



RESEARCH PAPER

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Research Paper

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Editorial

The research work carried out by Colonel Oleg Kulakov at the NATO Defense College in Rome is based on ten years of Soviet military experience in Afghanistan. We felt it would be useful to highlight the issues examined in this Research Paper, which are important for an understanding of the political, cultural and operational terrain and therefore for the conduct of ISAF actions in 2006. It is of course impossible to establish political links between the actions taken by the Soviets over 20 years ago and those conducted by the NATO-led coalition forces today. Nevertheless, we are dealing with the same country and - frequently - the same actors, the same tactics and the same problems of establishing a stable, sovereign country, at ease with its ethnocultural diversity and geo-economic and geopolitical environment.

A number of relevant lessons can be drawn from the work of our Russian colleague, who completed several tours in Afghanistan with the Soviet forces. When the Soviet forces were inserted in Kabul in late December 1979 they certainly did not envisage direct intervention in a civil war: they had come to shore up a fragile regime, and they had neither an exit strategy nor a clear strategic objective. They were immediately confronted with a classic dilemma: the challenge of finding a balance between military effectiveness and promoting civil stability. How were they to identify the enemy? How were they to prevent the enemy from splitting into countless autonomous armed groups with no common political objectives? Who were they to negotiate a settlement with? The compromises made at that time had a strong impact on the outcome of the intervention, for each of the different factions that made up the political landscape tried to exploit the presence of foreign troops for its own ends. Moreover, the cooperation and stabilization initiatives that the Soviets tried to conduct needed the security protection of military forces, whose operations undermined the civilian efforts and prevented confidence building. Mission impossible?

Facing an insurrection in a country with a shaky political structure and fragile ethnocultural homogeneity is an ambitious undertaking of uncertain outcome, unless rapid action is taken: first to change the balance of military power by force, and then to establish a local force able to impose itself on the other actors and take over from the expeditionary forces, whose presence, asserts Colonel Kulakov, should be limited to a few weeks. With a longer timeframe, a political solution becomes impossible.

Colonel Kulakov made the following statement to Le Monde on 9 December 2001: "The West will be deceived by the Afghan leaders, who are very cunning. It is in their interest to maintain tension and discord, in order to be the object of Western attentions and receive financial aid".

This paper offers a means to assess the recent development of this country which, with international backing, has made decisive progress in democratic normalization and in the construction of its national political space.

Jean DUFOURCQ, Chief, Academic Research Branch

NB: The views expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author and should not be attributed to the NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Les opinions exprimées dans cette publication sont celles de l'auteur et ne peuvent être attribuées au Collège de Défense de l'OTAN ni à l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord.

Lessons learned from the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan: Implications for Russian Defense Reform

Oleg KULAKOV¹

This paper represents an attempt to analyze Soviet military experiences in fighting a variety of Muslim combatants in Afghanistan in 1979-1989, and to reach conclusions regarding the significance of the Soviet experiences for Russian defense reform and NATO's current engagement in Afghanistan.

This paper is drawn from a larger research project with five chapters: Soviet military experiences in Afghanistan; phases of the internal Afghan conflict; analysis and classification of Muslim armed opposition movements; the influence of Islam and national peculiarities on the formation of these movements; and the implications of the Soviet experiences for Russian defence reform. However, in this paper the focus is on Soviet military experiences in Afghanistan, and their implications for Russian defence reform and NATO.

1. Origins of the Soviet Intervention

Seventeen years after the end of the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, the settled opinion has formed in expert circles in Russia that the dispatch of Soviet troops failed to achieve its strategic objective. Moreover, some experts contend that there may have been other ways to achieve the goals that the Soviet leadership had formulated. For example, Moscow could have used political means to influence certain Afghan leaders.

How did the leadership of the Soviet Union decide to use force? The Russian Empire had studied the area and had maneuvered against the British Empire over Afghanistan in "the great game" of the nineteenth century. The Soviet Union had diplomatic ties with Afghanistan since 1919 and extensive bilateral trade contacts since the 1930s. Soviet economic and military advisers had been constantly present in Afghanistan since 1950. The Soviet Union built airfields and much of Afghanistan's road network (including the world's longest tunnel, the Salang tunnel). The Soviet General Staff was well informed about the geography, economy, sociology and military forces of Afghanistan. In other words, the Soviet political-military establishment was

far from ignorant about Afghanistan's society and political dynamics.

G.M. Kornienko, who was Deputy Foreign minister at that time, noted that the decision to send troops to Afghanistan was taken on 12 December 1979, after the Soviet leadership learned about the North Atlantic Council's decision that same day to deploy American medium range missiles in Europe.² According to Kornienko, there was something emotional in the Soviet decision. It was a way of reacting to the NATO decision. Owing to the earlier successful Soviet military interventions in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968), military power seemed to Soviet leaders to be an irresistible political instrument.

In deciding to send troops to Afghanistan, the leaders of the Soviet Union tried to act in support of national security interests. The explosive situation in and around Afghanistan influenced the political and state leadership of the USSR. Moscow's objective was to stabilize and Sovietize Afghanistan, so that it would be a stable client state and not a source of threats to the Soviet Union.

As a result of the decision taken on 12 December, on 27 December Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. Major cities, radio stations and centres of power were seized. The new Afghan government under the leadership of Babrak Karmal, who had been brought to Afghanistan from the Soviet Union, started consolidating its power. The Soviet armed forces initiated 10 years of warfare under difficult conditions.

2. Soviet Military Experiences in Afghanistan

The Soviet armed forces that marched into Afghanistan were trained to conduct warfare against a modern enemy occupying defensive positions stretching across the Northern European plain. The Soviet command planned to penetrate NATO defensive positions through the weight of massed artillery fires and aerial attacks and then to drive through the subsequent gap to strike deep and pursue the

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² *Novaya i noveyshaya istoria*, 1993, No.3, c. 111.

shattered enemy. The tactics and equipment were designed solely to operate within the context of this massive strategic operation. Future war was seen as a lethal, high tempo event in which forces and firepower would be carefully choreographed.

In Afghanistan, however, the terrain, the climate and the enemy were entirely different from what the Soviet armed forces had prepared for. The opposition forces, *mujahideen* armed groups, did not accommodate the Soviet armed forces by fighting a European-style war. Tactics had to be reworked on site. Indeed, during the war the Soviet armed forces made innovations in tactics, structure, and equipment.

Tactics. When it became clear that tactics suitable for the European theatre did not work, innovations based on combat experience were tested and employed. Four innovations in tactics are noteworthy: the armed group concept, the bounding overwatch maneuver, new approaches to the use of air assault tactics and helicopter gunship tactics, and enveloping detachments.

- *Armed group concept.* The Soviet Ground Forces developed the armed group concept to use the firepower of personnel carriers as an independent reserve once the motorized rifle soldiers had dismounted. It was a bold step, for commanders of mechanized forces dislike separating dismounted infantry from their carriers. However, the terrain often made it impossible for the Tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicles (TIFVs), Tracked Airborne Fighting Vehicles (TAFVs), and armed personnel carriers (APCs) to follow or support their squads. The armed group concept gave the commander a potent maneuverable reserve which could attack independently on the flanks, block expected enemy routes of withdrawal, serve as a battle taxi to pick up forces which had finished their mission, perform patrols, serve in an economy-of-force role in both the offense and defense, and provide convoy escort and security functions.
- *Bounding overwatch.* The Soviet Ground Forces developed and adopted the bounding overwatch tactic for mounted ground forces. One combat vehicle, or a group of vehicles, would occupy dominant terrain to cover another vehicle or group of vehicles during its advance. The advancing group would then stop at a dominant position to cover the forward deployment of its covering group.
- *Air assault tactics and helicopter gunship tactics.* Air assault tactics and helicopter gunship tactics improved steadily throughout the war. Helicopter

support should have been part of every convoy escort, but this was not always the case. Dominant terrain along convoy routes should have been routinely seized and held by air assault forces. However, this was not done consistently because of shortages of equipment and well-trained personnel, the fear of unjustifiable losses, and other factors. The airborne and air assault forces were often the most successful in closing with the enemy.

Air assault forces were often quite effective when used in support of a mechanized ground attack. Heliborne detachments would land deep in the rear and flanks of the enemy strongholds to isolate them, destroy bases, cut lines of communication, and block routes of withdrawal. The ground force would advance to link up with the heliborne forces. As a rule, the heliborne forces would not go deeper than their supporting artillery. Although the combination of heliborne and mechanized forces worked well at the battalion and brigade level, the Command's preference for large-scale operations often got in the way of tactical efficiency.

- *Enveloping detachments.* The Soviet armed forces used enveloping detachments frequently in Afghanistan. Battalion or company-sized forces were split off from the main body and sent on a separate route to the flank or rear of the enemy to support the advance of the main body, perform a separate mission, prevent the withdrawal of enemy forces, or conduct a simultaneous attack from one or more unexpected directions. If the enveloping unit was dismounted, it was usually composed of airborne, air assault or reconnaissance forces. If the enveloping unit was mounted, it was frequently the unit's armored group.

Structure. During the Afghanistan war the Soviet Command experimented with several force structures. Self-sustained separate motorized rifle brigades and separate rifle battalions were constituted for independent actions. Mounted rifle battalions were formed. The Soviet Command experimented with combined arms battalions and motorized rifle companies with four line platoons. These experimental formations were devised in search of an optimum troop mix for independent counterinsurgency actions. Materiel support brigades and battalions were formed to provide more effective support to the combat units. Airborne and air assault troops and Troops of Special Designation were refitted with larger APCs and TIFVs instead of TAFVs. Firepower was augmented with extra machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, and mortars.

At the very beginning of the Soviet intervention it became clear that special task groups³ would be of

³ Special task groups or "Spetsnaz" are "forces of special designation" or special troops and can include a variety of branches and jobs. In Afghanistan, the highly-trained, hardened Spetsnaz were commandos who performed long-range reconnaissance, close combat and Special Forces functions.

great utility in Afghanistan. In January 1980 the Soviet military contingent included one special task company. By 1986 the number of special task companies had increased to 25⁴.

Equipment. Many new systems were field tested and introduced during the period 1979-1989. The most notable of these were the TIFV 2, APC 80, Mi 8T helicopter, the Su-25 ground support aircraft and the ASU 74 assault rifle. Several models of the Mi-24 helicopter gunship were introduced during the war. Some experimental systems were developed and proved their efficiency during the war: ordnance racks for helicopter gunships; a new helmet, which provided better protection; new mine clearing gear – that is, mine rollers.

3. Stages of Soviet Military Operations

The Soviet military operations in Afghanistan may be divided into four stages: the deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (December 1979-September 1980), the initial stage (1980-1984), the stage of the most intensive warfare (1984-1986), and the stage of less intense warfare and planned withdrawal of the Soviet troops (1986-1989).

During 1984-1986 the Soviet command intensified combat operations. Moscow attempted to solve the Afghan problem by force. However, it did not achieve the desired results. On the contrary, the number of active *mujahideen* fighters in Afghanistan increased from 45,000 in 1981-83 to 150,000 by 1986. By 1986 armed opposition movements controlled up to 80% of the territory.

The Afghan war was fought under four General Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko, and Mikhail Gorbachev. None of them could identify a political solution, and finally the Politburo decided that the Soviet Union should withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. The Soviet armed forces suffered the losses displayed in Figure 1.

4. Analysis and Classification of Armed Opposition Groups

After Soviet troops were engaged in warfare in Afghanistan, the Soviet command faced the problem of identifying the enemy.

After several years parameters applicable to all armed groups in Afghanistan were developed. These groups could be classified along the following characteristics: organized and unorganized military-political formations, Sunni and Shia political formations, fundamentalists and traditionalists,⁵ and Pushtun and non-Pushtun armed formations.⁶ It should be recalled that the Islamization of Afghanistan took over 1,200 years, with some areas not accepting Islam until the end of the nineteenth century. This made for significant regional differences within the country as to the prominence of various Islamic beliefs and practices in relation to traditional religions and customs.

If this classification is applied to all opposition armed formations in Afghanistan during the “Soviet period” from 1979 to 1989, the tendencies described in Figure 2 can be identified.

With these parameters it was possible to predict not only the formation of new armed groups but also to use that data in the interests of the Soviet armed forces – that is, to encourage them to unite or, on the contrary, to divide them. The success of some local Soviet psychological operations seduced the Soviet command into prolonging the engagement in Afghanistan.

At the same time these parameters allowed experts to monitor tendencies among Muslim armed groups. They tended to become more non-organized and non-Pushtun by the late 1980s. The leaders of the organized armed formations probably recognized this tendency, and it may have made them more flexible at the Geneva talks.

5. Operational Findings and Obstacles to Implementation

The Afghan war triggered the development of new concepts for waging war in a non-linear fashion and conducting operations on battlefields dominated by lethal high-precision weapons. This new non-linear battlefield required: the abandonment of traditional operational and tactical formations; a redefinition of traditional echelon concepts; and a wholesale reorganization of formations and units to emphasize combat flexibility and survivability.

During the early and mid 1980s the Afghan war encouraged the Soviet military to develop new concepts of the theater strategic offensive; develop new concepts for shallower echelons at all levels; develop the concept of the air echelon; experiment with new force structures such as the corps, brigade and

⁴ Kononenko S. Nesavisimoye voyennoye obosrenyie “Proveren Afghanistanom i Chechnei”, art. 28.10.2005.

⁵ Traditionalists upheld the monarchy based on national and Muslim traditions developed over centuries, while fundamentalists (both Sunni and Shia) emphasized the radical Islamic ideas introduced in the 1960s.

⁶ It should be noted that the same groups could be (and were) categorized in several different ways.

combined arms battalion; test new, more flexible logistical support concepts; and to adopt new tactics, as discussed earlier.

After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the Soviet military planned to thoroughly study, analyze and implement the lessons learned from the Afghanistan war experience. The direction of implementation included changes in: personnel selection and training; exercises; civil-military relations; procurement; and organization of command structures.

However, major events interfered with that process. Among them the most important was the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Russian experts disagreed as to which lessons were most important and how to pursue remedial action.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, two years after the Afghan War, created obstacles to learning from the Afghan experience. These obstacles to

learning included the following factors. First, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the new Russian leadership had other urgent priorities in its policy towards the armed forces. Second, the structure of the former Soviet military establishment was seriously damaged and the Russian armed forces had to pass through a hard adaptation period. Third, the Russian military command had to carry out a hasty withdrawal of the former Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. Fourth, the only two mountain training centers created during the Afghan war were located outside Russia — in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.

There was no agreement among experts about the Afghan experience. Some considered the experience of Soviet forces in Afghanistan specific to that locality. Some experts insisted on preparing for a possible confrontation with NATO. In other words, in the 1990s the conditions were completely unfavorable to the Russian armed forces benefiting from the lessons learned in Afghanistan.

Figure 1 – Soviet losses in Afghanistan, 1979-1989

Stages of the presence of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan	Killed in action <i>total/per month</i>	Wounded and ill <i>total/per month</i>
First (December 1979 -February 1980), 2 months	245/123	5,306/2,653
Second (March1980 - April1985), 62 months	9,175/148	226,649/3,656
Third (May1985 - December1986), 20 months	2,745/137	114,861/5,743
Fourth (Jan1987- Feb1989), 26 months	2,262/87	119,609/4,600
Total losses for 110 months	14,427	466,425

Figure 2 – Transition tendencies among Afghan opposition armed formations, 1979-1989 (%).

	Organised	Unorganised	Sunni	Shia	Fundamentalist	Traditionnal	Pushtun	Non Pushtun
I stage 1979-1980	90	10	80	20	90	10	70	30
II stage 1980-1984	70	30	80	20	90	10	60	40
III stage 1984-1986	60	40	70	30	90	10	50	50
IV stage 1986-1989	45	55	70	30	90	10	40	60

At the end of the 1990s the situation changed, and an opportunity to learn from the Afghan war experience appeared, owing to three factors. First, the nature of conflicts was changing, with an increase in local and medium-sized conflicts. Second, some recent local conflicts clearly had a lot in common with the Afghan war experience. Third, the economic situation in Russia changed for the better, with more funds available for implementing defense reform.

6. Main Lessons Learned

What are the main lessons learned from Soviet military experiences in Afghanistan that should be taken into account in defense reform in Russia? Russian military experts have identified fifteen lessons.⁷

1. For the first time since World War II the Soviet armed forces took part in warfare on an extensive and prolonged basis and faced the resistance of a new kind of enemy. A combination of historical, national, and religious traditions enabled the enemy to rapidly organize armed formations with a highly motivated ideology on a local and national level.
2. Battlefield victory can be almost irrelevant. There was no task the Soviet armed forces were assigned and failed to carry out. The numerous local successful operations carried out by the Soviet armed forces did not lead to an overall victory. Achievements at the battalion and brigade level could not be translated into a general political success.
3. The importance of logistics cannot be overstated. Secure logistics and lines of communication were essential for the Soviet troops. Force protection missions, however, can tie up most of a conventional military force. The Soviet armed forces suffered the major part of their losses in personnel and materiel when supplying their garrisons by logistics caravans.
4. Weapons systems, field gear, communications equipment and transport which were designed for conventional war in Europe often worked less effectively or failed completely in the rugged terrain of Afghanistan.
5. Tactics for conventional war did not work against armed Muslim groups. Forces needed to be reequipped, restructured and retrained for fighting Afghan *mujahideen*. The most effective Soviet combatants were light infantry.
6. Tanks have a limited utility in counter-guerrilla operations, but they can serve as an effective reserve on the right terrain. Sometimes one or two tanks serving as part of a bounding overwatch maneuver mounted on the dominating hill proved to be sufficient.
7. Infantry fighting vehicles and helicopters can play an important role in mobility and fire support. Mechanized forces usually fight effectively only when dismounted and when using their carriers for support or as a maneuver reserve. Ample engineer troops proved to be essential.
8. The use of field artillery proved to be effective when fire support was carefully planned and well coordinated with air support.
9. Field sanitation, immunization and preventive medicine are of paramount importance in less-than-optimal sanitary conditions. Immediate medical support to wounded combatants is often hard to provide.
10. Logistics determines the scope of activity and the size of the forces either side can field.
11. Unity of command is important, yet sometimes impossible to achieve.
12. The most effective level to conduct warfare proved to be the battalion level when the commander could take decisions on his own about how and when to use artillery and air support and could rely on integrated artillery and reconnaissance capabilities. The most effective units to conduct warfare proved to be reconnaissance platoons, companies and battalions. In comparison with other infantry units, reconnaissance personnel were much better selected, trained and prepared to conduct warfare.
13. Domination of the air is irrelevant unless airpower can be precisely targeted. Seizure of terrain can be advantageous, but is usually only of temporary value. Control of cities can be an advantage, but can also prove to be a detriment. Support of the population is essential for victory.
14. The Soviet conscript system proved to be completely insufficient and unjustified in Afghanistan. The conscripts were by definition inexperienced and could not respond adequately to battlefield challenges. In contrast, the *mujahideen* became increasingly experienced and resourceful combatants.
15. Modern mechanized forces are in peril when committed to fight guerrillas in the middle of a civil war on rugged terrain.

⁷ This list of 15 lessons has been compiled from various Russian sources as well as the author's own experiences in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

7. Significance for NATO-Russia Relations and NATO's Engagement in Afghanistan

What do these lessons signify for NATO-Russian relations today and for NATO's engagement in Afghanistan?

On 11 September 2001 NATO and Russia realized that they face the same threats and a common enemy — terrorism. This realization made Russia and NATO allies in fighting common threats as well as in overcoming common obstacles.

During the Cold War NATO, like the Soviet Union, prepared to conduct warfare against a modern enemy. In its operations in Afghanistan NATO may face problems similar to those experienced by the Soviet armed forces in the 1980s. The lessons learned from the Soviet experience may be helpful in NATO's adaptation to deal with its own challenges in Afghanistan. The lessons learned extend beyond improving equipment, force structure, and operational tactics and developing expeditionary forces capable of operating in the harsh climate and rugged terrain of Afghanistan.

Four points stand out from the Soviet experience as worthy of NATO's consideration as the Allies think about their grand strategy.

First, a foreign military presence may hinder the pursuit of political solutions. A political prescription that is perceived as foreign — and promoted by foreigners — is likely to be rejected by the people of Afghanistan,

because they have historically been sensitive about maintaining their autonomy.

Second, sensitivity to losses may discourage commanders from seizing the initiative and taking risks in operations. NATO seems to be politically even more sensitive to losses than the Soviet Union was.

Third, the Allies must recognize that Afghan leaders and groups have their own agendas, distinct from NATO purposes. Local leaders may try to exploit the NATO presence to pursue their own objectives.

Fourth, it is imperative to have clear strategic objectives and staying power. The Soviet grand strategy objective of stabilization through Sovietization could not be achieved, even with 10 years of combat.

Why? This raises a final point of current relevance for NATO.

A minute percentage of the population of the country (around 1 percent) was involved in political processes from 1919 to 1989, and 90 percent of the Afghan population was illiterate. These percentages have not changed significantly in the recent past. Sometimes characterized as the poorest country in Asia, Afghanistan faces a long road to economic, political, and social development.

This means that NATO faces a long and demanding task if it intends to promote Afghanistan's democratization and modernization.

January-February 2006 NDC RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

Departure

Ms Rosheen LORATO (Italy)

Arrival

Gen. Carlo FINIZIO (Italy)

Internship

Ms Hélène PRESTAT,
(France, Feb-May 2006)

Lecture on "CFSP/ESDP" at the M. A. Study Program on European Integration for the Centre for European Integration, University of Bonn, 13-14 February 2006, Germany.

Lionel PONSARD

Lecture at the NATO School on "NATO-Russia Relations", Staff Officers' Orientation Course, 12 January 2006,

Lecture in Russian on "NATO-Russia Relations", at the Ukrainian Military Academy, 10 February 2006, Kyiv, Ukraine.

Lecture on "NATO-Russia Relations", Staff Officers' Orientation Course, NATO School, 16 February 2006,

Lecture on "NATO's Relations with Russia and Ukraine", Faculty Research Seminar, George Marshall Centre for Security Studies, 17 February 2006, Garmisch Partenkirchen, Germany.

Participation in a Brainstorming Session on Russia with Dr. Jamie Shea, NATO HQ, 23 February 2006, Brussels, Belgium.

David YOST

Presentation on "NATO's Partnerships with Other Countries and International Organizations: What are the Next Steps?", Wilton Park Conference on "NATO's Political and Military Transformation: Current Issues", 12 January 2006, UK.

Participation in "International Week in Kyiv: NATO and Global Security Challenges" at the Ukrainian National Defense Academy, 6-10 February 2006, Kyiv, Ukraine.

External Publications

Laure BORGOMANO-LOUP

«La médiation internationale religieuse. Le cas de Sant'Egidio», in *AGIR*, No. 24, January 2006, pp. 99-109.

«Sant'Egidio et la médiation internationale religieuse: entretien avec Mario Giro», in *AGIR*, No. 24, January 2006, pp. 110-121.

Carlo MASALA

«Managing Protectorates», *International Relations*, 02/2006, pp. 110-115.

«Rising Expectations», in *NATO Review*, Winter 2005, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue4/english/art1.html>

INTERNAL ACTIVITIES

6-10 February 2006

Academic Research Talks, Kyiv, Ukraine.

27 February 2006

Kosovo Workshop: "Final Status and Next Step", NDC, Rome.

EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES

Laure BORGOMANO-LOUP

Lecture on «*Les transformations d'un acteur stratégique: l'OTAN, 1949-2006. Implications sur le processus de décision*», université de Paris Sud, 9 January 2006, Paris, France.

Lecture on «*Harmonization of Security Policies in the Mediterranean Region*», Marshall Centre for Security Studies, 16 January 2006, Garmisch Partenkirchen, Germany.

Lecture on "How to Promote a Mediterranean Identity for Young Generations?", Los Angeles Middle East programme, 16-19 January 2006, Athens, Greece.

Jean DUFOURCQ

Lecture on "Vers l'Europe stratégique", université de Paris Sud, 23 January 2006, Paris, France.

Participation in "International Week in Kyiv: NATO and Global Security Challenges" at the Ukrainian National Defense Academy, 6-10 February 2006, Kyiv, Ukraine.

Carlo MASALA

Presentation on "Challenges for the Alliance", Roundtable with the American Delegation to the Munich Security Conference, 13 January 2006, Munich, Germany.