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Abstracts

How Innovative Was the Poupatempo Experience in Brazil? Institutional Bypass as a New Form of Institutional Change
Mariana Mota Prado and Ana Carolina da Matta Chasin

This article analyzes Poupatempo, a recent bureaucratic reform in Brazil. We argue that it offers insight into a potentially successful strategy to promote institutional reforms. After analyzing the design of the project and the obstacles to its implementation, we conclude that Poupatempo's most innovative feature was the fact that it did not try to reform existing institutions. Instead it created a new pathway around an inefficient bureaucracy. This type of reform — the institutional bypass — has not been considered by the academic literature on institutional change but, as the case of Poupatempo suggests, it should be further investigated and analyzed.

Keywords: Institutional change; New Institutionalism; Poupatempo; Bureaucracy; Brazil.

Political Dynamics and Liberalization in the Brazilian Air Transport Industry: 1990-2002
Cristiano Fonseca Monteiro

A first wave of theories on globalization suggested that because of new competitive pressures, national economies would converge into a single market economy model. Economic rationale would overcome politics, and political choices would be restricted to the implementation of a set of policy prescriptions aimed at favoring private investment, so-called “market-oriented reforms”. More recently, research based on economic sociology and historical institutionalism has shown that the implementation of market-oriented reforms at national, regional and industry-level has been characterized by a variety of outcomes, and politics has played a major role in producing such variety. The analysis of official documents, newspaper articles, interviews and other sources related to the main actors in the Brazilian air transport industry shows that the implementation of market-oriented reforms in this industry has also been marked by a complex political dynamics, comprising conflict, dispute, negotiation and compromise. This political dynamics has forged a trajectory that is unique in relation to other economic sectors in Brazil, and to the same industry in other countries. This paper concludes that politics has to be seriously taken into account in the debate on the search for efficiency and competitiveness in the Brazilian air transport industry.

Keywords: Deregulation; Market reforms; Economy and politics; Economic sociology; Historical institutionalism.
Brazilian Parties According to their Manifestos: Political Identity and Programmatic Emphases
Gabriela da Silva Tarouco

Generally, party programmes are neglected in Brazil owing to their alleged (and assumed) irrelevance. It is argued that given that such documents are designed on order and with propaganda purposes, they could hardly be accepted as depictions of the parties’ true political positions. However, such an assessment lacks empirical verification. This article tests the hypothesis that Brazilian parties emphasise distinct questions in their manifestos. This hypothesis is based on saliency theory, according to which parties can be distinguished from one another depending on the themes they choose to prioritise. Content analysis technique was applied to the texts, using an adaptation of the categories of the Manifesto Research Group. The results indicate that the programmes do not have the same content, and neither are the differences in their emphases random. It is possible to distinguish between Brazilian parties not only by the kinds of questions they emphasise more, but also by those that they emphasise less.

Keywords: Parties; Programmes; Manifestos; Emphases; Content analysis.

Ana Paula Tostes

This article systematically investigates, in a comparative perspective, the support for new extreme right-wing political parties (ERPs) in national elections across the Western European Union countries (WEU). The objective of the research is not to explain why or how the ERPs platforms can be convincing and persuasive, but to describe conditions that contribute to identify when this has occurred. Since the reactionary nature of ERP discourse met the spreading phenomenon of Euroskepticism, a vote for ERP candidates and platforms is considered Euroskeptic voting behavior. Our hypothesis is that the greater the political power a member state enjoys in European Union institutions, the fewer the incentives for voters to support ERPs. To test this hypothesis, a great amount of data was organized and a set of econometric exercises was established using panel data with fixed effects. Given the intertemporal variation captured by the panel data with fixed effects, it is possible to assess the political conditions for the growth of electoral support for ERPs across the WEU as a function of three classes of variables: representative variables, economic variables, and variables of perception. The findings suggest that representation in European institutions has greater impact on ERP support than economic circumstances.

Keywords: Extreme right-wing political parties; European elections; European Union; Euroskepticism.

Public Attitudes towards Parties in Portugal: A Longitudinal Overview
Conceição Pequito Teixeira and Paulo Almeida Pereira

This article reviews the case of the often claimed “crisis of parties” in Portugal, and argues that such controversy rests at least in part on “ambiguous” evidence. We will try to answer two fundamental research questions: 1) What motivates popular support for political parties (or lack thereof)? 2) Why does anti-party rhetoric resonate with some
citizens, but not with others? The empirical data and statistical regression models used allow the following conclusion: in the eyes of Portuguese citizens, parties have become a kind of “necessary evil”, being criticized for “what they actually do” and supported for “what they are supposed to do”.

Keywords: Political parties; Decline of parties; Anti-party sentiments; Political attitudes and behaviour.

Do Institutions Produce Institutional Change? The New Historical Institutionalism and Analytic Innovations in the Theory of Change
Flávio da Cunha Rezende

This essay discusses the problem of endogenous institutional change in the context of the new historical institutionalism. It reviews the critique of traditional theorizing on institutional change and offers a comparative analysis of innovative approaches to institutional change on the contemporary agenda of historical institutionalism in comparative political science. The analysis focuses on the logic underlying the conceptual and analytical transformations in the methodological debate of how to expand the explanatory capacity of traditional models by introducing institutional variables in them. We review quasi-parametric models, incremental change models and those models seeking to introduce the dynamic interaction between ideas and institutions. The key argument is that, over this decade, institutional change models, driven by the introduction of new concepts, new modes of theorizing, and new mechanisms of change, have undergone a remarkable analytical transformation. These innovations have allowed political scientists to deal with change endogenously.

Keywords: Comparative Political Science; Endogenous change; Theory of institutional change; New institutionalism; New historical institutionalism: Theory and models; Case studies.
How Innovative Was the Poupatempo Experience in Brazil? Institutional Bypass as a New Form of Institutional Change

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This article analyzes Poupatempo, a recent bureaucratic reform in Brazil. We argue that it offers insight into a potentially successful strategy to promote institutional reforms. After analyzing the design of the project and the obstacles to its implementation, we conclude that Poupatempo’s most innovative feature was the fact that it did not try to reform existing institutions. Instead it created a new pathway around an inefficient bureaucracy. This type of reform — the institutional bypass — has not been considered by the academic literature on institutional change but, as the case of Poupatempo suggests, it should be further investigated and analyzed.

Keywords: Institutional change; New Institutionalism; Poupatempo; Bureaucracy; Brazil.

Introduction

At a very intuitive level, everybody can agree with the idea that dysfunctional public institutions are undesirable. Nobody wants to deal with inefficient, incompetent and corrupt bureaucracies, courts or elected bodies. Yet, there is at least one other important reason for countries to want to get rid of dysfunctional institutions: they may impact on a country’s development prospects. New institutional economists argue that developing and transitional economies struggle because their institutions create incentives that are
ill-suited for economic growth: “Third World countries are poor because the institutional constraints define a set of payoffs to political/economic activity that does not encourage productive activity” (North 1990, 110). In other words, for new institutional economists having functional institutions may positively influence a country’s development prospects. A number of studies have now shown that not only is there empirical basis to support North’s argument (that good institutions promote economic growth) but also that good institutions can have a positive impact on literacy levels and life expectancy (Rodrik et al. 2004; Kaufmann et al. 1999; Kaufmann 2003; 2004; World Bank 2007). Thus, functional institutions are of utmost importance to any country, but they are especially relevant for developing countries such as Brazil.

Why then is Brazil not getting rid of all dysfunctional institutions at once, firing inefficient bureaucrats, prosecuting corrupt civil servants and creating public bodies that will allow it to develop at an even faster pace? The answer seems to lie in the numerous obstacles to institutional change identified in the academic literature, especially by new institutional economics (NIE). There are particular conditions and circumstances that ideally need to be present for institutional change and reform to take place, but these cannot be easily found. Instead, one often finds obstacles to institutional change, for example, strong political resistance to reforms, or informal rules and norms that reinforce the status quo (Trebilcock and Daniels 2008; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; North 1990; 2005).

This is not to say that institutional change never takes place or that it cannot be explained by NIE. On the contrary, institutional change has a prominent position in political science and new institutional economics has become increasingly relevant as a method to analyze these changes (Hall and Taylor 1996; Rezende 2009). For example, NIE has been used in political science to analyze constitutional change, administrative reforms, welfare state reforms, sectoral reforms, and fiscal reforms, among others. 2

Some of these studies have proven to be illuminating in helping us understand how institutions emerge, evolve and change, but there are limitations related to the theoretical assumptions of this type of analysis (Rezende 2009). Cognizant of that, this article suggests that even if one adopts its theoretical assumptions, there is yet another important limitation: NIE’s focus on changes to pre-existing institutions.

The literature on institutional change has focused primarily on attempts to reform a dysfunctional institution and the obstacles that reformers may face in this process, including fierce and powerful resistance of interest groups that benefit from the status quo and path-dependency. This article acknowledges that this is an important focus of analysis, but it argues that it does not need to be the only one. We argue that one could (and should) also focus on attempts to promote institutional change by bypassing dysfunctional institutions, instead of modifying them. This is what we call an institutional bypass, a type of institutional
reform that creates new pathways around clogged or blocked institutions (Prado 2011).

To illustrate the importance of this alternative focus – institutional change that occurs outside pre-existing institutions – this article analyzes a recent institutional reform in Brazil called Poupatempo (in English, “timesaver”). Poupatempo is a one-stop shop for Brazilian citizens who need documents such as identity cards, driver’s licenses, and criminal records. Public utility companies also have offices at the Poupatempo units, where consumers can pay utility bills (electricity, water and telephone), dispute charges, and settle debts with representatives of these companies. In contrast to the pre-existing bureaucracy, which has offices scattered throughout the city, Poupatempo places offices of the federal, state and, in some cases, local administration in one location of easy access to the general public (normally in the vicinity of subway and bus stations). This makes it easier for citizens to obtain a wide range of services. Moreover, in some cases the services at Poupatempo can take significantly less time than the ones offered by the pre-existing bureaucracy.

The project started in 1997 with one unit in the capital and today it has a total of 28 units in the state. In 2010 alone the units combined provided services to more than 32 million people.3 In 2011, Poupatempo was providing services to an average of 115,000 people a day.4 The impact of the Poupatempo is significant: the total number of people who benefited from services provided by Poupatempo from 1997 to 2010 is approximately 272 million (Poupatempo 2011). We argue that this fast expansion and ability to overcome obstacles to institutional reforms can be largely attributed to the fact that it was an institutional bypass. In other words, it did not face the same obstacles related to path-dependency and transaction costs that other attempts to reform face.

To support our argument, this article analyzes the implementation of the Poupatempo project identifying the obstacles it faced. For this purpose we have used the scarce academic literature available, complementing it with fieldwork, which consisted of analyzing official governmental publications, visiting some units and interviewing some of the relevant actors in the process. We first gathered all the public information available on the web-site and official publications and, after examining it, began to schedule the interviews. Two kinds of interviews were conducted: interviews with the individuals responsible for creating and initiating the implementation of the Poupatempo project; and interviews with the staff currently responsible for its administration. In the first group, we interviewed Daniel Annenberg, Poupatempo’s first coordinator and latter superintendent for seven years, Antonio Angarita, the former state of São Paulo secretary of government and strategic management (from 1995 to 2001), and Dalmo Nogueira Filho, the former adjunct secretary (1995-2001) and former secretary of government and strategic management (2002). In the second group, we interviewed Tânia Andrade, the current superintendent of operations, Ilídio Machado, the current superintendent of new projects, and Carlos Antônio Guimarães.
de Sequeira, the director of the identification department. All of them were semi-structured interviews which had the purpose of both furnishing some institutional data, and presenting the individuals' understanding and own thoughts about the program. These interviews were used as primary sources of information, providing data and details that were not readily available in official documents or academic scholarship.

The article will be structured as follows. The first part maps out the conception of the project and identifies its constitutive elements, trying to identify what made Poupatempo more efficient than the pre-existing state bureaucracy by analyzing its core innovations. In the second part, we discuss implementation, demonstrating how Poupatempo overcame well-known obstacles to institutional reforms, such as lack of resources, embedded cultural traits, political economy problems, and institutional interconnections. Our main argument is that Poupatempo managed to overcome these obstacles because it was an institutional bypass. The third part asks whether Poupatempo can be considered a success, concluding that there are no conclusive answers to this question. The potential effects that an institutional bypass may have on pre-existing institutions are especially unclear. We suggest that Poupatempo may have had feedback effects on the traditional bureaucracy, promoting structural changes in the internal structures of the Brazilian State. This needs to be further investigated in future research, in order to determine whether institutional bypasses like Poupatempo could be an important drive for institutional change. In any event, our conclusion is that regardless of its impact on pre-existing institutions, Poupatempo is clearly an institutional bypass, which is a concept that deserves more attention by the specialized literature.

Poupatempo: A Brief Overview of the Project

One-stop shops for bureaucratic services have enjoyed a significant boom in the last decade around the world (Programa Nacional de Gestão Pública e Desburocratização 2009), and these projects could serve as interesting case studies on successful attempts to promote bureaucratic modernization by tailoring private sector management techniques to the public sector, a strategy known as New Public Management (Israel 1987; Manning 2001, 298-99). The one-stop shop idea, for instance, was influenced by the business strategies of shopping centres and supermarkets (Estrada 1982). In Brazil, previous reforms had focused on traditional public sector management principles, such as hierarchical structures, anonymity of public servants, and input and output centred program management. In contrast, Poupatempo’s staff asserted that this project centred on the customer, deemphasized hierarchy, and focused on outcomes (Gonçalves 2003, 9). This shift in the focus and approach of bureaucratic reforms could serve as a potential explanation to Poupatempo’s success and could provide lessons for bureaucratic reforms in other countries.
Thus, Poupatempo could be interpreted and analyzed as a relevant case of public management and public administration reforms. However, we believe that Poupatempo can also offer insights that address broader concerns about institutional reforms, which are relevant to but not confined to the bureaucratic sphere. The latter will be our focus in this article. More specifically, Poupatempo may show an effective strategy to overcome obstacles to institutional reforms and institutional change identified in the literature. However, before we get to these broader institutional concerns, it is important to explain the context in which Poupatempo was created, and what kind of innovations it has implemented in an attempt to achieve a higher level of efficiency than the traditional bureaucracy. In other words, this first part of the article will provide relevant background information about Poupatempo, so as to help the reader better understand the obstacles it faced – or could have faced – in its implementation. More specifically, this section will show that while it is not clear where the idea of a one-stop shop for bureaucratic services was conceived, there was strong political will to promote reforms within the office of the governor. In terms of innovations, we show that Poupatempo implemented both creative and simple solutions to problems that were impairing efficient delivery of services.

The unknown origins of the idea of a one-stop shop for bureaucratic services

Within Brazil, it is hard to identify where or when the idea of a one-stop shop for bureaucratic services was originally conceived. While the state of São Paulo was designing its project, a similar project had already been implemented in 1995 in Bahia: Serviço de Atendimento ao Cidadão (“Citizen Assistance Service”). The experience in Bahia influenced the creation of the Poupatempo, but its creators often cite significant differences between these projects to support the idea that the latter did not merely mimic the former (Annenberg, Tomchinsky and Tokairim 2006, 29). They argue, instead, that the proposal of a one-stop shop for bureaucratic services was originally presented in a book (Estrada 1982), which was an edited volume with background papers for a federal red tape reduction plan (in Portuguese, desburocratização) initiated in 1979 by minister Hélio Beltrão. The plan was partially implemented with the creation of the Brazilian small claims courts and of the micro business statute, but a one-stop shop for bureaucratic services at the federal level never came into being. Instead, the proposal was appropriated by governors and implemented at the state level, starting with Bahia in 1995. Today, 23 out of 25 Brazil’s states have one-stop shops (Centrais de Atendimento Integrado 2003).

Although Brazil has fully embraced one-stop shops for bureaucratic services, it seems unlikely that the idea was conceived in Brazil, as many other countries were promoting
similar reforms at about the same time. For instance, in the same year the Poupatempo was created, 1997, Australia implemented a one-stop shop agency, Centrelink (Halligan 2005, 134). Portugal and Spain have also adopted the one-stop shop model for bureaucratic services (Programa Nacional de Gestão Pública e Desburocratização 2009).

It is also not fully clear what mechanism led to the proliferation of this type of bureaucratic reform in Brazil and around the world in the 1990s. One hypothesis is that it was part of a larger process to increase bureaucratic efficiency led by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank. Another hypothesis is that these projects were simply the result of a process of policy diffusion, i.e., informal exchanges of information among public administrators about successes that could be replicated in other places. For instance, between 1997 and 2003, Bahia received 22 delegations from other countries interested in replicating the experience, as well as receiving requests from other Brazilian states to provide technical assistance in the creation of their own one-stop shop units (Gonçalves 2003, 11). It is likely that this was a combination of both, as after an initial process of informal diffusion, the reform was endorsed by governmental and international institutions: the Inter-American Development Bank sent a mission to Bahia in 1996; in 1997, the United Nations recommended the replication of this type of reform in all continents; and in 1998, the Brazilian government began supporting similar reforms in other states (Gonçalves 2003, 13), and in 2002 it published a manual on how to implement the bureaucratic one-stop shop (Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão 2002). This national and international endorsement may not only have provided funding and political support, but it may have created incentives for a more intensive exchange at the level of informal networks.

Although it is hard to pinpoint where the inspiration for the one-stop shop model came from, or where it was originally conceived, how Poupatempo was created is clear. The project was an initiative of the executive branch of the state of São Paulo (Paulics 2003). In 1994, Mario Covas was elected governor of the state of São Paulo with an agenda of improving the provision of services to citizens and reforming the public administration. In January 1995, when he was inaugurated, he created the Unit of Strategic Management, which was in charge of designing a plan to execute the governor’s campaign promises. One year later, this unit proposed a project entitled Central de Atendimento à População (“Citizens Services Centre”), which later changed its name to Poupatempo (Annenberg et al. 2006. 29-30).

**Implementing the idea: Diagnosing the problems and designing tailored solutions for each office of the bureaucracy**

In order to implement the Poupatempo project, in September 1996 the governor of the state of São Paulo assembled a team of professionals with diverse backgrounds. This
team was comprised mainly of civil servants from different governmental departments, but it also included some political appointees and private sector professionals. The team was in charge of designing one unit, which later became a model for new ones. The coordinator of the project at the time points out that the task was experimental: the team had not done anything similar before, and at the time it was unknown how the project would unfold (interview with Daniel Annenberg, 2009). The team started with a case-by-case diagnosis of the problems in primary government services, and based on this decided which problems would be tackled by the project (Paulics 2003, 6). Some government offices did not need improvements and became part of Poupatempo right away, with no changes in their existing processes. One example is the public utility company for water services (Sabesp), which had an efficient system of consumer services. In contrast, other offices and departments required more careful analysis of why service times were long, and whether improvements could be made to expedite their delivery. An example is the State Identification Department, which formerly took up to 60 days to issue identity cards (Registro Geral, also known as RG) for residents of the state of São Paulo. In this case, the Poupatempo team made a diagnosis and prepared proposals in collaboration with the offices of the pre-existing bureaucracy (interview with Daniel Annenberg, 2009).

Some diagnoses made by the team were fairly simple. For instance, in the case of the national identification card, the pre-existing bureaucracy was using paper files: citizens would fill out a form that would be typed into a paper file and then shipped to a central office, with the individual’s fingerprints. Once the fingerprint file was in place at the central office, the offices of the bureaucracy would be authorized to produce a new identity card. To replace a lost or stolen identity card, new fingerprints would be taken. These would be shipped to the central office to be compared to those already on file. If there was a match, the office of the bureaucracy would then be authorized by the central office to issue the replacement card. The time required to physically transport files from local offices in different locations around the city and to store these documents was substantial, and it resulted in identity cards being delivered to citizens around 60 days after the date in which the form was filled.

The team’s proposal, in this case, was to install a scanner that would transfer the file to the central office electronically, reducing the required time to physically transport and store the files. As the director of the Registration Department noted, a scanner was installed when the first unit of the Poupatempo was created, significantly reducing the time for the cards to be issued (interview with Carlos Sequeira, 2009). This example illustrates two principles that guided the project. First, the reform was oriented to immediate results: the team avoided creating a costly digitalization project that would take many years to be implemented. Instead, the Poupatempo office had a scanner at the time of its creation but the
pre-existing bureaucracy continued to operate with paper files. Second, the project focused on the “consumer” or the user of the service, not on the structure of the bureaucracy. In other words, it did not try to change hierarchies and the functions performed by civil servants.

**Poupatempo’s strategies to increase efficiency and improve quality in the delivery of bureaucratic services**

Poupatempo’s goal was to guarantee access to basic governmental services with expediency, quality and transparency. To achieve this goal, the project used a series of strategies.

Technology was used to improve the flow of the service and to eliminate bottlenecks caused by inefficient or redundant processes. Hardware played an important role. As the example discussed earlier showed, adopting the scanner eliminated the need to physically transport the files. Over time, a new digitalized system allowed the complete substitution of paper files with electronic files. As a result of the digitization process, issuing identification cards became faster, cheaper and more secure (Annenberg et al. 2006, 148-49).

The use of hardware (such as scanners) was coupled with sophisticated information technology, which provided for a more efficient flow of information. For instance, Poupatempo had a tracking system for a customer’s service at the reception desk. The system measured how long a person had to wait in line, how long the line was, how long the person was in contact with customer services, how productive each employee was etc. This system allowed the manager to allocate more resources (such as personnel) to the services in greater demand. While this system managed information regarding the interaction between citizens and offices, there was another system to manage the flow of information between the offices. Two different communication networks were created for Poupatempo services: the Intragov and the Strategic System of Information. Created in 2001, the Intragov is a web-based network that uses data, voice and images and is available to public services in the entire state of São Paulo. Before that, the Poupatempo units had only internal communication systems (i.e. for different offices within each unit). The Strategic System of Information is also a web-based network that connects the governor’s office with all the offices of the executive branch (Annenberg et al. 2006, 148-49). Despite being more recent, these systems seem to have expedited the exchange of relevant information among different offices within each unit of Poupatempo, and allowed for greater accountability of each of these units – and their performance – by the governor’s office.

Poupatempo also sought to improve the communication between government departments and citizens. For this purpose, it prepared booklets indicating all the required
documents and procedures to obtain services, so that citizens could gather the necessary documents in advance. Previously, citizens would be required to travel to a department just to obtain information about what they needed, returning later with the appropriate documents. Often times, there were misunderstandings or lack of accurate information, and citizens would be required to make three or fours trips to the same office just to place a request for services. In addition to the booklets, Poupatempo also has a call centre providing information about the services available on each unit and a list of the required documents for each service. In 2002, the attempt to reduce delays even further led to the creation of the internet service called e-Poupatempo.11

Another concern of the reforms was appropriate infrastructure. The building structures of Poupatempo units were designed to be easily accessible and comfortable for those waiting for the service to be provided. When choosing the location to install a future unit, the architects would look for places situated in central areas, easily accessible by public transportation. They also sought large ventilated buildings, with high ceilings and natural sun light. Once a building was acquired or rented, they would divide areas of circulation from service areas, and each service area would be identified by different wall colors and colored signs. Finally, there are no walls dividing different departments and offices. Instead, the units have half walls in order to give the feeling of openness and transparency (Annenberg et al. 2006, 123-45).

Regarding human resources, an internal selection process was able to identify civil servants who were willing to be transferred to a Poupatempo unit. They were selected through a competitive internal process, which evaluated, among other things, their capacity to interact with people, to take initiative when needed, and to be flexible and open to change. The incentive to participating in this process was a marginal salary increase, a better working place and a more dynamic environment.12 After the selection process, these servants underwent intensive training to learn how to operate the new system, and once they became employees of Poupatempo, they were periodically re-trained.

This internal selection process, targeted at motivated civil servants, was used in 1997 and 1998, but was largely discontinued in 1999 due to complaints of the heads of offices in the pre-existing bureaucracy, where employees were being selected and removed. They claimed that Poupatempo was draining their core personnel, leaving the older departments with fewer employees than they needed (and a hiring freeze did not allow them to hire replacements). The former adjunct secretary reports that, as a result, around 2000 Poupatempo was forced to start contracting out its services in order to create new units (interview with Dalmo Nogueira, 2009). The current superintendent of new projects mentions that contracting out process initially was used only for some services, but it expanded over time. Starting in 2006, some of the newly-created units (Osasco and Santos)
were fully contracted out (i.e., the management of the entire unit is provided by a private company) (interview with Ilídio Machado, 2009). By 2009, around 45% of the employees of the Poupatempo (currently 6,695) were contract employees.¹³

**Overcoming Obstacles to Reforms: Poupatempo as an Institutional Bypass**

Theories of institutional change have often identified significant obstacles to reform. First and foremost, political will is a necessary condition for institutional change to take place (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). This was certainly present in the case of Poupatempo, as we have shown in the previous section. While necessary, political will is not a sufficient condition to promote reforms. Reforms need to be politically desirable, but they also need to be politically feasible. Thus, if there is resistance or obstacles to the implementation of institutional reforms, it is unlikely that they will succeed.

There are three main obstacles to institutional reforms, according to Trebilcock and Daniels (2008). First, despite the political will to promote reforms, countries may lack the necessary financial, technological or human resources to implement changes. Second, a series of social values, norms, attitudes and practices, which Trebilcock and Daniels loosely classify as social-cultural-historical factors, may form a hostile environment for implementing reforms. Third, there are political economy-based impediments. Interest groups will resist reforms that eliminate their privileges, do not foster their interests, or do not offer any gains (material or otherwise). The last two obstacles can potentially explain why the massive surge in development assistance for institutional reform projects in developing and transition economies have had mixed to disappointing results thus far: there was money to tackle the lack of resources (Trubek 2006, 74), but the other two problems were not properly dealt with (Trebilcock and Daniels 2008; Tamanaha 2011).

In contrast to those identifying obstacles that explain why institutional reform fails to take place or to succeed, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) have identified, in their most recent book, what factors explain institutional change. Not surprisingly, their analysis largely matches two of the obstacles to reform identified above. First, they argue that the political context matters, i.e., if the group that is likely to defend the status quo is not powerful and their veto power is weak reforms are likely to happen. This largely maps into the political-economy problems described above. Second, they argue that the characteristics of the institutions also affect the likelihood of reform. They distinguish between institutions with high or low level of discretion in applying rules, and argue that lower levels of discretion are more conducive to reforms. This is largely because informal rules can undermine efforts to promote reforms, as those who are interpreting, applying and enforcing the new rules are
not the ones that made them. Thus, the more discretion they have in applying the rules, the more they can deviate from the purpose of the reform. This largely maps into the social-cultural-historical factors described above.

The fact that Poupatempo was successfully implemented and expanded significantly within a relatively short period of time suggests that the establishment of Poupatempo' was able to overcome the three obstacles to institutional change mentioned earlier, namely: lack of resources, culture (embedded patterns of behaviour or values that negatively impact reform efforts), and political economy (groups of interest that benefit from the status quo resist changes for self-interested reasons) (Trebilcock and Daniels 2008). Moreover, the reform also needed to tackle the problem of institutional interconnections, where other pre-existing institutions (in addition to the one being bypassed) can undermine the effectiveness of reforms due to self-reinforcing mechanisms and institutional interdependencies (Prado and Trebilcock 2009).

Considering that these obstacles are likely to be present in most attempts to promote institutional reforms, how was Poupatempo able to overcome them? We argue that the reason is because Poupatempo was an institutional bypass. An institutional bypass has four characteristics: (i) it keeps pre-existing institutions in place; (ii) it creates an alternative pathway creating the option to use one or the other; (iii) it aims at being more efficient or functional than the pre-existing institution and (iv) it only offers some services or performs just some functions that used to be provided or performed by the pre-existing institution, and therefore it does not modify the entire system (Prado 2011).

Poupatempo exhibits these four characteristics. First, the offices of the old bureaucracy were not eliminated or replaced at the time of Poupatempo’s creation. As we will discuss below, some of the offices later faded away and died, but this was a consequence of the success of Poupatempo, rather than an objective of the project. Second, citizens were given the option to obtain documents in the old bureaucracy, or in the new Poupatempo. Third, due to a series of innovations described above, Poupatempo aimed at (and in certain cases succeeded in) significantly improving the provision of documents by reducing the costs and time required to obtain them. Fourth, Poupatempo did not replace all the functions of the pre-existing bureaucracy. For instance, Poupatempo performed two functions of the department of motor vehicles (issuance and renewal of driver’s licenses and registration of vehicles), but it left all the other functions to be performed by the pre-existing bureaucracy. Finally, as an institutional bypass, Poupatempo was able to overcome the major obstacles for the implementation of institutional reforms in developing countries mentioned above: lack of resources, culture, political economy and path dependence. The following sections will discuss whether and how Poupatempo overcame each of these obstacles.
Obstacle 1: Resources

Poupatempo was able to overcome lack of resources by starting with a small pilot project that did not require a significant initial investment. Indeed, the initial budget for the first unit of Poupatempo project was approximately R$ 10 million (US$ 5 millions). In 2008, it its annual budget had increased to R$ 150 million (roughly US$ 75 millions) a year. In large part, the budget increase was a result of the success of the pilot project, illustrated by the increasing demand for the services. Soon after its inauguration in 1997, the number of people looking for the services quickly became larger than the unit’s capacity. According to the team’s manager “it had more success than it could handle.” The state secretary of government and public management reports that, as the project gained popular support, it was easier to convince the Office of the governor that it was a good investment, making it attractive to use part of the budget to expand it. The governor’s office monitored numbers and statistics after the implementation of the project, and the demand in the first unit was a key factor in convincing the governor and other state officials of the need to invest in and to expand the project (interview with Antonio Angarita, 2009).

Also, as the project began displaying substantive results, it became much easier to overcome political resistance towards allocating resources to the project. Popular demand made Poupatempo an attractive project for electoral purposes. Voters were the ones benefiting from its services, and politicians began to see Poupatempo as a very attractive “campaign card”. After the initial success of the first unit, a series of units were opened in the capital and in other cities by the end of 1998, many shortly before state elections.

Increasing the Poupatempo budget, however, was not as easy as it might seem. The state government has a complicated budgetary process in which what is defined as budget for one year is replicated in the next year. Therefore, adding a brand new project in the budget was a difficult process, because it meant taking money out of other items, which was always met with fierce resistance. To overcome this difficulty at the early stages, the governor’s office presented Poupatempo as a temporary project entitled to exceptional funding (crédito suplementar). As the former adjunct secretary reports, eventually, the success of the project, created enough political support to have it included in the budget (interview with Dalmo Nogueira, 2009).

One budgetary concern with the project, however, was the duplication of bureaucratic services. Multiple offices serving the same function seems irrational from the point of view of resource expenditures. So, while the success of Poupatempo allowed for the expansion of its budget, this expansion was always considered within a context in which redundancy would be a waste of money. This resulted in the eventual elimination of some of the offices of the pre-existing bureaucracy, like the provision of the identity card services, which are now exclusively offered at Poupatempo.
Obstacle 2: Culture

A key aspect of cultural problems in bureaucratic reforms is institutional culture. Culture here refers to informal rules and institutional practices that are difficult to change, in part because they are self-reinforcing (North 2005; Trebilcock and Daniels 2008; Prado and Trebilcock 2009). Poupatempo overcame obstacles related to institutional culture in at least two ways. First, it adopted a recruiting process that tried to screen out candidates to eliminate patterns of behaviour that would reproduce the problems of the pre-existing bureaucracy. At first, the team considered that for this purpose hiring new people would be better than recruiting civil servants from the pre-existing bureaucracy. This option, however, was not favoured by the governor, who believed that there was a need to change the mindset of the existing bureaucracy (interview with Dalmo Nogueira, 2009). In addition, those involved with the reform process noted that hiring new people was not feasible at that time because at both the federal and state levels, there were massive efforts to reduce the size of bureaucracy (which was part of a larger plan to promote fiscal stability) (interview with Antonio Angarita, 2009).

Second, there were constant adjustments and improvements largely based on user’s feedback and external evaluations. This reflected an understanding by the reformers that efforts to modify embedded cultural traits can result in consequences that are hard to identify in advance (Prado and Trebilcock 2009). In this regard, it was extremely relevant for Poupatempo to have both specific suggestions from users, who were invited to provide feedback on the spot by filling out a form, and also from outsiders hired to provide external assessments of the overall performance of the units.15

It is not clear, however, if these practices of constant adjustments and revisions that happened intensively at the beginning will remain in place. They may not, for instance, if the state government’s urgency to introduce new units as fast as possible (in order to realize the electoral benefits associated with that) takes the improvement of the actual services off the government’s priority list. The fast expansion of the project would then have a negative impact in the overall quality of the services offered. These practices of consulting citizens and asking for feedback may also disappear if the governor’s office changes hands, which may be followed by the replacement of top personnel in the bureaucracy. The system seems to have been solid and consistent until now largely because the same party has been in power since its creation. Poupatempo’s success may keep it in place, but there is a risk that another party may not want to have its name and its administration associated with a project created by the opposition.

Feedback has another beneficial role: it creates a self-reinforcing system of changes and constant improvements, modifying not only the culture of the services themselves but the culture of the people using the services. In this regard, one of the goals of the project.
was to prove that “the old image of inefficient and dysfunctional bureaucracy could be eliminated and overcome” (Annenberg 2002). The idea of asking for feedback may create a culture in which citizens feel entitled to demand better services, and to request changes. For this reason alone, it would be relevant to secure its maintenance.

Obstacle 3: Political economy problems

Political economy problems is an expression that refers to obstacles created by entrenched interests. The reformers implementing Poupatempo had to adopt a series of strategies to overcome the resistance offered by certain groups at different phases of the implementation process.

The governor was able to overcome any legislative resistance by creating a project that did not depend on legislative approval. The governor had been elected with two major reform plans: privatization and internal restructuring of the bureaucracy. Both aimed at increasing efficiency (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 2002). However, both required legislative approval and the governor thought it was too risky to put forward two major reform plans before the legislature at the same time. He then decided to present to the legislature only the privatization plan, abandoning the idea of promoting an internal restructuring of the bureaucracy, which was largely aimed at reducing the number of departments subordinated to the governor’s office. Its closest advisors were left with the challenge of coming up with another plan to increase bureaucratic efficiency for services that would not be privatized, without internal restructuring. As the former state secretary reports, Poupatempo was an attractive solution because it did not depend on legislative approval. The governor could create and implement the project by decree, bypassing any potential resistance or obstacle that could be imposed by the state legislature (interview with Antonio Angarita, 2009).

However, despite bypassing legislative resistance, the implementation of Poupatempo still came up against a number of political economy issues. In some cases, there was initial resistance by certain groups inside the bureaucracy. Civil servants resisted the creation of Poupatempo largely due to rent seeking, i.e., when bureaucrats stood to lose some benefit (financial or otherwise) from having services transferred to Poupatempo. Indeed, the creation of the project triggered resistance from corrupt civil servants who either received bribes to expedite the process to issue documents, or were making money by selling falsified documents. In these cases, the governor dealt with matters with an iron fist: he removed bureaucrats resisting reforms from their positions, or transferred them to another department of lesser importance. The former adjunct secretary mentioned that this happened, for instance, with sheriffs involved in corruption schemes who did not want the issuance of identity cards to be transferred from police stations to Poupatempo (interview
with Dalmo Nogueira, 2009). The governor’s strong commitment to the project helped overcome some of these obstacles. This not only suggests that political will is important to implement reforms, but also that institutional bypasses may not be shielded from political resistance. In any event, one may be tempted to suggest that resistance could have been fiercer if reforms were internal (i.e., if they were not a bypass), but it would be hard to find evidence to support this counter-factual argument.

Nevertheless, the governor’s power was limited to the state bureaucracy. He could not remove or relocate bureaucrats at the federal or the local level of the bureaucracy. In these cases, bureaucratic resistance was not so easily overcome. For instance, the former adjunct secretary mentioned that at the federal level, the federal police did not agree to have an office to issue passports at Poupatempo units (interview with Dalmo Nogueira, 2009). They claimed that Poupatempo standards of expediency would compromise the Federal Police security standards, but one can perhaps wonder if they were afraid of losing the monopoly over the services; or if they were resisting the idea of working longer hours, since the Poupatempo units had extended hours of operation. This is not to mention the possible interest to keep rents derived from corruption.

At the level of the local bureaucracy, there was also resistance, but largely motivated by a different set of problems. Local bureaucracies had very low standards of service provision, and they would require significant reforms before reaching the standards that would make it possible to consider their inclusion in the Poupatempo project. However, most municipalities could not afford these reforms. One of the few exceptions is the municipality of São José dos Campos, which is very wealthy. In addition, the mayor of the municipality was a political ally of the governor, which, as the former adjunct secretary notes, also helped create the goodwill to move ahead with the project (interview with Dalmo Nogueira, 2009). The former state secretary reports that, since reformers would need support from mayors to include local services in the Poupatempo units, local services were offered only in the cities in which mayors were political allies of the governor (interview with Antonio Angarita, 2009). Some civil servants who did not have self-interested reasons to resist the reforms were also not ready to support them. The reasons for this resistance are not fully clear, but the uncertainties associated with the outcomes of the reforms, due to its experimental nature, may have played a role.

The superintendent reports that, in order to overcome this resistance, the reformers used meetings and a long consultative process, in which bureaucrats in the pre-existing bureaucracy were invited to voice their concerns and suggestions. In order to diagnose the problems of each department or office of the government, the Poupatempo gathered information about service provision in that department and then articulated concerns in meetings with representatives from each government office. The team used these
meetings and the information produced by the assessments to convince bureaucrats of the importance of the project (interview with Daniel Annenberg, 2009).

In addition to the pre-existing bureaucracy, the government also faced resistance from other interest groups. In particular, there was significant resistance from business professionals who offered services connected with bureaucratic services. The state secretary mentions that, for instance, doctors who provided medical examinations for driver’s licenses lobbied against offering them at the Poupatempo units because that would imply that civil servant doctors, working for the Brazilian public health system, would perform the examination in loco (expediting the services, and reducing the time required from citizens to get their licenses issued). He also describes another example: the middlemen with personal networks in the bureaucracy that offered expedited services for a fee (despachantes), often sharing a percentage of the fee paid with the bureaucrat who processed the paper work. Citizens who were able to pay this fee would have their application processed faster through the back door. These groups strongly lobbied against Poupatempo issuing driver’s licenses, as it could potentially kill their main (and perhaps only) source of income. Despite this resistance, the service was implemented in all Poupatempo units (interview with Antonio Angarita, 2009).

**Obstacle 4: Institutional interconnections**

One important obstacle to institutional change and reforms is institutional interconnections. The former adjunct secretary explained that in the case of Poupatempo, this problem arose when the reformers were deciding who would control and coordinate the project. Poupatempo needed to be housed by an institution within the state government (interview with Dalmo Nogueira, 2009). Housing it in the office of the governor’s chief of staff would guarantee that Poupatempo would be under direct control of the governor’s office. However, according to the reformers, the bureaucratic structure of this particular office was ossified, and it would be difficult to change practices and procedures to increase efficiency and effectiveness in the decision making process despite the governors’ strong commitment to the reform (interview with Antonio Angarita, 2009).

Take, for instance, budgetary allocations. If the project was housed within the chief of staff’s office, the project’s budget would need to be approved yearly by the state legislature. In addition, the office of the governor must use public bids for every service or good provided by private companies. For instance, hiring architects to design and build new units could easily take six months. For this reason, the team reports that they decided to house the project in a state-owned company in charge of information technology and data processing (Prodesp) (interview with Antonio Angarita, 2009). This company had more flexibility in managing their budget. They could, for instance, hire an architect within a day (interview
with Dalmo Nogueira, 2009). The downside of housing it at Prodesp was that Poupatempo could not be included as a formal item in the government’s budget, making its budgetary situation very precarious, with no guarantee of funding from year to year. This shows how institutional interconnections and interdependencies are a relevant obstacle to reform, and also how an institutional bypass has more flexibility to avoid problems than reforms to pre-existing institutions would have.

**Promoting Institutional Change: The Consequences of Poupatempo**

Can we describe the Poupatempo experience as successful? Yes, if we are simply concerned with institutional change. Poupatempo did promote significant bureaucratic reforms in Brazil. The answer may also be yes, if we consider that Poupatempo increased the overall satisfaction of citizens using the state bureaucracy, and gathered enough public support to allow for a significant expansion of the service in a short period of time. In this regard, one positive outcome of Poupatempo concerns effectiveness. Identity cards, which are now issues in 5 days instead of 60, are frequently mentioned as an example of the efficiency of the project.

However, there are a number of potential problems with the project. First, it is unclear how much more some of the services are costing the government under the reforms compared to providing the services prior to reform. One independent study concluded that the issuance of documents under the Poupatempo system seems to be on average more expensive for the state (R$ 16 in contrast to R$ 12 through the traditional bureaucratic procedure), but, on the other hand, the costs for the population to obtain these documents is much lower (R$ 17 in the Poupatempo, against R$ 34 in the traditional procedure) (Ferrer n.d.). However, as the superintendent affirms, there is very little information about the cost of the services pre-Poupatempo (interview with Daniel Annenberg, 2009). Therefore, the accuracy of this study might be questionable. Further research is needed to develop a cost-benefit analysis of the reforms discussed here.

Another problematic aspect of the project is the fact that it largely duplicates a series of services, by offering them both at the pre-existing bureaucracy and at the Poupatempo level. This entails start-up costs (building the unit, buying new equipment, furniture, hiring new personnel etc) and the total budget allocated for the delivery of a particular service needs to increase as a result. This initial investment occurs only once and permanent costs will be only those for maintenance and salaries, which need to be considered in light of the increased capacity in service provision and the circumvention of inefficiencies in the pre-existing bureaucracy. Nevertheless, there were claims that sometimes the project was increasing rather than reducing government’s expenditures. It seems that in some cases this
problem was tackled by making the provision of certain services exclusive of Poupatempo. This is what happened with the issuance of identification cards. However, further research is needed to make a cost-benefit analysis of this change, and determine whether it was in fact beneficial to the state. More specifically, it is hard to determine whether the costs for the state were reduced in this case, as indicated above. Moreover, these cards were originally issued in police stations. Therefore, the costs to maintain the stations and its personnel remain, what may indicate that the overall cost for the government may be significantly higher now.

Another example in which the original offices were closed – and costs may have been reduced – is the consumer protection services (PROCON). This service is offered by the Consumer’s Protection and Defense Foundation and, in the case of São Paulo, is linked to the State Department of Justice and Citizenship Protection. PROCON handles consumer’s complaints against companies and service providers, using mediation and bringing the issue to court if necessary. The offices in which these services were provided were closed when the PROCON offices at Poupatempo units began to respond to a significant number of consumer complaints. In this case, the reduction in costs may be clearer, but further research is still necessary to assert this conclusively.

Another aspect of Poupatempo that may deserve further research is the potential elimination of pre-existing institutions in the future, as the project progressively becomes citizens’ first option for bureaucratic services. Indeed, an opinion poll showed that 74% of the people that went to Poupatempo units in 2008 did not consider using the pre-existing bureaucracy, an increase from 67% in 2006 and 70% in 2007 (Poupatempo and Ibope 2008). In sum, Poupatempo could be an example of how institutional bypasses can have a broader impact by eliminating dysfunctional institutions. In this aspect, however, it is too early to tell whether Poupatempo has been a success.

One way in which a bypass can change pre-existing institutions is by creating competition among public institutions, which may provide incentives for dysfunctional institutions to improve. Indeed, Poupatempo gave citizens an option to exit the pre-existing bureaucracy and go somewhere else, while at the same time keeping the traditional service provider in place. The increasing numbers of people attending Poupatempo was the main evidence that citizens were happy with it, but the traditional bureaucracy also had the option to become more attractive to these citizens by improving their service. This accorded with the reformers’ hope that innovations produced by these reforms would have feedback effects, being later incorporated by the traditional bureaucracy, creating a virtuous cycle of reforms (interview with Daniel Annenberg, 2009). In some cases, this actually happened, such as the digitalization project at the identification card central office.

There was at least one case in which changes were drastic: the complete modification of the services of the Company for Urban and Housing Development in São Paulo (Companhia
de Desenvolvimento Habitacional e Urbano do Estado de São Paulo (CDHU)) to meet the standards of Poupatempo units. Before Poupatempo, there were no standardized services: they were executed in different ways in each department within the same company. Also, consumers would receive conflicting information if they called more than one department within the company. To join the Poupatempo project, CDHU had to restructure, unify, and standardize its services (Noffs 2006). This new system was eventually adopted within the entire company, not being restricted to the CDHU’s offices at Poupatempo units. This case suggests that Poupatempo appears to have had some of the expected feedback effects on the traditional bureaucracy, promoting structural changes in the internal structures of the Brazilian State, but further research would be necessary to determine why this happened in this case, but not in other departments.

As an institutional bypass, Poupatempo did not try to reform the pre-existing institutions. Its creators hoped that the success would have feedback effects and foster structural changes within the state’s bureaucracy but it is not clear to what extent this has happened. The success of Poupatempo should not be reduced, however, to an evaluation of its capacity to eliminate dysfunctional institutions. Whether it has accomplished this or not, one cannot ignore the concrete benefits it has delivered to the population, as illustrated by the level of satisfaction of people who used it. Surveys conducted between 2001 and 2009 show that around 97% of the users support the project and 95% say that it provides good services to citizens (Poupatempo 2011). In addition to satisfaction surveys, another measure of success is simply demand for services: the number of people using Poupatempo is significant and growing steadily.

In sum, this section suggests that there is much research to be done, as our analysis seems to be only revealing the tip of the iceberg. This should not dismiss, however, the importance of our main argument: Poupatempo can be considered an institutional bypass because the project created a new pathway for the provision of bureaucratic services, instead of trying to modify or reform pre-existing institutions. This helped overcome common obstacles to institutional reforms. What remains to be investigated is whether in some cases Poupatempo has allowed for feedback effects impacting the pre-existing bureaucracy, what could indicate that institutional bypasses can be used as a mechanism to reform dysfunctional institutions.

**Conclusion**

This article reviewed a recent experience with bureaucratic reform in Brazil, Poupatempo. It argued that the project was an institutional bypass, which enabled it to overcome traditional obstacles to reforms. Because they are alternatives, not replacements,
institutional bypasses can start as pilot projects and have reduced start-up costs. For instance, it requires only R$ 6.5 million to build and equip a new Poupatempo unit. As the Poupatempo project shows, reduced costs addresses the issue of scarce resources, as well as the risk of political resistance.

Also, a bypass is equivalent to starting everything anew. This solves cultural barriers by putting bureaucrats and civil servants in a context devoid of the vices of the pre-existing bureaucracy. At the same time, a bypass is not as disruptive as replacing an entire system of bureaucratic offices. This non-disruptive rupture has three advantages. First, it allows for experimentation because the bypass does not tie the policymakers’ hands to what is there already. Second, if successful, the bypass may provide useful feedback on potential improvements of the traditional system. Third, if not successful, reformers can easily abort the reform and go back to the existing system if something goes wrong (as like any other institutional reform, bypasses have no guarantee of success). In sum, it helps reformers deal with the unintended consequences of institutional change.

Finally, as to political economy problems, the bypass can reduce resistance among bureaucrats in the pre-existing institutions because their services, routines and obligations may not be majorly affected by the reforms in the short-term. It is acknowledged that bureaucrats might foresee that they will be losing power and influence in the long term, if the bypass succeeds, and they may resist its implementation for fear of being replaced by the new service. This lobby against the implementation of a bypass can turn into a boycotting scheme once the bypass is implemented. But even in this case, reformers are more able to implement innovations in the bypass than they could be in the pre-existing institution. In this regard, many (but not all) of the political economy problems are overcome or mitigated.

Thus, Poupatempo illustrates a type of institutional change or institutional reform not yet captured or properly described in the specialized literature, called institutional bypass. We hope this article is just the first step towards future research to investigate not only whether there are other examples of bypasses out there, but also the theoretical implications of this concept.

**Interviews**

Antonio Angarita. Interview granted to the authors. São Paulo, June 16, 2009.

Carlos Antônio Guimarães de Sequeira. Interview granted to the authors. São Paulo, June 18, 2009.

Daniel Annenberg. Interview granted to the authors. São Paulo, May 22 and July 8, 2009.

Dalmo Nogueira. Interview granted to the authors. São Paulo, July 8 and 13, 2009.
Notes

1 They often adopt Douglass North’s definition of institutions: “Institutions are the rules of the game of a society, or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interactions” (North 1995, 23).

2 See Rezende (2009, note 3) for a full citation of these studies.

3 The services most used by the population are: identification cards (32%), driver’s license (14%), registration of vehicles (12%), criminal records (10%), unemployment insurance (6%) and worker’s identification card (5%) (Poupatempo and Ibope 2008, 9).

4 This number includes people that go to a unit and those who use the call centers. It does not include those who use the services via internet (e-Poupatempo).

5 Besides the experience of the centers of São Paulo and Bahia, this guide also considered the experiences of other states such as Amazonas (where the service was called Pronto Atendimento do Cidadão), Maranhão (Viva Cidadão), Rio de Janeiro (Rio Simples) and Rio Grande do Norte (Central do Cidadão).

6 The Unit of Strategic Management (Unidade de Gestão Estratégica) was subordinate to the State Secretary of Government and Strategic Management (Secretaria do Governo e Gestão Estratégica). It former was headed by Roberto Abunni and later by Dalmo Nogueira. For an explanation of this structure and the respective roles in the transformations implemented after 1995 in São Paulo, see Sanchez (2003). The adjunct secretary reports that there was an intense dialogue between the Unit and the Secretary (Interview with Dalmo Nogueira, 2009).

7 As the superintendent reported, some of the civil servants came from governmental departments, others did not. For instance, the first team had an IT person and a human resources person from the state-owned company for data processing of the State of São Paulo (Prodesp) and two architects from the state-owned company for metropolitan planning of the State of São Paulo (Emplasa). The manager and the person responsible for the information booklet, on the other hand, were in the private sector (Interview with Daniel Annenberg, 2009).

8 Sabesp is half state-owned, half a private company. The assessment of its efficiency in the context of this project does not refer to the delivery of water services itself, but exclusively to its ability to communicate to consumers efficiently.
9 It is important to note that the identity card is the primary identification document for Brazilian citizens.

10 As the adjunct secretary of the State Secretary of Government and Strategic Management says, a great deal of these innovations were being discussed in Brazil since the 1970s within two institutions: Fundap and the Red Tape Ministry (Interview with Dalmo Nogueira, 2009). The focus of the state administration in 1995 was on the use of technology to improve governmental services. For a detailed description of this process, see Sanchez (2003).

11 The call centre works from Monday to Friday from 7am to 8pm, and Saturday from 6:30am to 3pm, which are longer hours of operation than most of the Poupatempo units.

12 As the superintendent reports, the salaries' increase varied according to the position that the civil servant exercised. The gratification was of R$ 500.00 (US$ 250.00) per month to the receptionists, R$ 700.00 (US$ 350.00) to the tutors and R$ 900.00 (US$ 450.00) to the supervisor (Interview with Daniel Annenberg 2009). It is important to note that the staff emphasizes that there were greater incentives in going to work on a pleasant place and in a new promising institution. Civil servants were proud of being part of Poupatempo (Interview with Dalmo Nogueira, 2009).


14 This is an estimate, as this data is not available. The estimate is based on the cost to build a brand new unit (R$ 6.5 millions), plus costs in the implementation of the program (building up the team, diagnosing problems in the offices of the pre-existing bureaucracies etc).

15 The superintendent indicated the importance of user's feedback (Interview with Daniel Annenberg, 2009). The secretary-adjunt indicated the governor's concern with external assessment (Interview with Dalmo Nogueira, 2009).

16 Political economy has been historically used to define a variety of different things. For the purposes of this paper, we will use the term as a synonym to public choice theory as applied to institutional reforms, which assumes that both reformers and those resisting reforms are all utility maximizing individuals, and shows how political forces (i.e. self-interested acts) affect the choice of policies, especially as to distributional conflicts. See Alesina (2007, 3) and Groenwegen (2008).

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Political Dynamics and Liberalization in the Brazilian Air Transport Industry: 1990-2002

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A first wave of theories on globalization suggested that because of new competitive pressures, national economies would converge into a single market economy model. Economic rationale would overcome politics, and political choices would be restricted to the implementation of a set of policy prescriptions aimed at favoring private investment, so-called “market-oriented reforms”. More recently, research based on economic sociology and historical institutionalism has shown that the implementation of market-oriented reforms at national, regional and industry-level has been characterized by a variety of outcomes, and politics has played a major role in producing such variety. The analysis of official documents, newspaper articles, interviews and other sources related to the main actors in the Brazilian air transport industry shows that the implementation of market-oriented reforms in this industry has also been marked by a complex political dynamics, comprising conflict, dispute, negotiation and compromise. This political dynamics has forged a trajectory that is unique in relation to other economic sectors in Brazil, and to the same industry in other countries. This paper concludes that politics has to be seriously taken into account in the debate on the search for efficiency and competitiveness in the Brazilian air transport industry.

Keywords: Deregulation; Market reforms; Economy and politics; Economic sociology; Historical institutionalism.

Introduction

This article analyses the political dynamics of market-oriented reforms in the Brazilian air transport market between 1990 and 2002. During these years, regulation and market structure have been radically transformed, as economic policy has shifted from a nationalist-developmentalist strategy towards one aimed at insertion in a new globalized capitalism. Reforms involved macroeconomic stabilization (controlled inflation, fiscal discipline) and liberalization of economic activity, via trade opening,
privatization, deregulation and, finally, re-regulation under a new set of international competitiveness parameters.

The new model has drawn its legitimacy from a first wave of interpretations of globalization according to which the national domain – in the realms of politics, economy and also culture – would give way to a borderless world, materially based on new information technologies and ideologically sustained by the end of the polarity between the capitalist and the socialist blocs. In this new world, we would witness the virtual end of ideologies, history, and politics, so that the twenty-first century globalized capitalism would force all the national, regional and sector-level trajectories to converge into an increasingly homogeneous market economy.¹

Underlying these interpretations was the proposition that the economy would assume preeminence over politics in the new globalized capitalism (Cf. Diniz 2000). In the face of greater freedom given to the circulation of capital, reinforced by the conditionality policies imposed by international agencies upon developing countries, and competitive pressure coming from everywhere, there would be no other alternative for national States but to create adequate conditions for the reproduction of capital. Interferences of a political nature would be “punished” by capital, which would flee to best-fit locations. Finally, there would be no room left for active policies out of a pro-market agenda, as they became perceived as conductive to inefficiencies and distortions in the economic rationality.² A kind of “politics-free” policy process would be a necessary consequence of such tendency.

Most of the existing literature on the Brazilian air transport industry, even if it does not discuss the forces at work in the globalization process, is deeply marked by such a “politics-free” perspective. The core of this literature (Franco et al. 2002; Pêgo Filho 2002; Guimarães 2003; Salgado 2003; Oliveira 2005; 2006a; 2006b) can be said to ignore the role of politics, leaving a gap in terms of historical analysis, as the implementation of market reforms is interpreted as an inexorable, uncontroversial process in face of globalization.

Guimarães’s (2003) study, for example, speaks of a “long term equilibrium trajectory” which has been pursued by the air transport industry around the world in the last decades. Such trajectory has been characterized by the “search for more efficiency” by airlines as a response to the entrance of new competitors, while at the same time being “also simply the result of the very removal of regulation” (Guimarães 2003, 3, my italics). Salgado, for her part, speaks of a “careful process of liberalization of the domestic air transport market, with the gradual introduction of competition” (Salgado 2003, 13, my italics), while Oliveira (2005, 7-8; 2006a, 8) mentions a “European approach, followed by the Department of Civil Aviation (DAC), emphasizing gradualism in (liberalization) policies, in order to try to avoid its potential ‘harmful’ short-term effects”. In summary, all of them narrate the liberalization of the Brazilian air transport industry as the gradual, deliberate and uncontested removal
of regulatory restrictions by authorities, and airlines automatically responding to it with more competition.

In contrast with these analyses, this article approaches the implementation of market-oriented reforms in the Brazilian air transport industry from a perspective in which politics is central to the explanation. Historical backgrounds, institutional settings and the balance of power among key actors help define the initial conditions under which reforms take place, and influence the way they are carried out. In turn, changes cannot be reduced to a mere passive adaptation. On the contrary, they involve choices, negotiation, dispute and compromise, making the processes of pro-market reforms rather open and contested ones, as has been demonstrated, both at theoretical and empirical levels, by institutional analyses in Sociology and Political Science.³

This paper aims to shed new light on the policy and regulation debate about the Brazilian air transport industry as it questions the “politics-free” perspective which characterizes most of the existing literature on the issue. By demonstrating that the logic of politics played a major role in this process, making the changes possible in the first place and determining their course, this article sustains that policy prescriptions have to take this into consideration.⁴ The next section presents a historical account of the political dynamics of the air transport market in Brazil in the decades that preceded market-oriented reforms. The following sections present the main events that comprise the political dynamics of the twelve years of market-oriented reforms in the Brazilian air transport industry (1990-2002). Each section corresponds to a period of time in which the main actors involved, their interests, and disputes will be identified. A concluding section discusses some contributions of this article to the policy debate on air transport.

**State-Market Relations in the Brazilian Air Transport Industry between the 1960s and the 1980s**

A major characteristic of the political dynamics between the 1960s and 1980s, in the air transport sector, was the existence of close ties linking authorities in charge of commercial aviation, represented by the Ministry of Aeronautics and the Civil Aviation Department, and the airlines. The milestone for the consolidation of this pattern of relationship was the military coup of 1964, when a restrictive regulatory model started being adopted as a response to the crisis that had been affecting air transport since the end of the 1950s.⁵

Discussion on the regulatory model defined after 1964 started during the two first Civil Aviation National Conferences (Conferências Nacionais de Aviação Civil (CONACs)), which took place in 1961 and 1963, respectively, in the cities of Petrópolis and Rio de Janeiro. Representatives of the airlines, the Civil Aviation Department, and economic authorities
participated in these meetings, which had few practical results, considering the political instability of the period. However, they helped strengthen the ties between business leaders and aeronautical authorities, in a context in which the whole air transport system was under strong criticism from public opinion.

On the other hand, the two first CONACs opened up the debate for topics such as the tighter control of market access in order to reduce the costs of the existing airlines, and the maintenance of operations in small towns, which were being abandoned since the old DC-3s had started to be substituted by larger planes, unable to operate in such locations due to the lack of infra-structure and the higher costs involved. Among the consensual propositions was the support for a model based on privately-owned airlines⁶ and, consequently, the repudiation of the labor unions' demand for the creation of a new state-owned company to operate international flights.

It was at the third CONAC, in 1968, when the sector had already undergone a long process of consolidation,⁷ that the regulatory principles of “fare realism” and “controlled competition” were settled. The former meant that the users of the service were supposed to cover all the costs of the air transport service, putting an end to the state aid that airlines had been receiving since the 1950s. The latter was aimed at reducing what was considered an “excessive expenditure of resources”, due to the concentration of services on the main routes. Authorities mentioned frequent cases of two or more airplanes taking off from the same airport to the same destination, at the same time, with few passengers. The risk of a predatory competition (with the increase in the discounts offered on these major routes) and the fact that most of the airlines were abandoning flights to smaller towns were considered additional problems that the principle of “controlled competition” aimed to solve.

The new regulation also prohibited new agents from entering the domestic market, while foreign capital had to be limited to 20% of the total capital of the existing companies. The few existing airlines therefore became fully protected from any sort of direct competition in the domestic market. A remaining problem was the maintenance of flights to smaller towns. It was not until 1975 that a regional system was created, the “Integrated Regional Air Transport System” (in Portuguese, SITAR). This system comprised the creation of five new regional airlines, which would operate flights in five different regions of Brazil, in a monopoly regime.

Considering the various regulations, the whole air transport sector was under strict state control. Airlines, on the other hand, enjoyed privileged access to the DAC and other government authorities, by means of frequent formal meetings, and also more informal ones, such as dinners and ceremonies. The fact that the sector was controlled by the Air Force, in the context of a military dictatorship, provided additional stability for the airlines. Other social forces capable of contesting the status quo, such as labor unions, had been excluded
from the CONACs since the beginning of the 1960s, and with the coup of 1964, the most active union leaders had been banned, and some of them exiled.

This arrangement lasted for over a decade, a period in which most of the airlines’ profit margins grew constantly. It was only with the end of the military dictatorship in 1985 that such arrangement started to be challenged, with the gradual abandonment of nationalist-developmental policies, and greater room given to stabilization and pro-market policies. Within the executive branch, taming inflation by means of strict control of prices became a top priority, and aeronautical authorities would find it harder to authorize readjustments in fares, in order to maintain the principle of “air fare reality”.

Along with the loss of power vis-à-vis economic authorities, Air Force and the DAC’s position was confronted by the reemergence of organized labor in the political arena. Among the numerous subjects discussed in the Constitutional Congress elected in 1986 was the proposition, by labor unions representing workers in air transport, to create a civil agency to substitute the DAC in the control of non-military aeronautical activity. The “Pássaro Civil” (Civil Bird) campaign, as it was called, mobilized workers and progressive political leaders, representing a real threat to the interests of the Air Force and airlines. The proposition, however, did not pass. Aeronautical authorities, with strong support from airlines, lobbied against it in Congress, demonstrating that, despite the end of the military governments, the Air Force was still politically strong. While the debate about the military control of air transport would have to wait for another decade to return to the political arena, the relative loss of power of the Air Force and the DAC to economic authorities on the issue of fares would be the first round of a long dispute about the liberalization of air transport.

**The First Cycle of Reforms: 1990-1994**

In 1989, Fernando Collor was elected president, with the promise of a new economic era in Brazil, based on pro-market reforms aimed at the modernization of economic activity. Under the new government, the first wave of market-oriented reforms in the Brazilian air transport industry took place with the ratification of the new International Air Transport Agreement between Brazil and the United States (signed in 1989 and approved by Congress in 1991), and the privatization of Vasp, which was acquired in October of 1990 by entrepreneur Wagner Canhêdo. With the new agreement between Brazil and the United States, Varig started sharing routes between these two countries with Vasp and Transbrasil after years of exclusiveness as the only Brazilian airline designated for international routes.

At the same time, as the new owner of Vasp, Canhêdo challenged the air transport market in Brazil. In practice, the strategies adopted by Canhêdo violated both the principles of “controlled competition” and “air fare reality”. In the first semester of 1991, Vasp started
scheduling flights to some of the main destinations at hours that coincided with flights offered by other airlines, offering more flights, and greater discounts during the low season. Varig and Transbrasil protested against such initiatives, presenting complaints to the DAC, arguing that Vasp was using unfair competition practices, which were not compatible with the traditional functioning of the market. Canhedo replied with a radical defense of the liberalization of air transport, by means of interviews and articles published in the press accusing the other airlines of not being prepared for competition (Canhedo 1991a; 1991b). The DAC demonstrated some sympathy for Vasp’s strategies, suggesting that these events represented an “adjustment” process.

If aeronautical authorities seemed to be supportive to Canhedo’s more aggressive strategies within the domestic market, the same was not true for regional flights. Vasp presented a demand to start flying from São Paulo’s central airport, Congonhas, to other important cities such as Brasília, Curitiba and Belo Horizonte. In Congonhas at that time, Vasp, Transbrasil and Varig were only authorized to operate the traditional “air shuttle” between São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the country’s most important route. Other domestic flights were operated from Guarulhos International Airport, which was distant from downtown São Paulo. Except for the Rio-São Paulo air shuttle, the airport was dedicated to regional airlines, such as Tam and Rio-Sul. It was the Air Force minister himself who answered Canhedo’s request: “Congonhas is for regional airlines, and Vasp and Transbrasil are considered national airlines”. Canhedo’s disposition to challenge the market was shortlived. After a few months after Vasp launched its most aggressive strategies, the press started publishing a sequence of articles about the airlines’ debts with several suppliers, including Infraero, the Brazilian state-owned firm in charge of operating most of the country’s commercial airports. Eventually, Canhedo had to retreat from his most aggressive strategies and give up his challenger reputation, inviting other airlines to form some kind of operational agreement that would re-establish the previous market structure. At the same time, a congressional commission was created in 1992 in order to investigate the privatization of Vasp, motivated by evidence that the process had been fraudulent. Key members of the Federal Government, such as the minister of the Economy, Zélia Cardoso, were accused of having favored Canhedo (Cf. Salomão 1993).

Such evidence demonstrates that Canhedo’s aggressive, competitive style, apparently in line with the new president’s platform of economic modernization, was actually anchored in the same traditional clientelistic mechanisms that characterized state-market relations in Brazil. In this sense, this first round of liberalization in Brazilian air transport was a rather superficial one. One can say that it helped to publicize the neoliberal agenda, but it did not actually break away from the previous pattern of state-market relations. The fifth
Civil Aviation National Conference, which took place in Rio de Janeiro, in October of 1991, would ratify the liberalization agenda, as it sanctioned measures such as the increase in the margin for discounts, extinguished the SITAR (although maintaining the separation of domestic and regional markets), authorized regional airlines to operate jets from the central airports of São Paulo (Congonhas) and Rio de Janeiro (Santos Dumont) to Belo Horizonte, Curitiba and Brasília, aiming at business travelers, and, finally, opened the market up to new players. On the other hand, the meeting maintained the compromise with the principles of “controlled competition”.14

Despite maintaining this principle, the macro-economic scene was not favorable to airlines in the first years of the 1990s. Rising inflation, economic recession and the political crisis that lead to the impeachment of Fernando Collor in 1992 were the main features of a period of severe losses for all national airlines.15 It was in this context that the proposal for the creation of a Câmara Setorial (Sectoral Chamber) emerged, in which representatives of the airlines, government and workers would discuss and negotiate alternatives for the sector.

The Câmaras Setoriais represented an important institutional change in the relationship between state and society in the first half of the 1990s in Brazil. It aimed to expand the traditional corporatist model which state and business used to negotiate, away from other social forces. Inspired by European-style neocorporatist arrangements, labor was introduced as an active part in the negotiation process. In a way, such innovative practice represented the recognition of the labor unions’ struggle for political voice which was one of the main aspects of the redemocratization process in Brazil. By focusing on the production chain, instead of exclusively considering the major firms of the economic sectors in which these chambers were created, this institutional arrangement would also be more open to the plurality of interest within business community itself (Cf. Arbix 1997; Diniz 1996, chapter 4).

Notwithstanding the severity of the crisis, and the success of other Câmaras Setoriais (especially the one created for the automobile industry), aeronautical authorities and airline businessmen did not accept some of the main principles of such arrangement. They refused to provide information that would subsidize a diagnosis of the sector, and rejected negotiation of measures to overcome the crisis.16 Thus, the Câmara was shut down after a few meetings, while the economic crisis worsened.17

In 1993, the crisis struck Vasp and Transbrasil more severely, as they had to start lay off programs, and renegotiate debts with suppliers and airplane lessors. It was not until the beginning of 1994 that Varig, still the leading Brazilian airline, openly recognized that lay-offs would be inevitable, while it failed to meet obligations with leasing companies. Because of Varig’s default, some airplanes did have to stop flying or were subject to judicial mandates.
The airlines’ strategy to cope with the crisis was to demand some kind of aid from the state, reproducing the traditional pattern of public-private relations in Brazil. In fact, air transport businessmen started negotiating with National Development Bank (BNDES) and top government officials for a special loan that would help airlines to restructure and have enough cash to get through the period of crisis. Labor unions criticized such aid, arguing that it was not fair to use public funds to help companies adopt restructuring programs that would lead to more lay-offs. They also criticized the negotiation process for being “obscure” as it was not open to public scrutiny. They proposed that any program aimed at dealing with the crisis of the Brazilian airlines had to be discussed in an open forum. Thus, they proposed the creation of a new Câmara Setorial, which was eventually accepted by government officials.18

Despite the support from some important segments of the central government, and the fact that aeronautical authorities and airlines did agree to provide some of the necessary information to support the work of the second Câmara, once again, aeronautical authorities, airlines and labor unions were not able to carry out the process. Airlines eventually managed to obtain financial aid from BNDES, while the Plano Real – the economic reform program which would effectively tame inflation and open the way for the implementation of the most radical neoliberal reforms in Brazil – produced a substantial improvement in economic activity as a whole, directly benefiting air transport.19 Crisis, then, gave way to a cycle of expansion of the Brazilian economy which would diminish the interest of airlines in carrying on the work of the Câmara.

Thus, the first wave of liberalization in the Brazilian air transport industry, between 1990 and 1994, had a limited impact. It helped to publicize the neoliberal agenda more than to effectively break away from regulatory restrictions or to introduce new competitive practices. The possibility of offering a greater margin of discounts was a modest change, as many restrictions were maintained on routes and the use of airports. While international flights were liberalized to a greater extent, separation between domestic and regional segments were maintained, favoring those airlines that could fly from central airports – the ones preferred by passengers flying for business purposes, who were more willing to pay higher fares.

In turn, state-market relations can be said to have changed little. It is true that labor unions became recognized as a new, legitimate component of this relationship, with their participation in such institutional settings as the fifth CONAC and the Câmaras Setoriais. These forums, however, had modest practical consequences for the development of air transport. The CONAC did actually ratify some of the practices that had already been undertaken with the privatization of Vasp, while the Câmaras were unable to continue, due to the resistance of aeronautical authorities and airlines to provide information and
to negotiate the content of policies. On the other hand, the traditional patterns of public-private relations in the Brazilian air transport industry did not change in substance, as the privatization of Vasp and the negotiation for the BNDES loan in 1994 demonstrated.

The Radicalization of Neoliberal Reforms under Cardoso: 1995-1998

If the improvement in economic indicators after the Plano Real was reason enough to justify the lack of interest of airlines in maintaining links with the Câmara, new policy prescriptions also played a role in the failure of such arrangement. In fact, with the election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in 1994, a new technocratic elite, profoundly committed to the neoliberal agenda, ascended to power. This new technocracy advocated that state bureaucracy in charge of economic affairs had to be insularized from political forces, so that former state-market ties had to be broken. Thus, the kind of concertation strategies represented by the Câmaras were suspended, while the liberalization agenda was to be pushed further.

From the point of view of aeronautical authorities, a very restrictive perspective of liberalization was still predominant. The discourse of key representatives of the Air Force Ministry and the DAC in the bulletin DAC Notícias, published between 1994 and 1999, make this perspective evident. Brigadier Renato Pereira da Silva, for example, says about discounts and the increase in the number of flights offered by airlines right after the Plano Real:

Discounts exist only to increase the access of passengers when the market is weak. In principle, discount should exist only in such circumstances. However, with the implementation of Plano Real, airlines were not fast enough to eliminate such discounts. (...) Some people might not be able to fly during high season due to the unavailability of seats on airplanes; on the other hand, airlines should increase their fleets very carefully. There must be some sort of planning (...) right now, air transport users are being favored, but there must be an equilibrium.20

It is also worth quoting the DAC’s General Director during this period, João Felippe S. de Lacerda Jr., who appeared to be generically in favor of liberalization, while making several references to the traditional, interventionist model, that had been typical of the action of the DAC.

My objective is to continue the program of flexibilization in the regulation (of air transport), aiming at a healthy, free and non-ruinous competition. Proceeding in such a manner, I hope to continue promoting the necessary expansion of the airlines that represent our flag abroad, based upon discerning studies of the demand. In the domestic field, I will encourage national and regional airlines to expand according to their interests, always taking into account the interest of the user.21
Airlines, for their part, would once more have to deal with the toughening of control over price readjustments by economic authorities. According to the legislation that created the Plano Real, public utilities and services, in which air transport is included in Brazil, would have their fares adjusted on a yearly basis, and the increases had to be authorized by economic authorities.\(^{22}\) It was during this period that president Cardoso’s Civil Cabinet and economic authorities started threatening aeronautical authorities and the airlines with the opening of the domestic market to foreign airlines, which would allow much more powerful companies from the U.S., Europe and Asia to transport passengers between Brazilian cities.

During the second semester of 1997, the prices of air fares became a top priority for government authorities, and the Civil Cabinet started a workgroup\(^{23}\) responsible for implementing new liberalization measures within the Brazilian air transport market. Confirming the new public-private relationship pattern, airlines were not invited to participate or to discuss the measures to be implemented by the workgroup. It was during this period that the influential minister of the Economy, Pedro Malan, proposed the creation of a new civil agency that would substitute the DAC.\(^{24}\)

Civil Cabinet officials and economic authorities struggled with the Air Force Ministry, the DAC and airlines to impose a new round of liberalization. Under the threat of opening the domestic market to foreign airlines and creating a civil agency that would put an end to the DAC’s control over commercial aviation, aeronautical authorities progressively eliminated regulatory restrictions regarding the offer of discounts, control over routes and the use of central airports. An article by the general director of the DAC in 1998, Masao Kawanami, suggested that the former “controlled competition” principle was being substituted by “healthy competition”. In turn, airlines responded with aggressive competition, in which fares dropped while the number of passengers grew by more than 20\%.\(^{25}\)

As the elections of October 1998 were getting closer, however, the liberalization agenda weakened.\(^{26}\) Government officials seemed to be satisfied with the airlines’ response to the liberalization measures, and propositions to take reform further, such as the increase in the percentage of foreign capital in Brazilian airlines, were suspended. After the reelection of Cardoso, the political dynamics of the air transport industry would change radically as a new economic crisis struck the Brazilian economy, with dramatic consequences for the sector. In such a setting, the liberalization agenda gave way to another period of demands for state aid by airlines. But this time, new strategies, new kinds of demands and a new relationship with other key social actors would characterize the political action of business leaders, signaling new trends in the political dynamics of the consolidation of neoliberal reforms. Such features will be analyzed in the next section.
Crisis and Impasse towards the New Century: Cardoso’s Second Term, 1999-2002

In January of 1999, after Cardoso was reelected for a second term as president of Brazil, and in the middle of a series of global financial crises, economic authorities decided to implement a radical move in the exchange-rate policies, by introducing a more flexible system in which the fixed rate system would be substituted by a flexible one. Real, which so far had been worth approximately one dollar, devaluated to next to half of a dollar. Firms and individuals that had signed contracts in dollars for local transactions, saw their costs double in less than a month. Brazilian airlines were especially affected by this change, as their revenues in the domestic market were in reals, while most of their costs (fuel, leasing, maintenance, insurance) were in dollars. Since fares could not be updated, airlines had to bear the losses of the sudden devaluation.

In the domain of economic agenda, another important change took place. Cardoso’s first term had been characterized by a widespread consensus regarding stabilization policies, recognized as a top priority. After reelection, so-called developmentalists claimed that such policies could not be restricted to the control of inflation, introducing the question of economic growth (Cf. Diniz 2000, 96ss). While economic authorities tended to stick to the stabilization priorities (including the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, and the Central Bank), authorities related to industry and services, such as the Ministries of Development, Transport and Tourism, tended to question the exclusive focus on stabilization, demanding pro-growth measures.

In relation to air transport, the creation, in April of 1999, of a workgroup to elaborate a program to support airlines after the shock caused by the devaluation of the real, indicated that neoliberal orthodoxy might be loosing its strength. The program, however, was not implemented. At that moment, the search for solutions to the crisis were limited to the creation of another workgroup, this time under the responsibility of the newly created Ministry of Defense. If fact, members of the Air Force were inclined to support Brazilian airlines from what they interpreted as the “threats of globalization”.

In turn, airlines adopted new strategies to cope with such threats. As the traditional links to state bureaucracy, which allowed the negotiation of loans, tax reliefs and other forms of protection, were suspended by economic authorities, they had no alternative but to look for other forms of political action. From 1998 onwards, airlines invested in legitimizing their claims, publicizing their action, and extending their alliances to civil society entities (such as universities, associations and so on), labor unions and Congress. Their discourse changed: instead of “protection”, airlines demanded measures that would assure equal competitive conditions with foreign companies.
Despite such threats, the year 2000 represented a period of recovery for all airlines, as the Brazilian economy seemed to be entering an upward cycle. Such recovery, however, was interrupted by the energy “black-out” of 2001, followed by the terrorist attacks of September 11. Such events were deleterious for a sector that had already entered the new millennium with accumulated losses. Even Tam, despite having benefited from some crucial years of exclusivity in the operation of business routes linking São Paulo to other important capitals from its central airport, presenting increasing profits throughout most of the 1990s, joined Varig, Transbrasil and Vasp in negative results.

In December of 2001, Transbrasil had to quit the market, as suppliers stopped providing crucial services such as fuel, due to successive delays in the payment for their services. Vasp and Varig also depended on frequent renegotiations of debts with fuel and catering suppliers, and lessors. It was in this context that the Ministry of Development, along with the Ministry of Defense and other key government officials representing the developmentalist group, accepted the proposition by labor unions to create a “Competitivity Forum” for air transport. The forum resembled the previous Câmaras Setoriais, serving as a concertation arrangement in which government authorities, airlines and workers would discuss the sector’s weaknesses (and strengths, if there were any) and possible measures to overcome the crisis.30

The creation of such a forum, after years of radical opposition to the existence of this kind of arrangement by neoliberal orthodoxy, was evidence that things were changing. The Forum, in fact, was successful in carrying out measures that were in line with the demands of airlines, with the support of labor unions and developmentalist sectors within the government.31 Essentially, government offered temporary tax reliefs, exempted airlines from taxes on imported airplane parts, simplified procedures to import such parts and opened new credit lines. Even though these measures were announced in September 2002, a few months before the end of Cardoso’s term, they undoubtedly indicated that state-market relations were moving away from the orthodox, insularized model of neoliberals.

At the same time, pro-market reforms were not fully achieved during Cardoso’s two terms. Although former regulatory restrictions had been removed, the institutional infrastructure in charge of commercial aviation did not change. The Air Force, by means of the DAC, which resisted the liberalization of air transport as long as it could, was still the state bureaucracy responsible for the control of air transport. Cardoso’s cabinet did propose the creation of a new, non-military agency, that would substitute the DAC. A new legislation was also being analysed, as the existing one (Código Brasileiro do Ar) dated from 1986.

The project to create the new agency was designed by a restricted workgroup, with the participation of representatives of the economic authorities, the Air Force and Infraero. Once again, neither airlines nor labor unions were invited to discuss the project, under the
pretext that it was an administrative matter, not subject to open debate. When the project was sent to Congress for approval, however, airlines identified a series of items that had major implications for their competitive capacities. While the project was under analysis in Congress, several public hearings were held in which representatives of the government, airlines, labor unions and other entities were invited to discuss it. After six months of public debate, congressmen decided to incorporate most of the airlines’ and labor unions’ demands. The government decided to withdraw the project, and the creation of a new agency was indefinitely postponed.

It is interesting to note that, while the executive branch was unable to carry out the reforms and the whole sector suffered severe losses, a new relationship pattern was emerging with non-state actors involved in the process. The analysis of the business leaders’ and labor unions’ strategies during the period shows that there was a greater investment in the publicization of the air transport debate, and more dialogue between them. Business leaders were present in more institutionalized and public spaces, and established new links with civil society entities, including labor unions. These continued investing in the creation and strengthening of public spaces where stakeholders could discuss policies for the sector. Even if they suffered the consequences of the crisis of the 1990s, with job losses and the precarization of the jobs that remained, they were capable of advancing their institutional agenda, as the creation of the “Competitiveness Forum” demonstrates. As for the executive branch, it seems to have adhered too long to a neoliberal orthodoxy which kept it from engaging business leaders and labor unions in a renewal of the relationship between state and market towards a more open and democratic pattern.

Conclusion

This article has aimed to show the role of political dynamics in the twelve years of pro-market reforms in the Brazilian air transport industry. Politics evolved, during Collor de Mello’s and Cardoso’s terms, in such a way that aeronautical authorities were increasingly pressured by the core agencies of the executive branch to deepen liberalization. Airlines eventually engaged in price wars, as a response to such political pressure, but these wars tended to be short-lived since airlines could not bear the increasing costs, worsened by the frequent internal and external economic crises that affected Brazil and the global economy during the period. While the proponents of the reforms were successful in deregulating the market, the project of a new regulatory apparatus did not materialize. The creation of the Civil Aviation National Agency (ANAC) which in theory should be part of the reform process to adapt air transport to a new competitive global environment, was postponed and would not be completed until 2006.
Understanding the political dynamics of the liberalization of the Brazilian air transport industry is a necessary exercise. If this important dimension is not taken into account, the policy debate will miss the specificities that characterize the way the sector has been trying to adapt to the new competitive environment of a globalized capitalism. Instead of an “uncontroversial” option for liberalization as a result of a “natural” tendency, this article shows that the trajectory of the reforms in the air transport sector has been characterized by the confrontation of interests, sometimes resulting in contradictory movements, as in the case of the privatization of Vasp. Because of its political nature, the liberalization of air transport in Brazil has assumed a very particular character.

Even if this article has not directly aimed to discuss policy prescriptions per se, a few words can be mentioned about the issue. The literature on air transport in Brazil strongly supports more liberalization in order to face the challenges of twenty-first century capitalism. Among common prescriptions are the removal of remaining regulations for market access, the extension of market reforms to airports, an increase in the limit of the participation of foreign capital in the industry, and, more recently, they have incorporated the emergent contradictions between the efficiency-enhancing, profit-oriented strategies of airlines operating in a competitive market and the well-being of consumers. This is an issue with important political implications; however, the prescriptions that have been offered are also reduced to technical matters, for example, the proposition of specific regulations to stimulate services to regions where air services are not economically viable. Because the authors do not take the dispute, negotiation and necessary compromise involved in policy implementation into consideration, prescriptions do not mention potential conflicts of interest between airlines, authorities in different spheres of government, workers, and other stakeholders, let alone a way to deal with them.

Every rule has its exceptions. An important one from the economic literature discussed in this article is the last paragraph of Salgado (2003, 24). After criticizing the measures taken by aeronautical authorities in the first months of the government of Lula da Silva, in a movement that she interpreted as a (undesirable) return to the principle of “controlled competition”, the author asserts:

The debate on the best regulation for the sector, which simultaneously promotes the development of industry and the well-being of users, will certainly benefit from its publicization and the inclusion of more participants who can carefully assess the effects of policy prescriptions on the market.

Publicization and inclusion of more participants in the debate means recognizing the existence of potentially divergent views about the policies to be adopted. The recognition of divergence and the proposition to incorporate it into the debate does mean acknowledging politics and incorporating it as an issue. The debate on the policies for the Brazilian air transport industry is a necessary exercise.
transport industry will have much to gain in terms of historical consistency if the recognition of the importance of politics becomes less an exception and more the rule.

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Notes

1 For critical assessments of convergence theory, see Berger and Dore (1996), Drache (1996) and Ferrer (1997).

2 For an example of this approach, see Bacha (1995), who discusses economic policy in Brazil and Latin America in the early 1990s.

3 Institutional approaches in Sociology (Fligstein 2001; Nee and Swedberg 2005), Political Sciences (Hall and Soskice 2001), and at the border of both (Evans 1995) have highlighted the role of historical and political elements in shaping contemporary capitalism. In Brazil, see Velasco e Cruz (1998) and Diniz (2000).

4 For an example of a policy analysis that takes politics into consideration, see BID (2007). The report explores several key political dimensions of policy implementation in Latin America, such as intragovernmental conflict; public x private formal and informal mechanisms of interaction; the role of civil society; and the potential impacts of such political processes in policy implementation. Contrary to the neoliberal approach, the report recognizes that political processes can have both negative and positive outcomes, therefore successful policies do not depend on removing, ignoring or lamenting politics but on trying to understand it in the first place.

5 See Fay (2001) for a narrative of this crisis, describing the work carried out in the commissions created in the Brazilian congress (Comissões Parlamentares de Inquérito or CPIs) to discuss the increase in the number of accidents, bankruptcies and the claims, by surviving firms, for greater state aid. See also Pereira (1987), for a narrative presenting the point of view of labor unions.

6 At that time, Brazil, along with the United States and a few other countries, adopted an air transport system in which private airlines were predominant. The only exception was Vasp Airlines, owned by the state of São Paulo.

7 At that time there were two companies exploring international routes: Cruzeiro do Sul, flying to South America and the Caribbean; and Varig, flying to Asia, North America and Europe (flights to Africa would start during the 1970s). These companies shared the domestic market with Transbrasil and Vasp. A fifth company, Paraense, was still operating, but it would stop in 1970. At least two of the Brazilian major airlines since the end of the Second World War, Real Aerovias and Panair do Brasil, had stopped flying during the 1960s. In both cases, Varig had been able to negotiate with the federal government and aeronautical authorities support to incorporate routes, equipment, airport areas, and human resources from these airlines. The
most dramatic episode was the one involving Panair do Brasil, which was ruled bankrupt by a government decree, in the middle of a series of discretionary acts aiming to attack the company’s owners, who supported political leaders that opposed the military regime.

8 A principle of reciprocity had to be observed in all bilateral air transport agreements, according to the Chicago Convention of 1944. Therefore, the permission for Vasp and Transbrasil to fly these routes implied that two other North-American airlines would also be granted such permission, so that a total of six airlines started competing in the routes between Brazil and the United States in the beginning of the 1990s.

9 A few months before the fifth CONAC, which is formally recognized as the milestone of the liberalization process in Brazilian air transport, privatized Vasp launched an aggressive strategy of expansion, both within domestic and international services, which was partially tolerated, if not approved, by aeronautical authorities.

10 The decision to offer discounts in fares obeyed a different logic during the years of heavy regulation. In the first place, discounts were rare, being offered only during the “high season”, i.e., vacations (especially during the summer, which in Brazil occurs in January and February). The whole system was structured in order to serve frequent users, usually people traveling for business purposes, who had their tickets paid by employers (in many cases, the Government). Since those who travel for business do not have the option of not traveling, and considering that the quality of roads and railroads is very poor in Brazil, firms and government agencies had no alternative but to pay for air transport services if they needed it. Thus, discounts were limited to those months when there was a drop in business activity, during the summer, when more people flew for leisure purposes.


14 According to a document by the DAC: “A more flexible approach to regulation was adopted, with stimulus to the exploration of markets, routes and new schedules, always preserving the competitive equilibrium among airlines, under a less rigid price system. The policy prescribes the liberalization of fares as a goal to be pursued, but reminds the recent deregulation experience in other countries, recommending the necessary care in its adoption” (Ribeiro 2001,140, my italics).

15 In 1992, for example, the domestic market decreased by 17.6% in relation to the previous year, while the total profitability of the Brazilian airlines (including both national and international operations), was negative by approximately 11% in 1991 and 1992 (Cf. Departamento de Aviação Civil 1992).

16 Such resistance became evident, for example, when a representative of DAC said in one of the meetings, that the Câmara was not a forum to discuss policies for the sector, since there was already a policy which had been formulated by the Air Force Ministry, “with the experience of several years leading aviation” (Cf. Dia a Dia, 8/5/92, no. 68:2).

17 Inflation reached above 1.100% in 1992 and 2.500% in 1993. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates were even worse: after dropping to -4.35% in 1990, they raised to a modest 1% in 1991, going back down to -0.47% the next year.

In 1994 and 1995, the industry's average profitability reached more than 6% (domestic and international). For domestic flights only, the rate reached more than 14% (Cf. Departamento de Aviação Civil 1995).

See DAC Notícias, 1994, no. 2:5, my italics.


Between 1996 and 1997, government and airlines would struggle around the issue of ticket prices. Airlines were accused of cartelization and abusive fares, and entities such as the Brazilian Consumers Association started campaigns against the companies, while public authorities started investigating airlines and the Air Force ministry, accusing the former of anti-competitive practices, and the latter of allowing such practices – see “Ofensiva para derrubar o valor das passagens aéreas”, O Globo, 27/7/1996 and “Ponte aérea pode ser cartel”, Jornal da Tarde, 23/9/1996.

The minister of the Civil Cabinet, Clóvis Carvalho, was the head of the workgroup, which was composed of representatives of the main agencies involved with economic policies, including anti-trust, and the Brazilian tourism agency, Embratur.


DAC Notícias, n. 4, 1998:1. Another publication by the DAC narrated this period of changes as follows: “Airlines accepted the measures implemented by the DAC and reduced their fares. As a result, between February and August (of 1998) there was a 25% increase in the number of passengers in domestic flights, both in the national and regional segments. During the month of July only, 250,000 people traveled by air for the first time, people who had never boarded an airplane before” (Ribeiro 2001, 146).


The Ministry of Defense incorporated the three military ministries: the Army, the Air Force and the Marines.

Cf. DAC Notícias, 1999, no. 16:5.

Airlines argued that the level of taxation in Brazil was above 35% of total revenue, while in other Latin American countries it was around 20%. In Europe, the average was 15%, while in the United States, less than 10%. They also complained about the long time needed to import airplane parts, which forced them to maintain an excessive number of spare accessories, raising costs. North-American, European and Asian airlines also enjoyed better conditions on leasing and insurance contracts, so that Brazilian airlines demanded measures that would minimize such differences.

The opening session took place on January 23, 2002, with the presence of ministers Sérgio Amaral (Development) and Pedro Malan (Finance), representatives of the Ministry of Defense, airline executives, labor unionists and the DAC.

Pêgo Fiho (2002) analyzes such measures from an economic perspective, considering them a return to politically-driven, undesired paternalistic measures. He does not discuss, however, the argument of airline businessmen, union leaders and developmentalists about the need to balance the airlines' competitive conditions with their counterparts in other countries.

Airlines questioned such propositions as the introduction of new taxations, short-term concessions for the exploration of routes, and legal restrictions regarding the use of airport areas. Labor unions, on their part, proposed the creation of consultant bodies that would check on the agency’s work.
The agency would not be created until the beginning of 2006, long after the first version was sent to the Congress and sixteen years after pro-market reforms were introduced in the Brazilian air transport sector.

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Brazilian Parties According to their Manifestos: Political Identity and Programmatic Emphases*

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Generally, party programmes are neglected in Brazil owing to their alleged (and assumed) irrelevance. It is argued that given that such documents are designed on order and with propaganda purposes, they could hardly be accepted as depictions of the parties’ true political positions. However, such an assessment lacks empirical verification. This article tests the hypothesis that Brazilian parties emphasise distinct questions in their manifestos. This hypothesis is based on saliency theory, according to which parties can be distinguished from one another depending on the themes they choose to prioritise. Content analysis technique was applied to the texts, using an adaptation of the categories of the Manifesto Research Group. The results indicate that the programmes do not have the same content, and neither are the differences in their emphases random. It is possible to distinguish between Brazilian parties not only by the kinds of questions they emphasise more, but also by those that they emphasise less.

Keywords: Parties; Programmes; Manifestos; Emphases; Content analysis.

Introduction

Brazilian parties have been studied from several different perspectives. There is a considerable amount of academic production in Brazil dedicated to examining the functioning, organization and ideology of specific parties,¹ and a fruitful debate about the current party system. However, there is an aspect that has not been given due attention: party programmes, generally neglected due to their alleged (and assumed) irrelevance.

* This article contains some of the results of my Ph.D. thesis presented to Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ) (Tarouco, 2007), with support from Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado da Bahia (FAPESB) and Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento do Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES). I thank BPSR’s anonymous peer reviewers for their valuable suggestions.
This assumed lack of significance attributed to party programmes is based on the general view that, since they are made to order and for propaganda purposes, these documents can hardly be seen as a portrayal of the parties’ real political positions. However, this a priori evaluation is lacking in any empirical verification. Such verification is the aim of the following sections.

The Theory of Competition by Emphasis

One of the main concepts utilised in this piece of work is that of political identity, understood here as a combination of preferences regarding public policies that distinguishes one party from the others. Thus defined, the identity of a party is not confused with similar concepts such as ideology, strategy, image, discourse, organisational profile or behaviour.

The identification of the parties’ political preferences from their programmatic emphases is an alternate instrument for locating the parties in the political competition arena. Compared to other frequently used indicators, the platform content clearly constitutes the body of officially declared preferences or intentions, whilst perceptions and judgements (by specialists or the electors) are based on observed behaviours. This is equivalent to saying that the image that a party portrays of itself, and publishes in its programmatic documents, is more faithful to its real identity than the image that other political actors or analysts have of it.

The perspective of programmatic emphases (Saliency Theory) was originally developed by David Robertson (1976). It states that parties compete more by emphasising (i.e. manipulating the prominence of) different issues than by taking different positions about the same issues. This is an alternate concept to the downsian perspective, according to which competition takes place by adopting differing positions on the left-right continuum (Downs 1999).

According to Saliency Theory, what is presented to the electorate is a choice between selected political agendas, not between specific alternative policies aimed at the same items of a universal agenda. By grouping demands into policy packages, parties offer electors a choice and give them the task of deciding which group of issues is more important, rather than deciding specifically what to do about the same issues.

According to this point of view, rather than opposing their adversaries’ declarations about the policies they support, during an electoral campaign parties concentrate on themes in which they consider themselves to have an advantage over their competitors. The electorate then has at its disposal not a choice between different answers to the same problems, but a choice between different issues to be prioritised by the future government – the most prominent concerns of each platform.
The assumption is that the expectations about which policies to adopt for each issue are usually universal (all electors prefer lower taxes, increased well-being etc). There is, in theory, one main opinion about each issue, and no need to confront it head-on. What can vary and ends up distinguishing one party from the other is the degree to which each issue is mentioned. Each party may choose to emphasise those issues in which its performance has more credibility.

Thus, according to this perspective, the political preferences of parties are multidimensional, and therefore their measurement cannot be limited to gauging their position in one single dimension – the left-right scale.

At an empirical level, the very idea of an ideological axis with opposing positions might makes less sense in today’s world, since the discourse and practices of parties of the left and right in many countries have softened as they have moved towards the centre.

In societies in which class conflict-based distributive issues are no longer the focus of political concerns, the emergence of so-called post-materialistic issues (such as ethnic rivalries, national identities and environmental issues, for example) requires that parties no longer seek to differentiate from one another only through a one-dimensional positioning, since ideological differences are now less clear. In order to give the electors alternatives, parties have started to identify with specific issues, selecting themes from the public agenda and offering this selection as their specific agenda through the emphases in their programmes.

Based on Saliency Theory, the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) was created in 1979. It resulted in a vast database, currently maintained by the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) in Berlin, as well as in a number of other subsequent projects and work by several authors.

The propositions made by Saliency Theory about competition between parties have been the object of extensive research involving the content analysis of party manifestos in several countries, and a category scheme for codifying manifestos has also been developed and applied. The prominence attributed to each category, corresponding to each political issue, is measured by the proportion of text dedicated to it in the manifesto. The questions emphasised in these texts might explain issues ranging from the electors’ preferences to the governments’ budget priorities (Budge and Farlie 1983).

If the perspective of Saliency Theory is correct and applied to the case of Brazil, we should be able to find significant differences between the programmatic emphases of Brazilian parties. Thus, this is the hypothesis that will be tested in the next section: that the themes that different Brazilian parties prioritise in their programmatic documents allow us to identify them, and distinguish them from one another.
The Programmatic Emphases of Brazilian Parties

According to the perspective of the theory of programmatic emphases presented in the previous section, parties differentiate from one another by the emphases they place on different issues. The aim of this section is to verify if this is the case with Brazilian parties. To this end, seven parties were selected: Partido Progressista (PP, Progressive Party), Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT, Democratic Labour Party), Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Workers’ Party), Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB, Brazilian Labour Party), Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB, Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement), Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL, Liberal Front Party), and Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB, Party of Brazilian Social Democracy).

The measurement of the parties’ programmatic emphases was made through the content analysis of their manifestos. These documents, according to Law 9,096 of 1995, must be registered and published for the party to obtain its register from the Higher Electoral Court.

All seven parties analysed have websites where their programmatic documents are made available. In some cases, these websites contain historical documents and previous versions of programmes, since all parties analysed altered their programmes at least once since they were founded. In other cases, when previous versions were not available on the sites, they were retrieved from the last edition of the work by Vamireh Chacon (1988) on the history of Brazilian political parties. Thus, the body of documents analysed were the following:

<table>
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<th>Document</th>
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<tr>
<td>PDS 1979</td>
<td>Chacon (1998)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PP (n.d.) (manifesto and programme)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.pp.org.br">www.pp.org.br</a></td>
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<td>PDT 1994</td>
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<td>PT 1990 Resolution: O socialismo petista</td>
<td><a href="http://www.pt.org.br">www.pt.org.br</a></td>
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<td>PTB 2001</td>
<td><a href="http://www.camara.gov.br/ptb">www.camara.gov.br/ptb</a></td>
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<td>PMDB 1994</td>
<td><a href="http://www.pmdb.org.br">www.pmdb.org.br</a></td>
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<td>PFL 1984 (manifesto)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.pfl.org.br">www.pfl.org.br</a></td>
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Brazilian Parties According to their Manifestos: Political Identity and Programmatic Emphases

Chart 1. Cont.

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<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>PFL</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>PFL 1995</td>
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<td>PFL</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td><a href="http://www.pfl.org.br">www.pfl.org.br</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>PSDB</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>PSDB 1988 (manifesto and programme) <a href="http://www.psdb.org.br">www.psdb.org.br</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>PSDB</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td><a href="http://www.psdb.org.br">www.psdb.org.br</a></td>
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1 This text was made public with no date. Here, it will be considered as being in force from 2003, when the name PP was adopted.
2 At the moment when the data were gathered, PTB was the only party lacking its own website, among the parties studied. Its programme and statutes were available at the web portal of the Chamber of Deputies. Currently, PTB does have a website (www.ptb.org.br) where it is possible to obtain its programme, though in a summarized version without the introductory text that the version obtained in the portal of the Chamber of Deputies contains. The text available on the party’s new website corresponds to just one section of the full version, that subtitled “Policy guidelines”.
3 This is the Founding Manifesto launched on 19 December, 1984, after the creation of the Democratic Alliance (in August of the same year).
4 Accessed on 2 June 2006. The new website of the Democratas does not make available the party’s historical documents.
5 For the purposes of this analysis, PFL’s 1984, 1985 and 1986 programmatic documents were grouped together and treated as “pre-1988 documents”.

The content analysis method

Content analysis is a method of quantitative treatment given to qualitative data. It basically consists in classifying a large quantity of text units (the words, expressions and sentences into which the original text is divided) into categories according to their meaning, so as to produce valid inferences on the original text from its quantification.

The quality of the inferences thus obtained depends on the validity of the variables generated by the classification and on the reliability of the measurement procedure. An analysis is closer to the former the more effectively the categories created for classifying the text units represent the concepts intended for measuring. The latter is attained the more similar the results obtained by different people using the same codification are – or the results by the same analyst at two different points in time. The reliability of the classification must be verified by means of specific testing, especially when manual codification is used, as is the case of this analysis.

At an international level, the main authority on content analysis in Political Science is the CMP, which holds an extensive database on the political positions of 780 parties of 54 countries since the war, estimated from their programmatic emphases. Initially coming together in the MRG, linked to the European Consortium for Political Research, researchers from several countries since the 1980s have mapped the political preferences of parties through the content analysis of their programmes (Klingemann et al. 1994; Budge 1999; Budge et al. 2001; Laver 2001; Bara and Weale 2006). The classification techniques...
developed in the context of the CMP are the methodological references for this work, and will be described in the following section.

The content analysis which the programmatic documents of the Brazilian parties underwent consisted in dividing the texts into sentences and classifying each of them under one of the categories described in Chart 2. These correspond to the categories developed by the MRG (Budge et al. 2001) with the addition of group 000 – Sentences not classifiable under any of the categories – and category 306 – Political System Institutions –, created to accommodate the many occurrences of this subject in the manifestos analysed.8

**Chart 2** Codification table adapted from Budge et al. (2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of Domain 1: External Relations</th>
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<tr>
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<th>Categories of Domain 4: Economy</th>
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<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Brazilian Parties according to their manifestos: Political identity and Programmatic Emphases

Chart 2. Cont.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>412 controlled economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>413 nationalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>414 economic orthodoxy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>415 marxist analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>416 anti-growth economy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of Domain 6: Fabric of Society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>601 national way of life: positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602 national way of life: negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>603 traditional morality: positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>604 traditional morality: negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>605 law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>606 social harmony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>607 multiculturalism: positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>608 multiculturalism: negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of Domain 7: Social Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>701 labour groups: positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>702 labour groups: negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>703 agriculture and farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>704 middle class and professional groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>705 underprivileged minority groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>706 non-economic demographic groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Domain 000: Outlying subject. (Sentences that do not fit into any of the previous categories. Description of the current setting, historical narratives, internal party matters, sentences with very vague content, statistical data.)

6 The original definition of categories 101 and 102 refers to a country with which the home country of the party whose manifesto is under analysis has special relations. The choice of the United States is an adaptation for the research about Brazil.

7 This category is not present in the original classification, but was inserted to accommodate recurring references found in the manifestos of the parties studied.

**The content of the manifestos**

Thus, after classifying the sentences of all the manifestos according to the categories above, it was possible to count what proportion of text from each document (measured by the number of sentences) was allocated to each subject. This distribution can be seen in
Table 1 Programmatic emphases in the manifestos: Percentages of sentences by domain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Manifesto</th>
<th>Outlying subject</th>
<th>External relations</th>
<th>Freedom and democracy</th>
<th>Political system</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Welfare and quality of life</th>
<th>Fabric of society</th>
<th>Social groups</th>
<th>Total (n = 19720 sentences)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDS 1979</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPB 1995</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP 2003</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDT 1980</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDT 1994</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT 1980</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT 1990</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTB 1979</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTB 2001</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMDB 1981</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMDB 1994</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFL pre-1988</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFL 1995</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFL 2005</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDB 1988</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDB 2001</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson’s Chi-square Test = 3972.77; Degrees of freedom = 105; Significance = 0.000.

The data in Table 1 will be discussed in more detail for each party in the following section. However, certain considerations can already be made. The large amount of texts whose units (sentences) do not fall into any category draws attention. This occurs mostly because all the parties include long sections on themes such as the history of the party in their manifestos, for example, usually in the introduction. Such content has no correspondence in the classification categories because the categories refer to issues that may be the object of political proposals by the parties. An example of this is the narrative about the process of re-democratization, present in the first manifesto of all the parties. It can also be observed that all the parties reduced the emphasis dedicated to the theme of re-democratization in the first review of their programmes, which is understandable, given that the regime transition had practically concluded by the beginning of the 1990s, ceasing to be a public agenda issue.

However, in spite of these similarities between parties, the proportions of text dedicated to each domain and measured by the percentage of sentences in the manifestos vary a lot from one party to another. This variation indicates that the prominence of subjects
in the manifestos is neither random nor independent from the party. The significance of the statistical test confirms that the parties differentiate from one another in the proportion of text their manifestos dedicate to each issue.

The distribution shown in Table 1 can be better understood by using residuals analysis, which shows the difference in the number of standard deviations between the number of sentences observed in each combination of manifesto and domain, and the number expected in the case of the null hypothesis of independence between the two variables. The residuals of the distribution of sentences in the manifestos by domain can be seen in Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manifestos</th>
<th>PDS</th>
<th>PPB</th>
<th>PP</th>
<th>PDT</th>
<th>PDT</th>
<th>PT</th>
<th>PT</th>
<th>PTB</th>
<th>PTB</th>
<th>PMDB</th>
<th>PMDB</th>
<th>PFL</th>
<th>PFL</th>
<th>PFL</th>
<th>PSDB</th>
<th>PSDB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>-3.80</td>
<td>-7.98</td>
<td>-8.33</td>
<td>-6.64</td>
<td>-8.74</td>
<td>10.76</td>
<td>25.49</td>
<td>-5.07</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-3.76</td>
<td>-5.28</td>
<td>-5.28</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>6.95</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>-3.44</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-1.51</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>-8.19</td>
<td>-2.41</td>
<td>-2.41</td>
<td>-2.41</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>-1.34</td>
<td>4.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1.46</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>-6.95</td>
<td>-14.99</td>
<td>-5.23</td>
<td>-6.90</td>
<td>-7.07</td>
<td>-1.41</td>
<td>-2.99</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>8.15</td>
<td>-1.05</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>17.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-0.89</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>-9.37</td>
<td>-11.09</td>
<td>-1.18</td>
<td>-2.19</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>-1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>7.08</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>-2.84</td>
<td>9.31</td>
<td>-6.05</td>
<td>-10.96</td>
<td>-3.01</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-2.41</td>
<td>-4.54</td>
<td>-1.94</td>
<td>-2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>-1.15</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>9.11</td>
<td>-4.89</td>
<td>-6.72</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>-2.20</td>
<td>-3.69</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>-3.07</td>
<td>-3.19</td>
<td>-5.59</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>13.18</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>-3.01</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>7.43</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-2.48</td>
<td>-2.48</td>
<td>-7.72</td>
<td>-8.13</td>
<td>-4.29</td>
<td>-11.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this analysis, the residuals – and not the percentages – will be used to identify the parties’ programmatic emphases, because this resource allows us to identify in which category of the variables analysed in the table the relationship indicated by the association test (indicated at the end of Table 1) occurs, thus distinguishing the high percentages from those that are statistically significant.

The largest residuals in Table 2 allow us to identify the following relationships:

- PP significantly emphasises the themes of Domain 5 (Welfare and Quality of Life) and devotes significantly fewer sentences to themes outlying the classification (Domain 0).
- The two manifestos of PDT are inverted as far as the treatment they give to the issue of Freedom and Democracy is concerned: in the founding version, Domain 2 was the most emphasised, and in the reformulated 1994 version it came to be the least emphasised theme.
• PDT and PTB have many similarities. In their founding manifestos (1979), both of them emphasised the Domain 2 themes (Freedom and Democracy) more significantly, and the themes relating to the political system (Domain 3) significantly less. Furthermore, in the last versions of their programmes, both parties emphasised Domain 7 themes (Social Groups) significantly more and those pertaining to Freedom and Democracy (Domain 2) significantly less. In a way, these similarities between parties generally classified as having contrasting ideological positions is intriguing.

• PT significantly favours Domain 2 themes (Freedom and Democracy) in its founding manifesto and themes outlying the classification in the Charter of 1990, but in both documents the least emphasised themes are those pertaining to the economy (Domain 4).

• PMDB totally changes its emphases from one manifesto to the next. At the time of its foundation, themes related to the economy (Domain 4) were prioritised, while those pertaining to foreign relations gained the least attention. From the 1994 reformulation onwards, Domain 2 (Freedom and Democracy) became the most significantly emphasised and the proportion of text classed as outlying fell significantly.

• PFL, in the last two documents (those of 1995 and 2005), emphasised Domain 7 themes (Social Groups) significantly less, as did PSDB from 2001. However, the most significantly emphasised themes changed: Freedom and Democracy (Domain 2) in the founding documents, Political System issues (Domain 3) in 1995, and subjects outlying the classification in 2005.

• PSDB kept its main emphasis in both versions on Domain 3 themes (Political System). However, the least emphasised domain changed: from Domain 6 themes (Fabric of Society) in 1988 to Domain 7 themes (Social Groups) in 2001.

The circumstances surrounding the changes of emphasis will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

The context and the manifestos

The emphases in Tables 1 and 2 show, in almost all documents analysed, a considerable proportion of text dedicated to themes that do not fit into the classification – termed here “outlying” themes.11 The reading of the manifestos showed that these parts of the texts frequently referred to aspects of that moment in history, such as the re-democratization narrative and the role of the party in the process. In order to better understand this content, Table 3 distinguishes, from all the references coded in Domain 0 (“outlying”), those referring to such contextual elements:12
Table 3 Contextual references among the sentences “outlying” the classification, in the manifestos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manifesto</th>
<th>Domain 0 (sentences “outlying” the classification)</th>
<th>Contextual references</th>
<th>Other questions</th>
<th>N (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDS 1979</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>84.5%</td>
<td>142</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPB 1995</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP 2003</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDT 1980</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>76.6%</td>
<td>141</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDT 1994</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
<td>1129</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT 1980</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
<td>195</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT 1990</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>502</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTB 1979</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>89.8%</td>
<td>166</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTB 2001</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>80.8%</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMDB 1981</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>85.9%</td>
<td>333</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMDB 1994</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>92.1%</td>
<td>403</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFL pre-1988</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>89.5%</td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFL 1995</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>88.4%</td>
<td>346</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFL 2005</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>89.7%</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDB 1988</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>89.0%</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDB 2001</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>89.7%</td>
<td>561</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>88.1%</td>
<td>4509</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson’s Chi-square Test = 381.28; Degrees of freedom = 15; Significance = 0.000.

Table 3 confirms the impression given by the reading: once those “outlying” portions of text are recoded, many can be classified as contextual (referring to re-democratization and the role of the party in this process). The emphasis on contextual aspects varies a lot in the different documents analysed: PDT’s 1979 manifesto and both of PT’s programmatic texts (1980 and 1990) stand out due to the great proportion of this type of content, as do the manifestos of Partido Progressista Brasileiro (PPB, Progressive Brazilian Party) and PP for the same reasons.

These associations must be interpreted carefully, but it seems that the knowledge accrued about the Brazilian party system allows us to point out both the originality of PT’s proposal – whose founding texts insist that the content of the programme itself be open to workers’ participation – and the strategic need that led PPB/PP to reiterate its commitment to the regime transition in 1995, and again in 2003. This was much stronger than in 1979, when the party was still called Partido Democrático Social (PDS, Democratic Social Party), and was divided between guaranteeing its presence in the new democratic order and justifying its former support for the military dictatorship (Madeira 2006).
Another noticeable fact is the reduction in emphasis of the contextual aspects in the reformulated versions of the 1994 programmes of PDT and PMDB. This was possibly due to the perception that the process of democratic consolidation had advanced to the point of replace, in the public agenda, issues pertaining to the transition and to the original aims of the parties. These questions will be addressed in the following section, along with a brief account of the context in which each party issued its manifesto.

### The PP manifestos

PDS succeeded the Arena after the party reform of 1979, year in which it registered its first programmatic document. In 1995, it registered a new programme and manifesto, already under the name of Partido Progressista Brasileiro (PPB, Progressive Brazilian Party). PDS had already changed names in 1993 to Partido Progressista Reformador (PPR, Progressive Reformist Party), when it incorporated Partido Democrata Cristão (PDC, Christian Democratic Party), but the same programme was kept until the merger with PP, in 1995. In 2003, it came to be known as PP and made fresh alterations to its programme and manifesto.

The 1979 programme had a tone that alternated between an exultation of the economic victories of the preceding period, and promises of engagement with the re-democratization process. It did not refrain from criticising what it termed “ideological intransigence” or from arguing that the State should use self-defence measures against “possible aggression by revolutionary minorities”, at the same time as it committed to the respect for human rights and the democratization of the electoral processes.

The second programme was launched in 1995, along with the party’s third name: Partido Progressista Brasileiro (PPB, Brazilian Progressive Party). It contained important differences from the previous one. A considerable proportion of text, originally filled with general descriptions and historical narratives, came to be dedicated to themes relating to the political system and social well-being. References to re-democratization gave way to objectives and evaluations for the consolidation of the representation regime. Among the directives outlined for the social field, the themes of education and social welfare were highlighted. The latter was considered to be in need of reform, including having its budget separated from that of other social benefits.

In 2003, its name was altered once again – this time to PP – and the programme was only slightly updated, having remained the same since then.

### The PDT manifestos

Founded in 1980, PDT based its first manifesto on the Carta de Lisboa (Lisbon Charter), the document resulting from the meeting in Portugal in June 1979 with the
Brazilian trabalhistas of the old PTB.

The original programme was only reformulated in 1994, on the occasion of the 3rd Party Conference. The new programme mentioned the expression “Programme of Government”, but even so it could be considered as being the new party programme, given that in its preamble it was presented as the “expression of proposals by PDT for the construction of a national project”, to be discussed later in order to formulate specific electoral projects. According to the document itself, it would be the result of “an effort to update the founding documents of Partido Democrático Trabalhista, represented by the Carta de Lisboa, the Carta de Mendes (Mendes Charter) and the Party Programme.”\(^{15}\)

From one version of the programme to another, the most emphasised themes, which in the founding manifesto were those of Domain 2 (Freedom and Democracy), in 1994 became those relating to specific Social Groups (Domain 7).

The support for democracy, which in 1980 occupied a significant proportion of the text, 15 years later became much less significant. In 1994, the PDT programme came to devote much more space to the theme of land reform, rural workers and technological development.\(^{16}\)

**The PT manifestos**

Created in 1980, PT has to this day kept the same programme and manifesto,\(^{17}\) having added only in 1990 the text on a resolution pertaining to the petista concept of socialism, approved in the 7th National Meeting and reaffirmed in the 2nd Conference in 1999.\(^{18}\) Thus, two programmatic documents were considered: the one in force since the foundation in the 1980s, corresponding to the foundation programme and manifesto, and the Charter of 1990 on petista socialism, in force from June 1990 onwards.\(^{19}\)

The largest proportion of text of PT’s programmatic documents corresponds to descriptions of the historical process and declarations that do not fit into any of the categories of this analysis. In the founding documents (1980 manifesto and programme), there is an emphasis (measured by the domain of greatest residuals) on Domain 2 themes (Freedom and Democracy), but in the Resolution of 1990, the themes termed here as outlying became the most emphasised ones.

The themes most likely to become the object of policies do not seem very relevant compared to a very party-specific content. They are cast aside in favour of declarations of intention regarding the internal aims and functioning of the party itself. This is a rather intriguing result, as it makes PT stand out very much from the other parties.

However, this peculiar distribution of programmatic emphases is congruent with the argument, within PT, for the precedence of the principle of representation over the principle of direction of the working class (Singer 2001; Montenegro 2002). According to Montenegro (2002), the idea that the primary function of a party is to represent the working class and
its interests (that are intrinsic and non-contrastable with any theories) to the detriment of carrying out a role of education and conduct of the masses (as per the leninist conception) has accompanied PT since its foundation and could be responsible for its “deliberate choice of programmatic fluidity”.

The formulation of a clear project for society and even the very definition of the type of socialism to be advocated by the party maybe were discarded due the priority assigned to the political presence of wide popular contingents in the new democracy. Singer (2001, 40) even states that “To a certain degree, the existence of PT was, up to a point, its own programme”. Thus, the party that has been widely considered in the literature as an example of a programmatic party in Brazil is the same party that assigns the least importance to political definitions in its programme.

The PTB manifestos

Like PDT, PTB also formulated its first manifesto based on the content of the Carta de Lisboa (Chacon 1998). This first document was kept until 2001, when the party issued its new programme.

PTB’s first manifesto is incredibly similar to that of PDT, as both practically reproduced the content of the Carta de Lisboa (Chacon 1998). The founding programmatic emphases are the same: the most emphasised domain is no. 2 (Freedom and Democracy). In the revised 2001 version the emphasis changed to being on themes relating to specific Social Groups (Domain 7). Similarly to PDT’s programme, here the support for democracy gave way to the theme of land reform and rural workers.

The PMDB manifestos

Emerging from the party reform of 1979, PMDB kept its founding manifesto until 1994, when it approved the document called Democracia com Desenvolvimento – Novo Programa Doutrinário do PMDB (Democracy with Development – The New Doctrinal Programme of PMDB) at a national conference.

The differences in emphasis between the two versions of the PMDB programmes are huge. In its foundation, the party favoured economic themes (Domain 4). After the programmatic review of 1994, the proportion of text dedicated to outlying issues increased and the emphasis became mainly on Domain 2 themes (Freedom and Democracy). The interest in themes pertaining to foreign relations, political system and internal order institutions increased, while the references to well-being and social groups decreased. The party seemed to abandon the profile that identified it for a long time – that of a party engaged with the process of democratization and society’s quality of life – to become more attentive to formal aspects and conjunctures of political life.
These changes are contrary to Ferreira’s (2002, 166) interpretation, which identifies a continuity and consolidation of the programmatic profile throughout time,\(^20\) based on the presence, in both programmes, of a strong support for the democratic regime and economic development by the State.

**The PFL manifestos**

PFL emerged in 1984 from a split in PDS. Its first programme dates from 1985, when it officially registered with the Higher Electoral Court. Ten years later, the party carried out a programmatic review from which resulted many political documents, amongst them the 1995 programme. In 2005, after another decade, the last programmatic document was issued. For the purposes of this analysis of programmatic emphases, the documents predating the period of study\(^21\) were grouped under the title “Pre-1988 Documents”.

PFL’s emphases changed very much over time. The totality of its programmatic documents produced prior to the 1988 Constitution gave greater emphasis to the themes of Domain 2 (Freedom and Democracy). After the first revision, the themes outlying the classification began to make up the larger percentage of text and the most emphasised themes became those pertaining to the Political System (Domain 3).

This new version of the programme, approved in a conference in November 1995, was developed in the context of the Projeto PFL 2000 (PFL Project 2000), which aimed to formulate a new programme of action for the party from debates in four areas: 1) organic law for political parties; 2) modernization of the electoral legislation; 3) restructuring of strategies for the 1996, 1998 and 2000 elections and 4) constitutional reforms (Tarouco 1999).

The result was a programme whose emphasis ceased to be on supporting the democracy (common to the manifestos of the other parties during the regime transition) and concentrated on issues of institutional design of the political system. The large proportion of non-classifiable text remained. This time it was due to the evaluations on the task of re-democratization and economic stabilization fulfilled by the party (and considered successful) and to the description of its own internal process of programmatic reformulation, given the requirements of the new conjunctures.

In 2005, in the document titled Refundação do PFL (Refounding of PFL), no other theme was highlighted as much as the part of the text occupied by the issues termed here as outlying. The narrative of the trajectory continued to occupy a significant amount of space, and now statements on the need to change in order to keep up to date with the changes occurring in the world were added. Such a need required a political repositioning of the party and an updating of its ideas.

The great proportion of text dedicated to themes that do not fit into the classification categories is a characteristic that PFL shares with PT. Curiously, these are the two parties
that are generally referred to as being the ones with the most defined political identity.

**The PSDB manifestos**

PSDB came on the scene in 1988 from the split in PMDB. Its original programme was kept until the 2001 reformulation. Its emphases in terms of domains remained exactly the same since its inception.

Although it apportioned large amounts of its texts to themes that are classified here as outlying, in both versions the emphasis is on themes related to the Political System (Domain 3). In both versions the support for the parliamentary system occupies considerable space, but in the 2001 document there is also a great portion of text in support of a wide reform of the political system, including the adoption of an electoral system with proportional representation by districts.

According to Roma (1999), the content of the founding programme of PSDB (of 1988) contradicts its social-democratic ideology when it makes proposals of a liberal nature. According to him, this dilemma in the construction of the party’s identity could be related to its pragmatic and electoral origin. The absence of societal links could have served for it to easily adapt to electoral demands, including adapting through reviews of its political and ideological directives and inconsistent coalitions.

In spite of the predictions of the above model, PSDB has not made use of its “versatility” in its programmatic emphases, kept since its foundation. One possible explanation for this is that the identification of party preferences from the analysis of programmatic emphases does not depend on a one-dimensional positioning on the left-right axis, in which the party can move so as to seek votes. In the example of PSDB, the reiterated interest in the theme of political system institutions does not affect the (liberalising or state-oriented) sense of the policies proposed by the party in other areas.

**Measurement reliability**

As we saw in the beginning of this section, the use of a manual content analysis technique requires a reliability test. A measurement’s reliability is its quality of being free of measurement errors. A variable’s degree of reliability can be identified by replicating the measuring process and comparing results. However, in the case of the main independent variable of this piece of work – programmatic emphases – this is not a simple task.

Two manual content analyses of the same text carried out by different researchers are very unlikely to produce the exact same results, even if the same categories are used. This is due to the inherently subjective nature of a personal reading.

In the specific case of the programmatic texts of the parties analysed here, as well
as the analyst’s interpretative bias, the classification of the manifestos’ sentences can also contain errors due to other factors, e.g. ambiguity in the text’s composition, insufficient decision criteria and even inadequate categories for the object in question (Brazilian party manifestos).

As a solution for verifying the reliability of category evaluations, the literature suggests comparing the classifications with those of a second researcher.

The main reference on this is the kappa index, or simply, the k index, proposed by Jacob Cohen (1960). This is a concordance coefficient for nominal scales that removes the effect of random coincidences. That is, it measures the degree to which two or more classifications agree substantially, beyond accidental coincidence, in the (null) hypothesis of complete independence.

The content analysis reliability test of the party manifestos used in this article to measure the programmatic emphases of parties was made with the assistance of a second researcher, who classified a sample of the texts, thus providing an element of comparison.

According to the index k formula, the concordance measurement must only take into account the proportion of occurrences in which both classifications coincide, over the total sample. The cases in which both codifiers were in agreement amounted to 848, which corresponds to 78% of the total. This proportion must then be controlled by the proportion of concordance that one expects to occur by accident, according to the hypothesis of independence.

Index k is calculated as follows:

$$k = \frac{\text{no. of observed concordances} - \text{no. of expected random coincidences}}{\text{Total number} - \text{no. of expected random coincidences}}$$

Index k varies from -1 (when all the classifications diverge) to 1 (when all classifications are identical) and is equivalent to 0 when the proportion of concordances is limited to the proportion of random coincidences (those that would be observed even in the case of independence). The test consists in confronting the substantive coincidence hypothesis against the null hypothesis ($k=0$).

For the sample in question, index k is 0.743, which is statistically significant. This value is considered good by the literature (Landis and Koch 1977; Bonnardel 2001) and allows us to accept the measurement carried out as reliable.

**Conclusion**

The content analysis of the programmatic documents of the main Brazilian parties shows that, contrary to the general expectation among analysts, the texts of the programmes do not have the same content, and the difference in emphases is not random either.
It is possible to distinguish Brazilian parties from one another not only by the types of questions they emphasise more, but also by those they emphasise less.

We could say that, although the themes relating to democracy are the most emphasised in five out of the 16 documents analysed, there are themes that can be identified as specific to each party. Thus, the prominence of questions about the political system (which include the debate about the system of government) can be recognised, as is the case of PSDB’s specific emphasis on this matter. This was constant in both of the moments analysed (and in common only with PFL’s 1995 programme). It is also possible to identify that the party that most leaned towards themes pertaining to the economy was PMDB in its 1980 manifesto. What is also clear is the choice of Domain 5 themes, relating to welfare and quality of life, by PP, as well as the association between the current PDT and PTB and their emphasis on Domain 7 themes (Social Groups).

Some of these relationships may seem counterintuitive if the usual ideological classification of the Brazilian parties is applied. For example, it might be surprising to see that two parties commonly seen as the most programmatic and emblematic of opposing ideological positions – PT and PFL – are the ones that concede the most space in their programmes to content that does not deal with political proposals (the so-called outlying themes). This is similar to the aforementioned similarity between PDT and PTB. In its turn, the emphasis by PP on issues of well-being seems to go against the expectation based on its classification as a right-wing party. This expectation is based on the commonly made association between a state of well-being and social policies of redistribution; traditional guiding ideas of left-wing parties.25

The explanation for these apparently enigmatic contrasts lies in the very concept of party competition. Ideological classification is one-dimensional and intended to distinguish the parties by the proximity or distance between each of their proposals and the left and right poles. Meanwhile, the criterion of programmatic emphases is based on the selection by the parties of different parts of the public agenda, for which each of them formulates their proposals. The left-right counterpoint is frequently made use of in analyses of the Brazilian political system and seems to offer reasonable explanations for some recent processes, but is not sufficient to politically identify the totality of the parties. This article proposed to offer an alternative perspective on the arena of political competition: the multidimensional perspective of programmatic emphases, able to distinguish party identities by the issues the parties choose as priorities, not by the (liberalising or state-oriented) solutions that they can offer to those issues.

This analysis evidently still leaves several important questions unanswered: How can the identification by programmatic emphases be reconciled with ideological classification? How can the variations in programmatic emphases in the programmes of the same party
throughout time be explained? These are challenges to be met on a different occasion.

However, the finding that the Brazilian parties distinguish from one another by their programmatic emphases, and that these can be identified in the text of their manifestos, already points to an important feature of the Brazilian party system, until recently ignored – that the political preferences of the Brazilian parties must not only be sought in the content traditionally attributed to the ideologies of left and right (more or less intervention by the State, more or less market freedom). The inference of the parties’ preferences according to their ideological position may have become insufficient to distinguish between the Brazilian parties, as has been the case in other countries.

The research agenda on the institutionalization of the Brazilian party system and on the impact of the parties on many areas (on governments’ priorities in terms of public policies, for example) cannot continue to limit the political identity of the parties to their ideological classification. The results concerning the programmatic emphases obtained here also suggest the importance of a review of the debate on the alleged irrelevance of the Brazilian political parties.

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Notes

1 A quick search in the electronic catalogues of the libraries of some political science postgraduate programmes revealed four dissertations about PSDB, four about PFL, one about PDS, two about PPB, five about PMDB and one about PDT, to mention just contemporary parties. Reviews about the vast array of works on PT may be found in Leal (2005) and Ribeiro (2010).

2 This definition diverges from that by Janda et al. (1995), for whom the identity of a political party corresponds to the image that citizens have of it.

3 According to the economic theory of democracy, parties move along the ideological spectrum formulating policy proposals to obtain votes, in search of which they allow themselves to change positions. Under these conditions, parties would formulate policies so as to win elections and not the other way round; in other words, they do not run in elections with the aim of implementing policies. Also according to downsian theory, parties position themselves in relation to the desirable weight of state intervention in the economy, between the left extremity (full government control) and the right extremity (completely free market). The position assumed could vary according to the expected preference of the median voter, whose vote the parties strive for; in other words, parties position themselves on the left-right scale in order to compete for votes.
1018 party manifestos from 19 democracies between 1945 and 1983: results published in Budge et al. (1987); review, in 1992, of the 54 categories initially formulated: Laver and Budge (1992); comparative research into the relation between manifestos and government expenditure in 10 democracies during the 40 years after World War II: Klingemann et al. (1994); mapping of parties', electors' and governments' political preferences in 25 democracies between 1945 and 1998: Budge et al. (2001). Enlargement of the database to cover countries of Eastern Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and European Union: Klingemann et al. (2006).

Despite several changes in the party’s name and the incorporation of other, smaller parties over the course of the period studied, one is dealing with the same party that used to be called PDS, PPR and PPB, registered at the Higher Electoral Court under number 11.

One is dealing here with the party currently called Democratas (DEM).

There exist various computer programs that automate content analysis, thus reducing the time and effort needed for the manual procedure, as well as ensuring full reliability. Neuendorf (2002, 226-35) presents a list of content analysis software, with a description of each, including with respect to accessibility.

MRG’s original classification scheme also includes two categories referent to the European Community (108 – positive and 110 – negative) that were not used and therefore are not on Chart 2.

In one of PT’s documents this proportion surpasses 50% and has a specific explanation that will be dealt with below.

Frequencies observed that distance themselves more than 1.96 standard deviations from the expected frequency (in the independence hypothesis) have a likelihood equal to or below 5%, which indicates statistical significance.

The occurrence of sentences that fall without the classification categories is not a problem specific to this work. In the MRG analyses, the proportion of “uncoded” sentences varies from zero to 89% (1973 manifesto of the Danish Ventresocialisterne Party), with values at 50%, such as the case of the 1993 manifesto of the Polish Mniejszosc Niemiecka (Germanic Minority) Party.

I thank an anonymous BPSR peer reviewer for this suggestion, previously made by Pedro Floriano Ribeiro — who I belatedly also thank — at the presentation of a prior version of this work during the 2007 meeting of the National Social Science Postgraduate and Research Association (ANPOCS).

The decision to consider that the PDS programme remains valid for the PPR even after the 1993 change in name is in line with the findings of Almeida (2004, 55), according to whom despite the confluence of several members of other parties at this moment, the PDS continued to be dominant.


This is the largest document of all those analysed, and contains details of the policies to be advocated by the party in every field, including some repetitions. This suggests that its drafting resulted from the compilation of texts by different authors.

Like for the other parties, government programmes – launched during each election campaign and supported by the other parties of the alliance in question – were not taken into account, for the interest here is in party programmes.

19 PT has approved various political texts since its founding, over the course of several gatherings and congresses. Considering all of them to be programmatic documents in this analysis, quite apart from being unfeasible, would produce an insurmountable bias in comparison with the other parties. The decision to select the resolution of the 7th gathering (1990) was based on the fact that the party itself presents it as a document that is as important as the manifesto and founding programme, upon publishing it as one of PT’s historical documents on its website, side by side with the 1980 programme.

20 This divergence in the results is probably owed to the difference in methods employed: the intensity of statements is something that can only be well assessed by means of qualitative analysis, such as that conducted by Ferreira (2002), while the different emphases put on the various subjects can only be measured by quantitative analysis of the content. Furthermore, what the author calls the “programmatic profile” corresponds to the ideological profile and not to the concept of programmatic emphasis employed here.

21 Founding Manifesto (1984); Programme (1985); Letter of Commitment (1986).

22 Roma (1999) disagrees with the explanations according to which PSDB was formed exclusively on the basis of an ideological and programmatic dissidence within PMDB. The author argues that the creation of a new party was an electoral strategy to make the most of public opinion’s sympathy for PMDB while at the same time dissociating itself from the image of the Sarney government.

23 Yuri Kasahara, then researcher at Núcleo de Estudos do Empresariado, Instituições e Capitalismo (NEIC-IUPERJ) and currently research fellow at the Centre for Development and the Environment – University of Oslo, for whose valuable contribution I am grateful.

24 Kappa measure = 0.743182; standard error = 0.014643; T = 61.14063; significance = 0.000; N = 1087. Krippendorff (1980) proposes the α index, calculated inversely, i.e., using the expected and observed frequencies of divergences among the codifiers, which produces exactly the same result: $\alpha = 1 - \frac{\text{divergences observed}}{\text{divergences expected by chance}} = 1 - \frac{239}{930.62} = 0.743182$.

25 However, this association must be pondered by the consideration that there are different Welfare State models, and that the redistributive principle is not present in the residual models, for instance (Esping-Andersen 1991). I thank a BPSR anonymous peer reviewer for drawing my attention to this question.

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This article systematically investigates, in a comparative perspective, the support for new extreme right-wing political parties (ERPs) in national elections across the Western European Union countries (WEU). The objective of the research is not to explain why or how the ERPs platforms can be convincing and persuasive, but to describe conditions that contribute to identify when this has occurred. Since the reactionary nature of ERP discourse met the spreading phenomenon of Euroskepticism, a vote for ERP candidates and platforms is considered Euroskeptic voting behavior. Our hypothesis is that the greater the political power a member state enjoys in European Union institutions, the fewer the incentives for voters to support ERPs. To test this hypothesis, a great amount of data was organized and a set of econometric exercises was established using panel data with fixed effects. Given the intertemporal variation captured by the panel data with fixed effects, it is possible to assess the political conditions for the growth of electoral support for ERPs across the WEU as a function of three classes of variables: representative variables, economic variables, and variables of perception. The findings suggest that representation in European institutions has greater impact on ERP support than economic circumstances.

Keywords: Extreme right-wing political parties; European elections; European Union; Euroskepticism.

Introduction

Respectable scholars have presented theories about the emergence of a new extreme right-wing ideology (Ignazi 1996; 2003; Ignazi and Perrineau 2000; Ignazi and Ysmal 1992; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Norris 2005) and explored the rise of the new extreme right political parties (ERPs) in Western European Union (WEU) countries, claiming that this phenomenon has taken place due to a shift in the political spectra in
certain countries. However, there is no comprehensive and satisfactory explanation for the support for ERPs; instead, there are different focuses and different studies that often contradict each other (e.g., Kestilä and Söderlund 2007; Art 2007; Kestilä and Söderlund 2007; Rydgren 2004; Jackman and Volpert 1996).

Arzheimer (2009a; 2009b) has demonstrated in different ways how complex it is to understand support for ERPs, also classified as “anti-system parties” and byproducts of “post-industrial” societies (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Ignazi 1996; 2003; Poguntke and Scarrow 1996). The objective of the research is not to explain why or how the ERPs platforms can be convincing and persuasive, but to describe the conditions that contribute to identify when this has occurred. Since the reactionary nature of ERPs discourse met the spreading phenomenon of Euroskepticism, a vote for ERP candidates and platforms is considered Euroskeptic electoral behavior. Seeing European integration as an explanatory factor in domestic politics, the hypothesis is that the greater the political power a member state enjoys in European Union (EU) institutions, the fewer the incentives for voters to support ERPs in national elections.

The vote for ERPs has been associated with immigration and identity matters. Therefore, identity can be a function of representation as well. Several researches have tried to measure the relationship between immigration, economic issues and unemployment growth, on the one hand, and xenophobic behavior, on the other; but less effort has gone into investigating representation as an explanatory factor of the attitude against the European integration. This does not mean that immigration should be ruled out as an issue that threatens cultural and national identities from the perspective of the new extreme right ideology but, rather, that representation may also be considered an important matter.

This article suggests that the ERPs platforms somehow do not necessarily get more support in countries where the economy is under threat but, rather, in member states where national or local identity issues are not represented by the powerful leaders of the EU government. Moreover, this does not necessarily mean that the general electorate is aware of the balance of power of decision making in the EU, but merely that it is useful to look at political representation when identity matters.

The article considers that the European integration affects the domestic arena as well as international relations between member states. European institutions have defined preferences because of the phenomenon of “social learning” (Checkel 2001a, 562-63). In other words, institutions, such as EU institutions, do matter, as one of their outcomes, “social learning”, changes interests and concerns. The constructivist literature is an important reference in shaping our argument (e.g., Radaelli 1995; 1997; 2004; Checkel 1998; Adler 2005; Risse 2000) because it focuses on the new, socially constructed European integration environment as providing European citizens with a new understanding of their interests,
preferences, and choices. As a consequence, crucial aspects of the integration process – polity formation through rules and norms, the transformation of identities, the role of ideas and the uses of language – are thereby opened up to systematic inquiry (Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 1999).

Voters’ preferences on national identity that might be under threat by European policies are considered in national elections. Kitschelt (1992), Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) and Hooghe and Marks (2004; 2006) emphasize the emergence of identity issues (such as security, commitment to national symbols, sovereignty, and defense of national identity) as fundamental in explaining voter choice in national elections in Europe. According to the authors, the non-economic and non-material left/right dimension is understood as a more powerful predictor of voters’ choices in the integrated Europe. Besides, the emergence of the renewed radical right as a new political actor calling for the safeguarding of new socio-cultural issues within the framework of the party system is likely to have consequences on the dynamics of this system. Hence, this research considers that resistance to European integration, the growth of Euroskepticism, and the European citizens’ choice to support the new extreme right-wing ideology are all related. In this context, the deficit of representation in the EU decision-making process seems to be an impacting variable to be investigated, especially because the role a member state plays in the regional policymaking process can be seen as a decisive factor in influencing opposition or a skeptic mood toward European reforms.

The article is organized in two sections plus the results and conclusions. The first section discusses previous research on conceptual structures that inform specific problems addressed in the present study. The second section consists of a systematic examination of all national elections across Western European Union (WEU) member states. Economic, social and representative variables are tested in order to investigate the conditions of support for ERPs. Finally, the results suggest that the strength of a member state in decisive EU institutions is a significant variable in measuring support for ERPs in time series.

**In what Direction does the EU Matter?**

International politics and economic relations may be constrained by and may constrain the domestic foundations of international politics. Moreover, European disagreements and conflicts that were formerly played out in international relations are now negotiated in formal and informal meetings of the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and the European Parliament (EP) (Hooghe and Marks 2004). The multi-level game of European politics today has been the focus of important research, yet findings regarding the effects of EU institutions on national politics have varied widely (e.g., Putnam 1988; Keohane and
Euroskepticism in European National Elections

Milner 1996; Garrett and Lange 1995; Hix and Goetz 2000; Hix 1999). Also, different conclusions and views can be found about changes in political parties’ organization in different European countries as well as in the positioning of political parties regarding the European integration (e.g., Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002; Marks et al. 2006; Gabel 2000; Taggart 1998).

The Europeanization debate focuses on linkage issues, notably the institutional arrangements that link national practices and policies to the EU. Betz (1993a; 1993b; 2002; 2003) and Kitschelt and McGann (1995) have argued that some populist right parties have moderated their neoliberal appeals and have started to focus more on the themes of reactive nationalism, ethnocentrism and more comprehensive protectionism, which could be seen as an important impact of the EU on political party structures. Goetz and Hix (2001) has opened an interesting debate about the links between the European integration and the European political party systems, providing different positions and arguments. According to Peter Mair (2001), the impact of the European integration process on national party systems has been minimal both in terms of their format and mechanics. Sitter (2001) argues that opposition to European integration is neither issue-specific nor indicative of a new cleavage line. Stefano Bartolini (2007) disagrees and says that there is in fact an impact of European integration on national party systems. In Bartolini’s view, hardly any other issue in the European post-war electoral history has had similar wide and standardizing effects across European party systems. Gabel (2000) investigates European integration’s intersection with national voting behavior. As contended by the author, research studies have not often measured how much the EU shapes voters’ behavior, nor have they addressed the question systematically across EU member states (Gabel 2000). In short, the effort made thus far when considering European integration as an explanatory factor in domestic political continuity or change has been unsatisfactory (Harmsen and Spiering 2004). This article considers that the positioning of political leaders and member states regarding European policies on agriculture, immigration, trade, economy, currency, environment, social policies, and so on, can affect both national institutions and societies. European integration has already gone too far to not be seen as an important explanatory factor in the domestic politics of EU member states.

Constructivist approaches have demonstrated how European institutions can construct, through a process of interaction, the identities and interests of member states (Checkel 2001b, 52). However, the constructivist literature is not free from different interpretations and disagreements. For example, some constructivists follow scientific realism by relying on social mechanisms to explain social phenomena. Differently, Checkel (2001a) focuses on the “social learning” process to demonstrate that institutions define preferences. In the end, constructivist approaches find common ground with respect to the social world view.
as “intersubjectively and collectively meaningful structures and processes” (Adler 2005, 100). Thus, when specifically applied to EU studies, the world that constructivists see is one that has been shaped by the social changes taking place in the region, as the integration process has affected values, beliefs and identity issues. According to Checkel (2001b, 52), “European institutions can construct, through a process of interaction, the identities and interests of member states.” Therefore, it is clear that the socialization process and the perception of the constructive impact of Europeanization on EU citizens’ lives is crucial to analyze their electoral preferences as well as the political parties’ changes (e.g., Checkel 1998; Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 2006; Radaelli 2004).

The socialization effects of European integration also generate a new conception of the “Europeanization process” that scholars have identified as taking place among member states of the EU and European citizens (e.g., Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 2006; Radaelli 2004). Most of the works on the impact of “Europeanization” focus on domestic institutions and analyze whether and to what extent European processes, policies, and institutions affect domestic systems of interest intermediation, intergovernmental relations, national bureaucracies and administrative structures, judicial structures, macroeconomic institutions, national identities, and so on (Börzel and Risse 2000). “Top down” and “bottom up” perspectives have emerged to analyze the dynamics and outcomes of European integration, its institutions and processes. Hence, since the “Europeanization” of processes, policies and institutions may also refer to different issues, the major unsolved question is no longer whether the EU matters “but how it matters, to what degree, in what direction, at what pace, and at what point of time.” (Börzel and Risse 2000, 7)

The emergence of identity issues related to regional integration may have consequences for political and social behavior, the preference of voters, and agenda setting, by making certain political issues more salient and others less so (Rydgren 2010). Thus, “it may influence the way political actors talk about certain issues (framing); and it may make mainstream parties change positions in order to win back votes or to prevent future losses (accommodation)” (Rydgren 2010, p. 67). A good example is that the EU’s development and policies have been seen as a mandatory theme on the agendas of national parties (Hix and Lord 1997; Bartolini 2007). In other words, in the context of the development of European integration, social detachments give rise to ideological commitments and political demands called “new political issues” (Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002, 586). As a consequence, the multi-level face of politics in the European political game, the social impact of EU institutions, and the Europeanization of new political issues have appeared as new political concerns for voters.

This article argues that an investigation of voter choice even in national elections should take into account concerns about European policies and the position political
parties hold on European integration. Since the ERPs platforms are similarly and clearly Euroskeptic, populist and anti-immigration, it is expected that ERP voters understand platform differences when ERPs are compared to other traditional right-wing parties, which do not usually have a clear position against the EU, nor offer clear solutions for immigration problems.

**Europe at home**

After more than a half century of integration, European integration has also grown in importance among voters because the ‘communitarization’ of EU policies has internalized political issues that used to be the subject of bilateral and multilateral agreements between countries. Besides becoming an immediate issue on the agenda of national parties in Europe, the EU is taken into account not only in European elections, but also in national elections. A vote for candidates and platforms of the new extreme right-wing political parties (ERPs) that are openly against social and political integration is thus considered to be Euroskeptic voting behavior.\(^2\)

The history of the European integration is a complex edifice of new laws and policies designed to decrease some of the material and “non-material conflicts” (Ignazi, 2003 201) between member states’ societies. In other words, new laws to implement the free circulation of people, goods, capital and the exchange of services were necessary to make the integration efficient. Also, initiatives of cultural exchange and promotion of pluralistic values were seen as important tools for overlapping national differences. The European citizenship introduced by the Maastricht Treaty (1993) may be seen as the most important step of the social integration. For this reason, all kinds of intolerance and xenophobic behaviors have started to be seen as threats to the EU by the European Commission and the EP. A special Eurobarometer survey was conducted to provide information about “Racism and Xenophobia” (Eb 41 1989)\(^3\) when the European Commission started to concern itself with the increase of xenophobia in Europe. Since the 1990s a “European Racism and Xenophobia Information Network” (known as “RAXEN”), as well as the “European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia”, was established with its seat in Vienna (see Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 2 June 1997, published in Official Journal C 194, 25.06.1997) to study the extent and development of the phenomena and manifestations of racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism in the region of integration, analyze their causes, consequences and effects, and examine examples of good practice. To these ends, information by research centers, member states, EU institutions, non-governmental organizations and international organizations started to be collected, recorded and analyzed.\(^4\)
European integration as well as globalization has concurrently developed non-economic concerns to communities involved in the process (e.g. ideas, values, beliefs, identity, and security). As a result, the emergence and politicization of new issues such as immigration, national identity, and security – initially brought into the political agenda by the traditional conservative parties – have become important issues. The spreading phenomenon of Euroskepticism relates to “particular discursive formations within the battlefield of collective identities that is opened by European integration” (Trenz and de Wilde 2009). Accordingly, Ignazi (2003) argues that the success of the emergence of ERPs since the 1980s is associated to the fact that these parties respond to the unfulfilled demands of certain sections of the electorate that none of the other parties is able to meet.

**Changing Europe**

As already stated, the EU represents a new dimension of interactions among various institutions and new potential relationships among peoples and cultures. Europeans have increasingly perceived the social integration in their day-by-day lives since the implementation of the European citizenship. The rights to circulate, reside, work, vote and run for office anywhere in the European region of integration have converted the formerly remote process of integration between state governments and representatives into a new social realm. At the same time, gaps between regional interests and national interests tend to be commensurate with the development of the EU, and intolerance and xenophobic behaviors have been demonstrated to be inevitable. Looking for a better understanding of this, Marks, Wilson, and Ray (2002) have classified WEU political parties in terms of their cleavage location and their position on European integration (economic and political integration). WEU political parties support economic integration and political integration differently (more or less). The ERPs are not strongly against the economic integration, but absolutely against the social and political integration (Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002). Thus, ERPs have reflected the preference of those that denounce the EU as a threat to local, regional and national identities. As a consequence, voters that support ERPs are strongly against the political integration because they represent the “new political cleavage” defending strongly nationalist principles, national culture, and national sovereignty (Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002).

The process of social integration has increased the number of interactions between individuals of different national and social backgrounds (Master and LeRoy 2000); thus, xenophobic attitudes and fear of foreigners have negatively influenced support for integration. Support for ERPs in national elections, which grew by about 6% from 1981 to 2010 in the WEU region, is a warning sign that an assumed xenophobic attitude be measured. It suggests
that intolerant agendas tend to be more attractive to extremist voters as the European integration gets stronger. Many scholars have identified potential reasons to explain the support for ERPs as well as the tendency for the increase/decrease in such support: according to Jackman and Volpert (1996), for instance, support for extreme right-wing ideology is sensitive to factors that can be modified through policy instruments. The authors argue that “higher rates of unemployment provide a favorable environment for these political movements” (Jackman and Volpert 1996, 501). On the other hand, since the extreme-right parties focus their attacks on immigrants and foreign workers, the authors suggest that ERP campaigns are more successful when jobs are scarce rather than when they are more plentiful. Golder (2003), on the other hand, raises questions about the model proposed by Jackman and Volpert, especially their theoretical justification, and concludes that the effects of unemployment on ERPs depends on the number of foreigners in a country.

Although the debate between these scholars makes an important contribution to the study of ERPs, it fails to take into account the very clear distinction in the literature between the “new extreme-right” and the “traditional extreme-right” (e.g. Mudde 1996; 2007; Taggart 1996; Hainsworth 2008; Rydgren 2007; Ignazi 2003; Ignazi and Ysmal 1992; Ignazi and Perrineau 2000; Carter 2005). In cited articles, Jackman and Volpert, as well as Golder, investigated political parties from various right-wing families, not only the new extreme right parties. This article claims that making a distinction between traditional and new extreme right parties is critical because only the latter have enjoyed an increase in voter support. Thus, the different recent electoral performances between traditional and new extreme right parties can be better understood on the basis of their campaign priorities and the top issues considered in their political parties programs and proposals. A consequence of this distinction refers to the non-economic focus of most ERPs campaigns (Koopmans and Muis 2009; Hainsworth 2008). As already explained, undergirding the ERPs’ set of beliefs is a more general pessimism and a lack of confidence in democratic institutions, with ERP followers representing a “new political cleavage” (Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002). If this distinction were not relevant, why has support for ERPs been growing in Finland? Moreover, why have ERPs traditionally achieved electoral support in Sweden?

The average percentage of immigrants in the WEU region is around 7% (Table 1) when not considering the exceptional case of Luxembourg, which has become a country of immigrants since the emergence of the EU. Finland and Sweden, however, are among the countries with fewer immigrants in the region (about 2% of the population), while simultaneously experiencing the biggest decline of unemployment since 1995 – Finland from 15.4% (1995) to 8.4% (2005) and Sweden from 8.5% (1995) to 4.8% (2005) –, thus before the international crisis. Although the growth of support for ERPs should not be solely attributed to immigration and economic factors, it is possible to observe from
Graphs 1 and 2 the percentage of votes obtained by ERPs in the last thirty years (since the foundation of the first ERPs in the respective countries). In general, support for ERPs is rising sharply in Finland and gaining new breath in Sweden. An opinion poll conducted in December 2008 showed that the strongest ERP in Sweden, Sweden Democrats (SD), was expected to obtain a 4.5 percent share of the votes in the general elections to be held in September 2010, when actually the SD won almost 6%. In the case of Finland, where the last parliamentary election took place in April 2011, the True Finns Party finished just behind the conservative National Coalition Party (NCP), the biggest party in Parliament, and the Social Democrats, winning around 19% of the votes. As a consequence the True Finns increased their representation in Parliament to 39, from only 5 seats in comparison with 2007. The growth of the extreme right in Finland has been associated with the growth of Euroskepticism, especially at this crisis time.

Table 1 Non-national population compared to total population WEU, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU 15</th>
<th>% Immigrants</th>
<th>EU 15</th>
<th>% Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>General Average</td>
<td>5.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherland</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>2.599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Average without Luxembourg</td>
<td>7.429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

http://www.emz-berlin.de or www.emz-berlin.de/Statistik_2/eu/eu_03.htm (accessed October 1, 2010).

This article does not evaluate a temporal dimension that could provide a more accurate view of the impact of immigration on the growth of support for ERPs in WEU. However, “anti-immigrant skepticism” (i.e., wanting to reduce immigration) is among the main factors for predicting who will vote for a radical right-wing party (Rydgren 2008). So, regardless of the impact of the temporal dimension of immigration, right-wing radicals have indeed seen immigration as a threat to national interests. In contrast to much of the earlier research that used macro-level measures and comparisons, Rydgren (2008) used individual-level data from six West European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Norway). The author demonstrates in an innovative research the degree of ethnic heterogeneity of people’s area of residence and highlights that xenophobic attitudes are a
far less significant factor than “immigration skepticism” for predicting who will vote for the new radical right.

Rydgren’s findings (2008) show the extent to which anti-immigration frames employed by radical right-wing parties resonate with attitudes held by supporting voters, and to what extent they make a difference for people’s decision to vote for the radical right. The analyses indicate that frames linking immigration to crime and social unrest are particularly effective for mobilizing voter support for the radical right.

**Graph 1** Finland: ERPs votes in Finnish elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Graph 2** Sweden: ERPs votes in Swedish elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.73</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Theory and Models

Though some major questions will remain unanswered, we attempt to contribute to answer a simpler one: what is the conjuncture and favorable circumstances that support intolerance and Euroskepticism in Europe? Apparently there are different national reasons; however, when the region of integration is observed and systematically analyzed across WEU member states since the 1980s, it is possible to find common partial explanations for the growth of extreme right-wing ideology in Europe.

The research focuses on Western Europe because the phenomenon of the new extreme right populism has developed in Western European countries over the last 30 years. As the new extreme right populism considers globalization and migration as multifaceted enemies, it follows that European integration should be seen as an unlikable phenomenon. According to Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002, 591), ERPs stem from post-industrial societies, characterized by a crisis of confidence in democratic and representative institutions, and have their roots in the defense of national sovereignty and of national culture and community against the influx of immigrants and against competing sources of identity within the state. Therefore, hostility toward immigrants is seen as the epiphenomenon of a more integrated set of beliefs that defines the ERPs’ anti-system political culture (Ignazi 2003, 212). This research claims that beyond the xenophobic attitudes, the representation deficit in European institutions may impact on European national elections because radical right-wing voters do not want to lose control over their governments. The feeling that their country is open to sharing its sovereignty with others and following supranational decisions regardless of local and national interests has prompted the reaction of radical right-wing voters.

The most visible leaders of the integration, as well as their attitudes and discourses, somehow have not been seen as representative of sectors of national societies that identify themselves with the “new political cleavage” that has supported ERPs. The political integration has been claimed to represent a risk for those that defend strongly the national identity. Indeed, regional integration has created constraints on national sovereignty; it is also true that the more powerful a member state is and the more influence a member state has on the decision-making process, the more important is its position and the greater its capacity to protect national interests. Even though citizens have very little information or knowledge about the decision-making process of EU institutions, somehow ERPs have been seen as persuasive among citizens that do not identify themselves with the discourses for political and social integration in Europe. Thus, the test can contribute to verify when the ERPs were able to capture voters’ preference and under which circumstances this happened during their existence across the WEU.
A set of econometric exercises using 1990-2006 panel data with fixed effects was determined to have “support for ERPs” as the dependent variable. This period was chosen due to the significant amount of information available for testing. Before 1990 and after 2006 data are missing that could interfere in the result. Given the inter-temporal variation captured by the panel data with fixed effects, it is possible to assess the political conditions for the growth of electoral support for ERPs in all European member states as a function of representative variables, economic aspects, and indicators gauging the perception of the national populations concerning the development of European integration.

**Dependent variable**

The dependent variable is “the support for ERPs”, that is, the share of ERP votes per election. Consideration was given to the total number of votes achieved by all new extreme right parties in existence at any time during the period analyzed. Although the test will use the percentage of ERP votes in national elections between 1990 and 2006, the Appendix brings the result of a broader research with the classification of all the existing ERPs in the EU 15 and their performance since their respective foundations until the last election. Thus, the information provided in the Appendix allows identifying specific political parties and the desegregated data that was considered in the econometric exercise.

It was observed that the growth of support for right-wing extremist ideology has been the driver of far-right movements attempting either to create new ERPs or to reform traditional radical political parties. As a result, their number and names may vary from one election to the next. For instance, although some new parties have emerged, others have changed their names while, in many cases, retaining well known leaders and members. A good example was the creation of the party “Alliance for the Future of Austria” (BZÖ) as a consequence of considerable disagreement between Jörg Haider\(^{10}\) and other members of the “Freedom Party of Austria” (FPÖ) in 2005. As a result, neither the names nor the number of parties each country has is decisive in this research. Instead, the Euroskeptic agendas of the ERPs sustain this investigation. Thus, political party programs and stances had to be analyzed to identify common missions.

As already explained, two important criteria have been followed: first, the difference between traditional extreme right-wing and the new extreme right-wing political parties (ERPs) was crucial for the selection of the political parties to be investigated; second, the number of seats obtained by ERPs in general elections is not relevant because those parties are still minorities in most Western European countries and allocation of seats in the legislature is mostly a function of the different electoral systems subsisting in member states. Thus, the share of votes is the relevant information to be tested regarding the argument of this article.
Independent variables

This section introduces the six independent variables that can be understood as taking part in three different and complementary categories spanning a host of voters’ considerations: i) representative variables, ii) economic variables and iii) variables of perception.

i) “Council Votes” and “EP Seats”: Representative variables

There are three major legislative institutions in the EU: the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the EP. The European Commission is responsible for proposing legislation, implementing decisions, and upholding EU Treaties. The Council meets in different formations, each dealing with a particular department (e.g. the Foreign Affairs Council, the Agriculture and Fisheries Council), consisting of the heads of the respective departments in each particular national government. The Council is an intergovernmental institution that plays a strong executive role in the EU government. The most important task of the EP is to legislate. Different EU reforms have vastly strengthened the EP during the integration process. The most recent was implemented by the Treaty of Lisbon determining that the “affirmation” of the EP is necessary for almost every law; however, saying “yes” or “no” on the draft proposals of the commission is not enough. The EP still cannot initiate bills directly. The really meaningful change implemented by the Treaty of Lisbon concerned “affirmation” to approve every budget, since the old distinction between “compulsory” and “non-compulsory” expenditure was abolished. The Council remains as the EU’s most important decision-making institution.

Following Ignazi’s arguments (2003), feelings of misrepresentation and lack of confidence in representative institutions are assumed to be important conditions for the emergence of the new extreme right ideology. Therefore, the impact of a member state’s representation on the institutions responsible for the EU decision-making process should be assessed. However, the variation of the weight of most national representatives in the European Commission over time is “0.” Consequently, there is no reason to evaluate the variation of the weight each national member state had in the Commission, in contrast with the cases of the Council of Ministers and the EP, which have undergone important changes in the distribution of power over time.

The weight of votes each country holds in the EU’s Council of Ministers was considered as the key explanatory variable. It is assumed here that measuring the weight of votes in the Council over time is fundamental for understanding the rise in popularity of the ERPs platform. Though a negative correlation is expected between “Council Votes” and “support for ERPs”, this does not mean that voters are well informed about the weight of the Council
in the EU decision-making process. Still, somehow this can reflect how much voters have perceived their governments enjoying power in the EU structure. The members of the EU’s Council of Ministers are members of the national executives. In other words, they are nominated by national governments and, therefore, do not represent the “communitarian interest” but, rather, national interests. The members of the Council of Ministers have more visibility in the domestic political life, especially because they depend on national nominations. Somehow, they still represent national interests and are seen as capable of defending their national states’ preferences, especially when the member state enjoys power and has voice in the EU’s Council of Ministers.

“EP votes,” the other explanatory variable for representation, is not considered a decisive variable in the model because the EP is still a weak institution in the policy-making process. Although EP legislative power has increased, especially since 2003, it is still far from being a regular Parliament that plays a key role in national legislative processes (e.g. Jacobs and Corbett 1990; Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 2007; Priestley 2008).

The most important European laws are regulations and directives, which must be approved by the co-decision procedures that were introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht (1993). However, it was only after 2003 (Treaty of Nice) that faster and more effective processes for strengthening the role of the EP were in fact implemented. Briefly speaking, the most important power the EP holds is veto power. In other words, the EP can stop changes, but it does not have efficient tools to implement and adopt policies. The EP has no power to initiate legislation, nor does it play an agenda-setting role in legislative procedures. There is intense debate about the powers of the EP and how it could be improved, but that is not the major objective of this research. The article follows the common view that the EP needs to continue being empowered through future reforms of the EU, especially because this is the only directly elected EU institution.

Because the number of seats in the EP is a function of the size of the population of member states, no clear-cut expectation exists about the effects of this variable. On the one hand, one could expect a negative correlation if it is assumed that the EP would be able to impact as much as the Council on the policymaking process. On the other hand, a positive correlation could also be expected because the EP has an absolutely different methodology to distribute power (seats). The number of seats at the EP does not correspond to an effective capacity to compensate for the losses of national legislative power by the member states. Indeed, the EP’s legislative powers have been considered weak by various scholars, whose different arguments can be categorized into weakness before Maastricht (e.g. Dehousse 1989; Edward 1987; Fitzmaurice 1988; Lenaerts 1991; Lodge 1989; Wessels 1991) and after Maastricht (e.g. Tsebelis and Garrett 1997; Tsebelis 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 1999).
It is perfectly true that the EP has significantly increased its political power in the EU over time. Especially after the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), the European Parliament gained a bigger role in setting budgets, as the old distinction between “compulsory” and “non-compulsory” expenditure was abolished. However, there was no significant improvement with regard to empowering the EP in the policymaking process in the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon enlarged the fields of the EU legislation, but it did not change the role of the EP in the general policy making process. Shortly, the national legislative power transferred to European institutions is still more concentrated in the action of the Council than in Parliament.

ii) “Unemployment” and “GDP”: Economic variables

Data on the economic variables “GDP” and “unemployment” were compiled from national and international official sources (CIS, EUROSTAT, IMF, OECD)\(^{11}\) and released by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Statistical Division Database. The data are per country and per year from 1990 to 2006. “Unemployment” represents the rate of unemployed persons as a percentage of the labor force. The labor force is the total number of people employed and unemployed. Unemployed persons comprise those currently available for work and actively seeking work. The “GDP” is based on the gross domestic product (GDP) at purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita of the value of all final goods and services produced within a nation in a given year divided by the average population for the same year. Considering the motivations suggested by the literature about new extreme right ideology as being a function of distrust of representative institutions and other non-economic effects (Kitschelt 1992; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004; 2006; Ignazi 2003), it is predicted that “GDP” and “Unemployment” may have an impact on the increase in votes for ERPs in a time series analysis. However, this research is focused on showing how non-economic variables may impact the preference of voters even more than economic variables, particularly because ERPs are in favor of economic integration, but not of political and social integration (Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002).

iii) “Knowledge” and “Nationality”: Variables of perception

“Knowledge” and “Nationality” variables measure the perception of the national populations concerning the development of European integration. The variable “Knowledge” reveals the degree to which citizens feel they are informed about the EU, its policies and institutions (% per country). It is expected that the greater the level of information about the European institutions, the lower the support for ERPs. This expectation is based on the literature’s assumption that ERP support comes mostly from blue-collar, low-income people (Ignazi 2003), who are less-informed about political institutions in general.
The variable “Nationality” is based on the perception of “feeling European vs. Nationality only.” The question in Eurobarometer (Eb) surveys is the following: “In the future do you see yourself as ‘European only,’ ‘European and Nationality,’ ‘Nationality and European,’ ‘Nationality only’?” The model included only the answers with regard to “Nationality only.” In other words, the data help to measure strong national identity feeling per country. The data on “Nationality” were collected from several editions of Eurobarometer. Taking into account that identity is a key factor in this new conservative ideology, a positive correlation was expected between “Nationality” and the “Growth of votes on ERPs”.

**Models and results**

For the time-series data gathered, a panel data estimation was used with fixed effects having the “support for ERPs” as the dependent variable. Results of elections were considered for the period from 1990 to 2006. The years without elections required an interpolation of the score obtained by ERPs in the previous electoral episode.

The growth of ERPs in WEU national elections is expected to have a positive correlation with the development of European integration as a consequence of the decrease in political power of national governments. In other words, the defense of identity is a matter of defense of instruments to represent national will. In addition, the fact that the ERPs have grown all across the WEU suggests that an explanation for this phenomenon should be found for the entire region. In order to test the hypothesis, six model specifications were run.

### Table 2 Panel data fixed effects of support for ERPs 1990-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seats EP</td>
<td>104.460***</td>
<td>106.107***</td>
<td>109.312***</td>
<td>124.459***</td>
<td>122.305**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(35.673)</td>
<td>(36.965)</td>
<td>(37.828)</td>
<td>(51.206)</td>
<td>(58.821)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
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<td>0.0150</td>
<td>0.0561</td>
<td>0.0271</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.0833)</td>
<td>(.0835)</td>
<td>(.1572)</td>
<td>(.1704)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
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<td>0.0073</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>(.1596)</td>
<td>(.1724)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2453</td>
<td>-1.540</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.5528)</td>
<td>(.6041)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>7.082***</td>
<td>5.012***</td>
<td>5.062***</td>
<td>5.042***</td>
<td>7.450*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.901)</td>
<td>(1.134)</td>
<td>(1.172)</td>
<td>(1.175)</td>
<td>(4.004)</td>
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<td>3.95</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.78</td>
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*Statistical significance denoted by *; where * equals p-value < 0.1, ** equals p-value <0.05, and *** p-value < .001. Standard Errors are in parenthesis.
Observation of Table 2 indicates that the coefficients of the variables “Council Votes” and “EP Seats” were statistically significant in all model specifications, which means that representation is an important predictor for a comprehensive understanding of voter choice for ERPs. Specifically, the model shows a negative coefficient for the first variable “Council Votes” that is in accord to the theoretical prediction: the greater the representation (more weight of votes) a member state has in the Council, the lower the electoral support ERPs tend to enjoy in national elections.

This result leads us back to the debate on how powerful the Council of Ministers has been among EU institutions and on how capable it has been to drive the decision-making process throughout the development of the EU (Wessels 1991; Weiler, Haltern and Mayer 1995; Wallace, Wallace and Webb 1983; Wallace 1982). The decrease in Council powers and potential increase of EP powers can be interpreted differently depending on the role each institution has in the policymaking process, particularly in light of the actual changes introduced by the co-decision procedure (Lodge 1987; van Hamme 1989; Tsebelis 1995; 2002; 2008; Tsebelis et al. 2001; Tsebelis and Kreppel 1995; 2005; Tsebelis and Garrett 1997; 2000). However, even if we consider that formally the EP has ‘equal' legislative power as the Council under the co-decision procedure,

(...) a majority of EU legislation is still passed under consultation procedure, where the Parliament only has a limited power of delay. (...) And, although the EP now has that power to veto the government’s choice for the Commission President and the team of the Commissioners, the governments are still the agenda-setters in the appointment of the Commission. (Follesdal and Hix 2005, 5)

In addition to being a powerful intergovernmental institution in the EU decision-making process, the EU’s Council of Ministers represents national interests while not necessarily incorporating a “supranational interest”. Ministers are nominated by national governments and are part of national executives. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the greater the political power a member state enjoys in the Council, the lower the propensity of voters strongly concerned about the defense of national interests to support ERPs’ platforms.

Conversely, the greater the representation a member state has in Parliament, the higher the electoral support ERPs tend to enjoy in national elections. Though such result was not predicted, it may also denote dissatisfaction with the socio-dynamics of post-modernization and globalization, which the extremists believe to be more prevalent in larger countries with larger populations than in smaller countries with a smaller population. In fact, these findings contribute to a better understanding of the circumstances in which feelings of detachment and lack of confidence in the system of representation are present in European countries (Ignazi 2003, 204).
Finally, the variation of these results can also be better explored by taking into account two different features of the distribution of power in the institution. First, the criterion for the distribution of seats is different from that in the Council. As mentioned earlier, the distribution of seats in the EP is based on the size of the population; however, the fact that a country holds more EP seats does not necessarily mean that it has a corresponding importance in the EU policymaking process. Indeed, this evidenced concerns related to the supranational aspects of the EU as well as concerns regarding the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU (Weiler, Haltern and Mayer 1995; Follesdall and Hix 2005; Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002).

Moreover, Members of the European Parliament (MEP) are not expected to represent national interests but, rather, the general interest of the “Community of States”. Thus, as long as the European Parliament acts as a pro-integration entrepreneur, EP policy positions under consultation will be more integrationist than Council positions. MEPs work together in parliamentary groups formed according to political party. In other words, the EP is organized on the basis of ideological links rather than of national interests. Hence, a greater number of seats in the EP does not necessarily mean that a member state holds more decision-making power, yet it does reflect a member state’s supranational powers in the EU.

Second, the debate about the limited powers of the EP is as old as the creation of the EP itself. The design of the EU means that policy-making at the European level is dominated by executive actors: national ministers in the EU Council, and government appointees in the Commission. This, in itself, is not a problem, though the actions of these executive agents at the European level are beyond the control of national parliaments” (Follesdall and Hix 2005). Successive reforms of the EU treaties have increased the powers of the EP. Nevertheless, scholars still claim that the EP is weak compared to the national parliaments and executive representatives in the EU’s Council. Most analysts of the democratic deficit argue that the EP is too weak in the EU decision making (Weiler, Haltern and Mayer 1995; Follesdall and Hix 2005; Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002). Thus, country representation in the EP neither reflects high expectation of defense of national interests, nor does it mean that the EP has a decisive voice in EU policymaking.

Another striking result is that, contrary to the expectation of the literature that does not deal with the entire region on a long-term analysis basis (e.g. Taggart 1996; Mudde and Holsteyn 2000; Rydgren 2004; Veugelers and Chiarini 2002; Veugelers and Magnan 2005), the economic performance and measures of European public perception were not statistically significant in all model specifications. The econometric exercises also demonstrate that the ERPs derive more support from member states with lower levels of unemployment. This calls for more thorough investigation, but we can speculate over that by highlighting the populist characteristic of the ERPs’ rhetoric.
In other words, although ERP leaders, by and large, make use of strong rhetoric in citing economic reasons in their arguments against the opening of frontiers, economic explanatory variables do not appear to be relevant to explain voters’ choice in favor of ERPs. How could this be interpreted? When we observe the results we note that the ERPs have received greater support from countries in which the economy is consolidated, GDP per capita is high, and unemployment is low; yet and most importantly, those countries have a representation deficit in the EU’s Council of Ministers.

**Results**

The multi-level aspects of the European political game are the most important new issue in European politics nowadays. This research contributes to building an understanding of the growth of extreme right-wing populism as a phenomenon that should be understood neither as a random event nor as a national one. Moreover, voters’ preferences about European policies are an important aspect in national elections, and ERP growth can be interpreted as a side effect of the European integration.

Especially in the case of ERP candidates in national elections, their positions regarding integration are always an important subject in political campaigns. This can be attested by looking at programs and platforms in general elections of WEU countries.

Data from national elections were collected from each country of the EU 15 from 1981 to 2007 in order to identify the growth of the share of votes for ERPs. The result is that ERP votes have been increasing in the region in step with the development of European integration. Moreover, we tested the potential correlation between the growth of “votes on ERPs” and several explanatory variables from 1990 to 2006. The findings show that stronger resistance to the EU is not related to the economic benefits delivered by the integration (Table 2). In other words, irrespective of economic performance and perceptions, the power held by each country in the EU representative institutions (Council and EP) is the most important predictor to increase in support for ERPs. It is widely known that the Council is the principal decision-making institution in the EU. The Council is part legislature, part executive, and when acting as a legislature makes most of its decisions in secret (Follesdal and Hix 2005). Since the EU Council ministers are members of national governments, national voters mostly know them. Thus, we can claim that voters may perceive they are better represented in the EU government when their national politicians are more active in EU politics. Hence, the results of the econometric test can be interpreted as a sign that voters tend not to reward ERPs when their national executive representatives have the power to directly influence the destiny of European policies.

The conclusion is that the new radical right populism is based mostly on identity and representation of cultural and national values, and that the weight of votes in EU institutions
should be observed. Since the Council is a powerful intergovernmental institution in the EU government, it may be seen as an important instrument to enhance the defense of national identity. ERPs reject both the supranational aspects of the integration and the sharing of sovereignty by stimulating ultra conservative attitudes and intolerance. The growth of votes for ERPs can also be interpreted as a regional overreaction of a broader crisis of political parties and representation. This research was not able to explain why and how ERPs can be convincing and persuasive, but it tried to describe common conditions when this has occurred.

Conclusion

The politics of “anti-system theory” has become a leitmotiv for those proclaiming discontent with current politics in Europe (Poguntke and Scarrow 1996). The ideological core of the ERPs is embedded in a broad socio-cultural conservatism, stressing themes like law and order, traditional family values and nationalism. Its central political program can be understood as a response to the erosion of the ‘ethno-national dominance’ system, which characterized much of the history of modern nation states (Rydgren 2010). Hence, while the article sought to explore when ERPs received more support from voters, it identified that representative variables help to understand the variation of this support.

The emergence of a new extreme right populism has been identified as a byproduct of the crisis of confidence in the democratic and representative institutions (Ignazi 2003). Thus, both xenophobic behavior and distrust of politics and politicians (protest vote) have been pointed out as the main reasons for voters to have supported ERPs. However, the new extreme right-wing ideology looks different from the older one especially because, though supporting potentially non-democratic policies, ERP representatives participate in elections in a democratic way. In this context, gaining representation democratically is primary to achieving their objectives. Curiously, despite their distrust of representative systems and institutions, ERP voters abide by the rules of representative elections to implement changes that may, in the future, constrain the very same democratic processes that enable their present participation.

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Notes:

1 Ignazi (2003) points out that extreme right parties are very popular among male industrial workers, the lower strata of white-collar workers in the administrative and services sectors, the poorly educated and the unemployed. In other words, among those social groups that can be regarded as post-industrial development’s biggest losers.

2 See Mudde (2007) for a helpful distinction between a minimal and maximum definition for extreme right parties’ ideology.


5 The appendix details the political parties, number of votes, and share of votes in each of the 15 WEU countries over the period used by the article in formulating its hypothesis and arguments and in calculating growth of votes.


8 According to Ignazi (2003), the extreme right family consists of two types of party: the ‘traditional’ type, which is loosely linked to the fascist tradition; and the newly-emerged, ‘post-industrial’ type, which denies references to fascism and displays instead a set of values, beliefs, and attitudes nurtured by new issues and needs of a post-industrial society.

9 The period of time tested was a result of the availability of European data from the same sources.

10 Along with France’s Jean-Marie Le Pen, Jörg Haider, who died in an accident on October 11, 2008, was one of Europe’s best known populist right-wingers.


13 The official interpretation of the EU government is that the new co-decision procedure has increased the power of the EP on the decision-making process of the EU. The Treaty says that the EP shares legislative power with the Council. However, this is neither as simple nor as obvious as the non-critical view of Maastricht has affirmed. Immediately after Maastricht, Tsebelis started to call attention to the complexity of the reforms. Since the 1990s, Tsebelis has started several empirical researches and co-authored different works motivating a necessary critical view of the role of EU institutions. The most important of Tsebelis and his co-author’s argument is that “winning Council proposals under co-decision are often likely to be less integrationist than winning Commission/EP proposals under co-operation” (Tsebelis and Garrett 1997). The only substantive effect of co-decision is to give the EP veto power over proposals that it does not like. An obvious but superficial conclusion is that co-decision represents a significant increase in the
EP’s powers. The authors claim for an institutional argument, “rational actors make decisions on the basis of their expected consequences. Therefore, they strategize ‘backwards’ from the end of a game-tree to the beginning. For example, if the Council knows that at the end of the game it will select from the set of all feasible outcomes the one it most prefers to the status quo (or to what it could obtain on its own, acting unanimously), it will not accept anything less in earlier rounds. The authors also debate about the important differences of the effects of agenda setting and veto player power in legislative environments. Polemic and disapproved by some of their peers, their contribution from late 1990s started to become respectable and changed the course of the official view that the EP increased power since the creation of the co-decision procedure as something taken as granted.

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Euroskepticism in European National Elections


Euroskepticism in European National Elections


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Electronic Sources


Public Attitudes towards Parties in Portugal: 
A Longitudinal Overview

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Paulo Almeida Pereira
Portuguese Catholic University (UCP), Portugal

This article reviews the case of the often claimed “crisis of parties” in Portugal, and argues that such controversy rests at least in part on “ambiguous” evidence. We will try to answer two fundamental research questions: 1) What motivates popular support for political parties (or lack thereof)? 2) Why does anti-party rhetoric resonate with some citizens, but not with others? The empirical data and statistical regression models used allow the following conclusion: in the eyes of Portuguese citizens, parties have become a kind of “necessary evil”, being criticized for “what they actually do” and supported for “what they are supposed to do”.

Keywords: Political parties; Decline of parties; Anti-party sentiments; Political attitudes and behaviour.

Introduction

Political parties are universally regarded as an essential component of democratic regimes and a key vehicle in the process of political representation, voter mobilization, government organizing and public policy shaping (Ware 1987; Webb 2000). Perhaps no political institution is as closely identifiable with representative democracy as are political parties, precisely because no one has yet shown how representative government could function without them.

Yet in established democracies today, the role of parties is often more limited than it would appear, judging from their position of formal pre-eminence, precisely because
citizens and political analysts consider parties incapable of fulfilling some of the classic functions, while recognizing they enjoy undue and improper privileges (Teixeira 2009a; Webb 2000; 2005). Therefore, the linking of both perceptions explains not just popular disenchantment with political parties in Western European democracies – it is also at the core of the thesis sustaining that there is crisis or decline of parties, and of the ensuing debate on whether or not this is true (Daadler 1992; 2002; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995).

The relationship between citizens and parties is becoming more and more distant and problematic in established democracies, as different indicators seem to show. These are the erosion of partisan affinity and identification, declining electoral turnout, increasing electoral volatility reflected in greater uncertainty and hesitancy in the electorate’s party choices (which is not surprising, since voting behaviour tends to become less stable as people's partisan loyalties wane), a striking reduction in party membership and activism, as well as the rise of anti-establishment parties and widespread anti-party sentiments.

But, as Paul Webb (2000) argues, even if it is undeniable that there exists evidence consistent with the putative thesis of “party decline” and with the view that the popular standing of parties has been weakened in most Western democracies, we cannot automatically infer that parties and party elites are viewed with active hostility, rejection or dissatisfaction by most citizens. If so, this would have quite profound implications for party legitimacy, and the indicators mentioned above seem to show more an undeniable weakening of party penetration in society (Mair 1995; Teixeira 2009a).

Because we are dealing with imperfect measurement instruments, which may be related to the public image of parties and party government in an indirect way, the survey-based evidence available must be understood and interpreted cautiously, especially since some of the individual-level indicators were generally collected from surveys often designed with the express purpose of gauging anti-party sentiments in mind (Linz 2002; Poguntke 1996; Torcal et al. 2007). Therefore, it is important to contextualize and understand all evidence of public opinion about parties – and its ambiguities –, so as to be able to assume that these indicators are potential correlates of party sentiments, though not party sentiments themselves. It is precisely this empirical ambiguity and its foundations that make a thorough study of this subject relevant, especially since the Portuguese case – and this research topic in particular – is not widely studied internationally.

Nevertheless, it is important to add that the analysis developed in this article is a single case study about the nature, magnitude and evolution of public support for parties in Portugal and its individual-level determinants. It is therefore a case study that has a useful purpose for comparative analysis, because it allows us to generate hypotheses that can be tested in analytical studies involving more than one case. It also enables us to refine existing
theories about the conundrum that is the relationship between citizens and parties, and its consequences in the context of contemporary representative democracies.

There are important questions in need of answers: What role do citizens consider appropriate for parties in the context of modern democracy, and how much do the parties fulfil it in their country? What do citizens really expect from the major Portuguese parties? After a brief description of the institutional factors that help understand the position parties occupy between state and civil society in Portugal, our aim in this paper is to find out the nature and trends of popular support (or lack thereof) for parties and determine their correlates at an individual level.

**Popular Support for Parties: Political Context Matters**

**The genesis and evolution of Portuguese parties and party organization**

In a democracy such as Portugal’s, the roots of “party malaise” seem to be both of an institutional and an attitudinal nature, reflecting its late and very specific transition to democracy as well as the direct effects on the nature of the parties themselves. For instance, in Portugal, between 2000 and 2008, the mistrust level towards parties was not just extremely high – over 80% –; it was almost unaltered throughout the whole time period. This value is bigger than the average in the established first and second wave democracies and also bigger than Spain’s – 70% –, which is interesting due to the obvious cultural, historical and geographical affinities between both. Again, Portugal seems closer to Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria, Slovenia, Estonia or Romania than to Western European democracies (Eurobarometer Surveys).

**Table 1 Levels of trust in parties in European Union countries (2000-2008)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Average (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in parties</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>Malta</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>22</td>
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</table>
It is now important to explain the role of the democratization process in the structuring and evolution of the Portuguese party system, and also in the nature of parties and party organizations. Portuguese parties appeared within a revolutionary context instead of developing because of social cleavages or a pre-existent party system like most European countries. The Social Democratic Party (PSD) and CDS formed in 1974 following the April revolution, while the PS formed in 1973 by members exiled at the time. The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) was therefore the only main party operating in Portugal at the time of the revolution, having been created in 1921.

When the first mobilization of the masses occurred, the fact that parties focused not on politicizing traditional social cleavages but on the conflict around the choice of political regime helps explain some of the main characteristics of Portuguese political parties. The first characteristic is the weakness of their social rooting, partially compensated by their proximity to the State and dependence on its resources. The second is the hybrid nature of partisan organizations (Lisi 2007; Jalali 2007; Teixeira 2009b), which despite having formally incorporated some characteristics of mass parties are, in practical terms, closer to the definition of cartel parties due to their media-boosted electoral orientation (namely through television) and occupation of the state apparatus.

Contradicting the existent literature on the origin of political parties in Western Europe, the revolutionary context at the time was the key factor in the process of party formation, heavily influenced by the choice of political regime after the April 1974 revolution. The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and segments of the Armed Forces Movement
(MFA) defended the adoption of a popular-type democracy, inspired on the ex-USSR model, while the Socialist Party (PS), the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the now Democratic and Social Centre – People’s Party (CDS-PP) wanted a representative democracy of the Western kind.

With the (partial) exception of the PCP (the only party that survived the previous authoritarian regime, and generally characterized as an orthodox Marxist-Leninist party), all other parties had to build a whole new organizational structure after 1974. This helps explain the choice to mobilize a broad and superficial social basis to the detriment of a deep and limited one. Again, with the PCP partially excluded, the main Portuguese parties did not seek to represent a single social class exclusively, opting instead for an openly “inter-classist” strategy with a catch-all electoral orientation.

The need to build an organization from nothing and the weak social bases that pulled Portuguese parties away from the mass party democratic model contrast deeply with the central role they occupied at an institutional level, which has remained until today. In effect, due to the democratic transition’s unstable nature, parties acquired quick access to government, even before having developed their organizational structures in the whole country (Jalali 2007; Teixeira 2009b). After that, there followed the parties’ access to parliamentary representation and their monopoly, granted by the 1976 Constitution, which states that only parties can present candidates to legislative and – until 2001 – local elections. We can therefore state that the development of parties in Portugal was conducted by the “party in public office” at local and national levels (Biezen 2003; Bosco and Morlino 2007).

This means that the great social weakness of parties was compensated by both the occupation of the state apparatus and control of local power, extracting and distributing resources at national and local levels in an effort to maintain support networks through rewarding clienteles and supporters. Beside the state apparatus occupation and local power resource usage, the Portuguese parties’ supremacy over the institutional dimension is linked to their birth in a context of public financing. By contributing to strengthening material dependence on the state, public financing caused parties to lose interest in fundraising activities as well as in massive recruitment, both mass party formation activities.

Portuguese parties were also born in an environment where the media had a deep impact on society and television quickly became the main stage of electoral campaigns. There were two kinds of effects caused by this, the first one being the centralization of national leaders and their “charisma institutionalization”, and the second one the increasing factionalizing within parties – determined more by the support given to certain national or sub-national leaders than by ideological differences (Lisi 2009).

Soon parties and their leaders became synonomous, this having been enhanced by
campaigns more and more focused on the national leaders’ image (as potential candidates for prime minister), as well as by being highly professionalized and media centred (Lobo 2005).

**Popular Support for Parties in Portugal: Meaning and Measurement**

Firstly, we need to clarify the concept of popular support. By popular support we mean the extent to which individuals evaluate political objects positively (Easton 1965). Regarding political parties, more than theoretical distinctions between different levels of support and different objects of political support (the political community, regime and political authorities), we are interested first and foremost in Easton’s dichotomy of “diffuse support”, which reflects more generalized and normative orientations towards political objects, and “specific support”, which is more directly tied to evaluations of a political object (Easton 1975).

**Table 2** Positive citizens’ attitudes towards political parties in Portugal (1985-2008)

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<tr>
<td>Without parties there can be no democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agree completely + agree</td>
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<td>70%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>69%</td>
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<td>___</td>
<td>6%</td>
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<td>11%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>21%</td>
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<td>(3001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thanks to parties people can participate in political life</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agree completely + agree</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>70%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree completely + disagree</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<td>Doesn’t know / didn’t answer</td>
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*Sources:* Sani and Ossorio (1985); Bacalhau and Bruneau (1993); Barreto (2002; 2005); Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

Whilst the former represents deeper political feelings that might provide a “potential reservoir” of support in times of political stress, the latter might reflect the immediate performance of an object, namely political parties (see also Dalton 1999; Klingemann 1998; Norris 1998).

We can start the empirical analysis of popular support for parties in Portugal by finding out if citizens’ attitudes to parties are ambivalent and contradictory or not, and what the dominant trends between 1985 and 2008 were. In order to do so, we will use a set of post-electoral surveys containing four questions designed to measure the respondent’s opinions...
on whether they believe that (1) “without parties there can be no democracy”; (2) “thanks to parties people can participate in political life”; (3) “political parties criticize each other often, but in reality they are all the same” and (4) “parties only serve to divide people”.

The respondents’ opinions on this set of questions shows that most Portuguese people (69%) consider parties to be indispensable actors of representative democracy, an opinion that remained almost unaltered from 1993 until 2008. Likewise, after the political instability during the transition to democracy had passed, most respondents (70%, reaching almost 80% in 2008) understood that “it is through parties that citizens can participate in political life”.

If this data allows us to conclude that there is a broad consensus among Portuguese citizens regarding parties’ democratic legitimacy, the fact is that citizens are still heavily critical of their performance. As Table 3 demonstrates, between 1985 and 2008 almost 70% of respondents agreed to the statement “while parties criticize each other often, in reality they are all the same”. The percentage changed from 60% in 1985 to 82% in 2008.

On the other hand, half of the Portuguese population considered that “parties only serve to divide people” and while greater oscillations were registered, the fact is that the Portuguese citizens’ opinion was very similar both in 2008 and in 1985, when the transition ended and democratic consolidation began in Portugal.

Table 3 Negative citizens’ attitudes towards political parties in Portugal (1985-2008)

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<td>Agree completely + agree</td>
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<td>52%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>57%</td>
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<td>42%</td>
<td>44%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thanks to parties people can participate in political life</td>
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<td>(2000)</td>
<td>(1303)</td>
<td>(1350)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Sani and Ossorio (1985); Bacalhau and Bruneau (1993); Barreto (2002; 2005); Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

In conclusion, what stands out from the data is the existence of a contradiction in Portuguese citizens’ attitudes concerning parties. If on the one hand the democratic legitimacy they give to parties is undeniable, on the other their unhappiness and
dissatisfaction about the way existent parties carry out their representative and governmental functions is also evident.

**National trends of popular support for parties**

Table 4 shows the results of principal components analysis on all different items or questions mentioned above. The first and second questions introduced in both tables are intended to measure the overall attitude to political parties in general, that is, the dimension of “diffuse support” for parties. The third and fourth questions seek to capture what we hypothesized to be the basic evaluative and cognitive orientations towards the traditional Portuguese party alternatives, and those are part of the “specific support” dimension of parties.

**Table 4 Dimensions of citizens’ attitudes towards parties in Portugal (1985-2008)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>% Variance</th>
<th>% Variance</th>
<th>% Variance</th>
<th>% Variance</th>
<th>% Variance</th>
<th>% Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.851</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.858</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>-0.143</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Factor 2</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.873</td>
<td>0.854</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.868</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Factor 2</td>
<td>-0.182</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>0.866</td>
<td>0.875</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.809</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Factor 2</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td>0.837</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Factor 2</td>
<td>0.566</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.859</td>
<td>0.808</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Sani and Ossorio (1985); Bacalhau and Bruneau (1993); Barreto (2002; 2005); Freire, Viegas and Seicceira (2009).*

*Note: Principal components factorial analysis (Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization).*

The results suggest some immediate conclusions. On one hand, they show us that Factor 1 is made up of items involving the recognition of the necessity of political parties for the democratic system. As we can see in Table 4, two variables related to the dimension of
“diffuse support” for political parties belong to this cluster; the magnitude of factor loadings, the percentage of variance explained by this factor (ranging between 33.0 % and 37.0 %). On the other hand, a second autonomous dimension clearly emerges from the principal components analysis, now formed by a combination of feelings of lack of support for the current behaviour of parties. Also here is the magnitude of factor loadings, the percentage of variance explained by Factor 2 (ranging between 35.0 and 44.0%).

To sum up, from the results of the exploratory factor analysis we can state that popular support for Portuguese political parties has two basic dimensions. The first one is the popular acknowledgment of the representative role political parties play in the political system according to the ideology of representative democracy. The second dimension could be best described as the criticism of the current functioning of political parties, indicating “specific” popular support for parties’ behaviour.

It is also important to note that in each popular support dimension three types of attitudes can be found: “pro-party”, “ambiguous” and “anti-party”. Therefore, regarding the “diffuse support” for parties, we can speak of “pro-party attitudes” when respondents agree with the following statements: “without parties there can be no democracy” and “thanks to parties people can participate in political life”. Conversely, if respondents disagree with these statements we have “anti-party attitudes”, and when they agree with one statement only, “ambiguous attitudes”.

Regarding the “specific support” for parties, we are interested to know whether respondents agree or not with the following statements: “political parties criticize each other often, but in reality they are all the same” and “parties only serve to divide people”. If they disagree with both, we have “pro-party attitudes”, while if they agree with both statements we have “anti-party attitudes”. Finally, if respondents disagree with one statement only, we then have “ambiguous attitudes”.

We shall now see how these three types of attitudes are distributed with respect to each separate dimension of popular support for parties. Regarding “diffuse support”, in Table 5 we see “pro-party attitudes” assuming a clear preponderance over “anti-party” ones: on average 84% of the Portuguese population recognizes that parties are necessary to democracy, supporting Schattschneider’s (1942) view that “democracy without parties is unthinkable to most citizens”.

However, if democracy without parties is unthinkable to the great majority of Portuguese citizens, it still does not keep them from being extremely sceptical and critical of the parties’ democratic performance. Table 6 shows that between 1985 and 2008, over 60% of the Portuguese population demonstrated strong discontent with the traditional party alternatives due to their poor functioning. At the same time, little over 20% seemed satisfied with the way major parties had been carrying out their roles.
Table 5 Evolution of citizens’ attitudes towards parties in Portugal, 1985-2008 (diffuse support dimension)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude type</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-party</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-party</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Sani and Ossorio (1985); Bacalhau and Bruneau (1993); Barreto (2002); Barreto (2005); Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

Note: Both “Don’t know/Didn’t answer” and “Neither agree nor disagree” were excluded from the analysis.

With regard to “specific support”, it is also surprising to observe that in 2008 “anti-party attitudes” were higher than 1985 values, exactly after the end of the democratic transition and beginning of the consolidation of the regime. This shows that the strong “critical anti-partyism” of Portuguese public opinion on parties is relatively independent of political, economic and social mid- and long-term changes in the country – a pattern more expectable from “diffuse support” for political parties.

Table 6 Evolution of citizens’ attitudes towards parties in Portugal, 1985-2008 (specific support dimension)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude type</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-party</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-party</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Sani and Ossorio (1985); Bacalhau and Bruneau (1993); Barreto (2002); Barreto (2005); Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

Note: Both “Don’t know/Didn’t answer” and “Neither agree nor disagree” were excluded from the analysis.

From this data we can draw the following conclusion: the legitimacy that the majority of Portugal’s population recognizes in parties as pillars of representative democracy clearly coexists with a strong and generalized feeling of discontent about the way major parties have been carrying out their roles in the Portuguese political system.

Individual-level Determinants of Popular Support for Parties in Portugal

We will now examine whether this public support, understood as a multidimensional phenomenon, varies between different population segments. Using data from the most recent survey of the Portuguese population (2008), we will try to answer one fundamental research question: What motivates popular support for political parties (or lack thereof)? Starting from theoretical argumentation backed up empirically, stating that citizens’
attitudes regarding parties are not subsumable into a single concept of “popular support”, and have instead two distinct and autonomous dimensions – “diffuse support” and “specific support” –, it is our objective to test some specific hypotheses resultant from the following theoretical proposal:

Since “diffuse support” and “specific support” are both conceptually and empirically distinct, these dimensions of popular support for parties have substantially different individual determinants.

H1 – While “diffuse support” for parties is the result of accumulated experiences over time, we have reasons to expect its individual determinants to be more structural than cyclical, and therefore liable to be analysed through cultural-based interpretations of the sources of political support. This approach focuses mainly on the role played by socialization patterns, social or interpersonal trust and basic values orientations as explanatory variables of “diffuse support” for the political system.

H2 – While “specific support” for parties is deeply dependent on short-term performance and the main parties’ outputs, it is expectable that their individual determinants are more conjuncture-related than structural, and therefore liable to be analysed through performance-based interpretations of the sources of political support. From this point of view, a lack of support for parties would be a natural consequence of the discontent shown by citizens regarding the behaviour of major parties and their short-term policy outputs.

Hypotheses and methodology

In order to test these hypotheses, in this section we will carry out a multivariate analysis of public support for parties based on the most recent survey of the Portuguese population (2008). Since we have three possible choices (pro-party, ambiguous and anti-party attitudes) in each popular support dimension, we will use multinomial logistic regression in this analysis.

Dependent variables

The data used in this section was drawn from the most recent (2008) national survey, based on a representative sample of the continental part of Portugal (N = 1350). It was applied to citizens of 18 years of age and over, who were also stratified by region and type of habitat. In the multinomial logistic regression models, the dependent variables are “diffuse support” and “specific support” for political parties in Portugal. These are multinomial variables, since each comprehends three categories distinguishable by the following non-numerical characteristics: 1) pro-party attitudes; 2) ambiguous attitudes and 3) anti-party attitudes.
Independent variables

The multinomial logistic regression models developed in this article employ a number of independent variables that result from the two main theoretical approaches regarding political support, namely the cultural-based approach and the performance-based approach.

A) Social background and socialization experiences

To the extent that social background and socialization experiences do matter to the “diffuse support” dimension, the least advantaged could be expected to be the most disaffected and/or hostile to political parties. It is these sectors of society – the women, the elderly, the less educated, the less affluent, the unemployed and also the ones who live in rural and needy parts of the country – who are presumably the least likely to feel that parties are indispensable to democracy or that the party system is responsive to their needs.

However, considering the “specific support” dimension, and given its cyclical and more fluctuant nature, it is likely that attitudes regarding parties are more resultant of their “life cycle” and that they acquire a more critical and reactive tone amongst the young. Given that younger citizens are now associated with a “new style of citizen politics” (Dalton 2008; Inglehart 1997) reflecting an even more critical and reformist view of traditional political institutions, it is expected that they will be less supportive of parties than citizens of an older age.

Regarding education, as some authors note, in the less well-established democratic regimes of Southern Europe that underwent prolonged periods of authoritarian rule – Portugal’s case – a specific kind of anti-party sentiment is associated with lower education (Torcal, Montero and Gunter 2007). This is an expectation that tends to be the opposite in well-established democracies, where those with higher education tend to have greater awareness of the need for parties in a representative democracy. This occurs mainly due to a socialization process that took place under a democratic regime, and the ensuing early assimilation of all the “rules of the game” that characterize and distinguish it from non-democratic systems.

However, since a higher level of education tends to also be associated to a higher degree of political sophistication (Dalton 2008), this could explain the rising expectations of parties by the citizens of the Portuguese democracy, as well as the leaning by those who possess higher levels of education to act in a more demanding and critical fashion towards political institutions, elites and processes.

Therefore, there are reasons to expect that the more educated are more likely to become frustrated with manoeuvres performed by parties and politicians and harbour anti-party sentiments than the less educated. Also, the perceived lack of responsiveness by political
Institutions and authorities to the demands of less-developed regions can lead citizens to feel they are not receiving their fair share of wealth or power, hence the strong criticism of the current behaviour of the party system.

However, the fact that individuals who live in urban or semi-urban areas – and in the more developed regions near the coastline – are closer to the political decision centres and also more attentive to party performance and policy content can lead to more critical and reactive attitudes towards specific parties – typically the system’s main players – or in other words, to a larger critical anti-partisanship.

**B) Political sophistication**

Political variables may be helpful in understanding differences in public opinion about political parties. These variables express what we can call political sophistication, conceptualized here as an interest in politics and inclination to discuss it, internal political efficiency and media – namely television – exposure in order to obtain political information.

As for this set of variables, it is expectable that a politically sophisticated public would have a greater ability to understand the central role and the important functions political parties play in modern representative democracies. As far as the “specific support” aspect is concerned, there are also reasons to expect that a politically sophisticated public would be less likely to hold unrealistic expectations of party behaviour and have anti-party sentiments (Dalton 2008; Norris 1998).

However, this interpretation is far from consensual. According to some authors, most sophisticated publics are more demanding about the functioning of political institutions, which makes them more sceptical and critical about the poor functional performance of parties.

With regard to television, it is expected that greater exposure to political news implies greater “diffuse support” for political parties as such. When analysing the “specific support” dimension, this pattern is not as expected as in “diffuse support”, as some scholars argue that the increasing tendency shown by the media (television) to report on corruption and scandalous behaviour contributes to the erosion of public support for parties, making citizens much more sceptical and even cynical about the functioning of established parties.

Lastly, in the multinomial logistic regression model we include two other long-term political variables, since they are assimilated by individuals during the first phases of the political socialization process. The first one is the ideological self-placement of citizens on the left-right scale and the second is their adherence to materialistic or post-materialistic values. We expect those who place themselves to the right of the ideological spectrum to show greater hostility towards parties, because three decades after the 1974 revolution, and as some studies show, the support for the democratic regime by voters on the left is greater than by voters on the right (Heimar et al. 1990; Magalhães 2005).
On the other hand, and taking into account Ronald Inglehart’s thesis, one of the alleged consequences of “cultural change” and of the increasing adoption of post-materialist values (Inglehart 1977; 1997), when observed in the context of advanced industrial societies, is that individuals adopt more demanding criteria regarding the evaluation of traditional authority sources, a category in which parties are necessarily included. We can therefore admit that in that increasing demand there is a delegitimizing and criticizing anti-partyism.

C) Evaluation of economic performance

The lack of public support for parties may also have economic roots. A commonly mentioned cause for the lack of political support has been the negative public assessment of economic performance. With regard to parties, one might expect political support to reflect the ability of the major parties (the ones with a propensity to form government) to deliver what the general public expects of them in terms of economic policies. When successive governing parties fail to reduce public dissatisfaction with their poor economic performance, the public may become generally hostile to or even reject political parties.

The variables considered here are: the proximity of the respondent to the incumbent party; the retrospective evaluation of the party in the government’s economic performance and, lastly, the retrospective evaluation of the country’s economic situation. With “diffuse support”, a kind of positive sentiments reservoir concerning political objects, we can admit that it will not be challenged by short-term phenomena or specific advantages at a given moment. This means that even when voters show deep discontent and dissatisfaction with the parties’ short-term responses to the country’s economic problems, they still recognize their democratic legitimacy.

Conversely, and because “specific support” for parties is related to the way parties, particularly the incumbent party, respond to the social needs of citizens and the distribution of benefits concerning their personal material well-being, we have reasons to expect the following: the greater the proximity to the incumbent party (through voting) and the more negative the assessment of both the party’s economic functioning and the subjective state of the country’s economy is, the greater will the frustration regarding the performance of established parties be.

What also needs to be understood is if, given the current economic and financial crisis in Portugal, public frustration might be mirrored in overall dissatisfaction not just with the party in government, but also with political parties as such. Furthermore, it is also important to know to what extent the combination of frustrations with the economic performance of the parties in government will give rise to long-term attitudes towards political parties in general.
D) Evaluation of political institutions and politicians’ performance

Some indicators tell us that trust in political institutions and politicians affect what people think of political parties. On one hand, citizens are more likely to recognize the legitimacy of political parties as the level of trust in the institutions that constitute the pillars of democratic systems rises. On the other hand, and considering the “specific support” dimension, it is expected that the critical and reactive attitudes adopted by citizens as a response to the current behaviour of parties will be more expressive among those who are suspicious of the main political institutions, and also among those who consider politicians in general to be unaccountable and unresponsive to citizens’ needs.

E) Civil society and social capital

Civil society and social capital theories have different intellectual origins but are still related: both argue that the stability and quality of representative democracy – therefore of its main institutions – rest on strong informal and formal social networks independent of government, and both emphasize the importance of the underlying social foundations of democracy (Putnam 1995).

In order to test the impact of social capital, we have included in our regression model another set of independent variables, namely generalized social trust and belonging, and active participation in social and civic associations. Our expectations regarding these variables are the following: attitudes towards parties will be less hostile the greater the social trust and civic engagement are, especially in the “diffuse support” dimension.

Results and Discussion

The results of the multinomial logistic regression models that determine the variables that better explain “diffuse” and “specific” support are presented in Tables 7 and 8. As we can see, both models show percentages of total variance explained that are rather satisfactory, with pseudo R2 values that vary between 37% and 43%. We consider them to be rather satisfactory because democratic legitimacy and dissatisfaction regarding the performance of political parties not only coexist in Portuguese public opinion, but are also extremely diffuse and generalized phenomena among a large segment of the population, making the detection of explanatory factors at an individual level difficult.

We will now analyse Table 7, which shows the parameter estimates resulting from the model predicting citizens’ “diffuse support” for political parties.

If we contrast individuals who manifest attitudes of hostility towards parties in general (anti-party attitudes) with those who recognize parties as essential to the functioning of democracy (pro-party attitudes), we verify that respondents living in rural areas, who
declare themselves to be moderately partisan or non-partisan, demonstrate materialistic value priorities, and have a negative perception of the country’s economy are also those who have a higher probability of adherence to an anti-partyism of the delegitimizing type.

**Table 7** Parameter estimates of the multinomial logistic regression of popular support for parties in Portugal (2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diffuse support dimension</th>
<th>Anti-party attitudes versus pro-party attitudes</th>
<th>Ambiguous attitudes versus pro-party attitudes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-4.812 (3.43)***</td>
<td>-10.572 (8.70)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-demographic background</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>-0.167 (0.44)</td>
<td>-0.159 (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.378 (0.62)</td>
<td>-0.514 (0.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.576 (0.37)</td>
<td>-0.587 (0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>-0.319 (0.58)</td>
<td>0.313 (0.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>-0.260 (0.54)</td>
<td>-0.0324 (0.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitat (urban)</td>
<td>-1.994 (0.74)***</td>
<td>-1.390 (0.69)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (Lisbon and Tagus Valley)</td>
<td>-1.635 (7.50)***</td>
<td>-1.127 (0.72)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political attitudes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>-0.243 (0.27)</td>
<td>-0.628 (0.20) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal political efficacy</td>
<td>-0.222 (0.57)</td>
<td>-0.127 (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification</td>
<td>-5.505 (1.26)***</td>
<td>-3.323 (0.82)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure TV news</td>
<td>0.353 (0.62)</td>
<td>0.454 (0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological self-placement (left-right)</td>
<td>0.175 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.104 (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialist values</td>
<td>-0.778 (0.48)*</td>
<td>-0.345 (0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political and economic performance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in political institutions</td>
<td>-2.823 (1.62)***</td>
<td>-0.933 (0.92)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion about politicians</td>
<td>-1.552 (0.27)***</td>
<td>0.579 (0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of government performance</td>
<td>-0.447 (0.35)</td>
<td>-0.914 (0.44)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of the state of the economy</td>
<td>-0.872 (0.32)**</td>
<td>-1.554 (0.26)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social capital</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General trust</td>
<td>-0.276 (0.52)</td>
<td>-0.912 (0.49)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and civic activism</td>
<td>-0.217 (1.60)</td>
<td>-1.746 (0.85) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R2</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of valid cases</td>
<td>652</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correctly predicted</td>
<td>78.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p< 0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
Note: Column entries are multinomial logit coefficients with standard errors shown in parentheses.

In turn, if we compare the profiles of respondents who manifest pro-party attitudes and of the ones who show a neutral or indifferent attitude concerning parties, we observe that the latter have a higher probability of differing from the former on the following essential
aspects: they live in semi-urban areas and outside the more developed region of the country (Lisbon and the Tagus Valley). In terms of political attitudes, they are non-partisan or moderately partisan, have a negative perception of the country’s economic situation and have weak social capital, since they tend to be suspicious of others and participate less in social and civic associations.

When analysing the parameter estimates that result from the model that predicts citizens’ “specific” support for political parties, we found that the contrast between citizens who support the concrete functioning of established parties (pro-party) and those who do not (anti-party) becomes more evident in terms of social background. This occurs because there is a higher probability that citizens who show critical and reactive attitudes towards the performance of the party-system will be younger, single, possess higher educational capital, and live in an urban habitat or the more developed region of Lisbon and the Tagus Valley.

**Table 8** Parameter estimates of the multinomial logistic regression of popular support for parties in Portugal (2008)
In comparison to those who manifest support for the established parties’ behaviour, the probability of these citizens finding themselves unemployed, feeling distant from the party in government, and having a negative assessment of its performance and the country’s economic situation in general is higher. There is also a higher likelihood of them having mistrust in political institutions or negative impressions of politicians in general than among respondents who support the main parties.

As for the comparison between respondents who show themselves to be neutral or indifferent concerning the performance of parties, and those who support their performance (reference group), what stands out is the predicted probability of the former feeling less close to the party in government and assessing negatively its economic performance. Nevertheless, the probability of them being younger and possessing higher educational capital than respondents who claim to feel satisfied with the performance of parties also stands out.

Having reached this point in our analysis, we will now contrast these results with our investigation hypotheses. Regarding the “diffuse support” dimension, we have observed that in terms of the socio-demographic background, our hypothesis claiming that diffuse anti-partyism is associated to deprivation of social, economic and educational resources is not confirmed. The hypothesis is somewhat confirmed only in the case of habitat and region. Invalidated are also the hypotheses claiming that in Portugal – more than 30 years after the April 1974 Revolution – there subsists a lack of “diffuse support” for parties among the older and less educated population segments, whose socialization occurred under the authoritarian regime, which was characterized by an anti-political and anti-party rhetoric and practice.

However, regarding the “diffuse support” dimension, the hypotheses associating the closeness to a party, adherence to materialistic values, trust and social and civic participation to a greater support for parties as institutions that play a central role in democracy are confirmed. However, it is curious to note that along with these long-term attitudinal variables there is a short-term one that stands out. We are referring to the retrospective analysis (of the last 12 months) of the country’s economy. There is therefore a larger probability that anti-party feelings are greater among those who negatively assess the country’s economic performance, thus seemingly dissociating it from the general performance of the party currently in government.
In our understanding, this clear dissociation between the assessment of the government’s performance and the country’s economy allows us to state the following: the combining of short-term frustrations with the economic performance of the main parties likely to be in government (PS and PSD) may have become a political experience in itself. In fact, as we can see in Table 5, such results far from presuppose the existence of informed and mobilized people, both critically and cognitively. As for the variables related to the social background of the respondents who showed greater criticism of the main parties’ performance, such a hypothesis is widely rejected.

**Conclusion**

Throughout the preceding pages we attempted to shed light on the attitudinal Portuguese map regarding political parties, whose misunderstanding seems sometimes to justify some contradictions, ambiguities and perplexities. With a set of questions in four public opinion surveys (1985, 1993, 2002 and 2008) we showed that the attitudes of the Portuguese towards parties can be grouped into two dimensions – not just theoretically, but also empirically distinct. One of these translates “diffuse support” for parties and relates to the recognition and internalization of the popular role and functions that parties are often called to play in representative democracies. Another, in turn, corresponds to the satisfaction and contentment of the people with the practical operation of the established parties, and is reflected in the “specific support” to them.

The finding that these two dimensions are empirically independent allows us, therefore, to divert some more pessimistic interpretations that tend to relate the hypothetical crisis or perceived decline of parties in advanced industrial societies with the current loss (almost irreversible, according to many scholars and political commentators) of their democratic legitimacy. As we have seen, “diffuse support” for parties is not an issue in Portugal, and strong dissatisfaction with the functioning and performance of the major parties is far from producing any “contagion effect” capable of eroding the “reservoir of favourable attitudes” regarding the indispensability of parties and the functions they perform in the context of representative democracy.

If they can be considered an “evil”, they are, however, as we have seen, a “necessary evil”. And if there is a crisis of political parties in Portugal, it is certainly not a crisis associated with a loss of legitimacy but rather with a poor and challenged performance. On the other hand, as we demonstrated, both popular support dimensions possess distinct determinants at an individual level. If the initial hypothesis of the lack of “diffuse support” for parties (“delegitimizing anti-partyism”) was based on deprived economic resources and education, being most prevalent among older people and women – in terms of patterns of political
socialization not only unequal (men versus women), but also dual (dictatorship versus democracy) –, the fact is that this hypothesis has not been confirmed by our analysis.

The hypothesis that criticism of the current performance of the major parties (“critical and reactive anti-partyism”) would have in the younger, better educated but also the more politically sophisticated its main spokespersons in Portugal was also ruled out. If it had been confirmed, it would, in a sense, have been in accordance with the theories of Inglehart (1977; 1997) and Dalton (2008). But again, contrary to expectation, hostility to or rejection of the Portuguese parties as such are not fully independent of other phenomena of a more cyclical than structural nature, such as the performance of political institutions and political assessment of the current leaders, and neither are the discontent with and criticism of parties. In short, regarding the individual determinants, the “diffuse support” for parties (or lack of it) is explained not only through a cultural-centred interpretation, as we expected, but also through performance-based interpretations of sources of political support.

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### Variables Coding and measurement

#### Socio-background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coding and measurement</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male 1, female 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>8-categories from lower 1 (none) to higher 8 (university degree)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>Married or living with a partner 1, other 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation (labour market)</td>
<td>Employed 1, unemployed 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main job</td>
<td>Public sector 1, other 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitat</td>
<td>5-categories from lower 1 (less than 2000 inhabitants) to higher 5 (more than 300,000 inhabitants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Coast 1, interior 0</td>
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</table>

#### Political attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coding and measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>“What is your degree of interest in politics?” 4-categories from lower 1 (no interest) to higher 4 (high interest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal efficacy</td>
<td>“To what extent do you agree or disagree of the following statement: Politics is a very complicated subject, only specialists can understand it.” 4-categories from higher 4 (completely disagree) to lower (completely agree)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to TV news</td>
<td>“How frequently do you follow political events through the media? Television.” 5-categories from lower 1 (never) to higher 5 (every day)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right self-placement</td>
<td>“In politics, people sometimes talk about ‘left’ and ‘right’. Card nº 11 defines this situation: 0 - stands for someone whose views are entirely to the ‘left’; 10 - for someone whose views are entirely to the ‘right’. Of course, there are intermediate positions to the degree that defines one’s views as being more or less to the ‘left’ or to the ‘right’. When you think about your own ideas on this, where would you place yourself on this scale?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience of left-right self-placement</td>
<td>Self-placement in left-right scale 1, no self-placement in left-right scale 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialist values</td>
<td>To what extent do you agree or disagree of the following statements: a) Stronger measures should be enforced to protect the environment; b) Immigrants are beneficial to Portugal’s economy; c) Women should be free to decide about abortion; d) Marriage between individuals from the same sex should be allowed by law. The variable is the result of the sum of affirmative answers to each one of these items (completely agree + agree)</td>
</tr>
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#### Attitudes towards parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coding and measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diffuse support for parties</td>
<td>“To what extent do you agree with the following statements: a) Without parties there can be no democracy; b) Thanks to parties people can participate in political life”. This variable is composed by the combination of answers to these two questions, and was recoded into the following: If respondents disagree with both statements, we can say we are before “anti-partisan” attitudes. If respondents agree with both statements, then we are before “pro-partisan” attitudes. Finally, if respondents agree to one statement and disagree with the other, we are before “neutral” attitudes. After the recoding, the variable was divided in two categories: Pro-partisan attitudes 1, Other 0</td>
</tr>
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Specific support for parties

“To what extent do you agree with the following statements: a) Parties are only good to divide people; b) Parties criticize each other often, but in reality they are all the same”. This variable is composed by the combination of answers to these two questions, and was recoded into the following: If respondents disagree with both statements, we can say we are before “pro-partisan” attitudes. If respondents agree with both statements, then we are before “anti-partisan” attitudes. Finally, if respondents agree to one statement and disagree with the other, we are before “neutral” attitudes. After the recoding, the variable was divided in two categories: Pro-partisan attitudes 1, other 0.

Party identification

“Is there a party you feel more identified with?” Yes 1, no 0.

Proximity to the ruling party

“Did you vote for the party currently in government in the last legislative elections?” Yes 1, no 0.

Political and economic performance

Trust in political institutions

“What is the degree of your trust in each of the following institutions?” Government, Parliament, courts and public administration” 4-categories from lower 1 (no trust) to higher (high trust).

Opinion about politicians

“To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Politicians don’t care about what people like me think” 4-categories from lower 1 (completely disagree) to higher 4 (totally agree).

Assessment of government performance

“Thinking of the general performance of the current government, how do you assess its performance?” Categories from lower 1 (very poor) to higher 4 (very good). [Inversion of the scale]

Assessment of the state of the economy

“What do you think of the state of economy in Portugal?” 5-categories from lower 1 (very poor) to higher 5 (very good) [Inversion of the scale].

Social capital

General trust

“In general terms, do you think that most people can be trusted or that you can never be too careful”. Most people can be trusted 1, You can never be too careful 0.

Member of voluntary associations

Are you a member of any of the organizations or associations here mentioned: a) unions; b) employers’ organizations; c) socio-professional associations; d) religious organizations; e) social organizations; f) civic action organizations; g) cultural organizations; h) sports clubs; i) recreational associations and clubs. The variable is composed by the sum of the answers to these items: Yes, I am a member 1, No, I am not a member 0.

Social and civic activism

“Do you actively and regularly participate in any of the organizations where you are a member: a) unions; b) employers’ organizations; c) socio-professional associations; d) religious organizations; e) social organizations; f) civic action organizations; g) cultural organizations; h) sports clubs; i) recreational associations and clubs. The variable is composed by the sum of the answers to these items: Yes, I am a member 1, No, I am not a member 0.

Sources: Sani and Ossorio (1985); Bacalhau and Bruneau (1993); Barreto (2002; 2005); Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).
Do Institutions Produce Institutional Change? The New Historical Institutionalism and Analytic Innovations in the Theory of Change*

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This essay discusses the problem of endogenous institutional change in the context of the new historical institutionalism. It reviews the critique of traditional theorizing on institutional change and offers a comparative analysis of innovative approaches to institutional change on the contemporary agenda of historical institutionalism in comparative political science. The analysis focuses on the logic underlying the conceptual and analytical transformations in the methodological debate of how to expand the explanatory capacity of traditional models by introducing institutional variables in them. We review quasi-parametric models, incremental change models and those models seeking to introduce the dynamic interaction between ideas and institutions. The key argument is that, over this decade, institutional change models, driven by the introduction of new concepts, new modes of theorizing, and new mechanisms of change, have undergone a remarkable analytical transformation. These innovations have allowed political scientists to deal with change endogenously.

Keywords: Comparative Political Science; Endogenous change; Theory of institutional change; New institutionalism; New historical institutionalism: Theory and models; Case studies.

* This essay was developed in the context of a research productivity project on “Neoinstitutionalism and institutional change”, sponsored by the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) since 2005. The analyses herein contained draw on extensive contributions from many colleagues through suggestions, commentaries and remarks in several seminars, discussions and other forms of academic interaction.
Introduction

The study of endogenous institutional change represents a central theme in the new research agenda produced by new institutionalism in comparative political science. The key analytical challenge for endogeneity lies in the question of how possible it is to introduce institutional factors to explain change that was traditionally considered as being produced by exogenous, i.e., non-institutional factors. Analysts working in this tradition usually underscore the fact that, in interpreting and explaining change, institutional variables are to be understood as the building blocks on which to evolve new theories and models.

Considerable analytical effort in the neoinstitutional tradition has led to a new research frontier that has been seeking to more seriously address endogeneity issues. Institutional analysis has been faced with a remarkable revolution in the ideas and concepts underpinning theories of endogenous institutional change. The new institutionalism has offered a new generation of theories on how and why institutional elements drive institutional change. Traditional models and theories are being reviewed, while there is a rising wave in conceptual, theoretical and methodological innovations on the question of change.

This article aims to review innovative approaches to the new historical institutionalism generated since the 2000s. The choice for the new historical institutionalism as a case for comparative theoretical analysis stems from the fact that it is precisely in this strand of institutional research that lie the key concerns regarding innovation and the refinement of models designed to approach institutional change-related phenomena in political science. What is striking is the rising concern with expanding the analytical capacity of the traditional models and refining the status of endogenous institutional variables.

The models and theories analyzed herein represent plausible alternatives to go beyond the limits of the exogenous explanations traditionally considered in institutionalist research work. Emphasis on analytical innovations allows us to see which new frontiers are being expanded as a result of the increasing introduction of new concepts, new theorizing and, foremost, of a range of mechanisms that render it possible to approach the problem of change by relying mostly on institutional factors.

This article seeks to more closely understand how such transformations have taken place and which conceptual and theoretical changes were produced within the neoinstitutionalist debate on the actual possibility of conferring centrality on endogenous, i.e., institutional, factors in analyzing change.

The understanding of such innovations focuses primarily on the theoretical logic, concepts and mechanisms introduced to explain change. To be sure, as this is a field of
research wherein innovations occur on a continuous basis, the theoretical cases approached are to be construed as a consistent approximation to the universe of new analytical possibilities, rather than a definitive treatment of the issue. Furthermore, the article does not seek to launch a new theory on endogenous change or discuss specific results of empirical studies in different contexts of change but, rather, to focus more broadly on modes of analysis and theorization for the case of the new historical institutionalism.

The article is organized in the following manner. In the first section, it explores the problem of endogeneity on the research agenda by showing how new institutionalist traditional explanations ultimately respond to non-institutional (exogenous) factors. Next, we conduct a comparative analysis of three theories and models considered as substantively innovative insofar as they introduce endogenous elements in the traditional theories of change. In the last section, our final remarks take into consideration the likely implications of these comparative analysis findings for the development of the analysis of change in the context of the new institutionalism.

**The Traditional Explanation for Change in the New Historical Institutionalism**

The analysis of institutional change is one of the core problems of the so-called new institutionalisms in political science. Rothstein (1996) considers the analysis of change one of the most problematic issues on the institutional analysis agenda. Traditional approaches to the analysis of change tend to rely on functionalist, historical or cultural explanations to account for the demand for certain institutional arrangements, all of which have proven insufficient to explain why and how the latter are generated.

Theorizing on change actually depends on how to formulate models capable of generating plausible and testable hypotheses of why and how certain patterns of interplay between agents, resources and institutions are relevant in some conditions while not in others. Campbell (2006) argues there are at least three “critical frontiers” of key relevance to the new institutionalisms: (1) theorization about change; (2) the capacity to specify the mechanisms driving institutional change and (3) the challenge of embedding ideational analytical categories. The production of analytical innovations in the study of institutional change emerges as one of the essential fields for the survival and development of the new institutionalism.

To Goodin (1996) institutional change must be analyzed as arising from the isolated (or combined) action of variables associated with institutional design, selective competition and the action of exogenous shocks. Analysis is to focus on determining in which conditions certain combinations of institutional and non-institutional causes operate in order to produce change (or non-change), as well as identifying their key causal mechanisms.
Traditional approaches to change in the new historical institutionalism\textsuperscript{3} encompass two conceptual frameworks: incremental models and punctuated equilibrium models.\textsuperscript{4} While incremental approaches conceive of change as the outcome of a gradual accumulation of “small transformations and marginal adjustments to causal factors external to institutions over time”, punctuated equilibrium models conceive change as “radical alterations” in incremental patterns. These models conceive of the occurrence, in specific contingencies, of great transformations, usually brought about by non-institutional, exogenous factors.\textsuperscript{5}

Traditional theorizing therefore focuses on analyses that underscore how exogenous causes bring about institutional change over time. Change is understood as disruption, a deviation, an alteration in relation to those models hinged on status quo stability, order and maintenance. Traditional explanations, whether based on incremental or on punctuated equilibrium models, draw on the isolated or combined action of two key causal mechanisms: diffusion processes (e.g. of ideas, policies, technologies etc.) and the action of legacies and path-dependence.\textsuperscript{6}

As argued by Peters (2000), Peters, Pierre and King (2005), Pierson (2000; 2004) and Mahoney (2000), legacies and path dependence, as important mechanisms for structuring institutional maintenance and stability, are directly associated with the institutional arrangements’ self-reinforcing and positive feedback dynamics. Institutions are usually stable and tend to endure over time by relying on powerful institutional reproduction mechanisms.

The emergence over time of self-reinforcing outcomes that shape similar future outcomes is an important reasoning of traditional institutional change theory. Institutional inertia stems from the fact that certain sequences of events over time tend to reinforce self-enforceable institutional models that are decoupled from efficiency, legitimacy, or other performance criteria. The key to understanding institutional change is to assume that conditions exist whereby agents create and find ways to exploit institutional legacies.

Hence, the traditional analysis of change in the new historical institutionalism builds on the assumption that change is related to the occurrence of critical junctures external to institutions. These external events tend to produce conditions for a rupture with a given institutional order stemming from a transformation in agency-structure interaction\textsuperscript{7}. Katznelson (2003) suggests that critical juncture models approach this problem by addressing the relation between agency and structure in a new way, one that is gaining prominence in comparative political science and that is underpinned on a periodization and preferences approach. Processes of change in relation to the existing institutional order are seen as outcomes that, for a number of reasons, shape distinct relationship patterns between agents (preferences) and structures (periodization).\textsuperscript{8}

The occurrence of critical junctures is a key assumption in traditional institutional
analysis in the political science as well in sociology. Stinchcombe (1968) considers there are two basic types of explanation for institutional continuity and stability: constant causes and historical causes. The latter would be fundamental to understanding the role and meaning of critical junctures in the interpretation of change. Based on the critical junctures approach, Collier and Collier (1991) make an important contribution to the field of comparative policy studies with their analyses of labor-policy reforms for the case of six Latin American countries. Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) provide substantial analysis of the concept of critical junctures and of their relevance to the more recent analysis of change in new historical institutionalism frameworks in comparative political science.

Katznelson (2003) argues that historical-comparative analyses of change in political science should focus primarily on the role of agents and their preferences in these critical junctures. Attention to these processes would shed light on the mechanisms that disrupt stability, thus making it possible to understand how change is made possible.

Critical junctures represent therefore temporal configurations that enable the realigning of agents’ beliefs, preferences and strategic choices in relation to new institutional models. Katznelson (2003) considers that institution-centered approaches\(^9\) represent fruitful ways to more adequately address the tension between periodization and preferences for the analysis of change. The author suggests that the analysis of change should be built on models that do not confer ontological superiority either on agency, as do those models centered on rational choice, or on social structures.

In assuming the existence of critical junctures, institutionalist analysis makes it possible to understand how such “atypical” events enable agents and their preferences to generate change by breaking with the status quo. Pierson (2004) pushes further the boundaries of traditional theorizing by positing the existence of four conceptions in the traditional analysis of change: (1) the critical junctures theory, where explanations are fundamentally associated with the action of external shocks; (2) theories that assume institutional malleability, where change is accounted for by the action of losing coalitions in the context of a political process;\(^{10}\) (3) theories that emphasize multidimensional aspects and interactional effects, where institutional change is driven by the effects of the interaction between multiple realities or institutions\(^{11}\) and, lastly, (4) theories that focus on the action of reformers and view changes as being set in motion by political agents endowed with capabilities that enable them to undertake reforms in face of typical collective action problems.

Despite some variability in key concepts and institutional outcomes, the main analytical emphasis of traditional models in the new historical institutionalism rests on a causal connection between critical junctures and the emergence of new institutions. Critical junctures are therefore conceived of as configurations endowed with causal powers capable of sharply altering structural constraints operating on social agents in a given context.
In conferring causal powers on exogenous, non-institutional factors, traditional analysis would be better equipped to understand order and stability rather than change. Institutional models are admittedly limited in demonstrating how “institutions endogenously change”, i.e., building on cases that transcend agency, on the one hand, or structure, on the other. The analysis of change often tends to consider legacy-driven agency reconfigurations as decisive and, usually, to considerably underestimate the ways whereby gradual changes tend to yield sharp changes in institutions.

More recently, theories of change in the new historical institutionalism tradition are facing strong criticism. Are these theories indeed capable of embedding institutional factors in the explanation of processes of change by breaking with the strong degree of exogeneity of traditional conceptions? The answer is positive, and the ongoing debate on the neoinstitutional research agenda has given rise to mounting critique founded on, as we shall see in the next section, two pillars: the question of exogeneity and the status quo bias of institutional stability. The new generations of institutionalist studies represent, to a large extent, a response to these problems. In the next section we review and discuss the most important critiques on the traditional conceptions of change.

Critique and Limits of the Traditional Theories of Change

In this section we review the critique emerging from the new historical institutionalism research agenda on the problem of change. As mentioned earlier, despite a diversity of stances on the problem of change, the key arguments underpinning the critique rest on two themes: endogeneity and the neoinstitutional stability bias premise.

The problem of endogeneity lies in the consideration that institutionalist models and theories rely on analytical strategies that confer significant causal powers on factors deemed exogenous to institutions. Changes would be caused by alterations in parameters lying outside the institutions, i.e., in social structures or in the agent’s strategic choices. The problem of resorting to non-institutional variables lies in incorporating a high level of functionalism in the theoretical framework, which then starts to treat changes in terms of functional “needs” to adapt to patterns that are efficient, legitimate, rational, or better adapted to the contexts in which they are embedded. Institutions change to adapt themselves to context-driven outcomes, the decision-making environment or changes in parameters exogenous to the institutions. If such conceptions suffice to explain change, then there would be no room for incorporating institutional variables in the model.

The second emerging critique refers to the conservative bias contained (implicitly or explicitly) in institutionalist theories. Neoinstitutionalists usually build on the premise that “to understand the effect of institutions on action and behavior, it is necessary to
build models on the assumption that institutions should be understood as being stable over time”. This adherence to stability-based assumptions is typical of the so-called first-generation institutional models. Though the “stability” assumption in theoretical models proves useful in understanding order-related phenomena, it is rather poor in accounting for complex processes of change.

**Exogeneity**

Pierson (2000) holds that a most critical point in traditional analysis of change in the new historical institutionalism lies precisely in the core assumption that changes are due to the action of exogenous causes, often understood as external shocks. Greif and Laitin (2004) consider it to be analytically inadequate to understand institutional change processes only as factors that are exogenous to institutions. To them the key problem of institutional change theories lies in the explicit difficulty of demonstrating how processes of stability and change coordinate.

Lieberman (2002) considers that the various types of institutionalisms exhibit blind spots that can, on closer analysis, be understood as reductionism, prevalence of structure over agency, and exogeneity in addressing institutional change. Institutionalist models place great emphasis on the analysis of order and stability, of patterns of regularity, yet they pay little attention to complex institution-driven processes of change.

Institutional models are often limited when it comes to explaining changes brought about by the institutions themselves. When it comes to forecasting new institutional designs, institutionalist frameworks tend to focus more intensely on strategic action and on the conditions in which political agents can create and transform political institutions. However, they are ill-equipped to show how institutions change with institutions as the starting points, i.e., driven by causes that transcend both agency and structure.

Numerous authors consider that the neoinstitutionalist traditional legitimation explanations suffer from the “infinite regress” problem of exogeneity. To explain changes in behaviors, phenomena or interest-driven processes, neoinstitutional theories generally assume a highly-correlated causal connection between institutional changes over time \( t \) and antecedent institutional variables. In pursing this type of explanation, analysts create a new problem: which antecedent events brought about a subsequent change, and so on and so forth, endlessly. At some point of the analysis, neoinstitutional theories should consider that the sources of change might lie “outside” institutions, thus significantly affecting the endogeneity of the models.

Another major shortcoming of the traditional models lies in their inattentiveness or absence in relation to the fact that “political institutions” are multidimensional and,
therefore, constituted of tensions, imbalances, clashes of values, preferences, and conflicting interests between social agents. Institutions should not be understood as “exogenous rules”, as mere incentives for agents. Especially in the political realm, where institutions are laden with conflicts and ambiguity yielded by the “interaction” or “friction” between the various institutional realities.

Mahoney and Thelen (2010) argue that what the new institutionalisms are lacking is the production of more consistent theories on institutional change that may account for the interplay of the endogenous and exogenous factors that engender the mechanisms that ensure the transformation or maintenance of institutions over time. It is not about reducing the analysis of change to its endogenous dimension but rather, about providing more satisfactory ways to understand change and, in particular, gradual reform processes.\(^\text{13}\)

**Premises for institutional stability**

The critique regarding the conservative bias of first-generation institutional theories\(^\text{14}\) lies in the consideration of the problem generated by models and theories that assume that institutions are stable over time. This important assumption is made necessary to understand the effects of path dependence on behavior and action in shaping agential preferences, the construction of identities, strategic action, and the decision-making process (Harty 2005, 52). There seems to be a consensus among some authors working on the recent historical-institutionalist research agenda that emphasis on legacies and path dependence sharply constrains a more adequate analytical treatment of change. Stability premises institutional change analysis on well-known mechanisms, such as increasing returns, lock-in and positive feedbacks. However, these prove insufficient to account for complex processes of change, especially in political institutions.

March and Olsen (2006) argue that in theorizing on endogenously-driven institutional changes analysts should build on the following core assumptions: (1) change represents an essential characteristic of institutional arrangements. This precludes assuming ex ante the conservative bias of institutional stability on which traditional theories are premised and, (2) that change be explained on the basis of institution-based analytical categories.

Boas (2007) argues that the second-generation new historical institutionalism would be steadily parting ways with models hinged on the concept of path dependence. The analytical focus of the new studies is shifting towards approaches capable of conferring causal powers upon institutional variables, for one, and of working with models that allow conflating endogenous and exogenous factors, for another. These new approaches have been fruitful in driving attention to multiplicity and variability in change-related phenomena by building on a number of mechanisms such as layering, conversion and drift, as suggested by authors like Thelen (2000; 2005).
Mahoney (2000) and Thelen (1999) consider that traditional models should be expanded for the purpose of breaking away with the notion of increasing returns and its connection with institutional change explanation. They suggest that it is heuristically positive for the new generations of institutionalists to pay substantial attention to other mechanisms such as incentives structures, conventions, social norms, and for analytical categories produced by the interaction between agents and institutions. They criticize the important fact that traditional neoinstitutionalist research had made little progress in investigating how legacies affect agents and their choices at multiple levels of analysis, especially when dealing with gradual change issues.

Pierson (2004) holds that historical-institutional models of change suffer from three basic problems: (1) identifying and differentiating processes of change, in that it has thus far proved hard to accurately specify which typical change patterns should occur in certain conditions, as well as their differentiation; (2) intensive reliance on case-study research designs. This problem lies in the greater likelihood that these research designs will introduce a high degree of bias and indeterminacy in the selection and (3) a primary focus on the immediate causes of institutional change. Derived from the option for case studies, studies of change are seriously limited when it comes to accounting for the important role of factors considered structural that are shaped throughout the slow processes of erosion of antecedent configurations.

The traditional case study literature tends to confer substantial causal power on the strategic role of actors committed to institutional change and reform, while overlooking deeper structural factors and causes acting in a diversity of conditions and contexts. There is limited understanding of the types of action that lead to a reform’s success or failure over time. Case-based models are more clearly lacking when analysts seek to evolve concepts and to generate new typical mechanisms and plausible hypotheses.

Pierson (2004) advances the important point that understanding the conditions necessary for the emergence of various types of change is not possible merely by building on the analysis of demands for reforms. Hence the importance of a more in-depth analysis of failures, resilience and ambiguity in responding to such demands. A major shortcoming of traditional institutional models lies in approaching change and stability as being separate. Understanding the mechanisms that produce reforms requires, analytically, understanding the mechanisms that inhibit them. Reforms should be perceived as “transformation” of or “disruption” with the mechanisms that produce stability; hence, theories appropriate for the analysis of change should seriously endeavor in the task of unveiling the logic of institutional inertia.

Pierson (2004) suggests four clusters on which analysts should focus their attention to build analytical categories that would make it possible to account for the mechanisms
inhibiting change: problems related to coordination, action by veto players, asset specificity and the outcomes of positive feedback. Acting singly or in combination, these factors render reforms somewhat elusive.\textsuperscript{17} For the study of the analysis of change should consider it essential to understand the structure and configuration of the preferences of agents with veto power in a given institutional model.\textsuperscript{18} Agenda-setters are usually decisive in that they hold considerable clout over the capacity to protect institutions from proposals for change at the political level.\textsuperscript{19}

Pierson (2004) suggests that theoretical breakthroughs in change analysis would be a function of addressing five problems on the research agenda: a) the rationale underlying the production of deep equilibria;\textsuperscript{20} b) pathways of change; c) interactional effects among and between institutional realms;\textsuperscript{21} d) gradual change and e) policy making.

These critiques of traditional theoretical models are the building blocks on which a new set of institutionalist models are evolving that are better equipped to analyze change. The next section focuses on the comparative analysis of some typical models of this second generation of scholarly who introduced substantive analytical innovations for the treatment of change in the new historical institutionalism. Three specific cases are analyzed: Greif’s (2006) endogenous change quasi-parameters; the gradual change theory proposed by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) and the multiple orders model developed by Lieberman (2002).

**Analytical Pathways to Institutional Change**

In this section we analyze three of the main emerging theories on the neoinstitutional agenda for the treatment of change. The purpose is to understand how these models suggest new formulations for the problem of endogeneity. Three important innovation routes in contemporary institutional research are discussed: the quasi-parametric model as suggested by Avner Greif (2006), the gradual change model proposed by Mahoney and Thelen (2010), and the multiple orders model suggested by Lieberman (2002). These models have become important references for new studies of the problem of institutional change.

**Quasi-Parameters and institutional change**

Greif (2006) makes use of a fruitful combination of repetitive game theory and new historical institutionalism to account for endogenous change analysis. He suggests the introduction of two interrelated concepts, quasi-parameters\textsuperscript{22} and institutional reinforcement, to overcome the acknowledged constraints of those approaches hinging on the notion of institutions as equilibria external to agents.
The innovation proposed consists of holding that parametric elements have a dual analytical role in institutional change analysis. In doing so the author goes beyond the traditional notion that assumes that rules of the game as “equilibria” over time suffer from a conservative bias in relation to order. Parameters can be considered differently depending on the particular time horizon. Analysts should note that institutions can be considered as parametric (fixed, exogenous) if we analyze their self-enforcing property in short temporal horizons; but as quasi-parametric, i.e., varying in a long-term perspective. Thus, quasi-parameters represent institutional elements that can be endogenously altered and are decisive in understanding how institutions change without resorting to exogenous elements.

The model presupposes that change is directly associated with the transformation of quasi-parameters and processes of reinforcement (or undermining) of the associated beliefs and behaviors of agents in relation to the existing institutional arrangements. Changes in quasi-parameters can, depending on the conditions, generate mechanisms that either undermine or reinforce institutions over time. Yet, it is critical to consider the manner whereby the agents’ beliefs and associated behaviors change over time.

The institutional change analysis proposed is premised on the assumption that context-bound elements affect the self-enforceability of the agents’ beliefs in the institutional models. Understanding how the process whereby beliefs and behaviors associated with institutions are self-enforcing (or self-undermining) over time gains relevance.

Institutional undermining mechanisms are largely associated with the mode whereby incentives (sanctions/rewards) are created by the institutions themselves and interpreted by the agents. Institutional reputation mechanisms are typically undermining over time when the agents perceive a decrease in the future value of incentives associated with certain institutional behaviors.

The model holds the idea that endogenous institutional change takes place when the connections between the expected beliefs and behaviors of agents over time become fragile. Institutional undermining processes may reveal how self-enforcing behaviors come to be transformed by quasi-parametric change. An arguably necessary condition for endogenous change is that new institutions should cause a reduction in the self-enforceability and reinforcement of agents’ behaviors associated with existing institutional arrangements.

The specific mechanisms for endogenous change proposed by the theory are discernible by the way the connection between agents and their perception of quasi-parametric changes is organized. The model specifies three possibilities based on the visibility of the changes. In the first set there is scarce and inconsistent evidence of quasi-parametric change, which is barely recognized by agents. Institutional change mechanisms are bound to be associated with the behavior of agents in face of change-related risks; or, conversely, with the emergence of agents with a better knowledge of the context of change.
In the second case, institutional undermining processes stem from a strategy based on the radical rejection of strategic behaviors caused by the agents’ recognition ex post that the new behaviors are more adequate to the new context. Lastly, changes in behavior associated with institutions can occur when the agents perceive and understand the parametric changes. Agents start considering that behaviors that had previously been strategic become progressively less self-enforcing, while intentional and gradual institutional change is observed. Some typical institutional reform mechanisms are the generation of new behaviors, the specification of new normative models and the creation of new organizations.

Endogenous change can be analytically approached by assuming it is driven by marginal changes in quasi-parametric values. Institutional change does indeed combine exogenous and endogenous elements. Generally, institutions do not reflect changes occurring exogenously but, rather, the manner whereby reinforcement and undermining processes are driven by agents and their interactions with belief models on institution over time. Accordingly, the author suggests not dissociating the study of institutional change from stability analysis. The study of stability represents a case in which quasi-parameters are considered as fixed and exogenous. In order to study change, analysts should more closely examine how such processes enable, or not, change to be introduced, by considering long-term variation in the quasi-parameters.

Gradual policy change

The second innovation case analyzed herein is the new historical institutionalism model proposed by Mahoney and Thelen (2010). Based on extensive comparative research on change, they develop the analytical elements necessary to underpin a theory of gradual endogenous change. They start from the assumption that the main analytical shortcomings of the new institutionalisms lie in the latter’s excessive emphasis on exogenous elements, and that more satisfactory models for the analysis of change should balance the causal powers attributed to endogenous and exogenous factors. The model’s starting point is the assumption that gradual change exists and that it can be endogenously produced.

In accounting for gradual change the authors suggest the need to consider institutions on the basis of their political elements, i.e., more directly linked to the distributional conflict arising from the allocation of scarce resources. A distributional concept of institutions opens up possibilities for suggesting that institutional arrangements are fraught with dynamic tensions and continuous pressure for change rather than stability.

When seen from a distributional perspective, institutional arrangements, political institutions in particular, are conceived of as resource mobilization and allocation arenas
around which agential tensions and conflicts gravitate. Adherence to this conception allows the authors to distance themselves from conceptions of change that build on analyses favoring the notions of stability, self-enforceability and automatism. Change policies would be more adequately analyzed if premised on analytical categories based on the dynamic elements represented by power and conflict, and on agential tensions arising from resource allocation. Institutions are either constantly changing or vulnerable to change.

A main implication of this shift from traditional concepts is that change and stability are essentially intertwined. This conception shows that the new models must seriously consider institutional self-enforcement over time as a function of the agents’ continuous mobilization for political resources and for overcoming conflicts and ambiguity. Institutional stability would not take place naturally, automatically, spontaneously but rather, it would arise from the actions of agents engaged in the distributional conflict for resources, directly related therefore to power fluctuations arising from the political conflict.

Gradual change analysis should not be driven solely by (endogenously or exogenously produced) variables linked to changes in the distribution of power but, fundamentally, also by questions related to rule enforcement. Agency compliance gains causal centrality in this model. The problem of change is triggered by the degree of ambiguity yielded by the implementation of rules and decisions in the context of the distributional conflict. Farrell and Héritier (2005) is a good example of this approach to understand the role of ambiguity in policy implementation and the mechanisms of change for the case of regional integration institution.

The key category in explaining change is the ambiguity arising between institutions and change implementation. The authors contend that typical institutional ambiguities provide space for agents to interpret, debate, and contest rules, thus providing for endogenous change. Ambiguity and the problem of rule implementation would not be linked to the level of institutional formalization. The authors consider it important to take into account that, even when it comes to complying with highly formal rules, agents find space for rule interpretation, opening up considerable conflict-generating gaps over meaning, application and specific forms of institutional resource allocation. Driven by the rule-making policy and the interaction between agents and institutions, these gaps allow the emergence of new institutional models.

The authors are quite clear in specifying the “space” wherein analysts are to find the main analytical categories that matter to more accurately explain endogenous institutional change. These categories, the authors contend, are bound to occur as the result of causes situated between the rules and their implementation, i.e., variables embedded in the “politics of institutional change policies”. The context as well as the political conflicts over the allocation of scarce resources plays a key role in this analysis.
This conceptualization represents therefore a significant innovation in relation to traditional approaches insofar as it emphasizes the need to more deeply understand how agents organize themselves and the dynamic mechanisms whereby distributional coalitions are formed in rule-enforcement processes in a given context. By placing emphasis on the analysis of an institution’s policy connection, the authors create analytical possibilities for more serious thought on the distributional effects associated with institutional models by drawing on the study of agency (values, beliefs, preferences, identity), typical coalition patterns, and, most importantly, of the political conflicts that drive and structure the processes of production of institutional change in multiple contexts and conditions. Hence the need to understand change not as abstraction but as emanating from a most fecund dialogue with empirical cases and comparisons across institutional reform processes the most variegated in context and conditions.

**Ideas and institutions**

The third model of endogenous change analyzed is the one presented by Lieberman (2002), where it is critical to embed ideational and institutional analytical categories. The author’s basic assumption is that of seriously considering the role of ideas to account for dynamic processes of change while further adhering to empirical realities. Institutionalist models and theories should seriously consider agency-related analytical categories by taking into account the dynamic interaction between agents, their mental models and the existing institutions.

The incorporation of agency is to be considered on the basis of categories focusing on the processes that lead to the shaping of beliefs and the structuring of preferences, and on knowledge-related elements, understandings and expectations arising from the continuous interaction with institutions, thus requiring analytical treatment. Ideas play a decisive role in the creation of new institutional arrangements and can more accurately shed light on the causal mechanisms involved in the production of change.

Lieberman (2002) suggests that institutional theories, when reconfigured in accordance with an ontology of politics “as situated in multiple and not necessarily equilibrated order”, can more adequately make sense of complex processes of change. He considers it critical to introduce variables associated with ideas and values, thus going beyond reductionist institutional theorizing in political science, which tends to construe conflict and political cooperation as decisions by rational agents situated in a one-dimensional space on the basis of structured preferences. Ideation increases the likelihood that models will embody the multidimensional nature typical of political phenomena, as well as enabling analysts to move beyond the rational-choice premise of considering the interests and beliefs of the
agents as fixed. The key to interpreting change lies in understanding how tensions between institutions and cognitive models can, in specific conditions, lead to a reformulation of the political agents’ incentives and strategic opportunities.

Political orders are laden with conflict of values, ideas, and these are decisive in rendering it possible to account for a two-tiered interaction: across institutions, and at a deeper level, between ideas and institutions. Political orders would be charged with uncertainty and ambiguity, thus dramatically increasing the potential to produce change. This conception interprets processes of change as arising from tensions (frictions) between institutional models and ideas.

However, the great innovation in the adequate approach proposed by Lieberman (2002) lies in its dynamic conception of a more “balanced” approach for the interaction between ideas and institutions. The key problem is how to incorporate agency and its connection with institutional orders. He recommends that multiple-order models be designed that would strike a balance between institutional and ideational causal powers. It is precisely the dynamic interaction between ideas and institutions that would provide the basic clues for a more satisfactory understanding of endogenous institutional change.

The model’s key hypothesis is that the likelihood of abrupt change in political institutions (as opposed to incremental change) will be the more accentuated in conditions wherein the level of tension across political orders is more prevalent. The model’s core analytical category is the radical decomposition of the notion of a single political order, typical of traditional models, into its constituent parts (formal and informal), with the aim of considering to what extent they overlap, conflate, or conflict with one another, and how these interacting configurations produce change. A comparative advantage of the model is that it considers both institutional and ideational interactions as the explication’s core constituent elements. In analytical terms, this situational and relational understanding of change makes it possible to consider elements associated with the specific way variables (or causes) coordinate in specific historical conditions, broadening the scope of the traditional models that deterministically emphasize the causal power of legacies.

**Final Remarks**

This article reviews the main critiques and analyzes substantial innovations generated by the neoinstitutionalists in the construction of theories of endogenous institutional change in comparative political science.

The construction of new models reflects, to a large extent, the production of responses to critiques of traditional new historical institutionalism first-generation approaches, which placed excessive emphasis on exogenous causes and usually contained a strong conservative
bias. New studies have managed to steadily move forward in reconstructing concepts, mechanisms and arguments that can address change in a manner both more sophisticated and more befitting to its complexity.

As reviewed, there has been significant progress in the analysis of change in the new historical institutionalism. The development of plausible alternatives to account for change is directly linked to the development of new forms of apprehending change and to the embedding of new categories that are more sensitive to the problem of institutional dynamics. A review of these innovative models reveals that institutions are more dynamic than assumed by traditional approaches and exhibit a wide range of mechanisms that render the connection between theory and empirical reality much more complex. The institutional change models that have emerged are more sensitive to this diversity and admit of institutional incremental changes.

Furthermore, it has also become clear that assuming that institutions change constantly does not necessarily entail that order and stability are not necessary categories to understand change. On the contrary, order and change are deeply interlinked, and it should not be assumed there exists a clear analytical line separating the two situations. More robust theories of change must be guided by conceptions enabling a more integrated approach to these two sides of the problem.

Analytical treatment of the problem of endogenous institutional change is, in large measure, coupled with questions regarding the incorporation of agency. Far from assuming that changes are primarily structured in critical junctures, the more recent models seek to incorporate agency by drawing on conceptions that make it possible to understand how decisive certain fundamental dimensions, such as those associated with subjective and informal elements – values, mental models, beliefs, cognitivity –, are to account for how institutional reforms are produced by agents and their interactions with the institutions.

Another important question revealed through analysis is that the new theories of change have steadily reduced the level of exogeneity of traditional theories of change. The new models seek a number of alternatives toward reducing the excessive causal powers conferred on parameters external to the institutions, i.e., on social structures or on the agents’ strategic choices. Eventually the explications come to combine, to some extent, endogenous and exogenous explanations. However, the main argument of the neoinstitutional theories is that the various models should consider institutional variables more clearly than traditional conceptions do. This argument is the key to considering the important fact of explaining change with institutions as the starting points. While representing just the first steps in such direction, the cases reviewed provide insights as to the future prospects surrounding the question. Future generations of work may come to contribute more decisively in the analysis of change.
The roads taken by these analytical innovations may be considered the first steps toward securing the advance and survival of the neoinstitutionalist tradition in political science (and, more broadly, in social sciences). It is known that the latter depends on the relative success of theory in accounting for the chronic problem of institutional transformation, which must be more creatively addressed by comparative studies that may lead to deeper comparative analysis of institutional change processes. Despite the breakthroughs, the analysis of institutional changes is still wanting as a field of reflection in the neoinstitutional tradition.

A number of political scientists working in this research tradition continue to persuasively state that traditional theories have failed in interpreting the complex problem of change. Why they fail and how to overcome the problem in constructing new theories was the basic problem addressed in this short comparative work.

Comparative reflection over the critiques and analytical innovations for the case of historical neoinstitutionalism has become relevant, in that the study of change will continue to pose one of the greatest challenges for the research agenda of contemporary political science in a world in constant change on several levels of analysis. The analyses developed in this brief study reveal that, despite significant progress in the theorizing of institutional change, there is an urge for the construction of new institutional models.

As mentioned earlier, the aim of this work on comparative theory is not to launch any new theory on endogenous change. Its contribution is merely that of showing the main critiques that have affected the design of new models and theories for the “case” of the new historical institutionalism. Analysis renders it possible to understand a remarkable analytical transformation enabled by the gradual introduction of concepts, analytical categories and a new set of causal mechanisms that have made it possible to approach processes of change on the basis of institutional factors.

The acquisition of these new elements allows those researchers interested in analyzing institutional change to become more attentive to recent developments in terms of new theoretical formulations and designs. Designing more satisfactory theories of change requires, fundamentally, the analysts’ skill in satisfactorily “dealing” with the critique embedded in the contemporary debate and, more broadly, the creation of new models that go beyond those herein reviewed.

Lastly, it is worth underscoring that the development of more refined theories must be heedful of the questions of how to conflate traditional elements with the question of endogeneity. A theory of institutional change should not, for example, completely depart from social structures or exceed in embracing questions of agency. The success of a theory ultimately depends on the models’ capacity to foster fruitful “integrations” between traditional models and, fundamentally, to determine in which cases and conditions these
combinations can be undertaken. Greater attention to institutional elements themselves calls for a steady reduction in elements exogenous to institutions, as the former cannot account for change in its entirety.

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**Notes**

1 Neoinstitutionalism constitutes a main paradigm in comparative political science. Hall and Taylor (1996) argue that the new institutionalism in political science seeks to understand three fundamental problems: institutional genesis, development and change. March and Olsen (2006) argue that neoinstitutional models are premised on the assumption that existing institutional arrangements have considerable causal power to explicate how and why institutions emerge and transform themselves. Since the beginning of the last decade comparative political science has relied on the intensive use of an institutionalist conceptual framework to analyze change, thereby prompting a great deal of theoretical and methodological debates in the field, among which is the problem of endogeneity, herein focused on more in depth.

2 While institutionalist analysis in comparative political science includes a number of variables and sub-variables, it is also widely known that this field of knowledge is characterized by a great deal of conceptual stretching and diversity, and by a plurality of terms, with regard to its core categories. Herein, however, I deliberately restrict the use of the expression “new
institutionalisms” to a form equivalent to that used by Hall and Taylor (1996), who subdivide new institutionalism into three broad analytical clusters: historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and rational-choice institutionalism.

3 Pierson and Skocpol (2002) argue that the new historical institutionalism research in political science is focused on generating explanations for relevant phenomena and issues based on three interrelated characteristics: assuming time as a key analytical category, specifying sequences, and focusing on institutional contexts and configurations. Analysts working in this tradition are usually concerned with understanding variations relative to the occurrence of certain context- and history-bound phenomena.

4 With the seminal works of Baumgartner and Jones (1993) the analysis of change based on punctuated equilibrium-intensive models becomes very frequent in traditional public policies analysis, with a number of applications especially in the key areas of fiscal behavior and social policies in multiple research designs. Givel (2010) and Jensen (2009) offer excellent analyses of the evolution and use of these models in the field of public policy analysis.

5 The “scientific revolutions” model offered by Kuhn (1962) is the best example of this approach to institutional change as applied to the specific field of philosophy of science. Kuhn explains the development of science as being driven by the emergence of new mental models, paradigms, caused by crises that impinged on antecedent models. Paradigmatic revolutions are considered by Kuhn as necessary to lay the new foundations that structure scientific activity over the long periods of normal science that often succeed scientific revolutions.

6 Mahoney (2000) considers path-dependent analyses share three core features, namely: (1) substantive attention to the role of antecedent conditions based on the assumption of the existence of events that set in motion specific causal patterns. From this follows the core notion that multiple possibilities in a given set of conditions are reduced to a single trajectory that is self-enforcing over time; (2) analytical differentiation between causes that act decisively during critical and institutional reproduction moments and (3) that path-dependent processes institutionalize themselves upon the occurrence of critical junctures.

7 Gorges (2001) claims that new institutional approaches to change fail to provide adequate explanations for institutional change. This failure is mainly due to their reliance on variables such as critical junctures, path dependency leaving institutions behind. He suggests that better theories should specify with more accuracy the conditions these variables matter as well be more precise about the causal relevance of institutions. New institutional theories should be more explicit about the causes of change and the key links between these factors and the mechanisms of institutional change. Doing so, however, he argues, the traditional approaches could mean abandoning their emphasis on the primacy of institutions in developing explanations for political phenomena.

8 The analysis of the problem of agency, i.e., of preferences, offered by Katznelson (2003), for institutional change analysis clearly departs from the agency-structure conceptualizations as conceived by Sewell Jr. (1992) and Swidler (1986). These models work with an artificial divide between agency (preferences) and structure (periodization), wherein periods are considered either as “settled” or “unsettled”. Katznelson (2003) builds on the rather important assumption of the inappropriateness of conventional models in comparative social research to address change in that they reduce the role of agents. In opting for a structural-holistic ontology, this research tradition emphasizes lock-in processes to explain institutional persistence, continuity and inertia over time. He argues that more adequate analyses of change should, whenever possible, draw closer to critical realism conceptualizations (Archer, 1995), where agency and structure are analytically treated as mutually constitutive, and to the morphogenetic approach to change.
Institutionalist models that are able to address agency and structure in a more interactionist fashion may prove fruitful in accounting for processes of change in political science. Embedding analytical categories that may render it possible to understand the manner whereby choices and preferences are shaped, in addition to the institutions' distributional character, the action of social networks and cognitive models, are potential pathways to go beyond the often assumed notion of external shocks advanced by the first generation of institutional-historicist theories. The existing institutional models tend to create the likelihood (and not the determination) of certain equilibria to occur wherein the role of agents embedded in these arrangements, as well as their preferences, is critical.

This argument is originally attributed to William Riker, who considers it important to think that institutional change in politics constitutes a possibility set in motion by the organized action of groups and coalitions who suffer losses in the institutional system in relation to winning groups. Democracies represent a clear example of malleable political systems insofar as they make it possible for groups defeated in a given election to win in a future election.

This formulation is included in the original argument developed by Orren and Skowronek (1994), who hypothesize change in political institutions as driven by the “abrasive effects” of the various political institutions in interaction. The thesis is that, as institutions interact, they generate tensions and opportunities that yield the conditions for change.

In an influential article in the modern debates in the new institutional agenda of change, Przeworski (2004a) express his analytical ceticism about the potential and primacy of new institutional explanations of change in political science. Przeworski (2004b) discusses this ceticism for the case of institutions and economic development making the claim for endogeneity and the key problem of the causal “primacy of institutions” that supports the basic claim of institutional theory: institutions matter.

They consider that, when “institutions are treated as causes, scholars are too apt to assume that big and abrupt shifts in institutional forms are more important or consequential than slow and incrementally occurring changes”. Recent works on institutional change, as those produced by Pierson (2004), Streeck and Thelen (2005) and Caporaso (2007) would be better equipped to explain gradual change by building on models that distance themselves from the exogenous-driven, punctuated equilibrium approaches.

The debate agenda of the first generation of institutional studies was centered on the effects generated by institutions or on the explanation of institutional order and stability. Analysis of endogenous institutional change (i.e., with institutions as the starting points) is held to be critical for the research agenda of the so-called second institutionalist generation in comparative political science.

Thelen (2003, 37) emphasizes that one of the decisive problems for the advancement of theorization on institutional change lies in the analysts' ability to more accurately identify factors and conditions driving (or inhibiting) the emergence of specific types of change in institutions. The importance of accuracy in necessary conditions in comparative research is suggested by Goertz (2005).

This fact is particularly problematic given the crucial importance of positive feedback in institutionalization processes. If agents adapt to and align with existing institutions, the equilibria derived will self-reinforce over time. In face of this trend, change is likely to occur if the models consider the occurrence of slow erosions or the reconfiguration of antecedent conditions for institutional reproduction. Reform-driven analyses may commit the critical error of overlooking these slow erosions as causal processes and placing greater emphasis on the final stages of change.
Typically, political institutions are conceived of as very hard to undergo change or reform. This fact is usually accounted for in political science by the known argument that the creators of new political institutions, faced with the problems of uncertainty and intergenerational choice inconsistency, usually conceive institutions (and public policies) to stand up to the “uncertainties” of politics, just as suggested by Moe (1990). New institutions are usually constituted of rules devised to face and endure temptations for control by and reversal to antecedent models. In this sense political institutions are typically known for their change resistance.

Tsebelis (2002), in his well-known theory of veto players in comparative political science, advances the key argument that differentiation of the various political and institutional systems should be based on the configuration of their veto players, and that change is fundamentally derived from the collective action of these specific agents. He expands the concept that institutions are rules governing the action of agents and suggests the notion that institutions structure the decision-making sequences of agents endowed with veto power. Within institutions there exist agents with the power to shape the decision-making agenda, the agenda-setters. He hypothesizes that agenda-setting powers are inversely related to institutional stability. If the theoretical models specify veto players’ preferences, the stance of the status quo, and the identity of the agenda-setter, they will render it possible to predict change in an accurate way.

Miller (2000) classifies these important veto players when analyzing processes of “institutional reform policies” as being of the “self-referencing” type. The emergence of these institutional veto players is contingent upon the type of reform policy under analysis. Moreover, not all veto points are “self-referencing”, yet they are awarded such status as a function of the various types of institutional change. In some cases reformers can be created by referendum, weakening the capacity of political elites to block changes that are potentially damaging to their interests.

Deep equilibrium analysis is focused on understanding the underlying logic of why and how the interplay between certain factors tends to yield (in certain contexts) institutions situated at a point where the likelihood of reversal over time is highly unlikely. The understanding of these factors may provide a clue to understanding change.

Institutional change analysis would be premised on the key assumption that change is a function of interactional effects across multiple institutional realms. Pierson draws our attention to two important interactional effects when analyzing change: a) the occurrence of inter-institutional, self-reinforcing interactional patterns and b) inter-institutional loose coupling. In the first case, it is assumed that changes in certain institutional arrangements generate a high likelihood of occurrences in complementary institutions and, in the second case, ambiguities derived from power distribution across institutions are assumed which are fundamental in understanding change.

Conceptually, parameters represent factors deemed as exogenous to games (strategic interactions), that is, they cannot endogenously change in the short run. Quasi-parameters, in turn, are variable elements, endogenously produced by the outcomes of games over time. Institutions yield outcomes that alter the dynamically fixed elements that govern and structure interactions between agents. It is also worth underscoring that discerning between parameters and quasi-parameters is sensitive to empirical observation and the objectives of each analysis being considered.

Institutional reinforcement processes occur over time when changes in quasi-parameters yield self-enforcing associated behaviors for a large set of situations. Self-enforcing institutions are undermining when changes in quasi-parameters decrease the set of situations wherein behaviors associated with the new conditions are sharply reduced.
This type of mechanism is directly associated with cases that usually characterize the so-called punctuated equilibrium, typical of historical institutionalism's incremental approaches. Punctuated equilibrium models suggest that episodes of change be considered as radically deviating in relation to marginally-adjusted, organized, stable processes.

Based on neo-weberian claims, Roland (2004) proposes an interactionist approach for change. His model understands change based on variables produced by the continuous interaction between slow-moving and fast-moving institutions. His claims for understand interactions between different institutions can provide reasonable theories about punctuated and gradual change. His model suggests a key difference between slow-moving and fast-moving institutions. The former generally change slowly, incrementally, and continuously, whereas the latter are more given to rapid, discontinuous change in large steps. His neo-weberian claims confers causal powers for analytical categories related with context and culture.
Armed Forces in South America: The Ambivalent Dynamics of Civil-military Relations in the Context of the New Democracies

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**Time for democracy for all**

Maria Celina D'Araujo's book is an original and coherent contribution on democracy and the achievements and difficulties of the South American, especially Brazilian, Armed Forces in accepting that differential treatment which has granted them corporative privileges is not appropriate under democracy, and that the past, present and future actions of the Armed Forces should be monitored through public rules and institutions as they are set up. The book has non-linear structure which identifies the profound ambivalences that surround the difficult civil-military coexistence in the context of the young South American democracies. This is the first key point of the book.

A second key issue is political change. It is highly likely that political scientists and International Relations scholars still have great difficulty in keeping up with political change that occurs in the region as a whole. This is evident from their attempts to understand the emergence of new leaders who challenge concepts such as populism or neo-populism, once valid for the “eager masses” in search of messianic leaders. D'Araujo's book is a modern contribution which, without ignoring the contribution of categories bequeathed by Latin American social sciences (such as the category of corporatism), is creative in producing new concepts to understand the nature of the political changes at work.
In order to understand this change, the book starts with the observation that there is something extraordinary happening today in South America: “democracy has become the rule for all”. This fact in itself represents the most fundamental change in the region’s political scene in almost two centuries of political existence. While in the past democratic regime was the exception, and those few exceptions only had influence at the domestic level, democracy has now become a fully regional fact. This fact has redefined the scope of internal political and social actions but has also been projected outwards, conditioning and socializing a regional democratic ethos which tries to shun outsiders who have not yet realized the public restraints which democratic rules establish.

D’Araujo’s book does not indulge in the rather naïve idea of socially or politically homogenous democracy in South America. She recognizes instead that there are problematic democracies, especially among the Andean countries, which have marked authoritarian traits. After a review of different forms of democratic political practice which have emerged in South America, one of the first significant observations of the book is made: that there is a democratic plurality emerging in South America, comprising systems that have established themselves as representative democracies, as well as those of participative democracies.

Democracy for all, today’s political fact in Latin America, is accompanied by a collective mechanism for defending democracy, an emerging structural condition which restrains and limits the practice of sectors that still think of government as reaching beyond the rules established by democracy. This is most evident in the mechanism of “democratic clauses”, i.e. a system of safeguards for democracy which have been consolidated since the end of the 80s in the Organization of American States (OEA), Mercosul, the Andean Community (CAN) and more recently the Union of South American Nations (Unasul). “A convergence of attitudes aiming at strengthening governability and democracy (…)” (p. 31) has emerged.

Perhaps because of this optimism towards internal democratic change and its institutional systems of systemic safeguard, the author unnecessarily adds that,

(…) despite the drama of internal violence, South America is a peaceful region, with low military expenditure; it does not represent a threat to the international order and continually makes efforts to strengthen regional cooperation and peace (p. 31).

Surely internal wars (those that are to do with public security and violent breaches of human rights in several South American countries, violence from drug trafficking and disproportionate police violence), and the fact that armed conflict still goes on in the region (especially in the rural parts of these countries), mean that we cannot emphatically state that America is a “peaceful region”. On this matter I prefer Holsti’s (1997) argument that
strictly speaking South America seems to be a region free of inter-state wars rather than a peaceful zone. Continuing along Holsti’s line of argument, democracy (or democratization) does not sufficiently explain the emergence of a peaceful region in South America’s case, since even during the dictatorship era, which went from the first half of the 1960s until the first half of the 1980s, there were no military conflicts between dictatorships in the region, even though there were tensions such as between Argentina and Chile in the dispute over the Beagle Canal in 1978.

Despite pointing out the gradation of democracies in South America which range from representative to participative, D’Araujo’s book avoids the simplistic theory of two emerging political worlds, applied particularly to the Latin-American left, which has been classified by Carlos Castañeda’s (2006) famous binary formula as the modern left and the nationalist, archaic and populist left. Her argument is instead designed to highlight political change in the South American region rather than being confined to defining reality in terms of dichotomies of authoritarian and democratic regimes, or even from a sociological perspective, in terms of modern versus traditional societies. The author is also aware of and criticizes the illusions and rapid conclusions that could be inferred from the rise to power of the South American left in democratic regimes:

Therefore, instead of thinking of a new revolutionary ideological cycle, we could think about a set of changes geared towards representative or participative democracy within a political space mediated by different tendencies and with authoritarian traditions (p. 15).

This idea certainly goes beyond the black-and-white conception of reality. The axis that spans these various forms of change, in which the region’s left has been elected to power, is no longer so much a case of modern democratic opposition versus old authoritarian ways of doing politics, but is, above all, a political or social response to the unfulfilled promises of democracies and even of authoritarianism, which once dominated the State and which today persist in preserving privileged spaces. The target of the author’s criticism of these actors who continue to preserve privileged spaces is the military, which has been the only non-civilian actor to have had and implemented a plan to hold onto power in past few decades in South America.

**The Armed Forces: New Functions, New Functionalities**

D’Araujo hits upon an important point when evaluating South American and particularly Brazilian militaries, which is that as democracies in the region weaken, the military’s remaining political space is strengthened. As many indicators show, the political
changes at work in South America occur within a context of a generalized suspicion of institutions on the part of national civil society, “the degree of trust of institutions is low” (p. 23). However, the Armed Forces are an exception to this mistrust. In general the Armed Forces are well regarded, especially in Brazil, with the exception of Argentina (p. 30). In other words, a double paradox seems to operate in relation to South American Armed Forces: firstly, it implies that despite the strength of the collective social memory of the repressive role played by these sectors in the past, there seems to be a feeling of “nostalgia for authority” among many sections of society, which was identified by O´Donnel and Schmitter (1988) more than two decades ago. A second paradox is to do with the fact that, even though political changes have affected most political institutions, the positions of power within the South American militaries have remained almost as they were, of which Brazil is the most emblematic case.

Nevertheless, D'Araujo's book steers clear of the temptation to argue that nothing has changed. The most relevant changes that the author acknowledges are to do with civil-military relations. Of course the military power’s submission to civil power in South America has been undeniably slower than expected, but there have been significant changes:

The military issue in South America at the beginning of the twenty-first century can be approached from several angles. The most classic approach deals with civil-military relations and in this respect there have been significant changes: a greater subordination of civil power, even though the military has weakened as an institution (p. 39).

But to which Armed Forces does D'Araujo refer? They are certainly not those of the authoritarian years. To answer this we must look towards the nature of their new functions and the creation of new hemispheric institutionalities to harbor the changes that have shaped the roles of the militaries. Since 2003, when the Organization of American States (OAS) instituted the concept of multidimensional security in accordance with the notion of new transnational threats and the formulation of a new regional architecture of hemispheric security, the South American region has taken on this task, in both theory and practice. For a region where inter-state wars have practically disappeared, or for a region in which “new wars”, to borrow Mary Kaldor’s (1999) expression, are internal wars – against drug trafficking, corruption, money laundering, and different sorts of crimes, poverty among others – the internal functions of the Armed Forces have little to do with the old communist enemies, but instead with the adversaries of the “new wars”.

Although the consensus is that they should not return to power, some of the South American military sectors have discovered that, under the pretext of the “new wars”, it has been possible to achieve power through democratic means, such as in the cases of Hugo Chavez
in Venezuela and Ollanta Humalla in Peru. “The novelty (…) now is that the Army acts as an agent for elected governments” (p. 37). Thus they become needed and legitimate:

(...) the military continues to be a relevant social and political force in many South American countries. They have been used to arbitrate political disputes, such as in the case of Ecuador; to repress protests, such as in Venezuela; to administer public security, as in Brazil; to combat drug crime, as in Colombia; to hand out food, to oversee the provision of care, including healthcare, to the most deprived populations, as well as, of course, taking on humanitarian missions (p. 39-40).

D’Araujo also reminds us that the South American militaries have resumed their old dogmas on their role in their nation’s development, minus, of course, the notion of the (communist) internal enemy, and with more doctrinal autonomy in the face of foreign powers. Although we should agree with the author that only in Brazil was the military actually incorporated into a project of national development (remembering the different contributions of the military that go back to the days of the foundation of the National Research Council to their role in the creation of different state companies):

The close links between the defense and development industries are not as present in other countries as they are in Brazil, since no other South American country carried out such a successful industrialization process. In all countries, however, the idea that the military is directly related to the development strategy has always been predominant (p. 57-8).

In connection with this point on the new roles of the Armed Forces, D’Araujo is quite optimistic about the emergence of mechanisms of cooperation on defense which systematically strengthen the South American democracies, and which redefine the new functions of the Armed Forces which comprise various forms of military action both at the hemispheric level and the South American level. Among these institutionalities, we should agree with the author that the Conference of Defense Ministries of the Americas is an important piece of hemispheric cooperation for the coordination of defense policies, even though it has produced many normative elements and few concrete mechanisms or plans of action since its creation.

However, what D’Araujo’s book fails to look at in a more detailed way is that this forum has clearly served to distinguish U.S. views of the military's new functions in dealing with new threats, especially regarding the Army’s policing role, from those expressed by some South American countries. In South America’s case, a large number of the region’s countries do not disagree about adopting the concept of multidimensional security which assigns a new role for the regional Armed Forces, as has been institutionalized by the OAS since 2003, but all except Colombia disagree with the U.S. on the idea that they should be
used in policing roles especially in dealing with threats from drug trafficking and terrorism. The VI Conference of Defense Ministries of the Americas (2004) (available at www.oas.org/csh. Accessed in June 2011) which took place in Quito, was further evidence of the distance between these perspectives. The subject of the conference was designing a new architecture of continental security and “the participating countries refused the proposal of the role of the Armed Forces being transformed from one of defense to one of security and policing” (Guzzi 2007, 43). During the same VI Conference of Defense Ministries of the Americas, Brazil’s Defense ministry made the significant proposal to include extreme poverty as a generalized threat to security and democracy in the region.

For these reasons I disagree somewhat with D’Araujo’s premise that

(...) even democracies with low institutionality face economic and social problems, and at the same time try to now respond to the defense topic under new conditions. In other words, it is not about defending themselves from aggression from other states, but about guaranteeing the state’s monopoly on force in dealing with organized crime and new threats in general (p. 47).

What are these democracies of low institutionality? Actually, the search for state monopoly of force in dealing with organized crimes and “new threats” has become a topic discussed in all South American countries, be they democracies with strong or low institutionality.

However, as the author reminds us, even though a large number of the delegates agreed that the threats for democracies, which have redefined the role of the Armed Forces, should take the region’s specific social and political problems into account, it is common knowledge that there are big differences among South American countries regarding plans for political action to face the “new threats”, although it is clear that the institutionalities that are emerging go beyond the topics of the Armed Forces and defense. The author maintains, and I agree, that there are two projects nowadays that in theory could lead to a fork in the path taken to deal with the challenges facing region’s democracies:

The coexistence of Alba and Unasul show the ideological differences within the region and the search for institutional balance to express them. We could say they express old and new ways of politically understanding the continent’s problems, and the causes of its poverty, political instability and economic difficulties (p. 38).

However, an important finding in the author’s research is that there seems to be a clear perception that in a context in which the Cold War rivalries have ceased to exist, it makes more sense to concentrate on the South American cooperation efforts in various fields rather than to get caught up in ideological divisions. In other words, there is a collective effort to turn away from ideological differences and towards more autonomous
and adequate ways of dealing with problems specific to the region. Unasul and its defense organ, the South American Defense Council, follow this logic:

(...) it was becoming clear that South America would have more to gain from cooperation that would go beyond the immediate political demands. As a result, there was an increasing focus on an institutional design which, while respecting the sovereignty of each country, allowed them to deal together with technology, communications, industry, transport, energy and defense (p. 46).

Thus, for the author, despite the ideological debate surrounding the new forms of socialism, there is a constant effort to negotiate common interests (p. 38). Unasul and its South American Defense Council epitomize these new institutionalities, which turn the continent into a common platform to think about topics of economic development and defense. An example of this, and of how the region is beginning to come up with autonomous responses for specific problems, was Unasul's decisive action in dealing with the internal conflict in Bolivia in 2008 which strongly opposed the central government and the autonomist provinces in the East of the country. By reinforcing the legitimacy of Bolivia's democratic institutions, only Unasul's intervention managed to open up a channel of dialogue between the fighting political actors.

Changes and ambivalence in South American and Brazilian civil-military relations

As the book develops, an extremely important question emerges which D'Araujo tackles with great coherence and which constitutes one of the most crucial points of the research: after two decades of retreat, what political space does the military occupy today in the South American countries? Very generally, D'Araujo's reply to this central question does not seem very convinced that the military, even under democracy, has abandoned or reduced its space in the public sphere:

(...) if the threat of a military coup seems to rebuild around the turn of the twenty-first century, there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that in several countries, it is the military that defines the course of crises (p. 58).

It seems that a certain degree of praetorianism, in Huntington's sense of the word, did not completely disappear with the emergence of the new South American democracies. Brazil's case appears paradigmatic in this way, and the author is evidently correct when she says that democracy has not necessarily meant that the Brazilian government and people have restricted military activity. But the author's message is that not all seems to be lost in
South America. Some countries, such as Argentina’s case, can console us:

The increasing distance between Brazil and Argentina is gradually being confirmed, in that the latter has been more efficient in producing policies and legal instruments that control and regulate military activity, restricting their actions exclusively to a military and humanitarian context. The latest step towards this goal was to abolish the military justice in Argentina in 2009, while in Brazil plans for extending its functions are being discussed (p. 67).

In contrast to what has been happening in some other South American countries, the Brazilian military still receives differential treatment in many respects, such as a corporative military justice, and with the opportunist support of civil political sectors, it “has maintained its power of veto when it comes to discussing the human rights abuses of the dictatorship” (p. 109).

Nevertheless, the process portrayed by D’Araujo in Brazil’s case is hardly straightforward. Highlighting the dialectic between conservativism and change, the author points out that the country’s democratic achievements have coincided with the maintaining of privileges for the military. It is true that military activity still does not correspond well with the controls and equality before the law which democratic practice supposes, but it is also true that the military has not managed to keep hold of all aspects they monopolized during the dictatorship. The idea that the military was an interlocutor of civil political power remained a steadfast idea during the first 15 years of redemocratized Brazil. The existence of three military ministries representing the Army, the Air Force and the Navy in the government reinforced this idea of the military’s privileged interlocution. This meant that they shared a certain “polyarchy” of authority with the legitimately constituted civil government. But this “polyarchy” suffered a small but important setback with the creation of the Ministry of Defense, in 1999, which meant both the loss of their privileged position in and interlocution with the government, and fundamentally, a timid but important statement of civil political authority: The creation of the Ministry of Defense meant “(...) touching on subjects that were taboos, or rather on subjects which stirred up the past and which proposed to put the military under the control of a civil ministry” (p. 117). As the author points out, although there is resistance, for example, the fact that members of the military still run the Ministry’s administration, the creation of this new institution marked an important change which bodes well for the future of civil political power.

We can definitely say, therefore, that there is an ambivalent dialectic of set-backs and achievements in civil-military relations in contemporary Brazil. This dialectic is evident in long-term projects, as we see for example with the creation of the Ministry of Defense, but also in temporary situations such as the 2008 airline crisis. The crisis perfectly demonstrated how the Brazilian military can take advantage of the gaps in civil authority, especially
when this political authority is too weak to challenge the military’s autonomy in different areas of the State: “The crisis showed two perspectives from which civil-military relations in Brazil should be seen: on one hand, corporatism (…) on the other, the dismantling of civil authority over this subject (…)” (p. 171-72).

However, civil-military negotiation vigorously persists in many aspects of the State, beyond the creation of the Ministry of Defense and the 2008 airline crisis and even under democracy (when in fact the relationship should be of military subordination to civil authority). There are areas in which the military sector is not only an interlocutor but also continues to carry out its own political and judicial acts. A good example of this, documented by the author, are the military courts, which continue to exist even though the political condition under which they were created – the threat of the national communist enemy – has gone, “(…) which shows how much the military was seen as a project of an authoritarian government and state and how secure people felt in setting up this project” (p. 233).

Nevertheless, where are the roots of the dynamics of the ambivalent civil-military relationship in the case of Brazil? Maria Celina D’Araujo has a brief answer to this question. The military, as they manage to hold onto some of their pre-democratic privileges, embody one of the most ubiquitous historical characteristics of the Brazilian social and political structure: corporatism. The author sets out a sound argument in chapter 5, which is that

(…) a large part of what is today known as the Brazilian military’s autonomous political project should be considered as a corporatist defense of the Armed Force’s interests. They benefited from the development of corporatism as a state policy, and after the dictatorship they used this resource as a way of staking their claim over corporatist demands (p. 125).

Thus, we have to look to the long-term historical-structural traits in Brazilian politics rather than to factors within the institution in order to explain the military’s status quo in some State sectors. These traits have become incorporated into and made use of by the military who “defend the institution’s interests, want differential treatment in social and wage policy and silence about the past, but do not speak about their plans to hold onto power” (p. 173). In cruder terms, these plans could be confused with the survival of corporatism as a structural trait of Brazilian politics.

Nevertheless, despite D’Araujo’s sound and sharp argument, perhaps some aspects of the country’s civil-military relations cannot be properly understood only from the macro explanation based on corporatism. Corporatism may be one of the key elements which explains why the military tends to dictate the way in which some topics should be dealt with publicly, but it might not be sufficient as an explanation for the ambivalences mentioned.
above. The impact and appropriation of corporatism can only be understood well if you look at who the political actors are, in this case the civil political class, who should question and produce public agendas which do not use the corporatist status quo acquired over time by social and political groups.

The author herself provides us with a key explanation for a more complex understanding of the problem: it has to do with the responsibility of the civil political class and a lack of desire or possibilities to exert public control over the military sector. Once again we go back to the subject of affirming civil political authority. Although civil political authority surfaces at specific moments, for example the already mentioned case of the creation of the Ministry of Defense, there has been little political will to regulate and cut down corporative military space:

(...) we should remember that these corporative demands, up until now, have been very successful because no civil government has dared to impose political rule over the institution which continues to be treated differentially (...) no political group in power wants to upset the military (...) (p. 173).

However, at moments in which this political rule has triumphed, the years of the military regime have been handed over to the public sphere through policy. One example has been on the subject of the amnesty, especially in the case of the archives on the disappearance of political activists during the regime, archives which until today the military denies exist. In this respect, the author acknowledges that “(...) even though was not possible to gain access to all military archives, we did manage to establish a public policy on the matter” (p. 135-36).

But why do these public policies persist? Since the review of the Brazilian Amnesty Law, nothing has revealed so well the ambivalent nature of the civil-military dynamics, the existence and, at the same time, absence of public debate on military matters, especially those related to human rights. On this subject, D’Araujo’s book very accurately portrays the tough debate that took place during president Lula’s second term, with sectors in favor of a review of the Amnesty Law – human rights defense groups, the Ministry of Justice and other government bodies – opposing sectors against the review – the military, some members of parliament and the Ministry of Defense. The end result, i.e. no review of the Law, showed how much the military’s power of veto still prevails. It also revealed a large distortion of what the mission of the Armed Forces should be. As the author concisely concludes, “The institution took it upon itself to defend the oppressors, and they treated it as a mission. A pact of silence prevailed, a veto on the past” (p. 146).

The debate ended upon the decision of the president of the Ministry of Defense at the time. However, what explains the strength of the military’s power to veto this review was not
the space occupied by corporatism, but mostly the fact that, in contrast to countries such as Argentina and Chile, the topic of the “desaparecidos” (political activists who disappeared during the dictatorship and are still unaccounted for), and of military accountability for the crimes they committed during that time, are not yet problems that society is willing to tackle and it is still not completely in the power of civil politics to do so. In other words, it is not yet a topic that moves Brazilian society and the political class is not yet willing to assert its authority. It should also be said that time has worked in favor of the military sectors: the generation that lived through the era is forgetting, and the generation that did not live through the years of the Brazilian dictatorship is misinformed. However, there do seem to be reasons for being optimistic. In fact, a conclusion that we can reach from the author’s research is that the public sphere around the review of the Amnesty Law started to take form, a little late perhaps, but nevertheless within the State. “(…) it was the first time that ministers showed support for the review of the law, and for punishing the torturers, and effective policies were set up to recover archives from the dictatorship” (p. 147).

Because of this, the author’s argument that, “The matter [the review of the Amnesty Law] is off the government’s agenda, but not off the public’s agenda” (p. 160) is certainly enlightening. In general terms, we can conclude that the exceptionality of the Brazilian military with regard to accounting for past acts has three determinants: i) the absence of pressure from society in the debate (although some sectors do speak up); ii) civil authority’s lack of will to question this exceptionality, which would mean taking over political direction of the process and iii) the formation of a public sphere in which military acts, past and present, are increasingly subjected to political and juridical responsibilities, something that is so crucial and pertinent to consolidated democracies.

Translated by Hedd Megchild

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Volta Redonda, the City and the Steel

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(Dinius, Oliver J. 2011. Brazil’s Steel City. California: Stanford University Press)

Firstly, this book makes for a great read, with rigorous research typical of a specialist who wants to appeal to those who are not. The book is about the creation of the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN, National Steel Corporation) founded in 1941, during the Vargas dictatorship and, at the same time, about the emergence of the city which would be its home, in the Paraiba Valley, in the state of Rio de Janeiro. In particular, it deals with how the group of workers in this industry was formed and how intense union activity was initiated to represent them. The beginning of this process is analyzed from the perspective of the public policies geared towards the country’s industrialization and a paternalist model of workers’ relations is adopted.

Located in the then-named Santo Antonio district of Volta Redonda in the county of Barra Mansa, in the Paraiba Valley, Volta Redonda would gain city status in 1954, eight years after the CSN started up. During the military dictatorship the city was considered an area of “national security” and in the 1990s it underwent one of the most talked about privatizations of the time. It is no wonder: the CSN represented the start of the successful second industrial revolution in Brazil and caught the public imagination as a symbol of national independence and sovereignty. These are more than sufficient reasons to make the study of this subject fascinating. It helps to understand the country’s model for economic development and the persistence of a nationalist ideology.

Focusing on these aspects, the book’s central topic is work. Specifically, it looks at work relations in the factory, the emergence of the workers’ union, the relationship between the factory and the city and between the workers and government authorities and experts. It is an excellent piece of research for understanding the construction of the workers’
identity in a context of large state companies and union-State relations. The study presents an opportunity to think about how plans for social democracy and social capitalism were carried out (and failed) in the country. The chronology ends in 1964 when union activity practically dies out, in Volta Redonda and in the whole of Brazil.

The book tells us that the workers at the CSN formed a privileged group among the country’s industrial workers and that the CSN was a unique company because it belonged to the State and because of its work or “factory regime” (to borrow Michael Burawoy’s term). It was a state company based on intensive production of capital and had central monopoly over activity under the Brazilian government’s developmental and national project. It sought an innovative model in industrial relations within the factory as well as in the factory’s interactions with the city then planned in a rural space to give a home to the elite of industrial workers. These aspects in themselves make the CSN part of Brazilian industrial history with all its successes and twists. The CSN described in the book, therefore, is a landmark in developmentalist ideology, nationalism, industrialism and laborism. It is the expression of an enterprise which proposed to propel national development. Above all, it is a new experience for the activity and demands of a group of workers and their union leaders who knew how to use the factory’s symbolic status and its socioeconomic peculiarities in order to achieve social gains to which the majority of Brazilian industrial workers did not have access.

The author argues that the workers of this company considered themselves key actors in the national development project. Thus, they claimed that they should receive benefits (salary raises, health services, housing, leisure, education, quality of life) for the group and their city as dividends for this strategic participation. They were not opposed to the company or their employer as such, but there was a plan to give back the factory’s profits to those who worked in it and to the city where they lived. This led to a high union participation from the 1950s, after the union interventions of Dutra’s government.

Between 1951 and 1958 the workers at the CSN had the highest salary raises among the country’s industrial workers and, according to the author, their highly militant participation in unions contributed to the political crisis of the 1960s, at the center of which were suspicions about the highly mobilized union movement, such as the one in Volta Redonda. For him, this is a story which reveals the political consequences of an economically motivated action exemplifying how the specific claims of a group of workers to enjoy the “fruits of their work” can interfere in development policies and create political impasses.

The CSN was designed to be a large economic, political and social enterprise, and also an example of social welfare and fair salaries for their workers. This was the main impulse for the strong union movement which started up there and which produced a powerful union elite with strong negation power with the government.
The author begins by building up a picture of Brazil’s pre-industrial economy and the projects that led to the creation of the Corporation which would become the symbol of our industrialization. He tells the story from the calculations for economic benefit to the decisions on the geographic location of the factory, which was to be in a rural zone with good potential for connections and transport to the country’s most dynamic region, the Southeast. The Volta Redonda district belonged to a declining coffee growing region which still had preserved railroads and was close to the ports of Rio de Janeiro. The local political leaders, however, were not sympathetic to this tremendous enterprise, fearing that the new activity would take labor away from the countryside to the emerging city. It was understood that, not only in this small location, but at other levels of society, industry and agriculture were at odds with each other. The future would show, however, that Vargas’s development model made it possible for the country to industrialize without changing land privileges.

To ease this worry, many started to work on the construction of the Corporation as seasonal workers, dividing their time with rural activities during harvest time. The living conditions were still poor and even inhuman. Most of them did not have qualifications and needed to be trained. These were some of the challenges facing the skilled group of engineers responsible for the works and led by Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva.

Together with the factory a city was planned to give homes to the new migrants from the region and the rest of the country. It was to be a city directly connected to the factory, an extension of the Corporation, with residential housing, schools and health centers. Housing, education, technical training, leisure, childcare for the offspring of the local workers, everything was thought out to ensure the interdependence between the city and the working environment. In the words of the designers, one big family would be formed. The book cites some telling examples of these intentions, one of these being a competition for the strongest baby towards the end of the 1940s.

The local population doubled in ten years, there was not enough housing and the temporary facilities gave way to what would become known as favelas which coexisted with the city that was supposed to be a model of social democracy. The social services and quality housing, however, were always available to blue-collar workers. Generally, the quality of the social services meant that the city was ahead of the country’s other industrial centers although the city was not without significant inequalities, especially for those who did not work for the Corporation.

The local population felt that the corporation was part of their protection and of a personal project which shielded them from harsh policies regarding salary readjustments, reassignment of labor or even dismissal at moments of crisis or adjustments. According to the author, the project was imbued with a mixture of paternalism, bureaucratic rationalization and citizenship, all of which was supported by strong influence from the Catholic Church.
and by excellent archival records of employees. The study successfully examines workers’ career paths and the system of earned promotions.

With the end of the Estado Novo, political liberalization also led to intense surveillance of communist activities. The concentration of industrial workers in Volta Redonda meant that the city became a target for militant communists and, as a result, for the political police. The return of Getulio Vargas to power in 1951 eases industrial relations throughout the county and revitalizes union activity among this group of workers. Meanwhile, factory production was increasing and becoming more urgent for national development. This meant that this category of workers became a group with important and powerful resources for negotiating salary benefits. In their favor, they argued that this was no ordinary business enterprise; they were participating in a national project.

The workers therefore had a dual understanding of their identity and economic insertion: they were salaried workers but belonged to a company that was part of the local society and the soul of a national development project. The author does not deal directly with the concept of patrimonialism, but this would be a case for reflection on this phenomenon. With all the incongruities inherent in the inequalities of benefits among workers and inhabitants, the Corporation was seen as a mix of public and private, of national interest and private property for those who were directly or indirectly involved in it. According to the author, this characteristic undermined its power of corporate decision-making. Its moral and emotional links with the community prevented it from making more aggressive organizational restructurings aimed at stabilizing the corporation’s finances.

The union leaders, on their part, confused their tasks with company management duties and sometimes took on both roles. The social services within the corporation were headed by union representatives. An example we are given of these trajectories is that of Othon Reis Fernandes, someone who alternated between union leadership and the management of CSN’s social matters.

In setting up a strategic enterprise for development, the government also produced a powerful strategic group of workers who could sabotage the planned economic model, an attitude seen as threatening in the 1960s. For the author, this is one of the challenges in understanding the political and ideological connections between the steel industry and laborism in Brazil. He shows that countries which took on state enterprises in this economic activity, such as the USSR and India, arrived at different results and did not become very vulnerable to union and social pressures. With these thoughts the author concludes that the power of the workers, as power of “agency”, derived from their strategic position in the industry and from their place in the social division of labor.

With 57 pages of notes, the book is an excellent reflection on and narrative of a company so central to the country’s economy that in 1988 it hosted one of the country’s most
violent strikes and ended up being privatized in 1993. The book ends in 1964 but paves the way for thinking about what came next. In the 1960s the workers achieved raises above the rate of inflation, generating fears with regard to the Corporation’s financial collapse. With the military coup it was taken over by the Army which put an end to union activity. But the problems would come back. Its privatization was one of the most traumatic experiences, not only for the city of Volta Redonda, but for the whole of Brazilian society.

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