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### **Human vs. State Security:**

How can security sector reforms contribute to State-Building? The case of the Afghan Police Reform

**Florian Weigand**

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Development Studies Institute

London School of Economics and Political Science

Houghton Street

London

WC2A 2AE UK

Tel: +44 (020) 7955 7425/6252

Fax: +44 (020) 7955-6844

Email: [d.daley@lse.ac.uk](mailto:d.daley@lse.ac.uk)

Web site: [www.lse.ac.uk/depts/ID](http://www.lse.ac.uk/depts/ID)

## **Abstract**

The paper analyses how security sector reforms (SSRs) can contribute to state-building. It is argued that successful state-building requires an endogenous political process which aims at creating political legitimacy instead of certain ideal type Western state structures. In a conflict-torn society this demands security for citizens – an environment in which they feel safe and protected – allowing them to express their opinion freely and participate in a state-building process. The example of the Afghan police reform illustrates that a state-centric SSR is in danger of delegitimising and destabilising the state. In contrast, a human-centric security approach is more likely to support an endogenous process of building legitimate institutions.

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## List of Abbreviations

ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
ATN	Ariana Television Network
CoPP	Coordination of Police and Prosecutor
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
DFID	Department for International Development
EU	European Union
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
FDD	Focused District Development
G8	Group of Eight
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HRW	Human Rights Watch
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PTRO	Peace Training and Research Organisation
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RPG	rocket-propelled grenade
SSR	security sector reform
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

## 1. Introduction

“Violence can never do more than protecting the boundaries of the political realm. Where violence penetrates the political realm itself, that is the end of politics.”<sup>1</sup>  
Hannah Arendt (1965:20)

Since the end of the Cold War and the evolving danger of ‘new wars’ and international terrorism an increased involvement of Western countries in building state institutions in developing or ‘failed’ regions of the world can be observed. In the early 2000s the concept of ‘state-building’ and the instrument of ‘security sector reform’ (SSR) had already become catchwords of development, defence and foreign policy. By now SSRs have taken place across the world, for example, in Aceh, Afghanistan, Burundi, El Salvador, Colombia, Kosovo, Nepal and Southern Sudan.

The academic discourse on state-building is determined by scholars like Fukuyama (2004) and Rotberg (2004) who focus on creating Western-type rational-legal structures which extend the state’s capacity of public good delivery and promise legitimacy by improved performance. However, a growing number of scholars such as Holsti (1996) and Lemay-Hébert (2009) argues in favour of a more socio-political understanding in order to ensure that institutions are embedded in society and have political legitimacy. Even though both streams regard SSR as the core instrument of building a state its contribution has never been fully analysed. Furthermore, the interplay of the concepts of human and state security which underpin the concept of SSR has rarely been looked at in this particular context.

This paper analyses these aspects and argues that the underlying concepts of human and state security are not in sync in the context of SSRs in conflict-torn societies and have a different potential of contributing to state-building. A state security-centric SSR may destabilise the state on the long term by protecting

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<sup>1</sup> This quotation was translated by the author as it is not part of the English edition of Hannah Arendt’s ‘On Revolution’ which is shorter than the German one (“Die Gewalt kann nie mehr, als die Grenzen des politischen Bereichs schützen. Wo die Gewalt in die Politik selbst eindringt, ist es um die Politik geschehen.”).

institutions which are not embedded in society. In contrast, a human-centric approach is more likely to make a positive contribution by providing a safe environment which allows people to become involved in an endogenous process of building legitimate state institutions.

In order to illustrate the impact of choosing human or state security as a guiding principle of SSR the police reform in Afghanistan is analysed. Whereas the European mission (EUPOL) provides trainings for police and supports a design which reflects a human-centric understanding and focuses on human rights, rule of law and accountability the US-dominated NATO mission (NTM-A) is state-centric which is in line with the 'War on Terror'. Due to American dominance the police is predominantly designed and trained in a paramilitary way to combat terrorism and protect the Afghan state with its institutions which were created according to the interests of outside actors and the Afghan elite. Therefore, the police protects a state and values which are not embedded in the Afghan society and cannot provide security for large parts of the population. Eventually the Afghan state is delegitimised and the space for an endogenous process of state-building is severely restricted.

## **2. Building a Legitimate State by Reforming the Security Sector**

### **2.1 State and Legitimacy**

As a starting point for analysing state-building it is necessary to define what a state is and when it is legitimate as this understanding serves as the goal of what state-building is supposed to achieve. In order to create a state which is embedded in and accepted by society not only appropriate legal structures and performance are required but also political legitimacy. Thus state-building should be based on a broad understanding of the state that acknowledges the need for an endogenous political process which also allows the creation of political legitimacy.

Two basic streams of understanding the state and its legitimacy have to be differentiated in the context of state-building. The most prominent approach focuses on institutional reconstruction and is based on Weber's idea of legal rational domination: "A compulsory political organization with continuous operation (*politischer Anstaltsbetrieb*) will be called a "state" insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the *monopoly* of the *legitimate* use of physical force in the enforcement of its order" (Weber 1968:54; emphasis in the original). In order to be able to uphold the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force the state has to provide security for the population. Thus legitimacy is seen as a means or condition for exercising authority. Scholars like, most prominently, Fukuyama (2004), Rotberg (2004), Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan (2005) and Hippler (2004) build on this theory and argue that state-building should be directed at creating rational-legal structures which extend the state's capacity of public good delivery in order to increase its legitimacy by improved performance. State-building is seen as a bureaucratic task of "attempting to replace one type of rules with another, so that formal bureaucratic rules of a Weberian type take precedence over informal rules rooted in patronage and clientelism" (Lister 2007:3).

The Weberian theorists basically view the Western state as a universal ideal for social order (Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2010; Jackson 2011). Some authors even describe the absence of Western institutions as a security risk in a globalised

world (see Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2010:35). Accordingly, societies without a typical state structure are often called ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ because they appear chaotic and without obvious institutions in place which can control violence and prevent it from spreading into the ‘peaceful liberal democracies’ in the West. But even though Western-type state structures have legitimacy in several countries, creating this kind of institutions does not ensure the same outcome. The reason for the wide-spread existence of Western state structures lies in the colonial history rather than in general acceptance. During the colonial period Western type state structures were imposed on many countries from the outside (ibid:34-36). After the end of the colonial period this state form became an inevitable requirement for participation within the international community and thus, also trade, grants, loans and development assistance. The consequence is that many of these societies have the burden of “making up for the consolidation of anticipated statehood”<sup>2</sup> (Siegelberg 1991:13). Building on Risse and Lehmkuhl it has to be accepted that the “monopoly on the use of force and its ability to enforce political decisions (...) represents the exception rather than the rule in terms of both history and space” (2006:4).

Hence it has to be questioned if legitimacy can be reduced to a means or a condition for exercising authority. Building on a more sociological understanding of the state legitimacy itself has to be recognised as a core element of state-building and criterion of state strength as it ensures that a state is embedded in society. Kaldor points out that “nowadays, state weakness is first and foremost a legitimacy crisis“ (2009:184) which is supported by a second strand of scholars like Barker (1990), Buzan (1991), Holsti (1995/1996), Lemay-Hébert (2009) and Pegg (1998). For example, Holsti argues that the strength of the state should be defined as “the capacity of the state to command loyalty – the right to rule” (1996:82) as a government also requires the acknowledgement of the right to govern (Barker 1990:56). Even though rational-legal legitimacy and performance legitimacy cannot be ignored in a process of state-building a state also needs a core political acceptance which cannot be achieved by improving performance and legal structures only. This acceptance is commonly termed ‘political legitimacy’

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<sup>2</sup> Translated by the author from German.



expressing the “support for political authority” (Kaldor 2009:186) and the feeling of citizens that the government is trusted and has the right to govern. Political legitimacy derives from a public discourse and involvement in the state-building process which exceeds aspects of procedural democracy like elections. Thus state and society cannot be separated and institutions have to be seen as a vehicle through which people seek to exercise power and which simultaneously exercise power and govern behaviour (Kukathas 2008). This understanding extends the Weberian concept and incorporates Durkheim’s idea of the state as an “organ of social thought” (1957:79). Thus state-building has to be seen as a socio-political task which cannot be achieved by looking at institutions only.

## **2.2 State-Building in Conflict-Torn Societies**

The current state-building discourse is very much policy-oriented and focuses on the (re-)construction of institutions in conflict-torn societies. Yet especially in conflict-torn societies where state-building is driven by outside actors the construction of Weberian states is problematic and likely to create a new layer of institutions which is not accepted by and embedded in society. In order to create political legitimacy the security of citizens and officials has to be ensured, creating an environment in which they feel safe and protected and allowing them to express their opinion freely and participate in a state-building process.

The current state-building discourse evolved in the 2000s from the peace-building debate which had been increasingly criticised by a number of scholars for under-emphasising the creation of state institutions to achieve peace (e.g. Chesterman 2004; Fearon/Laitin 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Krasner 2004; Paris 2004). In contrast to the general theoretical debate on states and their legitimacy this debate focuses on the reconstruction of political authority in conflict-torn societies outside Europe in times of a globalised world where external actors are involved actively and demand changes (e.g. in terms of a military intervention) (Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2010:34). Building on Paris and Sisk this new concept can be summarised as “a particular approach to peacebuilding, premised on the recognition that achieving security and development in societies emerging from civil war partly depends on the existence of capable, autonomous and legitimate governmental institutions” (2009:1-2).

Adopting the dominant approach to state-building by creating rational-legal structures in order to extend the state’s capacity of public good delivery and achieve peace is particularly problematic in a conflict-torn society. On the one hand, the attempt of building a Weberian state allows a straightforward operationalisation into policy as a clear goal is set. Thus state-building can be planned step by step in a project management approach with certain goals and milestones (e.g. improve living conditions and reform ministries) involving bureaucrats and military officers with mainly technical concerns. On the other

hand, many institutions in conflict-torn societies are likely to be based on informal personal ties. However, the depoliticised understanding ignores local history, institutions and power relations (Jackson 2011:1807). Furthermore, the involved international actors tend to create alliances with local elites and prominent NGOs, ignoring other voices in order to achieve their national interests such as global stability (Kouvo 2009:29-33). Building on Reno it has to be noted that

“most intervention administrations try to build parallel state institutions to provide security, deliver services, and mobilize citizens’ organizations. These actions can duplicate or even circumvent the efforts of locally popular substate groups in some instances. To the extent that substate groups are shut out of formal programs to rebuild state institutions, some local people may interpret that as the political marginalization of their communities” (2008:144).

Yet if a state-building process does not include society it can result in layers of institutions – which may be called ‘hybrid’ (e.g. Brett 2009; Lister 2007) – where introduced formal institutions are only the surface but where unchanged informal institutions govern the interaction within a society. Eventually, states are created which have a Western institutional façade and look like a democratic state but are ruled on the basis of elite-dominated informal institutions (Jackson 2011:1806). Thus, these states are nothing but ‘phantom states’ or ‘empty shells’ (Lemay-Hébert 2009) that are not legitimate as they do not represent the collective interest of their society (Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2010:49).

However, building new states which have political legitimacy is not impossible. Building on a Habermasian understanding creating political legitimacy requires first of all a secure public sphere, an environment in which civil society can discuss the rules governing relations. As Arendt points out this political realm has to be secure and in case of need has to be protected with violence in order to allow politics to take place (Arendt 1965:20). Applied to the context of state-building Rubin notes that “building legitimate institutions requires sufficient security for unarmed citizens and nonmilitary officials to participate” (2008:34) and similarly Kaldor argues that “security, in the sense of protection from violence, is at the heart of political legitimacy” (2009:188). Therefore, the international community could provide the required security in order to enable societies to create institutions endogenously which have political legitimacy. In contrast, technocratic

international approaches have to be considered as being one reason why state-building fails rather than being a valuable contribution. Yet also the difficulties of this endogenous approach have to be considered. Even though creating a secure public sphere is theoretically possible and feasible it requires international actors to put back their normative and strategic interests and allow a process of endogenous state-building without knowing how long it will take and what the result will look like. Nevertheless, it can contribute to the creation of a more stable international community and, therefore, fulfils the international interests on a long term.

### **2.3 Security Sector Reform: Human vs. State Security**

In parallel to the rise of the state-building concept the idea of reconstructing the security sector has evolved since the 1990s and was coined ‘security sector reform’ (SSR) in 1998 by Clara Short, the first British Minister for International Development (Brzoska 2003; Sedra 2010). The security sector may include “all those organisations which have authority to use, or order the use of, force, or the threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight” (Chalmers 2000:6). This broad definition incorporates the variety of understandings as, for example, in some but not all cases besides classic components like the police, intelligence and military also the judicial system is included. The concept’s origin in foreign, development and defence policy rather than academia still influences the current discourse. Even though SSR could be used to describe any reform of the security sector the term is predominantly referred to as the core instrument of state-building policy conducted by developed countries ‘abroad’ in conflict-torn society rather than ‘at home’ in developed countries (Sedra 2010:17; Hänggi 2004). Hence, the strong influence of external actors – like development agencies, military forces, private security firms and warlords – in the process can be seen as main characteristics of SSRs (Jackson 2010:120). It also lacks an agreed understanding of SSR and what the priorities should be as politicians and international organisations customise the concept according to their political interest (Hendrickson/Karkoszka 2002). However, the core goal of SSRs which is usually brought forward can be summarised as contributing to state-building by achieving “efficient and effective provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic governance” (Hänggi 2004:3; see also e.g. Ball et al. 2003; DFID 2003:30, OECD/DAC 2001:II-35; Wulf 2004).

Despite the popularity of SSR as a policy there are only few academic studies on this concept (Jackson 2011:1804). The claim regarding the importance of SSR in the context of state-building which is brought forward by donors and international organisations (e.g. DFID 2003:30; OECD/DAC 2001:II-35; UN Security Council 2007) has never been fully analysed and the relation between the underlying

concepts of human and state security has never been looked at in this context (Jackson 2011:1804). Building on Peake et al. and Jackson it has to be noted that the SSR debate is characterised by a “benign analytical neglect” (Peake/Scheye/Hills 2008) and “begins to look more like a constructed mythology than a coherent theory” (Jackson 2010:130). Even though state and human security can be seen as complementary concepts the relationship can be problematic in the context of conflict-torn societies which questions the core of the SSR concept.

The idea of state security which is also termed ‘national security’ evolved with emerging nation states in Europe after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Its understanding has varied according to the evolution of the nation state over the past centuries from a concept which focused on borders, war and military matters to the “absence of threats to acquired values” (Wolfers 1952:483) and the protection of national institutions (Paleri 2008:51-61). The idea of human security reflects a paradigm shift as it challenges these traditional notions of security by focusing on the human being as the subject which has to experience security rather than the state, the nation or other institutions. The current discourse is dominated by three different streams of understanding human security. On the one hand, the broadest definition is based on the UNDP Human Development Report of 1994 which coined the term ‘human security’, describing security as a condition for development. This developmental understanding of human security includes seven core elements ranging from economic to food, health, and political security (UNDP 1994). On the other hand, the narrowest definition is closely associated with the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and was adopted by the Canadian government. It focuses on the protection of people from large-scale violence like genocide and ethnic cleansing (e.g. Pitcher 2009). In the context of SSR and state-building, however, a understanding is required which is open to compromise and acknowledges the long-term development perspective but is focused on ensuring the physical security of human beings in conflictual environments. The third stream of understanding ‘human security’ which is based on a concept outlined by Kaldor emphasizes these aspects and focuses on the prevention of violence and the creation of an environment where people feel safe (Kaldor 2007; Kaldor et al. 2007; Kaldor et al. 2004).

Depending on the context and chosen definition of human and state security the relationship between the concepts has to be assessed differently (e.g. Alkire 2003:31-35; Dulic 2009; Law 2005). In a liberal democratic society the theories are usually understood as being in sync and in a relationship of dependency. From a Hobbesian point of view, for instance, which sees the sovereign state as the primary provider of security, everybody is secure as long as the state is secure (Krause 2007:13-15; Tadjbakhsh 2005:28). However, in contrast to the general perception that the two concepts are mutually reinforcing each other (e.g. Lawrence 2012:24) in the context of SSRs the relationship between human and state security can be problematic. Contradictions may appear as external actors and national elites are the key players in a country's state-building process. A focus on state security consequently ensures the protection of values and institutions that reflect the conception of outside actors and elites as well as the physical security of these particular groups. The state monopoly of violence might even be directed against most of the citizens in order to ensure the survival of an artificial state or to extract resources from society (Law 2005:15). As Law points out "the crux of the problem is that states tend to seek security for governments and elites, as opposed to the people that they are supposed to serve" (ibid.). In contrast, providing human security gives people freedom to create their own institutions on the expense of the protection of the existing state institutions. It also reduces the influence of external actors and national elites which are required to ensure state security on the long term. The tension between human and state security in the context of SSR therefore reflects the clash in state-building between enabling local ownership of the process and fulfilling the dominant interests and norms of outside actors and elites like planning certainty, stability and the compliance with norms (Jackson 2011:1809). Jackson illustrates that "international donors are very keen to see states adopt transparency and accountability, but (...) the citizenry may prefer to be safe" (ibid.) – at least on the short term. Thus, building on Wulf, it can be summarised that "the people-centred concept of human security ideally complements, but often contrasts or competes with the notion of state security, or even more narrowly the security of the political elite" (2004:2).

## **2.4 Contribution of Human and State Security based approaches to State-Building**

The tension between human and state security inherent in the concept of SSR requires that policy makers decide what to focus on. However, the two conceptions of security have different potentials of contributing to state-building. A focus on state security reflects the depoliticised Weberian approach to state-building and can destabilise the state and contribute negatively to a more sustainable process of building a state from the inside. In contrast, a focus on human security is more likely to allow an endogenous process of state-building which can create political legitimacy.

Conducting a state-centric SSR seems to be a welcome policy choice for international actors as it promises to fulfil their interests like controlling violence and preventing it from spreading by protecting newly created or apparently stable existing institutions against enemies. Even though this is commonly seen as a technocratic exercise (see Jackson 2011) the impact is highly political and likely to destabilise a state and therefore also contradicting international actors' interests in the long term.

A main reason for the negative contribution of a state-centric SSR to state-building is that it is likely to protect institutions which are not embedded in society. If state security is the primary goal and the first step in the attempt of building a state it can only ensure the protection of institutions which either existed before – and in a conflict-torn society are likely to be dominated by local strongmen – or which are imposed simultaneously by the international community in cooperation with the local elites. Thus this approach reflects a Weberian understanding of legitimacy as a means to an end. If the legitimacy is derived from the outside and elites it might allow the government to exercise authority without being accepted by major parts of the population which might even consider the state as extractive and abusive. However, as a consequence, the state lacks political legitimacy causing state weakness. The Weberian idea of increasing the performance legitimacy of the state by capacity building measures in the security sector, like handing out guns and providing trainings, is likely to raise the oppressive capacity of a state even further



and can reduce the state's accountability and acceptance. Particularly problematic in the context of state building is, additionally, the outlined negative impact on human security by protecting imposed institutions. Thus, eventually, the state is not only delegitimised but also the space for civil society to meet and voice concerns without danger is restricted, making an endogenous state-building process difficult or impossible.

Furthermore, the depoliticised idea of state-centric SSRs that protecting the state and increasing the state's capacity contributes to successful state-building is built on the questionable assumption of 'the state' being the only possible legitimate provider of security. Lawrence notes that "in both practice and theory, state-building tends to associate the state with order and stability and the non-state with chaos and insecurity, but this often distorts a more complex reality" (2012:5-6; see also Stepputat et al. 2007:11). In the absence of formal state-institutions often informal institutions exist which provide a basic degree of security but are, however, often determined by different norms and not necessarily based on the Western understanding of human rights (Fitz-Gerald 2004:8). This became, for example, apparent in Haiti, Sierra Leone and even more striking in Charles Taylor's 'Taylorland' in the northern part of Liberia (ibid.). Therefore, a state-centric SSR despite being considered a bureaucratic exercise is always political due to its impact on local power relations. Reno and Stepputat point out that the attempt of creating or extending a state's monopoly of violence challenges other actors who legitimise themselves by providing security (Reno 2008:156-168; Stepputat et al. 2007:5). Hence, extending the formal central state's influence by conducting a state-centric SSR necessarily requires the state to either enter into a power-sharing agreement with non-state actors or to reduce the power of non-state actors with violent means (ibid.). Replacing these informal security institutions with more formal and central state-based ones can therefore undermine public support and cause backlashes as well as an even higher degree of insecurity (Sedra 2010:108). Thus, the state is delegitimised further and the space for civil society to participate in an endogenous process of building legitimate institutions becomes even more restricted.

However, an SSR can also contribute to building a state in a way that acknowledges the socio-political dimension and the necessity of creating political legitimacy. Building on Patel this requires an SSR to “build the integrity of the security system, promote its legitimacy, as well as empower citizens, in order to transform an overall abusive system into one that both respects and promotes human rights” (2010:278). Hence the SSR has to be approached in a human-centric way, “emphasizing the security of individual citizens rather than governments or regimes” (Sedra 2010:104). Law points out that

“without a functional security sector, the state will not be able to provide the secure environment that is required to realize human security goals. Similarly, unless guided by a human security perspective, security sector reform risks generating a security sector that is not accountable to those it is supposed to serve and that can act oppressively towards them” (2005:20).

Some scholars criticise this idea and argue that is built on the assumption of ‘liberal peace’ that human security will prevent all conflicts and dangers (see Lawrence 2012:24). However, by adopting human security principles as a guiding framework an SSR can contribute to creating an environment which is more secure, allowing civil society to interact freely and become involved in a state-building process. Thus this approach enables civil society to create the kind of state institutions they want and accept, ensuring that the institutions also have political legitimacy. Even though this certainly does not guarantee peace it makes it more likely. Lawrence even argues that SSRs should aim at ‘non-state building’, improving the performance of existing non-state security providers in order to ensure human security (Lawrence 2012). Yet, more radical approaches like this one are in danger of favouring local elites and approaches despite possible violations of basic human rights.

## **2.5 Policy Dimension: EU vs. USA**

On the policy level the differences between a human and state security focus in SSR can be seen when comparing the European with the American understanding. Operationalised into donors' policies a state security approach to SSR is more pragmatic and short-term focused protecting the created state and its institutions from enemies. A human security approach, in contrast, has to be context specific, being guided by the intended effect of human security provision rather than fixed understandings of particular 'good' structures. Under specific circumstances, for example, informal security provision can achieve better results than a formal security sector. Rubin points out that "political interests affect the definition of security objectives and hence priorities among security tasks" (2008:39). Whereas the European SSR policy evolved from a human-centric development discourse the American approach is determined by the state-centric 'War on Terror'. Consequently the US prioritises hard security and military training as part of counterterrorism in contrast to the EU which focuses more on aspects like rule of law and democratisation.

The term 'SSR' evolved in British development policy and subsequently the development communities have been the key players in the further evolution of the concept within the EU (Albrecht et al. 2010:77; Wulf 2004). Thus an understanding was adopted in the OECD's key documents (see OECD 2005/2007) guiding the EU's SSR policy which predominantly sees SSRs as a pillar of development assistance and can be characterised as human-centric and 'holistic' (Ekengren/Simons 2011:6). It includes policy, judiciary, military and intelligence, is in favour of civil society support and argues for a 'multi-layered' approach which acknowledges that non-state actors often are de facto providers of security (Scheye/McLean 2006; Albrecht et al. 2010:77). However, this understanding is also criticised for 'developmentalising security' within international relations (Schnabel 2012:44-46).

In contrast, the US conception of SSR is state-centric and determined by foreign policy focusing on counter-terrorism. The attacks of 9/11 sounded the bell for the

'War on Terror' and for a process Sherman describes as a 'militarisation of foreign policy' (2010:59). Hence SSRs are predominantly seen as an instrument to support the fight of those who are perceived as enemies of the USA and the state institutions which are created in the context of state-building efforts. These enemies can be neighbouring countries but also insurgents within a country who do not accept the created institutions. Thus SSRs are closely tied to exit strategies after international interventions and are supposed to prepare national forces to take over the tasks of American soldiers (Albrecht et al. 2010). The approach can be therefore be characterised as "technocratic" (Jackson 2011:1806), pragmatic and short-term focused.

### **3. Methodology**

In order to illustrate the impact of choosing human or state security as a guiding principle of SSR on state-building the police reform in Afghanistan is analysed. The case study is based on primary as well as secondary research. Information on the general perception of the Afghans on the police and security was gained from secondary resources, mainly surveys which were conducted by UNDP and The Asia Foundation. However, the results of perception surveys in Afghanistan which are based on large samples have to be treated with caution. The surveys are rarely representative as they can only be conducted in secure areas like province capitals. Furthermore, results are falsified as people are often afraid of participating and researchers are usually paid per completed survey form (Wardak, interview 05/07/2012). Thus, in order to confirm the impressions obtained from the surveys further information was gathered by conducting personal interviews with involved officials as well as civil society representatives who are meant to be the driving force of the Afghan state-building process. These exploratory interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way. The results extend the available survey-based information as they provide an in-depth impression of the problems which are seen by the involved internationals as well as Afghans in the context of reforming the police. Yet the information obtained still is limited as the selection of interview partners was restricted due to availability and language requirements. All interview partners agreed on their statements being used, however, some interviewees did not agree to being quoted or referred to by name, position or a specific quote (see Appendix for a list of the interviewees as well as the consent forms). Thus the information used does not always mention the people who provided it.

## **4. The Afghan Police Reform**

### **4.1 State-Building and Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan**

“The Americans teach the police how to shoot.  
The Europeans teach the police when not to shoot.”  
(common saying in Kabul)

The analysis of literature has shown that the Weberian approach to state-building is problematic in the context of conflict-torn societies as the created institutions might lack political legitimacy and are unlikely to be embedded in society. In theory more holistic alternatives are on the rise which focus on more endogenous processes of building state institutions. However, it has not been fully analysed yet how SSRs as the main instrument of state-building can actually contribute successfully and what the impact of a human or state security focus is. This essay argues that a state-centric SSR is likely to destabilise the state, reflecting a Weberian understanding and contributing negatively to state-building on the long term. In contrast, a human-centric approach is more likely to make a positive contribution by opening up space for endogenous state-building processes. This, however, is less feasible in foreign policy and, therefore, more difficult to achieve in practice.

Afghanistan serves as a useful case study to illustrate the argument as it has recurrent state crises (see e.g. Giustozzi 2009:69-80) and is the largest international project of state-building with a strong focus on SSR. The USA alone has spent an estimated \$89.48 billion on reconstructing the Afghan state since 2002 (SIGAR 2012:53). But the EU is also involved and has committed some €8 billion (community and member states combined) for the period 2002-2010 which allows a comparison of the different approaches in reforming the security sector (EU 2009:1). Due to this exceptionally high international engagement and Afghanistan's long history of war the results of this case study certainly are difficult to compare and therefore of limited explanatory power for other contexts. However, the results are not meant to be transferrable but rather serve as an example illustrating the impact of focusing either on human or state security in SSRs on a state-building process. The police reform as a component of SSR is a

particularly vivid example showing how different guiding principles translate into practice and eventually affect the state-building process. Whereas the military reform is mainly conducted by the USA alone both the EU and the USA are involved in reforming the police with contrary approaches. However, as there is a dominance of the USA the Afghan police is designed to participate in counter-insurgency activities and trained in a paramilitary way. Hence, the police protects a state and values which reflect outside actors' and the Afghan elite's interests but cannot ensure security for major parts of the population. This state-centric approach to SSR reduces the trust of the Afghan population in the police and eventually the state and reduces the space for civil society to become involved in state-building.

After the 9/11 attacks the Bush administration and its coalition partners began the global 'War on Terror' with the 'Operation Enduring Freedom' in Afghanistan in October 2001. Once the Taliban regime was toppled an 'International Conference on Afghanistan' with some of the Taliban opposition key figures and members of the international community took place in the German city of Bonn in December 2001 in order to decide on how to organise the country's future. The conference resulted in the 'Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions' – which is also known as the 'Bonn Agreement' – as a road map for building a democratic state. However, the Bonn Agreement and subsequent approaches emphasised the process of building a democratic state structure rather than a democratic substance. Tadjbakhsh and Schoiswohl point out that "by being formalistic and institution-based, they remained remote from the daily realities of the people and thus remained top-down approaches dependent on popular 'buying-in'" (2008:259). The USA made democracy – which was explicitly defied in a procedural way as having an elected government – as the goal of state-building in Afghanistan in order to create a stronghold against terrorism and allow the withdrawal of the American forces (Rubin 2006:184). At a G8 conference in Geneva in 2002 the main international actors who were involved in Afghanistan agreed on conducting an SSR and introduced a 'lead nation' approach. Under this plan the US was assigned to reform the army, Germany the police and Italy the judiciary while Britain became engaged in counternarcotics and the UN in the demobilisation.

#### **4.2 The EU – A Human Security Approach to Reforming the Afghan Police**

Building on the German approach the EU has been involved since 2007 in creating an Afghan police which is integrated and supported by civil society, serving the Afghan people. Thus, the current concept with its focus on human rights and literacy reflects a human-centric conception of SSR. Due to the comparatively low funding and small number of delegated European police officers the strategy, however, is superimposed by the US approach.

Police development assistance had already been provided by the Federal Republic of Germany as well as the German Democratic Republic in Afghanistan in the 1960s and 1970s (Bayley/Perito 2010:19). During the intervention of the USSR a Soviet police system was introduced which was built on a two-track system of career officers and short-term patrolmen who served in the police force instead of joining military service (ibid.). In 2002, however, after many years of war, only about 50,000 police officers were left who were mostly illiterate (an estimated 70-90%), untrained and ill-equipped (Farid Hamidi, interview 24/07/2012). Furthermore, most people were working for local strongmen rather than the national government (Bayley/Perito 2010:19). Germany as the leading nation for the police reform attempted to introduce a European-type police training including a three-year university-like education for a high rank track and a one-year training for officers in a middle rank scheme (ibid:20). Yet Germany sent only nine instructors in 2002, increasing the number to 74 in 2005, investing only €13 million in the first year and even less in the following years in the creation of the Afghan National Police (ANP) (Friesendorf/Krempel 2011:11). Despite the Afghan Interim Authority's aim of creating a police force of 70,000 officers by 2006 only 3,600 police officers had been trained by Germany up to then (Bayley/Perito 2010:20; Friesendorf/Krempel 2011:11).

Due to these shortcomings in 2007 a European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) was set up and became the 'lead nation' in police assistance in order to support the German efforts with officers from other European countries (Behr 2012:44-45; Friesendorf/Krempel 2011:13). EUPOL's official goal is "to support the



Government of Afghanistan in taking responsibility for strengthening the rule of law, and in particular, in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity” (EU 2010:1). A senior EUPOL officer summarised the overarching goal as “transforming a green into a blue police” (EUPOL official, interview 01/07/2012), thus, turning a militarized force into a community police where decision makers are accountable to society.

In order to achieve this EUPOL provides different trainings and programmes which are either funded by the EU or national governments, predominantly Germany and the Netherlands. A core pillar of the European mission is, for example, a training for senior officers and train-the-trainer programmes which address issues like conflict management, leadership and media relations. According to EUPOL an estimated 4,000 officers had attended a course at the ‘Police staff college’ until July 2012 (EUPOL 2012:2). Additional literacy courses which last one year and can be attended voluntarily on a part-time basis are offered by the German development organisation GIZ. In July 2012 5,500 officers had finished one of the literacy courses while a further 7,200 were in training (GIZ official, interview 04/07/2012). Furthermore, EUPOL attempts to transform the units of particular police districts from extractive into serving police units by introducing principles of community-based policing with additional training and mentoring in order to achieve a ‘police service’ (EUPOL 2012:2). This has happened, for example, in Mazar-e Sharif, Kunduz and Bamyan. A third pillar of EUPOL Afghanistan is the rule of law, addressing a demand which is brought forward by civil society organisations (Rafiee, interview 05/07/2012). The project ‘Coordination of Police and Prosecutor (CoPP)’ is supposed to offer joint trainings for police officers and prosecutors in order to enhance cooperation and the coordination of procedures (EUPOL 2012:2). In addition, the police detective TV series ‘Detective Amanullah’ is produced whose broadcasting by Ariana Television Network (ATN) started in June 2012. The TV crime story is to explain how police works and build trust by presenting typical police tasks like dealing with corruption, domestic violence or environmental pollution (EUPOL official, interview 01/07/2012; GIZ official, interview 04/07/2012). Even though the EUPOL approach can be considered an important step towards human security its

reach has to be questioned as the number of international EUPOL staff varies between 350 and 400 only with an annual budget of €50 to €60 million (EUPOL official, interview 01/07/2012; Najafizada, interview 04/07/2012). Thus the well-funded American approach is dominantly shaping the Afghan police forces.

#### **4.3 The USA – A State Security Approach to Reforming the Afghan Police**

The current involvement of the USA in the Afghan police reform is a striking example of the implementation of a state security approach. Due to the priority of fighting terrorism the US is predominantly interested in stabilising the co-created and now existing state of Afghanistan with its current institutions, but subordinating their accountability as well as how the underlying power relations affect the people. Thus, the police reform is approached in a technical way with a focus on extending the capacity of the forces by providing weaponry and training the police officers in handling them.

Due to the looming slow progress and the fact that Germany did not train low rank officers the USA started an additional police training called ‘Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan’ (CSTC-A) for building and training the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in 2003 investing \$224 million in the first year (Friesendorf/Krempel 2011:11). 20,000 police officers underwent the comparatively cost-efficient American training until 2004 allowing to achieve a total number of 71,147 trained officers in July 2007. However, the quality standards were much lower compared to the German programme. Most trainees were selected without vetting and received a five-week training by untrained English-speaking instructors of the private security company DynCorp with poorly trained translators (ibid:12). Due to the additional problem of illiteracy most officers still cannot perform basic police tasks like writing reports (Bayley/Perito 2010:21). In 2009 CSTC-A was integrated into a US dominated NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) as part of the NATO military command structure with the purpose of uniting training components of all countries conducting police trainings besides the EU (Friesendorf/Krempel 2011:23). Due to these efforts the number of ANP officers had increased to 149,642 by March 2012 (Livingston/O’Hanlon 2012:6) so that there were 491.92 ANP officers per 100,000 population which is one the highest rates in the world and well above the mean of 341.8 (Harrendorf/Smit 2011:135-36). However, the policing quality of the graduate police officers and, therefore, the quality of the American approach in general still has to be questioned.

The NTM-A is officially supposed to increase “the capacity of Afghan security forces in order gradually to hand over lead responsibility for security to the Afghans” (NATO 2010:1). The main mechanism for training the forces of the ANP has been the Focused District Development (FDD) programme in which all officers are withdrawn from a certain district at a time for a two-month training (Friesendorf 2011:85). During these two months the officers receive new weapons such as 9 mm pistols, AK-47s, light machine guns as well as RPGs (ibid:86). Out of the eight weeks of training seven weeks provide the officers with military tactics and skills like the use of weapons, reducing literacy and basic police training to one week (ibid.). Friesendorf points out that furthermore “training on community and democratic policing as well as domestic violence and women’s rights was removed from the FDD curriculum and replaced by military training” (ibid.). This concept of building and strengthening the ANP can therefore be summarised as an approach of militarisation, creating a paramilitary police force. A senior EUPOL officer summarised the US approach as “conducting an infantry training in order to create an infantry division” (EUPOL official, interview 01/07/2012).

In 2010 the Afghan Local Police (ALP) was created with support from the USA which is meant to consist of “village watch teams representative of, and accountable to (...) local communities that seek to defend themselves against the insurgents” (NATO 2010:2) in order to “compensate for shortfalls in the ANP” (ibid.). The idea of community policing is not new in Afghanistan as it has a tradition in certain parts of the country. So called ‘arbakai’ – which means ‘guardian’ in Pashtun and ‘army’ in Arabic – is a tradition which was imported to the Pashtun south-eastern region of Afghanistan during the Osman period (Rafiee, interview 05/07/2012). Predominantly old men who could not work anymore joined the arbakai and ensured the security of communities (ibid.). After the fall of the Taliban in 2001 many local strongmen in the south-east re-created arbakai forces to fill the power vacuum (Schmeidl/Karokhail 2009:320). These strongmen brought forward the idea of formally introducing the ALP which was accepted by commanders from the north under the condition of receiving forces themselves

(Wardak, interview 05/07/2012; Rafiee, interview 05/07/2012). The USA supports this approach and can be considered as the major driver of creating a countrywide local police as a counterinsurgency force and a means of their exit strategy allowing to create stability in rural areas and hand over the control of security to Afghans (HRW 2011:4). Even though the Afghan government has a target of hiring 10,000 officers for the ALP the USA approved the funding for 30,000 people (ibid.). Usually ALP officers receive weapons and a three-week training, however, no clear directives about their power and rights exist and they are only accountable towards the local commander (ibid:5).

#### **4.4 The Afghan Police – Ensuring whose security?**

The consequence of US dominance in reforming the Afghan police – hence the impact of a state-centric approach to reforming the security sector on society – becomes apparent by looking at how the police and security situation is perceived in Afghanistan. Many Afghans see the ANP not only as a helpful service but also as a source of danger and insecurity. The ALP is looked at even more critically and is understood as a means for warlords to rearm rather than a local security provider. Thus the Afghan police is often not improving human security but reducing it.

The opinion of the Afghan society on the police is explored in a yearly ‘Police Perception Survey’ which is conducted by UNDP. The 2011 report points out that 81% of the Afghans express personal respect for the ANP and 77% express a favourable opinion of the ANP overall (UNDP 2011:3-6). Yet, the report also illustrates that 17% of the interviewees or one member of their household experienced excessive physical force by an ANP member in the past year (UNDP 2011:20). About as many of the questioned people were falsely accused of crimes by the ANP (ibid.). Interviewed representatives from the civil society confirmed that people in Afghanistan are often subject to insecurity caused by the police as officers commit crimes in order to improve their financial situation with their subsequent involvement (Wardak, interview 05/07/2012; Rafiee, interview 05/07/2012; Najafizada, interview 04/07/2012). In one case, for example, the head of police in a province fired a rocket into the house of a member of parliament and arrested an unrelated but wealthy person afterwards who was released after paying \$200,000 (Wardak, interview 05/07/2012). Furthermore, interviewees complained that the police forces were involved in the “huge business” (ibid.) of kidnapping (Wardak, interview 05/07/2012; Rafiee, interview 05/07/2012; Najafizada, interview 04/07/2012). Thus, the police are often perceived as a danger rather than a trustworthy institution. Najafizada summarises “when I see the police I really don’t feel more secure, sometimes I even feel less secure” (interview 04/07/2012). Hence, many people prefer to solve problems in their local jirgas or shuras in order to avoid dealing with the ANP (Wardak, interview 05/07/2012).

The police further contributes to insecurity due to its role as a counterinsurgency force. Interviewed people noted that the ANP and the Afghan National Army (ANA) cannot be differentiated clearly (Najafizada, interview 04/07/2012; Reid, interview 05/07/2012). Even though the ANA is a much more accepted institution than the ANP their function is perceived as very similar as both run check-points, fight insurgents in mountainous areas and conduct raids. The international engagement of fighting insurgents with the police has direct negative effects as civilians are the main victims of the attacks by both sides. Human right abuses and corruption caused by the police as well as impunity for government forces fuel insurgency further (HRW 2011:4). Thus the estimated number of civilian casualties caused by the opposing forces increased from less than 1,000 in 2006 to more than 3,000 in 2011 (Livingston/O'Hanlon 2012:15).

The newly created ALP is perceived even more critically than the ANP. Even though *arbakai* are acknowledged as a part of the Afghan tradition in certain regions the transfer of this custom to other parts of the country with different cultures is not supported (Niazi, interview 04/07/2012). The ALP is seen as a means for warlords to increase their power and receive weapons for free from the government rather than as a force ensuring security for communities (Wardak, interview 05/07/2012; Niazi, interview 04/07/2012). Even if the ALP officers are trained and know about human rights this does not always make them act differently as they are only accountable to and dependent on their local warlord (Wardak, interview 05/07/2012). Apparently warlords like Dostum even started their own 'Taliban' groups to justify the need for an ALP in the areas they control (*ibid.*). Warlords in the south of the country collaborate with the Taliban and promise not to fight them although accepting the weapons from the government and international actors. This happened, for example, in the province of Wardak where the local strongman is a former Talib and where the first ALP programme was started (*ibid.*). As joining the police forces is not respected in the Afghan society and seen as the last option for unemployed people already, joining the ALP is seen as a promising position because the weapons received there can be used for other purposes (*ibid.*). A government official interviewed by HRW noted: "We've

had these arbakis for 30 years. Who were Gulbuddin, Massood, Dostum? All arbakis... But this is their way of making money (...). The problem is that most of these people are uneducated, and they have weapons in their hands, so they can do what they want” (2011:31).

Thus the Afghan police can be characterised as a force which is contributing negatively to human security rather than ensuring it. Except for data of international organisations on opium cultivation no crime statistics have been published in Afghanistan in the past years but the perceived security situation paints a gloomy picture. According to a survey conducted by The Asia Foundation 56% of the people questioned say they fear for their personal safety in their local area (The Asia Foundation 2011:27). 22% report that they or someone in their family became a victim of crime in the past year (ibid:28). These are particularly high rates considering the bias that surveys are generally conducted in safer areas. According to The Asia Foundation insecurity is seen as the biggest problem in Afghanistan by 38% of the interviewees (ibid:23). This perceived insecurity in Afghanistan is not only caused by ‘insurgents’ or ‘anti-government elements’ but also government forces are responsible for a large number of the reported crime and human rights abuses. Thus, having more armed officers even further reduces the perceived security in the Afghan society (Wardak, interview 05/07/2012).



#### **4.5 Contribution of the Afghan Police Reform to State-Building**

The police reform in Afghanistan illustrates the conflict between the concepts of human and state security in the context of SSR and the negative impact SSRs focusing on state-security can have on state-building. Whereas the USA attempts to construct a police which can be used for protecting the created state institutions and fighting insurgents who are perceived as the enemies of these institutions, the European mission has an opposing goal of forming a police force which is accountable towards the Afghan people rather than local strongmen or international troops. Due to the American dominance, however, the police is designed and trained in fighting insurgents in cooperation with military forces which has blurred the border between these entities. Yet these state institutions were not constructed by the Afghan society but from the outside, according to strict timetables and blueprints in order to create a stable and democratic-looking state structure quickly achieving domestic goals which are determined by domestic politics of outside actors (Theors/Kaldor 2011:36; Tadjbakhsh/Schoiswohl 2008). The view of the population and the creation of political legitimacy were largely ignored. Thus the protection of these institutions is in the interest of international actors and the Afghan elite but not of the general Afghan society (Kouvo 2009:29-33). Consequently a gap between society and state has evolved as society perceives the state as an alien body and the ruling government as an international puppet which are in line with outside actors' interests but do not reflect the Afghan society's conception and can rarely achieve positive changes for Afghans (Tadjbakhsh/Schoiswohl 2008:253).

The state security approach which is reflected in the narrow focus of the police training on fighting and the design of the ANP as a paramilitary counter-insurgency unit enhances the extractive and oppressive capacity of the state. Commanders in the ministry and the police use these forces to make money via corruption and kidnapping, lower-rank officers rely on bribes due to their low salaries (Wardak, interview 05/07/2012). The US support for the founding of the ALP illustrates the danger of the depoliticised approach which evolves from a state-security focus. In order to stabilise the current state and fight terrorism the

rearmament of non-state actors is encouraged without questioning their political role within the central state. Even though a local police does not look like a typical Weberian institution at the first glance its creation reflects the focus on performance while ignoring political legitimacy. Eventually, this form of power-sharing might keep the current central state together on the short term, however, it is likely to be destabilising on the long term as it allows warlords to suppress the people in the areas they control and fight for power and influence after the international military withdrawal with even more weapons. As the majority of the people encounters the state in the form of the police every action of the police shapes the people's perception of the state (Rafiee, interview 05/07/2012). The current role and perceived negative behaviour of the police, therefore, further delegitimises the state in Afghan society. Furthermore, the dominant focus on state security also causes a lack of human security in Afghanistan, limiting the secure environment for civil society to become involved in a state-building process. Thus, the continuing focus on state security is in danger of contradicting the successes achieved and harming the process of building a legitimate Afghan state from the inside.

A human security approach to reforming the Afghan police could allow a more positive impact of the SSR on state-building. Rafiee summarises that the "people do not want insecurity and war, they want an inclusive process" (interview 05/07/2012). The police could create the secure space for such a process to take place. A first important step for the Afghan people would be the possibility to leave their houses without the danger of becoming victims of crime and attacks. This requires a less militarised training and design of the ANP in order to create a police the population is not afraid of but which can make sure "that people are not carrying RPGs in the middle of the road at downtown Kabul" (Najafizada, interview 04/07/2012). Increasing the number of police officers is not sufficient and can even result in the opposite of what is intended as having more armed people reduces the perceived security in the Afghan society (Wardak, interview 05/07/2012). Rather the quality of the police officers has to be increased by better trainings which focus on human rights and community policing (Farid Hamidi, interview 24/07/2012). Higher salaries are necessary for lower-ranked officers in

order to reduce their reliance on bribes. The EUPOL mission certainly contributes positively, however, is too small to achieve lasting changes on a bigger scale. In order to enable the SSR to contribute to state-building in Afghanistan successfully the European mission has to be expanded by a large degree. Collaboration between society and police could further a human-centric concept of reforming the Afghan police. A good example was set by the Afghan Civil Society Forum Organization which introduced a neighbourhood committee in District 1 of Kabul (see Appendix for a map of the districts) in 2007 in order to reduce child prostitution (Rafiee, interview 05/07/2012). This committee allowed members of the neighbourhood and the police to meet on a regular basis to define roles, build trust and share information (ibid.). In addition, human rights trainings were provided for the police officers of the district. Even though the original goal of reducing child prostitution was not achieved it improved trust and reduced corruption (ibid.). Due to this success the approach has been duplicated in seven more districts and was finally adopted by UNDP in 2009 which has been extending the idea to a growing number of districts since then (ibid.). A success factor of this approach is certainly that society is directly involved in reforming the police. This makes the forces more embedded in society and creates political legitimacy. Ideally, however, a human-centric approach should not be restricted to reforming the police but should be adopted in a holistic way for all components of the security sector. Even though, for example, the military certainly requires a more extensive knowledge of weapons a human-centric guiding principle can ensure that collateral damage is not accepted as a necessary evil. A possibly resulting improved security situation further opens up space and allows society to become involved in discussing how other institutions should be designed.

If the Afghan civil society had the freedom to become involved in a more endogenous process of state-building the Afghan institutions could look different. Afghans do not generally oppose the existence of a state and do not reject democracy but are critical about the Western model and rather want institutions which are embedded in tradition, religion and culture (Theros/Kaldor 2011:12). For example, Theros and Kaldor as well as Roy point out four likely determinants of a legitimate Afghan state: independent, Muslim, providing minimal services

without interfering in daily life and acting as a broker between local groups (Theros/Kaldor 2011:10; Roy 2003). In the present circumstances of a persisting focus on state-security, however, the Afghan society has no means to become involved and build a state which reflects their understanding of legitimate institutions.

## **5. Conclusion**

It can be concluded that the dominant focus on state security in reforming the Afghan police has contributed to delegitimising the Afghan state and continuously restricts the space for civil society to become involved in the state-building process. Even though the EU assists in ensuring security for the people its approach is overshadowed due to the comparatively low funding and number of instructors. In contrast, the USA is the main player of the state-security approach providing a training which narrowly focuses on weaponry and paramilitary training of the ANP. The technocratic attempt of creating the ALP has strengthened warlords and increased their oppressive capacity. As the police cannot ensure protection for the people Afghans experience insecurity, which reinforces the distrust in the state and its institutions and complicates any contribution to state-building. Thus the state lacks political legitimacy and is detached from society, creating a gap between state and people.

In order to increase the political legitimacy of the Afghan state people need to be given a secure space where they can discuss the rules that govern relations. The result might look very different to the current institutions but will reflect the interests of society. This requires the international community to support inclusive human-centric approaches. Police officers need a much more extensive training which has to be designed in cooperation with civil society organisations and should focus on human rights and literacy rather than handling weaponry only. Yet the human-centric approach should not be restricted to the police but include all components of the security sector. However, as the result of this approach to state-building cannot be foreseen and planned and is also likely to need a long period of time it is certainly more difficult to implement in the foreign policy of the involved international actors which also have to acknowledge domestic interests.

The police reform in Afghanistan confirms the assumption that a focus on state security in SSR contributes negatively to state-building on the long term and predominantly fulfils the interests of elites and outside actors. It reflects a Weberian understanding and tries to achieve legitimacy by improved performance

through rational-legal institutions which substitute informal ones. However, this approach neglects that institutions also need political acceptance because otherwise they would be nothing more but a Western façade. In contrast, a stronger focus on human security in SSR appears to be more likely to contribute to a more inclusive as well as holistic and therefore on the long-term more successful form of state-building as it can create space for an endogenous process of building institutions which are embedded in and accepted by society. However, the evidence provided in this paper is only suggestive as it is restricted to one case study, Afghanistan, which is dominated by a state security conception. In order to gain a better understanding of the chances a human security approach can provide further research is required analysing other contexts different from Afghanistan also considering possibly more successful examples of SSR and state-building.

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## **Appendix**

### **A. Districts of Kabul**

*See hard copy.*

*Due to the maximum size of 2MB for files at Moodle this part of the Appendix is not attached here.*

**B. List of Interviewees**

<b>No</b>	<b>Last Name, Name – Position – Organisation – Date of Interview</b>
1	anonymous – official – EUPOL – 01/07/2012
2	anonymous – official – EUPOL – 01/07/2012
3	anonymous – official – EUPOL – 01/07/2012
4	anonymous – official – Project Implementation Unit (PIU), Support to Police Reform (GIZ) – 04/07/2012
5	Najafizada, Lofullah – Head of Current Affairs – Tolo News, Moby Media Group – 04/07/2012
6	Niazi, Mohammad Saeed – Director – Civil Society Development Center – 04/07/2012
7	Rafiee, Aziz – Executive Director – Afghanistan Civil Society Forum organization (ACSFo) – 05/07/2012
8	Wardak, Mirwais – Managing Director – Peace Training and Research Organization (PTRO) – 05/07/2012
9	Reid, David – Senior Vice President – Ariana Television Network (ATN) – 05/07/2012
10	Farid Hamidi, Mohammad – Commissioner – Independent Human Rights Commission – 24/07/2012 (on the phone)