This month’s Conflict Trends report coincides with the publication of Version 3 of the ACLED dataset, covering all African countries from 1997 to December 2012 inclusive. The most recently published data includes not only all real-time monthly data from 2012, but also a systematic revision of historical data in line with ACLED’s continued efforts to deliver the most comprehensive, reliable and accessible conflict data available. Data is published online at www.acleddata.com. In addition to new and revised data, ACLED has also launched new dynamic and static maps for data visualisation, as well as new graphics to highlight key trends over the course of the dataset’s fifteen year coverage. All data, maps, graphics and analysis are available at www.acleddata.com.

This Conflict Trends report provides an overview of developments in 2012 and recent trends in historical perspective. We provide an overview of continental trends, and a focused review of conflict in the past year in the top ten most conflict-affected countries in Africa: Somalia, South Africa, Nigeria, DR-Congo, Sudan, Egypt, Kenya, Tunisia, Libya and Algeria. Figure 1, below, shows the overall level of conflict events and associated reported fatalities in these countries over the course of 2012.

The map (above, right) shows those countries in which conflict levels improved, deteriorated or remained unchanged in 2012 from the previous year. Note that while conflict levels improved in Libya in 2012, this remains among the most violent countries on the continent this year.
2012 was the most violent year to date in ACLED records. There were absolute increases in event levels for all event types with the exception of battles in which rebels overtook territory. Proportionally, the greatest increase was in Riots and Protests, which constituted 36.9% of all events in 2012, up from 26.8% in 2011, and 18.9% in 2010.

There was a significant drop in battles, now constituting 31.9% of all violent events, down from 41.3% in 2011, and 42.7% in 2010. Levels of violence against civilians remain almost unchanged at 31.3% in 2012 (compared with 31.9% in 2011), but are significantly down from 2010, when such events constituted 38.4% of all violent conflict.

Table 1 lists the top five countries in various categories of events, fatalities and event types for the last three years of ACLED data.
If President Kabila is a student of recent Congo history, he must be thinking that the events of the past year are a prelude to him being replaced by an equally unreliable leader. The biggest story of the year was the M-23 movement taking Goma, backed by both Rwandan and Ugandan governments. It must be upsetting to Kabila to be the leader of one of the largest African states, and yet not have any control over what occurs therein. What was most worrying about the fall of Goma was the realization that not only was Kabila incapable of dealing with this threat, but his military, formed from various rebel and militia factions, has not coalesced into a national force.

That said, the military did combat over twenty-seven discrete armed groups in the past year, highlighting the scale of the challenge they face. Despite the M-23 movement catching most attention, 2012 was a year of substantive threat and a rising violence total throughout the state. It is the result of changes that started in 2009, when the violence profile of the state began to be defined by both rebel and regional militia movements fighting the FARDC and civilians. However, in 2012 the number of active locations (251), the number of events (over 1000), and the number of violent actors (75+) heralds a difficult time for the state, especially the eastern region (see Figure 2).

The Kivus are, as usual, the crucible of trouble. The M-23 is the dominant group therein and their activity has included typical fighting between the military and attacks on civilians, but also dealing with the many militias of the region. The dominant militias are the Mayi-Mayi, who now number fifteen different organizations led by various local/regional leaders. They are fighting the M-23, the military, each other, and the FDLR.

What is interesting about this particular time is that the government is fighting a rebel force whose demands cannot be met (e.g. autonomy in military or secession) but must be overcome for the sovereignty and legitimacy of the state. Yet the country’s military all but guarantees that will not occur. This precarious position is similar to recent periods (1999, 2002, 2009) when the state faced a large increase in violence, however there is almost no overlap between the groups active in 2009/2012 and those of earlier years. Further, despite the same regions being under threat, the sublocations of recent conflict concentrate on Masisi and Walikale, areas which were not hotspots of earlier conflict. Perhaps most critical is that the earlier years were dominated by rebel groups who leaders could be co-opted. During this period, the groups have splintered and fractured, their aims are rarely national but concentrated on regional autonomy or dominance, and the instability is beneficial to outside powers intent on determining the future of the Congo.

Figure 2: Distinct Count of Actors, Number of Records, and Reported Fatalities, DR-Congo, 1997 - 2012.
Kenya witnessed a very sharp increase in violence in 2012 over previous years, with three distinct and yet interrelated crises. Continued engagement in Somalia had repercussions in both the North-East, where several attacks on security forces and more sporadic attacks on civilian targets took place, and in the capital, Nairobi, where low-tech attacks civilians in crowded transport hubs and nightspots revealed the devastating impact of soft-target hits. Whether these attacks were primarily carried out by Al Shabaab forces or ideologically aligned but formally unaffiliated operatives is significant. Al Shabaab is on the run in Southern Somalia, and its operational viability will depend on its ability to expand into new territory and recruit successfully. By contrast, if many of the attacks attributed to unidentified armed groups were in fact carried out by aligned but unaffiliated operatives, the danger such factions pose may be increasingly unrelated - or even inversely related - to Al Shabaab’s losses in Somalia, as the threat of home-grown, violent Islamist factions within Kenya increases.

Relatedly, 2012 was the year the Coastal Province became a focal point for security discussions, with the legalisation of the secessionist Mombasa Republican Council, and several incidents of violent Islamist activity and Muslim-dominated communal rioting. The Coast now witnesses 22.9% of all violent conflict in Kenya - not a major increase on 21.9% in 2011, but up very significantly from 2009 when it accounted for only 6.8%, a level which was normal for almost a decade prior to this. The government will be hoping ties between violent Islamist groups, disaffected Muslim organisations and the secessionist-focused Mombasa Republican Council are not strengthened further, as an explosive mix of perceived Coastal marginalisation, targeting of Muslim populations, and land disputes issues in the province cut across all three groups. What remains to be seen is how these grievances will be channelled, particularly in the run-up to this year’s elections. As one MRC member reported recently, ‘But every politician we have sent to Nairobi over the last fifty years gets bought as soon as they arrive. Nothing can be achieved in parliament.’ (African Arguments, 11 Jan 2013)

On the subject of elections, the third crisis which Kenya witnessed involved communal clashes in the Tana River area most notably, but also in Baragoi. Communal militia violence against civilians is the third largest interaction category in the Kenya data, at 13.1% in 2012, up from 9.6% in 2011 and 5.74% in 2010 (see Figure 3). It is
also the most fatal interaction dyad, accounting for 40.9% of overall fatalities, up slightly from 38.3% in 2011. State forces engaging with communal militias is the second most fatal dyad, at 12%, up from 3.2% the previous year. The uncharacteristically brutal nature of the attacks in the Tana River area, along with concerns that the violence is linked to electoral preparations, drew more attention to the issue than usual. However, while 2012 certainly witnessed an increase in this type of violence, it is by no means out of line with general trends which attest to the chronic, unrelenting and largely unaddressed crisis of communal violence in Nigeria. The typical government response of deploying the quasi-paramilitary General Service Unit, and engaging in disarmament campaigns, do little to address proximate and structural drivers of such violence, including weak state capacity in rural areas, poor infrastructure and access, lack of trust in security services, and land tenure and access issues inflamed by the process of constitutional devolution currently under way.

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Nigeria witnessed a very sharp increase in violence levels in 2012, making this year the most violent on record for the country. There was an enormous increase in associated reported fatalities, as well, more than doubling from 1,055 in 2011 to 2,988 in 2012. In spite of this overall increase, the level of average fatalities associated with a conflict event dropped slightly to 3.3, and remained below the average for the years 1997 - 2011 (which remains elevated at 4.7).

2012 was ushered in by a wave of violent protests over the government’s decision to reduce fuel subsidies, a stance President Jonathan withdrew from following violent demonstrations. This contributed to the single largest proportional increase in activity type witnessed in Nigeria, in which Riots and Protests increased to 21.7% of overall violent activity, from 18.2% in 2011. The intensity of public outrage over the attempted de-regulation, and the speed at which the President capitulated, appeared to confirm that while the deeply divided country faces an escalating Islamist insurgency in the north, and the sporadic re-hashing of its long-running (and hard-won) conflict in the oil-producing region, these are largely compartmentalised conflicts, which the general populace may see as geographically - or at least contextually - contained. President Jonathan - who in 2012 also declared himself ‘the most criticised president in the whole world’ (Vanguard, 28 Aug 2012) - capitulated only when a conflict was brought to the capital and other key urban areas.

Conflicts, such as those in Nigeria’s Northern and Niger Delta regions, are often spatially contained, affecting a limited portion of a country’s entire territory. However, this containment has two implications: the first, which is significant in a federalised country such as Nigeria, is the effect on how populations conceive of themselves as a country and population, sharing in the same challenges and victories. The second, is that it is all the more dramatic a rupture for populations in conflict-affected countries when those engaged in political violence in certain territories decide to expand the scope of their operations. The extent of this spatial distinctiveness is reflected in the state-level maps reproduced in Figure 4, which display all violent events, violence against civilians in particular, and reported fatality levels across the country.

Meanwhile, despite a series of high-profile arrests of several senior Boko Haram operatives, and reports of potential peace talks between Boko Haram and the federal government, the group has continued in its campaign of targeted killings of security and political figures, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians throughout the Northern region. The group has an extremely high fatality rate when compared with other violent groups in the dataset, averaging 5.6 fatalities per event. When we look at violence against civilians only, this remains elevated at 5.3 average fatalities per event. It is interesting to reflect on the historic trajectory of Boko Haram’s engagement with civilians: in 2009 and early 2010, its attacks on civilians were primarily concentrated on security service or political officials in a civilian capacity (in their homes, off-duty, or retired), largely in keeping with their focus on engaging security services they saw as responsible for the death of their leader, Mohammed Yusuf. Mid- to late-2010 saw a gradual redefinition of the terms of their engagement with civilians - increasingly targeting traditional leaders, and followers of what the group alleged were heretical Islamic sects, before escalating into high-profile attacks on Christian groups as well as wider Muslim populations. This escalation can be tracked in ACLED data, but more research is required to investigate the processes - ideological, strategic, organisational and otherwise - by which the group came to this redefinition of legitimate targets and enemies.
North African states, including Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, had a rocky year following a transformative Arab spring. The most political violence occurred in Egypt and Tunisia; both countries are hosting very active rioting and protesting groups challenging the central regimes. However, Libya is the least stable, as it experienced the most battles between armed factions and violence against civilians. Both Algeria and Morocco has stable rates from 2011 to 2012, both counties attempted liberalization in response to the Arab Spring and neither experienced regime replacement (see Figure 5).

As a proportion of violent activity across time and countries, Egypt and Libya are the new trouble areas. Algeria’s problems dominated North Africa for fifteen years, and it has experienced many of the issues that plague its recently reformed neighbors, including hosting active Islamist political parties and transnational rebels. The events of 2012 and January 2013 underscore how intractable both problems are for Algeria, and are likely to continue for the rest of North Africa. There is little sign of peace ahead (see Figure 6).

Of particular concern to old and new regimes is the conduct of the security services in bolstering state power. In all states barring Libya, state security services have become far more active, despite the area’s dominance of civic rioting and protesting as the main type of politically violent activity. In Algeria, despite a stable occurrence of violent events, there has been more than a doubling of state security involvement. This is also the case for Egypt, although the military’s inaction in 2011 allowed for the Mubarak regime to fall. In Libya, there has been a four-fold decline in state security involvement, which may indicate issues in creating a functioning national military from the ashes of the Gaddafi regime.

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**North Africa**

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Egypt: Constitutional Crisis

Egypt’s turbulent year can largely be blamed on the actions of President Morsi. From his bombastic claim that he would fix the economy within 100 days of his inauguration, to his claiming of significant military powers in August, to his attempted reversal of reforms through dubious late constitution re-writing and a suspension of powers for all branches barring the executive in November; he has consistently acted as though the democratic revolution was in name only. However, the Brotherhood is frequently reminded by civic protests that he and his party do not dominate the public.

Cairo and the Sinai are the main hotbeds of conflict, although the main actors vacillated throughout the year from Islamist political parties in combat with military forces to the activity of the Bedouin. The actions and fatalities of the past year vacillated considerably, but deaths decreased towards the end of the year as protesters dominated the political space (see Figure 7). However, there is a worry that political differences in Egypt...
are set to be expressed through violence, as the regime continues to limit access to legitimate public opposition. The March 2013 election could prove decisive in how Morsi deals with challenges to his power.

**Libya: Internal and External Problems**

Despite improvements, Libya rivals Algeria in armed attacks between militants, and surpasses it in violence against civilians. This clearly indicates that there are many significant challenges to the inexperienced, new regime as the general congress and interim government are both being tested. Internal threats emanate from the fifteen plus communal militias seeking to hold onto local power by fighting each other and the security forces. This is due in part to disagreements over the up-coming constitution- militias are being used to encourage maximum regional autonomy. In addition, over seven active militias are combating government forces directly in an attempt to de-stabilize the regime. These latter groups are coordinating with regional threats- including al Qaeda- to position Libya as a fertile area for Islamist threats to organize, recruit and launch attacks from. A review of the number of groups, their action totals and fatalities is summarized for 2012 in Figure 8.

**Somalia**

2012 saw a further increase in violent activity in Somalia, after already relatively elevated levels of conflict in 2010 and 2011. Fatality levels also increased on 2011 (at 1.74 average fatalities per event, compared to 1.66 the previous year), but remained below their 2010 peak (3.21), during which time widespread shelling of residential areas in Mogadishu was employed to drive Al Shabaab out of the capital.

The largest proportional increases were, predictably, in battles in which government forces regained territory, and perhaps less predictably, in violence against civilians. As Federal Government and allied forces’ gains continued apace over the course of the year, Al Shabaab withdrew from one former stronghold to the next, establishing its current base of operations in the relatively unimportant town of Jilib, after the fall of Kismayo. The process of territorial transfer has immediate implications for civilian vulnerability and protection beyond the mid- to longer-term outcome of the Federal Government’s campaign against Al Shabaab. The violent Islamist group has, perhaps surprisingly, a relatively low level of violence against civilians in the territories it controls. However, rates of attacks against civilians increase in a targeted way in advance of challenges to the group’s territorial control, and in a relatively indiscriminate way through suicide and grenade attacks on crowded civilian areas in territory which had been recently seized.

**Rates of Al Shabaab attacks against civilians increased in a targeted way in advance of challenges to the group’s territorial control, and in a relatively indiscriminate way in territory which had been recently seized.**

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**Figure 8: Actor Count, Events and Reported Fatalities, Libya, 2012.**
which has recently been seized from the group. That the group would target civilians it suspects of spying or collaboration in advance of challenges by government forces is expected from an organisation which has sought to exert almost total control over civilian daily life. That operatives continue to be able to inflict serious harm on civilian and security targets after losing territory is significant in what it tells us about a) Al Shabaab’s evolving modalities of violence as it becomes increasingly comfortable using guerrilla-style tactics with its dwindling resources; b) its sustained organisational viability in spite of claims by optimists it is only a matter of time before it is routed from Somalia completely; and c) about the capacity of the Federal Government, allied forces and proxy interim regimes to establish security and rule of law in recently seized territory.

The continued viability of Al Shabaab will depend increasingly on the success of the Federal Government to ensure the security of civilians: without this, the same populations who find themselves victims of Al Shabaab attacks may find themselves questioning the legitimacy and capacity of the proxy regimes who claim to have liberated them from this threat.

Figure 9 maps Al Shabaab activity - including non-violent conflict events such as recruitment, establishment of bases and headquarters - by region, from 2008 - 2012. The maps show a clear intensification of conflict in Southern Somalia with the Kenyan incursion from the South and the Federal Government and allied forces pushing from Mogadishu outwards.

They also show a clear spread northwards to Puntland in particular, where limited government capacity, in addition to several pre-existing militia group threats may provide Al Shabaab with an opportunity to regroup, recruit and establish itself. One possibility in 2013 is that the group will benefit from tensions between the semi-autonomous region and the Federal Government, which would likely find it very difficult to pursue the group northward.

In other developments, communal violence continues to constitute a significant share of overall conflict, at 5.8% of events. Riots and Protests also increased in 2012, and were highest in the Somaliland regions and Banaadir.
South Africa’s recent political drama has reinforced the interpretation that the country’s governing elites are locked in an internal soap opera in which the problems of the country do not feature.

Rioting and protesting are equally and very frequent in contemporary South Africa and appear to be the public reaction of choice. Riots and protests are common throughout the state and widespread—over 300 locations had one or both in 2012 (see Figure 10). These are not just labor reactions, although considerable fatalities resulted from attacks at Lonmin mines in Marikana during the summer. Discontent is both more widespread and more diffuse than can be attributed to labor relations alone. Riots and protests constituted over 80% of all violent conflict events in South Africa in 2012, with absolute levels of rioting and protesting peaking in October and November. Rioting - distinguished from protesting by the use of violence by participants - was slightly less common than non-violent protesting, the former constituting 32.5% of overall conflict events in 2012 and the latter accounting for 33.7%.

Frustration with governance is at an all time high, with 16 million South Africans on some form of welfare, limited economic growth and a perception that politicians are far removed from common problems. Combined with the vigilante attacks— which largely stem from local reactions to widespread social problems, poor service provision, and limited public security - South Africa is experiencing widespread instability on several scales.

Violent conflict activity was highest in Western Cape province, followed by Gauteng and Eastern Cape. In general, South Africa has considerably fewer average fatalities per event than the other top ten most violent countries in the dataset, at just 0.31.

The violence of the summer was overshadowed by the leadup to the ANC leadership struggle in December. There are over ten separate armed factions of political organizations active in South Africa, the most active are ANC-Zuma supporters and ANC-Motlanthe. Both fought each other (without fatalities) in the latter part of 2012. The end result was Zuma retained his position, although it comes at a hefty price of promised patronage to elites from various districts. Although the election is not scheduled until 2014, fighting within and between elite ranks is likely to continue and disperse throughout the state.
Violent conflict events increased in 2012 for both Sudan and South Sudan, but much more considerably in the former, owing to a wave of decentralised, disaggregated protests which took place across the country over the course of the summer (see Figure 11). While fatality levels were roughly comparable in the two countries in 2011, in 2012 Sudan’s fatality rates arising from conflict far outweighed those of its Southern neighbour, at over 2,300 to 895. This extremely high rate is by Sudan’s devastating bombing campaign against the SPLA-North in the Nuba Mountains, where in May evidence of the use of cluster bombs was uncovered.

Nevertheless, violence against civilians accounts for proportionally higher rates of fatalities in South Sudan, constituting over 30% of overall conflict fatalities, in a country all assessments concluded this year had little to celebrate on the first anniversary of its independence.

In South Sudan, communal violence against civilians continues to account for a large share of overall violence, at 10.8% of all conflict events, and state responses to the problem have been accompanied by accusations of violence against civilians, human rights abuses and extra-judicial killings.

Zimbabwe’s overall violence in 2012 has returned to non-election year rates; indeed, the pattern of violence in the past year closely resembled that of 2007. With an election possible for June 2013, the comparison between 2007 and 2012 is apt; and while the variation by month and the characteristics of the violence are similar, there are important differences. In 2012 the number of active militias have doubled, as have the locations in which violence is actively occurring. The usual suspects - Central Intelligence, Military and Police forces, ZANU-PF, ZNLWVA (War Veterans Association), MDC, Rioters, Protesters and scattered unidentified groups continued activity, while new militias included ‘Al Shabab’, ‘Chicangano’, MDC splinters and vigilante groups. The intense instability of the past four years is largely due to government forces, in order to assure that 2008’s catastrophe is not repeated.

While police forces were far less active in 2012, the military forces have focused on civilians, and both are the main threat against civilians in Zimbabwe, followed by ZANU-PF militias. Figure 12 shows the main actors in Zimbabwe’s election violence in both years.

However there are additional problems: the possible succession fight within ZANU-PF is likely to blame for the rise in new locations, as successors try to keep regional militias in line. However, ZANU-PF is still in a strong position as both MDC factions face declining popularity, and the ‘missing’ recent diamond wealth is believed to be funneled into ZANU-PF election coffers. Nonetheless, the contest is predicted to be close, and hence potentially violent. Over the next few months, prepare for violent groups operating in order to assure specific voting returns before the election starts.
ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset) is the most comprehensive public collection of political violence data for developing states. These data contain information on the specific dates and locations of political violence, the types of event, the groups involved, fatalities and changes in territorial control. As of early 2013, ACLED has recorded over 75,000 individual events. In the recently launched Version 3, ACLED has coded over 65,000 conflict events which took place in Africa between 1997 - 2012 inclusive.

The data have the following breakdown: 40% are battles between armed actors; 34% are events in which civilians are directly targeted and harmed; 18% are riots and protests; and 7.5% is non-violent activity including armed group recruitment, high-profile arrests, troop movements or the establishment of bases or headquarters.

ACLED collects real-time data on a monthly basis for select high-risk states in Africa. Real-time data is available via the Climate Change and African Political Stability (CCAPS) website, and is published in ACLED format with each new version of the dataset.

The information in this issue of ACLED Conflict Trends was compiled from a variety of sources, including ACLED data, compiled from news reports; NGO reports, and Africa-focused news reports. Citations refer to African Confidential (AfCon); Agence France Presse (AFP); Reuters News Service; BBC News; African Arguments; and various national news media outlets.

Further information on sources of data, coding practices and archived data from ACLED Versions 2 (1997 - 2011) and 1 (1997 - 2009/2010) can be found online at www.acleddata.com/data. Back-dated issues of Conflict Trends, in addition to ACLED working papers, and academic research can be found at http://www.acleddata.com/research-and-publications/.

Figure 12: Conflict Actors as a Proportion of Overall Conflict Records, Zimbabwe, 2007 and 2012.

About the Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset