MIGRATION PROCESSES AND CHALLENGES IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA
ST. PETERSBURG CASE STUDY

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Number 6

Marya S. Rozanova
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WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS

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Marya Rozanova is adviser to the rector and associate professor at Admiral Makarov State Maritime Academy (St. Petersburg, Russia), and former Galina Starovoitova Fellow on Human Rights and Conflict Resolution at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. Since 2007, she has headed the nongovernmental organization Center for Civil, Social, Scientific and Cultural Initiatives “STRATEGIA” (www.org-strategia.org), based in St. Petersburg, which specializes in a wide variety of issues related to youth policy, xenophobia prevention and tolerance promotion, youth conflict resolution, migration processes, and migrant children and youth integration in Russian society.

Ms. Rozanova holds bachelor and doctorate degrees from St. Petersburg State University, and a law degree from the North-West Academy of Public Administration. Author of more than forty scientific works, she is also the winner of multiple grants from the St. Petersburg regional government. Her most recent book, Identichnosti v epohu global’nyh migratsii [Identities in an era of global migration] (St. Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo, 2010), coauthored with Sergey Akopov, is focused on transformation of cultural and ethnic identity and migration processes in contemporary Russia.
Transnational migration is a growing and complex phenomenon. At year-end 2009, the number of people in the world living outside their country of birth reached 214 million,¹ compared to about 191 million people in 2005, and 155 million in 1990.²

At the end of the twentieth century, Russia began to accept large numbers of migrants. According to United Nations data, Russia ranks second after the United States among host countries of transnational migrants.³ The number of immigrants in Russia reached about 13.2 million in 2009, nearly 9 percent of the total population.⁴ The major contributors to the mass migration influx are grounded in demographics and the growing post-Soviet economy. The Russian population is expected to decline from 145.2 million people in 2002⁵ to approximately 100 million people by the year 2050, if the current rate of natural population decline continues.⁶ Russia has one of the lowest birth rates in the world and a rapidly aging population,⁷ alongside serious labor shortages. Mass migration directly and indirectly contributes to the ongoing transformation of the nation and its major cities.

The most economically vibrant cities are also migrant magnets and independent actors and engines of economic growth competing with one another for investment and capital. The success of modern cities is “a function of their ability to integrate themselves in the global society.”⁸ In this process of integration, the urban entities become “unique, complex fabrics of sociability and identities,”⁹ encompassing contentious mixtures of globalism and localism. In the context of dramatically increasing diversity, formation of the new cities’ identities based on tolerance, “pragmatic pluralism,” and
flexibility can be considered as the best “survival strategy,” and thus “the order of the day.”

In this work, St. Petersburg is explored as a case study in how global challenges filter through the Russian Federation and shape new identities, and how the city adjusts to new massive migration inflows in the course of rapid transformation from the Soviet “closed” cultural capital to the inclusive global city. After Moscow, St. Petersburg is Russia’s largest economic, transport, scientific, cultural, and tourist center. The city’s cultural and financial arenas are closely interrelated and the city’s economic success is also due to “investments that became possible through the city’s ability to capitalize on the great resource of its cultural life.”

Mass migration affects not just the economic sphere, but also social structure, norms, and sense of identity. This transformation is accompanied by increasing intolerance of ethnic, racial, religious, and cultural differences. This is a real challenge for St. Petersburg because that “promotion of tolerance becomes essential to successful labor market strategies” to support and expand the city’s unique position as an economic, scientific, and tourism center.

Recognizing the intercultural challenges that a modern city in global society faces, the St. Petersburg government launched the Tolerance Program in 2006. The objective of this effort was no less than to establish tolerance as the city’s core value—its distinguishing feature and sense of identity—among increasingly diverse inhabitants.

The following interdisciplinary observations on migration processes and their consequences in contemporary Russia and St. Petersburg are organized into two major topic areas. Chapter 1 is devoted to a description of the increasing ethnic diversity and complexity of Russia as the host society alongside the growth of xenophobia at the national level. Chapter 2 is focused on St. Petersburg as a magnet for domestic and transnational migrants, and on the region’s migration policy and the city’s changing identity. Chapters 3 and 4 contain theoretical and empirically oriented analysis followed
by descriptions of municipal and regional projects aimed at tolerance promotion and xenophobia prevention among youth that have been successfully implemented or were still in process at the time of this writing.
In spite of great ethnic and religious diversity among the Russian population (the 2002 census recorded 160 ethnic groups and about 30 subethnic groups in Russia) and the long-term coexistence of various ethnic groups within the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, a large proportion of the population do not live in a multiethnic environment and has not gained the skills of intercultural communication.

The collapse of Soviet national policies and mass migration during the twenty-first century—both domestic and international—have led to a sharp increase in xenophobia, including ethnophobia and migrant-phobia, and a steady drift toward ethnonational extremism. According to public opinion polls, there is a generalized negative attitude in Russian society toward newcomers in metropolitan areas, small cities, and rural areas. The strongest ethnic xenophobia and extremism occur primarily in regions experiencing political/economic transition or crisis. Preconditions for conflict situations are rooted not so much in competitive labor markets, but rather in rapidly changing ethnic composition (so-called “ethnic imbalance”), and profound crisis and transformation of the entire political, economic, and social system.

1.1. Principal Causes of Xenophobia
Transformation in Socioeconomic and Political Spheres

The disintegration of the USSR saw a sharp decline in the quality of life of most citizens, and an accompanying increase in inequality. Meanwhile, the quality of primary, secondary, and higher education declined. Although there is no direct relationship between level of education and tolerance, as a rule, “those people with a higher
education express ethnic prejudices significantly more weakly than those with low levels of education.... Education, as a rule in general, affects the level of tolerance, not only of ethnic groups, but also of all minorities—religious, subcultural, and sexual.”

In post-Soviet Russia, the beginning of a population decline and relative economic growth coincided with economic problems in most countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), leading to a new phenomenon for the indigenous populations of most Russian regions—large inflows of migrant workers. The absence of integration measures for migrants, as well as resulting self-segregation of migrant communities and diasporas, on the one hand, and the lack of means to strengthen tolerance among host populations, on the other, has widened the gap between indigenous and migrant populations.

Fracturing of the entire sociopolitical value system during the collapse of the USSR also contributed to increasing xenophobia. The official “friendship of peoples” (Druzhba narodov) that had been imposed by the Soviet government for generations was effectively eliminated in a few years. Elements of this “imperial” mentality had ensured tolerant attitudes by the ethnic majority vis-à-vis ethnic minorities. According to sociological survey research conducted between 1970 and 1980, the attitude of most ethnic Russians toward other ethnic groups in various republics of the Soviet Union could be characterized as neutral (“I do not care. I never thought about what nationality they are”). In addition, more than 90 percent of Russians did not attach importance to the ethnicity of their co-workers, and more than half of respondents expressed a positive attitude towards interethnic marriages.

Interethnic relations, while relatively stable in the last decades of the Soviet regime, were rapidly destabilized just before the collapse of the Soviet Union. “[N]ation-building on the ruins of ... empire is usually taken by adherents of ethnic nationalism. Kemalist Turkey began its experiment in nation-building with the genocide and the expulsion of the Armenian, Greek, and Kurdish minorities. Austrians welcomed
the Anschluss, after 20 years of living in a small postimperial state. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia began to show an aggressive nationalism and attempted to redraw the political map of the former Yugoslavia.25

In the national republics, the emergence of a regional elite coincided with attempts to build a new ethnic identity.26 The entire former Soviet republic “cherished ethno-political myths, in which the state was proclaimed a home of the ‘indigenous’ population. In all these cases, the theoretical basis of the relevant policy has served the tradition of Romanticism, according to which humanity is clearly divided by ethnicity, and ... nations have sacred rights.”27 As noted by Emil Pain, “in the process of total transformation during the collapse of an empire, the minorities, especially those who are compactly settled, first awaken and consolidate, and the majority follows them.”28

This pattern was reflected in the collapse of the Soviet Union and in Russia. In fact, the formation of the state system of the new Russian Federation was marked by two phases that coincided with the respective governments of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. During the Yeltsin presidency, to preserve the territorial integrity of the new state, the government attempted to create a new civil (political) set of common values. The new political elite adopted “as the ideal for building a new national community the concept of the ‘civic nation,’ articulated terminologically through the notion of the ‘Russian [Rossiisky] population.’”29 Ethnic differences then had to be formally eliminated. The only element that was correlated with the numerically dominant group was the Russian language. Russian was the official language throughout the territory of Russia, alongside official support to maintain and institutionalize the languages of other ethnic groups. In this period, however, even the Russian language had lost its role as a basis for cross-cultural communication in a number of regions.

Attempts to mobilize citizens on the basis of supraethnic constructs in the form of a single “multiethnic people” were not successful. In the early 1990s, the old communist ideology still had many supporters, and its replacement could not address the complex
challenges of extremely adverse circumstances and thus rapidly lost supporters. Society was split into supporters of the old regime and supporters of liberal democratic reforms. A lack of “national consensus on basic ideological values created obstacles to the formation of a national idea that could unite the majority of Russia’s population.”

Thus, the objective of civil (political) unity and harmony could not be realized.

In a commonwealth that contained national republics in the active stage of the “parade of sovereignties,” the weakening of the federal center and its inability to mobilize diverse groups around common themes and solidarity naturally led to the willingness of a number of political leaders to construct their own regional ethnic identities. These processes strengthened the regionalization of Russia and found support in Moscow. From 1992 to 1996, a legal framework was established that focused on protecting the rights and freedoms of ethnic minorities and non-Russian peoples, beginning with the federal law “On National-Cultural Autonomy” (no. 74-FZ), and the policy concept approved by presidential decree no. 909 on June 15, 1996.

These legal innovations, which transferred many public sector tasks to national republics, gave the republics significant tax benefits and privileges during the mid to late 1990s. The latter were privileged compared to other regions of the country. At the regional constitutional level, most republics consolidated the privileged position of the titular ethnic group, intensifying the process of politicization of ethnicity. The constitutions of Bashkortostan, Buryatia, Ingushetia, Sakha (Yakutia), North Ossetia (Alania), Tatarstan, and Tyva (Tuva) established the requirement for presidential candidates to know the language of the titular nation. According to the Komi Republic’s constitution, the “indigenous people” were hailed as the source of statehood, and the right of law-making was granted only to the congress of the titular people; as per the constitution of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), the president of the republic must henceforth be born in Yakutia.
The distribution of financial, material, and nonmaterial resources among the citizens of Russia has become a real concern because “in a situation where a settlement’s borders do not coincide with the boundaries of the republics (... in most of the republics, the ‘titular’ nation comprises less than half the population), ethnicization of the distribution of authority, recruitment, formation of workers’ collectives, etc., often leads to national and clan solidarity, and exacerbates interethnic tensions.”\textsuperscript{34} In the framework of a democratic regime, the situation was quite incongruous; under the new regional constitutional norms, “the will of a minority [had been] imposed on the majority simply on the basis that the majority were of a different ethnicity.”\textsuperscript{35}

In some republics (as well as in many of the newly independent states of the former USSR), the revival of ethnic consciousness\textsuperscript{36} was accompanied by increasing ethnocentrism and Russo-phobia in the form of “nationalistic movements of titular peoples of the republics of Russia ... (Chechens, Tatars, Lezgins, Avars, etc.).”\textsuperscript{37} Directly, and indirectly, in order to propagate the superiority of titular nations over the Russian ethnic group, the Russian language began to be perceived as the language of “the occupier,” rather than the common language of a united country and a means of communication understood by all the peoples of Russia. In many national republics, general signs of political ethnocracy and its institutionalization in the North Caucasus emerged. Moreover, political autonomy, and even secession, has been proposed in some republics; discrimination against the interests of the Russian ethnic population was common and violence against the ethnic Russian population increased as well.

A reaction was not long in coming. Since the late 1990s, the “Russia for the Russians” ideology has become widespread. Polls by the Levada Center (Moscow) show that people with positive feelings about the notion of “Russia for the Russians” outnumber those condemning the idea (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1. Survey Results 1998–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I support it; it is overdue</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would be good to implement, but within reasonable limits</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative; in reality it is fascism</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m not interested</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total supporters</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The survey data demonstrate the deep crisis of ethnic Russian identity. For the first time, ethnic Russians have become the dominant ethnic group. In 2002, ethnic Russians in the Russian Federation comprised over 82 percent of the population, whereas in 1989 Russians in the Soviet Union accounted for no more than 51 percent, and in the Russian Empire, Russians comprised 44.7 percent of the population in 1897 and 43.4 percent in 1719.

During the Yeltsin administration, outcomes of political transformation for the ethnic majority follow:

- Weakening of traditional interethnic tolerance and increased xenophobia, as well as the emergence of ethnonational extremism.
• Massive outflow of the ethnic Russian population from many republics of the Russian Federation (primarily from the North Caucasus republics), which upset the established ethnopolitical and ethnocultural balance and diversity.

• Low participation of ethnic Russians in the political life of some republics, even in those where they were not outnumbered, because of existing politico-legal constraints in some republics and their own disinterest in political activity.40

The election of President Putin in 2000 led to administrative reforms aimed to strengthen the federal government, as well as to reduce regional disparities and centrifugal tendencies. These goals were achieved through the establishment of presidential plenipotentiaries; division of the country into seven federal districts; de facto abolition of regional governor elections; reorganization of the Federal Assembly’s Federation Council; and revision of regional legislation to correspond with federal legislation. The new political course emphasized not only the protection of minorities (titular nations) but the ethnic Russians as well—especially in the national republics. Thus, federal legislation (amendment to no. 165-FZ in 2002, and passage of no. 53-FZ in 2005) reasserted the Russian language as the country’s official language (along with other official languages of titular nations within the national republics), and declared the Cyrillic alphabet as the only alphabet acceptable for communication for all of the languages of the Russian Federation.41

Ultimately, after the Yeltsin government’s attempts to unify the all-Russia nation as a civic nation failed, federal policy since 2000 became more conservative, grounded more on an ethnic understanding of “nation” that included traditional (autocratic) and religious (Russian Orthodox) values. During this period the development of “conservative official nationalism,” the “weakening of separatist nationalism” (i.e., “titular” ethnic groups in national republics), and the “intensification of radical nationalism”42 took place.
Meanwhile, the overall level of conflict in Russia’s regions declined throughout the 2000s (the exception to the present remains a region of the North Caucasus) (see Table 1.4). The global economic crisis led to significant adjustments in how xenophobia was expressed, that is, migrant-phobia. Briefly, the process of gradual consolidation and solidarity among citizens of Russia has been accompanied by creating new images of the enemy. As the global crisis increased the level of unemployment in many countries, it seemed certain that migrant workers would become targets of popular discontent.

Since late 2008, principal targets (mainly in public forums) of negative attitudes, in fact, are migrant workers. In Russia, xenophobia is on the upswing in the forms of both ethnophobia and migrant-phobia. According to All-Russia poll data (Russian Public Opinion Research Center), in 2002, 45 percent of respondents supported a policy restricting the influx of migrants; in early 2011, that proportion had increased to 68 percent (see Table 1.3).

In 2008 and 2009, antimigrant sentiment was widely expressed in public demonstrations and graffiti/leaflet/sticker campaigns. These actions were initiated by the Young Guard of United Russia, and took place at the offices of the Federal Migration Service, the offices of large construction companies, and in railway stations in Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Chelyabinsk, Novosibirsk, Khabarovsk, St. Petersburg, Ryazan, Samara, Chelyabinsk, and other cities.

The Young Guard’s principal demands were to take jobs away from migrant workers and give them to Russian citizens, and the introduction of a visa regime with CIS countries. Popular slogans included, “Work legally,” “Do you want to work? Pay taxes!”, “Illegal = thief,” and “Our money to our people.” As a visual demonstration of the consequences of government quotas for immigrants (in effect, permitting large numbers of non-citizens to enter specific cities and regions to fill a variety of labor market needs), photos of the Paris riots and pogroms of 2005 were widely publicized.
Public demonstrations were held with the permission of regional authorities. It should be noted that in Russia, citizens’ rights to assemble peacefully, without weapons, and to hold rallies, meetings, demonstrations, marches, and pickets are enshrined in Article 31 of the Constitution. However, obtaining permission is a complicated process involving various levels of government, plus various committees, divisions, and departments of a given level.

The activities were run by the youth wing of the majority party in the national parliament (Federal Assembly of Russia), the All-Russia movement’s political party, United Russia. Thus, the Young Guard represents the United Russia party. Although the party may not have intended to escalate conflict, it is a source of distinctly anti-immigrant attitudes.

Young Guard activities were widely publicized in the media. These initiatives undoubtedly were intended to strengthen the image of the youth movement among much of the population, as well as increase already negative attitudes toward migrant workers. Overall, the ideas of the Young Guard coincided somewhat with the ideas traditionally expressed by extremist groups.45

The Federation Attorney General’s Office has also been involved in the political struggle around the issue of migration. On June 18, 2009, as a part of an antiextremist activity, the Attorney General’s Office ordered Tatyana Golikova, head of the Ministry of Health and Social Development (MHSD), to eliminate violations of federal legislation relating to employment of foreign nationals that were identified during an audit of the MHSD.46 Excerpts from a statement by the Attorney General’s Office follow:

[I]n 2008, the MHSD repeatedly made the decision to increase the size of the quotas on foreign workers that were originally set by the regions of the RF [Russian Federation].... The audit also found that the proposals of the regions ... on their need for foreign workers were adjusted by the Ministry without proper investigation. All [of these actions are] contributing to a violation of
the rights of Russian citizens in the area of employment and create conditions for interethnic conflicts. In addition, the working conditions of foreign nationals themselves pave the way for conflict. Since the global economic crisis began, interethnic relations in Russia have been aggravated, which is partly due to the involvement and employment of foreign workers. Immigrants in the labor market annoy Russians, motivate protest rallies, and create fertile ground for extremism. When coupled with rising unemployment among Russian citizens, it has led to an increase in crime in general.  

The problem here is not even the fact that this assessment is wrong-headed, given that the MHSD is not directly responsible for increasing or reducing quotas (proposals for quotas are prepared by regional governments, and the quotas are then approved by the federal government; the MHSD nominally approves the results). Its tone is clearly anti-immigration in nature. In fact, the decision by the Attorney General’s Office can be interpreted as follows: in order to cope with the spread of extremist views and violence, federal officials had to be perceived as engaged in getting rid of the object attracting negative attention—migrant workers. Organizations that promote the employment of immigrants then had to be sued for supporting extremism. Following the same logic, because conflicts between domestic migrants and host populations are common, then interregional migration in Russia should also be limited.
Changes in Ethnic Composition as a Source of Instability

After the Soviet Union collapsed, demographics changed significantly in many regions of the Russian Federation (Table 1.2).49


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Total Population, 2002 (thousands)</th>
<th>Birth Rate (per 1000 population, annual average)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>145,166.7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>115,891.4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>5,564.9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashkirs</td>
<td>1,673.4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuvash</td>
<td>1,637.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechens</td>
<td>1,360.3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mordovians</td>
<td>843.4</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avars</td>
<td>814.5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udmurt</td>
<td>640.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maris</td>
<td>604.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabardian</td>
<td>520.0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ossetians</td>
<td>514.9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dargins</td>
<td>510.2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buryat</td>
<td>445.2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakut</td>
<td>443.9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumyks</td>
<td>422.4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingush</td>
<td>413.0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lezgins</td>
<td>411.5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komi</td>
<td>293.4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At present, Muslims residing in Russia are estimated at 15 to 20 million, comprising approximately 12 to 14 percent of the total population. “Because the overall population of the Russian Federation is expected to drop to about 120 million by 2020[,] and the Muslim population, due to natural increase and migration, is expected to increase to at least 30 million by 2030.... The Muslim portion of the total population of the Russian Federation is projected to double to roughly 20 to 25 percent.”

In addition to demographic changes, two trends in the process of ethnic and cultural transformation are notable. One can be described as a trend toward monoethnicization (or homogenization) of the population, seen in regions such as the North Caucasus. The second is associated with a rapid increase in ethnocultural diversity seen in St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Astrakhan Region, Krasnodar and Stavropol, Kaliningrad Region, and other locales. In addition to these changes underway in Russia, there is rapid growth in transnational migration flows. Clashes motivated by ethnic hatred are common, especially in regions where ethnic composition was traditionally more or less homogeneous that are currently faced with mass51 migration (both transnational and domestic). As a result, according to Levada Center surveys, demands in major host regions to put restrictions on migration flows—both inter-regional and transnational—have steadily increased (Table 1.3).
Table 1.3. Levada Center Survey Results, 2002–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limit the influx of migrants</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No administrative barriers in the way of immigrants and use policy for the benefit of Russia</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Northern Caucasus as a Special Case of Internal Migration

A special case is migration from the North Caucasus region (Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Chechen Republic, etc.) to other regions of Russia. Most migrants from these republics are Muslim and constitute the largest potential migrant population in Russia. “In terms of the reallocation of labor and solving social problems in these regions, ... [migration] should be evaluated positively, but due to ... cultural characteristics[,] ... this migration process is fraught with conflict.... Based on sociological survey data of local populations [host populations], ... ‘aliens’ in general are typically rejected.... This rejection appears in double measure ... when the ‘aliens’ are of non-Slavic origin.”

There are many hypotheses on the causes of tensions and clashes between locals and newcomers from the North Caucasus region. It is necessary to take into account the historical, political, socioeconomic, and cultural context. The focus here is on sociopolitical conflicts and ethnic tensions in various regions (Table 1.4).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions and Republics</th>
<th>Level of Conflict (%)</th>
<th>Sociopolitical Situation, 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kabardino-Balkaria</td>
<td>30.82</td>
<td>26.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingushetia</td>
<td>26.22</td>
<td>24.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>17.16</td>
<td>20.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachay-Cherkessia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>19.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakutia</td>
<td>16.37</td>
<td>15.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagestan</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>10.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adygea</td>
<td>11.73</td>
<td>10.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region of Krasnodar</td>
<td>10.74</td>
<td>15.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saratov region</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>15.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khabarovsk region</td>
<td>9.53</td>
<td>7.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stavropol region</td>
<td>9.32</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashkortostan</td>
<td>20.65</td>
<td>7.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samara region</td>
<td>7.85</td>
<td>3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>7.83</td>
<td>7.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perm region</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>5.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Ossetia</td>
<td>5.76</td>
<td>8.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buryatia</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>10.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalmykia</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatarstan</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karelia region</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mordovia region</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuvash region</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conflict level is calculated as an average based on 46 indicator coefficients.

Level of conflicts is calculated as the average scores exhibited by the experts from 46 indicators.
(by a factor of the current value of each indicator). For convenience the data are presented as a percentage of the maximum possible evaluation:

1) Society is in conflict (conflict level is 75-100 %)
2) Conflicts occur frequently (conflict level is 40-75 %)
3) Noticeable conflicts (conflict level is 25-40 %)
4) Conflicts happen (conflict level is 10-25 %)
5) Conflicts happen periodically (5-10 %)
6) Situation is stable (less than 5 %)

b Ethnic monitoring scale (status of sociopolitical situation in the region)

NA, not available.

\[ \uparrow \downarrow \text{Marked deterioration or improvement in comparison to previous period.} \]


Table 1.4 shows that the conflict level in most titular nation republics of the North Caucasus region was very high in the 2005–2009 period. Social conflict is “particularly visible ... in Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Chechnya. In these regions, terrorist attacks occur frequently and the population is exposed to all sorts of phobias, in particular, rumors of ‘sweeps’ (cleansings) by federal troops and regional police forces.” In addition, in Chechnya kidnapping is very widespread. Another cause of tension is a deeply rooted clan system, and many conflicts are related to this traditional structure and transfer of budget resources. Alexander Bastrykin, head of the Russian Federation’s Attorney General Office, described the situation in October 2010 in the North Caucasus as “almost a war.”

According to Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev, from January through September 2010, a total of 454 crimes of terrorist orientation were recorded in Russia, most of them in the North Caucasus. The minister added that “very serious and very dangerous trends” were underway in the North Caucasus. Moreover, every day five to six law enforcement officers were being killed by terrorists in that area. Signs of declining conflict were noted in 2011. According to a report submitted to President Medvedev by Alexander Bortnikov, head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), in the first six months of the year, “there were 169 crimes of terrorist
orientation, including 110 in Dagestan.\textsuperscript{60} This compares to about 400 over the same period in 2010.

Another crucial factor is the long history of ethnic tensions in these republics. The process of monoethnicization\textsuperscript{61} has been underway in most North Caucasus republics since 1989.\textsuperscript{62} In the 1989–2002 period, ethnic Russians accounted for about 73 percent of the “nontitular” ethnic migration outflow from the area. According to official statistics, 279,000 ethnic Russians left the North Caucasus in the same period.\textsuperscript{63} Since 2002, this migration outflow has continued, so current figures might be higher.
Table 1.5. Population Dynamics of North Caucasus, 1970–2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N (000)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N (000)</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All republics:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titular population</td>
<td>4365</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4813</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>2478</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2905</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nationalities</td>
<td>1437</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1413</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adygea</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adyghe</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nationalities</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagestan</td>
<td>1429</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1628</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titular population</td>
<td>1061</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1267</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nationalities</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabardino-Balkaria</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titular population</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other nationalities</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachay-Cherkessia</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titular population</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nationalities</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1.5. Population Dynamics of North Caucasus, 1970–2002 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North Ossetia</th>
<th>553</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>592</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>632</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>710</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ossetins</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nationalities</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechnya-Ingushetia</td>
<td>1064</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1156</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Ingushetia</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechens</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Ingush</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingush</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Chechens</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nationalities</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Other nationalities</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chechnya | 1084 | 100 | 1104 | 100 |
Chechens  | 716  | 66  | 1032 | 93  |
Russian   | 269  | 25  | 40   | 4   |
Other nationalities | 99  | 9   | 32  | 3   |
The main causes of migration by the nontitular population (mainly ethnic Russians) from the North Caucasus republics follow:

• High unemployment (especially among young people).

• Low level of economic development. The North Caucasus is part of a general trend in Russia’s ethnic regions of increasing technological lag and brain drain. Consequently, the range of employment and self-realization prospects for young people is reduced. In addition, ethnic Russians as a whole are the most impoverished of all ethnic groups in the region.

• Unresolved problems in interethnic relations. The interests of nontitular populations in the regional political arena are underrepresented. Nontitular ethnic group members often do not participate in regional governance, and the principle of proportional representation of all major ethnic groups in government is not observed. Echoes of the “parade of sovereignties” in the 1990s continue, and Russo-phobia is on the upswing (due to propaganda on national/ethnic pride and ethnocentrism in the regional media). Regional history includes forced migrations during the Stalinist era, and more recently, war in the Chechen Republic.

• Drastic changes in ethnic composition in the region. The titular population increased from 66 to 80 percent between 1989 and 2002, while the nontitular population declined from 34 to 20 percent of the total (in particular, ethnic Russians from 26 percent to between 12 and 15 percent).

• Lack of security in the region (ongoing threat of terrorist attacks, kidnappings, and so on).

In this context, some natives of North Caucasus republics that lack ethnic diversity and intercultural communication and have higher rates of conflict may have difficulty adapting to a more “peaceful” life after moving to other regions, especially to metropolitan areas with different value systems and codes of behavior.
Unfortunately, migrants from North Caucasus often embody “otherness” among locals and face a high level of xenophobia elsewhere in the Federation. Such an atmosphere of tension and aggression encourages people to search for “enemies” and produces frequent clashes in interpersonal relations.

1.2. Principal Targets of Xenophobia

Recently, high levels of intolerance and xenophobia, as well as manifestations of ethnic extremism, are almost always associated with Russian ethnics. Since the Russian population makes up about 80 percent of the population throughout the country, “visible minorities,” or people who do not look Slavic—such as natives of the South Caucasus, North Caucasus, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia—are particularly disliked.68

For most extremists, there is no difference between ethnically different, domestic migrants and migrant workers from other countries (e.g., the CIS, China, and African countries). Extremist factions do not make significant distinctions among the following categories of migrants:

- Citizens of the Russian Federation from the national republics (notably, from the North Caucasus region)
- Former citizens of the Soviet Union (especially those from Central Asia and the South Caucasus)
- Citizens of non-CIS countries

The All-Russia Public Opinion Research Center collected attitudinal data in 2005, 2006, 2009, and 2010 on sentiments regarding various ethnic groups69 (see Table 1.6). Center survey data show a very positive trend over time in terms of respondents who do not have xenophobic feelings toward others (34 percent vs. 56 percent). Meanwhile, however, the proportion of those who disliked Caucasians increased from 23 percent in 2006 to 29 percent in 2009–2010, and those who disliked Central Asians increased from 2 percent to 6 percent. The data are somewhat misleading, given that views
of ethnocultural markers vary among respondents. For instance, respondents frequently collapsed the category of “Caucasians” with the peoples of Central Asia (“all are ‘Caucasians,’ even if they are Tajik”). As seen in Table 1.6, among all ethnic groups, people from Central Asia are the most common targets of negative feelings.

Table 1.6. All-Russia Public Opinion Research Center Survey Results, 2005–2010 (percents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peoples from the Caucasus region (Azeri, Armenians, Georgians, Ingush, Chechens, etc.)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples of Central Asia (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kazakhs)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balts (Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeans (English, German)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs, Muslims</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The lack of developed civil society institutions, a supranational (ethnic) identity, and core positive values held in common in Russia leads to fragmentation and polarization of society along ethnic lines, as well as difficulties in establishing interpersonal relationships between immigrants and members of host communities. In this context, it is not reasonable to assume that intolerance is expressed only by Russian ethnic hosts.

Changes in migration flows (there are now more migrants from homogeneous/monoethnic regions of the former Soviet republics, and primarily from rural areas who are carriers of traditional culture and lack experience living in a highly urbanized environment, much less a culturally diverse one) on the one hand, and inadequate mechanisms for the adaption and integration of migrants on the other, cause fears among the host population about the development of a stable and harmonious society. The lack of modern sociological research and surveys to determine the level of ethnic tolerance among (legal and illegal) immigrants is a serious problem. But it is important to note that according to sociological studies from the 1970s through the 1980s, the indigenous populations of the USSR (e.g., the Caucasus and Central Asia) were not known for great tolerance of outsiders. For example, in Tbilisi and Tashkent (the capital cities of Georgia and Uzbekistan, respectively), “no more than 10 to 15 percent of the titular nationality populations expressed tolerance of interethnic marriage.”71

Regions with the lowest levels of migration during the Soviet period are currently the largest sources of migrants. “The lowest rates were seen among the Uzbeks and Tajiks (three times lower and more)
and in the Central Asian republics and the Caucasus, especially among people who live in rural areas (four to seven times lower than in the RSFSR [Russia]), against a background of high rates of natural population increase in these areas.”72 The highest rates during the Soviet period were recorded in the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.73 Moreover, experts emphasize that the rural population in the Central Asian republics (as well as the Transcaucasia and North Caucasus Republics) were not involved in domestic migration. “For example, in the early 1980s the proportion of Tajiks in the enterprises of the South-Tajik territorial industrial complex was only 20 percent. The remaining 80 percent of workers were from other areas, including Siberia and the Far East, which accounted for 30 percent.”74 Thus, historically, the populations of many Soviet republics lacked the experience of coexistence in multiethnic and multicultural environments even within the Soviet framework. A very dangerous scenario here is “reverse” xenophobia, and with it, ethnonational extremism.75 Evidence of such reverse xenophobia is seen in the increasing number of victims of ethnically motivated attacks against Slavs, and not only in the North Caucasus republics.76

There is little research on tolerance levels among domestic migrants (especially from Russia’s titular republics, which have seen a revival of ethnic consciousness, often associated with ethnocentrism). For instance, it is estimated that “over three-quarters of migrants from the Caucasus strive to preserve their culture, [and] strictly adhere to ethnic traditions and rituals.... [T]hey do not acculturate (i.e., they do not develop new ... values and behavior patterns as a result of contact with other ethnic communities).”77 A high level of intragroup solidarity and mobilization, similar to their experience in rural communities, exists in many migrant neighborhoods.78 The desire to preserve and cultivate their cultural identity (sometimes including ethnocentrism) makes integration into the new host community extremely difficult for many domestic migrants.
1.3. From Slogans to Action: Dynamics in the Escalation of Violence

Extremist tendencies are widespread among young people. According to a statement by Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev on December 24, 2008, the total number of adolescents involved in informal extremist groups over the previous four years was 202,700.79

Data from the Attorney General’s Office indicate that ethnic/race hate crimes have consistently increased in recent years. During the first four months of 2011, these crimes totaled 213, an increase over the same period in 2010. Hate crimes in 2010 totaled 656, compared to 548 in 2009, 460 in 2008, 358 in 2007, and 263 in 2006.80 Unofficial crime statistics presented by the SOVA Center for Data and Analysis show higher figures (see Table 1.7).

Table 1.7. Consolidated Statistics of Race/Ethnic Hate Crimes, 2004 through March 31, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dark-skinned people</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from Central Asia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from the Caucasus</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from the Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As of 2009, the top four locations for hate crimes and extremist activity were the Moscow region (city and oblast), St. Petersburg and Leningrad region, Nizhny Novgorod, and Sverdlovsk. A sampling of recent statistics follows. In the Moscow region, 60 people were killed and 217 assaulted in 2008 compared to 38 and 131, respectively, in 2009. From January 2010 through November 2010, these totals were 19 and 174, respectively. In the St. Petersburg and Leningrad region, 15 people were killed and 39 assaulted in 2008, compared to 8 and 36, respectively, in 2009. Then in 2010, the same figures were 2 killed and 47 assaulted. Also in 2010, in Nizhny Novgorod, 4 people were killed and 17 assaulted.

Note: Descriptions of victims are not their “actual identity,” but rather the identity given them by assailants. For instance, if a Slavic person was taken for a Caucasian, this person would appear in the category “people from the Caucasus.”

A, assaults; D, deaths.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People from Asian Pacific region (China, Vietnam, Mongolia, etc.)</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>29</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>58</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>52</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>45</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>41</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other people of “non-Slavic appearance”</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of youth subcultures and leftist youth</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (including ethnic Russians) or unknown</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of 2009, the top four locations for hate crimes and extremist activity were the Moscow region (city and oblast), St. Petersburg and Leningrad region, Nizhny Novgorod, and Sverdlovsk. A sampling of recent statistics follows. In the Moscow region, 60 people were killed and 217 assaulted in 2008 compared to 38 and 131, respectively, in 2009. From January 2010 through November 2010, these totals were 19 and 174, respectively. In the St. Petersburg and Leningrad region, 15 people were killed and 39 assaulted in 2008, compared to 8 and 36, respectively, in 2009. Then in 2010, the same figures were 2 killed and 47 assaulted. Also in 2010, in Nizhny Novgorod, 4 people were killed and 17 assaulted.
Since 2009, radical nationalists have changed tactics. Galina Kozhevnikova\textsuperscript{85} identified the following as distinctive features of extremist activity:

- Rhetoric by rightwing groups has transitioned from open hate speech (now used only in private meetings) to public calls to strengthen patriotic values.

- The purpose of such radical groups is to destabilize the government, increase distrust of the government among the citizenry, and paralyze activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working to combat racism and xenophobia. The ultimate goal of these acts of terror is to achieve a “‘national revolution’ and the establishment of a neo-Nazi regime in Russia.”

- Many “legal” organizations of “Russian nationalists” now actively seek to destabilize interethnic relations and exacerbate ethnic tensions (e.g., Russian Path and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration).

The race riots in Russia in December 2010 (centered at Manege Square in Moscow) identified significant trends in the extremist movements and in public opinion generally. The All-Russia Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) presented survey data on what Russians think about the riots in Manege Square (Table 1.8). Thus, despite the ethnic slant, only 9 percent of Russian citizens explained the rioting in Manege Square in terms of interethnic conflict. Most people considered it to be banditry/hooliganism or protests against the authorities’ failure to act effectively against violence. Public perceptions of the December riots demonstrate that nationalist discourse had evolved in the direction of anti-state or anti-government expressions, and the “confrontation” is almost seen as a “civilizational clash” à la Samuel P. Huntington.\textsuperscript{86}
Table 1.8. All-Russia Public Opinion Research Center Survey Results on the topic “Riots in the Manege Square: Hooliganism or Protest?” (percents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do you think happened on December 11, 2010 at the Manege Square? (open-ended question, any number of responses, percent of those who know about what happened)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayhem (i.e., riots, lawlessness, hooliganism)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest against lawlessness, murders, inaction of the authorities</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carefully planned action, provocation</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interethnic conflict, clashes on ethnic grounds</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest action that turned into a riot, hooliganism</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antics of youth, fans</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation that exposed all the flaws of the authorities in implementing youth-based and ethnic politics</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Clearly xenophobic views are deeply rooted in the society at large and are widespread among youth. In 2010, the Internal Affairs Ministry reported that neo-Nazi groups surpassed 150.87 Another category of “legal” quasi-extremist organizations is more difficult to define and thus count. Altogether both types of organizations represent a potential, multifunctional “army” who are easily manipulated and mobilized and ready for violence.

The situation, however, is not as dire as it could be. As VCIOM reported, about 65 percent of respondents in the abovementioned survey did not support the December rioters, and 79 percent said that they would never participate in such actions under any circumstance.88 Also, upon comparing the Moscow riots and the marches in St.
Petersburg on December 11, 2010, it is clear that the broad-based programs supporting multicultural tolerance and “supranational” identity in the latter city had positive results.

Recent polls as well as multiple interethnic clashes show that a desire for reduced immigration is common among the general public. There is an increasing gap between general public opinion on migration and the political decision-making process in Russia as in other modern nation-states under democratic political regimes. Nathan Glazer underlines the fact that public opinion “says it desires in immigration policy preferably less immigration, and certainly not more,” while the government tries to solve the problems of underpopulated lands, an aging population, and growing labor requirements at the expense of the migrants.90 “The issue here is not that the public is right and the politically effective agents are wrong, or the reverse. It is rather that this disconnect raises a problem for democracy whose resolution may well be very disturbing. How long can what the majority claims it wants be ignored, and with what consequences?”91

On December 21, 2010, at a meeting devoted to the December riots with representatives of football clubs, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin emphasized the following partially-statements. First, Russia can be a great nation only as a multinational one, and second, that if migrants fail to comply with local rules and norms, then “it will be necessary to improve the rules of registration in the major cities.”92 This means placing some restrictions on the freedom of movement of citizens coming to cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg; these types of restrictions were in force in the Soviet era.

To decrease the gap between public opinion, which is mostly negative toward newcomers, and a desirable humane immigration policy and to avoid far-right political trends, mechanisms to restrain antimigrant sentiments are necessary. As of this writing, the only public officials who actively “defend” foreign immigrants are Konstantin Romodanovskiy, head of the Federal Migration Service, and Elena Dunaeva, who heads the regional migration service in
St. Petersburg and Leningrad region. Both officials devote much of their time to publicly refuting widespread rumors and publicizing positive characteristics of migrants. For instance, overall crime among migrants is much lower than among locals (especially after famous anti-migrant speeches of the former mayor of Moscow, Yury M. Luzhkov). In addition, most crimes committed by migrants are not against locals but rather against other migrants. Romodanovskiy, Dunaeva, and other officials exhort businesspeople in Russia to be more responsible for the migrants they hire, such as in restraining from exploiting them as slaves who lack minimal living conditions, medical care, and basic civil rights. On June 25, 2010, the federal government created a department for integration assistance within the Federal Migration Service that is responsible for migrant adaptation and xenophobia prevention in Russian society. Positive programs on migrant integration and tolerance for both host community members and migrants (from other regions and abroad) should be implemented at both federal and regional levels, rather than seeking negative measures such as censorship and restrictions on freedom of speech and freedom of movement. The most effective regional program in Russia on positive tolerance promotion has been developed and implemented in St. Petersburg.
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS AND MIGRATION FLOWS IN ST. PETERSBURG

St. Petersburg, the fourth largest city in Europe after London, Moscow, and Paris, is facing the same problems as most large European cities—low birth rate, predominance of single-child families, and a high proportion of seniors in the population. Historically, St. Petersburg seemingly always had a low birth rate. From the 1950s through the late 1980s, Leningrad was a megalopolis with the lowest rate of natural increase. In that period, in-migration accounted for 75 percent of the city's population growth.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the population of St. Petersburg rapidly declined. In early 2008, the city's population was 4.568 million people, down from 5.007 million in early 1991. The main cause of the population decline was natural decrease (the number of deaths was almost double the number of births), which until 2008 was not offset by increased in-migration. The economic crisis of the early 1990s still affects the demographics of St. Petersburg. The city is traditionally characterized by extremely low fertility rates, which have been exacerbated in recent years. At present, lifetime births per woman average 1.1 to 1.2.

Table 2.1. Demographic Indicators, St. Petersburg, 2003–2009 (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of births</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of deaths</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Natural decline | -37.4 | -33.7 | -33.9 | -29.9 | -24.2 | -19.4 | -12.8
Number of migrants | +4.4 | +8.9 | +14.5 | +20.4 | +21.1 | +33.1 | +31.2
Total population increase (decrease) | -33.0 | -24.8 | -19.4 | -9.5 | -3.1 | +13.7 | +18.4


Another dimension of the demographic problem is low overall life expectancy, largely due to the high mortality rate, and especially of working-age men (Table 2.2).

### Table 2.2. Life Expectancy at Birth in St. Petersburg, 2003–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>76.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although St. Petersburg leads most regions of the Russian Federation on life expectancy, the city is behind Moscow and most European countries. In St. Petersburg, life expectancy for men and women is about 15 years and 10 years lower, respectively, than in most developed nations (Table 2.3).
Table 2.3. Life Expectancy at Birth in St. Petersburg, Russia, Moscow, and European Regions, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Petersburg</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Every year the demographic burden of the working-age population increases, mainly due to increasing proportions of adults of retirement age—55 years of age for women, and 60 years of age for men. This ratio is higher in St. Petersburg than for the Russian Federation as a whole (Table 2.4).

Table 2.4. Demographic Burden of Working-Age Population, St. Petersburg and Russian Federation, Early 2009 and Early 2010 (per 1000 of working-age people)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>St. Petersburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children and retirement age people/working-age people</td>
<td>589.7/410.3 = 1.44</td>
<td>603.5/396.5 = 1.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since 2008, the population has increased due primarily to a significant increase in the rate of in-migration.100 In early 2009, the total increased to 4.582 million; in 2010, the population reached 4.6 million;101 and in 2011, the total was 4.869 million. As the statistics show, without in-migration, the city’s population would be almost halved with each successive generation, that is, approximately every 27 years.102 Forecasts indicate that by 2026, the proportion of retirement age people in St. Petersburg will reach 28.9 percent (535 older people per 1000 of working-age people).103

For sustainable economic development, St. Petersburg needs substantial migration inflows. A turning point in the dynamics of both foreign and domestic migration began with the celebration of the city’s 300th birthday in 2003 with a major marketing effort. Advertising worldwide has drastically increased the attractiveness of the city to potential migrant workers (Table 2.5).

Table 2.5. Official Net Migration in St. Petersburg, 1993–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>-16,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>7,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>13,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>3,420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At present, the majority of in-migrants to St. Petersburg are of three distinct types: (1) citizens from other regions of the Russian Federation (includes commuters and permanent residents); foreign migrant workers (transnational migrants), and students from throughout the Federation who come to study at the city’s universities and (mostly) stay after graduation. Today the major suppliers of migrants to St. Petersburg are still regions of the Russian Federation (Table 2.6).

Table 2.6. Official Net Migration in St. Petersburg, Sending and Receiving Regions, 1993–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-16257</td>
<td>4413</td>
<td>7837</td>
<td>13851</td>
<td>3420</td>
<td>14656</td>
<td>9288</td>
<td>11422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>-13104</td>
<td>-1506</td>
<td>4040</td>
<td>11574</td>
<td>1030</td>
<td>10168</td>
<td>8084</td>
<td>9281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>-3153</td>
<td>5919</td>
<td>3827</td>
<td>2277</td>
<td>2390</td>
<td>4488</td>
<td>1204</td>
<td>2141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: St. Petersburg government.
In 2010 the total number of officially registered employees in St. Petersburg (including those employed in small businesses) was estimated at 1.8 million. According to official statistics, on December 1, 2010, St. Petersburg companies employed 732,600 migrants from other regions of Russia. Thus, the share of nonresident, registered employees is about 41 percent.\textsuperscript{105}

According to official data, most of these migrant residents (as well as “commuter migrant workers”) come from the neighboring Leningrad Oblast\textsuperscript{106}—more than 330,000 people (equal to almost a third of the working-age population in the oblast). Of the remainder, 28,200 hail from Pskov, 26,300 from Novgorod Oblast, and 23,400 from the neighboring Karelia Republic (of the latter, nearly 16,000 from the capital). Among the largest sources of labor in St. Petersburg are Moscow Oblast, Tver Oblast, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblast, and Krasnodar Krai.

This labor migration is highly beneficial to the city—under current law, employee income tax collected by the employer is transferred...
to the entity of the Federation where the employer company is registered. Thus, altogether migrants pay about 45 billion rubles in taxes to the city of St. Petersburg, which amount to more than 13 percent of the city’s revenue. In 2009, Leningrad Oblast received 10.9 billion rubles in personal income tax payments; meanwhile the city of St. Petersburg received almost twice as much—20.3 billion rubles—from oblast residents employed in the city. In the national geopolitical context, this is a highly damaging practice that develops economically successful receiving regions (primarily Moscow and St. Petersburg) at the expense of the sending regions that are becoming more economically depressed and drained of human resources.

Another important labor source—both very new and common in the city—is transnational migration. As elsewhere in the Federation, foreign labor migration is limited by the number of work permits made available by the government for foreign workers (the quota system) (Table 2.7).

### Table 2.7. Number of Work Permits (Quotas) for Foreign Migrant Workers, 2007–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quota</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>235,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>210,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>189,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>198,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

St. Petersburg’s foreign worker quota for 2011 was 198,300, while total work permits for the Federation came to 1.7 million. In accordance with permit numbers and job qualifications, most migrants (about 80,000) were expected to be unskilled workers. About 46,000 migrants were expected to work in construction; nearly 16,000 foreigners could obtain permits to work in skilled labor and management, such as in financial services and engineering. Around 34,000 foreign migrants were expected to work in the service sector, transportation, mechanical engineering, and metalworking.
Since the mid-2000s, sources of the labor migration flow to St. Petersburg have been gradually changing. According to Elena Dunaeva, head of the Federal Migration Service for St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast, in 2009 most migrants in St. Petersburg came from Uzbekistan (96,500), Ukraine (48,000), Tajikistan (47,000), and Moldova (29,000). Under the official work permit regime, Uzbeks received 51 percent of quota slots, Tajiks 21 percent, Ukrainians 10 percent, Moldovans 6 percent, and Kyrgyz 4 percent. Among the total number of migrants arriving from other countries via the visa regime (non-CIS countries), Chinese workers obtained 49 percent of formal work permits, Turks 4.9 percent, Finns 4.6 percent, and Vietnamese and Koreans obtained 3.6 percent combined.

On July 7, 2010, Dunaeva stated that work permits at that time were held by Uzbeks (over 50 percent), Tajiks (21 percent), Ukrainians (8 percent), Moldovans (5 percent), Kyrgyz (3 percent), and Armenians (1.6 percent). Thus, the proportion of migrant workers from the Ukraine is declining, and the countries of Central Asia (Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) are now the leaders. Thus, the religious affiliation of migrants is also changing—an estimated 70 to 80 percent of migrants are Muslim or come from Muslim countries.

According to Federation-wide statistics, at present, 70 percent of migrant workers come from small towns and villages rather than large cities and capitals, a strong correlate of education level. Half of the newcomers have no job skills training. Another trend is that the percentage of workers who speak Russian at a basic level—as well as have familiarity with Russian (or at least Soviet) culture and traditions—is declining. Another change is related to the fact that the number of migrants coming to St. Petersburg with their family members is growing.

The quota system and official data do not reflect real migration flows and the number of migrants (including legal and illegal ones) is much higher. In a 2009 interview, Dunaeva could not provide the precise numbers of foreign migrant workers in the city. She said that attempts to provide even approximate figures are hazardous, in large
part because entry to the region is open (visa-free) for citizens of the CIS. Upon arriving in St. Petersburg, many migrants do not register or they obtain false documents. In October 2010, Eugeniy Yelin, head of St. Petersburg’s Economic Development Committee, declared that according to official statistics, the city had about 4.6 million inhabitants. However, up to 6 million people were living in the city at that time. Thus, he said, it was logical to assume that about 1.5 million were migrant workers. Even with these estimates, it is not possible to calculate precisely the proportion of unregistered migrant workers from other regions in the Federation or outside the Federation.

The third largest contingent of newcomers from other regions of Russia is students. St. Petersburg is the second largest university center after Moscow in the Federation. An estimated 11 to 15 percent of the country’s scientific potential is concentrated here. More than 170,000 researchers work in St. Petersburg; about 300,000 residents of the city are linked with scientific enterprises. More than 8 percent of all Russian college students, 13 percent of postgraduate students, and 15 percent of doctoral students are enrolled in St. Petersburg universities. Since 1999, university students as a proportion of the city’s population have dramatically increased.

In the 2008/2009 academic year, the number of students trained in St. Petersburg peaked at 1,001 per 10,000 population. Nonresidents have accounted for a large and growing proportion of university students in St. Petersburg for several years (Table 2.8).
Table 2.8. Proportion of Nonresidents among First-Year University Students in St. Petersburg, 2001–2010 (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Proportion (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>38.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>42.7</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>43.5</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>43.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Administration of St. Petersburg.

University students comprise nearly 10 percent of the city’s population. Student numbers in the 2005/2006 academic year totaled 429,000; in 2007/2008, 450,100; 2008/2009, 458,700; 2009/2010, 454,300; and 2010/2011, 429,900.116 As already mentioned, the number of nonresidents, including foreign students, at St. Petersburg universities is increasing. These students derive from many different regions, cultures, nationalities, and religions. After graduation, most find work in the city and gradually obtain the residential status of “Petersburgers.”117

All of the above mentioned categories of migrants are both highly important and challenging at the same time. The city’s rapidly-changing ethnic composition is the source of social instability. Since the mid-2000s, objective assessments of interethnic relations indicate high levels of intolerance among city residents.118
2.1. Historical Perspective on Interethnic Relations and Identity in St. Petersburg

St. Petersburg has an extraordinary history. Renaming of the city following the collapse of the USSR is emblematic of the city’s history of rebirths, including unprecedented population losses, and radically changing social structure, ethnic composition, culture, and politics. The ambiguous multivocal essence of the city has been also expressed in numerous symbolic entitlements in the present and in the past—Window onto Europe, City of Peter, North Venice, North Rome, North Palmyra, Northern Capital, City of White Nights, Proletarian City, Cradle of the Revolution, City of Three Revolutions, Lenin City, City of Maritime Glory, City of the Heroic Blockade, Cultural Capital, and more.

Table 2.9. Population of St. Petersburg, 1764–2010 (thousands)\textsuperscript{119}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>149.7</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>2124.6</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1541.0</td>
<td>1979</td>
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<tr>
<td>1765</td>
<td>150.3</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>2217.5</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>1920.0</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4635.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1770</td>
<td>158.8</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>2314.5</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1998.0</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>4699.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1775</td>
<td>166.1</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>2415.7</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>2218.0</td>
<td>1982</td>
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<td>174.8</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>2300.0</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2258.0</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>4762.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1785</td>
<td>197.6</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1469.0</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>2328.0</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>4806.4</td>
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<td>1986</td>
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<td>220.2</td>
<td>1921</td>
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<td>1987</td>
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<td>1805</td>
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<td>1988</td>
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<td>1923</td>
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<td>2816.0</td>
<td>1990</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1926</td>
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<td>1992</td>
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<td>1700.1</td>
<td>1961</td>
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<td>1994</td>
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Table 2.9. Population of St. Petersburg, 1764–2010 (thousands) Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1840</th>
<th>1845</th>
<th>1850</th>
<th>1855</th>
<th>1860</th>
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<th>1900</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1912</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>472.8</td>
<td>480.0</td>
<td>487.3</td>
<td>513.0</td>
<td>506.6</td>
<td>539.1</td>
<td>682.3</td>
<td>758.4</td>
<td>843.1</td>
<td>884.3</td>
<td>954.4</td>
<td>1097.5</td>
<td>1418.0</td>
<td>1635.1</td>
<td>1881.3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1827.8</td>
<td>2009.5</td>
<td>2372.5</td>
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<td>2715.7</td>
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<td>3015.2</td>
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<td>2992.0</td>
<td>2432.0</td>
<td>622.0</td>
<td>546.0</td>
<td>927.0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3594.9</td>
<td>3663.9</td>
<td>3731.6</td>
<td>3777.2</td>
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<td>4083.4</td>
<td>4149.9</td>
<td>4219.8</td>
<td>4287.0</td>
<td>4356.2</td>
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<td>4527.2</td>
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<td>4838.0</td>
<td>4815.0</td>
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<td>4748.5</td>
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<td>4694.0</td>
<td>4660.6</td>
<td>4629.0</td>
<td>4597.6</td>
<td>4624.1</td>
<td>4600.0</td>
<td>4580.6</td>
<td>4571.2</td>
<td>4568.0</td>
<td>4582.0</td>
<td>4600.3</td>
<td>4527.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


St. Petersburg, founded by Peter the Great in 1703, was built as a fortress and it also functioned as a port. Very soon, maritime trade turned it into a center of economic activity. In 1712, the city on the Neva became the de facto capital of the Russian Empire, and retained this exceptional status almost continuously for nearly two hundred years (except for a brief period of the reign of Peter the Second in 1727 to 1730, when the ruling elite moved back to Moscow).

The founding of St. Petersburg coincided with a turning point in Russian history. The city on the Neva River became a symbol of European influence in the “universalist” Russian Empire that
replaced the Muscovite nation-state. Initially, St. Petersburg’s “Window onto Europe” was oriented to Western Europe—seen in its name, architecture modeled after Venice, aristocratic practices, and notions of empire grounded on principles of supranationality and the common good.

Despite the unfavorable climate and remote location, the city not only established itself “from scratch,” but began to attract large numbers of immigrants from elsewhere in the Russian Empire as well as a plethora of distinguished people from throughout Europe. Many of the newcomers contributed to establishing an “innovative” imperial capital: “Peter the Great’s closest associates, along with Russians A. Menshikov and A. Apraksin, were the ‘Little Russian’ Feofan Prokopovich, F. Lefort (Swiss), A. Osterman (German), J. Bruce (Scottish), P. Shafirov (Jewish), [and] A. Cantemir, descendant of Moldavian rulers.” Following the tradition of Peter the Great, Russia’s political elite in the eighteenth century and even the nineteenth century was very ethnically heterogeneous and cosmopolitan.

Since its inception, St. Petersburg was a multilingual, multiethnic, and multireligious city. The residents of the new capital were mostly Russian, albeit with several sizeable ethnic minorities, such as Germans, Ukrainians, Finns, Jews, and people from Eastern Europe, primarily Poles, and many smaller minorities, including English, Dutch, Italian, French, Swedish, and Tatar, among others. Their significant role and participation in the city’s life is still visible in religious symbols—the Catholic Church of St. Catherine (founded in 1710 and rebuilt by 1783), Armenian Church of St. Catherine (1776), Kazan Cathedral (1811), House of the Dutch Reformed Church (1830s), Lutheran Church of St. Peter (1830s) on Nevsky Prospect, and the second-largest synagogue in Europe (1893) near Mariinskiy Theatre. St. Petersburg was also the first European capital in which a mosque was built (1913) right in the heart of the city.

Although the city was very open to migrants, the vast majority of the city’s population has always been ethnic Russians (Table 2.10). Despite the fact that the City of Peter was highly class stratified, ethnic
and religious differences were generally respected. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, St. Petersburg was considered the most enlightened milieu in the Russian Empire. However, ethnic policies during the Empire period did not always demonstrate tolerance. For instance, in 1822, the Charter of Aliens (or Outsiders) was approved. Initially M. Speransky and G. Batenkov classified “aliens” as peoples who were at lower levels of sociocultural and economic development, that is, the national minorities of the North, Siberia, and the Far East.

The charter was not just a coincidence but rather an indicator of the growing strength of the “old Muscovites” whose opposition to all reforms of Peter the First never flagged. The so-called triad formula—orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality—(Pravoslavie, Samoderzhavie, Narodnost), also known as “official nationality,” became the ideological doctrine of Emperor Nicholas the First. It is noteworthy that orthodoxy (i.e., Russian Orthodoxy) in the context of a multireligious country was put in first place after autocracy in pursuit of the “idea of national development.”126 In 1897, during an all-Russia census, the list of people relegated to the “aliens” category was substantially expanded to include the indigenous peoples of the Far North, Siberia and the Far East, the North Caucasus, the Caspian, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia.127 Over time, all non-Russian peoples were regarded as aliens.

Although the Russian state never adopted a policy of genocide, a series of discriminatory practices were imposed affecting certain ethnic as well as religious groups.128 Included among such practices over time were restrictions on participation in public service, place of residence (called the “Pale of Settlement”), and profession; forced conversion into the Orthodox Church (for the peoples of the Volga region, Siberia, and the North), restricting publishing, teaching, and learning certain languages; and evictions from particular places (Crimean and Nogai Tatars, Circassians, Abkhazians, Chechens, Kabardians, Jews).129

In contrast to the Empire’s public policies elsewhere, however,
Table 2.10. Ethnic Composition of St. Petersburg/Petrograd/Leningrad/St. Petersburg, 1869–2002 (thousands, % of total population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality/ethnic group</th>
<th>1869</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>667.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1264.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1905.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1609.8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3191.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3340</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4999.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4661.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>555.0</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1568.0</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>1386.9</td>
<td>86.15</td>
<td>2776.0</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>2968</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>4448.9</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>3949.6</td>
<td>84.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minorities, total</td>
<td>112.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>337.6</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>222.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>415.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>372.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>550.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>711.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Largest ethnic groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1869</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>555.0</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1568.0</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>1386.9</td>
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<td>89.1</td>
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<td>84.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic minorities, total</td>
<td>112.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>337.6</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>222.9</td>
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<td>415.3</td>
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<td>550.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>711.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
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Sources: Pervaya Vsyeobshchaya perepis, naseleniya Rossiiskoi imperii 1897 g. [The first general census of the Russian Empire in 1897], edited by N. Troinitskii (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Tsentral'nogo statisticheskogo komiteta Ministerstva vnutrennikh del, 1899–1905); T.M. Smirnova, Natsional', sostav naseleniya i narodnosti stetsiya Petersburga v XX vek [Nationality in St. Petersburg: Ethnic minorities of Petersburg and Leningrad region in the twentieth century] (St. Petersburg: Sudarynya, 2002).
St. Petersburg authorities demonstrated a high level of tolerance towards ethnic minorities: “The multiethnic nature of the population of St. Petersburg was a favorable condition for the creation of ethnocultural societies. The attitude of the authorities to the ethnocultural societies in the capital was more tolerant than in the provinces....

[The progressives of Petersburg, representatives of the national intelligentsia, tried to form voluntary associations for the preservation and development of the native language and culture, recreation, communication, publication of literature in national languages, strengthening ties among compatriots, [and] consolidation of ethnic groups.... There were also a large number of Russian cultural-educational centers (some were under the patronage of the imperial family). Active work of cultural centers contributed to the emergence of a multiethnic culture in St. Petersburg, tolerance and good neighborliness among the representatives of different nationalities, which served as a model for other cities in Russia.”

In spite of the multiethnic and multicultural composition of the city, by the second half of nineteenth-century St. Petersburg had established a common ground for all residents based on common language by becoming a Russian-speaking city. Another feature that to a greater or lesser extent united representatives of various social strata—the proletariat, intellectuals, and the political elite, among others, was a “Western spirit.”

The reforms of the Alexandr the Second via the Emancipation of the Serfs in 1861 influenced the city’s social structure. Former serfs began arriving in the capital, boosting population from half a million before the reforms to 1,439,600 recorded in the census of 1900. St. Petersburg was at the center of Russia’s industrial revolution during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as waves of peasant migrants gravitated to the city to work in local factories, eventually giving rise to a new label, the “Proletarian City,” and political movements.

The revolution of 1905-1907 was accompanied by increasing activity of ethnocultural associations. Their intensive work accelerated
the adoption of Russia’s first Law on Public Organizations (“Interim Rules on the Societies and Unions”). The law was passed on March 4, 1906 and was in effect until the February Revolution of 1917, when there were about 150 ethnocultural associations in St. Petersburg, the “Cradle of Revolution.”

The First World War officially put an end to the city’s “Venetian” culture. In 1914, St. Petersburg was renamed Petrograd. The essence of the pro-Russian name of the capital also symbolized the official incarnation of Slavophilism and the politics of Russification that was developed and cultivated in nineteenth-century Russia as opposed to the influences of Western Europe and the European idea of Empire implemented by Peter the Great.

In 1917, Petrograd became the center of dramatic events. After the February Revolution and the Russian Civil War, many people fled the “City of Three Revolutions.” By 1920, its population had declined from about 2.4 million in 1916 to about 740,000.

In 1918 the new government moved the capital back to Moscow. After Lenin’s death in 1924, the Bolsheviks renamed the city Leningrad. The history of Leningrad can be neatly divided into two periods—before and after the Leningrad Blockade.

In the 1920s, in connection with the formation of a unified socialist culture on the basis of Russian language and the construction of a class-less society, all ethnocultural societies were subordinated to the ideological tasks of the proletariat and the Communist Party. In 1936-1938, a number of policies adopted by the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Politbureau) led to persecution of “espionage and sabotage contingents” of Poles, Germans, Latvians, Estonians, Finns, Greeks, Iranians, Harbin, Chinese, Romanians, Bulgarians, and Macedonians. By 1938, all the ethnocultural societies of Leningrad were closed. For many decades, the activities of ethnocultural societies were banned. As the result of Soviet persecution, the sizeable minorities of Germans, Poles, Finns, Estonians, and Latvians almost completely disappeared from Leningrad during the 1930s and 1940s.
Prior to the siege, a “St. Petersburg” identity had been eroding due to government repression, pressures of mass migration inflows, and gradual integration of the so-called “formers” (individuals and groups identified with pre-Soviet “imperial caste” society). The writer Emma Gerstein in her memoirs about Leningrad factory workers in the 1920s and 1930s said: “The workers, to popular belief, were different from the proletariat of other cities ... marked by their politeness, the custom of wearing a suit, white collar and even a hat, which characterized them as European working class.” Remaining social and political antagonisms between old and new residents were largely eliminated during wartime.

In 1941–1944, during the nearly 900 days of the Siege of Leningrad, the city’s population declined from about 3 million to 558,000, as residents died from the cold, starvation, and artillery bombardments, or were evacuated. To understand the scope of these numbers, it is necessary to put them into comparative perspective: “[T]he number of Leningraders who perished during the blockade approximately equals the total number of U.S. armed forces personnel who died in all wars from the American revolution through the war in Vietnam.”

During the Siege of Leningrad, intellectuals and factory workers, young and old, “formers” and “currents”—all were equal before the common threat. The shared life experience in extremity—struggle for survival, mutual defense, and reconstruction—promoted empathy among residents for each other first, and then creation of a common regional identity of “Leningraders.” After the war, social barriers had been virtually eliminated, as a common enemy and the blockade and victory experience helped to reduce the level of hostility toward the “formers.”

In the postwar period, ethnic composition changed. Contingents from the Volga region, Caucasus, and Central Asia increased, while representatives of the original “foreign” diasporas virtually disappeared. The changing ethnic makeup of the city did not influence the host society’s social structure. Due to Soviet migration practices and tough administrative controls that limited the number
of eligible newcomers to those with particular skills that meshed with needs of the urban economy, acculturation of new arrivals took place gradually and without serious problems. The majority of newcomers were close to the population of Leningrad—all were citizens of the same nation-state, all spoke Russian, and all were raised under the same ideology.144

The scientific and industrial heritage of the city led to the further development of postwar Leningrad and shaped its new mission. In Leningrad, an integrated academic and industrial system was gradually developed that allowed the city to become one of the USSR’s leading scientific research and manufacturing centers. Leningrad also became a “cultural capital” of the Soviet Union.

By the late 1980s, alongside the change in political regime, the Blockade generation had long been dwindling in absolute and relative terms, while migrant numbers had been increasing for years. In addition, the breakdown of Soviet ideology called into question not only the leader of the proletariat, Vladimir Lenin, but also made irrelevant the traditional opposition to its identity as “St. Petersburg.”

These changes resulted in restoring the city’s original name in 1991. It was a new epoch for the city of Peter the Great, marked by the flight of highly skilled specialists and intellectuals,145 deterioration of higher education, decline of manufacturing (alongside growth of the service sector), and a reduction in the general cultural level of city residents.

Under the new more democratic system and the dominance of mass culture, the city’s historical elitist identity was unappealing. This is evidenced by the unpopularity of actions related to reviving the elitist identity or image of the city along with its name by Anatoly Sobchak, the first mayor of the new St. Petersburg.

Yet the legacy of prerevolutionary St. Petersburg continues. The basic elements of city identity were grounded in Western European culture and architecture, its multiethnic and polyglot religious character, and most important, the myth about its great
mission created by Peter the Great, which is reflected in the spatial environment. The history of St. Petersburg demonstrates how people “create a city and then [the] city creates” people. In 1989, the first People’s Friendship Center in the Federation was inaugurated in St. Petersburg. Within two decades St. Petersburg has become a truly multicultural, multiethnic metropolitan region.

The leading specialist in the field of interethnic relations in St. Petersburg—Tamara Smirnova—summarizes the changing ethnic makeup of the city since the 1990s as follows: (1) the number of migrants from elsewhere in the Federation and CIS countries has grown very fast; (2) while the number of ethnic Russians declined by over half a million (now accounting for less than 85 percent of the population), other ethnic groups increased by 712,000 (and thus currently represent over 15 percent of the population); (3) at present, more than 170 different nationalities/ethnicities are represented among metro area residents; (4) relative numbers of the city’s former largest ethnic groups—Ukrainians, Belarusians, Jews, and Tatars—have been significantly reduced, as well as non–Eastern European ethnic groups (e.g., Finns, Germans, Baltic peoples); (5) atypical ethnic diasporas have been formed—Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Afghans, and Africans; (6) numbers of permanent and temporary migrants from the Caucasus region and Central Asia have greatly increased; (7) the “cultural gap” between the “old” and “new” populations of the city has noticeably increased; and (8) mass temporary labor migration (especially irregular workers) from the “near abroad” is a new and growing phenomenon.

Since the late 1980s, more than one hundred nongovernmental ethnocultural organizations have been established in St. Petersburg. Among the organizations are at least fifteen ethnocultural autonomies, including Azeri, Armenian, Bashkir, Buryat, Byelorussian, Georgian, Jewish, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Korean, Latvian, Lithuanian, Tatar, Ukrainian, and Finnish autonomies. In addition, there are at least 50 ethnocultural associations, including African, Afghan, Greek, Ingush, Kazakh, Polish, Tajik, Chuvash, Chinese, and Syrian groups, as well
as the Pskov and Astrakhan fraternities. These organizations interact with city authorities via the St. Petersburg House of Nationalities.\textsuperscript{151}

The Foreign Relations Committee of the Government of St. Petersburg states that presently, more than 1,540 organizations in St. Petersburg have an ethnic component. They can be divided into five main groups: ethnic (Armenian, Georgian, Polish, etc.); interethnic (multinational associations, such as Slavic, Russian-Byelorussian, League of Nations of St. Petersburg, Tatar-Bashkir, etc.); ethnoreligious (Muslim, Judaic, etc.); occupational/professional (multinational writers unions, foreign language teachers unions, etc.); and scientific (the German section of city researchers, the Polish historical society, the Kirghiz commission at the House of Scientists, and so on).\textsuperscript{152}

Numerous ethnic secondary and vocational schools were established since the late 1980s, including Polish, Finnish, Jewish, German, Georgian, Tatar, Greek, Ukrainian, Turkmenian, Lithuanian, and Roma schools. Schools specializing in “Eastern” languages (Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Arab, Hindu, etc.) were also founded. Furthermore, several ethnic universities, university departments, and education centers were formed, including four schools focused mainly on Polish, Czech, Slovak, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Ukrainian languages; the East European International Institute, which trains specialists in Slavic languages and history; the Jewish Center of Science and Crafts, as well as the St. Petersburg Jewish University; the Ingermanland Educational and Scientific Center; a Finnish multipurpose center; and ethnic theaters and art galleries.\textsuperscript{153} Additionally, members of ethnic diasporas have also established numerous newspapers and magazines published in Russian and their respective native languages. The revitalization of St. Petersburg ethnic-cultural associations encouraged the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly\textsuperscript{154} to approve a regional law, “On interethnic relations,” in 2004.\textsuperscript{155} It was a very timely political step: only second to Moscow, St. Petersburg ultimately became the one of the most popular destinations for migrants in Russia, which forced the city to
face new, unfamiliar processes of restructuring identity in the form of “mosaics.” Over the previous turbulent decades, new city dwellers were creating “new platforms for asserting themselves as important actors—developing new languages, cultural forms of expression, and civic platforms—claiming a space in a city that would otherwise marginalize and drown out their voices.”

A new phenomenon for Russia in general and St. Petersburg in particular is the large number of newcomers who do not intend to integrate into the host society. Against the backdrop of a strong “melting pot,” which worked effectively in the USSR, the diaspora in its strictest terms simply could not exist. Today the millions of migrant workers/immigrants in Russia often settle very compactly, and form diasporas including “trans-state” migrant networks and elements of coalescing ethnic enclaves and “ghettos.”

Conventionally, the St. Petersburg diasporas, in a broader context, are represented by two groups: “old-timers” (extensive understanding of the diaspora within the paradigm of social constructivism) and “new migrants” (migrant networks). The old-timers are primarily migrants of the Soviet period, and thus mainly include second and third generations living in St. Petersburg. They are integrated into the life of the city and are usually middle class, have postsecondary education, and a high level of cultural capital. Among these are Armenian, Jewish, Tatar, Polish, Georgian, Ukrainian, Finnish, Kazakh, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian diasporas. The new migrants are largely comprised of migrants who came to St. Petersburg for economic reasons in the post-Soviet period; they typically lack vocational or university education, and many do not possess the skills for living in an urban environment (e.g., migrants from the countries of Central Asia).

For the old-timers, the conservation and cultivation of their native culture, language, and customs remain priorities, with the goal of implementing intercultural dialogue in a multiethnic environment. As for the new diasporas (“trans-state” migrant networks), priorities include the social and economic adaptation of compatriots; solving
problems of employment and living conditions; provision of legal and financial assistance, and so on. Moreover, the new migrants are guided by their primary social groups—family, friends, compatriots, a close circle of acquaintances, which somewhat hamper their integration into the new sociocultural environment.\textsuperscript{164}

Thus, in St. Petersburg a process of polarization between the long entrenched and newly forming diasporas and migrant networks is taking place. Diasporas lose their “ethnic and cultural integrity and are differentiated into internal subgroups on the basis of belonging to different regions and time of outcome.”\textsuperscript{165} Another issue of differentiation is the division of migrants into two basic groups: those who move to a new place to live the rest of their lives and install their children there, and those who consider their stay to be temporary. Typically, the second category consists of migrant workers who are initially oriented during a short period of residence and are interested only in finding work and earning income. In this connection, we can speak about different degrees of commitment to the host community and varying degrees of motivation to adapt and become socialized in the host society, and thus different behavioral strategies.\textsuperscript{166}

The vast majority of Russian researchers consider the diaspora institutionalization phenomenon to be rather negative. Members of diaspora groups often separate themselves from host communities, due to feeling conflicted about where to place their loyalties—particularly in case large contradictions between the sending and receiving countries exist. As a result of members’ divergent experiences, the appearance of sub-groups within each diaspora can result in a struggle for the interests and needs of the diaspora as a whole to be met, as cohesion between members is necessary for proper representation in the community. Such interests include access to political and economic resources.\textsuperscript{167}

The diaspora can be correlated with the process of “enclavization.” However, there is a big difference in between migrant ethnic enclaves at their initial stages in Russia and the institutionalized, isolated ethnic enclaves in the United States and some European countries.\textsuperscript{168}
In large Russian cities, the low population mobility of Western types of ethnic “enclaves” is not yet possible. At the same time, however, the absence of special measures to prevent “monoculturization” in some regions of Russia, on the one hand, and to adapt and integrate the migrants/immigrants, on the other, together constitute preconditions for increasing cultural distance between host society members and migrant workers/immigrants. These parallel absences become the basis for the rise of ethnic enclaves and further fragmentation and polarization in Russian society.

In St. Petersburg, most migrant workers are isolated from life in the mainstream due to low income, low-status jobs, the need to stay close to workplaces, lack of access to health care and other social welfare benefits, and are vulnerable to police harassment; in effect, they have already established “micro-ghettos.” These features or processes can, under certain conditions, lead to the institutionalization of migrant ghettos in Russia. Migrant workers’ economic, social, political, and legal marginalization contributes to their great internal cohesion based on ethnic, religious, and linguistic similarities.

In 2011 the St. Petersburg city government began implementing a construction program to build apartment blocks for migrant workers. The plan includes 37 apartment buildings in various districts of the city to house about 7,000 migrant workers and their families by 2013. Some experts are skeptical. On the one hand, migrants do need affordable housing and decent living conditions. On the other, these initiatives can lead to their further marginalization. According to Nicolay Mezhevich, professor of European studies at the Faculty of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University, migrants sequestered in such housing will be unable to adapt. Mikhail Delyagin, director of the Institute of Globalization Problems, believes that these ethnic neighborhoods or districts will become St. Petersburg versions of Harlem, which locals and tourists will learn to avoid.
All of the phenomena described in Chapters 1 and 2 have evoked growing concerns and tensions in Russian society, leading to a number of government initiatives for working with migrants.

3.1. Theoretical Foundations of Tolerance-1 Program

The Tolerance-1 Program (Program for Promoting Harmony of Interethnic and Intercultural Relations, Preventing Ultra-Nationalist Tendencies, and Strengthening Tolerance for Everyone in St. Petersburg, 2006 to 2010) was launched on July 11, 2006. In brief, the program is aimed at reducing the prevalence of ethnic prejudice among young people and consolidating conditions to establish principles of tolerance in all spheres of intercultural and interethnic collaboration. The program is designed to change public opinion so that residents of St. Petersburg do not view people as representatives of different ethnic groups and diasporas, but as “Petersburgers” of different nationalities. The main slogan of the program is “St. Petersburg unites people.”

Among the expected socioeconomic effects of the program is making St. Petersburg more attractive to Russian and foreign business managers and employees and to increase tourism and trade with Federation and CIS citizens and foreign nationals. The program is similar in spirit to UNESCO’s Declaration of the Principles of Tolerance. Conceptually, the program is based on the principles of multiculturalism—a concept that has been established in the United States, Australia, and Canada. In the 1960s through 1980s, certain aspects of multiculturalism were borrowed and put into practice in
some European countries. Today, the concept of multiculturalism is being gradually replaced by assimilation and integration. The new model does not guarantee successful resolution of all the accumulated contradictions in the sphere of migration policy in Western countries. But the logic of historical experience shows the feasibility of applying the integration model elements in the framework of contemporary migration policy. These elements were largely omitted in the final version of Tolerance-1.

The dominance of the multiculturalism model in the program confirms the fact that its target group does not really include migrants and does not focus on the mechanisms for active positive interaction with the “other.” The program aims to meet the ethnic and cultural demands of the people of various nationalities, beliefs, and religions who are already “Petersburgers.” The program is mostly aimed at a range of activities to cultivate a higher level of tolerance among indigenous groups (most aimed at youth). The program declares that it is going to negotiate “interethnic and interreligious hostility and intolerance.” Mass cultural events were selected as the basic methods to overcome these negative trends. The final success of migrant integration depends not only on their educational level or the level of socioeconomic development of the host community, but also on the openness of the host society toward migrants. Discrimination is a major factor hindering the integration of immigrants, so training members of the host society in tolerance is of paramount importance. Aleinikoff and Rubén Rumbaut argue that the way the host society receives migrants determines their future behavior. If at the very beginning, the host society is not welcoming toward newcomers, or demonstrates doubts about their potential for integration, a “process of forging a reactive ethnicity in the face of perceived threats, persecution, discrimination and exclusion is not uncommon. It is one mode of ethnic identity formation, highlighting the role of a hostile context of reception in accounting for the rise rather than the erosion of ethnicity.”

It is significant that interaction with migrants is described
in detail only in Section 6, which is focused on establishing legal provisions to help immigrants adapt and integrate. Thus, the issues of law enforcement and order, which belong to enforcement agencies, are linked with migrant adaptation and integration issues. This confirms the general trend that migrants should be subjects of security and enforcement agencies, including the Federal Migration Service, which is still a part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

It is important to note that the issue of a common language was peripheral to the framework of the program, given that a common language is the basis of effective and positive intercultural dialogue. The large majority of migrants do not speak Russian, an obstacle for establishing any form of communication, further preventing integration and contributing to their isolation.

3.2. Major Events of Tolerance-1 Program Implementation

One of the most outstanding achievements of the program is its comprehensive approach to implementation. Three levels are described here:

Government. These include all executive bodies of the St. Petersburg government, security and law enforcement institutions, and the St. Petersburg House of Nationalities.

Civil society. These are the stakeholders and actors in program events, which include educational and culture establishments, scientific institutions, sport associations, mass media, NGOs, ethnic diaspora societies, and representatives of religious organizations.

Experts. Included here are the local Human Rights Commission, Strengthening Tolerance Council, National Association Affairs Council, universities, and diverse study and research centers.

The thematic emphases of the Tolerance-1 program follow: developing a culture of tolerance through the education system and strengthening of tolerance and preventing extremism among young people. Most program events are cultural, social, and scientific.
(festivals, exhibitions, concerts, scientific conferences, round tables, public service messages on the streets of St. Petersburg, etc.). The events could be considered important cultural events for the city’s international image, but only partially as specific measures for including migrants.

The program’s principal focus groups were young people\textsuperscript{181} and professionals dealing with intercultural issues. Within the program framework, the following projects took place: competitions and festivals;\textsuperscript{182} round tables;\textsuperscript{183} exhibitions (e.g., “We Are All St. Petersburgers—We Are All Compatriots,” “Multinational Petersburg”); football tournaments\textsuperscript{184} among youth involved in the city’s ethnocultural associations and including Zenith, the city’s leading soccer team; scientific conferences and symposia;\textsuperscript{185} publications;\textsuperscript{186} citywide promotions campaign under the general title, “St. Petersburg: Manners, Customs, Traditions”; workshops for diverse professionals;\textsuperscript{188} lessons on tolerance in schools (since 2007) and kindergarten classes (since 2009); specialized courses for school teachers, public sector workers, law-enforcement officers, youth counselors, journalists, and employees of nurseries and kindergartens.

The program organized numerous activities without the direct participation of migrants/immigrants themselves. This was largely due to the prevailing attitude of city government officials at the time, who believed that working with migrants (especially migrant workers) to achieve integration and adaptation to the host society was the task of ethnocultural associations. Consequently, the program did not invest significant time and resources in certain crucial aspects for the adaptation of migrants and their children, including learning the Russian language. Program activities with cost indicators appear in Table 3.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected activities</th>
<th>Implementation period</th>
<th>St. Petersburg government budget appropriation (thousands of U.S. dollars)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop and implement special program for social adaptation of migrant children,</td>
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<td>2007–2008</td>
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<td>including conflictology.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Create a unified adaptation program based on available educational potential and</td>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>resources.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop and distribute practical recommendations for preschool and school teachers</td>
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<td>Permanently</td>
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<tr>
<td>and parents for cultivating tolerant ethnocultural standards and culture of peace</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>and accord in children</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monitor activities of the informal youth associations; work out recommendations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Permanently</td>
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<td>and actions on how to prevent recruitment into informal youth associations of</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>extremist orientation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish system of adaptation and integration of foreign students at higher education institutions, including training courses on Russian language, Russian history, and ethical conduct</td>
<td>2007–2010</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organize and hold youth events under the motto of peace and accord with participation of foreign students. Organize “The Golden Autumn” festival for foreign students</td>
<td>2007–2010</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organize the annual festival “Through Diversity to Unity” alongside youth projects of St. Petersburg national associations</td>
<td>2007–2010</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyze media materials on interethnic and cross-religious relations as well as materials containing evidence of xenophobia, ethnophobia, and other manifestations of social intolerance in St. Petersburg</td>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>Within limits of current financing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Organize the “Multinational St. Petersburg” citywide exhibit dedicated to various nationalities and cultures living in St. Petersburg  

| 2008–2010 | — | — | ~100.0 | ~116.6 | ~133.3 |

TOTAL funding for the program (2006–2010)  

~13,300

### 3.3. Intermediate Results of Tolerance-1 Program

Implementation of the Tolerance-1 program was intense. In 2007, approximately 3,000 activities took place, more than 4,500 in 2008, and over 4,000 in 2009. At the end of 2008, less than 18 percent of the city’s population claimed to know of program activities. Participation at local events was estimated 3 to 4 percent. An average of 3 percent of residents attended the lectures, seminars, round tables, and trainings, while 4 percent attended the theater events, concerts, and exhibitions. In 2009, positive changes were observed. More than 30 percent of the population (about 1.5 million) indicated knowledge of the program. According to observers, this increase in awareness created substantial positive interest in other cultures and customs, which led to a better understanding of the “other” and to multiethnic and intercultural dialogue. In addition, pollsters have noted a growing negative attitude by most city residents toward nationalist groups. During the period of Tolerance-1 implementation, the number of extremist crimes committed by Russian nationals declined, compared to an increase in crime by foreign nationals (e.g., incidence increased by 11 percent between 2008 and 2009).

In light of the success of Tolerance-1, the St. Petersburg government proceeded to work with various ethnocultural associations in
accordance with the Program’s mission statement, “St Petersburg is Uniting People.” Simultaneously, the Armenians lobbied the local government to take part in the implementation of Tolerance-1 programming. The Armenian diaspora is one of the strongest—and represents one of the more influential ethnocultural organizations—in St. Petersburg, with over 100,000 current inhabitants who have been traditionally oriented to integration while preserving their own cultural heritage. In June 2010, the 300th anniversary of the Armenian diaspora in St. Petersburg was celebrated in the Mariinsky Theater Concert Hall, where both Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan, as well as St. Petersburg governor Valentina Matvienko were present.

In 2010, for the first time the Foreign Relations Committee of the city government initiated research related to the activities of ethnocultural groups. The Tajik, Azeri, and Uzbek ethnic groups were chosen as focal groups for the research, with the objective of identifying trends and mechanisms in the formation of ethnic associations and to collect information on activities and important events. The committee also wished to identify respective leaders, and to assess leaders’ level of tolerance or provocative behavior.

An effective mechanism of constructive government interaction with migrant diasporas is incorporation, or the attempt by individuals (or groups) to move out from their ethnic enclaves into the mainstream culture. In practice, however, it is doubtful that including ethnic diasporas in the process of integration/incorporation can be very successful. Incorporation is a long-term process that often depends exclusively on the desire and efforts of individuals belonging to the diaspora group. Most importantly, diaspora populations (and especially leaders), as a rule, do not welcome such processes of incorporation, as they ultimately lead to further integration (or even assimilation) that may destroy the enclave and inner solidarity of the diaspora. Leaders of diasporas are not easily identified. St. Petersburg officials often deal with heads of officially registered ethnocultural associations or with official representatives of the nations sending
migrants. Unfortunately, often the government officials’ ideas do not coincide with those of nonofficial leaders of diasporas.

A major criticism of the Tolerance-1 program is that the public was insufficiently informed about program implementation, activities, working methods, and the scholars and organizers involved. Most of the analysis and monitoring of interethnic relations was intended only for internal governmental use. Thus, determining intervention effectiveness is extremely difficult since only very general information was reported. For instance, NGOs were aware that annually over 3000 events were held under the auspices of the program, but only a few events every year were described in detail. The program could have been much more effective had it actually worked with the many NGOs, including human rights organizations, who have extensive experience on issues of tolerance.

Critics have also pointed out that the concept of “tolerance” should be understood more broadly to include not only ethnic groups, but also tolerant attitudes toward all minorities, including gender and sexual orientation, as well as tolerance of nonradical political opposition. Critics point out the lack of tolerant behavior by government officials themselves, including those who are overseeing the program, state and municipal authorities, and law enforcement officers who closely interact with migrants. The school system requires monitoring as well. Despite the fact that every school in the city participates in the program, there are still many schools that have not been able to “manage” intolerance expressed by staff and administrators. Sometimes teachers themselves, one of the most disadvantaged occupational groups in Russian society, express intolerant behavior. However, teachers’ “intolerance” is not wholly irrational, because they carry the greatest burden of educating and socializing non-Russian-speaking children while rarely (if ever) receiving additional compensation for such challenging work.

The program has also been criticized for focusing on multiculturalism while ignoring the historical and cultural reality of the city. Attention was paid to diversity first and unity second, by
placing non-Russian citizens at the center of many events. For example, the poster and cover of the book titled, “We are Petersburgers,” had faces of only “visible minorities” and not a single portrait of “more typical” representatives of the city. In addition, the book contained interviews of foreign nationals only. For many people, these actions are considered discriminatory against the majority of city inhabitants, and result in negative opinions about the program.

Despite the criticism, the Program made a very significant achievement; during the period of its implementation, the city formed an official position on ethnocultural and religious diversity. A single concrete example to compare fundamentally different approaches to similar problems in two major migrant magnet cities—Moscow and St. Petersburg—is instructive.

In June 2010, the Moscow city government proposed the development and adoption of a “Muscovite Code.” Michail Solomentsev, chair of the Interregional Relations Committee, justified the city’s position as follows: “Moscow is a city whose lifestyle has been based on Russian culture and traditions for centuries, and all who come here to live must reckon with this. We are confident that this important requirement will help all the residents of the capital, without exception, to become Muscovites—that is, members of the community, which is more than nationality [ethnicity], as it intertwines different cultures and ... its own rules of conduct.” But the main task, said Solomentsev, was not so much to explain to migrants “what is accepted and what is not accepted,” but to make newcomers obey “unwritten rules, which the residents of our city must adhere to. For example, do not butcher sheep in the yard, do not cook barbecue on the balcony, do not walk around the city in national dress, [and do] speak Russian...”

The “Muscovite Code” project was received with ambivalence by the general public and attracted much criticism from human rights organizations. The SOVA Center for Information and Analysis noted, for instance, that the overall content of the Code was “extremely unfortunate....” The proposed project can only be described as nothing
“other than discriminatory.” Later Vladimir Platonov, chairman of the Moscow City Duma, declared that the Muscovite Code would not be enacted as law.

In St. Petersburg, many politicians, government officials, academics, and activists have attempted to outline a general framework to create a unifying identity for city residents. Most of these efforts are related to reconstructing the myth of St. Petersburg as Russia’s greatest “Cultural Capital” and “Cosmopolitan City.” Despite the desire of some politicians to follow Moscow’s example, the St. Petersburg government’s perspective was nonetheless fundamentally different.

A notable example was a request made by Deputy Elena Babich, the leader of Russia’s Liberal Democratic Party in the St. Petersburg legislative assembly. On June 24, immediately after the Muscovite Code was announced, she introduced a similar initiative, called the “St. Petersburgers’ Code.” Babich asserted that in recent years, many thousands of people from abroad and from elsewhere in the Federation who migrated to St. Petersburg “follow their own cultural and religious traditions, which are in strong contradiction to our standards of living,” and which ultimately lead to “cross-cultural tensions.” Thus, the Deputy attempted to initiate a ban on public religious offerings (such as the Islamic holiday Eid al-Adha), wearing traditional costumes in public, and so on.

The official reply by the St. Petersburg government, prepared by Vice-Governor Mikhail Oseyevsky, was unequivocal. Oseyevsky described the successes of the Tolerance Program and pointed out that St. Petersburg was cited by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as an example of the promotion of tolerance and nonviolence in 2009. In 2011, the local government launched a periodical titled ABC’s for Newcomers to St. Petersburg, which was distributed to migrant workers, nonresident students, and tourists. Oseyevsky noted that the Muscovite Code was not well received by the general public or human rights organizations. He wrote, consequently, “the development and adoption of a set of
rules of conduct in St. Petersburg, similar to the ‘Muscovite Code,’ as a normative legal act seems inappropriate.205

The *ABC’s for Newcomers to St. Petersburg* is part of the city’s Cultural Capital Program, aimed at increasing the level of culture and social responsibility that will in turn lead to behavioral change among the residents of St. Petersburg.206 According to Anton Gubankov, chair of the city government’s Culture Committee, this program is needed because the city is losing its traditionally famous high-culture level.207 According to local officials and scholars, the *ABC’s* is an important publication for all Petersburgers to read, not only newcomers; its articles are devoted to famous locales in St. Petersburg (e.g., architectural landmarks, museums, theaters, and libraries), and great historical and momentous events. Works by the city’s legendary poets—such as Alexander Pushkin, Nikolai Gumilev and Joseph Brodsky—are reproduced in *ABC’s* issues. Also, as of this writing, a special edition of the *ABC’s* for migrant children was scheduled for publication.

Thus, the St. Petersburg city government wishes to avoid imposing rules and restrictions that may have the opposite effect of harmonizing interethnic relations. Instead, the objective is to unobtrusively attract migrants to the city’s history, its cultural achievements, and its unique and multifaceted cultural identity. The main task of the *ABC’s* publications is to engender a genuine interest, sympathy, and deep respect for the city, and if possible, a desire to join the great enterprise of St. Petersburg’s famous and diverse culture.

To reduce the discomfort that some Petersburgers still felt due to the presence of large numbers of migrants in the city, as well as to establish positive communication platforms between host society members and newcomers, the Tolerance-1 program needed to lay out steps to integrate migrants and their children into the city’s sociocultural environment. Ultimately, these concerns became part of one of the major outcomes of the development of the “Tolerance-2” program.
Children of Migrants Left Behind in Tolerance-1 Program

All children, regardless of their parents’ immigration status, have the right to attend Russian public schools from kindergarten through eleventh grade. This is a very positive and progressive mechanism for migrant children’s adaptation. When Tolerance-1 program elements were being drafted, the number of migrant children was rather small, and thus it was assumed that the schools could more or less successfully absorb them. Important programs for migrant children’s adaptation, including Russian language training, were excluded and the few such efforts that existed were conducted outside the program framework.

Compared to the 1990s, the proportion of migrants arriving with family members markedly increased in the 2000s. Oleg Pachenkov, a sociologist at the Center for Independent Social Research, explains this shift as the result of several factors. In the Caucasian region (primarily, the Transcaucasia region, which includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), modernization processes are underway, leading to disintegration of the extended traditional clan. For migrant workers, most of whom are men, this means that they could no longer leave their wives and children in the care of relatives.208

Another contributing factor to the rapid growth of migrant children numbers in St. Petersburg is the increasing number of children born to non-Russian nationals. Thus, in 2010 this number reached 8 percent of all births registered in St. Petersburg.209 In 2007, 6.23 percent of all schoolchildren’s parents/guardians were foreign nationals and families without permanent residence registration; in 2008, 8 percent; in 2009, approximately 6.2 percent; and on January 1, 2011, about 8 percent. (The latter figure was equal to 8,259 schoolchildren without Russian citizenship and 15,732 without permanent registration). In 2009, about 100 children without registration or citizenship were enrolled in St. Petersburg private schools (approximately 2.7 percent of total private school enrollment); in 2010, this number increased to about 350.210 A significant number of these children do not speak
Russian as a native language. According to the Ombudsman for Children in St. Petersburg, Svetlana Agapitova, the number of migrant children will likely grow over time.\(^\text{211}\)

During the implementation period of Tolerance-1, there were no programs for children who did not speak Russian, aside from a few experimental projects.\(^\text{212}\) In some areas of St. Petersburg, 30 to 40 percent of migrant children do not speak Russian. In some classes at the Admiralteisky, Centralny, Kalininsky, Vasileostrovsky, Pushkin, and Kirovsky district secondary schools, the number of students who did not speak Russian reached 50 percent.\(^\text{213}\)

Not all children of migrants have the same difficulties in adapting to new environments. Results of a sociological study conducted in Admiralty, Nevsky, and Krasnogvardeisky districts in 2009 by the Sociology of Education and Science Research Lab, St. Petersburg State University/School of Economics showed that migration strategy and family composition differ among ethnic groups. These factors directly affect the duration and success of children’s adaptation and integration into their new environment (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2. Time of Arrival in St. Petersburg for Parents of Children in Schools Participating in Survey (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Parents were born in St. Petersburg</th>
<th>Parents arrived in St. Petersburg before birth</th>
<th>Parents arrived when child was younger than 7 years</th>
<th>Parents arrived when child was older than 7 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijani</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “Analiticheskie materialy o polozhenii detyei v Sankt-Peterburge (2009 god)” [Analytical...
These figures show that in selected schools over 65 percent of Armenian and about 80 percent of Azerbaijani schoolchildren were either born in St. Petersburg, or have lived in the city since preschool age. These children had a broad-based experience of socialization in Russia. Many children attended kindergarten in St. Petersburg and most of them experienced no difficulty with the Russian language.

Migrant children from the countries of Central Asia and the North Caucasus tended to be in a more difficult situation. Most arrived to St. Petersburg with their parents at school age. Many of these children had very poor Russian language skills. As a result, they faced serious problems in the socialization process. Also, in these schools the proportion of ethnic Russian children whose parents were not born in St. Petersburg was about 40 percent.

Children in the fourth group—those who had attended school in another country or in another ethnic region before their arrival in St. Petersburg—also face serious challenges. Teachers are obligated to take additional steps to help them adapt and learn Russian. Schools often lack resources to do this and these children can be forced into home schooling. In many schools, teachers had invested a great deal of time beyond regular school hours to educate these children who later “disappeared.” These children are forced to move when parents need to do so, which can happen at any time.

The strategies for adapting to a new sociocultural environment depend on the children’s age at the time of relocation and their degree of integration into Russian or St. Petersburg society. Children who have had some school experience in a Russian kindergarten or primary school have a better chance at fast adaptation. The preschool education system could potentially become one of the most effective means for migrant children’s adaptation. Statistics show that the number of migrant children attending public kindergarten in St.
Petersburg as of January 1, 2011 was 2.3 percent (1,934 children without Russian citizenship and 2,071 children without permanent registration), whereas on January 1, 2009, it was 2 percent, and on January 1, 2010 it was just 1.1 percent. However, the percentage of migrant children in preschool education in 2011 (2.3 percent) is significantly lower than in grades one through eleven (8 percent). Universities, NGOs, and other private organizations have also implemented valuable initiatives on their own to improve the situation of migrant schoolchildren. For example, the Department of Intercultural Communication at Herzen Russian State Pedagogical University in St. Petersburg has created linguistic programs for migrants and their children without any financial support from the government. A Center for Language Acquisition was established within this department where students and graduate students worked with migrants on a voluntary basis. In addition, schoolteachers asked Pedagogical University faculty to organize courses on teaching non-Russian-speaking children. As of this writing, these courses have been underway for five years. Also, many St. Petersburg municipalities together with NGOs have implemented tolerance and multicultural education projects in schools together with the psychological trainings and workshops for schoolchildren mentioned in Chapter 4.

In 2010, the Department of Intercultural Communication at Herzen Russian State Pedagogical University published the first edition of its Russian Primer for Migrants, to help migrant children to learn the standard Russian alphabet. This primer is designed to teach even very young children who do not know any Russian at all how to read the language. Furthermore, once migrant children learn Russian they are able to help their parents, not only as translators and interpreters but also as guides to Russian culture.

Most migrant children attend schools near parents’ places of employment, which may not offer the best or even mediocre opportunities to meet their special needs. Most “good” schools (informally) admit only middle- and upper-class children; thus, most migrant children attend nonprestigious schools and adopt the social
norms and codes of behavior of the “lower” class. These children require an individualized learning approach regardless of which school they attend, but the government’s lack of systematic support has handicapped many schools. Moreover, the lack of a developed unified public policy on migrant children’s school integration processes significantly reduces their chances of getting into higher education institutions or improving their overall social status.

By providing special educational programs for these children, the state could implement the principles of equality of opportunity, establish a system of social mobility, and prevent a variety of negative consequences. In some European countries, the third and fourth generations of migrant children are growing up. In Germany, for example, these children were denied citizenship status for a long period of time. Immigrant parents were often satisfied with a minimal income and low social status, but their children and grandchildren who have been born in the new country but continue to be marginalized without proper education, have higher expectations and tend to become resentful. As a consequence, they do not integrate and often lack respect for the culture and laws of the country in which they live.

Because large-scale migration is very new for St. Petersburg and Russia in general, there is a hope that the vicious cycle observed elsewhere in the world can be broken before it effectively begins. But it will be broken only with significant steps by the federal government, mainly by promulgating into law the basic principles of equality and the formalization of equal opportunity that are linked to equal legal status and citizenship. Current Russian Federation law (2002) is based on a restrictive concept of citizenship grounded in the principle of *jus sanguinis*, and provides no guarantees for children born in Russia to noncitizen parents or who moved to Russia together with their parents. German history demonstrates all the negative consequences of *jus sanguinis* principles. Although children who are not citizens are allowed to attend public schools, they cannot study at the university level tuition-free (as do eligible
No matter how talented they are, the social mobility system will not work for them in Russia, and these children are very likely to stay in marginalized socioeconomic circumstances together with their parents.

### 3.4. Tolerance-2 Program: Continuity and Change

The governor of St. Petersburg, Valentina I. Matvienko, has emphasized both unity and diversity in most of her public statements on interethnic relations. On Tolerance Day in 2010, she presented the new program to the city with the following speech:

Dear Petersburgers!

On November 16, St. Petersburg celebrates International Tolerance Day, which has already become a tradition.

In St. Petersburg there are representatives of more than 130 nationalities living and working here, different in their background, beliefs, and traditions, but tightly bound to each other by the city’s past and present.

We still pay special attention to preservation of cultural diversity, building tolerance, opposing ideas of hostility and hatred. Sharing all responsibility for the future of Petersburg, for the name of continuing the dialogue of cultures, the city government has passed a new variant of the “Tolerance” program for 2011–2015. Tolerance is becoming a typical attribute of Petersburg culture, a synthesis of the famous Petersburg sensibility (“intelligentnost”) and mutual respect among people. This moral value should become a must for new citizens of our city who wish to live up to the ideal of being “a Petersburger.”

I am convinced that the maintenance of traditions and the unique atmosphere of interethnic harmony will continue to be a distinctive feature of Saint Petersburg.

The Tolerance-2 Program (2011–2015) continues to focus on the adoption of St. Petersburg principles of tolerance in a multinational
context. On the one hand, the new program is a logical follow-up of the previous Tolerance-1 program; on the other hand, it includes a fundamental conceptual change.

The goal of the new program is to perfect efforts of the St. Petersburg government executive branch in the field of building and strengthening a tolerant city based on the values of a multiethnic Russian society, through the creation of conditions for successful social integration and cultural-linguistic adaptation of migrants. This goal should be achieved through the following seven objectives:

- Inclusion of the education system to build a culture of tolerance
- Facilitate interfaith communication and tolerance
- Intercultural communication assistance
- Interaction with the media community of St. Petersburg
- Create conditions for Russian language acquisition and sociocultural integration of foreign students
- End xenophobic and racist ideas among the youth
- Provide organizational and technical support throughout the program

The new program follows the principles of multiculturalism that promote the strengthening of ethnic and cultural identities, leading to a new form of integration that is based on shared values.

The main target group of the new program is the migrants themselves, especially the younger generation. Governor Matvienko, appealing to the rapidly changing ethnic composition in the schools, asserted that organizing a system of Russian language courses for newly arrived migrants and their children was absolutely essential. Therefore the most important task of Tolerance-2 is to adapt the huge number of migrants to the new sociocultural and linguistic environment of St. Petersburg, while continuing to harmonize relations with the local population.

The harmonization of ethnocultural relations is always a two-way process and depends on both host society members and newcomers.
At issue is the newcomer’s ability to adapt to the most “European” city in Russia where individualistic identity prevails and the population has a relatively high level of education. Establishing positive communication with migrants from lower socioeconomic strata of the population of the poorest regions of their home countries, who have a collective identity, relatively stable values, and specific social norms and traditional practices that are not completely complementary with developed urban areas has proven to be difficult.223

Blair Ruble points out that “migrants whether from elsewhere in the country or outside the nation, are themselves actors rather than objects on which the host communities impose their will.”224 Migrants are not ductile objects that can be changed and modified by designing a new sociocultural identity for them. Ruble also notes that it is very difficult to identify and structure a basic list of qualitative indicators to “measure” the value structure of migrant-receiving societies in an era of globalization. Thus, these receiving societies “have no essentialist elements that form a permanent core of values, norms, customs, traditions, and habits into which migrants might assimilate.”225 In these new types of societies close intercultural interaction between migrants and indigenous peoples leads to a constantly changing framework of the possible and permissible.226

To overcome the growing gap between migrants and members of the host society, program designers chose to focus on two major areas of work with migrants and their children—language acquisition as the first step toward integration by means of education and cultural knowledge/engagement. Table 3.3 summarizes selected program activities and funding levels. The next logical step in improving the educational system is government subsidization of the schools that teach migrant children proportionally to the number of children who require additional language education.
Table 3.3. Plan and Budget of Selected Activities to Implement Tolerance-2 Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Activities</th>
<th>St. Petersburg Budget (thousands of U.S. dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organize training for education system employees on teaching Russian as a second</td>
<td>-187.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>language as well as on the teaching history and culture of St. Petersburg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organize a system for the education of non-Russian-speaking schoolchildren</td>
<td>-33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organize courses of Russian language, culture, history, and ethics of conduct for foreign students</td>
<td>-77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organize visits within the cycle of museum educational programs, “My Petersburg,” for schoolchildren in first through eighth grades</td>
<td>-240.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organize visits within the cycle of museum educational programs “To know the peoples of Russia and the world—to know thyself” for schoolchildren in first through eighth grades</td>
<td>-240.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The new program is strategically future oriented toward positive results given that the target groups are young children and adolescents. Positive attitudes toward people who are different have to be ingrained from early childhood. The new program includes creating a series of 20 cartoon series and books featuring characters already known by the children. These heroes will express friendship, agreement, and mutual assistance from television screens. Upon implementing this program, St. Petersburg has excellent prospects for instilling in migrant children affection for their new homeland and language, while preserving respect for their own cultures and traditions.

The modern European migration experience has been very instructive for St. Petersburg. There are no illusions that migration is a temporary phenomenon in Russia. Migration is a well-institutionalized and self-regulated phenomenon that sustains itself in such a way that migration itself tends to create more migration. For instance, rather than hosting male guest workers who return
home, Europe now “needs to accommodate Muslim families who settle down for good.”228 City governments in Russia are aware of changing migration processes in a globalizing world. They will try to prevent the negative impacts of migration, especially of the type seen in Western Europe. At present, labor migration in St. Petersburg is similar to the period of mass labor migration in Europe in the 1960s. As Alexander V. Prokhorenko, chair of the Committee for External Relations of St. Petersburg, said about migration, “We still have time to take into account other countries’ mistakes.”229

Since 2006 many positive changes have been made to St. Petersburg’s public migration policy. Despite the strong pro-European orientation of the government’s migration policy, it is still very far from the model on integration adopted by the European Union in 2007 (the European Common Basic Principles [CBPs] on migrant integration230). St. Petersburg’s regional policy does not promote or guarantee the successful economic and social integration of migrants nor allow their full participation in the city’s future. For examples, in accordance with federal law (“On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in Russia”), regional authorities of Russia cannot change the legal status of migrants.231 Migrant integration includes the legal aspect of obtaining formal citizenship. In a highly diverse and multiethnic society, the only way to create this unity is to create a wide supraethnic identity—a political identity based on civic belonging.232 Thus, it is not only in the migrants’ interest to obtain permanent legal status and citizenship, but also in the interest of the receiving state. Lawful residents or potential citizens are likely to assume social responsibility and responsibility for the future of the country. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer point out that “citizenship, at its best, embraces the ideal of shared, universal rights. Attaining the status of citizenship holds forth the promise of equality with all other citizens. Citizenship also denotes the members of an intergenerational project who are committed to honoring a past and promoting a better future for generations to follow.”233 Thus, without serious changes in migration policy at the federal level, the country
is likely to follow in the footsteps of negative European experiences. Moreover, “there is a high probability that this experience will bring on huge social stratification among the local population in Russia, and unregulated national policies could lead to massive unrest and riots, where local youth will take their dissatisfaction out on visitors.”

The federal government can solve the problem of unauthorized migration, provide wider paths towards naturalization, change the principles of citizenship (from *jus sanguinis* to *jus soli*); protect migrants’ basic rights, and implement federal programs on tolerance in all regions of Russia. The future success of the city in achieving sustainable social and economic development depends largely on establishing an atmosphere of tolerance through a long-term policy on migrant integration. St. Petersburg will continue facing demographic problems and labor shortages, and the demand for the transformation of the resistant Cultural Capital of Russia will be imminent. “The legendary historical past of St. Petersburg, its architectural ensembles and mythos are “cited of memory invested with meanings that inspired successive generations to preserve them and the memories they contained.… [A]lmost from the outset Petersburg was wrapped between the progressive intentions of its founder and the preservationist passions of its residents…”
This chapter provides examples of regional-level implementation of the Tolerance program, as well as of related activities administered at the municipal and university levels.


The round table “Interethnic Dialogue: The Role of Youth” was held on October 19, 2007 in St. Petersburg with 45 participants. The event was sponsored by the Committee for Youth Policy and Cooperation with Public Organizations of the St. Petersburg Government within the Tolerance program. This event, organized by the Center for Civil, Social, Scientific and Cultural Initiatives “STRATEGIA,” brought together government officials, academics, journalists, and leaders of diverse civic, scientific, ethnocultural, political, and social activist NGOs, including numerous youth organizations.236

The objectives of the round table were to start a dialogue among youth leaders, scholars and other experts, government officials, and social activists on the issues of tolerance and intercultural interaction in St. Petersburg and to identify ways in which young people could participate in the process. This event was divided thematically into three parts. The first part included reports made by experts in tolerance, interethnic relations, human rights, and the prevention and resolution of youth extremism in St. Petersburg.237

The second part, focused on youth organizations in St. Petersburg, presented prepared sociopolitical projects and programs aimed at harmonizing interethnic and intercultural relations, prevention of
xenophobia, and strengthening tolerance in the city.\textsuperscript{238} After each presentation, a discussion with the experts and other participants took place.

The third and final part was devoted to relevant topics for both St. Petersburgers and newcomers: “Can we harmonize interethnic relations in St. Petersburg today?” and “St. Petersburg as a multicultural city: problems and perspectives” with debate and discussion including experts, government officials from the Youth Policy and Cooperation with Public Organizations Committee and the Federal Migration Service, youth leaders, NGO activists, and representatives of selected ethnocultural groups. General conclusions and outcomes from the round table follow.

- The main goal was achieved; dialogue and positive communication among youth leaders, experts, government officials, representatives of NGOs, and local ethnocultural groups on issues of tolerance and intercultural interaction was established.
- Experts demonstrated high-level skills and theoretical training.
- New approaches for working with youth organizations were identified.
- Active involvement in discussions and debates was displayed by participants as well as a serious interest in the topics of the round table.
- Debates included analysis of the migration situation in St. Petersburg and Russia, as well as a practical approach to topical issues of migration policies and mechanisms for constructive cross-cultural communication.
- The round table discussions and debates removed barriers and traditional distance among the various “players” involved. In addition, all participants had opportunities for informal discussion during coffee breaks.
- Most discussions emphasized interethnic and cross-cultural conflicts and complexities in their resolution. In fact, there was
no reference to positive examples of solutions or prevention of such conflicts.

- Discussions on presentations made by youth leaders showed an overall lack of preparation by youth political groups and movements, as well as ethnocultural groups to defend a positive position on intercultural dialogue based on tolerance. The only exceptions were well-trained and well-prepared Movement Against Illegal Immigration leaders (often described as extremist sympathizers). During these debates, it became evident that participants lacked a methodology to identify antimigrant extremist language. Representatives of St. Petersburg ethnocultural societies emphasized the maintenance and strengthening of respective cultures. Their only suggestions to realize these aims were cultural events dedicated to ethnic cuisine, dances, and music.

- Some participants suggested that the proposed activities among youth would not lead toward a real convergence of diverse cultures, but would only further demonstrate their differences.

4.2. Tolerance Trainings and Workshops for Young People (2007–2012)

This project consisted of trainings and workshops on establishing positive communication, social competence, and tolerance. It is focused on reducing xenophobia, strengthening the principles of tolerance, and building constructive interethnic and intercultural communication and interaction among young people. The project was created and implemented by Andrey Gretsov, one of the leading experts in St. Petersburg on deviant behavior and conflict prevention among youth; Marya Rozanova, a political scientist specialized in migration; Anastasia Azbel, an expert on constructive communication and the organization of sociopsychological trainings and workshops; and Natalia Somova, an expert on development of tolerance among youth.
Initially, a pilot version of the project with an emphasis on preventing xenophobia and extremist behavior among youth was presented to the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation in 2007 within the young professionals’ forum called “New Strategies,” where it received approval for practical implementation.

The project began in 2007 in the Frunze district schools, and involved high school students aged 14 to 17, in groups of 15 to 25, and served about 240 to 720 students per year. Trainings lasted two weeks to one month and included four working days a week with each group. As of this writing, a total of 2,324 students had been involved in this project.

This project was created to fill some of the gaps in the Tolerance program at the micro-level. It is focused on work in small ethnically mixed groups and oriented both at promoting tolerance in the receiving social environment and on the integration of migrant children and youth.

Working on the draft plan for the project, as the specialists and practitioners, we specifically focused on migrant youth. Our choice was determined by the fact that within the school system their adaptation, socialization, and integration into the host society occurs rapidly and at the same time is often conflict-ridden and painful. Thus, trainings and workshops in ethnically mixed groups are the most effective.

We chose this age group because they are typically flexible and open, that is, the possibility exists to revise perspectives, as well as openly discuss hot and sensitive topics because of their lack of “political correctness.” Furthermore, this age group is part of the larger target group of young people who are the most inclined to extremist violence (compared to older people).
Content

Informational block

The focus of trainings was development of practical skills that would help establish positive communication skills based on principles of tolerance rather than providing them with a set of factual information about tolerance. Information provided in the course was understandable by teenagers in the context of personal life experience. Participants were encouraged to share personal stories and avoid passive acceptance of information.

In brief, the project focused on a “dialogic method” and rejected the popular approach of “preaching” tolerance. Within the informational block of the project, we successfully used the following scheme: brief description of the general context of the problem/situation ➔ questions for the group ➔ answers by participants ➔ discussion ➔ debunking of myths ➔ conclusions.

Ultimate truths were not presented to adolescents; instead, facilitators and students discuss controversial issues together. Our purpose was also to bring together well-known and not-so-well-known random facts into systematic knowledge base, thereby giving the teens a clear “system of coordinates.”

Another important objective is to destroy myths, stereotypes, and prejudices about migrants and to give participants objective numbers. We explain to students what “globalization” and a “global” world mean, not just in relation to the circulation of investments, goods, and technologies, but also people. We give them the real numbers of migration in a global and national context, and we explain why migrants are greatly needed by developed countries, Russia in general, and specifically, St. Petersburg. Also, with the use of simple examples we demonstrate what an “aging” society and labor shortages mean, and why it puts pressure on all generations and can be harmful for economic and social development. The most important thing is a country’s sustainable progress (in short, its future) should be related not to natural resources or abstractions such as money but people, or
“human capital.” The logic here is quite rational and humanistic: we should invest in human capital, take care of ourselves and others, and very much appreciate young migrant workers who despite all manner of difficulties come to Russia and make a huge contribution to the economy. Furthermore the project also presents official numbers on crimes committed by migrants and explains why the numbers are lower than those committed by locals. Then we clarify why the mass media is interested in broadcasting all the scandals related to migrants, and giving migrant workers an image that for many years has had a very negative connotation and created many myths.

Unlike many other projects on tolerance, we tried not to focus on ethnicity and differences in ethnic identities because it would tend to divide people and increase the distance between different ethnic groups and individuals. Our purpose was not to promote the cultivation of differences but to show common grounds for mutual understanding and give positive impetus for constructive intergroup cooperation for mutual benefits.

**Psychological workshop: Strengthening principles of tolerance in interethnic relations among youth**

The workshops focused on several areas in the sociopsychological development of young people. The first set of training sessions focused on developing tolerant attitudes within the framework of interethnic relations, as well as the prevention of xenophobia by enhancing self-confidence through empathetic communication and developing self-awareness. During the program, the participants were able to understand what empathy is, to perceive the uniqueness of all participants, and to realize the value and worth of every person.

A second set of sociopsychological training sessions included teaching young people how to implement goal setting, including laying out socially acceptable methods for achieving those goals. This workshop included developing skills for establishing positive contact, the coordination of mutual actions to achieve common goals, active listening, greater perception of nonverbal information,
social observation, and the principles of positive communication and constructive intercultural communication.

**Role-playing: Demonstrating constructive behavior in extreme or socially dangerous situations, formation of basic social guidelines, and increasing social competence**

The emphasis in this workshop was on conflict prevention, as well as tactics of conflict resolution. We simulated situations that could cause different types of conflicts. Within the games we worked on the ability of the teens to control their own emotions and speech, as well as ability to read indirect nonverbal information.

**Other activities**

The final discussion was in the form of a round table dealing with the problems of intercultural dialogue and creating a culture of peace and harmony. Alternatively, a final, symbolic event to complete the workshop had participants laying flowers at the monument to victims of hostility. The workshop ended with the awarding of certificates and gifts to participating students. All participants also received a set of instructional materials prepared by Andrey Gretsov and Marya Rozanova.

**Results**

**Observations on ethnic composition of classes**

All the classes we worked with were ethnically mixed, but we should mention that the picture was different in every school and was continually changing, and every year, the ethnic composition of classes became more diverse. Ethnic diversity varied significantly depending on type of school. In ordinary schools, diversity reached 50 to 60 percent (in one highly conflictive class there were representatives of 19 different nationalities in a total of 23 pupils). In gymnasium schools, diversity was 10 to 20 percent.
General difficulties in project implementation

- Low level of interest by many young people to analyze the social problems of contemporary Russia and a lack of awareness in this sphere. Participants did not know population or ethnic composition numbers of the country, its uniqueness, or the principles of national policy in historical perspective. Participants pay attention to such issues only if they relate to them personally, and they often show a primitive approach in their judgment, without any attempt to make a rational analysis of the situation.\textsuperscript{246} It was also challenging to find a balance between consideration of serious societal problems and their expression at the household level, while avoiding oversimplification and moralizing.

- Lack of willingness to participate in active methods of sociopsychological training (discussions, role-playing, workshops). Unfortunately, these progressive methods were not in use by teachers and school counselors.

- We often encountered the absence of a well-established value for human life and dignity, as well as popular highly negative images of the “other/enemy” (mostly displayed by teenage boys).

Our working experience with teenagers, especially in discussions on issues related to social change and coexisting with newcomers showed a high degree of psychological imagery around the external enemy (from both a geopolitical perspective and a sociocultural perspective). We could see that the practice of political violence is often perceived as a norm rather than an unacceptable extreme measure. For instance, when we discussed demographic problems in the territories of the Far East, often the solution was in taking military action against overpopulated China. Behind the absurdity of such statements, one can find not just a lack of understanding of the essence of the problem, but an extremist view on social and political relations, influenced by the immediate social environment.
Unfortunately, our practical trainings have generally confirmed the thesis that Russian youth “express solidarity with extreme measures against migrants and minorities.” The mass youth survey showed that in answer to the question: “What should be done with illegal immigrants?” Twenty-two percent of respondents answered that they should be “eliminated,” and 21 percent answered that they should be “isolated from society.”

- The “Soviet” view based on the rapid and effective resolution of all social problems through administrative mechanisms prevails into the present: “Encouraging Russian women to have more babies is necessary,” “Resettling people from the North Caucasus, where the birth rate is high, to the underpopulated Far East is necessary,” “Guarding national borders to prevent the Chinese from sneaking in is necessary,” “Migrants should be required to improve their skills before they come to work in Russia,” and so on.

- Many participants showed no interest or willingness to take responsibility, expecting the authorities to fix everything. Also, most adolescents were extremely uncritical of themselves or the culture and history of the country, and believed themselves to be superior.

- Disrespectful and disparaging attitude towards migrant workers among young people was often accompanied by the traditional disrespect toward working-class people. Evaluation by participants was based on common stereotypes that most white-collar workers have higher status and deserve more respect than highly skilled blue-collar workers.

- In every class many participants expressed common myths about migrants. For instance, participants often asserted that approximately 97 percent of all crimes were committed by migrants, and most victims were locals; migrants are suitable only for the dirtiest and lowest-skilled jobs; and that because migrants are temporary workers, they should not be considered
equal members of society. We heard the notions that migrants were taking locals’ jobs occasionally, and that they were carriers of dangerous diseases very rarely.

• We also found the following observation interesting: many participants perceived such traditionally “Slavic” countries as Ukraine and Belarus as part of the Russian Federation, while the republics of the North Caucasus such as Dagestan, the Chechen Republic, and so on were perceived to be independent states, or at least “alien territories.”

Positive observations on working with teenagers

• We were pleased to note that project participants, despite the abovementioned superficial attitudes, showed an active interest in extending their knowledge of the issues raised in our classes. They were willing to make an effort to understand the serious problems of modern Russia and its place in the international arena. They expressed interest in receiving relevant information from additional sources, in addition to our lectures, such as books on conflict prevention and resolution.

• Participants took an active part in the discussions, openly voicing and vigorously defending their personal points of view, even if this view was contrary to the opinion of the majority or did not correspond with the views of the facilitators. Most teens demonstrate flexibility, that is, they are open to new information and to new experiences. This accentuated the urgency of our discussions aimed at influencing them to embrace a civil and tolerant belief system.

• Students demonstrated a high interest in communication, especially communication between people of different cultures.

• They expressed great interest in constructive solutions to typical conflict situations. They provided much positive feedback because they learned models for “adult” mature behavior and ways of overcoming conflicts in a “civilized” manner.
Concluding remarks

Project success was largely determined by the fact that only highly qualified experts and practitioners were involved in the work with adolescents. Adolescents are very much inclined to have a “black-and-white” outlook and share radical views. One of our greatest achievements is that we were able to open “shades of gray” as options for them, that is, to suggest different socially acceptable forms of compromises and flexible behavior.

In assessing the effectiveness of our trainings, we relied both on observations and interviews. Furthermore, since 2009 schoolteachers have reported on changes in participants that have taken place after the projects ended. We interviewed two to three teachers who work with each of the classes. A total of 47 surveys were conducted in the form of interviews. Selected results are shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavioral changes after participation in project</th>
<th>Percentage of teachers indicating this result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interrelations in the groups were improved, the number of conflicts (including on ethnic bases) involving participants decreased</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactions of adolescents to various complex situations have become more balanced and adequate</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teens have become more flexible in responding to conflict situations. Depending on circumstances, they were persuaded to compromise, adjust, or avoid conflict.</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants have become more confident in defending their own opinion in a group; they depend less on group dynamics.</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participants have become more purposeful. They are willing to put more effort into the achievement of long-term goals.</td>
<td>45</td>
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Thus, the most notable changes were seen in effectiveness of communication, as well as overall values of participants. They were able to find better points of convergence with others, became more self-confident, caused less conflict, and responded calmly in complex situations. Smaller changes were observed in terms of flexibility in conflict resolution due to the fact that few conflicts had reached a critical phase.

During our work with the students we confirmed our original hypothesis: that only an integrated approach, combining sociopsychological trainings with informational courses to working with teens, can defeat such destructive psychological qualities as xenophobia, extremism, and unbridled aggression. Only the implantation of positive behavioral models, together with the skills of constructive communication can help establish tolerant behavior in society.


The project on adaptation, tolerance, and positive cross-cultural communication at Admiral Makarov State Maritime Academy in St. Petersburg began in 2010. The Academy is one of the largest maritime educational institutions in Russia, and trains highly skilled specialists in maritime occupations for work in Russia and abroad. In addition to completing the prerequisite coursework through specialized trainings, students gain the skills of intercultural communication that allow them to function successfully in shipping and drilling companies that work in highly diverse environments around the globe.

The Academy has exercised an important role in domestic migration policy through strengthening interregional links and cooperation in the educational sphere. The proportion of nonresidents (both from other regions within Russia and abroad) among first-year Academy students is growing annually, and in 2011 reached about 80 percent. The most notable demographic within that proportion
is the enrollment of students from Ingushetia. The president of the Republic of Ingushetia, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, and the rector of the Academy, Valeriy L. Mikheev, signed an agreement on a special project for educational exchanges between regions. Since 2009, 30 students from Ingushetia (29 male and one female) were enrolled in the Academy, and under the agreement, this number will increase each year. Besides providing educational activities for students from Ingushetia, the Academy also provides complementary lectures and workshops for easier adaptation and integration of Ingush students into St. Petersburg society since 2010.

In addition to giving newcomers the tools for easier adaptation and integration, the most important mission of the project is to form a “common identity” with other students (to become makarovtsy, or academy students with shared goals and standards of excellence during their education and later). Students from Ingushetia face great challenges adapting and integrating. Ingushetia is predominantly Muslim, with a high birth rate and among the highest rates of unemployment in the Federation at between 46 and 55 percent. It is the second poorest region in Russia, a traditional agricultural area subsidized largely from the federal budget. At present, it is an ethnically homogeneous region in part due to an unstable climate since the 1990s, a complex geopolitical situation, unsolved latent border conflicts, and widespread ethnonational and religious extremist and terrorist activity. The area is also characterized underdeveloped market institutions and traditional gender relationships.

The pilot project at the Academy was created by Drs. Galina Bardier, Andrey Gretsov, Marya Rozanova, Anastasia Azbel, and Sergey Akopov. The main purpose of the project is to provide an adaptation and integration framework for students from other regions of Russia, particularly from Ingushetia, into the multicultural environment of the Admiral Makarov Academy and St. Petersburg as a whole. Project objectives are to extend the identity “repertoire” of students from Ingushetia to include their new profession (“seaman,” makarovetz) and their new living environment, as well as to reduce potential conflicts.
From the outset of the project, experts studied the Republic of Ingushetia, its history and traditions, as well as special cultural features of students from the North Caucasus region. The latter information was obtained from general materials in the area of cross-cultural communication and specific conclusions of studies carried out in relation to students from North Caucasus republics at the universities of Samara.⁵⁰ According to these studies, at the initial stage of interaction with representatives from other ethnic groups and cultures, these students are characterized by secrecy, isolation, keeping to their own ethnic group, a high level of anxiety, insecurity, and mistrust of their new environment.

Project designers had to take into account that the majority of students have no experience in intercultural communication, or in living in an urban environment. For them the new situation can be described as “cultural shock.” In this regard, the first meetings with students are organized in a friendly conversational mode in the form of a round table or tea party. We decided that this setting is the most appropriate, since students come from conflict-ridden environments and being open with us is difficult. At this first stage of the project, the goal was to set a precedent for comfortable communication to engage students into discussions about their interests and concerns.

**Preliminary Observations**

General results of interviews and discussions after the first two months of work with the students were very interesting. Students did not withhold their opinions, so researchers obtained a more or less “clear” picture. The following observations are focused on the group’s adaptation process.

One of the students’ main concerns was their religious practice. Most of the students had visited mosques at home once a week and some as often as every day.

Most students said that in their culture women were not allowed to work as equals to men, and must follow a certain dress-code (for
example, trousers and jeans are not permitted to be worn). Their job is to stay home and take care of the family, they said. Most had a negative attitude toward the governor of St. Petersburg, Valentina Matvienko, because she occupies a man’s position. According to them, only men can rule and occupy leading political and administrative positions.

All students from Ingushetia expressed a very strong belief that they should marry only “their own women,” or “Muslim women.” The reasons for such belief were first, personal preference, and second, their families would not accept inter-faith/interethnic marriages.

The general observation was that the higher educational level of the students the more “liberal” their outlook. For the most part, the students displayed compassion and had a certain degree of flexibility and high levels of sensitivity. A strong element in the Ingush culture is respect for elders, and proscriptions against most unhealthy habits (e.g., smoking and drinking). Unfortunately a common problem for many students was the lack of familiarity with compromise building and thus a tendency to respond to perceived aggression, disrespect, or the unknown with defensive or aggressive maneuvers. In brief, such behavior confirms our apprehension that natives coming from regions with higher rates of conflict have difficulty adapting to a more “peaceful” way of life of St. Petersburg.

Some students were relatively open, disciplined, tolerant, flexible, loyal, motivated, ready for new experiences, and put a lot of effort into succeeding in their education, while others expressed high conflict potential, resistance, apathy, and intolerance. Many expressed difficulties following academic discipline and obeying orders by authority figures. Most students showed a strong tendency toward self-segregation on ethnic bases. In addition, they demonstrated “fragmented narrow identity.” Mostly, they consider themselves Ingush men and inhabitants of Ingushetia (based on territorial and ethnic bases) but not citizens of the Russian Federation (‘Rossiane’).

The project on adaptation consists of three main parts: an information block comprised of lectures, round table conversations,
and counseling; a psychological block made up of lectures and counseling (orientation); and a social psychological part consisting of role-playing and workshops. As of this writing, the latter had not yet been implemented and assessed.

The information block includes basic themes on St. Petersburg as a multicultural city as well as on the maritime profession. Besides the general lecture on history, traditions, and cultural specificities of St. Petersburg as a unique multicultural, multiethnic, and multireligious city, lectures on the positive role of different ethnocultural groups, and the 135-year history of the Academy, a number of topics were tailored to the Ingush students. Thus, we took into account the historical, cultural, socioeconomic, and religious context of the North Caucasus region. Special attention was paid to issues that could cause culture shock or difficulties in interpretation, such as tolerance in a diverse society; gender equality; “connections” (clan system); freedom and its limits; authority; success in life and appropriate methods for its achievement; individualism and collectivism; and religious issues. The challenging part for the experts/facilitators was being able to discuss these sensitive issues in a politically correct manner. In addition, meetings with young successful seamen who have graduated from the Academy and are engaged in brilliant careers served as a highly effective motivational tactic.

The psychological block included basic knowledge on cross-cultural communication in a diverse environment, a general description of manners and customs in St. Petersburg, and general rules for everyday life (how to deal with other students, particularly women; how to behave on the streets or in dangerous situations, etc.). Included was a special segment on conflict prevention and conflict resolution in a comparative format (students and experts compare possible conflict situations and different ways to resolve them in St. Petersburg and Ingushetia). A better understanding of the “other’s” lifestyle and foundation building for the “common ground” takes place in this segment. As an initial common-ground builder for the students, the Academy uses co-education, teamwork practice,
and courses on adaptation and cross-cultural competence to create situations in which the interaction of various groups and individuals would be in the context of broader group identities. We can consider this to be the “matreshka effect” when we can construct different levels of self-identification (mararovetz, “St. Petersburger,” “Russian citizen,” etc.). The more identities that are formed, the greater the possibility for common ground and positive tolerant behavior to emerge.

As mentioned previously, the final (social psychological) element in the project is in development. We plan to work on its formatting after we better understand this group of students and can objectively see potentials and real problems that require attention. This stage might also include art therapy, a nonverbal method that can help remove cultural differences between the target group and facilitators.251

Concluding Remarks

At present, the Academy and STRATEGIA coordinates with Lemka S. Izmailova, the education minister for the Republic of Ingushetia, to establish a system for sociocultural preparation of prospective students from Ingushetia who are bound for study in the Academy (or other universities in Russia). We have discussed the idea of transferring psychological techniques on cross-cultural communication and adaptation methods directly to psychologists from educational institutions in Ingushetia. Ideally teachers in sending areas would train prospective students before they move to other regions of Russia, and implement the first two blocks from the course on cross-cultural communication. Within the orientation part, teachers can provide specific advice on how to respond correctly in psychologically difficult situations. In this case, the practical experience gained by facilitators and psychologists during project implementation at the Academy is quite valuable. It helps in identifying common problems students face, roots of miscommunication, causes of conflicts, and so on. In the future, psychologists from Ingushetia could participate in educational and methodology seminars, with an introduction into
new effective methods of preventing and resolving conflicts, including methods on how to establish positive cross-cultural communication.

The first steps in building such a systematic complex approach to interregional cooperation in the educational sphere had already been taken in the spring-summer of 2011. Makarov Academy under the supervision of Minister Izmailova and Rector Mikheev opened a maritime class in Ingushetia scheduled to start in September 2011. The class is designed so that the students can take special classes on future possible professions as well as on the history and culture of St. Petersburg two years before enrolling in the Academy. In June 2011, STRATEGIA board members, Drs. Gretsov, Rozanova and Azbel, hosted special seminars for Ingushetia secondary school counselors and psychologists, and held information exchange meetings with parents and students going to St. Petersburg and Moscow universities. In May–December 2011, TV programs—both in St. Petersburg and Ingushetia—were broadcast to influence mass opinion on the educational migration to St. Petersburg as well as highlight possible risks and methods of adaptation for future students.

Moreover, on the basis of our work with the non-resident students upon learning about their needs for better adaptation, the brochure “Discover St. Petersburg” was published for all non-resident students in St.Petersburg. The brochure was prepared by the Admiral Makarov State Maritime Academy together with the NGO “Center for civic, social, scientific and cultural initiatives “STRATEGIA” with the financial support of the St. Petersburg Committee for Youth Policy and Cooperation with Public Organizations.

The brochure provides basic information on St.Petersburg and highlights its uniqueness as a multicultural metropolis, as well as the role of youth in the city. In the section “How to become a Petersburger,” the authors highlight the psychological nuances and complexity of the initial phase of adaptation young people face after newly arriving in St. Petersburg, as well as rules and principles of intercultural communication. The section “Youth St. Petersburg” contains information about the youth policy and the main activities
of the Committee for Youth Policy and Cooperation with Public Organizations, as well as Internet resources that highlight interesting youth projects and activities.

The practice of initial social psychology trainings on cross-cultural communication and orientation seminars for prospective students is almost never used in Russia. Moreover, it is very rare for university administrations to contract professional counselors and other specialists in ethnocultural communications and education, who could assist these students in adapting and integrating into the new sociocultural environment. As a result, we have seen rising levels of interethnic tensions in student communities, as well as with teaching staff and administrators, as well as cases of maladaptation or maladjustment of students who withdrew into criminal circles or extremist/pro-extremist groups based on ethnic or/and religious affiliation.
ENDNOTES


4 Ibid.


Twenty percent of the Russian Federation’s total import and export freight volume passes through St. Petersburg, including 52 percent of imported goods brought to Russia by maritime transport. St. Petersburg houses facilities of major transnational companies, such as Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Gillette, Wrigley, Electrolux, American Tobacco, Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte, Toyota, Ford, and Philip Morris Izhora. As of this writing, plans were underway for factory construction in St. Petersburg by auto industry giants such as Nissan, General Motors, Suzuki, and Hyundai (St. Petersburg Committee for Economic Development, Industrial Policy and Trade, www.cedipt.spb.ru).


This term highlights the dynamics of modern migration patterns (the migrants tend to migrate more than once and to different destinations) as “the coexistence of different migration communities with differing levels of commitment to any given place.” Ruble, *Creating Diversity Capital*, 207.

Proof of this fact may be found in the Russian historical experience, namely the crisis in the early twentieth century. At that time, there were slogans such as, “Only the proclamation of the doctrine of ‘Russia for the Russians’ and nationalism that is consistently and comprehensively applied to all reforms could save our motherland from disintegration and anarchy... Anyone who cares about what is good for the country must be radically nationalist...” (Moskovskie vedomosti
16 Vladimir Zorin, deputy director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Science (the Institute monitors ethnic and religious conflicts), said, “We tried to check whether there is a relationship between the increasing tensions in the labor market and rising tensions with regard to migrants. It turned out that the dependence is not observed at the regional level, but only at the federal level. For example, last year the tightening labor market increased by 11 percent and the level of hostility toward migrants by 15 percent.... In Moscow the gap is even more notable—tension in the labor market increased by 1 percent, while the level of migrantophobia increased by 28 percent!” (http://www.ng.ru/regions/2010-05-28/5_we.html).


18 In European countries, the income ratio of the richest 10 percent and the poorest 10 percent is mostly between 6 and 9 (Austria, 4.4; Germany, 7.1; Greece, 8.5), and in the United States (until the mid-2000s), 10 to 12. In tsarist Russia, this ratio surpassed 25. According to the Moscow Branch of the Federal State Statistics Service, the ratio in the capital reached 47 in recent years. Ksenofobiya v sovremennom mire [Xenophobia in the contemporary world], edited by V.A. Achkasov and D.Z. Mutagirov (St. Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo S.-Peterburgskogo universiteta, 2008), 67. Demands for social justice have grown apace with the growing gap between rich and poor in Russia. The interpretation of inequalities in ethnic terms has become especially popular, that is, equating “poor” with “Russian” and hence its opposite, “rich” and “non-Russian.” V. Malahov, Ponaehali tut... Ocherki o natsionalizme, rasizme i kulturnom plyuralizme [Newcomers... Essays on nationalism, racism and cultural pluralism] (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2007), 24.

According to Valeriy A. Achkasov, “This sort of conspiracy theory enables the masses to cope with frustration, and elites to direct anger at the grassroots to ethnic ‘scapegoats’, rather than to allow them to attack the real culprit—the ruling class. Therefore, Russian nationalism in modern Russia is ... an ... expression of popular anger at the massive impoverishment of the population and the growth of social injustice.” Achkasov, “Etnicheskaya ksenofobiya i migratsionnye protsessy v sovremennoi Rossii [Ethnic xenophobia and migration processes in modern Russia]” Paper presented at conference Ksenofobiya i drugie formy neterpimosti: priroda, prichiny i puti ustraneniya [Xenophobia and other forms of intolerance: nature, causes and ways to address them], St. Petersburg State University, 2007.

20 Results of regular surveys conducted from April 1997 to November 2009 by the Levada Center identify the dynamics of change in attitudes among Russian citizens regarding labor migration in Russia (http://www.levada.ru/press/2009120704.html). Survey respondents were asked: “How do you feel about the fact that in Russia the construction sites are increasingly occupied by workers from Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and other countries in the ‘near abroad’?” Survey results showed little change in the dynamics of negative/more negative attitudes toward migrant workers. The proportion of respondents who had negative/more negative attitudes fluctuated between 27 and 38 percent, and in November 2009 that figure was 35 percent. Also relatively stable in this period was positive/rather positive assessments, with the exception of December 2002, when the proportion reached 30 percent.


22 The contradictory nature of ethnonational policy was related to the specifics of state territorial organization, and second, the system of ethnic preferences. The Soviet administrative division of the country and creation of a large number of national republics in the USSR contributed to the permanent bases of regional nationalism. N. Aleksyeev, “Sovetskii federalizm [Soviet federalism],” *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost’* 1 (1992): 117–118. Other issues were the practice of using the passport system to impose ethnic identification, and privileges in the republics for titular ethnicities against a background of unofficial restrictions for “Russian speakers” and Jews. V.A. Achkasov, *Etnopolitologiya* [Ethnopolitics] (St. Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo S.-Peterburgskogo universiteta, 2005), 116. These potential and real inequalities among citizens based on their origins and ethnic identity created barriers between peoples and individuals and could not be obliterated by propaganda on the benefits of a united Soviet people.

23 The term “ethnic majority” is based on E.A. Pain: “not only Russians ..., but also those culturally close to them... [including] Slavic diaspora groups and many other ethnic communities of European origin, living in Russia.” For example, Pain does not consider Russians to be the ethnic majority in some republics of Russia, but rather an ethnic minority group. Pain, *Rasputitsa: Polemicheskie razmyshleniya o predopredelennosti puti Rossii* [Thaw: Polemical reflections on the predetermined path of Russia] (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo «Rossiiskaya politicheskaya entsiklopediya,” 2009), 129.

24 Ibid., 131-132.


26 Pain, *Rasputitsa*, 131–133.

27 Zevelev, Budushcheye Rossi.


30 Ibid.

31 On August 6, 1990, Boris Yeltsin made a statement in Kazan to the leaders of the titular republics: “Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow.” From August through October of that year, the “parade of sovereignties” began—Declarations of State Sovereignty of the Karelian ASSR (August 9, 1990), the Komi Republic (October 11, 1990), the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (August 31, 1990), the Udmurt Republic and the Yakut-Sakha SSR (September 27, 1990), the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, JSC Adygei (October 7, 1990), the Buryat Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (October 7, 1990), the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (October 11, 1990), the Kalmyk ASSR (October 19, 1990), Mari ASSR (October 22, 1990), the Chuvash Autonomous Republic (October 24, 1990), the Yamalo-Nenets (October 17, 1990), the Gorno-Altai (October 10, 1990), and the autonomous districts of the Irkutsk region (October 26, 1990), among others.

32 A.V. Sidorenko, “Etnicheskii vyov rossiiskomu federalizmu [Ethnic challenge to Russian federalism],” *POLITEKS*, 1 (2009), available in Russian at: http://www.politex.info/content/view/538/30/, provides numerous examples of how the republics departed from existing Federation law, as well as future legislation. Two such examples follow: Buryatia, Komi, Tuva, Bashkortostan, Kalmykia, Karelia, North Ossetia, and Ingushetia established procedures for imposing a state of emergency in respective territories without the consent of the Russian president and the Federation Council; and Dagestan, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Tyva, Ingushetia, and Komi declared their respective rights to regulate matters of foreign policy and international relations, including international treaties.


34 Sidorenko, “Etnicheskii”.


36 Often these processes are correlated with higher levels of xenophobia (including ethnophobia). A St. Petersburg expert in the field of ethnosociology, Z.V. Sikevich, indicates the following prerequisites for the rise of xenophobia: (1) A threat to ethnic cultural identity (e.g., “Russification” in the national republics).
During a period of cultural blending or mixing, the archaic value of “bloodline... naturally becomes almost the only [element of] self-worth, and alone can provide psychological stability in difficult social circumstances (because the main function of ethnic identity is protective).” _Ekstremizm v srede peterburgskoi molodezhi: analiz i problemy profilaktiki_ [Extremism among young people in St. Petersburg: analysis and problem prevention], edited by A.A. Kozlov (St. Petersburg, HIMIZDAT 2003), 124. (2) During the period of nation-building, “the clan or tribal affiliation still dominates” (e.g., in Afghanistan and Chechnya, where the war against the “common enemy” consolidated Afgani and Chechen ethnic identity (p. 115). (3) Socioeconomic crisis creates a sense of humiliation of ethnic dignity.

37 Pain, _Rasputitsa_, 140–141.


40 Sidorenko, Etnicheskii.

41 M.N. Guboglo, “Etnopoliticheskie i sotsial'no-kul'turnye usloviya formirovaniya grazhdanskih solidarnosti [Ethnopolitical and sociocultural conditions for the formation of civic solidarity].” In _Molodezh' Moskvy: Adaptatsiya k mnogokul'turnosti_ [Moscow Youth: Adaptation to multiculturalism] (Moscow: Rossiiskii universitet druzhby narodov, 2007), 91.

42 Chzhan, _Krizis proekta stroyit'sta “rossiiskoi natsii”_.

43 But it should be emphasized that not all migrant workers are the objects of negative attitudes. For example, migrants from Ukraine and Belarus who do not belong to “visible minorities” are more or less welcome in most migrant-receiving regions of Russia. The explanation here is that major reasons for negative attitudes toward migrants do not include competition in the labor market (only 4 percent of respondents who did not like migrants said they took the jobs of locals), but rather different codes of behavior, strong adherence to preserving their own traditions, and lower cultural and educational levels (available at: http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematiceskii-arkhiv/item/single/13515.html?no_cache=1&cHash=3a09c9a3bb) (accessed on July 29, 2010).

44 See the official website of the Young Guard (transliterated, Molodaya gvardiya), a youth wing of United Russia, http://www.molgvardia.ru/nextday/2009/01/19/3871.

45 For example, on October 31, 2008, the leader of the Movement against Illegal Migration (actively involved not only in promoting anti-immigrant propaganda, but also escalation of ethnic conflict, such as the Kondopoga pogrom in 2006), Aleksandr Belov, stated that the Young Guard’s current initiative indicated that the “Movement was on the right path in its pioneering role vis-a-vis immigration issues” (available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_7701000/7701916.stml). Moreover, the Young Guard and the Movement
share perspectives on a number of issues regarding migration policies, labor migration, and necessary measures in times of crisis.

Leaflets distributed by the Movement against Illegal Migration on May 1, 2009 in Nizhny Novgorod during the Russian Labor March stated: “United Russia would legalize millions of immigrants by refusing to impose a visa regime for Transcaucasia and Central Asia. And this despite the fact that 60 percent of the Russian population favors limiting immigration and supporting its own citizens who suffer in times of crisis. Making use of legal loopholes and supporting corrupt officials, ethnic communities have captured the most important spheres of influence and actively displace Russians in the labor market. Inordinately inflated prices and lack of housing are the main reasons that most Russian families cannot afford more than one child. As a consequence, Russians in Russia are declining by one million a year. Approximately the same number of immigrants annually migrate to our country. Our demands: ... Down with immigration! Give work primarily to the indigenous population! Stop unlimited labor immigration to Russia! Introduce a visa regime with the Caucasus region and Central Asia!”


49 The table shows data for all ethnic groups of Russia with populations over 250,000 (excluding major ethnic groups of new independent states—the Ukrainians, Belarusians, and so on—since a change in their number is strongly dependent on migration).


51 The definition of “mass” for internal migration is very relative. Russians move house an average 1.5 times in a lifetime. Compare this to the United States, where residents move house an average of 13 times, and in the United Kingdom, 7 times. In 2009, there were 1.7 million internal migrants in the Russian Federation, which corresponds to the level of 1897. Moreover, according to the Levada Center, nearly half of all Russian citizens do not believe that there is a need for any migrants, including internal ones (http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=266&uid=13536).

52 An All-Russia sociological survey titled “Inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations in the Russian Federation: key trends, the role of migration, school, society, and government,” conducted by the Foundation of Public Opinion in late 2008.
shows that the intensity of ethnic prejudices and xenophobic sentiments is often reduced in regions where the proportion of ethnic minorities in the population is traditionally high, and is rising in regions with predominantly monoethnic populations (http://www.ng.ru/regions/2010-05-28/5_we.html).

Generally speaking, the cultures of the Caucasus region are characterized as closed, traditional, and communal, whereas other cultures, especially for people living in the middle and northern regions of the country, are characterized by greater moderation, openness, discretion, and individualism. G.U. Soldatova, Psihologiya mezhetnicheskoi napryazhennosti [Psychology of inter-ethnic tensions] (Moscow: Smisl, 1998), 224–226.


In 2010, this research project by the Network of Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflicts, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, was closed. More recent data are not available.

Byulleten’ Seti etnologicheskogo monitoringa i rannego preduprezhdeniya konflikтов [Bulletin of Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflicts Network], 85 (May–June 2009), 125–126.


Bastrykin: Na Severnom Kavkaze idet yedva li ne voina.


Monoethnicization occurs when a region loses ethnic diversity due to the outflow of ethnic groups other than the titular ethnic group (in this context) or similar cultural groups.

Many experts (including Russian demographers Dmitry Bogoyavlensky and Anatoly Vishnevsky, as well as leading specialists Aleksandr Dzadziev and Valery Tishkov) have expressed doubts on the reliability of 2002 Census data on the population of the North Caucasus region in general, and of the Chechen Republic in particular. According to V. Tishkov, the number of ethnic Russian population (not including temporary troops stationed in the region) in the Chechen Republic could not exceed 18,000 (not more than 2 percent of the total population of the Republic).

Murders of nontitular ethnics, especially Russian families, in the Ingushetia and Chechen Republics were at least partially aimed at terrorizing all members of nontitular populations.


For example, in Moscow a gang of “Transcaucasian nationalists” called Black Hawk was organized, whose members were connected exclusively to the Azerbaijani diaspora. The gang consisted of about 10 law students (ages 17 to 19) enrolled in Moscow universities. On May 6, 2008, the gang attacked young men of Slavic appearance in the Moscow metro. Officially, the main reason for the attacks was in reaction to skinhead activities (Infox.ru, June 16, 2009, available at http://infox.ru/accident/incident/2009/06/16/V_Moskvye_nachalsya_.phtml).


78 Y.Y. Karpov, “Etnosotsial’nye transformatii v usloviyah migratsionnykh protsessov (na primere Dagestana) [Ethnosocial transformation in terms of migration (the example of Dagestan)].” In Severnyi Kavkaz v natsional’noi strategii Rossii [Northern Caucasus in the Russian national strategy], edited by V.A. Tishkov (Moscow: FGNU “Rosinformagroteh”, 2008), 114.


80 Sizov, interview.


83 Kozhevnikova, Pod znakom politicheskogo terrora.

84 Al’perovich and Kozhevnikova, Leto 2010 goda.

85 Kozhevnikova, Pod znakom politicheskogo terrora. See also Al’perovich and Kozhevnikova, Leto 2010 goda.

86 The great divide lies not between ethnic Russians and other ethnic/national minorities. Acute anti-Caucasian sentiment is shared by people of various nationalities, including many among the Caucasian peoples themselves. The conflict is not so much interethnic but intercultural in nature. On one side there is a fractured, atomized internationalist majority wishing to speak and think in Russian, but to live as Europeans. On the other are closely knit ethnic communities whose members want to receive all the benefits of modern society while simultaneously retaining their traditional values. See V. Antipin, M. Ahmedova, Y. Vishnevetskaya, A. Molodyh, and D. Sokolov-Mitrich, “Nesvarenie naroda [Indigestion of people],” Russkii reporter [Russian Reporter], 1(180) (January 20,
These numbers were provided by Sergey Girko, head of All-Russia Research Institute, Ministry of Internal Affairs, in an interview published by the newspaper Kommersant 202(4502), October 29, 2010, available in Russian at: http://kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1530470.

All-Russia Public Opinion Research Center, press release no. 1659.


Dunaeva, for example, emphasizes that migrants are at risk. She argues that “[t]his raises a global issue of social responsibility, not only for our own citizens, but also for those who try to join this society from the outside. Foreign citizens often have no shelter, no means of livelihood. If they are provided with normal living conditions, there would be less crime.” “Ser’eznye prestupleniya migranty sovershayut drug protiv druga—ekspert [Serious crimes committed by migrants are against each other—an expert],” Baltiiskoe informatsionnoe agenstvo [Baltic news agency], July 7, 2010, available at: http://www.baltinfo.ru.


In 2001, the Russian Federation government approved funding for the Promotion of Tolerance and Prevention of Extremism in Russian Society Program (2001–2005). Despite the small budget (only 25 million rubles per year), for first several years a number of achievements were recorded, including establishment of basic techniques (including methodology for calculating the index of tolerance, which allows measurement and comparison of the level of social tension among regions), principles of media content analysis (including hate speech) were developed, and methods for diagnosing expressions of intolerance on the Internet were created and tested. In spite of these achievements, the program was prematurely closed in 2004 due to its “inefficiency” (read financial inefficiency). After the federal program was shut down, the regions had to develop and fund their own programs for xenophobia and extremism prevention.

Ibid., 192.

Ibid., 188.


“Information and analytical materials...”, 2009.


This term highlights the phenomenon of modern international migration—migrants tend to migrate more than once and to different destinations—which leads to “the coexistence of different migration communities with differing levels of commitment to any given place.” Blair A. Ruble, Creating Diversity Capital: Transnational Migrants in Montreal, Washington, and Kyiv (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 207.


Note that commuting (“pendulum migration”) or cases of people who move to the city from Leningrad Oblast and live there permanently without official registration are excluded from official migration statistics.

“V Sankt-Peterburge rabotaet bol'ee 730 tysyach inogorodnih rossiyan.”


“Peterburg perepolnen gostarbaĭterami: prirost 200 tys. v god” [St. Petersburg is full of migrant workers: an increase is 200 thousand per year] Baltiiskoe informatsionnoe agenstvo [Baltic news agency], October 1, 2009 (available in Russian at: http://www.baltinfo.ru/2009/10/01/Peterburg-perepolnen-gastarbaiteramiperirost-200-tys-v-god-107461

Svetlana Kovalenko, “S VIChem—vyselim, tuberkulez i sifilis—polechim” [We will deport those with HIV, and treat those with tuberculosis and syphilis] (includes

Unfortunately, data on ethnic composition is not well organized nor comprehensive, in part because such information is not accessible to the general public. These numbers are usually presented by Migration Service officials at press conferences or interviews.

E.V. Tyuryukanova, report delivered at meeting of the Scientific Council, Federal Migration Service, Moscow, April 10, 2009.


“Kolichestvo nelegalov v Peterburge nyeizvestno nikomu—migratsionnaya sluzhba” [No one knows the number of illegal immigrants in St. Petersburg—Migration Service], Baltiiskoe informatsionnoe agenstvo [Baltic news agency], July 30, 2009 (available in Russian at: www.baltinfo.ru).


According to a poll conducted in 2006 by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) in St. Petersburg, 72 percent of respondents observed the ethnic clashes. In 2008, Alexander Prokhorenko, chairman of the St. Petersburg Committee on Foreign Relations, asserted that approximately 85 percent St. Petersburg residents were “under stress due to cultural differences between indigenous people of the northern capital and migrants.” E. Poletaev, “Migrantov nauchat zhit’ po-piterski” [Migrants will be taught to live in St. Petersburg], Nevskoe vremya [Neva times], April 2, 2008.

Beginning in 1890, the city’s suburbs were included in population statistics. N. Chistyakova, “Naselenie severnoi stolitsty” [Population of the North capital], Naseleniye I obschestvo [Population and Society], no. 163–164 (August 2004), Table 1: http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2004/0163/tema01.php

In Sankt-Peterburg: Rossiiskaya imperiya protiv rossiiskogo haosa. K probleme
Vladimir Kantor opposes the concept of “empire” as synonymous with or incorporating “despotism.” Empire is focused on building a new political and social order that would include peoples of different cultures and religions. In contrast to despotism, based on total oppression and thorough control over all subject peoples, the Russian Empire under Peter the Great used co-optation of local elites and their “social assimilation, where the local ruling elites were not destroyed, not ostracized, not deprived of their privileged position (of course, there were always exceptions), but were included in the ruling classes in Russia, while maintaining, as a rule, their religion, and their special rights and privileges. In exchange, they had to faithfully serve the great sovereign.”


122 Kantor, Sankt-Peterburg, 72–81.


126 Kantor, Sankt-Peterburg, 106.


128 However, in this case, it is worth mentioning that “aliens” have included privileged people, such as the Germans who “have traditionally played an important role in the Russian army and state apparatus, [and] figured prominently in the Russian economy since the 18th century.” T.M. Smirnova, “Gosudarstvennaya politika v otnoshenii natsional’nyh men’shinstv Peterburga: Istoriya i sovremennost’” [Public policies on national minorities of Petersburg: Past and present], in Petersburg—nash obschii dom: Materialy nauch.-prakt. konferentsii (Konferentsii “Vklad natsional’nogo kul’turnykh ob’edinenii Sankt-Peterburga v razvitie goroda”
29 noyabrya 2002; “Sankt-Peterburg v sud’bah narodov Rossii” 28-30 oktyabrya 2003 g.) [St. Petersburg is our common home: Proceedings of conferences (Conferences “The Contribution of the national-cultural associations of St. Petersburg into development of the city” November 29, 2002; “Saint Petersburg in the lives of the peoples of Russia”, 28-30 October 2003)] edited by T.M. Smirnova (St. Petersburg: “Dialog”, 2007), 156. Other elites included Tatars. A long history of coexistence between the Russians and Tatars’ more secular culture allowed Tatars to become involved in the state government, and in the cases when Tatars’ converted to Orthodoxy, they could be eligible to be included in the ruling classes in Russia. Among them were many famous influential families, including the Shirinsky, Shakhmatov, Meshchersky, Apraksin, Naryshkin, Yusupov, and Turgenev clans. N.A. Baskakov, Russkie familiy tyurkskogo proishozhdeniya [Russian names of Turkic origin] (Moscow: Nauka, 1979).

129 Smirnova, Natsional’nost’—piterские, 18-20.
130 Romanova, Natsional’no-kul’turnye obshchestva Sankt-Peterburga.
135 Romanova, Natsional’no-kul’turnye obshchestva Sankt-Peterburga.
136 The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs Narodnyy komissariat vnutrennikh del, NKVD (The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) was the public and secret police organization of the Soviet Union that directly implemented law enforcement as well as political repression during the era of Joseph Stalin. For more details, see http:/ /en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NKVD.
137 Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union. In effect, the Politburo was a self-perpetuating body that served as the executive branch of the Soviet Union, and its decisions had the force of law. It was also known as the Presidium from 1952 to 1966, and functioned as the central policymaking and governing body of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. For more information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politburo_of_the_Central_Comp<ref>et Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.</ref>

Rabzhaeva and Semenkov, “Kakaya identichnost’ u zhiteleye Sankt-Peterburge?”


For more information, see S.V. Magaeva and V.B. Simonenko, Statistika zhertv leningradskoi blokady [Bulletin of the victims of the Leningrad blockade], Sankt-Peterburgskii universitet [St. Petersburg State University], 8 (3794) (May 6, 2009), available in Russian at: http://www.spbumag.nw.ru/2009/06/6.shtml.


Rabzhaeva and Semenkov, “Kakaya identichnost’ u zhiteleye Sankt-Peterburge?”


Smirnova, Russkii yazyk; Peterburg—nash obshchii dom, 238.

The change in economic system in the post-Soviet period, collapse of the Leningrad system that integrated academic and industrial complexes, and insufficient government support of higher education and cultural activities have produced numerous crises, resulting in mass emigration. According to Goskomstat, in the 1990s, 250,000 people emigrated from Russia every year. Included were 100,000 to 125,000 highly skilled professionals. In 2006, more than 65,000 highly qualified specialists left Russia to work abroad (44 percent of these from St. Petersburg and Moscow alone). M.V. Stolyarov, “Migratsionnye protsessy v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v kontekste zakonodatel’stva i natsional’nykh interesov” [Migration processes in Russian Federation in the context of legislation and national interests], in Sovremennye migratsionnye protsessy: sostoyanie, problemy, opyt gosudarstvennogo i obshchestvennogo regulirovaniya [Modern migration: situation, problems and experience of state and social regulation], edited by A.V. Ponedelkov, A.V. Starostin, VV. Rudoi, S.S. Zmiyak (Rostov-on-Don: Izdatel’stvo Severo-Kavkazskaya akademiya gosudarstvennoi sluzhby, 2008), 46.

L.B. Kogan, Byt’ gorozhanami [To be city dwellers], (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo “Mysl”, 1990), 147.
According to B.A. Achkasov, “If we take into account the ethnic diasporas that have already formed in St. Petersburg, more than 25 to 30 percent of people living today in St. Petersburg belong to the non-Slavic language groups” (Peterburgskaya identichnost’ [Petersburg identity], in Etnokalendar’ Sankt-Peterburga 2009 g. Ethno-Calendar of St. Petersburg -2009, St. Petersburg: ZAO “Fregat”, 2008. Pp. 184-192.

Achkasov states that according to various estimates, in 2004 and 2005, from 800,000 to 1.2 million immigrants arrived, primarily from the Caucasus region and Central Asia (Achkasov, Peterburgskaya identichnost’). Religious composition is rapidly changing as well. Spiritual Board of Muslims in St.Petersburg indicate that about 20 percent of the residents of St. Petersburg are Muslim. See: Million musul’man ometet Kurban-baĭram v Peterburge [Million of Muslims will celebrate Eid al-Adha in St. Petersburg], News agency “Neva24”, November 5, 2011. Available in Russian at: http:/ /www.neva24.ru/a/2011/11/03/Karban-bajram-bajram/

A person who, owing to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry, or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country. The definition covers inter alia those persons who have entered a transit or host country lawfully but have stayed for a longer period than authorized or subsequently taken up unauthorized employment (also called clandestine/undocumented migrant or migrant in an irregular situation). The term “irregular” is preferable to “illegal” because the latter carries a criminal connotation and is seen as denying migrants’ humanity. International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Glossary on Migration,” International Migration Law Series, No. 25 (2011): http:/ /www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/key-migration-terms/lang/en#Irregular-migration

Smirnova, Natsional’nost’—piterkie, 36.


For more information, see Romanova and Mikhailenko, *Natsional’nye oshchestva Sankt-Peterburga*.

The Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg is a standing effective supreme and sole legislative (representative) body of the state authority in St. Petersburg.


The notion of “diaspora” is very controversial. In this work, the term is used in the way discussed by A. Kim. According to Kim, diaspora is an ethnopolitical phenomenon is grounded in minorities living outside the territories of their historical origin and outside the ethnic majority with a number of characteristics such as multiple national/ethnic identity, which assumes the existence of ties with both the new country of residence and the historical (ethnic) motherland; establishment of institutions to ensure the preservation and development of ethnic and cultural identity and the articulation of ethnic interests; existence of a strategy for interaction with political institutions of both the new country of residence and the historical (ethnic) motherland; and attempts to establish certain forms of ethnopolitical self-determination (national-territorial or national cultural autonomy, formation of an independent state, irredentism). A. Kim, “Etnopoliticheskoe issledovanie sovremennoy diaspor (konfliktologicheskii aspekt)” [Ethnopolitical study of contemporary diasporas (conflictology aspect)], Abstract, Doctorate of Political Science diss., St: Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University, 2009.

A.G. Vishnevskii, “Raspad SSSR: etnicheskie migratsii i problema diaspora” [Collapse of the USSR: ethnic and migration issues of diaspora], *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost* [Social Sciences and Modernity], no. 3, 2000.


A clear definition of the term “ethnic enclave” emerged in 1985 when Alejandro Portes and his colleagues “developed the concept theoretically and brought it to the forefront in our understanding of the labor market experience of marginalized workers, particularly immigrants.” Darity, Jr., William A., ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 2nd ed. (New York: Thomson Gale, 2008), p. 3. An ethnic enclave can be defined as “immigrant groups, which concentrate in
a distinct spatial location and organize a variety of enterprises serving their own ethnic market and/or the general population. Their basic characteristic is that a significant proportion of the immigrant workforce is employed in enterprises owned by other immigrants.” (Ibid.) In this work, I use the concept of enclave formation as presented by Herbert J. Gans. According to Gans, “[E]nclaves are seen as places settled by racial, ethnic, religious, or other minorities that are not stigmatized by the ... majority but self-segregate themselves, for example because they share a language, culture, or nationality. True, such minorities, other than very orthodox religious ones, generally do not seek total self-segregation.” Gans, Herbert J. “Involuntary Segregation and the Ghetto: Disconnecting Process and Place.” City and Community 7, no. 4 (December 2008): 353-357. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6040.2008.00271_2.x

161 The notion of “ghetto” in contemporary sociology is still very opaque, complex, and even metaphoric. Here I rely largely on the concept as presented by Herbert J. Gans and William J. Wilson. Gans points out that “the ghetto is a place to which the subjects or victims of the involuntary segregation process are sent,” which means that the main criterion in defining a ghetto as such is that people are involuntarily segregated (Ibid., 354, 357). In his book, The Truly Disadvantaged (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), Wilson provides a broader definition of ghetto by pointing out the economic nature of ghettoization. The ghetto is related to concentrated poverty; thus it can be both racial and economic. To be classified as a “ghetto,” according to L. Wacquant, the entire range of essential constituents should be present: stigma, constraint (boundaries), spatial confinement, and institutional parallelism.”Ghetto,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, edited by N.J. Smelser and P.B. Balter (London: Pergamon Press, 2004). Also, it is usually correlated with economic disadvantage (Chaddha, A. and Wilson, W. J. (2008), “Reconsidering the ‘Ghetto.’” City & Community 7, no. 4 (December 2008): 388. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6040.2008.00271_7.x

162 For more information about the activities of various ethnic diasporas in St. Petersburg, see http://eng.spbdn.ru/index/multinationalspb/nazSMI/.


164 Ibid., 178.

165 Ibid., 181.
Western-style ghettos are characterized in this way: “First, the minority group must be readily identifiable. Second, the group must be kept physically isolated by the majority, which has the power to enforce the isolation. Third, institutions emerge within the ghetto to provide services that ghetto residents cannot otherwise obtain from the outside world. A distinct ghetto culture may also emerge” (Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, eds., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd ed., vol. 3 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Western ghettos “are generally characterized by neighborhood and household poverty, social isolation, segregation, discrimination, overcrowding, increased crime, neighborhood disinvestment, and political disempowerment” (William A. Darity, Jr., ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd ed. (New York: Thomson Gale, 2008), 313. For more information, see “Symposium on the Ghetto,” City & Community 7, no. 4, (December 2008): 347-398.

Most migrant workers do not have many social and business contacts with the local population. For Russian employers the process of attracting foreign workers and managing them is much easier if the ethnic composition of migrant workers is not complicated and closer to the monoethnic one. Mikhailov V.A., Kalinina KV., Dashmirov A.F., Pistryakova S.A. “Adaptatsiya i integratsiya etnicheskikh migrantov kak faktor priyodoleniya mezhnatsional’noi napryazhennosti” [Adaptation and integration of ethnic migrants as a factor in overcoming ethnic tensions], in Sovremennye migrationnye protsessy: Sostoyanie, problemy, opyt gosudarstvennogo i obschestvennogo regulirovaniya [Contemporary Migration Processes: Situation, Problems and Experience in State and Societal Regulation] edited by A.V. Ponedelkov, A.V. Starostin, VV. Rudoi, S.S. Zmiyak (Rostov-on-Don: Izdatel’stvo Severo-Kavkazskaya akademiya gosudarstvennoi sluzhby, 2008): 240-241.

This attempt by government entities to construct a new identity for St. Petersburg residents is fully consistent with the ideas of Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper that the modern state is one of the most important agents of imposing identity “from the outside,” because the state (in Pierre Bourdieu’s terms) has a monopoly (or seeks to monopolize) on symbolic power that identifies and categorizes “to state what is what and who is who.” Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond Identity,” *Theory and Society* 1, (2000): 15. This power is fully present in St. Petersburg regional policy and overall public relations messages on tolerance.

Hanley et al., eds.. *Immigration and Integration in Urban Communities*, p. 1.


Speech by the St. Petersburg Committee on Foreign Relations chair, A.V. Prokhnorenko at a government council meeting (March 2, 2010). Available at http://www.kvs.spb.ru/?p=fakti_i_tcifri_1075.


Section 6. Improving legal provisions in the field of interethnic relations in St. Petersburg. Facilitation of adaptation and integration of migrants into the cultural and social space of St. Petersburg.


According to a statement on May 21, 2009, by Alexander Bastrykin, head of the Federation Attorney General Office’s Investigative Committee, most people belonging to ultraradical groups are minors (under 18 years of age), as are most perpetrators of hate crimes. Available at: http://kp.ru/print/article/242974/491818.

For foreign students, such events included “The Golden Autumn” festival and a forum titled, “Palette of Languages and Cultures,” and for secondary school students, “The Culture of Peace for the Cultural Capital of Russia.” In 2009, all schools in St. Petersburg participated in the latter city-wide event, which ran from May through December.
Examples include “Russia—Our Common Home,” “Interethnic Dialogue: The Role of Youth,” “Sports and Nationalism,” and “Problems of Tolerance in the Modern School.” For an account of selected round tables, see the Center for Civil, Social, Scientific and Cultural Initiatives “STRATEGIA” at http://www.org-strategia.org/projects_03_en.html.

Organizing tournament competitors on racial/ethnic bases was a mistake. One of the first games concluded with fighting. Organizers of all subsequent games ensured that teams were ethnically/racially mixed.

Examples include “Tolerance: This Applies to Everyone,” “Tolerance and Intolerance in Contemporary Society: Perspectives and Reality,” “Tolerance as a Common Value in the Era of Globalization,” “Problems of Tolerant Cooperation between Political Youth Organizations and Government Institutions,” and “Ethnic Clashes in a Multicultural Student Environment and Ways to Resolve Them”.

Examples include An Ethnic Calendar for St. Petersburg, depicting various ethnic celebrations and traditions, and the book, Tolerance as a Way of Life.

Examples here included public service ads on the streets and in the subway system, and a series of television and radio announcements and programs, and print media spots and announcements.

Examples include “The Power of Words: Language and the Culture of Tolerance in Journalism,” “Migrants and the Local Community,” “Constructive Dialogue—The Path to a Tolerant Society,” and “Non-violent Methods of Struggle against Manifestations of Intolerance.”


Ibid., 3.


“Pravozashchitniki nedovol'ny hodom yrealizatsii programmy “Tolerantnost” v Peterburge.”

Ibid.


See http://www.hro.org/node/8529.


The city of St. Petersburg was awarded honorable mention for the UNESCO Madanjeet Singh Prize in November 2009 “for its constructive efforts to promote the principles of mutual respect and tolerance in a multicultural urban community.” St. Petersburg House of Nationalities, “UNESCO Bestowed an Honorary Award on St.Petersburg, for the Activities To Promote the Ideas of Tolerance,” news release, October 22, 2009, http://eng.spbdn.ru/index/news/unesco_bestowed_an_honorary_award_on_stpetersburg_for_the_activities_to_promote_the_ideas_of_tolerance.html.

“Oseyevskii: V Peterburge ne budet Kodeksa peterburzhtsa”

St. Petersburg Government Decree on December 22, 2009, Number 148-p on measures aimed at increasing the level of culture and social responsibility, and behavioral change of residents. Available at: www.assembly.spb.ru.

According to the city government’s Culture Committee, signs of “lower cultural
level” are: (1) Intolerance in the broadest sense of the word, such as disrespect for older people, people of other ethnic groups, and disabled people. (2) Aggression as a form of communication becomes the norm. (3) Vandalism targeting both architectural masterpieces and newly built sports facilities becomes common. (4) A sense of impunity vis-a-vis violations of basic social and cultural norms. (4) Public drunkenness. (5) Abusive language (e.g., liberal use of profanity at home and in public).


212 Ibid.


215 Alyab’eva, V Bagdade vse spokoino.

MIGRATION PROCESSES AND CHALLENGES IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA


218 Under the *jus sanguinis* principle, a person’s nationality at birth is the same as that of the natural parents, as opposed to *jus soli*, under which a person’s nationality is determined by place of birth.


221 Integration is a complex phenomenon that includes both the preservation of a certain cultural integrity in a group and the desire of the latter to become an integral part of a larger community. When this strategy is widely accepted, then several different ethnic groups will cooperate within a larger social system. Barkan, ed. *Immigration, Incorporation, and Transnationalism*, 187.


224 Garland et al., eds. *Immigration and Integration in Urban Communities*, p. 2.

225 Ibid.

226 Ibid.


228 Hanley et al., eds., *Immigration and Integration in Urban Communities*, p. 11.


230 For information on the European Council principles, see http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=610.


232 Akopov and Rozanova, *Identichnosti v epohu global’nyh migratsii*. 


For more information on round table participants and agenda, see Center for Civil, Social, Scientific and Cultural Initiatives “STRATEGIA” website, at: http://org-strategia.org.swteh.ru/projects_03_en.html.

During this time, a panel discussion took place with the following local experts: Galina Bardier, professor, Department of Psychology, Nevsky Institute of Language and Culture, St. Petersburg State University Center for Tolerance; Anatoly Kozlov, professor, Department of Sociology, St. Petersburg State University, full member of the Academy of Science; Tamara Smirnova, professor, St. Petersburg State University, Aerospace Instrumentation, director of St. Petersburg House of National Cultures, Marya Rozanova, associate professor, Faculty of Law, North-West Academy of Public Administration, head of the Center of Civil, Social, Scientific and Cultural Initiatives “STRATEGIA”; and Antuan Arakelian, European Commission, Council for the Commissioner of Human Rights in the Russian Federation (ombudsman).

The four projects/programs presented follow: “‘Other’ Is Not a Synonym for ‘Bad’” by the St. Petersburg youth political union “Apple”, “Festival of Friendship” by the St. Petersburg youth organization of the regional branch of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia; “Harmonization of Interethnic and Intercultural Relations” by the St. Petersburg branch of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration; and “Lessons of Friendship” by the political organization “Nashi”.

Gretsov is associate professor in the Department of Developmental and Educational Psychology, Herzen Russian State Pedagogical University, St. Petersburg. Since 1998 he has worked with secondary school students, developing psychological diagnostics, organizing trainings and workshops for the students, and as a counselor. He is the winner of numerous national and regional academic awards, including the national “Golden Psyche—2005” for his work “Practical Psychology for Youth.” He has authored numerous scientific papers and monographs as well as popular books on youth psychological challenges, socialization of adolescents, and conflict resolution, including *Learn How to Overcome Conflicts* (St. Petersburg: SPbNII fizicheskoi kulturi, 2008), *Psychological Workshops for Adolescents* (St. Petersburg: Piter, 2008), *Practical Psychology for Boys* (St. Petersburg: Piter, 2009), *Practical Psychology for Girls* (St. Petersburg: Piter, 2005), and *Practical Psychology for Teenagers and Their Parents* (St. Petersburg: Piter, 2006).

Azbel is assistant professor, Department of Developmental and Educational Psychology, Herzen Russian State Pedagogical University, St. Petersburg. Since 1998 he has worked with secondary school students, developing psychological diagnostics, organizing trainings and workshops for the students, and as a counselor. He is the winner of numerous national and regional academic awards, including the national “Golden Psyche—2005” for his work “Practical Psychology for Youth.” He has authored numerous scientific papers and monographs as well as popular books on youth psychological challenges, socialization of adolescents, and conflict resolution, including *Learn How to Overcome Conflicts* (St. Petersburg: SPbNII fizicheskoi kulturi, 2008), *Psychological Workshops for Adolescents* (St. Petersburg: Piter, 2008), *Practical Psychology for Boys* (St. Petersburg: Piter, 2009), *Practical Psychology for Girls* (St. Petersburg: Piter, 2005), and *Practical Psychology for Teenagers and Their Parents* (St. Petersburg: Piter, 2006).
Somova is an associate professor, Department of Developmental and Educational Psychology, Herzen Russian State Pedagogical University, St. Petersburg. For many years she has been working with psychological diagnostics and counseling of students and their parents at secondary schools in St. Petersburg. Author of more than 25 scientific works; she is also the recipient of multiple grants provided by the St. Petersburg government, including “Development of Social Tolerance among Young Adolescents of St. Petersburg” in 2006. She is a certified trainer under the program Reading and Writing for Critical Thinking (RWCT) provided by Open Society Institute, International Reading Association, and the University of Northern Iowa.

This category is not homogeneous, as it includes the children of migrant workers who have been working in Russia for a long time and brought their families with them, as well as the children of migrants from North Caucasus region.

According to the report at year-end 2008 by Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev, in Russia the total number of young people belonging to informal extremist groups during the previous four years totaled about 202,700. Available at: http://www.infox.ru/accident/crime/2008/12/24/skinhead_mvd.phtml.

This conclusion is based on our first “pilot” experience in schools in 2007 when we tried to use traditional teaching (“preaching”) methods, which were complete failures in practical implementation. This led us to dramatically change our approach to active involvement techniques, which include elements of the classical Socratic method.

The program included a short thematic complex focused on the overall personality development of the teenager. Our hypothesis was that given an inclination toward xenophobia, combined with living in an environment of dangerous propaganda, an undeveloped personal ego identity and weak communication skills result in the use of aggression as a means to solve problems in the absence of other behavioral strategies. In short, people are afraid of the “other” when they do not understand themselves.

We continually appealed to the personal experience of participants. Examples of questions used on the role of migration follow: “Who among you does not have immediate ancestors who were migrants? Were all of your parents and grandparents born in St. Petersburg?” “The city needs population growth of no less than three children per family. How many of you have two or more siblings?” On all the questions mentioned above, an average of only three or four people in the class gave a positive answer. Thus, we concluded that the development of St.
Petersburg without large-scale migration would be simply impossible.

247 Cited by V. I. Mukomel’, Ksenofobiya i nasilie v Rossi: sovremennye i gryadushchие vyzovy [Xenophobia and violence in Russia: Current and future challenges], Vestnik Instituta Kennana v Rossi, 16 (2009), 29.

248 Galina Bardier, professor of psychology at Admiral Makarov State Maritime Academy in St. Petersburg, co-authored the conceptual foundations of the Tolerance-1 program and played an active role in implementing events within the program. She is the author of Azbuka tolerantnosti [Alphabet of Tolerance] (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo “Utus”, 2007), and the coauthor and editor of the book Tolerantnost’ kak obraz zhizni: Uchebno-metodicheskie posobie [Tolerance as a way of life: Instructional book ] (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Yutas, 2008). She has wide-ranging professional experience in the field of ethnic psychology.

249 Sergey Akopov, PhD (candidate) in political sciences, and currently is an associate professor (docent) at the St.-Petersburg North-West Institute of Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. Sergey is the author of over 50 papers and book chapters published in Russian, English and Spanish on anthropology and communication, and international conflict resolution. His latest book, coauthored with Marya Rozanova, is Identichnosti v epohu global’nyh migratsii [Identities in an era of global migration] (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo DEAN, 2010) As a certified expert on the history and culture of St.-Petersburg he has been conducting lectures for the students from Ingushetia on ethnic diversity and history of intercultural relations of St. Petersburg. For more see: www.sergakopov.com.


252 For more information, see STRATEGIA, available in Russian at: http://org-strategia.org.swteh.ru/projects_07.html.


255 For more information, see STRATEGIA, available in Russian at: org-strategia.org