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EDITOR´S POLICY ANALYSIS: COUNTERING IRAN

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The victims of the latest Israel-Gaza flare-up have, by now, been buried, the wounded treated and the damage taken stock of. The consequences of the conflict are being dealt with. It is time to address the causes. There is a bigger picture, Gaza, like so many others, was an outcome of an irresponsible Iran.

The Islamic Republic is destabilising the Middle East. Gaza, Syria, an insurgency in Bahrain, war of attrition in Yemen, dysfunction in Sudan, Lebanon and Iraq, all reek of Iranian interference. Certainly, Iran is not the only destabilising (f)actor; the region is replete with competing groups, states, and contrasting ideological movements. But it is the largest, and owing to its pseudo-colonial 'Twelver' ideology, its nuclear ambitions, irresponsible threats and its use of force – internally and externally – it must be seen as a regional, if not international, threat.

Few however, seem willing to expose Iran as the culprit of recent turbulence; it is treated as a public secret. So enraptured is the international community with the rhetorical games Iran plays with Israel and its nuclearisation that its more clandestine and destructive policies slip beneath the radar.

Take Sudan, Iran's arms trafficking hub: weapons enter Port Sudan and slither their way north through Egypt to Gaza, West to the Maghreb, or remain in Sudan. Iran is also engaged in Shia missionary activities to convert – for money – the local population, while cosying-up to Omar al Bashir, the architect of the Darfur genocide. And of Syria, Iran's deployment of Hezbollah fighters, al Quds advisors and untold amounts of money and weapons to ensure that Assad's fall from power is long and bloody. On Bahrain too; many sit silently as Iran consolidates its power on the Island, as it trains Hezbollah and the so-called Sacred Defence the tactics of asymmetrical warfare; the dark arts of killing civilians by bomb in a clear escalation.

Why are Iranian fingers spoiling so many pies? Its superiority complex, coupled with its colonial ideology, drive it to attempt to

rise as a regional superpower. Yet, despite its power quest, Iran is not revisionist; it defends an untenable status quo. It does not want regional change, it is afraid of it. It anticipates that change will – if unchecked – knock on its own door.

If Israel and Hamas sue for peace, if the Assad regime is toppled and Lebanon maintains its stability, if Bahrain's reforms end recent conflagrations, Iranian regional power will be sapped and its ability of deflecting public opinion from its mounting domestic problems will be tempered. Iranians are weary of having to endure yet another year of economic hardships, of a valueless currency, of enormous taxation on petrol, of a lack of political liberty. So, Ahmadinejad, the Ayatollahs, Basij militia, al Quds, Revolutionary Guards are clutching at straws. They want to keep the region festering so they can stay politically aloft. They need to keep the region aggressive so they can imprison their critics at home.

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Over the past months, there were indications that Hamas and Israel were approaching a permanent truce. Gershon Baskin, a key negotiator in the prisoner swap that freed Shalit, had – reportedly – been given a completed draft agreement just hours before the latest conflict erupted. Why then did battle ensue?

Hamas' 2011/2012 evacuation from Damascus – citing the regime's murder of civilians – and Iran's unabashed reinforcement of Assad, exposed an ideological tension, resulting in the former's severing of its $20 million a month support to Hamas.

Hamas responded by dissolving three paramilitary units, which were directed by Tehran and established a new, more unified command, the al Aqsa Protectors, based out of Gaza's Interior Ministry.

Iran was not about to lose its Israel pressure point and instead of taking that $20 million-per-month and reinvesting it in its own national economy, it decided to divert its funding to the enemies of Hamas and Israel, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).

It is they who launched an attack against an Israeli armoured personnel carrier, wounding four, which initiated this latest episode of violence. PIJ fired the first dozen rockets into Israel and Israel escalated. Unwilling to distinguish between groups Israel punished Hamas, assassinated Akhmed al Jabari, Chief of Gaza's Security Wing of Hamas, and hit some 25 targets of opportunity. The war

was on. PIJ slipped into the background while Israel and Hamas fought.

Such nuances are lost in the press. Spectators saw Iranian rockets soaring to Israeli targets and assumed a continued Iran-Hamas relationship. Sure, Hamas deployed Iranian built Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets. But, that was what was available; they were delivered before the Hamas-Iran split. The idea that the origin of weapons used indicates political affiliation is simply misleading. Consider that the second most prevalent rockets – and the ones which caused the most damage to Israel – were Russian made Grads. If the weapons origins argument were accurate then Russia was also supportive of the Hamas campaign. It, of course, wasn't.

No, the rockets that Hamas held in its stocks came from 2009/2010, and although Israel's interdiction of the M/V Francop, which contained an Iranian consignment of some 11,000 rockets and mortars was a major blow to the Islamic Republic's arms trafficking, it was reported that two similar-sized vessels successfully landed in Port Sudan in December that same year and four others during 2010.

In the heat of the Hamas-Israel conflict (21 November), French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius noted that 'Iran bears a heavy responsibility for the unrest in Gaza ... since there are long-range weapons ... and these are Iranian weapons.' What Fabius failed to point out however, is that it is not the weapons that hoist the burden of responsibility onto Iran's shoulders, it is the Islamic Republic's obvious abuse of Palestine and its sacrifice of Palestinian lives for selfish political goals.

But the Gaza violence was a side show, a sheath to conceal a more pressing issue. Syria.

More than 40,000 casualties and no end in sight. Syria's civil war has been prolonged by enormous financial, military and political support from Iran and its Hezbollah proxies. The al Quds Force has assumed control of Syria's security apparatuses and Hezbollah is waging a counter-guerrilla war because Iran cannot allow the Assad's regime to collapse; it has invested too many political energies. The victory of the opposition will undermine Iran's geopolitical position, fracture its lines of communication with Hezbollah, reduce its ability to pressure Israel, lose a vital link in its 'Shia Crescent' – Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon – diminish its ability to out-flank its true

targets: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman, and deny it projection into the Mediterranean.

This is why Iran is hedging its bets and mounting pressure onto Bahrain, territorially and population-wise, the smallest and most vulnerable Arabian Gulf state. Not only is Bahrain's opposition on Iran's payroll, but its leaders Salman and al Hashimi take their orders from the Grand Ayatollah; orders that concern when and where to 'demonstrate,' the level of sociopathic behaviour such 'demonstrators' should practise – tame or riotous – and, importantly, when to escalate to clandestine paramilitary operations such as the multiple-bomb attacks in early November.

Iran is also calling-up its old partners for producing Bahraini instability, the Military Wing of Hezbollah Bahrain (MWHB) and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB), and is supporting the rise of new, more entrepreneurial saboteurs such as Sacred Defence, in conducting bomb, arson and small arms attacks against civilians, police and civil authorities

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Iran is responsible for an assortment of regional convulsions. Just how many people have to die to satisfy its superpower lusts, is uncertain. What is certain is that far too much blood has already been spilt and it is time to confront the Islamic Republic before its influence is too great; reinforced by nuclear weapons. If the road to peace in Jerusalem, Damascus and Manama runs through Tehran, it cannot be the road less travelled.

In Washington, Obama's re-election campaign froze the administration's foreign affairs while the clouds of regional conflict gathered. Now, the US is rapidly losing its regional credibility and has yet to develop a strategic awareness to, finally, constrain Iran.

Here is a 5-point proposal for doing just that:

First, empower Turkey. This means cutting the red tape and bolstering Turkey's land, sea and air defences. If NATO drags its feet, go around it. Turkey needs to be ready to balance against Iran.

Second, using an empowered Turkey, fully arm Syrian rebels and facilitate the liberation of Syria, even if this entails a Turkish invasion of northern parts of the country and a likely set of skirmishes with Iranian forces.

Third, comprehensively act to politically, economically and militarily isolate Hezbollah, not only Hezbollah in Lebanon, the entire

organisation. They are a proxy of Iran and follow Iranian doctrines. They have been deployed to suppress Iranian dissidents in 2009, organised violence in Bahrain and are a vital element in Assad's arsenal.

Fourth, fully engage and empower Hamas at the expense of PlJ though work to establish a functioning national dialogue between the PLO and Hamas. Hamas needs to be removed from terror lists and channels of communication with it established. This should also involve forcing Israel, Hamas and the PLO to sit down and negotiate a final settlement. There are bigger issues at stake; Israel and Palestine need to be made aware of them.

Finally, Bahrain must be protected from Iran. For too long Bahrain's allies were content on allowing the small Kingdom to bear the brunt of Iranian aggression. Now however, the stakes are too great and the pressure too pronounced for the US to sit on the sidelines of Arabian history.

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THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

Laz Etemike

Abstract: Since the explosion of the first atomic weapon the international system has been saddled with perceived threats to national security based around weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This is best seen through the spate of interest by countries to develop nuclear weapons. Hence, nuclear deterrence dominated the cold war calculus of international security. Even with the nuclear states the perception of safety in a nuclear world is illusory. A series of attempts have been made at arms control and disarmament. Most notable is the effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons centred on the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The effort by the US and its allies to stop the Tehran and Pyongyang programmes have once again brought to the fore the moral question associated to the NPT which itself rests on the claim of a nuclear monopoly by the existing nuclear states, or what the Malaysian delegate's (to the original NPT meeting) term, 'justifying nuclear states for eternity.' Meanwhile, while the US and Russia have taken incremental steps toward disarmament they were accompanied by measures to retain nuclear options. Despite the changed political climate of the post-cold war nuclear weapon states (NWS) still believe in the integrity of nuclear deterrence. This has questioned the credibility of the nuclear states to press others to drop their nuclear ambitions. There must be a genuine desire on their part to pursue disarmament. This work concludes that, amongst others, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty displays, in no uncertain terms, hypocrisy in international politics.

Keywords: Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament

Introduction

Mingst once observed that amongst the numerous issues engaging the actors in international relations, those with a clear security dimension are the most 'salient, the most prevalent, and indeed the most intractable.'[1] Consequently, security dilemmas proliferate and

lead to permanent conditions of tension and conflict among states. And, increases in weapon potency results in heightened dangers to regional and international stability.

Technologies produced in WWII, leading to the construction of atomic weapons with a destructive force immeasurably more potent than anything previously fielded and the security dilemma followed suit, has transformed international relations. The consequences of a nuclear armed conflict will be devastating. Throughout the Cold War a stable, though still dangerous balance of power was maintained between the US and USSR. The end of that chapter of international relations has produced a more ill-defined period where thousands of nuclear weapons have heightened the risk of nuclear war. The US and Russia have about 2000 warheads while the UK, France, China, Pakistan and India retain smaller capabilities. These have been joined by North Korea (DPRK) in 2006, Israel follows a policy of nuclear ambiguity and Iran is in hot pursuit of such weapons. This is just the tip of the iceberg as a variety of others seek, or have sought, nuclear forces to deter aggression in an period of international relations history defined, in part, by a new wave of proliferation.

Despite the constant reiteration by the nuclear powers of non-first use, it is naive to accept such assurances at face value. Indeed, historical records show that nuclear powers have, at times, seriously considered deploying such weapons, even aggressively.[2] Therefore, proper nuclear management – extended to other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – and transparency is required to alleviate tensions which could have dire consequences for the entire world since the most advanced weapons are able to deliver a 'pay-load' some 50 times greater than those deployed against Japan in 1945.[3] And, it is not only the weapons themselves which require regulation, it is all the components that allow for weapons to be deployed world-wide; notably missile systems.

While developing a theoretical lens to explain nuclear proliferation and disarmament is certainly an important task as existing approaches tend to offer on snapshots of both problems and potential solutions, and therefore must be blended, twisted and reshaped if sense it to be made of counter-proliferation strategies. This work, while encouraging others to delve into such theoretical reconstruction efforts, does not further pursue a strictly theoretical solution.

Instead this work deploys a historical contextualisation to glean lessons for decision-makers and publics so that nuclear weapons remain weapons of last choice and are eventually eradicated altogether from the arsenals of the great and aspiring powers. To gain such insights this work proceeds as follows. First, it considers the proliferation of WMD to demonstrate a singular – but erroneous – strand of logic which has been weaved through the international community since 1945 and maintains that nuclear weapons are responsible for the long peace between the proverbial East and West during the Cold War. Secondly, this work turns to counter-proliferation and disarmament efforts in a bid to disclose some of the positive contributions that have been made as well as the limited successes such programmes have produced. This includes the idea of Declaratory Policy which underpins the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). Thirdly, an assessment of the US's relations to the NPT is undertaken vis-à-vis an investigation of changes to the US's strategic orientation towards WMD (2010). This section concludes with a brief depiction of the START Treaty II (Prague Summit). Fourthly, this work explores some of the obstructions to building a working consensus on the need for international disarmament of WMD. This work concludes by outlining steps forward; those policies that may be adopted to render nuclear weapons politically obsolete on an international basis.

The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: A Short History

The US, essentially, opened the gateway to advanced WMD. Not for lack of trying, the Nazis and Soviets lost the initial WMD arms race to the US whose Manhattan Project produced the atomic weapons which were deployed against Hiroshima and Nagasaki that helped end WWII in 1945. With the war over, the Nazis defeated, and the US and USSR in a Cold War, the Soviets were able to, essentially, catch-up and by 1948 had successfully tested its first atomic weapon. The UK was next in October 1952 followed by France (1960) and communist China (1964). India (1974) and Pakistan (1978) also demonstrated their domestic nuclear capabilities though neither state was considered a full-fledged nuclear power until their tit-for-tat tests in 1998. It is also noteworthy that Israel, South Afri-

ca, Indonesia, Brazil and Argentina (among others) had nuclear ambitions and advanced programmes during the Cold War. It seems, though remains unverified, that only Israel was able to successfully acquire nuclear capabilities.

With the breakup of the USSR, a short – but dangerous – spike in proliferation occurred since, in addition to Russia, three former Soviet republics: Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, had Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on their territory. The UN, with the assistance of the US and Russia, were charged with decommissioning such weapons, marking the only time in history when country's with nuclear weapons voluntarily ceded them to international authorities for decommission. The latest member of the so-called 'nuclear club' is North Korea (DPRK) which, in 2006, successfully conducted a nuclear test.

With only nine declared or suspected nuclear powers in the world, disarmament and arms control seems wholly possible, yet it remains an elusive goal, one where the elusiveness is not mysterious but rather the opposite; states continue to conceive of the international politics as a game of brinkmanship governed by unpredictable security dilemmas. Ownership of nuclear weapons is meant to insulate states of external interference and to guarantee survivability. While this is certainly an archaic way to understand international relations, it continues to dominate many circles and thus many states continue to seek their own weapons or alliances with nuclear armed members.

Others, particularly in the US and EU, are working to illuminate nuclear weapons altogether though are forced to maintain small arsenals due to perpetual fear of abandonment – of such a non-nuclear regime – by the others. At the outset of his first term in office, and given his 'reset' with Russia, Obama (Prague, 2009) highlighted that thousands of nuclear weapons are still in service. Indeed, Obama foresaw a diminishing threat of sustained, interstate conventional wars while risks of nuclear conflict are steadily rising; points which reflect his overall worldview that true peace and security can only be achieved in a world without nuclear weapons. This is an especially important issue given the repeated attempts by al Qaeda – among other terrorist groups – to acquire nuclear weapons or some cocktail of depleted uranium or plutonium and more conventional explosives to develop a 'dirty bomb.'

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Given the above rendition of nuclear proliferation, and considering the importance attached to issues pertaining to nuclear weapons by states and civil societies, it is essential to examine some efforts at non-proliferation and disarmament; the focus of this section.

Churchill once declared that peace is the child of potential nuclear terror; that the threat of such a devastating conflict is enough to dissuade a potential aggressor from initiating hostilities against any state, or alliance of a state, that retains nuclear deterrent capabilities. Those who believe in nuclear deterrence, typically assume that such weapons should be controlled by a small number of responsible major powers.[5] This theory therefore presupposes nuclear monopoly, a point which underscores early non-proliferation logic and reflects the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the international community's most powerful chamber.

Efforts promoting nuclear non-proliferation after WWII began with the Truman Administration's adoption of the so-called Baruchi Plan (1946),[6] which drew heavily on the Acheson-Lilienthal report (1946) and proposed verifiable disarmament and the eventual destruction of the US nuclear arsenal; the only nuclear arsenal at that time. It was thought, naively, that doing so would reduce international tensions. Unilateral disarmament was not possible however since the USSR was steadily closing the technological gap and would soon have WMD of its own. Hence, the Baruchi Plan was abandoned. Instead, when Eisenhower assumed office, he devised the so-called 'Atoms for Peace' (1953) programme to bring a degree of international transparency to the atomic technology race and, perhaps, lead to a general system of safeguards. While 'Atoms for Peace' was succeeded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (1957) it was not until 1960 that an honest effort to reach international agreement over limiting nuclear proliferation was reached. By then the USSR, France and the UK had acquired nuclear weapons. Still, there was no agreement. The international community had to wait an additional eight tense years (1968) until the nuclear armed states agreed to halt proliferation, a consensus enshrined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which entered into

force in March 1970.

Kokoski argued that the NPT created a framework for controlling the spread of nuclear materials and expertise.[7] Indeed, the signatories pledged to avoid taking any action(s) that would add to the number of countries with nuclear weapons.[8] The treaty invariably presupposed that while the non-nuclear weapon states party to the treaty are not to manufacture or receive nuclear weapons, or any other nuclear explosive devices, the existing nuclear weapon states (NWS) are not required by the treaty to give up nuclear weapons but rather to negotiate in good faith. For the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) there was no room for negotiation. Consequently, the treaty established two classes of states: NWS and NNWS. The nuclear weapon states are those that had conducted nuclear tests before 01 January 1967.

The NPT may be broken down into three pillars; non-proliferation, disarmament and the right to peaceful use of nuclear technology. The articles of the treaty, arguably, impose only a vague obligation that all signatories move in the direction of nuclear disarmament which was to occur under strict and effective international controls. Unfortunately, the articles do not determine a time-frame for signatories to actually conclude a disarmament treaty; they were only obliged to negotiate in good faith.

The sixth NPT Review Conference (20 May 2000), the first since the treaty was indefinitely extended in 1995, adopted an important agreement on the practical steps for nuclear disarmament. This was the climax of the disarmament between the NWS and a key group of "New Agenda" NNWS over the fulfilment of disarmament obligations, for which previous conferences since 1985 were unable to reach consensus. The nuclear powers had pledged the unequivocal desire to completely eliminate their nuclear arsenals. The conference raised some concerns that the NWS had not taken disarmament seriously enough, noting that progress had stalled since the end of the Cold War while the NNWS indentified certain steps that should be taken. NWS should:

1. unilaterally disarm,
2. provide more information on their nuclear capability and the implementation of disarmament agreements,
3. reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons,
4. take concrete measures to further reduce the operational

status of nuclear weapons system
5. involve all five nuclear powers 'as soon as appropriate' in nuclear reduction and disarmament negotiations.[9]

For some observers, the 'as soon as appropriate' was seen as watering-down the basic aims of the steps, despite that they were intended to be carried out within 5 years.

NPT is only one of several treaties designed as confidence building measures (CBM) to create a transperant atmosphere for nuclear dialogue. Even with its limited objectives, NPT was, and remains, a cornerstone of nuclear limitations. Yet, since the 1970s, efforts at actual arms control – particularly between the US and the USSR produced few or no results. Among these efforts was the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I (1972) and SALT II (1979). Others include: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) (1987), the Missile Technology Control (MTCR) (1987), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I (1991) and START II (1993) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (1996). Remarkably, Russia did not ratify START II while the US under Bush withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) (1972) in order to pursue the development and deployment of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) systems. The US senate, for its part, refused to ratify the resulting CTBT (1999).

Declaratory Policy

Returning to the basis of nuclear management based on the NPT regime, declaratory policy is part of the bargain which originally underpinned the treaty. The purpose of the declaratory policy is deterrence. For this reason declaratory policy of the use of nuclear weapons has been a contentious issue in deterrence and disarmament discourses. Declaratory policy is, essentially, an official policy statement on the exact circumstances a nuclear weapon might or might not be used. Declaratory policies are central CBMs.[10]

The declaratory policy attempts to reconcile disarmament and deterrence since it represents an effort to devalue and delegitimise nuclear weapons to move towards a world in which nuclear weapons have less of a role in international politics. In other words, by creating transparency over nuclear strategies – and supposing that

NWS were not being deceiptful – and, as the case was and remains, relegating such weapons to a defensive posture, the NWS actually lead-by-example and indicate that developing, storing and maintaining nuclear weapons is expensive and, largely, inappropriate. And, under such a declaratory policy, the NNWS were given negative assurances: reassurance that their decision to forgo the nuclear options would not leave them exposed to nuclear coercion.[11] Nearly all nuclear deterrence strategies were accompanied by attempts at reassurance and arms control; to reassure NNWS, prevent arms races, improve crisis stability, and reduce costs.

Unfortunately, Obama's declaratory policies as developed under the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) only explain the US's vision of disarmament. They try to balance disarmament and deterrence but do not reassure NNWS and the NPR – the latest declaratory policy – explains identifies and then justifies the US's contradictory position on disarmament and deterrence. In short, US policy regarding its nuclear posture is ambiguous and ambiguity over such an important issue causes undue anxiety in both NNWS and the other NWS. Therefore, it is important to single out the NPR (2010) and assess its international impact.

The US and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 2010

The NPR 2010 document presented the US's position on nuclear weapons and deterrence. The document reflected the Obama Administration's sentiment of building a world without WMD by reducing their strategic role. The document listed three conclusions. Firstly, that the US would continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the US or its allies and partners the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons. Secondly, the US would only contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend its critical interests or its allies and partners. And, finally, that the US would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear proliferation obligation.[12]

Assessing the document, Warren notes that the actual reduction in the US's nuclear mission was rather moderate and it was 'difficult to see truly any shift in US nuclear planning.' He observed that Obama's NPR appeared to continue nuclear planning against regional adversaries with WMD.[13] In short, the declaratory policy embedded in the NPR should be seen as justifying the continuation of previous administration's nuclear strategies rather than reassuring other NWS and NNWS alike.

The NNSA was more forthcoming on US plans. It reported US plans to evolve and sustain its nuclear deterrent. The NNSA had planned to spend some $175 billion (USD) over the next two decades building new nuclear weapons factories, testing and simulating facilities, and modernising and extending the lives of the present nuclear stockpile. Obama's Administration plans to stockpile, maintain and modernise US nuclear weapons despite its commitment to nuclear disarmament. This position contrasts sharply with Obama's 2009 Prague speech based on creating a world free of nuclear weapons.

One area where the US is consistent is in regards to the NPT, and it took further steps at reinforcing that treaty during the NPT Review Conference in 2010.

NPT Review Conference 2010

The NPT Review Conference (NPTRC) was called for by the US to discuss challenges facing the treaty. The conference considered nuclear disarmament, including specific practical measures such as: nuclear non-proliferation; the promotion and strengthening of safeguards; regional disarmament and non-proliferation; measures to address withdrawal from the treaty and measures to further strengthen the review process.[14] The conference was a significant test of how it would meet unfolding challenges.

The conference final document reviewed commitments and produced an action plan for nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Many analyst are of the opinion that the language of the concluding document on its action plan was watered down compared with previous versions, leaving it up to the next review, in 2015, to determine how far these steps will take the international community towards ful-

filling NPT goals.[15]

The 2010 Review document was seen as forward-thinking and balanced. Praise was heaped on the US and others for steps taken to advance nuclear disarmament. The conference also encouraged the early entry into force of the CTBT and the urgent need to get on with long-delayed talks on the fissile material cut-off treaty. For some, the conference strengthened a non-proliferation regime, while others saw the achievements of the conference as modest. Since then no achievement has been recorded. Yet the NPT has managed through some difficult times and it speaks to its wide-acceptance that few states have joined the NWS since the treaty's inception back in 1968. Other treaties have not fared nearly as well.

The New START Treaty

START II has not yet fulfilled its intentions. The treaty includes detailed definitions and counting rules that both the US and Russia should utilise to identify the forces limited by the treaty. Both parties were expected to maintain a comprehensive database, indicating the locations, members and technical characteristics of weapons limited by the treaty. While there were some positives in START II, there were also many negatives in terms of limits versus reduction.

On the bright side, for instance, the new limit of 1550 deployed strategic warheads was 74% lower than the 6000 warhead limit of the 1991 START Treaty, and 30% lower than the 2200 deployed strategic warhead limit of the 2002 Moscow Treaty.[16] Alternatively, START II, while limiting the number of deployable warheads, it fell silent on the actual number of warheads in their arsenal. In other words, START limited the amount of deployed nuclear weapons, not the amount of weapons in total. Additionally, the treaty makes no mention of how the limits would be achieved and verified.

For all its successes and shortcomings START II has been polarising. Yet of all the critics of the treaty, none are more vocal than the US Senate, which has been deploying every filibuster in an attempt to stall its ratification indefinitely. In fact, some republican senators rehashed Cold War arguments to delay or defeat the pact, suggesting that the treaty will limit US efforts to build missile defences pointing to the provision in the treaty that bars the use of

missiles interceptors. The senators accuse Obama's Administration of not doing enough to modernise the US's nuclear forces. Not everyone agrees and a Senior White House Official argued that the US came away (from the START II negotiations) a clean winner. Why a 'winner?' Because the US retains its nuclear deterent and has found a way to redeploy its nuclear weapons without decommissioning them. Like Russia, the US is unwilling to disarm rendering START II moot.

Barriers to nuclear Arms Reduction and Disarmament

Rourke rightly observed that security concerns constitute the most formidable barrier to arms control and nuclear non-proliferation and suggested that the anxiety during the Cold War spawned a huge arms build-up that has yet to be fully appreciated, let alone reduced.[17] Owing to the Cold War, NWS decision-makers' mentality is skewed towards that period of international history rather than the unfolding period and exhibit extraordinary resistance to change.

Equipped with such old-fashioned thinking, the NWS were caught completely off-guard as the threat of nuclear terrorism thrust the nuclear clock a minute closer to Armageddon following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and the arrest of a man thought to have constructed a 'dirty bomb' by mixing plutonium with conventional explosives. The threat was further increased as a wave of so-called "rogue" states began to seek revisions of the distribution of power associated to possession of nuclear weapons. The only solution to such challenges, as the logic of the Cold War dictated, was to react on a tit-for-tat basis. Hence Bush began building anti-weapons systems, while Russia developed the SS20 – a stealth delivery system – and China increased the tempo of its nuclear programme; steps deemed to negate the spirit of disarmament.

Yet, Bush was the worst spoiler of the disarmament gains in the decade before his Presidency. Having viewed arms control treaties and multilateral non-proliferation agreements as inherently unverifiable and overly constraining of US security strategy, Bush simply side-stepped, ignoring the CTBT, pursing national missile defence and developing a nuclear bunker-buster weapon.[18] He explored the

option of putting anti-missile weapons in space and reached a nuclear cooperation deal with India, which is not party to the NPT.[19]

Obama, while publically supporting the elimination of all nuclear weapons, emphasised that the US will not disarm unilaterally and that as long as nuclear weapons exist, it will retain a strong, safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. This prompted Taylor to conclude that as long as nations possessing nuclear weapons continue to behave as though they feel more secure with than without them, more non-nuclear states can be expected to join the nuclear club.

Rauf notes that in the field of diplomacy the NWS have systematically and determinedly opposed all attempts, since the 1995 NPTREC, to be involved in a substantive engagement on nuclear disarmament issues in any multilateral fora, be it the NPT review process, the CD, the First Committee or even NATO councils.[20] At the NPT Review, the NWS accepted 'talking sessions' on nuclear disarmament, but continue to reject any and all proposals calling on them to either implement existing bilateral treaties, negotiate new reductions, or to take unilateral measures towards nuclear disarmament.

Such behaviour – of NWS – made many NNWS weary of renewing the NPT and demanded that the NWS should set a clear timetable for dismantling their arsenals.[21] This prompted Malaysian delegates to the conference to demand that without a pledge by the NWS for a timetable to dismantle, renewing the treaty would be 'justifying nuclear states for eternity.' In essence the treaty was meant to maintain their monopoly.[22]

Without the NPT it is uncertain how nuclear relations would unfold. And yet, the treaty has been violated time and time again and has many wondering whether it is becoming completely irrelevant. Consider the following short history of undermining actions which render the NPT a shell of its intentions.

Firstly, between 1975 and 1996, the US authorised transfers of nuclear parts to the UK under a National Security Decision Memoranda. It is also true that some of the fissile materials for the UK Trident Warhead were purchased from the US Department of Defence and property services. This was certainly against the spirit of the NPT and reveals that nuclear states can freely interact while insisting on a ban for others underlining that the difference between

NWS and NNWS is absolute, sending the message to other states that acquiring nuclear weapons increases national power and bargaining positions.

Secondly, India, Pakistan and Israel have been 'threshold' countries in terms of the international non-proliferation regime. Both India and Pakistan are publically opposed to the NPT as it stands and India has consistently attacked the treaty since its inception, labelling it, in 1970, as a lopsided treaty in favour of the existing nuclear powers. India refused to sign the treaty because China is a nuclear state and the two are locked in an enduring dispute. Former Indian Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherje, stated in 2007 that India's opposition was not because of a lack of commitment for non-proliferation but because they consider NPT as a flawed treaty which does not recognise the need for universal, non-discriminatory verification and treatment.

Thirdly, the Middle East conflict has also posed a major barrier to the NPT treaty. Israel feels unsafe among its Arab neighbours and following repeated hostilities. The US has been a staunch supporter of Israel, and has not pressed Israel to allow IAEA inspectors to its existing facility at Dimona. Now that the Arab-Israeli conflict has evolved into an Israel-Iran conflict, the latter uses the case of Israel to justify its own nuclear aspirations and (former) Iranian President, Al Muhabidean, remarked that nothing was said about Israel's suspected nuclear weapons programme. He also noted that the NWS were not making any effort to destroy their stockpiles. So, since the NWS reserve the right to keep nuclear weapons, Iran should reserve the right to develop them as well.

Fourthly, Israel has individually has expressed disdain for the NPT. The concern of Israel is its security hence Israel scorned the resolution by the IAEA calling on it to sign the NPT. Israel insists that it was unfair to single Israel out when they are not the only nation not to have signed it (Pakistan and India are not signatories). Israel has also argued that it has an inherent right to its arsenal. For instance, Horcy, the Israeli Atomic Chief, claimed that the call for Israel to join the NPT violates basic principles and norms of international law.

Finally, hostilities between India and Pakistan pose another obstacle to nuclear disarmament and to the success of the NPT. This is because they act as a reference point to those who desire to de-

velop nuclear weapons and it is well documented that Pakistan's so-called Kahn network is responsible for developing Iran's nuclear programme.

In addition to the above points, Rauf listed several impediments to nuclear reductions:

1. the deterioration in relations between the US, Russia and China,
2. the increased saliency of nuclear weapons in Russia's security policy,
3. the rise of domestic groups in Russia and the US that remain unconvinced about arms control as an element of national security policy,
4. the Eastward expansion of NATO without considering non-proliferation,
5. increased reliance by Russia on nuclear arms, notably sub-strategic weapons,
6. NATO's continued reliance on nuclear weapons in the absence of credible threats,
7. heightened proliferation concerns in South Asia, the Korean Peninsula and Middle East.[23]

Together, these may be insurmountable without a comprehensive, international rethink of the values of nuclear weapons.

Conclusion

Nuclear proliferation is difficult to stem for the reasons highlighted above. Nuclear disarmament amongst the nuclear states appear very distant and possibly unachievable. For instance, complaints over the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament have been a perennial feature of most NPT reviews. The significance of these complaints derives from the fact that the NPT is the only legally binding instrument through which the NWS committed themselves to nuclear disarmament.

This is supported by the ICJ, when it asserted that Article VI of the NPT committed the NWS not only to negotiate but also to conclude on nuclear disarmament. Hence the NPT provides a legal framework within which the NNWS could hold the NWS accountable for their actions on nuclear disarmament.[24] The NPT implicitly

stated that possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS is a temporary, not permanent situation. Consequently, the NPT is both a nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation treaty with the later being a contributing condition for achievement of the former and vice versa.

Arguments for nuclear proliferation or selective proliferation hardly offer a solution to the issue as also noted by the Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyed Axworthy in 1998 that the nuclear powers need to see themselves as others see them and to ensure that they do not send messages that they did not intend. He noted that the nuclear powers should be circumspect about the political value they place on NATO's nuclear forces lest they furnish arguments proliferators can use to try to justify their own nuclear programmes. Hence, Washington's confrontation with North Korea and Iran over their nuclear weapons programme has raised a host of important moral questions that touch on the credibility of the NWS and the possible success of the NPT.

In this light, this work calls for the revisiting of the Buruchi Plan of 1946. The plan had proposed the verifiable disarmament and destruction of the entire US nuclear arsenal, the establishment of an International Atomic Development Authority and the creation of a system of atomic sanctions, which not even the UN Security Council could veto, and which would proportionately punish states attempting to acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons or fissile materials.

It is obvious that countries that wish to possess WMD usually claim so not only on the basis of their security but also to exercise political and military power in the international system. Possessing nuclear capabilities certainly conveys some illusory security and prestige. What the NWS fail to realise is that the failure of disarmament treaties also risks creating an environment that makes non-proliferation more difficult. A better solution therefore, is to revisit the Baruchi plan with faith that the great powers would be courageous enough to embrace and implement it.

The conclusion is that a world without nuclear weapons can only work only if leaders are rational and wanting to avoid the catastrophe accompanying any use of such weapons.

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FAILED STATES AND THEORIES: THE (RE)SECURITISATION OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Matia Vannoni

Abstract: Over the past two decades, the term "failed state" has been popularised among both academics and policy-makers. This work seeks to adequately provide for the historical and cultural background driving the term and its theoretical and practical implications. However, the bulk of this work is concerned with questioning the analytical validity of the term "failed state" and argued that its creation was inextricably related to a phenomenon typical of the beginning and the end of the Cold War: the securitisation of underdevelopment. Accordingly, the concept of failed state is analysed as a discursive construction rather than an analytical tool.

Keywords: Failed States, Securitisation, Development, Discourse, Policy-Making

Introduction

According to Gates, fractured or failing states [are] the main security challenge of our time.[1] Yet such terms' entry into mainstream discourses render them "over-used" in the political lexicon of post-Cold War politics, a point reflected in the intimidating results produced by a simple Google search; some 468 million hits. Failed states have not only penetrated the Internet, other public communications systems have grown accustomed – some may even suggest comfortable – deploying the thematic.[2] Yet for all the attention the term failed states has received, it seems that international scholarship, let alone wider publics, are no closer to appreciating the gravity of situations facing the states which now have the term failed added as an adjective.

This work argues that the concept is analytically moot, and hence weighing into the definition debate is futile. However, to orientate readers, a popular depiction of failed states and how they are selected as such is provided for according to Newman's identifica-

tion which may be seen in Table 1.[3]

For methodological clarity, it is important to briefly present the indexes which provide such research to be able to gauge whether or not there are political motivations behind the deployment of the term.

Failed States: The Indexes Behind the Term

This work examines five indexes which themselves have targeted failed states:

1. **The Failed States Index** (FSI) is sponsored by the so-called Fund for Peace and is published by in the Foreign Policy Journal.[4] This index deploys social, political and economic indicators to reach its conclusions;
2. **The Global Peace Index** (GPI) is sponsored by the Vision of Humanity, which is part of the Institute for Economics and Peace; an international think tank self-described as being 'dedicated to the[5] research and education of the relationship between economic development, business and peace.'[6] The main difference from the precedent one is that the Global Peace Index is more focused on the trends of armed conflicts, assuming the latter as the main indicator of state failure.[7]
3. **The Human Development Index** (HDI) is associated to the UN Development Programme and has become one of the leading indexes for measuring state capacities to deliver public goods (regarded as an indicator of state strength). As argued below, the HDI and GPI vary in conceptualising the functions of the state, with the former selecting a more Lockean approach (re: the state as a service provider[8]) and the latter opting for a more Weberian disposition, conceiving state functions as related to coercive-power monopolisation within a territory.[9]
4. **The Index of State Weakness** (ISW) in the Developing World of the Brookings Institution closely resembles the FSI though contains more robust security connotations.
5. **The State Fragility Index** (SFI) of the Centre for Systemic Peace and the Centre for Global Policy and sponsored by the One Earth Future Foundation measuring state effectiveness and legitimacy.

Considering the above indexes and their associated institutions, two noteworthy aspects may be highlighted: first, the institutional prerogatives driving such research and, second, discrepancies between them.

The clear majority of centres and institutes tasked with examining failed states tend to be financed by governments. For instance, the State Failure Task Force – funded by the CIA – produced a series of reports which reflect US approaches. Hence, there is a decidedly subjective element to failed state assignments. The role of think tanks as epistemic communities and the interactions between them and policy-makers will be duly analysed in the following sections. Also, discrepancies are evident. While there is general consensus on the worst performers, the lists are rather dissimilar among themselves. Anyway, according to these studies, roughly a quarter of all states are fragile to different degrees; either failing or already failed and the situation is not progressing with the proverbial clock for some states, namely the weakest, has remained stuck in the 1970s without ameliorating their position. That is why, as illustrated below, many scholars question the Westphalian ontology and call for a post-sovereign international order.[10] Yet more traditional approaches to understanding failed states paints only a partial picture. Before moving on to addressing other, more dynamic aspects of the phenomenon, it is essential to first draw a line between failed and rogue states so as to avoid confusion. This is especially important since practitioners tend to misuse concepts of failed states; they deploy the logic of rogue states and apply the term failed.

Indeed, Bilgin and Morton commence their research via a theoretical lens to clarify the two thematics in IR and discover that the main difference is based on focus,[11] which is on the internal characteristics in the case of failed state and on the external behaviour in the case of rogue state.[12] Indeed, rogue state is used to indicate the behaviour of a given state in the international realm which is close in spirit to the concept of predation,[13] namely a state which does not follow the appropriate rules of the game, determined by the 'structure of identities and interests.'[14] After 9/11, rogue states were perceived as major sources of international threat or, as Bush noted, that unlike 'the Cold War today's most urgent threat stems from [...] a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states for

whom terror and blackmail are a way of life.'[15] Also, concerns about rogue states are closely related to more classical conceptions of international security, whereas the concept of failed state is usually associated to so-called human security.

Such a view has recently been challenged by those advocating juxtaposition between such approaches to security. Keohane, for instance, notes that 'future military actions in failed states, or attempts to bolster states that are in danger of failing, may be more likely to be described *both* as self-defence and as humanitarian or public-spirited.'[16] Despite differences, many factors bolster the interconnection between the terms failed and rogue. Being a failed state may be a precondition for being a rogue state, as suggested by Stern who asserted that 'we have to understand the role of failed states that often provide or condone safe havens for organised terrorism.'[17] Furthermore, many scholars and policy-makers tend to overlook differences between such labels. Despite such obvious overlap, this work is limited to assessing failed states for several reasons. First, the concept is more related to the internal characteristics of a state and may be framed within the broader discussion on development. Second, it is a multi-faceted topic not limited to security issues; it extends to economic, social and political dynamics as well. Finally, the term failed state has many implications on the ontological and epistemological aspects of the study of the international system.[18] The following section illustrates the theoretical approaches to the study of failed states widespread in IR theories and political sciences.

The Theoretical State of Art

Newman identifies three streams of studies on failed states, which will be analysed in this section.[19] It is worth conceiving them as 'opinion clusters [which are] more or less structured networks [with] formally structured orientations or approaches to [certain] issues.'[20] The first comprises those scholars who uncritically accept the concept of failed state and therefore, concentrate on practical implications.[21] The most noteworthy aspect of such a stream is its policy orientation. This is crucial since it bears consequences for how studies are conducted and the results these have on the functioning world. Additionally, this cluster is closely interconnected

with security studies.[22] The following section will analyse this in light of the literature on epistemic communities and norm entrepreneurs with special attention to the relation between such an opinion cluster and policy-makers. The second stream on failed states is based on critical approaches and extends the analysis to broader discussions.[23] As mentioned, since roughly a quarter of the states in the international system have, since their formation, suffered from some form of weakness, several scholars have begun to question the pillars of the international arena itself. Starting from the concept of failed state, some challenge the concept of sovereignty and the Westphalian system,[24] whereas others focus on the epistemological factors which such a term bears starting from a critique to the first stream of studies.[25] This work may be framed in the latter approach despite acknowledging contributions of the others. Thirdly, many stress the interventionist connotations of the concept and wholly reject it.[26] The division between such approaches is for the sake of exposition and overlaps exist among them. Yet, for reasons of clarity it is worth analysing them separately.

The majority of studies on failed states may be included in the first cluster; this represents the so-called "establishment approach" towards this topic where roughly all relevant actors are influenced by it (states, international organizations etc.). For instance, the indices noted above clearly express this stream. Despite the heterogeneity of such studies, several common features may be identified; Bilgin and Morton stress the common assumptions, which will be integrated by contributions from other authors.[27] First, they all presuppose an approach to the development of the state inherently related to its internal characteristics in line with the so-called Washington Consensus and the approach typical of the international financial institutions (i.e. WTO and WB) since the 1990s.[28] Accordingly, causes of "failure" are exclusively internal, aloof from any consideration on the colonial experience of those states[29] or positions in the system.[30] Here, the state is regarded as the agent of development.[31] This bears important consequences such as the reduction of state failure to empirically observable factors, which in turn may be manipulated by foreign policy-makers. Whatever the conception of the state, whether Lockean or Weberian, these studies focus on the symptoms of state failure without understanding the surface. The result is a categorisation of states in order of weakness 'rath-

er like Victorian butterfly collectors, to construct lists and typologies of the different species.'[32] A myriad of such categorisations are available in the literature, from simple dichotomies strong/weak,[33] through detailed taxonomies[34] to *continua*.[35] Furthermore, the indices reveal examples of categorisations of states according to different criteria resting on the assumptions of this stream of studies. Consequently, the concept of state failure 'rests on the assumptions about stateness against which any given state should be measured as having succeeded or failed.'[36]

As mentioned, the main characteristic of this cluster is its policy-oriented nature. Indeed, the principal objective of categorising state is rarely merely an academic exercise: 'the goal is to assess states in order to assist in calibrating the conditions for successful intervention.'[37] The following section will present the fallacies of this approach.

Regarding the second stream, several differences between the various authors are clear, though it is possible to identify two subgroups. First, scholars who use failed states to investigate sovereignty via its Westphalian conception. Accordingly, sovereignty is not perceived as something monolithic and as a *status per se*. Rather, as Sorensen aptly notes, 'sovereignty is like being married, you either possess this status or you do not, one can no more be a 75% sovereign than 75% married.'[38] Such an ontological revolution entails two assumptions:[39] either new post-national politics based on human rights[40] or an international system where sovereignty remains a prerogative of states, which are capable of disaggregating, transferring and pooling it though.[41]

Both bear interventionist (even neo-colonialist) consequences in their extremist versions. Indeed, the 'responsibility to protect' inherently contains and 'intervention dilemma,'[42] namely the Westphalian state is not always compatible with global human rights. For instance, state sovereignty may hamper humanitarian intervention and popular sovereignty may produce tyrannous government with deleterious effects for human rights.[43] As Havel announced during the Kosovo conflict 'the evolution of civilisation has finally brought humanity to the recognition that human beings are more important than the state.'[44] Furthermore, Krasner, assuming that 'the fundamental rules of conventional sovereignty [...] no longer work,'[45] criticises the policy tools *repertoire* used to cope with failed states.

As a result, he proposes a variety of forms of '*de facto* trusteeship and shared sovereignty' to deal with the problem of failed states.

Regarding the second sub-group characterising this approach, many focus on the epistemological implications of the concept.[46] Since this approach will be utilised below, it is sufficient to mention two points for now. Firstly, discussions on failed states may not be separated from the broader discussion on development. Secondly, the concept concerned is set aside as an analytical tool, thus focusing on it as a discursive construction. The factors behind its creation and the effects it bears will be duly analysed in the ensuing section, which provides a critique of the first cluster based on the second.

The third opinion cluster focuses on rhetorical aspects of the concept of failed state underlining its interventionist connotations. In line with what Johnston defines as the second generation of security studies, namely the approach to security widespread in the mid-1980s[47] which focused on the rhetorical use of concepts by politicians,[48] this stream focuses on the 'failed state doctrine.'[49] Indeed, Pha and Symon stress the instrumental use of the concept of failed state for various purposes (all with interventionist consequences).[50] For instance, the concept may be used in order to fill the *vacuum* left by the fall of the USSR and thus the lack of a *nemesis* for the US hegemony,[51] or simply to pursue neo-colonialist policies. As Havel noted 'I really do inhabit a system [...] where words can prove mightier than ten military divisions.'[52] This work, despite acknowledging the importance of the instrumental use of rhetoric, extends the analysis to the discursive origins of the term failed state.

Failed Theories

This section analyses under new epistemological premises the fallacies of the aforementioned first opinion cluster and its attempts to utilise the concept of failed state as a purely analytical tool. This analysis may not be separated from the broader discussion on development, of which the concept of failed state is a derivation. Indeed, the discourse is inherently interconnected with the modernisation theories on development formulated in the 1950s/1960s. As all concepts which are designed to describe reality with a certain degree of abstraction and without normative connotations, the definition of failed state has to respect a twofold requirement:[53] the coverage of

all *phenomena* concerned and the inclusion of all (and only) external characteristics. Such a concept (especially in the Weberian conception of state's functions) does not add anything to the already possessed tools used to analyse states.[54] Furthermore, as demonstrated by Rist, the concept of development as created in the 1950s/1960s falls short in respecting such requirements. Some of the criticisms which Rist refers to the Rostowian organic conception of development apply in turn also to the concept of "failed state." Such a concept relies on a given perception of development which has many characteristics. First of all, it entails a marked "directional" (if not teleological) connotation with two main consequences. For some authors the principal assumption is that development follows a defined path, which is the one already walked by *developed* states. Indeed, it is characterised by a strong ethnocentrism or by what Latour calls 'particular universalism'[55] falling into the field of studies of sociology's institutionalism, namely the diffusion of Western values, norms and institutions as benchmarks to analyse (and evaluate) other realities.[56]

For others, the unit of measurement is the ideal-type state and obviously 'compared to an ideal, reality is bound to appear as incomplete, even in the cases that served as the basis for the construction of the idea in the first place.'[57] The concept of sovereignty, like the concept of modernity, becomes to function like Fitzgerald's green light:[58] something sought but never reached. This approach is ethnocentric in a more subtle way, in that it compares the (Western) states themselves, which have been the basis for the creation of the ideal-type of state, to the concept derived from them. The logic behind the indices shown in the introduction reflects this. Furthermore, the concept of failed state as conceived by the first cluster is markedly ahistorical, namely it suffers from what Hobden and Hobson[59] define as chronofetishism and tempo-centrism. Indeed, the concept of failed state rests on the assumption that the present is something reified, naturalised (emerged spontaneously) and cut off from a historical context. Indeed, failed states are not perceived as former colonies: the elephant in the room is usually ignored. With decolonisation 'their right [of colonies] to self-determination had been acquired in exchange for a right to self-definition:'[60] the term "colony" disappeared along with its historical legacy. Furthermore, tempocentrism leads to the practice of conceiving the past as

a function of the present and thus seeing history as characterised by isomorphic systems functional to the ultimate stage and which alternate one after the other. A revealing example is the Rostowian take-off model,61 which represents the apex of modernisation theories and the basis for the Western approach to the Third World for more than two decades. Thirdly, the concept of failed state relies on a conceptualisation of the interaction between state and society as two separated (even counterpoised) realms. This *phenomenon*, defined as the "Huntingtonian formula,"[62] is one of the characteristics which link the concept of failed state to the securitisation of underdevelopment at the beginning of the Cold War; the next section will deal with this aspect. The ethnocentric, ahistorical and teleological conception of development and the concept of failed state in turn represent the central element of modern religion:[63] it is a mixture of beliefs and practices with strong normative connotations. Accordingly, it is worth analysing the concept concerned in its discursive connotation rather than in its analytical use. Under the light of post-modern conceptions of development the following section copes with development (and the concept of failed state) as a discourse; a social construction.[64]

Solutions sought by IR scholars to circumvent such a problem and thus individuating an analytically viable concept to describe reality are numerous, though they will be only mentioned here. Some focus on social forces in the historical creation of the state and thereby overcome the Huntingtonian separation between state and society.[65] Others claim the reunification of international political economy with security studies[66] whereas there are scholars who pose themselves in the broader discussion on development questing for a higher role of history. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the discourse on development has overcome the fallacies typical of its earlier approaches and thus introducing new elements in its theories, such as detailed historical analyses and a trans-disciplinary approach.[67]

The (Re)Securitisation of Underdevelopment

Building on the previous section, this part analyses the concept of failed state as a discursive construction. A caveat is needed: the method utilised is qualitative discourse analysis, under the light of

an agent-centred constructivism[68] with focus projected on the role of epistemic communities and norm entrepreneurs in creating and propelling inter-subjective understandings.[69] The indices and major studies of the members of the first cluster are analysed to deduce the logic behind the origins of the term failed state. This part of the work explores the concept of failed states as an "inter-subjective understanding" which is sustained through agency and which shapes identities and interests of agents[70] by focusing on the similarities between the post-WWII discourse on development and the one on failed states in the last two decades. A parallel may be drawn between the *phenomena* which led to the creation of the modernisation theories of development in the 1950s/1960s and the ones which led to the concept of failed state. As Gilman suggested,[71] the concept of development was a discursive construction which was to play a crucial role in the "psychological warfare" throughout the Cold War. In 1950, Project Troy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) led to the creation of the Centre for International Studies (CIS) (1952) under the aegis of Millikan, who in turn recruited for research activities Lerner (communication scholar), Pye (political scientist), Rostow (economist)[72] and Hagen (philosopher). The project, funded by the CIA and the Ford Foundation, retained the mandate to consider different types of propaganda methods. While the members, who were all Lasswell's protégés and strongly influenced by his political psychology views, had different backgrounds, they shared one commonality: they were all markedly interconnected with security and strategic studies. Indeed, many of them played an active role in WWII with respect to strategic studies. The result of Project Troy were different policy proposals between 1954 and 1961, in which the theory of modernisation was drawn, and which took a crucial role in the formation of the US policy toward the so-called Third World.[73] Several factors reinforced the influence of the CIS, such as the power position of conservatives – re: Eisenhower's Administration and a Republican majority in Congress – the beginning of the Cold War and the way the discourse was structured.[74]

A comparison may be drawn in order to deduce the similarities between these two historical *momenta* and understand the reasons why the result was the (re)securitisation of underdevelopment. First of all, many structural characteristics are similar, in that both the 1950s and the 1990s may be considered as crises of the internation-

al system.[75] Secondly, such historical *momenta* were characterised by an high influence of (neo)conservatives in the US Administration and of (ultra)modernists in the American social sciences. Accordingly, the result was what Newman[76] calls the securitisation of underdevelopment; this section focuses on this aspect despite acknowledging the importance of the other factors.

As mentioned above, two factors bolstered the creation of the ethnocentric and an ahistorical concept of failed state in the first cluster: the influence of security and strategic studies and the close interconnection between scholarship and policy-making.[77] Although these are mutually reinforcing, this part of the work analyses them separately. Many authors emphasise the merging of security and development in the creation of the term failed state with the result of limiting the development agenda to geostrategic and security interests.[78]

The 'silliest academic development of the Cold War,'[79] namely the isolation of security studies from other approaches, is one of the main reasons for the creation of the concept of failed state. The mechanism whereby this happened is termed by Hay[80] conjunctural mode of political rationality: the solution to an external stimulus is sought in the pre-existing structure of the system; geostrategic approaches typical of the Cold War. Accordingly, reality is framed in a way suitable for pre-existing analytical/operational tools, and not vice-versa; as argued by Maslow who posited that:[81] 'it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.' The result was the discursive creation of the concept of failed state through a process of abstraction in which 'contradictions are brought together in a simplified inter-subjective understanding within a broader meta-narration.'[82] Consequently, 'although the "formal Cold War" has ceased – involving the stalemate between capitalism and communism – a "structural Cold War" still prevails – involving new justifications for the persistence of old institutions.'[83] A second hand data analysis carried out on the main international economic newspapers[84] revealed that the term failed state and related jargon was mentioned only once in the last two decades: this is telling of the monopoly which security studies enjoys in this field.

The discourse on failed state is so diffused and broadly (almost universally) accepted in that it bears several features which are typical of a successful narrative. First of all, it is centred on the concept

of "direct responsibility,"[85] namely there is widespread consensus that bad governance in failed states is the reason for their situation. Indeed, in the first cluster the agency-based approach,[86] namely the conception that state failure is man-made, is a common assumption. Secondly, the same factor which led to the creation of such a concept has bolstered its diffusion among practitioners and academics: the fact that it does not represent a "Copernican revolution" in IR theories is an advantage given the resistance to change typical of social and political sciences, as pointed out by several behavioural scientists. Thirdly, a successful narrative has to recruit a variety of external symptoms in a simplified, general and flexible generalisation.[87] In fact, as illustrated above, the studies of the first cluster associate to the term failed states a myriad of complex political, economical, social phenomena. Accordingly, all the evil in the world may be reduced to a single source: failed states. This narrative points to a clearly defined enemy, which incarnates the perfect nemesis of liberal democracy. Thirdly, such studies have enjoyed attention by the means of dissemination: from the Internet, where the foreshown indices are available, through the broadcasting world to more specialist means of communication, such as political and IR publications.[88] Lastly, the role of epistemic communities and their close relationship to policy-makers strongly supports the diffusion of such a narrative not only in the academic world but also in the real one.[89] A telling example is the fact that the aforementioned Failed State Index is taken as a benchmark in the 2010 *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, which sets the priorities of US Administrations in the development policy arena.

The other factor is the close interconnection between the scholars and policy-makers regarding the role norm entrepreneur the former plays. Indeed, the similarities between the task force created at the MIT in the 1950s and the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) created in 1994 are revealing. Both were/are funded by the CIA and established on the explicit request of a US Administration, these two bodies had (and the latter still has) the objective of carrying out studies for US policy-making. In fact, the 1995 report of the PITF was a milestone for the concept of state failure; it is considered the first comprehensive attempt to tackle the issue. Not only does such a close relationship bear consequences on the high attention granted to the narrative of failed states by practitioners,

but also on the way the narrative itself is structured. Concerning the first aspect, many scholars underline the role of think tanks as norm entrepreneurs in this regard. Institutes providing the failed states indices and many others have been able to 'convince a critical mass of [actors] to embrace new norms.'[90] Furthermore, prominent scholars have also played a role and blur the line between practitioners and academics. Telling examples are Jack Straw, (former) UK Foreign Secretary and Stephen Krasner, (former) Director of Policy Planning at the US Department of State.[91] Their roles as norm entrepreneurs has been supported by many exogenous factors, such as the influence of conservatives in key states and the high role of ultra-modernists in the social sciences.

Such a close relationship between academic and policy-making circles has influenced the discursive creation itself of the concept of failed state in two main manners. Firstly, that the first clusters' studies focus only on measurable and material indicators of this phenomenon is related to the necessity to build policies on such studies.[92] Secondly, the solutions implicitly or explicitly suggested by these studies are of a managerial and organisational nature.[93] That is why the aforementioned "Huntingtonian formula" is a characteristic of this approach to failed states; the solution is sought at the state level, which is more manageable than the societal one. Thirdly, such institutional tools represent a one-size-fits-all model perceived as a "silver bullet" solution. A noteworthy factor is their inherently interventionist connotation based on institutional engineering.

Consequently, the concept of failed state may be perceived as a discursive construction, but also as a normative concept. Indeed, while it falls short of describing reality and therefore being analytically unfeasible, it represents a model towards which policy-makers aspire. Accordingly, reality is shaped in order to fulfil the model and not vice-versa. As stated before, inter-subjective understandings shape identities and, in turn, the interests of actors.

The consequences of the uncritical use of the concept of failed state in the policy-making are multiple, though they will only be identified due to spatial constraints. First, there is the risk of a self-fulfilling prophecy; a juxtaposition between the "me" and the "I"[94] of the allegedly failed states: if conceived and dealt with by other states as failed it is probable they will become failed. Second,

the narrative of failed state has interventionist and even neo-colonialist connotations if instrumentally deployed. Thirdly, spurious interpretations of "failed states" may lead to ineffective or disproportionate actions, creating dynamics of path dependence.

Conclusion

> *There were six men of Hindustan to learning much inclined, who went to see an elephant though all of them were blind, that each by observation might satisfy his mind [...]. So six blind men of Hindustan disputed loud and long, each in his own opinion exceeding stiff and strong; though each was partly in the right, they all were in the wrong!*[95]

As this quotation suggests, the common structural characteristics in place at the beginning and at the end of the Cold War led to the same phenomenon: the securitisation of underdevelopment. Despite differences, it is beyond doubt that the concept of failed state and related jargon is a derivation of an approach to development inextricably connected with security and strategic studies. The same factors which contributed to its creation have also played a crucial role in its diffusion as a mainstream narrative about development in the last two decades. Unfortunately, this has borne several drastic consequences in the way the major powers have dealt with the rest of the world. A last caveat is needed: the objective of this work was neither to give definite answers to the problem nor to fall into an infinite epistemological cycle. Instead, the aim of this work was to underline the dynamics where the term failed state has been created, not to propose an alternative narrative on the development of the state. Regarding the second point, this work avoided the eternal struggle between holism and individualism, which has been at the centre of the debate in social sciences since the 19th century. Indeed, constructivist theories tend to fall into the trap of cultural relativism, which may lead to intellectual stalemate. Nonetheless, even though not so easily achievable, the quest for an analytically viable concept is a reasonable objective: the important point is to acknowledge that such analytical tools derive from given agents acting in given circumstances and they may be the objects of analysis and evaluation themselves. In a pioneering work on the

epistemology of knowledge, Puchala (1971) compares the blind men of the notorious story with IR scholars. Indeed, like the blind men trying to identify the mysterious being by touching different parts of it, IR scholars conduct their research activities in the same way: by focusing on different dimensions of the same phenomenon and by wearing different theoretical glasses. As in the case of the blind men, there are not right or wrong answers.

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BARRIERS TO RECOVERY: CONTINENTAL CRISIS AND MEDIA THREAT INFLATION

Christopher Whyte

Abstract: *From the wars in Vietnam and Iraq to the Arab Spring, recent history is full of examples of how media outlets interact with government processes to shape public opinion and constrain the practical avenues policymakers may take in domestic and international affairs. The recent European financial crisis cedes a unique opportunity to study both how media commentary is formulated and the effects it has on the policy choices of governments in international economic affairs. This work, through analysis of original data drawn from case studies of six media outlets in two countries over the course of the recent sovereign debt crisis, seeks to contribute to the field an understanding of the role that such outlets play in influencing popular perception of international issues during times of crisis. With reference to the literature on the press in political and foreign policy affairs, it is found that outlets are incentivised to inflate particular national or international components of reported affairs based on different economic states of affair. These findings have significant implications for the formulation of policy in the future, particularly in the European Union, where continuing integration of political and economic processes requires a delicate balance of emphasis on international prosperity and sovereign interests.*

Keywords: Media, Public Opinion, European Union, Sovereign Debt Crisis, Economic Stability

Introduction

The global financial crisis, starting with stock market crashes in 2008 and continuing to this day, has strained the budgetary processes of numerous countries around the world. In Europe, rising government debt and the difficult task of coordinating fiscal countermeasures in the eurozone have, since late 2009, led to the gradual intensification of social and political unrest aimed at finding a fix to several overarching issues. Despite the barriers-free

nature of trade, demographics and financial institutions in the European Union (EU), the ongoing crisis over the state of sovereign debt has brought both the political and monetary union on the continent closer to fragmentation than ever before.

At the most basic level, while countries across Europe suffer from a commonality of responsibility to address the economic problems of the Union, not all member states have experienced a commonality of the situation. In contrast to the gradual recovery of many, some economies have suffered through drastic austerity measures, requiring bailout financing and continued stimulus attempts. In Greece, continued economic shocks and failures of fiscal governance have led to social uprisings and a change of power. Similar circumstances in Portugal, Spain and other countries across Europe contrast with France, the UK and Germany (to name a few), where more disciplined implementations of austerity measures, while painful, have largely led to steady market recoveries.

The contrasting circumstances raise a significant question: has Europe's near-fragmentation only been economic in nature? The clear reality of such situational differences across Europe, existing as a function of common economic and institution imperatives, indicates that the social effects of the crisis in countries across the eurozone has been different, not only in terms of responses to the crisis, but also in terms of perspectives on the future role of the EU and the single currency. After all, populations have, to greater or lesser degrees, been coping with common problems and burdens that should, in theory, be shared equally by all.

Economic crises affect countries differently; they are exposed to varying domestic and international economic conditions. However, as the case of the EU's sovereign debt crisis highlights, there can be considerable difficulties when it comes to the measurement of social discrepancies surrounding the treatment of similar issues across countries. As a result, this essay seeks to construct and analyse a particular relationship between the role of print media in reporting socio-political issues and changing economic conditions at the national level.

The constraints of print media outlets, necessarily distributively tied to the geographic area in which they operate, allow us to examine the relationship between national economic issues and the transformation of the frames through which the public views them.

This work asks if print media frames questions and issues of Europe's economic health differently depending on the national origin of the publication. If so, do such media outlets suggest a nationally-based discrepancy in the way in which different populations yet view the role of the EU and the eurozone?

A broad look at the comparative health of national economies in Europe over the past three years of the crisis may indicate some likely trends in the representative nature of print media framing across national borders. After all, the framing of issues in those countries that have faired relatively better in the crisis, still affected as they are by ties through the common currency to poorer-performing countries, would logically focus increasingly on the actions and problems of other states. In contrast, media framing of similar issues in poorer-performing countries may be more likely to focus on the role of systemic institutions as the country becomes more dependent on coordinated international action to stave off disaster. These hypotheses will be tested below.

The research undertaken in this essay could help policymakers, both within and beyond the eurozone, understand the social ramifications of economic policies enacted in culturally-diverse regions that are economically interdependent. Through understanding of the results of the cross-country content analysis in this study, European policymakers may, as they move forward towards closer fiscal union in the future, be able to more accurately understand how social perspective, as represented by framing from mass-distribution media outlets, manifests itself in the political and economic machinations of different members of the eurozone. Perhaps most importantly, this research could help policymakers understand the role of media outlets as a mechanism through which popular opinion is transmitted to the higher levels of political governing. Ultimately, this could aid in the formulation of socio-economic policies that are better designed to efficiently and fairly aggregate interests and integrate economic processes across borders.

This work proceeds in four stages: First, I begin with a discussion of the existing literature on issue framing and the role of the media in influencing the direction of social and political actions on economic and international issues. Next, I present data coded from six major circulatory print media outlets in two European countries with very different experiences over the course of the crisis – Ire-

land and Germany. Here, I test the above hypotheses by highlighting trends in the media framing of economic issues across time, paying particular attention to differences in the portrayal of the EU's structures and institutions versus the actions of fellow member states and nationally-based organizations. In the third section of this essay, I ask whether or not crisis conditions can be said, in line with supporting literary theory on competing frames of the media, to alter the delivery of perceptions in reporting. Moreover, I propose an alteration of existing theory for explaining the media framing during economic crises. In particular, I discuss the implications of trends in both the Irish and German media case studies. Finally, I conclude by scrutinising the outcomes of this case study analysis, identifying ways in which the theoretical trends discussed can affect future policy formulations and suggesting methods for conducting further research in the future.

Framing and the role of the media in aggregating social interests

In the field of political communication, the role of the media in establishing the "frames," meaning the contextual lens through which the public views a myriad of issues, is well studied. Numerous authors have contributed to the understanding of the complex relationship between the various factions of the press, the public and the government. In this section, I establish a basic position of understanding the ways in which media organisations choose to engage in the framing of different issues and the role they play in shaping, aiding and constraining the policy decisions and paths of governments. This basic position will take some reference from recent changes to socio-political circumstances in the EU. Ultimately, an understanding of the motives and capacities of media organisations is necessary to fully complement a test of changing reporting behaviours over time and build a theory of media-crisis reaction with appropriate literary context.

In the above introductory section, it was proposed that countries fairing better over the course of international crises, in this case the economic crisis over sovereign debt in the EU, over time would see the focusing of popular attention on those aspects of the international system that are most relevant to national interests

(and vice versa, with focus instead going to relevant domestic concerns). While it is logical that the public may generally refocus on those aspects of political-economic policy, insofar as it affects the interests of individuals that are most in need of repair or revision, does the frame constructed by media organisations as they report news reflect this?

First, it is necessary to frame the role of the media in modern, globalised societies appropriately. In political economic terms, the modern media could be said to act as one of several societal "gateways" through which the public is affected by national and international happenings.[1] Furthermore, the media acts as an outlet for popular sentiment that could potentially influence national policy.

The basis for these assertions lies in the fact that the path that today's states have taken to reach the current level of globalised interconnectedness has greatly altered traditional barriers through which domestic populations interacted with the world. In the immediate post-Second World War period, the US led in the construction of a multilateral trade regime that focused on government responsibility for correcting inefficiencies in free markets and guaranteeing full employment. Though this led to high economic growth in the non-communist world, the currency crises and stagflation in the 1970s and 1980s led to a reversal of focus on such matters. As a result, the international system slowly began to refocus on the spread of neoliberal reforms, including the privatisation of state-owner enterprises, tax reforms and other measures that increased the autonomy and effective influence of private sector forces.[2]

Embedded liberalism, as Ruggie called the first post-war system, emphasised shared norms connected to certain public sector-driven practices.[3] The effective result of such policies on a global scale was the spread of high growth economic practices that ceded control of domestic processes to governments; governments could, in effect, buffer at the border to shelter domestic society from the turbulence of international markets. However, neoliberal reforms around the world, most especially in Europe with the formation of the monetary union, essentially served to decouple economic processes from domestic control, causing the clash of social conventions and mechanisms for broadcasting desires at national levels. Though floating exchange rate regimes allow many countries to affect some measure

of control during bust periods, the EU's monetary union in particular showcases the new multi-level approach that some countries must cope with when dealing with economic matters.[4,5]

This work argues that, with diminished government capacity to shelter society and represent the abilities of the country to influence economic circumstances, the media in Europe has taken on a strong and popularly representative position in society that aggregates interests and accurately presents popular sentiment.

Elsewhere in the field, significant literary evidence reveals that media focus is largely defined by its relationship to government. Early work on "indexing" – meaning the reporting of news based on a broad survey of information coming from various source types – indicates that because of the common appearance of government commentary as experts on most subjects, all news sources are likely to report a government-centric viewpoint.[6] Authors like Bennett have expounded this relationship by arguing that media outlets are simply optimising the reach of their limited resources, as well as responsibly delivering the most appropriate and important information from representatives to their democratic readership.[7]

In 'Competing Images of the Press,' Thrall lays out three particular camps of belief about the actions and role of the media when it comes to government relations – the lapdog, the watchdog and the attack dog.[8] Proponents of the first school tend to see the media as a mouth of the government and an institution that exists to follow the line of the party.[9] Others believe that the press acts more like a watchdog, wisely drawing scrutiny and attention to those areas of government responsibility that require popular oversight. Both of these camps contrast sharply with believers in the attack dog media, in which news organisations see it as their task to relentlessly ridicule and critique the actions of politicians so that leadership of the country is constantly in question.[10]

Each of these "images" of the press represents a view on how media organisations frame a variety of issues that are related to the government. These camps are particularly pertinent in the context of this essay's research, as any perceptible alteration of the frame in which news and coverage of particular issues is presented is likely to correspond with one or more of the above camps. However, with these images in mind, it is necessary to consider the circumstances of European integration and the diminished role government play,

to some greater or lesser degree, in buffering society and acting as a gateway to international and economic affairs. The data used below to measure framing as it has occurred over the course of the sovereign debt and wider financial troubles will be analysed from each of the three "image" perspectives in order to gauge the applicability of each to media-government relations during periods of crisis.

Europe in Crisis: The Case Studies

As a precursor to the analysis of more inclusive samples of media from across the eurozone in the future, this work's examination of framing and perception in the media focused on sources from two countries that represent opposite ends of the range in terms of success in weathering and recovering from the global financial and European sovereign debt crises—Ireland and Germany. In doing so, this work establishes a lens and framework through which other studies review the relationship between media reporting and government policy in political economic matters.

These countries were selected for several reasons:

Firstly, both are members of the eurozone. Because the pressures of reform are likely to be less present in countries outside of the monetary union, even within the EU, research performed using data from other countries in such a small-n test may have ended in skewed results.

Secondly, both occupy opposite ends of the economic spectrum within the eurozone. By calculating a debt-to-Gross Domestic Product ratio, it is clear that Ireland and Germany are representative of those countries in the EU able or unable to reign in spending and implement appropriate austerity measures. Over the course of Europe's sovereign debt crisis, from late 2009 until October 2011 when this study was performed, Ireland's debt oscillated between 85% and 95% of GDP, while Germany's hovered between 55 and 60%.[11]

This study looked at the three largest newspapers in both Ireland and Germany by circulation. As a result, a final factor influencing the choice of these countries and their newspapers was that:

Thirdly, Irish and German sources, while clearly representative of countries with vastly different economic experiences, are either primarily published in English or are popular enough that print editions are multi-lingual. This helped control for human errors from

translation.

The newspapers involved were: the *Irish Independent*, *Irish Examiner* and *Irish Times* in Ireland and *Bild*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in Germany.[12] Together, these newspapers reach between 10-24% of the adult populations of each country on a daily basis. It is worthwhile noting that *Bild*, in particular, reaches almost 5 million people daily and dwarfs the circulatory power of any of its peer outlets. Nevertheless, *Bild* is still limited by the geographical confines of its physical circulation reach in Germany.

Focus in this survey was placed on headline stories from the one month period that included the onset of the sovereign debt crisis and the first major bailout initiatives from 23 May 2011. For the purposes of comparing results, further data was coded from the same sources for the one month period starting on 01 September 2011. This second period included the resurgence of major financial difficulties in various eurozone states, including Greece, Ireland and Spain. The applicability of articles in each newspaper over those periods was based on a clear discussion of international and national economic health as the main topic(s) involved, with each being coded to gather data on the perspectives expressed and information presented therein.

Specifically, each article was placed into categories by area issues (domestic politics, global financial crisis, EU politics, etc.). Data was drawn through a simple count of mentions of international institutional names and organizations versus their corresponding national counterparts (e.g. The European Commission vs. The Italian Prime Minister or the Portuguese Central Bank). Furthermore, each article was coded so as to gauge the tone in which it was delivered, with positive and negative adjective usage noted alongside the use of statistical citations that trended positively or negatively.

The point of coding each article in this manner and drawing these particular types of data lay in the applicability of the perception of the international processes at work in Europe held by the average citizen. In terms of answering the question of whether or not media-reported viewpoints and biases changed over time during crisis periods relative to observable economic circumstances, it was logical to focus on a very basic dichotomous methodological data collection regime and rely on straightforward cross tabulations and

graphical models that provided simple means for view contrasting trends.

Case Study Findings

In this section I discuss the results of the six sets of coding regimes. Coding of articles from across the two single month periods proceeded without hitch and focused, as discussed above, on the relevant media portrayal of the perception of international versus national institutions and associated individuals. Using a basic set of coding rules for judging sentiment that directly referenced each of these mentions and any use of statistical models, data was also drawn that indicated positive or negative positional representation of the issues being discussed. Neutral or descriptive phrases were discounted and statistical models were deemed to be positive or negative only if the data being presented described a > 66% discrepancy for poll data and above or below a 30% discrepancy in the trends detailed for economic statistics (e.g. Survey responses show that 75% disapprove of government spending cuts or unemployment went down from 10 to 7 %). It is also noteworthy that circulation numbers across all publications declined over the course of the period by at least 10%, something that was most notable in Ireland where the Irish Times and Irish Examiner lost almost a third of their readership. All results were coded and all models estimated using Stata 12.0.

Results

The range of articles surveyed in this test was broad. In both countries and across all six newspapers were a variety of different article types. In general, it was found that each newspaper reported on at least one issue or presented at least one headline news story every day that was related in some way to the global or European economic crisis or its domestic manifestations. For the bigger newspapers, particularly *Bild*, the *Irish Independent* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, the number of articles that addressed such issues was higher.

Using Stata, the results for each newspaper were correlated with each other and then coded into indices. This was done for all data coded out of each article and allows us get the bigger picture drawn by the data from each country during both of the two one-month periods.

The first indices portray the total number of articles in each

country by type. For the purposes of discriminating between the contextual circumstances in which each mention of international or national institutions was made, each piece was coded into one of the four following categories:

1. Global Financial Crisis,
2. Sovereign Debt/Eurozone Crisis,
3. Political/Economic Troubles of ther EU Member States
4. Domestic Political/Economic Troubles.

Graphic 1



In Ireland, there was a fairly clear trend in the types of articles covered over the course of the two periods. While focus on the global financial crisis was low during both periods, as Graph 1 shows, there are several interesting changes that indicate framing shifts for Irish print media outlets.

Articles focused on the Eurozone Crisis in period one represented about 20% of all coverage on political-economic matters. By

period two, this had nearly halved to a little over 10% of coverage. While it is interesting to note that period one, starting on 23 May 2011, included the first major bailout initiatives in several eurozone countries, this is still a sharp shift away from focus on international affairs. Perhaps more importantly, there is a stark shift in article focus from coverage of the political-economic troubles of other nations in the EU to domestic reportage. Between the two periods, the number of articles devoted to describing issues and events related to the affairs of other EU countries fell by almost exactly a third from 49–33percent while, at the same time, the number of pieces devoted to the description and analysis of domestic affairs more than doubled from 24 to 52% of all coverage.



Graphic 2

In Germany, trends between the two periods, in terms of the types of articles covered, were noticeably different and certainly more drastic than those in Ireland. These trends existed across all newspapers in Germany and were coded into a country-specific index, similar to Ireland. In all instances across all types of articles,

there was at least a 30% change in month-long coverage patterns. This was higher in most cases.

Between 23 May and 23 June 2011, media focus on the global financial crisis was relatively low, representing about 18% of all coverage on political-economic affairs. Similarly, focus on the eurozone crisis itself was low, 20% of all coverage. Other news categories, namely those focusing on domestic political issues (35%) and happenings in other EU member states (27%) made up the remainder of all coverage. These figures for news coverage of specific issues during the first month period indicate that the huge economic difficulties being experienced in Greece, Ireland and elsewhere, while of great interest and concern, were clearly as of yet weakly associated with the broader eurozone and global financial crises which, at this time, could still be said to be in a phase of slow recovery.

During the second month-long period, between 01 September and 01 October 2011, these coverage statistics drastically change. Focus on the global financial crisis jump to 37% of all coverage – the most of any category of article – while reportage of the eurozone crisis saw a no less impressive leap to 35% of all coverage. On the other end of the spectrum, news stories analysing both individual EU member economic and political troubles and domestic issues plummeted, with reporting of the former falling by a third to 18% and the latter by 75% to represent just under a tenth of all stories covered.

To recall the above hypothesis, countries weathering and performing better economically over the course of the global financial and eurozone crises would logically see an associated shift in perspective that focuses on the problems of others (and vice versa), as it is those other states that continue to cause downturn in international systems. To preliminarily analyse these hypotheses on the basis of changing article focus over the two month-long time intervals presented here, it would seem that media outlets in Ireland – where markets were seen to perform poorly over the period – reported significantly less on matters related to international affairs. Conversely, Germany, whose economy recovered strongly over the course of the period and was somewhat immune to the debt problems plaguing the EU's weaker economies, saw a drastic shift in media focus away from domestic politics and towards issues and relationships in the international arena. These findings may indicate a need to reject the null hypotheses.

However, this study also drew data about article content and disposition towards particular issues, something that may help re-

fine our understanding of the overall trends that appeared in both countries.

In both countries, and across all six newspapers, there were fairly clear trends in terms of mentions of international versus national institutions (and associated individuals) over the two time periods. As Graph 3 shows, Irish print media outlets between May and June 2011 tended to mention institutions of international organisations and of other nations in relatively balanced doses. In the later time period this changed. Stories that solely mentioned international institutions, which had been the lower in terms of appearance in earlier stories, accounted for more than 45% of all articles in September. While there were a similar number of news stories that had references to the institutions of other countries alongside international actors, the most drastic change was the near 100% (42% of all mentions down to 2%) drop in the number of stories that solely referenced individuals, institutions or groups associated with EU member states.



Graphic 3

In Germany the trends between the two time periods were even more striking. Articles in all three newspapers between 23 May and 23 June 2011 were dominated by mentions of international organisations and associated individuals. Of the articles from which data was coded, 82% solely mentioned international figures and institutions while articles providing balanced international-national outlooks and those solely reporting on national figures made up a far smaller, 14% and 4% respectively, portion of coverage.

In the second period of analysis, the market share of coverage of each of the categories of mentions shifted. With almost no balanced coverage of both international- and nation-level actors (5%), articles solely mentioning EU and global institutions nearly halved to just 42% and those mentioning national players spiked to 53% of all reported.

Here, with respect to the hypotheses that have been proposed in this test, it is clear that focus shifted in both countries from one type of actor to another. In the context of the above shifts over the two periods in both Ireland and Germany, this media data may suggest a twofold perspective on the economic and political machinations within each country.

In Germany, where media outlets clearly switched the focus of reporting away from international institutions and towards the troubles and happenings of other countries, articles became increasingly focused on topics of broader global affairs over the time period. This indicates that, although the direct objects of discussion and analysis in German newspapers were nations and associated groups, reporting was contextually based on addressing topics more broadly related to the regional and international crises. This was further seen during testing as a cross tabulation of the trends of distribution of different types of mentions across newspapers with the overall tone of each article broadly indicates that Germans, as represented by these news outlets, had international institutions framed positively during period one. This remained the same in period two, though the much higher number of references to other countries was associated with negative adjective use and an overall frame that was more highly critical.

The data also suggests the opposite trend in Ireland, where articles talked increasingly about domestic and localised troubles in other EU member states as a function of the international institutions that likely were seen as the primary means for enacting situational change. Here, the framing of issues across Irish newspapers

was an exact reversal of the trend seen in Germany, with a positive outlook on national figures and other countries during the first period shifting to the trend of using overwhelmingly negative grammatical mechanisms in conjunction with discussions of the international system.

Finally, testing included the coding of usages of statistics and polling data as journalistic means of information conveyance (see Table 1 below). In Irish media outlets, there appeared to be no change in the use of overwhelmingly negative data in association with article content. The usage of negatively-disposed statistics remained the same, even as content and framing changed, perhaps indicating simply that the severity of the economic circumstances in Ireland over the period of the crisis has not changed; only perceptions of the actors involved, the potential sources of relief and the framing of the issues themselves became different over time.

In Germany, the amount of used data negatively associated with the topics being covered in articles rose by over 40%. Taken in the context of the other results of this study and with respect to the hypotheses, this indicates that the external recessionary effects of the global and eurozone crises, while contrasting with steady domestic economic growth during both periods, were increasingly seen as related to Germany interests, at least in terms of media coverage on the issue.

Table 1

The Use of Statistical Data in Newspaper Articles
by Positive or Negative Connotation

Ireland	May-June 2011		September-October 2011	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Data Negatively Associated With Article Content	22	81.48	22	75.86
Data Positively Associated With Article Content	5	18.52	6	24.14
Germany				
Data Negatively Associated With Article Content	17	36.96	29	78.38
Data Positively Associated With Article Content	29	63.04	8	21.62

Overall, the results of this study yielded a variety of conclusions

about the nature of media reporting in the countries involved. Moreover, the data provides us with much insight into mechanisms of frame-shifting during crisis periods and could be the proof-of-concept test for a much larger-n test of countries, both within in out-side the eurozone. On the surface, the hypotheses proposed above seem to be supported by the results. To recap, the hypotheses are as follows:

The framing of issues in those countries that have fared relatively better during periods of international crisis would logically focus increasingly on the actions and problems of other states.

In contrast, media framing of similar issues in poorer-performing countries may be more likely to focus on the role of systemic institutions as the country becomes more dependent on coordinated international action to stave off disaster.

Despite high amounts of topic-level focus on international issues in Germany and domestic/national-level happenings in Ireland, the tone and content emphasis of articles coded across the two one-month time periods leads me to fail to reject these null hypotheses, as there was a clear shift in the framing of media coverage along the lines proposed above.

Discussion

In the case of Europe's sovereign debt crisis and the disparate experiences of countries across the eurozone, framing of broad issues in print outlets, tied as they are to geographical circulatory areas, can be used to determine what sources are most crucial to the functioning of the media and the portrayal of the news. After all, if it can be assumed that the media is a gateway through which governments and their subject populations interact and view each other, it is highly important to understand how the informational frames of the media are formed.[13,14,15]

In this study, the data collected showed that media portrayal of different issues, particularly of the effects of domestic political-economic troubles, shifted over time in both Ireland and Germany, with the former largely focusing with concern and negative sentiment on international institutions and the latter focusing negative crisis-based sentiment on domestic- and other country-level matters.

Why did media outlets cover news stories and portray issues in both countries, often referencing similar content, in these ways? The literature on the role of media framing, particularly with respect to the government, may have some answers.

There are certainly a variety of observed trends that could explain such shifts in focus by newspaper outlets. As Bennett (and others) argued, limited resources on the part of media organisations tend to consolidate the significant effect that resorting to indexed and government-centric information sources have in influencing the content of the media.[16] In Germany and Ireland, this would fit with the observed trends of the study. Media focus in both countries changed to frame economic problems as a function of those institutions that were of greatest import to both domestic and broader international economic troubles. In the case of Germany, increasingly negative articles were run from May to October that emphasised the role of individual countries in the world, particularly in the EU, in causing systemic economic issues and preventing a broad recovery. In Ireland, those same countries met with a more positive reflection, but were overshadowed by primarily negative coverage of the international system and the failures of institutions.

However, given that the media coverage studied here represents commentary on internationally-induced economic matters and that works in the literature on political communication have shown that governments are almost never able to lead the media and dictate the content of press outlets, is it not perhaps more reasonable to say that the limited resources of such organisations will be spent canvassing official sources of information?[17] Considering the reality that information on the crisis primarily comes from beyond the country, media outlets in European countries may logically look elsewhere, from the reports of other countries governments and international institutions to multinational statistics research organisations that are set up to look at such matters across borders, for perspective.

The works of Herman and Chomsky, arguing that media firms are most highly motivated and incentivised to bias coverage of events based on potential for profit, supports the idea that media outlets in crisis contexts will be driven to seek information most conducive to securing a favouring and profitable environment to operate in.[18] In the two countries studied here, this implies differ-

ent things. In Ireland, focus on domestic- and country-level problems as a function of international institutions is the logical outcome of crisis-driven media coverage policies because outlets have an interest in securing the conditions for the domestic recovery of the marketplace.[19] Moreover, as the supranational nature of the EU insulates media organisations to a large degree from the backlash of institutions that come under closest scrutiny, there is little reason for balanced coverage. In Germany, the opposite focus on other countries as a function of the problems of the international system is similarly logical, as media outlets have an interest in preventing future domestic downturn from the spread of foreign problems. In the German case, this may imply congruency with government policies in terms of focus on fixing international issues for which the country is seen as a regional leader, but different with respect to the fact that profit-centric media policies likely bias domestic perceptions of international issues through framing, thus diminishing the representative control of policy that the government has.[20] Finally, these trends toward outlet-centric framing practices are further reflected in both countries by two factors that came out of this study. First, the overwhelming use of statistical data from non government sources across both periods, particularly in Irish newspapers (three quarters of the 82% of all articles in period 2 with respect to half of the 47% in period 1 indicates that there was an obviously high level of reliance on information sources whose only criteria was issue relevance, not government linkage. Secondly, the significant decline in readership for each paper over the period between May and October (over 10% in all cases and around 30% for both the Irish Times and Examiner) indicates that, from a business perspective, there are clear incentives for media organisations to support framing on certain issues that are popular and could improve their operational climate.

A final set of conclusions seem relevant to the operation of media outlets in framing issues during crisis periods here, particularly with respect to Germany and Ireland during the global and sovereign debt crises. Thrall's proposal that the views of the media can be split into three distinct groups based on intent – the watchdog press, the attack dog press and the lapdog press – pertinently describes beliefs about how media organisations focus their efforts to provide a certain type of coverage.[21] However, since it is argued here

that media organisations are incentivised by profit and by their own ability to influence the flow of information as a gateway between governments and the public, it would perhaps be most fitting to link the mentality of the "dogs" with that of intentional threat inflation.[22,23]

For both countries, there is a distinct change their stance relative to the government could be labelled. In Germany, where media coverage initially focused on the troubles of other countries in the context of problems in the international system, outlet-level concerns about profits could certainly have led to the use of frames that, by supporting the German view that domestic reforms were needed in other countries, essentially represented an attack dog mentality. Though German media coverage of issues fell closely in line with domestic government commentary on the crisis, this research argues that lack of government influence over the processes of frame construction in media organisations and strong economic performance relative to other states make an attack dog definition of mentality with respect to other countries most apt.

Similarly, in Ireland, though framing of issues domestically and abroad as a function of international institutions fell closely in line with government commentary on the crisis at most points, the high number of mentions of non-government sources of statistical and poll information indicates that there was no causal link leading from government processes to media coverage. Rather, this and declining readership numbers would again imply that media organisations are motivated to construct certain frames during crisis situations based on what is thought to be popular and what will ultimately be beneficial for the future operation of outlet business. In other words, in Ireland over the period, print media outlets shrugged off the patronage of government-centric information sources and perspectives to frame issues from the watchdog position.

Ultimately, this study implies that, given an assumption of media-centric frame construction, there exists a phenomenon of "media threat inflation" during crisis periods, in which organisations act as the drivers of national perspective in the context of their own needs.

The result of this is that there are implications for future research. A broader sample of countries would certainly allow future studies to control for the situational significance of Ireland and

Germany either being in abject crisis or being a leader of the economic area responsible for dealing with the crisis. Those countries that have experienced middling to good recoveries would be good candidates for a further media study.

Conclusions and Implications for Future Research

The results of this study have many implications for future research into the behaviour of media organisations during crisis periods. Data gathered from news sources in both nations studied indicates a direct correlation between economic performance across the period of the global financial and sovereign debt crises and the orientation of media coverage. It is clear that, over time, media organisations were incentivised to construct different methods for framing news articles. This essay, through testing and analysis in which the researcher's null hypotheses failed to be rejected, argued that the unique political-economic makeup of the EU, and precipitous changes in the economic and circulatory circumstances of each newspaper over the period studied, indicates that frame construction is outlet-centric and, thus, premised entirely on the interests of media organisations. To expand upon this analysis in the future, it would be appropriate to undertake a similar study with regards to a greater number of countries, controlling for a broader range of crisis-based political-economic circumstances and compensating for any biases that result from only drawing from English language sources.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this study has significant implications for the formulation of both economic and social policy, particularly in the EU, in years to come. In Europe, where increasing divergence of sovereign political economic issues has already stressed the processes of international economic governance and forced alterations of the fiscal and monetary structure of the system, the phenomenon of media threat inflation observed in this study represents one aspect of a broader dynamic in which nationally-based interest groups, particularly private-sector market-driven entities, may not be incentivised to promote mechanisms of international integration. Though a natural occurrence in any free market system, such interest group activities pose significant obstacles

to the development of relationships institutionally defined more by their supranational applications than country-specific relevance. As seen during the sovereign debt and broader eurozone crises of the past years, the manifestation of this effect is especially evident with relation to policies that, in the short-term, benefited some international actors over others.

Ultimately, future policies of both domestic and international stakeholders must aim to ameliorate the effects of geographically-constrained interest groups as they are motivated to act on interests that constrain government reliance on non-biased popular opinion. After all, without the appropriate interplay between international and domestic concerns, between social and economic processes, how can a paradigm-spanning institution like the EU hope to construct an appropriately distributed system of accountability and support for coping with future iterations of what has undoubtedly been the continent's greatest challenge of fragmentation in over half a century?

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Notes to Pages

1 See Livingstone and Lance Bennett, (2003), 'Gatekeeping, Indexing, and Live-Event News: Is Technology Altering the Construction of News?' *Political Communication*, 20, pp. 363-380.

2 For information on neoliberal reforms in the post-WWII period, see Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin and Geoffrey Garrett (2004), 'Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism' *International Organization*, 60, pp. 781-810.

3 See John G. Ruggie (1982), 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,' *International Organization*, 36:2.

4 For a reading into decoupling and the unique variation that the process of the EU represents in neoliberalism see Christoph Hermann (2007), 'Neoliberalism in the European Union,' *Studies in Political Economy*, 79.

5 Ibid.

6 Livingstone and Bennett (2003), pp. 363-370.

7 Lance Bennett (1990), 'Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States,' *Journal of Political Communication*, 40:2.

8 See Trevor A. Thrall (2000a), *War in the Media Age*. Hampton Press; and

Trevor A. Thrall (2000b) Competing Images of the Press, University of Michigan Press.

9 Thrall (2000b), pp. 6-9.

10 Ibid, pp. 15-16.

11 Data for GDP and debt is derived from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm> (last accessed 12 December 2012).

12 Archival information for newspaper sources may be found at: <www.independent.ie>, <www.irishexaminer.com>, <www.irishtimes.com>, <www.bild.de>, <www.sueddeutsche.de>, and <www.faz.net>.

13 Melvin DeFleur and Margaret DeFleur (2009), *Mass Communication Theories: Explaining Origins, Processes, and Effects,* Allyn & Bacon.

14 David Manning White (1950), 'The "Gate Keeper": A Case Study in the Selection of News,' *Journalism Quarterly*, 27, pp. 383-391.

15 Livingstone and Bennett (2003), pp. 363-370.

16 See Bennett (1990), pp. 118-125.

17 See Robert Elegant (1981), 'How to Lose A War: The Press and Viet Nam,' *Encounter*, 57:2, pp. 73-90. See also Andrew Mullen and Jeffery Klaehn (2010), 'The Herman–Chomsky Propaganda Model: A Critical Approach to Analysing Mass Media Behaviour, *Sociology Compass*, 4:4.

18 See Herman and Noam Chomsky (1988), *Manufacturing Consent*, NY: Pantheon Books, pp. 1-36.

19 Ibid, pp. 28-34.

20 Again, such diminution of government control over components of the propaganda-related mechanisms of the press, as a result of national crisis and interest group-response, is well studied though with focus on conflict-based catalysts. See Elegant (1981), pp. 73-90.

21 Thrall (2000b), pp. 5-7.

22 Though originally used as a conceptual term by Chaim Kaufmann with respects to the Bush Administration's successes in selling the idea of War in Iraq, threat inflation is relevant in this case, describing the manner in which media outlets are incentivised to maximise their operational potential by highlighting aspects of the news that will resonate well with the reading and buying population. See Chaim Kaufmann (2004) 'Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War,' *International Security*, 29:1, pp. 5-48.

23 Thrall (2000b), pp. 9-13.

THE "ARAB SPRING" IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

Miron Lakomy

Abstract: *The Greater Middle East has traditionally played a major role in French foreign policy. Following WWI, the 3rd French Republic acquired Syria and Lebanon which created a foundation for political, economic and cultural ties between France and the Arab world. In the post-Cold War era, French diplomatic activity in the region was split into several main priorities which gravitated around being a solid mediator between Israel and the Arabs for the construction of a durable peace – via treaty – while supporting Arab and French regional interests. This work explores the dynamics of French foreign policy in the Middle East with particular emphasis on the most recent set of transformations brought about by the Arab Spring. This work seeks to reveal the level of preparedness (or lack thereof) of France for such eventualities as well as reveals the role France may play in the future.*

Keywords: France, Middle East, Arab Spring, Foreign Policy, Revolution

Thematic Introduction

The Middle East plays a major role in French foreign policy. After WWI, the 3rd French Republic acquired territories formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire: Syria and Lebanon; creating a foundation for strong cultural bonds between France and the Arab world. The end of WWII reinforced French interests in the region. Despite the rising challenges in its colonies, especially in Algeria, Paris – in the 1940s and 1950s – struggled to retain a presence and French attempts to suppress Algerian independence created widespread distrust among the Arabs. This was strengthened during the Suez Crisis (1956) and close cooperation with Israel; the 4th French Republic (1950s) developed a robust military alliance with Israel including the latter's nuclear weapons development programme.[1]

When de Gaulle assumed power (1958), French foreign policy fundamentally changed. De Gualle reduced military cooperation

with Israel and began to support the Arab cause instead. He also agreed to establish an independent Algeria which helped overcome a major hurdle between France and the Arab states. Both decisions were welcomed in the Maghreb and Mashriq. The real breakthrough however took place in 1967 as a reaction to the Six-Day War. Despite causing US anger, France officially supported Arab and Soviet policies during the conflict. Symbolically, de Gaulle adopted an arms embargo against Tel Aviv in what became a turning point for French diplomatic activity in the Middle East. Since then, France's foreign policy has been widely perceived as "pro-Arab." Subsequent presidents – until Sarkozy – remained somewhat loyal to the approach adopted by de Gaulle; a point reflected in French cooperation with Hussein's Iraq and arming Qadaffi's Libya.[2]

The Gaullist perception of the Arab world remained mostly unchanged, even after the Cold War. Traditional French diplomatic activity in the Middle East (post-1991) may be broken down into four priorities. Firstly, the 5th Republic attempted to gain the status of mediator between Israel and the Arab states. This goal was based on the assumption that France could play a major international role because of its unique value system. Additionally, this priority may have been perceived as a result of the traditional *politique de grandeur*. [3] Such convictions became an important element of French political culture. As Zeldin notes, France has unique capabilities to act as 'a mediator between the West and the Muslim world.' [4] It certainly attempted to utilise its position.

Secondly, and connected to the first, France prioritised a general peace agreement between Israel and the Arab states. Such an agreement could be achieved *only* through diplomacy, with mutual respect for the interests of both sides. This goal was summarised by Chirac during an official visit to Jordan. He remarked that the 'new Middle East [should be] reconciled or coexist, [with a] peaceful and prosperous Palestinian state, widely accepted and free of Israeli terrorism, Jordan as an example of democracy and development, Syria in possession of all its territory, at peace with its former enemies, a free, sovereign and dynamic Lebanon and strong and healthy Egypt, being a pioneer of peace.' [5]

Thirdly, France maintained support for Arab interests. While this priority was not officially admitted, French goals in the region tended to favour the Arab position; a point visible in the declaration

of Chirac (April 1996) in Cairo. He listed four main goals for France:

1. ensuring the right of self-determination for the Palestinians,
2. ensuring the security of Israel,
3. establishing long-lasting peace between Israel and Syria, based on Lebanese independence and regulating the status of the Golan Heights and,
4. the full sovereignty of Lebanon. [6]

These goals benefited the Arab states rather than Israel, although it is noteworthy that Israeli security was mentioned. Such an approach should have allowed for French interests to have been achieved and secure its political influence in the region.

Finally, in regards to the Maghreb states, despite the end of French colonisation, North Africa (after 1991) was considered by many as *Francafrique*; part of its traditional sphere of influence, a point underscored by Pascallon's suggestion that the 5th Republic wanted to play a role of a *gendarme* in North and Central Africa. [7] Influence in the Maghreb was regarded as an important attribute of French status. These priorities were fundamental for France's activities in the Middle East since 1991.

The beginning of the 21st century produced new challenges for France in the region. Due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the political and security situation fundamentally changed. However, despite new problems (re: Iraq 2003 and Iran's nuclear programme), French policy stayed focused on maintaining friendly relations to Arab political elites. In particular, Chirac based his activities on contacts to a number of African and Arab politicians from Tunisia, Syria and Lebanon. For several years this approach went unchanged since it allowed France to secure its national interests. However, it also caused multiple tensions in relations to Israel (and the US) and, owing to the enduring pro-Arab strain of French foreign policy, Tel Aviv strongly opposed the involvement of France in peace mediation. [8]

Only after 2007 did French diplomacy in the Middle East change. Sarkozy maintained the traditional French support for Arab dictators however he also improved relations with Israel. Unlike his predecessors, Sarkozy no longer clung to unconditional support for the Palestinians, a point visible during his visit to Israel (June

2008), when he accepted the logic behind the construction of the wall dividing Israel from Palestine. His critical approach to Hamas and friendly gestures towards Tel Aviv resulted in success, as the 5th Republic finally became a key mediator in the Middle East peace process. It was a great accomplishment; the 5th Republic maintained friendly relations with Arab states and Israel for the first time. [9]

From this initial historical context, it is important to fast forward to more contemporary issues since the unfolding set of revolutions sweeping the wider Middle Eastern region have undermined an assortment of relations while producing new opportunities and challenges. The remainder of this work is based on evaluating the way France has dealt with regional transformations; how it has reacted to the Arab Spring and sought to carve an appropriate niche to fulfil its enduring national interests. To achieve these goals, this work evaluates four Arab states regarded as central to France's international engagement. These are: Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Libya. The subsequent evaluation considers these one at a time though attempts to construct adequate bridges between these cases and the attempted fulfilment of French foreign policy objectives in the region.

Tunisia, France and the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring, ostensibly, began on 18 December 2010 in Tunisia following the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a series of demonstrations following that ultimate act of defiance and, in typical fashion, the attempted suppression of such demonstrations by the police forces of Ben-Ali. Over the span of several weeks of street battles and the abandonment of the regime by Tunisia's armed forces, a transitional government succeeded the exiled Ben-Alis. Overlapping the events in Tunisia, demonstrations erupted in Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Syria and Yemen while lesser street activities occurred in Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait and Lebanon (among others).

While each of these had its own reason for combustion; some based on legitimate demands, others on sectarianism and external agitations, and others still rooted in tribal power imbalances, together they produced an acute set of challenges for France (among others). Yet, since this work is concerned with the manner in which

France's foreign policy reacted to the Arab Spring, analysis will remain fixed on it.

Several factors produced the clear impetuous for change to France's foreign policy. First, as noted in the introduction of this work, France's regional engagement was based on personal relations with several Arab dictators and hence, when Tunisia (especially) began to agitate for democratic reforms France found itself in a serious dilemma. On one hand France was officially a champion of democratic movements around the world and therefore should support, if not openly encourage civilian thrusts against authoritarian regimes. Alternatively however, supporting such movements would undermine a foundation of France's regional influence. Second, since it was impossible to predict the scope and results of the Arab Spring, France was caught in suspended animation waiting for – rather than shaping – policy responses. Third, the unfolding revolutions produced general instability, a point which further underscored France's seeming momentary disengagement since one of the key reasons Paris had supported authoritarian regimes was due to the perception that they were more predictable and stable. Finally, regional instability could boost illegal immigration to the EU, and hence France was keen to avoid such spill-over effects. So, when the first demonstrations in Tunisia erupted, France remained silent.

There was also a degree of embarrassment. Since France kept close political, business and personal relations with the political elites of Tunisia, it was soon revealed that many French political elites – no matter the colour of their affinity – paid homage to the Ben-Ali clique; vacationing in the country and making personal and official visits with great frequency. Indeed, in 2008 Sarkozy travelled to Tunis and piled praise on Ben-Ali for 'expanding the liberties' of his people. That same year leading member of the Socialist opposition – the now defamed former IMF managing director – Strauss-Khan also visited Tunis and congratulated Ben-Ali for being a 'model' for other emerging countries around the world. Such visits were not novel, they were merely a continuation of Chirac's policy; a policy which specifically targeted Ben-Ali as a stabilising and modernising regional power.

Such examples are typical of France's style of engagement in the Middle East. The bonds between Paris and Tunis, coupled with

fears of instability drove France to muted reflection in the early days of demonstration. As one European diplomat suggested, France positioned itself according to the logic that it is better to deal with 'the dictator you know than the dictator you don't.' Such sentiments are not the material of policy; they reflect outmoded biases and worked to confuse France foreign policy orientation to the external international environment as much as within France itself. Just as the EU and many states around the world were looking to France for policy guidance in Tunisia, Paris could do nothing but retreat from centre-stage to better gauge the situation.

Such visible inactivity of the French government provoked internal political tensions, which reached fever-pitch as the first foreign policy announcement, with any substance, came in the form of a 'call to arms.' Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michèle Alliot-Marie, at the beginning of January 2011 suggested that France should dispatch its security forces in support Ben-Ali's regime; a shocking testament to the depth of the internal crisis the external crisis provoked. Indeed, opposition member Pierre Moscovici, commented – in response to Alliot-Marie's bizarre suggestion – that 'We [France] really have diplomacy without courage and without dignity. I am ashamed of what I have seen.' Such feelings were widespread; among the opposition and deep within French civil society. Three days later Alliot-Marie did an 'about face,' retracted her statement and clearly announced that France's foreign policy in the Maghreb is based on the principle of non-intervention. Additionally, and in contrast to the manner France had sought to re-emerge as a legitimate regional power Henri Guiano (a ranking official in the Sarkozy government), declared that France was not seeking the role of a *gendarme* in the Mediterranean. [11]

As noted above, assuming the role of *gendarme* was precisely what French foreign policy aimed to achieve and therefore the retracted statements sought to allay public and opposition-based criticism and were not truly policy statements (a point highlighted when, in March 2011, France fires the first salvos in the NATO campaign against Qadaffi). Alliot-Marie became a scapegoat for a dysfunctional policy approach and was forced to resign from office. On 18 January, she candidly admitted her, and the nation's, failures announcing: 'Let's face it, we were all of us – politicians, diplomats, researchers, journalists – taken by surprise by the Jasmine Revolu-

tion,'[12] hardly the inspiring words of a senior member of the cabinet and rather the dumbfounded sentiment of one who had cozied too closely to the Ben-Ali regime and had to bear the consequences of its demise.

Ultimately, with growing public concern, France's policy to Tunisia changed and the crutch Ben-Ali had hoped to continue to prop him up was withdrawn. France now actively worked to support political transformations in Tunisia and in February 2011 Prime Minister Francois Fillon presented a new plan aimed at supporting democratic reforms.[13]

Approaches to Egypt

As noted, Egypt's chapter of the Arab Spring overlapped with the events unfolding in Tunisia and demonstrations erupted on 25 January 2011 around the central Tahrir Square in Cairo. What began as a series of haphazard demonstrations aimed to show solidarity with Tunisia quickly transformed into a more organised protests against the inhumane deployment of force by Egypt's security forces, limits to freedom of speech, manipulated national elections and serial, widespread corruption. Such expressions were wrapped up in the language of deposing Mubarak who had come to be regarded as *the* barrier to modernisation and obstacle to reform. Predictably, Mubarak's government called up security forces to suppress the Tahrir demonstrations through the severing of lines of communication (the internet and mobile networks) mass arrests and the deployment of rival sub-national groups loyal to Mubarak. Despite such measures, or perhaps due to them, the raw alienation of the ruling clique from the Egyptian masses was revealed, ushering in a period of sustained violence and general instability. Following a series of stammering speeches which bordered on the delusional, Mubarak – his support from the military waning – ceded power to the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces (11 February). [14]

By the time demonstrations were in full swing, and having learned (the hard way) from its mistakes in dealing with Tunisia, France opted to engage in a more active policy approach to Egypt since the country has long been regarded as a linchpin for regional stability. Additionally, any civil war in Egypt – especially one with definite Islamic overtones – would likely undermine Israeli security

and damage European political and economic interests. Swift action was required. So, on 28 January, just three days after the commencement of demonstrations, Alliot-Marie (who had not yet been forced to resign) issued France's first statement expressing 'deep concern over the demonstrations which have rocked Egypt for the past few days ... [France] deplores the casualties and calls for restraint.' Stressing France's friendship with Egypt, she called for dialogue between all parties in order to meet expectations of greater freedom and democracy. [15] In other words, France would not blindly support Mubarak; different priorities were being sought. France then took the initiative to bring EU states to develop a common position, which bore fruit on 29 January, when Sarkozy, Merkel and Cameron declared – in the subtle language of diplomacy – that they are

> deeply concerned about the events that we are witnessing in Egypt. We recognise the moderating role President Mubarak has played over many years in the Middle East. We now urge him to show the same moderation in addressing the current situation in Egypt.

They demanded that violence against civilians cease and human rights be respected, particularly rights connected to the freedom of speech and of assembly.[16] The trickle of concern turned into a torrent and France issued an assortment of demands ranging from the responsibility to protect journalists to pushing for a rapid transition of power in Egypt; essentially regime change from within. Then, on 11 February, Sarkozy rounded off his government's public pressure against Mubarak with a welcoming of his resignation and hope that the new Egyptian authorities would establish democracy and the rule of law. [17]

This is not to suggest that France simply weighed in against Mubarak without pause for reflection on who would replace him. Instead, Sarkozy was acutely aware of the dangers that lay ahead and the potential for abuse of the unfolding situation in the country. Therefore, France repeatedly cautioned over the future of Egypt going so far as to call of the full rejection of any kind of religious dictatorship, stressing that Western democracies had a moral responsibility to help Egypt (and Tunisia) avoid systems than would be worse than the previous dictatorships.[18] Such an orientation indicates that France was not fully swept-up in the seeming euphoria

in Tahrir (and beamed around the world); instead it was happy to see the end of the Mubarak era and with it the end of dictatorships in Egypt though attempted to take baby-steps towards full engagement with the country's new power-brokers.

Nonetheless, Foreign Minister Juppé travelled to Cairo in March (2011) where he personally congratulated Morsi and sought to convey France's interests in the region's return to stability. While there, Juppé announced (06 March) that 'In Egypt this movement is conducted in an admirable manner (…) The attitude of the armed forces and protesters, gathered in the Tahrir Square, are exemplary.' He also promised augmented financial assistance from France and the EU, underscoring the importance of the Union for the Mediterranean for Egypt. It is noteworthy however, that France rejected the suggestion that it cancel Egyptian debt.[19]

France's treatment of the Egyptian demonstrations was multipronged and contained several features worth exploring. Firstly, France openly supported the protesters and developed an anti-regime orientation. Learning from errors in Tunisia, Sarkozy expended tremendous energies attempting (partially successful) to promote France as an unflinching, unapologetic champion of democracy and inalienable human rights in the region. In doing so, Sarkozy exposed a policy inconsistency since it had, in the not-too-distant-past stated a principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Arab countries. Secondly, Sarkozy began to cooperate closely with his European allies, particularly Great Britain and Germany. This multilateral cooperation aimed at boosting the French position in the region and was not meant to construct an EU policy as such, rather it intended to legitimate France's position through the nods of approval of the UK and Germany. Thirdly, during the Egyptian demonstrations – coupled with the seeming inability of Mubarak to offer any tangible reforms – France recognised that the Arab Spring (more generally) was widespread and persistent and likely to last for some time. To better secure its interests, France undertook a series of initiatives to quell hostilities against it for its previous support of Mubarak (among others) and generate support among the so-called Arab street. Finally, France continued to harbour anxieties that the momentum of change would result in a purely Islamic revolution and subsequent state. This was a well-grounded fear since the Muslim Brotherhood – while initially taking a back-seat in the

revolution – was the most disciplined and organised opposition group in Egypt and once it began to mobilise quickly emerged as the single strongest political force in the country. To prevent the rise of a theocratic Egyptian state France set a new – if unrealisable – goal; supporting democratic reforms as *the* avenue to suppress Islamist fundamentalism. France – like many others – expected the new authorities to respect democracy and human rights, particularly related to women and religious minorities. It has been disappointed.

The Syria Conundrum

In contrast to the short lived revolutionary zeal – though certainly not the long and arduous period of transformation – attached to both the Egyptian and Tunisian episodes, Syria's is one of phases, of demonstrations leading to suppression, suppression to insurgency, insurgency leading to a full-fledged civil war and the civil war seems likely to start a regional conflict. France, like many others, was overwhelmed attempting to deal with the unfolding regional fluctuations. As a result, it either underestimated the dedication of demonstrators to pursue a regime change strategy or overestimated the regimes ability to suppress the revolution. Additionally, – and perhaps most importantly – France was on good terms with the al Assad regime (especially during Chirac's presidency)[20] and was using its leverage in the country to balance some of the interests of Iran, Russia and China.[21]

Therefore, initially, France's reaction to the outbreak of violence in Syria was one of muted criticism and weak condemnations.

Similarly to its Egypt policy, France initiated a multilateral dynamic based around the EU, which itself only reacted to Syrian bloodshed with a limited-in-scope sanctions regime against 13 Syrian officials; adopted four months into the conflict. However with each passing day, as the death toll mounted, the EU adopted a sharper tone. On 20 June 2011, the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU took a proper stance and condemned

> in the strongest terms the worsening violence in Syria. The EU deplores that the Syrian authorities have not responded to the calls to immediately stop the violence and engage in meaningful reforms. The EU considers that the ongoing violent repression

> in Syria constitutes a threat to internal and regional stability (…) Stressing that the current crisis can only be settled through a political process, the EU reiterates its calls on the Syrian authorities to launch a credible, genuine and inclusive national dialogue and meaningful political reforms without delay.[22]

Expectedly, the regime's reaction was rhetorical and was not reflected in policy changes. The same could not be said of the EU, which thanks largely to French initiative, imposed personal sanctions against a wider web of Syrian representatives. These sanctions were again extended on 23 June. A third wave of European sanctions was adopted at the beginning of August.[23] These measures proved ineffective; they did not force Syrian authorities to end bloodshed. However, if seen through a more symbolic lens, they mark a milestone in the EU's foreign policy as they may be regarded as foreign policy in motion rather than in retrospect.

In addition to pursuing EU options, France also commence several unilateral initiatives. In April 2011, Juppé listed four priorities to end regime repressions. First, France pledged to use all possible diplomatic means to end strife in Syria. For example, Syria's ambassador was summoned to Quai d'Orsay to provide explanations and listen to French demands. Second, Juppé announced more robust cooperation in the UNSC to get both sides to agree to an immediate ceasefire. Third, France imposed its own sanctions against the regime. Fourth, tactic communications lines were opened to the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Fifth and finally, France was set to initiate actions within the Human Rights Council (HRC), becoming the initiators of the Council's 29 April resolution which placed blame squarely on al Assad and his regime.[24] France also supported the withdrawal of the Syrian candidature from the HRC.[25]

Libya: French Style

Ultimately, France's engagement to Tunisia, Egypt and Syria pales in insignificance compared to the active role France assumed in Libya. Domestic pressure mounted against Qaddafi in February 2011 as members of Benghazi's tribes, learning from the experiences of Tunisia and sensing an opportunity, agitated for greater control over Libya's economic and political future. The Benghazi-centric

demonstrations resembled less of a series of political gatherings and more as a rallying cry to mobilise the country against Qaddafi's rule. The Benghazi crowd drove west to Misarata, was stopped dead in its tracks and then pushed back to an inch of its life, that is, until NATO intervened and threw it a life preserver. Indeed, NATO's support was so vital, many doubt whether the revolution would have survived even an additional 24 hours more on its own. NATO's actions were largely driven by French interests and, in fact, warplanes.

The Sarkozy Factor

Sarkozy was driven by many factors. Despite Tripoli's geopolitical position beyond France's North African 'sphere of influence' (the so-called *pre carré*), [26] Qaddafi was perceived in Paris as a key actor in the Mediterranean littoral. Secondly, as suggested by Willsher, owing to very low approval ratings, and facing presidential elections (2012), Sarkozy was desperate for a political boost to reinvigorate his administration and reintroduce the *Super Sarko* nickname to the public domain. [27] These points converge with a third; Sarkozy was trying to salvage his reputation following idleness as the Arab Spring unfolded.

Indeed, the ambiguous policy during Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution coupled with cautious support for both the Egyptian and Syrian revolts, heightened French discontent. France retains the self-perception as a defender of universal values and thus the French public holds to account its leaders who are seen as undermining such values. Failing to clearly and unambiguously denounce regime-stoked violence in Tunisia, giving tied-support to demonstrators in Egypt alienated Sarkozy from his electorate and prodded him, in Libya, to apply a core element of French foreign policy: *politique de grandeur* to win over the French public.

France Libya policy was hashed in March 2011, during a decisive summit in Paris devoted to the crisis. According to Erlanger, Sarkozy announced that

> France decided to assume its role, its role before history. The decision to lead the military intervention was also explained by the humanitarian need, another important aspect of traditional French foreign policy. Muammar Qaddafi's actions against the

rebels were considered by France as a "killing spree" against citizens wanting to "liberate themselves from servitude."[28]

Sarkozy later added that 'if we intervene on the side of the Arab nations it is because of a universal conscience that cannot tolerate such crimes.'[29] Such rhetoric marked a significant departure from the reaction to the Tunisian and Syrian crises.

Also, France must consider the foreign policy preferences of its sizable – and growing – Muslim community and balance these against the dangers of illegal immigration to Europe. When faced with having to strike such a balance, Sarkozy decided that intervening in Libya would produce three tangible results: 1. it would stem the tide of immigration since it would deny would be immigrants a reason to leave Libya; 2. it would show its Muslim population that France was also concerned with what occurred in the Muslim world; and 3. it would allow France to demonstrate its regional influence and international significance. Regarding immigration France's Minister of European Affairs Laurent Wauquiez warned of some 300,000 would-be-immigrants to Europe, adding that France regarded Libyan immigrants as a 'real risk for Europe that must not be underestimated.'[30]

Finally, Libya played into another key aspect of French foreign policy; Sarkozy's transatlantic embrace. One of Sarkozy's 2007 campaign promises was to establish a clear delineation (or intersection when needed) of responsibilities between NATO and the EU, and re-entered the Alliance (2009) to do just that. The idea was for NATO and the EU to cooperate in managing political and military problems of a transnational manner; NATO to deal with pressing conventional and asymmetrical military actions – while retaining the Alliance's deterrence capability – while the EU would focus on less defined security challenges. Cooperation would be based on greater involvement of European powers in NATO's decision-making process.[31] War in Libya provided an ideal opportunity to demonstrate how this new transatlantic security system could function.

France's Libyan Campaign

As noted above, France assumed an assertive role throughout

the duration of upheaval in Libya. However, its first salvos were purely of a political nature as Sarkozy built the case for intervention through public appeals and consistent assigning of responsibility to Qaddafi and the tribes and military units loyal to him. This played out over nearly six-weeks in a clear attempt to heightening awareness of the situation and therefore gain a degree of legitimacy for any action that may be necessary in the future.

Once Qaddafi's forces had pushed rebels back to Benghazi, France took the lead in demanding the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya. This was not to be a standard no-fly zone that would limit the ability of Qaddafi to deploy the air-force against rebel fighters; it implied controlling the air in order to control the ground.

French officials rushed to the UNSC to plead the case for intervention in Libya, which was initially rejected as both Russia and China remained loyal to their Libya ally. Undeterred by the initial setback at the UN, Sarkozy unilaterally recognised 'the LTNC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people,' adding, that France would send an ambassador to Benghazi. Soon after, the UK joined in the chorus and together *la entente cordial* published a joint statement emphasising the legitimacy of the LTNC and suggesting that other EU countries consider them as 'political interlocutors.'[32]

On 11 March France initiated an EU summit in Brussels devoted to the Libyan crisis. It was, however, postponed; Sarkozy's decisions produced a confused policy. According to media reports, Juppé and Fillon were unfamiliar with Sarkozy's recognition of the LNTC.[33] Such recognition also surprised several members of the EU. For instance, Merkel regarded Sarkozy's unilateralism as being against the spirit of European solidarity. Despite these problems, France was determined and pushed ahead with an emergency meeting on Libyan. Some 20 world leaders heeded the call (including the US, UK, and Germany) and ventured to Paris on 19 March to discuss possible solutions. Intervention in Libya was decided.[34]

This assembly was only last minute window-dressing however. Having passed UNSC resolution 1973 (approved on 17 March), the meeting of the 19th was surely intended to develop an enforcement strategy rather than provide Qaddafi the chance to exit Libya. Indeed, 1973 imposed the no-fly zone over Libya, called for an immediate ceasefire, and strengthened the arms embargo and an assets freeze against the regime. It also authorised the international

community to use 'all necessary means' to protect Libya's civilian population.[35] While much of the events between 17 and 19 March 2011 remain shrouded in mystery, it is clear that France assumed a leadership role in NATO and that NATO assumed a leadership role in enforcing UNSC resolution 1973.

The Intervention

It comes as no surprise that on the 19th, while the assembly was still in session, the intervention commenced over Benghazi. French warplanes scrambled to secure the airspace above Libya. Surprisingly, the US played only a supportive role while the UK and France took the lead with the later contributing some 50 military aircraft – *Rafale*, *Mirage* and *Super Etendard* – which conducted hundreds of strikes against Qaddafi air and ground assets. It also provided helicopters, *Tigre* and *Gazelle* along with a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier the *Charles de Gaulle*, the destroyer *Forbin* and the frigate *Jean Bart*.

Five months later and French aircraft had conducted roughly 4500 missions; nearly a solid third of all NATO sorties. The cost of engagement was estimated at some $2 million (USD) daily. French activities were not limited to air operations, its territorial army was also involved and providing significant material support to the rebels. Consider, for example, that by late May France was airlifting both small arms (and ammunition) and auxiliary equipment to areas south of Tripoli and the Djebel Nefousa Mountains.[36] This support was sufficient to tilt the scales of victory and from summer 2011, rebel units had turned the tide. Just as France had shot the first, so it is fitting that French forces were responsible for an air strike on Qaddafi's convoy near Sirte, which led to his capture and death at the hands of a lynch mob. Officially, NATO's Libya operation drew to a close on 31 October 2011.

Libya represents an important milestone in the history of France's international military engagements after WWII since it was the first time the 5th Republic participated in a NATO operation on such a large scale. According to Bumiller, this intervention changed the perception of French military capabilities in Washington[37] and, above all, this operation symbolise Sarkozy's vision of a new transatlantic security system where greater equality between

the US and European members of the alliance exists.

Conclusion

The Arab Spring has gone down in modern history as an important turning point for French foreign policy in the Middle East. For decades, France had hedged its bets by supporting dictators in the Maghreb and Mashriq. Yet, within a short period of time – essentially from the end of 2010 until early 2011 – a series of regime-shattering protests in many Arab states produced new challenges and set France on a new trajectory. Interestingly, despite its self perception as the prototypical example of a just state, France initially perceived Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution as a threat, fearing both the rise of Islamic parties and sharp increases in European immigration.

Policy change reflected the heavy public criticism lobbed at Sarkozy for allying with Ben Ali instead of the demonstrators. So, mid-demonstration and Sarkozy did an about-face and opted to support the Arab Spring. Caution was thrown to the wind during the Libyan crisis since Sarkozy recognised a chance to reaffirm French commitments to democratic values while pursuing its regional policy of power aggrandisement. France took advantage of the conflict to test the new division of responsibilities between NATO and the EU with itself at the helm; an excellent way to improve both France's and Europe's image in the eyes of the US.

Although not noted in the above rendition, it may be noted that the conflict in Libya provided economic opportunities to France in the region as well. In September 2011 media reports revealed that Libyan rebels had promised France some 35% of their national crude oil for military assistance.[38] This point certainly requires deeper evaluation; though this work defers to others' explorations owing to spatial constraints.

Equally important, it should be remembered that France's regional role since 2010 is inconsistent since attention is paid to mostly to Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, largely ignoring other episodes of political violence such as a Shia insurgency in Bahrain and a strange-brew of tribal and religious conflict in Yemen.

Finally, the French-led intervention in Libya led to a number of controversies. First, France only supported the rebels in their bid to conduct a regime change against Qaddafi. This ran counter to the letter (and spirit) of UNSC resolution 1973 which theoretically

obliged the international community to use all means necessary to force both sides to adhere to a ceasefire, which was never attempted. Additionally, NATO's operation raised doubts in Russia and China. Indeed, Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Lavrov stated that

> Members of the international community, first of all our Western partners, have chosen the path of supporting one of the sides in the civil war – probably the party that represented the Libyan people's legitimate aspirations, but this still increased the number of casualties among the civilian population.'[39]

Multiple other problems such as the circumstances of Qaddafi's death, France's oil deal and the supposed infiltration of many rebel groups by al Qaeda and other Islamist extremists have tarnished the original reasons for and outcomes of the Libyan campaign. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that democracy and human rights, despite occupying a central tenet of France's declared foreign policy goals, were rather instrumental and played minor roles in French decision-making.

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DYNAMICS OF PEACE MANAGEMENT: FROM INTERSTATE TO INTER-HUMANITY DIALOGUE

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Abstract: *Traditionally the term "peace" has been defined as the absence of war. Yet, "peace" is closely associated to the term "security" and although "peace" and "security" are both generally referred to in interstate affairs, "peace" is more deeply attached to civil society, since it ultimately suffers in the absence of peace. Peace cannot be confined by territorial limits; a breach of peace in one territory may have consequence in neighbouring lands and may give rise to regional tensions. This work investigates peace management through the available international legal tools. In this respect the work shows how peace has links to the expansive human community where inter-territorial, inter-cultural, inter-regional, inter-ethnic, and other inter-community issues are involved. Subsequently the work suggests that a durable and sustainable peace requires adequately addressing human to human relations in a more sophisticated way and through a softer approach with long-term visions where dialogues from various levels play important roles.*

Keywords: Peace, Human Community, Security, International Law, Dialogue

Introduction

"Peace" is often treated as "security" with the word implying an enjoyment of a secure environment. Since peace is deeply connected to security, and since security implies a lack of conflict, it is easy to regard peace simply as the absence of war. When taken to the international level, peace as a state of affairs between recognised national entities is crucial and produces explicit differences between the domestic and exogenous areas of state activities. Obviously, the domestic area (of jurisdiction) is the physical place where state institutions, civil society and individuals conduct their interactions and it is from within this space that sovereignty – the key ingredient

in statehood – is derived from. And being sovereign provides state institutions – whether under the stewardship of elected officials or through inheritance – with legal authority over a defined territory free (in theory) from external interference. The maintenance of peace within a defined territory rests on sovereign authority, its legislative capabilities and implementation tools to uphold law and order within its jurisdiction. Sovereign authorities find its own way to maintain peace within its own national frontiers.

Alternatively, in reference to the exogenous area of state activity, sovereignty draws a clear line between internal and external affairs. It is the guarantee that other states will not interfere in its domestic political arena and the promise not to interfere in theirs. This dimension to sovereignty may be self-limited however, since access to international or regional organisations, and bi- and multi-lateral treaties may relinquishment some authority to a certain extent, in certain matters. This applies, at the present time, to transnational movements where civil societies interact with each other beyond the exclusive domain of national state sovereignty, re: in cyberspace.

The relevance of sovereignty is often questioned by scholars who examine its enduring pragmatism, which provides a functional perspective of sovereignty, such as the maintenance of peace, the failure of which may produce unwanted international attention and tensions.[1] Consequently, it has become very difficult to draw a precise line between the domestic and external affairs of states, especially when peace is at stake.

Consequently, understandings of peace have broadened to include both interstate and intrastate aspects: ranging from the absence of war (between states or within them), poverty, human rights, and natural disasters. Since there is a growing consciousness regarding civil society and inalienable rights, and considering that whenever peace is undermined, victims tend to come from that civil society, the role of sovereignty must be understood in a more limited manner, and against the 'unlimited opportunities for oppression at home.'[2] This is precisely what this work sets out to achieve; to reveal the shortcomings of traditional approaches to sovereignty as they apply to an international environment defined by political nuances. To do so, this work, firstly, evaluates the role of the UN in upholding – simultaneously – the contradictory trends of (traditional)

sovereignty and positive peace. This is followed by a section which reviews some steps towards peace management. Finally, this work details approaches that may be taken so that the appreciation of peace as determined in the second section is made to be sustainable over the long-term.

The UN: Between Sovereignty and Peace

The more traditional approach to sovereignty as underlined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter has (gradually) become obsolete. The scope of the Article can no longer be limited to 'essentially within the domestic jurisdiction.' Internal state matters, with the broadened scope of peace, are internationalised and embrace the exception found in the second part of the Article. A threat to, or a breach of, the peace is *always* a criteria to level a situation no longer fully embedded in a domestic jurisdiction, implying the labelling of a situation as international to facilitate an international response. This, technically, allows the UN to intervene when peace in general is threatened or breached regardless of whether or not it occurs within a domestic jurisdiction. Civil wars, the wide-scale violation of human rights, famine, oppression of minorities, terrorism, all generate international concerns. The UN deploys the provisions of the Charter to intervene and safeguard the peace to deal with such concerns.

Despite the centricity of the UN in determining the legitimacy of operations deemed to be of an international character that target the domestic sphere of sovereign states, and considering that the UN is meant to be a universal organisation representing the interests, rights and responsibilities of the community of states, it is best placed to positively affect the transformation of interpretation required of understandings of peace. However, the UN is severely constrained since questions related to international peace and security fall within the mandate of the 15-member Security Council, which is deeply political. Well, not all members are. Instead, only five, the permanent members (P5) enjoy veto power over all substantive resolutions passed under Chapter 7 of the Charter. Vetoes are used when the national interests of one (or more) UNSC member, or its allies, are challenged by a particular resolution. This poses a significant problem for the UN system since it empowers only five

states – and prioritises their interests – at the expense of the international community.

Indeed, most UNSC decisions are motivated by narrowly defined self-interests. As a result, the UNSC is often criticised because of inaction or hypocrisy. Consequently, the tools deployed by the UNSC are sometimes, but not always, effective. Even when effective actions are decided on, they are frequently time-delayed owing to diplomatic hurdles related to consensus building, the size of the UN's bureaucracy, striking a balance of interests, and convincing allies of the legitimacy of such actions. Such time-lapses may lead to untold miseries until an action is undertaken.

If, as alluded to above, peace is applicable to some form of international civil society, existing international legal mechanisms must be more reflective. The following section delves into the existing structure of peace management mechanisms, so that an adequate context is derived to encourage additional approaches for the development of human-to-human relationships and, ultimately, aims to contribute to sustainable peace.

The Existing Structure of Peace Management

The maintenance of international peace and security is among the primary goals of the UN as embodied in Article 1(1) of the Charter.[3] As previously noted, the UNSC is entrusted with the task upholding Article 1(1), a point underlined in Article 24(1). Originally, the task of the UNSC was geared towards the prevention of inter-state war.[4] The non-interference with territorial integrity and the political independence of each of state has been guaranteed in Article 2(4), which seemingly goes together with UN's role embodied in Article 2(7). The UNSC, however, bears responsibility to take effective and collective measures to repeal any threat to or breach of the peace for which, the Council simply is allowed to derogate the principle of territorial integrity and political independence; re: sovereignty. This exception is found in the second clause of Article 2(7), which presents the suspension of sovereignty, enforced by international law. Consensus based decision-making is crucial for the UNSC to act, and this process, as presented above, is replete with dilemmas.

The provisions of the Charter are divided into soft and hard criteria for the management of peace, reflected in Chapters 6 and 7 of the Charter respectively. Chapter 6 deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes; where the role of the UNSC is recommend, to disputants, ways to settle their disputes peacefully (via negotiations, mediation, conciliation or by judicial settlement). The UNSC delivers its recommendations when, in its opinion, the dispute likely to endanger international peace and security. This is more of a theoretical, rather than practical arrangement since the members of the UNSC have to reach consensus. On failure to reach agreement, the issue remains listed under Chapter 6. If, on the other hand, a majority in the UNSC – with unanimous consensus among the P5 – take up the issue, it shifts from Chapter 6 to Chapter 7, which authorises the UNSC to deploy harder tools to enforce peace.

Chapter 7 commences on Article 39, which reads that:

> *The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.*

The language is ambiguous enough to provide the UNSC an array of powers to act in accordance with the subsequent Articles (i.e., Articles 41 and 42) which call for mandatory sanctions including non-military and military measures. The resulting consequence of a Chapter 7 determination of a 'threat to the peace,' grants the UNSC virtually 'unlimited power'[5] to take 'all necessary measures' for the accomplishment of its mandate. Interestingly, the UNSC is not bound by any formula regarding what may constitute a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression when it acts under Chapter 7.[6] The UNSC may determine that situations relating to internal disturbances, human rights violations, apartheid, civil conflicts or even (conceivably) the acquisition of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, as threats to the peace. Even the refusal of a government or opposition group to accept the results of an election may constitute such a threat; at least if it involves the outbreak of hostilities between contending factions or causes some aggravation

of tensions such as refugee flows or other (potential) cross-border effects.[7] The idea has been supported by the *travaux préparatoires* of Article 39 of the Charter, which reflects the drafters' intention to allow the UNSC to take enforcement actions on a broad range of cases and not to subject it to restrictions in its decision when to act.[8] Therefore, for the "international nature of a threat to the peace formulation" under the exception clause of Article 2(7), it is enough to gain Article 39 determination which would render a threat international, meaning that it no longer falls 'essentially within the domestic jurisdiction' of a state. Such a flexible use of power was not typically used – besides during the Korean War, owing to the famous 'empty chair incident' – in the formative years of the UN due to the spill-over of East-West tensions. Indeed, the UNSC was deadlocked until the end of the Cold War, when it began operating as it was originally intended.

During, and in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War the UNSC only occasionally invoked Chapter 7 mechanisms concerning the enforcement of peace. Interestingly, in all but a few cases, such resolutions were of an intrastate nature.[9] The majority of cases, disturbance to the peace was due to internal issues such as: civil war, repression, the violation of human rights and humanitarian obligations, the suppression of democratic processes, and policies of apartheid (etc).[10] Territorial limitations were not respected when the maintenance of peace was concerned. The approach the UNSC adopted was, perhaps, pragmatic, but the effectiveness of its actions remains questionable. This view is supported by several interstate and localised civil disturbances.

Examples of a Stagnated Council

The problems associated to the UNSC indicated above have consequences far beyond the political relationship of the members themselves. Actions and inactions reverberate on the ground. It is thus important to draw attention to some of the instances of UNSC lethargy in a bid to fully appreciate the Council's shortcomings.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict—The Arab-Israeli conflicts during the second half of the 20th century serve as good examples of UNSC decision-making over interstate conflicts. In the first war 1948, the

newfound UNSC invoked Chapter 7 determination of the 'threat to the peace' without taking effective measures under Articles 41 or 42, with the exception of calling for a ceasefire.[11] Even when full scale wars erupted (1956, 1967 and 1973), the UNSC proved unwilling – or, given the Cold War, unable – to take action. Similarly, during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) a consensus-based resolution was only adopted in 1987, after seven years of violent conflict.[12] Examples abound if instances of UNSC P5 members' military operations are considered; the Council could not dream of passing effective resolutions to end the US-Vietnam, China-India, UK-Argentina, France-Algeria or the USSR-Afghanistan conflicts (to name a few).

Iraq—And, seldom, does the UNSC initiate effective measures to restore the peace. However, one case stands out as an exception, the unprecedented Chapter 7 actions adopted to facilitate Operations Desert Shield and Storm (1990-1991) to repeal Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. In this case, the UNSC adopted resolution 660, and 12 additional resolutions over a four-month period; until the full liberation of Kuwait and full compliance of Iraq with UNSC directives aimed at curtailing its WMD programme. These directives, essentially, burdened Iraq with a severe sanctions regime, and caused widespread suffering in Iraq while only marginally affecting Hussein's grip on power.[13]

Rhodesia and South Africa—The unilateral declaration of independence (1965) by the white minority in Southern Rhodesia was termed a threat to international peace, only a year after the actual disturbance to peace occurred.[14] The UNSC however, expanded its authority further and, acting under Article 41 of the Charter, imposed detailed trade, transport, and fiscal sanctions on Southern Rhodesia. The resolution focused on 'the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence.'

In South Africa, the policy of apartheid was consistently condemned by the UNSC from 1963, but an effective Chapter 7 mechanism was only adopted 14 years later (1977), with an embargo on arms to South Africa.[15] The UNSC called for the elimination of apartheid and all kinds of racial discrimination within the country.[16]

Bosnia-Herzegovina—In Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992–1993, in response to atrocities and the violation of humanitarian law, the UNSC adopted a series of resolutions. Although divided on how to reach consensus on effective peace enforcement measures, the UNSC was at least successful in declaring Sarajevo and five other towns and their surroundings as 'safe areas.'[17] The resolution, by condemning all violations of international humanitarian law, ethnic cleansing in particular, as well as the denial or obstruction of access of civilians to humanitarian aid, medical assistance and basic utilities, has further extended the mandate of UNPROFOR – the peace keeping forces employed in the region – to include, *inter alia*, the use of force to deter attacks against the safe areas.[18] Still, some 200000 civilians lost their lives and the UNSC's division has been criticised for an ill-conceived understanding of civil war and 'matters within the domestic jurisdiction.'[19]

The UNSC's behaviour is repetitive. In many occasions it has used enforcement mechanism in various manner, which some found innovative, such as, use of its power to establish judicial and other bodies with binding settlement authority under Chapter VII. The fiercely debated question – whether international law has binding enforcement authority – has been answered in the affirmative in some cases with the multifaceted application of the Security Council's authority under Chapter VII. Whether all such applications of its authority were in accordance with international law and/or in accordance with the Charter principles have been a fiercely debated issue. Many scholars argue that a pure legal role by a purely political body may become a threat for the international community at large. This assertion while deserves further discussions, for this paper it is irrelevant. Suffice is to mention that Chapter VII authority of the Security Council has been used to include almost everything that its members agree on. Yet, as mentioned earlier, as a political body, the Security Council cannot act effectively in many occasions due to the fact that its members, especially of the permanent ones, have to counter balance their political interests. Secondly, actions in the Security Council take a lengthy process of negotiations, information exchanges, and investigations and so on. All these cause lapse of time – the time in which civil populations suffer at their

most. Only in Rwanda in 1994, for example, genocidal slaughter of 800,000 Rwandan Tutsis had occurred in 100 day before the Security Council intervened. The mass-murder of over 8,000 Bosnians by an ethnic Serbian militia in 1995 has "laid bare the horror of inaction"[20] by the Security Council. These facts encourage the perpetrators to let the killing continue, and thereby, let the "peace" continue to be threatened or breached, and let the people suffer as long as the elite Security Council members decide something for the fate of the concerned human community.

The frustration led some to argue for alternative arrangements regarding peace management by-passing the Security Council's authority. In 1999 the NATO bombardment of former Yugoslavia by the US led NATO force has been widely characterised as a "humanitarian intervention" designed to stop "ethnic cleansing" by the Serbs. From a strictly legal perspective the action was criticised as being illegal,[21] although others argue for an implied "legal" authority in the Security Council's previous determination of a threat to the peace. Again, this caused another tension among the legal scholars. Some see it as "legitimate" even though not perhaps "legal" in the sense that there was no explicit Security Council authorisation. A need for a bridge between legality and legitimacy has been high on this debate.[22] The debate culminated to the emergence of a new peremptory norm widely known as "responsibility to protect." The idea suggests that in the event of large scale ethnic cleansing or genocide or human sufferings both from violation of gross human rights and (conceivably) from natural disaster where humanitarian support is an urgent issue being obstructed by the concerned regime, the international community should act promptly and effectively to ensure protecting the population at risk. And it is the responsibility of the international community as a whole to protect the human community. The approach is idealistic, but suffers from concrete contents and precise methods as to how to act in a concerted manner. Moreover, what many fear is that, the norm can be applied in broader and politically motivated cases. Such fear is not implausible though. Therefore, as some see, tyranny of Security Council under Chapter VII is much better in the sense that there are some checks at least. The political use of "responsibility to protect" without the Security Council's authorisation would be extremely

dangerous.

Consequently, a discussion on an alternative way concerning the management of peace has been at its crucial stage. In the beginning of last decade, international security structure has started being approached differently with yet another invention by the then US President George W. Bush – the so called "pre-emptive self-defence," also known as the "Bush Doctrine." The principal idea is that a state cannot just wait to receive an armed attack to attack back to defend itself. The approach altered the existing concept of self-defence. The existing notion of self-defence can be found in Article 51 of the UN Charter, which talks about an 'inherent right of individual or collective self-defence' and which continues only until the Security Council has taken necessary measures. As a result, such invention cannot be found justified within the structure of the UN system. It is criticised as "unilateralism" against collective security approach embodied in the Charter of the UN. Pre-emptive self-defence is a matter that bypasses the unanimous decision-making power of the Security Council putting a question mark on its authority. The recent test of pre-emption was exercised in the war against Iraq in 2003. The US administration, on failure to achieve a consensus based Security Council resolution authorising use of force against Iraq, decided to act on the basis of "pre-emptive self defence," which, many argued, was merely a unilateral action. The Bush administration however, invited its allies to join in its effort to regime change in Iraq on the basis of President Bush's famous statement 'either you are with us or you are against us' leaving no room to argue for an alternative view on "peace."[23] The rationale behind the US action was that the (possible) possession of weapons of mass-destruction at the hand of Saddam Hussein would cause a greatest threat to "peace" for which a regime change was necessary. The US has taken up the stewardship to free the people of Iraq from Saddam Hussein's ruling, and to secure the region at large from any further threat to "peace", although from legal point of view the action was found to be "illegal" under international law. At the end of the war, the regime collapsed though, no weapons of mass-destruction were found. Yet a durable peace apparently is not in place in Iraq even today. In any case the pre-emptive self-defence creates yet another danger which may set up an evidence of arbitrary action by

a state capable of doing so.

Way Forward to Sustainable Peace

A realistic achievement of "peace" is a puzzle. Multilateralism as discussed above failed to play an effective role for an endurable peace, mainly because of global power politics. The structure of peace management is targeted to states generally. The sufferings of human community are often neglected either because of technical difficulties or because of lack of proper tools as to how to address the issue. From "multilateralism" point of view, human suffering can be seen from both action and non-action by the UNSC. Action of the UNSC leaves sanctions on the regime causing ultimately huge distress to civilians, and non-action leaves the conflict to continue, and again, causing distress to civilians. Unilateralism, on the other hand, may cause even more chaos as its authority suffers from either legality or legitimacy. Initiatives such as uniting for peace, responsibility to protect and pre-emptive self-defence are, therefore, not pragmatic solution despite the idealistic view attached to these principles. International community might fear that the principles, once adopted into practice, can be politically abused. Overall, it is hard to choose any of the alternatives at its entirety. However, the United Nations in general, and the UNSC in particular, still play an important role at least at some point in time in a conflict, which opens up further chances to keep the peace with other soft mechanisms as discussed below.

Today's infringement of peace is not because of the occupation or annexation of land territory, and is not limited to only cross border matters. Inequality, injustice, discrimination, unfair distribution of earth's resources, and denying one from his legitimate rights etcetera are the main issues for a fragile "peace." Inter-state relations are not exclusively crucial; human relations has become more important, which include inter-regional, inter-cultural, inter-ethnic, and other inter-community concerns. Human peace accepts a broader concept in terms of promoting quality of human lives including protecting and respecting humans' and peoples' rights, maintaining equality and non-discrimination, establishing social justice, expanding fundamental human values, practicing forgiveness, and enlightening human minds with love and compas-

sion. Human peace, thus, has to be addressed from different angles. There is no other way than addressing such a broader and non-military concept of security in the management of peace.[24] A holistic approach is, therefore, required involving collective participation of stakeholders including states, non-state and supra-state actors.

Despite this subjectivity it is crucial to create an environment for interaction where dialogues play an important role in order to contribute to a greater "peace." Perhaps the role of the UNSC is significant in creating such an environment in the post-conflict situation where community dialogue becomes effective, and contributes to a long lasting and durable peace. Mechanisms such as building of confidence, knowledge and capacity, and sharing of good practices in terms of governance including distribution of wealth and resource are fundamental. Peace is not only safeguarding inter-state security, but also about building a culture – universal and common to all the human community at large. Dialogue among the cultures and civilisations would best contribute to such a culture of peace in both pre-conflict and post-conflict societies. Some of the examples discussed below could better explain such endeavours of building a culture of peace.

In 2005, the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery of the UN Development Programme published a report showing how three Commonwealth countries – Ghana, Guyana and Kenya – were able to mitigate there contentious issues by means of dialogues.[25] The report was the result of systematic support provided by the UN system to build national capacities and to agree on constructive negotiations in one's own society with a view to establishing durable peace in the society at large. In Ghana, for example, between September and December 2004, the UN supported a number of initiatives to promote capacity building measures, including soccer matches, media campaigns, and high level dialogues among the major political parties causing national actors to prevent the expected violence.[26] The capacity building measures such as these are not quite unfamiliar in international diplomacy. In Indian sub-continent "cricket diplomacy" has had a good standing for quite some time now to create a friendly environment to initiate peace dialogue.[27]

Dialogue process in the post-election mistrusts amongst the rival political parties in Guyana initiated in 2002 has led to a "national conversation" to undertake reforms in the political culture in the

country. Eventually, in 2006 as part of a wider strategy an initiative was launched to prevent any violence during the election later in that year. The initiative involved training for a network of local government officials, civic leaders and police officials which contributed to a peaceful management of disputes during national elections later in the year.[28] In Kenya, the approach adopted was designed as "social cohesion programme" in response to tension regarding claims from ethnic groups over the scarce resources and lands located in its northern region. The idea of social cohesion programme is about forming "peace and development committees" consisting of local leaders who by way of having friendly dialogue assist the provincial administration in the management of conflicts.[29] The endeavours undertaken in the above mentioned three African examples have been found effective, and as a result, they provide a basis for securing peace where dialogue play a very important role, and through which a sustainable and durable peace can be achieved where the involvement of national actors and institutions can be ensured.

Other accepted practice mostly, again in African countries, is amnesty through truth and reconciliation. In many cases an amnesty may create a nonviolent transition to peace. South African example pioneers in this context. Transition from apartheid era to peaceful democracy in 1990s was facilitated through reconciliation which would have been otherwise a civil war if perpetrators were fully separated from victims.[30] From the justice and human rights point of view, however, amnesty has been widely criticised as providing amnesty in other words indicates putting perpetrators above the law. Moreover, amnesty undermines international law as far as international law rejects impunity for serious crimes, such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Critics suggest that it is not amnesty but securing justice, is a valuable investment for sustainable peace. In the absence of justice to be done, further possibility of conflict and violation of human rights is possible to erupt. It is, however, important to closely look at the reality with a wider view. A vulnerable post-conflict state would not have much strength or resources to provide justice. In many cases an initiative to provide justice would even create chaos and further instability. Amnesty is indeed a cheapest solution, perhaps not a comfortable one. Yet, amnesty provides a safe transition where room for mis-

trust is blocked. An approach of uniting rather than separating the people would arguably create a common ground for a dialogue to effective peace. Subject to controls and limitations, amnesty can be effective alongside justice and sustainable peace. Amnesty can be just if it brings the cessation of conflict and ends human rights abuses. South African transition to democracy and peace has just been a remarkable example in this regard.

Conclusion

A stable peace requires security as well as respect for justice and human rights. Humanity stands at a decisive turning point. A durable peace, therefore, calls for establishing a culture of peace taking humanity at its core. Enforcement of peace is indeed desirable through the available multilateral means as discussed in this paper, especially where there exists a threat to or breach of the peace. However, for a culture of peace, an anticipatory approach is much demanded since enforcement only comes after peace has already breached, and offers only a short term solution, whereas anticipatory measures promote confidence for sustainable peace. The enforcement of peace, nonetheless, creates an environment for wider dialogue in a post-conflict situation, which is a pre-requisite for sustainable peace. A culture of peace, thus, need to be built on dialogue and co-existence among inter-state, inter-cultural, inter-ethnic, inter-faith communities putting humanity on top. The narrow examples of few African countries shown in this article suggest that the transition to peace and the sustaining of peace require softer approach including continuous dialogue and cooperation, consultation, forgiveness and inclusiveness, rather than hard enforcement measures in order to give the "peace" a chance to sustain.

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Notes to Pages

1 See Koskenniemi Martti (2011), 'What Use for Sovereignty Today?' *Asian Journal of International Law,* pp. 61-70.

2 Ibid, p. 61.

3 See Article 1(1), the UN Charter.

4 Inger Österdahl (1998), *Threat to the Peace: The Interpretation by the Security Council of Article 39 of the UN Charter*, Almquiest & Wiksell International, p. 18 and Frowein and Krisch (2002) in Bruno Simma (ed) (2002), *The Charter of the United Nations A* Commentary, Oxford UP, pp. 717-729. In the latter work, the authors note that the competence of the Council under Chapter VII is not self-evident and point out that initially 'threat to the peace' in Article 39 of the Charter was thought to cover primarily the preparatory phase of inter-state war.

5 Österdahl (1998), pp. 31 and 26. See also Judith G. Gardam (1996), 'Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Action,' number 17, Michigan Journal of International Law, p. 298 and Tomas Franck (1995), *Fairness in International* Law, Oxford UP, p. 218.

6 See T. D. Gill (1995), 'Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to Exercise Its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter,' number , Netherlands Journal of International Law, p. 40.

7 Ibid, pp. 42-43.

8 See Frowein and Krisch (2002), p. 718.

9 For instance: for the Arab-Israel conflict (1948) see UNSC resolution 5; for the Korean conflict (1950) UNSC resolution 82; for the War on the Falkland Islands (1982) see UNSC resolution 502.

10 For example, the civil war in Congo (1960); Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Southern Rhodesia; the Apartheid regime in South Africa; Repression in Northern Iraq; Genocide Bosnia-Herzegovina; Starvation and Famine in Somalia.

11 SC Res. 54, (1948).

12 See UNSC resolution 598 (1987).

13 David Cortwright and Thomas G. Weiss (et al) (1997), *Political Gain and Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions*, Rowmon and Littlefield.

14 UNSC resolution 232 (1966).

15 See UNSC resolution 418 (1977).

16 See Ibid.

17 This was adopted on 6 May 1993.

18 UNSC resolution 836 (1993).

19 See Daniel L. Bethlehem and Marc Weller (1997), *The "Yugoslav" Crisis in International Law: General* Issues, Cambridge UP, p. 440.

20 Max W. Matthews (2008), 'Tracking the Emergence of a New International Norm: The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur,' 31, *British Colombia International and Comparative Law Review*, p. 139.

21 Russian diplomat Lavrov expressed that the NATO bombing trans-

formed a humanitarian crisis into a "humanitarian catastrophe" as there were civilian casualty amounting to death of 500 to 1800 populations and thousands of wounded. See Marjorie Cohn (2002), 'NATO Bombing of Kosovo: Humanitarian Intervention or Crime against Humanity?' *International Journal for the Semiotics of Law*, number 1, pp. 79-106.

22 Jerzy Zajadlo (2005), 'Legality and Legitimisation of Humanitarian Intervention: New Challenges in the Age of the War on Terrorism,' *American Behavioural Scientist,* 48, pp. 655, 653-670.

23 George W. Bush (2001), 'Bush Speaks to United Nations,' available at: <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110-3.html> (accessed 22 March 2011).

24 See **Edy Korthals Altes (2005), '**Reflections on Peace and Security in the 21st Century,' available at: <www.paricenter.com/library/papers/altes05.php> (accessed 21 December 2011).

25 See Kathleen Cravero and Chetan Kumar (2005), 'Sustainable Development Through Sustainable Peace: Conflict Management in Developing Societies,' *Globalisation and Good Governance* in *The Commonwealth Ministers Reference Book*, available at: <www.undp.org/cpr/documents/prevention/build_national/article_peacebuilding_Commonwealth.pdf> (accessed 10 April 2011).

26 Ibid.

27 In March 2011, during a world cup cricket match, the Indian Prime Minister invited his counterpart from Pakistan to watch the cricket match between the two countries, which the latter accepted and eventually joined. Some fruitful discussions between the two leaders were recorded. Such an initiative encouraged actors and peoples in both countries to come forward to join in friendly dialogue for a sustainable peace. See 'India, Pakistan in talks ahead of 'cricket diplomacy' summit,' *CNN World*, available at: <articles.cnn.com/2011-03-28/world/india.cricket.diplomacy_1_mumbai-terror-attacks-india-and-pakistan-world-cup-cricket?_s=PM:WORLD> (accessed 09 April 2011).

28 See Cravero and Kumar (2005).

29 Ibid.

30 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was established to grant impunity in exchange for full disclosure of past wrongs, serves as an example of the peaceful transition to democracy and viable peace. See Adam Penman (2007), 'The Peace-Justice Dilemma and Amnesty in Peace Agreements,' *Conflict Trends*, number 3, pp. 8-9, available at: <www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=101969> (accessed 12 April 2011).

BALANCE OF POWER VERSUS COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE

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Abstract: *Both the concepts of Balance of Power and Complex Interdependence attempt to describe the post-cold war international system. We select Offensive Realism (re: Mearsheimer) and Neoliberal Institutionalism (re: Keohane and Nye), for theoretically contextualising the aforementioned concepts. Through a critical evaluation in contrast with the realities of the current international system we answer the question of which of these two concepts could be identified as the most relevant. Our conclusions suggest that 'complex interdependence' provides the necessary and at the same time broader framework for analysing the states and their relations after the Cold War, within which recent developments are better explained.*

Keywords: Balance of Power, Complex Interdependence, Offensive Realism, Neoliberal Institutionalism

Introduction

Among more conventional readings of International Relations (IR), history reveals that balances of power (BoP) – whether the international system struck such a balance or is in the midst of turmoil on the way to, or from, a BoP – characterise relations between the great powers.[1] We assume that the first BoP system emerged after the 30 Years War and the conclusion of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). While there have been other BoP systems since 1648, the most recent, the Cold War, was most pervasive.[2] Using BoP to divide the history of the state-system is largely accepted among scholars.[3] Moreover, a spectrum of IR scholars are fully rooted in BoP. Consider Kaplan's 'models of international systems,' and Rosecrance's political history of the 18th and the 19th Centuries, as examples.[4] In contrast, there is a seemingly endless supply of critics of BoP, who nevertheless deploy BoP to reveal its shortcomings. For instance, some suggest that the end of the sovereign state, and thus

the state-system, is inevitable and therefore seeking to understand elusive BoP between such declining actors is flawed. [5] Others understand the flow of IR history to be driven, primarily, by hegemonic powers which dominate international interactions and set the boundaries of exchange.[6] While such scholarship is certainly interesting, this work accepts many of the key hypotheses regarding the centricity of the state in the international system.[7]

Yet, there is a great deal of ambiguity since the end of the Cold War deprived scholars of a fluid testing ground for theories related to BoP since the US and USSR (and their allies) were engaged in such so-called balancing behaviour for roughly a half-century and with the departure of the USSR, the international environment has become more nuanced. So, what type of international system currently exists?[8]

On one side were situated the so-called neorealists, who defend, among other things, the BoP concept,[9] with Waltz's famous book *Theory of International Politics*.[10] On the other side of the debate were the so-called neoliberals, whose bible is Keohane and Nye's work *Power and Interdependence*.[11] This debate endured for much of the Cold War (it continues until the present in some quarters). Indeed, the latest 'Correspondence' in *International Security* between Keohane and Waltz seems like a continuation of Cold War international relations' debates.[12] But they are no longer alone in their hypothesising and the debate may now be understood as belonging to those that cling to more archaic theories of IR and those who consider the debate as being centred on synthesising between the two parts.[13]

With this in mind, it is useful, and possible, to compare two – largely dissimilar – theories which are reflections of the aforementioned mainstream IR theories: BoP (realism) and complex interdependence (neoliberalism). This work sets two main objectives: first, to examine the use of BoP in the context of offensive realism and second, to review the advent and use of complex interdependence (CXI) as a reflection of neoliberal institutionalism. Finally, in the last section, we evaluate the two theories in order to explore which could be identified as most relevant. Hidden within this comparison is the relevance of the two concepts these theories incorporate.

In other words, if we examine both theories and consider the historical events after the Cold War, we may identify which of the two concepts of BoP and CXI best reflects the realities of the current period of international history.

The International System, BoP and Offensive Realism

The concept of power is very difficult to define[14] though three general issues may be identified: first, it has many dimensions (economic, military, political etc.) and approaches (realist, Foucaulian etc);[15] second, if we assume the realist view of power, it cannot be measured according to commonly agreed standards,[16] and if we assume others, like the Foucaulian approach, power is something that cannot be measured at all.[17] Third, power in many cases is not manifested until a clash between two powers occurs; we may know for example how many missiles a nation has, but we don't know if they can all be used, if their use will be successful.

Consequently, if we are unable to formulate a common, clear and concrete definition of power, it follows that it may be more difficult to define the balance of power. Zinnes mentions eleven definitions for BoP,[18] and tries to elaborate a series of cases where a BoP could exist, though notes that it 'does not exhaust the possible permutations and combinations that one might generate.'[19] Alternatively, Sheehan refers to Wight's 'nine different ways in which the concept has been used.'[20] Examining Wight, one could argue that the BoP is about the 'even distribution of power' or the 'uneven distribution of power.'[21]

Prior to examining the use of BoP in the context of offensive realism, it is useful to consider how classical realism deploys it. Kegley and Wittkopf mention that 'if all states seek to maximise power, stability will result by maintaining a balance of power, lubricated by shifts in the formation and decay of opposing alliances.'[22] Consequently, one could say that in a given system the BoP will emerge when none of the great powers of the system is able to initiate war because all the others will unite against it. Most important, a system of BoP is characterised by stability, which does not, necessarily, imply that power is evenly distributed among all states or even the great powers.

For structural realism though, if a great power attempts to acquire more power, and more specifically to maximise its power, or pursue hegemony (i.e. disturb the balance), it would be the system that will eventually punish its behaviour.[23] This is exactly the beginning of differentiation between the offensive and the defensive branches of structural realism according to Mearsheimer.[24] For offensive realism, a great power can, and should, try 'to gain as much power as possible and, if the circumstances are right, to pursue hegemony.'[25]

Balance of Power Versus Complex Interdependence

Mearsheimer begins his analysis by making five assumptions.[26] First, that the anarchical character of the international system leaves a great power, in any emergency, vulnerable. Second, he assumes that the great powers can never be certain about the intentions of their rivals and are forced to live in an environment of significant insecurity. Third, for this reason all great powers develop and maintain offensive capabilities which, in the worst case, could seriously harm their rivals. Fourth, he underlines that the ultimate goal of each great power is survival. Finally, he acknowledges that states (including the great powers) are rational actors. Mearsheimer proceeds by recognising an unlimited appetite of all great powers for more power. They are, accordingly, ready to disturb the BoP whenever they see an opportunity and they should have no restraints in doing so because their own survival is at stake. But, since the acquisition of power is an endless task, Mearsheimer argues that at the 'end of the road' lays hegemony; of course when the circumstances will be ideal for such an enterprise. What a great power requires for hegemony is not *only* military power – the dominant form of power according to Mearsheimer – but also 'latent power,'[27] which is[28] defined as the entire socio-economic structure of the state that has to be solid and robust in order to allow the expansion and enhancement of the military power. Once again, the potential hegemon must carefully calculate the costs and benefits before pursuing hegemony in the particular time selected.

Furthermore, Mearsheimer argues that in the current world there can be no such thing as global hegemony.[29] For his theory, military land power is what counts most[30] and this kind of power cannot be projected through the large oceans dividing the earth.[31] Additionally, due to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a 'clear-

cut nuclear superiority' is needed for a state to become a global hegemon; meaning that it should have the power to eliminate his rivals without suffering any retaliation, since even one nuclear missile can cause serious harm.[32] What his theory proposes is that great powers can pursue hegemony in their region, which is a much more feasible enterprise.[33] This distinction among a general balance and sub-balances is not new.[34] Some theoretical argumentations can be found in other theorists' work, but not an extensive theory as illustrated by Mearsheimer.

What Mearsheimer's offensive realism proposes, either explicitly or implicitly, is a description of the post-Cold War international system in terms of BoP, that can be divided into several regional systems. In each of them there is a BoP among the regional powers, which are particularly uncertain about each other's intentions. Consequently, if one of them feels confident about its power, and favoured by the circumstances, may try to disturb the balance and pursue hegemony. But, if a state becomes a hegemon in Region A, it must also sustain a BoP with the other regions by: a) preventing peer competitors in the nearby-accessible by land regions, and b) play the role of offshore balancer in more distant regions.[35] The failure to act in this manner may have an impact to its own hegemonic statute; like in the case that a hegemon emerges in Region B, which will try and undermine the first hegemon's position in Region A.[36]

The Contrast: post-Cold War Complex Interdependence

By the early 1970s, Keohane and Nye (among others) had begun to examine the transnational relations that exist among states, concerning various issues of their international political agenda.[37] Keohane and Nye, elaborated Haas' concept of 'economic interdependence,'[38] albeit in the concept of world politics. In 1977, they came up with a co-authored book on *Power and Interdependence*[39] where CXI appears for the first time.

CXI is primarily based on the transactions between states, in terms of flows of money, goods, people and messages.[40] Accordingly, interdependence has two characteristics; it is more than a bilateral or multilateral agreement between states and far more than an interconnection. In the first case, an agreement is an intentional

act, confined strictly between two or more states. In terms of interdependence, a state is particularly affected when the oil prices are high, although it may well have not any kind of agreement with petroleum producing states. In the second case, if the price of gold increases the price of jewellery will increase too, but this has no serious effect on a state's economy.[41] Interdependence exists where the effects of a transaction are particularly costly (or beneficial) like in oil prices rate.[42] Based on such interdependence, Keohane and Nye introduced CXI as an enhancement. They claim that CXI constitutes a polar opposite to the assumptions of realism.[43]

CXI is based on three core characteristics.[44] First, it appears in multiple channels of connection: interstate relations; transgovernmental relations between the sectors of a state's government with those of another (for example, Departments of Environment, the collaboration of national policing forces etc.); and transnational relations between other (non-state) actors in the international system. Through this analysis, it is clear that the authors move beyond realist assumptions about states and involve other, domestic and international actors, like NGOs, multinational corporations, international organisations, bureaucrats and elites (etc). They function not only as potential influencers of a state's policies, but also as 'transaction belts' of the costs and benefits of interaction.

Second, the supposed absence of hierarchy of issues sharply contrasts realist assumptions which stress that issues of security are predominant. In a system of CXI other issues (beyond military) may emerge and different coalitions may be formed. For example, by assuming transgovernmental relations, issues like governments' interdepartmental cooperation on environmental issues, trade regulations and agricultural issues emerge as important, and the international coalitions that will be formed may be extremely different than the already existing military coalitions. Also, non-state actors exercise their own influence on the formation of the agenda in world politics.

Third and consequently, when we broaden the agenda of international issues, military power becomes less useful. Although the military power of a state is particularly important; on issues of CXI, economics, the environment, trade regulations no state will use, or threaten to use, armed force during negotiations. This analysis also

implies that there is a difference in the distribution of power; meaning the distribution of military power and of power resources (for example on trade shipping and oil).[45]

Keohane and Nye also acknowledge the role of international institutions. They claim that international institutions, among other things, can help setting the agenda, provide a forum for bargaining and coalition formation, help governments focus efforts on specific issues and give developing countries the opportunity to directly communicate with other governments' officials and pursue linkage strategies.[46]

Further elaborating this last argument, Keohane focuses on cooperation and international institutions in *After Hegemony*. His main argument is that the CXI between all these actors on such issues could easily generate conflict, possibly escalating into war.[47] Due to the anarchical character of the system – he does not propose world government or a cosmopolitan system[48] – international institutions are necessary in order to provide some grounds of common understanding and cooperation.[49] Specifically, he identifies several tasks they perform:

1. enhance the likelihood of cooperation,
2. create the conditions for orderly multilateral negotiations,
3. increase the symmetry and improve quality of information,
4. cluster issues together over a long period of time, thus bringing governments into continuing interactions, and
5. create the basis for decentralised enforcement founded on the principle of reciprocity.[50]

Finally, he provides a definition of institutions 'as sets of practices and expectations rather than [...] formal organisations with imposing headquarters buildings.'[51]

Following the Cold War, Keohane began to further refine his theory and argued that great powers need institutions in order to influence events and achieve goals since they reduce the cost of making and enforcing agreements, and reduce uncertainty by promoting transparency.[52] On the other hand, despite the enormous influence of great powers on institutions, the policies followed are different than those that the great powers would follow unilaterally.[53]

Later, Keohane describes the world based on the concepts of

interdependence and international institutions, although he now calls his theory institutionalism, and uses the terms "globalism" and "governance," in a clear linguistic shift.[54] He argues that states are the main actors in the international system, supplemented though by NGOs, IGOs, and Transnational Corporate Networks, formulating 'a complex geography.'[55] Numerous 'networks of interdependence' exist among them, extending to 'multicontinental distances.' These features constitute 'a state of the world;' "globalism,"[56] or networks of interdependence, which may be economic, military, environmental, social, and cultural.[57]

Balance of Power Versus Complex Interdependence

Interdependence, especially in such a high level of complexity as globalism, can lead to conflicts and disputes.[58] Consequently, the modern world needs 'processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that [will] guide and restrain the collective activities' of the actors.[59] This is what Keohane defines as "governance". Keohane makes two significant distinctions. First, between globalism and "universality," maintaining that we are not inhabiting an era of universality; for example, we may have a worldwide trade system, but not a fully integrated world market.[60] Second, between governance and "global government," arguing that any attempt at regulation must be 'consistent with the maintenance of the nation-states as the fundamental form of political organisation.'[61]

Evaluation

The theory of institutionalism presents a description of the current international system based on the concept of interdependence, constituting the concept of globalism. This depiction challenges offensive realism's view of the system; the later uses the concept of BoP. This section addresses some key points of offensive realism's world-view in contrast to that held by institutionalisms'.

The first characteristic of the international system according to offensive realism is its division into sub-systems of BoP. The difficult part is to actually identify this division. Apart from the US, which has dominated its continent as a hegemon for over a century, there is no clear distinction of sub-systems in other continents and/or regions. Europe, for example, is particularly dependant on Russian energy resources.[62] In Asia, we can identify Russia, China,

India, Japan, and the oil-producing states in Middle East as powerful, though not particularly in the military sector, and definitely not as parts of a BoP sub-system in Asia. Alternatively, we can identify several networks of interdependence, in which all of these states participate and seek to prevail among others at the global level.[63]

Second, concerning the claimed endless quest for unlimited power (mainly military), one could argue that it may be the case for states like Iran or South Korea, which seek to acquire nuclear weapons. But, in the larger picture there are several states with great influence which do not follow adopt such policies. If we consider, for example, Europe; the UK and France, already have nuclear weapons, and Germany, does not. The offensive realist assumption is baseless. Also in Africa and Asia, apart from the states that already have nuclear weapons, most others are interested in maintaining a strong position in the global economy, which will permit them to enhance their domestic economy and wealth, rather than putting together powerful mass armies to dominate their regions.

Consequently, in the case of states seeking regional hegemony, evidence suggests the opposite of offensive realism. For instance, although Russia tries to create a 'sphere of influence' in the Caucasus,[64] which could be perceived as 'hegemony in its region,' it also attempts to establish a reliable relationship with NATO,[65] enter the WTO to enhance its world trade options,[66] and it finally took a step back in the war in South Ossetia, accepting international mediation by the EU.[67] China and the other BRIC countries also try to strengthen their economy but it doesn't pursue its goals in the expense of other states in the region but with a rather international perspective.[68] These are examples of states in the process of strengthening their domestic structures, not because of their desire to dominate their regions against other competitors, but in order to enhance their position in the global economic network and influence the decision making centres. Of course, in the case of Europe, or Africa, there is no such thing as a hegemony-seeking-state. This part of the theory seems to apply only in the case of the US, though in recent years, some states in South America are attempting to break-out of US hegemony,[69] something that Cuba had already achieved in the late 1950s.

Two more issues are connected to this analysis, offensive real-

ism's claims of insecurity as a kind of motivation for the great powers' previously mentioned policies and the primary role of military power, and the supporting role of latent power.

Although both theories acknowledge the anarchical character of the international system, which generates a certain level of insecurity, this does not necessarily imply that the so-called great powers *must* seek refuge to hegemony. It may be the case that the US and the UK launched the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq due to sentiments of insecurity,[70] but it is also well-argued that international institutions enhance confidence; international organisations promote negotiations and resolution of misunderstandings; and the involvement of all states in various networks of interdependence decrease the potentiality of being deceived by others.[71]

Respectively, it is not easy even for such a powerful state like the US to violate, for example, the WTO, ICAO, WHO, and NATO collective decisions, although it may have a weighted vote, thus creating a certain degree of safety among their allies. We have also witnessed the great powers negotiating through their delegations in various international organisations, even in times of crisis. Furthermore, the violation of financial agreements, the voting of harmful decisions against an ally, and all other actions and practices that could be perceived as deceitful, may impact a state, since other states from around the world will react if their interests are damaged, exactly because of the high level of interdependence; something that the recent financial crisis confirms.

In the case of military power prevailing over latent power in the priorities of a great power, the response of institutionalism is particularly logical. Apart from the fact that offensive realism acknowledges that nuclear weapons are not useful (only as an element of deterrence), one could say that the military power of the states is not first priority. Great powers like Russia, China, the US, the UK, France and Germany, cannot use their power on a whole range of issues, like the environment, poverty, financial issues such as the recent crisis, and others. Moreover, most of them do not face a direct military threat from any rival; even if we consider the terrorist acts as a military threat, there are arguments saying that they have rather sociological, financial, and ideological causes rather than an endless quest for power on behalf of a terrorist group.[72]

Latent power is an important form of power for a state facing to-

day's world, and it does not simply serve to develop military power. A solid economy, education, health issues, and resources are necessary in order for a state to have a strong position in the international system and be able to influence decisions through the complex networks of interdependence.

Finally, Offensive Realism draws a connection between the sub-systems of BoP, arguing that a regional hegemon always has to act as an external balancer in other regions in order to maintain the BoP there and prevent the rise of a regional hegemon. In this context, Mearsheimer mentions the obligation of the US to prevent the rise of China in Eastern Asia.[73] Actually the only state that can be identified today as a regional hegemon is the US. However, although the US has several concerns for the rise of China, one could not argue that the former tries to impede its rise as a regional hegemon, or that it tries to preserve the BoP in China's region. Rather, China's empowerment can add another rival for the US in many issues of the international agenda, for example China's excessive needs for energy may lead it to deepen its engagement in the Middle East,[74] and its growing economy will augment its ability to influence decisions on issues like international trade, global finance, and of course in various international organisations where the US currently has a leading voice. Moreover, the US cannot limit the potentials that the networks of interdependence give to China. For example, China may use the weak dollar against the euro to put pressure on the US, it has offered many states in Africa and South America preferential economic treatment[75] and most significantly, large US corporations (re: General Motors) have already invested tremendous monies in the Chinese economy,[76] since China is now the bigger and at the same time less exploited market.

Furthermore, if we examine other parts of the world we can argue that the US has supported the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel, making it the strongest military power in Middle East. On the other hand, the US has managed to keep the BoP in Europe; one could agree with offensive realism's view that there is not any state in Europe that has both the latent and the military power to become a regional hegemon, even if it meets the appropriate circumstances. However, after the Cold War, in an era where the EU is fully functional on an economic level, it is very difficult for a European state to seek hegemony mainly due to the high level of interdepen-

dence between the EU members; it will lose more than it gains now by breaking off the EU and seeking to become a single hegemon.

Conclusion

Although this evaluation was limited to the basic lines of argumentation of the theories under examination, throughout the work one could draw the conclusion that the BoP concept seen in offensive realism is unable to accurately describe current international relations. Constrained around military power, it misses a range of issues and the complex network of relations between states, as well as non-state actors.[77] Each state participates in a number of regional, sometimes continental and international governmental organisations that the network created among them is really difficult to define and explore. In this network one can identify numerous overlapping procedures on equally numerous subjects. It may be that very powerful states, like the US, have an important say in most of the organisations they participate in, but they still lack participation in a significant number of others; regional and continental. For these reasons, the complexity of states' relations in the current international environment complicated. It also gets tougher for one to map these relations if he/she decides to consider the power that these organisations possess as entities, as well as non-governmental actors with expertise and influence.

In that sense, the concept of interdependence in the context of institutionalism – seen either as CXI or globalism – provides the necessary, broader framework for analysing states and their relations after the Cold War. By endorsing this concept, one can better understand the level of complexity in modern international relations. We must also take in to account that the understanding of the concept does not simplify the complex network of interdependence, it does not provide a clear view and neither does it make it easier for researchers to map the channels of interdependence or power relations. The advantage for the researcher of understanding this concept is the vast number of data, facts, phenomena and parameters that can help produce a wider view regardless of the subject under scrutiny.

It must be noted that Keohane's approach has limitations as well.[78] When it comes to issues of war, such as the interventions

in Kosovo, Iraq and Libya, the violation of international law and the decisions of international organisations, the theory of interdependence is unable to provide a convincing analysis. In most cases there was no clear mandate for the intervening states. In others, like Libya, the intervening states decided to adopt a broad interpretation of a UNSC mandate. Not to delve into each intervention, in general it was more the power of intervening states than their interdependence with the states in the region that enabled them to act militarily. Further research is required. Examining the complex networks of interdependence and the behaviour of states and non-state actors in order to enhance the theory and include its exceptions is a noble pursuit. This article constitutes an important theoretical exercise within the framework of the ongoing debate between BoP and CXI. This sought to provide researchers with a comparison that highlights hidden aspects of this debate deploying relevant theories.

Finally, this article brings post-Cold War issues to the more enduring debate between realism(s) and liberalism(s). While it is acknowledged that the current era shares characteristics with previous ones, it is unique in terms of economic and military capabilities, technological innovations and the diffusion and use of information. Contributing in that uniqueness are the high level of complexity and interdependence of states' national interests at the global level, which underpins societal, cultural, political and economic differences and surpasses geographical obstacles.

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Notes to Pages

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HOW THE STRONG LOSE WARS: TRANSFORMATIVE GOALS AND THE OUTCOME OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT

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Abstract: This work proposes an explanation of strong actor failure in asymmetric conflict. It proposes and develops the hypothesis of transformative and non-transformative goals and shows the correlation between strong actor objectives and the outcome of asymmetric conflicts. The central argument of this work gravitates around the theme that strong actors are more likely to lose if it pursues transformative goals and, on the contrary, is more likely to win if it pursues non-transformative goals. The hypothesis is supported with results of research on asymmetric conflicts which occurred between 1990 and 2008.

Keywords: Asymmetric Conflicts, Transformative Goals, US, Great Powers, Post-Cold War

Introduction

Thucydides' famous remark in the Melian dialogue maintains that the 'strong do what they can and the weak do what they must'[1] is as relevant now as it was all those centuries ago. Power, that elusive concept, continues to be the engine of international politics. However, power does not, necessarily, equate to foreign policy success and history is replete with examples of strong actors unable to achieve their objectives vis-a-vis vastly inferior opponents. Asymmetrical conflicts, for instance, may balance between conventional and unconventional capabilities and render the stronger side unable to adequately deploy and project power where it is needed allowing the weaker side to inflict a heavy loss on the larger actor.

According to Arreguín-Toft, some 14% of all wars between 1816 and 2003 were asymmetric while an additional 37% were tagged as probably asymmetric.[2] The results of my own survey are in line with Arreguín-Toft's findings: 33% of all wars which commenced in

between 1990 and 2008 were asymmetric or probably asymmetric, and when the survey was limited only to interstate and extrastate wars, the percentage of asymmetric conflicts increased to 63%. Such findings suggest that asymmetric conflicts are rather common in international relations, but surprisingly they are among the least studied.[3] In fact, the main-stream theories formulated during the Cold War focus mostly on hegemonic, major or systemic wars. And although they are highly useful in explaining causes and results of wars that erupted between great powers with relatively similar capabilities, they have little to say when it comes to asymmetric conflicts in which the belligerents' capabilities are incomparable. Moreover, theories that are based on the Thucydidean notion of power hardly explain failures of strong actors in asymmetric wars, and according to Arreguín-Toft, such an outcome is typical of almost 30% of all asymmetric conflicts.[4]

Following the Cold War, the question of asymmetry, in particular the riddle of strong actors' failures, has drawn increasing attention of IR scholars such as Arreguín-Toft, Merom and Record, who have made significant contributions to the debate on asymmetric conflicts. Nonetheless, gaps continue to exist in theories of asymmetric conflicts.[5]

In the search for answers as to why strong states may lose a war against a weaker actor a series of mutually reinforcing variables are assessed. For instance Arreguín-Toft examines strategic interactions between strong and weak actors; Merom stresses the central role of democratic regimes, while Record focuses on external assistance that may strengthen the weaker side. There is agreement among these three scholars that a key reason behind a strong actor's failure against a weaker foe, lies in factors external to the goals of the former.

This work argues to the contrary; that strong states fail because of, not despite, its political goals. I also indicate that the political goals of the strong actor are correlated to the outcome of an asymmetric conflict. This line of argumentation is based on the general hypothesis that great powers in war with weak actors might either pursue "transformative" or "non-transformative" political goals. The former refers to a situation in which the strong actor's aim is to change the political, economic and/or social system of the weak. System transformation might be an end in itself or a means to dif-

ferent political goals. On the other hand, the strong actor pursues non-transformative goals if he largely accepts the political, social and economic system of the weak. The strong uses its military power to force the weak to particular behaviour (either to do something or refrain from a certain action), but does not intend to change its political or socioeconomic order. In other words, the strong actor might achieve its goals without coerced transformation of the weak.

The idea of transformative and non-transformative goals is fundamental for my second hypothesis. I argue that in the case of asymmetric conflict the strong actor is more likely to lose if he pursues transformative goals, and on the contrary, is more likely to win if he pursues non-transformative goals. Such a hypothesis might seem quite conventional, because the attainment of transformative goals appears more difficult than the attainment of non-transformative goals. Transformation of the weaker actor's political or social system is definitely costly, lengthy and by all accounts an extremely ambitious task. Therefore, it should not be surprising if the strong actor fails. However, such a simple explanation of the strong actor's failure is unsatisfying and too many questions remain unanswered. Are transformative goals attainable? If not, what makes them unattainable and why do the strong actors strive for them? But if goals are within reach of the strong actors, why do they not succeed? What mistakes do they commit? Do they use their enormous resources adequately; squander them unwisely or maybe just cut corners?

In the following sections of this article I briefly present recent findings on asymmetric conflicts, and further develop the idea of transformative and non-transformative goals. To support my hypotheses I present results of research on asymmetric conflicts occurring in the period 1990-2008. The research was primary based on the Sarkees and Wayman data-set.[6] Lists of cases are presented in the appendix in table 1 and table 2.

Defining Asymmetric Conflicts and the Riddle of Strong Actors' Failures

In this survey, I adopt the definition of asymmetric conflict that is generally compliant with the definition used by Arreguín-Toft.

Conflicts are restricted to wars (1000 battle-related deaths per year), and are coded as asymmetric when the halved product of the strong actor's armed forces and population at the start of the conflict exceeds the simple product of the weak actor's armed forces and population by at least five to one.[7] Actors mean states, coalitions of states and nonstate entities, such as rebel or terrorist groups. Thus, the definition of asymmetric conflict used in this article includes wars between two or more states, and also between states and nonstate actors. The ratio of asymmetry, here 1:5 is, in fact, a subjective matter. For instance Paul, in his description of asymmetric conflict, uses a 1:2 ratio[8] and in many works on counterinsurgency strategy or small wars, the asymmetry between parties is automatically assumed and not measured further.[9] However, setting the threshold of asymmetry at the level of a ratio of 1:5 has at least two advantages. First, it shows a discrepancy in actors' material power and proves that the asymmetric conflict is truly a fight between the proverbial David and Goliath. Second, it facilitates examination on a wider spectrum of conflicts.

So far my definition of asymmetric conflict is much the same as that of Arreguín-Toft. Nevertheless, I introduce significant amendments. In my research, I confine asymmetric conflicts to interstate and extrastate wars and, moreover, to those conflicts that are initiated by the stronger actor.[10] Although the first restriction excludes civil wars from the survey, this does not mean that there are no "asymmetric civil wars." Measuring the material power of civil war belligerents is difficult and sometimes impossible due to poor or non-existing data, but there are still a few examples of civil wars in which asymmetry between the actors is undoubted (e.g. the two Chechnya wars).[11] There are substantial differences between asymmetric civil wars, and asymmetric inter- or extrastate wars. Firstly, in a civil war, the interests and goals of the strong actor are markedly different from those in an inter- and extrastate war. In a civil war, the territorial integrity of the stronger actor is usually at stake. Such a situation hardly ever occurs in an asymmetric inter and extra-state war. The territorial integrity of the stronger actor was threatened (however, indirectly) only in 2 of 7 asymmetric inter- and extrastate conflicts that erupted in the period of 1990-2008. Those cases are the two wars between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) fought in northern Iraq from 1991 to 1992 and in 1997. In fact,

those conflicts are a reflection of civil war in Turkey between the Turkish government and the Kurdish minority.[12] In the other 5 cases the weak actor did not pose a direct, if any, threat to the strong. Secondly, the risk of withdrawal from civil war is much higher because of vital interests that are threatened. Withdrawal from any war before achieving the main goals is a tough decision for any great power and creates a real dilemma for leaders: should we fight on and sacrifice more resources until we achieve our goals or should we accept our failure, take the risk of withdrawal and search for the best way out? In civil wars however, premature withdrawal is even more hazardous because there is a high chance that the unresolved problem will reoccur and the territorial integrity of the strong actor will be threatened again. Such a situation, in fact, is quite common: in the last two decades Russia fought two wars against Chechnya, Indonesia fought twice in the province of Aceh and the Philippines fought three times against Moro rebels. Threatened vital interests of the strong actor (especially territorial integrity) and the high risk of withdrawal have a major impact on the dynamics and outcomes of asymmetric conflicts. I argue that asymmetric civil wars are more civil than asymmetric, and therefore I exclude civil wars from my definition of asymmetric conflict.

The second amendment to the definition limits asymmetric conflicts to those wars initiated by strong actors. In such a case, the stronger is not only five (or more) times stronger than its adversary, but it also decides when to attack, where and how; setting its objectives freely and is, obviously, unsurprised by the attack, so is prepared. Statistically, asymmetric conflicts initiated by strong actors are the most common case. My survey shows that between 1990-2008, there were 11 conflicts that can be classified as interstate or extrastate war. Seven were asymmetric, and all were initiated by the stronger actor.[13] In the case of civil wars that proportion is much different. Out of 15 asymmetric or probable asymmetric civil wars, only 6 (40%) were initiated by the stronger actor.

In sum, I define asymmetric conflict as war in which the strong actor's halved material power exceeds the overall material power of the weak actor by at least five to one, where territorial integrity of the strong actor is not threatened by the weak actor, and where the war is initiated by the strong. Despite asymmetry, both in material capabilities and the situation (after all, it is the strong

who decides when to attack), the strong actor does not always win. The best known examples of strong actor failures are the Vietnam War and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In the post-Cold War era, most asymmetric conflicts have been won by the strong actor. However, the two most recent conflicts – the Iraq War and NATO intervention in Afghanistan – do not follow that pattern. Few would claim that the US (and its allies) won a decisive victory in Iraq, let alone Afghanistan, but should we categorise them as complete failures? Judging victory or defeat in contemporary wars, in which there is an observable 'decline in the occurrence of clear-cut victory,'[14] is difficult and debatable. Carroll, for instance, distinguishes fifteen (!) different conceptions of how to evaluate victory in war.[15] But, in the case of asymmetric conflict, such an evaluation should be based on whether the strong actor has accomplished its goals. A conflict initiated by a much stronger actor, and moreover, in which the weak actor does not pose a direct military threat to the strong, clearly falls into the famous Clausewitzian definition of war as 'a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.'[16] It is the strong actor who sets its political objectives and decides to use military force to accomplish them. However, sometimes the strong actor does not succeed; it fails to achieve the pre-war goals and eventually is forced to abandon them.

One of the first explanations of the strong actors' failure was proposed in 1975 by Mack. He argues that asymmetry in material power between belligerents implies asymmetry in interests. Mack contends that for the weak actor, struggling for survival, the asymmetric conflict is in fact "total war," whereas for the strong actor, whose survival is not threatened, the war is only "limited."[17] The low interests of the strong actor creates political vulnerability. If the war drags on and its costs increase, the strong actor's public opinion or competing elites push for quick withdrawal from the conflict. The weak actor does not face similar pressure, because the highest interest, survival, increases unity and determination.[18] According to Mack, asymmetry in interests implies political vulnerability, and political vulnerability explains the outcome of the conflict. Although this seems to be true in the case of the strong actor's defeat, it does not apply to the most common outcome of an asymmetric conflict, which is the situation in which the stronger wins. In the Russo-Georgian War (2008), Russia was the stronger actor with

rather low interests, as its survival was never threatened by Georgia. On the other hand, the sovereignty and survival of Georgia was in real danger, but contrary to Mack's thesis, Russia clinched a quick and decisive victory. Mack assumes that strong actors will lose in lengthy, guerilla wars, however, he does not explain why some conflicts drag on and some not.

Many theories of asymmetric conflict suffer from a similar problem of generality. They explain few conflicts in detail, but leave too many exceptions. For example, Merom suggests that democracies are more prone to fail in small wars than autocracies. He states that democracies lose in asymmetric conflicts because 'they find it extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to that which can secure victory.'[19] Again, a few cases verify Merom's thesis, while several others do not. His theory does not explain why the US lost in Vietnam despite the heavy casualties inflicted on the Vietnamese population. Moreover, it says little about the failures of autocracies in asymmetric conflicts (e.g. the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan), and also the successes of democracies in those kinds of wars (e.g. the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, 1999).

To avoid problems of generality, Arreguín-Toft backed his hypothesis of "strategic interaction" with extensive quantitative research. His argument is as follows. Actors come to the conflict with an estimate of resources and a strategy, that is to say a plan for the use of those resources in pursuit of specified goals.[20] Therefore, when the actor with more resources loses, the reason of his failure must lie in the strategy. Arreguín-Toft argues that 'strong actors will lose asymmetric conflicts when they use the wrong strategy vis-à-vis their opponents' strategy.'[21] Although that argument was confirmed in quantitative research, it suffers from some weaknesses. Firstly, Arreguín-Toft's definitions of different strategies that are available to belligerents (e.g. barbarism) are sometimes confusing and inconsistent. As a result, the clarity of the main hypothesis is lost in speculation whether a particular strategy used on the battlefield was barbarism or not. Secondly, Arreguín-Toft argues that because every strategy has an ideal counterstrategy, actors who are able to predict their adversary's strategy will 'dramatically improve their chances of victory by choosing and implementing that counterstrategy.'[22] For example, the best counterstrategy for guerilla warfare is barbarism, and for "direct defense" is "direct attack."

However, actors are not entirely free to choose the ideal strategy that will guarantee success. They are constrained by many factors: resources possessed, internal politics, culture and traditions (etc).[23] Moreover, in the case of asymmetric conflict, when a weak actor selects a strategy, it is largely determined by available resources, as it cannot implement a strategy involving resources not at its disposal. Consequently, prediction about the weak actor's strategy should be relatively easy. In the Afghanistan War, the Taliban learned quickly that in an open, large battle they are doomed to lose, and while the war continued they switched almost entirely to guerilla warfare.[24] Insurgents using guerilla warfare should not be a surprise for anyone.

Actors are not entirely independent when choosing their strategy, and in many cases the strategy eventually deployed might be easily predicted. Thus, if Arreguín-Toft's hypothesis is correct, and the sources of the strong actor's failure lie in "strategic interaction," the outcome of the conflict should be known from the very beginning. The strong will lose if it chooses an unsuitable strategy for the strategy employed by his adversary. But, if the adversary's strategy is not a surprise, or at least should not be a surprise, why then, does the strong actor choose the wrong counterstrategy? That means that we should search for the solution to the riddle of the strong actor's failure somewhere else than in "strategic interaction."

Transformative Goals and Non-transformative Goals

Unlike Arreguín-Toft, I argue that strong actors lose because they pursue transformative goals. Actors come to the conflict not only with a strategy and resources, but also with certain political goals. The strong actors' political objectives in asymmetric conflicts are different and vary from case to case. For example, in 1999 the NATO allies waged an air campaign against Yugoslavia in order to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, two years later the US intervened in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban government in retaliation for its support of al-Qaida, and in 2008 Russia attacked Georgia on the pretext of protecting Russian citizens, but seemingly to stop NATO enlargement into the post-Soviet space. Although the political goals of such 'top-dogs' appear to be entirely different, there is a common

denominator. The strong actors' goals might be easily divided into two separate groups: goals that require transformation of the weak actors' political, economic and/or social system, and those that do not impose such requirements. I called the latter "non-transformative goals," as the strong actor might achieve them and eventually succeed in the conflict without the need for coerced transformation of the weak actor's system. For example, consider two cases: Kosovo (1999) and the Russo-Georgian War (2008).

Kosovo

On 24 March 1999, NATO launched a bombing campaign to force Yugoslavia to withdraw its troops from Kosovo and to stop ethnic cleansing in that province. The air strikes however, proved to be ineffective. Yugoslavia mounted strong resistance and even increased attacks in Kosovo. Apparently, it was the planned ground invasion, and not the air strikes, that coerced Yugoslavia to negotiate and withdraw from Kosovo.[25] On 10 June 1999, NATO suspended its bombing campaign. The war was over and won. NATO achieved its pre-war goals of stopping ethnic cleansing and forcing Yugoslav troops to leave Kosovo. Significantly, the strong actor, NATO, achieved its goals without transforming the weak actor's (Yugoslavia) political system. Initially, NATO did not intend to overthrow Milošević's government and to install a more peaceful, democratic or pro-West regime. And, even if later preparation for a ground offensive and a plan for ousting Milošević were key factors that pressed Milošević to concede defeat and yield to NATO's demands, the invasion of Yugoslavia was never launched. NATO avoided entanglement in a troublesome invasion, searching for Milošević and probably fighting against guerrilla forces somewhere in the mountains of the Balkan Peninsula.

The Russo-Georgian War

Similarly, in the example of the Russo-Georgia war (2008). Russian political objectives were not entirely clear. At that time, few analysts suggested that Russian goals were much wider than maintaining control over the Georgian separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They suggested that the Russian military op-

eration against Georgia was aimed at thwarting Georgia's – and Ukraine's – NATO aspirations and also at strengthening Russian influence over energy producing states in Central Asia.[26] If accurate, Russia undoubtedly succeeded. A few months after the Russo-Georgian war, Sestanovich noted:

> Those NATO members that had endorsed eventual membership for Georgia and Ukraine are now divided on the issue. Those former Soviet states that had viewed closer cooperation with NATO (...) as a critical lifeline to the outside world now wonder whether this is still good idea. Energy producers in Central Asia that were considering new pipelines outside the Russian network may see such projects as too risky.[27]

It seems that Russia achieved what it wanted when, in early August, it ended military operations against Georgia. Russia succeeded without the necessity of occupation and transformation of its Caucasian neighbour. But is it correct? Did Russia not aim to transform Georgia into a pro-Russian state? Such transformation would inevitably call for the ousting of the government of the anti-Russian and pro-Western President of Georgia, Saakashvili. However, Russia did not make a direct attempt to topple Saakashvili. Obviously Russian leaders would have greatly welcomed the fall of Saakashvili, in the same way that Western powers would have been pleased about Milošević fall in 1999. But, in both cases, neither Russia nor NATO made a serious, direct attempt to change the political system of Georgia and Yugoslavia. Both actors were able to achieve their goals without resorting to the transformation of their adversaries' political orders.

The Gulf Wars

A similar mechanism also occurred during the Gulf War. As (then) Secretary of State Baker put it, US administration officials 'would not shed any tears' if Saddam Hussein fell, but they were also 'careful not to embrace it as a war aim or political aim.'[28] The US achieved its primary goals of driving all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. However, the quick and successful operation had a price. Hussein remained in power, and that created the impression that the job

was unfinished. Twelve years later US President George W. Bush decided to resolve the Iraqi problem once and for all.

The invasion of Iraq began on 19 March 2003, and after two months the mission seemed to be accomplished. On 02 May 2003 Bush declared that the major combat operation in Iraq had ended. The Iraqi government was overthrown, and in December 2003 Hussein was captured. The US undoubtedly prevailed in the Battle of Iraq. They achieved their main, pre-war goal; toppling Hussein. However, as it quickly turned out, the fall of Hussein was not the end of the war. On the contrary; it was the beginning. The US found itself involved in a long, costly and unpopular war in Iraq. And, after eight years of US occupation and full withdrawal of their troops from Iraq, it is still hard to tell who won. The thing that bothers many scholars, and probably a few politicians, was put forward by Rose who asks:

> How could this happen? How could the strongest power in modern history, fighting a rematch against a much lesser opponent at a time and place of its own choosing, find itself again woefully unprepared for the aftermath?[29]

The answer might be found in the actor's political goals. The US and their allies, as mentioned above, clinched an easy victory in the Gulf and in the Kosovo War. They achieved their political objectives in a relatively quick and cheap way. A similar scenario was drafted and enacted in the Iraq War. The US Army overwhelmed Iraqi forces and easily seized control of Baghdad. But, unlike the Gulf or Kosovo Wars, the US goals in Iraq in 2003 included ousting Iraqi leaders. From that moment, the US – intentionally or not – has been pursuing transformative goals.

Transformative Goals

In theory, an actor has transformative goals if it aims to change the political, economic and/or social order of its adversaries, or if its goals require such transformation. Thus, transformation might be an end in itself or a means to different political ends. In practice, however, states hardly ever take on the challenge of transformation as an end in itself. More commonly, they perceive transformation as

a necessary tool for different goals. Usually, the strong actor decides to transform the weak actor's political, economic or even social system if it considers that the reason of conflict lies in the nature of the weak actor. Therefore, the strong actor in order to ensure that in the future the weak will not pose a threat to its interests; tries to change the nature of the weak by imposing on him new political, economic and social institutions. At that point, transformative goals might be referred to as so-called state-building or nation-building policy.

The attainment of transformative goals is never easy. It usually involves military occupation of a particular territory, which is often costly and risky.[30] Furthermore, the creation of new political and social institutions that would not only act compliantly with the occupier's interests, but also would be able to survive once the occupation is ended, is no easier. The ability to shape local society in the short time of occupation is limited. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the number of successful outcomes of nation-building is very small.[31]

It is also unsurprising that great powers are unwilling to pursue transformative goals, even if they recognise that the reason for conflict lies in the nature of their adversaries' political system. The case of the Iraq War is no exception. In September 2003 Rumsfeld stated that the US is 'not in Iraq to engage in nation-building.'[32] The main political and military goal of the US was to get rid of Hussein, without engaging in Iraq afterwards.[33] The US perceived that the reason of the conflict of interests with Iraq lay in Hussein and the Ba'ath party, but ignored the fact that the dictator and his party were a fundamental part of the Iraqi political order. Therefore, resolving the conflict by ousting Hussein and the de-Baathification of Iraq inevitably led to the transformation of its political order.

As stated above, transformative goals are a difficult attainment for any actor, regardless of the power possessed. Long and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, both waged by 'the strongest power in modern history,' provide compelling evidence of that thesis. On the other hand, the examples of the Gulf War, intervention in Kosovo, and the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 show that strong actors prevail over their weaker adversaries, if the strong pursue non-transformative goals. In these cases, it is the logic of power portrayed by Thucydides in the Melian Dialogue that explains the results of conflicts. The superior military power of the strong actors enabled

them to achieve their pre-war goals in a very short time. But the same military power seems ineffective and insufficient in pursuit of transformative goals. Transformation of the weaker actor's political or social system is an ambitious and demanding task. And even for that reason, the strong actor is more likely to lose if it pursues transformative goals.

But what if the strong loses, because transformative goals are simply unobtainable? One might argue that the political and social institutions imposed by the outside power are too artificial and fragile, and therefore are unable to survive when the outside power is gone. Furthermore, the argument holds that the formation of any social institutions is a lengthy, grassroots process, and thus it is impossible to create a new institution on an ad hoc basis. History shows that successful transformation is extremely rare, but at the same time it also demonstrates that transformation is possible.

US occupations of Germany and Japan after WWII are serve as examples. But also, the Soviet transformation of East European states might be considered as a success of the USSR. Although the USSR intervened a few times, those interventions were never lengthy and only in the case of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 did the intervention lead to war. By and large, for nearly half a century, East European states acted according to the interests of the USSR. Another interesting case is the US invasion of Panama at the end of 1989. The primary military objective was to capture General Manuel Noriega and overthrow his regime.[34] The US achieved these goals and installed a new government. Shortly afterwards the US withdrew.

Although the examples of successful transformation differ a lot, they show that transformative goals are, at times, obtainable by the strong actors. Why then, have the US and their allies encountered such difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan? The answer to this question lies in the relationship between the political objectives and the strategy employed. The US chose the wrong strategy for their political goals in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their initial strategy, almost entirely based on military power, was an effective tool for the attainment of non-transformative goals, but failed in the more delicate task of transformation. That however, poses another question: why did the US employ the wrong strategy? The answer might be found in the false optimism of the stronger actor,

which expects that due to military superiority, the war would be quick, cheap and successful. The more power the actor possesses and the bigger the gap between it and its adversary, the higher are the expectations of easy success in the forthcoming war. That, in turn, creates false optimism, which makes the strong actor prone to flaws in planning for conflict.[35] The US administration neglected planning the post-invasion phase of the Iraq War (so-called "Phase IV"), which in turn caused enormous military and political difficulties. Other explanations of a poorly chosen strategy consider global hegemony, strategic culture and the domestic policy of the US. Rose, for instance, identifies four separate factors, both inside and outside the US government, which led to mistakes in preparing and implementing strategy for the Iraq War. These are: a dysfunctional national security decision making process; an obedient and blinkered uniformed military; a trusting Congress and public; and global hegemony.[36] Indeed, such explains the process that preceded the invasion of Iraq, but there is also a visible pattern in the way the US government chose its political and military goals toward Iraq as well as Afghanistan. The main goals were to overthrow the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the Hussein regime in Iraq. But the second priority was to 'keep the coalition footprint modest' and 'not to engage in what some call nation-building.'[37] In other words, the US planned to overthrow the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, and at the same time planned to avoid any deeper involvement in those countries. This however, proved to be contradictory, because ousting the Taliban and Hussein pushed the US into major engagement in post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq. From this perspective, the US mistake was not the fact that they pursue transformative goals with unsuitable strategy (i.e. largely based on military power), but the fact that they perceived those goals as if they were non-transformative. Therefore, the US did not develop a feasible plan for transforming the Afghani and Iraqi political systems after ousting the Taliban and Hussein..

Transformative Goals and Outcomes of Conflicts: A Conclusion

The transformative goal thesis may help predict and explain the outcomes of asymmetric conflicts. Accordingly, the strong actor is

more likely to lose if it pursues transformative goals, and contrarily, is more likely to win if pursuing non-transformative goals. Between 1990 and 2008 there were seven inter- and extrastate conflicts that may be tagged as asymmetric.[38] In three of them the strong actor pursued non-transformative goals. These were: the Gulf War, the War for Kosovo and the Russo-Georgia War. In all of them the strong actor clinched decisive victory and achieved the pre-war goals. Moreover, none of these conflicts lasted more than one year, and in the case of Russo-Georgia War it was a matter of days.

In the cases of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars intentions of the strong actor (whether goals were transformative or not) were not entirely clear. Although the US claimed it would not follow any transformative goals either in Afghanistan or in Iraq, it found itself transforming the political and social systems of both. To explain that, let me consider two phases of each of those wars. In the Sarkees and Wayman data-set, the Iraq War is coded as two conflicts: The Invasion of Iraq and the Iraqi Resistance. The war in Afghanistan is coded similarly. In the cases of the Invasion of Afghanistan and the Invasion of Iraq, the strong actor achieved its pre-war goals in a very short time. It took the US three months to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan and roughly the same time to oust Hussein in Iraq. However, as presented above, overthrowing the leadership of any state should be regarded as the beginning of the pursuit of transformative goals, because it leads to major changes in the political order of that state. In regimes where there is no strong political opposition to carry out transformation once the regimes' leadership is ousted by an outside power, it is the latter that shoulders the responsibility and costs of transformation.

The failure in transformation may result in restoration of former elites or in more severe conditions (e.g. civil war or the emergence of failed states). Obviously, none of these outcomes is favourable for the strong actor. It may threaten its interests, push for another intervention or reduce its international prestige, and in domestic politics it may be a reason for political turbulence (e.g. in democratic regimes, failure in asymmetric conflict may lead to failure in elections). These are a few reasons why the US did not withdraw immediately after ousting the Taliban government or Hussein.

Instead it engaged in long occupations and transformations of Afghanistan and Iraq. From that perspective, the US's pre-war goals were transformative, even though the Bush administration tried to ignore that fact.[39]

How the Strong Lose Wars

But what about the outcome of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars? Although the US withdrew its troops from Iraq, the results of both conflicts are still unknown. However, what we know about the duration, severity and relative costs of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars suggests that both may be perceived as the failure of the US. The Iraqi conflict lasted 8 years. The Afghanistan War – after a decade of fighting – is still unfolding. Material costs, and the number of casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan, have significantly exceeded the costs and casualties of any asymmetric conflict since the end of the Cold War. Worse still is that the outcome of the Iraq War, let alone Afghanistan, is dubious. The US is still far removed from the attainment of its goals; that is the creation of a sustainable political system in Iraq and Afghanistan that would be able to survive after the US withdrawal. In other words, it is highly possible that the strong actor would not achieve its transformative goals.

The last two examined cases are two interventions of Turkey in northern Iraq against the PKK. In those conflicts Turkish goals were non-transformative as it aimed to destroy the PKK's bases in Iraq. However, as noted above, the Turkish interventions in northern Iraq were a reflection of the intra-state war between Turkey and the Kurds in the 1990s. And, although the interventions were successful in military terms, they neither resolved the Kurdish problem nor brought the civil war to an end.

This is characteristic of asymmetric civil wars in which the government side is unable to attain transformative goals towards separatist ethnic or political groups. Failure to integrate such entities into the strong actor's political and social system results in long civil wars, low-intensity conflicts, terrorism and repeated interventions.[40] The internal Turkish-Kurd conflict is a compelling example. The first war between the PKK and Turkey erupted in 1984 and lasted until early 1986, after which the conflict continued at below war level (1000 battle related deaths). By 1991 the conflict had again reached the level of an intra-state war and lasted until 1999.[41] Other similar examples are the Kashmir Insurgents War, the Chechnya Wars and the Aceh Wars.

TABLE 1 Asymmetric inter-state and extra-state wars 1990–2008					
War name		Participants	Initiator	Strong actor's goals	Outcome
Gulf War (1990–1991)	Invasion of Kuwait	Iraq vs. Kuwait	Strong actor	Trans.	Third Party Intervention
	U.S. Military Response	U.S. and allies vs. Iraq	Strong	Non-trans.	Strong actor wins
First PKK in Iraq (1991–1992)		Turkey vs. PKK	Strong	Non-trans.	Stalemate
Second PKK in Iraq (1997)		Turkey vs. PKK	Strong	Non-trans.	Stalemate
War for Kosovo (1999)		NATO vs. Yugoslavia	Strong	Non-trans.	Strong actor wins
Afghanistan War (2001–present)		NATO vs. Al Qaida, Taliban	Strong	Trans.	Ongoing
Iraq War (2003–2011)		US and allies vs. Iraqi, Al Qaida	Strong	Trans.	Unknown
Russo-Georgian (2008)		Russia vs. Georgia	Strong	Non-trans.	Strong actor wins

TABLE 2 Asymmetric and probable* asymmetric civil wars 1990–2008			
War name	Participants	Initiator	Outcome
Kashmir Insurgents War (1990–2005)	India vs. Kashmiri guerrillas	Weak actor	Stalemate
Shiite and Kurdish War (1991)	Iraq vs. Shiites, Kurds	Weak	Strong actor wins
Turkish Kurds War (1991–1999)	Turkey vs. PKK	Weak	Stalemate
Dniestrian War (1991–1992)	Moldova vs. Dniestria	Weak	Weak actor wins
Abkhazia Revolt (1993–1994)	Georgia vs. Abkhazia	Strong	Weak actor wins
1st Chechnya War (1994–1996)	Russia vs. Chechnya	Weak	Weak actor wins
Croatia-Krajina War (1995)	Croatia vs. Krajina Serbs	Weak	Strong actor wins
Iraqi Kurds War (1996)	Iraq vs. PUK	Weak	Stalemate
Kosovo Independence War (1998–1999)	Yugoslavia vs. KLA	Strong	Third Party Intervention
1st Aceh War (1999–2002)	Indonesia vs. GAM	Weak	Stalemate
2nd Chechnya War (1999–2003)	Russia vs. Chechnya	Weak	Strong actor wins
1st Philippine-Moro War (2000–2001)	Philippines vs. MILF	Strong	Stalemate
2nd Philippine-Moro War (2003)	Philippines vs. MILF	Strong	Stalemate
2nd Aceh War (2003–2004)	Indonesia vs. GAM	Strong	Strong actor wins
Philippine Joint Offensive (2005–2006)	Philippines vs. MILF, NPA	Strong	Stalemate

The mistaken belief that it is possible to overthrow the rulers of any state, without engagement afterwards, was the reason for such enormous difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, as RAND analysts note in their work on counterinsurgency, "poor beginnings do not necessarily lead to poor ends".[42] The same can be said about the pursuit of transformative goals. Mistakes may be rectified, strategy adjusted, and eventually the strong actor may achieve his goals and win the war. Nevertheless, lives that were lost as a consequence of initial mistakes would not be returned.

So, what lessons can be drawn from the last two decades of asymmetric conflicts? Firstly, policymakers determined to use military force must be extremely careful in setting their political objectives. They must be aware that pursuing transformative goals is a demanding and risky task in which even great powers are likely to fail. Secondly, they must be cautious when choosing their strategy. Employing unsuitable strategy for particular political goals, especially transformative, might be a reason of higher costs or even eventual defeat in the conflict. Above all, policymakers should adhere to Clausewitz's golden rule:

No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.[43]

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Note: The title of this work is paraphrased from Ivan Arreguín-Toft's article 'How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,' found in International Security 26:1, 2001.

Notes to Pages

1 Thucydides. *History of the Peloponnesian War*. trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1972), 402.

2 Ivan Arreguín-Toft. *How the Weak Win Wars*: *A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 20.

3 See Gil Merom. *How Democracies Lose Small Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3; Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars* (2005), 20. Asymmetric conflicts are not only common, but they are also relevant. Great powers are involved in most of them, and in many cases asymmetric conflict has had a strong impact on domestic and foreign

policy of great powers (e.g. Vietnam War, Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan).

4 Arreguín-Toft. *How the Weak Win Wars*. (2005), p. 3–4.

5 See Jeffrey Record. *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win* (Potomac Books, 2007); Arreguín-Toft. *How the Weak Win Wars* (2005). Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*.

6 See Meredith R. Sarkees and Frank W. Wayman. *Resort to War 1816-2007* (Washington: CQ Press, 2010).

7 Ivan Arreguín-Toft. *How the Weak Win Wars*: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. *International Security* 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), 96. According to Arreguín-Toft halving strong actor power simulates the tendency of strong actors to have diverse security interests and commitments.

8 T.V. Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 20.

9 On small wars see: Eliot E. Cohen. Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars. *International Security* 9, no. 2 (Autumn 1984); Andrew Mack. Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars. *World Politics* 27, No. 2 (January 1975); Hew Strachan ed., *Big Wars and Small Wars* (London: Routledge, 2006). Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, (Basic Books, 2003) On COIN see Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke and Beth Grill, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers* (RAND Corporation, 2010); Bruce Hoffman. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, (2006).

10 I use the terms "extra-state" and "inter-state" wars according to Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*.

11 For instance the material power ratio between Russia and Chechnya during the Second Chechnya War was approximately 1:35 in favor of Russia, whereas in the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 it was "only" 1:16.

12 See Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*, 327–328 and 455.

13 For asymmetric conflicts initiated by the weaker actor see: Paul. *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers*.

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17 Andrew Mack. Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars. *World Politics* 27, no. 2 (January 1975), 181.

18 Mack. *Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars*. p. 182.

19 Merom. *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 15.

20 Arreguín-Toft. *How the Weak Win Wars*. (2005) p. 23.

21 Arreguín-Toft. *How the Weak Win Wars*. (2001) p. 95.
22 Arreguín-Toft. *How the Weak Win Wars*. (2001) p. 104.
23 On internal politics and cultural constraints see Cohen. Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars. and also: Jeffrey S. Lantis and Darryl Howlett. Strategic Culture. In Baylis, John. (ed.). *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
24 See Michael O'Hanlon. Staying Power. *Foreign Affairs* 89, No. 5 (September/October 2010).
25 See Sarkees and Wayman. *Resort to War*. p.181–182; Jacob Bercovitch and Judith Fretter. *Regional Guide to International Conflict and Management from 1945–2003*. (Washington: CQ Press, 2004), p. 255. And also: Daniel L. Bayman and Matthew C. Waxman. Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate. *International Security* 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000).
26 Stephen Sestanovich. What Has Moscow Done? *Foreign Affairs* 87, No. 6 (November/December 2008). Charles King. The Five-Day War. *Foreign Affairs* 87, No. 6 (November/December 2008). On Russo-Georgian War of 2008 see also: Ronald D. Asmus. *A Little War that Shook the World*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr. (eds). *The Guns of August 2008*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2009).
27 Sestanovich. What Has Moscow Done? p. 25.
28 James A. Baker with Thomas M. DeFrank. *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992*. (New York: Putnam, 1995) p. 435, quoted in Gideon Rose, *How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 217.
29 Rose, *How Wars End,* 239.
30 See David M. Edelstein. *Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).
31 Francis Fukuyama, *State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Profile Books, 2005), 50–51.
32 Donald Rumsfeld at the Eisenhower National Security Conference, September 25, 2003, available at www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?-speechid=1079.
33 Rose, *How Wars End,* 259.
34 Bercovitch and Fretter, *Regional Guide to International Conflicts*, 150.
35 On false optimism see Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 14–35.
36 Rose, *How Wars End,* 263.
37 Donald Rumsfeld. Beyond Nation Building. February 14, 2003, Available at: www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=337.
38 See Table 1 in the appendix.
39 Before the invasion of Iraq there were many analyses suggesting that ousting Saddam Hussein would force the U.S. to face the problems of

state-building and transformation of Iraq. For example, Kenneth Pollack opting for invasion warned that "the biggest headaches for the United States are likely to stem not from the invasion itself but from its aftermath." See Kenneth Pollack. Next Stop Baghdad? *Foreign Affairs* 81, No. 2 (March/April 2002), p. 45; see also: Rachel Bronson. When Soldiers Become Cops. *Foreign Affairs* 81, No. 6 (November/October 2002); Daniel Byman, "Constructing Democratic Iraq", *International Security* 28, no.1 (Summer 2003).

40 See Table 2 in the appendix.

41 Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*, 455.

42 Paul, Clarke and Grill, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*, 96.

43 Clausewitz, 577.

VALUES OF THE BELGRADE REGIME

Vladimir Dordevic and Danko Aleksic

Abstract: *This article evaluates the legacy of Slobodan Milošević whose regime ruled Serbia for more than a decade from the end of the 1980s until 2000. The article briefly examines the main political and social aspects of the Milošević regime and analyzes a value equation by questioning the social values of Serbia in the 1990s. The main argument presented here is that years of Milošević's rule produced catastrophic consequences for Serbian society that came to champion uncivic, non-democratic, anti-European values that still embody major roadblocks for successful democratic transition of the country.*

Keywords: Yugoslavia, Serbia, Milošević regime, value equation, democratic transition, domestic politics

Introduction

The 1980s in Europe was characterised by communism in decline. The fall of the Berlin Wall, and ultimately the collapse of communist regimes through most of Europe – with the exception of Belarus, Moldova and Transneisteria – produced a wave of freedom and hope that reverberated across the recently divided continent. Such was not the case in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Due to its internal, smouldering tensions, as well as the inability of political elites to accept new dynamics in international arena and to define common interests, the country became a stage for several conflicts, different in length, intensity and the sides involved.

The most prominent political figure of SFRY's dissolution was Slobodan Milošević, who held the positions of the Serbian Communist Party leader and, afterwards, became the president of the (Socialist) Republic of Serbia. Milošević's rule was the darkest period in the modern history of Serbia. The country was placed under severe economic sanctions by the international community, destroying the national economy and steeply decreasing living standard. Citizens were sent to wage wars that the country officially did not take part

in, usually by forced mobilisation. Serbia lost its historical allies, and the nation was labelled as an aggressor; an image still prevalent in public opinion and even among many political and academic circles around the world. Criminality bloomed. Overnight – and through criminal activities often whitewashed by patriotism – numerous individuals from the social "sludge" managed to become the elite. The system of cultural and intellectual values completely collapsed.

Thus, the first paradox of the Milošević regime was that instead of 'protecting the nation and national interest,' as Milošević's political discourse often emphasised, Serbia was turned into a pariah state ruled by an authoritarian leader whose years in power continue to be a major stumbling block in the democratisation of Serbia. Everything the regime supported and fought for was eventually lost. Regardless, the Belgrade regime was always quick to proclaim victory out of every defeat in the decade of Milošević's rule. That leads to another paradox: despite all such victories, the regime won a majority of votes (on the level of the Republic) in every election held during the 1990s. This could be identified as evidence that the values promoted by the regime had their roots within the Serbian public.

This work intends to add to the literature on Serbia, it regional and international role, by providing insights into the Milošević regime, how it came to power, what it sought and actually achieved once secure in its position and how Serbia has had to cope with the series of disasters brought about under Milošević. This work seeks to reveal the depth of responsibility Milošević bears for the current dysfunction of Serbia as it attempts to move beyond the immediate post-Cold War years to assume its proper place as a respected member of the European and international community of states. To achieve such aims, this work proceeds as follows. The first section traces some of the more important political and social aspects of the Milošević regime between 1989 and 2000, the year of his forced departure from office and, in fact, Serbia itself. This part of the work presents and examines the full gauntlet of issues ranging from the breakup of Yugoslavia – and the wars that followed – to domestic stability and economic hardships. The work then turns to evaluating the obstacles, and successes, faced by Serbia after the fall of

Milošević, including the wholesale political transformation of the state. Finally, this work concludes with a brief, but important, evaluation of the next (potential) steps in Serbia's national rehabilitation.

Political and Social Aspects of the Milošević Regime, 1989-2000

At the end of the 1980s, Serbia witnessed a metamorphosis of its political elites. Hard-line communists became hard-line nationalists, atheists became passionate believers, and convinced Yugoslavs became first-class Serbs. As later developments showed, there were precious few real political ideas or sincere national feelings behind this transformation. Everything was possible, allowed and finally enacted on for Milošević to retain power. The most prominent example of this metamorphosis was Milošević himself, and the process started on territory he desperately wanted to protect Serbian interests in, but which was eventually removed from the sovereignty of Serbia by his very signature namely; Kosovo.

Milošević was sent to Kosovo in April 1987, as a high-ranking official of the Communist Party, to reduce tensions between the Albanian majority and the Serbian minority. His rhetoric was appropriate to the function he held at the time, emphasising the protection of 'brotherhood and unity:' cornerstones of the Yugoslav communist ideology. However, soon afterwards, Milošević realised that exploiting the Kosovo issue could increase his personal political power. Therefore, he changed rhetoric and presented himself as the protector of Serbia, the Serbian nation, Serbian interests and heritage in Kosovo.[1] Milošević recalled the former glory of the Serbian medieval kingdom(s), themes which entred the political mainstream as a result.

Riding the wave of nationalism, using Kosovo Serbs as a tool and under the mask of the 'anti-bureaucratic revolution,' Milošević managed to sap the (rather extensive) powers from both Vojvodina and Kosovo and changed the political leadership in them (as well as in the Socialist Republic of Montenegro), rendering their autonomy symbolic. This was done to gain control over SFRY's Presidency,

which despite violating the constitution, was supported by a majority of Serbs.[2] This was also a period of intensive – as the Copenhagen School would suggest – securitisation.[3]

According to Hadzic, there have been three waves of securitization in Serbia over the past two decades.[4] The first, and critical, wave occurred in the second half of the 1980s and was ended with the eruption of the wars of Yugoslav succession. The core of this wave was the survival of both Serbs and Serbia. In this respect, Hadzic identified three specific lines of securitisation in Serbia. Firstly, Serbian securitising actors were (permanently) securitising the international community and its most important proponent (the US, NATO, etc). Secondly, partners in SFRY (republics and constitutive nations) were securitised and eventually presented as enemies. Finally, the "intra-Serbian," line, based on identifying 'true Serbian patriots' and 'traitors,' was developed.[5] The Serbian population was an appropriate public for this rhetoric; it was widely accepted and soon assumed bizarre proportions.

One prevailing characteristic of this period was the glorification of the past, i.e. Serbian history, stimulated by the anniversary (600 years) of the Battle of Kosovo Polje which was celebrated in 1989. The idea of a united Yugoslavia was presented by nationalists as a conspiracy against the Serbian nation, created specifically for the purpose of weakening Serbia (ironically neglecting that the most prominent initiator of the Yugoslav idea was Serbian King Aleksandar I Karadjordjevic and that a majority of Partisans during WWII were Serbs). Over a very short period of time, the communist legacy was abandoned, "comrades" became "gentlemen," socialist sacraments and mottos were soon altered or forgotten. The lack of vision and ideas for the future was substituted by a specific return to the past.

Another paradox is therefore evidenced: in May 1989 Milošević became president of Serbia. Although he managed to present himself as defender of the Serbian nation, the fundamentals of his political orientation focused on keeping Yugoslavia intact. In 1992, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which constituted Serbia and Montenegro, was established. This state existed until 2003, when it was renamed into State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, with more characteristics of a confederation than federation. The situation was indeed paradoxical; Serbs portrayed by the Milošević

regime as "victims" of Yugoslavia (a very common and extensively used interpretation by nationalists) were put in the position of being "protectors" of the very state that they felt "violated" in. During the parliamentary elections in 1992, after the proclamation of the FRY, Milošević's party won 40.4% of the vote.

The beginning of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), in which soldiers from Serbia particcipated without official recognition of the state, brought economic sanctions and international isolation to Serbia/FRY. What followed, abreast impoverishment of the population, was the collapse of social and intellectual values. The state, politics and criminality became entangled and essentially merged into one, while many prominent criminals gained the status of celebrities and appropriate political influence, some even organised their own paramilitary units.[6] It was a public secret that those units, supported and equipped by the state, were taking part in wars in Croatia and BiH. Nationalist politicians became prominent public figures, although some of their public speeches were almost beyond sense.

War marks the beginning of the second wave of securitisation in Serbia, a wave that lasts until 2000 with the overthrow of the Milošević regime. As determined by Hadzic, and seen via circumstances in Serbia during the 1990s, the mainstream political and securitising discourse was shaped and conditioned by the pace, scope and results of the wars.[7]

From the first salvos of combat until 1995, the collapse of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK)[8] and the Dayton Peace Agreement for BiH, the main referent object was the survival of Serbs west of the Drina river and their self-proclaimed states which could not have existed neither in economical nor in a military sense without the support of Serbia.[9] A majority of Serbs west of the Drina, although many in Serbia as well, believed that Milošević was genuinely interested in protecting them. Thus, considerable trust was lent to Milošević by the Serbian population that lived outside of the Republic of Serbia. Yet, Milošević's actions do not reflect those of a leader truly intent on defending his people, their prescribed territories and interests. To support this claim it is important to recall that:

1. Serb paramilitaries fought in Croatia and BiH and units of self-declared Serbian states were equipped by the army of the FRY, yet Milošević never publicly stated that the Republic of Serbia was actively engaged in these conflicts, quite the opposite.
2. Initiatives by the leaders of RSK and RS to merge with Serbia/FRY, were all rejected by Milošević.
3. RSK and RS were never officially recognized by FRY.
4. In August 1994 Milošević's regime imposed sanctions on RS because of political misunderstandings.
5. The army of the FRY was not ordered to react during Operations "Flash" and "Storm" in which the Croatian Army regained control of Serb-dominated territories; these were followed by ethnic cleansing.

Indeed, when Operation Flash commenced, information was presented very late (nearly the 20th minute) in the broadcast of the *Serbian Broadcasting Corporation* (RTS), the media wing of the government, a point which highlights the level of importance the Belgrade regime attached to RSK. Also, the army of RS – led by Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic – were equally lethargic, despite the long border between RSK and RS, and a history (albeit short) of joint military actions. It is clear that the concepts of "brotherhood" between Serbs and "holiness" of Serbian lands were not honest patriotic beliefs, but largely rhetorical devices for the political gains of Milošević and Karadzic.

At the same time, FRY was suffering from the third most robust hyperinflation in global economic history, with inflation reaching some 5,578,000,000,000,000,000% annually,[10] (re: 113% daily.[11] During this period, the highest banknote denomination – this was a country where the majority of the population believed they belonged to a 'heavenly nation' – was 500,000,000,000 Dinars (five hundred billion dinars). And yet, when FRY went to the polls in parliamentary elections in December 1993 and had the ability of voting Milošević out of office, the results speak for themselves: Milošević's party won 49.2% of the vote and gained 123 parliamentary mandates.

After 1995, and following the conflict in BiH, securitising discourses were withdrawn from the Serbian issue in Croatia and BiH; RSK had disappeared, except for a minute slice called *Eastern Slavo-*

nia, Baranja and Western Syrmia which was put under UN protection and eventually reintegrated into Croatia (1998) peacefully. In BiH, RS was confirmed as an entity within the unitary state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both Croatia and BiH were recognised by Milošević's regime in their existing borders. Thousands had lost their lives in combat; why, remains a mystery to many observers, though few would – in hindsight – consider it justified. Yet, Milošević was unfazed and in the parliamentary elections of 1997, the Serbian populace again reelected Milošević's party with some 44% of the vote, or 110 parliamentary seats. "Victory" was still incomplete; an additional "old/new" issue came to dominate the nearly-settled political environment in Serbia namely: Kosovo.

1998 marks the start of asymmetrical violence between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)[12] and Serbian security forces. This was the first armed conflict on the territory of FRY in the 1990s, though not the first time the FRY army was fighting for the "Serbian cause." As tensions rose, so did the international community's interest in preemptive conflict resolution so as not to repeat the errors it made during the conflict in BiH. Once international interest was peaked however, Milošević – who seemed unable of devising logical solutions to both internal and international problems – roused Serbian nationalism by calling potential international arbitration interference and, in that same spirit, asked for public opinion via referendum, which was held on 23 April 1998. Predictably, the results – some 94.73% of voters – were against the international community finding a solution to the Kosovo crisis.

Milošević was effectively handed a reason – and mocked democratic traditions in the process – for continuing his abrasive approach to Kosovo. The discourse on the very existence of Serbia and the Serbian nation was reactivated, while proponents of the international community, above all NATO, were labelled as existential threats, points reflected in the pervasive anti-Western propaganda in Serbian media, notably state owned television and newspapers.

In March 1999, after the Rambouillet stalemate, the elapsing of the NATO imposed deadline for Serbian troop withdraw from Kosovo and, in fact, intensified violence – mostly directed at civilians – in Kosovo, NATO commenced an air campaign against FRY in a bid to enforce the evacuation of Kosovo.

Instead of offering a public explanation as to why Serbia was

now at war with NATO, with no tangible political or military allies, the regime opted for cheap patriotism: broadcasting patriotic songs, populist speeches and replaying heroic partisan movies. Blunders piled up as, in April 1999, FRY's Parliament adopted a decision to join the Union of Russia and Belarus without mentioning such a Union was worthless as it was not discussed in Russian or Belarus's parliaments; it was a thinly veiled propaganda stunt that aimed to show Serbs that they did, in fact have allies. And yet neither Russia nor Belarus supported FRY in any meaningful way during Belgrade's conflict with NATO.

After 78 days of heavy bombing, Serbian security forces – police, military and paramilitary units – were fully and verifiably withdrawn from Kosovo and the territory placed under UN administration; the polar opposite the referendum was meant to deliver. Again, victory was proclaimed by Milošević. The reality was rather different.

Kosovo, the final chapter of this round of Balkan violence, also proved to be fatal for Milošević's regime; it had gone too far, had made too many errors, miscalculations and empty-promises. FRY was in economic and social ruin; internationally isolated and domestically paralyzed. Dissatisfaction turned in outrage which was reflected in popular demonstrations the security forces were unwilling to suppress. Milošević's regime was toppled in October 2000 under the weight of popular anger.

Following slow but steady democratic changes to Serbia, the political discourse was considerably altered. As argued in the next section, Serbian society is still not ready to face issues related to the Milošević era and, moreover, deep divisions in society persist; keeping the country imprisoned by values belonging to Slobodan Milošević's authoritarian rule. Unfortunately, the consequences of Milošević's rule are often explained through popular conspiracies against Serbs and observed through the lens of self-victimisation and self-amnesty. Until such attitudes change, Serbian society will not be ready to accept, let alone understand, its past and will remain in doubt over its future.

The Post-Milošević Transition: Considering a "Value Equation"

As suggested above, Milošević's 13 year rule produced cata-

strophic consequences. Not only did Belgrade venture into wars in ex-Yugoslav republics and finally in its own province of Kosovo, but its international standing was downgraded to a pariah. In a state of economic disrepair and international isolation, Serbia entered a vicious circle in which its political, economic and social capital was gradually eroded in a decade that many Serbian citizens remember as the roaring 1990s. With Milošević's regime, a type of a competitive authoritarian regime,[13] that saw delegitimisation of its political opponents and preservation of political power as its ultimate goals, Serbian citizens lived in a society of distorted values. This very distortion of values actually allowed the regime to take Serbia down a road of authoritarian rule and struck a devastating blow against the development of true civic values. As Pantić points out, values play a double role simply for they not only mirror the present, but also reflect the past.[14] In this respect, as Ramet succinctly concluded, 'values are created, promoted, and reinforced or, alternatively, subverted, mocked and destroyed by any number of agents and mediums.'[15]

Values stand at the very foundation of any society and once a values system is reinforced, changed or distorted – and in the case of Serbia one may speak of the predominance of un-civic values – society reacts and may be thrust down a different historical path. This section presents a brief, but dense, line of argumentation on Serbian values in the 1990s. It explains the significance of these for both the period of Milošević's regime and the post-Milošević transition of Serbia.

To place this line of thinking into a historical perspective, Milošević's regime was established at the end of the 1980s in an atmosphere of a greatly weakened federal Yugoslavia and his rise to power was associated with increasing problems in the (then) Serbian province of Kosovo where issues of Serbo-Albanian relations assumed markedly nationalist contours. Turning his back on liberal communist discourses, and politicians, including Milošević's own patron and former President of Serbia, Ivan Stambolić,[16] Milošević succeeded in introducing the masses into Serbian political life and swiftly rose to prominence. Considering that Serbian liberal political culture and its capital were not inconsiderable, but certainly insufficient, it does not wonder that substantial number of citizens actually supported Milošević in his rise to power.[17]

Embedded in paternalist traditions – with a tendency towards

a personality cult – with citizens preferring vested political power in the hands of a strong national leader, Serbian political culture remained associated to its authoritarian roots.[18]

In this context, Milošević's *anti-bureaucratic revolution,* presented as a strategy to protect Serbian national interests amounted to nothing more than the dismissal of those figures endangering Milošević's position. In other words, it was a power-grab. This is the fundamental reason why Milošević surrounded himself with a clique of political extremists, warlords and shady businessmen, members of the SPS and his wife's JUL. Indeed, some spectators of Serbian politics have noted that over a decade such clique isolated Serbia in an authoritarian nutshell; with Milošević atop a system that was only partly institutionalised.[19] This situation has hardly been remedied.

Serbia's current political situation technically fulfils the formal requirements of a functioning democracy – after Milošević's ouster – yet the country lacks working liberal values and a functioning political culture; intolerance and disrespect are mainstream traits of political life. Yet these are hardly new and author Jovan Skerlić, wrote over a hundred years ago about similar ills: 'populism, political bickering of every kind, constant and unexpected shifts in political beliefs and attitudes, and political sell-outs.'[20] Within such a climate, national triggers are likely to immerse the nation in endless political bouts and such triggers lurk at every (metaphorical) corner. In Serbia, the trigger was Kosovo and innumerable politicians engaged in innumerable debates, all for the sake of the elusive "national interest." The government and opposition refuse to accept Kosovo's independence; largely because both sides have built their careers on rejecting Kosovo and it has become nearly impossible – with this generation of leaders – to shift policy. Those refusing to participate in such a hallow discourse, or are ready to criticise majority opinion, are ostracised and portrayed as national enemies. Serbian domestic political life remains immature, similar to what Skerlić described (1906) as a process of 'channelling [...] institutionalisation of the domestic political arena.'[21]

Milošević's Serbia, when nearly all other former-communist states in Europe were experiencing socio-political and economic transformation,[22] was wasting away in nationalist isolationism. Dulic suggests that Serbia remains trapped in the nationalist discourse

of the past; it has trouble managing its nationalist legacy.[23] In this way, 'Serbia is not yet a post-conflict society,'[24] the conflict is ever-present and involves external issues related to territory and internal issues that gravitate around national identity, consciousness and determination. Unresolved historical issues (Serb diasporas, the legacy of WWII, etc.), continues to plague the country,[25] and these go far beyond the personality cult encouraged by Milošević. In other words, Milošević was an accomplished political tactician rather than a nationalist and the rhetoric he deployed found deep resonance in an expecting political community, Serbia. If such feelings of historical pride and violation were not acutely felt throughout Serbian society, Milošević and his clique would have been spitting into the wind instead of leading many millions of people – in Serbia and throughout the region – on the path of extreme narratives and subsequent political violence.

In respect to the values under scrutiny, it is clear that civic culture is underdeveloped which itself is an unfortunate trademark of Serbia today. Assigning blame for such underdevelopment on Milošević, Gordy described the 1990s as the decade of the 'destruction of alternatives'[26] where the regime – through destroying alternatives – created a system which championed state-sponsored criminality and the formation of a corrupt elite that actually enjoyed privileges while most Serbian citizens faced grim economic realities. With the country internationally isolated, Milošević's regime depended on maintaining a sense of claustrophobia in which a number of nationalist and religious values became central features.

As a result, the regime emphasised collective over individual rights, the opposite of modern, liberal democracies.

However, the idea that collective rights trump individual rights may be found in Serbian culture that transcends Milošević. Consider, for instance, those acutely anti-Western circles within the Serbian Orthodox clergy which routinely invoked a particular ethnic exclusivity while identifying the entire Serbian nation as a "community of believers,"[27] assuming that that anyone who places themselves first, and beyond the community, ceases to belong to the community.[28] This may be seen in the many opposition political activists who were castigated for undermining the community simply because of their dissent only to be portrayed as traitors. This was especial prevalent during Milošević's time in power. The situation

has, however, become more fluid.

Certainly, in the post-Milošević era, Belgrade faced major obstacles surrounding the imposition of modern civic values. Yet, Lazic keenly suggested that liberal civic values have still not been fully accepted and firmly grounded in Serbia.[29] It is not that Belgrade has been unable to re-evaluate its values (and national interests) in the thirteen years since Milošević was overthrown, it has been. However, these have been only superficially examined, the nation seems to suffer from a period of either 'shell-shock' or collective amnesia. Its failure is in the inability of the state and every actor within it to properly deconstruct "Milošević's Serbia" without which the post-2000 democratic engines will stall. Unfortunately, the Serbian national question is haunting political transformation and the acceptance of a new value system. Indeed, Belgrade has continued to press on without formal and thus proper ideational foundations rooted in civic values at a time in European history when new opportunities, re: EU accession was made possible; replete with economic and political benefits that far outweigh the costs involved of overcoming Serbia's turbulent recent and more distant past.

Conclusion

Unless Serbia embraces a more progressive approach – and reflective values for dealing with 20th century challenges it will remain captive to its past, a past with is not a permanent fixture but rather fluid, revised for political gains as they surface. This slow-as-molasses method instead of preventing internal – and international – conflicts – actually fuels them because the state is not able to give its people the one thing that all people demand; hope for the future. Above all, it was the catastrophic rule of Milošević that undermined Serbia. However, the former regime cannot, and should not, be blamed for all the problems Serbia faced over the past decades: anti-modern and anti-liberal nationalist traditions have their roots deep in Serbian history. The only way forward for Serbia requires nothing less than a complete re-evaluation and an attempt to a corpus of ideas and values of a modern, civic state. This certainly is much easier said than done, but must be attempted. Regardless of how cliché the notion of 'coming to terms with your past' may sound, for Serbia it is fitting. Only through the exercise of proper

leadership, that needs to start leading rather than misleading the country's public on the compatibility of international norms and Serbian culture. By accentuating individual over collective rights and democratic rule in a society based on civic values and norms, an example may be set that will reverberate. Only by overcoming its identity crisis can Serbia be free of its past, earning a chance for the European future its citizens deserve.

Notes to Pages

1 See 'Interview with Slobodan Milošević,' in the documentary 'The Death of Yugoslavia: Enter Nationalism,' The BBC.

2 One member of the Presidency was delegated by each of the republics and provinces. By installation of "his people" in both provinces and Montenegro, Milošević controlled 4 votes in the Presidency. As later developments showed, in some situations it was an issue how to persuade Macedonian or Bosnian members of the Presidency to vote in favour of Milošević. The reduction of power from the provinces occurred in 1988 (Vojvodina) and in 1989 (Kosovo).

3 See Barry Buzan (et al) (1998), Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Colorado: Lynne Rinner Publishers.

4 Miroslav Hadzic (et al) (2009), Yearbook of Security Sector Reform in Serbia, Dan Graf: Belgrade, Centre for Civil-Military Relations, pp. 121-126.

5 Ibid, p. 121.

6 The case of Zeljko Raznjatovic ARKAN is indicative; a convicted criminal and former-prisoner in several European countries, he was supported, by the state, to establish a paramilitary unit called the Serb Volunteer Guard. Also, Raznjatovic founded the Party of Serbian Unity and was a member of parliament between 1992 and 1993.

7 Hadzic (et al) (2009), p. 123.

8 RSK was a self-proclaimed Serbian entity within the recognised borders of the Republic of Croatia.

9 These were the Republics of Serbian Krajina (RSK) and of Srpska (RS), within the recognised borders of BiH. RS was officially recognized as one of two entities in BiH by the Dayton Peace Agreement.

10 National Bank of Serbia information is available at: <www.nbs.rs/internet/latinica/scripts/showfaqsection.html?lang=SER_CIR&konverzija=yes&id_sekcije=34#330> (accessed 12 June 2012).

11 Ibid.

12 The Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës) was a military organisation of Kosovo Albanians aimed at separating Kosovo from

Serbia/Yugoslavia.

13 Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik (2011), Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries, Cambridge UP, pp. 9-10. For hybrid regimes see Ibid; Larry Diamond (2002), 'Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,' Journal of Democracy, 13:2 and Fareed Zakaria (1997), 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,' Foreign Affairs, 76:6.

14 Dragomir Pantic (2003), 'Buducnost tranzicije u Sribiji zavisno od promena vrednosti,' in Grupa autora Promene vrednosti i tranzicija u Srbiji: pogled u buducnost, Belgrade: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institut drustvenih nauka.

15 Sabrina Ramet (2011), 'The Power of Values,' in Ola Listhaug, Sabrina P. Ramet and Dragana Dulić (ed) (2011), Civic and Uncivic Values: Serbia in the Post-Milošević Era, Central European University Press, p. 401.

16 Ivan Stambolić disappeared under mysterious circumstances in August 2000 only to be discovered a few years later that Slobodan Milošević ordered Stambolić's assassination. See Gabriel Partos (2004), 'Analysis: Stambolic Murder Trial,' BBC News Europe, 23 February 2004, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3511823.stm> (accessed 27 August 2012).

17 Milošević won 63.34% of the vote during Serbia's first presidential elections in December 1990. See Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds) (1997), Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe, Cambridge UP, p. 162.

18 Ramet (2011).

19 Dawisha and Parrott (eds) (1997).

20 Jovan Skerlić (1906), Politička književnost in Skerlić, (published in 1965), Belgrade: Prosveta.

21 Ibid.

22 Ramet (2011), p. 404.

23 Ibid, p. 404.

24 Stefano Bianchini (2011), 'The EU in the Values and Expectations of Serbia: Challenges, Opportunities, and Confrontations,' in Listhaug, Ramet, and Dulić (eds) (2011).

25 Ibid.

26 Eric D. Gordy (1997), 'Investigating the Destruction of Alternatives,' Problems of Post-Communism, 44: 4.

27 Ivan Čolović (2011), 'Nationalism as Religion: Examples from Contemporary Serbia,' in Listhaug, Ramet and Dulić, (eds) (2011), p. 245.

28 Ibid, p. 245.

29 Mladen Lazić (2007), 'Vrednosne orijentacije politickih i ekonomskih elita u Srbiji,' in Zoran Lutovac (ed) (2007), Političke stranke u Srbiji i Evropska Unija, Belgrade: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and FPN.

RESEARCH ARTICLES
BOOK REVIEWS
NOTES

BRITAIN IN A GLOBAL WORLD: OPTIONS FOR A NEW BEGINNING

By Baimbridge, Mark; Whyman, Philip B.; Burkitt, Brian, Imprint Academic, 2010,
ISBN 9781845401917

Reviewer: Oana Elena Branda
(University of Bucharest)

This work, a collection of essays, deals with the future of the UK-EU relationship, a relationship which has, in recent years, been tarnished as mutual recriminations and the ever-present "blame-game" unfolds within a Europe defined by internal tremors. With solutions in mind, the editors and authors delve deep into the origin of crises and are resolved to provide suggestions and recommendations on how this relationship should be conducted in the future.

The objectives of the book are usefully presented in the introductory section, written by Baimbridge, Whyman and Burkitt, along with summaries of the subsequent chapters and as the editors note 'this book seeks to provide an analysis of the economic and political relationship between Britain and the EU and thereby facilitate discussion of the future direction in which this relationship might develop' (p. 21). The main topic has been stated above, but the book is divided in several subtopics such as: British trade outside the EU, British foreign policy, the potential of trade relations with third countries, such as Canada, the impact of EU policies on British sensitive areas such as tax policy or sovereignty, (etc).

All chapters follow the same pattern: an introduction, a main corpus and a conclusion. They are all meant to demonstrate something and this is specified clearly. They are also interlinked: one complements the other; one launches a debate, the other ends it and/or provides solutions; even if the book is comprised of several different essays, it can still be read as a unitary work.

The fundamental arguments that can be summed up from all essays converge on the same topic: the United Kingdom would be better off if it adopted the model of entering interlocking networks of agreements. The current situation the UK experiences – as a mem-

ber of the EU – is damaging its potential for enhanced economic prosperity. Consequently, a strategic "step back", as a member of the EU would highly benefit British economic and political policies – according to the authors.

From the point of view of the argumentation, all essays are well documented and referenced. It is common for the authors to provide data and statistics, followed by detailed analyses. However, due to the excessive amount of data, some essays are slightly difficult to read and even more difficult to grasp. Nevertheless, the editors managed to strike a balance in this regard; so that more technical essays are followed by ones less difficult to understand.

All chapters are all well-written, without exception. They are clear in their purpose and all of them achieve their goals. The writing is fluent and the inner construction of the essays is transparent. Even if the aim of the book is to push a rather radical solution – diminishing the influence of the EU in the UK, by orienting the UK towards a more independent policy in aspects such as economics and politics – the tone the authors adopt is a balanced one, offering recommendations rather than urging to rash actions. Their tactic is to convince the reader by the sheer data provided, rather than propaganda against the EU. Based on this, the target readers are clearly specialists.

The added-value of this book stems from the approach used both by the authors as well as the editors. In an European landscape very much troubled by the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, with the Eurosceptics pointing the finger at the lacks and faults that occurred due to its implementation, the editors chose to put together a volume signalling the fact that the United Kingdom should explore more of its relationships to other countries, apart from the EU. The attempt is salutary, but the approach is extraordinary. The editors chose to put forward their argumentation and hope to convince their readers.

All things considered, this work comes highly recommended to all those interested in EU affairs and policies, students and advanced researchers. It is well-documented, has a good command of the topic and does not refrain from putting things into perspective. Thus, in the current context of EU policy research, this work is a must.

PEACEBUILDING

By Dennis J. D. Sandole, Polity Press, 2011
ISBN 9780745641652

Reviewer: Gökhan Güneysu
(Anadolu University)

One can think of only a few works more timely than the book by Sandole entitled: *Peacebuilding*.

Currently, we bear witness to an upheaval of international and national structures; structures which have been taken for granted. Informal violence is ubiquitous and state structures, which – be they strictly in a Hobbesian mind-set or not- we suppose would have saved individuals from the ravages of conflicts and "new" wars, are either dysfunctional or simply non-existent.

Peacebuilding itself is not a completely recent issue. International community has already been trying hard to tackle this emergent trend of chaos and mayhem for years. However, as Sandole succinctly puts it, we have failed thus far and, barring a revolutionary change in the way we perceive and handle these issues, we will continue to fail.

Persuasively, Sandole underlines the limited troubleshooting capacity of the reactive and narrow peacebuilding practices, which merely aim or only manage to establish the so-called "negative" peace (i.e. "absence of hostilities") and calls for a more comprehensive approach ("maximalist peacebuilding"). This he does diligently, yet in a manner that would allow even laymen to penetrate these very complicated issues surrounding the peacebuilding phenomenon.

Sandole tackles the *problematique* of the peace-building in the first chapter of his book. As already noted, the efforts to establish peace have hitherto been and will in the future be doomed to fail, as long as a more holistic and proactive approach is not adhered to. He stresses the fact that a national-interest oriented (dubbed by Sandole as "old" realism) policy is not capable of determining and addressing the causes of conflicts, which are now of a global character. Global is now national and national is global.

In chapter three, the author presents the reader a solid example of an "ideal praxis" on the field, namely UNPREDEP. UNPREDEP experience was proactive in nature and tried to address the roots and underlying causes of the conflict. It tried to establish good relationships with the locals, which increased the success of the mission. In this, Sandole has brought to the fore a very convincing proof that what he recommends is do-able and has been already achieved on the field. UNPREDEP embodied important aspects of what Sandole endeavors to establish in his book; a proactive, flexible peace-building, aiming to address the root causes of conflicts in close cooperation with the locals.

In the fourth chapter, Sandole highlights the need to address global problems with a view to preventing terrorism. According to him 'it is essential to deal effectively with the deep-rooted origins of political violence, of which terrorism is a manifestation or a symbol', i.e. terrorism is an 'epiphenomenon of deep-rooted conflict' Given the real nature of terrorism, Sandole adds, the traditional counter-terrorism measures will only be counter-productive and will end up creating more disillusioned and radicalized individuals, i.e. new recruits for the terrorist groups. He advises direct or indirect negotiations with terrorists. According to the author, this is nothing but a logical step needed if global governance is to be strengthened to address the inter-connected global problems, which cause the radicalization of individuals and groups. Professor Sandole has been researching and publishing on this issue for a long time and one cannot help feeling the immense theoretical and practical experience the author brings to the table. His masterful references to the cases on the field and extensive use of the relevant academic sources are, mildly put, remarkable. The reader feels that this book represents only the iceberg tip of what Sandole can actually offer about these topics. Even in this sense, the way he distills all these years' experience and comes up with a not-too-inflated book is praiseworthy. This makes the piece even more valuable. Vast references and creative usage of other academic works, as well as the eloquent elaboration of the most recent peace-building-relevant events make this book suitable for classroom instruction on the bachelor as well as graduate level studies.

This book is a must read for the students of the IR and CR areas as well as the practitioners on the field. Still for those merely wish-

ing to take a glimpse on the international problems, this book has much to offer, due to its clear and simple language.

THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM

Cejiss
3-4/2012

By Colin Crouch, Polity Press, 2011
ISBN 9780745651200

Reviewer: Jaroslav Dvorak
(Klaipeda university)

In his book *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism*, Crouch analyses the desperate causes and consequences of the neoliberalism doctrine. The discussion begins with the explanation of the origin of neoliberalism by providing political and economic explanations of neoliberalism: the application of market principles in economical life, the engagement of human rights and the right to live above the poverty level are the features common to the liberalism ideologeme. The author notes that the reincarnation of liberalism took place in the US, where liberalism gained a totally different meaning.

The case of neoliberal legitimisation is developed in the analysis of the crisis of oil prices in 1973. As the idea of full employment was rejected, attention focused on the stabilisation of prices and management of inflation. Mistrust in governments appeared because of their risky interventions. Legitimisation occurred nominating the scholars who propagated neoliberalism. There were some states that experimented with the neoliberal economic regime; international organisations encouraged the diffusion of *New Public Management* implementation. Despite earlier criticism, it is accepted that neoliberalism had positive consequences, decreased the dominance of government, raised the problem of centralisation while emphasising that the new paradigm may be flexible and adapt to the different ideologies and political approaches dominating in different countries.

The book provides a comprehensive, consistent and reader-friendly analysis of market limitations; though does not provide any original ideas. The author provides for the standard limitations of neoliberalism and, in fact, agrees with Clein. Reader will likely be interested in the author's position about the entry and exit from market barriers. Crouch attempts to defend big barriers of entry and

exit from market and maintains that high exit costs became important taking into consideration the world financial crisis. In order to protect society, the author suggests the application of stricter regulations for big banks because the society lacks ideal information about the operation of markets.

Crouch fears giant enterprises; entire markets depend on them. In order to curb the activity of such enterprises, the author analyses the antimonopoly law; in this case, in the US rather than Great Britain. Additionally, the book criticises the free choice of the consumer because, as it is claimed, the consequences of antimonopoly law have to be the welfare of the consumer rather than choices. Furthermore, the power of technocrats is acknowledged in taking care of the consumers' welfare; lawyers and economists decide what is better for the consumer, while value orientations are not so important. The remarks on national banks system are shrewd and purposeful, as a small number of banks dominate in them. Crouch continues a principled fight with the Chicago school and states that banks operate while using informal, virtual and invisible signals of regulation for institutions. Crouch views banks as actors, which are rational and seek profit, even though the need for a vegetative governmental intervention is questioned.

Even though Crouch is a fierce enemy of neoliberalism, while reading the book one can find many achievements of the ideology. Citizens may not trust the state and force the market to produce alternative choices for public services. Likewise, the privatisation of former public sector enterprises and the strengthening of the public sector, new regulation agencies are created and regulations increase.

Accepting the dominance of enterprises, lobbyist roles are analysed as they impact decision-making processes. Corporations act inside the political process, set standards, create private regulation systems and consult governments. Crouch criticises the responsibility (or lack of) of social enterprises and opposes the idea that the firm can be at least a little responsible because the cases of externality indicate the opposite. Only after a number of questions the author clarifies that the social responsibility of an enterprise can be a commodity because it creates trust between the enterprise and interested parties.

Furthermore, an attempt is made to relate the achievements of

neoliberalism with the deconstruction of political society; however, after reading the text, it is not clear how all this is related to neoliberalism. Crouch laconically allows the readers to understand that we all are cheaters and live in the imitation world because we cheat each other, even though we expect morality from others. Accordingly, political societies are formed of five groups: political parties, the church, agitation groups (e.g. the group of patient families), voluntary and charity sector and professions. Crouch blames these for hypocrisy and subservience for neoliberals.

Finally, it is claimed that neoliberalism is in crisis and the international environment are returning to the patronage of the state. However, the question of how much government is actually needed still remains unanswered.

CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT RESOLUTION

By Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, Hugh Miall, Polity Press, 2011
ISBN 9780745649740

Reviewer: Shalva Dzidziguri
(Central European University)

Statistical analyses indicate that the estimated 150 armed conflicts which unfolded in the post-Second World War period produced nearly 40 million deaths. Famine, forced migration and widespread diseases – among other conflict-related implications – dramatically increased human suffering. Remarkably, the civilian death ratio has largely outnumbered combatant death by between eighty and ninety percent.

The failure to break the cycle of violence has not, however, hampered the sub-discipline of Conflict Resolution (CR) from developing autonomous research platforms. And, despite the manner in which international relations have transformed since the end of the Cold War and following the 11 September attacks, and the near stillbirth of CR, the 2008 election of Obama and his signalled readiness to collaborate closely with other states in search for more peaceful solutions to international crises, has reinvigorated CR.

Bearing witness to such recent changes to the field, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall embark on an attempt to revise previous works on CR through the introduction of their third edition of *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* which brings new research findings and the latest empirical data into a comprehensive, flowing volume. This work provides a detailed exploration of an international phenomenon and is rooted on invoking social change in terms of understanding conflict as 'the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups', and resolution simply as 'behaviour [is] no longer violent, attitudes [are] no longer hostile, and the structure of the conflict [has been] changed'.

Similarly to the first and second editions, the authors have designed the same pattern of the book structure. Twenty chapters are

equally distributed in two main parts and comprise a holistic overview of the field. Written largely in an easy to follow language, its first part is organised as a summation of the evolution, and a theoretical survey, of the subject matter.

The second part shifts away from more orthodox conflict resolution from orthodox fount towards its new dimensions such as art and popular culture, media and modern communication, public discourse and language intractability. The current edition introduces new chapters offering a survey on those contemporary issues. Growing environmental regression that grants new facets to the otherwise overly interwoven complexion of modern conflicts also finds its reflection in the book.

Authors argue that conflicts no longer have only local implication that is confined within the state borders. Rather they have an immediate global reverberation thanks to the recent changes induced by globalization. This trend reinforces their conviction to put emphasis on the importance of Cosmopolitan Conflict Resolution that in their own words '[I]ndicate the need for an approach that is not situated within any particular state, society or established site of power, but rather promotes constructive means of handling conflict at local through to global levels in the interests of humanity'.

Every chapter is inclusive of case studies as a well-substantiation and good empirical illustrations of each discussion. Setting "sign posts" in an otherwise immense and factually overloaded text provides a helpful guidance to the reader to journey along the historical evolution of the subject and avoid confusion by richness of details.

The book offers a thorough discussion on the role of modern technologies in conflict resolution. Over decades theoreticians and practitioners alike have tested variety of approaches to explore causes and effects of conflictual violence and explore their contributory internal and external agencies in order to design effective techniques peacefully addressing the problem. Thanks to the technological breakthroughs in communication systems of recent past research institutions have designed platforms that enable to record and track the patterns and intensities of modern conflicts in a timely manner. Sophisticated computing systems transform the gathered information into data-sets of quantitative and qualitative nature and uphold the containment of lapsing violence into atrocities by alarming the world community for immediate intervention.

Unfortunately, as the book clearly describes, frequently the opposite holds true. Strikingly, development of conflict resolution techniques appears to be tantamount to the gross of homicide violence.

In closing, the edition delivers on its promise because it describes Conflict Resolution both as a scientific discipline and a practical venture. Drawing on interdisciplinary scholarship, it gives the account of conflict resolution formation in broad outlines and presents the collection of achievements the field has yielded thus far and the set-becks it struggles to repair in theoretical as well as practical sense. The book is recommendable as a useful handbook equally for researchers, practitioners and policymakers as guidance to understanding of an evolutionary process of conflict resolution as well as its current standing.

MULTILATERAL SECURITY AND ESDP OPERATIONS

Cejiss 3-4/2012

By Fulvio Attinà and Daniela Irrera (eds), Ashgate, 2010, ISBN 9781409407072

Reviewer: Anna Kalińska (Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika)

Multilateral security combined with ESDP are crucial fields within the theory of international relations and creation of their mechanisms. After the Second World War and primarily bipolar system of powers it was the United States that decided about arranging the cooperation between Western states under the aegis of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty so as to guarantee a global safety system. The authors of the book "Multilateral security and ESDP operations" start from this recognition. Nothing was more sufficient than Euro – Atlantic collaboration and efforts made in order to appease local conflicts which indirectly appeared as a result of provisions of Yalta agreement established in 1945.

The book is divided into two parts. First one depicts the evolution of peacekeeping operations carried out by international actors. Second one offers the presentation of European approach to this issue.

In the first part, the authors present sharp observations on how did the evolution of peacekeeping activities look like. They shows how did they transform from operations which aimed to widespread spheres of political influence to present ones, functioning on the different basis. The authors offer a thesis that this "difference" is about changing the way of political thinking. They claim that operations conducted nowadays, in the times of relative peace and stability have changed their motivations, from military to more complex ones, like a provision of humanitarian aid, social stability, supervision of disarmament and monitoring elections. At the same instant, peacekeeping operations which used to be neutral, now – due to external influence are often dominating over interior organization of states.

In addition, the authors put an emphasis to multilateral – mini-

lateral tendencies. Previously (starting from post – war period and ending with the beginning of the 90s) only the most powerful states were taking part in actions under the aegis of the United Nations, nowadays the idea of minilateralism made it more popular to engage single states or even small groups in handling peacekeeping problems within the frames of international order and rules of law.

What is specifically intriguing about this scholar analysis is the included wide range of novel problems, such as – regionalization of peacekeeping operations, NGOs commitment or the influence of Security Sector Reform (SRR). To be more precise – basing on examples such as East Timor and Southern Pacific the authors explain how is the idea of regionalization changing the notion of global peace operations. As a result of this analysis, they summed up that regional aid can be successful, but it proves correct especially when multilateral support of local activities is present and adequate to conflicts' scale.

Furthermore – increasing multifunctionality of NGOs. Non – governmental organizations are no longer just taking part in United Nations' consultation procedure but they also enhance humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations. The authors suitably call them "knowledge – providers", "peace – facilitators" and "voice – articulators", giving the tribute to their further analysis.

What is also taken into consideration is the comprehensive change in the area of global safety, aggregated in the concept of Security Sector Reform. What was particularly implied was that its main actors, i.e. UN, NATO and EU are not taking into account the rule of "local ownership", simultaneously devoting too much attention to the same conflicts and overlapping obligations which results in confusion and lack of efficiency and transparency instead of well-provided activities.

In the second part of this prominent tutorial the authors give a series of evidence that the number of European peacekeeping operations has increased since the development of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Nowadays, Western European countries are more capable of carrying out missions on their own, without UN's support. They are more involved in other organizations' and join hybrid missions' activities. The authors claim that although some observers are sceptical of many trends concerning European impact on peacekeeping operations this issue cannot be

omitted in this dissertation.

The authors give the book the bonus of also offering chapters' titles and subtitles in the form of questions, which absorbs readers' attention and introduces them to a decision – making process that they undertake themselves.

"Multilateral security and ESDP operations" is an overview of practice of peacekeeping operations well-based on the newest theoretical background, heavily supported by tables, statistics and graphic data. A full, for general readers interested in international relations, as well as for scholars committed to global and local security issues.