MISSION STATEMENT

The Ministry of Defence is established to formulate, implement, monitor and evaluate strategic defence policy for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces that is effective and fostered within a framework of democratic governance.

OBJECTIVES:

Ø Formulate and implements strategic Defence Policy.

Ø Develop and maintain a re-structured and robust RSLAF that is well trained, well disciplined and well cared for.

Ø To equip and provide logistic support to the RSLAF.

Ø To transform the RSLAF into an organisation that is accountable, incorruptible and subject to democratic control.

Ø To continually evolve and improve the RSLAF.

Ø Deliver the endorsed Defence Missions and Military Tasks.

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Forward by His Excellency the President

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DEFENCE WHITE PAPER

FOREWORD
The publishing of this White Paper signifies a new era in Sierra Leone Defence. An era that will see security and stability, which we have not seen for many years, returning to our country. The profound social and political upheavals our people so tragically endured are past. Following free and fair elections in May last year Sierra Leone can look forward to again becoming a prosperous and vibrant country. It will not be an easy road, it will take time. The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) will play a vital role in helping us make that journey by keeping everyone safe and secure.

We are committed to national reconciliation and unity. A dramatic illustration of this is the integration of ex-combatants into the new Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces. Armed Forces that function and operate within the law, that are loyal, accountable and subject to the control and oversight of the democratically elected and appointed Government.

With openness, responsiveness and accountability forming the cornerstone of Government policy this White Paper sets out to stimulate informed debate amongst the people of Sierra Leone. We want to hear your views on the future shape of your Defence Forces. In order for that debate to be fully informed, the Paper explains why we need defence, what is happening within it and how it is evolving. It explains how our thinking is being shaped and influenced by internal and external threats and why it is important to promote peace actively throughout our region and Africa whilst at the same time being prepared to counter any aggression. The key to this rests in having an effective and affordable defence policy that can sustain the long term peace and security needed to rebuild this nation's economy and prosperity.

This will not be easy. The nation faces the daunting task of addressing the widespread poverty and socio-economic inequalities resulting from a decade of civil strife and war. The key to resolving this problem rests with the Government's reconstruction and reconciliation programme. But it is important to understand that this cannot be achieved without a robust and reliable basis for security. I believe that Defence is at the very heart and vital to the success of this programme, I trust when you have read this White Paper you too will share this conviction.

Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
President and Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the RSLAF

CHAPTER ONE

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION
1001. The tragic events of the last eleven years and the untold suffering they caused are now over. A new chapter began on 21 January 2002, with the opening of the new Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the transformation of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) to RSLAF. We are well along the road of progress as the RSLAF plays a vital role in safeguarding the country’s future security and stability. Defence is an expensive, but necessary business, its requirement stems from the need to protect our national assets and interests from internal and external threats. In the past we have not been particularly good at protecting our assets. The reasons for this are complex, but are rooted in many years of injustice, bad governance, corruption and mismanagement that caused our economy to collapse. The RUF was formed, chaos ensued and civil unrest followed. External forces driven by self-interest backed the RUF in the wrongful exploitation of our mineral and agricultural resources. If we are to ensure that history is not to repeat itself we need to have loyal, strong, capable, well motivated and well-equipped armed forces that are accountable to the democratically elected civilian Government. Only then will the future security and prosperity of our country be assured.

AIM

1002. The aim of this White Paper is to share with the people of Sierra Leone the way in which their government's plans for defence are developing and to stimulate debate on this vital issue. The paper will also provide the basis for the country's first ever Defence Review which we plan to publish during 2004. This Review will aim to define the force structure necessary to provide a strong and effective defence structure capable of upholding and maintaining our territorial integrity against external aggression and internal insurrection. This White Paper is part of the process. It describes the past, present and future direction of defence. In the interest of transparency and inclusion we want to make the people of Sierra Leone part of that Review. We plan to achieve this by running a consultation process throughout the country to answer any questions you may have about the White Paper and explain why we feel a Review is necessary - and most importantly, to hear the views of the people.

1003. Clearly, the urgency of the situation in recent years has meant that we could not delay the restructuring of our security forces while we waited for a detailed review. A great deal of work has been done already, not least in the creation of the RSLAF itself, and the welcome stability that this has brought. This is why this paper goes into some detail on these structures. It may well be that the Review largely endorses the present way forward, and in some ways this would be re-assuring. We have to start from where we find ourselves, and we can be proud of the progress made so far. We do not have a clean sheet of paper or unlimited resources, and stability is as important for the Forces themselves as it is for society at large. But we really must use this breathing space to look more closely at our requirements from first principles, and this paper is intended to inform that debate. In the meantime, we are already pressing on in those areas where improvements have been identified. New more efficient management systems and processes will be introduced to enable us to manage the Defence Budget more effectively. This White Paper explains how we plan to go about it by discussing the important work being undertaken in the MOD and why it is so necessary. It also discusses the strategic context and security environment in which we are placed, the threats and challenges we face, how we propose to deal with them and what we believe our priorities are in securing our future. That future rests with the newly restructured professional RSLAF. In this
context it explains the various roles it plays not only in securing the territorial integrity of Sierra Leone but also in rendering Military Aid to the Civil Authority and Community at large when called upon to do so.

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

1004. The formal declaration in January 2002 ending the war signalled a new beginning for Sierra Leone. Social and political change is underway:

a. The RUF is now a political party embracing democratic ideals and principles.

b. The new RSLAF are creditable, non-partisan and well trained fighting forces.

c. The lifting of the curfew and the end of the State of Emergency are evidence of positive change.

d. The peaceful, legitimate and fair elections that took place on 14 May 2002 testify that stability has returned.

e. Territorial integrity is being maintained.

f. Security is being strengthened as Government authority and control takes hold across the country.

g. The RSLAF is strategically deployed throughout the provinces enabling internally displaced people and refugees to return safely to their homes and families.

SUB REGIONAL PROBLEMS

1005. It is the stated policy of this government to work with our neighbours to foster friendship and co-operation, and be seen as a force for good. However, the peace enjoyed by Sierra Leone is threatened by sub-regional problems. The war in Liberia is of serious concern to the security of Sierra Leone, and threatens to destabilise the wider region. Refugees continue to enter the country and the fighting could spill over into Sierra Leone threatening villages on the border particularly in the Kailahun district. It is vital to our security interest to ensure this influx is reversed and resolved.

INTERNAL CHALLENGES

1006. The fair treatment and reintegration into society of ex-combatants is vital to stability. A small number of Ex RUF fighters are encountering serious problems when returning to their respective towns and villages for crimes committed during the war. Under the banner of reconciliation it is the government's aim to put an end to such practices. Conversely, any persons impersonating legitimate RSLAF by the unauthorized wearing of uniform and the carriage of weapons to intimidate the public will be dealt with severely.

THE MANO RIVER UNION
1007. The sub-region as a whole has undergone substantial change. The ongoing negotiations to reawaken the Mano River Union (MRU) may offer new hope towards the resolution of internal and external conflict and the return of lasting peace and stability throughout the region but there is much work to do. For political, strategic and geographic reasons defence co-operation with other MRU States is a priority for Sierra Leone. In view of this policy the government will seek to strengthen both the defence and security forums of the MRU, whilst remaining alert to any potential threat to its national interest, security and stability.

PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE

1008. Positive and progressive change is underway. But let us not forget that this has only proved possible due to the timely intervention of the United Nations, Government of the United Kingdom and the International Community. The role of these organisations was decisive in bringing about a speedy end to the war and establishing a stable, secure environment in which the change and transformation we sought could take place.

1009. Our highest priority must now be to plan and look to the future. Neither the British, nor the UN will remain in our country forever. We must own the change process. Ultimately long term peace and stability will only be possible by having credible and professional armed forces in place capable of protecting the nation's interest and its people. In the future the British led International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) will gradually reduce in size, as the MOD and RSLAF develop and become less dependant on external support, though rapid reinforcement would be possible should the need arise. This will take time and depends on how the latter's experience and capability grows, but all the evidence suggests that they are fast becoming a loyal and capable fighting force, proud of their country and the people they serve.

THREATS AND CHALLENGES

1010. Threats. A threat to our national interest and security can come from external and internal sources or a combination of both. Principally the lead for domestic security lies with the civil authorities, particularly the police. However, the RSLAF plays an important part in the defence of the nation by ensuring the integrity of our land, air and sea borders from would-be aggressors. It also plays a vital part when called upon to do so by rendering Military Aid to the Civil Authorities. Where the latter is concerned it is a fundamental tenet of our constitution that such support, especially when force is used, must always come about as a result of a formal invitation by the civil authorities. The Government of Sierra Leone recognises that currently the greatest threat to its people comes from socio-economic problems. Poverty, unemployment, lack of housing, poor education and health support all contribute to instability and it will be essential to tackle these issues in order to combat both street crime and wider unrest.

1011. Small Arms. The Community Arms Collection Programme was a major success, but there is still much work to be done in the area of small arms control and regulation. The holding of unlicensed small arms is illegal and poses a serious threat to the Nation's security. This government is therefore determined to stop the illegal importation and possession of small arms and will seek to punish all transgressors in accordance with the law. The task of bringing these criminals to account falls to the
police, but where appropriate they will be assisted by other security agencies especially the RSLAF. The latter will play an important part in supporting the police by protecting our borders (including the maritime borders) not simply from external aggressors, but also from internal insurgency, smugglers, drug traffickers and arms dealers. The Police and RSLAF working together in this way are seen as vital to our national interest. This Government is determined to ensure these security priorities are met.

1012. Ex Combatants. The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme played an important part in securing peace and security. However, in the haste to secure peace and take the process forward some people through no fault of their own missed the opportunity to participate in the programme. There are many reasons for this, some ex-combatants did not benefit from the process because they failed to meet the qualification criteria, despite the fact that they participated actively in the war. To add to the problem many also failed to secure the training opportunities afforded to those that were included in the programme. This left a number of ex-combatants feeling disgruntled and understandably unhappy. The Government of Sierra Leone recognises that many of these ex-combatants because of their age and through no fault of their own have lost out on schooling, skill development and the employment opportunities that come from education. Disaffected people are likely to pose a threat to the wider society. Without gainful employment there may be the temptation to resort to crime, particularly with the current proliferation of small arms. It is this government's intention to address these anomalies by seeking ways to successfully resettle all ex-combatants into the community and where possible provide training and educational skills in order to improve their life chances, thereby improving the opportunity for them to be gainfully employed.

1013. Corruption. Corruption is endemic throughout Sierra Leone and remains the single most destructive force to the country's future well being - preventing the rich natural resources of the country being developed to their full potential for the benefit of all. In a corrupt society it is the poor who suffer the most. They are denied access to the basic amenities of life often because of the extra payments demanded by corrupt officials. Corruption is insidious; any benefit the perpetrator gains from his/her crime is short lived. In the long term they too have to pay more for the basic commodities of life. Corruption artificially inflates the cost of both services and produce. It makes our exports un-competitive and breeds an understandable contempt in the minds of both local and international business people. This leads to poverty, economic collapse, instability and insecurity with all the resultant threat and chaos that ensues. In particular, the theft by senior officers and officials of resources intended for their subordinate personnel is wrong, morally, legally and practically; it undermines the bond of loyalty, trust and respect that is essential in the security forces. The Government is determined to stamp out corruption and will stop at nothing to hunt down the perpetrators and bring them to justice.

SECURITY PRIORITIES

1014. Maintaining Peace. Now that peace and stability have returned to Sierra Leone we must ensure that they are maintained by building the confidence not only of neighbouring states but the world community at large. This will only be achieved if we have a robust and effective defence policy in place and by recognising that the prosperity that comes from inward investment will only come when international
confidence in our country returns. A strong economy is synonymous with a nation's internal stability and its ability to protect itself from both internal and external threat. They are mutually dependent. With this in mind the Government's first priority is to ensure it sustains and effectively manages the on-going peace. To achieve this it will need to:

a. Secure and maintain the territorial integrity of Sierra Leone against external aggression and internal insurrection.

b. Guarantee security and stability for all its inhabitants and their property.

c. Introduce efficient and effective management systems and processes into Defence and build an institutional framework that encourages collaboration between the differing security agencies.

d. Vigorously pursue all of the planned economic recovery programmes.

e. Ensure all financial practices are transparent and accountable. The introduction of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework forms part of the Government's strategy to effectively manage its resources. The setting up of the Anti Corruption Commission has also helped tremendously in checking corruption.

f. Provide adequate training and logistics support to the RSLAF.

g. Ensure the RSLAF is able to effectively meet the Defence Missions and Military Tasks set out for them (see Appendix A).

h. Control and minimise the proliferation of small arms

i. Re-integration and resettlement of all ex-combatants

j. Enhance Civil - Military relations, building mutual understanding, trust and respect.

1015. Regional Co-operation. For political, strategic and geographic reasons, defence co-operation with other West African States is a high priority. The Government will seek to strengthen the security and defence forums of the MRU, ECOWAS, and the AU. Also, as a responsible member of the international community, Sierra Leone will conduct its foreign policy, and external defence activities in accordance with International Law and acceptable norms. Our interest is not confined to the sub-region or the continent, but rests in regenerating international trade links with the wider business community. Developing trade is vital to our national security and future economic well being.

1016. Protecting the Social Fabric. Emerging from a decade of war we must not simply look at the external security threats, but also the internal threats. Sierra Leone has the potential to erupt into crime and criminal violence. This is because there are many ex-combatants out in the street whose expectations have not been met either by the DDR Programme itself, or by failing to meet the criteria for the DDR programme in the first place. These people could be the raw material for criminal violence if their lots are not addressed. Government is therefore considering ways of providing opportunities for these people to become useful again in society.
This is a preventative strategy intended to reduce the chances of them turning to crime. Government will in a like manner undertake to review and strengthen the criminal justice system, improve community policing and develop a national crime prevention strategy. These measures will all help to protect the social fabric.

THE FUTURE

1017. Maintaining Standards. The end of the war has transformed our security environment. We no longer live in a country torn apart by war and whilst the security environment is not benign, we must nevertheless seize the opportunity to build on the peace by taking stock of the future. Importantly, we need to consider what policies are needed to maintain the present favourable security situation. The first requirement of our defence policy is to maintain and reinforce the current achievements of the RSLAF. In particular we need to ensure that the professional training standards provided by the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) are sustained long after the Team has left. In order to realise this goal, we are in the process of establishing doctrine whilst training material and standards will be the subject of constant review. In concert with this programme, the Government has taken steps to ensure the transition to non-partisan, democratically accountable Armed Forces continues. Politically motivated military personnel have no place in the new RSLAF and will be removed. A clear code of conduct for all members of the Armed Forces is being implemented now.

1018. Equal Opportunities Policy. The Ministry of Defence together with the RSLAF is committed to recruiting and retaining high calibre personnel irrespective of tribe, region, gender, religion or without recourse to political or ideological beliefs. The aim of this policy is to enhance operational effectiveness and ensure the RSLAF is representative of a broad section of personnel from all backgrounds of Sierra Leone society. The policy is aimed at promoting a culture of fairness wherein individuals are respected and valued for their performance and commitment not their beliefs; a culture where personnel are given the opportunity to progress without harassment, intimidation, bullying, fear or favour. We are committed to ensuring that within the RSLAF a culture of zero tolerance of any form of discrimination or harassment exists. We are also committed to developing an equal opportunities strategy through education and by providing strong leadership at all levels. The government does not only view equality as a moral issue, but also an operational imperative. Operational effectiveness demands cohesion and teamwork, this can only be achieved by treating everyone equitably. We enjoy a diverse and rich cultural background. In the interest of peace and harmony we should value and promote diversity. The government recognises the need to make the RSLAF a model of excellence on which to take forward this important policy initiative. We are determined to ensure that recruitment and advancement within the RSLAF is based on merit and the valued contribution made by its men and officers. In this way, political, tribal or religious affiliations will not be the determinate of promotion. In the interest of transparency and accountability we intend to publish statistics in the Defence Review that will follow the publication of this White Paper. They will show the make up of the RSLAF in terms of gender, religion and tribal affiliation thus ensuring the RSLAF is broadly representative and in a balanced way mirrors our diverse nature and which in sum constitutes our cultural heritage and uniqueness as a nation.

1019. Alliances. It will be important to keep a sense of proportion and scale in the interest of affordability when planning the future shape and size of the RSLAF.
Aspirations will need to be tempered by economic reality. In developing our thinking we will want to ensure we use the RSLAF judiciously; the key to this rests in developing a future defence policy that is partly driven by internal security and external threats, and partly by foreign policy.

1020. Peace Support Operations. The emergence of a professionally trained RSLAF has given new hope for Sierra Leone to play, at some time in the future, an active role in peace support operations and security duties in Africa and elsewhere thus enabling others to benefit from our hard-earned experience. There are expectations that in the longer term Sierra Leone will become actively involved in multinational peace support operations throughout the world. In fulfilling these expectations, the RSLAF will embark on training programmes for its officers and men so that they can effectively and honourably represent Sierra Leone in all peace support operations that the country deems appropriate. They would achieve this by contributing to treaty obligations, responding to regional insecurity, supporting allies or generally promoting international law and stability in the region. This government also has a long-term aspiration to contribute to wider peace enhancement, including international peacekeeping and ultimately peace enforcement operations. Overseas disaster relief may also be a feature of future tasking, but building this capability will take time, it does not exist at present.

1021. Territorial Defence Force (TDF). The population at large will not forget the role of the Civil Defence Force (CDF) during the war. They provided active and vital support to the then Sierra Leone Army (SLA). With this in mind many people acknowledge and recognise the need for civilians to give support to the RSLAF in the defence of our country. However, in keeping with the spirit of reconciliation and particularly the Lome Peace Agreement this Government no longer recognises the CDF, but does acknowledge that there may be a need in the future for some form of part-time reserve force fully integrated into the command structure of the RSLAF. Such a part-time force would need to be representative of all sectors of society and totally non-political in the same way as their full-time colleagues in the RSLAF. A Working Group (WG) was set up to look at the requirement and advise on the need or otherwise to establish some form of TDF. The WG’s report was endorsed by the National Security Council (NSC) on 30 November 2001 and this Government is now studying the financial implications of implementing the endorsed WG’s Report. Government position on the TDF will be published in the Defence Review.

CHAPTER TWO
TRANSFORMATION

HISTORY

2001. Before Sierra Leone gained independence in 1961 the military was known as the Royal Sierra Leone Military Force. On 19 April 1971, following the successful passage of legislation through Parliament, a formal declaration of republican status was made and the Royal Sierra Leone Military Forces were renamed the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF). The RSLMF remained a single service organisation until 1979 when the Sierra Leone Navy was established. It then remained largely unchanged for 16 years until in 1995 when Defence Headquarters (DHQ) was established and the Sierra Leone Air Wing (SLAW) was formed. The new structure comprised the Army, Navy, and Air Wing. Each operated along single
service lines, but came under the overall command of the Chief of Defence Staff. This gave the need for the RSLMF to be renamed the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone (AFRSL). On 21 January, as part of the restructuring Defence in Sierra Leone, a new Ministry of Defence HQ was opened and the DHQ was reorganised to form HQ Joint Force and Joint Support Command whilst the name Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) pronounced by the HE the President replacing AFRSL.

INTERVENTION

2002. The turbulent political history of Sierra Leone led to the outbreak of the war in 1991. The politicisation of the military fuelled the problem. Undisciplined, poorly trained and ill-equipped soldiers put the country at risk. Non democratic military factions colluded with rebels to terrorise the very people they were meant to protect and chaos ensued. The country spiralled out of control; anarchy reigned until March 1998 when ECOWAS through ECOMOG restored the democratically elected government to power. Despite the valiant efforts of this friendly force the fragile peace collapsed in January 1999 when AFRC and RUF took it upon themselves once again to threaten to overthrow the democratic government by invading our capital Freetown, killing over 6,000 people and maiming many more in the process. At this point the timely intervention of ECOMOG and UNAMSIL in putting an end to the bloodshed and restoring peace to our country was instrumental.

VALUES

2003. Our tragic past has taught us that an ill disciplined, poorly trained military is capable of exercising power to the detriment of the country and its interest. This is particularly true when democratic control and loyalty breakdown. If history was not to repeat itself, the Government needed to restructure, reorganise and retrain the Armed Forces. It also needed to instil in the hearts and minds of our Service men and women a set of values that would make them become loyal and accountable to the government of the day, regardless of its political composition, while retaining their professional effectiveness. This was not going to be easy, but the process is already successfully under way. Professionally, the military have had little contact with their civilian colleagues and therefore need to develop a better understanding of the democratic processes and the role of the civil authorities in ensuring they remain accountable to the elected government of the day.

THE CHALLENGE

2004. The events of January 6 1999 sent our then Armed Forces into total disarray and they could no longer be considered an effective fighting force. Urgent action was called for if the fragile peace was to hold. The government's thoughts turned to the formation of new Armed Forces. Determining the future strength, structure and disposition presented a significant challenge. The success or otherwise of this process rested on transforming and integrating ex-combatants into a viable and effective fighting force, this is not an easy task. The key objective behind the integration process was to unite ex-combatants from the differing military factions into a single force that was professional, efficient, effectively structured and representative. This was a complex process that involved bringing together the differing and disparate organisational structures and political affiliations of soldiers who were not only former adversaries, but who also distrusted one another. Successful transformation did not depend on simply changing the military culture,
but also the social culture. Old fears, misconceptions, false impressions and distrust had to be discarded and a new start made.

INTEGRATION

2005. Help was needed and an approach was made to the British Government for assistance. The response from the British was positive. Following consultation, it was agreed that an International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) be established to reorganise, retrain, and reintegrate members of the Sierra Leone military into a newly structured and reorganised Armed Forces. Under the banner of reconciliation and in the interest of national unity it was thought by the government of the day that the Armed Forces should comprise former combatants of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); of the SLA; RUF and CDF who had been in the DDR Programme. In taking forward the programme these ex-combatants were reintegrated by undergoing a series of intensive refresher courses organised by the British at the Armed Forces Training Centre (AFTC). Later a special Military Reintegration Programme (MRP) was put in place to provide for the inclusion of ex-Combatants from the RUF and CDF into a single military force for Sierra Leone. The integration of ex-combatants into the Armed Forces through the MRP process was seen by the government as a vital part of its commitment to reconciliation and the establishment of a broadly based well balanced force. To maintain the balance and in the interest of sustaining loyalty and fairness, measures will be taken to ensure that ex-Combatants are not "held back" or missed out on promotion opportunities because of misguided notions about past allegiances.

CHAPTER THREE

REFORM

OVERSIGHT

3001. This government intends to be responsive to its peoples' needs by being open and accountable to them. Accountability must start at the top; it is an essential part of successful democracy. This government sees the key to this as ending the corruption and self-interest that has plagued Sierra Leone for so long. The government believes that the rule of law is essential as is respecting the fundamental rights of the people. Without this everything would be put at risk. With this in mind the government intends during the life of this parliament to weigh carefully the options available to it and to put in place oversight mechanism for all elements of government business. Early in this process will be a Security Sector Committee. The Committee will be independent and made up of representatives from across the political spectrum and public institutions. It will be tasked with monitoring the decisions taken by officials on behalf of the government and endorsed by it. Their findings will be published, open to public scrutiny and open to critique. They will be the watchdogs, the eyes, ears and voice, of the people, keeping them in touch, and provide a forum for popular and informed debate.

THE OLD MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (MOD)

3002. The structure of the old MOD, composed solely of a few civil servants and divorced from the military, led to it frequently being by-passed by the military dealing directly with the President. This made it virtually impossible for MOD to
THE ROLE OF MOD

3003. The existence of the restructured and strengthened MOD in Sierra Leone is an important indicator how far civil-military relations progressed. The MOD plays a vital role in handling and consolidating democratic civil-military relations. Political stability depends upon recognition by the armed forces of their commitment to democratic principles and civilian control as exercised on behalf of the elected government by the MOD. The MOD is the means by which the legitimacy of the democratically elected Government and its policies are enacted by a non-partisan civil service and a professional military force working in partnership to defend the nation. The role of the MOD is to advise the Ministers of Defence, and to exercise strategic direction on their behalf over the armed forces. This starts with determining defence policy overall and then developing a planning process to produce an effective programme within the resources available. It also encompasses management and control of resources during the year, and accounting for expenditure at the end of the year.

PIONEERING CHANGE

3004. The MOD is at the heart of this government's reform programme. It is pioneering change by building mechanisms and putting in place procedures and practices to ensure political control. Oversight is to be vigilantly exercised by the government. The MOD is developing a framework that will not only assure openness and accountability, but also will act to build and instil confidence in the people of our nation. This Government is confident that its territorial integrity, sovereignty and national core values can now be defended robustly against any attack from external hostile aggressors or threat from internal subversive and divisive forces. Many important changes have been made. What follows describes those changes.

THE NEW MOD

3005. It was clear from the outset that radical changes were needed if the Government's policies and aspirations for defence were to be realised. The old MOD building lacked sufficient accommodation to house the number of staff that would be needed for it to carry out its future role. New accommodation had to be found, staff selected and trained. In 1999 His Excellency the President approached the British Government for assistance. It agreed to help. A small team of Defence Advisors was sent to help with the creation of a new MOD. Plans were put in place and recruitment commenced. By May 2000 the number of staff employed by MOD had risen to 35; a Director General, two Deputy Secretaries, Six Directors and four Deputy Directors. They were joined by 22 ancillary and support staff. At this stage with the exception of a couple of military advisors the MOD remained a wholly civilian institution.

A NEW BUILDING FOR MOD
3006. The former Paramount Hotel was identified as a suitable site to house the new MOD. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) provided funding to convert the Paramount Hotel. Work started in February 2001. The project was completed in December 2002 and His Excellency the President officially opened the new MOD on the 21st January 2002.

**INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

3007. In concert with the construction work a programme of institutional development was put underway. Plans were developed to identify more civilians and for military personnel to be posted as an integral part of the new organisation. At the same time a series of training courses, ranging from Defence Diplomacy to computer and financial skills were arranged for the new occupants, in Sierra Leone and the UK.

**A CIVILIAN-MILITARY MOD**

3008. To complement the development of the new MOD both civilian and military officers are now seen working together in the new building. The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and his team of over 13 military officers came over to work along side the Director General and his civilian team. The effect of this new atmosphere is the beginning of civil-military co-operation that will provide a joint civilian-military MOD under the direction of the democratically appointed civilian political leaders. This result is to be achieved with the help and advice of the team of international military and civil advisors.

**THE CHALLENGE**

3009. Determining the future size and shape of the new MOD was challenging. The Government needed to provide a sound foundation on which to build an effective Department of State capable of supporting the new democratic and accountable Armed Forces. Staffing structures were however agreed, functions identified and effective efficient business processes put in place.

3010. In any democratic society, ultimate control of the Armed Forces must be exercised on behalf of the electorate by democratically elected politicians. Ministers give direction to the Forces, who are then responsible for the professional conduct of operations in accordance with those directions. Ministers need honest, impartial and professional advice in reaching their decisions and this is provided by a fully integrated structure of civilian and military officials in the Ministry of Defence, through whom Ministers exercise control of the Forces. The close and interdependent nature of this civilian-military partnership in the MOD is epitomised by the relationship between the civilian DG and the military CDS, neither being subordinate to the other, but each dependent upon the other and sharing responsibility for much of the Department’s business. Their roles reflect the importance of both military and civilian advice on political, financial, administrative and operational matters.

3011. The DG is accountable to Parliament for expenditure of all public money voted for defence purposes. This means that whilst ministers make policy decisions on the allocation of resources, the DG is responsible for ensuring that rigorous standards of propriety, regularity, affordability and value for money are applied to the expenditure giving effect to those ministerial decisions. He is the MOD’s Accounting Officer.
reflecting his responsibility to ministers for the overall organisation, management and staffing of the Department and for financial procedures and other matters.

3012. CDS is the professional head of the Armed Forces in Sierra Leone and the principle military adviser to Defence Ministers and Government. The Chain of command for the planning and conduct of military operations flows from the Cabinet through the Defence Ministers to CDS and from him to operational commanders at various levels. His professional advice is important in ensuring the provision of the best possible military capability from the funding available.

3013. Both the Director General and the Chief of Defence Staff have Civilian and Military Advisors to assist them in the further development of the MOD. The DG and the CDS are supported by two Deputy Secretaries (DS) and two Assistant Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS). Their role is to manage the day to day business of the Ministry, allowing the Director General and Chief of Defence Staff to concentrate on longer term strategic challenges and issues.

3014. The MOD now employs about 165 people. There is a healthy blend of civilian and military staff working in equal partnership throughout the organisation with military personnel working in civilian-led directorates and vice versa. A number of committees have been set up to take forward departmental business and implement government policy. IMATT officers currently fill a number of the military posts in the MOD, some of these being within the Sierra Leone chain of command. However, once sufficient trained and experienced Sierra Leone officers are available, they will revert to a purely advisory role. This process has already commenced. A mixture of civil-military clerical and ancillary support staff work at MOD. Further information detailing the principal directorates and the work that the various Defence Committees undertake can be found at Appendix B and C respectively.

CIVILIANS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL IN DEFENCE

3015. Responsibility for formulating defence policy rests with the Government. It is assisted in this task by the Defence Council and the Defence Policy and Operations Committee at MOD. The Office of National Security (ONS) plays an important role in the co-ordination of security matters and policy initiatives, and the MOD therefore places a high premium on maintaining close and effective relations with the ONS. Officials working in the MOD help ministers to implement policy on behalf of the Government. For the first time military and civilians are working together as never before in the national interest. Civilian participation and political primacy in developing an effective and efficient institutional framework for defence is crucial to its long-term success. All the key signs are good; endeavours are ongoing and a democratically accountable system is evolving, wherein civil/military direction of military purposes is taking hold through ministers appointed by due democratic process, and an equal partnership of civilian and military staff in MOD putting this into effect on ministers' behalf. At one and the same time this government recognises that competent guidance and advice is vital for national security and prosperity. It also recognises that there is still someway to go before we can feel absolutely confident that the advice MOD provides is sound, robust and complete. We need to strengthen our administrative processes and to eliminate bureaucratic delays and inefficiency within the MOD, particularly in procurement.
3016. Clearly the return of political stability and the recognition of the importance of civil control of the military is enabling us to enjoy a degree of equilibrium that we have not experienced for many years. The government’s determination to have the final say on national security issues and control over the Armed Forces marks another important step on the road to success. We must align our aspirations for a strong RSLAF with financial reality. This Government is committed to planning and driving through an affordable but effective defence policy in the interest of sustaining the peace and security we now enjoy. Its views on that will be set out in the forthcoming Defence Review. In this most important of tasks we will be assisted by the military and the officials who work alongside them in the MOD. All perform vital tasks in support of the RSLAF. The new Ministry of Defence offers a unique opportunity for civilian and military personnel to work together to support the country's interest. It is pivotal to our success that the political class directs the military through its representative, civil authority. In this way both Parliament's and the Nation's interests will best be served and we can avoid a return to the dark years of the last decade.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE ARMED FORCES

THE PRIMARY TASK

4001. The RSLAF's primary role and mission is to defend Sierra Leone's territorial integrity against external aggressors. To achieve this RSLAF needs sufficient forces to secure Sierra Leone's borders, land area and territorial waters. RSLAF will be designed and equipped to meet a range of military tasks. This includes a robust maritime and air capability to support the land forces. Currently the majority of the RSLAF is deployed to operational areas around the borders of Sierra Leone to deter external threats. However, it is thought this role will reduce over the next few years and that more troops will be based in permanent barracks. In order to meet these tasks the RSLAF needs a variety of capabilities. The need for strong, professionally trained, motivated and well-equipped Armed Forces with a full range of military capabilities (including engineering, logistics, medical, and communications) will remain if the Government's policies and aspirations for defence are to be realised and maintained.

MILITARY AID TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

4002. It cannot be emphasised too strongly that responsibility for internal security and all other civil matters rests with the civil authorities. In other words, the only circumstances under which the RSLAF may undertake internal security duties will be when ministers have given explicit authorisation, normally in response to a request from the civilian Police, and invariably acting under Police primacy of control. In a stable democracy, the Armed Forces are the trusted guardians against external threat, and internal security is left entirely in the hands of the civilian Police. The Government is determined that this will be the position in Sierra Leone.

4003. That said, the RSLAF may also be tasked to assist the Government in restoring law and order in situations where civil authorities are unable to maintain internal security. The RSLAF is a disciplined force with a nation-wide command and control
structure. Its personnel are equipped with skills and resources that can be utilised for non-military tasks in support of the civil authority. When the RSLAF is deployed in support of the civil authorities the tasks it is capable of undertaking are wide-ranging and diverse. For example, the RSLAF may be called upon to help with reconstruction and rehabilitation following a national emergency or it might be used to assist in restoring law and order when the civil powers (police) are over stretched and unable to maintain internal security.

This Government recognises the valuable contribution the RSLAF can make when supporting the civil authorities, but in principle deems the use of the RSLAF for other than military tasks as inappropriate, uneconomical and politically undesirable. Against this the Government recognises that in extremes such activities may well be appropriate; particularly when they are derived from capabilities which are pertinent and unique to the RSLAF, but there are no specific units, or equipment or other resources allocated for this purpose. Support to the civil authorities, when required, has to come from existing RSLAF resources and these are provided in recognition of their primary task not Military Aid. Strict guidelines exist in order to protect funding allocated for Defence tasks and to protect service personnel from inappropriate commitments. Funding is tight, and resources allocated by the government for one purpose should not normally be reallocated to another without political authority, albeit that this may have to be retrospective in extreme urgency. In most cases this will require the government to make a compensating transfer of funds from the beneficiary department to MOD. The RSLAF's role in pioneering a Joint Maritime Capability with other government departments provides just such an example, where the Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV), Alimany Rassin, often assists the Marine and Fisheries Department in apprehending and arresting illegal fishing vessels or smugglers.

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ADVISORY AND TRAINING TEAM (IMATT)

4004. That the transformation has taken place and has been a resounding success is in no small part due to the work of the IMATT and its influence in guiding and charting the Military Reintegration Programme. But that is only one part of the success story. The other is due to the willingness and sincere desire of our soldiers and ex-combatants to work together, put the past behind them and work as one in the interest of the greater good and our country.

4005. The IMATT provides advice to the Government, MoD and the RSLAF and achieves this by integration within the RSLAF chain of command not simply as advisors but as serving officers within the RSLAF. IMATT officers are in command and staff positions over RSLAF officers, warrant officers and senior non commissioned officers and vice versa. This strategy is considered vital to train Sierra Leonean officers to take over these posts - a process that is well underway. There is an inherent trust and confidence among the people of Sierra Leone that under this arrangement the transformation to a democratic and accountable RSLAF will take place all the sooner.

THE STRUCTURE

4006. The Government is building on what has been achieved so far. The RSLAF still has someway to go before it can settle down to a permanent cadre. The planned Defence Review will determine the RSLAF’s long term future shape and size, but in the meantime the process of restructuring the RSLAF is well underway. Its combat
Capabilities have been assessed in line with likely future operational activities and a new interim structure has been evolved, to meet the short to medium term requirements. (See Appendix D)

JOINTNESS

4007. On 21 January 2002 the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone was officially renamed the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces in recognition of a new start for a new force. At the same time the Defence Headquarters ceased to exist and was replaced by two organisations working in parallel, both of which are subordinate to the Ministry of Defence. These are known as HQ Joint Force Command (JFC) and HQ Joint Support Command (JSC).

JOINT FORCE COMMAND

4008. The JFC brings the land, maritime and air components of the RSLAF together under the operational command of the Joint Force Commander who is responsible for the planning and conduct of all RSLAF operations. RSLAF operations are controlled from the Headquarters of Joint Force Command in Cockerill Barracks, Freetown. The creation of the Joint Force Command enhances the capability of the RSLAF and ensures maximum efficiency in the use of resources. United under a single command headquarters, the land, maritime and air components of the RSLAF work together to guarantee the territorial integrity of Sierra Leone and carry out the Defence Missions and Military Tasks laid down by the Ministry of Defence.

JOINT SUPPORT COMMAND

4009. As with JFC the Joint Support Command (JSC) was established in January 2002. The JSC plays a crucial role in all military operations by delivering wide-ranging logistical, administrative and training support to the RSLAF. JSC's importance in providing tactical mobility and flexibility to our armed Forces cannot be underestimated. Its key task is to sustain the operability and capability of troops on operations or training. The material support it provides includes the acquisition, storage, movement, distribution and disposition of stocks or goods so that units can be issued with the quantities they require in the correct condition and at the right time and place. JSC is also responsible for the movement, evacuation and medical support of all personnel, including the recovery and repair of equipment, maintenance of infrastructure, training and the personnel management and administration of all officers and soldiers serving in the RSLAF.

CHAPTER FIVE

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

5001. Financial control and accountability plays an important part in the overall control and accountability of the RSLAF, and is exercised by Parliament through the MOD where the DG carries overall responsibility. There is a need to improve both the planning and allocation of resources, and the oversight of how or on what the money was spent. The Government recognises that the RSLAF will not enjoy the confidence and trust of the population at large unless its use of the public's money is transparent and wholly accountable.
5002. The Government over the past two years has made significant efforts to reintroduce practices and procedures that will ensure that every Leone spent on defence can be accurately accounted for. There is still some way to go; particularly in developing management information systems that can adequately predict in-year spending and enable senior management to take the decision necessary to contain expenditure within the limits of the annual budget allocation. In common with other departments, the current financial system is centralist in nature and this can lead to inefficiency and unnecessary bureaucracy. Over the next few years, we intend to put in place a system of financial delegations that will hold managers accountable for the resources that their duties make them responsible for in delivering their mandated output; in short we want to match accountability with responsibility.

MEDIUM TERM EXPENDITURE FRAMEWORK (MTEF)

5003. In common with all other government ministries/departments, the MOD prepares its detailed plans and estimates for a 3-year period using the MTEF methodology. Defence plans are intended to be supportive of the Government's Poverty Reduction Strategy. The MOD has adopted the MTEF process for the past two years and, internally, has developed a robust and transparent approach. The MOD issues detailed Defence Planning Assumptions that are cascaded to all Programme Managers who in turn produce their detailed plans for costing. Through a series of screenings, the Assumptions, Plans and Costings are scrutinised to ensure that they are both affordable and realistic. The approach provides Programme Managers with an opportunity to justify their resource requirements to senior management and for senior management to prioritise in deciding exactly where the limited funds available should be allocated. These screenings were, and will continue to be, conducted in the presence of the Financial Secretary to ensure transparency.

THE DEFENCE BUDGET

5004. Providing the defence capability to protect our national security interest is expensive. We recognise this. We set out to minimise waste and deliver the capability required in the most effective way possible. Currently defence costs about Le 61.2 Billion per annum. After health and education defence is the biggest spending area of government and currently constitutes 12.3% of the total budget for recurrent expenditure. This recognises that the primary responsibility of government is national security and this has a cost.

5005. The estimated requirement for total defence-related expenditure for fiscal year 2002 is Le 91.108bn of which 28.7% relates to salaries. However, the total allocation for FY 2002 is currently Le 61.2bn and this shortfall represents a significant challenge to senior management. We are putting in place robust management checks and the application of rigid stores and accounting procedures to ensure that our limited resources are not wasted. Value for Money (VFM) is the key to our new financial management strategy.

5006. In pursuance of transparency and accountability we intend to publish a detailed account of how we intend to expend public funds on Defence. We aim to publish these estimates after the proposed Defence Review. They will project defence spending over the next 3 years commencing with MTEF 2004.

DEFENCE PROCUREMENT
5007. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for ensuring that all procurement is carried out consistent with national policy and takes account of any financial restraints. This means that the MOD must ensure that the process of requirement scrutiny, authorization and procurement is conducted with due regards to propriety, regularity, affordability and value for money.

5008. Each year the MOD spends around Le 16 billion on procuring equipment, stores and services in support of the RSLAF. Earlier efforts to improve guard against corrupt practices and develop a system that delivers on time and to cost have not been successful so the Government intends to undertake a fundamental review of its procurement procedures. It will aim to deliver high quality equipment, cheaper and faster. A Procurement Working Group was set up to re-think and reappraise the way in which we run our procurement. The outcome of this group was the formulation of a Procurement Strategy which has since been approved and implemented. The new strategy has reduced the time taken in procurement by cutting the number of officials and Departments involved in the process. This has simplified the approval procedure and improved the time from requirement specification to delivery and reduces costs.

5009. To remedy such weaknesses we intend to use the Ministry of Defence to pilot a new system of public sector managerial and financial delegations. This will empower the Director General and his staff and will give them autonomy not experienced before. Importantly it will break down the centralized bureaucracy typical in Sierra Leone.

5010. The initial cost of equipment purchase is only one part of the total cost. It can sometimes cost more to maintain and operate than it cost to buy in the first place, so procurement decisions must be based on whole-life-costs. Every procurement decision should be supported by an investment appraisal (IA) comparing the full costs of all alternatives - as for any expenditure decision. The more complex projects or equipments will naturally demand detailed IAs, but it will be important to simplify the procedure for less complex items where purchase price may well be the main factor. Procurement itself is just one step in the overall acquisition process that starts with initial concept and requirement and then tracks the whole life cycle, concluding with final disposal. The MOD is already evolving a new acquisition policy, including a new approach to procurement, and intends to set new standards that will transform the way we tackle defence procurement and set a benchmark for the whole public sector.

5011. As the Armed Forces are restructured new equipment will be needed. Some of it may be donated freely by friendly nations. Over the past few years we have received significant financial and material support from the United Kingdom. In 2001, this contribution trebled the resources provided by the Government of Sierra Leone. Whilst this support was clearly welcomed, before accepting such gifts in the future we will need to ensure we can afford the running costs. It is possible that when these costs are taken into account, even donated equipment can become too expensive.

5012. The above illustrates the areas where we will be looking in order to achieve faster, cheaper and better procurement for the RSLAF. As an early step, we plan to delegate responsibility for all capital purchases up to and including Le 25M. The previous limit was Le12.5M. This figure will be reviewed and if appropriate increased. Indeed it is our intention to delegate the whole of the Defence Budget once we are
satisfied that the right checks and balances are in place. In the meantime we will look to the Procurement Working Group (PWG) to process all (request) procurement expeditiously. As part of this we would expect them to inform the Equipment Approvals and Procurement Committee of their actions. Only where expenditure was considered unusual would prior reference to the Equipment Approvals and Procurement Committee (EAPC) be necessary. The EAPC would then seek approval from the Central Tender Board. With unusual items they would go to the Minister of Defence.

**CATEGORIES OF EQUIPMENT**

5013. The RSLAF's requirements can be divided into capital and recurrent items.

a. Capital. These are items that generally provide repeated or continuous use over the longer term, tend to be more expensive, and will probably have residual value after use. They are categorised as classified or unclassified in security terms. The classified include, arms, weaponry, helicopter gun ships, armoured vehicles and communications equipment; the unclassified, furniture, office equipment, boots and uniforms. The procurement process for these items begins with an Operational Requirement which has to be endorsed as first being a capability needed to meet an identified threat, and second as warranting an appropriately prioritised position in the financial planning process. The Equipment Approvals and Procurement Committee (EAPC) is a high level body within the MOD that has to approve all major purchases.

b. Recurrent. These are consumable items that are routine in nature. They include stationery, foodstuffs, fuel, ammunition and lubricants. For recurrent expenditure the procurement process begins with the JSC/JFC approving the requirements of the various Units.

**DEFENCE ESTATES**

5014. The war has ravaged the Defence Estate. Many barracks were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable. Internally displaced people forced from their homes by the war sought shelter in the deserted barracks. This together with poor management and control has resulted in ill-defined boundaries, encroachments, and dilapidation and wide spread infrastructure collapse. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone has also occupied some barracks and defence property where it is habitable. In general, barracks are occupied by a random collection of individuals and units. In Freetown, the barracks are overcrowded and military personnel can be found living in almost every part of the city. This Government has set about improvements, but progress has been and will be slow due to the high cost of the repairs and a shortage of funding.

5015. Restoring the estate represents a real challenge to the MOD, but we are determined to improve the quality of the estates infrastructure so as to support the delivery of the defence capability required of the RSLAF within the allocated budget. A Directorate of Defence Estates has been set to centrally manage and oversee the repair and restoration programme and to produce a Strategic Restoration Plan, with milestones, performance measures and target objectives. The plan will spell out the Ministry of Defence's priorities for improving accommodation facilities for the RSLAF
and will demonstrate to the people of Sierra Leone that public funds are being judiciously and effectively used.

MANNAGEMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENCE ESTATES

5016. The day to day management of all Defence Estates property is effected through the Joint Support Command HQ on behalf of the Ministry of Defence. This includes maintenance, repair, allocation and the provision of barracks services. In terms of the development of the Defence Estates we intend to undertake projects of rehabilitation and construction to demonstrate Government's commitment to providing better and improved accommodation facilities for the RSLAF that will enhance their effective performance. Owing to the budgetary constraint the MOD is faced with, work on the Defence Estates will be prioritised in order to achieve maximum value for money.

5017. The first priority area that is being considered includes the provision of basic water supply and sanitation; structural repairs and waterproofing of viable existing buildings including married quarters and the provision of limited electricity. Accommodation at the Unit level will be supplemented by tentage in the first instance, particularly for single living accommodation, which is almost non-existent. Camp areas will be cleared and made safe by demolishing non-viable buildings and the removal of abandoned equipment. An estate asset register will be created and maintained to ensure accountability. Priority will be given to construction of simple new buildings to replace tentage and poor quality structures and provide additional working facilities that will allow migration of Units and Headquarters to operationally appropriate sites.

AUDIT

5018. A robust and effective audit capability is the key to ensuring corruption and fraud are minimised. The Government intends, with external assistance, to train and transform its audit staffs into professional and effective auditors. There are two essential areas to be addressed. The first is to ensure that systems are in place with appropriate cross checks, separation of functions and audit trails; the second is to ensure that these systems are then complied with. Once the basic audit structure is in place, we intend to extend it to cover value for money, effectiveness, and achievement of objectives.

CHAPTER SIX

DEFENCE SUPPORT

HEALTH AND WELFARE SUPPORT

6001. The purpose of the Defence Medical Services (DMS) is to provide high quality medical care to the Armed Forces and their families in peace and war, wherever needed. It forms part of JSC. The health and well being of our troops is a key component of operational success. Currently medical support falls short of that required. Recent action to recruit more doctors into the RSLAF has met with some success, but more needs to be done. With this in mind the Government recently
approved a sponsorship scheme whereby, medical students in return for serving for an agreed period in the RSLAF after they qualify will receive a grant to help them meet their study costs. This initiative has met with some success but further work is required.

6002. The Government intends to adopt a health and welfare strategy that is comprehensive and effective. It intends to provide not only remedial medical care to our troops but also ensure an active preventive approach limiting vulnerability to disease. This will include training in all aspects of health education, including health and safety at work and disease and injury prevention. In parallel with this the Government intends to introduce a sound management and records system into the DMS to ensure its effective administration appropriate to the RSLAF. This is a vital part of our commitment to the RSLAF and needs reform.

6003. We are committed to developing an autonomous RSLAF medical service. However, to meet our obligations some patients will be referred to public or private hospitals. Also, the DMS provides primary, secondary and tertiary health care consistent with national health policy. Providing primary health care for the RSLAF is a top priority whether on operations or in peace. In all circumstances the RSLAF will encounter a wide range of potential danger. The DMS has to provide the best medical from the limited resources, financial and human now available. Further information on the work of DMS can be found at Appendix E.

RSLAF AND HIV/AIDS

6004. In consonance with the National HIV/AIDS Policy, the RSLAF has realise that however successful programmes like the MRP and IMATT training initiatives are, the HIV/AIDS epidemic threatens the viability and effectiveness of the Armed Forces by potentially robbing us of our most productive and highly trained personnel. We fully recognise the threat pose by the HIV/AIDS pandemic and are determined to implement a coordinated programme in partnership with appropriate external agencies to successfully combat this threat within the service. An HIV/AIDS Policy aimed at guiding Commanders and Service Welfare Agencies in combating the spread of AIDS within the RSLAF has been formulated and is being implemented with assistance from external agencies.

6005. In order to support the work of the DMS, the RSLAF will establish an Armed Forces HIV/AIDS Council in delivering an AIDS prevention programme. This Council will work closely with external agencies such as the National AIDS Council, Ministry of Health, and all other non-governmental organisations and donor agencies interested in the combat of this disease. The Council will also support the mainstream national development process in this area and shall develop programmes that are time bound with measurable goals and objectives.

TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE (TACOS)

6006. The MOD is working in close collaboration with other ministries to ensure that the Terms and Conditions of Service (TACOS) for RSLAF personnel are in all respects unambiguous, fair and above all relevant to ensure the loyalty, active support and contentment of officers and soldiers alike. This will include a full review of the pay, pensions and allowances structures, leave, resettlement and medical entitlements and a fundamental overhaul of the promotion and career opportunities available
within the RSLAF. MOD is putting up structures that will ensure that the TACOS are attractive enough to recruit, motivate and retain the high grade individuals required to implement many of the proposed changes to make sure that the RSLAF remains effective, efficient and sustainable over the longer term.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

7001. This White Paper establishes a broad policy framework for defence in Sierra Leone, based on the principles of good governance and should provide the basis for informed debate. It sets the scene for a later more detailed review of the nation’s defence requirements. That review will be conducted in stages as part of the Government's commitment to poverty reduction and will be published in 2004. Before publication we will seek opinion from the people and engage them in the defence debate by explaining the role, function, size, shape, posture and approach of our Armed Forces. In this way we hope not only to inform the people of how we the Government are thinking about defence, but also gain an understanding of their aspiration for it.

7002. This White Paper is part of that process. By setting out the threats and challenges we face and describing how our Armed Forces are designed to meet them, we hope to engage you, the people of Sierra Leone, in our improvement. Acknowledging that the government does not have a monopoly of knowledge on defence issues, we recognise that everyone has a right to participate and have a voice in the formulation of defence policy. This White Paper also signals to the International Community that Sierra Leone is committed to democracy, good governance and to achieving the goals set out in its Development Plan. We aim to prosper and succeed, to be a force for good, and a model to other Sierra Leone ministries.

7003. In producing this White Paper the Government has set out to explain to you the people of Sierra Leone its expectations and aspirations for defence. It has described the structure and role of the military and the threats and challenges we face as a nation. It has set out how our Armed Forces are equipped and are training to meet that challenge. The processes and systems we are putting in place will lead not only to an accountable, transparent and loyal RSLAF, but also a more efficient and effective management system to direct and then resource them. The Government believes that a transformation is already underway. This is founded on sound policy and good governance. This White Paper is part of that process.

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