Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

December 2012

Report to Congress
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\(^1\)

During the reporting period of April 1 to September 30, 2012, the Coalition and our Afghan partners blunted the insurgent summer offensive, continued to transition the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) into security lead, pushed violence out of most populated areas, and coalition member nations signed several international agreements to support the long-term stability and security of Afghanistan. In May, President Obama and President Karzai signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement, reflecting the two governments’ desire for an enduring partnership. At the May 2012 Chicago Summit, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) nations also pledged to support Afghanistan through 2017. This was followed in July by the Tokyo Conference, at which the international community declared its support for Afghanistan by linking specific reforms in governance and rule-of-law by the Afghan government with sustained financial assistance through 2015.

During the reporting period enemy-initiated attacks (EIAs) were up one percent compared to the same period last year, due in large part to a shortened poppy harvest employing low-level insurgents far less than in past years. However, EIAs are down 3 percent from January to September 2012 compared to the same period in 2011, after dropping nine percent in 2011 compared to 2010. EIAs are now disproportionately occurring outside of populated areas, and the security of many of Afghanistan’s largest cities increased substantially during the reporting period.

Security progress and the development of the ANSF during the reporting period have enabled the security transition process to continue in accordance with the framework agreed to at the 2010 Lisbon Summit. As of the end of September 2012, roughly 76 percent of Afghans are living in areas where the ANSF has begun to assume the lead for security.

Despite these and other positive trends during the reporting period, the campaign continued to face challenges, including a rise in insider attacks. The rise in insider attacks has the potential to adversely affect the Coalition’s political landscape, but mitigation policies and a collective ISAF-ANSF approach are helping to reduce risks to coalition personnel, and to sustain confidence in the campaign. The cause of and eventual solution to this joint ISAF and ANSF problem will require continuous assessment; it remains clear that the insider threat is both an enemy tactic and has a cultural component. The many mitigation policies recently put in place will require additional time to assess their effects, although the number of insider attacks has dropped off sharply from the peak in August.

\(^1\)This report is submitted in accordance with Section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, and Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. The report is submitted consistent with requests in House Report 112-10 and Senate Report 111-295. It includes a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. This report is the tenth in a series of reports required every 180 days through fiscal year 2014 and has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Agriculture. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. The information contained in this report is valid as of September 30, 2012.

NOTE: This is a historical document that covers progress in Afghanistan from April 1, 2012, to September 30, 2012. The next report will include an analysis of progress toward security and stability from October 1, 2012, to March 31, 2013.
The insurgency’s safe havens in Pakistan, the limited institutional capacity of the Afghan government, and endemic corruption remain the greatest risks to long-term stability and sustainable security in Afghanistan. The Taliban-led insurgency and its al-Qaida affiliates still operate from sanctuaries in Pakistan, however, the insurgency and al-Qaida continue to face U.S. counterterrorism pressure within the safe havens. U.S. relations with Pakistan have begun to improve following the re-opening of Pakistani Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs), and there has been nascent improvement with respect to cross-border cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Although the insurgency’s kinetic capabilities have declined from their peak in 2010, the insurgents remain resilient and determined, and will likely attempt to regain lost ground and influence through continued assassinations, intimidation, high-profile attacks, and the emplacement of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Widespread corruption continues to limit the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Afghan government. Despite these challenges, the Coalition continued to make measured progress toward achieving its strategic goals during the reporting period.

The ISAF Surge is Now Complete

The United States completed the final stage of the phased recovery of the U.S. surge forces during the reporting period. As of September 20, 2012, the United States completed the drawdown of all 33,000 surge forces, consistent with the plan outlined by President Obama in June 2011. Despite this redeployment of forces, EIAIs continued to decline through the first nine months of 2012, due in part to the increased capability of the ANSF. Between March 1st and September 30th, the United States decreased its military forces in Afghanistan by 25 percent, while other Coalition forces increased by one percent.

Approximately 68,000 U.S. forces now remain in Afghanistan, and planning continues to determine future force level requirements. The U.S. remains committed to the long-term security and stability of Afghanistan.

The end of the surge provides an opportunity to look back upon its accomplishments. Many security metrics have improved during the last two years. The comparison in violence between 2012 to date and 2010 (the first year with surge-level forces present for the same nine month period) is stark: EIAIs have declined by 12 percent, IED explosions have declined by nine percent, ISAF-caused civilian casualties have declined by 28 percent (insurgent-caused civilian casualties increased by 11 percent), Direct Fire (DF) attacks have declined by nine percent, and indirect fire attacks are down by 24 percent. The ANSF has grown by 88,464 personnel, and has dramatically increased its capabilities. The areas of the country influenced by the insurgents and the ability of the insurgency to attack the population have been significantly diminished. Although challenges remain and progress in Afghanistan has been uneven in many areas, the security gains resulting from the surge are clear.
Security Progress

The improvement in the security of the populated areas of Afghanistan was the most significant security-related development of the reporting period. Security dramatically improved in most of Afghanistan’s five most populous districts, with EIAs in the first nine months of 2012 compared to the same period in 2011 dropping 22 percent in Kabul, 62 percent in Kandahar, 13 percent in Herat, 88 percent in Mezar-e-Sharif, and rising 2 percent in Kunduz.\(^2\) In many of the most contested areas of the country, insurgent attacks are becoming more isolated, and are occurring further away from population centers. The majority of Afghanistan’s 405 districts now experience very low levels of EIAs; 80 percent of attacks occur in districts encompassing only 20 percent of the population, and nearly one half of all attacks country-wide occur in just 17 districts – that contain only five percent of the population. The Taliban’s ability to attack the people of Afghanistan has been diminished, particularly in Kandahar, the operational and ideological base of the Taliban.

The slight rise in EIAs this reporting period when compared to the same period in 2011 was caused by a number of factors. In past years, many low-level insurgent fighters took part in the poppy harvest, substantially lowering attack levels for roughly six weeks. The harvest period this year was approximately 2-3 weeks due to weather conditions, as opposed to the 6-8 weeks observed in past years, effectively freeing up these low-level fighters to begin the fighting season early. This contributed to unusually high EIAs in April, May, and June. Conversely, the remainder of the reporting period had lower levels of EIAs when compared to last year. Major ISAF and ANSF operations also increased 21 percent compared to last year, and many of the EIAs that occurred during the reporting period were a result of this increased operational tempo.

The security situation in Regional Command South (RC-S) improved slightly during the reporting period, with EIAs down four percent compared to last year, most notably in populated areas in and around Kandahar City. ISAF transferred security responsibility to ANSF lead in Kandahar City in May 2012, after which the security situation improved significantly compared to last year, due largely to Coalition-initiated operations. Attacks were instead concentrated in less densely populated but highly contested areas in the “Taliban heartland,” Maiwand, Zharay, and Panjwa’i; these districts accounted for more than 12 percent of nationwide EIAs, but have less than one percent of the nationwide population.

The security situation for populated areas in Regional Command Southwest (RC-SW) also improved during the reporting period, despite a two percent increase in overall EIAs compared to the same period last year. The populated areas in RC-SW saw a decrease in EIAs, with much of the fighting now occurring in remote areas. Nahr-e Saraj is the most violent RC-SW district, with 10 percent of total EIAs for all of Afghanistan, and yet has less than 0.5 percent of the Afghan population.

Progress in security in Regional Command - North (RC-N) and Regional Command – West (RC-W) was mixed. EIAs were up by 28 percent in RC-N and 44 percent in RC-W compared to the same period last year. However, these areas are still much less violent than southern and eastern Afghanistan. EIAs in RC-W and RC-N combined make up just eight percent of total EIAs in

\(^2\) EIA figures are from January 1 through September 27, 2011 compared to 2012.
Afghanistan. Additionally, the rise in RC-W EIAs was likely the result of spillover from RC-SW, as ANSF and ISAF operations have pushed insurgents from populated areas in the Helmand River Valley north into Farah and Ghor Provinces. Despite the progress of ANSF-led security efforts, insurgents also assassinated several political leaders, garnering international media attention. In RC-N and RC-W, attacks are increasingly criminal in nature; as the insurgency recedes, narcotics trafficking and criminal patronage networks are becoming more prominent.

Pakistani-based sanctuary for insurgents, such as the Haqqani Taliban Network in North Waziristan, as well as the financial and operational support that insurgents receive from various sources, keeps the security situation along the border with Pakistan in Regional Command - East (RC-E) volatile. Although EIAs decreased by 1 percent in RC-E compared to last year during the reporting period, eastern Afghanistan accounted for almost a third of all insurgent attacks throughout the country. The death in August of Baddrudin Haqqani, the senior operational commander for the Haqqani Taliban Network, may have temporarily disrupted Haqqani operations, but the full impact of this event remains unclear.

In Regional Command - Capital (RC-C), sustained National Directorate of Security (NDS) and ANSF-led operations resulted in greatly improved security throughout Kabul, which was already far more secure than most of the country. Progress was highlighted by successful Afghan security responses to the April 15 and June 22 complex-coordinated attacks in which coordinated ANSF responses effectively contained the attacks with only minor ISAF support. EIAs decreased by 25 percent compared to last year, and high-profile attacks (HPAs) dropped from 12 during the same period in 2011 to just six this year.

**Unsuccessful Insurgent Military Offensive**

The insurgency was unable to re-take significant territory during the reporting period, despite stating this as one of its chief goals during the fighting season. Instead, the insurgency continued to lose territory overall, including much of its main safe havens in Southern Afghanistan. The insurgency is resilient, and its sanctuaries in Pakistan prevent their decisive defeat in the near-term. But the growth of the ANSF combined with high ISAF force levels enabled the Coalition to secure much of the country. The insurgents’ ability to threaten major population centers has been significantly weakened. Insurgent attacks, particularly in RC-S and RC-SW, have shifted from primarily offensive operations in Afghan population centers, to primarily reactive operations in areas that had previously been safe havens. Taliban territorial influence and control decreased last year; this trend continued during this reporting period.

The insurgency has nevertheless retained its capability to carry out attacks at almost the same level as last year during the reporting period. After a substantial decline in 2011 and early 2012, a number of violence indicators, including IED incidents and EIAs, have remained constant. Despite this leveling off of the number of attacks, the insurgency’s ability to carry out these attacks in populated areas has been greatly diminished. The insurgency has also retained the capability to carry out coordinated attacks infrequently, as evidenced by the attack on Camp Bastion on September 14 (in which six aircraft were destroyed, and another two were severely damaged).
The Taliban-led insurgency remains adaptive and determined, and retains the capability to emplace substantial numbers of IEDs and to conduct isolated high-profile attacks. The insurgency also retains a significant regenerative capacity. As insurgent capacity to directly contest the ANSF and ISAF erodes, insurgents have increasingly resorted to asymmetric tactics in an attempt to regain territory and influence, including assassinations, kidnappings, intimidation tactics, encouraging insider attacks, and strategic messaging campaigns.

The insurgency continues to receive critical support – including sanctuary, training infrastructure, and operational and financial support – from within neighboring Pakistan. The availability of sanctuary inside of Pakistan enables key elements of the insurgency to remain potent and threatening, including the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Taliban Network.

**The ANSF Continues to Take the Lead**

ISAF’s main effort is to facilitate the conditions under which the ANSF successfully assumes full security responsibility for Afghanistan by the end of 2014. ANSF force growth and training efforts yielded significant operational improvements during the reporting period. The ANSF is increasingly taking over responsibility for securing Afghanistan, and is conducting the vast majority of operations. Although many of these operations are routine patrols, the ANSF are now (as of September) unilaterally conducting approximately 80 percent of total reported operations and are leading roughly 85 percent of total operations. Additional, the ANSF have started to expand security independently in areas where ISAF does not already have an established presence, demonstrating initiative and increased capability. ISAF carries out only 10 percent of total reported operations unilaterally and is in the lead for only 15 percent of operations.

ISAF casualties in 2010 were roughly 60 percent of total friendly casualties, with the ANSF taking roughly 40 percent. This ratio was reversed in 2012, and overall friendly casualties have declined. This reversal is indicative of the ANSF increasingly taking the lead in the field.

The ANSF have also increased their ability to plan, carry out, and sustain large-scale operations, as evidenced by Operation Kalak Hode V in RC-S. This 11,000-person operation was principally planned, led, and manned by the ANSF. The operation, focused on disrupting the insurgency, involved coordination among the Afghan Army, Police, Border Police, and National Directorate of Security. The operation was logistically supported through Afghan supply channels.

While small in number, insider attacks have the potential to significantly disrupt the Coalition mission in Afghanistan. However, the relationship between the ANSF and the Coalition remains strong, particularly out in the field, where soldiers face a common enemy every day. The motivations behind the majority of the attacks in 2012 are varied and include but are not limited to: infiltration, impersonation, co-option, post-traumatic stress, inter-personal disputes and

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3 The data on operations in this paragraph represents only reported operations in RC-E, as this was the only RC that fully reported low-level operations as of the end of the reporting period. This data is indicative of operations in the rest of the country, however, the actual figures may vary in other RCs. This data on operations only covers the period from June through September 2012, as ISAF did not report low-level and routine operations before June.
extremist views. Regardless, insider attacks are helpful to the insurgency, whether the insurgency is directly responsible or not. As such, ISAF and the Afghan government are approaching this as both an enemy tactic and an issue that has a cultural component. Coalition forces and the ANSF are working together on a comprehensive, combined response and have implemented several measures, including requiring higher-level approval for some partnered operations. ANSF investigations into insurgent ties to ANSF members have already resulted in more than 400 arrests. However, the overall efficacy of our counter-measures cannot yet be assessed, as most measures have only recently been implemented.

**Improving Cooperation with Pakistan**

There were several improvements with regard to Pakistan this reporting period, including the reopening of the GLOCs and improved border coordination. Although strained, U.S. relations with Pakistan are beginning to improve. Pakistan agreed to reopen the U.S. and ISAF GLOCs into Afghanistan on July 4, and signed a memorandum of understanding governing the transit of U.S. cargo through Afghanistan later in the month. No new fees were applied to U.S. cargo that had been held in Pakistan since last year, which began to transit to Afghanistan soon after the agreement was reached. The reopening of the GLOCs allowed ANSF equipment, and in particular vehicles which had been held in Pakistan since the GLOC closure, to enter Afghanistan, helping the ANSF to meet its fielded force requirements. At the time of publication, U.S. and Pakistani negotiators were finalizing arrangements that, once completed, will allow new U.S. cargo to transit Pakistan to Afghanistan, and will open Pakistani GLOCs to U.S. retrograde cargo leaving Afghanistan.

However, sustainable cross-border cooperation and coordination remains a significant challenge, which causes mistrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Pakistani military, the ANSF, and Coalition forces all fire across the border in response to militant activity on both sides, increasing the risk of a serious incident. Although cross-border attacks remain a highly contentious issue, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have shown some signs of improvement. Recent meetings between senior Pakistani and Afghan officials have resulted in slightly improved cooperation between the two countries, specifically on efforts toward improved stability in Afghanistan. Additionally, within the last six months, there has been improvement in operational coordination between Afghanistan and Pakistan on border, including complementary ANSF, ISAF, and Pakistani military operations.

Overall, relations between Pakistan and the U.S., and Pakistan and Afghanistan are improving, but tensions remain. The insurgency continues to benefit from sanctuaries in Pakistan. Pakistan’s passive acceptance of insurgent sanctuaries, selectivity in counterinsurgency operations that target only Pakistan-focused militants, and ineffective actions to interdict material support such as IED components to the insurgency, continues to undermine security in Afghanistan and threaten the ISAF campaign.
Transition is On Track

The Transition process is on track for completion by the end of 2014, with three of five Tranches currently undergoing Transition.\(^4\) Another milestone was reached with the announcement of Tranche 3 by President Karzai on May 13, 2012. More than three-quarters of the Afghan population currently live in areas where the ANSF are transitioning to security lead, with areas in all 34 provinces now in some stage of Transition. Tranche 3 moved important population centers, economically significant districts, and the corridors that connect them, into Transition. This was considered a “stretch tranche,” as it included some contested areas, assuming greater but measured risk, while ISAF forces were best placed (in size and posture) to support the ANSF as they move into the security lead.

As U.S. and Coalition forces downsize and re-posture, the ANSF are progressively taking the lead in transition areas and helping to expand Afghan government influence, most notably in RC-N, where the Coalition will withdraw all of its forces from the eastern- and westernmost areas. Kabul remains the most secure area in the country under the ANSF’s lead. Further, the ANSF demonstrated increased capabilities and sophistication in transitioning areas, particularly in RC-E and RC-S, where they planned and conducted large-scale, multi-day operations and showed increased coordination and integration across military and police pillars. However, poor coordination between the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) continues to be a major challenge in transitioning areas. Attacks along access routes to major population centers and government ineffectiveness also hamper transition. Governance and development will require continued assistance through the “Decade of Transformation” (2014-2024).

During the reporting period, EIAs declined in transitioning areas overall by four percent, with Tranches One and Three experiencing nine and seven percent decreases, respectively, compared to the same period last year. EIAs in Tranche Two went up four percent. However, violence in transitioning areas was highly variable by geographic region, with some transition areas still facing challenges.

International Summits and Agreements

Significant steps were taken during the reporting period toward securing Afghanistan’s long-term stability, including two international summits and multiple strategic partnership agreements entered into by Afghanistan with various countries. On May 1, 2012, President Obama and President Karzai signed a long-term Strategic Partnership Agreement, providing the framework for a future cooperative relationship after 2014. Under this agreement, the United States seeks to support Afghanistan’s continuing social and economic development, long-term security, good governance and regional cooperation, while the Afghan government commits to strengthening accountability, transparency, oversight, and the protection of human rights. The agreement also provides for the possibility of U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014, for the purposes of training Afghan Forces and targeting the remnants of al-Qaeda. The agreement also commits

\(^4\) In accordance with the 2010 Inteqal (Transition) Framework, which establishes the Afghan-led process, Transition will occur in phases based on the selection of geographic areas, or “Tranches.” There are expected to be five Tranches total. Tranches 1, 2, and 3 have already been selected and are in Transition.
the United States and Afghanistan to initiate negotiations on a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that would supersede the current Status of Forces Agreement. Both governments have named lead negotiators for the BSA. To ensure the Strategic Partnership is implemented effectively, an Afghan-U.S. Bilateral Commission was established and convened on October 3, 2012, chaired by Foreign Minister Rassoul and Secretary of State Clinton. India, as well as Coalition members, including France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and Australia signed bilateral partnership agreements with Afghanistan this year, officially pledging their support to Afghanistan beyond 2014.

At the Chicago Summit, held May 20-21, 2012, NATO Allies and Coalition partners reaffirmed the Lisbon framework for Transition, endorsed a NATO Strategic Plan for Afghanistan (NSPA), and pledged to provide support for the ANSF after ISAF’s mission ends at the end of 2014. The NSPA recommends that the Coalition and Afghanistan reach an interim milestone in mid-2013, marking the beginning of the ANSF assumption of the lead for combat operations across the country and a shift in NATO’s primary mission from combat to training, advising, and assisting the ANSF in order to ensure they have the required support as they take on increased responsibility. At the Chicago NATO Summit and in the run-up to the Summit, ISAF troop-contributing nations and other donors pledged to contribute roughly $3.6 billion annually for three years beginning in 2015 toward the development of a sustainable ANSF. The Afghan government agreed to provide at least $500 million per year during the same period, bringing the total to $4.1 billion for the ANSF. The Afghan government additionally committed that it will progressively increase its contribution over time.

On July 8, 2012, the Afghan government and the international donor community met in Tokyo to define the international community’s pledge of support for the future development of Afghanistan over the Transformation Decade (2015 – 2025) and for the government of Afghanistan to establish a clear reform plan. At the conclusion of the conference, the participants issued a communiqué which announced the intent of the international community to provide $16 billion for Afghanistan’s development through 2015 and included a Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) setting specific measurable reform goals to improve Afghan governance, rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, and development performance. Over the long term, Afghanistan and the international community pledged to increase Afghanistan’s self-reliance and to reduce assistance levels gradually.

**Afghan Governance and Development Remain Limited**

The capacity of the Afghan government and the extension of effective governance and rule of law have been limited by multiple factors, including widespread corruption, limited human capacity, lack of access to rural areas due to a lack of security, a lack of coordination between the central government and the Afghan provinces and districts, and an uneven distribution of power among the judicial, legislative, and executive branches. Security, governance, and sustainable economic development are all necessary for a viable and stable Afghanistan.

The Afghan government continues to develop its capacity to provide stable and responsive governance to the Afghan population, although progress is mixed. Steady improvements in revenue generation have been made, including tax collection at the municipal level; however, execution of the development budget remains below targets. The Afghan government is highly
centralized, with revenue, budgeting, spending, and service delivery authority residing with the central ministries in Kabul, limiting the efficiency of service delivery at the provincial and district levels. Efforts to decentralize are slowed by limited human capacity and delays in the central government enacting structural reforms.

The Tokyo Conference recognized many of the issues raised above, and the resulting Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) included specific commitments by the Afghans to address some of the major weaknesses in sub-national governance. These commitments included the development of a provincial budgeting process in which Provincial Councils have a consultative role as well as a legal framework to clarify the roles and responsibilities of government agencies at national, provincial, and district levels, in line with 2010 sub-national government policy.

Economic growth and development in Afghanistan will continue to be led through 2014 by investments in construction and by private consumption, largely driven by donor and ISAF spending in services. The agricultural sector remains important as a large share in the economy and as a source of livelihood for the majority of the rural population. Mining’s contribution has been marginal thus far but has the potential to expand. Lingering investor fears regarding political and security uncertainty make it particularly critical for Afghanistan to show progress in regulatory and policy reforms and the completion of major infrastructure projects that enable commerce and job creation to thrive.

The Afghan population continues to benefit from the vast improvements in social development made over the past decade, particularly in health and education, although access and availability becomes more difficult further away from the cities.

A lack of sufficient progress in governance and sustainable economic development continues to slow the reinforcement of security gains in Afghanistan. Ongoing insecurity in parts of the country continues to inhibit economic development and improvement in governance. Inconsistent and at times corrupt political leaders in many parts of the central government continue to harm efforts to secure the country and threaten the long-term stability of Afghanistan. Over the reporting period, the Afghan government’s counter-corruption efforts have shown little progress.

**ISAF’s Mission Focus Is Shifting to the Security Force Assistance Model**

The NATO Security Force Assistance (SFA) construct is the basis for the alliance’s strategy to develop and support the ANSF in order to transition security responsibility to Afghan forces. The SFA model, which calls for advisor teams, is shifting the ISAF main effort from partnering and combat to training, advising, and assisting the ANSF at the tactical and operational levels until they are able to conduct operations independently. In some cases, Security Force Assistance Teams (SFATs) will be supported by Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB), which were designed to manage risk, oversee force protection, and provide enabler support when necessary for SFATs. The SFAT model reflects an evolution as to how ISAF solicits partner nation troop contributions, moving from a model focused on geographic areas of responsibility to a model focused on ANSF unit sponsorship, and is still under development and consideration by NATO and its partners. Each SFAT is tailored to possess specific skills associated with the
ANSF unit to which they are assigned. Each SFAT will vary in composition and disposition, as determined by each troop contributing nation.

Currently, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) has established 466 SFAT requirements, of which 13 percent (60 teams) were not yet filled as of the end of the reporting period. The near-term challenge for NATO is how to enlist the support of troop-contributing nations that have specific and readily usable and transferable skill sets for SFA teams, many of which will operate in the field. The number of requirements will decrease through 2013 as the ANSF improve their ability to conduct independent operations.
SECTION 1 – SECURITY

1.1: U.S. MISSION

The goal of the United States is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, and to prevent its return to Afghanistan or Pakistan. Specific U.S. objectives in Afghanistan are to deny safe haven to al-Qaida and deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The United States will pursue our core goal through five fully-integrated lines of effort: (1) Complete the process of Transition to full Afghan sovereignty in accordance with the Lisbon timeline; (2) Continue to improve the capabilities of the Afghan government and security forces through an integrated civilian-military campaign; (3) Implement a long-term partnership with Afghanistan; (4) Support talks among Afghans on reconciliation and a negotiated peace; and (5) Enlist regional support for Afghan stability.

1.2: ISAF CAMPAIGN STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

The current ISAF Operations Plan, OPLAN 38302 Revision 6.2, was revised during the reporting period to integrate the development of the Security Force Assistance Model, a focus on a Comprehensive Border Strategy effort with the Afghans, the effects of the transition of security responsibility to an Afghan lead, and further development of the ANSF. OPLAN 38302 Rev. 6.2, which was approved on October 22nd, also integrates retrograde operations and anticipates the transition to the post-ISAF mission. The mission statement of the current OPLAN states:

*ISAF, in partnership with the International Community, supports GIRoA in the conduct of counter-insurgency operations to support development of governmental institutions for legitimate, credible, and enduring governance, security, and sustainable socio-economic growth; support the ANSF as it assumes lead responsibility for security to protect the Afghan people; and neutralize insurgent networks in order to deny terrorist safe-havens, ensure GIRoA stability and sovereignty, and set the conditions for the NATO-led post-ISAF engagement NLT 31 December 2014.*

ISAF OPLAN 38302 Rev. 6.2 will continue to focus on key terrain districts (KTD) and area of interest (AOI) districts where the majority of the population lives, and seek to create the conditions necessary to complete a responsible transition to an Afghan lead for security throughout the country by the end of 2014.

**OP NAWEED**

As noted in the April 2012 edition of this report, the Afghan campaign plan, OP NAWEED (Dari for “Good News”) was published in January 2012. This Afghan plan reflects the ANSF concept of how the army, police, and intelligence services will work together to protect the population and defeat the insurgency through 2012 and the first half of 2013. As noted throughout this report, the ANSF are increasingly responsible for providing security and are reducing their reliance on ISAF forces. ISAF currently assesses that ANSF efforts have prevented the insurgency from achieving its objectives of regaining lost terrain and influence within key terrain areas, especially RC-S, RC-SW, and RC-E.
An important part of OP NAWEED is ISAF’s transition to a Security Force Assistance (SFA) model. As of August 15, 2012, 372 SFA Advisor Teams have been fielded throughout Afghanistan. The SFA concept is an integral part of the transition from ISAF combat operations to an advisory force with enabler support capabilities. SFA provides training, advising, assisting, and development functions to prepare ANSF units to assume full security responsibility by December 31, 2014.

1.3: ISAF COMMAND AND CONTROL

Several leadership changes occurred within the ISAF command and control structure during the reporting period. Lieutenant General James L. Terry (U.S. Army) assumed command of ISAF Joint Command (IJC), replacing Lieutenant General Michael Scaparrotti (U.S. Army). Major General William Mayville (U.S. Army) took command of RC-E and Major General Robert B. Abrams (U.S. Army) took command of RC-S. Major General Mark Gurganus (USMC) continues as commander of RC-SW; Major General Erich Pfeffer (German Army) continues as commander of RC-North (RC-N); and Brigadier General Dario Ranieri (Italian Army) continues as commander of RC-West (RC-W).

During this reporting period, ISAF established the Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (SOJTF-A), under Major General Tony Thomas, who is dual-hatted as commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (NSOCC-A), which NATO established in August. NSOCC-A / SOJTF-A synchronizes and coordinates special operations forces (SOF) in support of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) campaign plan, the Joint Forces Command-Brunssum (JFCB) campaign plan, and the ISAF campaign plan. NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A complements United States national mission objectives. The combined organizational structure integrates ISAF and U.S. Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) personnel into a new SOF headquarters to provide command and control over existing SOF elements. This establishes a robust, properly sized and structured headquarters that is not overly reliant on personnel augmentation, avoids duplication, and makes the best use of available funding, manpower, and infrastructure.

During this reporting period ISAF began plans to streamline the command and control (C2) for counter-corruption, counter-narcotics, counter-threat finances, and strategic targeting. This streamlining will align C2 functions and processes to achieve greater strategic effect. The plan has been forwarded up through appropriate command channels and is awaiting U.S. Central Command and DoD feedback for potential implementation during the next reporting period.

In anticipation of the end of the ISAF mission, ISAF has requested that NATO establish the NATO Afghanistan Transformation Task Force (NATTF) effective 1 January 2013. This task force will identify, plan, negotiate, implement, and monitor current ISAF tasks prior to disposition. NATTF will then facilitate the tasks to be transformed, transferred, or terminated to enable the transition from ISAF to the post-2014 NATO mission in Afghanistan.
1.4: NATO-ISAF FORCE LEVELS AND PLEDGES

U.S. FORCE LEVELS

As of September 30, 2012, the United States had approximately 65,936 military personnel in Afghanistan, down from 86,692 as of March 31, 2012.

The drawdown of all 33,000 U.S. surge forces, which President Obama announced in June 2011, was complete as of September 20, 2012. This drawdown began with the initial redeployment of 10,000 personnel by the end of 2011. The second phase of force reductions, completed by September 20, 2012, involved significant reductions in command and control and proportional reductions in movement and maneuver forces, while retaining significant capabilities in field and enabler support to the Coalition and the ANSF. Planning to determine future U.S. force level adjustments in Afghanistan is ongoing.

U.S.-AFGHAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

On May 2, 2012, President Obama and Afghan President Hamid Karzai signed a long-term Strategic Partnership Agreement, providing the framework for a future cooperative relationship after 2014 based on mutual respect and shared interests. Under this Agreement the United States seeks to support Afghanistan’s continuing social and economic development, long-term security,
good governance and regional cooperation while the Afghan government commits to strengthening accountability, transparency, oversight, and the protection of human rights. The Agreement provides a framework for the presence and activities of U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014, for instance for the purposes of training Afghan Forces and targeting the remnants of al-Qaida and its associated forces, and commits the United States and Afghanistan to initiate negotiations on a Bilateral Security Agreement to supersede current Status of Forces Agreement. These negotiations are expected to begin in the fall and to conclude within one year. As provided for in the Agreement, the United States designated Afghanistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA). The Afghan National Assembly approved the Agreement on June 3, 2012. To ensure the Strategic Partnership Agreement is effectively implemented, an Afghan-U.S. Bilateral Commission was established and convened on October 3, 2012, chaired by Foreign Minister Rassoul and Secretary of State Clinton.

India, as well as several Coalition members including France, Britain, Italy, Germany, and Australia, signed bilateral partnership agreements with Afghanistan this year, officially pledging their support to Afghanistan beyond 2014.

**INTERNATIONAL FORCE LEVELS AND PLEDGES**

The ISAF coalition currently consists of 28 NATO nations and 22 partnering nations with 107,042 forces deployed across Afghanistan. In addition to Headquarters (HQ) ISAF, IJC, and the NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A), NATO Allies command three of the six regional commands: RC–N (Germany), RC–W (Italy), and RC–Capital (RC-C) (Turkey). The United States commands the remaining 3 (RC-S, RC-SW, and RC-E). During the last six months, force contributions from the 49 ISAF troop contributing nations (excluding the United States) increased to 44,883 personnel, up from 44,247 as of April 2012. Force-level pledges through the 2013 fighting season will be clarified after a series of ministerial and working-level meetings scheduled for October, November, and December 2012. Between March 1st and September 30th, the United States decreased its military forces in Afghanistan by 25 percent, while other Coalition forces increased by one percent.

In spite of the announced plans of France to withdraw all combat forces ahead of the Lisbon timeline, indicators suggest the remaining 49 ISAF nations will uphold their commitments. The challenge for NATO and partner nations is how to use the 27 months remaining until the end of the ISAF mission to responsibly draw down individual national contributions and reinvest in the coming post-ISAF NATO-Afghanistan mission.

NATO Allies have publicly and repeatedly affirmed their commitment to the ISAF mission, and to a post-2014 NATO-led mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan forces. Key leaders within the Coalition – including the United States, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom (UK) – currently provide airlift, force protection, intelligence, and sustainment support to ISAF partners. Germany, Italy, and the UK did not reduce their force numbers during the reporting period. The UK, in close coordination with NATO/ISAF, has announced its intent to reduce its troop contribution by 500 soldiers to a total of 9,000 by year’s end. Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain are expected to make similarly measured reductions. Contrary to some reports, New Zealand will not withdraw all its forces, but, in coordination with ISAF priorities, does plan to close its
Bamyan base and redeploy its Provincial Reconstruction Team in April 2013, while continuing to support the mission at HQ ISAF. Bamyan entered Transition in the first tranche in 2011, and ISAF assessed that the PRT was no longer required. France’s decision to withdraw all of its combat troops ahead of schedule remains the anomaly among the Allies. France’s responsibilities, however, was limited to Kapisa and Sarobi Provinces and a particularly challenging district in Kabul province. The United States is in the process of taking over responsibility for these areas.

HQ ISAF has visibility on 18 initial national redeployment plans. Eight of these nations are the largest force contributors in theater and account for 90 percent of the force. Their redeployment execution will commence in early 2013. Due to the complex coordination required to monitor the redeployment planning and execution of 50 troop-contributing nations (TCNs) in theater, ISAF is focusing its efforts on monitoring the 11 largest TCNs. Through surge recovery, the United States will use the majority of the infrastructure and assets available in theatre and be postured to respond to further announcements or contingencies for redeployment as they arise.

During times of peak movement and activity, appropriate theater and operational priorities will be set to ensure that all nations conducting redeployment activities are able to execute their plans on time and in a cohesive manner that avoids Coalition competition for resources and ensures synchronization with the campaign. Coordination between nations, synchronization with the campaign plan, and de-confliction at all levels of command will ensure that competition for resources and contractors is reduced and cooperation and mutual logistic support is optimized. Nations continue to plan and execute extant national positions and adjust where necessary at the operational level. Currently, most nations await national political direction prior to proceeding with detailed planning and subsequent public release of redeployment options.

**CHICAGO NATO SUMMIT**

At the NATO Summit held in Chicago on May 20-21, 2012, NATO and ISAF partner nations made a strong pledge of long-term support for the security of Afghanistan. To this end, partner nations (including the U.S.) committed $3.6 billion per year for the ANSF starting in 2015 and running through 2017. The Afghan government agreed to provide roughly $500 million annually and to progressively increase its share of financial responsibility for maintaining its security forces over time. NATO and ISAF Partner Nations also endorsed NATO Strategic Plan for Afghanistan (NSPA), which defined a strategic approach for the pre- and post-transition Afghanistan. The NSPA reaffirmed the Lisbon Inteqal framework for Transition, recognizing that in mid-2013 the ANSF will have assumed the lead for planning and executing operations across the whole of Afghanistan. At this important interim milestone, ISAF’s main effort will shift from combat operations to training, advising, and assisting while continuing to provide the enablers necessary to support the ANSF while they adjust to their increased responsibilities. ISAF forces will continue to conduct combat operations in support of ANSF through 2014 as necessary. ISAF force numbers will decrease in a planned, coordinated, and responsible manner. By the end of 2014, the ANSF will be fully responsible for the country’s security, and the NATO-led combat mission will end. Lastly, the NSPA outlined NATO’s vision for a post-2014, post-ISAF NATO-led mission focused on training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces and security institutions.


**POST-2014**

A sufficient and sustainable ANSF is necessary for Afghanistan’s long-term stability and security. Under the NATO Strategic Plan for Afghanistan, agreed upon at the Chicago Summit, NATO and partner heads of state and government announced their vision for a new NATO mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan forces after 2014, and a political commitment to provide funding for ANSF. The ANSF sustainment plan calls for Afghan forces to achieve a surge strength of 352,000 personnel by the end of 2012, and to remain at that size for three full years, through 2015, to allow for continued progress toward a sustainable secure environment in Afghanistan. The ANA and ANP achieved their recruiting goals for this force by the end of the reporting period, and these recruits, once vetted, are expected to be fully inducted into the force by December 2012 and February 2013, respectively. The Afghan Air Force continues to recruit the final 2,000 airmen and will reach its full strength in 2014 as required by that more technical service’s long-term development plan. As Afghanistan continues to become more secure and stable through 2015-2016, the Afghan government, in coordination with NATO and allies, will begin to refocus the ANSF toward enduring security roles, and consider how to reshape the ANSF into a more sustainable force. ISAF coalition partners and the Afghan government will continue to work closely together to evaluate conditions on the ground and the execution of the ANSF sustainment plan, making adjustments as needed.

**CAVEATS**

National caveats are invoked by individual coalition partners to ensure their forces operate in accordance with respective national laws and policies. Regardless of national caveats, all ISAF coalition partners in Afghanistan operate according to the ISAF Rules of Engagement, which govern the use of force.

Although some Allies and partners have reduced these caveats, national caveats continue to constrain ISAF operations by limiting the types of missions a given country’s forces are authorized to undertake. Senior U.S. leadership consistently emphasizes the need to reduce national caveats in order to allow for the greatest operational effect.

For many nations, the focus will start to shift to the intended NATO mission post-2014. As a result of the new mission, authorities for activity and scope of operations will change. Although the structure for the new mission is evolving at the time of this writing, it is expected that some nations will complete individual security agreements or agreements with Afghanistan that will impact national caveats. With the NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC) Initiating Directive, agreed in September, the Military Committee has commenced planning for the post-2014 International Training, Advisory, and Assistance Mission (ITAAM). As part of this process, the nature of future operations must be planned and negotiated with the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
1.5: REPORTING PERIOD SECURITY OVERVIEW

THE INSURGENCY

The Taliban-led insurgency is composed of a syndicate of semi-autonomous groups, including the Haqqani Network. These groups are united under the senior shura\textsuperscript{5} in Quetta, Pakistan under Taliban founder and spiritual leader Mullah Omar and share a common vision of the re-establishment of an Islamic Emirate. Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and some Pakistan-focused groups such as Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan provide support to the Afghan Taliban. These groups maintain symbiotic and symbolic relationships in pursuit of overlapping interests. Ongoing ISAF and ANSF operations continue to target and pressure many of these groups.

Al-Qaida involvement in the insurgency in Afghanistan has been constrained by the disruption of their operational planning and the loss of several senior leaders who are key to these efforts. As al-Qaida has been degraded, it has become reliant on a shrinking cadre of experienced leaders primarily within a Haqqani-facilitated safe haven in North Waziristan, Pakistan. Al-Qaida continues to seek safe haven in Afghanistan, in particular the northeastern region, but its activities are constrained due to U.S. and Coalition Forces counterterrorism efforts. The terrorist group continues to derive benefit from its engagement in Afghanistan, including exploitation of incidents for propaganda, personnel recruitment, and the tribal connections that would be necessary to re-establish future safe havens. Al-Qaida considers continued involvement in Afghanistan integral to its global image, strategic relevance, and operational viability. The August 2012 death of senior operational commander Badruddin Haqqani provided at least a temporary disruption to the Haqqani Taliban Network’s operational planning against U.S. and Coalition forces within Afghanistan.

Although the specific area of operations for each group associated with the insurgency varies, the insurgent groups are most active along the border with Pakistan, with the exception of the IMU which operates in north-central Afghanistan. Insurgent groups are located primarily in the Pashtun-majority inhabited areas of Afghanistan. Most insurgent commanders and fighters operate within or near their home districts, and low-level fighters are often well-known in the local population. Out-of-area fighters (Pakistani Pashtuns or other individuals from the immediate region who fight outside their home districts) and foreign fighters (those fighters who have travelled to Afghanistan from outside the Afghanistan/Pakistan region) comprise a considerably smaller portion of the insurgency.

Taliban senior leaders remain capable of providing general, strategic guidance to the broader insurgency and channeling resources to support operational priorities, in particular in RC-S, RC-SW, and RC-E. Pakistan-based senior leaders exercise varying degrees of command and control over the generally decentralized and locally-based insurgency in Afghanistan. Within Afghanistan, insurgent leadership structures vary by province. In general, a two-man team comprising a shadow governor and military commander lead governance efforts and military operations at the provincial level. They also oversee district-level insurgent leadership and

\textsuperscript{5} “Council” (religious connotation)
lower-level military commanders. Most shadow governors and intermediate-level commanders reside in Pakistan, but cross the border to plan major attacks, settle disputes, or motivate troops. Some low- and mid-level commanders may view the Qatar peace talks with some skepticism and this may lead some of them to question the dedication of Pakistan-based senior leadership. There are some indications of divergence on this issue among insurgents.

To recruit, influence, and intimidate the Afghan populace, the insurgency uses a simple and effective messaging strategy that employs word of mouth, mosque sermons, and radio broadcasts to reach the predominately illiterate Pashtun and rural population. The Taliban message focuses on the following allegations: the Taliban’s service as protectors of Afghanistan’s Islamic character; the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s illegitimacy and betrayal to foreign powers; ISAF’s anti-Islamic nature; ISAF atrocities; and GIRoA’s corruption and incompetence. The insurgency cultivates and exploits popular perceptions of the Afghan government as corrupt, unresponsive, and uninterested in the plight of the rural populace in order to recruit local Afghans to join the insurgency or to turn to shadow governments and courts to resolve issues. Unlike their efforts to influence the local population, Taliban messages published on the Internet and in press venues are aimed at an international audience.

The insurgency depends on domestic poppy cultivation and the narcotics trade as its primary source of internally-derived revenue. The insurgency encourages farmers to plant poppies as a means of closing the resource gap experienced in rural Afghanistan by capitalizing on the lack of basic services and government assistance at the village level. However, low opium yields from this year’s harvest resulting from an unusually harsh winter and subsequent spring flooding led to reductions in insurgent revenue. As a result, the insurgency has sought other means to make up potential funding shortfalls. The insurgency continues to be funded from a variety of external sources in the region, including donors from the Persian Gulf, Pakistan, Iran, and various transnational and criminal syndicates.

The insurgency also continues to receive critical support in neighboring Pakistan in the form of sanctuary, training infrastructure, and at times, financial and operational support. These sanctuaries continue to bolster the effectiveness of the insurgency, particularly in areas where insurgents have access to direct or indirect logistical and training support. Thus, these sanctuaries remain the most critical operational threat to the ISAF campaign in Afghanistan. Although Iranian support to the insurgency is assessed to be less critical to the insurgency than the support emanating from Pakistani sanctuaries, the insurgency continues to receive a steady stream of lethal materiel support from Iran.

**STATE OF THE INSURGENCY – SPRING 2012 AND SUMMER 2012**

The insurgency failed to meet its stated goals for the 2012 fighting season, termed the al-Faruq campaign – a reference to Islam’s second Caliph Omar. The Taliban remain vested in Southern Afghanistan, and enjoy the support of the Haqqani Taliban Network, which is focused on the east of the country and Kabul. The insurgency continued to use the same tactics to attack ISAF security gains and to preserve a diminishing force structure: improvised explosive devices (IEDs), high-profile attacks (HPAs), assassinations of influential powerbrokers, tribal elders, ANSF, and Afghan officials, and the avoidance of larger engagements.
Taliban leadership intended to reclaim lost territory, in particular in RC-S and RC-SW, during the 2012 fighting season and to reassert influence over the population. The execution of high-profile attacks in Kabul along with other major urban centers remains an enduring aim for insurgents. Aggressive National Directorate of Security (NDS)-led targeting of insurgent networks and logistics has protected Kabul and other major urban centers from multiple high-profile attack plots. The number of high-profile attacks in Kabul District has decreased from eight last year to 5 this year for the reporting period.

During the reporting period, ANSF-ISAF operations maintained and expanded gains achieved by the Coalition during the winter of 2011-12 and continued to degrade the cohesion and capability of the insurgency. Significant progress was made in RC-S and RC-SW, where both ISAF and the Taliban focus their main efforts. The sustained pressure on insurgent networks (aided by a fortuitously harsh winter) disrupted attack planning, logistics, and overall freedom of movement for fighters. However, the insurgency has retained the capability to carry out infrequent high-profile attacks, as evidenced by the attack on Camp Bastion on September 14.

The insurgency has also retained its capability to carry out attacks at roughly the same level as last year. As seen in Figure 2, a number of security-related indicators, including IED incidents, and enemy-initiated attacks (EIAs)\(^6\), after declining substantially in 2011 and early 2012, have now leveled off or changed insignificantly.

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\(^6\) EIAs are the primary violence metric used in this report. However, this metric has a number of limitations, and should not be used by itself as an indication of the violence levels in Afghanistan. EIAs are primarily reported by ISAF forces, as ANSF reporting of EIAs is still developing. Insurgent attacks against purely civilian targets do not count as EIAs, nor do attempted attacks (such as found and cleared IEDs). Finally, EIAs often occur in response to ANSF or Coalition operations, and thus are not always a sign of insurgent strength. A more comprehensive analysis of violence levels in Afghanistan should take into account a number of other violence metrics, including a range of lower-level violence, as discussed on page 20 of this report.
Figure 2: Security Metrics 2011 – 2012, Year-over-Year change April 1 – September 30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Total EIs</th>
<th>High Profile Attacks</th>
<th>Direct Fire</th>
<th>Total IED Events</th>
<th>IED and Mine Explosions</th>
<th>Indirect Fire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% change from 2011 to 2012</td>
<td>+1%</td>
<td>+2%</td>
<td>+10%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>-12%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISAF, October 2012.

EIAs in RC-S declined, and while the overall number of attacks in RC-SW increased relative to the same period one year prior, the character and location of the attacks have followed the same trends as elsewhere in Afghanistan – reactive attacks that are increasingly distant from major population centers. For example, EIAs decreased in Kandahar’s capital district by 62 percent relative to last year. ISAF continues to focus operations in Helmand and Kandahar, which remain two of the most violent provinces in Afghanistan.

The EIAs in these provinces correlate with locations where ISAF and ANSF clearing and holding operations are underway. The nature of the EIAs indicates insurgents are reacting to defend areas, rather than shaping or more proactively engaging the coalition. Insurgent attacks are becoming more isolated and occurring away from population centers. The majority of Afghanistan’s 405 districts now experience very low levels of EIAs; 80 percent of attacks occur in districts with only 20 percent of the population, and nearly half of all attacks country-wide occur in just 10 districts – which contain only 3 percent of the population. Alternately, RC-W, RC-N, and RC-C account for 57 percent of the Afghan population, but only experienced roughly nine percent of all EIAs.

Many of the challenges faced by the insurgency in 2011 persisted this reporting period. These issues encompass leadership tensions, including internal discord regarding the Taliban’s acknowledgement of participation in the Qatar peace talks, friction between mid-to-low level fighters and the Pakistan-based senior leadership, and resource constraints that impede the effective execution of operations. Afghan fighters in Afghanistan are conscious of their sacrifices and of the fact that a large percentage of their leaders reside in Pakistani sanctuaries. Although this is a perennial theme, it has been a somewhat greater source of tension this fighting season than in prior cycles.

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7 Metric definitions: High-profile attacks (HPA) are currently defined by ISAF as explosive hazard events, where certain executed IED attacks are taken into account. Considered are only Person-borne IED (PBIED) attacks, suicide vehicle-borne IED attacks (SVBIED), and vehicle-borne IED attacks (VBIED). Enemy Initiated direct fire occurs when effects are delivered on a target that is visible to aimer or firing unit and uses the target itself as the point of aim. Enemy Initiated indirect fire occurs when fire is delivered on a target characterized by a relatively high trajectory and where the operator typically fire from a distance beyond line-of-sight or from a position where visual contact with the target is not possible. IED and Mine Explosions occur when a IED or a Mine (which has not been stacked, altered or used in some improvised manner, which would make it an IED) event results in the partial or complete functioning of the IED or Mine. Total IED Events comprises both executed and potential IED attacks. Executed IED attacks comprise IED explosions and mine strikes, while potential or attempted IED attacks comprise IEDs and mines that were found and cleared, premature IED detonations, and IED turn-ins.

8 See Annex A.7, A.8, and A.9 for further detail on population security.
Despite the tactical progress of ANSF-ISAF joint operations, the insurgency remains adaptable with a regenerative capacity. It retains the capability to emplace substantial numbers of improvised explosive devices and conduct high-profile attacks. Both the continued support the insurgency receives from Pakistani sanctuaries and the slow establishment of governance in cleared areas in Afghanistan risk undermining tactical gains by ANSF-ISAF operations. These sanctuaries account for the insurgency’s resiliency by protecting key insurgent and network leadership from ISAF/ANSF targeting operations and allowing time and space to plan, train, and fund operations in Afghanistan. Haqqani facilitation networks in Pakistan continue to move fighters toward Kabul and sustain a constant threat of high-profile attacks in the capital and eastern Afghanistan.

Insurgent operations are not limited to direct attacks on ANSF and ISAF personnel. The violence statistics, cited above, are not sufficient to measure the balance of insurgent and Afghan government influence. The insurgency continues to exert its influence in Afghanistan through alternate methods, including kidnappings, intimidation tactics, and robust assassination efforts. The insurgency also messages at mosques and leverages a network of familial, tribal, and ideological sympathizers to exert influence in areas controlled by the ANSF and ISAF. Insurgents have increased efforts to co-opt government officials and ANSF members in some areas. Insurgents continue to seize on areas where the Afghan government has failed to provide sufficient governance, rule of law, conflict resolution, and economic opportunities. The insurgency may likely continue to expand its soft power techniques as a result of its diminished operational capability and to conserve diminishing resources. It will retain an opportunistic propaganda and media campaign to exploit key events that inaccurately portray the security situation. Improved ANSF and GIRoA capability will be an important element in making gains permanent and establishing an enduring stability.

Near-term insurgent operations will continue to focus on regaining control of safe havens and influence over population centers in Helmand and Kandahar. Southern Afghanistan remains the center of gravity for the insurgency, both for its historical significance to the Taliban movement and its importance to the insurgency’s narcotics-related revenues. Kabul will remain a persistent target for high-profile attacks and assassinations. As the 2012 fighting season draws to a close and ISAF forces commence repositioning, the insurgency will likely continue to prioritize targeting Afghan security forces, as the insurgency is increasingly concerned with the improving capabilities of the ANSF and the effectiveness and influence of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program. Insurgents continued to encourage “insider attacks” through infiltration or co-option efforts, and to leverage those incidents as propaganda victories, in an effort to sow distrust in ISAF-Afghan relations and to erode the confidence of the ISAF coalition.

ANSF-ISAF OPERATIONS BY RC

REGIONAL COMMAND – EAST

During the reporting period, RC-E accounted for 41 percent of all nationwide EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012, a decrease of one percent compared to the same period from the previous year. EIAs in RC-E were down one percent compared to the corresponding period one
year ago. As part of the U.S. surge recovery, approximately 3,000 U.S. forces were drawn down from RC-E by the end of September.

Insurgents remained intent on expanding their influence in the provinces leading to Kabul, especially in the east and south. However, ANSF and ISAF operations in Logar and Wardak provinces reduced the ability of insurgents to use the region as a staging ground for operations in Kabul. The increased use of Laghman, Parwan, and Kapisa provinces as staging areas for insurgent attacks against Kabul was a result of these disruption operations.

Continued ANSF and ISAF operations disrupted facilitation routes from Pakistan’s tribal areas, particularly along the key eastern border provinces of Paktiya, Paktika, and Khost. These combined operations caused insurgent groups to alter their supply lines, as well as caused delays in supplies, fighters, and funds for local insurgent commanders. This progress was challenged by insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan’s tribal region, which continued to sustain insurgent operations in RC-E by providing facilitation routes and freedom from counterterrorism targeting Coalition and ANSF military operations.

Securing key border passes and major supply routes from Pakistan to Afghanistan remains a challenge. However, the Afghan Customs Department (ACD) and the Afghan Customs Police (ACP) showed increasing capacity to conduct independent operations. In early August, Afghan scanner operators interdicted 46,200 pounds of ammonium nitrate concealed in a truck at Torkham Gate. The effective operation of a truck x-ray scanner, provided by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Border Management Task Force (BMTF), facilitated this discovery. The ammonium nitrate seizure, which was the result of independent action by ACP officers with specialized training, is a positive sign of the capacity and resolve to conduct border law enforcement.

During the reporting period, the insurgency targeted district centers and GIRoA officials with operations designed to demonstrate the inability of the Afghan government to provide security in the region. Specific to Nuristan, ANSF efforts to hold the district centers of Barg-e-Matal and Kamdesh were exceptional. Supplying these centers through the Afghan Air Force, the ANA, ABP, AUP, and local ALP fighting together repelled a number of massed attacks from insurgents with the help of coalition airpower. Despite the logistical difficulties of supplying these mountain bases during the winter, the ANSF was committed to holding this province and was actively pursuing both winterization efforts and road building projects.

Simultaneously, the ANSF launched a number of large multi-day operations at the kandak level and higher, operating in several provinces, including Paktika, Wardak and Ghazni. These operations have disrupted insurgent operations and allowed the ANA to develop their operational skills. Most importantly, the ANA 201st Corps undertook Operation Husky in the difficult mountain terrain of Kunar Province to disrupt insurgent safe havens along the border with Pakistan. This operation was conducted in coordination with the Pakistani Army.

Persistent ANSF reports of cross-border indirect fire emanating from Pakistan into Kunar Province increased tension between the two countries. Although it is still in a confidence-
building stage, tri-partite coordination of border issues continued to improve at the tactical and strategic levels.

The surge of a Coalition brigade in Ghazni province and increased ANSF capability challenged insurgents in the support zones near Highway 1. Although this resulted in increased enemy-initiated activity, insurgent sanctuaries were effectively disrupted, leading to decreased insurgent activity along the highway. In Ghazni’s Andar District, local civilians upset over the Taliban’s oppression and closure of schools began to resist the insurgency forcefully. The ANSF and GIRoA increased both security efforts and developmental support to the people of Andar, expelling insurgents and channeling resistance efforts toward peaceful development. This movement has demonstrated the potential to inspire similar movements in adjacent districts and across RC-E. As the surge brigade left, the initial signs were that conditions were set for the ANSF to hold and expand security gains into the future with lowered levels of coalition support.

The operational capability of the Afghan National Army continued to improve with both Corps in RC-E planning and conducting large-scale, multi-day operations consisting of a series of complementary battalion- and brigade-level operations in Logar, Wardak, Paktika, Ghazni and Kunar Provinces. Concurrently, coordination and joint operations between the Army, Uniformed Police, Border Police, Civil Order Police and the National Directorate of Security continued to increase and improve. This progress lends confidence to the ANSF’s ability to retain and advance this year’s progress despite the departure of a U.S. brigade from Ghazni Province as the last of RC-E’s surge forces.

**REGIONAL COMMAND – SOUTH**

During the reporting period, RC-S accounted for 21 percent of all nationwide enemy-initiated attacks (EIAs), a decrease of one percent compared to the corresponding period the previous year. EIAs in RC-S decreased by four percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago. Just three districts within RC-S – Zharay, Panjwa’i, and Maiwand – accounted for more than 12 percent of insurgent attacks nation-wide. However, Zharay, Panjwa’i, and Maiwand had a two percent reduction in insurgent initiated attacks in comparison to the same time period last year. With the start of Tranche 3, 70 percent of RC-S’s population resides in areas at various states of Transition to Afghan security lead. As part of the U.S. surge recovery, approximately 4,500 U.S. forces were withdrawn from RC-S by the end of September.

The Taliban demonstrated a limited ability to affect large provincial population centers. EIAs in Kandahar City, Tarin Kot, and Qalat decreased by 37 percent in comparison to the same period last year and generated 43 percent fewer civilian casualties. Kandahar city alone saw EIAs drop by 62 percent, when compared to the same last year. Although high-profile attacks continue in RC-S, there have been no successful assassinations since January 2012. The most recent assassination attempt was an unsuccessful attack in late August against the Provincial Chief of Police, BG Razziq.

The focus of insurgent activity was intensely concentrated in Zharay, Panjwa’i, and Maiwand Districts in an effort to re-establish facilitation lines into Kandahar City, reclaim safe havens lost last year, and defend against recurring ANSF-ISAF operations. These districts are home to less than one percent of the total Afghan population, but together accounted for more than 13 percent
of nationwide EIAs and more than 15 percent of nationwide Direct Fire (DF) events in 2012. Although the Taliban were able to carry out an attack near Kandahar Airfield on June 6, 2012, the bulk of insurgent attacks have been pushed outside of Kandahar City and its surrounding populated areas. Kandahar-based insurgents have struggled to regain influence in the province due to Afghan government security improvements. Security has especially been enhanced by the ALP.

Taliban leadership made an effort to increase operations in Uruzgan Province, but lack of supplies and fighters, as well as tribal tensions, remain challenges. Zabul province has also improved security through aggressive operations against insurgent leaders and the formation of the ALP, both of which have weakened the insurgents influence as well as lowered fighter morale.

The ANA’s 205th Corps successfully conducted Operation KALAK HODE V during September 2012 in Zabul Province. This three-week operation, which involved more than 11,000 personnel, was principally Afghan-planned, -led, and -manned. KALAK HODE V was designed to defeat insurgents and expand police garrisons along Highway 1, the link between Kabul and Kandahar. OP KALAK HODE V also provided greater local security, allowing GIRoA officials to expand their district-level influence. ANSF commanders recognized that KALAK HODE V was not merely an operation focused on disrupting the insurgency, but was a critical opportunity to develop coordination between the Afghan Army, Police, Border Police, and National Directorate of Security. During KALAK HODE V, the 205th Corps seized large quantities of insurgent weapons, supplies, and explosives. The operation was logistically supported through the Afghan supply channels.

RC-S has had more insider attacks than any other RC in 2012. Insider attacks have had a negative operational effect, albeit temporarily, on partnered operations. ISAF and ANSF commanders have made preventing insider attacks a top priority, and have instituted a number of collective countermeasures. Although the rise in insider attacks has tested the ISAF and ANSF relationship, the relationship remains strong.

ANSF-ISAF operations in RC-S placed insurgents in a disadvantaged position. Insurgent operations in RC-S will likely continue to focus on regaining safe havens, freedom of movement, and influence by attempting high-profile attacks against GIRoA/ANSF/ISAF facilities and personnel.

**REGIONAL COMMAND – SOUTHWEST**

During the reporting period, RC-SW accounted for 30 percent of all nationwide EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012, the same percentage as compared to the corresponding period from the previous year. Eight of the ten most violent districts in the country were located in RC-SW. From April 2012 through September 2012, EIAs in RC-SW increased by two percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago, despite the removal of approximately 9,000 U.S. forces as part of the surge recovery.

ANSF and ISAF operations continued to pressure insurgent safe havens and strongholds, pushing insurgents out of the populated areas of the northern Helmand River valley. Most areas
under insurgent control two years ago are now under ANSF and ISAF control. This development has allowed the ANSF to expand their manning of outposts throughout the valley. ANSF and ISAF operations have generated reactive insurgent attacks largely consisting of defensive direct fire events. Nahr-e Saraj, home to less than 0.5 percent of the Afghan population and the most violent district in Afghanistan, generated 11 percent of nationwide EIAs and 12 percent of direct fire attacks (DFs) this year alone. These statistics highlight both the increasingly localized insurgent activity and their confinement to areas away from major population centers.

A small number of high-profile attacks (HPAs) occurred during the reporting period, including the multiple suicide bombings on August 14, 2012, in Nimroz’s provincial capital, Zaranj; these incidents resulted in multiple civilian casualties but also demonstrated the increased capacity of Afghan security forces, which were able successfully to interdict 11 of the 14 bombers.

ANSF and ISAF operations in Washir District also disrupted insurgent facilitation for northern and central Helmand Province. Increased ALP presence and interdictions of lethal aid and opium shipments delayed district-level seasonal materiel resupply to insurgents. This reduction in supplies and funding will likely impact the pace of attacks for the remainder of the fighting season, resulting in increased reliance on IEDs and harassing fire to preserve limited resources. Insurgent attempts to take advantage of transitioning districts by focusing on perceived softer targets of the ANSF through intimidation, infiltration, and co-option were unsuccessful during this reporting period.

**Regional Command – West**

During the reporting period, RC-W accounted for five percent of all national EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012, an increase of one percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago. From April 2012 through September 2012, EIAs in RC-W increased by 44 percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago. Many of the attacks can be attributed to ANSF-led operations in Badghis province and the presence of insurgents pushed out of northern Helmand province and into southern Farah province. All provinces in RC-W are currently in Transition with 11 of the 43 districts yet to enter. No province in RC-W has all its districts in transition. The majority of the remaining districts will be ready to enter Transition within 12 months.

The increase in EIAs in RC-W this year was likely due to spillover from RC-SW operations in Helmand. ANSF and ISAF operations were successful in pushing insurgents out of many of the populated areas of the Helmand River valley and into surrounding desert areas. Some insurgents were pushed further into remote areas in Farah, which borders Helmand to the north.

Although some insurgent activities in RC-W were Taliban-related, many activities were related to criminal networks. A small number of high-profiles attacks (HPAs) occurred during the reporting period. Contrary to insurgents’ stated intent, however, none of these HPAs significantly disrupted ISAF and ANSF movement along Highway 1, where ISAF-ANSF predominantly focuses operations. ANSF effectiveness in unilateral operations in the areas where security responsibility has been transferred has improved compared to the previous year.
Insurgent attacks remained largely ineffective, while the ANSF proved capable of maintaining minimal levels of security. Taliban-influenced, Pashtun-inhabited pockets in RC-W were primarily located in the districts of Farah Province in proximity to RC-S and RC-SW, along with segregated pockets in Badghis Province. The insurgency will likely continue efforts to exploit poor economic conditions, tribal rivalries, and a lack of effective governance to develop influence among the RC-W populace. RC-W has started to posture Coalition Forces for downsizing, with ANSF progressively taking lead in the respective areas.

**REGIONAL COMMAND – NORTH**

During the reporting period, RC-N accounted for four percent of all EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012, an increase of one percent compared to the corresponding period from the previous year. From April 2012 through September 2012, EIAs in RC-N increased 28 percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.

Operations in RC-N focused on key terrain in Faryab, Balkh, Kunduz, and Baghlan provinces, where the majority of the insurgents remain restricted in ethnic Pashtun pockets. With a view to planned force realignments, RC-N succeeded in establishing a stronger ANSF presence in the western part of RC-N, and effectively focused operations on supporting the ANSF in expanding GIRoA authority in Faryab province.

The insurgent strategy in RC-N evidenced minimal change this reporting period, with insurgents continuing to focus on high-profile attacks (HPAs) and assassinations directed at Afghan government officials and emplacing IEDs along the Baghlan-Kunduz corridor.

Counterterrorism (CT) operations against Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) leadership were effective at disrupting potential operations, and further attrition of the network could impede operational capability. However, the IMU remains a resilient group and will recover in the absence of persistent pressure. ISAF does not expect the insurgency to expand influence in northern Afghanistan, nor is it likely that attacks will increase further from norms in this region.

The Tranche 3 Transition Announcement in May 2012 covered another 46 districts in 5 provinces of RC-N, including the provincial capitals Kunduz and Maimanah, also placing all districts of Jowzan Province in Transition. All provinces in RC-N are now in Transition, with only 23 of the 123 districts in the region yet to enter the process. With the exception of the less secure districts in the far west of the region; all remaining districts are assessed as being ready to enter the Transition process within 12 months.

Following force retrograde and realignment (including the closure of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Feyzabad, Badakhshan, Faryab, and Maimanah), Coalition forces will no longer have an enduring presence in the western and eastern parts of RC-N. The ANSF are suitably developed to take lead in those respective areas. Nevertheless, RC-N has implemented an approach that will support situational awareness in areas without enduring Coalition force presence and – if required – establish temporary options to advise and support. This approach
will set the standard for other areas of the country, which will retrograde and realign ISAF forces in a similar manner.

**REGIONAL COMMAND – CAPITAL**

RC-C is the safest regional command by a wide margin. During the reporting period, EIAs in RC-C represented a negligible percentage of all EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012. EIAs in RC-C decreased by 25 percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.

Security has steadily improved over the reporting period, although RC-C has always had low rates of attacks. The ANSF assumed lead security responsibility for Kabul district on August 28, 2008. The entire province entered Transition as part of Tranche 1 in July 2011, and security functions have since been handed over from ISAF to the ANSF. The transfer of Kabul security from the Afghan National Army (ANA) to the Afghan National Police (ANP) marks a shift in primacy from military to police. Kabul is among the provinces that have progressed the farthest in the Transition process.

There were 5 high-profile attacks (HPAs) in RC-C this year compared to 12 HPAs during the same period in 2011. Despite the Haqqani Network (HTN) being responsible for most attacks in Kabul, the Taliban continued to claim credit for RC-C insurgent activity. Although the April 15, 2012 HTN complex attack against three targets in Kabul City demonstrated complexity in organization and execution, it also displayed the ANSF’s ability to respond quickly and effectively to HPAs, while minimizing civilian causalities. The tactics used in the May 2 Green Village and June 21 Spochmai Hotel attacks have also been used in other areas of Afghanistan. Kabul City remains a primary target of operations facilitated by the HTN due to the overwhelming media attention and political exposure a successful attack would generate.

Threat reporting for RC-C this reporting period was characterized by persistent insurgent efforts to conduct HPAs as a means to discredit security claims and advance perceptions of Taliban power and influence. However, improved ANSF security capabilities, as well as NDS activities and combined ANSF and ISAF special operations, disrupted insurgent attack cells and facilitation routes.

**1.6: TRANSITION**

The Transition process was jointly conceived of and developed by the Afghan government, the United States, NATO, and ISAF Coalition partners in a series of international conferences during 2010, beginning with the London Conference in January and culminating in the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November. Transition is the process of transferring security authority and responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan government by the end of 2014.

Transition commenced in July 2011 with the first of five tranches of geographic areas. The final tranche is expected to be announced in mid-2013, as agreed upon at the May 2012 Chicago NATO Conference, at which point the ANSF will be in the lead for security across all of Afghanistan.

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9The Transition process will occur in phases based on the selection of geographic areas, or “Tranches.” There are expected to be five Tranches total. Tranches 1, 2, and 3 have already been selected and are in Transition.
Afghanistan, and ISAF will be in a supporting role. By the end of 2014, Transition in all provinces will be complete, and the ANSF will be fully responsible for security nationwide.

**Figure 3: Transitioning Provinces and Districts (as of May 13, 2012)**

**SHIFT OF MISSION DURING TRANSITION**

ISAF’s mission focus remains to protect the people of Afghanistan by supporting the sovereign government in the development of a national security force capable of assuming the lead responsibility for security operations. Upon entry into Transition, the ANSF assume lead security responsibility for that area and become the supported command, with ISAF becoming the supporting command. During the Transition process, staff functions are steadily transferred to the ANSF as their capability increases. ISAF often retains military assets in that area, and when required, engages in combat operations alongside the ANSF. As the ANSF take on more responsibility and become capable of more independent operations, ISAF support is reduced, and authority to provide additional support migrates upwards to the Commander IJC (COMIJC) and then to the Commander ISAF (COMISAF). Areas proceed through Transition on different timelines based upon demonstrated improvement in security, governance, and rule of law, and to the increased proficiency of the ANSF. At completion, the ANSF assume full security responsibility.
The transition of security lead is not only the reallocation of responsibility from ISAF to the ANSF, but also a shift from counterinsurgency to increasing focus on law enforcement. This shift has already taken place in multiple areas, most notably Kabul, where the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) retain command and control, with ANA support only when necessary. Once the security situation allows ISAF to withdraw from the key regions and population centers, the responsibility for enduring stability will fall upon the Afghan police forces.

**Current State of Transition – Tranches One, Two, and Three**

Transition is being implemented in accordance with the *Inteqal* Framework\(^\text{10}\) across all 261 districts from Tranches 1, 2 and 3. As the ANSF demonstrates its capability, the level of ISAF support is adjusted allowing the ANSF to take more responsibility.

The Transition process met another major milestone this reporting period with President Karzai’s May 13 announcement of Tranche 3. With the implementation of Tranche 3, approximately 76 percent of the Afghan population lives in areas where the ANSF are in the lead for security. Tranche 3 is more expansive than the first two tranches with 122 new districts entering the Transition process. It includes all remaining provincial capitals and major transportation corridors. To better manage risk in subsequent tranches, some of Afghanistan’s more challenging districts were included in Tranche 3 while ISAF has sufficient combat power to address significant security challenges in support of ANSF.

Implementation of Transition in Tranche 3 areas has already begun. For Tranche 3, the Afghan government assumed responsibility for organizing Transition ceremonies, marking the start of Transition. Between July and September, Transition ceremonies were held in provinces entering Transition for the first time. With the start of Tranche 3, 11 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces are wholly in Transition, including Kabul, Balkh, Samangan, Takhar, Bamyan, Panjshyr, Daykundi and Nimroz.

Planning for Tranche 4 began during the reporting period. Transition readiness improved in 36 of the remaining 143 districts waiting to enter Transition, and no districts declined in their readiness ratings. As with Tranche 3, Tranche 4 will likely include areas with significant security challenges; however, managing the associated risk with the forces available is an important planning factor.

At the end of September, 2012, the ANSF had begun to assume the lead for security in 261 of the country’s 405 districts.

**Tracking Progress in Transitioning Areas**

The increasing capability of the ANSF has expanded security gains in many Transitioning areas. Tranche 1 and 2 areas (138 districts in 20 provinces) continue to be the most secure areas in Afghanistan, both in terms of objective measures and Afghan population perceptions. As U.S.

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\(^{10}\) According to the 2010 *Inteqal* Framework, which established the Afghan-led Transition process, the Joint Afghan-NATO *Inteqal* Board (JANIB) is responsible for approving transition implementation plans and recommending areas to enter or complete the transition process.
and Coalition Forces draw down and re-posture, the ANSF are progressively taking the lead in transition areas and helping to expand Afghan government influence, most notably in RC-N, where the Coalition will withdraw all of its forces from the eastern- and western-most districts toward the end of 2012. Additionally, there has been evidence of the ANSF independently expanding security in areas where ISAF does not have an established presence, showing the initiative and capability to establish security in areas before they have formally entered the Transition process, including Nuristan and other districts in the north. Improving and maintaining security in Tranche 3 will be more challenging than in the first two tranches because several areas entered Transition at lower readiness levels. Additionally, later tranches may also be challenged by successful operations in Tranches 1, 2, and 3 that have caused some insurgent forces to migrate into less secure areas, largely outside of the population centers.

Notably, during the reporting period, EIAs declined in two of the three Transition Tranches, although this reduction was variable by geographic area with some transition areas still facing challenges. EIAs declined in transitioning areas overall by four percent, with Tranches 1 and 3 experiencing nine and seven percent decreases, respectively, compared to the same period last year. EIAs in Tranche 2 went up four percent. In districts that have not yet entered Transition, there was a six percent increase in the number of EIAs over 2011. Tranches 1 and 2 continue to be the most secure areas in Afghanistan by objective measures and Afghan perceptions, although the most drastic reductions in EIA-related violence in transitioning areas occurred in RC-SW and RC-S.

Although these security gains were significant, progress was uneven across the country and within regions, with some Transition areas still facing challenges and occasionally regressing in security. Transitioning areas with the greatest reduction in attacks were Helmand, around the southern Helmand River Valley, and Kandahar, particularly Kandahar City and Uruzgan, where combined operations were focused over the summer. Additionally, in Kabul, where the ANSF have full security lead, security incidents have stayed at minimal levels, with HPAs declining significantly since last year.

EIA trends in Transition areas in the east were mixed. Many districts in Wardak and Kapisa saw considerable reductions in EIAs, while much of Logar and Ghazni experienced sizable increases, likely due to the preponderance of ANSF/ISAF operations those areas and the introduction of an additional Coalition brigade in Ghazni. The ANSF conducted unilateral operations in southern Paktika, establishing security and accepting responsibility for security lead.

Although attacks rose slightly in Transition areas in the west, it was not statistically significant, and much of the increase occurred in the southern-most and least-populated provinces of Farah and Ghor – likely a result of spillover from operations in northern Helmand. Similarly, in the north, there was a slight increase in insurgent-related violence but the overwhelming majority was concentrated in the in ethnic Pashtun pockets of the Kunduz-Baghlan corridor.

In general, the ANSF are displaying increased capability and sophistication in transitioning areas, particularly in RC-E and RC-S, where they are planning and conducting large-scale, multi-day operations and showing increased coordination and integration across military and police pillars. Kabul remains the safest area in the country under ANSF-led security. However, lack of
coordination between ANA and AUP in general continues to be one of the major challenges in transitioning areas, along with attacks along access routes to major population centers and government ineffectiveness. Governance and development tend to lag behind security and will required continued assistance through the Decade of Transformation.

1.7: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

A principal priority for ISAF is to protect the Afghan population. Therefore, ISAF takes all appropriate measures to prevent ISAF-generated civilian casualties (CIVCAS), while also seeking to minimize insurgent capabilities to cause CIVCAS.

The Afghan government’s legitimacy and credibility will, in great part, be determined by its ability to protect the Afghan population. Recognizing the devastating effects of CIVCAS incidents and their negative impact on campaign strategy and operations, ISAF is focused on applying lessons learned to identify and strengthen population protection measures.

The results of ISAF mitigation actions are manifest in CIVCAS trends and statistics. Over the reporting period, CIVCAS increased by 18 percent compared to the same period last year, the vast majority of which are caused by insurgents. However, ISAF-caused CIVCAS decreased by 35 percent compared to the same period last year. At the same time, insurgent-caused CIVCAS increased by 25 percent, resulting in an overall increase of 18 percent in CIVCAS from all sources for the reporting period.

In 2008, the Civilian Casualties Mitigation Team (CCMT) was established in HQ ISAF. The CCMT coordinates ISAF’s CIVCAS avoidance and mitigation measures, as well as providing COMISAF and other senior leaders with strategic assessments and recommendations on this issue. In addition to tracking all ISAF-reported CIVCAS in Afghanistan, the focus of the CCMT is to implement procedures for identification of the facts, review of post-incident management actions, assessment of causes, and identification of lessons and best practices for subsequent adoption.

In its efforts to mitigate CIVCAS, ISAF has implemented measures in the field, including the Tactical Driving Directive and Escalation of Force Procedures. On 12 June 2012, General Allen issued an order that no aerial munitions be delivered against dwellings housing civilians, except in cases of self-defense where no other options exist. Additionally, the lessons identified and learned following CIVCAS incidents have led to the inclusion of CIVCAS avoidance and mitigation topics in Pre-Deployment Training. As a result of these and other efforts, there was a 48 percent decrease in ISAF-caused CIVCAS from June to September 2012. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) 2012 Midyear Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict recognized the steps taken by ISAF to reduce CIVCAS. The

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11 The ISAF CCMT (Civilian Casualties Mitigation Team) methodology is based on internal and comprehensive reports provided by ISAF troops within Afghanistan, and the activation of Joint Incident Assessment Teams comprised of Afghan government representatives as well as ISAF to review evidence and conduct interviews. The amount of available information depends on ISAF involvement in the event, and therefore it is possible that ISAF statistics under-estimate CIVCAS caused by events where ISAF was not present.
discrepancies between ISAF and UNAMA numbers relate to differences in methodologies and categorization of civilian casualties. Nevertheless, the reported trends in CIVCAS are similar.

From April through September 2012, approximately 90 percent of CIVCAS were caused by insurgents. Insurgents continue to rely heavily on the use of indiscriminate tactics, such as IEDs. In the reporting period, 59 percent of insurgent-caused CIVCAS were due to IEDs. ISAF has continued its efforts to find and clear IEDs prior to detonation.

An area of great concern, however, continues to be alleged and disputed CIVCAS. Since conditions on the ground do not always permit complete battle damage assessments, insurgents have exploited opportunities to claim that those killed in ISAF-ANSF operations were innocent Afghan civilians, despite ISAF information to the contrary. The CCMT tracks alleged CIVCAS incidents as an indicator of public perception. Notably, from April-September 2012, there were a total of 187 confirmed ISAF-inflicted CIVCAS. Additionally, a total of 29 CIVCAS were alleged in the same period. ISAF investigates all alleged CIVCAS to determine responsibility and provides guidelines on consequence management.

During the Transition phase, emphasis is being placed on working closely with Afghan counterparts to ensure rigorous and accurate reporting of CIVCAS caused by Afghan and Coalition forces and to prevent negative repercussions generated by false allegations published by the media. An area of focus in the transition of security responsibilities to the Afghan government is therefore the transfer of ISAF CIVCAS avoidance and mitigation measures, procedures, and capabilities to ANSF for effective population protection. The CCMT has been engaging Afghan security institutions to jumpstart this process. Although efforts to mitigate ISAF-caused CIVCAS have shown positive results, success will ultimately be measured by the overall number of CIVCAS in the country, and the Afghan government’s ability to take effective actions to protect the Afghan population during and after the Transition phase.
1.8: INSIDER ATTACKS

Although statistically small in number, Insider Attacks (formerly referred to as Green-on-Blue incidents) have had a negative impact on the Coalition mission in Afghanistan. The frequency of these attacks has steadily risen since 2008, but has increased sharply in 2012 thus far. ISAF continues to assess the motivations behind the attacks, where possible, which are a combination of infiltration, impersonation, co-option, post-traumatic stress, inter-personal disputes and extremist views. The ANSF itself also continues to face insider attacks, formerly known as Green-on-Green incidents. The ANSF is working with ISAF and GIRoA to mitigate these attacks as well.

Although ISAF lacks the data to conclusively determine the cause many attacks due to the death of the majority of the attackers, insurgent propaganda and messaging has played a role in many attacks. Insurgents have adopted insider attacks as a tactic to create a seam between ISAF and the ANSF, sowing mistrust between partners and undermining domestic support for the campaign. Such attacks are helpful to the insurgency whether or not the insurgency is directly responsible.
Insider attacks are characterized by incidents in which ANSF members knowingly attack and/or help facilitate an attack against the Coalition with the intent to maim or kill Coalition personnel; incidents in which insurgents portray themselves as ANSF members with the intent to target Coalition Force (CF) personnel; and incidents in which previously friendly third-country nationals and local nationals, for whatever reason, seek to attack CF personnel.

The probable motives for Insider Attacks are categorized as:

- **Infiltration:** An existing insurgent member clandestinely joins the ANSF through the standard recruitment process in order to support the insurgency by conducting intelligence collection, sabotage, subversion, or attacks.

- **Co-option:** An existing ANSF member is recruited to assist or act on behalf of the insurgency. A member can be recruited through various means, including ideological...
pressures, financial incentives, intimidation, extortion, or familial and tribal ties. In contrast to infiltration, co-opting an existing ANSF member circumvents the initial screening and vetting process to which new ANSF recruits are subjected.

- **Impersonation:** An insurgent or non-ANSF member poses as an ANSF member to conduct attacks. With the availability of counterfeit uniforms and IDs, impersonation is often easier to accomplish than co-option or infiltration. More sophisticated cases of impersonation have often incorporated some level of facilitation, complicity, or awareness by ANSF members, whether by providing an ID, escorting the individual onto base, or simply knowing of the attacker’s intentions to target ISAF members.

- **Personal motives:** An ANSF member acts intentionally yet independently as an individual perpetrator – without direct guidance, command, or pre-planning by external entities.

In cases the attacker’s motive cannot be discerned, the category “Unknown” is used. Insider attacks incidents do not include cases of misidentification, negligent discharge, or any other ANSF-inflicted accidental injury or death of CF personnel.

Between May 2007 and the end of September 2012, a total of 79 Insider Attacks occurred. Of those 79 incidents, five (six percent) are possibly or likely attributable to infiltration; 11 (14 percent) are assessed as likely or possibly attributable to co-option; 30 (38 percent) are possibly or likely attributable to personal motives; three (four percent) are considered related to unknown reasons but having insurgent ties, and 30 (38 percent) to unknown (or pending due to ongoing investigations). Of the 79 insider attacks, 69 resulted in CF (military and civilian personnel) deaths and/or wounded, causing a total of 116 CF deaths and 164 CF wounded. As of the end of the reporting period, there have been 37 attacks in 2012, resulting in 51 coalition deaths (32 U.S deaths) and 74 wounded.

The Taliban has adapted its propaganda, hoping to inspire attacks through themes of praise, revenge, and provision of support and sanctuary. For example, in Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar’s August 2012 Eid al-Fitr address, he praised ANSF members who conduct insider attacks and urged other ANSF to do as “your brave friends have done.” Taliban statements have promoted the protection and facilitation of attackers out of Afghanistan, and projected a willingness to support those committing insider attacks, even those without prior Taliban affiliation. As part of this messaging, the Taliban claims attacks they did not engineer and exaggerates ISAF casualty numbers for attacks that do occur.

The cause of the majority of insider attacks in 2012 has yet to be determined, and sometimes the cause is impossible to determine given that in many cases, the attacker is killed during the incident. There may be a correlation in attacks inspiring one another. Seventeen events in 2012 occurred within 48 hours of a previous attack; however, there is no hard evidence to definitively conclude that these subsequent attacks were inspired by a previous event.

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12 The number of Insider Attacks is subject to change based on on-going analysis and as new incidents emerge.
Although no single definitive countermeasure can prevent such attacks, ISAF has implemented numerous measures, many of which have only been recently introduced (with some still being implemented) applying a DOTMLPF\(^{13}\) approach. It will take time for the full program of action to take effect. However, insider attacks declined substantially in September 2012 as compared to August, potentially providing an early indication that countermeasures are working effectively in reducing the threat.

Countering this threat is a top priority for both ISAF and GIRoA. Coalition Forces and the ANSF are working together on a comprehensive, combined, and integrated response to insider attacks, and have implemented several measures to reduce the risk of personally motivated attacks and to minimize infiltration. There are also a number of additional countermeasures that are currently under analysis for implementation in the near future.

A series of high-level conferences with senior ISAF and Afghan commanders and government representatives took place in August and September to stress the importance of the issue and coordinate further effective action. Consequently, ISAF has deployed a range of measures to mitigate the Insider Threat, many of which are combined with Afghan efforts to address the problem.

ISAF has a specific program of tasks which, when applied collectively, can minimize the threat posed by Insider Attacks. The program is adaptable, managed, and overseen by an Insider Threat Action Group (ITAG) and a combined ISAF/ANSF 3-star. A 1-Star level joint board was also created to ensure the policies of the ITAG are properly implemented. Many of the program tasks require multi-level ISAF-ANSF collaboration to address the issue.

Additionally, the Insider Threat Mitigation Team, a new executive oversight group of senior Afghan and Coalition leaders, was stood up to monitor, direct, and drive the new threat mitigation initiatives. The team will be supported by a combined multi-agency working group. A joint assessment commission will study incidents and identify lessons and required actions for the future.

\(^{13}\) DOTMLPF: A military approach or process to consider gaps in the context of strategic direction that takes into account: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities.
Specific attention has fallen on the ANSF recruit vetting process and a system of targeted re-vetting of the enlisted force is also being developed. The Afghan security ministries will enforce vetting procedures to mitigate infiltration threats. The ANSF has an eight-step process to vet recruits: 1) issuing an Afghan ID card; 2) gathering background information from tribal elders; 3) gathering personal information about family members; 4) conducting criminal background checks; 5) completing a formal application process; 6) drug screening; 7) medical screening; and 8) collecting the individual’s biometric data. To ensure the effectiveness of screening, the process is undergoing review and evaluation, and improvements are being implemented for new recruits, including a new measure, issued by Presidential Directive, which requires ANA recruits to be interviewed by a four-person council consisting of Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of Interior (MoI), NDS, and medical department officials. As a temporary measure, ALP training has been slowed to permit adequate resources to be applied to re-vetting more than 16,000 ALP personnel. The increase in vetting capacity will require the provision of additional equipment for drug testing, biometrics, and surveillance.

To address the risk of personally motivated attacks, ISAF is working with ANSF commanders and their Religious and Cultural Affairs officers (RCA). Nine hundred RCA personnel, assigned throughout the ANA down to the kandak level, train and educate ANA soldiers on cultural differences to mitigate insider attacks caused by disagreements, grievances or perceived offenses. They also screen ANA soldiers returning from leave for any signs of radicalization, and ISAF is working with the ANSF to implement additional procedures to strengthen this screening. Additionally, under a March ISAF Directive, all commands are required to conduct refresher cultural awareness training for ISAF personnel, particularly for mentors who work
side-by-side with the Afghans. The ANA have recently agreed to supply RCA officers to support NATO pre-deployment training.

Additionally, the Afghan MoD has established hundreds of counterintelligence positions within the ANA maneuver kandaks and garrison units. The MoD recently doubled its authorization of counterintelligence (CI) officers, and the NDS is focused on mitigating insider threats. GIRoA and ANSF members are assigned to Kandaks, Brigades, Recruitment Centers, and Training Centers. The primary mission is counterintelligence, but they consider their mission three-fold: first, to prevent or investigate desertion; second, to deny enemy infiltration into the ANA; and third, to detect external influences, such as the Taliban, Pakistani, or Iranian agencies and deny them contact with ANA soldiers. Additionally, CI training has been accelerated, graduating classes every four weeks instead of 5. In essence, CI training throughput has doubled.

The MoD has also issued a number of directives geared toward improving security postures, reducing vulnerabilities, and raising awareness of infiltration threats. ISAF is exploring additional CI initiatives with the ANSF, including:

- Examining potential to establish a “Chief of Counterintelligence” at corps and brigade levels, while expediting CI equipment requirements, e.g., mobile polygraph kits.

- Establishing ANSF mobile training teams to augment military intelligence training at the unit level.

- Establishing a Joint Protection Plan for how to integrate ANA protection measures for ANA serving with ISAF units.

- Joint random CI screening of select units.

- Re-vetting ANSF members and reinvestigating their backgrounds.

- Ongoing education programs are reducing this vulnerability. Insurgent co-option targets the vulnerable, seeking to influence those that are susceptible within the ANSF who have not had the opportunity for education.

A combined ISAF – ANSF assessment process for post-attack analysis has been formalized in ISAF procedures, changing our doctrine in assessing attacks to allow rapid dissemination of warnings and lessons learned. Cultural and religious awareness for both ISAF and ANSF personnel is also under review in order to build mutual understanding. ISAF personnel’s understanding of their operating environment has been formalized with sensing and atmospherics reporting to assist in identifying potential Insider Attack indicators. There are also initiatives to spread understanding of the Insider Threat within the ANSF to deter and dissuade potential attackers and encourage personnel to pass warnings on colleagues they consider a potential threat.
There is also a clear and coordinated line on communicating ISAF – ANSF messaging in order to combat insurgent propaganda that seeks to exploit every attack. However, all these initiatives and tasks do not detract from ISAF leadership responsibilities to protect personnel. Within COIN doctrine, commanders must be flexible in their operating posture to mitigate threats. The Insider Threat is no different. To protect ISAF soldiers, “Guardian Angel” over-watch (an additional force protection measure) is employed for specific tasks and activities in which ISAF soldiers may be more exposed to Afghan personnel or may be operating in more remote locations. Establishing and maintaining a disciplined mindset that is conscious of the Insider Threat is paramount to reducing the insurgents’ or rogue soldier’s opportunity to attack. Additionally, a robust system for passing Insider Threat warnings – the Red Stripe system – has also been developed to cascade warnings throughout the ISAF chain of command and heighten the situational awareness of ISAF personnel. The warning system will include the ANSF in due course. To further reduce vulnerability and to balance against elevated threats following the release of the “Innocence of Muslims” video, COMISAF issued a temporary directive in early September to assess force protection measures in partnered units and reduce operational tempo while these assessments took place in order to mitigate against insider attacks and civil disturbances. As of the end of the reporting period, 90 percent of operations have returned to normal.

ISAF’s organizational profile for Security Force Assistance is being reviewed to ensure that the correct force and protective posture can be delivered for future operations. An element of the review is an assessment of base facilities for vulnerabilities that need to be corrected or mitigated in order to reduce the risk to personnel, critical infrastructure and equipment to as low as practically possible. This review may require additional material and re-focusing of engineering assets to achieve the required protective standards. Furthermore, the Insider Threat training guidance for Troop Contributing Nations has been updated across 3 tiers: National pre-deployment training, reception training upon arrival in-theater, and continuation training throughout a tour of duty. The content of this training is regularly updated to hone training objectives based upon theater procedures; absorb lessons learned from recent Insider Attacks; accommodate the valuable input of Afghan Religious and Cultural Affairs officers; assure course content; and build Afghan CI capacity and capability.

The ANSF itself also continues to face insider attacks, formerly known as Green-on-Green incidents. The ANSF is working with ISAF and GIRoA to mitigate these attacks as well, using many of the same measures as detailed above.

1.9: REINTEGRATION

Afghan Presidential Decree #43 established the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) in June 2010. The APRP is a GIRoA National Priority Program (NPP) managed by the High Peace Council (HPC) and executed at the national level by the Joint Secretariat (JS). The HPC and JS work with the Provincial Peace Committees (PPCs) and Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams (PJSTs) to execute the program at the provincial level effectively. Successful APRP execution not only improves the security environment by bringing fighters and weapons in from the battlefield, but also promotes grievance resolution, which keeps individuals from returning to the insurgency. APRP strengthens governance by using provincial/district structures to deliver
projects to communities and, as a result, increases the legitimacy of GIRoA. Finally, community recovery projects provide jobs to members of the community (including former insurgents) and contribute to economic sustainability. Communities that accept the reintegrees propose community recovery projects specifically designed for their communities, providing them with a "peace dividend" for supporting the peace process.

The overall reintegration rate slowed during this reporting period as compared to the previous period (see Figure 7). From April 1 to September 30, 2012, the APRP enrolled 954 reintegrees, compared to 1,606 during the previous six months. The pace of reintegration, however, is difficult to predict, especially during the peak of the fighting season.

**Figure 7: Reintegree Numbers**

![Figure 7: Reintegree Numbers](image)

COMISAF’s directive to pressure the insurgency relentlessly throughout the country is viewed as a primary reason insurgents are deciding to join the peace process. As of September 24, 2012, the APRP had formally enrolled 5,044 former insurgents; this number is up from 3,907 since the close of the previous reporting period on March 31, 2012. Program recidivism still remains low, at less than one percent. RC-N and RC-W again achieved the greatest reintegration numbers, enrolling a total of 810 reintegrees. Despite the fact that reintegration momentum decreased in RC-E overall during the reporting period, it is significant to note that Nuristan, Kunar, and Nangarhar enrolled 57 official reintegrees. This figure is more than half of the 101 reintegrees enrolled for RC-E. Although RC-S and RC-SW enrolled only 34 total reintegrees, Uruzgan has a group of 26 insurgents undergoing the reintegration process and RC-S is cautiously optimistic regarding the outlook for the next six months. Although reintegree numbers still lag in RC-E, RC-S, and RC-SW, there has been increased dialog with insurgent individuals and groups in these areas concerning the process.

The past six months have seen improvement in the number of Provincial Governors, Provincial Peace Councils and Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams that support formal reintegration. RC-N and RC-W continue to lead the way in the reintegration effort, with 82 percent of all reintegrees coming from these two areas. APRP success appears to the product of a combination of program
support at the provincial level, provincial teamwork, effective security ministries (Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and the National Directorate of Security), and proactive leadership.

The primary reason that reintegration has been slow to take hold in the eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan is insufficient security in these regions. A small number of former insurgents who have shown an interest in reintegration or have undergone the reintegration process have been threatened or killed by the Taliban. The current Transition Assistance (TA) payment of $120 a month (for three months) does not appear to be adequate for former insurgents operating in the south. The JS is currently working on a proposal to increase the amount and duration of TA, which should help siphon fighters off the battlefield in southern and eastern Afghanistan.

There are more than 800 candidates in various stages of APRP demobilization/vetting throughout the country. The Joint Secretariat plans to enroll as many as 750 of these candidates by the end of September. Based on the current rate of reintegration, ISAF Force Reintegration Cell (FRIC) estimates there will be as many as 6,800 former insurgents in the program by the end of the year.

APRP small grant projects increased during this reporting period, rising from 48 to 102; 12 of these projects were completed. The total 2012 budget for Community Recovery activities remains at $87.4M, or 54 percent of the total APRP budget of $161M. Four Afghan ministries now have more than 1,500 APRP community recovery programs in various stages of planning and implementation across the country. These programs address basic essential service provisions, livelihood support, and job creation for the reintegree communities. Line ministry community recovery program implementation has increased significantly during the reporting period. Ministries planned program activities during the first quarter and actually implemented them during the second and third quarters of 2012. It is estimated that more than 39,000 persons participated in line ministry programs in the first half of 2012, including more than 3,200 reintegrees. Only Bamyan, Daykundi, Paktika, and Nimroz provinces have no planned line ministry programs or small grant projects. During the past reporting period, line ministries prepared their FY 2013 plans for approval by the APRP Technical Committee. Across the board, line ministries have expressed a need for increased messaging on linkages to APRP objectives and peace consolidation.

The ISAF Force Reintegration Cell (FRIC) continues to provide mission support to the HPC and the JS, although the JS is becoming more self-sufficient. For example, the APRP vetting process continues to improve. The vetting process now consists of a provincial vetting process involving the PGOV, NDS, ANP, ANA, and a PPC representative, as well as a national vetting process involving the same institutions. Vetting appears to be increasingly effective, with the Afghans routinely denying enrollment to insurgents who do not meet the program’s criteria. In Herat, for example, 155 reintegration candidates were rejected from the program during this reporting period.

The APRP still encounters challenges primarily related to a lack of capacity at both the national and sub-national levels. Despite past efforts to train the PJSTs, the teams continue to require support from Coalition and U.N. Development Program (UNDP) personnel. The JS, UNDP and ISAF FRIC are working to enhance sub-national capacity and effectiveness through regional
training events and a formal capacity building program funded with Afghanistan Reintegration Program (ARP) funds. ISAF and the JS continue to set up combined trips to provinces where they systematically meet with all levels of provincial leadership, including Provincial Governors, PPC and PJST members, ANA Corps Commanders, Provincial Chiefs of Police, and NDS chiefs.

Additionally, the JS continues to be challenged by budget execution. Poor communication and less-than-efficient money transfers by the JS have resulted in persistent friction with the Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams (PJST), which are themselves hampered by shortfalls in capacity, experience, and training. JS delays in providing top-up monies to PJSTs have only exacerbated these issues.

During the reporting period, the HPC and JS, along with the PPCs and PJSTs in the provinces, executed a Peace and National Unity Week (PNUW) from September 19-26, 2012. The primary goal was to increase public awareness and bolster the momentum of the peace process at the national and sub-national levels, as well as to commemorate those Afghans who lost their lives in the pursuit of peace. Another goal of the PNUW provincial activities was to highlight APRP’s efforts to promote outreach, demobilization, and community recovery. More than 200 peace-related events were carried out in Kabul and throughout all 34 provinces in an attempt to create a national movement for peace. Over 20,000 Afghans directly participated and it is estimated that outreach programs reached over 10 million Afghans. FRIC anticipates that these activities will elevate the APRP’s profile and lead to more reintegration events over the coming months.

1.10: LOOKING AHEAD: THE NEXT 6 MONTHS

During the next six months, ISAF, together with the Afghan government, will focus on building on the momentum and successes of the last year to further campaign progress and consolidate the significant security gains achieved in 2012. The nature and focus of the ISAF campaign will steadily evolve as the ANSF shifts to the lead and ISAF shifts to a Security Force Assistance and Training (SFAT) mission.

With ANSF progressively in the fore, the civil-military campaign will continue to expand security for the Afghan people and increasingly provide the necessary conditions for the Afghan government to extend governance to more of Afghanistan while promoting economic and social development and steadily degrading the influence and operational capacity of the insurgency.

ISAF will maintain its campaign momentum and support to the ANSF while transferring tasks to enable the transition from ISAF to the post-2014 NATO mission in Afghanistan, redeploying forces, closing and aligning bases, and evolving the command and control structure for the NATO-led, post-ISAF mission in 2015. With the expected announcement of Transition Tranche 4 this fall, ISAF will continue to reorient forces to enable ANSF-led security throughout Afghanistan by the summer of 2013.

Over the next six months, in addition to examining violence metrics, it is also important to examine the following areas to more fully understand the progress being made towards achieving
the core goal of disrupting, dismantling and defeating Al-Qaida and ensuring it cannot return to a sovereign Afghanistan, responsible for its own security.

**Transition to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Lead.** ANSF will continue to take the lead in security operations across Afghanistan. To support this growing effort, the Afghan government is developing OPLAN 1392, the second Afghan-led OPLAN. OPLAN 1392 will maintain the momentum gained this past year.

**The Ability of the Insurgency to Achieve its Objectives.** At the operational level, the Taliban and other insurgents will continue their attempts to regain lost territory in southern Afghanistan while maintaining pressure in the east, particularly on Kabul. They will also continue attempts to undermine the Afghan government and ISAF through increasingly asymmetric means such as high-profile attacks, assassinations of officials, insider attacks, and IEDs. Sanctuary in Pakistan remains critical for the insurgency to manage the overarching fight as well as recruit, train, fund, and plan.

**Shift to the Security Force Assistance Mission.** Seven of the 14 Coalition maneuver brigades will transition to a Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) configuration. SFABs are specifically tailored to conduct SFA and provide the ANSF enabler support for specific areas of operation, based upon the threat level, ANSF unit capabilities, and the level of governance. SFABs are battle space owners that partner and advise to develop ANSF and provide enabler support for both the Coalition forces and ANSF to conduct operations.

**Ability of the Afghan Government to Strengthen Governance.** The Afghan government will continue to make progress in governance with new leaders in the security ministries and the development of new strategic and operational plans for 2013, including a combined security ministry strategy for security and development. Improvements in the function and reach of sub-national governance are being made as the Afghan government develops an operating model that combines traditional and formal conflict resolution. The Afghan government is still working to build capacity but remains unable to deliver sufficient basic services to all areas or to sufficiently stimulate economic growth. Although improvements in governance will be made over the next six months, the Afghan government will continue to encounter challenges resulting from widespread corruption that limits government effectiveness and undermines perceptions of legitimacy among the international community and the Afghan people.
SECTION 2 – AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, AND OPERATIONS

2.1: SUMMARY

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have made substantial progress during this reporting period, and are gradually building a force that will assume full responsibility for security operations throughout Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

The ANSF are unilaterally conducting the vast majority of operations in Afghanistan, although many of these are routine patrols. During the reporting period, ISAF and the ANSF aggressively pushed insurgent forces out of densely populated areas, particularly in RC-S and RC-SW. As these areas were cleared of insurgent forces, the ANSF has been able to expand its reach in many areas, occupying patrol bases and combat outposts that had previously been too dangerous to hold. The ANSF have increasingly taken the lead in areas previously secured by US surge forces; it is premature, however, to assess their performance in these areas at this time.

The ANSF have also increased their abilities to plan, carry out, and sustain high-level kinetic operations involving multiple ANSF forces. Operation KALAK HODE V, carried out in September 2012 in Zabul Province, exemplifies the ANSF’s growing abilities. This three-week operation, which involved more than 11,000 personnel, was principally Afghan-planned, -led, and -manned. The operation focused on disrupting the insurgency and involved coordination among the Afghan Army, Police, Border Police, and National Directorate of Security. During KALAK HODE V, the ANSF seized large quantities of insurgent weapons, supplies, and explosives. The operation was supported logistically through Afghan supply channels.

The ANSF grew steadily during this reporting period, with the Afghan National Army (ANA) meeting growth targets while the Ministry of Interior (MoI) instituted a strategic 1-month pause in recruiting efforts in April for the Afghan National Police (ANP) to focus on aligning and balancing its force. As of September 30, 2012, the ANA reached 182,209 soldiers in training or in fielded units, the ANP reached 147,158 police in training or in fielded units, and the Afghan Air Force (AAF) reached 6,224 airmen in training or in fielded units. The ANSF met its goal of recruiting a force of approximately 352,000 Soldiers and Police by October 1, 2012. The current recruited strength of the Army is 195,000. The Police force stands at more than 157,000 recruited. The Army and Police personnel not currently in training or fielded units are recruited and awaiting induction at the training centers. The ANA is scheduled to achieve its surge-level end-strength of 187,000 soldiers inducted by December 2012, and to have these personnel trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2013. The ANP is expected to reach its surge-level end-strength of 157,000 personnel inducted by February 2013, and to have these personnel

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14 This section is submitted consistent with Section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended. This assessment complements other reports and information provided to Congress regarding Afghanistan; however, it is not intended as a single source of information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its international partners, or Afghanistan. NOTE: This is a historical document that covers the United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces from April 1, 2012, to September 30, 2012.
trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2013. The AAF is expected to reach its goal of 8,000 airmen inducted in December 2014, and to have these personnel trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2017. As a result of the significant increase in the size of the ANSF, Afghans now constitute more than two-thirds of all those in uniform in Afghanistan.

As the ANSF approach their designated surge-level end-strength, NTM-A, the Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the MoI continue to shift focus from force growth to qualitative development of the force and the ministries. Both the ANA and ANP face a shortage of officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). Both forces are now focused on recruiting and promoting more officers. However, there are inherent limits to the speed at which officers can be generated due to time requirements inherent in training incoming personnel and allowing them to gain the necessary experience to earn promotions. NTM-A’s focus areas continue to include the development of ANSF logistics capabilities and leadership and ministerial capacity. Further improvements are expected over the course of the next reporting period.

Force generation and development efforts continue to yield advancements in operational effectiveness. The ANSF is increasingly taking over responsibility for securing Afghanistan, and is conducting the vast majority of operations. Although many of these operations are routine patrols, the ANSF are now (as of September) unilaterally conducting roughly 80 percent of total reported Coalition operations and are leading roughly 85 percent of total operations. Additionally, the ANSF have started to independently expand security in areas where ISAF does not already have an established presence, demonstrating initiative and increased capability. ISAF carries out only 10 percent of total reported operations unilaterally and is in the lead for only 15 percent of operations. Additionally, as of the end of the current reporting period, 30 ANA kandaks and 49 ANP units have achieved the rating “Independent with Advisors.”

Afghan security ministries have made measured progress in developing the institutional capacity necessary to oversee, manage, and sustain the ANSF. Despite progress, corruption remains a critical issue, especially in the MoI, Afghan Border Police, and the Afghan Air Force – a condition that threatens to undermine public perception of the security ministries and ANSF as capable and legitimate security providers for Afghanistan. The Afghan Parliament’s vote of “no confidence” in the MoI and MoD ministers in mid-August 2012 and President Karzai’s subsequent replacement of the head of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) have further stressed the security ministries, slowing progress in some areas. All ministries, however, exhibited sufficient institutional cohesion to withstand these changes at the minister level.

ANSF will continue to face significant challenges to its growth and development, including attrition, leadership deficits (including Non-Commissioned Officer shortages in both the ANA and ANP), and limited capabilities in staff planning, management, logistics, and procurement. The ANSF also continues to require enabling support from Coalition resources, including air

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15 The data on operations in this paragraph represents only reported operations in RC-E, as this was the only RC that fully reported low-level operations as of the end of the reporting period. This data is indicative of operations in the rest of the country, however, the actual figures may vary in other RCs. This data on operations only covers the period from June through September, as ISAF did not report low-level operations before June.
16 Afghan led operations are operations that are commanded, controlled, planned, and executed by the ANSF and are conducted with the majority of the force being ANSF (50 percent or greater).
(both transport and close air support), logistics, ISR\textsuperscript{17}, counter-IED, and medical evacuation support.

As Afghanistan continues to become more secure and stable through 2015-2016, and as the relative costs and benefits of the current ANSF force size and structure become clear, the Afghan government, in coordination with the Coalition, will begin to refocus the ANSF toward enduring security roles, and consider how to reshape the ANSF into a more sustainable force.

2.2: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND ASSESSMENT

NTM-A’s ministerial development activities focus on advising, key leader engagements, combined and joint meetings and working groups, facilitated inter-ministerial coordination, advisor councils, functional boards, and Ministerial Development Boards (MDBs) for the MoD and the MoI. NTM-A Deputy Commander-Army (DCOM-A), which is in charge of ministerial advising for the MoD, has a manning level of 185 advisors. As of September 1, 2012, 51 advisor positions were vacant but in the process of being staffed by the U.S. military, Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) Program personnel, or contractors.

The MDBs assess the abilities and capacity of the MoI on a monthly basis and the MoD on a quarterly basis, and assigns ratings based on the Capability Milestone (CM) ratings system. Each MDB also assesses and approves ministerial development plans.

Figure 8: Capability Milestone Rating Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CM Rating Legend</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CM-1A</td>
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<td>CM-1B</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM-2A</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM-2B</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM-3</td>
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<td>CM-4</td>
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ASSESSMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

The MoD and the General Staff (GS) have made steady progress during the reporting period. In August and September development within the MoD and GS was delayed due to the removal of Minister of Defense Wardak and his replacement with Bismillah Khan Mohammadi. The First Deputy Minister, however, filled in as Acting Minister to ensure continuity during the transition. The follow-on effects of this transition remain unclear. The MoD and GS face a number of persistent challenges. Nonetheless, progress is being made in all of these areas, and the MoD remains one of the most capable parts of the Afghan government.

The MoD and GS have been expanding their capabilities along several lines of operation simultaneously, having overseen the rapid expansion of the ANA in both size and capabilities.

\textsuperscript{17} Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
over several years. As the ANA nears its targeted surge end-strength, focus is shifting toward institutional, enabler, and logistical development. The timetable for reaching full autonomy from Coalition advising is slower than initially expected due to challenges in several cross-cutting functions, such as human resource management, life support, intelligence, infrastructure, logistics, and contract management. Additionally, the MoD and GS face a shortage of qualified and experienced advisors: currently 27 percent of advisor positions within DCOM Army are unfilled.

The MoD and GS have made impressive progress in their ability to plan operations, which is an exceptionally difficult task even in Western defense ministries. However, the ability of these ministries to actually implement operational plans is still developing. The MoD, like many Afghan government institutions, lacks sufficient trained, educated, and professional staff in order to plan and execute operations at a requisite pace. The MoD is capable of deploying forces, but is deficient in its ability to ensure that those fielded forces are physically issued with equipment that has been provided by NTM-A. In many cases the equipment is in depots and not in the hands of the soldiers who require it. The ability to collect, share, and act on intelligence at the ministerial level is being developed; an assessment of this ability is not possible at this time, however. As a general rule, the various departments within MoD and the GS function well internally (although some departments, such as Counter-IED operations, continue to face challenges); however, their interaction and coordination with other departments requires improvement. Reflective of a problem common to many ministries of defense, internal stove-piping of information and a lack of staff interaction between departments hampers the maturing of the MoD and GS.

Due to the high pace of ANA expansion, the MoD and GS often do not have sufficient time to examine issues and develop coordinated, cross-functional solutions. Structurally, the Afghan military is not a mirror image of Coalition militaries, and the Afghans are, with ISAF support, developing their own strategies, policies, and procedures to address these issues. Afghan solutions to these issues will not replicate NATO or other Coalition’s procedures, and western standards should not used as benchmarks to gauge Afghan progress. It is assessed that the MoD and GS will require Ministerial Advisory Group (MAG) assistance until mid-2014.

The MoD is also actively involved in supporting the Transition process. The MoD works closely with ISAF on base closure and transfer, training infrastructure transfer, procurement responsibility, and the transfer of logistics and supply management. Although it is a slow and unwieldy process, ISAF and the MoD are moving forward on the transfer of logistics responsibilities, and have already transitioned Class I and Class II supplies to the Afghans. Planning for the transition of Class III Fuel is ongoing, although it is being done slowly and deliberately due to the increased potential for corruption in this class. MoD is now responsible for procurement of all Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE) for the ANA and is beginning to contract for base services such as facility maintenance and repair. The ANSF does possess the capability to contract; this capacity has not been fully developed across all commodity areas, however, but is being addressed. The MoD is challenged with budget execution and transparency in its procurement processes, and still requires advisor oversight.
Full transition of most MoD offices and functions to CM-1A ("Capable of autonomous operations") is not expected before mid-2014. However, given the recent replacement of the Ministers of Defense and Interior, and the unknown follow-on effects, it is highly likely that progression to higher CM ratings will be subject to further delays.

Figure 9: Ministry of Defense and General Staff CM Ratings and CM-1B Projections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line of Operations</th>
<th>Current CM</th>
<th>CM1B Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMoD Intel Policy</td>
<td>CM4</td>
<td>4Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD Reserve Affairs</td>
<td>CM3</td>
<td>3Q, 14</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMoD Dir Disaster Response</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD Chf Consr &amp; Prop Mgmt Div (CPMD)</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS G2 Intelligence</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS G3 Operations</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS G5 Policy &amp; Planning</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>1Q, 13</td>
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<td>GS G6 Communications</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>4Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS G6 Comm Support Unit</td>
<td>CM1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS G7 Force Struc, Training &amp; Doctrine</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>CM2A</td>
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</tr>
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<td>GS Legal Department</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA Special Ops Command (ASOC)</td>
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<td>Afghan Air Force Command (AAF)</td>
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<td>Medical Command (MEDCOM)</td>
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<td>AMoD Education</td>
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<td>(CFA) Gender Integration</td>
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<td>(CFA) Civilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sergeant Major of the Army (SMA)</td>
<td>CM3</td>
<td>3Q, 14</td>
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*CM Date is the projected advisor-recommended transition probationary period.
The NTM-A Ministerial Development Board (MDB) assesses the Ministry of Defense & General Staff quarterly. Departments or offices highlighted in purple are MoD, highlighted in blue are GS, and those in white are Cross Functional Areas (CFAs).

**ASSESSMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR**

The MoI has made measured progress during the reporting period. The removal of Minister of Interior Mohammad and appointment of the new Minister of Interior, LTG Patang, caused delays in MoI development during August and September. LTG Patang has already outlined his vision for the MoI over the coming year. The MoI remains committed to reaching its force generation goal of 157,000 personnel by February 2013. MoI leadership has taken on a more active role in managing end-strength, recruitment, and force balancing. Much like the MoD, the MoI already has an effective training and force generation foundation in place, and as it approaches its fielded force goals, more efforts are being applied to the professionalization of the force. The MoI will also concentrate on areas that needed improvement over the past quarter to include: fielding vehicles/equipment, recruitment, gender issues, transition from private security companies to the Afghan Police Protection Force (APPF), and building a more capable Counter Intelligence force. A notable milestone during this reporting period was the advancement of the
Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) to CM-2A, marking the advancement of all four Major Deputy Ministerial Security Pillars (AUP, ABP, ANCOP, and AACP) to CM-2B and above.

Shortfalls in logistics, facilities maintenance, office space, and technical capacity to solicit and manage contracts continue to be major impediments toward progress. NTM-A and Coalition police advisors will continue to work in close coordination with their Afghan counterparts to ensure deficiencies are addressed, and that the enablers and ANP units are afforded the resources necessary for continued development and progress toward autonomy.

Although the MoI demonstrated measured progress during the reporting period, the ministry faces multiple challenges which risk impeding further development. The MoI faces persistent difficulties in creating and maintaining a sustainable force, particularly in creating a logistics capacity within the ANP pillars. Similar to the MoD, the MoI lacks sufficient trained, educated and professional staff.

The MoI Procurement Department made measured progress this year. Through the end of July 2012, the procurement department processed 387 contracts valued at $8.4M, a 157 percent increase in volume over last year. MoI procurement remains challenged by a lack of transparency in the links between plans, budgets, obligations, deliveries, and payments. As a result of increased training, the procurement department is developing proficiency in executing the procurement process and expanding conformity to procurement law.

Furthermore, the MoI remains significantly susceptible to penetration by Criminal Patronage Networks (CPNs) in the fielded force, far more so than the ANA. Due to the nature of its mission, the dispersed deployment of its forces, and the span of control, the Afghan Border Police (ABP) is particularly vulnerable to potential influence by CPNs. The Afghan government, in partnership with ISAF, has made only limited progress toward removing corrupt officials. ISAF and the Afghan government are accelerating efforts to develop internal accountability systems and sustainable processes through ministerial development and reform initiatives within the MoI that will further enable prevention and detection of internal criminal activity, thereby reducing the influence of CPNs.
Figure 10: Ministry of Interior Capability Milestone Ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Interior Overall Rating</th>
<th>Current CM</th>
<th>CM 1B Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CM3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff / Special Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>2Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Affairs</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Policing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Indefinite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender &amp; Human Rights</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1Q, 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM of Counter Narcotics</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM of Strategy and Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Planning</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Development</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Management</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM of Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPSU</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Crime</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>3Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP-(G)</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>1Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Planning</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>4Q, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Readiness</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-IED</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM of Admin and Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Management</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance and Budget</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities and Installation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon Medical</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info, Comms and Tech</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Management</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition and Procurement</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>4Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting Command</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>4Q, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM APPF</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3: **INSTITUTIONAL TRAINER AND MENTOR STATUS**

The additional manning resources necessary to develop the ANSF are identified in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), NATO’s capabilities-based document which identifies campaign plan force requirements. However, the training requirements are frequently fluctuating, and the CJSOR requirements listed below do not reflect the number of trainers currently required. As specific Capability Milestones are reached, Coalition personnel are reduced at training sites, and in some cases, the requirement is transitioned to the ANSF. This reduction will be reflected in the next version of CJSOR (version 12.5), which will be released in December 2012. Therefore, although the number of trainers-in-place or pledged do not fill the total CJSOR requirements according to CJSOR version 12, NTM-A currently has sufficient trainers to conduct its mission.

The total NTM-A (CJSOR 12.0) number of required trainers is 2,612. The breakdown for this requirement is 723 Army trainers, 257 Police trainers, 140 Medical trainers, 433 Air trainers, 178 logistics trainers, 125 infrastructure trainers, 31 intelligence trainers, 588 security forces, and 137 Special Operations Forces trainers. The total number of 2,612 required trainers reflects a slight adjustment down from 2,778 since March 2012, due to the elimination of 1,499 positions and the addition of 1,337 different positions. These changes reflect the evolution of the NTM-A mission, as Afghans assume responsibility for some tasks, while other tasks become new requirements as new capabilities are brought into operation. The requirements for the draft CJSOR 12.5, which ISAF has submitted to SHAPE for approval, are estimated at 2,135 trainers. If the current level of in-place and pledged trainers remains, it will meet the projected CJSOR 12.5 requirements.

**Figure 11: CJSOR Trainer Status (Version 12.0, as of September 30, 2012)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required</th>
<th>In Place</th>
<th>Pledged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,612</td>
<td>1,752</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the campaign moves through Transition, establishing ANSF’s self-training capability is a critical milestone. As a result of the “Train the Instructor” program, the ANA now has 2,318 Afghan instructors, of which 525 are Master Skills Instructor Course trainers.

Although the requirement for ANP instructors by the end of the reporting period is 1,504, the ANP had only 1,126 personnel assigned to instructor positions. The ANP has consistently trained more instructors than required; however, it has been unable to assign enough of them to schools, resulting in a shortfall.

---

18 The United States currently sources 1,409 non-CJSOR trainer positions.
### Table 1: Afghan ANA Instructor Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghan Instructor Locations</th>
<th>SY 1391 Tashkil Instructors Authorized</th>
<th>Instructors Assigned</th>
<th>% Filled</th>
<th>Overall Shortfall</th>
<th>% Over/Short</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMTC</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>99.0%</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMTCs</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>-311</td>
<td>-36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch Schools</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>119.1%</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>101.4%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>112.5%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMAA</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>114.8%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC(A)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>84.2%</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,709</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,552</strong></td>
<td><strong>113%</strong></td>
<td><strong>-157</strong></td>
<td><strong>-5.8%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“% Filled” represents the percentage of tashkil instructor positions filled versus tashkil instructors required. 
KMTC = Kabul Military Training Center; RMTCs = Regional Military Training Centers; CFC = Consolidated Fielding Center; CSC = Command and Staff College; NMAA = National Military Academy of Afghanistan; CTC(A) = COIN Training Center (Afghanistan) 

### Table 2: Afghan ANP Instructor Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghan Instructor Locations</th>
<th>1391 Tashkil Instructors Authorized</th>
<th>Instructors Assigned to Region</th>
<th>Trained Instructors Filling Tashkil Positions</th>
<th>% Filled**</th>
<th>Shortfall</th>
<th>% Short</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>64.0%</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>67.0%</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>65.0%</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>97.0%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>89.0%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other / Not Assigned*</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,504</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,126</strong></td>
<td><strong>805</strong></td>
<td><strong>53.5%</strong></td>
<td><strong>709</strong></td>
<td><strong>46.5%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Other - Instructors that are assigned per the Tashkil, however, they are not attached to training sites but as support to provincial headquarters. 
** "% Filled" represents the percentage of Tashkil positions filled by trained instructors. 
Note: SY1391 Authorized Instructors number increased from 1,510 to 1,514 in one month due to an error in identifying those lines classified as “instructor” in the Tashkil. Not all of the instructor positions in the Tashkil are labeled “instructor.”
2.4: ANSF LITERACY TRAINING

Literacy is a critical force enabler and force multiplier for the ANSF. Literacy enables ANSF service members to learn required skills at vocational schools, enhances instruction on human rights and the rule of law, and promotes the long-term sustainability of the force as well as post-service economic opportunity.

As focus has shifted from force growth to force development, literacy training efforts have likewise begun shifting to increasing the number of ANSF personnel at the international standard for functional literacy (Level 3). The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) defines functional literacy as "the ability to identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate, compute and use printed and written materials associated with varying contexts." Level 3 is the level that all ANSF personnel need to achieve if they are to be deemed literate. Level 3 literacy is also required for ANSF personnel to attend professional military and branch schools, as it enables students to learn technical information and skills. Increasing the number of ANSF personnel at Level 3 literacy will have a significant positive impact on logistics and other technical capabilities of the ANSF.

The size and scope of literacy training efforts for the ANA and ANP remain expansive. As of September 30, 2012, 3,213 full-time Afghan literacy teachers were educating 108,413 soldiers and patrolmen, down from 112,045 as of March 2012. Additionally, there are currently 20,892 personnel at Level 3 literacy in the ANA and 21,791 personnel at Level 3 in the ANP. As of September 30, 2012, the following aggregate numbers of ANSF personnel have completed Literacy Training since November 2009:

i. ANSF passed Level 1: 167,999
ii. ANSF passed Level 2: 64,836
iii. ANSF passed Level 3: 42,177
As of September 30, 2012, the ANSF success rate for the pass/fail summative tests were: 93.1 percent for Level 1, 93 percent for Level 2, and 91.4 percent at Level 3.

Convincing local commanders to provide forces with sufficient time to complete literacy training is a primary challenge, particularly within the ANA. NTM-A’s current literacy goal for the ANSF is to achieve 100 percent Level 1 and 50 percent Level 3 literacy by the end of the NTM-A program.

### 2.5: Afghan National Army Capacity

The ANA continued to make improvements in both size and capability toward its goals of assuming lead responsibility for security across Afghanistan by the end of 2014. The ANA will meet its surge-level end-strength goal in December 2012. The ANA’s growing operational effectiveness was demonstrated by steadily increasing capability ratings during the reporting period. Although progress was not uniform across all sections of the ANA, some units, such as the Afghan National Army Special Forces (ANASF), have made impressive strides, and are now highly capable. Progress has been slower in other areas, such as in developing the ANA logistics capabilities and fielding the AAF’s required enablers and trained personnel.

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**Literacy Level Definitions:**
- **Level 1** - The ability to read, write pronounce and identify letters, read and write short words; and read and write own name. The ability to count up to 1,000, identify and order numbers up to 1,000, and add and subtract triple-digit whole numbers.
- **Level 2** - The ability to read, write and explain descriptive texts and spell commonly used words. The ability to carry out double digit by single digit multiplication and division and identify units of measurement.
- **Level 3** - The ability to add and subtract using six digits, and multiply and divide with three digit numbers.
MANNING

The current approved end-strength for the ANA – the projected end-strength required to support transition to Afghan security lead – is 352,000 personnel by December 2014, comprising 187,000 for the Army by December 2012, 157,000 for the Police by February 2013, and 8,000 for the Afghan Air Force by December 2014.

As of the end of the reporting period, the overall ANA force level reached 182,209 personnel; this number is 12,257 lower than the force level reported at the end of the previous reporting period in March 2012. However, this reflects an accounting change which no longer includes Air Force and MoD civilian personnel with the reported Army component strength.

Figure 13: ANA End-Strength, Attrition, Recruiting, Retention, and Goal

Prior to April 2012, NTM-A reported the ANA end-strength as the aggregated total of Army military personnel, Air Force military personnel, and Ministry of Defense (MoD) civilian personnel serving in Tashkil positions. From April 2012 onwards, NTM-A reports the ANA end-strength as only the Army military personnel; Air Force military personnel will be reported separately and MoD civilian personnel will not be reported. July 2011 data was reviewed by MoD and NTM-A, and found to be inaccurate. Subsequent months reflect a re-baselined end strength.
Although attrition\textsuperscript{21} levels exceeded the monthly goal of 1.4 percent each month during the reporting period, strong recruiting and retention\textsuperscript{22} efforts, which both exceeded their goals every month, contributed to the solid overall end-strength figures.

The main causes of attrition and low retention are poor leadership and accountability, separation from family, denial of leave or poor leave management, high operational tempo, and ineffective deterrence against soldiers going absent without leave (AWOL). The Attrition Working Group, made up of ANA, NTM-A, and IJC officials, continues to monitor and assess these trends in order to determine causes and potential solutions to reduce the overall attrition rate. Should the attrition rates consistently fail to meet target levels, there is a risk that training costs will compromise the Afghan government’s ability to maintain the 195,000 force. Consistently high attrition may also negatively affect ANSF capabilities, as a high number of soldiers will have to be recruited and trained each year, resulting in a force composed of many inexperienced soldiers.

NTM-A and the MoD also maintained efforts to recruit southern Pashtuns as well as improve the overall ethnic balance of the ANA. Using the MoD- and NTM-A-agreed definition for Southern Pashtuns\textsuperscript{23}, this ethnic segment made up 13 percent of enlisted recruits during the Solar Month of August. Increases in the percentage of Hazara soldiers at the \textit{Kandak} level slowed as the ANA approached their ethnic targeting goals.

\textsuperscript{21} Attrition is defined as the unanticipated loss of a soldier, NCO, or officer, and includes personnel dropped from rolls, killed in action, permanently disabled, captured, and non-combat deaths. A soldier is listed as absent without leave (AWOL) after 24 hours of not reporting for an assigned duty; soldiers, officers, and NCOs are dropped from rolls after 20 continuous days, or after 30 days if it follows a period of authorized absence. This is a reduction from the previous limit of 45.

\textsuperscript{22} Retention is defined as the re-contracting of those soldiers who are eligible for separation from the force and also includes re-accessions (former members of the ANA who have re-enlisted following a period of separation).

\textsuperscript{23} Southern Pashtuns are defined as belonging to the following tribes: Ghilzai, Durrani, Zirak, Mohammadzai, Barakzai, Alikozai, Achakzai, Popalzai, Panjpaio, Alizai, Ishaqzai, Tokhi, Hotaki, Khogiani.
As the ANA reaches its ultimate end-strength authorization, future recruiting figures are being monitored to assess how the ANA is balancing recruiting with attrition in order to stay within the approved authorization level of 195,000 personnel (including 8,000 AAF). Additionally, ANA training has started to focus more on quality than quantity, in accordance with ANSF development plans.

Future force levels of the ANA are pending final determination through ongoing discussions between the U.S. government, the Afghan government, and the international community. Considerations include the required size and capabilities of the ANSF to maintain security following Transition, the capacity of the Afghan government to fund its security forces, and the ability of the international community to contribute.

**FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING**

NTM-A continued to concentrate on the development of Afghan institutions and capabilities necessary to train and sustain the ANA. As part of this process, NTM-A shifted focus from increasing personnel quantity to developing personnel technical capabilities. The ANA is well positioned to shoulder increased responsibility for its training. The Darulaman Literacy Center opened in March 2012 and will fill a significant gap in literacy training within the ANA and provide graduates with the literacy skills necessary to progress to technical training within the branch schools. The construction of Darulaman Literacy Center is projected to be completed in the Fall of 2013. During the reporting period, 9,740 soldiers received advanced training from the 12 functioning branch schools.

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**Figure 14: ANA Ethnicity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Pashtun</th>
<th>Tajik</th>
<th>Hazara</th>
<th>Uzbek</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Officer</strong></td>
<td>43.1%</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Officer Delta</strong></td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>-2.6%</td>
<td>-3.7%</td>
<td>-7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NCO</strong></td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Soldier</strong></td>
<td>42.6%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Force</strong></td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Delta</strong></td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>-2.2%</td>
<td>-8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANA Ethnic Breakout Requirement</strong></td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures are as of the Solar Month of September
Additionally, Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) continued to increase the quality of the ANA. The MTT concept was developed to provide professional training to soldiers fielded without professional training at the ANA’s branch schools.

Over the next 18 months, the Afghan National Defense University (ANDU) will consolidate seven professional development schools under the administrative control of one headquarters at Qargha (Kabul) to improve and the quality of graduates. The first of the schools, the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA), which consists of more than 2,000 staff and students, moved to Qargha in September from its former location in central Kabul. Classes will commence at the NMAA’s new location in Qargha in October 2012. The formal opening of the ANDU will take place in November 2012. Additionally, the UK provides support to the Afghan National Army Officers’ Academy (ANAOA), another school falling under the ANDU. This institution is at the embryonic stages at the moment. There is a 'Forward' Project Team at Qargha consisting of seven officers (5 UK, 2 Australian).

The capacity of the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC), the premier military training center in Afghanistan, grew significantly during the reporting period. Upon completion of construction in September 2012, KMTC offers 16,000 bed spaces and approximately 11,000 classroom spaces for ANA trainees. KMTC is beginning to shift its primary focus from producing a high quantity of soldiers to increasing the quality of soldiers leaving the facility. The institution is increasing course lengths, reducing the student-to-instructor ratio, and is working to incorporate more ANA combat veterans into the instructor cadre. The aim is to produce a more capable soldier who will be able to succeed in further training and, more importantly, as a member of a front-line unit.

Additional ANA training is completed overseas. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Regional Center programs sent 84 ANA officers and NCOs to U.S. military schools in FY 2012 to support the professionalization of the military as well as to provide training to aid in the development of air and Special Operation Forces’ capabilities. India also hosts an international training program and provides authorizations for approximately 300 officers and 50 enlisted personnel per year. The requirements are defined one year prior to training.

In addition to training, the ANA made progress in developing force management tools critical for long-term sustainment and corruption control. For example, the Computerized Pay System (CPS), instituted in Fall 2011, finalized the second of the three-phase implementation plan, with the third phase set to begin in October 2012. Once fully instituted, the CPS, which uses fingerprint biometrics to identify soldiers, is designed to expedite the pay process and provide oversight to an increasingly complex pay system. The CPS will also provide ANA leaders and staff with an automated system to properly account for pay and query payroll data.

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24 The difference in spaces takes into account an ability to accommodate class turnover as well as having a portion of the training in nearby field environments.
**LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT**

The MoD continued to improve and increase leadership development by focusing on increasing both the quality and capacity of officer and NCO training programs. During the reporting period 29,180 trainees graduated from Basic Warrior Training (BWT), 423 soldiers from Officer Candidates’ School (OCS), and 3,765 from 1 Uniform Course (1U – an NCO direct accessions course). BWT and 1U courses have been operating at or above capacity throughout the entire reporting period.

Nevertheless, growing the required number of NCOs for the ANA remains challenging. The SY 1391 Tashkil authorizes the ANA 64,132 NCO positions. In order to address current NCO shortfall, an additional 7,093 are required. The plan to address the NCO shortfall emphasizes developing an experienced NCO corps by promoting from within the ranks. The shortage of NCOs will gradually be reduced through 2014, as experienced, qualified soldiers are identified, trained, and promoted.

**Trainee attrition numbers from initial accession training:**

ANA: Training Base Attrition is shown in Table 1. The attrition for the BWT and the 1U combined production is at 0.5 percent.

**Table 1: ANA Trainee Attrition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Number Started</th>
<th>Trainees Graduated</th>
<th>Attrition</th>
<th>Attrition %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer Candidate School (OCS)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Warrior Training (BWT)</td>
<td>2,183</td>
<td>2,181</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO Direct Accessions Course (1U)</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,708</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,689</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.7%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: FOCS graduates are not included in Table 1.

**SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**

The Afghan National Army Special Forces (ANASF) are the most capable component of the ANSF, and have made lasting strides toward becoming an independent and effective force. The ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC) is headquartered in Camp Moorehead, Wardak Province, and ANASOC continues generating new units and staff sections. The integration of Special Mission Wing (SMW) and Ktah Khas nighttime operations is a long-term effort. Although SF kandaks have officially been dissolved, Special Operations kandaks have been brought online to combine Commando kandaks with SF companies resulting streamlined command and control issues. Currently, all nine Commando kandaks have reached an average of 100 percent of Commandos under the Tashkil, and SF A and B teams continue to be fielded at a rate designed to meet the Full Operational Capability (FOC) target of 4th Quarter 2013.
ANASOC continues to develop its institutional capacity to conduct training programs. Currently, a majority of courses taught at the Division School of Excellence are Afghan-led, with minimal Coalition Force oversight. The ANASOC has produced 11,710 Commandos and 955 ANASF. Graduation rates for both CDO and SF operators remained steady and are on schedule to meet end-strength targets. From April through September 2012, the School of Excellence produced a total of 621 new CDO, and 282 new SF operators. Based on current recruiting and graduation trends, ANASF are anticipated to achieve their end-strength force level of 1,863 personnel by the 4th quarter of 2013. ANA Commandos (ANACDO) are currently at their end-strength force level of 12,525. Staff training at all levels is occurring through uniformed and civilian mentorship programs; the target of ANASOC reaching FOC for all units is 2014, with the exception of the SMW.

ANASOC continues to progress toward independent operations and self-sustaining capabilities at a measured rate. Embedded advisors in the field continue to work with Special Forces (SF) teams, developing checklists to assess the readiness levels of ANASF to conduct operations, with the focus on Village Stability Operations. Additional Special Operations capabilities will be fielded with an addition of Mobile Strike Forces, which provide the ANA with assets that have the flexibility to operate across corps boundaries. The fielding of these new units will begin during the second quarter of 2013.

In addition to force growth, the ANSF SOF community at large made significant progress in operational effectiveness. During the reporting period, ANSF SOF conducted a total of 2,384 operations, up from 1,884 during the previous six months. Notably, the number of Afghan led operations also increased; during the reporting period, 1,826 operations were Afghan led, up from 778 during the previous six months. The ANSF led 74 percent of total SOF ops during the reporting period.

The development of the ANASOC remains a critical component of the overall force structure and strategy to sustain the transition to Afghan security lead.

**WOMEN IN THE ANA**

NTM-A continues to work with the ANA to increase female recruitment, as female security forces play a key role in enhancing the credibility and effectiveness of the ANSF. However, recruitment and employment of women continues to be problematic for a wide range of systems and process factors. After a gap of about four months, the arrival of a full-time gender advisor to work on developing the Human Rights and Gender Integration Office is expected to improve the culture and climate for women in the ANSF and improve recruitment. Currently, there are 379 female members of the ANA, which is only a fraction of the goal of 19,500.

Nevertheless, training capacity continues to be set aside for female recruits. Two ANA Female OCS (FOCS) classes, each with a capacity of 60 women, were scheduled for 2012; however, only one FOCS course is currently running, with 11 students who graduated in September 2012. The FOCS course continues to be under-enrolled, despite a strong push from the Coalition for Afghans to fill quotas. The National Military Academy of Afghanistan will continue the practice of offering 10 seats to female medical students during their first year.
**Equipping**

Building a sustainable combat capacity in the ANA depends on the acquisition and fielding of equipment that allows ANA soldiers to shoot, move, and communicate. Vehicles issued to the ANA have similar standards as those issued to U.S. forces. Individual weapons are primarily standard U.S. weapons, while crew-served weapons are a combination of former Warsaw Pact weapons and standard U.S. weapons. NTM-A’s capacity-building efforts, through the acquisition and fielding of equipment, continued to improve ANA capabilities during the reporting period.

CSTC-A procured and delivered a high percentage of ANA-required equipment to Afghan depots during the reporting period. Of the three main categories of equipment required by the ANA (shoot, move, and communicate), CSTC-A delivered 102 percent of “shoot” equipment, 89 percent of “move” equipment, and 93 percent of “communicate” equipment. The re-opening of the Pakistan GLOC on July 4 enabled increased delivery of equipment to Afghanistan.

However, delivering equipment to the national and regional depots does not mean that this equipment has reached personnel in the field. The ANA’s main challenge in equipping its units continues to be the delivery of equipment from depots to the units deployed in the field. Each individual ANA unit is slated to receive equipment that has been released from the national depots, shipped through the ANA Central Movement Agency, and delivered to ANA Regional Logistic Support Commands (RLSC). RLSCs subsequently issue the equipment to the field units. Ensuring that the requisitioned equipment makes it through this chain to the units in the field has been challenging, however. Some RLSCs have warehoused equipment waiting to be issued, while nearby units in the field are forced to operate in an under-equipped state. CSTC-A has limited ability to track equipment once it is delivered to the depots, although the equipment levels of partnered units in the field are tracked under the Commanders Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) system.

**Logistics Capability**

Improving the logistical capabilities of the ANA has been the main focus of NTM-A during this reporting period, and will continue to be its main focus through the end of 2012 and into 2013. As a result of a deliberate decision made when the plan for expanding the ANSF was formulated, the initial focus for the ANSF was building combat capability and leveraging ISAF enablers to support the ANSF. As the ANSF approaches its end strength goals, ISAF is accelerating development of ANA enablers, particularly logistics capabilities.

Despite this focus, NTM-A anticipates that the ANA will continue to require assistance with logistics and acquisition processes beyond December 2014. The ANA logistics enterprise is in the early stages of development, and capabilities are widely variable, with some hubs functioning at a high level and others struggling to establish a basic level of self-sufficiency. Overall, the various Afghan logistical processes and organizations, regardless of proficiency level, do not operate as one national logistics system in an integrated and cohesive manner.
Essential capabilities are now becoming a primary focus area, as NTM-A partners with senior Afghan logisticians to build a sustainable Afghan Army and Air Force. However, many challenges remain. Although capabilities are demonstrated in some areas (local contracting for food, spare parts, and services), additional focus and attention is needed at a national/strategic level for requirements planning, budget integration, supply planning, quality assurance, contracting, distribution, material accountability, and performance measurements. In some process areas, a minimum core capability set does not yet exist, and in other more advanced processes such as contracting, a viable basic capability has been demonstrated since 2011.

The lack of trained logistics staff officers throughout the ANSF is a concern, however, and is likely to become increasingly problematic as ISAF reduces its advisor and mentoring positions. The low numbers of qualified logisticians at both soldier and leader levels continue to be a concern. NTM-A has addressed this challenge through application of Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) focused on maintenance, supply, distribution, and mid-level logistics management. In addition to formal, classroom-based training, ANSF logisticians are being trained through On-the-Job Training (OJT). NTM-A anticipates that the number of school-trained logisticians will increase by more than 10 percent (from 9,900 to 11,000) over the next few months, and that training executed by MTTs will produce an additional 2,500 trained logisticians.

Currently, the ANSF is dependent on CSTC-A for all bulk fuel ordering, delivery, and acquisition. The lack of technical capacity to solicit and manage contracts for logistics contributes to this problem. However, CSTC-A intends to conduct a phased transfer of all fuel funding and acquisition responsibilities for the ANA and ANP to the MoD and MoI. By January 2013, MoD will gradually begin taking over management of bulk fuel acquisition and distribution. Transition of these responsibilities will be completed by December 2014. The plan will be developed jointly with the MoD and MoI through an executive-level Fuel Committee and a Fuel Working Group. The executive Fuel Committee will also involve the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Ministry of Finance.

Construction of logistics facilities has made measured progress. At the national level, all but one of the ANA logistics nodes are complete. The new ANA Heavy Repair Workshop (HWS) is under design; construction should start in March 2013, with completion expected in the third quarter of 2014. On a regional level, the final two RLSCs were formed in July, completing the process of merging Corps Logistics Battalions and Forward Support Depots. ANSF logistics nodes are on track to commence transition to autonomous operations, with the first ANA node transitioning in late 2012, and 18 of 28 nodes anticipated to transition by the end of 2013.

Future logistics development efforts will focus on improving ANSF reporting systems, increasing effectiveness of the equipment distribution system, and streamlining the process used for requesting materiel. Investing in training and education of ANSF personnel is a key building block of the logistics system. Despite progress, the ANA is expected to be reliant on ISAF combat enablers and logistics support for some time.
**AFGHAN AIR FORCE**

The Afghan Air Force’s (AAF) long-term development strategy includes the creation of an air force that can support the basic needs of the ANSF and Afghan government by 2017. This force will be focused on airlift capabilities and casualty evacuation, and will have a limited capacity to conduct rotary and fixed-wing light air support. The AAF plans to sustain its capacity through indigenous training institutions, including a complete education and training infrastructure. The air fleet will consist of a mix of rotary and fixed wing aircraft providing light lift, medium airlift, and light air support capabilities to meet enduring ANSF security requirements and priorities. AAF airframes are a combination of Russian helicopters and Western aircraft. Afghan airmen, in cooperation with NTM-A, are developing safe aviation and operational procedures, and will be able to support the Afghan government effectively by employing the instruments of airpower.

AAF plans, however, are ambitious, and indicative of the conflict of aspirations, affordability, and necessity within the Afghan government. At present, AAF capacity and capability remains limited, but with a clear path to meet the demand of both the AAF and SMW pilot requirements. AAF development obstacles include inadequate education and literacy levels. The pilot training program is a two-year program, inclusive of English language training.

Corruption and infiltration by criminal patronage networks (CPN) also remain significant problems in the AAF. ISAF and the Afghan government continue to work together to combat corruption in the AAF, and as of the end of the reporting period, numerous investigations into allegations of corruption and other illegal activities were ongoing. As in other areas of governance, however, the Afghan government has yet to demonstrate the political will to address corruption and remove and prosecute corrupt officials on a consistent basis.

**AAF CAPACITY**

The NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan (NATC-A) focuses on building Afghanistan’s airpower along four lines of operation: aircraft build, airmen build, infrastructure build, and operational capability. All lines of operation made limited progress during the reporting period. The AAF’s growth and fielding capability rate lags behind other ANSF institutions, largely because its establishment was more recent than the ANA and ANP and requires more technical training time to produce mission-capable pilots and competent mechanics.

AAF airmen generation made progress during the reporting period but remains underdeveloped. The overall strength of the AAF was 6,224 personnel at the end of the reporting period, with 795 personnel currently in training. The pilot training program currently has 72 candidates progressing through the self-paced, roughly 18-month English-language training course, and 144 progressing through various 12-month pilot training courses. The AAF training program has expanded and begun training pilots from Shindand AB; it is envisioned that in the future, all pilot training will be conducted entirely within Afghanistan.

Following a series of investigations early this year that found substantial training deficits, NTM-A and the AAF responded with additional training programs in an effort to achieve a fully-trained force. At the close of this reporting period, fewer than 1,000 airmen on duty remained
untrained. NTM-A will ensure institutional and mobile training continues until all airmen receive the necessary training. In addition, throughout the reporting period, NTM-A and AAF Training and Personnel Officers were able to better define Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) and to refine the 2015 manning plan for the AAF based on the 2015 aircraft operational laydown.

The AAF aircraft build continued to make progress during the reporting period. Basic pilot training is now supported by six Cessna 182 aircraft. Six Cessna 208 aircraft are also in place to support initial fixed-wing pilot training. On the rotary wing side, six MD-530 helicopters have now been delivered to support the initial rotary-wing pilot training requirements. Additionally, five Mi-17s support initial qualification training for those pilots transitioning to that platform. Afghan-instructed basic fixed-wing and rotary-wing courses started in February.

On the operational side, the AAF received three additional Mi-17s in June. The final 12 Mi-17s are expected to be delivered between August and October of 2013. During this period the AAF underwent a complete maintenance overhaul to their Mi-17 and Mi-35 fleets. Maintenance standards were not being met or documented, and required a ground-up regeneration effort. Of the 16 Mi-17 helicopters that required a special 300-hour inspection, all but five have been completed and returned to service. Additionally, three Mi-17s were retired, four scheduled for overhaul, and two slated to be sent for a Return-to-Service inspection. The Coalition has provided experienced technicians to run the Mi-35 inspection line. To date, 2 Mi-35s are undergoing the inspection with four more awaiting entrance. Expected completion date for the Mi-35 is November 2012. The current work being done on the Mi-35s is not intended to extend the service life of the Mi-35s but will return them to service.

The AAF’s medium airlift capability will be met through the procurement of 20 G222 aircraft. The AAF has accepted delivery of 16 aircraft to date. The G222 program stood down in December 2011 to address maintenance and safety of flight issues. Efforts to improve the daily operational availability of these aircraft have been initiated.

The AAF’s light-lift mission capability is expanding rapidly. In addition to the six Cessna 208 aircraft now in place for fixed wing pilot training, eight more Cessna 208s are now in country to begin operational airlift missions. NTM-A is currently working to accelerate the delivery of the final 12 C-208s by the end of 2012 (the planned deliveries were originally anticipated to be complete by summer 2013). This will complete the operational C-208 Light Lift fleet at 20 operational aircraft.

Limited air-to-ground attack capabilities are being delivered by seven of the 11 Mi-35 helicopters. The operational life of the remaining four has now expired. In response the AAF may convert several Mi-17s into attack helicopters. This air-to-ground capability will transition in the future to the much more capable and modern Light Air Support (LAS) aircraft. Currently the LAS program is progressing through the acquisition procurement process. Contract award is anticipated to occur by January 2013, with the first aircraft deliveries occurring in the third quarter of 2014. The LAS aircraft will provide a highly capable western air-interdiction platform.
As of the end of the reporting period, the AAF has four remaining contractual efforts open and underway to complete the AAF inventory of 145 aircraft: Mi-17s, C-208s, LAS, and G222s.

The AAF’s infrastructure build made progress during the reporting period, reaching nearly 51 percent completion of all facilities projects. Kabul Air Wing facilities lead the way at nearly 87 percent complete, with Kandahar Air Wing following closely at 76 percent complete. The main training base at Shindand will soon begin Phase II of its four phases of construction, with training operations already underway. In parallel, planning and initial construction for the AAF’s Forward Air Bases at Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Jalalabad are also underway. Construction of AAF infrastructure is expected to be completed in late 2014.

**AAF Operational Capability**

As of September 2012, the AAF was rated as CM-4 (exists but cannot accomplish its mission) because not all manpower billets are sourced, and the airmen filling current billets often lack appropriate training. Kabul Air Wing is still awaiting its programmed allocation of aircraft. Currently, Kabul aircraft include 16 G222, 17 Mi-17s, and seven Mi-35s. As part of this fleet, Kabul Air Wing also hosts the Presidential airlift, which will consist of three Mi-17s and two G222 dedicated aircraft.

Kandahar Air Wing is assessed as CM-4, due to the absence of all programmed mission aircraft (Mi-17s, G222s, LAS, and C-208s). Additionally, the wing lacks manpower and training, which will follow once it begins to receive additional mission aircraft. Kandahar currently has five of the planned 13 Mi-17s. NTM-A continues to evaluate whether to locate four G222s in Kandahar should the final four G222s be delivered to Afghanistan. Kandahar will also receive the C-208 light lift aircraft as deliveries continue through December 2012.

Although Shindand Air Wing is assessed as CM-4, it has continued to mature as the AAF’s training wing. During the reporting period, Shindand began initial pilot training with newly delivered C-182, C-208, and MD-530 training aircraft. Additionally, the AAF’s English Language Training immersion program, “Thunder Lab,” was moved to Shindand Air Base.

**2.6: Afghan National Police Capacity and Growth**

As with the ANA, the ANP continued to make steady progress, increasing in size and capability during the reporting period. The ANP’s growing operational effectiveness was demonstrated in an increase in capability ratings during the reporting period. Although progress was not uniform across all sections of the ANP, some units, such as the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), are now highly effective, frequently partnering with ISAF forces in successful operations. Progress has been less rapid in other areas, such as the development of ANP logistics capabilities, and the development of the Afghan Border Police. The ANP remain significantly behind their ANA counterparts in developing the capabilities necessary to transfer to full Afghan lead by the end of 2014.
MANNING

The current approved end-strength for the ANP is 157,000 personnel, which they are currently estimated to reach by February 2013. This figure represents the projected requirement to support transition to Afghan security lead.

As of the end of the reporting period, the overall ANP force level reached 147,158 personnel, a decrease of 2,484 from the force level in March 2012. This force includes 24,566 officers, 43,632 non-commissioned officers, 74,956 patrolmen, and 4,004 initial entry trainees.

Figure 15: ANP End-Strength, Attrition, Recruiting, Retention, and Goal

The ANP did not meet its end-strength growth targets this reporting period, finishing 8,548 below the target goal of 155,706. Earlier this year, the ANP were recruiting at a pace to achieve the October objective ahead of schedule. However, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) ceased recruiting during April 2012 to focus on rebalancing ANP assets. The ANP had more low-level recruits than necessary at the time, but was facing a shortage of officers and NCOs. The MoI
opted to pause input of new (and mostly low-level) recruits to focus on ensuring that officers and NCOs were serving in actual officer and NCO billets, as well as to effect the reassignment of personnel from over-strength units to under-strength units. The MoI also used the recruiting pause to improve overall force quality by using training capacity to provide NCO training for promotable patrolmen and to train untrained patrolmen. Although this pause will slightly delay ANP from meeting its end-state force growth goal, NTM-A sees this as a positive sign of the MoI’s increasing independence and ability to assess its own recruiting needs accurately.

As a result of the pause, the ANP did not recruit any personnel in April and recruited only 464 in May, after resuming recruitment late in the month. The ANP General Recruiting Command (ANPGRC) recruited 7,931 police during the last four months. NTM-A and MoI have implemented a plan to mitigate the shortfall and are focused on meeting the end-strength goal by February 2013.

As part of the rebalancing of the force, the ANP were able to remove 3,400 personnel from over-tashkil positions and began assigning them to units where they were needed. The recruiting pause also enabled untrained patrolmen to receive formal police training. There had been success in recruiting for direct entry NCO courses, but almost no success in reducing recruiting of untrained patrolmen until the recent recruiting freeze. NTM-A leadership continues to engage and assist the MoI to overcome the issues of untrained patrolmen and low NCO numbers.

The ANP generally reflects the ethnic make-up of local communities, as personnel typically serve in the area where they join the force. However, when aggregated at the national level, Tajiks are significantly overrepresented in the force and Pashtuns are represented equivalent to the Afghan population, but Hazara, Uzbeks, and other ethnic groups are underrepresented to varying degrees.

Attrition25 in the ANP remained relatively steady during the reporting period, averaging 1.1 percent, consistent with the goal of 1.4 percent.

**FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING**

As of September 2012, the shortfall of NCOs in the ANP was approximately 9,464. However, due to the increased NCO training capacity resulting from the recruitment pause, the ANP added 3,341 NCOs since the beginning of the reporting period.

The training base capacity of NTM-A and the German Police Project Team (GPPT) has decreased as a result of the closure of temporary training sites at Mazar-e Sharif, Shouz, and Sheberghan. These sites were closed as part of the overall Transition plan that will consolidate the number of training sites from 30 to 13 by December 2014. National Police Training Center Wardak has expanded to its 3,000-man training capacity. ANP Training General Command and NTM-A are working to ensure that throughput is improved as soon as possible. The total

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25 At the end of February, the ANP began reporting attrition as only unanticipated losses to the ANP, "Dropped From Rolls" (DFR) and "Other" have replaced "AWOL" and "WIA" as counting toward attrition. "Other" are members who have left the ANP because they disappeared, were captured, or were transferred to other ANSF units. Source: ANP HRD Date: 7 May 2012
number of ANP patrolmen, NCO, and officer graduates from initial pillar training for the reporting period was 19,433.

The key to the ANP’s professional sustainability following the 2014 transition is an enduring and effective training management capability. The ANP Training General Command (ANPTGC) continues to assume increasing control of training issues, with emphasis on “Reform Training” for untrained patrolmen, recruiting for direct NCO (“Satanman”) training (expected to start early September), and the transition of the training system to Afghan control. The transition of course-scheduling continues, and ANP ownership will be in-place to enable the ANPTGC to design, deliver, and implement the next 12-month iteration of the course tracker from January to December 2013. Furthermore, ANPTGC has taken the initiative to assist training the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). APPF training is running at three sites, with more being scheduled as capacity is identified.

The training priority over the coming months will focus on supporting training for promotable patrolmen, replacing losses due to attrition, and shifting the focus of the ANP from COIN missions to a rule-of-law-based police force.

Part of this effort includes planning for a class of 400-500 training instructors who will augment the decentralized Permanent Training Teams, Zone Training Teams, and Provincial Training Companies. These training units will provide the quality training needed to transform the ANP from a COIN-focused security force to one capable of investigating and deterring crimes. ANP’s goal is to have an additional 861 instructors trained and certified by the end of 2012.

Total training attrition for Solar Month September was 5.9 percent, which was an increase from last month's attrition rate. Reasons for attrition include academic failure, drug use, discipline, and voluntary withdrawal. The variation in these figures is consistent with previous reporting periods.

Table 2: ANP Trainee Attrition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Arrived</th>
<th>Graduated</th>
<th>Attrition</th>
<th>Attrition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) Basic</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>919</td>
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<td>0.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUP NCO</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) NCO</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghan Border Police (ABP) Basic</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABP NCO</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist Courses</td>
<td>448</td>
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<tr>
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<td>70</td>
<td>69</td>
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<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total *</td>
<td>2,063</td>
<td>1,941</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Trainee Attrition is calculated on a monthly basis by subtracting the number graduated from the number arrived. The attrition rate is calculated by dividing attrition by the number arrived.


**Equipping**

The ANP remains under-equipped as a result of fielding challenges, including battle loss replacement needs and the closure of Pakistani GLOCs earlier this year. Distribution of vehicles in particular was slowed by the GLOC closures. To mitigate the border closure situation, many vehicles en-route to Pakistan, or planned for the Pakistan GLOC, were rerouted via the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). This route was able to deliver some vehicles and equipment, but at considerably less volume than the Pakistan GLOC or Karachi port. The re-opening of the Pakistan GLOC has increased on-hand quantities and ability to complete fielding of the ANP. Light Tactical Vehicles (LTVs), Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs), and other non-tactical rolling stock are still arriving via the Trans-Siberian Railway or the NDN. Up-Armored (UA) HMMWVs remain the top priority item to field once the vehicles arrive in country from Pakistan. Security along the GLOC remains an issue and has impacted the amount of material crossing the border. Weapons and communication equipment fielding has continued since the reopening of the GLOCs without unexpected delays.

CSTC-A was able to procure and deliver to Afghanistan high quantities of the required ANP equipment. Of the three main categories of equipment required by the ANP (“shoot”, “move”, and “communicate”), CSTC-A has been able to deliver to Afghanistan 99 percent of “shoot” equipment, 77 percent of “move” equipment, and 108 percent of “communicate” equipment. However, much like the situation with ANA equipment, problems arise when delivering the equipment from national (and largely ISAF-run) depots to smaller regional depots and to the units themselves. When equipment is fielded to the ANP, either staged by local pickup in Kabul or a convoy, CSTC-A has little oversight over the ultimate destination and unit receiving the equipment. Diversion of equipment from its intended unit as stated on the CSTC-A issuing order has occurred, although the exact rate of equipment diversion remains unknown. Often, far more equipment than necessary is delivered to one unit at the expense of others, giving rise to a situation in which some units are over-equipped while others are under equipped. In addition to diverted equipment, damaged equipment is often not reported by the units. This causes lower “on-hand” numbers at the unit level than what is documented as the quantity fielded.

Night-vision devices (NVDs) and other high-end equipment continued to be issued to ANP Special Forces, dramatically increasing the capability to conduct high-risk counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions. Sensitive items such as NVDs require monthly inventory. The ANP also has a monthly inventory requirement for a variety of explosive ordinance device/counter-IED, personnel protection, and specialty/tool items and equipment. ISAF is assessing the accuracy of multiple inventory records to gain better accountability of on-hand equipment numbers in all ANP pillars. Fielding of equipment to the ANP will continue, with a goal of on-hand quantities at 95 percent by September 2013.

**Logistics Capabilities**

During the reporting period, the ANP logistics system has made steady progress toward self-sufficiency, although major challenges remain. As a result of a deliberate decision to place initial focus of force generation on ANP policing units, the development of enablers – in
particular logistics capabilities – was delayed, and ANP logistics capabilities are not expected to be self-sufficient until late 2014. NTM-A began to shift its efforts to logistics development in mid-2011, and this is now the main focus of NTM-A. Logistics will remain the main focus area for the training mission throughout 2012 and 2013. NTM-A initiated a detailed planning process to review the current logistics system, and in conjunction with IJC and MoI, to develop a more sustainable system to meet ANP requirements beyond 2014.

ANP logistics nodes at the regional level and below continue to require Coalition assistance in order to effectively provide sustainment. The biggest logistics challenges include the recruitment of specialized policemen and the retention of trained logisticians, while ensuring fielded equipment is operational. Additionally, logistics continues to challenge the operational readiness of the ALP. Each District Chief of Police is authorized three AUP personnel to assist in ALP management and supply; however, the level of support varies from district to district. NTM-A is working with available ALP logisticians to establish better accountability of issued equipment, better coordination of services, and improved knowledge of the logistics system.

Although not yet executed, the approved plan to transition the transportation bridge from three light/medium kandaks to two light/medium kandaks and two heavy kandaks is anticipated to provide 90 percent of ANP’s transport needs. The expected completion date for the plan is the end of the first quarter in 2014. The logistics agreement between MoD and MoI for greater cooperation and coordination offers a wide range of opportunities. This effort has been demonstrated by the MoD providing training slots for MoI students and the joint coordination of convoy security. Training, transport, and storage facilities, at both the strategic and operational levels, highlight areas of collaboration.

The ANP’s National Logistics Center in Wardak Province will complete construction at the end of October 2012. This facility will co-locate three national institutions, including the ANP’s only national depot, the Material Management Center and the MoI Support Command. This custom-built facility also has a vehicle- and weapons-maintenance capability, in addition to a large classroom and office space. The development of this facility is being undertaken as a partnership between the ANP and NTM-A. The three national institutions are scheduled to transition to CM1A in the spring of 2013.

Development of an ANP maintenance capability is underway, as poorly maintained equipment affects unit performance in the field. Currently, the ANP is entirely reliant on contracted maintenance provided through an NTM-A-managed contract. NTM-A and maintenance experts from the MoI are focusing on the establishment of ANP mobile response maintenance teams, with recovery capability within the current manning and equipment levels. In order to improve the ANP’s maintenance capability and increase the level of confidence across the ANSF, several projects are ongoing. Expanding current NTM-A-provided maintenance training will address the necessary human capital investment to enable a basic maintenance capability within the ANP. NTM-A will pursue improvement in the ANP maintenance program and the use of recovery assets. Furthermore, NTM-A expects to refine sustainment requirements for eight MoI Supply Points (MSPs) and seven Regional Logistics Centers (RLCs). In conjunction with MoI, NTM-A plans to simplify the requirements and requisition process and develop infrastructure and contract management capabilities.
ANCOP continues to be an extremely effective and viable force for deployed security operations throughout Afghanistan. Attrition has been consistently low, with the 12-month average being 1.27 percent, and with June, July, August and September at or below 0.2 percent. During the reporting period, ANCOP communications were upgraded, leading to major improvements in ANCOP operational effectiveness. Unit equipping is improving across the force; however, shortfalls exist in some of the more contested regions. ANCOP fielding of specialized and sensitive equipment, as well as the construction of new facilities, should be completed by the third quarter of 2013, enabling ANCOP to achieve Capabilities Milestone 1A. During the reporting period, ANCOP have been heavily employed throughout Afghanistan, supplementing the regular ANP.

AFGHAN BORDER POLICE

During the reporting period, ABP made slow progress toward self-sufficiency. ABP’s mission is difficult, with a number of inherent factors preventing rapid progress toward self-sufficiency. Afghan terrain is some of the most difficult in the world, and many border posts are located in remote areas. The challenges involved in fielding the ABP in remote outposts and keeping them supplied is enormous, and would test even a far more advanced and well-equipped nation. There are no vehicle maintenance facilities within a reasonable proximity of some units, and no trained mechanics available in rural areas. The ABP relies on Coalition Forces for the provision of basic needs such as fuel and water. The ABP continues to be hampered by illiteracy, lack of accountability, and corruption; these conditions are expected to endure beyond 2014. Modest improvements in these areas have been realized through ongoing ABP training, education, and professionalization efforts.

A number of other issues hinder ABP development. Correctly accounting for personnel remains a major issue, especially with “ghost soldiers” (soldiers who are no longer assigned but for whom the unit continues to collect pay). Although LOTFA’s Electronic Payroll System (EPS) has been successful, it is challenging both in terms of the management of the software development process and internal control of payments, resulting in such problems as “ghost police,” double payments, and incorrect entitlements. LOTFA and NTM-A are engaged in several collaborative processes regarding the payroll data and pay distribution, including an effort to eliminate data problems by interfacing and coordinating the EPS, the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS), the Afghan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS), the ID card system, biometric identification, electronic salary methods (like EFT and payments to mobile phone networks), and the GIRoA I process. It is expected this effort will eradicate data inconsistencies. In addition to re-engineering the payroll system, pushing the roll-out of the Web-EPS system, and continued checking and analysis of EPS data, LOTFA will review the effectiveness and value of their Monitoring Agent services in the field. NTM-A audits and data analysis will continue to be used to identify pay inaccuracies.

Pay and promotion issues also negatively impact ABP development. The lack of banking facilities in some regions, along with the security situation along routes used for the movement of bulk funds, have prevented personnel from getting paid in a timely manner. ABP training is
currently not as extensive as the training most other ANP receive. Training shortfalls include communications, driving, maintenance, counter-IED, computers, and literacy. More NCO training is needed. Many ABP outposts remain static, and rarely conduct border security missions beyond the vicinity of their outposts.

ABP and ANSF leadership have engaged in multiple discussions with their neighboring counterparts to improve border relations. Efforts to build pan-ANSF supporting relationships and improve cooperation along neighboring borders are enabled by Coalition Forces. However, better communication, coordination, and cooperation with Afghan National Army (ANA), providing layered and "in extremis" support, will be required to reduce insurgent operations in the border zone.

Positive momentum is evidenced by the ABP's mission at the regulated points of embarkation, including five airports and 14 border control points (BCPs). ABP has also embraced the Combined Comprehensive Border Strategy (CCBS), in which ISAF supports GIRoA with focused and coherent nationally endorsed aims to decrease the ingress of homemade explosives (HMEs) precursors, insurgents, and weapons by concentrating effort at selected BCPs. NTM-A is currently equipping and training police at these sites in order to support the initiative. It is assessed that if sufficient security and force protection can be provided, the BCP mission is the best area to continue professionalization and corruption reduction efforts. Although the ABP is crucial to future border security, the overarching solution must first and foremost include the will of GIRoA to control the flow of illegal and illicit materials, coupled with the strategic impetus to improve diplomatic cooperation with neighboring countries.

**AFGHAN UNIFORM POLICE**

The AUP made steady progress during this reporting period, although major challenges remain. As part of a deliberate decision made when the AUP was still in the early stages of development, initial focus was on force generation and support to the COIN campaign. As increasing areas of Afghanistan transition to ANSF lead and the ANA is better able to handle the military aspects of the security mission, increased consideration is being given to AUP reform as part of security sector reform. This includes the further professionalization of the AUP to create a police service that can actively deal with criminality and has a sense of integrity, a code of ethics, an ability to engage with the community, and respects the rule of law.

NTM-A plans to assist the international community in the long-term evolution of the AUP from a security force into an effective police service by creating the conditions required for the police to support the rule of law. The desired end-state is for the AUP to be a competent police service that provides internal security, protects borders and respects the rule of law. Key areas of influence for police professionalization are the development of the MoI, the institutionalization of training, the enablement of sustainment functions, and the promotion of international cooperation. These areas will constitute the main focus areas for 2013.

Currently, roughly 17,552 (20 percent) of the AUP are untrained and approximately 12,800 (15 percent) are un-vetted. Full vetting for new AUP recruits occurs when they arrive at their first training center. Many instances have occurred in which Provincial Chiefs of Police (PCoPs)
place newly recruited patrolmen directly into local units from the recruiting centers, bypassing the training centers. Vetting of these assigned but untrained patrolmen is therefore delayed or never completed. The Direct Entry Satammen (NCOs), as well as officers, all complete training and are fully vetted before assignment to their units; therefore, at a minimum, all of the patrolmen's supervisors are all vetted. ISAF is working with the MoI to prevent police candidates from bypassing training centers, and by extension, bypassing the vetting process as well as continuing to retroactively vet those AUP that already bypassed the training centers.

One major impediment to AUP development in this area is the low capabilities of the Afghan justice sector. The AUP’s capabilities, both geographically and functionally, have far surpassed those of the Afghan judiciary and justice sector. The AUP have the authorization to hold suspects for up to 72 hours, but beyond that judicial intervention is required. AUP do not act as investigators of crime as police forces do in many Western nations. The Afghan judiciary is in charge of criminal investigations and prosecution. In many areas, AUP personnel may arrest a suspect but are forced to release them after 72 hours due to a lack of support from the justice sector. Increasing the capabilities of the Afghan justice sector and judiciary, as well as the coordination between them and the AUP, will be a priority through 2013.

**WOMEN’S POLICE INITIATIVES**

The Solar Year (SY) 1391 Tashkil provides a total of 3,000 female billets (up 223 from last year); however, women currently account for less than one percent of the total ANP force. As of September 2012, there were 1,455 female members of the ANP; 634 patrolwomen, 599 NCOs, and 222 officers. This number is relatively low because many Provincial Chiefs of Police (PCOPs) do not allow additional females to fill authorized billets for a variety of reasons, such as preference for male recruits, lack of adequate facilities, cultural influences, inability to work night shift, no day care facilities, etc.

Currently, women who are trained only at the patrolman level are often assigned positions at the NCO and officer level in order to fill Tashkil positions for female NCOs and officers. Lack of literacy is also a factor, which limits women’s ability to perform duties when not qualified for the position, thus reinforcing the reluctance to employ females. The ANP General Recruiting Command (ANPGRC) has indicated there are women who wish to join the ANP, especially ethnic Tajiks in the north, but PCOPs control how billets are filled by recruiters and have prevented the addition of more females. Recruiting advisors also confirmed with the MoI Tashkil Department and Tashkil advisors that the female billets are available to be filled. The MoI Gender Integration Department appears to have little authority to effect changes needed to increase acceptance of females within the ANP. Although the MoI issued Directive 055 in September 2010 addressing these issues, there appears to have been no enforcement or follow-through with its initiatives. However, recruiting advisors are working with their Afghan principals to identify provinces amenable to receiving more females and will make every effort to ensure ANPGRC recruits females to fill vacant billets with the appropriate personnel.

Despite a continued effort to recruit and train females into the force the ANP struggles to achieve their recruiting goals for women. NTM-A anticipates that progress will remain slow, and women are likely to remain underrepresented in the ANP for the foreseeable future.
The ANP continued to recruit and field elite police units under the command and control of the General Directorate of Police Special Units (GDPSU). The GDPSU are trained by and partnered with ISAF Special Operations Forces (SOF) in support of the COIN strategy. During the reporting period, the GDPSU changed its command and control (C2) structure to allow central control over the Provincial Response Companies (PRCs), and thereby assuming responsibility for their training, manning and equipping. The C2 change is improving and enabling better effects synchronization among all the Special Police Units (SPU), thus providing the Afghan government with a mature and highly functional National Special Police force.

The GDPSU continues to be directed by the Deputy Minister for Security. The directorate remains structured with national and provincial units that are trained, organized, and equipped to tackle the high-value malign threats throughout Afghanistan. The national units consist of Commando Force (CF) 333, Crisis Response Unit (CRU) and Afghan Task Force (ATF) 444; multi-functional special police units capable of high-risk arrests and hostage rescue missions. CF333 and ATF44 have a national focus, while the CRU is focused primarily in the capital region. The provincial units currently consist of 19 Provincial Response Companies (PRC), which are responsible for Special Police (SP) operations within their provincial Areas of Operations, conducting operational tasks that directly support the Provincial Chiefs of Police (PCoP). The PRCs specialize in civil order security and high-risk arrests. Each PRC is supported by a team from the Investigative Surveillance Unit (ISU).

GDPSU is at approximately 85 percent manning, with the PRCs estimated to reach Full Operating Capability (FOC) by end 2012. ISAF SOF has deployed with an average 62 percent partnered force ratio over the past six months. Progress is also being made in establishing an enduring career path for all policemen, with progression through the ranks that includes assignments in both national and provincial units and instructor posts at the SPTW and SPTC.

The Special Police Training Center (SPTC) in Wardak Province, has achieved initial operational capability and is now delivering PRC Advanced Courses, Trauma Assistance Personnel (TAP) Training and Train the Trainer (TTT) (8 weeks advanced) courses. It will pilot the PRC Foundation Course in November when all PRC training will be centralized at SPTC. By June next year, the Special Police Training Wing (SPTW) will come online in Logar Province and will come under SPTC C2. The SPTC will continue to provide foundation training to PRCs, will run GDPSU Selection, and GDPSU career courses. SPTW will focus on the delivery of foundation training for the National Units (NU), NU operator courses, and specialist courses. The key issue remains the identification of a framework (lead) nation for the life support issues that hinder the smooth transition to Afghan control.

Commander GDPSU is in the final stages of reviewing his Tashkil for 1392 with an emphasis on creating balanced national unit structures, interoperability between units, a justification of the ranks and greater coordination of activity at a regional level and improved control exercised over the units by GDPSU HQ.
Provincial Response Companies (PRCs) are provincially based Special Police Units (SPU) that specialize in civil order security and high-risk arrests, and partner with ISAF SOF and U.S. forces for training and operations. Nineteen PRCs, each comprising 100 police, are active in the field; of these, five have achieved full operational capability, and the rest are expected to achieve this status over the course of this year. ISAF reached a ratio of 50 percent of special police operations being led by Afghans while enabled by ISAF.

ISAF SOF personnel also partners with other SPU, such as Commando Force (CF) 333, a special police commando unit originally developed by UK Special Forces for counternarcotics and interdiction, but now considered a multi-functional commando force capable of high-risk arrests. The Crisis Response Unit, a national response unit based in Kabul, is partnered with ISAF SOF in high-risk arrest and hostage rescue missions, primarily in the capital region.

The foundation and the advanced training of national-level special police units continues to be conducted by the units themselves at individual locations, enabled by the units' coalition mentor teams. Work continues to consolidate and centralize these specialist courses through the establishment of Special Police Training Wing (SPTW) by June 2013 in order to provide specialized SOF training courses. The key unresolved issue is that a lead nation has not yet been identified, which impacts the ability to coordinate administrative life support. The SPTW facility provides GDPSU with training commonality and development focus.

NTM-A supported the GDPSU in a rewrite of the Ministerial Development Plan to account for the addition of 19 Provincial Response Companies (PRCs) and the removal of the VIP Protection Unit (VIPPU) and the Judicial Support Unit (JSU) from the command. The metrics and activities have been updated to reflect the outcomes required to reach Transition and are focused on capabilities over volume. The new version of the plan will be reported on in September 2012.

Commander GDPSU is in the final stages of reviewing his Tashkil for SY1391, with an emphasis on interoperability between units, a justification of the ranks, and greater coordination of activity at a regional level. It is likely that there will be a reduction in the number of senior officers as a consequence, but with GDPSU HQ better able to exercise control over units.

2.7: AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE (APPF)

The APPF is an MoI-managed force that was established by presidential decree to conduct all non-diplomatic commercial, development, fixed-site, and convoy security services (to include ISAF convoys) in place of the private security companies (PSCs) that currently provide these services. All PSCs were subsequently directed to transition to Risk Management Companies (RMCs), with security guards and contracts managed by the MoI. The initial target date for full implementation was March 20, 2012 and involved transitioning approximately 270 sites, 75 contracts, and 11,000 guards. The establishment of the APPF was intended to support the overall strategic goal of transitioning multiple armed groups in Afghanistan to Afghan governmental control, and the force is designed to eventually become self-supporting. Security services for ISAF bases and construction sites have also been directed to transition to the APPF, although their targeted implementation date is March 20, 2013, and involves transitioning an additional 185 sites, 145 contracts, and 13,000 guards.
The Afghan-controlled APPF management was not fully prepared or manned for the March 20, 2012 deadline to transfer all PSCs to RMCs. Therefore, on March 20, the MoI issued a directive creating an interim license category for PSCs providing fixed site and convoy security. This measure allowed additional time for a stable transition to occur with no interruptions in the provision of security. The APPF issued 22 RMC and 36 interim licenses, enabling PSCs to continue operating for an additional 30 to 90 days while the transition to APPF security services continues. To date, the APPF has signed 161 contracts covering 163 projects; 211 remain to be signed.

Although the goal of full transition to the APPF by March 20 was not achieved, progress still occurred. At the end of June, the APPF headquarters, zone headquarters, business directorates, and operations directorates were manned at 70 percent, a significant improvement from earlier this year. Furthermore, the APPF guard force has trained approximately 200 new guards per month, for a total of 6,800 trained APPF guards by the end of June. The APPF has also transitioned more than 95 percent of guards from existing PSCs to the APPF.

The APPF is facing challenges in its mission to take over convoy security, but is working toward the development of its first convoy security Kandak. Over the summer, MoI APPF agreed to a phased implementation plan for convoy security by developing seven Kandaks throughout Afghanistan. Recently, the Tashkils for all seven Kandaks were approved, and the first three Kandaks are in various stages of fielding. The first Kandak has troops and life support, and its infrastructure is under development. Both the second and third Kandaks’ site selection has been completed. Guard recruiting is underway for the second Kandak, and APPF Advisory Group (AAG) Convoy Security Team is assisting APPF with site development.

It is too early to make a determination on the APPF’s overall capacity to completely transition all ISAF fixed-site and convoy security missions by March 2013; however, the efforts of NTM-A and its APPF Advisory Group have been focused on supporting the Afghan government as it attempts to fulfill this presidential mandate.

2.8: LOCAL DEFENSE INITIATIVES

Village Stability Operations (VSO) and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) are complementary components of both ISAF and Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) COIN strategy. Both VSO and ALP have made substantial progress in protecting and mobilizing rural populations, preventing their exploitation by the insurgency, and expanding the influence of the Afghan government. The VSO and ALP incorporate both “bottom-up” and “top-down” approaches to COIN – the former being reflected in security, governance, and development built up from the village to the district levels, and the latter evidenced through increased integrations into national Afghan government implementing mechanisms.

VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS

The Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police (VSO/ALP) program is a population-centric COIN strategy, whose objective is two-fold: 1) to reestablish traditional informal governance mechanisms at the village-level; and 2) to link the informal governance to the formal GIRoA system at the district-level. This bottom-up and top-down approach supports
geographically isolated rural areas in their ability and desire to raise a local defense force. VSO builds local governance through implementation of security and creates stability for follow-on development. In Village Stability Platform (VSP) districts, governance activity is generally higher than throughout the rest of Afghanistan, both among local villages and between villages and district authorities. Success for a VSO/ALP site occurs when Afghans assume control in their district for local security and governance connectivity to the Afghan government. The villages and districts become resistant to Taliban, and establish a mechanism to allow GIRoA to support local communities.

Not only does the VSO/ALP program seek to build stability at the district level but it also focuses on expanding the tangible reach of the MoI. ALP forces are under the command of the local Afghan district police chief, and are considered part of the MoI. The VSO/ALP program has paid increasing attention to the MoI supply and pay systems, and the MoI recently has shown a growing ability and willingness to manage its personnel authorizations.

**Afghan Local Police**

As the principal component of the VSO initiative, the ALP are village-based security forces administered by the MoI. The program utilizes US Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Coalition forces to train Afghans in rural areas to defend their communities against threats from insurgents and militant groups. The ALP are a defensive police force – they do not go on offensive patrols and are not heavily armed. ALP units primarily man checkpoints in the vicinity of their village. When a checkpoint is attacked, the ALP defend themselves and their village until more capable military or police units arrive to conduct offensive operations.

As of September 27, 2012, the MoI has approved 136 districts for ALP development, an increase of 37 from the prior total. Of these 136 districts approved for ALP development, 73 have been validated by local shuras and the MoI, a 24 percent increase from the previous reporting period. The total ALP force of 16,474 ALP personnel represents a 29 percent increase from the previous reporting period.

The Afghan government has authorized an end-strength of 30,000 ALP. The ALP program continues to expand and gain popular support with Afghans. Growth of the ALP program continued at a steady pace from 3,100 in January 2011 to 16,431 in September 2012. ALP generation rates have been revised upward and are expected to reach 17,000 in December 2012, 22,000 in July 2013, and 30,000 in December 2015. The rapid expansion of the ALP has not compromised its combat effectiveness, as evidenced by its two percent attrition rate.

**Afghan Local Police Challenges**

Despite significant successes, the ALP program also faces challenges that stem in part from heavy dependence on U.S. government funding and USSOF training, mentorship, and oversight. Achieving the authorized force of 30,000 ALP personnel will challenge the capacity of SOJTF-A forces, and may require additional support from USSOF and conventional force enablers. ALP must also overcome personal, ethnic and tribal tensions. In most instances, local shuras are
effective in ensuring fair tribal balance and ethnic representation in ALP units. However, some shuras and ALP commanders actively resist recruiting certain ethnicities, which can create significant ethnic tension in multi-ethnic villages. USSOF are currently working closely with the MoI, village shuras, and the DCOP to resolve this issue.

The ALP program also faces logistical challenges. Logistical resupply is hampered by many variables including a low Afghan literacy rate, a lack of understanding their own supply process, and distances to Regional Logistic Centers (RLC). These challenges are compounded by difficult terrain, weather, as well as varying degrees of corruption. These factors threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan government in rural areas and the durability of the program. One initiative to better enable the ALP’s understanding of the logistics system is through Coalition-assisted education, specifically literacy programs provided to ALP members and their villages. ISAF personnel are also working at the RLCs to mentor their Afghan counterparts.

The proliferation of independent non-GIRoA sanctioned militias, which operate outside the VSO/ALP framework, threaten to undermine the legitimacy and progress of the program. Although limited in number, these unauthorized organizations threaten to damage the ALP “brand,” especially when they inappropriately use the ALP name to further their own interests. Although there are a few incidences to contrary, the ALP has favorable name recognition in the majority of Afghan provinces in which polling has been conducted.

Underscoring the effectiveness of the program, the Taliban Senior Leadership (TBSL) have identified infiltration of the ALP as a primary objective to weaken the program. As of August 2012, a small minority of insider attacks (3 out of 78) have involved members of the ALP. SOF remain deeply embedded with ALP, more so than other ISAF units working with AUP or ANA. Although this exposes them to much more direct contact with possible infiltrators, also it also allows for a better understanding of the human terrain and an opportunity to identify possible threat indicators.

To mitigate the risk of insider threats, SOJTF-A has taken active measures to re-validate all 16,474 ALP personnel. This revalidation process is currently 52 percent complete, with less than one percent removed due to nefarious activities or counter-intelligence concerns. This process, which is currently ongoing, is very similar in design to our initial screening/validation methodology. It begins at the local level by conducting shuras and intimately involving local elders, who must vouch for each ALP member, ensuring he remains in good standing. Each member’s application paperwork is re-reviewed by various personnel from the Coalition, MoI, NDS, and the DCOPs. If any ALP member “flags” as suspicious, additional counter-intelligence (both Afghan and Coalition) measures are taken. If it is determined that an ALP member is unfit, he is removed from the program. These processes are non-negotiable. In addition, NDS plans to embed three agents per 100 ALP to identify possible infiltration by the enemy. The prevention/elimination of Insider Threats will remain COMISAF’s top force protection priorities.

During the reporting period, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) released its annual report on the protection of civilians, which noted that ALP had improved security and kept insurgents out of ALP areas. The UNAMA report also maintained some
criticisms from its previous 2011 report, which included references to issues in recruitment, vetting, training, and discipline. To address these occurrences, MoI responded by creating ALP Assessment Teams charged with investigating misconduct allegations and related issues affecting the ALP at the district level.

**Executive Agent**

SOJTF-A assumed responsibility as COMISAF’s executive agent for VSO/ALP from Combined Forces Special Operations Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) on July 1, 2012, and exercises the program’s execution through its subordinate command, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A). The program currently involves 5,509 CJSOTF-A personnel, which have worked with more than 634 villages in 72 districts throughout Afghanistan.

There are currently 56 USSOF teams – anticipated to increase to 61 by December 2012 - and 116 Civil Affairs (CA) Officers, Non-commissioned officers (NCO), and Soldiers supporting VSO. Additionally, there are 42 Provincial Augmentation Team Chiefs (PATs) and District Augmentation Team Chiefs (DATs) operating in 36 separate locations across the Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA). This includes 20 Afghan Hands operating directly at the district/community level, with another 16 Afghan Hands operating at the provincial level and higher.

**Village Stability Operations 2.0**

In recognition of the success of the ALP program, its natural maturation, and the need to advance it geographically, SOJTF-A has begun to transition the primary supervisory responsibility for ALP districts to the ANSF, with U.S. forces moving into tactical overwatch. Currently, there are 21 districts that have transitioned into tactical overwatch. The sustainability and success of these districts, however, ultimately depends on GIRoA (ANSF) taking increased ownership and responsibility.

In order for a district to transition to tactical overwatch, it must meet the following criteria:

1. **Leadership:** DCOP and ALP Commanders are appointed and in place, and DCOP and ALP Commanders are competent and support each other; (2) **Legitimacy:** Shura leaders are identified and validated. Seventy percent of the ALP across the district are approved by *shura* and are from the local area. Shura leaders are capable of maintaining the ALP program. The local populace view the ALP as legitimate; (3) **Logistics:** 70 percent of on-hand ALP in districts are regularly receiving MoI pay and have sufficient weapons, fuel, and ammunition to perform duties. GIRoA district leadership provides adequate sustainment for ALP across the district; (4) **Security:** Each ALP village/element has an identified ANSF support force that can reinforce all ALP locations. DCOP is capable of coordinating security actions across the district in support of ALP; (5) **Manning:** 70 percent of the district tashkil is filled and trained. DCOP has the ability to train ALP; on-hand ALP numbers are sufficient to protect key population centers in the district.
Non-ALP Local Defense Forces

Until recently, three main Local Defense Forces (LDFs) were supported by ISAF: 1) Community Based Security Solutions (CBSS) – aligned to RC-E; 2) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) – aligned to RC-N; and 3) Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure (ISCI) – aligned to RC-S and RC-SW. From September to December 2011, media and international human rights reported multiple allegations of criminal activity and human rights violations by local security forces in Afghanistan. Some of these allegations were associated with coalition sponsored LDF, such as those previously listed. On December 25, 2011, the President of Afghanistan (PoA) called for the disestablishment of all non-GIRoA sanctioned LDF. As of September 2012, all three LDFs were in the process of being demobilized, with an estimated completion date of December 2012. In some cases, SOJTF-A has made application to the ALP program available to recently demobilized LDF. This transition option has been done with the express requirement that those demobilizing meet “all the same criteria” of any other ALP candidate and do not simply “cross-walk” from LDF to ALP. This initiative has addressed both ALP development requirements while maintaining sizeable numbers of former LDF employed under a legitimate GIRoA- endorsed program.

Figure 16: ALP Disposition Map
2.9: Afghan Intelligence Agencies

The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) Intelligence structures continue to develop at a steady, albeit a slow rate. The objective remains establishing self-reliant, professionally-led ANSF intelligence organizations that generate and sustain enduring intelligence capabilities. Despite early problems with recruitment and training, the intelligence organizations are becoming more effective and capable of leading and conducting intelligence operations. The primary Afghan intelligence organizations are as follows:

Afghan National Intelligence Committee (NIC) (under development): Approved by President Karzai, the NIC will be chaired by the Office of the National Security Advisor and consist of ministerial senior intelligence representation from MoD, MoI, and NDS. The NIC is intended to:

- Coordinate and establish intelligence policy;
- Define and delineate intelligence responsibilities;
- Discuss national intelligence requirements and priorities;
- Coordinate intelligence analysis efforts and major intelligence assessments; and
- Establish budget requirements for intelligence operations and growth;

National Directorate of Security (NDS): The NDS is Afghanistan’s premier internal security and intelligence service, and is an independent agency responsible directly to the President of Afghanistan. NDS has several thousand officers and staff. The directorate is a capable intelligence organization, with a multi-intelligence function capability and an extensive source network. It routinely operates independently and has succeeded in preventing numerous planned attacks.

Ministry of Interior (MoI): The principal intelligence organization within the Ministry of Interior is the Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI). In addition, several other organizations within the MoI have smaller intelligence functions or sections. These include the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP), and the Afghan Border Police (ABP). The AACP Criminal Investigation Department houses the forensics capability for the Ministry of Interior and the biometrics database for the country. The AACP also includes the Counter-Terrorism Department, which appears to have a robust source network but does not work with other elements active in the CT fight such as the General Directorate of Police Special Units (GDPSU) or the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC). The ABP has approximately 450 intelligence officers to provide intelligence support from the national headquarters down through the police zones to 37 ABP battalions, but they provide little in terms of usable intelligence.

Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI): The DPI was created to provide detailed research, analysis, and reporting on criminal, terrorist, and insurgent activity. The directorate provides ministerial leadership with strategic-level intelligence reporting, as well as intelligence in support of terrorist or criminal network lawful arrest operations. Subordinate departments include Operational Intelligence, Intelligence Investigations, Analysis, Support, Training Management, and the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center. The DPI is the most advanced of the police
intelligence organizations within Afghanistan. It has a robust HUMINT collection capability and is capable of small scale, independent intelligence operations. Many remnants of the DPI’s former internal policing mission within the Ministry of Intelligence remain, and it is often called upon to investigate police misconduct. Within the DPI exists the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC), an intelligence operations center through which intelligence is collected, analyzed, exploited, and developed to support operations against terrorist, insurgent, and associated criminal networks within a secure, warrant-based, and operationally focused environment. NTEC is capable of conducting independent intelligence operations. However, current capabilities to collect and perform target development are not sufficient to degrade significantly the country’s many terrorist and insurgent networks alone. NTEC’s evidence-based targeting ability is limited to a degree by insufficient intelligence flow, an incomplete, nationwide communications network, and a still-maturing analytical capability. Currently NTEC integrates intelligence derived from the seven police zones, various MoI organizations, the National Directorate of Security, and the Afghan National Army General Staff G2 (Intelligence). NTEC has developed and authorized 117 operations in its first 16 months of existence; 88 have been executed. Working collaboratively with other MoI intelligence and operational units such as the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and the General Directorate of Police Special Units (GDPSU), NTEC provides actionable, evidence-based target intelligence packages for its own or GDPSU action. NTEC conducts successful Afghan-planned and -led operations within its collection and analytical means. Increasing intelligence input to NTEC from the Anti-Crime Police, Counter-Narcotics Police, and GDPSU, as well as from NTEC’s own organic surveillance unit, and the addition of Coalition counter-terrorism and Special Operations Force subject matter expert mentors will further enhance NTEC’s analysis and targeting expertise.

**Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan:** CNPA is the MoI’s principal police organization targeting Afghanistan’s narcotics industry. CNPA executes the full range of CN policing operations and has a robust organic intelligence capability resident within three sub-elements: the Intelligence and Investigative Unit (IIU), the Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU), and the Technical Investigation Unit (TIU). These intelligence organizations are effective with Coalition mentoring and oversight, providing a critical capability within Afghanistan.

**Ministry of Defense (MoD):** Ministry of Defense Intelligence comprises the Office of the Assistant Minister of Defense for Intelligence, the Afghan National Army General Staff-Intelligence (G2), Corps and below G2 staffs, and Corps Military Intelligence battalions.

**Assistant Minister of Defense for Intelligence (AMoD-I):** There is yet to be an Assistant Minister named to fill the AMoD-I senior position. The AMoD-I was designed to conduct Intelligence planning, programming, and budgeting; policy development; security management; strategic analysis; and intelligence operations in support of the MinDEF and the National Leadership. AMoD-I is the principal advisor to the Minister of Defense on strategic defense intelligence, counter-intelligence (CI), security, and other national security matters. AMoD-I exercises ministerial-level oversight for all MoD, General Staff, and Afghan National Army intelligence activities and operations. AMoD-I directorates include Policy & Plans, Counterintelligence, Strategic Analysis, Foreign Intelligence, Operational Support, and the Defense Security Service. These directorates have all been created and are functioning to various degrees of proficiency.
The GSG2 is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping a sustainable Afghan Military Intelligence capacity in order to support current and future security requirements. ANA GSG2 departments include Collection Operations, Analysis & Production, Counterintelligence, Geospatial & Topography, Plans & Integration, and Programs & Budget. The ANA GSG2 is also developing a National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC). The NMIC is intended to provide all-source fusion and integration of intelligence for the ANA GSG2. The NMIC will consist of a Fusion Cell and an Afghan Security Operations Center. The GSG2 possesses the most robust of the Afghan intelligence training programs. GSG2 has an effective HUMINT program that provides “combat information,” but true intelligence analysis remains elusive. In response to continued threats within the ANSF, the ANA is receiving increasing external CI support, and the GSG2 counterintelligence program is expanding in numbers and scope through accelerated training and additional equipping.

Military Intelligence Kandaks (Battalions): Military Intelligence Battalions (referred to as MI Kandaks) are being fielded for each corps and for the 111th Capital Division. MI Kandaks consist of three Military Intelligence companies, each with a headquarters section, a HUMINT platoon, a low-level voice intercept platoon, a counterintelligence section, and an operations section. Thirteen MI companies of the 21 MI companies have been fielded as well as the core seven MI battalion staffs. Of the fielded companies, IJC assesses six are effectively performing support to brigade operations and the other seven are not fully operational. ANA GSG2 is conducting a familiarization program to teach corps and brigade commanders on how to best use MI company assets.

2.10: ANSF PARTNERING, TRAINING, AND MENTORING

ANA AND ANP PARTNERING

The ANA and ANP continue to improve and are becoming competent, professional forces capable of securing the Afghan people and the nation's borders. In particular, considerable improvement has been seen within the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) and Operations Coordination Centers since the last reporting cycle. The number of units rated Independent with Advisors and Effective with Advisors increased, especially in the ANA, as have the numbers of ANSF-led unilateral operations and ANSF-partnered and -advised operations. Nonetheless, broad issues related to logistics, manning, communications, critical enablers, and leadership continue to challenge the ANSF. Better planning and cross-functional coordination will improve operational effectiveness.

Following initial recruitment and training of Afghan soldiers and police by NTM-A, the operational development of the ANSF is the responsibility of the ISAF Joint Command (IJC). IJC partnering and advising teams provide a critical bridge from individual and collective training received during basic training and various specialty schools to the practical necessities of operating in a combat environment. Partnering and advising teams coach, teach, mentor, and support operational planning and employment of partnered ANSF units.
Regional Commands (RCs) establish partnering relationships based on the number of available Coalition Forces and campaign plan priorities and objectives. Partner and advisors teams are assigned to ANSF units in areas that are essential to accomplishment of campaign objectives, and are not assigned to many of the smaller units or units in areas less critical to Coalition objectives. ANA and ANP partnering requirements are now based upon the Security Force Assistance (SFA) concept. The SFA concept is a means to provide necessary partnering and advising assets to develop ANSF operational effectiveness. IJC is responsible for providing partnering assistance to the ANA (Ground Forces Command and below); AUP; ANCOP; ABP; Regional Operational Coordination Centers (OCC-R) and Provincial Operational Coordination Centers (OCC-P).

The United States provides the majority of required advisory teams for the ANSF. For this reporting period, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) established 466 Security Force Assistance Teams (SFAT) requirements, of which 13 percent (60 teams) were not filled as of the end of the reporting period. The SFAT requirement for the next reporting period is 460 SFATs for which SHAPE is currently generating forces. The near-term challenge for NATO is how to enlist the support of troop-contributing nations that have specific and readily usable and transferable skill sets for SFA teams, many of which will operate in the field. The number of requirements will decrease through 2013, as the ANSF improve their ability to conduct independent operations.

On September 12, in response to elevated threat levels following the release of the “Innocence of Muslims” Video, COMISAF issued a temporary directive to assess force protection measures in partnered units and reduce operational tempo while these assessments took place in order to mitigate against insider attacks and civil disturbances. If the assessment supported continued partnered operations, subordinate commanders are permitted to continue partnered operations, and most ISAF units are conducting normal, partnered operations. Under this guidance, partnering below the kandak (battalion) level required approval by the RC commander. This directive aimed to reduce vulnerability while maintaining campaign momentum. Although operations have, as of the end of the reporting period, returned to normal in approximately 70 percent of some RCs and to 100 percent in others, the order remains in place and RC commanders are continuing to assess the operational environment and the situation in their partnered units.

The Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) and Rating Definition Levels (RDLs) are used to assess ANSF operational effectiveness. Resulting reports cover quantitative data (Personnel, Equipment, and Training) as well as qualitative assessments in areas affecting the effectiveness of the unit (Communications, Equipping, Infrastructure/Facilities, Intelligence, Leadership, Logistics, Maintenance, Operations, Personnel, Supply, Training and Education, and Unit Corruption). Reports conclude with an overall assessment of operational effectiveness. Each assessment area uses the RDL scale specified for that assessment area, supported with comments from the coalition partner assigned to the ANSF unit. The RDL scale is: Independent with Advisors, Effective with Advisors, Effective with Partners, Developing with Partners, Established, and Not Assessed.26

26 For a complete explanation of each of these RDL levels, please see ANNEX A.
The assessment process has also been modified to include an operationally focused evaluation of operational performance. These details will allow IJC to consider the volume of long-term coalition assistance required throughout theater. As units move toward independence with advisors, the use of coalition enablers will be continually reviewed and revised.

Long-term reforms to the operational assessment process include a separation of ANA and ANP reports. Currently, the CUAT report template is uniform for all ANSF elements. In 2012, the CUAT report, with the support of the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB), implemented ANP-specific focus questions and began collecting data on community policing and rule of law capabilities.

Within each of the ratings below, detailed explanations and parameters guide partners or advisors in properly assigning an RDL. These RDL ratings, along with leadership assessments (very positive, positive, neutral, negative, and very negative) and partnering data are incorporated into the current CUAT reports.

IJC uses the CUAT to assess fielded ANSF units. Reporting requirements are based on Operation NAWEED (which covers SY 1391). As part of OP NAWEED, IJC subordinate commands are directed to report on all advised and partnered ANSF units in their battlespace. RCs prioritize which units to cover in the CUAT, and are required to report on all units above a certain size or of a certain type, or units operating in Key Terrain Districts (KTDs), Areas of Interest (AOIs), or Mission Required Areas (MRAs).

This operational reporting requirement does not include all fielded ANSF, only those that are advised or partnered. Although the CUAT system covers the majority of ANSF units, not all fielded ANSF units are tracked using the CUAT system, and not all ANSF units are advised or partnered. Twenty-eight ANA units and 201 ANP units are either of too small a size or are in areas too remote and outside of ANSF/ISAF focus areas, and are not covered. Under the campaign plan, ISAF prioritizes its main effort on select critical units and the most important areas of the country. The majority of these 229 units are police precincts, and/or are not in areas that are most vital to the campaign plan. ISAF does not independently track the operations or capabilities of these units, although the MoD and MoI have their own, separate reporting systems. These units are now counted in the “Not Covered Fielded Units” category in Figures 17 and 18. These units have not been included in any tables in previous 1230 reports, and have not previously counted toward the reported unit totals in either the ANA or ANP. Thus, comparisons to previous reports will be misleading; the total number of units in the ANSF did not grow by 229 units during the reporting period.

The tables that follow include both what is reported and what is required. As part of the CUAT, ISAF units report on all units with which they partner or advise. As the ISAF footprint in theater

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27 The types of ANA units that are required to be reported by OP NAWEED are: select Combat units, Combat support units, battalion-sized units, and smaller units with critical capabilities. The types of ANP units that are assessed are broken down by police pillar, and include: AUP Kandak-sized units, AUP Provincial HQs, AUP Regional/Zone HQs, ABP Airports, ABP Border Crossing Points, ANCOP Kandaks, ANCOP Brigade HQs, and a number of other Special Police units.
decreases, the number of ANSF units reported on will also decrease. This means that as time progresses, there will be fewer ANSF units receiving CUAT reports.

IJC is working with the Ministries of Interior and Defense on a self-assessment capability, focusing on operational effectiveness. Although IJC’s primary focus is developing the capability of the ANSF to assess themselves, IJC will determine if it is feasible to use these reports to fill the projected gap in CUAT reports during the fielding of these ANSF self-assessment tools. These tools are vital for the ANSF so that they may shift their focus from fielding their force to the capabilities of their fielded force. In addition to the self-assessment tools, ISAF is developing a course of action that would provide a combined ISAF/ANSF validation team capability to build confidence in the self-assessments and provide additional training on the reporting process as needed.

Because partnering and advising relationships have shifted due to both ongoing force reductions and the initiation of the Security Force Assistance construct, it is important to note that the CUAT tables do not lend themselves to overall ANSF-wide trend analysis, as they only reflect those units assessed in partnered or advised relationships, and not all fielded units of the ANSF.

Due to the shift to the Security Force Assistance (SFA) construct, partnering status categories have been changed in OP NAWEED in order to align them with the SFA model. According to this new reporting construct\(^\text{28}\), there are three new possible partnering statuses: Advised, Partnered, or Autonomous.

The first category, Advised, pertains to ANSF units that have small, purpose-built advisor teams designed to mentor and coach units that have reached one of the top two Rating Definition Levels (RDLs): Independent with Advisors or Effective with Advisors. These advisor teams also provide access to coalition enablers, such as close air support, MEDEVAC, and joint fires.

The second category, Partnered, pertains to ANSF units that have an ongoing relationship with an ISAF combat unit. Partner units are responsible for the development of all ANSF in their area of operations (AO). The goal for partner units is to coach and mentor ANSF units until the ISAF combat unit can be replaced with an ISAF advisor team.

The last partnering status, Autonomous, pertains to ANSF units that do not have partner or advisor teams that coach or mentor them. Notably, this status is not an indicator of a unit’s capability or developmental level. These are units that fall within the reporting requirement but are not partnered or advised. This does not include the units in the “Not Covered Fielded Units” category. IJC is developing several categories of autonomous for the solar year 1392 operations plan to more efficiently clarify whether the unit has become autonomous based on its ability to operate independently, it is uncovered due to resource constraints, or if it is temporarily autonomous pending resource allocation.

\(^{28}\) The new reporting construct started in CUAT cycle 14 but will take two cycles to fully implement. The current cycle, Cycle 15, ended on 15 July 2012, while the previous cycle, Cycle 14, ended on 18 April 2012.
In the partnering tables that follow, autonomous units and units that are not assessed that fall within the operational guidelines are shown in the Autonomous or Not Assessed columns. The total operational requirement for unit reporting is shown in the required reporting subtotals in green. Units that fall outside of the operational requirement and are not advised or partnered with ISAF units are in the “Not Covered Fielded Units” column and are added to the subtotals in green to show the total fielded force in blue. Each of these areas is broken down into Headquarters (HQs), OCCs, and Units, as described in the paragraphs below for both the ANA and ANP.

Another change to the reporting in the tables that follow, in addition to the inclusion of the “Not Covered Fielded Units” category, is that now all units that are required to be assessed and were not reported are included in the Autonomous and Not Assessed areas. The partnering tables now show all fielded units in the ANA and ANP.

OCCs are included with the ANA in Table 17 since they have a separate ANA authorization document (tashkil), while the police and National Directorate of Security (NDS) authorizations are part of other tashkils such as the provincial or regional police HQ. In the partnering tables in previous 1230 reports, these OCCs were counted as part of the ANP. Figures 17 and 18 show the partnering and advising status for each unit as reported in Cycle 15.

**Figure 17: ANA Partnering Status**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghan National Army Major Commands</th>
<th>Operationally Required CUAT Submissions</th>
<th>Not Required</th>
<th>Total Fielded Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advised</td>
<td>Partnered</td>
<td>Autonomous Or Not Assessed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HQ OCC Units</td>
<td>HQ OCC Units</td>
<td>HQ OCC Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Division (RC-C)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201st Corps (RC-E)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203rd Corps (RC-E)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205th Corps (RC-S)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207th Corps (RC-W)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209th Corps (RC-N)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215th Corps (RC-SW)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (National Assets)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANASOC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table source: Cycle 15 CUAT submissions. “Units” columns refer to all required ANA unit types (minus HQ and OCCs) as described in the preceding paragraphs.

“Not Covered Fielded Units” category is based on those units that have been fielded according to NTM-A and are located outside areas required by OP Naweed.
**Figure 18: ANP Partnering Status**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghan National Police Major Commands</th>
<th>Operationally Required CUAT Submissions</th>
<th>Not Required</th>
<th>Total Fielded Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advised</td>
<td>Partnered</td>
<td>Autonomous Or Not Assessed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HQ Units</td>
<td>HQ Units</td>
<td>HQ Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP Zone 101 (RC-C)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP Zone 202 (RC-E)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP Zone 303 (RC-N)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP Zone 404 (RC-S)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP Zone 505 (RC-E)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP Zone 606 (RC-W)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP Zone 707 (RC-SW)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Police Units</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Totals</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table source: Cycle 15 CUAT submissions: “Units” columns refer to all required ANP unit types as described in the preceding paragraphs. “Not Covered Fielded Units” are based on those units that have been fielded according to NTM-A and are located outside areas required by OP Naweed.

**ANSF OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENT PROCESS**

Assessing performance in operations is one of the most important methods of evaluating the progression of the ANSF. A partnered operation is a distinct event in which ISAF and ANSF units work together in the planning and execution of a combined joint tactical operation. The number and type of these operations, and whether they are Afghan-led, are monitored in the ISAF campaign assessment framework. Operational partnering efforts are aimed at improving the overall operational effectiveness of ANSF units, while at the same time protecting the population and accomplishing overall campaign objectives.

Ensuring the ability of the ANSF to plan and conduct operations unilaterally is the ultimate goal of partnering relationships. Units are performing exceptionally well when ANSF are capable of not only planning, preparing, and executing missions, but are also able to incorporate and coordinate other ANSF elements for a joint operation. ISAF is also focused on improving the sustainability of the combat formations through ANSF logistic mechanisms.

ANSF-ISAF operations include: 1) ANA Partnered (ANA conducted the operation jointly with ISAF); 2) ANP Partnered (AUP, ABP or ANCOP conducted the operation jointly with ISAF); 3) Joint ANSF Partnered (ANA and ANP conducted the operation jointly with ISAF); 4) ANSF-Led (ANSF conducted the mission with support from ISAF).
An important change in the reporting this cycle is a modification in how conventional operations are reported. Figure 20 has been expanded to include the total number of conventional operations conducted by month as opposed to just level 1 and 2 operations, which were previously reported. The ability to report on all four levels of operations (level R – routine; level 0 – low risk; level 1 – moderate risk, and level 2 – high risk) is a recent development. Showing all four levels of operations more accurately captures activity on the part of ISAF and the ANSF.

The monthly RC ANSF Operational Reports (OPREP) continues to show a steady increase in the number of ANSF-led operations across Afghanistan. September monthly OPREPs illustrated a significant increase in ANSF unilaterally led operations from 5,322 in June to 6,225 in September. At the same time there was a decrease in the number of ISAF-led operations from 1,359 in June to 428 in September while ANSF partnered and advised-led operations marginally decreased from 365 in June to 333 in September. Despite the decrease in ANSF partnered operations, the overall percentage of ANSF-led operations increased from 74 percent in June to 85 percent in September. Further, the percentage of ISAF led operations decreased over the four month period as well from 26 percent in June to 15 percent in September.29

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29 The data on operations in this paragraph are disproportionately influenced by RC-E, as this was the only RC that fully reported low-level operations as of the end of the reporting period. Although this data is indicative of operations in the rest of the country, however, the actual figures may vary in other RCs.
Figure 20: Conventional Partnered Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Category</th>
<th>Jun-12</th>
<th>Jul-12</th>
<th>Aug-12</th>
<th>Sep-12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISAF Unilateral</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF Led - Partnered</td>
<td>1,359</td>
<td>1,033</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF Led - Partnered</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF Led - Advised</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF Unilateral</td>
<td>5,322</td>
<td>7,136</td>
<td>5,994</td>
<td>6,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ISAF-Led OPS</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>1,767</td>
<td>1,315</td>
<td>1,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ANSF Led OPS</td>
<td>5,687</td>
<td>7,575</td>
<td>6,394</td>
<td>6,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total OPS</td>
<td>7,647</td>
<td>9,342</td>
<td>7,709</td>
<td>7,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total OPS That are ISAF Led</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total OPS That are ANSF Led</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table source: June through September ANSF in the Lead OPREP submissions. May is not shown due to a change in the reporting format starting in June, making May numbers incompatible with the current report. The data on operations in this chart are disproportionately influenced by RC-E, as this was the only RC that fully reported low-level operations as of the end of the reporting period. Although this data is indicative of operations in the rest of the country, however, the actual figures may vary in other RCs.

Figure 21: Special Operations Forces (SOF) Partnered Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISAF SOF &amp; ANSF SOF</th>
<th>April-12</th>
<th>May-12</th>
<th>June-12</th>
<th>July-12</th>
<th>August-12</th>
<th>September-12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANSF-Led Partnered SOF Ops</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF-led Partnered SOF Ops</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF SOF Advised Ops / ANSF in lead</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Partnered or Advised SOF Ops</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF SO Unilateral Ops</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF SO Unilateral Ops</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Unilateral SOF Ops</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total SOF Ops</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total SOF Ops that are Partnered</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Partnered SOF Ops that are ANSF-Led</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISAF-SOF. Date: October 01, 2012

ANSF Self-assessment

The ISAF Joint Command (IJC) is currently developing a proposed self-assessment capability to be used by the ANSF. The proportion of ANSF units that are partnered or advised will decline as the number of ISAF personnel in theater decreases and as more ANSF units are fielded. As ISAF starts receiving fewer and fewer CUAT reports, it will require an additional system to inform leadership and the international community on progress within the ANSF. Additionally, the ANSF itself will need an Afghan-run self-assessment system after transition. This ANSF self-assessment capability is not meant to be an entirely new system, rather it is intended to augment and improve Afghan reporting systems currently used by the ANA and ANP. The existing systems are the Readiness Reporting System (RRS) used by the ANA, and the Force
Readiness Report (FRR) used by the ANP. As they are currently designed, neither of these systems is sufficient to replace the CUAT because neither system provides an extensive enough assessment of the operational capabilities of the ANSF. IJC is also working to augment the existing ANSF capability to validate these assessments – a crucial part of any honest assessment system. The systems under development by IJC are intended to enhance the existing systems. These enhancements to the existing ANSF reporting systems require Afghan assistance to be fully developed and require the support of senior MoD and MoI leadership to ensure successful implementation.

**ANA OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENT**

The CUAT also provides operational effectiveness data. Figures 22 and 23 categorize units by their Ratings Definition Levels (RDLs) and unit type for both the ANA and the ANP. The overall unit ratings in these tables are correlated to operations, leadership, and logistics. For many units that improved in this cycle, positive leadership and operations were generally the indicators of success.

Comparisons between the two cycles will focus on units achieving the top two RDLs of “Independent with Advisors” and “1,” since the natural progression of SFA is to replace partner units with advisor teams. From here onward, units having achieved these two RDLs will be referred to as “top-third” units since they have reached the top two of six RDLs.

In the ANA operational effectiveness table, units are broken down by unit type as described in the ANA partnering section. The one addition in Figure 22 is the Echelons Above Corps (EAC) column in which the Ministry of Defense General Staff G3 was assessed during Cycle 15.

OCCs had an increase in top-third units with 22 (71 percent) of the 31 reported/required having achieved this milestone. This is an increase of four (18 percent) from the 18 reported as top-third units in the previous cycle, which shows improvement over a three month period. Of those 18, (11 percent) were not reported this cycle.

In summary, out of the 267 ANA and OCC required units, 165 (62 percent) are top-third units. This is a six percent increase from the 157 units reported in the top two RDLs in Cycle 14 while 16 (10 percent) of the 157 top-third units from that cycle were not reported in Cycle 15.
Figure 22: ANA Operational Effectiveness Ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANA RDLs (Rating Definition Levels)</th>
<th>HQs</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Total Required Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>Corps/Div</td>
<td>BDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent w/ Advisors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective w/ Advisors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective w/ Partners</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing w/ Partners</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Assessed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table source: Cycle 15 CUAT submissions. All ANA CUAT submissions are represented. EAC refers to Echelons Above Corps.

**ANP OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENT**

The ANP operational effectiveness table breaks down units by police pillar in the same way as in the ANP Partnering Tables. Police Pillars are further broken down into HQs and Units as described in the ANP Partnering section.

The ABP had 22 units (43 percent of the total required) reported as “Independent with Advisors” or “Effective with Advisors”, which is down 29 percent from the 31 reported in Cycle 14. Of the 31 reported in the top two categories in Cycle 14, seven (23 percent) were not reported in Cycle 15.

The ANCOP did have a measured increase in units reported as having achieved “Independent with Advisors” or “Effective with Advisors” status. Sixteen units reported as having achieved top-third status, which is an increase of 23 percent from the 13 reported in Cycle 14. Of the 13 reported in the previous cycle, four (31 percent) did not report in Cycle 15.

There has been a significant decrease in reporting on police units, and for this reason it has been difficult to make an accurate assessment of progress. Of the 408 required police units, 179 (44 percent) have achieved ratings of “Independent with Advisors” or “Effective with Advisors” this cycle.
Conclusion on ANSF Operational Effectiveness

The ANSF has improved in Cycle 15, as evidenced by a substantial measured change for the ANA, OCCs, and ANCOP. The ABP and AUP both had decreases in top-third units; however, operational limitations on reporting this cycle was the main cause for these changes. IJC is taking steps to eliminate the reporting issues encountered in this cycle, so that both positive and negative changes can be measured and accurately compared from cycle to cycle.

**ANSF FORCE STRUCTURE AND BENCHMARKS FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS TRANSITION**

The Department of Defense has evaluated options for developing the ANSF more efficiently. In 2011, the Department conducted a comprehensive analysis to examine options for the development of the ANSF, and identified the minimum level of capabilities needed to establish and preserve security in Afghanistan, in accordance with the Lisbon NATO Summit timeline, sufficient to support our core national security goals, and to yield an ANSF structure that is sustainable within the limits of Afghan human capital, economic capacity, and the will of the international community to provide long term assistance.

The current planned force of 352,000 personnel combined ANSF has been deemed necessary to complete the Transition to Afghan lead security responsibility by the end of 2014, and to secure the country during the transition of power following the Afghan presidential election in 2014, while mitigating the effects of the U.S. and Allied drawdowns. In April 2012, the Secretary of Defense and the Afghan Ministers of Defense and Interior committed to conducting 6-month reviews of the ANSF force structure and other needs. As Afghanistan continues to become more secure and stable through 2015-2016, the Afghan government, in coordination with NATO and other partners, will begin to refocus the ANSF toward enduring security roles, and consider how to reshape the ANSF into a more sustainable force. Figure 24 highlights the established institutional benchmarks related to ANSF development.

---

30 This section is submitted consistent with Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.
## Figure 24: ANSF Development – Institutional Metrics and Benchmarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Sep-11</th>
<th>Feb-12</th>
<th>Mar-12</th>
<th>Aug-12</th>
<th>Sep-12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruit</td>
<td>ANSF End Strength</td>
<td>305,000</td>
<td>330,014</td>
<td>332,750</td>
<td>337,187</td>
<td>349,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train</td>
<td>ANA trained in specialty</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP patrolmen trained</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF Courses</td>
<td>C-27 IQT Started</td>
<td>Basic RW &amp; FW Start 18 Feb</td>
<td>Basic RW &amp; FW course</td>
<td>Mi-17 IQT started on 15 Sep 12</td>
<td>Mi-17 IQT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fielding</td>
<td>New ANA unit manning</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CS Kandaks fielded</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MP Coys** fielded</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engineer Kandaks fielded</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RCCs fielded</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Signal (Coys) fielded</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MI Kandaks fielded</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MSF Kandaks fielded</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equip the Force</td>
<td>ANA Fielded unit equipment fill</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP Unit &amp; District equipment fill</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop the Force</td>
<td>ANA Instructors assigned &amp; trained (T2I)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP Assistant Instructor and Instructor positions filled</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Development</td>
<td>New ANA officers with Branch School training</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Junior NCOs trained</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AAF officer &amp; NCO positions filled</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP NCO Positions Filled</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MoD and GS ministerial departments at CM-1B*</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition the Force</td>
<td>MoI ministerial departments at CM-1B*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANA training institutions transitioned</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP training institutions transitioned</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANA Regional Logistics Support Commands at FOC</td>
<td>6 IOC</td>
<td>6 IOC</td>
<td>6 IOC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Green Column – March Report. Data for this report Valid as of solar month February (thru February 21).
Yellow Column – September Report. Data for this report Valid as of solar month August (thru August 21) unless otherwise annotated
Gray Columns – Goals established in October 2011.
* Data as of June 30. CM ratings are assessed quarterly, with the next assessment to be conducted at the end of September.
** Coys are the Afghan equivalent of Companies
IOC – Initial Operational Capability
FOC– Full Operational Capability

95
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>How it was calculated</th>
<th>Status of Metric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruit</td>
<td>ANSF End Strength</td>
<td>ANA end strength + ANP end strength</td>
<td>On track. ^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train</td>
<td>ANA trained in specialty</td>
<td>(Branch school grads less estimated attrited grads) / end strength</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP patrolmen trained</td>
<td>Current # of untrained patrolmen reported by MoI / end strength</td>
<td>Behind goal. *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AAF Courses</td>
<td>Basic Rotary Wing and Fixed Wing scheduled</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fielding</td>
<td>New ANA unit manning</td>
<td>Number of available soldiers less over-tashkil / end strength</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CS Kandaks fielded</td>
<td># of CS units already fielded / total # of units to be fielded</td>
<td>On track. Shifted. Fully fielded in Dec 12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MP Coys fielded</td>
<td># of MP units already fielded / total # of units to be fielded</td>
<td>Achieved. Recommend removing this metric.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engineer Kandaks fielded</td>
<td># of engineer units already fielded / total # of units to be fielded</td>
<td>On track. **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RCCs fielded</td>
<td># of RCCs already fielded / total # of units to be fielded</td>
<td>On track. Shifted. Fully fielded in Oct 12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Signal Coys fielded</td>
<td># of signal units already fielded / total # of units to be fielded</td>
<td>On track. ** (should be Kandaks, not Coys)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MI Kandaks fielded</td>
<td># of MI units already fielded / total # of units to be fielded</td>
<td>On track. Only MI Coys currently being fielded (68%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MSF Kandaks fielded</td>
<td># of MSF units already fielded / total # of units to be fielded</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equip the Force</td>
<td>ANA Fielded unit equipment fill</td>
<td>Current fill rates for Corps / Div average (weighted by # of BDEs)</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP Unit &amp; District equipment fill</td>
<td>Average of fill rates for Move, Shoot, Comms</td>
<td>On track. ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop the Force</td>
<td>ANSF Level 1 Literacy</td>
<td>(Level 1 graduates less estimated attrited grads plus estimated numbers of personnel literate before joining ANSF) / end strength</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANA Instructors assigned &amp; trained (T2I)</td>
<td>[Qualified instructors (Satha 2 thru 4)] / (Tashkil – Satha 5)</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP Assistant Instructor and Instructor positions filled</td>
<td>[Qualified instructors (Satha 2 thru 4)] / (Tashkil – Satha 5)</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Development</td>
<td>New ANA officers with Branch School training</td>
<td>All new ANA officers are scheduled to attend branch school training before being sent to their first unit</td>
<td>Achieved. New officers complete training prior to assignment – recommend removing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AAF officer &amp; NCO positions filled</td>
<td>Current number of AAF officers and NCOs / objective</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP NCO Positions Filled</td>
<td>Current strength NCOs / projected number</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MoD and GS ministerial departments at CM-1B</td>
<td>Current number of departments at 1B / total number of departments</td>
<td>Behind goal. NTM-A Base Order under revision, includes review of CM process. ^^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition the Force</td>
<td>MoI ministerial departments at CM-1B</td>
<td>Current number of departments at 1B</td>
<td>Behind goal. NTM-A Base Order under revision, includes review of CM process. ^^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANA training institutions transitioned</td>
<td>Current number of institutions at 1B / total number of institutions</td>
<td>Behind goal. NTM-A Base Order under revision, includes review of CM process. ^^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP training institutions transitioned</td>
<td>Current number of institutions at 1B / total number of institutions</td>
<td>Behind goal. NTM-A Base Order under revision, includes review of CM process. ^^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANA Regional Logistics Support Commands at FOC</td>
<td>For IOC – # of the six commands that have some functions operating</td>
<td>On track. All RLSCs are IOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>For FOC – # of the six commands that have reached CM – 1B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.11: BUDGET

AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND

The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) provides the resource foundation needed to train and equip a 352,000-person ANSF and 30,000-person ALP by providing funding to train, equip, and sustain the ANSF. For FY 2012, Congress appropriated $11.2 billion (B) for ASFF, a decrease of $1.6B from President’s FY 2012 budget request of $12.8B. This reduction followed COMISAF’s August 2011 review of ANSF requirements as well as efficiencies and cost avoidance opportunities that had been realized at the time. An additional $1B of FY 2012 funding was subsequently identified for transfer to other Department priorities in the Omnibus Reprogramming, leaving $10.2B as the authorized FY 2012 budget authority. The FY 2013 request of $5.75B reflects a shift as emphasis moves from building, equipping, and training to professionalizing and sustaining the force. Exceptions to this shift will include some AAF and Special Forces acquisitions.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FUNDING FOR THE ANSF

The international community also provides funding for ANSF through the NATO ANA Trust Fund and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). Twenty-two nations have contributed to the NATO ANA Trust Fund for support and sustainment of the ANA and ANP; totaling more than $570M over the life of the fund.
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) administers LOTFA to fund police salaries and build the capacity of the Ministry of Interior. Between 2002 and 2012, the United States donated roughly $759 M to LOTFA, while the international community has pledged approximately $2.3 B.

During the reporting period, a team from the UN Office of Audit and Investigation (OAI) conducted an investigation into the allegations of misuse of funds and corruption within the small administrative budget managed by LOTFA. There are no allegations relating to the $50M per month LOTFA allocates to support Police remuneration. Since there were no allegations relating to LOTFA support to Police Remuneration, the investigation did not include this pillar of LOTFA.

NTM-A, CJ8 interacts on a daily basis with the new program manager at LOTFA. Significant progress has been made in regard to oversight and reporting of U.S. direct contributions to LOTFA. Of note, NTM-A CJ8 Financial Management Oversight (FMO) office recovered $1.5M that was inadvertently placed in LOTFA Pillar II (Program Management Unit) instead of Pillar I (Police Remuneration). Additionally, the FMO office has been working with LOTFA and Ministry of Interior Finance to adjust more than 1,700 transactions totaling more than $12M that were misclassified and charged to CSTC-A and LOTFA since June 2012. The MoI Finance stated they will have the misclassifications justified no later than October 15, 2012. CJ8 will continue to engage LOTFA to provide reasonable assurance that our direct contributions are accounted for in a transparent and auditable manner.

**DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR**

For SY 1391 (March 2012 – December 2012), NTM-A/CSTC-A allocated $798.1M in direct contributions to the Ministry of Defense to enable the ministry to procure items in their operations and acquisition accounts. The MoD executed $471.2 M of direct contributions over seven months to pay for salaries, goods and services, and procurement solely through Afghan financial systems, procurement systems, and their requirements process.

For SY 1391, NTM-A/CSTC-A also allocated $217M in direct contributions to the Ministry of Interior to expand the MoI’s ability to procure items in their operations and acquisitions accounts. The MoI executed $41.1M in direct contributions over seven months for payment of Afghan Local Police salaries, goods and services, and procurements solely through Afghan financial systems, procurement systems, and their requirements process. Afghan National Police salaries and food are executed through LOTFA.

NTM-A cooperates with its Afghan partners to closely monitor these systems through liaison personnel embedded in Afghan ministries. Further improvement of key ministerial processes will help mitigate risks to the development and sustainment of self-sufficient Afghan security institutions and capabilities.
INTERNATIONAL DONATIONS

NTM-A solicits and tracks infrastructure, equipment, and weapon donations, and tracks overall international monetary donations, including bilateral donations.

NTM-A also solicits equipment and munitions through the NTM-A Security Assistance Office (SAO) to fill ANA and ANP Tashkil requirements. During this process, NTM-A evaluates equipment or munitions to verify technical specifications and quality and works with donors and Afghan government to coordinate shipping, receipt, and accountability of all equipment, materiel, and munitions.

Nations also approach the Afghan government directly to negotiate a bilateral donation, of which NTM-A may not always notified. When the Afghan government and the donor nation advise NTM-A early in the process, NTM-A is able to track these cases and provide assistance as necessary. Since 2002, nearly 50 nations, NATO, and six international funding agencies have contributed more than $2.9B in assistance to the Afghan government.

Future solicitations will focus on literacy materials, equipment, infrastructure, and monetary donations for both the ANA and ANP. Monetary donations are particularly critical due to the need for contracted institutional training centers, medical facilities, and standardized equipment.

The United States, as well as NTM-A, continues to work through diplomatic channels and international organizations to encourage Allies and partners to continue providing assistance for the sustainment of the ANSF. At the May 2012 Chicago NATO Summit, NATO and ISAF Partner Nations made a political commitment to provide funding for ANSF sustainment after ISAF’s mandate ends in 2014. An enduring ANSF, as envisaged by the international community and the Afghan government, requires an estimated annual budget of approximately $4.1B. The Afghan government has agreed to provide roughly $500 million annually of the total cost, progressively increasing its share of financial responsibility for maintaining its security forces over time. Given Afghanistan’s current economic and fiscal constraints, the international community pledged to contribute the remaining amount for three years beginning in 2015.

2.12: INFRASTRUCTURE

During the reporting period, NTM-A continued to improve its facilities planning capability to meet effectively the mission while drawing down the workforce. The goal is to have all remaining ANSF permanent infrastructure construction projects awarded for contract no later than December 2012 to set the conditions for successful completion of all construction by December 2014.

During the reporting period, NTM-A continued to execute the infrastructure program to support ANSF fielding with an emphasis on building a sustainable facilities maintenance program. NTM-A has initiated several programs to improve construction execution, including quarterly conferences that are conducted with Regional Command engineers and local ANSF leaders to
discuss specific issues within their areas of operation. Additionally, monthly facilities *shuras*\(^{31}\) are held with the MoD and MoI to discuss national-level concerns and issues.

At the end of the reporting period, NTM-A had 368 projects valued at $4.6B under construction for the ANSF. Another 121 projects for $1.36B are in the acquisition phase. As of the end of the reporting period, a total of 628 projects valued at $3.75B have been completed to date.

Lack of a national utility infrastructure (electric, water, and sewer) has impacted the ability to construct self-sustaining facilities. Even at sites in urban centers (such as Kabul and Kandahar), the majority of NTM-A projects require generators, water tanks, and leach fields/septic-tanks. The cost to keep generators and other site mechanical systems running may become cost prohibitive, possibly leading to decreased mission capability in the future. Follow-on projects to connect these new facilities to municipal grids should be considered as municipalities develop capacity. Additionally, the development and implementation of an Afghan national strategy for ANSF facilities to leverage solar power, geo-thermal power, and micro hydro power should be considered.

**ANA Infrastructure**

ANA Corps facilities are more than adequate for the garrison requirement and constitute a lasting capability for refitting, quartering, and training ANA soldiers. Standard designs ensure consistency in the size and layout of these sites, but some locations present a challenge due to their remoteness or the security challenges inherent to the area. Specifically, the reduction of Coalition forces presents an additional challenge for construction projects in RC-SW and RC-E regions. The delay in finalizing the final locations in RC-E for the 4/201st and 4/203rd brigades has put these units at risk of receiving less robust permanent facilities than other ANA brigades.

Facilities for aviation and SOF units face particular challenges in meeting the timeline for completion, and logistics infrastructure has been forced to adapt to meet emerging requirements. Air refueling sites required a great deal of effort in order to obtain adequate locations based on the range limitations of Afghan aircraft. The ANASOF Special Mission Wing Squadrons still face challenges in Kabul and in RC-N in obtaining adequate space to construct their facilities on current operational runways. The plan for logistics facilities has developed in accordance with realistic projections for the long-term need and additional fuel capability has recently been incorporated into the appropriate projects. Facilities for the Mobile Strike Force have been modified to include the required maintenance facilities. The final locations for these projects were defined late in the planning process and, as a result, their completion dates are in a high risk category of not meeting the December 2014 NTM-A and ANSF construction deadline.

**ANP Infrastructure**

Significant construction progress has been made across all ANP forces on the strategic fielding plan for the ANP. At the end of the reporting period, NTM-A had 257 projects valued at $1.39B under construction for the ANP. Another 50 projects for $46B are in the acquisition phase. As of the end of the reporting period, a total of 429 projects valued at $1.35B have been completed.

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\(^{31}\) “Council” (religious connotation)
to date. NTM-A is actively executing the last remaining projects in the program, with a schedule to award all remaining infrastructure projects prior to December 2012 in order to complete all construction by December 2014.

Substantial execution of ANP national, regional, and district logistics support facilities (supply points) has been achieved. These facilities will enable establishment of a network of ANP supply and maintenance function to support operations. Additionally, the first of many Family Response Units will be transferred to the ANP in 2012, improving access to the civilian justice network for women and families.

Suitable land (clear title to MoI, good proximity, buildable area, access to water, etc.) remains the most significant challenge to the ANP construction program. Many projects have been delayed or cancelled due to land disputes, or the inability to find suitable land. In most cases, an admittedly undesirable plot of land (in terms of location) is provided for construction by GIRoA.

**Facilities Maintenance**

NTM-A made significant gains with regard to Afghan facility maintenance during the reporting period. As a result of the surge, the number of personnel in the Infrastructure Training Advisory Group (ITAG) grew to 125 in June 2012 but reduced to 76 by September 2012 as a result of surge recovery. ITAG teams are currently operating at 26 ANA sites and 3 ANP sites. Through September 2012, ITAG identified 3,627 buildings to transition and has facilitated the transition of 1840 to ANSF control.

As a result of manning reductions, the ITAG will shift focus from the Brigade Garrison Support Unit and below to training critical capabilities at the Corps Garrison Support Unit and above. Through the force integration process, ITAG was able to work with the ministerial advisors to increase authorizations for the ANA facility personnel *tashkil* and improve on its corresponding equipment set, which will provide the ANA with a more effective workforce to maintain its facilities. ITAG recognizes the continuing need for ANSF Facility Engineers to delegate more technical services such as power plant, waste water treatment, and well operations to contractors; however, a more robust, in-house capability will reduce the need for expensive O&M services.

ITAG teams are working with the Facilities Engineer (FE) Sections in the Garrison Support Units (GSUs) within the Brigades and Corps of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Police Zones and Provinces within the Afghan National Police (ANP) to address the following systemic problems and challenges.

Hiring continues to be the primary challenge. The hiring process is not automated and tracking can be very difficult. One of the primary challenges is that hiring low-level employees requires a three star approval at the MoD level. ITAG and Ministerial Development mentors are working with the ministries on developing training opportunities at local trade schools, as well as increasing on-the-job training, which should increase the capabilities of personnel already hired.

Equipment fielding to FE sections is also slow under the current MoD process. However, recent acquisition of tool sets and equipment from depot stocks that came from Iraq are being pushed to
each of the Regional Support Commands to provide an initial capability of tools and equipment until acquisition through the MoD process can take effect. ITAT personnel continue to push FE's to process and track equipment to acquire the additional authorized tools and equipment needed to complete their Tashkil authorizations.

Finally, ANA Corps Commanders are the approval authority for funding FE requirements within their Corps. The FE requirements of maintaining ANA facilities compete against operational requirements supporting combat operations and often are not funded. ITAT personnel are working with the MoD to transfer FE approval authority to the Construction and Property Management Department (CMPD) in order to enhance mission command of the FEs and resolve the conflict of delegation of funding authority for FE requirements.

**MINISTERIAL DEVELOPMENT OF FACILITIES MAINTENANCE**

MoI and MoD Facility Engineers are becoming accountable for a rapidly increasing quantity of facilities as NTM-A continues to finish construction and move to the transition and transfer of bases. NTM-A advisors continue to coordinate directly with ITAG to link the Facility Engineer training and transition at ANA bases with CPMD to ensure that CPMD is prepared to support the transferred facilities. Advisors are focused on CPMD’s aptitude to execute its budget and spending authorities to enable it to program out-years. CPMD capability to generate requirements and navigate the procurement and acquisition process will become increasingly critical as transition continues and facilities become CPMD’s responsibility to operate and maintain. CPMD is showing constant improvements in these areas and advisors provide counsel, recommendations, and guidance as necessary with almost daily engagements.

As a direct result of a *Tashkil* cut from 999 to 265 positions, the MoI Facilities Department was forced to shift to the outsourcing of maintenance of ANP and MoI facilities across the country. This shift necessarily means that the Ministry of Interior needs to become more efficient at preparing contract packages so that more contracts can be processed within the constraints of the budget year. The MoI Facilities Department currently lacks the capacity to contract for facility operations and maintenance for the vast number of permanent infrastructure facilities and transitioned coalition bases and all 33 provincial prisons. NTM-A advisors are focused on identifying the right amount of direct contribution necessary to support the ASFF and advising the MoI Facilities Department to mature and expand its ability to contract for goods and services on the scale necessary to support effective policing operations across Afghanistan.
SECTION 3 – GOVERNANCE

3.1: Assessment of National Governance

The Afghan Government continues to develop its capacity to provide stable, effective, and responsive governance to the Afghan population. However, the long-term sustainability of the Afghan Government is challenged by corruption, ineffective program monitoring, sub-national government budget funding shortfalls, an inability to generate revenues sufficient to cover the cost of government operations, and limited public financial management capacity. Furthermore, poor linkages between the national and sub-national levels of governance and an imbalance in the distribution of power between the three branches of government, with power concentrated in the executive branch, continue to limit effectiveness and legitimacy. Limited human capacity and a lack of appropriate formal training and education within the civil service and Afghan populace also impede the development of stable and sustainable government across Afghanistan.

During the reporting period, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Afghan government demonstrated mixed progress in meeting their respective responsibilities and making gains toward long-term sustainability. Although some progress was made in national-level governance policy this reporting period, efforts to build a solid sub-national governance foundation still have room for improvement. The executive and legislative branches were focused on a series of international conferences - the May Chicago NATO Summit, the June Heart of Asia Conference, and the July Tokyo Donors Conference - and finalizing bilateral/multilateral agreements and other arrangements securing pledges of long-term support and financial assistance from the international community.

During the reporting period, President Karzai took a number of actions supporting his latest pledge to tackle corruption in the Afghan government. On June 21, 2012, Karzai called a special session of Parliament to solicit legislative support for carrying out measures to fight corruption and reform civil governance and law enforcement. In July, he issued a 23-page presidential decree, detailing a list of government reforms. The decree has been met with skepticism, since demands and timelines were not combined with a comprehensive financial implementation plan or enforcement mechanisms. Additionally, in a shakeup of provincial governors, President Karzai announced on September 20 that he would change the heads of 10 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, purportedly as a result of a review carried out by the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). These changes involved a few prominent officials that had worked closely with the Coalition, such as Helmand Governor Mangal.

The judicial branch, with the assistance of the international community, has made increasing progress with regard to training and staffing sub-national judicial positions, and held more public trials this reporting period than during the previous reporting period. Improvements in the reach and function of sub-national governance are being made as the Afghan government develops opportunities for both traditional and formal modes of conflict resolution. However, constrained freedom of movement due to security concerns impedes the expansion of rule of law, especially at the district level. The time required to resolve disputes through the formal system exacerbates the separation between the formal and traditional rule of law systems, and contributes to the perception that the Afghan government is ineffective and inaccessible to many rural Afghans.
In the legislative realm, the Afghan government’s legislative agenda, based upon its 2010 Kabul Conference Commitments, other international commitments, and other domestic priorities, is moving slowly. The Sub-National Governance Law, the Civil Service Law, and the Municipality Law remain blocked at the Ministry of Justice or Council of Ministers level. The National Assembly did demonstrate parliamentary authority with its vote of no-confidence action against former Minister of Defense Wardak and former Minister of Interior Mohammedi amid allegations of corruption and reported dissatisfaction with the handling of cross-border violence emanating from Pakistan. However, Mohammedi was later appointed as the new Minister of Defense.

The Afghan government made progress finalizing additional National Priority Programs (NPPs), although this effort remains behind schedule as all NPPs were due to be endorsed by July 2011. The June 2012 UN-Afghan Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) endorsed five National Priority Programs (NPPs), bringing the total number of NPPs to 16 out of 22. The newly endorsed NPPs are Local Governance; Strengthening Local Institutions; Health for All Afghans; Skills Development for Job Rich Growth; and, Urban Management Support. NPPs outline Afghan strategic security, governance, and development reforms, as well as service delivery priorities, for the next three years. The NPP on “Efficient and Effective Governance” was submitted in August, but will not be endorsed until international donors are assured of the program’s feasibility, transparency, and accountability.

Tokyo Conference

On July 8, 2012, representatives from the Afghan government, international community, and civil society met in Tokyo to discuss the future development of Afghanistan. The Tokyo Conference was held to define the international community’s commitment to a Transformation Decade and for the government of Afghanistan to establish a clear reform plan. Participants issued a communiqué announcing the intent of the international community to provide $16B for Afghanistan’s development through 2015 and included a Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) setting specific, measurable reform goals to improve Afghan governance and development performance. The United States pledged to request from Congress assistance levels at or near the levels of the last decade. Over the long term, Afghanistan and the international community pledged to increase the country’s self-reliance and gradually reduce assistance levels.

The Tokyo MAF established the mutual commitments and responsibilities for both the Afghan government and the international community (IC) to help sustain Afghanistan’s development gains of the last decade, improve the effectiveness of international assistance, steadily reduce Afghanistan’s reliance on international aid, and improve governance to maintain stability. Afghanistan’s performance in the five following major areas will be monitored: a) Representational Democracy and Equitable Elections; b) Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights; c) Integrity of Public Finance and Commercial Banking; d) Government Revenues, Budget Execution and Sub-National Governance; and e) Inclusive and Sustained Growth and Development. For its part, the international community committed to sustain financial support for Afghanistan’s economic development through the Transformation Decade, and reaffirmed its Kabul Conference Commitments to align 80 percent of aid with NPPs and channel 50 percent of
aid through the Afghan national budget. In addition, the international community agreed to work with the government of Afghanistan to improve the mechanisms for assistance delivery to better align with international principles of effective development.

Later in July, the Afghan government prepared a draft Tokyo Framework implementation plan to present to the international community. The paper was a positive step towards establishing the themes, goals, indicators, milestones, and responsible agencies necessary for implementing the commitments of the Tokyo Framework. After receiving input from international donors, the government of Afghanistan approved the implementation plan in late September and plans to present the final process, including specific milestones for each framework goal, at the October meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board.

The participants agreed to follow-up meetings, which will take place at the ministerial level every two years and at the senior official level in alternate years. The level of progress will be monitored at more frequent intervals by the Afghan-UN-led Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB). The first ministerial review of Tokyo Commitments will take place in London in 2014.

2014 Elections

In the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, the Afghan government committed to conducting credible, inclusive, and transparent presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2015 in accordance with the Afghan Constitution, in which eligible citizens—men and women—have the opportunity to participate freely without internal or external interference in accordance with the law. The Afghan Constitution calls for provincial council elections in 2013, presidential elections in 2014, and district council and parliamentary elections in 2015. (District council elections have never been held.) The Afghan government will very likely postpone the provincial council elections to hold them concurrently with the presidential elections in 2014 to reduce total cost and boost voter turnout. The Afghan government’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), in accordance with the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework and President Karzai’s July 26 governance decree, is preparing a comprehensive timeline through 2015 for electoral preparations and polling dates.

The Afghan government will be in the lead for planning, conducting, and securing the presidential and provincial council elections, which will likely be held in spring 2014. The IEC considers potential fraud and lack of security in remote areas as the two greatest challenges to credible and inclusive elections, as they could lead to disenfranchisement of ethnic-based elements of the population.

The IEC leads technical planning and preparations for elections. ISAF will support the elections process in terms of security and logistics. ISAF has already begun planning for that support and will begin detailed planning with MoD and MoI in the near future. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) provides technical assistance through the UNDP ELECT II capacity-building program. UNAMA, ISAF, the U.S. Embassy, and other international donors meet regularly to discuss 2014 elections planning and support.

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32 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Concept Paper on Implementing Tokyo Framework. 29 July 2012
3.2: Assessment of Sub-National Governance

The Afghan government remains highly centralized, with budgeting and spending authority held primarily by the Ministry of Finance and other central ministries in Kabul. Service delivery is implemented by central ministries. Sub-national administrations do, however, continue to engage in limited coordination, planning, and service-monitoring roles, and there are multiple institutional and operational programs in place aimed at improving sub-national governance, including the Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Program (ASGP II), and the Performance-Based Governor’s Fund (PBGF II). Over time, and if properly coupled with the MAF commitments noted above, these programs aim to increase the levels of delegation, accountability, and effectiveness at sub-national level, particularly in areas of budget planning and execution. Sub-national governance structures currently operate to varying degrees of effectiveness at provincial, district, and village levels, and are overseen by the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). Coordination and cooperation between these two organizations has historically been poor, but recent developments on District Representation (see below) has improved this situation.

IDLG continues to support development of sub-national government structures in keeping with National Priority Program for Sub-National Governance (NPP4) and through policy and planning, capacity development, contract management, and coordination and facilitation. The directorate faces a number of challenges as it takes this work forward, including insufficient operations and maintenance (O&M) funds for sub-national structures, lack of authority over line ministries on recruitment issues, accusations of politicization in the appointment process, and extensive dependency on donor funding and parallel structures. The total governance budget is very low, at just five percent (i.e., $720M) of the overall Afghan budget. Budget execution rates also remain low for two reasons: first, delays in budget approval and disbursements from Kabul ministries, and second, the lack of human capacity at the provincial and district levels to execute the funds.

MRRD sub-national programs are focused on the district and village levels. The ministry’s two largest programs, the National Solidarity Program (NSP), in support of District Development Assemblies (DDA) in districts and Community Development Councils (CDCs) in villages, and the National Area-Based Development Program (NABDP), represent 95 percent of MRRD’s program funding.

Sub-National Governance

Provincial Government: The Afghan constitution defines provinces as administrative units of the central government. The provincial tier includes provincial directorates of central ministries, provincial governor’s offices, and provincial councils. Provincial councils are elected bodies with oversight but no legislative authority. Provincial Governors are appointed by the President in coordination with the IDLG. They lead planning, budgeting, and coordination, and they oversee and monitor the activities of provincial line directorates to ensure the directorates implement programs in accordance with provincial plans. Directors of provincial departments report to their respective central line ministries. There is, however, generally poor coordination between councils, governors, and the provincial line departments of central line ministries, with the latter still determining for the most part how resources are allocated at the provincial level.
with little regard for local priorities. This problem is compounded by poor coordination and communications between the Afghan provinces and Kabul. The Provincial Budget Pilot Program (PBPP), introduced last year by the Afghan Ministry of Finance (MoF), sought to improve budgetary planning and communication between the provincial and national levels, by including provincial authorities to a limited degree in the budget planning process for Solar Year SY 1391\(^{33}\). After a promising start, the program stalled due to funding difficulties, but efforts are underway to address these difficulties and include some PBPP projects in the SY 1392 budget. The World Bank has been helpful to this end. Budgets aside, civil service capabilities continue to be a concern across the country.

**District Government:** District Governors (DGs) are appointed through a merit-based civil service recruitment process. Once installed, DGs generally face poor levels of coordination and communication with provincial authorities, resulting in limited engagement in strategic planning and budgetary processes. District governors are dependent on the international community for programmatic funding, and district governance remains limited by the centralized line ministry system highlighted above. The development of effective district governance has, however, made some progress during the reporting period, with endorsement by the Afghan government of the district representation roadmap, which was a pre-condition for international community approval of NPP four for local governance. Under the roadmap, Interim District Coordination Councils (DCCs) will be created to replace the multiple forms of currently existing district representative bodies established by donors. These interim DCCs will be voluntary unpaid bodies, led by IDLG and with MRRD in support for development issues. These efforts are meant to rationalize the existing, and often conflicting, sub-national structures and balance the division of power between nominated district officials and Afghan citizens. DCCs will serve mainly as a conflict resolution structure and prepare development plans without implementing them. Precise roles and responsibilities will be more clearly defined and endorsed by the Afghan government by end of 2012, and DCCs will be operational by end of 2013. Thereafter, a District Council roadmap in line with the Afghan Constitution will be finalized, paving the way for formal and constitutional District Council elections which should be held in 2015 according to the Afghan constitution.

**Village/Community:** With no formal/constitutional village/community council elections scheduled in the foreseeable future, villages are represented through elected and donor-sponsored MRRD Community Development Councils (CDCs), which have had a long-standing presence since 2003. CDCs are elected by local *shuras*, led by elders, or via a democratic voting process, and are primarily engaged in development decisions. There are some 28,000 CDCs across Afghanistan at present, but expansion of the program has stalled due to security concerns in the remaining uncovered areas.

Recruitment and retention of competent Afghan government staff remains a problem at both provincial and district levels, although the extent of, and reasons for, the problem varies across the country. The World Bank’s “Capacity Building for Results” program, recently launched in May, seeks to address some of the issues underpinning this problem, and the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission is also addressing the issue through

\(^{33}\) Afghanistan fiscal year SY 1391 will run from March 2012 to December 2012.
The recent Tokyo Conference recognized many of the issues raised above, and the resulting MAF included specific commitments by the Afghans to address some of the major weaknesses in sub-national governance. These commitments included the development of a provincial budgeting process in which provincial councils have a consultative role, and a legal framework to clarify the roles and responsibilities of government agencies at national, provincial, and district levels, in line with 2010 sub-national government policy. Although precise timing and plans have yet to be developed to take this work forward, robust adherence to these MAF commitments should enhance the level of sub-national engagement in policy, planning, and budgetary matters, and therefore result in a more effective and responsive sub-national governance in keeping with Afghan government policy.

3.3: Revenue Generation and Budget Execution

Afghan revenue generation is an area that has shown promising results. Collections of domestic revenue have improved steadily since 2009, and, as of August 28 in the current first year (SY 1391), are up by six percent compared to the same time period last year. The total domestic revenue reached roughly $950M for the first two quarters of the current fiscal year. Although revenue generation is on-track to exceed last year’s total revenue of $2 billion, it is projected to come in slightly below SY 1391 government targets, largely due to the shortened fiscal year.

New taxes and their administrative implementation are now underway, including new property taxes, customs tariffs, business taxes, and agriculture surplus taxes. Customs revenue on cross-border trade in Afghanistan has steadily and significantly increased over the past eight years, however, this year it has decreased slightly compared with last year due, in part, to border closures with Pakistan. In the future, customs revenues are expected to remain a major source of funding for government operations as trade increases in the region. As improved border management reduces corruption and the agencies responsible for implementing recent custom legislation and regulation become more capable, this targeted area of revenue generation should continue as a significant contributor to government revenue. Business taxes, however, will remain fairly low for the foreseeable future due to multiple issues, including the large informal economy, corruption, and the remoteness of sizable portions of the Afghan population. The sectors with the most revenue-generating potential are agriculture, information communication technology, and extractive mining and hydro-carbons. Although revenue generated from the

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34 Afghanistan fiscal year SY 1391 will run from March 2012 to December 2012.
35 Source of data: AFMIS/RTAS, 8/28/2012
36 SY 1391 will end in December 2012 (rather than March 2013) to facilitate a change in fiscal year. As of January 2013, Afghanistan’s new fiscal year will begin in January (as opposed to March).
37 The information and communication technology (ICT) sector is one of the largest revenue-generating sectors in Afghanistan with annual average revenue of $139.6 million – accounting for more than 12 percent of total government revenues – between the years 2002 and 2011. In Solar Year (SY) 1389 (March 21, 2010 to March 20, 2011) the Afghan Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) deposited $167.33 million of direct and indirect revenue to the GIRoA treasury and a further $91.12 million in the first eight months of SY 1390 (March 21, 2011 to March 20, 2012). The MCIT consistently ranks at or near the top of all Afghan ministries in terms of budget execution. In the first eight months of SY 1390, the MCIT had spent approximately 57 percent of its development budget.
extractive industry remains fairly minimal, it did increase roughly 60 percent (as of August 28 in SY 1391), compared to the same period last year.  

Despite measured progress in revenue generation, Afghanistan’s fiscal sustainability ratio (a measure of domestic revenues to operating expenses) is still one of the worst in the world. Projected revenue for 2012 is expected to cover about 2/3 of the central government’s operating expenditures yet provide less than 20 percent of the total estimated public expenditures budget. In the first quarter of CY 2012, the fiscal sustainability ratio dropped below 60 percent, due to proportionally higher increases in operating expenses, but rebounded in the second quarter to approximately 80 percent. Despite the improved fiscal sustainability ratio, economists remain concerned about Afghanistan’s fiscal sustainability as revenues are slightly below projections and government expenditures continue to increase. As Transition continues, the necessity to absorb additional expenditures for operations and maintenance (O&M) costs – as reconstruction/infrastructure projects are transferred to the Afghan government - will further strain the ability of government revenues to cover fixed operating costs. However, some of these additional O&M costs are expected to be offset by anticipated savings from Civil Service reforms. Additional efficiencies are expected to produce cost saving results in contracting, financial systems management, increased budget planning, formulation, implementation, and monitoring, as well as more effective prioritization of spending. Capacity-development programs have been in place and continue to increase the capabilities of the government in these areas.  As economic and infrastructure development and an improved business environment enable private sector industries to grow, a stable tax base will enable the government to become increasingly self-supporting.

In the medium term, the international community has pledged to provide assistance to help fill the fiscal gap between domestic public revenue and total public expenditures. At the July Tokyo Conference, donors promised $16B in civil assistance through 2015; this amount is in addition to donor pledges made in the run up to the May NATO Summit, which were focused on security assistance of $3.6B and an Afghan commitment of $500M annually to support the Afghan police and military from 2015-2017. Together, these sums align with the World Bank’s baseline scenario of the levels of foreign assistance, roughly $8B annually, needed to fill the gap, although World Bank notes that this level of assistance will be needed well beyond 2015. To increase aid effectiveness, international donors agreed that 50 percent of all aid pledged at Tokyo will be spent through the Afghan government budget, and that 80 percent of the aid will be directed to projects that are aligned with the Afghan government’s NPPs. This approach is in line with commitments made during the 2010 Kabul Process.

Revenue generation will only be beneficial in so far as the Afghan government has the capacity to spend its budget in prioritized areas effectively. Budget execution, while showing improvement from SY1389 to SY1390, continues to struggle to meet donor expectations, especially with regards to the development budget. For SY1390 (March 2011 – March 2012), the Afghan government executed 94 percent of its operating budget while the execution rate for the development budget rose from 39 percent in SY1389 to about 52 percent in SY1390. The

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38 Source of data: AFMIS/RTAS, 8/28/2012
39 It should be noted that total public expenditures includes donor financed activities that would normally be categorized as public expenditures, such as spending on infrastructure.
development budget execution rate through July was 9.9 percent, two percentage point higher than last year; and the expenditure rate continued to increase slowly over the second quarter. The operating budget execution rate was 10.6 percent in the first month of the Afghan fiscal year, 31.1 percent as of July, and remained slightly higher through the second quarter. Under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, the Afghan government is expected to improve its development budget execution rate to 75 percent by 2017. As donors look to increase on-budget funding to at least 50 percent, in accordance with pledges, the amount of funding that must be utilized will increase substantially over a short period and require the Afghan government to significantly, and potentially unsustainably, accelerate its spend rate.

Limited public financial management capacity remains one of the primary challenges hindering public sector program implementation and public service delivery. More specifically, the Afghan government cites capacity constraints at the national and sub-national levels; weak planning and budget formulation; donor earmarking of funds and funding delays; and communication challenges across ministries, donors, and sub-national entities as key challenges. An additional long-term concern is the retention and integration of the externally funded Afghan “second civil service,” a cadre of skilled civil servants funded by international donors at a higher rate than the regular service in order to expand technical assistance and capacity in line ministries and, in some cases, to help execute donor-funded projects. Although the externally funded Afghan staff represents only roughly 3.9 percent of the total workforce, they account for an estimated 31.9 percent of total payroll costs, according to 2011 World Bank survey of eight key ministries and one agency. The Afghan government has little ability to absorb the cost of these higher salaries, which may jeopardize the transfer of valuable program management and service delivery competencies into the regular service.

President Karzai issued a decree directing the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to develop an implementation plan proposal for the $16B in pledges, and to provide monthly progress updates to the Cabinet of Ministers. Additionally, Karzai has charged all three branches of the government to execute at least 50 percent of their respective development budgets. The MoF is working with relevant ministries and donors to develop a joint governing framework, coordinating both ministerial efforts and donor pledge commitments.

3.4: Rule of Law

The United States and coalition partners conduct a broad range of programs that promote the rule of law (RoL) in Afghanistan. The Department of Defense’s rule of law efforts include field support to civilian rule of law teams; training for judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and corrections officials; providing necessary infrastructure for courts and prisons; and training Ministry of Interior police forces in aspects of law enforcement from investigations to community policing.

The U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) rule of law program has three main components: building the capacity of the formal justice and traditional dispute-resolution systems; promoting governmental and civil society anti-corruption measures; and promoting human rights. The rule of law portfolio has both national and sub-national impact and promotes

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rule of law institutionally and at the grassroots level. Key successes and achievements include increasing the number of female graduates by 20 percent from the Supreme Court’s two-year training program for judges, the establishment of several legal clinics in law and Islamic faculties, the acceptance of curriculum reform in law and Islamic faculties, and condemnation of *baad*, the practice of using women as compensation to settle disputes among practitioners of traditional dispute resolution.

The Department of State funds projects to modernize court administration, build the capacity of investigators and prosecutors, support small-scale informal justice program, reform the corrections system, provide support to law schools and legal academia, and develop transparency in the prosecutorial process. The Department of Justice provides subject matter experts to provide advice and train key members of Afghanistan’s justice system.

The rule-of-law mission is shared among several military and civilian rule of law actors: the U.S. agencies and departments, specifically the DoD’s Rule of Law Field Force–Afghanistan (ROLFF-A), USAID, Department of State, DOJ, and Treasury Department; ISAF coalition partners, and Regional Commands; NTM-A; coalition civilians working in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA), including all United Nations agencies in Afghanistan; the World Bank; other donor countries; NGOs; the Afghan government; Afghan civil society; and other justice officials. Although NATO policy is for UNAMA to take the lead on civilian governance and rule-of-law issues, its capacity to do so is limited.

In an attempt to provide greater unity of effort across all communities, NATO Defense Ministers endorsed the establishment of the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission–Afghanistan (NROLFSM-A) at the June 2011 Defense Ministerial. Among its primary tasks, NROLFSM-A was intended to complement and eventually assume responsibility for much of the liaison and coordination activities of ROLFF-A, in support of UNAMA and other rule-of-law actors. NROLFSM-A works hand-in-hand with ROLFF-A to accomplish its primary tasks, including coordination in the field. The mission also works with HQ ISAF’s Rule of Law Team, the U.S. Embassy’s Interagency Rule of Law program, UNAMA’s Rule of Law Unit, and members of the international community. With NROLFSM-A turning its focus to transition, these coordination efforts will be centered on finding a suitable follow-on rule of law entity or entities to assume ongoing rule-of-law field functions currently supported by NROLFSM-A. Follow-on entities may include members of the international community, the Afghan government, or Afghan civil society.

Notwithstanding NROLFSM-A’s transition focus, the mission continues to provide a substantial presence in the field. NROLFSM-A provides security for Afghan and international civilians who provide technical assistance and training in supporting the building of Afghan criminal justice capacity. It supports increased access to Afghan government-supported dispute resolution services. Its three lines of effort are: (1) Forensics Architecture; (2) Evidence-based operations (EvBO); and (3) Field Support for Justice Sector Development. Within these lines of effort are four main tasks: (1) developing human capacity; (2) building sustainable infrastructure; (3) promoting awareness of the legal rights of citizens and access to state-sanctioned justice actors and public trials; and (4) facilitating justice sector security. NROLFSM-A has been a key
facilitator for aspects of justice development, both directly and through its support to the many U.S. and international community organizations assisting with rule of law efforts.

ROLFF-A initially had a specific mission to provide security and to assist in coordination and liaison with civilian rule of law agencies (e.g., USAID and the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)) in their long-term governance and rule of law projects. ROLFF-A has broadened its mission to support the Justice Center in Parwan (JCIP); this effort develops the capacity of Afghan authorities to prosecute insurgents and terrorists under Afghan law. It also supports the development of law enforcement professionals regarding investigations and surveillance (LEP-IS). Both efforts will help ensure peace and security in Afghanistan. Another area that it supports is the Afghan Criminal Techniques Academy, which is co-located with the JCIP, and is training a cadre of forensic examiners for Afghan law enforcement purposes.

Widespread corruption and insufficient transparency remain the main challenges with respect to establishing a self-sustaining rule-of-law system in Afghanistan. The country’s principal anti-corruption institutions, the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC) and the Attorney General’s Office (AGO), have minimal political support in encouraging and enforcing transparency and accountability measures within the Afghan government. Weaknesses within both the formal and traditional Afghan justice systems, and the link between the two, ensure the Taliban system of dispute resolution remains a viable option for segments of the Afghan population because the Taliban process is rapid, enforced, and often considered less corrupt than that of the formal Afghan justice system. Although traditional dispute resolution is often touted as more developed in parts of Afghanistan not under central control, some dispute resolution processes, such as the practice of baad,41 are inconsistent with international human rights principals.

Overall, progress in rule of law promotion and implementation continue to be mixed. The main challenges include access to the formal justice system, poor enforcement of human rights protections guaranteed by the Afghan constitution, corruption, insufficient transparency, and inadequate security for justice facilities and personnel. The shortage of human capital and the Afghan government’s insufficient political will to operate and maintain justice programs and facilities are key impediments. To fulfill the requirements of security and sustainability, security transition must include the transition of rule of law activities and assistance from military to civilian support, with an end state of full ownership of all aspects of the justice sector—police, courts, and prisons—by local, provincial, and national Afghan stakeholders. Successful rule of law efforts are more likely to be found in transitional areas where Afghan governance followed ISAF-supported stability. Expanding the reach of the rule of law into remaining areas, where the transition from an ISAF security lead to an Afghan lead has not yet occurred, poses a greater challenge as the Afghan government works to stabilize areas simultaneously with building capacity, effective governance processes, and personnel.

41 A traditional practice of settling disputes, primarily in Pashtun tribes, whereby a young girl is traded to settle a dispute for her older relatives.
The Justice Sector

In all areas where the U.S. military is present, the United States engages at nearly every level with the Afghan government to help develop Afghanistan’s justice sector. During the reporting period, there have been a few notable improvements in the Afghan legal system.

Rule of Law Field Force-Afghanistan (ROLFF-A) has seen both an increase in the total number of local districts holding trials as well as an increase in the total number of trials held throughout the areas where ROLFF-A personnel are deployed, highlighting an increase in access to the formal justice system by the Afghan population.

Human capacity is also increasing in the justice system. Recently the Afghan Supreme Court swore in 181 judges, many of whom were women, representing a significant increase in trained judicial officials. The addition of these new judges has resulted in a reduction of districts without assigned judges to only 38 districts, thereby reducing gaps in Afghan governance.

In general, the formal system is more frequently employed in urban areas, while traditional dispute resolution (TDR), appears more prevalent in the areas outside of district and provincial centers. Distances between remote areas and court facilities, the interpersonal and tribal nature of disputes, varying degrees of local trust in the formal system, and time required to resolve disputes through the formal system may contribute to the persisting separation between the formal and customary systems. ROLFF-A does not view TDR negatively, provided that dispute resolution is not administered by the Taliban or other insurgent groups, and will continue to work with Afghan Justice Sector actors to build linkages between the two systems. Aiding this effort is an innovative USAID program that supports the informal justice sector. This project’s activities are designed to help improve the decision-making capability of traditional dispute-resolution councils (shuras) in areas that have been recently stabilized through training on Afghan and human rights law, particularly as it relates to women’s rights, and by connecting them in a more formalized manner with district courts. Long-term anticipated results include increased harmony in actions of the formal and informal justice systems and increased access to justice with an emphasis on the rights of women.

Afghanistan has made limited progress toward an independent and self-sustaining, functional, transparent, and fair justice system. The Afghan judicial system continues to face numerous challenges, including inadequate coordination between the formal and informal justice systems and systemic corruption at all levels resulting in a lack of political will to pursue prosecutions against many politically connected individuals. Additionally, the challenge of keeping courthouses open and operating continues. Improvements in infrastructure supporting the justice sector include a number of projects designed to enable sustainability through the building or refurbishing of courtrooms, prisons and judicial offices across Afghanistan.

The key challenge to justice sector development remains the lack of security at the district level. True Afghan justice sector development is only possible where Afghan justice actors are present and accessible to the communities to be served. Security for judges and prosecutors is an ongoing concern expressed at the local, district, and provincial levels. In many cases, particularly at the district level, justice sector actors may be viewed as "softer" targets than ANSF. Generally, security conditions in RC-N and RC-W, and in limited key areas of RC-E,
RC-SW, and RC-S, support judicial sector operations and development at the local level. Progress in RC-SW, RC-S, and RC-E, however, has been uneven and remains contingent on the Afghan government maintaining the momentum gained to date by NROLFSM and the IC. District-level justice actors in these RCs often work from provincial capitals because of adverse security conditions at the district level. Without the security needed for justice sector personnel to work in their assigned districts, growth in the Afghan justice sector will continue to be slow. ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and ROLFF-A are working to enhance ANSF and the Afghan government awareness of the security threat to the justice sector, particularly among Provincial and District governors, to encourage the implementation of sustainable, Afghan-led solutions.

Progress in creating a transparent, consistent, reliable, and fair justice sector is being made but remains slow. More courts are holding public trials. Slowly increasing human capacity is resulting in more consistent decisions. Judicial coverage of more districts aids the Afghan government to gradually become the forum of choice for Afghans. Continuing efforts to eliminate corruption in the courts should improve the perceived legitimacy of a fair and just judicial system. However, until rule of law efforts are led and sustained by Afghans, sustainability of the rule of law will not be fully achieved. This process is gradual and requires continued international support to foster permanent changes. The international community continues to work with the Afghan justice sector to encourage and implement long-term changes and improvements.

### Detention Operations

Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-435 (CJIATF 435) is responsible for U.S. detainee operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. On March 9, 2012, COMUSFOR-A and former Minister of Defense Wardak signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to transfer U.S. detention facilities in Afghan territory to Afghan control, and to transfer Afghan nationals detained by U.S. forces at the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP) to Afghanistan, provided that certain commitments in the MOU are met by both the U.S. and the Afghan government. CJIATF-435 has successfully transferred to Afghan control more than 3,000 detainees, or roughly 98 percent of those persons detained in accordance with the law of armed conflict (LOAC) by the U.S. at the DFIP prior to the implementation of the MOU as well as those facilities required to detain them. The United States continues to engage GIRoA in furtherance of the objectives set forth in the MOU.

Although a formal transition ceremony took place on September 10, 2012, transfers of the remaining Afghan detainees were suspended due to questions raised by senior officials in the Afghan government over the legality of administrative detention under Afghan law. Following high-level engagement, the Afghan government appeared willing to work toward developing a legal framework that respects Afghan sovereignty, while providing the necessary protections against serious security threats. The United States and Afghanistan continue to work together to resolve this issue and to develop and enhance Afghan capabilities further.

Over the reporting period, the United States provided logistical and technical assistance to the Afghans as they assumed greater control over operations at the DFIP. The United States has transferred detained Afghan nationals to Afghan administrative detention only after a U.S. Detainee Review Board (DRB) determines that the detainee (1) meets U.S. criteria for
internment and (2) that continued internment is necessary to mitigate the threat posed by the detainee. Those criteria require a finding that a person either participated in or supported the September 11, 2001, attacks, or has substantially supported the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or associated forces engaged in hostilities against U.S. or Coalition Forces, including any person who had committed a belligerent act, or had directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces. Throughout the DRB process, every detainee receives the assistance of a "Personal Representative," a U.S. military officer charged with presenting information to the DRB on behalf of the detainee before the Board.

If the U.S. DRB determines that a detainee meets the criteria identified above and that continued detention is required to mitigate the threat posed by the detainee, CJIAAF 435 compiles and forwards each detainee's case file to the Afghan government for review by a body of 15 senior officials who make up a “Technical Committee,” drawn from GIRoA’s Attorney General's Office, Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of Interior (MoI), National Directorate of Security (NDS) and Supreme Court. The Technical Committee decides whether each case should be referred for continued internment or prosecution.

If a case is referred for prosecution, the NDS conducts a criminal investigation. Upon the completion of the investigation, the NDS refers detainee cases to a Saranjwal (the prosecutor) who files an indictment, the last step before the trial in the primary court. As of September 29, 2012, the Technical Committee has referred for prosecution 1,627 cases of the 2,600 it has reviewed. At trial, the primary court has adjudged convictions in 67 percent of the cases heard.

Detainee cases not referred for prosecution by the Technical Committee are reviewed by Afghan Impartial Review Boards (IRBs), a panel of three field-grade officers from the MoD, MoI, and NDS. IRBs consider detainee cases for potential prosecution, release, or continued administrative detention. An ANA staff judge advocate represents the Afghan government before each IRB, and another ANA attorney serves as the detainee's defense counsel. A third ANA staff judge advocate serves as the IRB's legal advisor. The Commander of the Afghan Detention Operations Command (DOC) is the convening authority for each IRB. He may approve or disapprove particular IRB recommendations. There are currently two standing IRBs, each with a full complement of permanent members.

The March MOU commits the Afghan government to consult with the U.S. prior to any release recommended by an IRB. Afghanistan must favorably consider a U.S. assessment that continued internment is necessary to prevent a particular detainee from engaging in or facilitating terrorist activity. Disagreements are resolved through the work of the Detention Transition Oversight Subcommittee (DTOS), which consists of the Commanders of CJIAAF 435 and the Afghan DOC. Disagreements not resolved by the DTOS are referred to a bilateral process between the Commander USFOR-A and the Afghan Minister of Defense. As of September 29, 2012, no case has been submitted for bi-lateral decision at this level.

The Afghan government has agreed that every released detainee will be offered the opportunity to enroll in the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP). APRP requires a detainee to renounce terrorism publically, as well as other pledges in order to rejoin as a productive, peaceful member of Afghan society. The program requires that each detainee secure a
"guarantor" who will personally vouch for the detainee and promise to ensure the individual does not return to the battlefield. The Afghan government has agreed that every guarantor will either be a member of the Afghan Parliament or be vouched for by a Parliament member or other appropriate government official. Finally, the APRP program monitors the detainee's behavior for 90 days after the individual’s release, during which time the individual receives a small stipend to support his transition back into society. The United States and the Afghan government are in discussions to implement an indefinite extension of the APRP monitoring period, which may include a role for Afghan law enforcement agencies in the monitoring effort.

The Afghan DOC’s capacity continues to grow and expand with the benefit of the Security Force Assistance (SFA) provided by Task Force (TF) Protector, a subordinate command of CJIAFT 435. As set out in the MOU, the United States intends to maintain a presence at the DOC and DFIP to provide advisory, technical and logistical support. TF Protector currently provides SFA to the DOC, with an emphasis on advising and assisting DOC leaders and ANA staff, to ensure that the ANA provides secure and humane care, custody, and control to Afghan administrative detainees and persons held at the Afghan National Detention Facility-Parwan (ANDF-P) and the Afghan National Detention Facility in Pol-e-Charki. CJIAFT 435’s continued partnership with the DOC is intended to reinforce a more credible and legitimate Afghan detention system.

3.5: Parliament

Afghanistan’s National Assembly has demonstrated slow but growing capacity and political maturity. The April-June 2012 period was marked by increasing cohesiveness of opposition blocs and a more functional legislative process that evidenced a renewed emphasis on both committee work and passing legislation through plenary sessions. By the end of June 2012, Parliament had taken 61 national executive oversight actions, a significant improvement over the 22 actions taken during the same period in 2011. Additionally, by the end of June, seven draft laws were subject to substantive amendment and final vote in Parliament, compared to just two laws over the same period the last year.

Although not yet as strong as the executive branch, Parliament manages to maintain greater oversight of the executive branch and provide balance to the three branches of government. Both chambers of the National Assembly regularly call ministers for question-and-answer sessions, and in some cases, hold votes of no-confidence on the ministers. On August 4, the Parliament overwhelmingly passed no-confidence motions against Defense Minister Wardak and Interior Minister Mohammadi, citing failures to stop cross-border shelling, high-level assassinations of government officials, and allegations of corruption. President Karzai respected Parliament’s vote and dismissed both ministers on August 5. Mohammadi was later appointed as the new Minister of Defense, which Parliament approved.

However, the National Assembly at times still refers to the executive branch for guidance in the legislative arena, relying on presidential actions to enact legislative debates. President Karzai has requested Parliament’s cooperation and assistance in executing his July 26 presidential decree on anti-corruption. In the coming months, the National Assembly will be focused on President Karzai’s call to work on reforming the government, Cabinet appointments, and the revised elections law.
USAID’s continuing assistance to Parliament includes members in both upper and lower houses, parliament staff, leadership offices, and committees. In addition to institutional development, the USAID-funded Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Project (APAP) activities improve Parliament’s constituency outreach efforts, communications, information technology use, and legislative reform and national budget review. USAID assistance strengthens the ability of the Parliament to operate as an independent and effective legislative, representative, and oversight body on behalf of the Afghan people.

3.6: Financial Reform

On June 29, 2012, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Executive Board completed its first review of the Afghan government’s performance under a three-year, SDR\(^{42}\) 85 million ($133.6M) Extended Credit Facility arrangement and approved the disbursement of SDR 12 million ($18.2M). The program was originally approved by the Executive Board on November 14, 2011. During the review, the IMF noted two deficiencies in program implementation. With regards to quantitative performance, the government achieved its end-March quantitative targets in the monetary sector, and most of its fiscal targets, but it failed to meet the revenue target by a small margin (0.2 percent of GDP), largely due to unanticipated disruptions at the Pakistani border. As a consequence, Afghanistan also slightly breached the operating budget deficit, an indicative program target. The IMF granted a waiver request in light of strong efforts to strengthen revenue collection. On structural benchmarks, the government, with some delays, met five of six benchmarks. However, it made 'insufficient progress' on bringing state-owned enterprises and corporations under control of the Ministry of Finance (MoF).

Resolution of the Kabul Bank Crisis remained a primary focus over the reporting period. President Karzai issued a presidential decree giving beneficiaries until June 4 to repay their debts or face criminal and civil action. Although a special tribunal has been established to investigate the Kabul Bank scandal, but there have been very limited legal actions thus far and asset recovery remains disappointing; only an additional $30M in cash was recovered by the deadline. As of June 4, cash recoveries from Kabul Bank had reached $128M out of a total of $935M owed to the receiver, but there have been no significant recoveries since then. Additional properties have been seized, including an estimated $44M in Dubai and $146M in Afghanistan, but the actual value of total assets seized remains to be determined. On June 3, the Afghan government announced the indictment of 21 people concerning various allegations of fraud at Kabul Bank. The indictment lists only two of the Kabul Bank shareholders and includes certain individuals that may not be culpable of any real crimes associated with the bank’s near collapse. The indictment list does not include certain politically-connected shareholders or clients reportedly involved in financial crimes at Kabul Bank. Prosecution of the two shareholders indicted does not appear to be progressing quickly. Going forward, assets recovered and status of criminal and civil proceedings will be reported on a quarterly basis.

The Kabul Bank Crisis resulted in widespread loss of confidence among many Afghan citizens in the Afghan banking sector and highlighted a number of significant weaknesses in the industry as a whole. These weaknesses covered all significant areas of bank stewardship and will continue

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\(^{42}\) SDR (Special Drawing Rights) is an international reserve asset – not a currency or a claim – created by the International Monetary Fund to supplement its member countries’ official reserves. Its value is based on a basket of four key international currencies, and SDRs can be exchanged for freely usable currencies.
to require extensive reforms to address weak financial supervision, corruption, overexposure, and security concerns. The Afghan government plans to submit a new Banking Law to the Parliament which aims to strengthen central bank regulations in primary areas of corporate governance, capital requirements, related parties, and large exposures amounts. However, leadership deficits and lack of professional capacity continue to be a concern and could hamper meaningful reform. The financial sector broadly remains underdeveloped and plays only a limited role in fostering private sector activity.

3.7: Counter-Corruption and Transparency

Corruption and organized crime are one of the major threats to the Coalition’s campaign objectives. The threat of “criminal capture,” or infiltration of the leadership of government institutions by criminal elements, is particularly evident within some elements of the Afghan Air Force (AAF), some provincial police forces, and border police units. However, progress was made in preventing criminal interference and subversion of institutions in the Afghan security sector.

Afghan judicial officials remain subject to bribery, intimidation, and political interference. Contributing factors to the problem of corruption in the Afghan justice sector include poorly qualified prosecutors and judges, gaps in the criminal procedure code, and a lack of standardized procedures and professional licensing requirements for justice officials. The most significant factor contributing to corruption in the justice sector is insufficient political will among senior Afghan leaders to enforce reforms and uphold the rule of law. However, Afghanistan’s Supreme Court has discharged multiple judges on corruption charges and pledged to continue the fight against corruption. Despite multiple engagements, prosecuting high-profile figures is still a challenge. The Attorney General’s Office (AGO) remains the weakest link among Afghanistan’s anti-corruption and judicial institutions.

A modest increase in political will to tackle corruption was evidenced by some senior Afghan leaders, due in part to the Afghan government’s desire to show progress to the international donor community ahead of the Tokyo Donors Conference. In recent months, President Karzai personally supported several prosecutions of politically connected individuals and announced his intention to put more focus and energy into anti-corruption efforts. Karzai also directed the creation of a special tribunal for the Kabul Bank; however, the results to date have been disappointing. On June 21, the president addressed both houses of Parliament and the judiciary, calling on Afghan leaders to tackle corruption.

Interagency Counter-Corruption Efforts

ISAF, primarily through CJTF-Shafafiyat, continues to implement initiatives to support the Afghan government in its efforts to reduce corruption and organized crime, while working to ensure that international resources and development assistance are not subject to fraud and corruption. During the reporting period, ISAF began plans to streamline the command and control (C2) for counter-corruption, counter-narcotics, counter-threat finances, and strategic targeting in order to align C2 functions and processes to achieve greater strategic effect. The plan has been forwarded up through appropriate command channels and is awaiting feedback and should be implemented over the next reporting period.
A critical component of counter-corruption efforts is monitoring contract funds and property losses to deny opportunities for power brokers, criminal networks, and insurgents to benefit from stolen property or illicit revenue. Task Force 2010 (TF 2010), the USFOR-A vendor vetting process, and the IJC vendor vetting process were established to achieve these objectives. TF 2010 coordinates with IJC, the CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command – Forward (C-JTSCC-F), and other DoD Heads of Contracting Activities to review high-risk contracts to ensure they do not benefit insurgents or criminal networks. Information also is provided to the U.S. Department of State and USAID.

Since its inception, the IJC vendor vetting cell has vetted more than 1,800 companies. Although the IJC Vendor Vetting Reach-Back Cell focuses on pre-award vendor vetting to facilitate force protection risk-level ratings, TF 2010 focuses on assessment of vendors during their execution of U.S. government contracts. As a result of TF 2010 efforts, more than 2,050 contracts valued at $38B and involving more than 3,500 companies have been reviewed. Additionally, since January 2012, TF 2010 has helped oversee the recovery of more than $8M of pilfered items. Finally, TF 2010 has assessed more than 165 total vendors in support of the Regional Commands, identifying more than 10 of these vendors as “high risk” for force protection issues.

Partnering is essential and TF 2010 works closely with the International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF), which is a cooperative effort of nine federal law enforcement agencies. In particular, TF 2010 works very closely with the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Major Procurement Fraud Unit, and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS).

TF 2010 regularly partners with SIGAR in making referrals for suspension or debarment. Additionally, since TF 2010’s creation in July 2010, the Task Force has tracked 126 debarments of companies and individuals due to criminal conduct, poor performance, or force protection concerns in Afghanistan. Another 46 companies and individuals are currently suspended, and another 38 companies and individuals have been referred for suspension or debarment and are pending action before the Suspension & Debarment Officials of multiple agencies.

The ISAF International Vendor Vetting Office (IVVO), established in December 2011, continues to support ISAF’s counter-corruption objectives with respect to contracts awarded by ISAF contracting offices. The IVVO and CJATF-Shafafiyat work closely together with the IJC as well as the US Embassy to share ideas and information, and to coordinate actions.

The MoD personnel, logistics, acquisition/procurement, finance, and legal departments reported progress in the first formal update report on 50 of the 54 anti-corruption commitments made as part of the Afghan-led Office of National Security Council (ONSC) Transparency and Accountability Working Group (TAWG) process. The Senior High Commission on Anti-Corruption, chaired by the First Deputy Minister, and the Transparency and Accountability Office, were created to monitor corruption and implement anti-corruption systems and procedures and increase transparency and accountability within the MoD. The MoD GS Legal investigative efforts into the crimes committed at the National Military Hospital have resulted in the referral of two cases to the military tribunal court; one case recently resulted in the conviction of three ANA officers for dereliction of duty. A full investigation into allegations of illicit
activity within the Afghan Air Force has been hindered by the lack of an Afghan investigative partner; investigative leads explored thus far have produced limited admissible evidence of corruption.

The Ministry of Interior (MoI) phase of the ONSC TAWG is currently in progress. As part of this process, the MoI has established a Transparency and Accountability Committee (TAC) to enhance transparency and accountability within MoI by identifying areas of concern and developing processes and procedures that contribute to a more transparent organization. The MoI TAC has established "Shafafiyat Commissions" in each police zone and province to address corruption among fielded police forces. The first of these committees was established in May 2012 in the 303 Police Zone (northern Afghanistan), with the final commission in 707 Police Zone (RC-SW), established in September 2012.

CJIATF-Shafafiyat led the Counter Corruption and Organized Crime Interagency Effects Group (CCIEG), which is focused on developing a common understanding of corruption as it exists within the justice sector. The group’s goal was to develop recommendations and concrete courses of action to diminish the impact of corruption. Nine substantive areas were examined, with justice sector subject matter experts outlining how corruption undermines the rule of law within Afghanistan. CCIEG topics included Functionality of Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Institutions (the HOOAC and the AGO), Transparency of Criminal Cases, Corrections, and how the Taliban Exploits Weaknesses in the GIRoA Justice Sector.

The issue of corruption extends beyond Afghanistan’s borders, and addressing this transnational element is equally as critical as eliminating domestic corruption. The transnational dimensions of the flows of money, narcotics, precursor chemicals, and weapons across Afghanistan’s criminal networks have become increasingly apparent. Key figures within Afghan criminal networks continue to thrive due to links to the international financial system, capacity to invest the proceeds of their illicit activities abroad, and their freedom of movement outside of Afghanistan.

ISAF is increasingly tailoring its operations to address transnational threats posed by the nexus between the insurgency, the narcotics trade, organized crime, and corruption in order to tackle the issue of corruption from all known sources. On April 16, 2012, Haji Bakhtawar, a politically connected narcotics trafficker, was arrested by CNPA in Kunduz Province. His capture was hailed publicly by GIRoA as a major arrest by the CNPA and an indicator of the potential for counter-narcotics law enforcement successes post-2014. On July 23, after a five-day public trial, Haji Bakhtawar was sentenced to 17 years imprisonment by the Counter Narcotics Justice Center (CNJC). The successful conviction of this major drug trafficker demonstrates the integrity of the CNJC in handling politically sensitive cases.

Additionally, as a result of ISAF’s mobilization of Afghan-vetted law enforcement units against the nexus of the insurgency, narcotics trade, and criminal patronage networks, nearly half of the sub-networks associated with ISAF’s priority narcotics trafficking organizations have been operationally degraded. Furthermore, as part of this effort, ISAF has created the Strategic Targeting process. It takes direction from the ISAF Commander’s Conference and translates it into a prioritized list to be used for operational and tactical targeting, planning, and Key-Leader
Engagements with the Afghan government. The strategic targeting process utilizes six different working groups that focus on different key ISAF functions and include members from each of the Headquarters staff sections. The Strategic Targeting and Influence Working Group is unique among the six working groups in that it is a small part of a larger targeting effort led by DCOM ISAF.

In other countries that have struggled to overcome the interconnected challenges of terrorism, insurgency, the narcotics trade, organized crime, and corruption, the ultimate reversal of these threats has depended on the mobilization of civil society in support of national unity and reform. Recognizing this, in coordination with the Afghan government, ISAF and its partners have set out to identify and connect elements of civil society, including independent media, religious figures, student organizations, and women’s groups, as well as Afghan civic education, leadership development, and communications programs, in a long-term effort to generate positive social pressure for counter-corruption reform.

**Afghan Counter-Corruption Efforts**

ISAF and CJIATF-Shafafiyat, in close cooperation with the Afghan government, continue their expansive counter-corruption campaign. These counter-corruption efforts, however, rely heavily on the capacity and political will of the Afghan government. Afghanistan’s principal anti-corruption institutions, the HOOAC and the AGO, continue to have only minimal political support for taking the lead in encouraging and enforcing transparency and accountability within the Afghan government.

On July 26, 2012, President Karzai issued a Presidential Decree combating corruption. This decree included 165 measures that impacted 36 GIRoA ministries and offices intended to reduce corruption and increase transparency. Many of these measures contained in this decree pertain to improving and enhancing the Rule of Law (e.g., courts, corrections, the AGO, the HOOAC). The Decree, although expansive and aggressive in some regards, is not necessarily indicative of a strong political will within GIRoA to combat corruption. Many of the measures contained in the decree are simply restatements of previous requirements or commitments already existing in Afghan law, with the addition of often unrealistic timelines. Additionally, the Decree does not contain any form of enforcement mechanism or penalties for lack of compliance, further diminishing its chances of success.

The GIRoA justice sector and IC continue to make slow progress in the detection, investigation, and prosecution of high-profile cases of corruption and organized crime. The Special Cases Committee (SCC), a joint Afghan-international unit created by the AGO, continues to initiate, investigate, and prosecute these high-profile cases. Though progress is slow, the SCC continues to move forward against the criminal actors in the Dawood National Military Hospital (NMH) matter. The HOOAC continues to develop and is producing results, and significant progress has been made where Coalition Forces investigators and prosecutors have been able to mentor and assist the HOOAC’s efforts. The HOOAC referred two cases to the AGO for investigation/prosecution and referred three cases to the MoD for investigation/prosecution. In July 2012, one of these MoD cases resulted in convictions for three military officers. Though the three convictions were for relatively minor offenses, the detection, investigation, prosecution, and conviction of these offenders is a positive indicator of the government’s willingness to take
action against, minor offenders. The HOOAC continues to investigate potential offenses at NMH, while both the MoD and AGO continue in the investigative/prosecution phase of their cases. Further cases are pending, and the personnel and law enforcement efforts of the HOOAC all show there is clear potential for this organization to provide an ever increasingly pivotal role in countering corruption and bringing major crimes to justice.

3.8: Counternarcotics

Strategies and Priorities

The Afghan government is the lead for all counternarcotics (CN) operations. The Afghan government regularly partners with the U.S. and international organizations to target narcotics traffickers and facilities. As part of COIN strategy, DoD coordinates with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other U.S. government departments and agencies to support the U.S. CN strategy for Afghanistan. The main goal of this strategy is to reduce the ability of the insurgency to draw support from the narcotics industry and to develop more capable, accountable, effective, and self-reliant Afghan CN security forces. RC-S, RC-SW, and RC-E remained priority areas for military and law enforcement CN efforts during the reporting period. These regions constitute principal areas for Afghan poppy cultivation and drug processing, and as such, are critical sources of revenue for the Taliban-led insurgency. The DoD’s role in support of CN operations includes building the capacity of the CNPA, improving border security, promoting information sharing, and fostering regional and international cooperation.

Counternarcotics Operations

Increased ISAF presence and expanded operations in southern Afghanistan, enabled by the surge in forces through 2010, have helped to decrease poppy cultivation in an area of the country where CN progress was previously unattainable. Areas with ISAF and ANSF presence have seen a steady decline in cultivation, most notably in Helmand, Afghanistan’s largest poppy-growing province, where cultivation has declined for three consecutive years after the Governor of Helmand initiated a designated food zone which has pushed poppy production to outlying, less fertile growing areas.43

Poppy cultivation decreased during the 2012 harvest season due to poor growing methods, less arable land available, over fertilization, and insufficient water supplies. These disadvantages were in part caused by poppy farmers migrating to less fertile areas to avoid the increased Coalition and GIRoA presence in the Central Helmand River Valley and exacerbated by atypical weather during the winter growing season. The poor harvest appeared to have a sizeable effect on insurgent profits from opium. The poor harvest had a sizeable effect on insurgent profits from opium.

Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) is a program led by the Afghan government and funded by the US State Department. GLE is not an ISAF program. Final UN Office on Drugs and Crime GLE verification figures show 9,672 hectares were eradicated during the reporting period.

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43 A food zone is an area designated by GIRoA to eliminate poppy and replace it with edible crops.
representing a 154 percent increase over last year. This year's GLE campaign was impressive in terms of scale and capacity, but should not be regarded as an unqualified success.

The increase in the amount of poppy eradicated indicates improvement in GIRQ capacity and political will. The Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN), which organizes and drives GLE, began planning efforts early in the year and communicated its plans to governors and ANSF. This year, ANSF provided increased security for eradication teams. ISAF provided crucial support, such as route clearance, which is a prerequisite for eradication operations. The amount eradicated this year is equivalent to about eight percent of last year's total cultivation. This represents approximately the same impact on overall opiate production as counternarcotics interdictions in 2011.

Although increased eradication deters some farmers from planting poppy by increasing the involved risk, this may result in the shifting of cultivation to areas outside the GLE due to the higher profit-margins. GLE does not concentrate on areas of insurgent control (often in more remote regions), and is not exclusively aimed at nor does it significantly affect insurgent funding. Indeed, GLE may actually push some poppy farmers away from GIRQ-controlled areas and into more remote areas which are under insurgent influence. The MCN believes that GLE is most effective when paired with an Alternative Livelihood (AL) campaign designed to give subsistence farmers a viable alternative to growing poppy. Evidence from the Helmand Food Zone Program and elsewhere suggests that targeted AL in combination with GLE is more likely to result in sustainable conversion from poppy to licit cultivation. This year, MCN proposed several Food Zone Programs modeled after the successful elements of the Helmand Food Zone, but the only Food Zone Program that is currently planned to be funded is the Kandahar Food Zone, beginning in 2013. USAID, INL and MCN are currently developing the implementation plan for the 2013 Kandahar Food Zone. Overall, it is not clear whether GLE by itself or coupled with an AL campaign has a positive or negative effect on the Coalition’s goal of reducing insurgent funding.

The DEA, the CNPA National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and ISAF maintained high CN operational tempos throughout the reporting period, conducting several major CN operations. From April 1, 2012 to July 31, 2012, the NIU and ISAF counterparts conducted 15 operations in Helmand Province. CN security forces also noted an increase in hashish seizures during the reporting period. During the reporting period, DEA operations resulted in the arrests of several high ranking members of the Taliban. The DEA-mentored Judicial Wire Intercept Program (JWIP) continues to make progress. The JWIP provides Afghan law enforcement with lawful intercepts that can be used in an Afghan court of law. During the reporting period, information obtained through the JWIP has resulted in the arrest of 43 individuals and the seizure of 12 kilograms of heroin, 20 kilograms of opium, and 2,800 kilograms of hashish.

Despite this high operational tempo and a number of large seizures and high-profile arrests during the reporting period, overall Coalition and ANSF interdiction efforts have had a minimal effect on insurgent financing. However, CN operations are the best line of effort to directly affect Taliban financing available to the Coalition at this time. The narcotics market in Afghanistan is large, and insurgent penetration of that market is extensive and expanding. CN interdiction operations in one area can be supplanted by the insurgents increasing profits in other areas.
CN interdiction operations, in addition to crop substitution, subsidies to farmers, targeted arrests, the disruption of narcotics trafficking networks, and increased CN-focused rule of law together have the potential to reduce significantly insurgent financing from narcotics. However, none of these efforts individually will be able to have a major effect. The political will of the Afghan government remains the greatest challenge to implementing this comprehensive CN program.

**Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan**

CNPA is the ANP component responsible for CN operations throughout Afghanistan. CNPA headquarters are located in Kabul, and CNPA has officers stationed in all 34 provinces and four forward operating bases located throughout Afghanistan. The U.S. DoD continues to support CNPA through capacity building, in order to establish a capable Afghan institution that can counter the narcotics trade and resist corruption. The current CNPA Tashkil is authorized at 2,570 positions, including CNPA headquarters elements, specialized units, and provincial units.

DoD, in partnership with the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, is funding the CNPA Development Unit (CDU). The CDU is working toward the goal of transitioning its CN responsibility to the Afghan government. In support of this, the CDU, with the NTM-A Senior Police Advisor for Counternarcotics, aided the CNPA in completing its Ministerial Development Plan, a roadmap for CNPA development and the transition of greater security responsibility to CNPA at the 2014 transition.

In order to further support the CNPA, the Afghan government with DoD support established a Tactical Operations Center (TOC), which conducts training, develops procedures to fulfill mission requirements, and produces materials to support CN operations. One of the TOC’s most valuable products is the Daily Report, which not only includes CNPA statistical data, but also threat information, coalition force military activity and seizures, weather, personnel strength data, and highlights of important CN events. The TOC improved data reporting and is responsible for more than 50 percent of seizures reported by CNPA. Other activities at the TOC include extensive support for the development and planning of CNPA-derived and -directed interdiction missions integrated with CNPA specialized units.

**Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units**

The CNPA and the TOC are supplemented by a number of specialized and highly-trained Afghan CN units, including the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), the Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU), the Technical Investigation Unit (TIU), and the newly-formed Special Mission Wing (SMW). The NIU, SIU, and TIU are all subordinate to the CNPA. The command relationship of the SMW is currently under development. The SMW will provide aviation support for CN operations, but as currently planned, the unit will report to the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC).

The NIU is the primary unit within the CNPA mandated to provide tactical support by assisting in criminal narcotics investigations, executing search and seizure and arrest warrants, and providing other tactical support to the CNPA. The NIU actively supports the SIU by providing security for officers acting in an undercover capacity, participating in air mobile operations, establishing roadway checkpoints to intercept vehicles transporting narcotics, and to arrest
wanted individuals. The NIU is currently staffed with 520 officers. By the end of 2012, the
DEA anticipates the NIU to be at its full Table of Organization (Tashkil) of 538 officers. The
NIU continues to assume greater responsibility for CN operations by independently conducting
its own operations.

The SIU is a specialized counternarcotics investigative unit whose mission is to identify and
dismantle DTOs operating in Afghanistan. The SIU conducts high-level complex drug
conspiracy investigations through the use of informants, undercover operations, and information
obtained through judicial wire intercepts conducted by the SIU-TIU. The SIU is staffed with 71
vetted and DEA-trained Afghan officers. The current Table of Organization (Tashkil) is 77
officers. The SIU-TIU is comprised of nine specially vetted officers and 200 contract linguists
and translators. Members of the SIU also serve as part of a Financial Investigative Team (SIU-
FIT) at the Afghan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC).

**Afghan Special Mission Wing Support to Counternarcotics**

The Afghan Special Mission Wing (SMW) plays a strategic role by enabling Afghan
Counternarcotics (CN) law enforcement personnel and their DEA partners to conduct CN
interdiction missions in dangerous areas and remote terrain. The unit transitioned from the Air
Interdiction Unit to the Afghan Special Mission Wing (SMW) on July 18, 2012. The SMW
maintains the Air Interdiction Unit's solid foundation of facilities, aircraft, and its most valuable
asset: trained and dedicated Afghan aircrew, ground personnel and leadership. The July 18
ceremony expanded the unit's mission from its traditional CN role to now include
counterterrorism (CT) and other special operations. The unit remains aligned under the Ministry
of Interior and Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), pending ministerial approval of
a cipher (or MOU) to align the SMW under the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Afghan
National Army Special Operations Command.

DoD provides funding support for the SMW with a combination of CN funds and Afghanistan
Security Forces Funds (ASFF). The United Kingdom contributes one training team member,
supplements aircrew salaries, and provides five Mi-17 helicopters. The DoD trains Afghan
pilots and crew members to fly and maintain Mi-17 helicopters to DoD standards. The DoD has
also assigned an embedded training team to train and mentor the unit's key leadership and
personnel to acquire and sustain quality standards in aviation operations and maintenance to
prepare the unit to provide tactical aviation support to law enforcement and counterterrorism
missions.

The SMW expanded its capabilities in 2012 by training and certifying two night vision goggle
(NVG) all-Afghan crews. The unit executed the first Afghan-planned and -led NVG air assault
on July 25, with the lead aircraft flown/crewed by Afghans, and the remaining three aircraft
having mixed coalition/Afghan crews. The July 25 mission supported the 1st Commando
Kandak, inserting 56 Commandos for action against a narco-terrorist target in eastern
Afghanistan under the cover of darkness. The mission resulted in one detained person of
interest, and was integrated into a larger nationwide information campaign on Afghan Special
Forces.
From October 1, 2011, to 30 September 2012, the unit supported 36 CN missions, dedicating over 575 flight hours to CN operations or CN support. Notably, 35 of the 36 CN missions were flown with Afghan crewmembers. In May 2012, combined SMW–Embedded Training Team (ETT) operations in southeastern Afghanistan supporting ISAF Special Operations Forces (SOF), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and partnered Afghan units, netted 4,300 kilograms of hashish and 450 kilograms of crystal heroin. The SMW with ETT assistance has flown over 390 NVG hours, including training, CN assault, and NVG resupply missions. For Fiscal Year 2012, the SMW seized or destroyed 630 kg of crystal heroin, 1820 kg opium, 1700 kg morphine, and 5,120 kg hashish.

The SMW has made great strides in FY 2012; the progress is a result of a deliberate, focused, and patient approach to aviation development over the past five years. Significant improvement is still required in aircrew development, autonomous Afghan maintenance, and in development of Afghan functional staff knowledge and skills (i.e., personnel, intelligence, logistics, plans, communications, and resourcing). Coalition support in the form of advisors, instructors, maintenance, and operational enablers will continue for the next several years.

**Training**

Specialized training is the key element in building the capacity of Afghan CN units. The CN Training Academy (CNTA) continues to provide basic investigative courses of instruction for all CNPA officers. Following graduation from Basic Police Academy run by NTM-A, all candidate CNPA officers must attend the five-week CN training course prior to being certified as a CN officer. The course is designed to provide fundamental training required to investigate and prosecute narcotics crimes effectively. The CNTA was established in 2007 and has graduated 2,180 students from 41 classes, with 42 classes ongoing. In addition to progress in training, efforts to grow and maintain the CNPA continue to yield progress. More predictable pay and above-average working and living conditions have diminished the CNPA’s recruitment and attrition challenges over the last year.

CNTA also continued to develop an Afghan training capacity through a “Train-the-Trainer” program. The 12-week program was created to build the capacity of an Afghan-owned, independent training center. This initiative complements the Afghan government’s development strategy, and is considered critical for Afghanistan’s long-term capability to address narcotics trafficking and organized crime. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) created Mobile Training Teams (MTT), which provide “Afghan to Afghan” training in drug and precursor identification as well as basic intelligence training. During the prior year, MTT courses trained 366 officers in nine provinces.

Training efforts extend beyond the CNTA for the specialized CN units. In order to provide basic, advanced, and sustainment training to the NIU and SIU, DoD, in support of DEA requirements, established an Afghan Regional Training Team (RTT). The Afghan RTT has created a cadre of Afghan CN police officers who conduct courses for the CNPA, but also conduct their own instructor development courses to train their own trainers, thus providing for sustainability and transition. The Afghan training cadre taught 100 percent of the last NIU basic course that was held in February 2012. Currently, the NIU has 12 officers devoted to the training cadre and the SIU has eight officers.
During the period of April 1, 2012 through September 30, 2012, there were 214 total classes conducted by the RTT in which 3,509 total Afghan law enforcement officers were trained.

Progress was made to transition training responsibility to the GIRoA for other Afghan ministries with counterdrug responsibilities. Within the Afghan Customs Department, the Afghan National Customs Academy (ANCA) graduated its final fiscal year 2012 course on September 26, 2012. This was the final course taught by DoD-contracted trainers. With the new fiscal year, 2013, all ANCA courses are taught solely by Afghan instructors. Also, instructor responsibility for the Afghan Advanced Border Management Course (AABMC) was transferred from DoD-contractors to the Afghan Ministry of Interior Training General Command on 20 September 2012.

Interagency Counternarcotics Effort

Several interagency and international organizations support CN operations in Afghanistan, including the Interagency Operations and Coordination Center (IOCC), CJIAFT-Nexus, and the Joint Narcotics Analysis Center (JNAC).

The IOCC provides intelligence and operational support to law enforcement CN operations in Afghanistan. The IOCC, led by the DEA and United Kingdom’s Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), is the central CN cell for developing an understanding of how the Afghan and regional narcotics trades support the insurgency and drive corruption. As the military drawdown continues, the ability to conduct evidence-based operations and combined Afghan and international civil-military collection and analysis efforts will become increasingly essential in sustaining CN efforts. The IOCC partners with ISAF, CJIAFT-Shafagiya and CJIAFT-Nexus to conduct CN law enforcement operations while bringing together the necessary resources to conduct an effective civil-military campaign to counter the narcotics-corruption-insurgent nexus.

CJIAFT-Nexus, an ISAF organization with representatives from the international law enforcement community, also supports interdiction operations to counter the narcotics-corruption-insurgent nexus. CJIAFT-Nexus specifically targets network functions (e.g., safe havens, movement, communications, and finance) rather than individual narco-traffickers to disrupt network resiliency. CJIAFT-Nexus improved and expanded its narcotics targeting support during the reporting period, providing critical support for law enforcement investigations and military operations by analyzing key trafficking networks and improving visibility on powerbroker corruption in RC-S, RC-SW, RC-W, and RC-E.

The U.S. Embassy Kabul Border Management Task Force (BMTF) is an interagency initiative between the DoD and the Department of Homeland Security. BMTF assists the GIRoA in developing professional Customs and border security forces and creating a viable border management strategy. The BMTF plays a critical role in increasing legitimate revenue collection for the Afghan government and improving interdiction for illicit drugs, IED materials, and other contraband. BMTF’s mentoring and training of their Afghan counterparts during the period of this report led to several significant discoveries of illegal drugs and IED materials, including tens of thousands of pounds of ammonium nitrate.
Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC)

The ATFC is a U.S. National Security Staff-mandated organization that identifies and disrupts insurgent and terrorist financial and material support networks in Afghanistan. Led by DEA, with deputies from DoD and the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the cell consists of DoD service and combat support agency personnel, Treasury analysts, law enforcement agents, and coalition partners.

The ATFC works closely with vetted Afghan law enforcement personnel from the DEA-mentored NIU and SIU, the Afghan Public Prosecutor’s Office, and vetted judges; this cooperation is critical to the development of an independent and sustainable Afghan financial investigative capability. ATFC investigations and operations are focused on prosecuting narco-traffickers and providing military forces with information on individuals who provide financial support to insurgents and are affiliated with Afghanistan’s narcotics industry.

ATFC analysts and liaison officers operate in close coordination with ISAF regional commands, the IJC, task forces, and SOF to ensure counter-threat finance efforts are integrated with military planning cycles and operations to disrupt insurgent funding. Specifically, the ATFC provides operational-level recommendations to military and law enforcement planners and tactical targeting support. During the reporting period, the ATFC identified and disrupted sources of insurgent funding throughout Afghanistan, and integrated targets into command-level operational planning. The ATFC assisted with Treasury Department designations of key individuals who moved money on behalf of narco-traffickers and the Taliban. Following successful operations, the ATFC also provided debriefing support at DFIP and disseminated this information to the broader interagency. The ATFC continues to work with SIU FIT and Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center of Afghanistan (FinTRACA) to develop Afghanistan’s financial investigative capability.

ATFC conducted a number of operations during the reporting period, including breakup of an insurgent kidnap-for-ransom organization, the arrest of insurgent propaganda and financial personnel, and the identification of high-level narcotics leaders.
SECTION 4 – RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

4.1: Economic Growth and Development

In the area of economic growth and development, the Coalition will implement a transition strategy with the objective of mitigating the economic impacts of the military drawdown and the gradual reduction in international development assistance, and moving towards a sustainable and traditional development engagement with Afghanistan. Since 2002, the Afghan economy has averaged a real GDP growth rate of roughly nine percent, with year to year fluctuations due largely to volatility in the agricultural sector. Services – especially communications and transport – and construction have been the largest contributors to that growth, fueled largely by the extremely high level of aid. However, these aid flows are mostly outside the Afghan budget, and much of what is spent eventually leaves the economy through imports, expatriated profits, and outward remittances. Core inflation has remained at roughly 10 percent, with fluctuating food and fuel prices dampening the positive effects of growth in some years.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects nearly seven percent growth in 2012 on the basis of strong performance in the agricultural and services sectors. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) expects that growth through 2014 will be led by investments in construction and by private consumption; however, growth is still largely driven by donor and ISAF spending in services and must become more investment-based to facilitate sustainable economic growth beyond transition. The agricultural sector remains important as a large share in the economy and as a source of livelihood for the majority of the rural population. Mining’s contribution has been marginal thus far but has the potential to expand, assuming no significant deterioration in the political or security environment. Lingering investor fears regarding political and security uncertainty associated with Transition make it particularly critical for Afghanistan to show progress in regulatory and policy reforms and complete major infrastructure projects that enable commerce and job creation to thrive. Inclusive economic growth benefitting all Afghans is critical to long-term stability but is significantly challenged by the nascence of most Afghan economic sectors, widespread corruption, underdeveloped infrastructure, and political and security uncertainty.

The World Bank’s May study on Transition in Afghanistan forecasted that, under reasonably favorable baseline projections, real GDP growth may slow to 5-6 percent annually between now and 2018. Significant improvements in the business climate and development in mining and infrastructure has the potential to increase economic growth to roughly seven percent. Failure of the Aynak and Hajigak mines to produce as expected could result in slower growth by up to two percent.

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44 Much of the data derived for this section is from the World Bank. They assert “…collecting reliable data on Afghanistan is extremely difficult. Moreover, much of the information that is available is subject to large margins of uncertainty, as well as often problems of incompleteness, incomparability, etc.” World Bank, “Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014” May 2012

45 “The local content of external budget aid is estimated at only 10–25 percent, compared with around 70–95 percent for on-budget aid. With the bulk of aid (88 percent) going through the external budget, its local economic impact is limited.” World Bank, “Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014” May 2012, pg 2.

46 This baseline scenario forecasted by World Bank assumes that security won’t significantly deteriorate, the Aynak and Hajigak mines produce as expected, the investment climate improves moderately, agricultural productivity increases, and aid declines only gradually (to 23 percent of GDP by 2018 and 10 percent by 2025).
percentage points, and if security and governance deteriorate and international aid rapidly declines, the economy could contract by two percent annually. Transition may also slightly increase unemployment (estimated at eight percent) but underemployment is likely to be a more severe problem (an estimated 48 percent) if reduced resources also reduce the number of short-term jobs or lower the pay of skilled jobs. Additionally, major reductions in resources could hurt the delivery of public services and reverse the human development gains of the last decade. The World Bank identified two major factors as important to mitigating the possible negative economic effects of Transition: assuring that the reduction in external assistance is gradual rather than precipitous and channeling aid through the Ministry of Finance budget to more directly benefit the Afghan economy. Sustaining economic growth in the near to medium term will require Afghanistan to commit to moving toward a better governed, more competitive and market-oriented economy.

The ability to provide investment capital to businesses has been very limited, although on a relative basis there has been growth in the financial industry in Afghanistan. Multiple entities provide some form of funding; these include domestic commercial banks, state-owned banks, branches of foreign banks, foreign exchange dealers, licensed money service providers, and microfinance institutions. Despite the growth of various institutions, the recent Kabul Bank scandal and disappointing audit results of Azizi Bank have reduced confidence in the banking system. Afghanistan has not been able to provide consistent and significant capital for business growth. Although the industry specific institutions have provided business loans, the lack of proper internal risk management processes leave the Afghan financial industry vulnerable to operation, market, and country risk. Without adequate long-term capital available, indigenous medium-sized companies struggle to undertake commitments to develop new markets and new trade opportunities.

An additional factor that is crucial to Afghanistan’s continued economic development is progress in infrastructure. In particular, lack of adequate and reliable power remains a major obstacle to doing business. However, the EIU projects that industrial growth may benefit from improved electricity supplies during 2012-13: a power-transmission link to Uzbekistan and increased capacity of Afghanistan’s North East Power System have improved power supplies in Kabul, and planned rehabilitation of dams providing hydropower near Kabul and in Helmand, and gas sector development in Jowzjan province, will further increase domestic power generation capacity by 2015. USAID remains committed to completing strategic power programs across the country and strengthening institutional capacity to operate and maintain power infrastructure on a commercially viable basis. Significant funding will be needed to meet the operations and maintenance (O&M) costs of a wide array of infrastructure built over the last decade, and significant assistance will be needed in helping Afghan institutions create the revenue streams necessary to make O&M sustainable. Regulatory authorities have been established for some sectors, such as power, telecommunications, and, most recently in September, road and civil aviation. Donors such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) plan to continue helping Afghanistan develop and maintain its physical and energy infrastructure in the near term.
Agriculture

Afghanistan has experienced a near-record cereal crop this year as a result of above average amounts of precipitation and higher agricultural yields. Although certified seed distribution was a factor in the higher yields, much of the improvement was due to the increased precipitation over the winter. For the harvest outlook, cereal crop are expected to produce approximately 6.3 million metric tons, which is the second highest yield on record, but still short of the required seven million metric tons required by the general population. However, Afghanistan has been able to significantly reduce its cereal imports from two million metric tons to 400,000 metric tons this year, and its food security is expected to be fairly stable through the winter and into the 2013 harvest season. Afghanistan has also had an increase in livestock birth, greater milk production, enhanced food security, and improved household nutrition. Labor wages were expected to increase from AFN250 per day to AFN500 per day as more farmers planted crops to take advantage of the up-to-140-percent increase in precipitation compared with 2011. The high level of precipitation has also provided enhanced water access well into the summer season.

The U.S. Agricultural Assistance Strategy for Afghanistan has dual goals: build the capacity of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) to deliver services to farmers; and increase agricultural sector jobs and incomes by enhancing agricultural productivity, regenerating agribusiness, rehabilitating watersheds, and improving irrigation infrastructure. USAID and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) work in coordination to implement programs in alignment with these strategic objectives and also to complement INL’s counter-narcotics objectives. These USG sponsored projects and activities are grounded in partnership with the MAIL with an emphasis on self-reliance and building ministry capacity to deliver services to farmers and promote private-sector agribusiness to further strengthen food security and economic growth. All activities are designed to be mutually reinforcing in order to have positive impacts in the targeted geographic regions.

Agribusiness development is a key driver to increasing overall economic growth and per capita GDP of the rural population of Afghanistan. Approximately 80 percent of Afghans’ livelihoods are directly linked to agriculture; this population will benefit from new agribusiness jobs now being created for rural families through donor funded programs.

The USDA is implementing a multi-year capacity building and change management program to strengthen MAIL’s delivery of services to rural citizens. The program has placed approximately 200 advisors throughout the ministry to improve the technical and administrative knowledge of MAIL’s civil servants. The capacity building and change management program has already improved MAIL’s administrative procedures by instituting an electronic time-and-attendance system, which has significantly reduced ghost employees, fraudulent overtime, and payroll expenses. The project has also installed and trained MAIL employees to use two software systems to tighten management controls: one that tracks MAIL’s 9,300 personnel nationwide, and the other to inventory the ministry’s physical property investments.

47 Source: FEWSNET March 2012 Afghanistan Food Security Outlook Update
48 Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock and Agromet project of USGS
Extensive efforts by the USDA continue to support the development of the Afghanistan Agricultural Extension Program, which aims to strengthen MAIL’s ability to deliver more effective extension services to producers and other rural clientele in targeted provinces, including Kabul, Herat, Balkh, and Nangarhar. The project focuses on upgrading the technical skills of the MAIL extension staff (primarily at the provincial and district level). The aim of the project is to demonstrate MAIL’s ability to support farmers and promote water and natural resource management, and thus build public confidence in MAIL’s capacity to provide critical services. USAID’s new Agricultural Research and Extension Development (AGRED) program builds MAIL capacity to develop and deploy new technology and improved agricultural production practices.

The USDA extension project has conducted workshops for women extension personnel, launched on-farm grain storage trials, and conducted training on agro-ecosystem observation and analysis. Upcoming trainings will focus on wheat and vegetable production, marketing, post-harvest storage, farm financial management, and participatory extension approaches. District agricultural extension agents are being trained and employed, but unfortunately the extension agents’ visibility is limited in many communities due to low wages, lack of transportation, and concerns of personal safety. The resulting lack of expertise at the village level has created a communication, capacity building, and knowledge transfer gap between the central government, the sub-national government, and the village farmers.

In concert with USDA’s efforts, MAIL has recently unveiled its Agricultural Extension Model, which outlines a national structure down to the district and community levels. The model suggests ways to achieve building staff capacity, improve lines of communication, enhance gender mainstreaming and improve accountability. However, more work is needed, especially in the areas of delineating division of labor, addressing transportation concerns of extension agents, and building critical linkages between the government and private institutions.

USAID’s agricultural portfolio builds on previous short-term investments that improved farm community infrastructure and supplied agricultural inputs and farm equipment to provincial Directorates of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (DAILs) and communities. The portfolio is now focused on building relationships between farmers, agribusinesses, and MAIL to increase the adoption of new technologies and practices to increase productivity. For instance, the Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives in the North, East and West (IDEA-NEW) program was adjusted in 2012 to move away from short-term activities, such as infrastructure interventions, and focus on high-value crop development. To date, 425,671 participants have benefited from receiving agricultural productivity training. Additionally, the $40.3M Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Project (CHAMP), which invests in Afghanistan’s acclaimed orchard and vine crops, was refocused in 2012 to ensure that post-harvest and farm-to-market activities are the priority through 2014. To date, the project has supported the establishment of more than 211,000 orchards on 3,552 hectares of land and the export of 120 tons of fresh fruit to India, Pakistan, and Canada.

USAID investments are also focused on regional economic zones to maximize geographic impact, such as the Southern Regional Agriculture Development Program (S-RAD), which seeks to increase agricultural production and infrastructure development in Helmand and Kandahar.
while improving access to agribusiness markets through grants and training. This program promotes licit agricultural value chains in an area historically vulnerable to poppy cultivation.

Water is the major limiting factor in Afghan agricultural production. Beginning in the fall of 2012, USAID’s five-year Irrigation and Watershed Management Program (IWMP) will work with MAIL and related ministries to increase sustainable agricultural production through more efficient and sustainable water resource management. Their first task was to develop a vision document for the Irrigation Department, which is the first formal departmental guidance document written since the department’s creation in 2010. The vision document is likely to be the key driver to enable the IWMP to become the flagship program that builds capacity within the Irrigation Department at MAIL.

The long-term success of Afghan agriculture depends on education and capacity building. Agribusiness development, along with privately and publicly funded vocational schools focused on agricultural, agribusiness, and maintenance and operations, are closing the knowledge gap on agricultural advancements resultant from years of extended conflict. The new technical and vocational institutions are teaching modern techniques and technologies in an effort to enhance farmers’ productivity and participation in the value chain. These non-traditional education solutions will provide time for traditional university-based agribusiness programs to educate the younger population, which will enhance capacity and bring Afghanistan up to regionally competitive standards in the future.

Mining

Mining’s contribution has been marginal thus far but has the potential to expand, assuming no significant deterioration in the political or security environment. Extractive industries accounted for $3.33M in tax revenue last year, and in the first quarter this year, a little over $1M has already been collected.

The mining and extractive industries sector experienced a set-back during this reporting period as a result of the stalled 2012 draft minerals law. The proposed law created a more favorable environment for potential private investors and was endorsed by the IC. The current minerals law, enacted in 2009, has been criticized for specific language separating exploration and extraction rights, which can discourage potential investors since there is no guarantee that companies would be granted the extraction rights necessary to recoup initial capital investment required by the costly exploration phase. The Afghan Cabinet did not pass the new draft Minerals Law when it was presented in July raising concerns about international involvement in the sector and advocating stronger government control of mineral and hydrocarbon resources.
The Cabinet referred the law back to the Ministry of Mines for further review and redrafting. The Ministry has reported it plans to resubmit the revised law to the Parliament in the Fall of 2012. Continued delays in approval of the revised draft mining legislation may slow mining-related investor interest, which could further slowdown a potentially significant government revenue stream.

Delays in passing the revised 2012 minerals law have stalled development across the extractive industries sector. Contracts for the Hajigak iron ore deposit were not signed in July 2012, as previously expected. SAIL, a consortium of six Indian companies with rights to three of four tender blocks, and Kilo Gold of Canada, with rights to the remaining block, have delayed signing their respective contracts until a more favorable mining law is passed or the current law is amended to include a linkage between exploration and extraction rights. Several years will be needed to develop the iron ore mines, with production potentially starting in 2017. The exploration phases of these iron ore mines are expected to stimulate active consideration of large-scale infrastructure investments in energy, rail, and road networks. The Hajigak deposit is estimated to be one of the larger deposits in the world, and once the mines have begun production, they are expected to provide the Afghan government with up to $200M in royalty payments per year.

The Afghan hydrocarbon industry has seen greater progress this reporting period due to more favorable legislation for attracting foreign companies and international investors. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was awarded rights to three of the eleven blocks in the Amu Darya oil basin early this year and has already begun oil production, with an estimated 5,000 barrels of crude having been extracted to date. However, the crude being extracted contains extreme high sulphur content, which requires additional refining to counter the corrosive effect the element has on steel pipes and storage vessels. Currently, CNPC is seeking to sell its Amu Darya extraction rights to Tajik or Uzbek investors.

The Afghan-Tajik hydrocarbon basin seismic survey is ongoing, with results expected in early 2013, and the outcome of bid evaluations for the West Garmak Coal site is expected in mid-to-late 2012. Gold and copper mines in Badakhshan, Ghazni, Herat and Sar-e-Pul Provinces were released for tender in December 2011, and are expected to be awarded by December 2012. These are the first tenders of a long list of medium- to large- scale mineral deposits to go to market.

**Trade and Exports**

Increased trade and regional economic integration will be highly important for sustaining Afghanistan’s economic development beyond 2014. Over the last decade Afghanistan has run a persistently large current-account deficit (about 40 percent of GDP) that has been offset by external funding. Higher fuel prices and current weak external demand for Afghanistan’s traditional exports, such as carpets and dried fruit, are adding to the imbalance. However, the EIU estimates that greater transit trade from Central Asian countries and other neighboring countries could provide a boost to the economy in the near to medium term and higher exports of minerals are possible further into the future.
Given the importance of trade to its economy, Afghanistan is seeking accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). With USAID technical assistance and support from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Afghanistan is systematically moving to align its legal and regulatory framework to WTO rules and best practices and responding to WTO member issues. Afghanistan’s legislative action plan includes new or amended legislation to address issues from non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures (SPS). USDA’s animal and plant health capacity-building project is working to strengthen MAIL’s capacity in SPS regulatory policy and methodologies to support trade and mitigate biological risks. The second WTO Working Group meeting was held on June 18 and the third is being planned for late 2012 or early 2013.

Progress on the implementation of regional bilateral trade agreements has been more mixed. Implementation of the Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) continues to move slowly as the two countries negotiate barriers to implementation and struggle against historical distrust. However, some progress has been made on implementation of the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) as member countries agreed to reduce their sensitive products lists. With help from USAID, the Afghan government identified 70 items to remove from its list.

**Information Communication Technology**

The Afghan information and communications technology (ICT) sector has attracted more than $2 billion in investment since 2002 and employs more than 110,000 people, directly or indirectly. There are six licensed mobile network operators (MNOs) and two fixed line service providers (FLSPs) with 18.8 million subscribers (the vast majority of which are mobile), covering 88 percent of the geographic area of Afghanistan and serving 70 percent of its population. Forty-four (44) licensed Internet service providers (ISPs) serve approximately two million customers, mostly via dialup, DSL, and VSAT service.

State-owned Afghan Telecom Corporation, which manages Afghanistan’s fiber infrastructure, decreased the price of wholesale Internet access from $1,500/megabyte/month to $300/MB/month on May 1, 2012, and, for the first time, made a much-needed distinction between wholesale and retail prices, which is expected to stimulate further development of the Afghan Internet sector. The Afghan Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (ATRA) recently awarded two 3G mobile broadband service licenses, and 3G service is available in four cities as of August 2012. ATRA concluded a national tender in July 2012 and is expected to award five spectrum permits for broadband wireless access (BWA) in late August or early September 2012. The advent of 3G and BWA service, along with decreases in the price of wholesale

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49 All statistics are per the Afghan Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT).

50 Dialup is Internet access via a phone line.

51 Digital subscriber line

52 Very small aperture terminal satellite service

53 Third generation, or 3G, mobile broadband service allows people to access the Internet through smart phones and web-enabled devices.

54 To Etisalat in March 2012 and MTN in June 2012, at a price of $25 million each.

55 Kabul, Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Herat.

56 Broadband wireless access provides last-mile broadband connectivity to the Internet for enterprises and institutions.
Internet access, are all part of a concerted strategy by the Afghan Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) to increase the availability and affordability of broadband Internet access.

4.2: Infrastructure

Afghanistan’s economic infrastructure continues to improve as a result of donor-funded development efforts, in roads, rail, power, and civil aviation. Maintaining and sustaining this infrastructure will be a significant challenge for the foreseeable future; however, the World Bank and others are designing projects to strengthen Afghanistan’s operations and maintenance (O&M) capacity.

Roads

After significant expansion of the road network in Afghanistan over the last decade, development has begun to slow given a shift in donor priorities and reductions in development assistance and increased emphasis on sustainability and the ability of the Afghan government to assume operations and maintenance. To date 5,430 km of provincial, regional, and national roads have been completed, while 2,266 km are under construction or partially completed. Many projects, however, are still planned yet unfunded or experiencing significant security delays.

Construction began on the last 233 km of the Ring Road Northwest (Highway 1) in Badghis Province during the reporting period. The road has enormous economic significance as it circumnavigates Afghanistan. Security is provided by the APPF because of the restriction on private security contractors for development projects.

For the East-West corridor (Highway 2), Italy will fund part of the road in Herat Province from Herat City to Chest-e Sharif (155 km), and also from Maiden Shar (Wardak Province) to Bamyan (Bamyan Province). The Asian Development Bank and Japan have nearly completed the road from Bamyan City to Yakawlang in Bamyan Province. The remaining sections of the East-West Corridor have not been funded.

Along the North-South corridor (Highway 3), the road from Mazar-e Sahrif to Pul-e Baraq (76 km) in Balkh Province was completed by the Asian Development Bank and the second section from Pul-e Baraq to Darisuf in Samangan Province is expected to be complete in 2012. The road from Tarin Kot to Chora (40 km) in Uruzgan, sponsored by the Netherlands, was completed by GIZ, the German Agency for International Cooperation. The United Arab Emirates is considering financing the last segment of Route 611 in Helmand Province, estimated at $39M.

During the reporting period, the first phase of emergency repairs were made to the Salang Tunnel under budget and ahead of schedule, and were complete as of October 4. Additional rehabilitation of the Tunnel is planned for spring 2013. Built by the Soviets in 1964, the Salang Tunnel is the major north-south route connecting Kabul and southern Afghanistan and, as such is critical to economic development. It is the only north-south route in operation year round.
Rail

In addition to the road network, Afghanistan’s future rail system will be critical to economic expansion, particularly in the mineral extraction sector. An operations and maintenance contract with Sogdiana Trans (Uzbekistan National Railroad) has been signed, and limited operations began in February 2012 on the newly built, 75-km rail line from Hairatan border crossing to Nabe’bed (outside Mazar-e-Sharif). The Afghanistan parastatal ASTRAS has taken over loading and unloading operations, but without a contract and lacking the capacity to provide a long-term solution, usage will remain limited.

In October 2011, USCENTCOM’s Railway Assistance Team drafted a proposal for a much needed Afghan Railway Authority that would regulate future railway construction and operations, but the proposal was rejected by the Cabinet and never reached Parliament. The USCENTCOM team, in coordination with United States Transportation Command and the Afghan Ministry of Mines, continues to develop an Afghan National Rail Plan that will take into account developments in mineral and hydrocarbon extraction, but this plan has not been finalized.

The most positive rail related news this reporting period was the announcement on September 24 that the Afghan Cabinet approved the long delayed Rail Authority. Its creation helps to advance Afghanistan’s much needed regulatory structure in the transportation sector and fulfills a milestone from the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. The Rail Authority will play a key role in the development of a national rail system by establishing regulations and standards, such as a national gauge, which is crucial for the future of the extractive industry. Funding will, however, remain a challenge.

Power

Increasing power transmission and distribution systems continues to be one of the top priorities for infrastructure development because of the foundational role it plays in fostering economic development and growth. Although there was significant progress during the reporting period towards capacity development and strengthening of energy institutions, a major challenge continues to be effective commercialization and efficiency in the sector.

The major power initiatives in Afghanistan are the North East Power System (NEPS), the Southeast Power System (SEPS), and the transmission lines connecting the two systems. NEPS provides power north of Kabul and is centered on the Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz areas, while SEPS services the areas south of Kabul in Kandahar and Helmand. The NEPS-SEPS Connector transmission lines will connect the North and South with the Gardez region into one unified system.

The Kandahar-Helmand Power Program (KHPP), which will increase power generation and improve distribution in the SEPS, has maintained activity on all project components, which include the rehabilitation of two substations (partially complete), improvements to the Kandahar medium voltage network (early stages), and installation of Turbine Unit 2 at Kajaki Dam (completion of preparatory work and tender of sub-contract). The eight-month closure of the Pakistan GLOCs created a significant backlog of electrical materials required for this project and resulted in delays of some project components of KHPP. Following the reopening of the
Pakistan GLOC in July, all electrical equipment arrived at the project site. The Durai Junction substation, one of the KHPP components, is nearing completion, and the Breshna Kot substation is now progressing following early subcontractor delays. Additionally, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), the national electricity corporation, has executed all urgent transformer installation upgrades in the Kandahar City distribution system, with Black and Veatch Consulting Co. providing planning, procurement, and training support. In July 2012, USACE awarded the contract for replacing and updating the 110 kV line from Kajaki substation to Durai Junction with Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) funding. The 110 kV line from Durai Junction to Kandahar is funded for FY 2012 and contract award is expected in Fall 2012.

Under the Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity (PTEC) Program, Scopes of Work for on-budget contracts and Implementation Letters are being developed to increase the transmission capacity of the NEPS system and construct approximately 500km of transmission line – “the NEPS-SEPS connector” – that will allow cheaper, imported power from the Central Asian Republics to benefit the southern provinces. USAID has received $101M in AIF funding for the first section of the connector from Kabul to Ghazni, and will fund the remaining segments with Economic Support Funds (ESF) funds. Under the PTEC project, USAID will also focus on significant technical and managerial capacity building activities with DABS, and on commercialization of the utility system. The scopes of work for these activities have been in development in recent months and will be awarded on-budget through DABS in late 2012.

The Salma Dam in Herat Province has overcome persistent security and contractual issues and work is proceeding, although the dam, a 42-megawatt (MW) power plant, and transmission line to Herat remain significantly behind schedule. The project is not likely to be completed until 2014.

Civil Aviation

Donor nations continue to support Afghanistan’s civil aviation sector through the Donor Coordination Board. ISAF and international donors provide assistance to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (MoTCA) in building operational capability in all five Phase I airport functions: air traffic control; communication and navigational aid maintenance; safety; weather; and fire, crash, and rescue services for Afghanistan’s four main international airports by December 2014. Training is conducted both internally and externally to Afghanistan.

The transition of airspace management from the Combined Forces Air Component Command to Afghan government control is under discussion. Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum has continued to progress, increasing over-flights by approximately 20 percent. Additionally, a Wide Area Multi-Lateration system has been installed to improve the overall air picture. Both projects increase Afghanistan’s compatibility with neighboring airspace control and thereby increase revenue received from over-flight fees. The main limiting factor that impedes the Afghan government’s ability to effectively assume control, however, is the lack the human capacity necessary to man the various functions required to manage its airspace in accordance with international standards. Those functions are air traffic control; fire crash and rescue; weather; navigation aid maintenance; aviation publications; among others. One complicating factor is the continued requirement for Low Level (FL160 - FL290) airspace for ISAF and coalition flights, which may prevent this lower zone from being transferred until this requirement
is reduced. Another challenge is that much of the revenue generated by the civil aviation, such as overflight fees, are not fed directly back into the sector.

On September 23, the upper and lower house transportation committees of the Afghan Parliament reached a resolution that allowed for passage of the Civil Aviation Law. This legislation allows for the creation of an independent Civil Aviation Authority, which will assume responsibility of civil aviation systems in Afghanistan. Moreover, this marks the completion of another Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework milestone.

Transition plans for Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat have been approved, and the transition plan for Mazar-e Sharif is in draft. The transition plans outline training requirements for Ministry of Transport and Civilian Aviation personnel to independently conduct these functions in line with international standards. During the reporting period, Federal Aviation Administration teams conducted inspections of Kabul, Herat, and Kandahar airfields to establish baseline assessments for refining the plans.

**Operations and Maintenance Capacity**

Despite improvements, the ministries responsible for maintaining critical infrastructure possess limited ability to execute adequately an Operations and Maintenance (O&M) plan on the scale required in Afghanistan. The consensus across the IC and ISAF is that the number of assets requiring O&M support will exceed projected Afghan government and donor resources in future year budgets. Current O&M expenditures are very low compared with actual requirements. It is estimated that the Afghan government currently expends approximately $330M annually on O&M while World Bank recently estimated that spending to sustain “known” capital investments, including security, requires $1.3 billion annually. This is fiscally unaffordable for Afghanistan unless more efforts are undertaken to recover costs for electricity and transportation services.

Future infrastructure sustainment is linked to efforts to improve capacity and capability of the Ministry of Public Works for planning and sustaining roads, bridges and tunnels, and the establishment of an independent Road Authority/Road Fund to implement those plans. For energy, as noted above, PTEC includes significant funding to support DABS by increasing cost recovery through commercialization efforts, and increasing the effectiveness of management and technical offices to manage, operate, and maintain the national energy system. PTEC also includes technical assistance to the Ministry of Energy Water to increase its capacity to plan, regulate, and set policy for the Afghan energy system.

Identifying, budgeting, and financing externally-financed assets are an ever-growing challenge. Over the past year, various U.S. Embassy, IC, ISAF, and Afghan government entities have engaged on an ad hoc basis in an attempt to address the O&M requirements to sustain these assets. Unfortunately, there is an overall lack of concrete data for key stakeholders to enable them to understand the scale of the problem beyond general estimates by various entities, such as the World Bank. Although recent discussions have focused on additional funding requirements that will be needed to support off-budget funded assets as they are transferred to the Afghan government, the fact remains that the current level of O&M funding is inadequate to support even the current assets built on-budget.
Even if a comprehensive asset registry could be obtained and adequate funds were made available for O&M, the Afghan government’s nascent budgetary capacity would still be a significant limitation to successful O&M execution. Currently, the systems and internal controls needed to both determine appropriate O&M spending levels and ensure that the amounts budgeted for O&M are deployed and disbursed for the appropriate activities are uniformly deficient throughout the ministries.

The Afghan government must continue developing internal capacity in order to sustain existing infrastructure. Improvements in capacity will support both the budgeting process for O&M costs and disbursement of the O&M budget throughout the year, thereby increasing the likelihood of sustainability for assets and service delivery.

4.3: Health

Afghanistan has made significant achievements in the health sector over the last nine years, supported by external assistance from the USG, primarily USAID, and other donors. The Ministry of Public Health’s reliance on donor financing for basic public health programs is expected to continue in the medium to long term. The introduction of the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) in 2003 and the Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) in 2005 is widely credited with driving the increase in the number of functioning primary health care facilities from 498 in 2002 to more than 1,970 in 2012.

Afghanistan has approximately 2,000 health facilities nationwide, 200 of which provide maternity and specialty care. Currently, the United States supports approximately 540 health facilities in Afghanistan, including five provincial hospitals, across 13 provinces, covering 40 percent of Afghanistan’s territory and 50 percent of the total population. Additionally, 82 mobile health teams have been launched and more than 12,000 health posts have been stood up, supplementing Afghanistan’s health system in more remote areas. Internet and communications technology are also being used to a limited degree to enable access to health care through electronic health and telemedicine initiatives, including text-message reminders for vaccinations and remote diagnostics.

Improvements in facilities have led to improvements in accessibility. In 2002, only nine percent of the population had access to basic health services within the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) benchmark of two hour walking distance. Today, 68 percent of the population can reach a healthcare facility (either public or private) within one hour by foot or animal. In urban areas, healthcare is much more readily accessible (97 percent); however, access declines for Afghans in rural areas (63 percent) and among nomad populations (46 percent). Overall, 85 percent can reach a healthcare facility (public or private) within one hour by any type of transportation (100 percent urban population, 81 percent rural, and 81 percent nomad).

The impact of the increased availability of basic health services has resulted in a dramatic improvement in health indicators between 2002 and 2010, according to an Afghan Mortality Survey conducted by the MoPH in 2011. The under-five years of age mortality ratio decreased

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57 Statistics calculating time to reach health post does not account for variance in terrain, weather, or security factors.
from 172 to 97 deaths per 1,000 live births and the infant mortality ratio (under one year of age) fell from 257 to 77 per 1,000 live births. Family planning acceptance rose as the modern contraceptive prevalence rate increased from 10 to 16 percent, and total fertility rates declined from 6.3 to 5.1 percent. The maternal mortality ratio declined dramatically from 1,600 to 327 per 100,000 births. Maternal health indications improved as antenatal care coverage increased from 16 to 60 percent, and skilled birth attendance also increased, from 14 to 34 percent. Although these statistics are based on imperfect reporting mechanisms and have yet to fully mature, they nevertheless point to promising trends in the availability and quality of Afghan health care, as well as the quality of life for the Afghan population.

Despite the improvements noted above, significant challenges remain. Although some of Afghanistan’s health indicators (e.g. maternal and infant mortality) are moving toward those of regional neighbors Pakistan and India, progress has been uneven. Performance has been good in urban areas but much worse among nomadic and rural populations and in insecure areas. A lot of work is still necessary within the healthcare sector to continue this positive trend in reducing maternal and childhood mortality. Additionally, efforts to improve the wider determinants of health (nutrition, sanitation, access to clean water and education) remain important.

Afghanistan remains one of only three countries with endemic polio, experiencing a major outbreak of polio in 2011 with 80 confirmed cases, compared to 25 confirmed cases in 2010. Major shortfalls in Afghanistan’s polio eradication program include inadequate management and oversight, inadequate performance by immunization teams, lack of community knowledge, weak routine immunization, and inaccessibility. To address this problem, an Emergency Polio Action Plan was developed by the MoPH in coordination with international partners. Key components of the plan include leadership commitment and ownership at all levels of government, clear lines of accountability, cross-sectoral (and cross-border) engagement, better monitoring mechanisms, and permanent immunization teams in certain high-risk districts.

4.4: Education

Afghanistan’s education system has improved significantly since 2002, supported by external assistance from the USG, primarily USAID, and other donors. Access has increased, resulting in an enrollment gain in primary and secondary schools from fewer than one million students in 2002 to more than eight million in the 2012 school year. During the reporting period, the Ministry of Education (MoE) reported student enrolment at MoE-registered schools at 7.8 million, with 4.83 million males and 2.96 million females in 14,245 schools across the 34 provinces and an attendance rate of 78 percent. Enrollment in tertiary institutions has increased from fewer than 8,000 to more than 77,000. Female enrollment has increased dramatically to 37 percent in basic education and almost 20 percent in tertiary institutions. The total number of teachers has increased from 20,000 to more than 175,000, and more than 60,000 candidates are enrolled in GIRoA teacher training programs.

The education system has also expanded vocational training opportunities for young adults and literacy training to Afghans of all ages. More than 38,190 students are matriculating at 142 GIRoA Technical and Vocational Education and Training schools, an increase of approximately 13,000 students and 45 schools from the prior school year. Technical and vocational training is particularly important since the actual skills demanded by the Afghan economy do not always
correlate with the education provided in schools. Improvements in the educational system have contributed to an increase in literacy. In 2001, the overall literacy rate was estimated at 12 percent. According to the Ministry of Education, the overall literacy rate nationwide is now 26.4 percent (39 percent for men and 12 percent for women); the Ministry’s goal is to increase literacy to 50 percent by 2015.

Despite progress in education, significant challenges remain. A large number of children and youth still have difficulty accessing basic education due to the capacity of education institutions, poverty, and social norms. Inequitable access is particularly significant for girls and vulnerable groups. An estimated seven million eligible primary and secondary school students do not attend school. Additionally, the quality of instruction and facilities remains uneven, and shortages in textbooks and school supplies for multiple content areas persist. The Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) continues to face a shortage of space (e.g., classrooms, labs and dorm facilities), qualified instructors, and student program options as it confronts a youth bulge, with Afghan secondary school graduates expected to increase annually for the next 10 years. Only 27 percent of the 145,000 secondary school graduates who sat for the Konkor college entrance examination were admitted, due to a lack of absorptive capacity in tertiary institutions. By 2024, the Afghan government projects there will be more than one million high school graduates seeking admission to universities that are currently unable to meet demand. In an effort to confront these challenges, USAID has implemented a number of programs. Their basic education strategy focuses on increasing access to schooling, primarily through support for community based education, and on improving the quality of education, primarily by providing teacher education and professional development. In higher education, USAID is supporting programs to increase the number of university faculty who hold graduate degrees and to provide support for essential equipment for instruction and research.

Although attacks on schools, teachers and students have declined, the provision of education continues to face security problems in parts of Afghanistan. The United Nations Security Council’s report *Children and Armed Conflict 2012* documented 185 incidents of attacks in 2011-12, including 35 incidents of school burning, 34 incidents of intimidation of educational personnel, and 32 closures of schools by force. In the same period, 32 education personnel were killed or abducted. The Taliban’s closure of girls schools in Andar District, Ghazni Province, this spring sparked a popular uprising against the Taliban.

### 4.5: Women’s Issues

Overall, circumstances for Afghan women and girls have improved significantly since 2001; however, gains remain tenuous. One segment in which women have made notable gains is the political arena. Women hold 27 percent of the seats in the National Assembly and 25 percent of the seats in the Provincial Councils-seats that are reserved for women by law. In the 2010 Wolesi Jirga election, 406 of 2,556 candidates were women, a 24 percent increase from the 2005 election. There is a female governor and mayor and three women are serving as cabinet ministers. Increased participation was met by increased electoral success: there were two female winners in Nimroz Province who won both provincial seats; 69 women filled elected seats, one seat above the reserved number of 68; and 11 women had enough votes to enter the Parliament independent of the reserved seats. Women have also increased their presence and visibility through the National Solidarity Program and constitute 24 percent of participants in the local
Community Development Councils. Altogether women make up 19 percent of the GIRoA workforce, and the government continues to make progress toward their goal of 30 percent female staff.

The Afghan government affirmed at the Tokyo Conference that the human rights of its citizens, in particular the equality of men and women, are guaranteed under the Afghan Constitution and in international human rights obligations. Key USAID engagements to promote these rights include a sizeable investment and support for a range of gender-based programming, in all sectors, including: women’s political and civic participation through the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC), the Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Program (APAP), and Support for Increased Electoral Participation in Afghanistan (CEPPS); support for women to participate in urban development and access basic municipal services via the Regional Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations (RAMP-UP); support to civil society via the Initiative to Promote Afghan Civil Society (I-PACS); the upcoming capacity building assistance for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, known as the Ministry of Women’s Affairs Organizational Restructuring and Empowerment (MORE) program; the upcoming Providing Opportunities for Women’s Empowerment through Enabling Resources (POWER) program; the U.S. Embassy Kabul Public Affairs grants; and USAID’s planned flagship program, Women in Transition (WIT), which will focus on increasing women’s access to leadership positions in social, economic and political sectors. In addition, per USG guidelines, gender analysis and gender impact assessments have been undertaken in USAID development assistance programming elements. These programs, taken in their entirety, are designed to impact the national and subnational levels and generate a momentum for a gendered approach to governance and development policy and programming in Afghanistan.

Ensuring women’s civic and political participation, as well as enhancing women’s status and equality, is dependent on an effective rule of law where women can rely on both the informal and the formal sectors to provide security and access to justice. Achieving greater equality within Afghanistan relies on inclusion of Afghan women in every phase of the justice system, as police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges, civil and family law attorneys, as litigants and as Islamic law scholars. To this end, rule of law programs that address commonalities between Afghan Constitutional Law and Sharia Law should be created or expanded, preferably utilizing Provincial University Law Faculties. Programs should include but are not limited to district and village outreach to local Mullahs by teams of University trained civil and Sharia jurists.

Although the Department of State and USAID administer the majority of women’s initiatives, the Department of Defense also oversees several programs focusing on women. These programs include assistance to the Department of Women’s Affairs in Kandahar and the District Development Assembly for Women’s Affairs in Parwan District. Additionally, coalition military units continue to incorporate Female Engagement Teams (s) composed multi-national female service members and civilians that accompany general purpose forces on patrol in order to engage local Afghan women, children, and communities in open communication, thus facilitating civil-military interactions and building trust, cooperation, and security. Similarly, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) employs U.S. Cultural Support Teams (CSTs) that provide an enduring female engagement capability in support of special operations and Village Stability Operations (VSO)/Afghan Local Police (ALP) expansion.
The development of a sustainable, organic female engagement capability is ongoing to include employing Afghan female security forces in support of Afghan police, military, and special operations units. Notably in 2012, the Ktah Khas Afghan (Afghan Special Unit) completed its second iteration of the Family Support Platoon (FSP) Basic Course and graduated two additional Afghan females to join the ranks of the Family Support Platoon (FSP) in support of their Strike Forces. This brings the FSP manning to 11 out of 26 slots. A concept based on the successes of the U.S. CST program, FSPs were developed to accompany Ktah Khas Afghan Strike Forces on missions and, working in conjunction with their CST counterparts, safeguard and interact with the women and children encountered during the conduct of special operations.

The two senior gender integration mentors to NTM-A from the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program continue to mentor the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior on gender integration and human rights. The mentors provide oversight for the development of long-range strategic plans to improve gender integration, human rights/dignity, and equality-related matters within the ANSF. However, recruitment of women for ANA, AAF, and ANP training has continued to fall well short of MoD and MoI female recruitment goals.

Despite advances over the last decade, women continue to be vulnerable and marginalized economically and socially. Violence against women and girls remains prevalent, and the troubles of poverty, illiteracy, and poor health care continue to affect women disproportionately. Ensuring the mainstreaming of women in the economic, political and social life will require a long-term sustained effort in all sectors.
SECTION 5 – REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

PAKISTAN

Pakistan’s centrality to US interests is evidenced by its status as a nuclear power, its shared border with Afghanistan and India, its integral role in the fight against al Qaeda, and its potential role in promoting stability in Afghanistan. The United States continues to seek a relationship with Pakistan that is constructive and, that advances both U.S. and Pakistani interests.

Pakistan has contributed to U.S. interests while simultaneously falling short in other areas. Pakistan has publicly declared its support for an Afghan-led reconciliation process and continues to cooperate on some counterterrorism activities, bolstering U.S. efforts to disrupt and defeat al Qaeda. Pakistani military (PAKMIL) operations against Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) and other militant groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa since 2009 have significantly disrupted insurgent groups in Pakistan – while also resulting in significant PAKMIL casualties.

However, Pakistan’s continued acceptance of sanctuaries for Afghan-focused insurgents and failure to interdict IED materials and components continue to undermine the security of Afghanistan and pose an enduring threat to U.S., Coalition, and Afghan forces.

Although still strained, U.S. relations with Pakistan are improving following the reopening of ISAF Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs) into Afghanistan on July 4, 2012. Pakistan closed the GLOCs after a November 26, 2011 cross-border incident that resulted in the death of 24 Pakistani soldiers. The incident prompted Pakistan’s parliament to review Pakistan’s bilateral relationship with the United States. The Pakistani Parliament issued its findings in April 2012 recommending the government seek written agreements to define bilateral cooperation in key areas and making national sovereignty a key redline. On July 3, Pakistan agreed to reopen the GLOCs, signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States establishing principles and procedures for governing the transit of U.S. cargo through Afghanistan later in the month. No new fees were applied to Coalition cargo.

Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan remain strained but have improved in some areas. Recent meetings between senior Pakistani and Afghan officials have increased bilateral cooperation, particularly on efforts to achieve a political settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan. Pakistani Prime Minister Ashraf and President Karzai agreed to restart peace talks during Ashraf’s visit to Kabul in mid-July.

Tensions resulting from continued cross-border fires from Pakistan into Afghanistan continue to undermine relations between the two countries and prompted the Afghan Parliament’s call for the resignation of the Afghan Defense and Interior ministers. Pakistan has stated that cross-border fires are in response to TTP militant attacks on its forces and have accused ISAF and Afghanistan of permitting a safe haven inside Afghanistan for TTP militants. ISAF, the ANSF, and PAKMIL often fire across the border, usually in response to militant engagement. Cross-border fire in response to military engagement are typically coordinated through the Border Coordination Centers. Thus far in 2012, ANSF or Coalition forces returned fire into Pakistan on 200 different occasions. In total, there have been over 300 cross border fires incidents during the
calendar year. Of note, from April to September 2012, Afghanistan claimed 126 cross border incidents originating from Pakistan territory with rounds impacting in Afghanistan territory in the border areas of Nuristan province (10 incidents), Kunar province (109 incidents) and Nangarhar province (7 incidents). The ANSF claimed that since April 2012, 2176 artillery rounds and 1,798 mortar rounds have been fired into Kunar alone, although ISAF believes the actual numbers to be significantly less.

Trilateral military cooperation has steadily increased and improved during the reporting period and several military border working groups have been established to increase cross-border cooperation. During the past several months, Border Flag Meetings (BFMs) have been held between the PAKMIL, ISAF, and the ANSF to discuss border issues ranging from disputed border posts to discussion of cross border fires. On June 15, a trilateral military dialogue was initiated at the 3-star level primarily to coordinate complementary operations along the border – three such meetings have occurred during the reporting. From mid-August to late September, ISAF, the ANSF, and PAKMIL conducted complementary operations (Operation HUSKY) in the border areas of Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktiya, Khost, and Paktika in Afghanistan, and in Chitral, Bajaur Agency, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurrum, North Waziristan and South Waziristan in Pakistan. Notably, this operation involved ANA, ABP, and AUP units, in addition to ISAF and Pakistani forces.

ISAF, ANSF, and PAKMIL leaders continue to negotiate standard operating procedures (SOPs) for cross-border incidents to reduce the possibility of cross-border incidents such as the one that occurred on November 26. Two SOPs have already been concluded. These SOPs are intended to establish a uniform set of protocols to enhance coordination and communication, minimize cross-border incidents, and prevent or mitigate fratricide.

INDIA

India continues to reinforce its relationship with Afghanistan, building on its October 2011 Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan and subsequent agreements addressing cooperation in the governance, economics, education, commerce, public administration, and security/law enforcement sectors. Assistance from India had previously focused on major infrastructure projects such as electricity generation and transmission and road construction, as well as small-scale development projects along. However, India may choose to broaden its reach into the investment as well as the development sector by bidding on future tenders for mineral extraction in Afghanistan. India is also a participant in the regional Istanbul process.

The Indian government expanded its efforts to promote investment ties, hosting in June 2012 an international conference in Delhi on investment opportunities in Afghanistan that drew the participation of Afghan ministers and outside representatives from key business sectors.

India supports a variety of high-visibility projects and initiatives. India and Afghanistan plan to fund and construct a new Afghan Parliament building. Indian financing also continues to support the construction of the Salma hydroelectric dam in Herat Province. Construction at Salma remains behind schedule, however; the current tentative completion date is late 2012. India also continues to support the development of Afghan human capital through scholarship programs at Indian universities (more than 1,000 scholarships per year), agricultural training
programs, and other vocational training activities. Public opinion surveys consistently indicate that Afghans have a favorable view of Indian involvement in their country.

Indian Security assistance to Afghanistan has been limited and conducted in India rather than Afghanistan. India currently provides scholarships for ANSF personnel to study in India, and the Indian government also is exploring options to train female Afghan police in India.

India remains involved in regional discussions regarding Afghanistan, and participated in September 2012 in a formal U.S.-India-Afghanistan trilateral consultation on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly session.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

The Central Asian States and Russia host the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which provides multiple ground and air transportation routes into and out of Afghanistan for commercial carriers and U.S. military aircraft. Prior to the November 2011 closure of the GLOCs to ISAF cargo, the air and ground routes of the NDN already functioned as sustainment routes into Afghanistan. Maintaining the NDN LOCs remains critical to ongoing operations in Afghanistan. In the past year, the NDN has diversified, with new over-flight permissions and expanded ground transit agreements encompassing “reverse” transit and transport of wheeled armored vehicles.

Beyond the NDN, the Central Asian States have participated in infrastructure and economic development projects in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan completed a 75-km railway line from Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2010; limited railway operations have begun, and may reach full capability later this year. Ideally, as Afghan infrastructure continues to develop, expanded road, rail, and air networks will facilitate increased commercial activity between Afghanistan and its northern neighbors.

The Kyrgyz Republic hosts the Transit Center at Manas International Airport (TCM), a critical transit point for Coalition force movement to and from Afghanistan. The TCM use agreement will expire in July 2014. Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev, who was elected in October 2011 in Kyrgyzstan’s first ever democratic transition of power, announced following his election that his country would honor the agreement for TCM through July 2014, but would not extend the agreement beyond its terms, instead favoring the development of a commercial transit-hub at Manas. The United States and the Kyrgyz Republic will continue to discuss the future of Manas.

Central Asian States’ concerns in Afghanistan include the spread of violent extremism in the region and threats stemming from narcotics trafficking and related criminal activities. According to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Tajikistan remains the primary route for Afghan-produced narcotics to Russian markets, with conduits through other Central Asian States. Border security remains a top concern for the Central Asian States, which are closely attuned to the implications of events in Afghanistan and developments in narcotics trafficking for their own countries. All of the Central Asian states are included in the Istanbul process.

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58 Central Asian states are Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan
IRAN

Iranian determination to have a strong, long-term role in Afghanistan is in accord with its aspirations of regional hegemony. Iran continues to call for the permanent withdrawal of all Western forces from the region. Iran’s attempts to influence events in Afghanistan includes overt support for the Afghan government; economic and cultural outreach to the Afghan population, particularly to the Shi’a minority populations; and covert activities, including extensive attempts at bribery and even provision of weapons and training for various insurgent and political opposition groups, including elements of the Taliban. Since 2007, Coalition and Afghan forces have interdicted several shipments of Iranian weapons. Tehran’s relationship with the insurgency, although not ideologically based, is consistent with Iran’s short- to mid-term goal of undermining Coalition efforts and opposing the international military presence in Afghanistan.

Iran seeks to maintain positive political relations within the highest levels of the Afghan government. In addition to maintaining a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, Tehran often uses high-level visits and key leadership engagements to criticize the presence of international forces in Afghanistan and to call for the withdrawal of ISAF. Various Afghan officials continue to solicit further Iranian support, despite evidence of Tehran’s covert support to insurgents.

Since 2001, Iran has pledged more than $1 billion in aid to Afghanistan and given more than $500 million. Iran’s reconstruction and development efforts have been largely concentrated in western Afghanistan, primarily in Herat Province. Iran’s intent is to increase its influence among the local population in order to foster pro-Iranian sentiment. Iran wants to expand its sphere of influence beyond border regions into other parts of Afghanistan, particularly Kabul. Iran currently maintains consulates in Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif, and is considering opening additional consulates in Bamiyan and Nimroz Provinces. Iran also participates in the regional Istanbul process.

Beyond economic and security issues, the protracted Afghan refugee situation continues to be a contentious issue between Iran and Afghanistan. Approximately one million registered Afghan refugees and about an estimated 1.4 million undocumented Afghan economic migrants (non-refugees) currently reside in Iran. Economic pressures and the Iranian government’s discontinuation of subsidies on basic goods and services has led to a rise in the repatriation of Afghan refugees since 2011, but during this reporting period, Iran has not forcibly expelled or returned registered refugees. The deportation of undocumented Afghans continues, though at a reduced pace compared to previous years.

CHINA

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has two primary interests in Afghanistan: security and trade. China continues to seek improved relations with, and stability for, Afghanistan, while it devotes diplomatic efforts to develop economic relationship. Beijing has given no indication of plans to commit security personnel to Afghanistan. However, the PRC has offered to train and equip Afghan police.

Since 2002, China has committed more than $180M in aid to the Afghan government, and in 2009, China announced it would provide an additional $75M over the next five years. PRC companies will likely continue to invest in Afghanistan, most notably in the development of
Afghanistan’s mines and infrastructure. Chinese companies are also developing a section of the Amu Darya oilfield. Beijing is currently conducting a feasibility study for a rail system to support extraction efforts at the Aynak copper mine. However, China continues to have concerns regarding Afghan security, including issues such as external support to Uighur separatists, the safety of PRC workers in Afghanistan, and narcotics trafficking into western China. Safety concerns in particular may inhibit progress on projects such as the Aynak copper mine while impeding other investments. China and Afghanistan exchange regular high-level political visits and seek to engage in bilateral efforts on counterterrorism and counternarcotics issues. Beijing has also voiced its support for reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

Although China maintains a strict policy of non-involvement with ISAF security operations, it has provided ANSF personnel a variety of non-lethal, China-based training to bolster Afghanistan’s security and stability. Training for the ANP conducted at People’s Armed Police municipal training facilities has covered policing skills, crowd and riot control, criminal investigations, and internal security duties. China has also offered basic, advanced, and senior military courses for ANSF officers at Peoples’ Liberation Army military training colleges and universities.

Beijing has continued to support regional diplomacy, most notably by involving President Karzai in regional economic summits. Following years of informal involvement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Afghanistan was awarded observer status at the SCO during this reporting period. China is also an active participant in the ongoing Istanbul process and Chinese representatives attended the ministerial conference in Kabul in June 2012.

RUSSIA

Russia has voiced its support for a stable Afghanistan to minimize the threat of terrorism and stem the flow of narcotics into Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus. Russia has also supported Afghan-led reconciliation and reintegration efforts. Based on a commitment made at the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, Russia continues to expand the types of cargo shipped by rail via the NDN and recently finalized an agreement with NATO on the reverse transit of goods back through the NDN. Under a separate bilateral agreement with the United States, Russia also permits the air transit of cargo and military personnel.

Russia recognizes terrorism as being closely intertwined with narcotics trafficking. Hence, Russia’s interest in expanding counternarcotics cooperation has continued with its participation in multilateral meetings, UNODC programs, and calls for greater international support to counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The NATO-Russia Council plans to expand its Central Asian counternarcotics program, which trains counternarcotics personnel from Central Asia, Afghanistan, and now Pakistan, in Russia, Turkey, and via mobile training teams.

Russia participates in the Istanbul process to promote regional support for Afghanistan. Russia supported Afghanistan’s bid for observer status within the SCO and has welcomed that designation. This has highlighted the role that Russia has placed on regional cooperation mechanisms for economic, development, and security in Afghanistan as ISAF draws down.
The members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) continue to provide support to Operation Enduring Freedom and have worked to provide financial support in the interest of a stable Afghanistan. Private Gulf citizens, however, are also a source of considerable funding for the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and other terrorist groups that operate in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Some GCC states provide the United States key basing facilities and access in support of the mission. Many of the GCC countries provide important air bases and over-flight and transit rights for operations in Afghanistan and logistical support of these operations. GCC countries host USCENTCOM’s forward headquarters, the Combined Air Operations Center, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Headquarters, and U.S. Army Central Command Headquarters (Third Army). GCC countries host key air and naval facilities and provide staging capability for combat, ISR, and logistics operations in support of U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan. On the ground, the UAE has contributed combat forces, with about 250 Emiratis serving alongside Coalition Forces, and Bahrain has deployed a small contingent, primarily tasked with guarding Camp Leatherneck.

GCC nations have supported humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, including the establishment of refugee camps in Pakistan, financial assistance, and aid for Afghan refugees. GCC countries are likely to continue support to Afghanistan after U.S. and Coalition combat operations end.

Gulf countries and their ongoing large-scale construction projects at home provide opportunities for migrant labor. Afghan participation in this labor force has been large and could continue to be a major source of remittances, further contributing to the economic development of Afghanistan. A number of wealthy Afghan expatriates choose to live in the GCC states, deepening the economic, political, and familial ties between the countries.

**JORDAN**

A leader in the Arab world, Jordan continues to be a key supporter of the Operation Enduring Freedom mission. To this end, Jordan contributes forces to train the ANSF and provides specialized capabilities such as SOF, medical, and religious and female engagement. Jordan provides more than half of the advisors to the female training battalion at the Kabul Military Training Center and maintains female engagement and cultural advisory teams. In September Jordan deployed a Jordanian Engagement Team to conduct training for ANA Corps leaders, religious and cultural affairs officers, ANA soldiers, and local religious leaders to counter the insurgency’s narrative.

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59 GCC members are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
ANNEX A: SECURITY METRICS

A.1: MONTHLY SECURITY INCIDENTS

The figure below depicts a one percent increase in total security incidents from the corresponding reporting period one year ago. Each of the first three months of this reporting period had more security incidents than the same three months one year ago. This rise is considered the result of an earlier start of the fighting season as well as a shortened poppy harvest.

Figure 1: Monthly Nationwide Security Incidents (April 2009 – September 2012)

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60 Security incidents include direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, and IED events. IED events include IED explosions, IEDs found and cleared, mine explosions, and mines found and cleared.
A.2: ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS

Nationally, EIAs during the reporting period were up one percent from the same period one year ago. Two of six months saw lower EIAs than the same period the prior year.

Figure 2: Monthly Nationwide Enemy-Initiated Attacks (April 2009 – September 2012)

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61 Enemy-initiated attacks comprise enemy action (enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire) and explosive hazard events, including executed attacks only (IED/mine explosions); potential or attempted attacks (i.e., IEDs/mines found and cleared, prematurely detonated IEDs, and IEDs turned in) are not included.
A.3: **ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS, NATIONWIDE YEAR-OVER-YEAR CHANGE**

The figure below depicts a one percent increase in EIAs from the corresponding period one year ago. Each of the first three months of this reporting period had more security incidents than the same three months a year ago. This rise is considered the result of an earlier start of the fighting season as well as a shortened poppy harvest.

**Figure 3:** Nationwide Year-Over-Year (YoY) Change for Monthly Enemy-Initiated Attacks (April 2009 – September 2012)
A.4: ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS BY REGIONAL COMMAND

RC-CAPITAL

The contribution of RC-C to all EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012 is statistically insignificant. The change in EIAs in RC-C over this period was therefore statistically insignificant, based on a decrease of 34 attacks over the corresponding period one year ago.

Figure 4: Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-Capital (April 2009 - September 2012)
RC-West

RC-W accounted for five percent of all EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012, an increase of one percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago. From April 2012 through September 2012, EIAs in RC-W increased 44 percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.

Figure 5: Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-West (April 2009 - September 2012)
RC-EAST

RC-E contributed 41 percent of all EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012, a decrease of one percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago. From April 2012 through September 2012, EIAs in RC-E were down one percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.

Figure 6: Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-East (April 2009 - September 2012)
**RC-North**

RC-N accounted for four percent of all EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012 an increase of one percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago. From April 2012 through September 2012, EIAs in RC-N increased by 28 percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.

**Figure 7: Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-North (April 2009 - September 2012)**
**RC-SOUTHWEST**

RC-SW contributed 30 percent of all EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012, the same percentage compared to the corresponding period one year ago. From April 2012 through September 2012, EIAs in RC-SW increased by two percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.

**Figure 8: Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-Southwest (April 2009 – September 2012)**
RC-SOUTH

RC-S contributed 21 percent of all EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012, a decrease of one percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago. From April 2012 through September 2012, EIAs in RC-S decreased four percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.

Figure 9: Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-South (April 2009 - September 2012)
A.5: IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE ACTIVITY

This reporting period saw a 12 percent year-over-year decrease in IED and mine explosions, while total IED and mine activity (which includes executed and potential IED attacks) decreased three percent. Potential IED attacks include those that were found and cleared, premature IED detonations, and those turned in to the coalition by local nationals. IED turn-ins more than doubled during this period compared to one year ago.

**Figure 10: Monthly IED and Mine Explosions (April 2009 – September 2012)**
A.6: CACHES FOUND

This reporting period saw a decrease in total caches found from one year ago and from the previous reporting period’s total.

Figure 11: Caches Found (April 2009 – September 2012)
A.7: POPULATION SECURITY IN KANDAHAR AREA

Figure 12: Kandahar EIA Location Changes, YoY Change, June – September, 2011 vs 2012
A.8: POPULATION SECURITY IN NORTHERN HELMAND RIVER VALLEY

Figure 13: Northern Helmand River Valley Area EIA Location Changes, YoY Change, June – September, 2011 vs 2012
A.9: MOVEMENT OF ENEMY ACTIVITY AWAY FROM POPULATION CENTERS

Enemy attacks are shifting to less populated areas. As seen in the graphic below, attacks have increased in remote areas with 500 or less people (BLUE) while enemy activity in more densely populated areas is on the decline (RED).

Count of EIAs by number of people living within 1 KM.

Population Data from LandScan, 2010.
SIGACTs Data: AMN CIDNE, 08 Nov 2012.
A.10: ANSF RATING DEFINITION LEVELS

These ANSF Commanders Unit Assessment RDL ratings reflect an ANSF unit’s overall operational effectiveness; however, the overall rating is derived from a more detailed assessment of each unit. The overall score is based on nine capabilities-based functional areas: leadership, operations, intelligence, logistics, equipping, personnel, maintenance, communications, and training and education. Each of these nine functional areas receives its own RDL which is based on a combination of a qualitative expert military assessment supported by quantitative data across three areas: manning, equipping, and training.

**Figure 14: Rating Definition Levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent with Advisors</td>
<td>The unit is able to plan and execute its missions and maintain command and control of subordinate elements, calling on and coordinating a QRF and, when necessary, other units. It is capable of conducting intelligence and operating in its assigned area of operations. The unit is capable of conducting joint and combined operations with other ANSF units and headquarters.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effective with Advisors</td>
<td>Effective planning, synchronizing, directing, and reporting of operations and status. Coordinating and communicating with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined joint units. Maintains effective readiness reports. Leaders, staff, and unit adhere to the ANSF Code of Conduct, and are loyal to GOROA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective with Partners</td>
<td>Requires unit presence and assistance for planning, synchronizing, directing, and reporting of operations and status, coordinating and communicating with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined joint units, and maintaining effective readiness reports. Leaders, staff, and unit adhere to the ANSF Code of Conduct, and are loyal to GOROA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing with Partners</td>
<td>Requires unit presence and assistance for planning, synchronizing, directing, and reporting of operations and status, coordinating and communicating with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined joint units, and maintaining effective readiness reports. Leaders, staff, and unit adhere to the ANSF Code of Conduct, and are loyal to GOROA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established</td>
<td>This unit is a fully capable unit. It is capable of planning, synchronizing, directing, and reporting operations and status, even with the presence and assistance of a partner unit. It is capable of conducting operations in its assigned area of operations. It adheres to the ANSF Code of Conduct, and is loyal to GOROA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Assessed</td>
<td>Areas where insufficient data available for complete assessment.</td>
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