The Kippenberger Lecture 2010

A changing Asia-Pacific: Prospects for war, peace, cooperation and order

Muthiah Alagappa Ph.D.
The Centre for Strategic Studies Discussion Paper series is designed to give a forum for scholars and specialists working on issues related directly to New Zealand’s security, broadly defined, in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

The opinions expressed and conclusions drawn in the Discussion Papers are solely those of the writers. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand or any other organisation with which the writer may be affiliated.

For further information or additional copies of the Discussion Papers please contact:

The Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand
Victoria University of Wellington
PO Box 600 Wellington
New Zealand.

Tel: 64 4 463 5434
Fax: 64 4 463 5437
Email: css@vuw.ac.nz
http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/

© Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand
Victoria University of Wellington.

2011

ISSN 2230-5378 (Online)

Desktop publishing: Synonne Rajanayagam
Printed by: Milne Print Limited
Foreword

The Sir Howard Kippenberger Visiting Chair in Strategic Studies is named in honour of a leading New Zealander who was keen for his fellow citizens to appreciate their country’s place in an often turbulent and challenging world. In the early twenty-first century this means, above all other things, developing a sound appreciation of the changing Asia-Pacific regional security environment in which New Zealand needs to pursue its interests and values. And in seeking an eminent international scholar to make sense of this regional landscape and what lies deep behind it we could have done no better than the third holder of this visiting professorship, Dr Muthiah Alagappa.

In his numerous public talks throughout the length and breadth of New Zealand, his media interviews, participation in policy roundtables and discussions with graduate students, Dr Alagappa was careful to emphasise the political context which has been shaping Asia’s transformation. As he argues below in a revised and extended version of the Kippenberger public lecture he gave at Victoria University in late 2010, Dr Alagappa concludes that Asia’s relative peace is related less to the external state-to-state relations between the major powers that so many of us concentrate our minds on, and rests more on what might be called the state of the state. In other words, it is the stage that many Asian polities have reached in the process of state-making that explains to a considerable degree the peace we have seen in the region over the past three decades. And it is the course of that state-making process which will have a good deal to say about regional security in future years.

An argument such as this requires us to stop, think, and re-evaluate our own assessments of what makes Asia secure or insecure, and what this might mean for New Zealand and its policy-makers. It warns us against the temptation to rely too much on external balances of power when internal political processes, over which even large and powerful countries have a limited degree of influence, also demand our consideration. In the most cogent traditions of strategic studies, this perspective is also inherently Clausewitzian, focusing us as it does on the energies and passions which come from the political process as the most potent sources of strategic behaviour. For exploring, testing and developing this logic in front of several appreciative New Zealand audiences, the Centre for Strategic Studies is extremely grateful to Muthiah Alagappa. And we commend the essay which follows for close reading.

Professor Robert Ayson
Director
Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand
Dr. Muthiah Alagappa is Distinguished Senior Fellow at the East-West Center. From 2001 to 2007 he was founding director of East-West Center Washington. Prior to that he was director of the integrated research program in East-West Center Honolulu and was a senior fellow at the East-West Center from 1989. From 1985 to 1989 he was Senior Fellow at ISIS Malaysia and from 1962 to 1982 he was a career officer in the Malaysian Armed Forces.

Muthiah Alagappa has extensive research experience in comparative and international politics of Asia. He has led numerous multi-year, multi-national, collaborative research projects and has published widely in highly reputed university presses and international journals. His recent books include The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia; Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space; and Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, all published by Stanford University Press. He is now working on a book manuscript tentatively titled “War, Peace, and Cooperation: State Making and International Relations in Asia since 1945.”


Dr. Muthiah Alagappa has held visiting professorships at Columbia University, Stanford University, Keio University, and the Nanyang Technological University. He was Leverhulme visiting professor at the University of Bristol in the fall of 2008 and the Sir Howard Kippenberger Visiting Chair in Strategic Studies at Victoria University in Wellington, New Zealand in fall/winter 2010-11.

Prior to his academic career Dr. Muthiah Alagappa served as a commissioned officer in the Malaysian Armed Forces in field, command, and staff positions. He graduated from Federation Military College (Malaysia) in 1962 and attended the British Army Staff College (Camberly) in 1973-74.

Dr. Alagappa received an MA in Politics from the University of Lancaster and a Ph.D. in International Affairs from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.
Established in 2006, the Sir Howard Kippenberger Visiting Chair honours Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger, KBE, CB, DSO, ED, one of New Zealand’s most distinguished and courageous soldiers, who was also an eminent scholar and strategist. He served as President of the New Zealand Returned and Services’ Association and oversaw the production of 23 volumes of New Zealand official war histories. The Chair was established with funding from the Garfield Weston Foundation in Britain, the New Zealand Defence Force and the Royal New Zealand Returned and Services’ Association (Incorporated) through the Victoria University Foundation and is coordinated by the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand.
A changing Asia-Pacific: Prospects for war, peace, cooperation and order

The Sir Howard Kippenberger Visiting Chair in Strategic Studies
Third Public Lecture

7 December 2010

Muthiah Alagappa Ph.D.

Introduction

Asia has experienced dramatic changes over the last several decades. It has transitioned from war to peace and cooperation. Despite predictions to the contrary, Asia has now enjoyed relative peace, security, and prosperity for well over three decades. Simultaneously Asia has travelled from a peripheral region in international politics and economics to become a core world region. The continued rise of Asian countries, especially China and India, will further increase the significance of Asia possibly making it the core world region much like Europe in the age of industrialization and colonization. Some argue that the rise of Asia, especially China, poses fundamental challenges to continued United States’ dominance of the international system, and that war has become thinkable again in Asia. This essay explores the prospects for war, peace, cooperation, and order in a changing Asia-Pacific region.

New Zealand is an integral part of that region. Its strategic and economic well being is firmly connected to developments in Australia, United States, and Asia. Both the United States and Australia are in the midst of reviewing and reshaping their interaction with the rising Asian countries. New Zealand too is rethinking its economic and strategic relations. An eminent military historian and strategist, Sir Howard Kippenberger was interested in New Zealand’s place and role in the world. I hope this essay will provide the strategic context for New Zealand as it considers how to relate to a changing Asia-Pacific.*

Main arguments

The subject of my essay, “A changing Asia-Pacific: Prospects for war, peace, cooperation and order”, is indeed a broad topic and to keep it manageable I will explore a few specific questions: How has the Asia-Pacific changed and how is it likely to change in the next twenty to thirty years? Will a changing Asia-Pacific continue to be peaceful or become more war prone? What will be the nature of cooperation and order in a changing Asia-Pacific? What is the likely role of force in the Asia-Pacific? I will advance a few propositions in response to each question. Some propositions may be controversial. Further, as I have a lot of ground to cover, my discussion may not be in depth in all areas.

* I would like to express my deep appreciation to Professor Rob Ayson and the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Victoria, Wellington for inviting me to hold the Kippenberger Chair in Strategic Studies.
Another point to note is that although the reference in the title is to Asia-Pacific, my discussion will focus on the Asian region. I believe that Asia rather than Asia-Pacific is the region of consequence. I define Asia broadly to include Northeast, Southeast, South, and Central Asia, United States, Russia, Australia, and New Zealand. In due course delimitation of the Asian region will extend westward to include West Asia and parts of the Middle East especially the Gulf region.

I will begin by setting out four main arguments. First, over the last sixty years there has been a transition from war to peace in inter-state relations and in the political heartlands of many Asian countries but not in the interaction of states with their minority communities. Contrary to certain predictions, particularly in the West, I argue that peace in inter-state relations and in Asian political heartlands is likely to be sustained in the foreseeable future. Although minor wars, military clashes, and cross-border military incursions are possible, large-scale war is highly unlikely.

Second, cooperation in Asia has been primarily intergovernmental with the purposes of ensuring national and regime survival, and promoting national economic growth. Although economic cooperation may become more collaborative and integrative, it is unlikely to erode the goal of building strong national political communities. The continuing international orientation of Asian economies and the increasing economic and strategic weight of Asian countries in global affairs are likely to increase the national-regional-global nexus making the global context even more salient for regional cooperation in Asia.

Third, order in Asia over the last sixty years has evolved from an exclusively instrumental one to an instrumental order with certain normative-contractual features. Despite that evolution, the purposes and rules of order remain focused on private ends (national survival, regime security, and national prosperity). That focus appears unlikely substantially to alter in the foreseeable future. Over time Asian countries and regional institutions have assumed increasing responsibilities for sustaining international order in Asia. The rise of Asian powers is likely further to strengthen that trend, making for a corresponding decline in the role and influence of the United States. However, the U.S. will continue to be an important player in the construction and maintenance of order in Asia.

Fourth, the process of state and nation making along with change in state capacity have been and will continue to be the key drivers of war, peace, cooperation, and order in Asia. The rise of Asian powers does not substantially alter the prospects for war, peace, and cooperation or the type of order in Asia. It will, however, affect how order is sustained in Asia and who will do so. I will elaborate these themes. Before doing so let me set out my thoughts on how Asia has changed and how it may further alter in the foreseeable future, i.e. the coming two to three decades.

Asia transformed

I do not subscribe to the tyranny of history or geography but believe that exploration of the future should be grounded in a good understanding of the past and present. I will therefore begin by exploring how Asia has changed over the last sixty years. Here I advance four inter-related propositions.¹

First, Asia has travelled from a subordinate to a region dominant system. From 1945 through the mid-1970s Asia was a subordinate region. Political, security, and economic interaction among

¹ For a more elaborate discussion of these propositions, see Alagappa, 2008a.
countries in the region was strongly influenced by the global rivalry between the two superpowers (United States and Soviet Union) as well as the interests and actions of retreating colonial powers (United Kingdom, France, Holland, and Portugal) that were influential in matters of decolonization till about the mid-1960s. Emerging from long periods of colonial domination, Asian countries were weak as states and powers. They were vulnerable to domestic and international conflicts as well as external intervention in internal affairs. And their small and weak economies were structurally dependent on former colonial powers or one of the two Cold War blocs. To achieve national liberation or preserve their newfound sovereignty, most Asian countries aligned themselves with one of the two superpowers or a former colonial power. A few like India, Indonesia, and Burma sought a path of non-alignment. Ultimately even these countries chose de-facto alignment with one of the two superpowers or self-isolation in the case of Burma.

Deep penetration of global bipolarity and the dynamics of superpower competition along with weakness as states, nations, and in-state capacity shaped the international orientations and foreign policies of Asian countries. Conflict formation and management in the region, relations among regional countries, and relations with extra-regional states were all influenced by those considerations. At the same time although Asian countries had little or no influence over the global structure and dynamics of superpower competition they were not purely pawns in a great game. Some like North Vietnam and China sought to take advantage of superpower competition to pursue their own interests and others sought to create space for independent foreign and security policies. Nevertheless, Asia was a theatre of several hot wars that were driven or shaped by the Cold War ideological and military struggle. Except in maritime Southeast Asia, the only sub-region in Asia to witness the development of indigenous regional multilateral cooperation, all other regional efforts were led by one of the two superpowers that took the form of alliances or strategic alignments. To sum up, from 1945 to about mid-1970s the dynamics of political, security, and economic interaction in the region were conditioned strongly by weaknesses of Asian states and the dominance of external powers.

Over time Asian countries became stronger states, their economies experienced rapid growth increasing state capacities, and the role of external powers declined substantially. Political, security, and economic interactions were increasingly driven by the interests and actions of regional countries. Although the Cold War overlay did not completely disappear, its impact significantly declined. Local and regional dynamics became important in their own right giving rise to a region dominant system. Certain external powers, especially the United States, continued to be important but primarily in the context of regional developments. Although it is difficult to ascertain a precise date, the transition from a subordinate to a region dominant system began sometime in the early to mid-1970s with the dramatic growth of several Asian economies (especially Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), Sino-American rapprochement that commenced in 1971, termination of the Second Indochina War in 1975, and change in U.S. policy embodied in the 1969 Guam Doctrine and the 1973 Nixon Doctrine that called upon Asian countries to assume greater responsibility for their security.

The region dominant system gained even greater traction with the rapid economic growth of the ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand) and especially China, India, and Vietnam, as well as termination of the Cold War in 1991. With the rise and reorientation of Asian powers (China, India, and Japan), political, security, and economic interaction in Asia was increasingly driven by their interests and actions as well as that of the United States. Sub-regional and regional forums that multiplied in number and function also affected international interaction. Political ideology ceased to be a key factor in inter-state relations. Strong local and regional content informed conflict formation and management. A relatively high level of regional interdependence characterized economic interaction particularly among East Asian countries.
With the exception of the United States, political-security involvement by external powers in the region declined dramatically with Russia ceasing to be a major player in Asia. Continued U.S. involvement generates and modifies regional structure and dynamics. However, there is no overarching external dynamic that superimposes itself on the region as was the case during the Cold War. If the rise of China, India, and other countries continues, Asia may be on the verge of another transition, this time from a region dominant system to an international system in which Asia becomes the world’s core region much as Europe was in the 19th and 20th centuries.

The second proposition is that Asia has been transformed from a war prone to a more peaceful, and stable region. Post-World War II Asia was highly conflict-ridden. Over the years, however, the number and intensity of inter-state and intra-state wars substantially declined with Asia enjoying relative peace and stability for well over three decades. This is a remarkable transformation and achievement by any standard.

Between 1945 and 2010 there were a total of 71 major wars (battle casualties above 1,000). Of these 15 were inter-state, 47 intrastate, 6 extra-state or liberation wars against colonial rule, and 3 non-state wars. During the same period there were approximately 23 minor inter-state wars (25 to 999 battle casualties) and 24 inter-state militarized disputes with armed clashes/violent incidents (less than 25 battle casualties). In all about two million people were killed in interstate wars, 1.9 million in intrastate wars, and about 400,000 in anti-colonial struggles. These figures do not include civilian casualties which were rather high especially in intra-state war. The casualty figures also do not include civilian deaths from state oppression, massacres, massive policy failures, and genocide.

Beginning in the 1970s Asia witnessed a substantial decline in the number of major and minor inter-state wars (Tables 1 and 2). After reaching a peak in the early 1970s, major inter-state war declined in number and frequency, as well as in intensity measured in terms of battle casualties. In the last three decades (1979 to 2009) there were only two major interstate wars compared to 13 such wars in the first three and half decades (1945 to 1979). Connected to earlier major wars among the same countries, the two wars since 1979 (the 1987 Sino-Vietnamese military clash along the border and the 1999 Pakistan-India military engagement in the Kargil district in Indian Kashmir) were limited in purpose and nature. They reinforce rather than undermine the claim that major inter-state wars in Asia have substantially declined in number and frequency, and are becoming a feature of the past.

Counting wars in dyads instead of episodes that exceed one thousand battle casualties also supports this observation. In dyadic terms, there have been nine wars in Asia, all commencing before 1979 (Table 3). Of these, four (U.S.-North Vietnam, Vietnam-Cambodia, Vietnam-Laos, China-Vietnam) have ended. The inter-Korean and China-Taiwan conflicts are stalemated and continue as highly militarized inter-state disputes. War has been avoided in these two dyads and appears rather unlikely. The Sino-Indian border dispute that resulted in the 1962 war is being handled through bilateral negotiations. Although a quick settlement of that dispute does not appear likely, war too appears highly unlikely. The Sino-Tibetan conflict has transformed into a largely peaceful Tibetan resistance against Chinese rule. Only the India-Pakistan dyad continues to be war prone. There have been four wars (1947-9, 1966, 1971, and 1999) in that dyad: three over Kashmir and one as a consequence of civil war in East Pakistan. Even in this dyad, major inter-state war has become limited in purpose, scope, and frequency. Concern over escalation has limited minor war as well although cross border military incursion and Pakistani support for

---

2 These figures are derived from the Correlates of War project data set (Sarkees, Reid, and Wayman, 2010).
3 These figures are derived from the Uppsala (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2009) and Heidelberg (Pfetsch and Rohloff, 2000) data sets.
militant insurgents continue and may have increased. Taken as a whole, there has been a
dramatic decline in the number of countries engaged in war and there has been no new war
dyad.
Table 2. Minor inter-state war in Asia (1945 - 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>China-Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>China-North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Cambodia-Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Indonesia-Netherlands (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Indonesia-Malaysia (1963-66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>India-Pakistan (1964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Cambodia-Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>India-Pakistan (1989-92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>India-Pakistan (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>India-Pakistan (2000-04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Laos-Thailand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The timeline includes wars and conflicts involving multiple states, with specific years and events indicated for each conflict.
Table 3. War dyads in Asia (1945-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DYAD</th>
<th>WARS</th>
<th>RESULT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China-Tibet</td>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>Ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China-Taiwan</td>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>Stalemate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1958</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China-India</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Stalemate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China-Vietnam</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1987</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan</td>
<td>1947-49</td>
<td>Stalemate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Vietnam-S. Vietnam/U.S.</td>
<td>1965-75</td>
<td>Ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam-Laos</td>
<td>1968-73</td>
<td>Ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam-Cambodia</td>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>Ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1977-79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Korea-S. Korea</td>
<td>1950-53</td>
<td>Stalemate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With no large-scale inter-state war since 1979 and substantial reduction in minor inter-state war, as well as the settlement of many land border disputes (through war or negotiations), it is possible to argue that Asia has experienced a long period of inter-state peace not unlike the long peace of the Cold War era. At the epicentre of the Cold War, Europe experienced several crisis situations and was highly militarized with the ever present danger of a nuclear catastrophe. At the same time it was also stable, peaceful, and predictable. Allied with the United States, Western Europe grew in prosperity and became more integrated. Eastern Europe remained under the firm hand of the Soviet Union. Like Europe of the Cold War era, Asia had its share of conflicts and crisis situations but also became relatively stable and peaceful.

Some like Mearsheimer (2001) may contend that the post-Cold War period is too short an evidentiary basis. The outbreak of peace in Asia, however, predates the termination of the Cold War. There has been no major or minor war in Northeast Asia since the 1958 China-Taiwan military hostilities over the Quemoy and Matsu islands. Peace in maritime Southeast Asia dates

---

4 On the long peace in Europe during the Cold War, see Gaddis, 1986.
from the termination of the Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia and Singapore in 1965-66. Since then that sub-region has not witnessed any major or minor war. The more war-prone continental Southeast Asia has not witnessed major or minor war since the 1987 Sino-Vietnamese and 1992 Myanmar-Thailand border related military hostilities. South Asia is often characterized as the least peaceful sub-region in Asia. It is possible to argue even that sub-region has experienced “ugly stability” since the Indian victory in the 1971 war that dismembered Pakistan (Tellis, 1997). Although it has been witness to periodic minor war and quite frequent cross-border military clashes, incidents, and terrorist attacks, large-scale war in South Asia appears to be a feature of the past.

The situation is more mixed in regard to intra-state war and peace. It is not possible to make the claim that internal peace prevails in all Asian countries. However, a number of them including Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore are now free of armed internal conflict. In a few countries like Nepal, Pakistan, and Tajikistan political contestation in the heartland is intense and violent. Other countries like China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines, and Burma are relatively free of armed struggle in their political heartlands. Although they continue to experience contestations over political system and the basis for national political community, for the most part such contestation has become non-violent. Reflecting growing legitimacy and state capacity, intra-state major war over political community and system in the political heartlands has been on a downward trend since the early 1980s (Table 4). The decline in intra-state major war in the heartland was initially accompanied by an increase in minor war. Since the late 1990s minor war too has experienced a decline (Table 5).

However, there has been no comparable decline in intra-state war between state and minority communities (Table 6). In fact there has been an increase in this category of war. Minority contestation of their inclusion or the terms of their inclusion in the state has remained violent, manifesting in frequent minor and major wars. This is the case, for example, in Indian Kashmir and Northeast India, northern and western Pakistan (Waziristan, Baluchistan), Sri Lanka (Tamil demand for an independent Eelam in the North and East), Burma (numerous ethnic groups), Indonesia (Papua), and in the southern provinces of Thailand, Philippines, and Kyrgyzstan. This does not imply there have been no advances. Indeed a few minority communities that initially contested their inclusion have since been integrated into the state (Acehnese in Indonesia, for example). However, there are still a large number of minority communities, especially those adjacent to or straddling international borders, that continue to contest their inclusion or the terms of their inclusion in the state.

The internal picture is thus more mixed: conflict and war prone outer regions but relatively peaceful political heartlands. National attention in political heartlands has increasingly shifted to economic growth, prosperity, and building state capacity both as a national objective and a prescription for dealing with remaining internal and international political and security concerns.

My third proposition is that Asia has been transformed from an impoverished to a prosperous region. In 1952 Asian countries accounted for about 15% of world GDP. Many countries in the region including South Korea and Taiwan were considered basket cases that had little prospects for economic growth and development. Southeast Asia was described as the Balkans of Asia. India and Indonesia were seen as likely to break up. In vogue in the 1950s and 1960s, the domino theory predicted that the fall of South Vietnam would lead to communist rule in the rest of Southeast Asia. Clearly these predictions did not materialize. Later in the first Clinton

---

5 At the time of publication, Thailand and Cambodia had recently experienced a small cross-border clash.
Table 4. Intra-state major war over political system (1945 – 2010)
Table 5. Intra-state minor war over political system (1945 – 2010)
Table 6. Intra-state major and minor war between states and minority communities (1945 – 2010)
administration, Winston Lord, the assistant secretary designate for East Asia and the Pacific in his confirmation hearing before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated that the dominos had become dynamos, that East Asia was on a steady upward path, and the U.S. should engage strongly with Southeast Asian countries.

By 2005 East Asia and India accounted for 22% of world GDP priced in U.S. dollars and 35% in terms of purchasing power parity. The Economic Intelligence Unit’s “Foresight 2020” estimates that Asia’s share of global GDP will increase to 40% by 2020. If Asian countries continue on their growth trajectories, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) forecasts that they could account for more than half of global GDP by 2050 (ADB 2011). Although estimates vary, all forecasts predict an increase in Asia’s share of global GDP. Asia also accounts for a significant share of world trade, capital flows, foreign direct investment, foreign exchange holding, and energy consumption. Asian countries have become significant players in regional and global economies. Economic problems at these levels cannot be addressed without their participation. Reflecting the economic transformation, there is an ongoing effort to increase the participation and weight of Asian countries in global economic institutions. In sum Asia has become one of three core world regions of the world.

The primary drivers of the above transformations (war to peace, and from impoverishment to prosperity) have been advances in nation and state making, and strong economic growth in key countries that significantly strengthened state capacity. I should observe that state strengthening is not a linear process. Some countries have experienced reversals as well.

*Finally Asia’s strategic environment has become more complex.* It is now much closer to the “complex interdependence” model than the simple zero-sum geopolitical model suited to the Cold War era. During the Cold war there was little economic and socio-cultural interaction across the ideological and military divide. Today potential competitors like the U.S. and China, Japan and China, and China and India, are also strong trading and investment partners with high levels of economic interdependence. All have prospered through participation in the global free market system. Although there are several pressure points including protectionist tendencies in some countries, particularly in the West, a transformation or break down of the global economic system is not in prospect. Political, economic, and security cooperation, competition, and rivalry characterize the contemporary Asian strategic landscape. Analysts who present a stark choice, for example between the United States and China, do not seem to appreciate the complex strategic environment. Their analysis and recommendations seem more suited to a Cold War type geopolitical environment. The challenge today is to manage and reap the benefits of complexity, not to present simple choices that may be attractive but not grounded in reality. The ASEAN countries, South Korea, Japan, India, and indeed the United States and China all seek to develop complex and at times conflicting bilateral and multilateral relationships across different domains.

**How might Asia alter further?**

In looking forward I advance five propositions:

*First, Asian economies are likely to continue to grow, increasing their respective weights in international affairs in the context of a globalizing world.* Although they confront numerous challenges and may suffer setbacks like that in 1997-8, and their growth rates may slow, on balance Asian economies will continue to grow at a relatively fast pace. In the next two to three decades Asia is likely to have three to six of the top ten world economies with China, India, and Japan featuring among the top five. I am not anticipating an Asian or Chinese century but increased centrality of Asian countries in regional and global affairs.
Second, the distribution of power is likely to undergo gradual change. The increasing weight of Asian countries will make for relative decline in U.S. power and influence in the region and the world at large. However, in the foreseeable future the United States will continue to be the premier global power and play the lead role in managing global affairs. The effectiveness of that role, however, will increasingly be contingent upon support from other major powers in the system. Gradually the distribution of power in the international system will alter but the system is unlikely to become genuinely bipolar or multipolar in the next decade or two. It is likely to display features of hegemony, bipolarity and multipolarity. The salience of specific polarities will vary with issue and location.

Third, complex interdependence will further strengthen. The pursuit of economic growth through participation in regional and global economies will remain a primary goal of most if not all Asian countries. This approach will further strengthen economic interdependence among them and with the rest of the world. Asian countries will not only seek to reshape the international system but will also have a vested interest in preserving beneficial elements. Although the rise of Asian powers may increase geopolitical rivalry and competition, we are unlikely to see the polarization and zero-sum balancing of the Cold War period. Rivalry, competition, balancing, cooperation, and regional institution building are all likely to feature in the political, economic and strategic interaction of Asian states. In the context of a strengthening U.S. centred alliance/alignment system in Asia, China and other Asian powers can be expected to develop comprehensive power positions and reach out to other major and middle powers. Major powers will also seek to shape and strengthen Asian multilateral institutions to serve their interests.

Fourth, Sino-American interaction will constitute the dominant political, security, and economic dynamic in Asia. Although China may not rival the United States for some time to come, Sino-American relations are already the important driver of security in Asia and their significance is likely to grow (Alagappa, 2008a). The salience of that dynamic will vary by issue and location. Other dynamics of consequence in the Asian security region will flow from Sino-Indian and Sino-Japanese relations as well as the relations of Japan and India with the United States.

Finally, Asia is unlikely to experience large-scale war. Some conflicts will persist. Asia may face new security challenges. Military modernization will continue apace. Force will continue to be relevant in international politics and there will be military clashes. However, these clashes are unlikely to escalate to large-scale war. This leads me to the discussion of the prospects for war and peace in 21st Century Asia.

War and peace in 21st century Asia

As indicated earlier, from 1945 to 1979 Asia was highly conflict-ridden. Subsequently it witnessed substantial decline in the number of major inter-state wars and intra-state wars in the political heartland. However, there was no corresponding decline in intra-state wars between the state and minority communities. In fact there was an increase. What explains the high incidence of war in the first three decades after World War II and the subsequent substantial decline in inter-state war and intra-state war over political systems but not in intra-state war between the state and minority communities? Further, how are the enduring conflicts on the Korean peninsula, across the Taiwan Strait, and over Kashmir to be explained? These are not simply academic questions. They are relevant in anticipating the future and prescribing policy.

Limitations of structural explanations

The transition from war to relative peace in inter-state relations and the decline in certain types of intra-state war but not in others highlight the limitations of structural explanations...
(anarchy and distribution of power) that dominate analysis and prescriptions by realist scholars and policy analysts. Neorealist scholars deploy anarchy (deep structure) to explain the security dilemma and war. However, as anarchy is a constant in a system of sovereign states, it cannot explain change including the transition to peace in Asia. Anarchy also cannot explain the termination of some types of war and the persistence of others. Likewise distribution of power (unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar) explanations cannot explain war and peace in Asia. The high incidence of war, the transition to inter-state peace, intra-state peace in the political heartlands of many countries, and the persistence of some inter-state and intra-state wars all occurred during a structure of bipolarity that characterized Asia from 1945 to 1991. Further, inter-state peace in Asia broke out at different times in the various sub-regions and preceded the 1991 structural change from bipolarity to unipolarity.

One Australian analyst asserts that peace in Asia is a post-Vietnam development guaranteed by American primacy (White, 2008). I would make two observations on that thesis. First, as observed earlier, the transition to inter-state peace (defined as the absence of major war over a decade or more) occurred at different times in the various sub-regions of Asia. The outbreaks of peace in Northeast Asia and maritime Southeast Asia date from 1958 and 1965 respectively and the outbreak of “ugly peace” in South Asia dates from 1971. These occurred well before the termination of the Vietnam War. Peace in continental Southeast Asia, on the other hand, was a later development beginning sometime in the 1980s. It did not immediately follow the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam. In fact in the aftermath of the U.S. defeat, North Vietnam invaded South Vietnam and forcibly unified that country under communist rule. In 1978 Vietnam invaded and occupied Cambodia (and Laos) for more than ten years. In response China launched a punitive attack on Vietnam in 1979. The Sino-Vietnamese military struggle continued for a further decade before the normalization of relations began in November 1991. Taking Asia as a whole it is possible to argue that inter-state peace is a post 1979 development (largely a function of the 1978 Chinese leadership change and modernization program), not a post-Vietnam development. My second observation is that American primacy and commitment lacked credibility in post-Vietnam Asia. Anticipating withdrawal from Vietnam, in 1969 the U.S. called upon Asian countries to assume greater responsibility for their security. Following its defeat in Vietnam, Washington withdrew from mainland Southeast Asia and closed its bases in Thailand. In Northeast Asia, Washington reduced its troop level in South Korea and contemplated a further draw down. The U.S. also terminated its defence treaty with Taiwan. South Korea and Taiwan both embarked on secret nuclear weapon programs as they doubted American commitment to their security. Thus the thesis that peace in Asia is a post-Vietnam development and a function of American primacy, like other structural explanations, is not grounded in history as it unfolded in Asia and cannot withstand scrutiny.

I should note here that my argument is not that the distribution of power did not matter. Along with Cold War calculations, it intensified, escalated, and prolonged certain wars. My contention is that structural explanations add little to our understanding of the causes and types of wars in Asia, decline or termination in some types, persistence or increase in others, and the transition from war to peace in Asia. In fact they may obscure the real drivers of war and peace in Asia since 1945.

Drivers of war: Contested nations and states, weak state capacity

My general proposition is that that contested imaginations of nations and states in newly independent Asian countries along with weak state capacity is the key (though not the sole) explanation of war in Asia since 1945. It explains the origins, decline, or persistence of intra-state and inter-state wars. With the exception of Japan, Thailand, and Nepal, Asian countries gained independence in the aftermath of World War II through wars of liberation or negotiations with
Upon independence political leaders who acceded to power embarked on the task of “building” nations and states from populations and territories inherited from colonial rule. Often there were several competing imaginations of nation and state that were strongly rooted in the struggle for independence; some were irreconcilable. Also, many groups especially in the periphery contested their inclusion in states dominated by other ethnic, racial, or religious groups. They sought their own nations and states or political, cultural, and economic autonomy within new states. For the most part, ethnic or religious considerations dominated imaginations of the nation while secular (democratic, communist, authoritarian) and religious imaginations dominated the construction of state and political systems. Constructions of nation, state, and political system were also contested by certain regional countries and/or by extra-regional powers engaged in the Cold War struggle that engulfed Asia as well. In the absence of conflict mediating and resolution mechanisms, clashing constructions frequently turned violent making for intra-state and inter-state wars that were also penetrated and shaped by the Cold War struggle.

Intra-state wars over political community, national identity, and political-economic system in the heartland and periphery were linked to the making of nations and states in Asian countries. Communist movements contested incumbent political systems and governments (shades of democracy, monarchy, military rule, and authoritarianism) in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, Nepal, and India. Minority groups contested their inclusion or the terms of their inclusion in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, and China. The basis for national political community and national identity were also issues of contestation in the political heartlands of several countries. Those contestations over political community, national identity, political system, and legitimacy of governments frequently turned violent leading to minor and major intra-state war. As the newly independent states did not have the political authority, institutional capacity, and resources to govern effectively and confront internal challenges on their own, they often sought external support extending to intervention or such intervention was forced upon them making for escalation and internationalization of domestic conflicts.

Most inter-state wars in Asia since 1945 can also be explained in terms of clashing and irreconcilable constructions of nation and state. I will illustrate this claim with reference to the Taiwan Strait conflict which is one of the three long running conflicts in Asia. That conflict has its origins in the Chinese civil war from 1927 to 1949 between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) over the right to rule China. The contest was resolved in 1949 with the CCP emerging victorious. Subsequently the conflict transformed from an internal to an international conflict centring on the status of Taiwan. In the Cold War context the U.S.-led “Free World” recognized the ROC on Taiwan as a sovereign state and rightful ruler of all of China. The ROC became a treaty ally of the U.S. Over time a significant portion of the population on Taiwan came to imagine a distinct Taiwanese nation with the right to independent statehood. However, China did not accept Taiwan as a separate nation and state. Insisting it is part of the Chinese nation and state, Beijing sought the unification of Taiwan with the mainland if necessary by force. Bipolarity and the Cold War did not precipitate the conflict, which, as observed earlier, had its origins in the internal struggle for political power. However, they did contribute to the internationalization of the conflict and its persistence.

U.S. support strengthened the KMT and later democratic Taiwan, deterred Chinese intervention, and prevented forcible unification. The ROC alliance with the U.S. in the context of the zero-sum

---

6 Although not all of China was colonized, key territories were under foreign control. China fought several wars to rid itself of foreign control, especially by Japan. Colonial rule of Hong Kong and Macao continued well into the 20th century.
struggle between the two superpowers partially explains the transformation and continuation of the conflict. However, persistence is also due to the fact the conflict is grounded in irreconcilable constructions of nation and state that make negotiation and compromises extremely difficult. The conflict cannot be resolved through the use of force. Eventual resolution hinges on mutually acceptable constructions of the Chinese nation and state, and Taiwan’s relationship to them. In sum, although the Cold War and bipolarity overlaid and transformed the Taiwan Strait conflict from an internal to an international one, they did not cause the conflict and their termination did not end it. Now firmly rooted in conflicting constructions of nation and state, the dispute can be resolved only when both parties agree upon the rightful identity and status of Taiwan and its relationship to the Chinese nation and state. Similar explanations can be advanced in relation to the other two long running conflicts in Asia on the Korean peninsula and over Kashmir. These three conflicts may be classified as “divided” or “partitioned” nation and state conflicts.

Contested constructions of nation and state also explain other inter-state wars in Asia since 1945 including the three Indochina wars and the Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia. Before moving on let me re-state my proposition that nearly all intra-state and inter-state wars in Asia since 1945 and their trajectories can be explained with reference to contested imaginations of nation and state, and weak state capacity.

**Drivers of peace: Increasing state legitimacy and capacity**

In line with my general proposition on the causes of war, I argue that increased legitimacy of nations and states along with growing state capacity explain the transition to and strengthening of peace in inter-state relations and in the political heartlands of many Asian countries. Continuing contestations or setbacks in legitimacy and state capacity explain the persistence or fresh outbreak of violence in certain political heartlands and more generally in centre-periphery relations.

Legitimacy has international and internal dimensions. External recognition of sovereignty, identity, and territorial boundaries constitutes international legitimacy. Domestic legitimacy rests on wide acceptance and practice by key groups within a state of the bases for political community, national identity, and political-economic system and agreement among them to pursue change through legal and constitutional methods (Alagappa 1995). Although important in its own right, legitimacy is made more robust when accompanied by development of state capacity to govern effectively (including exercising monopoly over the legitimate use of violence and enforcing compulsory jurisdiction throughout the state’s territory), manage international interaction, and resist external aggression. Increasing legitimacy and capacity make a state less vulnerable to domestic and international conflict, and make international intervention and conquest more difficult. Growth in legitimacy and state capacity may be a consequence of a number of developments: victory in war or reaching agreement through negotiations that lead to political and diplomatic recognition of the state; forging and deepening the bases for national identity and political system; rapid economic growth and growing prosperity that bolster state legitimacy and capacity; development of strong institutions for governance including maintaining law and order and external defence; and the forging of a regional framework that recognizes and legitimates existing states, prevents forcible change, and facilitates cooperation for mutual benefit.

Turning to Asia, the international and domestic legitimacy of nations and states, and the state capacity of many Asian countries has increased over time contributing to stronger states and a more stable Asian political map. Only a few changes have occurred since 1945. The two Vietnams were unified under communist rule in 1976. Singapore (1965), Bangladesh (1971), and East Timor (2002) emerged as separate states. With the exception of East Timor, all changes to the
Asian political map occurred during the first three decades of the post-World War II era. Looking to the future it is possible that Taiwan and the two Koreas may disappear as separate states leading to unification of the Chinese and Korean nations and states. Kashmir may gain some form of unity and autonomy in the context of an agreement between India and Pakistan. However, there is no certainty that these developments will occur. The present situations can endure for a long time. Even if changes do occur, none is likely to be an outcome of war. In the domestic realm, although several countries have faced violent struggles with minority groups, these military struggles have not created new states. A few minority groups like the Acehnese in Indonesia gained a higher measure of autonomy but none emerged as a separate state. Bangladesh may be an exception but Indian intervention in the Pakistani civil war was a crucial factor. The Asian regional normative structure that gained force in the 1970s and 1980s legitimated and reinforced existing states, delegitimized international military intervention and conquest, and did not support the creation of break-away states. This does not imply there has been no change; only that changes were few and far in between. The stability of the Asian map is not only a function of international recognition and support but also a function of increasing domestic legitimacy in the political heartland and growing state capacity.

**Inter-state peace**

Increased international legitimacy flowing from resolution of underlying disputes and growing state capacity explain the substantial decline in inter-state war in Asia. Peace in maritime Southeast Asia, for example, may be traced to the resolution of disputes surrounding the formation of Malaysia. Sukarno’s effort to consolidate his domestic power base, his revolutionary worldview, and the expansive construction of the Indonesian nation and state underlay the 1963 Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia. Regime change in Indonesia brought about by the 1965 military coup, Suharto’s focus on internal stability and economic growth to consolidate his domestic position, his recognition of Malaysia, and decision to pursue Indonesia’s leadership role through regional cooperation ended confrontation and marked the beginning of peace in maritime Southeast Asia. The subsequent peaceful separation of Singapore from Malaysia and advances in nation and state making in both these countries strengthened peace in maritime Southeast Asia. The Malaysia-Philippines dispute over Sabah, also arising from the formation of Malaysia, continues to be unresolved. However, the increasing international and domestic legitimacy of the Malaysian state combined with declining interest and state capacity in the Philippines has effectively shelved the dispute. Although mistrust and disputes are not absent, the prospects for war in maritime Southeast Asia declined substantially after 1965. Peace in that sub-region has been underpinned by strong domestic and international legitimacy as well as strong state capacity especially in Singapore and Malaysia.

Peace in continental Southeast Asia may be traced to the resolution of disputes centring on the unity, sovereignty, and identity of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. North Vietnam’s victory over the United States and South Vietnam, the forcible unification of Vietnam, and international recognition of a unified Vietnam under communist rule effectively ended the North-South Vietnam, North Vietnam-United States, and the U.S.-Laos war dyads. Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia and Laos in 1989 and the resolution of the Sino-Vietnamese land border dispute through negotiations effectively ended the Sino-Vietnamese war dyad. Although mistrust and suspicion, and maritime disputes linger, Vietnam’s rapid economic growth and increasing governance capacity along with its rapprochement with China, deeper integration into ASEAN, and improving relations with the United States imply that the Sino-Vietnamese war dyad is unlikely to be resurrected any time soon. Vietnam’s withdrawal from Laos and Cambodia along with international recognition and support enshrined the sovereignty of these two countries. It also ended the Thai-Vietnamese war dyad and made possible the enlargement of ASEAN to
include the Indochina countries, ushering in a situation of inter-state peace and cooperation among all Southeast Asian countries.

In certain cases (China-Taiwan, North-South Korea, India-Pakistan) the onset of inter-state peace was not a consequence of the resolution of underlying disputes. Peace in these situations is largely an outgrowth of the deterrent capabilities of relevant states that prevented war and forcible change. Peace across the Taiwan Strait, for example, is due to the fact that no party can successfully prosecute a war to achieve its political goal. China has become a much stronger state, but it does not have the military capability to achieve unification by force. Although Taipei does not enjoy widespread formal international recognition, democratic Taiwan has broad international support and an implicit American security guarantee. It has also developed strong internal legitimacy and state capacity. These considerations, along with Beijing’s focus on economic growth and developing a responsible international image, have made Chinese aggression against Taiwan rather costly. At the same time China’s growing military capability and economic clout along with conditional American support have limited Taiwan’s movement toward independence. These constraints have favoured continuation of the status quo and peace. The ugly peace on the Korean peninsula and between India and Pakistan is largely due to deterrence as well. Although North Korea and Pakistan are both truncated nations and weak states, their relatively strong military capabilities (especially nuclear capabilities) have made war highly unlikely and explain the absence of war in their respective dyads.

A number of other factors linked to legitimacy and state capacity also explain inter-state peace in Asia. One is political leadership change that brought about a fundamental reorientation of the domestic and international politics of the state. As discussed earlier, the 1965 political leadership change in Indonesia had far reaching consequences for peace in maritime Southeast Asia. Likewise political leadership change in China in 1978 had far reaching consequences for war and peace in East Asia. To realize the modernization programme, which along with stability became the key basis for the political legitimacy of the CCP, Beijing emphasized peace and development as the prevailing trend in the world. In line with that worldview, it terminated support for communist insurgencies in other countries and moderated the role of force in resolving international disputes. A second important factor in the development of inter-state peace was the focus on economic growth to bolster legitimacy, state capacity, and international influence. That focus put a premium on international peace and stability. Integration of national economies into regional and global capitalist economies also increased economic interdependence and the political, diplomatic, and economic cost of using force to resolve disputes. For example, the high economic and diplomatic cost of using force, that became evident in the aftermath of the 1995-6 missile firing to intimidate Taiwan, has been a restraining factor in China’s approach to the Taiwan Strait conflict.

Third the growing legitimacy of the Asian political map argued against forcible change. Such change was opposed and reversed in Cambodia and East Timor. The regional normative structure that gained force in the 1980s reinforced the legitimacy and survival of existing states including small and weak ones like Laos, Cambodia, and Brunei. Finally the technology of force favoured defence and deterrence over offense and conquest. The centrality of deterrence partially explains the stalemate on the Korean peninsula, across the Taiwan Strait, and between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The development of nuclear weapon capability reinforced deterrence especially from the perspective of the weaker states in these dyads (Alagappa 2008b).

The four supplementary factors identified in the preceding discussion are all intimately connected to the primary variables of nation and state making and state capacity. I would like to reiterate here that the transition to and strengthening of inter-state peace in Asia occurred
without a change in the deep structure (anarchy) or distribution of power in the system. It occurred well before the termination of the Cold War and the ensuing change in the distribution of power brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union.

**Peace in political heartland**

Unlike international peace, domestic peace has been more mixed and uneven. There has been substantial decline in intrastate war in the political heartland but no corresponding decline in war between states and minority communities. Why has this been the case?

Increasing domestic legitimacy and growing state capacity explain peace in Asian political heartlands. Intrastate war in political heartlands was rooted primarily in contestations over the type of political system and legitimacy of incumbent governments. At the outset, communist movements seeking system change violently contested the legitimacy of incumbent political systems and governments in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, and Burma. Most of these contestations came to an end by the late 1970s. Insurgent movements succeeded in establishing communist rule in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Political systems and incumbent governments in post-1973 Thailand, post-1965 Indonesia, and post-1965 Malaysia progressively became more legitimate and stronger, and defeated communist insurgencies which also lost external support. Though lacking public support, the military government in Burma became entrenched and stronger over time, and crushed all opposition including the challenge posed by the Burmese Communist Party. Militant Marxist insurgency continues in the Philippines but in a weaker form than before. Maoist insurgencies became stronger only in India and Nepal. Although the Naxalite movement in India has grown and became more violent, it is confined to certain economically under-developed states with poor governance in Eastern India. Improved governance and attention to the economic grievances of the rural population has helped state governments like that in Andhra Pradesh contain the Naxalite challenge. Other Indian states confronting Naxalite challenges appear to be following that approach. As state governments grow their capacities and govern more effectively, and as the Indian state and political-economic system become more legitimate and effective over time, it appears unlikely that militant Maoist movements will succeed in their goal of revolutionary transformation of the Indian political-economic system. Only in Nepal has the Maoist insurgency movement grown stronger and mounted a formidable challenge. The state and the political system in that country progressively became weaker suffering a large legitimacy deficit. Upon negotiation of a peace agreement, the Maoist movement in Nepal contested the 2008 elections and became the largest party in the National Assembly.

The second wave of political contestation in Asia took the form of a people-power challenge to authoritarian and military rule. Military and authoritarian rule in the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, and Bangladesh have been replaced by democratic governments. However, people power uprisings in China and Burma were crushed by the state. Rule by the Chinese Communist Party in China and by the military in Burma has strengthened over time. Although many lives have been lost, democracy struggles have not become militant like the earlier communist challenge. Over the last six decades, considerable progress has been made in forging the bases for political community, national identity, and political system in the political heartlands of many Asian countries. State capacity has also grown significantly, allowing states to meet or suppress the demands of the people. Many countries have developed the capability to govern quite effectively, counter internal rebellion, and deter external aggression.

However, it should be observed that regime legitimacy and state capacity are not irreversible unidirectional developments. There have been setbacks as well. In post-1965 Indonesia and post-1975 Thailand once acceptable political frameworks came under stress, leading to violent political
struggles resulting in regime change in Indonesia in 1998 and a continuing political stalemate in Thailand. The post 1975 semi-democratic political system in Thailand became the object of political contestation in the 1980s. It was replaced by a more democratic political system and a fully elected government. Two decades later the legitimacy of that democratic system and particularly that of the incumbent Thaksin government were challenged by conservative forces leading to a political stalemate between “Red” and “Yellow” shirts. Though violent, that standoff did not degenerate to a war between organized armed groups like the earlier communist challenge in the 1950s and 1960s. Setbacks in nation and state making explain the persistence of violent conflicts in the political heartlands of certain states like Thailand, Nepal, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. Overall, however, increasing domestic legitimacy and stronger state capacity explain the substantial decline in intra-state war in Asian political heartlands.

Continuation of wars between states and minority communities

There has not been a corresponding decline in wars between states and minority groups. Very few such conflicts have been settled (Aceh). In Sri Lanka the Sinhala government defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in a military struggle that lasted for more than two decades, but the Tamil aspiration for political, economic, and cultural autonomy has yet to be effectively addressed and could lay the basis for future armed struggles. In a few cases as in Burma and India there have been partial, temporary truces between the state and certain minority groups. For the most part, however, intrastate wars between the state and minority communities have persisted over several decades with no end in sight. Why is this case?

First and foremost, the issues in contention are not easily addressed. They lie at the heart of making nations and states with protagonists unable or unwilling to make compromises. As indicated earlier, at the outset of independence many smaller groups aspired to nations and states of their own and resisted inclusion in new states in which they would become minorities. In other cases, over time minority groups became disenchanted with their position and treatment in the new states. They aspired to their own nations and states. At a minimum their goal was considerable cultural, political, and economic autonomy within existing states. The new states on the other hand embarked on ethnic or religious nation building projects that discriminated against minority groups. Viewing federalism and autonomy with scepticism, state building projects emphasized unity and centralization of power. Allowing little or no room for autonomy and independence, these projects alienated minorities. Fearing marginalization and assimilation, and in the absence of constitutional and peaceful means to pursue their objectives, the latter took up arms. Offering very limited concessions, states for the most part countered with military force. Irreconcilable objectives in the making of states and nations along with unwillingness or inability of relevant parties to make compromises or achieve decisive military victory explain the origins and continuation of wars between states and minority communities.

Other considerations that have prolonged such wars include external support (diplomatic, political, economic, and military assistance) for the state and minority groups, a regional normative structure that favours the state and disadvantages minority groups, and the inability of involved parties to achieve decisive military victory. Even when military victory is achieved, as for example in Sri Lanka, unwillingness or inability to resolve the underlying dispute has laid the groundwork for future conflict.

In sum Asian countries with multinational populations have made little or no headway in addressing issues and problems relating to minorities. Unless there is a fundamental rethinking of nation and state making projects in these countries, it appears unlikely that the number and intensity of such conflicts will decline in the foreseeable future. That rethinking must include imaginations of civic nations that emphasize equality, common citizenship, and common destiny.
as well as state building projects that devolve considerable power and autonomy to minority
groups and outlying provinces. Although these may not resolve all conflicts, they are important
starting points.

**The Future: Will peace continue? Will Asia become more conflict prone?**

Looking to the future, I do not foresee much change in the trends which have occurred
over the last several decades. Despite some new developments, the key political-security
dynamic in Asia will continue to emanate from advances, setbacks, and concerns relating to state
and nation making. State making is a gradual process that may take several decades and
possibly centuries. It is characterized by forward and backward movement with no fixed
terminal points. Significant strides in state making have occurred in several Asian countries over
the last six decades but a substantial number including some major ones still confront serious
problems. Unresolved international disputes over identity, territorial delimitation, and
sovereignty still persist among key states. Political systems in several major countries are not
deply rooted and could become the object of contestation; and the incorporation of minorities
has made little headway. Thus making of nations and states, preserving political power, and
enhancing legitimacy will continue to dominate the concerns of Asian elites and inform the
political-security dynamic in the Asian region in both the domestic and international realms.

Certain newer developments including the rise of Asian powers (especially China), the spread
of weapons of mass destruction, and the threat posed by international non-state actors will also
inform regional and domestic political-security dynamics. Although these developments will
certainly alter the international context, I argue they will not fundamentally affect the prospects
for war and peace in Asia over the next two to three decades. The region will continue to
experience military clashes and minor wars but is unlikely to witness major war in the
foreseeable future. Inter-state peace will continue and possibly strengthen. Likewise I argue that
relative peace will prevail in most political heartlands but not in the periphery. States may
increase their coercive capacities to deal with minority challenges. That may lead to stalemate but
not to conflict resolution. Without fundamental change in the imagination of political
community, national identity, and political system, states will not be able to resolve minority
contestations of nation and state. Far-reaching rethinking, however, does not seem likely. Thus I
do not anticipate a substantial decline in war between states and minority communities. Finally,
the threat posed by international non-state actors is likely to weaken but not disappear. It is
unlikely to precipitate intrastate or inter-state war. I will briefly elaborate and support these
claims in the ensuing discussion.

**Inter-state peace: Likely to continue and strengthen**

In the 1980s and early 1990s an influential body of Western scholars argued that Asia was
headed for war and instability. One stream asserted that growing wealth would increase power
and lead to instability. Another argued the case for instability on the basis that rising Asian
powers without the United States would engage in bitter rivalry. For these two schools, Europe’s
past would be Asia’s future. Others argued the case for instability on the basis that Asia lacked
institutions like those in Europe that kept the peace. Such predictions of instability did not come
ture. Instead Asia enjoyed peace and prosperity for more than three decades. Now another group
of Western scholars and analysts predicts that war is thinkable again in an Asia experiencing
rapid change in the distribution of power. It is argued that the rise of China will trigger tragic
competition among major powers in East Asia (Mearsheimer, 2001). Focusing on power
transition, Hugh White (2008) asserts that the rise of China threatens American primacy making
war thinkable again in Asia. I earlier refuted the claim that peace in Asia was a function of
American primacy. Continuing that line of argument, it is possible to argue that as peace was not
a function of American primacy, a threat to that primacy does not necessarily carry the implication of war. But that would be pedantic.

I will address more directly the general assertion that the rise of Asian powers, especially China, will make for fundamental change in the distribution of power and lead to war and instability. Although I anticipate change in the distribution of power in Asia and the world at large, that will be gradual. Change began more than a decade ago and is likely to continue into the next decade or two. At this stage it is difficult to predict the ‘ultimate’ distribution of power or what it might be at any point in time. It is likely that over the next two decades we will witness aspects of unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity with the United States remaining an integral part of the Asian security region. The salience of any particular distribution will vary by issue and locale. In any case there is no established causal connection between specific or changing distributions of power and war. Hence change in the distribution of power cannot be the sole or even primary basis for making assertions about war and peace. To be meaningful, power must be linked to the social context for interaction. Only when values, interests, and purposes clash in a fundamental manner, and only if states believe that use of force can resolve such clash in their favour, do they seek the force option. In an age of nuclear weapons it is hardly likely that the U.S., China, or other powers will seek to resolve differences through the use of force.

Those who argue the case for war and instability arising from the rise of China must fill out the causal chain if their assertions are to be taken seriously. They must specify the issue(s) of contention and indicate how and why that could lead to war. For example, those arguing that there is a connection between revisionary states and war in bringing about system change should address the following questions: Is China a revisionist power? What revisions does it seek? Can these be accommodated or adjusted peacefully? Under what conditions might this lead to war and instability, and can the use of force resolve such disputes? My point is not that the rise of China does not matter. Obviously it is consequential in important ways including the structure and content of international order and governance. My point simply is that the rise of China does not necessarily carry the implication of inter-state war. China has benefited enormously from the present international system. While it will certainly seek changes to accommodate its growing weight, values, and interests, China is not a revolutionary state seeking to overthrow the system. Even if that were true, it does not and will not for a long time have the capability to bring about such change through war. Change through hegemonic war, as even the proponents of that thesis concede, is not in prospect in a world with nuclear weapon states (Gilpin 1981). China’s behaviour over the last two decades in relation to the Taiwan Strait conflict (termed a core interest by Beijing) amply demonstrates the limited role of force in China’s foreign policy. The political, diplomatic, and economic cost of using force in an offensive role has become very high and possibly prohibitive in Asia. Uncertainty over the outcome of war further increases the cost of the force option, making it highly unlikely except for limited purposes.

In this connection, contrary to the conventional wisdom that the spread of nuclear weapons undermines security and regional stability, I argue that the slow spread of nuclear weapons in Asia has had a stabilizing effect (Alagappa, 2008b). By limiting the outbreak and escalation of hostilities to full-scale war, nuclear weapons reinforce deterrence, enhance national security especially of weaker states, and strengthen regional stability. The net effect of nuclear weapons reinforces my claim that the primary role of force in the contemporary era and in the foreseeable future is in defence and deterrence, not offence. I should make clear that my claim is not the obsolescence of force but its limited utility. The factors that have constrained the use of force by major powers including China and the United States over the last two decades will continue to prevent war in the foreseeable future. This does not preclude limited war, minor war, or military clashes.
Likewise I argue that threats posed by non-state actors will weaken but not disappear, and that they are unlikely to precipitate inter-state war. The India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir is a frequently cited case. It is argued that terrorist activities in India by insurgent groups based in Pakistan could precipitate war between the nuclear armed neighbours. Obviously such activities, especially state supported cross-border incursions by non-state militant groups, raise serious concerns and could result in retaliatory strikes. India has contemplated such strikes in the past and may do so in the future. However, it is important to note that the dangers of such cross-border activities are duly appreciated by both countries. Thus far no inter-state war has been precipitated by the actions of non-state groups. The 1999 Kargil War was not fuelled by the actions of non-state actors but by Pakistani military incursion into Indian Kashmir. Limited in purpose, scope, and territory, that war also demonstrated the futility of trying to bring about political and territorial change through war. I would argue that nuclear weapons have had a restraining effect on the outbreak and escalation of hostilities between India and Pakistan. The technology of force that favours defence and deterrence also helps prevent outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait. Deterrence dominance could help entrench these disputes. However, it is not a barrier to dispute settlement or resolution. Settlement hinges on the willingness of the protagonists to re-imagine identities and interests, and make compromises. Military stalemate may also encourage out-of-the-box solutions. Resolution of these long running conflicts over identity and sovereignty through negotiations or internal change will further strengthen the political map and international peace in Asia.

In conclusion inter-state peace defined as the absence of major war between countries is likely to be durable in Asia. The breakdown of major states, emergence of fundamental political disputes, breakdown of the global economy, or fundamental change in the technology of war that once again favours the offensive use of force could undermine my contention. Despite periodic inter-state tensions and crises, I do not envisage such developments in the foreseeable future. Inter-state peace is likely to continue and further strengthen as states develop the capacity not only to defend themselves but also to undertake and discharge an obligation to sustain peace.

**Political heartlands: Contestations but not armed struggles**

Earlier I posited that the increasing legitimacy of nation and state, and growing state capacity explain the relative peace that has developed in many Asian political heartlands. I also pointed out that legitimacy and state capacity are not permanent attributes or unidirectional in development. There can be setbacks as well leading to new struggles. Looking ahead I see the demand for popular sovereignty as the driving force of domestic political conflict and change in Asian countries. For the most part these conflicts will not take the form of armed struggle. In the few cases where militant movements already lead political struggles to bring about system transformation as in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nepal, intrastate war in political heartlands is a distinct possibility. International military intervention in domestic political conflict is highly unlikely except possibly in Afghanistan and Pakistan where domestic political struggles have become intertwined with the international war on terror.

The wide array of political systems and incumbent governments in Asia appears likely to confront three types of challenges. One is demand for within system change. Democratic and semi-democratic governments will confront demands for more substantive democracy focused on better performance, effective governance, justice, greater transparency, reducing corruption, devolution of power, and greater public participation in central, regional, and local governance. Second, authoritarian, autocratic, communist, and monarchical forms of government will confront demands for increased participation and ultimately system change. Demands for participatory and ultimately competitive politics may result in struggles to transform the political system through reform or revolution. Third, weak secular governments may confront demands
for increasing the religious orientation of the state and ultimately a theocratic state. Such a challenge is most likely in Muslim majority countries.

Although all political struggles can turn violent, only those led by armed groups lead to intrastate war. Demands for change within democratic systems are likely to be pursued through mass public protests and demonstrations with occasional violence. Demands for system change have greater potential to turn violent but the opportunities for armed struggle appear severely limited. Communist and authoritarian governments do not hesitate to crush alternative political organizations especially those that espouse armed struggle. Industrial unrest and people power demonstration are more likely vehicles for demanding system change in these countries. Although communist, military, and authoritarian governments can crush these demands as in China (1989), Burma (1988), and Indonesia (1998), such actions undermine the domestic and international legitimacy of governments. Prolonged or repeated mass unrest and demonstrations expose the moral bankruptcy of governments compelling them to attend to grievances and make compromises. Only tyrants can continue to rule through fear and coercion over a prolonged period as has been the case in Burma. However, over the long haul, even tyrants aspire to a semblance of legitimacy and normalcy. Only militant Islamic movements are likely to opt for armed struggle to bring about system change. Surveying the Asian landscape, such a development looks possible only in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. It is less likely in Indonesia or Malaysia. Militant movements seeking theocratic states already exist in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Except in the few countries where militant movements already exist, it appears highly unlikely that future political contestations in Asian political heartlands will take the form of armed struggle. For the most part political change will be pursued through mass demonstrations and be relatively peaceful. Sporadic violence cannot be ruled out. Compromises and accommodations reached to resolve political struggles arising from the demand for popular sovereignty will in due course enhance the legitimacy of the state and its political system. Along with growing state capacity, increased legitimacy will further strengthen peace in the political heartlands. To conclude, despite the anticipation of political struggles and temporary setbacks, my contention is that the trend in the political heartland is toward increased legitimacy and state capacity providing a more firm foundation for peace.

**States and minority communities: Continuation of armed struggles**

As pointed out earlier, little headway has been made in incorporating minority communities and extending state jurisdiction to areas and provinces inhabited or controlled by minority groups. Neither states nor dissident minority groups have shown much willingness to moderate their demands. Ethnic and religious bonding and outbidding rather than outreach and bridging characterize their interaction (DeVotta, 2004). Truces, ceasefires, and accommodations have been mostly tactical to buy time. No genuine effort has been made to reconcile differences. A substantial number of minority groups in the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Burma, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have come to view armed struggle as the primary means to resist the state and realize their political goals. There is also the possibility that peaceful resistance by the Tibetans and Uyghurs in China, and Papuans in Indonesia could transform into armed struggles. Based on the experience of the last several decades including the failure of numerous efforts to settle such conflicts, it appears highly unlikely that there will be substantial decline in wars between states and minority communities. The inability to integrate or accommodate minority groups is a great weakness that can undermine state legitimacy and capacity in many Asian countries.
To conclude this section, I would like to reiterate my claim that issues of legitimacy and state capacity will continue to lie at the heart of war and peace in Asia. An increase in the legitimacy of nation and state along with growing state capacity has fostered peace while setbacks foster contestation, struggle, and war. The supplementary factors (market orientation, increasing economic interdependence, conservative regional normative structure, and a technology of force that favours defence and deterrence) will continue to limit the role of force in resolving inter-state disputes. The new dynamics arising from the rise of Asian powers, especially China and non-state actors, are unlikely to precipitate war and undermine interstate peace in the region. I see the continuation of inter-state peace as well as intrastate peace in political heartlands but not in the periphery.

**Regional cooperation: Key drivers**

State and nation making concerns along with limitations and change in state capacity have been the key drivers of the pace, purpose, and type of regional cooperation in Asia. They will continue to be crucial factors in the years ahead as well.

Sub-regional cooperation began in maritime Southeast Asia with the formation of the intergovernmental Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN) in 1967 and spread to other sub regions. The South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was formed in 1985 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) focused on Central Asia was created in 2001. There is as yet no sub-regional cooperation forum for Northeast Asia. Cooperation in Southeast Asia gradually expanded in geographical scope to encompass all countries in that sub-region. Brunei joined ASEAN in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. East Timor has applied to join and Papua New Guinea has observer status in the Association. ASEAN has also become the hub and driver of broader regional cooperation focused on East Asia and the larger Asian region. The functional scope of sub-regional and regional cooperation has broadened as well to encompass economic, security, political, and cultural domains. The past couple of decades have witnessed dramatic growth in the number of sub-regional and regional organizations and free trade arrangements in Asia. And there are proposals for new organizations and arrangements in the political, security, and economic arenas. For a listing of sub-regional and regional organizations and arrangements in Asia please see Table 7.

After a slow start, why have sub-regional and regional organizations proliferated in Asia? Why have they broadened in membership and geographical scope? What has been the primary purpose of regional cooperation and how effective has it been in realizing that purpose? What explains the type of regional cooperation that has developed in Asia? I will briefly discuss the purpose and type of regional arrangements in Asia.
Table 7. List of sub-regional and regional organizations and arrangements in Asia since 1945.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Regional</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Security, Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Security, Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Security, Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMM Plus 8</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APT</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEM</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAS</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Talks and Dialogues</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPT</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEACD</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shangri-La Dialogue</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Arrangements</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN-China FTA</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN-India FTA</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISFTA</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAEC</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABMI</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFTA</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN-Japan CEP</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN-South KOREA FTA</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIMSTEC</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Primary purpose

The primary purpose of regional cooperation in Asia has been to foster the survival and development of newly independent states. State survival entails protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, and building state capacity for governance including countering internal and external challenges. Another related core purpose has been the survival of incumbent political-economic systems and governments. Regime security entails enhancing the legitimacy of incumbent political and economic systems along with better performance, as well as suppressing/defeating challenges to incumbent regimes. Regional cooperation contributes to these goals in several ways including:

1. Construction of a normative structure that legitimates existing state-nations, their political systems, and incumbent governments, as well as prevents breakaway states, external interference in domestic affairs, and forceful change.
2. Enhancement of the collective international voice of member states. A collective voice enhances the diplomatic and negotiating power of otherwise weak countries. It enables them to become “masters in their own house” and play a key role in organizing political and economic life in and affecting the region.
3. Fostering national economic well being. Economic growth and development has been viewed as crucial to state, regime, and government legitimacy, building state capacity for governance, and confronting domestic and international political, security, and economic challenges.

Although other goals like regional integration, regional community building, and inter-state conflict resolution have been articulated, these have been formulated essentially from the perspective of protecting and strengthening existing nations, states, and governments, and building state capacities. When a conflict arises, especially in moments of crisis, national interests override regional goals. There is little desire to move beyond national political community to regional or other forms of political community that dilute state identity and sovereignty. Economic community building is seen from the perspective of strengthening the state and its capacity. Security community building is directed toward minimizing the role of force and preventing wars among states, not curtailing the sovereign rights of states. In the interest of preserving sovereign state prerogatives, strictly regional dimensions are frequently watered down and relegated to the back burner or labelled a future goal.

Conservative, status-quo orientation

The high importance attached to state and regime survival along with associated goals and measures explains the strongly conservative orientation of regional cooperation in Asia that is reflected in the charters and institutional designs of regional organizations, and in the intramural interaction of member states and with others.

Set out in various charters and treaties, the Asian normative structure enshrines principles and values such as: mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, or coercion; non-interference in the domestic affairs of one another; settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; renunciation of the threat or use of force; and effective cooperation among parties to enhance national well-being. Clearly the emphasis is on the survival of existing nations and states, and preserving the domestic and international political status-quo. Proposals to make the normative structure more liberal (reducing the centrality of the state or instituting mechanisms for altering the status quo) have been resisted. For example, the minor change to the ASEAN non-interference principle proposed by Thailand and Indonesia in 1998-9 was resisted by other ASEAN members. Ultimately it was
reduced to a policy of flexible engagement. The gap between the ASEAN Charter recommended by the eminent persons group and the actual charter adopted by ASEAN in 2007 also reveals the conservative orientation and limits of substantive change to the regional normative structure.

Preservation of state sovereignty has also been the key driver of decision making methods adopted in Asian regional organizations. By and large, decision making has been by consensus with each state having veto power. Even the celebrated “N minus X” principle does little to curtail national autonomy. The applicability of that principle to a specific issue has to be decided by consensus among all members. Participation or non-participation in that endeavour remains a sovereign right. By excluding themselves, non-participating states preserve and demonstrate their independence and freedom to act. Even participating states do not concede sovereignty in any meaningful way. They decide on their participation. And decision making within the small group is by consensus.

Likewise the nature of inter-state conflict resolution mechanisms and the failure to utilize them demonstrate a deep attachment to national sovereignty and the unwillingness of member states to submit disputes to authorities over which they have little or no control. The difficulties experienced by ASEAN in initiating, institutionalizing, and operationalizing intramura dispute resolution mechanisms and by the ASEAN Regional Forum in moving from confidence and security building measures (CSBM) to preventive diplomacy (PD) highlight the deep concern with national sovereignty.

Looking forward

Going forward I do not see much change in the primary purpose and conservative orientation of regional cooperation in Asia. Regional organizations will continue to be important in the norm and rule setting that supports the continuation of existing states, nations, and governments. With minimal or no enforcement capability, they are unlikely to become problem solving organizations in the political-security arena. Notwithstanding aspirations, the role of regional cooperation in forging substantive collective identity is likely to be marginal. National identity and sovereignty will continue to feature prominently in the construction and regulation of regional cooperation in Asia.

In the context of those parameters, intergovernmental sub-regional and regional cooperation will flourish and become more significant in Asia. At the sub-regional level, ASEAN and, to a lesser degree, the SCO will remain important. Resolution of the India-Pakistan conflict could breathe new vigour into SAARC and settlement of the Korean dispute could lead to the launch of a Northeast Asia cooperation forum. At the same time cooperation at the broader regional level will become important. Many economic and strategic issues are better addressed at that level. The trend at the regional level will be toward Asian rather than Asia-Pacific regionalism. And increasingly Asia will be broadly defined to include Northeast, Southeast, South, and Central Asia as well as the United States, Russia, Australia, and New Zealand. West Asia and parts of the Middle East may become part of the Asian region as well.

ASEAN will continue to be at the core of Asia-wide cooperation. All major powers see value in supporting ASEAN as the cornerstone of regional forums. Japan and China came to this view some time ago. More recently the United States has supported ASEAN as the hub of Asia wide regionalism. Although there are multiple regional forums and some new ones have been proposed, it appears likely that the East Asian Summit (EAS) will emerge as the premier political and strategic forum, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) the premier defence forum, and the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) the primary economic integration forum. Other existing organizations like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) could assume an executive or
supporting role (perhaps for the EAS) while still others like Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) may gradually decline in salience and fall by the wayside.

In addition to widening geography, membership, and functional scope, regional cooperation in Asia will increasingly function in the context of the growing importance of Asian countries in world affairs. As Asian countries increase their economic, political, and strategic weights, their aspirations and interests will have to be addressed at the global level. Their membership and roles in global institutions (like the Group of 20, BRICS, United Nations Security Council, governing boards of IMF and World Bank) will grow and the regional global nexus will become stronger. Regionalism in Asia will be less defensive and reactive than in earlier periods and more proactive in shaping rules of the game and governance in the region and the world at large. Regional norms that protect national identity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of states will be transported to and strengthened at the global level. As international trade, investment, private sector financial flows, global production networks, and the like are generally viewed in a positive light, Asian countries will support cooperation in these areas at the regional and global levels to further solidify the state and its power as well as deal with perceived challenges to their well being. The increasing weight of Asian countries will have a significant impact on the construction of order in the region and the world.

Asian order in the 21st century

As with cooperation, the purpose, type, and content of order in Asia over the past 60 years have been shaped by concerns relating to national survival and prosperity. Over time the largely instrumental type of order that emerged in the first three decades of post-World War II Asia has developed certain key normative-contractual features. That order appears set to continue in the foreseeable future with possible strengthening of the normative-contractual dimensions. The rise of Asian powers will not significantly affect the purpose, type, and rules of order in Asia. However, it appears likely to alter how and who sustains regional order. With growth in their capacities, Asian countries and regional institutions have gradually assumed a greater role and responsibility in the construction and maintenance of regional order. The rise of Asian powers is likely to reinforce that trend. Before elaborating on this argument, I will first define order.

Defining order

Many analysts do not define order. Either they assume the meaning to be obvious or they have no clear idea on what order means. Some conflate order with peace. Peace may be a goal of order but it does not constitute order. Frequently analysts focus on arrangements or pathways like hegemony, balance of power, or a concert that may sustain order. They ignore the purposes of order and the rules that govern interstate interaction. Such a truncated focus and discussion obscures key features of order. It is essential to have a good analytical handle on the elements that comprise order. I define order as a formal or informal arrangement that sustains rule-governed interaction among sovereign states in their pursuit of individual and collective goals (Alagappa, 2003a). International order comprises three essential elements: purpose(s) or goal(s), rules that govern interaction of states, and arrangements (or pathways) for constructing and sustaining those rules. All three parts are essential but rule-governed interaction lies at the heart of order. Rules must exist, must be communicated, acknowledged and enforced, and violation must carry a cost. Rules may be implicit and informal or explicit and formal. Without rules there can be no order.

Instrumental order with normative-contractual features

Order in Asia has evolved over time from an exclusively instrumental type in the first three decades after World War II to an instrumental order with key normative-contractual
features. The exclusively instrumental order from 1945 to about the mid-1970s was grounded in two realities. First, the region was populated by newly independent states with weak capacities and whose national identities, political systems, state borders, and jurisdictions were internally and internationally contested. Second, the region was highly polarized by the intense global zero-sum ideological and strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union that also engulfed Asia. The coincidence of these two realities placed a high premium on state and regime survival. With minimal or no space for an alternative organization of international life, and with weak institutions and capacities, the newly independent states entered into alliances or alignments with one of the two super powers. The goal of order in that context was largely private: national survival, regime security, and survival of like minded states. Rules were minimal, largely implicit, and designed primarily to facilitate survival and co-existence. Formal rules, articulated in declarations and charters, were often pro forma and frequently contravened. Rule-governed interaction was limited to specific blocs and sustained by the respective bloc hegemon. To the extent it existed, order across the ideological divide was sustained by implicit understandings among the two superpowers and the threat of war. In that bipolar order, war was a legitimate instrument of state policy. It was a frequent choice in attempts to manage or resolve domestic and international disputes especially across the ideological divide. Regional states played little or no role in the construction and maintenance of that instrumental order. Regional cooperation was minimal or non-existent and there was no regional mechanism to manage interstate disputes.

From about the mid-1970s two developments dramatically altered the international political, economic, and strategic landscape of Asia. First, the Cold war overlay became less important and eventually disappeared with the formal termination of that War in 1991. The region became less polarized. Second, the pursuit of national prosperity through export-led growth became an important and widespread goal and strategy of Asian states. Growing national prosperity along with domestic political and economic change in a substantial number of countries increased state capacities and reduced national vulnerabilities. Although several countries still faced challenges, for the most part survival per se was not precarious. The Asian political map became more stable and widely accepted. In that changing context, political, ideological, and strategic competition gradually lost salience in the interaction of states. Co-operation, especially in the economic domain, became more important. Complex interdependence rather than zero-sum competition began to characterize interaction of Asian countries.

In line with the altered landscape, regional order in Asia began to incorporate some key normative-contractual features that became evident in the purpose and rules of regional order. National survival and regime security continued to be important but national prosperity and international stability became key goals of order as well. Along with private ends, collective ends like regional economic and security community building were also articulated as goals of regional order. Rules became more formal and thicker especially in the economic domain but also in the political-security arena. Further, rules in the economic arena became more collaborative, not just facilitating co-existence. Violation of rules carried a cost even in the political-security arena. Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of Cambodia and Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor, for example, were opposed and eventually reversed. Force continued to be a legitimate instrument of state policy but in defence and deterrence roles. Offensive use of force to alter the political-territorial status quo or resolve disputes was no longer accepted as legitimate. That norm was codified, for example, in the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that has been acceded to by all major powers and in the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea to construct a code of conduct in relation to maritime disputes in that Sea.
Notwithstanding the normative-contractual features, the purpose of order in Asia continued to be dominated by the private goals of national survival and national prosperity. Goals like regional community building were of second order importance and designed to support national survival and prosperity. Likewise the content of rules emphasized private ends. Power over decision-making, resource allocation and enforcement all lay with states. Force remained under national control. There was little or no interest in pooling resources to develop regional surveillance and enforcement capabilities. Order in the second phase was sustained by multiple pathways including hegemony, balance of power including alliances, economic interdependence, regional cooperation and institutions, and the UN system. The salience of each pathway varied with issue and function. Regional cooperation, for example, became more widespread and important in the specific role of norm setting. In sum order in Asia at the dawn of the 21st century was largely instrumental but with certain normative-contractual features. How might that order alter in the future? Is order in Asia poised for transformation to a fully normative-contractual or solidarist order?

**The future**

I will try to answer these questions by exploring how the strategic context of Asia may further change and what that means for order in Asia. As indicated earlier, we are likely to witness continuity and change in the Asian political, strategic, and economic landscape. The imperatives of nation and state making, and building state capacity will continue to be significant in shaping the Asian strategic dynamic. Concurrently the rise of Asian powers, especially China, will gradually alter the distribution of power and strategic interaction. My assessment is that international politics in Asia over the next few decades will be less of a constant struggle for survival. Security concerns will exist but will not dominate international interaction. Force will continue to be relevant in defence and deterrence roles. Economic cooperation and interdependence are likely to increase and will make for an even more complex strategic environment. Based on an anticipation of gradual change in the distribution of power and increasingly strategic complexity, my contention is that the purpose and rules of order in Asia will not undergo dramatic change.

As stated earlier, nation and state making is a long process that may take several decades if not centuries. Although substantial headway has been made, nation and state making in many Asian countries, including some major ones like China and India, confronts several challenges and is unlikely to reach maturity for some decades to come. Unification of divided nations, development of national identities that can successfully integrate minority communities, delimitation of land and maritime boundaries, development of viable political systems, all will take considerable time. Despite significant advances, the economies of many Asian countries including China are still at a relatively low level of development and are in a transitional phase. Per capita income in 2009 was $3,744 in China, $1,192 in India, and $2,349 in Indonesia. This compares with $45,989 in the United States (World Bank 2011). Thus building national communities, national survival, and national prosperity will continue to be key purposes of order in Asia in the foreseeable future. Economic community building at the sub-regional level may gather steam but is unlikely to undermine national community and authority. The continued emphasis on private purposes will reinforce the constitutive and regulatory rules of regional order that emphasize the political-territorial status quo and peaceful change.

Principles, norms, and rules that support the continuation of existing nations and states will be strengthened. Likewise rules that support the means to advance national prosperity (like international trade, investment, production, and financial flows, regional economic integration)

---

7 These pathways are discussed in Alagappa 2003b.
are likely to be strengthened as well. Collaborative rules in the economic domain will become thicker. Economic interdependence will grow. Rules in the political-security arena will also thicken but will still be designed to facilitate peaceful co-existence and peaceful change. Violation of rules will carry increased political, diplomatic, and economic sanction.

Unlike continuity in the purposes and rules of regional order, substantive change is likely in who sustains order and how order is sustained. The role of regional institutions in sustaining order is likely to become more significant. Regional institutions along with their global counterparts will become the premier locale for formal rule making. However, except possibly in the economic domain, they will not have surveillance, dispute management, and enforcement capability. The rise of Asian powers will gradually alter the distribution of power with implications for how order is maintained and who maintains it. With China, India, and other Asian powers seeking elevated status and influence, sustaining order will increasingly shift to Asian powers and institutions. The salience of the hegemonic pathway and the dominance of the United States will gradually decline while the balance of power and regional institutions become more significant. Future order in Asia will continue to be of the instrumental type but with the growing significance of normative-contractual features. A solidarist order is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. The emphasis will be on building durable national political communities, not a region wide community comprising half of humanity.

**The role of force**

What will be the role of force in 21st century Asian order? It should be observed here that order does not preclude the use of force but regulates the reasons for which states may use force, i.e. the role and use of force is rule-governed. And violation of those rules carries political, economic, and military cost. The type of order also determines who controls and decides on the use of violence.

The monopoly over the legitimate use of force is a key distinguishing feature of the modern state. Despite considerable progress, many Asian countries still have not realized that feature. Non-state actors (communist and religious movements, minority groups, and terrorist organizations) continue to command and deploy violence in pursuit of their political goals. Until states develop the capacity to provide safety and security to all their citizens, until agreement is reached on acceptable and viable political systems, and until arrangements are in place to facilitate peaceful change, the resort to violence in domestic politics is unlikely to abate. Despite their efforts, the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence will continue to elude states. Some resistance groups will seek to retain the option of violence. Earlier I argued that violence will continue to be a key feature in the interaction of states with non-state groups, especially dissident minority groups. I will not further rehearse that argument.

In the international arena populated by sovereign states, violence will remain a legitimate instrument of state policy. However, the role of force is contingent on the nature of international politics, rules governing the use of force, the existence of other means and methods for dispute settlement, and the cost of using violence to resolve disputes. I argue that force will continue to be an important instrument of state policy but its relevance and effectiveness in achieving national objectives like prosperity has declined. The primary role of force will be in defence and deterring aggression against the state. International peacekeeping and so-called domestic stability operations will also be significant roles for some militaries. The dominance of defence and deterrence technologies along with nationalism makes the outcome of wars highly uncertain. Generally the political, diplomatic, financial, and economic cost of using force in offensive roles has become very high and possibly prohibitive. The constraining factors are not likely to alter
rapidly. Though it cannot be completely ruled out, major war (battle casualties exceeding 1,000) in Asia is becoming a feature of the past.

A related point is that war is not the means by which systemic change has occurred or will occur in Asia. The change from bipolarity to unipolarity at the global level, for example, did not come about through American victory in war. It occurred largely as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union. China’s contemporary ascendance is through economic growth not victory in war and military conquest. Military capability continues to be important but it is no longer the defining measure of national power. Learning from the Soviet experience, China and other Asian countries seek to be comprehensive powers. Although war may not feature in bringing about systemic change, military force along with other means will play a significant role in ensuring regional stability through deterrence among major powers.

On the control of force, collective management through the UN or regional arrangements in Asia appears highly unlikely. Military force will continue to be national, remain under national control, and deployed in the pursuit of state goals or regional goals agreed upon by states. Periodically it may be deployed in a collective role under UN auspices or as part of a coalition of the willing. Peacekeeping is a distinct possibility in certain sub-regions but Asia-wide peace keeping and peace enforcement is highly unlikely. In this connection alliances will continue to be important in augmenting self-help capabilities for some countries. The functions of alliances, however, may undergo change.

The minimal and declining role of force and war in state security may raise important socio-cultural questions for militaries in states that face no military threats. What does it means to be a soldier in these countries? Fighting and winning wars still defines soldiering. But this may no longer be the primary mission for some militaries. Most if not all the time they will be deployed in disaster relief, domestic stability, peace keeping, countering pandemic threats, and similar operations. These missions do not require professional training to win wars. In fact they require other skills. To bridge the gap between expectation and reality, and to avoid frustration in the officer and soldier corps it may be necessary redefine the profession of arms and what soldiering means in some countries.

Conclusion

To conclude I would like to summarize the main points of my argument. First, over the last sixty years there has been a transition from war to relative peace and cooperation in Asia. Continuing and new security challenges as well as ongoing and anticipated changes in Asia’s strategic environment are unlikely to alter the trend toward inter-state peace and cooperation. Military clashes and minor wars are possible but large scale war (battle casualties exceeding 1,000 casualties) appears highly unlikely. Second, there has also been a transition from war to peace and stability in the political heartlands of many Asian countries but not in the interaction of states with minority communities. Although political contestations are likely in many Asian countries, resort to organized violence to bring about political system change appears less likely in most heartlands. Organized violence will continue to feature in the interaction of the political centre with the periphery. Third, inter-state order in Asia over the last sixty years has evolved from an instrumental type to an instrumental order with normative contractual features. That type of order is likely to continue in the foreseeable future with a strengthening of the normative contractual features. The purpose and rules of order are unlikely to significantly alter but substantive change is likely in the arrangements to sustain order. Asian countries and regional institutions will gradually assume greater responsibility while the role and influence of the
United States suffers gradual and relative decline. However, the United States will continue to be an important player in the maintenance of order in Asia.

Fourth, state and nation making along with state capacity have been the key drivers of war and peace in Asia over the last sixty years. Contested ideas of state, nation, and political system along with weak state capacity and a normative structure that accepted war as a legitimate instrument to bring about change explain the many wars during the first three decades in post-World War II Asia. The resolution of such disputes, military stalemate as a consequence of the dominance of defence and deterrence, a normative structure that constrains resort to war to settle disputes, and increased state capacity explain the transition to relative peace in inter-state relations and in the political heartlands of Asian countries. The inability to construct identities and political frameworks that accommodate minority aspirations and the absence of mechanisms for peaceful change explain the continuation of the many armed struggles between states and minority groups seeking independence or autonomy. Fifth, state and nation making concerns along with the goal of building state capacity explain the emergence and status-quo orientation of the instrumental type of cooperation and order that has developed in Asia. Advances in state making and increasing state capacity explain the development of normative-contractual features that increase the cost and reduce the salience of force in the pursuit of national goals.

Sixth, the rise of Asian powers is likely further to alter the Asian strategic environment making it even more complex, negating clear zero-sum relationships like that during the Cold War. However, it is unlikely to alter the purposes and rules of order although the arrangements for sustaining order are likely to undergo change with Asian countries and regional institutions becoming more significant. Finally, force will continue to play an important role in domestic and international politics in the Asian security region. In the interaction among states, force will be relevant primarily in the defence, deterrence, and assurance roles. National force may also be deployed periodically for international peacekeeping and domestic stability operations. Domestically the role of organized violence in politics will decline in the heartlands but not in the interaction of states with minority communities.
References


Tables

1. Major inter-state war in Asia (1945 – 2010)
2. Minor inter-state war in Asia (1945 - 2010)
3. War dyads in Asia (1945 – 2010)
4. Intra-state major war over political system (1945 – 2010)
5. Intra-state minor war over political system (1945 – 2010)
6. Intra-state major and minor war between states and minority communities (1945 – 2010)
7. List of sub-regional and regional organizations and arrangements in Asia since 1945