The Staffing, Training and Rostering of the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force

Staffing, Training and Rostering Workshop
10 – 12 July 2008: Kampala, Uganda

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Report compiled by:
Yvonne Kasumba, Cedric de Coning and Dorcas Onigbinde
with contributions from Col Charles Debrah
REPORT OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE
CIVILIAN DIMENSION STAFFING, TRAINING AND
ROSTERING WORKSHOP

10 – 12 July 2008
Kampala, Uganda

Hosted by
The African Union, Peace Support Operations Division

In partnership with
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes

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Training for Peace in Africa Programme

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Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) is a non governmental, non-aligned conflict resolution organisation based in Durban, South Africa. One of the Programmes at ACCORD is the Training for Peace (TfP) in Africa Programme, and together with other institutions TfP has been working in support of the African Union (AU) Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) on a project to develop the civilian dimension of the African Standby Force (ASF).

The discussions contained in this workshop report should not be considered as the views of the AU or ACCORD, but serves as a summary of views expressed at the workshop by the participants, including the AU Commission, Regional Economic Communities, Regional Mechanisms, AU Member States, member institutions of the African Peace Support Trainers’ Association (APSTA), civil society and international partners.

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### List of acronyms used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFDEM</td>
<td>African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peace Support Missions</td>
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<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Mission in Burundi</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>APSTA</td>
<td>African Peace Support Trainers’ Association</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
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<td>AU SMLC</td>
<td>African Union Senior Mission Leaders Course</td>
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<td>CADSP</td>
<td>Common African Defence and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Coordination</td>
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<td>CMD</td>
<td>Conflict Management Division</td>
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<td>COE</td>
<td>Contingent Owned Equipment</td>
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<td>CPX</td>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FTX</td>
<td>Field Training Exercise</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographical Information Services</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>ITC</td>
<td>Information, Technology and Communications</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisations</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mission Analysis Cell</td>
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<td>MAPEX</td>
<td>Map Exercise</td>
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<td>MOC</td>
<td>Mission Operations Centre</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>Mission Planning and Evaluation and Cell</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Staff Committee</td>
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<td>Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ONUB</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Burundi</td>
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<td>PLANELM</td>
<td>Planning Element</td>
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<td>POW</td>
<td>Panel of the Wise</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<td>Peace Support Operations Division</td>
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<td>PST</td>
<td>Peace Support Team</td>
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<td>Sexual Exploitation and Abuse</td>
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<td>SGTM</td>
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The African Union (AU) Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), in partnership with the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), embarked on a project to develop the civilian dimension of the African Standby Force (ASF) in 2006. The first phase was aimed at developing an official AU and ASF policy on the civilian dimension, and a Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF was produced in September 2006. The policy framework clarified the policy context, the multi-dimensional management structure, the main civilian roles and responsibilities, the main police roles and responsibilities and the mission support functions that are needed to be in place to support the civilian and police dimensions of the ASF.

In April 2007, the policy framework was developed into an implementation plan, which contained recommendations for the operationalisation of the civilian dimension of the ASF in a number of key areas, including: conduct and discipline, gender, HIV / AIDS, human resources, training, integrated missions planning, capacity building and the raising of awareness.

The AU PSOD conducted an ASF Training Implementation Workshop in October 2007, to develop a training plan for the ASF. During the workshop, it was recognised that there was a need to focus ASF training more on civilian and police aspects.

During a planning meeting conducted in February 2008, it became apparent that, for civilian training issues to be meaningfully discussed there would also be a need to address the staffing, recruiting and rostering aspects of the civilian dimension of the ASF. Consequently, a Civilian Staffing, Training and Rostering (STR) Workshop was convened in Kampala in July 2008, to generate recommendations relating to the staffing, recruitment, rostering and training of the civilian dimension of the ASF. The workshop was also aimed at harmonising the approach of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs), with regards to the civilian dimension of the ASF.

Working on the staffing of the civilian dimension of the ASF, the workshop developed a list of civilian functions that should be provided for in each regional ASF capacity. The workshop recommended that each regional capacity should be able to deploy approximately 60 civilians, and should develop a civilian standby roster of approximately 300 civilian specialists. The workshop also recommended that the deployment of the civilian dimension should take place in waves, with the first wave reflecting the most important civilian elements — without which a multidimensional mission should not deploy. The deployment would then build up in later waves, until full civilian strength is reached. The workshop further recommended that, in order to manage the development of this civilian capacity, the AU PSOD and each of the Regional Brigade Planning Elements (PLANELMs) should have four civilian members — namely a training and rostering officer, a planning and coordination officer, a logistics officer, and a head for the civilian component of the PLANELM.

With regard to recruitment, the workshop considered the merits and demerits of direct hiring and secondments for those civilian positions in the ASF civilian standby rosters, as well as those in the PLANELMs. It recommended that the existing AU and REC human resources and recruitment policies...
be augmented with policies that are specifically aimed at meeting the needs of the AU and RECs to deploy civilians on peace operations and related field missions. Such policies should provide for both direct hiring and secondments, as may be appropriate, and should consider a range of contracting options to ensure the rapid deployment of certain categories of civilian staff, as well as continuity among civilian staff in the PLANELMs.

The workshop also considered three models of civilian standby rosters. The first was a combination of an ASF rapid deployment roster, made up from existing AU and REC staff, augmented by an external roster, provided by an organisation like AFDEM. The second model was an integrated ASF and REC roster, and the third model was an ASF stand-alone roster. The workshop recognised that the first and second models would establish the most wide-ranging and interlocking capacities, whilst the third model would establish the most focused capacity. The first model was recommended, as it was felt that it was probably the most pragmatic option — it provides for a limited internal rapid deployment capacity at the level of the AU and RECs / RMs, as well as an outsourced medium- to long-term standby roster capacity. It was strongly emphasised that, whichever model was decided upon, it would need to be simple, manageable, and easy to use and resource.

With regard to training, the workshop recommended that training for all civilian personnel of the ASF should be a mandatory requirement prior to deployment. It was recommended that the AU should, in cooperation with the RECs / RMs and training service providers, set civilian training standards and develop an ASF training policy. It was stressed that civilian peacekeepers would, at times, be deployed in hostile and hazardous environments, and they need to be prepared for the related challenges. It was strongly recommended that the training methodology should, where appropriate, include practical field and simulation training in addition to a classroom component. Thus, the participation of civilians in Levels I, II and III Decision Making Exercises (MAPEX, CPX and FTX) would be important. There should also be an emphasis on problem-based learning, which allows participants to identify and discuss particular issues and come up with solutions. It was recommended that civilian training should consist of both integrated and single-component training, and that the regional training centres of excellence and other civil society organisations that provide training for civilians should, through the African Peace Support Trainers’ Association (APSTA) framework, continue to cooperate closely, not only among each other but also with international civilian training partners.

On the whole, the workshop provided a forum for the AU, RECs / RMs, member states and civil society to consider and make recommendations regarding the staffing, recruitment, rostering and training of the civilian dimension of the ASF. In addition to the recommendations summarised above, and discussed in more detail in the body of this report, the workshop agreed on the following short- to medium-term follow-on actions:

- The AU PSOD and the regional brigade PLANELMs should work jointly on developing job descriptions for the approximately 60 civilian positions agreed upon.
- The AU and RECs / RMs should develop and harmonise their respective human resources policies for peace operations and field missions, including streamlined recruitment procedures that provide for the rapid recruitment of staff through a civilian standby roster capacity.
In 2006, the AU PSOD, in partnership with ACCORD and in association with African Peace Support Trainers’ Association (APSTA), embarked on a project to develop the civilian dimension of the ASF. The first phase was aimed at developing an official AU and ASF policy on the civilian dimension. To this end, a Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF was discussed and produced at a Technical Experts Workshop on the Civilian Dimension of the ASF, which took place from 28 August to 1 September 2006 at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana.

The policy framework clarified the policy context, the multidimensional management structure and decision-making process, the main civilian roles and responsibilities, the main police roles and responsibilities, and the mission support functions that need to be in place to support the civilian and police dimensions.

At this stage, the police component was still regarded as “civilian”, and the policy framework thus also addressed the police dimension. Subsequently, it was decided to manage the police component separately.

The next phase was aimed at developing an implementation plan for the policy framework. Consequently, a Technical Experts Task Team Meeting was held from 11 to 13 April 2007 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the task team produced an implementation plan. This plan contained recommendations for the operationalisation of the civilian dimension of the ASF in a number of key areas, including conduct and discipline, gender, HIV / AIDS, human resources, training, integrated missions policies, capacity building and the raising of awareness.

From 29 to 31 October 2007, the PSOD, in collaboration with APSTA, conducted a Training Implementation Workshop in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to finalise a training plan for the ASF by collating the training schedules of the ASF regional brigades into one continental training schedule, leading up to 2010. As a result of this workshop, the PSOD noticed that the regional brigade training plans were focused on the military aspects of training, and did not reflect the multidimensional nature of the ASF.

On 6 February 2008, the PSOD convened a planning meeting to prepare a workshop that would further strengthen the civilian dimension of the ASF. The AU and RECs / RM present recognised that, for civilian training issues to be meaningfully discussed,
the workshop would also have to address the staffing and rostering aspects of the civilian dimension of the ASF, as recommended in the **ASF Civilian Dimension Implementation Plan**. The planning meeting thus decided to broaden the scope and organise a **Civilian STR Workshop**. The key objective of the workshop would be to harmonise the approach of the AU and the RECs / RMs with regard to the civilian dimension of the ASF. Further, the workshop would aim to devise a training plan for the civilian dimension, including looking at a generic civilian structure and the issue of maintaining a roster of civilians for ASF deployments. It was therefore important to approach the four aspects — staffing, recruitment, rostering and training — in a complementary manner.

### 3 : The Civilian STR Workshop

The Civilian STR Workshop was held from 10 to 12 July 2008 at the Speke Resort and Conference Centre in Kampala, Uganda. There were 67 participants, representing the AU, RECs / RMs, AU member states, APSTA, the United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the European Union (EU), regional and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and civil society organisations involved in civilian capacity building; as well as research and academic institutions. Apart from civilian experts, the workshop included key military and police representatives from AU member states and the regional brigade structures, so as to ensure that the workshop benefited from a multidimensional perspective. A full list of participants is attached as Annex 2.

#### 3.1. Welcome and the opening of the workshop

The workshop was opened by the head of the PSOD, Mr Bereng Mtimkulu, who emphasised that, whilst a considerable amount of preparation had gone into the planning for military structures and procedures for their deployment, for instance, there still seemed to be an impression among some that the “civilians just arrive” on their own accord. He argued that the ASF process has not invested sufficient time and resources into exploring which civilian functions were required, the exact timing that they should be deployed, under which sorts of contracts and other related considerations. He also touched upon the growing realisation, especially among military planners and member states of the AU, of the need to revise the tendency for the usage of overly militaristic terminology when referring to the ASF, and the need rather to develop terminology that was more embracing of the multidimensional character of the ASF.

In addition, Mr Mtimkulu reflected on the challenges that beset the AU missions in Burundi (AMIB), Sudan (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM) and the financial, institutional, physical and security challenges that had plagued these missions. These challenges had served to cast a shadow of doubt over the long-term ability of the AU to manage multidimensional peacekeeping operations on the continent.

Mr Mtimkulu encouraged the workshop participants to consider the following crucial issues during the three-day deliberations:

- the process and / or method for deploying civilians
- considering the financial limitations facing the AU, the extent to which the organisation could
merge with UN standards and mirror its thinking on peacekeeping

• suggestions as to what the non-military components of the force should look like
• the types of structures that should be provided at the regional, headquarters and mission levels, taking into consideration the constraints and challenges faced.

Mr Mtimkulu ended his welcome address by stating the importance of the ASF not becoming synonymous with “cheap peacekeeping”, especially in light of its scheduled operationalisation in 2010. He further stressed that a good deal of work still needed to be contributed to the effort, so as to ensure a drastic change in the manner in which African peacekeeping was conducted. He thanked the Norwegian Government for the financial support it had rendered to the project through the Training for Peace (TfP) in Africa Programme, which included the funding of the STR Workshop.

3.2. Workshop goals and objectives

In his overview of the aims and objectives of the workshop, Mr Cedric de Coning emphasised that the workshop should have, as its key focus, the civilian staff that would be required, how they would be recruited, the type of rostering system that would be employed and the type of training they would require both before and after deployment. Clear recommendations would be required to inform and guide the AU, RECs / RMs and the standby brigades and the planning elements on their work vis-à-vis planning, recruiting, rostering and training for the ASF. An underlying purpose of the workshop would be that all stakeholders and partners share a common understanding of the civilian dimension, which would, in turn, ensure inter-operability and coherence in approach.

3.3. Overview of the ASF and the role of the civilian dimension

In his presentation on the overview of the ASF, Mr Mtimkulu pointed out that the ASF was composed of multidisciplinary elements with civilian, police and military components in their countries of origin, and was ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. He also noted that ASF missions should focus on observer and monitoring missions; intervention in a member state; post-conflict reconstruction; peacebuilding; humanitarian assistance; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegrations (DDR); and preventive deployment. A particular challenge that was raised pertained to the deployment of an ASF mission within 14 days of a mandate of the Assembly, in countries where gross human rights activities were underway.

His overview highlighted the status of the various structures of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which not only served to set the broad context within which the ASF was situated but also gave the workshop group a better appreciation of the mutually supportive role of its components. Mr Mtimkulu enumerated the components of APSA as:

• the Peace and Security Council (PSC) – which is at the heart of the APSA
• the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP)
• the Military Staff Committee (MSC)
• the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)
• the Panel of the Wise (POW)
• the ASF
• the Peace Fund.

It was stressed that the ASF was not envisaged as Africa’s contribution to world peace, and was not a
replacement of the UN’s work insofar as peace and security was concerned. Mr Mtimkulu also gave a brush-stroke summary of the work that had been done over the last three years on the development of the ASF — namely that Africa went from having nothing in place to establishing a phased approach, as indicated below, within which to develop the ASF:

- **Phase 1:** Establish the baseline documentation policy and tools for the ASF.
- **Phase 2:** Consolidate the policy documents, seek their approval, and develop the concepts of operations and a training plan.
- **Phase 3:** Test the documents in ASF-related training exercises.

What became more evident in the above processes was that there was insufficient attention to the civilian dimension of the ASF, and that unless it is actively sought to develop this aspect, with an emphasis on establishing requisite standards and procedures, this state of affairs would inevitably persist. This line of thinking gave further impetus to the Civilian Dimension Project.

With regards to the civilian dimension, it was further shared that the AU should manage centrally a roster of mission administration, civilian experts for human rights, humanitarian, governance and DDR posts, which would be filled by civilian professionals. In addition to this, the process should also involve tapping into the experiences of the resources of UN agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as well as of international financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB).

The floor was opened for questions and answers, and the following key points were raised:

- The question was raised whether there was the need to establish civilian and police component bodies similar to the MSC, which would advise the PSC on deployment and security-related matters in so far as civilians and police were concerned. The military nature of the MSC was acknowledged as another example of the over-preoccupation with military issues during the conceptualisation of the ASF, and that in future there would be need for further debate and discussion on how to go about improving the multidimensional character of the ASF in general, and the MSC in particular.
- There was a need to give greater consideration to the issue of the myriad of economic, political and security groupings that had emerged on the continent, and to which AU member states belong. Particularly, it was suggested that there was a need to rationalise the membership of these various groupings to avoid AU member states having overlapping membership of the regional ASF brigades. The implications for successful interface in such instances needed to be examined in the context of the developments in and around the ASF structure, as well as to minimise the potential for a duplication of efforts and wastage of already-scarce resources. Ultimately, this issue remained a political one, and the solution lies essentially with the political domain of the respective regions.
- There was a need to establish a structure of civilian posts within the PSOD, so as to ensure smooth and steady follow-up and progress vis-à-vis developing the civilian aspects of the ASF. The PSOD had recognised this limitation and had been working jointly with ACCORD and the UNDPKo-AU Peace Support Team (PST) on consolidating a new staffing structure at the division. It was also working to reverse the current situation in which military
personnel were undertaking the tasks and responsibilities that, ideally, were better suited for implementation by civilian personnel.

- It would be an important next step to develop a focus and future timetable for the further development of the police dimension of the ASF.

4 : Workshop themes

The programme agenda divided the workshop discussions along the lines of four key themes, namely staffing, rostering, recruitment and training. Prior to each of the respective themes being discussed, a background paper thereon was shared to set the tone for the discussions, as well as to introduce the key areas for consideration. The workshop participants were then divided into focused working groups to consider and come up with relevant recommendations. The entire group then reconvened in plenary to share and discuss the outcomes of the working group sessions.

4.1. Theme 1: Civilian staff of the ASF

4.1.1. Purpose

The goal of this section of the workshop was to generate recommendations on the type and number of civilian positions needed in the ASF, so that the AU PSOD and regional brigades could have clear guidelines on the capacity of the civilian dimension that they need to develop. The workshop was introduced to the relevant policies in place, as well as to the main issues that should be taken into consideration when discussing the ASF civilian staff requirements.¹

The Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF² provides for a civilian-led multidimensional mission management structure and various substantive and support civilian components. It also provides for a mission-level management structure that would typically consist of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC), one or more deputy SRCCs, a Force Commander, a Commissioner of Police, various heads of substantive civilian components, and a Head of Mission Support.³ Table A contains the full list and description of the substantive and mission support functions provided for in the policy framework.

4.1.2. ASF civilian staff

Since its inception in 2000, the AU has deployed three major multidimensional peace operations, namely the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003–2004, the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004–2007 and the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).⁴ AMIB had approximately two dozen international civilian staff, consisting of a civilian

¹ This section of the report is based on a background paper prepared by Cedric de Coning for the workshop on the Staffing of the Civilian Dimension of the ASF. It is available from ACCORD and the AU PSOD.

² This policy framework was considered and refined at the Technical Experts Workshop on the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force, which took place from 29 August to 1 September 2006 at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana. It was considered and noted at the meeting of the African Chiefs of Defence and Security, and the meeting of the Ministers of Defence and Security of March 2008.

³ In the policy framework, the term “mission support” is used to refer to the administrative and logistics support functions, referred to as “civilian administration” in the original ASF policy framework. This is the same terminology as is used by the UN, and thus ensures inter-operability.

⁴ The various smaller observer missions and the recent enforcement mission in the Comoros are not listed, as the focus of the paper is multidimensional missions that include civilian staff.
Table A: Substantive and support civilian AU mission functions listed in the policy framework

**Substantive civilian functions**

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<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Political Affairs</strong></td>
<td>• monitor and analyse the political aspects of the peace process and provide the mission leadership and headquarters with advice and reports on short-, medium- and long-term developments and prospects</td>
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<td>• undertake conflict prevention and peacemaking initiatives and partake fully in the implementation of any ceasefire and peace agreements, as may be required</td>
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<td>• draft the Reports of the SRCC to the Chairperson of the AU Commission</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• facilitate the work of the Mission Analysis Cell (MAC)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Legal Advice</strong></td>
<td>• monitor mission planning and operations and provide legal advice to the mission on the legal implications of any intended actions and their consequences</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Planning and Coordination</strong></td>
<td>• facilitate the mission planning process (multi-year, annual, phase transitions, special events, drawing down, etc.)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• analyse and evaluate mission progress, and provide periodic reports to mission leadership on progress against plans, problem areas and unintended consequences</td>
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<td>• facilitate coordination between mission, internal and external stakeholders and partners</td>
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<td>• facilitate mission coordination processes and mechanisms, including the Mission Operations Centre (MOC) and the Mission Planning and Evaluation Cell (MPEC)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Public Information</strong></td>
<td>• act as spokesperson for the SRCC and mission</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• develop and implement an effective public information campaign to keep the general public, mission members, stakeholders and partners informed of developments in support of the peace process, and the role and activities of the mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• develop and implement an effective public information campaign to keep the general public, mission members, stakeholders and partners informed of developments in support of the peace process, and the role and activities of the mission</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• develop a media strategy, proactively gather and generate mission information and conduct regular press briefings</td>
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<td>• develop regular public information guidelines that would assist mission staff with sharing a coherent mission view with all stakeholders and the media</td>
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| Humanitarian Liaison | • facilitate the establishment of a positive relationship between the humanitarian community and the various mission components, based on recognition and respect for humanitarian principles, including independence  
• explore ways in which the mission could support the humanitarian community and coordinate mission support to the humanitarian community, in coordination with the Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) section of the military component, where relevant |
| Human Rights | • facilitate the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to women, children and other vulnerable persons, through human rights monitoring and reporting, advising and educating the parties to the conflict, monitoring and advising new institutions on human rights issues  
• coordinate human rights issues with stakeholders and partners |
| Gender | • provide policy and technical advice to the senior mission leadership, the host government and partners on strategies for advancing gender equality and women’s rights, in accordance with the AU instruments on gender equality and women’s rights and the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security  
• provide expert technical advice to inform policy and operational activities of mission components, and ensure the delivery of appropriate training for all levels of personnel  
• strengthen and expand partnerships, including with the national machinery for the advancement of women’s rights and gender equality  
• document and disseminate good practices and lessons learned to inform policy decisions |
| Child Protection | • facilitate and promote child protection in the peace process through advising, educating and coordinating the child protection efforts among stakeholders internally, and networking with external stakeholders and partners |
| Conduct and Discipline | • disseminate, promote and familiarise AU staff with the AU Peace Support Operation (PSO) Code of Conduct  
• monitor compliance with the code of conduct and the AU PSO Conduct and Discipline policies, and investigate all complaints according to the AU PSO Conduct and Discipline policies  
• undertake proactive training and monitoring to prevent cases of SEA |
| Rule of Law (RoL) | *Judicial*  
• monitor the judicial process and provide advice and assistance to promote the independence of the judiciary, and highlight any improper pressure on judges, prosecutors and courts  
• provide expertise to improve the quality of justice and access to justice through the reform of criminal law, policy and practice |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RoL</td>
<td>- collect, analyse and disseminate criminal justice data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- assist the government to re-establish the authority of the judiciary and the RoL throughout the territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- coordinate closely with the police and other state security services to ensure a coherent and system-wide RoL approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrections</td>
<td>- monitor and advise on reforming the correction services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>- refer to Section D — Police Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Affairs</td>
<td>- provide technical and logistical advice and support to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- facilitate and participate in the monitoring of elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>- in consultation with all stakeholders and partners, assist the parties to the conflict with the design and implementation of the national DDR programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>- facilitate liaison between the mission and national, provincial and local authorities and civil society to assist with the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction of social services and the extension of state authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- coordinate with other stakeholders and partners active in this area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- facilitate inter-communal dialogue and consultations as a confidence-building measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Sector Reform (SSR)</td>
<td>- advise SRCC, Force Commander, Commissioner of Police and other relevant components on issues or initiatives associated with SSR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Mission Support functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Human Resources**              | • human resources services, including the recruitment and contract management of local and international personnel, and managing staff conduct and behaviour  
• provision of staff welfare and counselling services  
• provide insurance and medical services, including emergency medical evacuation |
| **Financial**                    | • financial management services, including budgeting, accounting, cash management, payments and contractor management                             |
| **Procurement**                  | • the procurement of all aspects of logistical support, including lifecycle management* for the mission, the provision of mission assets to all mission components, fleet management, and the provision of an integrated communications infrastructure system (CIS) including design, installation, etc. |
| **Logistics**                    | • logistics and integrated support, including the distribution of mission assets to all mission components — including vehicles, computers and stationery — and provide bulk supplies of water, fuel products and foodstuffs |
| **Engineering**                  | • provide accommodation, building management and civil engineering services                                                                 |
| **Geographical Information Services (GIS)** | • geographical information and mapping services                                                                                         |
| **Information, Technology and Communications (ITC)** | • design, install, operate and maintain mission-wide communications including telephone, radio and data systems, proprietary information management systems, Internet, intra-mission mail and a diplomatic pouch service |
| **Transport**                    | • fleet management and maintenance services                                                                                             |
| **Contingent Owned Equipment (COE)** | • monitoring, database management and inspection of COE                                                                                   |
| **Security**                     | • provide security services to protect mission staff and assets                                                                            |
| **Integrated Training Services** | • provide induction briefings for all military, police and civilian staff  
• support pre-deployment training by providing T / PCCs with mission-specific information  
• identify training needs and facilitate in-mission training  
• act as a clearing house for out-of-mission training opportunities offered to mission staff |

* Lifecycle management includes the support of a logistic item from cradle to grave.
head of mission, as well as a deputy head, support staff and substantive components such as political affairs, human rights and mission support staff. AMISOM is the most ambitious mission yet, from a civilian staffing perspective, with a staffing table that provides for approximately 500 international and local civilian staff. There has thus been a small but meaningful increase in civilian staff from AMIB to AMIS, with a considerable increase potentially projected for AMISOM. Two considerations need to be borne in mind when discussing the civilian dimension of African PSOs. The first is the financial reality, and the second is the type of missions that the AU and RECs / RMs are likely to undertake.

The financial realities dictate that AU and REC / RM PSOs that depend on external financial support would always be constrained in scope and size, compared to UN missions under similar circumstances, which are funded through the UN-assessed contribution system. Compare, for example, the scope, size and budgets of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and AMISOM. The AU should thus be conservative in its planning when it comes to the civilian dimension of AU and REC / RM PSOs, so that it is in a position to do more with less, rather than plan for larger UN-type civilian components that are unlikely to be approved or funded. The civilian dimension of the ASF should thus be designed with this limitation in mind, and provide for fewer, but more broadly functioned, civilian staff.

The second, and perhaps interlinked consideration, is the scope of missions that the AU and RECs / RMs are most likely to undertake. If the AMIB, AMIS and AMISOM trend is followed, then it can be deducted that the AU is likely to undertake limited stability-type of operations for a period of approximately 12 to 24 months, and that the UN may, in cases where sufficient stability has been achieved, follow on with longer-term peacebuilding-type missions. This trend has been seen with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) becoming the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), AMIB becoming the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), and AMIS becoming the African Union – United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

Accordingly, ASF missions should be designed with the above-mentioned considerations in mind. This implies the capacity to deal with the political dimension of peace processes, conflict resolution, human rights, humanitarian liaison and environment shaping (public information). It also implies that such AUC and REC / RM missions are unlikely to take on post-conflict reconstruction functions such as DDR, SSR and RoL reform, other than laying the foundations for these aspects in the initial stages of the transition process. These issues should, at the minimum, be taken into consideration when planning and liaising with other key actors who would be primarily responsible for assessments, and planning for post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.

On the basis of the above considerations and for purposes of discussion, the workshop was presented with an AU civilian mission template that consists of the following functions:

5. Note that planning projections have not yet been approved, nor deployed.

6. AU RECs / RMs are unlikely to receive the funding required to undertake long-term peacebuilding missions. The UN system has the comparative advantage of having, under one umbrella, the political, security, development and humanitarian instruments necessary for post-conflict reconstruction and development.
• SRCC and Deputy SRCC
  ◊ An office of the SRCC that consists of:
    ■ personal staff of the SRCC and Deputy SRCC
    ■ personal protection for SRCC and other key mission personalities
    ■ legal advice
    ■ gender advice
    ■ protection advice
    ■ HIV / AIDS advice
    ■ conduct and discipline advice
    ■ post-conflict reconstruction and development advice.
• Mission Planning and Coordination Unit
• Political Affairs Unit

• Human Rights Unit
• Public Information Unit
• Mission Support component.

The deployment of the civilian dimension could occur in stages, with the first group reflecting the most important elements without which a multidimensional mission should not deploy, then building up in later phases until full civilian strength is reached. Considering the highly unstable operating environment in which an ASF mission might be deployed, the first phase of civilian deployment should start with the minimum essential staff, and this capacity may be increased gradually as the risk reduces. It is important that the civilian, military and police components of the rapid

Table B: The deployment of the civilian members of an AU mission

**Civilian Personnel for Wave 1 = 15**

![Diagram of the deployment of civilian personnel for Wave 1]

- **O/SRCC x 6**
  - 1 x SRCC
  - 1 x PA
  - 4 x VIP Protection

- **Planning and Coordination x 1**
  - 1 x Planning and Coord

- **AU PK Force**
  - 1 x Pol Off

- **AU Police**
  - 1 x Spokesperson

- **Political Affairs x 1**
  - 1 x CAO
  - 1 x PA of CAO

- **Public Information x 1**
  - 1 x Finance & Personnel
  - 1 x Admin & Log

- **Mission Support x 6**
  - 1 x IT
  - 1 x Comms

+ Local staff for HQ & Sector level
  e.g. Interpreters, Drivers, Administrative Assistants etc.
Civilian Personnel for Wave 2 = 30

- O/SRCC x 7
  - 1 x SRCC
  - 1 x PA
  - 4 x VIP Protection
  - 1 x Legal Adv

- Planning and Coordination x 5
- AU PK Force
- AU Police
- Human Rights x 2
- Political Affairs x 5
- Public Information x 3
- Mission Support x 8
  - 2 x HQ and 3 x Sectors
  - 2 x HRO
  - 2 x HQ
  - 3 x Sectors
  - 1 x Spokesperson
  - 2 x PIO

Per Sector (Assumption is 3 Sectors)
- 1 x Political Affairs (Head of Sector)
- 1 x Planning and Coordination

+ Local staff for HQ & Sector level
  - e.g. Interpreters, Drivers,
  - Administrative Assistants etc.

Civilian Personnel for Wave 3 = 60

- O/SRCC x 18
  - 1 x SRCC
  - 1 x DSRCC
  - 1 x SA
  - 8 x VIP Protection
  - 1 x Admin Asst
  - 1 x Legal Adv
  - 1 x Gender Adv
  - 1 x Protection Adv
  - 1 x HIV/AIDS Adv
  - 1 x Conduct & Discipline Adv
  - 1 x Post-Conflict RD Adv

- Planning and Coordination x 6
- Mission Operations Centre (MOC)
- Mission Planning & Evaluation Cell (MPEC)
- Mission Analysis Cell (MAC)

- AU PK Force
- AU Police
- Human Rights x 6
- Political Affairs x 5
- Public Information x 3
- Mission Support x 20
  - 1 x Training Officer
  - 2 x HQ
  - 3 x Sectors
  - 1 x Spokesperson
  - 2 x PIO

Per Sector (Assumption is 3 Sectors)
- 1 x Political Affairs (Head of Sector)
- 1 x Planning and Coordination
- 1 x Human Rights
- 1 x FAO

+ Local staff for HQ & Sector level
  - e.g. Interpreters, Drivers,
  - Administrative Assistants etc.
deployment capability be trained together, and they should have the same time frames and standards. See Table B for suggested phased deployments.

As alluded to earlier, the smaller size of the civilian dimension of AU missions compared with, for instance, UN missions with similar mandates, would mean that the AU civilian units would have to be more multidisciplinary and cover more functional areas, with less specialisation. For example, the Political Affairs section would have to undertake political analysis, support the peace process and provide liaison services with national and local government authorities and civil society — i.e. cover the same work that the separate political affairs and civil affairs units in a typical UN mission would cover. The Human Rights section would have to provide human rights advice, monitoring and training, as well as covering areas such as child protection, the protection of civilians, gender rights, etc. — thus covering a number of related functions that would typically be handled by several different units in a UN peacekeeping operation. The capacity of these units could be augmented and strengthened by adding senior specialist advisors to the office of the SRCC, so that the mission has specialist expertise at its disposal that could inform the planning, liaison and operational functions of the mission.

In addition to the civilian functions, another important consideration would be the number of civilians that the ASF should be able to deploy. Whilst it is understood that the type of functions and number of personnel of each mission would be determined by its mandate and available resources, the AU and regional PLANELMs would need to develop a generic civilian capacity in each of the “brigades”.

For discussion purposes, it was suggested that each brigade should develop a capacity that provides for approximately 60 civilian positions in the ASF structure, supported by a civilian standby roster with approximately 300 persons. See Table C for a breakdown of these positions.

4.1.3. ASF PLANELM structures

In order to manage the civilian components of the regional brigades it was suggested, for discussion purposes, that the AU PSOD and each regional PLANELM have at least four civilian staff members, namely a training and rostering officer, a planning and coordination officer, a logistics officer, and a head for the civilian component. See Table D for suggested PLANELM structure. All four personnel should be able to participate in various aspects of the planning process, and should be able to act as liaison officers, when needed.

4.1.4. Key issues emerging from the plenary discussion

In order for the AU PSOD and the regional brigade / PLANELMs to operationalise the policy framework and identify, train and incorporate the civilian dimension into the ASF, the workshop needed to consider and generate specific recommendations as to:

- the type and number of civilian positions needed in each regional brigade

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7  “Brigade” is placed in parenthesis here, because, as noted at the March 2008 Ministers of Defence and Security meeting, the terminology is not useful when actually describing a multidimensional PSO capacity that consists of military, police and civilian components, and that is headed by a multidimensional management structure, headed by a civilian Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC).
Table C: Proposed ASF brigade civilian capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Position in Regional Brigade</th>
<th>Number in roster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SRCC</td>
<td>1 x ASG / D1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSRCC</td>
<td>1 x D1 / D2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant to the SRCC</td>
<td>1 x P3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Assistant to the SRCC / DSRCC</td>
<td>1 x GSA</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal protection for SRCC / DSRCC</td>
<td>8 persons ranging from P4 to P1</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td>1 x P4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Advisor</td>
<td>1 x P4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection Advisor</td>
<td>1 x P4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/Aids Advisor</td>
<td>1 x P4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct and Discipline Advisor</td>
<td>1 x P4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conflict Reconstruction Advisor</td>
<td>1 x P4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and Coordination Unit, including Humanitarian Liaison</td>
<td>6 persons ranging from P5 to P3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Affairs Unit</td>
<td>6 persons ranging from P5 to P3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Unit</td>
<td>6 persons ranging from P5 to P3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information Unit</td>
<td>3 persons ranging from P5 to P2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Unit</td>
<td>1 x P3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Support</td>
<td>20 persons ranging from D2 / P5 to P3</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>60</strong></td>
<td><strong>300</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• the type and number of civilian positions needed in the rapid deployment capacity of each brigade

• the type and number of civilian positions needed in each regional PLANELM.

The main issues that emerged from the discussions are:

• the type and number of civilian positions needed in each regional brigade:
  ◊ There was a general consensus / agreement on the numbers and positions for the regional brigades and the standby roster.
  ◊ The exact roles and responsibilities of the various positions need to be explicitly detailed, so as to avoid an overlap in functions.
  ◊ Brigades could have less than the proposed number of 60 persons and each REC / RM would have to decide upon the exact numbers, based on the unique circumstances of the brigade in question. Furthermore, the specific needs on the ground, as indicated by a mission mandate, would determine the exact number of persons to be deployed.
  ◊ It was recommended that the staffing tables of each brigade include a humanitarian liaison officer / advisor.
  ◊ The legal advisor and post-conflict advisor should be increased to two persons each.
  ◊ The Head of Mission should be supported by a deputy Head of Mission.

• The number and type of civilian positions needed in the rapid deployment capability of each brigade:
  ◊ At the outset, it was agreed that, when it comes to the number and type of civilians required, one size does not fit all, and the realities and needs on the ground would be the guiding considerations.
  ◊ The SRCC and his / her team would need to be deployed on the ground as a matter of priority.
  ◊ There would be a need for humanitarian affairs officers, protection officers (to deal particularly with vulnerable groups such as women and children), and public information officers to keep the local population informed on the intervention and the evolving situation.
  ◊ In situations where genocide has taken place and there are mass graves, forensic experts would be required — although it is recognised that, in certain countries like Nigeria and Ghana, these may be police rather than civilian persons.
  ◊ It was recommended that in the second wave (See Table B), instead of two human rights officers, one could be replaced by a gender advisor.

• The type and number of civilian positions needed in each regional PLANELM:
  ◊ Regions should be free to propose their own variations to the basic structure, and should be able to make respective determinations as to what officers should be brought in at the strategic level.
  ◊ It was suggested that four key positions be established within the PLANELM — namely a training and rostering officer, a planning and coordination officer, a logistics officer, and a head for the civilian component.
  ◊ The civilian components should be included in all Technical Assessment Missions.
A “civilian” civil-military coordinator should also be included.

Some of the more general aspects that were highlighted and discussed under the theme of staffing are:

- Regional contributions were a major topic of discussion, particularly when pertaining to the kind of capacity that RECs / RMs would develop for their respective regions and for the AU. The sources of the contributions of civilian capacity were also discussed, and it was suggested that the AU recruitment process should primarily involve contributions from the RECs / RMs. In this way, RECs / RMs should be cognisant of the fact that, as they develop their own capacity, this capacity may also be utilised for the AU. Whilst the RECs / RMs cannot provide the 600 –1 000 personnel as in the UN system, a realistic expectation or goal should be in place to guide and determine the structure of an AU PSO.

- It was shared that the office of the SRCC may not have the time and / or resources to undertake the daily coordination associated with interdepartmental briefings and meetings, and that this and related tasks could be implemented by a Chief of Staff (a very senior manager). Alternatively, it was suggested that, considering the limited human resources capacity, such daily mission management functions could be undertaken by the deputy SRCC, who could also serve in place of the SRCC when he / she is unavailable.

- There was a strong feeling that the mission and component planning cells should be distinguished from each other, so as to ensure that there would be no overlap and unnecessary multiplicity of roles and functions. Some planning would take place at mission level and would be undertaken by the mission planning cell, consisting of military, police and civilian staff. Additionally, there should be component planning cells that would focus on planning for their individual components. The civilian component would thus have its own planning staff that would focus on planning civilian operations, as well as having representation on the mission planning cell.

- A question was raised in the area of humanitarian activities, as to what the role of the mission would be in dealing with displaced persons.
The response was that the bodies responsible for internally displaced persons (IDPs) would be the UN agencies, international NGOs and local authorities, but there would be a need for coordination between them and the AU mission, which would most likely be responsible for overall security. It was suggested that, at the planning and coordination level, a humanitarian liaison position be created to ensure good coordination between the AU mission and the humanitarian community.

- Some participants were of the strong opinion that a generic civilian staffing structure should be developed that could work across the regions; this to the end of ensuring harmonisation of approach throughout the continent.

- The situation on the ground, and the time and financial constraints involved in preparing and bringing civilians on board, would be the key factors determining the numbers of civilians required at each deployment phase.

- Some comments for reflection focused on the element of time with regard to the waves of civilian deployment. The timing of waves is critical and sometimes difficult to predict; however, it would be important that the most experienced people are deployed in the first wave, so that they can deal adequately with functional gaps.

- There was a note that, when an African PSO is handed over to the UN, a core AU presence should remain on the ground to ensure continuity. The AU would typically establish an AU office that would replace its PSO when such a mission ends, or is handed over to the UN.

4.2. Theme 2: Overview of recruitment options

4.2.1. Purpose

The goal of this element of the workshop was to generate recommendations on the types and methods of recruitment of civilian personnel for the ASF, so that the AU PSOD and RECs / RMs can have clear guidelines as to how they should go about identifying and recruiting civilian personnel for the ASF. The workshop was briefed on the relevant policies in place, as well as the key areas for consideration when discussing recruitment of ASF civilian staff.8

4.2.2. Background

Recruitment refers to the identification and hiring of civilian staff for the ASF. It occurs in two contexts: firstly, civilian staff for the PLANELMs at the AU PSOD and regional brigades, and secondly, civilians on standby for potential deployment as part of the regional brigades themselves. For the former, the recruitment of permanent or contract staff working for the PSOD and the regional PLANELMs is thus referred to and, for the latter, this refers to recruiting persons into a standby arrangement, and involving them in the training courses and exercises meant to operationalise the ASF, with a view of them being pre-screened, pre-trained and potentially available for recruitment for future AU or REC / RM PSOs. For the latter context, some of the civilians could be assigned to fill specific positions for brigade exercises, etc.

Civilian PSO staff differ from military and police personnel in two important aspects. Firstly, they...
are not necessarily civil servants working for AU member states, and made available to the ASF on an offer or secondment basis. They could also be individuals directly recruited from the private sector or civil society. For instance, most civilians working in UN peacekeeping operations are individually recruited by the UN on a contract basis for specific missions. Secondly, it is not possible to assign individuals to positions in a regional brigade and assume that they would be readily available for deployment, in the same way that an infantry battalion is available to the ASF once offered. It is thus necessary to recruit more staff into a standby roster system. In this way, several persons would be available for each of the positions identified. Some required skills may differ from mission to mission — language skills, for example — and it may thus be wise to have several people that could fill the same position, but with different language and other such skills.

Once the brigade PLANELMs have developed civilian staffing tables, and defined the positions contained therein (in other words, the job descriptions), they could then begin to recruit civilian personnel into a standby roster for the brigades. It is foreseeable that the individual vacancy announcements may become over-subscribed (more applicants per post than could be accommodated in the standby roster). In this instance, apart from the requirements listed in the job description and vacancy announcement (such as level of education, experience and health), the regional PLANELMs would likely also have to consider issues such as gender balance, language balance, religious balance and geographical representation. The regional brigades and the AU would thus have to address the kind of balances that they would like to see reflected in their rosters. Attention to these types of details would also ensure that any future AU or REC / RM PSO would have at its disposal personnel who have the requisite skills necessary to operate anywhere in its potential area of deployment.

4.2.3. Secondments and direct recruitment

The workshop was also tasked with considering whether the ASF should make use of secondments from member states or direct hiring by the AU or RECs / RMs. The implications of each should be carefully weighed.

4.2.3.1. Secondments

Secondments imply that member states respond to PLANELM vacancy announcements by offering some of their nationals — most probably current-serving civil servants — to fill these civilian positions. It may also imply, depending on how the arrangement is structured, that the sending state retains the responsibility for the basic salary of the persons it is seconding to such a PLANELM, whilst the PLANELM assumes responsibility for any additional allowances and related costs. Most, if not all, military and police staff officers currently serving in regional PLANELMs are seconded to these bodies, so both the PLANELMs and the member states are familiar with these arrangements. Most civilians working for the AUC and RECs / RMs, and for similar bodies such as the UN or the EU, are however individually recruited. It is thus important to understand the merits and demerits of both types of recruitment processes.

Merits of secondment

- Recruitment is made easier in that the onus is on member states to offer, instead of on the PLANELM to fill, positions. When there are vacancies, the PLANELM could call on the willingness of member states to offer personnel.
• If member states contribute to the cost of the participation of their nationals in the regional brigade’s roster, training and exercises, it would lessen the brigade’s dependency on support from partners.

• In some cases, specialised skills may not exist in the private sector and, in such cases, PLANELMs could turn to member states to second specialised staff.

Demerits of secondments

• Member states may be reluctant to release some of their civil servants for service with the regional PLANELMs, especially when these persons are fulfilling critical functions in their national civil service.

• Some of the specialised categories of staff may not have equivalents in the civil service, or may be in such short supply that member states may not be willing to release their specialists.

• Thus, PLANELMs may not necessarily get the most qualified or best suited personnel, as they would have to make do with the personnel offered by member states.

• Once a person has been offered through secondment and is found to be unsuitable, it is extremely difficult to replace them, as issues of national sentiments and formal PLANELM to member state relations have to be taken into consideration. The UN and others have found this problem to be particularly difficult to deal with.

• Accepting personnel offered by member states may make it difficult for the PLANELM to meet all its criteria, such as gender, language, religion and geographical representation.

4.2.3.2. Direct hiring

The direct hiring of staff implies that the individual is hired on his / her own merit on contract basis by the organisation responsible for the PSO, e.g. the AU, in the cases of AMIB or AMIS, or a REC like ECOWAS. This typically implies that staff vacancies are advertised in public and through member states; that applicants apply in their individual capacities; that the responsible organisation selects a shortlist of candidates, interviews those selected, makes a final choice, and makes an offer of employment to the selected candidate. If the candidate accepts the offer, then an employment contract is entered into with the candidate. The net effect is that the responsible organisation hires civilian staff on an individual basis from the civil service, private sector or civil society. If the person so hired is a serving civil servant, he / she should be released from service for duty with the PLANELM on either a secondment basis, or on an unpaid leave basis, or released altogether — depending on the respective policies of the member state and the responsible organisation.

Merits of direct hiring

• The key advantage of the direct hiring system is that the responsible organisation could hire individuals on merit.

• The responsible organisation could satisfy its gender, language, religious and geographic balance requirements more easily.

• Once persons are hired, the responsible organisation employing the individual has control over the evaluation, advancement or release of the person on merit.

Demerits of direct hiring

• There may be highly qualified staff available in the civil services of member states who may
not be interested in such positions if they are not advertised on a secondment basis, and thus requires them to leave the civil service.

There may be specialised skills that are not available in the private sector or civil society.

Direct hiring may require more effort on the side of the responsible organisation, and may take longer and require more resources.

Direct hiring of civilian staff implies that the responsible organisation would assume full responsibility for the remuneration of its civilian staff. This arrangement may put more stress on the financial resources of the organisation, and eventually lead to over-reliance on external partner support.

4.2.3.3. Combining secondments and direct hiring

It is also possible for the AU and RECs / RMs to choose to make use of both systems. They may use secondments for certain positions, and direct hiring for others — depending on the availability of certain skills, or on the availability of resources. Or they may choose to use secondments as a first choice, and then revert to direct hiring to fill those positions that they are not able to fill via secondments, or to meet some of its own criteria such as gender, language, religion and geographic representation.

4.2.4. Recruitment for PLANELMs

Recruiting staff for service in PLANELMs should follow the normal procedures for hiring staff in their respective organisations, or could be a test case for the specific hiring processes established for ASF purposes.

4.2.5. Recruitment for regional brigades

The recruitment of civilian staff for regional brigades could take two forms. In regions where a small brigade HQ exists, civilian staff hiring would follow the same process as for hiring staff for the PLANELMs.

In most cases, however, civilian staff would be recruited onto standby rosters for the regional brigades, and this process requires special consideration as it is a completely different form of “recruitment”. It is unlike “normal recruitment” in that the persons are not offered employment directly, but placed on a standby roster that may eventually lead to employment. However, to ensure a fast-track employment process, personnel are pre-selected for specific appointments. Should the need arise, there is no delay in them being offered the opportunity and their employment contracts could be swiftly processed.

This process would require that regional PLANELMs need a recruitment policy, a standby roster, and a rapid-recruitment employment and deployment process that could fast-track PSO requirements.

The civilian standby rosters need to be designed on the basis of the civilian staffing tables agreed upon by the PLANELM (see Table C). Each position should be filled by several persons on the standby roster, giving a range of personnel to choose from who meet mission-specific criteria (such as language, etc.). When the standby roster is designed, a ratio of persons per post would need to be decided on for each category of post.

Such a roster would thus be populated by following a type of recruitment process:
- advertising the positions
- screening and selecting applicants
• selecting applicants
• entering into some kind of contract or arrangement with them
• exposing them to training opportunities, and making use of them for regional brigade exercises
• replacing them with new personnel when they are no longer available.

4.2.6. Rapid recruitment and deployment

The type of contract or arrangement entered into requires special consideration. Depending on the level of rapid deployment required, a PLANELM may want to enter into a temporary contract with staff for a limited period, to ensure their availability. For instance, should Regional Brigade X be placed on high readiness status for a certain period, e.g. 30 days, the PLANELM may wish to ensure that it is able to deploy the required civilian staff on short notice. It would thus pre-select, from the roster, the required civilian staff for the first wave of deployment, and offer them a special contract wherein they agree to be available for deployment for that set period of time. This implies, for instance, that they agree not to take up other employment over that period, or that they are required to give a certain number of days’ notice if they do. Such contracts may not necessarily require a remuneration component, but could include a nominal amount to meet legal requirements, or an honorarium.

PLANELMs may also wish to make use of such short-term contracts to recruit civilian staff for regional brigade exercises. Such an arrangement would both ensure the availability of key civilian staff for such exercises, and test the PLANELM or RECs / RMs’ short-term rapid recruitment / employment / deployment systems.

Another possibility for the PLANELMs is to have virtual contracts in place with a number of civilian staff at any given time, which could be activated at short notice when needed, following a specific procedure. In other words, it could enter into a formal recruitment process with a number of civilian staff who are on a standby roster, and undertake all the selection and screening processes necessary, up to and including entering into a draft or virtual contract with the prospective employee. In this case, should employment become necessary, there would be no delays due to screening, the checking of qualifications and references, the obtaining of health certificates, etc., as they would already have been completed. The only steps necessary would be a formal offer of employment, and acceptance by the candidate.

The same process could be tested and followed for short-term contracts, for participation in brigade exercises. Having such a process in place would greatly add to the operational capability and high-readiness of a regional brigade. However, it would also imply certain maintenance costs, as the number of persons on this level of readiness would have to be constantly maintained, and this implies continuously processing new candidates as others leave the system due to changes in their availability status.

The third element of the process is a rapid deployment capacity, and the PLANELMs would have to consider what systems are necessary to ensure that civilian staff, once employed, can be sent to the mission area as soon as possible.

4.2.7. Key issues emerging from the plenary discussion

To ensure the smooth — and in some cases rapid — recruitment of civilian personnel for AU and REC /
RM PSOs, the regional PLANELMs need to consider a number of issues related to the recruitment, employment and deployment of civilian staff. The workshop was thus required to consider and make recommendations as to:

- the type of employment arrangements, e.g. secondments from member states, the direct hiring of individuals, or a combination of both

- the type of contracts that may be needed for the different categories of employment, e.g. for PLANELM staff, for brigade staff (i.e. persons on the civilian standby roster), and a sub-category earmarked for rapid deployment (and which may need contracts that can be activated at short notice).

The workshop group deliberated the issue of recruitment under three key priority areas:

- **Recruitment methods — secondment versus direct hiring:**
  - It was recommended that recruitment policies be developed to guide the AU PSOD and the RECs / RMs in the process for acquiring civilian staff.
  - The majority of participants viewed the process of secondment as an attractive option, as it would serve to ensure member states’ buy-in and ownership, more than the process of direct hiring. With secondment, member states could be actively engaged in the process of identifying and nominating key civilians.
  - Headhunting — i.e. actively seeking to fill specific positions, regardless of whether through secondments or direct hiring — was also viewed as an acceptable method for the recruitment of specific key positions.
  - In considering candidates for recruitment, the RECs / RMs should take advantage of the diversity and scope of expertise that exists within civil society.
  - Whilst some felt that the position of the head of the civilian component of the PLANELM should be filled through the process of secondment (as it allowed for linkage and ownership between the member states and the respective PLANELM), others felt equally strongly that the head of the civilian component should be selected through a process of direct hiring — as this allowed for continuity and institutional memory. It was further emphasised that the head of the civilian component should have significant mission experience, should be politically neutral and should pledge allegiance and commitment to achieving the objectives of the region and not those of the contributing country — all of which further strengthen the argument that the individual be recruited through direct hiring. In deciding which method to employ, it was felt that the respective REC / RM or AUC should be given the flexibility to determine the most suitable option.

- With regards to the more technical civilian positions within the PLANELM, there was a general agreement that these positions could be recruited through a process of direct hiring, so as to ensure access to a broader pool of expertise that may either not reside within the capacity of member states, and / or limited-supply expertise that may not be available for release to the PLANELM.

- **The types of contracts needed for PLANELM staff:**
  - At a minimum, the contracts should be for two to three years, with a six-month probationary period, to allow for more depth and sustainability as well as to guard against a loss of institutional memory. At the AUC, three-year...
secondment periods are the current practise, and this could also be applied to the RECs / RMs. The contracts should be renewable, and should be timed appropriately so that there is no loss of institutional memory and no gaps between staff changes.

- There was a concern raised regarding the fact that donors and partners also determine the length of contracts which may limit the control of the AUC and the RECs / RMs in deciding the exact time frames for these contracts.

- **Contracts for brigade staff:**
  - Short-term rotational (and renewable) contracts of up to three years could be explored.
  - It was suggested that four to six positions within the brigade be pre-selected and placed on standby. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or letter of intent would then be concluded between the individuals and the roster. When an individual determined that he / she was no longer available for standby, he / she should inform the brigade so that a replacement could be identified.

4.3. Theme 3: Proposed roster models for the ASF

4.3.1. Purpose

During this section of the workshop, the concept of civilian standby rosters as a tool for the rapid mobilisation and deployment of skilled civilians for peace support and humanitarian missions was considered.⁹

4.3.2. Background

In light of the difficulties associated with identifying and recruiting civilian personnel in a wide array of PSOs and post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction tasks, a number of standby rosters have been developed to increase the efficiency and speed with which civilian personnel can be recruited and deployed.

Once a standby roster is populated with suitable candidates, it offers obvious benefits as a recruitment tool, including speed and responsiveness, transparency, homogeneity, accessibility and low maintenance costs. Rosters also encourage merit-based selection, as the easiest way of filtering candidates is by searching for relevant qualifications and experience.

The use of civilian standby rosters in various forms has led to the creation of a number of different types of rosters. The UN currently recognises seven national rosters¹⁰, two regional rosters¹¹ and three international NGO rosters.¹²

4.3.3. Costs

While there are obvious benefits associated with utilising a roster system, the development of rosters inevitably involves considerable costs and expertise. The most significant human resources and financial cost of roster management relates to

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⁹ This section of the report is based on a background paper prepared by Nhlanhla Dube and Eustace Chiwombe for the workshop on the Rostering of the Civilian Dimension of the ASF. It is available from ACCORD and the AU PSOD.

¹⁰ Canadian Civilian Reserve (CANADEM), Canada; France Cooperation Internale (FCI, France); ZIF Experts Pool, Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF, Germany); Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM, Norway); Swiss Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding; UK Stabilisation Unit; and Civilian Reserve Corps, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (USA).

¹¹ OSCE — Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT), and Roster of Civilian Crisis Management Experts, EU Commission.

¹² African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Missions (AFDEM); International Legal Assistance Consortium; and Register of Engineers for Disaster Relief.
the process of screening and “clearing” candidates for placement on a roster, and then ensuring their retention. These costs vary with the size of the roster, the number of applications it contains, and the screening strategies that the ASF decides to adopt.

A number of strategies have been employed by the AU Conflict Management Division Roster, the African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peace-building Missions (AFDEM), and other renowned roster / database institutions, for instance, to limit the human resources / screening costs.

These include:
- limiting the size of the roster
- adopting just-in-time, competitive screening
- reducing the costs of “in-house” screening
- incremental screening in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity
- developing targeted advertising strategies
- introducing automated, electronic techniques to filter out unsuitable applicants
- pooling personnel information
- linkages (e.g. with training and deploying agencies).

4.3.4. Effectiveness

Roster effectiveness and functionality is largely determined by the personal will, commitment and availability of the candidates. An ASF roster would have to devise commitment and retention mechanisms to ensure that candidates remain committed to availing themselves for AU and REC / RM deployments. If not, resources would be invested in candidates who may not have an obligation to make themselves available for the AU missions. One option that needs to be considered is member states seconding civilian personnel through the RECs / RMs to the ASF roster, but this adds additional layers of bureaucracy and more stakeholders that need to be coordinated — first at national level, and then at regional level.

4.3.5. Potential ASF roster models

Three potential models, which illustrate the different options available to the AU and RECs / RMs, were presented to the workshop. The models were not exhaustive but formed a base for discussion.

4.3.5.1. Model 1: ASF rapid deployment roster and an external roster

The ASF might create and manage an internal rapid deployment roster of pre-screened, pre-trained, and pre-agreed “available” individuals who are already working in the AUC REC / RM system. These individuals would provide the core staff for the mission start-up phase, i.e. for the first 60 to 100 days of a new mission. Agreements have to be reached and honoured so that, when individuals are needed, they would be released within an agreed time frame by their respective departments. By having an internal rapid deployment roster, core positions could be filled by individuals who already have knowledge of the AU and REC / RM systems, procedures, culture and ethics. It also allows the ASF the lead time in which to recruit and deploy the medium- to long-term staff, who would replace the mission start-up group deployed via the rapid deployment roster.

For the second phase of recruitment, the AU may enter into a formalised agreement, possibly in the form of an MoU, with one or more already-existing African rosters. The agreement signed between the two parties should set the parameters of the relationship, with clear roles and responsibilities of each party. The MoU would be a mechanism that
assures the AU, or RECs / RMs, of commitment and responsiveness from an organisation functioning from outside its structures.

These independent rosters would, based on the MoUs, establish and maintain a civilian standby roster of African specialists on behalf of the AU and the RECs / RMs. The number and type of candidates would be determined by the AU and RECs / RMs, and would be specified in the MoU. The candidates should be pre-trained and screened, against specific ASF-approved positions.

If the AU or RECs / RMs require a rapid deployment capability, then a number of candidates — as determined by the AU and RECs / RMs — could be placed in a high-readiness category. Typically, this would imply that this group has pre-approved contracts that could be activated within a short time frame. If their availability needs to be guaranteed, they could be asked to sign a short-term availability contract, against a retainer, on a 30-day high-readiness (24-hour notice) period. This is obviously an expensive capacity, and it is recommended that the AU and RECs / RMs rather make use of the internal rapid deployment roster (suggested earlier) for its rapid response capacity.

The use of independent rosters for the medium- to long-term deployment needs of the ASF system allows for more effective and efficient use of roster resources, as the same roster capacity could be used for other AU and REC / RM purposes, e.g. election monitoring, mediation support, post-conflict reconstruction, etc. It is also flexible enough to serve the UN and other international and regional agencies and NGOs. The AFDEM roster, for instance, has current agreements with AMISOM, the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM), the Swedish Rescue Services, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and ACCORD.

Operational arrangements of Model 1
- The ASF would identify what types of civilian personnel it needs, as well as the number of personnel in each category it would be likely to deploy, and generate generic vacancy announcements for these positions.
- The independent roster would use the generic vacancies to identify, select and register individuals that meet the ASF requirements onto the roster.
- Candidates selected for the ASF roster would need to meet the education, training and experience requirements specified in the vacancy announcements, and would undergo further specific ASF training to remain active on the roster. Some of these candidates would be selected by the AU and RECs / RMs to participate in ASF and regional brigade exercises.
- The MoU between the AUC, RECs / RMs and the roster(s) would specify a liaison arrangement that would ensure regular reporting, monitoring and verification of the candidates on the roster, as well as regular training and exercises to ensure that the recruitment arrangements between the roster and the AUC or RECs / RMs are regularly tested and exercised.
- Within the AUC and REC / RM structures, a specific focal point (e.g. one of the civilian planning officers in the AUC and REC / RM PLANELMs) should assume responsibility for the AUC or REC / RM roster — both the internal rapid deployment roster and the external medium- to long-term roster.

Merits of Model 1
- Using already-serving AU employees for the crucial role of a mission start-up rapid
deployment roster assures that the initial mission structures are staffed by personnel familiar with AU procedures, rules and regulations. This would improve mission effectiveness, especially in the first crucial months when staff who know the system would be much more effective.

- Utilising already-existing independent rostering service providers that have experience in roster management means that the ASF would take advantage of already-established systems, and would thus save on the time and resources that would otherwise be invested in establishing such systems.

- The creation of rosters requires substantial resources, both human and financial. Independent rosters have their own resources and, by entering into an agreement with an already-existing roster, the ASF would leverage existing investments. AFDEM is, for instance, funded by Norway, which means that the AUC and RECs / RMs could rather use their own resources for other purposes.

**Demerits of Model 1**

- One of the biggest challenges for the mission start-up phase is the commitment of the various departments that would have to release their staff from their crucial day-to-day duties, at short notice, with no immediate replacements. The UN DPKO tried to establish a similar internal rapid deployable system, but it was not effective because departments were reluctant to release their staff. In addition, the missions often extended staff contracts beyond the initial 90-day period, because they were unable to find replacements within that period.

**4.3.5.2. Model 2: ASF / REC integrated roster**

The second model provides for an ASF roster, established and managed by the AU, with subsidiary rosters at each of the RECs, linked up into one overall ASF roster. Candidates registered onto the RECs’ rosters would be made available for the AU-led missions, as well as missions led by the respective RECs / regions. The main ASF roster would retain control over the selection process for ASF missions. There would be a roster coordinator at the AUC and at each REC / RM, who would manage each respective roster and liaise between the REC / RM and the AUC. The AUC should provide a central database capacity and staff, with satellite capacities at each REC / RM. If the AU and RECs choose to make use of secondments from member states, mechanisms could be created to establish further subsidiary satellite coordinators and databases at a national level. The training of roster candidates would be coordinated by the AUC and REC / RM training officers.

**Merits of Model 2**

- The rosters would be owned and managed by the AUC and RECs / RMs.

**Demerits of Model 2**

- The AUC, and most of the RECs / RMs, do not have the additional staff capacity, civilian specialists and resources to establish, maintain and follow up on such civilian standby rosters. If this option is preferred, additional donor support and external expertise would be necessary.

- If the AUC and RECs choose to make extensive use of secondments in this model, it may end up having less influence on choosing the best personnel for any given mission, as it would have to make use of the personnel offered by the member states. Member states may face
the same problems as the AUC and RECs, i.e. they might be reluctant to make crucial staff available for AU or REC / RM missions, especially at short notice.

- This option would require a significant investment in additional resources for the AUC and RECs / RMs.
- This model risks duplication with the independent rosters.

4.3.5.3. Model 3: ASF stand-alone roster

In this model, the AUC would be responsible for the development and maintenance of an ASF civilian standby roster with no direct links to similar rosters, if any, at the level of the RECs / RMs. The roster could be housed at the PSOD or the Human Resources Department of the AUC, and would cater specifically for AU PSOs. The PSOD / Human Resources Department would be responsible for the development and management of the roster as well as the identifying, selecting, registering and training of candidates from across the continent. The assumption underlying this model is that it would be too expensive, both in terms of human and financial resources, to operationalise Model 1 and Model 2. Apart from establishing a roster at the AU level, these models also require establishing a roster at each REC / RM (Model 2) or an independent roster (Model 1). Model 3 thus assumes that it would be more effective and efficient to develop this capacity only at the level of the AU.

Also, if the AUC relies on the RECs / RMs, and if all the RECs / RMs have not developed their respective regional civilian rosters, the AUC may end up in a situation where it is unable to ensure overall continental representation in its missions. If the AU takes responsibility for creating a continental standby roster, it could ensure that all the regions, languages, religions, etc. are proportionally represented. Model 3 is most in line with the way that the UN DPKO operates, and the standby roster and recruitment system could then be designed as one overall system, where those recruited also automatically become part of the roster, for potential future deployments.

**Merits of Model 3**

- The AUC would be in full control of the roster and its own mission needs, and it would thus not be dependent on independent rosters, or the RECs / RMs.
- The standby roster and recruitment system could be integrated, similar to the DPKO system.

**Demerits of Model 3**

- This option would require a significant commitment and investment in additional resources for the AUC. If not, there is the danger that it would end up with more or less the existing recruitment system, without a meaningful standby roster capacity.
- The model risks duplication with those RECs / RMs that are planning to establish their own standby rosters, in line with their own regional and overall ASF expectations.
- The model risks duplication with the independent rosters.

Two key recommendations were proposed to the workshop, including that:

- The AU and RECs / RMs would have to take into account the potential resources available for establishing this capacity, as well as the likelihood of investing these resources in the context of competing priorities.
- Models 1 and 2 would establish the most wide-ranging and interlocking capacities, whilst Model
3 would establish the most focused capacity. Model 1 is probably the most pragmatic option, as it provides for a limited internal rapid deployment capacity at the level of the AU and RECs / RMs (although not all the RECs / RMs are likely to operationalise such a capacity equally), as well as an outsourced medium- to long-term standby roster capacity.

4.3.6. Key issues emerging from the plenary discussion

With the above discussion in mind, the workshop group also aimed to consider the various rostering options for the ASF. Three panellists presented papers, which shared regional and international best practice, an overview of standby rosters and the civilian database that is being established by the Conflict Management Division (CMD) of the AUC. The key areas of discussion are summarised as follows:

- Generally, participants were in favour of Model 1 — the ASF rapid deployment roster and an external roster, as it also caters to the issue of rapid deployment. Additionally, it was suggested that the model should also include time frames for the deployment of the various personnel. The model had more chances of being “live” and less costly than the other proposed models. One of the disadvantages of Model 1, however, was that some felt that it does not afford the AUC and RECs / RMs sufficient ownership of the rosters. As a means of overcoming this limitation, over and above the MoU and day-to-day coordination, it was recommended that a governing board — consisting of representatives from the AUC and RECs / RMs, who could meet regularly to oversee the management of the independent roster(s) on behalf of the AU and RECs / RMs — be established.

- It was recommended that the AUC should provide civilian start-up capacity for Wave 1 (Table B) deployments, whilst the rosters for the RECs / RMs should be utilised for Wave 2 and Wave 3 deployments. However, it was stated that the AUC and RECs / RMs would, in reality, not have the ability to deploy even the first 15 to 20 civilian staff from within existing AU or REC / RM staff. This is because the AU and RECs / RMs do not have 15 to 20 people to spare, with these requisite skills, that it could deploy for a period of 60 to 90 days, due to human resources limitations. The AUC and REC / RM human resources departments also do not have the additional capacity at present to manage the range of tasks required for civilian rostering and recruitment for the ASF.

- It was strongly emphasised that, whichever model was decided upon, it would need to be simple, manageable and easy to use and resource. Quality control mechanisms should also be built into the roster, and these could include competencies, qualifications and the training history of the individuals, among other aspects. These individuals should also be exposed to periodic training and testing, and should also be incorporated in simulation exercises.

- The roster should be populated through governments / ministries of foreign affairs, NGOs, civil society organisations and public advertisements.

- There needs to be awareness that there could be competitors vying for a limited pool of African civilian experts such as the UN, NGOs, etc., which could present a challenge to building and sustaining a healthy roster.

- A recommendation was made that a technical workshop — focusing on the process, required
infrastructure, technical expertise, etc. of rostering — be organised, so as to increase understanding and discuss ways in which to coordinate the development of an ASF roster. The workshop would bring together the AUC and RECs / RMs, as well as institutions and individuals who have rostering expertise and knowledge.

- As a core principle, the AUC should assume the lead and work towards the establishment of an interlinked network amongst the commission and regions, coordinated by the commission.

### 4.4. Theme 4: Training for the civilian staff of the ASF

#### 4.4.1. Purpose

This aspect of the workshop aimed at discussing the issue of the training of civilians for ASF PSOs, which is a critical consideration — bearing in mind that the operational capability of the ASF would be dependent on the level of preparedness of its various components, amongst other factors.\(^\text{13}\)

#### 4.4.2. Background

One of the key features associated with the paradigm shift from traditional to complex multidimensional peacekeeping has been the increase and diversification of the civilian functions included in peacekeeping mandates including, inter alia, electoral assistance, the promotion of human rights, the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the protection of vulnerable groups. The expansion of civilian roles has also resulted in increasing training needs for civilian peacekeepers. The fact that civilians are not deployed in identifiable groups like the military and police components, and the fact that they represent a large number of different functions, has resulted in training for civilians happening in a largely ad hoc fashion. Consequently, there has been a lack of sufficiently trained and qualified civilian personnel (in terms of knowledge and skills) for PSOs.

Over the last decade, however, the situation has improved owing to, among other factors, greater recognition and understanding of the roles and functions of civilian peacekeepers and an increase in the amount of funding available for civilian training, both on the African continent and beyond. A number of training initiatives have been developed by various African peacekeeping training centres to provide specialised training for civilian peacekeepers. Most African peacekeeping training centres also offer opportunities for integrated civilian, police and military training. In addition, African civilian personnel have been able to benefit from peacekeeping and peacebuilding-related training offered by international institutions.

However, the need to develop a civilian capacity for the ASF would significantly increase the need for civilian peacekeeping training, and calls for a much more systematic approach than has been followed to date.

#### 4.4.3. Levels and types of training required

Most civilians who are currently deployed in UN or AU missions have not benefited from any specific peacekeeping training. Individual civilian peacekeepers are experts in their chosen profession, e.g. lawyers, journalists, political analysts, etc. but they need guidance on how to apply their expertise in the highly physically and psychologically challenging, multicultural and...
dynamic peace operations environment. Being a lawyer in such a context could be an altogether different thing to being a lawyer in a “normal” peace-time and national context.

Training for civilian peacekeepers in the ASF context could include the following types / levels of training:

- **Mission preparedness (generic) training**
  This takes the form of a foundation course for civilians interested in serving in a variety of roles in AU missions, and aims to provide participants with the core knowledge and skills they would require to serve in PSOs. Such training could also be provided to civilians who are already deployed in missions, with the aim of improving upon their knowledge and qualifications. This training should orientate participants to the key functional areas and the main actors involved in AU PSOs, and would include, inter alia:
  ◇ the modern AU PSO environment
  ◇ the roles and responsibilities of the civilian, police and military peacekeepers
  ◇ key functional skills such as assessments, planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation
  ◇ cross-cutting issues such as human rights; gender; protection, conduct and discipline, HIV / AIDS and cultural awareness.

- **Mission-specific training**
  This is training that is tailored to reflect the mandate or specific environmental context within which a mission is deployed, as well as reflecting the specific roles and responsibilities of the civilian, police and military peacekeepers; other partners and local authorities; and the specific political, security, development and social-cultural context of the conflict system where the mission would be deployed.

- **Specialisation training**
  This is advanced training that targets civilians who are already engaged in, or earmarked for, specialist activities (for example, conflict management; mission planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation; and management). The training aims to build on the existing skills of the civilian peacekeepers, and to prepare them for more specialised, senior or management positions, by learning from resource persons with extensive knowledge in that particular field. Specialised courses may be offered as mission preparedness, mission-specific or in-mission courses, as appropriate.

- **End-of-mission “training”**
  The learning process, both for the individual civilian specialist and the ASF, should not terminate once the individual’s contract expires. Some form of end-of-mission “training” should be provided, and should focus on such aspects as debriefing and evaluation, to help the ASF draw out lessons learned that may inform future training.

In addition to the above, the training of civilian staff of the AUC and the secretariats of RECs or RMs should be targeted as a matter of priority. Persons working at this level undertake their regular tasks without necessarily appreciating the fact that they also have a role to play in terms of support to, or as participants in, AU or REC / RM PSOs. A lack of awareness by persons operating at this level, especially those in positions of leadership and who have critical decision-making roles, could serve to hinder the development and eventual deployment of AU or REC / RM PSOs. They need to understand that the preparation for and deployment of peace support missions is an all-encompassing affair involving, for instance, all AUC departments either
directly or indirectly, and is not limited to only the AU PSOD. This requires the involvement of political affairs, finance, administration, human resources and legal departments, and so forth. Training at this level should focus on a general orientation to PSOs and the roles of their respective departments (for e.g. finance) in preparing and supporting these operations.

4.4.4 Course curricula

Quite importantly, the course curricula for civilian training needs to be approached from the perspective of an integrated mission which, in the AU context, refers essentially to the multidimensionality (civilian, police and military) of a mission as well as the coordination and cooperation that exists between these components and the overall multidimensional mission management and support structures. All civilian personnel working within the mission would need to have a good working level understanding of the integrated mission concept, in both the AU and UN contexts. Integrated training should, very importantly, also target those at senior leadership level and persons who would work closely together at both the HQ and sector levels on key aspects such as assessments, planning, coordination, management and evaluation.

Thus, a module on integrated missions should be incorporated into the various training courses, with the aim of fostering a general awareness of the concept (i.e. the intent and objectives thereof) versus its structures and mechanisms, which may differ from mission to mission. Such awareness of the integrated mission concept should serve overall to inform the ethos and attitudes of personnel, and should inform their daily work. Training on integrated missions could be delivered at all levels and in all types of training.

Two possible options for integrated training are:

- The military, police and civilian components can participate in a fully integrated course where they are learning together consistently for a one-to-two week period, e.g. in staff officers, integrated planning or civil-military coordination courses.

- The military, police and civilian components have their own specialised training courses parallel to each other over the same time period, and come together for specifically selected modules, e.g. civil military coordination, conceptual frameworks, integrated missions or conflict management. In this example, a regional PSO training centre would conduct a military staff officers’ course, an AU police officers’ course and a civilian mission preparedness course alongside each other at the same venue, or in the same vicinity, and bring the three groups together for integrated sessions on the topics mentioned, as well as for an overall integrated exercise.

Some opportunities for integrated training include:

- **AU senior management level training**
  
The AU Senior Mission Leaders Course (AU SMLC) is a good example of a fully integrated (military, police and civilian) course that targets those at the senior management level. This course, though consistent with UN doctrine and practise, is very much tailored to the African context. Accordingly, it makes good use of African structures, approaches, case studies, facilitators etc.

  The curriculum at this level of training may include such modules as:
  
  ◊ conflict analysis
  ◊ ASF vision / concept
◆ strategic leadership
◆ resource management
◆ partnerships and UN support
◆ planning
◆ gender.

Continuing challenges at this level include ensuring appropriately qualified participants are nominated / selected for the course, and improving the AUC / REC / RM / member state coordination so as to ensure timely response to requests for nominations, among other things.

• **ASF and regional brigade training exercises**

There are also a number of ASF training exercises that have been charted by the RECs / regions, brigades, PLANELMs and centres of excellence, some jointly with external partners. The relevant civilian training service providers should participate in exercises including assisting in the exercise planning process; assisting as monitors, observers, resource persons etc. and participating in post-scenario evaluations. One of the key benefits of participating in such exercises would be that the lessons learned and other observations deduced could be used to further inform an institution’s training.

• **Civilian training courses**

Specific training courses aimed at the civilian components of AU and REC / RM PSOs would prepare civilians to serve in AU PSOs alongside their military and police counterparts. The course curriculum should incorporate a selection of the modules listed below. This is not an exhaustive list, but a representation of some of the minimum modules that should be contained in a curriculum. These modules should always be informed by the realities on the ground and the needs of the ASF:

◆ conceptual frameworks: introduction to conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding
◆ institutional frameworks: the AU, UN, sub-regional organisations
◆ multidimensional peace operations, including core functional areas
◆ the role of the military, police, civilian
◆ civil-military coordination
◆ cultural awareness and cross-cultural communication
◆ mental preparation and stress management
◆ human rights
◆ international humanitarian law and human rights law
◆ humanitarian assistance
◆ DDR
◆ SSR
◆ gender perspectives
◆ protection of vulnerable groups
◆ sexual exploitation and abuse
◆ HIV / AIDS
◆ media relations
◆ conflict management including conflict analysis, negotiation, mediation and facilitation
◆ working with interpreters.

The above may also be complemented by modules on practical aspects such as:

◆ map reading
◆ radio communications
◆ road safety
◆ mine awareness
personal safety, hostage taking and crisis management.

These practical types of modules could be supported by military and/or police training institutions, which typically have the field exercise terrain and equipment necessary for this type of practical training, and provide further opportunities for civil-military cooperation.

4.4.5. Course methodology

The course methodologies employed would differ from institution to institution, based on factors pertaining to available resources and capacity. A general note of guidance, however, should be that institutions should strive to ensure a methodology that fosters an adult learning type or participatory learning approach. A good range of didactical techniques should be employed as and where relevant, including substantive presentations, discussions, case studies, group work and various audiovisual aids. Training could also incorporate a mix of facilitators with academic and practical experience (so as to inform on best practice); high level/high profile facilitators (SRCCs, Force Commanders or Commissioners of Police, ambassadors); and panel discussions, highlighting both divergent and complementary views and approaches.

4.4.6. Standards

The AU, together with its training partners, should develop minimum standards for civilian training. ASF training policy states that training should be designed and conducted with due consideration of ASF doctrine, AU guidelines, UN Standard Generic Training Modules (SGTM) and any other relevant AU and UN documentation. It should also take into account actual events and developments at the regional and global levels. Training standards for the ASF should be in line with UN standards, where they exist.

Course curricula and the methodologies employed by individual institutions could also serve to set the yardstick for minimum standards for ASF training. Those institutions that do not meet minimum standards should not be sidelined but should receive support to enable them to meet standards.

Ultimately, when it comes to training for civilians of the ASF, the AU should aim at the realisation of a system of civilian peacekeeping that is professional, efficient and available on demand. Once the AU has completed the identification, recruitment and rostering aspects as pertaining to civilian specialists for PSOs, preparation of these individuals becomes another critical link that would facilitate their overall operational capability. Training should not only be limited to civilians that the AU intend to deploy, but should also target those at the AUC and various REC/RM levels, those working in peacekeeping and peacebuilding-related fields, and persons coming from national foreign ministries.

4.4.7. Key issues emerging from the plenary discussion

Overall, the workshop was tasked to discuss the various aspects related to ensuring a more systematic and long-term preparation of civilian personnel for the ASF. An important priority would be to ensure that training for civilian personnel is integrated into efforts that have already been undertaken, to ensure the readiness of military and police personnel. In addition to a presentation on an overview of the various training options, the AU PSOD delivered

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a presentation on the ASF training plan, and the (APSTA) presidency briefed the workshop on the ASF-APSTA relationship. The key discussion areas were:

- The training of all civilian personnel of the ASF should be a mandatory requirement prior to deployment. The achievement of this would be challenging, particularly as the core civilian staff for the ASF would be contributed not from within the RECs / RMs and AUC staff complement but from contributions from a number of sources (as highlighted above), including the member states, civil society organisations, the private sector etc. Organising training for these persons would require greater coordination and cooperation from the diverse body of training service providers on the continent.

- Civilian training service providers should strive to provide training that meets the minimum standards of training, as set out in the ASF training policy (which, in turn, is designed to be consistent with UN policy). It was shared that, amongst the regional training partners, there is a critical need to develop and agree upon the modalities for streamlining the curriculum and methodology for civilian training.

- In addition to the function-specific modules indicated in the background paper, participants also stressed the importance of the inclusion of modules such as basic communication skills, safety and first aid, personal and physical security, mine awareness, cultural communication, driving and road safety, and map reading. The emphasis on these types of modules serves to reinforce the fact that African civilians would be deployed in oftentimes hostile and hazardous environments. In this way, they would need to be physically and mentally prepared for the related challenges.

- It was strongly recommended that the training methodology should, where appropriate, and in addition to a classroom component, include practical field and simulation training. Thus, participation of civilians in Levels I, II and III Decision Making Exercises (MAPEX, CPX and FTX) would be key. There should also be an emphasis on problem-based learning, which allows participants to identify and discuss a particular issue and come up with solutions.

- Training should consist of both integrated and single-component training.

- Facilitator exchange should be encouraged, both amongst regional training partner institutions and regional and international partner institutions, so as to allow for the exchange of experiences and the broadening of perspectives.

- The regional training centres of excellence and other civil society organisations that provide training for civilians should (through the APSTA framework) continue to cooperate closely, not only amongst each other but also with the international civilian training partners.15

- Obtaining an appropriate profile for course participants was identified as a challenge, the overcoming of which requires more clearly defined selection criteria and more discerning screening of profiles. In order to avoid the current situation, in which the same individuals are repeating courses at different institutions,

Other types of modules to include would be information management, reporting and conflict management and, particularly at the senior mission leadership level, training should focus on assessment, planning and coordination.

15 For example, the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR), the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) and the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT).
The workshop had, as its main objectives, determining the type of civilian staff that would be required for the ASF, recruitment options, possibilities for the establishment of a rostering system, and the type of readiness training that would be required to ensure a professional and readily available civilian cadre of personnel for African PSO missions. In this way, it could be said that further strides were made to the ends of effecting a more systematic, thorough and coherent approach to the operationalisation of the civilian dimension of the ASF.

The workshop provided a forum in which the AU and RECs / RMs could discuss and share ideas on these aspects, both among each other and with the various other stakeholders and partners involved and / or interested in the area of civilian capacity building. It also served to create a greater awareness and understanding of the civilian dimension of PSOs — an area that is, relatively speaking, still grey, considering the decades-long dominance of the military in the peacekeeping domain.

As follow-on actions, the following recommendations (to be undertaken in the immediate short-term) were put forth by the workshop:

- Both the AUC and the RECs / RMs should work jointly on developing job descriptions for the 60+ functions that have been agreed upon, as well as developing the recruitment process for these positions.
- The AU and RECs / RMs should develop human resources policies for PSOs that address the particular needs of mission staff.
- The RECs / RMs should start with the identification of and recruitment for the 60+ positions, which translates into between 300 and 400 personnel for the roster.
- An AUC / REC / RM task team should be established to design an ASF roster, based on the discussions of this workshop.
- Funding would be critical to ensuring operationalisation. Consequently, the AUC and RECs / RMs, together with international partners, should identify adequate funding channels.

5: Conclusion
Annex 1: Workshop agenda

AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE (ASF)
CIVILIAN STAFFING, TRAINING
AND ROSTERING WORKSHOP

AGENDA

Day 1: Wednesday 9 July 2008
PM Arrival of delegates and registration

Day 2: Thursday 10 July 2008

Session I: Opening session
08:30 – 10:00 Opening session
• Welcome and opening of the workshop
  — Bereng Mtimkulu, Head of AU PSOD
• Introduction of participants (self)
• Overview of ASF and role of civilian dimension
  — Bereng Mtimkulu
• Workshop goals and objectives
  — Cedric de Coning, ACCORD
• Group photograph
10:00 – 10:30 Coffee and tea break

Session II: Staffing and recruitment
10:30–11:10 Introduction: civilian staffing
• Overview of civilian dimension policy framework and staffing options
  — Cedric de Coning, ACCORD
• Workshop goals and objectives
  — Cedric de Coning, ACCORD
• Group photograph
11:10–12:30 Group work: civilian staffing
• Consider and recommend civilian staffing (functions and priorities)
12:30–13:30 Lunch break
13:30–14:30 Group work: civilian staffing (continuation)
14:30–17:30 Plenary feedback and discussion: civilian staffing (including coffee and tea break 15:30–16:00)
19:30–21:30 Welcome reception

Day 3: Friday 11 July 2008
08:30–09:20 Introduction: recruitment
• Overview of recruitment options
  — Cedric de Coning, ACCORD
• Overview of recruitment options
  • AU current practise
    — Gaone Masire, AU
  • UN best practise
    — Andrzej Grzelka, DPKO AUPST
09:20–11:00 Group work: recruitment (including coffee and tea break 10:00–10:30)
• Consider and recommend recruitment options
11:00–12:00 Plenary feedback and discussion: recruitment
1200–12:30 Wrap-up: civilian staffing and recruitment
12:30–13:30 Lunch break

Session III: Rostering
13:30–14:30 Introduction: standby rosters
• Overview of standby roster options
  — Nhlanhla Dube, AFDEM
• CMD civilian database
  — Abraham Kebede, AU
• International best practise
  — Winrich Kuehne, ZIF

14:30–17:00 Group work: standby rosters
  (including coffee and tea break 15:30–16:00)

17:00–18:00 Plenary feedback and discussion: standby rosters

18:00–18:30 Wrap-up: standby rosters

Day 4: Saturday 12 July 2008

Session IV: Training

08:00–08:40 Introduction: training
  • Overview of training options
    — Yvonne Kasumba, ACCORD
  • AU PSOD training plan
    — Charles Debrah, AU PSOD
  • APSTA-ASF relationship
    — Istifanus S. Zabadi, APSTA

08:40–10:00 Group work: training

10:00–10:20 Coffee and tea break

10:20–11:00 Plenary feedback and discussion: training

Session V: Closing session

11:00–12:00 Closing session
  • Summary and wrap-up of workshop outcomes
    — Cedric de Coning, ACCORD
  • Closing remarks
    — Charles Debrah, AU PSOD

12:00–12:45 Lunch

Annex 2: List of participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POSITION / INSTITUTION</th>
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<td>Col Charles Debrah</td>
<td>Training Officer AU PSOD</td>
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<td>Ms Michaela Friberg Storey</td>
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<td>Zambian Police</td>
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<td>Officer-in-Charge</td>
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<td>Supt Ahmed Magaji Kontagora</td>
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1. We, the members of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) of the African Union (AU), met at our 3rd Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 15 May 2009, to review the progress made in the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF) to further identify the challenges ahead, in order to chart the best way forward to achieve operationalization by 2010. Our meeting was preceded by the 6th Meeting of the African Chiefs of Defence Staff, Safety and Security and the Meeting of Experts from 11th to 14th May 2009.

2. This meeting was held within the framework of the relevant provisions of:
   a. the AU Constitutive Act;
   b. the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) which, in terms of Article 13, provides for the establishment of the ASF in order to enable the PSC to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and interventions, pursuant to Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, which stipulates that the ASF shall be composed of standby multi-disciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components, in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice;
   c. the Policy Framework on the Establishment of the ASF and the MSC, as adopted at the 3rd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa in July 2004, which, inter alia, provides for the establishment of five regional brigades to constitute the ASF.
3. Our meeting afforded us an opportunity to take stock of the progress made in the establishment of the ASF as spelt out in the PSC Protocol. In this respect, we recognise the adoption of the ASF Roadmap II during the Consultative Meeting held in Addis Ababa from 30th to 31st July 2008, between the AUC and RECs/RMs and the Chiefs of Staff and Brigade Commanders of the regional brigades.

4. While welcoming the significant progress made in many countries and regions as a result of the steadfast efforts exerted at the level of the AUC, the RECs/RMs and individual AU Member States, we continue to be deeply concerned about the continued scourge of conflicts and instability on the continent, which cause immense suffering among African people, as well as undermine efforts towards socio-economic development.

5. Against this background, there is need to intensify the efforts aimed at making the ASF fully operational as an enforcement tool of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), to ensure that the continent is adequately equipped to meet the daunting challenges of peace, security and stability. In this respect, we:

   a. stress the urgency of the operationalization of the ASF as an important component of the APSA designed to support African efforts at conflict prevention, management and resolution;

   b. undertake to fully support the AUC, the RECs/RMs and our respective nations in the endeavour to ensure the operationalization of the ASF in the framework of APSA;

6. In assessing the different steps taken in pursuance of the relevant provisions of the PSC Protocol, we would like to:

   a. commend the Commission for the initiatives it has taken, in close collaboration with the RECs/RMs, to implement the ASF Policy Framework, guided by our recommendations, in particular through the formulation of the ASF Roadmap II, the ongoing efforts to improve upon the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) Concept, the Continental Logistics Bases (CLBs), work on the Strategic Lift Capability Concept, the Formed Police Unit (FPU) Concept, development of the Civilian Dimension and the elaboration of an ASF Training Plan 2009 – 2010, as well as the various training efforts;

   b. encourage the Commission and the RECs/RMs to vigorously pursue their efforts in order to meet the 2010 deadline for the full operationalization of the various ASF components;

   c. express our gratitude to the AU partners within the international community for having provided the essential financial support for the policy development process.

7. In order to consolidate the progress made thus far, and achieve our goal within the stipulated timeframe, we:

   a. endorse the proposal to develop Rules of Procedure for the STCDSS to enable the committee deliberate on issues appropriately and without waste of time;

   b. undertake to set up a Finance Committee to make proposals in respect of finding predictable and sustainable means of funding for AU missions and the ASF;

   c. considered the trends that emerged from our deliberation on the issue of the CLB and the view that the discussions should not be limited to the choice of the location of the CLB, but that priority should be given to the establishment of the five regional logistics depots, while the issue of the CLB should be settled subsequently. On this note, we decide that:
(1) the organizers should also pay attention to the establishment of the five regional logistics depots;

(2) the reports drafted by the experts mandated by the Commission in 2007 and 2009 should be distributed to member states;

(3) the issue of the CLB will be decided subsequently in the light of the original reports of the technical evaluation missions carried out in 2007 and 2009;

d. request the AUC to come out with the cost implications of the Communication and Information Systems (CIS) requirements of the PSOD and that Africa should look inwards in provisioning for the requirements, in view of African ownership and the sensitivities that go with information;

e. take note of the ongoing work in respect of further develop the ASF Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) concept and urge the Commission to go ahead and conduct the remaining workshops of the RDC concept and harmonize it for further action;

f. recognize the work in respect of the Strategic Lift concept and request the Commission to ensure that those tasked to develop the concept should work closely with those regions that have already taken the lead in working on their strategic lift concept, in order to enrich their final product. The concept should cover legal aspects as well;

g. urge the Commission to ensure that Exercise AMANI AFRICA is conducted within schedule. Similarly we encourage member states to second officers to the AU PSOD for Exercise AMANI AFRICA and be able to sustain them during the period of their secondment.

h. On the issue of Police Component development we urge the Commission to:

(1) develop Police Standby Databases at the AUC for Strategic Level Police Mission leaders and the RECs/RMs for Individual Police Officers (IPOs) and Formed Police Units (FPU);

(2) take necessary steps to enhance advocacy/sensitization of Police Contributing Countries (PCC) and Police Chiefs and Heads of Gendarmerie on ASF Police activities;

(3) take action to increase the staff level at the AUC and the RECs/RMs. The recruitment of Police Commissioner at the AUC should be taken as a matter of priority;

(4) review the Police Standby Arrangement upwards from the 240 Individual Police Officers (IPOs) per REC/RM to 720 and the FPU from 2 to 6 per REC/RM;

(5) conduct Police Training Needs Analysis (TNA) and develop curriculum to enhance the operationalization of the ASF Police Component;

(6) urgently address the issue of ASF Police RDC composition and capability in liaison with the RECs/RMs and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs);

(7) harmonise the existing differences in Police Structure at the AU and RECs/RMs in line with identified core functions as a matter of urgency;
i. request the Commission to take the following actions in respect of the development of the Civilian Component:

(1) work jointly with the RECs/RMs to develop job descriptions for the more than 60 functions (that have been agreed upon) as well as developing the recruitment process for these positions;

(2) encourage the RECs/RMs to start with the identification and recruitment for the more than 60 positions (approximately 400 for the roster);

(3) establish an AUC/REC/RM Task Team to design an ASF roster based on the discussions of the Civilian Dimension Staffing, Training and Rostering workshop. The development of a roster by the AU and RECs/RMs should not preclude the AU from recruiting directly in the event that the individuals in the roster do not meet the requirements for the vacancies;

(4) develop human resource policies for PSOs that shall address the needs of mission staff and encourage RECs/RMs should be encouraged to do the same;

(5) inform member states about the vacancies so as to give them the opportunity to identify and submit names of candidates for the posts. Undertake further consultations with Member States on the vacancies and RECs/RMs should be able to recruit for the vacancies. Additionally, regional equity should be taken into consideration while filling the vacancies;

(6) ensure alignment of capabilities and capacities between the AU and the RECs/RMs.

(7) establish the Civilian Component, where applicable, following a similar process to that of the other ASF components.

(8) request the Commission to proceed with the short – term (six months) recruitment of a civilian specialist to assist in kick-starting the ASF Civilian Planning Element;

j. on the issue of some member states belonging to more than one regional brigade, we are of the view that such a decision is a matter of national sovereignty, choice, and capacity to fulfill their obligations to both brigades at the same time;

k. agree that the name ASF be retained for the continental mechanism, while the capabilities at the regional level should be changed to regional standby forces, to reflect a common nomenclature for the force at all levels.

l. On the issue of PSOD recruitment, we request that:

(1) the Commission should adhere to the principles of rotation, transparency and equitable geographical distribution regarding all types of positions within the PSOD and to be in accordance with the recruitment procedure of the AUC;

(2) the Commission should take urgent steps to provide further details i.e. Cost implications, Terms of Reference of the respective vacancies (for the 58 posts) to enable the member states respond appropriately.

m. urge the Commission to ensure that documents for meetings are provided in all AU working documents at all times.
The African Union-African Standby Force
Civilian Dimension Staffing, Training and Rostering Workshop
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