Table of Contents:

Articles

Illicit Drugs and Insurgency in Afghanistan .................................................................4
by Ekaterina Stepanova

Mapping Contemporary Terrorism Courses at Top-Ranked National Universities and Liberal Arts Colleges in the United States .................19
by Ivan Sascha Sheehan

Taking on the Persona of a Suicide Bomber: a Thought Experiment ......51
by Anne Speckhard, Beatrice Jacuch & Valentijn Vanrompay

Terrorism Bookshelf: Top 150 Books on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism........................................................................................................74
Selected and reviewed by Joshua Sinai

Resources

Illicit Radiological and Nuclear Trafficking, Smuggling and Security Incidents in the Black Sea Region since the Fall of the Iron Curtain – an Open Source Inventory .................................................................117
by Alex P. Schmid & Charlotte Spencer-Smith

The Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism ....................158
by Alex P. Schmid

Bibliography: Literature on Terrorism in History .................................................160
Compiled and selected by Eric Price

Book Reviews

Beatrice de Graaf. Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance. ............181
Reviewed by Martha Crenshaw

Mitchell D. Silber. The Al-Qaeda Factor: Plots Against the West ..........183
Reviewed by Richard Phelps.
Michelle Shephard. Decade of Fear: Reporting from Terrorism's Grey Zone

Reviewed by Richard Phelps.

Jeevan Deol and Zeheer Kazmi (Eds). Contextualising Jihadi Thought.

Reviewed by Richard Phelps

News from TRI's National Networks of PhD Theses Writers

About Perspectives on Terrorism
Articles

Illicit Drugs and Insurgency in Afghanistan
by Ekaterina Stepanova

Abstract
It is argued that the relationship between illicit drugs and the insurgency in Afghanistan cannot be captured by the simplistic concept of “narco-terrorism”. Rather, it has to be seen in terms of linkages of various types and degrees between two distinct phenomena. Drug trafficking may generate criminal violence in both peacetime and conflict settings. In the latter case, the illicit drug business becomes a “conflict resource”, while also serving shadow economic functions (such as serving as a social-economic coping strategy to peasants in some areas) and generating organized criminal violence and street delinquency. Organized crime groups play the main role in the illicit drug business, especially at the higher, internationalized levels of the drug chain. Drug profits are in fact lowest in the drug producing areas themselves. In the case of Afghanistan, only 4.3 per cent (or US $2.9 billion) of the US $60 billion average annual volume of the global market for Afghan opiates remain in the country. Of the proceeds that stay in Afghanistan, the author estimates that no more than between US $100-150 million probably went to the Taliban in 2011. The US/NATO war on the Taliban has not significantly reduced Afghanistan’s opium economy. The prospects for achieving significant results in counter-narcotics after the US/NATO withdrawal in 2014 are dim unless major armed conflict comes to an end – a goal likely to be achieved only if Afghanistan is decentralized and regionalized and the Taliban is given a regional role in Pashtu parts of the country whereby tougher counter-narcotics provisions should be a negotiable demand/condition for any configuration of talks with the insurgents on the political settlement.

Introduction
At the peak of the U.S. and NATO military intervention and security presence in Afghanistan, in line with the discourse of the “global war on terrorism”, the Taliban-led Islamist insurgency was routinely and fully identified with (a) terrorism and (b) illicit drugs. However, degrading the Afghan insurgency to “narco-terrorism” has become increasingly problematic as, by the end of 2014, much of direct Western security involvement in Afghanistan is about to be wrapped up, leaving behind malfunctioning governance, mounting insurgency, deteriorating security and ever spreading corruption.

As the Barack Obama administration, under growing financial pressures, came to realize the lack of political and counterinsurgency progress in Afghanistan, it started to push more actively for the end of the U.S. military presence in its current form, to be completed in 2014. Even as the U.S.-Afghan treaty signed in May 2012 confirms that some U.S. forces and several military bases will stay in Afghanistan after 2014, it is clear that the United States and NATO are determined to lay down a significant share of responsibility for security that they had assumed in
the aftermath of the 2001 intervention into Afghanistan. Military withdrawal amidst unabated violence has to be accompanied by moves towards some form of political settlement. The political process, in turn – whether it aims at a genuine peace settlement or is more of a face-saving political cover-up of the U.S./NATO hasty retreat – requires direct involvement from the very same insurgents who have so long been blacklisted as “narco-terrorists”.

Apart from the political requirements of the moment, degrading the Afghan Taliban to “narco-terrorists” appears problematic, both in substantive terms and from the point of formal logic. First, the concept of “narco-terrorism” extends the notion of “terrorism” to apply to all militancy and all means of armed struggle, including those that have little to do with terrorism (e.g., direct combat-style confrontation between insurgents and government forces). Second, “narco-terrorism” implies a merger of drugs and terrorism, whereas the relationship is more accurately described in terms of linkages of various types and degrees between two distinct phenomena.

Militant groups with explicit socio-political, religious, ideological agendas include groups that combine guerrilla attacks against military targets with terrorist means in their tactical arsenal. Any such group may also use revenues from taxing illicit crop cultivation, production and trade as one of its several sources of funding.[1] These linkages are the strongest and most typical in armed conflicts in the world’s major drug-producing areas (such as Afghanistan) and in many “gray areas” along the main trafficking routes, such as the Balkan and the Northern routes of trafficking of the Afghan opiates (to Europe and Russia, respectively).

For the Taliban, terrorism has become one of several violent tactics, along with guerrilla-style attacks against U.S., NATO and the Afghan government security and military targets. Drug revenues, in turn, comprise just part of the insurgency’s diversified financial system. Consequently, attempts to exclusively tie a specific violent tactic to one select source of funding and then to make this link absolute as some fixed and inseparable phenomenon are problematic.

The quick resurgence and the exponential growth of the opium economy in post-Taliban Afghanistan continues to pose a major challenge at the regional and international level. Afghan opiates directly threaten human security in many countries, starting from Afghanistan itself and its immediate neighbors (especially Iran) to more distant end-markets such as Russia that has emerged as the world’s largest consumer market for Afghan heroin.[2] As the end of the U.S./NATO large-scale security presence and counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan is approaching, the complex links between drugs and militancy in Afghanistan, as well as the general ways to reduce violence and the opium economy in Afghanistan, need to be re-examined.

I. Background: Illicit Drugs, Conflict and Terrorism

The illicit drug business may be linked to armed violence in two main ways. First, the drug business may itself generate criminal violence, in both peacetime and conflict settings. Illicit narcotics business feeds street violence, especially in overpopulated urban areas. Larger traffickers have armed guards or hire armed groups to protect them, sometimes amounting to private mini-armies. These criminal armies attack police and other security forces, engage in violent turf wars among themselves and resort to violence against civilians. The most intense forms of such criminal violence are:
• escalation of trafficking-related cross-border violence, especially along the borders between major source countries and transit states (the Afghan-Tajik, Afghan-Iranian, Myanmar-Thai or Colombian-Venezuelan borders);

• major campaigns of organized criminal and anti-crime violence that involve combat-style fighting across the country (such as trafficking-related violence in Mexico). This trafficking-related violence may be comparable to – or may even outmatch in scale and intensity – “classic” armed conflicts over issues such as political control of territory or government.

Second, in areas of armed conflicts over government or territory, the illicit drug business, in addition to serving its main shadow economic functions, generating organized criminal violence and street delinquency, also becomes a major “conflict resource”. Most commonly, it serves as a direct source of funding for non-state combatants who are generally more constrained than state actors in their access to the formal economy and who tend to rely on shadow economic activity for funding.

Armed non-state actors in conflict with the state (such as the Taliban in Afghanistan throughout the 2000s, the Mong Thai Army in Myanmar until the mid-1990s or FARC in Colombia) are distinct – and should be distinguished – from organized crime, even if they use drug profits for funding and engage in illicit narcotics business. The main distinction is that these secular or religious militant actors also contest a declared political incompatibility over territory or government, whereas criminal groups generally do not. Still, non-state conflict actors are similar to organized crime groups in that they primarily operate within the informal economy.

Exceptions include insurgent’s overt or covert engagement in select forms of legal economic activity (e.g., cultivation of legal crops, such as wheat or coffee) or a specific mode of funding available to militant Islamist groups through transfer of religious funds originally collected for legitimate purposes as religious donations.

Involvement of non-state conflict actors in the illicit drug business is most strongly driven – or even predetermined – by a combination of

a) their main areas of operation and/or origin and

b) the comparative high profitability of the narcotics business, as compared to most other informal or formal sources of funding.

Indeed, the links between politico-military armed actors and the drug business are most profound in major drug-producing regions (e.g., the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Mong Thai Army in Myanmar or FARC in Colombia) and also in areas beyond stable state control along major trafficking routes. The comparatively high profitability of the drug business may even allow some of these militant groups to achieve financial self-sufficiency (e.g., FARC is the world’s largest supplier of coca paste and cocaine). Furthermore, in marginalized peripheries where most drug crops are grown, cash-generating income alternatives are scarce or absent. In these peripheral areas where militant non-state actors are often based or operate from involvement in narcotics-related activities in initial, down-the-chain forms (protection of cultivation, regulation of local prices, etc.) may become an additional source of population support and form part of a “hearts and minds” strategy for political-militant groups.
At the same time, it should be kept in mind that in areas where the links between drugs and conflict/militant actors are the closest – i.e. in major drug-producing areas – drug profits are, comparatively speaking, the lowest (!) as they comprise a relatively small, sometimes minuscule, proportion of the overall income and total value of the global narcotics market. For instance, US $ 2.6 billion of opium income that stayed in Afghanistan in 2011 (earned primarily by peasants and criminal traffickers) comprises no more than 4.3 per cent of the US $ 60 billion average annual volume of the global market for the Afghan opiates.[3] The highest profits in the illicit drug business are always made by those actors – almost exclusively professional criminal organizations – who control wholesale and retail/street distribution in consumer countries. However, while guerrilla movements based in drug producing countries are at the low end of the drug business chain and get a limited share of the overall profits, these revenues can still be significant in comparison with the relatively small size of the local/national economy (e.g., in Afghanistan).

Conflict actors engaged in the drug business range from leftist guerrillas to right-wing paramilitaries, from secular nationalists to Islamist militants. These actors may participate in different aspects of the drug business from the more typical informal taxation and protection of cultivation and regulation of the local trade and trafficking to some aspects of international trafficking and may even play a minor role in distribution in the main consumer countries. Conflict actors are also involved in different types of linkages – or stages in relationships – with organized crime groups who play the main role in illicit drug business, especially at the higher and the more internationalized levels of the drug chain. These different types of linkages sometimes overlap or are combined by the same group and may be categorized as follows:

- **Activity appropriation and limited cooperation** with professional crime groups. Most militant/terrorist actors in major drug-producing areas – and many such actors operating along major trafficking routes – have gone through this stage. Types of linkage may range from the most typical and widespread ones such as the arms-for-drugs barter trade to the more unorthodox ones (e.g., the service provided by the Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the form of LTTE-affiliated drug couriers on air flights);

- **Unlimited cooperation** (all the way up to forming a symbiotic relationship with professional traffickers / organized crime groups). This is stage that the Taliban movement in Afghanistan had reached in the second half of the 1990s – before the very strict and effective Taliban ban on poppy cultivation was enforced in 2000-2001 – and then again by the mid-2000s, as an active insurgent movement in need of funding and in control of territory in drug-producing areas. Other examples include most regional fronts of FARC in Colombia, up to the present day;

- **Merger with organized crime** (hybrid-type relationship). The best criterion to establish that an insurgent group has reached this stage of integration with the illicit drug business is when one can no longer discern whether its agenda and activity are dominated by political (religious, ideological) or profit-oriented motives and goals. This was the case with the Mong Thai Army – the largest insurgent and trafficking actor in Myanmar until a decisive crack-down by the government in 1996. Other
examples include several more heavily criminalized FARC fronts and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the late 1990s and early 2000s;

- **Full criminalization and political/ideological degradation** of an originally genuine social-political militant actor. This scenario tends to become more likely for groups engaged in protracted armed confrontations that reach a stalemate or gradually fade away. It is also one of the typical paths of many more radical, splinter groups that become spoilers at the stage of the ongoing – and lasting – peace process. Examples range from the “Abu Sayyaf” group in the Philippines (that originally split from a genuine Islamist/nationalist Moro liberation movement) to several post-IRA splinters and ex-militants of the Peruvian “Sendero Luminoso” who partake in control over distribution of *paco* (inexpensive drug made from cocaine mixed with amphetamines) in the slums of Buenos Aires.

Against this background, it is worth noting that while the Taliban in Afghanistan displays a relatively advanced stage of integration with drug trafficking, this radical Islamist movement has never reached the most advanced stages and **stopped short of a hybrid-type merger** with trafficking organizations. A number of other insurgent organizations have demonstrated closer integration into the drug business than the Taliban, i.e. a full merger with organized crime (when insurgent groups and the main drug entrepreneurs were identical and inseparable, as in the case of the Mong Thai Army) or even complete criminalization.

Even in the midst of an on-going armed conflict, the illicit drug business is never fully subordinated to the conflict needs or linked to insurgent/terrorist groups only. The drug business is rather apolitical in the sense that it tends to entangle all parties to a conflict, including – and often prioritizing – links to corrupt elements of the state at different levels of government. Pro-government and vigilante militias, select public officials or even some segments of the government, including segments of the security sector, maybe as deeply, if not deeper, involved in illicit drug business than the insurgents.

In conflict areas, the drug business plays a multifunctional role by:

- allowing criminal entrepreneurs to gain economic profit, with all related social-economic implications (such as corruption);
- playing an adaptive role as a social-economic coping and survival strategy and a major source of cash-generating income for the local population, especially in marginalized peripheries;
- serving as a source of funding for armed actors who also use drug revenues to directly finance the war effort, arms and other materiel purchases etc.

The multifunctional nature of the illicit drug business in conflict areas explains why the link between drugs and conflict-related violence (combat, terrorism, communal violence etc.) is not as linear as it may seem. Analysis of drugs and conflict-related violence as two exclusively interrelated factors in a closed self-regulatory system is thus untenable. Armed conflict may, for instance, serve as a catalyst for the expansion of the drug business (as it was the case during the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in 1979–1989). It may, however, also surge under improved security conditions – e.g., in areas under Taliban control in the mid-late 1990s.
In fact, the most critical link between armed conflict and the drug business may not even be the direct role of drug revenues as a source of war funding. Rather, it is the more general role of armed conflict and other conflict-related violence in weakening and undermining basic state capacity and functionality and preventing state access to insurgent-controlled areas where drug crops are concentrated or migrate to.

II. The Case of Afghanistan

Illicit Drugs and the Taliban

Afghanistan remains the theater of a major armed conflict and the largest security problem in the wider region at the intersection of the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia. While the country has also been the primary source of the global poppy cultivation and opiate production since the 1990s, its opiate output has grown exponentially since the toppling of the Taliban government by a U.S.-led intervention in 2001. In 2011, Afghanistan accounted for almost two thirds of the global poppy cultivation and for 82 per cent of global opium production.[4]

According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the area under poppy cultivation in the peak year of 2007 (193 000 ha) was more than 25 times larger than the low of 8,000 ha in 2001, when the strict Taliban ban on opium poppy cultivation was in force.[5] Following the historical peak year of 2007, the area under poppy cultivation temporarily decreased in 2008–2009, but even then it remained 35 per cent larger than that in the pre-2001 peak year of 1999. [6] Furthermore, in 2010 poppy cultivation and opium production stabilized and in 2011 started to rise again (reaching 131 000 ha and 5,800 mt, respectively).[7]

When the Taliban de facto came to power in Afghanistan in 1996, amidst bitter feuds among competing mujahedin factions, the country was already the well-established hub of the regional shadow economy. Adjusting themselves to the economic realities, the Taliban established a form of rentier state taxing formal and informal trade and collecting a 10 per cent post-harvest tax (ushr, or Islamic tithe) from all agricultural production, including poppy cultivation.[8] From the start, however, the Taliban repeatedly tried to limit opium cultivation in areas under their control – primarily on religious grounds. In addition, their revenues from taxing the region-wide smuggling of other goods were larger than those from opium cultivation; for example, in 1997 the Taliban collected US $75 million in revenues from taxing the regional trade in consumer goods, compared to just US $27 million from taxing poppy cultivation.[9] In other words, the Taliban could economically afford a total religious ban (haram) on poppy cultivation that they finally imposed on 27 June 2000.[10] The 2000 ban may have also been intended to avert further international sanctions that could have negatively impacted the Taliban’s income from taxation of other smuggled goods. Thus, a combination of market forces, political conditions and a strong religious imperative favored an opium cultivation ban.

As a result of the Taliban ban, in 2001 – the year of the U.S.-led post-9/11 intervention – the opium cultivation in Afghanistan had been reduced by 91 per cent. The main explanation for such an unprecedented result is that by 2000 the Taliban had emerged as a functional de facto state able to impose basic (sharia) law and order and to ensure that their decisions were implemented down to the local level (even if they interfered with informal markets dynamics or
social-economic needs of the segments of local population). No authority had managed to exercise functional governance in such a large part of the country since at least the 1970s, when a series of internationalized internal conflicts in Afghanistan began, nor has any authority since the 2001 foreign intervention.

In post-Taliban Afghanistan, in addition to disintegration of functional state capacity, the resulting power vacuum and the flawed and largely imported state-building experiment, three other factors contributed to the exponential growth of the opium economy. These factors are the principal drivers of Afghanistan’s multifunctional drug economy. First, opium production has served as a socio-economic adaptation strategy for peasants in a country dominated by informal economic activity and torn by decades of armed conflict. Second, the local trade in, and particularly the cross-border trafficking of, opiates offers a lucrative income for local traders, smuggling networks and power-brokers from warlords to corrupt government officials. Third, the illicit drug business has served as one of several sources of funding for the anti-U.S./NATO and anti-government insurgency (dominated by, but not confined to, the Taliban movement).

The annual value of the Taliban insurgency income from drug-related revenues in the 2000s – early 2010s – and the relative share of drug revenues in the Taliban’s overall funding – is extremely hard to estimate. This is even harder to do than to estimate the gross and net values of the opium economy in Afghanistan. Some of the earlier estimates provided by the UN (such as the annual US $ 200–400 million range in opium-related funds of armed groups for 2006–2007) did not differentiate between various warlords and insurgent groups.[11] Later UNODC estimates – for instance, for 2009 – put the Afghan Taliban income from opium at around US $ 155 million (in the range of US $ 140-170 million), as compared to US $2.2 billion income for Afghan traffickers alone.[12]

What most analysts agree upon is that the narcotics-related part of the insurgents’ income still primarily comes from 10 per cent post-harvest ushr levies on poppy-growing farmers. Depending on the region, to a greater or lesser extent, this income may also integrate protection fees on laboratory processing of opiates, transit fees on drug convoys, and taxation on imports of chemical precursors. This is the basis for the author’s estimate of the possible Taliban income from opium in 2011. If, according to the UNODC, the farm-gate value of opium production alone in 2011 was US $ 1,4 billion (or 9 per cent of Afghanistan’s GDP).[13] then the absolute maximum that could in principle be collected as ushr at farm-gate would be US $ 140 million. However, it is known that the cultivation tax has not been universally collected by the Taliban even in areas which they more or less control (e. g., in the south where 78 per cent of the total poppy cultivation took place). Also, significant part of the cultivation takes place in areas beyond the Taliban/insurgency presence (for instance, in the west of the country). In other words, the Taliban in principle would not be able to get more than 60–70 per cent of the maximum possible ushr from poppy harvest, or $84–98 million.

Furthermore, ushr from opium harvest is often reportedly divided equally between the local mullah and the Taliban or, in some villages, goes directly to a local mullah and not to the Taliban. [15] In addition to this form of contributing to local social and religious expenses, by protecting opium production, the Taliban insurgency is also is able to pose as the protector of general labor
employment: opium stands out among crops because it is very labor intensive (88 percent more labor intensive than wheat).

While at times the Taliban also manage to collect a higher zakat tax from the opiate trade, the latter is a far more erratic revenue – due to the highly mobile and elusive nature of trafficking networks that overlap with tribal networks and are not easy to “pin down” and tax. Even the UNODC concedes that anti-government elements like the Afghan Taliban are not usually directly involved in the opium trade.[16] By any account, this additional income is lower than what the insurgents get from taxing poppy cultivation in areas under their more or less stable control.

In sum, as estimated by the author of this article, by combining potential ushr payments on the harvest with some income from taxing opium trade, in 2011 the Taliban could probably get US $ 100–150 million in total annual opium-related funds. This estimate is close to other assessments that the Taliban can raise around US $ 100–200 million per year by taxing the opiate sector.[17] The US $ 100–150 million range makes up for just 3.4–5.2 per cent of the estimated net value of the opium economy inside Afghanistan in 2011 (US $ 2.9 billion). This makes the Taliban a minority beneficiary, by the Afghan standards, and a miniscule player compared to the total value of the global market in Afghan opiates (the latest UNODC estimate of which stood at US $ 60 billion in 2009).[18]

Various analyses also reveal an increasingly diversified financial system with several sources of funding available to the Taliban. These sources include levying regular Islamic taxes on property and licit economic activity, taxing gem smugglers across the Afghan-Pakistani border, donations from sympathizers in the Gulf states and support coming from non-state and state-affiliated actors in Pakistan, etc.[19]

The final reservation repeatedly stressed by the UNODC is that those who profit from the opium business in Afghanistan include “the broad range of profiteers, at home and abroad”, including purely criminal groups and officials at different levels of government.[20] The most solid available empirical studies of the dynamics of the Afghan opiate economy – the field-based analyses by the UK development expert David Mansfield and his international and Afghan colleagues – reveals a widespread perception in southern Afghanistan that corrupt officials, especially in the ranks of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the recently established local police, are no less, if not more, heavily involved in taxing the opiate trade than “anti-government elements”. The ANP are also generally blamed for illegal “taxes” and intimidation of farmers who travel by road. According to Mansfield, due to the widespread lack of trust in the security forces in the many contested areas, even the seizure of opium by the police is often seen as “theft” rather than law enforcement. Predation by authorities, including the ANP and especially the local police, is routinely reported by communities in conflict areas. They often compare unfavorably the low moral standards of government employees to those of the Taliban.[21]

United States, NATO and Counter-narcotics in Afghanistan

Although Afghan opiates have not directly threatened the United States, from 2001 onwards Washington has been the largest contributor to counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan, allocating about $2.9 billion in FYs 2001–2009. In 2009 the Obama Administration called for a
A major review of U.S. counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan (in March 2009, U.S. special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, even called the previously allocated funds “the most wasteful and ineffective program” he had “seen in forty years in and out of the government”). The revised policy formally moved away from the United States’ traditional heavy reliance on forced eradication and prioritized a combination of interdiction (stepped up drug seizures, targeting drug traders, cross-border traffickers and heroin laboratories) and alternative development measures, such as crop substitution.

United States’ counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan have always been strictly subordinated to the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. According to U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, Michael G. Vickers, the new counter-narcotics strategy was to focus on “going after those targets where there is a strong nexus between the insurgency and the narcotics trade, to deny resources to the Taliban”. In a country where drug profits are made by a wide range of the government-affiliated, anti-government and unaffiliated/criminal actors, linking counter-narcotics primarily or even exclusively to anti-Taliban counterinsurgency could partly be explained by the need to provide some “national interest” justification for increasing U.S. counter-narcotics support (especially as the United States is not directly threatened by Afghan-sourced opiates).

Some individual NATO member-states (such as the UK whose own domestic opiate markets are dominated by heroin and other opiates of Afghan origin) showed a more genuine interest in counter-narcotics in Afghanistan. However, NATO/ISAF’s direct support to actions against drug laboratories and traffickers was not even allowed until the Budapest NATO defense ministers’ decision in October 2008. Since then the ISAF has prioritized targeting only those trafficker who “provide material support to the insurgents”. It is only since 2009 that the ISAF started to execute select counter-narcotics tasks, mainly confined to assisting the Afghan authorities “through training, intelligence and logistics, and in-extremis support”. This restrained position of the European states reflects not only their fear to jeopardize ISAF troop security in Afghanistan by alienating influential local forces through stepped up counter-narcotics, but also more basic dynamics of Europe’s own drug markets and certain objective limitations of the alliance’s own internal transformation. While the EU/NATO member-states are among the main end-markets for Afghan opiates, heroin consumption in Europe has generally stabilized, illicit drug markets are becoming more diversified, and the growing inflows of cocaine from Latin America, especially through West Africa, are now seen as an equal, if not more urgent, challenge. This pattern does not allow European countries, both individually and collectively, to exclusively prioritize Afghanistan as the main “source country”. Nor has the process of NATO transformation and going out-of-area turned the alliance into an effective police force or development agency – the types of organization best suited for counter-narcotics efforts.

In sum, even at the peak of Western security presence in Afghanistan, the U.S. and its coalition partners’ interests and capabilities in the field of counter-narcotics and drug control have had a very limited, if not negligible, impact on Afghanistan’s deeply embedded opium economy. More generally, the U.S./NATO – and the weak Afghan government’s – failure to establish even basic security in the areas torn by drugs and conflict, including through helping build a form of functional and legitimate governance, has made any lasting success of the softer, longer-term development strategies such as crop substitution or generating alternative cash incomes very difficult.
As the withdrawal of the U.S. / NATO forces from Afghanistan progresses, the prospects for a significant and sustainable reduction in Afghanistan’s opium does not appear to be an achievable objective. However, a more adequate – and more fundamental – question to ask is whether even optimal, well-balanced and well-funded combination of development- and enforcement-oriented counter-narcotics and drug control strategies can ever succeed in Afghanistan as long as the state is unable to establish even a minimally functional governance and security presence in much of the country.

Conditions for a Reduction of the Opium Economy

Significant reduction of the drug economy, even in conflict-torn areas, is not an impossible task. It has been achieved before. There are, however, two main underlying conditions that need to be in place for any anti-narcotics measures to be effective and for any drug economy to be substantially weakened.

The first is a combination of regional and global market conditions favoring the decline of drug production in a particular region (even if this favorable combination is temporary and should rather be seen as a short-term “window of opportunity”). These conditions include the availability of formal or informal economic alternatives to opium (or coca) as a sustainable cash-based income (ranging from solid remittances, wage labor, high-profit licit export crops to region-wide smuggling and other types of profitable illicit activity). For instance, a significant decline of poppy cultivation in Myanmar between the mid-1990s and 2006 [28] was partly made possible by the parallel spike in regional production of synthetic drugs.[29] Another example is a temporary decline in poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2008–2009 that resulted mainly from a positive market correction towards a discernible shift to wheat cultivation amidst a global food crisis (rising wheat prices and growing food insecurity at the micro-level of peasant households).

The second – most important and indispensable – condition is the generally functional state capacity. This also implies state access to, and basically functioning governance in, the main drug-producing and trafficking areas. In this context, the sheer functionality of governance (including access to “problem” areas and the ability to establish relatively non-confrontational relations with the population) is more important that the exact type, origin, political or ideological orientation of a governance system. This capacity has been in place in Myanmar (including increased state access to formerly insurgent-dominated areas as a result of an effective peace process following sustained military pressure), Thailand over the past several decades and China. This capacity is absent in today’s Afghanistan.

A combination of these two fundamental conditions is decisive and more important than the exact selection of counter-narcotics and drug control measures or even the scale of foreign counter-narcotics assistance. No sustained decline in a drug-based economy has ever been achieved primarily as a result of foreign aid. In fact, quite the opposite appears to be true, i.e. countries that receive the largest foreign counter-narcotics aid have been chronically unable to significantly limit their drug output (Colombia since the 1990s and Afghanistan since the 2000s). In contrast, in the few cases when the deeply embedded drug economy was significantly reduced, it primarily resulted from actions by functional national authorities.
Peace First

In areas where the drug-based shadow economy is compounded by an ongoing protracted armed conflict coupled with a sustained terrorist campaign, counter-narcotics can only be one of several inter-related priorities, such as the need to find a lasting solution to an armed conflict, state-building, reconstruction, social-economic development, etc. In such settings, integrated ways of addressing drugs and conflict-terrorism should be found. But integrated solution in this case does not mean simultaneous solution. In practice, no state in conflict has ever succeeded in “having it both ways at the same time”: (a) to achieve a sharp decline in illicit drug production/trafficking and (b) to defeat or secure a stable ceasefire and lasting peace with insurgent groups who depend on the drug business as their major source of funding and who use drugs as a “hearts and minds” strategy to keep the support of the rural population.

In areas of drugs and conflict-related violence, the tasks of achieving basic security and fighting drugs cannot be solved at once: one of these tasks has to be to some extent – and temporarily – subordinated to another. The order of subordination is the following: security first, drug control next. This was exactly an approach taken by the Myanmar junta that first prioritized interim ceasefire agreements with the multiple insurgencies in drug-producing areas, followed by increased state access and security and then renegotiated settlements introducing much stricter counter-narcotics provisions. That strategy contributed to a decade-long decline in opium production between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s,[30] in combination with some other factors (such as China's threats to cut its support to some of the rebel groups in the Shan state of Myanmar if they continue to grow poppy and the parallel region-wide spike in synthetic drugs production).

In insecure areas affected by conflict and terrorism, tough counter-narcotics measures (such as massive forced/aerial eradication) are inefficient or even counterproductive, while all softer measures are difficult to implement due to insecurity and lack of state access or recognized governance in these areas. All softer measures (voluntary eradication, crop substitution, alternative development) can work only (a) if they are a part of broader strategy of rural development and (b) on condition of a non-confrontational attitude of the population (which has been more or less in place in Bolivia and Thailand). None of these conditions can be met in the midst of an ongoing protracted armed confrontation, especially one that involves a foreign intervention.

In an on-going armed conflict, with no stable or functional governance in place in contested areas, neither tough, nor soft counter-narcotics measures will work. In such settings, neither a law enforcement nor a developmental solution is feasible. The only solution is to end the conflict – or at least to qualitatively degrade the level of armed violence – either by force or through a peace process. This is the main precondition for ensuring minimal functional governance in areas of concern. This, in turn, is the most fundamental condition for any progress in counter-narcotics and drug control.

In the Afghanistan context, the “security first, drugs next” thesis has long been interpreted by Western analysts as “war/counterinsurgency first, drugs next”.[31] For others, including the author of this article, this appears to be an improbable scenario, given the protracted
asymmetrical stalemate between technologically superior foreign forces (supporting a weak and dysfunctional Afghan government) and the determined resistance centered on the Taliban. In Afghanistan, where heavier foreign military footprint had always only stimulated stronger resistance, the insurgency had no chances to be decimated by a foreign-dominated counterinsurgency campaign even at the peak of the U.S. and NATO military presence. In the wake of the speeded-up withdrawal of U.S. forces, the “peace through counter-insurgency” option is not even worth consideration. The situation has long reached the point where continuing armed confrontation between the main protagonists is the main factor that impedes the emergence of a degree of stable functional governance in areas affected by both drugs and conflict.

If “peace (through counterinsurgency) first, drugs next” is not an option, what is an option? In theory, “security first, drug control next” may also mean “peace process first, drug control next”. As applied to Afghanistan, “peace” is, of course, a relative notion that falls short of “end to all armed violence”; rather it implies only an end of a “major armed conflict”. Still, there is no way to achieve an even relative peace without a new political settlement for Afghanistan.

**In Lieu of a Conclusion: What Kind of Peace?**

The nature of the political settlement that may involve the Taliban is a highly contentious matter that combines intra-Afghan, regional and broad international dimensions and remains an open question. This issue is addressed in more detail in other publications.[32] Still, even the best-intentioned peace plans [33] concede that the Taliban can in principle be integrated into the present, heavily centralized and relatively secularized civil governance system, with a strong presidential role, appear to be based more on wishful thinking than present realities on the ground in Afghanistan.

Throughout the 2000s – early 2010s, the Taliban have evolved not just as an active insurgency, but also as an adjusted alternative system of governance and sharia-based law and order. In significant parts of the south-east, this system became more functional than the foreign/government-affiliated structures. This is also a result of a certain ideological and organizational evolution of the movement since its demise in 2001-2002. Compared to the Taliban years in power (1996–2001), its present ideological goals have become simpler and broader and boil down to two primary objectives – “true Islam” and “get the foreigners out” – that appeal to many Afghans. It would seem that the insurgency’s interests do not extend beyond the Afghan-Pakistani arena. Moreover, it does not appear that the Taliban has an interest in retaking Kabul or regaining control of the central government. They seem to have concentrated on consolidating their presence and control in the Pashtu countryside. While the overall insurgency is broader than the Taliban, as noted by field-based analysts, the Taliban themselves appear as a more consolidated and coherent organization than many would like to believe; it has also managed to avoid serious internal splits. In addition to military commanders, it also includes provincial governors and the political commission.[34]

The movement’s major moral, administrative and law and order resource is its organic link to the network of sharia courts. The Taliban sometimes establish executive committees to execute the courts’ decisions and oversight commissions to guarantee court impartiality and fight corruption.
The insurgents do not only directly impose their order “from above”, but also actively draw upon the preexisting village, tribal and religious authorities. For instance, local village water masters may collect tax payments on land and sometimes also the opium post-harvest ushr on behalf of the Taliban. Local mullahs are often the end beneficiaries of the ushr, while the Taliban are granted an opportunity to speak to worshipers during Friday prayers. They also effectively punish those who ignore their ban on working for the government or accepting foreign/government assistance.[35]

In sum, while a political settlement requires some form of Taliban involvement, the latter brings with it a pre-existing, alternative shadow governance system that is both (a) unlikely to be radically modified and (b) unacceptable to several key Afghan communities – particularly the Northern Alliance and the Hazaras. This means that the Taliban-style system can only be integrated into the political structure of Afghanistan if the present national constitutional system is radically, not just cosmetically, revised.

An effective political settlement requires a significant revamp of the present national governance model towards its decentralization and regionalization. These transformations should be adjunct to the withdrawal of the bulk of the foreign forces in their current role, preferably followed by the deployment of some interim international peace support force, ideally under a joint UN/Organization of the Islamic Conference umbrella. This new, regionalized system is to be negotiated among Afghanistan’s “veto players” (the main communities and political/militant forces). In this decentralized system, the main security, administrative and other functions (with the exception of external defense, international representation and the role of an acceptable political arbiter in inter-regional disputes reserved for a compact national government) would be transferred to five or six large regions. These would include a conglomeration of provinces in the south/south-east where the Taliban de facto governance should be recognized de jure.

The Taliban has a record of both improved basic security and functional governance in areas under their control, especially in areas less contested by foreign/government forces. As an active insurgency movement and a shadow governance system in need of funding, the Taliban have to rely on opium cultivation tax as one of several sources of funding, but they have also demonstrated an ability to collect basic taxes from licit activities and property. Historically, the Taliban movement is one of the very few actors in Afghanistan who have had a rare record of strict counter-narcotics politics – the unprecedented strict enforcement of the 2000 ban on poppy cultivation. There is some evidence that the appeal to religious grounds as the main justification for anti-narcotics – so far, most effectively seized upon by the Islamists, including the Taliban – resonates with many Afghans (e.g., according to the 2011 UNODC review, 52 per cent of farmers who had never grown opium reported that they did not do so because it is forbidden in Islam, making religious ban (haram) the dominant reason).[36]

These and other factors make tougher counter-narcotics provisions a welcome negotiable demand/condition for any configuration of talks with the insurgents on the political settlement in Afghanistan. This settlement – with or without direct foreign participation or mediation – can hardly be achieved without the recognition of the Taliban’s de facto governance in several regions in the south-east of the country. In conclusion, as long as an active (counter)insurgency
continues, no basic security is likely to be achieved in Afghanistan, and the counter-narcotics and drug control measures are not likely to be measurably effective.

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Notes


[2] According to the latest estimates available from the UNODC (for 2009), Russia was the largest single country market for Afghan-origin heroin (consuming the same amount of pure heroin – approximately 70 mt – as all countries of West and Central Europe combined) and the largest per capita consumer of heroin in the world. World Drug Report 2011 (New York: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011), pp. 72–73.


[4] Ibid., p. 3.


[9] Z. F. Naqvi, Afghanistan–Pakistan Trade Relations (Islamabad: World Bank, 1999), pp. 15–16. At that time, the more profitable functions such as refinement of opium into heroin mostly took place outside Afghanistan.


[14] Ibid., p. 74.


[27] Ibid.


[34] Presentation by Thomas Ruttig, co-director of the Afghan Analysts Network (<http://www.aan-afghanistan.org>), a transnational network of field-based researchers in Afghanistan, made at the Round Table on “Afghanistan at a crossroad?” at the Royal Institute on International Affairs (Egmont Institute), Brussels, on 29 November 2011.


Mapping Contemporary Terrorism Courses at Top-Ranked National Universities and Liberal Arts Colleges in the United States

by Ivan Sascha Sheehan

Abstract

Most of the scholarly work on Terrorism Studies focuses on terrorism research (knowledge production). By contrast, relatively little attention has been paid to teaching about terrorism (knowledge dissemination) at universities. This paper addresses this gap by providing a systematic analysis of contemporary terrorism courses at 106 top-ranked U.S. based universities and colleges. The study uses 1) key word searches of course catalogues for the academic year 2010-2011 to identify terrorism courses; 2) descriptive statistics to document the field and disciplinary distributions of these courses 2) stepwise regression to assess the relative contributions of institutional characteristics to the frequency of these courses; 3) text analysis to extract dominant topics and a qualitative review of a sample of syllabi. The results indicate that a) most of the these academic institutions offer terrorism courses but courses only secondarily on terrorism outnumber those explicitly or primarily on terrorism by 3:1; b) the institutional presence of a highly cited terrorism scholar, a security studies program and terrorism research center are significantly associated with more terrorism courses c) courses explicitly on terrorism tend to emphasize non-state terrorism and prescriptively focus on counterterrorism while those only secondarily on terrorism have a broader focus. The results have implications for the development of Terrorism Studies as an academic discipline.

Introduction

The study of terrorism has been described alternately as a “booming field” and as one that is “unbounded“ and “unruly” barely existing at the margins or “interstices” of academia. [1] Routinely critiqued for not being able to come to a consensus on a definition of terrorism [2] and for insufficient rigor in research [3], accused by the those on the right of the political spectrum of producing experts who sympathize too much with their subjects [4] and by the left for having too state-centric a security focus (and not considering violence perpetrated by states) [5], Terrorism Studies could be said to be under siege. Still, publications and dissertations on terrorism are increasing, Terrorism Studies programs are exploding at many of the world’s colleges and universities and although federal funding for terrorism research has declined in the U.S. in the last two years, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security still allocates millions of dollars to university-based homeland security research and development programs, especially those in its designated COEs (Centers of Excellence). [6] How are America’s top-ranked universities, the ones that are often assumed to set academic trends, handling this situation?

Most of the scholarly work on Terrorism Studies has focused on terrorism research (knowledge production). [1-3] [7-14] By contrast, relatively little attention has been paid to how universities treat Terrorism Studies in terms of teaching (knowledge dissemination).[15] This may be because research is viewed as more important to the legitimization of a field or simply because
knowledge creation is seen as something that inevitably and necessarily precedes knowledge dissemination. The history of the development of academic fields, however, suggests that although research is critical, teaching also matters and indeed new fields may emerge and become integrated into college curricula, as many area and ethnic studies did, in response to a need and demand for teaching on a subject. Moreover, there is increasing evidence that researchers have much to learn from teachers who may refine, re-define or re-construct a subject in ways that cast new light on avenues for new research. [16]

This study was designed to address the gap in data on the teaching component of Terrorism Studies by providing a systematic review and analysis of recent catalogue descriptions and syllabi from academic courses on terrorism and courses with terrorism content at America’s top 80 national universities and top 26 liberal arts colleges.

Fundamental questions addressed in the study include the following: How visibly committed are America’s top academic institutions to offering courses on terrorism? How many offer distinct courses on terrorism? How many only offer courses that include content on terrorism, secondarily or peripherally, as a topic among other topics? To what extent are institutional characteristics associated with more or fewer terrorism courses? Which institutions and which academic departments offer the most terrorism courses? What are the dominant topics? Are there differences in the number or types of terrorism courses across undergraduate vs. graduate curricula? And to what extent does a closer examination of syllabi provide other insights e.g. about the scholarly nature of these courses?

Since visible teaching at universities or colleges is one component of the evolution of an academic discipline, this study has implications for the legitimization of terrorism as a field or discipline. It also has implications for the generation of new terrorism scholars since academic preparation, especially at the undergraduate level, is an important influence in the choice of research topics at graduate levels.

**Background**

**Evolution of Terrorism Studies**

Terrorist activities became a concern for Western governments in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, but, unlike war, it was often considered too fuzzy or too policy-oriented for academics. There was no one universally accepted definition of the phenomenon. [17-18] The subject, moreover, did not fit “neatly” into any one department. It could be researched from the perspective of psychology, history, political science, sociology, religion, ethics, and even area studies. And while it might appear to fit best in political science or international relations, it was not a topic that could be easily adapted to either the realist or liberal paradigms that dominated those departments. [19] Perhaps more importantly, terrorism was considered too driven by short-term policy agendas and government contracts to deserve serious or sustained attention. A few important scholars within university settings e.g. Martha Crenshaw, David Rapoport, Walter Laqueur and Paul Wilkinson did make sustained scholarly contributions in these early years, but they were exceptional and all too frequently terrorism was viewed as a topic that was risky for academics and one that belonged outside the ivory tower. Indeed, as late as 2002, a full year after...
9/11, Audrey Kurth Cronin observed that for graduate students a “principal interest in terrorism virtually guarantees exclusion from consideration for most academic positions.” [19] Still, in the context of 9/11, dissertations proliferated and the number of terrorism publications was estimated to have increased by as much as 60 percent by 2004. [20] [21] The period after 9/11 also witnessed an infusion of federal money into research and into research facilities designed to find solutions to “pressing security concerns”; dozens of homeland security programs emerged at community colleges, universities and graduate schools across the U.S. [22] Today, according to a listing maintained by the Naval Postgraduate School and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, there are more than 340 such programs located among 260 universities and colleges across the country [23] and a growing number of universities now host Terrorism Research Centers. [24] Although federal funding for such programs and centers is not as generous as it was a few years ago [25], some of these academic institutions, designated as Centers of Excellence (COE) [26], receive millions of dollars in federal grants annually. These trends have helped launch new sub-fields (e.g. cyberterrorism and information security) and are believed by some to be opening new career pathways for junior faculty. [27]

The study of terrorism was on its way to becoming a distinct academic field, discipline or specialty. Or, was it? For some, the answer was no. Despite initial optimism, writes Andrew Silke, the field has not “crystallized” into an academic discipline or even a sub-discipline or specialty. [28] Although many explanations for this state of affairs have been advanced, the most common ones are that terrorism as an object of study is too diffuse, too unbounded, crosses too many disciplines and lacks conceptual clarity. [1] Today the field is also being contested and problematized by advocates of “Critical Terrorism Studies” [29] and by subscribers to a theory that the field is still dominated by a core of 42 “key terrorism researchers,” many from think tanks and non-academic settings. [30]

The Problem of Disciplinarity

But how important “disciplining” is to the future of Terrorism Studies is a matter of debate. Avishag Gordon, a proponent of promoting terrorism to an academic discipline, has gone on record to state that an important opportunity was missed. [15] Silke, on the other hand, has stated that the failure of Terrorism Studies to become a discipline “is not necessarily a bad thing” since “good science does not need a ring-fenced academy.” [21]

Whether Terrorism Studies will go on to become a distinct discipline is not yet known. What is clear is that the future of terrorism research depends on generating new cohorts of scholars and the production of scholars depends on generating interest, enthusiasm and skills, tasks that are best accomplished in academic courses that in some way address terrorism as a puzzle that requires inquiry and investigation. This consideration highlights the need to take a closer look at how terrorism as a subject of academic inquiry is taught in our universities and colleges. The present article is designed to contribute to this discussion.

Data and Methods
The top 80 national universities and 26 liberal arts colleges were identified using *US News and World Reports* undergraduate rankings for 2010-2011. [31] Although these institutions constitute an admittedly limited sample of all higher education institutions in the U.S., their “center-to-periphery” influence as creators or distributors of knowledge has long been acknowledged [32]. Many of these national universities train graduate students who “diffuse” or “radiate” models of orientation when they go on to teach in other sectors. Similarly, top liberal arts colleges, thought to “uphold the traditions of liberal education,” often become models, in the words of the sociologist Burton Clark, “for what education would be if properly carried out.” [33] As such they may be viewed as trendsetters, both domestically and globally.

Key word searches of course catalogue descriptions, available online, were used to identify courses explicitly or primarily on terrorism (defined here as courses with the term “terrorism” in the title) or only secondarily on terrorism (defined here as courses with “terrorism” content as evidenced in the text of the course description but not in the title). To minimize the potential for changes in courses during an academic year, all of the searches of course catalogues were performed at about mid term (March-April) in the spring of 2011. To avoid duplication, courses that were cross-listed across departments or listed more than once because they had multiple sections were only counted once.

Courses meeting the above criteria were listed by nine institutional characteristics. They included type of institution (national university or liberal arts college), level of study (undergraduate or graduate), institutional funding (public or private), institutional size (in terms of undergraduate enrollment), regional location, ranking, the presence of a peace- or security studies program or degree, the presence of a Terrorism Research Center, and the presence of at least one well-known (i.e. highly cited) scholar. For the purpose of the study, the presence of a security program or degree (concentration, minor, major, certificate or graduate degree in security, biodefense, intelligence analysis, emergency preparedness) was based on catalogue information, supplemented by a listing prepared by the Naval PostGraduate School and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. [34] The presence of a peace studies program (concentration, minor, major or degree in peace studies or peace and conflict or conflict resolution) was based on catalogue listings supplemented by a listing of academic peace studies programs prepared by Pilgrim Pathways. [35] The presence of at least one well-known terrorism scholar was documented using *Google Scholar* listings of scholars with 75 or more terrorism related citations using March 2012 data for the period 2000-2012. [36]

All courses were further listed by academic discipline and field (defined broadly as Social Sciences, Humanities, Natural Sciences, Area Studies, other Interdisciplinary Studies, Professional or Pre-professional fields such as Law and Criminal Justice and other Pre-Professional fields such as communications, journalism, social work and health).

Dominant topics were identified using course titles and catalogue descriptions for a sub-sample of undergraduate courses primarily on terrorism (n=90 courses) and courses only secondarily on the subject (n=329 courses). Only universities and colleges institutions with 7 or more undergraduate terrorism courses (n=38 institutions) were used for these analyses. To extract dominant topics from undergraduate course listings, counts of key words associated with the
study of terrorism (e.g. war, crime, tactics, counterterrorism, rights, religion, moral) were identified in course descriptions and recorded.

Additional data relating to required readings and scholarly content were obtained from a review of syllabi and textbook requirements from a smaller sample of these courses.

Data Analysis

Descriptive statistics were employed to document the overall frequency and distribution of terrorism courses, primary and secondary. Text analysis, using the Text Analysis tool created by the Office for Mathematics, Science, and Technology Education (MSTE), a unit within the Department of Curriculum and Instruction in the College of Education at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, was employed to extract dominant topics from course descriptions for undergraduate courses.[37] To facilitate comparison of key words for primary and secondary courses, rates for key word counts are presented per 100 primary courses and per 100 secondary courses. The relationship between institutional characteristics and the number of terrorism courses was evaluated by using stepwise forward multiple regression techniques. An advantage of stepwise multiple regression is that it allows for simultaneous control of many variables and takes into account the overall patterning of a group of variables in predicting a single variable. A disadvantage of this, as with all statistical models, is that unknown variables that could have an important influence on the outcome may be omitted.

Results

Institutional characteristics for the 80 national universities and 26 liberal colleges in the study are shown in Table 1. Most (69%) of the institutions were privately funded. The Northeast had the largest concentration (40%) and the Mid-Atlantic had the smallest (8.5%). One fourth of the institutions (mostly liberal arts colleges) were of small size (enrolling 3,000 or fewer undergraduates), 48% were of medium size (enrolling 3,000-9,999 undergraduates) and the remaining institutions were either large (20%) enrolling 10,000-19,999 undergraduates or very large (30%), enrolling more than 20,000 undergraduates. Twenty-five institutions (29 national universities and 2 liberal arts colleges) offered a security studies program or degree, 22 (15 national universities and 8 liberal arts colleges) offered a peace studies program or degree and 21 (24 national universities and one liberal arts college (USMA/West Point) hosted a Terrorism Research Center (TRC). Of these TRC, 7 were designated Department of Homeland Security Centers of Excellence. [38] Twenty-two institutions (21 national universities terrorism and one liberal arts college (USMA/West Point) had at least one well-known terrorism scholar on the faculty and many had more than one. [39]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National Universities (N=80)</th>
<th>Liberal Arts Colleges (N=26)</th>
<th>Total (N=106)</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Univ.</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Arts</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Public</td>
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<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid Atlantic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very large</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security degree</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace studies degree/program</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terrorism Research Center</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terrorism scholar</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Ranking, range</strong></th>
<th>1-80</th>
<th>1-26</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Table 1. Institutional characteristics of study sample

a. Size: small defined as <3,000 undergraduates; medium as 3,000-9,999 undergraduates; large as 10,000-19,999 undergraduates; very large as 20,000 or more undergraduates.
b. Homeland Security program or degree: includes degree offerings such as a minor, major, certificate or graduate degree security, biodefense, intelligence analysis, emergency preparedness. Based on catalogue information and listing provided by the Naval PostGraduate School and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Available at http://www.chds.us/?partners/institutions

c. Peace studies degree: presence of a peace studies or peace and conflict studies program or degree; based on catalogue descriptions and Pilgrim Pathways’ “Listing of Colleges/Universities with Peace Studies Programs.” Available at http://pilgrimpathways.wordpress.com/about/

d. Terrorism Research Center (TRC): presence of a TRC based on Freedman, B. “Terrorism Research Centres: 100 Institutes, Programs and Organisations in the Field of Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Radicalisation and Asymmetric Warfare Studies,” Perspectives on Terrorism 4 (5). Additions to the list include Northeastern U, which opened the George J Kostas Institute for Homeland Security in 2011, NYU which houses the Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response.

e. Terrorism Scholar: presence of at least one well-known or highly cited terrorism scholar on the faculty. Defined as a scholar with 75 or more citations for terrorism-related publications (journal articles and books). Based on Google Scholar search for 2000-2012, accessed March 2012.

Undergraduate Terrorism Courses

Number of courses. The key word catalogue search on terrorism yielded a total 689 distinct undergraduate courses on terrorism for the institutions in the sample. Of these, 159 (23%) could be classified as primarily on terrorism since they contained the word terrorism in the course title. The remainder (530) were classified as secondarily or more peripherally on terrorism since they contained content on terrorism among other subjects but did not use the term terrorism in the title of the course description.

More than half of the institutions studied (66% of the 80 national universities and 54% of the 26 liberal arts colleges) offered at least one undergraduate course with terrorism in the title of the course and more than 9 out of 10 of each type of institution offered a course with terrorism content either in the course title or description. The total numbers of terrorism courses, however, showed considerable variation. Within institutions with any terrorism courses, the number of courses explicitly on terrorism ranged from 1-11 while the number with any terrorism content ranged from 1-35.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Number of Primary Terrorism Courses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgetown</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U North Carolina Chapel Hill</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Notre Dame</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke University</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio State University</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Southern California</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American University</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornell University</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York University</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northeastern University</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulane</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Georgia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Maryland College Park</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Virginia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington U St. Louis</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia University</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Arts College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnard</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vassar</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMA/West Point</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Institutions with the most undergraduate courses explicitly on terrorism

Notes: Based on study sample of 80 top-tier national universities and 26 top-ranked liberal arts colleges, academic year 2010-2011. Primary terrorism courses defined as courses explicitly on terrorism, i.e. with the word “terrorism” in the title of the course. Includes national universities with 3 or more such courses at undergraduate level, 2 or more for small colleges. Courses with multiple sections and ones cross-listed across departments are only counted once.
Most courses on terrorism. The universities and liberal arts colleges with the most undergraduate courses explicitly on terrorism (primary courses) are listed in Table 2. Georgetown topped the list with 11 courses in the national university sample (n=80), but 17 top national universities offered a core of at least four undergraduate courses explicitly on terrorism for the academic year 2010-2011 and the University of Maryland College Park offered an undergraduate minor in the field. In the liberal arts college sample (n=26), 5 institutions offered 2 or 3 courses explicitly on terrorism and the USMA/West Point offered a minor in Terrorism Studies.

Most courses overall. Institutions with the ten or more courses either explicitly on terrorism (primary courses) or with terrorism content (secondary courses) are listed in Table 3. Again, Georgetown with 45 courses overall dominated the list, but several institutions not listed as having a high number of primary courses showed visible commitment to teaching about terrorism in secondary courses.

Ratio of primary to secondary courses. On average, the ratio of secondary terrorism courses to primary ones at the undergraduate level was 3:1 for national universities and 6:1 for liberal arts colleges. These differences are not surprising given the historically broad orientation of liberal arts colleges and the more specialized orientations of national universities. Still, within the national university cohort, there were distinct differences. At the undergraduate level, the ratio of secondary courses to primary ones was greater than 5:1 at three of the nation’s top universities, Harvard, Stanford and Yale. Moreover, two West coast universities (Washington University at Seattle and UC Berkeley) offered 9 or more courses with terrorism content, but none with terrorism in the title. Conversely, primary courses on terrorism outnumbered those only with terrorism content by 7:0 at the University of North Carolina while some institutions (e.g. University of Maryland College Park, American University) offered approximately equal numbers of courses that were explicitly on terrorism or only had content on the subject.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Number of Terrorism Courses (Primary &amp; Secondary)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgetown</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Notre Dame</td>
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<td>Stanford</td>
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<td>UCLA</td>
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<td>Northeastern University</td>
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<td>U Washington</td>
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<td>Harvard University</td>
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<td>Boston College</td>
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<td>Cornell University</td>
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<tr>
<td>U Pennsylvania</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Southern California</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana U- Bloomington</td>
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<td>Lehigh</td>
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<td>Duke</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York University</td>
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<td>Ohio State</td>
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<td>U Michigan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UC Irvine</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Arts College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wesleyan</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amherst</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colgate</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vassar</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Institutions with 10 or more undergraduate courses with any terrorism content

Notes: Based on study sample of 80 top-tier national universities and 26 top-ranked liberal arts colleges, academic year 2010-2011. Primary terrorism courses defined as courses explicitly on terrorism, i.e. with the word “terrorism” in the title of the course. Secondary terrorism courses defined as ones with the word “terrorism” only in the course description. This is a conservative listing since courses with multiple sections and ones cross-listed across departments are only counted once.
Institutional predictors: Many of the universities with the most terrorism courses were associated with terrorism research centers, securities studies programs, peace studies or the presence of at least one well-known terrorism scholar. To explore the influence of these characteristics on the number of terrorism courses while controlling for other institutional characteristics (e.g. type of institution, regional location, funding, ranking, size) we conducted an exploratory stepwise regression. The results, shown in Table 4, indicate that institutional characteristics explained a relatively small percent of the variability in terrorism courses ($R^2=38\%$ for primary courses and 24% for secondary courses). For courses explicitly on terrorism (primary courses), size (large) and the presence of a well-known terrorism scholar were both positively and significantly associated with the number of courses ($p<0.02$). None of the other institutional characteristics were significant. For all courses (primary and secondary), the presence of a terrorism scholar and the presence of a peace studies program were both positively and significantly associated with the number of courses ($p<0.01$). None of the other institutional characteristics were significant, except regional location in the South ($p<0.03$) which was negatively associated with the number of all terrorism courses. This effect was not a function of fewer primary courses but rather of fewer secondary ones in the South.

![Table 4. Stepwise regression of undergraduate terrorism courses by institutional characteristics](image)

Notes: Number of institutions = 106. The dependent variables are the numbers of primary terrorism courses and of all terrorism courses (primary and secondary). The following 9 variables were permitted to enter the regression: institution type, funding source, ranking, regional location, size of undergraduate student body, presence of a terrorism research center, security or peace studies degree or program and presence of at least one well-known terrorism scholar. The table shows variables in the final model with $p$ values <0.10.

Disciplinary distribution of courses: As shown in Figure 1, more than half (52%) of the courses explicitly or primarily on terrorism were in the field of Social Sciences (defined here to include political science, international relations, international studies, sociology, anthropology and...
psychology), but almost one fifth (17%) were in the Humanities (including history, philosophy, religion, literature, film and drama). About 13% could be classified as falling under Interdisciplinary Studies (including freshmen seminars and area studies e.g. Middle Eastern Studies, African Studies, Latin American Studies). Relatively few fell under the rubric of Law and Criminal Justice (6%), or Pre-professional studies such as journalism and communications, security studies (4%), and natural sciences (4%).

![Pie chart showing distribution of undergraduate terrorism primary courses by academic field]

**Figure 1. Distribution of undergraduate terrorism primary courses by academic field**

**Notes:** Primary terrorism course defined as one with the word “terrorism” in the title.

Broken down by discipline (Figure 2), the total number of courses with any terrorism content (in the text or title) was highest at the undergraduate level for political science (164), history (100), and international relations (92). Courses explicitly on terrorism were most frequent in political science (38), international relations (27) and sociology (18) followed by history (14). Only one institution in the national university sample (University of Maryland) offered a minor in Terrorism Studies and none offered a major. As shown in this figure, there were distinct disciplinary differences in the ratio of courses only peripherally on terrorism to those explicitly on the subject. For some disciplines (e.g. philosophy, anthropology, literature/drama, area studies, history) peripheral courses outnumbered explicit ones by as much as 6:1. However, for IR, political science and religion the ratio was closer to 3:1.
Figure 2. Frequency of undergraduate terrorism courses (primary and secondary) by discipline

Notes

a. Course primarily on terrorism defined as one with the word “terrorism” in the title; course secondarily on terrorism defined as one with the word “terrorism” only in the content of the course description.

b. Bars show total number of courses by discipline and breakdown for primary and secondary terrorism courses.

c. Basic science includes biology, microbiology, engineering, space sciences. International Relations includes courses in International Studies and in Global Studies.

d. Data based on catalogue description for top-tier national universities (n=80) and liberal arts colleges (n=26).

Dominant topics. Figure 3 shows the relative rates of references to specific topics per 100 course descriptions of courses primarily on terrorism and per 100 course descriptions of courses only secondarily on the subject.

Dominant topics. Figure 3 shows the relative rates of references to specific topics per 100 course
descriptions of courses primarily on terrorism and per 100 course descriptions of courses only secondarily on the subject.
Figure 3. Dominant topics in undergraduate terrorism course descriptions

Notes: Bars show number of references to topics per 100 courses primarily on terrorism and per 100 courses secondarily on terrorism. Rates per 100 courses calculated from catalogue course descriptions of 90 courses primarily on terrorism and 329 courses secondarily on the subject at the 38 institutions in the sample with a minimum of 7 terrorism courses (primary or secondary).
These rates are based on adjusted totals of 90 courses primarily on terrorism and 329 secondary ones from the studied universities and colleges with at least seven undergraduate terrorism courses overall (n=38 institutions). While counts of key words from text descriptions in catalogues could be viewed as somewhat impressionistic, the results provide valuable insights into the ways terrorism courses are constructed and summarized for potential students.

The most common words for courses primarily on terrorism in order were war, violence, counterterrorism, response and threat. The most common words for courses only secondarily on terrorism were war, policy, security, conflict and history. Although the word “war” dominated both lists, it was more than two times as frequent in the descriptions for courses only secondarily on terrorism compared to those explicitly or primarily on the subject. “Peace”, while it occurred more rarely, was also more common in the descriptions for secondary courses. Terrorism perpetrated by states (“state terrorism”) was not a dominant topic in the courses explicitly on terrorism. The concept of state terror, however, did appear relatively often courses secondarily on terrorism (especially in history, in the context of terror perpetrated by Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia and some Latin American regimes).

The two types of courses referred to the “war on terror” about equally often. They also placed terrorism in the context of “insurgency” about equally often. However, they differed in their relative emphases on many other topics. For example, there was much more emphasis in the primary courses on terrorism as a “threat” and the construct was more often framed in terms of “violence.” The words “Islam” and “Islamic” and the events of “9-11” were more prominent. There was a greater emphasis on “terrorist organizations.” There was also a greater emphasis on recent events such as “9/11” as opposed to the past (“history”). In addition, there was a more frequent focus on terrorism as “crime” and on immediate prescriptive measures such as “counterterrorism” and “response.”

By contrast, courses only secondarily on terrorism placed more emphasis on contexts of “conflict”. They placed less emphasis on direct “response” and greater emphasis on more reflective measures such as “intelligence” and “policy.” In addition, they framed the subject of terrorism in broader contexts, e.g. social and political “movements” rather than terrorist “organizations.” They referred more often to “ethics” and “morality” and to issues of “human rights.” In addition, they focused more often on other broad constructs and processes that might affect the emergence or manifestation of terrorism e.g. “ethnic” issues, “culture”, “religion”, “development”, “democracy”, “economics,” and “globalization.”

Required readings and scholarly focus. There was no evidence from the syllabi review of courses explicitly on terrorism that non-academic texts dominated the required course readings. Most of the courses had 1-3 textbook requirements. Of these, two out of three on average were from scholarly (academic) presses and only one out of three were from general publication presses. Almost all required 2-3 additional weekly readings in the form of scholarly articles from journals or chapters from books. Among these, works by ten of a “core” 42 researchers, identified by Reid and Chen [10] as dominating the field as of 2003, appeared at least once. However, with the exceptions of now classic papers and chapters by Bruce Hoffmann and by Martha Crenshaw, the most frequently required readings were produced by a newer group of scholars not on that list. [40] Almost all of the courses focused primarily on non-state terrorism. Only two provided full
modules on state terrorism. There was no evidence, however, to support contentions made by advocates of Critical Terrorism Studies, that the concept of terrorism as a practice or phenomenon was not interrogated or challenged. Most (82%) contained a distinct module addressing the problem of defining terrorism. Fewer than half (40%) had a distinct module on bioterrorism and/or nuclear terrorism, but 70% had a module on suicide terrorism. About half (48%) emphasized case studies as a methodology in teaching.

Graduate Terrorism Courses

Number of Courses. Catalogue descriptions were more limited for graduate courses than for undergraduate courses. Within this constraint, data was available (if sometimes limited) for 76 of the 80 national universities. This set of data yielded 491 distinct graduate courses with terrorism content (in the title and/or text description of the course). Of these, 136 (28%) contained the word terrorism in the title and could be viewed as courses primarily on terrorism and the remaining 355 courses (72%) could be viewed as secondarily or more peripherally on the subject.

Compared to undergraduate programs, a lower proportion of the national universities studied offered at least one graduate course explicitly on terrorism (52% vs. 66%) and fewer (7 of 10 vs. 9 of 10) appeared to offer courses with any terrorism content. These differences may have been a function of the more limited number of institutions with available data, the more specialized missions of graduate programs [41] or simply an artifact of using catalogue descriptions. (At the graduate level, course descriptions are often more condensed; they may only refer generally to a seminar or independent study). As at the undergraduate level, the overall number of graduate courses varied widely, in this case from 1-18 courses.

Most primary terrorism courses. The graduate programs with the most courses primarily on terrorism are listed in Table 5. As at the undergraduate level, Georgetown dominated the list with 18 such courses, but 5 other graduate programs (including George Washington University, Johns Hopkins, University of Chicago, the University of Maryland College Park and Penn State) offered 6 or more courses and 13 institutions in all offered a core of 4 or more such courses. Most of these institutions (11 of 13) offered a security studies degree. Several hosted a terrorism related research center (TRC) and some (George Washington University, Northeastern, New York University, Penn State and U Maryland) offered both. These characteristics of the institutions help explain the higher number of primary courses. One or more terrorism courses may be required for a security degree or may fit into a terrorism research mission and the institution may decide to invest the time and resources to develop such courses. In the case of Georgetown, where 7 of the 18 primary courses (39%) were law courses, this institution’s unique offerings in security law, international affairs and law and international human rights law may also have played a role in the number of primary graduate courses. [42]

Most courses overall. The graduate programs with the most courses overall (primary and secondary), identified from catalogue descriptions, are listed in Table 6. Among national universities Georgetown dominated the list, but several other private institutions (Harvard, New York University, George Washington University and Boston University) also showed very high numbers of courses with any terrorism content at all. The exceptionally high number of courses
found for Georgetown is likely to have been a function of two factors. First, Georgetown (like Harvard, NYU and several other of the private institutions) offered longer (less condensed) course descriptions in its graduate course catalogues. As a result, it was easier to detect a large number of secondary courses with terrorism content. (Some of the public institutions may include as much or almost as much terrorism content in secondary courses, but it may not be identifiable in catalogue descriptions). Second, Georgetown’s unique law offerings through its law center and its graduate programs in foreign service, as well as security studies and international affairs, are likely to have played a role. Twenty-eight (32%) of its 87 secondary terrorism courses (courses with terrorism content) were law courses, twenty (23%) were in security studies, fifteen (17%) in government and international affairs and eleven (13%) were in its graduate foreign service program. Law courses also made up significant numbers of graduate courses with any terrorism content for American University (12 courses), University of Pennsylvania (9 courses), UCLA (9 courses), and Harvard (8 courses).

Ratio. On average, the ratio of secondary graduate courses to primary ones was similar to that at the undergraduate level (3:1). Again, however, graduate programs differed in these ratios. At some institutions (e.g. Harvard, Yale and University of Pennsylvania), secondary courses were 10-14 times as frequent as primary ones at the graduate level. At others, (e.g. the University of Maryland at College Park, Johns Hopkins and the University of Chicago) the reverse was the case and graduate courses explicitly on terrorism were seven times as frequent as courses only secondarily on the subject. These differences are likely to be a function of the broader missions of the former institutions and the more specialized offerings in security and terrorism in the latter. However, they could also be a function of differences in how much information is provided in catalogue descriptions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Number of Primary Terrorism Courses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georgetown</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Washington U</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johns Hopkins</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Chicago</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Maryland College Park</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York University</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baylor</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston University</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke University</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeastern University</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulane</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American University</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia University</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Western</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutgers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syracuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>U Pittsburgh</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Texas Austin</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5. Institutions with the most primary terrorism courses, graduate level*

*Notes: Based on study sample of graduate programs associated with 76 top-ranked national universities, 2010-2011. Primary terrorism courses defined as courses explicitly on terrorism, i.e. with the word “terrorism” in the title of the course. Includes graduate programs with 3 or more such courses. Courses with multiple sections and ones cross-listed across departments are only counted once.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Number of Terrorism Courses (Primary &amp; Secondary)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georgetown</td>
<td>105</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harvard U</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYU</td>
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<tr>
<td>George Washington U</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston U</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeastern</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>UCLA</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>American U</td>
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<td>Northwestern</td>
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<td>Penn State</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yale U</td>
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<tr>
<td>Case Western</td>
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<td>Princeton U</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tulane U</td>
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<td>U Michigan</td>
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<tr>
<td>U Pennsylvania</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Institutions with 10 or more graduate courses on terrorism overall

Based on study sample of graduate programs associated with 76 top-ranked national universities, 2010-2011. Primary terrorism courses defined as courses explicitly on terrorism, i.e. with the word “terrorism” in the title of the course. Secondary terrorism courses defined as ones with the word “terrorism” only in the course description. Includes graduate programs with 3 or more such courses. This is a conservative listing since courses with multiple sections and ones cross-listed across departments are only counted once.

Institutional Predictors. Region and Security Studies were the only variables which accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in terrorism courses at the graduate level when all institutions (n=76) were considered. Examination of the residuals revealed one significant outlier for the number of terrorism courses (the numbers of explicit and all courses were 3 SD above the mean for the group) and the analysis was recalculated excluding that institution. The results of the regression analyses, excluding the outlier, are shown in Table 7. These results indicate that that when the other predictor variables were held constant, three variables (location in the Mid-Atlantic, the presence of a Security Studies program, and the presence of a Terrorism Research Center) explained 43% of the variability in the number of primary terrorism courses. The same three variables, with the addition of regional location in the Northeast, explained 27% of the variability in all terrorism courses (primary and secondary).
### Table 7. Stepwise regression of graduate terrorism courses by institutional characteristics

No. of institutions = 75. The dependent variables are the numbers of primary terrorism courses and all terrorism courses (primary and secondary). The following 8 variables were permitted to enter the regression: funding source, ranking, regional location, size of undergraduate student body, presence of a terrorism research center, security or peace studies degree or program and presence of at least one well-known terrorism scholar. The table shows variables in the final model with \( p < 0.10 \).

**Distribution of Courses.** As shown in Figures 4 and 5, the field and disciplinary profiles of graduate terrorism courses differed in important ways from those at the undergraduate level. Much larger proportions of explicit (primary) courses were in the fields of Law and Criminal justice (43% vs. 6%) while lower proportions were in the Social Sciences (27% vs. 52%) and humanities (6% vs. 17%). Surprisingly, considering the security image of Terrorism Studies, only 6% of graduate courses explicitly on terrorism could be classified as belonging in the field of Security or military studies. There were 3 times as many courses at the graduate level in other Professional fields e.g. health sciences, communications, urban planning, engineering (15% vs. 4%). Overall, these differences are in line with the more career-oriented focus of graduate degrees compared to undergraduate ones.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Standardized coefficient</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Terrorism Courses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (Mid-Atlantic)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism Research Center</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security studies</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 = 0.43 ) ( F ) (df 3,71) = 18.1, ( p &lt; 0.0001 )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Terrorism Courses</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (Mid-Atlantic)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (Northeast)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrorism Research Center</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security studies</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 = 0.25 ) ( F ) (df 4,70) = 6.0, ( p &lt; 0.0004 )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Broken down by discipline (Figure 5), the highest numbers of courses explicitly on terrorism were in law and criminal justice (56) followed by international relations/studies (22), health sciences (12) and political science (11). Among graduate courses with any terrorism content in the text or title the highest numbers were in law and criminal justice (189), international relations or international studies (69), security (46) and the health sciences including public health (34).

The high number of graduate terrorism courses in law and criminal justice compared to the social sciences in general may reflect a consensus at this level that terrorism is best addressed in terms of criminal and legal constructs (as opposed, for example, to political ones) or it may simply be a function of allocating more resources to develop courses in marketable career fields and fewer to less marketable research oriented ones. As at the undergraduate level, there were distinct disciplinary differences in the ratio of secondary courses to primary ones. For security studies the ratio was almost 5:1. However, for law and the health sciences it was closer to 3:1 while for international relations it was closer to 2:1.
Figure 5. Frequency of graduate terrorism courses by academic discipline

Notes: Based on study sample of 76 institutions with graduate programs; courses primarily on terrorism defined as courses with “terrorism” in title. Courses secondarily on terrorism defined as ones only with “terrorism in text of course description. Basic science includes biology, microbiology, engineering, space sciences. Health Sciences includes public health, nursing, and medicine.

Discussion

This study focuses on a relatively understudied area, namely the teaching component of Terrorism Studies. The study has several limitations. First, it is limited to one academic year (2010-2011). As such it only provides a snapshot at one point in time. Since university curricula
change from year to year, inclusion of other years could have produced different results. There is
good evidence that the number of university courses on terrorism exploded in the U.S. in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11. Gordon, for example reports that UCLA had 50 terrorism-related
courses the following academic year. [43] The results presented here suggest that this trend may
have moderated.

Second, the study is limited to a small sample of colleges and universities in the U.S. that are
ranked at the top of the U.S. News and World Reports ranking system. Although these
institutions have long been thought to set trends, the strength of their influence on other
institutions in the U.S. and elsewhere is a matter of increasing debate. [44] Extension of the
study to a wider range of colleges and universities in the U.S. and abroad could have generated
different results in terms of numbers and topics. A recent Homeland Security report lists as many
as 56 academic institutions are currently addressing homeland security, defense and terrorism in
their curricula. [45] Of these only four (Johns Hopkins, Penn State, University of Connecticut
and University of Washington) are included in this study. Other reports estimate that as many as
271 higher education institutions offered Homeland Security degrees or certificates with content
on terrorism in 2009. It is unclear whether the mix of courses in such programs would or would
not mirror those in the study reported here. Some of these programs may offer certificate or
graduate degrees that are more skills-oriented, targeted to combating terrorism. [46] The
frequency and mix of terrorism courses in European institutions may also differ significantly
from the U.S. profile. [47]

Third, many terrorism courses are cross-listed across two or more departments. They may be
listed under political science, but also under international relations, sociology or even religion.
Course catalogues also frequently describe multiple sections of a course more than once. Since
this study counted cross-listed courses and multiple sections only once, it has the potential to
underestimate the overall frequency of courses on terrorism as well as the number in some
disciplines.

Fourth, the results could have been distorted by the study’s use of text descriptions of courses on
terrorism or with terrorism content in course catalogues. In a few cases, course descriptions were
not available. Only titles of courses were provided. Additionally, some universities (e.g. Harvard)
offered long and rich (3-4 paragraph) descriptions of each course. Others, especially very large
universities, e.g. (Penn State, U California Berkeley) often gave only condensed (1-2 line)
descriptions. These differences could have led to underestimation of the number of courses with
terrorism content for some universities and may also have led to underestimation of key terms
related to dominant topics.

Fifth, following recommendations made by Martha Crenshaw [48] and adopted by the Task
Force on Political Violence and Terrorism of the American Political Science Association,
terrorism content is now often subsumed in political science and international relations curricula
under the rubric “political violence” and may not be visible in catalogue course descriptions in
political science courses.

Despite these limitations, the study has several important strengths including its systematic
approach, its inclusion of different types of higher education institutions (e.g. liberal arts colleges
as well as national universities) and its effort to separate out courses uniquely on terrorism from those only secondarily on the subject at undergraduate and graduate levels.

Overall, the results suggest that top ranked academic institutions in the U.S. are visibly but still somewhat cautiously committed to offering content on terrorism in their curricula. While two-thirds of the national universities offered at least one distinct undergraduate course explicitly on terrorism and 52% offered at least one distinct graduate course, most offered only one or two courses specifically on terrorism in 2010-2011. For the most part, terrorism was addressed secondarily as one topic among other topics in courses on other subjects. This pattern was especially apparent in liberal arts colleges where the ratio of primary to secondary terrorism courses was 6:1 and at national universities with some of the highest US News and World Reports rankings (e.g. Harvard, Yale and Stanford) where the ratios of primary to secondary courses was at least 5:1.

Placing terrorism content in other courses may signal recognition that terrorism is still a contested concept [49] or reflect a tacit policy of “reticence” towards using the word terrorism in course titles because of its negative connotations and more specifically because it “implies a political judgment about the legitimacy of actors and their actions.” [50] On the other hand, departments and programs may place terrorism within courses on other subjects because they believe that the topic is best studied in the context of other constructs and problems (e.g. political violence) or because of the missions of individual institutions. (In the U.S., liberal arts colleges are generally committed to a broad education, but some of America’s national universities, including Harvard, Yale and Stanford, are multitier structures that have evolved to contain colleges with a broad mission and universities with more a more specialized focus.[51]).

About 20% (17/80) of the top-tier national universities studied here have clearly made a niche for undergraduate courses on terrorism. These institutions offer 4 or more courses explicitly on the subject. A slightly smaller proportion (17%) (13/76) of the graduate programs offered at least 4 distinct courses explicitly on terrorism.

The R squares for the exploratory stepwise regressions of institutional characteristics on the number of terrorism courses were low, indicating that the studied characteristics explained only a small percentage of the variability (24-43%) in the number of terrorism courses. This result is likely to be a function of the relatively small but diverse set of institutions used. It should not be taken to mean that the characteristics identified as relevant are meaningless. As James Colton and Keith Bower observe, a small R square indicates that not everything was explained, but a few important variables were identified.[52]

The presence of a well-known terrorism scholar showed the strongest associations and was significantly related to the number of explicit courses and to the number of courses with any terrorism content at the undergraduate level. This finding suggests that terrorism knowledge dissemination tends to be furthered when the knowledge producers are on campus. Institutional size was also identified as having an influence (large institutions were associated with more explicit terrorism courses). This result is likely to be a function of more resources in large institutions. Three other variables (the presence of a security studies or peace studies program and regional location in the Mid-Atlantic, near the nation’s capitol) showed similar but non-significant effects for the number of explicit courses. The presence of a peace or peace and
conflict studies program clearly enhanced the number of courses with any terrorism content (primary and secondary courses) for undergraduates. This finding was an interesting one given the growing and now sometimes contested coordination of activities between the peace and conflict and security sectors. [53]

At the graduate level, regional location in the Mid-Atlantic had the strongest effects on the number of explicit courses and all courses, but the presence of a security studies program and the presence of a Terrorism Research Center also showed significant independent effects enhancing the number of graduate terrorism courses overall. The high concentration of courses in the Mid-Atlantic is understandable since this region can more easily draw on security and policy experts in the nation’s capitol than institutions at a greater distance. There may also be greater demand in the mid-Atlantic since students (and faculty) see opportunities to influence terrorism policy when they are near the capitol. On the other hand, this heavy concentration in one region also speaks to the need for academic institutions at a greater distance from the capitol to develop more courses on terrorism and with terrorism content.

Within the universities and colleges studied, there was wide variation across disciplines in the extent to which terrorism was treated as a primary or secondary course topic. In disciplines such as political science, international relations, communications and religion, primary courses (those with terrorism in the title) constituted 25-30% of all courses with any terrorism content. In history, however, courses primary courses constituted only about 14% of all courses with terrorism content. This distribution in history departments is unfortunate given growing criticism that Terrorism Studies have become too focused on contemporary terrorism and ignore valuable lessons of the past. [54]

On the other hand, the overall multi-disciplinarity of terrorism courses, explicit and peripheral, is encouraging. Terrorism research has previously been criticized for being too narrowly concentrated in a few disciplines, namely political science, international relations and security studies. The multi-disciplinary of terrorism research, however, may be one of its strengths. The results presented here on the teaching component of undergraduate Terrorism Studies bodes well for generating new cohorts of graduate students who may study the topic from a wide diversity of perspectives including anthropology, sociology, economics, philosophy, religion, peace studies, area studies, basic sciences and communications.

The perspective that the study of terrorism focuses too narrowly on terrorism “from below” (ignoring state terrorism) [10], "exceptionalizes 9/11" and so-called “Islamic” or “Islamist” terrorism and is overly prescriptive [55] was largely supported in the review of dominant topics in the texts of catalogue descriptions of courses explicitly (primarily) on terrorism. However, the results suggested that courses secondarily or more peripherally on the subject were more likely to frame terrorism in broader contexts incorporating “religion” in general (rather than Islam in particular) and other broad constructs such as “democracy”, “development” and “globalization.”

The syllabi review of undergraduate courses explicitly on terrorism indicated a strong emphasis on scholarly publications and wide readings well beyond the "core" once thought to dominate the field. There was no evidence from this review that courses explicitly on terrorism focused only or even predominantly on strategic threats or Osama bin Laden. Further, the presumption put
forth recently by Dixit and Stump, that terrorism courses in the U.S. do not, as a rule, interrogate terrorism (i.e. question the assumptions behind the concept) [56] was not supported in this sample of syllabi from top-tier universities and colleges. In fact, the syllabi review indicated that 88% of the courses, even ones requiring the textbooks cited by Dixit and Stump, contained specific modules on the challenge of defining terrorism.

Going forward, what do the results mean for the academic development of Terrorism Studies? The evolution of “studies” programs into disciplines is a complex process in part because the concept of academic discipline is itself “neither simple nor undisputed.” [57] The term discipline as Krishnan points out, comes from the Latin word discipulus, which means pupil, and disciplina, which means teaching (noun). Krishnan observes that as a verb it means “training someone to follow a rigorous set of instructions, but also punishing and enforcing obedience.” As such, it has a moral dimension that “defines how people should behave or think.” At an academic level, disciplines are most often visibly associated with subjects taught at universities but usually have to meet five other criteria including the presence of 1) an object of research 2) a body of accumulated specialist knowledge 3) theories and concepts related to that knowledge 4) specific terminology 5) specific agreed on research methods. Not all disciplines meet all of the above criteria. English literature, for example, as Krishnan observes, “lacks a unifying theoretical paradigm or method and a definable stable object of research but still passes as an academic discipline.” Criminology too, although viewed as a discipline, lacks one “overarching theory that explains all the complexities of crime” and draws on a multiplicity of perspectives. [58] However, as Krishnan further points out, the more “boxes a discipline can tick, the more likely it becomes that a certain field of academic enquiry becomes a recognized discipline capable of reproducing itself and building upon a growing body of its own scholarship.” In general, when a discipline is called “studies”, it usually means that it “falls short of some of the above mentioned criteria.” Such studies disciplines can go on to discipline themselves or remain “undisciplined” as some studies programs (e.g. Women’s Studies) consciously chose to do in the 1970s.[ 59] Some studies programs may come to be perceived as disciplines as has happened with Peace & Conflict Studies.

Whether Terrorism Studies will or should go on to become a distinct discipline is still unclear. This study demonstrates that the field meets the minimum criterion of a taught subject. While debate continues about the ability of the subject to meet the other five criteria, the fact that content on terrorism is taught across so many disciplines suggests that it is still best constituted as an interdisciplinary field. Such fields, as Julie Thompson Klein points out, are well suited to the task of trying to “answer complex questions” and trying “to solve problems that are beyond the scope of any one discipline.” [60] Although progression from multi-disciplinarity to inter-disciplinarity takes time and, in Klein’s words, requires moving through a series of stages (including “playing the old songs,” playing “the glass bead game” of building common jargon and finally coming to synthesis) an interdisciplinary paradigm may be particularly well suited to Terrorism Studies because of its potential to bridge the current divide between ‘mainstream’ and ‘Critical Terrorism Studies.’
Conclusion

The future of Terrorism Studies depends on generating new cohorts of scholars and the production of this cohort depends at least in part on the availability of teaching faculty and courses on terrorism. This study investigated the still relatively unstudied area of the curricular component of Terrorism Studies. Future research on the subject could be enhanced by extending investigations such as the current one to a larger range of colleges and universities in the U.S., by conducting cross-national studies of terrorism courses and programs, by looking at differences in traditional and newer online courses, and by examining changes in the frequency and dominant topics of terrorism courses over time. Studies over time, in particular, could help us better gauge the evolving state and maturity of the Terrorism Studies field. To further measure growth in institutional commitment and the unique relationship between teaching (knowledge dissemination) and research (knowledge production), data should be collected on the number of faculty, researchers and graduate students that different institutions send each year to national and international conferences (e.g. ISA) to present scholarly papers on the subject of terrorism. Since no two institutions or degree programs (nor the faculty within them) are alike, quantitative analyses such as the ones presented here should also be paired with thorough qualitative analyses to enrich our understanding of the field of Terrorism Studies and how it has evolved (and continues to evolve). In addition, since research can benefit from a better understanding of the challenges of teaching a subject, qualitative work on the experiences faced by faculty trying to clarify content on the subject to students is recommended.

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Notes


[6] See L. J. Daniels, and G.L. Epstein, “Department of Homeland Security, American Association for the Advancement of Science, AAAS Report XXXVI, Research and Development FY 2012.” Available at: http://www.aaas.org/app/d/report2012; DHS funding, although high in 2003, was cut dramatically in 2007. The budget was increased in 2009 and 2010, then decreased by 10% in 2011 with university programs expected to experience a 19% drop from $49 million in FY 2010 to $40 million in FY2011 eliminating one or more university COEs and cutting $600,000 from scholarship and fellowship funding.


Today, according to data from the Naval Post Graduate School and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security there are as many as 342 homeland security degree or certificate programs at 260 US Colleges and Universities. See http://www.chds.us/?partners/institutions . Of these, 84 are bachelors programs, 89 are masters programs, 117 are certificate programs and 5 are doctoral programs in homeland security or a related field e.g. biodefense strategic security or emergency risk management. See “Colleges and Universities Offering Homeland Security Programs,” Available at http://www.chds.us/?partners/institutions.


DHS funding for university programs is proposed to be budgeted in FY 2012 at $36.6 million, $29 million or 44% less than its FY 2010 budget. See L. J. Daniels and G.L. Epstein, Department of Homeland Security, American Association for the Advancement of Science, AAAS Report XXXVI, Research and Development FY 2012. Available at http://www.aaas.org/ssp/rd/rdreport2012o.


In 1997, Edna Reid, using online bibliometrics and citation analysis, put forward a theory, that terrorism research was dominated by “invisible colleges of pro-western terrorism researchers” generating a one-sided perspective of terrorism from below (See footnote 9). In 2007, Reid and Chen, using ISI Web of Science citation data, published an updated list of 42 “core terrorism researchers” that they determined to be influential knowledge producers in the field as of 2003 (See footnote 10). More recently, the authors have republished this list of “core” researchers, as of 2003, in book form. See Chin, Hsinchun, Reid, Edna, Sinai, Joshua, Silke, Andrew and Ganor, Boaz, Terrorism Informatics: Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security (Springer, 2008).

U.S. News and World Reports provides annual rankings of more than 1,600 accredited U.S. institutes of higher learning. These rankings include 281 national universities, 250 liberal arts colleges, 996 regional colleges and universities and 81 specialty schools. Their rankings are based on a weighted formula that uses seven broad indicators: peer assessment, graduation and retention rates, faculty resources, student selectivity (e.g. admission test scores), financial resources and alumni giving.

See Philip G. Altbach, "The University as Center and Periphery", in: Teachers College Record 82 (Summer, 1981): 601-622. Altbach’s conception of center-periphery influence was developed in the context of international education but has often been used “to explain” domestic trends.


Google Scholar citations have been found to be significantly correlated with ISI citations but tend to be more comprehensive for the social sciences. See Kayvan Kousha and Mike Thewall, “Google Scholar citations and Google Web/URL citations: A multi-discipline exploratory analysis.” Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 58, no. 7 (2007): 1055-1065.
[37] The Text Analysis tool is available online at University of Illinois at Urbana website at http://mste.illinois.edu/pavel/java/text


[39] Among the terrorism scholars identified using the Google Scholar search of authors with 75+ citations for articles, chapters or books on terrorism and matched with institutions were: R.K. Betts and B. Nacos (Columbia); B. Hoffman, D. Byman, P. Pillar, F. Moghaddam (Georgetown); L. Richardson, J. Stern, P. Norris, G. Allison, B. Posen (Harvard); J. Mueller (Ohio State); J. Horgan, M. Bloom, J.A. Piazza (Penn State); A. Krueger (Princeton); L.R. Beres (Purdue); M. Crenshaw, S. Flynn (Stanford); Q. Li (Texas A&M); B. de Mesquita, R. Pape (U Chicago); C. Flint (U Illinois Urbana); T.R. Gurr (University of Maryland); S. Atran (U North Carolina Chapel Hill); G.A. Lopez (U Notre Dame); A. Kydd (U Pennsylvania); T. Sandler (U Southern California); A. Pedazhur, R. Adams (U Texas Austin); V. Volkman (U Virginia); M. Stohl (UC Santa Barbara); D. Rapoport (UCLA); R.D. Howard, R. Sawyer, J.F. Forest, J.M. Brachman.,

[40] These frequently required readings included journal articles and chapters by Mark Jurgensmeyer, Marc Sageman, Robert Pape, Russell Howard, Reid Sawyer and Natasha Bazjema, Alan Krueger and Ahmed Rashid among others.


[42] Georgetown’s graduate law program offers specific degrees including JD/LLM and LLM in National Security Law, International Affairs and Law and International Human Rights Law.

[43] A. Gordon (see note 15 above).

[44] In recent years, relevance of the center-periphery concept has undergone re-examination in the context of the changing nature of academic work, faculty flows and commodification of knowledge. See S. Gopinathan and Philip Altbach, “Rethinking Centre-Periphery,” Asia Pacific Journal of Education 24, no. 2 (2005): 117-123. Internationally, the concept is also increasingly being challenged for overestimating “central hegemony” and underestimating the agency of local actors. See Thi Kim Quy Nguyen, “Beyond Center Periphery Higher Education Development in South East Asia,” Journal of the Pacific Circle Consortium for Education 22, no. 2 (2010): 21-36.


[50] See R. Jackson who describes “Critical Terrorism Studies” as characterized, ontologically by a “general skepticism towards, a resultant reticence to employ, the ‘terrorism’ label” because in practice “this label has always been a pejorative rather than analytical term and thus to use the term is to apply a label that implies a political judgment about the legitimacy of actors and their actions.” Richard Jackson, “The Case for Critical Terrorism Studies,” Paper prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30-September 3, 2007 Available at: http://casdir.aber.ac.uk/ksmuse/bitstream/handle/2160/1945/APS-A-2007-Paper-final7 ned?sequence=1
[51] See Burton Clark above, 51.


Taking on the Persona of a Suicide Bomber: a Thought Experiment
by Anne Speckhard, Beatrice Jacuch & Valentijn Vanrompay

Abstract

Nineteen university students experimented taking on the persona of an apprehended suicide bomber. The role play explored the psychological mechanisms of dissociative phenomena, euphoria or a sense of empowerment contemplating suicide bombing; responses of imagined secondary traumatization; identification with the victim group; creation of fictive kin; choosing the (imagined) target; and their (imagined) moral reasoning. Results were eerily similar to accounts of real (failed) suicide bombers. Subjects identified with secondary trauma and fictive kin; and reported revenge and justice seeking as motivators; dissociation, some having experiences of euphoria or empowerment when contemplating strapping on a bomb. Their moral reasoning was nearly identical with the one of suicide bombers, despite none of them being Muslim. Most imagined targeting children or civilians. This leads us to the tentative conclusion that psychological mechanisms underlying the contemplation to engage in suicide terrorism may be universal.

I. Understanding Suicide Terrorism

In the West, we live in a post-modern society in which we have lost our understanding of communal values and the ideas of self-sacrifice on behalf of the group. Indeed, we struggle to comprehend an individual who does not deem his own life and pursuit of it as more sacred than anything he could achieve by setting it aside. For this reason most of the early writings on the 9-11 bombers and on suicide terrorists in general found them incomprehensible, mad, beyond reason or driven by poverty and illiteracy to commit inhuman deeds. However, in time researchers found that these conclusions were wrong and that human bombers are in the main not psychologically disturbed [1], are less impoverished and more educated than their peers (Atran, 2003; Sageman, 2004, Speckhard, 2005; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005). Indeed among samples of Palestinian (from the second intifada) and Chechen bombers it was found that suicide terrorists were often college educated and came from less impoverished sectors of their societies than their peers (Atran, 2004; Merari, 2003; Merari, 2005; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2006; Akmedova, & Speckhard, 2006).

Those who study suicide terrorism have argued that as a phenomenon it arises from a unique synergy between the personal factors and individual motivations and social political concerns that foster it. As a tactic, suicide terrorism requires an ideology of martyrdom to sustain it. This ideology, which may exist completely independent of religion, is the glue that marries the individual motivations of the “would be” human bomber to the social political factors and groups that promote its use. That the ideologies that promote the use of suicide terrorism as a tactic may exist completely independent of any religion and be utilized in support of human bombing is a crucial point to make - one that is often missed by those who lump all suicide terrorism together with so-called “Islamic” based terrorism. Indeed suicide terrorism has been used by Marxist and non-religious groups as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and is as prevalent in groups whose ideologies are not related to Islamic beliefs as those that are.

Religion, poverty, illiteracy and madness put aside, one still must ask - once the marriage of individual motivations, ideology and political goals of the sponsoring organization has been achieved - how does an individual go forward to become a human bomb? How is he or she able to knowingly get in a car, truck or even on a bicycle, or most horrific of all - strap a bomb onto his or her own body - to in essence become a human bomb that goes directly to his target to explode him- or herself? How are these individuals psychologically able to manage their fears and put aside the universal instinct for self-preservation? If it is not religion sustaining them in all cases, or madness driving them, how do suicide bombers make the decision to carry out such acts and what psychological processes aid them to go forward to their own deaths and the destruction of others - often including innocent civilians? These are the questions for which we sought answers.

We have limited answers to some of these questions from our own interviews and the research of others with failed suicide bombers – those who were apprehended prior to detonating their devices; interviews with their family members, acquaintances and handlers or senders as well as the study of the last testaments of successful bombers (Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005; Speckhard, 2005; Argo, 2003; Hafez, 2004; Atran, 2003; Merari 2003). From these sources it appears that bombers are fairly rational in their decision-making processes and that they do not appear depressed, psychologically disturbed [2] (Akhmedova, K., 2003) or suicidal in the normal sense of the word, or psychopathological in their views of others (Atran, 2003). Yet there must be some active psychological ingredient present in all of them, which makes it possible for them to do the unthinkable – die in order to kill. We were curious to explore if the ability to put aside one’s instinct for self preservation consists of universal traits that could be identified and studied and perhaps addressed when one seeks to curb the use of this particularly horrific terror tactic?

II. The Bomber Within

Indeed, after studying human bombers in Chechnya and the Palestinian territories and finding that personal experiences of daily humiliation; severe bereavement and traumatic stress, loss, frustration, desire for justice and nationhood, loss of all meaningful roles, and the desire for revenge often act as individual motivations for this type of self sacrifice, the lead author wondered if perhaps there is a universal capacity within all individuals to carry out such an act, a capacity that perhaps extends to all human beings? That perhaps we all carry a human bomber within - that every individual has their breaking point and given the right situation, circumstances, politics, and ideology anyone can become a suicide bomber? [3]

As researchers of suicide terrorism we were curious to learn about this potential breaking point and wondered if there are universal rationalizations given for and psychological defenses that are enacted by people of any nationality or religion when they consider, or actually carry out, strapping a bomb to their own bodies to go and explode themselves. Given that many real would-be bombers have been apprehended and given interviews about their decision-making process, psychological state and thoughts in carrying out such a mission, we wondered how similar the responses of ‘normal’ subjects of a similar age and educational background might be

52 May 2012
if the 'normals' were placed in a similar situation – even in a fantasy – to those of actual bombers. If so, we asked ourselves: would they make similar or very different rationalizations, speak of similar or different use of defenses? We wanted to know, if placed in such a fantasy role, whether they might voice similar or very different thoughts and feelings to those expressed by actual suicide bombers apprehended before detonating themselves.

To study this we decided to conduct a “thought experiment” in which subjects – that is university students of varied international backgrounds – were asked to take part in an exercise in which they would be asked to briefly imagine taking on the persona of a suicide bomber in order that we could study what psychological states they would experience in that role. In this exercise they were asked to enter briefly into a role play in which they took on the role of a bomber apprehended shortly after strapping on a bomb and going to his target but apprehended just prior to exploding himself and to give an interview from that psychological point of view. We wanted to learn whether, once in role, 'normal' students might give evidence of the use of psychological defenses reportedly utilized by real bombers, and whether they might identify from a distance with the traumas of others. We also wanted to know whether the concept of “fictive kin” might be operational for them. In addition, we wanted to study their decision-making process in the imaginative exercise - of how they picked a target and whether or not they justified targeting civilians.

III. Taking on the Persona of a Suicide Bomber - The “Thought Experiment”

Sample

Our thought experiment was conducted in English at a Belgian University within an English speaking college in Brussels (the Free University of Brussels, Vesalius College). 19 subjects of varied nationalities (1 each of Swedish, Bulgarian, German, Indian, Norwegian, Italian, British, Puerto Rican, Dutch, 2 unspecified, 2 Belgians, 6 Americans) and varied majors (1 philosophy; 1 anthropology; 1 economics; 1 communication; 2 psychology; 2 international studies; 3 computer science, 6 political science, and 2 unspecified), all aged between 19-24 and of both genders (7 female and 12 male) were recruited to take part in the experiment. In regard to their religious upbringing, 6 had an atheistic/agnostic background, 8 had a Christian background (5 Catholic, 1 Protestant, and 2 Orthodox), 2 had a Christian/atheist background, 2 had a Jewish background and 1 unspecified. The sample contained no one of Islamic heritage. None of the subjects had prior military experience.

Recruitment

The subjects (none of whom declined) were invited by the student members of the experimental team to take part – being invited from the hallway immediately during the time of the experiment - and told if they agreed that they should wait a short time period in the hall before being invited into the experimental room to take part in a brief psychologically oriented “thought experiment”, giving an interview on a subject that should not be embarrassing to them (following an informed consent protocol). Upon their arrival for the interview the subjects were invited to take part in the “thought experiment” in which they were asked, immediately at the time of the interview if
they would be willing to take on the persona of an individual that we would describe to them and then once having assumed that role give an interview based on the thoughts and feelings that they experienced in the role described to them. All of the subjects were told that we did not reasonably expect the experiment to cause them any harm or significant distress or humiliate them and that the only foreseeable risk to them was if they were actively suicidal. All students were screened negative for any active suicidality and informed consent was obtained prior to proceeding with the experiment, making clear to the students that they could discontinue the experiment at any time and for any reason.

The Role Play

Following obtaining informed consent and the proceeding introduction, we verbally presented to the subject the scenario for the experiment as follows:

For this experiment we would like you to take on the persona of a suicide bomber. For this role you will be a Palestinian living in the Palestinian territories. You probably know something about the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, no? (Affirmation was gained in all cases, although one (American) subject was particularly naïve and even unsure where Israel was located). As a Palestinian living in the Palestinian territories you are from time to time subjected to all day curfews lasting sometimes for several days in which you are required to stay in your home. You suffer many small indignities and your life is not easy. Your economic situation is difficult and you often face the necessity to cross checkpoints to get to school or work if you work. You are aware of the Israeli practice of destroying the homes of suicide bombers, although, on the other hand, you also know of the practice of families of “martyrs” receiving financial compensations often including new homes and raised standards of living as a reward for their family member’s action. You have, for various reasons, decided to become a suicide bomber. You may have many motivations for deciding to become a bomber, which you are free to make up as you role play, but we would like you to consider that there was a particular galvanizing event in your decision making process - the fact that you witnessed, not in person, but on television, the mistaken shootings of two young children (boys) by Israelis special forces - an event which may in reality occur occasionally. This event disturbed you greatly. Likewise you were not actively recruited by a terrorist organization to become a bomber, but instead you volunteered, seeking out the terrorist organization yourself, asking for the means to carry out this act. You also picked your own target, which you are free now to pick in the role-play. It might be a pizza parlor, a bus, a military checkpoint, or any crowded area, or place. You are free to choose it. You may have a preference for a place populated by soldiers or by civilians. You may choose to avoid a place where there are many mothers and children or that may be less important to you. In any case you were furnished by the terrorist organization with a suicide belt and the instructions on how to use it– you know this device by which suicide terrorists carry out their acts - it’s strapped to their bodies and they
have a detonator? (This was answered in the affirmative in all cases). Now, to make this “thought experiment” plausible we ask you to pretend that you went so far as to strapping on the belt and going to the target where you were about to detonate, but that you were discovered and apprehended before detonating – hence you are still alive and we can now interview you about your thoughts and feelings up to that point. Having been apprehended you are, in this scenario, currently in an Israeli prison and life is not so great for you. (Then asking the subject directly.) Is this okay of you? You can take on this role and we can begin our interview? (The answer was affirmative in all cases, although often with some nervous laughter and brief expressions of doubt about one’s ability to carry on “in role”).

The rational for giving this scenario was as follows: We were interested to compare what average college students of varied nationalities and religious backgrounds would say when role playing the part of a Palestinian bomber to what actually apprehended Palestinian and other human bombers often say about themselves; we also wanted to compare what our subjects would say with what the experts on real human bombers have to say about them.[4] To do so, we wanted our person in role-play to have suggestions about how stressful and humiliating aspects of daily life can be for Palestinians (economic hardships, curfews, checkpoints, etc.), particularly during the time period of the Second Intifada when there was a huge spike in suicide terrorism. Likewise, we wanted our fantasy role-play bomber to reflect on the current Palestinian terrorism situation in which bombers more often recruit themselves than are being recruited. We were also curious to know how active and strong the concept of “fictive kin” and secondary traumatization might be if we introduced into the imagined role play the aspect of having witnessed not in person - but over the television - an Israeli act of aggression (admittedly a mistaken shooting) of children not related by blood to the person witnessing it via television. We wanted to know whether our role player would show somehow that he or she had psychologically identified with the children victims, even going so far as to consider them related to him or her in some manner (i.e. fictive kin). We also wished to learn how our role player would pick his or her target if free to do so and what he or she would feel in imagination when “recalling” strapping on an explosive self-detonating device. We did, however, not give any additional information about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict other than these specific bits of information because we did not want to introduce any potential bias to the role-play. The information was presented verbally because the subjects were of many different nationalities and more proficient in oral versus written English. The verbal explanation also opened rapport and facilitated the move to the experimental interview.

The interview began immediately at this point, with the experimenters asking the subject how he was being treated in prison, about their family members and if their families knew where he was and if he had contact with them and concerns about them. All of the subjects went immediately “into role” and deepened their experience of the role as they proceeded with the interview. The subjects were asked how they decided to become “martyrs”, using this word to affirm their assumed world-view. After discussing the jail and their imagination of their families all of the subjects went deeply into their assumed roles and moved easily to speaking freely in response to research questions posed to them about how they decided to become bombers and how they
picked their targets. After this, the subjects were asked to describe how they felt upon receiving the bomb and strapping it on to their bodies, what they felt at that moment and what happened as they moved to their target. The interview ended with their imagined description of how the scenario ended in arrest and imprisonment.

Following the conclusion of their role play, all of the subjects were carefully debriefed with questions about how they felt participating in the experiment, whether or not they were surprised by their own answers (most were), whether it was difficult to move into the role play (all said it was strange at first but that they easily moved into it as they began to make up their story and that they strongly identified with the character they role-played - even though most had little to no knowledge of either the subject of suicide bombing or the Palestinian/Israeli conflict). Lastly, subjects were assessed to be sure they had moved completely out of the role play, were back to “normal”, and were not emotionally upset. (The process upset only one woman and this was due to her alarm over the fact that she had expressed a strong aspect of revenge stating when in role that she would target young children. She received further debriefing about her strong identification with the traumas of the children “shot on television” and became calm and self accepting again, although she remained surprised at the intensity of her desire for revenge in the role play). Subjects were then thanked for their help in the research project.

IV. Results

The results of this experiment are quite interesting in light of how “normal” college students approach the role of a suicide bomber in comparison with the information available about the mentality and decision-making of real suicide bombers (from interviews with apprehended bombers, their family members, close associates, hostages and senders). We were particularly struck by how easily a normal student would take on this role and imagine making similar decisions and describe similar mental processes to real suicide bombers. This leads us to conclude that perhaps the mentality of revenge, generalizability of revenge to wider targets than those who caused the original harm, and the psychological defenses enacted to face one’s own death by self-explosion are not limited to bombers but are universal to all persons. We discuss our results in comparison with existing data below:

Witnessing Trauma, Identifying with the Victim and the Concept of Fictive Kin

The concepts of secondary traumatization (Atran, 2003; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2006), witnessing or identifying with the victim has a large psychological literature. Indeed the current definition of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) defines an event capable of engendering acute or posttraumatic stress disorder as one in which the person experiences, witnesses, or is confronted with an event or events that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others and that the person’s response involves intense fear, helplessness, or horror (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed DSM-IV-R, American Psychiatric Association, 1994).

The fact that witnessing or experiencing injustices in a conflict zone can be an individual motivator for terrorist activity including becoming a human bomber has been borne out in many
research endeavors including research interviews of both Chechens and Palestinians (Argo, 2004; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005; Speckhard, & Akmedova, 2006a; Speckhard, & Akhmedova, 2006b; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005). Clearly absorbing the traumas of others and identifying with them can be a motivating force both within conflict zones and even far from them.

The likelihood of posttraumatic responses occurring in those living in conflict and terror ridden zones via witnessing versus personal and direct experience and even outside those zones is greatly increased these days by satellite television and Internet coverage. Indeed Nicole Argo (2006) reported the following from one of her Palestinian research interviews:

The difference between the first intifada and the second is television. Before, I knew when we were attacked here, or in a nearby camp, but the reality of the attacks everywhere else was not so clear. Now, I cannot get away from Israeli attacks - the TV brings them into my living room. When they are not in my camp, they are in Rafah, Gaza City, Ramallah, Jenin.... And you can't turn the TV off. How could you live with yourself? At the same time, you can't ignore the problem - what are you doing to protect your people? We live in an internal struggle. Whether you choose to fight or not, every day is this internal struggle. - PFLP leader, Khan Yunis, June 2004.

Incarcerated Palestinian “would be” suicide terrorists also recount their traumatic stress responses after viewing televised images of violence. “The things we see on television are nauseating and make us lose our taste for life....” “Beforehand I saw pictures of dead or wounded children on television...” One such respondent even goes so far as to credit what he saw on television as the main motivation for his thwarted act of suicide terrorism, “The pictures we saw on television are what influenced me and pushed me to make the decision to do the operation” (Hass, 2004).

Terror-sponsoring organizations understand this psychological effect and make use of televised and Internet images to motivate and capture impressionistic youth into joining Jihadist groups. Indeed some of the images found on the Internet used on behalf of promoting Al Qaeda type terrorist ideologies urging violent responses to the West have become iconic. When one delves deeper into the images and stories behind them, the truth is often much different than what is portrayed, but like all iconic images – the truth is often of much less importance than what the images have come to represent – a rallying call to action on behalf of the downtrodden and victimized.

In this research we were curious to learn if we introduced the element of witnessing trauma into an imaginary role play – in this case witnessing an act of mistaken aggression over the television, but not in person – in which an Israeli soldier mistakenly fires upon and kills two Palestinian boys would act strongly as a motivator and rationalization for becoming a suicide terrorist. We suggested to our subject that this was a type of “galvanizing event”, something that pushed the “would be” terrorist into action but we left it up to the student to incorporate this aspect of the narrative into his or her own role play. We were curious to know how much impact witnessing over television, but not experiencing in reality would play a part in an imagined role-play.
concerning what the person offered as rationalizations, justifications and motivations for violence.

Moreover, we were curious about the concept of fictive kin – if and how the subject might incorporate this concept into their role-play. Scott Atran (2003) writes about this anthropological concept in terms of terrorism studies stating that current terrorist ideologies, particularly those of an Islamic nature and their sponsoring units often promote this concept within their ideology and practices. They do this by referring to other Muslims, albeit individuals of completely differing cultures and nationalities undergoing traumas in other parts of the world as fictive kin naming them “brothers”. On the home front, they also make use of this concept by encouraging terrorist members to identify with their terror cell mates as fictive kin - being loyal to and willing to die for them as they would for mother, father, brother or sister – a phenomena we have found in our research as well (Speckhard, & Ahkmedova, 2005). We were interested to learn if our subjects would incorporate and identify with as “fictive kin” - the story about two killed children that we had offered them - into their imagined world. We coded for evidence of identifying with fictive kin if the subject created a family member in imagined role play of the same age as the boys and/or directly named a relationship to the boys – i.e. stating they could have been my sons or brothers (and therefore I was willing to die on their behalf).

Remarkably, this concept was quite active in the sample (see Table 1). Seventy-nine percent of the sample (15 of the 19) subjects identified immediately with the shooting of the two small children by fantasizing themselves as either the parent of small children or the older sibling of younger siblings – hence it appeared that they had made the shootings of the small children that they were told were only witnessed from afar (over television) personally “real” for them and a traumatic event with which they identified. One subject, for instance, told us that he was the father of two children and spoke about how disturbed he was by what he had viewed on television, “I saw on television innocents just born into this war killed brutally.” Another male student explains how he kept his feelings at bay (in role play) for strapping on the bomb by focusing on his feelings for the children who were killed, “I was thinking of the kids at home the whole time, it made me stronger … it could have happened to them. It could have been my brothers. As I went toward the target I didn’t look to the soldiers. I was thinking of those two boys - it made me stronger. I felt conscious of what I was going to do, to help stop massacres. Everyday kids die from Israelis soldiers.”

Television and Internet images are an amazing medium when one considers their potential to traumatize. Even when one witnesses events from a distance over this medium, the psychological impact can be immense and the memory of it can be confused with having had the experience in reality. Take, for instance, one subject who was told by the researchers that he witnessed the event on television but in the interview tells us he saw the shooting with his own eyes (neither is true, but he confused having been told he saw it on television with having seen it in reality). From our own interviews with terrorists (Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2005) and those of others (Haas, 2004; Argo, 2003) we know that many strongly identify with traumas they have only seen over the television. From this research as well as our field interviews we suspect that many people who view traumas over television and the Internet may feel this way. The same is true for victims of terrorism; some have strong and acute stress responses from viewing televised images of events they were not even close to experiencing.
Humans have a strong, possibly innate, desire for, and willingness to enforce, fairness. There are a limited number of ways to deal with an offense: denying the hurt, reframing it in some way that explains or justifies the offender’s behavior, receiving fair restitution, forgiving, accepting the transgression, or obtaining successful revenge. Revenge is also something that is often claimed to be related to Islamic related terrorist ideologies as though Islam is to blame, when in fact the desire for, and willingness to enforce, fairness – even by enacting revenge upon an offender – is more than likely to have an innate basis which can be universally found in all persons.

Indeed it was reported in Science (Knutson, 2004) that researchers studying the concept of revenge in laboratory settings found that people playing a game with real money will pay a fine to punish players who stray from concepts of fair play. The laboratory game was set up so that in each interaction a subject was allowed to choose to give their partner money, which was then quadrupled for the recipient. The player receiving money was then given the chance to split half of this windfall. That is, he could reciprocate in fairness to the first player by sharing half of it or defect from the game and keep the money himself. If the receiving partner decided not to reciprocate and defected, the first subject could choose to administer punishment. In the initial trial, the punishing player did not pay to punish, but subsequently the punishing player was only able to punish by fining the other player for not sharing his windfall by having to pay from his own money half the amount of the fine to do so. In both cases, brain imaging of the punishing
player suggests that there is an anticipated pleasure associated with the satisfaction of punishing a transgressor and that this pleasure exists even when one must pay to do so. If viewed in strictly economic terms, paying to punish another player is irrational behavior. However, when one factors in the emotional pleasure and satisfaction of punishing a transgressor, this benefit then outweighs spending costly personal resources (i.e. in this case money) to do so.

The Knutson study, which is only one of a growing body of literature, underlies the growing recognition that perhaps concerns over social justice are innate. While extrapolating from laboratory findings of concepts of fair play to individuals witnessing what they perceive as socially unjust actions is perhaps unmerited, it does shed some light on why individuals – even human bombers - might be willing to put aside the personal costs (i.e. sacrificing themselves) in order to punish others, and thereby depriving the anticipated satisfaction of ensuring that transgressors receive their just due. Indeed researchers have often heard exactly this justification given by “would be” bombers, in bomber’s last testimonies, from their family members and close associates etc. (Merari, 2005; Speckhard, 2005b; Speckhard, & Akhmedova, 2005; Argo, 2003)

It is also interesting to consider the concept of generalized revenge which relates to the individual’s, as well as his sponsoring organization’s justifications for targeting acts of revenge to a wider group, including civilians, than those who in the bomber’s and the sponsoring organization’s perceptions are directly responsible for the injustices. Akhmedova (2003) has studied this concept in Chechnya. There, the majority of the population consists of ethnically Islamic people who share in their Chechen traditions the ideology of revenge. According to this ethos when a family member is harmed or killed it is the responsibility of specific family members to seek out the transgressor and make him pay accordingly. This ideology of revenge is strictly codified and does not in normal practice spread beyond seeking out the originator of the harm or his close family and obtaining repayment for his deed. Recently however, with widespread war, resulting psychological traumatization, bereavement and the importation of a terrorist ideology this mindset is changing: revenge is becoming generalized in the minds of many.

Akhmedova (2003) found in her study of 653 clinical subjects who had undergone war traumas that those who had the highest levels of posttraumatic effects had undergone a transformation in this regard (Akhmedova, 2003). They endorsed revenge in thirty-nine percent of the cases and no longer regarded revenge as a duty to find and repay in kind the person who had harmed their family, but instead generalized their revenge – to enact harm on any member of the ethnic group from whom the harm had originated (i.e. the Russians military or civilians). With increased traumatization, generalized revenge became both sufficient and acceptable. There were also positive correlations between their endorsement for revenge and increasing levels of religiosity, aggression, suspiciousness, and negativism (Akhmedova, 2003).

We see a willingness to target civilians reflected in the Palestinian case. In a research interview from his jail cell in Jericho, the leader of the PFLP, Ahmed Sadat, (Speckhard Palestinian interview October 2004) told us that there are no civilians, except for children in Israel because all women and all men train for the defense force at age 18 and they all serve in reserve units. Therefore, when one targets adult civilians in his logic, one is targeting the defense force.
Likewise a mother from Gaza whose children were recently killed in the crossfire between terrorists and Israelis cried out after picking up the body parts of her innocent children, “Let Sharon lose his son. Let Sharon collect the parts of his son”. Then, pointing to her own body, “Put the explosives here! I’ll go to the tank and explode myself” (Erlanger, S. 2005).

In regard to our thought experiment study, we were curious to observe how easily normal students far removed from conflict zones would, while in role-play, embrace the concept of revenge and how much they would generalize their revenge-seeking behaviors to justify targeting civilians (see Table 2). In this case, it was very interesting to see that only twenty-six percent (5/19) of the subjects who when given complete freedom to chose their target reported limiting their choice to a strictly military or government target (i.e. military checkpoint, government house, etc.). Remarkably, one third of the sample (6/19) deliberately chose targets involving children, teenagers, and extremely sensitive places (children’s schools, McDonald’s, the Western (Wailing) Wall, UN conference, etc.) in order - as they stated - to inflict the worst and most horrific revenge on their enemies. One young woman explained, “I chose the Western Wall because it is where I’d inflict the most pain, hit them where it hurts.” The remainder or forty-two percent of the sample (8/19) chose civilian targets but did not mention specifically targeting children, teenagers or extremely sensitive locations (i.e. cafes, buses, busy markets, etc.). Hence the majority of the sample – seventy-four percent (14/19) displayed behaviour in line with the concept of generalized revenge and the willingness to target civilian populations.

Examples of statements made by the students about how they picked their targets were as follows: A young man explains, “I was going to the government building, because I wanted the people in charge with some authority to die.” A young woman states, “I didn’t think for a moment of the people I would kill, of their pain or their relatives’ emotions.” A young man states that his target was a school. When asked why, he explained, “They kill our children all the time. If you want to hurt them you have to hurt their future.” Another young woman stated, “I went on a crowded bus full of civilians. Because they pick civilians - to kill them.” A male student explained, “My religion does not encourage killing, but after their atrocities it is what they deserved. There is no distinguishing between victims, as many people could suffer for what had been done.” Regarding targeting civilians, a female stated, “I had a quick flash of pity, but I didn’t let it overtake me.” Another male student recounted, “I wanted to shock as much as possible. I wanted to be sure it will be on television. To be sure of the impact.” When asked if he felt any guilt he said, “I’ve been through so much, all I wanted was revenge.”

The student’s own amazement at themselves, at how easily and completely they could take on in a role-play the perceived injustices of Palestinians and how strongly they wished in the role-play to enact revenge – and to do so in an expressive manner – causing their enemy to feel the same pain they felt, was one of the most discussed aspects in debriefing with the students. Most stated in the role-play and the debriefing that they understood that acts of revenge would likely do very little to change the situation and might even worsen it, but that it was still important to enact revenge to express their pain and for purposes of social justice. One young woman, as stated earlier, became upset with herself and cried briefly after the experiment because she had said she would target a children’s school – an aspect of her desire for revenge that deeply surprised and horrified her. Most of the students in the debriefing admitted they knew very little about suicide terrorism in general and had few opinions on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict prior to participating,
yet they surprised themselves that they had identified so strongly with the Palestinians and chosen civilian targets on the basis of the desire for revenge.

Table 2: Goals according to Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenge</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Better</td>
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</tbody>
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Motivations and Commitment to Carrying out the Act

*When we asked our role-playing students about their motivations for carrying out a suicide act, sixty-three percent (12/19) cited oppression or suffering; forty-two percent (8/19) referred to the “fictive kin” story we had told them about the two boys being killed; another eleven percent (2/19) referred to stories they invented about other blood relatives being killed; and five subjects (twenty-six percent) cited expressive reasons – “to give a message”.[6] Likewise, when we asked them about their goal in carrying out such an act, seventy-nine percent (15/19) stated enacting revenge and acting for reasons of social justice; eleven percent (2/19) stated political goals of bringing freedom or a better place to live; twenty-one percent (4/19) wanted to send a message; and one subject wanted to bring media attention and public awareness to the Palestinian cause. An example of one male student’s rationale was as follows: “(After) all the suffering of my people I wanted to do something. I saw a lot of people die. I just want to do something.” He goes on to say, eerily echoing words often heard by real bombers, “(It’s) something you have to do. It’s duty for your people – nothing more.”*
Out of curiosity, we decided to also ask the role-play students whether, upon being caught, they regretted having carried out their mission or if they remained committed to it. Half the sample volunteered that they would do it again. It was interesting to observe the emotional effect of taking on a martyr identity – that, once in role, they became very committed to their role and the sense of purpose derived from it. Without any suggestions to do so, many described their act as self-sacrifice for their communities and took on a sense of honor for what they were doing. One for instance stated, “I was very angry at these people for stopping me from fulfilling my destiny. (Would you repeat it?) “Yes, I’d plan it better. I’d use a way they couldn’t stop me.” Another young man described his conflicting feelings (imagining) strapping on a bomb - feelings for which he ultimately came to terms with by seeing himself as a martyr for a greater cause, “it (the bomb) felt very, very cold. Physical aspects, it takes a lot of conviction, conflicting feelings, (but) in the end you know what you have to do. Intense emotions, a sense of power, sense of duty, purpose. (Fear?) I tried to overcome it. I convinced myself. I felt fear, but it was something I could deal with. I should respond to the call to arms. It was an important way to use my life.” This same young man stated, “I feel like I accomplished something, I was ready to die. I’d do it again. I blame them, they drove me to do this to save my people.” Another young man stated that in strapping on the bomb he felt a, “Sense of power, a sense of duty – a purpose.” Another young man explains that, facing death, “It was worth something. I was not afraid.” A young woman compares life in general to her willingness to sacrifice herself, “I don’t really mind. There is nothing so amazing on this earth. I wanted to help.” A young woman states that even the expressive nature of the act made it worth dying for, echoing how many Palestinian bombers speak of their recognition that often their acts do very little to change things but at least express their pain and make the other feel it as well (Argo, 2003). This young subject states, “It was worth it to die if it sends the message.”

Feelings About Facing Death

All the subjects were asked about their feelings facing death. Sixty-eight percent (13/19) stated that they were peaceful when facing death. A young man stated, “I’d be in a much better place. I told my family of my plans, goodbye, it was peaceful on both sides. (Their) provider has left them in a most honored way.” A very bright young female student stated in her role-play a somewhat irrational view of how death would bring her peace of mind, perhaps reflecting how young people often do not totally comprehend the finality of death. She explained that she viewed facing death as, “Peaceful, I’d be at peace, no longer frustrated and no longer see others frustrated. It would be good for my own state of mind.” Perhaps this can be compared to the real thwarted Palestinian student human bomber who agreed to be a bomber but told his sender he would have to wait for his mission until the day after he completed his exams – as though having completed his exams would make any difference after his death.

Emotional State and Use of Dissociative Defenses to Face Strapping on the Bomb

Dissociative defenses [7] are commonly active in survivors of psychological traumas (those with acute and posttraumatic stress disorder) and in individuals who grow up under repetitively traumatic circumstances, such as those that characterize the lives of many suicide bombers.
Dissociation - that is the disruption of the normally integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity, or perception of the environment - as well as the ability to enter and make use of a dissociative trance state – is frequently observed in trauma survivors. Traumatized individuals, especially those who have suffered multiple and repeat traumas (particularly in childhood) have often learned to utilize this defense to detach themselves from overwhelming horrifying, terrifying and life-threatening circumstances.

Similarly, individuals with near-death experiences often report dissociative responses to them such as depersonalization (the feeling of being outside one’s body) or derealization (feeling things are not real). In the near death moment, individuals often report feeling as if they are outside of their bodies, observing from a distance, as if everything is not real, or as if they are watching a movie, are still, blissful, joyful, etc. (Greyson, 2000).

Likewise, dissociation is a defense frequently engaged in individuals enacting normal suicide probably to overcome the horror of taking one’s own life. Bruce Bonger (2004), for instance, recalled his work studying the video and audio recordings left behind of normal (i.e. non-politically motivated) suicides who recorded taking their own lives. He stated that, generally speaking, there is clear evidence that the individual becomes highly dissociative as he makes the last moves before taking his own life, particularly when using a violent method. Similarly, an Israeli study of ‘normal’ suicides showed that suicidal people differ from non-suicidal in their tendencies towards body dissociation, body protection and body in general (Orbach, Israel, et al. 2001; Speckhard, 2004). Their study showed that people who experience physical or mental traumas often change their perceptions and body experiences, and suffer symptoms such as bodily detachment. They also found a very high correlation between dissociation and suicide, suggesting that early trauma can lead to dissociative episodes and furthermore to suicide ideation.[8]

The dissociative function – that is the ability to enter into a trance state and separate oneself from fear, dread, and grief – seems to be both a facilitator and a commonly spoken about characteristic of those who commit acts of suicide terrorism. Failed bombers often speak of utilizing what appears to be a dissociative defense to manage their fears in strapping on a bomb and moving toward their own self-induced deaths. Almost universally, the putative bombers describe their psychological state (with their bombs strapped on) as one of “floating” or “bliss”, or they report having “felt nothing”, etc. Such descriptions are consistent with dissociative trance and feature prominently and repeatedly in accounts given by failed suicide terrorists to journalists and researchers (Hassan, 2001; Haas, 2004; Speckhard, & Akmedova, 2005; Speckhard, 2005). When bombers speak of feeling in this dissociated state, a sense of euphoria or “dissociative” bliss (Speckhard, A. 2005), we hypothesize that they have accessed a neurobiological brain state which is in all likelihood endorphin induced - as is also hypothesized for other self injurious behaviors (i.e. self cutting, anorexia, bulimia).[9]

An example evidencing the dissociative defense in a real bomber follows below. Arin, a twenty-four year Palestinian woman was arrested after going to bomb herself. She had worn her explosive belt for six hours, but opted against detonating and returned home. She was interviewed in Israeli prison in March 2005 by the first author (Speckhard, 2005). Arin recalled her normal tendency to dissociate when experiencing negative situations and emotions and her
mental state with the belt on. “I was not conscious. When I meet bad things I, Arin, move away. I collect the bad things and work out of myself.” She stated, with the bomb on, “I felt very nervous. I felt my mind stopped. For six hours I cannot think.” Then she stated how her dissociative trance was interrupted by seeing babies. “Just at the last moment. I looked at the people. I looked at the babies. I saw babies. I thought if he dies what should I tell God? What should I tell Him? If he wants to cut my life and take my soul okay, but I don’t have the right.”

We were particularly interested to learn if the normal students in our role-play exercise would also give evidence of the use of a dissociative defense when imagining strapping on a bomb and if they would also speak of any type of “high” or “blissful” state in describing the time when they approached (in imagination) the final moments before detonating their devices. We were surprised to find that, even in role-play, a majority of the sample, seventy-four percent (14/19) referred to what could be considered a dissociative defense in response to imagining strapping on the bomb. Thirty-seven percent (7/19) of the subjects also described using this dissociative response in a way that went so far as to induce (in their imaginations) a euphoric state of mind. These responses are described below:

A young female student stated, “It (the bomb) felt heavy, not only physically but emotionally heavy, because there was no turning back once it’s on. I had no fear – more of a tranquility. Committing so strongly – it is like your medicine, your remedy – that this will solve everything. … The journey with the belt – it was like a dream, I floated along. I interacted with people, but my mind was not there. I was not totally unconscious, but it was a muted scene, my senses were dulled. It felt euphoric, everything at ease.” When asked how she felt about being caught, she stated that being arrested felt like “being woken up from a dream.” When asked whether, upon being freed, she would attempt another attack, she answered, “I’m not sure if I would do it again. It’s like a drug. It’s very euphoric, but I’m not sure I would want to do it again, rather just remember it the way it was.”

Another female student told us, “It was very easy for me to contact the organization. I did it very quickly after I decided it – it had to be quick. I was in a kind of euphoria. I was afraid it wouldn’t last – I had to hurry. I saw a fantasy of myself as a saint, a martyr in a children’s book… I was happy people will talk about me.” Another female stated how she felt strapping on the bomb (in imagination), “I felt it was the beginning, starting. Kind of feels like the first step. From then on I started getting adrenalin, a good feeling. I was not scared. I thought of my mission that I was going to fulfill.”

A male student explained his imagined mental state with the bomb strapped on, in these words: “Right before I was caught. I felt a very peaceful moment. I’d made everything let go, I’d been cleansed of all doubt, all big burdens lifted from me. There were very vivid, very bright colors, and I could smell the air. My adrenaline was pumping and I noticed everything, like in sports.”

A young male student explained about putting on the bomb, “It felt good. When you walk in with a sense of purpose, righteousness, correct actions.” Answering when we asked him if he felt afraid, “No of what? You know you are going to die.” But he did admit that he was afraid of death at other times, but in this purposeful incident he said he was not scared at all. “I was calm. It’s like being in control of your own destiny. No matter what happens you can always blow yourself up. I felt confidence and knowledge that my destiny is already sealed - no one can
change it. You lose that insecurity of the future.” When asked if any of these feelings approximated a sense of bliss or euphoria he answered, “In a way. I felt calmness and security. It wasn’t happiness. It was knowing you are doing something right. I didn’t consider the possibility of being caught.”

A male subject explained pushing his fear out of conscious awareness in favor of focusing solely on his goal at the time when he was anticipating exploding himself, “(There was) not fear – totally empty. I was waiting to explode the bomb. Only my family came to my mind. I will leave them behind for a greater cause.” Another young man stated, “I didn’t feel it. I was conscious I would kill some people, at least I hoped to. It was the last thing I would carry. … (Fear?) I was trying not to think of it. I was not really conscious of what I had.”

A female student explained how she (imagined) feeling putting on the bomb, “I was taught how it would work, I knew if… weird at first. We had practiced. I knew it was the right moment to do it. I knew I would be honoured by family and friends. I had negative feelings that I had to do it to be noticed and then I felt good, the cause would be good. I felt happy because I knew it was good, because I felt a real sense of pride.” She goes on to explain how she used a dissociative defense to shut out her fear and recognition of the finality of death. “I was very focused, shut everything out. (In your own world?) Yes. …You just see the plan, in the future, getting to that goal. I don’t know why I wasn’t terrified. I knew everything would be better afterward.”

Religion and Dissociation

Some students mixed statements of religious beliefs with descriptions of their dissociated mental state. A male student, for instance, explained how he felt (in imagination) with the bomb strapped on: “When one is dying for one’s religion it is the most noble death one can experience. I also felt heavier. I felt a certain peace of mind. I was dying for my religion and using my religion. I felt a little high on myself, in that state of mind – you have to understand, everything stops around you - you’re in your own little world. It’s strange. (A good feeling?) Yes definitely. (Still have it?) Yes. (Could it be stronger?) Yes by completing my mission. I felt untouchable and a sense of awe.” Another young man regarded his future in terms of religion, “It’s up to Allah – he will decide what he will do for me. I wanted to die for him.” A young woman stated, “I was very scared, I was scared of the physical hurt, the pain. I was not scared to leave my family because I was persuaded that I would see them again – I am very religious. They will be with me in heaven. If I die tomorrow I will see them again. The only thing I feared was the pain.”

Strategies of Mind Control

Even those who did not give decisive evidence of dissociation cited other psychological strategies to enable them to strap on the bomb and go forward in their imagined role. One young man referred to using “self-induced mind control”; another stated, “Yes I was nervous. I tried to keep my feelings inside as best I could. I just tried to keep to myself, not to make eye contact.” Another male student stated, “I was trying not to think of it. I controlled my fear by imagining all the good - that I was helping, (I) kept my feelings far away.” Another young man expressed the importance of community and family support in keeping focused on his self-destructive goal,
“I didn’t have to train. (I was) mentally prepared totally because I had nothing else except family but I know they agree and are really proud that I did this.” Another male student stated that he controlled his emotions, “by (the) knowledge that my death would have a purpose. I was thinking of suffering we have to go through each day. (Focused?) Yes, but in a meditative way. I told myself, this is the way it should be.”

Positive Emotions with Bomb Strapped on

Incredibly, when asked about what their mental and emotional state was with the bomb strapped on, eighty-four percent (16/19) of the sample imagined experiencing positive feelings going forward to explode themselves.

Feelings of Empowerment

Forty seven percent (9/19) stated that they suddenly felt empowered as they strapped on the bomb. A male student explained, “(Once the bomb is strapped on) “your actions are inevitable – no one can stop you no matter what you do. It (the sense of feeling powerful) happens at the decision point, when I knew I wasn’t going to stop.” Another male stated, “It felt like I had extra power. Knowing I could take someone’s life with the press of a button. It felt really good – like I could do anything.” Another male, “I felt powerful, very powerful, full of courage, full of might. It was the first time I felt that way.” A young woman stated, “yes it has power to kill and to take lives without them having any say, like a surprise. I had never taken another’s life in my hands before. I had to be strong and couldn’t back down. I couldn’t let fear interrupt my mission. I didn’t feel joy but pride.”

A young male stated, “(It was the) first time in my life (that I) feel powerful over those people who steal the power from me. I never felt powerful. First time in life I had ability to do something. I felt in control of my destiny.”
Table 3: Emotional State Participants Expressed Regarding Strapping on Bomb

V. Implications
This study, while rather unorthodox in its methods of comparing role-playing 'normal' college students to actual suicide bombers and its reliance on the one side to imaginary experiences does manage to shed some light on how even a normal college student could see him- or herself at a point where he or she is ready to sacrifice him- or herself for what he or she sees as a greater good. In this case, our role-playing bomber students spoke about enacting through terrorism revenge seeking, expressive and social justice seeking behaviors. We were amazed to observe how easily the mix of circumstances, situation, individual motivations, ideology of terrorism and terror sponsorship can lead to an individual, at least in role play, imagining doing what, to Westerners, is nearly always viewed as a complete and total anathema.

Our student subjects were as surprised as we were with how easily they slipped into this role and how deeply they embraced it - however momentarily. They were impressed, as were we, how once in role, they felt strongly the desire to enact revenge – even choosing children, young people, and sacred places as their targets. Moreover, we were deeply impressed with the fact that while in role-play nearly three quarters of our student sample spontaneously referred to enacting a dissociative defense to enable them to imagine strapping a bomb to their bodies, with one quarter of the sample taking this imagined defense to the point of inducing an imagined state of euphoria.

Chillingly, the students felt empowered with a bomb strapped on and imagined it as a positive rather than negative experience. Likewise, over half of them stated that they would repeat their attempt if they got the chance. We were deeply struck by how impressionable this age group appeared to be and how easily in role-play they could glorify the idea of giving their lives for something greater than themselves. Self-sacrifice and seeing oneself as a hero, appeared
important in their descriptions of why they would do it and remain committed to trying to repeat it.

While we cannot know how closely imagined experiences would match the real world - and this was admittedly a small exploratory study - we can compare the role-play students’ responses to real world human bombers. In doing so, we find many matches. Both speak of enacting a dissociative defense even to the point of feeling a state of euphoria to enable them to overcome the self-preservation instinct and sacrifice themselves by explosive device. Both justify the act by reasons of enacting revenge, seeking social justice and expressing pain. Both ignore the criminal aspects of their act and consider it instead in terms of taking on a positive identity – the sacrificial martyr on behalf of the community and for the greater good. Both speak of being a bomber as a positive versus negative experience that they regret not having succeeded in carrying out. In the case of real bombers, these rationalizations may have been suggested to them by their sponsoring organization or the terrorist ideology – in the case of our role playing bombers they came up with them spontaneously with little reference to, or knowledge about, terrorism studies. Indeed, in the debriefing period we found that none of the students had strong feelings or in-depth knowledge about the political situation in Israel or about suicide bombing in general.

Alarmingly, this group of students also provides evidence that primary traumatization experiences may not be necessary as motivators for this type of revenge seeking behavior – that secondary traumatization and identification with victims as “fictive kin” can be equally powerful motivating forces. This is what is seen in non-conflict zones such as Morocco and in Western Europe where instigators have radicalized terrorist recruits through Internet downloads that helped them to identify with the traumas of Muslims in Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq or Afghanistan (Speckhard, 2005; 2008).

Just as many human bombers are not motivated in any sense by religion despite Islam often being blamed as the source of all suicide terrorism, none of our students were of Islamic background. Yet they easily embraced this act in role-play and, in doing so, gave very similar responses to actual bombers. Clearly being able to realistically contemplate the use of this terror tactic is neither limited to people of Islamic background nor to Islam.

The implications of this experimental study for counterterrorism experts are that we must consider the motivating role of injustices and experiences of psychological trauma – even witnessing from afar - over Internet or television the traumas of others – in potentially opening a pathway and motivation for individuals to consider human bombing. Our study underlines the fact that terror-sponsoring organizations that promote their suicide bombing ideologies over the Internet, making use of visual images and films of the traumas of others – particularly those they can somehow link to their witnessing audiences as “fictive kin” (i.e. your Islamic brothers in Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, etc.) - have in their repertoire powerful psychological tools that can strongly motivate individuals into action. Indeed, in Brussels the authors have learned that in certain Internet cafes invitations appear as “pop ups” on the screen to the browser to consider joining the “worldwide jihad”; it directs the interested recipient to further information and contacts. Given how easily we observed our students taking on a martyr identity for a role play and identifying strongly with the victims of injustice (i.e. the two boys we told them about who
many identified in their role play as fictive kin) our findings suggest that normal European and American youth of this age, if psychologically vulnerable for some reason, may not be so difficult to pull into these types of activities.

Currently Europe is home to large pockets of disenfranchised youth, many Muslim, who can readily identify with their oppressed “Muslim” brothers in other lands. Given our findings, we should not be surprised that recruiters are able to use the Internet and images of injustices in other parts of the world to foster identification with, and even ties of “fictive kin” on behalf of the “victims” shown. When they couple this with an ideology that promotes self sacrifice and human bombing to help the victims and as a means of attaining a positive self identity, it may not be difficult for them to move impressionable young people to action. Indeed, Europe has already reported cases of cells and self-radicalization over the Internet, and many more report about recruiters using such images in person. It is important also to say, given our findings of how easily normal students could identify with this role, that it may not be only Muslim youth who are vulnerable but youth in general - and even older persons who are lacking positive life paths and who fall under the influence of such suggestions. We already have evidence of such cases from Europe – Richard Reid (the shoe bomber), Muriel Degauque (the Belgian woman who blew herself up in Iraq), and cases where others have begged their organizations to become martyrs. Indeed, it is not just living in a conflict zone that makes one vulnerable to becoming a human bomber. Ideas - of pain and injustice, identifying with victims and feeling a sense of expressing that pain, fighting to make it right or at least revenging for it, belonging to something bigger than oneself and taking on a heroic role - all appear to be important factors into what goes into making a human bomber.

Likewise, the use of the dissociative defense may be something that is universal in all human beings and easily accessed by individuals who once having reached their breaking point and signed on to an ideology of self-sacrifice may be able to utilize to experience actually strapping on a bomb as positive goal oriented and even an ecstatic or euphoric, rather than negative experience. If this is combined with religious ideology (of any type) it is likely to reinforce the ecstatic and euphoric qualities induced by the dissociative defense which, in turn, may reinforce the perceived religious nature of the suicide “mission”.

The fact that role playing European and American students can so easily embrace the role of human bombers and end up spontaneously giving reasons, rationalizations and defenses similar to those real thwarted bombers give when interviewed, gives credence to the very real possibility that suicide bombing, far from being a mystery that we cannot understand – is a result of that we may all harbor - aggressive, vengeful and justice-seeking tendencies within us. In fact it may only be a mix of circumstances, situation, ideology and relationships that need to come together to bring these to the forefront. Our study shows that indeed we may all carry a human bomber within.

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**Notes**

[1] A. Speckhard (2005) has, however, argued that bombers coming from conflict zones frequently show evidence of posttraumatic and dissociative symptoms and those coming radicalized Muslim groups such as those found in Europe and totalitarian regimes in the Middle East often suffer from social marginalization, alienation and extreme frustration and may also be utilizing a projective defense, projecting their own sense of badness (for things they feel guilty over) onto the West stating that it must be destroyed.

[2] Speckhard differs from the common view that there is no psychological disturbances observable among human bombers – her interviews with and regarding Chechen and Palestinian bombers often reveals severe personal and secondary traumatization contributing to severe dissociative and posttraumatic symptoms which in her view contribute to the transition in the psyche from normal individuals to those willing to become bombers. Likewise she points out that radicalized Muslim youth in Europe often suffer severe identity issues, which contributes to their willingness to take on self sacrificial roles in behalf of the group.

[3] Palestinian psychiatric researcher in Gaza, Eyad Sarraj, asks in fact, given the daily injustices, chaotic relationship of actions to consequences, and the abnormality of life in conflict zones whether is it not amazing that there are not more human bombers (Eyad El Sarraj, 2002).

[4] We decided for this sample to base our comparisons on Chechen and Palestinian cases. - While the more recent spate of suicide bombers in Iraq has greatly changed the age profile (they tend to be older and often married with children) until recently suicide bombers were often young single persons, many pursuing university degrees or were already college educated.
[5] Also referred to in clinical and other helper settings by Charles Figley as ‘compassion fatigue’.


[6] The total numbers may add to more than 19 because some subjects listed more than one motivation; the same is true regarding goals.

[7] According to the American Psychiatric Association, the essential feature of dissociative disorders is “a disruption in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity or perception of the environment” - American Psychiatric Association (1994) Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (4th ed.). Washington, D.C.: Author. - In the case of suicide terrorism, this means an emotional barrier is unconsciously erected, walling off the negative emotions generated by choosing to die in this manner and may even include compartmentalizing the event from one’s ambitions and daily life. One bomber for example, when planning his attack, suggested that he could not carry a bomb until after his university exams – suggesting that while on the one hand he acknowledged that he was going to his death he was able separate this reality so completely from his mind that he still felt that the need to complete his exams prior to going to explode himself.

[8] This finding is supported by other research as well. A study by Suleyman Salih Zoroglu et al. showed that any kind of trauma and especially dissociation highly contributed to suicide attempts and self-mutilation. In their study they found that those participants who were abused or neglected had 7.6 times higher suicide attempts than those who were not. Another study by A. Bessel at al. yielded similar results. The researchers found that childhood abuse is a predictor for suicidal behavior and that dissociation is correlated with suicide attempts. Their results showed that people with childhood trauma, when under stress, tend to react in a self-destructive manner. Separations with parental figures and lack of a “secure” attachment was found to have a consolidating role in self destructive behavior. Simpson and Porter write that self-mutilating behavior in reaction to hostile environment and/or isolation are related to primitive behavior, that is also found in animals. Gladstone, Gemma et al., found that women with a history of sexual abuse, physical abuse, childhood emotional abuse or parental conflict at home were more likely to attempt suicide and engage in self-harming behavior; they also became depressed earlier (than those without a history of sexual abuse) and were more likely to experience panic attacks. An interesting find in their study is that women who experienced childhood physical abuse are more likely to engage in interpersonal violence in their adult lives.

[9] There is a growing literature showing that dissociative experiences may be endorphin-mediated and that self-injurious behaviors can be related to, or induce, these endorphin-mediated states. See Russ for example who found in a sample women with borderline personality disorder, that women who had more trauma symptoms and higher levels of dissociation did not experience pain while indulging in self-destructive behavior as opposed to those women who had lower levels of trauma and dissociation.
Terrorism Bookshelf: Top 150 Books on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism

Selected and reviewed by Joshua Sinai

Terrorist rebellions, in all their configurations, constitute first order national security threats facing the international community. This was especially the case following September 2001, when al Qaida demonstrated that it had world class ambitions to inflict catastrophic damages on its adversaries. Although substantially degraded militarily and geographically dispersed since then, al-Qaida, its affiliates and allies around the world continue to wage their insurgencies, whether localized or transnational. Of great concern is that not only have they succeeded in embedding themselves with terrorist networks that are spearheading internal conflicts in weak and failed states, such as in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, but as an ideological movement they have been able to radicalize new generations of adherents around the world using cyberspace, including social media.

In another development, terrorist targeting in other conflicts, such as the Palestinian-Israeli arena, is primarily localized against Israel, although as demonstrated by Hizballah's rocket guerrilla warfare against Israel in their summer 2006 war and Hamas’s firing of rockets against Israel’s southern towns since then, terrorist warfare continues to evolve, for instance, from suicide bombings to firing rockets over great distances. In other conflict zones, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, terrorists are resorting to placing IEDs against their adversaries.

Even counterterrorism campaigns now span the spectrum of latest trends in warfare technology, from deploying specially equipped special operations forces to launching aerial drones that can remotely target terrorist operatives in far-away locations.

Moreover, the Internet has provided terrorist groups and their supporters a new virtual space to conduct activities that were previously restricted to “physical” space, such as radicalization, recruitment, fundraising, and even command and control of operations, thereby enabling them to bypass physical borders where national governments have vastly upgraded their defenses. As a result, the worldwide reach of groups such as al Qaida and its affiliates has led to what are termed "self-starter" home-grown cells in Western Europe, North America, and elsewhere, although foreign terrorist groups still retain some influence over their operations.

To gain an analytical understanding of the origins, magnitude, and evolution of the terrorist threats around the world and how to counteract them, the academic and public policy communities have produced a plethora of books on terrorism in general, the groups that engage in terrorist warfare, the extremist religious movements that drive individuals to join terrorist groups and employ terrorist tactics on their behalf, the conflict zones where such warfare is being waged, and the types of counteractions that governments are employing in response.

The books listed in this review essay are organized into seventeen sections, which are not intended to be mutually exclusive:

(i) encyclopedias and reference resources,
(ii) textbooks and general histories,
(iii) using the social, behavioral, and economic sciences to study terrorism,
(iv) journalistic case studies,
(v) case studies of terrorist groups,
(vi) root causes of terrorism,
(vii) radicalization and recruitment into terrorism,
(viii) funding terrorism,
(ix) suicide terrorism,
(x) international law and terrorism,
(xi) terrorism on the internet,
(xii) terrorism and WMD,
(xiii) counterterrorism,
(xiv) intelligence in counterterrorism, and, under the general category of resolving terrorist rebellions,
(xv) de-radicalization and disengagement from terrorism,
(xvi) peace negotiations with terrorists, and
(xvii) how terrorist conflicts end.

Within each section, the nominated books are listed in order of their publication date. Although the most recently published books obviously merit the most attention, the earlier published books still retain sufficient importance for inclusion in the listing. Every effort was made to list the most updated and revised editions of earlier published books. Also, please note that the prices listed are the publishers’ official prices, with many of the books available for purchase at discounted rates at bookseller sites such as Amazon.com.

In the absence of consensus on the Romanization of Arabic names, the spelling of group names such as al Qaida have been left as published in their original title (e.g., “al Qaeda”), although the reviews spell it as “al Qaida.”

This listing of top 150 books is intended to provide an overview of many of the discipline’s pre-eminent books, but space considerations limit coverage of additional topics and the dozens of worthy books that cover all these topics. Readers are encouraged to nominate additional topics and books for inclusion in future lists.

(i) Encyclopedias and Reference Resources

Encyclopedias are highly useful in covering a wide range of knowledge about terrorism and counterterrorism issues in alphabetical order at a basic level, while reference handbooks generally cover them thematically and in greater depth. The following volumes provide excellent information and analysis about virtually all aspects of terrorism and counterterrorism:

This illustrated, three volume set is a substantially revised, updated, and reorganized successor to the 2003 edition of Encyclopedia of World Terrorism. It includes more than 200 in-depth articles providing background information and analysis on the spectrum of categories and types of terrorist groups ranging from domestic to international, religious and nationalist, state and non-state supported, left-wing and right-wing, as well as entries on worldwide terrorist incidents. Other sections include entries on terrorists’ agendas, modus operandi, weaponry, targeting and governmental counterterrorism programs, including the role of intelligence in counterterrorism (written by this reviewer), and issues involving security and civil liberties. The appendix includes hundreds of photographs, maps, and diagrams.


This five-volume set is an authoritatively-produced encyclopedic compilation of biographical information about individuals who were involved in terrorist activities, whether domestic or international, dating back 35 years. The terrorist biographies are arranged by their continent of origin, and provide detailed information regarding the incidents they were involved in, including their outcomes. As explained by the authors, “The list is designed to serve as a directory of leaders, perpetrators, financiers, defendants, detainees, persons of interest, conspirators, and aliases in the regions” in which they are listed. Each volume includes a separate index of the terrorists listed in that particular geographical volume.


This handbook represents the most up-to-date analytic findings and reference resources on terrorism and counterterrorism studies, compiled by Alex Schmid, one of the world’s leading academic experts. These findings are arranged in an easy to follow chapter framework, beginning with Dr. Schmid’s comprehensive overview in which he champions greater use of evidence-based empirical research, such as compiling biographies of terrorist operatives in order to generate insight into what types of individuals become terrorists. This is essential because of the nature of terrorism itself, which Dr. Schmid describes as an underground “war in the shadows,” that makes it difficult to ferret out all the information needed to thwart terrorist endeavors unless an understanding of the characteristics of the operatives who conduct such warfare is known. It is a big book with a price tag to match, but the depth of its detail merits its cost.


A substantially updated and expanded edition of the original encyclopedia, which was published in 2005. The entries by the contributors to this expertly written volume’s new material and expanded coverage explore in a comprehensive fashion terrorist groups and individuals involved
in terrorism, the culture and ideology of terrorism, significant terrorism events, types and methods of terrorism, components of counterterrorism, and the impact of terrorism on society, such as civil liberties.


This masterful handbook provides a comprehensive overview of the state of academic analysis and debate on insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well as an up-to-date survey of contemporary insurgent movements and government counter-insurgency campaigns around the world. The volume is divided into three parts: Part I: Theoretical and Analytical Issues, Part II: Insurgent Movements, and Part III: Counterinsurgency Cases. With each of the handbook’s chapters providing extensive reference resources, it is also organized to serve as a guide for further study and research. This volume is included in the listing for this review essay because of the substantial overlap between many of these insurgent movements and terrorist organizations (e.g., Hizballah, Hamas, and the Taliban are considered as both insurgent and terrorist organizations) and the governments’ counterinsurgent campaigns are similar in many ways to counterterrorism measures.

(ii) Textbooks and General Histories

Textbooks and general histories provide a foundation for our understanding about terrorism and counterterrorism, both past and present, which need to be supplemented with additional resources that go into greater detail. The following are considered among the leading classics in the field:


An updated and substantial expansion of the widely acclaimed original edition published in 1998 – despite being somewhat out of date in 2012 – is still considered one of the most comprehensive books on terrorism. Like its original edition, its chapters discuss how to define terrorism, the origins of contemporary terrorism, the internationalization of terrorism, the role of extremist religions in driving terrorism, the nature of suicide terrorism, the exploitation by terrorist groups of old and new media, terrorists’ objectives, tactics, and technological innovations in their use of weapons, targeting, and future trends in terrorist warfare.

Peter R. Neumann, Old & New Terrorism (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2009), 204 pages, $22.95. [Paperback]

This innovative book investigates how and why terrorism’s organizational structures, modus operandi, political agendas and types of warfare have changed over the years as a result of certain dynamics, such as the information revolution created by modernity and globalization. It concludes that both governments and societies need to better confront the challenges created by these “new” forms of terrorism in the areas where it has evolved.

The Belfast, Northern Ireland-based author, a widely published academic expert on terrorism (who was mistakenly attacked by a terrorist group in Belfast in 1991), questions whether terrorism since 9/11 has evolved into a new form of mass-casualty, politically-motivated violence by groups of a global reach or whether it remains essentially unchanged, with small groups employing violence in their struggles against their “imperialist” adversaries. He also explores the responses by governments to how terrorism has evolved and whether it is possible to facilitate the engagement of terrorist groups in a peace process in order to terminate such conflicts peacefully.


A sweeping, well-written historical overview by a prominent British historian on the nature of modern terrorism from its origins in 19th century Western Europe to the contemporary period. The book’s chapters cover terrorist groups ranging from the early Russian nihilists, the Black International anarchists, the nationalist Irish Republican Brotherhood, to post 1960s terrorism in the form of Palestinian groups, the Red Brigades, the Red Army Faction, as well as the contemporary global threats fueled by al Qaida and its affiliated jihadist groups.

**Martha Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences** (New York: Routledge, 2011), 268 pages, $43.95. [Paperback]

In this important volume, the author, a prominent academic expert on terrorism, has assembled her articles, many of which were previously published in the 1980s and 1990s, with a few published after 2001. The result is a comprehensive compilation that is divided into four parts: (1) the concept of terrorism, its causes, and the distinction between “old” and “new” terrorism; (2) how terrorists organize, their strategies, and the psychology of terrorism; (3) governmental responses to terrorism, such as coercive diplomacy, the formulation of counterterrorism strategies and “grand strategies,” and (4) how terrorism ends, including why and how terrorism may be rejected or renounced by its adherents.

**John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, editors, Terrorism Studies: A Reader** (New York: Routledge, 2011), 504 pages, $44.95. [Paperback]

A comprehensive compilation of articles by leading experts on the historical context of terrorism, this reader serves as an excellent supplementary text. The volume covers issues such as David Rapoport’s notion of the four historical waves of modern terrorism; the challenges in defining terrorism; terrorism’s root causes; the psychological processes involved in the development of terrorists and motivations to join terrorist groups; the spectrum of terrorist movements, ranging from the Lebanese Hizballah, the Provisional IRA, right-wing religio-super-nationalist groups, to al Qaida; narco-terrorism and insurgency; the nature of suicide terrorism; the components of counterterrorism, and future trends in terrorism, including WMD warfare.


A well-organized and comprehensive textbook on terrorism and counterterrorism. Divided into three parts, it covers subjects ranging from (1) defining terrorism, global terrorism, terrorism in the American context, religiously driven terrorism, the causes and drivers of terrorism, state
sponsorship of terrorist groups, terrorists’ goals, tactics and targeting, organizational formations, and how terrorism is funded; (2) the components of counterterrorism, such as the use of “hard” and “soft” power, balancing security and civil liberties, and the components of homeland security; and (3) the role of the media in covering terrorism, and how terrorists exploit the mass media of communications, including the Internet.


The authors are leading academics in what is called “Critical Terrorism Studies.” In this textbook, they outline their critique of “conventional” terrorism studies by providing a counter-explanation of terrorism over issues such as defining terrorism, the nature of the terrorist threat and what they consider to be effective and ineffectual counter-terrorism strategies. Chapters cover issues such as the “Orthodox study of terrorism,” “critical approaches to terrorism studies,” “the cultural construction of terrorism,” “bringing gender into the study of terrorism,” conceptualizing terrorism, reconsidering the terrorism threat, types of terrorism, understanding state terrorism, the causes of non-state terrorism, responding to non-state terrorism, and assessing the war on terror. While one may not necessarily agree with their political positions on the terrorist threat, it is important to take note of their assumptions and critiques of the field.


This is an excellent and up-to-date coverage of the latest trends in terrorism and counterterrorism studies. Chapters cover a conceptual overview of terrorism (defining terrorism, historical and ideological origins, and causes of terrorism), terrorist environments (typologies of terrorist groups, including state terrorism), and terrorist battlegrounds (the role of the media in covering terrorism, warfare tactics and targeting), counterterrorism, and future trends and projections. Also noteworthy are the discussions and case studies on a range of topics featured in each chapter and various end-of-chapter materials, including key terms and Internet-based exercises.


This widely used book’s fourth edition – and the author’s second textbook on terrorism – is a multidisciplinary, comprehensive examination of terrorism in general and terrorist incidents in particular. Also noteworthy is the coverage of major theories on terrorism, case studies, terrorist group profiles, and significant events. Each chapter begins with “Opening Viewpoints” that are illustrated with relevant examples to introduce readers to the themes and theories in the discussion that follows, and ends with “Discussion Boxes” that provide controversial information, along with critical thinking questions to stimulate classroom discussion. The text is accompanied by photographs, tables, and graphics.

Richard Jackson and Samuel Justin Sinclair, editors. Contemporary Debates on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2012), 240 pages, $42.95. [Paperback]

An innovative pedagogic approach to studying terrorism and counterterrorism through a debate format, with scholars representing different perspectives debating one another over controversial
issues. Although one may challenge the editors’ use of ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ perspectives since some of the ‘critical’ approaches can be quite dogmatic and partisan in their own way (aside from other problem areas), this is still a valuable textbook for the way its contributors address significant issues in the discipline. These include theoretical issues, such as how to define terrorism and state terrorism, substantive issues, such as the magnitude of the threat presented by Al Qaida and its affiliates, the effectiveness of various counterterrorism responses, and ethical issues, such as the use of torture in interrogations of prisoners and targeted killings.

(iii) Using the Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences to Study Terrorism

As exemplified by the following books, the counterterrorism community has greatly benefited from the application of social, behavioral, and economic science concepts and methodologies to investigate components of terrorism such as the underlying root causes driving terrorist rebellions, the psychological nature of terrorist groups and their operatives, and the factors driving individuals to become radicalized into extremism and recruited into terrorism.


An innovative examination of how terrorist organizations form cooperative coalitions and how they function within the changing international system. Although out-of-date in terms of capturing latest trends in the nature of such coalitions, its theoretical framework and historic overview are useful in conceptualizing how such linkages originate and are sustained over time.


When published in 2005, this book was considered one of the best applications of psychology to explain the drivers that motivate individuals to become terrorists, function as terrorists, and, in ideal cases, disengage from terrorism. Also noteworthy is the author’s discussion of how to define terrorism and conduct academic research on terrorist subjects. A revised and updated second edition is scheduled for publication in late 2012.


The three volumes bring together contributions by dozens of experts to discuss the central question of how individuals are transformed into becoming a terrorist. The first volume’s chapters cover the recruitment of terrorists, with emphasis on the psychological and religious appeals of joining a terrorist organization. The second volume focuses on how and where terrorists are trained by their groups. The third volume addresses the political, social, and economic root causes that contribute to terrorism globally and within specific countries and regions.

This important volume applies a theoretical and empirical economics-based methodology, together with political analysis, to qualitatively and quantitatively examine the incidents of domestic and transnational terrorism, in order to generate a spectrum of terrorist warfare trends. It also evaluates the effectiveness of governments’ counterterrorism policies, including dilemmas for liberal democracies in balancing security and civil liberties. A separate case study analyzes governmental responses to hostage incidents.


When this volume was published, it represented one of the first attempts to inventory the strengths and weaknesses in terrorism research in order to identify a set of priorities for future research. Fourteen academic experts (including this reviewer) contributed chapters on topics such as new trends in terrorism studies, the impact of 9/11 on terrorism research, responding to the roots of terror, the socio-psychological components of terrorist motivations, the nature of al Qaeda’s warfare, recruitment of Islamist terrorists in Europe, the landscape of intelligence analysis and counterterrorism, terrorism in cyberspace, and the components of terrorism and counterterrorism studies.


In this important comprehensive volume, leading academic experts present their findings on the psychology of individuals who become terrorists and the psychological theories that are relevant to the treatment and clinical responses to terrorist events, including the treatment of special populations such as children and older adults.


An important examination of innovations in terrorist tactics and technologies over the years in order to develop an empirical theory of innovation by terrorist groups. Also considered are the critical factors responsible for the differences in such learning and innovation practices among terrorist organizations. Case studies of four terrorist organizations (Aum Shinrikyo, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command, the Riyadus-Salikhin Suicide Battalion, and the Revolutionary Organization November 17) highlight the key factors in producing innovative tactics and weaponry by such groups. The author concludes by highlighting key trends for the future in order to identify signature characteristics of innovation-based terrorist organizations, which is a critical element in predictive threat assessment and in countering such groups’ warfare.


In this innovative theoretical volume, the author focuses on the extremist ideologies and structural capabilities of terrorist groups. This, the author writes, is a crucial element that enables resolution by the threatened governments of the asymmetrical threats confronting them at all levels, from the local to the global, which is dependent on disrupting terrorists’ structural capabilities and neutralizing the appeal of their extremist ideologies. Using Islamist terrorism as
the book’s primary case study, the author argues that defeating its “quasi-religious, supranational ideology” requires ‘nationalizing’ its transnational nature and co-opting it in a “more regular process.”


A significant groundbreaking volume by RAND academic experts that surveys the social-science literature on counterterrorism and then applies relevant conceptual models to examine issues such as terrorism’s root causes, radicalization into violent extremism, how terrorists generate, maintain, or lose public support, how terrorists make decisions, how terrorists disengage from violence, and why and how does terrorism decline.

Jeffrey Kaplan, Terrorist Groups and the New Tribalism: Terrorism’s Fifth Wave (New York: Routledge, 2010), 256 pages, $130.00. [Hardcover]

This insightful study examines David Rapoport’s thesis of the four waves of the history of modern terrorism to demonstrate how a new insurgent grouping has emerged to constitute a distinct ‘fifth wave’ of modern terrorism, which the author terms as the "New Tribalism". The terrorist groups constituting the ‘fifth wave’ share similar strategic ambitions and tactics, which the author characterizes as “radical localism, tribalism and xenophobia.”


The contributors to this conceptually interesting edited volume, who come from many disciplines and contrasting perspectives, apply David Rapoport’s notion of the four historical waves of modern terrorism – with each one lasting for 40 year “generations” – to explain the trajectories of terrorism and their impact on society over time, including how mob violence breaks out, how political violence spreads, the role of religion in driving terrorism and violence, the relationship between technology and terrorist warfare, and other issues, in order to analyze the questions that such phenomena present, including future trends.

(iv) Journalistic Case Studies

As criminal enterprises, terrorism and its radicalization and recruitment precursors take place underground. Generally, only government counterterrorism agencies possess the capability to monitor and track their activities through covert intelligence means, limiting the ability of those outside government to study this subject with empirically valid data. Nevertheless, our understanding of those who engage in terrorism as well as the nature of counterterrorism campaigns has greatly benefited from the reporting of investigative journalists, who often travel great distances and interview countless people in assembling their books. Some of the best reporting on terrorism includes the following books:

A veteran Irish journalist’s investigatory account of the inner workings of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), including how it came to end its 30-year terrorist insurgency by agreeing to a peace process that attempted to resolve the conflict’s underlying causes.


A veteran journalist’s insider account of the American intelligence agencies’ involvement with counterparts from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the covert wars in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s that succeeded in overthrowing the Soviet-backed government in that country. However, this involvement also ended up bolstering the Islamist militancy in that country which laid the basis for the emergence of the Taliban and, indirectly, gave rise to Usama bin Laden's al Qaida in that country, which sowed the seeds of al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks against America. The author also discusses the unsuccessful efforts by U.S. intelligence to capture or kill bin Laden in Afghanistan after 1998. The book is considered one of the most authoritative accounts on this period in Pakistan and Afghanistan.


An examination of the life and motives of Ted Kaczynski, known as “The Unabomber.” Mr. Alston’s account begins with Kaczynski’s unhappy adolescence in Illinois and proceeds to Harvard College. There, he studied psychology, but ultimately fled from what was supposed to be a brilliant academic career to the edge of the wilderness in Montana. It was in his book-lined cabin, however, that he formulated an extremist view of the world that he used to justify his later terrorist activities, which took the form of letter bombs and explosive-laden packages. The author’s narration is especially noteworthy not only for detailing Kaczynski’s planning and execution of his attacks, but the political context that drove him into such violent extremism.


Canadian journalist Stewart Bell’s important account of Mohammed Jabarah, a young Canadian Muslim who became radicalized and recruited by al Qaida for a bombing mission in Singapore in 2001. By investigating why such a young person who grew up in a comfortable middle class family in Canada (although the family was originally from Kuwait) would end up as an operative in a terrorist organization in East Asia, the author searches for answers on how to counter the proliferation of similar types of recruits in North America and Europe into radical Islamic terrorism.


A gripping account by a veteran investigative journalist of how three young Palestinian men living in a cramped Brooklyn apartment decided in late July 1997 to carry out a suicide bombing attack against a rush-hour subway train. Fortunately, an Egyptian dishwasher who had been
living with them informed two NYPD policemen about their plot, resulting in their arrest and thwarting what would have been America’s first Islamist suicide bombing.


One of the most sweeping and extensively researched narratives of the events leading to al-Qaida’s 9/11 attacks, including the rise of Islamic extremism. It also examines al Qaida’s 9/11 plot from the perspective of American counterterrorism agencies that had tried, but failed, to prevent it.

**Stewart Bell, Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Around the World (Mississauga, Ontario, Canada: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 304 pages, $32.95. [Hardcover]**

Although dated by much improved Canadian counterterrorism measures, this is an account by an acclaimed Canadian investigative journalist of how international terrorist groups, such as the Indian Sikh Babbar Khalsa, Hizballah, Hamas, the Tamil Tigers, Algerian GIA, and al Qaida, used to operate in Canada, which they regarded as a “safe haven” by raising funds (often through criminal enterprises), and recruiting and planning terrorist acts. The author explains how such terrorist networks were able to operate in Canada, who their central figures were, and Canada’s previous counterterrorism measures. This account of the terrorist underworld in Canada is enriched by his travels to Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.

**Dina Temple-Raston, The Jihad Next Door: The Lackawanna Six and Rough Justice in the Age of Terror (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 304 pages; $26.00. [Hardcover]**

A compelling and important journalistic investigation into “The Lackawanna Six” – a group of Yemeni American “bunch of guys” living in a close-knit Yemeni community outside Buffalo, New York, who fell in with Kamel Derwish, an al Qaida radicalizer who facilitated their travel in Spring 2001 to one of the organization’s training camps in Afghanistan. When five of them returned to America just prior to 9/11, they found themselves involved in a high-profile investigation and prosecution. Derwish, who made his way to Yemen, was eventually killed by a U.S. Predator drone in 2002.

**Sally Neighbour, The Mother of Mohammed: An Australian Woman’s Extraordinary Journey into Jihad (Carlton, Victoria, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 2010), 304 pages, $26.50. [Paperback]**

An important insider account, based on extensive interviews with its subject, by a prominent Australian journalist of Robyn Mary Hutchinson, an Australian woman, who grew up as a drug-using surfing groupie who converted to Islam while on a “hippie” visit to Bali, Indonesia, where she met her husband, who came from a Javanese royal family, with whom she had two children. Later she left her husband, when he became a drug addict, married again and had more children, before coming into contact with Abu Bakar Bashir, the imam who envisioned an Islamic caliphate across an arc of South-East Asia and whose name had been linked to several terrorist attacks in Indonesia. Eventually, Ms Hutchinson moved to Pakistan, where she lived a spartan existence among a community of devout Muslims. Later, she moved to Afghanistan, where she became known as Umm Mohammed (“mother of Mohammed”, the name of one of her sons) and
got to know the leaders of al Qaida, including Usama bin Laden. Bin Laden provided her an air conditioner and may have even have proposed marriage, according to the author.

**Ian Johnson, A Mosque in Munich: Nazis, the CIA, and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West** (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2010), 336 pages, $27.00. [Hardcover]

A first rate, captivating account by veteran journalist Ian Johnson who used primary sources, including unclassified documents, to investigate the origins of the Muslim Brotherhood’s first beachhead in the West during the post-World War II period, when a group of ex-Soviet Muslims defected to Germany and established a mosque in Munich. Over the years, they became entangled in the Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union, including becoming instrumental in recruiting fighters against the Soviet military in Afghanistan. This book is crucial in providing an understanding of how the Muslim Brotherhood had become such an influential force in contemporary Western Europe.


This extensively researched journalistic investigation of the arrests of three terrorism suspects in Ohio in the years following the 9/11 attacks focuses mainly on the story of Iyman Faris, one of the conspirators, who was convicted in 2003. Using court transcripts and interviews with law enforcement officials and members of Ohio’s Muslim community, the author recreates the events and circumstances leading up to the arrests. Although these cases may not be widely known, this is an important account of “homegrown” radicalization in America.


Overcoming the "insider" threat is one of the most bedeviling challenges in counterterrorism. This is especially the case when, in the attempt to penetrate an adversary terrorist organization, a decision has to be made about who will be deployed as a double agent. Can he be trusted? How is it possible to know if he has a hidden agenda that will lead him to turn against his unsuspecting handlers? What follows is Washington Post investigative journalist Joby Warrick’s compelling tale, based on interviews conducted across several continents, of the clash between high expectations and deceit, set against the backdrop of the inner workings of al Qaida and its Taliban affiliate, and their monitoring and countermeasures by America's intelligence services.


An account by an American investigative reporter of how homegrown extremists have become recruits for al Qaida’s next wave of terrorist attack. Terming this “al Qaeda 2.0,” the author shows how such recruits use modern technology, such as Facebook and Skype, to radicalize and communicate with one another. The book contains informative accounts of Major Nidal Hasan, Najibullah Zazi, and Anwar al Awlaki.

An informed account by two veteran New York Times’ journalists of how the U.S. government’s counterterrorism campaign against al Qaida and its affiliates was transformed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Adapting methods from classic Cold War deterrence theory, governmental counterterrorism now includes not only military measures, but the geographical field of battle has been expanded to disrupt jihadist networks in ever more creative ways, including in cyberspace. The authors discuss how these new counterterrorism strategies, adopted under President George W. Bush and expanded under Barack Obama, were successfully employed in planning and carrying out the dramatic May 2011 raid in which Usama bin Laden was killed.


This account by two investigative journalists claims that Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols did not act alone in plotting and carrying out the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995. Drawing on their more than 150 interviews, including correspondence with Mr. Nichols, as well as access to case records, the authors claim that additional far-right extremist elements were involved in the conspiracy, that the bombing could have been prevented if certain leads on these individuals had been properly followed up, and that the Alfred P. Murrah federal building may not have been the original target but was selected at the last minute.


A detailed and dramatic account by two former Los Angeles Times investigative reporters of how it took 18 months after al Qaida’s September 11 attacks for U.S. government investigators to capture Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the operational mastermind of the attacks, and, now, the most prominent al Qaida operative in U.S. custody. The authors also describe how KSM set up al Qaida’s global terrorist network, personally identified and trained its terrorists, and even flew bomb parts on commercial airlines to test their invisibility. Of special interest is the authors’ account of the U.S. government's pursuit of KSM, including numerous false leads and close escapes that kept him from being captured for five years before 9/11.

(v) Case Studies of Terrorist Groups

Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucibles of Terror (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 281 pages, $22.50. [Paperback]

Drawing on extensive fieldwork and interviews with militant leaders, the author examines how extremist Islamist groups emerged in Southeast Asia, with al Qaida serving as their organizational catalyst. Also examined are the grievances that shape Islamist militancy, how certain groups, such as Jemaah Islamiya were transformed from “parochial” jihadis to international terrorists as part of al Qaida’s expanding network, and the region’s governments’ counterterrorism responses. A key question, the author concludes, is whether these governments were sincere about resolving the root causes driving such rebellions or merely employing coercive countermeasures to suppress the symptoms.

An extensively researched and documented account on the origins, leaders, ideas and activities of the far right extremist paramilitary groups in America, such as the White Supremacists and the neo-Nazis, who seek to bring about a racist revolution in the country.


With eco-terrorism one of the outcomes of radical environmentalism, this is one of the few books published on these violent groups. The author’s authoritative account discusses how such eco-terrorists engage in arson, such as property destruction, and other types of violence. He discusses the major groups, such as ALF/ELF, as well as less well-known ones, focusing on their history, who they are, their motivations, ideologies, rhetoric, and tactics, and how to respond to their acts of violence.


In one of the most comprehensive and meticulously documented accounts of the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas, the author explains how it succeeded in blending terrorism, extremist political activism, and social welfare services to become the dominant political force in the Palestinian territories. Although this account is out-of-date, with important geo-political and military developments taking place since its publication, it still provides important background information on the organization.

Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 380 pages, $44.00. [Hardover]

An in-depth account of the states that sponsor terrorist groups, focusing primarily on Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Libya, and their linkages with groups such as al Qaida, Hizballah, and Hamas. Different types of support are discussed, including their motivations for sponsoring such groups, and the impact of such sponsorship on their terrorist proxies. Also considered are governments that permit terrorists to raise money and recruit new members within their countries without, however, providing more “active” support.


The left-wing Baader-Meinhof Group—later known as the Red Army Faction (RAF)—operated in West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. Their terrorist violence took the form of murder, hostage taking, and bank robberies. In the 1980s, the group’s leaders committed mass suicide while imprisoned, with a tiny faction continuing its terrorist campaign until the group’s breakup in 1998. In this comprehensive history of the group, German reporter Stefan Aust incorporates new information to present a full portrait of the group, based on testimonies by former group members to investigators and formerly classified Stasi documents.

An insightful account of the Red Brigades, an extremist left-wing terrorist group in Italy, formed in 1970 and active throughout the 1980s. In addition to their campaign of assassinations, kidnappings, and bank robberies, their most famous operation was the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro, Italy's former prime minister, in 1978. In the late 1990s, a new extremist group revived the name Red Brigades and began a campaign of killing Italian professors and government officials they considered to be their adversaries. The author applies a micro-sociological approach to this study, termed the "subversive-revolutionary feedback theory," which states that for such "purifiers of the world" the willingness to engage in political homicide and suffer death depends on how far a group’s members have been incorporated into such a revolutionary sect, much like a cult.


An insightful account by a leading academic expert on terrorism in Southeast Asia, focusing on the sectarian-based insurgency in southern Thailand, which has raged since January 2004 and resulted in more than 3,000 fatalities. What distinguishes this insurgency from previous ones in Thailand, the author points out, is its radical jihadist overtones and unprecedented levels of violence. Drawing on original research and extensive fieldwork, the author examines the conflict’s underlying causes, its impact on the south's Buddhist community, and the Thai government’s response, which he characterizes as ineffectual. The author warns that international jihadist groups, such as al Qaida, are likely to involve themselves in the conflict, thereby escalating its intensity and lethality, with regional and international consequences.


An extensively researched and gripping account of one of the first homegrown terrorist attacks in America against one of its most iconic symbols: Wall Street. The four-year hunt for the perpetrators stretched as far as Italy and the new Soviet nation. Especially interesting are the author’s accounts of the lives of the victims, the suspects, and the investigators, including the polarized political climate at the time which was dominated by the likes of banking mogul J.P. Morgan, Jr., labor radical "Big Bill" Haywood, anarchist firebrands Emma Goldman and Luigi Galleani, and William J. Burns, "America's Sherlock Holmes."


The authors place contemporary anti-regime Jewish terrorist activity in Israel within its historical context, with its “totalistic ideology” similar in many ways to Islamist extremism. It was such a mindset that drove Yigal Amir, a fringe member of Jewish extremism, to assassinat Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 as part of that movement’s opposition to the Oslo Peace Accords with the Palestinians. The book, one of the very few published on this
subject, benefits from the authors extensive interviews with former Jewish terrorists and extremist political and religious leaders, as well as Israeli law-enforcement officials.

Anna Geifman, *Death Orders: The Vanguard of Modern Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 229 pages, $34.95. [Hardcover]

With 19th century Russia considered the birthplace of modern terrorism, the author views it as a precursor to the psycho-historical patterns of worldwide terrorist activity that evolved over the next century. Especially noteworthy is the author’s analysis of how terrorists' objectives have degenerated from punishment of individual adversaries and attempts to intimidate political elites to carrying out indiscriminate acts of political violence. Moreover, as the author explains, a group’s stated ideology and rhetoric will invariably be transformed in practice into brutal violence. The author’s examination of such Russian precedents in political violence helps illuminate many of the brutal aspects of current terrorism.

J. Todd Reed and Diana Raschke, *The ETIM: China’s Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 244 pages, $49.95. [Hardcover]

This volume is an authoritative and comprehensive account of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the most significant Muslim terrorist group in China, which demands an independent Muslim state for the Uyghur ethnic minority in northwest China. In what is one of the few books on this subject, the authors discuss the group's origins, objectives, ideology, leadership, tactics, and ties to international terrorist networks. They conclude with an assessment of how other governments view ETIM’s activities and how this has affected their relations with China.


An insightful overview by a U.S. military expert on the Chechen and North Caucasus insurgencies against Russia and its government’s primarily military response to such terrorist threats. Thematically organized, it examines the origins of the conflict in the North Caucasus, including the influences of different strains of Islamism and al Qaida. It also features a detailed critique of Russia’s counterterrorism campaigns over years. Especially noteworthy is the author’s use of information from the North Caucasus Incident Database (NCID), including terrorist incidents, as well as informative charts that outline aspects of Russia’s counterterrorism campaigns.


An authoritative account of the Lebanese Hizballah by a veteran Israeli national security expert. In the author’s view, as Hizballah has become increasingly institutionalized over the years, it began using a “controlled policy” which integrates guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks while taking into account “profit and loss” political considerations. Such pragmatism, the author argues, has made it far more dangerous than that its 1980s revolutionary model. This pragmatism, he concludes, merely masks the fact that it has not abandoned its goals, only changed their pace of application.

This book provides a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the historical events which culminated in the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 and leadership of the Palestinian people for the next three decades. The author’s discussion of the organization’s key leaders, ideology, support base, financial structure, and recruitment strategies, is especially noteworthy. Also discussed are the PLO's activities in neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, and its evolution from a primarily terrorist organization into a ruling political regime in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, although in recent years its historical rival, Hamas, has succeeded in overtaking it in Gaza.


In what is one of the few comprehensive books published on Lashkar-e-Taiba (Let), based on his extensive field research in Pakistan the author traces its development from its origins as a small resistance group in Kashmir to its current role as the largest Pakistani terrorist organization operating in South Asia, including India. With the November 2009 Mumbai attacks placing the LeT high on the world’s radar, the author discusses its overall threat and how its warfare may evolve in the coming years. The LeT rose to prominence with Pakistani state support, especially as its proxy in Kashmir’s civil war with India. One may dispute the author’s judgment that the LeT may “fear” to associate too closely with al Qaida, which is also closely tied to sectors of Pakistan's government (as is the Taliban). With the LeT likely to continue mounting terrorist attacks in India – Pakistan’s historic rival – it will be interesting to see whether it is likely to mount any operations, as the Taliban has done, in the West, although it has used American operatives on overseas missions.

(vi) Root Causes of Terrorism

Tore Bjorge, editor, *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 288 pages; $47.95. [Paperback]

This collection of papers is the product of an experts’ workshop (in which this reviewer participated) that was held in Oslo, Norway, in June 2003, under the auspices of the Norwegian government. It represented the first time that an academic meeting had been held to explore, in a systematic manner, the concepts and methodologies to conduct analysis on root causes of terrorism. So innovative at the time, it is unfortunate that a follow up meeting has not been held to review, update, and revise the contributors’ initial findings in order to advance understanding of these issues and align them with the latest developments and trends in the field.


The author, an influential American economist, discusses what he considers to be some of the root causes underlying terrorist insurgencies and the factors that motivate individuals to become terrorists – all of which need to be addressed in order to resolve them. Using empirically derived
data, his inferences are drawn from terrorists' own backgrounds and the economic, social, and political conditions in the societies where they originate. He also discusses which countries he considers to be the most likely breeding grounds for terrorists, as well as their targets for terrorist warfare.


According to the author, who grew up in Northern Ireland where she experienced the effects of terrorism first-hand, terrorists are basically rational political actors who calibrate their tactics in a measured and reasoned way, including going to great lengths to justify their actions to themselves, their followers, and the world. To defeat terrorism, the author argues, governments must therefore understand a terrorist adversary’s motivations and grievances. These consist of three elements: a legitimizing ideology, such as a belief that they are doing the right thing or God's will in seeking revenge for a humiliation, a real or imagined defeat of their constituency by a government’s forces, and, on a personal level, some sort of dissatisfaction. For terrorism to succeed a group requires an enabling society that views its members as “heroes’ and provides them a measure of sanctuary or safe haven. To resolve terrorist rebellions, the author proposes a strategy to contain the threat and reduce its local support.


This is a comprehensive interdisciplinary examination of the motivations and causes of terrorism in general and specifically in the context of the Middle East. While critical of what he terms as 'orthodox' terrorism discourse which he argues has been faulty in addressing its roots causes, he employs the methods and approaches of conflict resolution to align it with the causes of conflict in general in order to gain a more complete understanding of its political, social, and economic causes and motivations.

(vii) Radicalization and Recruitment into Terrorism

Although each of the world’s major religions includes a tiny minority of militant elements that engage in terrorism, most of the literature on radicalization and recruitment into terrorism focuses on militant Islam because terrorist groups that have “hijacked” Islam represent the major threats against their own societies and the Western world. Like the root causes that drive terrorism in general, militant Islamic terrorism has not emerged in a vacuum, but is the product of the confluence of historical and contemporary drivers and "real world" factors. To understand the narrative that is central to Muslim belief, it is essential to read the Quran. The following books provide an excellent overview of radicalization and recruitment into militant Islam, within the context of the larger Muslim world.


This edited volume represents one of the first attempts to apply social movement theory to the study of contemporary Islamic activism as the basis for social and political action in the Middle East and North Africa. Social movement theory is then examined in the volume’s case studies on
Islamic activism, whether Sunni or Shi’a, in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Yemen.


At the time of its publication, this was considered a pioneering study on the global Salafi jihad— the interlocking radical Islamist terrorist networks led and shaped by Usama bin Laden’s al Qaida terrorist organization. Compiling biographies of 172 Islamist terrorist operatives gathered from open sources, the author employs social network analysis to unravel al Qaida’s operations since 1998. He identifies four large clusters of terrorist operatives: the first, consisting of the central staff of al Qaida and of the global Salafist jihad movement, which formed the movement’s overall leadership (many of whom were hiding in the Pakistan-Afghan border regions); the second, including operatives from core Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen and Kuwait); the third, also known as the Maghreb Arabs (the North African nations of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria), who resided in France and England; and the fourth belonging to al Qaida’s ally, Jemaah Islamiyah, which was centered in Indonesia and Malaysia. Such unraveling of al Qaida’s origins, evolution, organizational and demographic characteristics are the prerequisites for effective counteraction.


An important book which represented at the time of its publication one of the first attempts to formulate a systematic conceptual framework on radicalization into violent extremism in Western societies. According to the author, the mechanisms that drive potential recruits into violent extremism in the West begin with a “cognitive opening” in the form of “religious seeking” by individuals, perceiving an extremist movement and its religious ideology as “legitimate,” and, finally, being persuaded by the extremist movement to engage in “risky activism” on its behalf. Also innovative is the author’s application of his framework to the case of al-Muhajiroun, an extremist transnational movement based in London that supports al Qaida and other Islamist terrorist groups.


To understand how terrorist groups operate, it is crucial to uncover how they go about recruiting new operatives to maintain themselves as viable organizational networks and, if possible, expand their activities. In this excellent study, focusing primarily on the al Qaida network, the authors examine “why, how, and where individuals” become involved in that network, which they define as “financial backers and fund-raisers, operators, logisticians, recruiters, trainers, and leaders.” It is important to uncover such recruitment patterns to enable counterterrorism agencies to derive potential strategies for dealing with the “entry” points into their networks in order to defeat them.

This book updates and expands on the author’s earlier pioneering work, *Understanding Terror Networks* (2004) on the factors that drive radicalization into terrorism within the Salafi jihadist context. According to the author, the pre-9/11 al Qaida “Central” had morphed into a social movement consisting of several thousand members. Although decentralized and fragmented, this made al Qaida even more dangerous because as a social movement it had exponentially grown beyond its organizational origins. How do al Qaida’s supporters become radicalized into violent extremism? The author formulates a four phase process that depends on an individual's sense of moral outrage in response to perceived suffering by fellow Muslims around the world; interpreting such moral outrage within the context of a larger war against Islam; having such a sense of "moral outrage" resonating with one's own personal experience, for example, a sense of discrimination or difficulty in making it in Western society, and, finally, being mobilized by networks that take one to the next level of violent radicalization in the form of terrorist cells. The author’s “leaderless jihad” paradigm has been challenged for downplaying the role of facilitators in the West who play a crucial role in recruiting new members into al Qaida and its affiliated groups, thereby resulting in a new organizational hybrid that characterizes how al Qaida and its affiliates operate. Despite this criticism, the author’s innovative use of empirically derived data to generate al Qaida-related trends is a significant contribution to counterterrorism studies.


An authoritative account of how Western Europe became a host to militant Islamists of varying backgrounds, ranging from returnee veterans of the war in Afghanistan, members of Middle Eastern terrorist groups, to second-generation Muslim immigrants and European converts. Together, these extremists made Europe a breeding ground for Islamist activism, with some of them turning to terrorist activities following 9/11 such as the catastrophic attacks in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005, as well as numerous plots and attacks since then. The author, who is based in Italy, draws on original research and interviews with extremists and moderate Muslims to delve into the causes, motivations, and diverse forms of Islamic extremism in Europe.


An examination of how fatwas, which are legal opinions declaring whether a given act under Islam is obligatory, permitted, or forbidden, serve as an instrument for religious leaders to justify believers to engage in acts of jihad. The author argues that fatwas, particularly those that originate in the Arab world, should not be dismissed as a cynical use of religious terminology in political propaganda, but that Islamist terrorists testify that they are motivated to act by them. The author examines the underlying religious, legal, and moral logic of fatwas and the depth of their influence, particularly in contrast to alternative moderate Islamic interpretations, and applies them to issues involved in Islamic "laws of war", such as the justification for declaring jihad, the territory in which the jihad should be fought, whether women and children can participate in jihad, the legality of killing women, children and other non-combatants, the
justification for killing hostages and mutilating their bodies, and the permissibility of lethal tactics, such as suicide attacks, and employing weapons of mass destruction.


A meticulously researched biography of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, one of al Qaida’s most important theoreticians and strategists. In addition to writing an influential 1,600 page book, al-Suri had trained a generation of young jihadists in the Afghan training camps and helped establish the organization’s European networks. Syrian-born al-Suri was captured in Pakistan in late 2005 but released by the Syrian government in 2012. The author is a research professor at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI).

Kumar Ramakrishna, *Radical Pathways: Understanding Muslim Radicalization in Indonesia* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009), 292 pages, $75.00. [Hardcover]

An important and insightful case study on the pathways to extremism and violent jihad in Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim nation, which experienced one of the worst terrorist bombings in Bali in 2002. Specifically, the book explores the factors driving a minority of the country’s Muslim population to turn to violent jihad, and the continuing danger they pose to the country’s political stability. The author, based in Singapore, is one of Southeast Asia’s leading counterterrorism experts.


An authoritative account of how Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Usama bin Laden and many of the 9/11 hijackers, became the heartland of radical Islamism until the government began to clamp down on extremism. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Saudi Arabia, including many primary sources in Arabic, the author explains how over the course of several decades the religiously orthodox and oil-rich kingdom found itself contributing recruits, ideologues and funds to jihadi groups worldwide, including the rise of “home grown” Muslim militants who began to threaten the kingdom internally. The author is a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI).


In this highly informative and important account, the author defines the threats posed by militant Islamists who, he writes, cloak themselves in Islam but are not representative of its mainstream religion and practices. In an innovative typology, he distinguishes between "Islam," "Islamist" and "Militant Islamist," with the latter presenting the "true threat." Using this framework, Cmdr. Aboul-Enein then proceeds to discuss how militant Islamists abuse Quranic verses. He shows how they embrace violence (jihad) against those who disagree with their extremist views rather than seeking ways to improve their situation. He explains the ideas of the ideological founders of Islamism and militant Islamism, such as the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb. Also valuable is his prescription for using al Qaida’s rhetoric and actions to marginalize and counter it, including
exposing Usama bin Laden as a malignant force. He concludes with a penetrating analysis of what he terms "mindsets that hamper America's capabilities."


This is one of the most comprehensive accounts published on the several hundred American Muslims, some of them converts, who chose to join and fight on behalf of extremist Islamist terrorist groups overseas in conflicts regions such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Somalia, and Yemen, beginning in the late 1970s and through the contemporary period. While many of them chose to fight overseas, including against Americans and Westerners deployed in those conflicts, some of them also plotted to carry out terrorist attacks on American soil. Written by an investigative journalist, the book presents fascinating profiles of many of these fighters and how they were radicalized and recruited into militant Islamist terrorism.


This important study greatly benefits from the author’s unique operational experience. He had served as a former deputy inspector general of the Criminal Intelligence Unit of the New York State Department of Correctional Services and is a veteran senior investigator of Islamist recruitment in American prisons. This is one of the very few books written on Islamist radicalization and recruitment in American prisons. The author’s account begins in January and February 1993 with the incarceration of a young Palestinian in New York City for kidnapping and robbery, with the World Trade Center having been bombed a month later. According to the author, these two events were connected by common threads, signaling the arrival of “jihad” in America. Unknown at the time was the fact that this young man, initially thought to have been a common criminal, in fact had sworn allegiance to Usama bin Laden and began to convert other young prisoners to the cause. The rest of the narrative explores how the American prison subculture served to foster radicalization and recruitment into terrorism, including how religious and social welfare resources in prisons are used to promote violent extremism.


An important compilation of papers by leading experts on radicalization. Utilizing empirically-generated case studies, the contributors find that since 9/11 jihadi terrorism in the form of al Qaida “Central” has been greatly weakened, now resembling a patchwork of self-radicalizing local cells with international contacts but without any central al Qaida organizational direction and control, which is compared to the radical left-wing terrorism of the 1970s. Another finding is that “self-starter” type radicalization processes are at work in Western Europe and the United States. A separate section in the book examines the components of effective government strategies to de-radicalize extremists.

The author employs a theoretical model to examine the process of radicalization into Islamist extremism in Europe, based on an empirical study of how such extremists interact with their social environment and how, and under what conditions, individuals choose to radicalize. Especially noteworthy is the author’s biographical approach which uses trial and court materials, along with extensive interviews, to explain how radicalization takes place at the individual level. Also valuable is the author’s explanatory framework, which critiques simplistic deterministic paradigms that posit grievances as causes as well as certain psychological models. She argues that radicalization is a process much like one’s occupational choice – a rational choice made with social and ideational significance. The European governments’ counter-radicalization policies are also assessed.


This important edited volume focuses on the causes, nature, and impact of the ideological and theological divisions within the jihadi movement, and the splits between jihadists and other Islamist groups, which are contributing to the weakening of the jihadi movement. After discussing the fissures dividing the jihadists over strategic, tactical, and organizational issues, the book’s second part addresses several case studies of jihadi disagreements with other Muslim and Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and the Shi’a community, all of which affect the global jihadi movement’s overall cohesion.


Written by the Director of Intelligence Analysis, with a primary focus on terrorism, for the New York Police Department, this is an important account, based on primary sources. It covers 16 al Qaida-associated plots and attacks and investigates the specifics of al Qaida’s role in the inspiration, formation, membership, organization, planning and operational command and control over terrorist attacks directed against the West, since the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. Specifically, the author examines the factors that serve to connect radicalized groups in the West to al Qaida’s organization in the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan. He investigates whether such plotters have to attend an al Qaida training camp or meet with an al Qaida trainer in those foreign, or whether they simply can be inspired by al Qaida’s ideology, e.g. over the Internet. Although the author finds that the role of al Qaida “Central” may be limited in directly controlling attacks in the West, with more cases of individuals who have sought its aid or training, the continued interest by Western jihadi wannabes demonstrates that even a weakened al Qaida “Central” is not preventing new plots that are inspired by the group to continuously spring up in the West.


An in-depth study, based on extensive field research and interviews, of the dynamics that have created the ground for Europe to become a hotbed of Islamist extremism by its second generation of Muslim immigrants. Torn between their ancestral cultures, Europe’s secularism, their parents’ attempts to assimilate into their host societies, and feeling aggrieved over perceived
discrimination and hardships, many members of this second generation have turned to extremist versions of Islam, with some taking the next step into terrorist activities. These issues are covered in the book’s case studies on France, Britain, and Germany.

(viii) Funding Terrorism


This edited volume’s thematic chapters and organizational and regional case studies examine how terrorist organizations such as al Qaida, Hizballah, Jemaah Islamiyah, and the Taliban organize to raise, transfer, and spend funds in regions such as East Africa, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and South East Asia. The chapters also assess the effectiveness of governmental responses, such as problems of coordination and oversight.

Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert, editors, Countering the Financing of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2008), 360 pages, $44.95. [Paperback]

This edited volume brings together leading experts from the disciplines of terrorism, international relations, global finance, law, and criminology, to assess the effectiveness of governments and international organizations in countering the methods employed by terrorists to fund their operations.


An important account by a veteran investigative journalist, based on extensive field research and interviews in Pakistan and Afghanistan, of how the Taliban and al Qaida succeeded in mounting a financial comeback after they were overthrown in Afghanistan in Fall 2001. One of the reasons, the author explains, is the Taliban’s transformation into a criminal network that earns an estimated half a billion dollars annually from the opium trade, which spans from vast poppy fields in southern Afghanistan to heroin labs run by Taliban commanders, as well as the networks of money launderers in Karachi and Dubai. The author argues that the Taliban must be cut off from their drug earnings in order to defeat them in Afghanistan and Pakistan and create a new economy for Afghanistan that will ultimately break that country’s cycle of violence and extremism. Since some members of the Afghanistan government’s elite are also dependent on wealth generated by the drug trade, this may be difficult to accomplish, but at least the author succeeds in highlighting the issues at stake.

Jodi Vittori, Terrorist Financing and Resourcing (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 240 pages, $85.00. [Hardcover]

An authoritative primer on terrorist financing, it examines what terrorist organizations need to acquire in order to survive and operate. Vittori describes the various means used to meet these needs. Of particular interest is the author’s discussion of how terrorism financing has evolved over the years and his formulation of what he terms a “seven category typology of terrorist resourcing” based on how each selected strategy affects a group’s operational autonomy. To
illustrate this typology, case studies for each category are provided, based on actual examples drawn from the history of terrorism that apply to the spectrum of groups ranging from hierarchical organizations to “lone wolf” cells.


The author presents a comprehensive framework to analyze how terrorist groups go about financing their activities. This framework is applied to empirical case studies of terrorist group financing in Europe, Africa, South Asia and the Middle East, focusing on fund raising activities ranging from donations, criminality, to legitimate enterprises. Especially noteworthy are tables that estimate the cost of various types of terrorist operations and the impact of real-world counter-terrorist financing regimes on terrorist groups’ illicit economic activities.

(ix) Suicide Terrorism

Suicide terrorism, in which mission success is dependent on the perpetrators intentionally killing themselves together with their intended victims, has been examined extensively in the literature, as exemplified by the following books:


With suicide attacks becoming a defining act of the terrorist type of political violence in many conflicts around the world, the contributors to this insightful edited volume attempt to answer questions such as: are these the actions of aggressive religious zealots and irrational extremists, or is there a logic driving their perpetrators? Are their motivations religious or do they use the language of religion to express what are essentially political causes? How do the perpetrators maintain their motivation in carrying out their operations in the face of certain death? And: do these disparate attacks share a common cause?


The contributors to this edited volume examine the root causes of suicide terrorism at the organizational and rank-and-file levels. Although their thesis that in the case of Muslim operatives suicide bombing is not closely connected to Islam can be challenged, the conceptual methodologies they present are worth noting.


This important edited volume discusses the drivers behind why and how women and girls become radicalized into extremism and terrorism, and the strategies that are required to counter this phenomenon. Unlike their male counterparts, females who engage in terrorism, especially suicide martyrdom attacks, the authors point out, are generally viewed as violating conventional notions of gender and power in traditional societies where women’s roles are subservient to those of men. Several of the volume’s articles are based on field research where the authors interviewed incarcerated female terrorists.

One of the most insightful examinations of Palestinian suicide bombers and the men who dispatch them on their martyrdom missions. While perceived grievances against Israel and its occupation policy — primarily in the West Bank (since Israel has withdrawn from the Gaza Strip) — drive most Palestinian suicide bombers to attack Israelis, the cult of death through martyrdom is reinforced daily through indoctrination and hate propaganda in Palestinian mosques, schools, media and popular music, which give free reign to recruiters to spot vulnerable individuals to carry out such missions. How can suicide bombings be stopped? The key, Israeli criminologist Dr. Berko believes, rests with Muslim religious leaders, who "have the moral responsibility to forcefully condemn suicide bombing attacks and to issue unequivocal fatwas [religious rulings] against them." They must emphatically state that those who carry out such attacks "not only do not automatically go to paradise, but that they automatically go to hell." The book contains a wealth of information about Palestinian society, such as the impact of polygamous families and arranged marriages on the sons and daughters who decide to become suicide martyrs.

Ariel Merari, *Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 328 pages, $42.95. [Hardcover]

The author, a clinical psychologist, is one of the world’s preeminent experts on suicide terrorism, and a long-time adviser to Israeli governments on these issues. In this important book, the author discusses the psychological, cultural and political factors that drive individuals to intentionally kill themselves in order to kill others on behalf of their political or religious cause. In the case of Palestinian suicide bombers, the author’s findings are based on empirical data gathered by a team of Israeli researchers (including Dr. Anat Berko), who interviewed Palestinian prisoners who had ‘failed’ to carry out their suicide attacks. The result was a first-hand assessment of the personality characteristics and motivation of such suicide bombers. Also discussed are the ways suicide bombers are recruited, prepared and dispatched to their planned death, as well as how they feel and behave along this road. Although focused primarily on Palestinian suicide bombers, the book also discusses other groups, such as al Qaida.

Paul J. Murphy, *Allah’s Angels: Chechen Women in War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 320 pages, $34.95. [Hardcover]

A comprehensive account of the involvement by Chechnya women in terrorism, which the author writes began with the eruption of the Islamist insurgency against Russia in the early 1990s. Initially known as the “Black Widows,” these Chechen women have ventured beyond their traditional societal roles only to be manipulated and exploited by their male recruiters into carrying out suicide missions. Drawing on extensive field research in the region, the author presents valuable portrayals of the women who participate in the Chechen jihad as suicide bombers, as well those who perform noncombatant roles such as collecting intelligence, logistics, and managing safe houses.

What sets this book apart is that it was written by veteran law enforcement officers (one an Israeli and the other an American NYPD detective who was detailed to Israel) with first-hand investigatory experience in handling suicide bombings. Among the many issues discussed are how to fortify potential suicide bombing targets, how suicide bomber teams operate and the types of weapons they are likely to employ. Also valuable are the accounts of actual incidents which the authors had investigated, including managing the aftermath of bombing scenes, where first responder teams take over. Also discussed are the psychological effects of suicide bombings, including how terrorists seek to exploit the media, and recommendations for measures that government and media can implement to diffuse the terrorists’ propaganda.


With female suicide bombers committing more than 200 such attacks since 1985, women have become increasingly prominent in conducting such operations. The book provides interesting case studies ranging from Northern Ireland to Sri Lanka, where female operatives have been used to conduct a variety of terrorist activities, such as propaganda, logistics, and bombing attacks. Their motivations, the author points out, range from a desire to serve their groups’ as martyrs to having some of them coerced by physical threats or other means of social control. The author also discusses how terrorist groups such as al Qaida target women for radicalization and recruitment through Internet publications such as the March 2011 issue of its magazine *Al Shamikha*, dubbed the jihadi *Cosmo*.


An important and comprehensive analysis of the rise and spread of religiously-motivated suicide attacks around the world between 1981 and 2007. Numbering some 1,270 suicide operations, the author attributes their proliferation to the ascendance of al Qaida and its Salafi jihad ideology, which not only rejects the spread of secularism, but, most importantly, the “Western-imposed” notion of national boundaries, as part of its objective to create a global Muslim community. As a result, its martyrdom operations take place worldwide. This differentiates it, for example, from the ‘traditional’ suicide bombing operations of Palestinian groups which are primarily localized in their targeting.

Tamara Herath, *Women in Terrorism: Case of the LTTE* (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2012), 264 pages, $40.00. [Hardcover]

An interesting examination of the significance of the growing numbers of women who engage in terrorist activities around the world in order to formulate social science theories about the changing roles of women in such warfare. Toward that end, and based on extensive field research in Sri Lanka, the author analyzes the role of Tamil women combatants belonging to the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in all aspects of its terrorist warfare, including martyrdom suicide operations.

(x) International Law and Terrorism

Since terrorism is considered a violation of a country’s criminal laws as well as international conventions on military warfare, authoritative studies and handbooks have been published on the legal instruments to define and prosecute those who engage in terrorist activities. These are ranging from directly engaging in combat to providing ideological, financial and logistical support to such groups, as well as the judicial frameworks that can be used to prosecute them. Excellent and authoritative books on these subjects include the following:

Emanuel Gross, The Struggle of Democracy against Terrorism: Lessons from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2006), 320 pages, $35.00. [Hardcover]

One of the best studies on the legal challenges and moral dilemmas faced by democracies in countering the threats posed by terrorists in terms of balancing security against civil liberties, human rights and the rule of law. Mr. Gross, a law professor at Haifa University and a former military court judge in Israel, covers the spectrum of topics such as defining terrorism, the laws of war in countering terrorism, interrogating terrorists, the powers of military commanders in administering areas where terrorists operate (such as in Iraq or the West Bank), administrative detention, the right to privacy by citizens during emergency periods, the use of civilians by terrorists or armies as human shields, and thwarting terrorist acts through targeted killings of terrorist leaders and operatives.

Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 408 pages, $65.00. [Paperback]

An important exploration of the public policy need to define terrorism, which is necessary in formulating the basic elements of a consensual international definition with the power to criminalize such acts. With terrorist acts undermining human rights and peaceful politics, the author argues that a new consensual definition would be able to distinguish between political and “private” violence and enable governments to apply “acceptable proportionality” in their counter-terrorism measures. At the same time, the author points out, any consensual definition of terrorism must also accommodate “reasonable claims” to resorting to political violence, particularly against repressive governments. It is necessary, therefore, to define the range of exceptions and justifications that “self-determination” movements can turn to, as well as to define what is meant by ‘State terrorism’ and the resort to violence in armed conflict.

Benjamin Wittes, editor, Legislating the War on Terror: An Agenda for Reform (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 288 pages, $34.95. [Hardcover]

An examination by experts, many of whom served in the U.S. government, on how 9/11’s catastrophic attacks transformed America’s anti-terrorism judicial legislation. They discuss issues such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), whether a National Security Court is required, interrogation laws, the legal regime for covert actions, the relationship between
immigration law and counterterrorism, the appropriate legal regime of trying accused terrorists as criminals.

**Clive Walker, Terrorism and the Law** (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 720 pages, $300.00. [Hardcover]

Written by a leading British expert on anti-terrorism legislation, this important volume contains extensive, up-to-date analysis of key materials on anti-terrorism law and legal practice, including a comprehensive coverage of major domestic, European, and international laws, and their impact on the United Kingdom. The book’s first part discusses the relationship between anti-terrorism law and politics, while the second part focuses on major United Kingdom anti-terrorism legislations. The final part discusses the impact of European, international and transnational anti-terrorism laws and practices on issues such as international cooperation in the extradition of terrorists, in countering terrorist activities, and how they relate to adherence to human rights considerations.


The author, a specialist in law of armed conflict and a former attorney in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), presents an interdisciplinary and global exploration of the laws, policies, intelligence gathering, and operational decisions surrounding governmental counter-terrorism strategies and tactics. The counterterrorism policies of seven nations (India, Israel, Russia, Spain, the United States, China and Colombia) are presented and discussed in a comparative perspective. As a valuable textbook, each chapter includes issues to consider, such as actual dilemmas and scenarios, including simulation exercises that put students in the role of policy decision-makers. Specific issues covered include interrogations, the proper forum for trying terrorists, judicial review, international law, intelligence gathering, and policy responses to terrorism. A separate chapter discusses future hotspots of terrorism, such as Mexico, where new types of counterterrorism against new types of threats might require the formulation of new legal requirements. An appendix includes policy documents and a discussion of terrorism incidents around the world.


This new and revised edition of a classic reference text discusses current issues in the field of United States antiterrorism law. The materials in this comprehensive volume cover issues such as extraordinary rendition, interrogation, torture, the National Security Agency’s electronic surveillance program, the president’s inherent authority, and trying enemy combatants in military commissions. The volume also contains the text and notes from relevant legal cases, which are intended for use by legal practitioners as well as law school classes.

**Maria O’Neill, The Evolving EU Counter-Terrorism Legal Framework** (New York: Routledge, 2012), 328 pages, $145.00. [Hardcover]

With Europe increasingly targeted by terrorism, this book examines the rapidly emerging area of European Union (EU) law and policy regarding counter-terrorism, addressing these twin disciplines from both a theoretical and practical perspective.
Ana Maria Salinas De Frias, et al, editors, Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1120 pages, $290.00. [Hardcover]

A valuable comprehensive reference resource that brings together leading experts on the spectrum of legal issues involved in formulating and applying counter-terrorism policies domestically and internationally. Some of these issues include policy choices involved in implementing security measures, such as balancing security and civil liberties, the tensions between criminal justice, counter-terrorism and military measures, and legal aspects associated with counter-radicalization programs.

(xi) Terrorism on the Internet

As today’s generations of terrorists are tracked and monitored by government counterterrorism agencies, they possess a distinct advantage that their older predecessors lacked: access to computers, the worldwide Internet, and cyberspace's myriad technological benefits in enabling them to bypass a country’s physical borders to radicalize and recruit new members, raise funds, train operatives in warfare, direct operations, and then broadcast such incidents on their supporting websites. The following books illustrate some of the latest findings on how terrorists exploit the Internet:


When Terror on the Internet was published in 2006 it was considered ground breaking and an instant classic as the first comprehensive study of this issue. Still highly relevant, it discusses how terrorist groups and their extremist affiliates have established a sophisticated and dynamic presence on the Internet, which has transformed the way they communicate, obtain information, conduct propaganda and issue threats against their adversaries. Terrorists also use the Internet to radicalize and recruit new members, raise funds, train followers in tactics and weaponry, organize and carry out warfare, and then broadcast such incidents on their own websites. The author’s discussion is illustrated with numerous examples from terrorist websites.


This edited volume (in which this reviewer participated) is an important collection of papers by an eclectic group of international experts on terrorism and terrorists’ use of the Internet, advertising, and graphic design, who gathered at a NATO Advanced Workshop to formulate a comprehensive campaign to counter terrorists’ appeal on the Internet. The volume’s chapters examine the “seductive” appeal of radical Islamist websites for propaganda, radicalization and recruitment, the use of symbolism in Islamic fundamentalism and Jihad, and how to uncover a terrorist group’s rebellion’s root causes by examining its Internet presence. The author provides practical ways to counter the “seductive” terrorist web by monitoring their cyberspace activities.

A compelling account by an Israeli journalist who covers terrorism, of how al Qaida, which sees itself as a government in exile, along with its myriad affiliate organizations, while failing to achieve its goal of reestablishing the Islamic caliphate on the ground, has succeeded in establishing a virtual caliphate in cyberspace. As an Islamist state that exists on computer servers around the world, the virtual caliphate is used by such Islamists to carry out functions typically reserved for a physical state, such as creating training camps, mapping out a state’s constitution, and drafting tax laws. In such a way, he explains, these groups hope to upload the virtual caliphate into the physical world. Also noteworthy is the author’s discussion of the components of effective countermeasures.

Philip Seib and Dana M. Janbek, Global Terrorism and New Media: The Post-Al Qaeda Generation (New York: Routledge, 2011), 146 pages, $43.95. [Paperback]

A comprehensive account of how terrorist groups use the Internet’s new media by examining the content of their websites, including their extremist television programs. Based on the authors’ content analysis of the discussion in such extremist forums and chat-rooms, they discuss how terrorism 1.0 has migrated to 2.0 where the interactive nature of new media is used to build virtual organizations and communities that transcend physical boundaries. Terrorist groups’ media efforts are also directed at women and children, which are part of their long term strategies to radicalize whole communities. Of particular interest is the authors’ examination of the relationship between terrorists’ media presence and their actual terrorist activity on the ground. They conclude that, although the use of social networking tools such as Facebook and YouTube may advance terrorist groups’ broadcast reach, the full impact of their use of such new media remains uncertain. Also discussed is the future of cyber terrorism and lessons learned from government counterterrorism strategies against terrorists’ use of the Internet.

(xii) Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

While conventional weapons continue to represent terrorists’ “weapons of choice,” past incidents, such as Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 sarin gas attack against the Tokyo subway system and the post 9/11’s anthrax letters attacks, as well as several thwarted plots involving ricin and radiological dispersal devices, are reminders that the resort to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) warfare represents the “next frontier” in catastrophic terrorist attacks. These issues are discussed in the following books:


An authoritative discussion by a veteran counterterrorism expert of terrorists' motivations and efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, the availability of nuclear black markets, whether 'suitcase' nuclear bombs are feasible, and how mysterious substances such as red mercury have been thought of being instrumental in manufacturing such weapons.


A comprehensive, multidisciplinary account on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism and governments’ options for counter-action. Topics covered include terrorists’ incentives for
acquiring WMD; nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons technologies and genetically engineered weapons; sensor technologies; mathematical methods for analyzing terrorist threats and allocating governmental response resources; the role of domestic U.S. politics in shaping defense investments to counter WMD; port and airport defense; response and recovery technologies for WMD-contaminated sites; research and development incentives for bio-weapon vaccines and other homeland security technologies; psychological treatment of WMD survivors, and international initiatives to limit WMD proliferation by terrorist groups.

Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett, editors, Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Boca Raton, FL: CRS Press, 2009), 494 pages, $82.95. [Hardcover]

An authoritative and comprehensive examination by leading experts of the likelihood of Islamist terrorist groups resorting to WMD warfare by documenting current trends in the ideology, strategy, and tactics of jihadists as these relate to WMD proliferation. Topics discussed include terrorists’ interest in using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, an exploration of the roles of governments’ intelligence, law enforcement, and policymakers in anticipating, deterring, and mitigating WMD attacks, an overview of nonproliferation policies designed to keep WMD out of the hands of terrorists, a groundbreaking quantitative empirical analysis of terrorist behavior, and a polling of leading experts’ estimates of the likelihood of a future WMD threat by such terrorist groups.


The volume’s editors have assembled an important collection of papers originally presented at a 2007 workshop on these issues, held at the Swedish National Defence College. The book’s chapters discuss issues such as identifying early warning indicators to identify terrorists’ possible acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction, although such inquiry is hampered by the dearth of reliable data since there have been so few cases of such terrorist warfare. To address this challenge, the volume’s essays attempt to develop a new methodological framework that encompasses both the technical factors contributing to a terrorist organization’s ability to use such weapons and the motivational factors that might drive it to plan and conduct such attacks.


With terrorists expressing interest in potentially deploying chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons in their warfare, the author evaluates the likelihood of such threats ever materializing. Also discussed are the components of effective governmental counter measures, such as police, military, and intelligence means, as well as carefully evaluating the politics, motivations (including personal and religious), scientific and technical abilities of the groups expressing an interest in resorting to such catastrophic warfare. The author’s previous edition of this volume, co-authored with Nadine Gurr, was published in 2001.

Written by a branch chief at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, this is a highly authoritative account of the likelihood that Islamist terrorist groups might resort to nuclear warfare in pursuit of their political objectives. The author’s appraisal of this threat is based on two major contending schools of thought: (1) the “conventionalists,” who view the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack as highly likely over the next five to ten years, and (2) the “skeptics” who recognize the grave consequences of a terrorist nuclear detonation but discount the potential of terrorists ever deploying a nuclear fission device in the United States because massive casualties and widespread panic can still be produced by ‘conventional’ attacks. This is an important and objective assessment of the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist threat and the range of policy options required to address such threats.


A substantially revised and updated collection of original and previously published articles by scientists, academics, and government officials from the communities of counter-WMD proliferation and counterterrorism. The volume’s first part presents an overview of key terms and significant strategic and policy debates on the current security environment and outlines how such catastrophic weapons might be employed by terrorist groups. The second part discusses the characteristics, availability, and dangers posed by specific types of such weapons, including how they play out in five case studies. The third part focuses on key dimensions of the WMD threat to a nation’s critical infrastructure. The fourth part looks at past, present, and future national and international responses to such threats. In the final part, several analytical frameworks are provided (including one co-authored by this reviewer on threat convergence) to predict future WMD threats and identify lessons and strategies for the future. The appendices include U.S. national strategy documents on countering terrorism and standards for controlling WMD materials and technologies.

(xiii) Counterterrorism

The literature on governmental counterterrorism programs has produced valuable concepts and methodologies on the components required to formulate effective counterterrorism campaigns, including metrics to assess their effectiveness. Domestically, counterterrorism – or, anti-terrorism, its ‘defensive’ manifestation – is an important component of what is termed ‘homeland security.’ These and other issues are discussed in the following books:


The author, one of Israel’s top academic experts on counterterrorism, presents an important model for effective governmental counterterrorism. The "puzzle" of the book's title refers to the myriad ways a governmental response to a terrorist rebellion can affect policy making, intelligence analysis, and offensive and defensive law enforcement and military countermeasures, and how to avoid the "boomerang effect" in exacerbating a terrorist rebellion that can result from faulty policies.

The volume’s contributors assess the effectiveness of the British government’s responses to terrorism in terms of preventing, pre-empting, and countering such threats, and, in the event of an attack, mitigating its consequences. Effective counterterrorism, they point out, needs to consider a matrix of factors such as the nature of the adversaries’ terrorist networks, tactics and targeting. The contributors also compare and contrast the UK’s response with other states in the European Union and the United States. Also discussed are whether the post 9/11 era’s domestic security measures in the UK are able to balance homeland security measures and civil liberties.


Although dated, this edited volume is an important comparative study of the policies, strategies, and measures employed by thirteen democratic governments in countering the terrorist threats facing them. With many of the chapters using similar methodological frameworks, some of the findings include the need to understand one’s adversary through effective intelligence, integrating counterterrorism agencies to work in unison, employing discriminate and proportional force to avoid unnecessarily escalating a conflict, and engaging moderate elements among the insurgents’ constituencies to marginalize and reject the legitimacy of violent extremists in order to create the foundation for a possible negotiated settlement.


The three volumes bring together contributions by dozens of experts (including this reviewer) to discuss terrorist threats around the world and the components required for governments to defeat them. Volume I covers “Strategic and Tactical Considerations”, Volume II examines “Sources and Facilitators”, and Volume III discusses “Lessons Learned from Combating Terrorism and Insurgency”.

Amos N. Guiora, Fundamentals of Counterterrorism (Austin, TX: Wolters Kluwer, 2008), 208 pages, $44.00.  [Paperback]

An authoritative, multidisciplinary discussion of the multiple issues affecting governmental counterterrorism, written from a legal and policy perspective as they apply to nations around the world. The author is a former senior official in the Israel Defense Forces’ Judge Advocate General’s Corps, which gives the volume a practitioner’s expertise on these issues. Issues discussed include defining terrorism, what motivates terrorists, terrorism and geo-politics, the limits of governments’ power, terrorism and the media, state-sponsored terrorism, where terrorists are to be tried, and responding to terrorism as it affects the separation of a government’s constitutional powers.

A discussion by a leading academic expert of the components required for effective counterterrorism against al Qaida-type terrorism through the use of intelligence, law enforcement, counter ideological narratives, reforms in the targeted countries, and strong international alliances.


This edited volume focuses on the components involved in the competition for strategic influence between governments and their terrorist adversaries, including ways to neutralize terrorists’ use of the Internet in spreading their propaganda. These issues are further discussed in the volume’s case studies.

Stewart Baker, *Skating on Stilts: Why We Aren’t Stopping Tomorrow’s Terrorism* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2010), 375 pages, $19.95.  [Hardcover]

The author, who served as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s first Assistant Secretary for Policy, draws on this experience to give the reader an insider’s account of his agency’s post-9/11 strategy to upgrade border and aviation security. This involved obtaining improved information about travelers who might have a nexus to terrorism, and the strong resistance from privacy advocacy groups against expanding such databases. As a result, the author argues, certain security gaps still remain open and resistance by privacy groups is making it difficult to forestall future threats posed by new technologies, such as biotech viruses, which he argues could be more devastating than 9/11.

David Omand, *Securing the State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 320 pages, $29.50.  [Hardcover]

While democratic governments recognize that their citizens expect certainty and protection in their daily lives, especially safety from terrorism, this also places enormous pressures on their institutions to balance justice and civil liberty in the pursuit of such comprehensive security. The author, a retired former senior level security official in the British government, argues that while public security is necessary for good government, it should not come at the expense of eroding civil liberties, which might tip the balance in favor of bad government and, ultimately, result in an insecure state. To remedy this problem, the author establishes a set of principles and approaches for upgrading intelligence in counterterrorism while respecting the requirements of basic civil liberties.

Christopher Paul, et al., *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 188 pages, $18.00.  [Paperback]

An examination of the components of effectiveness in counterinsurgency, based on some 30 cases of resolved insurgencies. With several of these insurgencies featuring terrorist groups, the authors’ analysis is highly relevant to counterterrorism. Also examined are the factors that serve to hinder effectiveness in counterinsurgency. Especially noteworthy are the tables and figures that illustrate the volume’s analysis.

Paul Wilkinson who passed away in 2011, was one of the founders of terrorism studies in the early 1970s and became one of its most prominent experts. In Terrorism Versus Democracy, Dr. Wilkinson continues his assessment of the terrorism threat, which he outlined in his earlier seminal book, Terrorism and the Liberal State, first published in 1977. Here, he examines the terrorist networks that operate globally and analyzes the long-term future of terrorism and terrorist-backed insurgencies. This new edition discusses the political and strategic impact of modern transnational terrorism, the need for maximum international cooperation by law-abiding states to counter not only direct threats to the safety and security of their own citizens but also to preserve international peace and security through strengthening counter-proliferation and cooperative threat reduction (CTR) regimes.


Beginning with a discussion of the psychology of terrorists, such as their motivations, the factors that sustain them in their involvement in terrorist groups, and what eventually might drive some of them to end their involvement in terrorism, the chapters’ primary focus is on the psychological challenges involved in responding to terrorism. Practical information is provided on short-term tactical problems (e.g. interviewing), as well long-term strategic questions involved in terminating a terrorist campaign. The authors find that more complex countermeasures are required than merely a quest for apprehension of individuals who engage in terrorism because otherwise they may result in deficient outcomes and needlessly prolonged terrorist violence.


Organized topically, the textbook begins with an explanation of homeland security, and then proceeds to discuss the comparative homeland strategies and measures adopted by nine countries to combat terrorism, including countering radicalization, emergency response, border and transportation security, critical infrastructure protection, public health and military support for civil authorities in the event of a catastrophic incident.


An innovative approach to assess effectiveness in governmental counterterrorism measures through what the author terms “the concept of the performative power of counterterrorism,” which is “the extent to which governments succeed in mobilizing public and political support in favor of their policies, thereby weakening terrorists’ ability to create their “social drama.” This concept is then applied to governmental counterterrorism campaigns in the Netherlands, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States in the 1970s. Drawing on a case study approach which utilizes primary sources and interviews with counterterrorist officials and former terrorists, the author finds a correlation between a high level of counterterrorism “performative power” and a corresponding decline in terrorist incidents when linked to effective counter-radicalization efforts. Thus, addressing a terrorist conflict’s underlying causes is an important factor in improved counterterrorism performance.

This edited volume by RAND analysts addresses the issue of the American government’s response to the terrorist threat in the 10 years since 9/11, by assessing the military, political, fiscal, social, cultural, psychological, and moral implications of U.S. policymaking, and suggests policy options for effectively dealing with the terrorist threat in the future.


This is the first published guide to many of the U.S. government’s departments, agencies, and programs involved in all aspects of countering terrorism domestically and overseas. The authors, veterans of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism efforts, present an insider’s view of these counterterrorism efforts, addressing such topics as government training initiatives, countering weapons of mass destruction, interagency coordination, research and development, and the congressional role in legislative issues covering policies and budgets. Also covered are the still contested issues of defining terrorism and the government’s efforts to counter violent extremism by susceptible communities. The authors also raise new trends in global events that are likely to affect how government agencies will need to approach counterterrorism in the future.

(xiv) Intelligence in Counterterrorism

The following books discuss intelligence issues involved in counterterrorism, such as using analytic methods to identify key players, map how terrorist groups are organized, track terrorist funding, and forecast future terrorist warfare.

Sundri Khalsa, *Forecasting Terrorism: Indicators and Proven Analytic Techniques* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2004), 103 pages; $40.00. [Paperback]

In this highly innovative book, the author identifies 68 indicators that span the spectrum of terrorist activity, based on terrorist capability and intention, that, when applied to an actual group, serve as an early warning framework to anticipate future terrorist activity. A CD-ROM is included to graphically display the forecasting system and explain the author’s methodology.


The authors develop a methodology to assess, forecast, and prioritize likely threats posed by terrorist groups under investigation. It is a highly practical methodology, with the assessment of terrorist threats, for example, consisting of identifying indicators of terrorists’ intentions and capabilities which are then applied to assessing the threats presented in the case studies of four terrorist groups. Also examined are how different terrorist groups adapt and change over time, which is important in identifying their strengths and potential vulnerabilities.

The authors contend that effective counterterrorism should strive to stop terrorists before they can attack by reducing opportunities for such attacks by protecting likely targets, controlling the weapons likely to be used by terrorists, and removing any vulnerable conditions that might make such attacks possible. The authors believe that such countermeasures are essential because response agencies need to prepare for what the terrorists are likely to do: identify vulnerable targets, analyze their specific weaknesses, consider the weapons needed to be used in an attack, and assess access to the targets. Once these countermeasures are implemented, counterterrorism agencies will then be able to provide appropriate protection, limit accessibility to potential targets, anticipate the response forces that might be required to prevent a potential attack, and be prepared to mitigate the consequences of an attack if it does occur. By employing such a methodology, terrorists can be "outsmarted" and effectively defeated before they strike.


Terrorism informatics (a term invented by this reviewer in 2004) is the application of social science methodologies, information technology and computational software to analyze and model terrorism in all its configurations, making it one of the cutting edge methodologies used in the discipline of terrorism and counterterrorism studies. The contributors to this important volume (including this reviewer) discuss a multidisciplinary spectrum of topics in terrorism informatics ranging from mapping terrorism research, including identifying key figures in "terrorism studies"; applying methodologies and templates to identify and map terrorism’s root causes in order to generate solutions; developing information technology-based knowledge management databases, such as incident databases and group profiles in order to generate future warfare trends; applying techniques to conduct threat assessments; identifying “learning patterns” by terrorist groups in order to counter them technologically; utilizing data mining technologies to “hunt” for potential terrorists in government and commercial databases and the civil liberties issues associated with such searches; applying social network analysis software tools to map how terrorist groups are organized and operate; using “web mining” technologies to analyze terrorists’ use of the Internet; and applying situational awareness technologies for disaster response.

Malcolm W. Nance, Terrorist Recognition Handbook: A Practitioner’s Manual for Predicting and Identifying Terrorist Activities (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2008), 480 pages, $64.95. [Paperback]

Written by a 20-year veteran of the U.S. intelligence community, this book provides an assessment of terrorists’ motivations and methods, including a listing of pre-incident indicators of potential terrorist activity, and the methodologies required to organize such information into actionable intelligence for effective response measures. Also discussed are the measures required to mitigate damage from terrorist attacks. The information is explained through numerous illustrations, including explanations of the types of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction that might be used by terrorists.

Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 328 pages, $19.99. [Paperback]
An account of the challenges posed by the transformation of U.S. intelligence to take into account new trends in the threats posed by terrorist groups. Such threats, the author writes, are of a different order of magnitude than those posed by state actors, which still pose first order threats, because terrorist groups are organized differently than state adversaries, as well as being geographically decentralized. This presents different types of challenges, such as forcing greater cooperation in information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement agencies and less demarcation between foreign and domestic jurisdictions in countering such threats.


Written by a recently retired senior law enforcement officer in Miami – Dade County Florida police department who also held command position in the county’s homeland security department, this is an authoritative handbook on how to manage intelligence in countering terrorism at the local level. Especially useful is the author’s practical protocol for gathering, analyzing, investigating, and disseminating terrorism-related intelligence, including how to recognize the radicalization process, behavioral and activity indicators of an impending terrorist operation and how to deter such an attack before it can take place. Also discussed are informer source development and its use in investigations, the role of fusion centers, terrorism financing, the handling of classified materials, and the National Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative.

**Resolving Terrorist Rebellions**

Effective counterterrorism is expected to resolve terrorist insurgencies either through military/law enforcement or political/socio-economic conciliatory measures or through a creative mix of these response categories. Conciliatory measures are intended not only to address and solve the root causes underlying a terrorist rebellion, and, if possible, engage terrorist groups in a negotiation process, but also to facilitate the disengagement of a group’s operatives from terrorist to peaceful activities. Terrorism can also end through the implosion of a terrorist group on its own, independent of a government’s counterterrorism campaign. These issues are discussed in the following books:

**(xv)** *Deradicalization and Disengagement from Terrorism*


An important collection of case studies, using empirical data to analyze the processes by which individuals and groups are likely to disengage from terrorism – a crucial component in the research on how to resolve terrorist insurgencies. Using a comparative method, the chapters compare and assess the various strengths and weaknesses in the disengagement programs in Colombia, northern Europe, Italy, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. The lessons learned from these cases are valuable in explaining their potential utility in a counter-terrorism program’s ability to facilitate this crucial component in insurgency resolution.

An important overview of how and why individuals are likely to leave terrorist movements, as well as the lessons and implications that emerge from this process. Focusing on the tipping points for disengagement from groups such as al Qaida, the IRA and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the author’s account uses field research and interviews to explain why former terrorists left terrorism behind. The book examines three major issues: what we currently know about de-radicalization and disengagement, how discussions with terrorists about their experiences of disengagement can help identify how such exit routes come about, and how they fare as ‘ex-terrorists’ away from the terrorist “structures” that previously protected them, and the implications of these findings for counterterrorism agencies.

(xvi) Peace Negotiations With Terrorists


Northern Ireland's 1998 peace agreement, which put an end to some 30 years of the Provisional IRA’s terrorist insurgency, is widely regarded as a “best practice” model of enlightened conflict resolution by governments and terrorist groups. In this important volume, the authors discuss the range of variables that played out in the Ulster negotiations, such as the selection of state representatives, the information provided by intelligence agencies, the wielding of hard power, and the wider democratic process used to manage the peace process. One of the reasons the negotiations succeeded, the authors point out, is that a sufficiently large faction within the PIRA had begun to realize that their aims were no longer attainable through violent means, with the British and Irish governments, in turn, realizing that the underlying conditions driving the conflict needed to be resolved. At the same time, the American government was able to provide neutral third party mediation, which was trusted by all the parties to the conflict. This volume is important in explaining the basis on which such a peace process was initially established and how its lessons can be applied to other cases, such as Spain and its Basque insurgency.

Carolin Goerzig, *Talking to Terrorists: Concessions and the Renunciation of Violence* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 192 pages, $130.00. [Hardcover]

An examination, based on empirical field research in several countries, including interviews with current and former terrorists, of the effectiveness of governments’ responses to terrorism based on their position on whether or not to negotiate with terrorist insurgents. The empirically derived findings are then used to establish whether there is any link between negotiating with such groups in order to address a conflict’s underlying causes and the spread of terrorist violence when such negotiations either do not take place or fail. It also tests the hypothesis of whether terrorist groups proliferate when they realize that such acts of violence succeed in achieving their political goals or if they spread if governments give in to their demands. The author concludes that a qualitative relationship exists between providing concessions to terrorists and limiting the
proliferation of terrorist groups, because it is through concessions that the “mentalities” and actions of terrorist groups are likely to change in favor of a peaceful resolution to their conflict.


An important collection of papers analyzing when, why, and how governments and NGOs can negotiate with terrorist groups, including recommendations for best practice in negotiation processes. Part I discusses the theory and quantifiable data produced from analysis of hostage situations, while Part II explores several high profile case studies and the lessons that can be learnt from them. Negotiations involve attempts to align what began as completely polarized parties, with governments viewing terrorism as unacceptable means used to promote extremist demands, while terrorists view their actions as completely justified, even on moral and religious grounds. If both sides are to try and reconcile these polarized positions, the authors explain, it is essential for those in charge of negotiations to understand the terrorists’ culture, profiles and personalities, their views of the world, and, for the terrorist “negotiators” to understand the nature of the government authorities, their values and how they frame the problems raised by the resort to terrorism, including hostage taking.


The volume’s contributors contend that engaging extremists by governments is possible when it becomes part of a comprehensive roadmap that can ultimately lead to a conflict’s negotiated agreement by addressing underlying problems and promoting factions that can be engaged with. Case studies focus on how such engagements have worked out in practice in the past.

**Judith Renner and Alexander Spencer, editors, Reconciliation after Terrorism: Strategy, Possibility or Absurdity?** (New York: Routledge, 2012), 248 pages, $130.00. [Hardcover]

The edited volume brings together scholars from the disparate fields of terrorism and reconciliation studies to examine from theoretical and empirical perspectives whether and how reconciliation may be a feasible strategy for dealing with, and ending, a terrorist conflict. This is an important issue for policy makers involved in responding to terrorist rebellions because terrorism is often a sign of deep societal rifts which reconciliation measures may help to overcome, if properly managed. Interestingly, as noted by some of the contributors, in some cases terrorist leaders might turn into political actors during the reconciliation process, making such a past no longer a contentious issue (e.g., the ANC in South Africa), while in others, their persistence in violence makes them an untenable partner for negotiations. To explain these issues, the contributors analyze the central questions involved in the reconciliation process, such as what constitutes ‘reconciliation’ as a process and an outcome, and how reconciliation can be facilitated in a situation of social conflict.

Starting with the assumption that terrorist campaigns usually “come to an end,” the author contends that it is important to examine the processes facilitating such terminal points in order for counterterrorism agencies to understand how to formulate effective strategies to hasten the decline of terrorist groups. The book addresses crucial questions such as: how long do terrorist campaigns generally last? When does targeting the leadership for assassination actually severely damage a group’s capability? When do negotiations between governments and terrorist groups result in terminating the conflict? What conditions enable terrorist groups to transition to more widespread forms of warfare, such as guerrilla insurgency or civil war? How and when do terrorist groups succeed, fail, or disappear on their own? These theoretical issues are applied to a range of historical examples, such as the anti-tsarist Narodnaya Volya, the Provisional IRA, Peru’s Shining Path, Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo, and various Palestinian groups.


Utilizing empirical research, the authors find that terrorist rebellions usually end when they join the political process or local police and intelligence agencies succeed in arresting or killing key leaders. Their recommendation, however, that in dealing with groups such as al Qa’ida policing and intelligence, not military force, should form the backbone of U.S. counterterrorism efforts might be questioned, since it has been demonstrated that a comprehensive approach to counterterrorism is most effective in countering terrorist groups whose political and religious extremism is so unyielding that it needs to be countered with military measures, such as the targeted killings of their leaders, as well.

Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 268 pages, $32.80. [Paperback]

Although focusing primarily on guerrilla insurgencies, many of this important volume’s case studies also include terrorist rebellions, making their analysis of how insurgencies end highly relevant to counterterrorism studies. Their examination of 89 insurgencies finds that most last for about ten years, that being organized hierarchically increases their operational capabilities, as is the provision to them of state sponsorship. Having a sanctuary from which to organize their operations is also vital. They also contend that insurgents’ use of terrorism often backfires. The authors conclude that there are no shortcuts to defeating insurgent groups, but that some key indicators for tipping points include an increase in insurgent fighter desertions and defections.


Written by a veteran scholar on terrorism, this is an insightful discussion of how warfare by terrorist groups generally comes to an end, based on an historical empirical examination of terrorism since the 1960s. Especially interesting is the author’s discussion of the factors driving individuals who embarked on ‘careers’ in terrorism over the years to begin to disengage from violence. In addition to studying the roles of defection or the de-radicalization of individuals who
engage in terrorism, the author also focuses on how terrorist groups are defeated, or how they end up defeating themselves.

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Introduction

On March 26-27, 2012, leaders of 53 countries met for a summit in Seoul, Korea, in the framework of the American initiative to reduce and secure scattered nuclear materials which could offer terrorists an opportunity to acquire uranium or plutonium for exploding a nuclear weapon. It takes less than 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and less than eight kilograms of plutonium (Pu) for constructing a viable atomic bomb. There are still between 1.300 and nearly 1.600 tons of highly enriched uranium and nearly 500 tons of plutonium stored in Russia and the United States and, to a lesser extent, in some 30 more countries. While the more than 100 military storage sites which contain some 19,000 assembled nuclear weapons (all but about 1.000 in the USA and Russia) are generally well-protected, some of the ca. 500 civilian nuclear power stations and some of the ca. 120 academic HEU-powered research reactors are in a number of cases much less well protected. Some of the latter are badly in need of better security than a chain-lock at the gates and a single night watchman on duty. There have been some twenty known cases of theft of plutonium and highly enriched uranium since 1990 and many more of other radioactive materials.

Documented illegal nuclear material seizures were especially frequent between 1992-1995 when more than 15 kg were intercepted. Yet seizures of significant smaller quantities of HEU and Pu were also made in the years 2000, 2003 and 2005. [2]As recent seizures of highly enriched uranium in Georgia (2010) and Moldova (2011) illustrate, the problem continues to be most acute in the regions of the former Soviet Union and, in particular, in the greater Black Sea region.

Based solely on open sources, the authors of this inventory have made an attempt to document the extent of leakage of nuclear (Uranium, Plutonium) but also of other radioactive materials (isotopes like C0-60, Am-241,Cs-137,Ir-192,Sr-90,Cf-252,Ra-226) which could be used for the construction of an atomic fission bomb or, in the case of the latter, a radioactive dispersal device (RDD) or so-called ‘dirty’ bomb. No attempt is made here to look at the intentions and capabilities of possible terrorist end users.[3] Instead, we would like to discuss here briefly some issues of selection bias in radiological and nuclear smuggling and trafficking data.

Data Problems

The principal problem with open source data on radiological and nuclear smuggling and trafficking incidents are inherent selection biases. Such data therefore should not be used for
inferential statistics on all incidents of a radiological and nuclear nature. Open source data draw from a pool of incidents that have been intercepted by the authorities. Therefore, incidents of smuggling and trafficking that have not been intercepted will not appear in our data. There is another limitation to open source data: not only have there to be intercepts of one sort or another, the incidents also have to have been reported in the media. A government may choose not to make an incident public for security or political reasons. More rarely, an incident may not receive sufficient interest from the media because the context of discovery is unspectacular, e.g. when uranium is found on a metal scrap yard by accident. Both the number of non-intercepted incidents and the number of unreported incidents is unknown to the open source researcher. It is therefore not possible to calculate statistical standard deviation. This makes open source data on radiological and nuclear trafficking incidents a poor source for inferential statistics on incidents that have not been intercepted.

It is also unknown how different intercepted incidents are from non-intercepted incidents. It is plausible that successful trafficking of materials is inherently different from unsuccessful, intercepted trafficking: some traffickers may be familiar with routes and methods of trafficking that authorities are not aware of. They may be using weaknesses in nuclear security and customs control that have remained undetected. For these reasons, open source data of this nature should only be used for descriptive and not for inferential statistics. This is unfortunate as it is the successful cases of trafficking that are the most worrying from the perspective of terrorism prevention.

**Open Source Data as a Descriptive Snapshot**

Given these limitations, open source data can best be considered as snapshots on how nuclear and radiological materials can escape regulatory control regimes that protect them from malicious intent or pure negligence. Our data provide some insights how people attempt to smuggle and traffic nuclear and other radioactive materials and how they fail. The story that our data are not able to tell is the story of how materials are successfully trafficked and how they arrive in the hands of end users. Our data should be seen as illustrative examples of what might be considered ‘archetypes’ of nuclear and radiological smuggling and trafficking in the wider Black Sea region. Archetypes, or the multiple recurrence of similar incidents, are also closely connected with the political and economic history and present security situation of the region as described in the article co-authored by one of the present compilers and mentioned in not 1.

The amount of nuclear and radiological material that fell out of regulatory control after the end of former Soviet Union and remains so is unspecified but is believed to be significant. We must assume that in a number of cases, perhaps even in many cases, the intercepted quantities of materials were mere demonstration samples to convince potential buyers that the seller or his middleman had genuine access to nuclear and radioactive materials.

**Other Limitations of Our Data**

A further, practical consideration is that the data is not uniform. Details about the incidents have been gathered from newspaper and online articles about incidents. News reports vary in the
depth of information they give, and often, multiple news reports on one incident will contain almost identical information because different media outlets have acquired the story from the same news agency. This also means that the place of seizure of the material, the nature and amount of material, the method of interception and details about the trafficker, as well as the source of the material and its intended destination and use may or may not be known. The quality of information provided across different incidents is not uniform across the data.

A minor but noteworthy consideration is that some materials that are intercepted at customs checkpoints are not the subject of criminal trafficking at all, but have fallen victim to the failure of exporters and importers to acquire the correct transport permits. In the context of terrorism research, it might be better to disaggregate these incidents from the rest of the data: failure to acquire the appropriate permit does not indicate intent to traffic and to sell; the material may have been destined for a legitimate buyer. Which data to retain and which data to discard in an inventory like ours may often be a question of subjective judgment, because the information given about incidents only occasionally states whether or not there was malicious intent behind it.

The ghost of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident still haunts Eastern Europe. This history is reflected in the reports of discoveries of radioactive scrap metal and orphan source Caesium-137 and trafficking of radioactive materials from within the Chernobyl exclusion zone. Economic difficulties and the presence of organized crime are also part of the subtext of the data. These are illustrated in reports of thefts of ice detectors and quantities of nuclear material from commercial facilities, power plants and even submarines.

With these caveats, we release part of the fruit of our efforts to gather open source data to fellow researchers for their cautious consideration and their feedback in the form of corrections, qualifications and additions.
Nuclear and radiological smuggling and trafficking incidents, events, and threats from the wider Black Sea area, 1990 – 2011

An Open Source Compilation prepared by Alex P. Schmid & Charlotte Spencer-Smith

1990, February / Azerbaijan / N: Azerbaijani rebels unsuccessfully attacked a Soviet military depot near Baku where nuclear weapons are stored; Soviet troops were sent to secure the base (http://www.johnstonarchive.net/nuclear/wrjp1855.html).


1992 / USA / N: Last US explosive test. Former Russian test site Semipalatinsk is closed by newly independent Kazakhstan.

1992, January / Iran / N: An Egyptian newspaper claimed Iran had bought three Soviet nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan for $150 million; Kazakhstan denied the report. In April, Russian intelligence reported Iran had obtained at least two warheads from Kazakhstan; in July a Kazakh official said the 3 reportedly missing warheads were in test shafts at the Kazakh test site; in September a U.S. congressional task force alleged Iran had obtained 4 Soviet warheads (including two operational): two 40 kt SRBM warheads, one 50 kt NGB, and one 0.1 kt AFAP. By 1994, Russia said the warheads were accounted for; Israeli officials suggest the warheads were borrowed for disassembly and reverse engineering (http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/wrjp1855.html).

1992, March / Commonwealth of Independent States / R: Reportedly, a box of radioactive material stolen from Pridniestroviye, Transdnestr; thieves threatened to blow up the material if fighting in Moldova was not stopped (http://www.johnstonarchive.net/nuclear/wrjp1855.html).

1992, May–October / Russian Federation, Luch Scientific Production Association / N: This incident involved a chemical engineer, Yuri Smirnov and long-time employee of the State Research Institute, Scientific Production Association (also known as Luch) which is located 22 miles from Moscow. Beginning in May 1992, over a 5-month period, the individual smuggled out of the institute small quantities of 90% HEU, totalling 1.5 kg. In October 1992, the engineer was arrested because police suspected him of stealing equipment from the Luch faculty. Once in custody, the police discovered the nuclear material that he had stolen. The individual did not have a specific buyer in mind, but was trying to determine whether there was a market for the stolen nuclear material. He was tried before a Russian court and received 3 years’ probation. The material had been seized in October, 1994, in Podolsk, Russian Federation (Frank Barnaby: ‘Instruments of Terror’, 1996, p.154; and Rensselaer W. Lee: ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 110).

1992 / Kazakhstan/Iran / R/N: Iranian agents allegedly contacted officials at nuclear facilities in Kazakhstan on several occasions, attempting to acquire nuclear-related materials. In the same year,
Iran had allegedly unsuccessfully approached the Ulba Metallurgical Plant to obtain enriched Uranium.

**1992, May–October / Ukraine / R/N:** Apparently 100 kg of Uranium was stolen from the Chepetsk Mechanical Factory (Ukraine?); 80 kg could be recovered later. The material was apparently destined for the Middle East.

**1992, 30 March–6 April / Russian Federation/North Korea / N:** 56 kg of Plutonium was said to have been smuggled by train, hidden among scrap metals, to North Korea from Russian Federation in early 1992, according to *Kommsersant*.

**1992, October / Russian Federation:** Yuri Smirnov, an engineer at the Lunch Scientific Production Association in Podolsk, Russian Federation was accused of stealing 3.7 pounds of HEU (90% enriched U-235). He was caught when leaving for Moscow to find a buyer.

**1992, October 28 / Bulgaria/Iraq / N:** A consignment of 44 kg of Pu-239, possibly destined for Iraq, was found in the Sheraton hotel in Sofia, according to a report of *Komosomolskaya Pravda* (11.11.1992). However, Bulgarian officials ultimately identified the perpetrator as a British journalist claiming to research the activities of a gang who had offered to deliver 80 kg of Pu to Iraq. The journalist had managed to insinuate himself as intermediaries in the transaction and passed the first box of Pu (worth $378,000) to the Bulgarian authorities. The ‘Plutonium’ turned out to be a box of metal screws with a total content of 200 milligrams of Pu. (Rensselaer W. Lee: ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 75, 87).

**1992, December / Kazakhstan/Iran / N:** A phone conversation between two Iranian officials, intercepted by a European security service, allegedly recorded a discussion on the purchase of four nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan. Apparently the warheads had already been paid for but there was a ‘transportation problem’.

**1993 / Russian Federation / R/N:** 165 kg of Uranium were reportedly confiscated in Izjezk, 900 km from Moscow.

**1993 / Turkey/Iran / R/N:** Three Iranians believed to have had connections to Iran’s intelligence service, were arrested in Turkey while seeking to acquire nuclear material from smugglers from the former Soviet Union.


**1993 / Russian Federation / N:** The director of the nuclear research centre in Arzamas-16 was, according to his own testimony, offered $2 billion for a warhead by Iraqi representatives (Rensselaer Lee, as quoted in CSIS, The Nuclear Black Market, op. Cit., p. 15).

**1993 / Russian Federation / R/N:** A Volgograd businessman offered 2.5 kg of HEU to a criminal gang based in the Central Volge region to pay off a debt he owed to them. The gang refused the material as payment for the debt because it could not find any buyers (Gavin Cameron: ‘Nuclear Terrorism’, 1998, p. 9).

**1993, January / Russian Federation / R/N:** Several persons where arrested in the ‘closed’ city of Arzamas-16 in the Russian Federation after 10 kg of Uranium were found in their possession.
1993, March / Chechnya / R/N: Chechens were reported to have obtained enriched Uranium from Kazakhstan and from Russian Army deports.

1993, March / Turkey / R/N: Turkish intelligence sources reported that six kg of enriched Uranium was smuggled into Turkey through the Aralik border gate in Kars province in eastern Turkey. The material was reportedly brought in from Tashkent, Uzbekistan, to Grozny, Chechnya, and via Georgia to Nachichevan, before it was intercepted in Istanbul.

1993, April / Ukraine / R: 80 tons of nuclear fuel were discovered by the Ukrainian customs service on its way from Russian Federation to Varna, Bulgaria, where is was thought to be shipped to Libya.

1993, April / Lithuania / R/N: Uranium and Strontium were reported to have disappeared from a nuclear power plant in north-east Lithuania.

1993, April / Russian Federation / R/N: 75 g of Plutonium were seized in Orel, Russian Federation, in April, 1993. The material was reportedly stolen from the Orel Branch of the Moscow Instrumentation Research and Development Institute (Rensselaer W. Lee: ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 107).

1993, May / Glazov, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 11 kg Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1993, May / Vilnius, Lithuania / R/N: In May 1993, Lithuanian authorities recovered 4.4 tons of Beryllium in a smuggling investigation. Beryllium is a metal that is used in the production of, among others things, x-ray tubes, lasers, computers, aircraft parts, nuclear reactors, and nuclear weapons. When Lithuanian authorities seized the material, they discovered that some of the Beryllium (141 kg) was contaminated with approximately 0.1 kg of HEU (50% enriched U-235). There was no evidence that the individuals involved were aware that the Beryllium contained the enriched Uranium. Some reports indicated that the Beryllium originated in the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in the Russian Federation. This institute was involved in the research and development of nuclear power reactors and employed about 5,000 people. It was said to possesses several tons of weapons-usable materials.

1993, June / Orenburg region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1993, June / Electrostal company, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 2.5 kg natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1993, July / Andreeva Guba, Murmansk, Russian Federation / R/N: In July 1993, two Russian naval enlisted personnel stole two fresh fuel rods from a storage facility in Murmansk, Russian Federation. These rods were for Russian naval propulsion reactors that power submarines and contained 36% enriched Uranium. The amount of materials totalled about 1.8 kg of HEU. Russian security officers discovered the missing materials and apprehended the individuals before the material left the Murmansk area. One of the individuals arrested was a guard at the facility and was suspected by authorities after the material was missing. The two enlisted personnel who were caught implicated two Russian naval officers in the plant. However, at the ensuing trial only the two enlisted personnel were convicted and sentenced to prison terms of four and five years. (F Steinhaeussler and L Zaitseva. Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials, with a
focus on nuclear and radiological terrorism. Paper prepared for Courmayeur, ISPAC Conference, 6-8 December 2002, p. 5).

1993, August / Murmansk region, Russian Federation / R: reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1993, September / Novgorod region, Russian Federation / R: reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).


1993, September / Grodno, Belarus / N: Reported trafficking of depleted U-238 (Comprehensive List).

1993, October / Primorsk region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1993, October 5 / Turkey / R/N: Istanbul police seized 2.49 kg of natural Uranium and arrested four Turkish businessmen and four suspected agents of Iran's secret service. The material was of Russian origin and allegedly transported to Istanbul from the Hartenholm airfield (allegedly a privately owned airfield used by Iranian arms dealers) near Hamburg by a private Cessna aircraft. The purchasing price was said to be $ 825 million.

1993, November / Moscow, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 3.5 kg Depleted Uranium (Comprehensive List).


1993, November / Russian Federation / N/R: In November 1993, approximately 4.5 kg of 20% enriched Uranium, intended for use in submarine propulsion reactor, was stolen from a fuel storage facility in the Sevmorput shipyard near Murmansk, Russian Federation. Three individuals were arrested in connection with the theft, including two naval officers. The group stored the fuel rods in a garage for several months while they were looking for a prospective buyer. The three individuals were arrested and two of the men received 3-1/2-year sentences; the third person was acquitted. (F Steinhaeusler and L Zaitseva. Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials, with a focus on nuclear and radiological terrorism. Paper prepared for Courmayeur, ISPAC Conference, 6-8 December 2002).

1993, November / Russian Federation / R : In a case stemming from an incident in November 1993 in which a Russian naval officer stole 4 kg of 20 percent enriched U-235 nuclear fuel rods from a poorly guarded area at Severomorsk, a Russian court found the officer guilty but gave him a suspended sentence because he admitted the act. Two accomplices were sentenced to three years at a labor camp (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/go_appendixa_032796.html).

1993, November / Italy / Russian Federation / R/N: It was reported that in the previous two years 234.42 kg of Uranium-235 'pills' had been stolen by Moldovans, Romanians, Hungarians and a
Syrian from the Nuclear Reactors Institute in Pitesti. Another 208 kg, stolen from a plant in Braslov, could be recovered.

1993, Border Poland-Ukraine, Poland / R: Reported trafficking of Strontium-90 (7 mCi) (Comprehensive List).

1993, November 27 / Turkey / N/R: Three Georgian nationals arrested at Bursa, Turkey, were found in possession of 4.5 kg of Uranium

1993, November 29 / Russian Federation / N/R: Lt-Col. Tikhomirov of the Russian Navy, and Alyak Beranov, deputy administrator of the Polyarnyy submarine base, entered a naval fuel store at the Severomort shipyard near Murmansk, Russian Federation, through a hole in the perimeter fence and stole three fuel rods of Uranium, containing 4.34 kg of HEU (20% enriched U-235). They intended to sell the Uranium for $50,000. The fuel was kept in Beranov’s garage for seven months, until Tikhomirov got drunk and boasted of the theft to fellow officers. Both were arrested (Rensselaer W. Lee: ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 117).


1994 / Russian Federation / Chechnya / N: Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev reportedly warned the US government in the summer of 1994 that it had two tactical nuclear weapons and that he would transfer them to Libya if the United States did not recognise Chechnya's independence. The USA allegedly sent, with Russian Federation acquiescence, a team to inspect the weapons, which, however, did not exist (Andrew Cockburn and Leslie Cockburn. One Point Safe. Washington, D.C. Doubleday, 1997, pp. 101-103; cit. Scott Parrish, op. cit, p.10).


1994, January / Electrostal company, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 3 kg LEU (3.6% enriched) fuel pellets (Comprehensive List).

1994, February / Ekatarinburg, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 30 kg depleted Uranium in a protective container (Comprehensive List).

1994, March / Russian Federation / N: 11 out of 60 nuclear warheads and their missiles, en route from the Ukraine to the Russian Federation to be scrapped, reportedly disappeared, according to the German BND (This was not confirmed by the CIA. John M. Deutch, in testimony of 20 March 1996:"We have received well over a hundred reports alleging the division of nuclear warhead or component during the last few years. The Intelligence Community checks out all reporting of warhead theft and will continue to do so. But to date much of the reporting has been sporadic, unsubstantiated, and unreliable”). It was suspected that Iran was an interested potential buyer.


1994, March / Sneginsk, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 5.5 kg Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1994, March-April / Russian Federation / R/N: A worker at ‘Elektrostal’ and his cousin stole 1.76 kg of Uranium from the plant. They were arrested, together with two other persons, when they tried to sell the material to an agent of the Russian Federal Security Service (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998).

1994, March 4 / St. Petersburg, Russian Federation / N: Trafficking of 2.972 kg HEU Dioxide (90% enriched) that was likely to be from the Elektrostal company. Three people attempting to sell the HEU were arrested by Russian agents in St. Petersburg (Comprehensive List and the Christian Science Monitor).

1994, April / Sochi, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 3 kg Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1994, April / Yackutiya region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1994, April / Lenengrad region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1994, May / Leningrad region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1994, May 10 / Tengen-Wiechs (Baden-Wuerttemberg) Germany / R/N: In the small town of Tengen-Wiechs, Germany, a 5.6 g of very pure (99.75% enriched) Plutonium-239 was found in the garage of businessman Adolf Jaekle, mixed with Red Mercury. The most likely origin of the material was a Russian weapons laboratory, possibly the Arzamas-16 laboratory near Moscow (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 93).

1994, June / Nignegorod region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1994, June / Sevmorput shipyard, Russia / N: A naval office at the Sevmorput Shipyard notified authorities after a fellow officer asked about potential customers for nuclear material. The tip leads to the piecing together of a case involving two other officers and 4.5 kg HEU that had been stolen from the shipyard in 1993 (Compilation by The Christian Science Monitor, 2001).


1994, June 13 / Landshut (Bavaria), Germany / R/N: Gustav Illich, a Slovak national, was arrested by German police in Landshut after he had offered HEU to an undercover agent and after he had delivered an Uranium sample containing 800 millig of HEU. Illich had reportedly obtained the material from Jaroslav Vagner, a Czech national, and had told the police agent that several kg of HEU were secretly stored in Prague. The Uranium shipment reportedly consisted of about 3-6 kg...
and was smuggled from the Russian Federation to Prague in May or June 1994. The origin of the HEU sample was the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk, Russian Federation. Chemical identical HEU was found in Prague on December 14, 1994, and in June, 1995 (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 79, 98-101).

1994, July / Turkey / R/N: Turkish police confiscated 12 kg of possible weapons-grade Uranium coming from Azerbaijan to Istanbul; they arrested seven Turks.


1994, July 19 / Istanbul, Turkey / N: Reported trafficking of 12.38 kg Depleted Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1994, August / Kaliningrad, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 30 kg natural Uranium in a protective container (Comprehensive List).

1994, August / Sarov, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 8.94 kg Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1994, August / Vladimir region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).


1994, August 4 / Timis, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 2.6 kg LEU (Comprehensive List).

1994, August 10 / Munich, Germany / R/N: One Colombian and two Spaniards were arrested at Munich airport, arriving by Lufthansa from Moscow. In their possession were 560 g LEU and 363.4 g of Pu-239 (pu-240 10.78% enriched). German BND agents offering them $ 276 million to procure 4 kg of Russian plutonium and convey it to Munich had lured them into this sting operation (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 93). The smugglers displayed all characteristics of amateurs. However, the German magazine Focus reported that the planned sale was a private deal by high-ranking officers of the Illegals Directorate of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Agency (Focus report Feb. 1997, quoted in: Rensselaer W. Lee, p. 75).

1994, August 20 or 24 / Russian Federation / R/N: Three unemployed youth entered through a hole in the fence the All-Russia Research Institute in the 'closed' city of Arzamas-16 and walked away with 9.5 kg of Uranium-238. (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/go_appendixa_032796.html).

1994, August 30 / Hungary / R: Hungarian police seized two kg (4.4 pounds) of what they believed were Uranium rods coming from Russian Federation. (http://www.infomanage.com/nonproliferation/smuggling/timeline.htm).

1994, August 31 / Russian Federation / R: “Unidentified thieves stole radioactive Caesium from a chemical plant in southern Russian Federation. They stole the capsule containing the metal by breaking through a wall of the plant’s storehouse, said Karl Smolikov, a spokesman for the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situation. The theft occurred at the Ivarov chemical plant in the city of Tambov, about 250 miles south of Moscow. The Caesium capsule apparently was part of some industrial equipment, Smolikov said. According to the police, the device could emit lethal radiation if handled improperly, the ITAR-Tass news agency reported. The agency also quoted nuclear experts as saying the Caesium-137 was widely used in measuring devices applied in many fields of industry and medicine (www.infomanage.com/nonproliferation/smuggling/timeline.html).

1994, September / Sofia, Bulgaria / R: Trafficking of a Pu-239 source, one Natural Uranium source, Cs-137, Sr-90, TI-204, one Neutron source Pu/Be (low activity calibration sources) (Comprehensive List).


1994, September / Italy / R/N: A sample of Plutonium-239 (1 g) was found in the Turin home of former Bulgarian fencing champion Assen Djakovski. An Italian prosecutor indicted him and four others for trying to import 62 kg of Plutonium-239 and resell it to the Middle East.


1994, September 28 / Snagov, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 4.6 kg Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).


1994, October / Mordoviya region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1994, October / Bulgaria / R: Bulgarian authorities seized four lead capsules suspected of containing radioactive material on a bus en route to Turkey.

1994, October 1 / Romania / N: Press reporting indicates Romanian police arrested four people trying to sell over 4 kg of U-235 and U-238 (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/go_appendixa_032796.html).

1994, October 10 / Moldova, Romania / R: Reported trafficking of Sr-90 (1 mCi) (Comprehensive List).

1994, October 10 / Romania / N: Press reporting indicates Romanian authorities arrested seven people and seized 7 kg of Uranium and an unidentified quantity of Sr or Cs (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/go_appendixa_032796.html).[4]

1994, October 19 / Istanbul, Turkey / R/N: 650 g LEU (U-238) were seized in Istanbul. The origin of the material, which was found in the possession of an Azerbaijani national, was Baku/ Azerbaijan.


1994, December 14 / Prague, Czech Republic / R/N: 2.7 kg of 87.7 percent HEU (U-235 87.7% enriched) were seized in Prague by the Czech Security and Intelligence Service, and one Czech nuclear scientist, Jaroslav Vagner, and two former Soviet citizens were arrested. The market value of the radioactive material, which was professionally stored in two metal cylinders, complete with a Russian factory certificate, was many tens of millions of dollars. The seized Uranium was chemically identical to the HEU seized in Landshut, Germany, on June 13, 1994, and was apparently extracted from the same cache. The source of the material was the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk, Russian Federation. Vagner had already been involved in the Landshut incident (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 98-101).

1994, December 15 / Kaunas, Lithuania / N: Reported trafficking of 8 kg LEU fuel pellets (2% enriched U-235) (Comprehensive List).

1995 / USA / Ukraine / R/N: Federal authorities arrested three employees of the New York company ‘Interglobal Manufacturing Enterprise’ for trying to sell some tons of Zirconium to undercover custom agents posing as arms buyers from Iran. The Zirconium was smuggled to the U.S. from the Ukraine (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 120).

1995, January / St. Petersburg, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 1.5 kg LEU (3.6% enriched) fuel pellets (Comprehensive List).

1995, March 8 / Italy / N: Italian police arrested one Nicola Todesco for murder in a Plutonium smuggling case gone awry when the murder victim did not have the money to pay for a quantity of Plutonium smuggled out of Bulgaria. Todesco claimed he threw 5g of plutonium into the Adige river, but no trace of it was found after an extensive search. (Comment: Although an official Italian spokesman believed the Plutonium was "enriched for military use," it had not been analyzed. This may have been another scam involving 'plutonium screws' from smoke detectors (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/go_appendixa_032796.html).

1995, April / Czech Republic / R/N: Czech authorities arrested nine people and confiscated more than 50 kg of Uranium which was found in a car travelling from the Ukraine to Slovakia (Frank Barnaby, “Instruments of Terror”, 1996, p.157).

1995, April 4 / Ukraine / N/R: Press reports that 6 kg of U-235, U-238, Radium, and Palladium were found in a Kiev apartment. Occupants were ex-army, a lieutenant colonel and a warrant officer, and material reportedly came from Russia (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/go_appendixa_032796.html).

1995, April 13/Slovakia/N: Slovak police culminated a long investigation with the discovery of 18.39 kg of nuclear materials, 17.5 kg of which apparently was U-238, in a car stopped near Poprad in eastern Slovakia. Altogether, three Hungarians, four Slovaks, and two Ukrainians were arrested. This gang was said to be connected to three other nuclear material smuggling incidents (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/go_appendixa_032796.html).

1995, April 29 / R: A container with 763 kg of Cs-137, Am-241 and Be, shipped in December 1993 from Amsterdam by a French company, was discovered at Baku airport.

1995, May / Electrostal company, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 11 kg LEU (3.6% enriched) fuel pellets (Comprehensive List).

1995, May-September / Russian Federation / N/R: An engineer removed 1.5 kg of weapons-grade Uranium from the Luch’ Scientific-Production Association in Podolsk in several separate diversions between May and September 1995. The man was later arrested in Moscow carrying the Uranium in search for a buyer (Rensselaer W. Lee: ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998).

1995, June / Electrostal company, Russian Federation: 1.7 kg of 21% enriched HEU U3O8 (F Steinhaeusler and L Zaitseva. Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials, with a focus on nuclear and radiological terrorism. Paper prepared for Courmayeur, ISPAC Conference, 6-8 December 2002).

1995, June 15 / Romania / N: Press reports indicated that so far in 1995 Romanian authorities had seized 24 kg of Uranium powder and tablets. In 1994 they had arrested 24 people for involvement in nuclear smuggling and seized 10.35 kg of Uranium powder and tablets. From 1989 to 1993, the Romanians reportedly broke up five gangs, arrested 50 people, and seized 230 kg of nuclear materials (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/go_appendixa_032796.html).


1995, September / Nignegorod region, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 2 kg Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1995, September/Bulgaria/R/N: According to press reports, Bulgarian police had broken an international nuclear smuggling ring composed of Russians and Ukrainians. A police spokesman declining to disclose details, saying only that the materials seized were of strategic value and included rare metals. The arrests were the culmination of a year-long undercover operation. Senior police officials commented that they were still investigating the final destination of the materials, some of which were radioactive (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/go_appendixa_032796.htm).

1995, October 25/Russian Federation/R: The cleaning staff at Moscow's Sheremetyevo 2 airport found a small lead container packed with radioactive substances in the men's restrooms, according to press reports. Experts reportedly were attempting to determine the exact composition of the three sources of ionizing radiation found in the container. The speculation in the Russian press was that a nuclear smuggler lost his nerve and abandoned the material during an aborted smuggling attempt (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/go_appendixa_032796.html).

1995, November / Tchelyabinsk region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1995, November 8 / Prudnik, Poland / R: Reported trafficking of Sr-90 of “very low activity” (Comprehensive List).

1995, November 23 / Russian Federation / Chechnya / R: Chechen separatists were reported to have placed a 30-pound container of radioactive Cs-137 near the entrance of Moscow's Izmailov Park as a demonstration of their capabilities. Shamil Basayev tipped off NTV television reporters as to where to find the radioactive package under the snow. It allegedly emitted 300 times the normal background radiation. The idea behind this incident was apparently to show the Chechen's ability to strike at the heart of Russian Federation. The material has possibly been stolen from the Budyonnovsk hospital, which Chechens had temporarily occupied in the spring of 1995. Shamil Basayev and other Chechen commanders also threatened to attack Russian nuclear power plants. Earlier S. Basayev had explicitly denied having nuclear weapons in a July 1995 interview with the Moscow daily Segodnya. The Izmailov incident remains contested (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 135/136).

1995, November 29/ Russian Federation/R: Russian security officials recovered four containers with radioactive Caesium, stolen from an industrial plant in the Urals and arrested the thieves, according to press reports. Federal Security Service (FSB) officers found the 90 Kg containers in a shaft of an old mine, ITAR-Tass news agency reported. One of the alleged thieves, a Bakal mining plant’s electrical engineer, had initially kept them at his vegetable garden but moved them to a safer place after the theft had been discovered, according to claims by security officials. Two officials of a local penitentiary were said to be his accomplices. Each container held a capsule with Caesium-137, a radioactive isotope used in geological research, as well as in medicine. The
containers were similar to the one allegedly planted by Chechen rebels in a Moscow park (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/go_appendixa_032796.html).


1995, December 7 / Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan / N: Reported trafficking of 149.8 kg LEU (2.4% enriched) (Comprehensive List).

1995, December 28/ Novosibirsk, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 10 kg LEU (2.4% enriched) fuel pellets – According to press reports, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested 9 members of a criminal organization in Novosibirsk and seized a quantity of radioactive material. The material was identified in press reports as “enriched” Uranium-235. The material had been transported to Novosibirsk by middlemen, possibly from Kazakhstan. The ultimate destination may have been South Korea, according to press reports. (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/go_appendixa_032796.html and Comprehensive List).

1995-1996 / Chechnya: Chechens had reportedly developed a detailed plan to hijack a Russian nuclear submarine from the Navy’s Pacific Fleet with the help of a former commander on Russian submarines (M. Bunn, Anthony Wier, John P. Holdren, op. cit., pp 219-219).

1996, January / Russian Federation / R/N: Three workers reportedly stole fuel rods containing at least 7 kg of HEU, reportedly from a Pacific Fleet base at Sovietskaya Gavan. Some of the material (2.5 kg) was later found at a facility of a metal trading firm in the Baltic city of Kaliningrad and 5 kg were seized at the Sovietskaya Gavan facility (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 119).


1996, January 26 / Yalova, Turkey / n: Reported trafficking of 1121.2 g LEU (Comprehensive List).

1996, February / Switzerland / R/N: A Turkish citizen with dual Swiss citizenship was arrested in Switzerland for attempting to sell a sample of HEU. The suspect claimed that the sample belonged to a larger cache in Turkey. Turkish police, using information from their Swiss counterparts, subsequently arrested eight people and seized 1.128 kg of similar material, which is usually used in nuclear power plant fuel rods. Its origin was unclear. (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/go_appendixa_032796.html).

1996, February 23/Belarus/R: According to press reports, the Belarus Committee for State Security (KGB) seized five kg of Caesium-133. The radioactive metal was reportedly sealed in glass containers. Belarus authorities were investigating the incident, according to press reports. (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/go_appendixa_032796.html).
1996, March / Turkey / N/R: 20kg Uranium in the possession of five Turkish nationals were seized in Antalya, Turkey.


1996, May 21 / Kocaeli, Turkey / N: Reported trafficking of 15 g LEU (Comprehensive List).

1996, June / Tatarstan region, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 50 g Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1996, September 12 / Kocaeli, Turkey / N: Reported trafficking of 15.4 g LEU (Comprehensive List).

1996, December 14 / Bucuresti, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 50 g Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1997, February 14 / Edirne, Turkey / N: Reported trafficking of 15.4 g LEU (Comprehensive List).

1997, February 28 / Edirne, Turkey / N: Reported trafficking of 508.3 g LEU (Comprehensive List).

1997, March / Sofia, Bulgaria / R/N: Reported trafficking of Pu, Be, 23 mg (Comprehensive List).

1997, March / Turkey / R: Turkish police arrested three Turkish nationals, who offered them 2.5 g of Osmium, valued at US $ 3 million, for $ 500,000 (Osmium is extremely rigid and heat-resistant and is used with plutonium as coating for nuclear missile warheads).

1997, May 26 / Bursa, Turkey / N: Reported trafficking of 841 g LEU (Comprehensive List).

1997, June 17 / Brest, Belarus / N: Reported trafficking of 1.7 kg depleted Uranium in three cylindrical shaped pieces (Comprehensive List).

1997, September 11 / Sofia, Injproekt, Bulgaria / R: Reported trafficking of Am-241 (50 mCi activity) and Cs-137 (10 mCi activity) (Comprehensive List).

1997, September 13 / Kirovograd, Ukraine / R: Reported trafficking of Co-60 in four pieces of medical applications (Comprehensive List).

1997, October 31 / Russian Federation / N: Aleksey Yablokov, former advisor to President Yeltsin, threatened to release the technical details of the nuclear suitcase bombs if President Yeltsin does not reply to a letter Yablokov sent him on October 27. According to Yablokov, the letter warns that the Russian Federation had a whole class of nuclear weapons, which are not immediately controlled by the president (Interfax, 31 Oct. 1991. In: FBIS-TAC-97-304; cit. Scott Parrish, op. cit.12).

1997, November / Russian Federation / N: General Lebed claimed in an interview that of 132 Russian nuclear “suitcase bombs” (RA-115, 2 kilotons) only 48 had been accounted for (Jessica Stern: “The Ultimate Terrorists”, 1999, p. 90).[ This claim was distrusted by insiders].
1997, November 16 / Bucharest, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of Sr-90, Y-90 (Comprehensive List).

1997, November 20 / Bucharest, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 13.3 ounces of Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1997, November 24 / Hunedoara, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 17.35 g Natural Uranium fuel pellet scrap (Comprehensive List).

1997, November 24 / Bucharest, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 16.83 g Natural Uranium fuel pellet scrap (Comprehensive List).


1998, March 31 / Smila, Cherkasy region, Ukraine / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1998, April 22 / Georgia / R/N: A plan to airlift enriched Uranium from a mothballed experimental nuclear reactor near Tbilisi, Georgia, to the British nuclear complex at Dounreay became public. It was part of a deal between President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair to take the fuel to the UK after France, Russian Federation and the US had declined to accept it.


1998, May 12 / Republic of Tuva, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (70 mR/h) (Comprehensive List).

1998, June / Turkey / R: Three Turkish nationals were arrested and unspecified amounts of Antinomy, Bismuth and Scandium obtained from Azerbaijan were seized in Bursa, near Istanbul.

1998, June / Bulgaria / N/R: Bulgarian custom officials seized equipment of the kind commonly used in nuclear reactors in a Bulgarian truck at a border post on the Turco-Bulgarian frontier. The truck had reportedly picked up its consignment in France and was destined for Armenia. However, its log indicated that it was loaded in Austria and its destination was Iran.

1998, July 1 / Turkey / N/R: Turkish police arrested six suspects, one of them an Iranian national, the rest Turks, in Van, eastern Turkey, for smuggling 13 glass tubes suspected of containing nuclear material from Iran into Turkey (Caelisium, Tanium, Copper, Zinc, Lead, Iron Rubidium, Zirconium, Manganese and Sr (stable) isotopes). They had 13 cylinders, all marked UPAT UKA3 M8 and carrying stamps with three stars, containing an unidentified substance. The suspects claimed the
cylinders contained only snake venom, but police suspected it might be nuclear material. The suspects confessed that they were going to deliver the tubes to Istanbul for a fee of $1,000 per tube.

1998, 3 September / Turkey / N/R: Acting on information from the Turkish National Intelligence Organisation (MIT), more than 4.5 kg of unprocessed Uranium and six grams of Plutonium were seized in Istanbul. Nine suspects were arrested from possession of this material coming out of Russian Federation. The suspects had earlier asked an undercover officer for US $1 million for the contraband material, which was reportedly worth more than $3 million. The suspects were charged with felony smuggling, punishable by ten years in prison.

1998, October 16 / Kiev airport, Ukraine / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137, Am-241, Eu-155, Cs-134, Sb-125 (with a total activity of 4.3 plus/minus 0.3 kBq) (Comprehensive List).

1998, December 4 / Moldova / N/R: Customs officials and border guards detained two individuals attempting to smuggle a lead container with nuclear fuel materials into Moldova.

1998, December 17 / Chelyabinsk Oblast region, Russia / N: A Russian agency reports that it thwarted an attempt by workers at a nuclear facility to steal 18.5 kg of Uranium (Compilation by The Christian Science Monitor, 2001).


1998, December 29 / Chechnya / N/R: A container emitting strong radioactivity was found near the Chechen town of Argun, east of Grozny. It was reportedly rigged with landmines (Le Temps, Dec. 30, 1998).

1999, January 7 / Edirne, Turkey / N: Reported trafficking of 0.1 g Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1999, February 2 / Turkey / N/R: Turkish police seized 5 g of Uranium and arrested four people in the province of Istanbul. The Uranium was brought to Turkey from Azerbaijan (BBC, Feb. 3, 1999).

1999, February 5 / Turkey / R: A heavy block of lead and steel containing Cobalt-60 disappeared from a company in Ikitelli and was thought to be stolen. On January 13, 1999, 16 people in Ikitelli were injured when two scrap-iron dealers had found a similar block. The condition of the two men was critical (IAEA Daily Press Review, Feb. 5 1999, Turkish Daily News, Jan. 13/16, 1999).

1999, March 1 / Georgia / R: In Tbilisi, Georgian security officials arrested five persons for stealing from the premises of a firm which works closely with the Georgian Defence Ministry two containers with radioactive Caesium capsules valued at between $80,000 and $120,000. (BBC, March 2, 1999)


1999, May 3 / Victoria (Brasov), Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 14.7 kg Depleted Uranium and Ir-192 (2.5 microCi) (Comprehensive List).
1999, May 14 / Kyrgyzstan / N/R: An Uzbek national was arrested at Bishkek airport in Kyrgyzstan while trying to smuggle Plutonium on a flight to the United Arab Emirates. The surface of the rubber container he was carrying showed a deadly level of radiation. The arrested man said he had received the Plutonium at the airport from a person he did not know, and that he was to take it to the United Arab Emirates for a fee of $16,000 (IAEA Daily Press Review, May 17, 1999, ITAR-TASS May 15, 1999).

1999, May 22 / Ukraine / N/R: Two Armenians trying to sell 20 kg enriched LEU U-235 ore and a buyer were arrested by Ukrainian law enforcement officials in the town of Berehovo. The two Armenians demanded $35,000 per kg for the Uranium. They received heavy radiation doses because they had handled the material with their bare hands and carried it in rubber bags. (BBC Monitoring, source: ‘Fakty i Kommentarii’, Kiev, May 22, 1999, IAEA Daily Press Review, May 25, 1999) According to one source, the material was enriched Uranium in white powder form stolen from a radioactive-materials recycling facility in Krasnoyarsk. Other sources said it was LEU metal suitable for making fuel for RBMK reactors (IAEA Daily Press Review, May 28, 1999).

1999, May 28 / Bulgaria / N/R: Bulgarian custom officers arrested a Turkish citizen smuggling a container with 10 g of Uranium-235 across Bulgaria’s checkpoint at Rousse (IAEA Daily Press Review, May 30, 1999). Bulgarian scientists concluded that the material was HEU. Although the source of the material is not certain, it is likely that it came from the Mayak Production Association in the Russian Federation.

1999, May 29 / Dunav Most, Bulgaria / N: Bulgarian customs officers discover 10 g of HEU hidden in a car crossing into Turkey. The driver said he obtained the material in Moldova although authorities have not determined the source (Compilation by The Christian Science Monitor, 2001).


1999, July 1 / St. Petersburg (Murmansk), Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cf-252 (Comprehensive List).

1999, July 8 / Cherikov (Mogilev), Belarus / R: Reported trafficking of Ir-192 (1.85 x E 10 Bq) (Comprehensive List).


1999, July 30 / Plant ‘Granit’, Mikashevichi (Brest), Belarus / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (2.8 x 10 E Bq or 0.0765 Ci) (Comprehensive List).

1999, August 5 / Istanbul, Turkey / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (1739 MBq) and Cs-137 (44 MBq) (Comprehensive List).

1999, August 6 / Almaty, Kazakhstan / R: 5 KG of LEU (3.5-4%) was intercepted through an intelligence operation. The material possibly originated from Ulba, Kazakhstan (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey, CA.; Fall-Winter 2002).
1999, August 17 / Turkey / R: Turkish police arrested five people, among them foreign citizens, trying to sell 49 g of Caesium-137 in Istanbul after having smuggled it into Turkey from abroad (BBC Monitoring Service, Aug. 17, 1999, IAEA Daily Press Review, Aug. 18, 1999).


1999, August 30 / Romania / R: Shim’on, Ion Menciu, and Ivan Busuioc were arrested as middlemen in an illegal operation to smuggle arms, explosive, and nuclear components through Romania to export-embargoed nations and possibly terrorist organizations. (CNS Monterey Institute)

1999, September / Georgia: 1 kg of reportedly U-235 was seized in Georgia (http://www.defenselink.mil).

1999, September 20 / Batumi (Khelvachauri, Adzharia), Georgia / N: Reported trafficking of 998.87 g LEU (UO2, 3-3.3% enriched) (Comprehensive List).

1999, September 20 / Ukraine / R: During the week of 20 September, officials in Uzhgorod, Ukraine, confiscated two lead cylinders containing radioactive Strontium (according to early report) or Strontium-90 (according to later report) from a group of Russian and Ukrainian citizens during a routine passport check (CNS Monterey Institute).


1999, September 23 / Mramor (Sofia region), Bulgaria / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (740 GBq) and Co-60 (74 MBq) (Comprehensive List).

1999, October / Kyrgyzstan / N: In October 1999, two persons were arrested in the act of selling a small metallic disk containing 0.0015 kg of Plutonium. The item was analyzed by the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Kazakhstan and the two individuals arrested were convicted and sentenced to prison.

1999, October 2 / Kara-Balta, Kyrgyzstan / N: Reported trafficking of 1,49 g Pu (Comprehensive List).

1999, October 13 / Russian Federation / N: Russian officials warned that Chechen terrorists were planning to attack Russian nuclear facilities. (CNN, Oct. 13, 1999) Chechen rebel leader Basayev told Agence France Press on Oct. 12, 1999, that he was prepared to launch a terrorist campaign inside Russian Federation (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Oct. 12, 1999).

1999, December / I.N. Vekua Physics and Technology Institute, Sukhumi, Georgia / N: A Russian inspection team visits the institute in Georgia which had been closed as a result of the Abkhazia-Georgia conflict. About 2 kg of HEU that have been registered in a 1992 inventory turned out to be missing. The material has not been recovered (Compilation by The Christian Science Monitor, 2001).

1999, December 2 / Russian Federation (Chechnya) / C/R: Environmental organizations in Georgia and Chechnya warned that indiscriminate Russian bombing and shelling of chemical plants, oil refineries and of a huge disposal site for radioactive waste in the Karakh mountains near Grozny could lead to an imminent environmental catastrophe. The disposal site, which was
built for the Radon organization, had been in operation since 1965. It contains almost 1000 cubic meters of material, including Co-60, Pu, Be, Ra-226, Cs-137, Thulium-170, Ir-192, Am-241 and I-131. Environmental groups warned that powerful surface bombs could damage the burial shafts thus causing radioactive contamination of the environment. Scientists in Georgia, Chechnya and other regions in the Caucasus claimed that damage to the Radon site would have severe consequences for the whole region. Moreover various factories and enterprises in the Grozny region which were known to be storing many different forms of radiation were facing daily bombing. (UNIS Press Review, 12/2/99)

1999, December 3 / Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan / R: 1 kg of LEU was intercepted through an intelligence operation. The material originated from Ulba, Kazakhstan (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey, CA.; Fall-Winter 2002).


1999, December 24 / Mehedinti county, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 3 kg Natural Uranium (0.71% enriched U-235) (Comprehensive List).


2000, January 10 / Almaty, Kazakhstan / N: Reported trafficking of 530 g LEU (Comprehensive List).

2000, January 14 / Bucharest, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 1000 g Depleted Uranium (Comprehensive List).

2000, January 20 / Dupnitsa, highway, Bulgaria / N: Reported trafficking of 15 kg Depleted Uranium (Comprehensive List).

2000, February 5 / Romania / R: four persons were arrested by the police for stealing radioactive substances. Two of them, Liubovi Dasan (45) and her boyfriend, Anatolie Cojocaru (43), were said to be Moldovan nationals. The other two arrested, Ionel Bobeica (36) and Toader Ciuhan (45) were Romanians. They were arrested while found testing radioactive material in an underground laboratory in Bucharest, which they had apparently smuggled from a Russian military base in Tiraspol, Romania. They intended to sell the material, 1 kg of Uranium, for US$ 150,000. (WIJN News 2/8/00)

2000, February 23 / Ukraine / R: 28 containers with ampoules of Sr-90 and Y-90 were confiscated. According to preliminary estimates, the material taken off the five illegal traders in radioactive material would cost some 1.5 Million US$ on the black market. The material appeared to have been stolen from a military unit in the Donetsk region and was kept in a flat. In the 1990s, 81 radioactive objects had been stolen from enterprises in Donetsk, according to the Regional sanitary and epidemic station, of which only 56 had been found by early 2000 (Ukrainian Television Third Program cited by BBC, 25/2/2000).

2000, March 30 / Kazakhstan / Uzbekistan / N/R: Uzbek border controls stopped a truck, allegedly holding only scrap metal, at the border to Turkmenistan. The 10 lead boxes contained
nearly a ton of highly radioactive material. The trucks journey started in Kazakhstan and headed for Pakistan via Iran. The material emitted about 1,200 milliroentgen per hour, enough to cause radiation sickness after 50 days of exposure (AP, Apr. 6, 2000). Former head of the Defence Technology Security Administration, Stephen Bryen, claimed that the material may have the markings of a “radiation bomb”, which could be used by Asian terrorists, and not a nuclear weapon. There have been signals that terrorists supported by Iran and Afghanistan, for which the weapon could be created in Pakistan, might threaten Uzbekistan. He stated that these nuclear smuggling operations are run by “well-disciplined intelligence services of Iran and Afghanistan and, “quite possibly”, Pakistan” (The Hindu, Apr. 12, 2000). However, Kazakhstan’s ambassador denied the allegations of a radioactive substance, but claimed that part of the scrap material had been contaminated by radioactivity (RFE/RL).

2000, April / Georgia / R: Georgian police arrested four persons in Batumi, Georgia, for unauthorized possession of 0.9 kg of HEU fuel pellets. According to one press report, the material may have been smuggled from Russian Federation. The pellets mass and shape, together with the reported enrichment level, suggest that the pellets were produced for use a commercial or experimental fast breeder reactor. Another report also stated that the smugglers were detected when they crossed the Russian border into Georgia, possibility by radiation monitoring equipment and were then trailed to the city of Batumi, where they were apprehended. It is believed that the individuals were trying to smuggle the material into Turkey.

2000, June 29 / Almaty, Kazakhstan / R: 4 Kg of LEU pellets (3.6%) were intercepted through an intelligence operation. The material originated from Ulba, Kazakhstan (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey, CA.; Fall-Winter 2002).

2000, September / Tbilisi, Georgia / R: Three persons were arrested at Tbilisi airport for attempting to sell a small quantity of mixed powder containing about 0.0004 kg of Pu and 0.00008 kg of LEU. According to press reports, an official in the Georgian Ministry of State Security said that two individuals arrested were Georgians citizens, and the third was from Armenia. The individuals said they had brought the Uranium and Pu from the Russian Federation and Ukraine to sell it.

2000, October 6 / Turkey / R: 150g of LEU was intercepted through an intelligence operation. The material was from an unknown origin (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey, CA.; Fall-Winter 2002).


2001, February 16 / Russian Federation /N/R: Kamchatka Region detectives arrested a group, headed by an army officer, that allegedly stole radioactive devices from Mi-8 helicopters in a military unit deployed on Kamchatka. Authorities believe they intended to sell the equipment to China. An expert from the radiological control service determined that the radiation level reached 25 micro-roentgen per hour one metre away from the device. The suspects could face up to 10 years in prison. (NTV, Moscow (BBC), 16/02/01)
2001, July 20 / Batumi (Adzhariya), Georgia / R: 1.8 kg of LEU (3.6%) was intercepted via an informant’s tip. The origin of the material was unknown (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey, CA.; Fall-Winter 2002).

2001, October 15 / Tbilisi, Georgia / R: 23 containers of Pu were confiscated through an intelligence operation, its origin was unknown (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey, CA.; Fall-Winter 2002).

2001, November 6 / Istanbul, Turkey / R: 1.15 kg of LEU were intercepted in an intelligence operation, the material probably originated in the Russian Federation (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey, CA.; Fall-Winter 2002).

2001, December 19 / Samtske-Javakheti region, Georgia / R: 300 g of LEU were intercepted in an intelligence operation, the origin of the material was most likely Armenia (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey, CA.; Fall-Winter 2002).

2002, January / Belarus: In January 2002, in Minsk, Belarus, the Belarus State Committee arrested six international gang members for allegedly trying to sell Uranium metal rods (“Belarus police halt attempt to sell weapons-grade Uranium” DPA, 18 January 2002; and ”Belarus security services arrest 6, seize Uranium,” AFP, 17 January 2002).

2002, January 15 / Liya area, Georgia / R: Three woodcutters were hospitalized with radiation sickness after discovering two Sr-90 sources 27 km outside the village of Liya in Tsalenjikha District, Georgia in early December 2001, according to NTV. The radiation was emitted by two cylinders, six inches long and four inches in diameter, that contained Strontium-90. They had been used in radiothermal generators installed in the area during the Soviet era and then abandoned. According to NTV and Interfax, the three men had broken through the lead, tungsten, concrete, and ferrous layers that shielded the Sr-90, while the New York Times reported that the men found the cylinders laying in the snow. According to the Los Angeles Times, the men took the cylinders to their campsite to use as heat sources and became sick within hours from the radiation exposure. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/radiothermal-generators-containing-strontium-90-discovered-liya-georgia/).

2002, January 17 / Belarus / R: Agents of the Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB) arrested several members of an international criminal group trying to arrange the illegal sale in Belarus of radioactive materials, Interfax reported on 17 January 2002. The report said that six suspects had been arrested in connection with the case, but did not provide any names or details about their citizenship, nor did it specify the date of the arrests. The KGB made the arrests as the result of a “sting” operation. The agency had been informed that some “enterprising citizens” were trying to sell Uranium. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/belarusian-police-arrest-uranium/).

2002, January 27 / Avcilar, Turkey / R: Three grams of "Red Mercury" were seized from a house in Avcilar, Turkey, the Istanbul newspaper Aksam reported on 27 January 2002. Two suspects, Makhi Yeddinho and Irina Grische, both from Russia, were arrested by Turkish police. According to Aksam, the Russian mafia stole the substance from a nuclear plant in Russia. Aksam claimed that Red Mercury was "used in the construction of nuclear weapons," was a strategic metal, that trade "requires a special permit throughout the world," and that the three
grams seized in Avcilar have a market value of $300,000 (http://www.aksam.com.tr last visited 22/05/2003).

**2002, February 14 / Verkhnedneprovsk (Smolensk Oblast), Russian Federation / R:** Two radiation sources containing Krypton-85 gas were stolen from the Polimerplenka enterprise in Verkhnedneprovsk village, Smolensk Oblast, a spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations reported on 14 February 2002. Each ampoule emits 230mCi, "which is enough for a person to get a lethal dose quickly," according to the spokesman. The Smolensk Oblast prosecutor's office, assisted by specialists from the Ministry of Emergency Situations, has initiated a criminal investigation of the theft (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/two-krypton-85-sources-stolen-smolensk-oblast/).

**2002, March 6 / Belarus / R:** The Belarusian Prosecutor's Office arrested members of a gang based in the town of Kalinkavichy, Gomel Oblast. They had planned to plant radioactive materials in Internal Affairs Ministry offices in Kalinkavichy and Mazyr, Gomel Oblast, Belapan reported on 6 March 2002. Belarusian police seized four containers with radioactive material from gang members, as well as firearms, a grenade, and explosives. The report does not identify the radioactive material involved in the case. Investigation by the Prosecutor's Office has identified 20 gang members, and 17 have been arrested and charged. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/belarusian-police-seize-weapons-radioactive-materials-crime-ring/).

**2002, March 26 / Chkalovsk, Tajikistan / N:** Authorities in Tajikistan arrested four men in the city of Chkalovsk and confiscated 2kg of stolen "non-concentrated uranium" [probably natural uranium], the Tajikistani newswire AP-Blitz reported on 27 March 2002. Laboratory tests determined that the Uranium was taken from the Vostochnyy Rare Metal Industrial Association (Vostokredmet) in the nearby town of Taboshar. [Vostokredmet is a Uranium processing plant.] AP-Blitz reports that the suspects, Tobih Qurbonov, Rustam Ahmadshoyev, Yusuf Nurmatov, and Musulmon Azizov, were reported to be members of an organized crime ring and were accused to have stolen radioactive materials from Vostokredmet since 1998. Law authorities have opened criminal proceedings against the suspects (BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk last visited 22/05/2003).

**2002, May 16 / Bulgaria / R:** On 16 May 2002 the Bulgarian newspaper 24 Chasa reported that a stolen radioactive instrument and 100 "plutonium sensors" were seized by police during the arrest of two suspects headed for Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria in a taxi. The two suspects, 42-year-old Emil Spirov and Daniela Tsaneva, were arrested for possessing an American-made instrument containing Beryllium that is used to measure soil radioactivity. The instrument had been stolen from an unspecified nuclear power plant during its construction. The National Service for Combating Organized Crime (NSCOC), which conducted the operation to arrest Spirov and Tsaneva, had been looking for the stolen instrument for two years and had been monitoring the two suspects for "a long time." (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/plutonium-sensors-are-caught-near-turnovo-cesium-found-kurilo/).

**2002, May 22 / Moscow, Russian Federation / N:** On 22 May 2002 Izvestiya reported that Moscow police had arrested a homeless Belarusian named Nikolai Shitik who was in possession of 500 grams of what it describes as "weapons-grade uranium." An unspecified Moscow FSB official said Shitik most likely came to Moscow intending to sell the Uranium. According to
Izvestiya, Interfax reported that the seized material was Uranium-238 (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/native-belorussia-tried-sell-half-kilo-uranium/).


2002, July 19 / Rostov Oblast, Russian Federation / R: A 19 July 2002 article in The Guardian, citing an anonymous US official, reported that Chechen rebels stole radioactive and nuclear materials from the Volgodonsk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in Rostov Oblast, Russia. The official claimed that the theft occurred within the last 12 months and the list of stolen materials allegedly included Caesium, Strontium, low-enriched Uranium, and possibly Plutonium. The same US official said that the theft was reported by Russian officials to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which in turn informed the US Department of Energy about the incident. IAEA, Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, and Volgodonsk NPP officials denied the theft (The Guardian, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe).

2002, September 22 / Pavlograd, Ukraine / R: On 20 September 2002 ITAR-TASS reported that Ukrainian police had arrested a 26-year-old Russian man in Pavlograd who was attempting to sell a container of the radioactive isotope Sr-90. The man had brought the Strontium from Zlatoust, in Russia's Chelyabinsk Oblast and was arrested while trying to sell it to two local residents. The material was seized and an investigation to establish the identity of the buyers was opened (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russian-arrested-ukraine-attempt-sell/).

2002, October 10/ Belarus / N: Sovietskaya Belorussia reported that five men were on trial for attempting to sell 1.5 kg of 2% enriched Uranium-235 to undercover officers in a sting operation. This material was in the form of Uranium dioxide fuel pellets and was alleged to have come from Chernobyl. However, there are some doubts about the veracity of the story published by the state newspaper. http://bellona.org/english_import_area/international/russia/nuke-weapons/nonproliferation/26272

2002, October 15 / Dagestani-Azeri border, Russian Federation / R: Russian customs officers detained a resident of Chechnya who tried to transport a radiation source across the Russian-Azerbaijani border, Interfax reported on 15 October 2002. The suspect, Ilyas Dovletmurzayev, was detained at the Yarag-Kazmalyar border crossing between the Russian republic of Dagestan and Azerbaijan. An investigation into the incident, charging the suspect with violating Article 188 (contraband) of the Russian Criminal Code, was subsequently opened (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/chechnya-resident-tries-take-radiation-source-out-russia).

2002, December 6 / Bulgaria: Bulgarian media reported during the first week of December 2002 on the theft of two radioactive sources from the Kremikovtsi Metallurgical Works. The sources contain Cs-137 and were reportedly mounted on level gauges, which are used to control the level of filling zapulvane. The thieves stole the devices, which emit 3 curies, without their protective covers. Khristo Botev Radio reported on 6 December 2002 that a measuring device containing Cs-137 and Am-241 had been stolen from Bobov Dol Thermoelectric Power Plant. Each of the sources was mounted in its own container and weighed 45 kilograms (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/uranium-traders-punished-probation/).
2003, February 14 / Belarus / R: “Authorities have detained an unknown number of people in Belarus who attempted to sell two containers of Caesium-137 to an undercover agent, officials said yesterday.” (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cesium-peddlers-arrested-belarus/)

2003, February 28 / Russian Federation / R: Russian authorities announced today that they had prevented the sale of a quantity of radioactive Osmium-137 to organized crime elements. Russian Federal Security Service officials in the city of Omsk, located in the Siberian region, have detained one person with a quantity of Osmium-137 and another with 158,000 counterfeit Iraqi Dinars, said security service spokeswoman Natalya Grutsina. The two people had attempted to sell the Osmium-137, contained in a vial disguised as a pen, for $30,000 to organized crime members from Moscow, according to ITAR-Tass (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/osmium-187-seized-omsk-russia/)

2003, April 4 / Akhtubinsk (Astrakhan Oblast), Russian Federation / R: Two small cylindrical containers bearing radioactive warning labels and the inscription "harmful to life" were found in a shed in Akhtubinsk, Astrakhan Oblast, in southern Russia, Regions.ru reported on 4 April 2003. It is thought that there has been an underground market for radioactive materials at the military base in Akhtubinsk since Soviet times. According to Regions.ru, a container similar to those found last week was found in another district of the city last year. A criminal case has been opened in connection with the incident (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cesium-137-seized-akhtubinsk-russia/).


2003, August 28 / Russia / N: The deputy director of Atomflot, a company that performs repair work on nuclear icebreakers and submarines, was arrested in a sting when he tried to sell Uranium-235 to FSB agents posing as potential buyers. The material was found in his suitcase. Uranium-238 was found during a search of his garage. There are varying reports about how much material was found. http://saint-petersburg.ru/m/57854, http://bellona.org/english_import_area/international/russia/icebreakers/31049, http://www.lenta.ru/articles/2003/10/02/uran/, http://articles.sfgate.com/2003-11-23/news/17519696_1_research-reactors-radioactive-material-nuclear-facilities

2003, October / Russian Federation / R: two men were convicted for attempting to sell what they claimed was weapons-grade Plutonium stolen from a closed Russian nuclear site - a secure facility in the closed city of Sarov. Although no Plutonium had actually been stolen on this occasion, the two men posed as military officials tried to convince a third man that they had the material in their possession. The would-be client apparently planned to sell the Plutonium to a third party. (Gnosis, 13.10.2004)

2004, February 12/ Armenia, Iran/ R: It was reported, that on December 29, 2003, at the Megri border checkpoint on the Armenian-Iranian border, Armenian customs officials discovered a radiation source in a scrap metal shipment bound for Iran. Neither Iran nor the Armenian NPP were connected to the radioactive object, which was an empty casing from a radioactive sources, which previously contained Strontium-90, the implication being that the radiation source itself had been moved to an unknown location. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/armenian-customs-stops-radiation-source-bound-iran/)

2004, March / Kazakhstan / N: Three men were convicted in Kazakhstan after attempting to sell Plutonium at Pavlodar railway station the previous July. (Gnosis, 13.10.2004)

2004, March 13/ Georgian Republic/ R: Armenian citizen with radioactive material – the report did not identify the radioactive material - was detained at the Sadakhlo border post on the Georgian-Armenian border. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-material-seized-georgian-armenian-border/)

2004, March 13/ Tajikistan/ N: Tajikistani Drug Control Agency authorities arrested an Uzbekistani citizen in Dushanbe, Tajikistan and seized a capsule containing 3g of Plutonium on 13 March 2004. ‘According to Tajik Television First Channel, the Plutonium capsule was of Russian origin, and was intact and did not pose a health risk. According to Drug Control Agency spokesman Avaz Yuldoshev, the suspect intended to sell the plutonium to individuals in Afghanistan or Pakistan for $21,000. The Associated Press reported that the suspect was looking for Pakistani or Indian buyers.’ (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/radiation-source-containing-plutonium-seized-dushanbe-tajikistan/)

2004, early April/ Ukraine/ R+N: The Ukrainian Security Service seized two containers filled with Caesium-137 in Crime, and arrested members of an organized crime group involved in the trafficking of radioactive and rare-earth metals. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/cesium-peddlers-arrested-crimea-ukraine)

2004, May 18 / Ukraine/ R: “The Ukrainian secret service said Monday that it had arrested several members of a criminal gang that was trying too sell radioactive material in the Middle East. Secret service officials said in a statement that several Ukrainians and citizens of Middle Eastern countries had been detained for trying to trade in red Mercury which is allegedly used in nuclear weapons. The suspects had obtained the Mercury in Ukraine and had tried to take it out of the country in special containers, officials said.” (International Herald Tribune http://iht.com/articles/520286.htm).

2004, July 23/ Russia/ R: Regions.Ru reported on 23 July 2004 that the Belgorod customs post has conducted customs radiation control on nearly 5 million cargoes and transport vehicles since January 2004. During that same period, there were 145 incidents involving cargoes with elevated radiation levels. An investigation has been opened with reference to a radioactive item not declared by an individual who was crossing the border. In two cases radioactive cargoes entering Russia from Ukraine were detained and then sent back. The article did not specify how many of the 145 incidents involved attempted imports and how many involved exports.’ (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/belgorod-russia-customs-post-detects-145-radioactive-cargoes-during-2004)
2004, August 10 / Russia / R: A train car transporting scrap material for processing to the Krasnyo Oktyabr plant in Volgograd, Russia, was stopped since it was identified as emitting radiation ten times higher than normal background levels. (http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/2004/20040400.htm, 13.04.2005)

2004 / August 16 / Ukraine / R: Ukrainian police uncovered three containers with radioactive material (Strontium and Plutonium, emitted levels of radiation hundreds of times higher than normal background levels) an a cache of small arms in Kodyma, Odessa Oblast, Ukraine. One of the suspects claimed that he had bought the radioactive materials from an unknown person, in order to resell them with profit. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-material-reportedly-seized-near-odessa-ukraine/)

2004, September 2/ Ukraine/ N: Two men were arrested by Ukrainian police for the attempt to bring a container of Americium-241 into Kyiv. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/americium-241-seized-kyiv-ukraine)

2004, September 3 - 24 / Russia / R: Roman Tsepov, the general-director of Russian private security company, Baltik-Escort, died on 24 September, having fallen ill after a business trip to Moscow 3 weeks earlier. He showed symptoms of severe radiation poisoning and tests found that he was contaminated with an unknown radioactive material with radioactivity one million times over background levels of radiation. (http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/radevents/2004RUS1.html)

2004, September/ Kyrgyzstan / N: Two men were arrested near Bishkek while trying to sell 60 smoke detectors containing Plutonium-239. A spokesperson of the IAEA added that these smoke detectors have been produced 2 or 3 decades ago in the Soviet Union and these detectors themselves did not pose a nuclear proliferation threat, since such smoke detectors contain only a few micrograms of plutonium as an ionisation source. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/smoke-detectors-plutonium-seized-near-bishkek-kyrgyzstan)

2004, October / Russia / R: Russian customs officers prevented an unspecified radioactive material from being brought into Russia at Sochi. The incident appeared in the press in January 2005. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-material-denied-entry-russia-customs-post-sochi/)

2004, October 19/ Russia/ R: A truck carrying radioactive materials – scrap metal removed from a military unit located in the closed city of Vilyuchinsk – was seized at the port of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-cargo-seized-petropavlovsk-kamchatskiy-russia)

2004, October 28 / Russia / R: Radioactive scrap metal was discovered in a train car near Chelyabinsk, Russia. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-scrap-found-chelyabinsk-oblast-russia/)

2004, November 8 / Georgian Republic / R: Two containers emitting radiation were uncovered by Georgian security agents in Tbilisi suburb, Georgia. The recovered containers are gamma-ray flaw detectors containing Cobalt-60. Ministry experts stressed that these containers were ‘hermetically packed and in this condition they could not pose a threat to public health’. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-material-discovered-near-tbilisi-georgia)
2004, November 09 / Russia / R: A former nuclear physicist voluntarily surrendered several containers containing Plutonium-238 and Cadmium to the police in the eastern Siberian town of Zmeinogorsk. (The St. Petersburg Times, Issue 1019, 09.11.2004)

2004, December 29 / Russia, Kazakhstan / N/R: Russian customs officers detained a vehicle - bringing a group of workers to Kazakhstan – containing a container with 37kg of uranium –23, 12 kg of tungsten, and 200g of rare metals. The uranium was apparently depleted uranium used as shielding. (NTI NISTRAFF, 13.04.2005)

2005, January 18 / Russia, Georgian Republic / R: Russian border guards seized a minibus with radioactive cargo at the Nizhniy Zaramag border crossing on the Russian-Georgian border. The radiation level of the cargo was five times higher than the normal radiation background level. 42 sacks of Potassium Hydroxide in powder form, 35 kg each (1470 kg in total); and 11 barrels of aluminum powder, 50 kg each (550 kg in total) were found. The article did not cite the exact source of the radioactivity in the cargo. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-material-seized-russian-georgian-border)

2005, January 22 / Ukraine / R: ‘Ukrainian police seized six metal containers filled with Cesium-137 in the village of Ishun, Krasnoperekopskyi district, Crimea, Ukraine, the Podrobnosti (Ukraine) news agency reported on 24 January 2005, citing UNIAN. According to Krymskaya pravda (Simferopol), each container could hold up to 30g of Caesium-137. The radiation level of the containers exceeded the normal background by 380 times; this prompted authorities to evacuate the residents of the house and their neighbors.’ (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/cesium-137-seized-crimea-ukraine)

2005, February / Kyrgyzstan / R: Three residents of Tokmok were arrested for trying to sell 4kg of radioactive Mercury for over 1 million soms, as part of a sting operation by the National Security Service. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-mercury-reported-seized-kyrgyzstan)

2005, February 8 / Kazakhstan / R: Two persons tried to steal approximately 4 tons of radioactive scrap metal at the Aktau Chemical and Hydrometallurgical Combine, Kazakhstan. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/attempted-theft-radioactive-scrap-thwarted-aktau-kazakhstan)

2005, March 1 / Ukraine / N: The Security Service reportedly seized 582 g of Uranium-238 at Boryspil International Airport near Kiev from the boot of a car and arrested the owner of the car. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/uranium-seized-kyiv-airport)

2005, April 20 / Kazakhstan/Russia / R: A truck from Kazakhstan containing over 3 metric tons of radioactive metal was detained at the Karasook customs checkpoint at Novosibirsk Oblast, Russia, and returned to Kazakhstan. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-scrap-metal-seized-novosibirsk-oblast-russia)

2005, May 5 / Moldova / R: The Times (UK) reported that an arms dealer in Bender, Transnistria, offered to sell three Alazan rockets equipped with radioactive warheads. The existence of these rockets has not been confirmed. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/dirty-bomb-rocket-again-reported-sale-transnistria)

2005, June 23 / Ukraine / R: A container containing Yttrium and Strontium-90 was discovered in a warehouse in Kherson, Oblast. “The district Sanitary and Epidemiological Station (SES)
examined the warehouse and reported that background radiation near the device (0.1 to 0.5 meters) ranged from 313 to 50 microroentgens per hour.” (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/strontium-90-seized-kherson-oblast-ukraine)


2005, August 11 / Russia / R: A radioactive dosimeter containing a source of Strontium was discovered outside the Rezets factory in Tri Ruchya in Murmansk.

2005, August 16 / Turkey / N: Turkish police arrested two men in Istanbul trying to sell 173g of 17% Uranium 235 for $7m, although the market value was $1,500. This was part of a sting operation between the police and the secret service. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/turkey-seizes-lev/)

2005, August 18 / Turkey / N: Two men of undisclosed nationalities were arrested in a sting operation organised by the Turkish police while attempting to sell 173g of a mixture that was 17% U-235 and 83% U-238 for USD 7 million. An undisclosed source at Rosatom confirmed that the material was likely to have come from Russia. http://bellona.org/english_import_area/international/russia/nuke-weapons/nonproliferation/39468

2005, September 19 / Bulgaria / R: The BBC reported that a man was arrested for attempting to carry 3.4 kg of Hafnium across the Bulgarian border into Romania. It was transported as a metal and was therefore not radioactive. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4260996.stm

2005, September 28 / Ukraine / R: Ukrainian police recovered radioactive material missing since 1995. A plastic bag with 13 pipes and a 10-centimeter bar resembling fragments of nuclear fuel rods was discovered in the compound of the closed Chernobyl nuclear power plant (NPP). [2] The UNIAN news agency reported that the bag, emitting background radiation of 50 microroentgen per hour, was found during a routine radiation check in the territory surrounding the sarcophagus which encases unit four of the plant. The bag was hidden under a railroad car parked near the sarcophagus. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-material-found-chornobyl-npp-ukraine/; http://english.pravda.ru/news/world/28-09-2005/66940-0/)


2005, October 18 / Ukraine / R: A vial of Caesium-137 was found in a garage in Borisov. It emitted 2.5 - 3 times the level of background radiation, around 20 micro- roentgen per hour. (http://kp.by/daily/23597/140011/)

2005, November 8 / Russia / R: 113 capsules containing Plutonium-239 and Caesium-137 were discovered in the former biochemical plant in Blagoveshchensk in a building repair and machine shop. Radiation was at 1000 micro- roentgen per hour inside the building, and 600 outside. To receive an annual dose of radiation, it would have been enough to stand next to the dangerous sources for 5-7 minutes. The prosecutors did not rule out the possibility that people may have been exposed. (http://www.mkset.ru/news/chronograph/2130/)
2005, November 10 / Russia / R: A source of radiation was discovered at Magadan port. The material was a non-ferrous metal from the village of Berry Magadan that had been brought into Magadan city for delivery to a scrap metal collection point. It was detected by a Yantar radiation detection system. A grey cylinder with a radiation symbol was found in the scrap. It emitted ten thousand times background radiation. (http://www.korabel.ru/news/comments/v_morskom_torgovom_portu_magadana_obnaruzhili_istochnik_radiatsii.html)

2005, November 25 / Russia / R: Caesium-137 was found in the former warehouse of the enterprise "Hlebprodservis". The source was a RMGZ-01 from 1976. It emitted milliroentgen 6 per hour. "The device was used to test for radioactivity of food products. After closing the warehouse, Hlebprodservisa's management was supposed to arrange its transfer to the appropriate authorities. The fact that Caesium-137 was abandoned in a warehouse constitutes “inexcusable negligence”, commented the MOE laboratory. (http://stolica.onego.ru/news/42064.html)

2005, December 23 / Russia / N/R: The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) detained three suspects and seized 12 kg of radioactive materials in Yaroslavl as part of an undercover sting operation. The suspects claimed the materials were “real uranium” but tests revealed the material was unnamed radioactive material (possibly Caesium). (http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/comment/ufsb/single.htm%21id%3D10316366%40fsbComment.html)


2006, February 1 / Russia/Ukraine / R: A Ukrainian citizen was detained attempting to smuggle two RIO-3 radioisotope icing sensors for use in aviation without a license across the Russian-Ukrainian border at Belgorod. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-cargo-stopped-border)

2006, February 3 / Russia / R: RIA Novosti-Yug reported that according to Usam Bakayev, chief epidemiologist at the Chechen Ministry of Health, 12 radioactive sources have been reported missing since 1995, while there were 29 sources between 2001 and 2005. There are no records of radioactive sources before 1995 because they have been destroyed. The Groznyy Chemical Combine, where a radioactive accident occurred in 1999 at the 212 Unit, still poses a threat to health and safety, as on the territory on the unit, radiation levels at 90,000 times that of background levels. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/unidentified-number-radioactive-sources-still-missing-chechnya/)

2006, February 5 / Georgia / N: Georgian media reported the alleged seizure of 80g of enriched Uranium by Georgian security agents on the South Ossetian border. This was disputed by the Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Sergei Ivanov. (NTI NISTRAFF 29.04.2010)

2006, February 10 / Belarus / R: A cargo containing 3 tons of Charoit, a slightly radioactive semi-precious stone from Sakha Republic in Russia, was detained at customs at Brest. Background radiation near some of the stones was nearly 4 times higher than normal, but
dropped to a normal level three to five metres away from the cargo. ([http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-cargo-semi-precious-stone-charoit-seized-belarus/](http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-cargo-semi-precious-stone-charoit-seized-belarus/))

2006, February 20 / Russia / R: A truck carrying the debris of a minivan emitting 50 times the level of background radiation was detected by a Yantar radiation detection system and detained at the port of Vladivostok. The owner refused to cooperate and Primtekhnopolis, the company responsible for the removal of radioactive materials, was unable to extract the debris from the van. ([http://nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-truck-detained-entry-port-vladivostok](http://nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-truck-detained-entry-port-vladivostok))

2006, March 25 / Russia / R: A fast neutron source, 2x3cm in size, and emitting 1500 neutrons per second and 14000 microroentgen per second, was discovered in scrap metal at the port of Vladivostok. ([http://nti.org/analysis/articles/neutron-radiation-source-detected-port-vladivostok](http://nti.org/analysis/articles/neutron-radiation-source-detected-port-vladivostok))

2006, March / Russia / R: Four dismantled Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators were discovered in Norilsk, Krasnoyarsk with the Strontium-90 sources left intact. (NTI NISTRAFF 29.04.2011)

2006, April 13 / Russia / R: Russian police detained two men who tried to sell 5kg of 4% LEU pellets stolen from the Machine Building Plant in Elektro staal in a sting. One of the men led them to a further 17kg LEU he was storing in his garage. ([http://nti.org/analysis/articles/ukrainians-tried-smuggle-military-equipment-poland](http://nti.org/analysis/articles/ukrainians-tried-smuggle-military-equipment-poland))

2006, April 20 / Ukraine / R: A man was detained at Smilnytsa on the Polish-Ukrainian border by Ukrainian police after his minivan containing 11 TZK-11 zenith tubes, 700 artillery compasses, 51 periscopes, 43 azimuth compasses, and 14 binocular telescopes set off radiation detection alarms without the required cross-border transport permit. ([http://nti.org/analysis/articles/ukrainians-tried-smuggle-military-equipment-poland](http://nti.org/analysis/articles/ukrainians-tried-smuggle-military-equipment-poland))

2006, May 11 / Uzbekistan / R: Two incidents were reported by the Uzbek authorities. A cargo of 15.386 kg of zinc powder destined for Iran set off radiation alarms at the Bukhara Oblast checkpoint because it contained traces of Caesium 127 emitting 240-300 microroentgen per hour at a distance of 1.5m. It was detained because the transporters did not have the appropriate permit and were using falsified documentation. In the other incident, a train cargo of Molybdenum was seized en route to Tajikistan because it contained Radium-226, Uranium-234, Uranium-238 and Thorium-234. ([http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/uzbek-customs-uncovers-contraband](http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/uzbek-customs-uncovers-contraband))

2006, July 27 / Georgia / R: Two orphaned Caesium-127 sources were found by a joint Georgian Ministry of Environment and IAEA team in the first three days of a joint initiative to locate orphan sources. One was found in an abandoned arsenic processing plant in Iri and another was found in a house in Likhaura. ([http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-recovered-georgia](http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-recovered-georgia))

2006, October 23 / Russia / R: Vremya Novostey reported that a car loaded with metal pipes contaminated with radiation was discovered in Rostov-on-Don. The radiation was seven times the background level and it is suspected that, as the cargo was of Ukrainian origin, the pipes came from the Chernobyl quarantine zone. ([http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/metal-contaminated-radiation-again](http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/metal-contaminated-radiation-again))
2006, November 1 - 23 / UK / R: Former KGB agent, Alexander Litvinenko fell ill on 1 November and died on 23 November in London from poisoning by an estimated 5 microcuries of Polonium-210. Two of his associates, Andrei Lugovoi and Dmitry Kovtun were also taken ill, 120 individuals showed probable contamination, 17 showed contamination not significant enough to cause a risk to health, and 12 locations in London tested positive for trace levels of Polonium-210. On 28 May 2007, the UK authorities formally requested that Russia extradite Lugovoi under charges for Litvinenko’s murder. This was refused, sparking a period of diplomatic tension between the UK and Russia.

2006, November 13 / Kazakhstan / R: Kazakh customers inspectors seized 500g Caesium-137 from a Chinese citizen at Maykapchagay. The material emitted 22.67 microsieverts per hour. (NISTRAFF 05.05.2011; http://www.yorkintel.com/NFCInitiate_Trafficking_News.aspx)

2007, January 15 / Georgia / N: Media reports appear alleging that Russian national Oleg Khintsagov was arrested in February 2006, alongside three Georgian citizens, for trying to sell 100g of almost 90% enriched HEU, in a sting operation by the Georgian Secret Service in Tbilisi. Reportedly, he was secretly tried and jailed for eight years. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/heu-seized-georgia)

2007, February 27 / Russia / R: A radioactive isotope icing sensor used in aviation was discovered by a railroad worker 50 meters away from the Krasnodar-Yeysk highway. It was covered in oiled paper and measured 30cm by 30cm. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-object-krasnodar-territory/)

2007, April 13 / Russia / R: A radioactive item in a sealed pipe and a radioactive item in a metal container were discovered at the site of the Stroyindustriya joint stock company in Togliatti, Samara Oblast, by officials from the local Center for Hygiene and Epidemiology. The radioactive item in the pipe was 1.5 cm in diameter and 15 cm in length and emitted 9 – 10 microsieverts per hour, while the other item emitted 1.55 microsievert per hour. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/highly-radioactive-discovered-togliatti)

2007, May 7 / Russia / R: Eight men face prosecution for attempting to sell two containers of Plutonium-Beryllium and one container of Caesium-137 to two Kazakh buyers and one buyer from an unidentified Arab country for USD 400,000. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/criminal-prosecution-attempted-sale-plutonium)
2007, May 16 / Russia / R: A radioactive parcel was detected at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo-I airport. It emitted 20 times background radiation levels and was detected by a Yantar radiation detection system in a mail screening operation. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-parcel-found-sheremetyev)

2007, June 5 / Russia / R: A cylinder 4.5cm in diameter and 5cm in height marked with a radioactivity sign and a serial number was discovered in a forest in Stavropol Kray in southwestern Russia. It emitted 8.4 microsieverts per hour at the surface, although it emitted only background radiation from 1m away. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-container-stavropol-kray)

2007, June 5 / Kazakhstan / R: 10 glass ampoules marked Caesium-137 were discovered in an abandoned water well near Ivanovka, although they emitted background radiation normal for the region. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/ampoules-labeled-cesium-133-uncovered-water-well-kazakhstan)

2007, June 15 / Georgia/Azerbaijan / R: A Plutonium-Beryllium source hidden inside a truck carrying stainless steel scrap metal set off a radiation alarm, entering Georgia from Azerbaijan at the Red Bridge port of entry. The truck was sent back, according to Georgia because it did not want to incur the cost of storage of a radioactive source, and according to Azerbaijan because there was no source and the truck was merely emitting higher than average levels of radiation. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/georgian-authorities-thwart-attempt)

2007, June 18 / Kazakhstan / R: Kazakh media reports that two individuals were arrested for attempting to sell a container of Caesium by an operational investigation group from the Kazakh Interior Ministry. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-material-seized-kazakhstan)

2007, June 29 / Kazakhstan / R: In Petropavlosk, a radioactive source was found at the bottom of a metal pole 50cm in diameter, fixed into the ground 2m from a street. The source was 15cm in length and 10cm in diameter, was marked with a radioactivity symbol and emitted 25 times background radiation. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/potentially-radioactive-orphan-sources-found-construction-site-arkhangelsk-russia)

2007, July 29 / Russia / R: A sealed container holding 2.1kg of Mercury was discovered by workers on a construction site in Arkhangelsk. A site inspection discovered a further eight instruments 10cm x 8cm that were labeled, “caution: radioactive”. (http://www.arkhpress.ru/arkhangelsk/2007/8/1/22.shtml, http://nti.org/analysis/articles/potentially-radioactive-orphan-sources-found-construction-site-arkhangelsk-russia)

2007, August 27 / Russia / R: Three men were arrested in Dimitrovgrad in possession of 300g of Americum-241, possibly stolen from the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Reactors, although this may have been part of a training exercise. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/nuclear-attack)

2007, September / Russia / N: 30.7 kilograms of Uranium rods were stolen from an enterprise in Udmurtia. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/trial-uranium-rod-thieves-begin-udmurtia/)

2007, September 7 / Belarus / R: Media reported that Belarussian customs officials detained a truck carrying of Aluminium concentrate that was radioactive on the Belarussian-Polish border en route to Russia. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/belarussian-customs-seize-radioactive)
2007, September 24 / Ukraine / R: A 12 kg package emitting high levels of radiation was seized at Zhulyany airport. It was emitting radiation 100 times the normal level. (http://kartina-ua.info/index.phtml?art_id=180344&action=view&sel_date=2007-11-01)

2007, September 28 / Russia / R: A 15cm x 15cm metal cylinder emitting 3 milliroentgen of gamma radiation at close range was discovered by an employee at a scrap metal receiving station in Ufa. (http://www.yorkintel.com/NFCInitiate_Trafficking_News.aspx)

2007, October 3 / Russia / R: The Department of the Interior Directorate for Fighting Organised Crime arrested four Russian citizens for attempting to sell an ampoule of 10.5g of Osmium for $735,000 as part of a sting operation. Authorities also discovered an ampoule labelled “Osmium-187” which was filled with a Cobalt-Zinc mixture. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/authorities-department-interior)

2007, October 3 / Russia / R: A piece of scrap metal emitting 3 microroentgen per hour was brought to a scrap metal collection point in Ufa. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/three-cases-radioactive-metal-scrap-are-uncovered-russia/)

2007, October 15 / Ukraine / R: A railroad car carrying 54 metric tons of Zirconic ore was detained by officials at the Chop checkpoint between Ukraine and Hungary and was sent back to Italy because of a lack of relevant certificates. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/railroad-car-radioactive)

2007, October 22 / Russia / R: A Russian customs official in Vladivostok discovered a parcel sent from Russia to the UK containing binoculars and a strand for the binoculars covered in Radium-266, emitting 400 times the legal limit of radiation. The parcel was disposed of by Primtekhnopolis. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/parcel-object-radium-discovered)

2007, October 23 / Russia / R: Customs officials in Vladivostok discovered two shipping containers labelled “concentrated ore” that emitted 20 times background radiation levels. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/parcel-object-radium-discovered)


2007, November 8 / Russia / R: A railcar emitting over 20 microroentgen per hour was detained in Murmansk. The content of the cargo is unknown. It was on its way from Saratov to a military base in Kola Peninsula. (http://www.murman.ru/news/?d=09-11-2007, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/kola-peninsula-bound-railway-car-radioactive-shipment-detained-murmansk/)
2007, November 11 / Ukraine / R: A 32 kilogram container of Caesium-137 was seized from a suspect in Lugansk. 7 vials of what may have been Mercury were also seized. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/ukrainian-police-seizes-mercury-and-cesium-137-individual/)

2007, November 27 / Russia / R: Ferrous metal scrap containing Barium and Thorium emitting ionising radiation twice background levels was discovered in a train car bound from Kazakhstan to Estonia at the Kartaly checkpoint. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/three-cases-radioactive-metal-scrap-are-uncovered-russia/)


2007, December 31 / Uzbekistan / R: A “chunk of black metal” emitting 1000 milliroentgen per hour was discovered aboard a freight train travelling from Kyrgyzstan to Iran by Uzbek border officials. (http://www.yorkintel.com/NFCInitiate_Trafficking_News.aspx)

2008, January 10 / Kazakhstan / R: The Department of State Ecological Expertise of the Ministry of Ecology and the Environment of Kyrgyzstan Kubanychbek Noruzbaev announced that Uzbek customs guards detained a railcar from a Krygyz train passing through Kazakhstan on 31 December 2007. It was carrying Caesium-137 emitting more than 1000 milliroentgen per hour. http://news.mail.ru/incident/1553844/

2008, January 23 / Russia / R: The city court in Kurgan found four Russian citizens guilty of contraband and sentenced them to 7 – 10 years in prison for smuggling a container containing 9 radionuclides across the Russian-Kazakh border in 2006, including Iridium, Cobalt, Radium, Promethium and Europium, with intent to sell. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/four-russians-sentenced-smuggling-radioactive-sources-across-russian-kazakh-border)

2008, February 28 / Kazakhstan / N: Integrum Techno reported that two individuals had been sentenced by a Kazakh court in Almaty for attempting to sell 2 kg of Uranium-235. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/almaty-court-sentences-two-individuals-two-years-prison)

2008, March 11 / Kazakhstan / R: 65 barrels of Tantalum concentrate emitting radiation 4 times higher than normal was seized from an airplane that had arrived from Fujairah. It later emerged that there were no irregularities in the transport of this material and that its travel had been legitimate. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/kazakh-customs-detain-consignment)

2008, April 5 / Russia / R: A radioactive container was found in cargo from Chita at Vladivostok port emitting 130 microroentgen per hour. The container was later destroyed. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/kazakh-customs-detain-consignment)

2008, April 21 / Ukraine / R: Radiation detection equipment installed at a checkpoint detected 4,500 tons of used medical isotopes emitting 60 microroentgen per hour on a truck travelling from the Institute of Oncology in Chisinau, Moldova, to the Czech Republic through the Ukraine. The driver did not possess the required documentation and hazard signs were not displayed. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/truck-radioactive-medical-isotopes-detained-ukraine-moldova-border)
2008, May 23 / Kazakhstan / R: Kazakh customs officials intercepted a truck travelling from Petropavlovks in Russia to Germany, which was emitting 116.22 microroentgen per hour. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/kazakh-customs-detain-germany-bound-lorry-radioactive-material/)

2008, May 27 / Russia / R: Customs officials at the Kartaly checkpoint discovered a 60-ton consignment of scrap metal containing a source of Caesium-137 on its way to Latvia. It was sent back to Kazakhstan. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/latvia-bound-train-radioactive-cargo-detained-russo-kazakh-border/)

2008, June 5 / Belarus / R: The Deputy Chairman of the Belarussian State Border Committee Vadzim Zaytsaw announced that in the past 6 months, Belarussian customs officials have halted more than 10 cargoes emitting more than the legal amount of radiation, all attempts to transport material from Western European countries to southern countries. (http://nti.org/analysis/articles/belarusian-customs-say-theyve-stopped-10-vehicles-radioactive-cargo)

2008, June 17 / Russia / R: A former pilot travelling to Kazakhstan installed an airplane turn indicator in an abandoned warehouse in Chelyabinsk airport in his car with scotch tape. He was detained by customs officials and it is believed that he was unaware that it emitted 6.17 microsieverts per hour. http://uralpress.ru/news/2008/06/17/magnitogorskie-tamozhenniki-sokhranili-zdorove-byvshemu-aviatoru

2008, June 19 / Russia / R: A lighting element containing Radium-226 emitting 47 500 microroentgen per hour was found in a lighting sign in cargo at Vladivostok port. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/radiation-sources-discovered-vladivostok-port/)

2008, June 20 / Russia / R: A container containing Radium-226 emitting 475 microsieverts was detained at the port in Vladivostok. The material was removed by Primtekhnpolis. (http://primamedia.ru/news/vladivostok/20.06.2008/73870/istochnik-radiatsii-obezvrezhen-v-portu-vladivostoka.htm)

2008, July 1 / Kazakhstan / R: Three vehicles with radioactive cargo were detained at Zhanozol checkpoint, containing metal with excessive amounts of radiation. Kazakh customs detained a Volvo emitting 34.3 microsieverts per hour, an Iveco-model truck emitting 12.5 microsieverts per hour and another Iveco-model truck emitting 51.6 microsieverts per hour. The cargo was 60 tons of the insulating material vermiculit bound for the UK. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/kazakh-customs-officials-detain-vehicles-radioactive-cargo/)

2008, July 7 / Ukraine / N: Two men were arrested at a location between Dnepropetovsk and Kiev Boryspil for trafficking enriched Uranium and Caesium as part of a sting operation conducted by the Interior Ministry General Directorate for Combating Organized Crime. They had planned to sell the material for USD5 million. (http://www.kommersant.ua/doc.html?docId=910052)


2008, July 8 / Ukraine / R: An individual was arrested in Dnepropetrovsk on suspicion of dealing in Uranium and Caesium as part of a sting operation. Two radioactive containers were
also seized. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/ukrainian-police-arrest-suspected-sellers-
cesium-and-uranium/)

2008, July 8 / Ukraine / N: Deutsche Welle reported that a worker at the Ukrainian Embassy in
Germany and the security manager of a bank in the Ukraine were arrested in Cherkassy with
radioactive metals worth 3.1 million euros in their car, including Uranium and Caesium. The
material was stolen from a holding facility in Kiev and intended to be sold to a criminal group.
articles_2008/ukraine_smuggling)

2008, September 11 / Russia / R: Zakon reported that a train destined for Moldova carrying a
radioactive cargo was detained at the Kartaly checkpoint in Russia. The train had begun its
journey in Ust-Kamenogorsk in Kazakhstan. From there, it had passed undetected through the
Kazakh customs point at Uba and the Russian customs points at Tretjakov and Veselyarsky. It
continued its journey through Karaganda, Akmola and Kostanai and the customs point at Tobol,
before it was discovered in Kartaly. The radioactive sources were found to be bismuth-207 and
technetium-99 and emitted 4 microsiervets per hour. (http://www.zakon.kz/120490-po-territorii-
karashstana.html)

2008, October 2 / Russia / R: A criminal case was opened by the police in Saratov into the theft
of a RIO-3 ice detector. The ice detector was from a decommissioned YAK-40 airplane owned by
Avia Alyans. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/strontium-stolen-saratov/)

2008, October 13 / Ukraine / R: 20 tons of radioactive scrap metal emitting 1.4 times
background radiation was discovered in a trailer attached to a Daimler Chrysler at the Zhanazhol
checkpoint in the Mamlyutsky region. (http://www.emer.kz/conditions/archiv/detail.php?
ID=3049)

2008, December 1 / Russia / R: Welding equipment emitting 190-340 microroentgen per hour
was seized from the Dutch ship "Nedloyd Barentz" at Ilyichevsk. (http://www.nr2.ru/odessa/
209277.html)

2008, December 22 / Russia / R: The Deita news agency reported that radioactive scrap metal
was detected in cargo at Vladivostok. It emitted 21.05 microsiervets per hour and the source of
the radiation was found to be a broken measuring device containing radium-226. (http://
www.nti.org/analysis/articles/radioactive-cargo-detained-vladivostok/)

2009, March 12 / Ukraine / R: A Moldovan citizen was detained when a radioactive receiver
was found in the back of his car as he crossed the checkpoint from the Ukraine to Moldova. He
told police that he had purchased it from a man in Mikhaylova-Rubensova in the
Sviatoshynsky Kiev region. (http://www.odvestnik.com.ua/issue/271/5887/)

2009, April, 9 / Russia / N: The FSB detained a man on the Chelyabinsk-Ufa highway after
discovering an iron container containing suspected Uranium-235 and Uranium-238 particles in
news/33/item142306/)
2009, April 13 / Russia / R: Russian news outlet Sever Info reported that a German tourist was detained at Pulkovo airport when the Yantar-3 radiation detection system detected 138 grams of Radium-226 and Thorium-232 with him. He was en route from Prague to St Petersburg. The material emitted 2 400 microroentgen per hour. (http://www.old.severinfo.ru/news/26791)

2009, May 14 / Ukraine / R: Kompromat reported that a sheet of radioactive scrap metal emitting 30 times background radiation from Chernobyl was discovered buried 0.3m underground beneath a scrap metal collection point near a housing estate in Chernihiv. (http://compromat.ua/ru/16/25073/index.html)

2009, June 9 / Ukraine / N: Ukrainian regional news outlet Donbass reported that a railroad car in Donetsk carrying 60 tons of scrap metal and emitting 54-64 microroentgen per hour was stopped by a security company for the steel and metal works company Azovstal. (http://donbass.ua/news/region/2009/06/09/na-azovstali-obnaruzhili-radioaktivnyi-metall.html)

2009, June 9 / Georgia / R: Four sources of Caesium-137 and Strontium-90, emitting 3 millisieverts per hour were discovered at a scrap metal detection point in Tbilisi. (http://newsgeorgia.ru/politics/20090709/151193925.html)

2009, July 20 / Russia / R: A cylinder containing Caesium-137 emitting over 100 times background radiation was found in a glove in a railcar on a train from Almaty to Moscow. The train was detained at the Ilesk-1 checkpoint. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/railcar-emitting-radiation-detained-kazakh-russian-border/)

2009, August 16 / Russia / R: A man was detained on a train from Nikolaev to Moscow at the Dolbino checkpoint at Belgorod station and found in possession of 28 sets of radioactive night-vision devices for the Kalashnikov rifle. They emitted over 600 times the background level of radiation. The man claimed he had bought them in Dnepropetrovsk and was going to use them for hunting. (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/man-carrying-radioactive-night-vision-devices-detained-belgorod/)

2009, September 11 / Ukraine / R: A truck carrying 25 tons of radioactive scrap metal from Pripyat was detained at a checkpoint at the Chernobyl exclusion zone. It emitted over 13 times the background level of radiation. Six people were detained, including the truck driver and owner, a man who was accompanying the truck in another car, two police officers that were on duty at the time, and two police battalion commanders. The seizure was part of a sting in which a deputy chief of the Kiev SBU (Security Service) intended to test police and the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MIA) official in charge of the exclusion zone by calling him to ask him to let the truck pass. The Deputy Chief and the four detained policemen were subsequently fired. No authorisation had been requested prior to the sting. (http://russia-ukraine-byelorussia.com/kak-sbu-mvd-na-pushku-brala/)

2009, October 21 / Russia / N: Lenta reported that a Chinese man was arrested at Irkutsk airport for attempting to transport six pieces of rock containing natural uranium from Russia. (http://www.lenta.ru/news/2009/10/21/chinese/)

2009, November 19 / Russia / R: A car containing sports equipment contaminated with Cobalt-60 was detained on the Russian border. The cargo emitted 4 microsievert per hour. The car was sent back to Lithuania and the cargo was isolated and sent back to the owner in
2010, March 14 / Ukraine / N: Six elderly friends came into possession of 2.5 kg of enriched uranium-235 in Slavayansk Donetsk. Two were arrested in a sting organised by Donetsk security officers, in which they attempted to sell the material initially for a deposit of $10 000. The other four were arrested at a nearby train station. The material emitted 250 microroentgen per hour.

2010, May 16 / Ukraine / N: The Ukrainian security service announced that it had seized 2.5 kg of depleted uranium and two products containing strontium-90, which exceed 300 times background radiation, as part of a special operation in Donetsk and Lugansk.

2010, August 24 / Moldova / N: Several individuals were arrested and 1.8 kg of uranium-238 was seized in Chisinau. They were attempting to sell the material for 9 million euros. Three of the individuals had previous convictions for illicit trafficking in Moldova, Romania and Russia.

2010, November 30 / Pakistan / N: A Wikileaks cable dated May 27 2009 detailed that an unknown quantity of HEU from an old research reactor has been in Pakistan for the past three years awaiting removal and disposal by a US team because the Pakistani government is delaying concluding an agreement with the US on the matter.

2010, December 14 / Kazakhstan / R: Ria Novosti reported that customs officials detained a Volvo with a semitrailer loaded with scrap metal at the Zhanazhol checkpoint in north Kazakhstan. The scrap metal exceeded the legal limit of 0.6-0.7 microroentgen per hour. The car was en route to Ankara, Turkey.

2011, 5 April / Georgia / R: The Nuclear and Radiation Security Service of Georgia announced that metal containing Caesium-137 had been located on board a cargo train at Batumi International Container Terminal. It is believed that the radioactive material may have become mixed up in radioactive scrap metal.

2011, 29 June / Moldova / N: Moldovan police arrested six people for attempting to sell more than 1kg of uranium-235 with a value of approximately 20m USD. It is reported that they were intending to sell the material to an individual from North Africa.

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Charlotte Spencer-Smith has contributed to The Atlantic Online and ‘Obama and the Bomb: The Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons’ (Ed. Heinz Gaertner).
Notes

[1] This inventory was originally meant to go as Appendix to an article by Vladimir Fenopetov, Bruce Lawlor, Tedo Japaridze, Yannis Tsantouli & Alex P. Schmid. New Security Threats – Old Security Architecture and Mind-Sets: Countering the Threat of Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism in the Black Sea Region. American Foreign Policy Interests, 33,197-208, 2011 and should best be read in conjunction with it (see: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10803920.620510). The views and opinions expressed in this introduction do not represent any official views or positions but are solely the responsibility of the authors. Errors in the inventory are possible as are omissions, due to the type of open sources utilized.


The Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism

by Alex P. Schmid

The Definition of Terrorism

Terrorism is a contested concept. While there are many national and regional definitions, there is no universal legal definition approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations (the one proposed by the Security Council in Res. 1566 (2004) is non-binding, lacking legal authority in international law). The Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism of the 6th (legal) Committee of the General Assembly has, with some interruptions, been trying to reach a legal definition since 1972 - but in vain. In the absence of a legal definition, attempts have been made since the 1980s to reach agreement on an academic consensus definition. The latest outcome is the revised definition reprinted below. It is the result of three rounds of consultations among academics and other professionals. A description how it was arrived at can be found on pp. 39 - 98 of Alex P. Schmid (Ed.). The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. London and New York: Routledge, 2011. The same volume also contains 260 other definitions compiled by Joseph J. Easson and Alex P. Schmid on pp. 99 -200.

Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism (2011)

Compiled by Alex P. Schmid

1. Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties;

2. Terrorism as a tactic is employed in three main contexts: (i) illegal state repression, (ii) propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in times of peace or outside zones of conflict and (iii) as an illicit tactic of irregular warfare employed by state- and non-state actors;

3. The physical violence or threat thereof employed by terrorist actors involves single-phase acts of lethal violence (such as bombings and armed assaults), dual- phased life-threatening incidents (like kidnapping, hijacking and other forms of hostage-taking for coercive bargaining) as well as multi-phased sequences of actions (such as in ‘disappearances’ involving kidnapping, secret detention, torture and murder).

4. The public (-ized) terrorist victimization initiates threat-based communication processes whereby, on the one hand, conditional demands are made to individuals, groups, governments, societies or sections thereof, and, on the other hand, the support of specific constituencies (based on ties of ethnicity, religion, political affiliation and the like) is sought by the terrorist perpetrators;

5. At the origin of terrorism stands terror – instilled fear, dread, panic or mere anxiety - spread among those identifying, or sharing similarities, with the direct victims, generated by
some of the modalities of the terrorist act – its shocking brutality, lack of discrimination, dramatic or symbolic quality and disregard of the rules of warfare and the rules of punishment;

6. The main direct victims of terrorist attacks are in general not any armed forces but are usually civilians, non-combatants or other innocent and defenceless persons who bear no direct responsibility for the conflict that gave rise to acts of terrorism;

7. The direct victims are not the ultimate target (as in a classical assassination where victim and target coincide) but serve as message generators, more or less unwittingly helped by the news values of the mass media, to reach various audiences and conflict parties that identify either with the victims’ plight or the terrorists’ professed cause;

8. Sources of terrorist violence can be individual perpetrators, small groups, diffuse transnational networks as well as state actors or state-sponsored clandestine agents (such as death squads and hit teams);

9. While showing similarities with methods employed by organized crime as well as those found in war crimes, terrorist violence is predominantly political – usually in its motivation but nearly always in its societal repercussions;

10. The immediate intent of acts of terrorism is to terrorize, intimidate, antagonize, disorientate, destabilize, coerce, compel, demoralize or provoke a target population or conflict party in the hope of achieving from the resulting insecurity a favourable power outcome, e.g. obtaining publicity, extorting ransom money, submission to terrorist demands and/or mobilizing or immobilizing sectors of the public;

11. The motivations to engage in terrorism cover a broad range, including redress for alleged grievances, personal or vicarious revenge, collective punishment, revolution, national liberation and the promotion of diverse ideological, political, social, national or religious causes and objectives;

12: Acts of terrorism rarely stand alone but form part of a campaign of violence which alone can, due to the serial character of acts of violence and threats of more to come, create a pervasive climate of fear that enables the terrorists to manipulate the political process.

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Compiled and selected by Eric Price

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**About the Compiler: Eric Price** is a Professional Information Specialist formerly associated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Currently he is an Editorial Assistant with ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’.
The work of Beatrice de Graaf (professor of Conflict and Security at Leiden University’s Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism), *Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance* is both rich in historical detail and novel in its use of theory. It focuses on counterterrorism policy in the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the United States in the 1970s. This period in time marks the beginnings of counterterrorism policy in Western democracies, long before the “jihadist” era, when the threat was primarily but not exclusively left revolutionary terrorism of domestic origin. Despite similarities in the nature of the threat and in basic constitutional principles these four states responded differently. De Graaf evaluates the effectiveness of their responses through the lens of a “performative power” model. She argues that while terrorism is clearly performative and communicative, so too is counterterrorism, although governments appear not to recognize the importance of their actions in setting the agenda (especially defining the threat), mobilizing popular support in support of counterterrorism, and framing the issue in the public mind.

The work is based on thorough research into the policies of these four states, using archival materials and interviews as well as exploring secondary sources written in four languages. It is thus admirably authoritative and comprehensive. Anyone wanting simply to understand the history of counterterrorism during this time will appreciate the scholarly depth of the volume. The project was supported by the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research.

Each national case study is organized in terms of five questions: How high was terrorism on the political agenda? How was the threat defined? Did the government try to mobilize the public in responding to terrorism? How visible and intrusive were counterterrorism measures? What sort of solution was proposed – intransigent or conciliatory? Very roughly summarized, according to de Graaf the Dutch response was generally characterized by pragmatism, restraint, and tolerance, especially toward the minor threat from the far left “Red Youth” and somewhat less so toward a more lethal threat from a South Moluccan group. Germany, faced with mounting terrorism from the Red Army Faction, initially had no national strategy at all, but the situation shifted dramatically in mid-decade to “hysteria” and “moral panic.” The media played a large role in creating a national security crisis that brought into question the nature of the state. In the United States, the Nixon Administration relied heavily on law enforcement and intelligence to suppress the revolutionary left as well as violent black liberation groups. Ironically, this approach was discredited by the government’s own illegal actions that produced the Watergate scandal. Italy faced the most severe terrorist threat in this period, in terms of the numbers of people engaged in anti-state violence and the lethality of its consequences. Nevertheless, before 1977 the Italian
government did not take the threat seriously and even after mobilizing to meet the challenge counterterrorist policy was not effective (in fact, the author terms it “commedia dell’arte”).

The study then offers specific cross-national analysis of policy implementation on the part of the police, intelligence services, and the judiciary, with a chapter devoted to each subject. The key problem for the authorities is to avoid disproportionate responses that reinforce the terrorists’ “injustice frame.” The discussion of the role of trials is particularly interesting. As the author points out, trials not only demonstrate a state’s adherence to the rule of law; they also provide a theatre for the terrorists. What matters is not so much the legal verdict as the effect on a watching audience.

Professor de Graaf concludes that “low levels of performative power” on the part of the state are positively correlated with a decline in terrorist incidents. The causal mechanism remains somewhat obscure, but it is clear that exaggerating the threat is likely to lead to more rather than less radicalization. In the end, a policy that employed a criminal justice approach, restrained rhetoric, and reduced visibility for counterterrorism measures was most effective. This study raises a number of questions for further research. One is why some democratic governments appear to be so tempted to do the opposite of what this study recommends. One answer may be the role of the news media in particular societies and circumstances. Another question is why democracies respond differently to similar threats.

About the Reviewer: Martha Crenshaw is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, as well as Professor of Political Science at Stanford University.
Mitchell D. Silber. The Al-Qaeda Factor: Plots Against the West.
Reviewed by Richard Phelps.

The destruction of the Afghan camp network that Al-Qaeda and its sister organisations had developed during the late 1990s prompted a radical change in the way the movement functioned in the decade since. The movement’s shift from a globalised network to regionally-orientated franchises has become established as orthodoxy almost to the point of cliché. Yet the material impact that the loss of the camps has had on the life-cycle of terrorism plots in the West has been little explored. With reference to sixteen plots in Europe, North America, and Australia, Mitchell Silber’s book *The Al Qaeda Factor* examines the main plots case by case, before drawing conclusions from this dataset. His presentation is unusual, but the book nevertheless serves as a useful reference work in addition to making a convincing argument.

Silber structures his presentation of each of the sixteen plots the same way. Following an introduction to the background, he describes the radicalisation of the protagonists, then profiles each plot’s core members, followers, and peripheral figures one-by-one, before finally moving to describe the plots’ development towards maturity/disruption. In so doing, the lack of narrative and structural rigidity makes for somewhat frustrating reading by the time of the sixteenth repetition. On the other hand, such a structure provides enduring value since it makes the book the first biographical dictionary of the “War on Terror”.

Among the dataset one plot is pre-9/11: the first attack on the World Trade Center. Another of the sixteen is the 9/11 plot itself, while the remaining plots reached their climax over the decade since 2001. Helpfully, the author allows each case to speak for itself. In so doing, the approach is subtle: by dint of repetition, the reader is able to discern his/her own conclusions regarding the trends shared between the plots. Though low on analysis and narration for most of the book, the author does analyse the trends in a concluding chapter.

In terms of the picture that emerges, many of the plots involved one or more of the protagonists travelling to an overseas theatre of jihad. Yet far from being groomed in the West and urged to train overseas, most who travelled were “self-starters” who sought such training themselves. In many of such cases, however, the eventual plotters travelled overseas with a different intention to when they returned: the 9/11 ringleaders went to Afghanistan to prepare for fighting in Chechnya, the 7/7 ringleader Mohammed Siddique Khan did not intend to return, and the 2009 attempted New York truck bomber Najibullah Zazi had wanted to fight with the Taliban. Al-Qaeda here appears resourceful and opportunistic. Highlighting the impact of the loss of Afghan bases, the 9/11 attacks are an outlier in terms of the extent that the Al-Qaeda leadership became involved. In most cases since, the Bin Laden network provided neither funding, weaponry, or dictation regarding targets – though it did often provide technical advice for the assembly of explosives.

Another strong theme that emerges is the role of small group dynamics. Silber’s dataset clearly favours the interpretation of Marc Sageman and Scott Atran, who present terrorist plots as usually the product of small group dynamics. Again and again, the characters central to the
sixteen plots are shown to have grown up together, lived together, married one another, or regularly hung-out together. As such, the plots tend not to emerge from random individuals who are put in touch either by a centralised organisation or through a medium such as the Internet – though such cases of course do exist. Rather, the plots emerge organically as a product of like-minded actors urging each other on, as well as being driven by charismatic figures.

Introducing the sixteen plots, Silber describes them as “what could be argued were the most important al Qaeda and al Qaeda-like plots against targets in the West between 1993 and 2009” (p.5). Whilst this undoubtedly holds true for the 9/11, 7/7, Madrid, and “shoe bombing” plots, the same cannot be argued in one case he presents. The author himself concedes in the case of a cluster of Yemeni-Americans arrested in 2002, who had completed training at Al-Qaeda camps before 9/11, that despite having links and contact to senior Al-Qaeda figures “the men did not conduct any actions that could be judged to be part of any operational cycle” (p. 270) – there was no “plot”.

Critics may attack either the author’s choice of dataset – in terms of what he leaves out – or the way he presents his material. Yet whereas narrative descriptions of individual terrorist plots abound, a plot-by-plot reference work that profiles the characters involved represents a significant contribution. Likewise, in most of the cases presented, the severity of the plots presented is genuine: where the plots failed, the threat is diminished usually by the plotters’ ineptitude in executing their plans – rather than the threat itself being exaggerated. The author allows his evidence to do much of the talking; in so doing, his subtle approach enables significant insights into the changing nature of the life-cycles of terrorist plots over the past decade.

About the Reviewer: Richard Phelps is an Adjunct Fellow at the Quilliam Foundation (London). He focuses on the history and development of Islamist dissent in the Arabic world.
Michelle Shephard. Decade of Fear: Reporting from Terrorism's Grey Zone.
Reviewed by Richard Phelps.

Reporting on international events in the decade of the “war on terror” since 9/11 with a particular eye on Canada may not seem like an obvious approach. Yet such an approach was placed upon journalist Michelle Shephard as she reported for a Canadian readership from various warzones for the *Toronto Star*. Her experiences as a journalist in Somalia, Yemen, Guantanamo Bay and the US, have now made it into book form in *Decade of Fear*. The result is as much a reminder of the role that Canada and Canadians have often played throughout various events of the "war on terror" than it is an account of a foreign correspondent’s experiences.

Like many who have come to write on the subject in the past decade, Shephard was thrust into reporting on Al-Qaeda and its sisters organisations having had almost no background on the topic. "I knew more at the time about the Bloods and Crips than Osama bin Laden", she writes. But after moving to the US to cover the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, she quickly became immersed in unfolding events during a series of overseas postings. Her lack of background surfaces at times when she resorts to clichés, but this detracts little from a lively and readable adventure across the international landscapes of the *jihad*.

Starting in the US, Shephard describes the horrific aftermath of the attacks. The US she describes at the time now seems so distant: the smouldering ruins, the bereavement, the fear, the reaction, the Sikh gas station owner who was shot dead in Arizona for looking "Middle Eastern", the Pakistani store clerk killed in Dallas, and the Yemeni shot in Indiana. Yemenis and Somalis in turn come to feature as central characters in their own right, as Shephard travels to report back on countries that acquired a transfigured international significance in the post-9/11 world.

"We have not been persuasive in enlisting the energy and sympathy of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims against the extremist threat", two of the authors of the 9/11 Commission later wrote. True perhaps, but "the extremist threat" remains as distant from the lives of most of those 1.3 billion as it does from most non-Muslims. It does not seem distant, however, from the lives of those who Shephard encounters in the later sections of her book - in Somalia, Yemen, and Guantanamo. In Somalia, she describes those who live in fear of the Shabab militia, and the mutilation and intimidation that is meted out upon its victims: extortion, beatings, and public stoning. Later in Toronto, she talks to those whose lives were disrupted by extremism as they became caught up in “home grown” terror plots.

What is most unusual about this book is that Shephard highlights the involvement of Canadians in the many events of the decade. After all, a Canadian child soldier, Omar Khadr, became a child prisoner of the “war on terror” after he was captured in Afghanistan by US troops in 2002 and was subsequently transferred to Guantanamo Bay. Likewise, with the CIA's rendition programme, it was an innocent Canadian, Mahir Arar, who found himself diverted from the flight he intended to take at JFK in New York, only to end up delivered into custody to a Syrian prison. Elsewhere in Somalia, Shephard describes how the Canadian Abdullahi Afrah (aka “Asparo”)
emerge as a leader of the austere Islamic Courts Union movement which rose to power in 2006. Each step on her path, Shephard comes across Canadians.

The book follows Shephard on her travels across the globe and the attention she pays to a topic changes as she moves. The result is that the book is part description of her travels and part examination of the issues she encounters, yet it is neither a political study nor a travel memoir. Shephard herself concedes as much, writing that it is "not a memoir or an exhaustive analysis" since the result - flitting from one topic to the next with little closure - is as much a reflection of her lifestyle as a journalist as it is a shortcoming of the book. The book’s style is chatty and wide-ranging but she offers some prescient observations. In particular, the book offers some thoughtful passages that reflect on the use of language in the “war on terror” – such as prison administrations labelling toothbrushes as “comfort items” and force feeding as “enteral feeding” – and the idea that the “Arab Spring” or “Awakening” is just as much a Western “Awakening” in the way that regimes in the Middle East are viewed as it is an Arab “Awakening”.

Decade of Fear chronicles the evolving atmospheres and developments of the past decade and Shephard places them into a narrative. As the reader follows her travels, what is striking is the speed in which an industry built up around the fear of terrorism in the West – from the T-shirt and toilet paper vendors to the academic and corporate profiteers. Likewise, Shephard, raises some important and searching questions: how can the apparent threat "remain so dire when billions had been spent, new laws enacted, laws fought" to combat it? This, she does not seek to answer.

About the Reviewer: Richard Phelps is an Adjunct Fellow at the Quilliam Foundation (London). He focuses on the history and development of Islamist dissent in the Arabic world.
The attention given to a handful of Islamist intellectuals such as Sayyid Qutb notwithstanding, observers have largely given the ideological influences on militant Islamists short shrift. Amid such a background comes a diverse collection of sixteen essays in this edited volume aimed primarily at specialists, which explore and contextualise militant thought in conflicts across South- and South-East Asia, Africa and the Middle East, as well as the thinking of individual ideologues. The essays represent a significant contribution in advancing or revising our understanding of jihadist thought. The geographic breadth of focus denies the book a single message, yet this may in fact be the point.

Jeroen Gunning notes in relation to the two leading Egyptian groups, Islamic Jihad and Gamaa Islamiyya, “organisations with similar ideologies often behave very differently” (p.227). In line with this, the growing emphasis in other studies of terrorism on the functioning of small network dynamics is crucial, since ideology is not the be all and end all. The tendency to reduce jihadist thought to an intellectual pedigree of only a handful of figures (Banna, Qutb, Azzam) has been significantly undermined by this volume. Flagg Miller’s examination of the audiotapes of Abd al-Rahim al-Tahhan – a Syrian preacher who is the most prominent among the speakers found on a trove of 1,500 audio tapes retrieved from Bin Laden’s house in Afghanistan in 2001 – is a major contribution. A little-known figure who currently lives discreetly in Qatar, Miller’s chapter on al-Tahhan is arguably the most significant study since Byrnjar Lia’s biography of Abu Musab al-Suri – although his chapter would have benefitted from further biographical exploration of the man.

Robert Crews’ essay examining the ideology of the Taliban in Afghanistan is particularly thoughtful. Pointing to the perceived low level of literacy among its followers and its leaders’ parochial rural backgrounds, the conventional tendency among most analysts has been to overlook any meaningful ideological component to the Taliban. As such, it is written off as anti-intellectual and its messaging is often dismissed as propaganda incapable of providing an understanding of how the movement perceives itself and the world and how this may be subject to internal variation and change. Not so, Crews argues, “the central Taliban cause is ‘about ideas’” (p. 346). Its own messaging describes it as a “movement” and its cause as a “revolution”. Tactical shifts such as the adoption of suicide bombing, roadside bombs, and beheadings highlight the fact that “[n]either geography nor illiteracy has isolated these mobile communities from wider historical processes” (p. 349).

Other essays move also to territories that have been hardly explored. Greg Fealy and Ken Ward’s chapter examines jihadist thought in Indonesia. Although acts of violence such as the 2002 Bali bombings have received significant attention, the role of ideology there has not. Whereas Scott Atran’s book *Talking to the Enemy* explored the highly localised social dynamics between the individuals involved, the authors here examine an impressive selection of Indonesian primary sources, such as the prison writings of the Bali bombers, to gain an
understanding of ideological influences. Revealingly, a treatise titled *Sowing Jihad, Reaping Terror* that was authored by followers of the Malaysian terrorist leader Noordin Mohammed Top lists over 200 sources – of which many are publications written in Arabic and almost none of which are local Indonesian religious texts.

Elsewhere, examining the ideology of Lashkar-e-Taiba (“LeT”), Faisal Devji observes although it is often presented as proxy of the Pakistani military in its war over the border region of Kashmir, the LeT’s view of the Indian subcontinent is profoundly different from the concept that underwrites the state of Pakistan. The group wishes to eradicate the border between Pakistan and India rather than simply readjusting it to include more Muslims on the Pakistani side. Confronted with the demographic reality in which the subcontinent’s Hindu population dwarfs the Muslim population by hundreds of millions, LeT responds by envisaging a future state that is fragmented into numerous Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh statelets – such as the kind which existed in colonial times (p.287).

The eclectic nature of the grouping together of these essays is as much a strength as it is a weakness. They range from the Saudi disengagement programme for prisoners, to discussions of historical terms such as *Khariji* and *Murji‘i* that jihadists and their opponents use to denote one another. Almost everywhere where it exists, Islamism has worked in conjunction with nationalism and other local ideological currents, rather than in opposition. Though one or two of the essays (such as an examination of Islamism in Britain and an anthropological essay about Afghanistan) appear to contribute little, this does not detract from an otherwise informative volume.

*About the reviewer:* Richard Phelps is an Adjunct Fellow of the Quilliam Foundation.
News from TRI's National Networks of PhD Theses Writers

In line with its mission “Enhancing Security through Collaborative Research”, the Terrorism Research Initiative is setting up national networks of post-graduate scholars working on their PhD theses in the field of Terrorism Studies (including counter-terrorism, political violence, security and armed conflict). So far, TRI has five emerging networks run by Research Assistants of the Terrorism Research Initiative who act as coordinators. If you wish to join, here are their contact details:

**United Kingdom**: Gordon Clubb, Leeds University; <G.Clubb@leeds.ac.uk>;
**The Netherlands (& Flanders in Belgium)**: Renée Frissen; Campus Den Haag, <R.Frissen@forum.nl>;
**Russia**: Yulia Netesova, <julianetesova@gmail.com>;
**United States**: Jason Rineheart, <jrineheart@gmail.com>;
**Canada**: Nick Deshpande. Email: nick.despande@gmail.com.

Since Jason Rineheart is currently working for the Red Cross in Afghanistan, he could need some help from a qualified US-based PhD thesis writer to assist him in strengthening the network in the United States.

The UK network was the first one established and is now up and running. Its coordinator is organizing a workshop on *Terrorism, Theory and Radicalisation* for its members at the University of Leeds on May 26, 2012. The list of speakers includes Prof. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and a former terrorism adviser to the Bush administration. If you want to register, contact TRI’s Research Associate and UK network coordinator, Gordon Clubb, and check the website: <http://www.pvac.leeds.ac.uk/trin/>

The British TRI network aims to facilitate collaboration between PhD and academic researchers on terrorism, conflict and security throughout the UK. So far the network has members from twenty-two universities. Gordon Clubb is currently in the process of extending the UK network to professionals in NGOs, Think Tanks and government organisations. In addition to compiling researcher profiles, the UK network also hosts events to bring members together to collaborate where feasible in their ongoing research.

While national TRI networks focus on writers of PhD theses, they are not confined to them. Scholars and professionals with similar qualifications and those who have already completed their PhD theses are also welcome. We encourage post-graduate scholars to join such national networks or, if there is none in your country, to assist in setting one up. For more information, contact TRI Director <apschmid@gmail.com>.
About Perspectives on Terrorism

PT seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the field of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. It invites them to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) could be characterized as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than fee-based subscription journals. Our on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles - but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal is peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT is not supporting any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles we expect contributors to adhere to.

Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism:

- **Alex P. Schmid**, Editor-in-Chief;
- **Joseph J Easson**, Associate Editor;
- **James F. Forest**, Associate Editor;
- **Tim Pippard**, Assistant Editor;
- **Eric Price**, Editorial Assistant

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