

A policy mix for gender equality? Lessons from high-income countries

Megan Gerecke

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Preface

Over the past 15 years, important gains have been made in gender equality. Gender gaps in educational attainment have shrunk substantially. In fact, in many high-income countries, young women's educational attainment now exceeds that of young men. At the same time, most countries have seen a significant increase in female employment rates – a trend which slowed only with the recent financial crisis.

This said, gender inequality in the labour market remains a pressing problem. Despite women's gains in education, wage gaps remain substantial. Wage gaps are usually wider between men and women with tertiary education. Women are still less likely to participate in the labour market, and when they do, they are more likely to work part-time. In most countries, women are overrepresented in low-wage work and are more likely to be poor or socially excluded. This trend is particularly pronounced among women over age 65: for this group, gender gaps in poverty rates are alarmingly high.

This paper looks at 19 high-income countries, reviewing recent trends and summarizing the “lessons learned” on policies to promote gender equality. Understanding the “who” and “why” of gender inequality is essential in finding appropriate policy solutions. It is important to remember that men and women do not form homogeneous, diametrically opposed groups. Though gender inequality still exists on the labour market, we cannot treat it in broad strokes, but rather must recognize diversity and ask ourselves which women and which men are being affected. Disaggregating men and women by their various traits - age, income, working hours, region, contract type, etc. – improves our diagnosis of the underlying problems that feed gender inequality and, in doing so, can help inform policy choices.

This analysis reveals striking inequalities between workers with and without young children. The gap in employment rates is often wider among these two groups of women than between the sexes. “Motherhood” gaps remain significant even once children are older. Worryingly, if mothers are not able to reintegrate successfully into the labour market, inequalities in the short term will be exacerbated over their life course. The paper highlights effective policies regarding family responsibilities, such as improving the treatment of families in taxes and social benefits, ensuring short, well-paid leave is available to men and women and offering high-quality, affordable care services.

Childless or not, women are more likely than men to work part-time. In and of itself, part-time work can be an effective path for integrating women and men in the labour market. However, it often comes with wage penalties, greater occupational segregation, reduced eligibility for social benefits and less opportunity for career advancement. Rather than eliminating part-time work, the question becomes how to improve it. Many countries have taken steps towards guaranteeing the equal treatment of part-time workers and helping workers achieve their desired working hours.

Women are more likely than men to be poor or socially excluded and to work in low-wage jobs. Combating gender gaps at the bottom of the income distribution involves interventions that narrow inequalities in general, most notably strong and inclusive labour market institutions.

Finally, this paper shows that occupational segregation remains a pressing problem. Women and men remain clustered into different occupations, despite a slight improvement over the past 15 years. Overcoming occupational segregation will likely require continued efforts to challenge stereotypes and gendered preferences, and to combat gender biases within company procedures. Countries have recently begun to experiment with management quotas, though these remain quite controversial.

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Raymond Torres

Director

International Institute for Labour Studies

Introduction and framework for the analysis

Half a century after the ILO's conventions promoting equal pay (1951) and non-discrimination (1958), gender inequality in the labour market remains alive and strong, even in developed countries. Why is gender inequality so persistent? To answer this question, scholars have given more and more attention to the constraints that different individuals face. Indeed, disaggregating men and women by their various demographic traits - household structure, age, income, etc. - can improve our diagnosis of the underlying problems that lead to gender inequality and can help inform policy choices.

This paper will first explore average trends in gender inequality and then disaggregate these trends by household structure, and class (as captured by income and education). Several key differences emerge in men and women's interactions in the labour force: namely mothers are underrepresented in the labour force and in full-time work in particular; women are underrepresented in positions of power; and finally women are overrepresented among low-wage workers and the poor, with poverty rates quite high for older women in particular. The paper will continue on to explore the reasons behind these inequalities, and finally highlight potential policy solutions.

Gender inequality has been very well studied, with a substantial literature dating back several decades. With this in mind, we will avoid reinventing the wheel and will focus here on recent trends since 1995. The literature on gender inequality in the labour market is divided between developed and developing countries and indeed, the barriers individuals face in these countries are often quite different. For the purposes of this paper, we will limit our study to high-income countries. In tackling this problem, we will follow the literature trend of grouping countries by rough similarities in policies and outcomes, building on the work of Esping-Andersen (1989; 1990).

Esping-Andersen divides countries into "social democratic" (largely Nordic) countries, "liberal" (largely Anglo-Saxon¹) countries, and "conservative" (continental European) countries based on the different institutional logics of their welfare states - that is to say, how the responsibility for welfare is divided between the state, the market and the family.² He suggests that "social democratic" countries intervene to promote equality and universal rights tied to citizenship, that "liberal" states rely more heavily on the market (through, for instance, private pensions, insurance, etc.) and assistance to the poor is typically modest, and finally that "conservative" states attach benefits to earnings and occupation, replicating market-generated inequalities. His model was criticized by feminists for neglecting gender issues like family leave, care provision and the division of paid and unpaid work (Lewis 1992; Orloff 1993; O'Connor 1999; Sainsbury 1999; Orloff 2009). Nonetheless, most revisions to his theory result in similar country groupings (Korpi; Palme 1998; Korpi 2000; Myles; Quadagno 2002; Ferrarini 2006; Gornick; Jäntti 2009).³ Scholars have built on his model: they have added a Southern European group and disaggregated "conservative" countries by the strength of their work-life balance policies. To avoid any possible normative connotations denoted by Esping-Andersen terms "liberal", "social democratic" and "conservative", we will restrict ourselves to regional and linguistic labels. The country groups will be used as reference groups for our discussion of trends (see table 1.) Obviously these groups are not fully coherent - for instance Denmark is occasionally grouped with the Anglo-Saxon countries and Ireland with the continental Northern European countries - nevertheless they provide a useful framework for our study.

¹ Obviously, the term Anglo-Saxon does not account for the present multicultural, multi-lingual make-up of these countries.

² In doing so, he build on a rich literature exploring country variations in social expenditure; for a summary see Myles and Quadagno (2002).

³ Of course there are exceptions, both in terms of countries and in terms of specific policy domains (O'Connor 1999; Sainsbury 1999; Chang 2000; Gornick; Jäntti 2009).

Trends in gender inequality in the labour market since 1995

1. Employment trends by sex

In most of the countries studied, the employment rate of working aged women increased substantially since 1995, with rapid growth in Southern Europe, several Anglo-Saxon countries (Canada, Ireland, and Australia), Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Finland (see fig. 1). The only countries that did not see a significant increase in women's employment rates were Sweden and the United States (with rates moving from 69.6 to 71.5 and from 65.7 to 64.7, respectively, for the period 1995–2009).⁴ Since the crisis, women's employment has slowed in most countries, though some exceptions exist (most notably Germany and the Netherlands).

Trends in male employment can clearly be divided by the onset of the current economic crisis. Until the crisis men enjoyed fairly strong employment growth in Southern Europe, several Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, the UK and New Zealand), Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden. The strongest growth in male employment was seen in Ireland and Spain, and both countries experienced severe drops in employment since the crisis began, as did the United States.⁵ In all countries aside from Sweden and Germany, the crisis appears to have had a larger impact on male employment.

Despite women's gains, men are still more likely to be employed in all countries studied. Using 2009 OECD data, the smallest gaps in employment rates are found in Nordic countries, with a difference of less than 5 percentage points (see table 2). Canada, France and the US have slightly higher gaps, at 5–7 percentage points. In contrast, Greece and Italy have the largest gaps in employment rates, with a difference of over 20 percentage points. All other countries have similar gaps in employment rate, ranging from 9 to 13 percentage points. Of course, it is important to remember that women's employment is not necessarily synonymous with their economic empowerment.⁶ Participation in work does not necessarily imply participation in “decent work”, but rather could involve precarious, non-standard forms of work, or underemployment.

2. Part-time work

These average trends in employment tell us very little in terms of how men and women are interacting in the labour force. To begin, we can disaggregate employment by working hours or, more simply, by part- and full-time status. Women continue to dominate part-time work, though trends in their share of this work vary by country, as does its importance in total employment. In many developed countries, part-time work brings pay penalties, a higher risk of poverty, greater occupational segregation, reduced eligibility for social benefits, underemployment, job insecurity and less opportunity for career advancement (Bardasi; Gornick 2008; OECD 2010a). On the other hand, part-time work may have a positive effect on women's job satisfaction⁷ when chosen voluntarily and may pose fewer occupational health and safety risks (Booth; Van Ours 2009; OECD 2010a).

⁴ For this section, rapid growth will be taken to mean an increase of 6 or more percentage points, significant or “fairly strong” growth will be taken to mean an increase of 3 to 6 percentage points, and finally no significant change will be taken to mean a change of less than 3 percentage points. Similarly, rapid decline and slow decline will be defined as a decrease of 6 or more percentage points and of 3 to 6 percentage points, respectively.

⁵ This is likely partly explained by the severe contraction in the activity in the construction sector; for instance in Ireland and Spain, activity in construction has decreased by 50–65 per cent since 2007 (as captured by data adjusted for working days, latest figures are 2010 for Ireland and 2011 for Spain).

⁶ Just as we enter a quagmire in trying to define well-being, agency and capabilities (Sen 1985; Sen 1992), women's empowerment is quite to delineate; for interesting discussions on the topic see, for instance, (Kabeer 1999; Malhotra; Schuler 2005; Mosedale 2005; Narayan 2005)

⁷ Job satisfaction is a subjective measure of how satisfied individuals feel with their work. Such an effect is only observed for women (OECD 2010c, 230–231)

Using data from 2009, we observe that the importance of part-time work varies substantially by country (see fig. 2). The Netherlands is a clear outlier with part-time work making up more than 35 per cent of total employment. Part-time work is very important in most Anglo-Saxon countries, making up 22–25 per cent of employment in Ireland, the UK, Australia and New Zealand; in the United States and Canada, part-time employment makes up a lower share of employment, at 14 and 19 per cent respectively. In most Southern European countries, part-time employment is fairly low, while its importance varies in the Nordic and Continental Northern European countries (excluding the Netherlands).

Over the period 1995–2009, the share of part-time work among adults (aged 25+) grew rapidly in several Continental Northern European countries (Austria, Germany and the Netherlands) and in Ireland. Fairly strong growth was seen in Belgium, Finland, Italy and Spain. Norway alone experienced a notable decline in part-time work among adults. All other countries did not experience a significant change in the share of part-time work in the total economy (with the change under two percentage points).

These trends can be broken down by sex. Rapid growth occurred in the share of employed women working part-time in Austria, Germany, Ireland and Italy, while significant, if slower, growth occurred in Spain. In Norway, a rapid decline was observed and a significant, if slower, decline was observed in Denmark, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom. On average the share of employed men working part-time grew, with fairly strong growth in several of the Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden), Continental Northern European countries (Austria, Germany and the Netherlands), and in Ireland and the UK.⁸ While there are exceptions⁹, in most countries part-time work became less feminized, with particularly large changes in the Nordic countries.¹⁰

In many countries, women's participation in part-time work is voluntary. That said, we should highlight the definition of "voluntary" and "involuntary" is quite subjective and varies by country (OECD 2010a, 216). Generally "involuntary" part-time work only includes workers who choose part-time hours because they are unable to find full-time ones; it can be a good indicator that workers will transition to full-time work in the future (Stratton 1996). On the other hand, "voluntary" part-time work includes those with other time demands, which in the case of care responsibilities often fall disproportionately on women (see fig. 4).

With this in mind, it is perhaps not surprising to note that women's part-time work was over 70 per cent voluntary in all countries aside from Southern Europe, Canada and Finland (OECD 2009 figures). In several Anglo-Saxon countries (Ireland, UK, US) and in Austria, the Netherlands and Norway, over 90 per cent of women's part-time work was voluntary. Men's voluntary participation in part-time work has risen in all but the Southern European countries (see fig. 5). Both male and female involuntary part-time work grew in Southern Europe, Austria and Germany; it fell or remained stable in all other countries.

3. Wage gaps

Wage gaps are another important aspect of labour market gender inequality. There are two main ways to measure wages gaps: either raw or adjusted. In their most basic form, raw wage gender gaps do not reflect individual characteristics (seniority, education, working hours, contract type, etc.) or larger contextual factors (occupation, sector, firm size, region, unionization, etc.), but instead capture average differences in mean and median earnings across the entire economy. That said, often scholars

⁸ If we look at change in terms of growth rates, the figures appear quite substantial, mainly due to men's low participation in part-time work at the beginning of this period; for instance, in both Austria and Germany the share of employed men working part-time grew by over 110 per cent (at 117 and 137 per cent, respectively).

⁹ Exceptions include several Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Spain), Ireland and France.

¹⁰ This rebalancing is a combination of reduced part-time incidence among women and increased incidence among men (see figure 3).

measure gaps within a restricted population (i.e. a group defined by education, occupation, working time, income, etc.), yet these raw measures remain distinct from adjusted wage gaps which use sophisticated statistical procedures to account for a wide range of “observable” differences (see table A2 in Annex for an overview of these characteristics). Once these factors have been controlled for, any remaining or “residual gap” is often said to be the result of discrimination (though some would argue it reflects differences in “unobservable” characteristics). Looking at data since the 1990s for three European countries, Eurofound (2010a, 8) finds that residual or “discriminatory” wage gaps have slightly narrowed in Belgium, Norway and Sweden.

Since the mid-1990s, progress on raw wage gaps has been mixed (Rubery; Grimshaw; Figueredo 2002; Plantenga; Remery 2006). As figure 6 below illustrates, the data and methods used significantly influence reported gaps and trends. Nevertheless, some consistent trends emerge across sources. Raw wage gaps appear to have narrowed in Belgium and the Netherlands, and in all Anglo-Saxon countries studied aside from Australia. Given wide cross-country variation in the importance of part-time work, differences in mean hourly gross wages likely offer the least biased measure for comparison; using 2006 Eurostat data, Belgium, France, Ireland, and the Southern European countries stand out with low gaps in hourly wages (of under 15 percentage points), while Finland, Germany and the UK stands out with high gaps (of over 20 percentage points).

4. Segregation by occupation and sector

We can gain insight into the type of work men and women are doing by looking at their distribution across occupations (i.e. a clerk, a teacher, a lawyer) and sectors (i.e. education, hotels and restaurants, manufacturing). It is well-known that men and women are concentrated in different occupations and sectors, with women overrepresented in social services and men overrepresented in blue-collar work and engineering (Anker; ILO 1998; 2003; Charles; Grusky 2004; 2005; Bettio; Veraschchagina 2009).

Segregation can occur across different occupations (known as horizontal segregation) or along the career ladder within an occupation (known as hierarchical or vertical segregation). Horizontal segregation is not necessarily neutral, as some jobs may come with better pay, status, contract types, etc.¹¹ In concrete terms, men and women’s segregation into substantively different jobs – such as nurses and accountants - can exacerbate wage gaps despite these jobs having similar value (that is to say, similar value given working conditions and the required qualifications, effort and responsibility (see Gunderson; ILO (1994, 31–47) and Chicha; ILO (2008, 69–81) for more information on how these concepts are implemented).¹² Also, even if men and women work in the same occupation (as secretaries, for example) their segregation by workplace can exacerbate inequalities (Blau; Brinton; Grusky 2006, 48). Recent studies using harmonized matched employer-employee micro-data find that combined occupational, industrial, workplace and occasionally job cell segregation explain between a third¹³ to over half¹⁴ of the gendered wage gap.¹⁵

¹¹ Not all segregation leads to pay inequality; dividing horizontal segregation into the components that contribute to pay inequality and those that have no effect, Bettio et al (2009, 49) find that the only a small portion of total segregation actually leads to pay inequality, especially if total segregation is captured by an index (i.e. a single number).

¹² In petrol factory in the province of Ontario (Canada), occupational health nurses (a female-dominated occupation) were found to be underpaid compared to accountants (a male-dominated occupation) despite the comparable value of their work. Subsequently, their wages were increased by CAD\$1.81 (Lemière 2010, 34). For more evidence on the results of such initiatives see (Michael; Hartmann; O’Farrell 1989, 179–242; Gunderson; ILO Interdepartmental Project on Equality for Women in Employment 1994, 73–82; ILO; Chicha 2006, 10–26)

¹³ Bayard et al. (2003) examining 1990 US data; Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2006) examining 1995 Spanish data) to half (Simón (2011) examining data from nine European countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Norway, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovakia and Lithuania).

There are many different measures of segregation. The most common is the Index of Dissimilarity (ID) developed by Duncan and Duncan (1955). It measures the minimum proportion of women and men that would have to change occupations to create an equal distribution.¹⁶ It varies between 0 and 100 (or 0 and 1). Calculating segregation from the European labour force survey for the period 1997–2007, Bettio and Veraschagina (2009) find that occupational segregation, as captured by the ID, has decreased across the Nordic and Continental Northern European countries, as well as in the United Kingdom (see fig. 7). It has increased across Southern European countries and in Ireland. Trends in sectoral segregation are less uniform. Sectoral segregation, as captured by the ID, has decreased in two Nordic countries (Denmark and Sweden), two Continental Northern European countries (Austria and the Netherlands) and the United Kingdom. In all other countries, sectoral segregation increased.

Indices of segregation, like the ID, have the advantage of condensing all information into one easily comparable number; however they offer little insight into the qualitative changes occurring (i.e. more male nurses or female engineers) and into the mechanisms of change (i.e. increased wages attracting atypical employees).¹⁷ In addition to capturing whether occupations are feminized, changes in ID also reflect changes in the occupational structure of the labour market (see fig. 8). However, Bettio and Veraschagina (2009, 7–8) suggest that changes in the sex composition have been more important in determining long term trends.¹⁸ In most Nordic countries (save Finland) and the United Kingdom, occupations have become significantly less sex-segregated, while they have become significantly more sex-segregated in Spain, Portugal, and to a lesser extent, Ireland. Some suggest that there is a short- to medium-term trade-off between employment growth and occupational gender segregation (for a review see Bettio and Veraschagina, 2009, 35–36). This may be due to the marketization of previously unpaid domestic work, which simultaneously increases female labour supply and demand because of the traditional gendered nature of this work (ibid.)

Looking at qualitative differences, women are more likely to work in “white collar” occupations than “blue collar” ones.¹⁹ In all countries they are underrepresented among legislators, senior officials and managers, crafts and related trades workers, and plant and machine operators and assemblers (see fig. 9). Men are underrepresented among clerks, service workers and salespeople, and technicians and associate professionals.

In addition, certain sectors are typically segregated by sex. While wide cross-country variation exists, construction, mining, transport, and manufacturing tend to be male-dominated, while health and social work, education, hotels and restaurants, and employment in private households tend to be female-dominated (see fig. 10). In all countries, the share of employment in manufacturing has fallen over the past 15 years, while in all but the Continental Northern European countries the share of employment in construction has grown with wide cross-country variation in the pace of this growth. While there have been slight changes in sectoral segregation, male and female employment has largely followed

¹⁴ Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2006) examining 2002 Spanish data; Bayard et al. (2003) examining 2002 US data.

¹⁵ Nonetheless, there is debate over the importance of occupational segregation for wage gaps, while some authors claim occupational segregation is very important (Reskin; Roos 1990; Levanon; England; Allison 2009) others suggest the effect is marginal (England; Allison; Wu 2007).

¹⁶ This is often mistaken for the proportion of women or men that would have to change occupations, but as Anker (1998) clarifies this is not the case (see Appendix 5.1 in Anker, 1998).

¹⁷ In addition, as with any measure that aims to compare segregation across countries, indices will also suffer from country differences in the definition of employment and in occupations deemed to be included in various categories, not to mention problems introduced by shifts in the occupational classification system used (Anker; ILO 1998, 61–69)

¹⁸ For the most part structural changes in the economy decreased occupational segregation (see fig 8)

¹⁹ “Blue collar” work involves manual labour, while “white collar” work is typically performed in an office environment (e.g. services).

sectoral trends, declining when the sector is declining and increasing when the sector is growing.²⁰

Occupational segregation impacts workplace health and safety. In this respect, men's segregation into blue collar work comes with some clear disadvantages. In terms of health hazards, in the EU-15, men are much more likely to experience fatal work-place accidents and are more likely to suffer from non-fatal accidents, though not in sectors where women comprise a high proportion of the workforce, such as "health and social work" (European Commission; Directorate-General for Employment - Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities 2008). In terms of routine hazards to health, men are more likely to be exposed to vibrations, carry heavy loads, or move or lift people in their jobs; they are just as likely as women to work in tiring positions and make repetitive hand and arm movements (Eurofound 2010b, 6–7).

5. Vertical segregation: Women in decision-making

Women are less likely than men to hold positions among the higher echelons of the occupational hierarchy (Anker; ILO 2005; Eurofound 2008; Zahidi; Ibarra 2010; European Commission 2011b). If we look at women's share of jobs among legislators, senior officials and managers (LSOM) – a common measure of vertical segregation – they are typically underrepresented (see fig. 9).²¹ There are some exceptions to this rule: in most countries women make up the majority of LSOM workers in education (with the exceptions of Austria, Germany, Italy and Spain). In several countries, women also make up a large share of LSOM workers in health and social work. Nonetheless, if we take into account women's overrepresentation in these sectors, they are relatively underrepresented among management.²² In fact, when we take into account women's relative share of sectoral employment, it is perhaps surprising to note that women are relatively overrepresented in management in several male-dominated sectors, seen most clearly in France in figure 11 below.²³

As Anker notes, the category of "manager" encompasses widely different levels of power or status, not to mention the fact that the enterprises vary significantly in their national and international influence. It is important to recognize that significant cross-country variation exists in who is included under the broad label of LSOM. Among managers, women tend to be overrepresented at the lower echelons of the hierarchy – a point clearly illustrated by the WEF recent survey of 600 of the world's largest employers (see fig. 12).

6. Family structure and gender inequality

The presence of children in a household is widely recognized as a barrier to women's participation, employment and extended working hours, while for men children's presence is linked to higher rates of participation (Uunk; Kalmijn; Muffels 2005, 42; Budig; Misra; Böckmann 2010; Misra; Budig; Böckmann 2010).²⁴ This is likely linked to the fact that women clearly do the majority of housework and care work (see fig. 13). Nonetheless, the contribution of men has increased slightly over time

²⁰ This appears to be contrary to the "queuing" argument regarding feminization, in which formerly male-dominated sectors or occupations are feminized when the wages or working conditions are in decline.

²¹ This high-level ISCO-88 category consists of several sub-categories: In politics, this category includes legislators, senior government officials, traditional chiefs and heads of villages, and senior officials of special-interest organisations; for the corporate world, it includes directors and chief executives, production and operations department managers and other department managers; in addition there is a category covering general managers.

²² Exceptions: education in Greece and public sector in Ireland.

²³ This may be an example of "glass escalators" for women (Maume 1999). While the original theory suggests that men in female-dominated fields will be promoted to more "appropriate" management positions, perhaps in blue-collar occupations, women could be promoted to more "appropriate" office positions, which happen to be higher up in the management echelon within these fields.

²⁴ Children are not the only potential recipients of care responsibility; many care for elderly, ill or disabled adults (see page 33 for more details.)

(Coltrane 2000; Gershuny; Sullivan 2003; Crompton 2006, 141; Chichilnisky; Hermann Frederiksen 2008; Lachance-Grzela; Bouchard 2010).

Childless men and women have roughly the same employment rates in many countries, with Greece and Italy as notable exceptions (see fig. 14). On the other hand, men living with young children (under the age of 6) are more likely to be employed than childless men, while women in the same situation are significantly less likely to be employed (with Portugal as a notable exception).²⁵ Outside of Finland and Portugal, even mothers of older children (12+) are less likely to be employed than childless women. Even though mothers of young children (under the age of 6) are employed at lower rates than their childless counterparts, their employment rate rose in most countries over the past 15 years, however this trend has been dampened by the crisis.

Looking at participation in full-time work, the gaps are even more notable. As above, in all countries aside from Portugal, women with young children are less likely to work full-time, while men with young children are more likely to work full-time.²⁶ And, as above, outside of Finland and Portugal, even mothers of older children (12+) are less likely to be employed full-time than childless women. Yet notably, the extent to which children impact mothers' labour supply varies significantly by country (for similar findings see Uunk et al., 2005, 42). The full-time employment rate of mothers of young children is highest in Southern Europe, Finland, Belgium and France. Yet notably in Belgium, women with older children do not increase their full-time participation. Gaps between mothers and childless women are largest in the Continental Northern European (Austria, Germany and the Netherlands) and Anglo-Saxon countries (Ireland and the United Kingdom).

Women's higher likelihood to interrupt their career because of parental responsibilities can exacerbate gender inequalities over the long term. While short career interruptions, such as maternity leave, do not appear to impair labour market outcomes, longer interruptions can lead to lost experience, outdated skills, reduced access to on-the-job training and impaired wage bargaining power, and thus lead to poorer outcomes in terms of wages, career advancement and ease of return to work (Booth 2006; Letablier et al. 2009; European Parliament 2010; Robson 2010).²⁷

Women with children tend to earn less than childless women, though again the extent of this impact varies significantly by country. Using 2000 LIS data, Budig et al. (2010) find significant motherhood wage penalties in several Continental Northern European countries (Austria, the Netherlands and Germany) and Anglo-Saxon countries (Canada, the UK and the US) even after controlling for individual factors affecting selection into work like age, education, working hours and household structure (see table 3).²⁸ While mothers' lower labour supply explains a certain extent of the wage penalty, residual inequality remains.

7. Poverty, inequality and gender inequality

In most developed countries, women, and older women in particular, are more likely than men to be

²⁵ Between a fifth and a third of the individuals aged 25–49 live with children under the age of 6.

²⁶ In Portugal, women with 3 or more kids (with one aged under 6) are less likely to work full-time than childless women. In the United Kingdom, men with 3 kids (with one aged under 6) are less likely to work full-time than childless men.

²⁷ Some argue these penalties are only experienced in the medium-term, and that as women compensate for their lack of human capital accumulation, they will progressively catch-up with childless women in terms of pay (Gupta; Smith 2002). Arguably, these costs of leave could be higher for men (Albrecht et al. 1999), given possible stigma against male leave-takers, however as most studies focus on the impact of women's leave it is difficult to draw clear conclusions.

²⁸ Summarizing the findings of past research, Budig et al. (2010) note scholars have found motherhood wage penalties in Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland Sweden, Germany, Portugal, Spain, the UK and the US.

poor or socially excluded (see fig. 17).²⁹ Focusing in on the elderly, rates of poverty and social exclusion are very high among men in Southern Europe, Belgium, Denmark and the United Kingdom. They are quite low among men in France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Among women, these rates are highest in Southern Europe, Finland and the United Kingdom. They are by far the lowest in the Netherlands. Using Eurostat 2010 data, pronounced gender differences between men and women's rates of poverty and social exclusion are seen in most of the Nordic and Southern European countries (Denmark and Spain being exceptions to this rule), and in Austria and Great Britain. If we supplement this with OECD data for non-European countries, we see that the United States and Australia have high rates of old-age poverty, while Canada and New Zealand have very low rates (OECD 2008a). Patterns of labour market interaction can affect wage-related social benefits; for instance, lower wages and shorter working time contribute to women's lower pension coverage and lower annual benefit rates after retirement (Bonnet; Geraci 2009; Jefferson 2009).³⁰

In most countries, women are overrepresented in low-wage work (Canada emerges as an exception to this rule) (see fig. 18). Incidence of low-wage work is high among men in many of the Anglo-Saxon countries (save for New Zealand). Among women, it is high in Austria, Germany, Ireland, the UK and the US.

According to OECD data, between 2000 and 2008, low wage incidence increased in many countries: among men it increased markedly in Denmark, Germany, Australia, Ireland, and the United Kingdom; it increased slightly in New Zealand and the United States (see fig. 18). Among women, a large increase was seen in Denmark and Germany. In most other countries for which data are available, a small increase was observed among women (Canada and the UK are exceptions.)

Looking at the bottom half of the wage distribution, the widest gaps among men are observed in the Anglo-Saxon countries (aside from New Zealand) and Germany (see fig. 19). Similar patterns emerge among women, with the widest gaps found in North America, Ireland and Germany.

Looking at the top half of the wage distribution, the widest gaps among men are found in Portugal and the United States, followed by Austria, Ireland and the UK. Among women, the widest gaps are found in Greece, Portugal and the United States (see fig. 20). The Nordic and Continental Northern European countries have compressed wage structures among both sexes.

Reasons behind gender inequality and policy responses

Most factors used to explain gender inequality in the labour market fall into one of the following 3 groups: (a) factors affecting labour supply, (b) factors affecting labour demand, and (c) larger cultural, institutional or structural factors. Understanding why gender inequalities exist is very important as it allows us identify the appropriate policy responses.

1. Supply side factors and policies to challenge gender norms and overcome obstacles

Theories relating to supply side factors usually focus how the choices and constraints individuals face influence labour market outcomes. To a certain extent, choices regarding fields of study channel men and women into different occupations even before they have entered the labour force (Smyth;

²⁹ Social exclusion here is defined as individuals with very low work intensity (working age members in the household worked less than 20 per cent of their potential during the past year) or severe material deprivation. The figures are combined with people at risk of poverty, defined as those with an equivalized disposable income below 60 per cent of the national median equivalized disposable income after social transfers (Eurostat 2012).

³⁰ However given women's longer life span, their lifetime pension wealth would be higher than men's if one assumes similar life-time earnings (OECD 2011a). In addition, derived pensions rights often benefit women, though typically only if they are married (or in some cases previously were married) (Jefferson 2009)

Steinmetz 2008). Similarly, it can be highlighted that in many countries women's high rate of part-time work is largely voluntary (though, to reiterate, "voluntary" encompasses several constraints, childcare responsibilities among them). Again, such differences in preferences for working hours and other job characteristics may channel men and women into different occupations at different wage rates (Macpherson; Hirsch 1995). This is often seen in a framework of "compensating differentials", where to attract employees, employers must offer better wages for jobs with undesirable traits (like risk, long working hours, low job security, unpleasantness, etc.) and are able to offer lower wages for jobs with non-pecuniary benefits (like satisfaction from helping people³¹, "family-friendliness", childcare, short or flexible working hours, etc.)³² Women are argued to be more averse to "undesirable" jobs and more attracted to family-friendly ones (see Budig and England (2001) for a review of this argument.) To the extent that such choices are "free" this does not necessarily pose a problem for gender equality, yet defining and measuring "freedom of choice" is quite complicated³³ and many argue that men and women's choices are constrained by household-level decision-making, internalized and external gender roles and stereotypes, and the lack of attractive alternatives.

Household-level decision-making helps explain men and women's different patterns of labour market interaction. Becker (1991) argues that when men and women form a home together, they specialize in paid and domestic labour for the greater well-being of the household.³⁴ How such decisions are made should be influenced by household members' relative resources, skills, economic dependency and bargaining power.³⁵ Following this logic, when women make relative gains in the labour force

³¹ Another interpretation is that interpersonal services have limited potential for productivity growth through technology and mechanization thus limiting potential wage growth. Looking at the care sector specifically, financing challenges and downward pressure on wages may also be created by the fact that demand for care is highest when the care recipient is least able to pay (i.e. children, sick, elderly) (Razavi; Staab 2010, 412).

³² There is debate whether or not mothers voluntarily choose "family friendly" occupations or sectors; some authors find women sort into lower-paying organizations or sectors before childbirth, while others find no evidence of this pattern (Budig et al. 2010, 7).

³³ A useful way to look at choice is to evaluate the range of alternatives individuals face and their different resources enabling them to choose (Korpi 2000). Sen highlights the importance of *potential* choices and actions rather than actual outcomes. As the huge literature on survey reliability reveals, stated preferences may not be actual preferences and individuals' answers to generalized questions may differ from their preferences in their own life (Sen 1985, 183,187; Hakim 2007). Further complicating matters, is the fact that preferences are not necessarily stable; rather attitudes adjust to behaviour over time, even as existing attitudes shape current behaviour (Ellingsaeter; Gulbrandsen 2007). If behaviour and attitudes are in conflict, individuals experience an uncomfortable feeling of "cognitive dissonance" and may adjust their preferences and beliefs to match their actions, particularly if there is little external justification for the attitude-behaviour conflict.

³⁴ This is not to say that all members of a household have the same interests or preferences (indeed much has been written to disrupt the idea of a unitary household), but that their togetherness impacts how decisions are made – whether that be conflictually, cooperatively or in a "cooperative conflict" (Lansky 2000; Sen 1987). Discussing how men and women share housework and care work hinges on assumptions about household composition in general, and cohabitation and parenthood in particular. Unfortunately, the literature on work-family balance tends to focus on nuclear families to the exclusion of more atypical household structures – such as single-dads and same-sex partners – and at times, even fairly typical household structures like single individuals, childless individuals, single-moms, extended families, and unmarried cohabiting partners (Özbilgin et al. 2011). Same-sex partners – particularly those with children – have been found to be more likely to share both paid and unpaid work (though as Peplau emphasizes this may be due to a sampling bias that tends to overrepresent affluent, well-educated homosexuals) (Patterson; Sutfin; Fulcher 2004; Peplau; Fingerhut 2007). Married women spend more time on housework than cohabiting unmarried women (little or no effect is found for men) (Bianchi et al. 2000; Davis; Greenstein; Gerteisen Marks 2007). This may not be due to marriage *per se* but rather the traditional views that surround it. For instance, men and women who live together before marriage are more likely to share housework more evenly (Batalova; Cohen 2002). Unsurprisingly, when individuals become parents time spent on unpaid work substantially increases, with the increase consistently larger for women than for men.

³⁵ Some argue these decisions are influenced by the "marriage market": high sex ratios that increase the demand for women mean that more resources will be allocated to them for their role in household production creating a higher reservation wage for labour force participation (see Emery, 2009).

through income or even productivity potential (i.e. education), they should reduce their contribution to housework. Indeed, the absolute and relative hours spent on housework have been shown to be influenced by relative and absolute resources, as captured by income and education, as well as by time availability³⁶, yet these reductions have not kept up with women's gains in the labour force (Lachance-Grzela; Bouchard 2010). In male-female households³⁷, women clearly do the majority of housework and care work, but the contribution of men has increased slightly over time, while the time needed to tend a house has fallen³⁸ (Coltrane 2000; Gershuny; Sullivan 2003; Crompton 2006, 141; Chichilnisky; Hermann Frederiksen 2008; Lachance-Grzela; Bouchard 2010).

Several scholars suggest that gendered behaviour is more than a simple matter of relative resources, but rather is engrained in gender roles and stereotypes. Individuals with more egalitarian views have been shown to have a more equal division of housework and care work than individuals with traditional beliefs (Davis et al. 2007; Lachance-Grzela; Bouchard 2010). At the country-level, gender egalitarianism is linked to women spending less time on housework (in absolute terms) (Lachance-Grzela; Bouchard 2010). Such cultural beliefs likely shape men and women's behaviour in many spheres. For instance, women have been shown to underrate their skills in stereotypical "masculine" fields; a case in point, even when controlling for actual performance in math, men tend to assess themselves more positively than women, which may explain to a certain extent women's underrepresentation in such fields (Correll 2001; Correll 2004).

Not only are individuals influenced by expectations and norms, they may even re-enact and reassert gender roles to affirm their identity (see Coltrane (2000) for an overview.) For instance, to affirm their identity as wives and mothers, women may place more value on their home's order and cleanliness and on their skills at and responsibility for care-work.³⁹ Non-normative choices that risk stigmatization, guilt, etc. may be compensated for through "performing gender" more aggressively in other spheres.

Finally, as preferences reflect a compromise with reality, they are shaped by the perceived range of available choices (Sen 1985, 191; Lewis 2009). For instance, unavailable or unaffordable alternatives for child care constrain women's labour force participation, as do high marginal tax rates on secondary earners (Polachek 2006, 104; Gash 2008). The expanding opportunities or "facilitating policies" approach aims to reduce the barriers to entry and progress of the underrepresented gender. Many feminists suggest that the encouragement and support of a dual-earner, dual-carer family model is one of the most hopeful avenues towards achieving gender equality (Fraser 1994; Gornick; Meyers 2003; Crompton 2006; Lewis 2006). Policies on work-family balance are sometimes premised on a one-and-a-half-earner household, emphasizing harmonization of the secondary earner's paid and unpaid work rather than equal sharing within the household (Lewis 2006, 22–23). Korpi et al. (2010) suggest that dual-earner families can be supported through full-time daycare of young children and job protected, earnings-related parental leave, while traditional family structures can be supported through part-time daycare for young children and through taxes or transfers in child allowances, child care leave benefits⁴⁰ and subsidies for non-active spouses. Given that the transition to a dual-carer/dual-earner model implies a reduction of both men and women's hours and work

³⁶ Theories explain the division of housework highlight the role of time availability, however if when we look at gender inequality more holistically, a problem of circular logic emerges, in that labour force participation is seen to be limited by housework but housework is limited by labour force participation.

³⁷ See footnote 28.

³⁸ The increased reliance on the service economy contributes to this decline (i.e. buying pre-made meals, using maid services), as does a general devaluation of housework and its results (i.e. wrinkle-free clothing is seen as less important) (Bianchi et al. 2000)

³⁹ Choices around childcare, for instance, will be embedded in individuals' identity as mothers/fathers, the "ethics of care" and the "proper thing to do", and cultural ideas about what is best for the child (Ellingsaeter; Gulbrandsen 2007, 657; Lewis 2009, 17).

⁴⁰ These are distinct from parental leave benefits in their long duration and low wage-replacement or flat rate transfers (Ferrarini 2006)

responsibilities, it may require a more fundamental rethinking of the labour market structure as it applies to parents and care-givers.⁴¹

Childcare is not the only potential care responsibility that individuals face. With an aging population, elder care has gained more and more attention. Yet it is difficult to evaluate the impact of providing elder care on family and friends' labour market outcomes, because individuals with worse labour market prospects may be more likely to provide care work. Many studies do not take this selection effect into account and therefore overstate the relationship between labour market outcomes and eldercare responsibilities (Lilly; Laporte; Coyte 2007; Leigh 2010). More intense care responsibilities for the elderly appear to have a greater impact on labour market outcomes.⁴² Many of the factors that have been suggested as mediating the impact of care giving on labour force outcomes (such as sex, education, income, age) are also predictive in general models of labour supply such that their significance may be overstated (Lilly et al. 2007, 668).

Children are not the only barrier to work. Other facilitating policies can include services and subsidies to support caregivers of the incapacitated, leave and flexible working time arrangements, incentives for men and women to study non-traditional fields or enter atypical occupations, and policies that touch on other barriers, such as commuting, housing, family laws, family planning, etc (Gundersen; ILO Interdepartmental Project on Equality for Women in Employment 1994, 17; O'Connor 1999).

2. Demand side factors and antidiscrimination and equal opportunities policies

On the demand side or the side of employers, gender inequality could result from outright discrimination (men are preferable) (Becker 1971; Arrow 1973), stereotyping (men are preferred for "masculine" jobs and vice-versa⁴³), devaluation of "women's work" (not recognizing and rewarding the value of feminine skills⁴⁴ and female-dominated jobs, see England et al. 2007), social closure (self-perpetuating male advantage due to self-interest among men in positions of power and male-dominated networks, see Hultin; Szulkin 1999; Meyersson Milgrom; Petersen 2006) or even unintentional or indirect discrimination, which we will touch on in more depth in the following section. If women are believed to be less productive or committed than men this could lead to "statistical discrimination" (Phelps 1972; Aigner; Cain 1977), where due to imperfect information or its high cost, employers use group averages in job commitment and productivity to draw conclusions about individuals, meaning that individuals with above-average job commitment or productivity potential are discriminated against due to assumptions inferred from the group.

Gender discrimination is difficult to establish (or refute). As such, field-experiments (and quasi-experiments) are a useful indicator of possible discrimination. Goldin and Rouse (2000) find the move to blind auditions in American orchestras substantially increased women's recruitment. Summarizing

⁴¹ Arguably this goal has lost attention in the international arena with a refocusing on economic efficiency.

⁴² If we divide care intensity into low, medium and high (at under 10 hours, 10–20 hours and over 20 hours respectively), those with medium intensity care responsibilities are likely to reduce work hours and those with high intensity care responsibilities are likely to reduce work hours or drop out of the labour force entirely (Lilly et al. 2007; Colombo et al. 2011).

⁴³ Stereotypical feminine skills are thought to include nurturing/caring, communication and interpersonal skills, dexterity, attractiveness, honesty, docility and deference; masculine skills are thought to include strength, leadership and authority, bravery and risk-taking, rationality and logic, scientific/mathematic ability, and rationality and logic (Anker 2001, 2003; Charles and Grusky 2004). The "glass escalator" theory (Williams 1992; Maume 1999) goes further to suggest that men entering female-dominated fields (like childcare) will be seen as deviant, and will be promoted to more "appropriate" management positions.

⁴⁴ For instance, Razavi and Staab (2010: 412) note a wage penalty for care work even beyond that implied by gender concentrations; they suggest this may indicate bias against care work as "women's work."

30 years of field experiments on discrimination⁴⁵, Riach and Rich (2002, F515) find “pervasive and enduring discrimination” against women; interestingly they also find evidence of stereotyping, where in occupations dominated by one sex, the underrepresented sex is discriminated against. OECD (2008c) suggests that evidence since the early 2000s has been more mixed, but limited sample sizes mean that no firm conclusions can be reached.

Anti-discrimination legislation and guarantees of equal rights (such as equal pay for work of equal value) can help reduce demand side barriers to participation through prohibiting discrimination and taking proactive measures to combat it. Discrimination on the basis of sex can also include discrimination linked to pregnancy, childbirth, breastfeeding or a change of civil status (i.e. marriage) (ILO 2010, 61–66). Looking at adherence to international antidiscrimination conventions⁴⁶, Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2007) and OECD (2008c, 183–184) find a significant correlation with smaller wage and employment gaps. While the conventions on equal pay (C100) and anti-discrimination have been widely accepted, many countries have not yet ratified the conventions on family responsibilities and maternity protection (see table 4).

How policies are designed and enforced has been shown to be very important in shaping their effectiveness. A recent overview of the topic suggests that anti-discrimination laws are effective when they aim to: reduce complexity or provide additional legal services; increase transparency and public awareness; reduce costs and increase benefits for plaintiffs to bring cases before the courts; increase incentives for employers to comply with legislation; and provide alternative non-adversarial methods of resolution, such as mediation or conciliation (OECD 2008c). Shifting the burden of proof to the respondent rather than the complainant can also make anti-discrimination laws more effective (ILO 2010, 67). Indeed, proving that discrimination did not take place (i.e. legitimate grounds existed) should be relatively easy for respondents given their easy access to information on the decision-making process; nonetheless, it is important to facilitate complainants’ access to such information and give more guidance on what constitutes evidence of discrimination (OECD 2008c, 168–169). Proactive antidiscrimination measures that encourage or require compliance regardless of whether a complaint has been made are more effective in reducing discrimination, as are laws that allow for collective action (through bargaining, unionization or even collective action law suits) (O’Connor 1999; ILO; Chicha 2006).⁴⁷

3. Structural factors and gender mainstreaming and affirmative

In some cases, gender inequality does not reflect intentional or direct discrimination, but rather results from structural factors. Bias can also occur in seemingly neutral organizational procedures, such as job evaluations or hiring and promotion procedures. Efforts to make such procedures more gender-neutral have met some success (Bettio; Veraschagina 2009). Bias can also occur in policies and institutions; to give a concrete example, women’s higher likelihood to interrupt their career to care for children can reduce pensions and other social benefits. In fact, many developed countries have recognized this impact and now include pension measures to compensate for time dedicated to childcare (see section 3.1 below) (Letablier et al. 2009). Gender mainstreaming has proven to be a

⁴⁵ The authors include five studies (from Austria, Australia and the United States) that evaluate sex discrimination in job applications through conducting field experiments in written, telephone or in-person applications and interviews. Most of the studies address job openings within the service sector.

⁴⁶ The authors include the following three international anti-discrimination conventions: the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the ILO convention on Equal Remuneration, 1951 (No.100) and the ILO convention on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation), 1958 (No. 111).

⁴⁷ Looking at employment equity strategies, O’Connor (1999) touches on the idea of a trade off between mass and elite outcomes. For instance, complaint-based, individualistic approaches to pay equality, as seen in the US, UK and Canada, are more likely to help high-income, high-status women, because these women are more likely to have the resources required to pursue discrimination complaints and to work in environments where discrimination is easier to prove

powerful tool in identifying and combating these structural biases. It is the process of assessing the gender implications of any planned action, such as policies and programmes at the national, enterprise or union level. Gender mainstreaming aims to ensure that all steps of the process account for gender differences and further gender equality including design, implementation, monitoring or evaluation (United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 1997/2). It can help reduce unintentional bias and discrimination that are built into institutions, policies and programmes.

Affirmative action (also known as employment equity, quotas, etc.) is another way to combat structural discrimination (that is to say, discrimination due to historic, systemic and/or institutional factors); these can include preferences, targets or even quotas in favour of the underrepresented sex often with a timeline for their achievement (Gundersen; ILO Interdepartmental Project on Equality for Women in Employment 1994; O'Connor 1999). Unlike anti-discrimination legislation, affirmative action is less concerned with individual behaviour and intent, but rather “the structuring and functioning of the labour market and implications for employment practices” (O'Connor 1999).

Highlighted issues and possible policy solutions

While some policies – such as guaranteeing equal political, economic and social rights – have the capacity to affect all men and women, many policies can be better understood as specific medicines that have the potential to address specific problems rather than as cure-all solutions (Michael et al. 1989).⁴⁸ The feminization of poverty, for instance, may be best solved with minimum wages, basic income transfers or a Social Protection Floor, whereas the low participation of mothers can be tackled through increased support to dual-earner families through, for instance, childcare and access to flexible working time. Breaking the glass ceiling may require affirmative action like recent quotas on corporate boards. Nonetheless, if supply-side barriers remain, even such proactive policies will not necessarily lead to the desired result. To give a concrete example, gender wage gaps could not be fully addressed by early equal pay policies that targeted wage gaps between men and women in jobs deemed the “same or at least of the same kind in their essential parts” because of the wage disparities that accompanied sectoral, occupational and workplace segregation (Määttä 2008). Recognizing this weakness, many countries introduced comparable worth policies that target jobs that are judged to have a comparable value, typically using a composite measure of qualifications, effort, responsibility and working conditions to establish comparability (ILO; Chicha 2008).⁴⁹

Furthermore, men and women clearly do not form homogeneous, diametrically opposed groups. Though gender inequality still exists on the labour market, we cannot treat it in broad strokes, but rather must recognize diversity and ask ourselves which women and which men are being affected? Understanding the “who” and “why” of gender inequality is essential in finding appropriate policy solutions. Disaggregating men and women by their various traits - age, income, working hours, region, contract type, etc. – improves our diagnosis of the underlying problems that feed gender inequality and, in doing so, can help inform policy choices.

As gender gaps are relative group-based measures, they do not necessarily capture the trends that individual men and women are experiencing; in fact, decreasing gaps may sometimes represent losses by men rather than gains by women (Morris; Western 1999). Given men’s increasing incidence of low wage work and involuntary part-time work, and the decline of several traditionally male-dominated sectors, now more than ever it is important to remember that achieving equality must be done through a “race to the top” rather than a “race to the bottom.” In doing so, it will be important to recognize that

⁴⁸ Of course, that said, the different aspects of gender inequality (i.e. care responsibilities, wages, working hours, etc.) are interrelated, either directly (“I need to care for my child, so I cannot work longer hours”) or through feedback loops (“I expect low wages and career mobility so I will invest less of my time and energy in my job”).

⁴⁹ But again such evaluations are often limited to gaps occurring within one establishment (often the public sector).

gender is a two-sided coin and that men need to be brought back into the discussion.

All this is to say that governments and worker and employer organizations will need to choose which issues to focus on, and to do so in a way that takes into account men and women's diverse situations. This paper highlights several important labour market gender inequalities that have persisted; these include (1) the low employment of women with children, (2) women's overrepresentation in part-time work, (3) women's higher likelihood to be living in poverty or earning low wages and finally (4) women's underrepresentation in positions of power and status. As each specific problem has different possible solutions, we will treat policy responses in turn.

Buyer beware: The small print of policy prescriptions

Before we analyse these issues in depth, it is useful to recall that measuring whether an institution or policy is "gender-egalitarianism" is not an exact science. Policy features and institutional frameworks vary widely across countries and may not be comparable term-for-term (Maurice et al 1982 cited in O'Reilly 2006). An attempt to compare them in this way may neglect the overall societal effect. Reducing policies to numbers obscures qualitative differences that can be fundamental in shaping gendered outcomes. For instance, it is common practice to measure parental leave in number of weeks (or number of equivalent weeks at full-time pay). Such a measure combines short well-paid, wage-related parental leave with long, low-paid, flat-rate leave. This is problematic, because short, well-paid, wage-related leave is thought to increase female labour force participation, while long, low-paid, flat-rate leave is thought to reduce female labour force participation (Ferrarini 2006; Erler 2009, 122–124; Fagnani; Math 2009, 107). Yet given the substantial policy variation across countries, capturing all relevant features and institutional frameworks is an arduous if not impossible task. The popular trend of reducing interrelated policies into a single index score hides potential trade-offs and endogenous relationships.

Even if we can capture in numbers what policies aim to do, it has been increasingly evident that this may not capture its potential impact if there is incomplete coverage and weak enforcement. Take, for instance, minimum wage provisions in Spain: while such provisions are equal to 44 per cent of the median wage and 35 per cent of the mean wage (OECD 2011c), a very small fraction of the workforce is paid at minimum wage (0.8 per cent in 2005, see Eurofound 2007b, 2), suggesting they do not dramatically alter the wage curve. A similar case could be made for low take-up of short unpaid parental leave in the UK, Ireland and Greece (Eurofound 2007a).⁵⁰ Take-up and coverage rates are gaining increased attention as crucial elements in determining a policy's effectiveness and scope.

Finally, even if the measures of policies and gender inequality are flawless, establishing the causal link between them is difficult. Quantitative research typically approaches this challenge in two ways, either measuring differences in policies and outcomes (1) across countries or (2) in a single country (over time or between different demographic groups.) There are distinct shortcomings of the varying approaches, but to be brief, a common weakness of cross-country studies is to neglect other important differences between countries (for instance, institutions, culture or economic structure). Single country studies, on the other hand, need to control for trends, simultaneous changes (for instance, in policies, the economy, etc.) and the possibility of reverse causality. A cross-cutting weakness of these studies is selection bias. Because national policies are rarely introduced with a comparable control group⁵¹, comparing policy impacts (for instance between the groups that used a policy such as maternity and those who did not) may capture differences that already existed in the groups studies

⁵⁰ In the US employees who have worked 1250 hours over the past year and have been employed for at least one year in an enterprise with 50+ employees are eligible for 12 weeks of unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). However, these conditions mean that only half of workers are covered; in fact, some estimates suggest that coverage is as low as 20 per cent among new mothers (Fass 2009, 5). In several states, temporary disability insurance provides partial wage replacement, though typically does not provide job protection (ibid.)

⁵¹ Of course, pilot projects are a noteworthy exception.

(for instance, those who did not use a policy might begin with lower bargaining power or lower wages). Thus we have a difficult problem – one that is perhaps best addressed with the simple acknowledgement that any exploration of this relationship will be fuzzy at best.

1. Workers with family responsibilities

Reiterating the trends

Our analysis of trends reveals a striking difference between workers with family responsibilities and those without. In fact, the gap in employment rates is often larger between childless women and those with young children than between men and women (see fig. 22A). Yet simply using a child to proxy “family responsibilities” can be quite misleading given the marked difference in how children affect men and women’s labour force participation. While men with young children (under 6) are more likely than their childless counterparts to be employed, women with young children are much less likely to be employed.⁵² The gender gaps between those with young children are, on average, two times the mean gap and over five times that found between childless individuals (see fig. 22B). Obviously sex and family responsibilities interact to shape employment and looking at one or the other alone is insufficient.

The large gap between men and women with young children may imply a traditional division of household labour, where the new father is responsible for “breadwinning” and the new mother “homemaking”. Yet, surprisingly, even once the children are old enough (12+) not to require close supervision, their mothers are still less likely to work in many countries (Netherlands, Ireland, Great Britain, Spain, Greece, Italy) and, if working, are more likely to work short hours (as seen earlier in figure 14 and 15 [pp. 24, 25]). Of course, this may result from their preferences or reduced availability due to time spent on household tasks, yet we cannot overlook the possibility that these sustained inequalities result from discrimination or obstacles to accessing and reintegrating in the labour market. This may also result from the lack of suitable work-family policies and in particular affordable childcare services.

Before continuing, it is important to highlight that such group-based comparisons are intrinsically problematic due to selection bias. Women and men typically self-select into parenthood and into the labour market, thus the groups are not randomly selected and may be qualitatively different in ways that are difficult to observe or measure but are important in shaping labour market outcomes. Let’s clarify with a concrete example: women who want to work long hours and are highly committed to finding a job may be disproportionately represented among childless women; as such gaps in wages, employment, etc. may reflect differences in attitudes and motivation rather than the presence or absence of a child and the associated family responsibilities.

Then again, this very decision to remain childless or have only 1 child is not necessarily a “free” one. In all countries studied, the “ideal” fertility rate outstrips actual fertility (OECD 2010b). Esping-Andersen (2009) suggests that highly educated women – who would arguably suffer the highest opportunity cost from childbirth – have higher fertility rates in countries with strong “family friendly” policies (see Nordic countries and Belgium in fig. 23).

Why should we be concerned?

Nonetheless women’s higher tendency to interrupt their career and/or reduce their working hours can be problematic for several reasons. Through depreciating their human capital, reducing their access to job training and lowering their wage bargaining power, long career interruptions can lead to poor outcomes in terms of wages, career advancement and ease of return to work (Booth 2006; Letablier et

⁵² Among women, this difference is less pronounced in Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands.

al. 2009; European Parliament 2010; Robson 2010).⁵³ Furthermore, women's disproportionate use of these reconciliation policies may worsen employers' expectations of them and their treatment as a group.

Also given the widespread concerns about the population aging, reducing the opportunity costs of children could produce a win-win situation by enabling individuals to achieve their desired fertility while also facilitating high labour force participation. As is, it appears that childbirth can severely constrain women's wages (see fig. 24). That said the goal of increasing fertility should not obscure the larger goal of gender equality, equal opportunities and economic independence (see Lewis (2006) for a critique on the instrumental use of side goals to promote gender equality.)

Why do such gender imbalances occur and what can be done about them?

Given that men and women face broadly similar family situations, the question emerges: why do women with children drop out of the labour force at such high rates both compared to their male counterparts and to childless women? Why don't they re-enter once their children have reached a certain age? Furthermore, why are men with young children more likely to be employed than childless men?

As outlined above, this behaviour could be the result of a truly "free" choice of men and women to presumably take up the roles of "breadwinner" and "homemaker". If this choice is truly free, dissuasion will likely be difficult and, in light of the valuable social function reproduction plays, the most beneficial course of action would be to limit the adverse impacts of career break. This could be achieved by replacing lost wages during leave, guaranteeing the right to return to the same or similar post, providing services to facilitate labour market reintegration, and ensuring that social benefits like pensions are not adversely affected over the long-term.

On the other hand, the choice to partition family responsibilities by gender may not be taken "freely"; families could be constrained by their economic resources, the (lack of) available childcare alternatives, and external and internalized gender identities and norms. For instance, gender norms that normalize women's parental leave may mean that men taking leave face more stigma and higher career costs (Albrecht et al. 1999). To address such issues, employment gaps can be reduced through policies that challenge the traditional gender division of labour (i.e. increasing men's access to leave for childcare) and prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex or family status. Furthermore, dual employment can be facilitated through the provision of alternative childcare arrangements and through fiscal incentives that make it more profitable to work.

Parental leave: making it short, well-paid and wage-related

Leave provisions are significant in that they can alter patterns of career interruption and reduce the costs such interruptions pose. Well-designed leave policies can narrow participation and employment gaps and increase female job continuity. Leave around childbirth (and adoption) can be split into wage-related parental leave, job guarantees and flat-rate or lump-sum transfers related to childbirth. Wage-related parental leave falls into three broad categories: (1) maternity leave for mother's exclusive use, (2) paternity leave or "daddy quotas"⁵⁴ for father's exclusive use and (3) parental leave for shared use between both parents. Not all countries provide all (or any) of these types of leaves. The leave varies in terms of eligibility conditions, duration, inclusion of a job guarantee, flexibility, level of compensation (percentage of previous wages), tax treatment, and implications for pensions and other social benefits. In addition to or instead of wage-related parental leave, countries may offer

⁵³ There is debate on whether such penalties eventually disappear

⁵⁴ "Daddy quotas" refer to periods within parental leave reserved for men's exclusive use. This leave functions much like paternity leave, though the wage replacement rate may differ. It is unlikely to be taken during their partners' leave as provisions are usually for one or the other parent. Parental leave taken by fathers *during* their partners' leave does not necessarily challenge the fundamental notion of the primary caregiver being the mother.

flat rate benefits around childbirth. These include maternity or birth grants – lump sums transferred to the mother or household after childbirth – and childcare leave – a longer period of leave paid at a low flat rate and conditioned on state-subsidized childcare not being used (Ferrarini 2006, 42).

While some researchers combine different types of leave, theoretically we can expect very different outcomes from short, wage-related leave and long, flat-rate or lump sum leave or benefits. When these two types of leave are analyzed as separate groups, only the wage-related leave shows a significant, positive effect on labour force participation (Ferrarini 2006).

Wage-related leave has often been introduced with the goal of increasing female labour force participation and it is widely argued to do so⁵⁵ (Jaumotte 2004; Boje; Ejrnæs 2008; European Parliament 2010). Even the qualifying period attached to such wage-related benefits may encourage parents' labour force participation (Jaumotte 2004; Boje; Ejrnæs 2008; European Parliament 2010). Nonetheless, the leave should not be too long, as long leave can have an adverse effect on ease of return to work, wages and career advancement (Jaumotte 2004; Booth 2006; European Parliament 2010; Robson 2010; ILO 2011a, para.26).

Obviously, the definition of “long”, “too long” and “very long” leaves must be revisited; the ILO Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (C183) recommends a duration of at least 18 weeks for maternity leave (roughly 4 months). Looking at wage penalties, leave of a duration of up to 6 months (26 weeks) has a neutral effect on wages, and after this time it is unclear whether there is a wage penalty as absence from the workplace lowers wages in the short- to medium-term, but job protection increases job continuity and the possibility of future advancement, thus improving wages in the long-term (Hegewisch; Gornick 2011, 125). Looking at female participation and employment, cut-off points after which parental leave has a negative effect are estimated at between 20 weeks (5 months) for participation (Jaumotte 2004) and 40 weeks (9 months) for employment (Ruhm 1998). Again, there is debate on whether these effects are long-term or only short-term (that is, whether mothers catch up with their childless colleagues) (Jaumotte 2004). In terms of children's health and development, after the age of two, good quality childcare has a positive effect. At younger ages, the impact of non-parental care is less straightforward; some evidence suggests childcare during the first year could be harmful for children's health effect (ILO; Hein; Cassirer 2010, 20–22), while other studies that take into account social and emotional outcomes find that maternal employment during the first year has a net neutral effect (Brooks-Gunn; Han; Waldfogel 2010).⁵⁶

On the other hand, long leave paid at a low flat-rate (or with a lump sum transfer) is often introduced with the goal of freeing up jobs for men and encouraging female home-making (Ferrarini 2006; Erler 2009, 122–124; Fagnani; Math 2009, 107). In Germany, its introduction (and extension) reduced mother's active employment rate and rate of return (Erler 2009). The long length is troublesome in itself, and this coupled with poor pay means that the primary breadwinner – often male – will be less likely to take leave, especially in low-income families (Ferrarini 2006; Plantenga; Remery 2006). Though there is relatively limited knowledge on take-up rates of different policies by specific groups of men and women (Eurofound 2007a), many suggest that long parental leave will be used disproportionately by low-wage, low-skilled women, since they face lower opportunity costs from labour market exit, and are less likely to have the resources to purchase high-quality childcare on the market (Ferrarini 2006, 47; Esping-Andersen 2009).⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Though some conflicting evidence exists when analysis is restricted to the national level.

⁵⁶ Though they find that full-time employment may lead to negative outcomes (ibid.)

⁵⁷ On the other hand, a study in Canada found that education had no effect on chosen length of paid leave and that low-wage, temporary workers tended to return to work sooner than their high-wage, permanent counterparts (Marshall 2003). This trend held even when taking into account the family supplement for low-income earners, which increases the wage replacement rate to 80 per cent. Many worry that parental leave reinforces inequalities by creating parental leave rich and poor households (O'Brien; Shemilt 2003; Doucet; McKay; Tremblay 2009).

Paternity and parental leave: increasing men's access and take-up rates

To target men, leave can be shared between both parents or reserved for their exclusive use. It is more likely to be used by men if the wage-replacement rate is high, so that benefits are comparable to previous earnings. Both methods have limitations. Shared leave tends to be used disproportionately by women, and leave for fathers' exclusive use is often short (only a few weeks) and thus does not fundamentally challenge the gender division of unpaid childcare (Adema; Whiteford 2007, 116–117; Marshall 2008). In general, targeted provisions have had moderate success in increasing male take-up of leave, supporting a more equal division of shared leave and allowing women to return to work faster (Lammi-Taskula 2008; for evidence for Canada see Marshall 2003).⁵⁸

Up until the 1970s, the only parental leave benefits offered in OECD countries were maternity leave and grants (Ferrarini 2006). While some imbalance in access is justified given the recovery period needed after childbirth, men deserve time with their children too. In fact, in several cases, men have successfully argued that providing access to leave only for women is in fact discrimination; in the case of Canada this spurred the introduction of shared parental leave (Porter 2003, 194, 198). From 1970 to 2000, many new provisions on paternity leave, shared parental leave and childcare leave were introduced (see fig. 26). Since 2000, these trends have continued with many countries introducing paternity leave.

Such provisions can have a significant impact on behaviour. Following the introduction of paternity leave in Quebec (Canada) (effective January 2006), the claim rate among eligible men skyrocketed, while this figure for the rest of Canada contracted slightly.

Parental childcare: reducing long-term penalties

Career interruptions⁵⁹ may reduce pensions and other social benefits. In fact, many OECD countries have recognized this impact and now compensate time dedicated to childcare. Nonetheless, these policies vary in their coverage, duration, financing and goals (see table 5) (OECD 2010d, 30). Basic universal or targeted pensions can also compensate for such caring periods particularly among low-earners, as can formulas that allow for a certain number of years with low or no earnings (OECD 2010d, 30).

Providing high-quality non-parental childcare

Accessible high-quality childcare with hours harmonized with the working day can improve work-family balance, increase parents' participation in employment, increase productivity, and reduce absenteeism; of course, the opposite is also true, as an inadequate supply of affordable non-parental childcare and short school or childcare hours can constrain parents' full-time participation (typically mothers) (Budig et al. 2010; ILO et al. 2010). There is debate on the most effective way to ensure access to high-quality care.

Non-parental childcare can be provided by friends and family, the workplace, the public sector, the private sector or non-profit sector. Such care varies in its quality, price, availability, hours and flexibility, adhesion to regulation, financing and working conditions. Even putting aside any labour market concerns, these elements obviously influence parents' childcare decisions and shape their perceptions about how care impacts children's well-being.

Particularly in countries offering partial wage replacement, well-paid, unionized or public sector employees are more likely to receive an employer top-up the wage replacement rate (Doucet et al. 2009; Marshall 2010).

⁵⁸ However, country-level evidence suggests that men who take leave do not necessarily contribute more hours to childrearing than their non-leave taking counterparts, but they may feel closer to their child.

⁵⁹ We use this term broadly to refer to a period away from the workplace (other than vacations or short-term illness). Reasons for such interruptions could include job loss or unemployment, long-term sickness or disability, child care and other family responsibilities, training and education, etc.

Non-parental care can be supported through direct service provision (crèches, early childhood education and care, after-school programs, school, etc.) and through harmonizing the hours of work and childcare. Governments can also offer targeted or universal subsidies for care work (through transfers to citizens or to childcare institutions directly) and regulate and certify care providers.⁶⁰

Despite the fact that care services for children under age 3 are typically not available or limited in coverage (ILO et al. 2010, 30), several of the countries studied here stand out with well-developed formal services, particularly Denmark, followed by Sweden, Norway, Belgium, France and Portugal. In fact, in Southern Europe, the Nordic countries, North America, Belgium and France, young children in formal care have high average weekly hours of attendance. In many countries, children spend only a limited amount of time in informal care (though arguably statistics on its usage are much more likely to be inaccurate.) The US stands out with high reliance on informal care.

After-school care can increase parents' participation and improve work-life balance (Letablier et al. 2009), but it does not necessarily fully substitute for informal or parental care as there can be gaps in school hours and a need to transport children to the after-school services (Lewis 2009, 77–78). Very few countries have comprehensive after-school care: OECD (2008b, 4) suggests such systems exist in Denmark, Sweden, and to a lesser extent, France and Quebec (Canada). Individual forms of childcare (for instance, nannies) offer more flexibility than collective structures to address the care needs of workers with atypical schedules; however there is no consensus on the role of flexibility in terms of quality and parental demand (Letablier 2009). Furthermore, such informal care work is often female-dominated, poorly regulated and poorly paid, which not only reproduces gender stereotypes and hierarchies, but also reproduces class and racial hierarchies, drawing largely on working class and minority/immigrant women (Crompton 2006, 194).⁶¹ The ILO's recent convention on domestic workers (no. 189) aims to improve working conditions in this sector. In general care workers are documented to have lower wages than workers with comparable skills (though some country exceptions apply) (Korpi; Ferrarini; Englund 2009; Razavi; Staab 2010, 411)⁶², but in countries with large public sectors and low inequality, care workers may actually enjoy a wage premium (Razavi; Staab 2010, 414).

Childcare subsidies are more likely to increase female participation than child benefits⁶³ and may also reduce the effective marginal taxation of second earners (Jaumotte 2004). Such subsidies can be conditioned on dual participation in the labour market. To be effective, the supply of childcare must also be responsive. Subsidies can be particularly effective when wage structures are compressed (and thus childcare is relatively expensive) or when credit market imperfections exist that prevent low-income women from borrowing against future earnings (Jaumotte 2004). In some cases, costs are so high that single parents will have difficulty accessing childcare and the costs may exceed the benefits of second earners' employment (Letablier 2009).

The effectiveness of childcare subsidies is reduced by substitution effects. Public expenditure substitutes previous private expenditures and may encourage a shift from unpaid informal childcare services to formal paid ones. In general, the evidence on childcare costs impact on employment is

⁶⁰ In addition, seemingly unrelated policies may have an indirect impact on childcare choices: for instance, the trend to promote "active aging" and delay retirement reduces grandparents' ability to care for grandchildren; such unintended effects warrant attention, particularly in countries where grandparents provide a large share of childcare (i.e. Greece and Italy, see Plantenga et al. 2005).

⁶¹ Public provision of childcare is also female dominated. Several scholars argue that it reinforces occupational segregation and that it does not fundamentally challenge the traditional gender division of labour, but merely relocates where this work takes place (Chang 2000; Mandel; Shalev 2006).

⁶² For example, a "caring" profession such as nursing may earn less than a profession that requires similar training like "nursing"; see example from Ontario (Canada), footnote. 13, p. 15.

⁶³ Child benefits and tax allowances reduce women's labour participation, particularly that of potential part-time workers. However they also can increase horizontal equity between family types and reduce poverty (Jaumotte 2004).

mixed, as the methods of measurement and demographic groups considered vary substantially.⁶⁴ Net childcare costs (after benefits and transfers) are by far the highest in Anglo-Saxon countries studied excepting Australia (see fig. 29). They are the lowest in the Nordic and Southern European countries and in Belgium. Among European countries for which data are available, gaps in employment rates between mothers and childless women are largest in the Continental Northern European countries with weaker work-family balance policies (Austria, Germany and the Netherlands) and in Ireland and the United Kingdom.

Reducing taxes on second earners

In OECD countries, favourable treatment of second earners is correlated with higher female labour force participation (Jaumotte 2004). Taxation systems can be joint, split or separate. Whereas joint systems were common till the beginning of the 1970s, many OECD countries have moved to separate taxation systems (Jaumotte 2004). Separate systems have the advantage of lowering the marginal tax rate of second earners (typically married women).⁶⁵ However, they also introduce horizontal inequity in the treatment of different family types, with single earning families paying higher taxes at the same household income. Despite the move to separate taxation systems, often second earners are effectively taxed more heavily than single individuals, as their return to work involves the loss of the dependent spouse allowance.

Reducing taxes on second earners

Retraining and support services may reduce the impact of parental on parents' careers (Letablier et al. 2009). Some argue that active labour market policies are particularly effective for adult women and single parents (Bergemann; Van den Berg 2008). Furthermore labour market reintegration is supported through job guarantees attached to leave, which strengthen attachment to the workforce, improve wages⁶⁶, but may adversely affect hiring of women if women can be expected to take leave more than men (Jaumotte 2004).

2. Part-time work

Reiterating the trends

Women are much more likely than men to work part-time. Even childless men and women – who as noted earlier have roughly equal employment rates in most countries⁶⁷ – differ in their working hours, with childless women less likely to work full-time than childless men for all countries for which data were available. This difference is even more noticeable among men and women with children. Nonetheless part-time work has seen some gender rebalancing over the past 15 years; the share of employed men working part-time grew, often to a greater extent than that of women.⁶⁸ The recent

⁶⁴ Public support for childcare has been found to increase female participation in the UK and the US, but in other countries, such as Denmark, high participation rates were found to predate public support (Jaumotte 2004). Studies often do not take into account women's potential wages and childcare quality (Schlosser 2005). These omissions are fundamental given the consensus that these factors play a crucial role in a mother's decision to work (Letablier 2009).

⁶⁵ The marginal tax rate is the amount of tax paid on an additional unit (\$, €, etc.) of income. As Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) demonstrate, to reduce deadweight loss of a tax system, the marginal tax rates should be lower for those whose labour supply is more elastic (i.e. more sensitive) (Jaumotte 2004). Given the apparent strength of the modified breadwinner model, mothers and married women fall into this category and should be taxed less for increased tax revenue.

⁶⁶ When women return to the same employer after a career interruption they are likely to have better wages (European Parliament 2010).

⁶⁷ Greece and Italy are exceptions where childless men are more likely to be employed than women, as are Ireland, Spain and Portugal, where patterns vary pre- and post-crisis.

⁶⁸ However exceptions exist, including several Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Spain), Ireland and France.

spike in involuntary part-time work may be due to the current crisis, as economic downturns tend to have a disproportionate impact on involuntary part-time work (Kalleberg 2000; OECD 2010c). Population aging may also be contributing to increased part-time work, as older workers tend to prefer part-time work (Kalleberg 2000, 344; OECD 2010c).

Should we be concerned?

Not all part-time work is harmful: authors emphasize the heterogeneity of part-time work (see Kalleberg (2000) for a review). On one hand, there are more attractive part-time jobs, such as “new-concept” part-time work used to retain high-skill workers and part-time jobs that help individuals transition into the labour market; on the other hand, there are less attractive part-time jobs, which are typically low-skilled, low-paid and offer low job security. In addition, there is the question of choice: some workers prefer part-time work to full-time work even if it is low-skilled and low-paid. On average, it has been demonstrated that voluntary (see discussion p.11) part-time work can bring higher life satisfaction for women (but not men) and carries fewer health and safety risks (Booth; Van Ours 2009; OECD 2010a). From an employer and government point of view, part-time work offers several advantages: it can reduce costs to employers, improve flexibility and activate individuals with constrained labour force participation (for health reasons, due to family responsibilities, etc.)

Yet, it is also true that part-time work often penalises workers through pay penalties, a higher risk of poverty, greater occupational segregation, reduced eligibility for social benefits, underemployment, job insecurity and less opportunity for career advancement (Bardasi; Gornick 2008; OECD 2010a). Some authors suggest that this has more to do with segregation of part-time workers into low-paying, female-dominated occupations than anything inherent in part-time work itself (for a review of the literature see Bardasi; Gornick 2008; Manning; Petrongolo 2008). The truth is likely more complex than this: part-time work is often concentrated in service, clerical and sales occupations, which are better paid than blue collar work, but have a significant part-time work wage penalty⁶⁹; this wage penalty varies by country, with Anglo-Saxon countries penalising part-time work most severely and some countries, like Sweden, not penalising part-time work at all (Bardasi; Gornick 2008).

Given that the diversity of part-time work and the advantages it can bring for both individuals and the economy, improve the conditions of part-time work makes more sense than trying to eliminate it completely. Following the European Directive on Part-time Work (1997) and the ILO Convention (C156) and Recommendation (R182) on Part-time Work (1994), many countries have taken positive measures to guarantee the equal treatment of part-time worker (see table 6 below). Also part-time workers are increasingly likely to be unionized (OECD 2010a). Nonetheless these workers still tend to suffer from penalties in terms of earnings, promotions, and training and career prospects (see OECD (2010a) for a thorough review). While part-time workers tend to face higher job insecurity, this is largely due to the prevalence of temporary contracts in part-time work.

To improve peoples’ agency and sense of well-being, it is important to ensure they can access their preferred working hours, whether these are full- or part-time. Thus a second goal should be to improve access to voluntary full-time and part-time work (again, for a discussion of voluntary see p.11). As shown in table 6, many countries have taken measures to facilitate part-time work for parents, caregivers, sick and disabled works, older workers and workers pursuing education or training. A few countries have also instituted preferential treatment of part-time workers for full-time vacancies. Such laws do not necessarily increase the incidence of part-time work, but seem to reduce unmet demand for part-time work (OECD 2010c).

3. Poverty and wage inequality

Reiterating the trends

⁶⁹ That is to say, part-time workers are much lower paid than their full-time counterparts.

As mentioned above, women, and older women in particular, are more likely to be poor or socially excluded in most developed countries. Women are also overrepresented in low-wage work in most countries (though this trend is less evident in Canada). If we turn our attention from poverty and low wage work to inequality, even if we limit our analysis to full-time employees, gender gaps clearly vary across the wage distribution and by country.⁷⁰ In most Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries the wage gap increases along the earning distribution (see fig. 30); Canada and Ireland emerge as exceptions with relatively constant gender wage gap across the deciles. A relatively flat gap is also seen in most Continental Northern European countries with the exception of France, where the gender gap is higher among high earners. In all of the Southern European countries the gender wage gap declines across the wage distribution. However, as women are underrepresented in the labour force, such gaps may be under/overstated.⁷¹ These gaps have generally narrowed over time (see fig. A1 in Annex).

Yes, we should be concerned, but what can be done about poverty and inequality?

Clearly, in beginning to discuss poverty and privilege and the underlying notions of class and inequality, we open a much larger debate in terms of policy responses. Labour market institutions like employment or unemployment protection and wage-setting (bargaining, minimum wages, etc.) can clearly impact inequality, as can social assistance and insurance. Several authors have looked specifically at the impacts such institutions may have on gender (Blau; Kahn 1996; ILO; Rubery 2003; Estévez-Abe 2005; Estévez-Abe 2007; Estévez-Abe; Hethy 2008; Esping-Andersen 2009; Rubery 2010; Rubery 2011).

Increasingly authors are paying attention to the possible trade-offs that legislating for gender inequality may entail. While originally this literature focused on trade-offs between different forms of inequalities (for example, glass ceilings versus participation rates), some authors now suggest that there may be intra-gender trade-offs between men and women of different classes (i.e. glass ceilings affect privileged women, while low participation rates disproportionately affect marginalized women). Certain policies can help certain women and men, while having no impact on others (Esping-Andersen 2009; Mandel 2011). For instance, a minimum wage is much more likely to help marginalized women rather than privileged ones (at least to the extent that these women do also not perform unskilled work, part-time.) Indeed, if these privileged women rely heavily on the service economy, a minimum wage may increase their day-to-day expenses. While, to some degree, differences in the use of policies across classes can be explained by a policy's legal coverage (or lack thereof), there is still limited knowledge on who uses policies and how these take-up rates shape their

⁷⁰ Given women's disproportionate involvement in part-time work, limiting our analysis to full-time employees opens up the possibility of a large selection bias in who is being compared. This is particularly troubling for countries like the Netherlands where part-time work makes up a very large share of women's employment (see Figure 2 and 3).

⁷¹ Given the fact that many women do not work, comparing gender wages by deciles can be misleading. It likely comes as no surprise that selection into and out of the labour force is not necessarily random, but rather can be affected by potential earnings (as captured, for instance by education) and this impact may differ non-randomly between the sexes (1976; Heckman 1979). Under positive selection bias individuals with higher earning potential are overrepresented in the labour force (privileged, highly educated or influential men or women), whereas under negative selection bias, individuals with lower-earning potential are overrepresented.

To clearly show the problem this may cause, let's say 70 per cent of women and 100 per cent of men are working. Among women there is an extreme positive selection bias, meaning those who are active have the highest earning potential and would not be in the bottom deciles if all women were working. By ignoring the inactive women with low-earning potential, women's wages will start at a higher level compared to a situation of total employment; it's clear, then, that the comparison will understate gender wage gaps across the distribution, and particularly among low earners.

impact across classes.⁷² Nonetheless the relationship obviously merits attention. For example, paternity and parental leave is not used equally across classes; it is well known that male partners of high-skilled women are more likely to take parental leave than partners of low-skilled women.

Strong labour market institutions

Many suggest that labour market institutions (such as centralized wage-setting, promotion and protection of high-quality part-time work, high coverage of unions or collective bargaining, minimum wage laws, progressive taxation and transfers, unemployment insurance, and hiring and firing protection) favour both wage compression and narrower gender wage gaps (Hall; Soskice 2001; Barry et al. 2002; Rubery et al. 2002; Blau; Kahn 2003; Jaumotte 2004). A positive correlation between gender and income equality makes sense intuitively: first, less wage dispersion on the grand scale will translate into narrower distances between men's and women's wages and, second, as women tend to be overrepresented at the bottom of the wage distribution, measures that increase equality and are "worker friendly" should help women (Jaumotte 2004; Arulampalam; Booth; Bryan 2007).

Yet the relationship between labour market institutions and inequality is controversial due to these institutions purported disemployment effect (i.e. reducing total employment) and contribution to increased labour market segmentation (Estévez-Abe et al. 2001; 2005; 2007). In a perfectly competitive labour market, a minimum wage could reduce overall employment by artificially increasing the price of labour above the market-clearing equilibrium. (By contrast in a monopsony (or single employer) labour market, minimum wages can actually increase employment by levelling the marginal cost of labour).⁷³ Summarizing the literature, Rubery (2003) notes that the employment effects of minimum wages have been found to be relatively small in high-income countries and vary across countries (for similar findings see Jaumotte 2004). Rubery (2003, 4) examines the impact of the minimum wage on gender inequality in the labour market, listing the possible reasons for gender wage gaps and how minimum wages could help reduce these gaps (see table 7 below). High minimum wages tend to correlate with smaller gender wage gaps, but gaps remain nonetheless, suggesting other complementary policies are needed.

Given that many families rely on low-wage care workers, increased minimum wages may need to be complimented with public childcare service or subsidies. This will also improve gender equality as these services are female-dominated and often underpaid (Morgan 2005).

Inclusive labour market institutions

Labour market institutions that typically would be associated with greater societal equality may contribute to labour market segmentation if their coverage of different workers is incomplete (by sector, contract type, etc.) In addition, they may create obstacles to hiring workers who deviate from traditional breadwinner career path (that is to say, those who do not work full time and who interrupt their careers); for instance, strong employment protection can make it more difficult to hire a temporary worker to replace someone on parental leave (Estévez-Abe 2007). There are many theories of labour segmentation, all of which essentially highlight an institutional separation of good and bad jobs.⁷⁴ Yet Rubery and the ILO (2010; 2011) convincingly argue that employment protection, itself,

⁷² Of course there are many exceptions; for instance, see Lapuerta et al (2010), Doucet (2009) and (Smeaton 2006) parental/paternity/maternity leave use in Spain, Canada and the United Kingdom, respectively.

⁷³ In a competitive labour market, the market price of labour is set by many different firms. In contrast in a monopsonistic (or oligopsonistic) market, the employer sets the market price of labour, and each movement along the wage curve comes with a higher marginal cost than in a competitive labour market, because this increase also affects the wages of their current workers. In this case, setting a minimum wage changes the marginal cost of labour, so that the quantity and price of labour is closer to the competitive market equilibrium.

⁷⁴ Divisions include: core, peripheral and irregular workers; formal and informal workers; insiders and outsiders; primary and secondary sector workers; workers in internal and general labour markets; standard and nonstandard workers (this last distinction must be combined with risk exposure, as one can clearly see that a

does not spur the creation of an internal labour market and the corresponding insider/outsider dynamics, but rather its incomplete coverage. To resolve this issue, governments and unions should work to increase job security and inclusion of marginalized workers thus ensuring a “race to the top”.

4. Combating segregation *Reiterating the trends*

Men and women are clustered in different sectors. Women tend to be overrepresented in the sectors of health and social work, education, hotels and restaurants, as well as in employment in private households; men tend to be overrepresented in construction, mining, transport and manufacturing. Looking at occupations, women tend to be overrepresented in white-collar jobs, while men are overrepresented in blue-collar jobs; in more concrete terms, women dominate jobs as clerks, service workers and salespeople, and technicians and associate professionals; men dominate crafts and related trades workers, and plant and machine operators and assemblers. Occupational segregation decreased in many countries, while trends in sectoral segregation were more varied.

Looking at vertical segregation, men are overrepresented in jobs as legislators, senior officials and managers on average. Yet in male-dominated sectors, women sometimes hold a larger share of management positions than their relative representation would suggest (i.e. despite only 20 per cent female representation in the sector, they hold 25 per cent of the management positions.) Such a trend is most pronounced in France. By contrast, in several female-dominated sectors, women are underrepresented in management given their share of sectoral employment; this is most evident in Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Spain.

Why do such gender imbalances occur?

As mentioned earlier, choices regarding fields of study can channel men and women into different occupations even before they have entered the labour force (see fig. 32) (Anker; ILO 1998; Smyth; Steinmetz 2008). Even taking occupation into account, educational segregation can contribute to wage gap (for the UK and Germany see Brown; Corcoran 1997; for the US see Machin; Puhani 2003). At risk of stating the obvious, individuals who study male-dominated fields are more likely to end up in male-dominated occupations, and those who study integrated or female fields more likely to end up in integrated occupations (see fig. 32) (Smyth; Steinmetz 2008). Nonetheless significant gender effects remain, and there is a large cross-country variation in the degree of channelling.⁷⁵ In all countries studied, women are overrepresented among graduates with humanities, arts or education qualification, while men are overrepresented among graduates with computing, engineering, manufacturing and construction qualification (OECD 2011b).⁷⁶

Some argue that women choose female-dominated jobs because they are more “family-friendly” or have aspects that are argued to be more attractive to women (one such feature is the satisfaction derived from “helping people”), though there is debate whether this choice is voluntary (Budig et al.

high skilled free-lancer, for instance, is not in a “bad job.”) For a review see Cain (1976) or European Commission (2004, 80–85).

⁷⁵ A close link between male-dominated studies and male-dominated occupations is found in Germany and Greece; a weaker link is found in Slovakia, Hungary and the UK. A close link between female-dominated studies and female-dominated occupations is found in Denmark and Slovenia; a weaker link is found in Spain and Greece. Smyth (2008) suggests that low wage gaps, high female labour force participation and high female participation in higher education are associated with less occupational segregation and a rebalancing of the workforce towards female-type jobs. While she does not give a thorough theoretical explanation of this phenomenon, it may be that increased female participation in the labour market is tied to the commodification and marketization of formerly unpaid domestic labour, thus creating new, arguably feminine, “caring and serving” jobs (Bettio; Veraschagina 2009, 36)

⁷⁶ Humanities and arts are thought to bring lower labour market success than sciences (though this could arguably reflect the field’s gender composition.)

2010, 7). Due to gender stereotypes, men and women may be preferred for certain “feminine” and “masculine” skills (caring, dexterity, attractiveness, docility; vs. strength, leadership, scientific/mathematic ability), or in fact, may internalized such stereotypes and prefer these fields (Anker; ILO 2001; Riach; Rich 2002). Such stereotypes can create “glass escalators” for men in female-dominated fields, where men are promoted to more “appropriate” management positions when lower positions (like childcare) are seen as improper (Maume 1999). Similarly, blue collar fields may be seen as unsuitable for women and they may be promoted to office positions, higher up in the management echelon within these fields.

Women may face discrimination if they are viewed by employers as “risky investments” due to expectations about the division family responsibilities; for instance, they may be overlooked and undertrained for high level positions perpetuating their exclusion from management and hindering their success if such opportunities (Maume 1999). Furthermore, social closure and male social networks arising from the traditional male domination of management may self-perpetuate, as some male managers find it easier to interact and cooperate with other men or, more worryingly, may monopolize desirable positions and occupations and work to maintain their dominant position to the exclusion of others (Reskin; Roos 1990; Maume 1999).

Should we be concerned?

Adults’ “choice” to work in sex-segregated occupations is not a free one, but rather is shaped by their upbringing, their culture’s gender stereotypes and inertia in institutional practices and policies; to establish that a choice is truly “free” is nearly impossible from a societal point of view since children are raised to conform with the societies values seen as appropriate. Segregation can reduce labour market efficiency and often penalizes feminized occupations and sectors in terms of wages.⁷⁷ As mentioned above, segregation may contribute to higher occupational health risks among men, and may strip women of their influence and opportunities for decision making. Segregation into particular sectors can be especially damaging; one such example that has gained attention recently is domestic work.

Changing stereotypes through encouraging atypical choices

Efforts to encourage individuals to enter gender-atypical fields of study and occupations have traditionally targeted women, but more and more countries are recognizing the importance of also encouraging men to enter female-dominated occupations. Pay seems to be the most effective way to encourage men to enter feminized fields. Some countries offer training programs explicitly targeting desegregation and aim to identify and oppose organizational biases, for instance, in evaluations. Outside of the labour market, campaigns to fight stereotypes can be launched in schools and the media, and through public events (see Bettio et al. (2009, 10) for specific examples). Employer and worker organizations can play an important role in combating stereotypes too: employers can promote non-traditional career choices to women and men and trade unions can be, and indeed have been, active in launching anti-discrimination campaigns (ILO 2009, 162). As the ILO (2009, 162) highlights, it is important that such campaigns are not “one-off” interventions, but are complemented with policies to address structural inequalities.

Companies can reduce the adverse impacts of segregation

⁷⁷ Drawing on earlier studies, Anker (1998) suggests that occupational segregation constitutes a third of the wage gap. If one includes segregation by workplace, the explanatory power increases further. This is unsurprising, as many authors note that the more disaggregated the occupational categories are, the more power they have in explain the wage gap. Using harmonized matched employer-employee microdata from nine European countries to explain cross-country differences in the gendered wage gap, Simón (2011) finds that that aggregate occupational and workplace segregation explain on average 54.4 per cent of the gendered wage gap, with workplace segregation alone explaining the majority of the average gap (42.1 per cent of the above 54.4 per cent).

Instituting gender-neutral job evaluations, as outlined by the ILO (2008), can significantly contribute to improved gender equality. Through reducing the pay penalty associated with feminized occupations, such evaluations may also lead to gender rebalancing, since pay has been shown to be a key factor in determining men's likelihood to enter a field. The move to subjective, merit-based evaluations and performance pay systems are likely to reduce diversity, as women and minorities tend to be evaluated more harshly even in light of similar performance (Rubery 1995; Castilla 2008).

Diversity training and evaluations are unlikely to improve women's access to top positions (Kalev; Dobbin; Kelly 2006). Instead companies can help women through mentoring and networking programs, or better yet, through clearly allocating responsibility for change to a manager or committee; in fact, establishing clear responsibility can increase the effectiveness of other diversity interventions (Ibid.).

Quotas offer a promising, if controversial, way to promote women into positions of power and status

To promote women's entry into high positions of political power, many countries introduced quotas, whether voluntarily established by parties or required/encouraged by law (see International IDEA (2010) for a global database of such policies). Candidate quotas exist in Belgium, France, Portugal and Spain (International IDEA et al. 2010).

More recently countries have experimented with quotas for corporate boards. After Norway's success in introducing these quotas in the private and public sector, many countries have introduced quotas of their own (see Table 8 and Catalyst (2011) for more details). Others have introduced targets and regulations, often asking companies to "comply or explain" their failure to do so. Comply or explain regulations exist in all Continental Northern European countries, all Nordic countries save Norway, several Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Ireland and the UK) and Spain. In the United States and Sweden, regulations require companies to disclose either statistics or information on the selection procedure. Earlier Nordic experiences using quotas in state-owned companies suggest quotas can be effective, but it is too soon to evaluate more recent quotas (European Commission 2011a).

To a certain extent, the effectiveness of such quotas depends on gender inequalities being the result of structural or demand-side factors. If supply-side constraints exist – either a "blocked" pipeline (that is to say, an insufficient pool of experienced and trained women) or simple unwillingness among women to take on positions that demand enormous time investments when sufficient family-friendly supports are not available – these regulations and quotas may need to be complimented with other facilitating policies, or more radically, the demands of the positions themselves may need to be changed.

Conclusions and ways forward

To understand persistent gender inequalities, we focused on the constraints that different men and women face. Disaggregating men and women by their various demographic traits - household structure, age, income, etc. – improved our diagnosis of the underlying problems that lead to gender inequality.

Our analysis reveals striking inequalities between workers with and without young children. In fact, the gap in employment rates is often wider among these two groups of women than between the sexes. Surprisingly "motherhood" gaps remain significant even once children are older. While such sustained inequalities may result from women's preferences or time constraints, they could indicate discrimination and obstacles to labour market reintegration. Worryingly, if mothers are not able to reintegrate successfully into the labour market, inequalities in the short term will be exacerbated over the life course. The paper highlights effective policies regarding family responsibilities, such as improving the treatment of families in taxes and social benefits, ensuring short, well-paid leave is available to men and women and offering high-quality, affordable care services.

Childless or not, women are more likely than men to work part-time. In and of itself, part-time work is not negative; however, it often comes with wage penalties, a higher risk of poverty, greater occupational segregation, reduced eligibility for social benefits, underemployment, job insecurity and less opportunity for career advancement. Rather than eliminating part-time work, the question becomes how to improve it. Many countries have taken steps towards guaranteeing the equal treatment of part-time workers and helping workers achieve their desired working hours.

Women are more likely than men to be poor or socially excluded and to work in low-wage jobs. Combating gender gaps at the bottom of the income distribution involves interventions that narrow inequalities in general, most notably strong and inclusive labour market institutions. These can include centralized wage-setting, high unionization or collective bargaining coverage, strong minimum wage laws, progressive taxation and transfers, unemployment insurance, and hiring and firing protection.

Finally, occupational segregation remains a pressing problem. Women and men remain clustered into different occupations, despite a slight improvement over the past 15 years. Overcoming occupational segregation will likely require continued efforts to challenge stereotypes and gendered preferences, and to combat gender biases within company procedures. Countries have recently begun to experiment with management quotas, though these remain quite controversial.

To sum up, despite some clear gains in terms of labour force participation and education, men and women are still unequal in several key domains. First, women still do the lion's share of unpaid domestic work (housework and carework) and mothers participate less on the labour market and, when they are employed, receive lower wages. Second, women are more likely to work part-time whatever their family status; this work can penalize workers in terms of pay, opportunities for advancement and job security. Third, in most countries, women are overrepresented in low-wage work and are more likely to be poor or socially excluded. And, finally, occupational sex segregation is still very strong.

We came to the conclusion that there are four major issues that need attention:

- (1) Supporting workers with family responsibilities and facilitating a more even sharing of these responsibilities between the sexes;
- (2) Ensuring access to quality part-time and full-time work;
- (3) Targeting gender inequality among those who are disproportionately poor through creating a Social Protection Floor; and finally,
- (4) Reducing occupational segregation and encouraging balanced representation of both sexes in positions of leadership through gender mainstreaming, affirmative action and active campaigns against gender stereotypes.

Tables

Table 1. Country groupings

Nordic	Anglo-Saxon	Continental Northern European	Southern European
DNK: Denmark FIN: Finland NOR: Norway SWE: Sweden	AUS: Australia CAN: Canada* GBR: United Kingdom IRL: Ireland NZL: New Zealand USA: United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>w/ strong work-life balance policies</i> BEL: Belgium FRA: France <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>w/ weaker work-life balance policies</i> AUT: Austria DEU: Germany NLD: Netherlands	ESP: Spain GRC: Greece ITA: Italy PRT: Portugal

Note: *For Canada, the term Anglo-Saxon is very misleading, since the country is officially bilingual and roughly a fifth of the population speak French as their mother-tongue (Statistics Canada, 2006 #591)

Table 2. Employment rate among those aged 15 - 64

Country and grouping	Female rate 2009	p.p. difference (M-F) 2009	Trend in female rate 1995-2009
Social democratic	Very small gap in employment rate		
DNK	72.5	4.9	+
FIN	68.5	1.0	++
NOR	75.9	3.8	+
SWE	71.5	4.8	
Continental Northern European w/ strong work-life balance policies	Small- medium gap in employment rate		
BEL	56.2	11.7	++
FRA	60.1	6.5	+
w/ weaker work-life balance policies	Medium gap in employment rate		
AUT	67.1	9.8	+
DEU	65.8	9.7	++
NLD	71.6	11.4	+++
Anglo-Saxon	Medium gap in employment rate Small gap in employment rate in N. Am		
AUS	67.5	12.4	+
CAN	69.1	5.3	+
GBR	65.8	10.0	+
IRL	58.5	10.5	+++
NZL	69.5	12.0	+
USA	64.7	7.0	
Southern European	Medium - high gap in employment rate		
ESP	53.0	13.3	+++
GRC*	48.2	25.0	++
ITA	46.8	22.1	++
PRT	65.7	9.8	++

Notes: *2008 figures for Greece

Source: Statistics and author's calculations based on OECD 2010. Labour Force Statistics: Population and labour force, OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics (database). doi: 10.1787/data-00288-en (Accessed on: 01 June 2011).

Table 3. Effect of Motherhood on the Natural Log of Annual Wages

Country	Net motherhood wage penalty (after controlling for individual level characteristics)	
Finland	-0.071	+
Sweden	..	
Austria	-0.312	***
E Germany	-0.182	*
W Germany	-0.286	***
Netherlands	-0.174	***
Belgium	..	
France	..	
Australia	..	
Canada	-0.134	***
Ireland	..	
UK	-0.135	***
US	-0.183	***
Italy	..	
Spain	..	

Notes: *** p>.001, * p>.05, + p>.10; two-sided test

Source: Budig (2010, 41), "Table 3: Effect of Motherhood on the Natural Log of Annual Wages"

Table 4. Ratifications of ILO Conventions, as of the end of 2011

	Nordic				Continental Northern European					Anglo-Saxon					Southern European				
	DNK	FIN	NOR	SWE	AUT	BEL	DEU	FRA	NLD	AUS	CAN	IRL	NZL	GBR	USA	GRC	ITA	PRT	ESP
C100 Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951																			
C111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958																			
C156 Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981																			
C183 Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 or																			
C103 Maternity Protection Convention (Revised), 1952																			
C189 Domestic Workers Convention, 2011																			

Source: ILO 2012 ILOLEX. www.ilo.org/ilolex/english

Table 5. Rules for childcare credit mechanisms in OECD pension systems, 2010

Country	Period of care	Crediting
Denmark	Up to one year in receipt of parental benefits	Double the amount of contribution is paid for the Danish labour market supplementary pension (ATP). The beneficiary will pay 1/3 of the contribution, 2/3 is paid by the government/municipality. Those out of the labour market caring for children beyond the maternity period typically switch to another scheme which also carries an ATP contribution. There are no credits or contributions for occupational pension schemes for periods out of paid work caring for children.
Finland	Periods of maternity (11 months) Periods caring for children under age 4	Pension accrues based on the 1.17 times the salary on which the family benefit is based. Until the child is 3 and for unpaid periods of care by either parent during which child home-care allowance is paid, pension accrues based on fictitious salary of € 556.60 a month (2006) and contributions are paid by the State. During parental leave, pension contributions are not due and pensions' accrual is paid by the earnings-related pension system. These periods are not included in the income test for national pension.
Sweden	Periods caring for children under age 5 Periods of parental benefits (16 months)	Contributions based on wages which are most favourable are paid by the government. This is, however, up to the earnings ceiling in the pension system. Parental benefits paid to people on parental leave from work are also considered pensionable income.
Belgium	Maximum of 3 years	Under the Collectively bargained pension plan for white-collar employees (ITP) occupational plan, there is a recommendation that the employer contributes to an employee's pension during periods of up to 11 months for parental leave. This credit is granted to all the employees who benefit the <i>tijdskrediet</i> which is a right for the employees that have worked for at least one-year for the same employer during the 15 months preceding the application. Earnings before the childcare breaks are counted in the benefit formula. These years count in the numerator of the benefit formula.
France	Periods caring for children under age 16 (at least 9 years) Periods caring for children under age 3 (maximum 3 years for the first two children)	Two years covered per child in the public scheme, whether continuing to work or not during that time (Majorations de Durée d'Assurance (MDA)). Both parents receive a 10% increase in final pension payout from the public plan if they have raised 3 or more children.
Austria	Up to 4 years per child	Credits based on the minimum wage are given for family whose earnings are under the €17,600 threshold for the first child (30% more for subsequent children) (Assurance Vieillesse des Parents au Foyer (AVPF)). In the "Association pour le Régime de Retraite Complémentaire (ARRCO)" scheme, pension rights are increased by 5% for each dependent child. Pension rights accrued after 1.1.1999 are increased by 8% if the person had 3 or more children.
Germany	3 years per child Periods caring for children up to age 10	Contribution based on salary of € 1 350 per month is paid (by government), but only 2 years per child are covered years and count towards the qualifying period for pension entitlement. Contributions based on average earnings (one pension point) are paid by the government. These years count toward the number of years needed to qualify for a pension. If people work and contribute when their children are under 10 or if at least two children under 10 are parented, they receive a bonus of up to 0.33 pension points per year. However, this cannot result in a total accrual exceeding one pension point per year.
Netherlands		In the basic old age pension scheme, periods out of paid work are automatically covered. In the occupational schemes, there are no credits for childcare periods during which people are out of paid work but the accrual of pension rights continues over remaining working years. However, many schemes allow voluntary contributions to cover the aforementioned periods of absence.
Australia		no specific credit; some protection offered though means-tested age pension
Canada	Periods caring for children under 7	Periods are excluded from the averaging periods for calculating pension benefits if doing so is beneficial to the recipient.
Ireland	Periods caring for children under 12 (maximum of 20 years)	Periods are excluded from the averaging periods for calculating pension benefits.
New Zealand		Eventual public pension entitlement is not affected by periods out of paid work for caring purposes.
United Kingdom	Periods caring for children under age 16 Periods caring for children under age 6	Periods are counted to reduce the number of years required for a full pension under the basic pension. Caring parents are deemed to have earned at the low earnings threshold for the state second pension.
United States	No credit for childcare	
Greece	1 year for the first child, 2 years for each subsequent child to a max of three children	This period only counts towards the qualifying conditions for retirement, not for the calculation of benefits.
Italy	1 year for one or two children, 2 years for three or more children	The pension is increased for mothers by giving them a more generous transformation coefficient. For mothers of one or two children this is the transformation coefficient of their actual retirement age plus one year. For three or more children this is the actual retirement age plus two years. Mothers have also the choice to retire early instead of having a higher pension.
Portugal	Periods of maternity leave Periods caring for children under age 12 (maximum 3 years) working part-time	Credits based on pay in the six months before the second month of the start of the leave are given. Periods can be treated as if working full-time.
Spain	Maternity period 2 years of childcare	Maternity period is covered. In addition, two years out of the labour market looking after children count towards eligibility for a pension benefit.

Source: OECD (2010d, 31-34) Table 2 pp. 31-34; Information for Canada from Service Canada (2011)

Table 6. Statutory rights for part-time work and part-time workers

Country	Equal treatment for part-time workers since:	Rights to work part-time or request part-time work (acceptable grounds for refusing requests: N = none; SB = serious business grounds; AG = any grounds)						Rights for existing part-time workers	
		Parents	Carers of adults	Sick or disabled workers	Education or training	Older worker	Automatic reversion to full-time hours	Notification of full-time vacancies	Preferential treatment for full-time vacancies
DNK	–	AG	–	–	–	–
FIN	2001	SB	AG	AG	..	AG	Yes	No	Yes
NOR	2006	SB	SB	SB	SB	SB	Yes	Yes	Yes
SWE	2002	SB	–	–	SB	–	Yes	No	Yes
BEL	2002	N	SB	SB	SB	SB	Yes	Yes	Yes
FRA	1982	N	SB	SB	N	SB	Yes
AUT	1992	SB	–	–	–	–	Yes	No	No
DEU	2001	SB	SB	SB	SB	AG	Yes	Yes	Yes
NLD	1996	N	SB	SB	SB	SB	Yes	No	No
AUS	–	SB	–	–	–	–	No	No	No
CAN	1990 (QC) 1995 (SK)	–	–	–	–	–	–	No	No
IRL	2001	AG	–	–	–	–	Yes
NZL	–	SB	SB	–	–	–	No	No	No
GBR	2000	SB	SB	–	–	–	No	No	No
USA	–	AG	N	N, SB	–	–	No	No	No
GRC	1998	N, SB	–	–	–	–	Yes	Yes	Yes
ITA	2000	AG	AG	AG	AG	AG
PRT	1971	SB	–	–	–	–	Yes	Yes	No
ESP	2001	N	N	AG	AG	AG	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: (1) “–” indicates that the policy does not apply; “..” indicates that information is not available. (2) Many countries have additional eligibility criteria for requesting part-time work (e.g. length of service, size of firm). Acceptable grounds for rejecting requests assume that the employee has met these criteria. See the related OECD background documents for full details. (3) Australia: While there is no specific statutory requirement for equal treatment, all permanent employees have the same safety net of minimum entitlements for wages, leave, dismissal protection, etc. Casual employees are not always entitled to paid leave (but receive a loading on their hourly rate in lieu of this) and are entitled to unfair dismissal protection in certain circumstances. (4) Belgium: Equal treatment rules have applied since 2000 in collective agreements. (5) Canada: Québec: Right to equal treatment applies to wages if employees earn less than twice the minimum wage. Saskatchewan: right to equal treatment applies to pro-rated non-statutory health and life insurance benefits after qualifying period, only applies to employers with 10+ full-time equivalent employees. (6) Denmark: Right to equal treatment applied through collective agreements since 2001. (7) France: Employers cannot refuse requests for parental leave to be taken as part-time work, but can choose the number of hours worked (16- 32 hours/week). Employers cannot refuse requests for part-time work for educational purposes, but can postpone the period of part-time work. (8) Germany: older workers do not have an automatic right to revert to full-time hours. (9) Greece: There are no grounds for refusing requests for a one-hour per day reduction in working time. Requests for other arrangements must be agreed to by the employer. (10) Portugal: There is no statutory right to preferential treatment for part-time workers when filling full-time vacancies but employers are obliged to consider requests for full-time work from part-time employees. (11) United States: Workers with serious health conditions can work a reduced schedule without their employer’s agreement. Workers with a disability can work part-time unless it will cause undue hardship. If it causes undue hardship, the employer must reassign the employee if there is a suitable vacant position.

Source: OECD (2010a, 208), Table 4.1.

Table 7. Causes of gender pay inequality and their implications for a minimum wage policy

Cause of gender pay inequality	Potential impact on pay	Impact of minimum wage	Conditions for improvement under a minimum wage
<i>Dependence on income sources other than own wages for subsistence:</i> women are assumed to be seeking second income and to have access to family subsidies, so only a component wage may be paid; women less likely to have access to unemployment benefits due to employment discontinuity which increases pressure to take low wage job.	Employers' pay policies reflect social expectations: pay family wage in male jobs/component wage in female jobs. Reinforced by limited access to unemployment benefits for women.	Raises floor to wage structure towards wage necessary to cover reproduction costs of single adult; reduces subsidies by family wage employers of component wage employers.	Minimum wage should be set above component wage level – towards reproduction cost of single adult
<i>Powerful employers:</i> women's assumed and actual domestic responsibilities restrict employment options by time/space.	Employers may act as monopsonists, keeping wages and employment low so as not to spoil the market. Standard employment contracts may restrict the range of jobs where it is possible to work flexible/reduced hours.	Minimum wage may raise employment as well as wages; reduce penalty of seeking non standard jobs.	Minimum wage needs to cover workers in non standard jobs defined by time and space (part-time, homeworkers etc.) and needs to be set above monopsony wage level
<i>Weak representation:</i> women have traditionally had less access to both wage employment and the public arena, including trade union organisation and politics.	Women are found in less well organised sectors and are less well represented within organised sectors. Lack of direct representation among women has reduced attention paid to gender issues in collective bargaining.	Minimum wage if universally applied provides some substitution for the representation of the non or weakly organised within the wage determination system.	Minimum wage coverage must extend to non or weakly organised groups; the wage level set needs to redress the undervaluation of wages caused by inequalities in representation and organisation between different groups of workers
<i>Job segregation:</i> women confined to specific labour market segments	Job segregation can provide a basis for differences in wages not covered by equal pay for same work laws or equal pay for work of equal value (if segregation results in employment in different firms). Job segregation may lead to crowding effects; lower wages and less incentive for productivity enhancements in the crowded sector.	Minimum wages could reduce the wage gap between the feminised and the non-feminised sectors and establish a new floor for women's wages when seeking employment outside the crowded sector.	Wage must be set above the prevailing rate in the feminised/crowded sector. Coverage must extend to feminised sectors.
<i>Social valuation of skills:</i> women's role as care providers has not been highly valued in the wage economy; transfer of care work to wage economy has been based on this low valuation.	Care work has been considered low skilled and has been largely invisible. Skills are not validated by labour market institutions (training systems or pay structures).	Minimum wage could reduce gap in value between traditional wage work and care work.	Minimum wage should cover domestic and other forms of care work in the wage economy, including the informal economy e.g. childminders.
<i>Social hierarchies:</i> women paid less than men so as not to challenge man's dominant role in wider society.	Employers are socialised in same society; employment policies and practices reflect acceptance of gender hierarchies. Couples who wish to change gender division of labour constrained by limited opportunities for female partner, irrespective of abilities or domestic commitments.	Minimum wage may be basis for beginning to challenge gender hierarchies, but a minimum wage will need to be built upon to generate higher earnings opportunities for women, facilitating a change in gender hierarchies.	Minimum wage must be set above minima in female dominated sectors to start process of challenging established hierarchies.

Source: Rubery (2003, 4), Table 1.

Table 8. Quotas for women's board representation, select OECD countries


Country (date)	Rep. required	Sex covered	Compliance date	Type of company	Size
Norway (2003, 2006)	40%	F	2006 (SOEs) 2008 (PT)	State-owned enterprises, Publicly traded companies	>9*
Belgium (2011)	33%	F	Varies	State-owned enterprises, Publicly traded companies	
France (2011)	40%	F	2014 (20%) 2017 (40%)	Publicly traded and non-listed companies	>500*
Canada (QC) (2006)	50%	F	2011	State-owned enterprises	
Canada *proposed*	40%	M/F	2018-2019	Publicly traded, state-owned enterprises, financial institutions	
Italy (2011)	33%	M/F	2015		
Spain (2007)	40%	M/F	2015	Publicly traded companies	>250

Notes: France: or with revenues of over 50 million Euros; Spain: No penalty, but will be considered in awarding public subsidies or state administration contracts.

Sources: Catalyst (2011) and EC (2011a). Reference to laws available at Catalyst (2011).


Figures

Figure 1. Trends in civilian employment, by sex, 1995-2009




Source: OECD 2010. Labour Force Statistics: Population and labour force, OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics (database). doi: 10.1787/data-00288-en (Accessed on: 01 June 2011).

Figure 2. Share of part-time employment in total employment, by country, 2009




Source: OECD 2010. Labour Force Statistics: Population and labour force, OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics (database). doi: 10.1787/data-00288-en (Accessed on: 01 June 2011).

Figure 3. Trends in part-time employment for individuals aged 25 and over, by sex and sex composition, 1995-2009




Source: Statistics and author's calculations based on ILO 2009. Table 5. Part-time workers (by sex and age group), Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM), 6th edition.

Figure 4. Proportion of workers choosing part-time work to look after children or incapacitated adults, aged 25 – 49, 2010




Source: EuroStat 2012 “Main reason for part-time employment - Distributions for a given sex and age group (lfsa_epgar)”

Figure 5. Voluntary and involuntary part-time, aged 25-54, by sex



Source: Statistics and author's calculations based on OECD (2010), "Labour Market Statistics: Involuntary part-time workers: incidence", OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics (database). doi: 10.1787/data-00308-en


Figure 6. Mean and median gender wage gaps, by data source



Note: (1) The gender wage gap is unadjusted and is calculated as the difference between the earnings of women relative to the earnings of men. (2) OECD figures refer to gross earnings of FT employees in all countries but Denmark (gross earnings, all employees), France (net earnings, full-time) and Norway (not specified gross/net, full-time equivalent). In addition, data for Austria, Canada, Finland, France and Sweden is limited to full-year employees. See Table A2 in annex for further details.

Source: Statistics and author's calculations based on OECD 2010. Database on Earnings Distribution. url: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/59/39606921.xls>; ILO 2010. Wage database (Travail). url: <http://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/protection/travail/pdf/wagedatabase10.xls>; Eurostat 2009 "Gender pay gap in unadjusted form in % (national sources: 1994 to 2006) (earn_gr_hpgg)"


Figure 7. Trends in occupational and sectoral segregation, by country, Index of Dissimilarity (ID), 1997-2007



Note: The authors use the ISCO-88 three-digit occupational classification system and the NACE two-digit sector classification system for their calculations.

Source: Bettio and Veraschagina (2009, 93-94), Table A.1.


Figure 8. Components of the change in occupational segregation in Europe, 1997–2007



Note: The authors use the ISCO-88 three-digit occupational classification system for their calculations. Italy is excluded due to insufficient comparable data.

Source: Bettio and Veraschagina (2009, 35), Figure 5.


Figure 9. Female share of employment by occupation (ISCO-88, 1-5, 7-9) over share of total employment, 2008



Note: Female share of total employment is relatively low in the Southern European countries, excepting Portugal.


Source: ILO 2011 LABORSTA “Table 1e, Economically active population, by industry and by occupation”

Figure 10. Female share of employment by sector, 2008




Source: Statistics and author's calculations based on ILO 2009. Table 4b. Employment by 1-digit sector level (ISIC-Rev.3, 1990) (by sex), Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM), 6th edition.

Figure 11. Women’s share of LSOM positions over their share of employment, by sector, by country, 2007



Source: Author’s calculation from ILO 2011 LABORSTA “Table 1e, Economically active population, by industry and by occupation”, using ISCO-88 1-digit occupational classification system and the ISIC Rev.3 sector classification system.


Figure 12. Approximate percent women in various corporate positions (average for 600 of the world's largest employers), 2009



Note: Survey results from large employers in OECD and BRIC countries

Source: Zahidi and Ibarra (2010)


Figure 13. Percentage of time dedicated to care work, by number of children under school age, 1999-2006



Note: (1) School age refers to children under age 7, except for the US where data refer to children under 6. (2) Year: France 1999; Finland 2000; 2001: Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom; Germany 2002; Italy, Spain; Canada 2005; 2006: Belgium, United States. (3) Care work includes all episodes of care work declared as primary or secondary activity, except for the United States and Canada. It also includes the time spent to care for household members or to informally help other households.


Source: Source: OECD Family Database (May 2011), "LMF2.5 Time used for work, care and daily household chores"

Figure 14. Trends in employment for individuals aged 25-49, by sex and presence of children in a household, select countries, 2005-2010




Source: EuroStat 2011 European LFS “Number of adults by sex, age groups, number of children, age of youngest child and working status (1 000) (fst_hhacwnc)”

Figure 15. Trends in full-time employment for individuals aged 25-49, by sex and presence of children in the household, select countries, 2005-2010



Source: EuroStat 2011 European LFS “Number of adults by sex, age groups, number of children, age of youngest child and working status (1 000) (lfst_hhacwnc)”


Figure 16. Rates of poverty and social exclusion, by country and age group, 2010



Notes: See footnote 29 for definition.


Source: Eurostat 2011 “People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by age and gender (ilc_peps01)”

Figure 17. Incidence of low pay work by gender, 2000, 2008



Source: OECD 2010. Database on Earnings Distribution. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/59/39606921.xls>

Figure 18. The bottom half of the wage distribution, by sex and decile (at the 10th, 20th, 30th, 40th and 50th percentiles), 2008*




Note: (1) 2007 data for Belgium and France (2) refer to gross earnings of FT employees in all countries but Denmark (gross earnings, all employees), France (net earnings, full-time) and Norway (not specified gross/net, full-time equivalent). In addition, data for Austria, Canada, Finland, France and Sweden are limited to full-year employees. See Table A2 in annex for further details.

Source: OECD 2010. Database on Earnings Distribution. URL:

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/59/39606921.xls>


Figure 19. The top half of the wage distribution, by sex and decile (at the 50th, 60th, 70th, 80th and 90th percentiles), 2008*



Note: (1) 2007 data for Belgium and France (2) refer to gross earnings of FT employees in all countries but Denmark (gross earnings, all employees), France (net earnings, full-time) and Norway (not specified gross/net, full-time equivalent). In addition, data for Austria, Canada, Finland, France and Sweden are limited to full-year employees. See Table A2 in annex for further details.

Source: OECD 2010. Database on Earnings Distribution. url: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/59/39606921.xls>

Figure 20. Gender division of labour




Traditional ←
←
→
 Less Traditional

Source: Crompton (2006, 193)

Figure 21. Employment rate gaps (percentage points), 2008


A: Average male-female gap compared to that between women with different family responsibilities

B: Gap between men and women with different family responsibilities



Source: EuroStat 2011 European LFS “Number of adults by sex, age groups, number of children, age of youngest child and working status (1 000) (lfst_hhacwnc)”


Figure 22. Share of live births by mother's educational attainment



Note: (1) This graph does not control for the relative size of each educational group (2) Educational attainment is defined as follows: “low” is less than upper secondary education (levels 1 and 2 of ISCED 1997), “medium” includes upper secondary education or post-secondary non-tertiary education (i.e. vocational training) (levels 3 and 4) and “high” includes tertiary education (levels 5 and 6).

Source: Eurostat 2011 “Live births by mother’s age at last birthday and educational attainment (ISCED 1997) (demo_faeduc)”


Figure 23. Average wages of high-skilled women by age and age of first birth, subsample from the United States



Note: (1) Original data from the US National Longitudinal Survey, NLSY79I (2) Here, high-skilled is proxied by ranking in the top third of the US Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).

Source: Ellwood et al. (2004, 39) Figure 4.


Figure 24. Proportion of employed parents with a child under age 1 on statutory or employer-provided leave, 2006



Source: OECD (2010b) “PF2.2 Use of childbirth-related leave benefits, by mothers and fathers” Original source: European Labour Force Survey, 2006.

Figure 25. The evolution of statutory parental leave benefits in 18 countries (1950-2000)

Average duration of post-natal parental leave benefits



Source: SCIP

Figure 2.2 Average duration of post-natal parental insurance benefits in 18 countries 1950–2000, in two-earner family with two children (0 and 5 years of age)

B: Program existence





Figure 2.1 Programme existence of paid parental leave in 18 countries 1950–2000

Note: (1) The 18 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. (2) Figure A refers to a two-earner family with two children (0 and 5 years of age)


Source: Ferrarini (2006, 36, 39), Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2.

Figure 26 Eligible fathers claiming paternity or parental leave, Canada



Source: Marshall (2008, 9)


Figure 27. Participation rates in formal care for children under 3 years old, 2008 or most recent year



Note: Informal childcare may be poorly captured by such surveys, perhaps explaining the unexpectedly low average hours in Southern Europe.

Source: OECD 2010 Family database (March 2010). "PF3.2.B: Full-time equivalent participation rates for children under 3 years old" and "Table PF3.3.A Use of informal childcare arrangements by children's age, 2008 or most recent year" url: <http://www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database> (accessed: 11/05/2011).


Figure 28. Net childcare costs (after benefits and transfers) as a percent of average wages, by household type, 2004



Source: OECD 2010 Family database (March 2010). “Chart PF3.4.B & Chart PF3.4.C Net childcare costs for families with full-time arrangements” url: <http://www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database> (accessed: 11/05/2011).

Note: Information is not available for Italy and Spain


Figure 29. Gender wage gap across wage deciles, grouped by regime type, 2007*



Notes: (1) The gender wage gap is unadjusted and is calculated as the difference between the earnings of women relative to the earnings of men across the deciles. (2) Refers to gross earnings of full-time employees in all countries but Denmark (gross earnings, all employees), France (net earnings, full-time) and Norway (not specified gross/net, full-time equivalent). In addition, data for Austria, Canada, Finland, France and Sweden are limited to full-year employees. See Table A2 in annex for further details. (3) 2005 data used for the Netherlands (NLD).

Source: OECD 2010. Database on Earnings Distribution. url: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/59/39606921.xls>

Figure 300. 'Gendered' occupational outcome by 'gendered' field of study, by sex, 2004



Notes: (1) Data from the European Union Labour Force Survey (EULFS) 2004 (second quarter) for 16 European countries and for 2005 for the UK.

Source: Smyth and Steinmetz (2008, 266)

Annex

Table A- 1 Characteristics (* commonly) controlled for in wage adjustments

<p>Contractual characteristics *Working time or working hours *FT/PT status Type of schedule (overtime, shift work, flexi-work) Flexi-work Employer offers career breaks Skilled part-time work Unskilled part-time work Temporary work Type of contract (fixed-term or open-ended)</p> <p>Personal characteristics *Education/Qualification *Training * Country of birth / immigrant status *Race *Children *Family/Marital status * Marital status interacted w/ presence of children Over-educated Nationality Age Knowledge of national language Family structure (head of household, partner in gainful employment, working time of partner) Contextual variables *Region/Area (of employment or residence) *Urban/Non-urban *Concentration of women in particular occupation and industry Demographic size of municipality Regional unemployment Value added/Business volume Proportion of women in a specific job/occupation within company School run</p>	<p>Job/company characteristics *Occupation *Sector/industry *Public/private *Company size Managerial work/Level of supervision Having a typically female occupation Job function/Job position/Seniority Form of ownership (public/private/foreign) Export intensity of company Size of market</p> <p>Job history *Job tenure (with current employer) *Potential experience *Total experience Professional/Work experience Change of job Spells of unemployment or non-employment Return from parental leave after a certain number of years</p> <p>Industrial relations variables *Member of a trade union Collective agreement Works councils Member of a professional body Minimum wage cover Level of wage agreement (individual, business, industry, national, other)</p>
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
Source: Eurofound (2010a); Weichselbaumer(2005))

Table A- 2 Earnings definitions for OECD Database on Earnings Distribution, 2007 data

Country	Definition	Gross or net earnings (G/N)	Full-time?	Time Hourly, Weekly, Monthly, Annual (H, W, M,A)
DNK	Gross hourly earnings of all workers.	G	all	H
NOR	Average monthly earnings for full-time equivalents		FTE	M
AUS	Gross weekly earnings in main job (all jobs prior to 1988) of full-time employees	G	FT	W
BEL	Gross monthly earnings of full-time employed wage earners in NACE sectors C-K.	G	FT	M
DEU	Gross monthly earnings of full-time workers.	G	FT	M
ESP	Gross hourly earnings of full-time employees.	G	FT	H
GBR	Gross weekly earnings of all full-time workers (i.e. on adult rates of pay).	G	FT	W
GRC	Gross hourly earnings of full-time employees.	G	FT	H
IRL	Gross weekly earnings of full-time employees.	G	FT	W
ITA	Gross hourly earnings of full-time employees.	G	FT	H
NZL	Gross hourly earnings of full-time employees.	G	FT	H
PRT	Gross hourly earnings of full-time employees.	G	FT	H
USA	Gross usual weekly earnings of full-time workers aged 16 and over.	G	FT	W
AUT	Yearly gross income (excluding casual payments) for full-year employees working full time	G	FTFY	A
CAN	Gross annual earnings of full-time, full-year workers	G	FTFY	A
FIN	Gross annual earnings of full-time, full-year workers.	G	FTFY	A
FRA	Net annual earnings of full-time, full-year workers.	N	FTFY	A
SWE	Growth monthly earnings for full-year, full-time employees	G	FTFY	M

Source: OECD 2010. Database on Earnings Distribution. url: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/59/39606921.xls>

Figure A - 1. Change in gender wage gap across wage deciles over time, 2000 and most recent year



Notes: (1) The gender wage gap is unadjusted and is calculated as the difference between the earnings of women relative to the earnings of men across the deciles. (2) Refers to gross earnings of FT employees in all countries but Denmark (gross earnings, all employees), France (net earnings, full-time) and Norway (not specified gross/net, full-time equivalent). In addition, data for Austria, Canada, Finland, France and Sweden are limited to full-year employees. See Table A2 in annex for further details.

Source: OECD 2010. Database on Earnings Distribution. url: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/59/39606921.xls>

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