I hereby promulgate the

DEFENCE POLICY GUIDELINES

for the area of responsibility of the

Federal Minister of Defence

Berlin, 21 May 2003
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I. Defence Policy Guidelines for a Changed Security Environment

1. The security situation has changed fundamentally. New security policy risks and opportunities call for changed capabilities.

2. The mission, tasks and capabilities of the Bundeswehr are consistently oriented on the anticipated security situation and Germany’s security commitments as a NATO and EU partner. At the same time, they take account of the available resources.

3. The comprehensive reform of the Bundeswehr that is already under way will be further developed. In this connection, special emphasis is being placed on the prioritisation and shaping of the Bundeswehr’s tasks in the new strategic conditions. Universal conscription in an adapted form remains an indispensable requirement for the operational readiness, effectiveness and economic efficiency of the Bundeswehr.

4. The reprioritisation of the tasks of the Bundeswehr and the ensuing conceptual and structural consequences correspond with the broad understanding of defence that has evolved over the past few years.

5. According to Article 87a of the Basic Law, the Federation establishes Armed Forces for purposes of defence. Defence as it is understood today means more, however, than traditional defensive operations at the national borders against a conventional attack. It includes the prevention of conflicts and crises, the common management of crises, and post-crisis rehabilitation. Accordingly, defence can no longer be narrowed down to geographical boundaries, but contributes to safeguarding our security wherever it is in jeopardy. The Federal Constitutional Court and the German Bundestag have confirmed that Bundeswehr operations conducted within the context of collective security systems are compatible with the Basic Law.

6. German defence policy comprises the preventive security action Germany takes within the scope of its foreign and security policy. Armed Forces are an integral part of a foreign and security policy that aims at the prevention and containment of crises and conflicts.
7. The present Defence Policy Guidelines

- lay down the principles of shaping defence policy,
- prioritize tasks and determine parameters for the capabilities of the armed forces of the future within the scope of the overall obligation of the state to take preventive measures for safeguarding Germany’s security.

8. These Defence Policy Guidelines are the binding foundation for the work performed in the area of responsibility of the Federal Minister of Defence. In view of constantly changing security policy challenges, these Guidelines will be regularly reviewed and further developed.

II. Key statements

9. Germany’s security environment is characterised by changed risks and new opportunities. At present, and in the foreseeable future, there is no conventional threat to the German territory. The Bundeswehr’s spectrum of operations has changed fundamentally.

10. The security situation calls for a security and defence policy that is geared to the prevention and containment of crises and conflicts; such a policy must comprise the entire spectrum of instruments and options for action relevant to security policy and must be based on common action with allies and partners. The Bundeswehr focuses on operations in the context of conflict prevention and crisis management as well as in support of allies, also beyond NATO territory.

11. Multinational preventive security measures are one of the basic factors determining German defence policy. With the exception of evacuation and rescue missions, the Bundeswehr will conduct armed operations only together with allies and partners in a UN, NATO and EU context.

12. Traditional national defence against a conventional attack, which previously solely determined the structures of the Bundeswehr, no longer corresponds with the actual security policy requirements. The capabilities that had been kept available solely for this purpose are no longer required. However, it must be ensured that the ability to conduct national defence operations against a conventional attack can be reconstituted within a foreseeable, albeit prolonged, period of time.
13. The Bundeswehr is being further developed with the intention of achieving a balance between its mission, tasks, equipment and resources. In view of the changed security situation, the tasks of the Bundeswehr will be reprioritised. Its capabilities will be adapted accordingly. In future, financial resources will be used mainly for the provision of the military core capabilities.

14. A capability-oriented overall approach integrating all the armed services and organizational areas is being developed for procurement and equipment planning. Armaments cooperation within a European and transatlantic framework is to be given precedence over the realisation of projects under national responsibility.

15. To orient itself more strongly and quickly on the more probable tasks of international conflict prevention and crisis management the Bundeswehr needs armed forces that are categorized according to their operational readiness and availability and can be employed rapidly and effectively in combined operations with other nations' forces. This calls for a capability profile focusing on six essential, interlinked capabilities:

- Command and control,
- intelligence collection and reconnaissance,
- mobility,
- effective engagement,
- support and sustainability,
- survivability and protection.

16. Conscription in its adapted form remains an indispensable requirement for the operational readiness, effectiveness and economic efficiency of the Bundeswehr. In the future, too, the need to protect Germany and its citizens including the required ability to reconstitute for national defence as well as to provide support in the event of natural disasters and emergencies provide reasons – beside other reasons – for the retention of universal conscription.

III. German Security: Risks and Opportunities

17. Regardless of the politically advantageous changes in the past few years, Germany’s security environment is not free from military and non-military risks jeopardizing and threatening its security and stability.
18. The attacks of 11 September 2001 have shaken the civilized world to its very foundations. Subsequent terrorist attacks have heightened the awareness of asymmetric threats that may occur anywhere in the world and may be directed against anyone.

19. It is mainly religiously motivated extremism and fanaticism in combination with the worldwide reach of international terrorism that threaten the achievements of modern civilization such as freedom and human rights, openness, tolerance and diversity.

20. The further development of weapons of mass destruction combined with long-range delivery means can also pose a threat to the populations and countries of Europe. Forces on operations abroad are particularly endangered. The risks connected with proliferation have been aggravated by the attempt of terrorist groups to gain access to weapons of mass destruction.

21. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can only be prevented and contained by comprehensive non-proliferation policy measures and a regulatory framework put in place by the international community and shaped in accordance with transparent rules. These political crisis prevention activities need to be complemented by measures to protect against risks resulting from proliferation. Appropriate civilian and military assets and capabilities need to be developed in order to counter threats stemming from non-government actors.

22. Global non-proliferation treaties and export controls on armaments need to be improved. Resolving regional conflicts can help to induce states to renounce weapons of mass destruction.

23. There is still the possibility of nationally and ethnically motivated violent conflicts in Europe, often fostered by criminal structures. The persistently unstable security situation in the Balkans continues to call for special commitments to be made by the European nations. Military contributions to shaping a secure environment for lasting political and social normalisation will remain indispensable.

24. Europe is directly affected by crises at its southern and southeastern periphery. The changed security situation poses new challenges to both NATO and the EU.

25. Resolving the multifarious regional crises and conflicts remains a matter of outstanding importance to security and stability in Europe and the world. Unresolved political, ethnic, religious, economic and social
conflicts combined with international terrorism, organised crime on an international scale and increasing migratory movements directly affect German and European security. They can only be countered by a comprehensive security concept and a global collective security system.

26. Modern information societies depend on information and communication systems and are therefore vulnerable. Easy access and use and insufficient protective measures increase the risks to states, societies and their infrastructure and facilitate the manifold forms of information warfare.

27. Due to its high volume of foreign trade and the related special dependence on vulnerable transport routes and means, the German economy is exposed to additional hazards.

28. The huge political upheavals in Europe and the end of the Cold War that had had a global impact, however, have also resulted in new opportunities for security and stability. The broad international anti-terror coalition forms the basis for effective prevention and combatting of this threat. This coalition also opens up new options for taking common risk prevention action, even between states with differing cultures and religions. The fight against terrorism is based on international law and in particular on the Charter of the United Nations.

29. German security policy gains additional options for action in a united Europe. It is important to further develop cooperative strategies for multilateral risk prevention and international conflict resolution together with our allies and partners in NATO and the EU, and in cooperation with Russia and other partner nations. Thus, the opportunities for regional and even global preventive security measures can be exploited and risks to security policy can be reduced. Disarmament and arms control remain essential factors of the global security order.

30. The progressing development and strengthening of the Euroatlantic security structures create an area of stability that is unique in the world. The opening of NATO and the EU to new members strengthens security and stability but also requires members to assume more obligations.

31. Germany is benefiting from these developments in Europe. At present, and in the foreseeable future, there is no apparent conventional threat to the German territory.
32. NATO’s adaptation to the changed security environment provides the basis for the alliance’s ability to perform its central role in the future, too. The United States of America remain indispensable to European security.

33. The European Union’s integration in the field of security policy and the resulting capacity of action are core elements in safeguarding peace and stability in Europe. By adopting the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the EU is enhancing its instruments for concerted action in conflict prevention and crisis management operations, also beyond European borders. ESDP is no substitute for but rather a necessary supplement to NATO that strengthens the Alliance and forms the core of a European pillar of the Alliance. Already today, the EU and NATO see themselves as strategic partners in international conflict prevention and crisis management activities.

34. Russia’s reorientation in the field of foreign policy opens up new opportunities for a constructive cooperation in Europe and in a global framework. The decision taken at the World Summit 2002 to admit the Russian Federation to the G8 as a full-fledged member, the intensification of the dialogue within the scope of the NATO-Russia Council and the common measures taken against terrorism form the foundation for an even closer long-term cooperation on security issues.

IV. Principles and Interests of German Security Policy

35. The first and foremost goal of Germany's security policy is to ensure the safety and protection of its citizens. To achieve this goal, it uses the existing global and regional security institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the European Union (EU). The multiplicity of tasks requires a consolidated national security policy with flexible and well-coordinated instruments which must in the medium term be merged into a national security concept.

36. German security policy is comprehensive and takes political, economic, ecological, social and cultural conditions and developments into account. It is not possible to guarantee security primarily or solely by military means. Preventive security policy includes political and diplomatic initiatives and action in the fields of economic and development policy as well as constitutional, humanitarian and social measures.
Nevertheless, the political will and ability to enforce or restore freedom and human rights, stability and security with military means, if necessary, are a sine qua non of a credible comprehensive approach to security policy. The Basic Law and international law form the basis on which all Bundeswehr missions are conducted.

Under the circumstances prevailing today, no state can ensure peace, security and prosperity on its own. Developing the international environment in harmony with German interests, coping with complex challenges, containing risks and threats and protecting Germany from them are tasks which cannot be accomplished by going it alone. Joint efforts are needed.

The new security policy opportunities and complex risks call for a German security and defence policy that is geared to the prevention of crises and conflicts, encompasses the full range of available instruments and options relevant to security policy, and is organised jointly with allies and partners in NATO and the EU. Its goal is to prevent violence by taking proactive and containment measures. National and international early warning and reconnaissance capabilities are vital prerequisites for this.

In terms of German security and defence policy, this has three consequences:

Firstly: The transatlantic partnership remains the bedrock of our security. Now and in future, there can be no security in and for Europe without the United States of America. Germany will continue to make a substantial contribution to the transatlantic partnership.

Secondly: The European area of stability is strengthened by a broadly based, cooperative and effective EU security and defence policy. Globalisation also calls for a Europe fully capable of acting. The European Security and Defence Policy is based on the strategic partnership with the North Atlantic Alliance and enables the Europeans to act independently where NATO as a whole is not willing or there is no need for NATO to become involved.

Thirdly: Germany is actively participating in UN and OSCE efforts so as to provide for its own security, to ensure that human rights and international law are respected worldwide, to promote sustainable economic progress and social development, to conserve the natural resource base and to bridge the gap between the poor and the rich regions of the world.
V. German Defence Policy

41. German defence policy is determined to a large extent by three factors:

- multinational integration of the Bundeswehr within the framework of a foreign policy focused on European integration, transatlantic partnership and global responsibility,
- the changed operational spectrum of the Bundeswehr and the increased number of international operations,
- available resources.

V.1 Multinational Integration

42. With the possible exception of evacuation and rescue missions, the Bundeswehr will conduct armed operations only together with allies and partners in a UN, NATO and EU context.

43. The UN has a crucial role to play in mastering the challenges of the 21st century. According to the Charter of the United Nations, the UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

44. The nature of UN-led international peace missions has changed considerably. Such missions range from typical "blue-helmet" missions to conflict prevention by political means and preventive troop deployment to the employment of armed forces to contain conflicts and stabilise the political situation. Increasingly, it is also a matter of ending intra-state conflicts and restoring conditions in which the population can live in peace. To achieve this, peacekeeping missions need military, civilian and police capabilities in a balanced proportion.

45. The willingness to make substantial contributions and active participation in the work of all UN bodies as well as in the practical work done by the UN in crisis areas maintain and strengthen Germany's influence on the future role of this world organisation.

46. Germany's NATO membership is the cornerstone of its security. At the beginning of the 21st century, NATO still remains the guarantor of stable security in Europe, a collective defence alliance and a transatlantic forum for consultation. As such, it makes a key contribution to the shaping of a pan-European order of peace and ties Europe's security to the security of North America.
47. Crises and conflicts, threats and their underlying causes over a widened geographical area have an ever more frequent and pronounced effect on the Alliance. NATO must square up to these challenges and be capable of defending the vital security interests of its members. Germany will make an adequate contribution so that NATO, in conformity with the Washington Treaty and the UN Charter and on the basis of its Strategic Concept, can accomplish the full spectrum of its tasks and respond collectively to the new challenges, from whatever direction they may come.

48. Germany has its armed forces integrated in NATO to a greater extent than any other ally. Within the Alliance, it has a crucial role and responsibility for the future course of NATO.

49. NATO intends to set up a rapid reaction force and to improve military capabilities for protection against weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and for defence against terrorism. The Bundeswehr will contribute to these projects as far as its capabilities permit. Compatibility with the build-up of capabilities under the ESDP will be ensured.

50. The EU is the nucleus of the European area of stability. For the sake of its political credibility and effectiveness, it must have the ability to take action in all fields of politics. The EU must have a wide range of civil and military capabilities at its disposal with which to respond to crises affecting Europe. ESDP is therefore a decisive step towards Europe's deeper integration and enhanced capacity for action in security matters. The goal is the creation of a European Security and Defence Union as part of a fully developed Political Union.

51. Over the past few years, Germany has played a key role in EU decision-making on the shaping of ESDP. The achievement of the European force goals and the elimination of identified capability deficits at national and European level, as well as the commitment of reported military capabilities and means are the yardstick for the degree to which Germany and its partners are fulfilling their obligations within the framework of the EU.

52. Assets reported to NATO and the EU will be available to both organisations.

53. Germany's commitment to provide a rapid response capability within the context of NATO and the EU make an equally rapid political decision-making capability at national level imperative.
V.2 The Bundeswehr on Operations

54. The operational spectrum of the Bundeswehr has undergone fundamental changes over the past decade. The intensity, extent and duration of operations place varying and increasing demands on the armed forces.

55. The Bundeswehr is called upon when it comes to evacuating German citizens in an emergency and providing humanitarian aid. Together with armed forces of friendly and partner nations, it participates in peacekeeping, peace building and peace enforcement operations. The Bundeswehr thus helps to prevent or end violent conflicts. Through stabilisation and deterrence, it counteracts aggravation of crises and conflicts and enables the consolidation of peace processes. It is furthermore involved in operations to fight international terrorism, thereby also acting in support of allies.

56. Moreover, the Bundeswehr makes a wide range of military contributions in the areas of operation, from helping to ensure security and order in the respective area and supporting humanitarian measures to making provisions for the protection of deployed forces – to include forces of other nations – down to taking precautions against attacks with weapons of mass destruction. The Bundeswehr is more frequently assuming a leading role in multinational operations.

57. Given the new comprehensive approach to a modern security and defence policy and its attendant demands, it is impossible to predetermine future operations in terms of their intensity or geographic location. The political aim will define the goal, location, duration and type of an operation. The necessity for the Bundeswehr to participate in multinational operations may arise anywhere in the world and at short notice and may extend across the entire mission spectrum down to high-intensity operations.

58. There are no clear-cut dividing lines between the various types of operations. Rapid escalation of a conflict as a result of which a peacekeeping mission will transition to a higher-intensity operation can never be ruled out.

59. Current and future Bundeswehr missions require that the armed forces be sufficiently capable of participating in multinational operations covering the entire operational spectrum of conflict prevention and crisis management and providing support to allies even beyond the boundaries of Allied territory.
60. The present basic parameters for the number and dimension of potential operations must be reviewed and adjusted in order to ease the – sometimes excessive – burden on the deployment forces.

61. In putting the Bundeswehr on track for the tasks ahead it is necessary to concentrate on improving the mission-essential range of capabilities. Interoperability and the capacity for concerted multinational action with allies on operations need to be enhanced.

62. In view of the new international environment, capabilities solely designed for traditional national defence against an adversary using conventional means are no longer needed. Due to the scarcity of resources which demands concentration of effort, they can no longer be provided without adversely affecting the capabilities needed in future. What must be retained, however, is a capability allowing reconstitution, within a foreseeable, albeit prolonged, period of time, of the assets needed to conduct national defence against a conventional attack. This requires the retention of conscription. In addition, the armed forces must be capable of making an adequate contribution – as part of an overall national effort – to preventing, repelling and coping with terrorist attacks as provided for under prevailing law and protecting Germany against asymmetric threats. This also makes the retention of conscription indispensable.

V.3 Resources

63. The numerical strength of the armed forces and the principles of their organisation will be determined by their mission and the budget established in response to it. Medium-term financial planning is the basis to which Bundeswehr planning is tied.

64. The defence budget is currently characterised by almost constant operating expenditure, a high percentage of personnel costs and insufficient investments in equipment, whilst at the same time there is considerable overplanning and a high percentage of resources are committed by contract. Due to limited funds, structural reorientation and material modernisation are still out of alignment. It is therefore necessary to reallocate funds within the defence budget in favour of investments.

65. Procurement and equipment planning will be oriented even more stringently to a capability-focused, overall approach across all services and organisational areas, coordinated at multinational level. Given the
high costs of multinational missions and combined joint operations, as well, it is imperative to think and act in a strictly jointness-oriented way with a corresponding command structure.

66. The available resources are chiefly committed to the maintenance and improvement of military core capabilities. Of decisive importance in this respect are the efforts to enhance efficiency in the Bundeswehr, also in cooperation with trade and industry.

67. Savings are achieved through armaments cooperation, cutbacks in dispensable capabilities, standardisation, task sharing, functional worksharing arrangements and role specialisation. The progress of political integration in Europe as well as the limited financial leeway enhance both the necessity and opportunities for greater multinationality.

68. Pooling of national assets in a European and transatlantic context is a prerequisite of armaments cooperation. Common planning, common procurement, common operation of weapon systems and common training provide the framework for what has become necessary and possible from a security point of view as a result of European integration and the development of ESDP and which is already becoming manifest in a more effective European armaments cooperation policy. Concerted efforts are being made to establish a European Armaments Agency.

69. As a prerequisite for this ability to cooperate, Germany will maintain an efficient and competitive industrial base in core areas of technology affording it some leverage in the development of key weapon systems. This will promote the capacity to play a constructive role in an Alliance and European context and is thus an element of German security policy. The merger of national defence industry capacities will remain a matter of great importance.

VI. Mission of the Bundeswehr

70. The mission of the Bundeswehr is an integral element of the state’s overall obligation to provide security for the citizens of our country, to defend our system of values and to protect our interests within the European and transatlantic context.
71. The Bundeswehr, as an instrument of a comprehensive and proactive security and defence policy,

- safeguards the capacity for action in the field of foreign policy,
- contributes to stability on a European and global scale,
- ensures national security and defence and helps defend allies,
- supports multinational cooperation and integration.

72. An efficient Bundeswehr is crucial for a constructive and creative security and defence policy. In order for Germany to safeguard its interests and international influence and to play an active role in peacekeeping, it provides forces of adequate strength which can rapidly and effectively be employed together with the forces of other nations. This includes the support of allies, on the periphery of allied territory or in a geographically even wider context.

73. The Bundeswehr has become an indispensable instrument of a comprehensive conflict prevention and crisis management policy. Its contribution to multinational security insurance and the strengthening of international security organisations promotes European and global stability.

74. The defence of Germany against external threats continues to be the political and constitutional raison d'être of the Bundeswehr. As the guarantor of national security, the Bundeswehr protects and defends Germany against any threat to its population and territory and contributes to the defence of its allies.

75. In view of the fact that Germany is under increased threat from terrorist attacks, the protection of its population and territory assumes added importance and places further demands on the Bundeswehr in terms of the performance of domestic tasks and hence its cooperation with Federal and State interior authorities.

76. The Bundeswehr makes an important contribution to the building of friendly relations through comprehensive cooperation and exchange programmes with partner forces all over the world. At the same time the Bundeswehr is instrumental in promoting integration and confidence building in Europe through multinational cooperation within the European and NATO context and furthers the political goal of creating an independent European capacity for action.
VII. Tasks of the Bundeswehr

77. The tasks of the Bundeswehr derive from the mission it has been assigned under the constitution and from the goals of German security and defence policy.

78. *International conflict prevention and crisis management* – including the fight against international terrorism – are the likelier tasks to be fulfilled by German armed forces for the foreseeable future and put considerable strain on the Bundeswehr.

These tasks are the major determinants of the capabilities, the command and control system, the degree of availability and the equipment of the Bundeswehr. They do in fact determine the structure of the Bundeswehr.

In terms of intensity and complexity, conflict prevention and crisis management operations do not differ from, and may even turn into, operations conducted in support of allies. Both types of operations therefore require basically the same military capabilities.

79. *Support of allies* comprises the preservation of their territorial integrity, to include their territorial waters and airspace, as well as their political sovereignty and freedom of action. It also includes support in the fight against terrorism and the protection of their populations and vital infrastructure.

Should allies be attacked, or in the event of crises and conflicts which might escalate into an actual threat to allies, Germany's obligation to render assistance will apply. It will also apply to the support of allies in the defence against asymmetric, notably terrorist, attacks.

An attack on the Alliance as a whole that would pose an existential threat would place the most complex demands on the state and its armed forces and would presuppose a fundamental reversal of the political developments of the past few years or the emergence of totally new political constellations. It is unlikely to occur.

80. The contribution which the Bundeswehr will make in future to the protection of Germany and its citizens, as part of a national security concept, will be substantial and markedly different, involving numerous new sub-tasks.
National defence in an Alliance context remains the task of the Bundeswehr as an expression of national sovereignty and collective security insurance against perilous developments of the security situation which, while currently unlikely, cannot be totally ruled out for the future. It may call for a considerable increase in own force strengths. The necessary additional forces can be re-established within the necessary time frame, should the security and strategic situation so require. Such reconstitution is ensured primarily through universal conscription.

For the protection of the population and vital infrastructure of our country against terrorist and asymmetrical threats, the Bundeswehr will have forces and means ready commensurate with the risk. Although this is first and foremost a task to be fulfilled by internal-security forces, the armed forces will be available to act, within the scope of the law in force, whenever they alone possess the capabilities needed or when the protection of the citizens and of critical infrastructure can only be provided by the Bundeswehr. Conscripts and reservists will thus be employed in their classic role, the protection of their country and fellow citizens.

Surveillance of German airspace and maritime waters and air and maritime sovereignty tasks in cooperation with other ministries is a permanent task.

For rendering support to the armed forces of allies and partners in Germany, the Bundeswehr needs no additional capabilities of its own but can accomplish these tasks by using available own capabilities and taking recourse to civilian assets.

81. As a matter of principle, rescue and evacuation operations will be conducted as a national responsibility; however, participation of allies and partners is possible. This task is not limited by geographical boundaries and requires a particularly high readiness level of special forces.

82. Being permanent military tasks, partnership and cooperation support political measures for crisis and conflict prevention and post-crisis and post-conflict rehabilitation and promote stability by building confidence. They create the precondition for transparent common action and include participation in multinational activities and exercises as equal partners. This also includes arms control measures.
If the constitutional requirements are met, the Bundeswehr renders supplementary assistance in the event of natural disasters and very serious emergencies at home, and in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations abroad. Such assistance by the Bundeswehr has recently assumed a new quality. It is being rendered at home and abroad using available forces, means and facilities. When provided as a contribution to the restoration of social order and infrastructure in crisis areas, such assistance can be conducted as an independent operation. The procedures for conducting such operations must be further developed in collaboration with other government institutions and civilian relief agencies.

VIII. Consequences for the Bundeswehr

The Bundeswehr’s employment in international conflict prevention, crisis management and anti-terrorism operations has a decisive impact on its further transformation towards an army on operations. Accordingly, suitable and sufficient forces must be kept available at high readiness and with a rapid response capability. Forces to be employed early on must be capable of being deployed quickly to the crisis area already in the initial phase of an operation.

It is above all against the background of potential regional conflicts or terrorist attacks that the capability to support alliance partners remains necessary. To a greater extent than before, the armed forces must be oriented on harmonising their capabilities, means and structures with those of their partners, thus avoiding the duplication of capacities. It is also possible to dispense with certain individual capabilities if these can be provided or taken over by other nations’ forces. Structures must reflect the fact that the warning time of an attack on the alliance as a whole has become much longer and can be exploited politically and militarily.

The traditional national defence in an alliance context against conventional attacks, which previously had played a decisive role in determining the Bundeswehr's structures, no longer corresponds to the actual security policy requirements. On the other hand, the protection of Germany and its citizens including air and sea surveillance as well as the performance of air and maritime sovereignty tasks have gained in importance. Germany’s protection capabilities in these fields are being reoriented and require consistent gradation of availability, readiness and training of the armed forces, and the exploitation of the synergy of all national instruments of preventive security.
87. The future task spectrum calls for Bundeswehr personnel who are excellently qualified and highly motivated and capable of responding to the challenges of a security environment that has become more complex. The attractiveness of service in the Bundeswehr must therefore be ensured in order to be able to compete with trade and industry in recruiting new personnel and increasing the proportion of women. The potential of reservists must be utilised consistently to complement the capabilities of the standing forces.

88. With its manifold tasks, the Bundeswehr plays a highly important role in German society and politics for which it deserves unreserved support. At the same time, the Bundeswehr continues to develop its concept of Innere Führung in order to adapt this to the new demands of operations and enhance the integration of the armed forces in society. The same applies to the cultivation of tradition and to civic education in the armed forces.

VIII.1 Strength and Structure of the Bundeswehr

89. The Bundeswehr’s tasks have a decisive impact on the development of its concept. Conflict prevention and crisis management operations require the Bundeswehr to be highly professional and flexible. A high degree of interoperability is the crucial prerequisite for multinational missions and combined operations. Furthermore, the increased demands necessitate unrestricted application of jointness in thinking and acting. The Bundeswehr’s overall capability therefore takes priority over the capabilities of the individual services. Maintaining and improving the military core capabilities is of paramount importance. Facilities and services of the Bundeswehr not directly required to attain this goal are being subjected to critical examination.

90. The Bundeswehr’s orientation on its more probable tasks requires forces of graduated readiness and availability. Military capacities for international conflict prevention and crisis management and for the support of alliance partners must be rapidly available and sustainable. An appropriate number of forces will also be kept available for the protection of Germany. In the event of a recognisable deterioration of the situation, these forces can then serve as the core for reconstitution for national defence.
VIII.2 Capabilities of the Bundeswehr

91. To be able to cope with its tasks, the Bundeswehr will have efficient forces capable of being employed rapidly and effectively in combined operations with other nations’ forces. This requires a capability profile comprising six essential, interlinked capability categories:

- Command and control;
- Intelligence collection and reconnaissance;
- Mobility;
- Effective engagement;
- Support and sustainability;
- Survivability and protection.

92. Considering the security situation, there is no requirement to furnish all sub-capabilities with state-of-the-art, high-quality materiel, nor are there the financial resources. This is why, based on mid-term financial planning, procurement and equipment planning will be developed so as to reflect the Bundeswehr’s tasks. Priority continues to be given to the sub-capabilities that the Bundeswehr does not have at present, i.e., “strategic deployment”, “global reconnaissance” and “efficient, interoperable command and control systems and means.” The basic missile defence capability, which also includes protection of deployed forces against rockets and missiles, needs to be further improved.

93. In addition, it is vital to acquire or enhance those sub-capabilities suitable to render the required military contribution to combating international terrorism.

94. Measures for the protection against the effects of information warfare are to be developed in the medium to long term.

95. Procurement and equipment planning must be stringently oriented to a capability-focused, overall approach across all services and organisational areas, coordinated at multinational level.