Making a Mark
Reporting on Firearms Marking in the RECSA Region

By James Bevan and Benjamin King
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The Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States

The Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) is an intergovernmental organization that was established in June 2005.

Its mission is to coordinate action against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the great lakes region and horn of Africa, in order to establish a safe and secure sub-region in a peaceful continent, free from arms proliferation.

Initially known as the Nairobi Secretariat, RECSA was set up to coordinate the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.

The Nairobi Declaration was signed on 15 March 2000 by ten countries: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Central African Republic, Congo, the Seychelles, Somalia, and South Sudan have since signed, bringing the total number of RECSA member states to fifteen, as of March 2013.

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**James Bevan** has more than a decade of experience in tracking weapons in armed conflicts across Africa. A former field researcher with the Small Arms Survey and head of the UN Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire, he is now the director of Conflict Armament Research—a UK-based organization that identifies and tracks conventional weapons in contemporary armed conflicts.

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Foreword

Both the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) and the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (Nairobi Protocol) underscore the importance of marking, record-keeping and tracing to counter the illicit proliferation of small arms.

Governments have spent more than ten years and millions of dollars to make good on their commitments in this regard. The 15 members of the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA)—together with generous support from many donors, including the United States and the 27 members of the European Union—have made great progress in attaining their objectives.

But progress is not uninterrupted or even. Why have some governments made greater strides whereas others have moved forward haltingly? And what can governments learn—both from within and outside of the region—from RECSA members’ experiences?

This study, Making a Mark: Reporting on Firearms Marking in the RECSA Region, is the latest example of the mutually beneficial collaboration the Small Arms Survey and the RECSA Secretariat have long enjoyed. The studies’ three researchers—James Bevan, Benjamin King, and Jonah Leff—together with Godfrey Bogonza, Barbara Munube, and Francis Waraigu, from the RECSA Secretariat, who helped procure the marking machines, develop the accompanying record-keeping software, provide the requisite training for these systems’ use, and administer and manage the assistance program to RECSA members, are to be congratulated for providing such a useful piece of research and analysis. The U.S. Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement deserves credit for not just underwriting the purchase of equipment and associated training, but also for seeing the value of examining how their investment was used and how its assistance can be made more effective in the future.
We note that the systems now in place as a result of these initiatives have already resulted in successful weapons tracing and likely have deterred diversion from occurring in the first place. We look forward to working together to examine how the six RECSA member states not part of this study fare in meeting their objectives as well as following the progress of the nine countries visited and which form the basis of this initial undertaking.

Dr. Francis K. Sang
Executive Secretary
RECSA Secretariat
Nairobi, 27 February 2013

Eric G. Berman
Managing Director
Small Arms Survey
Geneva, 27 February 2013
Acknowledgements

The authors wish to extend their thanks to all of the people who took the time to respond to our questions. The country assessments were made possible thanks to the participation of each country’s National Focal Points plus other involved persons. Our sincere appreciation goes to: Zenon Ndabaneze in Burundi; Yemane Gessesew and Eyob Tesfu in Ethiopia; David Kamaiyo in Kenya; Emmanuel Misingo and Sam Karemera in Rwanda; Riak Gok Majok, Christo Fataki, and John Mekki Malou in South Sudan; Abdel Aziz Malik Mohamed and Dr. Mahmoud Zinelabdin in Sudan; Esaka Mugasa and Mayala Towo in Tanzania; and Ahmed Wafuba in Uganda. We would also like to thank Marius Kahl from BICC for his assistance.

Special thanks are necessary for Barbara Munube, Godfrey Bagonza, and Francis Wairagu from the RECSA Secretariat for the thorough clarifications they provided throughout the course of the study.

The authors also wish to acknowledge several colleagues from the Small Arms Survey. In particular, thanks to Jonah Leff for conducting several of the country assessments as well as to Anna Alvazzi del Frate for serving as an advisor throughout the study. And, finally, we are grateful for all of the hard work the production team contributed to this publication, especially Jovana Carapic for her timely fact-checking, Biddy Greene for editing the draft, and Martin Field for overseeing the entire production process.
## Abbreviations and acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BICC</td>
<td>Bonn International Center for Conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES</td>
<td>Central Equatoria State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDN</td>
<td>Burundian National Defence Force (Force de défense nationale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for International Cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO</td>
<td>International Organization of Standardization (classification)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITI</td>
<td>International Tracing Instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDF</td>
<td>Kenya Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFP</td>
<td>National Focal Point (on small arms and light weapons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM/WRA</td>
<td>Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (US Department of State)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNB</td>
<td>Burundian National Police (Police nationale du Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSSM</td>
<td>Physical security and stockpile management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECSA</td>
<td>Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDF</td>
<td>Rwanda Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSPS</td>
<td>South Sudan Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPF</td>
<td>Uganda Police Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWA</td>
<td>Uganda Wildlife Authority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

With the signing of the Nairobi Protocol in 2004, 11 member states of the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of African and Bordering States (RECSA) committed themselves to marking their national stockpiles of small arms and light weapons. The objective of this exercise was to ensure that any weapon found on the illicit market could be traced back to its original, legal owner through a unique identifying code. The participating states viewed this measure as an essential precursor to controlling diversion – the ‘unauthorized transfer of arms and ammunition from the stocks of lawful users to the illicit market’ (Bevan, 2008, p. 43).

In 2006, the US Department of State provided RECSA with the first of a series of grants for the purchase of weapon-marking machines (see Figure 1) and to

Figure 1 A dot-peen marking machine in operation
finance the associated training of the machine operators. Additional donors contributed to the effort, notably the government of Japan’s financial support for the development of national record-keeping software. In the six years leading up to 2012, and with assistance from other international donors, RECSA member states have been able to mark hundreds of thousands of weapons.

This assessment examines the progress made by eight RECSA states during the 2007–2012 marking initiative. It summarizes the findings from an extensive Small Arms Survey field evaluation, conducted from October 2011 to March 2012. During the evaluation, the Survey’s staff assessed all aspects of national marking programmes, including the suitability and functioning of marking equipment, necessary logistical arrangements (such as vehicles to transport marking machines) and, critically, the success of these states in establishing effective national record-keeping systems.

The assessment’s main findings include the following:

- The RECSA states surveyed had not met their commitments to mark all small arms and light weapons by December 2008, although some states had made significant progress towards this goal.
- States need to exhibit greater commitment to resolving challenges on their own when solutions are within their means.
- The states had, in general, found it relatively easy to mark weapons stockpiled in capital cities, but face logistical challenges to marking weapons in outlying areas (mainly due to a lack of mobility).
- Donor governments should consider allocating greater financial support to the logistical aspects of marking initiatives, providing funds to enhance the mobility of marking teams (including vehicles, fuel, and subsistence budgets).
- Existing marking equipment in use by the states is adequate for the needs of the marking programme, although the realistic marking rate (between 100 and 200 weapons daily) is slower than originally estimated.
- Most states still need long-term record-keeping solutions. This would entail the use of adequate software and the means to link all records nationally.
- The states face problems in centralising records of weapons that are deployed in far-flung areas, because defence and security forces have no means of sharing electronic information remotely.
• The states mark weapons in phases, on a region-by-region basis, but, because of sporadic funding, marking is periodically dormant, so security force redeployment necessitates uneconomical repeat visits to each region.

• National marking progress is often difficult to evaluate due to conflicting reports and inconsistencies between accounts provided by National Focal Points (NFPs) and the RECSA Secretariat.

This assessment paper examines the progress of RECSA member states towards meeting the goals inherent in the marking of firearms. It includes an analysis of the efficacy of the marking technology, the advances made in establishing effective record-keeping systems, and the progress made in enhancing the tracing capability.

Lessons from this analysis should have programmatic implications for both future marking performance among the currently participating states, and to similar marking initiatives getting under way in other regions. 📝
Development of the initiative

The firearm-marking initiative originates in a commitment made by the region’s states to Article 7 of the Nairobi Protocol (2004, Art. 7b). Article 7 stipulates that the parties must mark firearms under national control or jurisdiction with ‘a simple marking permitting identification of the country of import and the year of import, and an individual serial number if the small arm or light weapon does not bear one at the time of import so that the source of the small arm or light weapon can be traced’.

In 2005, the region’s states agreed upon a common weapons marking format, which consists of a star to denote state-owned weapons in the RECSA region, an International Standards Organization (ISO) country code and a unique serial number (RECSA, 2005, p. 15). States may also introduce codes that specify the particular branch of service or particular unit of the defence or security forces.

Figure 2 Marks applied to a Uganda Police Force (UPF) weapon

(Handle image of a weapon marking)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>★</td>
<td>Denotes state-owned weapons in the RECSA region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UG</td>
<td>ISO country code for Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Uganda Police Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-128119640</td>
<td>Serial number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25072</td>
<td>Accounting number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td>Dot matrix code (enables electronic reading)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Weapon marking initiative at the Butaleja District Police Headquarters, Uganda, 18 November 2011. © Conflict Armament Research Ltd.
In 2005, the states that were signatory to the Nairobi Protocol further committed themselves to marking their entire stocks of small arms and light weapons by the end of 2008 (RECSA, 2005, p. 15). This was an unrealistic objective – particularly given that RECSA did not supply the majority of the marking machines until 2009 – but it provided an important impetus for states to commence with marking operations. At the time of writing, the Central African Republic (CAR), Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia were the only RECSA member states not marking firearms.  

Procurement of the marking equipment used in the RECSA region occurred over the course of four grants. RECSA procured 26 machines through two grants provided by the US Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA). The first set of seven Couth MC 2000 was delivered in 2008, while the remaining 19 machines were delivered in 2009.

The East African Community (EAC) also supplied marking machines to its five member states, all of whom are also RECSA members. The EACs first round of marking machine procurement came in 2008 thanks to financial support provided by the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ). Five machines were purchased, one for each of the EAC member states. In 2010, the EAC procured an additional seven marking machines through a grant with the European Union (EU) (EAC, 2010). Thus, while this is a RECSA-led initiative, the complementary efforts added to the programme by other entities make it a ‘RECSA region’ initiative.

With funding from the Government of Japan, the RECSA Secretariat designed specialized software to serve as the basis of national databases for each country’s defence and security force. The development of this software began in February 2010, when the RECSA Secretariat held a brainstorming session with NFPs and representatives from several regional and international organizations. The software was briefly piloted in October 2010 by Uganda and Seychelles. Their experience informed the changes that followed in the second version. This second version, developed in May 2011, also benefitted from reviews from Rwanda and Zambia. In May 2012, Rwandan police became the first force to use the software.

RECSA’s role in the programme is one of facilitator rather than implementer – because the Nairobi Protocol signatory states have a responsibility to implement
their own national marking programmes. In this role, RECSA has obtained funds for the initiative, assisted in the distribution of marking machines, facilitated trainings and technical support, and served as a central coordination mechanism for NFPs on small arms and light weapons in the region.

As of March 2012, RECSA member states had received a combined total of 38 marking machines. Twenty-six of these were supplied by RECSA, and 12 by the EAC (five of these marking machines were designated specifically for EAC member countries).

The Small Arms Survey field evaluation, however, estimates that six of these (held by various states) are currently unused (see Figure 5). By March 2012, hundreds of thousands of weapons had been marked. There is, however, a significant variation in national totals (see Table 5). This is the result of various factors, including the differing sizes of national stockpiles, differences in national capacity and varying degrees of national commitment to the initiative (see Table 6).
Objectives of a marking initiative

The overall aim of firearms marking is to prevent (or at least hinder) diversion. Diversion involves the loss, theft, or sale of weapons from legal users – including defence and security forces and civilian users – to illicit users (Bevan, 2008, p. 43).

Table 1 Markings on government-owned firearms, by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Stara</th>
<th>Country code</th>
<th>Unit Codesb</th>
<th>Locations</th>
<th>Dot matrix</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>BI</td>
<td>PNB, FDN</td>
<td>Receiver</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>* BI PNB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bolt carrier</td>
<td></td>
<td>UA1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>ET</td>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Receiver</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>* ETP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NM12345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>KE</td>
<td>KP, KDF</td>
<td>Barrel</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>* KE KP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Breech block</td>
<td></td>
<td>12345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Receiver</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>RW</td>
<td>DF, PL,</td>
<td>Receiver</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>* RDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>INT SEC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12345</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bolt carrier</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>SSPS, WL,</td>
<td>Receiver</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>* WLCES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>appliedc</td>
<td>FB, PS, C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Slide</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Khsp</td>
<td>Slide</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>* SD PKHAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>TZ</td>
<td>PL, CAR</td>
<td>Slide and/or</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>* TZ POL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>receiver</td>
<td></td>
<td>12345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>UG</td>
<td>UPDF, UWA,</td>
<td>Receiver</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>* UG UPDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>POL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>56-123456</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

This table is based on information gained during assessment interviews.

a. The star stamp denotes state-owned weapons.

b. These were the codes marked at the time of the study. Some of the services had yet to be marked (e.g. in Ethiopia).

c. South Sudan was not a country when they began their marking programme, and therefore they did not include a country code in their markings. Instead, the state in South Sudan where the firearm is held is indicated by a two- or three-letter abbreviation. In the example, in the table the CES refers to Central Equatoria State.
From a counter-proliferation perspective, marking serves two purposes. First it dissuades legal users (for example, soldiers) from selling weapons into illicit markets for fear that they might be identified as the ‘diverting party’. In the second place it enables the tracing of weapons, after diversion, to the persons or units responsible for transferring them into illicit markets. This implies that, for a marking project to be successful, not only must weapons be marked so that they may be uniquely identified, but also records of the weapons and their users must be accurate, accessible, and searchable.

These principles are established in a non-binding international agreement through the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). The ITI clearly declares that tracing operations occur as a result of three mutually reinforcing pillars, namely marking, record-keeping and cooperation between states (UNGA, 2005, paras. 7–23). Marking, in combination with accurate record-keeping, enables weapons to be traced back to a legal user (see Table 1 for the identification information marked by the assessed states). Bilateral or multilateral cooperation then facilitates tracing by providing a means of exchanging information across international borders. Record-keeping and cooperation are therefore crucial components of any marking initiative. 
About this study

Analysis criteria

The analysis has been separated into two layers:

a. The marking initiative itself. The marking initiative needs to fulfil a number of requirements in order to achieve its counter-proliferation objectives. The actual marking of firearms is just one of these requirements. Record-keeping and tracing mechanisms must also exist. The marking initiatives are therefore evaluated according to the criteria shown in Table 2.

b. The evaluation of the programme. This study breaks down the evaluation of the gun-marking programme according to the two distinct processes involved: the set-up and the implementation. This distinction is important to acknowledge; the RECSA Secretariat provides assistance in certain key areas

Table 2 Assessment criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Sub-category</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marking</td>
<td>(a) Technology</td>
<td>Marking rate&lt;br&gt;Number of operable machines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Process</td>
<td>Total marked&lt;br&gt;Information marked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record-keeping</td>
<td>(a) Accounting system</td>
<td>Appropriate data recorded (weapons ID, user ID)&lt;br&gt;Use of daily issue procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) IT infrastructure</td>
<td>Existence of a national database&lt;br&gt;Is data retrievable?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracing</td>
<td>(a) Capacity</td>
<td>Can traces be performed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) International mechanisms</td>
<td>Number of international traces conducted&lt;br&gt;Established procedures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in setting up the process, but each member state is responsible for the implementation of the initiative within its borders.

**Information-gathering process**

The study relied on some 40 key informant interviews and on-site field visits to assess technical performance, regional assistance, and national implementation processes.

During the information gathering, 14 member states possessed firearms-marking equipment supplied by RECSA. Owing to financial and time constraints, only nine countries were selected to participate in the field assessments – the selection criterion being that the country should already have a marking initiative in operation. Most of the assessments were conducted from 15 October through 28 November 2011 (see Table 3). The Kenya assessment was completed in March 2012, owing to scheduling constraints. A ninth assessment had been planned for Congo, but unforeseen complications prevented a November 2011 trip, and the researchers were not able to return until April 2012, one month after the devastating ammunition depot explosion in Brazzaville. The explosion

<table>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>April 12</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>April 12</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
<td>Not granted</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>March 12</td>
<td>Not granted</td>
<td>Not granted</td>
<td>Not granted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Oct. 11</td>
<td>Oct. 11</td>
<td>Not granted</td>
<td>Not granted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
<td>Not granted</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
<td>Not granted</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* The ‘on-site visit’ column indicates that the researcher was allowed to view the marking process in action and interview members of the marking team.
destroyed all of the marking equipment and the marked firearms, so only limited information could be gathered.

The NFP was the first point of contact in each country. Interviews were sought from key personnel who had first-hand familiarity with their country’s firearm marking initiative. Interviews were also conducted with the police and military officials who managed the daily marking operations. Often these interviews were facilitated through the NFP. Finally, when possible, on-site observations of the marking process were conducted.

RECSA and EAC officials were also interviewed regarding their role in the marking process. These interviews took place in parallel with the country assessments at their offices – in Nairobi, Kenya, and Arusha, Tanzania, respectively. The RECSA Secretariat also granted two follow-up interviews, at which they displayed the new software (June 2012) and commented on the draft of this assessment report (October 2012).

Supplementary sources on national marking programmes were few. The most relevant publicly available sources were RECSA Monthly Activity Reports. These reports provide brief updates on the current activities of member states and the RECSA Secretariat. Another useful, though limited, source was speeches made by government representatives at the United Nations General Assembly.

**Limitations of the study**

The success of the assessment depended on the cooperation of the interviewees. The limited number of secondary sources unfortunately prohibited the cross-checking of most information. The researchers made every effort to verify significant claims (using methods such as random spot checks of markings on operational firearms), but some information could not be independently verified. Conflicting information has been highlighted as necessary.

In addition, despite the researchers’ efforts, not all of the key interlocutors were interviewed in each country. NFPs of each assessed country were interviewed, but access to the police and the military and/or on-site observations were not always granted (see Table 3). This led to an unevenness in country reporting. ☹️
Findings

Setup – RECSA’s role in the marking initiative

The decisions made by the RECSA Secretariat regarding system design and procurement had consequences for the entire implementation. RECSA’s main contribution to the marking effort was to provide the equipment and initial training.

Marking technology: performance of the equipment

States in the RECSA region use the Spanish-manufactured Couth MC 2000 dot-peen marking machine. Dot-peen machines punch a set of marks onto the receiver or frame of a weapon to create letters, numbers and images (Persi Paoli, 2010, p. 3). There are two basic components: the machine itself and the control unit. A petrol or diesel generator is also required, to provide electricity to the computer and to the compressor operating the pneumatic marking head.

Figure 3 Marking on a curved surface

Marks applied to the bolt carrier of an AKM assault rifle, Kamenge, Burundi, 24 November 2011.
© Conflict Armament Research Ltd.
Figure 4  A Ugandan marking team seats a 1970s-era AKMS assault rifle in the Couth MC 2000 marking machine

© Conflict Armament Research Ltd.
The marks applied by the Couth MC 2000 meet the marking needs of the member states. These machines can easily mark most flat surface areas, but curved surfaces (such as the barrel of a weapon) can sometimes result in a mark of varied depth and definition. The machine is fast and can imprint a mark in less than five seconds. The full process of recording a weapon, however – entering its details into a computer and properly seating it in the marking machine – can take an experienced marking team three minutes or more from start to finish (see Figure 4).

Although the marking machines are fairly ruggedly built, one controller was damaged during transit (see Figure 5). This is primarily because of ad hoc transport arrangements – machines carried unboxed in the back of a pick-up truck on untailed roads. Lessons could be learned in this respect from South African marking initiatives, in which extensive preparations were made for the transport of marking machines, including the provision of purpose-built boxes and compartments affixed to vehicles (SAPS, 2012).

Some of the compressors supplied with the marking machines failed to deliver sufficient pressure. Markers in Burundi, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda all reported experiencing difficulties in this regard and

Figure 5 Total numbers and numbers of non-functioning machines in the assessed countries

![Total numbers and numbers of non-functioning machines in the assessed countries](image-url)
some states have replaced their compressors with more powerful models, available from the civilian market.

Training

The first marking training took place in November 2008 in South Africa, through the support of the EAC. Training was provided to personnel from Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

Each member state also received training through RECSA. The RESCA Secretariat provided in-country training on operating the equipment to each recipient, upon delivery of the marking equipment. Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda received their equipment and training in December 2008. The next rounds of training occurred during October and November 2009 in (chronologically) Ethiopia, Burundi (for a second time), Seychelles, Djibouti, Sudan, and the DRC. From there, users in Zambia (March 2010), South Sudan (June 2010), CAR (December 2010), Eritrea (April 2011), and the Congo (August 2011) were trained.

Operating the Couth marking equipment has proved to be a simple, repetitive task, one easy to master. The necessary skill set is easily transferable. After a single initial lesson, trainees in most countries were able to commence marking their national stocks. Several of the countries now provide their own training to new marking team recruits.

RECSA’s training also taught basic maintenance and equipment repairs. Each piece of equipment was assigned one of three methods of maintenance. First, the commonly worn parts (the marking head units and marking pins) would be handled internally, since these components were designed to be easily replaceable. Secondly, the electrical parts of the marking equipment sometimes need repair; however, that requires much greater expertise, so states were instructed not to attempt any repairs of this kind. Electrical problems, and any other problems involving internal components, were to be directed to RECSA. Thirdly, faults with the various accessories (computer, compressor, or generator) were believed to be solvable by in-country technicians as they involve non-specialized equipment.

Overall, the success of the training has been difficult to gauge. The lessons on operating the machinery appear to have been sufficient, as trainees in each country have mastered the marking process. Repair and maintenance training
has, however, been less successful. The three-tiered approach to effecting repairs is not being universally followed. Some states require RECSA’s help in replacing marking pins, a task that people operating the machine should certainly be capable of performing.

The methods of repairing the compressor – the most frequently problematic component – have been varied. Some states have found local technicians able to repair them, or have simply purchased new ones on the local market. Other states have abandoned the compressor and thus the accompanying marking equipment and simply waited for RECSA to hand them a solution. This latter example is less a case of unsuccessful training than of a lack of state initiative.

Record-keeping

RECSA did not provide record-keeping software in the original marking equipment package. By the time the design for the software began in 2010, ten countries had already received their marking machines and training, and many had already started marking. As a result, each state needed to find a solution to cover their particular record-keeping needs.

Table 4  **Software use by country**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Software</th>
<th>Awaiting RECSA software</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>UNDP designed (police, civilian, and military)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Microsoft Excel (federal police)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Yesa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>FirePro 6 (police and civilian)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Microsoft Word (police)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Unspecified (police)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Microsoft Excel (military)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

All of the data for this table was obtained during the in-country assessments that occurred between November 2011 and February 2012.

a. As at May 2012, the Rwandan police were using the RECSA software, according to updated reports from the RECSA Secretariat (author’s interview with two RECSA Secretariat representatives, Nairobi, 22 October, 2012).
The majority of RECSA member states had planned to use the RECSA software, so interim solutions were necessary. (See Table 5 for a list of the interim software used by member states.) Member states decided on one of two types of record-keeping platforms: either Microsoft Office or specialized software. These platforms were temporary solutions for all but one member state.

As the new software becomes available, member states must transfer the data from their current records and, at the same time, become proficient in the new software. This transition from the old platform to the new software will be critical. It is unclear at this point how long that process will take. The possibility of errors occurring during the data transfer should be a real concern. Furthermore, the costs and time spent could be significant.

RECSA’s decision to design specialized software was taken after careful review of what made sense in 2008.20 Commercial asset management software existed at the time, but RECSA found it wanting. In the past five years, commercial tailor-made firearm inventory software has been developed.21 And one country has expressed its willingness to share its national software, which UN member states or regional organizations may wish to pursue.22

The RECSA software

The RECSA software is essentially an inventory-management system. Its features allow it to serve as a national database for state and civilian weapons. Using the accompanying server, field offices should be able to connect their records to the national database.

The information recorded in the database contains the key components necessary for a state’s inventory-management and tracing needs. Records include weapon type, all of the markings (both manufacture and post-manufacture), the authorized location, the weapons status (in duty, missing, destroyed, etc.), and, in the case of civilians, information identifying the legal owner. The system is also widely searchable. Full or partial pieces of information can be searched to identify the precise item or, failing that, a range of possibilities based on the criteria provided. This has proved to be a very effective tool for tracing weapons back to their original authorized locations.

One of the strengths of the system appears to be its security features. Electronic keys and passwords restrict access to the database. All modifications to the
records are permanently linked to a specific user through a history tracking feature, and any user’s alterations to the database are also recorded. This could discourage attempts to manipulate the stored data.

As the system was not in operation in any of the RECSA states at the time of the research, it was impossible to assess its merits fully. The primary concern regarding the software is that this is a brand-new system. Since it is an untested product, it is difficult to predict what glitches or flaws may come to light once the system is fully operational. Given the amount of time governments will be spending on entering information into it and, especially, given the sensitivity of the information, the possibility of such problems arising must be considered.

**Implementation – the efforts of member states**

While the RECSA Secretariat supplied its member states with the equipment and training necessary to initiate marking programmes, it was the states themselves who were responsible for moving the effort forward. Member states developed their own strategies to undertake the marking exercise.

**Marking**

The marking process varies slightly from state to state. Marking is conducted in teams of two to six members. To increase efficiency, labour is divided, depending on the number of markers, much like a production line. Each team typically assigns one person to manage the marking machine (loading the firearm into the vice and lowering the machine for marking), one to operate the control unit, and another to create the record, usually manually entering information into a computer (see Figure 6). Others include disassembling and reassembling a firearm and general labour involving moving and storing firearms.

On average, states mark between 90 and $200^{23}$ firearms a day. This is far below the envisaged rate of $1,500^{24}$ which now appears impracticable, given the time it takes to load a firearm into a vice before marking and to remove it afterwards. Surprisingly, the limited data available suggests that there is no correlation between the marking team composition and the speed of marking
(see Table 5). Having more team members does not necessarily appear to lead to increased daily rates. Anecdotal evidence suggests that more important factors of efficiency include the centralization of firearms at a fixed location and the marking of firearms of a similar type during the same session.25

**Marking team mobility.** One of the main challenges facing weapons markers in the region is the wide dispersal of defence and security forces across often-difficult terrain. States report that it is comparatively easy to conduct civilian marking and registration programmes, because government authorities can request civilians to present their weapons to a central registry within a certain period of time. Serving defence and security forces, however, cannot always be recalled from active duty and this necessitates the deployment of mobile marking teams to duty areas, where they mark weapons *in situ*.

Mobile marking has imposed severe delays on marking initiatives in most of the region’s states. The reasons for these delays include time spent in travelling long distances to often small and isolated units. More importantly, delays also result from a shortage of vehicles, fuel and personnel assigned to marking teams.
### Table 5 **Country marking totals, rates and team composition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number in team</th>
<th>Date started</th>
<th>Percentage complete&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Estimated rate per machine per day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>PNB FDN</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>May 2010&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>64 N/A</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Federal police</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Spring 2010</td>
<td>N/A (100% FP in Addis Ababa)&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Police KDF</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>May 2009</td>
<td>60 30</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Police RDF</td>
<td>5 6</td>
<td>Jan. 2009&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>100 N/A</td>
<td>– 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>SSPS Wildlife Fire Brigade Prisons&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Nov. 2010</td>
<td>Not available (100% of 2010 imports and 0% of old stocks)&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Police Civilian</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>March 2011</td>
<td>80% in Khartoum</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Police Wildlife Civilian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>45 60 N/A</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>UPDF UPF UWA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nov. 2009</td>
<td>20 98 100</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

a. These percentages are based on updated totals, provided by RECSA Secretariat, 22 October 2012. During the in-country assessments (Nov. 2011–Feb. 2012) we obtained the total numbers of firearms marked. (These totals are given in the unpublished Country Assessment Reports.) Note: Some states expressed reservations about publishing the total number of marked firearms, so the Survey has used percentages to illustrate the progress in a country.

b. August 2010 RECSA Activity Brief.

c. Data was available for federal police in Addis Ababa. No data was available for other agencies or locations.

d. September 2009 RECSA Activity Brief.

e. Data for South Sudan was for a single combined procurement order for all four agencies.

f. Total percentage not available. 100% of firearms comprising the 2010 procurement were marked. Pre-existing stocks were not marked.
There is little evidence that, beyond a few cases, states have allocated substantial defence and security force resources – such as vehicles, fuel and personnel – to mitigate these difficulties. Rather than part-financing marking initiatives from defence and security budgets, the region’s states have largely relied on foreign donations, including tranches of regional development assistance, intermittent funds acquired by NFPs, and the successful self-financing by relatively small organizations such as the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA).

Reliance on external donations has resulted in sporadic marking, with long periods of dormancy whilst states await new donor funds. These dormant periods not only slow the marking process but, more importantly, have knock-on resource implications for national marking programmes. For example, when a state marks weapons deployed by its forces in one region, then ceases marking operations for several months because of a budget shortfall, security forces with unmarked weapons may redeploy into the region. The result is a mixing of marked and unmarked weapons, necessitating yet another marking operation in the region.

In summary, regional states and international donors need to give serious attention to enhancing the rate of marking in the RECSA region. Once existing national stockpiles have been marked, it will become relatively easy for states to mark newly procured weapons, since they can be marked ‘straight from the box’ in capital cities, with no need for mobile marking operations. The sooner the region’s states reach this phase, the sooner marking costs will decrease, but the initiative requires short-term resource increases by all the parties concerned.

Record-keeping

While some of the region’s states may have made considerable gains in marking weapons, record-keeping remains a significant challenge. This limits the success of the entire marking initiative. Tracing marked weapons requires searchable weapons records which uniquely identify each weapon and specify its legal user – whether a civilian or a unit of the defence and security forces. The benefits of weapon marking are substantially reduced if weapons records cannot be regularly and easily accessed.
The region’s record-keeping problems arise from two factors: 1) the absence of either appropriate software or the IT systems to run it; and 2) the lack infrastructure necessary to network weapons databases in different parts of the country.

**Software and IT problems.** The RECSA member states have adopted at least six different record-keeping systems, within which there are also significant variations. Moreover, in some states, various branches of government administration have adopted differing and mutually incompatible types of software. For example, one state in the region runs a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-developed registration system for its police and civilian registries, but the country’s military does not have the IT infrastructure required to run this system and, instead, compiles records of its marked weapons on laptop computers using Microsoft Excel.

**Networking problems.** IT networking is arguably the most severe challenge to record-keeping in the region. Marking teams often have to travel for several days to reach isolated outposts of the defence and security forces, which have neither electricity nor Internet access. Once compiled, electronic records of marked weapons have to be transported on disk back to the capital. In addition, the constant redeployment of personnel makes it virtually impossible for central record-keeping authorities to keep track of the movement of weapons after a given marking initiative – particularly since defence and security forces redistribute weapons among different units regularly. This undermines the main reason for the regional marking initiative – traceability – because records become out of date almost as soon as they are compiled.

**Underlying infrastructural problems.** Many of the region’s states do not have a fixed infrastructure capable of supporting the networked IT systems required for effective record-keeping. Intermittent electricity supplies incapacitate the existing systems, and marking initiatives would undoubtedly benefit from greater investment in the prerequisite infrastructure, such as electricity generation. In addition, the requirement for networked systems suggests a need to consider solutions such as mobile Wi-Fi, to enable remote access to records (including remote data entry). The provision of hardware or software alone cannot solve these problems.
In summary, the fundamental obstacle to record-keeping is not limited to the availability of software, but includes also the availability of the IT infrastructure and communications systems required to update records remotely and rapidly.

**Marking and tracing successes**

Despite problems related to the slow pace of marking, and the very mixed level of attainment of record-keeping systems, the success of the RECSA region marking initiative should not be underestimated. Before the marking initiative, many states could not even begin to estimate the number of weapons held by their defence and security forces, let alone establish their whereabouts. The region’s states now have a growing capacity to make statements regarding the condition, size, deployment and security of their national small arms and light weapons stockpiles.

**Cataloguing the national stockpile.** Some states have been recording important information on the condition and serviceability of each weapon as it is marked – a process sometimes referred to as ‘verification’. The states involved thus not only have a growing capacity to quantify their national stockpiles, but are also able to assess the quality of these weapons. This is a fundamental prerequisite for identifying surpluses of obsolete or unserviceable weapons, setting surplus destruction targets, and optimizing future arms procurement. Integrated platforms, such as the one used by Burundi, are more than just national weapons registries; they are comprehensive arms management systems which enhance the functioning of defence and security forces at the same time as deterring the proliferation of illicit weapons.

Figure 7, from the Burundi police arms management system, shows that the system permits a wide variety of information to be retrieved. For example, it allows searches by weapon category and condition, or by the region, unit or person to which the weapon was issued. The database includes major conventional weapons.

**Identifying diversion.** National capacity to trace weapons has improved significantly following the marking initiative – a result that is likely to become even more evident in the future. Although states have experienced difficulties in establishing networked record-keeping systems, the fact that the region now
Figure 7 A webpage from Burundi's arms management system
hosts numerous weapons that, from their marks alone, can be identified as belonging to a particular state or branch of the armed forces is a critical first step in combating diversion.

Several of the region’s states have already discovered marked weapons on illicit markets. Nevertheless, accurate tracing – the capacity to identify the specific person responsible for the loss or theft of a weapon – necessitates more comprehensive record-keeping. Attaining this target is the next challenge for the region.
Lessons learned

The RECSA region marking initiative is the first regional programme of its kind on the African continent. The challenges faced in its development and in the solutions adopted by the region’s states together with the programme’s overall successes, provide valuable lessons for future initiatives – whether on the continent or further afield.

Comprehensive national implementation plans. The supply of marking machines and record-keeping software was not, on its own, sufficient to maintain brisk, uninterrupted weapons marking in the region. Most of the region’s states have not been able to sustain marking operations for periods longer than

Anticipating operating costs

Each marking team comprises a marking machine and the personnel needed to assemble and operate it. Their tasks include assessing the quality of the weapons which pass through their hands and verifying the information on the unit or the person in possession of them. The Survey’s evaluation of the RECSA region initiative suggests:

Staffing:
• Three- or four-person marking teams are often sufficient;
• Larger teams have not proved more efficient, and cost more.

Transportation:
• Marking equipment is bulky and vehicles must also accommodate marking team personnel;
• Small 4 × 4 vehicles do not comfortably accommodate marking teams and machines – which could result in damaged equipment;
• More than one vehicle may be required to transport marking machines and teams;
• Marking equipment should be boxed, padded and secured to prevent damage in transit.

Consumable resources:
• Fuel costs should not be underestimated, especially as they often increase quickly;
• Marking teams require subsistence allowances when deployed outside capital cities.
a few weeks. This is due to resource limitations that include access to vehicles and fuel, personnel, and subsistence allowances. Moreover, the strain on these resources increases as marking operations move outside of capital cities.

Given that most states in the region began weapons marking in capitals and then proceeded into the countryside, initial budget allocations have proved insufficient, because of the rapid – and to some extent unanticipated – increase in resource demands (mainly relating to transport logistics). The graph in Figure 8 provides a simple illustration of this trend (an explanation of the four phases follows).

Phase 1 requires start-up resources, including expenditure on training, marking machines, IT infrastructure, software and the allocation of fixed assets such as offices and marking spaces in military or police facilities.

Phase 2 consists of weapons marking in capital cities (for example, at police and military facilities or civilian registries). Resource requirements are relatively light, because neither marking machines nor weapons have to be transported over long distances.

Phase 3 involves the deployment of marking teams into the countryside. Distances increase as the teams move further afield, and resource expenditure – on vehicles, fuel, personnel and subsistence allowances – increases accordingly.

Figure 8 **Fluctuating resource demands during a typical national marking initiative**

![Graph showing fluctuating resource demands](image)
The daily rate of weapon marking diminishes progressively, since marking teams have to travel to ever-smaller units of the defence and security forces.

Phase 4 begins when the state has marked its entire existing weapons stockpile. Resource demands fall dramatically because the state can now mark weapons when it imports them, installing marking machines in the facilities where the weapons are unpacked and catalogued – and before they are deployed to military or police personnel.\(^{28}\)

An evaluation of marking progress in the RECSA region suggests that international donors and national governments considered the resource implications of Phases 1 and 2, but gave less consideration to the escalating resource demands of Phase 3. This is evidenced by the fact that many states have had to rely on ad hoc funding and in-kind support for Phase 3 operations. This includes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sustained operations without prolonged delays</th>
<th>Completed police or military weapons marking</th>
<th>Marked outside of the capital</th>
<th>Received EAC vehicle(s)</th>
<th>Received money from donors (excluding $6,600 start-up)</th>
<th>State-provided budget (not including salaries)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓‡</td>
<td>✓‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>n.d.(^{b})</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓‡</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓‡</td>
<td>✓‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓‡</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓‡</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓‡</td>
<td>✓‡</td>
<td>✓‡</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:


b. No information on this indicator was available for Kenya.
the piecemeal acquisition of funds from a variety of international donors, including gifts such as the provision of vehicles for marking operations (see Table 6). To some extent, such problems could have been expected of a project that was largely untested in the region or in other regional initiatives. Nevertheless, these factors need to feature heavily in any further decision making regarding the future of the RECSA marking initiative – as well as in any initiatives of this kind elsewhere (for example, in West Africa).

In particular, there is a clear need for national governments to work more closely with prospective international donors in the drafting of ‘lifecycle’ implementation plans. These plans should anticipate resource demands throughout the entire marking initiative. Efficient lifecycle planning would aid national governments in conducting long-range forecasts of resource requirements – facilitating specific, scheduled requests for donor assistance to fill funding gaps – and in the advance mobilisation of security forces (involving personnel, vehicles and fuel). Such comprehensive lifecycle planning would, arguably, mitigate the periodic dormancy which has to date hindered marking in the region.

Investment in prerequisite logistics and infrastructure
Experiences in the RECSA region highlight a number of difficulties related to both the short-term logistics required to implement marking initiatives and the infrastructure required to sustain initiatives in the long term. Again, good lifecycle planning would provide states and international donors with a better grasp of these problems.

From a logistical perspective, the largest component of expenditure on project resources needs to be channelled into mobile marking operations. As mentioned above, the US Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) provided funds to RECSA in 2007/8 for the purchase of 26 marking machines, and for training and logistical support. These funds, and those of other donors such as the EU, kick-started the project, but on their own they are not sufficient to see the project through to completion. To realise the project’s full potential – and capitalise on the great gains already made – international donors will need to consider providing further tranches of funding for specific, measurable activities within the national marking initiatives. At the same time, national governments will need to reassess their existing
(often scant) allocation of resources to marking initiatives, and consider making greater use of the logistical capacity of defence and security forces. Priority resource allocations include personnel and vehicles. States should thus be prepared to maintain prolonged budgets for the marking initiative, while donors should consider allocating funds towards clearly demarcated support.

Regarding infrastructure, investment requirements are likely to increase as national marking initiatives head towards completion. At present, the region’s states have installed record-keeping software and necessary IT equipment in capital cities. While the systematic marking of the existing national weapon stockpile continues, such measures will probably be adequate for compiling a basic, central registry of small arms and light weapons. However, to sustain an up-to-date national registry, changes in weapon ownership (including the circulation of weapons among different units of the defence and security forces) need to be updated quickly. Given that many units are in only sporadic contact with headquarters, national governments and international donors need to give more thought to developing procedures which will allow remote units to update registries remotely.

One option would be to create a series of regional registries. These could monitor distant outposts more frequently and be linked remotely to a central record-keeping system in capital cities. This is not a new concept and several of the region’s states are already moving towards the construction of these networked registries. They require, at a minimum, the following facilities: one computer terminal per district or sector, a means of remote communication (such as mobile Wi-Fi), the ability to back up and securely store records, and, in most cases, generators and fuel to power the systems. Such commitments would entail significant resource allocation, but they are fundamental to ensuring the long-term success of national marking initiatives. If these resources are not installed and maintained, national records will quickly become outdated, seriously hindering efforts to manage and trace small arms and light weapons.

**Exploiting the wider benefits of the marking initiatives.** Marking initiatives have enabled states to begin to clarify the size and quality of their national stockpiles. This suggests obvious advantages regarding physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) enhancement programmes. In Burundi, for example, the German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) has
worked in parallel with the national marking initiative to improve PSSM at local weapons stockpiles (EAC, 2011). These activities include the comprehensive cataloguing of armoury contents; the racking of weapons; and the introduction of security measures such as exterior lighting, roof and window bars, and secure doors and locks. Programmes such as these, which are often funded by agencies unconnected with national marking initiatives, suggest potentially beneficial coordination. These programmes can help states to integrate national-level marking and record-keeping systems into armoury-level accounting practices. This would involve the development of coordinated accounting systems (including the minimum requirements for paper-based systems) in which armourers catalogue weapons according to a standard national format. Moreover, such initiatives are likely to present avenues for logistical support to national marking initiatives, such as the co-deployment of PSSM personnel and mobile marking teams – with the aim of improving PSSM measures and marking weapons at the same time. 📖
Conclusion

Despite severe challenges, and varying degrees of progress at national levels, RECSA member states have made significant advances in their efforts to mark and record small arms and light weapons. A region that once hosted hundreds of thousands of largely ‘anonymous’ weapons is now increasingly populated with weapons that are marked with information that can pinpoint them to specific countries and particular branches of the defence and security forces. This alone is a great step forward towards mitigating diversion and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

Much remains to be finished, however. The region’s states are essentially at the beginning of the process – or, in a few cases, halfway through – rather than approaching its end. The marking of weapons is a costly and time-consuming activity and its resource implications grow as marking teams have to operate further and further from capital cities in an effort to mark the whole of a nation’s weapons stockpile. The region’s governments, working alongside international donors, will have to devise ways to forecast these costs accurately, and adapt strategies to ensure that the marking operations currently underway continue without interruption.

In the long term, the region’s states will have to put in place the necessary infrastructure to ensure that their new national record-keeping systems do not slide out of date due to a lack of maintenance. In particular, both governments and donors will need to develop solutions to the problem of updating national registries quickly and remotely. The spread of telecommunications infrastructure in most of the region is advancing at great speed. National record-keeping systems need to exploit this to the fullest, but doing so will require careful planning and the targeted allocation of resources – particularly in developing ways to update national records locally.

Above all, the region’s states and their international supporters need to look carefully at the initiative’s progress to date. States now have a clearer idea of the
challenges involved in marking national weapons stockpiles and the corresponding commitment of resources. These lessons provide valuable information which governments can use to devise comprehensive implementation plans for concluding national marking initiatives. Finally, the RECSA region experience provides a valuable lesson to other regions, whether in Africa or elsewhere, of the processes required in implementing large-scale weapons-marking programmes.
Endnotes

1 Originally comprising 10 member states, RECSA now includes 15 states: Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

For more information on weapons tracing, see Bevan (2009, pp. 106–133).

3 Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

4 1,500 was the original estimate cited in RECSA’s 2008 US PM/WRA funding proposal, p. 5.

5 All RECSA members are legally bound to ‘establish National Focal Points to, inter alia, facilitate the rapid information exchange to combat cross-border small arms and light weapons trafficking’ (Ministerial Declaration, 2004, 16(a)).

6 The Seychelles was also not marking during the assessment period, but that was because they had completed the project in 2011.

7 The original marking machine selected for use was the MB 32 stamping machine. RECSA purchased twelve in 2008. However, the MB32 was never distributed to the member states because it had the potential to damage firearms during the marking process. The stamping method places enormous pressure on the firearm during the marking process (Persi Paoli, 2010, p. 3). These machines were returned and replaced by the Couth machines.

8 The five East African Community (EAC) states are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.

9 RECSA April 2010 Activity Report.

10 Author’s interview with two RECSA Secretariat representatives, Nairobi, 22 October 2012.

11 Author’s interview with two RECSA Secretariat representatives, Nairobi, 22 October 2012.

12 RECSA’s involvement in the marking effort of the member states includes: acquisition and distribution of marking machines, organizing initial training on using the equipment, handling requests for parts and repairs as implementation proceeds, developing record-keeping software for the use of member states, organizing opportunities for countries to share their experiences, evaluating the outcomes, and, recently, facilitating financial assistance despite logistical obstacles in the implementation.

13 The information in Table 4 was provided by the NFPs in each country during the in-country assessment period (Nov. 2011–Feb. 2012). It does not reflect changes that might have occurred later on. In October 2012 the RECSA Secretariat provided new information on the non-functioning machines. Compressors were at fault in Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Tanzania. Kenya had one machine down with a stripped marking head and another with a faulty controller. Rwanda had never sent an official request to RECSA for repairs as theirs is an EAC-procured machine. Its controller was damaged in transit. Uganda, although not indicated on the table as all machines were functioning at the time of this research, has a problem with the controller because it can no longer mark the number ‘4’: author’s interview with two RECSA Secretariat representatives, 22 October 2012, Nairobi.
The training was funded by the German development agency, Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).

Author’s interview with two RECSA Secretariat representatives, 22 October 2012, Nairobi.

Zambia is not a RECSA member state, but PM/WRA funds did go towards their training. PM/WRA supports the gun-marking efforts in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), of which Zambia is a member.

Author interview with Congolese military representative, 3 May 2012.

Training schedule provided by a RECSA Secretariat representative.

Author’s interview with two RECSA Secretariat representatives, Nairobi, 22 October 2012.

According to a RECSA Secretariat representative, the other software they examined had extra costs and maintenance fees that were deemed unacceptable.

Author’s interview with a representative from Traceability Solutions, 23 January 2012.

Statement by Gary Fleetwood, Australian Crime Commission, to the 4th Biennial Meeting of States to the UN PoA. 17 June, 2010.

Several interlocutors provided Small Arms Survey with estimated marking rates during the in-country interviews. These estimates were not tested for their accuracy.

The RECSA Secretariat’s Funding Proposal to the United States, August 2008, p. 5. Information provided by PM/WRA.

Clamping the firearm in place for marking is one of the longer steps in the marking process. The clamp does not need much adjusting if the firearms are the same model.

The UWA used its own vehicles, fuel and personnel to mark almost its entire complement of weapons between 2010 and 2011. In November 2011, it reported having marked 1,512 weapons, leaving only 30 weapons ‘in far flung areas’ requiring marking. Meeting with representatives of the UWA in Kampala, Uganda on 17 November 2011.

The Ugandan NFP mentioned two recent cases where stolen police firearms had been identified because of the markings: author’s interview, 4 December 2012, Entebbe.

Note: the graph in Figure 7 applies only to state-owned weapons.
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