Overall Coordination
Ministry of National Defense

Design and Diagramming
Adriana Marcela Ruiz

Printing
Imprenta Nacional de Colombia

2007
Ministry of National Defense

Juan Manual Santos Calderon – Minister of Defense
Juan Carlos Pinzon – Vice Minister for Strategy and Planning
Sergio Jaramillo Caro – Vice Minister for International Policy and Affairs
Luis Manual Neira Nunez – Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense

Armed Forces

General Fredy Padilla de Leon – General Commander of the Armed Forces
General Mario Montoya Uribe – Army Commander
Admiral Guillermo Barrera Hurtado – Navy Commander
General Jorge Ballesteros Rodriguez – Air Force Commander

National Police

General Oscar Naranjo – Director General of the National Police
This document on the Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security (PCDS) has been prepared by the Ministry of Defense as part of the National Development Plan 2006-2010 “Community State: Development for Everyone.” The document describes the strategic objectives that will receive the focus of each one of the institutions in the defense sector.
# Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 15

2. New strategic scenario..................................................................................................... 19

3. Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security (PCDS) ........................................ 25
   3.1 Principles for implementation ..................................................................................... 27
   3.2 Strategic objectives ....................................................................................................... 29
      3.2.1 To consolidate territorial control and strengthen the rule of law across the entire national territory................................................................. 29
         3.2.1.1 Strategy for the consolidation of territorial control ................................. 30
         3.2.1.2 Development of the Integrated Action Doctrine (DAI) ......................... 33
      3.2.2 To protect the public and hold on to strategic initiative against all threats to citizen security ................................................................. 34
      3.2.3 To drastically raise the cost of trafficking drugs in Colombia. ........................ 36
      3.2.4 To keep our public security forces modern and effective, with a high level of legitimacy based on public confidence and support. ................................................................................................. 38
         3.2.4.1 Strengthened capabilities in the public security forces ......................... 38
         3.2.4.2 Structural reforms .................................................................................... 40
      3.2.5 To maintain the downward trend in all crime rates in the country’s urban centers ................................................................. 41
         3.2.5.1 Citizen security strategy ............................................................................ 42
   3.3 International initiative .................................................................................................. 43
   3.4 Plans, programs, and initiatives .................................................................................. 45
In modern day societies it is clear that security is not an end in itself, but serves rather as a foundation for building a future with progress and social justice.

From the very first day, the main goal of President Alvaro Uribe’s government has been to make Colombia safer, free from threats to its citizens’ security, where legitimate government authority can promote the economic and social development of all Colombians.

These goals for the 2002-2006 period were outlined in the Democratic Defense and Security Policy and developed by the Ministry of Defense and the public security forces.

The policy’s main objective was to recover state control over the majority of the national territory, particularly areas affected by the activity of illegal armed groups and drug traffickers.

The results by the end of the first term were decisive. Colombians enjoyed huge improvements in security, and improved security brought with it significant increases in investor confidence and quality of life.

From 2002 to 2006, to cite just a few indicators, we were able to reduce the number of homicides by 40%, the number of kidnappings for extortion by 83%, the
number of victims from collective homicides by 72%, terrorist attacks by 61%, and kidnappings at illegal roadblocks by 99%.

By the start of Uribe’s second term on August 7, 2006, as is normal in every dynamic process, many things had changed. The different actors threatening society began to adapt to the new circumstances, making it necessary for the government to respond by changing the emphasis and parameters under which it had been operating.

For example, with the demobilization of the illegal self-defense groups and the beginning of the application of the Justice and Peace Law, the Colombian paramilitary phenomenon came to an end. Nevertheless, once the demobilization of close to 32,000 members of paramilitary groups and their leaders had taken place, criminal bands closely tied to drug trafficking emerged in some of their former zones of influence, requiring a new strategy.

Meanwhile, the FARC recognized it could not engage in a war of movements, and was forced to return to guerrilla warfare with its sporadic ambushes, quick escapes, and terrorism.

Drug traffickers also transformed their business in order to adapt to the government’s ambitious anti-narcotic strategy. They switched from large plantations of illicit crops to small parcels in difficult to access sites with the coca hidden under legitimate crops.

In brief, after four years, the Democratic Defense and Security Policy needed adaptation to the new strategic scenario. Its initial objective of territorial control by the public security forces gave way to the goal of social recovery of that territory through integrated state action. The Ministry of Defense undertook a rigorous analysis of these developments, with the active participation of the Armed Forces General Commander, the Commanders of the different Armed Forces, the Director General of the National Police, and high-level officers at the Armed Forces and Police. The resulting adjustments are contained in the Policy for the Consolidation of De-
Democratic Security (PCDS). This policy has been implemented since the beginning of President Uribe’s second administration and is described in this document.

We have already gained control of the vast majority of our national territory. Now we must consolidate that control, meaning that, in addition to the presence of the public security forces, we must bring in the diverse institutions and agencies that provide every type of government service. A return of institutionality will bring a definitive end to the isolation to which many zones of the country had been condemned by the violence they experienced.

The Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security will bring that institutionality back to the country through its five strategic objectives, broken down into 28 plans, programs, and initiatives led by executive managers who will follow-up, supervise, and measure results.

This policy is a mandate from the President of the Republic and the Ministry of Defense establishing priorities, criteria, and instructions on how efforts by the Armed Forces and the National Police are to be organized as they fulfill their constitutional mission during the second administration of President Uribe. It is, in synthesis, Colombia’s national defense policy for the 2006-2010 period.

The PCDS includes new elements such as a three-phase strategy to consolidate territory in different areas in the country according to the individual security characteristics. This means that military operations and police presence will be more or less intense according to the presence and threat of illegal armed groups, drug traffickers, and criminal bands, until normal activity by all government institutions can be guaranteed.

Another new element is the Integrated Action Doctrine, which is a methodology for consolidating territorial control that prescribes combining the legitimate use of force with state and community social action. Members of the security forces apply principles and protocols for proper coordination with representatives of other government institutions.
The public security forces will work together closely with the Center for the Coordination of Integrated Action (CCAI for its Spanish initials), in places where that agency is present. When not present, the public security forces will work directly with local authorities and state agencies in the area, coordinating social work that will satisfy the most urgent needs of the people.

To adapt to the new dynamics for illicit crops, we will put greater emphasis on manual eradication as an important aspect in the fight against drug trafficking. The advantage of manual eradication is its precision combined with durable effects. We will not give up on aerial spraying, however, but will continue to use it when warranted by the circumstances and the size of the plantations.

If criminals change, then the strategies to fight them must also change, and that is why the notion of flexibility will be one of this policy’s guiding principles.

Special attention will also be given to improving urban security. Urban security is a focus of concern for citizens, whose peace of mind is affected by the actions of common criminals in organized bands dedicated to theft, kidnapping, and extortion.

The citizen security strategy will provide additional tools to the Police for dismantling groups responsible for committing high impact crimes in cities and urban centers.

Lastly, without pretending to have covered all aspects of the PCDS in this presentation, the policy will include structural reforms in diverse areas such as military penal justice, the definition of roles and missions, and the police and military educational systems.

We will develop and implement a comprehensive human rights policy to generate a systematic and long-term transformation process toward a strengthened culture of respect for human rights in the security forces.

Likewise, special investments will be made during President Uribe’s second term to improve the mobility of the
Armed Forces, increase our intelligence capacity against criminals, build up the standing force, and maintain minimum strategic capabilities.

Intelligence will play a dominant role in this consolidation phase, and we will work to strengthen it, promoting a law to regulate intelligence functions. Only with excellent, modern intelligence will the security forces be successful in their mission to dismantle criminal organizations and fight terrorism.

We therefore proudly present to the country the Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security. It represents a step forward in the national goal of rescuing Colombia from the harmful influence of violence and corruption and leading us into progress and social justice.

This Policy is also a bridge between the DSP applied during the first period of the Uribe administration and current efforts to turn these lines of action into a state policy.

This democratic security strategy has demonstrated that it has every element it needs to become the core of a permanent and long-term security policy that will prevent Colombia from experiencing swings in security strategy in response to short-term circumstances.

After just over a year since we began to design and apply the PCDS, results can already be seen in an increase in demobilized persons, a continued downward trend in crime, and the capture or neutralization of dangerous criminals.

We are reaping these fruits thanks to the professionalism and the sacrifices of the Armed Forces and the Police, who work untiringly on behalf of the security and peace of mind of the Colombian people.
In the year 2002 the government of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez launched the Democratic Security Policy (DSP) describing the guiding principles for all activities related to national defense and security.

The DSP concentrated on recovering state control of the majority of national territory. To do that, it continued and intensified the process begun by the prior presidential administration to strengthen the Armed Forces and the National Police.

The number of military and police units was increased to better cover national territory. In total, the standing forces increased by 32% from 2002 to 2006. New units and the ones already in existence were equipped with better means for mobility and tactical support, such as helicopters, aircraft, river patrol boats, and intelligence platforms.

By virtue of this strengthening, it was possible for the public security forces to establish a level of control over the nation’s geography without precedent in the country’s history.

In 2002, after years of aggressive offensive action by illegal armed groups, 158 of the 1,099 municipalities in the country were left without a police station to protect the local population. By 2004, all the municipalities of Colombia had police stations in their municipal seats.

During the four-year term the Armed Forces developed the capacity to launch operations into increasingly remote regions of the national geography where the state
had never before been present in a sustained manner. This ended a situation that had been taken advantage of by the illegal armed groups to strengthen their armed structures and expand their influence over the communities settled in those regions.

Thanks to these advances, all the illegal armed groups and other criminal organizations assailing the security of Colombians have received hard blows, significantly reducing their capability to destabilize the constitutional order.

Stronger public security forces have significantly hobbled the plans of the illegal armed group the FARC. Aggressive military operations from 1998 to 2002 led the FARC to renounce armed operations with large concentrations of men. In the same way, increased Military and Police capabilities over the last four years have allowed them to establish sufficient territorial control to be able to launch offensive operations against FARC rearguard positions, dismantling several FARC fronts and support structures.

Not only did these efforts from 1998 to 2006 keep the FARC from being able to move into a war of positions, but after sustained confrontation across the entire nation, they almost completely dissolved the capacity the FARC once had to launch large-scale attacks, thus meting out a decisive defeat in the war of movements. This situation forced the FARC to once again adopt guerrilla warfare, deploying in small groups and staying constantly on the move in order to survive the constant pressure of the Armed Forces and the National Police.

The other two large illegal armed groups, the ELN and the AUC, were also fought with determination. Constant action by security forces significantly reduced ELN capabilities and structure. It decided to begin exploratory conversations with the national government in December 2005, in order to work out a negotiated solution to the armed conflict. After several rounds of conversation, this process is ongoing as of this document’s publication.

Similarly, at the beginning of this administration the illegal armed group the AUC decided to engage in a
peace process with the national government. By 2006 the process had produced the demobilization of around 32,000 men from its armed structures and support networks. The main leaders of the organization are now confessing their crimes to the justice system in the framework of the Justice and Peace Law.

There is no doubt that the weakening and disintegration of these illegal armed groups has had a significant impact on the fight against drug trafficking. Combined with efforts in the areas of eradication, interdiction, and extradition, this weakness has severely impacted the organizations dedicated to drug trafficking in Colombia.

By the end of President Uribe’s first presidential term in 2006, after four years of implementing the DSP, the results were highly satisfactory. All crime rates had been reduced across the nation. Homicide, for example, went from 28,837 cases in 2002 to 17,479 in 2006. Kidnapping for extortion went from 1,709 cases to 282 in the same period. Attacks on towns by the illegal armed groups went from 32 in 2002 to 4 in 2006, while terrorist attacks in general decreased from 1,645 in 2002 to 646 in 2006. In the same way, while in 2002 there were 131 mayors in the country who were unable to exercise office from their municipal seats due to pressure and threats from the illegal armed groups, in 2006 this figure went down to four mayors.

These improvements, together with the government’s steadfast resolve to continue to fight crime have brought
back a feeling of peace and security to the vast majority of Colombians.

These results have not only benefited security in Colombia, but they have also had a very positive effect on economic and social arenas.

A “virtuous circle of security” has been generated in the last four years. Greater security brings greater confidence and stability, which then acts as a powerful attraction for private investment. Private investment then generates greater economic growth.

Private investment grew in Colombia around 15 points as a percentage of the GDP for the four years from 2002 to 2006. This had very favorable repercussions on economic growth, which went from 1.93% of the GDP in 2002 to 6.8% in 2006, the country’s highest growth rate in the last twenty years.

Economic growth, in turn, generated greater tax revenues, which has permitted increased investments in social development programs. This explains the reduction of around ten percentage points in the poverty index and approximately five percentage points in the unemployment rate from 2002 to 2006.

We can thus declare that the DSP has decisively improved the climate of peace and security, increased private investment and economic growth, and, most importantly, stimulated social development and produced well being for the great majority of Colombians.
NEW STRATEGIC SCENARIO
The very success of the DSP has generated a new security context where criminal groups have been forced to change their tactics and strategies in order to survive. They have been weakened, but have not disappeared. Following their criminal logic, they have gone through a transformation. This situation presents a series of challenges to the institutions of Colombia and its public security forces.

The first and most important threat comes from the illegal armed groups (IAGs), in particular the FARC and the ELN. Though undeniably weakened, they persist in their intention to confront the state, challenge its authority, and attack its citizens.

In the case of the FARC, this group continues to insist on terrorism and drug trafficking. It currently dedicates a large portion of its armed efforts to defending what it considers to be its strategic assets - its illicit crops, its kidnap victims, and its leaders.

It has now become impossible for the FARC to stage attacks with great numbers of armed men given the public security forces’ military superiority and quick response capability. Therefore, the FARC keeps its forces dispersed in classic guerrilla warfare, seeking to wear down government forces through attrition. Even so, under special circumstances this group can engage in armed actions with a significant concentration of individuals.

In addition, although the FARC continues to be active in numerous regions of the country, it has deployed its
strategic rearguard in border regions. Its illegal activities are increasingly concentrated in those regions, making it a threat not only to the security of Colombia but also to the security of neighboring countries.

The FARC is also expending great energy in an attempt to influence national and international political arenas in search of recognition and legitimacy, in order to compensate for lost ground in the military arena.

From the beginning of President Uribe’s administration the ELN gave signs of wanting to explore a negotiated solution. Despite several attempts, however, only in December 2005 did it decide to begin dialogue with the national government. Today, while periodic rounds of conversations between government representatives and the ELN take place in the city of Havana, Cuba, ELN armed structures continue to carry out terrorist actions in different regions of the country, continue to participate in drug trafficking, and continue to indiscriminately plant anti-personnel mines in the territories where they are still present.

The demobilization of the illegal self-defense groups put an end to the paramilitary phenomenon as a nation-wide armed structure, but set the stage for the appearance of new threats.

Without a doubt, the most representative threat in this context is the emergence of criminal groups in several of the zones where armed self-defense structures demobilized. These criminals seek to control the different illegal activities once dominated by self-defense groups and take advantage of the enormous financial resources they generate. Another threat comes from the desire of other illegal armed groups to enter into demobilized zones in order to exercise armed influence. At this point it is important to emphasize the national government’s firm decision to cancel legal benefits, apply regular criminal justice, and, when appropriate, extradite any person who relapses into drug trafficking, terrorism, or any other crime once he has demobilized from the self-defense groups.

A commonality between illegal armed groups and criminal groups is the systematic use of kidnapping and
extortion. These crimes have a high impact on society. They affect not only freedom, peace of mind, and the finances of the victims and their families, but also affect the state, since they are used as political betting chips by the illegal armed groups to try to pressure the state into political and military concessions in exchange for the freedom of captive citizens. For that reason, any reduction in these crimes requires first dismantling those groups.

Numerous drug trafficking cartels present another threat to the security of Colombians. Drug traffickers have figured out how to adapt to the government’s anti-narcotics strategy. Instead of planting large, industrial coca fields, they now plant multiple small, scattered plots at remote sites. The coca is planted among legal crops, making it hard to detect and eradicate. They are also making increased use of natural parks and border zones to avoid aerial spraying. They also use these areas to mount and operate clandestine laboratories for drug production.

In terms of drug exports, the drug traffickers have begun to use a greater number of land and sea routes, since those transportation methods are less expensive and permit greater mobility and a greater number of routes that can be used more frequently. Colombia’s borders are extensive and complex and the public security forces are limited in their capacity to effectively cover every section of the border and the ocean. By the same measure, the use of air space for drug transportation has increasingly gone down, due to increased and more effective coverage by the Colombian Air Force’s air interdiction system.

Another concern in the area of drug trafficking is the growing participation of foreign drug trafficking networks, which, in connection with Colombian cartels and organizations, make continual attempts to transport drugs from Colombia to different countries. In this sense, international cooperation is essential for fighting these networks.

There is another threat to the peace and security of the inhabitants of the country’s urban centers. It is the exis-
tence of bands of common criminals who commit every type of crime from muggings, house robberies, and bank robberies, to extortion, kidnapping, and homicide. Although over the last four years it has been possible to reduce crime rates across the country thanks to police action against these criminals, they continue to commit a significant number of crimes. For that reason, the National Police will strengthen its citizen security strategy, with the objective of dismantling these bands.

The new security context establishes a series of challenges to our institutions that must be met without delay. Priority must be given to facing these challenges. The legitimacy and credibility of the security forces constitute their center of gravity and are the basis for all their actions. It is therefore necessary to make structural reforms that will strengthen and raise ethical and professional standards, redounding in greater respect for and protection of human rights and in obedience to the Constitution and the law in every action.
3 POLICY FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRATIC SECURITY

PCSD
In 2002, in the framework of the Democratic Defense and Security Policy, the national government determined that the overall goal of Democratic Security was to “Reinforce and guarantee the rule of law across the nation.” In response to changes in the security context, the Ministry of Defense has now designed new strategies to reach that same objective. The Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security (PCDS) is the result of that process. It establishes the specific priorities and political objectives that will orient the actions of the Ministry of Defense, the Armed Forces, and the National Police during this current presidential term.

In addition, the Ministry of Defense is heading up a process of review and analysis that will determine strategies for further development of this policy’s directives and objectives.

As the PCDS is implemented, the public security forces will operate under the constitutional mandate to reinforce and guarantee the rule of law across the nation, as a necessary condition for protecting all the inhabitants of Colombia.

3.1 PRINCIPLES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

Decisions and actions implemented by virtue of the PCDS will always be framed within the following principles:

- **Our goals are security and peace.** The great desire of all Colombians is to live in a climate of security and tranquility. Therefore, no action will be taken by the security forces that does not have the purpose of moving Colombians increasingly closer to stable and lasting peace.
• **We will act within the law.** The security forces will always act out of the strictest respect for human rights and international humanitarian law. They will act within the framework of the rule of law, giving priority to protecting the public. Public confidence and support are the basis of the security forces’ legitimacy and their center of gravity.

• **Continuous presence.** The public security forces will not abandon any of the zones where they are currently present, or any zones where they gain territorial control through military operations over the next few years.

• **Security guarantees the functioning of the justice system.** The security forces must continue to contribute to the proper administration of justice by guaranteeing the security conditions the justice system needs in order to function. This is a fundamental means of protecting the rights of citizens.

• **Security is a catalyst for economic growth and social benefits.** Security force operations must continue to contribute to a climate of confidence and stability that will attract private investment and produce economic growth and social development, reducing unemployment and poverty. Greater security will establish proper conditions for state social action in benefit of the most needy.

• **Flexibility and adaptability.** Without detriment to its structure, organization, or line of command, the security forces must establish and apply procedures for flexibly and effectively adapting to changes in tactics and strategies on the part of illegal armed groups and other agents threatening national security. With that same flexibility, the security forces must make every effort to develop new tactics and procedures to continue to hold the strategic initiative in the confrontation.

• **Coordination with other Forces.** Each one of the Armed Forces will intensify its process to adapt to the joint operations doctrine, so that soldiers on the land, on the ocean, and in the air might engage in
coordinated and complementary actions. The Armed Forces and the Police, especially, will give priority to intensifying the application of coordination procedures in every zone where they share jurisdiction.

- **Coordination with other state institutions.** More than ever, the consolidation of Democratic Security will depend on the effective coordination of the public security forces with other state institutions, especially those in charge of social action and the administration of justice. Therefore, the security forces will develop protocols and principles within their doctrine to ensure proper coordination.

### 3.2 STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

In accordance with these principles, the Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security has five (5) strategic objectives:

#### 3.2.1 TO CONSOLIDATE TERRITORIAL CONTROL AND STRENGTHEN THE RULE OF LAW ACROSS THE ENTIRE NATIONAL TERRITORY

Through the Democratic Security Policy, the state recovered extensive territorial control, represented mainly by military and police control of geography. During this current presidential administration, the government must move from a stage of territorial control to one of consolidation of territorial control. Strengthening the rule of law and protection of the public will be at the core of this effort.

Consolidation of territorial control is when the security provided by the public security forces enables the state to establish the justice system and the rule of law. Democratic institutions are guaranteed free and continuous function, so that citizens may fully exercise their rights.

The policy’s triumph is linked to the concept of irreversibility. That means that the achievements of the consolidation process will be so deep-seated in a given region that in practice it will be very hard to return to the
scenario where illegal armed groups or other threats to citizen security exercised influence through violence.

3.2.1.1 Strategy for the consolidation of territorial control

The consolidation of territorial control and the rule of law has been a strategic objective since the Democratic Defense and Security Policy was formulated. Having a strong constitutional order based on territorial control is at the foundation of security, peaceful coexistence, and democracy. Therefore by meeting the objective of territorial control we end up effectively protecting citizens and supporting the exercise of their rights and freedoms.

Three phases will be identified in the consolidation of territorial control. The phase for each zone of the country will be established in line with the distinct security characteristics of that zone. Although the intense efforts made in each zone will be different, interagency coordination and the work to strengthen democratic institutions and the justice system will be a constant.

The strategy for the consolidation of territorial control concentrates on aligning military and police efforts with the anti-narcotic efforts, social efforts, the justice system, economic development, and the strengthening of state institutions. When those six components function simultaneously and in coordination they will produce protection, justice, and prosperity. They will provide legitimate economic alternatives that complement the increased security with progress and social development. They will attack drug trafficking organizations along with the armed structures that protect them and profit from that activity. Coordinating resources will establish conditions of security, legality, and availability of public and social services, making economic, social, and institutional development possible.

In order to attain that type of coordination, the Ministry of Defense and the Presidential Agency for Social Action will develop pilot programs to promote: (i) the recovery of regional security and state institutional control, (ii) the presence of state democratic institutions, the reinforcement of local governability, and the effective parti-
cipation of civil society, (iii) the eradication of illicit crops and the development of a legitimate economy, (iv) the recovery of the environment, and (v) the effective administration and application of justice.

**Consolidation Strategy**

### CONSOLIDATION STRATEGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1 – Territorial control</th>
<th>Phase 2 – Stabilization</th>
<th>Consolidation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial Control</strong></td>
<td><strong>Stabilization</strong></td>
<td><strong>Consolidation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas with active presence of IAG</td>
<td>Controlled areas in process of institutional recovery</td>
<td>Consolidation of State authority and establishment of all State institutions and public services,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective: Disrupt and drive out IAG, territorial control</td>
<td>Objective: Maintain and security within the community, return of rural institutions of the State</td>
<td>Social and political intensive effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military intensive effort</td>
<td>Police and military intensive effort</td>
<td>Social and political intensive effort</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Phase 1 – Territorial control** This phase will be implemented in zones where illegal armed groups, drug trafficking structures, and criminal bands are still active, and in zones where illegal self-defense groups have demobilized.

Intense military operations will dismantle and neutralize criminal organizations at the same time they break up drug trafficking networks and infrastructure in the zone.

**Phase 2 – Stabilization** This phase will be implemented in regions where the public security forces are already exercising control, in other words in those zones where phase 1 has been successfully completed.

In this phase the objective is to establish minimum security conditions in order to begin the process of institutional recovery. This means that the state democratic institutions and agencies will be able to continue or, in some cases, begin to carry out their work. The priority of this phase is to satisfy the local population’s most basic and immediate needs.
During this stage intense policing will maintain order, security, and peaceful co-existence in the community, so that other state agencies can enter and function, especially agencies in charge of social action. Significant military efforts will continue in order to prevent any attempt by illegal armed groups to attack, gain a foothold, or be active in the zone.

**Phase 3 – Consolidation** This phase applies to regions that have already been established, and the objective is to expand state authority and increase public well being through the normal and proper functioning of all government institutions and agencies.

This is a transition phase working toward the satisfaction of people’s basic needs and the effective provision of all essential state services such as education, health, justice, infrastructure works, and recreation.

During this phase, the most intense efforts will be focused on political, economic, and social arenas. Of course, the police and the Armed Forces will continue to selectively exercise their authority to maintain the underlying security conditions.

As part of this consolidation strategy, we will give priority to the implementation of the following plans and programs:

**Program for Humanitarian Attention to Demobilized Persons (PAHD for its Spanish initials).** The mission of this program is to provide comprehensive humanitarian attention to the demobilized person and his family, and to facilitate his social re-integration. The objectives at this stage are: (i) To guarantee comprehensive, efficient, and timely humanitarian attention, (ii) To create incentives for demobilization, (iii) To raise the awareness of national and international communities, (iv) To prevent recruiting, and (v) To strengthen the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of information.

**National Highway Security Program.** The Ministry of Defense is redesigning the Integrated Strategy for National Highway Security. The process will optimize
the use of existing resources, promoting substantial improvements in mobility, communication, and inter-institutional coordination. The result will be the creation of an integrated system to respond more efficiently and effectively to current security threats.

Network Program. Using a network model, the Ministry of Defense will fill regional security vacuums in order to consolidate state presence across the nation. The program objectives are: (i) To optimize and organize human, logistical, and technological resources, (ii) To improve mobility, communication, and coordination in the security forces, (iii) To integrate the community, industry associations, authorities, and security forces, and (iv) To promote active, voluntary citizen cooperation.

Kidnapping and Extortion. This program has four main elements: (i) to keep GAULA personnel properly trained, (ii) to strengthen the work to dismantle kidnapping and extortion networks, (iii) to prosecute the financial assets of these criminal networks, and (iv) to launch a communication campaign to decrease the rates of non-reported extortions in the country.

3.2.1.2 Development of the Integrated Action Doctrine (DAI for its Spanish initials)

There is no doubt that these key elements will determine the success or failure of this strategy: the consolidation of territorial control and inter-agency coordination, especially civilian-military coordination.

For that reason, the development of the Integrated Action Doctrine (DAI) will be a fundamental aspect of the PCSD and the main tool for coordination between the state’s use of legitimate force and its social action.

The DAI will give security force members the principles and protocols they need to properly coordinate with the representatives of other state institutions, local authorities, international cooperation agencies, non-governmental organizations, civic organizations, and the private sector.

Raising the principle of integrated action to the level of operational doctrine will make it mandatory to include
integration in the design and execution of every operation undertaken by the Armed Forces and the Police in their respective theaters and areas of operation.

There will be two different scenarios for the execution of this doctrine, depending on the proximity of an office of the Center for the Coordination of Integrated Action (CCAI), under the Office of the President of the Republic. In the first scenario, the CCAI is present in a region. In that case, all the security units in that region must establish close and continuous coordination with the local CCAI representative. There will also be coordination at a central level, between the Ministry of Defense, the General Command of the Armed Forces, the Commands of each of the Armed Forces and the National Police, and CCAI headquarters at the Office of the President of the Republic.

The second scenario operates in regions where the CCAI is not present. The CCAI currently has offices in just 58 of the 1,099 Colombian municipalities, so during this presidential term, this second scenario will be the most common one for the public security forces.

The DAI must therefore establish clear principles and multiple procedures for direct coordination between security forces and the different authorities and civil organizations present in regions that do not have a CCAI office.

3.2.2 TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC AND HOLD ON TO STRATEGIC INITIATIVE AGAINST ALL THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY.

Protecting people is at the core of the mission of the public security forces. As long as there is still impunity, law breaking, and rebellion against the authority of democratic institutions, people will continue to experience a threat to their security. That is why state actions in all arenas have the final goal of protecting people, under the constitutional system they follow and defend.

So as part of the overall goals, one of the main responsibilities of the security forces is to dismantle illegal armed groups (IAGs), criminal bands, drug trafficking cartels, and organized criminal groups that constitute a threat to the security of Colombians.
The public security forces will dismantle the structures of those groups and deny them access to urban centers and rural towns. In the case of the IAGs, as territorial control is consolidated, they will progressively lose their violence-based influence over people, which will be a severe blow to their logistics and intelligence. In the same way, progressive isolation of the IAGs will continue to demonstrate that they do not represent the people nor do they have any popular legitimacy.

It will be the job of the security forces to engage in offensive operations across the nation, including the most remote areas. They must go to the strategic rear-guards of the illegal armed groups and to the hideouts of drug traffickers and members of criminal bands in order to dismantle them.

The role of military and police intelligence will be basic to this effort. It will provide opportune analysis and reporting for effective offensive operations, which, in turn, will help us maintain strategic initiative against all threats to the public. In response to the ever-present threat of terrorist acts by illegal armed groups in compensation for their military weakness, intelligence will attempt to anticipate terrorism and contribute to its prevention.

In the same measure, we will strengthen counterintelligence to prevent criminal organizations from having access to information, plans, and operations of the public security forces in their attempt to prevent or escape actions.

Certain that it is now impossible to reach their objectives using armed methods, and with military defeat imminent, illegal armed groups may seek a rapprochement with the national government. It is possible they will be interested in a serious and committed process of political negotiation, under the terms established by the President and by the High Commissioner of Peace. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense and the security forces will continue to hold out the option of individual demobilization in the midst of the confrontation. Members of IAGs will be able to demobilize and enter the re-integration and re-socialization programs sponsored by the Office of the President.
Demobilization will not be a possibility for any of the drug cartels, gangs, or organized crime organizations, or for former AUC members who have demobilized previously and relapsed into criminal activity. For them the only road open is to voluntarily and immediately submit to the regular justice system, or face the consequences of offensive actions by the public security forces.

These same conditions will apply to any member of an illegal armed group who, having demobilized through a political negotiation process with the state, relapses into criminal activity.

An inter-agency process for strategic review and analysis will determine the best course of action for implementing military and police strategy against these threats.

3.2.3 TO DRASTICALLY RAISE THE COST OF TRAFFICKING DRUGS IN COLOMBIA.

The fight against drug trafficking will use a holistic approach because the drug business is comprised of a series of interdependent links. Only by simultaneously targeting action on all links will it be possible for the fight against drug trafficking to be effective.

In a context of limited resources, but with multiple tools available, we will choose actions that will make the greatest contribution to destabilizing the drug trafficking system and implement them with the greatest priority and intensity. The Armed Forces and the National Police will carry out operations in the following areas:

Eradication. The public security forces will make use of all means available for eradicating illicit crops. It must be emphasized that the national government has begun a process to review its eradication strategy, in order to optimize the use of resources. More resources and efforts will go toward manual eradication, balanced with aerial spraying. The use of one or the other in each zone where there are illicit crops will be determined by topography, natural features, and security status.

Interdiction. Interdiction operations take place on the ground, on the ocean, on rivers, and in the air. The objective is to make it more difficult to transport drugs
from inland areas to the borders and also to make sure chemical precursors for drug production do not have an easy trip to the processing laboratories. Interdiction will also neutralize illegal traffic in arms, munitions, and explosives for illegal armed groups and for the armed structures of drug trafficking organizations. Important efforts will also be made toward the identification and destruction of infrastructure for drug storage and processing.

Neutralization. We will neutralize illegal armed groups that participate in any stage of the business, as well as the armed structures of drug trafficking organizations. Because of the enormous resources received by illegal armed groups from their active participation in the drug trafficking business, they allocate an increasingly greater proportion of their military apparatus to protecting that whole system from actions by the public security forces. When the Armed Forces take offensive action against illegal armed groups, the drug trafficking system is weakened, making it more vulnerable to other state actions to combat it.

Consolidation of territorial control. Consolidating territorial control significantly increases the chances of success in the fight against drug trafficking, because it permits the arrival and functioning of the state’s social agencies. Government social agencies can develop alternative development programs for people who live in regions where illicit crops are grown. It also permits the expulsion of illegal armed groups, criminal bands, and drug trafficking cartels, thus guaranteeing that fields will not be replanted and the structures will not be there to promote the purchase, collection, processing, and transportation of drugs.

It has been demonstrated that when an attack is made on all fronts, the drug trafficking system can be broken and destabilized, limiting and complicating its different activities, forcing the drug traffickers to constantly change their tactics and stay on the defensive in hiding, thus increasing its costs and risks and reducing its profits. With this in mind, public security operations will concentrate on hitting drug trafficking increasingly harder at every link of the productive chain, complicating
the business to the point of creating disincentives for individuals and organizations that would like to stay in or enter this business in Colombia.

The international cooperation agreements signed by Colombia in this area will be implemented with determination as a fundamental part of the fight against drug trafficking.

### 3.2.4 TO KEEP OUR PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES MODERN AND EFFECTIVE, WITH A HIGH LEVEL OF LEGITIMACY BASED ON PUBLIC CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT.

To fulfill this objective, the efforts of the Ministry of Defense will concentrate on two priority areas. Firstly, it will make special investments to strengthen the operational capabilities of the public security forces. At the same time, it will implement a series of structural reforms at the Ministry of Defense, the Armed Forces, and the National Police, with a clear orientation toward legitimacy as their center of gravity. These reforms will be guided by a long-term vision, which we have developed through work with scenarios to determine the future actions most likely to be required from the security forces.

### 3.3.4.1 Strengthened capabilities in the public security forces

Over the next four years, the Ministry of Defense will make special investments that will have a decisive impact on the force structure and on operating methods in the medium and long run. These investments will be allocated to public security capabilities in the following areas:

**Consolidation of territorial control**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREAS FOR INVESTMENT</th>
<th>INCREASED CAPABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOBILITY</td>
<td>SPECIAL OPERATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTELLIGENCE</td>
<td>SUSTAINABILITY/CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANDING FORCE</td>
<td>OPERATIONS OF DESTRUCTION OF ILLEGAL STRUCTURES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINIMUM STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES</td>
<td>INTELLIGENCE (TECHNICAL / HUMAN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MILITARY SOCIAL WORK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Mobility.** Investments in this area will increase the efficiency of territorial control operations, in the measure that with greater mobility greater extensions of territory can be covered in less time. Likewise, greater mobility will permit quicker reaction with greater impact in response to an attack or threat of attack at any point of the national geography.

**Intelligence.** Strong intelligence becomes fundamental when facing enemies that recur with increasing insistence to terrorism and ambush, and who take refuge and camouflage themselves among the civilian population to avoid actions by security forces. Intelligence helps to identify and locate threats, and opportunely provides the proper information for engaging in successful operations against those threats.

**Standing force.** Consolidating territorial control presents a series of challenges making it necessary to increase the number of personnel in the Armed Forces and Police. Extending territorial control to zones where the state currently does not have control, occupying the areas where illegal self-defense groups have demobilized, increasing combat capacity through new units, and doing integrated action work all obviously require a larger standing force.

Aware of this need, the Ministry of Defense will allocate resources for a sustainable increase in the standing force, under the premise of prudent growth. The growth will occur at a set ratio between commanders and troops, to maintain a proper command and control level.

**Maintenance of strategic capabilities.** At the present conjuncture, the Colombian government makes use of all of its strategic material to support the operations against drug trafficking and terrorism. For example, ships and submarines are used for surveillance and maritime interdiction of drugs and arms, just as combat aircraft are used for air fire support against targets related to illegal armed groups.

Further investments in strategic material will focus on extending the useful life of existing materials through upgrading and retrofitting. In addition, minor acqui-
The Ministry of National Defense will allocate resources for a sustainable increase in the standing force, under the premise of prudent growth. The growth will maintain a proper ratio between commanders and troops, so that a proper command and control level can be maintained.

The Armed Forces can thus maintain the minimum capabilities necessary to fulfill their constitutional mandate to defend the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and constitutional order of Colombia. From a strategic defense posture, they will remain attentive to the emergence and formation of potential new threats requiring action.

3.3.4.2 Structural reforms

In the years to come, the Ministry of Defense will provide leadership for reforms that will allow security forces to successfully confront security threats in the medium run, and at the same time establish a forward-looking structure for the next decade. To that end, the reforms will concentrate on the following aspects:

**HR and IHL policy.** The comprehensive HR and IHL policy for the public security forces will emphasize designing better instruction processes and practical training in HR and IHL. It will introduce more and better controls for strict compliance. It will generate better systems for legal consulting, and design differentiated mechanisms for protecting especially vulnerable population groups. It will strengthen mechanisms for national and international cooperation.

**Legality.** Based on the principle that legality and public support are the center of gravity for all public security actions, important reforms will be made to strengthen respect for HR and IHL. The structure and functioning of the military penal justice system will be improved. Education and training will have the goal of maintaining and strengthening the tradition of respect for and allegiance to the Constitution and the Law.

**Modernization.** In order to optimize the technical and human resources of the public security forces in accordance with current international standards the entire system for education and training for security force members will be revamped. The career path for military personnel and police will be modernized, and we will reevaluate and redefine the roles and missions of
the different forces, Special Forces, and task groups to meet current and future needs. The very organizational structure of the Ministry of Defense will be redesigned.

**Operational strengthening.** In terms of operative capabilities and force structure, reforms will be made in aspects such as intelligence and counterintelligence, and special operations capabilities. In this sense, the reform will focus on achieving increasingly effective operations, technology intensive and with economy of force. In some areas the development of new operational doctrines will be necessary.

In order to increase the efficiency of operations, these reforms will be complemented by reforms to the structure and functioning of military and police intelligence. Only with proper intelligence will it be possible to plan and conduct high impact operations against threats to the security of Colombians.

**Well being.** In the area of well being the reforms will concentrate on improving the health system, increasing salaries, and improving living conditions in operative units. A holding entity will be created for all the companies in the defense sector, to provide the proper well being and logistics to help the public security forces fulfill their mission.

**Vision of the strategic future of the Forces.** Initiatives will be undertaken in this area such as the Law of Security and Defense, and an evaluation of the vision and strategic future needs of the public security forces. The purpose is to develop the human skills and technology that will allow the forces to adapt and respond to internal and external security challenges in the medium and long term.

**3.2.5 TO MAINTAIN THE DOWNWARD TREND IN ALL CRIME RATES IN THE COUNTRY'S URBAN CENTERS.**

Colombia today is largely an urban country, with the majority of its people living in cities and urban centers in the different regions of the country.
Although the existence of illegal armed groups, drug trafficking cartels, and criminal bands has a negative impact on the security of all Colombians, their actions affect rural populations more directly and with a greater impact.

In the urban centers, in contrast, the perception of overall security is determined less by actions by those groups and much more by the existence of organized groups of common criminals. The occurrence of muggings, thefts of vehicles and residences, extortions, and homicides, is, in the end, what determines how the inhabitants of cities feel about their security.

For that reason, and under the principle that Democratic Security implies security for everyone, the Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security will pay special attention to strategies and actions to improve security conditions in the country’s cities.

The National Police will have the mission of reinforcing its citizen security strategy in order to neutralize and dismantle organized gangs and groups of common criminals that affect the security and harmony of urban population groups. Dismantling these groups will continue and accentuate the current downward trend in crime rates in the country’s cities and urban centers.

3.2.5.1 Citizen security strategy

In the 2006-2010 period, the Ministry of Defense will make important investments in Police capabilities for dismantling groups and gangs that commit high impact crimes in an urban context.

The citizen security strategy will be based on 5 main aspects:

**Increase in the standing force.** This increase will permit the creation of new units and the strengthening of existing ones, considerably increasing the coverage of police services in the main cities of the nation.
Improved mobility. Ground mobility will be significantly reinforced through the acquisition of cars, motorcycles, and anti-riot vehicles. This will allow the police to respond more quickly to citizen security requirements over a greater range.

Creation of new judicial units. The creation of these units and equipping the ones already existing will strengthen the capabilities of the judicial police.

Adaptation to the accusatory criminal system. The National Police Force will make the necessary organizational and procedural reforms to harmonize its function and capabilities with the dynamics of the accusatory criminal system.

Intelligence and communications. The National Police will strengthen technical and human intelligence capabilities, and will equip units with new communications equipment to facilitate and promote coordination between units.

Education and police careers. Reforms will be made in education and training schools, and in the career path for police officers. These reforms will deliver police agents to society who are increasingly prepared and sensitive to security and peaceful coexistence needs in the cities and urban centers of the nation. Close relations with the public, based on absolute respect for human rights, will be the foundation of these reforms.

3.3 INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE

In today’s world it would be unthinkable to even attempt make the above objectives a reality without help from the international community. For that reason, the Ministry of Defense will develop, in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Relations, and in strict agreement with Colombian foreign policy, an international initiative to explain abroad the objectives and advances of the Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security and the benefits it will generate for the Colombian people.

This initiative will dispel mistaken perceptions and questions about the legitimacy of the institutions, and in this particular case, of the Colombian public security forces.
It will counteract mistaken ideas, using arguments and information about the real situation of these institutions and their functioning. In the same way, it will show the reality of illegal armed groups, their terrorist and drug trafficking vocation and activity, and their absolute lack of popular representativity and political legitimacy.

This initiative must also share with the international community about how a democratic nation can confront and counteract security threats, according to the Colombian experience. We will put at the service of friendly countries our complete willingness to cooperate in areas in which the Colombian public security forces have exceptional skills and experience.

The initiative will also generate international consensus on the need to support Colombian state efforts against security threats that, although manifested in Colombia, are tied to criminal networks that are present and influential in many countries around the world. Under the principle of shared responsibility, international political support must lead to practical international cooperation for a more effective and integrated fight against these threats.

Through this initiative, the Ministry of Defense hopes to be able to count on international accompaniment for the entire process of structural reforms and investments to be made over the coming years to modernize our Armed Forces and the National Police in accordance with current international standards.
3.4 PLANS, PROGRAMS, AND INITIATIVES

The PCDS will be implemented through 28 strategies, programs, and initiatives, each one of which will have a manager or coordinator responsible for constant orientation and evaluation. These strategies, programs, and initiatives have been grouped into five lines of action:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIONS TO FACE THREATS TO THE PUBLIC</th>
<th>ACTIONS FOR POLICY SUSTAINABILITY</th>
<th>STRUCTURAL REFORMS WITHIN THE PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES</th>
<th>ACTIONS TO IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY AND TRANSPARENCY OF THE USE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES</th>
<th>ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE COMMUNITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War on Drug Trafficking Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Program for the Well Being of the Public Security Forces</td>
<td>Plan for the Coordination and Definition of the Roles of the Public Security Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Policy in the Demobilization Zones</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borders Plan</td>
<td>Defense and Security law</td>
<td>Creation of a Center for Strategic Studies</td>
<td>Program for Managerial Improvement of the Sector</td>
<td>Military Social Work Doctrine (MSWD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New War Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Program for Science and Technology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy to strengthen public security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of the Veterans’ Office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Mobility, Intelligence and the Standing Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program to maintain minimum strategic capacities</td>
<td>Reform and strengthening of intelligence</td>
<td>Reform of Military Criminal Justice</td>
<td>Program for the standardization of goods and purchases for the sector</td>
<td>Strategy toward the International Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Against Extortion and Kidnapping</td>
<td></td>
<td>Human Rights Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Steadfastness in the Use of Discretional Faculties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>