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on German Security Policy and
the Future of the Bundeswehr
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I. German Security Policy

Twelve years have passed since the publication of the last White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation of the Bundeswehr. During that time, the international environment has changed dramatically. Globalisation has opened up new opportunities for Germany, too. At the same time, the radical changes in the security environment have created new risks and threats that are not only having a destabilising effect on Germany’s immediate surroundings but also impact on the security of the international community as a whole. A successful response to these new challenges requires the application of a wide range of foreign, security, defence, and development policy instruments in order to identify, prevent, and resolve conflicts at an early stage. With its broad spectrum of capabilities, the Bundeswehr has been making significant contributions towards the achievement of this goal.

International terrorism represents a fundamental challenge and threat to freedom and security. Increasingly, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of the means of their delivery has become a potential threat to Germany as well as other nations. In addition, Germany has been confronted with the aftermath of intrastate and regional conflicts, the destabilisation, and the internal disintegration of states as well as its frequent by-product – the privatisation of force. Strategies that were previously effective in warding off external dangers are no longer adequate against the current, asymmetric threats. Today’s security policy must address new and increasingly complex challenges. Effective security provisions require preventive, efficient, and coherent cooperation at both the national and international levels, to include an effective fight against the root causes. It is imperative that we take preventive action against any risks and threats to our security and that we address them in a timely manner and at their sources.

Germany’s security is inseparably linked to the political development of Europe and the remainder of the world. The united Germany has an important part in
shaping the future of Europe and beyond. As a member of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), Germany has proven itself to be a reliable partner. In these international ventures, as well as in the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and other such forums, Germany has been working towards the preservation of peace, protection against global threats, promotion of democracy and human rights, sustainable development, and cooperative security.

Since the mid-1990s, the organisations vital to the security of Germany – the North Atlantic Alliance, the European Union, the United Nations – have significantly evolved and adapted to the new risks and challenges. As a result, their member countries have taken on additional responsibilities. Bundeswehr personnel have been serving as peacekeepers in the Balkans, in the Caucasus region, at the Horn of Africa, in the Middle East, on the African continent, and in Asia. For several years, the Bundeswehr has consistently followed the path of transitioning to an expeditionary force, and it has been radically transformed along the way.

The process of global change will continue. In concert with its partners and allies, Germany has accepted the challenges created by this change, shaping it in accordance with its responsibilities and interests. German security policy is driven by the values set forth in its Basic Law and by the goal of safeguarding the interests of our country, in particular:

- to preserve justice, freedom, and democracy for the citizens of our country, as well as their security and welfare, and to protect them from threats;
- to assure the sovereignty and integrity of German territory;
- to prevent, whenever possible, regional crises and conflicts that may affect Germany’s security and to help manage such crises;
- to confront global challenges, above all the threat posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- to help uphold human rights and strengthen the international order on the basis of international law;
- to promote free and open world trade as the basis for our prosperity and, by doing so help close the gap between the poor and wealthy regions of the world.

German security policy is based on a comprehensive concept of security; it is forward-looking and multilateral. Security cannot be guaranteed by the efforts of any one nation or by armed forces alone. Instead, it requires an all-encompassing approach that can only be developed in networked security structures and within the context of a comprehensive national and global security philosophy. One of its components is the Federal Government’s overall concept of “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Post-Conflict Peace Building”.

The transatlantic partnership remains the foundation of Germany’s and Europe’s common security. The North Atlantic Alliance will continue to be the cornerstone of Germany’s future security and defence policy. Forming the link between two continents, it provides unique political and military instruments for the maintenance and restoration of peace. In the long run, the global challenges confronting German security cannot be met without an effective transatlantic alliance that is based on mutual trust among its member states. The fundamental issues of European security can be addressed only in a joint effort with the United States of America, and this will continue to hold true in the future. However, the bonds between Germany and the United States must be continually cultivated and deepened through mutual consultation and coordinated action.

The European Union stands for political stability, security, and prosperity in Germany as well as its other member states. It has evolved into a recognised actor in international crisis management, with an increasing capacity for taking action on foreign and security policy matters. As an integral part of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Security and Defence Policy has defined military and civilian headline goals, established politico-military structures for operations, created a European Defence Agency, and formulated its European Security Strategy. Thus, Europe now has the prerequisites to more effectively fulfil its share of responsibility for global security in the future and to contribute to making the world a safer place. One of the primary goals of German security policy is the strengthening of the European area of stability through the consolidation and development of European integration and the European Union’s active neighbourhood policy with the states of Eastern Europe, the southern Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Mediterranean region. Equally important are the development and reinforcement of a durable and resilient security partnership with Russia.

The strategic partnership between NATO and the EU is one of the pillars of the European and transatlantic security architecture. The EU and NATO are not competitors; both make vital contributions to our security. Germany will continue to work towards improving the relationship between the two organisations in a manner that will lead to closer cooperation and greater efficiency, avoid duplication, and fortify European and transatlantic security in general.
Germany supports the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe as an important instrument of our foreign and security policy and seeks to strengthen its position.

The United Nations is the only international organisation that is universal in nature. Its Charter provides the fundamental framework of international law that governs international relations. As the expectations of the UN’s ability to maintain global peace have increased, so has the number of UN requests for assistance from NATO and the EU. The UN is of critical importance to the resolution of the multitude of issues that arise from an expanded concept of security. Germany fully accepts its share of responsibility to safeguard world peace and international security within the framework of the UN and is committed to strengthening the UN through fundamental and comprehensive reforms.

Arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, and a restrictive armaments export policy will remain important elements of the German security policy that focuses on conflict prevention. In light of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, special importance must be placed on strengthening the treaties regarding the prohibition and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the continuation of nuclear disarmament.

II. The Bundeswehr – An Instrument of German Security Policy

The Bundeswehr is an instrument of a comprehensive and proactive security and defence policy. Its mission is:

- to guarantee the capacity for action in the field of foreign policy,
- to contribute towards European and global stability,
- to maintain national security and defence,
- to provide assistance in the defence of our allies,
- to foster multinational cooperation and integration.

An effective Bundeswehr is vital to a German security and defence policy that seeks to actively shape its environment. Politically and constitutionally, the Bundeswehr’s “raison d’être” and core function continue to be the defence of Germany against external threats. Additional responsibilities include the defence of allies in the event of attack and assistance in crises and conflicts that might escalate into actual threats. Thus, the central task of the Bundeswehr continues to be national and collective defence in the classical sense. However, the need for protection of the population and of the infrastructure has increased in importance as a result of the growing threat that terrorist attacks pose to German territory.

The Bundeswehr’s functions are derived from its constitutional mission and from the values, goals, and interests of German security and defence policy. They are:

- international conflict prevention and crisis management, to include the fight against international terrorism;
- support of allies;
- protection of German territory and its citizens;
- rescue and evacuation operations;
- partnership and cooperation;
- subsidiary assistance (legal and administrative support, help in the wake of natural disasters and particularly grave accidents).

For the foreseeable future, the most likely tasks will be the prevention of international conflicts and crisis management, to include the fight against international terrorism. They will determine the structure of and exert significant influence on the capabilities, command and control systems, availability, and equipment of the Bundeswehr.
Internal and external security are increasingly intertwined. The defence against terrorist and other asymmetric threats within Germany falls primarily into the purview of the Federal and Land authorities responsible for internal security. It is, however, permissible under current law to deploy the Bundeswehr and its available assets whenever a particular situation cannot be managed without its assistance. To date, the use of military munitions in such cases has been prohibited. The Federal Government deems it necessary to expand the constitutional framework in this regard.

The structure of the Bundeswehr is consistently oriented towards its operational needs. Consequently, the German Armed Forces are organised into the categories of response, stabilisation, and support forces. They are trained, equipped, and deployed according to their respective functions. The Bundeswehr will continue to be a conscript force in the future; universal conscription has proven to be an unqualified success in varying security environments. The tenets of “Innere Führung” – leadership development and civic education – will remain the Bundeswehr’s guiding principles.

However, the effectiveness of the Bundeswehr depends not only on its personnel but also on the availability of financial resources. The ever-present dichotomy between the requirements of defence policy and the financial needs of other national tasks will continue into the future.

Today’s Bundeswehr has been shaped by international missions. Already, more than 200,000 military personnel have served on operations abroad. The cost to the Bundeswehr for humanitarian relief operations has also been steadily increasing over the past years, tying up its resources.

Successful missions require armed forces that can be deployed across the entire task spectrum. To realise this goal, the Bundeswehr is continuously working to improve its capability profile. This is achieved via targeted measures in the capability categories of command and control, intelligence collection and reconnaissance, mobility, effective engagement, support and sustainability, and survivability and protection.

Modern and effective armed forces are an element of national security provisions. The Bundeswehr has been adapting to the dynamic security environment through a continual process of transformation. This process is aimed at improving operational readiness across the entire mission spectrum and requires unconditional joint force thinking and action throughout the Bundeswehr as well as a stronger interministerial approach. At the same time, any development of existing capabilities must take into account the Bundeswehr’s multinational engagement. The ability to conduct network-enabled operations will be a fundamental prerequisite for the Bundeswehr’s successful participation in multinational conflict prevention and crisis management.

In the future, national preventive security measures will be premised on even closer integration of political, military, development policy, economic, humanitarian, policing, and intelligence instruments for conflict prevention and crisis management. Operations at the international level will require a comprehensive, networked approach that effectively combines civilian and military instruments. The Federal Government is prepared to confront the ensuing challenge of continuously assessing and, wherever necessary, refining its instruments of security policy. This approach will best serve the security of Germany and, at the same time, contribute towards global peace.
1 Fundamentals of German Security Policy

1.1 Germany’s Security

Twelve years have elapsed since the last White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation of the Bundeswehr was published. During this time, there have been far-reaching changes in the international situation. Globalisation is opening up new opportunities for Germany, too. At the same time, the radically changed security environment is producing new risks and threats that not only have a destabilising effect on Germany’s immediate surroundings, but also impact on the security of the international community as a whole. To overcome these challenges a broad range of foreign, security, defence and development policy instruments are needed to identify, prevent and resolve conflicts in their early stages. The Bundeswehr is able to make an important contribution here thanks to its comprehensive spectrum of capabilities.

The Euro-Atlantic security structures have created a singular area of stability - a development from which Germany benefits directly. Germany is a member of the European Union and of the North Atlantic Alliance, and as such a partner and ally to be counted on. In these and other organisations, including the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Germany contributes to preserving peace, combating global threats, promoting democracy and human rights, sustained development, and cooperative security.

International terrorism is a threat to freedom and security and a central challenge. The attacks of 11 September 2001 and the acts of terror perpetrated in Europe, Asia and North Africa since then have highlighted this.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and of their means of delivery is steadily emerging as a potential threat also for Germany. State and non-state actors are endeavouring to acquire high-tech goods for criminal purposes. What is more, a number of countries are eager to acquire WMD as well as long-range delivery systems. Credible deterrence, backed up by defence, policing and intelligence measures to prevent proliferation, plus effective control of exports remain important elements for containing this risk; the same applies to arms control, disarmament, and contractual agreements on the non-proliferation of WMD.

Furthermore, Germany is being confronted to an increasing extent with the after-effects of intrastate and regional conflicts, destabilisation, and the internal disintegration of states, as well as the privatisation of force that frequently ensues.

The strategies previously effective in warding off external dangers, such as deterrence and containment, are inadequate to deal with the new asymmetric threats also often emanating from non-state actors. Effective security planning thus calls for preventive, efficient and coherent cooperation at national and international level, successfully tackling the root causes.

Germany’s security is inseparably linked to the political development of Europe, indeed of the whole world. Today Germany is part of an ever closer-knit Europe that has overcome its artificial postwar division. An important role in the future shaping of Europe, and beyond, falls to united Germany because of its size, population figures, economic power and geographical location at the heart of the continent.

Germany stands by its international responsibility for freedom and peace and, in doing so, strives for the long-term protection and welfare of its citizens. It is determined to exploit the greater freedom and room for shaping progress in a world of globalisation and, together with its allies and partners, to address crisis developments that affect its security.

Since the mid nineties, the organisations vital to the security of Germany have evolved significantly and adapted to the new risks and challenges.

The North Atlantic Alliance, in its Strategic Concept of 1999, defined conflict prevention and crisis management as a core task of the Alliance, in order to strengthen the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. New capability requirements reflecting the changed spectrum of tasks of NATO have been laid down for the armed forces of the NATO countries in the years since then. The Alliance has, at the same time, developed an active partnership policy, opened itself to the new democracies in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and, as a result, decisively consolidated Europe as an area of stability.

The European Union has grown steadily closer together since the early nineties. It has continued to develop a greater capability for action on foreign and security policy matters. It has defined military and civilian headline goals, established politico-military structures for operations, set up
1.2 The Strategic Context – Global Challenges, Opportunities, Risks and Dangers

Today, our security policy faces new and ever more complex challenges. Transborder risks as well as conflicts within and between states are putting Germany to the test in a completely new way. We therefore need to take precautions against risks and threats to our security and to counter them in good time at source.

Given such threats posed by WMD and international terrorism, internal and external security are overlapping more and more. The Armed Forces must be prepared to make their capabilities available in the homeland, too, in support of the security and protection of our citizens.

Globalisation

The process of globalisation is affecting every state and society around the world. The evolution and progressive networking of international flows of trade, investments, travel, communication and knowledge are primarily opening up new opportunities. Germany, whose economic prosperity depends on access to raw materials, goods and ideas, has an elementary interest in peaceful competition of thoughts and views, an open world trade system and unrestricted transportation routes. The hugely accelerated and facilitated exchange of ideas and technology is a further characteristic of globalisation. Societies are becoming more mutually dependent. Major financial transactions move around the world within seconds, and the Internet and satellite communication networks people at the remotest locations. The global village is becoming reality.

Global change is an ongoing process and will, also in future, involve constant adaptation to new situations and circumstances. Germany, together with its partners and allies, is taking up the challenges this poses and is helping to shape the process commensurate with our responsibility and interests.

The end of the East-West conflict has given the United Nations greater scope to fulfill the task of preserving world peace and international security, as defined in its Charter. Ever greater hopes are being pinned on the UN to ensure global peace. As a result, the UN is turning to NATO and the EU more frequently for assistance.

As NATO, the EU and the UN have adapted to the changed world, the tasks facing the member countries have also increased. Germany, in its Defence Policy Guidelines (2003) and Bundeswehr Concept (2004), has drawn far-reaching consequences from the changed situation for the Bundeswehr. For years now the Bundeswehr has consistently pursued the course of transition towards an expeditionary force, involving radical transformation. Since the mid-nineties Bundeswehr personnel have seen service in the cause of peace in regions such as the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Horn of Africa, the African continent, the Middle East, and Asia. The number of these missions, their durations and personnel strengths, the areas of deployment and the mandates involved underscore how security policy has changed over the past twelve years.

Global change is an ongoing process and will, also in future, involve constant adaptation to new situations and circumstances. Germany, together with its partners and allies, is taking up the challenges this poses and is helping to shape the process commensurate with our responsibility and interests.
Terrorism

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington, and the subsequent series of terror acts stretching from Bali to Madrid and London, have illustrated the vulnerability of modern states and societies worldwide. They underline that the most immediate danger to our security currently emanates from international terrorism perpetrated methodically in transnational networks. With their attacks, terrorists aim to achieve the greatest possible media impact, to intimidate people, and to shake the polity, not least of all by attacking civilian targets of symbolic character, fully aware that there will be a high number of casualties. To these ends, terrorists are making ever greater use of new technologies and modern means of communication. Germany cannot escape this danger, there having been repeated instances where also German citizens have lost their lives in such attacks.

Proliferation and Military Build-up

The signs of military build-up observed in many parts of the world and the excessive accumulation of military materiel can have negative implications for regional security and, consequently, one of the largest political challenges to the international community of states. This applies particularly to the contingency of terrorist groups and non-state actors obtaining access to radiological, chemical and biological agents. Sources of proliferation often stem from inadequate national export controls or state actors deliberately trading in proliferation-relevant goods.

Regional Conflicts

Unresolved political conflicts on the periphery of the European area of stability and in remoter regions are, to a growing extent, also impinging on the security of Germany and its European partners. The erosion of state structures, the disintegration of entire nations, frequently resulting in civil wars, and the creation of regions that place themselves outside the international order all open up areas where armed groups and terrorist organisations can operate and take refuge. They encourage organised crime, corruption, trafficking in human beings, and the cultivation of drug economies. In consequence, they not only have a destabilising effect on their immediate environment but also diversely affect the security of the international community in the globalised world. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was an example of this, until the international community of states succeeded in putting the country on track towards stabilisation under the leadership of a democratically legitimised government.

Even on the European continent and at its periphery, there is still potential for intra- and inter-state conflicts along ethnic and religious dividing lines. The collapse of the former Yugoslavia in the Balkans in the nineteen-nineties, for instance, led to grave violations of human rights, leading and civil war, including thousands of dead and hundreds of thousands of refugees, and could only be ended through resolute and concerted intervention by the international community of states. By 1998 it was possible, in the course of the NATO-led stabilisation operations IFOR (Implementation Force) and SFOR (Stabilisation Force), to create a secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, making reconstruction as well as the return of over 400,000 refugees from Germany possible.

Illegal Arms Trade

Uncontrolled exports of conventional arms and illegal international arms trading have continued to increase in recent years. Easy availability and the misuse especially of small arms and light weapons prolong and aggravate conflicts, and contribute towards the destabilisation of societies and states.

Obstacles to Development and Fragile Statehood

In parts of Africa and Asia, supply and distribution problems, besides the factors inherent in globalisation, repeatedly affect political and social stability. The consequences of climate changes may compound these effects even further. Economic and ecological factors, frequently amplified by inefficiency and corruption up to government level, give rise to political tensions. State failure and uncontrolled migration can play a role in the destabilisation of entire regions and have a lasting, negative effect on international security. In this connection the responsibility for the security of our country stands alongside the moral obligation to provide assistance.

Transportation Routes – Resources – Communication

Germany has a particular interest in international stability and an unhindered exchange of goods because of its ever closer integration into the world economy. Like many other nations it is highly dependent on a secure supply of raw materials and safe transportation routes around the world, as well as reliant on functioning information and communication systems. Distortions in international relations, disruptions in the flows of raw materials and goods due to increasing piracy, for example, and interruptions in worldwide communications cannot fail in an interdependent world to have repercussions on the national economy, prosperity and social peace.
Energy Security
A secure, sustained and competitive supply of energy is of strategic importance for the future of Germany and Europe. Global challenges result, such as the growing need for energy worldwide, the increasing regional and inter-regional trade in energy, proliferation risks, rising climatic protection requirements, and the necessity in developing countries to improve access to energy thereby opening up opportunities for economic development. Energy issues will play an ever more important role for global security in future. Germany’s and Europe’s growing dependence on imported fossil energy resources calls for an intensification of the dialogue and cooperation between producer, transit and consumer countries, including trade and industry. To ensure energy supplies in the long term, it will be vital to have differentiated sources of energy, to develop indigenous forms of renewable energy and a balanced energy mix, and to reduce the demand for energy by using it economically and efficiently. It is also imperative to ensure the security of the energy infrastructure.

Migration
Europe and Germany continue to hold a high attraction for people who have left their homelands because of wars and civil wars, displacement, persecution, environmental destruction, poverty, hunger and other distress situations in order to seek a better life. The effects of uncontrolled migration on domestic policy as a consequence of refugee movements are a growing problem for European societies, whose capacity for integration can be overtaxed by flows of civil war and environmental refugees and economic migrants. To deal with the causes of migration effectively, it is necessary to have in place a range of instruments across the political spectrum that can, in particular, address the reasons for migration and strengthen the affected states and societies so that they themselves can assure security, the respect of fundamental human rights, and development opportunities for their people.

Epidemics and Pandemics
Rising levels of migration, international mobility and global world trade are conducive to the spread of epidemics and pandemics. The advance of HIV/AIDS (Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome), especially in Africa, serves to illustrate how such a threat to world health at the same time brings poverty and social instability to the regions most heavily affected. Epidemics and pandemics can develop into a serious threat to stability and peace.

1.3 Values, Interests and Goals of German Security Policy
The Basic Law, which lays down Germany’s commitment to the preservation of peace, the unification of Europe, the observance and strengthening of international law, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and integration into a system of mutual collective security, continues to provide valid points of reference.

German security policy is guided by the values enshrined in the Basic Law and by the goal of safeguarding the interests of our country, in particular:

- preserving justice and freedom, democracy, security and prosperity for the citizens of our country and protecting them from dangers;
- ensuring the sovereignty and integrity of German territory;
- preventing regional crises and conflicts that may affect Germany’s security, wherever possible, and helping to control crises;
- confronting global challenges, above all the threat posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD;
- helping to uphold human rights and strengthen the international order on the basis of international law;
- promoting free and unhindered world trade as a basis for our prosperity thereby helping to overcome the divide between poor and rich regions of the world.

German security policy takes account of general long-term conditions as well as changing interests. The constants include Germany’s geographical location at the heart of Europe and the experience gained from German and European history, our worldwide integration as a trading and industrialised nation, and international obligations arising particularly from our membership of the United Nations, the European Union and NATO. German security policy also has to take account of developments in geographically remote regions, insofar as they affect our interests. These are not static, but contingent on international constellations and developments. In the age of globalisation, interests can no longer be defined solely in geographical terms.

The central goal of German foreign and security policy continues to be to shape the transatlantic partnership in the Alliance with the future in mind, and to cultivate the close and trusting relationship with the USA. Now and in the future, the fundamental issues of European security can be only addressed together with the USA.

A further, overriding goal of German security policy is to strengthen the European area of stability through consolidation and expansion of European integration and through a proactive neighbourhood policy of the European Union with the states of Eastern Europe, southern Caucasus, Central Asia and the Mediterranean region. At the same time, we are striving to develop and deepen a lasting and durable security partnership with Russia.

The Federal Government additionally attaches great importance to the development and further deepening of security partnerships with countries in far-away regions.

German security policy is multilateral in character. Together with the member states of the European
Union, Germany is committed to active multilateralism. No state in the world nowadays is able to ensure its security on its own. Germany therefore safeguards its security interests primarily in international and supranational institutions and plays an active role in shaping their policies.

German security policy is forward-looking. The new German security policy is forward-looking. The new risks and threats to Germany and Europe have their origin in regional and global developments, often far beyond the European area of stability. They are multifarious and dynamic, and will spread if not addressed promptly. Preventive security can hence be guaranteed most effectively through early warning and pre-emptive action, and must incorporate the entire range of security policy instruments.

German security policy is based on a comprehensive concept of security. Risks and threats have to be addressed with a suitably matched range of instruments. These include diplomatic, economic, development policy and policing measures as well as military means and, where called for, also armed operations. The latter entail dangers to life and limb and can have far-reaching political consequences. The Federal Government will therefore continue in future to examine in each individual case what German values and interests require the operational involvement of the Bundeswehr.

1.4 Networked Security

The chief determinants of future security policy development are not military, but social, economic, ecological and cultural conditions, which can be influenced only through multinational cooperation. It is therefore not possible to guarantee security by going it alone, or with armed forces only. What is called for, rather, is an all-embracing approach that can only be developed in networked security structures based on a comprehensive national and global security rationale.

Germany uses its influence in the relevant international and supranational organisations, from the United Nations, European Union, North Atlantic Alliance, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, International Monetary Fund and World Bank, through to the G8 framework, to improve the coherence of the community of states and its capability to take action.

An all-round picture of the situation and, building upon that, a shared situational understanding of all the actors form the basis for security policy decisions, at national and international level. In developing a picture of the national situation, an interministerial approach is needed that considers and brings together all aspects. Cooperation between the Federal Intelligence Service and the military intelligence organisation of the Bundeswehr has already been intensified as a step in this direction. In future the Federal Intelligence Service will, as part of its statutory responsibilities, take over the task of central situation analysis and updating for the Federal Ministry of Defence (FMoD) and the Bundeswehr, contingent on their requirements. This is also to meet the increased demand for information of forces on operations as a consequence of the broadened task spectrum of the Bundeswehr. On the basis of the most accurate information possible, military instruments can be purposefully deployed as part of a political strategy.

Important steps have been taken to establish an interministerial network structure by setting up the “Crisis Response Centre of the Federal Foreign Office”, where the crisis unit of the Federal Government meets in the event of civil crises and disasters abroad, the “National Air Security Centre”, the “Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre”, and various facilities at Federal and Land level for the protection of the population. This structure remains open to adjustments to cope with changed tasks. An intensified exchange of personnel between the supreme federal authorities, and suitable continuation training measures, for instance at the Federal College for Security Studies, will additionally help to expand interministerial cooperation.

The Federal Government’s overall concept of “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace Building” is an element of this national security rationale. It comprises the areas of economic, environmental, financial, educational and social policy, among others, besides the classic fields of foreign, security, defence and development policy. The necessity of networking security structures and their main actors derives from this, with the elimination of structural crisis causes being seen as a cross-cutting, inter-agency task. The concept is being implemented under the responsibility of an interministerial steering group to which all federal ministries belong.

The ‘Civilian Crisis Prevention’ Action Plan as an Example of Interministerial and Networked Security Provision

With the ‘Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace Building’ Action Plan, the Federal Government has reaffirmed its resolve to gradually give German contributions to peace, security and development a more preventive orientation, thus making them more effective and sustainable. By taking more and broader-based preventive measures, the risks of evolving crises and hence the necessity of military crisis response operations in particular is to be reduced. Lessons learned in the past few years have shown that the chances of sustainable peace solutions increase when actors from different fields of politics bring their instruments to bear by using an integrated approach. The concept of ‘Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace Building’, which follows the logic of the 2003 European Security Strategy, integrates all available crisis prevention instruments in a concerted political approach oriented towards attaining civilian objectives. The term ‘Civilian Crisis Prevention’ is not to be understood as a delimitation towards military crisis prevention, but rather includes it. It includes the handling of conflicts before the outbreak of violence, crisis management, and also post-conflict rehabilitation (nation building). It is only through sustainable consolidation of peace and stability and the establishment of ownership on the part of those concerned that the renewed outbreak of conflicts can be prevented.

The cornerstones of the Action Plan and the most important measures for its implementation are the following:

- Orientation on the broader notion of security, and comprehensive interpretation of crisis prevention measures as political instruments to be used prior to, during and after a conflict;
- The principle of cross-cutting, coherent action through intermeshing of all available instruments;
- The realisation that cooperation and transparency at national level must be supported by appropriate crisis prevention structures, and that effective crisis prevention in a multinational network requires the availability, capability and networking of respective structures at European and global level;
- The complementary role of civilian society and non-state actors, giving special consideration to the peace potential of women.
No state is able to ensure peace, freedom, security and prosperity for itself and its citizens on its own. National security planning calls for networked structures in Germany and close multinational coordination. German security policy is committed to effective multilateralism, based on the conviction that the challenges to international security can only be mastered together with partners. The observance and strengthening of international law as well as the multilateral orientation of German foreign and security policy are values that are explicitly anchored in the Basic Law.

2 German Security Policy in the International Environment

2.1 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Lines of Development
The transatlantic partnership remains the bedrock of common security for Germany and Europe. It is the backbone of the North Atlantic Alliance, which in turn is the cornerstone of German security and defence policy. NATO is committed to safeguarding the principles of democracy, freedom and the rule of law and lays the foundation for collective defence. Forming the link between two continents, it provides a unique range of political and military instruments for peacekeeping and peace restoration. In this regard, it is the most successful alliance in history.

The global challenges confronting German security would be insurmountable in the long run without an efficient transatlantic alliance based on mutual trust of the member states. The friendly relations between Germany and the United States of America have developed historically; they are based on common cultural roots, and are an expression of a community of shared values and interests that has proved its worth time and again. The reconstruction of Germany and its democratic and peaceful reunification would not have been possible without the support of the United States of America. The fundamental issues of European security can be addressed only in a joint effort with the United States of America, and this will continue to hold true in future. The bonds between Germany and the United States must be continually fostered and deepened, though, by means of mutual consultation and coordinated action. Maintaining a close and trusting relationship with the USA is paramount for Germany’s security in the 21st century.

Due to its political ambition, its economic weight, its military capabilities and resulting influence, the USA has always played a prominent part in the Alliance. Germany continues to seek compatibility and interoperability of its Armed Forces with those of both the United States and its other allies. This is crucial if Germany is to maintain its military capability to honour alliance commitments and take action so that it can continue to fulfill its role as a relevant partner.

Even against the backdrop of the changing international political environment, NATO offers a reliable security framework to Europeans and Americans alike. Over the past 15 years the Alliance has repeatedly drawn political and conceptual conclusions from the changed security situation. It has changed its military capability profile, conducted military crisis management operations in Europe and beyond, admitted transition states of Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and established a close network of partnerships beyond the borders of the Alliance. The changed tasks in Europe and elsewhere, and NATO’s operational spectrum resulting from them, call for a broad process of consultation in the North Atlantic Council, extended political dialogue with partners, and closer cooperation with international and regional organisations. From the German point of view, the Strategic Partnership between NATO and the European Union plays a prominent role in this regard.

Germany has supported NATO’s open-door policy from an early stage. This policy led to the accession of three former Warsaw Pact members in 1999 and of another seven countries in 2004. Article 10 of the 1949 Washington Treaty will continue to apply, with the door still open to states seeking membership provided that they recognise NATO’s goals and are able to contribute to common security.

Instabilities, crises and conflicts are impacting on the Alliance ever more frequently and directly as a consequence of globalisation. Over the past decade its operational spectrum has changed profoundly. Peacekeeping, stabilisation and peace enforcement operations, to an increasing extent in cooperation with the European Union, are NATO’s central fields of activity today. Together with the forces of allied and friendly nations, the Bundeswehr is making a considerable contribution to the NATO missions in Afghanistan, in Kosovo and to the maritime operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR in the Mediterranean. Following the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, NATO declared for the first time in its history that this was an Article 5 contingency as defined in the North Atlantic Treaty. All operations serve the purpose of active preventive security through timely measures geared to preventing or containing violent conflicts and, following an armed conflict, to supporting sustainable stabilisation and the reconstruction of state and societal structures.

The further development of NATO’s partnership policy continues to be an integral element of its cooperative external relations. In view of NATO’s growing commitment beyond the borders of the Alliance it is increasingly important to maintain well-functioning relations with other international organisations and
states. Intensive political dialogue in a spirit of trust and multi-faceted practical cooperation help to establish a basis for political and operational support of NATO missions by numerous partner nations.

With the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which Germany has been instrumental in advancing, NATO has rendered a considerable contribution to the stabilisation of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In future, the important thing will be to exploit the partnerships and the range of instruments created under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) project more intensively and to improve the political dialogue “at 27”, as well as to extend the participation of EAPC members in NATO-led operations.

Since the NATO–Russia Founding Act was adopted in 1997, relations with Russia have been of special importance. The NATO–Russia Council, which was established in its present form in 2002, is a forum where the Alliance members and Russia cooperate “at 27” on an equal footing. This holds true for both political dialogue and practical cooperation. Russia’s participation in the NATO-led peace mission in Kosovo from 1999 to 2003 is a prominent example of such successful cooperation. The joint fight against international terrorism is another field where Russia and NATO work together.

NATO has maintained a special partnership with Ukraine since the conclusion of the NATO–Ukraine Charter in 1997. This partnership is an important contribution to supporting the country’s defence sector reforms and its political transformation. The main fields of cooperation are laid down in the 2002 NATO–Ukraine Action Plan. Since 2005, the Alliance members and Ukraine have been conducting an intensified dialogue on accession issues. Ukraine, too, contributes to NATO-led operations.

NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue has been ongoing since 1994. NATO offers the Mediterranean Dialogue countries (participants: NATO states plus Egypt, Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Mauretania and Tunisia) consultations on political issues combined with support in building up efficient forces that are integrated into democratic structures. All this serves to promote mutual transparency, build confidence and increase interoperability, thus enabling the Mediterranean Dialogue countries to take part in crisis response operations of the Alliance. The Initiative established at the 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul on cooperation with countries of the broader Middle East region (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative,ICI), which addresses in the first instance the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia), is an offer extended by the Alliance to engage in dialogue and practical cooperation to promote security and stability.

The Alliance is particularly interested in developing relations with additional partner states that are able to provide efficient forces as a substantial contribution towards NATO-led operations and are, at the same time, democracies embracing the same political values and goals as NATO.

The new security environment has led to changes in the tasks to be mastered by the Alliance. Today they range from the continuing central commitment to collective defence, to humanitarian operations in disaster areas, through to robust stability operations in Europe and at its periphery as well as far beyond the boundaries of NATO territory. The capabilities needed for this must also be retained in the future.

A debate on the role of deterrence in the security environment of the 21st century has been initiated in the Alliance, the results of which will be incorporated in a new NATO Strategic Concept at the appropriate point in time. Besides conventional means, the Alliance will continue to need nuclear assets in the foreseeable future as a credible deterrence capability.

The Alliance members’ nuclear forces have a fundamentally political purpose, this being to preserve peace, prevent coercion and war of any kind. The allies’ common commitment to preventing war and the credible demonstration of Alliance solidarity, as well as the fair sharing of burdens, require Germany to make a contribution towards nuclear participation commensurate with its role in the Alliance and the principles laid down in the Strategic Concept of 1999.

At the same time, the Federal Government continues to pursue the goal of worldwide abolition of all weapons of mass destruction. Germany itself has entered into a binding obligation under international law to renounce possession of such weapons. Since the early nineties, NATO member states have reduced the number of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe by more than 85 percent. They are being kept to the minimum level needed to safeguard peace and stability.

Within the wider set of tasks, the Alliance must be prepared to conduct a number of concurrent operations of varying type and intensity over increasing distances and to sustain them for prolonged periods. This necessitates a fundamentally different force posture than in the past. In view of continuing pressures on the defence budgets of most allies, it is therefore important to change and streamline obsolete structures and concentrate the resources available on the capabilities needed in future.
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In December 2005 the member states adopted the

Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) to take account of the ever-changing security environment.

It complements the Strategic Concept, refines it in compliance with Germany’s comprehensive concept of security, and thus points the discussion on transformation within the Alliance in the right direction.

The CPG covers all NATO planning disciplines and promotes their harmonisation, thus contributing to greater efficiency. The central objective is to derive the future capabilities needed by the armed forces of the member states and the Alliance in an understand-

able way. In future, NATO’s efforts will to an increasing extent focus on stabilisation operations and military support for the rebuilding of state structures.

What is increasingly important in this regard is the coordinated use of all political and military instruments and capacities available to NATO. It is additionally necessary to organise cooperation even more closely with other international organisations, in particular with the United Nations and the Euro-

pean Union.

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strategic objectives (Level of Ambition, LoA) were hence realigned accordingly. They describe the nature, intensity, scale and number of NATO-led operations that allies want to be able to contribute to. It is from these that the Alliance’s requirements for national forces are derived. The capabilities, strength, readiness level and availability of such forces are coordinated and harmonised under NATO force planning.

For conflict prevention and crisis management, the armed forces of the NATO member states need to be better geared to jointness and to be able to perform a wide range of tasks in a combined environment.

The requirements that armed forces have to meet for crisis response operations are just as complex as those entailed in high-intensity combat operations in the context of collective defence. It is therefore vital for NATO to be able to draw on forces of sufficient quantity and quality, enabling it to respond appropriately across the entire task spectrum.

The Prague Summit of November 2002 brought international terrorism, asymmetric threats and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction into the focus of threat analysis. NATO has made it its business to counter the risks and dangers to its security at source and, as a result, has expanded its geographical sphere of action beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. The adoption of a comprehensive catalogue of measures to combat international terrorism, an extensive package aimed at transforming military capabilities, and the resolution to improve the Alliance’s capabili-
ties to counter nuclear, biological, radiological and chemical threats underscore NATO’s reorientation (Prague Capabilities Commitment, PCC).

The Alliance’s military transformation also manifests itself in a modified command structure, a new force structure and the development of new capabilities. The hallmark of the NATO command structure reform

The Alliance’s Strategic Concept of 1999 – NATO’s fundamental security tasks

As an Alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

- **Security**: To provide an indispensable foundation for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate any other through the threat of force.

- **Consultation**: To serve as an essential transatlantic forum for allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests and for appropriate coor-
dination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

- **Deterrence and Defence**: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

- **In order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area**:
  - **Crisis Management**: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.
  - **Partnership**: To promote wide-ranging partner-
ship, cooperation, and dialogue with other coun-
tries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.

The changed force structure also reflects NATO’s reorientation on security and strategic issues. The improvement of its command and control capability, deployability, sustainability and operational readi-

ness across the entire task spectrum serves to strength-
en NATO’s capacity for action and adapt it to the new challenges. The establishment of the NATO Response Force (NRF), in particular, underscores this develop-
ment. The NRF has to fulfil an important dual role: on the one hand, it is a well-trained and suitably equipped, operationally ready force and, on the other hand, it serves as a transformation catalyst for constant improvement of the military capabilities of all contributing nations. This multinational response force consisting of land, air and maritime components is deployable within days across the entire broad-
edened spectrum of tasks. It is planned that the NRF will achieve full operational capability by the end of 2006. It will comprise a land component up to brigade size, a maritime component up to naval task force size and an air component capable of 200 combat sorties.
The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is responsible to the political leadership for the planning, conduct and preparation of operations as well as follow-up activities. Command authority over the forces made available by the member nations is transferred to him.

The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), dual-hatted as Commander, US Joint Forces Command, is at the level of Strategic Commanders, responsible for the continuous transformation of NATO, his chief task being to ensure that the Alliance is fit for the future by further developing capabilities, in particular, and enhancing interoperability.
a day, totalling some 25,000 military personnel who can be assembled to form the necessary force packages tailored to the mission in hand and deployable at very short notice. Fully trained forces committed by the armed forces of the NATO member states on a six-month rotation schedule make up the NRF, which thus impacts on the overall capabilities of the Alliance. Each NRF contingent is to cover the entire spectrum of tasks up to and including high-intensity combat operations for a limited period of time autonomously.

As regards new capabilities, the Alliance is concerned with filling gaps that have been identified primarily in the areas of strategic reconnaissance, command and control and airlift capabilities. Strategic airlift, notably of outsize cargo, is just one example of the most serious capability gaps in NATO, as well as in the EU member states. For this reason, Germany has realised the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) project together with other nations. This project guarantees access to the strategic airlift capacity required to deploy rapid response forces.

Political and military transformation of the Alliance are inextricably linked. The Alliance can only fulfil its tasks if its members show the same political will to analyse the relevant security problems in a collective approach, to decide by consensus and then to take joint action. It is therefore crucial that the Alliance’s political and military transformation is continued successfully. Germany will play an active part in this process by swiftly and fully implementing the conceptual decisions taken.

### NATO Response Force

- **Land component:** brigade-size
- **Sea component:** naval task force level
- **Air component:** 200 sorties a day

The NRF dates back to a decision taken by the North Atlantic Council at the Prague Summit in November 2002 to create a multilateral response force.

To be able to meet the full spectrum of possible future missions, the NRF must be ready to move quickly to wherever military forces are needed. As a core element of NATO’s transformation process, the NRF consists of technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable forces. The NRF is hence to be a catalyst for focusing and promoting improvements in the Alliance’s military capabilities.

The NRF will achieve full operational readiness at 30 days’ notice and can operate as a stand-alone force in crisis areas for approximately 30 days.

2.2 European Union (EU)

The European Union stands for political stability, security and prosperity in Germany and its other member states. Yet also outside Europe the EU is seen as a model for a successful economic and political integrative community that can be used to export prosperity and stability. It remains the pre-eminent political goal of Germany, therefore, to strengthen the European Union as the core of the European area of stability and to push ahead with the process of European integration. The prospect of accession, and also the global network of cooperation agreements and programmes of the EU have spurred democratisation and economic development as well as the peaceful settlement of conflicts, transformations to a market economy, and democratic control of security forces. Examples include the Gothenburg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, or the Cotonou Agreement regulating cooperation with African, Caribbean and Pacific states. Germany’s national interests can best be asserted in a capable European Union.

Europe can exert its influence most effectively if it speaks with one voice. This requires a constant conciliation of interests between all member states as well as a culture of dialogue that permits open exchange, is characterised by mutual understanding and consideration, at the same time making effective leadership possible. Trusting bilateral relations between the EU partners form the foundation for constructive decisions in Brussels.

Close Franco-German relations have helped significantly over the past decades to make European integration a success. Owing to their history, intensity and special institutionalisation they occupy a prominent position in the close cooperation between the 25 EU member states. Both countries have a special responsibility for the development of the European Union because of their size, their economic resources and their historic role. The institutional basis for the close cooperation between the two countries is the Elysée Treaty of 1963. The Franco-German Defence and Security Council was founded in 1988. It facilitates coordination and agreement and serves to establish common positions. Important initiatives for strengthening the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) result from this cooperation.

The United Kingdom, given its capabilities, expertise and experience, also has a crucial role to play in furthering Europe’s capacity for action on security matters. Time and again in the past, fresh impetus to strengthen transatlantic and, consequently, European security has come from the United Kingdom. Germany needs the United Kingdom as an eminent partner in the European Union and NATO.

Moreover, great importance is attached to cooperation with our other direct neighbours.

**European Security and Defence Policy**

In future, the European Union itself must contribute to its security to a greater extent than in the past. Only a strong, united Europe capable of action on security matters can help to shoulder responsibility in overcoming the challenges to collective security. The development of the European Security and Defence Policy as an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is an expression of this awareness, as is the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by the European Council in December 2003.

The European Security and Defence Policy was “born” in Cologne, Germany, in June 1999 during the German Council Presidency. The logic of this Policy is summarised in the conclusions of the European Council adopted in Helsinki in December 1999:
‘The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.’

At the same time the heads of state and government decided to ‘improve and make more effective use of resources in civilian crisis management in which the Union and the Member States already have considerable experience.’

The ESDP aims to strengthen Europe’s capacity to act in the field of civilian and military crisis management. It is characterised by the parallel build-up of civilian and military capabilities, which is also its particular strength. A good seven years since its establishment, the European Union has increasingly gained recognition and become a valuable actor in international crisis management: in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Macedonia, in Georgia, in the Congo, in Aceh (Indonesia), in Darfur (Sudan), in the Palestinian territories and on the border between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. The replacement of the NATO-led SFOR operation by the EU Operation ALTHEA (European Union Force, EUFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina shows what strides in quality the ESDP has achieved.

The European Security Strategy is the strategic framework for employing the range of instruments available to the European Union. The ESS is in accord with the goals and interests of German security policy. It serves to define, in strategic terms, the role and tasks of the EU in a drastically changed security environment, and in the conditions of a globalised world. The ESS reflects the increased clout of the enlarged Union, which has assumed responsibility as a global actor. At the same time, it identifies ways in which the EU can bring to bear its political, economic and military weight and that of its member states - more effectively and coherently, and with improved capabilities. It provides the EU’s overarching range of instruments for conflict prevention, crisis management and post-crisis activities to confront the global challenges.

The Strategy focuses on three objectives. To address new threats, the European Union must first commit itself early on with its entire available range of instruments. Whenever possible, action should be taken even before a crisis develops. Secondly, the ESS places emphasis on establishing peace and stability in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood. It draws upon the EU’s longstanding experience with stabilisation processes in its vicinity. Thirdly, it places the EU under the obligation to uphold and further develop international law and calls for the strengthening of the community of states, smoothly functioning international institutions, and a well-regulated world order.

The European Security Strategy furthermore emphasises the importance of the role of the Charter of the United Nations as the fundamental framework for international relations, as well as the irrereplaceability of the transatlantic relationship and the aim of an effective and balanced partnership with the United States of America.

**EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY – “A secure Europe in a better world”**

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The European Security Strategy of December 2003 identifies the main threats and challenges to European security, strategic goals, and implications for European politics.
The European Union has adapted its European Security and Defence Policy procedures and structures and created new institutional structures in order to meet the complex requirements of crisis management operations. The most important decisions in this regard were taken by the European Council in Nice in December 2000.

Political decisions relating to European Security and Defence Policy are, as a rule, made by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), within the framework of which the defence ministers also meet and take decisions. This takes into account the EU’s increasing military capabilities and the growing responsibility of the defence ministers.

In regard to crisis management, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) assumes political control and strategic direction of operations on behalf of the Council. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) as the decision-making and discussion forum of the chiefs of defence of the member states or their deputies, and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), composed of diplomats and civilian experts, advise the PSC on all issues of military or civilian crisis management and on the development of suitable capabilities.

Also fundamentally inherent in the European Union’s institutional structure is the need for intensive networking of the range of civilian and military instruments. In December 2004, the European Council approved detailed proposals for improving the EU’s capabilities for the planning and conduct of operations. The establishment of a Civil-Military Cell enables the EU to make preparatory and coherent plans for civil-military crisis management operations. This Cell is also responsible for forming the nucleus of an Operation Centre that can be activated by a Council decision as needed, and subsequently augmented. The Operation Centre is to be able to plan and conduct EU operations involving up to 2,000 personnel over the entire task spectrum if no national headquarters is designated for the task. This capability can be utilised particularly in cases where a joint civil-military mission is called for.

Capabilities

With the European Headline Goal (EHG) adopted in Helsinki in December 1999 the European Council formulated a common European objective to establish military rapid reaction forces. This was to enable the European Union to cope with the entire spectrum of crisis management tasks provided for in the EU Treaty.

As a result, the member states are today capable of deploying as many as 60,000 land forces and, depending on the situation, naval and air forces in a theatre of operations within 60 days. Germany contributes a contingent of up to 18,000 military personnel for this purpose. These troops are able to carry out the full military range of so-called Petersberg tasks, as well as operations for a period of at least a year.

The bulk of the EU reaction forces are not kept constantly at the ready and in fixed structures, but are assembled in response to the situations and missions as they arise. They are drawn from existing national and multinational staffs and units.

In June 2004, the European Council reformulated the military objective of the European Headline Goal. According to the new Headline Goal 2010, the forces will be geared to operations that are more likely to arise. This calls for the capability to carry out various conflict prevention and crisis management operations on different scales concurrently. This approach corresponds with the European Security Strategy.
The force elements necessary to assemble a battlegroup either come from a single EU member state or are contributed multinationally. The Bundeswehr has participated substantially from the outset in the implementation of the concept. Once full operational capability has been established in the first half of 2007, Germany and the Netherlands will form a battlegroup, in which Finland will also participate.

The Federal Government has additionally been successful in inducing the European Union to decisively upgrade its civilian crisis management capabilities. In December 2004, the European Council launched the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, which contains planning objectives for civilian crisis management. The implementation of this Headline Goal involves the strengthening or build-up of those civilian crisis management capabilities that the EU needs to cope with future tasks and challenges in the civilian area. The following priority areas have been identified: police and the rule of law, civilian administration and disaster control, monitoring, and providing support to EU special representatives.

Within the context of implementing the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, the EU also aims to set up and deploy integrated Civilian Response Teams (CKTs) for civilian crisis management. Experts are to be identified and trained by the end of 2006 for deployment at very short notice in integrated Civilian Response Teams.

The European Union has set itself the goal of being able to conduct two concurrent crisis management operations with one battlegroup, respectively. This means keeping two battlegroups in the highest state of readiness at all times. The European Union has had the first battlegroups of limited operational capability at its disposal since early 2005.

**EU Battlegroups**

- The Battlegroups Concept is based on a Franco-British-German initiative from 2003 aimed at furthering the rapid response capabilities of the EU in the event of crises.
- Battlegroups are deployable task forces (at 10 to 15 days’ notice), each with a multinational strength of around 1,500 military personnel, designed for rapid, robust action across the full range of tasks of the EU. They are considered to be best suited for deployment as combat forces in a crisis management context. There are basically no geographical restrictions as to their deployment. Brussels has agreed on a distance of 6,000 km as the planning basis for operations.
- The EU has set itself the goal of being able to conduct two crisis management operations simultaneously, using one battlegroup respectively, from 2007 onwards. This involves keeping at least two battlegroups in the highest state of availability at all times. The European Union has had the first battlegroups of limited operational capability available since early 2005.

Efficient cooperation on armaments in Europe is conducive to European security policy goals, furthering the development of force capabilities, and strengthens the position of the European Union both in competition with the United States of America and as its cooperation partner. Germany will strive to maintain a capable and competitive industrial base in core technological and armaments areas as a prerequisite for future cooperability.

**European Defence Agency**

The determination to improve the capabilities required in the field of European crisis management was underscored by the foundation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) by the European Council in June 2004. It has the tasks of harmonising the military requirements of the member states, promoting European armaments cooperation, improving the effectiveness of European defence research and technology development, strengthening the defence industrial and technology base, and creating a competitive European market for defence materiel. The Agency is managed by a steering committee on which the defence ministers of the participating states sit under the chairmanship of the Secretary General / High Representative of the EU. The Agency is run under the authority of the Council. The General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting at defence minister level decides on fundamental issues regarding the Agency’s activities. The EDA works together with the European Commission, the Political and Security Committee and EU Military Committee as well as international organisations and groups to fulfil its tasks.

The Headline Goal 2010 is being implemented by means of, among other things, the EU Battlegroups Concept agreed on in 2004. The Battlegroups Concept is based on a Franco-British-German initiative launched in 2003 with the aim of furthering the rapid reaction capabilities of the European Union in the event of crises. Each battlegroup has a strength of 1,500 multinational personnel and is designed for rapid and resolute action across the entire EU task spectrum. If called for by a crisis situation, the battlegroups should be able to begin their mission in the area of deployment within fifteen days after a Council decision has been taken on the crisis management concept. A distance of 6,000 kilometres from Brussels was agreed as the planning basis for operations.

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**Petersberg Tasks**

Treaty of Nice (Art. 17 (2) Treaty on European Union)

- Humanitarian and rescue tasks
- Peacekeeping tasks
- Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking

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Efficient cooperation on armaments in Europe is conducive to European security policy goals, furthering the development of force capabilities, and strengthens the position of the European Union both in competition with the United States of America and as its cooperation partner. Germany will strive to maintain a capable and competitive industrial base in core technological and armaments areas as a prerequisite for future cooperability.
2.3 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – European Union (EU)

The Strategic Partnership between NATO and the EU is a vital pillar of the European and transatlantic security architecture. The EU and NATO are not in competition with one another, but make complementary contributions to our security. Only together can the democracies of Europe and North America that belong to both organisations guarantee their security. Germany will therefore strive for fundamental improvements in the relationship between both organisations so as to achieve closer cooperation and greater efficiency, avoid duplications, and strengthen European and transatlantic security as a whole. The dialogue between the EU and NATO needs improving at all levels. Germany is campaigning for a more efficient coordination of NATO and EU activities. This will benefit the efficiency of both organisations and conserve resources, which are scarce in all the member states of both organisations. At present, 19 states are already members of both organisations. The number of dual memberships is set to increase over the next few years. This is one reason why very close coordination and pragmatic cooperation will be necessary in the interest of both sides. The Strategic Partnership between the EU and NATO must be further developed with this in mind.

NATO, and remains, the foundation for the collective defence of its member states. No other organisation is able to take on this task in the foreseeable future. It is the transatlantic forum for consultation and the natural choice for all military operations involving European and American allies. It has comparative advantages when it comes to complex military crisis management operations requiring robust and proven military structures, procedures, forces and capabilities for combat and stabilisation tasks. Primarily because of the strategic capabilities and force contributions made available by the USA, it boasts a unique military potential. The EU, on the other hand, has a much broader spectrum of capabilities at its disposal, making it well suited for operations and missions that call for the joint employment of civilian and military assets. It is hence important to develop the different profiles, areas of expertise and strengths of the EU and NATO with the aim of complementarity and to use them as efficiently as possible.

The permanent arrangements between NATO and the EU, known as Berlin Plus, provide the framework for the Strategic Partnership between both organisations for crisis management purposes and improve the EU’s operational capability. They assure the EU access to Alliance assets and capabilities for the planning and conduct of EU crisis management operations. Operation CONCORDIA in Macedonia from March to September 2003 and the hitherto largest military operation within the scope of ESDP, Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina since December 2004, are examples of successful missions under these permanent arrangements. The Berlin Plus arrangements also provide for early political consultations between both organisations in the field of crisis management. In future, greater and more timely use should be made of this possibility in the case of newly emerging conflicts and crises.

The partnership between the EU and NATO should be further developed by intensifying the strategic dialogue on all aspects of security policy. The topics dealt with at the formal meetings of the NATO Council and the Political and Security Committee of the EU at ambassador level are currently restricted to operations involving the Berlin Plus arrangements; Cyprus and Malta do not participate in these meetings as they are not Partnership for Peace members and have no security agreements with NATO. Although there have been positive developments in the informal dialogue also at minister level, including Cyprus and Malta, a comprehensive partnership of both organisations with all their members participating is the continued aim of German politics.
There is additionally the objective, however, of enabling the European Union to plan and lead ESDP operations autonomously. To do this, it should be able to draw on force structures of its own, at least to a limited extent.

The cooperation of both organisations should be intensified, in particular in the fields of fighting international terrorism, coordinating civil defence measures and preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The expansion and optimisation of civil-military cooperation also makes good sense. It is crucial, considering the striven-for complementarity, to broaden cooperation in terms of quality to include capability development and forces planning. Furthermore, there are many fields offering potential, including capability development and forces planning, and certification of NRF assets and EU battlegroups.

It is crucial, considering the striven-for complementarity, to broaden cooperation in terms of quality to include capability development and forces planning. Furthermore, there are many fields offering potential, including capability development and forces planning, and certification of NRF assets and EU battlegroups. As NATO and the EU use a single set of forces, the same military standards should apply as far as possible in both organisations.

2.4 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe remains the largest pan-European security organisation, in which the 56 member states, including the USA, Canada, the member states of the European Union, Russia and other successor states to the former Soviet Union participate on an equal footing. It stands for a comprehensive concept of security and plays an important role as a forum for consultation, cooperation and negotiation. It performs central tasks, among others in the establishment and improvement of constitutional and democratic structures, in protecting human and minority rights, in the promotion of civil society development, in election monitoring, conventional arms control and military transparency, in economic and environmental cooperation, as well as in the field of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-crisis rehabilitation.

The OSCE is based on comprehensive common principles and obligations in the human, economic, ecological and security dimensions (known as the OSCE Acquis). All OSCE participating states are committed to these politically binding rules and obligations, which are the legitimate basis of reference for dialogue and cooperation between the OSCE participating states.

To implement these obligations, the OSCE has created a unique and differentiated range of instruments. These include, in particular, its Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and election monitoring and field missions. In the OSCE election monitoring missions, professional observers determine whether OSCE standards for free and fair elections are being observed so that the fundamental requirements for the expression of democratic will are met. Field missions on the ground in 19 of the OSCE participating states are making significant contributions towards promoting the rule of law and establishing democratic institutions. A total of 3,200 experts accompany, advise and support participating states from Sarajevo to Astana in their reform projects and thus assist in overcoming dividing lines in Europe. Their activities comprise the entire spectrum of the OSCE Acquis and include conflict prevention and mediation (e.g. Transnistria / Republic of Moldova, South Ossetia / Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh).

Because the OSCE is an important instrument of foreign and security policy, Germany supports it by making substantial political, financial and personnel contributions. In 2005 alone, 80 German experts were assigned to the Secretariat, to institutions and OSCE missions, and about 350 election monitors were deployed on OSCE election monitoring missions. Within the scope of the reform discussion in the OSCE, Germany lends its support to a comprehensive strengthening of the OSCE as a consultation forum for security policy, as well as to the preservation and further development of the Acquis and OSCE instruments.

2.5 United Nations (UN)

The United Nations is the only universal international organisation. Its Charter provides the fundamental international law framework for international relations. The United Nations Security Council has prime responsibility for safeguarding world peace and international security. The United Nations plays an outstanding role in dealing with a multitude of issues relating to a wider concept of security: peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, the fight against hunger and poverty, the concerns about sustainable development, overcoming the North-South divide, combating global pandemics and diseases as well as drug trafficking, and the protection of natural resources. Germany is committed to strengthening the United Nations and furnishing it with the requisite means for accomplishing its tasks.

There has been a fundamental change in the number and type of UN missions since the East-West conflict ended. Currently amounting to approximately 75,000, the numbers of military and police personnel deployed on these missions have increased considerably.

After the setbacks suffered in the mid nineties (Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenica), the UN peace missions underwent an intensive reform process. Since the Brahimi Report was submitted in 2000, there has been agreement that blue helmet missions must be adequately furnished in terms of equipment and personnel, and in most cases with a robust mandate, permitting them to use force not only in self-defence but also in fulfilling their mission and in protecting the civilian population at risk.

Over the past few years, a sort of division of labour has evolved in the framework of which the classic troop-contributing countries of the Third World
have provided entire units, while the industrial countries have contributed so-called enabling elements, i.e. limited capabilities such as strategic and tactical airlift, logistics, military observers, and field medical services. Germany is also under special obligation to make respective contributions.

Another approach to dealing with the strain on the United Nations’ capacities is to make increased use of regional organisations in their own regions and elsewhere. For example, the United Nations interacts with NATO in Afghanistan, with the African Union, NATO, and the EU in Sudan, and with NATO, the EU and OSCE in Kosovo, although not necessarily all of these organisations provide troops. In the Balkans the tasks of the United Nations are increasingly being taken over by the EU.

Over the past few years, greater awareness of the importance of a more just world order has emerged where human rights must be protected and international humanitarian law strengthened. Not least due to the lessons learned in Kosovo, the notion is also emerging in western countries. In the long term, this will affect the mandating of international peace missions by the United Nations Security Council as legitimation under international law is crucial especially when military force is used.

Germany accepts its share of the responsibility to strive for world peace and international security within the framework of the United Nations. As the third-largest contributor in monetary terms after the USA and Japan, Germany currently shoulders just under nine percent of the UN budget and of the budgets for international peace missions and additionally makes obligatory and voluntary payments to sub-organisations and special organisations. Furthermore, it participates in humanitarian assistance measures by providing extensive assets. The Bundeswehr is currently represented by 50 soldiers in other UN-led missions besides its participation in the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. German participation in this respect focuses mainly on sending specially qualified individuals (military observers, medical personnel) and on the provision of special capabilities, for example in the fields of planning and logistics. Military planners in the United Nations are also turning their attention more and more to military capabilities such as the EU Battlegroups and the NATO Response Force.

International peace missions call for common doctrine and training guidelines. Joint training and exercises promote mutual understanding, trust, and professionalism. The Bundeswehr conducts appropriate training at its UN Training Centre in Hammelburg and also trains officers in international courses at the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College in Hamburg and also trains officers in international courses in the fields of planning and logistics. Military planners in the United Nations are also turning their attention more and more to military capabilities such as the EU Battlegroups and the NATO Response Force.

2.6 Arms Control and Disarmament

Arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and a restrictive armsments export policy remain important elements of a German security policy oriented towards conflict prevention.

Germany pursues a multilateral approach in this respect, striving for cooperative solutions in the conviction that an active arms control policy based on cooperation and equality can make an important contribution to regional and global stability. To promote its arms control and non-proliferation objectives, the Federal Government is strongly engaged in the pertinent international institutions and forums, in particular in the United Nations, the Disarmament Conference, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the G8.

Given the threat emanating from weapons of mass destruction, special importance has to be attached to the universalisation and reinforcement of the treaties on the prohibition and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in this regard particularly the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and to the continuation of nuclear disarmament. Of equal importance is the complete and timely destruction, verified by the OPCW, of all chemical weapons in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

In the EU, Germany supports arms control policy efforts within the scope of the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Germany’s arms control policy also addresses the prevention of unauthorised states and non-state actors from procuring weapons of mass destruction. This includes the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) proposed by the USA in 2003, which aims to prevent the sea, air and land transport of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems.
Among the treaties on the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, the CWV is of exemplary importance. This is the first and so far the only multilateral disarmament treaty to oblige the parties to the treaty to destroy an entire category of weapons of mass destruction within set time limits and under international monitoring. The Federal Government therefore advocates the full and timely implementation of the destruction regulations in particular, as well as the universal application of this Convention.

Germany is furthermore committed to securing the success of the verification conference to be held in late 2006 regarding the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons on and their Destruction (BWC). The Federal Government particularly advocates the establishment of another four-year work programme for the annual meetings of experts and states (follow-up process) in addition to the usual review of the Convention. This is intended to reinforce the BWC as long as there is no prospect of success for negotiations on a BWC verification protocol. In the medium term, the aim is to establish a binding declaration and verification regime.

As regards conventional arms control, it is still the aim of the Federal Government to achieve the ratification and implementation of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which was signed as early as in 1999 by the heads of state and government of the 30 member states in Istanbul. Germany, in addition, supports the further development of the confidence-and-security-building measures in the context of the Vienna Document, an extension of the scope of application of the Open Skies Treaty, and the promotion of regional arms control and confidence building in South-Eastern Europe through implementation of the Dayton Accord and the Stability Pact.

Germany actively supports the worldwide application of the Ottawa Convention on the global ban of anti-personnel mines and its consistent implementation. In the course of the negotiations on the UN Weapons Convention, Germany as a party to this Convention is striving for further development of humanitarian arms control, particularly with regard to anti-vehicle mines and cluster munitions. Germany also attributes considerable significance to the control of small arms and light weapons, which have claimed the overwhelming majority of casualties during the conflicts of the past few decades. For example, Germany particularly advocates within the UN the introduction of uniform international guidelines for the approval of small arms transfers and has taken the initiative in putting the issue of conventional ammunition on the arms control agenda of the UN. African states especially are receiving support in small arms control within the scope of bilateral cooperation.

As the effectiveness and reliability of arms control agreements largely depend on their verification, Germany maintains a Bundeswehr Verification Centre with a staff of approximately 250 personnel to take care of this task. This Centre is tasked with ensuring compliance of the rights and responsibilities that ensue from the arms control agreements with respect to security and military policy. The Bundeswehr Verification Centre cooperates closely with the verification organisations of Germany’s allies and a large number of OSCE states.

2.7 Strengthening Relations with Partners

In this age of globalisation and new challenges, security policy cannot be limited to regions in our immediate neighbourhood. Promoting regional security cooperation and consolidating and developing good relations with the most important regional powers is a significant element of German security and stability policy.

Russia takes a special place in this bilateral cooperation, this being due to the formative experiences in the course of our common history and that country’s special role as a prominent partner of NATO and the European Union, its size and potential. Russia is one of the G8 nations, a nuclear power, and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Being a member of the European Council and of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Russia bears a special responsibility in Europe, not least in view of the situation in the regions of South Caucasus and Central Asia. For many European nations, Russia is an important energy supplier and economic partner. Without Russia, security, stability, integration and prosperity in Europe cannot therefore be guaranteed. It is in Germany’s special interest that Russia’s modernisation is supported by intensified political, economic and societal cooperation. Germany therefore promotes the improvement of Russia’s political, economic and cultural cooperation with the European Union and supports an even closer cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance.

Following the political turnaround in the wake of the 2004 Orange Revolution, Ukraine is undergoing sweeping modernisation on the way towards more democracy, constitutionality and a market economy. Germany will continue to support the political and economic reform process in Ukraine. Peace and stability in the Western Balkans are important prerequisites for Europe’s security. This is in Germany’s special interest due to its proximity to the region. Stability in the region is jeopardised by poverty, high levels of unemployment, corruption and organised crime, including human and drug trafficking, so that it is of paramount importance to establish democratic and constitutional structures, prosecute war crimes, successfully implement economic reforms and effectively protect minorities. To contain future conflicts it is also necessary to resolve the dichotomy between the national state principle and ethnic diversity. This can only be achieved, with any modicum of success, through reconciliation and integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures.

The South Caucasus and Central Asia are located at the interface between Europe, the broader Middle East and Asia. The Central Asian region also plays an important role in the field of security policy, not least in the supply operations for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The main goal there is to create sustainable stability by promoting democracy, the rule of law, economic development and regional cooperation, as well as to expand cooperation in the fight against international terrorism, organised crime and international drug trafficking.

The broader Middle East has become a hotspot of international politics due to its historical development, political-religious and cultural differences, its societal and social problems associated with modernisation, the political and military unpredictability of individual states, and its rich energy sources. The potential for conflict already present in the region is increased by the involvement of parts of the region in international terrorism, the striving for the possession of weapons of mass destruction and the development of long-range means of delivery. It is
as in the field of development aid. The importance of financial commitment in the United Nations, as well as the provision of military assistance, is crucial for stabilising international security and stability through its substantial political and economic relations with Germany and Europe. In the field of development policy, or their fringe areas. These are, in particular, issues of judicial and police reform, politico-military relations with the armed forces of partner countries, interministerial activities in post-conflict operations, the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, measures to control small arms, and their fringe areas. These are, in particular, issues of judicial and police reform, politico-military relations with the armed forces of partner countries, interministerial activities in post-conflict operations, the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, measures to control small arms, and their fringe areas.

Although there has been progress in the democratisation and political, social and economic development of a number of African states, and there is a growing awareness that they have a responsibility of their own for peace and security, major efforts are still necessary in Subsaharan Africa to stabilise state structures and further improve governance. The African continent in particular is becoming a focus of attention due to the fact that there is growing willingness among the international community to support crisis prevention and conflict management efforts. In 2003, the Bundeswehr participated in the EU-led Operation ARTEMIS in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is currently making a substantial contribution towards another EU-led operation in the Congo, the aim of which is to create a secure environment during the 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections. In Sudan, the Bundeswehr is participating in the UN-led peace mission UNMIS. It will be increasingly important in future to strengthen the capabilities of African countries to help themselves when it comes to dealing with crises and conflicts. Germany, through its partnerships in the field of security policy helps to support Africa in coping with the challenges it faces in the spirit of the G8 Action Plan for Africa of June 2002 and the EU-Africa Strategy of December 2005. It is in this context that Germany’s substantial commitment to supporting the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana, is to be seen.

Since 1999, there has been a strategic partnership between the European Union and Latin America / the Caribbean. Many countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are taking an active part in multilateral peace missions. Within the scope of this strategic partnership, the European Union supports efforts to strengthen the region’s stability by means of regional integration, greater social justice and the combating of drugs and organised crime.

Germany is represented by full- and part-time military attaches in 117 states. The Bundeswehr contributes towards the expansion of bilateral relations through a differentiated and flexible range of instruments, reciprocal visits at political and military leadership levels, staff and expert talks, personnel exchanges between training institutions, and detachment of military advisers in support of reform and restructuring processes in the partner nations.

The Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Defence, as well as other ministries where necessary, cooperate in providing equipment assistance for foreign armed forces.

Within the scope of military training assistance, the Bundeswehr offers extensive training and advanced training programmes at training facilities or in units, thus strengthening relations in the long term and serving to imbue democratic values and minds of personnel from the armed forces of our cooperation partners. The interministerial steering group commissioned by the Federal Government to coordinate the implementation of the “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace Building” action plan is developing an interministerial concept designed to assist developing nations and countries in the process of transformation with the reform of their security sector, with the aim of addressing the entire spectrum of their societies’ security needs and, at the same time, meeting the democratic standards and principles of rule law.

Although interministerial cooperation on security sector reform is still in its infant stages, there are already numerous activities that directly address established areas of foreign, security, defence and development policy, or their fringe areas. These are, in particular, issues of judicial and police reform, politico-military relations with the armed forces of partner countries, interministerial activities in post-conflict operations, the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, measures to control small arms as well as increasingly broader approaches aimed at establishing long-term structures and capacities in partner countries.
Part two
3 Mission

The mission of the Bundeswehr is an integral part of national security provision.

As an instrument of a comprehensive and proactive security and defence policy, the Bundeswehr:
- guarantees the capacity for action in the field of foreign policy;
- contributes towards European and global stability;
- maintains national security and defence;
- provides assistance in the defence of our allies;
- fosters multinational cooperation and integration.

An efficient Bundeswehr is indispensable for a German security and defence policy that plays an active and shaping role. It must be able to fulfill the enlarged spectrum of tasks and missions together with armed forces of other countries. Within the scope of its security interests, Germany commensurately provides forces that are rapidly and effectively deployable in combination with other nations’ forces. This includes supporting allies at the boundaries of Alliance territories, or in an even wider geographical context.

The Bundeswehr promotes European and global stability through its contributions towards multinational preventive security and the strengthening of international security organisations. It is a key instrument of a comprehensive, multilateral conflict prevention and crisis management policy.

The political and constitutional raison d’être of the Bundeswehr is, and always has been, to defend Germany against external threats. The growing threat that terrorist attacks pose to German territory accentuates the importance of protecting the population and infrastructure. This places additional demands on the Bundeswehr in relation to performing tasks in Germany and, therefore, its cooperation with the agencies responsible at Federal and Land level for internal security.

The Bundeswehr affords an important contribution towards the development of trusting relations in the spirit of partnership by working extensively together with armed forces all over the world. At the same time, the Bundeswehr plays a major role in the process of integration and confidence building in Europe through multinational cooperation at EU and NATO level. It promotes, as a result, also the political goal of an independently capable Europe.

3 Requirements and Parameters

The Bundeswehr –
An Instrument of German Security Policy
in Germany falls primarily to the interior security authorities at Federal and Land level. To support them, it is however possible under current law to deploy the Bundeswehr and the assets it keeps available if a given situation is manageable only with its assistance, in particular if it alone has the necessary capabilities available, or if the authorities responsible are able to ensure the protection of the population and at-risk infrastructure only in concert with forces of the Bundeswehr. The Bundeswehr provides special services in the surveillance of German air and maritime space and supports other agencies in looking after air and maritime sovereignty responsibilities. The rescue and evacuation of German citizens is fundamentally a national responsibility. It must be possible to meet this responsibility anywhere in the world independently, but also together with allies and partners, and calls for special and specialised Bundeswehr forces at a particularly high level of readiness and deployability.

Partnership and cooperation, as ongoing military tasks, serve to support political measures taken for the purpose of crisis and conflict prevention and post-crisis and post-conflict rehabilitation, and promote stability through confidence-building. They create the precondition for transparent common action and also encompass participation in multinational activities and exercises as equal partners. This includes arms control measures.

The Bundeswehr, in drawing upon available assets and capabilities, can subsidiarily provide relief aid in the event of natural disasters and particularly grave accidents at home, and as part of humanitarian relief actions and disaster responses abroad, subject to compliance with constitutional requirements. The Armed Forces can also help in connection with stabilisation operations to restore social order and infrastructure in crisis areas where this is necessary to fulfil their mission and is unrealisable by means of civilian contributions. The procedures for conducting such operations are being developed steadily further in close collaboration with other governmental and non-governmental institutions and organisations.

### 3.2 Tasks

The Bundeswehr’s tasks derive from the constitutional requirements, from its mission, and from the German security and defence policy objectives.

International conflict prevention and crisis management, including the fight against international terrorism, are tasks more likely to arise in the foreseeable future. They will dictate the structure and have a decisive influence on the capabilities, command and control systems, availability and equipment of the Bundeswehr. Conflict prevention and crisis management operations are similar in terms of intensity and complexity to operations mounted in defence of Alliance partners.

In the event of attacks on Alliance partners, NATO’s mutual defence clause applies. It may also be invoked for defence against asymmetric and terrorist attacks.

The contribution made by the Bundeswehr in protecting Germany and its population is significant. National defence within the framework of the Alliance continues to be a central responsibility of the Bundeswehr as an expression of national sovereignty and joint security provision to deter possible yet, for the foreseeable future, unlikely threats. Efficient national defence calls for reliable regional structures as well as civil-military cooperation in utilising available capacities. The concept of civil defence is being refined with this in mind and that of civil-military cooperation evolved further. A differentiation is made in this regard between civil-military cooperation at home and cooperation with civilian actors on operations abroad.

Internal and external security is becoming increasingly interwoven. The task of providing defence against terrorist and other asymmetric threats with-
3.3 Constitutional Requirements

The Bundeswehr is firmly integrated into the constitutional structure of Germany’s Basic Law and is subject to the primacy of democratically legitimised politics. The Basic Law and international law form the foundation for all German Armed Forces operations. Their observance and enforcement are indispensable components of international peace policy. International humanitarian law and the Rules of Engagement (ROE) laid down for operations are integral to the command and control process in the German Armed Forces.

Defending Germany against external military threats and remains the Bundeswehr’s core function, as provided for by the constitution. The defence of Alliance partners in the event of attacks and the rendering of assistance in crises and conflicts that may escalate into an actual threat are additional aspects. Classic national and collective defence continues to be the central task of the Bundeswehr, even if such menacing developments are unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Germany’s Basic Law affords a wide margin of freedom that makes it possible to also respond to changes in the security environment. The German Federal Constitutional Court clarified through its judgement of 12 July 1994 that the German Armed Forces may, in addition to national and Alliance defence, be deployed on international operations in the context of, and according to the rules of mutual collective security systems (Article 24 (2) of the Basic Law).

On this basis the Bundeswehr participates in international conflict prevention and crisis management missions, including the fight against international terrorism. The decision as to whether the Bundeswehr takes part in operations in an international context is primarily a responsibility of the Federal Government. Armed operations undertaken by German Armed Forces always require the constitutional stamp of approval from the German Bundestag beforehand, however. The requirement of approval serves as a means of parliamentary control over the deployment of armed forces. Support by a broad parliamentary majority is also in the interest of the servicemen and women as they go about their dangerous missions.

It is up to the Federal Government to take the initiative on deployments of the Armed Forces and define their precise terms and arrangements. The Parliamentary Participation Act that came into effect in March 2005 gave the formal and procedural aspects of the approval process for missions of the Armed Forces abroad a statutory basis for the first time. In individual cases, the conditions for political action at international level and the need to be able to respond flexibly to developments in military situations place considerable demands on those involved in the constitutional decision-making process relating to the deployment of armed forces. The Federal Government will continue to play its part in this regard in future by informing Parliament comprehensively and promptly.

Other than for defence, the Armed Forces may be employed in Germany only to the extent expressly permitted by the Basic Law (Article 87a (2)). For example, during a state of defence or tension, the Armed Forces can be deployed to protect key civilian facilities and for traffic control functions (Article 87a (3) of the Basic Law). Their employment is also permissible under certain conditions to support the police forces in the event of imminent danger to the existence or free democratic basic order of the Federation or of a Land (Article 87a (4) of the Basic Law) and to support the Laender in responding to natural disasters and grave accidents (Article 35 (2) and (3) of the Basic Law). It is possible for the Armed Forces to render legal and administrative assistance (Article 35 (1) of the Basic Law) at any time to the civilian authorities of the Federation, the Laender or local governments without having any additional sovereign powers.

The Federal Government therefore considers it necessary to expand the constitutional framework for the deployment of the Armed Forces. Due to the new quality of international terrorism and the increased violence potential of non-state actors operating largely unrestricted by territorial boundaries, attacks are now also imaginable in Germany that, because of their type, objective and impacts, exceed actual and legal parameters applied in classic hazard prevention. A forward-looking and responsible government security policy must include such extreme situations in its considerations.

To avert such possible developments, the Federal Government must take swift and concrete action. The protection of the population and critical national infrastructure is increasing in view of the growing threat that terrorist attacks pose to German territory. This is a task, first and foremost, for the Federal and Land authorities responsible for internal security. For example, the German Federal Constitutional Court, through its judgement of 15 February 2006 relating to the Act on Aviation Security, has identified the limits in this area and, at the same time, concretised the framework for supporting operations by the Armed Forces under Article 35 (2) and (3) of the Basic Law.

Terrorist attacks can, accordingly, constitute grave accidents within the meaning of Article 35 of the Basic Law. The Armed Forces may then be deployed to prevent them if an occurrence of damage is imminent with certain probability, due to a terrorist attack. As Article 35 of the Basic Law provides only a basis for assisting the responsible authorities, however, the use of military munitions has not been allowed specifically in such cases to date. The Armed Forces are restricted to using the weapons that the police are permitted to use under applicable law.

The Federal Government therefore considers it necessary to expand the constitutional framework for the deployment of the Armed Forces. Due to the new quality of international terrorism and the increased violence potential of non-state actors operating largely unrestricted by territorial boundaries, attacks are now also imaginable in Germany that, because of their type, objective and impacts, exceed actual and legal parameters applied in classic hazard prevention. A forward-looking and responsible government security policy must include such extreme situations in its considerations.
Article 87a (2), (3), (4) Basic Law

(2) Apart from defence, the Armed Forces may be employed only to the extent expressly permitted by this Basic Law.

(3) During a state of defence or a state of tension the Armed Forces shall have the power to protect civilian property and to perform traffic control functions to the extent necessary to accomplish their defence mission. Moreover, during a state of defence or a state of tension, the Armed Forces may also be authorised to support police measures for the protection of civilian property; in this event the Armed Forces shall cooperate with the competent authorities.

(4) In order to avert an imminent danger to the existence or free democratic basic order of the Federation or of a Land, the Federal Government, if the conditions referred to in paragraph (2) of Article 91 obtain and the police forces and the Federal Police Force prove inadequate, may employ the Armed Forces to support the police and the Federal Border Police in protecting civilian property and in combating organised armed insurgents. Any such employment of the Armed Forces shall be discontinued if the Bundestag or the Bundesrat so demands.

Article 35 (2), (3) Basic Law

(2) (…). In order to respond to a grave accident or a natural disaster, a Land may call for the assistance of police forces of other Länder or of personnel and facilities of other administrative authorities, of the Armed Forces, or of the Federal Border Police.

(3) If the natural disaster or accident endangers the territory of more than one Land, the Federal Government, insofar as is necessary to combat the danger, may instruct the Land governments to place police forces at the disposal of other Länder, and may deploy units of the Federal Border Police or the Armed Forces to support the police. Measures taken by the Federal Government pursuant to the first sentence of this paragraph shall be rescinded at any time at the demand of the Bundesrat, and in any event as soon as the danger is removed.

3.4 “Innere Führung” – Leadership Development and Civic Education

It is the duty of every serviceman and woman of the Bundeswehr to serve the Federal Republic of Germany faithfully and to bravely defend the rights and the freedom of the German people. Military service characteristically involves integration in a hierarchical organisation with a clear-cut chain of command, the militarily indispensable principle of command and obedience, and a very wide-ranging duty of allegiance that also includes risking one’s own life. Moreover, military personnel have control over weapons and instruments of power with a considerable destructive potential, including the authority and the obligation to use them under certain conditions.

Innere Führung – leadership development and civic education – as the guiding principle of the Bundeswehr implies that the conditions under which mission-capable military forces operate have to be brought into harmony with the principles of a free and democratic state in which the rule of law prevails. Particularly considering the special nature of military service, it is important for servicemen and women to identify closely and consciously with the values and standards anchored in the constitution. Only those who actively recognise the free, democratic basic order are able to defend it with conviction. And only those who experience constitutional principles and values themselves as a day-to-day routine develop the necessary willingness to stand up for them. For these reasons the military personnel of the Bundeswehr have the same basic rights as every other citizen. Restrictions apply only in as much as the dictates of military service make them absolutely necessary, and they then require a statutory basis.

A central element of the leadership development and civic education concept is the model of the citizen in uniform. The servicemen and women are called upon, like everybody else, to be a formative part of society. When off duty, they are active in political parties, churches, interest groups representing the socially disadvantaged, clubs and other organisations, and thus play a proactive part in the shaping of communities. Even on duty they are expected to grapple with the constraints of military service by themselves and to evolve their own positions, enabling them to contribute co-responsibly to the fulfilment of military missions.

With the formation of the Bundeswehr in the 1950s came an assimilation of the Prussian army reform principles dating back to the beginning of the 19th century. The concept of leadership development and civic education construes the establishment of the Bundeswehr as a conscious continuation of this tradition. The integration of “military and nation”, the comprehensive training and education of military leaders, and the encouragement to act on one’s own initiative have become central maxims. The formation of the Bundeswehr took place on 12 November 1955, the 200th birthday of Prussian army reformer Gerhard von Scharnhorst, as a visible expression of this tradition.

Military tradition helps soldiers to develop the image they have of themselves and of their profession. It serves to give them self-assurance, to put their actions in the greater context of history and to give them orientation for military leadership and conduct. The cultivation of traditions therefore plays a vital role for the Bundeswehr on operations.

Tradition means passing on values and standards. The cultivation of traditions in the Bundeswehr focuses on the Prussian army reforms, the military resistance to the National Socialist regime, and the history of the Bundeswehr itself. The 50 successful years of the Bundeswehr have created a tradition that deserves greater attention than in the past, and the military personnel duly need to be made aware of it.
The cultivation of tradition is a responsibility of company-level and higher commanders. These ensure that military personnel also concentrate on German history as part of their political and historical education and sharpen their awareness for attitudes and deeds that can serve as a model for the Bundeswehr. This instils inspiration to continue cultivating traditions in the Bundeswehr.

Innere Führung stands for the realisation that the capability to act on security matters requires a successful interchange between politics, society and the military. The mission and tasks of the Bundeswehr must therefore be integrated in a comprehensive political concept. The strength of the Bundeswehr is rooted especially in its close and time-tested incorporation into German society.

The concept of Innere Führung, developed during the years when Germany’s new Armed Forces were being built up, has already proved its worth on operations. The Armed Forces today are characterised by a generation of soldiers who, themselves, have experienced special operational demands as far-reaching as risking life and limb, primarily on operations abroad. Having to confront injury and death is a particular challenge that also affects the soldiers’ relatives and friends at home. The entire spectrum of operations abroad now defines the way the military personnel see themselves.

Besides being combatants, the servicemen and women in the new Bundeswehr are at the same time helpers, protectors and mediators. This job profile calls for analytical and action-taking capabilities that go far beyond purely military needs. Civic education helps them to grasp the complexity of crisis scenarios and to take account of political parameters. Intensive ethics and moral education not only helps to develop a well-considered occupational self-perception, but also promotes the capability of the individual to act on his or her own responsibility in morally difficult situations. An all-round intercultural education sharpens the awareness for specific religious and cultural aspects in the particular areas of deployment. This comprehensive educational approach boosts the motivation of the individual serviceman and woman, links their actions to the protection of peace and freedom, and strengthens assuredness, especially on operations. Innere Führung thus fosters the servicemen and women’s operational readiness and helps to enhance the standing of the Bundeswehr in mission areas.

The concept of Innere Führung is the starting point for any dialogue with our partners concerning leadership principles in their respective armed forces. The development of common concepts of leadership and military identity necessarily precedes any further intensification of cooperation on defence policy. This applies particularly to the further development of already existing bi- or multinational units and staffs. Innere Führung is also proving helpful in the transformation of the Armed Forces. Especially in a world that has become more complex, it proves an indispensable aid to military personnel in finding their orientation. Responsibility, motivation, care and welfare, mission command, and leadership by example continue, also 50 years on, to be the central ideas of the command and control philosophy in the Bundeswehr of the future.

3.5 Universal Conscription

Universal conscription has shown itself to be an unqualified success for Germany, despite the changes in the security environment. Since it was introduced more than five decades ago, a defence and force structure has evolved that, through intelligent combination of regulars and temporary-career volunteers, basic-service and extended-service conscripts and reservists, ensures a high degree of professionalism and integration in society. Basic- and extended-service conscripts contribute a broad range of knowledge and skills to the Armed Forces. Through them a continual exchange takes place between the Bundeswehr and society, particularly the young generation. The enlisted conscripts fulfill a varied spectrum of tasks in the Armed Forces, building on a broad base of educational and vocational qualifications. This reduces the training effort and helps to sustain the high personnel quality of the Armed Forces. The conscripts perform vital tasks in all military services.

Universal conscription additionally guarantees an extensive potential of rapidly available forces to protect Germany and its citizens and creates a solid foundation for recruiting suitable conscripts who volunteer for extended enlistment.

Conscripts willing to go on operations abroad can volunteer to do up to 14 months of extra military service after their nine months of basic military service. The conscripts can already opt for such an extension before induction, as well as during their basic military service. On average, 20 percent of the military personnel on deployment abroad are extended-service conscripts. This highlights the particular importance of these soldiers for the Bundeswehr.

Universal conscription serves to anchor the Bundeswehr in society. The Federal Government and the Coalition Agreement dated 11 November 2005 stand by universal conscription and by civilian service as an alternative for conscientious objectors to military service. The commitment of the young men performing their compulsory military service by way of civilian service, civil defence and disaster control as well as other forms of alternative service is also widely acknowledged in society.

Compulsory military service is a civic duty and signifies a key event in the planning of young men’s personal lives and careers. For the Bundeswehr it is important to organise military service in a meaningful way and to keep the associated stresses and strains to a minimum. The Federal Government, additionally, has the responsibility to ensure that basic- and extended-service conscripts receive the recognition they are due from society. According to the provisions of the Basic Law, all male citizens must in principle make a contribution towards the security and defence of our country. In order to make better use of the potential that the conscripts due for induction offer, as well as for the purposes of conscription equity, the Federal Minister of Defence has instructed that the numbers of inductees be increased by more than 6,500 conscripts annually for 2006 and 2007.
3.6 Financial Basis

The appropriation of suitable funding for the Bundeswehr is crucial for Germany to remain able to act on security and defence policy matters and maintain its influence with regard to international developments.

Defence spending in Germany has been subject to cutbacks since 1991 due to the changes in the security environment in Europe and German reunification. The budget of the Federal Ministry of Defence for the year 2006, without taking the pensions and benefits expenditure into account, is some 3 billion euros below the ceiling of 1991. This cutback in defence spending has helped to consolidate federal expenditure in a period of major burdens ensuing from reunification. An additional factor has been the cost-intensive build-up of the Bundeswehr in the new Länder, which has been accomplished only through changes to the force structure and consistent utilisation of every savings potential.

The transformation of the Bundeswehr into an expeditionary force involves considerable adaptation and modernisation effort. There will continue to be a dichotomy between defence policy requirements and financial needs for other national tasks. Security and defence policy cannot be formulated independently of the general budgetary development. In consequence the central fiscal objective of the Federal Government, to continue to consolidate the Federal Budget, also places binding constraints on Bundeswehr planning.

Despite huge personnel cutbacks, there is no margin for any further reductions in spending for reasons of the Bundeswehr mission and ensuing structures, and of maintaining operational and combat readiness, as well as social responsibility for its military and civilian members. Appropriate budgetary adjustments are essential in order to maintain the ceiling in real terms.

The current medium-term financial planning provides for annual growth of the defence budget. Only such a budget line will guarantee the transformation of the Bundeswehr and enable Germany to meet its international commitments to establish joint capabilities both at a European level and in the transatlantic alliance, and to carry out its international operations.

The reorientation of the defence budget, in particular the reallocation of funds from running costs to investments, will provide an adequate financial basis for the transformation. A multitude of measures are helping to reduce operating expenditure. They essentially include further personnel cutbacks, the new stationing concept, materiel and equipment planning, and continued stripping-out of bureaucracy. The reduction of operating expenditure will serve to increase the defence investment expenditure share of the defence budget. The 30 percent investment ratio set partly as a target in the past is rendered out of date by the estimate of the proportionate pensions and benefits expenditure in the defence budget. It is necessary in this regard to develop a new measure of effectiveness that more suitably represents the striving for goal of optimising and modernising the equipment of the Armed Forces.

The Bundeswehr will consistently concentrate on its core tasks. Cooperation with trade and industry on service tasks, extending as far as the outsourcing of complete task packages that the private sector can provide more economically, is being pursued further. This will ease the work burden of the Armed Forces, boost cost efficiency, and reduce operating costs and tied-up capital. Private investor capital will be mobilised, new sources of revenue opened up and opportunities to strengthen investments for the Bundeswehr thereby created. What is crucial, besides any materiel and equipment planning capable of meeting future challenges, is that the running of the Armed Forces and the provisions for the ongoing missions remain assured.

Alternative financing options, also for procurements, are to be examined in future in view of the limited financial resources.

3.7 Armaments Policy

A modern Bundeswehr requires an efficient and sustainable defence industry base. This will need to be defined increasingly in a European context, given the limited national resources and restrained national demand. Political, military and economic aspects make in-depth cooperation highly important for the EU member states to meet the materiel requirements of their armed forces. For this reason, the development of a European armaments policy is a central goal in establishing and expanding the European Security and Defence Policy.

It means having indigenous defence technology capabilities in order to co-shape the European integration process in the armaments sector. These will guarantee cooperability and assure an influence in the development, procurement and operation of critical military systems. Only nations with a strong defence industry have the appropriate clout in Alliance decisions.

The political leadership and industry must jointly define the strategic positioning of German defence technology in Europe. The Federal Government will do its utmost in this regard to preserve a balanced mix of defence technology, including its high-technology areas, in Germany. National consolidation, such as is taking place in the shipbuilding industry, is preparing Germany’s defence technology enterprises to suitably position themselves for the restructuring process in Europe.

By developing interministerial strategies and continuing our dialogue with industry, we are looking to preserve competitive industrial capabilities in key technology areas of the German defence industry as part of a balanced European partnership. We must, equally, ensure that there is a future in Europe for the
innovative potential of our small- and medium-sized companies in the defence sector. Using what control instruments are available, the Federal Government supports the export efforts of German defence industry companies in order to promote adequate utilisation of capacities. It is prepared to enter into strategic partnerships with states also outside NATO and the EU that help to reduce conflicts, pursue common security interests and adhere to democratic norms of behaviour as well as commit themselves to arms controls, export control regimes on armaments and non-proliferation.

It will continue to uphold future viability and competitiveness by investing in defence-related research and technology at national and international level. The exploitation of developments in other areas of technology and of innovative dual-use products will complement these measures. Where appropriate, innovative cooperation and financing concepts may open up possibilities for more efficient development and procurement processes.

An opening-up of the defence market at European level is also expected to have positive implications for the defence industry. The voluntary code relating to the application of Article 296 of the EC Treaty (Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement) entered into force on 1 July 2006 under the aegis of the European Defence Agency. It already represents an important step towards more competition and transparency in the defence industry and will, in the end, also benefit the German defence industry.

The European Commission is also working on an interpretative communication relating to the application of essential security interests within the meaning of Article 296 of the EC Treaty. The aim of the communication is greater legal certainty in the application of this Article. These two instruments, the voluntary code and the interpretative communication, already provide or respectively, will prove to be, important means for promoting competition for defence procurements.

In its Green Paper on Defence Procurement, the European Commission has also presented broader plans for procurement guidelines specifically for the defence sector, but beyond the scope of Article 296 of the EC Treaty. From the viewpoint of the Federal Government, however, the unfair competition and barriers still existing in the European defence market should be removed prior to the creation of legally binding instruments. This includes, in particular, the harmonisation of export conditions and the reduction of subsidies and government-held shares in defence companies.

The European Defence Agency, whose responsibilities include military capability development, research, procurement and the defence market, is an important instrument for organising a European defence technological and industrial base. The Federal Government also regards the European Defence Agency as coordinator of a network for bringing together and correlating existing initiatives and institutions, with the aim of improving European military capabilities. Armaments and standardisation activities are being initiated and coordinated in the transatlantic context within NATO in order to meet the NATO capability requirements. Germany would like to see close coordination between NATO and the EU in this connection so as to avoid any duplication of effort and maintain interoperability.

Stronger European integration in the defence sector will strengthen Europe as a partner in the transatlantic alliance. Germany supports the harmonisation of military requirements and the further removal of barriers that continue to hinder transatlantic cooperation in the spirit of partnership, especially with regard to technology transfer and market access.

3.8 Determining Factors for Bundeswehr Planning

The Bundeswehr’s mission, tasks and international obligations determine its capabilities, structures and personnel requirements. These are being consistently geared towards the tasks that are more likely to arise.

The new Bundeswehr is duly adopting a strictly deployment-oriented posture. This must be developed further in a way which will enable the Armed Forces to operate unrestrictedly in a multinational environment.

The force goals of NATO and the European Union are important factors that have a determining influence on the military capabilities in the respective member countries. NATO has, firstly as part of its Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and subsequently in the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), defined capability gaps that urgently need closing, in the same way as the European Union has in the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP). These tally essentially with the national capability deficits.

The planning of the materiel and equipment must help to establish and maintain a balanced relationship between the mission, tasks and assets of the Bundeswehr and the funds that are available. The absolute standard for the quality and quantity of the projects undergoing planning and realisation is their specific contribution towards establishing the new joint capability profile. The adaptation of materiel and equipment planning, and concurrent structural realignments, are part of the Bundeswehr’s transformation. The determining factor here is the conceptual requirement for procurement, within budgetary constraints, for the force categories to be differentiated and prioritised according to capabilities in the following areas: force protection,
worldwide reconnaissance, command and control of forces deployed in a multinational environment, improvement of the basic missile defence capability, precision and stand-off capability of the response forces, and strategic deployability. In regard to the joint and multinational tasks, the immediate priority is to realise those projects and services that help within the system to establish or expand the capabilities receiving no or insufficient consideration in terms of materiel. The principle that applies in this respect is: the establishment of new capabilities has precedence over expansion of basic capabilities. In the field of maintenance, it is necessary to accurately identify cost-increasing factors, in order to initiate measures to also ensure deployments and routine duty of the Armed Forces at home in future.

Operational Requirements
The national level of ambition defines the scope and quality of German contributions to operations spanning the entire task spectrum.

This takes into consideration the following politico-military commitments that Germany has made to NATO, the European Union and the United Nations regarding the contribution of troops to multinational operations and response forces:

- Continued participation in the NATO Response Force calls for a joint force pool to be kept available at all times. This ties down a total of approximately 15,000 military personnel during the standby phase, including preparation and follow-up activities.

- In the framework of the European Headline Goal, Germany has undertaken to provide an initial joint contingent of up to 18,000 servicemen and women, depending on the situation. This includes the German contribution towards the implementation of the EU Battlegroups Concept adopted to improve the EU’s Rapid Response Capability.

- Within the scope of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), Germany has pledged to the United Nations to provide, on a case by case basis, force packages with state-of-the-art equipment, including transport, medical, military police and engineer forces, as well as maritime patrol aircraft and mine countermeasures units. Bundeswehr planning needs to provide for up to 1,000 military personnel for this.

Forces up to about 1,000 strong must additionally be kept available for evacuation operations generally conducted as a national responsibility.

Germany, furthermore, is making very large force contributions to ongoing peace stabilisation operations. This applies to the current NATO-led operations, primarily in Afghanistan and in Kosovo, to the EU operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and also to missions of the United Nations.

Given this background, Germany must have a force pool for peace enforcement missions that is adequate at international level. The military capabilities that such missions necessitate are significantly different from those needed for nation and society building. They involve the use of weapons in joint network-enabled, high-intensity combat operations. This can be achieved only by close interaction of land, air and maritime forces, operating together with armed forces of allied and partner nations, and may also involve utilising the capabilities of special forces.

The majority of current Bundeswehr operations are peace stabilisation missions. Their aim is to create the preconditions for establishing governmental and societal structures within the scope of international cooperation. They range from the task of separating parties in conflict, to the enforcement of embargo measures, through to monitoring air and maritime spaces and protecting populations. The national level of ambition is to deploy up to 14,000 servicemen and women at any one time, distributed over as many as five different areas of operations.

Where operations allow little or no forewarning, as in natural disasters for instance, available Bundeswehr forces are called in immediately. These may be augmented or also replaced by reservists if the duration of deployment becomes protracted. If there is ample forewarning, reservists are deployed at an earlier juncture.

Protective tasks within Germany are viable only if the services act jointly and in conjunction with civilian agencies and organisations. The Bundeswehr is a major contributor in this regard. Civil-military cooperation is being expanded and improved. The cooperation between military territorial commands, government district and region liaison elements and civilian regional planning and support agencies is setting the trend for the future. Over the coming years there is to be a considerable intensification
3.9 Structures and Strength

The establishment of new elements capable of meeting future challenges and the dismantling of no longer needed structures will serve to make the Bundeswehr consistently deployment-oriented. Traditional national defence against conventional attack is no longer a determinant of Bundeswehr structures as it no longer reflects current security requirements. This will mean that, by 2010, the great number of still existing non-active units will be significantly reduced.

The Armed Forces will be divided into three force categories: response, stabilisation and support forces. Each of these will be trained, equipped and employed according to their respective functions. These force categories will form the conceptual basis for shaping the fundamental structures in the military services.

The numbers of servicemen and women planned for the response, stabilisation and support forces are 35,000, 70,000 and 147,500, respectively. The future basic strength of the Bundeswehr, according to current planning, will consequently be 252,500 active military personnel. This figure includes a total of 2,500 posts for reservists (maximum number of reservists undergoing daily training, taking the annual average).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Operational Requirements</th>
<th>Target Strength of the Bundeswehr 2010</th>
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<tr>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
<td>Total Servicemen and women* 327,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Headline Goal</td>
<td>Civilian posts funded posts 75,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Standby Arrangement System</td>
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*Including 2,500 posts for reservists (maximum number of reservists undergoing daily training, taking the annual average)
The Bundeswehr on Operations

Over the past fifteen years, Germany has become one of the largest troop contributors to international peace missions. This is due to the changes in the security situation, Germany’s grown responsibility, its international commitments in the United Nations, the North Atlantic Alliance, and the European Union. Today, the Bundeswehr operates worldwide.

After the end of the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 1995, Germany provided armed forces to monitor and secure the peace process in the context of an international peace mission. For this purpose, NATO initially conducted the multinational operation IFOR and, from December 1996 onwards, the operation SFOR. From the outset, the Bundeswehr made substantial contributions to both operations and thus provided sustained support in the political efforts to achieve lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In December 2004, the European Union took over the responsibility for safeguarding the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU operation ALTHEA became the successor operation to SFOR. ALTHEA is to date the largest military operation in the context of European Security and Defence Policy and complements the European Union’s extensive civilian commitments. With a Sarajevo-based headquarters of its own, NATO continues to support defence reform efforts of the Bosnia and Herzegovina government. Germany is maintaining its military commitment in Bosnia and Herzegovina and is contributing significantly to ALTHEA. Support for the reconstruction of the devastated country was of prime importance in the early stages of the operation, besides the purely military efforts to safeguard the peace process. As a result of the successful stabilisation and reconstruction efforts, numerous refugees have been able to return from Germany to their home country.

To put an end to the Kosovo crisis and prevent a humanitarian disaster, German armed forces participated, from 24 March 1999, in an armed military conflict for the first time in the Bundeswehr’s history. During the Operation ALLIED FORCE, NATO conducted an air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Upon the successful completion of this operation, the UN Security Council paved the way for the deployment of military and civilian forces to implement peace in Kosovo. This task has since been performed by the NATO-led multinational Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Creating and ensuring a safe and secure environment is an essential part of KFOR’s military mission. This includes, in particular, the protection of minorities and of returning refugees and displaced persons, the guaranteeing of freedom of movement for the civilian population, the confiscation of illegal weapons, and the prevention of cross-border crime. The Bundeswehr has consistently provided one of the largest force contingents for this operation.

The crisis that developed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001 was successfully managed through the preventive employment of military forces as part of an international operation. The Bundeswehr participated mainly in the NATO-led operation AMBER FOX and the EU operation CONCORDIA. Operation AMBER FOX, conducted in support of the OSCE and EU observer missions, was the first international peace mission for which Germany assumed the lead role from the outset and for a long time provided the largest troop contingent.

The Bundeswehr operations in the Balkans are important and necessary for our security, but they have also shown that sustainable peacekeeping calls for patience and appreciable stamina.

The UN Security Council condemned the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 as a threat to international peace and security. As a result, for the first time in its history, NATO declared that this was an Article 5 contingency. The Bundeswehr’s participation in the NATO Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE), conducted to protect allied merchant vessels in the Mediterranean Sea against terror attacks, is also based on this Article 5 contingency.

Since November 2001, Germany has been contributing naval and special forces, among other assets, to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) to combat international terrorism.

Germany is one of the largest troop contributors to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. ISAF was established by the UN Security Council on 20 December 2001 after the Taliban had been ousted from power and an interim government formed.

In 2003, after successful stabilisation of the situation in Kabul, NATO assumed the lead role for the gradual extension of ISAF into the country’s provinces. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) have been playing a central role in this context. They provide the foundations for the rebuilding of state structures in a safe and secure environment.

NATO duly decided at its Istanbul summit in June 2004 to extend the PRT concept to the entire territory of Afghanistan. For this purpose, the country was subdivided into five regional areas of responsibility, in each of which a troop contributing nation assumed coordinating responsibility. Since July 2006, Germany has been responsible for the northern region and has been pursuing an interministerial approach involving civilian and military elements. Together with members of the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Federal Ministry of the Interior as well as international partners and non-governmental organisations, German soldiers have been accomplishing their mission through military presence and participation in reconstruction assistance and training support for the new Afghan Army and the Afghan police force.

Germany is participating in the operation EUFOR RD Congo, conducted by the European Union following a request by the United Nations. This operation is to provide, for a limited time, military assets to ensure the security of the first democratic elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
In response to requests by the United Nations and by the Lebanese government for assistance, Germany is also committing substantial forces to the Maritime Task Force, as part of the UN-led peace mission UNIFIL. The Israeli government had also expressly asked for a German contribution to UNIFIL. Germany will thus afford a major contribution towards the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. In close cooperation with the Lebanese government, the Maritime Task Force will ensure effective monitoring of Lebanese coastal waters with the aim of preventing the smuggling of weapons. It will, in doing so, help to preserve the conditions for a lasting cease-fire. The hitherto largest German force contingent for a UN-led mission will be deployed in Lebanon by assigning up to 2,400 servicemen and women.

Besides the peace missions mentioned above, Germany has for many years been participating in international observer missions to monitor security zones and cease-fire agreements, particularly in Georgia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the Sudan.

International humanitarian assistance operations have placed a steadily growing burden on the Bundeswehr and are increasingly tying up resources. In the recent past, for example, comprehensive aid in terms of personnel and materiel has been provided in the wake of earthquakes in Pakistan, flooding in Mozambique and the tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia.

The Bundeswehr has changed profoundly since its first operations abroad in Cambodia and Somalia and so has the job profile of the soldier. Besides the purely military characteristics, political, humanitarian, economic and cultural aspects must increasingly be considered in today’s operational environment. This entails the need, during operations, for the Bundeswehr to cooperate in networks with military and civilian actors, nationally and internationally. The lessons learned from the operations have led to the Bundeswehr personnel gaining a broader understanding of military thinking and action. Bundeswehr servicemen and women today are confronted with an operational reality that cannot fail to have an impact on their professional self-image.

The Bundeswehr also renders reliable and comprehensive assistance at home in Germany, however, and thus contributes towards protecting the population and vital infrastructure, and helps to prevent the consequences of major catastrophic incidents, including terrorist attacks. Since its activation, the Bundeswehr has repeatedly provided comprehensive assistance in the wake of major disasters and incidents such as snowstorms, forest fires and area conflagrations, major accidents or flood disasters. Its structures and special capabilities in the context of civil-military cooperation have always enabled the Bundeswehr to take on such subsidiary tasks.

Combating the flood waters of the Elbe, Mulde and Danube rivers in August 2002 has been the largest domestic operation of its kind so far. At the time, 45,000 Bundeswehr personnel fought against the floods around the clock, shoulder to shoulder with members of civilian relief organisations and volunteers. They saved lives and protected the land and the people from even greater damage.

The Armed Forces kept personnel and materiel at the ready to support the Federation and the Laender in the organisation of major events involving millions of visitors from all over the world, such as the World Youth Day of the Catholic Church in 2005 and the Football World Championship in 2006. In addition, the Bundeswehr has supported allied forces in Germany within the framework of Host Nation Support. This was last done on a major scale when the Bundeswehr protected facilities of the US forces over several years.

Regardless of the reprioritisation of its task spectrum, the majority of the Bundeswehr’s active military personnel will continue to be present in Germany in future and thus be available to support civilian disaster protection efforts. More active military personnel will continue to be available for disaster relief at short notice than have ever been employed in any given disaster situation in Germany in the past.
The constantly changing challenges to security in a globalised world can be countered effectively only through security structures that are adaptable and flexible. Political, societal, economic and, not least, technological parameters are changing at an ever greater pace. The Bundeswehr is facing up to these developments by embarking on a process of permanent adaptation. Transformation is the means for shaping this adaptation process.

The overriding goal of transformation is to improve and sustain the operational capability of the Bundeswehr in a changing environment. Transformation has a security-related, societal, technological, and, most notably, innovative and mental dimension.

Transformation responds to changes in the security environment and provides solutions to ever new challenges.

Transformation takes the dynamic developments in society and in trade and industry into consideration and enables the Bundeswehr to benefit from them.

Transformation promotes the integration of technological developments into the Bundeswehr.

Transformation shapes the adaptation process by utilising new procedures and techniques.

Transformation requires readiness and willingness for change. The Bundeswehr’s transformation process cannot succeed unless there is a lasting willingness for change.

The transformation of the Bundeswehr covers all aspects of the Armed Forces and their administration: capabilities, strengths, structures, stationing, personnel, materiel, equipment and training. It puts an end to static force planning and establishes a continuous process of adaptation.

A coherently joint realignment of the Armed Forces, as an essential element of transformation, is under way and well on track. To make the Bundeswehr more efficient, innovative solutions such as its reorganisation into response, stabilisation and support forces are being utilised.

The stationing decision, based on military, functional and economic criteria, supports the overriding goal of transformation through operational savings and a closer deployment of units, thereby improving their coordination and interaction on operations.

New tasks require new qualifications. On stabilisation operations, in particular, personnel have to be resolute, confident and self-assertive, and must additionally show a sense of ethnic responsibility combined with social, intercultural and foreign language skills.

The generally proven personnel management methods have to constantly measure up to the requirements of transformation. This applies just as much to the procedures of recruitment, selection, training, development and promotion as it does to the optimal utilisation of capabilities and skills the personnel already have. Materiel and equipment must be adapted to the current and future operational requirements. A consistently capability-oriented, Bundeswehr-unified holistic approach is being taken to carry out the required modernisation of materiel and equipment.

By rigorously concentrating on key capabilities, and by introducing modern forms of cooperation and financing, the Bundeswehr has succeeded in implementing more efficient development, procurement and operational procedures.

**5 Transformation**
5.1 Concept Development and Experimentation

The modern-day Bundeswehr is characterised by new capabilities and a new way of thinking. Only the ongoing transformation process will ensure that the Bundeswehr retains its ability to fulfill its tasks in cooperation with the armed forces of partners and allies and successfully counter those threats to Germany’s security that are difficult to predict.

Making the Bundeswehr fit for the future is a matter of recognising potential for innovation early on and utilising it appropriately. Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) is one of the fundamental methods for supporting the transformation process. It serves to examine new conceptual considerations, organisational ideas, management procedures and technological innovations for use in the Bundeswehr. This is done by applying operations research methods and procedures, and by utilising modelling and simulation. The results obtained will help decisively to adapt the capability profile to the future operational demands that confront the Armed Forces.

Where concept development is concerned, the focus is in particular on the development of an overarching Bundeswehr-unified operations concept and of the conceptual foundations for a common operational picture, to serve as a basis for a common situational understanding. Both are essential preconditions for network-enabled operations.

Germany is participating in the CD&E process within NATO and in a multinational context and has been introducing its own concepts and findings into this process. Concept Development and Experimentation are among the fundamental tasks of the newly established Bundeswehr Transformation Centre.

5.2 Network-enabled Operations

A network-enabled capability facilitates the command and control as well as operations of armed forces on the basis of an all-embracing and interoperable information and communications network. This network interlinks all relevant personnel, units, facilities, intelligence and reconnaissance and weapon systems. In future, it will no longer be the classic one-on-one situation on the battlefield that is important, but rather the goal to achieve information and command and control superiority, based on a common situational understanding. The objective in this regard, besides being successful on the battlefield, is to influence the enemy’s development of objectives. This makes military action across the entire task spectrum faster, more efficient and more effective.

Force planning in NATO and the European Union is already being geared towards the principles of network-enabled operations to a considerable extent. For the Bundeswehr, network-enabled operations have likewise become a key element of transformation. This concept is being pushed ahead with priority and is having impacts on all capability categories. The effectiveness of weapon systems already in use can be substantially enhanced by integrating them technologically into networked systems.

Network-enabled operations will be reflected in all capability categories of the Bundeswehr. Depending on operational demands, there will be different levels of capability in the response, stabilisation and support forces. All force categories, however, will be networkable to the extent that they can support each other effectively.

Besides their challenging technological aspects, network-enabled operations place high demands on decision-makers at all levels and at the same time call for military thinking at the strategic, operational and
tactical levels. The ability of deployed soldiers to act in accordance with their higher commander’s intent—mission command, in other words—will be even more indispensable than ever before. Network-enabled operations, moreover, impact on the further development of the command and control systems, and on operational concepts and training, especially leadership training.

Network-enabled operations play a decisive role in the support of effects-based operations. Effects-based operations comprise the uniform planning and interaction of military capabilities in concert with other instruments of states, alliances and organisations. They embrace all the factors necessary for achieving political and military-strategic objectives.

All transformation projects must be geared to improvement operational capability. The scarcity of resources and budgetary funds calls for innovative approaches regarding investments, operation, cooperation with the defence industry, research, development and experimentation, and international cooperation.

In the years to come, practical implementation of the transformation process will be pushed ahead in all fields of activity. The principle of centralised control and decentralised implementation will apply in this respect. Even more so than has previously been the case, all relevant topics will in future be interlinked through precise contents, responsibilities and timelines. This will give shape and method to the transformation process as a holistic approach. Progress needs to become visible and tangible. The Bundeswehr today is already more modern and efficient compared with just a few years ago and will continue to improve.

5.3 Force Categories

Through transformation, the Bundeswehr is being oriented towards its more likely tasks. However, it must also be capable of accomplishing all the other tasks it has been assigned. The three new force categories, i.e. response, stabilisation and support forces are an essential element for achieving this. The individual force categories each consist of land, air and naval forces and of the required joint command and control, and support assets. These will realise their full capability by acting in a joint and unified manner.

The Bundeswehr is thus gearing itself, including its training and equipment, to potential operational tasks.

Response Forces

The response forces are earmarked mainly for combined and joint, high-intensity network-enabled operations. They are intended to conduct peace enforcement missions against adversaries with a predominantly military structure, while keeping their losses to a minimum, and thus create the prerequisites for peace stabilisation operations.

The response forces are capable of a quick response and have the best possible equipment, as well as the required joint command and control, and support assets. They also include special forces capable of conducting particularly rapid response operations. The response forces comprise a total of 35,000 servicemen and women.

This force pool is used to generate the German contributions to the NATO Response Force, to operations in the context of the European Union’s Military Response Concept, to other NATO, or EU and multinational operations at the upper end of the intensity spectrum, to the United Nations Standby Arrangement System, and to the forces for rescue and evacuation operations, which are normally a national responsibility. The Bundeswehr is thereby able to meet Germany’s international commitments adequately and to participate in complex, high-intensity combat operations.

Due to the high demands regarding training and operations, the response forces are, as a general rule, composed solely of regulars, temporary-career volunteers and extended-service conscripts. Reservists may also be included at their own request.

In conflict prevention and crisis management operations, response forces and stabilisation forces may operate simultaneously or be employed in close succession. Both force categories must therefore have the capability to interact in operations. It must additionally be possible to reinforce and support stabilisation forces with response forces.

Stabilisation Forces

Stabilisation forces are intended for multinational, joint military operations of low and medium intensity lasting for an extended period of time and spanning the broad spectrum of peace stabilisation missions. These requirements largely derive from the operational reality currently confronting Bundeswehr forces.

The stabilisation forces comprise 70,000 military personnel, up to 14,000 of whom can be employed more or less concurrently and distributed over as many as five different operational areas.

They must be able to assert themselves against adversaries with a military structure and against forces using asymmetric warfare techniques, while minimising their own losses. To attain this, they need robust capabilities which, in the land forces, are provided essentially by armoured forces. The robustness of stabilisation forces rests mainly on three pillars: a resolute approach, marked cultural and social competence in the deployment area, and the capability of comprehensive intelligence collection and reconnaissance in order to counter unfavourable situational developments at an early stage.

When on operations, stabilisation forces must be capable of escalation dominance across the entire spectrum. As stabilisation operations conducted on land frequently involve such tasks as carrying out patrols or setting up and manning checkpoints in close proximity to the local population, a high priority is given to the personal protection of the deployed soldiers and to their situational awareness training.

Because of the special skills and qualification needed to participate in specific deployments abroad, only regulars, temporary-career volunteers and conscripts who have volunteered for extended enlistment are normally employed in the stabilisation forces. The principle of voluntary service also applies to the inclusion of reservists.

Support Forces

The main task of the support forces is to provide comprehensive and efficient support for response and stabilisation forces during the preparation and conduct of operations, both in Germany and in mission areas abroad. The support forces are therefore intended to provide comprehensive, joint and sustainable support for operations across the entire intensity spectrum and for routine Bundeswehr duties in Germany.

They are chiefly tasked with command and control support, intelligence collection and reconnaissance, logistics and medical support, geoinformation, explosive ordnance disposal, and fire fighting and protection.
The support forces comprise a total of 147,500 servicemen and women. This figure includes 39,000 posts for providing career or functional training, and for providing civilian occupational qualifications for regulars and temporary-career volunteers.

5.4 Capabilities

Germany needs Armed Forces that can be employed across the entire continuum of tasks. They must be readily available for the more likely types of operations and prepared for high-intensity combat operations.

The capability profile required to accomplish these tasks comprises six capability categories, i.e. command and control, intelligence collection and reconnaissance, mobility, effective engagement, support and sustainability, and survivability and protection, and is to be developed in such a way that the Armed Forces gradually attain the capability to conduct network-enabled operations.

The capability categories are interdependent and of equal importance. Sub-capabilities can be dispensed with only if this is justifiable and if it can be ensured that the forces of allied or partner nations keep such sub-capabilities available. This conversely requires the Bundeswehr to be able to place its specific capabilities at the disposal of allies and partners.

Such interlocking of capability categories also means however that in addition to improving hitherto inadequate sub-capabilities, there must be enough leeway for modernisation in all capability categories so as to give priority to achieving a broad spectrum of basic capabilities.

Special emphasis must be placed on improving force protection as a fundamental requirement for mission accomplishment, as well as on improvement of the stand-off and precision capabilities of the response forces.
A comprehensive capability-based approach requires that the modernisation of materiel and equipment receives the same consideration as personnel, training, and research and technology. This will serve to ensure the attractiveness and fitness of the Bundeswehr in the long term to meet future challenges.

**Command and Control Capability**

Command and control capability is an essential prerequisite for establishing information superiority, command and control superiority and best possible effective engagement capability. Efficient command and control capability calls for reliable and speedy information management at and between all Bundeswehr command levels and units. This requires a tight command and control organisation, clear and uniform command and control procedures, secure and efficient command and control support, and the capability to conduct network-enabled operations.

Using a joint approach, efficient command, control, and information systems of the Armed Forces will ensure the capability to exercise command and control worldwide. Joint, networkable radio equipment and the SATCOMnw satellite-based communications system are important prerequisites for network-enabled operations.

Improvements in the command and control of land, air and naval forces are indispensable with regard to the interoperability required for NATO and EU operations. Adequate provisions are being made for this in materiel and equipment planning.

The task spectrum of the Bundeswehr calls for a radical modernisation of the IT equipment and networks, and concerted support of the administrative and logistics processes to complement the above measures.

Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance

Knowledge and accurate estimates of the situation, particularly in potential crisis areas, help the political and military leadership considerably to arrive at the appropriate decisions. They are essential for the early recognition of crises, for crisis management and for the planning, preparation and conduct of operations by the Armed Forces.

Intelligence and reconnaissance collection assets gather and record situational information in areas of interest, crises and operations on a worldwide basis. They analyse such information and feed it, tailored to the situation, mission and requirements, into the joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) network. The information thus processed forms an important basis for issuing early warnings of imminent threats to deployed troops, for duly providing data and findings for targeting, and for making network-enabled operations possible.

Information and intelligence collected as a national responsibility by the Bundeswehr’s Military Intelligence Organisation afford an indispensable contribution in terms of the capability to independently make judgements and decisions and take action. They are vital for safeguarding German interests in multinational organisations and for being on an equal footing when exchanging information with partner nations.

In the capability category of intelligence collection and reconnaissance, the procurement of the SAR LUPE space-based reconnaissance system will, for the first time, provide the Bundeswehr with a worldwide imagery reconnaissance capability. There are plans to integrate this system into a European network.

Germany is, furthermore, participating in NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) project. This system is to attain an Alliance-wide initial core capability of airborne, wide-area imagery surveillance and reconnaissance for the support of ground operations across the entire task spectrum. There is the intention to close the capability gap caused by the phasing-out of the SIGINT aircraft Breguet Atlantic by fielding the EUROHAWK unmanned airborne reconnaissance system.

**Mobility**

Given the new operational environment, the mobility of the Bundeswehr’s forces and assets is crucial to its operational capability.

Strategic deployability is a prerequisite for fielding, augmenting and supplying forces in distant operational areas. Priority is therefore being given to attaining this capability, which includes adequate air, sea and land transport capacities as well as their timely and secure availability. This includes suitable load handling systems, provided by military and civilian agencies. It is indispensable in this respect to have a minimum of own military capacities. Strategic deployment is carried out utilising all modes of transport and, as a general rule, in the context of multinational deployment planning.

Operational deployability means having the capability to carry out rapid changes in location and in points of main effort in a land, air and maritime operation over long distances. This also includes, if necessary, movements in a threat environment and in areas with a poorly developed infrastructure.

Tactical mobility with own means and assets is essential for the effective employment of forces and is hence crucial to the conduct of operations. It must also be realisable in difficult geographical and climatic conditions and areas with inadequate infrastructure, while ensuring the necessary protection of own forces.

Effective Engagement Capability

Credibly demonstrating military capabilities may sometimes suffice, alone, to achieve a desired political, military or psychological effect. The optimal interaction of all forces and means in a joint and multinational network, in accordance with the principles of network-enabled operations, is a prerequisite for attaining effective engagement capability.

Besides the classic military factors of forces, space, and time, the information factor is increasing in importance. The secure availability of and unfettered access to information form the basis for the military decision-making process and for the issuance of orders in the planning and conduct of operations. In future, the German Armed Forces will have an even better capability to conduct information operations.

The Army’s embarkation on air mechanisation is being continued with the introduction of the TIGER, a multi-role, near-all-weather-capable combat support helicopter and the PUMA, an air-transportable infantry fighting vehicle. Where the Air Force is con-
Parameters and Conceptual Orientation

The modernisation of materiel and equipment is consistent with the Bundeswehr’s capability-oriented holistic approach. Priority is being given to those areas in which the life and limb of all Bundeswehr personnel must be protected, where there are justified requirements arising from ongoing operations, or where legal obligations have to be met.

Given the limited resources, the planning of the materiel and equipment is tailored to the needs of each individual force category.

The Armed Forces must protect themselves against all types of threats originating from regular and irregular forces, including the impact of information warfare. Information superiority is decisive for providing active protection. Training, threat-appropriate protective equipment including protected command and multi-function transport vehicles, tactical mobility, and a robust infrastructure ensure passive protection.

The development and fielding of the Infantryman of the Future system and of a friend or foe combat identification system will enhance the survivability of combat troops. The equipment package termed Soldier on Operations optimises the specific equipment needs of military personnel employed in non-infantry roles.

Survivability and Protection

Servicemen and women deployed on operations are entitled to the best possible protection. The survivability and protection of personnel and infrastructure are vital to mission accomplishment and indicative of the state’s obligation to care for members of the Bundeswehr.

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The response forces are given priority when fielding state-of-the-art technology, in order to markedly improve their capability to conduct joint and multinational, high-intensity, network-enabled operations. The stabilisation forces will in future also have modern equipment geared to their capabilities and tasks, with their survivability and command and control capability initially being improved by means of air- and ground-based reconnaissance systems and protected vehicles. The networkability of the stabilisation forces is such that they are able to interact with the response forces.

The equipment standard of the support forces is sufficient to enable them to support both response and stabilisation forces efficiently in the deployment areas. This requires them to also have networkability in some areas.

Capability gaps are being closed in accordance with political guidelines, overall planning parameters, conceptual requirements and operational demands, taking into account aspects of economic efficiency and applying modern methods to identify and meet requirements. To the greatest possible extent, modernisation measures will be implemented or concretised on a multinational basis, primarily within the scope of NATO and the European Union. The European Defence Agency will play a central role in future planning.
Below its political Executive Group, consisting of the Minister as well as the Parliamentary and Permanent State Secretaries, the Federal Ministry of Defence is structured into five military service staffs and six ministerial directorates, including the recently established Modernisation Directorate. There are, in addition, the special staffs to support the Executive Group.

The first official seat of the Federal Ministry of Defence is in Bonn. Of the 3,200 military and civilian posts, roughly ten percent are currently allocated to the Ministry's second official seat in Berlin.

In the course of the transformation, both the Federal Ministry of Defence and its subordinate units and agencies have been constantly undergoing adjustments. Such measures are primarily aimed at exploiting possible potentials for optimisation, in order to further strip out bureaucracy in the Federal Ministry of Defence and, in particular, to strengthen the cross-cutting leadership capability of the political executives.
The Special Forces Operations Command is an independent staff tasked with planning and conducting special forces operations at operational level. Where necessary, it also serves as the nucleus for a correspondingly composed multinational command post.

The Response Forces Operations Command provides the nucleus for a multinational deployable Force Headquarters (FHQ) for EU operations or, if necessary, augments the German nucleus of the Operation Headquarters. The Response Forces Operations Command exercises command and control over the response forces for joint exercises. Within the transformation process it is involved in the further development of the response forces as well as, for the time being, that of the stabilisation forces.

Small-scale operations may remain under the control of the service commands, as decided on a case-by-case basis.

During peacetime, operations in response to natural disasters and particularly grave accidents in Germany are controlled by the Joint Support Command. The Fleet Command provides assistance in the event of disasters or particularly serious accidents at sea.

Search and Rescue (SAR) operations involving aircraft are controlled by the SAR Coordination Centre of the Air Force, whilst SAR operations at sea are under the control of the Fleet Command.

The Bundeswehr Operations Command is responsible for the national tasks of planning and conducting operations at operational level. It also forms the nucleus of a multinational Operation Headquarters (OHQ) for EU operations. As a general rule, the deployed contingents of the Armed Forces are under the control of the Commander, Bundeswehr Operations Command, for administrative purposes and for those operational tasks that remain a national responsibility.
6.3 Army

The Army is the core of the land forces and the mainstay of land operations as well as operations conducted by airmobile and air mechanised forces. The Army is geared to meeting future operational challenges, thinks and acts jointly, and, within combined structures with allied nations, is a linchpin in the multinational cooperation of the Armed Forces.

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The CH-53 medium transport helicopter and the future NH-90 light transport helicopter will ensure the Army’s tactical and operational air deployability and air manoeuvre capability.

With the introduction of the TIGER combat support helicopter into service, the Army will greatly improve its capability to conduct air assault operations. The PUMA infantry fighting vehicle will meet the fundamental requirements for robustness, mobility and protection.

Modular equipment of the Army, based on the concept of families of vehicles, will decisively improve the sustainability and tactical mobility of deployed forces whilst affording them a greatly enhanced level of protection. Priority will be given to procuring protected command, multi-function and transport vehicles. The range of protected vehicles is being augmented consistently.

Altogether, this will give the Army increased flexibility, responsiveness, mobility and robustness.

This realignment of the Army is resulting in new structures:

- The Response Forces Division, the Specialised Operations Division and the Airmobile Division can perform command and control tasks on operations, including on a multinational scale.
- The brigades of the stabilisation forces are under the administrative control of two division headquarters that can also provide command personnel for multinational headquarters during stabilisation operations.
- The tasks of command and control support and logistic support are being reorganised between the Army and the Joint Support Service.
- The Reserve structures are being aligned to meet the new tasks.
- Below ministerial level, the Army has a two-pillar command structure.
- The Army Forces Command is responsible for the operational readiness of the army corps, divisions, and brigades. It exercises command and control over all Army divisions, as well as over the German elements in multinational corps headquarters and in the Franco-German Brigade.
- The Response Forces Division, consisting of two armoured brigades plus operating forces and command and control and support forces, will have the capability to conduct mainly network-enabled, joint and high-intensity multinational composite land force operations.
- The Specialised Operations Division exercises command and control over the Army’s special and specialised forces, which have been organised into the Special Forces Command and two airborne brigades. The operational spectrum of the special forces ranges from obtaining key information, providing wide-area proactive protection of own forces, countering terrorist threats and rescuing hostages held by terrorists, through to carrying out combat missions on enemy territory. Specialised forces play a role in the fight against international terrorism and can be employed for armed evacuation and recovery, for initial entry operations, and for rescue and evacuation missions.
- Through its Airmobile Division, the Army has the capability to deploy forces rapidly and over long distances, deliver effects, shift points of main effort quickly, and contribute to joint operations conducted in the depth. Its forces can be employed during operations of both the response forces and stabilisation forces. The Airmobile Division is comprised of the Air Manoeuvre Brigade, three Army Aviation Regiments and the Army Troops Command. On operations the Air Manoeuvre Brigade is reinforced with forces from the three Army Aviation Regiments.
- The brigades of the stabilisation forces, which are under the administrative control of the two division headquarters, can be deployed independently as part of low- and medium-intensity, multinational joint military operations.
- The Army Office elaborates the basis for the organisation, further development, equipping and training of the Army. It is responsible for the Army’s schools and central training facilities.
6.4 Air Force

With its extensive special capabilities to deliver effects in and from the air, including space, the Air Force contributes to German security. These include its operational flexibility, its considerable responsiveness plus its capability to deliver effects over great distances.

The fighter wings and the Air Force’s corresponding command and control facilities are permanently tasked with safeguarding air sovereignty in order to ensure the protection of our citizens and own territory against air attacks at all times.

The Air Force plays a significant part in maintaining political and military freedom of action in the context of international crisis management and conflict prevention beyond our own borders. It directly supports land and maritime forces and establishes the prerequisites for protecting own and allied forces against attacks from the air.

On account of their specific characteristics and capabilities, air forces also have an important political role. By demonstrating timely presence and/or delivering graduated effects, it is possible to react to situational developments in an escalatory or de-escalatory manner. Their capability to carry out the strategic lift of personnel and equipment enables rapid deployment of force contingents and their reliable sustainability in crisis areas. They additionally support national rescue, disaster relief and evacuation operations all over the world.

Ever since the Air Force was set up, internationality and multinational cooperation have been its hallmarks. Consequently, the Air Force has already assigned substantial forces to NATO.

The structure and organisation of the Air Force are dictated by its operational mission. Below ministerial level, the Air Force Command is responsible for ‘Operations’, and the Air Force Office for ‘Mission Support’.

The German Air Force Command exercises command and control over all the Air Force’s operational units. As the force provider it is responsible for operational training, exercises and preparation of operations and makes Air Force units available for Bundeswehr operations. The German Air Force Command has three divisions under its control as well as the Air Transport Command, whose tasks in the medium term will be transferred to a European Air Transport Command. The target structure of the Air Force will include a total of seven combat air wings.

Three surface-to-air missile (SAM) wings form the core of the ground-based air defence and ensure the basic capability for missile defence.

The number of tactical air command and control units is being adapted to operational needs and condensed to three. The Air Force’s specific capabilities for key point and installation defence are being pooled and consolidated in one battalion-size unit.

The Air Force Office looks after those aspects of mission support that remain the responsibility of the Air Force. In case of operations, the Air Force Office is subordinate to the Air Force Command. It also performs joint tasks through its flight safety and flight operations departments as well as through subordinate agencies for air traffic control and aviation medicine. The Air Force Office exercises direct command and control over the Air Force Training Command, including its training units and schools, and over the Air Force Weapon Systems Command and its logistics units.

The transformation of the Bundeswehr makes it similarly imperative for the Air Force to fine-tune its materiel and equipment consistently, in line with its tasks, to meet the fresh challenges. The procurement of mobile operations centres and the replacement of both the airborne and ground-based weapon systems will mean an altogether greatly improved operational capability.

The EUROFIGHTER weapon system will in future afford the Air Force a highly agile and extremely efficient combat aircraft for ensuring the integrity of German airspace, as well as for conducting operations in the context of international crisis management. Superior-performance air-to-air missiles optimised for different ranges will be integrated into the EUROFIGHTER to provide this capability. For the air-to-ground role, the multi-role EUROFIGHTER will be equipped step by step with laser- and GPS-guided precision weapons for various ranges, as well as with a modular stand-off weapon.

Procurement of the highly mobile tactical Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS), a transatlantic development, will enhance the ballistic missile defence capability, in particular. Together with an upgraded PATRIOT weapon system, this will constitute a significant contribution to national risk prevention.

Capabilities for airborne, stand-off and all-weather surveillance and reconnaissance are to be ensured in future mainly by means of unmanned aerial vehicles operating at medium and high altitudes.

The AIRBUS A400M transport aircraft with its air refuelling capability will add considerably to existing airlift capacities.
6.5 Navy

Germany faces the challenge of being able to counter both conventional and asymmetric threats to its security from the sea. The maritime capabilities of the Bundeswehr necessary to meet this challenge are provided by the Navy. In the course of transformation of the Bundeswehr, the Navy is also evolving into an expeditionary force.

The Navy is thus becoming well-positioned to conduct sustained operations also on a multinational scale and under threat off foreign shores. This is the Navy’s contribution to the containment of crises and conflicts where they arise and, if called for politically, their management. The special legal status of the high seas stands the Navy in good stead in that the sea can be used as a base for operations, with all forces interacting to deliver a desired effect in countries of deployment.

German maritime forces can pre-station unhindered in distant regions at an early stage, thus flanking diplomatic efforts. Besides their ability to conduct military operations at sea, they can make an effective contribution to operations ashore. They can also enforce embargo measures from the sea and support humanitarian relief and evacuation operations. Their considerable endurance in the mission area, robustness and their operational versatility make the German Navy a vital component of multinational operations. Joint operations ashore can also be commanded from the sea.

Given Germany’s maritime dependency, it is additionally vital to make adequate provisions for Germany’s security. A special responsibility falls to the Navy to protect the coastal waters and sea lines of communication of Germany and its allies. This means having capabilities for sea surveillance as well as for countering sea mines, submarines and terrorist threats to the maritime space, including support of Federal and Land police forces.

One of the German Navy’s main attributes is its ability to integrate rapidly into multinational task forces. Almost all of its forces are assigned to NATO. The Navy will continue to contribute on a regular basis to all four NATO Standing Maritime Groups, thus ensuring that Germany is generally represented in the NATO Response Force at all times. The German Navy has pledged naval forces of task force strength to the European Union, plus the Glücksburg Maritime Headquarters as the Maritime Component Command for given joint operations. This also includes setting up a maritime contribution to the EU battlegroups.

The Fleet Command, in its function as a higher command authority, is a force provider as well as a headquarters and lead command. As a force provider it is responsible for ensuring that operational forces are available. As a competent headquarters it has an important function in the further evolution of naval and naval air forces, this also in cooperation with external partners.

The fleet is divided into two flotillas and two naval air wings. The forces of the boat flotillas have been combined as Flotilla 1 in Kiel. This step has been taken not just to streamline command structures but first and foremost to bring expertise in conducting operations in coastal waters together under one roof.

A Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters (COE CSW) has, moreover, been established with Flotilla 1. Here, new concepts and procedures are to be developed and tested together with the other services and international participants. NATO allies will also be invited to contribute to the Centre of Excellence, thus strengthening Germany’s
role in the Alliance. With the reduction of the number of frigate squadrons from four to two in January 2006 and the establishment of a permanently available operational headquarters, the Destroyer Flotilla has been reorganised to form Flotilla 2.

The German Navy has set up a battalion of naval protection forces to protect own units in confined waters and in port. It is streamlining its structures and improving its operational and command and control capabilities by establishing rapidly available, embarkable operational headquarters.

The Naval Office is responsible for course-based training, armaments, equipment and naval logistics. Subordinate to the Naval Office are the Navy schools, the five base commands, the Naval Command and Control Systems Command, and the Naval Service Test Command.

The Navy will improve its future robustness and sustainability with the Type K-130 corvettes. The corvettes will be capable of precision target engagement ashore, thus supporting joint operations from the sea.

The Type F125 frigates now at the planning stage will be a completely new type of vessel, designed especially for prolonged stabilisation operations. Thanks to innovative concepts for operational deployment, the ship will be able to remain on station in the area of operations for up to two years.

Type 212A submarines will maintain our capability for submarine operations in the long term. Their capabilities include antisurface operations, insertion of special forces, plus intelligence collection and reconnaissance. These submarines, together with the P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, frigates, and shipborne helicopters needed for effective engagement of submarines, make up a three-dimensional antisubmarine warfare net.

With its Type 702 combat support ships the German Navy ensures logistic and medical support for prolonged operations. Combat support ships can also be used to support joint operations, as well as humanitarian assistance and evacuation operations. What is more, they can serve as a command platform during joint operations. Depending on the type of operation necessary, they can be equipped with an operations centre, or alternatively, with a mobile naval surgical hospital.

The procurement of the MH-90 naval helicopter will mean the future availability of powerful and efficient shipboard helicopters for the German Navy.

The Type F124 frigates have improved the Navy’s air defence capabilities against aircraft and missiles and contribute to maritime theatre ballistic missile defence. They thus help to protect own forces, the civilian population, economic centres and conurbations on land.
6.6 Joint Support Service

The Joint Support Service (JSS) is the key military organisational area that provides support for the Bundeswehr, both on operations and during routine duty. It performs cross-cutting and joint support tasks for the entire Bundeswehr. Concentrating these tasks reduces the strain on the single services, exploits synergetic effects and enhances the performance of the Armed Forces as a whole.

The tasks of the Joint Support Service include:

- provision of the command and control organisation for operations abroad and for Bundeswehr assistance efforts in support of civilian disaster relief in Germany;
- command and control support in Germany, in the areas of operation and from Germany to the areas of operation;
- logistic support, explosive ordnance disposal as well as NBC defence and protection tasks;
- the military intelligence organisation, including strategic reconnaissance, geoinformation and psychological operations;
- Bundeswehr military police operations and civil-military cooperation at home and abroad;
- joint training plus academic research and studies.

Tasks involving officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) personnel management as well as bi- and multinational cooperation are equally a part of the Joint Support Service’s area of responsibility as are family support, voluntary reservist work, the military music service and the promotion of top-level sport.

This multifaceted task spectrum determines the organisation and structure of the Joint Support Service. Because of their special functions, the Bundeswehr Counterintelligence Office, the Office for Military Studies, the Bundeswehr Personnel Office plus the yet-to-be-established Bundeswehr Enlisted Personnel Office, and the German Military Representative to NATO and the European Union also report directly to the Chief of Staff, Joint Support Service, and Vice Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr.

The Joint Support Command is the Joint Support Service’s command headquarters. It exercises command and control over the bulk of the Joint Support Service’s forces and is responsible for predeployment training, exercises and preparations for deployment. It is also the specialist agency for the task areas of logistics, command and control support, NBC defence and protection, as well as military police matters and civil-military cooperation of the Bundeswehr.

The Strategic Reconnaissance Command has command over the fixed and mobile signal intelligence, electronic warfare and satellite intelligence forces and institutions. The Bundeswehr Geoinformation Office meets the needs of the Bundeswehr for geoinformation in close cooperation with civilian agencies and allied and friendly nations. The Psychological Operations Centre uses communication means and methods to reach specific target audiences in the areas of operations in support of own operations. The Logistics Office organises logistics procedures for the Joint Support Service and is responsible for the in-service support management of its equipment. The Logistics Centre controls central logistic support for the Armed Forces worldwide.

Four military district/Land commands are subordinate to the Joint Support Command. They exercise command over all the Joint Support Service’s logistics, command and control support and military police personnel, the training area headquarters, military driver training centres, family support centres, military bands and sports promotion sections, plus the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre and the Bundeswehr’s Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Centre.

The Military District Commands, their eleven subordinate Land commands and the Berlin garrison command are central elements of the territorial realignment to be completed by 2007. Approximately 470 government district and regional liaison elements are to be set up, manned preferably by reservists, so that nationwide civil-military cooperation can be intensified at the lower and medium levels so crucial for operations. Additional support for the civilian disaster management authorities can be provided by civil-military cooperation support points stationed throughout Germany. At present, these include engineers and medical service and NBC assets. Besides the organisational measures being taken, the military principles of employment are being adapted to better meet the needs of the civilian agencies responsible for countering threats and providing disaster relief, as well as to the requirements for effective protection of Germany.
The purpose of medical support is to protect, maintain or restore the health of soldiers. Trust in the reliability and quality of the Medical Service is an important factor in the motivation of servicemen and women.

The organisation and structure of the Medical Service are being further adapted to the new task spectrum, thus enabling the Medical Service to provide appropriate medical support both at home and abroad. This support includes the operation of suitable preclinical and clinical treatment facilities on deployments, medically qualified and suitably protected casualty evacuation, and a deployment-related reorientation of Bundeswehr hospitals as treatment facilities integrated into Germany’s civilian health care system.

The guiding principle of the Bundeswehr Medical Service on deployments abroad is to guarantee a treatment outcome that, in terms of quality, corresponds to medical standards in Germany. This applies to preventive health care, general medical and dental care, the treatment of deployment-related stress, and medical evacuation.

Operational medical support begins with emergency on-site medical treatment of a wound, injury or illness and includes appropriate emergency surgery. If support consistent with German peacetime medical standards cannot be obtained from suitable treatment facilities of partner nations, then clinical care facilities including the required medical specialist assets are also provided in the country of deployment. En-route medical treatment is ensured during medical evacuation. Treatment is concluded with continued full-spectrum care and rehabilitation carried out in Bundeswehr hospitals or, if necessary, civilian facilities.
assemble medical task forces. Where regional medical support in Germany is concerned, the services offered and the staffing levels have been adjusted to local requirements. In addition, the regional medical commands carry out health care tasks normally performed by public authorities.

Bundeswehr hospitals ensure free medical care for soldiers according to an integrated treatment concept in which in-patient hospital treatment is dovetailed with out-patient care in medical centres. They are modern hospitals whose range of treatments is tailored primarily to the mission relevance of the respective specialist field. In cooperation with civilian hospitals, they ensure that hospital personnel of the Armed Forces receive medical training and continually refresh their skills for deployments. Bundeswehr hospitals are an integral part of the civilian rescue service, supplying it with rescue helicopters and ambulances. In the event of a disaster, they can support the civilian health care system by providing it with specialist personnel.

The operational elements of the Joint Medical Service are classified as response, stabilisation and support forces. The Rapid Medical Response Forces Command with its air-deployable medical facilities forms the heart of the response forces. Its air-transportable aid stations and surgical hospitals enable it to ensure highly flexible emergency medical and surgical care and deliver appropriate support to troops even in high-intensity combat operations. Together with elements of the organic medical services, the medical and hospital regiments provide the medical services necessary to support the broad spectrum of peace stabilising measures.

The only medical personnel serving outside the Medical Service are to be found in the following areas: the Army special forces, the aeromedical service, the Air Force Institute of Aviation Medicine, the shipboard medical service, and the Naval Institute of Maritime Medicine.

In addition to supporting German force contingents, the Medical Service provides medical care for civilians in the country of deployment, using local civilian health care structures. Such services are not only of humanitarian significance, they are also an important contribution towards protecting our own troops as they create confidence and trust.

Capabilities not required for current deployments serve at home to maintain the routine provision of medical care in the Bundeswehr and are available for tasks related to the protection of Germany and its citizens. Rapid reaction medical elements are available for accident and disaster relief. Special capabilities such as aeromedical evacuation are an additional, important aspect in the spectrum of the Medical Service.

Below ministerial level, the Joint Medical Service consists of two commands: the Joint Medical Forces Command and the Bundeswehr Medical Office.

The Joint Medical Forces Command packages mission-tailored medical contingents for the support of deployed military personnel. It supports the units at their home stations and during exercises and, upon request, provides disaster relief assistance in Germany. Four regional medical commands and the Rapid Medical Response Forces Command have been subordinated to the Joint Medical Forces Command so that it can perform these tasks.

The regional medical commands are responsible for the Bundeswehr hospitals, regional medical facilities, and medical and hospital regiments, and thus have at their disposal all the components necessary to
6.8. Federal Defence Administration

Article 87 b of the Basic Law confers the administrative support of the Armed Forces on an independent Defence Administration. It is basically separate and independent from the military organisation but, like the Armed Forces, it is under the direct control of the Federal Ministry of Defence. The Federal Defence Administration is responsible for personnel management and for satisfying the immediate material requirements of the Armed Forces. This includes, first and foremost, personnel administration tasks, budgeting and accounting, pay, pensions and benefits, messing, management of defence estate and accommodation facilities, as well as procurement issues.

The Federal Defence Administration is organised into the Territorial Defence Administration and the Armaments Organisation. Whilst the Armaments Organisation has overall responsibility for developing, testing and procuring weapons and equipment, the Territorial Defence Administration is tasked with supporting the forces directly on the ground, including at deployment bases abroad and within the scope of international operations.

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The structure and organisation of the Federal Defence Administration are being optimised in parallel with the realignment of the Armed Forces, while taking operational tasks into account. All such measures are aimed at ensuring that there will continue to be a modern and service-oriented administration available in future which provides effective and unburdastric-
The selection and induction offices are the interface between the Bundeswehr and young conscripts. They are being reorganised so that they can carry on functioning as modern, cost-effective and citizen-friendly agencies. They will be reduced to 52 in number by 2010. Seven pre-induction examination centres will additionally be established, so that there will still be a sufficient number of such offices throughout the country.

The Federal Academy of Defence Administration and Technology is the Federal Defence Administration’s highest central educational establishment, with an attendance of some 10,000 students per year. Every year the Federal Office of Languages provides foreign language training in more than 40 languages for over 17,000 personnel of the Armed Forces and the defence administration, and for personnel of Federal and Land authorities as well as friendly nations, and offers translation and interpretation services to all areas for which the Federal Ministry of Defence is responsible. The Federal College of Public Administration/Defence Administration Department trains future civil servants of the higher intermediate non-technical administrative service, whilst the Federal Schools of Defence Administration train future civil servants of the intermediate technical and non-technical service. Bundeswehr schools of general education give temporary-career volunteers, in particular, the opportunity to acquire school-leaving qualifications needed to facilitate their return to civilian working life at the end of their period of service.

The new tasks of the Bundeswehr also mean new obligations for the Territorial Defence Administration. Since 1995, it has been making a major contribution in the areas of deployment outside Germany. Members of the Territorial Defence Administration take part in operations abroad, for the duration of which they may change their legal status from civilian to military. During operations, support focuses on the areas of personnel administration and remuneration of local-hire personnel, language support, local procurement matters, as well as defence estate administration and management and infrastructure issues.

The reorientation of the Territorial Defence Administration towards operations also entails changes in its structures and tasks in Germany. The Federal Office of Defence Administration provides central expertise ranging from messing, contractual matters and environmental protection through to infrastructure, taking the special aspects of operations abroad into account. The Federal Office of Languages provides all the linguistic support needed by German forces deployed abroad, for which it has a “Support of Operations Abroad” cell. The Territorial Defence Administration Operations Support Coordination Centre, which cooperates directly with the Bundeswehr Operations Command, is tasked with coordinating civilian operational activities.
Technical specialist tasks, technical and operational systems testing, and the implementation of projects in the field of defence research and technology are the remit of the Bundeswehr technical centres and research institutes. They are independent agencies controlled by the Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement. The Naval Arsenal, responsible for maintenance and logistic tasks for the Navy, is also subordinate to the Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement.

Information management, command and control support, and central and cross-cutting information technology are the responsibility of the Federal Office for Bundeswehr Information Management and Information Technology. This Office is under the organisational, personnel and technical control of the Director of Modernisation and is subordinate to the IT Staff headed by the Director for Information Technology. The IT tasks of the civilian and military organisational areas are concentrated at the Federal Office for Bundeswehr Information Management and Information Technology Centre. Over and above satisfying the Armed Forces’ requirements for modern information technology, the Federal Office for Bundeswehr Information Management and Information Technology is responsible for the strategy, conceptual planning and architecture of the Bundeswehr IT system.

Armaments and IT Organisations

The Armaments Organisation is responsible for satisfying the immediate materiel requirements of the Armed Forces. It must ensure that the Bundeswehr is supplied not only with classic military equipment but also with standardised and cost-effective, state-of-the-art information technology.

The Armaments Organisation has a three-tier structure. At ministerial level, the Directorate General of Armaments, the Modernisation Directorate and the Director for Information Technology are tasked with planning, directing and controlling all armaments-related activities and working with politicians and parliament on defence and armaments issues. The Director General of Armaments is directly responsible to the Ministry’s Executive Group, whilst the Director for Information Technology is assigned to the Modernisation Directorate. In his capacity as National Armaments Director, the Director General of Armaments represents the interests of the Federal Ministry of Defence in the field of armaments at international level. The Directorate General of Armaments has responsibility for economic policy matters, international armaments cooperation, the planning and direction of defence research and technology, and for exercising ministerial oversight of the armaments projects in its area of responsibility.

The two higher federal authorities, the Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement and the Federal Office for Bundeswehr Information Management and Information Technology (Bundeswehr IT Office), are responsible for the armaments projects below ministerial level. The core task of the Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement is the management of all armaments projects (with the exception of information management and information technology projects). It is, furthermore, responsible for important cross-functional tasks, in particular disposal, contracting policy and industrial property rights.
6.9 Military Legal System

Military decisions may only be taken in compliance with the established principles of national and international law. It is therefore essential that all members of the Bundeswehr are familiar with the law and know right from wrong. The servicemen and women are entitled to seek protection of their rights before independent courts in case of such rights being violated. In the Armed Forces it is primarily the members of the Bundeswehr Military Legal System who have the task of imparting the necessary legal knowledge. They also advise military superiors, particularly on matters of military law and criminal law as well as constitutional and international law. The Bundeswehr Military Legal System has a civilian structure and consists of the following:

- Courts having jurisdiction over military disciplinary offences and complaints by military personnel
- Disciplinary attorneys for the Armed Forces including the Disciplinary Attorney General for the Armed Forces
- Legal advisers
- Legal instructors

More than 100 civilian legal experts are currently employed as legal advisers to commanders and directors in units, agencies and offices of the Armed Forces at division level and higher. These act, in a secondary function, as disciplinary attorneys for the Armed Forces. Some 50 civilian legal instructors are employed at schools and academies of the Armed Forces. Military jurisdiction is exercised by the North (Münster) and South (Munich) Disciplinary and Complaints Courts of the Bundeswehr, with a total of 15 divisions and the two Military Affairs Divisions of the Federal Administrative Court in Leipzig. The courts having jurisdiction over military disciplinary offences and complaints by members of the Armed Forces are staffed by professional civilian judges and military lay judges. They take decisions on military complaints and disciplinary matters. In so doing, they are independent and bound only by law. Prosecution of criminal offences, however, is the exclusive jurisdiction of civilian criminal courts.

The operations-oriented posture of the Bundeswehr also poses fresh challenges to the Military Legal System. Legal advisers take part in operations abroad in the rank of field-grade officers. They advise the contingent commanders on the wide range of legal issues pertinent to operations. Not only are they tasked with the interpretation of United Nations resolutions, Status of Forces Agreements and Rules of Engagement, for instance, but they must also conduct a legal sufficiency review of operation plans to ensure that they comply with the rules of international humanitarian law. They are besides employed in multinational headquarters together with legal advisers of other nations. Their tasks additionally include supporting the deployed units during disciplinary investigations in the country of deployment, rendering administrative assistance to German investigative and judicial authorities, and providing military personnel on operations with initial legal advice on private legal matters.

6.10 Chaplain Service

Bundeswehr servicemen and women have a legal right to pastoral care and undisturbed practice of religion. The religious communities have the opportunity to provide pastoral care for their members in the Armed Forces, taking into account the special conditions of military service.

There have so far been agreements only between the Protestant Church in Germany and the Catholic Church of the Federal Republic of Germany, and agreements concerning an independent chaplain service for servicemen and women belonging to one of these religions. Under these agreements, the state takes care of the organisational structure of the Protestant and Catholic chaplain services, employs chaplains as temporary or permanent civil servants, and bears the costs of these services' organisation and personnel. This does not affect the independence of the Church's mission. In fulfilling their pastoral duties, military chaplains are exempt from government directives and only answerable to their Church, irrespective of their status as federal civil servants.

In addition to their church work, military chaplains hold moral guidance classes, which the Bundeswehr supports and encourages all servicemen and women to attend, regardless of their religious beliefs. This provides a forum for discussing and reflecting on fundamental moral and ethical issues of military service and is well in keeping with the concept of Innere Führung (leadership development and civic education).

Roughly 40 percent of military personnel belong neither to the Protestant nor to the Catholic Church. These include personnel who are completely non-denominational and, to an increasing extent, members of other denominations. Undisturbed practice of religion is equally guaranteed for these servicemen and women in their units.

The Chaplain Service has had to focus its attention on new tasks as a result of the Armed Forces mission-oriented realignment. Protestant and Catholic military chaplains accompany units on international peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. They successfully help military personnel to cope with personal and emotional strain in the areas of deployment. Particularly on deployments abroad, when soldiers often experience dire situations where they are confronted with injury and death and the misery of the local population, the fact that the chaplains are there to help and talk to constitutes an important element of care and welfare, with even non-denominational soldiers using this opportunity and finding it very helpful. In connection with such deployments abroad, military chaplains devote special attention to the families of soldiers on operations and take part in activities to help soldiers returning from operations abroad to readjust to daily military routine and resume their own private lives.
Well-trained, capable and motivated soldiers and civilian employees are crucial for the operational readiness of the Bundeswehr. The Bundeswehr is one of the largest employers in Germany. Every year it offers attractive jobs to more than 20,000 young men and women in military and civilian vocations.

No other public institution has experienced such drastic reductions in personnel numbers over the past few years. The first year in which an all-German budget was drawn up for an entire year was 1991, when the National People’s Army was disbanded. At that time, the manpower strength of the Bundeswehr was well over 650,000 military and civilian personnel. Today, the Bundeswehr is some 370,000 strong; this includes around 250,000 military and approximately 117,000 civilian personnel. Since Germany’s reunification, the civilian personnel cutbacks in the Bundeswehr alone have accounted for well over 80 percent of all personnel reductions throughout the public service at Federal level, helping significantly to bring down personnel costs over the long term.

Operations abroad place considerable strain and pressure on personnel. The Bundeswehr has therefore taken a number of well-coordinated measures to respond to the demands facing Armed Forces personnel on operations.

The restructuring of careers and the qualification campaign offering a wide range of initial civilian occupational training as well as continuation training opportunities in the career path for non-commissioned officers (NCOs) has resulted in a sufficient number and quality of recruits volunteering for service in the Armed Forces. There has been a significant improvement in applicants’ general level of education and professional skills over the past few years. In 2005, some 70 percent of the applicants admitted to the career paths of NCOs and enlisted personnel had vocational qualifications. Ninety-three percent of the applicants recruited for senior NCO careers had an intermediate school-leaving certificate (Mittlere Reife), or a technical college (Fachhochschulreife) or university (Abitur) entrance qualification.

Some 40 percent of temporary-career volunteers (TCVs) in the enlisted and NCO career categories in 2005 were recruited from the group of basic-service conscripts (BSCs). This underlines not only the fact that universal conscription is still the mainstay of recruitment, but also that young people consider serving in the Armed Forces to be attractive.
The attractiveness of military service is being consistently enhanced so that the Bundeswehr can hold its own in the job market in the face of increasingly fierce competition for qualified personnel. The adjustment of East German pay levels to West German standards is a central element of such efforts. At present, civil servants, judges and military personnel who are given their first assignment in the new Laender (including the eastern part of Berlin) receive lower pay amounting to 92.5 percent of the amount paid in the old Laender. This differentiation between old and new Laender does not apply to conscripts.

As is already the case with public employees under collective bargaining agreements, there is also the intention to end the differentiation between East and West German pay levels for civil servants and military personnel in the lower income brackets (up to pay grade A9) from the end of 2007, and for those in the higher income brackets from the end of 2009.

Personnel sent on deployments abroad receive a foreign deployment allowance to compensate for the additional stresses and strains endured. The amount of this allowance depends on the danger to life and limb, the type and duration of the deployment and other personal restrictions during the deployment abroad.

The Foreign Deployment-Related Benefits and Pensions Act, which entered into force on 1 December 2002, grants considerably increased benefits and pensions to military personnel and civil servants who are injured or suffer lasting health impairments during deployments abroad. At present, the issue of establishing a legal framework to enable those military personnel who are injured or sustained health impairments on operations to stay in service is being vigorously examined as a matter of priority. The objective is to apply, even more consistently, the principle that continued employment and rehabilitation take precedence over mere payment of pensions and benefits.

A key factor for the motivation of the servicemen and women to fulfill their duties on deployments is the support of their families. The Bundeswehr seeks to take this aspect sufficiently into account. A family support organisation including a central family support agency and 31 family support centres has been established to this end. These provide assistance on all social issues and care and welfare matters and are being increasingly networked with comparable institutions of civilian organisations. The Bundeswehr, moreover, attributes special importance to the compatibility of family and employment in the Armed Forces.

7.1 Regulars and Temporary-Career Volunteers

Some 60,000 regulars and about 130,000 temporary-career volunteers (TCVs) are serving in the Bundeswehr.

The Armed Forces need a well-balanced mix of personnel age groups to maintain their operational readiness. Many tasks to be performed in the Services can only be mastered up to a certain age by very reason of the physical demands involved. This is why only some 25 percent of all officers and NCOs who serve in the forces as temporary-career volunteers are currently kept on as regulars. All other personnel have to take up a new civilian occupation when they leave the Service. For this category of personnel there are special provisions governing their right to vocational advancement, for instance, and the certainty of being employed in the public service.

A Personnel Structure Model (PSM) provides the basis for military personnel planning. It includes not only personnel strengths but also detailed categorisation of careers, terms of enlistment and pay grades. Regulars for whom there are no vacancies under the changed structures tie up funds no longer provided for in the Personnel Structure Model.

The Personnel Early Retirement Act expiring in 2006 enables up to 3,000 regulars to opt for early retirement, provided that they meet specific conditions. Also in future it must be ensured that the age structure in the forces is in line with the applicable personnel structure model. The Federal Government is therefore examining the necessity to correct the imbalance in the age structures of regulars in the upper age brackets, tailored to the needs of the Armed Forces in the course of the transformation process.

The special nature of military service is also being taken into account in the striven-for reform of public service law and pay regulations. It is being examined whether it is possible or necessary to apply the same type of pay system based on performance variables to the military sector. In this context, the option of introducing an independent and cost-neutral pay system for military personnel will be looked at as stipulated in the Coalition Agreement dated 11 November 2005. Military personnel will, on no account, end up being financially worse off than civilians in public service.
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7.2 Basic-Service and Extended-Service
Conscripts

Some 55,000 basic-service conscripts (BSCs) and extended-service conscripts (ESCs) serve at any one time in the Bundeswehr and perform a wide variety of tasks in support of operations abroad. They have a broad range of educational and vocational qualifications, thus reducing the training effort of the Armed Forces and increasing the spectrum of vocational qualifications available.

Basic-service conscripts can volunteer for an extra 14 months of military service after their nine months of basic military service. Such extended-service conscripts account, on average, for 20 percent of the personnel on deployments abroad. This underlines their special importance for the operational readiness of the Bundeswehr on operations abroad and during routine duty at home.

Universal conscription and equity in conscription are two sides of the same coin. For this reason, the potential offered by the conscripts due for induction will continue to be utilised to the best possible extent. It is interesting to note in this connection that the number of posts for basic-service conscripts for the years 2006 and 2007 has been increased by 5,000.

7.3 Reservists

Reservists play their part in the successful fulfilment of the Bundeswehr’s mission. Their voluntary participation in deployments abroad, in particular, is indispensable. Through their commitment, they are instrumental in ensuring that the Bundeswehr is generally held in high esteem and can count on the broad support of society.

Civil-military cooperation at government/urban district and regional level is another area in which mainly reservists are needed. They not only function as advisers to the regions and districts, but also render assistance in the event of natural disasters and particularly grave accidents in Germany, and initiate the necessary measures within the overall national preventive security system.

The Bundeswehr can employ its reservists across the entire task spectrum without resorting to mobilisation. The Armed Forces’ augmentation requirements amount to 80,000 to 100,000 reservists.

7.4 Civilian Personnel

At present, some 117,000 civilian personnel are employed in the Bundeswehr, about 26,000 of whom are civil servants and around 85,000 public employees. More than 5,000 young people hold trainee positions with the Armed Forces and the Defence Administration.

In the course of the transformation of the Bundeswehr, the number of civilian personnel will be cut back to some 75,000 posts by 2010.

The further reduction in civilian personnel is to be achieved in a socially benign manner and without any compulsory redundancies. It will be carried out by strictly adhering to collective bargaining agreements and in close coordination with personnel representatives, unions and professional associations. Safeguarding jobs continues to be a central responsibility of civilian personnel management.

The Collective Agreement of 18 July 2001 on Socially Benign Support Measures in Connection with the Restructuring of the Bundeswehr offers public employees a reliable basis for orientation. Every effort is made, moreover, to ensure that employees whose posts are cut can find another job in the Bundeswehr, with other administrative authorities or agencies in the public service, or even with partner enterprises involved in cooperation projects.

Irrespective of the envisaged reduction in the number of personnel, the Bundeswehr will in future continue to offer interesting and responsible jobs with good career prospects at home and abroad to civilian employees holding all manner of qualifications. The new tasks to be performed by the Armed Forces will open up new opportunities for the civilian workforce. So far, more than 2,000 civilian Bundeswehr personnel have taken part in Bundeswehr deployments abroad, which usually involves temporarily switching to military status.

The objective being pursued for higher intermediate-level and higher-level civil servants under the Personnel Development Concept is to identify, at an early stage, civil servants who show well above-average commitment and to prepare them for executive or managerial responsibilities. This includes, first and foremost, ensuring that future executive or managerial staff acquire qualifications in the fields of personnel management as well as leadership and social competencies.
7.5 Training and Education

Training and education are crucial to the success of the Bundeswehr’s transformation process. All servicemen and women receive the training they need to fulfill their tasks successfully. New and innovative approaches in advanced and continuation training as well as targeted investments in training technology are vital for enhancing the capabilities of servicemen and women to act independently in response to changed situations. Efficient use is, at the same time, being made of the opportunities opened up by global networking and the resulting education resources, thus making the Bundeswehr even more attractive as an employer.

The modular concept of “Predeployment Training for Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management”, adopted in 2004, underscores the Bundeswehr’s focus on operations. Right from basic military training, which is identical for all servicemen and women, everyone is taught sufficient basic cross-functional knowledge and skills for deployments abroad. During their overall term of service, all soldiers must master and demonstrate individual self-defence and protection capabilities, irrespective of age, rank, service or organisational area.

Exercises at national and multinational level also remain indispensable for assessing and enhancing the operational readiness of Bundeswehr units. State-of-the-art training tools and computer-assisted training facilities, such as the Army Combat Training Centre, help to improve the quality of training and to reduce costs.

It is primarily officers and non-commissioned officers who receive a comprehensive education in politics and history. Intensive ethical/moral and intercultural education helps to foster the soldiers’ capability to act in ethical conflict situations and in deployment areas characterised by cultural differences. The Leadership Development and Civic Education Centre, in particular, has been pioneering the conceptual development and organisation of educational courses on these subjects. It additionally offers “Leadership coaching in military organisations” to leaders in units and staffs.

Intensive foreign language training, especially English, is vital for deployments in a multinational environment. This training is provided by the Federal Office of Languages at training establishments of the Armed Forces and of the defence administration and is mandatory for all senior NCOs and officers of the Bundeswehr.

The Bundeswehr reserves a total of some 20,000 posts as part of a major long-term training and qualification campaign for personnel to gain recognised, transferable civilian occupational qualifications, such as apprenticeship trade qualifications, externally accredited higher qualifications (e.g. as a master craftsman) or technical college qualifications. This provides primarily NCOs in the general specialist service with the qualifications needed for their specialist military tasks. A full range of qualification opportunities is offered by the Vocational Advancement Service to facilitate the integration of soldiers into civilian working life when they leave the Bundeswehr.

The vast majority of future officers take a degree course based on independent research and teaching at the universities of the Bundeswehr, which were established in Hamburg and Munich in 1973. The German Armed Forces hence have officers at their disposal who, in addition to their military training, obtain an academic qualification. This form of dual professional qualification is unique in the world. Both Bundeswehr universities are firmly integrated into the German and international university land-
Besides the exchange on security policy topics at the Federal College for Security Studies, efforts are being made to establish interministerial approaches at other education and training institutes. Security policy topics are being taught interministerially, both as part of training relating to deployments abroad and as part of the training of future leadership personnel, and this is complemented by appropriate personnel exchange measures.

The process of transformation calls for a new didactic approach. The Bundeswehr is making increasing use of self-learning processes for initial and continuing education and training. The emphasis here is on accessing and assimilating knowledge independently and transmitting it within a team. This promotes individual responsibility, team spirit, creativity as well as readiness for lifelong learning.

The modern education method of distance learning is an example of this didactic approach. Based on the principle of “New Teaching/New Learning”, students have the opportunity to use the new media for independent and team learning, supported by experienced instructors known as tele-tutors. Distance learning also gives military personnel on deployments access to a wide choice of learning options.

Education in the Armed Forces has taken on a new level of importance, as the success of transformation and operations is largely determined by the ability of the individual to assume responsibility. The independent pedagogical task of education calls for military superiors to lead and train their subordinate personnel in such a way that they can consistently expand their capability to act on their own responsibility.
Modern and efficient Armed Forces are an element of national security provision. Their tasks derive from their constitutional mission and from the values, goals and interests of German security and defence policy. The transformation of the Armed Forces is aimed at improving their operational readiness across the entire task spectrum and requires unconditional joint thinking and action throughout the Bundeswehr, as well as a stronger interministerial approach. The further development of existing capabilities must, at the same time, take account of the Bundeswehr’s multinational involvement. The capability of the Bundeswehr to conduct network-enabled operations will be an absolute prerequisite for it to play a successful part in multinational conflict prevention and crisis management.

In view of the changed international environment, the future role of Armed Forces will be substantially determined by the fact that effective protection of a country and its people is possible only within the framework of national security provision based on a networked security policy. This will require not only the Armed Forces, but also all other government agencies concerned with threat and hazard prevention, preventive security and peacekeeping, to be provided with the necessary funds within budgetary constraints. Preventive security measures by the state will in future necessitate even closer integration of political, military, development policy, economic, humanitarian, policing and intelligence instruments for conflict prevention and crisis management. The Bundeswehr is ready to meet the challenge of such an interministerial approach, no matter what the task, thus making allowance for the fact that security parameters will also change as new risks and new constellations in international politics arise.

The Bundeswehr undertakes operations at national and international level. This similarly necessitates an all-round, networked approach that effectively combines civilian and military instruments. Such an approach is of paramount importance in the context of comprehensive security provision, particularly for conflict prevention and crisis management operations. The same applies to the employment of military and civilian capabilities in relief operations in the wake of natural or man-made disasters. Experience at national and international level has shown that, where fewer resources are available, civilian and military actors achieve greater effect if they pool forces and coordinate their actions for the conceptual planning and conduct of operations. The Federal Government is taking up the ensuing challenge of subjecting the instruments of security policy to constant appraisal and, where necessary, refining them. This will serve the security of Germany best and, at the same time, contribute to peace in the world.
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>AF</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
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<td>AGS</td>
<td>Alliance Ground Surveillance</td>
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<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>AirMedEvac</td>
<td>Air Medical Evacuation</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>Biological Weapons Convention</td>
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<td>CD&amp;E</td>
<td>Concept Development and Experimentation</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>COE CSW</td>
<td>Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>CJVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civil Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
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<td>Comprehensive Political Guidance</td>
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<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
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<td>CRT</td>
<td>Civilian Response Team</td>
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<td>Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Defence Capabilities Initiative</td>
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<td>Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROM</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHC</td>
<td>Force Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMoD</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of the seven leading industrial nations and Russia</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICI</td>
<td>Istanbul Cooperation Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSS</td>
<td>Joint Support Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LoA</td>
<td>Level of Ambition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>Mediterranean Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEADS</td>
<td>Medium Extended Air Defence System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear, biological, chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-commissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAE</td>
<td>Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation ENDURING FREEDOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHQ</td>
<td>Operation Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCW</td>
<td>Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Prague Capabilities Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMG</td>
<td>Politico-Military Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Proliferation Security Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSM</td>
<td>Personnel Structure Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD Congo</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEM</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALIS</td>
<td>Strategic Airlift Interim Solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-air missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATCOMbw</td>
<td>Satellite Communication for the Bundeswehr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR LUPE</td>
<td>High Resolution Space-based Synthetic Aperture Radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signal Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACC</td>
<td>Tactical Air Control Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOS</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>United Nations Standby Arrangement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Code</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<td>DEU</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNK</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>ITA</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>NOR</td>
<td>Norway</td>
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<td>POL</td>
<td>Poland</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUR</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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