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## RUSSIA AND RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM

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## ANALYSIS

## New Extreme Right-Wing Intellectual Circles in Russia: The Anti-Orange Committee, the Isborsk Club and the Florian Geyer Club

Andreas Umland, Kiev

### Abstract

Some recent publications on Russian nationalism focus on various extra-systemic right-wing radicals and their links to the new urban protest movement in the RF. However, developments in the intra-systemic ultra-nationalism of Putin's regime are at least as important. This article examines some of the new, extremely anti-Western intellectual circles that have emerged during the past two years in Russia. In the face of the new polarization between pro- and anti-Putin forces, the authoritarian regime and its propagandists are closing ranks with certain extremely right-wing literati. Also, there is stronger cooperation between formerly competing anti-Western intellectuals, such as Sergei Kurginyan, Aleksandr Dugin, and Aleksandr Prokhanov. The three new, rabidly anti-American discussion clubs briefly introduced in this article, include a broad spectrum of publicists, journalists, politicians, and academics.

### The Anti-Western Discourse

Since the revival of the Russian democracy movement in December 2011, some Western observers of Russian ethnocentrism have focused on the partial cooperation between democrats and ultra-nationalists during the protests (e.g., Popescu 2012; Satter 2012). During the past few months, however, a trend of radically anti-Western nationalism consolidating itself as a relevant political force has become a challenge not so much in terms of the emergence of the Russian opposition, but in connection with Putin's authoritarian regime. The recent further promotion of an already rabid anti-Americanism in the public rhetoric and politics of Putin and his cronies can be easily classified as a PR maneuver by the Kremlin to distract the population from other domestic challenges, such as wide-spread corruption, elections manipulation, or bloated government. At the same time, the societal impact of the bizarre TV campaigns, and the deeper effects of the escalating demonization of the USA on Russian public discourse cannot be neglected as merely temporal phenomena. This has become clear from the long-term repercussions of similar, earlier instances of Russian media hysteria, for instance, in connection with the bombardment of Serbia by NATO in 1999, the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City in 2002, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the Russian–Georgian Five-Day War in 2008. Following these campaigns, public opinion in the Russian Federation has become increasingly critical of the US and, to some extent, also of the EU.

### An Increasingly “Uncivil” Society

The renewed stimulation of anti-Western discourses through application of “political technologies” is promoting a dangerous undercurrent and accelerating the development of what may be called “uncivil society” in

Russia (Umland 2007). The anti-democratic faction of the Russian third sector represents a network of, partly cooperative, partly competing, extremely anti-liberal groups, organizations, and publications. Many of them, to be sure, are currently distinguished by the support they receive from government agencies and through active advertising on Kremlin-controlled TV channels. They thus present GONGOs (Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations), rather than genuine civil society initiatives. However, there is a danger that the increased campaign of incitement against the US may both permanently establish a conspiracy-minded, paranoid worldview as a legitimate pattern for the interpretation of international events, and help entrench the clubs that promote this worldview as legitimate participants of Russian public discourse.

As a result, an aggressively anti-Western right-wing extremism seems to be forming, within Russian political life, as a stable third pole between the authoritarian regime and the democratic opposition (while the Communists have a hybrid function being part of both, the regime and opposition, as well as also closely linked to Russian right-wing extremism through their radical anti-Americanism). The Kremlin appears to be implementing a risky political scheme aimed at a restructuring of public life. In that scenario, the increased incorporation of ultra-nationalists into mainstream political discourse is designed to cause a comprehensive right-wing shift within Russia's ideological spectrum, to the extent that the nationalism of Putin and his immediate associates, which is also quite virulent, comes across as relatively centrist against the background of the far more radical demands “from the grassroots”, i.e., from the more and more prominent right-wing extremists (Umland 2009).

Several ultra-nationalist groups and leaders have connections—sometimes through one and the same

person—to both the government and the opposition. One example is the blogger and activist, Vladlen Kralin, known in right-wing extremist circles by the pseudonym of “Vladimir Thor”. He has been a member of both, the Coordinating Council of the opposition and of two nationalist organizations led by Dmitri Rogozin, a current Deputy Prime Minister of the RF, namely, “Rodina” and “Velikaya Rossiya”—“Motherland” and “Great Russia”. Due to the way Putin’s system of government and Russia’s mass media operate, however, right-wing contacts in the government have a higher political significance than the ultra-nationalist participation in protests, which is controversial among Russian democrats anyway. Within the democracy movement there is an eloquent minority that is explicitly opposed to any cooperation between the liberal opposition and radical nationalists. These voices are organized, for example, in the Facebook group “Russia without Hitler! No to meetings with fascists, Nazis, and nationalists”.<sup>1</sup>

Amid the spectrum of ultra-nationalist associations, which, though often promoted via Kremlin “political technologies”, are nevertheless not necessarily irrelevant, right-wing extremist intellectuals and their clubs, publications, and media appearances deserve particular attention. These are publicists, TV commentators, and (self-styled) academics, who have an impact on the formation of public opinion through their influence on university students, junior academics, political bloggers, and civic activists in particular, but also on the general public.

### Consolidation Tendencies in the Extreme Right-Wing Spectrum

The extremely right-wing Russian political spectrum is currently divided by whether the respective groups fall into either the pro- and anti-Putin camp. Since the announcement of Putin’s return to the presidential office in September 2011, two further tendencies within the radically anti-Western intellectual milieu, which had already been present before, have intensified. First, the extremely anti-Western literati milieu is experiencing a partial consolidation. This means that formerly manifest differentiations between similarly oriented, but separate intellectual clubs and their respective interpretations of Russian history and world politics are gradually losing significance. The rivalry among the various “Slavophiles”—for example, between those of the ethno-nationalist and the “Eurasian” orientations—which was still manifest in the 1990s, is decreasing against the background of the new polarization between the increasingly anti-Western regime, on the one hand, and the largely pro-Western opposition, on the other. This is

illustrated by the recent cooperation between two of the most influential theoreticians and TV commentators in this spectrum, Sergey Kurginyan and Aleksandr Dugin. In the 1990s, acting as the propagandist for a reinstitution of the Soviet system under new auspices, Kurginyan had harshly criticized Dugin in his then capacity as an openly neo-fascist publicist. In the meantime, however, Kurginyan, who had already been closely linked to the conservative establishment in the final phase of the Soviet era, has come to publicly cooperate more and more closely with Dugin, who had once been marginalized politically as an SS admirer.

Second, there is increasing cooperation between extra-systemic ultra-nationalists, on the one side, and intra-systemic sympathizers of their conspiracy theories, on the other—a tendency that has been observable since the end of the 1990s, but is now intensifying. This includes a partial cooptation of marginal publicists, who used to be located on the outermost political fringes, into structures close to the Kremlin or sometimes even into governmental institutions. One example is the quick academic rise of the above mentioned neo-fascist Dugin, who is now teaching as a professor and acting Chair of the Sociology of International Relations at Moscow State University (MGU) named after Lomonosov, Russia’s leading higher education institution.<sup>2</sup>

These tendencies of consolidation among the extreme right-wing can be illustrated by considering three new intellectual clubs, which were not yet in existence in 2009, when Marlene Laruelle published her seminal review of post-Soviet Russian nationalist think-tanks.

### Kurginyan’s Anti-Orange Committee

Created by Kurginyan on the basis of his “Sut’ vremeni” (Essence of Time) movement, the Anti-Orange Committee<sup>3</sup> has so far been the most visible new structure, although it may turn out to be only an ephemeral phenomenon. It includes, amongst others, the above-mentioned Dugin, prominent TV journalists Mikhail Leontiev and Maksim Shevchenko, neo-Stalinist publisher Nikolai Starikov, and Aleksandr Prokhanov, the editor of the most important extreme right-wing weekly journal “Zavtra” (Tomorrow). The committee was a result of the pro-Putin counter-demonstration organized by Kurginyan on 4 February 2012 on Submission Hill (Poklonnaya gora) in Moscow, against the simultaneous opposition event on Bolotnaya Square. The name of the club refers to the 2004 Ukrainian so-called Orange Revolution, which is interpreted by extra-systemic right-wing extremists, as well as by many rep-

1 See <https://www.facebook.com/groups/knbor/permalink/458823157522279/>

2 See <http://www.socir.ru/>

3 See <http://anti-orange.ru>

representatives and apologists of the Putin regime, as a conspiracy that was steered by the CIA or even as a fascist-inspired event. Such a link from the Orange Revolution to “fascism”—a glaring example being Leontiev’s TV propaganda film “The Orange Children of the Third Reich” (2010)<sup>4</sup>—is drawn in Russian anti-Western conspiracist circles by highlighting the role that some Ukrainian émigrés played at the electoral uprising in 2004. This includes, for instance, Kateryna Chumachenko, the second wife of the Orange Revolution leader and 2005–2010 Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko. Chumachenko grew up in the 1970s and 1980s in the USA, within the nationalist Ukrainian diaspora. The Northern American émigré milieu was then dominated by adherents of the so-called Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), which at the beginning of World War II had been a fascist underground movement. In spite of being marginal, the participation of nationalists returning from the Western diaspora of Ukraine, as well as of some native extremely right-wing splinter groups, like the mini-party UNA-UNSO (Ukrainian National Assembly—Ukrainian Self-Defense of the People), in the Orange Revolution constitutes a problematic legacy of the Ukrainian electoral rebellion. It is today being used by the Kremlin’s conspiracists as a welcome pretext to denigrate both the Ukrainian and the Russian democracy movement as a crypto-fascist “Orange plague”.

In any case, according to its website, the extremely anti-American Anti-Orange Committee has met only twice, in February 2012. Even though the website of the committee is still online and calls upon visitors to sign an “anti-Orange pact”, it remains unclear whether the structure is still in operation.

### Prokhanov’s Isborsk Club

A project that is so far less well known—although it has a similar ideology—but has a broader political appeal and may well be more persistent, is the Isborsky klub,<sup>5</sup> named after the place of its first meeting, the city of Isborsk in Pskov Oblast in northwestern Russia. This relatively big intellectual circle, brought to life by the grandseigneur of Russian right-wing extremism, Prokhanov, wants to unite the “Reds” (national Communists) and the “Whites” (anti-Soviet nationalists). It is based on the Institute of Dynamic Conservatism and is apparently intended to compete with the well-known Valdai International Discussion Club of RIA-Novosti. The latter consists of foreign experts and journalists working on Eastern Europe, as well as Russian politicians, sci-

entists, and intellectuals. Prokhanov is a member of the Valdai Club, and, for his new anti-Western Isborsk Club, he copied Valdai’s format of a geographical term as a name, the versatile composition of its membership, and the practice of holding large meetings outside Moscow.

Similar names appear in Prokhanov’s club as those found in the Anti-Orange Committee; for example, Dugin, Leontiev, Starikov, and Shevchenko. The Isborsk Club’s spectrum of members is, however, more widespread and includes many other prominent anti-Western publicists, such as Sergei Glaziev, Leonid Ivashov, Nataliya Narochinskaya, Archimandrite Tikhon (a.k.a. Shevkunov), Yuri Polyakov, and Mikhail Khazin. The group’s connection to the Kremlin may be even closer than in the case of Kuginyan’s committee. This was illustrated, for example, with the participation of the Russian Minister for Culture, Vladimir Medinsky, mostly known for allegations of plagiarism in his doctoral dissertation, in the founding meeting of the club in Isborsk. Prokhanov’s club seems to be well-funded and has so far held meetings in the cities of Khimki, Yekaterinburg, and Ulyanovsk. The Isborsk Club publishes an illustrated journal of the same name, with a run of 999 copies.

### Geidar Dzhemal’s Florian Geyer Club

The most astonishing new foundation in the extreme right-wing intellectual milieu, however, is a small circle, which calls itself Conceptual Club “Florian Geyer”<sup>6</sup> that was founded on 22 September 2011. Led by the notorious Islamist and avowed anti-Western activist Geidar Dzhemal, the group uses the name of a figure from the German Peasants’ War of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. The historical figure Geyer is entirely unknown in Russia, and unfamiliar even to many Germans. The name “Florian Geyer”, however, is well known among experts on contemporary European history, as the byname of the Third Reich’s 8<sup>th</sup> SS Cavalry Division, which was deployed on the Eastern front in 1943–44.

Dzhemal, Dugin and Shevchenko, the founders of the Florian Geyer Club, claim to be referring to the former peasant warrior and not to the SS division. Dugin’s past in particular, however, indicates that the club’s founders are probably familiar with the use of the name in the Third Reich, which indicates that the twofold historical significance of “Florian Geyer” is actually intended. From 1980 to 1990, Dzhemal and Dugin were members of a small occult circle in Moscow that called itself the “Black Order of the SS”. During the 1990s, Dugin, both under his pseudonym “Aleksandr Shternberg” and under his own name, repeatedly expressed support for sympathizers, members, and divisions of

4 See <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xg5K8TJqC0>

5 See <http://dynacon.ru>

6 See <http://floriangeyer.ru/>

the SS, for example the Institut “Ahnenerbe” (Institute “Ancestral Heritage”) of the SS, the Italian fascist theorist and admirer of the *Waffen-SS* Julius Evola, the *SS-Reichsführer* Heinrich Himmler, and the *SS-Obergruppenführer* Reinhard Heydrich (the initial organizer of the Holocaust).

The above-mentioned TV host Shevchenko—probably the best-known of the three founders to the greater Russian public, does not concede that the club’s title “Florian Geyer” referred to the SS division of the same name. However, in his opening speech for the foundation of the circle, he admitted: “This name was also used by those German National Socialists (the left wing), who were linked to National Bolshevism. And the Florian Geyer song, which the young generation is familiar with from the work of the group *Rammstein*, was very popular with those left- and right-wing circles that adopted an anti-elite and anti-liberal stance”.<sup>7</sup> Thus, it is all the more astonishing that—in addition to several right-wing extremists—some well-known Russian intellectuals were participating in the club’s round-table talks, who do not fit this context, among them historian Igor Chubais, legal scholar Mark Feygin, and sociologist Boris Kagarlitsky. It is also worth noting that, at the meetings of the club, anti-American activists from abroad were also invited to speak, including, for instance, the notorious Italian “traditionalist” Claudio Mutti.

Another participant in the club worth mentioning is the infamous political writer Vladimir Kucherenko, better known under his pseudonym “Maksim Kalashnikov”, who is also a member of the Isborsk Club. Like Dugin, he sympathizes with aspects of National Social-

ism and also develops extravagant flights of political fantasy in his publications. In the book “Onwards to an USSR-2” (2003)—which had a large print run—for example, Kucherenko-Kalashnikov speculates about a future “neuro-world” that would be a “structure” combining the characteristics “of a church, a giant media conglomerate, and a financial empire” that is “equipped with a secret service”.

As in the case of the Anti-Orange Committee, despite its continued internet presence, it is unclear whether the club is still active. The last meeting documented on the Florian Geyer club’s website took place in June 2012.

### Are Russian Anti-Western Activists on the Rise?

Since the announcement of Putin’s third presidency in September 2011, a restructuring of the ultra-nationalist intellectual milieu has been underway in which the Isborsk Club plays the leading role. Extreme right-wing publicists comment unfavorably and, sometimes, hysterically on today’s situation in Russia. They frequently conjure up apocalyptic scenarios for the future of their country and the world. Notwithstanding their dubious background, questionable academic credentials and tarnished reputation, they can act freely, often appear on governmental television, and are regarded with favor by the Kremlin, if not purposefully promoted. Should these tendencies continue, the already critical Russian public opinion towards the US will deteriorate even more, and the alienation between Russia and the West will increase further.

*Translated by Christopher Findlay*

#### About the Author

Andreas Umland, Dr. phil., Ph. D., is a DAAD Senior Lecturer in German and European Studies at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, the editor of the book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society” (*ibidem*-Verlag, Stuttgart), on the editorial board of the “Forum vostochnoevropeiskoi istorii i kul’tury” and “Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies”, a member of the Valdai Discussion Club, and the administrator of the Yahoo web-archive “Russian Nationalism”. This article emanates from the University of Oslo research project “Nation-building, nationalism and the new other in today’s Russia” supported by the Research Council of Norway, project number 220599.

#### Recommended Further Reading

- Laruelle, Marlene (2009), “Inside and Around the Kremlin’s Black Box: The New Nationalist Think Tanks in Russia,” *Institute for Security and Development Policy Stockholm Papers Series*, October. [http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2009\\_laruelle\\_inside-and-around-the-kremlins-black-box.pdf](http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2009_laruelle_inside-and-around-the-kremlins-black-box.pdf)
- Popescu, Nico (2012), “The Strange Alliance of Democrats and Nationalists,” *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 46–54. <http://blogs.euobserver.com/popescu/files/2012/07/The-Strange-Alliance-of-Democrats-and-Nationalists.pdf>
- Satter, David (2012), “The Threat of Russian Nationalism,” *FPRI E-Notes*, April. <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201204.satter.threat-russian-nationalism.pdf>
- Umland, Andreas (2007), “Post-Soviet ‘Uncivil Society’ and the Rise of Aleksandr Dugin: A Case Study of the Extra-parliamentary Radical Right in Contemporary Russia.” University of Cambridge. <http://www.academia.edu/2635113/>

7 See <http://www.floriangeyer.ru/lectures/sovremennaya-demokratiya-kak-po-liticheskij-institut>



Post-Soviet Uncivil Society and the Rise of Aleksandr Dugin: A Case Study of the Extraparliamentary Radical Right in Contemporary Russia University of Cambridge 2007\_

- Umland, Andreas (2009), "Restauratives versus revolutionäres imperiales Denken im Elitendiskurs des postsowjetischen Rußlands: Eine spektralanalytische Interpretation der antiwestlichen Wende in der Putinschen Außenpolitik," *Forum für osteuropäische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 101–125. [http://www.academia.edu/205532/Restauratives\\_versus\\_revolutionares\\_imperiales\\_Denken\\_im\\_Elitendiskurs\\_des\\_postsowjetischen\\_Russlands\\_Eine\\_spektralanalytische\\_Interpretation\\_der\\_antiwestlichen\\_Wende\\_in\\_der\\_Putinschen\\_Aussenpolitik](http://www.academia.edu/205532/Restauratives_versus_revolutionares_imperiales_Denken_im_Elitendiskurs_des_postsowjetischen_Russlands_Eine_spektralanalytische_Interpretation_der_antiwestlichen_Wende_in_der_Putinschen_Aussenpolitik)

## DOCUMENTATION

### Prominent Right-Wing Figures in Russia

Compiled by Christoph Laug

#### Kurginyan, Sergei Yervandovich (14 November 1949, Moscow)

Kurginyan's views can be described as patriotic, Communist, and marked by conspiracy theories. Kurginyan assumes that Russia should adopt a distinct non-European path of development. This experience should enable Russia to offer the world an anti-Western alternative. He argues that Russia should distance itself from the idea of being part of European civilization.

Early years: Grew up in an intelligentsia family in Moscow.

1972: Graduated from the Moscow Institute of Geological Exploration with a focus on geophysics.

1974–80: PhD in physical-mathematics and research assistant at the Institute of Oceanology, USSR Academy of Sciences.

Until 1986: Research assistant at the Laboratory for Applied Cybernetics, Moscow Institute of Geological Exploration.

1984: Graduated from the Moscow Theater School "Boris Shchukin", with a specialism on the direction of drama.

1986: The studio theater, which he created in 1967 as a student, receives official state status as an experimental theater

1989: President of the "Experimental Creative Center", also known as Kurginyan Center.

1990: Runs for Deputy of the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR in a Moscow district. Kurginyan's election manifesto includes a strategy for Russia's national salvation, which is proclaimed to be necessary to avoid a collapse of the economy, society, and state.

From 1993: Publisher of the journal "Rossiya XXI".

2011: Founder of the "Sut' Vremeni" (Essence of Time) movement, which calls for a reinstitution of the Soviet Union. The name of the movement is taken from a television program in the second half of 2010, in which Kurginyan took part.

After 2011: Following the protests against the voter frauds, the movement organizes several demonstrations against an "Orange Revolution". After that, Kurginyan called for a USSR 2.

From 2012: Kurginyan and his movement have been protesting against the implementation of a criminal law relating to young offenders, as well as against the alleged liberal course of Medvedev's government.

2013: Against the background of a ban on the adoption of Russian orphans by US citizens in February 2013, Kurginyan initiates the foundation of the "All-Russian Parents' Resistance" movement. His wife, Mariya Mamikonyan, is appointed as its chairwoman. President Putin holds a speech at the initial foundation meeting.

Sources: Sycheva, Valeriya, "Avtor stenariiev. Sergei Kurginyan: ot teatra 'Na doskakh' do kremlevskikh podmostkov", *Itogi*, No. 7, 18 February 2013, <http://www.itogi.ru/obsch-profil/2013/7/186996.html>

Biographies: <http://politmix.ru/content/biografiya-sergeya-kurginyana>; <http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/ruwiki/1147039>

Website of the movement "Essence of Time": <http://eot.su>

#### Dugin, Aleksandr Gel'evich (7 January 1962, Moscow)

Dugin is considered one of the most influential national-patriotic spokesmen and ideologists of "Neo-Eurasianism".

1979: Begins his studies at the Moscow Aviation Institute (MAI). In his second year, excluded from his studies for

falling behind; he himself believes his exclusion was due to his ideological non-conformity.

1980: Introduction to the circle of an esoteric-occult secret society, which occasionally calls itself “Black Order of the SS”.

1987: Joins the ultra-nationalist “Pamyat” (Memory) movement, participates in its central council in Moscow from 1988 to 1989. Exclusion after disagreements.

1988–1991: Editor-in chief of the center “EON”.

1990: Co-founder of the “Arktogeya” historical-religious society, which becomes a central publisher of ultra-nationalist literature in post-Soviet Russia and of Dugin’s writings in particular.

From 1991: Editor at “Den” (Day).

From 1991: Publisher of the journal “Elementy”, which further contributes to the spread of Dugin’s writings.

1993: Together with Eduard Limonov, Dugin co-founds the “National-Bolshevik Party” and becomes one of its ideological leaders and chairmen. In 1998, he leaves the NBP.

2000: Foundation of the social-political movement “Eurasia”. In 2000, it is turned into a party; until 2003, Dugin holds the chair of the political council.

2009: Founder and chairman of the “International Eurasian Movement”.

From 2008: Professor at the Moscow State University (MGU), and manager of the Center for Conservative Studies at the sociological faculty of the MGU.

From 2009: Head of the faculty of Sociology of International Relations of the MGU.

From March 2012: Member of the Council of Experts advising the chairman of the State Duma, Sergej Naryshkin.

*Biographies:* <<http://dugin.ru/bio/>>; <<http://newslab.ru/info/dossier/dugin-aleksandr-gelevich>>; <<http://obozrevatel.com/person/dugin.htm>>.

### **Prokhanov, Aleksandr Andreevich (26 February 1938, Tiflis)**

Prokhanov is considered to be the spokesperson of the patriotic opposition.

1960: Graduates from the Moscow Aviation Institute (MAI). In the final year of his studies, Prokhanov writes prose and poetry.

From 1970: Works as a foreign correspondent for *Pravda* and *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, including in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Angola and other places. Publishes many articles in these publications.

From 1986: Publishes in the journal “*Molodaya Gvardiya*” (Young Guard).

1989–1991: Editor-in-chief of the journal “*Sovetskaya Literatura*” (Soviet Literature).

December 1990: Founder and editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper, “*Den*” (day). The newspaper develops into one of the most radical opposition papers against the policy of perestroika. Prokhanov supports the attempted coup in August 1991.

September–October 1993: After President Boris Yeltsin has the Supreme Soviet dissolved by decree, the newspaper “*Den*” calls for support of the Supreme Soviet and accuses Boris Yeltsin of constitutional violations. The newspaper is banned by the Ministry of Justice in October 1993.

Since November 1993: Publisher and editor-in-chief of the newspaper “*Zavtra*” (Tomorrow).

*Biographies:* <http://lib.rus.ec/a/19716>; <http://biopeoples.ru/pisateli/1355-aleksandr-prokhanov.html>; <<http://konservatizm.org/news/mneniya/120912163251.shtml>>

### **Narochnitskaya, Nataliya Alekseevna (23 December 1948)**

Initiator of several national-conservative movements and organizations: “*Vsemirnykh Russkikh Soborov*” (Worldwide Russian Council), “*Fond edinstva pravoslavnykh narodov*” (Foundation for the Unity of Orthodox People), foundation “*Russkii mir*” (Russian World).

Key publications: “*Rossiya i Russkie v mirovoi istorii*” (Russia and the Russians in World History—2005); “*Za chto i s kem my voevali*” (For what and with whom we fought—2005); “*Russkii mir*” (Russian World—2007); “*Oranzhevye seti. Ot Belgrada do Bishkeka*” (Orange Networks. From Belgrade to Bishkek—ed. 2008)

Early years: Daughter of Aleksei Narochitsky, a member of the Soviet Academy of the Sciences and author of groundbreaking works on the history of international relations.

1971: Degree with distinction at the MGIMO (Moscow State Institute of International Relations, which belongs to the Foreign Ministry) with a focus on the US and Germany.

1974–1981: Research assistant at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Soviet Academy of Sciences (IMEMO).

1982–1989: Secretarial staff member at the United Nations in New York.

1989–2003: Research assistant at the IMEMO.

2003–2007: Representative of the State Duma. Election via the list of the patriotic electoral alliance “Rodina” (Homeland). Deputy Chairwoman of the Committee for International Affairs.

2004: Founder and President of the “Foundation of Historical Perspectives” (FIP). Its tasks are defined as the reinstitution of Russia’s intellectual and economic power, strengthening social cohesion, and an objective depiction of Russian history.

2008: Head of the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation in Paris, a Russian NGO for the observation of human rights violations in the US and Europe.

2009–2012: Member of the Committee Against Attempts to Falsify History in Order to Harm Russia at the Russian President’s office.

*Biographies:* <http://narochnitskaia.ru/about>; <http://www.pravoslavie.ru/authors/370.htm>; *Homepage of the Historical Perspective foundation:* <http://fip.ru/>

### **Rogozin, Dmitrii Olegovich (21 December 1963, Moscow)**

1981–1986: Studied at International Department of the Faculty of Journalism, Moscow State University (MGU).

1986–1990: Worked at the Committee for Youth Organizations (KMO), of the USSR. Rose from a consultant to become the head of the department for International Organizations.

1990: President of the Association of Young Political Leaders in the USSR (Russia), also known as “Forum 90”.

1990–1993: First deputy head of the organization for research and education “RAU Corporation” of the Russian–American University

1991: Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the “Constitutional Democratic Party (Party of People’s Freedom)”

1992: Co-founder of the “Soyuz vrozozhdeniya Rossii” (Alliance for the Renaissance of Russia), a non-partisan structure that brings together Christian Democrats, conservatives, and right-wing Social Democrats.

1993: Founder and chairman of the patriotic movement “Kongress Russkikh Obshchin” (KRO) (Congress of Russian Communities) for the preservation of the Russian-speaking population in the former Union republics.

1997: Deputy in the State Duma for a constituency in the region of Voronezh, and serves as Deputy Chairman on the Committee for Nationalities’ Affairs.

1998–1999: Member of the central council of the group “Otechestvo” (Fatherland) founded by the former mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov.

1999: Re-elected to the State Duma, member of the delegates’ group “People’s Deputies” and Chairman of the Committee for International Affairs.

2001: Deputy-leader of the “Narodnaya Partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (People’s Party of the Russian Federation)

2002–2004: Presidential Special envoy for the Kaliningrad region in connection with EU expansion. No agreement was reached on visa-free transit between Russia and Kaliningrad.

2003: Co-chairman and campaign leader of the patriotic alliance in the election campaign “Rodina” (Homeland).

2003: Re-elected to State Duma.

2004–2006: Faction and party leader of “Rodina”. Withdraws after xenophobic campaign for seat in the Moscow city parliament in autumn 2005.

2006: Member of the organizational committee of the nationalist “Russian March”.

2006: Chairman of the now renamed “Rodina. Kongress Russkikh Obshchin”.

2008–2011: Permanent Representative to NATO. Until 2012, special representative of the Russian president for collaboration with NATO regarding missile defense.

2012: Deputy Prime Minister. In Medvedev’s government, he is responsible for the military-industrial complex, as well as for the nuclear and space sector.

From March 2012: Special presidential representative in Transdniestr.

*Biographies:* <http://whoiswho.dp.ru/cart/person/1931671/>; <http://www.lenta.ru/lib/14159797/full.htm>; <http://www.rbc.ru/persons/rogozin.shtml>

### **Dzhemal’, Geidar Dzhakhidovich (6 November 1947, Moscow)**

1965: Begins studies at the Institute for Eastern Languages, Moscow State University.

1980s: Extended sojourns in Tajikistan, where he developed connections to local Muslim underground forces.



1988–1989: Joined central council of the ultra-nationalist movement “Pamyat” (Memory), but withdrew from the organization a year later.

1990: Deputy Chairman of the “Islamic Party of Renewal” in Astrakhan.

1991–1993: Publisher of the newspaper “Al’-Vakhdat” (Unity)

1993: Participated in the Islamic People’s Conference in Khartoum (Sudan). Instigates the foundation of an international Islamic committee.

1993–1996: Host of several TV shows on Islamic issues.

1995: Founder and chairman of the supra-regional social movement “Islamic Committee”.

1999: At an Orthodox–Islamic conference, in St Petersburg, Dzhemal’ puts forward the idea of a strategic union between Islam and Orthodox Christianity within the framework of an anti-Western project.

2001: Organizes several anti-globalization demonstrations in Moscow.

2009: Investigations by the state prosecutor’s office on charges that his website contained extremist material, and the “Islamic Committee” is an extremist group.

*Biographies:* [http://www.archipelag.ru/index/biography\\_djemal/](http://www.archipelag.ru/index/biography_djemal/); <http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/203866/>

### **Leontiev, Mikhail Vladimirovich (12 October 1958, Moscow)**

1979: Degree in “Economy of Work” at the Moscow Plekhanov Institute for Economy.

1979: Apprenticeship as carpenter.

1989: Participation in Sergei Kurginyan’s “Experimental Creative Center”.

1990–1992: Head of the economics section of “Nezavisimaya Gazeta”.

1993–1996: First deputy editor-in-chief, and later editor of the newspaper “Segodnya”

1997–1999: TV host (“Na samom dele” (In reality) and “Den’ sed’moi” (The Seventh Day) at the TV station “TV-tsentr”).

1998: Journalism award “Golden Pen of Russia”.

Since 1999: Host of the TV show “Odnako” (However) at ORT—“Channel One”. From 2000 onwards, host of other shows.

2001–2002: Member of the political council of the “Eurasia” movement

Since 2002: Member of “United Russia”.

2007–2009: Editor-in-chief of the journal “Profile”.

From 2008: Publisher of the journal “Odnako” (However).

*Biography:* <http://lenta.ru/lib/14160196/full.htm>

### **Shevchenko, Maksim Leonardovich (22 February 1966, Moscow)**

1990: Graduate from the Moscow Aviation Institute (MAI). Subsequently failed to complete degree in Oriental Studies at the Institute for the Countries of Asia and Africa (MGU).

1987–1991: Correspondent for “Vestnik Christianskoi demokratii” (The Messenger of Christian Democracy).

1992–1995: Head of department of society and culture at the “Pervoe sentyabrya” (First of September) publishing house.

1993–1993: Teacher in Russian and Western European history at an Orthodox High School in Moscow.

1995–2002: Special correspondent for ‘hot spots’ at “Nezavisimaya Gazeta”, and editor in charge of the “Religion” supplement.

2000: Founded the Centre for Strategic Studies on Religion and Politics in the Modern World.

From 2008: Host of TV shows on “Channel One” (including “Sudite sami” (Judge for Yourself), and “V kontekste” (In Context).

*Biographies:* <http://www.1tv.ru/person/6280>; <http://echo.msk.ru/guests/7198/>

## ANALYSIS

## Racist Violence and Neo-Nazi Movements in Russia

Robert Kusche, Dresden

### Abstract

In spite of repression by governmental authorities, a right-wing extremist movement has established itself in Russia. It is winning popular support for its slogans and therefore claims to act as the voice of “the people’s will”. However, its victims and their families are often marginalized and excluded.

### Right-Wing Violence

Racist acts of violence, be it murders, assaults or right-wing terrorism are still almost everyday occurrences in Russia. There are numerous attacks against those perceived as “non-Russians” in the streets. The modus operandi of the extreme right is to aggravate social conflicts and imbue them with racist hatred. Frequently, this results in incidents reminiscent of pogroms.

The 542 racist murders and assassinations of political opponents since 2004 in Russia are only the tip of the iceberg. In 2012, extreme nationalists alone carried out 19 murders. Even if the numbers have been declining since the all-time high of 116 murders in 2008, statistics of the independent observer, the “Sova” center, provide evidence of the continuously high level of violence. The number of registered physical assaults, on the other hand, is comparatively low (187 in 2012), since the victims often do not file charges due to fear of the police and the authorities (see also Statistics p. 19ff.). Moreover, society at large and the media appear to be growing increasingly indifferent to the issue of right-wing violence.

### Attitudes and Societal Discourse

What is the reason for this “aversion” to everything that is not “genuinely Russian”? It would be wrong to believe that the phenomenon of racist violence is restricted to the so-called fringes of society. As elsewhere, racism in Russia is based on deep-rooted inhuman attitudes among large parts of society, as well as the church and the state. While Russian President, Vladimir Putin, emphasized in early 2012 that the multiethnic state epitomized Russia’s state identity, he simultaneously stressed the special and privileged role of “genuine Russians”. This provocative choice of words was aimed at appeasing those nationalist elements of the electorate that had taken part in anti-Putin protests. In a situation in which, according to Levada polls, about 67 per cent of the population approves of the slogan “immigrants are taking Russian jobs” (see Figure 6 on p. 15), and 56 per cent support the notion of “Russia for the Russians” (see Figure 4 on p. 14), Putin’s move seems to be in tune with popular sentiment. Moreover, Levada reports that 83 per cent of respondents support the use of “stringent measures” in order to remove illegal immigrants, and 65 per cent

call for a reduction of immigration to Russia (see Figure 5 on p. 15 and Figures 1 and 2 on p. 13). Latent attitudes that assign varying levels of value to different groups of people can serve to legitimize right-wing violent offenders, especially if societal authorities do not take a clear stance against those inhuman ideologies.

### Ideology

Acting on the assumption of statehood as an ethnically exclusive concept and national chauvinist attitudes, the extreme right cultivates, for example, anti-Semitic notions of a global conspiracy, biological racism, the institution of a dictatorship free of enemies foreign and domestic, and elimination fantasies. Such extreme right-wing ideologies are adaptable to varying degrees. Thus, for example, certain frames of interpretation are able to create a positive reference to German National Socialism. Elements of paganism, as well as the notion of a preemptive strike against “Jewish Bolshevism” are adopted, in order to relate positively to historical National Socialism. The central demand of the Russian extreme right today is the creation of an ethnically cleansed Russia.

### Extreme Right-Wing Staging Grounds and Spheres of Activity

In a Russian society in which the authorities and rulers often resolve conflicts by repressive means, the extreme right-wing movement have sought to find issues and staging grounds that are not of major importance to the state in order to avoid repression. The extreme right still has no autonomous party in the State Duma. In spite of its voter potential, it has failed so far to win any seats because of administrative obstacles and internal disagreements. Recently, the “Novaya Sila” (New Power) party, founded in 2012, was barred from registration. In the past, however, the extreme right has been able to count on the support of individual deputies.

However, all serious efforts to take over the parliament to form an extra-political staging ground have so far failed. Therefore, the actors are restricted to the role of an extra-parliamentarian opposition; nevertheless, certain individuals exploit this sphere of activity with sufficient skill to ensure their continued public perceptibility. The most important and biggest event is the

annual “Russian March” of about 5’500 protestors in Moscow. In 2012, it took place for the first time on a route through the city center. The main topics are anti-immigration rhetoric and advocacy of a “pure”—i.e., “white”—Russia. Swastika flags, Nazi salutes, and acts of violence are routine hallmarks of the demonstration. One of the main slogans of the protest—“Stop feeding the Caucasus”—is supported by about 65 per cent of the population, according to a Levada poll (see Figure 9 on p. 17).

In the 2000s, the “Movement Against Illegal Migration” (DPNI), which was banned in 2011, developed a strategy of aggravating and exacerbating social conflicts. The first such incident was observed in 2006 in the small Karelian town of Kondopoga. Members of the movement, who had travelled there, youths, and many inhabitants of the town issued an ultimatum of 24 hours for all Caucasians, who had moved there, to leave Kondopoga and for the re-establishment of “Russian control” of the city market. A massive police presence was required to stop the ensuing riots. From 2006 onwards, there have been at least 17 assaults of this kind all over Russia, including in the regions of Kirov and Stavropol in 2012. The extreme right exploits such “inter-ethnic” conflicts as a stage for spreading its views.

One reason for the prevalence of right-wing violence in Russia is the fact that organizations, such as the DPNI apply the “Kondopoga strategy” to create opportunities, as well as a framework, for such attacks. At the same time, neo-Nazi organizations offer weapons instruction in paramilitary boot camps.

After comparable riots in the center of Moscow in 2007 and 2010, and after international headlines covering a multitude of murders of anti-fascists, migrants, activist lawyers, and journalists by the extreme right, the state reacted with massive crackdowns on organizations and arrests. As early as 2002, the Russian penal code forbade acts of “political, ideological, racist, national, religious hatred and hostility, or against any social group” (RF penal code, Art. 63, paragraph 1e). Moreover, the legislation concerning anti-extremism (Art. 282) allows for the prosecution and ban of “extremist” organizations; however, it is used against disagreeable opposition groups with equal frequency as it is used against extremists.

### Extreme Right-Wing Subculture

Additionally, a network of right-wing extremist gangs and subcultures has established itself in Russia that is ready to carry out its aims with physical violence and militant actions in the streets. These groups represent the base of the neo-Nazi movement. They are small, often nameless, not bound into any party structures,

and have a low threshold of access for new members—often via concerts, football matches, and other subcultures. Common actions and events, as well as symbols and codes contribute to identity formation. Their repertoire ranges from neighborhood-level sticker and graffiti actions to street violence. Racism and positive references to National Socialism are among their guiding motives.

Music is one of the most important media to transport the ideology and an extreme right-wing lifestyle, and furthermore offers the opportunity for quite profitable sales. Among the most popular Russian neo-Nazi bands are “Kolovrat”, “Antisystem”, or “Wotan Jugend”. All are openly neo-Nazi and refer positively to National Socialism. The songs of “Kolovrat” reference the “heroes” of the Vlassov Army, who collaborated with the Germans during the Second World War. There have also been instances of co-operation between German and Russian bands. The German songwriters Jan Peter and Fylgien played at the Moscow “Price of Freedom” festival on 8 February 2013. Both songwriters are established figures in the German neo-Nazi scene and play regularly at events of the German neo-Nazi NPD party. Jan Peter, who is also the guitarist of the German right-wing rock band “Sleipnir”, is said to have contacts with the neo-Nazi “Blood and Honor” music network and to militant groups. He recorded the song “Frei-Sozial-National” (Free-Social-National) together with the Russian band “Russkii Styag” (Russian Banner). Such co-operations show that Russian neo-Nazis have long managed to establish international networks and links. The ideological bracket for international cooperation is the “concept of ethno-pluralism”, a vision of “white European peoples” coexisting without “racial miscegenation”, and a positive reference to certain aspects of paganism.

The indisputable pervasiveness of the ideology is seen particularly in the case of the extreme right-wing groups that spread fear and terror as “death squads”. The so-called Voevodin-Borovikov cell, which was held responsible for at least four murders, was particularly notorious. Borovikov was shot dead by the police during his arrest and has since been considered a hero and martyr of nationalist resistance in Russia.

In 2012, too, neo-Nazis received prison sentences: For instance, ten members of the “Autonomous Combat Terrorist Organization” (ABTO) were sentenced to between eight and ten years in prison for a series of arson and bomb attacks. In Moscow, members of the gang of Jan Lyutik (real name: Yemelyan Nikolaev) were sentenced to between eight and 19 years in prison for participation in several “ethnically motivated” attacks on migrants.

If they are given long prison sentences, the offenders can count on their comrades’ support through donation

campaigns, information, and demonstrations of solidarity. The webpage “geroivoli” publishes the names and stories of prisoners, deceased activists, and alleged traitors. A self-perception of being victims of political repression by a state regarded as illegitimate has become part of the collective identity pattern of the extreme right. This creates links to the opposition movement, which often fails to demarcate its own ranks sufficiently from those of the neo-Nazis. Thus, at protest rallies in December 2011, high-ranking neo-Nazis also spoke in front of several thousand demonstrators. Prominent neo-Nazi Vladimir Tor used this public appearance as an opportunity to announce his solidarity with “national” political prisoners.

### After the Protests in Winter 2011/12

The participation in the protest of the democratic opposition against Putin, and the concomitant support for

pro-Western ideas associated to the mainstream opposition, has given rise to divisions in the right-wing camp. Among many neo-Nazis, frustration at failing to establish their own party has bred a preference for “direct actions” against minorities. At the same time, the state usually only feels compelled to intervene if its monopoly on power and force is being questioned. This is why access to parliament is blocked and certain organizations are banned. It is undisputed that the legislation against extremism and the legal code offer powerful instruments against the extreme right. Their effectiveness is, however, limited because of the high degree of ideological indoctrination of the offenders, their acceptance in society, a lack of political alternatives, and the unwillingness to bring about change regarding the causes of extremism.

#### About the Author

Robert Kusche is a political scientist and manager of the Information Center for Victims of Right-wing and Racist Violence of the RAA Sachsen e.V.. He spent some time in Moscow as an ASF (Action Reconciliation Service for Peace) volunteer, and wrote his Master's thesis on the extreme right in Russia. He is the co-author of the regional report “Hate Crime in Russia” of the foundation “Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft” (Memory, Responsibility, and Future—EVZ).


#### Reading Suggestions

- Golova, Tatiana; Kusche, Robert; Weinmann, Ute, *Hate Crime in Russia. Monitoring and Support for Victims of Racist Violence*. With the assistance of: Anzhelika Avdeeva, Sebastian Friedrich, Sabine Seyb. Berlin, Berlin: ReachOut—Victim Counselling and Education against Right-wing Extremism, Racism and Anti-Semitism, a project by ARIBA e.V. October 2010, <http://www.stiftung-evz.de/w/files/publikationen/hc-ru-vollversion-en-freigabereachout-3-.pdf>
- Laryš, Martin and Mareš, Miroslav, “Right-Wing Extremist Violence in the Russian Federation”, *Europe-Asia Studies* 63, 1, 2011, pp. 129–154.
- Varga, Mihai, “How Political Opportunities Strengthen the Far Right: Understanding the Rise in Far-Right Militancy in Russia”, *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, 4, 2009, pp. 561–579.
- Verkhovsky, Alexander, *The Ultra-Right in Russia 2012*, September 2012, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/09348.pdf>, 4 October 2012
- Worger, Peter, “A mad crowd. Skinhead youth and the rise of nationalism in post-communist Russia”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 45, 3–4, 2012, pp. 269–278.
- Zuev, Denis, “The Russian March: Investigating the Symbolic Dimension of Political Performance in Modern Russia”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 65, 1, 2013, pp. 102–126.
- Statistics on racist violence can be found in <http://www.sova-center.ru/en/database/>

## OPINION POLL


## Attitudes Towards Other Ethnicities and Immigrants

Figure 1: What Do You Think? Today the Number of Immigrants in Russia Should Be ...



Source: opinion polls by Levada Center conducted June 1996–October 2012, N = 1516. Published on 28 November 2012, <http://www.levada.ru/28-11-2012/natsionalnaya-politika-i-otnoshenie-k-migrantam>


Figure 2: Which Policy Should the Russian Government Implement Towards Immigrants?



Source: opinion polls by Levada Center conducted July 2002 to 17–21 August 2012, N = 1601. Published on 30 August 2012 on: <http://www.levada.ru/print/30-08-2012/rossiyane-o-politike-v-otnoshenii-priezhzhikh>




Figure 3: Should the Residence in Russia of the Following Nationalities Be Restricted?




Source: opinion polls by Levada Center conducted from August 2004 to 17–21 August 2012,  $N = 1601$ . Published on 30 August 2012 on: <http://www.levada.ru/print/30-08-2012/rossiyane-o-politike-v-otnoshenii-priezzhikh>

Figure 4: What Do You Think About the Notion of “Russia for Russians”?




Source: opinion polls by Levada Center conducted August 1994–November 2012,  $N = 1600$ . Published on 11 June 2013 on: <http://www.levada.ru/11-06-2013/izvestnost-i-populyarnost-lozungov-oppozitsii> and on 30 August 2012 on: <http://www.levada.ru/print/30-08-2012/rossiyane-o-politike-v-otnoshenii-priezzhikh>

**Figure 5: To What Extent Do You Agree With the Statement: “Russia Must Adopt Stringent Measures in Order to Evict Illegal Immigrants From The Country”?**




Source: opinion polls by Levada Center conducted June 1996–October 2012, N = 1516. Published on 28 November 2012, <http://www.levada.ru/28-11-2012/natsionalnaya-politika-i-otnoshenie-k-migrantam>

**Figure 6: To What Extent Do You Agree With the Statement: “Immigrants Are Taking Jobs from Russians”?**




Source: opinion polls by Levada Center conducted June 1996–October 2012, N = 1516. Published on 28 November 2012, <http://www.levada.ru/28-11-2012/natsionalnaya-politika-i-otnoshenie-k-migrantam>

**Figure 7: What Is Your Opinion About the Fact That More and More Workers from Moldavia, Tajikistan, Kirgistan, And Other Countries From the “Near Abroad” Can Be Encountered on Russian Building Sites?**




Source: opinion polls by Levada Center conducted from April 1997 to 21–24 September 2012,  $N = 1601$ . Published on 19 October 2012 on: <http://www.levada.ru/print/16-10-2012/47-rossiyan-otritsatelno-otnosyatsya-k-gastarbaiteram>

**Figure 8: Is the Work of Immigrants Useful for Country and Society?**




Source: opinion polls by Levada Center conducted on 20–24 June 2013,  $N = 1601$ . Published on 3 July 2013 on: <http://www.levada.ru/print/03-07-2013/otnoshenie-k-migrantam>

Figure 9: Do You Support the Slogan “Stop Feeding the Caucasus”?




Source: opinion polls by Levada Center conducted from July 2003 to 23–26 November 2012,  $N = 1596$ . Published on 14 December 2012 on: <http://www.levada.ru/14-12-2012/rossiyane-o-mezhnatsionalnoi-napryazhennosti-natsionalisticheskikh-lozungakh-obstanovke-n>

Figure 10: What Do You Think About the Idea of Introducing Strict Visa Regulations for the Countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus?



Source: opinion polls by Levada Center conducted on 20–24 June 2013,  $N = 1601$ . Published on 3 July 2013 on: <http://www.levada.ru/print/03-07-2013/otnoshenie-k-migrantam>

**Figure 11: Do You Currently Feel Enmity from People of Other Nationalities Directed Towards You?**



Source: opinion polls by Levada Center conducted from July 2002 to 21–24 September 2012, N = 1601. Published on 19 October 2012 on: <http://www.levada.ru/print/16-10-2012/47-rossiyan-otritsatelno-otnosyatsya-k-gastarbaiteram>

**Table 1: Against Which Nationalities Do You Feel Irritation, Hostility?**  
(Moscow and St. Petersburg only; open question, unlimited number of answers)

Moscow		St. Petersburg	
Caucasians	31%	Caucasians	28%
Tajiks	23%	Tajiks	24%
Azerbaijanis	17%	Uzbeks	18%
Uzbeks	13%	Azerbaijanis	11%
Chechens	12%	Chechens	8%
Georgians	9%	Asians	7%
Armenier	6%	Georgians	6%
Dagestanis	5%	Dagestanis	5%
Asians	4%	Armenians	3%
Kyrgyz	4%	Americans	2%
Ukrainians	2%	Ukrainians	2%
Tatars	2%	Chinese	2%
Chinese	2%	Jews	2%
Abkhaz	1%	Roma	1%
Americans	1%	Turkmens	1%
Roma	1%	Ossetes	1%
Ossetes	1%	Baltic nationalities	1%
Baltic nationalities	1%	Moldavians	1%
Moldavians	1%	Kyrgyz	1%
Kazakhs	1%	Kazakhs	1%
Ingush	1%	none	1%
Jews	1%	other	15%
Vietnamese	1%	no answer	8%
none	2%		
other	11%		
no answer	7%		


Source: opinion polls by VTsIOM conducted on 14–24 November 2011, N = 1200 in each city. Published on 1 February 2012 on: <http://old.wciom.ru/novosti/press-vypuski/press-vypusk/single/112356.html>



## STATISTICS

## Violence in Russia Motivated by Racism and Directed Against Minorities 2004–2012

Figure 1: Right-Wing Violence 2004–2012



The data is shown according to “Sova” center’s information for February 14, 2013. For a detailed breakdown of the data see pp. 20–23.

Source: Informational and analytical center “Sova”: data base: acts of violence, <http://www.sova-center.ru/database/>

Table 1: Convictions for Violent Hate Crimes 2004–2012

	Number of convictions	Number of convicted persons	Suspended sentences or acquittals
2004	9	26	5
2005	17	56	5
2006	33	109	24
2007	23	65	18
2008	34	110	25
2009	52	129	35
2010	91	297	120
2011	61	193	75
2012	28	61	11

The data is shown according to “Sova” center’s information for February 14, 2013. For a detailed breakdown of the data see pp. 24–36.

Source: Informational and analytical center “Sova”: data base: acts of violence, <http://www.sova-center.ru/database/>

Table 2: Statistics of Racist and Neo-Nazi Attacks between 2004–2012 (with categorization of regions)\*

	2004			2005			2006			2007			2008			2009			2010			2011			2012		
	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims
<b>Total</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>269</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>419</b>	<b>468</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>522</b>	<b>588</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>623</b>	<b>716</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>499</b>	<b>615</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>443</b>	<b>537</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>410</b>	<b>454</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>196</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>206</b>
Including:																											
Moscow and Moscow Oblast' / from 2008 Moscow**	18	62	80	16	179	195	40	228	268	57	224	281	64	223	287	35	114	149	18	146	164	7	54	61	5	65	70
St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast / from 2008 St. Petersburg**	9	32	41	4	45	49	6	56	62	11	118	129	15	40	55	16	42	58	2	44	46	3	27	30	1	21	22
Adygei Republic	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Altai Kray	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	3	2	5	7	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	5	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
Amur Oblast'	0	2	2	0	7	7	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	8	9	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	0	0
Arkhangelsk Oblast'	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	7	8	0	5	5	0	4	4	0	2	2	0	4	4	0	0	0
Asrakhan Oblast'	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	0	0	0
Bashkir Republic	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	1	0	4	4	0	1	1	0	7	7	0	1	1	0	19	19
Belgorod Oblast'	0	5	5	0	4	4	0	18	18	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bryansk Oblast'	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	3	0	13	13	0	3	3	1	1	2	1	3	4	0	0	0
Buryat Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	0
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	1	4	5	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	11	11	1	7	8	1	7	8	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	0	0
Chita Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chuvash Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Dagestan Republic													0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Irkutsk Oblast'	3	0	3	2	5	7	0	8	8	1	53	54	0	1	1	2	4	6	3	4	7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ivanovo Oblast'	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jewish Autonomous Oblast'	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kaliningrad Oblast'	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	11	11	0	1	1	0	10	10	2	5	7	1	0	1	0	4	4	0	1	1
Kaluga Oblast'	0	0	0	0	12	12	1	4	5	2	1	3	2	2	4	2	3	5	0	4	4	1	12	13	0	1	1
Kamchatka Kray													0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	1	1	0	0	0

continued overleaf

Table 2: Statistics of Racist and Neo-Nazi Attacks between 2004–2012 (with categorization of regions)\* (Continued)

	2004			2005			2006			2007			2008			2009			2010			2011			2012		
	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims
Karelian Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kemerovo Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Khabarovsk Kray	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Khakass Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug																											
Kirov Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Komi Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kostroma Oblast'	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Krasnodar Kray	2	32	34	1	3	4	0	7	7	0	11	11	1	2	3	0	9	9	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Krasnoyarsk Kray	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	3	3	0	4	4	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kurgan Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kursk Oblast'	0	5	5	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Leningrad Oblast**													-	-	-	3	4	7	0	7	0	1	0	1	0	2	2
Lipetsk Oblast'	0	1	1	0	3	3	1	0	1	0	3	3	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mari El Republic	0	1	1	0	15	15	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Moscow Oblast**													-	-	-	7	40	47	2	36	6	13	6	19	2	25	27
Murmansk Oblast'	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	1	5	6	4	12	16	0	36	36	1	44	45	4	21	25	6	31	37	5	21	26	0	6	6	0	2	2
North Ossetia Republic													0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Novgorod Oblast'	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	2	0	0	0	0
Novosibirsk Oblast'	2	12	14	1	9	10	0	9	9	1	5	6	3	7	10	1	11	12	0	2	2	0	1	0	1	1	1
Omsk Oblast'	0	3	3	0	0	0	1	3	4	1	2	3	0	2	2	0	4	4	2	1	3	1	0	1	0	0	0
Orel Oblast'	0	8	8	0	0	0	0	9	9	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	11	11	1	6	7	0	3	0	1	1	1
Orenburg Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Penza Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	15	15	0	8	8	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Perm Kray	0	2	2	3	2	5	0	1	1	0	3	3	2	3	5	0	0	0	0	5	5	2	1	3	0	0	0

continued overleaf

Table 2: Statistics of Racist and Neo-Nazi Attacks between 2004–2012 (with categorization of regions)\* (Continued)

	2004			2005			2006			2007			2008			2009			2010			2011			2012		
	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Total victims
Primorye Krai	5	9	14	0	3	3	2	18	20	1	3	4	3	6	9	2	13	15	1	2	3	0	4	4	4	2	6
Pskov Oblast'	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rostov Oblast'	0	0	0	0	10	10	0	2	2	1	7	8	0	4	4	0	2	2	0	9	9	0	3	3	1	3	4
Ryazan Oblast'	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	4	4	0	6	6	1	9	10	2	7	9	1	2	3	1	0	1	0	0	0
Sakha Republic (Yakutia)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sakhalin Oblast'	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Samara Oblast'	1	3	4	4	5	9	0	2	2	2	9	11	0	3	3	3	5	8	0	11	11	2	1	3	2	4	6
Saratov Oblast'	1	0	1	0	0	0	4	4	8	2	4	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	0	1	1	0	0	0
Smolensk Oblast'	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	0	0	0
Stavropol Krai	0	0	0	0	21	21	0	1	1	1	8	9	3	10	13	2	11	13	1	5	6	1	2	3	0	4	4
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	7	8	6	6	12	0	6	6	3	17	20	4	16	20	1	20	21	0	7	7	0	2	2	1	1	2
Tambov Oblast'	0	3	3	0	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tatar Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	0	1	1	0	9	9	0	4	4	0	8	8	0	1	1	0	2	2
Tomsk Oblast'	0	3	3	0	6	6	0	4	4	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	10	11	0	3	3	0	0	0
Tula Oblast'	1	0	1	0	3	3	1	2	3	0	0	0	1	3	4	1	1	2	0	1	1	0	3	3	1	2	3
Tver Oblast'	0	0	0	2	0	2	2	7	9	0	4	4	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	1	1	0	0	0
Tyumen Oblast'	3	1	4	1	0	1	0	15	15	0	1	1	3	3	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Udmurt Republic	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	6	7	0	5	5	0	1	1	0	4	4	0	1	1	0	0	0
Ul'yanovsk Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	12	13	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vladimir Oblast'	0	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	7	7	0	10	10	0	2	2	0	3	3	0	2	2
Vologograd Oblast'	0	2	2	0	1	1	2	9	11	1	5	6	0	4	4	0	4	4	1	5	6	0	0	0	0	4	4
Vologda Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	3	3	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	1	1
Voronezh Oblast'	1	2	3	1	21	22	1	6	7	0	17	17	2	23	25	0	5	5	0	3	3	0	5	5	0	3	3
Yaroslavl Oblast'	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	7	0	3	3	0	1	1	3	6	9	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zabaikalye Krai													0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0

\* The data is shown according to "Sova" center's information for February 14, 2013. \*\* Up to the beginning of 2009 data on attacks committed in Moscow and the Moscow region and St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region had been summed up and from the beginning of 2009 they are considered separately.

The cities are arranged in alphabetic order, except Moscow and St. Petersburg—two major centers of racist violence. Victims of attacks in the North Caucasus are not counted in this and the following tables; victims of mass brawls and homeless victims are only counted where a hate motive has been attributed by law enforcement officials.

Source: Informational and analytical center "Sova"; data base: acts of violence, <http://www.sova-center.ru/database/>

Table 3: Consolidated Statistics of Racist and Neo-Nazi Attacks in 2004–2012 (with categorization of victims)

	2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2012	
	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Killed	Beaten, wounded	Killed	Beaten, wounded
<b>Total</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>419</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>522</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>623</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>499</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>443</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>410</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>196</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>187</b>
Dark-skinned people	1	33	3	38	2	32	0	38	2	23	2	59	1	26	1	19	0	25
People from Central Asia	10	23	18	35	17	60	35	82	63	123	40	92	20	86	10	35	7	35
People from the Caucasus	15	38	12	52	15	72	27	64	27	76	18	78	5	45	6	17	4	14
People from the Middle East and North Africa	4	12	1	22	0	11	2	21	2	13	0	2	0	2	0	5	0	0
People from Asia-Pacific Region (China, Viet-Nam, Mongolia, etc.)	8	30	4	58	4	52	2	45	1	41	14	36	3	19	0	11	0	5
Other people of “non-Slav appearance”	2	22	3	72	4	69	20	90	11	56	9	62	7	100	1	25	1	14
Members of youth subcultures and leftist youth	0	4	3	121	3	119	5	195	4	87	5	77	3	62	1	35	1	54
Homeless	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	0	1	3	3	3	6	2
Ethnic Russians	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	8	1	8	1	7	0	7
Jews	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	3	0	3	2	2	0	0
Religious groups	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	0	22	0	24	0	10
LGBT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	12
Others (including ethnic Russians), or not known	10	57	5	21	21	107	2	88	6	80	1	24	3	31	1	10	0	9

*This table reflects not the “actual identity” of victims, but rather the identity given to them by the attackers. In other words, if a Slavic person was taken for a Caucasian, he would be registered in the category “people from the Caucasus”. We also know about attacks on homeless people committed, as police suspects, with ideological motivation. In 2004 we have reports about 13 murders of this kind, in 2005 – about 5 murders and 4 beatings, in 2006: 7 murders and 4 beatings, in 2007: 4 murders and not less than 2 beatings, in 2008: 7 murders and 1 beating, in 2009: 1 murder, in 2010: 1 murder and 2 beatings, in 2011: 1 murder and 1 beating, in 2012: 1 murder and 2 beatings. Since 2010 we have not included victims of death threats. In 2010 we have reports about 6 persons who received such threats and in 2011: 10, in 2012: 1.*

*The data is shown according to “Sova” center’s information for February 14, 2013.*

*Source: Informational and analytical center “Sova”: data base: acts of violence, <http://www.sova-center.ru/database/>*



**Table 4: Statistics of Convictions for Violent Crimes With a Recognized Hate Motive in 2004–2012**

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
<b>2004</b>			
Moscow	4	11	Not known
St. Petersburg	2	10	4
Novgorod Oblast'	1[1]	1	0
Vladimir Oblast'	1	1	1
Voronezh Oblast'	1	3	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2005</b>			
Moscow	2	4	0
St. Petersburg	2	10	4
Amur Oblast'	1	4	0
Lipetsk Oblast'	1	4	0
Moscow Oblast'	4[2]	14	0
Murmansk Oblast'	1	2	1
Perm Kray	1	1	0
Primorye Kray	1	1	0
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	3	0
Tambov Oblast'	1	1	0
Tyumen Oblast'	1	5	0
Volgograd Oblast'	1	7	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2006</b>			
Moscow	5	11	1
St. Petersburg	3	10	4
Altai Kray	1	1	1
Bashkir Republic	1	3	3
Belgorod Oblast'	1	11	1
Jewish Autonomous Oblast'	1	3	0
Kaluga Oblast'	1	2	0
Kostroma Oblast'	2	7	5
Moscow Oblast'	3	18	4
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	4	6	Not known
Novosibirsk Oblast'	1	Not known	Not known
Orel Oblast'	2	6[3]	2
Rostov Oblast'	1	2	0
Sakhalin Oblast'	1	1	0
Saratov Oblast'	1	5	0
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	3	8[4]	0
Tomsk Oblast'	1	3	0
Voronezh Oblast'	1	13	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>109[5]</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>2007</b>			
Moscow	4	11	0
St. Petersburg	2	11	3

*continued overleaf*

**Table 4: Statistics of Convictions for Violent Crimes With a Recognized Hate Motive in 2004–2012 (Continued)**

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
Belgorod Oblast'	1	2	0
Kaluga Oblast'	1	3	2
Komi Republic	1	1	0
Krasnoyarsk Kray	1	2	1
Leningrad Oblast'	1	1	0
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	1	9	9
North Ossetia Republic	1	1	0
Omsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Stavropol Kray	2	2	0
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	3	9	0
Tambov Oblast'	1	1	0
Tyumen Oblast'	1	6	2
Voronezh Oblast'	1	4	0
Yaroslavl Oblast'	1	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>2008</b>			
Moscow	7	40	4
St. Petersburg	4	9	2
Altai Kray	1	3[6]	0
Arkhangelsk Oblast'	1	1	1
Ivanovo Oblast'	1	1	0
Kaluga Oblast'	2	13	6
Kostroma Oblast'	1	1	0
Krasnodar Kray	1	1	0
Lipetsk Oblast'	1	1	1
Moscow Oblast'	2	11	3
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	1	2	2
Novgorod Oblast'	1	2	0
Novosibirsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Omsk Oblast'	1	4	0
Penza Oblast'	1	1	0
Samara Oblast'	1	1	1
Stavropol Kray	1	2	1
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	3	10	0
Tambov Oblast'	1	3	3
Vladimir Oblast'	1	2	0
Yaroslavl Oblast'	1	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>2009</b>			
Moscow	11	41	7
St. Petersburg	2	3	0
Adygei Republic	1	1	1
Altai Kray	1	7	2
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	1	4	4

*continued overleaf*

**Table 4: Statistics of Convictions for Violent Crimes With a Recognized Hate Motive in 2004–2012 (Continued)**

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
Chuvash Republic	2	9	0
Kaluga Oblast'	3	8	3
Khabarovsk Kray	1	1	1
Kirov Oblast'	1	2	0
Kostroma Oblast'	1	1	0
Krasnoyarsk Kray	1	1	0
Kursk Oblast'	1	2	0
Moscow Oblast'	3[7]	3	0
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	5	12	5
Novgorod Oblast'	2	5	0
Novosibirsk Oblast'	3	4	3
Orenburg Oblast'	1	2	0
Samara Oblast'	1	6	6
Stavropol Kray	1	2	0
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Tambov Oblast'	1	1	0
Tula Oblast'	1	2	0
Tver Oblast'	1	1	0
Udmurt Republic	1	1	0
Vladimir Oblast'	2	2	0
Voronezh Oblast'	3	7	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>2010</b>			
Moscow	10	35	3
St. Petersburg	6	27	18
Adygei Republic	1	3	0
Amur Oblast'	1	1	0
Bashkir Republic	2	10	5
Bryansk Oblast'	3	4	2
Chuvash Republic	1	2	0
Irkutsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Kaliningrad Oblast'	1	6	2
Kaluga Oblast'	3	5	2
Karelian Republic	2	8	1
Khabarovsk Kray	1	2	0
Kirov Oblast'	2	5	5
Kostroma Oblast'	1	1	1
Krasnodar Kray	2	3	0
Moscow Oblast'	7	15	8
Murmansk Oblast'	2	7	3
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	10	34	22
Novgorod Oblast'	1	3	0
Penza Oblast'	2	6	2
Primorye Kray	2	14	10

*continued overleaf*

**Table 4: Statistics of Convictions for Violent Crimes With a Recognized Hate Motive in 2004–2012 (Continued)**

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
Rostov Oblast'	1	1	1
Ryazan Oblast'	1	2	2
Samara Oblast'	2	5	2
Saratov Oblast'	1	1	0
Smolensk Oblast'	1	0	1
Stavropol Kray	4	29	6
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	3	9	0
Tatar Republic	2	7	5
Tver Oblast'	3	16	2
Tyumen Oblast'	1	14	3
Udmurt Republic	1	2	0
Ul'yanovsk Oblast'	1	9	0
Vladimir Oblast'	4	3	4
Volgograd Oblast'	1	2	0
Voronezh Oblast'	4	5	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>297</b>	<b>120</b>
<b>2011</b>			
Moscow	10	34	4
St. Petersburg	3	36	16
Altai Kray	1	3	0
Altai Republic	1	1	1
Astrakhan Oblast'	1	1	0
Bashkir Republic	1	1	1
Bryansk Oblast'	1	4	5
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Irkutsk Oblast'	2	8	4
Kaliningrad Oblast'	2	3	0
Kaluga Oblast'	1	1	0
Karelian Republic	2	3	1
Kemerovo Oblast'	2	2	0
Khabarovsk Kray	1	2	0
Kirov Oblast'	2	3	0
Moscow Oblast'	4	6	5
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	5	17	4
Novosibirsk Oblast'	2	2	1
Omsk Oblast'	1	2	0
Orel Oblast'	1	1	0
Ryazan Oblast'	1	7	1
Samara Oblast'	1	2	2
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	3	5
Tatar Republic	3	11	4
Tomsk Oblast'	1	7	2
Tula Oblast'	3	3	0
Tver Oblast'	1	1	1

*continued overleaf*

**Table 4: Statistics of Convictions for Violent Crimes With a Recognized Hate Motive in 2004–2012 (Continued)**

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
Udmurt Republic	1	2	2
Vladimir Oblast'	1	4	3
Volgograd Oblast'	1	1	0
Vologda Oblast'	1	1	1
Voronezh Oblast'	1	1	0
Yaroslavl Oblast'	1	19	12
<b>Total</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>193</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>2012</b>			
Moscow	4	12	1
St. Petersburg	3	5	3
Altai Kray	1	1	0
Bryansk Oblast'	1	1	0
Buryat Republic	1	1	0
Irkutsk Oblast'	2	3	0
Kirov Oblast'	2	2	0
Komi Republic	1	1	1
Kostroma Oblast'	1	2	0
Krasnodar Kray	1	1	0
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	1	5	2
North Ossetia Republic	1	1	0
Omsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Orel Oblast'	1	11	2
Perm Kray	1	6	0
Smolensk Oblast'	1	1	0
Stavropol Kray	1	1	1
Vladimir Oblast'	1	2	0
Volgograd Oblast'	1	1	0
Voronezh Oblast'	1	3	0
Zabaikalye Kray	1	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>11</b>

[1] For threats to blow up a synagogue.

[2] We are not sure of the exact date of one sentence for a killing motivated by ethnic hatred; we assume that it occurred in 1.1.2005.

[3] Estimated minimum; in one case, it is only known that a sentence has been passed.

[4] Including 3 convicted for setting up an extremist community, and also for a murder where the hate motive was not recognized.

[5] Estimated minimum.

[6] Including one convicted without mentioning hate motivation.

[7] According to the Moscow region prosecutor's office, 15 cases were considered in the region in 1.1.2009; in 9 of them 13 people were convicted; 6 of the cases with 7 people accused terminated in reconciliation of the parties. We have details on 3 of the cases in which 4 people were convicted and one case terminated in reconciliation of the parties. No details are available to us on the other of the cases.

The data is shown according to "Sova" center's information for February 14, 2013.

Source: Informational and analytical center "Sova": data base: acts of violence, <http://www.sova-center.ru/database/>



**Table 5: Statistics of Convictions for Hate Propaganda (art. 282 of Criminal Code) That We Do Not Rate as Inappropriate in 2004–2012**

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
<i>2004</i>			
Novgorod Oblast'	1	1	0
Novosibirsk Oblast'	1	1	1
Udmurt Republic	1	1	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>2005</i>			
Moscow	1	1	1
Kabardino-Balkaria Republic	1	1	1
Kemerovo Oblast'	4	4	1
Khabarovsk Kray	1	1	0
Kirov Oblast'	1	1	0
Komi Republic	1	1	1
Novgorod Oblast'	1	3	0
Orel Oblast'	1	2	2
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	1	0
<i>Total</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>2006</i>			
Moscow	1	1	0
St. Petersburg	2	2	1
Astrakhan Oblast'	1	1	0
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	1	3	0
Kemerovo Oblast'	2	2	2
Kirov Oblast'	1	1	0
Komi Republic	1	1	0
Krasnodar Kray	1	1	0
Moscow Oblast'	1	1	0
Novgorod Oblast'	1	1	0
Samara Oblast'	2	2	2
Saratov Oblast'	1	1	1
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Yaroslavl Oblast'	1	2	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>2007</i>			
Moscow	1	1	1
Altai Kray	1	1	1
Altai Republic	1	2	2
Amur Oblast'	1	1	0
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Chuvash Republic	1	4	0
Kaliningrad Oblast'	1	1	1
Kaluga Oblast'	1	8	0
Kirov Oblast'	1	1	0
Komi Republic	3	3	0

*continued overleaf*

**Table 5: Statistics of Convictions for Hate Propaganda (art. 282 of Criminal Code) That We Do Not Rate as Inappropriate in 2004–2012 (Continued)**

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
Krasnodar Kray	3	3	2
Kurgan Oblast'	1	1	0
Novgorod Oblast'	1	1	0
Novosibirsk Oblast'	3	3	0
Ryazan Oblast'	1	2	0
Sakha Republic (Yakutia)	1	2	0
Samara Oblast'	1	2	2
Stavropol Kray	1	1	1
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Ul'yanskovsk Oblast'	1	1	1
Vladimir Oblast'	1	1	0
Vologda Oblast'	1	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>2008</b>			
Moscow	2	4	2
St. Petersburg	3	3	0
Adygei Republic	1	1	0
Altai Kray	1	1	0
Amur Oblast'	2	4	2
Astrakhan Oblast'	2	4	0
Bryansk Oblast'	1	1	0
Buryat Republic	1	1	1
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	2	2	1
Dagestan Republic	1	2	2
Kaliningrad Oblast'	1	1	0
Karelian Republic	2	2	2
Kirov Oblast'	1	1	0
Komi Republic	2	2	0
Krasnodar Kray	2	3	2
Kursk Oblast'	1	1	1
Leningrad Oblast'	1	1	1
Lipetsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Novgorod Oblast'	2	2	0
Novosibirsk Oblast'	1	1	1
Penza Oblast'	1	1	1
Primorye Kray	1	1	1
Rostov Oblast'	2	2	1
Samara Oblast'	3	3	1
Stavropol Kray	1	1	0
Tatar Republic	1	6	1
Tyumen Oblast'	1	1	0
Ul'yanskovsk Oblast'	1	4	0
Vladimir Oblast'	1	1	0
Voronezh Oblast'	1	1	1

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**Table 5: Statistics of Convictions for Hate Propaganda (art. 282 of Criminal Code) That We Do Not Rate as Inappropriate in 2004–2012 (Continued)**

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug	1	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>2009</b>			
Moscow	5	9	2
St. Petersburg	2	2	0
Arkhangelsk Oblast'	3	3	1
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Ivanovo Oblast'	1	1	0
Kaliningrad Oblast'	2	1	1
Kamchatka Kray	1	2	2
Karelian Republic	1	1	0
Kemerovo Oblast'	1	1	1
Khabarovsk Kray	3	5	4
Komi Republic	2	1	2
Kostroma Oblast'	1	1	0
Krasnodar Kray	1	1	0
Krasnoyarsk Kray	2	2	0
Kurgan Oblast'	1	0	1
Kursk Oblast'	2	2	2
Murmansk Oblast'	1	1	1
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	1	1	0
Novgorod Oblast'	2	2	0
Omsk Oblast'	1	2	0
Orenburg Oblast'	2	5	0
Primorye Kray	1	1	0
Sakha Republic (Yakutia)	1	1	0
Samara Oblast'	1	1	1
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	2	0
Tyumen Oblast'	1	1	0
Vladimir Oblast'	2	2	1
Vologda Oblast'	2	3	2
Zabaikalye Kray	1	1	1
Tomsk Oblast'	2	2	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>2010</b>			
Moscow	1	1	1
St. Petersburg	1	3	2
Arkhangelsk Oblast'	2	2	0
Astrakhan Oblast'	2	2	1
Bashkir Republic	1	1	1
Belgorod Oblast'	1	1	0
Buryat Republic	1	1	1
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	2	5	3

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**Table 5: Statistics of Convictions for Hate Propaganda (art. 282 of Criminal Code) That We Do Not Rate as Inappropriate in 2004–2012 (Continued)**

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
Chuvash Republic	2	2	1
Kaluga Oblast'	2	2	0
Kamchatka Kray	1	1	1
Karelian Republic	2	2	0
Khabarovsk Kray	1	1	1
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug	1	1	0
Kirov Oblast'	2	2	1
Komi Republic	4	5	4
Kostroma Oblast'	3	3	2
Krasnodar Kray	3	3	0
Krasnoyarsk Kray	1	1	0
Kurgan Oblast'	1	1	0
Kursk Oblast'	3	3	2
Leningrad Oblast'	1	0	1
Mari El Republic	1	1	1
Novosibirsk Oblast'	3	3	2
Orel Oblast'	1	1	0
Pskov Oblast'	1	1	0
Rostov Oblast'	1	1	0
Sakhalin Oblast'	1	2	1
Samara Oblast'	1	1	1
Stavropol Kray	4	4	1
Tyumen Oblast'	1	0	1
Udmurt Republic	3	3	1
Ul'yansovsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Vladimir Oblast'	5	5	0
Volgograd Oblast'	1	1	1
Voronezh Oblast'	2	2	1
Tomsk Oblast'	1	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>2011</b>			
Moscow	2	2	1
St. Petersburg	1	1	0
Adygei Republic	2	2	2
Altai Kray	1	1	0
Arkhangelsk Oblast'	3	4	3
Bashkir Republic	3	3	1
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	4	4	2
Chuvash Republic	5	4	1
Kalmyk Republic	1	1	0
Kaluga Oblast'	1	1	1
Karelian Republic	2	2	0
Khabarovsk Kray	1	1	0

*continued overleaf*

**Table 5: Statistics of Convictions for Hate Propaganda (art. 282 of Criminal Code) That We Do Not Rate as Inappropriate in 2004–2012 (Continued)**

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug	4	4	2
Kirov Oblast'	2	3	1
Komi Republic	4	4	2
Krasnoyarsk Krai	1	1	0
Kurgan Oblast'	2	2	0
Kursk Oblast'	2	2	0
Lipetsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Moscow Oblast'	2	2	2
Murmansk Oblast'	1	1	1
Novgorod Oblast'	1	1	0
Novosibirsk Oblast'	1	1	1
Primorye Krai	1	1	1
Pskov Oblast'	2	2	2
Sakhalin Oblast'	1	1	0
Saratov Oblast'	2	2	0
Smolensk Oblast'	1	1	1
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	4	4	3
Tatar Republic	1	4	0
Tomsk Oblast'	1	1	1
Tula Oblast'	1	1	0
Tver Oblast'	1	0	0
Tyumen Oblast'	1	1	1
Udmurt Republic	1	1	0
Ul'yansky Oblast'	1	2	0
Vladimir Oblast'	1	1	0
Volgograd Oblast'	1	1	1
Vologda Oblast'	1	1	1
Voronezh Oblast'	1	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>2012</b>			
Moscow	4	5	3
St. Petersburg	1	1	0
Altai Republic	2	1	0
Arkhangelsk Oblast'	6	6	2
Bashkir Republic	2	2	1
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	1	0	1
Chuvash Republic	3	3	0
Irkutsk Oblast'	2	2	0
Kaliningrad Oblast'	1	1	0
Kaluga Oblast'	1	1	0
Kemerovo Oblast'	2	0	1
Khakass Republic	1	1	0
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug	1	1	0
Kirov Oblast'	1	1	0

*continued overleaf*

**Table 5: Statistics of Convictions for Hate Propaganda (art. 282 of Criminal Code) That We Do Not Rate as Inappropriate in 2004–2012 (Continued)**

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
Kostroma Oblast'	3	3	0
Krasnoyarsk Kray	1	1	1
Kurgan Oblast'	2	2	0
Kursk Oblast'	4	4	0
Murmansk Oblast'	2	3	0
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	1	0	1
North Ossetia Republic	1	1	0
Novgorod Oblast'	4	4	0
Novosibirsk Oblast'	2	2	0
Omsk Oblast'	2	2	0
Orel Oblast'	1	1	0
Orenburg Oblast'	1	0	1
Primorye Kray	1	1	0
Pskov Oblast'	4	4	0
Rostov Oblast'	1	1	0
Ryazan Oblast'	1	1	0
Sakhalin Oblast'	1	1	0
Samara Oblast'	2	2	1
Stavropol Kray	1	1	0
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	4	4	0
Tatar Republic	1	1	0
Tomsk Oblast'	1	1	0
Tyumen Oblast'	2	2	0
Udmurt Republic	3	3	1
Ul'yanovsk Oblast'	2	7	0
Vladimir Oblast'	1	1	0
Volgograd Oblast'	3	3	0
Voronezh Oblast'	1	1	1
Zabaikalye Kray	1	0	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>17</b>

*The data is shown according to "Sova" center's information for February 14, 2013.*

*Source: Informational and analytical center "Sova": data base: acts of violence, <http://www.sova-center.ru/database/>*

**Table 6: Statistics of Convictions for Incitement to Extremism (art. 280 of Criminal Code) in 2005–2012**

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
<b>2005</b>			
Kemerovo Oblast'	3	3	2
Kirov Oblast'	1	1	1
Vladimir Oblast'	1	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>2006</b>			
Moscow	1	1	0
Astrakhan Oblast'	1	1	0
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	1	3	0
Kemerovo Oblast'	2	2	2
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast'	2	3	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>2007</b>			
Kemerovo Oblast'	1	1	0
Krasnodar Kray*	1	1	0
Novgorod Oblast'	1	1	0
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	1	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>2008</b>			
Moscow**	1	1	0
St. Petersburg	1	1	0
Kaluga Oblast'	1	1	0
Novosibirsk Oblast'	1	1	1
Samara Oblast'	2	3	3
Tatar Republic*	1	5	1
Vladimir Oblast'	1	1	0
Vologda Oblast'	1	2	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>2009</b>			
Moscow	1	1	1
Amur Oblast'	2	3	2
Arkhangelsk Oblast'*	1	1	1
Jewish Autonomous Oblast'	1	2	2
Kemerovo Oblast'	1	1	1
Khabarovsk Kray	1	1	Not known
Novosibirsk Oblast'*	1	2	2
Primorye Kray*	1	1	1
Samara Oblast'	1	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>2010</b>			
St. Petersburg	1	1	0
Amur Oblast'	1	1	1
Bashkir Republic**	1	1	1



**Table 6: Statistics of Convictions for Incitement to Extremism (art. 280 of Criminal Code) in 2005–2012**

	Number of convictions	Number of offenders convicted	Received suspended sentences or were released from punishment
Chelyabinsk Oblast’**	1	1	1
Kemerovo Oblast’	1	1	1
Komi Republic [1]	2	2	1
Novosibirsk Oblast’	1	1	Not known
Omsk Oblast’	1	1	1
Sakhalin Oblast’	1	2	1
Tyumen Oblast’	1	1	0
Yaroslavl Oblast’**	1	2	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>2011</b>			
Adygei Republic **	3	3	2
Bashkir Republic [2]	1	2	0
Chelyabinsk Oblast’**	3	3	1
Khabarovsk Kray	1	1	0
Moscow Oblast’**	2	2	2
Primorye Kray *	1	1	1
Sakhalin Oblast’*	1	1	0
Tyumen Oblast’	1	1	1
Voronezh Oblast’*	1	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>2012</b>			
Moscow **	1	1	0
St. Petersburg **	1	1	1
Arkhangelsk Oblast’*	3	3	2
Khabarovsk Kray **	1	1	1
Khakass Republic *	1	1	0
Lipetsk Oblast’	1	1	1
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast’	1	1	0
Novgorod Oblast’*	1	1	0
Orel Oblast’**	1	6	0
Sakhalin Oblast’*	1	2	0
Tyumen Oblast’	1	1	0
Voronezh Oblast’*	1	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>6</b>

[1] One sentence according to art. 282 is included.

[2] Sentences include sentences according to art. 2052 and 282 of the Criminal Code.

\* Sentences include sentences according to art. 282 of the Criminal Code.

\*\* Sentences include sentences according to other articles of the Criminal Code.

The data is shown according to “Sova” center’s information for February 14, 2013.

Source: Informational and analytical center “Sova”: data base: acts of violence, <http://www.sova-center.ru/database/>

## ABOUT THE RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST

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The Russian Analytical Digest is a bi-weekly internet publication jointly produced by the Research Centre for East European Studies [Forschungsstelle Osteuropa] at the University of Bremen ([www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de](http://www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de)), the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich), the Resource Security Institute, the Institute of History at the University of Zurich (<http://www.hist.uzh.ch/>) and the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at The George Washington University. It is supported by the German Association for East European Studies (DGO). The Digest draws on contributions to the German-language Russland-Analysen ([www.laender-analysen.de/russland](http://www.laender-analysen.de/russland)), the CSS analytical network on Russia and Eurasia ([www.css.ethz.ch/rad](http://www.css.ethz.ch/rad)), and the Russian Regional Report. The Russian Analytical Digest covers political, economic, and social developments in Russia and its regions, and looks at Russia's role in international relations.

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Layout: Cengiz Kibaroglu, Matthias Neumann, Michael Clemens

ISSN 1863-0421 © 2013 by Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, Bremen and Center for Security Studies, Zürich

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