



RESEARCH PAPER

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Research Paper

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Editorial

La réforme dans le secteur de la Défense constitue sans nul doute une des priorités majeures pour la Fédération de Russie. On ne peut ignorer bien sûr la complexité et l'ampleur de cette tâche qui peut paraître insurmontable. Pourtant, ce défi doit être relevé dans l'intérêt de la Russie mais également afin de préserver la stabilité internationale.

Le Collège de Défense de l'OTAN se félicite d'avoir pu accueillir deux boursiers russes dans le cadre du programme de recherche OTAN-Russie dont le travail met respectivement en exergue deux aspects essentiels de cette réforme: d'une part la possibilité d'influencer l'opinion publique russe afin d'optimiser la réforme du système militaire et d'autre part la question de la solde du personnel militaire sous contrat en Russie et sa réglementation juridique. La contribution de ces deux boursiers est non seulement très documentée mais également nourrie de contacts entretenus avec les principales institutions impliquées dans ce processus de réforme. En outre, l'expérience acquise respectivement au sein de l'Institut Militaire pour les Affaires économiques et de l'Université Militaire de Moscou a sans nul doute contribué à la richesse de leur analyse.

Le travail du Lieutenant-Colonel V. Levanov permet entre autres de lever le voile sur des questions fondamentales comme la spécificité de la vie militaire russe et les méthodes à envisager pour l'amélioration de la réglementation juridique de la solde des militaires engagés sous contrat. Le Lieutenant-Colonel I. Sharavov quant à lui nous livre une analyse approfondie de l'opinion publique russe face aux réformes entreprises dans le domaine de la Défense. Une attention toute particulière est portée à des aspects fondamentaux tels que la nécessité de rendre le processus de réforme plus transparent, l'amélioration des relations entre les groupes médiatiques et les représentants militaires, et la professionnalisation du système militaire russe.

L'influence, voire le contrôle, que peuvent exercer certains groupes criminels sur le complexe militaro-industriel russe constitue également un sujet d'intérêt primordial. L. Kosals invité par le Collège de Défense de l'OTAN dans le cadre du programme de recherche du Partenariat pour la Paix, s'attache pertinemment à démontrer l'importance de ce problème et plaide pour la mise en œuvre de mesures destinées à décriminaliser les industries de défense russes.

Lionel Ponsard, chercheur



Introduction

Vous trouverez ci-après trois résumés de travaux récents effectués au Collège de Défense de l'OTAN (Rome) par des officiers russes titulaires d'une bourse de recherche. Par leurs approches variées, ils nous apportent un utile éclairage sur certains aspects de l'actualité militaire de la Fédération de Russie.

D'autres "Research Paper" suivront régulièrement pour nourrir notre réflexion, alimenter le débat au sein de la communauté de l'OTAN et préparer l'avenir.

Jean Dufourcq, Chef de la section Recherche, Collège de Défense de l'OTAN

Please find below three recent executive summaries by Russian Officers, former Research Fellows at the NATO Defense College, Rome. Each in their own way casts a useful light on certain aspects of the current military environment in the Russian Federation.

Other Research Papers will be issued on a regular basis, intended as food for thought for debates within NATO and in preparation for the future.

Jean Dufourcq, Chief Academic Research Branch, NDC

NDC Research Branch Synopsis of

Influencing Russian Public Opinion in order to Improve Russian Military Reform

by **Igor Sharavov**¹

Like so many of its neighbors, Russia faces an inescapable choice. Because the world's geopolitical and security context has changed so markedly over the last 15 years, its armed forces must reform. Russian leaders are well aware of this requirement and have responded accordingly. They are currently modernizing the nation's military to cope with the instabilities and challenges that confront them, including international terrorism. However, Russian leaders also know that substantive military reforms cannot occur without a clear-eyed consideration of national and, to some extent, international public opinion. Military reforms, in short, require the backing of citizens and friends alike; they require their forbearance and political-economic support. These requirements then yield requirements of their own. First, Russian leaders must know who is the "public," what they believe (vis-à-vis national security), and what reforms they seemingly want. Second, the leaders may want to account for these preferences, if not outright reconcile them, with their own reform program. (In the latter case, Russian officials need to explain their preferred objectives, why the country

needs them, and how they intend to achieve them. Public "transparency" is critical here if Russian military reforms are to succeed.)

Now when speaking of Russian "public opinion," it is important to remember that it has two components. Ordinary people make up the first category. They include would-be conscripts and their typically 30-49 year old mothers, who have strong (i.e., "emotional") opinions about military reform. They firmly and repeatedly stress the need for optimal working conditions in the armed forces. (Minimizing the hazing of young conscripts is a primary concern here.) In contrast, older people and those with limited education are less critical of the military status quo and more amenable to preserving a conscript-based system.

Public opinion also has an expert component. The experts include state employees, scientists, retired high-ranking military officers (who provide mostly "rational" security estimates), politicians, and some journalists (who often

¹ Doctor (psychology) and Lieutenant Colonel Igor Sharavov (Russia) was a NATO-Russia Fellow at the NATO Defense College, Rome, from September 2003 to February 2004.



lapse into negative and “emotional” characterizations of national security).

The above two groups largely agree on the requirements for military reform, although there are some differences in emphases, and the experts certainly have a more detailed appreciation of the immediate issues at hand. Having said this, what does the “public” believe about the Russian military and its need for reform?

Lt Col Sharavov’s analysis attempts to answer this overarching question and related secondary ones. The statistics-laden analysis does not pretend to be all-inclusive, but it does highlight the following public beliefs.

- The public continues to believe that the military is the most trustworthy “power institution” in Russia, but they also “pity” its present condition and blame the State for its decline. (Put another way, barely half the population has “confidence” in the Army and almost 90% believe its current fighting efficiency is “low.”)
- What ordinary people believe: 75% believe military reform is necessary while 11% do not. Predictably enough, 82 % of those who are young advocate military reform, as do 81% of university graduates, 81 % of those who have “succeeded in adapting to modern life,” and 79% of city dwellers.
- What experts believe: 90% of those interviewed support radical military reform in Russia.
- In keeping with the above figures, 66% of eligible voters would consider a political party’s position on military reform as an important reason for determining whether they would vote for its candidates or not.
- Last, if a military conscription system must survive, over 60% of the public would respond “positively” to the idea of one-year tours of service.

The above beliefs establish parameters; they bound the art of the possible for transformation-minded politicians, as do the following reforms themselves. They are the ones most preferred by the Russian public for its military.

- 68% of the public advocates increased spending on the military, regardless if it stays the same size or becomes smaller.
- In order of priority, ordinary people also support the following.
 - Approximately 60% of them prefer a professional military instead of the current conscript-based force. (Put another way, 31% of the public said building a professional army is a “top priority” for Russia.)

However, to most of those who advocate this particular reform, a “professional” army also means a highly trained, contract-based, and/or voluntary force. They expect the same benefits from this type of military that Western nations currently enjoy.

- The public further advocates establishing a national service alternative to military conscription.
- They support the development and introduction of truly modern weaponry into the Russian armed forces. (At present, 62% of the public does not believe the military receives sufficient quantities of these weapons.)
- They want a capable and indigenous defense enterprises system.
- They desire system-wide improvements in military training and retraining.
- They support the expansion of Russian arms exports.
- What experts advocate: In addition to the above improvements, legislative and executive reformers have suggested further remedies for Russia’s military problems. They include making the Ministry of Defense budget more transparent, and developing new defense strategies and doctrines.
 - But as in the case of ordinary people, the overwhelming majority of experts (77%) believe that Russia needs a completely professional and/or volunteer army.
- Finally, 38 % of the public would like Russia to field smaller armed forces in the future. (This number is even higher – 60% – with staunch pro-reform advocates.)

Finally, it is important to remember that the above recommendations are not antithetical to Government reform plans. They either complement or go beyond the current agenda, which includes (but is not restricted to) the following.

- Culling 600,000 personnel from defense rolls over the next 3 years.
- Manning 91 units with “professional” soldiers by 2007.
- Reaching a 50%-50% balance between defense personnel costs and research & development, acquisition, and operations and management costs by 2011.

All the above beliefs and recommendations are a positive good. They represent a call to arms by Russian authorities and their public. The public, however, is not stupid or gullible about military reform.

- Approximately 40% of experts, for example, believe that force reductions will improve the military while



an almost equal number believe that it will not. (The figures for ordinary people are worse – i.e., 31% and 23% respectively.)

- Furthermore, 40% of ordinary people do not expect military conscription to disappear or decrease down to 12 months in the next 3-5 years. (Interestingly, over 50% of experts believe that it will, while 45% believe otherwise.)

No, the public is not naïve about reform. They merely receive contradictory information (and opinions) about the condition of their armed forces. The information is often too inconsistent, subjective, stereotypical, and even retrograde to be useful.

A prime reason for this problem is immature media-military relations. Like their counterparts elsewhere, the Russian media often treats military issues sensationally and negatively. Fair, substantive, and informed coverage of military issues does not occur as consistently as it should. At the same time, State structures – including the defense establishment – have yet to “optimize” their relationships with the media and “interface” with them properly. (Using the media as a dialogue-enhancing tool for reform will come at a cost though – the Russian military must be prepared to accept a degree of healthy and justifiable criticism about its affairs.)

Another problem is that Russian politicians pay irregular

attention to security issues in general and defense reform in particular. Paying attention to these areas primarily during election campaigns is unhelpful; sloganeering and deliberate emotionalism inevitably collides with objective and comprehensive analysis.

So what is to be done? The author argues that successful Russian defense reform is tightly connected to public support. It is the public that will ultimately provide the human and material foundations on which improved national security rests. This improved security, however, will require a transparent and on-going dialogue between defense experts and officials, politicians, and ordinary people. The dialogue does not necessarily have to be weighted equally though. As a rule, experts provide the most “reasonable” proposals for defense reform, and most readily identify the weakest.

In any case, the ideal venues for this open, policy refining dialogue are, in order of priority, the Russian media, first-hand public and personal contacts, and regional-global networks. These venues will provide the information the public needs to make informed judgments. They will, in other words, highlight the aims and rationales behind Russian military reform, and expose them to the free marketplace of ideas. Out of this exposure will then come the mutually agreed-upon military reforms of the Russian armed forces.

La réglementation juridique de la solde du personnel militaire sous contrat en Russie: particularités, problèmes et perspectives

Vladimir Levanov¹

Le processus de réforme des Forces armées de la Fédération de Russie doit être analysé dans le difficile contexte social et économique d'une société en transition. A cet égard, nombreux sont les paramètres qui entrent en jeu dans la protection sociale des militaires sous contrat, tels que l'image du militaire et de sa fonction, les dimensions qualitative et quantitative de la réforme des armées, et notamment le nombre important de postes de soldats et de sergents à pourvoir, principalement sur la base d'un service sous contrat.

De nombreuses publications ont déjà abordé la pratique juridique actuelle et plusieurs études ont traité en profondeur les questions du paiement de la solde et les recours

possibles en cas de manquements voire de violation des droits des militaires en la matière. En revanche, il n'existe pas encore de travaux portant sur la question du cadre juridique général dans lequel s'inscrit la solde des militaires sous contrat, et exposant ses particularités, ses enjeux et les améliorations éventuelles à y apporter.

C'est cette absence de normes précises régissant la solde du personnel militaire, ajoutée à celle d'études théoriques sur les questions de réglementation juridique qui nous ont poussé à approfondir ce sujet.

Cette problématique prend d'autant plus d'importance que des moyens immenses sont déployés aujourd'hui pour la

¹ Le Lieutenant-Colonel Igor Levanov (Russie) a été boursier de recherche du programme OTAN-Russie au Collège de Défense de l'OTAN (Rome), de septembre à décembre 2003.



professionnalisation des Forces armées, dont on attend d'importants bénéfices sociaux, militaires et économiques.

Afin de garantir le succès du processus de réforme dans ce domaine, il convient de répondre à trois questions:

- quels sont les problèmes liés à la solde du personnel militaire?
- comment peut-on les résoudre?
- et dans quelle perspective?

La réglementation juridique de la solde des militaires russes engagés sous contrat ne peut être analysée sans réflexion préalable sur la spécificité de la vie militaire.

Cette spécificité a bien évidemment un fort impact sur la façon de concevoir la réglementation de la solde des militaires sous contrat professionnel. Il importe en effet que le règlement juridique la prenne en compte dans le cadre des particularités propres à la fonction publique russe. Pour la vie militaire, on doit retenir avant tout:

- le droit du travail qui s'applique aux militaires de carrière,
- la limitation de certains droits constitutionnels des militaires,
- les sources de revenu de la famille du militaire,
- l'obligation de mobilité et les affectations successives du militaire,
- la complexité, les tensions et le stress liés aux activités militaires,
- les activités opérationnelles impliquant un risque vital.

C'est cet ensemble de particularités qui doit être pris en compte par le législateur.

Dans la situation actuelle, les particularités relatives à la réglementation juridique de la solde des militaires professionnels sont prises en compte par des procédures spécifiques soit imposées, soit libres. Or les procédures libres sont de plus en plus fréquentes et leur application au paiement de la solde présente des caractéristiques à étudier. En effet, le paiement ne relève que d'une des parties concernées, en l'occurrence l'Etat, représenté par les organismes du commandement militaire. Ceci vaut, avant tout, pour les versements supplémentaires comme la prime mensuelle pour la complexité, la tension et le régime spécial du service militaire, la récompense pour service exemplaire et la récompense exceptionnelle en espèces, dont la part varie entre 33,85% et 48,63% de la solde. Ces spécificités résultent d'un encadrement juridique minimum de la solde des militaires. De plus, il n'y a que deux façons de sanctionner les violations de la réglementation de la solde, soit par la restauration du droit acquis, soit par la limitation de celui-ci. De fait, les sanctions conduisent en général au remboursement intégral du dommage et ne sont pas liées au niveau de revenu du contrevenant (comme le veut le droit du travail). De plus,

le remboursement ne correspond pas au montant intégral des pertes réelles, comme le prévoit le droit civil (c'est à dire le préjudice direct, plus le manque à gagner). Tel est le constat que l'on peut faire.

Le choix des méthodes et l'amélioration de la réglementation juridique de la solde exigent un cadrage plus précis de celle-ci.

Avant d'entrer dans le détail, il est utile d'examiner le mécanisme de formation de la solde des militaires professionnels, de définir l'efficacité des incitations financières et de comprendre comment les lois du marché influent sur le calcul de la solde. Il convient également de cerner quels sont les principes qui régissent le calcul de la solde de base et ceux qui interviennent dans le calcul des versements additionnels. La prise en compte réelle de ces différents facteurs doit permettre de rendre le système plus efficace.

On a souvent tendance à simplifier tous ces problèmes en les réduisant à la simple question du montant, certes insuffisant, de la solde militaire. On ne peut nier qu'il s'agit là d'un problème majeur mais il a tendance à faire oublier d'autres considérations moins immédiates mais tout aussi importantes comme, le caractère peu attractif de la solde, la grande diversité des niveaux de salaires, l'irrégularité du versement de la solde ou encore les questions sensibles d'opportunité du versement ou de paiement intégral de la solde. On omet généralement aussi de considérer la variété voire la dispersion et même parfois la discordance des données juridiques régissant la solde des militaires, l'absence de procédures adaptées et les faiblesses de l'Institut de la Responsabilité pour les délits en la matière, etc.

L'identification et la prise en compte de tous ces problèmes devrait permettre de répondre à la difficile question suivante: comment perfectionner la réglementation juridique de la solde pour attirer et retenir dans des Forces armées aux moyens financiers limités, les experts de haut niveau dont elles ont besoin et rendre l'activité militaire encore plus attractive?

Cependant, pour y parvenir, il ne suffira pas de perfectionner le système existant car celui-ci reste fondé sur les principes d'une économie centralisée datant de l'époque soviétique. Il ne répond donc pas aux nouveaux besoins d'une économie de marché qui en est encore à son stade initial ; le système actuel ne peut donc pas garantir l'exécution convenable des tâches assignées aux Forces armées. L'accomplissement des tâches militaires prévues aujourd'hui implique donc la révision de la réglementation de la solde pour:

- augmenter le prestige et le caractère attractif du service militaire,
- inciter davantage de volontaires à signer un contrat militaire,



- augmenter la capacité opérationnelle des armées pour mener à bien n'importe quelle tâche décidée par le Président dans le domaine de la sécurité nationale.

Quelles solutions envisager?

Il s'agit tout d'abord d'étudier:

- la standardisation des salaires selon le grade et la position occupée et la diversification des primes complémentaires pour que chaque militaire ait un "profil personnel" distinct de la solde de base standard;
- la mise en place d'un cadre juridique codifié et publié réglant tous les aspects organisationnels de la solde et d'application systématique sur la solde individuelle ;
- le remplacement du principe 'à travail équivalent, salaire équivalent' par le principe 'à travail équivalent, niveau de vie équivalent'.

Le travail équivalent est considéré comme un travail de même intensité, accompli dans des conditions identiques par les militaires et présentant des caractéristiques qualitatives similaires (la durée du contrat militaire, le niveau de la formation, l'expérience requise dans l'exercice des fonctions, etc.).

Cette étude n'avait pas eu pour ambition de proposer une référence complète au processus nécessairement long et complexe d'amélioration de la réglementation juridique de la solde du personnel militaire engagé volontaire. Elle n'a abordé qu'une partie des problèmes existants en proposant des solutions limitées. Mais il faut éviter que le processus de réforme s'enlise car, aujourd'hui déjà, des milliers de militaires sont engagés sous contrat et les progrès accomplis dans le domaine de la solde seront déterminants dans leur décision de poursuivre ou non leur carrière militaire.

NDC Research Branch Synopsis of

Criminal Influence/Control over the Russian Military-Industrial Complex in the Context of Global Security

by Leonid Y. Kosals¹

The international community has long underestimated the control exercised by organized crime in the Russian defense sector. Although the criminal control over defense industries is less apparent than in other sectors of the Russian economy, 10% of all directors in the defense industry report cases of criminal penetration of their companies. And since this penetration continues to grow, the Russian government needs to adopt and elaborate special measures that will help decriminalize its defense industries.

The above conclusions are based on surveys conducted either one or two times a year since 1995 by sociologists and economists from the Russian Academy of Sciences, and in cooperation with the League for the Support of Russian Defense Industries. The surveys, which were typically over 100 questions long, asked directors of non-nuclear defense companies to answer queries about production facilities, financing, personnel management, import-export issues, and most importantly for this paper, the potential criminal control of defense industries. In addition to relying on the above data to draw its basic conclusions, this research paper also refers to official statistics, media reports and informal interviews conducted by the

author with industry directors. According to these directors' estimates, about 12% of all defense companies in Russia are under criminal influence, and no less than 10% are directly controlled by criminal entities. By criminal influence, the study usually means that criminal groups threaten to exert pressure on shareholders and/or managers involved in a company's decision-making processes. By criminal control, it means that criminal groups may hold some shares in a company, and are thus involved in its internal financial planning, strategy development, leadership policies, etc. Additionally, criminal control means intimidating company directors and their families, or even having them killed as a last resort.

Given the above (and alleged) levels of influence and control, criminal groups can have a profound impact on a defense company's activities. This impact is particularly obvious when the company establishes new contracts with governmental or private institutions in domestic and international markets. According to the above surveys², these contracts represent up to 29% of a company's activities most affected by criminal controls. The same percentage applies to credit agreements, which remain of great interest to criminal groups. Other areas that suffer significant

¹ Doctor Leonid Kosals (Russia) was a PfP Fellow at the NATO Defense College Rome, from September to December 2003.

² The data presented in this analysis is based on company directors' estimates. Since every respondent could choose several possible answers, the total amount is not equal to 100%.



criminal influence include sales (25%), innovations/penetration into new markets (25%), privatization/trading of shares (21%), and office management (18%). In contrast, imports/exports, investments, and bartering historically seem to come under less criminal control (7% each).

Having answered the “what” question (i.e., “what are the defense industry areas where criminal influence most occurs?”), the next obvious one to ask is, “why”? Why do criminal groups try to penetrate Russian defense companies? In up to 80% of cases, the primary reason is profit. (In turn, 60% of the for-profit cases involve buying real estate, including well-located buildings owned by defense industries that criminal groups then transform into large stores, casinos, etc.) Other prominent reasons for criminal penetration include the opportunity to be a “normal” businessman (43%), to gain both political and economic influence (30% and 28% respectively), to penetrate international arms trade markets (14%), and to control Russian weapons production (11%).

All the above motives, including a desire for simple profit, are of social concern. The actors here, after all, are criminals, and criminal control of the Russian defense industry does lead to perceived domestic consequences. One reported consequence is an increase in the political and economic influence of criminals (respectively 42% and 41% of all consequences under analysis). Other observed or alleged domestic consequences of criminal penetration/control of the defense industry include decreasingly qualified company directors (41%), murders (33%), arms falling into the hands of criminals (15%), lack of investments/innovations (14%), and the criminal penetration of international arms trade markets (9%).

But just as there are domestic consequences to worry about, there are also perceived concerns on the international front. First, there is the worrisome development of a “shadow” Russian arms trade that now totals approximately \$500 million dollars per year – i.e., the equivalent of about 10% of official defense exports. (The possible sources of these shadow sales, however, are controversial. Some argue that they are not necessarily attributable to criminal entities. They may result from particular bureaucratic practices, a complex regulatory system for arms exports, and from companies so eager to speed up foreign sales that they violate existing domestic regulations, and therefore fail to report those sales.) Second, there is the inevitable worry that Russian arms will fall into the hands of terrorists or irresponsible political factions. Finally, there is concern over the increased corruption within the international arms trade. In the particular case of Russia, bribes now amount to 10-30% of all shadow transactions – i.e., \$50 to 150 million dollars.

So there are perceived domestic and international consequences to the “what” and “why” of criminal activity now

occurring in Russia’s defense sector. Even if the primary motive is profit, the consensus remains among those who should know best – the vulnerable directors of Russian defense companies – that a criminal presence in their industry damages the Russian economy, Russian institutions, and international relations.

So what is to be done? First it might be helpful to reach consensus on why this problem occurred in the first place, particularly since solutions must inevitably take their cue from causes. With this assumption in mind, one could argue that there are at least four general reasons behind the increased criminalization of the Russian defense industry. First, there are the lingering difficulties generated by a society in transition. These difficulties include lost privileges, unemployment, and a general disorientation felt by many Russians. Second, there is – as already suggested – the widespread rise of an unreported and often illegal “shadow” economy, which now amounts to an estimated 25%-50% of the overall Russian economy. (Many “satellite companies” registered in Russia or in offshore zones are part of the defense sector’s shadow economy. They exist long enough to conduct several transactions, and then they close. As a result, the parent company remains technically free from any charges of wrong doing on the part of its now-gone subsidiary.) Third, while defense procurement by the Russian state plummeted, privatization lagged. This problem inevitably led state-owned companies, who could not sell their products domestically, to try and sell them on the black market. Finally, there has been a singular lack of attention paid by Russian authorities to the problem of criminal control over the defense industry. (They first focused their market reforms on those companies – oil, gas, metals, etc. – that produced the most wealth. They paid less attention to other industries and their particular problems, including the budding criminal control of the defense industry.)

After agreeing on what are the “root cause” problems behind criminalized defense industries, reformers should then remember the specific “what” and “why” explanations provided earlier in this synopsis. With this data in mind, they might then pursue the reforms that admittedly remain sketchy at this point time, although there is broad agreement that “general measures” should first be implemented to decriminalize the military-industrial complex. More specific actions should then follow, including “special clearance operations” within major defense industries. Both steps, however, require international support, which might best be obtained by working through the NATO-Russia Council. In the meantime, 71% of directors in the defense industry expect their situation to remain approximately the same, 16% envisage a possible decrease in criminal influence, while 13% believe it will actually increase (they believe privatized companies will only expand their arms exports, and therefore become even more attractive for criminals).



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RAKIPI, Albert, “The Weak States and the Role of International Institutions”, Rome 2004.

Essays and Best Research by Senior Course Members

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