Special Double Issue on Terrorism and Political Violence in Africa

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About Perspectives on Terrorism

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Introduction

In 1994, Martha Crenshaw’s edited volume Terrorism in Africa made clear how terrorism – generally defined as a tactic that uses violence or the threat of violence as a coercive strategy to cause fear and political intimidation – was a feature within resistance movements, military coups, political assassinations, and various intra- and inter-state wars that have affected most African states at some point during the continent’s transition to independence and subsequent post-colonial period. Crenshaw further noted that terrorism was not “an isolated phenomenon” for African states or the region more broadly [1]. This description remains salient today: terrorism has been a global phenomenon for many decades, and Africa has not been unscathed by it. Terrorism is just one of several types of political violence that states and their citizens, in Africa and elsewhere, have had to grapple with. In fact, from a macro perspective, terrorism may not be universally seen as the most important security challenge faced by African states and their citizens. Famine, drought, endemic poverty, diseases and other natural and man-made disasters that undermine human security have also been at the forefront of recent policy discussions on Africa among Western governments and international aid organizations. It is thus necessary to place terrorism within the broader terrain of Africa’s security challenges, before examining the historical trends and specific examples discussed in this Special Issue of Perspectives on Terrorism.

To be sure, Africa has its own peculiar domestic collection of ideologically-inspired violent non-state groups that are responsible for periodic bouts of murderous mayhem. Some of these, like the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, al-Shabaab in Somalia or Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa, have attracted ample media attention. Yet in addition to terrorist groups, there are also irresponsible governments that have employed the tactics of terrorism in (for example) a brutal crackdown against opposition leaders in Zimbabwe, or the Eritrean government’s support (according to a recent UN report) for terrorist plots against African leaders gathering in Ethiopia. President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan is the first sitting head of state to be indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity, while in the newly independent South Sudan, locals are calling for a war crimes investigation. In Senegal, riots erupted in the streets to protest President Abdoulaye Wade’s attempt to change the constitution in
an effort to be elected to another term in office. Add to that the tragic episodes of genocide in places like Rwanda and the Darfur region of Sudan and you have a first glimpse of the atrocities that the present African generation has witnessed.

With this caveat in mind, our intention in assembling this Special Issue of Perspectives on Terrorism has been to draw attention to contemporary issues and trends in order to promote further research and policy interest in the terrorism challenges faced by Africa today. In addition, we recognize that this publication comes at time when the world looks back on the 9/11 attacks and reflects not only on the impact of this event but also looks at the current state of the terrorist threat. Without question, the future of Africa’s security and the role that terrorism will play in particular is especially pertinent given the combination of the unfolding revolutions and political transformations in North Africa and what appears to be a transforming, if not growing, Islamist terrorism threat in sub-Saharan Africa’s largest country, Nigeria. Against this backdrop, this introductory essay will review a handful of important themes related to political violence and terrorism in Africa, including domestic and international trends, and the ways in which politically violent and terrorist groups finance themselves, organize and operate, and communicate (both internally as well as externally). We conclude with some brief observations regarding the challenges and opportunities for countering the terrorist threat in Africa, and then introduce the remaining articles in this Special Issue of Perspectives on Terrorism.

**Indigenous and Foreign Dimensions of Terrorism in Africa**

Contemporary and historical scholarship on terrorism in Africa, particularly since the early post-colonial years, has highlighted themes of international terrorism (which emerged most prominently during the 1970s) as well as domestic incidents where terrorism was employed. In terms of the former, Africa has played a role in several high profile terrorist events and movements that originated in other parts of the world. For example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was felt in East Africa when in June 1976 Palestinian terrorists hijacked a commercial Air France plane carrying 248 passengers and took it to Entebbe, Uganda. While this event was quickly resolved through a raid carried out by the Israeli Defense Forces, it nevertheless illustrated the intersection of transnational terrorism and the African continent. It bears mentioning that four years later, in apparent retaliation for Israeli troops being permitted to refuel in Nairobi during the Entebbe raid, the Jewish-owned Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi was bombed by terrorists linked to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, killing at least 15 people and injuring 80. Meanwhile, in North Africa, Libyan ruler Muammar Gaddafi was well-known for his support of anti-Western terrorist organizations – providing support in one form or another to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Red Army Faction, the Red Brigades [2] as well as groups in Africa and other regions. His connection to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 (otherwise known as the Lockerbie bombing) resulted in broad UN sanctions. These lasted until 2003/2004 when...
Libya agreed to pay £2.5 million to the family of each victim in exchange for ending the UN arms and air embargo. [3] And, lastly, we should not forget the role that the Egyptian-based Muslim Brotherhood (MB) played in the Islamist ideology that has come to inspire many neo-jihadist groups today. In the 1960s, MB theologian Sayyid Qutb laid the foundation for the religiously justified violence that has repeatedly expressed itself today in various terrorist movements, Al-Qaeda being but one example.

Of course, terrorism has also been employed during many domestic state and non-state campaigns within Africa throughout the last half century. Examples of violent non-state actors include the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in Eritrea, and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa – to highlight just a few – which incorporated terrorist tactics within their modes of conflict waging. [4] For instance, through its military wing “Umkhonto we Sizwe” (“Spear of the Nation”), the ANC publicly sought to rationalize its use of terror tactics in its campaign against the Apartheid regime. In 1969, it specifically called for opposing the “political, economic, and social structure of South Africa by means of political subversion and propaganda and sabotage and terrorism.” [5] During the 1980s, the ANC was responsible for several large-scale terrorist attacks, including the May 1983 car bombing that took place on a busy street in Pretoria, near the office block housing South African Air Force personnel. [6] As a result, 19 people were killed and more than 200 injured. Along similar lines, car bombs were used in two attacks carried out in 1984 and 1985 that also resulted in numerous casualties.

At the same time, state-sponsored terrorism was a common feature in the Rhodesian bush war and more recently has been used by Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe to silence dissent and maintain power. In the former, during the 1970s the Selous Scouts emerged as a counter-insurgency unit amidst the domestic Zimbabwean nationalist insurgency that sought the removal of the White minority rule government (3% of the population was European, 1% mixed race, and the remaining roughly 95% were from the Shona or Ndebele tribes). [7] With the Zimbabwean nationalists receiving foreign assistance and the Rhodesian Army lacking domestic support from the population, the Selous Scouts were created as a mixed-race unit to infiltrate insurgent territory and carry out activities that sought “the clandestine elimination of terrorists/terrorism both within and without the country.” [8] To target nationalist fighters, they utilized asymmetric warfare tactics which ranged from bombing civilian homes, raids on insurgent camps, abductions and sabotage of transportation infrastructure. [9] The bush war ended in 1979 with a subsequent transition to majority rule in 1980 whereby Robert Mugabe was elected to power and continues to rule the country (re-named Zimbabwe) up to this day. However, in recent years it appears as though Mugabe, in his quest to maintain a one-party state under his rule, has adopted some of the tactics employed by the Selous Scouts. In fact, his preferred use of violence to maintain power became already clear in 1976 when in a radio broadcast from Mozambique he declared: “Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have shall have been the product of a gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain its security officer – its guarantor. The people’s votes and the people’s guns are always inseparable twins”. [10]
By 2000, Mugabe had adopted a sustained ‘campaign of terror’ to maintain power – consequently forcing many citizens to flee his oppressive rule and thus systematically destroying what was once considered one of the more prosperous African states. [11] In response to opposition and international criticism, he threatened to heighten his violent campaign and become the “black Hitler” against any opposing forces. [12] Illustrative of this, in 2005 he carried out “Operation Drive out the Rubbish,” which involved raiding Harare’s townships, which coincidently was home to many who supported the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. [13] This raid resulted in the destruction of thousands of homes, clinics, and small businesses. With this broad spectrum of violent non-state actors and state-initiated terrorism in mind, it is useful to briefly review how the history of terrorism in Africa has had many prominent domestic and transnational dimensions.

Domestic Trends: Terrorism Continues to be Woven into Conflict Systems

A variety of socio-economic and political conditions in Africa – too many to recount here – produce grievances that have been used by militant groups to justify their recourse to violent actions. While generalizations are risky, some comparisons can be made in the way that physical terrain is used and the violent methods are employed. In terms of terrain, this includes securing a location (typically in the form of a region) that serve as an operational base to host members, plan attacks, receive support (commonly from neighboring countries) and provide a source of recruitment. As for methods, since the mid-1990s the strategic use of terrorism in Africa has been interwoven into broader conflict systems such as insurgencies, civil wars and other forms of political violence.

Applying this terrain-method approach provides us with insights into some of the more prominent rebel movements that emerged during the 1990s. For example, in the mid-1990s the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) – a rebel group in Uganda comprised of self-identified “religious crusaders” from the Muslim Tabliq sect opposing the government – carried out terrorist attacks against local civilians and internally displaced persons in particular. According to an IRIN special report, the ADF were based in western Uganda, along the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo. Here they took advantage of the terrain and local context by “setting up rear bases in neighboring Congo where they began recruiting and training fighters with the promise of money and education.” [14] This location enabled them to operate and move fluidly between Uganda and the DRC, the latter of which was suspected of providing support. Attacks varied from the use of brute force and assaults to kidnapping and hostage-taking of youths who would then be forced to assist the ADF. In the case of abductions, two notable attacks took place in 1998 - one involving the kidnapping of 30 students from the Mitandi Seventh Day Adventist College in Kasese, the other involving the abduction of more than 100 school children from Hoima district. In another, more brutal, display of terror, ADF rebels killed...
80 students of the Kichwamba Technical College in the Kabarole district by setting locked dormitories on fire. [15] In all, as South African terrorism expert Anneli Botha reports, ADF’s violent campaign peaked between 1997 and 2001 with “48 explosive devices detonated in and around Kampala, killing approximately 50 and injuring an estimated 200 people.” [16] Thankfully, the government was finally able to defeat and disband the group in 2004.

In another example in Uganda, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) – which dates back to 1987 – has carried out numerous atrocities directed at civilians in its nearly 25-year campaign in the northern region. Operating as an ideologically apocalyptic Christian group opposing the central government, its modus operandi has been to use violence or the threat of violence to intimidate and instill fear in the Ugandan people and, more specifically, the Acholi tribe. Though its objectives are not always clear, the decades of indiscriminate violence with political undertones have made this group one of the more well-known rebel groups using terrorism as a method in their campaign. [17] Furthermore, it has used the structural weaknesses of its host environment to diffuse across multiple borders, namely the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Southern Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR). [18] Overall, the ADF and LRA are examples of two non-state, religiously and politically motivated groups that have caused at least 10,000 deaths in their respective campaigns. [19]

Similarly, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which operated throughout much of the 1990s, was a rebel group based in Sierra Leone that sought to overthrow the government. Its membership pool and financial support blurred the boundaries between the country and Liberia, while its activities included politically motivated attacks on local communities in an effort to induce widespread fear and submission. Its decade-long policy of youth abductions to build ranks and attacks that involved cutting off hands, arms, and legs of civilians and government troops resulted in thousands of child soldiers and amputees by 2002. [20]

More recent cases of domestic terrorism have been seen in Nigeria, where political violence in the north carried out by Boko Haram (BH) has claimed hundreds of lives, while in the non-Muslim south militant gangs carried out near daily attacks on oil infrastructure and public targets until 2009, wreaking havoc on the country’s economy and making life miserable for thousands of locals. On the other side of the continent, Somalia’s situation is looking ever-more grim, with daily violence a tragically consistent part of life. Furthermore, South Africa continues to experience some periodic episodes of political violence from both domestic and regional groups. For instance, in the mid-1990s Cape Town experienced a number of bombings and attacks on popular tourist spots that local officials attributed to the organization “People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD).” Another group, Die Boeremag, claimed responsibility for a series of bombings in 2002 on transportation infrastructure and religious temples in Soweto. More recently, in the run up to the 2010 World Cup, authorities foiled a plot by extremists linked to Somalia and Mozambique to attack the event. Shortly after, AQIM issued a threat in April
2010 to target the major international soccer event. [21] However, fortunately such threats and/or plots never materialized. Pooled together, such incidents reveal some similarities to what Crenshaw observed in 1994, that terrorism in Africa is interwoven into the fabric of various forms of conflict. However, today we must also account for the increasing transnational features of terrorist activity on the continent.

Transnational Dimensions

In the last 15 years, African countries have not only struggled against domestic terrorism, they have also been challenged by the emergence of transnational terrorist groups that have used Africa as a theatre to carry out attacks against both domestic and international targets as well as to develop and maintain operations. The 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel and airplane, and attacks against UN buildings in Algeria and Nigeria offer just a few examples of terrorist attacks carried out on African soil with a distinct international dimension. In such cases, terrorists groups use the ‘softness’ of African-based targets to attack Western – primarily European and US – and international interests. According to one report, during the first decade after the end of the Cold War (between 1990 and 2002), “Africa recorded 6,177 casualties from 296 acts of [international] terrorism” on the continent. [22]

In addition, the past decade has witnessed the transformation of some domestic groups, some of whom have adopted transnational objectives. Most notably, the 2007 merger of Algeria’s Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, or GSPC) with Al-Qaeda resulted in the formation of the Organization of Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). More recently, the Islamist extremist group Boko Haram, based in Northern Nigeria, has been increasing its rate of domestic attacks against civilians and government targets and has also targeted the United Nations in Abuja, communicating that it is not only concerned with domestic developments but also has a broader transnational agenda. In fact, The Economist recently observed that the growth of Islamist extremist activity in sub-Saharan Africa, and Nigeria specifically, is beginning to “sound” like the Middle East. [23] According to several experts, BH associations with the broader Al-Qaeda movement seem to be strengthening, reflected by its use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombings - both hallmarks of attacks by Al-Qaeda affiliates.

Beyond transnational mergers and ideologies, the context for terrorism in Africa has also been affected by global geopolitical and economic forces. Three intersecting trends can be seen as particularly salient for understanding how the contextual aspect of the terrorism threat in Africa has evolved: financing of violent movements, actor/conflict characteristics, and the media/information sharing environment. First, while the early post-colonial period can be characterized
as *terrorism in the background*, the Cold War marked a turning point in Africa’s conflict terrain in that the use of terrorism moved increasingly to the forefront of violent campaigns – particularly for groups who received some level of support from either the United States or the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War not only resulted in the loss of foreign backing for opposing insurgent forces (Angola being a prominent example) [24], it also led to large caches of Soviet-produced arms proliferating in the region, able to supply a new generation of armed groups. What’s more, the loss of external financial backing forced armed groups to explore other opportunities to sustain and expand their operations. This included the trafficking and illicit trade of small arms as well as other materials such as narcotics and raw materials. Over the years, this domain of activity has matured into a robust and vibrant criminal trafficking network that has increasingly deepened its reach throughout Africa, fueling rebel movements and terrorist groups. [25]

Second, armed conflict has changed from being primarily inter (between) to intra (within) states, where it is not only dominated by small, diffuse rebel movements and criminal networks (Somali piracy being an example) but also by terrorist networks that exploit the weaknesses of many African states to carry out attacks that have domestic and international resonance. Increasingly, such armed non-state actors are not bounded by their terrain – indeed, their adaptability is showcased by their ability to shift, move, and, at times, change form. In addition, armed groups in Africa can avail themselves of an increasingly global network of strategic and tactical knowledge sharing among terrorists and insurgents. Innovations in terrorist weapons or attacks in one region of the world are monitored and emulated in other regions, including Africa. [26]

Third, the global media environment has undergone significant shifts in the last two decades. Information communication technologies, such as the mobile phone, have now become ubiquitous features in African society, and once out-of-reach resources (like access to the Internet) are becoming more accessible. This has implications for the external observer as well as the internal perpetrator. For the ‘outsider,’ as Joshua S. Goldstein aptly noted, “once remote battles and war crimes now regularly make it onto our TV and computer screens, and in more or less real time. Cell phone cameras have turned citizens in reporters in many war zones.” [27] For the ‘insider,’ access to technology can help with communicating between members to maintain operations and coordinate attacks. Furthermore, it allows today’s violent non-state actor to operate within and between the virtual and physical realm. Groups of all kinds are taking advantage of this globally connected media environment for their communications and strategic influence efforts. For example, according to one recent report, Boko Haram “has been waging a propaganda campaign that includes conference calls with reporters.” [28] This growing role of the media environment is also seen in the activities of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), an umbrella militant movement in the oil and gas fields abundant in the Niger Delta. During the height of its activities, between 2006 and 2009, when it carried out regular attacks on energy infrastructure, it maintained a close relationship with various media.
outlets – oftentimes claiming responsibility immediately following attacks. It also used its access to strategic oil and gas resources, and the Nigerian government’s inability to protect them, as a platform to air its grievances and communicate demands.

These are just some of the many transnational dimensions which have influenced the evolution of terrorism in Africa. They will no doubt be familiar to many readers of Perspectives on Terrorism, as the same dimensions are intertwined with terrorism threats in other parts of the world. In sum, terrorism in Africa must be understood as both a domestic and transnational phenomenon. It follows that the response to terrorism in Africa must involve a combination of both domestic and international efforts.

**Domestic and International Dimensions of the Response to Terrorism in Africa**

The contexts for combating terrorism in Africa, both in its domestic and transnational forms, have changed in recent decades. Scholars and policy makers have increasingly recognized the limitations of a typical African government’s ability to effectively combat a sophisticated domestic terrorist threat – particularly one with transnational linkages. Scores of books, articles and reports have been published in the last decade, focusing on the theme of security challenges in “weak”, “failing” and “fragile” states - terms meant to reflect the poor capacity of most formal government institutions. Often, these weak states are described as having “ungoverned spaces” or “lawless areas” within their borders. In an extreme case like Somalia, the complete absence of a viable central government suggests that an entire state is “ungoverned.” The US National Intelligence Council has described “failed or failing states” as having “expanses of territory and populations devoid of effective government control.” [29] A recent report by the American Security Project describes how “the challenge of ungoverned spaces remains a core issue in the management of the threat posed by transnational terrorism. A lack of government capacity allows terrorist groups to find sanctuary.” [30] African countries feature prominently in the annual Failed States Index, published jointly by the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine.

At the same time, however, there is an emerging consensus in the scholarly community that local non-state actors can and often do play a critical role in confronting the efforts of armed groups within their communities. For example, senior leaders of the Sufi Islamic community in Nigeria have roundly condemned the violent actions of Boko Haram. Many kinds of non-governmental entities – informal power structures, such as ethnic groups, clans, religious sects or tribal systems – can provide services, help mitigate grievances, and in some cases, address local threats to human security. [31] Indeed, the sobering reality is that while many military and law enforcement bodies in African communities and urban centers have the potential to strengthen over time, they still have a long ways to go due to institutional constraints and economic limitations. However, this apparent state weakness does not imply that African communities are
without policing. In fact, according to a study carried out by the Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN) Foundation, non-state actors – in the form of bodies such as ethnic associations, religious organizations, neighborhood groups, etc. – undertake local policing duties that embrace and understand cultural factors and traditions. [32] Granted, non-state policing is not without its problems and challenges (due to issues of transparency, occasional abuses, etc.) but such local capacity could be further developed and used to strengthen local police efforts to combat criminal activity in whatever form it comes. In other words, while states in Africa may lack strong formal institutions, if there is a security-conscious and pro-active local community, terrorists will not find operational freedom or safe haven.

In terms of the transnational dimensions of the threat since 9/11, the past decade has shown an increasing willingness by the U.S. and other Western countries to fund joint training exercises and other initiatives meant to foster cross-national collaboration in countering terrorism. Perhaps more importantly, we are also seeing an increasing willingness among African nations to participate in these initiatives. This often includes sending bright and promising young security professionals to Western-sponsored seminars as part of a long-term commitment to improve regional capacity for understanding how to effectively address the threat of terrorism. Of course, building relationships of mutual trust requires time and consistent effort. For this reason, one of the hallmarks of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Counterterrorism Fellowship Program over the past decade is that it has built mutually beneficial relationships with foreign military and intelligence officers, and has provided a technology-aided infrastructure through which these professionals can stay connected and maintain those relationships across the huge African continent.

Confronting the threat of terrorism anywhere requires at least a rudimentary level of local political will and security capacity, particularly in terms of intelligence and law enforcement. In Africa, outside intervention has sometimes been necessary for bolstering a state’s capabilities in these areas. In this respect, the United Nations has made some strides in assisting African states develop the appropriate legal frameworks and institutional capacity to address issues such as terrorist financing and money laundering. However, terrorism (whether of domestic or foreign origin) is a particularly contextual phenomenon, requiring a specific, context-aware response. Understanding the diversity of these contexts, an objective of this Special Issue of Perspectives on Terrorism, is thus a critical asset to formulating effective counterterrorism research and policy agendas for Africa in the 21st century.

The Special Issue of Perspectives on Terrorism

Collectively, the depth and breadth of Africans’ experiences with political violence can be overwhelming to any researcher of security studies. Thus, a considerable challenge in assembling
this special issue has been selecting a handful of representative themes and topics for inclusion. Our task has been further complicated by the fact that incidents of political violence are taking place throughout the continent on a daily basis, in some cases altering the contexts that inform academic analysis and rendering some research perspectives quickly “old news.” We have nonetheless attempted to capture an academic snapshot of the current state of affairs in Africa, with articles that address various kinds of terrorism and political violence in different regions of the continent.

In northern Nigeria, Boko Haram (BH) has been ramping up its violent campaign against the local Nigerian state, raising alarm bells in the U.S. and in other Western countries. However, it was not long ago that Nigeria’s woes were mainly in the southern oil-producing region, known as the Niger Delta. Thus, in the first article, Ibaba Samuel Ibaba returns to the evolving nature of political violence in the Niger Delta, with a particular focus on the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). He describes how the history and ideology of militant groups in this region, rooted in legitimate grievances over environmental destruction and governmental neglect, formed the basis for the emergence in 2006 of MEND as an umbrella organization. MEND’s violent tactics – including hostage taking, attacks on oil infrastructure and the placement of bombs and other explosive devices in public places – can clearly be described as terrorism. Nigeria is also the focus of the following article, by Isaac Sampson and Freedom Onuoha, which explores the government’s attempt to enact new anti-terrorism legislation since 2006. In their view, violence caused by militant groups in the Niger Delta and by the northern Islamist group Boko Haram clearly warranted some kind of formal response to the threat of terrorism. However, only international attention resulting from the failed attempt by a Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, to bomb a U.S. commercial airliner proved to be the final catalyst for the National Assembly to adopt new legislation that should enable the government to confront more effectively the threat of terrorism.

The next two articles examine Al-Qaeda’s relationship to events and evolving contexts in Africa. First, Alex Wilner examines how the so-called “Arab Spring” impacts on the local resonance of Al-Qaeda’s ideology in North Africa. In his view, Al-Qaeda’s violent narrative has come under immense pressure, following the toppling of Arab regimes by largely secular and peaceful protest movements. Further, the death of Osama bin Laden has diminished Al-Qaeda by eliminating a charismatic and unifying figure who had attracted a small but lethal following in the Muslim world. Yet, the author notes, these events are unlikely to impact the aspirations, tactics, or strategies of Al-Qaeda’s regional affiliate groups, notably Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Somalia’s al-Shabaab.

In his article, James Forest notes that Al-Qaeda faces a variety of steep challenges in its attempt to influence local populations in sub-Saharan Africa. While the historical record suggests that Salafist jihadi terrorists have attempted to establish a foothold in various regions of the
subcontinent, they have largely failed, with the exception of tenuous links in the Horn of Africa. Despite the wealth of conditions that in other parts of the world have sustained the resonance of Al-Qaeda’s ideology, beyond North Africa there is no sub-regional coalescence of jihadists – comparable to AQIM – elsewhere in Africa. Further, while various leaders of the global terrorist network have expressed an interest in West Africa, and particularly Nigeria, there has not yet been much evidence that local Islamist groups are interested in establishing a formal affiliation with Al-Qaeda, which is surely good news for the U.S. and others in their fight to eradicate this pernicious global terror threat. However, ongoing investigations into the recent spate of attacks by Boko Haram suggest that this local Islamist group maybe receiving some tactical or operational expertise from members of the global Salafi-Jihadist movement.

Next, Annette Hübschle examines the critical linkages between organized crime and terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. She describes how perceived weaknesses in the criminal justice sector, limited law enforcement capacity, political and systemic corruption, poor border patrol and weak anti-terror and organized crime laws are believed to provide an ideal environment for the terror-crime nexus to flourish. However, her research on organized crime in Southern Africa found no strong empirical links between criminal and terrorist organizations, suggesting that these widely-held perceptions are not always supported by facts.

Finally, Victor Ojakorotu explores the kinds of armed conflict and violence that have occurred in the Cabinda region of Angola over the last two decades, with particular focus on the actions of the leading secessionist group, the Liberation Front of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). As the main oil-producing region in Angola, the Cabinda province is of central importance to the government, and thus demands for independence by FLEC or other local groups are unlikely to bear fruit. Further, he notes, the violent actions of FLEC have threatened the country’s economic security, and have allowed Angola’s government to portray the group as terrorists. As with Professor Ibaba’s article on militant groups in the Niger Delta, this case study offers useful insights on the dynamics of oil-related violence in sub-Saharan Africa.

Together, the articles are meant to whet the reader’s appetite for further study in a continent that is unfortunately rich with topics for security studies research. Eric Price encourages and facilitates this by offering a stellar bibliography of recommended resources on terrorism and political violence in Africa. Our sincere gratitude is extended to all the contributors for their hard work and commitment to this effort. We welcome correspondence from readers of this Special Issue of Perspectives on Terrorism.

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Notes

[12] Ibid, p.646.
[22] Ibid, p. 64
[23] “Sounding Like the Middle East”, The Economist, August 27, 2011.
Terrorism in Liberation Struggles: Interrogating the Engagement Tactics of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

by Ibaba Samuel Ibaba

Abstract

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) emerged in 2006 as an umbrella organization of militia groups in the Niger Delta, pursuing common political objectives of freedom and development. However, MEND’s engagement tactics of taking hostages, attacks on oil infrastructure and the placement of bombs and other explosive devices in public places suggest to many observers that this organization’s members should be considered terrorists. Using a perspective which views terrorism as crime, this article illustrates how MEND’s engagement tactics can be viewed as acts of terrorism.

Introduction

Oil-related conflicts in the Niger Delta [1] date back to the 1970s when Oil Producing Communities (OPCs) began agitations against transnational oil companies (TOCs) over concerns about oil-induced environmental devastation, TOCs reluctance to support community development, and inadequate compensation for damages to properties caused by the operational activities of the TOCs. The failure of the Nigerian Government to adequately address the myriad grievances instigated several developments, resulting in the formation of militia groups that mobilized a violent struggle against the Nigerian State. [2] The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) emerged in this context as an umbrella organization of several militia groups in the region.

As the name suggests, MEND postures itself as a liberation movement. But its use of violence as a strategy of engagement and method to communicate political objectives has raised concerns as to whether their activities fall under the heading of terrorism. However, the meaning and applicability of such a term is highly debated; it elicits different meanings to different people, and at times different things to the same person in different contexts. While it can be viewed through the prisms of crime, politics, communication, religion and warfare, [3] there have been many attempts to create a definition of terrorism that can be applied to various contexts. For example, Article 2 of the UN draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism classifies acts of terrorism as unlawful and intentional means when resulting in:

“Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a state or government facility, a
While the aforementioned classification could easily apply to MEND’s tactical behavior in Nigeria, the question is then whether it can be viewed as a criminal act (when international and national legislation proscribe it as constituting a terrorist act) and/or a method of warfare (when terrorism is seen as a tactic in which civilians or non-combatants are deliberately attacked). [5] In regards to MEND’s engagement tactics, both perspectives are relevant. For example, kidnapping/hostage-taking of TOC personnel, attacking security personnel, and planting explosives in public places are common tactics employed by MEND - these deliberately target non-combatants. On the other hand, MEND’s attacks against the Niger Delta’s abundant oil infrastructure point more towards a crime perspective.

The main objective of this article is to discuss MEND’s targeting behavior and locate it within the context of terrorism. In doing so, it adopts the view that the crime perspective of terrorism is actually more relevant given that the situation under which MEND operates cannot be strictly described as war-time, especially since attacks on oil infrastructure as well as oil company personnel have occurred regularly outside armed confrontations with the Nigerian Armed Forces. When MEND forces have engaged the military in direct combat, such as in the May 2009 confrontation in Gbaramatu Clan [6] of Delta State, non-combatants were not targeted by MEND. Although attacks by MEND have led to the deaths of non-combatants, these are not judged to be deliberate acts. Although the crime perspective of terrorism has been criticized for not distinguishing between terrorism and other forms of violence, [7] it nonetheless captures essential attributes of terrorism—use of violence and the goal of instilling fear in a target population. [8] It also reflects the view by Schmid that terrorism is about the means of engagement, while liberation struggles refers to ends of a struggle. [9] These definitional aspects provide a useful framework for discussing MEND and the use of terrorism in the Niger Delta. As follows, this discussion will proceed with a brief theoretical explanation of the conflict, followed by analyses of MEND and its tactics. It concludes with some suggestions on the way forward.

The Context of Violence in the Niger Delta

Why do conflicts occur in society? This question has elicited different theoretical perspectives and explanations, as captured by the diversity of conflict literature represented in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary of Selected Theoretical Explanations of Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Theory</th>
<th>Explanation of Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural Conflict Theory</td>
<td>This blames conflict on the structure and organization of societies and human reactions to it. For example, people’s response to injustice, marginalization, exploitation, poverty, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realist Theories</td>
<td>These attribute conflict to man’s selfish nature which reflects in his personalized pursuit of power for self interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frustration-Aggression Theory</td>
<td>This attributes conflict to the outcome of frustration triggered by the gap between needs expectation and need attainment or what is referred to as the “want-get-ratio”. People tend to be aggressive when what they get falls below expectation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physiological Theories</td>
<td>These theories note that aggression is inherent in human nature, but this aggression only results in conflict if it is activated by man’s environment and his responses to failure, success or necessity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Theories</td>
<td>These attribute conflict to resource scarcity and competition, and the commoditization of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psycho-Cultural Conflict Theory</td>
<td>This explains conflict as the outcome of ethnic identity and a culture of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Needs Theories</td>
<td>These blame conflict on the competition to satisfy human needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic Theories</td>
<td>These explain how conflict lies in the social context within which it occurs, and is triggered by challenges to human comfort and existence such as unemployment, environmental degradation, domination, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational Theories</td>
<td>These attribute conflict to the interdependence of sociological, political, economic and historical relationships among people. Examples include history of migration and stereotypes on inferiority-superiority relationships and past conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological Theories</td>
<td>These postulate that conflict is inherent in man due to hormonal composition that is aggression prone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ademola, 2006 [10]

It is important to recognize how these theories of conflict overlap; conflict settings can hardly be adequately explained from the standpoint of a single theory. Further, the nature and state of mind of the individual is central to the occurrence of conflict, and thus, the same situation can lead to different trends of conflict just as different situations can result in similar dimensions of conflict. From this perspective, conflicts – particularly those involving terrorist or insurgency tactics – must be seen as the product of complex and dynamic interactions between individuals, organizations, and their surrounding environment. [11]

In recent times, the greed thesis of Collier and Hoeffler [12] has been used to explain wars in Africa. This explains violence as the outcome of the activities of conflict entrepreneurs and
profiteers. Thus, insurgency and civil wars are blamed on the greedy behavior of rebel groups seeking to capture natural resource wealth or rents. Whereas this is true to an extent, it fails to explain agitations that are not driven by greed. However, the grievance perspective remedies this deficiency as it blames violence on grievances resulting from deprivation. Relative deprivation (the gap between aspirations and achievements), polarization (greater inter-group heterogeneity combined with intra-group homogeneity), and horizontal inequality (inequality among culturally defined heterogeneous groups) have been noted as variations of grievance theory that account for conflict in different settings. [13]

While this theory goes some way in explaining civil strife in the Niger Delta, it does not do so adequately since the reasons for conflict are not limited exclusively to greed and grievance. In fact, some conflicts interface between these two areas; being triggered by grievance but ending as greed. This view is supported by Collier, who argued that:

“A political entrepreneur seeking to fund a loot-seeking rebellion may need to rekindle dormant grievances to generate start-up finance...Grievance may enable a rebel organization to grow to the point at which it is viable as a predator; greed may sustain the organization once it has reached this point.” [14]

In the Niger Delta, deprivation grievances related to the locally produced oil wealth have motivated conflict, but the proliferation of armed groups and other intervening issues resulted in the use of the conflict for personal aggrandizement, leading to oil theft and kidnapping/hostage taking for ransom. It is noteworthy that the need to finance armed groups could lead to illegal exploitation of a country’s natural resources. This should not be confused with greed driven conflict.

Though the link between oil, deprivation and conflict in the Niger Delta has been extensively discussed in the literature, it is important to underscore some of the issues related to the Niger Delta context. Four interrelated factors have created conditions for the conflict. First, the Niger Delta is the hub of Nigeria’s oil industry. Second, oil is the mainstay of the Nigerian economy and has generated huge revenues for the country, contributing 40% of GDP, about 90% of total earnings, and about 80% of national gross income. [15] Third, oil related environmental problems - such as oil spills and gas flares - have undermined environmental quality and the productivity of the local economies where oil is produced.[16] Fourth, the Niger Delta is a strange paradox as it represents one of the extreme conditions of poverty and lack of development in the country, despite its oil and gas resources. These main factors have motivated conflicts against the Nigerian government, accused of development neglect and deprivation, and against the oil companies for neglecting corporate social responsibility in the region.
Neglect by the Nigerian government is linked to the country’s federal system and ethnicity-based identity politics. Nigeria is a federation of 36 states, [17] but the division of governmental powers, skewed in favor of the central government and the placement of natural resources under the control of the federal government has resulted in the states being subservient to a domineering central government. [18] For example, the federal government determines tax laws just as revenues are nationalized and paid into a common account called the Federation Account. On a monthly basis, finance officials of the federal and state governments gather at Abuja, the capital city, to share monies from this account based upon criteria fixed by the federal government. [19] This implies that although oil is located and produced in the Niger Delta, the federal government owns and controls everything—such as granting licenses to TOCs to explore and produce oil, regulating the industry, and determining the monetary value of compensation for damages to properties caused by oil production activities. The local disempowerment arising from all these issues can be linked to the lack of regional development, which is central to the conflict in the region.

The other issue is ethnic politics. The nationalist movement in Nigeria broke into ethnic identities, following the politicization of ethnic consciousness that emerged under colonial rule. This resulted in ethnicity-based political competition after independence in 1960. Ethnic groups engaged in competition for power to advance their group and parochial interests as against the national interest or public good. State laws and policies reflected local ethnic interests, [20] thus undermining good governance. This is a fundamental source of the conditions which have created violence in the Niger Delta, as the people attribute their under-development plight to the outcome of ethnicity-based political domination. This, in turn, is linked to the changes in the revenue distribution criteria, in particular, the derivation component. Derivation has been a major, yet contentious criterion for revenue allocation in Nigeria. At independence in 1960, the derivation share of revenue allocation to the federating units in Nigeria [21] was 50%. However, this was reduced to 45% in 1970, 20% in 1975, 2% in 1980 and 1.5% in 1984; before it was increased to 3% in 1992 and 13% in 2000 due to protests and agitations by the people. [22] In other words, during the period 1960-2000 the percentage of national revenues allocated to the region from which those revenues were derived substantially decreased. This, along with the widespread environmental and economic damage that oil exploration and extraction has caused within this region, result in grievances against both the Nigerian government and the oil companies.

The coincidence between the displacement of agriculture as the mainstay of the nation’s economy by oil and the reductions in the derivation component of revenue allocation in 1970, [23] is cited by many to vindicate the link between ethnic politics and deprivation in the Niger Delta. Agricultural products such as ground nuts, cocoa, cotton and palm oil, produced in the homelands of the major ethnic groups [24] were the primary source of the country’s economy from independence until 1970, when oil became the revenue generator for the economy. While a
50% derivation was allocated to the regions during the period that agricultural products drove the economy from 1960-1970, as noted above the derivation began to decrease dramatically when oil became the nation’s dominant economic product beginning in 1970.

The decreases in the percentage share of derivation is perceived by those living in the region as intended to checkmate the shift in revenue from the majority ethnic groups, the custodians of state power, to the politically powerless minority groups. [25] However, this resulted in the Niger Delta being denied of an equitable share of national resources and development funds; both of which brewed discontent. Poorly regulated, abusive resource extraction and production activities – both the fault of the government and TOCs – that resulted in broad environmental degradation further added to the region’s discontent. Oil spills arising from operational failures and gas flares have impacted negatively on the economies, leading to productivity declines, occupational disorientation and forced migration of people from their land in search for jobs in other communities. [26] In the face of an unresponsive government, poverty was exacerbated and the communities turned to the TOCs, demanding compensation for damages caused by oil production activities [27] and community development. [28] The lack of support, however, by the oil companies pitched the TOCs against the inhabitants and thus triggered conflicts. Later events transformed the conflict as civil society and youth groups emerged to make political demands, such as resource ownership and control, increase in the derivation component of revenue allocation, and abrogation or amendment of laws governing the oil industry. Militia groups, which emerged later, began using violence as engagement tactic in pursuit of these demands, which are considered the basis of disempowerment and deprivation in the region.

**Mapping the Emergence of MEND**

Militia violence in the Niger Delta dates back to 1966, when the Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS), led by an Ijaw, Major Isaac Adaka Boro, declared the Niger Delta Republic and took up arms against the Nigerian State. The revolt lasted less than a month, beginning February 23, 1966 and ending a few weeks later on March 6th when leaders of the rebellion were taken into custody by federal troops. They were prosecuted on charges of treasonable felony and sentenced to death, but were later pardoned and released from jail. [29] During the Nigerian Civil war, which lasted between 1967 and 1970, agitations in the Niger Delta died down even though development neglect—arising from ethnicity-based political domination cited as a main reason for the rebellion—was not addressed.

With the end of the civil war in 1970, community protests against TOCs operating in the region emerged. The reasons were centered on demands for development assistance, employment opportunities, payment of compensation for damages to properties caused by oil production activities, awarding of contracts to community members, and environmental protection. The failure of the Nigerian government to effectively address the issues in contention aggravated the
conflicts, which have turned particularly militant and violent since 1997 [30]. It burst into full blown insurgency in 2005. [31] The foundation for militia activities was laid by factors such as inter-ethnic conflicts, intra-community and inter-community conflicts, piracy/oil theft and the use of violence during election campaigns (involving the hiring of armed youths to ensure electoral victory). The thread running through all these factors is the formation of cults/gangs and militia groups, and the proliferation of arms. During 1997 in Delta State, for example, inter-ethnic conflict between the Ijaw and Itsekiri was triggered by the relocation of the headquarters of a local government council (Warri South Local Government) from Ogbe-Ijoh (an Ijaw town) to Ogidigben (an Itskeri community). This led to the formation and proliferation of youth groups, particularly on the side of the Ijaws who were the aggrieved party. [32] Groups such as the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), Meinbotu Ogbo, Dolphin Ogbo, among others, emerged in this context. [33]

In Rivers State, inter-and intra ethnic contests for oil benefits, intra-community struggles for chieftaincy space, urban-based struggles for the control of illicit business space such as drug dealing, struggle for supremacy over oil theft/bunkering space, and the commoditization of violence in the electoral process by politicians are cited as having instigated the formation and multiplication of armed youth groups. [34] The point to emphasize here is that the existence of armed groups preceded the violent phase of the Niger Delta conflict. These groups merely keyed into the oil-related conflict and transformed into militia groups when the need for a violent response to state repression arose. The militia groups—which can be categorized as private, ethnic and pan-ethnic (see Table 2)—have sought to achieve a variety objectives, including the eradication of injustice and neglect, empowerment and survival of ethnic groups, true federalism, and increases in security, the share of oil revenue, development, self-determination and political representation. [35] Essentially, they sought to liberate the Niger Delta from ethnicity-based political domination, and anchored it on self-determination and resource control. They drew inspiration from the Major Adaka Boro-led revolt in 1966, considered to be an unfinished revolution by the Ijaws. [36]

**Table 2: Categories of Militia Groups in the Niger Delta**
Militia activism was preceded by the mobilization of a number of civil society groups who used enlightenment, declarations, dialogue, rallies and protests as their strategies. Such groups include the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), Ijaw National Council (INC), the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and Movement for the Survival of the Ijaw Ethnic Nationality in the Niger Delta (MOSIEND). While the activities of MOSOP brought the Niger Delta question—and in particular, the plight of the Ogoni ethnic group—to the fore of international discourse, the murder of the Ogoni leader Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other of his associates in 1995 by the General Abacha-led military government set in motion a process of radicalization of youth groups. This radicalization was consummated in 1998 when the Nigerian Government responded violently to the 1998 Kaima Declaration – a document produced from a meeting held by Ijaw youths in Kaima, Bayelsa state who met to discuss the survival of the Ijaw nation in Nigeria. The ten-point resolution that was born out of the meeting included the following passages:

“All land and natural resources (including mineral resources) within Ijaw territory belong to Ijaw communities and are the basis of our survival....we cease to recognize all undemocratic Decrees that rob our peoples/communities of the right to ownership and control of our lives and resources....we demand the immediate withdrawal from Ijaw land of all military forces of occupation and repression by the Nigerian State.....we demand that all oil companies stop all exploration and exploitation activities in the Ijaw area.”

The youths resolved to implement these decisions from December 30, 1998, yet their attempts met state repression that lead to violent confrontation between the youths and security forces – consequently providing the setting for the transformation of youth groups into militia organizations. In addition to casualties and damages to personal property, there were larger confrontations such as the total destruction of the Odi community in Bayelsa State by federal troops in November 1999, a reprisal attack for the killing of eight policemen by militias based in the community. Similar circumstances led to military attacks and destruction of the Odioma community of Bayelsa State in 2005. Another event included military attacks on Okerenkoko, an Ijaw Community in Delta State, by federal troops with the objective to destroy the base of youths engaged in oil theft/bunkering. Many observers describe the three-day attack, which took place February 15-18, 2005, as the primary reason for the birth of MEND. Several Ijaw militia groups united their efforts under one umbrella (MEND) with the political objective of liberation. In sum, MEND emerged in 2005 as an umbrella organization of the militias in the region, in an attempt to unite forces for effective engagement with the Nigerian government. Before the formation of MEND, the different militia groups in the region operated in an uncoordinated
manner. The leaders of these groups - which met to create MEND – sow that they were ill-prepared for dealing with the firepower of the Nigerian military, making them vulnerable to defeat. MEND emerged to address this challenge.

**The Engagement Tactics of MEND: Acts of Terrorism?**

As already noted, terrorism can be viewed as both a tactic of politico-military engagement [41] and as a criminal act. [42] Combining the two perspectives produces a framework of analysis that can be used to make the case that MEND’s use of violence as an instrument of engagement or insurgency that amounts to terrorism. This is particularly reflected in three kinds of activities: hostage-taking, attacks on oil infrastructure, and placing bombs in public places.

1) **Hostage-Taking as Instrument of Engagement**

One of the prominent tactics used by MEND to drive home its political objectives of resource control and self-determination has been the targeting and seizure of foreign oil workers as hostages. Unlike other groups described as fringe elements by Okonta [43] —who saw hostage taking as a commercial enterprise and thus exchanged those seized for ransom—MEND’s hostages were viewed as political tools meant to draw the attention of the Nigerian government and international community to the local grievances and the groups demands. [44] Table 3 provides data on the trend of attacks by MEND to demonstrate the intensity of violence and the discernible elements of terrorism.

**Table 3: Trend and Nature of Attacks by MEND: 2006-2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object/Target/Location of Attack</th>
<th>Number per Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Company Personnel/oil infrastructure</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-oil related infrastructure/facility</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Personnel</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of hostages</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Deaths</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Injured</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NDTC Report [45]

As illustrated in Table 3, MEND took a total of 119 hostages between 2006 and 2008, while 300 deaths were recorded in the course of attacks. In 2006, 28 of those killed were soldiers, while three were security guards and two were oil workers. In 2007, 71 of those killed were neither oil
workers nor security personnel. However those killed in 2008 were oil workers and security personnel. The high number of “civilian” deaths in 2007 was due to MEND’s attack on public places such as a filling (gas) station owned by the Nigerian government in Port Harcourt, the Rivers State capital. Also, 11 of the hostages in 2007 were leaders of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) [46] in Ondo State; they had been taken hostage for local political demands. Although hostage-taking is a distinct activity of MEND, it requires attacks on oil workers and facilities and thus sometimes results in unintentional deaths. Though MEND typically apologized for such deaths it cannot exonerate itself from the deaths caused by its actions.

The use of hostage-taking helped achieve some of MEND’s political demands such as the release of Alhaji Asari Dokubo, the leader of the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force, from prison. The insecurity that resulted from such hostage-taking incidents also negatively impacted oil production activities: TOCs withdrew their personnel (in particular, foreign workers in vulnerable areas), leading to the closure of operations and reduction in oil production. This, in turn, achieved one of MEND’s objectives of instilling fear in the TOCs as a means of forcing them out of the region and disrupting production. [47] Furthermore, such actions would qualify as terrorist acts under the draft UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, as they resulted in deaths and injuries, and were meant to compel the Nigerian Government and the TOCs to meet their demands.

(2) Attacks on Oil Infrastructure

In addition to hostage-taking, direct attacks on oil infrastructure were also meant to disrupt production and thus force the Nigerian Government and the TOCs to respond to MEND’s political demands. This should be considered separate from the profit-motivated sabotage of oil installations, which is done to enhance oil theft/bunkering or cause environmental pollution that can then be blamed on the oil companies for property damages and compensation. MEND’s attacks on oil infrastructure—such as oil pipelines, flow stations, manifolds and well heads—have damaged facilities and equipment, disrupted production and reduced oil production and export. For instance, in 2008 Nigeria’s oil production capacity was nearly 2.6 million barrels per day, but attacks had reduced this production to just 1.1 million. [48]

The intense militia attacks on oil infrastructure and the drastic cut in oil production is regarded as the reason that the Nigerian Government created and launched the 2009 amnesty program in the Niger Delta. [49] This program sought to restore peace and ensure unfettered oil production in exchange for pardoning the militias who revolted against the state. Although the amnesty program was part of several recommendations made by the Niger Delta Technical Committee in 2008, [50] the acceptance and isolation of the amnesty policy from others suggests that the government was forced to do so due to the dwindling oil revenues caused by attacks and the dangers this presented to the Nigerian economy.
Classic definitions of terrorism often include the use of violence to compel a government or society to act in a certain way. [51] Indeed, the draft UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism partly views terrorism as the compulsion of a government to take an action due to the threat of violence. [52] Similarly, the UN draft Convention also describes terrorism as the use of violence to cause damage to the environment. One consequence of attacks on oil infrastructure is damage to facilities and equipment such as oil pipelines and manifolds, which results in oil spills. Significant oil spills are known to have caused severe damage to the environment, resulting in the destruction of fauna and flora, soil nutrients, crops, economic trees and marine life. [53] Thus, this tactic of engagement by MEND also warrants the label of terrorism.

(3) Placement of Bombs and Explosives in Public Places

Another common characteristic of terrorism is the placement of bombs and explosives in public spaces, resulting in property destruction and loss of human lives. Significantly, this tactic has been employed by MEND in its mobilization and revolt against the Nigerian State. In 2006 for example, MEND detonated car bombs in Port Harcourt and Warri. Although the bombs were exploded in military locations (headquarters of Amphibious Brigade of the Nigerian Army in Port Harcourt and headquarters of the Joint Task Force in Warri), the Port Harcourt explosion led to the death of three civilians. [54] Also in March 2010, MEND placed and detonated two vehicle bombs near a Delta State government guest-house in Warri while political leaders and other stakeholders were inside for a meeting to discuss policy interventions for sustaining the peace in post-amnesty Niger Delta. Three persons were reported to have died in the incident. [55] Again, on October 1, 2010, MEND detonated a car bomb near the Eagles Square in Nigeria’s capital city Abuja, where guests, including President Goodluck Jonathan and foreign friends of the country had gathered to celebrate Nigeria’s 50th independence anniversary. Twelve persons died, while 17 were injured in the Abuja blast. [56] In all these incidents, MEND claimed responsibility and linked it to its political struggle which seeks to emancipate the Niger Delta from ethnicity-based political domination and its consequences which is linked to the region’s lack of development.

But MEND’s attack on public places indicates a shift in its targeting objectives from energy to non-energy infrastructure. Although the organization had used car bomb attacks in the past, these were targeted at soldiers and security operatives. Thus, civilian deaths were unintentional. But its recent attacks on public places, as witnessed in Abuja and Warri, had direct consequences for civilians and made it appear that the civilian population was the actual target. MEND linked these attacks to its political objectives of self-determination and resource control. The Warri attack was intended to draw attention to the fact there has been too much talk but little action in attempts to resolve the Niger Delta crisis. In MENDs view, concrete plans and actual
Implementation was required rather than conferences and workshops. Again, MEND justified its Abuja attack on the grounds that President Jonathan has been slow to address the regions concerns. But the respective March (2011) and June (2011) bomb threats suggest a disconnect between the groups targeting behavior and political objectives of self-determination and resource control. In March 2011, MEND threatened to bomb Abuja, Lagos and the Niger Delta, and advised Nigerians to stay away from political campaign venues of President Jonathan. Although it noted that the bomb threat was due to the President’s reluctance to address their concerns, the advice that people should stay from his campaigns suggests other undeclared objectives. In June 2011, the movement threatened to attack oil infrastructure of the Italian ENI Group in the Niger Delta, citing allegations that ENI was supporting the NATO-led bombing of Libya. The attacks were to be carried out as a mark of solidarity with the Libyans. [57]

Conclusion

MEND took shape in 2005 and emerged in 2006 as an umbrella organization of militia groups in the Niger Delta to advance the political objective of liberation started by Major Isaac Adaka Boro and the Niger Delta Volunteer Service in 1966. The goal of freedom from ethnicity-based political domination was reactivated by the youth movement in the late 1990s after both the Nigerian Government and TOCs had failed to resolve conflicts that had erupted in the early 1970s. The youth movement embarked on anti-state mobilization, requesting development and a fair share of the oil wealth. Yet the Nigerian government’s ineffective policy initiatives and violent responses set in motion a process of radicalization, resulting in the formation of several militia groups who had the capacity to directly confront the military and other security organizations such as the anti-riot police. [58] MEND, which became the arrowhead of this plethora of groups, adopted demonstrative public violence as a strategy of engagement.

Drawing from the perspectives of terrorism as, on the one hand a crime and, on the other a violent tactic for the achievement of political goals, this analysis of MEND’s engagement tactics (i.e. use of hostage-taking, attacks on oil infrastructure and the placement of bombs and other explosive devices in public places) concludes that they are rightly considered to be acts of terrorism. The deaths and injuries, the destruction of oil infrastructure and damages caused to the environment arising from its politically motivated actions are also in line with the description of terrorism in the draft definition of the UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. [59] Even though the MEND organization seeks freedom for its people, its tactics and behavior undermine the moral claims and strength of the organization and, ultimately, the attainment of peace in the region. Ending the use of violence and bringing dialogue and negotiation into MENDs engagement tactics are thus essential requirements for the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict and for the restoration of peace in the region. The current relative peace.
pervading in the region as a result of the Nigerian Government Amnesty Program [60] vindicates this point.

The Anti-terrorism Act recently by passed by the Nigerian parliament will certainly support the containment of terrorism by groups such as MEND. But it’s uncertain – if not unlikely – that it will end such activity as previous legislative efforts failed to do so. For example, in 1975 the Nigerian government enacted the Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti-sabotage) Decree 35 to steer people away from the sabotage and disruption of oil production. Despite the fact this law “empowered the military to execute without civil recourse, anyone preventing the procurement or distribution of petroleum” [61] it did not deter groups, such as MEND, from attacking oil installations and disrupting production. Presently, MEND appears to be led and driven by militants who are either dissatisfied with the implementation of the Amnesty Program or who do not support the program. This suggests that a more violent MEND could re-emerge and start another campaign of violence if the conditions which created the conflict are not addressed. At the moment, the Amnesty Program has neglected non-armed youths, focusing instead on ex-combatants. This appear to be a reward for engaging in violence and ,with the fundamental conditions which triggered violence intact, it is highly probable that MEND may become prominent again in the future as a violent non-state actor. Furthermore, if not properly managed, MEND may become a franchise for perpetrating terrorism. With the leadership vacuum created by the acceptance of the amnesty offer by the Nigerian Government, the organization can be hijacked by faceless groups or individuals to pursue goals other than those which originally motivated the Niger Delta struggle. To overcome this danger, one likely option will be for the ex-MEND leaders to transform the organization into a civil society organization that will pursue their original goals within the context of peaceful democratic mainstream politics.

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Notes
[1] The Niger Delta is located in the southern part of Nigeria, and is the hub of Nigeria’s oil industry. By geographic definition, it is made of six states- Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers States. But the political definition, accepted in policy circles by the Nigerian government includes Abia, Imo and Ondo States; making it a total of nine states and several ethnic groups, with the Ijaw as the largest group.
[4] Ibid., 199.
[6] Gbaramatu is one of the several clans that make up the Ijaw nation in Nigeria.
[8] Ibid.


[17] The 36 states are grouped into 6 geo-political zones as follows: South-West Zone (Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo); South-East (A比亚, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo); South-South ( Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers); North-West (Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara); North-East (Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe); and North-Central (Benue, Kogi, Kwarar, Nassarawa, Niger, Plateau). The Federal Capital Territory, Abuja is also placed under the North-Central Zone.

[18] Ben Naanen, ‘Oil Producing Minorities and the Restructuring of Nigerian Federalism: The Case of the Ogoni People’, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol.33, No. 1, 46-78. - The second schedule of the 1999 Nigeria constitution (which is a repeat of previous legislative list) provides for the exclusive legislative list made up of 68 items and reserved for the federal government. The concurrent legislative list on which both the federal and state governments have powers on has 30 items. Meanwhile a federal law supersedes state laws whenever there is a conflict. Section 4(3) of the 1999 constitution also provides that “the entire property in and control of all minerals, mineral oil and natural gas in, under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of the Federation and shall be managed in such a manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.

[19] These criteria include population, equality of state, land mass, need and the principle of derivation which requires that a percentage of revenues derived from natural resources in any state should be paid to it.


[21] From the twilight of colonialism in the late 1950s up to 1967, the federating units in Nigeria were known as regions (the Northern, Western, Eastern and Mid-Western Regions). From 1967, they were renamed States; there are presently 36 in number.


[24] Nigeria is made of over 250 ethnic nationalities; the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba are noted as the dominant groups. Out of the 11 heads of the federal government since independence, all except one, President Goodluck Jonathan who succeeded the late President Umaru Yar’adua last year, are of one of the three major groups.


[27] Although the compensation rates were determined by the Nigerian Government, the communities see the oil companies as those responsible for the damages; their inability to pay adequate compensation for damages caused by their oil production activities is considered a conspiracy between the government and the companies to deprive the people.

[28] The Oil companies later responded by providing basic infrastructure such as clean water, electricity, health facilities, agricultural support, class room blocks, scholarship and micro-credit. But a number of factors, including corruption, and structural deformities in the country’s development process limited the impact of this support on the communities.

[29] The Ijaw and Itsekiris have been pitched against each other from the colonial days, over Ijaw perception of Itsekiri domination and contestations over the ownership of Warri land (Warri is the name of the area occupied by the Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo, who are also part of the land conflict). The Ijaws had sought for a separate local government as part of efforts to deal with the problems of Itsekiri domination. Although the creation of the Warri South Local Government did not meet this desire as both ethnic groups were still mixed, the location of the head quarters in the Ijaw area brought some relief to the people. The relocation of the local government headquarters created the condition for the violence which resulted in ethnic hate and attempts by each side to annihilate the other.


[33] It is considered unfinished because its objectives and freedom of development are yet to be achieved.

Ibid., 98.

The Kaima Declaration, Resolutions of all the Youths Conference held at Kaima, Bayelsa State, to Explore Strategies for the Survival of The Ijaw Nation in Nigeria, December 11, 1998

Ike Okonta, 2006, op. cit.


Ike Okonta, 2006, op cit,14.


The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) is one of the over 60 registered political parties in Nigeria. It is the ruling party in the country, and as at the time of the kidnapping and hostage taking of its officials in Ondo State, it was also the ruling party there. Presently, Labor Party rules in Ondo State.


See BP Statistical Review of World Energy (June 2009); available online at http://bp.com/statisticalreview. Also, see Chris Ajaero, Nigeria’s Lost Trillions, Newswatch Magazine, May 4, 2009, 21. Notably, in February 2011 President Goodluck Jonathan announced that Nigeria’s crude oil production had recently increased to 2.6 million barrels per day in large part due to dividends from the Amnesty Program. See http://allafrica.com/stories/201102221027.html

Ottoabasi Abasiekong, MEND should Learn from ETA, Businessday, March 21, 2011,14.


Dangerous Dimension: Bombing should not acquire a life of its own, like kidnapping, its precursor; The Nation (Newspaper’s editorial/opinion comment), March 22, 2010, 15.


Bisi Olaniyi, Sanni Ologun & Jude Isiguzo, Ibid; Also see Daily Sun Newspaper, June 7, 2011,p.15


As part of efforts to resolve the Niger Delta Conflict, the Nigerian Government proclaimed Amnesty for all militants in the area, including MEND leaders and members. The program offered pardon for all those who took arms against the state, in return for disarmament and reintegration. Over 20,000 militias, including key leaders and members of MEND surrendered thousands of sophisticated arms and ammunitions, and renounced militant activities. They have since been sent for non-violence training, while many of them have been sent for training in skills acquisition and enhancement. Some have been sent to tertiary institutions to acquire higher education in their chosen fields of study. Since the Amnesty Program, hostage taking of oil workers have ceased while attacks on oil infrastructure have reduced significantly. However, some members of MEND are still carrying on with violent engagements as shown by recent attacks on oil facilities and threats to bomb selected targets in the country and the Niger Delta persist.

‘Forcing the Horse to Drink or Making it realise its Thirst’: Understanding the Enactment of Anti-Terrorism Legislation (ATL) in Nigeria

by Isaac Terwase Sampson and Freedom C. Onuoha

Abstract

Attempts by the Nigerian government to enact a comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation (ATL) since 2006 had suffered several setbacks. However, the failed Christmas Day bombing of a U.S. airliner by a Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and subsequent acts of domestic terrorism have induced the National Assembly (NASS) to revive deliberation on the ATL. Adopting a historical approach, this article critically engages with the complexities surrounding renewed efforts at enacting a comprehensive ATL in Nigeria and further highlights the contentious debates on its necessity. It argues that the litany of domestic imperatives that led to a lethargic approach to counter-terrorism legislation between 2006 and late 2009 by the NASS have been overwhelmed by more serious domestic and international terrorist acts, which have made the enactment of a comprehensive ATL in Nigeria a matter of necessity rather than choice.

Introduction

For decades, terrorism has been a grave security concern to many states. However, its increasing frequency and sophistication at the dawn of the 21st century informed global efforts to develop frameworks for countering and criminalising it at the international level. [1] In particular, the devastation in human and material terms generated by the September 11, 2001 (henceforth 9/11) Al-Qaeda-led attacks on the United States (US) reinforced the need to revitalize efforts towards its criminalisation and denunciation, both nationally and internationally. Before 9/11, despite the 1998 bombings of US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, terrorism was considered an insignificant security threat in much of Africa. [2] Though more recently its effects have gradually permeated the borders of African states, either through the existence of Western terrorist targets (like embassies, hotels or corporate offices) within their territories or by acts of domestic insurrection; hence its re-prioritization on the list of security threats and growing attempts by African states to adopt comprehensive national legislation to criminalise it. In Nigeria, for instance, the 9/11 attacks inspired a domestic effort to criminalise terrorism, as the act was hitherto unknown to the country’s penal laws. Although attempts to enact anti-terrorism legislation (ATL) was initially met with stiff opposition from some quarters, recent international events involving Nigerians, coupled with cascading domestic acts of terror, have reinforced its necessity, if not its inevitability.
This article therefore examines the confluence of domestic and international factors that have made the enactment of a comprehensive ATL inevitable for Nigeria, in spite of earlier opposition to its adoption. The article is divided in six parts. Following this introduction, part II conceptualises the term terrorism, and part III contextualises the external influence on the criminalisation of terrorism, especially in Africa. Part IV highlights the debate surrounding Nigeria’s initial failed attempt to enact a comprehensive ATL, while part V explores recent security threats (within and outside the country) that have significantly neutralized entrenched opposition to the enactment of an ATL in Nigeria. Part VI concludes by arguing that although the effort to enact an ATL in Nigeria was initially externally-driven, the internal security dynamics in Nigeria in the last three years have accentuated its necessity.

**Conceptual Underpinnings**

Before delving into the substantive aspect of the discourse, it is important to review some definitions of terrorism and try to explain the controversy behind the enactment of ATL in most states. The word *terrorism* existed in the international security lexicon long before it became a household word in the late 20th century. As far as the study of terrorism is concerned, the subject of definition remains problematic. Terrorism can mean different things to different people, organizations or states. Jeffrey Simon [3] identified no fewer than 212 different definitions of terrorism in use, with 90 of them used by governments and other institutions. Michael Radu, for instance, defines terrorism as “any attack, or threat of attack, against unarmed targets, intended to influence, change or divert major political decisions.” [4] Similarly, Grant Wardlaw views terrorism as “the use, or threat of use of violence by an individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear including effects in a target group larger than immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators.” [5] The multiplicity of definitions therefore suggests that a person described as a “terrorist” in one context may be regarded as a “freedom fighter” in another. Regardless of the multiple definitions of terrorism, some analysts contend that two main characteristics are critical for distinguishing terrorism from other forms of violence. First, terrorism is aimed at non-combatants—that is, civilians who are not engaged in any form of armed combat. Second, the use of violence is for dramatic purpose. In other words, the objective of instilling fear in the target audience is often more important than the physical result. [6]

In the context of this article, terrorism is defined as the premeditated use or threat of use of violence by an individual or group to cause fear, destruction or death, especially against unarmed targets, property or infrastructure in a state, intended to compel those in authority to respond to the demands and expectations of the individual or group behind such violent acts. Their demands or expectations may be for a change in status quo in terms of the political, economic, ideological,
religious or social order within the affected state or for a change in the (in) actions or policies of the affected state in relation to its interaction with other group or states. [7] Viewed this way, four elements underlie terrorism or a terrorist act. First, the act is essentially but not exclusively violent; whether premeditated or instantaneous. Second, the direct targets of such attack are usually non-combatant (including physical objects), usually without a direct relation or influence on the real motive behind the act. Third, the act takes place largely in an environment of relative peace, but sometimes could involve conflict situations. Finally, the ultimate motive for resorting to violence is to cause fear (in the psyche of the public) in order to influence those in political authority to respond to the demands or expectations of the individual or group behind the attack. [8]

Notwithstanding the essential features of terrorism or terrorist acts outlined above, there is no unanimity on the definition of terrorism by all states in the international community. The lack of consensus under international law partly accounts for the marked absence of terrorism as an offence under the International Criminal Court (ICC) statutes. Yet, the reality of terrorism is appreciated by all and internationally acknowledged as a significant threat to international peace and security. Given that states may experience acts of terrorism in different ways, each case of terrorism requires an in-depth and comprehensive treatment from a perspective that is related to its environment at a given time. [9] Hence, states resort to the adoption of legislation that specify what they consider as terrorism, from the standpoint of their specific historical, political, social and legal experiences. It is the respective context that largely accounts for differences, not only in the way terrorism is interpreted but also in ways that it is countered, including the textual narrative of their anti-terrorism legislation. Consequently, acts that may not constitute terrorism in one period may be regarded as terrorist acts in another. This, for example, would occur if a state adopts a new ATL in response to changing security dynamics occurring either within or outside its territory, or both. Also, an act which may be defined as terrorism in a state’s ATL may not fit perfectly into the legal description offered in the ATL of another. Thus, at the minimum, an act becomes labelled as terrorism when it has been defined as such in the ATL of a specific state or in international instruments or legal texts it subscribes to.

It is against this conceptual backdrop that Nigeria’s recent efforts to enact an ATL can be appreciated. In spite of the post-9/11 recognition that transnational terrorism is the world’s top security threat, Nigeria did not view itself as under significant threat, particularly given that it had not suffered significant attacks in the mould of the 1998 embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya. As will be demonstrated in this article, the need to adopt a comprehensive ATL was borne out of the convergence of internal and external forces generated by attempted or successful acts of terror.

9/11 Terrorist Attacks and the Politics of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (ATB)
In recent years, terrorism has taken a centre stage in political exchanges about risk and human security, driven by the belief that a new form of global terrorism has emerged. [10] Although the history of terrorism dates back more than two centuries, there were warnings since the early 1990s about the emergence of a new breed of terrorists. Unlike the close-knit, disciplined groups of the 1980s, the new form of terror came from loose groupings of people with similar backgrounds and beliefs, who resorted to violent tactics as a means to strike out against their enemies. Instead of operating with unified ideological aims and delineated hierarchies, the ‘new terrorist’ groups are defined by their amorphous objectives, dispersed following and their ability to strike across different continents. [11] Noteworthy here is the emergence of religiously motivated extremist groups that aim to cause significant death and destruction around the world. Of particular prominence is Al-Qaeda, which was founded in the late 1980s and has been linked to many high-profiled attacks around the world. Analysts, contend that the 9/11 attacks represented the new face of terrorism. This is essentially due to the magnitude of destruction caused by those attacks, coupled with the aggressive counter-terrorism campaign initiated by President George W. Bush. This subsequently transformed the relations between and among states as well as how terrorism is viewed across the world.

The response of the Bush administration to 9/11 had two main dimensions: internal and external. While the internal dimension captured the enactment of a more stringent anti-terrorism legislation and the restructuring of the country’s internal security architecture, the external dimension manifested itself principally through the ‘global war on terror’ (GWOT). 9/11 also saw the redoubling of the United Nations’ (UN) efforts at combating terrorism. For instance, UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1368, 1373, and 1377—all passed in 2001—demonstrated the UN’s commitment to combating and interdicting terrorists. These resolutions called upon states to fight terrorism, including the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors. UNSCR 1373, in particular, urged all Member States to criminalize terrorism by legislation. More importantly, the U.S.-led GWOT gave terrorism a prime place in the catalogue of international security threats and introduced far-reaching counter-measures which were characterised by restrictions on immigration and international travel, derogation of basic rights, limitations on access to cash, invasion of privacy, and the imposition of conditions of emergency in law enforcement - among many other reprehensible methods. [12] Thus U.S. foreign policy on counter-terrorism (CT) sought to commonize terrorism as a global security challenge requiring common but serious counter-measures.

Although the GWOT enjoyed UN endorsement in principle, its modus operandi differed significantly from those of the UN. Widespread concerns for human rights in the pursuit of CT were consistently raised by Member States. Notably, in June 2004, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights appointed an Independent Expert on the “Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism,” with a mandate to evolve a credible guide
for compliance with human rights norms by states in their CT efforts. The UN High Commissioner on Human Rights’ Special rapporteur on Torture, Mr. Theo Van Boven, also drew the attention of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to the prevalence of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment in the process of countering terrorism. [13] These outcries led the UNGA to task the High Commissioner for Human Rights to examine the question of human rights protection and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, and ask him to make recommendations concerning the obligation of states to protect human rights in that endeavour. [14] Consequently, the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights published the Digest on the Protection of Human Rights while Countering Terrorism, in 2003. [15] The digest outlined some non-derogable rights under the UN and regional systems and addressed the core principles of necessity and proportionality which were thought fundamental to lawful counter-terrorism measures. [16]

Secondly, the GWOT privileged military force and strategy as the fulcrum of its operations, an approach that was criticized by some members of the UN as ineffective. [17] Most importantly however, the US policy on CT had a coercive character that did not tolerate indifference or abstinence; a closed choice that put many states in a dilemma. The coercive nature of the GWOT therefore evoked skepticism from some African leaders about the sincerity of the U.S. approach to combating terrorism at the global level. Consequently, most African countries—especially those with large Muslim populations—preferred a coalition against terrorism led by the UN rather than the U.S. [18] In spite of the divergence between the UN and the US approaches to CT, the UNSC (although largely inspired by the U.S.) demanded that states across the world adopt national legislation against terrorism. It was thought that since terrorism was not criminalized by many states, the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of terrorism would be ineffective in the event that such crimes were committed on the territories of states without legal prohibition. African countries were therefore brought under pressure by the UNSC and the U.S. to enact or amend their existing criminal laws to punish acts of terrorism. [19] To ensure that all Member States of the UN complied with resolution 1373, a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) was established by the UNSC to monitor its implementation. Enticed by the carrot of U.S. aid and complying with the UNSC’s demand, some African states like Egypt, the Gambia, Nigeria, and South Africa began legislative efforts at criminalising terrorism. [20]

Although African legislative responses to terrorism pre-date 9/11’s reactionary furore, [21] efforts by these states to enact ATL in the aftermath of 9/11 attracted a fair share of criticism. Critics argued that terrorism is not Africa’s prime security challenge, demanding such prioritized and comprehensive legislative response. Instead, they contended that poverty, human rights violations, persistent conflict, bad governance, corruption, a concentration of power and wealth in the hands of elites, and many other issues are more pressing concerns for the well-being and security of African states and people. [22] The new wave of CT legislation in Africa was thus criticised as a ploy by African leaders to attract foreign aid with the tendency to undermine
genuine democracy and personal liberty. [23] It was also feared that a strong counter-terrorism legislative campaign that reinforces repressive regimes in Africa could fuel radicalism where it did not exist. [24] These scepticisms notwithstanding, some African countries—including Nigeria—started the process of enacting a comprehensive ATL after 9/11, in response to increasing pressure mainly from the US and, to some extent, the UNSC.

**Nigeria’s Attempt at Enacting an Anti-Terrorism Legislation: the Debate**

Although Nigeria has a history of violent acts that could have been labelled as terrorism, it is only after 9/11 that it launched any serious attempt to enact some form of ATL. In this regard, Nigeria’s initial response to UNSCR 1373 was at best incomprehensive. Rather than enact new legislation on terrorism, the National Assembly (NASS) squeezed in provisions in the *Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Establishment Act 2004* that define, prohibit and prescribe punishment for terrorism. [25] This aspect of the EFCC Establishment Act was, however, criticised for being incomprehensive and inadequate to address all the ramifications of terrorism contemplated by UNSCR 1373. [26]

By 2006, a private member bill, the “Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)”, [27] was proposed by Senator Ben Obi to the NASS as a comprehensive national legislation on terrorism. However, debate on the 2006 PTA was short-lived (it was defeated in the Senate in September 2006), as it did not attract widespread support, leaving section 15 of the EFCC Establishment Act 2004 as the subsisting legal framework on terrorism in the country. [28] In 2007, another attempt to propose a “Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)” emerged and attracted more debate from legislators as well as interest from the public. Such newfound support can be attributed to the changing domestic situation where in the north radical Islamic movements increased their activities and in the south ethnic militants in the Niger Delta violently campaigned against prolonged marginalisation of the oil-rich region. In addition, Nigeria’s particular experience with military rule characterised by gross human rights violations added more fervor to the controversy over the PTA.

Needless to say, both proponents and opponents of the PTA have their points to share. Supporters, for instance, argued that apart from Nigeria’s vulnerability to transnational terrorism through its association with Western targets, several internal factors could predispose it to high magnitude terrorist attacks. [29] The contention here was that the absence of an ATL would embarrass the Nigerian state in the event of such an attack. Similarly, it was thought that the void in legislation could also serve as an incentive for domestic terrorists to operate. [30] Indeed, the proliferation of militant groups in northern Nigeria and in the Niger Delta, [31] the rising wave and sophistication of their attacks on civilians, security forces and infrastructures as well as their alleged association with international terrorists groups [32], were all highlighted as justifications
for the enactment of an ATL. Some observers had argued that these groups’ possible association with international terrorist cells could potentially expose the country to terrorist attacks of serious magnitudes, hence the imminent need for a law that could criminalise their activities and prescribe serious punitive measures. The possibility of a Nigerian permanent membership of the proposed reformed UNSC was also advanced as a potential gain to be derived from the enactment of an ATL. Analysts argued that the enactment of an ATL would put Nigeria in an advantageous position, while refusal to do so could be detrimental, given the U.S.’s influence in international politics. [33] According to a Senator who seemed convinced with this contention, “the bill if enacted into law would boost the image of the country and enhance Nigeria’s chances for a seat in the United Nations Security Council.” [34] Given that South Africa and Egypt, top contenders for the anticipated permanent seat at the proposed expanded UNSC, have all enacted anti-terrorism legislation, this argument appeared to be a persuasive incentive. [35] Related to the above is the contention that Nigeria’s dominant role in continental and sub-regional politics would be diminished if it failed to enact an ATL. [36] It was argued that Nigeria’s inability to enact an ATL had the effect of stimulating regional apathy on legislative measures and the U.S.-led war on terrorism more generally. Under this belief, the argument was put forward that the U.S. could prop a sister state to take over Nigeria’s regional and sub-regional dominant political role, thereby rendering her long history of championing regional peace and security inconsequential.

In stark contrast to these arguments, opponents of the PTA argued its prematurity and stated that its narrative disregarded Nigeria’s political and legal history, especially the effects of prolonged years of military rule that was characterised by repression and state violence. Sadly, the return of civil rule in May 1999 brought little change as illustrated in the continued treatment of political opponents as ‘enemies’ by those in power or with access to state power. Thus it is the apprehension generated by this political culture that reinforced opposition to the Western-styled ATL. A primary fear was that the law could be exploited by those in power to unjustly persecute their opponents, whether they were critics, activists, politicians or others. This anxiety informed Senator Nkechi Nworgu cautioned statement to the NASS:

... We [legislators] do not go back to draconian ways where freedom of expression will be hampered by the bill. We need to revisit the bill to propound a national security bill that will capture our culture, tradition and political development. We cannot jump into it because developed nations are doing it. It must be in tandem with our socio-economic and political development. [37]

In particular, differing perceptions and interpretations of lingering militancy in the Niger Delta region (south) and Islamic extremism (north) presented the main challenge to Nigeria’s endeavour to enact comprehensive terrorism legislation. [38] People from the Niger Delta and
some members of the Muslim community had denounced the draft PTA for what they described as an open-ended definition of terrorism, with the potential of subsuming the activities of the Niger-Delta and Islamic militants under its definition. On the one hand, the Niger Delta people steadfastly opposed the PTA, which they interpreted as an attempt to criminalise their struggle for equity in the distribution of oil resources produced from the region. [39] This apprehension is understandable given that the sustained attacks on oil installations by the Niger Delta militants, abduction of oil workers (particularly expatriates) and many other forms of sabotage against oil installations had been described as oil terrorism. [40] On the other hand, the manifestation of militant Islamism in northern Nigeria presented another challenge to the criminalisation of terrorism. For example, some Islamic clerics had criticised the proposed PTA as targeting Muslims.

Consequently, some analysts urged the NASS to abandon the bill in view of the volatility of these regions and the general sensitivity of the issues involved. More so, analysts argued that the existing criminal codes already prohibited some acts defined by the bill as terrorist acts. Rather than risk the controversy that the enactment of a comprehensive ATL portended, it was argued that it would be safer to amend the provisions of the existing criminal codes in order to accommodate elements of terrorism not hitherto covered by the codes. [41] Against this backdrop, it appeared that the NASS was persuaded more by the opponents of the ATL than the supporters, leading to its relegation to the background by the end of 2007. The efforts to enact a comprehensive ATL remained unsuccessful at worst and lethargic at best, until the infamous attempt by a Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, to detonate an explosive onboard a U.S.-bound Northwest Airlines flight on December 25, 2009.

**International and Domestic Acts of Terror and the Enactment of an ATL in Nigeria**

Since November 2007, following a series of arrests of suspected terrorists believed to have links with the Al-Qaeda network, concerns over Nigeria’s vulnerability to terrorism has been a subject of debate. [42] The vulnerability bar was further raised in March 2008 when the Inspector General of Police, Mike Okiro, warned during the inauguration of the police anti-terrorism squad, that the Al-Qaeda terrorist network was planning to bomb some parts of Nigeria. [43] In spite of such a warning, Nigeria had not recorded any serious Al-Qaeda-related terrorist incidents on its soil; however, the growing audacity of northern-based Islamic militants and southern-based ethnic militants in the Niger Delta region have increasingly been sources of serious concern to the Nigerian government and the international community. Hitherto, the activities of militants operating in the Niger Delta region, particularly the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), were termed as militancy, in spite of the destruction of lives and property associated with their activities. [44] Similarly, the violence in the northern parts of the country
unleashed by militant Islamists (especially the Boko Haram), though deplorable, was also largely interpreted as sectarian. [45]

The concern over Nigeria’s vulnerability to terrorism assumed a worrisome international dimension in December 2009 when one of its citizens, Abdulmutallab who had been trained in Yemen, attempted to detonate an explosive device hidden in his underwear while on board Northwest Airlines Flight 253 (carrying 279 passengers and 11 crew members) en route to Detroit’s Metropolitan Airport in the US. The passengers and crew managed to put out the small fire caused by the partial detonation of the device. Like the 9/11 incident, the response of the U.S. to the failed ‘Christmas Day’ bombing had two main dimensions: internal and external. The internal dimension encapsulates actions within the U.S. to further enhance aviation security, including among others, 100 percent checking of passengers travelling within the U.S. and its territories against terrorist watchlists using the Secure Flight program, increased “threat-based” screening of suspicious passengers, and a review of the possible loopholes in the terror watch lists system. Some of these were contained in the new security directives issued on January 3, 2010 by the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA).

The external dimension found its strongest expression when the TSA issued its new security measures, which included blacklisting Nigeria by classifying it as a ‘Country of Interest’ on the US Terror Watch list. This blacklist includes four countries the United States considers to be “State Sponsors of Terrorism”—Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria—and another ten described as ‘Countries of Interest’: Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Yemen. The implication of blacklisting a country is that citizens of the designated and affected countries will be subjected to enhanced screening techniques, such as body scans, pat-downs and a thorough search of carry-on luggage for traces of explosives - no matter where they are travelling from. Despite the historically cordial relations between the two countries, the blacklisting of Nigeria sparked a diplomatic row with the US and the Nigerian government strongly criticized the decision. For instance, Nigeria’s Minister of Information, Professor Dora Akunyili, described the move as “unfair” and discriminatory against the roughly 150 million Nigerians. Foreign Affairs Minister, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, while conveying to the U.S. the official reaction of the Nigerian government, stated that “the new security measures by the US targeted at Nigerians is an unacceptable new year gift to a friendly country like Nigeria on its jubilee anniversary year.” In a press conference in Abuja on January 5, 2010, the spokesman of the Senate, Ayogu Eze, echoed this sentiment when he said:

“I am speaking on behalf of the Senate and on behalf of the Senate President to state categorically that we are very unhappy about the development and when we resume, we are going to take this matter up seriously, if America has not taken Nigeria off that list. We also want to advise America that it is in their own best interest to conduct this matter very well in a manner that will
The blacklisting of Nigeria equally attracted reactions from analysts. Some informed observers opined that Nigeria’s diplomatic ties with the U.S. began to weaken before the failed Christmas Day attack and may have contributed to the quick decision for blacklisting. Palpable indicators of weakened diplomatic ties include the near breakdown of high-level diplomatic contact between Aso Rock and the White House due to the temporary absence of President Yar’adua during his illness, the absence of a substantive Nigerian ambassador to the US as well as Nigeria’s lack of a strong lobbying group in the US. [47] As a result of these bilateral deficits on the part of Nigeria, there was no high-level channel of communication (e.g. between President Obama and his Nigerian counterpart) to diplomatically resolve issues generated by the unfortunate incident.

The Nigerian government, however, reinvigorated its diplomatic response to the blacklisting by increasing its engagement with the US government. The strategic and economic importance of Nigeria, in view of its enormous oil endowment as well as its huge (Muslim) population, explained Washington’s understandable disposition to reach a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. Ensuing constructive engagement between top U.S. and Nigeria officials provided the avenue for the US to staunchly demand that Nigeria fulfil her international obligations in combating terrorism. In particular, the U.S. gave four conditions Nigeria would need to meet before it could be delisted, namely: public condemnation of any form of terrorism anywhere in the world; improvement of security in the nation’s airports; deployment of air marshals on board aircraft and passing legislation geared towards combating terrorism in the country. [48]

Given that the Nigerian government had earlier and repeatedly condemned all forms of terrorism even before the Abdulmutallab case, it was expected that Nigeria would pass outstanding legislation geared towards combating terrorism as well as tighten aviation security. The Nigerian government immediately redoubled efforts at meeting these outstanding conditionalities. In relation to comprehensive measures at combating terrorism, two important pieces of legislation had been lying before the NASS since 2008: (i) a Money Laundering (Amendment) Bill and (ii) the Prevention of Terrorism Act. In this light, the US continued its pressure on Nigeria to pass these bills. In April 2010, the Senate debated the general principles (second reading) of the PTA and consequently referred the Bill to a joint Committee of Judiciary, Human Rights and Legal Matters, Foreign Affairs, and National Security and Intelligence for further legislative action. [49] Soon thereafter, Acting President, Goodluck Jonathan wrote to the House of Representatives (HoR), urging the parliamentarians to pass the Anti-Terrorism and Money Laundering Bills before the end of June 2010. [50]
As a result of growing pressure from the US, the Nigerian government expedited actions to improve airport security. This included introducing explosive detection equipment, installing ten full-body scanners at its four international airports, training of local staff to handle the full body scanners, and allowing Air Marshals from the US to guard US - Nigeria bound flights. [51] Following persistent protests over the blacklisting by some US allies, including Nigeria, the Department of Homeland Security announced in April 2010 that it was adopting new security measures to replace mandatory screening of air travellers from 14 countries short-listed as either “sponsors of state terrorism” or “countries of interest.” [52] By this act, the U.S. had aborted the list but remained actively engaged with its allies, including Nigeria, on the understanding that the “terrorist threat to global aviation is a shared challenge and ensuring aviation security is a shared responsibility.” [53]

From International Pressure to Domestic Incidents

While U.S. pressure on the Nigerian government continued, cascading domestic acts of terror in the country guaranteed additional pressure from within to address strategic deficiencies in Nigeria’s commitment to combating domestic and international terrorism. For instance, on March 30, 2010, there was a failed attempt by a cab driver to ram into an aircraft at Margaret Ekpo airport, Calabar, Cross-River State. The cab driver crashed through two gates of the airport, and headed to the tarmac to collide with a boarded Abuja-bound Boeing 737 aircraft. [54] It was alleged that the attack on the airline might have been targeting five Americans and some top politicians who were aboard the plane. [55] Although no casualties were recorded, the driver of the car sustained minor injuries. A more serious, sustained threat, however, comes from the Boko Haram sect in northern Nigeria. In July 2009, for instance, members of the sect staged spectacular attacks on government institutions. In response, a state-sanctioned aggressive crackdown led to the killing of over 700 members of the group including their leader Muhammed Yusuf. [56] Roughly a year later, in September 2010, Boko Haram carried out another attack that involved a jail-break in Bauchi Prison that freed over 700 inmates, including members that had been detained since the July 2009 revolt. In addition, over five people including a soldier, a policeman, two prison wardens and a civilian were killed during the attack. [57] The attacks by this extremist sect have increased in tempo in recent times.

Particularly worrisome is the spate of bombings during the last two years. The October 2010 celebration of Nigeria’s 50th Independence anniversary, for example, was disrupted by two bomb blasts near the venue in Abuja, killing at least 12 people and injuring several dozen others. The MEND claimed responsibility for the blasts. This attack took place after a similar type of vehicle bombing in March 2010 in Warri, Delta state, Niger Delta. In fact, both attacks were not aimed at energy assets (uncharacteristic of MEND) and took place at public gathering venues where civilians were present. President Jonathan later described it as an act of a small group of
terrorists, based outside the country, who use “the name of MEND to camouflage criminality and terrorism.” However, subsequent investigations revealed that the South Africa-based MEND leader, Henry Okah, amongst others, were involved in the attack. [58]

On Christmas Eve, December 2010, triple bomb blasts rocked the northern city of Jos, killing over 80 people and wounding several dozen others. In a statement published on what is thought to be its website, http://mansoorah.ne, the radical Islamic sect Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack. [59] There was no independent confirmation of this claim, as the bombing in central Jos was believed by many to be beyond the sect’s usual area of operation. The claim was also dismissed by Nigerian security agencies; nonetheless, these acts were manifestations of the terror threat faced by all Nigerians. Shortly afterwards, on New Year’s Eve, another bomb explosion occurred at the Mammy market near the Mogadishu Barracks in Abuja, claiming more than 30 lives and wounding several others. It was reported that the bomb was planted in a piece of luggage near Mogadishu Cantonment, a popular local hangout and tourist attraction. [60] No individual or group claimed responsibility for the attacks, though SMS messages circulated shortly after the attacks suggested the involvement of the MEND. [61] A statement by MEND issued two days later, however, said the group was not responsible for the New Year’s Eve blast. The New Year’s Eve bombing was followed by another explosion on 3 March 2011 during a Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) rally in Suleja, Niger State. More than 13 persons were killed and many more injured. In all, during the last two years explosions, largely targeting civilians, have rocked places in Warri and Asaba in Delta State, Atlas Cove in Lagos, and Government House in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, among others.

These and other related incidents point to Nigeria’s growing vulnerability to extremism and terrorism, and further reinforce the urgency for an ATL in Nigeria. It is thus noteworthy that on January 26, 2011, President Jonathan appointed former director-general of Nigeria Intelligence Agency (NIA), Ambassador Zakari Ibrahim, as an Adviser on Terrorism. [62] Also, between January 2010 and February 2011, the President wrote the NASS thrice, urging it to expedite action on the PTA in order to restore the confidence of the international community in the country’s commitment to the global fight against terrorism. By February 2011, the Senate passed the “Prevention of Terrorism Act 2011” and sent to the HoR for concurrence and onward assent by the President. The PTA, now known as the “Terrorism (Prevention) Act (TPA) 2011”, and the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act (MLPA) were both signed into law on 3 June 2011.

Concluding Remarks

With the passage of the TPA and MLPA, Nigeria now has comprehensive legislation criminalising terrorism. There is no doubt that the provisions of the legislation demonstrate serious commitment on the part of the Nigerian government to combat domestic and international terrorism. By promulgating the TPA 2011, Nigeria has formally joined countries
like Australia, Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, and the United States, among others, in the fight against terrorism. Consequently, on July 24, 2011, the U.S. government delisted Nigeria from the list of countries that harbour or sponsor terrorism thereby effectively bringing to an end, the enduring diplomatic tension between the two countries following the ill-fated failed Christmas Day bombing. [63]

The 41-section TPA establishes measures for the prevention, prohibition and combating of acts of terrorism and the financing of terrorism in the country. It equally provides for the effective implementation of the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism as well as the Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and prescribes appropriate penalties. Similarly, the MLPA makes comprehensive provisions to prohibit the financing of terrorism, and the laundering of the proceeds of crime. It also expands the scope of supervisory and regulatory authorities so as to address the challenges faced in the implementation of the anti-money laundering regime in Nigeria.

Section 2(c) of the TPA defines an ‘act of terrorism’ as an act which is deliberately done with malice, aforethought and which has the capacity to seriously harm a country or an international organisation; and which is intended to unduly compel a government or international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act, intimidate a population, destabilise the fundamental, political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation, and otherwise influence such government or international organisation by intimidation or coercion. In the light of this definition, elements that constitute ‘acts of terrorism’ include an attack upon a person’s life which may cause serious bodily harm or death; kidnapping of a person; destruction to a government or public facility, transport system, and infrastructural facility including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss. It prohibits the seizure of aircraft, ship or other means of public or goods transport and the use of such means of transportation for illegal purposes. They also include the possession and manufacture of weapons and explosives and the dissemination of views aimed at destabilising the polity; the release of dangerous substance or causing of fire, explosions or floods, with the intention to endanger human life; and any act which disrupts a service but is committed in pursuance of a protest. [64]

In all, the TPA provides the requisite legal framework for the prevention and punishment of terrorism in Nigeria, including conditions for the extradition of person(s) suspected of involvement in the commission or sponsorship of terrorist acts. Under its provisions, many organised crimes in Nigeria such as oil bunkering, hostage-taking, kidnapping and use of explosive devices for the expression of grievances, which were hitherto prohibited under Nigeria’s Criminal and Penal Codes are now consolidated as ‘acts of terrorism’, thereby
attracting stiffer penalties. In terms of its provisional tenor, the TPA is more comprehensive than the subsisting EFCC (Establishment) Act 2004, which merely established, defined, and prescribed punishment for acts of terrorism. However, a key deficit of the TPA is its failure to repeal the relevant sections of the EFCC Establishment Act and even similar provisions in the Criminal and Penal Codes. The consequence of this oversight is that persons suspected of terrorism could be charged under either or all of the legislation. Whereas a conviction for attempting to injure with explosive substances may attract life imprisonment under sections 1 (2) (IV & VI) and 33 (1) (a) of the TPA and 46 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, the same act(s) are punishable by 10 years imprisonment under sections 336 of the Penal and Criminal Codes.

Furthermore, it appears that the minor criticisms against the definition of terrorism that trailed the EFCC (Establishment) Act and the failed PTB 2006 still subsist in the TPA. The TPA has defined terrorism in such a manner that tending to subsume almost all violent organized crimes under its definitional tenor, which, though prohibited, may not necessarily harbour terrorist intents. For example, acts of kidnapping which have assumed a worrisome dimension in the last few years in Nigeria may be treated as terrorism under the TPA. If tried and convicted for kidnapping under the Criminal Code, it attracts maximum of 10 years imprisonment; however, if convicted under the TPA, it attracts a penalty of life imprisonment.

Undoubtedly, the tremendous pressure from Washington on Abuja in the aftermath of the failed Christmas Day bombing, coupled with cascading incidents of domestic acts of terror made the enactment of an ATL in Nigeria a matter of necessity rather than choice. However, the enactment of a comprehensive ATL in Nigeria may not significantly address Nigeria’s growing vulnerability to terrorism and violent extremism unless some of the governance and security deficits – poverty, youth unemployment, corruption, porous borders, small arms proliferation, and ineffectual national security agencies – bedevilling the country are addressed in a comprehensive and sustainable manner. Therefore, Nigeria’s counter-terrorism efforts can only be effective in addressing violent extremism and other acts of terror, if there is a robust combination of legislative interventions with governance reforms that address some of the acute human security challenges confronting a vast majority of her population. Otherwise Nigeria is poised to witness more acts of terror even in the face of a comprehensive ATL.

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**Notes**


[16] For a comprehensive reading on the efforts of the UN to halt the practice of human rights violation while countering terrorism, see Sepulveda op cit, note 7 above, 434 – 437.


[21] Prior to 9/11, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), recognizing the scope and seriousness of terrorism and the dangers it poses to the stability and security of African states, took the initiative of developing a comprehensive regional legislative framework which was envisaged to form the bedrock of African-States’ policy and legislative pivot on terrorism. This initiative gave birth to the OAU Convention on the Prevention


[27] At the time of presentation, this proposed legislation was titled “Prevention of Terrorism Act”. Technically it should read “Prevention of Terrorism Bill”, since it had not been passed by the NASS let alone assented to by the President.


[31] The militant groups in the North are radical Islamic groups with divergent religious ideologies; they include: the Hisbah, the Zamfara State Vigilante Service (ZSVS), Al-Sunnah Wal Jamaa a.k.a “the Nigerian Taliban” and the Kala-Kato, the Boko Haram among others, while the Niger Delta militant groups include the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta (COMA), and the Martyrs Brigade etc. Their apparent aim is to force the Nigerian State to concede the control of oil resources in the area to the locals (resource control).


[35] Whereas South Africa has enacted “Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004”, Egypt relies on several laws in dealing with terrorism.

[36] Ibid.


[39] For a detailed analysis of why Niger Delta militants, particularly MEND, should be considered “terrorists”, please see the article by Ibabia S. Ibabia in this issue of Perspectives on Terrorism.


[44] However, a divergent view has been offered by Ibabia S. Ibabia in his article in this issue of Perspectives on Terrorism.


[53] Ibid.
[64] See section 1 (2) (a-d) & (3) of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011.
Opportunity Costs or Costly Opportunities? The Arab Spring, Osama Bin Laden, and Al-Qaeda's African Affiliates

by Alex S. Wilner

Abstract

There is little doubt that Al-Qaeda faces twin challenges in the “Arab Spring” sweeping North Africa and the Middle East (MENA) and in the death of Osama bin Laden in May 2011. Al-Qaeda’s violent narrative has come under immense pressure following the toppling of Arab regimes by largely secular and peaceful protest movements while the removal of bin Laden robs the organization of a charismatic and unifying figure. Yet for Al-Qaeda’s most prominent African affiliates — Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Somalia’s Al-Shabaab — the political upheaval sweeping the MENA region also creates opportunities for growth. And while the elimination of Al-Qaeda’s founding leader will certainly sting, bin Laden’s exit is unlikely to greatly influence AQIM’s or Al-Shabaab’s aspirations, tactics, or strategies. This paper offers a critical overview of the costs and opportunities to Al-Qaeda’s African allies in light of the Arab Spring and bin Laden’s death.

In January 2011, long-simmering political, economic, and social discontent in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) finally boiled over. Individual acts of desperation—including self-immolations—turned into street demonstrations and collective protest, which in turn rapidly evolved into widespread (and for the most part non-violent) dissident movements. Few regional governments—and fewer Western governments—properly anticipated what was to follow. To date, the resulting “Arab Spring” has toppled two dictatorial regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, has likely mortally wounded three more in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, and has shaken the political status quo in several other countries, notably in Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. In Tunisia and Egypt, unprecedented political change is currently taking place, with free and open elections expected in the coming months. In Libya, a NATO-led and UN-mandated offensive is underway to help a ragtag rebel alliance wrest control of the country from Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s forces. And in Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain, status quo powers have used fear, imprisonment, and deadly military force in the hope of regaining control over their increasingly restless citizens. While these battles are ongoing and political uncertainty hangs in the air, there is little doubt that unparalleled shifts in political power are taking place in the Arab and wider Muslim world.

And then there was the death of Osama bin Laden on 2 May 2011. The Al-Qaeda leader was killed in a dramatic and daring covert operation carried out by US Special Operations forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan, a small city 50 miles north of Islamabad. Just after midnight local time, two dozen members of the United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group (popularly
known as SEAL Team Six) dropped into bin Laden’s compound from specially designed stealth helicopters. In a systematic search of the compound’s various buildings, the team engaged with members of bin Laden’s small entourage, killing him along with three other men (including one of his sons and two trusted operatives) and one woman. The SEAL team retrieved bin Laden’s body (which was later buried at sea after it was biometrically and genetically identified) and collected a trove of data stashed on diaries, hard drives, and some 100 digital storage devices. In an operation that lasted just 40 minutes, the United States finally succeeded in its decade-long promise to locate, track, and kill or capture the reclusive Al-Qaeda leader responsible for the death of nearly 3,000 individuals on September 11, 2001.

At the time of this writing, the combined repercussions of the Arab Spring and bin Laden’s death on political developments in the Arab/Muslim world, on global counterterrorism efforts, on US policy vis-à-vis Pakistan, Afghanistan and other countries, and most importantly, on Al-Qaeda, its global and regional affiliates, branches, and ideological sympathizers, are poorly understood. Events on the ground are still unfolding and open-source information remains limited and at times murky. Yet one thing is certain: 2011 has already been marked by a multitude of major events that will have long-lasting ripple effects on a number of critically important and inherently interconnected global issues.

This article offers a tentative assessment of just one of these issues: how Al-Qaeda’s jihadi-salafist affiliates in Africa will be affected by these recent global developments. Using the political upheaval in North Africa and bin Laden’s demise as backdrops, the article focuses primarily on Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Somalia’s Al-Shabaab, offering an overview of various and competing projections concerning both movements. The article is structured accordingly: section one offers a brief overview of AQIM and Al-Shabaab while sections two and three highlight the effects the Arab Spring and bin Laden’s death may have on Al-Qaeda’s leading African affiliate groups.

**Al-Qaeda’s African Allies: The Rise of AQIM and Al-Shabaab**

Of the many and varied violent non-state African groups that share some of Al-Qaeda’s ideological principles and practical goals, two currently stand out: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al-Shabaab. Other prominent regional organizations, like the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), al-Itihaad al-Islaami (AIAI), Hizbul Islam, or the Armed Islamic Group (popularly known by its French name Groupe Islamique Armé, GIA) have largely been destroyed, disbanded, or rolled into other groups. While it is plausible that remnants of these organizations will regroup in the future or that new terrorist organization will be formed, the focus of international counterterrorism in Africa today rests primarily on combating and containing AQIM and Al-Shabaab.
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) traces its roots to Algeria’s radical Islamist movement and the Algerian civil war of the 1990s. [1] During that conflict, a number of violent Islamist groups took up arms against the Algerian military in hopes of toppling the government and establishing an Islamist state. The most prominent group, the GIA, carried out a devastating domestic terrorism campaign against the Algerian government and also internationalized its campaign by targeting foreigners and France (Algeria’s historical colonizer) both in North Africa and in Europe. By the late 1990s, however, and primarily as a result of the unprecedented brutality the GIA conducted against civilians in Algeria, domestic support for the organization evaporated and the group eventually fractured. One splinter, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Le Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, GSPC) eventually rose to prominence in 1998. Bin Laden is suspected of having personally encouraged its formation. [2] With a pledge to nominally avoid purposefully targeting civilians, the GSPC continued to harass the government but its efforts were successfully countered and it was eventually reduced to two pockets of territory, the mountainous and coastal region of north-eastern Algeria (the Kabylia) and the southern stretches of the Saharan region. In the early 2000s, the group also suffered from a bout of severe in-fighting over strategy and over divisions concerning its loyalty to Al-Qaeda and global jihad. Despite further losing ground to successful Algerian, American, and European countermeasures following 9/11, the GSPC finally declared its allegiance to Al-Qaeda. Between 2006 and 2007, the GSPC formally tied itself to global jihad (rather than restrict itself to regional jihad) and officially changed its name to AQIM.

With its rebranding, the GSPC/AQIM changed its modus operandi, placing emphasis on large-scale terrorist attacks using explosive devices within a much wider and expanding field of operation spanning parts of Mauritania, Mali, Southern Algeria, Niger, and Chad. In fact, between 2005 and 2007, bomb attacks attributed to GSPC/AQIM nearly quadrupled in number (from 22 to 78) and the region suffered its first wave of suicide bombings. [3] Likewise, AQIM increasingly targeted foreigners and Westerners in North Africa and the Sahel region.

Major attacks attributed to AQIM include multiple assassination attempts on Algeria’s President, the 2007 double-car bombing of the UN office in Algiers and the Algiers’ Constitutional Court, a rudimentary attack in 2008 on Israel’s embassy in Mauritania, and a 2008 car bombing of a police academy just east of Algiers. More recently, in early February 2011, Mauritanian security forces intercepted three AQIM car bombs reportedly carrying 1.5 tons of explosive, including one that was destroyed in the capital, Nouakchott. It appears that AQIM had intended to assassinate the Mauritanian President. [4] And though it denied responsibility, AQIM was also blamed for the April 2011 attack on a café in Marrakesh, Morocco, in which over a dozen Western citizens were killed. The organization has also carried out dozens of bombing attacks and ambushes against security personnel and police, killing and injuring hundreds, and has been involved in dozens of abductions and murders targeting Western tourists, diplomats, and foreign
workers in the Sahel region. Despite these successful attacks, it appears that AQIM is increasingly “sliding into criminality”, with the abduction racket and drug trade overshadowing its zeal for political insurgency. Andrew McGregor goes so far as to suggest that AQIM is turning into “the North African version of the Philippine’s Abu Sayyaf movement,” intent on using the “rhetoric of Islamism” to justify its criminal activity. [5] Perhaps, but the foiled February 2011 attack in Mauritania suggests AQIM has yet to abandon its jihadist ideology.

Al-Shabaab, like AQIM, traces its roots to a civil war. [6] Somalia has resembled a failed state for over two decades and at times various militant Islamist groups have risen to prominence and have controlled parts of Somali territory. And like in North Africa, Al-Qaeda appears to have been active in Somalia, beginning in the early 1990s. It claims to have trained some of the Islamists who took part in the 1993 “Battle of Mogadishu”, in which 18 US servicemen were killed and to have used Somalis to coordinate its 1998 bombing of two US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Other indigenous Islamist groups were also active in Somalia in the 1990s. The most prominent, the AIAI, gained a foothold in eastern and western Somalia and sought to establish a Shari’a-based emirate. Its ranks included a number of Somali fighters who had fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. [7] By 1996-97, however, the AIAI suffered a series of setbacks in confrontations with the Ethiopian military and was largely destroyed as a functioning entity. Some surviving leaders, preying on the continued lack of central government and relying on kinship and clan relations, went on to establish small, autonomous, and locally-organized Islamic courts. Eventually, desperate courts and various militias came together under the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and managed to impose Shari’a law over parts of Somalia. Al-Shabaab emerged from within the UIC in 2003/4, led by former AIAI member Aden Hashi Farah “Ayro” (who was later killed in a US targeted strike in 2008). [8] With the assistance of Al-Shabaab, the UIC greatly expanded its control in southern and central Somalia and by 2006, successfully wrested control of Mogadishu from the Western-backed Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG). It then established a governing coalition under the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC). But the SCIC was short-lived. Ethiopia, with US assistance, invaded Somalia in December 2006, destroying the SCIC and reinstating the TFG in Mogadishu.

Ethiopia’s occupation was a rallying cry for Al-Shabaab. It sought to overthrow the TFG, remove international forces from Somali territory, institute Shari’a law, and establish a larger East African Islamic Emirate that would include all of Somalia (including Somaliland and Puntland), parts of eastern Kenya, Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, and Djibouti. Al-Shabaab quickly regrouped and led a successful and bloody insurgent and terrorism campaign against the TFG, Ethiopian troops as well as Ugandan and Burundi peacekeepers supporting the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Al-Qaeda and other foreign salafi-jihadist groups took notice, and sought to “globalize Somalia’s conflict” by supporting Al Shabaab with foreign fighters, equipment, and finances. [9] Sophisticated attacks, including suicide bombings — which had never been used in Somalia before—were imported from Iraq and Afghanistan. Under fire,
Ethiopia pulled back its forces in January 2009, leaving AU troops to bear the brunt of propping up the TFG. By then, Al-Shabaab had gained control over large swathes of southern Somalia and Mogadishu. More problematic, it was also attracting foreign recruits (including “hundreds” from the Somali diaspora living in the West) [10] and strengthening its ties to the global jihadi movement.

While some Al-Shabaab fighters retain their clan-based loyalties, the group’s ideology is aligned with the transnational jihadi movement. Like past groups (i.e. the AIAI and UIC) Al-Shabaab believes that strict “religious governance is the solution to Somalia’s ills.” Yet it diverges from these groups by espousing an internationalist perspective and actively seeking to replace Somalia’s historical “clan structure” with a pan-Islamist one. [11] It has had a natural inclination, then, to support Al-Qaeda’s global efforts and actively sought closer ties with the organization in 2008. At the time, Al-Shabaab’s Muktar Robow stated that “Al Qaeda is the mother of the holy war in Somalia … Most of our leaders were trained in Al Qaeda camps. We are negotiating how we can unite into one.” [12] That alliance was officially forged in February 2010 with Al-Shabaab declaring that it was connecting “the horn of Africa jihad to the one led by al Qaeda and its leader Sheikh Osama Bin Laden.” [13]

In terms of terrorism, Al-Shabaab has repeatedly proven its willingness and ability to coordinate mass-casualty attacks. It has targeted Somali, Ethiopian, and AU forces along with Somali and foreign government officials and civilians. Some of its most devastating attacks include a suspected 2007 missile strike on an AU cargo plane taking off from Mogadishu; a 2008 attack in Puntland that killed dozens of Ethiopian immigrants; simultaneous suicide attacks in 2008 in Puntland and Somaliland targeting the UN, an Ethiopian Consulate, the President’s palace, and the Puntland Intelligence Service; [14] a 2008 attack on an AU base that killed and injured over 25 Burundi peacekeepers; a 2009 hotel bombing in Beledweyne that killed 20 people, including Somalia’s security minister and former ambassador to Ethiopia; a 2009 attack on an AU base in Mogadishu that killed 17 soldiers, including AMISOM’s deputy director; a 2010 attack on a commencement ceremony for medical students in Mogadishu that killed over 25 people, including four TFG ministers; and a 2010 attack on a mosque in Mogadishu, that killed and injured over 100 people.

Despite the brutality and frequency of these and many other attacks, Al-Shabaab began to be of concern among Western security officials primarily as a result its “out of theatre” engagements. There are tangential links between Al-Shabaab and a foiled 2009 terrorist plot in Australia, and Westerners from Canada, the US, and Europe have travelled to Somalia to train with Al-Shabaab. [15] While some have died fighting in Africa, officials fear others will return home to wreak havoc. In January 2010, for instance, a Somali man with suspected links to Al-Shabaab was shot by Danish police as he tried to attack political cartoonist, Kurt Westergaard. And in July 2010, after uniting with Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab carried out its first bombing attack outside Somalia,
killing and injuring nearly 150 people watching the FIFA World Cup in Kampala, Uganda. Given the continued absence of any central authority in Somalia and given its meteoric rise since 2007, Al-Shabaab has become a major regional and international terrorist threat.

The Arab Spring: Shifting Narratives, Newfound Opportunities

“We watch with you this great historic event,” stated Osama bin Laden “and we share with you joy and happiness and delight and felicity … We are happy for what makes you happy, and we are sad for what makes you sad. So congratulations to you for your victories.” [16] It may have taken several months, but bin Laden finally got on the record with an audio recording specifically focused on the Arab uprising—even though the recording went public two weeks after his death. Bin Laden followed Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Yahay al-Libi and other ideologues in tacitly approving the popular (and mostly secular) movements sweeping the MENA region. Starting in early 2011, al-Zawahiri—who replaced bin Laden as Al-Qaeda’s number one—released a series of five recordings, three of which specifically addressed the protest movements.

[17] “Your jihadi brethren,” he exclaims, “are confronting alongside you the same enemy, America and its Western allies, those who set up … Husni Mubarak, Zein al-Abidin b. Ali, Ali Abdallah Saleh, Abdallah b. Hussein and their ilk to rule over you.” [18] In trying to connect Al-Qaeda’s longstanding and violent struggle against the secular (and “apostate”) regimes of Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Jordan, al-Zawahiri’s objective is to paint the enemies of the Arab Spring and the enemies of Al-Qaeda as one and the same. And yet, despite a narrative that purposefully attempts to unite the popular movements with Al-Qaeda, it is clear that the actors involved in each struggle (i.e. a secular and generally non-violent youth movement versus a violent Islamist jihadist movement) and their respective goals (presumably, a secular and democratic system versus an Islamic system of governance), are intrinsically opposed. There is only so much Al-Qaeda can do to credibly recast and reshape these two competing narratives in its attempt to hijack the evolving Arab and Muslim political movement.

Instead, there are good reasons suggesting why the popular uprising has weakened Al-Qaeda and its branches, offshoots, and supporters active in Africa and the Middle East. For starters, in Egypt and Tunisia, a handful of technologically-savvy youths spurred a popular movement that was able to do in weeks of peaceful protest what Al-Qaeda and its allies could not accomplish with violence over several decades. Al-Zawahiri, for instance, has been seeking President Mubarak’s removal and the establishment of an Islamic state since before he took over Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the mid-1980s. That change has finally come to Egypt and Tunisia (and likely, to Libya, Yemen, and Oman, too) as a result of popular and generally peaceful movements is an embarrassment to Al-Qaeda, whose entire script has been predicated on the idea that violent overthrow is the only way forward. And even if only the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions “prove successful,” explains Michael Ryan, “a major part of the Arab world will have unfurled
the banner of modernization and democracy … which could become a new beacon for a large part of the Arab Middle East.” [19] Suddenly, there appears to be another, gentler, way to achieve change, a way that appeals to a much broader popular base, does not alienate potential supporters with excesses in violence, and has, until now, proven successful at least twice. The challenge facing Al-Qaeda is to properly repackage its own brutally violent and perpetually ineffective methods so as to remain a viable option to would-be supporters who now appear to have other options to choose from.

In a similar vein, Al-Qaeda has long relied on the autocratic MENA regimes themselves to help it resonate with its prospective popular base. As Nelly Lahoud recounts, “the jihadist narrative enjoyed greater credibility under the autocratic regimes,” where endemic corruption, economic and political malaise, and brutality fed the flames of popular despair. [20] In the wake of this despair, Al-Qaeda picked out and assembled recruits. It offered those who would listen an alternative to the existing system, suggesting that by violently overthrowing these regimes and by establishing pure Islamic governance in their stead, Muslims and Arabs would reconstitute their historical greatness vis-à-vis the West. But now that more than a few of these regimes have been mortally wounded, Al-Qaeda’s message appears to have been called into question. Not only was Al-Qaeda barely visible during the revolutions, but with the toppling of its target regimes it has also lost its power of juxtaposition. One might even ask whether Al-Qaeda is still needed at all, given the initial success of the protest movements.

This is why al-Zawahiri, after congratulating the masses, immediately called for the establishment of pure Islamic governance, warning that without it, these recent popular achievements would be lost. The future, he cautioned, would resemble the past and Al-Qaeda’s struggle would continue. It is in these warnings that we catch a glimpse of how the Arab Spring may, over the long run, come to help—rather than hurt—Al-Qaeda and its African affiliates.

Cleverly, Al-Qaeda has placed itself in a position to once again gain traction among disaffected Arabs and Muslims if and when these experiments in people power fail. What if democracy does not ameliorate or alleviate social, political, and economic grievances? What if democracy proves unstable, unworkable, or chaotic in Egypt and Tunisia? What if tomorrow’s leaders turn out to be just as corrupt as past leaders? “In reality,” explains Juan Zarate, Al-Qaeda’s leaders “are banking on the disillusionment that inevitably follows revolutions to reassert their prominence in the region.” [21] The transition from dictatorship to democracy can be a long and messy affair. [22] New institutions need to be established; a new political culture must take root; and the power vacuum produced by outgoing elites needs to be filled. All of this takes time. The process of building social and political cohesion may require a level of patience not common among Arab revolutionary movements.
Thus, it is in the chaos that has followed the revolutions that Al-Qaeda’s African allies may find opportunities to regroup, recover, and reemerge. As Philip Mudd illustrates, an opening of the democratic space and the establishment of competing political parties in the MENA region might lead to “ethnic and religious fissures that turn violent.” [23] Think of Lebanon or Iraq. Already, attacks against Egypt’s Christian communities are on the rise and sectarian lines are being drawn. [24] Furthermore, in the time it takes for political stability to return, crime and economic stagnation remain a distinct possibility. In fact, it could take years to consolidate the market reforms that will be needed to liberalize and improve MENA economies. It will also take time for the proper democratic institutions to be built and for civil-military relations to be revamped. Until then, millions of individuals will remain unemployed, underutilized, and undervalued, potentially easy prey for a resurgent Al-Qaeda.

From this perspective, what matters now is the management of political, social, and economic expectations. The greater the level of post-revolution optimism is among Arabs and Muslims, the greater the risk of exceptionally high levels of disillusionment, resentment, and anger if and when things go sour on the ground. If the uprising’s popular base cannot achieve noticeable improvements to their collective lot, than Al-Qaeda’s narrative stands to gain a second inquisitive look and renewed interest. A “surge” in support for Al-Qaeda’s allies is a possibility. [25] And if MENA economies continue to limp along in 2013 and 2014, if new leaders prove ineffective in addressing existing grievances, and if internecine violence and fear, rather than political stability and hope, take root, Al-Qaeda’s narrative will have been given another chance to resonate with disaffected communities.

Importantly, Al-Qaeda does not have to passively watch the drama unfold. It can take active steps in Africa to consolidate its base and improve its position as the upheaval unfolds. Lorenzo Vidino writes—pointing to the “ungoverned areas” of Pakistan, Iraq, and Yemen—that “jihadist movements could gain traction in newly formed pockets of instability” currently spreading over the landscape in North Africa. [26] For instance, the AU’s African Center for Terrorism Research noted in May 2011 that AQIM “sleeper cells” were actively “recruiting and doing field work” in Africa. [27] Taking advantage of the ensuing chaos and the shifting security environment in the region simply makes sense. Political prisoners, held as suspected extremists in Egyptian, Tunisian, Libyan (and Yemeni) jails, have been freed; some might be especially susceptible to Al-Qaeda’s advances. And domestic instability will provide increasingly porous and under-defended borders, easing the movement of people, contraband, and weapons between and within African countries. Civil wars, Daniel Byman reminds us, have offered opportunities for jihadists before, who first pose as supporters of the opposition only to “spread their vitriol” and attract recruits to their cause over time. [28]

Herein, Libya poses a unique opportunity for AQIM and others. Islamist militants are suspected of having joined the rebels fighting the Gaddafi regime, and in so doing, might be able to carve
out a regional foothold while attracting supporters. [29] There have also been numerous accounts suggesting that AQIM has taken advantage of Libya’s civil war to help itself to Colonel Gaddafi’s weapons stockpiles, “liberated” by anti-government forces. In April 2011, Idriss Deby, the President of Chad, noted that he was “100 percent” certain that AQIM had pillaged military caches in eastern Libya and had acquired heavy weapons, including sophisticated surface-to-air missiles. [30] If so, a repeat of Al-Qaeda’s 2002 Mombasa attack, in which two shoulder-launched missiles were fired against an Israeli-owned charter plane taking off from Moi International Airport, remains a distinct possibility. As for Al-Shabaab, it simply has to look north, over the Gulf of Aden and into Yemen. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula stands to gain as the Yemeni government falters. Al-Shabaab, already suspected of having close links to AQAP, would catch a windfall as a result.

**OBL’s Demise: From 9/11 to 5/2**

On the cover of its May 7-11, 2011 edition, *The Economist* titled its coverage of bin Laden’s death with: “Now, Kill his Dream”. The title is an apt one. It implies that even in death bin Laden’s vision retains its power and that though the man himself can no longer participate in terrorism, his ideology will continue to spur others towards violence. When gauging the meaning and possible effect bin Laden’s death will have on Al-Qaeda’s African supporters, this dichotomy — between facilitating terrorism and inspiring terrorism — proves useful.

In practice, bin Laden was not only Al-Qaeda’s primary figurehead. He led the organization for 23 years, laid out its strategic goals, secured religious approval for its tactics, oversaw its regional expansion, and was involved in planning many of its spectacular attacks. He was both operationally and strategically active. What is less certain is the degree of control bin Laden retained over Al-Qaeda’s sprawling structure in the decade following 9/11 and especially after its safe haven in Afghanistan was removed. The debate in recent years has pitted terrorism experts who have observed a “leaderless” Al-Qaeda movement of loosely affiliated groups and individuals sharing a common ideology against those who maintain that Al-Qaeda’s core leadership — including bin Laden — retained an important role in directing the organization’s international and regional efforts despite the loss Afghanistan. [31] The truth—as most of the time—probably rests somewhere in the middle: bin Laden (and Al-Qaeda’s central leadership) both directed Al-Qaeda-sponsored attacks while also legitimizing Al-Qaeda-inspired attacks in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and the West.

Even from his hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, bin Laden appears to have been well connected with Al-Qaeda and may have even directed some of its recent efforts. [32] That does not mean, however, that Al-Qaeda’s supporters, franchises, and offshoots relied on the group’s central leadership to plan, finance, and orchestrate their attacks. They did not. Al-Qaeda’s affiliates have
always retained a degree of autonomy and have used that freedom accordingly. While they have
signed on to Al-Qaeda’s global venture, they have largely controlled their own destinies. That Al-
Qaeda in Iraq’s leader Musab al-Zarqawi was apparently personally chastised by al-Zawahiri in
2005 for having so blatantly alienated Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’a communities with his violent
excesses, speaks volume. Clearly, Al-Qaeda had little operational control over its Iraqi franchise
even though Zarqawi had declared allegiance to bin Laden and nominally sought to advance Al-
Qaeda’s global ambitions.

Arguably, though bin Laden’s removal is a defining and monumental event in American and
global counterterrorism, his death may have limited effect on AQIM, Al-Shabaab, and other Al-
Qaeda allies. While bin Laden’s charisma, inspirational importance, and historical significance
will be impossible to replace, in practical and operational terms, his death will not greatly
impede Al-Qaeda’s regional franchises from planning further attacks and consolidating their
regional gains. They did so while bin Laden was alive and will continue now that he is dead. So
while bin Laden’s death may send a deterrent message to current and would-be terrorist leaders
that the US will, in due time, find a way to kill or capture them, and while Al-Qaeda may suffer
power vacuums, fractures, and internecine feuding until (and unless) a strong leader steps in, Al-
Qaeda’s African allies will nonetheless continue to survive as they did under bin Laden’s tenure.
[33]

This is not to suggest that bin Laden’s death will have little effect on their behavior. It is possible,
as McGregor writes, that “the elimination of al-Qaeda’s core leadership will result in the
inevitable localization of the ‘global jihad’; or in jihadist terms, a refocus on the ‘Near
Enemy’ [local regimes] over the ‘Far Enemy’ [the US and the West].” [34] Others agree,
suggesting that depending on who takes over leadership of Al-Qaeda, its allies may decide to
concentrate on conducting “less risky” regional attacks rather than target the West and absorb the
inevitable retaliation. [35] In this case, groups allied with Al-Qaeda might revert to their regional
agendas, tailoring their attacks to affect change in their immediate spheres of influence rather
than launch far-flung attacks against the US, UK, or France, a strategy they adopted when
declaring allegiance to bin Laden. They may also become even more autonomous, expressing
continued fealty to Al-Qaeda while also paying more attention to local financial, social, and
human dynamics. [36]

Of course, the opposite alternative is possible, too. In the case of AQIM, Camille Tawil posits, if
al-Zawahiri is accepted as the new emir of Al-Qaeda, the organization may have a greater role in
shaping AQIM’s behavior. Not only was al-Zawahiri instrumental in getting the GSPC under the
Al-Qaeda umbrella, but he also personally asked AQIM to limit its operations in Libya in hopes
of placating a faction of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). [37] Under al-Zawahiri’s
leadership, Al-Qaeda may reengage its relationship with AQIM and other jihadists in North
Africa. But even then, to date, Al-Qaeda’s African supporters have lacked the ability to launch
international attacks like those carried out by AQAP in 2009 and 2010. While AQIM tries to link its kidnapping of Westerners in Africa as part and parcel of its global war against the West, it has difficulty masking the economic incentives it has to keep these hostages alive in order to trade them for cash. And even though AQIM has greatly expanded its operations into West Africa, it has rarely successfully attacked Western targets therein and even vociferously denied involvement in the latest attack in Morocco, which did kill over a dozen westerners. As for Al-Shabaab, while it has attracted many westerners to join its local efforts, its only successful attack outside of Somalia was the 2010 Kampala attack. Even then, that attack was carried out for local reasons (i.e. to punish Uganda for participating in AU efforts and try to force it to leave Somalia) rather than to conform to Al-Qaeda’s global mantra. In sum, while AQIM and Al-Shabaab may strive to continue carrying bin Laden’s internationalist agenda, there are good reasons to suggest why they may revert to local programs instead.

A Future in Flux

It is clear that the Arab Spring and bin Laden’s death will leave a mark on Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Africa. Not only has the organization scrambled to rebrand itself in the light of the dramatic changes sweeping through its strategic backyard, but the death of its charismatic leader robs the organization and its allies of a preeminent and guiding force. At the same time, it is a mistake to put too much emphasis on these twin shocks. Political upheaval provides Al-Qaeda, AQIM, and Al-Shabaab with new opportunities, especially if socio-political and economic grievances are not properly met. And while bin Laden will surely be missed, Al-Qaeda has never been chiefly about one man. In its May 6, 2011, statement confirming his death, Al-Qaeda reminds us that “Sheik Osama did not build this organization to die with his death.” [38] Though weakened, Al-Qaeda and its African affiliates will march on.

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Notes


[3] Ibid., 51-60.


[14] American Shirwa Ahmad took part, becoming the first known American suicide bomber. Since then, at least another two American citizens have carried out Al-Shabaab suicide attacks. See Abdi Guleid, “Militant say Suicide bomber was Somali-American”, Associated Press, June 2, 2011.


[38] Quoted in J. Binnie, “Dead Man’s Shoes”, op. cit., 8.
Al-Qaeda's Influence in Sub-Saharan Africa: Myths, Realities and Possibilities

by James J.F. Forest

Abstract

This article examines the question whether Al-Qaeda has been able to develop significant influence in sub-Saharan Africa. After reviewing what the historical record indicates about activities which have some links to the Al-Qaeda network, and discussing what some observers have asserted, the article describes some key challenges that Al-Qaeda faces in its quest to gain influence in sub-Saharan Africa. It concludes with a brief look at policy implications.

Security practitioners and policymakers in the U.S. have been increasingly worried about the potential for Al-Qaeda to gain influence in impoverished, developing countries with large Muslim populations. According to some predictions, we should expect by now to see a significant Al-Qaeda presence—from planning and operational cells to training camps and hubs of ideological radicalization—throughout sub-Saharan Africa. As one senior U.S. Naval officer stated in his 2005 Congressional testimony, “Africa is an emerging haven for our enemies in the Global War on Terrorism.” [1] In a February 2006 Armed Forces Journal article, Kurt Shillinger argued that “southern Africa comprises a mix of economic strengths and state weaknesses, demographics and social “seams,” and historical links and attitudes that provide ample attraction and opportunity for terror-related activity.” [2] He also cites a U.S. State Department report as declaring: “It is unclear to what extent terrorist groups are present in South Africa; however, the activity of Al-Qaeda and affiliated persons or groups in South Africa and Nigeria, home to Africa’s largest Muslim population, is of growing concern.” [3] And yet, while we have indeed seen some local or regional groups in North Africa affiliate themselves with Al-Qaeda and its global jihad, as well as a few (albeit dramatic) examples of the terror network’s presence in a few East African countries, Al-Qaeda’s overall presence in this vast region is actually quite limited. The African continent is nearly four times the size of the United States, and yet there is far less Al-Qaeda presence there than in Western Europe or even the U.S.

In one recent example, in December 2009 a young Nigerian man named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who was radicalized online and trained in Yemen, attempted to attack a U.S. airliner heading to Detroit by detonating explosives smuggled in his underwear. [4] The media frenzy that followed was accompanied by the U.S. placing Nigeria on its list of countries of concern, meaning Nigerian citizens traveling to the United States would now be subject to additional scrutiny. And yet, this was just one instance - one man from a region with hundreds of millions of Muslims. Such a stark exception to the norm is quite telling; why have we not seen more similar cases? Many other relevant questions must also be asked, such as: Why have the
messages and ideology of Al-Qaeda not found resonance among the large (and almost entirely impoverished) Muslim communities of sub-Saharan Africa? What forces may constrain the attraction of joining the global jihad in sub-Saharan Africa? And, perhaps most important for policymakers, what can or should be done to exacerbate Al-Qaeda’s challenges in sub-Saharan Africa, and ensure that their presence and influence remains limited?

This discussion begins with an overview of what we know primarily about Al-Qaeda’s historical presence on the African continent, starting from North Africa, where remnants of an Algerian extremist group aligned with Al-Qaeda in 2007, to Sudan, Kenya and Tanzania, where the terrorist network has found some semblance of support and operational safe haven. The article then turns to look at some of the more prominent and troubling assertions that have been made about Al-Qaeda, including its involvement in the global trade of West African blood diamonds. Then the discussion focuses on why scholars and policymakers have indicated that sub-Saharan Africa could provide enabling conditions and a hospitable environment for Al-Qaeda to exploit, even though they have not yet done so. And finally, the article looks at key challenges faced by Al-Qaeda in its efforts to gain influence in sub-Saharan Africa, and suggests ways in which the U.S. could exacerbate those challenges in support of US national security objectives.

Al-Qaeda’s Presence in Africa: What do we know?

To begin with, Al-Qaeda’s known presence on the continent has been primarily within the countries of North and East Africa. The North African role in the story of global jihad is closely linked to the founding of Al-Qaeda. In 1989, when Soviet troops left Afghanistan, scores of North Africans returned to their home countries, feeling proud of their role fighting alongside the Afghan mujahideen in what they felt was a successful jihad against an infidel superpower that had invaded a Muslim country. They returned to Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Egypt, where many joined local radical Islamist groups. The largest number of these returning North African fighters were Algerians. Upon returning to their home country they found a growing Islamist movement that offered a natural home for the sentiments of these self-described holy warriors.

In December 1991, the Islamic Salvation Front—the largest Islamic political opposition party—appeared victorious in the first round of Algeria’s legislative elections. The military government responded by voiding the election results, triggering the formation of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), an organization which naturally attracted these Al-Qaeda-trained veterans of the Afghan war. Meanwhile, back in Afghanistan, a prominent veteran of the conflict named Abdul Azzam had begun establishing training camps in Afghanistan to support the development of an international cadre of mujahideen that could help him liberate his home (the Palestinian Territories) from Israeli occupation. He was assisted in this endeavor by a wealthy young Saudi
named Osama bin Laden, with whom Azzam has founded Al-Qaeda (the Base) in 1988. Some GIA members traveled to Afghanistan to participate in advanced guerilla warfare training and for other, related reasons, forging long-lasting relationships with other members of the burgeoning jihadist network. [5]

Between 1992 and 1998 the GIA conducted a violent campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation. These increasingly violent attacks against civilians spawned a splinter group in 1998, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, or GSPC). Several of the GSPC leaders were former GIA members who had received Al-Qaeda training; they brought innovative tactics and global connections to this bitter struggle against the government. In 2003, for example, the GSPC took 32 European tourists hostage and held them for several months until the German government reportedly paid a ransom of five million Euros. [6] After releasing the hostages, the leader of the GSPC cell—a former Algerian paratrooper named Amari Saifi (whose nom de guerre is “El Para”—led his band of fighters on a running gun battle that began in Mali, transited Niger, and ended in Chad (where he was apprehended with assistance from the U.S.).

Other GSPC cells have trained mujahideen to fight in Iraq, and escorted Al-Qaeda emissaries into North Africa with the intention of unifying the various local terrorist groups under the umbrella of Al-Qaeda. [7] In 2004, the Moroccan security services disrupted an Al-Qaeda-supported plot to attack American and European ships passing through the Strait of Gibraltar. In that same year GSPC openly declared its allegiance to Al-Qaeda [8] and its cells have since been discovered in Italy, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, and Canada. Other North African groups such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group also have connections to Al-Qaeda’s global jihad network. More broadly, North Africans have been responsible for attacks in Madrid, Casablanca, Tunis, and Algiers, and have been apprehended as participants in failed terrorist plots in Barcelona, London, Vancouver and Montreal.

In January 2007, the GSPC renamed itself the “Organization of Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM), and has since been responsible for several violent incidents throughout the region, including the December 2007 car bomb attack against the UN office in Algiers, which killed 17 people; an attack on French contractors in June 2008; the killing of an American aid worker in Mauritania’s capital city of Nouakchott in June 2009; the ambush and murder of 11 Algerian soldiers in July 2009; and various kidnappings of foreigners who were being held for ransom. According to North Africa expert Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, “the vast majority of AQIM’s attacks are in the form of ambushes, roadblocks, kidnapping, extortion, and bombings. AQIM has occasionally attacked Algeria’s energy sector, targeting natural gas pipelines with explosive devices or attacking foreign personnel involved with gas production.” [9] From a base of operations in northern Mali, the group has carried out a number...
kidnappings (foreign aid workers and tourists) throughout the border region of Mali, Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger. On March 10, 2010, the group released a video recording of AQIM leader Abu Yusuf entitled “A Speech to the People and Rulers of the Sahel and South of the Desert Countries,” which warned against joining the U.S. and the West in their war against Al-Qaeda. Overall, this group poses a security challenge throughout the North African region, and there are some indications that their influence is spreading to countries southwest of the Saharan Desert as well.

Turning further to the East of Africa, we know that Osama bin Laden and his colleagues lived in Sudan during the early 1990s. According to the 9/11 Commission report, Hassan al Turabi, head of the National Islamic Front—part of a coalition that seized power in Khartoum—invited bin Laden to help him in an ongoing war against African Christian separatists in southern Sudan, carry out road building, and use Sudan as a base for worldwide business operations and for preparations for a global jihad. Bin Laden moved to Sudan in 1991 and set up a large and complex set of intertwined business and terrorist enterprises. In time, these would include numerous companies and a global network of bank accounts and nongovernmental institutions. Fulfilling his bargain with Turabi, Bin Laden used his construction company to build a new highway from Khartoum to Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast. Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda finance officers and top operatives used their positions in bin Laden’s businesses to acquire weapons, explosives, and technical equipment for terrorist purposes.

During this time, bin Laden established an “Islamic Army Shura” that was to serve as the coordinating body for the consortium of terrorist groups with which he was forging alliances. It was comprised of his (personal) Al-Qaeda Shura together with leaders or representatives of terrorist organizations that were still independent. In building this Islamic army, he welcomed groups from throughout the Middle East and Southeast Asia, as well as from the African countries of Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia, Eritrea, Chad, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Uganda. Bin Laden appears to have enjoyed his stay in Sudan until international pressure led by both Western and regional countries (especially following a June 1995 assassination attempt in Ethiopia against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak that was linked to Al-Qaeda) led the Sudanese authorities to “encourage” him to leave. On May 19, 1996, he relocated to Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban. From there, bin Laden issued his first fatwa in August of that year, a declaration of war against the United States. What followed is well known.

In 2006, a group calling itself the “Al-Qaeda Organization in Sudan and Africa,” led by Sheikh Abu Ya’li, claimed responsibility for the September beheadings of the chief editor of the independent Sudanese daily al-Wifaz, and Muhammad Taha, a pro-Islamist who had republished an Internet article that questioned the Prophet Muhammad’s ancestry. And on New Year’s Day 2008, American diplomat John Granville and his Sudanese driver were killed in Khartoum while driving home from a party. A previously unknown group named Ansar al-Tawhid claimed...
responsibility for that attack. [17] Overall, however, Al-Qaeda’s influence in Sudan appears to have declined significantly since 2001.

East Africa

For centuries, the Swahili Coast of Africa has had a significant Muslim presence, though rarely demonstrating any radical tendencies. While staying in Sudan, we know that bin Laden sent operatives to Nairobi, Kenya and established an NGO as a cover for them. In 1992, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, Abu Ubayda al-Banshiri (Al-Qaeda’s military commander at that time) established the cell in Nairobi, Kenya, [18] which included operatives such as Muhammad Atef (who became Al-Qaeda’s military commander after the death of Abu Ubayda al-Banshiri in a May 1996 ferry accident on Lake Victoria), Abdullah Muhammad Abdullah, Muhammad Siddiq Odeh, and Fazul Abdullah Muhammad. [19]

The cell’s primary mission was to provide arms and support for Islamic fighters in Somalia, rather than radicalize local community members or plan operations against the relatively pro-Western Kenyan government. [20] However, they were also instructed to identify suitable Western targets in Kenya for potential attacks. According to court records, Ali Muhammad surveilled the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, the USAID building, the French embassy, the French Cultural Center, and British and Israeli targets. A former Major in the Egyptian Army, Ali Muhammad later became a supply sergeant in the U.S. Army’s Special Forces base in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In 2000, he pled guilty to five counts of conspiracy to kill nationals of the United States and officers or employees of the U.S. government on account of their official duties, to murder and kidnap, and to destroy U.S. property.

In February 1998, bin Laden issued a second fatwa, this time calling upon Muslims worldwide to kill Americans and their allies wherever possible. Court records indicate that about this time, the Al-Qaeda plot to attack two U.S. embassies in East Africa was set in motion. Under the leadership of Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, operatives rented safe houses for building the bombs, prepared false documents, and acquired delivery vehicles and explosives. [21] On August 7, 1998, two bomb-laden trucks were driven almost simultaneously into the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 213 people in Nairobi (including 12 Americans) and 11 people in Dar es Salaam, and injuring over 5,000. [22] These attacks, code-named by Al-Qaeda as “Operation Holy Ka’ba” and “Operation al-Aqsa,” [23] respectively, were timed to occur between 10:30 and 11:00 AM, when observant Muslims would be in their local mosque for their prayers. [24] Of equal significance, the attacks took place eight years to the day after U.S. troops landed in Saudi Arabia as part of an international effort in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. [25]
Another attack in Kenya, on November 28, 2002, has also been linked to Al-Qaeda. On that day, a suicide bomber drove a truck full of explosives into the lobby of the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, near Nairobi. Moments later, an Israeli airliner lifting off from the runway at Mombasa’s Moi International Airport was fired upon by a shoulder-fired missile launcher that narrowly missed its target. Omar Said Omar, a native of Mombasa, was later arrested and cooperated with authorities in revealing all the names of his co-conspirators and the details of the attack, which included several visits to Somalia for training and planning, and highlighted the ease with which the group acquired weapons, stolen passports and other identification papers, and other logistics support. [26]

Further up the coast of East Africa, Somalia has been one of the most active hotspots of political violence on the continent for decades. Radical Islam has had a presence in Somalia since the early 1980s, predominantly in the form of Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), a group established through the merger of several Salafi Islamic militant groups in Somalia opposed to the dictatorship of Siad Barre. After the collapse of the Barre regime in the early 1990s, AIAI gathered supporters in part by offering employment and social services, in essence filling a vacuum created by the lack of a functioning government and legitimate economy in Somalia. At the same time, AIAI leader Sheikh Ali Warsame and other members of his group were responsible for a variety of attacks against both government and civilian targets. In December 2001, because of the growing strength of this group and their commitment to violence for bringing about political change, AIAI was added to the U.S. State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

However, despite the considerable Al-Qaeda activities in Sudan, Kenya and Tanzania, Al-Qaeda failed to establish a solid presence in Somalia during the mid-1990s. As recounted by documents captured from its leaders and operatives, Al-Qaeda’s efforts to establish a presence in the south of the country and use it as a base for attacks against Western targets elsewhere were largely a failure. [27] As described in the report by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Al-Qaeda’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa, the jihadists failed to gain traction in Somalia in the early 1990s because: (1) its members were perceived as foreigners; (2) it significantly underestimated the costs of operating in a failed state environment; and (3) its African vanguard did not understand the salience of either local power structures or local Islamic traditions. In a region dominated by clan-based authority structures and moderate Sufi Islam, the benefits of joining a foreign Salafi terrorist organization paled next to the costs of leaving one’s clan. [28]

Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda leaders have claimed some involvement in the infamous 1993 “Black Hawk Down” incident in Mogadishu (in which Somali warlord Mohammad Aideed’s gangs shot down an American military helicopter and subsequently dragged the bodies of dead servicemen through the streets). However, the evidence supporting such claims is limited at best. We do know that in more recent times Al-Qaeda has established a stronger presence in
Somalia. For example, Kenyan-born Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a major Al-Qaeda operative of the Kenyan cell described above, was killed in a commando raid in Somalia in September 2009.

In January 2010, the Somali militant group al-Shabaab (“The Youths”) declared its loyalty to Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. [29] A recent story in the Wall Street Journal indicated that al-Shabaab “has taken control of important towns inland and along the coast, including the port towns of Kismayo, and Marka. The group has also reportedly entered into financial arrangements with pirates operating from port cities under al Shabaab’s control. Al Shabaab’s numbers are steadily rising; it’s estimated that they now have up to 7,000 fighters.” [30] Perhaps most worrisome, a recent FBI investigation revealed that a group of Minneapolis teenagers, descendants of Somali immigrants, had traveled to Somalia to join al-Shabaab. According to Senator Joe Lieberman, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, one of these young men—Shirwac Ahmed—was “probably the first US citizen to carry out a terrorist suicide bombing.” [31] Clearly, if this indicates a growing Al-Qaeda influence among African diaspora communities in the West, it is cause for considerable alarm.

West, Central and Southern Africa

Compared with North and East Africa, Al-Qaeda’s presence or influence throughout the rest of this vast continent is sparse. To be sure, there are pockets of Islamist radicalism that worry security analysts, but these are rare and exceptional cases, with minimal known ties to the global Al-Qaeda network. For example, in Northern Nigeria, the Boko Haram movement (a Hausa term that loosely translates as “Western civilization is forbidden”) preaches the superiority of Muslim culture and seeks the imposition of strict Islamic law. Members of Boko Haram have attacked Nigerian police stations, killed hundreds, burned buildings and battled security forces across five Nigerian states. In 2004, several attacks against police stations in Yobe state yielded the group a considerable stash of arms and ammunitions, allowing the group to build up its own arsenal. The group established training facilities and recruited primarily young men, unemployed and angry at the government’s ineffectiveness and corruption. In August 2009, the group made headlines after they attacked police stations and churches near the town of Maiduguri, the capitol of Borno state, setting off a wave of violence and deaths. Public attention focused on the group and its grievances, as well as the brutal way in which the local police responded to the uprising, including the alleged extra-judicial killing of the group’s original leader Mohammed Yusuf and other members.[32]

In May 2010, the leader of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb offered to assist Boko Haram with weapons and training, and in October of that year a senior leader of Boko Haram reportedly responded by pledging the group’s allegiance to Al-Qaeda.[33] However, in the year since then,
no evidence has emerged of any formal links between Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram. In 2011, an increasing flurry of attacks led thousands of people to flee Maiduguri for other parts of the country. On June 11, Boko Haram took credit for a suicide bomb attack against the police headquarters in Abuja which killed two people. Four days later, ten Boko Haram members staged simultaneous bomb and gun attacks on a police station and a bank in Katsina state (which is to the west of Borno state), killing seven people. On June 26, the group killed 25 people in an attack on a beer garden in Maiduguri. And on July 24, a bomb exploded in Maiduguri, injuring three soldiers and destroying a military patrol vehicle. [34]

According to the group’s current leader, Mallam Sanni Umaru, the group is active in 32 Nigerian states, and is planning to expand activities in vital economic centers like Lagos and Port Harcourt in the Niger Delta. [35] Of course, this oil-rich area of the country already has a significant problem with violent militants, but these are mostly local tribal militias (like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta) whose focus is on the distribution of oil wealth and government services, with no connections to Al-Qaeda’s ideology of global jihad. Overall, the December 2009 case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (dubbed by some in the media as the “underwear bomber”) is perhaps most striking as an exception to the norm, rather than an indicator of a potential growing Al-Qaeda influence in Nigeria.

Elsewhere in West Africa, members of AQIM were caught in an undercover drug operation in Ghana in December 2009. The three suspects, originally from Mali, were arrested in Accra after trying to arrange major shipments of cocaine through the Sahara desert and into Spain. Court documents indicate that agents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency infiltrated the AQIM cell by posing as Colombians. [36]

Further south, instances of an Al-Qaeda threat in sub-Saharan Africa are even more scarce. In July 2005, a suspected British Al-Qaeda operative named Haroon Rashid Aswat was apprehended in Zambia. But overall, to date we have not seen evidence of any significant organized Al-Qaeda presence in any of southern African countries, with the minor exception of South Africa. In July 2004, fears were raised about potential terrorist attacks in South Africa when individuals allegedly linked to Al-Qaeda were apprehended with detailed maps of Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town and Durban. As Andrew Holt observed, there is already a religious extremist group in South Africa designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. State Department: the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), a group which describes itself as “a militia devoted to safeguarding the interests of ordinary South African Muslims from the scourge of organized crime,” though it also routinely espouses anti-Western rhetoric and is an ardent critic of U.S. foreign policy. [37] PAGAD has already been connected to several high-profile attacks in Cape Town, including the Planet Hollywood bombing in 1998 and a series of urban bombings in 2000. [38] However, to date there has been no evidence to suggest that PAGAD is linked in any way to Al-Qaeda.
In January 2007, the U.S. Treasury named two South African cousins—Junaid Dockrat and Farhad Dockrat—as Specially Designated Global Terrorists because of their support to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Farhad, who had been detained in the Gambia for suspected terrorist activity in 2005, was identified as having provided nearly $63,000 to al-Akhtar Trust, a charity that in 2003 was accused of providing support to Al-Qaeda. Junaid was responsible for raising $120,000 for Hazma Rabia, the Al-Qaeda operations chief killed in Pakistan by the U.S. military in 2005. [39] But Al-Qaeda has yet to show any significant penetration of South Africa.

Summary

Overall, Al-Qaeda’s known presence in Africa has been strongest in a handful of Northern and Eastern countries, and weakest in the West, Central and Southern regions of the continent. Even in the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the real operational planning and final preparations were conducted by Yemenis, not by anyone in Africa. Beyond what is known for certain about the sub-Saharan Africa-related activities of Al-Qaeda, there are also a number of information sources where one can find assertions and anecdotal indicators of a broader and deeper Al-Qaeda threat to the subcontinent. Yet much of this focuses on how local conditions could create an environment in which Al-Qaeda’s ideology finds resonance.

The Centrality of Ideological Resonance

What does the term ideological resonance mean? To begin with, recall the old maxim that all politics is local, even political violence. Therefore, a terrorist group’s ideology must have local resonance, in order to convince members of a local population to donate their blood and treasure to the cause. The ideology needs to be communicated effectively and persuasively within a favorable cultural, socio-economic, and political environment which can provide ideological resonance. It is the way in which people react to their environment that enables acts of violence. Thus, many counterterrorism analysts have described various pre-existing conditions which could enable a potentially violent ideology to resonate among a particular population.

Within any given political environment, members of a society have expectations, demands, aspirations and grievances. The degree to which there are opportunities and power to address these without the use of violence is a major determinant of terrorist group formation. Local chaos (for example, in a weak or failing state) can also create an opportunity for an ideology of catastrophic terrorism to resonate. Unemployment, significant ethnic fissures and animosities, socio-demographic pressures (for example, the rising youth bulge in Arab world), and political regimes that are viewed as overly repressive, authoritarian, corrupt and incompetent all contribute to an environment in which a violent ideology can appeal to a broad audience.
Among Arab Muslims in particular, there is a growing sense of crisis and resentment toward their state leaders and Western allies, along with a sense of powerlessness and humiliation that stems from the relative socio-political standing of the Muslim world versus the Western, Judeo-Christian world; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (and current U.S. policy towards it), along with Israel’s repeated defeat of Arab armies; and a fear that a creeping globalization or westernization of cultural values is having a detrimental impact on long-held traditions and belief structures in the Muslim world.

Many of these environmental enablers are certainly found throughout the Middle East, but can also be seen in other parts of the world. In Southeast Asia, for example, a host of social and economic inequalities have contributed to the rise of Muslim-led secessionist movements since the 1970s, particularly among the Muslim minorities of the southern Philippines and southern Thailand. In Europe, Muslim communities contain many comparatively poor, disenfranchised permanent residents, with limited prospects for successful integration (as opposed to, say, the more integrated Muslim experience in the United States). In major cities like Copenhagen, London and Paris, large numbers of Muslims live in so-called “ethnic enclaves,” neighborhoods with impoverished schools, limited transportation and few employment opportunities. These and other environmental factors could be perceived as enablers of ideological resonance, and are cause for concern when analyzing the global spread of the Salafi-Jihadi ideology.

From this perspective, it is easier to see why some scholars and policymakers have suggested that with hundreds of millions of impoverished Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa, surely there is the potential for Al-Qaeda’s ideology to find resonance among at least some of them. For example, Ray Wasler of the Heritage Foundation recently opined, “Africa’s alienated and restless youth constitute a potentially fertile ground for Al-Qaeda operatives as they seek new ways and fresh recruits to wage jihad against the U.S.” [40] It echoes the quote provided in the first paragraph of this article, that “Africa is an emerging haven for our enemies in the Global War on Terrorism,” a statement by Rear Admiral Hamlin B. Tallent, the Director of the European Plans and Operations Center for the United States European Command in his March 2005 testimony before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee. [41]

Some observers have pointed to the twelve northern provinces of Nigeria that adopted Sharia law in 1990 as indicators of rising Islamist extremism. Here, they cite as evidence the involvement of Muslim gangs in the recent flare-ups of sectarian violence in this region (particularly in the towns of Jos and Kano), as well as the various incarnations of the so-called Nigerian Taliban (2002-2003; 2006-2009), known for attacking police stations and other government facilities. As described earlier, the Boko Haram movement has thrived in this politically-volatile environment, and some analysts have suggested that this could also be a hospitable environment for Al-Qaeda’s ideology.
In East Africa, as Angel Rabasa observed, there are “numerous indigenous radial Islamist groups with varying degrees of affinity for Al-Qaeda’s agenda. In addition, missionary groups—many funded by Saudi charities—are actively propagating a radical, fundamentalist, Salafi interpretation of Islam.” [42] Examples include the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement, based in Sudan, which seeks to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state in Eritrea; the al-Shabaab movement in Somalia (which includes remnants of the former Islamist militant groups like the Islamic Courts Union and AIAI); and the Sudanese branch of Takfir wal-Hijra, a secretive militant group that originated in Egypt, whose ideology espouses the need for isolation from a corrupt society and for excommunicating (and even eliminating) Muslims who fail to follow their conception of the ‘righteous path’. Overall, notes Rabasa, “Geographic proximity and social, cultural, and religious affinities between East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula make East Africa susceptible to infiltration by radical activists and ideologies from the Middle East.” [43]

Internally, throughout sub-Saharan Africa, corruption and oppression have delegitimized many governments in the eyes of their citizens, leading them to preserve their loyalties for alternative power centers like clans, tribes and other ethnic groups instead of supporting a legitimate central government. Countries throughout the subcontinent face enormous challenges with economic and political stability, social justice, and significant resource limitations, and there are several failed or failing states (like Somalia or Zimbabwe) and oppressive dictatorships (like Equatorial Guinea).

In some cases, government forces have done more damage than good when confronting a disenfranchised group. For example, on July 30, 2009, the leader of the Boko Haram movement, Malam Mohammed Yusuf, was killed after he was captured by the Nigerian Army and turned over to the local police in Maidiguri. Video footage obtained and shown by the Arabic satellite television network al-Jazeera revealed that Mohammad Yusuf and dozens of his followers were executed in public by policemen, in some cases while handcuffed. However, to the credit of Nigeria’s criminal justice system, on March 1, 2010, seventeen Nigerian policemen were arrested for these extrajudicial killings. But naturally, there are concerns that the same kind of disaffection and hostility that drive locals to groups like Boko Haram could also be funneled toward the kinds of political violence espoused by Al-Qaeda.

In short, there are a variety of observers who suggest that there is a growing potential for Al-Qaeda to establish a significant level of influence and presence in sub-Saharan Africa. If true, this is certainly cause for concern, particularly since most governments in the subcontinent are limited in their capabilities to confront such a threat without considerable assistance from powerful Western allies. Certainly, among many disenfranchised or marginalized populations in Africa there is a longing for retribution against others for perceived injustices, and a desire to address a power imbalance. Al-Qaeda’s propagandists can tap into these sentiments by offering a
promise to empower the disenfranchised, and to right a perceived global wrong. Further, Jihadists can also point to various environmental factors which, they argue, support their choice for violence and terrorism.

However, to truly appreciate the nature and scope of this alleged threat, we must balance these perspectives with a recognition of the challenges that Al-Qaeda faces in its efforts to gain influence in Africa. In doing so, we find a variety of very real and significant constraints that this extremist network faces—challenges which could inform a more expansive and robust effort to counter its efforts to gain influence in the sub-continent. Indeed, when looking at sub-Saharan Africa, there are relatively few indications of a hospitable environment in which Al-Qaeda’s ideology can find resonance. Unlike the Middle East or Central Asia, there is no history of radical Salafi Islamism in sub-Saharan Africa. In several instances, the strength of moderate Sufi Islamic traditions have provided a bulwark to the attempts by Wahhabi or Salafi preachers to gain influence on the sub-continent.

Repeated polls by organizations such as Zogby and the Pew Research Center reveal that relatively few Muslims in Africa really care about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In addition, the harsh environment creates such basic challenges for human survival that many locals just want to be left alone by Westerners and by Muslim extremists alike. They tend to be more concerned about their daily struggle for human security so that the call for global jihad against the West does not seem to find much support. Further, in some cases where Al-Qaeda has established a presence, locals have been increasingly turning against them, as seen in the growing rebellion against al-Shabaab by Somalis in Mogadishu, described by Jeffrey Gettleman in a March 2010 New York Times article. [44]

Perhaps more importantly, Al-Qaeda’s ideology has not found support among many critical African sources of influence. That is, the leaders of local clans, tribal and other kinds of ethnic groups—individuals who arguably matter most to Africans—do not find global jihad appealing, and many view Al-Qaeda as an entity that must be resisted. Further, tribal and ethnic rivalries are seen as far more important concerns for these leaders—again, all politics is local. Several local Islamic leaders have worked together in recent years to confront the threat of Al-Qaeda gaining influence in the region. [45] In general, there is no history of radical Islam in sub-Saharan Africa, only various forms of moderate, Sufi Islamic traditions. At a more macro level, organized religion in sub-Saharan Africa is not nearly as pervasive as it is in other parts of the world; there are a plethora of traditional Animist and other indigenous forms of religion that are viewed as more favorable by locals.

Another reason for the limited resonance of Al-Qaeda’s message is that its declaration of war against the U.S. has not been well-received by many in Africa. To most Africans, the U.S. is not considered an enemy, and there is far less animosity towards the U.S. than towards the former
Western European countries who colonized the African continent. In contrast, the U.S. is known as having done quite a lot for Africans, particular from its position as the world’s largest provider of humanitarian and security assistance. Facts like these undermine the legitimacy of Al-Qaeda’s ideology, and without legitimacy there can be no resonance, and thus the likelihood of someone taking action on the basis of that ideology is greatly diminished.

**Three Core Challenges Al-Qaeda Faces in Sub-Saharan Africa**

Among the many other challenges faced by Al-Qaeda in sub-Saharan Africa, three appear to stand out in the view of this author: 1) the group’s means of communicating and influencing target audiences in the region are limited; 2) the U.S. and its allies have actively sought to confront the Al-Qaeda threat in Africa, and these initiatives have had modest success, while indigenous local and regional efforts are also having a similarly productive impact; and 3) there are important differences of opinion among Al-Qaeda’s leadership over the rationale and justification for investing the organization’s limited resources in sub-Saharan Africa.

**Limited Means of Communications and Influence**

Al-Qaeda’s main conduit for communicating with the broader world is the Internet. In March 2008, the Associated Press noted that “the terror network is recruiting computer-savvy technicians to produce sophisticated web documentaries and multimedia products aimed at Muslim audiences in the United States, Britain and other western countries.” [46] Clearly, the Internet plays an increasingly central role in their struggle for influence over hearts and minds in the Muslim World. According to Steve Coll and Susan Glasser, “Al-Qaeda has become the first guerrilla movement in history to migrate from physical space to cyberspace. With laptops and DVDs, in secret hideouts and at neighborhood Internet cafes, young code-writing jihadists have sought to replicate the training, communication, planning and preaching facilities they lost in Afghanistan with countless new locations on the Internet.” [47] Their uses of the Internet include mobilization and radicalization, training, support (fundraising and friend-raising), financial transactions, logistics arrangements, surveillance, cell-related operational communications, and much more. [48] Thousands of websites in all parts of the world reflect a growing virtual community of individuals linked indirectly through association of belief, who celebrate Al-Qaeda and its ideas. [49]

Al-Qaeda effectively employs models of viral marketing to advance its strategic influence campaigns, using Internet vehicles like YouTube, blogs, websites and so forth to exploit the portrayal of kinetic events, especially spectacular attacks and martyrdom operations. In essence, decentralized global information networks are playing an increasingly prominent role in modern
terrorist organizations’ ability to communicate with various target audiences. The mass media function of the Internet allows anyone to become a powerful communicator, providing an open forum for the exchange of words, sounds, and images which can influence thinking and behavior. Further, when many voices communicate the same message, in ways that complement and reinforce this message, the result is a more powerful and pervasive form of influence.

However, sub-Saharan Africa is largely offline. Satellite photos of our planet illustrate why Africa is often referred to as the “dark continent”—compared with other parts of the world, there are virtually no lights on at night, with the exception of South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, parts of Nigeria, and a few major cities in Kenya and Tanzania. The absence of lights, in turn, reflects the very limited access to electricity (and other types of infrastructure and government services) that most Africans deal with on a daily basis. In this context, access to the Internet is quite limited, and mostly concentrated around major urban areas. In the U.S., it is increasingly common to find widespread Internet access from home, through DSL, cable or satellite. In comparison, only some Africans may have a little exposure to the Internet—via a local university or Internet café—while most have none at all. Granted, this is changing via the rapid expansion of basic mobile services and a growing market for smartphone users that provide Internet access. But to date the Internet has not been a significant means for Al-Qaeda to connect with disenfranchised Africans in the same manner that we have seen Western Europeans or Americans radicalized by videos and websites promoting the Salafi-Jihadist ideology.

Related to this is Al-Qaeda’s need for media and publicity to generate the kind of images and perceptions that favor their cause. Since fewer cameras are focused on sub-Saharan Africa than on other parts of the world, a group that is so heavily focused on managing perception is far more likely to carry out attacks in places that will guarantee fast, global coverage. Perhaps this is one of many reasons why Europe is considered by most terrorism scholars as a much more likely target of Al-Qaeda influence and attacks than sub-Saharan Africa.

*The Growing Impact of Efforts to Counter Al-Qaeda’s Influence*

Many of sub-Saharan Africa’s states have shown a strong commitment to resisting Al-Qaeda’s efforts to gain influence and support in the region. For example, the Sudanese government significantly increased its counterterrorism cooperation with the U.S. after the attacks of 9/11. As Angel Rabasa notes, “Khartoum is now closely aligned with the United States in the campaign against international terrorism . . . Sudanese security forces have deported suspected foreign terrorists to their countries of origin and reportedly handed to the United States files with photographs of most of the Al-Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad leaders previously based in Khartoum.” [50] In fact, the level of cooperation between the two countries provoked an angry rebuke from the prominent Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. [51]
One of the main U.S. initiatives that seeks to address the potential influence of Al-Qaeda in Africa has been the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). As Lianne Kennedy-Boudali pointed out, “The goal of the TSCTP is to build partner capacity for counterterrorism and facilitate efforts to counter extremist thought.” [52] Begun in 2005 as the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), this interagency program has grown to include nine countries—Morocco, Algeria, Mali, Niger, Tunisia, and Mauritania, Senegal, Nigeria, and Chad. [53] Through a combination of military-to-military security assistance and development programs that aim to reduce support for violent extremism, the TSCTP seeks to address the core factors that could provide an enabling environment for Al-Qaeda’s ideology to resonate.

North African countries participating in this initiative receive counterterrorism training from U.S. Marines and Army Special Forces on such things as basic marksmanship, planning, communications, land navigation, and patrolling. [54] Participating countries have also received equipment such as night vision goggles and specially-equipped sports utility vehicles. A program in Nigeria teaches non-violent conflict resolution and provides social engagement for at-risk youth through basketball leagues. Other programs range from capacity-building seminars for local militaries to the promotion of moderate authors and textbooks for local schools. In addition, regional conferences have been sponsored for defense ministers and military intelligence chiefs, bringing them together in order to build trust and demonstrate the advantages of cooperation. [55]

Overall, various government efforts throughout sub-Saharan Africa—some sponsored or even led by the U.S.—are having a positive impact on diminishing the potential for Al-Qaeda’s ideology to find resonance. Not only are various governments working toward this end, but in March 2009 a group of traditional Islamic leaders from across West Africa met to “try and form a common front against Al-Qaeda’s growing influence in the region.” [56] These efforts demonstrate a recognition at the local level of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda and its affiliate networks. In the end, only Africans can insulate their communities from Al-Qaeda’s influence and radicalization efforts.

*Internal Organizational Perceptions of Limited Strategic Benefits*

Finally, there are important differences of opinion among Al-Qaeda’s leadership over the rationale and justification for investing the organization’s limited resources in sub-Saharan Africa. As evidenced by documents captured in Al-Qaeda safe houses and laptops in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, there is a significant debate within the organization about the perceived benefits—or lack thereof—that could be derived from investing limited resources in trying to achieve greater influence in sub-Saharan Africa.
In fact, Al-Qaeda is starved for cash. This has been made abundantly clear by their constant (and sometimes urgent) appeals from Al-Qaeda leaders and spokesmen for funding from the global ummah (Muslim community). To date, INTERPOL and the U.S. Department of Treasury (among other major agencies of this type) have found scant evidence that Africans are responding to these pleas for financial assistance. Further, as members of the world’s poorest continent (by far), many Africans struggle mightily to achieve even the bare minimal quality of life. Thus, sub-Saharan Africa offers relatively limited prospects for productive fundraising by global jihadists. Instead, Al-Qaeda’s interests in Africa are more likely to be geared toward trafficking in drugs or weapons and other profit-making ventures. Establishing training camps or mobilizing populations might be of interest, but as described above, a thorough scan of the African environment does not yield much evidence that Al-Qaeda would have success in pursuing such a course of action at this time.

At best, sub-Saharan Africa offers an environment for an array of organized crime activities. Trafficking in drugs, weapons, human beings, and counterfeit goods is already a vibrant activity in the subcontinent, and particularly in West Africa. This criminal environment that could facilitate some Al-Qaeda operations, particularly fundraising and money-making schemes. However, it could just as easily prove inhospitable for Al-Qaeda and its network of affiliates.

**Conclusion and Implications**

In sum, sub-Saharan Africa should not be considered a key front in the war between Al-Qaeda and the Western world. Nor, however, should it be ignored altogether. Al-Qaeda’s internal documents indicate that they find other parts of the world more hospitable, having more to offer by way of logistical support and potential targets of opportunity. There are few, if any, valid indications that Al-Qaeda is gaining (or losing) ground in Sub-Saharan Africa. Further, it would appear that, judging from its own statements in documents and web forum postings, relatively few members of Al-Qaeda see much value in focusing increasing attention to growing its influence in Africa. That said, it is important that the U.S. and its allies continue to work to ensure that Al-Qaeda does not gain a significant foothold in sub-Saharan Africa. To do so we must engage not only states but incorporate important local non-state actors in our efforts as well.

This analysis generates a variety of potential research questions, such as

- “What is the likelihood of North African Jihadist groups (like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Moroccan Islamic Liberation Front, and al-Shabaab in Somalia) spreading their influence south of the Pan-Sahel region?”
- “Under what conditions would this likelihood increase?” and
- “What role, if any, can the international community play in exacerbating the challenges that Al-Qaeda already faces in its efforts to gain influence in sub-Saharan Africa?”

Research on these and many other related kinds of questions is urgently needed. Future security policies and strategies should be informed by a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of Al-Qaeda’s influence—or rather, lack thereof—in sub-Saharan Africa.

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Notes

[3] Ibid.
[8] John C.K. Daly, “Libya and Al-Qaida: A Complex Relationship.” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3 No. 6 (March 24, 2005). In 2004, militant Islamist websites circulated a declaration that purported to announce the creation of a new Al-Qaeda affiliate, Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Berber (Organization of Al Qa’ida in the Land of the Berbers), which was followed several months later by a similar announcement for Qa'idat al-Jihad fi al-Jaza’ir (Organization of Al Qa’ida in Algeria).
[15] Ibid.
[19] USA v Osama bin Laden, Summation of Prosecutor, pp. 5253-5261; For names of the operatives see the declassified FBI Executive Summary of FBI’s investigation into the embassy bombings. The document can be found at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/summary.html (Accessed on June 4, 2011). Note that in June 2011, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed was reported killed in Somalia, though an investigation to confirm this is still ongoing.
[22] In Kenya, the number of casualties would have been significantly higher if not for the guards who refused to allow the truck inside the compound. In Tanzania, due to good fortune, a water tanker stood between the bomb-carrying truck and the embassy building and absorbed a lot of the bomb’s impact. For more on this attack and the events that followed, please see Sundara Vaddamuri, “The U.S. Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania,” in Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, edited by James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007).
possible to do so, in order to liberate the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque [the Al-Haram Mosque in Mecca, home of the Kaba] from their grip...” See Randall B. Hamud, ed., *Osama Bin Laden: America’s Enemy In His Own Words* (San Diego, CA: Nadeem, 2005), p. 60.


[26] The (Disallowed) Confession of Omar Said Omar,—a document that was made available to journalists (who sought it from the Court Clerk) after it was submitted, but before the judge had ruled on its admissibility—is available as Appendix CII of the CTC report, “Al Qaida’s Misadventures in the Horn of Africa” (beginning on p. 155), available online at http://ctc.usma.edu.

[27] See “Al Qaida’s Misadventures in the Horn of Africa,” a report published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, which includes the original and translated versions of these documents. Online at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq

[28] Combating Terrorism Center, “Al Qaida’s Mis-Adventures in the Horn of Africa,” available online at: http://ctc.usma.edu/aq


[37] Andrew Holt, “South Africa in the War on Terror,” *Terrorism Monitor* vol. 2, no. 23 (December 1, 2004).


[40] Ray Wasler, Heritage Foundation, January 8, 2010; http://blog.legacy.org/2010/01/08/abdulmutallab-nigeria-and-Al-Qaeda-are-we-sufficiently-focused-on-africa/

[41] Rear Admiral Hamlin B. Tallent, USN, Director, European Plans and Operations Center United States European Command in testimony before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Non-Proliferation, 10 March 2005.


[43] Ibid.


[50] Angel Rabasa, p. 51


[55] Ibid.

From Theory to Practice: Exploring the Organised Crime-Terror Nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa

by Annette Hübschle

Abstract

A growing body of scholarly literature suggests confluence or even convergence of organized crime and terrorism in various parts of the world. However, links remain somewhat nebulous at this stage and vary considerably, based on region and context. Africa has come under the spotlight due to perceived weaknesses in the criminal justice sector, limited law enforcement capacity, political and systemic corruption, poor border patrol and weak anti-terror and organized crime laws which are believed to provide an ideal environment for the terror-crime nexus to flourish. This article provides an African perspective on the links between organized crime and terror networks in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a particular focus on Southern Africa. The discussion begins with an overview of the theoretical discourse on the subject – relying on African definitions of the contested concepts of ‘terrorism’ and ‘organized crime’ – and will then narrow the analysis on the sub-Saharan case. It relies on an extensive literature review and concludes with empirical findings of a research project on organized crime in Southern Africa, which found no strong empirical links between criminal and terrorist organizations.

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization, states—and more broadly international organizations—have expanded their focus from state-centric security threats to those emanating from non-state actors. The 9/11 terrorist attacks accelerated this shift and brought with it intense scrutiny and efforts to address international terrorism and organized crime – both as distinct phenomena as well as the relationship between the two. For example, in addition to operative provisions, [1] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 suggests a close link between international terrorism, transnational organized crime and other forms of crime:

[The Security Council] “Notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms- trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and in this regard emphasizes the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, sub-regional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security;” [2]
In addition to concern at the international policy level, as illustrated by UN Security Council Resolution 1373, a growing body of scholarly literature has emerged that examines the proposed link between international terrorist and organized crime networks. However links between these two areas remain somewhat nebulous at this stage and vary dramatically, depending on region and context. Thus, rather than looking at global trends, this article will provide an African perspective.

Definition

Before discussing the terror-crime nexus it is important to first lay out how each are defined in the African context. When it comes to the term of terrorism, it has proven to be a particularly difficult task to arrive at a widely accepted definition. The 20th century saw many wars of independence or liberation struggles across Africa and in many instances at least one of the warring parties was tagged a terrorist movement. Indeed the aphorism of ‘one person’s terrorist is another one’s liberation fighter’ captures the African policy maker’s problem of arriving at a definition of terrorism. To circumvent this, most legislators in Southern Africa have provided definitions of ‘terrorist activity’ or ‘act of terror’. [3] This was also the case when the 35th Ordinary Session of the Heads of State and Government adopted the Organization of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (the Algiers Convention) in July 1999. [4] In turn, the definition of ‘terrorist act’ contained in the Algiers Convention is now widely accepted and has been employed as a blueprint for domestic anti-terror laws on the continent. According to this definition a terrorist act denotes the following:

“(a) Any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:
(i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or
(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or
(iii) create general insurrection in a State.
(b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any
person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii).” [5]

However, it bears pointing out that state terrorism or acts of terrorism perpetrated by state parties were omitted in this definition due to heated political debates and discord amongst member states. In addition, what differentiates the Algiers Convention from anti-terrorism instruments outside Africa is its exclusion of struggles for self-determination from its definition. [6]

Turning to organized crime, different types of organized crime markets are believed to have evolved in the 1980s. The concept is thus relatively new, though is as controversial as elsewhere in the world. Early attempts at defining ‘organized crime’ relied on depictions of mafia-type hierarchical criminal organizations, which existed outside the formal economy. The assumption that organized criminals originate from the clandestine criminal underworld is problematic because it omits the fact that politicians, law enforcement agents, government officials and business entrepreneurs from the formal economy often facilitate and work with organized crime networks. In the case of southern Africa, though, all states have either signed or ratified the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) over the past decade, [7] although most of them have yet to define the concept for their internal purposes. As was the case with anti-terror conventions, issues of organised crime (and terrorism) were not prioritized by most African legislators at the turn of the millennium. However, the growing threat posed by organised crime networks and international pressure have moved domestic integration of the Palermo Convention to the apex of legal and policy agendas of many states. Consensus building on an internationally agreed definition of organized crime proved an onerous task at the 1999 and 2000 meetings of the UN Ad-Hoc Committee meetings in Vienna. In the end, states compromised and opted for a definition of an organized criminal group [8] and called for the criminalization of participation in such a group. [9]

By 2008, the heads of criminal investigation departments came together during a Southern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO) meeting and agreed on a definition of organized crime derived from the Palermo Convention. The same definition was adopted by member states during the SARPCCO annual general meeting in September 2010. Thus, for the purposes of this article the same definition of organized crime will be employed.

- “it is committed by two or more perpetrators, who are aware of each other’s existence and general role, and who are acting in concert
- it is serious
- it is committed repeatedly
- the crimes are motivated by the pursuit of material and financial gain.” [10]
Theories on the crime-terror nexus

In the last two decades, a growing body of literature has explored whether there are links between organized crime and terrorism. The term ‘narco-terrorism’ [11] emerged in the 1980s in reference to narcotics traffickers who used violence or the threat of violence aimed at communities and government officials for politically motivated objectives. More specifically, certain designated terrorist groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia who have used drug trafficking (as well as extortion, kidnapping, money laundering and other forms of economic crime to finance operations) have been labeled as narco-terrorists. [12] Some authors also refer to Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru, guerrilla fighters from Chechnya, the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and others as narco-terrorists. [13] Grant Wardlaw warned in 1987 that the concept of ‘narco-terrorism’ had become “a potent weapon in the propaganda war waged by governments against terrorists, insurgents, organized crime, drug traffickers and even other sovereign states.” [14] Wardlaw argues that an analytical concept should not subsume a selection of different activities, involving different actors with contradictory law enforcement and national security implications. When Wardlaw made this observation in 1987, theories on the links between the two phenomena were in their infancy. Some theories have not moved beyond the infantile stages of suggesting a “drug mafia-cum-terrorist conspiracy.” [15] Thus, the perceived intersection of terrorist and criminal organizations has led some analysts to conflate these two types of entities into one. Theorists are split between skeptics and supporters of confluence and convergence theories. The former see ever-closer links between the two phenomena, while the latter go one step further by suggesting a transformation from one to the other. [16]

According to Alex Schmid’s prominent article on this subject in 1996, terrorism and organized crime remain two distinct and clearly distinguishable phenomena despite some common features. While terrorists are ideologically or politically motivated, organized criminals strive for greater shares in illicit markets. Terrorists usually admit to their deeds and use the media to propagate their cause; organized criminals avoid the media. Terrorist victimization tends to be less discriminate than the violence used by organized criminals. They may fight each other in turf wars, which is less common with rival terrorist groups. [17] Schmid provides a list of commonalities, including that both are rational actors; they produce victims; they use similar tactics such as kidnappings, assassination, extortion and others; they operate secretly; and both are criminalized by the ruling regime and stand in opposition to the state. [18] In addition to Schmid’s list, Peng Wang adds that both defy the state and the rule of law; for a member to leave either group is rare and often fatal; both present an asymmetrical threat to the United States and what he terms “friendly nations”; both may have “interchangeable” recruitment pools; both are highly adaptable, innovative and resilient; both have back-up leaders and foot soldiers and both have provided social services. [19]
In his book *The New Terrorism*, Walter Laqueur dedicated a whole chapter to terrorism and organized crime. He argued that fifty years ago a clear dividing line existed between the two. However, “more recently this line has become blurred, and in some cases a symbiosis between terrorism and organized crime has occurred that did not exist before.” [20] The end of the Cold War and the international drug trade had opened new opportunities for terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism. He warns that organized crime was becoming increasingly politicized, with crime bosses interested in both material gain and political power. [21] Likewise, Tamara Makarenko [22] argued that since the end of the Cold War and the subsequent decline of state sponsorship for terrorism, organized crime activities had become a major revenue source for terrorist groupings around the world. Thus, the ‘crime-terror’ nexus was consolidated during the 1990s with the rise of transnational organized crime and the changing nature of terrorism when the formerly distinct phenomena began to show operational and organizational similarities. According to Makarenko, organized crime and terrorist groups are learning from one another by examining each other’s successes and failures. The final point of the crime-terror nexus is convergence [23] when both groups amalgamate into the same or similar organizations with a convergence of beliefs. [24] Few other theorists support the idea that criminal and terrorist groupings converge into one entity with similar ideologies and motives. However, tactical cooperation between the two appears to be based on temporary consistent interests. The realities of opposing aims and ideological beliefs make it difficult for the two entities to maintain long-term cooperation or merge into one. Peng Wang contends that the possibility exists that either entity could transform itself into an entity with characteristics of both groups. [25]

Terror finance expert Loretta Napoleoni [26] postulated that terror groups have developed a system of self-finance in what she refers to as ‘the new economy of terror’. The globalization of the world economy has led to modern terror groups funding themselves through a wide range of legal and illegal business activities. She makes a clear distinction between the two phenomena due to differing motivations, which dictates how both run their respective businesses. Criminal organizations run their operations like private corporations with profit and accumulation being the ultimate goal. Terrorist organizations, on the other hand, are more interested in money disbursements than in money laundering. Revenues generated by legitimate business enterprises are not laundered but need to be distributed within the network of cells. Further sources of income for terrorist organizations include remittances, charities, and illegal revenues, which circumvent or break laws. Income from kidnapping, extortion, theft, fraud, piracy, smuggling and money laundering is believed to be the largest source of income. Napoleoni says little more about the organized crime-terror nexus but her analysis suggests that both terror networks and criminal organizations are part of the same ‘shady’ business system: ‘the international illegal economy’. This economy provides huge cash injections of an estimated $1.5 trillion into mainly Western economies. She argues that the degree of interdependence between legal and illegal economic systems may be too advanced to consider severing all ties. [27]
Phil Williams [28] provided an interesting analysis of fundamental differences between organized criminal and terrorist entities. At the heart of terrorist organizations is the desire to bring about political change. Terrorist attacks should be seen as a sum total of activities that include fundraising, recruitment, training, development of special skills and preparation for an attack which can stretch over several months or even years. Meanwhile, criminal organizations focus on profit generation and maximization, which is aided by the development of illicit business strategies. These strategies are not different from those of big corporations but because the products and activities are illicit, normal business rules do not apply and steps are taken to manage, avoid, control or mitigate risk. Such risks include threats from competitors or government and law enforcement agencies seeking to close down or move into their business. In some instances, criminal organizations choose to operate from countries where the state is weak and lacks resources to combat crime effectively. When and where the state fights back, criminal risk management strategies involve “the use of violence and corruption to neutralize the criminal justice system, to circumvent customs and immigration controls, and ultimately to perpetuate the weakness of the state and maintain the territory as a safe haven.” [29] Williams points to a third level, where criminal entities adopt strategies to reduce damage in case of detection. This includes the adoption of networked structures that are compartmentalized and easily replaced or regenerated.

Despite the scholarly literature that largely aims to delineate the differences and similarities between terrorism and organized crime, there are few empirical studies available on the subject. In 2004, Yvon Dandurand and Vivienne Chin published a report on the links between terrorism and other forms of crime for Foreign Affairs Canada and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. [30] In terms of methodology, the report provided a literature review and relied on analysis submitted by Member States of the United Nations to the UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee and the results of a questionnaire that was distributed via official channels to Member States of the United Nations through the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In February 2004, a UN Expert Group agreed with the findings of the report and concluded:

“The available responses from Member States indicated that terrorist groups are frequently involved in other crimes, particularly illegal drug trafficking, smuggling of migrants, falsification of travel and identity documents, trafficking in firearms and exploitation of illegal markets, inter alia, to support their activities. However, the responses did not provide strong evidence of organizational links between terrorist groups and organized crime groups.” [31]

However, in the same report, Dandurand and Chin warn that the future threat may not stem from cooperation between common criminals and terrorists but from the transformation of terrorist groups into predominantly criminal ones. [32]
With this general review of the alleged crime-terror nexus discourse as an intellectual backdrop, the following section of this article will narrow the analysis on the sub-Saharan African context, first by looking at scholarship on the topic and then highlighting empirical findings from a study on organized crime in Southern Africa.

**Scholarship on Crime-Terror Nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa**

There is a paucity of African scholars commenting on the organized crime-terror nexus. Authors from outside the continent argue that the continent is a breeding ground and springboard for transnational crime and terrorism. For example, a US Library of Congress report on nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism devoted a whole chapter to Africa and individual African states, claiming that the continent had become the meeting place of terrorist groups to plan and execute terror operations and for transnational organized crime to flourish. This ‘hospitality’ is traced back to a number of factors “common to almost every country on the continent.” [33] The listed factors include:

- weakness of state institutions
- limited law enforcement capacity
- widespread poverty
- political and systemic corruption
- incomplete or weak anti-terrorism and organized crime legislation
- lack of respect for the rule of law in society
- long porous and unpatrolled borders
- geographic location along international trafficking routes
- the existence of transnational ethnic networks whose members move freely across national borders [34]

The factors are based on generalized notions of poor governance, historical factors, geopolitical issues and socio-economic shortcomings. When analyzed critically most factors or a combination of factors are present in most developing nations and in some cases developed nations as well. In another reference, a US interagency law enforcement working group described the African climate for transnational organized crime and terrorism as follows:

“Porous borders, ample routes for smuggling of drugs, weapons, explosives, and other contraband, and corruptible police and security forces make Sub-Saharan Africa an inviting operational environment for international criminals, drug traffickers, and terrorists. Major Sub-Saharan cities with extensive commercial, financial, and sea and air transportation links to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia
Such arguments fall in line with Bovenkerk and Chakra’s thesis that weak states easily fall prey to organized crime groups and terrorists. Citing the examples of Sierra Leone, Somalia and Liberia as failed states in Africa or Afghanistan in Asia, they argue that the lack of or limited state control enabled organized crime to collaborate with “national kleptocrats or local warlords who plundered their countries’ diamonds, gold, tropical timber, exotic species of animals.” [36] Louise Shelley [37] suggests that ‘newer crime groups’ that operate from ungovernable regions make their services available to the highest bidder. These groups flourish in impoverished regions with demoralized populations and their operations are facilitated by the lack of an effective state. Shelley speculates that while the ‘newer crime groups’ may not share the ideological motivations of terrorists, they show a willingness to cooperate with them. Meanwhile longstanding transnational crime groups or ‘old crime groups’ in long established states have developed in tandem with their states and depend on existing institutional and financial structures to move products and invest profits. [38] Shelley believes that the milieu “in which transnational criminals, terrorists and corruption merge, poses a threat to the international order.” [39] Furthermore, the ‘Unholy Trinity’ of organized crime, corruption and terrorism thrives in regions with large shadow economies where the funding of terrorism by way of criminal activities is the least risky and the extent and length of collaboration the most prominent. [40] In sum, it is within this context that the discourse on the crime-terror nexus in sub-Saharan African states is framed.

Empirical Findings

In terms of empirical data, in 2009 the United Nations Office for Drug and Crime (UNODC) carried out a threat assessment on transnational trafficking in the West Africa and looked at a number of illicit commercial flows including stolen oil, undocumented migrant laborers or sex workers, toxic waste, firearms, counterfeit medicines and drugs. The report found that West Africa had become afflicted with organized crime, and in the case of each illicit flow at least one component of the supply chain was outside West Africa. While the authors argue that “West Africa is caught in a morass from which it cannot reasonably be expected to extract itself,” [41] no links were drawn between terrorist and transnational organized crime groups.

In another threat assessment, in 2010 the regional anti-money laundering group Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) found that Hezbollah and, to a lesser extent, Afwâj al-Muqâwama al-Lubnâniyya (AMAL) were “embedded within the growing Shi’a community in West Africa, and may engage in a variety of fund-raising
activities which straddle the continuum between legitimate charitable donations, *criminality* (author’s emphasis), and the financing of terrorism.” [42] The report suggests that Lebanese involvement in the diamond and cocoa industries and the importation of basic food goods in Côte d’Ivoire *may* facilitate the raising and laundering of funds on behalf of the two terrorists groups. However, the report warns that while Salafi Jihadi groups are operating in West African states, analysts should be careful to differentiate between indigenous groups and al-Qaida. Simple banditry and kidnapping for personal gain should not be confused with activities carried out for terrorist purposes and politically related killings. The report also acknowledges “suggestions” that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) may be involved in the drug trade. Of course there are the “long-standing rumors” of al-Qaeda’s involvement in diamond smuggling but no evidence had been found to corroborate this. [43] Likewise, the 9/11 Commission reported that it had no persuasive evidence to suggest that the terror network funded itself through diamonds. [44] A 2003 research report by Global Witness was among the first to allege that al-Qaeda used African diamonds to convert cash into a transportable untraceable form of wealth. [45] This was preceded by allegations made in the *Wall Street Journal* in November 2001 [46] that al-Qaeda controlled a sizeable chunk of the tanzanite [47] trade in Tanzania. However, police investigations found no evidence of any terrorist group’s involvement in the industry.

Nonetheless a UN Security Council Report of May 2011 warns that in addition to drug traffickers, terrorist groups had begun to exploit the structural weaknesses in the West African sub-region. The smuggling of arms, drugs and contraband, widespread corruption, poor governance and a history of hostage taking for ransom in the Sahel have opened new opportunities for terrorist groups and “the lines between Islamic militancy and organized crime are becoming blurred.“ [48] This report links both Al-Qaeda, and more specifically, AQIM to a series of kidnappings for ransom. Moreover, Hezbollah and the Taliban maintain opportunistic links in the region, especially in the area of money laundering. [49] In the case of the Taliban, it bears mentioning that operatives were arrested by Liberian security staff and have since been charged in the United States with a plot to assist the Taliban by sending weapons to their operatives and transporting tons of Afghan heroin through West Africa. [50] In fact, Amado Philip de Andrés warns of the possibility of ‘narco-terrorism’ in West Africa, based on the assumption that the drug cartels operating in the Latin American Tri Border Area (TBA) of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay are trafficking cocaine from South America through West Africa to European markets. The same drug cartels have been operationally linked to Middle Eastern terror groups. [51]

Turning to the other side of the continent, many regard Somalia as the breeding ground of terrorism in Africa and not without good reasons. Following the suicide attacks in the Kenyan coastal city of Mombasa in November 2002 [52] a UN Security Council Panel of Experts on Somalia found:
“Owing to violations of the Somalia arms embargo, transnational terrorists have been able to obtain not only small arms, but also man-portable air-defense systems, light anti-tank weapons and explosives. On at least one occasion in the past 12 months, arms delivered illegally to Somalia were employed in the commission of a terrorist act in Kenya; although that particular attack was unsuccessful, the Panel believes that additional weapons may have since been imported into Somalia solely for the purpose of carrying out further terrorist attacks in neighboring states.” [53]

The report also notes how the team responsible for the Mombasa attacks met in Mogadishu to train and procure weapons from illicit arms dealers in informal markets. In other cases, Somali nationals have also been linked to various terrorist attacks. Of note, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Al-Qaeda leader in East Africa, and the mastermind of the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, was killed in a late-night shootout at a security checkpoint in Mogadishu in June 2011. [54] Mohammed was also known as a field commander of Al-Shabaab, a Somali-based militant group involved in a terrorist campaign against the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. It has also carried out operations outside of the country, claiming responsibility for the 2011 bombings in Kampala, Uganda, that killed 79 people who were watching the World Cup final on television. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Al-Shabaab is involved with criminal groups or activities, although its alleged involvement with pirates operating in the Gulf of Aden and beyond is a matter of vigorous debate. While US Navy officials reject claims that Al-Shabaab has operational or financial links to the pirates, a Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor correspondent, citing anonymous Somali security authorities, claims that the group received at least 20% of ransoms from some pirate groups in exchange for training and weapons. It is further suggested that the pirates help to traffic weapons and people to the Al-Shabaab controlled port of Kismayu. Nevertheless members of al-Shabaab are not believed to be involved with hijackings at sea. [55] In the absence of verifiable data, it is difficult to establish the veracity of this report. Moreover, it may be in the interest of Somali authorities to assert links between pirate groups and al-Shabaab in order to encourage more robust international action against both groups. [56]

In terms of the piracy phenomenon in particular, an investigation by the Forum for African Investigative Reporters (FAIR) [57] describes the Somali pirates as “social bandits” who originally regarded themselves as the Somali coastguard. In response to foreign fishing vessels that have carried out illegal fishing activities in their coastal area, they viewed themselves as taking what is rightfully theirs. Today Somali pirates can be roughly devided into two groups: one which operates from central Somalia while the other group is active in Puntland in the northeastern part of Somalia. Highlighting the growing criminality, according to FAIR, instead of fighting the pirates, the government of President Abdirahman Mohamed ‘Faroole’ in Puntland is said to be sharing in the pirates’ earnings which would make it a criminal state. Confirming this, the UN Monitoring Group estimates that over 30% of ransom payments were retained by Puntland government officials. [58]

Studies undertaken by South African scholar Gail Wannenberg were inconclusive in establishing links between transnational organised crime and terrorist networks. [59] In a research report on the links between terrorists and organized criminals in 2004, [60] this author examined seven case studies from Southern Africa. The analysis included the terrorist attacks on Dar es Salaam, Nairobi and Mombasa. Investigations indicated that Al-Qaeda had interacted with illicit arms dealers in the procurement of weapons, ammunition and explosives. The report found that the interaction between the terror network and organized crime groups boiled down to a once-off ad hoc business transactions. Both entities fear detection and thus ongoing cooperation would heighten operational risk. The report concluded:

“...organized criminals are fighting for survival due to increased competition between different criminal syndicates. Entering into a close relationship with terrorists would not feature on their agenda unless there is an immediate financial gain. Furthermore, there is little political or ideological common ground between terrorists and criminals. During Africa’s ‘winds of change’ period, some ‘indigenous’ criminal groups did work with so-called terrorists. But in the post-transformation period, ‘indigenous’ groups are a-political; support for terrorist structures would not derive from similar thinking, or from fighting for a similar cause.” [61]

However, between 2008 and 2010, a study was undertaken in partnership with the Southern African Police Chiefs Cooperating Organization (SARPCCO) to look at organized crime in Southern Africa. Amongst other research questions, it also looked at possible links to terrorism. For this study, selected organized criminal activities and observed levels of prevalence were studied in twelve countries in southern Africa. [62] Due to a lack of statistical and quantitative data in most countries covered, the study relied mostly on a qualitative methodology. Representatives from law enforcement agencies, government departments and publicly-owned corporations, civil society, business and professional associations, academics, prisoners, former gang organized crime network members and members of the broader communities whose lives had been impacted by organized crime, were consulted in one-on-one interviews, focus groups, observations and workshops. A team of field researchers led by a research coordinator collected the data and the project was guided by working definitions of organized crime and terrorism referenced in this paper. [63]

The result of this effort was that the research disproved the popular notion of the existence of hierarchically structured, single-nationality criminal organizations. It also found that multinational networks adhering to the vagaries of supply and demand were predominant. [64] Trafficking in stolen motor vehicles, ivory, diamonds and drugs were shown to be the mainstays
of organized criminal business in southern Africa. However, venture criminals had also diversified into the smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol, fuel, firearms, counterfeit commodities, cattle, foodstuffs and people across regional borders. The research project also covered armed robberies, smuggling of endangered species and rare resources, financial crime and money laundering and human trafficking. ‘New’ forms of crime were identified (such as the smuggling of counterfeit pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, illegal fishing and illegal logging) and the smuggling of people across regional and international borders, the use of forged travel documents and other immigration offences featured prominently. While terrorist networks have been linked to some of these criminal markets elsewhere in the world, no such connections were found in the Southern African case. [65]

This research project also showed that, although economic crimes may not be as prevalent as other forms of crime, statistically their impact on society and the economy was far-reaching. Organized crime networks have diversified their criminal interests; instead of dealing in one specific crime only, they may be involved in several legitimate and illegitimate operations at any given time. The proceeds are ‘cleaned’ through a variety of money laundering mechanisms, including the acquisition of real estate and luxury assets. While the region’s long and porous borders are often cited as a source of vulnerability in southern Africa, the research revealed that criminals prefer legal border points: international airports, ports and land border posts. Why swim through crocodile infested rivers or trek over dangerous mountain passes on roads less travelled, when it is easy to cross borders undetected with smuggled commodities, sometime with a little help from a friend. In this respect, powerful alliances between criminal networks, law enforcement officials, civil servants, politicians, politically connected people and business corporations propel new markets, methods and routes. Often considered a type of organized crime, corruption is also a facilitator of organized crime. This includes petty corruption involving staff at border posts to allow contraband or smuggled commodities to pass without muster, police officials warning criminals of planned roadblocks and police operations, or airline managers who manipulate flight rosters to accommodate cabin attendants willing to smuggle narcotics. The research revealed the important role that corruption, petty and grand, plays in sustaining organized crime. It paints a rather somber picture but also recognizes the strides being made by regional law enforcement agencies to combat organized crime. The realities of globalization have put into gear a number of responses. While law enforcement capacity, coordination, investigation skills and regional cooperation should be enhanced, a holistic approach incorporating non-law enforcement sectors of government, civil society and local communities in control and harm reduction measures are more likely to make a measurable impact.

Concluding Assessment
Overall, this analysis finds that there is no concrete evidence to suggest that organized crime was linked to terrorism between 2005 and 2010, save for the notion that the proceeds of crime may constitute a potential source of terrorist financing. [66] Granted, speculations abound that members of terrorist networks can hide, plan and prepare their activities from the sub-region. It is known, for example, that Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, the alleged mastermind behind the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings, was in possession of a fake South African passport when he was killed in June 2011 [67]. Similarly, in recent years, there have been at least five instances of alleged terror suspects using fake South African passports; however, to date none of these cases have shown deeper links with organized crime activities in this region. [68] At this stage, as was suggested in the 2004 study, terrorists and organized criminals may interact on an ad hoc basis by forming tactical and strategic alliances in pursuit of short-term goals. Indeed, while theories of convergence and confluence look good on paper, the reality of cultural, ideological, political, operational and practical differences between organized crime and terrorist groupings are obvious and ultimately ongoing collaboration appears unsustainable. Casting a gaze into the future, it is likely that terrorist networks will increasingly appropriate criminal methods to sustain their activities ‘in-house’, rather than forging lasting alliances with criminal networks.

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Notes

[1] This included the criminalization of the financing and other forms of support for terrorism, the freezing of bank accounts of terror suspects, the introduction of effective border controls and other measures to speed up the exchange of operational information to counter the terrorist threat.
[4] The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was disbanded on 9 July 2002 by its last chairperson, South African President Thabo Mbeki, and replaced by the African Union (AU).
[6] Article 3 (1) of the Algiers Convention provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, the struggles waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts.”
[8] United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html#Fulltext (accessed on June 8, 2011) Article 2 of the Palermo Convention stipulates: (a) ‘Organized criminal group’ shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit; (b) ‘Serious crime’ shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty; (c) ‘Structured group’ shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure.
[11] The concept of ‘narco-terrorism’ was coined by the Peruvian President Belaunde in 1983.

Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs, 2006).

Gail Wannenberg, Africa’s Pablos and Political Entrepreneurs: War, the State and Criminal Networks in West and Southern Africa (Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs, 2006).


Research was conducted in Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, all of which are Member States of SARPCCO.

The definition used for data collection is the same employed in this article.

Senior police officials from the region rejected the connections between the two phenomena and cited various examples of bogus links negatively affecting their countries, e.g. the allegation that tanzanite was used to fund terrorists.


The Paradox of Terrorism, Armed Conflict and Natural Resources: An Analysis of Cabinda in Angola

by Victor Ojakorotu

Abstract

Angola is a coastal west-central African state which currently stands as one of the fastest growing economies on the sub-continent. Angola's development as a burgeoning economic powerhouse has been attained despite a protracted and brutal civil conflict spanning several decades. In the current post-conflict era, Angola has emerged as one of the leading producers of oil on the African continent, second only to Nigeria, in addition to boasting an equally robust diamond mining industry. However, the main oil-producing region in Angola, the Cabinda province, has been the centre of intense conflict between the inhabitants of the region on one hand in their endeavor for self-determination, and the central government on the other, which defends the economic and geo-strategic importance of the region. At a practical level, the proponents of the conflict are the Liberation Front of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), which is at the forefront of secessionist calls, and the Luanda government through the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). The activities of FLEC in the Cabinda region against Luanda (the Angola state) have launched a new debate on the dynamics of oil violence in the region. Among the main concerns is that the militia groups in the region are carrying out terrorist acts which, in turn, breed further instability that could have severe consequences for the state's security. Therefore, it is pertinent to undertake an in-depth exploration of the nexus between terrorism and FLEC activities in the region, as well to establish whether the recurrent breach of national security law committed by the FLEC in their secessionist endeavors have allowed the Angolan government to rightly characterize the violent activities of the militant group as terrorism.

Introduction

Angola's protracted civil war came to an end on April 4, 2002 after 27 years of bloodshed. Shortly after the ceasefire, the government—led by the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, Labor Party (MPLA)—swiftly embarked on an ambitious process of economic growth and much-needed infrastructural and humanitarian rehabilitation. The core of this strategy focused on attracting international investors to aid in the extraction and production of Angola's abundant natural resources. This effort has transformed the Southern African state into one of the fastest growing economies on the continent, with the GDP growth rate reaching 9.4% in 2006 [1]. However, despite the soaring economy, Luanda remains embattled in a long-standing domestic quandary which continues to imperil the stability of the Dos Santos regime. For three decades, the Angolan enclave of Cabinda, which is geographically separate from the mainland, has been
engaged in an insurrectionary separatist battle with Luanda. While Cabinda’s core concerns are governed by the need for access to oil resources, the conflict has largely been motivated by economic nationalism. Through the establishment of the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), the leading militant group that has been engaged in a secessionist battle with Luanda and the militants in Cabinda have employed tactics that elicit a political response from the central government and the international community. The ultimate goal of the FLEC is to gain political autonomy, secession, and access to the management and exploitation of oil resources, which are indigenous to the province. [2]

The article explores the core dynamics of the long-standing impasse between Luanda and Cabinda, the latter of which has been engaged with the central government through military and diplomatic means for over two decades in a tussle over autonomy and eventual independence. Section 1 begins with a conceptual discussion that lays out the definition of terrorism that will serve as the guiding framework for this study. Within this discussion, the author will illuminate the secessionist case of Cabinda within a comparative international perspective, drawing on examples from Chechnya and Sri Lanka to elucidate the trajectory of the FLECs endeavours and the plights of the province’s inhabitants. Section II will first provide a brief historical trajectory of the tensions between Cabinda and the Angolan government, followed by a discussion and analysis of FLEC’s use of hostage-taking and kidnapping in their attacks. The author will evaluate whether such tactics can be defined as terrorism. Section III concludes with some reflections on Luanda’s response to FLEC’s activities as well as an analysis of the implications of Cabinda’s militant tactics on the government’s peace-building efforts and the province’s endeavour towards greater autonomy.

Defining Terrorism & Positioning the FLEC Case

Terrorism has been one of the most malignant features of domestic and international politics for centuries. The term ‘terrorism’ officially became a component of the political lexicon following the French Revolution of 1789. While the nature and devices of terrorism have changed since the 18th century, the key definitional aspects of terrorism remain unchanged. From a historical perspective, each successive wave of terrorist activities appears to introduce new definitional dynamics and perspectives from various fields into the broader terrorism landscape, leading the renowned terrorism expert Walter Laqueur to refer to the existence of more than 100 definitions of terrorism. [3] In addition, the ambiguity in defining terrorism stems from the multiplicity of scholarly and official perspectives from which the construct is studied and articulated. [4]

Nonetheless, Laqueur notes that most definitions of terrorism are united by the common trait that it is a tactic that entails the utilization of violence and organised threats in order to attain a desired political end. [5] Although there is still a lack of consensus on the definition of terrorism,
there are a number of common features which can be highlighted to delineate activities which are considered terrorist. At a broad level, terrorism can be conceived in terms of a series of trends and factors which are common to a majority of terrorist acts. These include 1) the use of violence or force in the manner of threats or action, 2) the primary objective is a political one, 3) thriving from the use of fear or terror to elicit the desired reaction, and 4) the expectation that the perpetrated actions will induce psychological (and political) effects and responses. There is also a considerable level of consensus that terrorist acts usually have non-combatant victims. Therefore, while no consensus exists on the actual definition of terrorism, at the most basic level terrorism can be identified as the organised use or threat of violence for the purpose of political coercion and intimidation for objectives which are motivated by social, economic or religious causal mechanisms. [8] Moreover, at the level of the intentions of those who engage in terrorist acts, the objectives of terrorism differ from conventional acts of violent crime to the extent that the ultimate aim of the perpetrators is not financial, but rather to influence political outcomes which are specific to the executors cause. [9]

Other scholars, such as Charles Ruby, have suggested that any depiction of terrorism is dependent on the particular context being analysed, with key perspectives including legal, moral and behavioural elements. For example, from a legal or moral standpoint, the phenomenon is defined with respect to the values and laws governing the decisions of the exponent, with the specific deed of terrorism being secondary; meanwhile, a behavioural perspective emphasises the various reactions to the feat and deciphers terrorism as an act. Notwithstanding the discordance in the definitional realm of terrorism, a key area of incontrovertible assertion is the dynamic evolution of the phenomenon throughout the ages. To this extent, the characterisation of terrorism has advanced on various etymological levels, resulting from shifting factors at the practical level of perpetration. In the main, such progressions in the definition of the phenomenon are directly related to variations in objectives of the perpetrators, as well as the tactics which they have employed to attain such ends. Essentially, the varying devices and purposes of different terrorist groups over the centuries have progressively added new fundamental interpretations to the debates. As a case in point, during the years 1793-94, the French echelons of political power enacted a state-sponsored form of legal terror. [13]

Throughout the 19th and 20th century, the perpetrators of terrorist activities came from different sections of modern society, each embracing a setting of distinct objectives relative to their particular circumstances. To this extent, the levels of analysis and precipitation of terrorist activities have evolved beyond the state level apparent during a brief phase of the French Revolution. Specifically, terrorism has evolved to include global, transnational and international, societal, group, organisational and individual levels of terrorism. Accordingly, each level of analysis examines terrorist groups at the international, nation-state, national, regional and non-affiliated individual levels. At each of these levels, terrorism embraces distinct characteristics which are the result of the advancement in the practical dimensions of terrorist
activities over the ages. On one hand, at the state level, terrorist activity can take the form of internal repression, state-sponsored, or state-performed terrorism. [16] On the other hand, at the non-state level, terrorist activity typically exists on the basis of key motivators, including political ideology, ethno-nationalism, and religious extremism. [17]

FLEC-Cabinda Secessionism: A Comparative International Perspective

To characterize the various dimensions in the evolution of terrorism, it is imperative to consider two contemporary examples which can contextualise the case of the FLEC in the Cabinda-Luanda impasse. Among several cases of ethno-nationalist secessionism, the protracted stand-off between the Republic of Chechnya and Russia presents a parallel case to that of Cabinda and Luanda. The plight of Chechnya is parallel to that of Cabinda to the extent that the region holds geo-strategic and economic significance to the central government, as the Caucasus region is rich in oil and natural gas reserves, among other important minerals. The implosion of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War led to the formation of several relatively small states within the former territory, which progressively became self-governing entities. Although in 1991 Chechnya claimed the right to sovereignty in a similar manner to other Soviet states in the Baltic and the southern Caucasus region, the geo-strategic importance of the territory as well as its inclusion in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic under constitutional law, led to harsh resistance from the Russian government. [18]

Consequently, Chechnya—which has a different ethnic composition than other regions in the Russian federation—has been engaged with the Russian government and military in a fervent and violent struggle for secession. Chechen separatists have employed a range of violent measures, including bombings and indiscriminate attacks against non-combatant Russian civilians. These attacks have been widely considered as terrorist in nature. [19] While major military actions of the Chechen secessionist groups have been repressed by the Russian security forces, dispersed organisations have continued to make their demands for political changes, using suicide bombings, hostage takings and other, less aggressive, attacks on civilians. [20]

In a similar manner, the case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers) in Sri Lanka also offers an informative comparison with the case of Cabinda and the FLEC. For example, the origins of the secessionist engagement between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government, are rooted in a similar historical trajectory as the Cabinda case. Most notably, ethnic differences between the minority Tamil people of the north and northeastern regions and the majority Sinhalese population of the central, western and southern regions evolved into civil conflict [21], particularly after the Tamils were politically disenfranchised by the Sri Lankan government after 1949. [22] The long-term consequence of the ethnic and class-based discordance between the Tamil and the Sinhalese groups resulted in a violent secessionist struggle in which atrocious acts
were committed by the Tamil Tigers, acts which have been recognized as terrorism by up to 30 countries, including neighbouring India, the United States, and members of the European Union. This international condemnation of the Tamil Tigers’ terrorist tactics in turn allowed Sri Lanka’s armed forces to get away with the use of indiscriminate attacks and atrocious counter-insurgency measures for wiping out the LTTE. In this process, a range of government-led acts have amounted to gross human rights abuses. [23] In this manner, the Sri Lanka-Tamil Tiger situation presents an illuminating comparative perspective, as one of the main contentions in this article is that the Angolan government has portrayed FLEC actions as terrorism in order to cloak their use of unlawful means for suppressing the secessionist movement in Cabinda.

The Impasse between Luanda and Cabinda: the emergence of the FLEC and economic nationalism.

The Cabinda province is a geographically isolated territory north of Angola, separated from the mainland by a strip of land which is a part of the north-western boundary of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The origins of the ongoing tensions between Cabinda and Luanda are rooted in Angola’s colonial trajectory. The foundations of the concerns raised by the people of Cabinda are premised on the contention that the Angolan mainland and the enclave bear somewhat divergent identity and historical experiences. [24] In this regard, while Angola was a Portuguese colony for a period that spanned over four centuries, the Cabinda province was a protectorate which gained quasi-independent status in 1956. [25] The crux of the age-old tensions is premised on the fact that the Cabinda province was eventually amalgamated into Angola, albeit without consulting the enclaves’ leadership. Cabinda’s sovereignty was reaffirmed in 1963 by the Organisation of African Union, which designating the territory as an independently-governed state with its own inherent anti-colonial movement. [26] The turning point in Cabinda’s colonial trajectory came in 1956, when the conservative government of Portugal ceased to be the protector of the region, strategically handing the territory over to Angola’s administration without prior negotiations with Cabinda’s political leadership. Consequently, the people of Cabinda established militant groups which have been engaged in intermittent fighting with Luanda’s military forces in what has historically been framed as a struggle for self-determination based on its claim to sovereignty. [27]

Thus, the history and primary motivation of the reactive militant groups in Cabinda stems from the quasi-annexation of the province by Luanda and the desire for autonomy. [28] These groups include: the Freedom Movement for the State of Cabinda (MLEC) in 1960; the National Action Committee of the Cabindan People (CAUNC); and the Mayombé Alliance, which was referred to as ALLIAMA. [29] In 1963, these three groups merged to form the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), which has since been at the forefront of diplomatic negotiations and militant actions geared toward achieving independence and self determination for Cabinda.
The armed invasion of Cabinda by MPLA forces on 11 November 1975 heralded a prolonged period of intermittent conflict and diplomatic tensions which continue largely unabated today.

From a historical perspective, the militancy of the FLEC is rooted in the exclusionary manner in which the pre-independence negotiations between Angola and the Portuguese administration were carried out. [30] While the province of Cabinda had been a Portuguese protectorate since the ‘Scramble for Africa’ in 1885, the territory was annexed to Portuguese Angolan control in 1956 through a process which excluded the Cabindan people. [31] To make matters worse, when the Portuguese administration departed and granted independence to Angola in 1975 through the negotiated Alvor Accord, the future of Cabinda was planned and decided by the outgoing administration and Angola’s three leading nationalist movements (MPLA, FNLA and UNITA) with the outright omission of Cabindan representatives. [32] Thus, the FLEC was formed as a result of the aggravation and disenfranchisement engendered by exclusionary politics on the part of Luanda and Portugal. [33] The secessionist fervour and militancy of the FLEC was the product of a refusal to allow Cabinda’s inhabitants to determine their own future.

Although FLEC’s call for secession is premised on this history of political exclusion and disenfranchisement and the resulting desire among Cabinda’s inhabitants for regional autonomy and self-determination, there are predominant motivating factors of an economic nature which have also propelled the militancy of the group. Essentially, the people of Cabinda have been strategically deprived of access to vital oil resources which are indigenous to the province. Upon the discovery of oil in Cabinda in 1956, and the commencement of exploration by the Gulf Oil Company in 1966, the geo-strategic and financial importance of the province became a decisive factor in the deliberations between Portugal and Luanda. [34] Following the generation of substantial oil revenue in Cabinda by the Gulf Oil Company after 1966, the significance of the province in the colonial dispensation became paramount, albeit without the inclusion of Cabindans in the management and exploitation of oil resources. [35] Fundamentally, the annexation of the territory to Portuguese Angola was largely influenced by the anticipated windfall and future significance of oil revenues to Portugal’s colonial administration. [36]

Of particular importance, the royalties paid by the Gulf Oil Company contributed significantly to the colonial administration’s military budget in their endeavours against nationalist forces during the war for independence. According to one account, oil revenues accounted for roughly 30 percent ($16 million) of the Portuguese colonial administration’s military budget in 1970, and these revenues were projected to rise to $33-50 million by 1972. [37]

Therefore, by assigning increased control of Cabinda’s oil resources to the colonial administration, and eventually to Angola - with minimal interference from the former’s independence movements - the Portuguese effectively harmonized the administration of their colonial outposts, while simultaneously marginalizing and excluding the province’s political
groups from all critical negotiations. This line of reasoning on Portugal’s part substantiates the military strategic importance of oil resources and revenues, as well as the importance of suppressing Cabinda’s right to self-determination and aspirations for independence. In addition to abundant and economically strategic oil resources, the Cabinda province is also blessed with other valuable natural resources, including coffee, timber, palm oil and rubber. [38] The desire to control these resources is another reason that the central Angolan government rejects all demands for independence or self-determination for the people of Cabinda.

Today, Cabinda’s oil fields comprise a significant proportion of Angola’s total oil output. The Angolan government is particularly dependent on Cabinda’s offshore crude oil, which represents approximately 86% of the state’s earnings. [39] Furthermore, Cabinda’s offshore fields account for up to 60% of Angola’s oil exports, a significant proportion of Luanda’s annual revenue stream which the state cannot practically forego despite the opposition of the region’s inhabitants. [40] Essentially, the long-drawn-out tussle between Cabinda and Luanda is motivated by the need for deriving much-needed economic gain from valuable oil reserves and accessing the socio-economic benefits which can potentially be drawn from oil reserves of which the province fundamentally declares ownership. Further, the province continues to be marginalised by the central Angolan government, and the inhabitants of Cabinda do not adequately reap the benefits of the oil wealth which is derived from their territory. Accordingly, the FLEC’s militancy is animated by demands for management and access to oil resources which are de facto indigenous to Cabinda, in addition to acquiring political autonomy from Luanda and eventual secession from Angola.

The array of complexities and layers implicit in the discontent between Cabinda’s age-old independence movement on one hand, and Luanda’s defiance on the other, reveals that devising an effective resolution to the unremitting impasse between the two parties is a counsel of despair. A series of attempts at building peace and reaching agreements which are mutually beneficial to both parties have clearly failed. On Luanda’s part, the decision-making dynamics taken in relation to Cabinda’s pleas appear to be inordinately influenced by the economic imperative.

With Cabindan oil fields accounting for such a significant proportion of Angola’s oil exports, granting autonomy to the province would lead to overwhelming dire consequences for national revenue. Alternatively for Cabinda, the multifaceted concerns of the province’s inhabitants - including legal-historical claims, universal rights to self-determination, and perceived denial of the economic benefits from being a valuable resource-rich region, among other central contentions - have provided the impetus for separatists to adopt a ‘by any means necessary’ line of attack, to include voicing their concerns through the actions of FLEC in the hope of yielding desired outcomes.
FLECs Primary Tactics: Hostage-takings & Kidnappings

The FLEC, which has splintered into various rival factions during the last 20 years, has predominately used hostage-taking and kidnapping activities as primary tactics in pursuing its political objectives. Looking at their violent activities more closely reveals that the movement initially sought to use violence, mainly in the form of kidnappings and hostage takings, for both economic necessities (the need to generate revenues) and political objectives (the need to raise awareness and draw international support for their broader independence cause). This was primarily done by carrying out attacks that included kidnapping workers from multinational energy, construction and timber corporations operating in the region. [41] For example, in 1992, the FLEC launched a violent attack on Chevron oil workers in transit, leading to a brief offensive against the separatists by government forces. [42] Although this first attempt did not yield the desired outcome for the separatists, the FLEC and its factions continued to employ such tactics. More successful attempts followed in the late 1990s; however, economic motivations came to greatly outweigh the political objectives. Of particular note is an attack in 1997 when the extremist faction FLEC-FAC (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda - Armed Forces of Cabinda) kidnapped workers from a Cabinda-based construction company. They released the hostages after receiving ransom amounting to $400,000. [43] Another hostage-taking act in 1998 yielded approximately $500,000 in ransom fees. While economically-motivated attacks continued, the group used funds garnered from ransoms to support politically motivated attacks such as the 1999 kidnapping of four workers from Portuguese and French companies. In doing so, they sought to gain international attention for the separatist cause. [44] The group also sought international attention when it kidnapped three Portuguese nationals and an Angolan in 2000. Instead of a ransom, the group demanded that the Portuguese government formally recognize the problem of Cabinda. [45] A year later, in March 2001, the FLEC-Renovada, another faction, kidnapped five Portuguese employees of a construction company. [46] Notwithstanding the efforts of the FLEC to garner broader attention and communicate their political grievances, such attacks, while resulting in some international attention, did little for the Cabinda cause. For example, in March 2001 the European Parliament released a joint motion for a resolution that condemned the hostage-taking in Cabinda as a tactic for political action.[47] In fact, such attacks prompted the government to clamp down on the militant movement by arresting high-ranking FLEC members who were implicated in the attacks.

While the FLEC has been engaged in various criminal and politically motivated acts of kidnapping and hostage-taking, the most recent event which caught international attention was the attack on the Togolese national soccer team during the 2010 Cup of African Nations tournament. Although the Cabindan Forum for Dialogue (FCD) - an integrated unit comprised of representatives from various civic institutions established in 2004 - had signed the peace Memorandum with Angola in 2006 to bring a de facto termination to the conflict, the FLEC-FAC branch desisted. On the basis of FLEC’s dissatisfaction with the nature of the accords, the group...
pledged to heighten militant activity leading up to the 2010 Cup of African Nations. Consequently, on January 8th 2010 the national football team of Togo was in a convoy of busses led by Angolan state security forces en route to a stadium for training in Cabinda when they were attacked by an armed group. The ensuing gunfight resulted in 3 deaths, as well as several injured. According to reports, a different faction (FLEC-PM) initially claimed responsibility for the attack, but the FLEC-FAC faction ultimately claimed responsibility and noted that the intended target was the Angolan security force, not the Togolese players. Shortly following the attacks, the Angolan state police made numerous arrests, many of which included high-ranking members of the FLEC-FAC. They were charged with a terroristic “crimes against the security of the state” indictment.

Can FLEC’s Use of Kidnapping & Hostage-taking be Labeled Terrorism?

To the extent that acts of terrorism can be defined by the factors detailed in the first section of this discussion, the case of the Cabinda conflict presents a difficult case for scholars. Most of the violent acts committed by the FLEC have been acts of kidnapping and hostage-taking, which some scholarly perspectives view as falling outside the scope of terrorism. For instance, in a definition of terrorism proffered by Charles Ruby, the scholar asserts that terrorism, as it exists within a politically motivated framework, is aimed towards objectives which are strictly geared towards manipulating government policy, essentially excluding undertakings such as ‘robbery, homicide, and kidnapping.’ According to Ruby, these acts can be perceived as deeds which are geared towards personal objectives, rather than motivated by the desire to induce sweeping political changes at the government level. From this perspective, these acts of the FLEC, as discussed above, can largely be seen as activities which have the goal of furthering the illicit economic goals of the militant group, thereby being removed from the core secessionist objectives of Cabinda’s inhabitants.

Alternatively, there are other academics whose wider and more comprehensive definition considers acts of terrorism as spanning a wide array of politically-motivated tactics of struggle, with the government comprising the main target of such activities. In this regard, Charles Tilly suggests that dedicated military groups in various regions of the world employ kidnapping, murder, as well as mutilation (among other tactics) in their encounters with government forces that have been commissioned to engage in counter-terrorist operations. The FLEC’s tactical engagements have not involved the kidnapping of government security personnel; instead, the group has typically resorted to hostage-taking of workers from oil companies and other non-combatant targets. This point has been reiterated by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in citing the use of hostage-taking methods, among a range of other human rights abuses, as the preferred means of engaging with the Angolan government in their endeavour to influence the current political conditions imposed on Cabinda.
In the same vein, terrorism expert Brian Jenkins suggests that a majority of terrorists operate with a narrow tactical framework, including six principal devices: kidnappings, bombings, assassinations, armed attacks, hijackings and hostage-takings. Moreover, within this context, the use of kidnapping and hostage-taking by the FLEC has evolved into a vital means of generating revenue to launch further actions aimed at influencing the government in their favour. [56]

After considering the body of knowledge on whether kidnapping and hostage-taking should be considered terrorism, it can be argued that the FLEC’s use of these tactics do not constitute terrorism. Rather, FLEC relies on these tactics to generate revenues with which they can launch other forms of political violence. However, the Angolan government has consistently portrayed the actions of FLEC as purely terrorist in nature, a characterization which is then used to justify the states’ use of unlawful measures against the militant group in efforts to suppress Cabinda’s counter-secessionist operations. In this regard, the state has utilized the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) for the suppression of the FLEC insurgency, using disproportionate acts of force and engaging in wanton human rights abuses. Fundamentally, the Angolan government has continued to strategically undermine the human rights of Cabinda’s inhabitants under a cloak of national security breaches committed by the FLEC and other militants, as outlawed by the ‘crimes against the security of the state’ legal framework. As discussed in the following section, in this respect - notwithstanding the previously mentioned ‘Memorandum for Peace and Reconciliation for Cabinda’ of 2006 which signified the end of hostilities between the government and the FLEC - Luanda has continued to employ gratuitous means for suppressing the insurgency, including torture, disappearances, arbitrary arrests, sexual assault, targeted killings and executions. [58]

**The Socio-Political Dynamics of the Conflict: Luanda’s human rights abuses**

While the three decades-long conflict has already resulted in thousands of casualties, the paramount humanitarian concerns mainly relate to the human rights abuses inflicted by the governments’ forces against Cabinda’s inhabitants. In efforts to circumvent the endeavours of the belligerent FLEC and other more minor secessionist forces, reports have surfaced that Luanda has resorted to selective military filtrations in order to root out insurrectional intentions and dissidence in Cabinda. In response to the hostage-taking and kidnapping attacks, the FAA allegedly responded with arbitrary arrests, unlawful detention of innocent civilians and torture in its attempts to quell secessionist splinter groups within Cabinda society. For example, between 2007 and 2009 approximately 38 arrests were made, mainly of individuals who were implicated in separatist endeavours. A series of military raids executed by the FAA have also prompted numerous reports of human rights violations ranging from disappearances, torture and
incommunicado detentions to martial executions and rape cases. [62] Accounts of such atrocities committed by the FAA are detailed in a 2009 report released by Human Rights Watch. Such abusive actions, which have increased since the end of the Angolan civil war in 2002, have fallen under the FAA counterinsurgency measures. These have been central in engendering a state of mutual mistrust between the parties involved, adding a further level of complexity to the convoluted dilemma.

The Angolan government’s record of misconduct in Cabinda has raised the wariness among leaders of the FLEC and the province’s civil society organisations regarding Luanda’s intentions. Notwithstanding the efforts by Luanda and FLEC’s leadership to reach a peace deal in 2006, the peace-making efforts have been tainted with signs of dissatisfaction among particular segments of the separatist organisation and Cabinda’s various civic institutions. [63] While the insurgency was brought to a de facto end with the signing of the Memorandum, there have been continued reports of isolated spates of insurrectionary violence as well as statements of dissidence from within Cabinda. The antagonism has been largely attributed to the dissatisfaction regarding two central factors: 1) the nature of the peace Memorandum, which only grants Cabinda ‘special status’ and a limited measure of autonomy - a decision which some elements within the province have refused to sanction; and 2) the apprehension among the region’s civil society organisations about the FAA’s record of human rights abuses against civilians. [64] The discontent with the first of these factors was fuelled by the high level of discord within Cabinda’s independence movements, with a divided leadership within the FLEC. There was also a divergence in the perspectives between the FLEC and other institutions such as churches and human rights groups. [65] Disquiet regarding the second factor was animated by Luanda’s ban on the Civic Association of Cabinda (Mpalabanda), Cabinda’s principal human rights civil society institution, which has been instrumental in advocating the region’s foremost interests. [66]

While the actions of the FLEC in the 2010 attack on the Togo football team may have provoked the desired reaction from Luanda and the international community, the event added further complexity to the impasse between the central Angolan government and Cabinda. Among other factors, the incident presented an opportunity for Luanda’s security forces to further infiltrate Cabinda’s separatist leaders and pivotal elements in the secession movement. The reaction of Luanda’s security forces has been succinctly expressed by a 2010 Human Rights Watch report. Following the arrest of Belchior Lanso Tati, Francisco Luemba, and Raul Tati, three pivotal figures in Cabinda’s independence movement, Luanda released a statement citing that it would bring to court all of the ‘material and moral authors’ of the onslaught. [67] Moreover, the government proceeded to label the rebel leaders as ‘terrorists’ who needed to be brought to book for committing ‘state security’ crimes. [68] Following a series of detentions by Luanda, reports have emerged regarding the abusive and unconstitutional treatment of detainees, many of whom had been arrested and kept incommunicado and without due process.
Despite the succession of arrests by the government, it appears that these efforts have not been followed by any criminal and/or forensic investigations. Evidently, the government may have taken advantage of the state of affairs in Cabinda by exacting unlawful imprisonment of suspects and those believed to be instrumental to Cabinda’s separatist cause. In this context, Cabinda’s militant efforts in the previously described January 2010 attack may have produced undesired consequences. Although the event garnered widespread international attention, the implications are clearly not beneficial for the broader cause; the arbitrary arrests of key Cabinda figures and the coincident human rights abuses by Luanda have effectively made it difficult for international human rights and criminal organisations to access critical information essential to making meaningful strides in resolving the quandary in the long-term. [69] Correspondingly, in the context of peace-building, the incommunicado arrests of key figures of Cabinda’s movement, including militant organisations and civic institutions, significantly undermines the capacity for the province to present a staunch and efficient front to tackle Luanda’s abuses of criminal and territorial legislation in the name of weakening secessionist efforts. [70]

Summary

From the broader political economic perspective of Angola’s oil production, the instability in the region presents potential threats to Luanda’s secluded oil resources. The age-old standoff between Cabinda and the central government is grounded in fundamental historical, socio-cultural and economic issues which are impossible to ignore despite the foray into militancy by the FLEC. While the historical and territorial arguments continue to be pivotal in Cabinda’s line of reasoning, the most pressing concerns from both perspectives are palpably economic. Cabinda’s on- and offshore oil deposits represent a significant proportion of Angola’s annual oil revenue which the state cannot afford to lose, although the benefits of this increasing wealth are not apparent for Cabinda’s inhabitants.

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Notes
[5] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid, p.13
[19] Ibid.
[25] Ibid. It is,however, important to note that the Portuguese administration did not eventually grant Cabinda complete autonomy as promised.
[26] Ibid
[27] Cabinda’s armed resistance is currently led by the ‘Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda’ (FLEC), which evolved from two distinct militant splinter groups as of 2004.
[29] Ibid
[33] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[37] Ibid, p.5.
[38] Ibid, p.8.
[41] Pham, J. P. (2007), ‘Cabinda: The “Forgotten Conflict” America Can't Afford to Forget’ World Defence Review, p.4. The tactics employed by the FLEC have some similarity to those of the Niger Delta’s Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Notwithstanding, the actions of the FLEC have yet to reach a scale as widespread as those of the MEND.
[43] The FLEC-FAC is the breakaway faction of the FLEC established during the 1990s when the group underwent internal reforms which also resulting in the formation of the FLEC-Renovada. The FAC, which stands for Armed Forces for Cabinda, is the more extremist militant faction of the FLEC outfit.


[47] Ibid.


[50] Ibid. According to HRW, “the Angolan law on ‘crimes against the security of the state’ dates from 1978. It includes not only those participating in violent acts that undermine the territorial integrity & sovereignty, & ‘collective action aimed at instigating public opinion i.e. in accordance with foreign pretensions’ (article 1).”


[52] Ibid.


[60] In efforts to contain the secessionist efforts in Cabinda, the Angolan government has methodically deployed the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). The FAA has been cited in various human rights violations against Cabinda’s inhabitants.


[63] Ibid. p.1. - The peace deal, the ‘Memorandum for Peace and Reconciliation for Cabinda,’ was signed by Luanda and the FLEC on July 15, 2006, in Congo-Brazzaville and overseen by the African Union.


[65] Although the interests of Cabinda’s separatists had been conveyed by the ‘Cabindan Forum for Dialogue’ (FCD), an integrated unit comprised of representation from various civic institutions established in 2004, there was an eruption of dissonance within Cabinda’s independence organizations. Principally, the leading independence movement, the FLEC, splintered into two distinct groups in 2004 following an array of structural disputes, leading to the formation of the ‘FLEC Renovada’ and ‘FLEC-FAC’ respectively.


[68] Ibid.


[70] Ibid, p. 9-11.
Book Reviews


Reviewed by Madeleine Gruen

Terrorist groups based in Pakistan pose one of the biggest threats to international security. Dozens of terrorist and insurgent groups use Pakistan, particularly its Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), as a base to launch operations in Afghanistan and terrorist attacks worldwide. In Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero, Rohan Gunaratna (Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, and a well-known Al-Qaeda expert) and Khuram Iqbal (former head of research at the Pakistani Institute for Peace Studies in Islamabad, currently working towards his PhD at the University of Wollongong) clearly explain the conditions that make Pakistan a “Terrorist Disneyland.” The threat cannot be terminated simply by surgically removing Al-Qaeda (AQ) from the FATA. Rather, the authors argue, any viable solution to contain the threat will include consideration of the myriad of complexities at play, and will have to address the decades of bad governance, illiteracy, poverty, lack of development, lack of healthcare, and political corruption that have contributed to the creation of the ground that is likely to support ideological extremism and terrorism for years to come.

The book covers the broad scope of the threat in seven chapters; from the systematic negligence of the FATA since the time of British Colonial rule, to how the spider web of non-state actors have challenged Pakistan’s ability to juggle internal and external threats with pressure from the international community to take more sustained action.

Some readers may be put off by the introduction to the book, in which Gunaratna and Iqbal assert the US precipitated the global spread of terrorism, and the escalation of terrorist attacks in Pakistan itself, by stirring the hornets’ nest in its retaliation for 9/11 and by not neutralizing the ideological source of the threat (p.14). In this context, the authors fail to mention that Pakistan had been the headquarters for the “global jihad” for years before 9/11. Fortunately, the authors leave this point behind, and make clear in the rest of the book the FATA was “kept backwards” (p. 21) by the state, which has not contributed enough towards its development and stability. The authors also do not hold back their criticism of the state’s weak stop-and-start military and humanitarian campaigns to eject foreign terrorists from the FATA.

Scholars and counterterrorism analysts will appreciate the detailed profiles of the major terrorist and insurgent groups operating in Pakistan, including Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Tehrik
Lashkar-e-Islami (LI), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Gunaratna and Iqbal do an outstanding job teasing out the differences between the groups so readers can picture the TTP, for example, not as a single, monolithic organization, but as a network of groups, a few of which are allied with AQ in its war against the “far enemy”, some of which are concerned with ejecting U.S. and coalition troops from Afghanistan, while some others are focused entirely on attacking the host state. The authors also provide important details about each group’s leadership, financing, intentions and capabilities, and the nature of their cooperation with other groups.

A full chapter covers terrorism in Karachi, introducing the added complications brought on by sectarian violence between the Sunni and the Shi’a; tensions that have been exacerbated by Iran and Saudi Arabia in the course of promoting their own interests (pp. 111-121). To that end, the authors continually remind readers throughout the book of the broader implications of militancy in Pakistan, providing solid examples of how the threat has spilled over to neighboring South Asian, Central Asian, and Western countries.

Gunaratna and Iqbal’s assessment can serve as a valuable tool to shape a comprehensive strategic policy to defeat terrorism in Pakistan. The book also provides counterterrorism analysts with a much-needed roadmap of the multiple variables and subtleties in action that have affected, and will undoubtedly continue to affect, much of the rest of the world.

About the Reviewer: Madeleine Gruen is a senior analyst at the NEFA Foundation, and is a consultant for the Homeland Security and Counterterrorism program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Unfortunately, it is often the case that those who are dispatched to report from war zones are the least qualified to do so. So too – by her own admission – in the case of Kim Barker, who was sent to Afghanistan and Pakistan as the Chicago Tribune’s South Asia bureau chief. As she recounts her experiences in The Taliban Shuffle, Barker offers some insight into the bizarre world of the war correspondent in the 21st century. Yet deeper insights regarding either country remain elusive in this light-hearted account.

Amid a long-standing culture in which area studies are dominated by punditry and the cult of self-proclaimed “experts”, Barker’s self-deprecation is remarkably refreshing. Happily, she highlights her unfamiliarity with the terrain prior to visiting. In 2004, in place of one of the legions of young American politics wonks – writers academically familiar with Afghanistan’s history, politics, or languages, who were infinitely more qualified to report back from the country - the Tribune decided to send Barker to report back instead. In a media culture that often appears to celebrate ignorance, such a decision is itself a revealing one. Tragically, it is not uncommon. The Taliban Shuffle represents the outcome of Barker’s years spent on the ground. Until 2009 she remained in the region, reporting back as it wafted in and out of newsworthiness, yet despite her wealth of on the ground experience there is scant convincing evidence to show that she is any more informed now. The book does not claim as its goal to inform readers much about politics in the area, and nor does it. Indeed, few readers will come away from this book knowing much more about the Taliban, Pakistan, or Afghanistan than they already did before. Instead, it offers triviality and anecdote.

Still, what the book does promise is an amusing account of life inside the bubble of war correspondents, and in this it does deliver – at least in part. Entertainingly, Barker, for example, tells of a journalist friend in Pakistan kidnapped by the Taliban. At one point he overheard a BBC radio report about the presence of militant training camps in Pakistan meeting with vehement denial from Pakistani officials, only for the listener to hear the radio report drowned out by the sound of gunfire coming from the militant camp outside. Barker’s anecdotes are amusing, but not as side-splitting as they are built up by the praise on the book’s cover.

Despite the cover’s gushing endorsement (“witty, brilliant, and impossible to put down”) from Rajiv Chanrasekaran, the author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City, Barker does not do for Afghanistan what he had done earlier in his book about Iraq. Descriptions of Kabul’s ex-pat parties, such as the ‘Invader’ themed party hosted by Department of International Development
(DfID) employees, or a similar ‘tarts & Talibs’ themed event do come close, but elsewhere the book remains an awkward mix between memoir and political narrative.

Describing one exchange, Barker writes “‘Yeah, I talk to the Taliban,’ I said. ‘I’ve hung out with them before’”. And if only she had – rather than writing later of “my seventh embed” with the American military occupying the county – for her book surely would have benefitted from it. “Four years into this gig”, she writes at one point, and “my whole identity was wrapped up in it”; but sadly the reader never gains the sense that Barker actually ‘gets it’. With admissions like “I planned to spend as much time as possible following the Americans in Afghanistan”, one can appreciates why she did not ‘get it’.

Barker provides an entertaining enough account of one journalist’s experience, but this is far from what the book had the potential to be after such a sustained period spent living on location in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Ten years on, the Afghan impasse and the insecurity of Pakistan continue with few signs of abating.

About the Reviewer: Richard Phelps is an Adjunct Fellow at the Quilliam Foundation (London). He focuses on the history and development of Islamist dissent in the Arabic world.

Reviewed by Richard Phelps

To understand the origins of Al-Qaeda, one’s eye must focus on Cairo and Riyadh. Yet mere knowledge of Arab politics will offer only limited help in understanding the evolution of the historic Al-Qaeda organisation in the years following 9/11. Based in Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is instead an understanding of the militant landscapes of these frontiers that will be of greater benefit for understanding “Al-Qaeda Central”. This is what the Pakistani journalist Saleem Shahzad offers in his remarkable account of the of Pakistan’s militant underground.

Numerous journalists continue to dine out on the experience of having interviewed Osama bin Laden during the 1990s. The insight that such journalists can offer as a result of what undoubtedly proved to be curious and once-in-a-lifetime experiences is, however, questionable. After all, the Al-Qaeda leadership welcomed such journalists as the recipients of their press releases: the more the merrier. By contrast, those with high-level militant access in the post-9/11 period have understandably been few and far between. In this way, Shahzad stands out in his success in making contact with leaders within Pakistan’s clandestine movements, and his writing benefits a great deal from the details that such encounters provide him with. Shahzad’s proximity cost him, as his new book went to press, his life. Shahzad was murdered after publishing a newspaper article – the basis of which he doubtless gleaned from his militant contacts. For some, he knew too much.

What Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban offers is a survey unlike any other of the militant landscape in Pakistan since 9/11. What emerges is a picture very different from the popular account that presents al-Qaeda Central as a spent and marginal organisation long prior to the death of Bin Laden, with only about a hundred fighters remaining after having been devastated by US drone strikes. Whilst the latter point is not disputed, the above picture overlooks what Shahzad presents: an Al-Qaeda that has grown away from its Arab roots of exiled “strangers” into a Pakistani-staffed organisation that has developed deep roots in the country by piggybacking on the infrastructure of existing local networks, many of which have access to the state’s resources through patronage from the military.

Such a presentation is reflected in Shahzad’s access to Ilyas Kashmiri, the reclusive Pakistani militant leader whose death shortly after Bin Laden’s was arguably far more damaging to the organisation in operational terms than the Al-Qaeda leader’s own slaying. Kashmiri’s background was that of a veteran of various Islamist militant networks in Kashmir, long-sponsored by Pakistan’s military and intelligence apparatus in its conflict with India. Yet Kashmiri moved away from such sponsorship, and became as comfortable targeting Pakistan’s
military as he was targeting India’s. By doing so, he earned a seat on Al-Qaeda’s leadership council.

The underworld that Shahzad presents is complex. It consists of the Afghan Taliban, a slew of Kashmiri militant groups, other Pakistani anti-Shi’a militants, former Pakistani army officers, the Pakistani Taliban, the Haqqani network, al-Qaeda as well as other foreign militants such as Uzbeks, who also operate from Pakistan. What he presents is the blurring and interweaving of these nebulous groups. Shahzad describes disaffected officers quitting the Pakistani military and pressuring their comrades to follow suit, before targeting the officers they previously answered to, all the while still making use of military facilities. Little is as it appears to be in the world that Shahzad presents: for example, the Iranian regime allows NATO troops to transport equipment through Iran in order to sustain the occupation in Afghanistan; Al-Qaeda supports Jundallah (an Iranian Sunni Islamist organisation that targets the Iranian regime) yet after an Iranian diplomat named Heshmatollah Attarzadeh was kidnapped in Pakistan in 2008, Iranian intelligence officers became close to Al-Qaeda’s interlocutors during the course of their negotiations for his release and ended up releasing many of the Al-Qaeda leaders that Iran had earlier detained when they fled from Afghanistan.

Shahzad’s presentation is granular, and offers a profile of several Al-Qaeda figures that few will previously have heard of. For example, Shahzad presents Sheikh ‘Isa al-Masri, a septuagenarian Egyptian dissident cleric who learned Pashto and rooted himself among Pakistani tribesman of North Waziristan, earning a loyal militant following by so doing. The strength of this book is the alternative picture it presents. Yet Shahzad errs half way through the book by offering a lengthy interruption that analyses the ideology and Arab politics that gave rise to Al-Qaeda in a way that is both tiring and unsophisticated. The book could have done without this. Similarly, both the structure of the book and Shahzad’s style of writing are frustrating: Shahzad hops back and forth in a number of places, making the book seem repetitive in spite of its novelty; likewise, every couple of pages he insists on stating that Al-Qaeda’s situation in Pakistan is reminiscent of a drama from Thousand and One Nights.

Though tempering the overall feel of the book, one must overlook such imperfections in presentation in order to benefit from the content Shahzad offers. Though the numbers he cites seem exaggerated, he nevertheless presents an alarming situation regarding Pakistan, in which the state’s writ is increasingly surrendered, the army is an institution rotten to the core, and high levels of hatred, extremism, and violence circulate in an underworld populated by thousands of militants. S.S. Shahzad, the Pakistan Bureau Chief of Asia Times Online, however, was not killed by this underworld but apparently at the order from someone in the upperworld, with the ISI as most likely suspect.

About the Reviewer: Richard Phelps is an Adjunct Fellow at the Quilliam Foundation (London). He focuses on the history and development of Islamist dissent in the Arabic world.
Daniela Pisoiu. Islamist Radicalisation in Europe. An occupational change process. 

Reviewed by Alex P. Schmid

This doctoral dissertation from the University of St. Andrews has been written by a Rumanian researcher currently attached to the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. It is a work that challenges many of the assumptions of current European governmental de- and counter-radicalisation programs. It does a good job in identifying some of their weaknesses. It is, however, less persuasive when proposing an alternative framework for viewing radicalisation. The author is utilizing a grounded theory approach whereby “data collection...uses a systematically applied set of methods to generate an inductive theory about a substantive area” (Glaser, 1992; cit. p.4). However, the book’s Appendix contains neither the coding sheet nor the coding results from the ca. 50 mainly Austrian, German and French sources she utilizes. One can only hope that her coding of data was more careful than her spelling of names [e. g. Peter Gridling, not “Grindling” (p. 147); Benno Ohnesorg, not “Ohnesog”, p. 139]. The empirical basis for her bold conclusions is rather small; she herself conducted only one interview of one hour’s length with one “Islamist radical” (p. 171). True, she made use of almost a dozen prison interviews conducted by Farhad Khosrokhavar (2006), attended four terrorist trials and conducted some interviews with intelligence officials, Islamic community representatives and others, etc.. On the other hand, she has absorbed a sizeable portion of the secondary academic literature on radicalisation as well as government reports which she subjects to close scrutiny and criticism. That is the most valuable part of her book. D. Pisoiu is right in stressing the utility of rational choice theory in explaining why some individuals and groups see merit in becoming violent radicals. She is also right in seeing parallels between choosing a criminal career and a terrorist career (there are also parallels between opting for such careers and opting for joining a religious sect – something she has, however, not looked into). She is also right in viewing Islamist radicalisation as a gradual process, in stressing the role of social networks in joining militant groups (p. 81-82) and in viewing it not as a sui generis phenomenon, but as one type of radicalisation (p.23). However, these are, in themselves, not new findings. Her definition of radicalisation as an “occupational change process’ like any other, however, is new and problematic. Sure, on an abstract level the categories reward, recognition and standing, inform the choice of both legal and illegal occupations but there are also important differences (linked to operating in illegal undergrounds where sanctions are often violent) which she does not explore. Her “discovery” that the radical Islamist occupation is a matter of rational choice, leads her to far-reaching - and in the view of this reviewer often questionable - conclusions about other existing explanations of radicalisation such as

- that grievances…hardly apply to individual profiles, and that, more importantly, motivational development occurs along completely different lines” (p. 107) ;
that the “….assumption that extremist groups have something to do with Islamist
radicalisation” is debatable (p.150);
- “….a lack of integration is not a cause of radicalization….“(…)”….integration ….should
be taken out of the counter-radicalisation debate once and for all” (pp. 162, 166);
- “…Islamist radicalism is a process generated within European societies and that the
foreign nature of ideologies or the foreign background of some of the radicals do not
fundamentally impact on the way this process unfolds” (p. 163);
- “….radicalisation…is not the process leading to extremism: (p. 163);
- “…eliminating ideology and root causes are dead-end streets”(when it comes to
countering radicalisation, APS);
- “The enemy is not the ideology, and much less the ideologue….“(p.166).

These are strong statements derived from a narrow and undisclosed database. Her “most
important recommendation” that “governments need to ‘get the radicalisation process right’,
before even considering devising counter-measures” (p.166), is debatable too; governments
often have to deal with problems (like epidemics) while initially not yet fully understanding
the root cause. Instead of asking ‘Why does one radicalize?’ or ‘Why or how does one
become a terrorist?’ we should ask, according to Dr. Pisoiu, ‘What is the process through
which one decides for an Islamist radical occupation rather than another one?’ (p.168). This
reviewer fails to see that this rephrasing of the problem radically opens new pathways to
understanding and countering Islamist radicalisation. Daniela Pisoiu is more successful in
questioning existing approaches to radicalisation than finding a new one. Nevertheless, her
dissertation is a welcome contribution to the discussion - although it is quite pricy for its
length.

About the Reviewer: Alex P. Schmid is Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’.
Resources

Selected Literature on Terrorism and Political Violence/Conflict in Africa since the Second World War

*Monographs, Edited Volumes, Non-conventional Literature and Prime Articles published since 2001*
compiled by Eric Price

NB: some of the items listed below are clickable and allow access to the full text; those with an asterix [*] only have a clickable table of contents.


[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip056/2004030174.html*]


[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0720/2007025290.html*]


[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0817/2008018083.html*]


[*http://www.uk.sagepub.com/books/Book235717#tabview=title*]


[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy045/2004270345.html*]


[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/hol031/2002069030.htm*]


Mazrui, A.A. (et al.) (eds.) *Globalization and civilization: are they forces in conflict?* New York: Global Scholarly Publications


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[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip061/2005029483.html*]

[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0816/2008017057.html*]

[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy043/2002359225.html*]

[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0703/2006043610-t.html*]

[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy07017/2007019852.html*]

[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0702/2006284089-t.html*]

[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip043/2007012057.html*]

September 2011
Non-conventional Literature

De Andres, A.P. (2008) *West Africa under attack: drugs, organized crime, terrorism, as the new threat to Global Security* UNSCI Discussion Paper No.16


Brenthurst Foundation, Tswalu


[Davis, J. (n.d.) *Africa and the War on Terrorism.* Howard University


Gagel, A.C. (el al.) (2011) *Patterns in Terrorism in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia: 2007-2010.* Washington: Center for Strategic & Stategic Studies


International Crime in Africa Programme (ICAP) (2011) *Overview of ISS and ICAP*


Lyman, P.N. (2009). *The War on Terrorism in Africa* [from Africa in World Politics by Harbeson, J.] [http://www.cfr.org/content/thinktank/Lyman_chapter_Terrorism.pdf]

Organization for Africa Unity (OAU) *OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*


on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, second session, April 1, 2004 [*http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS51006]


Prime Journal Articles


[http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/arw/summary/v048/48.1barnes.html]


[http://werzit.com/intel/classes/amu/classes/LC514/LC514_Week_14_Non_Military_Security_in_the_Wider_Middle_East.pdf]


[http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded_files/4343.pdf]


Monaghan, R. 'One Merchant, One Bullet': The Rise and Fall of PAGAD 12 (1, Spring) 2004, pp.1-19.


Ozkececi-Taner, B. Terrorism, Instability, and Democracy in Asia and Africa *Political Science Quarterly* 125 (2) 2004, pp.353-354


Ryan, M.: ‘War in countries we are not at war with’: The ‘war on terror’ on the periphery from Bush to Obama. *International Politics* 48 (2) 2011, pp. 364-389.


Shin, D.S. Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn: an Overview *Journal of Conflict Studies* XXIII (2, Fall) 2009, pp.79-91


Straker, G. A Crisis in the Subjectivity of the Analyst: The Trauma of Morality *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* 17 (2, March) 2007, pp.152-164.

Tiefenbrun, S. Semiotic approach to a legal definition of terrorism *Decoding International Law* 1 (4) 2010, pp.81-83.


**About the Compiler: Eric Price** is a Professional Information Specialist and Editorial Assistant of Perspectives on Terrorism
Networking

Creating a Network for Postgraduate Researchers in the Fields of (Counter-) Terrorism, Political Violence and Armed Conflict in the United Kingdom - a TRI Proposal

by Gordon Clubb & Alex P. Schmid

While much research is conducted in the overlapping fields of (countering) terrorism, political violence and armed conflict, those who make their first steps in postgraduate research are often unsure what is going on outside their own university department, wondering how their own work relates to current research developments elsewhere. To address this concern, there exists, in some countries, a number of more or less formal networks of postgraduate researchers (e.g. in Germany the network terrorism research [<www.netzwerk-terrorismusforschung.de>] which numbers almost 400 participants). No such network appears to be in place in the United Kingdom and some other parts of the English-speaking world.

Hence this initiative by the Terrorism Research Initiative to link up young researchers in the UK. The idea is to create a clearinghouse where researchers can exchange information and ideas and check who is working on a topic similar or related to their own. The practical goal is to maintain, and periodically update, a list of researchers and their research topics so that those engaged in postgraduate research can contact each other and, if they so desire, collaborate. In this way members of the UK research community can keep themselves updated about developments in the field and also make each other aware of upcoming workshops and conferences.

For a start, potential UK participants are invited to complete the form below. The information received will be grouped and listed by the TRI Research Assistant Gordon Clubb (University of Leeds) on behalf of the Terrorism Research Initiative and made available in appropriate form to all bona fide participants.

(i) Name:

(ii) University:

(iii) Department/Discipline:

(iv) (PhD Thesis) research topic:

(vi) Expected completion of project:

(vii) Email address:
Please send this information (i – vii) to Gordon Clubb (University of Leeds) at
<gordonclubb@googlemail.com>.

NB: TRI is planning to create more country-based networks and is looking for volunteers to set them up and run them.
About Perspectives on Terrorism

PT seeks to provide a unique platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the field of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. It invites them to:

• present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
• submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
• use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) could be characterized as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than fee-based subscription journals. Our on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles - but without compromising professional scholarly standards. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT is not supporting any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles we expect contributors to adhere to.

**Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism:**

Alex P. Schmid, Editor;
Joseph J Easson, Associate Editor;
Tim Pippard, Assistant Editor;
Shazad Ali, Assistant Editor;
Brad McAllister, Assistant Editor;
Eric Price, Editorial Assistant

**About the Terrorism Research Initiative:**

PT is the journal of the *Terrorism Research Initiative* - an initiative that seeks to support the international community of terrorism researchers and analysts by facilitating coordination and cooperative initiatives. TRI was formed in 2007 by a broad association of individual scholars and representatives of institutions in order to provide the academic community as well as counter-terrorism analysts and practitioners with scientific tools to contribute to the enhancement of human security by collaborative research – thereby allowing them to better actualize the full
potential of their efforts. TRI is working to build a truly inclusive international research community and seeks to empower it by creating synergies that can extend the impact of each participant’s research endeavours.

The Journal can be accessed at the following website URL:
www.terrorismanalysts.com

**Legal Note:** *Perspectives on Terrorism* hosts articles that reflect a diversity of opinions. The views expressed therein, and the empirical evidence cited in their support, remain the sole responsibility of the contributing authors; they do not necessarily reflect positions and views of the journal’s Editorial Team or its parent organization, the *Terrorism Research Initiative*. 
Greetings and Welcome to 'Perspectives on Terrorism'

It is an pleasure to welcome you to one of the newer publications in the field of Terrorism Studies. We would like to take this opportunity to introduce you to our journal and explain, in a few words, the underlying impetus that motivates us as well as the intended direction of this online publication and the underlying Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI).

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) seeks to provide a unique platform for established and emerging scholars to present their perspectives on the developing field of Terrorism Studies, based on scholarship focusing on political violence and armed conflict; to present original research and analysis and to provide a forum for discourse and commentary on related issues.

The journal could be characterized as 'non-traditional' in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities of academic journals in order to allow its editors and authors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles while at the same time maintaining professional scholarly standards. Although PT differs from other publications in the field, it is intended to be complementary and non-competitive. Indeed, the establishment of this journal was brought about in consultation with leaders in the field of terrorism and political violence studies, several of whom have also editorial responsibilities for various other scholarly journals.

One of the objectives of *Perspectives on Terrorism* is to allow authors to write on subjects or present thoughts that might precipitate further debates and commentary from the wider community of scholars studying violence and conflict and how to prevent and counter such threats to human security. Since PT is using an electronic platform, it is possible to engage in discourse more promptly than in paper-based publications.

PT is a journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), an initiative that seeks to support the international community of terrorism researchers and scholars through the facilitation of collaborative projects and cooperative initiatives. TRI was founded in 2007 by scholars from several disciplines in order to provide the global research community with a common tool than can empower them and extend the impact of each participant's research activities. By including promising young scholars working on their PhD theses as Research Assistants in its network, the Terrorism Research Initiative also seeks to create opportunities for them to enter the circle of more established scholars and analysts. To enhance the quality of academic research in the field, TRI has facilitated the publication of the *Handbook of Terrorism Research* [London: Routledge, 2011; 736 pp. ISBN: 13: 978-0-415-41157-8 (hbk)], by Prof. Alex P. Schmid, Editor of *Perspectives on Terrorism* [see: <http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415411578/>].
TRI Openings *Summer 2011*

1. **Editorial Assistant (PT)**  
2. **Research Assistants (TRI)**

TRI is currently accepting applications for Research Assistants, Editorial Assistants as well as Technical Assistants for Information Technology. Responsibilities for these part-time, non-paid positions will include assisting the Editor of *Perspectives on Terrorism* and the Director of TRI with developing collaborative projects, conducting in-depth topical research, and assisting with the daily activities of the Initiative.

The Editorial Assistant position will support the production of TRI's *Perspectives on Terrorism* journal.

Responsibilities of Research Assistants (RA) will include assisting the Editor of *Perspectives on Terrorism* and the Director of TRI with monitoring terrorist organizations and developments, developing collaborative projects, conducting in-depth topical research as well as offering assistance with the daily activities of the Initiative.

Interested candidates should send a letter (e-mail) outlining their motivation to apply for a TRI position. In addition, they should attach a CV/Resume to the letter (and, if available, a publication list) as well as the names of two references who are familiar with their work and educational achievements and send this information to info@terrorismanalysts.com.

Applicants with an interest in integrating emerging web-based technologies and techniques into scholarly activities are especially encouraged to apply.

The workload of TRI positions is flexible and negotiable but averages 5-10 hours per week. RA positions run for six months (renewable) whereby the first month is a trial month.
International Advisory Board of the Terrorism Research Initiative

Adam Dolnik has just been appointed as Professor of Counterterrorism at the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies in Germany. Before that he was Director of Research Programs and Professor at the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP) at the University of Wollongong, Australia.

Javier Jordán is a Professor at the Universidad de Granada, Spain, and Director of Athena Intelligence.

Gary LaFree is a Professor of Criminology at the University of Maryland and the Director of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).

David Rapoport is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at UCLA, a Mellon Foundation Emeritus Fellow, Founding and Co-Editor of the journal Terrorism and Political Violence.

Marc Sageman is a Consultant on transnational terrorism with various governmental agencies and foreign governments and the author of Understanding Terror Networks and Leaderless Jihad.

Michael Scheuer is currently a Senior Fellow with The Jamestown Foundation, prior to which he served in the CIA for 22 years where he was the Chief of the bin Laden Unit at the Counterterrorist Center from 1996 to 1999.

Yoram Schweitzer is a Researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and Lecturer at Tel Aviv University.

Michael Stohl is Professor of Communication at the University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB).

Jeff Victoroff is an Associate Professor of Clinical Neurology and Psychiatry at the Keck School of Medicine, University of Southern California.

Peter Waldmann is Professor Emeritus of sociology at the University of Augsburg, Germany, and a long time member of the Advisory Board of the German Ministry of Development.

Leonard Weinberg is Foundation Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada.
Participating Institutions of the Terrorism Research Initiative


Center on Terrorism, John Jay College, USA.


Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), University of St. Andrews, Scotland. http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/.

Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP), University of Wollongong, Australia.

Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, USA. http://www.comops.org/.

Defense & Strategic Studies Department, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Global Terrorism Research Centre (GTReC), Monash University, Australia.

International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Singapore.

International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Pennsylvania State University, USA.

Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, Syracuse University, USA. http://insct.syr.edu/.

The Institute of International and European Affairs, (IIIEA), Dublin, Ireland, with a branch in Brussels.

Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, Pakistan.

Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), Athens, Greece. www.rieas.gr.

Research Unit, Political Violence, Terrorism and Radicalization,

Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Denmark.

University of the Pacific, School of International Studies, USA.

University of Wisconsin, Oskosh Institute for the Study of Religion, Violence and Memory, USA.
Individual Participants of the Terrorism Research Initiative

**Mahan Abedin** is a former editor of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor and currently the Director of Research at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism (a London-based organisation studying Islamism, democratization and extremism in the Muslim world). He is editor of *Islamism Digest* - a monthly academic journal specialising on the in-depth study of Islamic movements.

**Gary Ackerman** is Research Director at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)

**Shaheen Afroze** is Research Director and Head of the Peace and Conflict Studies Division at the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS).

**Abdullah Alaskan** is Professor of History at King Saud University, columnist, Riyadh daily newspaper.

**Mustafa Alani** is a Senior Advisor and Program Director in Security and Terrorism Studies at the Gulf Research Center, UAE.

**Rogelio Alonso** is Lecturer in Politics and Terrorism at Rey Juan Carlos University, Madrid, where he holds the position of Ramón y Cajal Fellow in Political Sciences. He coordinates the Unit for Documentation and Analysis on Terrorism.

**Ramiro Anzit Guerrero** is a Senior Advisor in the Argentine National Congress and Professor at the University del Salvador and University del Museo Social Argentino.

**Victor Asal** joined the faculty of the Political Science Department of the University at Albany in Fall 2003 and is also the Director of the Public Security Certificate at Rockefeller College, SUNY, Albany.

**Omar Ashour** is a Lecturer in the Politics of the Modern Arab World at the University of Exeter and Director of the MA Program in Middle East Studies.

**Scott Atran** is Presidential Scholar at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City, Visiting Professor of Psychology and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, and Research Director in Anthropology at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris.

**Edwin Bakker** is Professor of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism at the Campus The Hague of Leiden University.

**Daniel Baracskay** is a full-time faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Valdosta State University, where he also teaches public administration courses.

**Michael Barkun** is professor of political science in the Maxwell School at Syracuse University.

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