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**SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND ITS ROLE IN
CHALLENGING OF RADICALISM**

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Countering Radicalisation through Development Assistance

In the spring of 2005 the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs called on the Danish Institute for International Studies to undertake a policy study on how to counter radicalisation through development assistance.

Despite growing interest in the field, very little research has yet been conducted. To expand the knowledge base, a number of subject matter experts were identified and asked to produce papers on select topics. Initially, the papers were intended to serve only as background material for the policy study. Due to considerable international interest it has been decided to publish the papers as DIIS working papers, making them available to a broader audience. All papers can be downloaded free of charge from www.diis.dk.

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The papers do not reflect the views of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs or any other government agency, nor do they constitute any official DIIS position. For more information on the policy study, please contact Michael Taarnby Jensen (mtj@diis.dk) or Louise Andersen (lan@diis.dk).

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Abstract

This working paper explores the linkage between security sector reform and development assistance in countering radicalization. It is argued that security is an essential prerequisite to sustainable development.

The premise of this paper is that there are important security sector reform objectives that are essential in countering radicalisation through addressing many of the underlying root causes that can create and sustain radical opposition to authoritarian or totalitarian governments in developing countries.

It is often the case that the security forces are themselves not so much guarantors of security but rather a key agent of insecurity in themselves. At its simplest security sector reform seeks to improve the professional capacity of the security sector while at the same time also seeking to ensure that it respects human rights and is not corrupt and properly accountable.

1. Introduction

This paper is intended to provide a background to the concept of security sector reform (SSR) as a developmental tool and its utility or applicability in countering radicalism.¹ It is however important to note that this should not be confused with traditional military assistance. Further, while military and police assistance has a clear role in countering radicalism, through promoting the capacity of state security forces that may confront radical groups the role of SSR is perhaps more nuanced. However, the premise of this paper is that there are also important SSR objectives that are essential in countering radicalisation through addressing many of the underlying root causes that can create and sustain radical opposition to authoritarian or totalitarian governments. The premise of SSR is that security is an essential prerequisite to sustainable development. That is in communities that do not have security it is impossible to engage in traditional economic development. Further, it is often the case that the security forces are themselves not so much guarantors of security but rather than a key agent of insecurity in themselves. At its simplest SSR seeks to improve the professional capacity of the security sector while at the same time also seeking to ensure that it respects human rights and is not corrupt and properly accountable.

Therefore this background paper will firstly outline the basic concepts of SSR and also its history before going on to establish the role of SSR in development assistance and then in countering radicalism. Finally this paper will explore the applicability of SSR in countering radicalism through examining three case studies Iraq, Afghanistan and Indonesia. This paper will finally conclude by establishing a number of key recommendations through which SSR could be used when countering radicalism.

¹ The term security sector reform is popular with the practitioner community but there are other terms also used the OECD DAC uses 'security system reform' and the UNDP talks of 'justice and security sector reform' while many Africans prefer 'security sector transformation'. However, while there may be discussion as to which name to use there is, in general, unanimity about the nature of the concept.

2. The concept of Security Sector Reform

Security sector reform (SSR) is a concept that originates from the debate within the development community about the linkages between security and sustainable development that dates back to the 1980s.² However, it was only with the end of the cold war that the concept of SSR was able to develop. Cold war realities had meant that military or police assistance tended to be given by states in order to advance foreign policy and security goals rather than on the basis of either need or applicability. However, once the cold war ended it became possible to change the concept of security away from being regime security and rather be seen a public good which was in fact a positive or at time an essential element of development.³ The OECD –DAC has embraced security sector reform as a way in which the security forces can concurrently both increase their efficiency at the same time that you enhance accountability and transparency issues (both key parts of the governance agenda. ⁴The DAC was with DFID and to a lesser extent the Netherlands and Germany one of the earliest champions of SSR within the development community. Despite the adoption of SSR by a number of development agencies ⁵ it has to be recognised that SSR is not accepted in the mainstream development community. Ignorance of SSR as well as hostility to its aims and methods continues to exist among some respected elements within the development community and this needs to be addressed by any state that is considering an SSR engagement. Therefore it is vital that the aims, objectives and methodology of SSR is mainstreamed within any implementing agency and not a separate unit or entity. The recent changes in the DAC eligibility criteria for official development assistance (ODA) to include a significant amount of SSR activities should help to bridge this distance.

The concept of the security sector is a deliberately wide cross section of those individuals who are engaged in security provision. The concept is intended to include direct providers of security including military forces, police and intelligence services. However, it also includes the judiciary and the penal systems as well as oversight actors including parliamentarians and civil

² The most well known example of this was probably the Brant Commission 'Our global network- the report of the Commission on Global Governance see <http://www.cgg.ch/contents1-2.html>.

³ An excellent introduction to the concept of SSR is Dylan_Hendrickson 'A Review of Security Sector Reform' London: Kings College, 2001.

⁴ OECD, The DAC Guidelines Helping prevent Violent Conflict. Paris: 2002.

⁵ See for instance DfID, Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform, London: 2002

society. The DAC definition of the security sector is outlined in Box 1 below but it is intended to recognise that in order to approach the provision of security it is vital that a donor approach it in a holistic manner looking at the sector as a whole in a country. This joined-up approach is also vital inside the donor governments as SSR projects will often require a cross departmental approach within a donor country drawing from military, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, development and interior ministries both the governments of the UK and the Netherlands have established cross departmental structures to facilitate this. Further the current moves within the European Union to try and develop a common SSR concept are all examples that this is possible. It is also important to point out that SSR is not a short term solution so it requires a sustained engagement by the donor.

Box 1 Security Sector Actors⁶

- **Core security actors:** armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias).
- **Security management and oversight bodies:** the Executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).
- **Justice and law enforcement institutions:** judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems.
- **Non-statutory security forces,** with whom donors rarely engage: liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private body-guard units; private security companies; political party militias.

Engagement in SSR projects requires a holistic approach which takes into account all of the main security actors outlined in the box above. There are a number of vital criteria that need to be addressed in any SSR programme. Specifically, local ownership is vital for sustainability as at some stage donor engagement will finish and for it to work local stakeholders have to be prepared and ready to move it forward. Further, the political sensitivity of SSR is such that donors and local stakeholders have to work together on developing the concept in order to ensure that the potential blockages can be addressed and dealt with.

⁶ 'Security System Reform and Governance', DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, Paris: OECD 2005. Page 11

2.1 SSR ASSISTANCE AS OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

As mentioned above the OECD-DAC has been leading the way in terms of developing the concept of SSR. However, conversely the OECD DAC has also been a barrier to devolving SSR projects with a developmental focus through the exclusion of military assistance in the OECD DAC Official Development Assistance (ODA) criteria with the exception of a number of instances where the military are used to support humanitarian operations.⁷ In April 2005 this position was modified with a widening of what forms of security related assistance support could be classed as ODA in order to encourage SSR projects. The April amendments allow for the inclusion of technical assistance that does not contribute to the strengthening of the military or fighting capacity of the armed forces. While this still excludes important parts of SSR such as military training it does allow for significantly greater flexibility in terms of SSR commitments especially in the area of promoting civilian oversight.⁸

The key importance of these amendments are that much greater range of SSR and SSR related activity can be included in a countries ODA. The exclusion of military related projects from the revision has disappointed some observers but projects that can be included cover a range of security actors including civilian police and intelligence services as well as civil society organisations that are working on projects that come within the SSR remit (eg human rights organisations, public awareness campaigns, access to justice projects and public- security sector dialogue and research).⁹

Despite this welcome move it needs to be ensured that the revised DAC criteria do not act as a block on SSR engagement in the wider sense and reform of the military should not be confined to budget controls and/ or oversight projects. It is vital for good governance that mechanisms for the establishment of civilian democratic control of armed forces are established and that the military are properly trained and equipped to provide adequate and appropriate protection of a countries territory.

⁷ OECD, 'DAC Statistical Reporting Directives', paragraphs 1.32 to 1.36. Accessed from the internet 10 October 2005 from <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/32/31723929.htm#AboutDirectives>.

⁸ OECD, 'DAC Statistical Reporting Directives: Addendum' [DCD/DAC(2000)10/ADD1/REV1] 7 April 2005. Accessed from the internet 10 October 2005 from: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/13/31724752.pdf>.

⁹ For further information see The Global facilitation Network's on line "Compendium of Good Practices on Security Sector Reform : DONOR PRACTICES" downloadable from: http://www.gfn-ssr.org/good_practice.cfm?id=80&p=25

Box 2 The key areas of SSR that can now be categorised as ODA are¹⁰:

- Management of security expenditure: Under this criteria projects that would be included are ones where democratic oversight of security expenditure are promoted.
- Enhancing civil Societies role in the security system: This is where activities that enhance the competence of civil society (eg NGOs, universities, the media and research institutions)
- Child Soldiers: this includes assistance that discourages the recruitment of child soldiers and encourages their demobilisation and reintegration back in to society- but not operations against groups that use child soldiers.
- Security system reform: this essentially allows for support of processes that encourage transparency within the security sector and civilian democratic control. Support can be given to defence ministries only as part of a national security system reform strategy.
- Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution: This promotes civilian peace-building activities including the disclosure of military strategy. Direct assistance to defence ministries and the military is excluded. However, if a civilian organisation/authority runs a training course primarily for civilians it can invite the military to attend.
- Small Arms and Light Weapons: This can include weapons collection projects, public awareness and the development of laws, monitoring and institutional structures.

2.2 IMPLEMENTING SSR AS A COUNTER TO RADICALISM

While the concept of SSR is relatively well understood implementing the theory has not been as easy as perhaps the research and policy thinkers would like to suggest. In implementing an SSR project it is vital that any strategy is developed as a result of careful analysis of the situation on the ground. The analysis could be something such as a European Commission Country Strategy Paper or carry out a specific Security Sector Analysis such as those conducted by the UK Security Sector Defence Advisory Team (SS-DAT). There are also a range of tools that have already been used not least the Clingendael Institute's Institutional Assessment Framework tool which contains within it a number of the key issues that a practitioner would need to address in order to implement a project.¹¹

In relation to countering radicalism SSR (like other governance approaches) has a number of specific roles depending on the nature and context of the problem. Police reform and restructuring becomes vital if you have a situation such as the one in Iraq (see case study) where the police have been subject to infiltration by radical groups. On other occasions such as in for instance Northern Ireland during the 'troubles' (1968-1997) insurgents learnt very quickly to play on human rights abuse by the security forces in recruitment of new members and build-

¹⁰ Op Cit OECD DAC 7 April 2005

¹¹ *Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework*. The Hague: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affaires, August 2003.

ing sympathy within the wider community. This has been replicated by more contemporary terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda who have used alleged mistreatment and human rights abuses by the security forces as a recruitment tool. In this situation a process of prison building or refurbishment together with the active support of oversight actors (both official and unofficial) can be productive. In countries where the state is weak or fragile SSR can be used to try and support states that are in decline through boosting their capacity to both protect the rule of law but also carry out acts such as guaranteeing revenue flows from extractive industries. This is something that the EU is currently attempting to do in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Finally SSR also is able to add a significant human rights and governance dimension to conventional police or military re-equipment. It may well be in the strategic interest of a state to aid the counter terrorism capacity of a police or intelligence agency in a given country. However, there are often major human rights concerns, which can not be ignored. In such a case where both human rights training is provided and oversight is encouraged (and oversight actors protected) by the donor government it may be more easy to counter the danger that support is not misused. However, it is important to recognise that SSR is potentially a high risk but high gain strategy and that while it is possible to adopt risk mitigation strategies it can only be mitigation and not prevention. This is another reason why a donor agency may consider cooperating with another institution that shares a common interest or agenda in a country in order to avoid a major reputation risk.

The table on the following pages is adapted from an earlier report published by International Alert, which gives examples of the form of activity which you can conduct in different contexts. These are given simply as examples as the specific context will always vary.

Table 1 Potential SSR response to radicalism¹²

Country Type	Contextual conditions	Radicalisation Threat	Security Sector Reform Response	Role of External Assistance
Consolidating Democracies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Healthy democratic Institutions and good governance • Minimisation of external shocks, including impact of economic stabilisation and adjustment • Conductive international and regional security environment, including measures against trans border spread of conflicts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Terrorism • Economic destabilisation • Civil unrest 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Professionalism • Security • Public Access to Justice 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic Defence Reviews • Police and Intelligence Capacity Support • Build capacity of legislature, media, and civil society to exercise oversight • Assist regional security bodies, help increase their capacity to monitor, prevent and reduce conflicts
Lapsing or Staled democracies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Willingness of governments and opponents to resolve differences through politics not violence • Ability of political and civil society to withstand authoritarian proclivities of regime • Interconnections between economic and political sources of security/insecurity • Leverage exercised by other governments in this region and by international community 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Infiltration/insurgency • Terrorism • Civil unrest • Undermining of state institutions • Infiltration of security forces by radical groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased democratic accountability • Prevent escalation of political conflict into violence • Avoid politicisation and de-professionalisation of military, police, etc. • Contain privatisation of violence • Prevent human rights abuses, maintain rule of law • Empower civil/political society 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security sector reform assistance may be problematic without real government commitment to reform. 'Do no harm' :neither increase risk of conflict, nor reinforce regime's tendency to respond with force rather than through political process. <p>Thus:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited professional training (e.g. on human rights) • Improve capacity and independence of courts, civilian police • Build capacity and independence of legislature, civil society • Support human rights monitoring, elections, etc.
Transitional Democracies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nature of transition, whether negotiated with outgoing regime, following from collapse of the latter, or conflict • Depth of authoritarian legacies and scope for neutralising them • Strength of pro-democracy movement/civil society groups • How far professionalism of armed forces/police maintained • Presence or absence of civil and criminal violence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insurgency • Terrorism • Civil unrest • Undermining of state institutions • Infiltration of security forces by radical groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peaceful democratic transition • 'Good governance' and democratic accountability in security sector • Re-professionalisation and depoliticise armed forces, police, etc. • Ensure the regulation of privatisation of violence • Ensure accountability for past and recent human rights abuses • Assure public security, access to justice and rule of law • Empower legislature 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security sector reform is problematic where legitimacy of public authorities is contested – but no less essential. 'Do no harm' and support peaceful resolution of conflict • Support regional conflict-resolution/peacekeeping mechanisms • Support initiatives to cut flows of finance/weapons (e.g. measures against 'conflict' diamonds, regional small arms moratoria)

¹² Adapted from Lilly, Luckham, and von Tangen Page, A Goal Orientated approach to Security Sector Reform. London: International Alert, 2002, pp 12-14.

Country Type	Contextual conditions	Radicalisation Threat	Security Sector Reform Response	Role of External Assistance
			and civil society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use humanitarian aid to support peace building • Support legislative, media and civil society oversight of security sector/conduct of war • Support civil society in peace/public order initiatives
Conflict Torn Societies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survival (or not) of some legitimate framework of public authority • International/regional economic and political mechanisms sustaining or limiting conflict • High degree of political/social polarisation (e.g. on ethnic/religious basis) • Destruction/resilience of civil society • Scale of 'public security gap' and human rights abuses • Regional conflict-resolution mechanisms, support of neighbouring governments for peace (or absence of it) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outside radicals establishing operational bases within territory. • Terrorism • Alternative para-state structures established by radicals • Sectarian attacks against minority/majority groups • Insurgency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflict-resolution; end to violence • Control by legitimate authorities over all armed groups/means of violence • Minimise indiscipline and corruption of armed forces/police • Minimise human rights abuses by all combatants • Disarm/demobilise combatants (where feasible) • Restore public security, rule of law • Strengthen regional conflict-resolution and peacekeeping mechanisms 	
States Under Reconstruction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How conflict 'terminated' (negotiation or 'victory') and likelihood of reigniting • Legacies of ethnic etc. polarisation and how they are managed • Establishment of democratic and inclusive governance • Ability of government to fill 'governance voids' and 'security gaps' resulting from conflict • Resilience of civil society • Economic reconstruction and its impact on employment, welfare, inequality • Insulation from regional economic/political mechanisms sustaining violence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Para state structures established • Terrorism • Economic Regeneration attacked • Civil Unrest 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevent re-ignition of conflict • Rebuild legitimacy and capacity of public authorities, including security sector • Reassess security needs and roles of armed forces, police, etc. • Disarm, demobilise and reintegrate ex-combatants • Restructure, re-professionalise armed forces, police, etc. • Establish democratic control • Ensure balanced, inclusive recruitment • Accountability for past and present human rights abuses • Restore public security, rule of law • Limit privatisation of security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diplomatic/political support for reconstruction • Assist disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration • Aid re-professionalisation of armed forces, police, capacity-building, training, equipment • Support legislative, media, civil society oversight of security sector • Support reconstruction of public order institutions: courts, police, community dispute-resolution • Support constitutional reform, human rights monitoring, elections • Ensure economic stabilisation and adjustment measures do not aggravate social tensions • Support regional institutions for monitoring and management of conflict

3. Case Studies

3.1 CASE STUDY 1: INDONESIA; STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND DECENTRALIZATION

Background

Radicalism in Indonesia

Following thirty years of corrupt autocracy under former President Soharato, Indonesia inaugurated its first freely elected government since the 1950's in 1999. One of the major challenges facing Indonesia's current President, Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is a reform of the security sector. In order to strengthen civil society, reducing the role of the military is a critical task. Under Soharato, the New Order rule (1966-1988) was structured around a nearly exclusively dominant military sector whose role was to maintain control over civil society. Military officers were given extensive powers to investigate, arrest and detain anyone the government deemed a threat particularly ideological enemies or separatists in East Timor, Aceh and Papua¹³. All components of society were subject to the militarization of the bureaucracy and the military control over the intelligence services¹⁴. Radicalism was a hardly feasible option because of the power exercised by all actors of the authoritarian regime. In such a context, President Soharato's legacy to contemporary Indonesia is an overpowering military sector whose structure mirrors that of the State. Major problems include unclear institutional division of labour, particularly between the police and the military, and lack of accountability of the security services¹⁵. The impact of SSR in Indonesia should be assessable at the civilian level so that civil society could benefit from all aspects of democratic rights.

Description of threats

Indonesia is a disparate state bearing several separatist movements who undertake regional activities in Aceh and Papua. The case of Ambon is a particular one in terms of potential for sectarian clashes within the separatist movement. New radical movements are also developing in Bali where the Hindus are largely resentful of the Islamic population because of the recent terrorist atrocities led by radical Islamic groups. In such a context, separatist movements and

¹³ International Crisis Group "Indonesia: Rethinking Internal security Strategy", Crisis group Asia Report n°90, 20 December 2004

¹⁴ Muhammed Najib Azca, "Security sector Reform, Democratic Transition, and Social Violence: The Case of Ambon, Indonesia", Berghof Handbook, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management

¹⁵ International Crisis Group, *op cit*

potential ethnic conflict pressure each other mutually into radicalism as a response to the danger of state fracture. The main issues faced by SSR are governance and counter-terrorism. However, the necessary democratisation of the military may undermine the army's unification force. SSR in Indonesia is driven by two potentially incompatible interests. The governance approach to SSR -through the democratisation of the military sector- and the counter-radicalism approach - focusing on both separatist movements and potential ethnic conflict - are likely to clash over their respective ethos'.

Challenges of SSR

Among the several potential approaches to SSR, two are most adapted to the case of Indonesia. First, the "elite versus participatory policy making approach" is based on the view that there is a basic dilemma of democracy in the policy process. This means that for the security policy to be successful in the long term there must be a significant degree of participation by the wider civilian public. However, in such a framework it is difficult to reconcile the expertise of the military elites and civilians with the demands of participatory democracy. The second approach, "the system analysis approach" assumes that many different inputs from many different actors including civilians go into the policy process. In both cases, the need to re-constitute the capacity of the civilian to involve and to control the policy processes is underlined¹⁶.

Effective civilian control to the military thus requires legal and constitutional frameworks that enable a high degree of accountability and transparency of the armed forces¹⁷. The parliamentary oversight mechanism should also have three roles in controlling the military, such as political, policy and operational accountability. To achieve security sector reform in Indonesia, professional civilian control of the defence ministry is necessary, including public scrutiny of defence policy and its implementation. Lastly, the active involvement of society in redefining its relations with the military, including a national debate on security related issues, is critical to the full implementation of security sector reform¹⁸. The objective of such reforms is to provide civilians with opportunities for awareness and control of the implementation of security policies through appropriate institutional structures and democratic procedures of oversight and transparency.

¹⁶ Anak Perwita, Security sector Reform in Indonesia: The Case of Indonesia's Defence White Paper 2003, *Journal of Security Sector Management*, vol 2 n°4, December 2004

¹⁷ Ann Fitz-Gerald, Security Sector Reform – Streamlining National Military Forces to Respond to the Wider Security Needs, *Journal of Security Sector Management*, vol1, n°1 March 2003

¹⁸ Perwita, *op cit*.

Current situation

Indonesia is currently undergoing an in-depth security sector reform including government efforts to lead an internal security sector reform and a number of ad hoc initiatives from supporting countries, NGOs and international organisations.

The UNDP focuses on Justice and Security Sector reforms aiming to strengthen civil society through empowerment and decentralization. On this large-scale basis, the OECD has also established a partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia¹⁹. By bringing together the Indonesian government, the legislature, the judiciary, civil society, the corporate sector and the international community, the Partnership hopes to deal comprehensively with complex questions and ensure national ownership of the process. Two of the Partnership's ten sector priorities are directly linked to SSR: legal and judicial reform and police/security reform. Several others have links to SSR: anti-corruption measures, legislative and parliamentary reform, and civil society and media strengthening. The Partnership Governance Trust Fund disburses funds directly to Indonesian agencies active in the national governance reform effort whilst the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) manages donor contributions to the Trust Fund.

Within its foreign policy, the UK is running a number of SSR projects and focuses on the Strategic Defence Programme in Indonesia as well as availability of education. USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives is working on the civilian side of the civil-military equation to support SSR.

More precise projects have also been undertaken by organisations such as the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs that launched a program to strengthen civilian capacity for leadership and oversight of the military. NDI initiated a series of activities to strengthen civilian institutions that are critical to civilian leadership, direction, management and control of the military: the legislature, the media, civil society and leading universities. NDI is also working with Indonesian NGO's on reforming the military economy, in particular Indonesian military involvement in business and Indonesia's reliance on its military business complex as the key source of revenue for defence spending.

¹⁹ OECD, Security System Reform and Good Governance: Policy and Good Practice, Policy Brief, May 2004

Mr Pratomo²⁰ expressed his views at a Security Sector Reform Whitehall Policy Seminar²¹ underlining that efforts are ongoing to develop leaders to support civil institutions in Indonesia. The Indonesian armed forces (TNI) have indeed led the democratisation process but are still unwilling to shed all their previous responsibilities until an alternative fully functioning governing structure is developed. Nevertheless, much work has been done to incorporate democratic principles into the existing civil-military relations model in Indonesia.

Lessons learned

In order to overcome worries²² regarding the consequences of a full democratisation of Indonesia's national security structure, which may be viewed by some religious elements as a threat to Islamic norms, it must be made clear to all groups that SSR is essential for Indonesia's security and prosperity.

SSR can only be achieved if a genuine coordination effort is made by all the actors and stakeholders so that projects can gain in impact and rid themselves of overlapping dimensions. Regarding the Indonesian government, it is crucial that it defines the roles and responsibilities of regional governments for security. The role of the TNI should be affirmed publicly and any ambiguity as to their position should be avoided. It must also be made clear that the police have primary responsibility for internal security. Lastly, the Indonesian government is encouraged to use and support the expertise that can be marshalled by NGO's and other elements of civil society²³. On the other hand, the TNI must accept democratic reform and demonstrate commitment to it by working constructively with the police and with civil society.

Acknowledgement of the progress on behalf of the Indonesian government shows that national ownership is key to a successful implementation of SSR. The international donor community is thus encouraged to continue providing financial and technical support to the Indonesian SSR programme but must be reminded of the importance of national ownership for the success of SSR. In Indonesia, although it has been suggested that democratisation through SSR may fuel radicalism it must also be noted that a well functioning and transparent security sector is also the best way to control potential upsurges in radicalism.

²⁰ Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in the UK

²¹ The Hempel Hotel, London 8-9 September 2004

²² Mr Pratomo expressed his worries at the SSR Whitehall Policy Seminar

²³ International Crisis Group, *op cit*

3.2 CASE STUDY TWO: IRAQ, THE USE OF SSR TO COUNTER TERRORISM. A STUDY OF THE UK'S SSR ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHERN IRAQ

Background

Radicalism in Iraq

In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, and within the context of the occupation of the territory, the US-led Coalition troops are confronted with the practical challenge of creating a secure environment for the Iraqi population. The fall of Saddam Hussein's fundamentally secular and pan-Arabic regime has given rise to tensions between different radical groups sharing a common goal of undermining the Coalition's action in order to lead the transition from the Coalition authority to the new freely elected government. Rivalry between groups may be considered a cause of the radicalisation of their political positions and activities.

Description of threats

There are a number of factors of insecurity in Iraq, most of which stem from political groups prepared to compromise their own security in order to resist the Coalition forces. Broadly, some of the former Baath Party members have access to considerable personnel, financial and weapons resources and benefit from a deep presence in certain areas deeply Sunni populated. In order to keep their past privileges, the loyalists to Saddam Hussein may be prepared to promote Iraqi nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism or Sunni sectionalism.

The second threat to security in Iraq is composed of various Iraq-based Islamist-terrorist groups. These groups exploit Sunni fears and resentments basing their ideology on a strong radical Islamist foundation.

Other groups to be considered as an element of threat are the external terrorist groups who may find in Iraq a congenial environment, because of general disorder, easy access across porous borders and some support from elements of the population²⁴.

Members of the secular Baath party and some radical Sunni have created a strategic alliance to fight the coalition forces. The long discriminated Shia, largely motivated by their fear of seeing a rise of Sunni power, are attempting to gain influence and some radical elements among them

²⁴ Slocombe Walter B., "Iraq's Special Challenge: Security Sector Reform 'Under Fire'", Chapter 10, Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector, Bryden Alan and Heiner Haenggi (eds), DCAF Publications 2004

are also fighting the coalition forces. The task of countering radicalism in Iraq is particularly challenging because of the multiple and overlapping claims made by these groups.

Challenges of SSR

The aim of Security Sector Reform in Iraq is to build a secure environment through the consolidation of a democratic state that is representative of all groups. However, the three way conflict between the coalition forces, the Baath-Sunni alliance and the Shia majority strongly undermines international and local attempts to implement effective nation-building measures. Under Saddam Hussein, the pervasiveness of the regime's security apparatus and its brutal methods meant that crimes were more likely to be committed by regime operatives than criminals²⁵. The security challenge in Iraq bears several dimensions and the impact of greed-based criminality, score-settling and general discontent must not be discarded. Moreover, criminality has reached such a degree in Iraq that it may have played into radicalism by showing the inadequacy of the Coalition Forces in dealing with crime. In such a context, the reform of the security sector in Iraq must be designed to incorporate the overlapping dimensions of radical activities and civilian disorder. SSR is necessary at both civil and institutional levels and must reach across all political and religious groups. The challenges faced by SSR strategists are multiple because of the very nature of radical activities and their diverse manifestations by both civilians and security actors themselves. The rise of violence levels in Iraq has also made post-conflict planning particularly challenging and current efforts are still being directed towards the stabilisation of violence and the creation of a more secure environment.

Current Situation²⁶

With the aim to help build the capacity of the security sector to prevent and manage conflict in Iraq, the Coalition troops have undertaken a variety of activities. The following paragraph gives a brief description of the British activities led around Basra in Southern Iraq.

The task of the British forces in Iraq is complicated by the geographical position of the strategic centre of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. The Coalition did not take into account that its presence would be resented by some Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs and some Shia nationalist elements, and portrayed as cultural and economic imperialism. Further,

²⁵ Perito Robert M., "The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Public Security in Iraq", Special Report 137, United States Institute of Peace, April 2005

²⁶ The following logistical data is available on the UK Foreign and Commonwealth website:
<http://www.fco.gov.uk>

the scale of the anti-Coalition, anti-Iraqi Government insurgency movements was underestimated by the Coalition. There are several, anti-Coalition, anti-Iraqi Government movements that are conducting operations with very different objectives. They employ a range of tactics from assassinations to suicide bombings depending on their motivations and goals, but foreign fighters, such as Musab al-Zarqawi and other Islamic extremists, are particularly skilled at using psychological operations such as kidnappings and beheadings²⁷. British SSR must cover a wide range of activities to create a secure environment for the Iraqi population.

In order to reform the Iraqi National Police (INP) towards whom the Iraqi population had been growing increasingly distrustful because of poor management, low standards, bribery and brutal interrogations, the UK government is providing International Police Advisors (IPA's) to mentor the INP and help with leadership and junior management training. The Coalition's initial efforts were structured around a short-term, bottom-up, numerically-focused approach meaning that the Iraqi military, security, and police did not develop in a well-coordinated manner. The emphasis for building up the Iraqi Security Forces is now on capability, effectiveness and long-term sustainability. The British focus is in southern Iraq where 13,500 police have received basic training and the target is for around another 11,000 to be trained to provide sufficient Iraqi policing capacity in southern Iraq in order to operate effectively. Recent initiatives by the UK government and the EU also include training of the Iraqi Police Service in complex policing techniques.

The British MoD has been called upon to provide assistance to the Iraqi Transitional Government and National Assembly so that the need for intelligence is balanced with the need to maintain judicial and political oversight of all intelligence activities.

It must also ensure that the future development of the Iraqi Army, including its prospective merger with the Iraqi National Guard, does not compromise its operational effectiveness or organisational coherence. The UK SSR activities would be incomplete without a particular strategy to tackle the problem of paramilitary militias. They continue to exercise considerable power in Iraq and exist to protect particular sectional interests. The objective is to disband them entirely and subsequently to consolidate the Iraqi Security Forces' authority.

²⁷ Select Committee on Defence, Sixth Report; House of Commons, The United Kingdom Parliament, 24 March 2005

Prisons are also an important part of capacity building in the security sector and the UK government has supported the development of an effective Iraqi Prison service, which aims to meet minimum international standards for the treatment of prisoners in Southern Iraq. To meet these aims, over 600 Iraqi Corrections Services (ICS) staff have been trained, and the training is now conducted by the Iraqis themselves.

The need for political oversight by the Iraqi Ministry of Defence over the Iraqi Security Forces is a crucial part of Iraq's post-Saddam Security Sector Reform. Ensuring appropriate oversight over, and coordination mechanisms for, the Iraqi Security Forces that mirror Iraq's decentralised political system is important, but care needs to be taken not to undermine the Iraqi Government's control of its national security apparatus.

On a broader scale, the UK government seeks to support Iraqi government and civil society institutions in preventing and resolving conflict. To this end the UK government funds advisors for the Iraqi Ministry of Interior to improve their capacity for policy development and implementation and to help contribute to the effective civilian oversight of the Iraqi police Service. The Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights is also supported by UK funding of an advisor who is helping to strengthen the role of the Ministry. Human Rights training has also been provided. The UK government also works closely with the United Nations and other international organisations to help the Ministry establish a National Centre for Missing Persons and Exhumations.

Within the Iraqi territory, the UK government seeks to promote good relations between different groups by improving the coverage and quality of the Iraqi media/public broadcasting service in order to reach alienated groups.

Lessons learned

Important lessons for peace and stability operations can be drawn from the Coalition's activities in Iraq. The successful conduct of the elections to the Iraqi Transitional National Assembly on 30 January 2005 was a turning point in Iraq's post-conflict development. It shows that the Iraqi Security Forces have begun to develop the capabilities to provide effective security for their own people. However, Iraq remains an insecure and unstable

country. This is mainly due to a series of mistakes and misjudgements by the Coalition at the time of early planning for the post conflict phase²⁸.

Following the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, growing tensions between the main ethnic groups and an unexpected civil insurgency have made security in Iraq the most salient issue to address. Whilst certain categories of the population initially expressed a sense of liberation, the occupation of the Iraqi territory by the Coalition forces has been causing a heightened sense of insecurity, anger directed both at the former regime and at the current occupiers, intensified inter-group rivalry and a growing risk of sectarian conflict as militias loyal to different groups vie for control²⁹. The Coalition forces were not adequately prepared to deal with the Iraqi insurgency. Such large-scale breakdowns in public order should be anticipated in the aftermath of international interventions, particularly in societies emerging from brutal oppression. However, the Coalition forces were neither trained nor equipped to control civil disorder or perform police functions, and local police or security forces are generally either unavailable or unable to deal with civilian violence and lawlessness³⁰. Therefore, security sector reform should have been given greater priority immediately after the invasion in 2003. Early efforts at reform suffered from lack of coordination and a focus on simple numerical targets rather than the development of real capabilities. The lack of adequate planning, personnel and procedures has seriously undermined the success of the mission by creating a permissive environment that, in turn, has weakened the willingness of citizens to cooperate with international forces.

Although the Coalition's efforts to restructure and train the Iraqi police forces are progressively showing results, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) cannot yet sustain responsibility for operations carried out in their name; they continue to rely on Coalition forces and capabilities in many areas³¹. However, the Coalition troops have not been trained to sustain policing operations and their initial role is not that of controlling civil disorder. Such failure to control civil dis-

²⁸ Bonn International Center for Conversion, "Can the Coalition Transform the Iraqi Security Sector before it's Too Late?", bulletin n°29, 1 October 2003

²⁹ International Crisis Group, "Iraq's Shiites Under Occupation", Middle East Briefing n°8, 9 September 2005

³⁰ Perito Robert M., *op cit.*

³¹ House of Commons Defence Committee, "Iraq: An Initial Assessment of Post-Conflict Operations", 24 March 2005

order has created a climate of impunity in which looting and street crime have risen exponentially and ordinary citizens are left with no effective defence against rampant crime³².

A strong feeling of insecurity among the civilian population may in turn be exploited by radical groups that seek to obtain power through local support. Among many Shiites, a sense of relief at the US-led invasion remains. But the failure of the occupation forces to safeguard law and order, ensure adequate welfare and offer the Iraqi people a genuine sense of ownership in the political process or a clear path toward self-government have combined to intensify feelings of nationalism and opposition to the Coalition. The less the Iraqi people have a feeling they are getting security, welfare and their country back, the more this trend is likely to grow, leading to growing nationalism and heightened religious polarization. The more religiously-motivated Shiites, for example, have made the most of the vacuum in authority and the absence of a clear political compass following the fall of the Baathist regime to bolster their position on the political landscape³³.

Paradoxically, the Coalition's intervention in Iraq, primarily aimed at liberating the population from a radical and intolerant regime, seems to have boosted the radicalization of locally-based groups whose activities include suicide-bombing on a regular basis. Most recent events, such as the temporary breakdown in relations between the Iraqi police and the UK troops following a forceful break-in to an Iraqi prison, have further widened the gap in communications between the Western forces and the locals. Radicalism may thus appear to some as an effective response to a situation that has gone far beyond their control.

3. 3 CASE STUDY THREE: AFGHANISTAN- SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND RADICALISM

Background

Radicalism in Afghanistan

After the fall of the Taliban regime and US-led coalition's victory in October 2001, the security vacuum left in Afghanistan is an opportunity for several forms of political, religious or ethnic radicalism to develop. As a result of twenty-three years of civil war, Afghanistan's institutions are in a state of disarray and leaders have shown themselves incapable or unwilling

³² Perito Robert M., *op cit*.

³³ International Crisis Group, *op cit*.

to ensure the security of the Afghan population. The international community is confronted with a situation that has proven to be chaotic at times, and below the minimum standards of security sector reform. After the fall of the Taliban regime, regional military commanders across Afghanistan established mini-fiefdoms within their spheres of influence. These networks exercise a negative impact on the state building process by encouraging corruption, including at the government level. Afghanistan's anti-government spoiler groups, which include remnants of the Taliban; former Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami faction; and al-Qaeda, are determined to undermine the authority of the new central government and bring about the withdrawal of the international community, particularly the US-led coalition forces³⁴.

Description of threats

Insecurity in Afghanistan is fuelled by a criminalized economy, dominated by the opium trade. Several groups and factors feed into these dynamics and have severely impede upon any attempts to ensure the security of the Afghan population. The strategy of the spoiler groups to create further insecurity in Afghanistan has been evolving and they are now focusing on "soft targets", including aid workers and government employees, in order to deprive parts of the country of development assistance. Criminal networks in Afghanistan are further developed within the "shadow economy" comprising a range of illegitimate economic activities such as trafficking in gems or even humans although its most profitable element is opium trafficking. In a country which was accountable for 75% of the world's opium production in 2002, the rise of insecurity levels is parallel to the development of the trafficking³⁵. Perhaps one of the most dangerous consequences of the trade is the vast amount of resources it channels to terrorists, spoiler groups and warlords. The overlapping dimensions between these factors are crucial to the development of radicalism in both political and religious terms. The unstable environment in Afghanistan is an ongoing opportunity for the radicalisation of groups and the exploitation of insecurity to involve new people in radical activities. If successful, the transformation of the security sector in Afghanistan could counter both international terrorism and stabilise the environment for the Afghan population.

Challenges of SSR

The initial design of the SSR process is confronted with a number of challenges of which the most difficult to overcome is clearly the lack of minimal security necessary for the reform

³⁴ Sedra, M., Security sector Transformation in Afghanistan, DCAF Working paper no. 143, p.23

³⁵ Ibid. p 21

itself. It is thus appropriate to speak of a security sector transformation³⁶ in Afghanistan, rather than a reform. Security sector transformation is a long-term process that requires a minimum level of security and stability to function. A successful security sector transformation in Afghanistan must be operated on an in-depth level, in order to overcome the number of threats to security that characterize the current post-civil war environment.

Afghanistan's security sector reform was launched with two security donor meetings held in Geneva in the spring of 2002. The process was designed to be divided into five pillars, each to be overseen by a lead-donor nation – military reform (US-led); police reform (German-led); disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (Japan-led); judicial reform (Italy-led); counter-narcotics (UK-led). However, the wide range in donor competencies winds up obstructing the smooth coordination of the SSR process. Competing political visions of the lead donors foster donor turf wars and deprive the process of much-needed cross-pillar initiative and leadership. Lack of coordination has resulted in inconsistencies at the donor-donor, donor-government, intra-governmental and inter-agency levels and wasting time and funds. Funding is also an issue because of the scale of the reform that needs to be achieved. Afghanistan is one of the most impoverished countries in the world, ranking only ahead of Sierra Leone in the UNDP Human Development Index. The funding of the process will inevitably fall upon the international community for the next 5-7 years and yet it is urgent that Afghanistan obtains ownership of its own security sector transformation in order to counter those internal problems that are particular to the post-civil war environment.

Current Situation³⁷

Military reform

Among the five pillars of the SSR process previously described, the following paragraph will examine the structure and potential shortcomings US-led military reform.

The military reform pillar's main focus is the creation of a multi-ethnic and non-factional Afghan National Army (ANA). The ANA should eventually be subordinated to the Ministry of Defence which also requires a profound transformation in order to rid it of its dysfunctional organisational structure and corruption.

³⁶ Sedra, M., Consolidating an Elusive Peace, Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan, in Reconstruction and Reform of the Security Sector, Alan Bryden, Heiner Hänggi (eds), DCAF

³⁷ The following data is available in Mark Sedra's publications as quoted above

The US military began training the first intake of Afghan recruits on 14 May 2002 at the country's former military academy on the outskirts of Kabul, renamed the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC). The US programme was originally based on a ten week training cycle with two classes or cohorts of 750 recruits being trained simultaneously. To accelerate the process, the training cycle was reduced to eight weeks in the fall of 2003 and an additional class was established in early 2004. The programme produced its first *kandak* (battalion) in July 2002 and emitted a total of 15 *kandaks*, the entire Central Corps, by March 2004. This marked the completion of Phase I of the program. Phase II involves the establishment of four regional corps to be situated in the north, south, east, and west of the country. Ongoing specialist training is also being provided by Mobile Training Teams (MTT) with support from local PRTs. The original aim of the program was to train 18,000 troops by October 2003; however, as of June 2004, only 11,000 ANA recruits had graduated. High desertion rates have circumscribed the programme and may be explained from several aspects. First, The U.S. initially relied on the Ministry of Defence and regional military commanders to identify and deliver recruits for the ANA programme. This proved to be counterproductive as they tended to submit unqualified candidates while maintaining their best trained soldiers. In an effort to reform the recruitment process, the U.S. has launched a plan to establish National Army Volunteer Centres (NAVC) every provincial capital of the country.

The issue of ethnic representation is salient in Afghanistan and is particularly problematic within Military Reform. At the beginning of the training process the pool of recruits featured a disproportionately large number of Tajiks, particularly at the officer level, a result of interference by the Tajik dominated Ministry of Defence. The US has taken successful steps to address this inequality. However, the main cause of desertion is said to be the low pay given to the new recruits. Although a pay-rise has been established, it is still well under the estimated 150 US dollars/month required to keep soldiers in the ranks.

In an effort to confront the worsening security situation the United States established an Afghan Guard Force (AGF) in the spring of 2004, modelled on the Iraqi National Guard erected by the U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The decision has been much criticised as it represents the formation of a militia auxiliary at a time when the government is endeavouring to breakdown militia structures throughout the country under the auspices of a DDR programme.

Ministry of Defence (MoD) Reform

The Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior and the security services have long been dominated by one faction of the United Front or Northern Alliance, the Panjsheri Tajiks.

Several attempts have been made to implement institutional and personnel reforms within the Ministry of Defence, including some new appointments within the general staff in early 2003 and 22 new appointments, affecting all the senior positions within the Ministry, in September 2003. The balance of power within the Ministry was not, however, significantly altered, thus fuelling ethnic tension and undermining previous efforts to create the ANA. Although removing senior leaders is a vital component of the process, addressing corruption and factional influence requires a bottom-up approach in order to train and reshuffle the civil service in every Ministry, particularly those in the security sector. Such a process appears to be the only way to undercut the clientalistic networks and their links to radical groups.

Lessons learned

The main weakness of the SSR process is its initial lack of coordination. In order to create a structured security sector, the roles and funding resources of different donors must be appointed more precisely. Donor turf wars fuel tensions and feed into the general insecurity environment. The diversity of the donor panel also impedes upon a gradual ownership of the process by the Afghan government. Ownership would reduce tensions around the process and encourage more effective results. Although Afghanistan faces an acute capacity deficit, it has successfully established a policy development and coordination body, the National Security Council, which can oversee reform. The current coordination deficits can be resolved by devolving increasing authority to the NSC³⁸.

The results that may be expected from an SSR process in Afghanistan on the short-term need to be revised. In a completely insecure environment, the first step needs to address the key security issues that create discontent and fear among the population. Providing peacekeeping missions could regulate the security environment in such a way that Security Sector Reform may actually be feasible. In a security prone environment, reforms are effectively necessary and require the acknowledgement of the local problems that undermine, if not completely circumscribe the success of the process.

³⁸ Sedra M, op cit. p 19

SSR in Afghanistan has proven to be somewhat efficient but still suffers from local instability and external interferences from Russia, Iran and Pakistan. The regional security framework bears a strong influence on the development of a SSR in Afghanistan by creating alternatives for spoiler groups, warlords and drug-traders³⁹. The International Community must ensure Afghanistan's external regional security in order to achieve a successful SSR programme.

Efforts to reform the military sector requires an added focus on the government bodies that oversee that will gradually be held accountable for the ANA activities. The reform of the Ministry of Defence is crucial to reach effective results within the entire military sector. Leaders of the process have also highlighted the need to separate the roles of the Afghan National Army and the police, although they should both be national in character, non-factional, professional, equipped and well-trained⁴⁰.

It is also recommended that the US clarifies its policy in Afghanistan. Its war against the Taliban and other spoiler groups in the southeast of the country and its support of President Hamid Karzai's regime bear different dimensions that are not necessarily accepted by the local population. Growing insecurity in Afghanistan is an inevitable motive for radicalisation of the spoiler groups. In order to create an environment conducive for SSR, local discontent, factions and rivalries must be taken into account and their root causes must be addressed urgently. In such a long-term framework, SSR appears as a feasible and productive solution to counter radicalism.

4. Conclusions

Security sector reform is a long term process. As such, it may be too soon to speak of definite results in the case studies presented. However, there are a number of readily observable trends that vary hugely from one context to another. In Indonesia, the impact of the SSR process is particularly difficult to assess because full-blown radicalism is not part of the dynamics of the country. However, the gradual strengthening of the security sector suggests that SSR has been effective to counter manifestations of radicalism in violent forms, however, the impact of SSR

³⁹ Sedra M, op cit. p 19

⁴⁰ Press release, Afghan leaders gather to discuss Security Sector Reforms, 31st July 2006, www.afgha.com

has yet to be proven. In Afghanistan, SSR appears to be a feasible tool to gradually counter the multiple dimensions of radicalism. By creating a secure environment for the population, SSR discourages the manifestation of radical activities on the Afghan territory. Finally, the Iraq case is the most controversial. The invasion of Iraq by the US led coalition forces represented both the liberation of the population from an undemocratic regime and the opportunity for radical groups to forge solid positions in the political landscape. The rejection of the coalition forces by many Iraqi's suggests that in the absence of national ownership, the SSR process may in fact have fuelled radicalism. However, the lack of a post conflict reconstruction strategy at the time of the invasion prevented many of the basic assessments that are vital for successful SSR strategies.

The case studies do, however, demonstrate some very important basic lessons that need to be incorporated in any SSR strategy designed to counter radicalism. Local ownership is absolutely invaluable for sustainable SSR engagement and the greatest success at the moment, Indonesia, is the result of a locally driven process rather than one that was imposed by an outside donor while the least successful example, Iraq, demonstrated that in the absence of local ownership the process has been extremely difficult. Iraq also demonstrates two other vital SSR lessons which are the importance of strategic planning and a holistic approach to SSR. The absence of strategic planning in the early days of the occupation of Iraq meant that radicals were able to step in and fill the vacuum created by the end of the Baathist regime. This meant that the army was demobilised without thinking through the potential need to use the army or the fact that this created a pool of discontented individuals for radical groups to draw from. Further, SALW stockpiles were not adequately monitored or policed again allowing radicals to arm themselves. In terms of an holistic approach again the lack of co-ordination between coalition forces and the interim government has led to unnecessary confusion and delays at a time when an SSR intervention could have been extremely timely in countering the rising insurgency.

In conclusion SSR if it is part of a wider governance strategy can and does represent a major asset that the international community can deploy to counter the impact of radicalisation. However, given the risks that are involved in conducting an SSR programme it is absolutely vital that the policy is grounded in a conflict assessment which takes into account the security needs of the local population and the areas of reform that need to be addressed within the security sector.

5. Recommendations

- **Ownership:** There is a need for national ownership of the process, whilst the donors may provide funds and may monitor the implementation. In Indonesia the success of national ownership of the process has meant that it is well accepted by the population. If the international process is rejected by the population, and there is lack of coordination because of donor turf wars then SSR may even fuel radicalism by it appearing that the process is imposed by foreigners.
- **Planning:** It is vital that any SSR engagement is well planned. The possibility of civilian insurgencies especially should be anticipated and the SSR strategy should be planned accordingly. The absence of strategic planning is very clear in Iraq.
- **Coordination of activities:** SSR strategy is often so large it needs a multi donor approach so therefore coordination between different donors is vital. Often turf wars between donors can result in at best the wastage of funds. Donors are often unaware of different activities being led by other agencies. In Indonesia this resulted in too many ad hoc projects. In Afghanistan: there were too many donors and this resulted in a need for cross-pillar leadership.
- **Coordination of levels:** A holistic SSR strategy works at different levels: parliamentary, military, police etc... all these levels should be impacted by SSR, including the civilian one therefore donors need to approach this by identifying different niches in which they can work.
- **Roles and responsibilities:** The roles of security actors should be clearly defined. This has to be the case for donors/ implementers/ national government... Within the security sector itself there has to be a clear demarcation of mandates/missions this is especially the case between the army and police. What are their objectives? Protecting the population or protecting the government/political party in power.
- **Regional security:** In the case of radicalism as expressed through terrorism, the situation often allows for insurgency and terrorist activities being launched from neighbouring countries. States need to ensure that there is a regional security dimension for an SSR process to be effective this is clear both in Iraq and in Afghanistan.