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## Articles

### Implementing ‘Targeted’ UN Sanctions in the UK: Is Freezing of Terrorist Assets Giving Fundamental Rights the Cold Shoulder?

by Joe Stevens

“This paper will examine how the UK has implemented ‘targeted’ or ‘smart’ sanctions designed to freeze the assets of individuals and other entities in relation to those suspected of being involved in terrorist activity, through implementation of various United Nations Security Council Resolutions (SCR’s). This article will chart the historical development of these UN sanctions and analyse how the UK introduced them into domestic law, firstly by means of secondary legislation contained in the United Nations Act 1945 and secondly following the decision by the UK Supreme Court in *R v A (& others)* [2] in the form of the Terrorist Asset Freezing Etc Act 2010. Both the case and the subsequent legislation and its impact will also be discussed. Finally the paper will consider whether this implementation has eroded fundamental rights within the UK’s domestic law in order to fulfil our international obligations under the UN charter and what if any protection, is now in place for those named under this system after implementation of the UK’s new asset freezing regime.

#### The Historical and Legal Background of UN Sanctions

Following the formation of the United Nations, member states bound themselves through the UN’s Charter to maintain international peace and security, to take collective measures for the prevention and removal of any threat to this peace and to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Article 1)[3]. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was given primary responsibility for maintaining this peace and security and member states agreed through the charter to carry out the decisions or resolutions of the Security Council in order to achieve this end (Article 24).

Under Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. Among a number of miscellaneous provisions in Chapter XVI is one of the most important articles 103, which provides;

*“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.[4]”*



Only treaty provisions that are incompatible with *jus cogens*, such as the prohibition on torture are considered void. Obligations under the decisions and enforcement measures of Chapter VII prevail over other commitments of the members concerned in international law[5].

There have of course been numerous threats to international peace and security since 1945. Various UNSC Resolutions have been made calling upon the members of the United Nations to take measures under article 41. As the Security Council's practice has evolved it has become more directive to what States themselves might or might not do SCR 1189[6] (1998) declared that every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organised activities within its own territory which might be directed towards the commission of such acts.

In response to attacks on US embassies and other assets the Security Council directed its attention to the activities of the ruling regime in Afghanistan. SCR 1267(1999) provided for the freezing of funds and other financial resources derived from or generated from property owned or controlled by the Taliban and Al Qaeda. A sanctions Committee was established to oversee implementation of these measures, known as the 1267 Committee. SCR 1333(2000) took this process a step further, it provided that all states should freeze funds and other financial assets of Usama bin Laden and individuals and entities associated with him to ensure that no funds were made available for the benefit of any person or entity associated with him, including the Al-Qaida organisation. Although previous UN practice did not go this far, nothing in article 41 would appear to prohibit the taking of direct collective measures at an international level against individuals. Article 41 contains only an enumeration of the non-military measures that could be taken which was illustrative and non-exhaustive[7].

As part of its response to the attacks on the US mainland collectively known as 9/11, the Security Council broadened its approach to the problem still further. It decided that action now required to be taken against everyone who committed or attempted to commit terrorist acts or facilitated their commission. It adopted SCR 1373(2001) requiring states to complement international co-operation by taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, within their territories through all lawful means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism. The Security Council also decided that all states should, among various other measures, prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other states or their citizens. States were also to ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts should be brought to justice. Provision was made for establishing a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all its members, to monitor implementation of the Resolution, known as the *1373 Committee*.

Prior to the events of 9/11, the United Kingdom Parliament had already enacted a new Terrorism Act in 2000 it had specifically created a criminal regime for dealing with the funding of terrorism. The Act provided the framework for the making of freezing orders. Further legislation in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 provided for the making of control orders which can also affect a person's finances. The Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 introduced a legislative procedure for setting aside financial restrictions decisions taken by the Treasury.

In order to give direct effect to its United Nation Charter obligations in domestic law the United Kingdom had introduced the United Nations Act 1946[8]. This act allows the Government to introduce secondary legislation by making various orders in council to give effect to relevant SCR's.



## The Terrorism Order (TO)

SCR 1373 was given effect in UK domestic law by introducing the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2001 (SI 2001/3365), in October 2001. The wording of its leading provision was modelled on that of the SCR, making it a criminal offence for any person who, except under the authority of a licence granted by the Treasury, makes any funds, financial or related services available directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of a person who commits, attempts to commit, facilitates or participates in the commission of an acts of terrorism. It also includes those people who may be controlled either directly or indirectly and those who act on behalf or at the direction of, anyone involved in terrorism.

A lack of Parliamentary debate regarding the introduction of this major terrorist legislation is typical of Parliament's response to any matter involving 'terrorism', which nearly always passes through both houses with little or no debate. Perhaps most infamously demonstrated by recalling the introduction of the 1911 Official Secrets Act which became law the same day it was introduced to Parliament, leaving the iniquitous Sec 2 on the statute books for over sixty years.

The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006[9] (SI 2006/2657) the (TO) was also introduced as an order in council under the same act. It gave effect to SCR 1373(2001) and SCR 1452(2002), revoking the 2001 order. The new order allowed for the Treasury to give a direction as to who could be designated provided they are satisfied under the grounds of *reasonable suspicion* that the person is or may be, a person who commits, attempts to commit, participates in or facilitates the commission of acts of terrorism or merely a person identified in the Council Decision. The order also applies to those allegedly controlled either directly or indirectly, or acting on behalf of or at the direction of a designated person. Designation imparts a very onerous regime on those selected. No one including the designated person may deal with funds or economic resources belonging to, owned or held by a person referred to in the order, unless he does so under the authority of a licence granted by the Treasury. A person who contravenes the prohibition is guilty of an offence. The phrase "deal with" in this order was written in terms which are designed to catch every imaginable kind of transaction in respect of funds and economic resources. The treasury may authorise certain transactions under a licence to. These may be general or granted to a category of persons or to a particular person, they may be subject to conditions and may be of indefinite duration or subject to an expiry date. The Treasury may vary or revoke the licence at any time. This gave extraordinary power to HM Treasury in respect of persons assets without that person being convicted charged arrested or even questioned over their alleged involvement in terrorism.

In August 2009 the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2009[10] (SI 2009/1747), came into force. Like the 2001 and 2006 Terrorism Orders, to give effect to SCR 1373(2001). It revoked the 2006 Order, but it provided that persons who had been designated under the 2006 Order were to remain subject to its terms until 31 August 2010, unless their designation was revoked by that date.

There were some technical differences between the 2006 and the 2009 Orders, such as to the definition of dealing with an economic resource, which improved to a slight degree the difficult effects of the regime on spouses and other third parties who interacted with the designated person. The prohibitions that the 2009 Order imposed on making funds, financial services available for their benefit and on making economic resources available to them or for their benefit, apply only if the benefit that the person would obtain or is able to obtain is significant. An additional pre-condition for designation is that the Treasury must consider that the direction is necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from the risk of terrorism. Subject to these minor adjustments, the impact of the regime on the designated person himself continued as rigorously as it



was under the 2006 Order, and the phrase “*reasonable grounds for suspecting*” in the 2006 Order was retained in the 2009 Order.

## The Al-Qaida and Taliban Order

The Treasury's response to the Security Council's directions that measures that were to be taken to deal with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, the Taliban and other individuals, groups undertakings and entities associated with them as designated by the committee established pursuant to SCR 1267 was to make the Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2002[11] (SI 2002/111). It was replaced by Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2006[12] in November 2006. As in the case of the TO, this Order sets out a rigorous system of prohibitions and licences which is applied to persons who are designated persons for its purposes. The Treasury's may give a direction that a person identified in the direction is designated for the purposes of this Order, if they have *reasonable grounds for suspecting* that the person is or may be, Usama bin Laden, a person designated by the Sanctions Committee, a person owned controlled by a designated person or a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of a designated person. The Treasury were given the power to vary or revoke these directions at any time.

## The Issues

The fundamental issue with the *HM Treasury v A* case was whether or not the Treasury, in effect the executive, were empowered by the United Nations Act to allow the introduction of both the Terrorism Order and the Al-Qaida Order, by Order in Council. The contention was that these Orders were *ultra vires* on three grounds. Firstly they passed into effect without Parliamentary scrutiny, secondly they lacked legal certainty and proportionality and thirdly there was no procedure available to allow any challenge to their designation on the list in the first place. From a Human Rights perspective it was argued that both sets of Orders were incompatible with article 8[13] article 1 of Protocol 1[14] of the European Convention on Human Rights. There was also a complaint regarding the lack of access to a court for an effective remedy[15].

## The Facts of the Ahmed Case

A, K and M are brothers with UK citizenship. In August 2007 they received letters which stated that under the Terrorism Order (TO) a direction had been made because the Treasury had reasonable grounds for suspecting that they were persons who facilitate or commit acts in the commission of terrorism. The restrictions they were placed under as a result of designation put a great burden on their wives and families, created significant mental health difficulties and ultimately have been blamed on the breakdown of their marriages.

It is important to reiterate that A, K and M, have never been charged with or arrested for any terrorism related offence. It was until September 2007 that the Treasury provided some details about the factual basis for the decision to make the directions, although this was limited again due to the sensitive nature of some of the material

G, another appellant, was also informed in December 2006 that a direction had been made against him under the TO. He was not told until later that his original listing had been at the request of the United Kingdom. It was not until March 2007 that he was told that his listing meant that he was now a designated person under the AQO.



They all issued proceedings in the Administrative Court, seeking to set aside the directions made against them in pursuance of the two orders made by the Treasury. In April 2008 Collins J held that the TO and the AQO were *ultra vires* and he quashed both Orders[16]. Following an appeal by the treasury in October 2008 the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part. It held that the provisions of the AQO were lawful but stated that any person designated under these orders was entitled to seek judicial review of the merits of the decision. A, K, M and G were also given leave to appeal by an appeal in March 2009. The third proceedings were brought by HAY an Egyptian national, who also is resident in the United Kingdom. His name was added to the Consolidated List by the 1267 Committee in September 2005. As a result he also became a designated person for the purposes of the AQO. Unlike G, the proposal that his name be added to the list was not made by the United Kingdom. It provided no information to the 1267 Committee in relation to its decision to add his name. Numerous attempts by Hays legal team via the FCO failed to establish which state had in fact designated him although it was understood not to be the UK. In fact the Foreign Secretary has made an application to the 1267 Committee for HAY's name to be removed from the list, as he considers that HAY's listing is no longer appropriate. The High Court[17] concluded that the AQO was *ultra vires* the 1946 Act. The Court held that the practical effect of the AQO was to preclude access to the Court for protection of what HAY contended were his basic rights. The Treasury appealed against this decision. In response to representations made by HAY's solicitors the Treasury amended his licence conditions which enable his wife to obtain welfare benefits. However despite the Home secretaries intervention Hay must remain subject to the AQO unless and until the 1267 Committee decides to remove him from the Consolidated List.

The TO and AQO impose extremely onerous regimes, every transaction, however small, which involves the making of any payments or the passing of funds or economic resources whether directly or indirectly for the benefit of a designated person is criminalised. This affects all aspects of life, including the ability to move around at will by any means of private or public transport. To enable payments to be made for basic living expenses a system of Treasury regulated licensing has been created, There interpretation of the sanctions regime and of the system of licensing and the conditions that it gives rise to is extremely rigorous. The overall result is very burdensome on all the members of the designated person's family. Sir Anthony Clarke MR accepted that the orders are oppressive in their nature and that they are bound to have caused difficulties for the appellants and their families[18]. Wilson LJ said that they imposed 'swingeing disabilities upon those who were designated.'[19] The House of Lords described the regime as it applied to HAY's wife as 'disproportionate and oppressive'. They continued that the invasion of the privacy of someone who was not a listed person as 'extraordinary.'[20]

## The Judgement

The Supreme Court ruled by majority that both Orders were *ultra vires*, albeit on slightly different grounds. Lord Brown dissenting on the AQO on the grounds that the wording of the order was the same as the UNSCR and therefore was a direct compliance of the UNSCR which the UK was obliged to carry out as a member of the UN no matter what the Court felt. This meant in his opinion that, in the presence of a clear UN mandate, the principles governing the separation of powers and the protection of human rights within the UK would have had to bend before the need to fulfil UN Charter obligations.

The majority felt that there was no indication that Parliament had anticipated the adoption of such draconian measures when it enacted the 1946 Act.[21] On the contrary, the Court applied the "Simms principle[22]" which dictated that Parliament could only depart from fundamental rights



through express and unambiguous language. When the measures required by a UN Resolution affect the rights of an individual so profoundly there were limits to their adoption by means of Orders in Council under the general enabling power of the 1946 Act.

The Court held that the TO was ultra vires by introducing a “reasonable suspicion” test, it went beyond the requirements of Resolution 1373 and therefore beyond what is allowed under executive discretion granted by the 1946 Act (Lord Rodger dissenting). Only Parliament could properly decide to impose more stringent measures upon individuals than provided for in a UN measure, (Lord Rodger agreeing). Lord Brown would have allowed “reasonable grounds for believing[23]” and Lord Mance suggested proof on the ‘balance of probabilities’.[24] Lord Rodger even accepted “reasonable suspicion” as “expedient” within section 1(1) of the 1946 Act, albeit only on a temporary basis pending rapid replacement by an Act of Parliament.[25] Lord Phillips suggested that the purpose of the Resolution extended only to freezing the assets of “criminals” and not mere “suspects”, [26] an argument rejected by Lord Rodger as “an impractical approach which would emasculate the very international system the Security Council wished to create.[27]”

The court held that the orders went beyond their limit when even though the executive measure fell within the scope of a UNSC Resolution, the interference with fundamental rights was such that it could only be authorised by the democratically elected Parliament. In the absence of any effective and independent review at UN level it left no means to contest their designation. The Court did clarify that although Article 103 of the UN Charter displaced the applicants' ECHR rights and thus prevented any claim that the AQO was unlawful under the Human Rights Act, the right of access to a court had long been recognised in the common law as fundamental to the rule of law, and could only be overridden by clear Parliamentary wording.

Restrictions upon the rights of citizens were made conditional upon the explicit seal of the democratic process. Lord Brown, dissenting in part, identified a “clash of conflicting principles”[28] on the one hand, the UK's UN Charter obligations, and on the other the *Simms principle* that human rights infractions need to be explicitly sanctioned by Parliament. Lord Brown concluded that, while the TO was ultra vires the 1946 Act, the AQO was not because it was categorically mandated by a UNSC Resolution. Lord Brown thus resolved the conflict by giving precedence to the UK's duty under Article 25 of the UN Charter to carry out UNSC Resolutions. The majority rejected such a conclusion; they felt that such restrictions upon individual rights always need Parliament's express consent. While Parliament can choose to legislate contrary to fundamental rights, it can also decide that certain measures required by a UNSC Resolution are too onerous to be given direct effect in the UK through secondary legislation.

The Treasury reacted to the Supreme Court's judgment by publishing the Draft Terrorist Asset-Freezing Bill 2010 and by securing the rapid passage of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act 2010. The latter deems all of the impugned Orders in Council under the 1946 Act to have been validly adopted and therefore retains in force all directions made under those Orders regardless of the fact that the Home Secretary wished Hays to be removed from the designated list. The Act expired in December 2010, and was replaced by the Terrorism Asset Freezing Etc Act 2010. This Act now provides a statutory basis for the UK's asset freezing regime. Under this new act there are two designation powers available to the treasury, final and interim. Interim designations are based on the lower ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard rather than the more generally accepted ‘reasonable belief’. Interim designations only may last up to 30 days, but can be renewed, while final designations based on ‘reasonable belief’ expire one year from being made unless also renewed. There is a provision within the act which provides for judicial review of any Treasury



decision made but that is unlikely to help anyone placed on the UNs consolidated list. It would appear that victory of the successful applicants in the *Ahmed* case has proved extremely short-lived.

In December 2011 the first report into the operation of the Terrorism Freezing Etc Act 2010 was published.[29] The author considered the lack of funds seized and numbers of persons involved make this an ancillary rather than central part of the UK fight against terrorism. A positive note was that to incur designation now required both a necessity to protect the public and the burden of *reasonable belief* rather than *reasonable suspicion*. Although it was found to questionable if the required necessity test had been met in all cases[30]. There is a recommendation that the HM Treasury should be required to explain to Parliament the basis on which it considers the necessity test will be satisfied and that it is proportionate. The report recognises the lack of judicial input into designation process such as required in the use of control orders and unlike the procedure adopted in France and Ireland[31]. This gives wide powers to the executive and recommends that it should be a last option with prosecution being preferred with its inherent protections for the accused. Improved clarity in Treasury reports and its website is recommended to improve transparency of the Act as a whole. Licensing and compliance under the Act needs to be clearer in order assist those designated in understanding what they are and are not permitted to do[32]. There was also concern that the names of those designated are made public without the person being in a position to know the case against them or defend themselves in any way from it. The author of the report acknowledges many improvements over the previous regime and cooperation from the Treasury itself as well as a sharp decline in the number of people designated.[33]

## Conclusion

This case is important for a number of reasons. On a constitutional level what started as a narrow interpretation of section 1 on the 1946 United Nations Act took on enormous significance. Critics may argue that there was a lack of consistency in the Lordships judgements and that the decision itself in this case is divisive, however taken overall the Court has produced a coherent view. In the main they suggested that to implement such measures which directly affect in such a grave manner an individual's fundamental rights is a matter that should be put before Parliament and not left to the Executive alone. Unfortunately their reasoning that this would allow full democratic debate before implementation has proved imaginary. Lord Rodger in his judgement stated that it really did not matter by what means the SCR's were introduced into our domestic law, as introduced they inevitably will be because of our international obligations under the UN Charter. Whilst ultimately this has have turned out to be true, perhaps he misses the point, that under the UK's duellist system it should be for Parliament to discuss the ramifications to our democratic society of implementing international measures that have such a draconian effect on an individual's rights. There is a danger that by accepting these resolutions of what Stone refers to as 'incremental infringement' that is, Parliament accepts one type of control as necessary in one area of law which may then justify its application to another[34].

This Court's ultimate decision to find both orders *ultra vires* does show an attempt to protect the individual from excessive executive power, whilst supporting the concept of Parliamentary supremacy and the respect of the judiciary for the separation of those powers, contrary to much recent media reporting. The Government in turn has shown unwavering support for almost unrestricted authority of the UNSC with their innate lack of effective judicial review or democratic accountability. The UN is essentially a political body that has none of the inherent safeguards we consider necessary to protect those subject to decisions in a democracy. Surprisingly perhaps the ECtHR has effectively played no part in protecting an individual from the excess of any SCR, they



have made clear in various judgements that under article 103, the UNSC will always take precedent over any other international agreement.

Whilst the primary aim of the UN is the maintenance of international peace and security, it seems that when doing so human rights are seen as secondary, there is a disregard for fundamental rights and an inherent lack of judicial protection available to those subjected to these sanctions as shown in *A* case. The view that peace and security and fundamental human rights are mutually exclusive is thought by some, if not all commentators to be simply untrue<sup>[35]</sup>. They argue that any lasting strategy for peace and security that is not anchored in respect for human rights and civil liberties is essentially a strategy of insecurity<sup>[36]</sup>. Whilst this is clearly only one view, it could be argued that whenever national or international security is threatened states should uphold human rights not dispose of them on the grounds they are luxuries that cannot be supported. Fundamental rights such as a fair trial, family life, peaceful enjoyment of possessions and an effective judicial review are surely equally important to a strong democratic society as are peace and security. These rights are clearly missing from the SCR now implemented into UK domestic law. One view is that by treating both security and human rights as equal, it may actually lead to a more ‘rights’ based democratic society, one possibly be less susceptible to cause and effect of terrorism in the first place.

The reasoning behind the sanctions imposed by the UN are of course laudable in their overall aims of attempting to maintain peace and security by suppressing international terrorism, one that operates without borders or even a substantive organisation to hold to account. However to use such a blunt international instrument as UN sanctions against individuals with its real and personal consequences as shown in the *A* case is something that Parliament was unlikely to have foreseen when it introduced the UN Act in 1946 and one that should have perhaps been debated more stridently by Parliament before introducing any new asset freezing legislation. Whilst this lack of real debate is disappointing it is not surprising when considered in the historical context of terrorism debates generally within Parliament.

Lord Rodger stated in the *A* case that those subjected to these measures are effectively ‘*prisoners of the state*’. As a permanent member of the Security Council it appears that the UK government has done little to uphold our own democratic principles within the asset freezing regime currently initiated by the UN. Although these sanctions are not supposed to be criminal in nature but a preventative civil measure, those subjected to them, many for over ten years now, they may have good grounds to suggest they are in effect a punitive measure with few safeguards available under national law. Generally speaking the UK has a robust human rights protective mechanism in form of the Human Rights Act enshrining rights agreed in ECHR, however the *A* case and the subsequent implementation of the new asset freezing legislation has highlighted the vulnerability to interference and erosion of those rights through instigating SCR at the international level, something perhaps we should all be concerned about.

**About the author:** *Joe Stevens is a third year PhD candidate at the University of Bedfordshire, he is particular interested in the area of human rights and terrorism, he is researching from a human rights perspective the main issues in relationship to the United Nations efforts to control and suppress terrorism and the use of targeted sanctions against individuals. Joe obtained a first in his LLB(Hons) in 2008 and a merit in his LLM which was in International Criminal Law and Security in 2010, both of which are from the University of Northampton his home town. On completion of his PhD Joe hopes to become a university lecturer. Joe is married with two grown up and one young child. In his spare time he enjoys flying having obtained his private pilot’s licence (PPL) in May 2010.*



## Notes:

[1] PhD candidate, School of Law, University of Bedfordshire.

[2] *HM Treasury v A (and others)* [2010] UKSC 2

[3] The Charter of the United Nations at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>, accessed 2 March 2012, fully lists the charter articles.

[4] For a full discussion of the implications and meaning of Article 103 see; Rain Liivoja, *The scope of the supremacy clause of the United Nations Charter*; 2008, *International & Comparative Law Quarterly*, 57(3), 583-612

[5] B Simma (Ed), *The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary*, OUP (2nd Ed) 2002, p1295

[6] See full list of all UN SCR at: <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>, accessed 2 March 2012.

[7] Simma, *op cit*, p 737

[8] The 1946 United Nations Act Section One states:“ If, under article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945 (being the article which relates to measures not involving the use of armed force) the Security Council of the United Nations call upon His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to apply any measures to give effect to any decision of that Council, His Majesty may by Order in Council make such provision as appears to Him necessary or expedient for enabling those measures to be effectively applied, including (without prejudice to the generality of the preceding words) provision for the apprehension, trial and punishment of persons offending against the Order.”

[9] Full details of Order at: <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2006/20062657.htm>, accessed 2 March 2012

[10] Full details of Order at: [http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2009/uksi\\_20091747\\_en\\_1](http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2009/uksi_20091747_en_1), accessed 2 March 2012

[11] <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si2002/20020111.htm>, accessed 3 March 2012

[12] <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si2006/20062952.htm>, accessed 3 March 2012

[13] Right to family life, privacy and correspondence

[14] The enjoyment of property

[15] Article 6 Right to fair trial

[16] *HM Treasury v Ahmed (and others)* [2008] EWHC 869 (Admin), [2008] 3 All ER 361

[17] [2009] EWHC 1677 (Admin)

[18] [2009] 3 WLR 25 , para 25

[19] *R(M) v HM Treasury* [2008] 2 All ER 1097 para 152

[20] *R(M) v HM Treasury* [2008] 2 All ER 1097, para 15

[21] As per Lords Hope (with whom Lord Walker and Lady Hale agreed) para 61, Lord Phillips para 145-155 and Lord Mance para 239-241

[22] *R v. Home Secretary ex parte Simms* [1999] 1 A.C. 69

[23] Lord Brown at para 199

[24] Lord Brown at para 230

[25] Lord Rodger at para 176

[26] Lord Phillips at para 129-143

[27] Lord Rodger at para 170

[28] Lord Brown at para 195



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[29] David Anderson, FIRST REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE TERRORIST ASSET-FREEZING ETC. ACT 2010, (Dec 2011), The Stationary Office, London

[30] Ibid p4

[31] Ibid p68

[32] Ibid p72

[33] Ibid David Anderson, the numbers have dropped from 149 at the start of 2009 to 38 in Sep 2011

[34] Stone, Civil Liberties & Human Rights, (6th Ed) 2006, Oxford p9

[35] See for example those who advocate a strong human rights approach: Christina Pantazis, Simon Pemberton, From the "old" to the "new" suspect community: examining the impacts of recent UK counter-terrorist legislation, 2009, British Journal of Criminology; O Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law (2006) 26 OJLS 235-256.; see for example those who suggest the more open a democracy, the more likely terrorists can operate within it; James Lutz & Brenda Lutz, Democracy & Terrorism, Perspectives on Terrorism, a Journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative, 2010, Vol 4 No1 p1

[36] Dora Kostakopoulou, How to do Things with Security Post 9/11, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Vol: 28,(2) pp317-342.



## Whose Hearts and Minds? Narratives and Counter-Narratives of Salafi Jihadism

by Dina Al Raffie

### 1. Introduction

*“...the real dynamic of terror lies in the telling of the story itself.” [1]*

Perhaps the biggest mistake in the ‘War on Terror’ was the belief that the destruction of Al-Qaeda’s training camps would lead to the demise of the group, its affiliated movements and the Salafi Jihadist ideology to which the organization is understood by many to belong. Few paused to consider if Osama bin Laden and his cohorts were perhaps only the tip of a substantially larger iceberg. Now, eleven years down the line, two wars and 1.283 trillion dollars later,[2] politicians and scholars alike are still devoting time into furthering our understanding of groups like Al-Qaeda and their associated Salafi Jihadist movement. More importantly, much focus has been given to the ideology that underlies the phenomenon of Salafi Jihadism in an effort to understand why it continues to inspire local initiatives and individuals to act on its behalf.

The utility of military action against a threat that clearly draws its strength from an ideology has often been questioned. Instead, focus has increasingly been given to understanding the ideology’s constituent narratives in an effort to explain the reasons behind its resonance with certain individuals. Documenting these narratives is a complicated process, as there cannot be said to be one narrative to which all elements of the movement adhere. An overview of geographically dispersed groups that allegedly adhere to Salafi Jihadist ideals shows that there are similarities and differences in narratives that may be attributed to differing geopolitical priorities on which the groups focus.[3] Instead, this paper argues that a more worthwhile endeavour may be to search for common elements in the varying Jihadist narratives that may form a master narrative that these groups share, and examine how such elements aid in promoting and spreading the ideology.

The role of narratives is relatively novel in the field of terrorism studies, as well as the approaches used to analyze them. Nevertheless, studies that have been carried out on the topic have been fruitful in helping us understand how narratives can contribute to the furtherance of ideology, not least that of Al-Qaeda’s. An important contribution in this respect is that of Halverson et al. in their book ‘Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism’, which posits that despite there being differences in locally embedded narratives, master narratives exist that override these local narratives in importance.[4] This finding pertains fundamentally to Islam and Muslims, where the master narrative is found to constitute elements derived from ‘sacred texts’ and history.[5] More importantly, master narratives are by no means static and represent the embodiment of a constant re-interpretation of individual and collective perceptions.

Research on Salafi Jihadist narratives has traditionally focused on the message framing process of Salafi Jihadists and why it has been able to, on occasion, motivate individuals to commit acts of terror. Although this has contributed to understanding of Jihadist narratives, it sidetracks the importance of actors external to the Salafi Jihadist movement that help leverage the message of the



Salafi Jihadists. This is best captured by R. Korteweg et. al in their view that the EU, in their counter-terrorism policies, would benefit from shifting their focus from the ‘causes’ of terrorism to the ‘background contributing factors...that lead to and catalyse the radicalization of EU citizens.’[6]

In a similar strand, this paper aims at examining the support structures, primarily within the US and the EU, that help extremist messages proliferate and potentially increase the recruitment pool for Salafi Jihadists. The paper starts by examining similarities in the narratives of Salafi Jihadist groups that are argued to be the main constituents of a Salafi Jihadist master narrative. Here, Al-Qaeda is used as an example of an adherent to the Salafi Jihadist movement, primarily due to the plentitude of literature available on it. The paper then searches for similarities in the narratives of non-violent actors outside the Salafi Jihadist movement and demonstrates how such narrated parallels aid in further cementing core Jihadist messages in the minds of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Neither the intentionality nor motivation of external actors is analyzed, however the interplay of the latter’s narratives with that of the Salafi Jihadists is shown to play a significant role in supporting the proliferation of core extremist messages in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries.

The relationship between mainstream Islamic beliefs and the Salafi Jihadist master narrative is also examined. The success of a narrative can be attributed to the extent to which it resonates with its target audience. Narratives that stray too far from established traditional, cultural and religious perceptions are often unsuccessful. Instead, the development of narratives must have existing ones at its core. The success of the emergent narrative is the extent to which the narrator can gradually integrate alternate meanings into existing ones to eventually reconstruct perceptions. Beginning with the religion on which Al-Qaeda’s ideology claims to be based, the paper first studies how Al-Qaeda embeds its messages in Islamic texts and scriptures as a source of legitimacy, before identifying the key external supporters of its ideology.

The paper’s conclusions find that the foreign policies of the US and EU, whilst not direct contributors to terrorism have so far pursued strategies of appeasement and compromise that have only perpetuated the credibility of Salafi Jihadist claims. This has not only undermined the democratic, secular values of these societies but has increasingly tolerated obvious advocates of the Salafi Jihadist ideology at home. The result has been the radicalization of Muslims and non-Muslims alike as well as the steady proliferation of extremist messages and ideas in society. Any counter-narrative should thus be one that seeks to protect and promote individual liberties of human beings as opposed to being one that advances compromise; which is only damaging to the long-lasting peace and prosperity of democratic societies.

## 2. Defining Narratives

In the simplest terms, a narrative is defined as a “coherent system of interrelated and sequentially organized stories.”[7] These stories are so deeply ingrained in cultures that they are an essential part of people’s identities and “who they are” in any given cultural setting.[8] An alternative definition presents narratives as discourse that works to produce meaning through the construction of “social realities, particularly in terms of defining subjects and establishing their relational positions within a system of signification.”[9] This definition stresses the nature of narratives as stories, which can be reshaped over time and are both products of and contributors to the nature of existent cultures. Therefore, the cultural contexts in which narratives are embedded are extremely important to the understanding of narratives.

Whereas narratives are frameworks of communication through which people are expected or taught to interact, master narratives override narratives in importance in that they are a crucial element or



reason for a certain culture's *existence*. In 'Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism', Muslim 'culture' is explained as having a master narrative that draws its stories from sacred texts and Muslim history.[10] Likewise, the master narrative of Salafi Jihadism can be argued to constitute alternative narratives according to cultural settings from which emerge common stories that transcend local borders.

An important aspect of narratives is the manner in which they are related to the cultures that they aim to influence or else are already embedded within. In the introduction, a point was made on the process of redefining existent cultural narratives in a gradual manner to reshape perceptions. A study on radicalization in the UK traces this reframing process and demonstrates how key ingredients of Salafi Jihadist narratives include the dominating political and sociological situation, the interweaving of religious sources with the latter and the reconceptualizing of identity as a result of the two.[11] This view is similarly demonstrated in Fiona Adam's 'Global Liberalism versus Political Islam' where narratives are framed in geopolitical and religious contexts. Here, 'norm entrepreneurs' seek to reshape and/or strengthen certain norms through building on master narratives of Muslim cultures.[12] By doing so, Salafi Jihadists aim at building bridges between mainstream Islam and their ideology in an effort to rewrite Muslim cultures' understandings of worldwide phenomena and religion. These 'norm entrepreneurs' understand the importance of solid master narratives in communicating their ideology and redefining the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behaviours.

## 2.1 Religious Legitimization

Salafi-Jihadism is an outgrowth of the Salafiyya movement. The meaning of Salafism is derived from the Arabic word *salaf*, and is a movement or an understanding of Islam, which seeks to emulate the earliest forefathers of the religion.[13] Although it is often difficult to trace back Islamic reform movements to their precise moments of inception, key sources of inspiration for this movement are often attributed to 13/14th century Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya.[14] Ibn Taymiyya was a scholar belonging to one of the four main schools of Sunni jurisprudence - *fiqh* - whose religious edicts weigh heavily in today's Salafi Jihadist narratives. For example, Ibn Taymiyya was an avid supporter of violent Jihad for Islamic world domination,[15] whose writings stressed the sovereignty of God's laws, and apostatized manmade laws. This is very similar to today's calls by Jihadist groups for the return to the Caliphate and the rejection of political participation in favour of imposing Islamic law or *Shar'ia*. Much of the more recent Jihadist propaganda that is often cited in literature can be traced back to Ibn Taymiyya's work, albeit having evolved to accommodate the 'contemporary period.' [16]

It would be inaccurate, however, to equate Salafism as it is practiced in Saudi Arabia for example with the form of Salafism that drives the violent Jihadist movement. Although both can be understood to draw from similar sources and espouse similar messages, there remains significant discord amongst Salafists as to the permissions for and justification of violence, the conditions for excommunicating fellow Muslims – *takfir* – and the relationship between society and state.[17] The third point is one of the most important, as the basis for recognizing Wahhabism (understood in this paper to be synonymous with Salafism) as the official state religion at the time of the founding of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was the result of a compromise: the Wahhabis could dictate the religious practices of the Kingdom as long as they did not interfere with the holders of the throne, the Saud family.[18] In line with the Islamic understanding of *fitna*, [19] Salafism within countries respects the formal positions of authority and decries violence against the ruling elite that could sow



discord in society. With Salafi Jihadists, this is clearly not the case as is made public in their *fatwas* and declarations calling for the violent overthrow of the ‘apostate’ regimes.

The divides in Salafist thought are many and, of the most relevant, are the conditions and explanations provided for the justification of violence. These depart from the Salafist mainstream in that they progressively broaden the boundaries in which violent Jihad is permitted. Aptly documented by Quintan Wiktorowicz, ideologues and ‘thinkers’ in the Salafi Jihadist movement have merely ‘adapted’ the understandings of reformists like Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Taymiyya, ‘... stretching them to their logical conclusion in a way that increased the permissible scope of violence.’[20] This broadening of boundaries is best exemplified by the difference in conditions or ‘voiders’ by which a Muslim can be made an apostate.[21] On the one hand, the Wahabbist doctrine, which can be argued to represent mainstream Salafism, takes into consideration both the beliefs and actions of Muslims as indicators of whether or not one they are apostates. The former embodies a Muslims’ beliefs in Allah’s sole supremacy – *tawhid* – and likewise accepts that Islam is God’s supreme religion on Earth. And thus, Salafism preaches that a Muslim may not be made an apostate unless he/she openly proclaims that they do not hold the aforementioned beliefs to be true. [22] For Salafi Jihadists, belief plays a minimal role and it is the actions of Muslims that take priority. In this context, the apparent rejection of any one of such ‘voiders’ is immediate proof of apostasy.[23]

Secondly, religious interpretations often involve the redefining of religious terms and concepts to fit the contexts of Jihadist narratives. An example of this is seen in the Salafi Jihadist use of the term *jahiliyya*, which in Islamic theology refers to a ‘specific historical period’, but is re-contextualized to represent a ‘state of affairs’ that allegedly mirrors the deviation of Muslims from the ‘Law of Allah’ and their adherence to manmade laws.[24] In this version of Sayyid Qutb’s ‘apostasy’, literally any Muslim can be made an apostate if he/she is not seen as obeying the strictest form of *Shari’a*. The view propagated by Qutb and other ideologues in the Salafi Jihadist movement is that the way to prove or ascertain that a Muslim is not an apostate is through actively ‘struggling’ against those that wish to impose manmade laws. Or, as put by Wiktorowicz: ‘This dichotomous struggle for God’s sovereignty on earth eliminates the middle ground and sets the stage for a millennial, eschatological battle between good and evil.’[25]

Having said this, the continued influence of such scholars’ work on today’s understandings of Islam begs the question of why medieval interpretations still hold sway in some Islamic societies today. This can perhaps best be explained by examining the evolution of the interpretation and application process of Islamic religious sources. Historically, interpretation was a task of a group of religious scholars that were well studied in the fundamentals of Islam and were called upon to provide religious rulings – *Shari’a*. [26] These religious rulings did not represent the work of only one scholar but reflected scholarly consensus – *ijma*’.[27] In stark contrast to the individual manner in which many 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century reformers of Islam and scholars interpreted and applied their exegesis of Islamic sources, medieval interpretation was a much more complex, refined and social form of providing religious jurisprudence through community consensus. James Piscatori similarly finds that ‘the meaning of scripture no longer needs to be interpreted by a religious establishment but, rather, lies in the eyes of the beholder.’[28] The degradation of authority of religious Islamic institutions may be attributed to their connections to repressive state regimes, where Jihadists have often stated the former as being the ‘puppets’ of the latter. Thus, with the ‘doors of *ijtihad*’ (interpretation)[29] closed, there has been a steady degeneration of *ijtihad* and much of the present day interpretations and understandings of Islam are based on the medieval interpretations of the schools – *madhabs* - of religious jurisprudence of old.



The lack of an authoritative body that regulates and oversees the process of *ijtihad*, and the availability of Islamic sources rife with violence provides a rich source for Salafi Jihadists to draw from for their narratives. Within Islamic texts, the concept of ‘Jihad’ is often portrayed as a two-fold struggle: the ‘smaller jihad’ and the ‘greater jihad’.[30] The ‘smaller jihad’ or the ‘Jihad of the sword’ represents the violent struggle against non-Muslims in an attempt to proselytize them.[31] The ‘greater jihad’ represents an inner struggle to vanquish immoral and evil behaviours.[32] In the Qur’an as well as other Islamic sources, there exist a plethora of *Suras* (verses) that relate to Jihad in both forms, with the former often cited by Salafi Jihadist ideologues as religious justification. Although the degree and permissibility of the ‘smaller Jihad’ remains a contested debate in Salafism, Salafi Jihadists generally espouse the view that it is a religiously sanctioned duty of each and every Muslim – *fard ‘ayn*.[33]

## 2.2 Assigning Blame and Crafting Conspiracies

Religious sources are not the only support for the Salafi Jihadist master narrative. In order to reach full effect, stories have to resonate with their target audience on several levels. On a cognitive level, this is achievable through ensuring that the underpinning messages of narratives do not stray too far from established cultural frames.[34] Narratives should thus aim to build on the current situation of the target audience through gradually attributing common perceptions to alternative themes/stories.[35] In other words, if Group A understands *phenomenon a* to be a function of *b*, a slight reframing process would perhaps attempt to explain *phenomenon a* through the introduction of *c* and *d*, in connection with *b*.

In the Salafi Jihadist context, the worldwide suffering, endless humiliation, poverty and oppression of many Muslims (*phenomenon a*) is not only the fault of the corrupt governments of these countries (*b*), but is also due to their deviation from Islam (*c*) that results primarily from the brutal colonization of many of these countries (*d*). This is one example of many, where the Jihadists seek to group the grievances and disaffections of Muslims around the world and provide easy-to-grasp explanations for their misfortune; the appeal of their narratives a measure of the ‘...simplicity of message and linkages with real-world grievances’.[36] In his book, ‘The Future of Political Islam’, Graham Fuller adequately summarizes how the concept of humiliation is one of the key supporting elements of the master narrative:

“The deepest underlying source of Muslim anguish and frustration today lies in the dramatic decline of the Muslim World... from the leading civilization in the world for over one thousand years into a lagging, impotent and marginalized region of the world. This stunning reversal of fortune obsessively shapes the impulses underlying much contemporary Islamist rhetoric.”[37]

This reversal is attributed to the oppression of colonial hegemony, as well as the supposed abandonment of Muslims of their ‘true’ religion.[38] [39]The regimes in power during Qutb’s time, as well as those that remain in power today are viewed as corrupt US/Israeli puppet governments that are not true Muslims and should be replaced. This view is taken from many sources and finds expression in the Qur’an where it is stated that non-Muslims cannot govern Muslims.[40]

Before the establishment of Al-Qaeda ‘Core’, Jihadist efforts were focused on the ‘near-enemy’. In other words, the shared view was that apostate governments in the Muslim world needed to be overthrown in order to establish strong Islamic states. Only then could such states attempt to challenge the West and the rest of the world. The ‘near enemy’ was the main target whereas for Al-Qaeda and groups inspired by its ideology, the real enemy is the ‘far enemy’, which helped support the ‘near enemy’ and keep them in power at the expense of its peoples. By eliminating these foreign



support structures for the apostate governments first, the ‘near enemy’ would then be easier to defeat.[41]

Placing this into context, the master narrative of Salafi Jihadists has increasingly shifted its focus to not only foreign governments but also foreign populations as pools for recruitment. The master narrative is aimed at radicalizing not only Muslims at ‘home’ but also those from Muslim diasporas in the US and Europe. The process is complicated yet models have been adopted that attempt to explain how core messages of the master narrative are developed for this purpose.

The first obvious element of the Salafi Jihadist master narrative is its consideration of the political situation, and its selective adoption of ‘causes’ for which it claims to represent. Literature has indicated that with regards to Al-Qaeda, the core political themes on which its ideology rests emerge and disappear depending on their relevance to the master narrative. The master narrative focuses on the sufferings and grievances of fellow Muslims in one of two theaters: 1. Countries where Muslims are the minority and, 2. Muslim-majority countries that are perceived to be suffering heavy losses due to foreign intervention. The grievances of Muslims in both cases are caused by non-Muslim regimes and are thus framed as a war against Islam.

The Palestinian issue is a cornerstone of discussion and politics in many Middle Eastern and North African countries, where societies are increasingly antipathetic to Israel’s policies and, by extension, Jews. Capitalizing on these negative emotions that have become inherent to most Muslim cultures, Al-Qaeda ideologues have, from the onset, defined the enemy as ‘Zionist’ and ‘Crusader’; terminology that is steeped in Islamic concepts and holds negative connotations for many Muslims. Although the Jewish people are occasionally referred to as the chosen ones in the Qur’an,[42] and even acknowledged as the rightful receivers of Palestine from Allah,[43] there remains a plethora of verses in the Qur’an that contradict this position.[44] As rightly stated by Piscatori, ‘...ideas concerning issues from popular participation to social injustice are far from stagnant, and Qur’anic meanings are nothing if not ambiguous.’[45]

Al-Qaeda ideologues advance an anti-Semitic worldview that frames current conflicts in a religious context in order to advance the rhetoric of a Jewish conspiracy aimed at the destruction of Islam and Muslims.[46] This rhetoric is also not lost on the mainstream Muslims outside the Jihadist realm, where anti-Semitic propaganda is plentiful in Muslim media and sanctioned by various authoritative figures and bodies, such as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the Saudi ministry of education.[47] [48]

Although few studies have been carried out on the extent to which Muslims believe such a conspiracy, various Pew Poll surveys have carefully documented the rising hostility and anti-Semitism in many Muslim countries.[49] A quotation from the translated works of al-Zawahiri states, “The one slogan that has been well understood by the nation and to which it has been responding for the past fifty years is the call for Jihad against Israel.”[50]

According to a study of the content of conversations on Jihadist websites leading up to and following Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003, the focal point of the narrative shifted to place increased emphasis on the notion of regional domination by the ‘Jewish-Crusader’ alliance thereafter.[51] Thus, not only did the war provide a geopolitical opportunity for Al Qaeda ideologues in legitimizing Jihad in Iraq, but it also gave them an opportunity to reinforce other dimensions of the narrative:[52]

“America has attacked Iraq and soon will also attack Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan. You should be aware the infidels cannot bear the existence of Muslims and want to capture their resources and destroy them.”[53]



These examples are a testament to the importance of political opportunities in the crafting of the Al-Qaeda/Salafi Jihadist ideology. The link between radicalization and mobilization is still fraught with uncertainty, however the role of socialization is extremely important. Finding little evidence pointing to a terrorist personality or profile that makes one more prone to radicalization, the socialization processes employed by Jihadists have been found various scholars to bear more fruitful results[54]; more specifically, the recreation of an identity through the gradual indoctrination of the would-be Jihadist to an alternate world and self-view. The worldview that is propagated builds on the political aspect of the master narrative that works at alienating the would-be Jihadist from the society in which he/she lives. The religious aspect of the master narrative appeals to the fissures in the belief system of the would-be Jihadist who is understood as attempting to reconcile between his/her Islamic beliefs and modernity; more specifically, the non-Islamic societies in which he/she lives.[55]

The master narrative has a strategic outlook in that it works to create both real and perceived hostilities between Muslims and non-Muslims; cementing a perception of a 'War on Islam'. The primary purpose of the master narrative is to drive a wedge between Muslims and non-Muslims, through funneling messages and ideas through a religious filter. On an analysis provided by the Jihadist group *al-Ghuraaba*, Mark Huband notes: '...At the heart of the al-Ghuraaba analysis is the intention of justifying – as well as promoting, and even celebrating – the intense feeling of alienation from non-Muslim Britain... This is done by stressing the primacy of the individual identity, and then explaining that identity purely as a product of belief – belief that is the result of the 'perfection' Islam has offered its adherents.'[56]

Offering itself up as a perfected, purified version of Islam, the Salafi Jihadist master narrative is the reflection of the broadest interpretations of Salafism in current geopolitics and acts as a platform for radicalization with the ultimate goal being the mobilization of action.

### 2.3 Islamism and the Salafi Jihadist Master Narrative

There is a danger of singling out Salafi Jihadist groups without taking into consideration the much broader and widespread phenomenon of Islamism. Here, a distinction must first be made between the two. Where Salafi Jihadism is defined as a transnational Jihad against the 'far enemy', Islamism is "A spectrum of movements committed to Islam as a total way of life and as a viable alternative to Western secular ideologies." [57] Within this spectrum, there are violent Islamist groups such as al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), and non-violent ones that either reject violence or else condone it only for specific circumstances.

Regardless of where these movements lie, they mostly accept Islam as a modern political ideology and seek to first 'Islamize' their own societies and states, with a long-term goal of Islamic world domination.[58] The categorization of Islamist groups is highly contested in academia. In discussing groups like the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) for example, many scholars have contrasting opinions. This may be due to the fact that many of today's Jihadist organizations, like Al-Qaeda, grew out of the MB. However, organizations that reject the use of violence have been given relative freedom to operate in the US and Europe.

A working definition for the purpose of this paper defines moderate Islamist organizations as organizations that have been willing to and have often participated in the political processes in their countries.[59] This is important as it stands in stark contrast to both Salafi Jihadist and radical Islamist groups who are usually not interested in political participation as they believe it to be a confrontation with Allah's divine rule or *hakimiyya*. [60] Islamist groups can thus be defined as



groups that a) have participated to some extent in political arenas; b) reject the notion of transnational Jihad and prefer to work within defined borders; and c) limit the use of violent Jihad to very specific circumstances and prefer a non-revolutionary means in spreading their ideology. [61]

Two points require reinforcement. First, whilst many Islamist organizations have adopted a different path in spreading their own ideologies or *da'wa*, the ideologies they spread share many similarities to Salafi Jihadism. Very often, the narratives draw from or else build on one another. If one were to observe the meanings and understandings of Jihad in the context of the MB narrative and that of Al-Qaeda's, many similarities can be identified. The main difference between the underlying ideologies of the various groups is not so much the goals and objectives but, rather, the *means* by which they achieve these goals and objectives.

Secondly, there are significant differences in the implementation of ideology. The two opposing approaches are a 'grassroots', bottom-up approach or else a 'top-down approach.' [62] The former seeks to Islamize a culture in a gradual manner that focuses on individuals, families and communities and preaches its propaganda and ideology accordingly. The latter seeks to enforce religion onto societies without much focus on individual religiosity. The MB is a prime example of the former where, instead of trying to overrun the government and impose its ideology, the group uses a combination of social services, sermons, and the distribution of religious material to persuade people that Islam is the only solution to their woes. [63] The MB also rides on the policy failures of local governments and populist sentiment in offering itself and 'Islam' as the only alternative. Indeed, the group's recent success in the presidential elections in Egypt may arguably be testament to their methodology.

The objectives of the MB are also not as clear as those of other organizations. Regardless of the violent acts that have been attributed to the group, the group itself does not openly espouse violence on its official website. The mission statement of the group is one of the few exceptions: "Allah is our objective; the Prophet is our leader; the Quran is our law; Jihad is our way; dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope." [64] The use of the word 'Jihad', followed by the last phrase in the statement, "...dying in the way of Allah", indicates that the 'Jihad' referred to here may be more than an internal struggle. Furthermore, in stating that the 'Quran is our law...' the group also makes clear its desire to have an Islamic state which is ruled under *Shari'a*.

The significance of the similarities in the mottos and proclamations of groups is that, irrespective of open calls for violent Jihad, having similar or identical core messages to those of the Salafi Jihadist master narrative lends a measure of credibility to the Salafi Jihadist master narrative. Having earlier demonstrated how narratives are a key part of cultures in framing communicative contexts, the more certain words or phrases circulate within society, the more they become fixed into such contexts. By embracing the concept of Jihad, promoting *Shari'a* and coupling positive connotations to dying for religion or religious purposes, Muslim populations begin to internalize and more readily accept the concepts of martyrdom and Jihad. What's more, even if the majority of a population does not resort to violence or openly endorse it, the strengthening of the Salafi Jihadist master narrative in some countries may increase the number of sympathizers to the imagined 'cause.' [65] Likewise, the lack of public endorsement for violence by many Islamist institutions by no means indicates that the latter reject its eventual or conditional use. It only means that they prioritize political and social involvement in the countries that they operate in an attempt to garner support for their ideology; which at the end pursues many of the same goals that many Jihadist organizations do.



A good example of an Islamist organization whose narratives bear striking resemblance to that of the Salafi Jihadist master narrative is Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). On their British website, the group clearly outlines its goal of working towards the reestablishment of the Caliphate or *Khilafah* and how Islam calls the *Ummah* ‘...towards the Shar’i obligation of establishing the Khilafah in Pakistan as well as spreading it throughout the world.’ [66] Likewise, in the proceedings of the group’s first conference in Lebanon on the 1<sup>st</sup> of May, 2012, members of the group address the ‘foreign agenda’ that has been ‘...appointed to fight to fight Allah and His Messenger and the believers, and to realize the interests of the Zionists and disbelieving colonialists’ [67] This sentence alone captures some of the core messages that constitute the Salafi Jihadist master narrative. The ‘foreign agenda’ are the repressive regimes in the Middle East (in this case Syria), who are at a war with Islam and are products of the ‘Zionists’. The remainder of the speech further emphasizes a disconnect between ‘Allah’ and his ‘believers’ and the unbelievers, thus deepening the wedge between Muslim and non-Muslims.

With the advent of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and then again in OIF, Islamist and Jihadist groups were fast to declare the wars as the next assault on Islam:

*“The campaign against Iraq has aims that go beyond Iraq into the Arab Islamic world [...]. Its first aim is to destroy any effective military force in the proximity of Israel. Its second aim is to consolidate the supremacy of Israel...”* [68]

Here, the war is framed as not only being against Islam but one that seeks to further strengthen and protect the position of Israel in the region. Al-Zawahiri strategically makes the reference to Israel and the US, emphasizing their alliance as part of a larger conspiracy of encroachment upon the so-called ‘Arab Islamic World.’

In light of narrated parallels, the existence of organizations like HT in the US and Europe are arguably potential inciters of violence. Whereas their messages may not directly call on Muslims to bear arms on behalf of the religion and their grieving brothers and sisters, they nevertheless add weight to the argument and ‘model for reality’ that the Salafi Jihadist master narrative propagates. [69] Regardless of whether or not these organizations promote the use of violence, the manner in which they share some of the more utopian goals commonly only associated with Al-Qaeda and cohorts (like the global establishment of *Shar’ia*) should have caused heads to turn by now.

## 2.4 Other Agents boosting the Salafi Jihadist Narrative

Although many Muslims tend to differentiate between Wahhabism and Salafism, it can be argued that there are very little differences between the two. [70] Elements within Saudi Arabia and the Saudi royal family have supported the Salafi Jihadist master narrative through allowing, for example, the Protocols to be taught in Saudi-run and supported schools around the world. A more important example is the role the Kingdom played in financially supporting the emergence of the Taliban. Although the aid from the CIA to the Arab-Afghan *mujahideen* stopped after the defeat of the Soviet Union in 1989, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan continued providing funds and backing to the Taliban’s fight to take control of the country.

The role of *madrassas* in Central Asia is yet another incubator of the radical ideology that underpins Salafi Jihadism. Although the *madrassas* in Pakistan were originally based on the reformist ideology of Deobandism, [71] Saudi Arabia has more recently been exporting Wahabbism as an alternative. Both Deobandism and Wahabbism share many narratives with prominent Islamist and



Salafi Jihadist groups in the sense that they both heavily reject Western influence and ideas and seek to return to “classical, conservative Islam.”[72] The Taliban, whose militants were increasingly provided for by the Deobandi *madrassas*, are a prime example of the manifestation of this ideology at a state level.

After the killing of bin Laden, many Islamist organizations including Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), expressed their condolences and disseminated leaflets in support of bin Laden’s ideology.[73] This is extremely significant as organizations like HT are considered to be “moderate” Islamist organizations and often have headquarters in European cities. This being said, the master narratives of Salafi Jihadism are not solitary manifestations but also the products of the support of likeminded organizations.

The popular support of leaders is often a good source for providing insight with regards to narratives within specific countries and cultures. Just because the US or Western countries do not find solace in the explanations of life provided by the likes of the Egyptian Islamic theologian Yusuf al-Qaradawi does not mean that many Egyptians and Arabs do not. In fact, so popular is this individual’s work that Foreign Policy magazine placed him on the ‘top 20 public intellectuals of the World’ list.[74] So what are al-Qaradawi’s views?

*“...throughout history, Allah has imposed upon the [Jews] people who would punish them for their corruption. The last punishment was carried out by [Adolf] Hitler...Allah willing, the next time it will be at the hand of the believers.”[75]*

In an interview with the BBC[76] he said: "I consider this type of martyrdom operation as an evidence of God's justice".

In providing a counter-narrative for Salafi Jihadism, countries must first seek to eliminate the support structures of its master narrative. Namely, Islamist groups and organizations that hide under a cloak of supposed non-violence whilst simultaneously indoctrinating Muslims with radical ideas. This is not an easy task and calls into question whether or not it is actually possible. Is it worthwhile to attempt to reverse years of indoctrination of Muslim countries? Is it possible for the US and the West to bring to bear pressure on Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in dealing with and reversing the years of support it has provided to Jihadists? Would doing so not be simply reprimanding these countries for the sincere religious beliefs to which they adhere?

### 3. Positioning the Narratives

There are linkages between understandings of Islam in not only the Islamist and Salafi Jihadist master narratives, but also mainstream narratives of Islam. Mainstream Islamic narratives indirectly support the master narratives of Salafi Jihadists because in some instances there exists considerable overlap between the two. The most obvious linkage between the two is the religion. Because the Salafi Jihadist master narrative draws credence from its usage of Islamic sources, it can be said to stigmatize the open rejection of Muslim communities to violent practices insofar as religion is implicated.

It is oft repeated in the media, official statements and scholarly work that the majority of Muslims reject the extreme interpretation of Islam practiced and propagated by the Salafi Jihadist movement. Nevertheless, a cursory glance at the slogans and posters hoisted by ‘mainstream’ Muslim populations in and following the recent revolutions of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ and in similar demonstrations implies a more intimate connection between core Salafi Jihadist messages and




Islamic cultural ones. Although not a claim to Muslim endorsement of violence, the sentiments conveyed, as Christina Hellmich puts it, ‘..could have been taken right from an al-Qaeda propaganda video.’[77] Thus, a question of how Jihadist narratives are formulated has much to benefit from examining mainstream values and beliefs in Muslim communities, as well as how the Salafi Jihadist master narrative builds on and simultaneously aims at radicalizing these very same values and beliefs.

Sookhdeo[78] provides an inverted pyramid (see below) that breaks down Muslim populations into categories. The basis of his argument is that, although Muslims on different levels of the pyramid share the identity of being ‘Muslim’, the level to which the core messages of the lower, more extreme levels will resonate with or else be internalized by other levels depends on the extent to which they practice the religion.[79] The correlation of Muslim piety to radicalization readiness is something that has not been sufficiently addressed in the literature, but the reverberations of messages up the pyramid and into the heart of mainstream Islam can nevertheless be argued to constitute the main thrust of the Salafi Jihadist master narrative. Thus, it is perhaps not only the extent to which Islam is practiced, but also the extent to which the master narrative reshapes mainstream concepts and interpretations of Islam so that they infiltrate up to the upper, non-radical levels.

Graham Fuller breaks down Muslim communities and reaches a similar conclusion where Muslims can be charted along a spectrum, from the fundamentalists to the liberal (terms differ).[80] Fuller also quotes John Voll[81] on the position of the ‘traditionalists’:

*“...the traditionalists (or conservatives) seek to hold the lid down on too rapid change; they represent a force of conservation and preservation, a critical factor of cultural and community coherence and continuity in times of turmoil. But this school will also adapt to new conditions when necessary to keep Islam alive.”[82]*



Source: Figure excerpted from Patrick Sookhdeo, *Ideas Matter; How to Undermine the Extremist Ideology Behind al Qaeda*, (New York: Mcgraw-Hill, 2011), p.244.

Being rather passive in their steadfast adherence to societal and cultural norms, traditionalists do not contribute to change but are recipients of change. With the existence of Islamist groups like the MB and HT that have worked for years in reshaping cultural norms in Muslim societies, the traditionalists' views of cultural and societal norms are in danger of becoming radicalized.

The more the ideologies of the lower levels infiltrate to the higher levels of the pyramid, the more endangered the Muslims in the higher levels are. This is because exposure to mainstream elements of Islam, which have been perverted by the radical factions, increasingly challenge the less radical Muslim identities that cultured and traditional Muslims have built for themselves. It is this stage, where uncertainty takes hold, which many radicals attempt to seize upon. Thus, the battle for the hearts and minds of Muslims should not attempt to start with the radicalized elements but should focus on maintaining and protecting the comfort zones of Muslims who are comfortable with their Islamic identity and do not necessarily adhere to mainstream concepts.

#### 4. Western Narratives, or the Lack Thereof

The main issue nowadays seems to be the obsession of Western governments with finding a politically correct name for the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism. The war has been framed from its inception as being one against 'terror', an emotion. Governments have been increasingly mindful of reminding the public that this is not a war against Islam, but rather one against a fringe



movement that "...perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam",[83] whose ideology was "incubated in Afghanistan when it became a failed state,[84] and is overall "...rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim scholars." [85]

The problem with such statements is that they are only partly true and do not reflect the bigger picture in an accurate manner. The idea of exploiting Islam to serve political ends is incorrect when one takes into account that the religion is believed by many of its adherents to provide answers and solutions in most spheres of public and private life; *din wa dawla* - religion and state. Thus, even in countries where *Shari'a* is not implemented, legislation in some areas is still dictated by Islamic norms.

The terming of Salafi Jihadism as a 'fringe movement' belies the fact that it is not only Al-Qaeda or fringe groups that support the movement, but various other actors, organizations and states. The incubation of radical beliefs in Afghanistan also only partially contributed to radicalism, as the roots of radicalism we see today precede the war in Afghanistan. Islamist ideologies are the product of a long line of reformist versions of Islam, which go back centuries, and Salafi Jihadism is arguably the tip of these ideologies' spears.

Renunciation of violence is often welcomed by Western societies. Islamist organizations that condemn violence are left to operate so long as they condemn violent acts. The problem with this is the West's dismissal of non-violent elements of Islamist narratives that do, in the long run, contribute to acts of violence. The mainstream messages of Islamist narratives are ones that promote, glorify, and seek to achieve Jihad in the way of Allah. The only difference between them and Salafi Jihadist narratives is that they are more strategic in communicating their desired end effects and seemingly reject violent tactics. The steady proliferation of core Islamist messages into Muslim populations fly directly in the face of Western efforts of curtailing the spread of extremism. Therefore, it is meaningless if scholars and clerics are renouncing violence if they are, simultaneously, encouraging acts of violence under a holy pretext.

A conference held in July 2011 titled the "Founding Conference of the Arab-Islamic Gathering to Support the Option of Resistance", saw the gathering of groups and organizations ranging from Hamas and the MB to the supposed religious authority of Al-Azhar, Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb, to discuss the options of 'resistance' in occupied Muslim territories.[86] Although the focus was mainly the Palestinian territories, it also included Muslim countries that have more recently experienced brutal government crackdowns in response to their protests (i.e. Syria) as well as Kashmir and Chechnya. Authoritative figures in religious bodies like Al Azhar in Egypt continue to religiously sanction the use of violence against the 'Crusader Invasion' by issuing *fatwas*. [87] In communities where the collective nature of the predominant religion imposes itself on the behaviours and norms of societies, those capable of shaping and influencing it the most are the ones that (sadly) have the final say.

The master narrative of Salafi Jihadism has heavily influenced the terms, the understanding and the context in which the battle of ideas and discourse is fought. The post 9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have increasingly been framed in a religious context in Islamist and Salafi Jihadist narratives. Moreover, several officials in Western countries have tended to respond to such accusations in an apologetic manner, thus affirming that the narratives may indeed be sound. In focusing on and giving bin Laden and al-Zawahiri's narratives more credit than deserved, governments have begun to expand freedoms which are enabling a further strengthening of Islamist positions in Western countries.

An excellent example of the lengths some countries have gone to in ensuring that their Muslim communities do not feel 'discriminated' against is the introduction of *Shari'a* courts. Disputes are



settled in line with *Shari'a* law, and the rulings are then passed to the country courts or the High Court for enforcement. These courts have the right to enforce but not to amend the decisions passed down to them and, in doing so, undermine the country's entire judicial system. By allowing *Shari'a* courts to operate in the country, the UK has succeeded in not only succumbing to the desires of the Islamists but has also reinforced their agenda of the eventual world domination of Islam and an eventual return to the Caliphate.

Finally, Western governments seem to believe that by strengthening the Islamists, they prevent Muslims from becoming Jihadists. Whilst attempting to play Islamists off against the Salafi Jihadists, the West has failed in providing a coherent counter narrative that is based on Western values. In part, this reticence is caused by the concerns of governments that they are infringing on Muslims' religious freedom. Yet the failure of finding a middle ground has led to the advancement of Islamist and Jihadist narratives in Western societies.

## 5. Conclusion

In providing a counter-narrative, the Western world should do more in the way of understanding the elements that Islamist and Jihadist master narratives share. They should also be wary of inadvertently advancing the cause of such groups. Western societies have a much better opportunity in providing a counter-narrative to their own Muslim populations that can more effectively undermine the predominant Islamist and Jihadist narratives. Given the highly unfavourable views held of Christianity, Judaism and the West in general, it is futile to attempt to reverse years of fermenting hostility fostered by Islamist and Jihadist indoctrination. Instead, it is probably more likely that efforts to roll back and contain the radical narratives in Western countries will provide the most effective counter narrative yet.

When providing such a counter-narrative, governments have to first recognize the importance of agents and 'norm entrepreneurs', which reside within their own borders and act as effective support structures for Jihadist and Islamist narratives. By diminishing the strength of agents and structures within the confines of the existing laws, the effect of such narratives are likely to decline in strength. It is also important to understand that there are millions of Muslims in the Western world who enjoy the sanctity of democratic freedoms and understand their value for further personal, spiritual, and material progression. They are Muslims who have formed their own understandings of religion that are often rejected by the majority of Muslims living in Muslim-majority countries due to their divergence from the mainstream tenets of Islam.

The tolerance of groups and individuals who propagate Islamist and Jihadist agendas and narratives in the West not only infringes on and alienates such Muslims, but also promotes the spread of Islamism. An alternative approach for Western countries may be to focus more on integrated, 'cultural' Muslims and provide them with the protection and solidarity that they need in a time when they are increasingly being pressured into passively accepting Islamist beliefs.

The fight against the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism is one that will have to be fought from within. The underlying ideologies of both Islamism and Salafi Jihadism are not ideologies that are utterly disconnected from the religion. Nor are they ones that hold minimal sway in Muslim countries. On the contrary, the Islamist forces embodied in grassroots movements like the MB have spread dramatically over the past century, attracting a large number of followers as a unifying alternative to Nasser's attempt at Pan-Arabism. It has seen avid supporters in Saudi Arabia, whose Wahabbi doctrine has heavily cross-fertilized with that of the MB's, as well as large backing of *madrassas* in Asia.



Narratives are not simply stories but are the primers of action because they shape populations' perceptions of the world. An effective counter-narrative needs to start today and needs to openly confront the Muslim populations and radical revolutionary movements that attempt to overrun societies and drastically alter them. Radical organizations cannot be tolerated and must be held accountable for both their action and hateful speech; especially those that attempt to use their religion as a pretext for violent acts.

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## Understanding Political Influence in Modern-Era Conflict: A Qualitative Historical Analysis of Hassan Nasrallah's Speeches

by Reem A. Abu-Lughod and Samuel Warkentin

### *Abstract*

*This research examines and closely analyzes speeches delivered by Hezbollah's secretary general and spokesman, Hassan Nasrallah. We reveal that several significant political phenomena that have occurred in Lebanon were impacted by the intensity of speeches delivered by Nasrallah; these three events being the 2006 War, the Doha Agreement, and the 2008 prisoner exchange. Nasrallah's speeches with significant key words and themes, that are reflective of the three selected events, have been collected from various transcribed news media sources and analyzed using a qualitative historical approach. Finally, the research study uses latent analysis to assess Nasrallah's underlying implications of his speeches by identifying key words and themes that he uses to influence his audience*

### *Introduction*

“**T**he present globalization of extremist discourse and its impact on international relations as a whole have historical precedents.[1] Whether it's print media, television, the internet, or any other form of communication, charismatic leaders of influential organizations have led their audience to believe in certain ideologies that are deemed hopeful and powerful, all through their emotional and authoritative speeches. One such leader is Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's secretary general. Nasrallah has been an influential leader of Hezbollah, inspiring his supporters and engaging them at an emotional level to garner more support of his actions. Through his rhetoric, he has been able to relate to his audience, in particular the majority of the Shi'a community in Lebanon and those who are in opposition to the Israeli occupation of Palestine; all with a strategic strength to gain their commitment of his broad and open pleas. While Hezbollah was initially identified as a religious revolutionary movement in the 1980s, it has since transformed into a more politically motivated organization, holding seats in Lebanon's Parliament, and having membership in the Resistance and Development Bloc, a ruling coalition of different political parties in Lebanese government. Hezbollah has been cited by Daniel L. Byman as “the most powerful single political movement in Lebanon.”[2] This transformation became known as the *Lebanonization* of Hezbollah.[3]

This research study first outlines how Hezbollah gained power as an influential political and religious resistance movement. Second, the study uses a qualitative historical approach to identify repeated and emphasized key words in Nasrallah's speeches that he uses to gain more support for his cause. Finally, the research study examines Nasrallah's speeches' main themes by focusing on three different but interconnected events: the 2006 War, the Doha agreement, and the prisoner exchange.

### *Background*



Speeches have often served as precursors to momentous and profound events, with Nasrallah's influence on Lebanon being but one example.[4] Research consistently indicates that powerful speeches have the impact to sway the masses politically and socially;[5] leaders with enough charisma are masters at popularizing their cause to attract followers.”[6]

Increasing amounts of research have been generated in the past decade examining the rise of Hezbollah,[7] the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon in 2000,[8] the 2006 War,[9] and the ascent of Hezbollah to become an important political power in Lebanon.[10] The rise of Hezbollah following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982,[11] has also been extensively studied. Perhaps most studied of all is how issues and conflicts in the Middle East are interrelated on different levels of government. One very significant issue in this regard is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict,[12] which many of Nasrallah's speeches focus on.

When words are not enough to gain the support and outcomes he desires, Nasrallah is willing to use violence. Hezbollah's turning point to gaining popular support came in 2000, when Israel withdrew from Lebanon, after twice invading and occupying the region (in 1978 and 1982). May 24, 2000, became a day of celebration in Lebanon, particularly in the south, where Nasrallah gained much praise from the populace for his role in driving Israel from Lebanon.[13] As late as 2008, Nasrallah was still characterizing the withdrawal as “a brilliant victory for Lebanon...and a brilliant defeat for Israel,” failing to acknowledge any other cause for the withdrawal in his speeches other than the “steadfastness” of the resistance. Despite the heavy losses on both sides, Nasrallah once again claimed victory in a May 26, 2008 speech: “We feel that we won; Lebanon won; Palestine won; the Arab nation won, and every oppressed, aggrieved person in this world also won.”

Nasrallah continued to warn Israel subsequent to Olmert's remarks about attacking Lebanon without any restrictions if Lebanon in fact becomes a Hezbollah state. While Israel refrained from attacking Lebanon as a State in its past wars and conflicts, becoming a Hezbollah state would mean attacking integral parts of Lebanon's infrastructure, including roads, water plants, and Lebanon's main international airport (which was attacked by Israeli military during the 2006 war).

Furthermore, Nasrallah became enraged when the Lebanese government imposed limits on Hezbollah's communication network, and sought to fire Beirut's International Airport Security Chief, Walid Shukair, a close supporter of Nasrallah.[14] He feared that these actions were precursors to a total disarmament of Hezbollah under the provisions of the UNSCR 1701. On May 9, 2008, Nasrallah ordered Hezbollah militants to seize control of portions of the capital and Druze territory,[15] stating that “We have the right to defend our existence from whoever declares and begins a war on us, even if they are our brothers”.[16] Within one month, Hezbollah was successful in producing a new head of state, gaining veto power in the cabinet, and successfully reinstating the parliament, all under the auspices of the Qatari government and the Doha Agreement.[17]

During the political unrest in 2007, many Lebanese feared that Hezbollah would gain control of the government,[18] but Nasrallah denied these allegations and promised to work for a national unity government, stating “it is not permissible to use the resistance weapons for political gains...” Research has indicated that as Hezbollah becomes more powerful, it may seek to focus more intently on Lebanese politics to reduce its international profile and remove itself from needing any assistance from supporting nations, such as Iran.[19]

### *A Qualitative Historical Analysis*

To illustrate Hassan Nasrallah's political and social influences through his rhetoric, this study selects 28 speeches delivered by Nasrallah (see Table 1) during three specific events; the 2006 War,



the Doha Agreement, and the 2008 prisoner exchange between Israel and Hezbollah. The lack of complete databases made it necessary to select speeches from multiple news sources; including Al-Manar, Al-Jazeera, BBC, and others. Of the selected speeches, 10 covered the 2006 War, 9 covered the Doha Agreement, and 9 covered the 2008 prisoner exchange incident; all with respect to specific time frames and relevancy to the selected incidents. Additional speeches given by Nasrallah during each of the three time frames were not included if they lacked relevance to either the 2006 War, Doha Agreement, or prisoner exchange.

To overcome translation biases from Arabic to English, speeches that share a common pattern in translation were selected. However, due to the lack of complete databases, researchers were forced to select some speeches that may not share a common translation. This bias in translation was validated by the primary author of this article, who is a native Arabic speaker.

A qualitative historical analysis was used in this study to examine Nasrallah's speeches. The study first examines the themes of Nasrallah's speeches, evident through his repeated use of selected key words. Second, the study identifies the frequent use of words used by Nasrallah to emphasize his cause (as seen in Table I). Third, the study indicates how Nasrallah, through his speeches, managed to gain some support from the majority of the Shi'a community in Lebanon as well as the economically and socially deprived that are hopeful for change in their current living situations as well as Nasrallah's promise for the destruction of Israel. This study argues that charismatic leaders use public speeches to express ideology and legitimize and rally support for a cause. In this case, Hassan Nasrallah's speeches on the three selected incidents provide a portrait of Nasrallah's ideology and the methods he uses to legitimize his cause. Finally, the analysis of news sources and scholarly works emphasize the effects of Nasrallah's ideology.

## *Analysis*

### *The 2006 War*

The 2006 War between Hezbollah and Israel, which pitted a vocal, militant movement against a powerful military state, quickly provoked a global reaction. While the US gave Israel some military support during the conflict, Iran aligned itself with Hezbollah and condemned Israel. The Arab League supported Lebanon but condemned Hezbollah.

Hezbollah *admittedly* designed and executed the plot to attack and abduct the Israeli soldiers which directly led to the 2006 conflict.[20] Nasrallah and Hezbollah's popularity declined during the conflict and many Lebanese condemned Nasrallah for the violence and destruction wrought by the war.[21] Ignoring this, Nasrallah spoke to the Lebanese People immediately after the conflict began, claiming that national polls indicated a majority of the people believed and trusted him.[22] However, public resentment remained strong, and Nasrallah faced the difficult challenge of selling the righteousness of his cause to Lebanon.

Nasrallah approached this challenge by focusing on two main themes in his speeches: the perceived US/Israeli Zionist plot to destroy Lebanon and the spirit of steadfast resistance. Nasrallah purported that the war was "born of a plot between US and Israeli Zionists." [23] Nasrallah claimed that Israel's strong response was the Zionism's attempt to "clear its account with Lebanon." [24] On July 25, Nasrallah referred to the war as part of a "Middle East Plot" devised by the US and Lebanon Zionists to control the Arab world.[25] By labeling the Israeli military response a Zionist plot, Nasrallah could encourage "steadfast resistance" against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). This second theme of resistance allowed Nasrallah to portray Hezbollah's violence as an ideological



struggle against Israel. Resistance was Nasrallah's persistent theme; a cry of opposition to Zionism and western influence. Nasrallah praised the "resistance combatants [who] are enduring heroic battles" and the "martyrs" who died in the struggle. On September 22, he stated that, "Resistance dealt a blow to the New Middle East plan." Nasrallah frequently coupled the concepts of "steadfast" and "resistance" to sustain the resolve of the Lebanese against the Israelis. At the outbreak of war, Nasrallah praised the "steadfastness of this proud nation... that is nearing the level of a miracle." Nasrallah encouraged the population to "maintain steadfastness... [and] further steadfastness" for the conflict ahead. During his victory speech on September 22, Nasrallah claimed that steadfast resistance "was the secret of victory we are now sharing today...."

The "Zionist" theme provided the foundation to legitimize Hezbollah's war with Israel. Nasrallah built on the 2000 Israeli withdrawal and labeled the 2006 War on Israel as "revenge and reprisal for May 15, 2000." [26] He claimed that the 2006 War would be a "historic opportunity to accomplish a great victory" against Israel, building on widespread Arab hatred of Israel, Zionism, and the humiliation suffered by shocking Israeli victories in 1967 and 1973. Nasrallah argued that Israel and the US had premeditated an invasion and sought a motivation to attack. [27] Nasrallah claimed the kidnapping of the soldiers was only one catalyst that could have triggered the invasion, but later admitted that he would not have kidnapped the soldiers had he known war would ensue. [28]

Portraying the war as a Zionist movement to conquer Lebanon garnered support for Hezbollah's resistance. [29] Nasrallah's speeches during the 2006 War show strong arguments for the continuation of violence against Israel, consistently encouraging the Lebanese people to adopt a plan of "resistance" against the "Zionist invaders."

Hezbollah "surprised the Israelis with its resistance." [30] Many Lebanese rallied in the streets in support of Nasrallah, despite lingering resentment over the violence. Hezbollah was able to withstand the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) for 34 days without being destroyed. The media's depiction of Nasrallah as a symbol of resistance against the Israelis sustained Hezbollah's campaign and gathered an impressive amount of support. [31] It is unlikely that Hezbollah could have sustained its operations without the support of friendly media. [32] When the fighting ended, Nasrallah immediately proclaimed victory, stating, "We are today celebrating a big strategic, historic, and divine victory." [33] Many Lebanese rallied in the streets, waving banners of Nasrallah as a "symbol of resistance," and most newspapers printed declarations of "victory." [34] Many news sources, including Al-Jazeera, revealed in the apparent "defeat" of Israel and published articles labeling the 2006 War the end of the "Israeli military myth." [35] Shai Feldman notes that Nasrallah won the "war of narratives," portraying Hezbollah as the savior of Lebanon and the antagonist of Israel. [36]

Nasrallah used his speeches to encourage Islamic resistance in the Arab world. Radical Islamic sects believed in Hezbollah's resistance, especially Palestinian organizations, [37] including Hamas and the PLO. [38] Nasrallah called for the "oppressed" Arab people, especially those in Palestine, to resist the Zionists, and warned that if the "resistance should fail in Lebanon... the Palestinian cause would be shrouded in humiliation." [39]

Support for Hezbollah was not unanimous. While some of the Arab public may have shown support to Nasrallah through their street protests and rallies, the Egyptian and Jordanian governments, in addition to the Arab League, condemned Hezbollah's antagonistic actions and refused to support Lebanon. Many Arabs did not see the survival of Hezbollah as a cause for victory celebrations. [40] Egypt and Jordan refused to recognize a true victory, and Saudi Arabia actually portrayed a defeated Hezbollah. [41] While Hezbollah may have benefited from Syria and Iran as its main regional allies (transporting arms to Hezbollah and financial support), Saudi Arabia, a strong U.S. ally, is strongly



connected to Lebanon's Sunni community as well as Saad Hariri, the son of the former assassinated prime minister of Lebanon, Rafic Hariri. Additionally, Hezbollah's political position in Lebanon weakened because of hostility over their aggressive actions against Israel.[42] The war also set the stage for the violence surrounding the Doha talks in 2008. Nasrallah succeeded in legitimizing the war to radical groups and state supporters of terrorism, but he failed to generate unanimous Arab and Lebanese support for Hezbollah's fight against the "Zionists." Even some of Hezbollah's high-ranking members expressed discontent with Nasrallah's reliance on military force.[43] Nasrallah may believe the 2006 War was a victory for Hezbollah, but as many Lebanese believe that "nobody won." [44]

### *The Doha Agreement*

The end of the 2006 War marked the beginning of a conflict that gradually led to the Doha talks in 2008. This evolved from the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which primarily focused on resolving the 2006 Israel-Lebanese conflict by emphasizing, among other things, the disarmament of all armed-groups in Lebanon; one of which being Hezbollah. Nasrallah quickly stated that this matter required future attention, but on August 14, scathingly asked, "Who will defend Lebanon, if Hezbollah is disarmed?" The Lebanese Defense Minister Elias Murr quickly responded on the same day that the Lebanese military would not disarm Hezbollah.[45]

During his victory speech on September 22, Nasrallah stated that "no army in the world can make us lay down our arms." By November 2006, polls indicated that 51% of Lebanon supported disarming Hezbollah, and 47% believed Hezbollah fighters should be disarmed and integrated into the Lebanese military.[46] Nasrallah stubbornly resisted disarmament and largely ignored the provisions of the UNSCR 1701. Furthermore, the 2006 War split Lebanon politically, and Nasrallah seized this division to demand a "national unity government" on August 27, 2006.[47] Nasrallah claimed that Hezbollah should be granted veto power in the cabinet, to prevent any government attempt to disarm the organization. Hezbollah's refusal to disarm, coupled with Nasrallah's aggressive attitude, weakened the Lebanese Government's sovereignty.[48] Washington, Riyadh, Amman, and Paris pressured the Lebanese Government to adopt a harsher stance towards Hezbollah, but "prospects for disarming the Shi'a group were dimmer than ever." [49]

On May 8, Nasrallah stated, "any hand that reaches for the resistance and its arms will be cut off." [50] Nasrallah labeled the Siniora Government an "unconstitutional gang" and declared the need for "self defense." Violence erupted in Beirut, and Hezbollah rapidly overran the Sunni neighborhoods of west Beirut and seized control of the area, demonstrating to Lebanon that it possessed greater power than the current government.[51]

Nasrallah legitimates his actions to his supporters by focusing on the theme of self-defense. On May 8, Nasrallah raged against the government's stance on Hezbollah's communications network, stating, "I am declaring oppression and self-defense,"... "and we have a right to defend our existence." [52] Hezbollah fighters immediately launched a campaign that seized control of western Beirut, the Druze section of Mount Lebanon, and a Damascus highway.[53]

On May 13, Nasrallah offered a more rational explanation for Hezbollah's "self-defense." He argued that "communications" are the most important part of the resistance, and that if the government seized control of the network, Hezbollah would no longer be able to "defend Lebanon against Israel." [54] Thus, from Nasrallah's perspective, "self-defense" in the form of *violence* was necessary to preserve the organization's existence.



The second theme of an “unconstitutional gang” provided further material for Nasrallah to defend his actions. He claimed that the Lebanese Government was part of a “Zionist conspiracy” designed to overthrow Hezbollah. Nasrallah saw the attempted replacement of Walid Shuquair (former Security Chief of Beirut airport and a close friend to Hezbollah) as a threat to Hezbollah’s security and as a movement by the government to allow foreign intelligence services into Lebanon. In a May 8 speech, Nasrallah stated that the “gang” was serving US interests by attempting to disarm Hezbollah. The government, he said, is a “pro-American subsidiary serving committed party that is implementing a scheme that America and Israel have failed to impose, which is the disarmament of resistance [Hezbollah’s] arms.”[55] Since 2008, research has indicated that much of the Lebanese population distrusted Nasrallah, but Nasrallah believed his assertions were accurate.[56]

Throughout this conflict of words and violence, Nasrallah emphatically declared that it was not the intent of Hezbollah to instigate a civil war or coup. He stated several times that “we [Hezbollah] are not competing for power.”[57] Nevertheless, the struggle between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Government gravitated around power. Hezbollah immediately resorted to violence in response to the revolved declarations of war against it as well as a plan for its disarmament. The violence ended only when the Government suspended the declarations and offered to negotiate with Hezbollah.

These “negotiations” comprise the final elements of Nasrallah’s speeches. The Doha speeches reveal a pattern of progression, from claims of “self-defense,” to condemnation of the “gang government” regulated by “Zionists,” to, finally, the offer of a “settlement.” This was important particularly due to the fact that it would put an end to the political crises in Lebanon and prevent another future civil war. On May 13, Nasrallah claimed, “We are a people of negotiation and solving issues,” and, “whoever wants a settlement will find the doors to [a] settlement wide open.”[58] Interestingly, Nasrallah called for a settlement only after demonstrating the military power of Hezbollah. The Doha settlement was signed on May 21, and produced a new head of state, amended the election process, and successfully reinstated the parliament. Nasrallah’s greatest victory was gaining veto power in the Lebanese Cabinet. Now it is possible for Hezbollah to veto any attempt to disarm the organization. The Doha Agreement includes a vague article on disarmament and fails to mention Hezbollah by name.[59] Hezbollah’s negotiations ended in an unprecedented political power increase for the organization. Nasrallah termed the Doha Agreement a “victory,” not just for Hezbollah, but “a victory for all Lebanese.” Nasrallah claimed responsibility for the agreement, declaring, “I promised you victory...as on May 25, 2000, as in July 2006, as in Doha.” Hezbollah emerged as the winner in the Doha negotiations; chiefly because disarmament is now only a vague possibility.

While Nasrallah has failed to garner a majority support for his actions from the Lebanese community at large, including the Sunni Muslims, he resorted to the Shi’a community, one that has been alienated and marginalized due to Nasrallah’s efforts in making it more powerful. In fact, Hezbollah supporters and the Shi’a population have further rallied to support Nasrallah’s vision of a “unity” government. However, the Sunnis, Druze, many Christians, and other sects condemned Hezbollah’s actions. Hezbollah’s popularity fell to a new low, and many Lebanese believed Nasrallah purposefully used intimidation to force government change.[60] Nasrallah claimed Hezbollah’s violent actions were not for political gain, but that is exactly what he achieved. Still, he reaffirmed the Doha Agreements clause banning the use of weapons for political gains, stating, “the resistance’s arms are to fight the enemy, liberate lands and prisoners, and defend Lebanon – and for nothing else.” Only time will indicate whether the remainder of Lebanon will accept Hezbollah as a legitimate political power.



## *The 2008 Prisoner Exchange*

In 2008, Hezbollah rejoiced in the return of its long lost compatriots, dead and alive. Israel was also excited at the return of its soldiers, but felt humiliated by bargaining with its bitter enemy. The prisoner exchange allowed Hezbollah to “bolster its domestic position and to rebuild its reputation in Lebanon.”[61] Nasrallah also pointed to his success in returning Samir Kuntar to Lebanon, though this success was disproportionate to the havoc of the 2006 War.

The Israeli capture and imprisonment of Samir Kuntar along with other Lebanese prisoners was a lingering humiliation for Hezbollah. Hezbollah declared 2006 to be the “year of retrieving the prisoners.”[62] On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regeve. Hezbollah hoped to negotiate an exchange by kidnapping the Israel soldiers, but instead brought a destructive war upon Lebanon. Nasrallah clearly stated that the kidnapping operation in 2006 was “in order to liberate the rest of the prisoners in the Zionist prisons,” and had this failed, “it [Hezbollah] would have abducted more Israeli soldiers.”[63] The negotiations lagged for 2 years, until Israel and Hezbollah agreed on an acceptable deal in 2008. On July 16, the IDF bodies returned to Israel, and Kuntar and other Lebanese prisoners to Lebanon. Nasrallah rejoiced, stating that “the prisoner deal validated the victory of 2006,”[64] and telling the Lebanese people that “no one should feel defeated...[this] victory is theirs.”[65]

Nasrallah did not need to legitimize the exchange; the new Lebanese President Sleiman approved the deal and welcomed Kuntar with open arms.[66] Rather, the theme of Nasrallah’s speeches was to legitimize the 2006 War. On February 7, 2008, Nasrallah stated, “The [2006] operation was conducted for the sake of his [Kuntar’s] release.”[67] After Kuntar’s release, Nasrallah offered a detailed explanation for the 2006 kidnapping:

*On the 12th of July year 2006, a group of resistance fighters implemented an operation which led to the abduction of two Israeli soldiers. This was in order to liberate the rest of the prisoners in the Zionist prisons... we must look back at those who fought in that battle, those who were on the front line, those who were martyred, those who were injured, those who challenged the enemy... [their] perseverance, this victory is the main factor, the biggest factor which contributed in achieving this prisoner swap, this victory.[68]*

Nasrallah hoped that the anger directed at Hezbollah for the devastating 2006 War would dissipate because of “his victory” in bringing the Lebanese prisoners home. He stated, “I congratulate all the Lebanese on this victory... I hope that they consider this achievement and victory theirs...an opportunity for the Lebanese to come together again...”

Nasrallah clearly stated that a “bitter hostility” continued to exist between Hezbollah and Israel, despite the exchange.[69] On July 17, during the celebration rally in honor of Kuntar’s release, Nasrallah called the swap a “defeat of Israel.”[70]

Eyal Zisser notes that Hezbollah seized Israel’s apparent willingness to negotiate as an opportunity for it to redeem its image in Lebanon.[71] Nasrallah hinted that if Hezbollah had failed in the negotiations, “Lebanon would have lost and the whole region would have lost.”[72]

While Hezbollah celebrated, some news sources labeled the swap a “shameful exchange.”[73] Norton writes, “One may easily imagine Israelis seething at the spectacle of Kuntar being greeted by the Lebanese government with fanfare and acclaim, as though he were a national hero.”[74]



Nasrallah labeled Kuntar “a very rich national treasure,” while American media termed him “a strange kind of hero,” and emphasized Kuntar’s history of murder and mayhem.[75]

Nasrallah proclaimed his victory for keeping his word to returning Samir Al-Kuntar in what he referred to as *Freedom for Samir Al-Kuntar and His Brothers*, later named *Operation Truthful Promise*. Nasrallah stated, “This victory is for every resistance movement and every noble and free person in the Arab world.” Nasrallah also used this incident to once again garner support for the Palestinian cause, stating that, “the release of Palestinian detainees is symbolic and marks great importance from the angle of our common cause and struggle.”

## Conclusion

The revolutionary inspiration of Nasrallah and his use of oral political rhetoric to frame events as “victories” are sometimes difficult to dispute, as seen in the outcomes of the 2006 War, the integration of Hezbollah into Lebanese politics, and the exchange of prisoners with Israel. Nasrallah used his speeches during these events to legitimize his cause. Each event necessitated new themes; Nasrallah legitimized the 2006 War through claims of Zionist conspiracies and steadfast resistance; the Doha Agreement by claiming self-defense and unconstitutionality; and the prisoner exchange by stating that the return of Kuntar justified the 2006 War. Nasrallah also used two constant themes throughout his speeches. First, he focused extensively on the future liberation of the Palestinians from Zionist oppression, and, second, he constantly called for resistance against what he perceives as injustice and tyranny. On May 27, 2008, he stated, “we owe all [these victories] to the resistance martyrs.” These two themes are constantly interwoven into his speeches, and provide a framework for Nasrallah to maintain his role as leader of Hezbollah.

Closely examining speeches delivered by politically influential leaders, such as Nasrallah, is only one possible way future inflicted damages may be prevented or even minimized. For instance, perhaps the Israelis could have prevented the July 12 kidnappings had they taken Nasrallah’s threats to make “2006 the year of retrieving the prisoners,” more seriously. Perhaps the Lebanese Government could have delayed Hezbollah’s seizure of power had they listened to Nasrallah’s threat to “cut off the hand” that attempts to interfere with Hezbollah. In his speeches, Nasrallah also focused on the destruction of Israel, the freeing of the Palestinians, and imperviousness to whatever losses needed to achieve these results. Nasrallah continues to use his speeches to underscore his ideologies and present future ambitions. To neglect these statements is to imperil the regional security of Lebanon and a volatile area in the Middle East. Misjudgment of Hezbollah and Nasrallah’s speeches has already created serious problems for U.S. and Israeli foreign relations.[76]

Recent research indicates that the Shi’a community within Lebanon continues to increase in population and power.[77] Other research indicates that the Doha Agreement, along with popular support for Hezbollah, has made it virtually impossible for the Lebanese Government to disarm or control Hezbollah.[78] Additionally, the possibility exists that Hezbollah will attempt either to seize national power or establish an independent state.[79] These forewarnings are amplified by the rise of Hezbollah, under Nasrallah, as a powerful political party.[80] Other scholars contend that Hezbollah under Nasrallah is a “threat” to Lebanese security.[81]

Since Nasrallah became Hezbollah’s secretary general in 1992, Hezbollah has demonstrated a very active resistance movement. Within the past decade, Israel withdrew from Lebanon twice, negotiated a prisoner exchange deal, and watched Hezbollah rise to unprecedented heights in the Lebanese Government. By the use of speeches and strategic uses of aggression, Nasrallah has



legitimized his politics, encouraged his followers, and exacerbated the violence in the Middle East. Hezbollah, under Nasrallah's leadership, is currently strong, but it is far from invulnerable.

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**Appendix 1****Table 1. Events, Key Words, and Sources**

<b>Event</b>	<b>Key Words</b>	<b>Date and Source of Speeches</b>
<b>2006 War</b>	<b>Resistance, Steadfast, Zionist, Enemy, Victory</b>	<b>July 15, 2006 – Al-Manar TV</b> <b>July 17, 2006 – Al-Manar TV</b> <b>July 20, 2006 – Al-Jazeera</b> <b>July 25, 2006 – Al-Manar TV</b> <b>July 29, 2006 - BBC</b> <b>August 3, 2006 – Al-Manar TV</b> <b>August 9, 2006 - BBC</b> <b>August 12, 2006 - BBC</b> <b>August 14, 2006 – Al-Manar TV</b> <b>Sept 22, 2006 – Al-Manar TV</b>
<b>The Doha Agreement</b>	<b>Self-defense, Gang, Communications, Rafik Airport, Government, Settlement</b>	<b>August 3, 2007 – Al-Alam</b> <b>August 14, 2007 – Al-Alam</b> <b>October 5, 2007 – Al-Manar TV</b> <b>January 15, 2008 – Al-Manar TV</b> <b>May 7, 2008 – Al-Alam</b> <b>May 8, 2008 – Ya-Libnan</b> <b>May 13, 2008 – Al-Manar TV</b> <b>May 26, 2008 – Al-Manar TV</b> <b>May 27, 2008 – Shi'a TV</b>
<b>The 2008 Prisoner Exchange</b>	<b>Victory, Negotiations, Prisoner Swap</b>	<b>September 22, 2006 – Al-Manar TV</b> <b>August 19, 2007 – Al-Manar TV</b> <b>October 16, 2007 - BBC</b> <b>February 7, 2008 – Al-Manar TV</b> <b>May 26, 2008 – Al-Manar TV</b> <b>May 27, 2008 – Shi'a TV</b> <b>July 3, 2008 – Hezbollah Website</b> <b>July 17, 2008 – Iranian Press TV</b> <b>July 22, 2008 - BBC</b>



## Crossing the Rubicon: Making a Case for Refining the Classification of Jihadist Terrorism

by Robert Wayne Hand

### *Abstract*

*This paper posits that our current understanding of Jihadist Terrorism as a monolithic sub-type of Political Terrorism is flawed and that as a result our governments counter this threat with inappropriately-adapted methods. The author argues: (A) There is a sub-type of Jihadist Terrorism that is more consistent with Walter's 'Military Terrorism' or Feldman and Hinojosa's 'Guerrilla Warfare' than within the typology of Political Terrorism; (B) The author-proposed sub-type of 'War Terrorism' should be accepted, examined, defined, and established; and (C) Establishing the author's sub-type will allow western democracies to devise better counter-terrorism strategies while protecting the civil liberties of their citizens.*

**Key Words:** Jihadist, military, guerrilla, terrorism, typology, counter-terrorism, civil rights, law enforcement, classification, theory, definition

*The problems begin when the civil society of a democratic nation-state, in seeking to understand a phenomenon of vital interest, discusses the issues and decides on an action plan without agreeing what its definitions, words, and concepts mean.[1]*

*Professor Frank Teti*

### **Preface**

“**N**early thirteen years after Walter Lacquer's ground-breaking book *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (Oxford University Press, 1999), and only three years after the dust of the debates on 'New Terrorism' have settled, the classification has been accepted, our foundational texts are written, and the taxonomy and typologies are in place. In fact, the publication of Alex P. Schmid's edited volume *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (Routledge, 2011; hereafter, *The Handbook*) should be considered a 'capstone achievement', and represents both a comprehensive updating of the discipline and a closure of the debate relating to New Terrorism.[2] This 'critical mass' of information and collaboration means that terrorism studies now have the most complete volume of high-value, cross-referenced academic material available. From a theoretical viewpoint, few questions remain.

In parallel to the paradigm, taxonomical, and ontological advances, however, we must also note that the attacks in the US, London, Madrid, and elsewhere in the territory of the EU[3] have resulted in an increased focus and legislative action from our own governments—not all of which has been consistent with the recently-established academic understanding of the threat. Somehow, and despite the relative rareness of that style of Jihadist Terrorism, our governments appear to have



perceived those attacks as threatening our states' vital systems. Certainly, in the US and the UK, the political leadership feels the need to be seen as being proactive in combating this threat. Consequently, the institutional fear created on the days of the 9/11, 7/7, 21/7, and the Madrid attacks has resulted in an unparalleled growth in the remit of, and powers granted to, our law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the name of public safety and security. The end result is that while most of the actions undertaken by our security agencies are professionally beyond reproach, occasionally they are not[4] and our democratically-elected governments now routinely pass laws and regulations in the name of collective security that undermine our rights and destroy the very fabric of our liberal democratic societies. One could reasonably ask, "Have the terrorists won?"[5]

This paper takes a step back from the current deductive thinking that has guided our classifications and typologies[6] and examines Jihadist terrorism from both *inductive* and *foundational* perspectives. It uses EV Walter's original classifications of terrorism augmented by both the works of his contemporaries and the most recent, proven work in the field to consider the reality of the jihadist operation at 'the point of attack', the processes required to reach that point, and the goals of the operation. The findings of this study are significant. Our inductive reasoning[7] ultimately leads us to propose that Jihadist Terrorism is not monolithic, but contains at least two discrete sub-types. Furthermore, we can conclude that by understanding this bifurcation in the typology, we can advise and assist counter-terrorism professionals to construct more effective and efficient protective systems at the national level, and governments to legislate and regulate necessary activities while simultaneously protecting our democratic freedoms.

In the conduct of this evaluation we also discover that the two sub-types can be discretely characterised as; one (largely transnational and Al-Qaeda affiliated) where Jihadists undertake a *campaign*[8] of terror involving training and operations closely resembling a military action and desiring a cumulative effect of eroding a state's control and legitimacy;[9] while in the other the perpetrators are individuals or small groups whose motivation is purely political and who seek to attain a clearly-expressed political goal.

We seek to answer directly, or at least suggest answers for the following critical research questions: Why do some international groups (*e.g.*, Al Qaeda) want to acquire weapons of mass destruction and 'dirty bombs' while others prefer to rely only on explosive devices? Why did the 9/11 attacks target the US centres of economic activity and national political control rather than purely political targets? Are Islamic insurgencies (*e.g.*, *Boko Haram*, *Taliban*) using terrorist attacks and the tactics of Jihadist Terrorists, those of paramilitary insurgencies, or a combination of them both? Are Al Qaeda and, say, the Provisional IRA essentially similar in their operations and desired goals?

The author of this paper does not desire to 'reinvent' the already-quite-efficient wheels of New Terrorism, Political Terrorism, or the typologies accepted and agreed. This paper does not contain any revolutionary theoretical approaches. It is simply, as admonished by Teti (above), an attempt to be very specific in our definition of Jihadist Terrorism typology so that we can be consistent in our taxonomy and gain a better understanding of a phenomenon affecting our security and existence. Consequently, this paper acknowledges and is consistent with the traditional framework of terrorism studies established by such eminent academicians as Walter, Laqueur, Wilkinson, and Schmid. Likewise, the author accepts as 'given' the standard definitions of this discipline. The superb compilation of material represented in *The Handbook* has also been invaluable in conducting this examination and defining types of terrorism. The only issues that remain open to debate, then, are those of either interpretation or where there is a lack of an agreed definition. It is in this specific and narrow realm we operate to refine our definitions and typing of Jihadist Terrorism.



This paper posits that: (A) There is a *sub-type* of Jihadist Terrorism that is more consistent with Walter's 'Military Terrorism' and Feldman and Hinojosa's 'Guerrilla Warfare' than within the typology of Political Terrorism; (B) The author-proposed sub-type of 'War Terrorism' should be accepted, examined, and defined; and (C) Establishing this sub-type will allow western democracies to devise better counter-terrorism strategies while protecting the civil liberties of their citizens.

## *Dilemma*

Since the 9-11 attacks, governments and academics around the globe have been struggling to understand, define, and counter what is considered a somewhat familiar form of terrorism with a Muslim extremist variant. It is familiar to us because the videos on our televisions and the internet appear to be echoes those the IRA, ETA, Baader-Meinhoff, the Red Brigade, and other politically-motivated terrorist groups made years ago.[10] Likewise, claims of political oppression, threats of attacks, and the use of asymmetric methods to terrorise and kill non-combatants looks and feels like the Political Terrorism we in the West know so well. Many of the groups use similar crime-based networks, logistics structures, or methods to amass their weapon(s) of choice.[11] Operational training for and execution of the attack continues in much the same manner.[12] Even the means of attack are often similar.

As a result, we have largely reacted to Jihadist Terrorism by taking many of the same operational, legal, and security measures we did in the previous four decades of dealing with Political Terrorism—adapting them only slightly (and usually to the detriment of our civil rights) to cater for the Jihadist terrorists' actions and methods of attack (*e.g.*, suicide bombing) and adjusting them for the modern world (*e.g.*, mobile phones, 'SMS-texting', internet, and the globalisation of ideas and logistics).[13] The cost to our civil societies and our democratic rights has been determined to be acceptable by most, although there are increasingly frequent legal challenges to what have become routine infringements on civil liberties.

But, herein lays the seed of the problem we face today. We intrinsically sense that Jihadist Terrorism of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century is the same as, or a subset of, the Political Terrorism of the previous decades. In our eyes, the political goals and trappings are only *modified* by a religious aspect and updated for a globalised and technologically-progressed world. In other words, we have *deductively* pre-selected Political Terrorism as the category, 'defaulted' to counter-terrorism methods designed for Political Terrorism, and executed accordingly.[14] Today, our laws, bureaucracy, counter-terrorist structures, and even our outlook reflect the familiar playing field of Political Terrorism of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, but have been adapted—often to society's detriment—for the New Terrorism.[15] The 'spectacular' nature of much of 21<sup>st</sup> Century Jihadist Terrorism has, indeed, disproportionately influenced western perceptions of the severity of this threat.

The seminal theories of modern terrorism, however, suggest the possibility of taking a different path—of considering at least a portion of Jihadist Terrorism as something other than political in nature. If we can agree with Wilkinson that Jihadist Terrorism is something different[16]—a new twist on terrorism—then we should return to our academic methodology and ensure that we dissect, classify, and type it accordingly. This examination has not yet occurred, but the time is ripe for it and the results of this evaluation will allow us to craft a credible and more productive response to Jihadist Terrorism that also promotes the preservation of civil liberties and rights in our democratic nation-states.



## *Foundations, Definitions, Classifications, and Sub-types*

Surveying the texts from the beginning of the systematic study of modern terrorism we find that the majority originate from the 1960s and early 1970s. EV Walter's own *Selected Bibliography* from 1969, as extensive as it is, suggests that almost all of it was deductive and little serious work was done in foundational theory, identification of root causes, analyses of operations, taxonomy, lexicon, typology, or even a cursory synthesis of the various aspects of terrorism until at least the late 1950s.[17] This is rather surprising given that the first example of modern terrorism was in the French Revolution,[18] there were clear indications of a major terrorist movement in Russia in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, [19]and that from the 1920s to the 1950s Ireland and the UK were most certainly on the European terrorist map.[20]

Regardless, the reality is that Walter, in his 1969 examination of the use of terror in primitive African communities (*NB: an inductive examination*), was able to codify our discipline. He established the foundational definitions for State Terrorism on page 5, systems of terror on pages 6 and 7, and the taxonomy of Civil (Political)[21] Terrorism on pages 7-13. His main and most important conclusion is that Political Terrorism, be it in the form of a 'reign of terror' or a reaction against the state, is intended *to control*.[22]

But as early on as page 14, Walter also acknowledges that there is Military (War) Terrorism. Walter defines this with the following words:

Military Terror is different. When terrorism is used in a war of extermination, the aim is to paralyze the enemy, diminish his resistance, and reduce his ability to fight, *with the ultimate purpose of destroying him*.[23] [emphasis added]

Later, and this was subsequently supported by his case studies, Walter suggests yet another form of terrorism (Ethnic).[24] In a separate examination, Wardlaw, who was critiquing the works of Wilkinson, extrapolates the category of Religious Terrorism.[25] Therefore, according to Walter and Wardlaw, within our taxonomy and by way of a summary we have four main categories of terrorism:

- (1) State Terrorism—The government uses terror to control its constituents. (*e.g.*, The French Revolution, The Soviet Union, Libya under Qaddafi)
- (2) Political Terrorism—Non-governmental forces and individuals use terror to control government and/or affect government policy and decision-making. (*e.g.*, ETA, IRA, Bader-Meinhoff, Red Brigade)
- (3) Military (War) Terrorism—An external force/organisation uses terror against a state/entity to destroy it.
- (4) Religious/Ethnic—A homogenous religious/ethnic group uses terror to dominate and control another religious/ethnic group. (*e.g.*, Rwanda, aspects of Ethiopia-Eritrea War, Sudan)



In keeping with our earlier claim of not trying to re-invent the already-quite-efficient wheels, we acknowledge that several previous authors have attempted to define and categorise terrorism. In *The Handbook*, Easson and Schmid provide a chronological list of more than 250 individuals and organisations who have attempted to define terrorism.[26] What becomes conspicuous when reading this exhaustive list is that while most have correctly placed it within the broad spectrum of Political Violence, some have narrowed the classification so much that they have equated Terrorism (one form of Political Violence consisting of several classifications) with a singular classification within Terrorism—Political Terrorism (*e.g.*, Devine and Refalko (1982), Della Porta (1988), and Houghton (1995) to name a few).

Helpfully, a complete reading of Easson and Schmid's appendix also shows many *more* authors, who appropriately define terrorism as one form of Political Violence, and that terrorism, itself, includes several sub-classifications. For example, one author writes specifically on our subject of 'Military' or 'War' Terrorism (Douglas Lackey, writing to define 'Wartime Terrorism' in 1989). After examination of the definitions, it is revealed that all of Walter's original classifications are represented and none are refuted. It is therefore reasonable for us to accept that Walter's classifications, having survived the academic tests required, can be used as the basis of our examination.

Returning to our examination, we recall that our main purpose in this paper is to re-examine the classification and typing of 21<sup>st</sup> Century Jihadist Terrorism. It is clear that this does not fall into the classification of State Terrorism, leaving us with three options; political, religious/ethnic, and military. Logically, since we are dealing exclusively with Jihadist Terrorism, we could perhaps make the case that it is a sub-type of Religious Terrorism. For that to be a legitimate decision we must prove that the purpose is to *convert* the target (*i.e.*, the West) to Islam. In both subsets under study, however, conversion was not the jihadist's goal. Since 9-11 far more Muslims have suffered at the hands of Jihadists than have non-Muslims worldwide (*e.g.*, Indonesia, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, *etc.*); a fact that also undermines religious conversion as a motivator.[27]

To further refine our identification and typing of 21<sup>st</sup> Jihadist Terrorism we should also examine the goals of the attacks that occurred on western territories since 9/11. Considering our own study subject we can determine from the propaganda, martyrdom recordings, and press releases from the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks that the intent was to *destroy* and not to convert (or more appropriate to Qur'annic teachings, offer the chance to convert and then punish refusal). Indeed, the videos and propaganda suggest that the Al Qaeda-affiliated jihadists desired to create turmoil and undermine the existing governmental systems as part of a campaign of terror, the ultimate goal of which was that the targeted non-Islamic states would self-destruct. Terrorism of this type and conducted within the framework of what resembles a campaign designed to destroy the established state falls at least partially within Feldman and Hinojosa's definition of Guerrilla Warfare.[28] These facts further call into question Religious Terrorism as a motivator for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Jihadist Terrorism. The resulting situation yields our two focal candidate categories: Political and War Terrorism.[29]

In doing so, we find that in the Jihadist Terrorism attacks *after* 9/11, London (both 7/7 and 21/7), and (to an extent) Madrid, the perpetrators espoused purely political and/or religious motives (*e.g.*, Martyrdom recordings and press releases cite revenge, the removal of troops from Islamic territories, protection of Muslim rights in a western country, and the cessation of hostilities against Muslims in the international political arena and foreign military operations as the prime motivators).[30] The end goals of this subset of attacks are, therefore, consistent with our



understanding of Political Terrorism and entirely different (and more completely understood) from those of the first subset (9/11/London/Madrid).

Our interim findings from this portion of our examination are: (1) In 21<sup>st</sup> century jihadist operations, there are two subsets (pre- and post-9/11/London/ Madrid) that are similar in their mechanics, but can be differentiated and exclusively typed by their goal; (2) The goal-related aspect of *destruction* is only prevalent in the 9/11/London/Madrid subset; (3) The goal of destruction suggests a sub-type of Jihadist Terrorism more akin to Walter’s Military Terrorism or Feldman and Hinojosa’s Guerrilla Warfare than that which is political in nature.

From both a legal and a counter-terrorism point of view, these findings already highlight a significant difference from our current understanding and imply the requirement to formulate two different sets of countermeasures. Yet, we are reminded that our governments have so far treated them as equivalent forms of Jihadist Terrorism and legislated in line with that determination.

### *Empirical and Qualitative Revelations*

To support our claim that the fear of Jihadist Terrorism in our liberal societies has, ‘disproportionately influenced western perceptions of the severity of this threat’ and further support our findings of two sub-types we must first examine the empirical data. Our data set for this examination is the open source-based *Global Database on Terrorism* (GDT),[31] which is a product of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) based at the University of Maryland in the US.[32] As we seek to evaluate the number and nature of jihadist attacks on the territory of ‘western’ states, we have limited the data to those attacks occurring on the territory of the US, Canada, and within the territory of the European Union as we have broadly defined it in our opening paragraphs.

In searching for incidents occurring from 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2010,[33] we find that there were 943 incidents, of which only 27 were attempted or perpetrated by Islamists (*i.e.*, just under three percent). Of those 27 Islamist-related incidents, 20 were multiple-incident events (four in the US in the 9/11/01 attacks, four each in London in the 7/7/05 and the 21/7/05 attempted attacks, six in Madrid, and two in Sweden—which were, incidentally, perpetrated by the same person within close temporal proximity).

Of the seven remaining incidents, one was sectarian in nature (attacking an Iraqi absentee polling station in Sweden), and another one was clearly focused on a diplomatic building. The remaining incidents (Richard Reid (the ‘Shoe Bomber’), Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the ‘Underwear Bomber’), the attack on Glasgow Airport, the UPS/printer cartridge bombs, and the un-realised attack on two German commuter trains) had only a minimal chance of producing mass casualties or a ‘spectacular’ that would remind us of 9/11, London, or Madrid. The minimal potential to produce mass casualties in two of the five incidents and the lack of strategic targets (*i.e.*, targets essential for a society’s wellbeing and governance) in *all* of these events means that the likelihood of causing severe damage to the state or the society on whose territory the attack took place was small if not miniscule.

The data and analysis from the last seven of our incidents, then, naturally leads us away from an attack intended to disable a state and to the conclusion that the GTD Criterion II[34] is in play (*i.e.*, “There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.”[35]). Arguably, and as many of the critics of this paper will *correctly* assess, none of these seven incidents, alone or together, had the potential to destroy the state on whose territory it occurred. These seven cases, then, fully adhere to



our understanding of Political Terrorism that, while conducted in a highly-sophisticated manner, were intended to ‘coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message...’.

However, turning to the previous 20 incidents, there are a few logical inconsistencies if we attempt to apply that determination to the 9/11, London, and possibly even the Madrid attacks. Considering the 9/11 attacks alone leads us to ask that if the perpetrators desired to instil fear in a third party, would not a claim of responsibility been left, made, or expected soon after the event? (We would remind the reader that it was a number of weeks before Osama bin Laden made a first statement on behalf of Al Qaeda, and even then, it was a denial of involvement.[36]) Target selection, as well, would seem to match that of Political Terrorism, but the functions of the World Trade Centre Complex (*NB: a major US monetary hub and financial district similar to ‘The City’ in London*) as well as the Pentagon (and, presumably, the capitol or the White House that were to be the target of United 93) were clearly documented before the attack as being vital portions of the US economy and her National Command structures. Had this attack been wholly political in nature would not a strike on, for example, the Sears Tower in Chicago by United 93 been even more successful at spreading the coercive influence throughout the *whole* of the US and not just the East Coast? After all, United 93 would nearly have covered such a distance by the time it crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.[37]

Our review of the data also implies that there is also a qualitative aspect to consider. It is, for many, sufficient that the 9/11/London/Madrid attacks were ‘spectacular’, and this aspect qualifies them as unique and New Terrorism. But such a characterisation does not account for the true dimension of terror and the potential for future fear that was instilled on that day. As the director of Ditchley Park said in a recent conference on the 9/11 attacks, “It had been extremely emotional, particularly for the Americans, and its nightmarish quality had captured the imaginations of billions of people around the world.”[38] The fact that the multiple-incident events were perpetrated by teams of assailants, all of whom had extensive training, funding, and indoctrination by Al Qaeda and whose actions were orchestrated in a manner consistent with a military operation intended to cripple the targeted governments, suggests a level of sophistication beyond the terrorism experienced by most of the western world. The 9/11 attacks, as an example, were devised, planned, funded, provisioned, provided intelligence, guided, and more by what amounted to a global, non-state organisation designed to recruit and train terrorists to execute the designated mission.[39] It is most likely these practical aspects and the potential for such military precision to be brought to bear again in the name of *jihad* in the future that have so gripped our lawmakers and resulted in our extensive counter-terrorism laws since 9/11.

### *Implications*

We have established that Political Terrorism seeks to coerce or control.[40] The ultimate goal is to bend the will of the established government to the desires of the terrorist group. The terrorists hope to attain an end-state that results in either the group having more influence in decision-making *or* to so degrade the population’s faith in the ability of the ruling government that a change of government is precipitated and the terrorist group remains a controlling force.[41] To restate an accepted axiom, Political Terrorism usually desires a lot of activity (a ‘big bang’), but few casualties so that the terrorists can win the hearts and minds of the population over to their side of the fight. Political Terrorism usually arises from within defined geographical limits. Peter Neumann calls this the, “physical centre of gravity”[42] and goes on to explain that it may be located within a country, region, sub-region, or even straddling a border—but that there *is* a physical location to which the terrorists’ struggle can be tied and identified.[43]



At a very practical, counter- and anti-terrorism practitioner level there are certain indicators that are largely consistent with Political Terrorism. Since *control* is the desired effect, the Political Terrorist group usually desires to survive beyond the terror campaign so that they may exercise that control. As a result, secrecy and security are required to ensure survival even after an attack. While it is acknowledged that some individual members may not survive certain operations,[44] the leadership and the group as a whole must logically remain intact so that it can exercise its control after achieving capitulation. Additionally, the use of code words and advance warning of bombings serve the triple-pronged purposes of minimising the loss of life (necessary for maintaining public support), contributing to the terror campaign experienced by the population (thus undermining confidence in the government), and proving to the government that the group can and will act with impunity.[45] These can be protected against by the more routine counter-terrorism efforts we are familiar with since the mid-20<sup>th</sup> Century. For the counter-terrorism professional, large groups or waves of suicide bombers, the desire for mass casualties, and the use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons are *not* a normal manifestation of Political Terrorism, or a characteristic of such groups.[46]

When we apply our established taxonomy to the more military interpretation of Jihadist Terrorism, [47] however, we see significant contrasts with Political Terrorism. It is true, for example, that if we analyse the propaganda and statements issued by Al Qaeda and its affiliates, Jihadist Terrorism appears to fall under the umbrella of Political Terrorism. However, looking at the deeper, motivational issues of a particular subset of Jihadist Terrorism leads us to a contrary position. Foremost is the fact that in this subset the Jihadist Terrorist does *not* seek to control or sway the decision-making apparatus of a nation-state. He (or she) seeks to destroy, weaken, or paralyze.[48]

Further, there is often no requirement for a geographic centre of gravity within which Jihadists limit their attacks. Unlike the IRA, ETA, or Baader-Meinhoff, the Jihadists who appear to be engaged in a form of Military Terrorism deliberately work from *outside* a country in many cases; training and preparing for attacks in isolated camps that guarantee security such as in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Their organisations are international and, quite often, virtually linked through the internet, mobile and international satellite telephones, and other forms of modern technology. As a result, there are no 'home base' logistics signatures, security vulnerabilities arising from home basing, nor is there an easily apparent centre of gravity for counter-terrorism forces to attack.

Next, contrary to political terror groups (P/IRA, ETA, Marxists, etc.), many Military (War) Jihadists accept—indeed desire—to acquire weapons of mass destruction and cause mass casualties as a result of their attacks. This is wholly consistent with the definition of Military Terrorism (as modified to 'War Terrorism' by the author because it can then include non-state terrorist groups that seek to destroy a nation-state or society). Logically, War Terrorism also includes the use of weapons and methods that result in mass casualties. As a result, multiple simultaneous or waves of suicide bombers, CBRN weapons, and coordinated attacks (suicide or other) resulting in mass casualties feature prominently in a military form of Jihadist Terrorism. In fact, in Chapter 10 of *Homeland Security in the UK*,[49] Frank Gregory covers in rather excellent detail the practical issues confronting counter-terrorism operators when these non-standard (from the point of Political Terrorism) aspects are part of terrorist operations.

It is at this point that we have tipped the scale and appear to be able to support the creation of the sub-type of War Terrorism as proposed in our thesis.



## *So What?*

For the reader approaching this paper (appropriately) with a sceptical mindset, it may seem that the re-classification of a relatively small portion of 21<sup>st</sup> Century Jihadist Terrorism from Political to War is of little practical use. However, we should pause a moment to review the underlying and rather significant implications of such a change. Otherwise, the definition refinement proposed is a purely academic exercise with no practical application for the state or its counter-terrorism efforts. In the main, there are four major issues that must be resolved if we accept the classification:

- (1) The most significant issue is the recognition that Jihadist Terrorism, by virtue of being War Terrorism, does *not* originate from within the territory of the European Union. As such, it has an extra-territorial dimension that is not accounted for in most of western criminal and civil law. While it is true that cells and operations may be located and even originate from within the territory of the EU (and will need to be dealt with accordingly in counter-terrorism operations, civil, and criminal law),<sup>[50]</sup> the driving force and basic motivation do not originate from within the EU.<sup>[51]</sup> *To pre-emptively deal with the root causes, therefore, nation-states must consider the political and legal issues involved in extra-territorial action*—either independently or in concert/agreement with other nation-states. This condition further suggests that the necessary legal and bureaucratic structures must be formulated and built to work beyond the bounds of the recognised state.
- (2) Furthermore, since the proposed subtype of Jihadist War Terrorism is focused on destruction, and by design effectively follows a military campaign plan using terrorism as its tool, counter-terrorism professionals must consider the implications of what is the terrorist's 'military operation.' By examining the Jihadists' actions as a military operation and not as a series of criminal infractions, counter-terrorism experts will gain added knowledge that will contribute to the destruction of the terrorist organisation at a much deeper and more devastating level than the operations cell alone. This will also allow counter-terrorism experts to apply their limited resources to identifying the points of vulnerability and use a proven and internationally understood methodology that will act as an anchor point for cooperation with organisations beyond the borders of the nation-state or political territory.
- (3) The legal foundations in place for dealing with non-political Jihadist Terrorism will need a significant re-look. Our existing terrorism laws remain focused on prosecuting criminality at an individual level. The punishments vary in severity proportionate to the potential loss of life or property. Arguably, however, Jihadist War Terrorism is intended to destroy or disable the *state*. As such, sedition and treason are the closest parallels to the intent of the Jihadist War Terrorist—but neither has been applied to terrorism law. It is true that numerous governments have amended their laws to specifically take into account all categories of terrorism as a homogenous group, but the procedures and punishments fall squarely in the civil realm. *If we accept that the Jihadist War Terrorist is, in our terms, a combatant who seeks the destruction of a nation-state, then we must also accept that civil and criminal law likely will not be a deterrent to potential members who are resident within the nation-state.* Additionally, continuing to prosecute under extant laws will often lead to insufficient action and unequal treatment of the perpetrators in different nations. This also implies that we will need to devise a way to separate that which is jihadist Political Terrorism from that which is jihadist War Terrorism, and prosecute accordingly.
- (4) Finally, refining the definition of Jihadist Terrorism to include at least the two sub-types discussed ('Political' and 'War') should lead to an increase in the efficiency in the state's counter-terrorism effort. Counter-terrorism efforts, in their current form, are the arena of *civil* protections (i.e., the intelligence services and police forces). As a result, there are elements of these and other national resources that cannot be effectively applied to combat Jihadist War Terrorism as a result of



civil liberties and constitutional issues. Indeed, while some states have established specific paramilitary organisations to deal with terrorism the fact is that all the states currently place restrictions consistent with their constitutions and civil law on the information sharing, operations, authority, and jurisdiction of their counter-terrorism regimes. By refining the definition of Jihadist Terrorism to include Jihadist Political Terrorism and Jihadist War Terrorism as sub-types, we lay the foundation for treating a political terrorist appropriately and within accepted civil rights guarantees, while in the case of the War Jihadist the nation-state can legally level the playing field and bring all potential counter-terrorism assets to bear. The refinement will also facilitate the emplacement of multi-national systems for cross-border cooperation, intelligence sharing, authority and jurisdiction.

### *Crossing the Rubicon—Into the Unfamiliar*

There is, perhaps, one more issue to be dealt with if this paper is to be ‘complete.’ We must acknowledge that the taxonomy of Military (War) Terrorism as a whole is yet to be fully developed. Walter’s definition[52] and few additional explanatory words as well as the works of Wilkinson, Laqueur, Lackey, Feldman, Hinojosa, and others have left us only with the terms Military Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare and their association with a state or a non-state organisation directing a military-style campaign of terror. There is little more beyond this. Perhaps the only deduction we can make is that behind this concept there was always the notion of an identifiable power centre in a conventional sense (*i.e.*, a leadership regime that can be identified, located, and perhaps targeted as a way to combat the campaign of terror).

Here is one point where we differ from the underdeveloped concept of Military Terrorism. If we look beyond Al Qaeda and its affiliates we still see numerous cells and groups willing, *without* direction from a central point or hierarchy, to engage in Jihadist Terrorism. This is a clue to understanding and combating the War Jihadists.[53] Jihadist Terrorism is a result of a structure where the ideology, itself, is the guiding leadership.[54] There is no need for a guiding person, council, or state—no physical entity. The notion of *jihad* and the extremist view of the Qur’an is centred within the individual, and not required to be directed from recognisable headquarters (*NB*: This is fully consistent with *both* Political and War Terrorism). These internal focal points cannot be eliminated in the same way as the leadership of conventional Military Terrorism. Jihadist Terrorism as a whole is, as a result, pervasive and spreads directly and indirectly through the transmission of ideas and beliefs. It is exactly these aspects that have made it so difficult to quash and so uniquely different from the Political Terrorism we have experienced in our western history. It is also these aspects that further justify the proposed refinement of the definition so that the type ‘Jihadist Terrorism’ can contain ‘Political’ and ‘War’ sub-types.

As we stand today in our western democracies and civil societies, our efforts to fully understand and deal with the Jihadist threat have not been entirely effective. We have maladapted our criminal laws, blurred our constitutional lines, and lost much of the civil liberties our western nations were built on in an effort to deal with a style of terrorism that is different and new to us. If, however, we re-visit the seminal works on terrorism we can see that there is both a gap and a legitimate foundation for a refinement of the classification that can bring us back into balance. We only need to cross our Rubicon and go into the uncharted land of ‘War Terrorism’ to be able to be more effective at combating Jihadist terror in both of its forms.

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## Notes:

[1] Professor Frank Teti, Lecture: “*The Problems of Civil Societies*” (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, August 1991).

[2] Among the first of the foundational texts that provides a definition and taxonomy for *New Terrorism* is Peter Neumann’s 2009 book: *Old & New Terrorism* (Polity Press, Cambridge 2009). This was followed two years later by Alex P. Schmid’s edited volume *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (Routledge, London 2011). This volume was later published in electronic form for Amazon Kindle by T & F Books, UK, which is the version used in this paper as “Schmid, AP (2011)”.

[3] The ‘European Union’ (EU) for the purposes of this paper is broadly defined as all EU member states as of 1 January 2012 and the geographically encompassed areas of Switzerland, Norway, the Isle of Man, Northern Ireland (as part of the UK), Gibraltar, and Corsica (as part of France).

[4] A case in point was the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in the Stockwell Tube Station in London on 22 July 2005.

[5] See Hewitt, S (2008), Chapters 4 and 5, for an excellent discussion on the ‘reactive’ nature of the United Kingdom’s anti-terrorist law development and its erosion of civil rights.

[6] Marsden, SV and Schmid, AP in Schmid, AP (2011), p. 192.

[7] *Ibid.*, Marsden and Schmid cite AL George and make the point that, “The inductive route may be considered particularly useful in [improving typology], as it allows a building-block approach, where further data may be applied to typologies in order to enhance or challenge them, thereby countering the possible reification of the subject.”

[8] “Campaign” as used by the author denotes a series of events, actions, or attacks that are orchestrated and coordinated so that over a period of time they will attain a specific goal of defeating an enemy.

[9] Schmid, AP (2011), p. 14. Schmid quotes the response of GA Sahni, Executive Director of the Institute for Conflict Management in New Delhi, “What matters is not the immediate or direct impact, but the ripples it will create. And with a thousand little pebbles, the wasted, crumbling, degenerate walls and structures of this system will collapse, and a deluge will wash away the ‘evil of the world’.” This highlights the goal of destruction some jihadists harbour.

[10] Dobson, C and Payne, R (1979), pp. 151-192; Hewitt, S (2008), pp. 9-11.

[11] For a more complete understanding of the methods of supporting terrorism and their results see, in combination, the majority of James Adams’ excellent book *The Financing of Terror* (1986) (especially Chapters 5 and 6, pp. 136-196), Dobson and Payne’s *The Weapons of Terror* (1979) (Chapter 5, pp. 78-94), and Hewitt’s *The British War on Terror* (2008) (pp. 21, 37-38, 58-60).

[12] Neumann, P (2009) pp. 6-8, 25-37. Hewitt, S (2008) Chapter 1. For related issues, see also Wardlaw, G (1982) Chapters 6 and 7 (pp. 50-62).



[13] See all of Part III (especially pp. 117-320) and Part V (pp.371-394) of Wilkinson, P (ed.) (2007) *Homeland Security in the UK: Future preparedness for terrorist attack since 9/11*. See also: Neumann, P (2009) pp. 52-73. Hewitt, S (2008), pp. 82-85. For specific methods and results, see: Bowman-Grieve, L (2011) "Chapter 6, The Internet and Terrorism (Pathways to Terrorism)", *The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism* (ed. Andrew Silke), pp. 76-88, and Fussey, P (2011) "Chapter 12, Deterring Terrorism? (Target-hardening, surveillance, and the prevention of terrorism)", *The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism* (ed. Andrew Silke), pp. 164-185.

[14] Hewitt, S (2008), in Chapter 1 covers the progression of terrorism and parallels its development with that of the legal and operational framework for counter-terrorism. Hewitt clearly shows that the government's responses were incremental and evolutionary in nature. In "Chapter 2, The Rules of the Game are Changing: From 9/11 to 7/7", Hewitt continues the chronology of terrorist acts, indicating the shift to jihadist terrorism, but also shows clearly that the UK government's response was, again, incremental and in line with the philosophy that the 'new' form of terrorism was political in nature.

[15] It is interesting to note, for example, that Neumann, Hewitt, and Silke, all begin their books with a definition that is consistent with Walter's definition of Political Terrorism, and then go on to analyze their respective subjects within that context. Only Wilkinson (ed.) (2007) in his *Part I. Introduction* appears to avoid the trap of limiting his categorization options early, by referring to *Al Qaeda* and similar jihadist terrorists as a new form different from, "...more traditional terrorist groups such as ETA and FARC." (p.7) and by defining terrorism without the word 'political' that is prevalent in the other publications mentioned. Furthermore, Wilkinson draws a clear distinction between internal and external terrorism—suggesting that at least one form of jihadist terrorism is the latter, and therefore 'different' from what the West has known before. (p. 6). Even Wilkinson falls partially foul, however, of predetermining the category by writing, "However, in an operative democracy the major threat of terror is posed by non-state movements or groups seeking to destroy or undermine democratic government and to impose their own agenda by coercive intimidation." (*Ibid.*) Wilkinson's explanation leaves the door open for us to consider Military (War) Terrorism, but still appears grounded in the vernacular of Political Terrorism by using phrases like, "...impose their own agenda..." and "...coercive intimidation...", which suggest political motivations and not the destruction and subjugation sought by the practitioners of War Terrorism.

[16] Wilkinson, P (2007), p.7.

[17] Walter, EV (1969) pp. 367-374. The bibliography, itself, is a wealth of information and lists numerous publications pertaining to the study and investigation of tribal social structures (primarily in Africa), the role and responsibility of a nation in maintaining order, concepts of group identity, anthropology, and civil disobedience. It has, arguably, only one book listed that is at least partly dedicated or directly relates to the study of terrorism: Brian Crozier, *The Rebels: A Study of Post-war Insurrection* (London, 1960). Walter lists four other, shorter publications that are also dedicated to terrorism as a topic, but they are relatively obscure and from the 1930s. Walter's book is considered a seminal text precisely because there was a dearth of analysis and systematic study of terrorism up to the 1960s and his was one of the first dedicated studies of the subject.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

[19] Wardlaw, G (1982) pp. 19-20.

[20] Hewitt, S (2008) pp. 12-15.

[21] The term "Political" was eventually adopted in the early 1980s during further theory development to encompass and categorise the numerous forms of civil terror (e.g., revolutionary, counter-revolutionary, economic, *etc.*) the goal of which to affect or control political process or government. See: Wardlaw, G. (1982) pp. .

[22] Walter, EV (1969) p. 13, "...the proximate aim is to instil terror; the ultimate end is control." [*sic*]

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[24] This can be deduced from Walter's examination of power in tribal societies, and becomes apparent when he begins discussing the power structures that emanate from the band, tribe, chiefdom, and kingdom levels of African primitive societies (pp. 56-59). In pages 61-65, Walter establishes the potential for force to be used for maintenance of control. Walter reinforces and expands this position through his case studies—exhibiting the link between the power in society and the exercise thereof to control and subdue others from different family groups, bands, or tribes. On pages 62 and 68, Walter also identifies religion as a further defining factor



that can be related to these power centres, thus opening the door to Religious/Ethnic Terrorism. See also: Neumann, P (2009) pp. 8, 18, 83-88, 94-96.

[25] Wardlaw, G (1982), p. 12.

[26] See Easson, JJ and Schmid, AP, "Appendix 2.1 250-plus Academic, Governmental and Intergovernmental Definitions of Terrorism" in Schmid, AP (2011) pp. 98-144.

[27] For example, the US Department of Justice Report, "The National Security Division's International Terrorism and Terrorism-Related Statistics Chart" tracks the number and purpose of terrorist attacks in the US, the arrests, and any resulting convictions in the from 11 September 2001 to 18 March 2010 (See: <http://jnslp.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/march-26-2010-nsd-final-statistics.pdf>). This report shows that Category II attacks (involving, among other results, the loss of life) totalled 240 out of 403 attacks, but those involving deaths or potential deaths from jihadist terrorism make up less than 3% of terrorist incidents in the US at that time. Additionally, the US National Counterterrorism Centre's "Worldwide Incidents Tracking System" website ([https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?t=Reports&Rcv=Victim&Nf=p\\_IncidentDate%7CGTEQ+20100101%7C%7Cp\\_IncidentDate%7CLTEQ+20101231&N=0](https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?t=Reports&Rcv=Victim&Nf=p_IncidentDate%7CGTEQ+20100101%7C%7Cp_IncidentDate%7CLTEQ+20101231&N=0)) report for 2010 shows clearly that worldwide, Muslims have suffered the brunt of jihadist attacks while the US, UK, and other western nations have escaped relatively unscathed. This is further supported by the US State Department's online publication, *Country Reports on Terrorism* (See: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140884.htm>).

[28] McAllister, B and Schmid, AP describing and summarising the works of Feldman and Hinojosa in their "Chapter 4. Theories of Terrorism", in Schmid, AP (2011), pp. 212-213

[29] However, lest the author be accused of oversimplifying these classifications and definitions, it is duly acknowledged that in seeking to establish terror through any particular act of violence, the actual act may not fall exclusively into one or another of the categories offered by Walter, *et al*. Some fit clearly within the categories while others may seem to be an element of two or more. For example, Religious/Ethnic Terrorism may have the characteristics of War Terrorism if the ultimate end is to destroy the target religion/ethnicity (e.g., The Holocaust). Suicide bombers may indicate Religious Terrorism (e.g., jihadists) or possibly War Terrorism (e.g., kamikaze attacks in the Pacific Theatre in World War II).

[30] A review, using more than 20 sources, of the perpetrators' published recordings from the subject attacks show clearly the themes mentioned. Those of 9/11, 7/7, and Madrid, however, revealed statements centred on the destruction of the targeted government or society.

[31] See: <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>. Admittedly, the GTD is not the *entire* database of world-wide attempted and perpetrated attacks. Governments do not always release information regarding terrorist plots, attacks thwarted, or terrorist operations in progress but being monitored. However, it is reasonable to assume that if we make a comparison of those attacks related to Jihadist Terrorism in the GTD and the overall number of attacks listed, the representational percentage is unlikely to change in a positive manner in any significant amount. This assumption is logical because just as the raw number of Jihadist Terrorism incidents would increase with the addition of classified information, so would those from *all other sources combined*. Consequently, a complete data base of both classified and unclassified incidents in our identified area is unlikely to show an increase in the proportion of Jihadist terrorism beyond a few percentage points and might actually show a proportional *decrease* as a result of mathematical probabilities of categorical expansion.

[32] Homepage url: <http://www.start.umd.edu/start/>

[33] The advanced search criteria used to derive the statistics in this examination were: (a) From 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2010; (b) Within the geographical territory of the European Union (including Switzerland, Norway, Corsica, Gibraltar, Northern Ireland (as part of the UK), and the Isle of Man) and North America (Canada and the US only); (c) Criteria I, II, and III apply; (d) Ambiguous and unsuccessful attacks were included.

[34] See the GTD "Search Criteria" at: <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/>.

[35] There is an excellent historical background of the GTD and the development behind Criterion II in *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*. See: Bowie, Neil G and Schmid, Alex P, "Chapter 5. Databases on Terrorism" in Schmid, AP (2009), pp. 296-298.



[36] Holbrook, D, “Appendix 4.3 Al-Qaeda Communiqués by Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri: A Chronology” in Schmid AP (2011), p. 286.

[37] Regarding the flight paths and distances covered, see *The 9/11 Commission Report*, Commission (2004), p. 33.

[38] Greenstock, J (2011)

[39] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks (2004), pp. 149-173.

[40] Walter, EV (1969), pp. 13-14.

[41] As suggested by Grant Wardlaw’s discussion (pp. 12-17) of the topic and his critiques of Paul Wilkinson’s works in this area.

[42] Neumann, P (2010), p. 18.

[43] *Ibid.*

[44] This aspect—an individual becoming a casualty in a Political Terrorism attack—may also be considered to be consistent with the tenets of Jihadist Terrorism in its political form, where the perpetrator commits to a suicide attack for political reasons. The key to this practical appraisal is that the attack will likely be small (or a small group) and less lethal than a military-style campaign.

[45] Assistant Commissioner Peter Clark, Head of the UK Counter-Terrorism Command in a 2007 speech, as cited by Hewitt, S (2008), p. 10. See also Neumann, P (2010), pp. 25-27.

[46] Neumann, P (2010), pp. 27-28.

[47] At this point, we must caution the reader that it is exceptionally simplistic, abhorrently superficial, and academically unsound to rely on the definition of the word *jihad* alone as part of our nomenclature exercise. The word itself can denote any part of a spectrum of possibilities from ‘a struggle to reach enlightenment’ to a ‘holy war against one’s enemy’, with the latter (holy war) being among the more extreme interpretations. Ultimately, the meaning of *jihad* is framed by the fervour and beliefs of the individual. It is only when the individual chooses to apply a militant philosophy (i.e., war-like and ‘holy war’ characteristics) to the word that it results in extremist violence (terrorism) based on an extreme interpretation of the Qur’an. See: Randy Borum, “Chapter 2 Understanding Terrorist Psychology”, *The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism*, Andrew Silke (ed.) (2011), pp. 25-27, for an examination of a path to militant terrorism. Borum cites Saucier’s work (i.e., Saucier, et al. (2009), p. 259), and provides a superb discussion of the path to militant terrorism. This is, indirectly, is additional support for the proposed re-classification, but is beyond the immediate scope of this paper.

[48] It should be noted that the more extreme interpretation of *jihad* is that of ‘holy war’ and that within this context, a jihad can only result from a declaration (*fatwa*) issued by a senior Muslim cleric or council. It is interesting to note that since the 9-11 attacks, all of the major governing bodies of Islamic clerics have issued *fatwas* **against** suicide bombing and terrorism. It is only minor, extremist clerics—known less for their Qu’rannic knowledge than their religious fervour—who have issued such *fatwas*.

[49] Gregory, F, “Chapter 10 Police and Counter-terrorism in the UK, Homeland Security in the UK: Future Preparedness for Terrorist Attack Since 9/11” in Wilkinson, P. (ed.) (2007) pp. 203-247.

[50] See Peter Neumann’s reflection on ‘old versus new terrorism’ with respect to territorial anchors and as referenced earlier in this paper.

[51] This aspect is often seen as a result of globalisation and the erosion of national sovereignty. While the effects of globalisation are relevant to our thesis, this is yet another area that is beyond the narrow focus of our paper. In our focused examination, the facts remain that when dealing with jihadist terrorism, there is a legal need to reach beyond the territorial borders of any one nation or political territory.

[52] Walter, EV (1969), p. 14.

[53] For excellent case studies in the radicalisation of individuals, see Fouda and Fielding’s *Masterminds of Terror: the truth behind the most devastating attack the world has ever seen* (2003), pp. 48-51, 56-59, 81-87, et al.

[54] LoCicero, A and Sinclair S (2008), p. 15.



The Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence

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## Will it Ever be Possible to Profile the Terrorist?

by Jonathan Rae

“Identifying members of terrorist organisations and preventing them from carrying out successful attacks is a core component of any anti-terrorism effort. The fundamental task of this process is to separate the terrorist from the non-terrorist. The most prevalent method of attempting to achieve distinction between these two groups is to establish a set of psychological, socio-economic, physical, and/or racial attributes that mark one from the other. In other words, what does a terrorist look like, what personality traits do they possess and in what circumstances do they live and work? Essentially, it constructs a *terrorist profile* comprised of certain perceptible qualities with which an observed individual can be likened to, thus determining the probability of terroristic tendencies within the subject. Press describes the process of profiling, as follows:

*'In a large population of individuals... governments attempt to find the rare malfeasor [terrorist, for example] by assigning prior probabilities to individuals, in some manner estimating the chance that each is a malfeasor. Societal resources for secondary security screening are then concentrated against individuals with the largest priors' [1].*

If terrorist profiling is possible, it would be an irresistibly attractive method for countering terrorist attacks as it would maximise the efficiency of prophylactic resource allocation, increasing the likelihood of the interception of a terrorist attack. As an example, terrorist profiling could be used to focus assets at malfeasor populations within a crowd of lawful travellers at an airport terminal. Equally, if not more importantly, would be the use of terrorist profiling in observing parallels and similarities in the biographical records of terrorists and subsequently providing insight into the root causes of terrorism. By analysing the personal histories of terrorists, a terrorist personality is hoped to be discovered that signposts individuals willing to ‘commit espionage or sabotage, try to overthrow the government, commit terrorist acts, or otherwise engage in acts that would endanger national security’ [2].

The reality, however, is that terrorist profiling has not proved to be the panacean silver bullet against terrorism. Many explanations have been given as to the reasons why terrorist profiling has, so far at least, failed to deliver [3] [4] [5]. This begs the question: “*Will it ever be possible to profile the terrorist?*” Paramount to this discussion is the logic that drives terrorist profiling efforts; that terrorists can be identified in comparison to a societal population through the observation of noticeable, indicating traits and behavioural patterns. The three most prominent approaches to terrorist recognition employ racial-physical, psychopathological and socioeconomic attributes as profiling parameters. This paper will investigate the merits and failings of these three profiling techniques in order to determine whether the titular question - whether the terrorist can ever be profiled – is answerable.



Before investigating the methods of profiling terrorists, the fundamental difficulty of definition within the field of terrorism studies must be introduced due to the relevance of erecting operational boundaries in terrorist profiling. Defining the limits of the term “terrorism” has been an obstinate stumbling block for terrorism experts; a difficulty that has been evaded and confronted in equal measure by academics and other scholarly experts. Most troubling is the lack of definitional unanimity [6]. For terrorist profiling, in particular, ambiguity of the fundamental terminology has resulted in the bounds of the malfeasor to be imprecise. This is because without a universal meaning of *terrorism*, a comprehensive definition of *terrorist* is impossible. Any serious attempt to study terrorism must appreciate this conceptual opacity. Until the discovery of a universal definition, if one can exist, the efforts to further research the phenomenon must adopt working definitions in order to achieve some clarity of meaning. Those creating a terrorist profile must do exactly that, with particular detail to what actions differentiate a terrorist from a non-terrorist. Importantly, not all of the activities involved in terrorism are illegal, particularly those which support the ultimate action - the terrorist attack - through a peripheral network of terrorist sympathisers, such as financiers, promoters and recruiters.

### *Racial, Gender and Age Profiling*

The crudest and most egregious method of profiling terrorists is to identify potential malfeasors based on racial characteristics. Implicit in racial profiling is the logic that individuals of a certain race are, as a general rule, more likely to commit acts of terrorism. In this thinking, ethnicity and alienage are viewed as adequate demographic divisions to be proper subjects of scrutiny. Following the 9/11 attacks, racial profiling re-emerged as a viable system for detecting potential terrorists and was implemented by the border security agencies of many countries, notably the United States. Ellman writes that,

*‘[to profile] on the basis of race and comparable factors, is both discriminatory and foolish. Arabs and Muslims - to name the two most obvious targets for such reactions today - are part of the American mainstream. Many are citizens. The vast majority... are altogether innocent of any connection with terrorism. Meanwhile, some people who are not Arabs... have apparently joined our enemies in Al Qaeda’ [7].*

While it is true that the majority of current international terrorists are of Arab or Muslim identity, this neglects the fact that a considerable number are not. The second most lethal terrorist in American history, Timothy McVeigh, was a white American citizen. Also, the majority of terrorist attacks against the United Kingdom have been orchestrated and executed by predominantly white republican dissidents. To further deconstruct the cogency of racial profiling, international terrorist organisations have circumvented such measures by initiating attacks on targets thought to be outside of their expected theatre of operations, such as the 1972 Lod Airport massacre in Tel Aviv by the Japanese Red Army (JRA) on behalf of the People’s Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Clearly, relying on race as the salient factor for profiling a terrorist is not a practical solution for an effective counter-terrorist measure.

Another immutable dimension which is often employed to profile terrorists is biological gender. Proponents of gender profiling argue that all of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were



male, as were the 21 Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists arrested in Singapore in 2002 [8]. The dominance of male terrorists should not be overstated. Despite having numerical superiority, Russell and Miller warn against using simplistic male-centric profiling;

*'[Female terrorists] are more adept at allaying the suspicions of security personnel. As a result, posing as wives or mothers, they often can enter areas that would be restricted to males...'* [9].

Hudson writes that 'women have played prominent roles in numerous urban terrorist operations in Latin America' [10]. Notorious Latin American female terrorists include the Sandinista's Dora María Téllez; Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front's Ana María; Montoneros' Norma Ester Arostito; and a large portion of the M-19 details that seized the Dominican Embassy in Bogotá in 1980 and the Colombian Palace of Justice in 1985. Hudson writes that '[the female terrorists during the siege of the Palace of Justice] were among the fiercest fighters' [11]. The violent assault left 11 Supreme Court justices and 48 Colombian soldiers dead, and the building ravaged by fire. Prominent female terrorists elsewhere include the JRA's Fusako Shigenobu; PFLP's Leila Khalid; the Irish Republican Army's Sisters of Death; the Red Army Faction's Gudrun Ensslin and Susanne Albrecht; and Baader-Meinhof's eponymous Ulrike Meinhof. In fact, the Baader-Meinhof Gang had a 60% female membership and the militant feminist group, Rote Zora, comprised entirely of women [12]. As with ethnicity, the use of gender as a dominant factor in terrorist profiling is undermined by the weight of exceptions against the generalisation. An effective terrorist profile must be constructed using meters that are more clearly indicative of terrorist behaviour and that reduce the malfeasor population to a plausible size for secondary screening.

The issue of age discrimination in terrorist profiling is also an example of the failure to limit the filtering of a large population into a manageable group. There is no definitive age group that terrorists fall into. Although the majority of terrorists are in their early twenty's, the average age of several terrorist groups is considerably lower [13] [14]. Hudson writes that the LTTE had 'many members in the 16 to 17 year-old age level and even members who were preteens' [15]. At the other extreme, the leadership hierarchies of terrorist organisations tend to be markedly older than the mean age. Both Osama bin Laden and Carlos Marighella were in their late 50's when they were killed. The new head of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, turned sixty last year. When the FBI's *Most Wanted Terrorists* list was published in 2001, the average age of the 22 individuals listed was 37 years-old. In light of this variety, it is clear that age is a problematic measure of profiling potential terrorists. It is of interest to note at this point that while race, age and gender profiling in the criminal context - such as the routine searching of young black males by police patrols - is condemned as prejudiced, unconstitutional or institutionally racist, the equivalent usage in the terrorism context is largely overlooked by the general public. The populace's relative tolerance of these unsophisticated profiling techniques - and the infringements on individual liberties that result from them - may be a consequence of the post-9/11 climate of fear and the culture of terrorist stereotyping that has emerged from it.



## *Pathological and Psychological Profiling*

Unlike racial and gender discrimination, psychological profiling is widely accepted in both the study of criminology and as a method within law enforcement operations. There have been multiple attempts to transfer its apparent success from the criminal environment to the context of terrorism. Implicit in this approach is the belief in a causal connection between abnormal psychopathological behaviour and terroristic tendencies. The presence of certain exhibited personality traits or traumatic life experiences is believed to be suggestive of a propensity towards terrorism. In the criminal context, psychological profiling is used as a method of suspect identification, particularly in highly emotive cases involving rape offenders, sexual-orientated killers and serial arsonists [16]. Several psychologists have associated violent behavioural patterns with the presence of mental trauma, sexual deprivation and/or an oppressive formative atmosphere in the perpetrator's past [17] [18] [19]. Adorno's use of psychometric testing and clinical interviews of willing Holocaust participants concluded that there existed an 'authoritarian personality' that was susceptible to the influences of prejudicial and totalitarian directives. Lester, et al. transfer this work into the field of terrorism studies by attaching to Islamic terrorists such proclivities as the projection of internal guilt, the displacement of anger onto others, the submission to conventionalism, aspirations of toughness and bravado and an absence of empathy [20]. The work by Kagitcibasi into Islamic child raising practices is used by Lester, et al. to demonstrate that Middle Eastern family traditions are more likely to produce authoritarian personalities with recidivistic inclinations [21]. Volkan proposes that terrorists, particularly those that drive others to martyr themselves, had suffered psychological trauma during their childhoods [22]. Alternatively, Juergensmeyer suggests terrorism is a symbolic sexual acting-out by young males confined by religious and social suppression and who are attracted to the explosive nature of the terrorist act and the promise of virgins in the hereafter [23].

Similar studies have been conducted to psychologically profile European terrorists. In analysing right-wing Italian terrorism, Ferracuti and Bruno define an 'authoritarian-extremist personality' characterised by pathological disturbance, ideological vacuity and a psychological disconnection with reality [24]. Sullwold categorises German terrorist leaders into two psychological profiles; the unstable, egotistic and apathetic extrovert, and the intolerant, paranoid and hostile neurotic [25]. Post terms the combination of logical reasoning and psychopathological terrorist influences as 'terrorist psychologic' - a system of warped cognition that rationalises and legitimises 'acts [terrorists] are psychologically compelled to commit' [26]. By compiling the numerous psychological studies into the terrorist mind, their amalgamated results produce multiple terrorist personalities, or utilise personality traits that are widely distributed in a population. Psychological profiling, so far, has failed to determine a single 'terrorist personality'. The commonality between these psychological profiles is that the malfeator is either insane or they hold a warped awareness of reality. This is particularly seen as the case with suicide terrorism. Kushner writes that Palestinian suicide bombers may be overwhelmed by a life experience which has generated extreme feelings of anger and hopelessness, such as the result of losing several relatives or close friends at the hands of Israeli security forces [27]. Salib and Rosenberger both hypothesise that the rationality of suicide bombers is hijacked by desperation caused by a perceived absence of hope, derailing them into a dependence on grandiose, paranoid delusions [28] [29].



The endeavours of psychologists in profiling the terrorist have been limited to vague implications of irrationality and insanity. Post notes that,

*'behavioral scientists attempting to understand the psychology of individuals drawn to this violent political behaviour have not succeeded in identifying a unique "terrorist mindset"' [30].*

Dean states that the employment of methods based on behavioural and clinical assessments appear 'to be of very limited use when applied to terrorists, as no such definitive "terrorist personality" has been found to exist in the scholarly literature'[31]. Dean describes figurative 'road blocks' that obstruct the success of psychological profiling in a terrorism context. The most prominent of these obstacles is the lack of any apparent psychological dysfunction in the biographical records of terrorists. There are two responses that could be drawn from this; firstly, that psychological profiling requires more primary data to deliver significant results; or, secondly, that psychological profiling is intrinsically a fruitless endeavour. The former conclusion is espoused by Lester, et al. who write that the absence of first-hand assessments result in the records of many terrorists, most patently suicide bombers, to draw from a process of 'psychological autopsy' [32]. Other scholars dismiss the possibility of a terrorist personality altogether. Wilkinson states that; 'We already know enough about terrorist behaviour to discount the crude hypothesis of a "terrorist personality" or "phenotype"' [33]. Laqueur writes that the search for a unique 'terrorist personality' has been a futile venture [34]. The focal point of this argument is that terrorists are as likely to suffer from a mental illness as the population at large are - or at least to an imperceptible differential. Moghaddam states that; 'Critical assessments of the available evidence suggest that there is little validity in explanations of terrorism that assume a high level of psychopathology among terrorists' [35]. McCauley writes that;

*'[Systematic research into the biographical records of the Baader-Meinhof Gang conclude that they] did not differ from the comparison group of nonterrorists in any substantial way; in particular, the terrorists did not show higher rates of any kind of psychopathology' [36].*

Proponents of the *normalcy* of the terrorist mind depict the social environment that terrorists operate in. Terrorists are generally not delinquents or recluses, but thrive in an atmosphere of interdependence. Clark's investigations into ETA found that its members are not socially marginalised or mentally disturbed; instead, they belonged to a close-knit ethnic community and were supported by loving families [37]. Unlike lone wolves, the terrorist group relies on 'mutual commitment and trust' and 'the cooperation between groups', as demonstrated by the four 9/11 hijacking groups, which is 'radically inconsistent with the psychopathic personality' [38]. In fact, Townshend writes that terrorists are 'disturbingly normal people' and Crenshaw notes: 'What limited data we have on individual terrorists... suggest that the outstanding characteristic is normality' [39] [40]. Without the supposition of mental illness – a denigration due to a fundamental attribution error - psychological profiles resort to assigning subtler personality traits found in many sane members of the public [41]. For example, Post describes terrorists as 'action-oriented, aggressive people who are stimulus-hungry and seek excitement', which, even if accurate, would cover a sizable demographic of



those in the military, security or emergency services [42]. It is now generally accepted that as opposed to serial killers, pyromaniacs and rapists, the terrorist mind follows rational decision-making and attends to a coherent political philosophy that facilitates the use of violence as a tool of strategic and communicative value. The motives of terrorists are inherently socio-political, relating to a group philosophy rather than individual psychology. From this perspective, terrorism is a manifestation of political militancy, albeit in an intentionally audacious form, and the rationality of its actions should not be considered in isolation from their purposes.

Another criticism of the psychological profiling of terrorists is that the terrorist organisation, as with a legal enterprise, recruits many personalities in order to fulfil a diversity of functions. The composition of a terrorist organisation is far from homogenous, and requires the skills of not only hijackers and bombers, but bomb-makers, smugglers, leaders, disciplinarians, orators, communicators, trainers and financiers. The work undertaken by these roles culminates in the overall terrorist campaign. The complexity of a single terrorist organisation, not to mention the variety of terrorist movements as a whole, leads Hudson to write that;

*'The personalities of terrorists may be as diverse as the personalities of people in any lawful profession. There do not appear to be any visibly detectable personality traits that would allow authorities to identify a terrorist' [43].*

Psychological profiling is an inadequate form of discerning between the terrorist and the non-terrorist due to both the diversity and normalcy of the personalities that constitute a terrorist organisation's membership.

### *Socioeconomic Profiling*

The final profiling technique which will be examined is the use of socioeconomic measures. This strand of terrorist profiling relies on the premise that terrorist proclivity can be ascertained through information on an individual's social status, education, livelihood and marital status, amongst other factors. The general belief among international leaders is that "poverty lies at the heart of terrorism", as purported by Desmond Tutu and South Korean President Kim Dae Jong, and "education reduces terrorism", as supported by the Dalai Lama and Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel [44] [45]. These blanket suppositions do not always correlate with real world research. An example of this incongruity can be seen in Russell and Miller's analysis of eighteen different terrorist organisations and 350 individual terrorists active in the decade following 1966 [46]. Their research concluded that '[the observed terrorists] have been largely single males... who have some university education, if not a college degree'. From this, terrorists are more likely to be single, and, more surprisingly, they are likely have undertaken higher or further education. The same conclusion is drawn from the study of West German terrorists during that period;

*'Whether having turned to terrorism as a university student or only later, most were provided an anarchist or Marxist world view, as well as recruited into terrorist operations while in the university' [ibid.].*



Hudson writes that; ‘The RAF and Red Brigades were composed almost exclusively of disenchanting intellectuals’ [47]. Dean’s study of the thirty-six Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists arrested in 2001 and 2002 found that most of the members had high levels of education [48]. Besides a defining commonality of religion and above average education, the terrorist sample was socially and economically unremarkable. As with the other profiling measures, education does not, frustratingly for the profilers, paint a uniform portrait of a terrorist. A distinction can be made between the urban terrorist and the rural terrorist; the former – such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades – are typically highly educated, whereas rural movements – such as the Armed Islamic Group, PKK and FARC – tend to be characterised by a poorly educated membership. Citing the works of Nolan and Sprinzak, Lester, et al. depict several cases of oscillating demographic dimensions that ‘change with time and place’ [49] [50] [51]. This shows that terrorism, in part at least, is concomitant to the political environment, and, therefore, it is expectable that as social and economic circumstances evolve, so does the composition of the terrorist demographic. It can be concluded that a successful attempt to profile the terrorist must recognise that its assessment is both ephemeral and context-specific.

### *Behavioural Detection*

The lack of definitive success in profiling terrorists based on the dimensions of race, gender, age, pathology, psychology and socioeconomic factors has led to other methods of processing a population in order to detect malfeasors. The intention of these newer techniques is to avoid dimensional profiling due the already explained differences between terrorist movements, between roles within terrorist organisations and between the personalities and motives of individual terrorists. Instead, abnormalities in physiology and behaviour are detected by using technology and behavioural detection officers to monitor individuals at security points. The obvious benefit to this approach is that it requires no previous knowledge of the individual’s personal history. The US Transport Security Administration implemented the Screening of Passengers through Observation Techniques (SPOT) programme in 2003 to ‘identify potentially high security risk individuals by screening travellers for behaviours that may be indicative of stress, fear or deception’ [52]. SPOT has met with increasing criticism for not being able to detect terrorists: There have been 23 occasions where terrorists have travelled through SPOT security points and no interceptions have been made using the technique [53]. As Meyer points out: ‘Put bluntly, the program has a 100% failure rate’ [54]. Many scholars are sceptical as to whether the observation of behavioural and micro-facial movements is scientifically proven to be able to determine future violent intent. Honts, et al. raise several concerns:

*‘First, scientific research does not support the notion that microexpressions reliably betray concealed emotion... Second, whereas brief facial activity may reveal the purposeful manipulation of a felt emotion... the problems of interpretation of such manipulation renders the approach useless for practical purposes... In conclusion, the use of microexpressions to establish credibility is theoretically flawed and has not been supported by sound scientific research’ [55].*



Unless the employment of brief behavioural observation to identify future malicious intent in an individual is scientifically proven, and palpable results are forthwith, SPOT and similar programmes will continue to be rightfully derided by critics.

## *Conclusions*

The task of profiling the terrorist has been a long and drawn-out process that has seen a revival of interest in the post-9/11 era. During the seventies and eighties, many psychologists, sociologists, political scientists and international security academics sought to systematically record terrorist data in order to construct profiles organised around various parameters. The crudest profiles used immutable traits such as race and biological gender, while others endeavoured to define the terrorist through psychopathological or socioeconomic measurements. The initial obstacle facing all of these efforts was definitional, as is still the case today. This is because the fundamental terminology under investigation – *terrorism* – has not been universally defined. Working definitions employed by different studies vary and, therefore, the internal validity of recorded data and the generalised conclusions drawn from that data is considerably weakened. Regardless of this preliminary hindrance, the profiling of terrorists fails to result in any definitive phenotype of the universal terrorist. For instance, the use of racial profiling to monitor a population for potential international terrorists would result in a discrimination of security checks against Arabs, which total over 5 million people living in the United States alone. Overlooking the sheer size of this demographic, the fact remains that not all terrorists are Arabs. The implementation of racial stereotypes into terrorist profiling is not only imprecise, but has considerable ramifications for the individual liberty of the population being monitored. This has equal severity in the instances of gender and age profiling.

The argument for psychological profiling in the context of terrorism also falls short in its claim that a terrorist personality or personalities exist. Although some scholars argue that with more primary data, psychological profiling will be substantiated as a successful measure, the current evidence concludes that no causal progression from mental illness to terroristic intention occurs. Psychological profiling is further stifled by the apparent normalcy and sociability of many terrorists. Ethno-nationalists, in particular, are intertwined into an interdependent close-knit community which requires high levels of trust and mutual commitment, far from the notions of psychosis or other pathological disorders. Psychological profiles that incorporate subtler but ubiquitous personality traits, such as aggression and thrill-seeking, do not provide enough specificity to be of any practical application to the countering of terrorism. On the other hand, socioeconomic profiles do display some merit in specific temporal and geographic contexts, but are soon invalidated due to the fluidity of the political environment and the evolving terrorist-counterterrorist dichotomy. Due to the need of a considerable amount of biographical data and the lack of longevity or generalisability, such profiles have limited practical use in combating emerging terrorist threats. Socioeconomic profiles succeed in demonstrating one thing - the multiplicity and complexity of the phenomenon of terrorism.

To succinctly answer this paper's titular question - *Will it ever be possible to profile the terrorist?* This author believes that the usage of one-dimensional measurements to profile the terrorist is a futile endeavour and is likely to remain so in light of the current research. It may be argued that a successful terrorist profile can be created by amalgamating several unsuccessful one-dimensional assessments into a multi-dimensional profile. This is clearly a



recipe for compounding failure because, with each additional dimension added, the profile's scope becomes more and more extraneous to the diverse nature of the modern international terrorist. As an alternative to profiling the *terrorist*, a more lucrative venture may be to transcend the individual by profiling *terrorism* as a process within a complex system [56] [57]. This perspective is particularly pertinent today in order to profile terrorism as an increasingly globalised phenomenon.

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## Lone Wolves in Cyberspace

by Gabriel Weimann

**Keywords:** Lone-wolf, Communication, Internet, Social media, Open-Source Jihad, al-Qaeda

### Abstract

*Lone-wolf terrorism has been regarded as a serious threat to public safety in recent years. Moreover, the phenomenon appears to be increasing at an alarming rate. However, the gap between the perceived threat of lone-wolf terrorism on the one hand and the almost exclusive scholarly focus on group-based terrorism on the other indicates the need for more conceptual and empirical examinations of lone-wolf terrorism. One perspective highlighted in this article is the use of online communication platforms. In nature, wolves do not hunt alone: they hunt in packs. As this study demonstrates, lone-wolf terrorists are not really alone. They are recruited, radicalized, taught, trained and directed by others. Analysis of all recent cases, reports and studies of these individual attackers reveals the importance to lone wolves of online platforms, ranging from websites to new social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and more). After reviewing the role of these platforms for lone-wolf terrorists in general and for the “new” al-Qaeda, in particular, the paper concludes with proposed counter-terrorism measures applicable to this new arena.*

### Introduction

*"The most likely scenario that we have to guard against right now ends up being more of a lone-wolf operation than a large, well-coordinated terrorist attack."*

President Obama, August 16, 2011

“Lone-wolf terrorism is the fastest growing form kind of terrorism. Before 9/11, the men who went to terrorist camps and to Jihadi mosques where radical Imams preached jihad were seen as constituting the largest terror threat. Since 9/11, a gradual change has occurred. The real threat now comes from the single individual, the ‘lone wolf’, living next door, radicalized on the internet, and plotting strikes in the dark. A lone wolf is an individual or a small group of individuals who uses traditional terrorist tactics – including the targeting of civilians – to achieve explicitly political or ideological goals, but who acts without membership in, or cooperation with, an official or unofficial terrorist organization, cell, or group. The Unabomber, the Oklahoma City bomber, and the Fort Hood and Oslo attackers are examples of this new form of terrorism. Currently, less than two percent of terrorism in most countries that keep terrorism statistics can be attributed to lone-wolf terrorists but the problem is a rapidly growing one [1]. The report issued by the Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management on Terrorism (COT/TTSRL), which uses the RAND Terrorism Knowledge Base, reveals two trends: First, the number of lone-wolf attacks has increased in recent decades; second, lone wolves seem to come from all types of extremist ideological and religious groups [2].



Acts of lone-wolf terrorism have been reported in the United States, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Russia, Great Britain, Denmark, Portugal, Poland and Sweden. The fatal shooting in 2011 of two American airmen in Frankfurt by a Kosovar Albanian, the 2009 shooting rampage on the Fort Hood army base in Texas, or the 2011 deadly attack by the Norwegian right-wing extremist Anders Breivik killing 76 people in a bombing and shooting rampage—all share one thing in common: they were lone-wolf attacks. These lone wolves are challenging the police and intelligence community, as they are extremely difficult to detect and to defend against. Compared to group or network terrorism, lone wolves have a critical advantage -- they more easily avoid identification and detection before and after their attacks since most of them do not reveal their inclinations, visions, and plans. However, as this paper will attempt to demonstrate, these lone terrorists are not completely divorced from contact with others. They connect, communicate and share information, know-how and guidance -- all online -- on the “Dark Web”.

Following the Fort Hood shooting, Bruce Hoffman commented "I used to argue it was only terrorism if it were part of some identifiable, organized conspiracy..." but he was changing his definition because, "This new strategy of al-Qaeda is to empower and motivate individuals to commit acts of violence completely outside any terrorist chain of command." [3] Every month, Hoffman noted, there has been either a terrorist act committed or one broken up before it could be carried out. President Obama expressed unease at this trend. In a speech in August 2011 he argued that, "The biggest concern we have right now is not the launching of a major terrorist operation, although that risk is always there. The risk that we're especially concerned over right now is the lone-wolf terrorist, somebody with a single weapon being able to carry out wide-scale massacres of the sort that we saw in Norway recently."

Europol's recent annual report on terrorism and terrorist trends highlights the rise in lone-wolf attacks in Europe [4]. Rob Wainwright, director of Europol, summed up the situation like this: "Radicalization into violent extremism and lone-wolf attacks represents a significant threat for European citizens and have led to many tragedies. Looking ahead, lone actors will continue to pose a threat, whether inspired by political or religious extremism" [5]. However, despite the alarming increase in lone-wolf terrorism, there seems to be a gap between the perceived threat of lone-wolf terrorism, on the one hand, and the almost exclusive scholarly focus on group-based terrorism, on the other hand. The need for more conceptual and empirical examinations of lone-wolf terrorism may lead, as this study suggests, to revealing the lone-wolves' reliance on modern communication platforms. The analysis is based on a database collected in a 14-year-long project of monitoring thousands of terrorist websites and online forums, chatrooms and social networking. When this research was started in the late 1990s, there were merely a dozen terrorist websites; by 2000, virtually all terrorist groups had established their presence on the Internet and in 2003 there were over 2,600 terrorist websites. The number rose dramatically and by January 2012 the archive contains almost 8,000 websites serving terrorists and their supporters. The monitoring of terrorist online platforms involves tracking them, downloading their contents, translating the messages (texts and graphics) and archiving them according to a preset coding system [6]. Given the rather broad application of the lone wolf's definition, this paper will focus on the most frequent form today, the jihadist lone-wolf terrorism.

## Who are the lone wolves?

The term “lone wolf” was popularized in the late 1990s by two white supremacists, Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis, as part of an effort at encouraging fellow racists to act alone in committing violent



crimes for tactical reasons. Other terms that have been used to describe similar or comparable forms of political violence include “leaderless resistance” and “freelance terrorism.”

A lone wolf is someone who commits violent acts in support of some group, movement or ideology, but does so alone, outside of any command structure. Lone-wolf terrorism is defined as follows: “[...] terrorist attacks carried out by persons who (a) operate individually, (b) do not belong to an organized terrorist group or network, and (c) whose *modi operandi* are conceived and directed by the individual without any direct outside command or hierarchy” [7]. This definition covers such Islamist lone wolves as Nidal Malik Hasan, the Fort Hood killer, Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, who opened fire on a U.S. military recruiting office in Little Rock, Arkansas, as well as anti-Semitic devotees like Buford Furrow, who attacked a Jewish Community Center, and Eric Rudolph, also known as the Olympic Park Bomber, who perpetrated a series of bombings across the southern United States between 1996 and 1998 that killed two people and injured at least 150 others.

Usually, the lone-wolf terrorist shares an ideological or philosophical identification with an extremist group, but does not communicate with that group. While the lone wolf's actions are motivated to advance a certain group's goal, the tactics and methods are conceived and directed solely by the individual, without any outside command or direction. . Because of this lack of any personal contact with a larger group, lone-wolf terrorism poses a particular problem for counter-terrorism officials, for it is considerably more difficult to gather intelligence on lone-wolves than on conventional terrorists. In their paper entitled, “Lone Wolves; How to Prevent This Seemingly New Phenomenon,” Bakker and de Graaf examined the rise in lone-wolf terrorism and its characteristics and reached this conclusion: “There is no single, standardized profile of a lone wolf. Nonetheless, it is possible to distinguish between different categories of lone-wolf terrorists based on their ideological or religious background” [8]. A more promising way to analyze lone wolves is by applying a systematic typology or categorization of these highly variegated individuals.

## Typology of Lone Wolves

An analysis of lone-wolf terrorism distinguishes various categorizations of this complex phenomenon. The first distinction is between two forms, chaos and career [9]. Chaos lone-wolf terrorism involves a single event, which is singularly disruptive. Suicide bombing is a major form of chaos lone-wolf terrorism. A single event is planned and conducted in such a manner that maximum impact in terms of casualties and/or public visibility is achieved. The The Fort Hood Massacre by Major Nidal Hasan is an example of chaos terrorism by a lone wolf and so is the case of Andres Breivik, the Norwegian mass murderer and terrorist. On 22 July 2011, Breivik bombed the government buildings in Oslo, which resulted in eight deaths. He then carried out a mass shooting at a camp of the Workers' Youth League (AUF) of the Labor Party on the island of Utøya where he killed 69 people, mostly teenagers.

Career or serial terrorism by a lone-wolf operative usually involves a continuous series of lower-level acts of violence over an extended period of time. Ted Kazinsky, the so-called Unabomber, is an example of a career lone-wolf terrorist. Kazinsky engaged in a mail-bombing campaign that spanned almost 20 years and killed three people while injuring more than two dozen others. Lone-wolf terrorists who engage in career or serial terrorism see their violent actions as a long-term strategy, in which survival is a prerequisite for the continued visibility and viability of their campaign.

Another distinction relates to the type of individual terrorist. Phillips and Pohl applied economic models to develop a profile of lone-wolf terrorists. Specifically, they noted that an “important



advantage of the rational choice approach to offender profiling is its capability at handling cognitive and behavioral factors as well as situational factors” [10]. Based on a rational choice model, they identified two basic types of lone-wolf terrorists, the risk-averse and the risk-seeking individual. The risk-averse lone-wolf terrorist is a “part-time” terrorist who engages in low-level acts of serial terrorism while also engaging in other, more legitimate forms of activism. In contrast, risk-seeking lone wolves employ an alternative calculus, placing higher value on the expected marginal return of their acts in comparison to the potential threat of exposure and capture. For this latter personality, in essence, the risk is of as much importance, and possibly more so, than the cause or crusade.

Pantucci offered still another typology of the lone wolves, based on the means and context of self-radicalization, their tactics of engagement and the framework of available support [11]. He classified them into four categories: Loner, Lone Wolf, Lone Wolf Pack, and Lone Attacker. The Loner is defined as an individual who plans or attempts to carry out an act of terrorism using the cover of extreme ideology. However, while he (or she) may exploit an ideology to provide an explanation for their action, Loner terrorists do not appear to have any actual connection or contact with extremists – beyond their ability to access such groups or individuals through passive consumption, whether of the internet or from society at large.

Lone Wolves, Pantucci, are individuals who, while appearing to carry out their actions alone and without any physical instigation from the outside, in fact demonstrate some level of contact with operational extremists. Close analysis demonstrates that while similar to Loners, in that they act alone when operating in the real world (as opposed to the online world), Lone Wolves have some level of contact with members of a terrorist organization; furthermore, they possibly make contact with such individuals through the internet in what can appear to be some sort of command and control structure.

The Lone Wolf Pack category resembles that of the Lone Wolves, with one exception: rather than there being a single, ideologically motivated individual, it is a group of individuals who self-radicalize. This subset is in many ways the definition of Sageman’s “bunch of guys” theory, according to which groups form, radicalize and then seek to join the *jihād*. As Sageman describes the process, “social affiliation with the jihad accomplished through friendship, kinship and disciplinship; progressive intensification of beliefs and faith leading to acceptance of the global Salafi Jihadi ideology; and formal acceptance to the jihad through the encounter of a link to the jihad” [12]. What distinguishes this group from the broader community of terrorists is that they have not taken the final step of making contact with operational extremists or, if they have, it is not done in a way to further immediate operational goals.

Pantucci’s final group is that of the Lone Attackers – these are individuals who operate alone but demonstrate clear command and control links with a terrorist group or affiliated groups. Unlike the Lone Wolves or Lone Wolf Packs, individuals classified as Lone Attackers have contact with active extremists, rather than loose online connections or aspirational contacts. In other words, they are in fact simply one-man terror cells dispatched by terror groups.

Despite the differences among these categories, they display a clear communality: lone wolves are not really alone. They are linked, networked or communicated with through the Internet.

## The Role of the Internet

In nature, wolves do not hunt alone: they hunt in packs. So, too, with the lone-wolf terrorists: there is a virtual pack, a social network, behind them. They may operate alone, but they are recruited,



radicalized, taught, trained and directed by others. They seem to be alone and yet there are social ties linking them to others as a report released by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point concludes:

*An assessment of eighty terrorist incidents both successful and failed during a seventeen-year period from 1993 to 2010 using the strict definition of a lone wolf attack developed above is instructive...Many of these forty-five individuals in fact received training abroad or joined larger organizations at some point in their radicalization process [13].*

What is the role of the Internet as an incubator or accelerator of the Lone Wolf phenomenon? Pantucci's conclusion in this regard is instructive:

*The internet is clearly the running theme between most of the plots included in this dataset [on lone wolves] and it appears to be a very effective tool: it provides a locus in which they can obtain radicalizing material, training manuals and videos. It provides them with direct access to a community of like-minded individuals around the world with whom they can connect and in some cases can provide them with further instigation and direction to carry out activities. Many of the individuals in the dataset demonstrate some level of social alienation – within this context, the community provided by the internet can act as a replacement social environment that they are unable to locate in the real world around them [14].*

A report by the General Intelligence and Security Service in the Netherlands (AIVD) came to a similar conclusion:

*The AIVD is aware of the fact that lone wolves often plot and carry out a (violent) act on their own, but has found that they rarely radicalize in complete isolation....The AIVD argues that radicalization is a social phenomenon. This also applies to most lone wolves. In the aftermath of such events, it is often discovered that lone wolves hardly had any contact with like-minded individuals in real life, but did maintain active contact with people on the Internet. In retrospect, it is then concluded that these contacts, as well as the consumption of jihadist propaganda and the online discourse, have contributed to their radicalization and (may also) have inspired them to commit such a (violent) act [15].*

An intelligence report by the Canadian government's Integrated Threat Assessment Centre also expressed concern about the emerging threat posed by lone-wolf Islamist terrorists. The report stressed the importance of the Internet:

*The Internet is helpful to an individual who may be preparing to conduct a lone-wolf attack, providing ideological motivation, encouragement, and justification, all within an anonymous*



*environment....Islamist extremist web sites offer not only theoretical and religious instruction but also practical on-line training courses that urge visitors to take action on their own. For example, the comprehensive Encyclopaedia of Preparation for Jihad is available online. Professional, video-formatted instructional materials detailing various explosive manufacturing recipes have also begun to circulate widely on the web in the past two years, along with at least 22 other separate audio-visual terrorist manuals [16].*

Europol's most recent annual terrorism situation and trend report, published in April 2012, highlighted the importance of the internet. The report states that the internet has become the "principal means of communication" for extremist groups, which now have a "substantial online presence." As well as its use for propaganda, recruitment, fundraising and planning - facilitated by social media - the internet also has the potential to be employed in cyber-attacks on the operating systems of vital infrastructure in EU member states [17].

A recent example may illustrate the online process. In 2011, Jose Pimentel was arrested for planning attacks with home-made pipe bombs against police vehicles and postal facilities in New York and New Jersey. Pimentel, a native of the Dominican Republic who had come to the U.S. at the age of 8, was an unemployed, 27-year-old Muslim convert and al-Qaeda sympathizer who lived in Manhattan. He was charged with five counts of building pipe bombs targeting returning veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan. Pimentel was not part of any known al-Qaeda organization. However, the inspiration for his planned bombing attacks came from reading instructions in the online Inspire Magazine produced by al-Qaeda and the American-born cleric Sheik Anwar al-Awlaki on the Arabian Peninsula. According to New York authorities, Pimentel was not just radicalized by the al-Qaeda magazine, but he also found in its pages the instructions he used to build the pipe bombs; this was thanks to a notorious article in English, entitled, "How to make a bomb in the kitchen of your mom."

Reading *Inspire* magazine was not Pimentel's main online activity. He maintained a massive website on Blogger and a YouTube channel featuring hundreds of radical works. As an analysis of Pimentel's online footprints reveals, he was "directly linked online to known extremists through whom he is connected to some hundreds of like-minded individuals." [18] Pimentel's website, TrueIslam1.com, hosted an impressive archive of jihadist texts, with audio and video organized by means of the online publishing tool Blogger. The website connects to Pimentel's YouTube channel, which was similarly thorough; it had collected more than 600 videos relating to radical and violent interpretations of Islam, 60 of which he had uploaded himself. This channel had more than 1,500 subscribers.

### **Al-Qaeda calls for lone wolves**

One of the most difficult challenges faced by al-Qaeda today is the on-going loss of a large part of its first-, second- and even third-generation leadership, some of whom have been assassinated, others arrested, while still others have dissociated themselves from the organization and its terrorist methods. As observed in Europol's recent report, "As a consequence of sustained military pressure, al-Qaeda core have publicly discouraged sympathizers from travelling to conflict zones in order to join them. It has instead promoted the idea of individually planned and executed attacks in Western countries without the active assistance of any larger organization" [19].



Partly out of necessity, al-Qaeda has now thrown its weight fully behind “lone” terrorism. Already in 2003, an article was published on an extremist internet forum called *Sada al Jihad* (Echoes of Jihad), in which Osama bin Laden sympathizers were encouraged to take action without waiting for instructions. In 2006, a text authored by an al-Qaeda member, Abu Jihad al-Masri, “How to fight alone,” circulated widely in jihadist fora. Another prominent Salafi writer, Abu Musab al-Suri, also advocated that acts of terrorism be carried out by small, autonomous cells or individuals. He outlined a strategy for global conflict that took the form of resistance by small cells or individuals and kept organizational links to an absolute minimum.

In March 2010, As-Sahab, al-Qaeda’s media wing, released an English-language video entitled, “A Call to Arms,” and featuring an American-born spokesperson, Adam Gadahn. The video, directed at jihadists in the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, highlights the Fort Hood shooter, Nidal Hasan, whom Gadahn describes in glowing terms (“a pioneer, a trailblazer and a role model who has opened a door, lit a path, and shown the way forward for every Muslim who finds himself among the unbelievers...”). Nidal Hasan is held up as an exemplary figure for his loyalty to Islam and Muslims in defiance of his unbeliever commanders and for having struck at a sensitive target in the heart of America. Gadahn then uses the example of Nidal Hasan to call on other Muslims in the “Crusader West,” especially in the U.S., Britain, and Israel, to undertake lone-wolf attacks. He advises his listeners to focus in particular on targets that will do serious economic damage to these countries, and points to the 9/11 attacks to show that such attacks need not necessarily employ conventional firearms.

In an early June 2011 English-language video message, headlined, “Do Not Rely on Others, Take the Task upon Yourself,” Gadahn even more clearly emphasizes lone-wolf operations. He suggests possible measures: “Let’s take America as an example. America is absolutely awash with easily obtainable firearms. You can go down to a gun show at the local convention center and come away with a fully automatic assault rifle, without a background check, and most likely without having to show an identification card. So what are you waiting for?” [20].

On February 10, 2012, a member of the Shumoukh al-Islam jihadi forum, “Abu Asma’ Al-Cubi” (“the Cuban”), posted a message detailing how Muslims living in the West, particularly in the U.S., can promote the global Jihadi movement and can weaken America from within. Al-Cubi writes that it has become clear to all that the two main forces operating in the geopolitical and ideological arenas are al-Qaeda and its supporters, on the one hand, and the U.S. and its allies, on the other. Referring to al-Qaeda as a “hidden phenomenon,” he says that the organization has proven itself to be the force that is the stronger and more united of the two, especially after it defeated the Americans and their allies in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an al-Qaeda affiliate, has been especially vocal in encouraging lone acts of terrorism. Its online English-language magazine *Inspire* promotes “open-source jihad,” a new tactic that emerged as the al-Qaeda leadership steadily vanished in the decade following 9/11. With its leaders either dead or in jail, al-Qaeda had to apply new modes of attack. The organization splintered first into “franchises” by country or region, then further into lone operators. *Inspire* became an important tool for recruiting, informing and motivating these lone jihadists. Each edition of the magazine, in fact, has a special section called, “Open Source Jihad,” which is intended to equip aspiring jihadist attackers with the tools they need to conduct attacks without traveling to jihadist training camps. It is also dedicated to helping terrorist sympathizers in the West carry out attacks by including, among other things—as was seen above in the case of Jose Pimentel—bomb-making recipes. *Inspire* has featured articles attributed to three prominent violent jihadist propagandists with strong American ties: Gadahn, the radical U.S.-born imam Anwar al-



Awlaki, and the Saudi-born American citizen Samir Khan. The latter two were killed in a U.S. air strike in Yemen in September 2011.

The article, "How to Make a Bomb in Your Mom's Kitchen," mentioned earlier, was downloaded by individuals who plotted terrorist attacks in both the U.S. and the UK (e.g., Naser Jason Abdo, a Muslim U.S. soldier who allegedly plotted to attack the Fort Hood military base, and Pimentel, who had started making a pipe bomb based on the recipe when he was arrested). The magazine has also heavily featured the writings of a Syrian al-Qaeda-linked terrorist, Abu Musab al-Suri, who pioneered the concept of individual terrorism before the 9/11 attacks. "We ask the Muslim youth to be a terrorist. Why do we ask for such individual terrorism? First because secret hierarchical organizations failed to attract Muslims," al-Suri told recruits in Afghanistan in 2000, according to a videotape obtained by CNN [21]. The articles in *Inspire* clearly promote individual jihad; thus, the Fall 2010 edition editorialized: "Spontaneous operations performed by individuals and cells here and there over the whole world, without connections between them, have put the local and international intelligence apparatus in a state of confusion, as arresting the members of aborted cells does not influence the operational activities of others who are not connected with them." The ideas and methods for terror attacks are meant for anyone, including those without direct ties to al-Qaeda or its affiliates. Thus, the Summer 2010 issue advised making a pipe bomb using everyday materials, the Fall 2010 issue encouraged using one's car to "mow down" people in crowded places and the Winter 2010 issue discussed how to blow up buildings.

Since its foundation, *Inspire* magazine has also advocated the concept that jihadists living in the West should conduct attacks there, rather than traveling to places like Pakistan, Somalia or Yemen, since such travel might bring them to the attention of the authorities. Indeed, *Inspire* views attacking in the West as "striking at the heart of the unbelievers." The October 2010 issue included an article, entitled "Tips for Our Brothers in the United States of America," that contained this recommendation: "We strongly encourage our brothers to fight jihad on US soil.... A random shooting rampage at a crowded restaurant in Washington D.C. at lunch hour, for example, might end up knocking out a few government employees [and it] would attract additional media attention." Gaining world attention has always been important for al-Qaida.

On May 2, 2012, The eighth and ninth issues of *Inspire* were released on jihadist forums. Both editions reinforce al-Qaida's promotion of lone-wolf attacks, but each issue presents different arguments and directions. The eighth issue, carrying the cover headline, "Targeting Dar al-Harb Populations," advocates the lone-wolf trend for non-Muslim lands in the same way as did previous editions. It details plans for new attack methods in the "Open Source Jihad" section, and presents the culmination of Anwar al-Awlaki's justification for killing American civilians. This issue also explains to potential lone wolves how to use small handguns and to build remote-controlled detonators for explosives. The contents of the eighth issue clearly rely on articles from previous issues.

The ninth issue, entitled "Winning on the Ground," includes instructions for individuals wishing to carry out lone-wolf jihad attacks. An article entitled, "The Convoy of Martyrs: Rise Up and Board with Us," declares,

The objective of this workshop is to communicate with those seek[ing] martyrdom operations, or those who want to execute a slaughter to the enemies of Islam, [or] those who have no means of contacting their *mujahideen* brothers. Whatever the reason, the aim is to activate them in the midst of the enemy, weather [sic] the enemy is the Jews, the Christians or the apostates. It is becoming obvious to many that the concept of individual jihad, which [has] begun to appear recently, has been called for by the leaders of jihad.



The article instructs candidates to send basic information about themselves to AQAP's "military committee," which will then help them in planning and executing the attack; it will also take responsibility for the incident and provide media coverage. The article includes a list of conditions that candidates must meet a list of possible targets, and directions for contacting the committee securely by using encrypted emails. The ninth issue encourages individuals to act alone in gathering information, preparing and ultimately executing an attack. While the focus is still on individual jihad, the article does argue, however, that there must be an operational leadership, which AQAP will provide. This issue of *Inspire* also places strong emphasis on lone-wolf operations to limit the opportunity for law enforcement interdiction, and advises small group plots only if the individual completely trusts his associates. The article, "Convoy of Martyrs," describes the qualifications of the desired lone wolf. According to the article, you must be a Muslim; must possess "maturity"; and be skilled in "listening and obeying." The terrorist group provides a public encryption key and a handful of Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail accounts where you can send your idea about whom or what you would like to attack. If you are approved, you are sent to act, unencumbered by any traditional terrorist cell: "The only connection that mujahid has", states the text, "is with the group leadership. In this case it will be our military committee".

Another article in *Inspire* 9, "Qualities of an Urban Assassin," published by 'Uthman ibn Al-Ightiyal ("the son of assassination") described the necessary attributes and precautions of the would-be lone wolf operative. It discussed the need for inconspicuousness and integration into one's Western surroundings, with an emphasis on the set of knowledge and skills, including technological proficiency that would enable the individual fighter to properly plan and execute attacks in the heart of urban population centers. Al-Ightiyal called on the lone wolves not to limit their attacks to military or political targets, but to include "anyone that the shari'a allows him to eliminate," including "non-combatants."

There is convincing evidence on the impact of *Inspire* magazine among lone wolves. A growing number of lone-wolves were found to be linked with this online magazine, including Jose Pimentel, Naser Jason Abdo, Hakan Ertarkan, arrested in London on April 12, 2011 and found to be in possession of a CD issue of *Inspire*, The Germans Christian Emde and Robert Baum, arrested July 15, 2011, when they tried to enter Britain in possession of electronic copies of *Inspire*, Zahid Iqbal, Mohammed Sharfaraz Ahmed, Umar Arshad, and Syed Farhan Hussain, arrested in Britain on April 24, 2012 and accused of working to recruit others, of taking their lead from *Inspire*, and of possessing copies of it.

## Social Media and Lone Wolves

Online social networking platforms have become a powerful terrorist apparatus for attracting potential members and followers [22]. These types of virtual communities are growing increasingly popular all over the world, especially among younger demographics. Jihadist terrorist groups are especially targeting youths for propaganda, incitement and recruitment purposes. Accordingly, terrorist groups and their sympathizers are more and more exploiting predominately Western online communities, such as Facebook, MySpace and Second Life and their Arabic equivalents, to export their message. Anthony Bergin, a counter-terrorism expert, says that terrorists use these youth-dominated websites as recruitment tools "in the same way a paedophile might look at those sites to potentially groom would-be victims" [23].

The "Forum on the Role of the Internet in Fighting Terrorism and Extremism" held in Saudi Arabia in January 2011 focused on the way the new, online social media has contributed to the increase in "lone wolf" acts. Marc Sageman, for example, argued that the internet has allowed "a conversation



between disconnected, scattered people which was not possible before. This is because individuals shy about discussing their extremist views in person can easily find like-minded people on the web through chat rooms and forums. Through these virtual contacts, individuals gain enough confidence to carry out violent acts” [24]. Europol’s annual terrorism situation and trend report of 2012 concluded:

*Online social media sites attract high numbers of users. Internet forums are an effective means to address targeted audiences, including supporters who have no off-line links to terrorist organizations. Most forums restrict access, wholly or partially, to vetted members who need to prove their credentials and loyalty, or be recommended by established members before admission. Forum members are strongly advised by their moderators to use encryption software for direct communication [25].*

The accused Fort Hood shooter, Nidal Hasan, exchanged internet messages with Awlaki, while the Frankfurt terrorist, Uka, was a Facebook friend with a number of known Islamist extremists in Germany. In fact, almost all of the lone-wolf cases in recent years have involved the use of electronic social media. For lone wolves, online communication provides the needed social bonding, a (virtual) community and a source of guidance, support and moral backing. Today, the internet allows anyone to post his or her ideology on the Web. James von Brunn, the Holocaust Museum shooter, operated an anti-Semitic web page, called the Holy Western Empire. Major Nidal Malik Hassan developed a Power Point presentation entitled, “The Koranic World View as it Relates to Muslims in the U.S. Military.”

Terrorists harness the interactive capabilities of chatrooms, instant messenger, blogs, video sharing-websites, self-determined online communities and social networks: “Today, 90% of terrorist activity on the internet takes place using social networking tools, be it independent bulletin boards, Paltalk, or Yahoo! eGroups. These forums act as a virtual firewall to help safeguard the identities of those who participate, and they offer subscribers a chance to make direct contact with terrorist representatives, to ask questions and even to contribute and help out the cyber jihad” [26]. The Jihadi forum Shumukh al-Islam is often used to exchange messages regarding lone-wolf attacks. Thus, for example, a prominent jihadist writer, Abu Asma'a al-Kubi, posted a message on February 9, 2012, on the Shumukh al-Islam forum, and in it he argued that attacks in the enemies' own lands will complement the actions of al-Qaeda abroad and expressed discontent with Muslims living in the West, questioning why they have not yet committed individual acts of jihad, especially after the killing Usama bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki, and Attiya Allah. In April 2012, a posting on this forum suggested that prospective lone-wolf fighters collaborate with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and carry out attacks similar to the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. The suggestion came in response to a previous posting calling to avenge the death of former al-Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden. In that initial posting, the author had recommended that lone-wolves in Western countries use explosives to derail trains. Following up on that idea, he posted that a mass-casualty incident like the Madrid bombings will serve al-Qaeda's cause more than killing one average person. The jihadist wrote: "My beloved brother... the issue is not just to kill and that is it; rather, the issue is of changing the balance of power... Look to the Madrid operation. Three or four people were able to kill 191 people and cause the withdrawal of the Spanish army from Iraq” [27].

Hamas has also noted the power of social media. "We call for adopting a strategy on the basis of resistance and the upholding of our rights and constants," a Hamas spokesman, Sami Abu Zuhri,



stated in an official message on Twitter. While statements in support of "resistance" may be old-fashioned, Hamas' leadership is capitalizing on the social media craze in order to reach a new crowd. Its new media push includes accounts on Youtube, Flickr, Twitter, and Facebook, as well as a website ([www.hamainfo.net](http://www.hamainfo.net)) and forums. One such forum, run by the Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades, provides an official outlet for discussion, multimedia and advocacy on Hamas' behalf. It includes photos of "martyrdom operations" and videos honouring suicide attackers. Similarly, Hezbollah has established a vast network of operatives throughout Latin America and North America that could be used to wage terrorist attacks if directed to do so. More than 80 Hezbollah operatives have been identified in at least a dozen South American countries, according to Roger Noriega, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs [28].

In May 2012, a jihadist, urging fellow forum members to participate in a "workshop" to spread the *Inspire* e-magazine to Facebook, listed hundreds of links to American Facebook pages and groups where forum members could promote the publication. To assist in the campaign, which was highlighted with a promotional banner and given a prominent position on the Shumukh al-Islam forum, the author posted an example of a code that participants could use as a template to easily disseminate download links for the eighth and ninth issues of *Inspire*.

On March 22, 2012, several Jewish schoolchildren and a Rabbi were murdered by 23 year-old Mohamed Merah in Toulouse, France. Before he was shot dead by a police sniper, Merah said that he had videotaped this killing as well as the previous murder of three French soldiers. The terrorist had used a GoPro camera strapped to his chest to record the killing of his seven victims and then posted the gruesome footage online while he was in his flat surrounded by police. After his death, members of several online jihadist forums praised Merah for his attacks on French Jews and on soldiers. Postings on such forums have included calls for similar lone-wolf attacks and described Merah's shootings as Allah's revenge on France for its foreign policy and attitude toward Muslims. Later, a video tribute to Merah called, "The Lone Lion," began circulating on the forums. The video begins with text commending Merah for killing "three French soldiers returning from Afghanistan" and "a Jewish rabbi and his children." It also applauds him for fighting "the French special forces with courage until he was killed as a martyr." The video includes recordings of Osama bin Laden speaking about a promised war "between us and the Jews" and of current al-Qaeda leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, describing England and the United States as legitimate targets because of the civilian casualties in Iraq, Afghanistan and Gaza. A Facebook page, headlined "Homage to Mohamed Merah," that praised the lone killer was closed after France's interior ministry asked the social networking site to remove it. In the few hours it had been online, more than 500 people had consulted the Facebook page. Many of the visitors left comments attacking the police or supporting radical Islam.

## Conclusions

Despite the many differences in background and tactics, lone wolves share some commonalities. One common characteristic is that they are not indeed so lonely: they are motivated, taught, recruited, incited or even trained by external sources; they display a degree of commitment to and identification with extremist movements; in other words, their solitary actions do not take place in a vacuum. These commonalities are important in identifying and understanding the process of radicalization [29]. The significant increase in lone-wolf terrorism in the past three decades can partly be explained by the adoption and use of various online platforms for the dissemination of lone-wolf tactics. Terrorist groups have learned how to appeal to potential lone wolves, to attract



and seduce them, to train and teach them and finally to launch them on their attacks – all by using online communication, from forums and chatrooms to Facebook, YouTube and Twitter.

The alarming spread of lone-wolf attacks raises the issue of counter-terrorism (CT) measures. Attacks by lone operators provide the most challenging form of terrorism. Lone-wolf terrorists offer a nightmare for counterterrorism organizations, the police and intelligence communities, as they are extremely difficult to find, identify and arrest. However, the fact that lone wolves are not completely alone may lead to potential measures. First of all, according to Alex Shone of the Henry Jackson Society, the key factor concerning locating lone wolf attacks is knowing, not *who* will carry out an attack, but *how* such an attack is formulated (Shone, 2010). Shone stresses the need to study the radicalization processes of lone wolves. He shows that insight into these processes opens up possible avenues for effective CT measures to prevent or counter the threat of lone-wolf terrorism.

As Bakker and de Graaf conclude: “Knowing how lone operator attacks are formulated requires a far more sensitive detection system at the tactical, sharp-end of operations than most CT organizations currently use” [30]. Yet, if the process of recruiting, supporting and training lone wolves relies on online platforms, these sites can be monitored and studied. The “outreach” by law enforcement into radical, extremist, Jihadist and other terrorist communities is a key to providing early warnings of threats. Such warning signs include ties individuals may have developed with known radicals or online interaction through radical websites. Another CT measure to track down and find potential lone-wolf attackers is the use of online undercover agents and informants. For example, the New York Police Department has developed a Cyber Intelligence Unit, in which undercover “cyber agents” track the online activities of suspected violent extremists and interact with them online to gauge the potential threat they pose. The unit has played a key role in several recent terrorism investigations, including that of Abdel Hameed Shehadeh, who authorities allege attempted to travel overseas to Somalia to fight for the local al-Qaeda group.

An indication of the potential utility of these measures is the number of lone wolves that have been found to be in possession of terrorism material acquired by accessing online sources. The list includes, for example, Antonio Martinez, a Maryland man arrested for attempting to detonate a car bomb at a Maryland Army recruiting center in December 2010; Jason Naser Abdo, the soldier charged in a bomb plot targeting personnel at Fort Hood, Texas; Barry Walter Bujol, Jr., a Texas resident arrested for attempting to deliver money and other equipment to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; and Mohamed Osman Mohamud, who was arrested in November 2010 for attempting to blow up a Christmas tree-lighting ceremony with a car bomb in Portland, Oregon. Mohamud went so far as to submit an article to AQAP’s online English-language magazine, *Inspire* (it was not published), as well as to another online English-language terror magazine, called *Jihad Recollections*. These cases demonstrate not only the growing threat posed by individuals who self-radicalize without any physical interactions with established terrorist groups, but also their reliance on online communication, which may be used against them.

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## Lashkar-e-Taiba of Pakistan: An India Centric Threat Projection

by Saroj Kumar Rath

### Abstract

*Within a year of the Mumbai attacks by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the public outrage that many thought would usher in a political groundswell for a firmer government response, has dissipated. Almost all the political figures who resigned as a result of the attacks either back in their old jobs or promoted to other plumb posts. After a brief hiatus, bombings by LeT and/or its affiliates resumed in cities like Mumbai, Delhi, Pune, Varanasi and Srinagar. Total casualty including left-wing extremism related death since Mumbai attacks as per the South Asia Terrorism Portals is more than 5000. India's post-Mumbai public appraisal and official introspection is no match to the response of the US after September 11. India's lackluster appreciation of the impending danger could be undersood from the fact that, while the US government has commissioned atleast a dozen of official studies on LeT after the Mumbai attacks, India government commissioned none. The LeT is gradually growing from strength to strength by encompassing the role of a political pressure group under the guise of Difa-e-Pakistan. But India is blind to the development and poised to the danger unfolding in its western neighbour.*

**Keywords:** Lashkar-e-Taiba, Difa-e-Pakistan, India, Pakistan, Future Security.

### The Gathering Cloud

“On May 10, 2011, exactly a week after the US Navy SEALs killed Osama bin Laden in a raid on a compound near Pakistan's top army training school Kakul Academy in Abbottabad, the US Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen received an unsigned, undated secret memo from Pakistan. Hussain Haqqani, then Pakistani Ambassador sent the memo through the secret intermediaries of US businessman Mansoor Ijaz to Adm. Mullen after the alleged approval of President Asif Ali Zardari[1]. The document, which sought Adm. Mullen's intervention in the affair of Pakistan, reveals interesting facts about Mumbai terror attacks. The memo indicated that the Zardari government suspected active involvement of the shadowy S-Wing of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in the Mumbai attacks and expressed helplessness in bringing the perpetrators into justice[2]. Admitting the role of ISI in the Mumbai attacks and proposing a new national security team the memo said, 'We are prepared to bring all perpetrators of Pakistani origin to account for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, whether outside government or inside any part of the government, including its intelligence agencies'[3]. Earlier, Pakistan government has admitted the role of LeT and Pakistani citizen in the Mumbai attacks[4]. The secret memo was the first official admission by Pakistan about the involvement of ISI in the Mumbai conspiracy.

Not only this, the memo provides a rare glimpse into the inner sanctum of the shadowy S-Wing of the ISI, whose relations with the LeT is robust. The S-Wing of ISI has been responsible for many attacks and it is said that this wing is dedicated to promoting the dubious agenda of a narrow group of nationalists who believe only they can protect Pakistan's territorial integrity[5]. Such blatant admission is a sign of ongoing as well as impending ISI-LeT sponsored danger against India. The



S-Wing provides military support and intelligence logistics to groups like the LeT as the ISI embodies the scourge of radicalism that has become a cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy[6].

The availability of literature on LeT is abundant; most of them explaining the historical journey of the group while few describing its ideological orientation at best. This article would analyze the threat of LeT towards India. The principal questions the article will take includes – What are the LeT's objectives today, and how are they likely to be achieved? What role would the ISI play in LeT's future? How will the LeT work with other groups? And what is likely to be the international pressure on LeT? Answers to these questions are vital for the future security of South Asia.

Immediately after the Mumbai attacks, which is also famous as 26/11 attacks, the US dispatched a team under the leadership of New York Police Commissioner Mr. Raymond Kelly and Under Secretary of Department of Homeland Security Mr. Charles Allen to analyze and provide information on the attacks[7]. Since then the US government has commissioned nearly a dozen of studies to analyze the potential danger from LeT to the US homeland security and US 'interest' abroad[8]. The US government also invited Congressional hearings on this subject from senior defence officials and intelligence personnel. With the submission of dozens of research studies on LeT to the US government and with its subsequent media coverage, there was flooding of research materials on the threat assessment of LeT. Interestingly, all the studies were meant to assess LeT's potential to harm US 'interest' inside and outside America[9]. After the US, almost all leading governments and universities of repute of the world commissioned studies on the Mumbai attacks and LeT with the same perspective – what would be the future potential of LeT to harm 'Western Interest'[10]? Since LeT never attacked any Pakistani interest, there is no such study required or available in Pakistan, which discuss LeT's potential to harm Pakistan in future. Curiously, despite the fact that India is the primary target of LeT, government of India neither employed nor produced any futuristic study on the group. India's intelligentsia is almost silent on this vital subject. There were a few studies conducted by Indian thinktanks after the Mumbai attacks but those were mostly visual spectacles and copy paste job[11]. Whatever little futuristic studies available in India about LeT are only in the domain of newspapers and print periodical magazines. The Indian media has done a commendable job on this subject not only because of their access to information but also because of their commitment to undertake further studies on the LeT[12].

Till the time the article is completed, LeT has never attacked any US target on the US soil. The paintball jihadi, where LeT trained terrorists supposed to attack US targets, never succeeded[13]. Outside the US, LeT never conducted an exclusive attack on any US interest and wherever there was some report of LeT's participation in any attack against US target, the role of LeT was subsidiary in nature[14]. Despite its anger against the US, the group refrained from attacking US interests in the Asian continent[15]. The US views the LeT through the prism of al Qaeda and hence it is paranoid with the very thought of a repetition of 9/11[16].

Sensing the damaging potential of LeT, especially the organization's public rhetoric on the termination of US supply line towards Afghanistan, an alert US administration placed Hafiz Saeed as one of the 'Most Wanted Terrorists' with a US\$10 million bounty[17]. Wendy R. Sherman, the US under secretary of state for political affairs, announced the reward during a visit to India on April 2, 2012. She also announced a reward of \$2 million for information leading to the capture of Hafiz Abdul Rahman Makki, Saeed's brother-in-law[18]. In the subsequent time, the State Department's announcement became a matter of ridicule as Saeed lives in plain sight in Muridke near Lahore and running his operations from a sprawling compound on the outskirts of Lahore. Immediately after the announcement, Saeed himself appeared live on several television channels deriding the American bounty as a 'foolish step' orchestrated by Pakistan's archenemy, India. He



said, 'These rewards are usually announced for people who are hiding in mountains or caves. I wish the Americans would give this reward money to me[19].' Experts viewed the US step as a method to place Saeed inside a box as he has been taking out countrywide protests against the resumption of NATO supplies into Afghanistan and drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal area[20].

The reward diplomacy of the US worked rather well. After the announcement, Saeed's well-wishers inside the government 'advised' him to keep low profile and once he was caged, NATO supply lines were resumed[21]. Fearing action from the ISI under US pressure, Saeed went to the Lahore High Court and requested the court 'to direct the government to ask the US to withdraw the bounty and to provide protection to him'[22]. The matter is pending before the court. However, the US remained unfazed. The Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her India visit reiterated US position that she authorized the 10 million dollar award for the twin objectives of protecting 'US citizens' and 'to go after those who are trying to kill' US citizens[23]. Mrs. Clinton was categorical that the US knows the whereabouts of Saeed and the reward announcement is 'a way of raising the visibility and pointing out to those who are associated with them that there is a cost for that'[24]. Nevertheless, despite the clarification vagueness about the US announcement remained. Meanwhile, Abu Jundal, one of the LeT handlers of Mumbai terrorists resumed his work and in 2009 and in one of the communications Indian agencies heard his plan to attack American and Israeli targets in India. CIA and Mossad were alerted about Jundal's plan[25]. When Abu Jundal was arrested by Indian agencies on June 20, 2012, his interrogation further paranoid the US. Consequentially, the US Treasury Department has placed sanctions on eight leaders of LeT[26].

Contrary to the US paranoia, India has been continuously under attacks from the LeT. Since 1990, nearly 95% of LeT operations were directed against India[27]. As per the South Asia Terrorism Portal, which list chronologically the attacks conducted by the LeT, there were dozens of LeT attacks on India since November 2008[28]. The most significant terrorist attacks carried out either by the LeT or its proxy since November 2008 were Pune bombing of February 2010, Zavery Bazaar (Mumbai) bombing of July 2011 and Delhi High Court bombing of September 2011[29]. In January 2010, a Mumbai like attacks was replicated in Srinagar's Punjab Hotel, near Lal Chowk where LeT terrorists had holed up and taking constant instruction from their handlers in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) during the siege. 'Their communication with their handlers revealed that more attacks are in offing'[30]. These attacks are the testimony of the growing capacity and commitment of LeT to orchestrate deadly terror strike against India. The Lal Chowk siege prompted then union home minister P. Chidambaram to admit that 'the country, especially Jammu and Kashmir, remains vulnerable to militant attacks sponsored by forces from across the border.[31]'

## **Lashkar-e-Toiba's Growing Clout**

In Pakistan, LeT - the dreaded terrorist organization, has taken a gigantic shape to which even elected government shudder to disturb. High ranking Indian officials admitted that President Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani had been confronting difficulty in dealing with groups like LeT[32]. India's worry was added by the fact that the civilian government was incapable of taking action against LeT and the military had not yet made the strategic shift required to do so. During the Kargil War, LeT militants fought along with their army counterpart at the mountains of Kashmir[33]. Immediately after the Kargil defeat, LeT organized a mass rally where LeT *Amir* Hafiz Saeed addressed the gathering and said, 'We will not rest until the whole of India is dissolved into Pakistan'. He assured his audience that LeT would continue sending militants into India and 'Allah will save them from the fires of hell and huge palaces in paradise awaited those martyred by infidel enemies[34].' There was no demoralizing effect of Kargil defeat on the LeT as the



organization promised to send mujahideen into India. Probably this was the reason why Pakistan army paid wages to LeT and sustained the organization[35]. The Army-LeT nexus is especially important as after September 11 attacks, since when most of the militant groups of Pakistan have turned their guns inward and attacked Pakistani interest. LeT is the only group, which has not only refrained from attacking Pakistani interests but also discouraged other groups to do so. Due to its pro-Pakistan ideology and policies, it has deep roots in Pakistani society and military establishment. The robustness of the alliance could be measured from the fact that LeT Commander Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi was still directing LeT operations from custody inside the Adiala Jail. According to a US memo sent to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and National Security Council, Pakistan Army Chief Gen. Pervez Kayani rejected US request that authorities should take away the cell phone Lakhvi was using in Adiala jail[36].

What is more significant is Jamaat-ud Dawa (JuD); one of the aliases of LeT is no more a banned organization in Pakistan. On November 5, 2011, the interior ministry of Pakistan released a list of 31 banned organizations. LeT is on the list but its changed name – JuD is missing[37] With renewed support pouring from every conceivable source, LeT is operating with impeccable immunity and posing greater threat to India than ever. Indian army has acquired credible intelligence that the ‘LeT is imparting training to 21 selected female terrorists and named the new organization as Dukhtareen-e-Taiba. They are undergoing the training at one of its 42 active training facilities in Muzaffarabad in PoK for carrying out terrorist activities in India[38]’. The raising of female terror group was brainchild of Lakhvi. During the years 2009-2012, security agencies have arrested number of female terrorists in J&K. The female terrorists are instrumental in sending LeT’s messages to its operatives and useful in transporting arms and ammunitions to LeT cadres. They are employed by the LeT to accompany male LeT terrorists by way of camouflaging as their wives, which make the travel of LeT terrorist easy[39]. The group is improvising its skill, performance and adapting to the changing security circumstance with clinical efficiency. With easy and uninterrupted flow of funding (from Saudi Arabia, expatriate Pakistani and ISI), cadres (from Pakistan), weapons and operational guidance (from army and ISI) the group has become the ‘civilian extension of Pakistan army[40]’, which is consistently on war with India. The LeT is spreading its tentacles with surprising ease. India not only require a superbly vigilant intelligence and quick reaction team but it is indispensable for the country to pre-empt such future threat.

## **Consolidation of LeT’s Threat against India**

The LeT leadership is frank in its appearance in Pakistan and consider its activities as equivalent to that of any political party. After the ban of LeT by the government of Pakistan its spokesman Yahya Mujahid said, LeT’s work cannot be stopped by mere ban and when LeT leaders call hundreds of thousands of people gather. He clarified that LeT is not a terrorist organisation but like any other party with political ambitions and support for the Kashmir cause[41]. Saeed make fiery speeches and touches existing political issues of Pakistan. In a speech Saeed said ‘Allah has told us to make atom bombs. America is telling us not to. Who should we listen to, oh Muslims, Allah or America? [42]’ Immediately after his release in June 2009, Saeed made his public appearance more frequent and took part in political rally including campaign against the Pakistani government’s move to repeal the country’s controversial blasphemy law[43]. By the time 2011-12, LeT able to work as a political pressure group in a number of areas in central and northern Punjab. Although it openly denounces democracy, it covertly supports candidates of its choice. Saeed openly denounced Pakistan’s decision to give India the Most Favored Nation trading status. He warned that ‘LeT will surround the markets where Indian goods are sold’[44]. He vowed that jihad to oust Indian forces



from Kashmir would continue. The meeting where Saeed speaking was significant. The gathering under the banner of 'Difa-i-Pakistan Conference' was attended by thousands of supporters of Barelvi and Deobandi parties. LeT follows Ahl-al-Hadith brand of Islam to which a minority of Pakistanis, roughly 4 to 5 percent, subscribe. The recognition of LeT by the majoritarian sects like the Barelvi and Deobandi parties and acceptance of its leaders is an indication of future danger. In the coming days LeT would not miss to take centre-stage in Pakistan politics as well and pose danger to the security of India.

The other most important objective of LeT as of 2012 is to unify all militants of Pakistan at the behest of Pakistan army and end the 'current clash of institutions' in Pakistan[45]. The emerging danger to Pakistan today emanates not from its traditional external adversary to the East – India – but from homegrown insurgency and militancy[46]. Pakistan army's decision to join US war on terrorism in Afghanistan had turned almost all militant groups of Pakistan against it. After a decade of war, as the US withdrawal from Afghanistan is nearing, Pakistan army again want to realign all the militants of Pakistan and direct them against India and use them to spread Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan. LeT was the only outfit which never opposed Pakistani army. Hence, the Pakistani army is using LeT as a 'Trojan Horse' to bring the rest of the militant groups into its strategic thinking[47]. The Difa-e-Pakistan is a Pakistan army inspired and sponsored organization solely organized by the LeT.

As early as on July 23, 2011, when there was no trace of Difa-e-Pakistan, the LeT organized a gathering in Multan and Hafiz Saeed requested all religious parties and militant groups to unite politically, socially and nationally for the progress of Pakistan. He said 'we need to end all of our internal grievances and work for the greater good.[48]' The new umbrella group Saeed proposed in Multan later became the Difa-e-Pakistan[49]. The group's website is a reflection of LeT's objective. The website counted India's atrocities on Muslim in detail and made India responsible for every single ill of Pakistan. The Difa-e-Pakistan discuss about India's 'Cold-Start' doctrine and India's desire to dominate the region after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan[50]. The army is using Saeed and his LeT to correct its so called mistake committed 10 years before by joining the US war on terrorism. In his address Saeed said, 'The current standoff between state institutions is the result of a sin that we committed 10 years ago by allowing our territory to be used against Afghan Muslims, and until we repent for that grave mistake, we will never be able to overcome these issues[51].'

While disagreements existed in between the civilian government and the army of Pakistan on a range of issues including Kashmir, the LeT's objective is to position itself as close to the army as possible. Denying the role of militant groups like LeT and the use of war as an instrument for the resolution of Kashmir dispute Prime Minister Gilani said, unlike the past century when India and Pakistan fought four wars, it is difficult to afford a war in 21<sup>st</sup> century. So, dialogue, diplomacy, prudent policy and national consensus must be opted to resolve disputes[52]. However, contrary to the civilian thinking, Gen. Kayani admitted that the ISI maintained contacts with 'certain elements' within the hierarchy of insurgent groups' as 'Pakistan cannot leave both its eastern and western borders insecure'[53]. By aligning the group's objective with the army's strategic vision, LeT has made tremendous progress.

The next objective of LeT is to gather support of rival militant factions and religious parties inside Pakistan[54] and project itself as the flame bearer of Islam. While doing so the group wants to exert greater control on the Pakistani politics and decision-making[55]. As part of mobilizing support from other religious groups of Berelvi and Deobandi bending, LeT has formed the Difa-e-Pakistan and managed to gather over 40 different religious leaders under one platform. Some of the groups



present along with the JuD at the Difa-e-Pakistan platform like Sepah-e-Saheba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi were earlier opposed to LeT. Although Hafiz Saeed announced that, LeT 'do not have any political aspirations', his intension to influence Pakistani politics is explicit. He said, 'We have a broader perspective of the dangers faced by Pakistan, for that we want to unify the whole nation on a legitimate and focal point of defending the nation against any external aggression and conspiracy'. Answering a question on how can Difa-e-Pakistan influence the policy making and national issues and what does JuD believe in as an alternate to democratic politics he explained that 'Islam emphasizes on public opinion and the system of Shura does respect the public sentiments and opinions'[56].

## Conclusion

The final objective of LeT, rhetoric (which is '*Nizam-e-Mustafa*' or Rule of God)[57] apart, is to use its fame after the Mumbai onslaught and became an international player. Earlier the LeT was resisting the call to enter the Afghan theater of war. However, the aggression and commitment to jihad shown by the several splinter groups in Afghanistan influenced many committed fighters to leave Kashmir centric outfits and join the Taliban category outfits. Infact, the LeT was compelled to consider the spectacular Mumbai strike of 2008 to keep the LeT terrorists out of the ambit of Afghan based militants[58]. Nevertheless, recently the group has shifted its stand and announced that 'Pakistan and Afghanistan were like twin brothers; whoever tried to harm one, would have to face the people of the other country'[59]. This shift of stand is based on two facts; first the US withdrawal is nearing and hence Pakistan want a more pro-active role of militants in Afghanistan and second, LeT has realized the fact that the group cannot remain immune to the development at the western border[60]. As part of this strategy, LeT has reactivated its training camps in Afghanistan[61] and started participating in attacks against Indian targets in Afghanistan[62]. Considering the above background, the present calm in Indo-Pak thaw is a sign of future danger, where Pakistan may use LeT to unsettle India with the explicit intension of resisting India's rise in the region and to restrict India's role in Afghanistan.

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## About JTR

In 2010 the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence launched the online Journal of Terrorism Research. The aim of this Journal is to provide a space for academics and counter-terrorism professionals to publish work focused on the study of terrorism. Given the interdisciplinary nature of the study of terrorism, high-quality submissions from all academic and professional backgrounds are encouraged. Students are also warmly encouraged to submit work for publication.

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