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Table of Contents:

Letter from the Editor.....	3
Counter-Narratives and the Unrehearsed Stories Counter-Terrorists Unwittingly Produce.....	5
by Beatrice de Graaf	
Terrorist Drop-outs: One Way of Promoting a Counter-Narrative.....	12
by Michael Jacobson	
Understanding al-Qaeda's Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work.....	18
by Tom Quiggin	
Winning the Battle but Losing the War?.....	25
Narrative and Counter-Narratives Strategy	
by Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley, Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley	
Book Reviews.....	36
Peter R. Neumann. <i>Old & New Terrorism. Late Modernity, Globalization and the Transformation of Political Violence</i> . Cambridge, Polity, 2009. 218 pp. ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-4376-2	
Reviewed by Alex P. Schmid	
Ana S. Trbovich. <i>A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia's Disintegration</i> . Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008. 522 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-533343-5	
Reviewed by Dipak Gupta	
Ruediger Lohlker. <i>Dschihadismus Materialien [Jihadism Materials]</i> . Vienna, Facultas WUV, 2009. 248 pp. ISBN 978-3-8252-3132-3	
Reviewed by Alex P. Schmid	
Conference Calendar (Sept. – Dec. 2009).....	39
by Michael Cheek	

Letter from the Editor

Dear Colleagues,

Perspectives on Terrorism (PT), the on-line journal of the *Terrorism Research Initiative* (TRI), is now in its third year. It has gained a readership of several thousand academic researchers and security analysts. The mission of TRI and its journal is the promotion of the “three Cs” – Coordination, Cooperation and Collaboration - among individuals conducting research and analysis on terrorism and related political violence. One group that is especially close to our hearts is that of graduate students who are working on doctoral theses in this field. We hope to help promote their creativity through the publication of their novel research in our journal. We invite them, as well as established researchers and analysts, to use PT as a forum for presenting research findings. PT is a non-traditional electronic journal that is not constrained by commercial or political interests. It is flexible in terms of content, style, length and number of articles as well as the frequency of its publication. Yet at the same time PT adheres to professional scholarly standards.

We at TRI see *Perspectives on Terrorism* as a synergistic networking platform that serves the needs of the research and analytical communities. Our aim is to be practical, helpful and useful to all those who subscribe to our vision of enhancing security through collaborative research. Since terrorism itself continues to be a ‘contested concept’, the field of Terrorism Studies has suffered from politicization. For more than ten years, efforts have been under way in the United Nations’ General Assembly to reach consensus on a legal definition of terrorism. For even longer, efforts have been under way to reach an academic consensus definition (for the latest version, see: <http://knol.google.com/k/anonym/terrorism/dd3psyh8k3c3/2?domain=knol.google.com&locale=de>). Definitions are important if we want to get away from the morally flawed double standard notion that “One man’s terrorist is the other man’s freedom fighter”.

As new Editor of *Perspectives on Terrorism*, let me briefly introduce myself. Together with Robert Wesley, I have been involved with the *Terrorism Research Initiative* and its journal since their inception. However, until recently professional obligations have prevented me from playing a more active role in its publication. Until May 2009, I was Director of the *Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence* (CSTPV) at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. I also was, together with David Rapoport, Editor of *Terrorism and Political Violence*, one of the two leading academic journals in this field. I recently returned to Austria where I had previously served for a number of years as Senior Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Officer at UNODC and Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations’ Terrorism Prevention Branch.

With the collaboration of you - reader, researcher, analyst - and the assistance of PT’s Editorial Team - we hope to further develop *Perspectives on Terrorism* as a common discussion forum of the research community. Like in the past, most of our future issues will reflect a variety of topics and approaches. Some, like the present one, will mainly focus on one particular issue – Counter-Narratives in this case. It illustrates how one subject can be viewed from different perspectives. Truth is unlikely to be found in any single perspective and debate is the lifeblood of both academic scholarship and civil society.

Four Perspectives on Counter-Narratives

There is still much confusion and controversy about the best way Salafi jihadists ought to be confronted. Should “the West” develop its own Counter-Narrative to al-Qaeda’s *Single Narrative*? Many argue that the West has already a powerful counter-narrative, one based on democratic values and individual rights. The problem is that when it comes to the foreign policies of some Western states in the Middle East and beyond,

these policies have, in the past, too often been guided by *realpolitik* alliances with non-democratic forces. That has made Western democracies open to charges of double standards. Counter-narratives which are not backed by deeds that give credence to them are bound to be perceived as hypocritical and might in the end do more harm than good. Western democracies have to be both forceful and careful in what they say and how they say it in their Counter-Narratives to the Single Narrative of the transnational jihadist movement spearheaded by al-Qaeda.

A discussion on such issues took place under the heading *Counter-narratives and the Performative Power of Counter-Terrorism* in the Netherlands on June 4-5, 2009. This International Expert Meeting was held under the auspices of the Leiden University's *Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, the *National Coordinator for Counterterrorism* (NCTb) and the British and Canadian embassies in The Hague. The Editor of *Perspectives on Terrorism* attended this meeting and asked four of the forty speakers and participants for their views on the matter. The current issue of *Perspectives on Terrorism* contains their contributions. A publication on the entire proceedings of that International Expert Meeting is under preparation by the NCTb and will be available in early 2010.

Sincerely,

Dr. Alex P. Schmid
Director *Terrorism Research Initiative* (TRI)
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Counter-Narratives and the Unrehearsed Stories Counter-Terrorists Unwittingly Produce ^[1]

by Beatrice de Graaf

‘All counter-terrorism is a stage, and all counter-terrorists merely players’
(paraphrasing Shakespeare)

Abstract

Governments produce both deliberate and involuntary (and less conscious) narratives when countering terrorism. The thesis of this article is that such unintended messages can be much more powerful and consequential than is realized; in fact, they can completely contradict the intended official ‘counter-narrative’. To substantiate this hypothesis, the author looks at the experience of the German Federal Republic in the 1970s and beyond when state and society were confronted with the Red Army Faction (RAF) and similar left-wing “revolutionaries” like those of the 2nd of June Movement or the Red Zora.

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s Social-Democratic Counter-narrative against Terrorism

The RAF was founded in 1970 by Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin and the already well-known publicist Ulrike Meinhof.[2] Until 1974, West Germany’s central government, headed by the Social-Democratic Party’s leader, Chancellor Willy Brandt, was not very active in developing a counter-narrative. This was, in part, due to the fact that the Federal Republic had been divided by the victors of the Second World War into strong regional states which governed their internal affairs rather autonomously and also dealt with terrorist incidents on their territory the way they saw fit. It was also due to the fact that the left-liberal coalition, and especially Brandt, did not want to place domestic national security issues too high on their reformist agenda.[3]

The first to make an effort to instigate a form of national coordination on combating domestic terrorist violence was Horst Herold, director of the Federal Criminal Office (BKA) since 1971. He was the first in Europe to introduce computers and data-mining techniques in the investigation process. He also recognized the importance of conveying a message to the public at large, as many citizens felt intimidated by the militants of the RAF and affiliated organisations. Herold’s response to the bombing, shooting and kidnapping campaign of the RAF was ‘to demonstrate state power’. This meant, inter alia, the use of road-blocks, Most Wanted-posters and the massive and visible deployment of helicopters, police units and area searches. The wave of arrests in the Summer of 1972, when all the first generation RAF members were traced and apprehended, gave Horst Herold’s approach credibility and gained widespread public support. It also earned him the nickname ‘Kommissar Computer’.[4]

Only after Willy Brandt’s successor in the German Chancellery, Helmut Schmidt, entered office in 1974, and especially after CDU politician Peter Lorenz was kidnapped in 1975, the central government took counterterrorist matters more firmly in its own hands.[5] At this point, a genuine and original political counter-narrative was being developed.

Helmut Schmidt, as a Social Democrat, was not keen to evoke the old sentiment of the ‘War against

partisans and vandals', as many officials within the BKA, the security apparatus and the conservative parties (CDU & CSU) were eager to do. Rather than looking for support for his approach with the conservative hardliners, Schmidt stressed the value of the 'Gemeinsamkeit der Demokraten' ('communality of democrats'). His main concern - and the message he wanted to spread - referred to the protection of democracy and the rule of law. He therefore rigorously rejected all unconstitutional proposals that were made. While over 67 % of the population demanded the introduction of the death penalty, he refused to submit to such pressure. There were even more radical proposals, e.g. a police union proposing to issue rewards of 50.000 German Marks for anyone who killed a terrorist.[6] Others, such as the Bavarian president of the CSU, Franz-Josef Strauss, even called for reprisals against RAF prisoners and their relatives. 'Not with me', was Helmut Schmidt's response to such proposals. He thought such emergency measures would result in 'morally cracking the people'.[7]

Schmidt consciously invoked the concept of a 'militant democracy', as elaborated by Karl Loewenstein and Karl Mannheim, a concept that was in line with a ruling of the West-German Constitutional Court.[8] By using such a framework, the Chancellor was able to indicate that the German Federal Republic was not involved in a battle of the revolutionary Left against a (neo-) Fascist Right, as the RAF suggested, but instead suffered an attack on the liberal democratic order, prompted by a marginal group of terrorists. All parties were targets and therefore all were required to repel these attacks collectively.[9]

This counter-narrative concept entailed the idea that the German Federal Republic was a constitutional democracy, that it had (and should have) the necessary power to combat any (perceived) threats to the democratic order[10] and that citizens took their duties and obligations seriously, as Prime Minister of Baden-Württemberg, Hans Filbinger, stated in the funeral speech for three police officers who had been killed during the abduction of Hans-Martin Schleyer, president of a powerful industrial association.[11] In a statement issued on 15 September 1977, the government appealed to all young West-Germans, calling upon them to respect democratic principles and asking them to 'acquire and internalize a democratic sense of citizenship within our society'.[12]

Successes and Failures

This was a sensible and convincing message: it cut through the Left-Right divide, inviting people of all parties to join forces in defence of the democracy. It gave the government the necessary authority to defend the political system. However, there were also some drawbacks. First of all, it closed the political debate for all radical ideas and convictions. In other words, there was no political space left to vent and debate non-mainstream positions. This situation was made worse by the constitutional requirement that for a political party to enter parliament a minimum of 5% of all votes cast in an election had to be reached – a threshold that had been set after 1945 in the light of the Weimar experience. Secondly, it created a situation where citizens were viewed as being for or against democracy, with no room for manoeuvre, political abstinence, or any ideologically more differentiated position. This ideological closure had very real social consequences: through the 'Anti Radicals Decree' of 1972, persons who were not deemed to be loyal to the state and the democratic system could be excluded from a career in the civil service. Thousands of public employees were vetted, including school teachers, and many were disqualified from civil service – rulings which frustrated many careers and are still in force today.

Another weakness lay in the fact that the opposition did not accept the open invitation to join the 'communality of democrats'. Furthermore, it dismissed every nuanced tone in the political debate on radicalism as being 'soft on terrorism'. In those German states where the right-of-center CDU-CSU parties were in control of the government, the conservative parties dismissed professors who showed some degree of 'understanding' for the revolutionary radicalism of many young students. At the same time, members of the CDU-CSU kept attacking the ruling left-liberal coalition because of its allegedly soft stanced towards those who wanted to change society by violent actions. The Christian Democrats, notably CDU's party

leader Helmut Kohl, deliberately evoked associations of chaos and democratic weakness and blamed the government for its 'inability to govern'. [13] He painted the spectre of 'political vandalism' and a relapse into 'the bad period of the Weimar Republic'. Berlin's parliamentary CDU party chairman Heinrich Lummer spoke of a 'degeneration of democratic morals and principles'. Even the country's President, Karl Carstens (CDU), warned of a 'weak state that, like in 1933, could not defend itself against its enemies'. [14]

However, apart from this politicization of the debate on how to tackle terrorism, the most serious weaknesses of the ruling government's counter-narrative pertained not to its contents, but to the way the security forces, the regional authorities, the judiciary and the governing parties themselves were undermining their own narrative with actions that appeared to contradict completely their declaratory policy of adherence to democratic values and the rule of law.

Signifiers and Legends

In the context of counterterrorism politics the concept of 'signifier' refers to a variety of occurrences, happenstances, failures or situations where a certain meaning is attached to elements of government policy. [15] The term 'legends' indicates the collective meaning that is linked to the 'signifier' under consideration (as in 'urban legend'). It can relate to stories narrated and distributed in response to significant events, within the 'radical scene' itself, or within society at large. The signifiers can be real events. However, the (urban) legends – the significance attached to them – are often gross exaggerations or distortions of what really happened. Terrorists, their supporters or sympathisers, as 'entrepreneurs of violence' are prone to intentionally overemphasize certain elements in order to construct 'injustice frames' out of significant occurrences. [16]

What were the signifiers and legends surrounding German counterterrorism efforts in those years? A very important signifier was created from, and caused by, a police failure as early as 1967, when Benno Ohnesorg, a young student, was shot dead by a Berlin police officer named Karl Heinz Kurras during a demonstration against the visit of the Persian Shah and his wife. [17] Kurras was immediately cleared of all charges. At the time, the circumstances surrounding the shooting were never fully clarified. However, in May 2009, in an ironic twist of history, it surfaced that Kurras was, after all, not a 'Fascist cop', but a Stasi informer, working for the secret service of the German Democratic Republic. [18] The legend attached to this police killing is encapsulated in an exclamation, attributed to Gudrun Ensslin: 'The fascist state is back, they are out to kill us all, so we have to arm ourselves!'. One of the members of the 2nd June Movement - the organisation was founded on the 2nd of June 1972 - Ralf Reinders, explained why his group had opted for this name five years after the death of Benno Ohnesorg: 'Everyone knows what the 2nd of June means. By including this date in the name, people are forever reminded of the fact that they were the first to shoot!' [19]

Another series of signifiers were the new laws that were passed by parliament between 1974 and 1976. [20] Criminal Procedures were made more strict, the RAF defence team was downsized, while at the same time the conditions for prosecuting and sentencing terrorists were upgraded. In 1976, a new paragraph (Para.129a) was included in the German Penal Code, making 'forming a terrorist organisation' a punishable offence. As a result, not only the direct perpetrators, but also associates and accomplices providing logistical support could be prosecuted for terrorist crimes. In addition, the new law regarding 'Kontaktsperre' ('contact'- or 'communications-ban'), passed on the 30 September 1977, allowed police and judicial authorities to isolate jailed RAF members completely from the outside world, even banning them from communicating with lawyers and close relatives. "Terror against the judiciary or terror by the judiciary?" the Hamburg news magazine *Der Spiegel* asked ominously. [21] The imprisoned RAF members and their supporters made good use of these highly symbolic laws and engaged in hunger strikes to protest against their treatment, solitary confinement, alleged sensory deprivation and the whole system

of 'political justice' (a reproach associated with the Nazi period).[22] Through such efforts to portray the state as one that did not hesitate to engage in torture, a second generation of terrorists was created. New members were recruited through the solidarity committees which took up the cause of those imprisoned for 'political' reasons. Others came from among protest demonstrators supporting the imprisoned RAF leaders. They engaged in a new series of attacks, the culmination of which was the kidnapping of the industrialist H.-M. Schleyer and a supporting action by Palestinian militants, involving the hijacking of the Lufthansa plane Landshut in September-October 1977.[23]

The most damaging 'signifier' however, was the climax of the 'German autumn', namely the collective suicide of imprisoned RAF terrorists of the first generation in October 1977. The nationally and internationally predominant image of stern German governmental actions had already been constructed based on the TV footage of the high-security Stammheim prison, the previous suicide of Ulrike Meinhof and the many hunger strikes that RAF prisoners had carried out. Although the government of Helmut Schmidt had gained broad public support for the liberation of the hostages by the German elite team GSG- 9 in Mogadishu, this did not alter the fact that in the eyes of a sizeable minority, the survival of democracy in the German Federal Republic was considered to be in serious peril.[24]

These doubts gained more substance when four of the remaining first generation RAF leaders were found dead (and in one case wounded) in their cells of the Stammheim prison, the day after the Landshut hostages in the hijacked plane in Mogadishu (Somalia) were liberated. Although Brigitte Mohnhaupt, the new RAF leader, later admitted that she knew from the beginning that Baader and two of his colleagues had taken their own lives, at that time she immediately crafted the 'legend' that they had been murdered by 'the government'. She and others portrayed this as another step in the direction towards a totalitarian police state. This legend managed to trigger a series of new terrorist actions in the years to come – attacks that continued with decreasing frequency and severity until the early 1990s.[25]

Only after the Stammheim drama did the government make serious efforts to try to 'neutralize' the left-wing legends with new counter-narratives of its own. As a consequence, political polarisation and mutual recrimination among the parliamentary parties declined. The accusation of being 'weak' was no longer made, and the government led by Chancellor H. Schmidt could at last relax somewhat. The social-liberal political coalition that had, up until then, acted relatively defensively, gradually came out of its shell. In 1978, President Walter Scheel stated that there was to be an end to polarisation and the widespread tendency to denunciate alleged terrorism sympathisers anonymously to the police. The 'private sphere of fellow citizens' was to be respected once again – by the police forces as well as the citizens themselves. [26]

In addition, in 1978, the new liberal Interior Minister, Gerhard Baum, published a series of TV interviews in book form - interviews he had conducted with Horst Mahler, a lawyer defending the RAF terrorists. In these dialogues he discussed the political aspirations of the left-wing 'revolutionaries' and exposed their failures in an open and honest debate.[27] Through this courageous step, it became clear to almost anybody except the most fanatic 'true believers' that the alleged relapse of West Germany into fascist behaviours had been a huge exaggeration. Freedom of speech prevailed throughout, and there was plenty of opportunity to criticise the new security measures. Furthermore, the government asked Horst Herold to step down as head of the BKA in 1981. Through his name, the BKA and counterterrorism had become tainted with the association of an Orwellian 'surveillance state', partly due to the data-mining programs Herold had introduced.[28]

The federal prosecution subsequently offered collaborating terrorists a crown witness arrangement - but this was kept secret for some time. In 1991 only, Minister Klaus Kinkel formalized this arrangement and - following the Italian experience with the pentiti [those who repented] – also offered lenient treatment to sympathizers and supporters in exchange for a truce (contrary to Italy, the West-German authorities excluded all terrorists from this provision who had been sentenced for major offences, only the ones with lower penalties could profit from this offer).[29] This offer divided the remaining terrorists; some of

them did come forward and provided useful information, thereby allowing the authorities to roll up much of what remained of the RAF. However, the aftermath of German terrorism was protracted and only in 1998 did the RAF officially disband itself. It is worth noting that this closure was not primarily the result of governmental counter-narratives or clemency offers. Neither was it the result of the pressure of prosecution. It was just as much, and perhaps more, the result of the end of Communism in East Germany, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. [30] What also mattered was that extremists who in the 1970s had endorsed the revolutionary ideals of the RAF found, since the 1980s, new outlets for their militant energy in non-violent civil society organisations and in the rising political party of the Greens.

Conclusion

What lessons can be learned from the German experience with left-wing terrorism between 1968 and 1998? Four German lessons stand out:

- 1- The declaratory policy of official narratives is less persuasive than the actual practical experience of terrorists and their sympathizers in their encounters with state and society – experiences gained from security measures, police approaches, and (ab-) uses of the law;
- 2- Democratic governments need to recognize and understand the way terrorists and their sympathizers try to capitalise on the practices and, even more so, malpractices of the organs of the state when trying to maintain law and order;
- 3- Governments need to be cognizant of the fact that not only terrorists try to play politics with the government's sometimes ill-considered counter-measures;
- 4- Opposition parties also try to gain political capital from the confrontation between terrorists and the state and contribute to the polarisation in society while also being engaged in myth-making and the creation of urban legends.

It is only possible to counter such legends, connected to all kinds of possible signifiers, when these signifiers are first clearly identified. An effort of separating fact from fiction probably produces more results than constructing counter-narratives that will have little effect at best or are considered state propaganda at worst - thereby further antagonizing radical elements in society.

Therefore, these 'German lessons' suggest that governments should not embark on inventing new, offensive counter-narratives. It is doubtful that the government is the right party to launch a credible counter-narrative. The message of parliamentary democracy, freedom of speech and association should be enough. However, it makes sense to invest energy and resources in neutralizing existing myths and legends. Those 'neutralizers' are much more important: they can serve to dry up the pool of new terrorist recruits, take away justifications for new attacks and, in doing so, undermine the potential legitimacy of terrorist calls to arms.

Terrorism is theatre, Brian M. Jenkins observed in the 1970s. That is also true for counter-terrorism. The public forum is the stage, and governments, political parties, civil society, media, and citizens are all players, performing one role or another. We would all do well to keep in mind that what matters is not only what we think we do, but how our performance is received and perceived by various audiences. The terrorist is a performer. Yet counter-terrorism too is about performance: it involves not only target hardening, surveillance and prevention and pursuit. It also involves the production of images and stories and the debunking of legends, like the myth that the 'West' is seeking the submission of cultural, religious or ethnic minorities. [31] Before governments state their own counter-narrative against such myths, as is often advocated by counter-terrorist experts,[32] the authorities should become fully aware of the unintentional and unconscious messages they propagate – messages that are often exaggerated by terrorists and their sympathizers. Only when democratic governments succeed in shattering the myths and half-truth propagated by terrorists and their sympathizers, will they manage to take the wind out of the sails that keep

terrorism alive. [33]

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NOTES:

[1]Based on the forthcoming study: Beatrice de Graaf, *De strijd tegen terrorisme in Nederland, Duitsland, Amerika en Italië* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009). English translation to be published in 2010 under the title: *Counterterrorism as Performance. The Presentation and Perception of Counterterrorism in the Netherlands, Germany, the United States and Italy*.

[2]Cf. Butz Peters, *Tödlicher Irrtum. Die Geschichte der RAF*. Berlin 2004; Stefan Aust, *Der Baader-Meinhof-Komplex*. Hamburg 2008.

[3]See Matthias Dahlke, *Der Anschlag auf Olympia '72. Die politischen Reaktionen auf den internationalen Terrorismus in Deutschland*. München, 2006, pp. 25-27; Klaus Weinbauer, 'Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik der Siebzigerjahre', in: Beatrix Bouvier et al., *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, Vol. 44 (Bonn, 2004), p. 225; Cf. Matthias Dahlke, 'Der blinde Fleck. Transnationaler und nationaler Terrorismus auf dem Weg zum "Deutschen Herbst"'; in: Jan-Holger Kirsch/Annette Vowinckel (Eds.), *Zeitgeschichte-online*, Thema: Die RAF als Geschichte und Gegenwart, Mai 2007, p. 8. URL: http://www.zeitgeschichteonline.de/zol/portals/_rainbow/documents/pdf/raf/dahlke_dbf.pdf (September 2008).

[4]Klaus Weinbauer, 'Zwischen Partisanenkampf und „Kommissar Computer“. Polizei und Linksterrorismus in der Bundesrepublik bis Anfang der 1980er Jahre', in: Jörg Weinbauer et al (Eds.), *Der linke Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik*. Frankfurt am Main, 2006, pp. 244-270.

[5]Cf. Matthias Dahlke, "'Nur eingeschränkte Krisenbereitschaft". Die staatliche Reaktion auf die Entführung des CDU-Politikers Peter Lorenz 1975', in: *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte* (2007) No. 4, pp. 641-678; Michael März, *Die Machtprobe 1975. Wie RAF und Bewegung 2. Juni den Staat erpressten*. Leipzig, 2007.

[6]Dahlke, "Nur eingeschränkte Krisenbereitschaft", op. Cit., p. 654.

[7]Georg Bönisch, Klaus Wiegrefe, „Massive Gegendrohung“, in: *Der Spiegel*, No.. 37/2008, pp. 48-53.

[8]Karl Mannheim, *Diagnosis of Our Time. Wartime Essays of a Sociologist*. London, 1943; Karl Loewenstein, 'Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights'; in: *American Political Science Review* (1937), No.. 31, pp. 417-433 & pp. 638-658.

[9]Dahlke, „Nur eingeschränkte Krisenbereitschaft“, op. cit., p. 650.

[10]Karl Mannheim, *Diagnosis of Our Time*, op. cit.; Karl Loewenstein, op. cit., pp. 417-433 and pp. 638-658.

[11]Cit. in Nicolas Büchse, 'Von Staatsbürgern und Protestbürgern. Der Deutsche Herbst und die Veränderung der politischen Kultur in der Bundesrepublik', p. 318.

[12]Ibid, p. 319.

[13]See Wilhelm Hennis, Peter Graf Kielmansegg, Ulrich Matz (Eds.), *Regierbarkeit. Studien zu ihrer Problematisierung*. Stuttgart, 1977.

[14]Carstens sieht im Terrorismus eine Hauptgefahr', *Weserkurier*, 29 September 1977.

[15]In social-constructivist discourse analysis, 'signifiers' are empty shells, to which meaning is attached, thus constructing a discourse. L.J. Phillips and M.Jørgensen, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*. London/New Delhi, Sage, 2002, pp. 50-51. Here, the concept of 'signifiers' is being interpreted less in a social-constructivist sense than in an empirical-historical manner. In this context, 'signifiers' are not only terms, but also incidents and occurrences, that subsequently are interpreted and filled with meaning by actors in the public and political discourse.

[16]D. Della Porta. *Social Movements, Political Violence and the State. A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*. Cambridge: University Press, 1995, pp. 60-61, 195.

[17]Cf. Uwe Soukup, *Wie starb Benno Ohnesorg? Der 2. Juni 1967*. Berlin, Verlag 1900, 2007.

[18]In May 2009, Kurras was exposed as an *Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter* („informal collaborator“, i.e. an informer) of the East German Ministry of State Security, the so-called Stasi. It is not clear whether Kurras also acted as an *agent provocateur*, under orders of the Stasi, to destabilize the German Federal Republic. So far, no evidence to that effect has surfaced from the DDR Stasi files. German experts on the matter, such as Aust, Kraushaar or Timm, leave that possibility open, but are cautious. From known Stasi-files, it appears that the Stasi itself considered Ohnesorg's death as an accident. Kurras was depicted as 'very much in love with guns'. Cf. also 'Vielleicht war es nicht die NS-Vergangenheit', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 23 May 2009; 'Kurras gesteht IM-Tätigkeit', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)*, 24 May 2009; 'Der Schuss, der die Republik veränderte', *FAZ*, 24 May 2009; 'Es wäre trotzdem zur Protestbewegung gekommen', *FAZ*, 27 May 2009; 'Spy Fired Shot That Changed West Germany', *New York Times*, 26 May 2009.

[19]Ralf Reinders, Ronald Fritsch, *Die Bewegung 2. Juni 1967. Gespräche über Haschrebellen, Lorenz-Entführung, Knast*. Berlin/Amsterdam, Edition ID-Archiv, 1995, p. 39.

[20]See Eberhard Foth, 'Terrorismus vor Gericht', *Deutsche Richterzeitung*, September 2001, pp. 389-390.

[21]*Der Spiegel*, 18 November 1974, No. 47, p. 1; see also the article „Es werden Typen dabei kaputt gehen“, in: idem, p. 28.

[22]Gisela Diewald Kerkmann, "Im Vordergrund steht immer die Tat...". Gerichtsverfahren gegen Mitglieder der RAF"; in: *Rechtsgeschichte* (2005), No. 7, pp.139-152; See, for example, the contributions in Wolfgang Dressen (Ed.), *Politische Prozesse ohne Verteidigung*. Berlin, 1976.

- [23]For an overview of developments during the ‘Deutscher Herbst’ [„German Autumn“], see Stefan Aust, *Der Baader-Meinhof-Komplex. München*, Goldmann Verlag, 2008; Peter Butz, *Tödlicher Irrtum. Die Geschichte der RAF*. Berlin, Argon, 2004.
- [24]See Rudolf Wassermann, ‘Sicherung oder Aushöhlung des Rechtsstaates?’, in: J. Augstein et al. *Terrorismus contra Rechts-staat* Darmstadt/Neuwied, Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1976, pp. 125-162.
- [25]See, for example, A. Lehning, H. Wielek and P.H. Bakker Schut, *Duitsland: voorbeeld of waarschuwing? West-Duitsland een politiestaat, of “de geschiedenis herhaalt zich”* [Germany: example or warning? West Germany a police state, or “history repeating itself”] Baarn, Wereldvenster, 1976.
- [26]Cit. in: Weinbauer, ‘Zwischen „Partisanenkampf“ und „Kommissar Computer“’, p. 262.
- [27]The interview was published in *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), No. 53/1979. For the extended version, see Axel Jeschke and Wolfgang Malanowski (Eds.), *Der Minister und der Terrorist – Gespräche zwischen Gerhart Baum und Horst Mahler*. Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1980.
- [28]The compilation by the Federal Ministry of the Interior [Bundesministerium des Innern] (Ed.), *Hat sich die Republik verändert? Terrorismus im Spiegel der Presse* (Bonn, 1978) includes several newspaper articles, in which a greater level of understanding for the government’s attitude is requested. - see Weinbauer, ‘Zwischen “Partisanenkampf” und “Kommissar Computer”’, op. cit., pp. 261-266.
- [29]Antje Vollmer, ‘Die Kinkel-Initiative und das Desaster von Bad Kleinen’, in: *taz* (Berlin), 3 August 1993.
- [30]Peters, *Tödlicher Irrtum*, op. cit., p. 715.
- [31]See Walter D. Casebeer and James A. Russell, ‘Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive “Counter-Narrative Strategy”’, in: *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 4 (2005), No. 3, pp. 1-16.
- [32]See suggestion in Anonymus., *Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law, ‘Theoretical Treatise on Counterterrorism Approaches’, 19 October 2007. Deliverable 10, Work package 6*. [Executed as project within the European Commission’s ‘Sixth Framework Programme’ .], pp. 18, 24-25.
- [33]See also Marc Sageman. *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 176; R. Gunaratna, ‘Strategic Counterterrorism: The Way Forward’, in: J. Ellis (Ed.), *Terrorism* (Oklahoma, MIPT, 2006), pp. 63-73.

Terrorist Drop-outs: One Way of Promoting a Counter-Narrative

by Michael Jacobson

Abstract

The answer to the question whose voice is most effective in terms of delivering a counter-narrative to al-Qaeda's Single Narrative depends on which audience one wants to reach. Arguably, the terrorists themselves (as opposed to segments of their envisaged constituency) are the most difficult audience to reach. However, there is one group that might have special credibility with them – former terrorists. This article explores, by way of examples, how former terrorists and extremists could contribute to reducing terrorist violence.

As the United States continues to fight militarily to disrupt the efforts of al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the U.S. government has slowly come to the realization that military force alone cannot defeat radical extremism. Countering the ideology that drives this extremism has become a critical element in the effort to prevent and defeat the violence that emerges from it. Focusing on the “softer” side of counterterrorism has become a new and necessary approach of U.S. and its allies alike. One of the main foci in this new battle is the recognition of the importance of the so-called “battle of ideas.” Al-Qaeda’s ideas and those of like-minded groups must be challenged with a counter-narrative of stronger appeal.

As the United States and other parties have attempted to begin crafting their own narrative to counter that of radical groups in this “battle of ideas,” it has become clear that in order to develop an effective message, it is necessary to better understand the radicalization process itself for the factors that cause people to choose this path must be properly understood. If this is not the case, it will be impossible to figure out which messages will resonate among terrorist recruits and which might be effective to counter the radicalization process.

An examination of the reasons why, and the processes by, which individuals are radicalized, has made clear that, as one British government official stated “there is no single path that leads people to violent extremism.” The same official noted that “social, foreign policy, economic, and personal factors all lead people to throw their lot in with extremists.” Consequently, there might also be more than one ‘single narrative’ to persuade an individual to join the extremist cause. While al-Qaeda employs a global narrative centered on the West being at war with Islam, Hamas and Hizballah have different narratives to build their following – narratives that rely heavily on their track record of providing needed support to local populations.

As the U.S. has begun to focus on the softer side of counterterrorism, there has been a great deal of attention paid to what a counter-narrative may do to try to prevent radicalization from occurring in the first place. However, an effective counter-narrative will need to address not only those vulnerable to the extremist message, but also those on the path toward radicalization, and those already radicalized. It is clear that the U.S. government and others cannot develop a single, overarching counter-narrative that can be expected to work across the board.

In order to determine what counter-narrative might be effective among those apparently hardened individuals already incorporated in terrorist organizations or those well along the path to radicalization, it is

useful to look at examples of people who have voluntarily walked away from these organizations. Determining the reasons for a change in perspective could help governments craft messages designed to peel people away from terrorist groups; this is one vital element of an effective counter-narrative. Determining who might be best positioned to deliver this 'liberating' message is another key angle from which to view the efficacy of a counter-narrative.

There are several common themes that emerge from an analysis of why various drop-outs left terrorist organizations. Governments may be able to take advantage of this emerging knowledge and discern trends to better formulate appropriate counter-narratives.

"Naming and Shaming," or the undermining of terrorist and extremist leadership should be one part of the approach. For this, crafting messages that significantly detract from leaders' authority and credibility is vital. A general lack of respect for a group's leadership has often been a factor in stimulating the exit of members from terrorist organizations. Essam al-Ridi, an Egyptian veteran of the 1980s *jihād* against the Soviets, testified during the 1998 East African embassy bombings trial that he resented taking battlefield orders from bin Laden and others who lacked military experience during the Afghan *jihād*.^[1] The decisive factor for al-Ridi's change of perspective occurred in a battle in which many jihadis died—in his view needlessly—as a result of inept leadership. In that particular battle, al-Qaeda nevertheless declared victory. Al-Ridi, however, stated, "My judgment as a person living here, not in the hereafter, is that this is pure killing. If you don't know what you're doing, you are killing your people... I became more angry and more opposing [to] what's happening in Afghanistan and what's happening to Osama and how he became a leader of his own."

Another example: Ziad Jarrah, one of the 9/11 hijackers, was unhappy with Mohammed Atta's leadership while the 19 plotters were in the US; the two often clashed.^[2] Jarrah had been on his own for most of his time in the United States before 9/11 and strongly resisted Atta's attempts to exert more direct control. At least in part due to his problems with Atta, Jarrah appeared to be contemplating dropping out of the plot during the summer of 2001.

The United States has tried this approach of undermining the leadership of terrorist organizations more than once. For example, the US made efforts to undermine al-Qaeda in Iraq's leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi by showing captured video footage that made clear that he did not know how to handle a gun. This was potentially effective in deterring would-be jihadis to serve under him. More generally, taking steps that might help avoid the building up of reputations of terrorist leaders also has potential merit. For example, before 9/11, President Clinton said that he tried to avoid mentioning bin Laden's name too often in order not to make him a bigger hero in some parts of the world than he already was. Based on the evidence available, this strategy appears to have merit.

An effective counter-narrative should also strive to demonstrate civilian and Muslim suffering at the hands of the terrorists. Showing the resulting deaths of Muslims and focusing on the hypocrisy of an ideology that purports to defend Muslims but kills them instead is a worthwhile endeavour. A review of further cases of terrorist drop-outs does indicate that this tactic has potential. Disillusionment with the terrorists' strategy and ideology has, historically, been a major reason why militants have left their groups. Some of them simply felt that their groups' fellow members or its leader had finally gone too far.

One example is Omar bin Laden, Osama's fourth son. He had spent nearly five years living in Afghan training camps. Yet following 9/11, Omar quit al-Qaeda and called the attacks "craziness," according to journalist Peter Bergen. He continued, "Those guys are dummies. They have destroyed everything, and for nothing. What did we get from September 11?"

Nazir Abbas, one of the top commanders in *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI), left his organization for similar reasons.^[3] He trained hundreds to become terrorists in the JI camps that he had helped to establish. He

later questioned a bin Laden *fatwa* in 2000, which said that killing Americans and Jews everywhere is the highest of act of worship and good deeds. He alone among the JI commanders refused to carry out an ordered attack. His view was that *jihad* was to be fought only on the battlefield in defense of Islam as he had always been taught that the killing of civilians had nothing to do with “holy war.”

Abbas felt that his fellow members in JI had an incorrect understanding of the JI mission. *Jihad*, to Abbas, was warranted in Afghanistan and the Philippines, countries facing an enemy attacking a Muslim community. Since he dropped out of JI, Abbas has turned against the organization and has been cooperating with the Indonesian government and even testifying against the group’s leadership.

Interestingly, Abbas did not think that attacking a repressive government was wrong; his qualms with JI and other terrorist organizations’ actions extended only to their use of violence against civilians. In his own words: “I couldn’t understand that exploding bombs against innocent civilians was jihad. That was the difference that made me escape from the group.” Abbas’ cooperation with the Indonesian government and his public criticism of his former organization has been invaluable.

In the same way, and for similar reasons, al-Ridi began assisting the US government, explaining that he wanted to cooperate because “I told them I have an interest in helping you because I think Osama has ruined the reputation of Muslims.” A counter-narrative that emphasizes the terrorist groups’ hypocrisy might resonate with those having similar doubts in terrorist organizations.

Related to this, painting terrorists as common criminals may help demonstrate the impurity of the ideology. Terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, are increasingly getting involved in all types of criminal activities, including drug trafficking. The US should take advantage of this fact and portray them as hypocritical.

A further theme in a counter-narrative should be a focus on the reality of life as a terrorist. If people are joining a terrorist organization because it appears glamorous or because they believe they are fulfilling some larger purpose, demonstrating the harsh reality of life in the underground will help to dispel such myths. Terrorist recruits are, in fact, often treated badly by their own organizations. If this message can be promulgated, the counter-narrative would certainly be strengthened. There needs to be a platform for former members to speak out about their unsatisfying lives as members of a terrorist organization, hopefully emphasizing that it does not live up to the hype. We know for a fact that the tough reality of life as a terrorist constantly on the run has often helped drive people out of these organizations.

In fact, more broadly speaking, it is surprising that a number of seemingly trivial, petty factors can drive apparently fully committed terrorists away from their cells and groups. Through studying the personal stories of terrorist drop-outs, it can be discerned that perceived lack of respect was, for individual operatives, often influential in their decision to break away from the radical group. L’Houssaine Kherchtou, a Moroccan who trained to serve as bin Laden’s personal pilot, grew bitter after a bin Laden aide turned down his request for \$500 to cover the costs of his wife’s Caesarean section. He grew livid when al-Qaeda subsequently paid the expenses for a group of Egyptians to renew their passports in order to travel to Yemen. “If I had a gun,” Kherchtou later testified, “I would shoot [bin Laden] at that time.” When the organization moved to Afghanistan, Kherchtou said that he refused to accompany them, thus violating his oath. From then on, he no longer considered himself to be a member of al-Qaeda.

Others have also bailed out for financial reasons – often regarding low wages as a sign that they were not being treated with adequate respect. Jamal al-Fadl, a Sudanese radical, fumed over his salary while al-Qaeda was based in Sudan.[4] He began embezzling funds and stole approximately \$100,000 from bin Laden, according to his own testimony in the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings trial. When bin Laden got wind of al-Fadl’s theft, he ordered him to repay the money. Al-Fadl, after handing back about \$30,000, fled from al-Qaeda, fearing retribution. Khertchou, as well, grew bitter after bin Laden ordered

his followers to cut back on their spending. He felt that bin Laden—a notoriously rich Saudi—was being stingy.

A counter-narrative should also focus on the fear factor and make graphically clear why an individual should be afraid to be a suicide bomber. Given the fact that some have abandoned a planned attack even at the last minute, a fear-awareness approach could have some impact. This factor appears to have been significant in the case of Sajid Badat, a British citizen who was trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan to serve as the other “shoebomber.” In a letter he had sent earlier to his parents he spoke of his “sincere desire to sell my soul to Allah in return for Paradise.” Later, he dropped out because, as he told prosecutors, he wanted to “introduce some calm to his life.”

Mohammed al-Owali fled the scene of the 1998 embassy bombing in Nairobi before he could carry out what was supposed to be another component of the suicide attacks. While he did not drop out of al-Qaeda, his fleeing from the scene is significant in considering what could be done in influencing those who do not follow through on their assignments to commit suicide attacks. In the failed July 21, 2005, attacks in London, one of the bombers, Manfo Kwaku Asiedu, a 32-year old British Ghanaian, abandoned his bomb in a West London park. While not much is known about him at this point, it can be presumed that fear was an important factor in this last-minute decision.

Another important element for governments to consider is the fact that they are not always the most effective messengers for the counter-narrative. There is certainly a role for the US government and other governments to play. There are many cases, however, where other actors may make more effective messengers than governments.

Former terrorists and extremists are one obvious party to consider when it comes to transmitting counter-narrative messages. Their messages would resonate particularly strongly compared to that of unknown government officials. They could deliver forceful messages about the reality of life as a terrorist and their disillusionment with the cause. Moves in this direction have already occurred organically to some extent. The UK-based Quilliam Foundation is the best known of non-governmental organizations challenging the extremist ideology, describing itself as the first “counter-extremism think tank.”

Led by two former members of *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, the Quilliam Foundation aims to undermine the ideological foundation of radical extremism by refuting its premises. Quilliam argues that the ideology must be criticized and refuted “wherever it is found,” a process that includes developing an effective counter-narrative to rebut the message put forth by radical extremist organizations. Addressing local grievances is also critically important in Quilliam’s view to ensure that the terrorists’ and extremists’ global narrative does not resonate in individuals’ minds. Another prominent figure who has spoken out against terrorist and extremist groups is former Egyptian *Islamic Jihad* head Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (also known as Dr. Fadl).[5] Al-Qaeda often cited his previous treatises as ideological justification for its actions. Dr. Fadl has since renounced bin Laden and written a new book rejecting al-Qaeda’s methods and tactics.

What is also important, the US. government in particular must better understand who can wield influence in the Muslim communities throughout the world. These potential messengers can include activists, entrepreneurs, business people, media personalities, and students, among others. The US embassies should play a leading role in trying to identify who these people are, and then to determine how most effectively incorporating them into any overall efforts to make their voices heard.

The families of terrorists could also play an important role in trying to persuade individuals to leave these organizations. Ties and renewed contacts with family members have been major factors that have caused militant individuals to reconsider their membership in a terrorist organization. A number of people who left their families to join organizations returned home, often as a part of their plot’s plan. Yet after renewed contact with their families, they subsequently decided to abandon the plots they had been selected to participate in. Illustrating this phenomenon, this included two individuals who had been selected for the 9/11 plot: they reconsidered participation when returning for a visit to their homes in Saudi Arabia.

In conclusion, the bottom line is that the issue of countering the terrorist narrative with a counter-narrative is a complicated one, with no easy solutions. Broadly speaking, in order to break this disturbing cycle of radicalization, the United States and its allies must stimulate competition for the would-be “radicalizer” - loosely defined to include al-Qaeda and like-minded groups that engage in global jihadist propaganda efforts, influential extremist clerics, and local-level recruiters. At least at this point, the US and other countries are starting to address the issue of radicalization and understand its importance. This represents progress in itself. The United States should deepen its efforts to counter the extremist narrative, both by better using its existing mechanisms and by increasingly relying on, and partnering with, those who can effectively transmit the messages. Understanding that there is no single, simple, overarching solution to becoming a member of a terrorist organization has been the most important first step.

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About the Task Force: The focus of the Task Force included democracy promotion, reform in Arab countries, public diplomacy and strategic communication, as well as an exploration of the specific counterradicalization programs being developed by governments throughout Europe and the Middle East. The Task Force concluded that the Obama administration could make a number of key strategic, functional, and organizational changes to the Bush administration’s approach. The Task Force recommended that the Obama administration expand its focus from violent to nonviolent extremism, devote increased attention to identifying and empowering mainstream Muslim voices, and to prioritize its efforts to address local grievances, which often are at the root of why al-Qaeda’s global narrative resonates in individuals’ lives. Additionally, the Task Force concluded that while democracy promotion should be de-linked from counterterrorism policy, democracy promotion in the Arab world should still be a focus for the new administration. Promoting political and economic reform and the development of civil society in this troubled area of the world should be a key part of the Obama administration’s overall strategy. As a strategic response to extremism, the US and its allies must offer a viable and attractive political alternative to the dark vision offered by radical extremist groups. Prosperous democratic societies that respect the rights of their citizens are more resilient and less susceptible to political instability and radicalization. Likewise, highlighting the weaknesses of al-Qaeda and similar groups and exploiting existing fissures within these organizations will also help reduce these dangerous organizations’ appeal - a key element of success.

NOTES:

[1]Essam al-Riddi was born in Egypt; he later moved to the United States, where he married and lived in Texas. In 1982, he fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan where he became acquainted with Osama Bin Ladin. Al-Riddi, a trained pilot, later purchased a plane for Bin Ladin in the US and flew it to Sudan, where al Qaeda was based at the time. However, in 1987 he grew disillusioned and returned to the U.S. He testified for the US government in the Kenyan-Tanzanian US embassy bombing trial.

[2]Ziad Jarrah was a Lebanese national who participated in the 9/11 plot, piloting United Airlines Flight 93 until its crash in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Jarrah was a member of the so-called “Hamburg cell” in Germany, where he had lived for several years before coming to the US for flight instruction.

[3]Nasir Abbas was an important member of Jemaah Islamiyya, a Southeast Asian affiliate of Al-Qaeda. Abbas claimed to oppose the killing of civilians in the course of jihad and was distraught when he learned that militants trained in Afghanistan perpetrated the Bali bombings, which caused a high civilian death toll. When he was interrogated regarding the bombings, he cooperated with the authorities; he also helped to find and arrest his former colleagues. In September 2008, the UN removed Abbas from its list of terrorists tied to al Qaeda and the Taliban.

[4]Jamal al-Fadl moved to the United States from Sudan in 1986 and lived primarily in Brooklyn, N.Y., where he attended and worked for the Farouq mosque to help send money to Afghanistan. He later travelled to Pakistan and subsequently Afghanistan for weapons training. There he met Osama bin Laden and became a member of al-Qaeda upon its formation. Later he defected from the organization after having embezzled more than \$100,000. Al-Fadl was a key witness for the US government in the Embassy bombing trial.

[5]Dr. Fadl, also known as Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, was born in Egypt and later met Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's "No. 2," after attending Cairo University for medical studies. He later led the former Egyptian *Islamic Jihad* and wrote both a field guide for jihadis as well as an extensive account of what is required of a perfect Muslim. He severed ties with the Egyptian *Islamic Jihad* in 1994 after a disagreement with al-Zawahiri, and was, after 9/11, imprisoned. Since 2004 he is serving a life sentence in Egypt.

Understanding al-Qaeda's Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work

by Tom Quiggin

Abstract

In order to counter the process of radicalization, it is necessary to understand the attraction of the narrative or the "messages" of al-Qaeda and its inspired followers. This article, based on a combination of wide ranging research and front line experience[1], examines the key points in al-Qaeda's ideology and its narratives which have gained so much attention and following. Central to this ideology are eight main themes or concepts which appear consistently in the narratives of al-Qaeda. These have been used to indoctrinate and twist young minds, many of them feeling attracted to such violent ideas. Based on a better understanding of the ideology and the underlying concepts of radical narratives, counterterrorism efforts can be enhanced by more effectively targeting the counter-narrative message.

Introduction

Al-Qaeda (and its ideology) did not spring from the ground wholly formed in 1988/1989 as it is sometimes portrayed. Much of what passes for al-Qaeda's own views owes its origin to others who came before them. In addition, the concepts and ideas that underlie al-Qaeda's body of literature have continued to develop after the initial foundations in the late 1980s. Individuals such as Hassan Banna and Sayyid Qutb laid much of the earlier groundwork. Especially Sayyid Qutb's works such as *Social Justice in Islam* and *Milestones* are required reading for understanding the early thinking of jihadists.

In order to comprehend the current ideology and objectives of al-Qaeda, it's necessary to dwell on a number of their key works. Al-Qaeda and its adherents, like most revolutionary and terrorist organizations, have gone to considerable lengths to ensure that their message has been sent out both to their followers and their enemies. In terms of "propaganda" that is sent to its enemies, al-Qaeda has been both prolific and clear. There have been a series of messages to the "Crusaders" which detail the objectives of al-Qaeda. Prominent among these are the 1996 *Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places* and the 1998 *Jihad against Jews and Crusaders World Islamic Front Statement*.

At the same time, al-Qaeda and its adherents have published an extensive series of books and essays that are primarily intended for Muslim audiences. No attempt has been made to hide these works, but neither are they distributed as broadly as the "propaganda" that al-Qaeda intends for Western consumption. It should be noted that most of its documents have proven to be consistent over time; but these have evolved in a manner that parallels al-Qaeda's operational realities. In other words, they are worth reading as they are an accurate reflection of belief structures and resulting practice.

The list of works by al-Qaeda and its sympathizers is extensive; not all of them can be highlighted here. Among the most relevant and influential[2] works that should be reviewed are:

1. *Join the Caravan of Martyrs*, by Abdullah Azzam. This is probably the single most quoted (and misquoted) piece of jihadist literature[3] that has been written. It contains many of the key phrases and ideas that are used and misused by jihadist all over the world. Abdullah Azzam was the key ideological mentor of Osama Bin Laden up to Azzam's death by assassination in November 1998 (it is still not clear who ordered

his assassination but it most likely was an internal operation ordered by Ayman al Zawahiri or Bin Laden himself). In addition to his work on *Join the Caravan*[4] Abdullah Azzam also made an important statement concerning what he viewed to be the mission of the future:

“ Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and, while focusing its way into society, puts up with heavy tasks and enormous sacrifices. There is no ideology, neither earthly nor heavenly, that does not require a vanguard that gives everything it possesses in order to achieve victory for this ideology. It carries the flag all along the sheer endless and difficult path until it reaches its destination in the reality of life, since Allah has destined that it should make it and manifest itself. This vanguard constitutes Al Qa’idah al-Sulhah for the expected society.”[5]

2. *Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places* by Osama bin Laden. This article was published in the open press in London (UK) in August 1996. It appeared originally in the *Al Quds al Arabi* newspaper.[6] The “Declaration” outlines bin Laden’s views on the “Zionist-Crusaders alliance” and provides the reader with a list of grievances suffered by Muslims and concludes with appeals for an uprising.

3. *Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders World Islamic Front Statement* (23 February 1998) by Usamah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Ladin, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, Emir of the Jihad Group in Egypt, Abu-Yasir Rifa’i Ahmad Taha, Egyptian Islamic Group, Mir Hamzah, secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan, Fazlur Rahman, Emir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh. The “World Islamic Front” that takes responsibility for the statement can be considered to be a synonym for al-Qaeda. This brief, but rather direct, statement sets out al-Qaeda’s arguments against various actions of the Crusaders (American government) and how al-Qaeda’s members should respond.[7]

4. *Knights under the Prophet’s Banner* by Ayman al Zawahiri. This extensive volume containing 21 chapters was published[8] in a serialized format in late 2001 and 2002. Ayman al Zawahiri, the deputy to Osama bin Laden, was the leader of Egyptian *Islamic Jihad* (EIJ). The EIJ may have been the most ruthless of all the Sunni militant and terrorist groups of the 1990s before it merged with al-Qaeda. This volume outlines many of the key historical views and beliefs of the man who is regarded as the key figure in al-Qaeda, second only to Bin Laden himself. This includes his justifications for suicide bombings and his hyper-critical views on the Muslim Brotherhood.

5. *Loyalty and Enmity* (Al Wala wal Bara). This extensive essay was released by Ayman al-Zawahiri in December 2002. In Zawahiri’s view, the world is divided into two warring camps, true Muslims and the rest of the world. True Muslims must, according to this account, be in a constant state of *wala* or being ‘loyal’ to one another at all times. At the same time, true Muslims must also be in a state of *bara* or ‘enmity’ where they are either in a constant state of hatred or at least being distant from everyone else.[9]

6. *Moderate Islam is a Prostration to the West*. In this essay, which was either authorized or written directly by Osama bin Laden, a general description is made of how “moderate” Muslims are in fact aiding and abetting the “Crusaders” of the West – at least in the eyes of al-Qaeda. The essay also explores the highly controversial subject of offensive *jihad* and whether it is obligatory for all Muslims to participate in this activity. While the overall concept of offensive *jihad* has been abandoned or decried by most Muslims, (including Abdullah Azzam), Osama Bin Laden uses a number of cherry-picked verses from the *Qur’an* and the *Haddith* to try to justify it.[10]

7. *Jihad, Martyrdom and the Killing of Innocents*. This essay was either written or authorized by Ayman al-Zawahiri. It lacks the usual obligatory references to the attacks of September 11, 2001, so presumably it was written before that date. In this essay, Zawahiri tries to tackle the tricky issues of martyrdom or suicide bombers as well as the killing of innocents. While classical Islam has rejected both of these concepts, Zawahiri uses a combination of *Sunnah* and *Haddith* passages and analogies to justify the unjustifiable. To the theologically uneducated, this work makes a case for the justification of suicide bombings and the killing

of innocents.[11]

8. *Sharia and Democracy*. Around 1991 a book first appeared with the title *The Bitter Harvest: The Muslim Brotherhood in Sixty Years*. The book itself was a repudiation by Ayman al-Zawahiri of the Muslim Brotherhood's decision to forego violence as a political tool and participate in the electoral process instead. While the book itself continues to circulate among military jihadists, an extract of it has also been widely circulated under the title *Sharia and Democracy*. In this short extract from the book, Zawahiri describes why he feels that anyone who claims to be both democratic and a Muslim is in fact an apostate or non-believer.

9. *The Call to Global Islamic Resistance*. In January 2005, Mustapha al-Suri released this massive treatise numbering some 1,600 pages in its original form. While not directly a part of al-Qaeda, al Suri provides a number of insights on matters of ideology, strategies, tactics and organization. A book entitled *Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri*, written by Brynjar Lia of the Norwegian Defense Institute sheds some light on this. [12]

The Ideology of Al-Qaeda

What is an ideology? Many academic or public discussions on ideology are often confusing because authors tend to talk about ideology when they are in fact discussing objectives and strategy. In my view, an ideology is primarily a set of beliefs that are characteristic of a group or of an individual in that group. These beliefs are the non-material glue that binds that group together as it seeks to obtain its goals.

What then can be said about the ideology of al-Qaeda based on its literature, various other statements and its activities?

First, it is necessary to note the worldview of al-Qaeda that forms the basis of its ideology is as follows:

- 1: Muslims are under attack everywhere.
- 2: Only al-Qaeda and its followers are fighting the oppressors of Islam.
- 3: If you are not supporting al-Qaeda, then you are supporting the oppressors (note the exclusionary nature of these statements – this is key).

Second, al-Qaeda sees its mission to be the vanguard of the uprising of the oppressed. Al-Qaeda knows it cannot achieve these goals by itself, so it needs to inspire the masses with an uplifting message intended to create a revolution.

Third, it is clear that the basic grievances of al-Qaeda (real and imagined) are political, not religious. The window dressing that is used in their documents is almost always religious, as are the justifications for violence. However, the problems raised in the texts are those of classic identity politics: oppression, poverty and exploitation are common themes.

Fourth, in terms of how it spreads and justifies its world views, there are a number of ideological ideas and concepts that constantly reappear in al-Qaeda's literature and statements.[13] After the Singapore Religious Rehabilitation Project (RRP) had conducted some 500 interviews[14] with jihadist detainees and their families, the researchers noted that eight main themes were persistent surfacing in almost every case. What struck them the most, however, was the widespread variance in how the young jihadists interpreted the concepts when compared to their meanings in mainstream Islamic circles. The differences allowed the RRP researchers to gain insight into the minds of the young jihadists and understand better how they viewed al-Qaeda in ideological terms.

The list of eight themes is not just unique to South East Asia or adherents of the local *Jammah Islamiyah*. For instance, convicted terrorist Momin Khawaja of Ottawa, Canada, had written extensively about his

beliefs before he was arrested. During the course of legal proceedings against him, six of the eight themes emerged in name while a seventh (*al Wala Wal Bara*) appeared in all but name only.

The eight themes that appear on a regular basis in jihadist discourse are; *Jihad, Bayat, Daru Islam, Ummah, Takfir, Shaheed, Al-Wala Wal Bara*, and *Hijrah*. Each of the eight themes/terms has two major interpretations, that of al-Qaeda and/or its followers and a more classical, mainstream interpretation of the concept. It is instructive to juxtapose how each term is perceived by al-Qaeda adherents as opposed to how each term is used by mainstream scholars.[15]

Jihad or Struggle (al-Qaeda's View)

Jihad is war, according to al-Qaeda's perspective. It is an obligatory act for all Muslims. This obligation is described as being "*fardh ain*". Permission from parents or other relatives is not required if the jihadist is of an age of understanding. The aim of *jihad* is to achieve Muslim dominance over *Daru Islam*. Armed *jihad* is the highest form of *jihad* and should be undertaken against all enemies of Islam. This includes infidels, polytheists, as well as those who support them.

Jihad or Struggle (Islamic Scholars' View)

According to mainstream Islamic scholars, the concept of *jihad* refers to 'striving for excellence'. There are multiple goals for *jihad*. Among them are *jihad* for goodness (*al khair*), human development, prosperity, education, family, friendship and nation-building. There is also *jihad* against the human condition as well. This includes *jihad* against evil (*asy-syarr*), one's inner self, and intrusions upon one's laziness, stupidity, hatred and arrogance.

Bayat or Pledge (al-Qaeda's View)

A *bayat* is a pledge of obedience given to the *Emir* or leader of a group. The *bayat* to the leader of the group is the same that one would give to the Prophet Mohammed. Once a *bayat* is given, it cannot be broken. Anyone who breaks the pledge is guilty of an exceptionally grave sin. One who does so is not only guilty of sin, but then becomes a *kafir* (non-believer) as well. If you have not made a *bayat*, you can be considered less pious and less Muslim than those who have.

Bayat (Islamic Scholars' View)

The status of the permissibility of a *bayat* must be ascertained by the majority of the leaders of society, i.e. the *ulama* (scholars), *umara* (rulers) and other respected people. It cannot be decided by just one self-appointed leader. The *Emir* of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, does not represent the majority of the Muslim community or its leaders. Therefore, he does not have the authority to take a *bayat* from anyone. The al-Qaeda interpretation of a *bayat* is invalid and does not carry any religious weight.

Daru Islam (al-Qaeda's View)

The concept of *Daru Islam* or an 'Islamic state' is a constant theme within al-Qaeda's propaganda. It holds that in order to establish the religion, it is first necessary to establish an Islamic state, which, in turn, will then lead to the re-establishment of the *Caliphate* (Khilafah Islamiyah). It is obligatory for all Muslims to contribute both financially and physically to this end.

Daru Islam (Islamic Scholars' View)

Islamic scholars believe that the term *Daru Islam* is a relative term. It does not have a precise or exact meaning. There are no clear injunctions towards *Daru Islam*. Therefore, the justification of killing or spilling blood to achieve this vague notion is considered dangerous.

The Ummah (al-Qaeda's View)

The *Ummah* is the collective community of all Muslims. The rules for the *Ummah* are those of the “rightful way.” Anyone who follows the “rightful way” is a member of the chosen community. Anyone who does not believe or follow the rules is a non-believer. Every Muslim must follow the *Ummah*, but if the states in which they live are run by non-believers, Muslims do not have to follow the laws of those states.

The Ummah (Islamic Scholars' View)

No one can claim that their community is the “one and only” true community. There is no single authority in Islam that can make such a declaration; that would be an expression of arrogance. Islam encourages the creation of Brotherhood (*Ukhuwwah*) among all Muslims. Within Islam there is the Medina Charter, which believes that there must be peaceful co-existence among Muslims, Jews and Christians. Islam also advocates that a good Muslim should be a good citizen as well.

Takfir (al-Qaeda's View)

Takfir is the action of accusing others of being infidels or non-believers. This is considered a very serious act. Al-Qaeda, however, has regularly employed the term in an attempt to discredit or disparage other Muslims who oppose them. By doing so, fellow Muslims are now turned into enemies.

Takfir (Islamic Scholars' View)

Muslims are forbidden to declare others to be *takfir*. If a Muslim does this, then that individual casts an infidelity upon him- or herself.

Shaheed or Istisyhad (al-Qaeda's View)

Al-Qaeda advocates becoming a *shaheed* or ‘martyr’ by the act of suicide bombing. This *istimate* (suicide act) is part of their *hirja* or migration to God. They believe that they will be rewarded in heaven for this action.

Shaheed or Istisyhad (Islamic Scholars' View)

Suicide is an act that is strongly forbidden in the *Qur'an* and the *Haddith*. Allah has granted you a body. Only Allah can decide when the body will be taken back. There are no justifications for exceptions to this rule. Lives, be they human or others, are sacred, and must be honoured. Whoever commits suicide will be considered eternally committed to hellfire. Once in hell, the individual will spend the rest of eternity dying again and again in the same way they committed suicide. Therefore, suicide bombers will spend the rest of eternity having their arms, legs and head pulled off.

Al-Wala' Wal Bara' (al-Qaeda's View)

Al-Qaeda fosters an atmosphere of “us versus them” through the use of the term *Al-Wala' Wal Bara*. *Al-Wala* means “those to whom they are loyal” or simply, “their friends”. *Al-Bara* refers to those whom they hate or their enemies. This concept becomes their tool to categorize people into friends and enemies. Those they hate are the enemy and those they like, or agree with, are their friends. Their enemies are non-Muslims and many Muslims as well.

Al-Wala' Wal Bara' (Islamic Scholars' View)

There is not, nor should there be, an “us versus them” mentality in either Islam or in humanity. All human

beings are creatures of God and we therefore must show respect to each other. This implies a multi-racial, multi-religious society. Islam must be seen as a *Rahmah* (Blessing) to the Universe.

Hijrah or Migration (al-Qaeda's View)

According to the al-Qaeda view of *Hijrah*, volunteers should leave their homes, properties, jobs and families for the sake of God. They do not need permission from their families to do this. Al-Qaeda also advocates that they should disregard the needs of their parents, wives and children for the sake of their struggle. They believe that the volunteers should migrate (*Hijrah*) from worldly inclinations to heavenly goals. They can achieve this heavenly goal and obtain beautiful virgins through suicide bombings.

Hijrah or Migration (Islamic Scholars' View)

The concept of Migration (*Hijrah*) relates to the spirit of continuous life-long progress, opportunity and change. In classical Islam, those who would migrate must also take into consideration their family. Parents and children must be taken care of before *Hijrah* can be considered. A physical migration should only be considered in a dire situation when one fears for one's religious freedom, personal rights, dignity and wealth. Muslims should be able to prosper in their birthplace as a sign of thankfulness to God. It is even compulsory for a Muslim to remain in his country when he can enhance the progress of the Muslim community in that country.

What is a Story or Narrative?

Terrorists at all levels in al-Qaeda, from the leaders of organizations down to the inspired home-grown jihadists tell stories. These stories, or narratives, are used to reinforce their views on global grievances, recruit new members, justify their own actions, and develop new ideas on organization and tactics. Terrorist extremists also use narrative stories to maintain group cohesion, especially among smaller groups or cells that operate in isolation.

Much has been written about what constitutes a story or a narrative. It is not the intent of this article to enter into that debate. In general terms, however, it can be said that a narrative must have a beginning point, a middle part and an end. The beginning is the set-up for the narrative or recalls a grievance or difficult situation. The middle part then must have a hero or agent or potential solution to the problems. The end of the narrative either shows the solution or challenges the recipients to act for themselves on what they now know is the problem. This tri-part structure of a set-up, a climax, and a resolution is a recurring theme.[16] The videos produced by *As Sahab* (al-Qaeda's media arm) frequently use it. Other terrorist groups have followed a tri-part structure, such as the series of five "Russian Hell" videos produced in Chechnya.

In one such video, the Chechen mission commander is introduced as he does a military style briefing. He identifies the problem (the Russian occupiers), outlines a plan of attack for his followers (ambushing a convoy), and then they all successfully carry out an attack on a Russian convoy. These videos were widely circulated on the Internet and on DVDs and were known to have played a direct role in recruitment, even at the level of home-grown jihadist cells. [17]

Many of the narratives told by al-Qaeda follow this simple structure. It is reflected in and consistent with al-Qaeda's overall narrative:

- 1: Muslims are under attack everyone (set-up);
- 2: Only Al Qaeda and its followers are fighting the oppressors of Islam (climax);
- 3: If you are not supporting al-Qaeda, then you are supporting the oppressors (resolution/challenge).

Countering the Terrorist Narratives

Many observers and leaders in the West are not even aware of the types of various competing narratives that are being told. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia provides an interesting example. To many government leaders and citizens in the West, the narratives they hear are about peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and conflict intervention. For many followers of the al-Qaeda ideology, the conflict there is lumped together with Chechnya and Kashmir. The narratives they tell are about oppression of Muslims, which is either portrayed as being ignored by the West (Chechnya) or worse still, carried out by the West (ex-Yugoslavia).

To counter such narratives, it is critical to know which aspects of al-Qaeda's ideological appeals are working. As has been demonstrated in both extensive empirical research and first-hand experience in investigations and convictions, these themes and concepts are persistently recurring. The ideology as outlined above and the eight recurring themes are therefore key areas that need to be addressed.

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NOTES:

[1]The author was directly involved in the investigation and conviction of Momin Khawaja on terrorism charges. This case was known in Canada as *Operation Awaken* and in the UK as *Operation Crevice*. The author testified twice in the proceedings and was qualified as a court expert during this testimony. The author has also testified as an expert in National Security Certificate cases in control order cases in the Federal Court of Canada.

[2]In this context, "influential" should be taken to mean works that have been quoted or used by those who have taken the path of violent jihad.

[3]The concept of al-Qaeda was first noted in the principal journal of the Afghan Arabs – *Al Jihad*. In 1987, Abdullah Azzam, the ideological father of the movement, outlined its mission.

[4]A copy of *Join the Caravan* is available at: www.islamistwatch.org/tests/azam/caravan/preface.html

[5]For a more extensive explanation of this text and its importance, see Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda – Global Network of Terror*, Berkley Books, New York, 2002, pp. 4-5.

[6]This statement is available in English on line at a number of places including the Public Broadcasting Service's website at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html.

[7]This statement is available in any number of places in English, including the *Federation of American Scientists* website at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>. It is also available in the original Arabic at: <http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/fatw2.htm>.

[8]A translation of this book is available on line or through FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service). The document number at FIS is FBIS-NES-2002-0108. The document date is 02 Dec. 2001. The sourceline is GMP20020108000197. It was originally serialized in Arabic in London's *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*.

[9]This essay is available on line on a number of sites under the title *Al Wala Wal Bara* or *Loyalty and Enmity*. It is also available as a chapter in the book *The Al Qaeda Reader*, by Raymond Ibrahim (New York, Doubleday, 2007).

[10]This essay is also available in *The Al Qaeda Reader*, op.cit.

[11]This extract is also available in *The Al Qaeda Reader*, op.cit.

[12]For an overview of al-Suri's work, see also *Al-Suri's Doctrines for Decentralized Jihadi Training (Parts 1 and 2)* which is available on the *Jamestown Foundation's* website at: <http://www.jamestown.org/>.

[13]I am greatly indebted to *Ustaz* Hannif Hassan from the S.Rarjaratnam School of International Studies (NTU) for his continuous assistance and explanations over a period of several years. I am also indebted to the RRG for its work as well as to *Ustaz Mohammed Bin Ali* from the RRG for his explanations and understanding.

[14]The Singapore RRG project started informally in 2002; it was formalized in 2003. The project includes more than 800 interviews. Their website can be viewed at: <http://www.rrg.sg/>.

[15]There is no absolute agreement on the use of these terms either within Al Qaeda itself or among mainstream scholars. The definitions presented here are generalizations provided for a basic understanding of the nature of the problem.

[16]For more detailed information on narratives and storytelling, see: *The Stories Terrorists Tell: A Neurobiologically -Informed "Counter-Narrative Strategy" for Diminishing Terrorism's Effectiveness*. This article can be viewed online at: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/9/1/7/pages99174/p99174-4.php.

[17]In the case of Momin Khawaja, court evidence was entered to show that he used these videos as part of a successful effort to recruit another individual to assist his terrorist cell in its financing operations.

Winning the Battle but Losing the War?

Narrative and Counter-Narratives Strategy

by Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley, Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley

Our enemies have skilfully adapted to fighting wars in today's media age, but for the most part we, our country, our government, has not adapted. Consider that the violent extremists have established media relations committees – these are terrorists and they have media relations committees that meet and talk about strategy, not with bullets but with words. They've proven to be highly successful at manipulating the opinion of elites of the world. They plan and design their headline-grabbing attacks using every means of communication to intimidate and break the collective will of the free people.

- Then US Secretary of Defence D. Rumsfeld addressing the Council on Foreign Relations in February 2006.

Abstract

Since 9/11, intelligence and security services have become particularly concerned about radical ideologies and have looked for ways on how to counter them. One of the strategies has been to develop a counter-narrative. Some authors, including those of this article, are concerned that, in the marketplace of ideas, the West is losing market-share.[1] Communication failures with the Muslim world were cited in a report by a U.S. Department of Defence Advisory Committee as early as 2004.[2] The puzzle this article explores is why, having recognized the problem early on, the data suggest that further ground has since been lost. We posit the problem as having to shift the discourse from one focusing on a single counter-narrative to one of tailoring communications to target specific audiences. The article traces methodological and empirical shortcomings that are at the root of the problem and builds on these findings to develop a model to strategize about counter-narratives.

In the United States, the 'battle of ideas' opened on several fronts after 9/11. President Bush framed the enemy as those who "hate our freedoms – our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other".[3] Advertising executive Charlotte Beers created the "Shared Values Initiative" campaign for the U.S. State Department. Five television commercials depicted Muslims Americans living happily in the United States. Primarily aimed at women, the TV spots ran in countries with large Muslim populations. Print advertisements were produced as well. The effect was not what had been hoped for and the "Happy Muslim" ads were withdrawn under fire and Ms. Beers resigned.[4]

Perhaps the saddest aspect of this advertising failure was the failure of strategy. Crucial questions were neither posed nor answered – questions such as:

What were the values the ads were designed to change?

What are the values that currently support jihadist violence?

What audience currently accepts these values?

The link between values and behaviour has been much studied, and found to be generally weak.[5] In this article we focus not on political values, but on political narratives. We briefly identify the narrative associated with jihadist violence, examine the success of this narrative in Muslim opinion polls, estimate the

importance of this narrative in radicalizing individuals and groups to acts of violence, and conclude with some suggestions about how best to counter the jihadist narrative.

What is the Jihadist Narrative?

Narratives are essentially “compelling storylines which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn”:[6] Critical theorists like Richard Jackson contend that in the case of the “war on terror”, the US narrative is a deliberately constructed discourse that has had the ultimate effect of normalizing counter-terrorism policy, empower political elites, marginalize public dissent and enforce national unity. Indeed, the current American discourse on the ‘war on terror’ has been so successful, he claims, that it has become embedded in the institutions of law enforcement, national security, the legal system and the legislative and executive processes. [7]

In a similar vein, Michael Vlahos surmises:

“In war, narrative is much more than just a story. ‘Narrative’ may sound like a fancy literary word, but it is actually the foundation of all strategy, upon which all else – policy, rhetoric and action – is built. War narratives need to be identified and critically examined on their own terms, for they can illuminate the inner nature of the war itself. War narrative does three essential things. First, it is the organizing framework for policy. Policy cannot exist without an interlocking foundation of ‘truths’ that people easily accept because they appear to be self-evident and undeniable. Second, this ‘story’ works as a framework precisely because it represents just such an existential vision. The ‘truths’ that it asserts are culturally impossible to disassemble or even criticize. Third, having presented a war logic that is beyond dispute, the narrative then serves practically as the anointed rhetorical handbook for how the war is to be argued and described.” [8]

Insightful as this statement is, Vlahos commits a pivotal error: it *is* culturally possible to disassemble or criticize truths. Otherwise, constructing counter-narratives would be a futile exercise. The issue is not whether they can be disassembled or criticized but, rather, how it is being done, the response which the current approach to a counter-narrative is eliciting, and what follows from the analysis for the purpose of counter-narrative strategy.

The greater the traction of the jihadist narrative, the more democracies will have to rely on government intervention in the form of security and intelligence activities that are bound to curtail the freedom of all. To safeguard the freedom of their societies and citizens, the democratic narrative of freedom, equality, and justice must succeed at the same time that the jihadist narrative fails. Anti- and counter-democratic narratives threaten the values and way of life that democracies prize.

What exactly is the narrative that we are looking to counter? The many propositions about radicalization notwithstanding, the eschatological narrative remains the same: “The West is engaged in a millennial battle against Islam and Muslims must defend themselves – Islam is under attack and Muslims have an obligation to rise to its defence.”[9] David Betts offers a more meticulous deconstruction of the narrative:

- (1) Islam is under general unjust attack by Western crusaders led by the United States;
- (2) *Jihadis*, whom the West refers to as “terrorists,” are defending against this attack;
- (3) the actions they take in defence of Islam are proportionally just and religiously sanctified; and, therefore
- (4) it is the duty of good Muslims to support these actions.[10]

This narrative advocates a “global *Jihad*” and its potency “is rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power.”[11] The narrative is strategic insofar as (i) it does not arise spontaneously but is deliberately constructed or reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are already current, thereby expressing a sense of identity

and belonging and communicating a sense of cause, purpose and mission; and (ii) it depends on selective appeal to evidence or experience, and may rely on appeals to emotion, or on suspect metaphors and dubious historical analogies.[12]

Which Parts of the Jihadist Narrative Do Most Muslims Accept?

After 9/11 there was, in the Arab and Muslim world, a considerable amount of not only understanding but even sympathy for al-Qaeda's attacks against the United States. As Michael Howard observed: "The sympathy is not so much for their objectives as for the struggle itself, the *jihad*, and for the resentment that it motivates." [13] In other words, Muslims may sympathize with the view that Islam is under unjust attack by Westerners (1), and sympathize with the terrorists' desire to defend against this attack (2), but still not agree with the third and fourth parts of the narrative. That is, they may not believe that terrorist actions are just and religiously sanctified (3), and may not believe that it is the duty of Muslims to support terrorist actions (4).

How do the parts of the narrative 'sell' to Muslims? There is ample survey evidence to show that many Muslims in the U.S. and the U.K. as well as in Muslim countries, see the Global War on Terror as a war on Islam.[14] When asked "In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, do you feel the U.S. is fighting a war on terrorism or a war against Islam?", the percentage of American Muslims who affirmed "Islam" has kept on rising steadily from 18% in 2001, 31% in 2002, 38% in 2004, to 55% in 2007. Comparable results come also from the United Kingdom.[15] In a 2009 START poll of Muslim countries, the proportion of respondents who thought that the US has goals that are hostile to Islam ranged from 62% in Indonesia to 87% in Egypt.[16] Such findings confirm that the West is losing the narrative in the misnamed "War on Terror". Even more critically, however, some opinion polls indicate that, the current strategy to develop a Western counter-narrative has not just failed but may actually be counter-productive.

Consistent with widespread Muslim perceptions that the war on terrorism is a war on Islam are Muslim opinions about the presence of U.S. troops in Muslim countries. A 2009 START poll asked "Overall, do you think the US having naval forces based in the Persian Gulf is a good idea or a bad idea," those who answered "bad idea" ranged from 76% in Jordan to 91% in Egypt. A similar consensus emerges when respondents are asked whether they endorse the goal of al Qaeda to "push the US to remove its bases and its military forces from all Islamic countries: 87% of Egyptians, 64% of Indonesians, and 60% Pakistanis concur with this goal.[17] If these are the popular attitudes among America's apparent "allies" in the "Global War on Terror," then the findings confirm that the current counter-narrative enjoys little legitimacy across the Muslims world.

In short, polling results show that the perception of a "war on Islam" is well entrenched among substantive sections of Muslim populations in both the West and other parts of the world. Yet, those who see Islam under attack do not necessarily endorse terrorism as a legitimate response that warrants support. Indeed there is considerable evidence from public opinion surveys that most Muslims do not agree with terrorist tactics. For instance, in the aftermath of 9/11, two-thirds of respondents in Muslim countries rejected the attack on civilians in the World Trade Center as forbidden by the *Qu'ran*. [18] Large proportions of the population of predominantly Muslim countries do not agree with attacking civilians. In the START survey "Bombings and assassinations that are carried out to achieve political or religious goals", large majorities ranging from 67 to 89 percent are rejecting these as 'not justified at all'. These results are consistent with earlier polls conducted by Zogby, Pew, and ICM among US and UK Muslims.[19]

Similarly, in a July 2005 ICM telephone poll of UK Muslims, only 5 percent of respondents, when asked "Do you think any further attacks by British suicide bombers in the UK are justified or unjustified?" answered with "justified." However, that proportion might be an under-estimate. Given the proportion of respondents (14 percent) who answered to this question, with "do not know/refuse to answer," we can

infer that at least some of them were inclined to answer “justified” but opted not to identify themselves as such in a public poll. Assuming that there are about one million adult Muslims in the UK, 5 percent works out to 50,000 Muslims.

Of course, not all those justifiers would commit violence. In the next section we try to give some indications of how few Muslims in Europe are actually participating in *jihād*.

Who are the Jihadists in Europe and North America?

Security forces everywhere are looking for the proverbial needle in a haystack. From a recent investigation into the Istanbul bombings,[20] we know that there was a circle of about 400 people who were aware of what was going to happen but did nothing to stop it.[21] In such a case, inaction is a form of action, a crime of omission or permissive violence. Since the Istanbul bombings involved multiple bombers, we can estimate that, for each bomber, there were perhaps 200 passive supporters of a terrorist action who do not commit the actual violence themselves.

Similarly, in the UK upwards of 200 Muslims have been implicated in terrorist action and more than one thousand are currently under observation. As already noted, approximately 50,000 adult Muslims in the U.K. are willing to justify jihadist violence in the UK. The challenge for security is to profile and find the 1 in 50 militant who is ready to act out his extreme beliefs.

The numbers matter. They are to some extent corroborated by EUROPOL’s 2009 *Terrorism Situation and Trend Report* from which the Tables 1 and 2 (below) are drawn.[22]

Table 1: Number of Arrested Suspects in 2008 by Member State and Affiliation

Member State	Islamist	Separatist	Left Wing	Right Wing	Single Issue	Not Specified	Total 2008
Belgium	17	1	4	0	0	0	22
Cyprus	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Denmark	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
France	78	283	37	0	3	1	402
Germany	8	1	3	0	0	0	12
Ireland (Republic of)	3	49	0	0	0	0	52
Italy	9	35	7	0	0	2	53
Lithuania	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Slovakia	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Spain	61	129	6	0	0	1	197
Sweden	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
the Netherlands	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
UK	-	-	-	-	-	-	256
Total 2008	187	501	58	0	3	4	1009


Table 2: Number of Verdicts for Terrorism Charges in 2008 by Member State and Affiliation

Member State	Islamist	Separatist	Left Wing	Right Wing	Not Specified	Total
Belgium	5	7	0	0	0	12
Denmark	10	0	0	0	7	17
France	31	44	0	0	0	75
Germany	8	2	0	0	0	10
Ireland (Republic of)	0	9	0	0	0	9
Italy	20	3	2	0	0	25
Spain	49	85	25	0	3	162
Sweden	1	0	0	0	0	1
the Netherlands	13	0	0	0	0	13
UK	53	5	0	2	0	60
Total	190	155	27	2	10	384

Table 2 seems to suggest that authorities are doing a formidable job at finding and convicting alleged Islamist terrorists. After all, half of all verdicts concern Islamist terrorists.[23] Only 34 percent of proceedings related to Islamist terrorism ended with acquittals. That is not to say that those acquitted were necessarily innocent; the burden of proof in terrorism trials can be considerable and many suspects are tried for crimes they allegedly intended to commit rather than crimes committed, an anomaly in the criminal justice system which is generally used to trying people who have already committed crimes. Security services and courts are concentrating on Islamist threats, and with considerable success.

The overall picture that emerges is one of a small percentage yet a sizeable number of Muslims in Western countries who approve of jihadist violence, with only a tiny fraction of those who approve actually involved in violent acts. The disjunction between opinion and action implies that an effective counter-narrative must reach radical terrorist perpetrators, justifying supporters and sympathizers - as depicted in Graph 1.

Graph 1: The Pyramid Model of Radicalization



Higher levels of the pyramid represent more extreme opinions, with violent radicals at the apex. In the aforementioned 2004 *Guardian/ICM* poll of UK Muslims, 7 out of 10 respondents equated the “Global War on Terror” with a “War on Islam” (while 3 out of 10 were neutral on that point); about 5% justified

suicide terrorism, and perhaps one tenth of one percent (1.000/1.000000) know something about or are involved in jihadist activity in the U.K.

The characterization “Activists” in the pyramid model might be accompanied by a question mark on the left side of the pyramid, opposite the right-side levels that range from Neutral to Radical. The question mark and separate location would represent an important uncertainty about political activism, which we understand as legal and non-violent political protest or political action. It is beyond the scope of the present article to explore whether or how often activism leads to radicalization, that is, how often legal and non-violent political action leads on to illegal and violent political action. We expect that the answer will differ for different groups, different decades, and different cultures.

Note also that the pyramid does not imply a stage theory, which would require that every trajectory to terrorism must start at the base of the pyramid and rise through each intervening level in order to reach terrorism at the apex.[24] Note that, in the pyramid model, the volcanic “magma pipe” of radicals/terrorists reaches down even into the neutral population. This representation recognizes that even apolitical individuals at the base of the pyramid can sometimes shift more or less rapidly to political violence and terrorism.

Indeed analyses have suggested that the pathways to terrorism are varied and complex.[25] Recent work suggests that there are plural pathways with no profile trajectory.[26] The next section discusses some of the sources of these pathways.

Mechanisms of Radicalization and the Importance of the Narrative

Insofar as jihadi radicalization is concerned, four types of popular explanations can be found:

1. *Socio-economic marginalization*: This is the prevailing neo-Marxist explanation that assumes economic factors underlying all conflicts everywhere at all times. People are frustrated because they are poor or otherwise victimized by the economic and social system.
2. *Social-identity marginalization*: This explanation holds that people have trouble integrating culturally into the mainstream of society or encounter difficulties in having their own identity recognized and validated by the mainstream.
3. *Religious fanaticism*: This explanation is favoured by those who see *Wahhabism* and *Salafism* as the crux of the problem. In this account, extremist religion is the ‘center of gravity.’
4. *Political grievance*: From this perspective, the major source of the problem are people who are unhappy with certain political decisions or policies which they seek to change.

It is worth noting that the four explanations are all sub-species of grievance; each specifies something wrong with the world that needs to be changed. From a comparative perspective, the important fact to note is that the vast majority of people that might fall into any of those four categories are not violent, indeed do not advocate, support, or even sympathize with violence. For this reason and for our purposes, then, all four are of limited utility.

A more differentiated system of explanation has recently been offered by McCauley and Moskaleiko (2008). They distinguish among individual, group, and mass-public mechanisms of radicalization. Their focus is specifically on radicalization that leads to the extreme of political violence.

1. *Personal grievance*. Harm to self or loved ones produces anger toward the perpetrators. This explanation includes individual experience of socio-economic or identity frustration, but includes

also any perceived personal injustice at the hands of the powers that be. Chechen Black Widows are one example.

2. *Group grievance.* Again, anger is predicted in response to harm, but the harm is to a group too large to be known personally. The individual identifies with a group perceived as suffering victimization or injustice. When radicalization by group grievance occurs without any personal grievance or involvement in a radical group, the result may be described as “sudden jihad syndrome” and includes such examples as Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar, and Momin Khawaja. “Lone wolf” terrorism is often said to be associated with Internet exposure to radical narratives. [27]

3. *Self-persuasion in action – the slippery slope.* This is based on a psychology of self-justification in which each act of increasing extremity produces desensitization and rationalization which, in turn, encourage more extreme acts. As in Stanley Milgram’s experiment requiring subjects to give increasing shock levels to “another subject,” the crucial element is that the trajectory toward extreme behaviour is divided into very small steps.

4. *Joining a radical group – the power of love.* Individuals can be radicalized through their attachment to friends and family.[28] Their request “join me” can be a good enough reason to join a radical group. The attachment may be long-term and pre-existing or it may be deliberately cultivated. Note that even previously apolitical individuals can be pulled into radical groups by the power of love.

5. *Fear – escape to group security.* Sometimes an individual is safer in a violent group than alone on the streets of a failed state. An example is the formation of sectarian groups in Iraq.

6. *Thrill, Status, Money.* These are instrumentalist explanations that play on individual preferences, usually those of young males. Examples include setting Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq or Afghanistan but the same kind of motivation is often present in members of street gangs.

In addition to these six mechanisms of individual radicalization, three mechanisms of group dynamics can be identified.

7. *Group polarization.* Research by social psychologists indicates that groups made up of like-minded individuals are likely to become more extreme in their shared preferences. Group dynamics lend more weight to arguments and to individuals leaning in the group-favoured direction.

8. *Extreme cohesion under isolation and threat.* These circumstances often affect underground groups, cults, and combat squadrons; the high cohesion multiplies every kind of group dynamics, including inter-group polarization.

9. *Inter-group and intra-group competition.* Three kinds of competition are relevant. A non-state group may compete against state power, against another non-state group (often in the form of “outbidding” the other group), or may experience competition among factions of their own group (such as the split within the IRA and the formation of two IRA splinter groups).

Finally, three mechanisms are identified that can move mass publics to support political violence.

10. *External threat.* Perception of common threat reliably leads to increased group identification, magnified ethnic entrepreneurship and the power of leaders, sanctions against in-group deviants, and the idealization of in-group values. These changes prepare a group to confront the threat, including preparation for the use of violence.

11. *Hate*. As political homogeneity of the in-group increases, there is a strong tendency to adopt a view of the threatening group as likewise a homogenous group. The enemy is likely to be de-individualized and essentialized in ways that make it easier to kill by category.

12. *Martyrdom*. A martyr is the ultimate witness because the sunk costs are all-encompassing. The classic example of mobilization by way of martyrs is the story of the 1981 hunger strike from which ten IRA prisoners perished as recounted in *Ten Men Dead*.^[29]

The existence of multiple mechanisms at multiple levels has two important implications for understanding how political radicalization occurs. First, there cannot be any one profile of radicalization, nor one single pathway to terrorism. Rather there are many pathways, potentially as many as the possible combinations of the twelve mechanisms identified. Similarly, in a recent article, Andrew Silke reviews the literature on radicalization and lists what he views as the most important emerging variables: age and gender, education, career and marital status, social identity, marginalization, discrimination, catalyst events/perceived injustice, status and personal reward, and opportunity and recruitment. One important caveat that Silke highlights is that radicalization is the result of the compound effect of a number of these variables. He notes that “these factors will vary depending on the culture, the social context, the terrorist group and the individual involved.”^[30]

The second important implication of multiple mechanisms of radicalization is that there is no single mechanism that, if controlled or eliminated, will control or eliminate radicalization. This is of key importance for thinking about narratives.

As already noted, the jihadist narrative can be broken down into several parts. We have shown that some of these parts are accepted by most Muslims (War on terror as a War on Islam) and some parts are rejected by most Muslims (attacking civilians). Yet even the accepted part, that there is supposedly a war on Islam going on, represents only a single mechanism of radicalization – group grievance. A completely effective attack on this grievance would yet leave eleven other mechanisms of radicalization in play. We conclude tentatively that even eliminating the perception of a War on Islam may not have, at least in the short term, a large effect on the rate of radicalization.

Another kind of limitation is that group grievance appears seldom to produce political violence without a group or organization to frame and focus the grievance into violent action. As noted already, a special case of group grievance is lone-wolf terrorism, in which an individual is moved to violence by perceiving harm to a group the individual identifies with. But lone-wolf terrorism is rare, at least relative to group-organized terrorism. Again tentatively, we conclude that group grievance alone is not a powerful source of radicalization. Indeed we suspect that perception of group grievance may often be the result of radicalization via other mechanisms rather than an independent cause of radicalization. That is, a radical group framing of group grievance may often be adopted or learned by members of a radical group who themselves joined for other reasons – including personal grievance, fear, or merely thrill-seeking.

With these limitations in mind, we turn to some practical questions about developing counter-narratives to the jihadist narrative.

Tailoring Counter-Narratives

Given that we must distinguish among sympathizers, supporters, and activists as well as legal, illegal, and violent forms of political action, there is no single counter-narrative that can neutralize the jihadist narrative. The core narrative has to be analyzed in its parts - which are accepted by different audiences to different extents. To attack the jihadist narrative therefore implies preparing different narratives for these different audiences. At a minimum, four counter-narratives are required:

1. One narrative must counter the perception that the West is engaged in a War on Islam. This perception is accepted by a very broad cross-section of Muslims, perhaps still more than half of Muslims worldwide even after the inauguration of President Obama. So long as Western troops are deployed in Muslim countries, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan, a counter-narrative for the War on Islam will likely remain difficult to formulate.
2. A second narrative must counter the perception that Muslim terrorists are defending Islam. While the aforementioned polls in Muslim countries suggest a reservoir of personal admiration for Osama bin Laden, most respondents do not endorse terrorism as a legitimate means.
3. A third narrative must counter the perception that the actions of Muslim terrorists, especially attacks on Western civilians and collateral damage to Muslim civilians, are legitimate acts of war. Polls indicate that only a small percentage of Muslims believe this, although amounting to large numbers of potential extremists in absolute terms. Research will be needed to identify the characteristics of this small but very important minority.
4. Finally, a fourth narrative must counter the perception that good Muslims have a duty to support the terrorists. As far as we are aware, there are no polls that have assessed how many or what kind of Muslims agree with this view. We expect that the percentage is very small but one representing a very high level of radicalization. Targeting this tiny minority with any kind of mass media intervention may be difficult indeed.

Without detracting from Olson's claim that (1) "we have not adapted our war-fighting structures to the new information-dominated operational environment"[31] and from the claim that (2) "we do not focus enough effort on winning and maintaining the hearts and minds of the most critical and accessible population: our own," and that (3) "we struggle to be persuasive in the virtual dimension because the message that we wish to convey lacks narrative coherence," it is not a matter, as David Betts has eloquently argued, of developing a coherent and strategic narrative.[32] Nor is it a matter, as posited by Frank Douglas, of making the idea of violent *jihad* widely unpopular.[33] It is already widely unpopular, even among its supposed target audience! Rather, it is a matter of developing multiple counter-narratives that are tailored to specific audiences. This finding echoes General Sir Rupert Smith's observation that "we are living in a world of confrontations and conflict rather than one of war and peace." [34]

This article has been motivated by a concern that the West is targeting the wrong people and for the wrong reasons. Radical ideas are not the problem per se. After all, many of democracies' greatest advances have been the result of "radicals" propagating "radical ideas." Democratic governments are not (or, at least, ought not be) in the business of policing what people think or believe. Thoughts and beliefs are (or ought to be) of concern only insofar as they are linked to behaviour that is illegal. Even then, however, it is important to distinguish between non-violent and violent illegal conduct. Only the latter is (or ought to be) of genuine concern to security and intelligence forces. Therefore, the counter-narrative task is a narrow one: to counter those narratives with the clearest link to violence.

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NOTES:

- [1] This sentiment is shared by, *inter alia*, Walid Phares. *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against the West*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, and his more recent book *The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; J. Michael Waller. *Fighting the War of Ideas like a Real War*. Washington, D.C., The Institute of World Politics Press, 2007; David Kilcullen. "Countering Global Insurgency," *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 28, No. 4, 2005, pp. 597-617; Michael Vlahos. "Losing Mythic Authority," *The National Interest* May/June, 2007.
- [2] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. Technology and Logistics. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication. Washington, D.C., DOD, September 2004.
- [3] George W. Bush, 43rd President of the United States, addressing a joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001.
- [4] Lawrence Pintak. *Dangerous Delusions: Advertising Nonsense about Advertising America*. <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/32.htm> (Aug. 29, 2004)/*The Daily Star* (Beirut).
- [5] John Sabini. *Social Psychology (2nd ed.)*. New York: Norton, 1995.
- [6] Lawrence Freedman. *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*, Adelphi Paper No. 379. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. March 2006. p.22.
- [7] Richard Jackson. *Writing the War on Terror: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005.
- [8] Michael Vlahos. "The Long War: A Self-defeating Prophecy," *Asia Times*, 9 September 2006.
- [9] For substantiation from primary Taliban sources, see, for instance, Thomas Johnson. 2007. "The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah ("Night Letters")," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* Vol. 18, No. 3, 2007, pp. 321-322.
- [10] David Betz. 2008. "The virtual dimension of contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2008, p. 520.
- [11] Thomas X. Hammes. 2005. "War evolves into the fourth generation," *Contemporary Security Studies* Vol. 26, No. 2, 2005, pp.189-221.
- [12] L. Freedman, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
- [13] Michael Howard. "A Long War?" *Survival* Vol.48, No.4, 2006, p. 11.
- [14] See, for instance, *Zogby International* polling from Nov/Dec. 2001 (American Muslim Poll in conjunction with Georgetown University's Project on Muslims in the American Public Square at: <http://www.projectmaps.com/PMReport.htm> , May 2002. (The Hamilton College Muslim America Poll at <http://www.hamilton.edu/news/MuslimAmerica/MuslimAmerica.pdf> , June 2004 (in collaboration with Project MAPS at <http://www.projectmaps.com/AMP2004report.pdf> , and Pew Research Center polling from 2007 (*Muslims Americans: Mostly Middle Class, Mostly Mainstream*).
- [15] *Guardian/ICM* telephone poll of UK Muslims in 2004.
- [16] February 2009 poll by the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland in conjunction with world public opinion.org at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb09/STARTII_Feb09_rpt.pdf
- [17] Ibid.
- [18] <http://www.projectmaps.com/PMReport.htm>
- [19] Ibid.
- [20] Edmund F. McGarrell, Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermak. "Intelligence led policing as a framework for responding to terrorism," *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, Vol. 23, No.2, 2007, pp. 142-158.
- [21] See: *ibid*.
- [22] EUROPOL. *TE – SAT Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*. The Hague, EUROPOL, 2009.
- [23] The number of suspects tried does not correspond to the number of verdicts because suspects are often tried for multiple offences and in separate court proceedings, especially in Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK.
- [24] See, for example, Shahid Bux.. "Muslim Youths, Islam and Violent Radicalization: Addressing Some Myths" *The Police Journal* 80, 2007, pp.267-278; Thomas Hegghammer. "Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia" *Middle East Policy*. Vol. 13, No. 4, 2006, pp. 39-60; John Horgan. "From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. 116, 2008, pp. 80-94; Aidan Kirby. The London Bombers as Self-Starters: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, 2007, pp. 415-428; Evan F. Kohlmann . "Homegrown Terrorists: Theory and Cases in the War on Terror's Newest Front". *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, No. 618, 2008, pp. 95-109; and Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko. "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism" *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2008, pp. 415-433.
- [25] For example: Magouirk, Atran and Sageman, 2008: pp. 1-16; B.L.Smith, K.R. Damphouse and P. Roberts. 2002. "American Terrorism Study: Patterns of Behavior, Investigation and Prosecution of American Terrorist, Final Report" Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2002; and Mark S. Hamm, Mark S. *Terrorism as Crime: From Oklahoma City to Al-Qaeda and Beyond* New York: New York University Press, 2007.
- [26] Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko. "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol. 20, No. 3, 2008, pp. 415-433.
- [27] Evan Kohlmann. "[Inside As-Sahaab: The Story of Ali al-Bahlul and the Evolution of Al-Qaida's Propaganda](#)," Nefa Foundation, 2008, pp. 95-109; see also: Anne Stenersen. "The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?" *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Vol. 20, No. 2, 2008, pp. 215-233; Brynja Lia. "Al Qaeda Online: Understanding Jihadist Internet Infrastructure,"

Jane's Intelligence Review Vol. 18, No. 1, 2006.

[28]Marc Sageman. *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

[29]David Beresford. *Ten Men Dead: The Story of the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike*. Grove/Atlantic, 1997.

[30]Andrew Silke. "Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Process of Jihadi Radicalization" *European Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2008, pp. 99-123.

[31]See also William J. Olson. "War Without a Centre of Gravity: Reflections on Terrorism and Post-Modern War," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2007, pp. 559-583.

[32]Betts, *op. cit.*

[33]Frank "Scott" Douglas. "Waging the inchoate war: Defining, fighting, and second-guessing the 'Long War'," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2007, pp. 391-420.

[34]Rupert Smith. *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. London: Allen Lane, 2005, pp. 16-18, 371-372.

Book Reviews

Peter R. Neumann. *Old & New Terrorism. Late Modernity, Globalization and the Transformation of Political Violence*. Cambridge, Polity, 2009. 218 pp. ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-4376-2.

For those who are new to the field of Terrorism Studies, this is a useful and concise volume which summarizes some of the recent debates in the terrorism research community in a clear and well-structured way. According to the author of the volume - he is Director of the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) at King's College, London – it was written out of frustration with the academic field of 'Terrorism Studies' which often studies terrorism out of context.

Regarding context, Neumann makes a credible case that *globalization* has been a facilitating factor in the transition from older to newer terrorism. However, he is, to this reviewer, less convincing in his discussion of the contribution of the more abstract *late modernity* to the emergence of 'new' terrorism. 'Old' and 'new' terrorism are illustrated by case studies on the IRA and al-Qaeda which Dr. Neumann discusses in terms of structure, aims and method. He is aware of the limitation of such a comparison and honest enough to ask himself whether the Palestinian Hamas or the late Tamil LTTE should be regarded as 'old' or 'new'. He fails to discuss in any detail other groups than the IRA, the Irish Protestant Loyalists, ETA and al-Qaeda. The *Lord's Resistance Army* in Uganda, for instance, which caused many more casualties than Al Qaeda is not even mentioned and its record contradicts Neumann's claim that "Those who claim to act in the name of Islam have killed more people in the past two decades than any other branch of religiously inspired terrorism" (p.105) .

There are other questionable statements like "...even the United Nation have come to recognize that, for the foreseeable future, international cooperation on counter-terrorism issues will continue to rely on informal, ad hoc forums that involve mostly bilateral contacts" (p.157). If that were fully true, the UN would long ago have abolished most of its 24 bodies in the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretariat and other parts of the UN system that deal with preventing and countering terrorism. When it comes to policy recommendations, the author calls for more international cooperation (p. 154), the promotion of non-violent forms of expressing any identity or ideology and, somewhat surprisingly, educating the public about the ineffectiveness of terrorist violence (p.160). As to what the future holds, Neumann suggests that the anti-globalization movement and anti-immigrant groups in Western Europe and North America may soon resort to terrorist methods (p. 164).

Regarding the jihadist movement, Neumann is modest enough to conclude that "...it is impossible to make any precise forecasts when the picture is as confusing and contradictory as it seems right now" (p.165). The book covers some of the same ground as Brynjar Lia's magisterial 'Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism. Patterns and Predictions' (London, Routledge, 2005) but cannot match the latter's scope and originality. – *Reviewed by A.P. Schmid (Editor PT)*

Ana S. Trbovich. *A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia's Disintegration*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008. 522 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-533343-5

Beginning in 1991, the state of Yugoslavia disintegrated like an accidentally dropped fine crystal. Yet according to Ana S. Trbovich, it was hardly an unforeseen and indeed, an unforeseeable occurrence. Its seeds were sown in the historical apportionment of various provinces, which bore the names of ethnic groups (except for the Muslims) but had little to do with the patterns of actual demographic composition within these geographical entities. She points out that the internal boundaries of Yugoslavia reflected only the administrative needs of the Communist government; these did not pertain to any territorial claims of the Slovenes, the Croats, the Serbs and the Muslims (who claimed Bosnia-Herzegovina). As a result, each group felt compelled to drive out the "intruders" by a process, which became enshrined in history of the twentieth century under the euphemistic name of "ethnic cleansing."

Nationalism, the process by which a group of people see themselves as part of a larger collectivity, separated from the "others," was largely a product of nineteenth century Europe. From the beginning, the principle of (and later right to) self-determination and political separation came directly in conflict with the sovereign need of the state to maintain its territorial integrity. Although Trbovich frames this dilemma in terms of the former Yugoslavia, her analysis is eminently pertinent for our understanding of other conflicts - from Uighur nationalism to the Basque rebellion, from Kashmir to Georgia.

However, in the quest for international political stability, the post WWII practice in the United Nations, with the possible exception of Bangladesh and East Timor, has been to side squarely on the side of state sovereignty. Trbovich poignantly points out that "(i)n the case of Yugoslavia, the fundamental principle of territorial integrity, which lies at the basis of international law, appears to have been undermined" (p. 1). On the basis of a great deal of legal and historical research, the author constructs her case in favour of state sovereignty and warns us against the romantic notion of ancestral community and a common bond of blood and culture – notions which psychologically separate a group from everyone else within a larger political entity.

While Trbovich builds an impressive set of arguments based on international law and a painstaking discussion of various treaties and plans, she generally shies away from answering her own core question adequately: why did the international community break its own rule in the case of the Yugoslav republics which "rendered human and minority rights the only form of determination" (p. 436)? It would have been interesting to place it in the broader context of international politics, the discussion of which is somewhat inadequate in the treatment of her own Balkan case study. Had she done so, we would have understood better the reasons why, along with Yugoslavia, Bangladesh and East Timor stand out as exceptions to standard UN practices. It could also have shed important light on the West's concern about genocide in Darfur as opposed to the one in Rwanda. Equally absent in her discussion is the question of the formation of individual ethnic identity, which was used to romanticize each community while demonizing others. Tito, on the one hand, tried to develop a Yugoslav national identity, yet, on the other hand, created at the same time a political structure which could only promote sectarianism.

Much of this unfortunate process can be traced to successive amendments to the Yugoslav Constitution, which almost guaranteed conflict among various groups. Trbovich comments that "(i)n addition to escalating nationalism, the reason for creating such an ambiguous, contradictory, and inefficient constitutional arrangement for Yugoslavia was the so-called inheritance question or the problem of Tito's succession. Tito safeguarded his power so strongly, that he fashioned a system in which any conflict resolution among the republics called for his personal intervention" (p. 165). Unfortunately, while presenting the

legal evolution of Yugoslav federalism, Trbovich did not explore these important and in many ways, more interesting political questions in greater detail. Nevertheless Ana Trbovich's work is an excellent example of multidisciplinary work, imaginative in its presentation, historical in perspective, and magisterial in scope. Any serious student of the disintegration of Yugoslavia in particular, and all other violent calls for self-determination and secession in other parts of the world in general, can ill afford to ignore her arguments. - Reviewed by Dipak Gupta (San Diego State University)

Ruediger Lohlker. *Dschihadismus Materialien* [Jihadism Materials]. Vienna, Facultas WUV, 2009. 248 pp. ISBN 978-3-8252-3132-3

The author of the volume who holds a chair for Islamic Sciences at the Institute for Oriental Studies of Vienna University, discusses *jihadism* in terms of a transnational Islamic movement which regards *ji-had* in a military sense as the core of its theory and practice. Prof. Lohlker traces the history and theory of *jihad* and related concepts and presents texts from Internet forums, communiqués, songs and poetry, biographies as well as training manuals. The original Arabic texts were downloaded by the author from the Internet and translated into German whereby he deliberately excluded in most cases texts which had already been translated into English by G. Kepel and others.

In his comments to the texts, the author demonstrates great erudition with regard to the history and culture of the Arab and Islamic world. He discusses issues like the connection between monotheism and violence (and finds no direct and necessary causal connection when it comes to Islam). In a semantic analysis he notes, for instance, that only in 10 out of 41 uses of the word *jihad* in the Koran there is a clear reference to warfare.

His philological and juridical analyses of the concept make clear how complex and varied its interpretations were over the course of centuries. He also demonstrates how modern theorists of the *jihad* – ideologues and practitioners like A. Assam, S. Qutb, A. Farag, S. Imam (Dr. Fadl) A. M. as-Suri and A. al-Zawahiri – reshaped and instrumentalized *jihad* and related concepts like *takfir* (heretic) for the promotion of their political agendas.

Some of the translated texts from the jihadi literature discuss the role of women on earth (who are admonished not to put obstacles in the way of the *jihad* for their husbands) and the (seductive) role of the virgins (*hur*) in paradise - a place situated "in the shadow of the swords" in some of the jihadist literature. These original primary documents provide the reader with a direct glimpse into a world that is archaic in its imagery but contemporary in its use of Internet technology. The last chapter of the volume discusses ways to exit from the *jihad* with text samples from Yemen, Singapore and Saudi Arabia. A glossary completes this remarkable volume which deserves to be translated into other languages. – Reviewed by A.P. Schmid (Editor PT).

Conference Calendar (Sept. – Dec. 2009)

by Michael Cheek, Research Assistant TRI

Title	World Summit on Counter Terrorism: “Terrorism’s Global Impact”	Rethinking Jihad: Ideas, Politics and Conflict in the Arab World and Beyond	2009 Homeland Security Symposium and Exhibition
Dates	7-10 September 2009	7-9 September 2009	9-10 September 2009
Venue	Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel	Playfair Library, University of Edinburgh, Scotland	Crystal Gateway Marriot, Arlington, VA
Organizer	International Institute for Counter-Terrorism	Centre for the Advanced Study of the Arab World	National Defense Industrial Association
Topics	Programme	Programme	Programme
Speakers	List of Speakers	List of Speakers	List of Speakers
Expected audience	Academics, security professionals, government officials, first responders	Academics, field experts	Government officials, academics, security professionals, experts, private sector
Costs	\$600	£70.00	Variable, starting at \$545
Programme Details	Conference Announcement	Conference Announcement	Conference Announcement
Contact	International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya P.O. Box 167 Herzilya 46150, Israel Tel: 972-9-9527277 Fax: 972-9-9513073	CASAW Events Team Centre for the Advanced Study of the Arab World University of Edinburgh 16-19 George Square Edinburgh EH8 9LD Scotland Tel: 0131-650-6814 Fax: 0131-650-6804 Email:events@casaw.ac.uk	Ms. Mary Anna Christiansen Tel: 703-247-2596 Email: mchristiansen@ndia.org
Title	6th Handelsblatt Conference on Security Policy and Defense Industry	17 th Annual Terrorism Trends and Forecasts Symposium	Victims and Society: “Terrorism and Society”
Dates	15-16 September 2009	18 September 2009	18-19 September 2009
Venue	Pullman Berlin Schweizerhof, Berlin	Fairleigh Dickinson University, Hackensack, N.J.	National Assembly building Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Lamartine Hall, 101 rue de l’Université, 75007 Paris
Organizer	Euroforum	The International Association for Counterterrorism and Security Professionals	Association française des Victimes du Terrorisme and Network of Associations of Victims of Terrorism
Topics	Programme	Programme	Programme
Speakers	List of Speakers	List of Speakers	List of Speakers
Expected audience	Academics, security professionals, government officials	Government officials, first responders, security professionals, military	Academics, victims, victim assistance personnel
Costs	Variable, starting at €399	Variable, starting at \$129	Conference by invitation only
Programme Details	Conference Announcement	Conference Announcement	Conference Announcement

Contact	Kristina Seimetz Tel: +49 (0)2 11 96 86-36 71 Email: kristina.seimetz@euroforum.com	Contact Form	Porte-parole & Directeur général : Guillaume Denoix de Saint Marc Tel: (+33) 6 61 11 96 54 Email: gsaintmarc@AfVT.org
Title	First International Conference on Disaster Management and Human Health Risk: Reducing Risk, Improving Outcomes	Preventing and Mitigating the Next Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons	Terrorism, Security and Human Rights: Opportunities for Policy Change
Dates	23-25 September 2009	25-27 September 2009	1-4 October 2009
Venue	Ashurst Lodge, Wessex Institute, New Forest, UK	Wilton Park, Wiston House, Steyning, West Sussex, BN44 3DZ, UK	Wilton Park, Wiston House, Steyning, West Sussex, BN44 3DZ, UK
Organizer	Wessex Institute of Technology and University of Toronto	Wilton Park	Wilton Park
Topics	List of Topics	Programme	Programme
Speakers	List of Speakers	List of Speakers	List of Speakers
Expected audience	Academics, first responders, security professionals, private sector	Academics, security professionals, experts, private sector	Academics, members of policy community
Costs	£940	£1350	£1350
Programme Details	Conference Announcement	Conference Announcement	Conference Announcement
Contact	Rachel Swinburn Conference Manager, Disaster Management 2009 Wessex Institute of Technology, Ashurst Lodge Ashurst, Southampton, SO40 7AA, UK Tel: 44-0-238-029-3223 Fax: 44-0-238-029-2853 Email: rswinburn@wessex.ac.uk	Ms. Alison Jones Wilton Park Tel: 44-1903-817714 Fax: 44-1903-817162 Email: alison.jones@wiltonpark.org.uk	Lisa Elvy Wilton Park Tel: 44 (0) 1903 817777 Fax: 44 (0) 1903 815244 Email: lisa.elvy@wiltonpark.org.uk
Title	International Counter-Terrorism Officers Association 7 th Annual Conference	1 st Middle East Security Conference	
Dates	20-22 October 2009	6-8 December 2009	
Venue	Disney's Coronado Springs Resort, Orlando, FL	Dubai, UAE	
Organizer	International Counter-Terrorism Officers Association	ASIS International	
Topics	Programme	Programme	
Speakers	List of Speakers	List of Speakers	
Expected audience	Academics, security professionals, first responders, private sector	Academics, security professionals, government officials, first responders, private sector	
Costs	Variable, starting at \$ 495	Variable, starting at \$1,180	
Programme Details	Conference Announcement	Conference Announcement	

Contact	International Counter-Terrorism Officers Association Empire State Building 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3304- #16P New York, NY 10118 Tel: 212-564-5048	ASIS International European Bureau Tel: 32-2-645-2674 Fax: 32-2-645-2671 Email: dubai@asisonline.org	
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Perspectives on Terrorism (PT) seeks to provide a unique platform for established and emerging scholars to present their perspectives on the developing field of terrorism research and scholarship; to present original research and analysis; and to provide a forum for discourse and commentary on related issues. The journal could be characterized as 'nontraditional' in that it dispenses with traditional rigidities in order to allow its authors a high degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of article while at the same time maintaining professional scholarly standards.

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PT is a journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), an initiative that seeks to support the international community of terrorism researchers and scholars especially through the facilitation of collaborative and cooperative efforts. TRI was formed by scholars in order to provide the global community with centralized tools from which to better actualize the full potential of its labours. TRI is working to build a truly inclusive international community and empower it through the provision of collaborative projects to extend the impact of participants' research activities.

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