# Contents

March 2013 , volume 7, issue 1

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# Demographic Warfare

Mitchell Belfer

## Introduction

Spectators of the Arab Spring (in general) and Bahrain's chapter (more specifically) tend to expend their intellectual energies attempting to depict the symptoms of spasmodic violence while simplifying, exaggerating or omitting root causes from public discourses.[1] It seems that the international public prefers visualising—and reporting on—political violence; or rather violent acts carried out in the name of politics instead of the more mundane, but certainly more important, lines of argumentation which ostensibly drive the engines of upheaval.

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This analysis focuses on one of the most explosive dynamics currently unfolding in Bahrain; demography. Within such a highly charged environment, two main demographic arguments are being advanced: first, that in Bahrain the demographics favour the Shia population while national power favours the Sunni community, and second, the Shia community is disempowered economically; it does not have the same economic rights or employment opportunities as Sunni Bahrainis.

After conducting some eighteen months of field research, it is clear that both lines of argumentation are false and have only served to further polarise Bahraini society and render reaching a negotiated settlement less likely. This work does not venture to answer who is responsible for propagating such disinformation about Bahrain and neither does it suggest a motive. Instead, this analysis seeks only to pose a counter argument so that researchers may be able to reach their own conclusions after being presented with two sets of argumentation.

To achieve the objectives of this analysis, two methods are utilised. First, the work presents and critiques the arguments developed by Mansoor Al-Jamri who has been one of the leading proponents of sectarianism and demography in Bahrain's political situation. Indeed, since Al-Jamri's works form the basis of a wide spectrum of subsequent

research, it is important to investigate the way he derived at his conclusions that the Shia community form the majority of Bahrain's population. Therefore, the first section challenges Al-Jamri's propositions and seeks to show a degree of misinformation regarding the demographic situation in Bahrain.



Once this task is achieved, this analysis then turns to investigating the second line of argumentation, which is based on the alleged discriminatory practises of Bahrain's Sunni political leadership against the Shia community. Again, this line of argumentation is deeply flawed and eighteen months of field work has uncovered a more balanced economic situation in the country then previously assumed.

## Let's Talk About Sects

Despite the oft-quoted "sectarianism" that many associate with Bahrain, honest exploration reveals that, in fact, there are no clear indicators as to religious orientation. This is a unique feature of the country since it is the only state in the wider region which does not ask for religious identification on national censuses. In fact, reflecting on all nine (1941, 1950, 1959, 1965, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2010) of the past censuses leads to the social-scientist question of how to determine the sectarian preferences of the Bahraini population if no official records exist in which sectarian identity is prioritised?

In the existing literature, there is no convincing answer to this question and the deeper the topic is explored the greater the inconsistencies of the answers. However, while most authors simply forgo substantiating the assumed demographic imbalance between Sunnis and Shia, others adopt more bizarre techniques of unofficial "census-taking."[2] * Take, for instance, Al-Jamri's measurement and justification that Bahrain's population is more than 60% Shia. He argues that while 'there is no accurate statistics for number of Shia and Sunnis, a closer look at the 2006 election results indicates that around 62% are Shia Muslims.'[3] *

There are, of course, several problems with Al-Jamri's argument related to arbitrarily connecting votes in favour of a Shia political bloc, such as al Wefaq, with the religious affiliation of the voter; of assuming that all Shia vote only for Shia blocs and, importantly, reflecting on the rationale behind deploying such statistics is suspect. Each of these must be examined in greater detail to falsify such lines of sectarian argumentation and, therefore, show that depictions of Bahrain as a Shia country dominated by a Sunni regime is a dangerous exaggera-

tion meant to further fan the flames of sectarianism and with it mutual recriminations and potential violence.

Regarding the first point, election results are no way to determine the religious beliefs of a population, unless there is the (erroneous) presupposition that only Shia Muslims would be attracted to Shia blocs while Sunni Muslims would only vote for Sunni blocs. Careful inspection of the 2006 elections reveals that cooperative religious voting between the Shia and Sunni communities was not only possible but highly probable given the nature of the three main religious blocs; al Wefaq (Shia bloc), Asalah (Sunni bloc, Salafist) and the al Menbar (Sunni bloc, liberal) as they competed with each other and the two, non-religious blocs, the Democratic and the National Justice blocs.

In the first case, it was apparent in the 2006 campaign that Asalah was at a decisive disadvantage when compared to al Menbar since the latter adopted a more liberal line concerning women's rights within Bahrain's socio-political system. Indeed, al Menbar MP, Dr. Ali Ahmed reportedly told the *Bahrain Tribune* that 'Granting women their political rights is not against Islamic precepts. Women should be motivated to achieve their aspirations and contribute to the Kingdom's development.'[4] Also, it should be remembered that the 'al Menbar bloc has [...] backed women's rights activists' campaign for the introduction of a unified personal status law, which was vehemently opposed by Shiite Islamists.'[5]

Not only by Shia Islamists. Asalah too was adamant about the exclusion of women from Bahraini politics and opposed a unified personal status law. Why then, with both the al Wefaq and Asalah (and, in fact al Menbar) wanting to 'focus on real political and socio-economic issues rather than being distracted by talk of sectarian politics,'[6] is it impossible to imagine that Asalah supporters would vote for al Wefaq since 'both are opponents of what they consider moral laxity and have been ready to join forces in order to campaign together on morality issues.'[7] Given that the 2006 elections were conducted by secret ballot, there is no way to ascertain whether those that voted for the al Wefaq were indeed Shia and to infer that they were is an irresponsible manipulation of election statistics.

Furthermore the 2006 elections had a voter turnout of some 72%, a respectable number, but also one which leaves room to interpret since 28% of the electorate are unaccounted for. If Sunni Muslims formed the majority of this twenty-eight percent what impact would it have on Al-Jamri's statistical assumptions? This problem is compounded when

adding the non-religious blocs into the equation. Is it possible that an equal number of Sunni and Shia voted for these, or such numbers could be imbalanced in favour of one group or the other? The same could be said of other communities. Is it impossible that Christian or Jewish or any number of naturalised Bahrainis also voted for al Wefaq? Certainly, these questions are not meant to be answered. They are only intended to challenge the insinuation that support for al Wefaq in the 2006 elections automatically reflects the population of Shia in Bahrain.



A second problem, one which takes a different track to produce the same result in challenging Al-Jamri's assertions, revolves around the issue of what constitutes a Shia. Since there are no clear indicators that suggest a particular behaviour for all Shia, aside from some religious practises, it is uncertain why Shia must support al Wefaq. Indeed, there are many different Shia groups living in Bahrain such as the Ajam Shia community which serves as a case in point; it is a community of Persian refugees, who fled the turbulence of early twentieth century conflict in Iran, and settled on the Island. They were welcomed and immediately joined in state-building projects while retaining some of the particulars of their Persian heritage. Yet they, as a community, wanted to make a distinction between themselves and other Shia and Persians and hence drew-up a criterion which determines their unique heritage and place within Bahraini society. To belong to the Ajam a person must speak Arabic, be born in Bahrain and belong to a family with at least a fifty year history in Bahrain. In other words, while Ajam Shia may trace their roots to Persia, they must also belong to Bahrain. This may not seem to contradict the argument that Shia comprise around 60% of Bahrain's political body however, the Ajam are very supportive of the al Khalifa family and are unlikely to vote for Shia revisionist parties, the very same that Al-Jamri and his ilk use to determine the percentage of Shia in Bahrain.[8]

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In fact, the number of Shia may be even more than Al-Jamri suggests; if the Ajam did not vote for al Wefaq in the 2006 elections, then they too are not represented in Al-Jamri's statistics. However, in a country where religious affiliation is not an essential determining characteristic, the production of such statistics are deeply politicising. They are meant to produce sentiments of wide discrimination, of one community awash in another, not to determine the actual religious make-up of the country.

A third and final problem centres on the point of constructing sectarian indicators to determine who is a Shia and who a Sunni when it is

clear, from census statistics, that Bahrainis actually form the minority in the country. In other words, why is it so important for some scholars, the press, activists and wider publics, to highlight that Shia are a majority and Sunnis the minority in a country where both are now in the minority? In fact, al Wefaq and the Shia bloc they represent do not regard the multitude of Indians, Pakistanis, Philippinos, Sri Lankans, not to mention Americans and Europeans who call Bahrain home and, in many cases, retain Bahraini nationality, as actual Bahrainis. Indeed, of the (roughly) three-hundred and fifty thousand Indian expatriates who live in Bahrain—a number alone accounting for some 44% of Bahrain's total population—nearly one third have, become Bahraini nationals.[9] Despite such overwhelming evidence to the contrary, al Wefaq cling to the archaic notion that the Shia constitute a majority; they do not.

The demographic statistics which bounce around scholarship and the international press do not reflect reality; they are produced using whimsical research approaches and have only succeeded in polarising Bahrain's civil society. Certainly, it is worthwhile to investigate why such loose demographic bookkeeping has been so comprehensively deployed, and absorbed, into regional political discourses though such an analysis falls beyond the scope of this research. For this work, and to return to the first line of argumentation presented above, the claim that Shia Bahrainis consist of the majority and Sunni Bahrainis form the minority is an unqualified assumption and unverifiable.

However, after conducting some eighteen months of field research in Bahrain, I have uncovered an avenue of more accurate demographic accounting: using marriage certificates as a means of determining particular religious orientations since Bahrainis may select to marry in either Shia or Sunni religious institutions. The information which stems from such research is deployed below in a bid to clearly demonstrate that the second line of argumentation—that Shia are underrepresented in Bahrain's workforce—is equally unsubstantiated.

## Demographic Realities in Bahrain

In contrast to the inaccuracies behind the assumption that Shia represents the majority of Bahraini society, there is clear evidence that Shia Bahrainis enjoy the (relatively) equal distribution of economic benefits from many of the country's key sectors and industries. This section does not seek to demonstrate that either the Shia or the Sunni form the majority of the population; such guesswork is nearly impossible

owing to the lack of formalised sectarian accounting. Instead, this section seeks to establish that within the economy of Bahrain, Shia and Sunni are equally represented with the sole exception of Shia-run major businesses where Sunnis are systemically excluded and make up a mere 1.9% of major Shia owned companies (see graphs below).



As noted above, there is one way to determine (with only a small margin of error) whether a Bahraini national is an adherent of the Sunni or Shia denomination; through an inspection of marriage certificates since these are issued by the religious authorities of each denomination. The main problems with this approach are threefold; first many Shia have selected to be married in Sunni courts owing to the newly initiated Family Law which was rejected by al Wefaq (among other Shia theocratic parties and personalities) because it provided too many advantages to women which they argue were anti-Islamic.[10] Secondly, even though Bahrain is an Islamic country, it is very tolerant of other religions and of atheists and agnostics. Hence, the second problem is that there may be a misrepresentation of numbers since marrying in either a Sunni or Shia court and being issued with Sunni or Shia documents of marriage does not indicate the level of religious affiliation of an individual and may be more symbolic than practical. Finally, statistics of this nature do not extend to the unmarried or those married outside of Bahrain. Hence, even though the examination of marriage certificates offers greater opportunities to examine the demographics of Bahrain, they remain imperfect.

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Yet, in conducting this research, an interesting series of observations were made revolving around the main arguments used by al Wefaq and others to justify their behaviours; namely unemployment and the claimed unfair distribution of wealth and resources. This research was conducted with the sole purpose of investigating the claims that Bahrain's Shia community is underrepresented and/or excluded from the advanced elements of Bahrain's economic life. In order to falsify this claim, research was undertaken in four main areas of Bahrain's economy: government (six ministries and five organisations were selected based on the number of employees), high income specialisation areas (the health sector, finance and accounting, information technologies etc), the private sector (the ten most successful companies in Bahrain were selected for investigation) and the banking sector (the five largest bank, in personnel and financial holdings, were selected for this research). Additionally, explorations were made of the ten largest Shia companies in a bid to show contrast.

### *Government Ministries and Organisations*

For the purpose of this research, six governmental ministries and five organisations were selected to better grasp the sectarian divide between Shia and Sunni Bahrainis. These were selected based on three main criteria: first, that they are considered key agencies for governance and national development, second that the ministries employ more than 1000 people and the organisations employ more than 300 people so that the research is more reflective, and third, for practical reasons, there was wide access to information in these ministries and organisations.




Graph 1. Government Ministries

Six ministries were investigated for this research, the Ministries of: Education, Health, Municipal Affairs and Urban Planning, Justice and Islamic Affairs, Works and Finance. With the exception of the Ministry of Finance, in all the other ministries, the majority of employed Bahrainis were married in Shia courts and retain Shia affiliation. The numbers are staggering; in the Ministry of Education, for instance, of the total 14536 employees (whose documents were inspected for this research) 9427 were Shia and 5109 were Sunni leading to a 35.1% - 64.9% imbalance in favour of Shia registered employees. The demographic situation in the Ministry of Health is even more staggering since members of the Shia community comprise some 83.4% of the 7407 employees; in Municipal Affairs and Urban Planning Shia make-up 75%, in Works it is 72.1% and in Justice and Islamic Affairs the number sit at 51.7%. For reasons unknown, only the Ministry of Finance sees a significant imbalance with 79.1% of the workforce identified as Sunni. In

total, in the six Ministries explored, Shia comprise 68.7% while Sunni hold 31.3% of available positions.






Graph 2. Government Organisations

In terms of the five government organisations under scrutiny, there is a slight imbalance overall and some more acute imbalances within several such organisations. Again, while it may be difficult to explain why such imbalances occur, it is certain that both communities are represented in government. For instance, Shia representation is highest in the Electricity and Water Authority where they hold 80% of available positions and lowest in the Information Affairs Authority (22.8%). At the Same time, in the University of Bahrain, which employs some 1400 people, balance is nearly struck since Sunni are represented by 53.3% and Shia 46.7% of employees. In total however, despite the underrepresentation in some organisations, the Shia still maintain a greater presence in such organisations than Sunnis the former community is represented in 57.4% while the latter in 42.6% of available positions.

Given the above information—and considering that such situations are likely in the other ministries as well—this analysis concludes that there is no systematic discrimination of Shia in terms of employment as civil servants.

### *High Income Specialisations*

In addition to exploring governmental ministries and organisations, research also turned to some of the more important—and highly paid—specialisations since these have been targeted as 'closed' to Shia. Seventeen industries were thus selected in order to determine whether

sectarian biases were present. These industries were: Administrative,[11] Human Resources, Educational,[12] Finance and Accounting, Engineering, Information Technologies, Information and Tourism, Inspection and Quality Control, Secretarial, Soft Sciences,[13] Psychology (and Soci-






Graph 3. High Income Specialisations

ology), Nursing, Physicians, Public Health, Pharmaceutics, Physiotherapy and Nutrition and Medical and Laboratory Technicians.

While the above graph indicates the overall sectarian distribution among such high salary specialisations, it is important to note where Shia employees are most represented: in the Health Care Sector. Indeed, of all Bahraini employees in the Healthcare Sector Shia are strongly represented in Nursing (84.8%), Public Health (85.3%) and Medical and Laboratory Technicians (85.3%).



Since the overall picture of the 23252 people examined for this research sees a Shia representation of 62.6% and a Sunni representation of 37.4% it is safe to conclude that the Shia are not discriminated in these high-salary positions.

### *The Private Sector*

A similar story unfolds when examining the 12404 people employed in Bahrain's ten top-tier companies; Shia occupy 60.3% and Sunnis at 39.7% of available positions. The companies selected for this research were based on the largest number of personnel and revenues. Indicated alongside each of the subsequent (investigated) companies is the number of employees: Aluminium Bahrain (2409), Bahrain Petroleum Company (2371), Bahrain Airport Services (1935), Gulf Air (1899), Batelco (1246), Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard Company (767), Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill Company (592), Gulf Petrochemical Industries (485), Bahrain National Gas Company (399), Bahrain Airport Company (301).

In examining the companies noted above, it is interesting to observe that the Shia community is most visibly represented in four major companies: Aluminium Bahrain (73.8%), Bahrain Petroleum Company (71.5%), Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard (81.1%) and Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill Company (73.8%). While the two companies related to Aluminium continue to prosper, the Bahrain Petroleum Company and the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard have experienced significant restructuring over the past decade. While not wishing to speculate, it may be that what seems a sectarian issue may, in fact, be a series of political outbursts more related to the insecurity of Shia employees—and their children—in some key companies.

Keeping in mind the theme of this section, the statistics again speak volumes and it is clear that Bahraini Shia are adequately represented in the country's top-tiered companies.




Graph 4. Companies

### *The Banking Sector*

As Bahrain's hydrocarbons began to decline, the government took measures to liberalise the country's banking sector and has encouraged the development of a financial hub on the Island. The research conducted for this analysis identified Bahrain's five most important banks in terms of their revenues and the size of their workforce (indicated in parentheses beside the bank names below). As in other sectors of Bahrain's economy, the Shia are adequately represented, though in this case the numbers are more balanced.

The banks selected for inspection were: The Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait (638), National Bank of Bahrain (560), Ahli United Bank (512), Bahrain Islamic Bank (379) and Standard Chartered Bank (369).

On inspection, the Shia and Sunni communities are nearly balanced in terms of employment within this sector of the economy with the Shia holding some 53.4% and the Sunni some 46.6% of available positions. This distribution indicates that there is no discrimination based on sect in the financial and banking sector of Bahrain.




Graph 5. Banks

### *Shia Owned Companies*

In contrast to the above explorations, research was also conducted on the top ten (in terms of revenues and workforce) businesses owned and operated by members of Bahrain's Shia community. In this research, it was discovered that systemic biases are evident, though di-




Graph 6. Shia Owned Companies

rected against the country's Sunni community. Consider that in none of the ten companies do Sunnis account for more than 3.0% of the workforce. Indeed, in only half of the researched companies do Sunnis represent even between 2%-2.9% of the workforce: Ahmed Mansoor Al A'ali Company (2.9%), Hasan and Habib S/O Mahmood Company (2.6%), Al Jazira Supermarkets (2.1%), and Al Wasat Newspaper (2.4%).

Of the 2648 employees of such Shia owned businesses, an average of 98.1% of available positions are held by Shia.

Researching these Shia companies indicates that there is, in fact, a systematic hiring bias, though it is directed at Bahrain's Sunni, rather than Shia community. Therefore, the original argument that Shia are economically disempowered is falsified, though the argument that, in certain sectors, Bahrain's Sunni community may be disempowered, may be validated with further research.

## Conclusion: Demography as a Solution

Critics of this research will certainly point to the distribution of employment as an indication that the first line of argumentation—that the Shia form the majority of the population—is accurate. However, demonstrating that key sectors of the economy retain a majority of Shia in the workforce does not imply a reflection in the larger community. Instead, such statistics (as presented above) only seek to show that the theory of economic desperation and disempowerment is false.

Additionally, if demography is used as a tool to delegitimise the governance structures of Bahrain it may be useful to turn the debate on its head and argue that demography may in fact be utilised as a solution to combating politically motivated attacks against Bahrain's civil society especially since a different strand of arguments are used to politicise demography; arguments that suggest that the Bahraini government is attempting to alter the demographic balance by inviting Sunni Arabs, Indians, Pakistanis and others, into the country and to provide them with naturalisation documents. This line of argumentation is echoed by serial-revolutionaries in the West and among some of Bahrain's more acutely dangerous neighbours, re: Iran in a bid to cast a shadow of doubt over the intentions of Bahrain's government.

This line of logic holds that the *only* reason for immigration to Bahrain is to alter the demographic situation on the Island. This is a false pretext for anti-establishment behaviour. In other words, those which decry Bahrain's immigration policy do so because they do not recog-

nise the decision-making authority, or legitimacy, of the government and use demographic arguments to further push their own sectarian agenda.

Yet, in such a sustained sectarian attack against Bahrain's immigration policy, few have truly sought to learn about the people who are being politicised for nothing more than gaining Bahraini nationality through the many channels open to immigrants; asylum seekers, economic migrants, regular immigrants, etc. Despite the near deafening depiction that immigrants are mercenaries working to suppress the 'majority Shia,' most immigrants to Bahrain—over the past century—are hardly Sunni zealots seeking to eliminate the country's Shia; they tend to be either the politically vanquished or the economically downtrodden. The come from around the world; the Philippines, Kurdistan, Eritrea, Sudan, Turkey, Western Europe and the US and, for the past century, they have steadily come from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Baluchistan and from throughout the Middle East.



It is on this last destination that pause for reflection is most needed since the cases of Palestinian and Syrian immigrants to Bahrain clearly demonstrate that Bahrain's immigration policy is not intended to alter the demographic situation on the ground—it has already been widely acknowledged by the Bahraini government (and noted above) that Bahrainis, Shia and Sunni, are the minority in the country—but is designed in a way to provide political safety and economic opportunity for those that require it most.

Consider Bahrain's naturalisation of a substantial number of Palestinians following the 1967 general Arab-Israeli conflict and again during the first intifada in 1987. Bahrain was not attempting to upset some illusionary demographic imbalance; the notion of doing so was not mentioned in any policy document and neither is it reasonable to suggest that Bahrain's leaders even considered this possibility. Instead, Bahrain was responding to the humanitarian crisis facing the Palestinians. In this case, owing to the importance attached to the Palestinian cause throughout the width and breadth of the international community, al Wefaq and other Shia political blocs determine that the government of Bahrain is actively bringing Sunni Muslims into Bahrain to form a majority without citing the Palestinians by name; they are, largely, Sunni Muslims. It would be quite unreasonable for al Wefaq to publically demand that the Palestinians be sent back to Palestine and, it is supposed, that many of its followers would challenge it on this point. So, instead of accepting that Bahrain has actually worked for the

benefit of Palestinians by granting them Bahraini nationality, al Wefaq drowns the specifics of the Palestinian case in its wide-scaled attack on Bahrain's leadership.



The same could be said of Syrians who have streamed into the kingdom since 1981 following Hafez al Assad's destruction of the city of Hama in a quest to end months of Muslim Brotherhood violence against the state. Most, if not all, Syrian refugees that were granted asylum in Bahrain and later became naturalised citizens, were civilians trapped in a brutal war. They were not reinforcing some abstract sectarianism and they were not coming to Bahrain at the request of the government. Instead, they were refugees looking for respite and economic prospects. A similar pattern has been unfolding since mid-March 2011 when Syria's political reform demonstrations transformed into civil war; Bahrain has assisted many hundreds of people settle into the Kingdom. That they tend to be Sunni Muslims is beside the point, or at least it should be.

Whether discussing Palestinians, Syrians or others, al Wefaq (among others) can only see the black-and-white of sectarianism, for them everything smacks of attacks against them. This is more than a slight case of sociopathology, it is terminal. And such a terminal, collective neurosis needs to be brought into the light so that those who have learned to recite the lines without inspecting the text can be enlightened. So it is not prudent to simply allow demographic slander to go unchecked, these lines of argumentation need to be openly challenged not for Bahrain as a state, but for the very people who live within it, those who found shelter, safety and security in the Kingdom, who call it home while al Wefaq calls them strangers and mercenaries.

This analysis was meant to reveal the politicisation of demographics by al Wefaq and to illustrate the diversity of Bahrain. The country is not a simple case of Sunnis and Shia Muslims competing for dominance of the political and economic resources of the state, Sunnis and Shia are joined by many other identities not least of Bahrainis. Despite the manipulation of demographics to attempt to delegitimise Bahrain's immigration policy, and the government by extension, Bahrain continues to be a vibrant society where the majority of all citizens and residents from the full spectrum of ethnic, religious, linguistic, social and political groups enjoy freedom of speech, of assembly, of worship, of association.

Finally, it is important to note that Bahrain's migration rate is very low; Bahrainis do not tend to leave their country. So, unlike the Pales-

tinians or the Syrians, Bahrain is not a net migration country in that people—Shia or Sunni—feel so desperate that they would rather try their luck and start a new life elsewhere. Instead, for better or worse, Bahrainis prefer to stay in Bahrain.

*Mitchell Belfer*

## Notes

*p.4* 1 Special Note: The contents of this work form the basis of a forthcoming research book on Bahrain.

*p.5* 2 For instance, Peterson, when discussing Bahraini liberalisation and Islamist political blocs noted that 'Islamist forces in the country, among both the minority Sunni and majority Shi'i, constitute positive pressure towards liberalization …' This, seemingly innocuous suggestion of demographic imbalance is unreferenced and therefore based on conjecture. Without clear evidence for verification of such a demographic imbalance it is remarkable that scholars are not more cautious, particularly when it is clear that neither Sunni nor Shia form the majority in Bahrain, points clearly indicated in the 2010 national census. See John E. Peterson (2009), 'Bahrain: Reform—Promise and Reality,' in Joshua Teitelbaum (ed) (2009), *Political Liberalisation in the Persian Gulf,* Columbia UP, p. 157.

3 Mansoor Al-Jamri (2010), 'Shia and the State in Bahrain: Integration and Tensions,' *Alternative Politics,* Special Issue 1, p. 3.

*p.6* 4 See: Mohammed Zahid Mahjoob Zweiri (2007), 'The Victory of Al Wefaq: The Rise of Shiite Politics in Bahrain,' *Research Institute for European and American Studies, Research Paper No. 108,* pp. 6-7.

5 Zweiri (2007), p. 7.

6 Zweiri (2007), p. 7.

7 Zweiri (2007), p. 7.

*p.7* 8 In a press release related to the continuing violence in Bahrain, the Shia al Ajam Grand Maatam issued a statement in support of the Bahraini authorities in overcoming street violence. The statement reads: 'We follow in the steps of our fathers and forefathers in our allegiance to the Kingdom of Bahrain.' For details see: Press Release: 'All Should Unite to Stop Radicals and Put an End to Violence,' *Information Affairs Authority,* 09 October 2012.

*p.8* 9 Gil Feiler (2012), 'India's Economic Relations with Israel and the Arabs,' *Mideast Security and Policy Studies,* 96, p. 27.

*p.9* 10 The information for these points was gleaned during a series of interviews in Bahrain's Council for Women and in discussion with a legal advisor to the Council between 25-30 January 2013 and 02-08 March 2013.

*p.12* 11 Including Supervisory and Executive positions.

12 Beyond the Ministry of Education and the University of Bahrain.

13 Physicists, Chemists, Statisticians.

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ISSN: 1802-548X E-ISSN 7805-482X



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# A Meeting of Minds: Sino-Pakistani Military Relations

Prem Mahadevan

This paper examines defence cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. It suggests that both countries have a strong convergence of security perspectives which encourages continued close ties. However, along with such ties comes the risk of an authoritarian consensus among militant nationalists within these countries. With the United States now being viewed as a declining power by sections of Pakistani society, Beijing has gained considerable influence within the Pakistani military. This does not bode well for US-Pakistani relations, notwithstanding aid packages dispatched by Washington. The growth of Sino-Pakistani security ties could lead to rising tensions on the part of both countries with India, which would triangulate the already polarised India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry. Circumventing this scenario requires that the United States remain actively engaged in Asia. The Chinese and Pakistani military establishments share a common hostility towards the US and India on strategic grounds, and towards liberal democracy on ideological grounds. Since the Pakistani army is currently facing a popular backlash owing to its tradition of intervening in politics, its ties to Beijing are likely to get stronger.

Keywords: *China, Pakistan, military relations, Beijing, Sino-Pakistani, US-Paskistani, security ties*

## Introduction

This article argues that Pakistani strategic behaviour is heavily shaped by presumptions of unconditional Chinese support. Although belied

in practice, such presumptions have led Pakistan to pursue adventurous policies against India despite Western disapproval. As the United States seeks to stabilise the Indian subcontinent, it would do well to identify how security cooperation with Beijing might influence decision-making in Islamabad.



The paper shares the assessment of many scholars that the Sino-Pakistani relationship is essentially a military-driven one, albeit with an economic dimension.[1] The armed forces of both countries have developed an enduring but unequal partnership in which China is the larger beneficiary. Pakistan on the other hand, has been internally harmed by its high level of dependence on China, but remains committed to its northern ally.

Reasons for such counter-intuitive behaviour have not been explored by scholars, beyond acknowledgement of the security assistance that Beijing extends to Islamabad.[2] Pakistan's nuclear program, it is widely believed, was helped by China until the 1990s and perhaps even beyond. After acquiring a nuclear umbrella, the Pakistani military in turn felt confident about affording protection to terrorist groups operating against India.

So far, most discussions about the India-Pakistan conflict have focused on Kashmir, as though that were the only source of tension between the two countries. Little consideration has been given to the possibility that, emboldened by its Chinese-supplied nuclear and conventional arsenal, Pakistan might be unilaterally ratcheting up hostilities in South Asia. An independent dynamic to the Indo-Pakistani rivalry might have come into existence, which makes conflict resolution all the more improbable.

## After Abbottabad: Pakistani Emphasis on Chinese Support

Following the killing of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad, the Pakistani security establishment faced international opprobrium. Its relations with the US were already in a downward spiral, over suspicions that its spies had assisted terrorist groups that were attacking US interests. A number of Pakistani newspapers had reciprocated this hostility by demanding that the government cease cooperation in the US-led War on Terror. China, they asserted, was a more reliable friend and partner. Crucially, China was also rich—it could afford to underwrite the Pakistani economy as much as the US had.

It is impossible to discern how far this rabble-rousing commentary

had any relevance to Pakistani government policy. What is indisputable is that Islamabad's official response to the Abbottabad raid included a telling and seemingly out-of-place reference to China's economic progress. To most listeners, Pakistan seemed to be signalling that it did not need American goodwill and could always find another wealthy patron. For a country that has traditionally been a rentier state, dependent upon Western developmental aid to keep its economy afloat, to make such a bold statement was unusual.[3]

Between 2002 and 2011, the US had provided over $20 billion in aid to Pakistan—a country that was formally labelled an ally against terrorism. Two-thirds of this amount went to the Pakistani military, ostensibly as reimbursement for counterinsurgency operations against the Taliban.[4] Yet, in 2011, the cumulative outcome of this decade-long investment was a caustic reminder that the US needed Pakistan more than Pakistan needed the US. Where did this confident assessment come from?

Part of the answer might be deduced from China's own endorsement of Pakistan in the aftermath of Abbottabad. Calling upon the US to appreciate Islamabad's counterterrorist efforts, Beijing attempted to defuse much of the criticism that was being thrown at its long-standing ally.[5] In having maintained close security ties with both the US and China, Pakistan was well-positioned to play one off against the other. No other country had the same luxury, since no other country was as important to the geopolitical agendas of both powers.[6] The US needed Pakistan's help in fighting terrorism, and China needed Pakistan's help in developing its restive western provinces.

Although much has been written about the US-Pakistani relationship, little attention has been directed to the Sino-Pakistani relationship. Yet, of the two, Islamabad places greater value upon the latter.[7] It is domestically embarrassed about its ties to Washington, but loudly proclaims its affection for Beijing. Any discretion that exists in ties with China is exercised by Beijing, which prefers to let quiet diplomacy and security cooperation drive bilateral contacts.[8] Part of this reticence might be the customary secretiveness of a one-party state, and part might be awareness that the military-dominated nature of the relationship might make Chinese interests unpopular within Pakistan.

There is more than a passing similarity between the military establishments of Pakistan and China. Both are imbued with a strong sense of historical grievance against the West and its apparent regional lackey, India. Both have an inferiority-superiority complex, which

perceives that foreign powers are out to harm Pakistan/China because they begrudge its nuclear arsenal/economic progress. Both believe that authoritarian politics can provide a better governance model for developing countries than airy-fairy notions of liberal democracy. Both consist of competent fighting forces, riddled with high-level corruption.



There are also differences: the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is completely subordinate to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), while the Pakistani army is an independent power-broker within the country's political scene. The PLA has a respectable war-fighting record, while the Pakistan army has failed to win every war it has fought, despite having the luxury of initiating hostilities on each occasion. The PLA has not assisted insurgent/terrorist attacks in India for some decades now, while the Pakistan army has. These differences do not, however, act as barriers to security cooperation.

A key to understanding the continuing basis of Sino-Pakistani military relations might be a commonality of belief systems. Mohan Malik, a scholar at the Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies, has argued that the psychological and ideological basis for the relationship is as important as its strategic dimension.[9] Security ties between Pakistan and China might be driven by more than just pragmatic concerns about containing Indian influence within South Asia. There might also be domestic roots to this alliance, springing from internal fault-lines in both countries.[10]

At the centre of these fault-lines would be the issue of regime legitimacy. To what extent is the CCP a legitimate government, considering that it is unelected, corrupt and has flouted its own laws by not registering itself as a political organisation? As the enforcement arm of the communist party, the PLA's legitimacy is tied to that of its civilian overlord.[11] Although the Pakistani case is significantly different, in that the military functions as an independent power centre within the country, its overt interventions in domestic affairs make it just as politically vulnerable as the PLA is in China.[12] Both the Pakistani and Chinese militaries confront the unpleasant reality that their political role is resented by large sections of the population, thus requiring that it be concealed under an externally-directed threat narrative. It is on the common need for such a narrative, perhaps, that the Pakistani and Chinese armies have their strongest grounds for cooperation.

It is not clear who has copied who, or if any copying has been done at all. Yet, an argument can be made that from a very early stage, elites in China and Pakistan developed similar responses to the challenges posed by domestic political turmoil. Pakistan had to airbrush the military's colonial heritage and project it as protector of the country. China had to acclimatise itself to communist rule, which operated under endearing dictums such as 'power flows out of the barrel of a gun'. Both countries were established under civil war conditions, and therefore had to fight for control of outlying buffer states (Pakistan in Kashmir, and China in Tibet).

Their subsequent policies for internal consolidation used the army as an instrument of nation-building. Both re-settled large numbers of former soldiers in frontier areas, altering local demography to the disadvantage of the indigenous population. The military in each country developed wide-ranging business interests, ostensibly to provide for soldiers' welfare and reduce the strain on the national budget. By the 1980s, the PLA controlled almost 20,000 commercial enterprises, from luxury hotels to oil fields to pharmaceutical laboratories and arms factories.[13] The Pakistan army adopted an identical course, entering into real estate, food production and trucking, among other businesses. During the 1980s it also engaged heavily in heroin trafficking, temporarily making Pakistan the world's largest supplier.[14] The commercial identity of the army was rationalised by citing the Chinese model.[15] When China's economy began its spectacular takeoff, apologists for the Pakistani military argued that state-led economic activity, if carried out under the disciplined supervision of soldiers, could lead to societal progress.

Underlying these explanations were latent tensions about how the military was to legitimise itself with the populace. Following the creation of Pakistan in 1947, its military leadership consisted of a Westernised and upper-class elite. The colonial roots of this elite made it suspect among some of its own officers. In 1951, a handful conspired to seize power, believing that the country was being run by British-appointed puppets. They wished to expunge all Western influence from Pakistan, so that the country could pursue a truly independent security policy. Interestingly, these officers are also thought to have been sympathetic to communist ideas. (The conspiracy was detected and foiled).[16]

During the 1950s, the Pakistani army undertook several studies of People's Warfare, at the urging of the United States. What began as an effort to sensitise the military establishment about the dangers of communist subversion had an unintended side-effect: it made Pakistani strategists appreciate the positive contribution that subversion could make in degrading an enemy's war-fighting potential.[17] Admiration for communist China started from this point onwards. In the latter half of the decade, Pakistan surreptitiously opened an air corridor for its northern neighbour, allowing Beijing to bypass an international trade embargo.[18] Thus, Sino-Pakistani cooperation pre-dated the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Whether this was because China and Pakistan realised what India did not—that peaceful coexistence amidst conflicting territorial claims was impossible—is unclear. Quite possibly, Pakistan's political trajectory had merely taken it onto a course that would drive it away from the West, and towards the rising power of the East.

The 1960s saw two developments that accelerated this trajectory. First, in keeping with generational change in recruitment patterns, increasing numbers of army officers came from middle class backgrounds in poorer areas of Pakistan. The aristocratic land-owning classes, who dominated the top ranks of the military, had to work with these younger officers, who came with strong socio-economic grievances and were susceptible to Islamist ideas. As part of this accommodative process, the army refashioned itself from a secular, Westernised institution into a religiously-devout, Arabised one. Army journals began publishing articles on the 'Arabic' soldiering tradition of Pakistan, in an effort to set the country's military apart from both its Western mentors and its Indian adversary.[19]

The second major development was the political rise of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a populist civilian politician with strong leftist sympathies. Bhutto reportedly urged Pakistan's military dictator, Ayub Khan, to attack India in 1962, when the Indian Army was preoccupied with responding to a PLA attack from Tibet.[20] Under pressure from the United States, Ayub Khan resisted this advice. He did however, open talks with Beijing over the status of Pakistan's own disputed Kashmir frontier with China. A settlement was quickly reached, resulting in the removal of what was then the only major irritant in the Sino-Pakistani relationship. In reaching this settlement, Pakistan backtracked on its own stand that the status of Kashmir should be decided between India and Pakistan, before any consideration was given to Chinese territorial claims.[21]

Bhutto was the leading advocate of closer Sino-Pakistani cooperation, from the Pakistani side. He was already inclined to be sceptical of the alliance with the United States, and projected its decision to supply military aid to India in 1962 as a betrayal. Encouraged by the Indian army's poor performance against the PLA, he strongly supported Pakistan's 1965 military offensive into Indian Kashmir. During the subsequent war, he allegedly referred to Indians as 'dogs'—an indicator, perhaps, that Maoist-style rhetoric about 'running dogs of capitalism' was starting to influence official Pakistani views of India.[22]

The failure of Pakistan's 1965 offensive brought home the harsh reality that outside help would be needed to fight India. With the West having imposed an arms embargo on both countries and Pakistan having already aligned against the Soviet Union, the only plausible candidate was China. For its part, owing to the Sino-Soviet split, Beijing too was in need of allies. During the active phase of Indo-Pakistani hostilities, it had provided rhetorical support to the Pakistani attack and made signs of opening a second front along the India-Tibet border. Although Chinese assistance never went beyond words, Pakistan's security establishment became permanently obliged for it nonetheless.

It is interesting to note that the year Sino-Pakistani military cooperation began in earnest (1966) also coincided with the start of the Cultural Revolution in China. After having killed anywhere between 30 and 45 million Chinese through sheer administrative incompetence during the 'Great Leap Forward' (1958-61), the communist regime was being consumed by factional warfare.[23] Rival cliques were destroying the reputations of CCP stalwarts, in a bid to find scapegoats for leadership failure. Helping Pakistan to confront India—a wounded adversary that was growing militarily more powerful from its 1962 nadir—would have seemed a logical course of action at this vulnerable juncture. It would buy security along China's exposed Tibetan frontier at little direct cost.

## A Common Sense of Grievance Against the West and India

Before studying how Pakistan and China have sought to reinforce each other vis-à-vis India, it is useful to look at their larger assessment of India's role in South Asia. In particular, India's relations with the Anglo-American led 'West'. To the best knowledge of this writer, no research has yet been conducted on how far Chinese and Pakistani historical narratives converge in their portrayal of the West. However,

the internal discourse of both countries is directly relevant to studying their foreign policy, since it creates a populist dynamic that spills over into external relations. From first appearances, there are two key similarities between Pakistani and Chinese interpretations of history. Both tend to over-estimate the past political cohesiveness of each country, and both blame the West for undermining this cohesiveness.



According to Pakistani school textbooks, for example, the country came into existence in 711 CE with the arrival of Arab Muslim conquerors in the Sindh region of India.[24] From this small base (essentially a 'liberated zone' in Maoist terms), the Muslims gradually came to rule the entire Indian subcontinent. Their benign political and military supremacy continued uninterrupted for centuries, until the arrival of British colonialists in the 1600s. Working together, the British and their indigenous allies, the Hindus, set out to destroy the Mughal Empire, because it represented Islamic might in the region.

The key turning point was the 1857 anti-British Revolt. In its aftermath, Hindus connived with the British to repress Muslims, who were unfairly blamed for the revolt. When the British finally left 'Pakistan', they rewarded this loyalty by mostly handing power to the Hindus and doing their best to damage the reborn, present-day state of Pakistan.[25] Thus, the 'West' (a blanket term, applied by many Asians to Anglo-Saxon countries) and present-day India share a common and inherent antipathy towards Pakistan.

Fantastical though this interpretation might sound, it has caused alarm both within and outside Pakistan, over the radicalising effect it can exert on students. Analysts have commented on the religiously-defined dehumanisation that permeates history curricula in the country. However, despite this interest, no parallel has yet been drawn with an identical process that has been ongoing in China. Ever since the pro-democracy uprising of 1989, the Chinese Communist Party has made political indoctrination of the youth a top priority.[26] In 2001, its propaganda department announced that it would rewrite Chinese history up to 1840, to explain why the CCP's rise was inevitable.

The result has been a xenophobic narrative that emphasises Western aggression against China, starting with the First Opium War of 1839. (Coincidentally, as in Pakistani history, the principal aggressor in this case also happened to be Britain.) For the next 100 years, according to this narrative, the West and Japan ravaged China. The Middle Kingdom fell from its exalted status as the richest and most culturally developed region in the world, into enslavement. Regions that had his-

torically been part of China broke away after sensing the weakness of the central government. It was only when the Communist Party took power that matters returned to normal and China once again became politically united, as it had previously been for over 2000 years.[27]



Some Chinese scholars have disputed the very basis of the CCP's historical narrative—that China has a long tradition of political unity. They point out that, if one considers the last two millennia, China might have been united for only about 45% of the time. Furthermore, even this estimate would only apply to the Han-dominated eastern half of China, and exclude western provinces such as Xinjiang and Tibet. If examined in totality, the territory of modern-day China has previously only ever existed as a single political unit for a total of 81 years.[28] Its demise, however, coincided with the start of the First Opium War, thus providing the CCP with a convenient storyline about 'foreign aggression' and 'subversion' to sell domestically.

Viewed from their own perspective, both China and Pakistan see themselves as having been wronged by the West, and remaining at risk of further aggression and intrigue. These views tend to be reinforced by recent history: Pakistan feels aggrieved that the West has never fully supported its 'just' cause vis-à-vis India in Kashmir, while China feels that the United States seeks to obstruct its rise through geo-strategic containment. Crucially, both countries see India as a Western proxy. As early as the 1950s, Chinese communist propaganda described India as a bourgeois state, ruled by Western-controlled lackeys.[29] Although Pakistan did not express similar sentiments, its military elite suspected that the West would have preferred to ally with civilian-ruled, democratic India in the Cold War. Membership of anti-Soviet pacts was only extended to Pakistan as an afterthought, once India had declined to join. Ever since that time, there have been doubts within the military as to whether Pakistan should have allied with the United States at all, since the latter was too distant (in every sense of the word) to be a credible patron.[30]

The single event that removed barriers to Pakistani criticism of the West was the end of the Cold War. Although public sentiment in the country had been taking an anti-Western slant from the 1970s onward, with the 1979 storming of the US embassy in Islamabad being an example, this had been capped by the military leadership for higher strategic purposes. American aid was crucial to the health of the Pakistani economy, allowing it to grow at an average of 6% per annum. However, once this aid was suspended in 1990 over US concerns that Pakistan

was developing nuclear weapons, economic growth was halved.[31] In return, restraints on anti-Americanism loosened, and the growing influence of Saudi Arabia in Pakistan's cultural life ensured that visceral views from the Arab 'street' on US-Israeli relations were transplanted onto Pakistan's own streets.



For its part, during the early 2000s China grew alarmed by the United States' increasing defence cooperation with India—a country that it considered a precocious rival.[32] In response, Beijing intensified its diplomatic support for Pakistan and explicated its contempt for Indian claims to great power status. India, in its view, lacked any basis to compete with China, and was only led to do so by a cynically manipulative West. Moreover, it regarded India's open aspiration for South Asian hegemony as itself an act of political aggression, since it connoted subordination of Chinese interests in the region. The Chinese viewed India as an insecure and insignificant power, whose military strength was mainly derived from Western patronage rather than indigenous achievement.[33] Naturally, Pakistan shares this view.

## A Common Economic Objective: Making China Richer

The most important link between the militaries of China and Pakistan is also economic—the 1300 kilometre long Karakoram Highway. Construction began in 1966, one year after Pakistan's abortive military offensive against India, and opened in 1982. Less than a year later, Pakistan cold-tested a nuclear device and subsequently acquired blueprints for a nuclear bomb from China. Beijing supplied nuclear-capable missiles to Islamabad via the Karakoram Highway, besides outfitting the Pakistani army with conventional weaponry.[34] It is interesting to note that this period (the early and mid-1980s) coincided with the beginning of massive and systemic Pakistani support to insurgent groups in India's Punjab province.

The Karakoram Highway was crucial in augmenting the Pakistani military's strength and enabling Islamabad to pursue a covert war against India. Beginning in Punjab, this war expanded to Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in 1989 and, if one accepts Indian interpretations, to the rest of India in 1993, when multiple bombings took place across Mumbai. Indian analysts argue that, once it had acquired a nuclear umbrella and substantial quantities of cheaply-priced Chinese weapons, Pakistan lost all inhibitions about escalating hostilities through proxy warfare. There might be some merit in this argument, since virtually all

terrorism-related crises between India and Pakistan have involved Pakistani nationals crossing into Indian territory. To date, there has not been a high-profile instance of cross-border terrorism in the opposite direction.[35]



Despite its military character, in recent years the Karakoram Highway has taken on the additional role of being an economic connector. Islamabad is seeking to strengthen the relationship with Beijing by serving as a physical and political bridge between energy-hungry China and energy-rich Muslim states in West and Central Asia. Since 1993, when China became a net importer of oil, securing access to energy supplies has been an overwhelming priority for Beijing. Pakistan, with its strong ideological connections to regimes in both regions, is well-poised to assist China's efforts.

In return, it has obtained Chinese investment in infrastructure development. The Karakoram Highway is currently being maintained in part by Chinese engineering troops based in Pakistani territory. At least 16 tactical airstrips have been constructed along the highway, which is being expanded from its current width of 10 meters to 30 meters. In the event of a war with India, Pakistan's strategic airlift capabilities would be enhanced by these upgrades. China is also in the process of building two other highways in Pakistan, which would strengthen connectivity between the two countries.[36] All of these measures serve to tighten Pakistani control over the Northern Areas of Jammu and Kashmir, which remain a disputed territory like the rest of J&K. By strengthening Islamabad's military infrastructure in the Northern Areas, Beijing has implicitly conveyed that it recognises the Pakistani claim to Kashmir and not the Indian one.

Beyond its potential for hydropower generation and mineral exploration, the Chinese are probably not interested in Kashmir itself.[37] Rather, Beijing's intention is to obtain road access via Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir to the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar, in Baluchistan province, and thence to the oil-rich Persian Gulf states. Gwadar lies 400 kilometres east of the Straits of Hormuz, through which 40% of the world's oil supplies pass. Its value as a Chinese maritime base is obvious: the port, when fully operational, would cut down sea travel between China and the Gulf by 19,300 kilometres. It would shorten shipment time for oil supplies by a month, and reduce transport fees by 25%.[38] For this reason, the Chinese government has underwritten 70% of the development costs of the port, and taken over its administration from the Singapore Port Authority.[39]

What is not quite so clear is the Pakistani game plan. Policy statements by government officials suggest that Islamabad expects to serve as an energy corridor for western China, which would entitle it to receive transit fees. Better road connectivity would also increase Pakistani access to Central Asia through Xinjiang. Beijing would have reason to be grateful to Islamabad for helping develop China's remote western provinces, which have long been plagued by ethnic unrest. Lastly, linking China with Western and Central Asia would also allow Pakistan to receive Chinese investments in civilian infrastructure, particular for electricity production, which the country cannot afford by itself.[40]



These benefits are in the realm of the theoretical, however, and have yet to translate into practical manifestations. At present, bilateral trade via the Karakoram Highway has provided short-term benefits to Pakistan and long-term benefits to China. It has created a huge trade imbalance, with Chinese exports to Pakistan outnumbering imports by 4:1. So far, Beijing has extended generous credit to its southern ally, but this is unlikely to continue indefinitely. Pakistan's own export industries have not benefited in any substantial measure, since China is a direct competitor with all sectors where Pakistani businesses are attempting to expand their limited international market share.

In the final analysis, it would appear that the only real convergence of economic agendas between China and Pakistan is a common desire to make China more prosperous. Although Beijing has been sympathetic to Pakistani requests for greater equity in bilateral trade, in practice it is China that benefits commercially from the Karakoram Highway. Pakistan's reward is overwhelmingly confined to the military sphere, as China continues to strengthen Islamabad's hard power resources vis-à-vis New Delhi. Chinese firms are currently working on approximately 30 infrastructure projects in the Pakistan-Occupied Northern Areas of Jammu and Kashmir.[41] These initiatives certainly benefit Pakistan from a narrow security-centric view, but they have little direct impact on the economy. For its own development and sustenance, Pakistan still has to depend upon the West.

Ironically, if newspaper commentary is any indication of public opinion, sections of Pakistani society are jubilant over the West's economic troubles.[42] In their estimate, the United States is in terminal decline while China is on an unstoppable rise. One editorial even boasted that, just as Pakistan helped bring down the Soviet Union, so too could it destroy the American-led world order if it entered into an ideological

alliance with China.[43] Although it is easy to dismiss such views as the ranting of delusional hyper-nationalists, one must recall that elements within the PLA are inclined towards similar sentiments. They believe that the 2008 economic crisis and the 2003 Gulf War have done irreparable damage to American soft and hard power, and that the status differential between China and the US has narrowed considerably[44]. It is possible that such logic has permeated the Pakistani military through the course of official exchanges with Beijing.

## Towards a 'Karakoram Consensus'?

What is most striking about the Sino-Pakistani military relationship is its potential one-sidedness. If the prospect of India launching a land-grabbing offensive is disregarded, then Islamabad has derived little benefit from its ties to Beijing.[45] Instead, it has locked itself into an adversarial posture vis-à-vis India, thus fulfilling its own prophecy of unrelenting Indian hostility. Meanwhile, China has reinforced this dynamic by using its United Nations Security Council veto to shield anti-Indian terrorist groups based in Pakistan from international sanctions. Following the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, CCP-controlled newspapers gleefully observed that the security failures of the Indian state had undermined its claims to great power status.[46] More tellingly, they also suggested that the origins of the attack lay within India's own polity, due to the failure of its governance model to meet popular aspirations. Apparently, besides realpolitik-driven strategic rivalry, India and China still remain ideological rivals, competing for the legitimacy of their respective democratic and authoritarian political systems.

Pakistan is a convenient instrument in this war of ideas. Its indulgence of cross-border terrorism serves Beijing's purpose of denying India a peaceful periphery within which to build economic strength and thus, attain domestic stability. Tensions with Pakistan, provoked by terrorist attacks, have limited foreign investment into India and diverted developmental expenditure to security purposes. The power differential between India and China thus continues to widen in China's favour. By urging a resumption of the India-Pakistan dialogue process, Beijing has sought to deny New Delhi any diplomatic advantage that it might have gained from not responding militarily to the Mumbai attacks. While doing so, it has of course, paid lip-service to the notion of a peaceful compromise between India and Pakistan and common efforts against terrorism.

Naturally, such benevolence is lacking when China deals with Uighur separatist groups based in Pakistan. On this issue, more than any other, Beijing's own unilateralism and the limits of Sino-Pakistani strategic convergence come to the fore. China has occasionally shut down the Karakoram Highway as a demonstration of its dissatisfaction with Pakistani counterterrorist cooperation against the Uighurs. Since the 1980s, the Highway has served as a transit route for separatists in Xinjiang to reach Afghanistan, where they received arms training. Initially, Chinese authorities believed that free movement of Uighur militants southward was a positive development, since it would lead to them getting killed by the Soviets and Afghan security forces. However, a blowback effect was felt from the early 1990s onward, as radical Islamist fighters returned to Xinjiang with proven combat skills. Since then, increasing trade links between China and Pakistan, via the Karakoram Highway, have also increased the operational space available to drug traffickers and jihadist groups based in Pakistan.[47]

China's security community has calculated that it can co-opt Pakistan into selectively targeting Uighur militants, even as all other categories of jihadists enjoy sanctuary in the country. For this reason, the PLA has cultivated Pakistani officials with known Islamist sympathies. It views them as assets in its own efforts to maintain stability in Xinjiang, since their influence with jihadist groups would serve to deflect terrorist attacks from China.[48] For its part, the Pakistani military has sought to meet Chinese expectations wherever possible, by prioritising operations against Uighur groups. It has arrested or killed a number of militant leaders and made statements in support of the Chinese government's policy towards Xinjiang.

There might, however, be some future strains in the Sino-Pakistani relationship. Notwithstanding official-level warmth between the two policy elites, China's increasing commercial presence within Pakistan has not been entirely welcomed at the public level. In Baluchistan, anger has focused on the Chinese expatriate community, who are seen as enjoying business privileges denied to local entrepreneurs.[49] Elsewhere, Chinese workers have come under threat following the storming of the Red Mosque in Islamabad in July 2007. That action was widely perceived to have been carried out by the Pakistani army under pressure from Beijing, since some Chinese nationals had been taken prisoner by Islamist militants in the mosque.[50] Although Pakistanis routinely blame the United States for terrorist bombings within the country, arguing that support for the United States' War on Terror has

undermined Pakistani security, the reality is different. It was actually Islamabad's inability to resist pressure from Beijing, not Washington, that led to jihadist violence within Pakistan and the rise of an indigenous Taliban movement.



The United States is literally picking up the tab for Sino-Pakistani military relations. Despite being Pakistan's biggest benefactor, it remains vilified by public discourse and berated in official circles for its alleged insensitivity to Pakistani interests. Yet, Washington gave Pakistan $690 million in emergency aid in 2010, to cope with damage caused by flash-flooding in the country. China, in contrast, gave just $18 million.[51] A cost-benefit analysis of the relationship between Beijing and Islamabad might therefore conclude that, if Pakistan continues to view China as an alternative to the West, it might be in for a big disappointment. Pakistan seems to value Chinese friendship more than China values Pakistan's. While Islamabad's rationale for allying with Beijing is clear—'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'—it remains uncertain whether China operates according to the same logic.[52] Perhaps the Chinese elite have another proverb in mind, while supporting Pakistan against India: 'it is good to strike the serpent's head with your enemy's hand'.[53] Only time shall tell if Pakistan will emerge stronger or weaker from its alignment with China, but the record thus far is not promising for South Asia.

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## Notes

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# Understanding China's Global Search for Energy and Resources

Sigfrido Burgos Cáceres

The need for massive amounts of energy supplies, raw materials, among other natural resources in part drives Beijing's defence, energy, and foreign policies. The dynamic economic growth rates experienced over the past twenty years, coupled with increased manufacturing levels, rising exports of low-cost goods, rapid urbanisation, and higher demands for air and land travel and transportation, among other things, are increasing China's appetite for crude oil, natural gas, timber, and other critical minerals. This article tackles the issue of how such demands shapes China and how the international community responds.

Keywords: *China, Beijing, energy, resources, raw materials, economic growth, oil, natural gas, timber, minerals, export, economic dynamism, trade surplus*

## Introduction

The need for massive amounts of energy supplies, raw materials, and other natural resources is, in part, driving Beijing's defence, energy, and foreign policies. The dynamic economic growth rates experienced over the past twenty years, coupled with increased manufacturing levels, rising exports of low-cost goods, rapid urbanisation, and higher demands for air travel and land transport, among many other things, are increasing China's appetite for crude oil, natural gas, timber, and critical minerals.1 To give an idea of China's accelerated economic dynamism, one has to look at exports. China's exports increased from US$184 billion in 1998 to US$1.2 trillion in 2007. As a result, China's trade surplus increased from US$44 billion in 1998 to US$262 billion in 2007, leading to increasing pressure on China from both the United

States and the European Union to upwardly revalue its currency, the Yuan.[2]

Over the past two decades, the Chinese economy has grown at an annual rate of around 10%, a pace that stands out in 2012 especially as the global economy continues to suffer from a financial meltdown (2008+). However, experts note that there are three major problems that could derail China from its impressive track record of consistent economic throughput: 1. a property bubble burst, 2. unbalanced rebalancing, and 3. rising political unrest.[3] Even under temporary duress, China's hunger for aluminium, cement, copper, and steel have caused its gas and oil consumption to surge. Such accelerated use of resources turned it into the world's second-largest oil importer after the US.[4]



The most traded commodity in the world is oil since oil, and its derivatives, literally make the world move. It is used in transportation vehicles and to propel factory machinery.[5] In the absence of sustainable alternative energy sources, oil will remain the substrate of choice in global production. Moreover, aspirations to attain Western lifestyles are fuelling an unprecedented competition for gas, forest products, minerals, oil, and water as rapidly growing nations like Brazil, Chile, India, Russia, Turkey, and Vietnam pursue comfort, prosperity, and economic security for more and more of their people.[6] Energy is the essence of modern civilization; and as societies and economies around the globe grow, so does their energy consumption.

As the international community witnesses the growth of China (and India), it is pertinent to ask whether there is enough recoverable oil to see emerging market powers join the highest circles of global governance? Resource experts claim that the world already hit peak oil.[7] As demand meets supplies resulting in higher oil prices it becomes evident to energy analysts that the output of conventional petroleum will peak at about 95 million barrels per day in 2012. It will then begin an irreversible decline that could trigger a bitter competition for the remaining oil. In short, global reserves of crude oil are dwindling as demand rises.

In recognition of the much-heralded resource depletions and talk about climate change, China has set out to replace some of the coal, gas, and oil it consumes with alternative energies such as geothermal, nuclear, solar, and wind while addressing shortcomings that have interfered with a more successful expansion of renewable energy.[8] In the meantime, while Beijing continues to purchase oil from traditional oil-producing countries, it also seeks greater direct control and man-

agement over sources abroad. This has resulted in China's engagement with a variety of unstable and often dictatorial states in Africa, Central Asia, South America, and Southeast Asia. This situation is mirrored in China's other resource demands; it requires minerals, copper, iron ore, gold, and silver, as well as natural resources like timber and rubber.[9]



Zweig and Jianhai note that China has been courting resource-rich states through

> building goodwill by strengthening bilateral trade relations, awarding aids, forgiving national debt, and helping build roads, bridges, stadiums, and harbours. In return, China has won access to key resources, from gold in Bolivia, coal in the Philippines, oil in Ecuador and natural gas in Australia.[10]

Furthermore, as China enters Africa and consolidates its position as a major oil player oon the continent, it gains leverage to prevent—or at least limit—others from entering upstream operations. Additionally, there are the long lead times required for funding and developing oil in territories that remain unclaimed or areas too logistically complicated to propose a profitable business endeavour.[11]

Tellingly, China's search for energy and resources is devoid of moral considerations. Given that sought-after energy supplies and natural resources are often found in states with weak governance and oppressive leaders, Beijing has reached agreements with governments that have little or no respect for international norms of conduct. Such business methods places China at odds with US and European foreign affairs because it undermines long-stipulated objectives in sensitive regions such as isolating obstreperous and undisciplined governments or punishing them for neglecting human rights, seeking WMD proliferation, hosting religious radicals and terrorists, incompliance with international law, and failing to promote democratic reforms.[12]

Due to China's ascendancy, the international political system is shifting for the second time since the Cold War ended.[13] Europe and the US are closely following Beijing's assertiveness and newfound confidence in foreign affairs. They are also trying to bring China, other major emerging economies, and the developing world under a collaborative framework to address climate change, international terrorism, and resource depletions. The latter is particularly critical given that developing countries will generate nearly 80% of the growth in world energy demand by 2020, with the Middle East representing 10% and China representing approximately 30%, according to global consulting firms' forecasts.[14]

This work is based on answering the question of *how* China searches for resources globally and contributes to an increasing body of work on China's demand for resources. The work is broken into four substantive subsections dealing with: economic, environmental, geopolitical, and strategic aspects of China's resource demands. This is closely followed through the development of reflections which offer analyses to make better sense of the impact such behaviour stemming from Beijing is having on international political life in general terms.



## Economic Dimensions

The first twelve years of the twenty-first century saw the rapid economic growth and increased consumption of energy, among other resources, by hyper-growth countries such as China, Brazil and India. This was quickly reflected in demand jumps, and with them, price hikes, for key resources. The hydrocarbons sector is indicative; between 2004 and 2012, supply could not keep up with demand, which led to market fluctuations and the formation of new price floors and ceilings.[15] The rapidly rising costs of energy and resources may be hurting oil-importing countries, but it is helping oil-exporting states to fill up their national coffers. China, now the second largest economy in the world, has—through its annual importation of energy and resources from developing countries—assists these states offset the increased costs of non-oil goods that are heavily reliant on gas and oil for their production and transport. Additionally, the oil-producing states, especially large producers such as Angola and Nigeria, increase their fiscal revenues as oil prices rise. Over the years, these countries have accumulated significant foreign exchange reserves that regrettably have been mostly used to the personal advantage of the ruling elite.[16]

In China, for now, this rapid economic growth and sharp consumption of resources is driven by export-oriented manufacturing of low-cost goods to the West. The contribution of domestic consumption and services is comparatively lower. For instance, consumption accounts for 42% of China's GDP; compared to 68% for the US, 64% for India, 58% for the EU, and 55% for Japan. One could say that Beijing has implemented a resource-mobilisation model of growth instead of a consumption-led approach. This is changing however. Officials in Beijing have begun to recognise that overreliance on exporting to high-income countries may come with a series of hidden risks. But change is difficult, especially for a country guided through one-party rule. In

this spirit, Das, former Chief Executive Officer of Procter and Gamble in India, notes that 'Beijing remains highly suspicious of fast-talking capitalists and entrepreneurs. Also, only about 10% of the credit goes to the private sector in China, even though the private sector employs 40% of Chinese workforce.'[17]

In terms of economic benchmarking, copper is closely watched by analysts and traders. It is called "Dr. Copper" because it is a proven bellwether for the overall health of the global economy. Copper is used in many industries, so strong demand for the metal often indicates that the overall economy is in the process of expansion. By mid-2012, copper prices had more than doubled after a three-year upswing, which saw it go from US$1.50 per pound in January 2009 to US$3.60 in 2012.[18] This was largely driven by the belief that China, the world's largest copper user, has an insatiable hunger for the metal.[19] China's annual copper consumption hovers at roughly 7-8 million tonnes.[20] Recently, rising commodity prices can be partly explained by companies and individuals hoarding commodities of all types—from cooking oil and cotton to copper—betting that prices will increase. However, experts agree that successive rounds of interest-rate increases and moves to mitigate speculation will have a negative impact of commodities and other critical markets in the short run. On the whole, China's long term demand for commodities remains robust because of the economy's size and rapid growth.[21]

If copper wires the Chinese economy then oil is the economic lubricant that keeps the manufacturing and industrial sectors going at full speed. Beijing is becoming increasingly dependent on domestic and foreign oil, especially from Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East. This creates interstate competitions, and with it, the threat of investment protectionism. The control of natural resources by sovereign wealth funds and state-owned investors is a primary concern. Many resource-rich countries are becoming increasingly anxious about China's thirst for direct and unimpeded control of natural resources, particularly gas, minerals, timber, and oil. As developed and developing countries face increases in the deployment of foreign direct investments from China—most of these occur in the natural gas, mining, and oil industries—a growing tendency to more closely examine deals is under way. In fact, transactions that involve government-controlled entities, oil-for-infrastructure deals, and natural resources are subjected to intense scrutiny.[22] A study by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) notes that in the recent past at least eleven powerful economies,

which together constituted 40% of all foreign direct investment in 2006, have cleared new laws that would restrict certain types of foreign investment or expand government oversight.[23]

One of the oil business' major points of attractiveness is its highly inelastic demand; that is, an increase in the price does not greatly decrease the demand for oil in the short run. This being the case, if oil companies can maintain a higher price for oil, they will not lose sales volumes and will reap high profits. This is why many states in the Middle East maintain amicable relations with both China and the US. For example, the US's oil import bill accounts for over two-fifths of the total US trade deficit. Another source of US trade deficit is the protectionist and mercantilist trade policies of its major trading partners, especially China. China accounted for about one-quarter of global growth between 2000 and 2010, stepping out beyond the US for the top spot as trade-maker.[24] This evolving oil competition is because the Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy and power, as well as the stability of the whole country, depends heavily on Beijing's ability to ensure sustained economic growth above 8%, generate employment for thousands of young people joining the labour force, and to provide rising living standards for its citizenry. While senior government officials are busy handling international affairs they must also pay attention to their evolving domestic dynamics that could very easily derail economic, military, and political plans.



China, as well as Europe and North America, have a healthy appetite for natural gas. This gas is considered a relatively benign fossil fuel. Peru has several trillion cubic feet of natural gas in its remote South Eastern jungles. Developing this resource is good for the world's energy security, air quality, and the Peruvian economy. China is fully aware that exploiting its natural gas reserves could transform Peru from a net importer of energy into a net exporter and Peru is cognizant that this transition can translate into boosting growth, job creation, and fiscal revenues.[25] A shift from oil to gas may lower energy prices. In general terms, when energy costs fall it brings food prices crashing down as well because the cost of producing foods are now closely tied to the price of crude oil and natural gas, given that petrochemicals are so widely and heavily utilised in the cultivation of cereals and grains.[26] This is important owing to the rising demand for food in China. The Earth Policy Institute estimates that if China keeps on growing at a baseline level of 8% annually, by 2030 the per capita income of 1.5 billion Chinese will be the same as the US in the mid 2000s.[27]

There have been attempts to stymie China's growth. With the help of its European allies, the US has stepped up pressure on China to revaluate its currency. This is easier said than done for Beijing. If the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) allows the Yuan to appreciate rapidly—not only to please critics but also to reduce inflation—it will generate a plunge of exports as these will become more expensive in foreign markets and less competitive. As a result unemployment will rise. Moreover, if inflation keeps climbing and dissatisfaction rises, mass unrest will likely follow. Evidently, China embraces free and open trade expansion because it is cognizant that if a country wants to be a world power, it has no choice but abide to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). To this effect, China's growing commitment to economic liberalisation has increased foreign investment and trade, as well as global commercial etiquette and trade rules.

The problems of China are not limited to the economic realm. There are also environmental, legal, and social conflicts. For instance, Nobrega notes that 'between 1992 and 2005, 20 million farmers were evicted from agriculture due to land acquisition, and from 1996 to 2005, more than 21% of arable land in China has been put to non-agricultural use.'[28] In environmental terms, China is now home to a large number of polluted cities. The following section examines these issues.

## Environmental Dimension

From the 1800s to the 2000s, the world witnessed exponential monetary growth, economic development, expansion of trade, urbanisation, a sustained boom in residential and commercial construction, an explosion of manufacturing and industries, and the irresponsible use of the world's limited energy sources. But, one may ask, why? Well, the answer is why not. During this timeframe, all the coal, gas, and oil to fuel the monetary-market economic model seemed relatively harmless, extremely cheap, and seemingly inexhaustible. Indeed, it was this paradigm that permitted acceleration of energy usage and our inability to stop consuming it, to the point that some Western countries are now termed 'oil addicts.'[29] Regrettably, this carries a collective burden: environmental problems. Some suggest that one can manage risk only when it can be measured—this is China's dilemma with carbon dioxide. It is an invisible, odourless, tasteless gas that is known to cause global warming. But today it does not appear to significantly hurt anyone in China, so the perception is that managing this gas (and other pollut-

ants) is not only costly but also with negligible economic payoffs.

A World Bank study estimates that pollution costs China between 8% and 12% of its annual GDP because of increased medical bills, lost work due to illness, damage to fish and crops, and money spent on disaster relief.[30] Similarly, China's National Bureau of Statistics estimates that the health problems, environmental degradation, and lost workdays from pollution cost China anywhere from 4% to 9% of its total economic output.[31] It is often said that China has an edge related to the amount of pollution produced without regulation in comparison to industries in the US that face the highest compliance costs. Companies such as Dow Chemical and US Steel spend about 3% of their revenues on environmental-related expenses. In comparison, Chinese competitors such as Sinopec and Bao Steel spend only about a tenth as much. Unfortunately, this polluting largesse comes at a steep price to Chinese citizens. China is now home to 16 of the world's 20 most polluted cities. In fact, of China's almost 100 cities with over one million people each, 66% fail to meet World Health Organisation air quality standards.[32] Ultimately, it comes full circle: whatever China's pollution-based competitiveness and environmental cost advantages are at the individual enterprise level, they are likely being offset by aggregate social costs (i.e. healthcare).



In terms of energy utilisation for food production, it takes 35 calories of fossil fuel to make one calorie of beef in confinement and 68 calories of fossil fuels to make a calorie of pork.[33] China, with 1.3 billion people, is adopting a richer meat-based diet that will need to be supplemented from abroad. If this is indeed the case, the intensification of livestock production systems will demand more energy and resources that are already dwindling. No wonder people ask: will it be food or fuel? To avoid reaching a carbon dioxide level of 560 parts per million, world leaders will require a massive global energy project aimed at conservation, emission mitigation, and oil substitution. This initiative will have to leave room for developed countries to grow using fewer fossil fuels, and for countries like Brazil, China, and India to progress under a progressive pollution cutback programme, until they fully climb out of poverty and are able to become more energy efficient.[34] These are ambitious ideas that merit consideration given dwindling resources.

Sceptics are asking how to verify the claim that the international community reached peak oil. The answer to this question rests on several indicators. First, many of the significant gas and oil fields that have supplied global demands previously are experiencing diminished

outputs. For example, Burgan in Kuwait, Cantarell in Mexico, Ghawar in Saudi Arabia, and Samotlor in Russia are either in steep decline or about to become so. Second, while in recent years major oil producers have been spending more resources to discover new gas and oil reserves, they are finding less. In fact, the last decade in which new discoveries exceeded the rate of extraction from existing fields was the 1980s. In the past 25 years, only two major gas and oil fields have been discovered: the Kashagan field in Kazakhstan's sector of the Caspian Sea and the Tupi field some 150 miles off the coast of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.[35] The solution to declining oil supplies will revolve around some combination of renewable, eco-friendly, domestically-produced energy supplies, including bio-fuels, geothermal, solar, ocean waves, and wind energy generation.

To be sure, 2.5 out of 7 billion people currently depend on wood and other biomass fuels that cause further deforestation and air pollution. As an energy source, coal replaced wood because—pound for pound—it contains twice as much energy as wood does. In the 1850s crude oil emerged as an alternative source and this was burned in the form of kerosene to light lamps in households and streets. Today, for many countries the preferred energy sources are natural gas and methane, which burns cleanly and with the added advantage of low emissions of carbon dioxide and even lower emissions of other noxious pollutants. Regrettably, it has not been widely adopted because most gas supplies lie disparate from consumers, so transportation costs are high. However, industrial engineers and energy experts have considered and proposed importing natural gas from distant suppliers by transporting it, in liquefied form, by sea in ships fitted with high-pressure containers. The only problem with this proposal is that special terminals need to be designed, built, and equipped to receive liquefied gas which adds another layer of upfront costs that disincentives investment in infrastructure projects of this magnitude.[36]

China, Europe, and the US should embrace the challenge of developing—as much as possible—green economies as decidedly, and with the same creativity, dedication, entrepreneurship, investment, and intelligence that they once committed to accelerating economic growth. Comparatively speaking, this is a minor challenge compared to the major global crises the international community faced and learned to overcome over the last 500 years. In fact, such large-scale projects should proceed as public-private partnerships enjoying strong government and corporate commitments, with engineering, industrial, and

university leadership across many countries and an internationally binding climate change mitigation framework designed to engage in sustainable and sustained economic growth.[37] Commentators have also pointed to China's evolving water crisis. In other parts of the world this is nothing new. Finnegan, reporting from Cochabamba, Bolivia, notes that 'the world is running out of fresh water, at a time when demand is rapidly increasing [...] with protestors fighting the water privatisation that has taken place.'[38]



In terms of international climate negotiations, some observers note that if China is pushed too hard some of its poorest yet populous provinces—with low per capita emissions and relatively high levels of energy inefficiency—may ask to start negotiating for themselves with intergovernmental organisations to receive more favourable terms and lenient treatment than Beijing would impose on them.[39] The success of Suntech Power Holding, China's leading manufacturer of modern silicon solar panels, has opened the eyes of many CCP officials that now see this subsector as a profitable industry that could be successfully developed. And if it is successful, increasing supplies and investments in research and development will bring the price down so far that businesses and households would be able to afford solar cells to reduce coal-burning and greenhouse gas emissions.

Environmental concerns are overshadowed by China's emergence as both a military and economic rival (to the US, and European states to a lesser degree)—heralding a profound shift in the distribution of global power. As China's power spikes, two outcomes are likely to occur in international politics: states will begin to view China as a security threat, and China will use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests. The following section examines this eventuality.

## Geopolitical Dimension

Between 1970 and 1990, a small group of countries that produced and exported oil managed to seize control over the international gas and oil system. These countries managed to restrict supply in order to reap the benefits of much higher prices. The US, in large part motivated by concerns about control of gas and oil reserves in the Middle East, engaged in the Gulf War in 1991, its invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the subsequent occupation of Iraqi territories. At present, the overriding US fear—exacerbated by the media—is that Beijing's discourse of peaceful

development in the region may be a ruse to deceive Asian leaders and the international community about China's long-term aims, including the eclipsing of the US in East Asia and the challenging of its global hegemony. State power is based on sustained economic growth and officials in Beijing are well aware that no major emerging economy can do this without securing energy supplies and integrating into the globalised capitalist system.[40]

A number of commentators theorise that Beijing may be "lying low" until it is ready to comprehensively challenge the US in Asia and elsewhere. However, China's push into Africa, Central and Southeast Asia, and Latin America in search of energy supplies, raw materials, and natural resources seems to suggest that the long-expected global contest for the world's remaining oil has already begun.[41] In recognition of its energy and market development needs, Beijing has influenced its southern neighbours to keep their eye on the ball of regional economic integration, and it has generally succeeded in overcoming ASEAN's recurrent historical suspicions because renewed regional vitality offers protection from the insalubrious effects of globalisation. Cambodia, for example, is pivotal to China's strategies to project greater influence in Southeast Asia, buffer longstanding rivals, and potentially tame US hegemony.[42]

In 2000, Beijing established the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF) to incentivise commerce, promote trade, and foster investments with African nations. Unintentionally, however, China's energy and resource needs can have deleterious impacts on some African states. It is now well documented that increasing dependence upon natural resource exports greatly increases the risk of conflict.[43] This is particularly worrisome in places where the cost of a typical civil war is US$50 billion.[44] Additionally, unrestricted access to resource rents has significantly worsened governance on the African continent.[45] China's rapprochement with Iran and Sudan (considered rogue states by Europe and the US), and its reinforced ties with Venezuela may be a sign of things to come. South of China, Australia has been a beneficiary of Beijing's appetite for coal, gas, iron-ore, and oil, and it has begun to explore the prospects of establishing a number of preferential trade agreements with China as well as ASEAN.

After the USSR collapsed and produced an independent Russia and five independent states around the Caspian basin—and after about a decade in making the transition to capitalism—Russia has become a key player in world gas and oil markets. With Moscow, Beijing is seek-

ing a relatively stable relationship impinged in strategic collaboration and pragmatic utilitarianism as both countries depend on gas and oil to sustain economic growth.[46]

Also, China and India maintain ongoing talks on energy cooperation, the success of which would greatly ease competitive frictions between the two as their economies grow and expand, and as the demand for gas and oil increases.[47] Additionally, both countries have initiated efforts to resolve tense border claims that led to war in 1962, as well as evolving dialogues on broad topics such as climate change, water scarcity, terrorism, globalisation, radicalism, WMD nonproliferation, and the reform of the UN.



Importantly, world leaders need to consider how the magnitude of China's energy and resource needs affects the international oil market. As India and Brazil start to establish themselves more solidly in foreign markets, along with China's ever-rising demands, this could affect global prices and supplies universally. China, Europe, and the US share interests in stable oil prices, safe and protected shipping routes, and a secure international environment that fosters investments and capital flows, all of which can help sustain their economic prosperity and that of the rest of the world. All large oil consumers, traditional powers (e.g. the EU and the US) or emerging (e.g. Brazil, China, and India) share an interest in an open energy market without artificial restrictions on supplies. If such a market were achieved, Brazil, China, and India would be less tempted to secure supply sources through costly bilateral deals.[48]

Finally, China remains heavily dependent on international sea lanes to bring oil from Africa and the Middle East, and worries about strategic vulnerabilities. The following section looks at the strategic dimension.

## Strategic Dimension

Throughout history countries have sought to gain control of energy supplies, raw materials, and natural resources, and to manage the use of these for their economic, military, political, and social benefits. Few would disagree that oil and geopolitics are tightly connected. It is no secret that the global politics of energy is shaping economic and diplomatic intercourses around the world. In relation to Asia, a Report for the US Congress notes that the thirst for gas and oil is sending China and India in an all-out search for energy sources to the point that these

states are appearing in parts of the world where they have not been seen before.[49] China's relatively unscathed position after the world financial crash of 2008-2010 have given them a clear and unambiguous opportunity to strengthen its strategic advantages as the US and EU struggle to recover from recession. In terms of natural resource acquisitions, Beijing is currently in a position to financially assist other states through key tactical investments or direct monetary transfers. These are primarily states suffering from balance-of-payment deficits at a time when the West cannot come through as it has done in the past.[50] For example, Beijing has undertaken numerous negotiations in Central Asia for a multibillion-dollar (USD) pipeline to transport Caspian Sea oil to China's mainland.

Indeed, as China continues to enjoy a US$3.0 trillion portfolio of foreign exchange reserves, it is expected to continue making tactical overtures and strategic investments through its sovereign wealth funds and state-owned financial institutions. Considering China's hunger for gas, oil, coal, and other natural resources, these emerge as likely candidates of interest. Lanteigne notes that what separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers, is that not only is it "growing up" within a milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country's development of global power status.[51] Also, Beijing has been using its soft power in its Asian neighbourhood without raising hegemonic suspicions.[52]

China's economic diplomacy has successfully outflanked the US; China's Asian neighbours understand China as an engine of growth and while many of them may be concerned about China's military ambitions they have also pegged their own economic development to Beijing's.[53] Through economic diplomacy, China has markedly improved its relations with Australia, one of Washington's most faithful allies in the Asia Pacific region. To be sure, China's regional integration in Asia will make it easier for the CCP to leverage economic power in support of geostrategic ambitions that could pose a threat to US and European interests in the future. Beijing's participation in a number of regional bodies has paid handsomely in terms of acceptance, prestige, and image-building. It is now easier to perceive that prosperity-driven cosmopolitanism is superseding the biased attitude of one-party ideologues who distrust regional organisations as tools to constrain China's power and influence.[54] However, despite successful rapprochements, uncer-

tainties about available supplies and increased demand from emerging countries such as Brazil, China, and India have resuscitated fears about energy security.

Although a number of commentators welcome China's economic growth and international assertiveness, a good number of diplomats and government officials feel negatively about the prospect of Beijing significantly increasing its military (army and navy) power. Again, it is important to underscore that China's dependence on foreign oil—especially from Africa and the Middle East—will make it more concerned and engaged with the sea lanes used by its gas and oil tankers, such as routes in the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, and the Taiwan Strait. Chinese officials believe that China could face an energy and economic crisis if its gas and oil supply lines are blocked. For some time now it has been rumoured that China is building up its navy to protect its commercial ships and oil tankers, and oversees shipping lines. Its newly-devised naval strategy consists of defensive and offensive approaches. Furthermore, Beijing is forging a number of strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea so that it can protect its commercial and energy interests. For instance, it has closely liaised with Pakistan on infrastructural projects; with Myanmar for establishing radar systems and building airstrips; and with Bangladesh for naval facilities. Clearly, Beijing wishes to build its own capacity to secure critically important sea lanes, but it also seeks to continue to cooperate with Europe, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and the US to keep the straits open. It seems that CCP officials will have to engage in a range of diplomatic, economic, and political measures to ensure a steady supply of energy sources, raw materials, and natural resources.[55]



Alternatively, the widespread usage of renewable energy sources would reduce both dependence on oil suppliers located in volatile regions (i.e. North Africa and the Middle East) and the potential terrorist threats that nuclear plants and liquefied gas terminals could attract. To avoid energy crises, China must reduce its needs for new energy-generation plants via aggressive investments in efficiency. To that end, the impact of standard setting, fiscal incentives, and generous subsidies should not be underestimated. For instance, in the 1980s countries like Denmark, Germany, Norway, and Spain imposed manageable standards, tax deductions, and offered subsidies for wind power on their utilities; creating a market for wind-turbine manufacturers in Europe and the US. Some insist that rich countries should invest heavily in

research and development in all energy sectors, promote conservation, develop inexpensive, feasible, and viable forms of renewable energy, and test the possibilities of significantly reducing greenhouse gases through large-scale geologic carbon sequestration.[56]



Additionally, a geostrategic imperative for developed and emerging market economies is the recognition that intentionally conserving natural gas and crude oil puts less money in the hands of autocratic regimes and hostile forces. Conservation also mitigates climatic changes. Leaders around the world need to be reminded that the precipitous descent of some of the world's poorest countries into food insecurity, instability, and poverty raises the risks of potentially detrimental spill-over effects, ranging from a rise in illegal migration to organised crime.[57]

## Conclusions and Reflections

At the heart of a dramatic upsurge in the usage of energy and resources lies the industrial revolution of the 1800s. This is usually dated to the very early experiments with successful powering of industrial machinery and steam locomotives. At present, new waves of energy and resource usage revolve around China. As time passes, China will continue to rapidly build up a powerful mix of cheap skilled labour, flexible manufacturing and industrial capacity, investment-friendly central government, and massive domestic markets. But audiences need to be cognizant that China's importation of gas, oil, minerals, and timber from the developing world can cause a series of unintended problems. Armed conflicts are more likely in countries that depend heavily on energy sources, raw materials, and natural resources for their export-earnings partly because belligerent groups can extort the economic gains from this trade to finance their subversive operations. Also, energy and resources fuel wars because they make secession more likely.[58]

China must develop ties that do not flout international standards of good governance and human dignity, or threaten US or European security. Under its energy- and resources-based defence, energy, and foreign policies, Beijing has become assertive in seeking what it needs in international markets to keep its economic machinery running at full speed. The US and EU should contemplate the construction of a stable Asian balance of power that will certainly be in the collective interest of China, its neighbours, and its competitors. While keeping

China's actions in sight, what the world warrants are balanced, patient, and farsighted leaders to adapt to rapid changes in the global distribution of commercial, economic, political, and military powers, without allowing temptations for combativeness to override their peaceful rhetoric and common goals of peace and prosperity. To be sure, the ascendancy of China is not assured.



Beijing faces a host of challenges that could have significant destabilising effects on regional growth and the global economy if not handled correctly. For example, one of the most frequently hypothesised scenarios is China's growth slowing and its unemployment rising,; producing political unrest from those who lose their jobs and the hundreds of millions of rural peasants still living in the countryside.[59] Some accounts note that the authoritarian wall in China is starting to show fissures. This is partly explained by the upstream and downstream effects of the economic slowdown, which, inevitably, affected China given that much of its exports are sent to the US and EU. As these countries could not boost consumption by flooding the system with fresh money, China started to slow down its manufacturing and industrial engines which immediately translated to layoffs, unemployment, insecurity, uncertainty, and less confidence on the current governing system consisting of one-party rule. Beijing is adept at "handling" popular revolt in faraway locations, in capturing and imprisoning artists, at managing its economic dealings, and in attracting foreign capital, but it remains to be seen if they can stamp out waves of dissatisfaction that may rapidly arise if the Chinese were to encounter an insurmountable roadblock or faux pas.

Private sector strategists and investment bankers are not sure that China is the place where sustained growth will occur and stable business will flourish, especially because property right protections and rule of law are lacking. Some pundits believe that India's differentiating advantage comes in the form of an 'entrenched and vibrant democracy that will ultimately drive India to outperform China socially and economically.'[60] In fact, more pungent questions need to be posed such as: will global affairs continue to be heavily influenced by Washington's free-market democracy or will it start gathering some intense momentum from Beijing's authoritarian state capitalism? Beijing has gone to great lengths to keep any democratic waves from entering Chinese territories. For instance, it has shut down internet sites, stymied communications, banned political art, harangued against Nobel Prize nominations, and hit protests with an iron fist. At least in the near

term, by rolling out these measures, the Chinese government will be successful in stifling protests.

The wave of democratisation that has recently swept through North Africa has sent shockwaves around the world where authoritarian regimes are still ruling. China has not been immune to these incendiary popular moves. However, it is important to highlight that authoritarianism in China is of a far higher quality and of a deeper breadth than in the Middle East. This does not mean that Beijing is protected from violent revolutions—Not at all. Revolutions are still very much a possibility. But, if this indeed becomes a reality, it will not come from the disenchanted poor but from an upwardly mobile middle class fed up with anachronistic government that does little but keep the productive social classes from achieving their true potential. This is where the revolution can start and ignite other groups to join forces to bring democracy to a land ripe with opportunity. Once the one-party rule becomes stagnant or very much unable to keep the masses pacified, then change is going to come, one way or another. For China, the problem will be that political unrest will surely produce economic stagnation.[61]



Many are optimistic in terms of fierce resource competitions—much of which is derived from Beijing's discourse of peaceful development and neighbourliness. However, there is much money to be made out of conflict and war, and the race to secure those remaining sources of energy sources, raw materials, and natural resources is the ideal trigger for US and EU military-industrial complexes to lobby their respective governments to find excuses to leverage friction, sore spots, and tension that could precipitate yet another war of giants. Military deployments to the Middle East and Central Asia can be partly explained by this internecine geopolitical contest of setting strongholds in existing and potential gas-and-oil fields.

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# Insurgencies, Border Clashes, and Security Dilemma—Unresolved Problems for ASEAN

Deniz Kocak

The decision to deepen ASEAN cooperation has inspired a lively debate among scholars. Since, no large-scale war has occurred between ASEAN member states since its 1967 founding, it is reasonable to ask whether the institutionalisation of a Security Community was not long overdue. Furthermore, the official proclamation of ASEAN as a Security Community should lead to the expectation that ASEAN is a zone of peace and stability. This article questions the stability of ASEAN security arrangements, and subsequently queries whether ASEAN can be considered a security community in the fullest sense of the term. The main goal of a Security Community is to provide transnational peace and political stability. However, armed border conflicts between neighbouring countries emerge occasionally due to unsettled territorial claims, as the recent border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia about the Preah Vihear temple compound with several casualties. Furthermore, in nearly half of the ASEAN member states there are ongoing armed insurgencies against the governments. Yet, concerted actions of the affected ASEAN members against transnationally operating insurgents have failed to materialise. Until the respective governments can ensure that civilians are not affected by border clashes, skirmishes between insurgents and armed forces, and other threats, as well as effectively tackling these issues, the existence of ASEAN as an effective security community should be doubted.

Keywords: *ASEAN, Security Community, Zone of Peace, Insurgencies, Security Dilemmas*

## Introduction

*Deniz Kocak*

The decision to deepening ASEAN cooperation and to enhance ASEAN's ability to 'catch-up' with other regional organisations was taken by ASEAN officials in 2003. The project of an ASEAN Community (comprising the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), and the ASEAN Security Community (ASC)) was planned to be fully developed by 2020.[1] However, it was not until 2008 that all ASEAN members ratified the new ASEAN Charter. Nevertheless, the community-building process has been brought forward to the year 2015. Even before ASEAN promoted its security community, Amitav Acharya voiced the claim in several publications that ASEAN is a 'nascent security community.'[2] This claim has been heavily debated among regional scholars from different fields and perspectives.[3] Supposing that Acharya's claim is correct and ASEAN is indeed a nascent security community, a reasonable question would be whether ASEAN is actually ready to become a security community in the full theoretical sense.

The main goal of a security community is to provide transnational peace and political stability within a region. However, armed border conflicts between neighbouring countries emerge periodically and then due to unsettled territorial claims, as the recent border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple compound showed. Furthermore, in nearly half of the ASEAN member states there are ongoing armed insurgencies against the respective central governments. Yet, due to a lack of coordination and cooperation ASEAN members failed to take concerted actions against transnational insurgents.

Establishing a security community should provide the opportunity to anticipate security dilemmas and arms races between states. Nonetheless, the historic mistrust between most of the ASEAN members is hardly fading away and antagonisms and stereotypes are still used in political propaganda and feature in daily life. Furthermore, distrust between government officials is aroused by the increasing arms purchases of several ASEAN members. Instead of mutual collaboration and integration dealing with security issues, there are only bilateral agreements between some member states and external partners. Barely any multilateral agreements exist, especially dealing with security. The aforementioned security issues suggest that there is a lack of cooperation, efficiency and willingness at the decision-making level of the respective member countries to fully implement security cooperation

within ASEAN. Furthermore, sensitive civil-military relations as well as a lack of political accountability in Southeast Asian countries are further obstacles to deepened transnational cooperation.



In light of these inherent, and generic, problems among ASEAN members, this article questions the stability of ASEAN security arrangements, and subsequently queries whether ASEAN can be considered a security community in the fullest sense. The article is structured in the following way: first, the basic concept of the security community will be introduced. This will be followed by case studies describing ongoing insurgencies in Burma and Southern Thailand. Afterwards, border clashes and national antagonisms between Burma and Thailand as well as Cambodia and Thailand will be discussed. Finally, the last two sections deal with the security dilemma in Southeast Asia and how to mitigate it.

## Theorising On The 'Security Community' Concept

According to Deutsch, a security community is a community of states that aim to establish and maintain peaceful interstate relations among themselves. Increased cooperation and communication as well as the will to settle interstate conflicts through mediation and communication rather than through military threats and engagement is the basis of such a community. The term "security" however, should not be misleading since the establishment of a security community does not refer to a military organisation directed towards an external enemy. "Security" rather means all encompassing security in a defined spatial area for all its inhabitants and the guarantee of peaceful relations between member states.[4] As Deutsch's security community aims, in the ideal case, at providing a peaceful environment for every citizen within the security community, "security" therefore should be related not only to the traditional security context but to the non-traditional security concept as well. While the traditional security concept deals with classical external threats which should be met first and foremost by the national military and other relevant security agencies, the non-traditional security approach encompasses environmental threats to the population, water- and food supplies, health- and sanitation standards as well as societal peace.[5]

We can identify two models of security communities in Deutsch's concept: amalgamated and pluralistic communities. While the amalgamated community-model is a fusion of two or more former sover-

eign states into a new state with a distinctive centre, the pluralistic model encompasses two or more independent states with tight grids of cooperation and consultation in various political fields.[6] Political research however has focused, in the last ten years, on the pluralistic model because of the exceptional status of the amalgamation model.[7] Essential conditions for establishing a (pluralistic) security community are the compatibility of norms and values as well as mutual political accountability. The existence of shared values increases the necessary coordination and improves communication between member states as well as accelerating the integration process. The key variables in the construction of a security community however is trust and assurance of the peaceful cooperation with "the others."[8]



## Regional Insurgencies

The nation state and its related concepts is a relatively new phenomenon in Southeast Asia due to the fact that most of the Southeast Asian countries experienced colonial rule since at least the end of the 19th century. After the transition to national independence in the 1950s, the emerging states faced the challenges of nation-building, establishing fixed borders with their neighbours, and imposing the state monopoly on the use of force. In short, the emerging states tried to emulate the concept of the Westphalian state-system in Southeast Asia. Yet, traditional border concepts, remote and undeveloped areas as well as the multiethnic composition of the new states made it difficult to establish the authority of the central state successfully. Moreover, apart from armed conflicts with neighbouring states, each country in Southeast Asia experienced rebellious movements, mostly driven by ethnic and religious minorities and their respective demands.

The main feature of the nation state is, according to Weber, that the state defends the rule of law and holds the monopoly of force undisputedly within a defined territory with fixed borders.[9] Insecurity within states however, poses a serious threat not only to the stability of the political regime but also the daily lives of the inhabitants. Furthermore, the inability of the central government to protect its citizens from regular violence gives rise to questions about the sovereignty of the government.

The following two cases studies of ongoing insurgencies in Burma and Thailand illustrate the above mentioned incapacity of the respective central states to end insurgencies. At the same time civilians suffer

from internal insecurity caused by ongoing clashes between the armed forces and insurgents.

### *The Case of Burma*



The history of Burma has been shaped by insurgencies against colonial occupiers and central governments. Even now, there are a large number of armed and rebellious groups in Burma who are fighting against the central government (SPDC[10]) and partly against each other since independence from the UK in 1948. One crucial factor for the ongoing insurgencies in Burma is the colonial legacy of the British Empire. Since the incremental occupation of the territory between British India and Siam, which was finally called "Burma," the British faced massive resistance and rebellions against their rule. To control the country, the British supported particular ethnic groups, collaborated with them and granted several ethnic groups semi-autonomy. This not only led to asymmetries of political power and mistrust between indigenous ethnic groups in Burma, but also to attempts to achieve self-determination by some ethnic groups. Furthermore, these rather neglected and suppressed ethnic groups established militias to defend themselves from the incursions of adversary ethnic groups. This means, that the use of private security actors and the private use of weapons is a feature of the security context in Burma, which was strengthened during the colonial period. Even now several ethnic groups maintain their own security forces and administrative apparatus in their respective territories.[11]

According to Smith, there are four reasons why there are so many insurgencies that have lasted so long. The landscape of Burma with its mountainous ridges, dense jungles and porous borders, is well suited to guerilla activities. Undeveloped infrastructure in many Burmese regions as well as the mountainous landscape prevents the central government from controlling the territory effectively. In addition, the porous borders between Thailand, China, and Bangladesh allow insurgent ethnic groups to make use of external support, such as weapons and technical utilities, as well as enable them to retreat into safe-zones and establish bases, where the central government forces are not allowed to operate.

Secondly, external political influences, like diaspora organisations of the respective ethnic groups, generate moral and political support as well as external funding. This external support may encourage the

political and armed struggle of the respective ethnic groups.

Thirdly, by far most important source of income for some armed groups in Burma is the trade in narcotics. Particularly the Shan State Army-South (SURA) and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) are infamous for producing and trading narcotics to finance their armed struggle against the SPDC. Here again, the porous borders to neighbor countries like Thailand serve as smuggling- and drug trafficking conduits. In general, the profits from drug smuggling are used to purchase weapons. Apart from that some armed groups strive for profit maximisation and personal enrichment by trading drugs to Thailand.[12]



Fourthly, despite some attempts by the central government to negotiate with the insurgent groups on equal terms, there were no conflict-resolution initiatives. Rather, uncompromising military campaigns under Ne Win aimed at eradicating any ethnic opposition to his regime. Instead of using a "hearts and minds" counterinsurgency tactic to win the support of the rural population, the Tatmadaw tried to isolate the insurgents from the villages and cut off support by destroying villages.[13] These tactics however, led to growing support for the respective insurgents on the part of affected villagers and created deep mistrust and resentment toward the central government.[14]

The Christian Karens, formerly supported by the British colonial administration, organised the Karen National Union (KNU), maintained an armed organisation called the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and fought against the central government since the 1940s. The KNU experienced a heavy setback when the Tatmadaw seized the Karen capital Mannerplaw and forced the weakened Karens to retreat into the mountainous border region in 1995. But the great factor weakening the Karen insurgency was a result of internal splits between Buddhist and Christian factions within the KNU, and the following move by the Buddhist faction to support the SPDC. The KNU however, recovered from the 1995 clashes and reestablished operational bases along the Burma/Thailand frontier. Furthermore, the Karens formed a political party, the Karen National League (KNL), to advocate the Karens' interests peacefully. Nevertheless they also continued the armed struggle against the SPDC as well.[15]

### *The Case of Thailand*

In addition to the Case of Burma highlighted above, Thailand acts as a solid indication of the main theoretical basis of this work and

acts in support of the work's main hypothesis. The Malay-sultanate of Pattani, which comprised the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, was a tributary state of the Siamese kingdom since the 18th century. However, the treaty of 1909 settled the borders between British Malaya and Siam, and granted Siam the sovereign rule over the three Malay provinces. Since then, the centrally administered kingdom aimed at tightening its rule and political legitimacy in the new southernmost provinces. During the following decades a sustained attempt at state-building and assimilation was made through which Thailand established administration structures, schools and garrisons in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. The proto-nationalist Phibun Songkhram-regime in the 1940s promoted a particularly aggressive assimilation strategy for the southern provinces. Furthermore, most of the administration staff came directly from Bangkok and were mainly Buddhist while Muslims were not assigned to administration posts until the 1960s. Ethnic as well as religious dominance by the central Thai governments in the three Muslim provinces was used as an instrument of political power.[16] Several Malay insurgency groups emerged during the 1960s and 1970s. The two most influential groups were Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), founded in 1960, and Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), founded in 1968. Both groups were supported politically and financially by international Muslim organizations. Currently, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) is the leading insurgency group with more than 1800 active fighters. Their organisational structures and hierarchy are still unclear. Yet, it is known that they maintain extensive paramilitary training for new recruits, and that the respective organisations maintain several paramilitary tactical combat units.[17]

Despite the fact that the Prem Tinsulanond-government funded programs for villages, amnesty programs for rebels, and established the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC) to ease the economic and social pressures in the three provinces as well as to undermine the insurgents' legitimacy, the insurgents continued to operate. Although insurgents had always engaged regularly in violent attacks, a new generation of insurgents intensified its activities during the 1990s. Their attacks aimed particularly at representative and hard targets such as police stations and garrisons. After 2001 however, the attacks intensified and even included soft targets, mainly civilians, both Buddhist and Muslim. Some observers assumed operational links between PULO and international terrorist networks.[18]

The Thai governments reacted to the new level of insurgency without mercy. Often security forces violated human rights while engaging suspected rebels, such as the so called "Tak Bai"-massacre in 2004, where more than 100 people died. The brutal behaviour of the security forces and the uncompromising stance of the Thaksin Shinawatra-administration provoked further distrust and hatred towards the Thai central state among the Muslim community in Thailand. Thaksin's unbending will to quell the southern unrest by force caused him to shut down the SBPAC and proclaim martial law in the three provinces. The violent conflict however was restricted to the three provinces only. There were never any attacks by the insurgent groups in Bangkok or in the densely populated tourist areas of Southern Thailand.[19] The conflict in Southern Thailand is political in motivation rather than religious. On the one hand, the ethno-nationalist Malay movement instrumentalized the religious-component to get stronger support from the international Muslim community. On the other hand, the Thaksin-administration used the "us-against-the-others" distinction between the Thai Buddhist majority and the Malay Muslim minority as a tool for political propaganda. In particular the Thai government stressed the religious components and causes of the conflict in order to distract from the actual cause of the Malay insurgency, which is a purely political one—the demand for self-determination and secession from Thailand.[20]



In sum, the state's monopoly on the use of force, the classical indicator of a sovereign state, challenged by armed insurgent groups in both the cases of Burma and Thailand. Furthermore, the regular clashes between government security forces and rebel groups pose a serious threat towards innocent civilians since the civilians' daily life is tremendously affected by martial law, curfews, campaigns of vengeance by both sides as well as the pure brutality of being victimized. The inability or unwillingness of the respective governments to protect their citizens from violence testifies to a lack of internal security, at least in certain regions, within the respective countries. Most often, as in the cases of Burma and Thailand, ethnic- and religious minorities are seriously affected by this internal insecurity.[21]

## Regional Border Clashes

Collins stresses the historical rivalry of Southeast Asian states. Especially the case of Thailand with its borders to Myanmar, Malaysia,

Cambodia and Laos serves as the basis for the continuous distrust between the peninsular countries.[22] Political tensions emerge between the countries due to the fact that insurgents receive assistance from beyond the states' borders. The infamously porous borders of Southeast Asian countries do not prevent militias and smugglers from dealing in weapons, drugs, and commodities across borders.[23] Idean Salehyan confirms 'that transnational rebels in neighboring states raise the probability of international conflict.'[24] In fact, there is a long history of border violations by the Burmese Tatmadaw and the Royal Thai armed forces. While the Burmese forces regularly entered Thai territory to hound rebel groups, the Thai armed forces combated illicit drug trade and drug production on Burmese territory.[25] Moreover, according to Phongpaichit, successive Thai governments supported rebels with weapons, provided border zones in which insurgent groups could maintain operational bases to weaken the central government of Myanmar—the so called "buffer-zone-policy"—and trained several insurgent groups in paramilitary tactics.[26] While this is a typical strategy to covertly weaken an adversarial neighbour, it bears some political risks as well, such as antagonising the neighbour and provoking an interstate conflict or retaliatory strikes by conventional armed forces.[27] As a reaction to the Thai border-policy, the SPDC regularly closed border check points and allowed its troops to violate the Burma-Thai frontier while chasing Karen rebels on Thai territory which culminated in clashes between units of the armed forces of Myanmar with the Thai border police on a frequent basis. These incidents not only alarmed military officials in both countries but also provoked government officials to threaten each other.[28]

Serious clashes between Burma and Thailand took place in 2001 when Burmese troops crossed the Thai border during a skirmish with the Shan State Army-South. The skirmish then evolved into a clash with Thai military forces, the deployment of heavy artillery and the capture of a Thai border police post by the Tatmadaw. The use of heavy artillery by the Burmese- and Thai military, as well as the bombardment of civilian settlements and military positions led to a large number of casualties on both sides. As a result of the political rise of Thaksin Shinawatra and his economic interests in Burma, there was a gradual improvement in diplomatic relations between Thailand and Burma. As a sign of courtesy towards Burma, Thaksin partly renounced the buffer-zone-policy. Yet, several insurgency groups maintain operational bases along the Thai-Burmese border. Furthermore,

there are still border violations and sporadic clashes, including mortar bombardment and heavy casualties, between Burmese and Thai armed forces.[29]

The diplomatic history between Thailand and Cambodia is marked by Thai hegemony over Khmer tributary kingdoms. Furthermore, Cambodia was the bone of contention between Siam and Vietnam, the two dominant powers in the Southeast Asian peninsular and later Siam and Imperial France. Due to several French military campaigns during the 1880s and 1890s, Siam lost control over large parts of Cambodia.[30] The already sensitive relations between Thailand and Cambodia experienced a serious backlash in January 2003 when the Khmer media reported that a Thai celebrity made a provocative claim about the illegitimate occupation of Angkor Wat by the Cambodian state and that the temple compound should be handed back to Thailand. As a consequence, an enraged mob, mostly students and youth gangs, besieged the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh. As the anti-Thai riots started, Cambodian police forces stood by and watched the scene. Even as the mob started storming the embassy compound the police did not intervene. It was not until the Thai ambassador and the administrative staff fled before the mob set the embassy ablaze that the riot police dispersed the mob. After that, street mobs chased Thai citizens and set fire to Thai-owned hotels, shops, and private houses. The subsequent evacuation of Thai officials and civilians from Cambodia by the Thai military and the closing of border checkpoints between Thailand and Cambodia weighed on diplomatic relations between the two countries for several months. Furthermore, Thaksin ordered the Royal Thai Air force to be combat-ready for eventual retaliation strikes. Afterwards, the Cambodian government agreed to pay compensation to the Thai government and the affected civilians as well as offering its apologies.[31]



The conflict over the temple compound of Preah Vihear between Thailand and Cambodia is another politically sensitive issue. Actually, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided in 1962 that the temple compound of Preah Vihear belongs to Cambodia. Here, the ICJ referred to a border treaty between Siam and France, the former colonial occupier of Cambodia, in 1904.[32] However, Thailand still asserts its historical claim on the temple compound. Since 2001, these territorial claims on the Preah Vihear temple compound on the Thai-Cambodian border regularly surfaced among nationalist propaganda in times of domestic political tension and especially in the power struggle in Thailand in 2008 between the anti-government organisation—PAD—and

the then ruling PPP, linked to Thaksin Shinawatra. While the PPP tried to strengthen bilateral relations with Cambodia by supporting Cambodia's plea to classify Preah Vihear as a UNESCO-World Heritage Site, although without admitting that the surrounding compound belongs to Cambodia, the PAD and the Democrat Party (DP) blamed the PPP for treason and "selling the nation."[33] Simultaneously Hun Sen and his Cambodian's People Party (CPP) government in Cambodia tried to fan nationalist sentiments against Thailand in anticipation of a coming election in 2008.[34] Verbal attacks were soon followed by an increased gathering of troops along the border on both sides and several smaller clashes with minor casualties occurred. Additionally, the PAD stormed and occupied the temple compound to manifest the territorial claims of Thailand.[35] Furthermore, bordering villages were evacuated in case of serious clashes between military forces and militias were prepared for contingent operations. Finally, in October 2008 several clashes occurred between Khmer and Thai armed forces and caused several casualties on both sides followed by mutual accusations of aggressive and provocative actions. Although diplomats prevented a further escalation and a large-scale war, relations between the two countries seem likely to remain tense as long as the Preah Vihear issue has not been resolved.[36] Hun Sen's move to appoint the ousted Thai-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra as an economic advisor exacerbated already tense diplomatic relations between Phnom Penh and Bangkok. Furthermore, Hun Sen resisted extradition demands of Thaksin by the Abhisit Vejjajiva-administration. Several clashes and border violations occurred between Thai- and Cambodian military forces in 2009 and 2010. A striking but typical example for this kind of border incident is a clash at the Chong Chom border crossing which occurred in April 2010. According to a commander of the involved tahan prahn (rangers) in the Thai province Surin, a tahan prahn patrol witnessed Khmer soldiers trespassing at the border. Subsequently, the Khmer soldiers opened fire on the Thai border patrol. Although the exchange of fire lasted about fifteen minutes and the Khmer soldiers pulled back, there were no casualties on either side. The commander in question furthermore admitted that such incidents occur on a frequent basis, although the causes of such incidents are unclear since both sides accuse each other.[37] This permanent state of mutual mistrust and threat between Thailand and Cambodia is a fragile one that can erupt at any time.[38]

The common point among the border clashes between Thailand and Myanmar in 2001 as well as Thailand and Cambodia in 2008 is

the lack of clarity about who was in military command or rather who ordered the intensification of the skirmishes on the respective warring factions.[39] A possible interpretation of these events however suggests that the respective commanders in charge acted of their own accord. This fact would subsequently raise questions about the integrity of the military command structures, military professionalism, and finally about the effectiveness of civilian government control of the military. While misperceptions of the respective border guards can occur, border clashes of this frequency suggest a lack of professionalism among the respective units involved. Furthermore, the instrumentalisation, or rather misuse of transnational conflicts and nationalist sentiments to influence political interests in domestic politics suggests that the respective government actors acted irresponsibly since the border clashes caused several casualties and brought grievance and agony to the affected civilians along the borders.



## The Security Dilemma

The results of the above case studies suggest that there is a variety of threats towards internal security as well as external security. While the insurgency movements pose serious threats to the stability of the respective states and the daily life of its citizens, the government security forces often do not provide security but insecurity. As described above, there are furthermore, interstate disputes that lead occasionally to fatal clashes between neighboring states.

Within these patterns of action we can identify the concept of the security dilemma. The security dilemma works on two levels: the dilemma of interpretation and the dilemma of response. While the dilemma of interpretation describes the difficulties and insecurities of interpreting the actions of "the other," the dilemma of response deals with the crucial question of how to react and re-react towards the actions of "the other." Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that one's reactions influence the mindset and actions of the other actors as well. Mistakes in the timing of certain actions towards "the other" could inflict serious consequences and unintended chain reactions.[40] Applying this concept to our cases enables us to define a domestic security dilemma and an interstate security dilemma.

Violence begets violence. The internal security dilemma of many Southeast Asian states derives out of conflicts between the central state, which is still in a process of state-building, and opposition groups

which are pursuing political independence, ethnic self-determination, religious freedom or social inclusion. In many cases, these factors and motives intertwine. Since these kinds of conflicts are seldom resolved by political means, the actors involved resort to violence to add emphasis to their respective claims. As a result, a spiral of violence occurs. While non-state groups organize themselves in paramilitary organisations to counter and fight the central state authorities, government security forces in turn are often involved in human rights abuses while fighting or containing anti-government uprisings. As we have seen in the case studies, this spillover of politicised violence and internal security problems can severely affect interstate relations. Porous borders enable transnational insurgency groups to operate on foreign soil, and therefore export an internal conflict to contiguous countries. At the same time, border violations and territorial disputes are often used by governments to distract from domestic political problems and fan nationalist and populist sentiments. As a consequence, the buildup of troops along the border by state-A causes state-B to react in the same way. Mutual threats by combat ready troops deployed along the borders only bolsters mutual (mis)perceptions and can lead to serious conflict.

Another dimension of mutual threat perception, besides the actual deployment of troops, is weapons procurement among states. Booth and Wheeler argue that, 'given the stakes involved, the existence of weapons in the hands of one state can provoke at least uncertainty and possibly fear in others even when those weapons are not intended to be used except for self protection.'[41] The defence expenditures of Southeast Asian states rose steadily from the end of the Cold War until the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997. Although the economic crisis dampened the amount of the weapons purchases, some countries invested in prestigious items, for example the aircraft carrier purchased by Thailand and the modern airplanes, by Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines in 1997.[42] By now, ASEAN member states have mostly recovered from the economic downturn and increased their military budgets by 50% from 2000 until 2008.[43] Interestingly, all ASEAN members obviously transformed and are still transforming their militaries. There is a much lesser focus on equipment for maintaining internal security and a new focus on conventional warfare equipment such as modern jet fighters, vessels and submarines. Yet, the armament and modernisation of the air force and the navy could be perceived by worried neighbours as offensive weapons, and therefore as

a threat.[44] Furthermore, the recent increase of potential conventional warfare equipment raises the question of whether there is an ongoing intra-ASEAN arms race.[45]



Bitzinger, however, suggests that the recent arms purchases by Southeast Asian states are a regional 'arms dynamic' rather than a regional arms race. The classical arms race aims at outnumbering and threatening the adversary as well as dominating the operational region. Furthermore weapons acquisition must be carried out rapidly. An arms dynamic however, describes an act of weapon acquisition that does not aim at dominating the surrounding neighbor countries but rather aims to maintain a status quo of armament and weaponry, or more accurately, a constant military balance between the neighbouring countries. Bitzinger underpins this interpretation by referring to the fact that except for Singapore, ASEAN member states purchased only small amounts of the latest weapons technology thus aiming to demonstrate that they can keep up with their neighbours.[46] Although this explanation sounds plausible two caveats should be added. Firstly, the partial retreat of US-forces from Southeast Asia after the Cold War left a power vacuum in the region. Therefore, the increased armament of ASEAN could be directed against supra-regional powers such as China. This seems especially likely set against the background of territorial disputes in the South China Sea between China and several ASEAN members. Secondly, despite the possibility that ASEAN members try to equal their respective military capabilities and hence try to maintain a regional status quo of military power, there is a danger that this trend could shift towards a more aggressive contest between ASEAN members. Volatile dynamics such as interstate rivalries could get out of control because of territorial disputes and border violations could occur at any time within this fragile regional environment.[47]

A subsequent question could be: how ASEAN tries to channel the diverging security interests of its members and implement a coherent security policy. Initially, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), established in 1994, was supposed to function as a policy instrument to foster regional security cooperation. However, Chung assets that the ARF is rather a security dialogue forum than an effective security policy institution.[48] This verdict is based on the fact that the ARF comprises 26 countries and therefore exceeds the Southeast Asian region by including countries such as Russia, China and the US. Although ASEAN members unofficially control key positions within the ARF's, they do not have the necessary bargaining power to prevail against supra-regional

heavy-weights like China. The multifaceted composition of the ARF means that the member states 'do not share a common interest, norm or threat to any extent, nor ways of handling security concerns [...].'[49] Bilateral agreements prevail in security cooperation while multilateral agreements are an exception. Even though the ASEAN declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism was supported and signed by all ASEAN members in 2001, the unanimous agreement was rather a symbolic act. According to Acharya, ASEAN members have always rejected the idea of a corporate or multilateral security policy. Rather, individual ASEAN member states conducted bilateral security collaborations with external powers or other ASEAN members. Joint military maneuvers in which all ASEAN members took part have not yet been accomplished. Rather, there were extensive US-led Cobra-Gold-maneuvers with several US-affiliated ASEAN members, and annual bilateral military maneuvers among individual countries.[50]

## Mitigating The Security Dilemma?

It should be emphasised that bilateral and exclusive defence programmes, do not enhance regional mutual trust, but instead have the opposite effect. The combination of an increasing conventional warfare arsenal with fractional and exclusive military alliances within ASEAN is further grist to the security dilemmas' mill. Mutual understanding and trustworthiness between nation states however could ease the unpredictability of "the others'" actions and provides ways and means to mitigate the dilemma of interpretation as well as the dilemma of response.[51]

As described above, a working security community needs accountable and trustworthy members to rely on. Therefore, it is mandatory that each member state fulfill certain characteristics of a sovereign and functioning nation state. Holding the undisputed states' monopoly of violence is an absolute prerequisite for implementing and enforcing governance structures within the respective sovereign territory.

Furthermore, crucial elements of good governance, such as accountability, the rule of law and transparency in government and bureaucracy are useful tools for establishing coherent policy structures. While accountability and transparency of the administrative structures strengthen the credibility and trust of the electorate towards its government, fostering the principle of rule of law assures equal judicial treatment of its citizens. According to Zielinski, maintaining fair and

effective rule of law domestically, leads to equal behaviour on the international level. This means, that supranational conflicts are rather resolved by negotiations than by threatening each other and mobilising troops along the borders. In addition, the integration of civil society organisations and associations into the policy making process not only leads to meaningful monitoring of the elected representatives by the electorate, but also provides a critical counterbalance to dubious nationalist and militarist agitation.[52] The idea behind the inclusion of civil society organisations into the policy process can be traced back to Kant who suggested that the people should be the actual decision-maker when it comes to the question of war or peace since the people suffer the most in cases of war because it is they that have 'to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the future.'[53]



Granted that the implementation of the proposed measures faces a long and difficult path and cannot be achieved overnight. Yet, the domestic political pluralisation of the ASEAN members could positively affect their foreign policy behavior as well. Moreover, supra-national political cooperation, especially in such hard cases as security policy, between likeminded constitutional countries would be much more likely and likely more binding than it is now.[54] This theoretical approach sounds too easy yet the ASEAN-reality offers a different picture since all ASEAN members ratified the 2007 ASEAN charter with its goals of

> adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government [...] abstention from participation in any policy or activity, including the use of its territory, pursued by any ASEAN Member State or non-ASEAN State or any non-State actor, which threatens the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political and economic stability of ASEAN Member States.[55]

However, the described empirical cases of insurgents operating transnationally, the lack of internal security, and various border clashes tell us a different story about the current state of ASEAN. Not without reason Jones indicates the huge gap between aspiration and reality within the brave-new ASEAN-charter world. Moreover, he traces this discrepancy back to the typical problematic relations of different po-

litical regimes with different constitutions.[56] Furthermore, Jones hints that the simple formula of implementing pluralist political structures in ASEAN could lead to unintended consequences. This is because most of the Southeast Asian states still rely on autocratic political systems. Breaking up these rigid structures would lead first and foremost to political instability and eventually to regional disintegration.[57]

## Conclusion

The discussed cases of interstate conflicts and insurgencies are just fragments of several ongoing conflicts within ASEAN. Moreover, the above-mentioned issues prove that the historical rivalries between some Southeast Asian states have not been overcome. Rather, the frequent occurrence of border clashes and unresolved territorial claims hint that the 'peaceful settlement of disputes' has not yet been achieved. However, since the foundation of ASEAN in 1967 no large-scale war has taken place between its member states. Therefore, the goal of stabilising relations between the then major power in Southeast Asia, Indonesia and its neighbour Malaysia as well as adjacent countries after the four year long *konfrontasi* in the 1960s was relatively successful.[58] Despite the absence of large-scale wars between ASEAN members, there are continuous internal and external threats towards the most vulnerable group—civilians. Until the respective governments can ensure that civilians are not affected by border clashes, skirmishes between insurgents and armed forces, and other threats, as well as effectively tackling these issues, the existence of ASEAN as an effective security community should be doubted.

Finally, there are some remaining questions. First, why is ASEAN labeling itself a security community if it does not fulfill the characteristics of a security community? Secondly, is ASEAN able to evolve into an effective security community by agitating for the implementation of political pluralism and effective rule of law within its member states? What is certain is that ASEAN as a regional institution must gain more administrative independence and authority vis-à-vis the ASEAN member states in order to foster political pluralism throughout the region. Yet, a subsequent question would then be whether ASEAN could cope with the implementation of political pluralism. Actually, the adoption of effective and indiscriminate rule of law as well as the initiation of unrestricted party competitions and the inclusion of civil society organisations could erode the authoritarian political bases of some

ASEAN members. Therefore, the liberalisation of ASEAN politics would rather lead to political instability due to shifts in power configurations and violent contests over political power, as Jones has pointed out.[59] Nevertheless the continuation of authoritarian political practices, as we have seen in the cases studies, triggers several internal as well as external security dilemmas in Southeast Asia.



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## Notes

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# The Regional Policy and Power Capabilities Of Jordan As a Small State

Martina Ponížilová

This article deals with the foreign policy activities of Jordan as a small state with a special focus on the Middle Eastern region. The article explores the impacts of Jordan's "smallness," its lack of power capabilities in terms of foreign policy, and its relations with other states in the Middle East as well as with extra-regional powers such as the United States. It also focuses on Jordan's behaviour both within regional organisations, during regional conflicts, and its economic and military dependence on other (stronger) states. This article provides a critique of existing concepts and dominant criteria of small states and, subsequently, a new conceptual framework for analysing foreign policy behaviour of small states. On this basis, this work explains particular foreign policy activities of Jordan in light of its "smallness" or lack of (hard) power capabilities, respectively.

Keywords: *Jordan, small states, Middle East, soft power, human security, conflict mediation, King Hussein, King Abdullah II, foreign aid, dependence*

## Introduction

The research of states´ foreign policy behaviour has been dominated by studies of great and superpowers which was caused, above all, by the long-term predominance of realism in International Relations and its strong belief that only these powerful actors matter because they shape the international system. This resulted in the perception of small states as passive, weak and vulnerable, and therefore not im-

portant actors in the world politics.[1] Since the 1960s and 1970s, more attention has been paid to the topic of the foreign policies of small states, though only a few valuable theoretical, and even fewer, empirical studies exist in the literature.



The principal goal of this work is to provide a critique of existing small state concepts and of some dominant criteria in particular. On the basis of new conceptual framework for analysing the behaviour of small states, certain foreign policy activities of Jordan, as a case study,—in the light of its "smallness" and lack of power capabilities—is explained. Moreover, particular aspects of Jordan's behaviour might provide better understandings the behaviour of small states (also called small powers or small nations) in general. This work argues that small states are not necessarily "passive" in international or regional politics but rather their material capabilities deficiency constrains many of their foreign policy activities. As compensation for this deficiency, they expand non-material capabilities (such as manoeuvrability, diplomacy skills and positive imaging).

Although the foreign policies of small states tend to be functionally and geographically limited (usually to the region they are part of), this does not imply a lack of activity. Small states lack required (material and human) resources to make a significant change in international politics, to pursue international issues by itself or to be able to deal with all international affairs and problems they are confronted by. For this reason, such states focus only on certain issue and geographic areas. This is best articulated by East who suggested that 'reduced organisational capacity in foreign affairs means that small states will be less active overall, and differentially active in various areas of policy.'[2] However, in the last few decades, membership in international organisations (both regional and international) and participation in international regimes enables them to influence regional and even global issues and to contribute in solving worldwide problems. Moreover, small states often engage in policies (generally known as soft power policies) appropriate for utilising its good reputation or diplomatic manoeuvring in order to counterbalance their insufficient (i. e. relatively small) hard power capabilities.

The case of Jordan illustrates common efforts of some small states to play an active role in international (particularly regional) politics even despite their "smallness" and lack of material resources, and hence hard power capabilities. These efforts are demonstrated using the case of Jordan's foreign policies based on vigorous and efficient diplomacy

and soft power policies (such as conflict mediation, support of peace, human security and Islamic values), rather than on material power resources.



The conceptual reflections as well as the presented case study intend to stimulate discussion of the future research agenda on foreign policy of small states and their position in international and regional systems. The work is divided into three parts: the first section establishes a conceptual framework for further research, the second section explains an impact of "smallness" on small states behaviour and the third section focuses on "smallness" of Jordan and its implications for Jordan´s policies and relations within the region of the Middle East and with extra-regional powers, such as the US.

## Definitional Criteria of "Small State" in International Relations

The problem of a general lack of analytical instruments to identify and compare small states, and to differentiate small from other states starts with the substantial disagreement over definitional criteria of small state and continues with the absence of a consensual definition. This results in a situation where individual researchers or studies create a definition of their own. Despite a widespread belief that for research and analytical purposes a consensus-definition has to be agreed on, Maass maintains an alternative view: 'such fundamental disagreement over what makes a state small has actually benefited the area of small states by providing it with conceptual flexibility to match different research designs as well as the quite substantial variations among actual small states in the world.'[3]

Additionally, the possibility of developing a precise definition is barely feasible since there are no consensual definitions of "power" or "size" in International Relations. Besides, some authors are persuaded that no strict definition is needed and that 'the research on small states [...] is best characterised by an "I know one when I see it" approach to choosing its subjects of inquiry.'[4] The difficulty in defining small states is, for some scholars, a reason to suggest that the concept is entirely useless.[5] Rather than completely resigning from studying small states, it is more useful to advance a more flexible concept, one that may not be precise, but also not entirely vague either. Since policy experts devote great energies to developing suitable concepts to analyse foreign policies of regional, middle and great powers, there is no reason to re-

fuse to study small states. Most states in the world are small and therefore they should not be overlooked. As an integral part of international politics, small states have 'proven to be a useful tool for analysis.'[6]

Although there is a general agreement about the distinctiveness of small nations as a specific category of states, this consensus disappears when an issue of basic attributes of "smallness" is brought up. The dispute relates to the question whether quantitative (capabilities-oriented) or qualitative ("relational") criteria are the most convenient to define "smallness" of state.



### *"Smallness" Measured by Quantitative Criteria*

Quantitative criteria relate mostly to geographical and demographic size (land area and population), economic and military strength (Gross National Product, GNP, and military expenditures), but also available natural resources. They are often used either separately but this results in ambiguous and confusing classification because states can be small in one respect, but large or powerful in another. Israel, regarding its territory and population, is a small, yet economically and militarily powerful state. Yet nuclear weapons transform it into a potential regional power with leverage over the regional security agenda. Similarly, the small oil Gulf monarchies have small populations and land areas, and are militarily dependent on stronger states however, they have enormous economic power. That is why it is necessary to combine as many criteria as possible in order to develop more accurate concept of state's size.

Moreover, individual criteria usually relate to other applied standards. Size of land area and especially population are primary and most frequently used characteristics because they often correlate with many other criteria, such as natural resource base, arable land and GNP, or military expenditures.[7] The larger the landmass the richer and more diverse natural resources and agricultural products might be. And retaining a numerous population might implicate higher incomes, larger market and bigger economy.[8] Such variables might be converted into considerable economic strength and thus also higher defence expenditures and military power which, in turn, can be transformed into political power and influence. Therefore, larger states are often more powerful than small states (however, not every large country is able to turn material capabilities into political influence). However, there are several, but very important exceptions such as large territory along with

small population (in the case of large sparsely populated or completely uninhabited areas like deserts or polar areas), small land area together with rich resources of raw materials (states with great reserves of strategic raw materials, such as oil) or a small population and economy along with extensive military power (re: the possession of nuclear weapons). Also the character (i.e. stability and conflict potential) of the region and sense of threat influence the amount of money state spends on armaments and then the amount of military expenditures does not have to correspond with size of economy (and the number of soldiers with the size of population).

The evident advantage of this approach is that the measurement of quantitative standards is easier and more exact and the resulting definition of size (i.e. "smallness") is of more permanent character. Nevertheless, it also implicitly requires delineation of a "borderline" between particular categories. Baehr aptly observes that '[o]nce the criteria are set out, the problem remains where to draw the line among [...] "small," "middle," and "very large."'[9] Some authors attempted to capture small states' distinctiveness from other categories by exactly drawn line,[10] yet the process of determining cut-offs of particular criteria of "smallness" is subjective. For example Vital's small state has a population of less than 10–15 million in the case of economically developed states and 20–30 million in the case of developing states.[11] According to others, small state's population is not larger than for example one or two million inhabitants (such state is rather considered a micro- or ministate). Similar problems accompany cut-offs determination in the case of all measurable criteria.

This work argues that conceptualising small states by means of exact figures of individual criteria is wrong in principle. Not only are the boundaries subjectively defined and there is no general consensus about any possible cut-offs but there are also too many exceptions which do not fit them and too many states which exceed given cut-offs only very slightly. Christmas-Moller clearly explains that the social (and thus also political) world is 'not organised in distinct groups but on a continuum with transition from one category to the next.'[12] It is also important not to exclude quantitative criteria completely since material capabilities and strength of a state are (more of less loosely) linked to state's power. Advocates of either group of criteria (or of single criterion) limit the scope of research since neither quantitative, nor qualitative standards are sufficient for explaining foreign policy behaviour. Rather, it is useful to combine different criteria because most of

them are interrelated, and only this way of conceptualisation embraces most aspects of "smallness."

### *"Smallness" Judged by Qualitative Criteria*



The impact of state's size on its foreign policy is connected with relations with other states and with intra-regional and international affairs. Qualitative criteria based on power relations are, in essence, relative and hence "smallness" can be judged only in comparison with other states and in relation with particular issues (such as participation on global decision-making process, dependence on other states etc.). In contrast to quantitative standards, this perspective implies a possible change of "smallness" during a certain period of time.

The concept of power and power relations shifts the definition of small state from solely capabilities-based concept to another dimension—understanding state's size as an *(in)ability* (power, capacity) of a state to achieve intended goals, fulfil national interests, secure its demands and/or resist the demands of other states.[13] Hence, a small state is a state that does not have enough power to project its influence or to resist the projection of influence on it by other states. Therefore, they do not endanger regional and/or great powers but they are not perceived as potential strategic allies either. Hence they can be (and often are) excluded from the decision making process regarding global and also regional political issues. In the past, either the Concert of Europe, or later great and superpowers assumed the right to decide about important international issues and small nations could not participate in such decision-making.[14] This indicates that 'small states are necessarily [...] less important states in terms of power and influence'[15] within international politics characterised by power relations.

The (minor) projection of small state's power and influence applies to the relation with other (more and less powerful) states and hence to state's position within the regional and international system. Therefore, the geostrategic position must be taken into consideration—how large (and powerful) are neighbouring states and other states in particular region, and how the given state is ranked in the global size and power hierarchy of states. Simply, small states are affected by different surroundings and have to deal with certain problems since they are situated in different regions and border on different countries. Also Keohane confirms the importance of a state's status within regional and international systems when he suggests that 'a small power is

a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system.'[16] It does not possess enough power capabilities to become a (regional or international) hegemon and therefore has minor chance to shift the arrangement of power relations or to transform the system. Crucial is whether small state *recognises* and *accepts* its position and thereupon adjusts its foreign policy to the reality of international politics without any aspirations to its transformation. The way the state perceives itself and is perceived externally (by other states and powers) is also relevant for foreign policy analysis.

Together with the aforementioned, the matter of security is closely related; small states recognise security deficits (its own capabilities are not sufficient for guaranteeing its security) which state's representatives understand as unchangeable, and admit the need for external assistance from (i. e. dependence on) more powerful states or institutions in obtaining security.

Since we suggest to think within a relative framework and not subjectively constructed (although exact) boundaries, the outcome cannot be a precisely defined concept which would help to distinguish small states from others. On the contrary, it is necessary to focus on one particular state; how relatively large or small its population is, its landmass, economy, military and natural resources *vis-à-vis* neighbouring states and other states in the international system. These relative figures of quantitative criteria can provide a basis for exploring (power) relations of a given (small) state with others and its position within the international system. Merely this way of conceptualisation can adequately demonstrate how particular state is small, weak and insufficiently powerful, influential, and important in world politics.[17]

Regarding the creation of suitable analytical framework, first, it is necessary to use a complex set of standards in order to minimise possible exceptions and, at the same time, develop a relatively homogenous category of states different from large states. Second, attention should be aimed to *relative*, not absolute value of these individual criteria (evaluation of particular variables of the given state in relation to its specific position and surroundings, and to other states is needed). And third, measurable and qualitative standards should be combined, since including the term "power" into the concept of small state is essential for adequate analysis of (power) relations and hence foreign policy. Favouring physical characteristics and material resources ignores other important criteria, such as political power and ideological capabilities,

and cannot therefore express adequately the complexity of "smallness" of a state in world politics. The whole concept is meaningless, unless we take into consideration relations with other states or size of other states, respectively. "Smallness" simply exists and makes sense only *vis-à-vis* "largeness." That is why "relational" criteria, with regard to "power," are essential for the conceptualisation of small state.



## The Impact of "Smallness" on Foreign Policy Behaviour

Each state's foreign policy is influenced by many factors (e. g. character of political regime, level of economic development, geography, political surroundings) and according to a general belief, also size and power has a certain impact on state's foreign policy behaviour. Therefore, small states have been studied as a distinctive group of states which behave in a certain way within the international system. "Smallness" and limited material capabilities might restrict autonomous execution of foreign policy. However, some authors are convinced that small states are capable of dealing with many problems they face despite their "smallness" and lack of power, as is explained in detail below.[18]

Small states exhibit a, generally, low level of participation in international affairs due to their limited political power and international importance which stems from their "smallness." Consequently, their foreign policy priorities and activities are usually limited both in geographical and functional terms; to their immediate surroundings (usually the region they are part of) and to a narrow range of foreign policy issues.

Limited power and ability (or inability) to implement a specific policy within the international system results in small states being unable to act as autonomously as great powers and are naturally afraid of unilateral behaviour of powerful states which can have a negative impact on them, yet they cannot prevent it. Therefore they support multilateralism in international relations, often through international institutions, and promote an observance of international law, norms and principles. This, along with preventive diplomacy serves as an instrument for conflict prevention—small states are generally too vulnerable which is why they try to avoid armed conflicts (especially with stronger nations). This leads also to the reluctance to use military force and the employment of non-military foreign policy instruments (such as diplomacy, economic incentives, cooperation etc.). Nevertheless, this does not mean they do not arm themselves. In many cases (often due to the

high instability of a region) states spend a high percentage of GNP on armaments to better ensure their security, or at least to strengthen their bargaining positions.



Despite certain security deficits and the inability of self-defence for long periods of time, small states are not absolutely helpless. They are often members of alliances which improve their defence capabilities considerably—at a relatively low cost—and guarantee defence in case of conflict. Their smallness and vulnerability can be advantageous for another reason as well: they can use it to gain more military and financial aid from great or regional powers. Prasad calls this efficient utilisation of weakness (smallness) as a "power of being powerless" which implies that even "being unimportant" is important for small states if they know how to use these skills effectively.[19] Obtaining help from wealthy and powerful states is considered to be a part of their manoeuvrability,[20] however donors demand, in return, political support and might use their aid as a leverage. Thus their significant impact on small states´ security and economic well-being (and, in consequence, foreign policy) makes these weaker states even more vulnerable. For example they often avoid policies and activities which could, as a result, alienate powerful states, including their donors (e. g. they choose to stay neutral in conflicts).

International and regional institutions enable small states to achieve some of their goals if they lack necessary material or other capabilities to do it by themselves. They retain the possibility to articulate and push through their interests (for instance thanks to the "one state, one vote" rule) and into better negotiating positions. For the purpose of achieving some common objectives, states with insufficient influence often create blocs within international organisations or like-minded groups in order to balance the superior position of powerful states (for example the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1973-74 imposed an oil embargo on some Western states in order to improve their terms of oil trade at the expense of these powerful nations, and to "punish" some of them (primarily the US) for their support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War).[21] In addition, members of international organisations are formally equal; hence even small nations have the possibility to participate in international affairs, in creation of new international legal norms and in solving global issues. The acceptance of new international norms strengthens the security of small (military weak) states because norms restrict unilateral policies and the use of violence and military force by great powers. For these reasons, small

states are usually highly active within such structures.

As said, a state's political power and influence stems, to a certain degree, from its material resources. Nevertheless, a small state does not have to be limited in its foreign policy by the deficiency in material capabilities and strength ("hard power"); it can increase its influence by using soft dimensions of power. On this grounds, it pursues to balance the lack of hard power by using "soft power," a source of political and diplomatic capabilities, in order to strengthen its political power and influence, and thereby international importance (another question is if small states are able to, and actually do, translate their soft power into political gains). For example the Al Jazeera television network may be considered as a soft power instrument of Qatar which is a very small (though very rich) state who influences neighbouring societies and thus Middle Eastern affairs through modern media. By improving its reputation, credibility, image and external attractiveness, a state facilitates closer cooperation with more powerful states so that it obtains military and political support, economic aid or direct foreign investments.[22] The non-coercive policies of small states; these "attractive instruments of power,"[23] include, among others, the promotion of democracy, civil rights, freedom, human security and mediation services as a way of solving conflicts, diplomacy etc. Soft power policies are less expensive than the development of hard power capabilities; however their implementation can be a long-term activity which is why it requires domestic stability.



These general behaviour patterns of small states are ideal-typical; there might be exceptions because there are many factors (domestic and others) to be considered during the foreign policy decision-making process. Moreover, the changing international environment has a great impact on the overall possibilities of foreign policy behaviour.

## The Foreign Policy of a Small State: The Case of Jordan

A quick look at the political map of the world and the Middle Eastern region gives an idea of the relative size of Jordan's land mass. With an estimated 89sqkms, Jordan is among the smallest states and territories in the international and regional system. This is also applicable to its small population size (6.5 million), and weak economy (GDP = 36.82 billion USD, GDP per capita is 5,900 USD) (see Table No. 1).[24] Jordan's demographic vulnerability stems not only from its population size, but also its composition because more than a half of total Jordanian in-

habitants are of Palestinian origin. For instance King Abdullah II has been criticised for being influenced by the US and Israel, respectively, who require Jordanians of Palestinian origin to be granted permanent residence in order to prevent their return to Palestinian territories.[25] The vulnerable economic condition is linked to a serious lack of natural resources (unlike the Persian Gulf monarchies, it has no oil and/or natural gas), chronic shortage of water and, due to vast infertile desert areas, has insufficient arable land which accounts just for 6% of the territory.[26] Moreover, the Jordanian economy has to deal with many other problems such as an increasing inflation rate, reduced economic growth, a high level of unemployment (especially among youth) and poverty. Due to its bleak economic situation, Jordan relies on foreign aid from rich oil producers in the Persian Gulf and some Western countries (mainly the US), and remittances from Jordanian workers abroad.



Table 1: Jordan's position within the international and regional systems regarding the size of its land area, population, economy and military

| Size criterion | Jordan's position in the international system (total number of states and territories) | Jordan's position in the regional system (total number of states and territories) |
|---|---|---|
| Land Area | 112th (251) | 13th (20) |
| Population | 105th (238) | 13th (20) |
| Economy (GDP) | 101st (226) | 18th (20) |
| GDP per capita | 139th (226) | 14th (19) |
| Military (number of active troops) | 45th (200) | 10th (20) |
| Military expenditures | 4th (172) | 4th (19) |

Source: table and ranking (from the largest to the smallest states) made by author, particular figures from: CIA Factbook, Country Comparison—Area, Population, GDP (purchasing power parity), GDP per capita, Military expenditures, available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/rankorderguide.html#top> (accessed 2 May 2012); IISS (The International Institute for Strategic Studies) (2010), The Military Balance 2010, London: Routledge, pp. 164, 245–277, 462–468.

Jordan is surrounded by larger, more populous and economically stronger states engaged in mutual political and ideological disputes which placed Jordan into a position of a buffer state between current

or possible rivals (see Map 1). This, along with high instability in the region, conflicts and generally problematic relations results in high military expenditures (between 7–11% of GDP in last few years) and, compared to its population, relatively large army (100,500 active and 65,000 reserve troops) which is widely understood as well-trained, disciplined and professional.[27] However, these figures are dwarfed by neighbouring states; it borders on an alleged nuclear power (Israel) and also within the meaning of conventional weaponry and number of troops, many Middle Eastern countries greatly exceed the size of Jordanian military. As Mufti concludes, the obvious effect of this situation is Jordan's inability (i.e. insufficient capacity) 'to impose its will on any of its neighbours through military means, [and] to stand up on its own to a determined attack by any of them.'[28] It follows that Jordan seeks regional and extra-regional alliances and powerful allies.

*Jordan As a Small State*




Map 1: Jordan in the Middle East

This is an interactive map. Go beyond the printed page, experience interactive features online, explore the Middle East in detail by following this link:

bit.ly/ZtcRxv

Or take a picture of this QR-code on your smart device.

Long-term economic problems and insufficient military capabilities led to Jordan's dependence on foreign aid in order to secure and maintain its defence capabilities and feasible economic and social programmes which, in turn, legitimises the Jordanian regime. Without assistance from abroad, the very survival of the Jordanian regime would be endangered.

Until the 1950s, Jordan's main protector and donor was the UK; former administrator of the earlier Emirate of Transjordan. In 1957, Jordanians demonstrated against remaining in the alliance with Britain on the basis of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty (1948) which was regarded restricting the Kingdom's independence. The treaty guaranteed mutual assistance in war and £10 million GBP as an annual subsidy for Jordan.[29] After its termination, Britain ceased its financial support and withdrew its troops from Jordanian territory. Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia committed themselves to covering the lost revenues, though this promise went unfulfilled.

Financial and military provisions were ultimately made by the US. Even though Jordan was not included in the Eisenhower Doctrine, an anticommunist logic was deployed when the country faced domestic political crises in 1957 and 1958. Over the years Jordan demonstrated that it was a solid ally of the US and even tended to take a less-than-active position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such a policy direction assisted in maintaining the power status quo in the Hashemite Kingdom since the US indirectly—through a deterrence push—intervened in the aftermath of the so-called Black September (1970) to limit Syria's invasion of Jordan with Iraqi collusion. External support was also essential for preventing the spread of transnational ideologies, particularly pan-Arabism, a.k.a. Nasserism. Jordan faced a series of internal crises and tensions since its post-WWII founding though there was a clear spike in the 1950s–1970s. This was largely due to the manner in which Nasser was reaching for regional hegemony; inspiring armed internal opposition groups in Jordan. For this reason, Jordan entered into alliances with like-minded, relatively conservative monarchical regimes from the Persian Gulf in order to balance the threat posed by rival revolutionary republics. Saudi Arabia became Jordan's closest ally and was used to deter Egyptian pan-Arabism from taking root.

Iraq was also prioritised and quickly emerged as Jordan's strategic partner in security and economic affairs. Thanks to the country's rich hydrocarbon resources, Iraq was able to supply Jordan with oil at considerably reduced prices. As expected, this produced a high level of dependency of Jordan on Iraq so that when Operation Desert Shield commenced in January 1991, Jordan became isolated—it was one of Saddam's few allies at the time—and suffered serious economic stagnation as a result. Indeed, while Jordan's original plan of repelling Nasser's pan-Arabism required a dual containment policy that itself relied on both Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Jordan was slow to change its policy

approaches and ended up losing—for a while—its Saudi and US allies. But Jordan's choices were limited and it is largely regarded as pursuing the 'interests of a state trying to contain the worst consequences of a situation over which it had little control.'[30] Despite its limited capabilities Jordan's support for Saddam led to the deterioration of relations with the US and Saudi Arabia amounting to economic freezes and the loss of aid worth tens of millions of USD, undermining Jordan's economy.

While the effects of Jordan's support for Iraq were felt immediately, its recovery and damage control to many years to implement. However, the experience led King Hussein to redirect Jordan's foreign policy and play a balancing act between US regional interests and its own vulnerabilities which were increased as it sought to exit Iraq's sphere of influence. In short, Jordan needed to safely balance against Iraq in order to appease the US and thus normalise its economic and political relations. King Hussein, ever the prudent leader, saw that such a balance could be struck via Israel (with the support of the US). And so, in 1994, Jordan concluded a peace treaty with Israel. Similar to the Camp David accords, the US supported the peace through the announcement of enhanced economic and military ties wiping out is debt and encouraging proper economic engagement.

There is, however, no such thing as a free lunch. Washington conditioned its support for Jordan on the latter's full cooperation in ending the Arab-Israeli conflict and maintaining a solid sanctions regime against Iraq. Jordan was forced to prioritise US interests. This tradition has been reinforced by King Hussein's successor Abdullah II, evidenced in Jordan's place as the second largest per capita recipient of US economic aid, which was valued at over $670 million USD in 2012.[31] The Kingdom is simply 'hardly positioned to pursue purely Jordanian national interests.'[32] Moreover, Jordan's special position was seriously undermined when the peace process failed with the beginning of the Second Intifada in 2000 and Saddam's forced removal in 2003. As Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe[33] point out, Abdullah's influence on individual states involved in the peace process was, nevertheless, minor (compared to his father) and he could not be 'more than a bit player.'

Similar to Hussein, Abdullah II took a very pragmatic approach to the issue of Jordanian foreign relations and sought to repair diplomatic tensions with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for the purpose of political and economic stabilisation. The policy succeeded and Saudi Arabia provided Jordan with some $1.4 billion USD in 2011.[34] Additionally, both Saudi

Arabia and Kuwait opened their markets to Jordanian commodities and qualified labour force. Using its steadily improving relationship with Saudi Arabia, Jordan began to extend its agenda to include more active relationships with the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. Indeed, Jordan is seeking membership in the GCC. Its prospects are significantly better than they were in the 1980s and 1990s when Jordan's application was flatly rejected. This is reducible to the internal alterations to the GCC, coupled with a clear external dimension to the series of revolutions and attempted coups following the 2011 outbreak of the Arab uprisings. In short, the GCC is increasingly becoming a mature security actor and has begun to look at ways of enhancing its collective military power. Jordan is one such avenue, especially since there is growing fear of mounting Iranian influence.[35] In this context, Jordan suits the GCC well; its body-politik is largely Sunni and its government—a Monarchy—is pro-Western, it is nervously eyeing the growing military, diplomatic and ideological power of Iran and Jordan has a well-equipped and trained military able to enhance GCC security and reinforce the organisation's deterrence capabilities.

In analysing Jordan´s foreign policy it is necessary to consider the individual characteristics of the King since he retains extensive powers over the formulation of foreign policy. Although the Hashemites, as a ruling dynasty, enjoy wide legitimacy among the Jordanian people, Abdullah II 'must maintain the institution of the monarchy in a post-modern era while governing a country beset by economic problems that render it dependent upon US and other foreign aid.'[36] Abdullah II has faced the difficult task of harmonising national and monarchical interests. Yet there has been one consistent dimension of Jordan's approach to its international relations, a deep recognition that the state is small—by both regional and international comparisons—and that such "smallness" produces inherent vulnerabilities to national security and the ability to pursue an autonomous foreign policy.[37]

Although Jordan has been active and even, at times, acted assertively, it never aspired to attain regional great power status; it has seldom commenced conflicts with other states or to shift thhe regional balance of power. Jordan is not an especially economically important state either and its economic problems indicate that it remains dependent on foreign assistance. This does not imply however, that it is resigned. In contrast, Jordan aims its foreign policy at increasing the Kingdom's influence in the Middle East and the international system through a different approach, one that is in-sync with its small stature.

## Bolstering Jordan's Regional Importance and Influence

*Jordan As a Small State*

Jordan is well aware of its power limitations and insufficient material resources and adjusts its foreign policy accordingly. It is also aware of its geopolitical location; it is situated in an unstable region where the use of force is common. This heightens the Kingdom's vulnerability and helps explain its drive in support of peace, preventive diplomacy, cooperation, Arab unity and welfare, and its mediation services points described as the 'hallmark of Hashemite leadership.'[38]

Since Abdullah II assumed power, he strove for the peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which is vital to regional peace and the stability of Jordan in particular because any deterioration of the situation will affect it negatively; Jordan's population is mostly Palestinian. This is best seen in Jordan's involvement in the so-called Arab Peace Initiative (2002) which sought the most comprehensive peace to date; it was based on the idea of the full normalisation of relations between Israel and the bulk of the Arab states in exchange for Israel's full return to its pre-1967 frontiers and its allowance of the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.[39]

It is important to note that support for regional cooperation goes beyond the Palestinian issue. Jordanian leaders seek to cultivate and maintain good relations with all its neighbouring states in economic, cultural and religious fields together with higher forms of security. Recently, Jordan has championed the idea of Arab unity—an irony considering the manner in which it resisted Nasser's similar drive—regional social welfare and the general resurgence of the Arab world. In this, Jordan has proposed several projects to create an Arab integration arrangement where all states would be treated equally with intra-Arab relations based on explicit and transparent cooperation, not dominance and power relations. In doing so, Jordan's limited (hard) power and vulnerable position is reflected.

Again, Jordan is not locked in the region and regularly participates in UN peacekeeping missions with deployable forces. Such international engagements—as Jordan's leaders emphasise—illustrate 'the country's global commitment to peace.'[40] Interestingly, considering its economic constraints, Jordan is a generous provider of both military and police personnel to UN missions such as Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Cambodia, Angola and Liberia.[41] However, these operations have also entirely practical benefits, such as employment opportunities for Jordanians, improving military skills and expertise.[42] Besides peace and regional

security, Jordan also supports human security world-wide. It is a member of the Human Security Network (formed in 1999), a group of 13 states that promote alternative perspectives on security where human beings, not states, are prioritised.



The internal dynamics of Jordan—as a small state—are also indicative of the way that it engages with the rest of the international community. It is a hybrid system where democratic rights and freedoms set it into a similar category as Bahrain and Kuwait, where the legal system is not used arbitrarily but rather in a transparent and democratic manner, individuals are endowed with an extensive set of rights and responsibilities and elect one legislative chamber. Jordan has all the necessary trappings to evolve into a full-fledged multi-party democracy. However, the simmering political situation, where a stream of cross-cutting cleavages exist (tribal, ethnic, national, religious, political and economic), locked in the catch-22 system of enhancing the already extensive powers of the King which may serve to further alienate segments of Jordanian society, coupled with corruption—which is rife—retards, or at least slows, adequate reform. This problem is likely to remain into the foreseeable future since parliament is weak and serves more as 'a facade of democracy behind which the Royal Court wields actual power.'[43]

## Conclusion

The analytical framework for small states' foreign policy deployed here is based on combining a complex set of quantitative and qualitative criteria, which emphasises relative, not absolute values. Not only territorial and population size, economic capabilities, military and natural resources but also the geopolitical position, neighbours, alliances and internal dynamics directly influence the "smallness" of a state. The outcome of this work, its conceptualisation, is a relatively homogenous category of states distinguishable from super, great and middle powers.

When applied to the case of Jordan, the concept of small states comes alive since its leaders have dealt with a wide variety of foreign policy problems and restrictions resulting from country's basic features and regional position. The Hashemite Kingdom is economically and militarily vulnerable and dependent on the assistance and goodwill of powerful and rich regional and extra-regional states. Its weakness is intensified by its location in the middle of an unstable region

where it often acts as a buffer between adversaries.

Jordan has staked its own peace and security on its ability to encourage and sponsor cooperative political and economic programmes through an active policy approach in its neighbourhood, a point confirmed by King Abdullah's II who declared '[d]ecades of robust regional and international engagement have made Jordan one of the most stable, secure and prosperous countries in the region.'[44] This sentiment is confirmed by Ryan who explains that 'Jordan in the early twenty-first century—and under a new king—finds itself more secure in the regional system [and] had achieved greater stability in foreign relations than ever before.'[45] Jordan's regional policy and international engagement is based on the belief that there 'are no bystanders in the 21st century. There are no curious onlookers. There is no one who is not affected by the division and hatred that is present in our world.'[46] This conviction provides clues for understanding the many foreign policy steps during the reign of King Abdullah II undertaken with the explicit goal of managing Jordan's stability as a small state in a region plagued by endemic instability. The conflagration unfolding in the Middle East, collectively termed as the Arab Spring, is only the most chapter in a period of prolonged social and regional-level violence that spills over borders and produces acute challenges to the status quo. For Jordan, Samuel and Tally Helfont go so far as to suggest that after these events, Jordan became 'a strategic battleground' between two rival forces.[47]



Since Jordan—among other small states—must find allies to act as security anchors, it must tread cautiously to avoid getting dragged into the troubles of its friends. The lessons learned from the erroneous engagement with Iraq before the latter invaded Kuwait and the resulting isolation of Jordan has forced a new prudence among its leadership. In this context, Ryan rightly notes that 'Jordan realised that regional alignment politics are not necessarily a zero-sum game, [rather it] tried to make it a positive-sum game so that increasing cooperation with one set of allies does not mean conflict with former allies.'[48]

Jordan has, thus far, managed to be resilient in the face of numerous threats and crises and has succeeded in increasing its geopolitical importance; engaging in activities which are supposed to overcome its "smallness" and set it as a significant regional actor not punching above its weight. What the future holds remains a mystery, however it is clear that Jordan is capable of navigating the dangers of the region through the recognition and respect of its limitations.

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# After a Violent Revolution: Romanian Democratisation in the Early 1990s

Roxana Radu

The 2011 uprisings in the Middle East have frequently been compared to the 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe. The prospects of free elections in countries such as Egypt, and Libya gave rise to concerns over the extent to which the regime change can be equated with the pursuit of a democratisation, in particular in the absence of a strong socio-economic integration programme at the regional level. Drawing on a social constructivist perspective, I present the Romanian experience in pursuing and complying with membership criteria for intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and the approaches adopted by political decision-makers in the first five years of post-communist transformation. The lessons from this case study are two-fold: firstly, the willingness to manage inter-ethnic disputes remained primarily subsumed to political interests as long as no strong compels were imposed; secondly, the prospect of full membership in multilateral institutions served the purpose of domestic legitimacy even when there was only partial compliance with international norms, which delayed the implementation of a thorough reform process. Nonetheless, as different regional forums increased their leverage by employing threats of sanctions, the role of IGOs increasingly constrained domestic elites. In light of this, the democratisation efforts started after the Arab Spring could build on the experiences of regional cooperation initiatives as those initiated in the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe.

Keywords: *Romania, democratisation, multilateral institutions, Arab Spring, revolution*

## Introduction

*Roxana Radu*

The 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East have recently been put side by side. Such assessments have, largely, focused on the similarities in the mobilisation process, the type of authoritarian rule and the range of human rights abuses and liberty limitations experienced by the populations of these countries prior to the social unrest. The scheduling of the first free elections in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have stirred a series of concerns regarding the degree to which the change in power can be equated with the pursuit of democratisation. From a political socialisation perspective, international actors are able to shape the norm adoption and the adherence to democratic values with a long-term impact on the transformation pursuit; among the most influential mechanisms at work in that process are the 'carrots' (incentives) and 'sticks' (sanctions), which are part of the conditionality process.

The 2011 turmoil in the Middle East—known as the 'Arab Spring'—led to a regime change in Tunisia, the first country in the region to witness mass unrest in December 2010 / January 2011. Egypt and Libya continue to face violence following the forced removal of their authoritarian leaders, Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gaddafi, respectively. The havoc in Syria—under Bashar al-Assad—has led so far to more than 75,000 deaths and the violence continues as the Syrian leader is unwilling to step down.[1] The intervention of international institutions in these countries was, up to now, primarily aimed at providing humanitarian help and political support to opposition groups in the areas where mobilisation was taking place or in those where protest crackdowns occurred. Discussions about financial assistance have also been in the spotlight following the turnover of power in the region. In the near future however, the involvement of international institutions is likely to go beyond humanitarian aid and economic recovery initiatives. Undoubtedly, new directions of action will regard the social and political development of the country and in particular the efforts to promote democratisation. In light of this, an account of the role of IGOs in the post-Revolution period in Romania is eloquent for the interaction between the international community and the early stage transition countries.

After facing the most violent revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe, Romania continued to be confronted, in the 1990s, with a series of brutal acts carried out by the miners from the Jiu Valley (these events were

subsequently called 'mineriads'), which aimed at silencing the opposition forces that were dissatisfied with the seizure of the National Salvation Front (NSF). This body—emerging from the temporary National Salvation Front Council—did not exist as an organisation prior to December 1989. Moreover, its leaders did nothing to mobilise the masses or give voice to social dissatisfactions prior to the start of the protests; while the temporary body originally included political dissidents, they soon withdrew their support as the National Salvation Front decided to take part in the May 1990 elections.

In this context, the Romanian early transition stage represents an interesting case for the involvement of regional multilateral institutions. The novelty of this study resides in assessing the impact that the international norms and constraints had on the enhancement of democratic advancements in the first years of transition in Romania in key moments, by analysing the courses of action undertaken under international compulsion and the logic behind their application. For this, I investigate critical policy lines adopted at the domestic level once IGOs have expressly demanded or conditioned their implementation. The analysis includes the interactions with the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), later on renamed the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and the European Community (EC), which changed its name to the European Union (EU) in 1993.

The topic is analysed from a social constructivist perspective. Accordingly, institutions are perceived as 'generating agents that reinforce or enact, as a result of normative socialisation into a common civilization, a particular set of principles, norms, and rules.'[2] With its deep roots in sociology, this understanding defines socialisation as a process of inducing actors into the norms and rules of a given community, whose purpose is the sustained compliance following the internalisation of the specified provisions.[3] Consistent with this theory, undertaking domestic changes under the influence of the international standards follows either the logic of consequentiality (cost-benefit analysis) or the logic of appropriateness (intrinsic reasons deemed appropriate under a given context), bridging the incentive-based behavioural adaptation and the actors' preferences redefinition. On strictly political grounds, the Romanian case appears to provide the necessary conditions for studying how the logic of consequences was replaced by the logic of appropriateness, in keeping with what is socially acceptable in a given setting.

This article is divided as follows. The next section addresses the theoretical background, emphasising the position of international institutions in driving the democratic transformation for Romania. The second section focuses on international pressures, with three subsections each dedicated to an in-depth analysis of the interactions with an international actor exerting significant influence on the process: CSCE/OSCE, Council of Europe and EC/EU. The final section concludes and puts into perspective the involvement of IGOs in the democratisation of Romania in the early 1990s, and its relevance in the light of the transformation process in the Arab Spring context.



## The Role of IGOs in the Early 1990s in Romania

In the early 1990s, the courses of action that would transform transitional governments into democratising agents were a response to both internal and international pressures. Regardless of how tardy the transition countries managed to complete the reforms they committed to and in spite of the extent to which they were able to abide by the previously-acknowledged democratic rules in the first post-communist decade, the 1990s change generated a degree of foreign support rarely manifested throughout history. Moreover, the socialisation process has been mutually reinforced by the objectives of both the international institutions and the newly democratising countries, with a match of interests that reshaped the so-called "world order" replacing the Cold War bi-polar arrangement. Attempting to increase their reliability domestically and externally, the transitional governments were eager to join international organisations in order to increase their civil society support, economic benefits and international reputation. By the same token, the risk of any deviation from the embarked path was considerably reduced within the control of international supervising institutions, thus making the costs of any such attempt significantly higher. In addition to market-related advantages that supplemented the expansion of the sphere of interest and the global reputation, by means of accepting new members, transnational organisations strengthened their power, while coalitions defending certain causes found more supporters.

The Romanian revolution of 1989 was the only violent one of that year in Eastern Europe. The dictatorship of Nicolae Ceausescu ended on 25 December 1989, after at least 1290 people were killed in the public protests leading up to his departure from Bucharest and subse-

quent execution.[4] 1989 was the year when simultaneous changes and instances of departure from authoritarianism occurred across Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, 1989 witnessed the violent suppression of the student demonstration in Tiananmen Square (China) in June, but also the formation of the first non-communist Polish government in September. The 1989 events in Europe disrupted the artificially-created order of the communist regimes in the Central and Eastern part of the continent to their eventual breakdown. From that point on, the path embarked on by the former communist countries came to be frequently labelled as "the democratisation process," thus implying that the system of government they were heading towards was, in effect, liberal democracy.

Romania's poor ratings in 1989 (regarding the lack of prior democratic experience, the low involvement of civil society, the low economic development, as well as the timing and mode of transition) led Huntington to conclude that Romania and Sudan were the two countries in the world with the worst chances for democratic consolidation.[5] Huntington's prediction did not materialize, and this may be attributed, to a certain extent, to the role played by IGOs in the region. Yet, many authors have seen this transition as an incomplete one, stressing primarily the inability to cope with or the unwillingness to deal effectively with key transition-related problems, such as corruption or the application of transitional justice mechanisms.[6] Beside the impact of the CSCE, the Council of Europe and the EU, NATO conditionality has also determined a large part of the cooperative advancements in the Romanian context. While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) provided a significant part of the funds used for reforms during transition, their mechanisms of direct or indirect constraint can be distinguished from democracy-oriented initiatives developed at the regional level. The *modus operandi* of these two institutions, as well as of NATO, has a less straightforward connection with the drive towards democratisation and adherence to liberal values, and can be assigned to a particular interest being pursued (economic or military). For this reason, they have not been included in the present analysis. Needless to say, the engagement of civil society actors (such as grant-providing foundations) or transnational networks provided strong support for democratisation. However, the current investigation remains limited to intergovernmental organisations.

From a sociological point of view, the perception of a chain of events that leads to a strenuous internal tension is formed during a subjective

process of internalisation, which is context-dependent. The national political players, the civil society as an assembly, as well as the international actors shape, alter and change their attitudes and the proposed policies depending on the dynamics of their insight into local circumstances. As social constructivism maintains, the adoption of a specific interaction path can only be explained by a deep exploration of the relations that regulate the intercession. The domestic institutionalisation of the international norms can be realised in four stages[7]: to begin with, the values promoted by the external grouping are internalised by the national elites; subsequently, these beliefs are further integrated into the local bureaucratic procedures and then incorporated into domestic law. By these mechanisms, the international rules are finally appealed to in order to justify a wide range of interests, from national claims to interest-based individual ones. Analysing the variation of domestic compliance with international rules in different states, Cortell and Davis emphasise the importance of two conditions for assessing how the national actors' internalisation of exterior norms influences state behaviour.[8] The first and foremost condition is 'the domestic salience of the norm,' defined as 'a durable set of attitudes toward norm's legitimacy in the national arena.'[9] Salient norms increase the feeling of obligation and the cost of deviation in the absence of an appropriate justification. The second variable is 'the domestic structural context within which the policy debates transpires.'[10]



At the outset, the mechanisms for socialisation used by the international structures in Central and Eastern Europe disregarded the differences between transitional countries and concentrated on convergence. Treating the states of the former communist bloc in a similar way was, to a certain extent, a sign of the incomplete preparation of these actors to confront the outcomes of the totalitarian legacy other than in a collective manner. Notwithstanding the inherent difficulties of the international organisations to unanimously decide on a long-term policy to follow, their first goal was convergence, defined as the 'gradual movement in system conformity based on an institutionalized grouping of established democratic states that has the power and mechanisms to attract regimes undergoing change and to help secure their democratic outcomes.'[11] The main cause for this focus was partly owed to the reticence of the older members of these institutions, which tended to especially emphasise regional disparities when compared to their own socio-economic status. The CSCE/OSCE, the EC/EU and the Council of Europe have been the most powerful groupings in

the region; they left their imprint on the democratisation process of the CEE transitional countries to the point of considering international leverage as fundamental in the transformation.



## International Pressures and Domestic Reactions

Good neighbourly relations and sub-regional cooperation were among the frequently used prestige-driven strategies employed by the Romanian government while pursuing the goal of becoming a stable leader in the Balkan region. Being a founding member of the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation or signing a friendship and cooperation treaty with Bulgaria in 1992, for instance, have been initiatives based on a two-fold reasoning: initially, they were attempts to create a proper milieu for peacefulness and economic development by overcoming historical disputes; in the second place, they were intended to formally guarantee the commitment of Romania towards profound democratic transformation. On the other hand, such projects unveiled the gradual influence of the external actors in the area; these were reflections of the implementation of the IGOs' socialisation mechanisms on a smaller scale.

In the international relations arena, the Romanian elites pursued regional cooperation simultaneously with European integration. National leaders often argued that the need for reform was a necessary condition for accession to international organisations and primarily to the EU. Therefore, whenever reforms were successful, they claimed their merit in achieving them, following a 'social rewards' calculation. In the same way, when the reforms proved to be unsuccessful or imposed a succession of hardships, there was a blame-shift towards the external conditionality and the requirements for integration. Anyhow, the prospect of membership in IGOs represented the strongest incentive for undertaking burdensome reforms, as detailed below.

### *CSCE/OSCE Requirements in the First Transition Years*

The CSCE was established in July 1973 as a political dialogue forum and became the OSCE on 1 January 1995. Through its conflict prevention activities, and its efforts towards democratisation and human rights protection, the CSCE became actively involved in the transition in Central and Eastern Europe by aiming at shaping a stable socio-political environment, primarily for ethnic minorities. The frequent criticism ad-

dressed to the organisation was that it lacked both the 'sticks' and the 'carrots' to efficiently implement its decisions; yet, since 1975, a degree of influence over the behaviour of Eastern leaders may be evidenced.[12]

The organisation is structured along three dimensions—politico-military, economic and environmental and human—and the input for each is given through summits attended by heads of state or government. In the aftermath of 1989, the CSCE process came to be perceived as a powerful mechanism for monitoring the compliance of Central and Eastern European states with the European norms of democracy, human rights and minority protection, as signatories of the Helsinki Final Act.[13] As McMahon puts it, 'although no one country or any single organization was willing or able to take responsibility for preventing and managing ethnic conflicts, a certain consensus had emerged on the leading role of the OSCE in this area.'[14]



In Romania, which harboured the largest Hungarian minority in the region, the violent clashes in 1990 with the Magyars in Targu Mures triggered the attention of the CSCE to the need to urge the Romanian government to create a legal framework for the protection of minorities. Additionally, it was recommended that a set of monitoring mechanisms and the 'civil society watch' be strengthened in order to supervise the implementation of norms. With the 1992 creation of the High Commissioner of National Minorities (HCNM)—a position held initially by Max van der Stoel—the CSCE introduced a major restructuring. Yet, given the lack of legal enforcement provisions, the HCNM relied extensively on 'proactive quiet diplomacy, and when necessary was prepared to "name and shame" those countries which did not comply with the agreed standards.'[15] Consequently, the Romanian government hardly integrated the recommendations of der Stoel, in spite of giving more attention to the ethnic problems so as not to hinder the prospects of European integration. From a domestic standpoint, the message the HCNM delivered was incongruent and incoherent: on the one hand, it accommodated the idea that 'if ethnic conflicts are not violent, the international community will not pay attention.'[16] On the other hand, blame was publicly assigned to the deficient cooperation between the Hungarian minority representatives and the Romanian government, thus ignoring the implementation of universal standards regarding minority rights.

By 1993, after President Iliescu declared accession to Euro-Atlantic institutions the top priority, the Council of National Minorities was established, as an acknowledgement of the fact that the peaceful set-

tlement of inter-ethnic disputes was a pre-requisite for further regional integration. The role of this Council was to enhance the dialogue with the national minorities in order to provide recommendations to the President.



According to one report prepared for the Free Media Seminar Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1993, in Romania, 'several minority language newspapers charge that hostile local postal and distribution authorities have periodically damaged their circulation by delivering their newspapers significantly later than their Romanian language competitors' and in some cases destroying their shipments.'[17] By the end of Iliescu's term, cooperation with neighbouring Hungary had not been formalised, but the necessary conditions for this endeavour had been created. The constant attention given to minority issues and the monitoring process endorsed by the CSCE/OSCE placed ethnic conflict prevention on the domestic agenda. One year later, in 1996, a Romanian-Hungarian bilateral agreement was signed by the then elected President Emil Constantinescu, with the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania being part of the governmental coalition.

### *The Council of Europe and its Domestic Impact*

The Council of Europe was the first Pan-European political institution to be founded in the aftermath of the World War II. From its creation in 1949, the Council of Europe has been concerned with the legal aspects of democratic government, while from 1989 onwards, it focused on three directions: first, raising awareness, providing information and fostering political dialogue; second, providing assistance and enabling cooperation; third, actively promoting integration. Starting in 1989, its observers advocated that the Council membership for post-communist countries can be regarded 'as a way of positively "locking" a country into an intergovernmental democratic network, with its binding international conventions and treaties, so as to protect it more effectively from its own antidemocratic enemies within.'[18] However, as the CSCE, the Council of Europe possesses weak enforcing mechanisms: in special circumstances, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, consulting the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), can suspend member states for infringements of its statutes; yet, by 1995, this sanction was never employed.

Soon after the Iron Curtain's dissolution, at the 1990 Lisbon Spe-

cial Ministerial Meeting dealing with the recent challenges of the 'new world order,' Romania was the only state from CEE to be absent, due to the internal tensions generated by the continuous violence in the country. As remembered by Adrian Severin, a former Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs from December 1996 to December 1997, 'Romania was one of the first states to apply to join the Council, after the changes occurred at the end of the 1980s. I believe that Romania's advancement could have been faster had it not been for the miners' coming to Bucharest [...] Our way to the Council of Europe was blocked all of a sudden after the miners' arrival to Bucharest on 13-15 June 1990.'[19] Due to the domestic circumstances, Romania was also the last country from the former communist bloc to acquire the Special Guest status in the Parliamentary Assembly, as late as February 1991.

By 1990, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the so-called 'Venice Commission') was created. This committee, which was mandated to help Romania to draft a new Constitution by offering legal expertise, faced an unprecedented situation: at the time of meeting with the Romanian representatives, the latter presented the Commission the draft of the first post-communist Constitution and only required the help of the Commission for gaining international recognition; this *fait accompli* was able to generate domestic legitimacy in a period of significant social unrest. Moreover, the actions of the government combined with the nationalist discourses of the Romanian politicians of the first post-communist years and with the miners' repeated visits to Bucharest induced—primarily in the international debates—the idea of transitional vulnerability, which delayed the country's accession to the Council of Europe until 1993. To the Romanian application for full membership, the Opinion 176 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe responded:

> In accordance with commitments made by the Romanian Parliament and authorities, as well as the remarks and proposals contained in the reports of the committees concerned with the application for membership, the Assembly calls the attention of the Romanian authorities to the necessity of instituting separation of powers, guaranteeing the real independence of the media, and ensuring the conditions for the free functioning of local administrative bodies. The Assembly recommends that the Romanian authorities sign the European Charter on Local Government as soon as possible.[20]

The document also provided a series of recommendations regarding

the minority rights status, including the imperative implementation of the legislation on national minorities and education, the restitution of confiscated Church property, especially for allowing the operation of church schools teaching children belonging to minority groups in their mother tongue. Moreover, it urged the Romanian authorities to combat racist, ethnic and religious discrimination and recommended the signing of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in due time.

The suggestions of the Parliamentary Assembly had been, to a large extent, integrated into national policies by the end of Iliescu's term, but this was primarily done in an unsatisfactory way. Romania signed the European Charter "Autonomous Exercise of Local Power" in October 1994, granting, however, only limited autonomy. A judiciary reform was undertaken in the autumn of 1995 introducing the immovability of judges and, during the same year, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was signed. Among the most flagrant acts of non-compliance with the Opinion 176 requirements was still the minority rights legislation. In 1995, the Romanian Parliament passed a new law on education restricting the educational rights national minorities previously enjoyed. According to article 123 of that piece of legislation, at the secondary level of education, Romanian was the language of instruction for subjects such as the history or the geography of Romania; additionally, article 124 stipulated that university entrance examinations had to be taken in Romanian, except for the subjects for which university instruction in the mother tongue is provided, such as teacher training and arts. As it was infringing on the international commitments already made, the application of this law was postponed in order to avoid a deterioration of Romanian-Hungarian relations. According to one Romanian witness to the carrying out of the reforms inspired by Opinion 176, 'the accession was not the result of a typical streamlining of the human rights situation and of the construction of the rule of law in accordance with the standards of the Council of Europe, but rather the outcome of a laborious process of political negotiation.'[21] Therefore, the adoption of external values and compliance with the international norms came at a lingering pace.

The Council of Europe's value convergence marked one of the most difficult instances of the logic of consequentiality in post-communist Romanian history. The cost-benefit analysis acted reversely in this case: by offering the much needed legitimacy in the domestic realm in a period of risk, the international institution found the proper ground

for monitoring the direction to be followed by the important chain of transformations affecting Romania's position at the regional level. In spite of the deficiencies that accompanied the process, the 'international sticks' carried forward the democratic progress.



### *The Influence of the European Community/European Union*

Referring back to the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community, the 1957 Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, with a single set of institutions collectively known as the *European Community* (EC). Undergoing a series of transformations in its mission, the EC had, by 1986, already gradually integrated six new member-states, apart from the six founding countries. By 1989, it had acquired a political position liable to rank it as one of the most powerful groupings in the region. With the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which entered into force in November 1993, the EC became the first among the three pillars that would constitute the 'European Union,' developing as a political and economic entity.

From 1990 onwards, when the possibility of becoming an indispensable regional actor arose, the Eastern enlargement opportunity took prevalence over other objectives, predominantly economic ones. According to Grabbe and Hughes, the 'Eastern enlargement of the EU is partly inspired by a sense of historical opportunity; it is not motivated just by the logic of political, economic and security interests on both sides, but has an emotional and moral dimension in re-uniting Europe and making up for the painful divisions of Yalta.'[22]

Assessing the domestic impact of such a complex explanation for transnational involvement always poses an impediment to defining the features exerting pressure and leading to specific effects, due to the overlap of interdependent sequences of motivations. The European Community's reasoning with a view to enlargement after 1989 included several new aspects, compared to the previous waves of integration: the first proposal to support and later on to foster accession negotiations to a number of transitional countries, was seen as democratically vulnerable and economically fragile; additionally, they formed a distinct group, they did not compose a uniform bloc, therefore they needed to be approached differently. Faced with these circumstances, the European Community developed the "conditionality" mechanism, which could be simply equated with imposing a series of conditions in

order to continue negotiations in the pursuit of acquiring full membership. Furthermore, the good-neighbour policy acquired an unprecedented role: 'in no case [in past EU enlargements] was substantive sub-regional cooperation among the candidate countries put forward as a condition for entry. The idea of sub-regional cooperation as a stepping stone, or even a condition for integration into the EU first arose with the CEE candidate states'[23].

Romania was the first country from the Soviet bloc to have signed a limited trade agreement with the EC as early as 1980. Seven years later, negotiations were held to expand the provisions of the agreement to agriculture and cooperation, but they were unsuccessful. In July 1989, the Paris Summit of the Arch included a provision mentioning that any East European country embarking on the democratisation path and market oriented reform would receive Western aid, under the supervision of the EC. However, by December 1989, the trade agreement with Romania was cancelled as a result of the deterioration of human rights protection in its territory. The European Community-Romanian diplomatic relations were re-established in March 1990, followed, two months later, by a discussion on the possible conclusion of the trade and cooperation agreement; yet its final signing was delayed due to the start of the Mineriad.

While the EC involvement in the transition processes in Central and Eastern Europe, from 1989 onwards, was conceived, in its first stage, in terms of economic aid and trade support, caution was expressed concerning the instability in the region. The agenda that would provide financial assistance to the newly-democratising countries also included the PHARE programme, apart from the trade and cooperation agreements signed on an individual basis and meant to facilitate the import from the EC by gradually eliminating restrictions. Nonetheless, Romania was excluded from the PHARE schemes for repeated violations of human rights until January 1991.

Some analyses of the EC/EU's domestic impact have concluded that, in the post-1989 period, 'the general perspective of the ruling elite regarding Romania's development was distorted. It was not democratisation, but EU integration that mattered most. The only long-term objective was EU accession, and short-term objectives were objectives set under EU conditionality, nothing more. Under such circumstances reinstating the rule of law in Romania was never seen as a goal per se, but rather as a means of achieving accession.'[24] In particular, after the interruption of negotiations, the image of the country needed to be

restored and improved. The 1990 repression of the protesters in the University Square by 'government-backed miners who ran amok in Bucharest'[25]—as it was viewed from Brussels—raised serious questions regarding the capacity of Romania to reform and move beyond totalitarian practices. At the same time, the European Community reacted towards the persistence of former communist political and economic elites in power and the reluctance of politicians in office to decide on the institutional change in an effective way. The poor national economic performance at the beginning of the 1990s stemmed, in part, from the delay in the signing of the cooperation agreement, whose long-standing effect would be visible in the loss of credibility for foreign investments, with a wide range of consequences for the future development of Romania.

Starting with 1991, the Associations Agreements (also known as Europe Agreements) represented a second stage in the EC strategy towards the Central and Eastern European countries; beside trade liberalisation, the free movement of services, capital and labour was negotiated. Moreover, at the 1990 EC Foreign Ministers Meeting, held in February, five eligibility principles for acquiring the status of associated country were set up: establishment of the rule of law, respect for human rights, introduction of multi-party democracy, holding of free, fair and competitive elections and finally, development of market-oriented economies. In 1993, the EC-Romania Association Agreement was signed, with the date for entering into force set for 1 February 1995. In spite of the fact that the position of 'partner country' offered no promise of future membership in the EC, it managed to boost the prestige of the national elites and prospects for democratisation.

On the other hand, pressures coming from the transitional countries for a specific commitment and membership binding objective determined the European Commission to issue, on 18 May 1993, the statement entitled "Towards a Closer Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe" in view of the future meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen. One section of this document emphasised the importance of adopting concrete measures.[26] The shift in the EU's approach towards transitional countries, from the partnership status agreement to promoting a real commitment for full membership, was done in order to strengthen the engagement in the region, since the EU 'could not protect itself against the spill-over effects of political instability or conflict at its borders.'[27]

At the Copenhagen European Council from June 1993, the political

criteria for accession to the EU were set for the first time. However, being among the strictest conditions ever imposed, they have fed the perception of the EU's 'double standards,'[28] compared to the previous waves of integration. These criteria can be summarised as: democratic institutions and the rule of law, respect for human rights and the protection of minorities, and a functioning market economy. Nonetheless, given that the EU was, under no circumstances, legally bound to offer membership to the countries complying with these criteria, the decisions of the Copenhagen Summit rather constituted an important part of a powerful incentive structure. The value of the document was expressly political, but it included a degree of ambiguity that only hindered the transitional transformations in the Eastern European countries. For instance, the requirement of having stable democratic institutions and of ensuring minority rights protection stressed the importance of democratic consolidation solely, rather than transition, without providing guidance on how the democratic institutions should act.[29] As a result, the internalisation of these norms was only done formally, because in countries where former communists remained in power, such as Romania, the elites had no personal experience of a functional democracy, while the institutions still struggled with the ever-delayed reform, lack of professionalism and inefficiency. The public administration deficient management obstructed, as well, the *acquis communautaire* implementation requirement. Moreover, due to the reluctance of the parties in power to enforce accountability for civil servants, the harmonisation of legislation slowed down the pace of integration. All the same, the market economy still suffered from the gradualism policy adopted by the government in the transition from a centralised system to capitalism.

Faced with these realities, Romanian decision-makers acknowledged the fact that 'EU accession process largely represents the management of domestic transformation and not a sophisticated diplomatic exercise with Brussels.'[30] A thorough commitment to becoming a member-state implied a sustained effort in order to meet all the criteria necessary for signing the accession treaty. In December 1994, at the Essen European Council, a pre-accession strategy initiative was launched for the first time, with the aim of providing a clear image of the steps to be taken for EU integration. One year later, in 1995, the Madrid European Council introduced a new pre-condition for accession: the capacity of the candidate states to adjust their administrative and judicial structures, one of the laggard sectors for Romanian reforms. In the same

year, in April, Romania signed the Stability Pact for Europe, committing to minority rights protection, a document made reference to in the European Parliament's threat to 'disqualify Romania from joining the EU'[31] stirred by the discriminatory educational law passed by the national legislature.



The warning had immediate results by postponing the application of the law. The reasoning behind this endeavour was clear at the domestic level. Understanding the importance of the moment, all fourteen Romanian political parties signed the so-called 'Snagov Declaration,' showing their support for the accession process. On the international scene, this threat brought into play a multitude of factors: the actual power of the EU to reject one country's effort towards accession, with all the economic implications derived, was the principal one; on political grounds, such an explicit sanction threat reflected the international influence and reputation that the EU had acquired as a regional player. In 1995, the Romanian government sent its application for membership to the EU, being the third country from the post-communist bloc to submit it after Hungary and Poland. In the domestic arena, the actors' rhetoric was informally structured around the "European integration" ever since the fall of communism and formally acknowledged from 1993 onwards. The influence of the European Community, and later on, that of the EU has considerably shaped the democratisation process in Romania.

## Conclusions

This account aimed to reveal the extent to which the external engagement shaped the development of Romania in the early 1990s, through the prism of the 'sticks' and 'carrots' employed by the CSCE/OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the EC/EU. Using a social constructivist approach, I argued that the Romanian democratic trajectory was strongly influenced by the role of multilateral institutions operating in the region after the overthrow of communism. Never before have so many international actors been involved actively in one region for overcoming transitional difficulties as in the early 1990s in CEE and never before had the European integration prospect been offered in such a short time span to countries struggling with social, political and economic hardships.

The intertwined influence and monitoring role of all these major regional actors determined the shift from logic of consequentiality to-

wards the logic of appropriateness driving the domestic political actors. By inducing the direction and the nature of this turning point, the international institutions ensured that the Central and Eastern European transitions would result in democratisation. However, the shift from the logic of consequences to the logic of appropriateness has not been smooth. As unveiled by the historical examples provided, domestic political interests continued to play an important role up to 1993, when the mechanisms of conditionality became stronger. As the priority of international involvement in the region was originally defined in terms of value convergence, the transformation of transitional governments in democratising agents proved to be a strenuous process in which the influence of external actors was neither constant, nor uniform.

At the same time, the regional organisations active in CEE pursued overlapping strategies, in particular with regards to the protection of ethnic minorities and legislative reforms. Consequently, the image of the international community at that point in time was not one of a homogenous actor; in effect, most initiatives at the regional level acted independent of each other, seeking complementary outcomes only in a limited number of cases. Moreover, the leverage of international compulsion was different in terms of the types of responses required. Thus, to the CSCE/OSCE constant attention and monitoring towards managing ethnic tensions, Romanian elites exerted a slow adaptation and delayed the implementation of recommended reforms. Transitional vulnerability and the deterioration of human rights conditions in the country additionally postponed Romania's membership in the Council of Europe until 1993. Building on its initial approach towards the CEE transitional governments, the EU set in place strict accession criteria promoting democratic values. As such, the prospect of membership 'had a positive impact in preventing further outbreaks of ethnic and nationalist violence.'[32]

Moreover, in the case of Romania, the dynamics surrounding the prospect of 'partnership' proved to be very different from the prospect of full membership in multilateral institutions. This transitional experience in the aftermath of a violent revolution emphasised the difficulty of enshrining respect for human rights in the context of simultaneous socio-economic transformations. In that sense, there are many similarities with the current trajectory of Arab Spring countries, where initially peaceful protests turning into armed violence and the negotiations for regime change did not necessarily bring about a move

towards democratisation. As sectarian, ethnic and economic tensions continue to make victims in countries swept by change after the Arab Spring revolutions, the role of IGOs needs to be reconsidered. Regional grouping, such as the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council, can build new strategies informed by the experiences of the external involvement towards democratisation in CEE.



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## Notes

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# The Europeanisation of Political Communication: Framing the Online Communication of French Political Parties

Kateřina Čmakalová

The aim of this article is to examine the process of online Europeanisation of political communication, both theoretically and through empirical analysis. On one hand, the text emphasises the relationship between the public sphere and the legitimacy of the European Union and examines different concepts of the public sphere on a European level. On the other hand, it touches on the significance of the World Wide Web, a relatively new medium, and its propagation to a pan-European public arena. Furthermore, the article stresses the role of political actors, especially political parties, in communication about Europe. It discusses the extent to which national political parties´ arguments and political claims on their official websites contain references to shared values or common EU identity. To illustrate the theoretical framework, seven French political parties have been chosen and the online contents of their official websites will be explored.

Keywords: *European Union, legitimacy, public sphere, Europeanization of national public spheres, political parties, France*

## Introduction

This article critically investigates the notion of the Europeanisation of political communication and the possible creation and development of a European public sphere which is related to it. The debate loosely

follows the article of Čmakalová and Rolenc that examines the legitimacy deficit of the European Union (EU) and identifies problems of European integration related to the EU's legitimacy which are still to be overcome, for instance on the creation of common public sphere, democratic deficit, citizenship and identification.[1]



The question of whether to have or to not have a European arena that establishes and broadens communication channels between the European level and the general public is usually answered in the negative, emphasising linguistic and cultural boundaries and the existence of multiple (European, national and subnational) identities. Alternativley, some scholars, notably Habermas, suggests that further advances in the integration process are increasingly dependent on acceptance and legitimacy among the citizenry.[2] They perceive the existence of the European public sphere as 'a precondition for taking up any democratisation project.'[3] Contact between institutions and other administrative bodies and the broad public is also essential in order to avoid the problematic ratifications of EU treaties that occurred in the last decades. Yet, what should the European public sphere look like? Could we apply the concept of a national public sphere to the European one? In response to such an intricate question, the article, in its first part, revises the different concepts of the public sphere on the European level and attempts to indicate the most suitable one—the Europeanisation of the national public spheres—which may have a positive impact on further development of European integration.

The research presented in the second part of the article concentrates on discussing the potential contribution of political actors and their online communication about Europe to the process of gradual Europeanisation of the public spheres. With regards to the negative outcome of the referendum in France in 2005, the theoretical framework is then tested on a sample of French political parties and their communication on official websites relating to three widely-discussed European topics: the Lisbon Treaty, EU enlargement and the Eurozone. The analysis proceeds on three levels: number of references, evaluation of European topics and identification with them through three patterns of interpretation: shared interests, common identity and values. The context gives rise to a few questions: Are the interests of those political parties national or European, and which are preponderant? Can references to shared or universal values and to European (common) identity be found when those three issues are addressed? In short, the results give us an idea of the extent to which political parties in a particular

member state contribute to communication about Europe, and thus indirectly enhance the legitimacy of the European Union.

## Is There a European Public Sphere?



Against the background of the legitimacy deficit of the EU, some scholars (van Os, Habermas, van de Steeg et al.)[4] recognise that the process of European integration must be accompanied by the Europeanisation of political communication in order to overcome the lack of popular involvement in the EU by European citizens.[5] The interest in the analysis of legitimacy is due to several factors: on an empirical level it has been caused by the ever decreasing citizen support for EU membership, reflected in, for example, the declining participation in elections to the European Parliament or several failed referenda (e.g. the failure of the Constitutional Treat in 2005 or the original rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008).[6] On a theoretical level, discussion on the legitimacy of the EU is divided into many specific questions; mainly the question of legitimacy in the sense of the democratic character of decision making in the EU, which is dependent on the will of the citizens of the EU (input legitimacy), but also the aspect of sufficient public support for activities of the EU (output legitimacy).[7] Hence, some of the debates concerning the crisis of EU legitimacy revolve around the (non)existence of the European public sphere.

"Public sphere" was, in the past, perceived as 'an arena where citizens come together, exchange opinions regarding public affairs, discuss, deliberate, and eventually form public opinion.'[8] The agora, originally meaning a specific meeting place in Ancient Greek, has in the recent past changed from a location to a communication network within a particular community (e. g. national state) where different actors such as the public, civil society, public officials, the media and private actors come together not only to share information, but especially to debate different topics. Today, the public sphere goes beyond space and includes all channels of communications through which its actors can send and receive information and which facilitate an open discussion of all issues of general concern: 'the public sphere thus presupposes freedoms of speech and assembly, a free press and the right to freely participate in political debate and decision-making.'[9] Habermas, who provided a comprehensive analysis of the nature of the public sphere, highlights the relevance of the public sphere for promoting democracy and political accountability.[10]

When discussing the term, we should distinguish between the various forms which a public sphere can take. Habermas defines it as 'a network that gives all citizens an opportunity to take part in encompassing process of focused political communication.'[11] Some authors go beyond this interpretation and define it as 'a forum where public opinion is shaped.'[12] Others even insist on the creation of a '"we" group of insiders whose identity is defined in terms of values or characteristics deemed to be common, as a key prerequisite for the existence of the community of communication.'[13] The study will, however, adopt and further develop a definition of van de Steeg that 'a common public sphere is not merely a media space that just contains a series of news items, but it is a democratic space in which these news items are being debated. A public sphere is a forum of joint discussion in which various speakers and actors relate to each other and refer to each other.'[14]



In debates about the public sphere on the European level, scholars do not agree on either its nature or the elements that such sphere should consist of. This is mainly caused by the crucial divergence in opinion regarding its existence within the EU. Van de Steeg identifies authors such as Grimm (1995), Kielmansegg (1996) and Schlesinger (1995) who have maintained that a European public sphere does not exist because of the relation of such a sphere to key concepts including language, media system and state frontiers: 'since each of these has different boundaries, which moreover, do not coincide with those of the EU, it has been suggested that there cannot be a community of communication.'[15] The concept clearly considers the public sphere, media system, communication and language interchangeably and connects their character with specific national collective identities and national cultures, limited by state borders. Cerruti and Lucarelli's commentary leads to the same conclusion: 'they (communication structures) are still overwhelmingly national, with the EU being a preoccupation or a scapegoat for politicians and journalists (whose political culture remains widely national).'[16]

Contrarily, authors like Habermas or Kanter and Eder—as van de Steeg mentions notes—make several attempts to provide an operational definition of the European public sphere. Those authors perceive the existence of the European public sphere as a precondition for a democratisation process[17] or as a 'remedy for the legitimacy deficit.'[18] According to Habermas, 'the function of the communicational infrastructure of democratic public sphere is to turn relevant societal problems into topics of concern, and allow the general public to relate,

at stand on news and opinions.'[19]

The current shape of the public sphere on the European level, however, does not resemble a single monolithic European arena that can possibly have the familiar design of a nation state. Rather than searching for a Europe-wide public sphere, this article emphasises the process of Europeanisation of national public spheres. In general, Europeanisation is perceived as 'processes of (1) construction, (2) diffusion and (3) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public policies.'[20] Banchoff and Smith explain the process of Europeanisation of national public spheres by saying that representation within the EU does not require the existence of a single European "people" bound by shared cultural and historical roots. They identify informal policy networks consisting of 'policy-making sites which involve the mediation of the interest of interdependent actors, including European and national officials, technocrats, agency officials, representatives of non-governmental organisations and other interest groups, journalists, media and academics.'[21] The same idea is shared by van de Steeg. Together with her colleagues, she emphasises that despite that there is no common language, no common media and no European nation-state, 'we can still discuss the same topic at the same time using similar criteria of relevance and meaning.'[22] They explain their position on the example of the Haider debate and its analysis of media representation in five EU member states and in the US.[23] Their research leads to the conclusion that 'a European public sphere does not emerge as a by-product of European institution-building and European integration. Rather, the more a particular issue is perceived as a common European one by the participation in a public discourse, the more a transnational European public sphere is actively constructed through social practice.'[24]

The study does not attempt to analyse the entire process of Europeanisation of national public spheres. Due to the complexity of such a process, this article focuses only on a particular element—the Europeanisation of political communication of political parties. National political parties have also begun to address European issues, while following the imperatives of the national political game. Banchoff and Smith emphasise that 'the integration process has induced a nascent reorientation of political party activity towards the European level.'[25]

Accordingly, the 'increasing involvement of national parties in EU governance is rendering Europe less foreign for national politicians, and may counteract their tendency to blame the EU for unpopular or failing policies and thus improve the positive image of the EU.'[26]



## Methodology and Data

For data collection, this research is based on an analysis of political claims, which takes individual instances of claim-making by political parties made on their official websites as the unit of the analysis.[27] Since such a political claim, defined by Berclaz and Giugni, is 'a strategic intervention, either verbal or non-verbal,[28] in the public space (e.g. World Wide Web) made by a given actor on behalf of a group or collectivity and which bears on the interests or rights of other groups or collectivities.'[29] Hence, public claim-making acts are defined as intentional public speech acts which articulate political demands, calls to action, proposals, and criticism, which actually or potentially affect the interests or integrity of claimants or other collective actors in an issue field.[30] Claims can take three main forms: 1. political decisions (law, governmental guideline, implementation measure etc), 2. verbal statements (public speech, press conference, parliamentary intervention etc) or 3. protest actions (demonstration, occupation, violent action etc).[31] The research in this case will mainly focus on verbal statements.

In addition, claims are, by definition, politically and strategically oriented; they relate to collective problems and solutions to them, and not to purely individual strategies of coping with problems.[32] This means that purely factual information is excluded. Moreover, an article can report several claims. The whole article must therefore be read so as to code all the claims reported.[33]

In the text, three different and widespread topics related to European integration have been selected for further analysis of the official websites: the issue of the Lisbon Treaty, enlargement of the EU and the Eurozone. The main goal of the study is to investigate the political claims that are communicated. The starting point will be the analysis of 1. the visibility of the political claims on the official websites and 2. the parties' evaluation (negative/positive) of European integration. The text will primarily observe how and why they are communicated, and thus deal with the interpretative context. Yet, 3. the frame in which the chosen European topics are discussed on the websites will be the most salient issue. In order to analyse the character of the communi-

cation, the patterns of interpretation are pre-defined: whether and to what extent interests, common EU identity (demos) and shared values (shared among member states) are present in the political claims of French political parties.



This work firstly examines their political claims through the interpretative pattern of 1. European identity ("we" group) searching for evidence of a sense of belonging to the same community. Secondly, the claims are evaluated in relation to 2. shared values. They are understood as universal values and refer to acknowledged moral principles. Statements concerning an issue may constitute an explicit relation with general normative principles that are considered valid for the institutional context of the EU. Finally, they are evaluated through the prism of 3. common interests; they are analysed in relation to the particular issue, rational arguments and motivations that are put forward.

### *Framing Online Communication*

This article develops a few ideas from the works of van Os (2005, 2008), especially those related to the role of the World Wide Web in communication about Europe. According to van Os, the internet is often said to have potential to provide a public forum where everyone is able to obtain and maintain a virtual presence.[34] It serves as a space where information can be shared, issues discussed and where the interested can engage in political action. These elements are often considered important components of the political process and accordingly of the public sphere. This article argues that, as with other mass media, it is possible to investigate the notion of Europeanisation of communication about Europe on the websites of political actors. Moreover, I believe that political actors express particular perspectives when discussing European issues and events on their web pages, and that in doing so, these online documents provide indicators for the Europe envisioned.

Indeed, '(d)uring recent years, more and more websites, produced by a variety of political actors have become available to citizens of European countries for political communication about European issues.'[35] The importance of online communication as a means of communication has increased. Habermas commented that 'the use of the internet has both broadened and fragmented the contexts of communication.'[36] Foot and Schneider stress the importance of independent websites developed by national and state advocacy groups, civic organisations and mainstream alternative press.[37] Also, Norris[38] highlights the existence

of websites run by minor and fringe parties, and considers these an asset for democracy, enabling citizens to learn more about the range of electorate choices than was previously possible.[39]

European issues are generally less discussed than national issues in the mass-media. It is via their websites that political actors can offer a particular perspective on European issues, suggesting whether and why issues concerning Europe are socially and politically relevant. Furthermore, political actors themselves determine the nature of communication about Europe and the manner in which European issues are addressed. This text will evaluate information that has appeared on official websites, such as articles, news, and programmes of political parties, in the period between October 2010 and January 2011.



The study investigates only those online texts produced by a political party that expressed its positions and arguments on European issues, institutions and policies such as news, articles produced by the party, party programmes, press releases or other more informal deliberations on particular events or issues related to European integration. Articles prepared by the media and press agents that are in some cases included on the websites are not relevant for the analysis, and neither are weblogs maintained by party members.

### *Objects of Investigation*

As Poguntke indicates, the process of integration of the EU influences national political parties to a certain extent.[40] He shows two basic aspects: the first represents the inclusion of European affairs in current issues of political parties. In the 1970s, parties began to discuss European questions in the context of the elections to the European parliament. They were, however, more engaged during the period of the two referendums, the first one being linked to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the second one to the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe in May 2005.[41]

Seven political parties were selected for the purpose of the empirical study. Together they represent a sample that shapes the national political spectrum in France. In the text I distinguish between six families: three traditional party families which have representatives in all western European countries: 1. social democrats, 2. liberals and 3. conservatives; and more recent competitors: 4. the greens, 5. the radical right, and finally 6. the radical left.[42] The analysis consists of representatives of each family.

The selected French political parties are namely: *Le Front national* (FN), the far-right, nationalist political party, founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen; *Le Mouvement pour la France* (MPF), a conservative and Eurosceptic political party, founded in 1994 and led by Philippe de Villiers; *Le Mouvement populaire* (UMP), a political party that represents centre-right wing of the French political spectrum; *Le Mouvement démocratique* (MoDem), a centrist, social liberal and pro-European French political party founded by centrist politician François Bayrou to succeed his Union for French Democracy (UDF) in 2007; *Le Parti socialiste* (PS), the largest centre-left political party in France; *Les Verts*, a Green political party to the centre-left of the political spectrum founded in 1984; and finally *Le Nouveau parti anticapitaliste* (NPA), a party closely associated with Olivier Besancenot.

Apart from their political orientation, the second criterion by which the political parties were chosen for analysis was their results in the European elections in 2009. All seven political parties were placed among the first ten in the European elections. All of them except for the NPA also received at least one seat in the European Parliament.

## Analysis and Results: French Political Parties, An Empirical Study

As previously described, in order to determine the degree of Europeanisation of online political communication, the study looks at three different topics that are firmly linked to frequently discussed European issues and analysed: first, the language used, second references to actors and information provided on the site, and third actors that become visible as claimants on the site. Using the method that examines the public dimension of politics on parties' websites, in contrast to media contents, this method filters out journalists' own claims and takes news as a source for reported claims by collective actors, in this case political parties.

The exploratory study aims to resolve following questions: To what extent do the political parties in France frame Europe in the context of the chosen European topics? Are their interests strictly national or can we find a European dimension? Is there any evidence of a common or, in this case, European identity and of universal values when European issues are addressed? Or does the identity remain strictly national or regional? Answers to such questions may help the author unravel the current development of Europeanisation of national public spheres.

The first level essentially shows the visibility of three topics, i.e. the Lisbon Treaty, EU enlargement and the Eurozone, on the official websites of the seven selected political parties. The results of the coverage are illustrated in Table 1 (Analyzed websites).

| Political party | Official websites | Lisbon Treaty (number of references) | EU enlargement | Eurozone, EU Monetary policy |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UMP | lemouvementpopulaire.fr | 11 | 2 | 3 |
| PS | parti-socialiste.fr | 151 | 202 | 200 |
| MoDem | mouvementdemocrate.fr | 166 | 82 | 25 |
| Les Verts | lesverts.fr | 84 | 160 | 47 |
| FN | frontnational.com | 79 | 65 | 122 |
| NPA | npa2009.org | 77 | 31 | 70 |
| MPF | pourlafrance.fr | 136 | 8 | 19 |

Table 1: Analyzed websites

The data in Table 1 comes from the period 2000 - 2010. All three topics are mostly written about by members of the parties, especially by their leaders or spokespersons. In the case of the Lisbon Treaty and the Eurozone, the members of the European Parliament are also often active (especially the members of the FN). The parties renew the content of their websites weekly and sometimes daily if there are special occasions or politically urgent issues.

The party that covers the selected European issues less is the UMP, even though the party currently has a majority in the government. In this case, visibility is low, especially with regards to the topics of EU enlargement and the Eurozone. These two topics are not mentioned much on the website of the MPF either. On the contrary, the number of references is substantially high for the PS and is also important for the MoDem (regarding the Lisbon treaty), Les Verts (regarding EU enlargement), and the FN (the Eurozone), where it reaches over a hundred references.

As a partial conclusion, we can assume that there is no clear relationship between the number of references and the parties whose position is closer to the political centre and those that are further, or between the parties on the left or the right wing of the political spectrum.



### *Evaluation of the EU*

The second level of the analysis deals with political parties and their evaluation of the European integration. In general as Statham and Koopmans argue,

> for debates over European partisanship is common observation of an inverted U pattern of support for Europe; parties' stances cross-cut left/right divisions, so that the centre parties are largely pro European, with opposition to Europe confined to the marginal poles of extreme left and right [...] Theories are advanced for how European issues constitute an ideological basis for party contention that cross-cuts the traditional left/right cleavage. This transformation of the ideological space leads to new opportunities for mobilization and alignments among parties. European contestations are absorbed into their left/right contestation, whereas others are not. This is partly because EU competences relative to nation-states do not penetrate all policy fields equally.[43]

Diverse political, economic or cultural aspects may influence the arguments of political parties. The contestation over European issues may thus have different forms. Some political parties fight over the issues of regulated capitalism and neo-liberalism, some share the green-alternative-libertarian ideas, while others share the traditional-authoritarian-nationalist visions. In response to globalisation, the strong cleavage may also appear between the defenders of national sovereignty and advocates of supra-national authority.

In the case of French political parties, the evaluation mostly corresponds with the general cleavages. Starting with the FN, all of its evaluative claim-making is against Europe. The FN´s claims build a coherent and consistently mobilised critique that characterises the party as committed Eurosceptics.[44] According to the FN, 'the EU is bad for France.'[45] The party defines itself as France's defender against the loss of sovereign national autonomy imposed by the EU. It opposes EU enlargement, calling for treaty renegotiations. Likewise, the Euro is criticised for being against national, economic, social, and politi-

cal independence: the 'Euro is by all means a mistake,'[46] depicted as potentially weak, leading to a doomsday scenario of inflation, unemployment, social crisis and national identity problems. In other words, in response to globalisation the FN defends national sovereignty and fights against the consequences of globalisation in politics, economics and culture, emphasising the national identity. The party compares the nature of the EU to 'an infernal machine.'[47] The negative evaluation is also visible in the way the FN visualises the EU officers and high representatives as 'the European ruling class, blinded by the ideology of the Euro, who refuses to watch this reality, and who is desperate to save the single currency, the sacred cow of the system.'[48]



The MPF seems less aggressive, but still remains very critical of European integration. Blaming the EU that 'Lisbon kills France!'[49] its members also defend national autonomy. They make several references to de Gaulle, Jeanne d´ Arc and Churchill who, according to them, were excellent examples of supporters of national identity.[50] With the same attitude, they condemn the existence of the Euro and suggest that the 'Euro penalises the creation of jobs'[51] and is only another factor aggravating the economic crisis. Therefore, they consider the EU to be unable to protect French citizens, their jobs or identity.

The situation is different in the case of moderate parties situated in the centre or right/left-centre of the political spectrum (Les Verts, UMP, PS and MoDem). Those parties generally have positive attitudes towards European integration. The most pro-European parties are the MoDem and Les Verts. For the MoDem, 'the European integration is not a problem, but a solution.'[52] On the other hand, les Verts sometimes displays more radical attitudes advocating social, political and federal Europe to replace the current form of the EU. The party rejects nation-states' dominance over the EU through a commitment to federalism. Its members accuse the current elite of the EU for not proceeding faster with the integration process.[53]

The left/right-centre of the spectrum also contains a group of parties that remain roughly divided. This is particularly true in the case of the UMP and the PS, the largest political parties seated in the National Assembly. Their members are not united in their views on Europe and do not share the same opinion on the direction of the integration. In general, however, their members believe that the EU, still under construction, provides several benefits. The UMP, on its websites, emphasises the advantages of the integration process, such as the free movement of the Euro, goods and people. Both parties also decided

to support the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. According to the PS, 'the Lisbon treaty opens the way for more efficient intervention of the EU in matters such as international affairs and globalization.'[54] The party considers the ratification as a possible solution how to escape the constitutional crisis. Furthermore, it believes that ratification may help us focus on affairs important in the daily life of European citizens: employment, high social protection and quality of public services and environmental norms: 'Europe has had the treaty she needed. Now it is applying and moving on to more important tasks that Europe has to accomplish.'[55] However, the PS and the UMP emphasise different values. The PS considers the defence of interests of European citizens to be the key factor while the UMP highlights the benefits and interests of specifically French citizens.

The NPA on the left wing of the spectrum represents (as a far-left political party) more Eurosceptic vision. It mostly emphasises the EU's social deficits and defends national social welfare and labour interests against the EU's perceived neo-liberalism. According to the NPA, it may lead to a failure of the European social model and to unsustainable support of markets. Its critical view is weaker than the views of the far right-wing political parties (the FN and the MPF). Its negative assessment stems from the deficiencies of the current system of decision-making since '(c)itizens can change, by universal suffrage, their mayor, their deputy or government, but they are totally helpless against the European Commission.'[56] The NPA also opposes the Lisbon treaty, claiming that 'it will have negative consequences on daily lives of people in the EU.'[57] The party favours a unified Europe, but not in the present form and its members feel that today's problems result from uncritical support of large-capitalist groups which dominate over the interests of EU citizens, especially workers.

### *Analysis of Communication through Interpretative Patterns*

As van Os argues, 'it is through their websites that parties (as any other political actor) offer particular perspective on European news, issues and events, suggesting whether and why discrete issues broadly concerning Europe are (or should be) socially and politically relevant.'[58]

This study describes selected European issues in the context of particular interests, identities and values of French political parties. Whereas the analysis in the previous two parts dealt with the visibility of the explored topics and the evaluation of the parties' orienta-

tion towards European integration, the last part examines the nature of their communication with the public and their voters, identifying their frame of reference. Does the frame of reference remain national or does it become European? This indicator provides more of a qualitative measure of whether actors communicate from a Europeanized perspective and reflect a sense of belonging to Europe. The degree to which French political parties portray the EU as a single entity varies substantially. Whether the emphasis is on European or national interests mostly depends on the evaluation of their attitude towards European integration as specified in the previous part.

Expression of common identity may be portrayed in different ways, and again it occurs mostly in the case of parties with positive attitude towards the EU. Some refer to the EU using terms such as "we" or "us." This strong affection is visible in the articles and references of the MoDem and of Les Verts.[59] The others remain more cautious (the UMP, the PS and the NPA), referring to mixed identities—national and European—at the same time. They make references to common future development and measures that should be taken in order to improve the EU economically and socially; 'a great step forward for Europe,'[60] 'Europe, if we can unblock it, will be better than nothing,'[61] 'Europe, it is not a foreign policy issue for me!'[62] On the contrary, in the online contents of the FN and the MPF, there are no signs of belonging to the common entity; they only emphasise the national one. They perceive the EU as a community, but only as 'Europe of Brussels'[63] or 'Europe of failure,'[64] and they are extremely reluctant to consider France part of it and suggest that '(w) e must abandon this Europe: the one which compels us to accept all the misery of the world.'[65]

Contrary to shared identity, references to common values are present in the online content of all analysed parties. This is especially true in references related to democracy, such as human rights and equality. On the websites of the left-wing parties the principles of 'citoyenneté' or of multicultural diversity might be identified. All analysed political parties perceive democracy and freedom to be the basic and key factor of the functional community. The far-right parties, especially the FN, repeatedly refer to the lack of democracy in the integration process. Members of the FN use the expression 'the totalitarian spirit of the EU'[66] or blame the EU that 'it betrayed its people and democracy.'[67]

Finally, national/European interests have been examined. In the case of the FN, there are no references to European interests. Its members only speak in terms of national identity. The authors of the texts men-

tion the need for democracy, or for social improvements for French citizens. As in the previous analysis, this extreme right party framed the EU as disadvantageous, stressing national interests and values and denouncing 'the ultraliberal orders'[68] of the European leaders and the common currency ('Euro represents a failure at all levels'[69]). Almost the same view may be identified in articles on the website of the MPF. Its members try to convince the public that discussions about the Lisbon Treaty, the Euro or EU enlargement have no positive aspects.

Contrarily, the UMP seems to portray Europe as a single entity with shared interests. The party supports the current process of integration, but claims that the defence of French identity remains a key factor, and thus emphasises the interests of French citizens; interests that may be considered common or European are sometimes present in the online contents of the party: 'The aim is obviously to reassure the markets about the financial and political strength of the EU and to avoid a domino effect in the Eurozone.'[70] Yet, France is perceived as the key player and the main goal is to restore its prominent position in European integration; 'to restore its influence throughout the EU and the world, to become a locomotive of Europe once again.'[71] Moreover, the UMP emphasises the role of the French president (the UMP leader) and his merits: 'Nicolas Sarkozy has fought to revive the European process and to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon,'[72] 'Nicolas Sarkozy has managed to make the EU a key player in resolving conflicts.'[73]

The PS focuses more on the defence of interests of European citizens in general, speaking about their social and political rights. However, the party remains sceptical of some activities and actions of the EU, and portrays Europe as still being under construction. Its members stress democracy as the most important universal value (including citizens' rights), as well as solidarity and cultural diversity. For them, the only real Europe is 'Europe which is more social-democratic.'[74] In that regard, they also support the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, they do not reject the Eurozone at all levels as the far-right political parties do, instead they criticise it from their leftist perspective since 'it opens a new page for the Eurozone, in which a real dialogue between the monetary policy (ECB) and economy (governments) should be established.'[75]

Les Verts, in contrast, almost fully embraces the current process of integration and refer to European identity often. For them, the only action that may improve the current situation of European states is based on coordination of the common project. Their interests are

strongly attached to European ones. Finally, the MoDem considers that 'the Lisbon Treaty is not useless but not sufficient; we need Europe of will and not just Europe of common territory.'[76] They emphasise the existence of 'particularly strong and independent authorities that act in the interest of Europeans.'[77] Therefore, its members articulate interests related to the European integration process and to European citizens more than the other political parties (except Les Verts): 'Europe should really learn how to be more attentive today, closer to our fellow citizens in the difficulties they are experiencing. It should further assist those affected by the crisis. From this point of view, it is urgent!'[78]



The analysis has led to several preliminary conclusions. First, I have not found a clear relationship between the level of visibility of European issues on each website and the evaluation of the European integration. Second, there is an apparent connection between the attitude of the political parties towards the EU and the third level of analysis. In other words, the hard Euro-critic parties such as the FN and the MPF do not refer to any benefits that the French electorate may gain from European integration. At the same time, there are no signs of a European dimension in their online communications and when communicating European issues, they therefore concentrate purely on national interests and identity. The parties with moderate attitude classified as soft Euro-critics, i.e. the NPA, the UMP or the PS, developed a different approach. In their online communications, they emphasise European interests and identity to some degree; however, they usually combine it with French preferences that prevail. In some cases, in particular with parties such as the PS or the NPA, a shared ideological identity was mentioned, putting the accent on workers identity or European citizens. Only the Euro-optimist parties, i.e. les Verts and the MoDem, addressed European issues using "we" or "us" when referring to Europe and expressed shared beliefs, interests and a common identity. Third, the study has showed that all political parties referred to common (European) values; especially to the democratic principles and human rights.

## Conclusion

The study endeavoured to connect the democratisation of the European integration process with the emergence of the community of communication. The aim of the text was not only to discuss the term 'European public sphere,' but to demonstrate its consequences empiri-

cally. I focused mainly on the Europeanisation of public spheres, as one of the approaches which defines the shape of the European community of communication. The object of the analysis is then narrowed and focuses on the Europeanisation of public communication of French political actors.

In the first part of the article, the existence of the European public sphere was addressed. Opinions about its existence vary substantially. It is therefore difficult to establish only one definition of such community of communication. Many authors prefer to speak about the process of Europeanisation of national public spheres which may be described as a discursive community that emerges from debating specific issues and '(a) European public sphere does not fall from heaven, does not preexist outside social and political discourse. Rather, it is being constructed through social and discursive practices creating common horizon of references and, at the same time, a transnational community of communication over issues that concerns us as European, rather than British, French or Germans.'[79]

The concept was then applied to the political communication of seven French political parties and three different European issues. Three levels of analysis were investigated: the visibility of online communication, the evaluation of the EU and the analysis of communication through different interpretative patterns. I studied how national political parties communicate about Europe, or in other words, how Europe is framed within online content available on their official websites.

In the light of the preliminary conclusions of the previous chapter, the empirical study has shown the need of national parties to communicate about various European topics no matter where the political parties are placed in the political spectrum. Political communication about Europe has proved to be viable not only during important European events as investigated in the article of van Os (2005) on the European elections in France, but also on a regular basis. Some of the parties even identify themselves with the European community, stressing common interests and values. The others have not reached yet this level of identification and in some cases will never. Nevertheless, the analysis clearly showed that the Europeanisation of the political communication of national political parties in France is still in the making and may be strengthened in the upcoming years. The analysis thus encourages to some extent the development of the Europeanisation of public spheres, a process that enables promotion of the democratisation of the European integration and creation of broad networks

between European institutions and citizens, which (networks) seem nowadays neglected and weak. Consequently, European identity will have a chance to put down roots only if political parties, as well as other actors in the public spheres of member states will not remain conceptually stuck to national patterns, but will continue to legitimise the authority of the Union.



On the other hand, much additional research is required to draw more substantiated conclusions. Firstly, a more comprehensive analysis is needed, including research in other member states in order to obtain cross-national data which may be compared. Secondly, it would be more than exigent to repeat the research in few years' time in order to see whether the process of Europeanization continues. And finally, it would be helpful to conduct the study in relation to the communication of other actors of the public sphere, such as mass media or non-governmental actors, which may broaden the research and lead to more general conclusions.

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*This work was supported by the Faculty of International Relations, University of Economics, Prague (grant number 6/2010—'European Union as Actor in International Relations: Analysis of Four Types of Actorness').*

## Notes

1 Kateřina Čmakalová and Jan M. Rolenc (forthcoming) 'Actorness and Legitimacy of the EU,' *Cooperation and Conflict.*

2 See Jürgen Habermas (2001), 'Why Europe needs a Constitution,' *New Left Review* 11, p. 5-26.

3 Marianne van de Steeg (et al) (2003), 'The EU as a Political Community: A Media Analysis of the Haider Debate in the EU,' Nashville TN: Annual Meeting of the EU Studies Associations, p. 2.

4 See Renée van Os, Renée (2008), *Communicating Europe Online: An Exploratory Investigation of the Europeanised Political Communication on theWeb*, Nijmegen: Print Partners Ipskamp; Habermas (2001) and Marianne van de Steeg (et al) (2003).

5 Renée van Os, Renée and Nicholas W. Jankowski (2005), 'A European Public Sphere: How Much of it Do We Have and How Much So We Need?' *University of Amsterdam*, Workshop organiedd by the Network of Excellence

CONNEX, p. 2.

6 Čmakalová and Rolenc (forthcoming), p. 10.

7 See Marcus Höreth (1999), 'No Way Out for the Beast? The Unsolved Legitimacy Problem of European Governance,' *Journal of European Public Policy* 6:2, pp. 249-268; Christopher Lord and Paul Magnette (2004), 'E Pluribus Unum? Creative Disagreement about Legitimacy in the EU,' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42:1, pp. 183-202.

8 The Public Sphere, World Bank, Communication for Governance and Accountability Programme at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVACC/Resources/PubSphereweb.pdf> (accessed 01 February 2013).

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10 Habermas (2001), p. 17.

11 Ibid. p. 17.

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13 Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler (1999), *The EU as a Global Actor*, London: Routledge, p. 223.

14 van de Steeg (et al) (2003), p. 2.

15 Ibid. p. 2.

16 Furio Cerutti and Sonia Lucarelli (2008), *The Search for a European Identity*, New York: Routledge, p. 29.

17 van de Steeg (et al) (2003), p. 2.

18 Habermas (2001), p. 17.

19 Ibid. p. 18.

20 Claudio Radaelli (2000), 'Whither Europeanisation? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change,' *European Integration Online Papers* (EIoP), 4:8 at: <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm>, p. 4.

21 Thomas F. Banchoff and Mitchell P. Smith (1999), *Legitimacy and the EU: The Contested Polity*. London: Routledge, p. 12, 15.

22 van de Steeg (et al) (2003), p. 2.

23 After Austrian elections in October 1999, Haider's right wing Populist Party FPO formed a coalition with the centre-right party OVP. This action led to many protests all over Europe, as a result the Presidency of the European Council of Ministers decided in favour of so the called 'bilateral sanctions' of EU member states against the Austrian government.

24 Banchoff and Smith (1999), p. 15.

25 Ibid, p. 15.

26 Ibid. p. 15.

27 Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (2009), 'Political Party Contestation over Europe in the Mass Media: Who Criticises Europe, How, and Why?' *European Political Science Review*, 1:3, p. 437.

28 In this case, the political claim would be rather verbal in its nature due to the fact that the research is done on the internet.

29 Michel Berclaz and Marco Giugni (2003), 'Political Opportunities for the

Mobilisation of the Unemployed: Insights from Switzerland,' Marburg: ECPR Conference, p. 8. This work is available at: <www.unige.ch/ses/resop/greca/reports/marburg03.pdf>.

**30** Koopmans and Statham (2009), p. 437.

**31** Berclaz and Giugni (2003), p. 8.

**32** See Ruud Koopmans (2002), 'Codebook for the Analysis of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres,' Codebook WP2: 5th Framework Programme of the European Commission available at: <http://europub.wzb.eu/Data/Codebooks%20questionnaires/D2-1-claims-codebook.pdf>.

**33** Berclaz and Giugni (2003), p. 8.

**34** Renée van Os (2005), 'Framing Europe Online: French Political Parties and the European Election of 2004,' *Information Polity*, 10:3,4, p. 57.

**35** van Os (2008), p. 27.

**36** Ubayasiri (2006), p. 8.

**37** Kirsten Foot and Steven Schneider (2005), 'Web Sphere Analysis: An Approach to Studying Online Action,' in Christine Hine (eds) (2005) *Virtual Methods: Issues in Social Research on the Internet*, Oxford: Berg Publishers, pp. 199-207.

**38** See Pippa Norris (2003), 'Preaching to the Converted: Pluralism, Participation and Party Web Sites,' *Party Politics*, 9:1, p. 21-45.

**39** van Os (2008), p. 27

**40** Thomas Poguntke (2007), 'The Europeanisation of National Party Organisations: A Concept Analysis,' *European Journal of Political Research*, 10:65, p. 748.

**41** Ibid. p. 749.

**42** See Hanspeter Kriesi (2005), 'How National Political Parties Mobilise the Political Potentials Linked to European Integration,' Unpublished manuscript, University of Zurich.

43 Koopmans and Statham (2009), p. 438.

44 Ibid. p. 452.

45 Les roumains viennent en France, notre production industrielle part en Roumanie!, at: <www.frontnational.com> (accessed 03 December 2010).

46 All French quotations in the article are translated by the author.

47 Révision du Traité de Lisbonne : l'oligarchie européenne choisit les marchés financiers contre les peuples, <www.frontnational.com> (accessed 03 December 2010).

48 Le peuple irlandais saigné et l'argent des Français dilapidé pour sauver l'euro ! at: <www.frontnational.com> (accessed 03 December 2010).

49 Le Traité de Lisbonne bientôt modifié, <http://www.pourlafrance.fr> (accessed 17 December 2010).

50 Declan Ganley (2010), 'Mister No' en Vendée, <http://www.pourlafrance.fr> (accessed 20 December 2010).

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*Kateřina Čmakalová*

# National Parliaments in the Council: Parliamentary Scrutiny Reserves

Viera Knutelská

This research compares the activity of different groups of national parliaments in European decision-making as reflected by the use of parliamentary scrutiny reservations by Member States in the Council. It aims to contribute to the comparative literature on national parliamentary scrutiny systems of European Affairs by using data that reflect everyday practices and offer new insight on level and timing of activity of national parliaments. It shows that while there are no substantial differences between the level of activity of parliaments with mandating systems and parliaments with document-based systems, those with mandating systems might have a somewhat greater chance of influencing their governments earlier in the decision-making process in the Council. However, the significance of scrutiny system is smaller than expected. This work also contributes to the growing literature on the adaptation of national parliaments from new Member States to the European decision-making and shows these parliaments have been, in the five years following the Enlargement, considerably less active than parliaments from the old Member States. This research thus supports the conclusion that formal rules of national parliamentary scrutiny are not crucial in determining the parliament's activity.

Keywords: *EU integration, parliaments, Models of Parliamentary Scrutiny, Parliamentary Scrutiny Reserves*

## Introduction

Over the past twenty years, questions over the powers of national parliaments vis-à-vis the EU have become more pointed in European de-

cision-making and better reflected in academic research. This research addresses explores the comparability of systems of national parliamentary scrutiny over EU matters. Many of these systems are already well articulated in the literature. Comparisons and categorisations have been made based on the strength of formal rules, characteristics of domestic political systems (etc), points raised in the section 'Models of Parliamentary Scrutiny' below. The approach adopted for this work looks at national parliaments from a different perspective, and deploys a single indicator; the so-called parliamentary scrutiny reserves (PSRs), which reflect some impacts of national parliaments' deliberations on presenting the national positions in the Council and is collected on the European, not national level. This approach has three main advantages: first, the use of a single European-level indicator marginalises the disadvantage of different resources existing on different national parliaments; second, it reflects daily practices and not—like most works in the comparative literature—the formal rules and; third, it offers new insights on the frequency and timing of the activities of different groups of national parliaments that would be not possible to obtain by using only national-level sources. On the other hand, this work builds on the literature on national parliaments in the sense that it follows the deparliamentarisation thesis which argues that European integration has strengthened executive branches over the legislatures and examines ways national parliaments have reacted.[1]



The work is organised as follows: the first section describes some recent developments of national parliaments' involvement in European integration and presents related literature; the second section reviews the comparative literature on national parliaments while the third section introduces the parliamentary scrutiny reservations indicator (PSRs). The final substantive section presents and analyses the data collected for this work.

## National Parliaments in European Integration

Studying the roles played by national parliaments in process of European integration is vitally important for understanding the direction of the EU since it has long been recognised as an integral part of the democratic deficit debate, which has formed an key area of scholarly research since the early 1990s.[2] Despite the attention the democratic deficit in the EU has received, there is no general agreement as to its definition or parameters though typically explanations gravitate

around concerns over strong executive powers and insufficient controls by parliamentary bodies. Therefore, a significant part of the academic work on the alleged democratic deficit tackles the position and powers of the European Parliament (EP), European elections and (non-existing) European demos.[3] In response, the EP's powers have been significantly amended; the introduction, widening and adjusting of the co-decision procedure being the most important measure.

However, the EP is not the only parliamentary body within the EU; and the question of national parliamentary involvement has also assumed prominence in the debate on the democratic deficit.[4]

There are various ways and levels on which national parliaments can enter into the decision-making process on, or in, the EU. First, they provide assent to the ratification of the primary law, i.e. the founding treaties and any treaties amending them, including accession treaties. Second, they may adopt domestic legislation related to, or based on, EU legislation, especially legal acts transposing European directives into their domestic legal systems. These tools of national parliaments have been present since the beginning of EU integration; however they have not been sufficient in preventing the deparliamentarisation claims. While parliament's role in a ratification process is the custom in all Member States, it is an opportunity that presents itself only rarely, and the ratification process is often pressured by ratification in other Member States or by the national executive. The transposition of EU legislation is a second-degree legislation process with clear limitations of independence of national legislative decision-making.

Two other ways of national parliamentary engagement in the EU-related decision-making have evolved over the years with the deepening and widening of EU integration. On the EU level, the treaties recognise the role of national parliaments' in declarations attached to the Maastricht Treaty and a protocol annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty.[5] The Treaty establishing the Constitution for the European Union as well as the Lisbon Treaty also contained Protocols on the role of national parliaments in the EU which, in its latter version (now in force following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty), contains not only an obligation for the Commission to forward all the proposed legislation directly to the national parliaments, but also strengthens the possibility to object against it by introducing the early-warning mechanism. Pending the ratification, the Commission's President Barroso introduced a mechanism of forwarding the documents to national parliaments, known as the *Barroso Mechanism*. The Treaty currently contains numerous ref-

erences to the obligation to forward various types of documents and other information to national parliaments.

Despite such developments, the greatest possibility for the national parliaments to influence EU affairs lies in the fourth way of involvement; national parliaments may influence their governments and the positions they represent at Council meetings. Here the formal (and informal) powers of national parliaments range from simple scrutinising and adopting of non-binding resolutions to the possibility to mandate the government.



This work focuses on the latter. The following section offers comparisons and classifications of national parliaments in relation to EU integration.

### *Models of Parliamentary Scrutiny*

Unlike the institutional provisions regarding the EU institutions, the models of cooperation between national parliaments and governments differ considerably among the Member States. Yet adopting such a cooperative system is among the most important institutional and decision-making adaptations incoming Member States have to undergo as a precursor to joining the EU. Most of the existing literature on national models of parliamentary scrutiny is devoted to individual Member States and largely draws on formal rules such as constitutional and other legal provisions which shape those systems, though the importance of practices and political culture is often acknowledged.[6] It is important to examine the different types of resources available and to assess the ability they have capture the unfolding realities of national parliamentary roles. Consider the main sources of information: a selection of papers and edited volumes that deal with—via comparative analysis—two or three national parliaments at a time and may therefore be said to be of a limited scope,[7] or are based on presenting specific approaches of specific parliaments without the necessary comparisons but rather through the illustration of variations.[8] Examining comparisons and categorisations of national parliaments in the EU have been made based largely on the resilience, costs and benefits of formal rules, and key characteristics of domestic political systems.[9] Such works typically offer ratings; ordering the national parliaments most often in an ordinal scale (usually containing five to six categories) from strongest to weakest parliaments.[10]

Perhaps the most widely used ranking system was developed by

Maurer and Wessels who rate national parliaments from strong to weak.[11] For instance, they contend that Denmark's is strong with a top ranking, closely followed by Finland's, Austria's, and Sweden's; there are moderately strong parliaments such as Germany's and the Netherlands', followed by France's and the UK's, and, finally, there are weak parliaments such as Ireland's, Luxembourg's, Italy's, Spain's, Portugal's and Greece's. Alternatively, Kiiver uses systems of parliamentary scrutiny and deploys five criteria to classify the systems of national parliamentary scrutiny. These are:

1. Timing—of the scrutiny (ex ante and ex post),
2. Relative Centralisation—of the scrutiny (the involvement of other committees),
3. Methods—of government influence (mandate-givers, systematic and informal scrutinisers),
4. Legal basis—for scrutiny (constitutional or lower),
5. Relative 'strength'—of national parliaments in European scrutiny.[12]

This model is then reinforced with empirical testing to determine whether national parliaments are strong or weak. Kiiver's research confirms the sentiments of Maurer and Wessels and suggests that:

1. Strong = Danish parliament,
2. Strong/Moderate = Finish, Swedish, Austrian, German parliaments,
3. Moderate = Dutch parliament (in matters of the third pillar), British and German parliaments,
4. Moderate or weak = Dutch parliament (in non-third pillar matters) and French parliament,
5. Weak = Belgian, Luxembourgish, Irish, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and Greek parliaments.

While such a ranking system does assist in providing clues as to relative strengths and weaknesses of national parliaments in dealing with EU issues, including integration, they remain incomplete. Indeed, The first categorisation to include all 27 (current) members of the EU was made by Karlas, who categorised parliaments into six groups:

1. Very weak = Greece and Cyprus,
2. Weak = Spain, Portugal, Malta, Luxembourg, Ireland, France and Belgium,
3. Mostly weak = the UK, Austria, Italy, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria,
4. Mostly strong = the Netherlands and Latvia,
5. Strong = Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Poland, Germany, Hungary and Denmark,
6. Very strong = Lithuania, Finland and Estonia.[13]



However, some scholars show that informal rules and everyday practices do not always correspond to these ratings. The most commonly acknowledged example is the parliament of the UK. According to Bogdanor, 'there is widespread agreement that the scrutiny procedures adopted by the Lords are amongst the most effective in the Community.'[14] He also notes that the scrutiny of EU matters now forms a major part of the work of the House of Lords. Similarly, Cygan notes that the European Union Committee in the House of Lords is, arguably, among the most influential within the EU thank to its systematic and responsive approach.[15] There are also examples of states, such as Austria or Slovakia, which are less influential than would be expected based on their formal ratings.[16]

A semi-official COSAC categorisation also exists, which defines two models,—that will be used in this work as basic categories for the analysis—the mandating and document-based systems.[17] The mandating system allows a parliament, as a whole or the European Affairs Committee acting on behalf of the parliament, to adopt negotiating positions more or less binding for the respective government. The government then takes and defends this position at Council meetings as the official position of the Member State. Danish parliament was the first to introduce the mandating system in 1973,[18] thus allowing its European Affairs Committee to adopt, on behalf of the Parliament as a whole, the negotiating positions politically binding on the government. Thanks to its prominence, the Danish model served as an example for other countries such as Finland, Sweden, Austria, Latvia and Slovakia.[19]

Certainly, the model takes different forms in different Member States. Consequently, the capability of the parliament in question depends on several details: at which stage of the Council decision-making process the mandating process is applied (working groups, COREP-

ER, the ministerial level), how often / on how many proposals it is used and how binding the mandate is. Beyond the formal level, the frequency and efficiency of mandating may depend on political culture and traditions, including those related to federative or unitary form of the State, relations and party links between the government and the parliament or the Committee, and even the personal characteristics of key individuals such as the chairman of the Committee. Various forms of the mandating model are used in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden.

The other model applied is document-based; the process of examining proposals does not depend on the individual Council meetings and the parliament does not, therefore, mandate its government. However, the positions of the parliament may also be binding on the government, although this is less common. This model is used in Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Luxembourg, Portugal and the UK. It is important to note that some systems have features of both models, and are therefore more difficult to categorise.

Although, as in the case of Denmark, the mandating power is often associated with strength (and influences the formal ratings), neither the formal ratings nor the literature on more informal influences and everyday practices would justify expectations of different levels of parliamentary activity of parliaments with different basic models of scrutiny systems. On the other hand, the procedural differences between mandating and document-based system may indicate that timing of national parliamentary activities and its relation to EU activities will differ between these systems.

Based on this, I hypothesise that

**H1** *The level of activity of parliaments does not differ substantially between parliaments with mandating systems and of those with document-based systems. However, the parliaments with mandating systems of parliamentary scrutiny will time their activities with regard to the timing of the Council's activities. On the other hand, in the case the parliaments with document-based systems, the timing of their activities should not be related to Council's activities.*

Although there is significantly less literature on the national parliaments of the new Member States than on the older ones, it is continually growing.[20] This literature reveals that, although the new Mem-

ber States adopted mostly systems that give strong powers to national parliaments in European affairs, the short time that has passed since accession to the EU is a factor that influences parliamentary scrutiny in a negative way. For example, Łazowski concluded that in Poland

> The parliament has definite opportunities and tools to be a conscious actor in EU affairs. The experience so far have unfortunately proved that some of its chances have been wasted by the realities of everyday parliamentary work and fairly limited expertise and understanding of EU matters among deputies and senators. Unfortunately, this makes the Polish parliament more of an accidental hero than the effective actor that it has a real chance to be.[21]



This is echoed by Győri who wrote that in Hungary

> The gap between formal-legal and actual-political powers is considerable because at present there is no political will in Hungary to have the scrutiny model work properly; it ranks very low on the government's, parliament's and the parties' list of political priorities. De jure strength vis-à-vis de facto weakness is the main characteristics of parliamentary control over EU issues in Hungary.[22]

New Member States must first find a way to adapt their constitutional orders to the reality of European integration. This may take a substantial period of time and the models adopted in these countries might yet have to undergo a few major adaptations. For example, the case of an older Member State, Germany, shows that its current scrutiny system has steadily evolved over decades.[23]

Based on this information, a second hypothesis may be articulated, that

**H2** *The parliaments of the new Member States are less active in European affairs than the parliaments of the old Member States.*

The main indicator to test these hypotheses, parliamentary scrutiny reservations, is introduced in the next section.

## Parliamentary Scrutiny Reservations

To date, scholarship on systems of national parliamentary scrutiny is based on the study of domestic rules and practices of national parliaments. However, with the growing activity of national parliaments

and the rapid improvements for access to EU documents, data from the European-level may be used to contribute to the study of national parliaments. As already mentioned, the greatest advantage of this approach is that all national parliaments can be studied simultaneously using the same indicator formulated and operationalised using the same source of data, thus allowing for easier comparison of various parliaments / systems of parliaments.

PSRs are among the tools available to parliaments in the decision-making process. While the scrutiny process in the parliament is in motion, the respective government may hold a PSR at the Council meeting. This means that it does not present its final position until the scrutiny process at the parliament is complete and tries to postpone the decision-making process in the Council until the reserve is lifted. Although—since the qualified majority has become the most common voting rule in the Council—the use of a PSR cannot place a complete brake on the legislative process,[24] the Council (traditionally) respects the PSR, even if its rules of procedure do not mention them.[25] In practice the decision-making process thus continues, and, by custom, the final adoption is delayed until all pending PSRs are lifted. On the other hand, this instrument is sometimes embodied in legal acts in various Member States, and is also used by those countries that do not have formal rules on their use.

The first parliament to introduce this measure was the British House of Commons in 1980.[26] Currently, both chambers of British parliament have this rule,[27] which constrains ministers from giving agreement in the Council or European Council to legislative proposals (not including only final approval, but also such decisions as political agreements, common positions etc.) and certain other decisions of former second and third pillars which are still subject to scrutiny in the European Scrutiny Committee or which are awaiting consideration by the House (i.e. have been recommended by the European Scrutiny Committee for consideration by the House). The minister may give agreement despite the fact that the scrutiny is still ongoing only under special circumstances and then justify such decision in front of the Committee. The alleged motivation for introducing the PSR mechanism was assurance of timely provision of documents by both government and the European Commission and of government's awareness of parliamentary deliberations.[28]

France also has rules on using PSR, introduced by a Prime Minister's circular in 1994 and amended in 1999 (in relation to the protocol on

the role of national parliaments adopted with the Amsterdam Treaty). It gives both parliamentary chambers the right to vote on a proposal before Council voting. It has also been formally introduced into Danish, Austrian and Dutch systems. Some new Member States have also introduced it, either in formal or in informal ways, including Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic Bulgaria and Malta.[29] However, it is important to note that the Council respects the reservation regardless of national rules, and the data presented in this work shows that is has also been used by states that do not have formal provisions on PSRs.[30] It is clear that PSRs are used by parliaments with both document-based and mandating systems.



Of course, the mere fact that a Member State holds a PSR, and that this reserve is recorded in the Council documents (see the section on the data), does not by itself prove that a parliament of this State has greater power over its government; it is a tool to measure the level of activity of a national parliament, meaning that the parliament deals with the issue and wants the government to behave accordingly.

The use of PSR may be influenced by various factors, especially the length and eventual deadlines for adoption of parliament's position according to the rules of the scrutiny process in the national parliament. It has also been noted that sometimes a Member State tries to give stronger weight to its position by imposing a PSR, indicating the salience of the issue for its parliament.[31] It has been claimed that while the PSR mechanisms

> works as a sword of Damodes [...] strengthening the parliament's potential in worst-case scenario of conflict between legislature and executive [... but] the logic underlying a reserve mechanism is a parliament which acts as "supportive scrutiniser" of, rather than a systematic opponent of its government.[32]

A government that would ignore the obligation to raise a PSR can be called to justify its actions in front of the national parliamentary committee.[33]

Regardless of the motivation for any specific PSR, it seems clear that a frequent use of a PSR by national government in the Council points to a parliament active in European affairs that has some influence over its government.

Based on the relevance of PSRs as an indicator of national parliaments' influence, the hypotheses can be specified as follows:

H1 *The frequency of the use of* PSRs *by Member States does not differ substantially between Member States with mandating and those with document-based system of parliamentary scrutiny. However, the Members with mandating systems of parliamentary scrutiny use the f* PSRs *more often at the earlier stages of the Council decision-making, which reflects better timing of parliament's activities to the timing of the Council's activities. On the other hand, the States with document-based systems of parliamentary scrutiny use of* PSRs *equally in all stages of the Council decision-making, as the timing of activities of their parliaments is not closely related to the timing of Council's activities.*

**H2** *The new Member States held f* PSRs *less frequently than the Old Member States.*

## Data And Analysis

In order to review the actual use of PSRs, I examined the five-year period starting with the date of the Eastern Enlargement, i.e. from May 2004 until May 2009. Data on the use of PSRs is not easily accessible. The only documents that may include data on voting or positions of the Members of the Council, and therefore on the use of PSRs, and at the same time are systematically stored and available through the register of Council documents,34 are the minutes of Council meetings. However, these contain information only on the Council proceedings on the ministerial level, which excludes the large part of the Council's internal decision-making process. On the other hand, data on its earlier stages—those of working groups and COREPER—may be acquired from other types of documents; reports form working groups to the COREPER, reports from COREPER to the Council, outcomes of proceedings of working groups, notes from Presidency etc. While these contain valuable information, they are not systematically registered as such in the Council's public register of documents. To gather the data on the use of PSRs in the given period, I used all the documents rendered by full text search of all Council documents from the given period containing the words "parliamentary scrutiny reservation," executed in November 2008 and in August 2009. Nevertheless, in reality, the PSRs are probably used more often than recorded in my data set, as not every use of a PSR must be necessarily recorded in a Council document, or even if it is, probably not all such documents are publicly available.

Some cases of PSRs were excluded from the data set. First, I exclud-

ed all the cases where the decision-making process started before May 2004, thus allowing for the possibility that some PSRs were recorded at the lower levels of the Council decision-making in earlier documents. Second, all the PSRs that were not attributable to specific Member States (i.e. the document states only that a Member State held a PSR or the document is only partially accessible and the name of the Member State holding a PSR is deleted from the publicly available version) were excluded as well.

*Parliamentary Scrutiny Reserves*

The data set includes the following information: which State raised the PSR, for what issue and at what stage of the internal Council proceedings a PSR was recorded (i.e. working group, COREPER, ministerial level). The data on Member States and their use of PSRs at different levels is summarised in the table below.

Table 1. Use of the PSRs in the period May 2004 – June 2009[35]

| | scrutiny system | *WG* | *WG-COR* | *WG-C* | *COR* | *COR-C* | *C* | *allPSR* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | M | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Denmark | M | 138 | 46 | 6 | 47 | 2 | 0 | 239 |
| Finland | M | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Greece | M | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Latvia | M | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Malta | M | 55 | 13 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 77 |
| Poland | M | 25 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 41 |
| Sweden | M | 6 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 15 |
| Slovenia | M | 6 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 11 |
| Slovakia | M | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Belgium | DB | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Bulgaria | DB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Cyprus | DB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Czech Republic | DB | 5 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 |
| Germany | DB | 9 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 16 |
| Spain | DB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| France | DB | 79 | 11 | 4 | 14 | 3 | 6 | 117 |
| Ireland | DB | 9 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 18 |
| Italy | DB | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 5 |
| Luxembourg | DB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Portugal | DB | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |

Continues on page 158 ▸

◂ Begins on page 157



| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UK | DB | 141 | 28 | 12 | 26 | 5 | 3 | 215 |
| Estonia | H | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| Hungary | H | 4 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 8 |
| Lithuania | H | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Netherlands | H | 11 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 23 |
| Romania | H | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| all | | 498 | 112 | 41 | 120 | 18 | 20 | 809 |

There have been 444 separate issues on which at least one identifiable Member States held at least one PSR, resulting in some 809 PSRs.

To test the first hypothesis, I compared the number of PSRs held at different levels by both groups of the Member States.

There are 21 Member States that have held PSRs. Nine of them have mandating systems and have held 391 PSRs, eight of them have document-based systems and have held 382 PSRs, and so no important difference can be attributed to the general nature of the systems in terms of overall use of parliamentary scrutiny reservations.

The States with mandating systems have held 371 PSRs at working levels of the Council only (e.g. working and / or COREPER), which is 37.1 per Member State. The States with document-based systems have held 333 such PSRs, which is 27.75 per Member State. However, if we take into account only those States that have held at least one PSR, the rate 41.2 PSR per Member State with mandating system, and 41.6 per Member States with document-based system.

The States with mandating systems have held only 20 PSRs that were not withdrawn before the ministerial level meeting, which is 2 per Member States. The States with document-based system have held 49 such PSRs, which is 4.08 per Member State. Again, if we take into account only those Member States that have held at least on PSR, the ratio is 2.2 ministerial-level PSRs per Member State with mandating systems and 6.1 for Member States with document-based systems.

The three States with the most PSRs are Denmark, the UK and France. In their cases there is also a difference in the number of PSRs held at the ministerial level: only 8 out of 239 Danish PSRs were held at the ministerial level (3.35%), while in the case of the UK it was 20 out of 215 (9.3%) and in the case of France it was 13 out of 117 (11.11%).

This analysis shows that there is no significant difference between the States with mandating and the states with document-based systems in the overall number of PSRs held, neither is there significant

difference in the number of PSRs held solely on working levels. However, states with mandating systems seem to hold less PSRs at ministerial levels, which indeed suggests that they time their activities more closely to the timing of the Council in hopes of influencing the process at its earlier stages. The first hypothesis is thus partially confirmed; although the relatively small number of PSR held at ministerial level by both groups suggest that the difference is no as significant as expected.



The data also shows that the activity of national parliaments is not related to the formal strength of its system; as out of the three States with most PSRs, only Denmark appears among strong parliaments in such categorisations; both France and the UK (and the next country, Malta) are rated as weaker in all available ratings.

To test the second hypothesis, I compared the number of PSRs held by older and newer Member States. The older Member States have held 658 PSRs, i.e. 43.87 per Member State, or, if we take into account only those Member States that have held at least one PSR, 50.6 PSRs per Member State. On the other hand, the newer Member States have held only 151 PSRs, i.e. 12.58 per Member State or 18.88 per Member State if only states using PSRs are counted.

This clearly supports the second hypothesis on smaller activity of national parliaments form the new Member States.

## Conclusions

The study of national parliaments' position in the process of European integration is an integral part of the democratic deficit debate and of the debate on the future of the EU that has re-emerged in relation to the currently discussed reforms to the European monetary and economic policies.

The national parliaments retain strong democratic legitimacy as directly elected organs with relatively high electoral participation (compared for example with the elections to the European parliament). The influence they individually are able to exert over their governments and their positions in the Council—one of the main European decision-making bodies—is thus highly relevant for the democratic deficit debate.

The adoption of formal rules on parliamentary involvement in formulating and coordinating national positions on EU policies is probably one of the most important institutional adjustments a state joining the EU must make. While the rules differ considerably among the

Member States, this worked aimed to contribute to the comparative debate on different systems in parliamentary scrutiny by showing that parliaments with very different formal powers may be equally active national position formation process. The data on the use of parliamentary scrutiny reservations in the Council shows no significant difference in level of activity between States with mandating and States with document-based systems. On the other hand, they suggest that States with mandating systems might have a greater chance in influencing their governments in time for the national position to play a role in the Council negotiations by being able to time their activities with greater regard for the Council's proceedings. However, the difference is smaller than expected, which further supports the findings that formal rules may play less significant role than informal practices.

The data also clearly confirmed that parliaments of the new Member States, regardless of the apparent strength of their formal systems, are less active than their more experienced counterparts from old Member States. However, as they gain experiences from their membership, we may expect also increase in their activities, and, possibly, influence.

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*The author would like to acknowledge the support of the Czech Science Foundation (grant no. 407/09/1747).*

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# EU Agenda Setting in Kosovo: A Constructivist Read

Vjosa Musliu

The EU's relationship to Kosovo is based on a post-conflict agenda, from which the development of democracy is prioritised. Yet, the EU's mission agenda in Kosovo is incoherent and there is a clear gap between what the EU's discourse propagates and what it actually implements (in terms of funding and financial allocation). This work explains the EU's agenda in Kosovo between 2005 and 2010 by looking at differences between the Union's textual mandate and the actions it has undertaken. Constructivism argues that such disparity has its own drawbacks in terms of self-perception and the self-identity of the EU. The work employs a framing methodology to operationalise the EU's discourse on its agenda towards Kosovo, revealing the rationale behind the EU's mission.

Keywords: *Agenda setting, EU, Kosovo, constructivism, post-conflict agenda, Balkans*

## Introduction

Since the cessation of hostilities between Kosovar Albanians and regular and paramilitary Serb forces, the EU has engaged in a wide assortment of programmes in the province-cum-state. The EU's Kosovo agenda includes post-conflict reconstruction, conflict resolution, state and institution building, human rights promotion and protection, enforcing the rule of law and democracy building. Maintaining such a broad agenda has, consequently, produced a certain fluidity in terms of priority setting; the timing, internal developments in Kosovo and dynamics within the EU itself, determine what is focused on in terms

of financial support and political energies.

Still, the EU's policy towards Kosovo's independence remains, theoretically, neutral since there has not been recognition 'en bloc.'[1] This reveals that the EU has no contractual relations with Kosovo as an independent country while it legally refers to Kosovo as defined by UNSC Resolution 1244.[2] Yet, statistically, the EU is the largest donor to Kosovo while the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX, deployed in 2009) is the most robust EU mission to date, with more than 2000 active police officers and judges deployed for a population of less than 2 million.



With the term, "EU mission," I refer to what is classically attributed only to EULEX. Ontologically, "EU mission" encompasses the entire set of EU structures and institutions present in Kosovo namely: the European Union Office in Kosovo, European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) and EUSR and EULEX. Epistemologically though, EULEX is not included in the framing and analysis, since its mission statement is clear and its activities are inherently directed to rule of law.

This work analyses EU actions by evaluating EU funding to Kosovo throughout the 2005-2010 period. It employs framing of the EU's documents, of the ECLO and the EUSR respectively. Evidencing the incoherence between the EU's action and the EU's discourse, the work sets forward a constructivist analysis of the agenda of the EU as an external actor and seeks to determine what such incoherence says about the EU the EU mission to Kosovo.

## Conceptual Framework

### *Framing*

According to Abolafia, framing is a fundamentally political act; it represents a boundary, a schema of interpretation. Alternative frames may have significantly different policy consequences. As a result, framing is not haphazard. The statistics, reported events, and predictions that are at the narrative core of frames do not arrive in "raw form" at policy meetings.[3] Frames are therefore vulnerable to tampering and they are reinterpreted to fit changing situations.[4]

Of the 131 documents collected from ECLO and EUSR, I follow Swaffield's approach of first, mapping ideas, concepts and relationships of the terms used in EU documents on Kosovo.[5] Second, I looked for common patterns among these "categories" to search for what in-

terpretivist scholars refer to as "common frames of reference." Finally, I identify and summarise the distinctive features of each common frame, to analyse the discourse of the EU mission and its implications on the EU agenda for Kosovo.



## *Agenda Setting*

There is a wide range of literature in "agenda" and "agenda-setting" studies. I will first present a solid definition of the terms, then focus on types of agendas and, third, the manner in which they materialise. Finally, I conceptualise the indications of agenda-setting.

Over the past two decades, scholars have approached the study of agenda-setting from a number of different perspectives. For instance, Kingdon examines agenda setting at the state level, defining the agenda as 'a list of subjects or problems to which government officials and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention to at any given time.'[6] In contrast, Schattschneider, focuses on the way conflicts within (democratic) government processes are exploited or suppressed. For him, together with Baumgartner and Jones,[7] agenda-setting involves establishing priorities within a competitive, democratic system.[8] In terms of typology, Puentes suggests that there are two types of agendas; systemic (macro agendas) which includes the widest range of potential issues that might be considered for action by the government and that might be placed on the public agenda—and institutional (micro agendas) based on issues already under consideration of decision makers, legislatures or courts.[9] For Kingdon, different drivers thrust issues onto an agenda including (*intern alia*), an event or crisis, information/evidence from evaluations and existing programmes revealing that a situation requires attention; values, beliefs or motivations', collective action of interest groups, protests, lobby, social movements, the media and political changes, etc.

The aforementioned inform on the notion of agenda on more organisational levels. In this work however, agenda is analysed based on the internal dynamics of the EU mission's agenda in Kosovo where the EU is both an actor and a factor, which raises the importance of the EU agenda locally. Alternatively, since the EU is the largest donor per capita in Kosovo, the EU's agenda is also important for the "EU in Brussels;" for decision-makers and public opinion. In this context, agenda consists of discourse, action, timing and financial resources.

Structurally, agenda is not merely a particular priority—the rule of law or state building—it represents a sequence of priorities. It is a multi-layered concept including a list of priorities, investment, sequences and timing. Indeed, the timing of a priority in this context defines its importance.

*EU Agenda Setting in Kosovo*


Figure 1. EU Agenda in Kosovo

Comparing both dimensions of this agenda, this work deploys constructivism to explain how the inconsistencies between speech act priorities reflect on the character of the EU's Kosovo mission.

*Inconsistency*

Defining "policy coherence" and "consistency" is difficult; there is no accepted universal definition of this subject. Consider a modest sampling of some of the leading authors in the literature. Gebhard suggests that 'despite its over-use in the literature and in political debate, the notion of coherence is among the most frequently misinterpreted and misused concepts in EU foreign policy.' Alternatively, Nuttall argues that coherence 'may well have a broader signification' than consistency. Similarly, Hoebink states that 'coherence is synonymous with consistency.' Krenzler and Schneider similarly define consistency 'as coordinated, coherent behaviour (...).'[10] It is important to note that, most often, authors use different terms (incoherence, inconsistence, ambiguity, discrepancy), as synonyms.

A large part of the literature looks at inconsistencies within the Common Foreign and Security Policy CFSP; since a key feature of the new European identity is based on "coherence" between the Member States. The Single European Act (SEA) emphasised the responsibility of the EU to speak with one voice and to act with consistency and soli-

darity. The Maastricht Treaty—with the creation of the CFSP and the position of the High Representative—aimed to address some of the EU's coherence problems in its external affairs.[11]



The EU still struggles with problems of consistency and there remains doubt over its abilities to be coherent. Sjursen and Nuttall note that such problems may be categorised as either vertical or horizontal: vertical implies that the foreign and security policies of individual Member States are out-of-sync with EU policies; horizontal is linked to the EU's involvement in various external activities that are part of different pillars.[12] In a slight deviation from Nutall and Sjursen, I refer to differences between the EU's discourse and actions. In practical terms, incoherence refers to the inner dynamics of the EU's mission agenda in Kosovo; derived when comparing the EU's allocation of funds and their implementation, and its discourse of how it sees itself. Coherence between action and discourse would indicate that they both work to maximise the utility of the agenda. As discussed below, incoherence reveals problems of agenda setting and ambiguities over the role of the EU in Kosovo.

Such internal incoherence may be explained in various ways. First, actors often have unclear goals, a point illustrated by Zaharidis who explains that because of time constraints and ambiguities decisions are made, and may be facilitated, by opaqueness.[13] Sharkansky on the other hand, maintains that the vagueness of objectives is a good way of coping with complex and conflicting political demands. For example, during the Yugoslav wars in the early 1990s, few national governments, with the exceptions of Germany and Greece, actually had a strong opinion about what to do. Second, according to Richardson when it comes to EU policies, jurisdictional boundaries are blurred, particularly in areas such as trade and foreign policy; where the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament share responsibilities. The result is turf battles and interagency conflict, making the process highly unstable[14].

## Constructivism

To better understand the EU and its internal incoherence, constructivism is deployed. Yet, there is an unfolding debate about what constructivism exactly is, though its importance in the study of IR and foreign policy has increased because it touches upon (what used to be) neglected dimensions such as culture, identity and language in the study of IR,

after all, as Hynek and Teti argue, 'constructivism provides the identity variable.'

The confusion over the definition of constructivism is both in the meta-theory structure as well as in the inside constructivist ontological debate. On one hand, for positivists, constructivism is one facet of sociological theories which explains culture and for many post-structuralists, constructivism is a general rubric in which many unrelated issues fit.



On the other hand, different constructivists give different explanations, definitions and typologies on constructivism. One, key definition, is promoted by Ruggie who explains three types of constructivism: neo-classical constructivism—language oriented but committed to social sciences, with its main authors like Onuf, Kratochwil, Adler, Finnemore (etc); post-modernist constructivism—which rejects the idea of social sciences (with main authors like Nietzche, Foucault, Derrida) and is anti-foundationalists, denying that discourses have a reality behind them; naturalistic constructivism—using Bhaskar's scientific realism to defend 'deep realism' which might legitimise 'scientific approaches.'[15]

Owing to this schizophrenic typology discourse on constructivism, this work seeks a reconciliation among three representative constructivist scholars, Wendt, Onuf and Kratochwil. By reconciliation I refer to the creation of a symbiosis of the three strands of constructivism which are not necessarily linked to one another. Yet, they address concepts by explaining the context and the processes mentioned in the work. This symbiosis provides an analytical definition of constructivism with Wendt's constructivism focused on identity; Kratochwil's constructivism focused on norms; and Onuf's constructivism focused on rules. Overall, constructivism in this work is treated not solely as a theoretical pursuit *strictu sensu*; it is a way of thinking, observing and analysing the social reality.

Wendt, Kratochwil and Onuf represent different branches of constructivist thought which, from time to time, tend to be colliding with one another on core ontological issues (re: the primacy of structure). Despite differences, "thick" or "thin," "critical" or "conventional," "liberal" or "realist," constructivists of all tendencies share at least two core premises. First, the focus on social facts as parts of the world that are treated as if they were real by social agents.[16] Second, the paradigmatic question of a constructivist work: how are social facts socially constructed and how do they affect politics? Similarly, Wendt, Onuf

and Kratochwil, retain the constructed "reality" as a reference point. Wendt talks about reality of international politics, Kratochwil focuses on everyday reality while Onuf's work is informed by reality as raw material—its ontological and conceptual foundations. In her renowned post structuralist critique of Wendt, Onuf and Kratochwil, Zehfuss contends that in contradiction with the assumption that the world is socially constructed, many constructivists claim a reality as a starting point, thus partaking in the 'politics of reality' naming them as acts of essentialisation (essentialisation of reality, identity, intersubjectivity, etc). In Zehfuss' words, it is clear that observation is interpretation: 'social reality is a web of intersubjective meanings, and meanings cannot be studied in any "objective" way.'[17]

Wendt has tried to bridge a gap between the realist liberal and rationalist-reflectivist debates drawn from structurationist and symbolic interactionist sociology, on behalf of the liberal claim that international institutions can transform state identities and interests.[18] Accordingly, constructivism might contribute significantly and thereby perhaps itself be enriched with liberal insights about learning and cognition which it has neglected. Wendt argues that actors acquire identities, 'relatively stable, role specific understandings and expectations about self—by participating in such collective meanings. Identities are inherently rational: Identity, with its appropriate attachments of psychological reality, is always identity within a specific, socially constructed world.'[19]

Onuf's rule-oriented constructivism on the other hand, is more of a way of studying social relations as systems of concepts and propositions. It remains—as much as possible—on the level of ontology. Independently, it offers no specific theory on the study of IR or foreign policy. It helps make sense of what is learnt in studying IR by sorting material into categories: agents, structures, institutions, type of rules.[20] For Onuf (and constructivists of similar dispositions), language has performative capacities. In other words speaking is doing. As communication is social act, so is knowledge. This is the bridge that constructivists offer between ontology and epistemology.

In his explanation on constructivism, Kratochwil argues that 'the emergence of a moral point of view can advance us towards a solution.'[21] For him, norms provide the 'basis of a reasoning process in which some violations of the rules are classified as excusable, whilst others are not.' Whether an action can obtain support depends on the definition of the situation, on what it is seen as an instance of. Therefore, he con-

tinues, the justification given for a particular course of action provides an important indication for its appraisal.[22] When it comes to politics, a general point in constructivism is that interests and derived policies are shaped within a particular framework of meaning and are not exogenously given.[23]



Building on the symbiosis of such three layered constructivism, the EU can be seen as an entity on its way to forming and shaping its collective identity which is socially and institutionally created. It sees itself operating based on certain norms and rules (such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law) and tries to establish this paradigm through its discourse of putting these values at the forefront. According to Larsen, what the EU performs outside of the EU, displays the EU's constructed role as an international actor, the values it is based on: the 'EU's staunch discourse on values and norms for rule of law and democracy building mirror the same principles and values the EU was built upon at its very foundation—values which it wants to see being transposed outside of its borders.'[24]

Speaking on the relationship between discourse and identity, another well-known constructivist, Aggestem, argues that the conception of one's identity leads to the conception of the roles too. He explains how cultural norms and values are translated into verbal statements about expected foreign policy behaviour adding that foreign policy is essentially interconnected with the identity.

## Defining Action

As explained, action denotes the materialisation of the EU's mission; the allocation of funds and material implementation of financial resources in different sectors. In order to analyse the logic of EU funding, a periodisation (in political terms) of funds is necessary, which is before and after the declaration of independence, (2005-2008) and (2008-2010). Prior to embarking on such an analysis, it is essential to provide an overview of EU activities in the pre-2005 period to better understand the trajectory of the EU's philosophy in engaging with Kosovo.

### *EU Funding, 1999-2007*

In the aftermath of Operation Allied Force (1999), the EU was under UNMIK Pillar IV—EAR38—which ran reconstruction and economic development projects in Kosovo. The "Economic and Social Devel-

opment" component included enterprise development (privatisation), rural economy and vocational training. Moravcsik and Baldwin explain that the EU's activism at that time cannot be explained within a purely rationalist theoretical framework.[25] A core explanation for this was the pressure to respond quickly to the crisis and set the region to normalisation. The following table gives an overview of EU funding (1999-2007).



| Sector | Amount in million € |
|---|---|
| Democratic Stabilisation | 44 |
| Minority rights and returns | 33 |
| Civil society and media | 11 |
| Good governance and institution building | 176 |
| Justice, police and border management | 45 |
| Public administration reform | 131 |
| Economic and Social development | 695 |
| Economic strategy and enterprise development | 94 |
| Rural economy | 68 |
| Energy | 401 |
| Environment | 65 |
| Vocational training | 16 |
| Transport | 52 |
| TOTAL | 915 |

Table 2. EU funds as allocated per sector during 1999-2007, Personal Elaboration[26]

This information indicates that the EU's investment for economic reconstruction and development is almost five times higher in comparison to other criteria falling under rule of law or democracy building. Kosovo is the poorest country in Europe with an unemployment rate of between 40%-49%.[27] Energy on the other hand, remains a pertinent problem for Kosovo due to insufficient production and mismanagement.

### *IPA Funding, Post-2007*

In 2007, Kosovo became eligible for the IPA mechanism with €100 million per year in funding was given to fulfil the European Integration agenda; that is, political requirements, socio-economic requirements and European standards. Below, the analysis of IPA funds (2007-2010)

is presented to see how they were allocated, prioritised and implemented.[28]



| Year | Amount in million |
|---|---|
| 2007 | 68.3 |
| 2008 | 184.7 |
| 2009 | 106.1 |
| 2010 | 70.0 |
| TOTAL | 429.1 |

Table 3. IPA Funds Allocated for Kosovo (2007-2010)

In 2007, IPA projects implemented in Kosovo were primarily political in nature with the main sources allocated to build Kosovo's institutional capacities, strengthening the rule of law, facilitate returnees and cultural heritage, local governance and decentralisation.[29] Also, projects on 'developing an economic environment for all Kosovo's communities,' reconstruction of roads and bridges were implemented. In 2008, the year with the greatest budget from the IPA for Kosovo, projects on strengthening the rule of law, rehabilitation of cultural heritage, support for Agency for European Integration, support for media and civil society, and preparation for agricultural and rural development policy were the main projects implemented. Similarly, 2009's projects were also implemented along political lines, namely in support for the rule of law, human resources, cultural heritage, returnees (etc). Friis and Murphy explain that the EU's self-understanding as an organisation which has peace and democracy as its defining values was critical too in determining the policy choices made.[30] "Crisis management and stability" is the paradigmatic concept within which the EU mission in Kosovo has been operated.

## Defining Discourse

Framing is used to explain the EU's discourse in Kosovo, the logic behind the language used and its implications in the political context. The EU has embarked on a crisis management mission for which issues of "stability" and "security" represent the paradigmatic framework of the discourse. Before proceeding, it is important to explain what security and stability mean for the EU and how is that translated in the context of Kosovo.

First, security for the Western Balkans (in general) and Kosovo (in

particular) is largely seen under the crisis management policy of the EU.[31] In the correspondence of reports between the UNSC and EULEX (2008-2009) on the situation in Kosovo, security and stability (interchangeably used) are used to describe the "calm situation" and non-ethnically driven frictions between local Serbs and Albanians.[32] From a broader paradigm of the EU's concept of dealing with a post conflict society, the issue of rule of law—customs, judiciary and the police—are vital pillars of state and societal security.

The correspondence and newsletters of the EU Liaison Office to Kosovo (ECLO) and speeches of the EUSR in Kosovo between 2005-2010 have been reviewed for analysis. What is traced in these texts are: 1) to what extent numerically the terms "economic development" and "rule of law" where mentioned. The higher the number of one category mentioned indicates the importance the EU attaches rhetorically; 2) what is the context and the framing of these two categories?

What was revealed is that while the EU, financially, invests six times more to "Economic and Social Development," the discourse (numerically speaking), is three to four times more stressed for rule of law and a multi-ethnic society.

Table 2. Discourse Analysis from ECLO newsletters and EUSR speeches.

| Year | Democracy | Rule of law | Economic Development | Decentralisation | Minorities |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | 27 | 53 | 41 | 8 | 41 |
| 2009 | 8 | 46 | 29 | 7 | 36 |
| 200833 | 11 | 32 | 40 | 4 | 46 |
| 2007 | 1 | 5 | 4 | | 2 |
| 2006 | 5 | 10 | 6 | 6 | |
| 2005 | 7 | 7 | 12 | 3 | 7 |
| TOTAL | 59 | 153 | 132 | 28 | 132 |

For framing, terms related to "economic development" (economic prosperity, economic recovery) are mostly mentioned towards the end of a text/speech. These terms are usually mentioned not as the main variable in a sentence, rather they serve as an adjacent to other variables such as 'the strengthening of rule of law will certainly improve the stability and will provide grounds for economic development.'

Further, the mentioning of the term "economic development" is

rarely a figure speech or an analysis as with the "rule of law" or "minorities." "Economic development," when mentioned, is most often used to indicate a concrete/practical project invested in by the EU. It is interesting to note that in the majority of such cases the epicentre of the speech is not at the financed project for economic development as such; it is explained as setting forward the rationale of multi-ethnicity and reconciliation. One of the catch phrases most often found is "developing economy for all communities." This practice is not solely used with the "economic development" criteria though. Projects on rural development, short film documentary, Dokufest, or the funding for the Jazz and Blues festival are framed in a way that these developments will help to bring all communities together.



Constructivist scholars argue that political ideas and perceptions are assumed to be part of the cognitive structures that give meaning to the material world.[34] The key elements mentioned denoting these documents—thus the three cognitive structures of the EU mission in Kosovo are 1) minorities; 2) the rule of law; and 3) reconciliation. Having these three frames in the broader paradigm of security and stability for the country and therefore, stability for the region, there is a reassertion of the EU's role conception of a mechanism strengthening this norm. Wendt argues that the process of EU integration is leading towards a "cognitive" security system in which states identify positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived responsibility of all.

## Evaluation

Viewing the EU as an external actor, Holsti proposes looking at role theory through which he explores the link between social context and foreign policy. First, Holsti distinguishes between role expectation; what the EU is expected or predicted to deliver. Here the focus is on the receiving subject, the local reality in Kosovo. Taken to the post-conflict setting, evidence of EU action—focused on economic recovery and development—finds ground for delivering the threshold for further stages of development in a war torn setting.

Second, Holsti argues on role conception, which is the normative expectation on which the EU is seen to operate and function. The role conception has, as its focus, the EU itself and the way the EU sees what it is bound to. The EU's discourse sets forward the idea of a mechanism whose role is to bring order in terms of the rule of law, democracy promotion and post-conflict reconciliation. The assertion of the

EU's discourse as a watchdog of the rule of law and democracy discourse—shadowing the vast material investment in other areas such as economic development—is an indication of what the EU wants to be perceived and seen on the ground.



Third, in exploring the link between social context and foreign policy, Holsti talks on the role performance which he defines as action. As explained, action is understood as the concrete materialisation of the EU's attention and funds, which is the focus on economic development and reconstruction.[35]

It is important to note that the fluidity of the term "action" can be looked at also as a rhetoric/discourse/'action voice.' It is equally important to distinguish whether action or discourse matters for the EU more. If sticking with Onuf's argumentation on language and discourse according to which 'speaking is doing,' the EU in Kosovo is materialising what Holsti denotes the 'role conception' of a rule of law and democracy actor. However, what Onuf falls short of explaining, is if 'speaking is doing' what would 'actual action' indicate for the EU as an external actor!?

According to Jorgensen, the deployment and the politics of the CFSP have produced a significant ontological dimension for the EU as an external actor. The problems with the vertical and horizontal inconsistency in terms of the CFSP have had the identity question of "who we are." Looking at the EU mission in Kosovo, it can be argued that the identity issue is uncertain both ontologically and epistemologically. From a constructivist perspective, Diez agreed that the political discourse on normative power is an essential dimension of the EU's strategy to assert its power on the international scene. For him, this strategy leads to a specific identity building process defining both the EU's self and its relations with "others."[36]

From this perspective, Larsen argues that discourse is a constitutive element of social life, since reality always needs to be discursively interpreted to be meaningful. If there is a search for an "underlying reality" beneath competing discourses, it rather has to be located within discourse itself: more "sedimented" discourses,[37] or "governing statements,"[38] may accommodate the clash of competing discursive formations at a lower level of abstraction.[39] This philosophical constructivist position, then, amounts to a political theory of discourses as slowly, yet constantly, shifting structures that sustain common knowledge claims, world views, institutions and values in a society.

However, Larsen warns that the reduction of most aspects of social

reality and politics to discourse may stretch the notion too far. Consequently, employing the compromise of Schmidt gives more insights on the context. According to Schmidt, the variant of political discourse analysis is hesitant about overarching effects of discourses taken in isolation, or sceptical that politics is 'ideas all the way down.'[40] This assumes that discourses have some impact in terms of framing perception, legitimising actions and, most importantly, mediating processes of change, but that his impact is highly dependent on structural context. Discourse is, therefore, only to be thought of as a theoretical addition, in particular to other "institutionalisms" in political science.[41]



## Conclusion

EU funding for economic development versus the rule of law throughout (1999-2007) sit at a ratio of 695:220. This is remarkable evidence not to have been "felt," "perceived" or "acknowledged" and, as such, proclaimed as an investment for the development concept the EU has for Kosovo. At the popular [mass] level, the EU has not made enough "publicity" of its involvement in economic development. As a result, the EU is often criticised for not "doing enough" to support economic alleviation. Alternatively, similar to its practice at the popular [mass] level, the EU is "reluctant" to reveal (not publicise) its role and support on economic achievements not only for discourse analysis but also in more targeted settings such as interviews and public debates. At best, the discourse would pinpoint examples of economic support for human rights projects, minority issues and returnees and reintegration; lending much to the political agenda of these projects.

It can be argued that, by implication (of the context), the EU mission is more focused on rule of law and democracy building because in the lens of the EU's foreign policy, the rule of law and democracy building come before economic development in the context of Kosovo. The norms (Kratochwil) and rules (Onuf)—based on which of the EU functions—attribute the latter with a strong commitment to rule of law and democratic principles. In addition, the speech acts and the EU discourse not only cements this attribution but from time to time, it tends to overshadow its investment and support in other areas which are not part of the package of rules and norms the EU sees itself acting upon. This "dislodgment of target" can be looked at as shuttle movements in search of an established identity as an international actor.

Constructivism lends significant weight to social or subjective forc-

es not just to "objective" or material. In this respect, constructivist theoreticians, while focusing on the features already elaborated, give a rather marginalised depiction of the role of "law" in pursuing a valid analysis in foreign policy. They pose questions, what is the normative constitution in new political regimes? What is the rule of law in societies undergoing massive political changes? The argument for not taking the role of "law" into account, according to constructivists, is that in most transition countries justice and rule of law are unsettled; they are in the making. Even in cases where the "making of" is complete, there is a large gap between the law as written and as perceived. Consequently, what matters in establishing the rule of law is legal culture, not abstract universal ideas of justice.

The first awkward constructivist component related to the EU's mission in Kosovo is the idea of presence and being as power. According to Derrida's argument on the valorisation of power, the valorisation of the real over the represented power is a feature of Western thought which understands being as presence. If, for simplification reasons, the EU would be set in the Western thought, it seems that the valorisation of the represented power over the real one appears more important for the EU mission in Kosovo. Yet, Derrida also implies that portrayal of something as real and indeed the assertion of knowledge about what reality is have immense political power.

The second pitfall is the risk of entrapment in spoken word. Pettman argues that as talking species we prioritise speech, 'but in doing so we tend to neglect what else is going on. We neglect the silent languages that are revealing of context and milieu.'[42] Therefore, failing to understand the speech we hear in its own political cultural terms, which may well be very different from our own.

The discourse-action inconsistency evidenced with EU's perceived and actual role indicates the trajectory of identity formation of the EU as an international actor and the searching for positioning. According to Wendt, what matters is whether and how far social identities involve and identification with the fate of the other. Politics is inextricably linked to what it is to be, that is interpreting oneself and one's surroundings.

When reflecting on the ethical dimension of EU external affairs, an obvious approach would be to analyse the EU's rhetoric and self-image as an 'ethical power' and to contrast it with the EU's concrete actions and real capabilities. Identifying a serious gap between the rhetoric and action, ambition and implementation, expectation and capabil-

ity, would shed light on the EU's conceptual agenda for its mission in Kosovo. According to Mayer, messages sent by the EU are filtered by genuine and/or deliberate and self-interested 'hearing problems.' By this incoherence, not only does the EU send unclear messages, non-Europeans are often reluctant to listen. Additionally, issues are "lost in translation" and sometimes players twist the message to suit their own interests.



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## Notes

1 22/27 EU countries recognise Kosovo's independence; Spain, Greece, Romania, Cyprus and Slovakia do not.
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3 William A. Gamson, *Talking Politics,* 67.
4 Erving Goffman, quoted in Ibid, p. 67.
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6 J. W. Kingdon (1995), *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies,* 2nd edition, NY: HarperCollins.
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9 Cristina Puentes (2007), 'Policy Analysis and Decision Making,' Paper presented at Bridgetown, Barbados, 15-17 October 2007.
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13 Nikolaidis Zaharidis (2007), 'Ambiguity and Choice in European Public Policy,' Paper presented at the biannual meeting of the European Union Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, 17-19 May 2007.
14 Jeremy Richardson (2007), 'Not a Bad Pillar of Democracy After All?' pp. 272-279.

15 Nik Hynek and Andrea Teti (2010), 'Saving Identity from Postmodernism? The Normalisation of Constructivism in International Relations,' *Contemporary Political Theory,* 9, p. 28.
16 Vincent Pouliot (2004), 'The Essence of Constructivism,' *Journal of International Relations and Development,* 7, p. 319.
17 Maja Zehfuss (2002), *Constructivism in International Relation,* Cambridge UP.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Gonzalo P. Quero (2001), 'Thus Spoke Franco: The Place of History in the Making of Foreign Policy,' in Vendulka Kubalkova (ed) (2001), *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World,* (M. E. Sharpe: 2001), p. 77.
21 Maja Zehfuss (2002), *Constructivism in International Relations,* Cambridge UP.
22 Ibid. Zehfuss notes that '(r)ules and norms are not simply the distillation of individual utility calculations but rather antecedent conditions for strategies and for the specification of criteria of rationality. Norms [...] establish certain games and enable the players to pursue their goals within them; they also establish inter-subjective meanings that allow the actors to direct their actions towards each other, communicate with each other, appraise the quality of their actions, criticize claims and justify choices.'
23 Henrik Larsen (1999), *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis,* Taylor and Francis: New York, p. 81.
24 Ibid, p. 81.
25 Follesdal Andreas and Simon Hix (2006), 'Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: a Response to Majone and Moravcsik,' *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 44, p. 34.
26 Data gathered from European Agency for Reconstruction Annual Report 2007.
27 See Bekim Grainca (2012), 'Unemployment and Employment Services: A Comparison with other Post-Socialist Countries,' *Journal of Economy and its Applications,* 2:1, p. 28.
28 The IPA's five components include: 1. support for transition and institution-building; 2. cross-border cooperation; 3. regional development; 4. human resource s development; and 5. rural development.
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41 Ibid, p. 111.
42 Kubalkova (2001), p. 98.

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# Book Reviews

Nicole Detraz, Polity Press, 2012, ISBN: 9780745651170

# International Security and Gender

Review by Kateřina Krulišová

More information on the reviwed book is avaiable at **cejiss.org**

In International Security and Gender, Detraz explores the role of socially constructed and expected codes of behaviour attached to both sexes in relation to international security's most pressing issues. The work aims to incorporate gender as a concept into a traditionally masculine security studies discipline and thus broaden the sphere of analysis. However neutral the title may seem at the first glance, the applied gender lenses are clearly feminist and concerned mainly with women and their respective roles in various security landscapes, which include: militarisation and militarism, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, terrorism, human security and the environment. Each chapter is clearly structured, as it first introduces the chapter thematic comprehensively—almost like a textbook of international security—analysing threats and vulnerabilities, which may be appreciated mainly by students and scholars connected to IR and other branches of social sciences. Then, issues are analysed from gendered lenses in several of its aspects with the aim of showing how different the security threat under consideration may appear when focused on gender. Finally, each chapter is concluded with a view of the emancipatory potential in the field; again clearly studied from a feminist perspective.

Detraz's understanding of gender, introduced at the beginning of the work, adopts a modern feminist perspective and she aims to explore gender roles in contemporary politics while highlighting the problem of inequality and existing patriarchal system(s) which privilege masculinity and are prevalent in security landscapes around the world. Not only does Detraz argue that different security situations (and interpretations) exist for women and men and that the impacts of war—a phenomenon central to security studies—are acutely gendered, at each stage. Women are believed to be more vulnerable during a conflict, as they tend to be marginalised and disempowered. From that

perspective, the book offers fresh insights into issues of security, as these have been traditionally studied in academia rather from a holistic point of view, i.e. statist or structuralist focus. Importantly, Detraz does not approach security realities simplistically, seeing women as lacking agency. On the contrary, she acknowledges the differences in positions of women in private and, mainly, political life, ranging from victims of rape in war, military prostitutes and refugees to women as political and/or military leaders, activists, soldiers, revolutionaries or terrorists.



The second chapter, deals with gendered militarisation and militarism recognises that this 'area' is traditionally reserved for males and challenges patriarchal security dominance. Although, recently, many women joined and serve in military units, such is not entirely positive for Detraz, as the legacy of resolving conflicts by legitimised violence is critically challenged by many feminists. Also, the role of women in the military remains limited. Hegemonic masculinity is one of the central concepts of militaries and is successfully reinforced and effectively legitimised by every single violent conflict. Since in a majority of states, militaries are portrayed as protectors; militarised and aggressive men protect the innocents. When women join militaries, as active members, who remains to be protected? The example of PFC Jessica Lynch demonstrates the masculine ruled mentality, where a female soldier injured during enemy attack and subsequently rescued was firstly portrayed as real G.I. Jane who fought for her country under extreme duress. However, after finding out that she only prayed under fire, the picture of woman in peril was in place, a beautiful blonde female who still needed to be rescued from the hands of evil Iraqis by brave American male soldiers. Using this example, Detraz shows how social roles traditionally ascribed to females are still entrenched, and how mental structures are built around these. Importantly, it is not only the militaries, but also terrorist organisations, drug cartels and mafia that are highly masculine and, similarly to states, are not only abusing women to advance some of their criminal activities in the name of the protection of females—as bin Laden often did—but also use the feminisation of their enemy in order to express dominance. This dominance is, however, real for many civilian victims of militarisation, be it women suffering war rape, forced or 'choosing' to become military prostitutes, or beaten by their husbands returning from war.

Militarised masculinity is again highlighted in the next chapter dealing with peacekeeping and peace building, where othering is again ac-

tive and peacekeepers are needed in order to protect the primitive and vulnerable, women. However, Detraz correctly points to many cases of peacekeepers harming the local population they were meant to defend, highlighting sexual misconducts during the missions and their consequences for women, as rise in prostitution, the spread of AIDS and the bartering of sex for food and other goods. It is suggested that the greater participation of women in peacekeeping would not only work as some kind of control over male peacekeepers, but would include cooperation from a greater proportion of the population and raise the probability for a more lasting peace. Gendered peacekeeping and peace building is thus desirable, however often gendered issues are ignored.

The beautiful souls and just warriors concept is also applied on the analysis of terrorism, where mainstream understandings of who is a terrorist is, above all, centred around males. In the terrorist narrative women who become terrorists are believed to have some special or added advantage, such as revenge-lust over a dead husband or son. Faith in a particular cause as a motivation is not enough for women, although for male terrorists is perfectly acceptable. Once again, females are the "protected" and formed one of the main pillars of thought used to justify the invasion of Afghanistan; to protect Afghan women from oppression of the Taliban. Interestingly, the US did not seem so gender sensitive prior to 9/11.

The last two chapters deal with human security and the environment. These analyse wide subjects and are analytically limited to emphasising the importance of (potentially) greater involvement of women, which are both disproportionately affected by negative phenomena related to such insecurities and omitted from decision-making procedures. The all-encompassing topic of human security is convincingly criticised and revised, similarly to the challenge posed by maintaining a sacredness of science as a male field of study.

Detraz selected difficult elements of security studies and analysed them through gender lenses in an understandable, clear, convincing and argumentative manner. The book offers insights into feminist security studies, and makes readers more critical towards the so-called 'Holy Grail' of state security and its measures through feminist perspectives. This is an essential read for every IR and feminist scholar and student seeking deeper understandings of current events in the field and a valuable source for further research.

Charlie Beckett & James Ball, Polity Press, 2012, ISBN: 9780745657956

# WikiLeaks: News in the Networked Era

Review by Johanna Granville

University of Debrecen, Hungary

What is new about the Wikileaks phenomenon and why is it important? Is Wikileaks a form of journalism? What were the effects of Wikileaks' revelations? How has Wikileaks impacted the future of the internet? Charlie Beckett and James Ball pose these, and other, questions in their latest work. The book is organised into four chapters and an epilogue. Chapter one contains a brief historical sketch and demonstrates the ways in which Wikileaks challenges not only governments, but both mainstream and alternative journalism as well. WikiLeaks is a non-profit organisation that accepts anonymous submissions of previously secret material and publishes them on its internet site. Registered on 04 October 2006, Wikileaks was managed by a small team of pro-transparency hackers, including Julian Assange and a few German members of the so-called Chaos Computer Club (p. 18). As Beckett and Ball point out, Wikileaks' founders pioneered in the development of information security, setting up hidden open-source encryption standards. 'These enable Wikileaks, and its sources to hold and disseminate information unreadable by anyone else in the world, including security services' (p. 20). Wikileaks challenges the role of traditional media in the digital age. Unlike mainstream media, Wikileaks is not constrained by commercial, technical, legal, and cultural boundaries (p. 9). It has been called the world's "first" stateless media organisation (p. 5). Beckett and Ball opine that Wikileaks itself is 'not a revolutionary idea.' Rather, it can be seen as a 'radical hybrid' combining 'hacktavism' with some of the traits of more traditional investigative journalism (p. 3). At a time when mainstream media outlets have increasingly failed to check abuses of power, many argue that a network like Wikileaks is sorely needed. As the authors put it, 'when the infrastructure which supports journalism is owned entirely by companies, which at their start are free of a journalistic mission, the consequences are troubling and potentially

threatening for the operation of a free press' (p. ix). On the other hand, Wikileaks was irresponsible in releasing top-secret cables containing the names of undercover informers, thus jeopardising their lives.



The authors also reveal a paradox, namely that while Wikileaks and Assange repeatedly condemn governments for their lack of transparency, the Wikileaks organisation itself is very secret and non-transparent. In chapter two, the authors describe three of Wikileaks' biggest "scoops" in 2010: the Afghan war logs (including the "Collateral Murder" video), the Iraq war logs, and the American Embassy cable releases. These were difficult to leak due to the sheer volume of documents. Assange and others knew that simply leaking so many documents would have very little impact on international public opinion. Earlier leaks had involved the publication of just one secret report. In 2004, for example, Wikileaks leaked a report about the President of Kenya's extensive laundering of public money to buy property in the UK, New York, South Africa, and Australia. Thus, in 2010, Wikileaks signed contracts with mainstream papers like the Guardian, New York Times, Der Spiegel, and El Pais for them to interpret the documents and write articles providing context. The leaks had widespread effects. Arguably, the WikiLeaks stories have changed the way many people think about how the world is run. Some—including Assange—are convinced the publication of the report of the Kenyan leadership's corruption sparked the civil unrest in Kenya during the December 2007 elections. Former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton bitterly condemned Wikileaks' actions, not for its use of the internet, but for its handling of 'stolen government property' (p. 100). Pro-government hackers managed to take Wikileaks offline briefly (p. 64). US Senator Joe Lieberman called on enterprises like Amazon.com to ban Wikileaks from using their servers (p. 64). Indeed, the widespread effects of the leaks have made governments increasingly defensive about their lack of transparency.

But how has Wikileaks influenced the future of the internet? In chapter three Beckett and Ball argue that Wikileaks' disclosures—in jeopardising lives and endangering sensitive diplomatic operations—might 'create a freedom-of-expression backlash,' thus helping pro-government, security-minded individuals who advocate limiting the openness of the internet. This book by Beckett and Ball—one of the first to analyse Wikileaks with respect to the evolution of contemporary journalism—would be an excellent text to assign in courses on journalism. Other books look more closely at the interpersonal tensions within the organisation, Bradley Manning and the origins of the

Afghan war leaks, the impact of the leaks on American foreign policy, and the role and personality of Julian Assange. See, for example, Daniel Domscheit-Berg's Inside WikiLeaks: My Time with Julian Assange at the World's Most Dangerous Website (2011); Denver Nicks' Private: Bradley Manning, WikiLeaks, and the Biggest Exposure of Official Secrets in American History (2012); Alexander Star's and Bill Keller's Open Secrets: WikiLeaks, War, and American Diplomacy (2011); and David Leigh's and Luke Harding's WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange's War on Secrecy (2011).



Beckett's and Ball's work surely belongs on the growing list of literature that examines the changes to media and international relations in the post-September 11th world. The work comes highly recommended, since it is full of insight, is easy to navigate and makes compelling arguments.

Roger Scully & Richard Wyn Jone, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010,
ISBN: 9780230231788

# Europe, Regions and European Regionalism

University of Victoria

Review by Tatiana Shaban

Despite that current governance in the EU has been characterised as "multi-levelled," the nation-state remains the dominant actor in terms of major decision-making. Newhouse's statement that 'whether within or across national borders, (regionalism) is Europe's current and future dynamic,' remains relevant and challenges the narrative that the "Europe of the Regions" rhetoric has been marginalised. While there are certainly countervailing trends among fringe political groups, much of the European continent's citizens recognise themselves as belonging, intrinsically and historically to "Europe," no matter how ill-defined the territory and/or idea is. Indeed, Europeans seem set to develop the cultural and political affinity (and trust) required to sow the continent together, and infuse it with a sense of trans-European civic responsibility.

Scully and Jones' (eds) work on *Europe, Regions and European Regionalism* refocuses scholarly attention back to the important question of the shape of European regionalism (and identity) by examining the experiences of regions and regionalism across twelve states in Western, Central and Eastern Europe including: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria. This work is therefore balanced and reflective of different national experiences that have come to form the backbone of the post-Eastern Enlargement (2004, 2007) EU.

In dealing with regional integration initiatives, van Langenhove (chapter author) argues that these should fulfil at least eight functions: the strengthening of trade integration in the region; the creation of an appropriate enabling environment for private sector development; the development of infrastructure programmes in support of economic growth and regional integration; the development of strong public sector institutions and good governance; the reduction of social ex-

clusion and the development of an inclusive civil society; contribution to peace and security in the region; the building of environment programmes at the regional level and the strengthening of the region's interaction with other regions of the world. These are an important starting point, but still does not bring the audience closer to understanding what is implied by the term "region."



Instead of providing a shorthanded answer, the work's editors link regionalism to the answering of three main questions: What is a region; what is the dynamic of regionalism; and what do regions do? By posing such questions they develop a precise research framework, which country specialists should adopt. For example, when they talk about the dynamics of regionalism, the use of a three-fold classification of these various dynamics, distinguishing between Euro-regionalism, state-regionalism and regional-regionalism seems to be a useful analytical guide to study governmental efficiency and economic development of the European regional project from top-down, bottom-up or integration versus "Europe of the regions" approaches. Divisions between regions as "policy-makers" and "policy-takers" which can be traced back into European history helps understand the extent of the impact of regions on policy-making at the EU level which varies from strong constitutionally entrenched regions towards weaker systems. This brings the relationship dilemma between integration and regionalisation processes (greater representation, direct right of appeal, other) into focus for further explorations.

The contribution of the book to regional studies is found in its choice of case studies where—along with historically strong regions—the "new" countries of Central and Eastern Europe are introduced to the reader. These countries might have weaker regional capacities but definitely retain long regional histories, have developed their own politics and social trends long before Enlargement occurred. The challenges they faced, and still face, may encourage academics towards further research in areas of policy-making, policy-implementation and governance, those areas where regional and national/subnational authorities come together. Through programmes, inspired by the EU cohesion policy experience, partner countries will be able to develop and support regional development strategies aimed at reducing disparities and funding projects which will help in overcoming structural deficiencies.

The book concludes that there is a growing diversity of European regions, and a wide variety of regionalising rules and necessities. Despite of the growing powers of supranational and national authorities,

Europe's regions and European regionalism remain significant parts of the European experience. Regional governments are securing larger budgets and developing professional bureaucracies, which brings to attention studies of policy-making and policy-implementation processes at regional level. Moreover, cultural aspect in regional policy-making remains understudied. Problems of regional development for further scholarly research can be investigated: the examination of institutional adaptation and change as a result of democratic institutionalisation process by looking at selected regional policy areas within new European member states (former and current neighbouring countries), which either were implemented successfully or faced particular difficulties due to various institutional issues, culture, different mentality, and other; why and under what circumstances the EU was able to push for improvements in some areas of regional development, while fail in others; how the EU could facilitate cooperation within various sub-state actors, such as reform-minded segments of bureaucracy, and civil society representatives in particular.

In all, for scholars of the EU, this is a must read since it provides solid evaluations, coupled with empirical evidence, over the unfolding debate over the future of Europe as marked by the triumph or failure of regionalism.

Thomas Hale & David Held , Polity, 2011, ISBN: 9780745650616

# Handbook of Transnational Governance

Review by Moses Kibe Kihiko

International Leadership University

Even though the modern state is often regarded as the most effective form of governance ever devised—ideally, securing unprecedented levels of prosperity and security for its citizens –globalisation has severely altered the social, economic and ecological relations between people, and no state, matter how competent, can address transnational issues unilaterally. This created a host of new policy challenges; many of which fall outside states' territorial jurisdiction. At the same time, national institutions which states have historically deployed to address transborder problems, have proven wanting since most states seem unable to cooperate effectively. And so, Hale and Held weigh into the debate on how states are reacting to globalisation in terms of accommodating to, or attempting to pervert, transnational governance structures. They argue, in their stellar, assessment: *The Handbook of Transnational Governance*, that governance institutions alter over time, but that the current period has seen important institutional innovations in transactional governance; giving birth to a wide set of institutions, some with historical antecedents, some unprecedented. And so, it follows that the continuation of nation state governance, in modern times, is essentially using 17$^{th}$ century institutional technologies to confront 21st century challenges.

Private actors like nongovernmental organizations and companies are thus increasingly engaging in transactional governance either as partners of states or intergovernmental organizations, or as private authorities in their own right by providing technical expertise, setting agendas, monitoring compliant, lobbying decision makers and making regulatory decisions and even enforcing them besides providing best practices or recommendations that are voluntary in nature are required, de facto, which are sometimes later adopted into formal public international law and leading to international legal agreements rec-

ognizing them in transactional governance in the contexts as diverse as human rights agreements and bilateral investment treaties. And so, new modes of accountability and enforcement based on capacity building, transparency, market incentives or moral suasion are joining formal rules as key features of the governance architecture.

The proliferation of actors and institutions at the transnational level has also disrupted a common, though often implicit, assumption of the traditional cohesive regimes or institutions possessing norms, decision-making rules and procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectations into what can be called regime complexes defined as an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue area. Fifty examples of such innovations in transactional governance are presented by Hale and Held in their Handbook. One mapping innovations is transgovernmental networks which bring domestic government officials together with their peers around specific issues, often regulatory in nature and serves for the purposes of best practice and information. Some examples of these are the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCNS); the Financial Action Task Force (FATF); and Transnational Policing, to name a few. Another mapping innovation is arbitration bodies to adjudicate transactional conflicts with examples being the Citizen Submission Process of the North American Commission on Environmental Commission, Transactional Commercial Arbitration and World Bank Inspection Panel. Then, there is the Multistakeholder initiatives, mixing private and public realms, like the World Bank Commission on Dams, for example, forming partnerships to achieve some governance goals and their activities ranging from service provision to deliberate policy-making. Other mapping include voluntary regulations with numerous codes of conduct for corporations and some with naming and shaming mechanisms for violators or rewarding compliers through reputational benefits such as eco-labels.

Such innovations raise three fundamental questions: what has changed why it has changed and what are the implications? Four classes of theories are subsequently introduced by Hale and Held to answer such questions and explain innovations in governance. The first theory is a functionalist theory that draws a line between changes to the nature of political problems, such as interdependence or complexity, and institutional arrangements, ideational or constructivist theories that ask what types of arrangements key actors believe to be normatively or functionally appropriate, and how these beliefs change, while

historical approaches connect the nature of governance arrangement to contingent shifts in society and the economy. The implications of these is achieving effectiveness, the governance gap between North and South being narrowed down, as well as the global power shift and transactional governance mechanism and legitimacy of global governance being achieved. However, on observation, it is clear that with many actors in global governance, a monopoly of policies have been lost in both the nation states and traditional global governance institutions, sometimes producing unhealthy lobbying and competition among them; thematics which need to be addressed if the Handbook is to serve its purpose of guiding the construction of viable decision-making and governance architecture deep into the 21st century. Hale and Held have certainly constructed a solid Handbook; one which is accessible to students and scholars of international relations, instrumentation for 21st century decision-makers and inspirational for civil societies around the world.

# The Post-Sarkozy Era: A Review Essay

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Three books are reviewed for this Review Essay. See the list of reviewed book on page 201

On the evening of 06 May 2012, France entered the "Post-Sarkozy Era," As with any president in Western democracies, many authors have commented his ideas, governance, personality and image during the five years of his office (2007-2012). Among dozens of publications written on Sarkozy, three titles stand out—one written in English, and two in French—which form the backbone of this review article.

## Book 1: The Sarkozy Phenomenon

In *The Sarkozy Phenomenon*, Hewlett comments from an outside perspective on the success of Sarkozy's Presidential campaign in 2007, and its aftermath. In his theoretical framework, Hewlett refers mainly to Marx, but also Gramsci, in their analysis of Bonapartism (that is, Napoléon III), understood by Hewlett as 'a moment in mid-nineteenth-century France when many ordinary people had entered the political arena but where any real class compromise had not been achieved' (p. 21). This idea is transposed by Hewlett into 21st century France, in order to validate his hypothesis of 'a modern form of Bonapartism' applied to Sarkozy (p. 14).

Accordingly, Sarkozy's success can be explained by many elements combined together: 'a carefully constructed brand of authoritarian populism which struck a chord in the particular political, economic and social circumstances of the time' (p. 57). However, Hewlett's comments are sometimes unfair and biased; even when Sarkozy adopted attitudes of openness ("ouverture") and fair-play. For instance, regarding the appointment and nominations for about a dozen of high profile socialist figures (like Bernard Kouchner and Éric Besson) to high level positions in the French government or diplomacy—thus ignoring the ideological barriers between Left and Right—Hewlett interprets these

unusual decisions by Sarkozy as opportunistic and as tangible examples of a new form of Bonapartism (p. 74). This reflex confirms the old motto that said 'No matter what your opponents do, criticize them!' Further on, Hewlett compares the policies of the French Right and especially Sarkozy's programme to the infamous Occupation era, with direct references to Maréchal Philippe Pétain (p. 81).



Elsewhere, Hewlett discusses Sarkozy's low popularity in the 2010 polls and writes with a spontaneous touch of hope ('at last') that his opponents, the Socialist Party, might win the 2012 presidential election: 'it seemed at last that the PS and the rest of the left had some chance of winning' (p. 99). But why did Hewlett write 'at last' when alluding to a possible socialist victory in 2012; why did the author take his arguments to the personal level when he is certainly a commentator meant to be detached from political practise? This question goes unanswered and remains a smudge on an otherwise interesting read.

Indeed, despite its detailed enumerations of Sarkozy's shortcomings and what can be seen as errors, this book on the reads more like a long reproach against the Right rather than an analysis of policies and governance. Because of its constant negative tone where even the positive steps are criticised and labeled as strategies, we often feel that the author cannot really explain why the majority of French voters chose Sarkozy for president in 2007. Perhaps France's population is often divided on many fundamental issues and one option, the Sarkozy option, was viable at the time. Hewlett misses this avenue of exploration.

## Book 2: The Postmodern Sarkozy

French sociologist, Michel Maffesoli, is among the most eminent advocates of postmodernity in France, which he sees like a 'réenchantement du monde' [a 're-enchantment of the world'] (pp. 38 and 67). In his latest book entitled *Sarkologies: Pourquoi tant de haine(s)*? [approximately *Sarkologics: Why So Much Hate?*], Maffesoli investigates Sarkozy's public image as interpreted in the French media. Often, the media seemed to only retain the superficial dimensions of Sarkozy's everyday life: his spontaneous and sometimes provocative words, his private life and luxurious way of living. According to Maffesoli, Sarkozy's early successes were based on his capacity to 'give the people what they want' at every level (p. 20). As a demonstration, Maffesoli refers to many authors and ideas about power, including Ernst Kantorowicz's concept of the *Two Bodies of the King*, and focuses on the

symbolic dimensions of Sarkozy's system and presidency (p. 23). But Maffesoli does not elaborate a coherent theoretical framework; he only quotes a variety of authors throughout his demonstration; sometimes in a "name-dropping" fashion.



Moreover, Maffesoli criticises Sarkozy's tendency to protect the élites and his own circle of allies (pp. 50 and 62). Here, Maffesoli observes that Sarkozy is perceived and appropriated as if he were a mere character from a novel, that is, a virtual character without any real existence (see pp. 9 and 66). But the critiques made by Maffesoli regarding Sarkozy's attitudes towards the friends he protected could also have been made François Mitterand, who was hedonist and epicurian (p. 24). One could add that Mitterand carefully hid the fact he had cancer (despite his promise of transparency) and protected many friends with Nazi pasts (like Paul Bousquet, known as a *collaborateur*). If this president is at some point compared to 'a good representation of the postmodern mystique' (p. 53), at the end of his demonstration, Maffesoli concludes in Nietzschean terms that Sarkozy is a 'Dionysos postmoderne' who sees his own life as an artwork (p. 187).

## Book 3: A Strategy Labelled as "Sarkozysme"

Among the first books about Sarkozy following his 2007 election (and perhaps the first book to use the expression the "Sarkozy phenomenon"), French journalists Olivier Mongin and Georges Vigarello, published a short book entitled *Sarkozy: Corps et âme d'un président* [approximately: *Sarkozy, Body and Soul of a President*]. It is in fact taken from two articles published earlier in the Parisian journal *Esprit*. Written less than one year after Sarkozy's rise to power and published in January 2008, the authors present their book as neither a biography nor an exam, rather an undressing ("mise à nu") of the social changes in France through its President (p. 13). According to the authors, Sarkozy's strategy is to depict performance through his own "success-story" (p. 14). This success, labelled as "sarkozysme", can be explained by the mix of a new bourgeoisie and popular imagination (p. 51). Furthermore, because Sarkozy often appeared in public, and allowed the French media to have 'something to report,' the authors insist on the importance of television and public image in their critique of Sarkozy' strategies to legitimate his own decisions, actions, performances in public, and even his 'mises-en-scène' whenever in public (p. 51).

Even if they admit that Sarkozy grew up in France near Paris, the

authors also mention Sarkozy's roots from Hungary and his Jewish background (from his Grandmother) (p. 36). In their conclusion, the authors try to restrain themselves in criticising Sarkozy, arguing that 'it is too soon to say he is not good enough' (p. 99). Here, Sarkozy is understood as three symbolic characters: the "entrepreneur, coach, and MC" ("animateur") (p. 99). But Mongin and Vigarello conclude that no matter which of the three characters the man is mimicking, he is nonetheless 'doing too much' in terms of decisions, actions, and media exposure (p. 99).

## Conclusion

These three books each retain an apparent bias against Sarkozy; as a politician and a person. Frequently, readers do not get a picture that spans both sides of an issue; the main point of scholarly works. However, Hewlett's *Sarkozy Phenomenon* is undoubtedly stronger and more rigorous than Maffesoli's approximations and more spontaneous essay. The theoretical framework in Hewlett is described meticulously in the first half and then applied to the French Republic through its President. As for the third essay, Mongin and Vigarello wrote a partial, yet sometimes intuitive piece that cannot fairly be compared to the other two titles because it was conceived much earlier.

Nevertheless, I believe the first rigorous, fair and balanced book about Sarkozy's legacy still has to be written, to do justice to a dedicated politician. These three critiques only confirm the intelligentsia's all-too-common negative attitudes towards Sarkozy, their fidelity to a Leftist ideology, and their failure to produce a fair and balanced portrait of the Sarkozy phenomenon. Attachment to the Left or Right is not objectively "good" or "bad" *per se*, but academics must leave their opinions aside if they want to study political systems, public opinion, and politicians fairly. Personal opinions cannot be regarded as facts, or at least authors should declare their own political and ideological positions openly instead of hiding behind the language of academia while pursuing their own political agendas.

Three books are reviewed for this Review Essay

Nick Hewlett, *The Sarkozy Phenomenon*. Societas Academic Publishing, 2011. ISBN: 9781845402396.

Michel Maffesoli, *Sarkologies: Pourquoi tant de haine(s)*? Albin Michel, 2011. ISBN: 9782226220929.

Olivier Mongin and Georges Vigarello, *Sarkozy. Corps et âme d'un président*. Éditions Perrin, 2008. ISBN: 9782262028121.