Southeast Asia
Patterns of security cooperation

Strategically, Southeast Asia sits at the intersection of the wider world and Australia’s local neighbourhood; what happens there matters to Australia. But the broader Asian security environment is in flux, and an era of strategic quiescence in Southeast Asia may be drawing to a close. Security trends there are increasingly being shaped by a set of global and broader Asian concerns as well as local ones. The growing Asian great powers are eroding the old sub-regional boundaries between Northeast and Southeast Asia. In consequence, traditional patterns of strategic influence and cooperation are shifting in Southeast Asia.

In this paper, Professor Carl Thayer from the Australian Defence Force Academy ‘unpacks’ four patterns of strategic influence in the region, assessing the interactions between them and what they mean for Australian strategic interests. Those patterns increasingly overlay in new and complex ways, ways that might undermine the stable, consultative Southeast Asia with which we have become so familiar.

What can Australia do? It is likely to face a new Southeast Asian security environment in future, one marked by more great-power intrusion and competition. In consequence, Australia must anticipate a future where it can no longer afford to take for granted a largely benign local strategic environment. Over the next five to ten years, we are likely to become much more involved with strategic developments in Southeast Asia, working where we can to reinforce patterns that best serve our interests. That would include working to enhance practical multilateral security cooperation where we can, encouraging and supporting a larger US role in the region where we can, and building hard-power strategic links of our own to regional partners to bolster Southeast Asia’s own strategic weight. We should be exploring opportunities for closer strategic partnerships with key Southeast Asian states, and be willing to invest the time, attention and resources that it will take to turn those partnerships into genuine strategic assets.
Carlyle A Thayer

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In the post-Cold War era, Australians have become accustomed to framing their strategic worries on a broad canvas. The liberation of Kuwait, the shifting great-power relationships in Asia, the troubles in the South Pacific microstates, the events of 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the global financial crisis have served as the backdrop for a national discussion about Australian strategic policy that has been wide ranging in its scope and thoughtful in its content.

A closer inspection of that debate, though, reveals that there has been one region which has frequently been missing from detailed consideration—the region of Southeast Asia. In large part, the reasons for that omission have reflected Southeast Asia’s own story of strategic success. The region has moved from being what US analyst Saul Cohen labelled ‘a geopolitical shatterbelt’ in the 1960s to the stable, consultative, interactive community it is today. And, like other countries, Australia tends not to worry about places where good things are happening.

But those good times might be coming to an end. A sea change now seems to be occurring in the Southeast Asian security environment. As Asian great powers grow, so the broader strategic circumstances within which Southeast Asian countries manufactured that story of strategic success have also begun to shift. That shift is critical to Australia. Southeast Asia forms the intersection point between the broader Asia and our own neighbourhood, and we cannot be indifferent to the events taking place there.

For that reason, we asked Professor Carl Thayer, a noted Southeast Asian specialist, to revisit the topic of Southeast Asia’s strategic future. Carl is an academic with long experience of the region and an impressive list of publications to his credit. I am glad that he accepted our offer to produce a Strategy paper on this topic, and think readers will benefit from his assessment of the issues. He has skillfully portrayed a shifting range of patterns within the region, and in doing so has clarified greatly our understanding of the growing strategic tensions there.

I would like to thank Carl for his efforts and the ASPI team members, on both the research and publication sides, who have helped make this paper a reality.

Peter Abigail
Executive Director
Australia will face a more complex strategic environment in Southeast Asia over the next five years. That environment will be characterised by an overlay of mutually supporting and competing security patterns in which Southeast Asian and external powers will play more significant roles. The strategic weight of key Southeast Asian states—principally Indonesia and Vietnam—is growing. But it is not growing as fast as the strategic weight of the Asian great powers, whose influence will be felt increasingly in the region. Australia will need to reassess its future role within that shifting environment and devise a set of strategies that will allow it to promote its national interests there.

Southeast Asia’s emerging strategic environment is being shaped by eight major trends: the global economic and financial crisis, China’s military modernisation and transformation, the United States’ stepped-up engagement, increased arms procurements, the heightened importance of the maritime domain, the increasing salience of transnational security issues, the persistence of ‘everyday security challenges’, and the evolution of the regional security architecture.

In sum, the security environment in Southeast Asia is being shaped by global, Asia-Pacific-wide and domestic trends. Southeast Asia will have to work hard to maintain its regional autonomy as global forces erode the boundaries between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia.

Four major patterns of security cooperation combine and compete to shape Southeast Asia’s security environment: multilateral defence cooperation between external powers and individual Southeast Asian states; US-led theatre security cooperation; Chinese-led exclusivist East Asian regional security cooperation; and multilateral efforts centred on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Each of these patterns overlays the other.

The major strategic trends impacting on Southeast Asia have produced tensions in inter-state relations that may be grouped into five clusters: maritime disputes in the South China Sea; the security dilemma created by China’s military modernisation; the potentially destabilising effects
of the diffusion of military technology; the corrosive effects of ‘everyday security issues’ and transnational security challenges.

Emerging security tensions have resulted in some increased cooperation among regional states and between regional states and external powers. At the same time, in particular cases these tensions have undermined confidence and trust among states and contributed to competitive rather than cooperative patterns of security cooperation.

The weakness of individual Southeast Asian states likewise constrains their capacity to act multilaterally to address region-wide security challenges. In cases where the interests of external powers are affected these powers may decide to act more assertively outside the framework of multilateral regional security institutions.

Both the United States and China seek to shape the regional security environment in accord with their national security strategies. Both major powers reach into similar toolkits to find appropriate political, economic and military instruments suitable to their national strategies. But the two major powers differ in their vision of what kind of security order they would like to see emerge in Southeast Asia and how they go about influencing their preferred outcomes. In other words, the United States and China use similar means, but in different ways and towards different ends.

China and the United States each seek to shape a different regional order. China promotes multipolar security arrangements that uphold state sovereignty irrespective of the type of domestic political system in order to balance if not constrain the power and influence of the United States. China’s approach emphasises nominal equality among members of regional multilateral institutions and is particularly focused on binding ASEAN to exclusive East Asian regionalism. In reality, China is nonetheless first among equals.

The United States, in contrast, pursues a national strategy aimed at creating an Asia–Pacific-wide security order under US leadership founded on rules-based multilateral institutions that promote universal values such as democracy and human rights. The US approach is to enlist the support of key allies and strategic partners as the critical mass towards achieving those ends.

Southeast Asia has been unable to insulate itself from Sino-American strategic rivalry, and Sino-American strategic competition appears likely to intensify.

Changes in Southeast Asia’s security environment are pulling Australian strategic policy in different and possibly contradictory directions. The US alliance relationship focuses mainly on conventional threats across the Asia–Pacific region, while the focus of the Five Power Defence Arrangements is giving greater prominence to addressing non-traditional threats in the maritime domain. ASEAN-led regional security cooperation is at a nascent stage. ASEAN’s default position has been to address soft security issues such as transnational or non-traditional threats. The commencement of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus process holds the prospect that ASEAN and its security partners will develop new areas of practical security cooperation which could benefit the region.

Australia’s strategic planners need to pursue a range of pathways to secure Australia’s national interests in Southeast Asia. One pathway would entail building on and redirecting the presently existing web of security ties into a more robust multilateral framework. Another pathway would involve encouraging the US to become more engaged in...
Southeast Asia as a region in its own right. Australia might help build regional support for that role where it could. And a third pathway would involve Australia revitalising its own security ties with key Southeast Asian states in order to increase the region’s strategic weight in dealing with external powers. Australia also should work closely with Southeast Asian partners to develop a common vision of the region’s future.
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

For much of the past six and a half decades, Australia’s national security was threatened by the intrusion of major powers into the region to our north. Japan occupied all of Southeast Asia during World War II and mounted attacks on continental Australia from bases in the region. After the war, China materially assisted the Vietnamese communists in their struggle against French colonialism and provided support for communist insurgencies in Malaya and Burma. The Soviet Union briefly provided military equipment, including medium bombers, to Indonesia in the 1950s. Throughout the Vietnam War in the 1960s and early 1970s, China and the Soviet Union supported the Vietnamese communist drive to reunify Vietnam. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union lodged military forces at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.

During this same period, Southeast Asia was more of a shatterbelt than a cohesive region. In the 1960s, Indonesia launched a campaign of confrontation against the newly formed Federation of Malaysia. Insurgencies raged elsewhere—in Burma, the Philippines and Thailand—leading one analyst to characterise Southeast Asia as a ‘region in revolt’ (Osborne 2007). In short, Southeast Asia was a source of threat to Australian interests and national security.

Beginning in 1967, Southeast Asian states sought to forge a sense of regional identity. This took the form of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The five founding members—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand—prospered as a result of their own efforts and the protective security umbrella provided by the United States.

It was not until the end of the Cold War that the momentum of Southeast Asian regionalism took shape. ASEAN expanded its membership to include Vietnam, Laos, Burma, and Cambodia and sought to build up regional resilience against the intrusion of major external powers. Most notably, this took the form of the Declaration of

ASEAN also sought to assert its centrality in regional security affairs with the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. ASEAN sat in the driver’s seat as chair of the ARF, and ASEAN norms—‘the ASEAN Way’—framed the ARF’s work program. ARF membership quickly expanded beyond ASEAN’s dialogue partners to include states from Northeast Asia, South Asia and the South Pacific.

In 2003, ASEAN announced its objective of forming an ASEAN Community by 2020 (a date later brought forward to 2015) based on three pillars: security cooperation, economic cooperation and socio-cultural cooperation. In late 2007, ASEAN took a major step forward by adopting an ASEAN Charter to give the organisation a legal character and a rules-based approach to multilateral cooperation. The three pillars of the ASEAN Community were transformed into three ministerial level councils.

Major Asian powers, as well as external states, are now playing an increasingly assertive role in regional affairs.

Southeast Asia has not managed to attain the degree of regional autonomy its leaders originally sought. Globalisation eroded the boundaries between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, creating an East Asia ‘security complex’ (Buzan 1988, 2003). Major Asian powers, as well as external states, are now playing an increasingly assertive role in regional affairs.

This Strategy paper will review contemporary security developments in Southeast Asia in five parts. The first part examines major security trends impacting on the region’s security (Chapter 2). The second part reviews four major patterns of security cooperation (Chapter 3). The third part analyses emerging regional security tensions (Chapter 4). Part four identifies great power influence points (Chapter 5). Part five reviews the challenges and opportunities that contemporary security developments pose for Australia and offers some suggestions for Australian defence and security strategy (Chapter 6).
Chapter 2

MAJOR TRENDS SHAPING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

At least eight major trends are likely to shape the security environment in Southeast Asia over the next five years.

Global financial and economic crisis

The global financial crisis remains the single most important driver of inter-state dynamics in Southeast Asia. It has brought home to all states that they have a vested interest in global economic recovery as the precondition for a resumption of economic growth in their domestic economies. Recovery from the crisis has only been made possible through high-level multilateral cooperation and coordination at global and regional levels coupled with national economic stimulus packages.

A major net result of the global financial crisis has been to accelerate the power shift from North America and Europe to East Asia.

A major net result of the global financial crisis has been to accelerate the power shift from North America and Europe to East Asia. The most dramatic manifestation of this power shift has been to reinforce China’s rise as a major power in all dimensions of national power. China now has an enhanced global and regional leadership role through the Group of Twenty and ASEAN Plus Three (APT).4

China has used its new position to press for strengthened supervisory and regulatory arrangements over international financial institutions and greater influence for newly emerging economies in the World Bank.
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and the International Monetary Fund. China’s leadership on these issues has found widespread support in the region.

China’s emergence as a great power could make it a potential strategic competitor of the United States across the Asia-Pacific and in Southeast Asia. The dynamics of Sino-American relations will have a major impact on the security environment in Southeast Asia.

The global financial crisis drove home to Southeast Asia its interdependence and vulnerability to global forces. It also triggered a regional power shift that contributed to the rise of Indonesia and to a lesser extent Vietnam as major regional players. Both countries emerged from the global financial crisis in a strengthened position due to their domestic recovery programs and maintenance of internal stability. Indonesia and to a lesser extent Vietnam can be expected to play an increasingly important role in shaping Southeast Asia’s security environment.

China’s military modernisation

There is a direct link between China’s phenomenal economic growth, including recovery from the global financial crisis, and rising defence budgets to support the modernisation and transformation of its military forces. This has both strategic and regional implications.

China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is developing roles and missions that will permit it to project power beyond its territorial sphere of interest into the Western Pacific and South China Sea. Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, has stated that the strategic intent behind China’s development of new capabilities seemed to be ‘very focused on the United States Navy and our bases that are in that part of the world’. In particular, the construction of the Yulin Naval Base near Sanya, on Hainan Island, provides China with a forward presence to exercise its sovereignty claims over the South China Sea and to protect its sea lanes of communication through the Malacca and Singapore straits.

China’s military modernisation and transformation, especially naval modernisation, has created a security dilemma for regional states.

In summary, China’s military modernisation and transformation, especially naval modernisation, has created a security dilemma for regional states. China’s efforts to safeguard its security by developing what it considers a reasonable force structure to deter the United States has created insecurity in several neighbouring states due to China’s lack of transparency.

United States stepped-up engagement

There can be no doubt that the global financial crisis has dented the authority of the United States and undermined the attraction of its free market capitalist economy as a model of development. In February 2009, Dennis Blair, then Director of US National Intelligence, observed in testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the global
financial crisis ‘has worsened questioning of US stewardship of the global economy and international financial structure’ and damaged America’s reputation for world leadership.

In broad strategic terms, the global financial crisis has resulted in a reduction of US defence spending in those areas (such as acquisition accounts, procurement, and research and development) that are vital if the United States is to maintain its commanding technological superiority. In sum, the United States will have fewer resources to shape strategic developments in the Asia–Pacific, including Southeast Asia. In the coming decade, the United States will rely even more heavily on its allies and strategic partners to cooperate to ensure regional security.

The change in power relativities between China and the United States has prompted some strategic analysts to write about the possible erosion of US power and loss of US strategic primacy. The United States has responded by beefing up its military muscle and renewing its political engagement with the region.

Over the next several decades, the United States will retain its role as the world’s leading country in all measures of national power.

Over the next several decades, the United States will retain its role as the world’s leading country in all measures of national power. It will also remain the prime maritime power in the Asia–Pacific and Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future.

The global financial crisis occurred during a transition period in US politics. The Obama Administration has brought renewed energy to US engagement with Southeast Asia. As US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton exclaimed in a January 2010 speech to the East–West Center, ‘the United States is back in Asia’.

Secretary Clinton included Indonesia on her first trip to the Asia–Pacific. She has attended consecutive ARF meetings since taking office and at her first meeting launched the Lower Mekong Initiative. The United States has acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and is moving to appoint a resident ambassador to ASEAN. The Obama Administration has also promoted free trade agreements with selected regional states, such as Vietnam, under the Trans-Pacific Partnership program. More significantly, President Obama attended the first ASEAN–US leaders’ meeting and will host the second meeting; also, he has made a commitment to visit Indonesia.

It is clear that the Obama Administration is not only re-engaging with Southeast Asia, but is also more willing than the previous Bush Administration to participate through multilateral channels. ASEAN has responded by inviting the United States to consider joining the East Asia Summit. The US has responded positively. In sum, stepped-up US engagement will play a major role in influencing the security environment in Southeast Asia.
Increased arms procurements

As noted above, China’s defence modernisation and transformation has generated a security dilemma for regional states. ASEAN states have been circumspect in public statements but their concerns can be discerned in the significant rise in defence expenditures and the kinds of weapon systems and platforms that they have acquired. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, ‘[arms] deliveries to South East Asia nearly doubled in 2005–2009 compared to 2000–2004. Deliveries to Malaysia increased by 722 percent in 2005–2009 compared to 2000–2004, for Singapore by 146 percent and for Indonesia by 84 percent’ (Holtom et al. 2010:4).

Southeast Asia’s arms procurements go beyond force modernisation and include the introduction of new capabilities that can be operated at extended ranges. In other words, Southeast Asia’s arms buying spree, although largely intended for defensive purposes, may have a destabilising impact on regional security.

Heightened importance of the maritime domain

The maritime domain will continue to grow in importance in the coming decade as Southeast Asia and East Asia continue to recover from the global financial crisis and resume economic growth. This will underscore the geo-strategic importance of the sea domain stretching from the Gulf of Arabia and the Indian Ocean through archipelagic Southeast Asia and the South China Sea to the Western Pacific.

There are both positive and negative features of this trend. On the one hand, all nations in the Asia–Pacific will have a vital common interest in maintaining the security of trade routes on which their economic prosperity and national security depend. This will be the case especially for the East Asian economies that depend on sea lanes of communication that pass through Southeast Asia for trade and for the import of vital energy resources. The heightened importance of the maritime domain raises the possibility of increased multilateral cooperation to guarantee maritime security.

On the other hand, vital sea lanes of communication pass through the South China Sea, where China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei have conflicting sovereignty claims. It is noticeable that the current military modernisation and transformation programs contain elements of a naval arms race embedded in competitive rather than cooperative maritime strategies.

Increasing salience of transnational issues

All ASEAN states stress the salience of non-traditional security issues as a major factor shaping the regional security environment. Because non-traditional security issues are transnational in nature and beyond the ability of any state to resolve, they are more amenable to multilateral cooperative security approaches. It is unsurprising, then, that Southeast Asian states have given priority to security cooperation to address non-traditional threats.

It is debatable whether each and every non-traditional issue should be ‘securitised’ and treated as a threat to national security. Submissions to the ARF’s Annual Security Outlook 2009, for example, identified twelve non-traditional security threats: terrorism, piracy, transnational crime, small arms and light weapons smuggling, money laundering, drug
Major trends shaping the security environment

trafficking, people smuggling, illegal migration, illegal logging, illegal fishing, avian influenza and swine flu, and climate change.

The extent to which the armed forces, as distinct from law enforcement, customs, immigration and public health officials, should be involved in addressing non-traditional issues is a matter of debate within individual countries. But it is clear from evolving trends that armed forces will be increasingly involved in addressing these security challenges, especially in responding to large-scale natural disasters, terrorism, and piracy and armed robbery at sea.

Persistence of ‘everyday domestic security challenges’

At least seven of Southeast Asia’s eleven states are affected by domestic security challenges of varying orders of magnitude in which violence has been used to advance the interests of a particular group or non-state actor. Within the past year, Malaysia, Indonesia, Laos and Vietnam have all experienced sporadic outbreaks of sectarian or ethnic violence. At the other end of the scale, Thailand, Myanmar and the Philippines continue to experience political instability and ethno-nationalist insurgency, ethnic conflict, and communist insurgency and armed separatism, respectively. Cambodia and Thailand were embroiled in an unseemly low-level conflict over disputed land surrounding a temple complex on their border.

These ‘everyday domestic security challenges’ will persist over the next decade. The ongoing conflicts in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines, and the unstable domestic political situation in Myanmar, if unaddressed, all have the potential to spill over and affect the security of neighbouring states. The situation in Myanmar could threaten to set back ASEAN’s unity and cohesion as it moves to implement the newly adopted ASEAN Charter. Human rights abuses and violations of religious freedom in states experiencing domestic strife raise the question of whether humanitarian intervention might be considered if a state fails to meet its obligation to protect its citizens.

... the security environment in Southeast Asia is being shaped by global, Asia-Pacific-wide and domestic trends.

Evolution of regional security architecture

From the very inception of the ARF, ASEAN has insisted on being in the ‘driver’s seat’. Yet, despite its accomplishments, the ARF remains a security dialogue forum that primarily advances confidence-building measures (CBMs) on the basis of consensus and ‘at a pace comfortable to all’ its members. Southeast Asia lacks an overarching security body to effectively address the range of current and emerging security challenges. This has led to the initiation of ad hoc efforts, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative to counter possible proliferation-related trafficking, and the Shangri-La Dialogue to discuss specific security challenges.

At present, there are a number of proposals to renovate the existing security architecture. China is pressing for the APT to take a larger role in addressing non-traditional security challenges. Various Japanese prime ministers have proposed an East Asia community, while former prime minister Kevin Rudd advocated an overarching Asia-Pacific community.
All these proposals, to varying degrees, challenge ASEAN’s insistence that it play a central role in the regional security architecture. One of the most important security trends now evolving in Southeast Asia is ASEAN’s drive to create a political-security community to reinforce ASEAN’s central role in the regional security architecture. In the face of proposals by non-ASEAN members to upgrade the existing regional architecture, ASEAN has responded by directing its defence ministers to become more proactive. They are now considering plans to develop what is known as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus process, involving the ten ASEAN defence ministers and eight of their counterpart dialogue partners.

In summary, the security environment in Southeast Asia is being shaped by global, Asia–Pacific-wide and domestic trends. The global financial crisis has accelerated China’s rise, military modernisation and influence in regional affairs. It has also given rise to perceptions that American hegemony is in decline. The United States has responded by beefing up its military presence and re-engaging with Southeast Asia as a distinctly important region. These two trends have already resulted in friction in the maritime domain and strategic competition for influence in Southeast Asia.

Key Southeast Asian states have reacted by adopting ‘self-help’ measures to shore up their defence capabilities and by pursuing hedging strategies as a response to the geopolitical transformation now unfolding in the broader Asia–Pacific region. Within Southeast Asia, a power shift is underway with the emergence of a stable Indonesia potentially followed by Vietnam as key players, a trend reinforced by Thailand’s domestic disarray.
PATTERNS OF SECURITY COOPERATION

There are four major patterns of security cooperation in Southeast Asia. The first pattern comprises multilateral defence cooperation between external powers and individual Southeast Asian states designed to address specific security concerns. The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) and Japanese-initiated anti-piracy efforts are prime examples of this pattern.

The second pattern of security cooperation involves United States-led defence and security cooperation with treaty allies, strategic partners and others in the Asia–Pacific region.

The third pattern centres on Chinese-led multilateral efforts to bind ASEAN to a structure of East Asian regional security cooperation with a major focus on non-traditional security issues.

The fourth pattern involves ASEAN-centred multilateral efforts to promote security cooperation both among its members and dialogue partners, and among members of the ARF.

In sum, Southeast Asia’s security environment may be viewed as comprising layers of those four patterns of security cooperation. Each of the patterns is discussed below.

Non-ASEAN multilateral cooperation

Five Power Defence Arrangements

The Five Power Defence Arrangements came into force in 1971 as a loose consultative arrangement involving the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. It is not a formal alliance. The FPDA is today the oldest—if not only—multilateral arrangement with an operational dimension in Southeast Asia.
The highest-level policy body is the FPDA Defence Ministers’ Meeting, which meets triennially to provide strategic direction. The ministerial meetings are attended by defence secretaries of the five members and the commander of the Integrated Area Defence System (IADS). The next senior body is the FPDA Defence Chiefs’ Conference. The defence chiefs provide reports and professional advice to the FPDA Defence Ministers’ Meeting. They meet annually with the commander of IADS. Since 2002, informal meetings of the defence chiefs have coincided with the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore under the auspices of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The FPDA’s third main structure is the FPDA Consultative Council, which oversees policy, planning and budget. Its meetings are co-chaired by the Secretary General for Defence Malaysia and the Permanent Secretary for Defence Singapore, and are attended by the high commissioners and defence advisers for Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom plus the commander of IADS. It meets biannually, rotating between Singapore and Malaysia.

The FPDA’s fourth main structure is the FPDA Activities Coordination Council. The Coordination Council is composed of defence force representatives from all members and from IADS headquarters. It also meets biannually and is responsible for coordinating exercises and activities. It does so through three working groups for communications, logistics and policy.

And the fifth FPDA structure is the FPDA Professional Forum. The forum involves an annual seminar hosted alternately by Malaysia and Singapore with a co-host from among the remaining three partners. The seminar is conducted at the theatre operational level and focuses on topics of current interest.

The unexpected 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami pushed the FPDA into humanitarian assistance and disaster relief...

In addition to those structures, and most importantly, the FPDA has a permanent operational component based at IADS headquarters at the Royal Malaysian Air Force Base, Butterworth. IADS is the only standing component of the FPDA. IADS consists of nearly fifty staff drawn from member states and all three services. IADS plans and prepares for exercises and officer education and training activities.

In 2000, defence ministers laid the basis for the greatest transformation of the FPDA in its history. The IADS was restructured from Integrated Air Defence to Integrated Area Defence. This decision initiated a new period of evolution and transformation.

In 2003, defence ministers agreed that the FPDA should become more relevant by considering how to meet emerging asymmetric threats while at the same time enhancing their operational capability and interoperability. The following year, the defence ministers directed that the FPDA should incorporate non-conventional threat scenarios into future exercises, with a particular focus on the maritime environment.

The unexpected 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami pushed the FPDA into humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). In June 2006, FPDA defence ministers endorsed a Malaysian proposal for the establishment of a regional centre for disaster relief. They directed that the
FPDA build capacity to enhance interoperability in undertaking HA/DR missions. Increasingly, FPDA exercises have involved the participation of non-military agencies.

But the FPDA has not neglected its role of addressing conventional threats, as demonstrated in Exercise Bersama Shield 2010, when seven warships, fifty-nine combat aircraft and nearly 2,500 personnel demonstrated interoperability in a combined air and maritime exercise.

Over the past thirty-nine years, the FPDA has evolved and adapted to the changing strategic environment. It now boasts a robust consultative structure, a standing multilateral military component and a comprehensive exercise program. The FPDA has gradually expanded its focus from the conventional defence of peninsular Malaysia and Singapore air space, through an annual series of Air Defence Exercises, to large-scale combined and joint military exercises designed to meet emerging conventional and non-conventional security threats extending into the South China Sea.

In sum, the IADS command and control system has developed to such an extent that the armed forces of the five states can effectively operate under a single command to deal with non-conventional security threats in a maritime environment including HA/DR as well as more conventional threats to peninsula Malaysia and Singapore.

Japanese-led anti-piracy cooperation

Japan's Self-Defense Forces are restricted by constitutional and legal provisions in the types of security and defence cooperation they can undertake with other countries. Since 9/11, however, Japan has adopted legislation permitting the Self-Defense Forces to undertake highly circumscribed missions overseas. This has led to a growing involvement by Japan in regional security affairs.

Japan’s most important contribution to security cooperation in Southeast Asia has been its promotion of anti-piracy measures. Japan successfully initiated the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). ReCAAP was the first government-to-government agreement to enhance maritime security in regional waters.

In 2004, all the ASEAN states became charter members. ReCAAP also includes Japan, China, South Korea, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The major functional component of ReCAAP is the Information Sharing Centre based in Singapore that serves as a clearinghouse for information exchange and operational cooperation in responding to incidents of piracy and armed robbery.

In sum, on the basis of both the FPDA experience and Japan’s more recent overtures for security cooperation, this first pattern of security cooperation demonstrates that external and regional states can effectively cooperate to address specific security challenges.

US theatre security cooperation

United States defence and security cooperation with Southeast Asia—the second pattern—predates the formation of the FPDA and is focused on treaty allies (the Philippines and Thailand), as well as new strategic partners such as Singapore. In the past, US security engagement in the Asia–Pacific region has been likened to a ‘hub and spokes’ model with the United States at the centre.
Even today, with the formation of ASEAN and the ARF, the United States continues to place prime emphasis on developing bilateral and multilateral security ties under US leadership. For example, the US Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2010:59) states, ‘The foundation of our presence in Asia remains our historical treaty allies... [and] the continued presence of capable U.S. forces in the region... and better leverag[ing] the capabilities of our regional allies and partners.’

Southeast Asia is subsumed under the US Pacific Command’s (PACOM) Area of Responsibility that stretches across the Asia–Pacific from Hawaii to the west coast of Africa. US security engagement takes place under the framework of PACOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan. This plan includes programs to deliver a broad spectrum of security assistance, security cooperation and capacity building. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review identified three groups of security partners: formal allies (the Philippines and Thailand), strategic partners (Singapore) and prospective strategic partners (Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam).

The following section will review these key US bilateral defence and security relationships before discussing US region-wide multilateral security cooperation.

**Treaty allies**

**The Philippines.** Security ties between the United States and the Philippines date back to 1951 when the two countries signed a mutual security treaty. The agreement effectively went into cold storage in 1991 when the Philippines Senate voted not to renew the lease on US bases, forcing the United States to withdraw from Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base in November 1992. It took nearly six years before Manila and Washington repaired their defence ties by signing a Visiting Forces Agreement in February 1998.

The terrorist attacks on the United States on 9/11 provided a new strategic context for defence ties.

The terrorist attacks on the United States on 9/11 provided a new strategic context for defence ties. The United States extended Operation Enduring Freedom to the Philippines and began providing counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency support in the southern provinces, especially in Mindanao, the Sulu archipelago and the Sulawesi Sea. Annual bilateral exercises include combined military training, instruction in civil–military affairs, humanitarian projects and capacity building for disaster relief. Since 2001, the two allies have conducted an annual exercise known as Balikatan.

The security and defence relationship gradually broadened and now encompasses US support for defence reform and a shift in the role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from internal security operations to territorial defence, including the development of a maritime security capability by 2016. The United States and the Philippines hope to retrain and re-equip up to fourteen battalions every year for five years. The Philippines currently receives the third-largest share of International Military and Education Funding (IMET) in the Asia–Pacific Region.
Thailand. The United States–Thailand alliance is based on the 1954 Southeast Asia Collective Security Treaty (Manila Pact) and an exchange of understandings between the US Secretary of State and the Thai Foreign Minister in 1962.

US security assistance is aimed at enhancing capabilities for joint operations, including HA/DR. According to American officials, Thailand provides unmatched access and support to US armed forces.

Thailand co-hosts Exercise Cobra Gold, an annual exercise first conducted in 1982 as a bilateral exercise with the United States. Cobra Gold has evolved and is now PACOM’s premier event and the largest multilateral exercise in the region. Thailand, the United States, Singapore, Japan, Indonesia and South Korea took part in the 30th Cobra Gold exercise, held in 2010, and observers from more than fourteen nations attended. Malaysia will join in 2011.

Like the FPDA exercises discussed above, Exercise Cobra Gold has shifted its focus in recent years from conventional scenarios to non-traditional security issues such as HA/DR and peacekeeping. The 30th Cobra Gold exercise, for example, involved a mix of two separate activities. One was a computer simulated command post exercise involving Thai, US, Indonesian, Japanese, Singaporean and South Korean military personnel and observers from ten countries (Brunei, China, Chile, Germany, Laos, Mongolia, New Zealand, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam). The other component was a field training exercise based on the United Nations multinational peace support operations model involving the six participants plus UN staff.

Strategic partners


A major step forward in bilateral defence relations occurred in July 2005, when Singapore and the United States signed a Strategic Framework and Defence Cooperation Agreement recognising Singapore as a major security cooperation partner.

Singapore and the United States conduct military science and technology exchanges and military training exercises to address common threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The two partners also share a common interest in maritime security. Singapore joined the Container Security Initiative in September 2002 and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) core group in March 2004. Singapore hosted the first Joint and Combined PSI Exercise in Asia in August 2005.

Singapore participates in Exercise Cope Tiger, a combined air force exercise involving the United States and Thailand. Singapore is a full participant in Exercise Cobra Gold. In 2007, Singapore was included in Exercise Malabar, an annual bilateral naval exercise involving the Indian and US navies held near the eastern approaches to the Malacca Strait.8
Prospective strategic partners

**Indonesia.** United States–Indonesia security and defence relations were renewed and advanced following 9/11 after a period of estrangement over East Timor. As Indonesia recovered from domestic instability following the Asian financial crisis and collapse of the New Order, it has re-emerged as a major player in Southeast Asian affairs. Accordingly, the United States is seeking to develop a comprehensive partnership with Indonesia that encompasses political and security cooperation. The Indonesian armed forces now play a greater role in US-sponsored multilateral events and exercises that focus on HA/DR and peacekeeping such as Exercise Garuda Shield. US restrictions on cooperation with Indonesia’s special forces, Kopassus, were lifted in July 2010.

**Malaysia.** When the United States lost its bases in the Philippines, Malaysia quietly offered to host port visits by US warships. The Malaysian and US air forces conduct a combined exercise known as Exercise Cope Taufan. In 2009, the United States conducted a major command post exercise with Malaysia’s Joint Forces Command aimed at enhancing support for maritime security operations. The United States currently seeks to increase military cooperation with Malaysia.

**Vietnam.** In 2008, US relations with Vietnam were advanced with the initiation of the first Political, Security and Defence Dialogue between the two countries. In 2009, Vietnam’s defence minister visited Washington and agreed to open direct military-to-military discussions with the United States. US officials reported that agreement was reached to look at ways to expand cooperation in peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

US-led multilateral security cooperation

The United States sponsors a wide variety of multilateral security programs involving Southeast Asian states through various agencies of the federal government. Many of these programs are aimed specifically at addressing transnational security challenges such as counter-terrorism; export controls; non-proliferation and disarmament; illicit production and trafficking in narcotics; and transnational crime (trafficking in persons, money laundering etc.).

**Theater Security Cooperation Plan.** PACOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan is coordinated by the US mission in each country because it includes a host of federal programs in addition to those offered by the US Defense Department. The US mission is responsible for ensuring the integration of all security assistance, including military-to-military exchanges, exercises, cooperative technology development, and capacity building and outreach programs.

PACOM itself sponsors four major multilateral security cooperation programs: Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT); Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT); Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism; and the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).

**Multinational Planning Assistance Team.** In 2000, as a result of instability in East Timor and influenced by conflict in the Balkans, PACOM initiated discussions with selected states in the Asia–Pacific to establish MPAT to create the capacity to deploy quickly a multinational force headquarters to support the delivery of HA/DR in times of emergencies. MPAT successfully developed a set of standard operating procedures that have been accepted by its thirty participants, including international and non-government organisations. PACOM regularly conducts multinational command post exercises.
The value of the MPAT program was demonstrated in December 2004, when an earthquake off the coast of Sumatra triggered a devastating tsunami in the Indian Ocean.

**Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training.** The CARAT program involves US-led annual bilateral training exercises conducted serially in Southeast Asia. Six ASEAN members participate: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The purpose of CARAT is ‘to strengthen relationships and enhance the operational readiness of the participating forces’. For example, the US–Indonesian leg of CARAT involves jungle training exercises; a major engineering civic action project; a medical civic action undertaking; symposiums on aviation operations; legal, law enforcement and surface operations; and afloat exercises.

**Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism.** The program is another US-led initiative. It involves annual counter-terrorism exercises between the United States and Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. In 2009, Indonesia participated as an observer.

**Global Peace Operations Initiative.** The GPOI was originally spawned by the Group of Eight to build the capacity and professionalism of military forces for United Nations-endorsed peacekeeping missions. The Department of State funds this program in Southeast Asia, and the Department of Defense implements it.

PACOM provides assistance to regional peace operations training centres in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. The armed forces from five ASEAN states—Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand—have taken part in GPOI programs. An annual GPOI multilateral exercise is held in Indonesia to enhance interoperability with UN mechanisms.

In summary, United States security cooperation in Southeast Asia is primarily centred on treaty allies, strategic partners and potential strategic partners operating bilaterally and/or multilaterally under US leadership. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has played a more proactive role in coordinating and leading efforts to promote greater interoperability among a wider circle of regional states. While US security cooperation remains centred on developing conventional capabilities, it is now more focused on addressing capacity building to meet transnational security challenges in the region.

**China and multilateral security cooperation**

China’s relations with Southeast Asia underwent a sea change in the 1990s. China and Indonesia restored relations and this opened the door for China to establish diplomatic ties with Singapore and Brunei. In 1994, China became a founding member of the ARF. The following year China was officially accorded dialogue status by ASEAN.

Since 1997, when China enunciated what it called its ‘new security concept’, it has become an active proponent of multilateral security cooperation in Southeast Asia. China first tabled its new security concept at an ARF conference on CBMs in Beijing in March 1997. Four months later, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen formally presented the concept to the 4th ARF meeting in Malaysia.

It was clear from the onset that China sought to advance two objectives. The first was to develop a closer relation with ASEAN by ‘talking the talk’ in order to convince its members that China’s rise would be peaceful. The second objective was to undermine the existing structure of US alliances. This became evident when Vice President Hu Jintao delivered a speech in Jakarta in July 2000 to the Indonesian Council on World Affairs. Hu argued that
‘a new security order should be established to ensure genuine mutual respect, mutual cooperation, consensus through consultation and peaceful settlement of disputes, rather than bullying, confrontation, and imposition of one’s own will upon others’.10

The following sections review China’s security cooperation with ASEAN and then the ARF.

China and ASEAN

In November 2002, China–ASEAN relations were advanced with the signing of two major documents, a joint declaration on cooperation in non-traditional security fields, and Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). The following year, China acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and formed a strategic partnership with ASEAN. The strategic partnership was the first formal agreement of this type between China and a regional organisation, and it was a first for ASEAN as well. The joint declaration was wide-ranging and included a provision for the initiation of a new security dialogue as well as general cooperation in political matters.

In July 2004, at China’s suggestion, ASEAN and China raised their relationship to one of ‘enhanced strategic relations’. This took the form of a five-year Plan of Action (2005–2010) that was adopted at the end of the year. This plan included a joint commitment to increase regular high-level bilateral visits, cooperation in the field of non-traditional security, security dialogue and military exchanges and cooperation. The Plan of Action set out the following objectives:

• promote mutual confidence and trust in defence and military fields with a view to maintaining peace and stability in the region
• conduct dialogues, consultations and seminars on security and defence issues
• strengthen cooperation on military personnel training
• consider observing each other’s military exercises and explore the possibility of conducting bilateral or multilateral joint military exercises
• explore and enhance cooperation in the field of peacekeeping.

By the end of 2006, China and ASEAN had concluded twenty-eight ‘cooperation framework mechanisms’ including regular consultations between senior officials on strategic and political security cooperation, a yearly conference of foreign ministers, and an annual summit meeting of government leaders.

Non-traditional security issues

China and ASEAN were drawn together to cooperate to meet the threat of severe acute respiratory syndrome which broke out in China in late 2002 and quickly spread to Southeast Asia. It impacted most heavily on Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand the following year. Initially, China was slow to report the avian flu to the World Health Organization. Because the causes of the flu were unknown and there was no known cure, widespread anxiety was generated.

ASEAN responded by convening a Special ASEAN–China Leaders’ Meeting to address the issue. Concerted action then followed. In January 2004, China and ASEAN signed a memorandum of understanding to further implementation of the 2002 ASEAN–China joint declaration on non-traditional security.
To address the problem of drug trafficking from the Golden Triangle area, particularly the trafficking of amphetamine-type stimulants from Myanmar, and other transnational criminal activity, China was invited to attend informal ministerial consultations with ASEAN held in Vietnam and Brunei in 2005 and 2007, respectively. In November 2009, the informal meeting was upgraded when the 1st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime Plus China was held in Phnom Penh.

South China Sea

Early in 2004, thirteen months after the DOC was signed, China and ASEAN agreed to set up a joint working group to consider ways to implement it. The recommendations of the group were submitted to the 1st ASEAN–China Senior Officials Meeting on the implementation of the DOC, which was held in Kuala Lumpur in December that year. Although the Joint Working Group has continued to meet and report its findings to the ASEAN–China Senior Officials Meeting, it has not proven to be an effective mechanism for addressing the ever-increasing number of incidents between Vietnamese fishermen and Chinese authorities in the South China Sea. The most recent meeting of the joint working group was held in Hanoi in April 2010.

Defence cooperation

Defence cooperation between ASEAN and China has been slow to develop. The first defence-related activity under the 2004 Plan of Action was a workshop on regional security between ASEAN and Chinese defence officials held in Beijing in July 2006.

In November 2007, China proposed a number of initiatives in the field of non-traditional security cooperation at the ASEAN Plus Three Summit. China also pressed for institutionalised defence cooperation and military exchanges among members. Early the following year, China hosted the 1st China–ASEAN dialogue between senior defence scholars.

China and the ASEAN Regional Forum

When China first joined the ARF it was highly suspicious about multilateral activities that might curtail its national sovereignty. Over time, however, China has come to embrace multilateral security cooperation under the auspices of the ARF. China has given priority to promoting CBMs and dealing with non-traditional security initiatives.

China has played a particularly active role in the ARF’s inter-sessional work programs related to confidence-building measures.
In the field of non-traditional security issues, in 2004, China hosted the ARF Workshop on Drug-Substitute Alternative Development. The following year, China hosted an ARF seminar on enhancing cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues. In 2008, China co-hosted with Thailand an ARF seminar on narcotics control.

In 2003, at the annual ARF ministerial meeting in Phnom Penh, China proposed the establishment of a Security Policy Conference composed of senior military and civilian officials (at vice-ministerial level). According to the Chinese proposal, the objective was to draft a security treaty to promote ‘peace, stability and prosperity’ in the region. China drafted and circulated a concept paper before hosting the 1st ARF Security Policy Conference in November 2004. China’s initiative on a regional treaty failed to gain traction, but the Security Policy Conference continues to meet. In 2007 and 2008, China co-hosted with Indonesia the ARF roundtable discussion on stocktaking on maritime security issues. In 2009 and 2010, China hosted two successive seminars on Law and Regulations on the participation of armed forces in international disaster relief.

**ASEAN Plus Three**

The APT process arose from a summit meeting of the leaders of ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. It has since become a permanent fixture among multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific region. It is China’s preferred mechanism to advance multilateral cooperation in East Asia.

The APT has become a major venue for addressing transnational issues. For example, its health ministers met in April 2003 to deal with the avian flu outbreak. China has been proactive within the APT framework in advancing cooperation to deal with disaster relief. In June 2007, China hosted a five-day workshop on disaster relief by representatives of APT members’ armed forces in Shijazhuang, Hubei province. In June 2008, China hosted the 2nd ASEAN Plus Three workshop on the role of armed forces in disaster relief. In May 2009, APT health ministers agreed to develop a regional framework to combat influenza A (H1N1).

This third pattern of Southeast Asian security cooperation—China’s engagement with the region—is the newest of the four patterns. It demonstrates the effectiveness of Chinese ‘soft power’ in cooperating with regional states in a multilateral setting to address non-traditional security challenges. It also aims to bind ASEAN states to an exclusivist East Asian structure of security cooperation.

**ASEAN-centred security cooperation**

The final pattern of regional security cooperation is the indigenous one centred upon ASEAN itself. Since its formation in 1967, ASEAN has established a dense network of structures at ministerial level downward to deal with transnational issues. Four bodies play a major role: the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police (ASEANAPOL), the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drugs Matters and the ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting.

ASEAN’s longest standing mechanism to deal with trans-boundary criminal activity is ASEANAPOL, established in 1981. The prime concern at that time was trafficking in illegal drugs. Over the next two decades and a half, a broader range of issues were included under transnational crime including arms smuggling, money laundering, illegal migration, piracy and terrorism. It was not until 2006, however, that ASEAN defence ministers were brought together to address non-traditional security challenges.
The ASEAN Ministers of Interior/Home Affairs first met as a body in December 1997 and adopted the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime to foster greater regional and international cooperation. The 2nd AMMTC adopted the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime (June 1999).

The events of 9/11, the 2002 and 2005 bombings in Bali, the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Indonesia and the bombings of several hotels in Jakarta in 2009 put terrorism firmly on ASEAN’s security agenda. ASEAN decided to bracket terrorism with transnational crime to signal its autonomy from the US-led global war on terrorism. ASEAN members oppose terrorism but differ over how best to counter it and what priority to give to terrorism over other transnational challenges.

Responding to the events of 9/11, ASEAN issued a Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism at its 7th Summit in November 2001. The AMMTC convened a special meeting to discuss regional responses in May 2002. This resulted in the adoption of the Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime (with a terrorism component) and a work program in August 2002. The work program set out six priority areas: information exchange; cooperation in legal matters; cooperation in law enforcement; institutional capacity building; training; and extra-regional cooperation. At the same time, ASEAN signed its first joint declaration to combat terrorism with the United States. In response to the terrorist outrage in Bali in October 2002, the 8th ASEAN Summit issued a further declaration condemning terrorism and calling for joint action the following month.

Significantly, in November 2002, ASEAN and China signed a declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues that included terrorism.

ASEAN has also developed international counter terrorism cooperation with nine other states and the EU. Significantly, in November 2002, ASEAN and China signed a declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues that included terrorism. Once again China demonstrated that it could ‘talk the talk’ by agreeing with ASEAN to subsume terrorism under the rubric of non-traditional security.

Nonetheless, individual ASEAN states, such as Singapore, accord a high priority to countering terrorism. All ASEAN members are required to implement UN Security Council resolutions on anti-terrorism, such as Resolution 1373 (2001).

ASEAN may be viewed as an organisation at the lower end of an international cascade of counter-terrorism measures flowing from the United Nations, the Group of Eight Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, international financial institutions (the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank) and the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Secure Trade in the Asia Region initiative. ASEAN’s counter terrorism policies are shaped by these external inputs and adapted to the specific circumstances of Southeast Asia. ASEAN, for example, encourages its members to sign all thirteen international counter-terrorism conventions and protocols adopted by the United Nations.
ASEAN took a major step forward in 2006 when it adopted the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism at its 12th Summit. This is ASEAN’s first legally binding anti-terrorism agreement. Individual member states are now in the process of seeking domestic ratification. The legal basis for cooperation under this convention has been underpinned with the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters by Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Myanmar, Singapore, and Vietnam. Currently, ASEAN members are engaged in drafting a comprehensive plan of action on counter-terrorism.

In 2004 and 2005, Southeast Asia was struck by two major natural disasters, the Indian Ocean tsunami and Cyclone Nargis, respectively. ASEAN was found wanting in 2004, when the United States, India, Japan and Australia took the lead in providing emergency disaster relief. Individual ASEAN members such as Singapore and Malaysia also made important contributions.

In 2005, ASEAN played a critical role in providing HA/DR to Myanmar when the State Peace and Development Council government obstructed international relief efforts. Due to the proactive intervention by the ASEAN Secretary General, a tripartite core group, involving Myanmar, the United Nations and ASEAN, was put in place to arrange the delivery of international emergency relief. An ASEAN emergency rapid assessment team provided a crucial evaluation of the situation on the ground. An ASEAN humanitarian task force was set up with twelve members, two from each country and the ASEAN Secretariat, to direct the relief effort.

The events of 2004–05 have raised the importance of HA/DR as a non-traditional security challenge to priority level for ASEAN and its member states. The 14th ASEAN Summit (2008) designated the ASEAN Secretary General as coordinator for humanitarian assistance in cases of large-scale disasters.

The ASEAN Community is composed of three pillars: the ASEAN Political-Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.

**ASEAN Political-Security Community**

In 1996, ASEAN defence officials initiated their first security dialogue at the annual ASEAN Special Senior Officials’ Meeting. This meeting brought together ASEAN defence officials and their foreign affairs counterparts. Four years later, the ASEAN chiefs of army began meeting informally in a process that has become known as the ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting. The other ASEAN service chiefs and heads of intelligence also began to meet regularly; these meetings were called, respectively, the ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference, the ASEAN Navy Interaction and the ASEAN Military Intelligence Meeting.

In 2003, ASEAN took determined steps to revitalise itself and take the lead in regional community building. At a summit meeting held in Bali that year, ASEAN adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) setting out its goal of creating an ASEAN Community by 2020. ASEAN was motivated by the desire to assert its centrality in regional security and to reinforce Southeast Asia’s regional autonomy in its relations with...
external powers, particularly China and the United States. In 2007, ASEAN brought forward the deadline for the ASEAN Community to 2015.\(^{15}\)

The ASEAN Community is composed of three pillars: the ASEAN Political-Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. The goal of creating an ASEAN Political-Security Community immediately led to a dramatic shift in interaction among ASEAN defence officials. In 2003, ASEAN chiefs of defence force began meeting in a process known as the ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Force Informal Meeting. The word *informal* in the title indicates that this process was not yet under the official ASEAN structure, although individual member states participated.

To implement the concept of an ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN senior officials drafted, and their leaders approved, the *ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action* and the *ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint*. The strategic thrust of these documents was to promote comprehensive security and to ensure that ASEAN remained the driving force in the ARF and the centre of relations with its dialogue partners.

The *ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action* called for increased cooperation in five areas: political development (peaceful settlement of intra-regional differences, promotion of human rights, the free flow of information and mutual support in good governance); shaping and sharing norms (work towards a code of conduct in the South China Sea and the adoption of a legally binding ASEAN convention on counter-terrorism); conflict prevention (greater transparency through CBMs, more military-to-military interaction, a conflict early warning system, a regional arms register and maritime security cooperation); conflict resolution (national peacekeeping centres) and post-conflict peace building (safe havens, a humanitarian crisis centre, educational exchanges and promotion of a culture of peace).

**ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting**

In May 2006, ASEAN defence ministers met for the first time and began the process of institutionalising defence cooperation on a regional basis. The ADMM brought under its umbrella separate meetings of the ASEAN service chiefs (army, navy and air) and military intelligence that had been meeting informally outside the official ASEAN framework.

The ADMM was the last ministerial sectoral body to be established by ASEAN. It was set up to implement greater defence and security cooperation on three levels. The first level involved promoting practical cooperation at the operational level among ASEAN militaries through a rolling two-year work plan drawn up by the ASEAN chiefs of defence. The second level involved ASEAN’s engagement with non-ASEAN countries in non-traditional and trans-boundary issues. The third level was to reinforce ASEAN’s centrality in Southeast Asia’s security architecture.

The ASEAN defence ministers quickly focused on ways of addressing non-traditional security threats and enhancing cooperation with ASEAN’s dialogue partner counterparts. The 3rd ADMM, held in Thailand in February 2009, for example, adopted the Joint Declaration on Strengthening ASEAN Defence Establishments to Meet the Challenges of Non-Traditional Security Threats. It also adopted three important concept papers: *The use of ASEAN military assets and capacities in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; ASEAN defence establishments and civil society organisations (CSOs) cooperation on non-traditional security; and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus): principles for membership.*
In 2007, ASEAN members finally approved the ASEAN Charter to give their organisation a legal identity and to move towards becoming a more rules-based body. The ASEAN Charter came into effect on 15 December 2008 and resulted in the formalising of ASEAN’s decision-making processes. The Charter created the ASEAN Council, composed of heads of government/state, as its highest body.

The next level of decision making was the ASEAN Coordinating Council, made up of foreign ministers. This council oversaw the work of three new community councils: the ASEAN Political-Security Community Council, the ASEAN Economic Community Council and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council. Under these new arrangements the ADMM became the sectoral ministerial body under the ASEAN Political-Security Council.

With the adoption of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN moved to push its twin objectives of regional autonomy and centrality in the regional architecture by lobbying external states, including all members of the UN Security Council, to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Success was achieved when the Obama Administration signed on. In July 2010, Canada and Turkey acceded to the treaty. ASEAN members also agreed to amend the treaty in order to permit the EU to do likewise.

Since 2006, ASEAN defence ministers have moved swiftly to open cooperative defence relations with their dialogue partners. The 2nd ADMM that met in Singapore in November 2007 adopted the ADMM-Plus concept paper outlining the principles of external engagement. The 3rd ADMM, which met in Pattaya in February 2009, adopted the concept paper *ADMM-Plus principles for membership*, co-authored by Singapore and Thailand. The 4th ADMM, which met in Hanoi in May 2010, adopted two key documents: *ADMM-Plus: configuration and composition* and *ADMM-Plus: modalities and procedures*. ASEAN will hold the first ADMM-Plus meeting in Hanoi in October 2010 with the participation of defence ministers from eight of their dialogue partners: Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the United States.

Over the longer term, ASEAN-led multilateral cooperation is slated to develop a regional capacity for peacekeeping.

The ASEAN-led process of enlarged security cooperation is to address practical steps to engage the region’s armed forces with civilian counterparts, including non-governmental organisations, to address major natural disasters in cooperation with dialogue partners. Over the longer term, ASEAN-led multilateral cooperation is slated to develop a regional capacity for peacekeeping.

Other ASEAN multilateral defence cooperation

The individual states of ASEAN engage in a multiplicity of bilateral and multilateral exercises with other ASEAN states and with external powers. These are not officially ASEAN-sponsored activities. Three important arrangements are discussed below.

According to figures produced by the International Maritime Bureau, the number of piracy incidents in Southeast Asian waters peaked in 2000 at 242, or over half the recorded incidents for piracy globally. The United States, in particular, was very concerned that a
linkage might develop between regional terrorism and piracy. In March 2004, Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander of US Pacific Command, proposed a US Regional Maritime Security Initiative to safeguard the Malacca and Singapore straits. Indonesia and Malaysia vociferously opposed US intervention. Although the Malacca Strait has been designated an international waterway, it falls within the sovereign jurisdiction of the littoral states.

In July 2005, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore combined forces and launched Malacca Straits coordinated patrols involving navy patrol boats. In September 2005, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore joined once again to launch coordinated air patrols over the Malacca Strait, known as Eyes in the Sky. An agreement on standard operating procedures and a cooperative air surveillance and intelligence exchange group was agreed in 2006. Two years later, Thailand joined the scheme.

As a result of multinational security cooperation by littoral states, the number of piracy incidents fell steadily after 2004. By 2009, Southeast Asia accounted for 45 out of 406 incidents globally, or 11%. This was the lowest figure recorded by the International Maritime Bureau since 1994. This demonstrated that regional states were capable of combining and addressing a major transnational security challenge without the assistance of external powers.

The third regional initiative involves a series of bilateral agreements between Vietnam and its neighbours—Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia—to conduct coordinated patrols along their maritime borders to protect fishermen from piracy and armed robbery. In addition, hotlines have been set up between naval commands to deal with incidents involving the arrest of fishermen caught poaching. Hanoi and Jakarta are currently discussing Indonesian participation. As a result of the ADMM process, Vietnam’s bilateral efforts have now been regionalised. At the 4th ADMM in May 2010, it was agreed that ASEAN navies would cooperate to patrol their maritime boundaries.

ASEAN Regional Forum

The ARF is a security dialogue forum comprising twenty-seven members with a geographical footprint spanning the Asia–Pacific. In 1995, ARF ministers approved a concept paper setting out three phases of development: CBMs, preventive diplomacy and ‘elaboration of approaches to conflict’. Shortly after, it was agreed that because of the overlap between CBMs and preventive diplomacy the two stages could proceed in tandem.

The ARF adopts a voluntary work program on the basis of inter-sessional groups and inter-sessional meetings (ISMs), whose mandates must be renewed each year. The ARF also sponsors the ARF Defence Dialogue for defence and military officials.

In 1995, the ARF set up three ISMs—search and rescue, peacekeeping and disaster relief—and one inter-sessional group on CBMs and Preventive Diplomacy. The mandates for the first two ISMs were not renewed in 1997 and the mandate for the ISM on Disaster Relief lapsed in 1999. The inter-sessional group on CBMs and Preventive Diplomacy, the mainstay of the ARF,
is the longest functioning working group and its mandate has been continually renewed up to the present.

In 2002, in a move that gave a new lease of life to the ARF (widely viewed at the time as nothing more than a talk shop) an Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter Terrorism and Trans-National Crime was established (ISM CT/TC). The ISM CT/TC developed a multifaceted and far-reaching work plan that spawned numerous practical counter-terrorism proposals and cooperative activities. In 2009, for example, the ARF approved the Work Plan for Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime.

Between 2002 and 2008, the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia declined and morphed into numerous splinter groups. Responding to these changes, in 2009 the ARF approved a new work plan with a special focus on illicit drugs, bioterrorism and cybersecurity.

In 2005, in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami and Cyclone Nargis, the ARF reinstated the ISM on Disaster Relief. The ISM DR met ten times between its founding and September 2010. In a major milestone, the ARF approved the ARF Statement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, adopted the ARF General Guidelines on Disaster Relief Cooperation and in 2010 took note of the Australian-drafted Strategic Guidance for HA/DR. The ISM DR is currently in the process of drafting the ARF Disaster Relief Standard Operating Procedures. In 2009, ARF ministers endorsed a joint Singapore-Australia ARF Disaster Relief Mapping Service.

The 16th ARF adopted the ARF Work Plan on Disaster Relief in July 2009 and directed the ISM DR to further refine the draft concept paper on ARF voluntary model arrangements for use of foreign military and civil defence assets in disaster relief. In sum, the ARF has moved swiftly to develop a regional framework for responding to natural disasters.

In 2009, the ARF expanded its work program. At the 16th ARF ministerial meeting, ministers approved two new working groups, the ISM on Maritime Security and the ISM on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

The ARF is now poised to shift from phase one, with its emphasis on CBMs, to phase two, preventive diplomacy. In 2008, after a review of ARF institutional procedures and mechanisms, the 15th ARF ministerial meeting endorsed the ARF Review Paper. Senior officials are now considering a preventive diplomacy work plan to develop measures to deal with priority areas such as non-traditional security challenges and explicit preventive diplomacy measures for promoting peaceful cooperation to prevent disputes and conflicts from escalating to armed conflicts. The ARF shift to phase two is planned to occur in tandem with the development of the ASEAN Political-Security Community.

The 17th ARF meeting (July 2010) adopted the Hanoi Action Plan to implement the ARF Vision Statement, which contains concrete goals and measures to be carried out between 2010 and 2020 in such areas as counter-terrorism, transnational crime, disaster relief, non-proliferation, maritime security and peacekeeping. The ARF ministers also approved a list of seventeen cooperative activities for the 2010–2011 period. In 2010, the ARF endorsed the preparation of a Maritime Security Work Plan.
Conclusion

This chapter has examined four patterns of security cooperation in Southeast Asia. The first pattern, subregional multilateral cooperation by regional and external states, was developed to meet specific security concerns. The FPDA was formed following the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the region and was designed to provide for the defence of peninsula Malaysia and Singapore. The FPDA originally addressed conventional threats, but in recent years it has evolved to include maritime security and asymmetric threats in its exercise program. Japanese-led security cooperation was designed to counter the threat of piracy in sea lanes of communication that passed through Southeast Asia. Both types of security cooperation supplemented rather than detracted from the more dominant patterns of security cooperation.

The second major pattern of security cooperation—US theatre security cooperation—was designed to improve interoperability among the region’s armed forces to address an array of security challenges, both conventional and non-traditional. Security cooperation was centred on US-leadership and included US treaty allies, strategic partners and prospective strategic partners. This form of security cooperation is the oldest pattern in Southeast Asia and has provided the mainstay of regional security since World War II.

The third pattern of security cooperation revolves around Chinese-led efforts to promote multilateral cooperation to address primarily non-traditional security threats. China seeks to bind ASEAN to a structure of exclusive East Asian regional cooperation as a means of bolstering its political influence in regional affairs. China also seeks to offer an alternative to the US theatre security cooperation model and over time undermine the salience of the US treaty network.
The fourth pattern of security cooperation involves efforts by ASEAN to strengthen Southeast Asian regional autonomy in its relations with external powers. ASEAN has thus sought to develop regional security architecture, such as the ARF and the ADMM-Plus process, which puts ASEAN in the driver’s seat in setting the agenda and in making decisions. ASEAN seeks to enmesh both the United States and China in its web of security arrangements to balance their influence on regional affairs.

In summary, Southeast Asia’s security environment is characterised by four patterns of security cooperation that have come to overlay each other over time.

Major security trends identified in Chapter 2 pose challenges to the older patterns of security cooperation. The FPDA, for example, has had to shift from a focus on conventional air defence to address asymmetric threats in a maritime environment. US theatre security cooperation, designed to address security challenges across Asia-Pacific, has had to refocus on specific multilateral programs to deal with emerging security challenges in Southeast Asia as a distinct region. Further, the United States has had to address transnational security challenges by reaching out beyond treaty allies to strategic partners and other regional states.

ASEAN-led multilateral security cooperation is still a work in progress.

ASEAN-led multilateral security cooperation is still a work in progress. Its main priorities have been transnational security issues and cooperative security arrangements, such as the ARF, that draw in and enmesh the major powers, particularly China and the United States. But ASEAN-led security cooperation has yet to address increased arms procurements, China’s military transformation and US renewed engagement in order to shore up Southeast Asia’s regional autonomy and ASEAN centrality in the region’s security architecture.

The Chinese-led pattern of security cooperation poses complications for pre-existing patterns of security cooperation. Chinese initiatives often duplicate existing security cooperation activities. China also seeks to draw ASEAN into its orbit and undermine and weaken US theatre security cooperation. This has triggered strategic competition with the United States and led to renewed efforts by ASEAN to seize the initiative in setting the region’s security agenda.
Chapter 4

KEY TENSIONS

This chapter explores five clusters of tensions in Southeast Asia generated by the impact of the security trends identified in Chapter 2. Those tensions have been generated by maritime disputes in the South China Sea, China’s military modernisation, diffusion of military technology, ‘everyday domestic security issues’, and the persistence of transnational security threats.

Maritime tensions in the South China Sea

The South China Sea forms a central component of the Southeast Asian region. China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim sovereignty over the entire South China Sea and its rocks and reefs (features) based on historical discovery and occupation. The Philippines and Malaysia each maintain separate claims to specific features, while Brunei claims only a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone.

China occupied all of the Paracel Islands in 1974, but had no physical presence further south until 1988, when its navy fought a successful engagement with Vietnam and occupied South Johnson Reef. In 1992, both Vietnam and China competitively scrambled to occupy as many features in the South China Sea as they could. Sino-Vietnamese tensions arising from a dispute over oil exploration prompted ASEAN to issue a declaration of concern urging the parties involved to exercise restraint and to settle their disputes peacefully.

Regional concerns were raised in 1995, when China occupied Mischief Reef, off the west coast of the Philippines. Once again ASEAN issued a declaration of concern urging restraint and a peaceful settlement of the dispute. The former Philippines’ Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado characterised Chinese actions as ‘talk and take’ while regional security analysts used the expression ‘creeping assertiveness’. In sum, in the 1990s the South China Sea was viewed as a potential flashpoint in security assessments.
With the exception of Brunei\textsuperscript{16}, all claimant states have built up structures and garrisoned the features that they occupy. Vietnam stations approximately 600 troops on its thirty features; the Philippines, 480 troops on its ten features; China, 200 troops on its nine features; Taiwan, 100 troops on its only feature; and Malaysia, 70 troops on its seven features.

In November 2002, after seven years of negotiations, China and ASEAN signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea as a guideline for inter-state behaviour until agreement could be reached on a more formal code of conduct.

Under the terms of the DOC, the signatories agreed to build trust and confidence, respect freedom of navigation and overflight, resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, and exercise self-restraint ‘in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes’ and refrain from occupying uninhabited features.

Until territorial and jurisdictional disputes were settled, the DOC urged signatories to build trust and confidence in four areas: dialogue between defence and military officials, humane treatment of persons in distress, voluntary notification of joint/combined exercises, and voluntary exchange of ‘relevant information’.

Finally, the DOC suggested that signatories ‘may explore’ cooperation in select areas: marine environment protection; marine scientific research; safety of navigation and communication at sea; search and rescue; and combating transnational crime (trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at sea and illegal traffic in arms).

The situation in the South China Sea quickly stabilised. In 2005, in a hopeful development, the national oil companies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam signed a three-year Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking to explore waters off the Philippines.\textsuperscript{17}

For the past three years, Chinese assertiveness in advancing maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea have led to friction ...

For the past three years, Chinese assertiveness in advancing maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea have led to friction in relations with Vietnam and become the most serious generator of insecurity in Southeast Asia today.

In January 2007, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam directed that a ten-year plan be drawn up to develop the resources along Vietnam’s extended coastline and its exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{18} Vietnamese economists estimated that the development of this area would contribute to well over half of the country’s gross domestic product. When China learned of Vietnam’s plans, it approached ExxonMobil and other companies and advised them that their commercial interests in China would be in jeopardy if they assisted Vietnam with its development scheme.

China’s behind-the-scenes actions were accompanied by greater assertiveness of its territorial claims in the South China Sea. In early 2007, China placed boundary markers on several islands in the Paracels. In April, Chinese fishery administrative vessels detained four Vietnamese boats in the Spratly archipelago. In July, in a more serious incident, a Chinese...
vessel rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat, killing one of its crew. In November, PLAN warships conducted exercises near the Paracels without prior notification. Vietnam lodged diplomatic protests after each incident.

But no action was more inflammatory than the reported decision of China’s National People’s Congress to create the Sansha county level town in Hainan province with administrative responsibility over the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos and Macclesfield Bank. China’s actions provoked unprecedented anti-China student demonstrations in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City on successive weekends in December 2007. China immediately protested. In January 2008, in a tit-for-tat response, China claimed that Vietnamese fishermen attacked its trawlers in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Vietnamese and Chinese leaders met at summit level to defuse tensions and resolved to settle their territorial dispute through dialogue and consultation. Nevertheless, the situation in the South China Sea continued to deteriorate. In August 2008, for example, a Chinese website posted a commentary arguing that Vietnamese upstarts should be put down with military force and published an ‘invasion plan’ to demonstrate how this could be accomplished. A virtual war of words erupted as nationalist hotheads fired repeated salvos into cyberspace attacking each other. Vietnam contacted the Chinese Ambassador on several occasions to request that the invasion plan be removed from the website.

In 2009, the ‘war in cyberspace’ witnessed a skirmish at the official level when Chinese trade officials posted material dismissing Vietnamese territorial claims on a joint website run with their counterparts from Vietnam’s trade ministry. Vietnam shut down the site in protest.

Nationalist passions soon spilled over into other areas. In early 2009, a Vietnamese national hero, General Vo Nguyen Giap, wrote a series of open letters to party and state leaders opposing Chinese participation in bauxite mining in the Central Highlands on the grounds of national security. General Giap’s letters received widespread publicity and support throughout Vietnam.

For several years, China has imposed a unilateral three-month (May–August) fishing ban in the South China Sea in the area above the 12th parallel. The Chinese ban coincides with the height of the Vietnamese fishing season and thus results in commercial losses. The official purpose of this ban is to preserve fish stocks and prevent illegal poaching and harassment of Chinese fishermen. In May 2009, without any prior consultation, China once again imposed its fishing moratorium.

According to Vietnamese officials, China imposed its 2009 fishing ban with greater aggressiveness than in the past. Eight Chinese fishery administration vessels harassed Vietnamese boats, forcing them from the area. Several craft were rammed, and one of them sank. Chinese vessels also seized fishing catches and confiscated items of value such as radios and GPS equipment. In a major cause célèbre, China detained the crew of one Vietnamese boat on Hainan Island until a hefty fine was paid.

In August 2009, Chinese authorities detained the crew of two Vietnamese fishing boats seeking safe haven in the Paracels during a severe tropical storm. Vietnam responded angrily by lodging a diplomatic protest and by threatening to cancel a previously scheduled technical meeting on maritime issues. After China released the fishermen, the talks were held in Hanoi as planned. According to Vietnamese figures, China seized 33 Vietnamese fishing boats and 433 crew members in 2009.
In a separate development, the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf called on states wishing to make a claim for an extended continental shelf to do so by 13 May 2009. On the eve of the deadline, Malaysia and Vietnam presented a joint submission, and Vietnam lodged a separate claim covering a different maritime area. These actions triggered a protest by China to the commission. For the first time, China submitted a map containing nine unconnected lines to document its claims to most of the South China Sea. Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea has prompted a debate in Vietnam about how best to respond. The chairman of the National Assembly’s National Defence and Security Committee argued in favour of a new law to create an armed militia at sea. The head of the army’s General Political Department suggested that Vietnamese fishing boats gather together for safety and mutual support.

In response to Chinese assertiveness, Vietnam has stepped up its efforts to modernise its naval fleet by acquiring modern Gepard-class missile frigates and six conventional diesel-powered Kilo-class submarines.

In response to Chinese assertiveness, Vietnam has stepped up its efforts to modernise its naval fleet by acquiring modern Gepard-class missile frigates and six conventional diesel-powered Kilo-class submarines. The air force increased its order for Russian-manufactured Sukhoi Su-30 multirole jet fighters. The Vietnamese military has also begun to create joint naval–air commands.

During the first quarter of 2010, China continued its harassment and detention of Vietnamese fishing boats, particularly in waters near the Paracels. A more serious incident developed in the Spratly Islands when Chinese fishing trawlers reported they were being harassed by Vietnamese fishing boats and called for assistance. China dispatched two fishery administration vessels from Hainan. On arrival, they were surrounded by Vietnamese fishing craft.

China then ordered PLAN warships from the East Sea Fleet taking part in exercises near Okinawa to rescue the stranded fishery vessels. By the time they arrived, all the Vietnamese fishing boats had departed. The PLAN ships then anchored off Fiery Cross Reef before proceeding further south to conduct exercises to the east of the Malacca Strait.

While the above incident was unfolding, Vietnam responded with renewed determination to assert its sovereignty. On 1 April 2010, President Nguyen Minh Triet sailed to Bach Long Vi Island in the Gulf of Tonkin accompanied by two naval escorts. Wide publicity was given in the Vietnamese media to President Triet’s declaration that Vietnam would ‘not let anyone infringe on our territory, our sea, and islands’.

In late April 2010, China once again announced it was imposing a unilateral fishing ban in the South China Sea, to take effect from 16 May to 1 August. A spokesperson from Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared on 6 May that the ban was ‘totally worthless’ and a violation of national sovereignty.
Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea has generated special concerns. In March 2010, US media reported that Chinese officials told senior State Department envoys that the South China Sea had been elevated to a ‘core interest’ along with Taiwan and Tibet and China would not tolerate any interference in the South China Sea. Chinese officials repeated this assertion in private conversations with foreign diplomats and the term ‘core interest’ was used in Chinese media reports. These statements generated a new level of anxiety about Beijing’s strategic ambitions in the South China Sea. Subsequently, Chinese officials backtracked and now deny making such a statement.

China has also attempted to thwart efforts by Vietnam, the current chair of ASEAN, to forge a united front against China on the South China Sea. In a series of ASEAN-related meetings held in Hanoi in the first half of 2010, for example, Vietnam failed to get the South China Sea on the agenda and failed to kickstart diplomatic efforts to forge a more binding code of conduct in the South China Sea. The South China Sea issues were relegated to the ASEAN–China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, a body that has so far been totally ineffective in addressing this issue.

However, at the 17th ASEAN Regional Forum’s annual ministerial meeting in Hanoi in July 2010, twelve of the ARF’s twenty-seven members, including the United States, raised maritime security issues, including the South China Sea. The Chinese foreign minister was visibly taken aback and described remarks by Secretary Clinton as ‘virtually an attack on China’.

**Tensions arising from China’s military modernisation**

China is now the second-largest economy in the world, having recently overtaken Japan. China has become an indispensable economic partner to the states of Southeast Asia as they recover from the current global financial crisis.

China’s rise as an economic power has given China greater political clout internationally and regionally. China’s has utilised soft power to promote the concepts of ‘China’s peaceful rise’, ‘China’s peaceful development’ and ‘harmonious world’. China’s economic power also has provided it with the resources to modernise and transform the People’s Liberation Army. China’s defence budget has grown by double digits for over a decade. This has aroused concerns, openly articulated by the United States and Australia, about the lack of transparency.

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China is rapidly developing area-denial/anti-access military capabilities aimed at pushing the reach of US forces further from its shores.

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China’s rise in all measures of national power has generated uncertainty in Southeast Asia over continued US primacy. Nowhere is this more evident than in the defence arena, where China is rapidly developing area-denial/anti-access military capabilities aimed at pushing the reach of US forces further from its shores. These capabilities are aimed primarily at hindering the United States from intervening in a conflict between China and Taiwan.
Between March and July 2010, the PLAN conducted three large-scale maritime exercises, the first in waters off Okinawa and the second in waters off Taiwan and the third in the South China Sea. The first exercise was conducted by a squadron of six warships from the North Sea Fleet, which conducted live firing exercises north of the Philippines. The second exercise involved ten warships from the East Sea Fleet as well as land-based aircraft. PLAN warships, including two Sovremenny-class destroyers and two Kilo-class submarines, conducted anti-submarine exercises. The land-based aircraft conducted simulated bombing raids. The third exercise was the largest of its kind and involved dramatic live missile firing exercises.

These exercises were viewed as a demonstration by China that it was now capable of deploying beyond the first island chain, to the second.

The United States has responded to the build-up of China’s area-denial/anti-access capabilities by developing an ‘air-sea battle’ concept to prevail in conflicts where area-denial/anti-access capabilities are well developed. The next several years are likely to witness a ‘defence-offense’ reactive cycle between China and the United States.

In 2009, at least two public maritime incidents involving China and the United States occurred in the South China Sea. The first involved Chinese harassment of the USNS *Impeccable*, which was operating south of Hainan in China’s exclusive economic zone. The United States responded by assigning a destroyer to escort civilian-manned survey ships. The second incident involved a Chinese submarine snagging a towed sonar array attached to the USS *John S. McCain* while it was participating in CARAT exercises off the west coast of the Philippines.

Up until the naval exercises of March–April 2010, China’s South Sea Fleet was the only fleet to operate in the South China Sea. The South Sea Fleet is currently being modernised with the deployment for the first time of a Jin-class nuclear submarine and amphibious landing craft to Yulin Naval Base. Yulin already houses surface combatants and conventional submarines. China is expected to deploy more nuclear submarines to Hainan. The implications are clear: China is developing the capacity to sustain larger naval deployments in the Spratly archipelago and further south for longer periods.

China’s lack of transparency has raised legitimate questions about its strategic intentions.

China’s rise and military modernisation have contributed to strategic uncertainty in the minds of regional defence planners. China’s lack of transparency has raised legitimate questions about its strategic intentions. A key question is the staying power of the United States and its willingness to maintain the balance of power in the maritime domain, including in the South China Sea.

The United States has responded to China’s naval build-up by deploying thirty-one of its fifty-three fast attack submarines to the Pacific. Eighteen of these subs are home-ported in Pearl Harbor; others are based in Guam. The United States has also deployed three Ohio-class nuclear submarines (‘boomers’) to the Asia–Pacific Indian Ocean region. Each has been modified to carry 154 conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles. In addition, the United States has begun to station the fifth-generation Raptor aircraft in Hawaii.
Southeast Asia inevitably will be once again affected by great power rivalry and peer competition in the military domain. Regional responses have included defence self-help procurement, modernisation programs to hedge against strategic uncertainty, and quiet support for US re-engagement.

**Tensions arising from the diffusion of military technology**

A third factor generating security tensions in Southeast Asia is the diffusion of new military technologies as an accompaniment to increased arms procurements.

Chapter 3 discussed the pattern of increased arms spending by key regional states. This has resulted in acquisition of advanced fourth-generation jet aircraft such as the F-15 (Singapore), Su-27 (Vietnam), Su-30 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam) and Gripen (Thailand). There are indications that both Singapore and Vietnam are looking to acquire fifth-generation aircraft in the next decade.

Regional arms purchases have included modern naval frigates, missile patrol boats, amphibious assault craft and conventional diesel submarines. Singapore purchased two Archer-class (formerly Swedish Västergötland-class) conventional submarines in 2005. They have been refitted and equipped with air-independent propulsion systems to extend their undersea operations. This is the first time this technology has been introduced into Southeast Asia. Malaysia has commissioned two Scorpene-class submarines also fitted with air independent propulsion and will base them at naval facilities in Sepanggar Bay, Sabah; the facilities are still under construction. Vietnam's contract with Russia to acquire six Kilo-class submarines included a provision for Russia to build a maintenance facility. Indonesia has postponed, but not cancelled, its acquisition of new submarines.

Regional states have also purchased modern air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons and anti-ship cruise missiles.

Defence industry sources have revealed that Indonesia will acquire C-802 and C-705 anti-ship missiles from China for mounting on its frigates and fast patrol boats. Indonesia's four new Diponegoro-class (Sigma) corvettes also will be equipped with MBDA MM40 Exocet Block II missiles.

Vietnam's military modernisations and arms acquisitions deserve special attention as they are obviously in response to China's military modernisation and naval reach into the South China Sea. Vietnam appears to be taking a leaf out of China's playbook and developing its own area-denial/anti-access capabilities.

Vietnam is currently upgrading its inventory of Su-27s and Su-30s so they can operate the Vympel R-177 (AA-12) beyond visual range air-to-air missile, the Kh-31 (AS-17) anti-ship missile and the Vympel Kh-29 (AS-14) and Kh-59M (AS-18) air-to-surface missiles. In 2009, Vietnam placed an order for six Sukhoi Su-30s and in 2010 announced its decision to buy six more.

Vietnam currently operates two S-300PMU1 missile batteries. The S-300 is regarded as one of the world’s most effective all-altitude regional air defence systems. Further orders are expected.

In 2007, Vietnam took delivery of two Tarantul V (Project 1241.8) corvettes armed with SS-N-25 (Kh 35 Uran) missiles. Vietnam will also introduce into service two Gepard-class guided missile frigates. Vietnam has plans to commission six Tarantul-3 corvettes armed with the SS-N-22 Sunburn missile to add to its fleet.
Vietnam’s Kilo-class diesel submarines are expected to be equipped with new heavyweight torpedoes and the Novator Club-S (SS-N-26) cruise missile.

In addition, Vietnam is reported to have taken delivery of the Russian-manufactured Bastion land-based anti-shipping missile.

A more worrying development concerns persistent unconfirmed reports that Myanmar harbours nuclear ambitions and has approached North Korea for ballistic missile and nuclear technology.

China’s rise and military modernisation has generated uncertainty among defence officials in Southeast Asia and this has led to the acquisition of new capabilities in response.

According to defence analyst Richard Bitzinger, when all of Southeast Asia’s weapons purchases are considered together, they reveal the introduction of new capabilities to the region that will change the way future war is conducted. These new military technologies include ‘stand-off precision-strike, long-range airborne and undersea attack, stealth, mobility, and expeditionary warfare and, above all, new capabilities when it comes to greatly improved command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks’ (Bitzinger 2010).

In summary, China’s rise and military modernisation has generated uncertainty among defence officials in Southeast Asia and this has led to the acquisition of new capabilities in response. But there are also intra-mural rivalries, territorial disputes and other points of friction involving Southeast Asian states that may explain recent arms acquisitions. For example, Malaysia and Singapore have long been engaged in a low-level reactive pattern of arms purchases, Indonesia and Malaysia have faced off over a territorial dispute involving Ambalat Island, and Thailand has experienced border clashes with its neighbours Myanmar and Cambodia.

Tensions arising from everyday domestic security issues

The fourth cluster of security issues that generate security tensions in Southeast Asia may be grouped under the heading ‘everyday domestic security issues’. These everyday issues include long-running insurgencies in the southern Philippines (New People’s Army, Abu Sayyaf group and other militants) and southern Thailand, domestic instability in Timor-Leste and civil unrest in Thailand, ethnic conflict in Myanmar, and violent extremism in Indonesia.

Although everyday domestic security issues do not directly threaten regional stability, they impact heavily on the human security of the communities involved.

There have been over 4,000 fatalities in southern Thailand in the period from January 2004 to December 2009. Regional security analysts have concluded that an earlier ethno-nationalist movement that sought separation from Thailand has morphed into a widely dispersed network of militants in over two hundred villages in Thailand’s southern border provinces. Although this conflict has not attracted support from international terrorist groups, there are indications that Malay Muslim separatists have made contact with
sympathetic groups in Malaysia and Indonesia. There are no signs that this pervasive conflict will abate any time soon.

Everyday domestic security issues have an impact on two levels. First, they spill over into other areas and contribute to the corrosion of good governance and the legitimacy of the state. Domestic conflict, for example, leads to arms smuggling and opens space for criminal elements and political extremists to operate.

Second, domestic security issues affect the ability of states to fully contribute to the ASEAN-led process of community building and thus retard, if not undermine, progress in this area. The persistence of everyday domestic security issues reinforces the default position of ASEAN states to put national security ahead of comprehensive and human security. For example, Myanmar’s appalling domestic circumstances are a continuing impediment to ASEAN efforts at community building and ASEAN’s relations with external powers.

Tensions arising from transnational security issues

The final cluster of security challenges that generate tensions may be grouped under the heading transnational. These include the negative by-products of globalisation, such as financial crises, fluctuating energy and food prices, political extremism/terrorism and international criminal activity (for example, trafficking in illicit drugs). Transnational issues also include pandemics and climate change.

Any one of these issues can pose a serious challenge to the security of the state in Southeast Asia. A global financial crisis, for example, can send a developed regional state’s economy into recession, and it may impact severely on the terms of trade of a developing state, create unemployment and possibly domestic instability.

Since the 1990s, ASEAN and its member states have identified trans-boundary non-traditional security issues as major threats both to the nation-state and to regional security. Despite ASEAN, the ARF and other multilateral institutions repeatedly adopting declarations, joint statements and plans of action to address these challenges, they persist.

Take the example of drug trafficking, which may be viewed as both an everyday domestic security issue and a generator of regional security tensions. Illicit drugs are used to fund criminal activities such as gun running, forgery, money laundering, bribery, and trafficking in persons. Criminal syndicates use money to corrupt the police, security, customs and judicial officials. Drug lords circumvent the democratic system and exercise undue influence on government. Corruption lowers the quality of governance, weakens the state, skews and diverts government funding and undermines the legitimacy of the state.

In the case of Myanmar, for example, the traditional illicit drug trade in opium financed the emergence of armed ethnic minority groups that controlled territory along the borders with China, India and Laos. Multinational efforts to reduce this trade have been largely successful in reducing the amount of poppy that is grown. However, warlord groups turned to the mass production of chemical drugs such as amphetamine-type stimulants. This development shifted the balance of power to warlords in the Shan State, who now control the bulk of production. Illicit chemical drugs flow into China, mainland Southeast Asia and further afield to the streets of Sydney and reinforce the power of international criminal syndicates.

Transnational issues can also contribute to regional instability in three ways. First, transnational issues can corrode state capacity to deal with them and thus contribute to
weak or even failed states. Second, domestic conflict can spill over into neighbouring states; for example, Burma’s drive against armed insurgents has driven them into India, China and Thailand. Third, regional multilateral cooperation can be undermined by protectionist policies, the use of national sovereignty to prevent intrusion in internal affairs, and rivalry among states.

Transnational issues cannot be addressed effectively by any one state; multinational cooperation is necessary to address them.

Transnational issues cannot be addressed effectively by any one state; multinational cooperation is necessary to address them. In many respects, transnational issues provide an opportunity for inter-state collaboration, and that collaboration contributes to the security of Southeast Asia as a whole.

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed five clusters of security issues that each serve in varying degrees to promote increased cooperation among regional states and between regional states and external powers. At the same time, in particular cases these tensions have undermined confidence and trust among states and contributed to competitive rather than cooperative patterns of security cooperation. These trends, if left unmanaged, could undermine multilateral cooperation and regional order and thus contribute to regional instability.

In reality, all these clusters are interrelated and impact on Southeast Asia simultaneously. It is clear, for example, that tensions generated by maritime disputes, China’s military modernisation and Southeast Asian weapons acquisitions are ‘insecurity multipliers’ and in combination could generate regional instability or, in a worst-case scenario, armed conflict.

If left unmanaged, the tensions between China and the United States in the maritime domain and the tensions between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea are worrying strategic developments.

The five clusters of security tensions outlined in this chapter pose serious challenges to the prevailing patterns of security cooperation because they undermine confidence and trust among the states concerned. This in turn undermines the viability of the region’s security architecture.

To compound this assessment, individual Southeast Asian states are weakened by a plethora of everyday domestic security issues and emerging transnational security challenges. The weakness of individual Southeast Asian states likewise constrains their capacity to act multilaterally to address region-wide security challenges. In cases where the interests of external powers are affected these powers may decide to act more assertively outside the framework of ASEAN-centred regional security institutions.
GREAT POWER INFLUENCE POINTS

This chapter considers how the major powers, the United States and China, seek to shape the regional security environment in accord with their national security strategies. Both major powers reach into similar toolkits to find appropriate political, economic and military instruments suitable to their national strategies. But the two major powers differ in their vision of what kind of security order they would like to see emerge in Southeast Asia and how they should go about influencing their preferred outcomes. In other words, the United States and China use similar means, but pursue different ways to achieve their ends.

United States policies towards Southeast Asia are shaped by a global strategy that seeks to create a ‘just and sustainable international order’ based on a rules-based system of representative and responsible international organisations.

United States engagement

United States policies towards Southeast Asia are shaped by a global strategy that seeks to create a ‘just and sustainable international order’ based on a rules-based system of representative and responsible international organisations (US National Security Strategy 2010: 12). The United States promotes a global free trade economic system, good governance and universal values of human rights, religious freedom and democracy.
US policies towards Southeast Asia are derivative of a larger Asia-Pacific policy framework. For example, the Obama Administration’s recently released *National Security Strategy* makes clear that US ‘alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the bedrock of security in Asia and a foundation of prosperity in the Asia–Pacific region’ (Office of the President of the United States 2010: 42). Further, the *National Security Strategy* stresses the importance of bilateral relations with China, India and Russia as ‘critical to building broader cooperation on areas of mutual interest’ such as promoting trade and investment and countering violent extremism and nuclear proliferation.

According to the *National Security Strategy*, the United States promotes security cooperation through ‘regional organizations, new dialogues, and high-level diplomacy’. These are the essential, but not the only, instruments in the US engagement toolkit.

What are the ‘influence points’ the United States will utilise to achieve its policy ends? The *National Security Strategy* states:

> We [the United States] will work to advance these mutual interests through our alliances, deepen our relationships with emerging powers, and pursue a stronger role in the region’s multilateral architecture, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the East Asia Summit. (Office of the President of the United States 2010: 43)

US foreign military assistance programs are used as a point of influence to encourage security cooperation with the United States.

**Alliances**

The main points of influence for the United States in Southeast Asia lie in its bilateral alliances with the Philippines and Thailand and its strategic partnership with Singapore. The United States leverages its influence with these three countries by regular head of government meetings with the US president at the White House, and less frequent presidential visits to the region. The United States reinforces its bilateral relations with regular high-level visits and annual security dialogues at senior official level.

Under the Bush Administration, Thailand and the Philippines were both designated ‘major Non-NATO allies’ for their assistance to the United States in the global war on terrorism. As US allies they are given preferential treatment in arms and equipment procurements under the Foreign Military Finance program. They are also the beneficiaries of US-funded professional military education and training programs in the United States. For example, more Thais have been trained through the IMET program than any other nationality.

US treaty allies are also the beneficiaries of various military assistance programs to build capacity to address security issues of mutual concern, such as counter-terrorism and maritime security.

Since 2000, the United States has provided nearly US$400 million in military assistance to the Philippines. The US Special Forces have been posted to the southern Philippines to train the Armed Forces of the Philippines. They also provide intelligence gathered from
satellite imagery, communications intercepts, global positioning information, and aerial surveillance to assist the AFP in tracking members of the Abu Sayyaf group. US Special Forces accompany the AFP on patrol strictly as observers. US armed forces personnel also directly assist in disarming land mines. US military assistance to the Philippines has broadened from counter-terrorism to support for reform of the armed forces and the development of capabilities to enhance territorial defence.

The United States conducts regular military exercises with its two regional allies. The United States and the Philippines conduct Exercise Balikatan annually. In 2009, this exercise involved 6,000 American troops and focused on responses to natural disasters. US and Thai armed forces from all services conduct an active program of joint military exercises averaging forty a year. The flagship annual Cobra Gold exercise has evolved into a multilateral exercise involving regional states; in recent years, it has focused on addressing non-traditional threats.

The United States and Singapore have designated each other ‘Major Security Cooperation Partners’. The Singapore prime minister is accorded regular access to the White House. The two partners conduct regular security consultations and hold joint military exercises. Singapore provides the United States with important logistics facilities. Admiral Robert Willard, Commander of the US Pacific Command, has characterised Singapore as ‘one of our strongest security partners in the region, hosting our transiting ships and deploying personnel, working with US forces in Afghanistan, and commanding the multi-national, counter-piracy, Combined Task Force in the Gulf of Aden’ (2010: 11).

US foreign military assistance programs are used as a point of influence to encourage security cooperation with the United States. On occasion, such programs have been suspended as a result of US displeasure with domestic developments not in accord with US policy goals. For example, military assistance to Thailand was suspended following the September 2006 military coup.

The US–Indonesia defence relationship has witnessed a complete about-face in recent years ... Military-to-military cooperation and arms sales have resumed, and in July 2010 the United States resumed working with Indonesia’s special forces.

Emerging powers

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review notes that the United States is working to ‘develop new strategic relationships with Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, to address issues such as counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and support to humanitarian assistance operations in the region’ (United States Department of Defense 2010: 59). PACOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Program is designed to draw these states into closer military and security cooperation with the United States.

The US–Indonesia defence relationship has witnessed a complete about-face in recent years after sanctions were imposed in the 1990s. Military-to-military cooperation and arms sales have resumed, and in July 2010 the United States resumed working with Indonesia’s special forces.
Between 2006 and 2009, the United States provided Indonesia with US$47 million under its Global Train and Equip Program to combat smuggling, piracy and trafficking. The US Defense Department helped finance the installation of seven radar systems to improve maritime security throughout the archipelago, including the Malacca and Makassar straits. In 2009, US and Indonesian armed forces co-hosted the Garuda Shield multilateral military exercise in Bandung, which focused on peace support operations. The 2009 exercise included more than 1,000 soldiers and marines from nine countries.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Indonesia on her first official trip to Asia. During this visit she and her Indonesian counterpart announced that the two countries would work to develop a strategic partnership. In recognition of Indonesia’s emerging role, President Obama has made a commitment to visit Jakarta.

The United States and Malaysia have extensive economic ties. The United States is Malaysia’s largest trading partner and biggest investor on a cumulative basis. US–Malaysia bilateral military relations are one of the region’s best-kept ‘secrets’. Defence cooperation proceeded below the radar screen during the Mahathir years despite often-prickly political relations in public. The United States and Malaysia cooperate closely on counterterrorism and ‘maritime domain awareness’. The US and Malaysian armed forces regularly exchange visits and participate in joint training exercises. Malaysia also hosts port visits by US naval ships. In July 2010, Malaysia announced it was deploying forty army medics to Afghanistan and that it will formally participate in the Cobra Gold exercise in 2011.

US–Vietnam bilateral security relations have taken time to develop since reciprocal visits by Vietnam’s defence minister to Washington in 2003 and by the US Defense Secretary to Hanoi in 2006. In 2003, for example, the two sides agreed that the United States could make one port call per year (see Table 1). The United States has pressed for more frequent access and in 2007 succeeded in gaining approval for two warship visits that year. The United States has attempted to push the envelope by requesting port calls by non-combat ships such as hydrographic survey vessels and humanitarian visits by hospital ships.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of visit</th>
<th>Ships involved</th>
<th>Port visited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003 November</td>
<td>USS Vandergrift</td>
<td>Ho Chi Minh City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 July</td>
<td>USS Curtis Wilbur</td>
<td>Da Nang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 March–April</td>
<td>USS Gary</td>
<td>Ho Chi Minh City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 July</td>
<td>USS Patriot and USS Salvor</td>
<td>Ho Chi Minh City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 July</td>
<td>USS Peleliu</td>
<td>Da Nang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 October</td>
<td>USNS Bruce Heezen</td>
<td>Da Nang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 November</td>
<td>USS Patriot and USS Guardian</td>
<td>Hai Phong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 June</td>
<td>USNS Mercy</td>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 June</td>
<td>USNS Bruce Heezen</td>
<td>Da Nang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 August–September</td>
<td>USNS Safeguard</td>
<td>Ho Chi Minh City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 November</td>
<td>USS Blue Ridge and USS Lassen*</td>
<td>Da Nang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 February–March</td>
<td>USNS Richard E. Byrd</td>
<td>Hon Khoi Port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 May</td>
<td>USNS Mercy</td>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 August</td>
<td>USS John S. McCain</td>
<td>Da Nang</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* US 7th Fleet Flag Ship and escort.
A major turning point was reached in 2008 following the landmark visit of Vietnam’s prime minister to the White House and the Pentagon. In October 2008, Vietnam and the United States inaugurated their first Political, Security and Defense Dialogue between the US Department of State and Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In April 2009, Vietnamese military officials were flown out to the USS John C. Stennis aircraft carrier to observe flight operations in the South China Sea. In August 2009 and March 2010, Vietnamese shipyards carried out maintenance repairs on two US vessels attached to the Navy Military Sealift Command. These repairs were a precursor to a contract with Vietnam’s leading shipbuilder, Vinashin, for further repairs.

In late 2009, Vietnam’s defence minister, General Phung Quang Thanh, visited Washington and held discussions with Defense Secretary Gates. On the way to Washington, General Thanh stopped in Hawaii to visit the US Pacific Command where he was photographed looking into the periscope of an American nuclear submarine. In July 2010, on the 15th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Vietnamese deputy ambassador was photographed making a visit to the newly launched USS George H.W. Bush nuclear aircraft carrier, while in Vietnam local military and government officials from Da Nang were flown out to the USS George Washington to observe carrier observations. The USS John S. McCain called in at Da Nang and conducted the first joint naval engagement activities with their Vietnamese counterparts.

The United States and Vietnam held their first defence policy dialogue in Hanoi in August 2010.

Other engagement
The United States also pursues security cooperation with other states in Southeast Asia. One notable success story is the quiet development of US–Cambodia security relations since 2006 when Cambodia requested US military assistance. Since then the Commander of the US Pacific Command has visited twice to develop a training program for the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), including assistance to the National Counter-Terrorism Task Force. Cambodia has hosted visits by three US warships.

In 2008–09, the United States increased financial assistance and the scope of its training programs to include demining and RCAF’s participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Cambodia also became the recipient of excess military equipment such as trucks, Kevlar helmets, field packs and camouflage uniforms valued at US$6.5 million.

US–Cambodia military relations reached a highpoint in 2009 with the visit of Cambodia’s defence minister to Washington and the opening of the office for Cambodia’s defence attaché. In discussions, Defense Secretary Gates agreed to assist in enhancing the capabilities of the RCAF in peacekeeping, maritime security and counter-terrorism and identified defence sector reform as a new area for cooperation. Secretary Gates invited Cambodia to participate in a future defence policy dialogue.

In a major development, in mid-2010, Cambodia co-hosted the largest peacekeeping exercise in the Asia–Pacific. Exercise Angkor Sentinel was the regional capstone for the 2010 Global Peace Operations Initiative. Angkor Sentinel involved more than 2,000 troops from twenty regional partners across the Asia–Pacific.
However, in 2010, relations hit a speed bump when Cambodia repatriated twenty Uighur refugees to China despite US diplomatic pressures not to do so. The United States suspended the delivery of military equipment in response.

US security cooperation with Laos has slowly evolved since 2006, with the United States generally taking the initiative. That year Laos sent military observers to the US–Thai Cobra Gold exercise for the first time. Laos has hosted two visits by the Commander of the US Pacific Command. In 2007, Laos became eligible for IMET funding for the first time and priority was assigned to English language training. In 2008, Laos and the United States exchanged defence attachés and opened offices in each other’s capital. But overall defence cooperation has been limited to military medical cooperation, civil military operations, training and education, and counter-narcotics.

The United States and Timor-Leste have recently held their first military-to-military bilateral discussions. US engagement focused on medical and dental readiness exercises, and on engineering assistance by US Navy SEABEEs.

**Multilateral architecture**

**ASEAN**

The United States has been a dialogue partner with ASEAN since 1997. The United States utilises the ASEAN Ten Plus One consultations, following the annual ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference with its dialogue partners, as a point of influence to assist ASEAN in capacity building to address current and emerging non-traditional security threats.

The centrepiece of US engagement with ASEAN under the Bush Administration was the ASEAN Cooperation Plan, announced by Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2002. US–ASEAN cooperation was advanced in November 2005 when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her counterparts from Southeast Asia issued a Joint Vision Statement of the ASEAN–US Enhanced Partnership followed by the ASEAN–US Partnership Plan of Action.

The Obama Administration has also revitalised US support and engagement with ASEAN as an effective influence point to advance American interests.

In November 2006, President George W Bush met with his ASEAN counterparts in Hanoi on the sideline of the APEC Summit and agreed that the priorities for the ASEAN–US Partnership Plan of Action would include cooperation in health (including avian influenza), energy, natural disaster relief and environmental management. To implement this action plan, the United States launched a new five-year assistance program called ASEAN Development Vision to Advance National Cooperation and Economic Integration.

The Obama Administration has built on these foundations. In July 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her ASEAN counterparts agreed on revised priorities for cooperation under the ASEAN–US Enhanced Partnership.

The Obama Administration has also revitalised US support and engagement with ASEAN as an effective influence point to advance American interests. In July 2009, Secretary Clinton
signed the document of US accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. In a new initiative, Secretary Clinton met for the first time with her counterparts from Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam to initiate cooperation to develop the Lower Mekong River basin. Secretary Clinton pledged US assistance in three areas: environment, health and education.

In November that year, President Barack Obama attended the 1st ASEAN–United States Leaders’ Meeting in Singapore. The ASEAN–US Joint Statement adopted at the meeting reaffirmed the commitment of both parties to work together to promote economic development, to cooperate on counter-terrorism, to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, to narrow the development gap, to conduct research on climate impacts and to develop appropriate mitigation policies. In addition, the ASEAN–US Joint Statement pledged cooperation to address the challenge of non-traditional security challenges such as ‘illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, money laundering, arms smuggling, sea piracy, international economic crime and cyber crime’.

ASEAN Regional Forum
The United States was a founding member of the ARF. This also constitutes another influence point. Although the United States has supported the ARF’s program of confidence-building measures, it has clearly been frustrated by the ASEAN Regional Forum’s consensus, non-binding style of decision making.

In the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the United States took the lead in initiating a proposal to advance cooperation among ARF members in the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In May 2009, the Philippines hosted the inaugural ARF-sponsored Voluntary Demonstration of Response on Disaster Relief field exercise, a simulated disaster relief operation in response to a major typhoon. This marked the first time that ARF members employed real assets in a practical exercise. The ARF subsequently took note of and praised this exercise and welcomed the co-sponsorship of Indonesia and Japan of the next disaster relief exercise. In 2010 ARF ministers approved the concept of the exercise that included both field and table-top exercises.

US engagement with the ARF was evident in remarks delivered on 12 January 2010 by Secretary Clinton to the East-West Center in Hawaii. After highlighting the centrality of the ASEAN Regional Forum in regional affairs, she called for the ARF to ‘work better’ to deliver concrete results. In particular, Secretary Clinton urged the ARF to continue its practical efforts to address humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. She stated, ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum should make good on the vision laid out at our meeting in Thailand last July for it to assume greater responsibilities for disaster relief and humanitarian operations. And the United States stands ready to assist in facilitating that.’

Trans-Pacific Partnership
The Bush Administration had limited success in promoting free trade agreements as an instrument of US influence in the region. In 2002, the United States launched the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative to facilitate bilateral trade agreements between the United States and individual ASEAN member countries with the objective of liberalising regional trade. Singapore and the United States quickly reached agreement in 2003, but negotiations with Thailand and Malaysia have stalled.

The Obama Administration has shifted US priorities from negotiating bilateral free trade agreements to a regional approach. The United States has renewed its bid for membership in the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (widely known as the Trans-Pacific
Trade Partnership)\textsuperscript{25} as part of a broader strategy to encourage a regional free trade regime. The United States is currently lobbying Vietnam to join.

**Other multilateral points of influence**

The United States utilises other multilateral initiatives as points of influence when existing multilateral institutions prove inadequate.

**Proliferation Security Initiative**

The PSI was launched by President Bush in May 2003. At present, ninety states subscribe to its Statement of Interdiction Principles devised to coordinate action to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related items. PSI members include four states from Southeast Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Singapore. The PSI is opposed by China, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

Singapore is also a leading participant in the PSI. It hosted Exercise Deep Sabre, a multinational maritime interdiction exercise in August 2005 and October 2009. Twenty-two countries participated in the most recent exercise.

**Shangri-La Dialogue**

The ARF does not meet at defence minister level. This gap has been filled partly by the Shangri-La Dialogue held annually in Singapore. The aim of this forum is to promote transparency on strategic goals, political intentions and military developments.

The 9th Shangri-La Dialogue, held in June 2010, was attended by ministers and/or senior defence officials from twenty-seven countries, including Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, the United Kingdom, the United States and Vietnam. The US Secretary of Defense has regularly attended meetings. The importance of this forum lies in the opportunity for defence ministers to meet on the sidelines to discuss regional security issues and promote defence cooperation.

**East Asia Summit**

The East Asia Summit was established in 2005 and includes sixteen members: the ten ASEAN states, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. This new multilateral body meets at head of state/government level and is still seeking to define its role in regional affairs. The most recent ASEAN Summit, which met in Hanoi in April 2010, issued a statement encouraging the United States and Russia to consider membership. Since then the US National Security Statement declared that the United States would ‘pursue a stronger role in the region’s multilateral architecture including the East Asia Summit’.

**Chinese engagement**

As noted above, China uses many of the same instruments as the United States to advance its national interests in Southeast Asia; however, it employs different methods to attain its strategic ends. China promotes direct linkages with ASEAN and, despite its strategic weight, it ‘talks the talk’ by promoting security cooperation on the basis of equality. China contrasts this to the ‘hub and spokes’ US-led pattern of security cooperation. China’s policies towards Southeast Asia are couched in an East Asia framework that seeks to reduce, if not exclude, US influence.
Cooperation for competition

Between February 1999 and December 2000, China negotiated long-term cooperative framework arrangements with all ten ASEAN members. These framework agreements incorporated regular high-level official visits at head of state/government and ministerial level that the United States, as a global power, cannot hope to match.

Subsequently, China has upgraded these framework agreements through additional joint declarations and/or memorandums of understanding. For example, in April 2005, China and Indonesia issued a joint declaration on building a strategic partnership, and in 2010 agreed to sign a plan of action to implement it. In April 2006, China and Cambodia adopted a Comprehensive Partnership for Cooperation. In May 2007, China and Thailand signed a Joint Action Plan for Strategic Cooperation. One analyst has described this process as ‘cooperation for competition’, in other words China’s cooperation with ASEAN is part of its competition with the United States for influence in the region.26

Bilateral security cooperation

Seven of the initial framework agreements included a reference to bilateral security cooperation (Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, Singapore, the Philippines, and Laos). These arrangements have become a significant point of influence for China.

For example, the oldest and most extensive security and defence cooperation measures were outlined in the 1979 China–Thailand framework agreement. The operative clause noted that the two sides would undertake CBMs, including consultations between their military personnel and diplomatic officials on security issues, and exchanges between their armed forces on humanitarian rescue and assistance and disaster reduction, exchanges between strategic and security research institutes, and exchanges of military science and technology as well as information.

The defence clause in China’s framework agreements with Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines are generally similar in nature and spell out cooperation through high-level exchanges, lower level visits and study tours, training, intelligence sharing, research and development, and naval ship visits. The China–Malaysia defence clause made particular reference to cooperation between national defence industries. China and the Philippines singled out cooperation in search and rescue and assistance in disaster relief and mitigation.

The relatively detailed programs of defence cooperation contrast with the sparse defence clauses in China’s framework agreements with Brunei, Vietnam and Laos. The China–Brunei joint statement merely expressed ‘mutual interest in exploring possible cooperation in science and technology and defense’, while the China–Vietnamese joint statement called for ‘multi-level military exchanges’.

High-level visits

China has used high-level visits as an important conduit for exerting influence. Between 2002 and 2008, for example, China and the ten members of ASEAN exchanged 124 high-level defence visits, including twenty-five at ministerial level. Reciprocal visits by defence ministers were conducted by China with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. China also hosted defence ministers from Cambodia and Laos, while Brunei hosted a visit by the Chinese defence minister.
China conducted its most intense high-level contacts with Thailand (twenty-one visits), followed by Vietnam (eighteen), Indonesia and the Philippines (fourteen each), Cambodia (twelve), Laos, Singapore and Myanmar (ten each), Malaysia (eight) and Brunei (seven).

Both Cambodia and Singapore have a marked imbalance in high-level exchanges with China. Cambodia sent three times as many delegations as it received. Cambodia’s exchanges with China picked up markedly after 2006 when the two countries signed an agreement on Comprehensive Partnership for Cooperation. Singapore sent twice as many high-level officials to China as China sent to Singapore.  

Naval ship visits

In the period between 2001 and 2009, China and Southeast Asia conducted twenty-one naval goodwill visits involving nine ASEAN states (Laos is landlocked). Chinese warships visited Vietnam (on three occasions), Singapore and Thailand (twice each) and Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. In turn, China hosted port visits from Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand (twice each), and Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam.

Combined exercises

In April 2006, China and Vietnam agreed to conduct biannual joint naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin after reaching a fisheries agreement. This was a first for the Chinese navy. Nine additional joint naval patrols were conducted in the Gulf of Tonkin by mid-2010.

China’s naval diplomacy has not always been a successful conduit for influence, particularly with US treaty allies. For example, repeated invitations to the Philippines to conduct combined naval exercises with the PLAN have not been taken up.

Thailand has been similarly hesitant. In December 2005 the Royal Thai Navy conducted its first combined exercise with the PLAN involving search and rescue and escort in the Gulf of Thailand. But Thailand has informed China that it would prefer to participate in a multilateral exercise that included other regional states. China has floated this idea among other ASEAN members, but the matter remains under ‘active consideration’ due to its sensitivity.

In 2002, at the invitation of Thailand, People’s Liberation Army observers began attending the annual Cobra Gold exercise. Subsequently, China sought to use combined exercises as a point of influence with Thailand and, in the view of some regional observers, as a rival to the Cobra Gold series. In July 2007, Thailand and China initiated an annual combined anti-terrorism training exercise, Strike, involving special forces. China and Thailand alternate as hosts. The first Strike special forces exercise, in 2007, was held in Guangzhou. Exercise Strike, however, remains limited in scope.

In May 2007, China participated for the first time in the second multilateral maritime combined exercise under the sponsorship of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in waters off Singapore.

Security consultations

China has initiated defence and security consultations with six of ASEAN’s ten members as another point of influence. These include annual consultations with Thailand (2001), the Philippines (2004), Vietnam (2005), Indonesia and Malaysia (2006) and Singapore (2008).
MOUs on defence cooperation

Between 2002 and 2009, China signed five memorandums of understanding with individual ASEAN states: Cambodia (November 2003), the Philippines (November 2004), Thailand (May 2005), Indonesia (July 2005) and Malaysia (September 2005). These MOUs provide an important conduit of Chinese influence particularly because of the political role of Southeast Asian militaries in domestic affairs.

China has also been opportunistic in offering military assistance to Myanmar, Thailand and Cambodia after the United States imposed sanctions or temporarily suspended military assistance in response to domestic political developments.

In 1990, for example, Myanmar was subject to international sanctions for not honouring the results of a national election. China stepped in and provided US$1.6 billion in military assistance and training. In particular, China helped with the modernisation of Myanmar’s navy, provided funding for the construction of naval facilities in Hainggik and Great Cocos Islands, and helped to upgrade the Mergui naval base.

In late 1997, China provided Cambodia with a loan valued at US$10 million after Western nations imposed sanctions following the violent political upheaval in July. These funds were used to finance infrastructure (an airfield, barracks and officers’ quarters), military transport vehicles and training. China stepped in once again in 2010 when the United States suspended military assistance after Cambodia repatriated Uighur refugees over the protest of the US government. China pledged to provide Cambodia with aid valued at US$14 million to acquire 255 military trucks and 50,000 military uniforms.

China also offered military assistance to Thailand following the suspension of US aid in the wake of the September 2006 military coup.

In order to compete with the United States for regional influence, Beijing has begun funding the participation of military personnel from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Timor-Leste in professional military education and training courses in China.

In order to compete with the United States for regional influence, Beijing has begun funding the participation of military personnel from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Timor-Leste in professional military education and training courses in China.

Weapons sales and technology transfer

China has used arms sales and national defence industry cooperation in co-production as another point of influence. China has even used barter arrangements with Thailand to help it offload agricultural produce in exchange for armoured personnel vehicles.

China has reached agreement with Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia concerning the sale and/or co-production of C-802 and other types of anti-ship cruise missiles.
In July 2005, under the terms of an MOU on defence technology between China and Indonesia, China agreed to provide technical assistance to Indonesia’s aircraft and ship building defence industries and cooperation in co-production of weapons and ammunition.

China has sought to develop avenues of influence in Timor-Leste following its independence. In 2003–04, China supplied US$1 million in military assistance, including uniforms, tents, and transport vehicles, and a further US$6 million for the construction of barracks and officers’ quarters.

In 2007, Timor-Leste’s first major defence contract went to a Chinese company to supply eight jeeps mounted with machine guns. In 2008, Timor-Leste contracted China’s Poly Technologies to provide two modified Shanghai-class patrol boats, a landing dock and training for forty crew members in a deal valued at US$25 million. These boats were delivered in mid-2010 and Chinese naval crew are currently providing training.

**Multilateral engagement**

**ASEAN**

China has promoted multilateral cooperation between itself and ASEAN as an organisation as a particular point of influence. In April 1995, for example, Chinese and ASEAN representatives first began meeting at senior official level to discuss political and security issues.

In 1996, China was accorded official dialogue partner status by ASEAN. As an ASEAN dialogue partner, China regularly participates in the annual ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference consultation process. In 1997, China formalised its relationship with ASEAN by establishing a bilateral Joint Cooperation Committee to coordinate all ASEAN–China mechanisms at the working level.

In November 2002, China further upgraded relations with ASEAN by signing three major agreements. The first was a framework agreement on comprehensive economic cooperation between ASEAN and China. This laid the foundation for the China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement that came into force for the developed members of ASEAN at the start of 2010. It will come into force for the less developed members in 2015.

The second agreement was the Joint Declaration between China and ASEAN on Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security Fields. The third agreement signed in 2002 was the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea to promote cooperation in disputed maritime areas. In 2004, China and ASEAN set up a joint working group to consider ways to implement the DOC and to submit its recommendations to the ASEAN–China Senior Officials Meeting. China has used this process to delay negotiating a more formal code of conduct.

In October 2003, China acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and used this to leverage relations with ASEAN by developing a ‘Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’. In late 2004, China and ASEAN agreed on a five-year Plan of Action (2005–2010) to bring the strategic partnership to life through regular high-level bilateral exchanges, cooperation in the field of non-traditional security, security dialogue and military exchanges and cooperation.

Under the Plan of Action, Chinese and ASEAN defence personnel began annual workshops to discuss regional security issues in July 2006.
Currently, China and ASEAN have concluded at least twenty-eight ‘cooperation framework mechanisms’, including regular consultations between senior officials on strategic and political security cooperation, a yearly conference of foreign ministers, and an annual summit meeting of government leaders.

**ASEAN Regional Forum**

China has used its membership in the ARF to ‘talk the talk’ by promoting its ‘new security concept’. China’s new security concept contains a distinct anti-US undertone with its stress on multipolarity and by contrasting China’s dialogue relations with ASEAN with hegemonism, bullying and gunboat diplomacy practised by unnamed great powers (read the United States).

China has actively participated in promoting the ARF’s inter-sessional program of CBMs. In 2000, China began contributing for the first time to the ARF’s *Annual Security Outlook* and began providing voluntary briefings on regional security. China has been more reticent, however, in supporting the ARF’s transition to preventive diplomacy.

In 2003, China launched a major initiative to further its new concept of security by successfully proposing the creation of a security policy conference composed of senior military and civilian officials drawn from all ARF members. China sought to use the conference as a springboard for a regional treaty. In November 2004, China drafted and circulated a concept paper on the security treaty before hosting the 1st ARF Security Policy Conference. Due to reservations by some ASEAN members, this proposal has languished.

China has been more successful, however, in promoting cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Undoubtedly China’s major contribution has been its successful drafting of the ARF’s general guidelines for disaster relief cooperation that were adopted by the 14th ARF ministerial meeting in August 2007. But note should also be taken of China’s initiative in establishing the Security Policy Conference and its hosting of the ISM on Non-proliferation and Disarmament.

**ASEAN Plus Three**

China has been proactive in pushing the APT to become more active in dealing with non-traditional security issues. In June 2007 and June 2008, for example, China hosted the first and second APT workshops on the role of armed forces in disaster relief. China has also sought to institutionalise defence cooperation and military exchanges among APT members with a particular focus on non-traditional security issues.

China has used the APT process as a point of influence to promote East Asian regionalism that would exclude the United States. China was decidedly lukewarm when a divided ASEAN finally reached consensus and decided to encourage both the United States and Russian Federation to apply to join the East Asia Summit.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has reviewed the major influence points utilised by the United States and China to achieve their national security objectives in Southeast Asia. Both states have developed extensive means—political, economic, development assistance—to exert influence on individual Southeast Asian countries.
Both the United States and China also have developed extensive military means to influence and shape regional security: alliances/strategic partnerships, long-term cooperative framework agreements, high-level visits, international defence cooperation (including foreign military assistance, professional military education and training, combined exercises and naval port visits) and arms sales and defence technology transfers.

During the Bush Administration, China was able to capitalise on widespread regional aversion to US unilateralism and its single-minded pursuit of the global war on terrorism by promoting its new security concept. China ‘talked the talk’ in an effort to offset, if not undermine, US alliance relationships. China gave priority to cooperative security measures that addressed transnational security issues. In doing so, China sought to bind ASEAN in multilateral security arrangements that excluded the United States.

China’s ‘no strings attached’ defence cooperation has both pluses and minuses. On the one hand, such cooperation addresses pressing security concerns by providing resources and material assistance to individual states. On the other hand, China’s ‘no strings attached’ policy does not address corruption or poor governance and human rights in individual states and may, in the longer term, undermine regional security.

China’s policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of regional states is promoted in contrast to interference by the United States in its promotion of good governance, human rights, religious freedom, and democracy.

For the decade after 1997 China made diplomatic gains in the region through effective ‘soft power’. But, as the next chapter will demonstrate, Chinese assertiveness after 2007 gave rise to regional apprehensions about the military element of Chinese national power.

China and the United States each seek to promote a different regional order.

China promotes a multipolar regional order that upholds state sovereignty irrespective of the type of domestic political system in order to balance, if not constrain, the power and influence of the United States. China’s approach emphasises nominal equality among members of regional multilateral institutions and is particularly focused on exclusive East Asian regionalism, but China is nonetheless first among equals.

The United States ... pursues a national strategy aimed at creating an Asia–Pacific wide security order founded on multilateral institutions that are rules-based and promote universal values such as democracy and human rights under US leadership.

The United States, in contrast, pursues a national strategy aimed at creating an Asia–Pacific wide security order founded on multilateral institutions that are rules-based and promote universal values such as democracy and human rights under US leadership. The US approach is to rely on key allies and strategic partners as the critical mass towards achieving these ends.
China’s defence cooperation programs in Southeast Asia may be viewed as more symbolic than practical. They are mainly designed to serve China’s political objectives rather than contribute in a meaningful way to a stable autonomous regional order.

The United States, in contrast, offers a wide range of defence cooperation programs designed to build up human resources, military professionalism and increased military capability to deal with a spectrum of security challenges and threats.

The Obama Administration has picked up the slack of the Bush Administration and is re-engaging with Southeast Asia. In some respects the United States has turned the tables on China by promoting multilateral cooperation. After the recently concluded 17th ASEAN Regional Forum held in Hanoi on 23 July 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced US support for the ASEAN-China Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and offered ‘to facilitate initiatives and confidence-building measures consistent with this declaration’.

More significantly, Secretary Clinton revealed ‘that President Obama has asked me to represent the United States in an appropriate capacity at this year’s EAS [East Asia Summit] in Hanoi to continue the process of consultations with a view toward full American participation at the presidential level in 2011’.

In sum, not only has Southeast Asia not been unable to insulate itself from Sino-American strategic rivalry, but Sino-American strategic competition looks set to intensify.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR AUSTRALIA

Australia will face a more complex strategic environment in Southeast Asia in coming years. That environment will be characterised by an overlay of mutually supporting and competing security patterns in which Southeast Asian and external powers will play more significant roles. The strategic weight of key Southeast Asian states—principally Indonesia and also Vietnam—is growing. But it is not growing nearly as fast as the strategic weight of the Asian great powers (Japan, China and India), whose influence will be felt increasingly within the region. Australia will need to reassess its own future role within that shifting environment, and to devise a set of strategies that allow it to realise its interests there.

Australia’s strategic interests in Southeast Asia

The 2009 Defence White Paper defined Australia’s strategic interests as ‘those national security interests that concern the structure and features of the international order that ensure our security from armed attack—and in relation to which Australia might contemplate the use of force’ (Australian Government, Department of Defence 2009:41).

The White Paper also identified four major Australian strategic interests: a secure Australia, a secure immediate neighbourhood, strategic stability in the Asia–Pacific region and a stable, rules-based global security order.

Southeast Asia sits at the intersection of those second and third interests. Southeast Asia borders our immediate neighbourhood (including the eastern reaches of the Indian Ocean and Papua New Guinea), but also sits as the geographic gateway between Australia, Northeast Asia and the wider Asia–Pacific. The Southeast Asia region is in fact changing in important ways precisely because it increasingly reflects the power shifts now underway in Asia, and transmits those power shifts into Australia’s immediate geographic area of concern.
Historically, Australia has viewed Southeast Asia as the region ‘from or through which’ a hostile power would have to operate in order to directly threaten Australia. In the late 1980s, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Gareth Evans, attempted to shift Australia’s strategic focus from security from the region to security with the region.

Australia’s strategic policy still remains focused on potential threats arising from external power domination of the region and regional instability.

Nevertheless, Australia’s strategic policy still remains focused on potential threats arising from external power domination of the region and regional instability. Australia’s Defence White Paper notes, for example:

A secure and stable Southeast Asia is in Australia’s strategic interest as neither a source of broad security threat, nor as a conduit for the projection of military power against us by others.’ (Australian Government, Department of Defence 2009:34)

The Defence White Paper also noted that economic progress and social development in Southeast Asia will be ‘beset by security problems such as terrorism, insurgency and communal violence’.

In order to address and mitigate these potential threats, the White Paper focuses on five main objectives:

• preventing any major external power from dominating Southeast Asia or from exercising military power in the region that would challenge Australia’s ability to control the air and sea approaches to its continental land mass
• maintaining the engagement of major allies, such as the United States, in regional security
• preventing or mitigating the acquisition of military power by any regional state to undertake sustained military operations in the air and sea approaches to Australia
• contributing to the stability, development, and cohesion of those states closest to Australia, particularly Indonesia, Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea, to ensure that those countries do not become a source of threat to Australia
• promoting and strengthening the regional security architecture to maximise the attainment of Australia’s strategic objectives through cooperative security relationships, particularly among the major powers but also including regional partners.

Attaining some of those objectives is going to become steadily more difficult. Australia has a clear conception about the kind of Southeast Asia that it would like to see emerge in the future—a region composed of peaceful, stable, prosperous, developing democracies, which enjoy increasing patterns of security cooperation among themselves and with Australia and its other security partners. But that vision of the future will be difficult to realise within a broader Asia–Pacific increasingly roiled by shifting power relativities and tensions among the great powers.
Changing security environment

The security environment in Southeast Asia is undergoing complex change as a result of the trends identified in Chapter 2 (the global financial crisis, China’s military modernisation, the stepped-up US engagement, increased regional arms procurements, the heightened importance of the maritime domain, the increased salience of transnational security issues, the persistence of ‘everyday security challenges’, and the evolution of regional security architecture).

These eight trends have resulted in cross-cutting pressures on existing patterns of regional security cooperation (see Table 2). For example, conventional security threats are addressed mainly by US theatre security cooperation and middle power multilateralism (for example, the FPDA), while Chinese-led multilateralism and ASEAN-led multilateralism focus on non-traditional security challenges. Chinese-led multilateralism seeks to undermine and/or exclude the United States, while ASEAN-led multilateralism seeks to engage both major powers. None of the dominant patterns of security cooperation addresses the potentially destabilising effects of increased regional arms procurements.

Table 2: Security trends and patterns of security cooperation matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security trend/Pattern of security cooperation</th>
<th>Non-ASEAN middle power multilateralism</th>
<th>US theatre security cooperation</th>
<th>Chinese-led multilateralism</th>
<th>ASEAN-led multilateralism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global financial and economic crisis</td>
<td>Does not address this trend</td>
<td>Does not address this trend</td>
<td>Specifically addresses this trend</td>
<td>Specifically addresses this trend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China’s military modernisation</td>
<td>Addresses this trend</td>
<td>Addresses this trend</td>
<td>China’s military modernisation is defensive and non-threatening</td>
<td>Does not directly address this trend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US stepped-up engagement</td>
<td>Does not address this trend</td>
<td>The United States asserts it is a Pacific power</td>
<td>Attempts to undermine and/or exclude the United States</td>
<td>Encourages the United States to remain engaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased arms procurements</td>
<td>Does not address this trend</td>
<td>Does not address this trend</td>
<td>Does not address this trend</td>
<td>Does not address this trend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heightened importance of maritime domain</td>
<td>Addresses this trend</td>
<td>Addresses this trend</td>
<td>Seeks area-denial capabilities aimed at the United States</td>
<td>Has only begun to address this trend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased salience of transnational security issues</td>
<td>Has begun to address aspects of this trend recently</td>
<td>Addresses aspects of this trend</td>
<td>Primary focus is to address this trend</td>
<td>Primary focus is to address this trend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persistence of everyday security challenges</td>
<td>Does not directly address this trend</td>
<td>Addresses this trend</td>
<td>Viewed as a domestic matter of country concerned</td>
<td>Viewed as a domestic matter of country concerned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolution of regional security architecture</td>
<td>Does not address this trend</td>
<td>Has recently begun to address this trend</td>
<td>Addresses this trend with emphasis on East Asian regionalism</td>
<td>Addresses this trend in evolutionary and inclusive fashion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is also evident than none of the multilateral organisations with a regional security focus, such as ASEAN, the ARF, APEC, APT, the East Asia Summit, deals comprehensively with the challenges posed by these major security trends. In sum, Southeast Asia lacks an effective comprehensive security mechanism at head of government/state level to deal authoritatively with major security challenges.
China’s military modernisation and transformation, accompanied by the development of a major naval base on Hainan island, will provide China with a foundation for power projection into Southeast Asia. In extreme circumstances, that might mean that a major external power will be able to challenge Australia’s ability to control the air and sea approaches to its continental land mass. That would be a fundamental shift in the strategic environment in which Australia has operated since World War II.

But long before those circumstances arise, Australia would be troubled by a range of intermediate events. Regardless of how the Asian great powers might choose to exercise their growing military capabilities, and long before they posed a direct threat to the Australian continent, two effects would begin to shape Australia’s strategic thinking. Southeast Asia would be likely to become the cockpit for growing great-power rivalry. And arms modernisation programs would receive a boost from the growing role of external states.

Australia has traditionally relied on the United States to contain and help resolve such great-power rivalries at a distance from its borders.

Australia has traditionally relied on the United States to contain and help resolve such great-power rivalries at a distance from its borders. But if geopolitical competition becomes more pronounced in Southeast Asia, that insulating layer of distance may fray and become thinner. The Obama Administration is re-engaging with Southeast Asia diplomatically, politically, economically and militarily, and the United States will retain its predominance for some years yet. But China’s rise is already altering power relativities and regional perceptions. A major unresolved question is how the United States and China will manage the power shift now underway.

China and the United States disagree fundamentally about the basis of China’s claims to features in the South China Sea. China claims it has ‘indisputable sovereignty’ over the South China Sea and its land features based on an historical claim of discovery and occupation. The US position, as put by Secretary Clinton in Hanoi, is ‘the United States does not take sides on the competing territorial disputes over land features in the South China Sea... Consistent with customary international law, legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features’.

If Chinese political leaders are committed to raising the South China Sea to a ‘core interest’, that would imply Beijing would be willing to use force or the threat of force to defend its sovereignty. Secretary Clinton has said that the US opposes ‘the use or threat of force by any claimant’ and has asserted the United States has a ‘national interest in freedom of navigation [and] open access to Asia’s maritime commons...’ Secretary Clinton’s offer to ‘facilitate initiatives’ to implement the DOC was rejected by China as an attempt to internationalise the issue.

Current and projected trends in weapons procurement indicate that several regional states are acquiring military power that will enable them to conduct military operations in the air and sea approaches to Australia. This trend can be expected to intensify in coming decades.
Southeast Asia: Patterns of security cooperation

For the first time in decades Indonesia appears to have established firm foundations for continued domestic stability. This fundamentally alters Australia’s strategic environment and presents Australia with a major opportunity to focus on developing an effective security partnership with Indonesia beyond the current administration of President Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono.

But at the same time the prospects for continued stability in Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea are less certain.

From the very beginning, Australia was an important partner for Southeast Asia’s efforts to strengthen the regional architecture. Australia was ASEAN’s first dialogue partner and automatically became a member of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference process when it was inaugurated. Australia was a major player in establishing APEC and a major contributor to the ARF since its inception.

But the circumstances that facilitated Australia’s ability to shape the regional architecture are quickly altering. China has taken the lead in promoting multilateral cooperation with ASEAN with an East Asia focus.

ASEAN is making determined efforts to maintain its centrality in regional security affairs. ASEAN has responded to China’s security activism by promoting an expanded East Asia Summit process embracing India, Australia and New Zealand, and by encouraging the United States and Russia to join this process in order to preserve Southeast Asia’s regional autonomy. ASEAN has also set itself the goal of creating an ASEAN Community by 2015.

Pursuing the national interest in Southeast Asia

Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper viewed defence and security relations with the region primarily in terms of counterterrorism, domestic stability, non-traditional security threats and regional arms races. While all of these issues are important security challenges, they also represent opportunities for Australia in pursuing its main strategic interests in Southeast Asia.

Australia’s strategy to deal with a set of shifting great-power balances in Asia must now incorporate increased support for new directions in ASEAN-centred regionalism along with the tried and true reliance on US engagement in the region.
Although China’s economic growth has generally been viewed positively in the region, its military modernisation and transformation has caused anxieties among regional states. And China is not the only Asian power bidding for a larger regional role. Japan and India both conceive such roles for themselves in the future. There are also other players—South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Russia, for example—who might see some form of ‘expanded’ regional security role as either likely or necessary in their own national planning.

Regional anxieties about China’s rise are merely the first of future concerns about the role of external powers. Regional security anxieties present a major opportunity for Australia in two respects. First, Australia should take advantage of the Obama Administration’s support for multilateralism and work out a common approach designed to enmesh China in regional multilateral structures. Careful consideration should be given to the role that the United States should play within the ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus Eight and as a future member of the East Asia Summit process.

Once the United States joins in these new multilateral arrangements, Australia should first push for greater coordination by like-minded states to shape the regional security agenda. This would mean going beyond the anaemic trilateralism of the past (US, Japan and Australia) to embrace a larger informal grouping including Indonesia, South Korea and New Zealand.

Second, Australia should offer major support for ASEAN-centred regionalism, particularly measures to enhance the ASEAN Political-Security Community as one of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community concept. In particular, Australia should play an activist role in promoting initiatives, as part of the ADMM Plus Eight process, as a means of diluting attempts to forge an exclusive East Asian regional grouping.

In sum, Australia should turn the tables on China’s promotion of multilateralism in an effort to shape China’s participation in regional security affairs. Up to now, it has been the policies of the United States that have let China promote its brand of exclusive regional security cooperation. The objective of this new multilateralism would be to coax China into participating in expanded security cooperation on a regional basis under ASEAN’s umbrella but supported by a wider grouping of Asia-Pacific regional states.

Third, Australia should continue to support the FPDA as the region’s only operational military arrangement. Both Singapore and Malaysia are modernising and transforming their militaries. A close relationship will help ensure that Australia’s national interests are served.

The FPDA’s command structure, organisation and exercise program could serve as a model for the ASEAN defence ministers as they plan how to work with their dialogue partners. The ADMM Plus Eight process is designed to add capacity where ASEAN is lacking through engagement with dialogue partners. The FPDA model demonstrates that ASEAN members have been successful in working with external powers to address both traditional and non-traditional security challenges without any weakening of their national sovereignty.

Fourth, Australia should continue to forge effective security partnerships with both Indonesia and Vietnam in recognition of their growing weight in regional affairs. Indonesia’s evolution into a stable democratic state presents a major opportunity for Australia to build on and enhance engagement and security cooperation and thus ensure the security of the air and sea approaches to Australia.

Australia’s security policy in Southeast Asia should be centred on a cohesive, stable and friendly Indonesia. Indonesia has a large population and a gross domestic product that (in purchasing power parity terms) is already larger than Australia’s. Indonesia’s connections
to the Islamic world would partner well with Australia’s connections to North America and Europe. These factors, combined with Indonesia’s geographic position, make Indonesia the natural leader in Southeast Asia and an influential voice in the broader Asia-Pacific and the world.

Likewise, Australia’s long and patient defence cooperation with Vietnam could now be taken a step further in recognition of Vietnam’s growing regional role and military muscle in the maritime domain. Australia could assist Vietnam in developing a maritime doctrine, for example. Vietnam is a slightly more difficult partner for Australia, not only because of its political authoritarianism, but also because of its asymmetric relationship with its giant neighbour, China.

Strengthening security partnerships with Indonesia and also Vietnam does not mean that Australia should put other Southeast Asian relationships on the backburner. Australia should continue to provide defence cooperation to other Southeast Asian states such as the Philippines. But Australia might need to be realistic—and discriminating—in determining the likely composition of a future Southeast Asian partnership that has greater strategic weight in its own right.

Conclusion

Changes in Southeast Asia’s security environment are pulling Australian strategic policy in different and possibly contradictory directions.

The US alliance relationship focuses mainly on conventional threats across the Asia–Pacific region, while the focus of the Five Power Defence Arrangements is on the process of addressing non-traditional threats in the maritime domain. ASEAN-led regional security cooperation is at a nascent stage. ASEAN’s default position has been to address soft security issues such as transnational or non-traditional threats. But the commencement of the ADMM Plus Eight process holds the prospect of ASEAN and its security partners pushing the boundaries of security cooperation into new areas, which would have practical implications.

Australia’s strategic planners will have to pursue a range of pathways to secure Australia’s national interests in Southeast Asia.

Australia’s strategic planners will have to pursue a range of pathways to secure Australia’s national interests in Southeast Asia. One of those pathways would entail building on and redirecting the presently existing web of security ties into a more robust multilateral framework. This could include not only strengthening the ADMM Plus process but also linking the ADMM Plus Eight to the East Asia Summit.

Another pathway would involve encouraging the United States to become more engaged in Southeast Asia in its own right rather than viewing the region as a way-station to the Gulf of Arabia. Australia might help build regional support for that role where it could. And a third pathway should involve Australia revitalising its own security ties to key Southeast Asian states in order to increase the region’s strategic weight in dealing with external powers. At the same time Australia should work closely with key Southeast Asian partners to develop a common vision of the region’s future.
1 Brunei became a member in 1984.

2 The ASEAN Way refers to a decision-making process based on norms, including non-intervention, respect for national sovereignty, renunciation of force or the threat of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, dialogue, consensus, equality, inclusivity and at a pace ‘comfortable to all’.

3 Australia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.

4 Discussed in Chapter 3.


6 Australian, China, India, Japan, New Zealand South Korea, Russia, and the United States. Canada and the European Union, who are both dialogue partners, may be invited at a later date.

7 Indonesia and Malaysia have signed but not yet ratified ReCAAP.

8 Australia and Japan were also invited to participate.

9 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States.


11 ASEANAPOL has met twenty-nine times most recently in November 2009. In January 2010 an ASEANAPOL Secretariat was finally established.

12 As early as 1984, an ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Drug Matters was established to recommend policy measures to combat illicit drugs. ASEAN’s Vision 2020 (1997) included the goal of a drug-free South East Asia. In July 1998, the 31st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting signed the Joint Declaration for a Drug-Free ASEAN setting out the goal of eradicating the production, processing, trafficking and use of illicit drugs by the year 2020.
India, Australia, Russia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan and Canada.

Apparently the first organised ASEAN-wide defence activity was the ASEAN Rifles Meet, a shooting competition among marksmen that began in 1991.

The 2009 ASEAN Summit adopted the Cha-am-Hua Hin Declaration on the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community (2009–2015) to push this process forward.

Brunei does not occupy any feature but its 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone includes Louisa bank, which is claimed by Malaysia.

Initially, China and the Philippines reached agreement in 2004. One observer argued that by so doing the Philippines had broken ranks with ASEAN by negotiating a bilateral agreement without prior consultations and also made ‘breathtaking concessions’ by agreeing to a seismic survey within the Philippines’s exclusive economic zone, thus undermining the position of other claimants such as Vietnam. See Wain (2008).

Called the East Sea (Bien Dong) by Vietnam. Vietnam has unofficially launched a campaign to rename the South China Sea the South East Asia Sea.

Unofficially, an earlier map had been in circulation based on a 1947 map drawn up by the Kuomintang government. The KMT map contained eleven dash lines; the PRC later deleted two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu Gulf).

The first island chain refers to the line of islands that runs north–south from the Kuriles, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The second island chain extends further east of China’s coast and includes a line running north-south from the Kuriles through Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, the Carolines, and Indonesia. The first second island chain embraces an area 1,800 nautical miles from China’s coast and includes most of the East China Sea and East Asian SLOCs.

Malaysia hosts the South East Asian Counterterrorism Centre.

The US Military Sealift Fleet Support Command based in Singapore has initiated a program of regional ship repairs for US Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force Program ships. US officials in Singapore have approached Vietnam to participate in this program.

The Global Peace Operations Initiative is a Group of Eight program to train and equip 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010. US funding is provided by the Department of State and executed by the Department of Defense.

Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development.

The Trans-Pacific Strategic and Economic Partnership, signed in 2005, is a multilateral agreement between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore.

Li Mingjiang (2010).

Chinese participants at the Shangri-La Dialogue were not included in the total.

After 9/11, APEC became involved in security measures to protect air and sea transport against terrorism in an initiative known as STAR (Secure Trade in the Asian Region).
Acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADMM</td>
<td>ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting</td>
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMMTC</td>
<td>ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>APT</td>
<td>ASEAN Plus Three</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEANAPOL</td>
<td>ASEAN Chiefs of National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARAT</td>
<td>Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>confidence-building measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOC</td>
<td>Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea</td>
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<td>FPDA</td>
<td>Five Power Defence Arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPOI</td>
<td>Global Peace Operations Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA/DR</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance/disaster relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IADS</td>
<td>Integrated Air/Area Defence System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISM</td>
<td>inter-sessional meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPAT</td>
<td>Multinational Planning Augmentation Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Pacific Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLAN</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Proliferation Security Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCAF</td>
<td>Royal Cambodian Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ReCAAP</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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Southeast Asia: Patterns of security cooperation


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Cover image: Ripples on Water Surface. © moodboard/Corbis
Southeast Asia
Patterns of security cooperation

Strategically, Southeast Asia sits at the intersection of the wider world and Australia’s local neighbourhood: what happens there matters to Australia. But the broader Asian security environment is in flux, and an era of strategic quiescence in Southeast Asia may be drawing to a close. Security trends there are increasingly being shaped by a set of global and broader Asian concerns as well as local ones. The growing Asian great powers are eroding the old sub-regional boundaries between Northeast and Southeast Asia. In consequence, traditional patterns of strategic influence and cooperation are shifting in Southeast Asia.

In this paper, Professor Carl Thayer from the Australian Defence Force Academy ‘unpacks’ four patterns of strategic influence in the region, assessing the interactions between them and what they mean for Australian strategic interests. Those patterns increasingly overlay in new and complex ways, ways that might undermine the stable, consultative Southeast Asia with which we have become so familiar.

What can Australia do? It is likely to face a new Southeast Asian security environment in future, one marked by more great-power intrusion and competition. In consequence, Australia must anticipate a future where it can no longer afford to take for granted a largely benign local strategic environment. Over the next five to ten years, we are likely to become much more involved with strategic developments in Southeast Asia, working where we can to reinforce patterns that best serve our interests. That would include working to enhance practical multilateral security cooperation where we can, encouraging and supporting a larger US role in the region where we can, and building hard-power strategic links of our own to regional partners to bolster Southeast Asia’s own strategic weight. We should be exploring opportunities for closer strategic partnerships with key Southeast Asian states, and be willing to invest the time, attention and resources that it will take to turn those partnerships into genuine strategic assets.