DIIS REPORT

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STRIVING FOR COMPLEMENTARITY IN EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

EVIDENCE FROM BURKINA FASO AND GHANA

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Preface and acknowledgements

This study is part of a larger study on EU development cooperation at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the context of the development of a strategic framework for Denmark's participation in EU development cooperation.

I gratefully acknowledge support from and beneficial discussions with the EU delegations and Danish Embassies in Burkina Faso and Ghana, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and officials interviewed in DEVCO and EEAS. I also want to express thanks to the officials and representatives of the governments of Burkina Faso and Ghana as well as donor organisations interviewed during fieldwork.

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The terminology used in the paper concerning the European Union is as follows. 'EU institutions' refers to the common institutions which are the European Commission (EC) and its different general directorates, as well as the Council of the EU and the EEAS, the European External Action Service, which is a functional autonomous body that also includes the network of EU delegations. In the field of development, the EU includes both common development policies and instruments as well as bilateral policies and programmes that are supposed to be complementary and reinforce each other according to the treaty on the functioning of European Union. 'EU development cooperation' refers to the programmes implemented by the common institutions while member states bilateral programmes are referred to as programmes of specific countries.

The views expressed and any errors in this paper are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs or any other person or institution.

Acronyms

ACP countries	African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
CPA	Country Programmable Aid
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DEVCO	Directorate General for Development and Cooperation
DIIS	Danish Institute for International Studies
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreements
EU	European Union
SCADD	Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Développement Durable.
TEC	Treaty establishing the European Community
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

Abstract

EU institutions and member states have made several commitments in recent years to improve division of labour and complementarity, and proceed to joint programming of development cooperation. On the basis of country studies in Burkina Faso and Ghana, this report analyses the progress in implementing these commitments in practice. Transfer of management responsibility to EU delegations in the 2000s and the legal changes of the Lisbon Treaty have paved the way to strengthening the role of EU delegations in coordination at country level. The EU has become a major forum for coordination for all member states, reflected, for instance, in the intense dialogue presently taking place around the process of joint programming of development cooperation in Ghana. Implementation of the commitments, though, is not a straightforward process from goals to results. In practice, division of labour processes concern multiple actors, have political ramifications and impinge upon longstanding traditions of individual donor agencies. The linking of stronger internal coordination in the EU with wider donor coordination processes is also a central issue.

The report recommends that flexible and horizontal approaches to EU coordination should be promoted at country level. In this respect EU delegations play a central role as facilitators, finding solutions and modalities in common with member states . At the level of the EU institutions it is particularly important to build on the results of the reforms of the 2000s furthering transfer of powers to delegations and more rapid and simple procedures and decision making processes. Finally, it is suggested that member states should invest in EU collaboration at country level by providing specific staff training and by allocating the necessary resources to promote and monitor EU division of labour.

1. Introduction

The role of EU delegations in developing countries has undergone major changes in recent years. The change from 'EC' to 'EU' delegations in December 2009 marked an extended role for the EU delegations in coordination of EU policy and intervention at country level. Common policies on security and foreign policy since the beginning of the 2000s and the Lisbon Treaty have also contributed to enlarging the formal scope of action of delegations. Moreover, changed conditions for international development cooperation such as the involvement of new actors, changes in international relations, the geography of poverty as well as awareness of global issues, contribute to new concerns and stakes for EU delegations.

The EU has taken a leading role at policy level in implementing the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness (2005), the Accra Agenda for action (2008) and the Busan Partnership for effective development cooperation (2011) and, in particular, promoting division of labour and complementarity between the EC and EU member states. Principles such as concentration on focal sectors, joint programming, delegated cooperation and coordination via lead donors are promoted in this context. Whereas policy statements are numerous, practical progress is more modest reflecting that passing from the individual logic of one agency to common concerns and organisation is challenging. As outlined in the "EU code of conduct on division of labour in development policy", the challenges to achieving a better division of labour and complementarity are both operational and political, the latter referring to issues of foreign policy and visibility among others (EC 2007: 6).

This study focuses in particular on the role of the EU delegations in promoting complementarity and division of labour. The main question is the following: *what barriers and unexploited opportunities exist in the EU's institutional structure in relation to division of labour and complementarity at country level?*

Concepts of coordination, collaboration, complementarity and division of labour are closely related. The European Commission defines the concept of complementarity as a process that starts with coordination but goes further, implying that each actor is focusing their assistance on areas where it can add most value, given what others are doing. "Complementarity is the optimal division of labour between various actors in order to achieve optimum use of human and financial resources" (EC 2007: 5). In the same vein, the OECD defines division of labour as a "process of streamlining and co-ordinating donors' assistance, for example by reducing the number of active donors in each sector, area or topic or the number of sectors, areas or topics focused on by any donor in a given country" (OECD 2009:1). The linked concept of collaboration refers in the report to processes of working together to define or to implement shared goals.

The analysis is based on two country cases, Ghana and Burkina Faso respectively. In both countries, the main financial instrument for development cooperation is the European Development Fund, governed by the ACP–EU partnership agreement (currently the Cotonou Agreement). The case studies focus on the implementation of existing development cooperation, current country programming for the 11th EDF[1] as well as EU coordination in policy dialogue and other policy areas. Fieldwork was done in EU headquarters and at country level. At country level, qualitative interviews were conducted with EU delegations, EU member state embassies, and other donors and governments. In Brussels interviews were conducted with officials in DEVCO and EEAS concerned with the geographical region of West Africa, EDF country programming and aid effectiveness. In sum, the study is based on a literature review and a total of 38 interviews at country level and 10 interviews in EU headquarters. In-depth fieldwork analysing cases of sectors and themes would be required in order to get a more comprehensive picture of the evolving relations between EU delegations and member states. The present analysis focuses on complementarity and division of labour in development cooperation from the angle of poverty reduction objectives and aid effectiveness.

EU development cooperation in Ghana is based mainly on the EDF, around EUR 455 million for the period of the 10th EDF (2008–2013). Focal sectors for the 10th EDF are transport governance-related programmes and budget support for poverty reduction. The following member states are represented in Ghana: Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. One of the major concerns for development cooperation in Ghana is the transformation from a least developed country to a lower middle income country in 2010.[2] Growth rates are very high, for instance 14.5% in 2011,[3] but inequality issues are still important,

[1] The 11th EDF covers the period from 2014–2020. In each ACP country benefitting from this fund, country programming is being drawn up during 2012 and 2013 (see Görtz and Keijzer 2012 for a detailed description of the process).

[2] It was a statistical exercise rebasing the national accounts in 2010, raising GDP by 65% and thus halving the country's public debt ratio, which made Ghana change status to lower middle income country.

[3] An IMF mission of May 2012 points to some macro-economic risks after the successful year of 2011 but nevertheless, in 2012 the economy should expand at a robust pace of more than eight per cent, (http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2012/pr12197.htm)

especially disparity in poverty levels between northern and southern Ghana. Donors and the government are currently discussing how to sustain progress and, eventually, change instruments to adapt to the new, more prosperous situation of the country including transforming Ghana into a less aid dependent country. Ghana is one of the five countries in an EU joint programming pilot which has been taking place since March 2012.[4]

EU development cooperation in Burkina Faso is also based mainly on the EDF, around EUR 708 million for the period of the 10th EDF including additional resources allocated to the country in 2010 on the basis of the mid-term review. Focal sectors for the 10th EDF are interconnectivity and basic infrastructure as well as good governance. Around 60% of EU development cooperation with Burkina Faso is currently based on general budget support and the country is experiencing a specific millennium development goals pilot budget support modality with increased predictability for the country compared to ordinary modalities. Member states present in Burkina Faso are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden.[5] One of the challenges facing development cooperation is that of an increased threat of insecurity from the crisis in Sahel, in particular in the Northern regions bordering Mali. Issues of governance are also important, including supporting political pluralism and democracy. Finally, it is a major concern to translate development aid into more tangible results in terms of poverty reduction and economic development, which are currently lagging behind.

First, the report outlines the context for EU complementarity and division of labour. Next, the evolving role of EU delegations is examined, followed by an analysis of complementarity and division of labour in practice in the two countries under study. Finally, taking into account the multiple decision-making levels and actors in the EU system, challenges and opportunities promoting complementarity and division of labour are discussed.

[4] The other countries are Guatemala, Ethiopia, Laos and Rwanda. A second wave of 27 countries progressively starting on joint programming has been defined, starting from the beginning of 2013. EU heads of mission at country level take the decision whether to proceed to joint programming or not.

[5] The Netherlands is phasing out cooperation in Burkina Faso and is planning to leave in 2013. Recently, in December 2012, Sweden also decided to phase out development cooperation in Burkina Faso by 2014–2016.

2. Context

In the field of development cooperation in the EU, the bilateral approaches taken by member states have evolved in parallel with common development policies and implementation instruments. In 2011, for instance, total EU DAC aid amounted to US$ 56.6 billion or 60.2% of total global DAC aid of US$ 94 billion. Resources managed by the EC amounted to US$ 12.3 billion representing 21.7% of the total EU contribution, whereas member states managed 78.3%.[6] The issue of complementarity and division of labour among EU institutions and member states concerning development cooperation has been on the agenda since the 1990s. In addition, the broader development effectiveness agenda, including the Paris Declaration of 2005, has emphasised the issue of complementarity and division of labour among donors. EU institutions have parallel competences to member states in development policy and rely on 'soft integration dynamics' (Orbie 2012: 26) and peer pressure to play a role as coordinator.[7]

At the time where the European Economic Community was mainly based on economic cooperation, development cooperation was not defined in the legal framework. Nonetheless, since the 1960s multiannual regional trade and development conventions have been agreed with developing countries, in particular the famous Yaoundé Conventions (and later the Lomé Conventions and the current Cotonou Agreement). In 1992, with the Maastricht Treaty, development cooperation was defined as part of the supra-national community pillar, distinct from the intergovernmental pillars concerning common foreign policy and judicial cooperation. The particularity of development cooperation is that common policies are established and implemented in parallel to member states' independently managed development policies.

In 1992, 'complementarity' and 'coordination' were included in the Treaty of the European Union: "Community policy in the sphere of development shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the member states ..." (Articles 176–177), and

6 Table DAC 2a: Destination of Official Development Assistance - Disbursements

7 As a rule, competences in the EU may be either exclusive or shared. Where a competence is exclusive, only the EU institutions may legislate and adopt legally binding decisions. Where a competence is shared, both member states and the EU institutions may legislate but member states may only exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence (Broberg 2011: 544). In the field of development, though, the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU states that the Union shall have competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy but, however, the exercise of this competence shall not result in member states being prevented from exercising theirs (TFEU, Article 4[4]). Therefore in the field of development, competences are parallel or shared without pre-emption (Broberg 2011: 544–545)

member states shall consult each other and co-ordinate their development policies (Article 180). In the 1990s some tensions arose concerning the meaning of complementarity. In particular, these debates concerned the 'complementarity arrow' – whether it goes only from the EC to member states or if it also draws member states into a more comprehensive division of labour (Carbone 2007: 48).

The decade from 1985–1995 when Jacques Delors was president of the Commission was characterised by a rapidly expanding role of the Commission with an implicit federal and harmonisation agenda (Holland and Doidge 2012: 185). 'Complementarity' was understood in the sense of alignment of member state policies with common EU policy not the other way around. The centre was considered the natural level for policy implementation.[8] This centralised approach to European affairs was resisted by member states; the ambitious agenda of the Commission turned out to be politically unacceptable. As a result the Council to some degree reasserted the importance and autonomy of bilateral development policy, and the principle of co-ordination was preferred to complementarity (ibid.). The debate in the 1990s also concerned the highly centralised and bureaucratic organisation of the EC that was hampering the possibility of reinforcing complementarity at country level (Carbone 2007: 34). Member states strongly criticised the management of EC development aid, which led to some of the reforms of the 2000s such as the so-called 'reform of the management of external assistance' (see below). The EC adopted a defensive position, fearing that complementarity would lead to a reduction or 'renationalisation' of common development aid.

In the 2000s EU development cooperation underwent major reform and strong emphasis was put on coordination and complementarity (Carbone 2007: 34; on the reforms see also Maxwell and Engel 2003: 1). The Cotonou Agreement was signed in 2000 and included major changes in the relationship with ACP countries. The allocation of aid is no longer only based on need but also on performance; adjustment of funding is possible with a system of rolling programming and trade liberalisation has at least in principle replaced preferential treatment and, finally, the political dimension of the relationship has been reinforced. The reform of the management of external assistance was intended to make "significant improvements in the quality and timely delivery of projects, while ensuring robust financial management and increased impact of EU external assistance" (EC 2000: 3). The reform includes reorganisation

[8] The 1992 EC communication known as 'Horizon 2000' represented this view on complementarity and was rejected by the Council. A majority of member states, especially the Nordic ones, reaffirmed their right to carry out development policy autonomously (Carbone 2007: 53).

in Brussels, an overhaul of development cooperation programming, simplification of procedures, reduction of the number of instruments and transfer of management responsibility to the delegations through extensive devolution.[9]

During the 2000s the internal debates in the EU on complementarity and coordination have developed in connection with the broader aid effectiveness agenda, with the Rome Declaration on aid harmonisation of 2003 followed by the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness in 2005. In 2002 the Council meeting in Barcelona reaffirmed the need for coordination integrating 'coordination and harmonisation' as one of the eight EU Commitments. The European Commission was charged to follow up on the Barcelona Commitments.

In this context, the Commission took the initiative to prepare a 'European Development Strategy' which was later to become the 'European Consensus on Development' approved in 2005. Repeating past controversies about complementarity, the first draft prepared by the Commission was rejected by the Council because it foresaw a strong role for the EC in coordinating member states around a common thematic framework (Carbone 2007: 55–56). What is so special about the Consensus is the fact that it was eventually approved by all member states together with the EC and the Parliament. The Consensus is a common reference document for both the bilateral and the common strands of EU development cooperation. The European Consensus states that the EC, on behalf of the Community, will attempt to provide added value through facilitating coordination and harmonisation (European Parliament et al. 2006: paragraph 51).

In 2007 another important milestone, the "EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour", was approved. The code of conduct foresees that each EU donor should focus on a maximum of three sectors in each country and establish priority countries. The code calls for a strategic vision of division of labour recognising that EU donors share common development objectives, vision and values, and therefore situations where all EU donors are absent from a strategic sector should be avoided (Council of the EU 2007: 11). The code recognises that each member state has a role to play as comparative advantage is not only based on financial volume but also on a wide range of issues such as geographic or thematic expertise (ibid). According to the code primary leadership and ownership of in-country division of labour lies in the partner country government. An EU fast track initiative on division of labour was

[9] In the terminology used by the European Commission, devolution is equivalent to *déconcentration* in French.

conceived in order to monitor implementation on the ground. More recently, the EU operational framework on aid effectiveness foresees a series of actions to accelerate implementation on the ground and reinforce monitoring of the fast track initiative (European Council 2011a: paragraph 8).

The Commission has expressed its commitment to joint EU country programming of development aid since 2004 (EC 2004a, EC 2006). In the operational EU framework for aid effectiveness the Council foresees that joint programming used as a pragmatic tool to advance division of labour will be generalised, starting with pilot countries (Council of the EU 2011a: paragraph 9).[10] In addition, in 2011 engagements to move forward to joint programming were confirmed in the common EU position at the Fourth High Level Forum on aid effectiveness in Busan. The Busan common position defines 'joint programming' as a process substituting individual country strategy papers. The joint programming process is based on four core elements including joint analysis and joint response to a partner country's national development strategy, identification of priority sectors of intervention, in-country division of labour and an indicative financial allocation per sector and donor (Council of the EU 2011b: 12–13). A flexible approach to joint programming has been chosen, allowing EU delegations and member states at country level to respond to specific needs and situations on the ground (ibid). Again, in 2012, member state engagement to proceed to joint programming was confirmed in the Council Conclusions on the new development policy "Agenda for Change" (Council of the EU 2012: paragraph 19). More subtly, joint programming is not only about increasing aid effectiveness. It is also part of the larger EU unification process and constitutes one among other moves towards speaking with one voice, acting as one and raising the political profile of the EU (interviews at EU headquarters and Concord Aid Watch 2012: 39).

It should be noted that the EU's stated position is not to compete against, but to reinforce multilateral and other coordination and harmonisation efforts (Delputte and Söderbaum 2012: 39). According to official documents, the Union and its member states have played a crucial role in bringing shifts towards aid effectiveness in the international debate, and the EC considers that there is no contradiction between deepening EU coordination and engaging in wider donor coordination processes

[10] Prior to the current wave of pilot countries, joint programming was deployed in Haiti and South Sudan in post-crisis situations, see Council conclusions 22 March 2010 on Haiti, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_9599_en.htm, and Council conclusions from 23 January 2012 on Sudan and South Sudan http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/127469.pdf. A joint member state and EU delegation programming document was produced on South Sudan from 2011–2013.

Figure 1. Important milestones for EU complementarity and division of labour in development cooperation

Year	*Treaty or Document*	*Content and Principles*
1992	Maastricht Treaty	Principles of complementarity and coordination. "Community policy in the sphere of development shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the member states …" (Article 176–177).
2002	Barcelona Commitments (EU)	Commitment to improve aid effectiveness through a process of coordination and harmonisation
2005	The European Consensus	Agreement on development objectives and policy. The consensus recognises a coordination role of the EC, stating that the EC has a comparative advantage to facilitate coordination (paragraph 51).
2007	EU code of conduct on complementarity and division of labour	Member states and EU institutions agree upon different measures to increase complementarity such as focusing development cooperation on three sectors per country, establishing priority countries and developing a strategic vision.
2009	Lisbon Treaty	Increased powers of EU delegations in coordination and representation of the EU at country-level. Principles of mutual complementarity "the Union's development cooperation policy and that of member states complement and reinforce each other" (Article 208).
2011	Operational EU framework for aid effectiveness, consolidated version	Commitment to joint programming and action to accelerate the speed of implementation of the code of conduct on complementarity and division of labour and reinforce monitoring of progress (paragraphs 8 and 9).
2011	Common EU position to the Fourth High Level Forum in Busan	Commitment to joint programming including a definition of joint programming.
2012	"Agenda for Change", Council conclusions	Update on the European Consensus, engagement that EU will make concrete progress in joint multiannual programming and specification that EU delegations will have an important role in enhancing coordination and information-sharing with member states, as well as coordination with other donors (paragraph 19).

(EC 2004a: 13). The Council agrees that the EU should act as a driving force for complementarity and division of labour within the international harmonisation and alignment process, and that the EU should follow an inclusive approach that is open to all donors and, whenever possible, build on existing processes (Council of the EU 2007: 2).

Division of labour and complementarity are now promoted in a specific EU context and a wider aid effectiveness agenda. Practical implementation remains complex, which will be further analysed in this paper with case studies of Burkina Faso and Ghana. The 2011 OECD evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration indicates a surprising increase from 2005–2009 in the average number of donors providing support to each country and in the fragmentation of aid across sectors at the country level (OECD 2011: 67–68). The evaluation also points to relative slowness in implementing division of labour exercises at country level and concludes that division of labour processes should be viewed as gradual processes since project and programmes are typically designed on a multi-year basis (ibid). It is difficult to measure progress in division of labour as no specific targets or indicators have been defined for the Paris and Accra commitments.[11] While increased concentration of aid is intended to reduce transaction costs for partner governments and duplication of donor efforts, there is no single optimal allocation of donors and resources and there may be benefits to working with different donors and different sources of development finance, for instance by bringing diverse points of view into policy dialogue (ibid).

The Lisbon Treaty recently introduced a principle of mutual complementarity between common and bilateral development policies in the EU. According to the Maastricht Treaty, community policy should be complementary to the policies pursued by member states whereas the Lisbon Treaty foresees that "the Union's development cooperation policy and that of member states complement and reinforce each other" (Article 208, 1). The principle of mutual complementarity means that neither takes precedence over the other. According to Broberg, rather than constituting a substantive change, this merely codifies the practice followed prior to Lisbon (Broberg 2011: 554). In practice, getting to this ideal of mutual complementarity between multiple member states and common institutions has been a major challenge.

[11] The Accra Agenda for Action commits donors to "reduce the fragmentation of aid by improving the complementarity of donors' efforts and the division of labour including through improved allocation within sectors, within countries, and across countries" (paragraph 17).

The Lisbon Treaty also reinforces the principles of consistency in EU external action more broadly including the links between development and foreign policy. The new High Representative and European External Action Service have been tasked with ensuring the consistency of the Union's external action in order to bring different strands such as diplomacy, security and development closer together. One of the overall consequences of the treaty is that it provides a stronger formal basis for coordination in EU foreign policy (see van Seters and Klavert 2011: vii, Gänzle et al. 2012: 8). It is often considered that the treaty has a potential to reinforce coordination, especially with the new status of EU delegations making it possible for them to engage more strategically with partner governments and EU member states at country level than formerly (Furness 2012: 84).

Figure 2. The division of tasks between EEAS and the EC General Directorate for Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) post-Lisbon



Source: Adapted from van Seters and Klavert 2012 and from Furness (2010).

Actually establishing the EEAS and defining the links between foreign policy and development cooperation has been a difficult process. The treaty on the European Union described EEAS in general terms but the exact organisation and relations to the Commission were to be defined by a Council decision. The latter, in 2010, established the EEAS as a functionally autonomous body existing independently but alongside the European Commission and the Council – "an institutional innovation within the EU structure that remains somewhat of a work in progress" (Holland and Doidge 2012: 125). Already from the beginning, the Commission was hesitant to support an expansive EEAS and fought to exclude development and neighbourhood policy from the EEAS (Fraser 2012: 67). Only a few spending areas have been moved into the EEAS and most financial tools for development cooperation remain within the Commission and its newly created directorate, DEVCO.[12] However, the Council did decide that EEAS should play a leading role in the allocation and programming of development cooperation by preparing the decisions of the Commission. According to the Council decision defining the EEAS, programming documents for the EDF and the development cooperation instrument shall be, "prepared jointly by the relevant services in the EEAS and the Commission under the responsibility of the Commissioner responsible for Development Policy and shall be submitted jointly with the High Representative for adoption by the Commission" (Council of the EU 2010, Article 9). In practice most steps in the programming cycle involve both EEAS and DEVCO. Belonging officially to EEAS but staffed by a majority of DEVCO staff, collaboration between EEAS and DEVCO is also essential for the EU delegations, as we will see in the next section. In general, uncertainty and disagreement about division of work and modes of collaboration between DEVCO and EEAS have persisted throughout the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty contributing to further complexity of EU development cooperation.

[12] The Commission created the Directorate General for Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) in 2011, a merger between the former DG Development and Relations with African Caribbean and Pacific states and DG Europaid.

3. New roles and organisation of delegations

In 2003 Prodi, then President of the EC, stated that "The role of the delegations has changed constantly … they now carry out tasks relating to almost all the areas where the European Union has a part to play. This reflects the Union's growing importance as a world global player" (EC 2004b: 5).

Originally, the purpose of making EC delegations was to represent the Commission in a limited number of industrialised countries and to oversee the implementation of the Commission's development cooperation within the Yaoundé and Lomé frameworks in ACP countries (EC 2001: 2). Delegations in ACP countries were opened in the 1960s and 1970s. This was extended later to other areas (Mediterranean, Asia and Latin America). In the 1990s, delegations were opened in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the former Soviet Union (ibid).

Historically, trends in development cooperation have influenced the role of delegations in ACP countries. The EDF was widely used for bigger infrastructure construction in the 1960s and 1970s, while new approaches to rural development, public sector reform and governance issues became increasingly central during the 1980s and 1990s. Integration of development with foreign policy and security issues since the 2000s again influenced the scope of action. With the growth of the EU as a 'security provider' (Gross 2008: 3) including the adoption of a common European Security Strategy in 2003, security issues have started playing an increasing role in relations between the EU institutions and developing countries.

The Lisbon Treaty and the integration of the delegations with the new external action service are designed to reinforce links between development and foreign policy within the EU. Compared to the former EC status, delegations have also got increased powers in external representation of the Union and coordination with member states since Lisbon's entry in force in 2010. The treaty also contributes to a complex institutional set-up, described in the previous section, where both the EEAS as a functionally autonomous body, and the EC, have powers over development issues and staff in the delegations.

Whereas the current reforms are important for the delegations, the reform of external assistance, from the early 2000s where the EC headquarter transferred authority and human resources to the delegations, has played a significant role, allowing the delegations to play a more active part in coordination of development cooperation. As stated by the DAC peer review, the reform of external assistance is widely seen as "a successful modernisation of EU development cooperation. Partners in the field and Commission staff have seen a marked improvement: specifically, an increase in the timeliness of EU support together with improved visibility and reputation amongst partners" (OECD 2012: 69). The report of the European Court of Auditors also concludes that devolution contributed to accelerating the speed of implementation and that there is some indication that results have improved as well, though the EC monitoring system is not fully developed to assess the quality of aid (European Court of Auditors 2011: 6–7).

The two country studies in Ghana and Burkina Faso point to two major and ongoing transformations in the role and organisation of delegations. First, the delegations play a more regular and formal role in coordination with member states in development and political issues by presiding over periodic meetings among EU donors and dialogue structures with partner governments. Second, the integration into the EEAS contributes to a shift from focus on development aid implementation to broader political and strategic issues including diplomatic representation and influence. These changes are incremental, for instance very few changes have been made concerning human resources in the two delegations under study since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

Delegations, since 2010, are presiding over regular local EU or 'EU plus '[13] coordination groups including heads of mission and heads of cooperation taking place in the framework of the so-called local presidency of the EU. The delegations also coordinate political dialogue with government through the mechanism of article eight of the Cotonou Agreement. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty also meant that the delegation is responsible for conducting diplomatic initiatives, and for communicating EU positions on international matters decided at central level to partner governments. Thus, the EU delegation plays a permanent role as coordinator of EU member states. Management of the EDF is built on a partnership with government represented by the 'national authorising officer', most often the ministries in charge of finance. According to the interviews, the new legal roles of the delegations contribute to reinforcing other links with partner governments, especially to the ministries in charge of foreign affairs.

[13] In Burkina Faso the EU plus group includes Switzerland and Canada in addition to EU member countries.

In Burkina Faso and Ghana where significant EDF programmes are implemented, the role of EU delegations has been largely focused on development issues. The current trend is to reinforce the role of delegations regarding political and strategic issues. In addition to the head of delegation, the main staff implication of the establishment of the EEAS at delegation level is the creation of a post of 'political advisor'. A concrete example of new orientations induced by the EEAS in development cooperation is the current 11th EDF programming exercise. Concerning West African countries, the EEAS central administration puts emphasis on political analysis and security issues in country programming. For instance, in the Burkina Faso case, headquarter comments on the first draft of 11th EDF country programming included the necessity to make more emphasis on security issues in relation to the Sahel crisis.

The institutional framework for the delegations allows for a hybrid structure with a link to both the EC and the EEAS. Financial instruments such as the EDF are managed by the EC (DEVCO). The latter still provide staff to the delegations and it may still provide instructions to delegations but a copy should be provided to the head of delegation and to the EEAS central administration (Council of the EU 2010, paragraph 13). The head of delegation is a central figure with an overall coordinating role "having authority over all staff in the delegation whatever their status and for all their activities. He/she shall be accountable to the high representative for the overall management of the work of the delegation and for ensuring the coordination of all actions of the Union" (ibid article 5.2). In order to ensure continuity in the work of delegations, financial regulations have been adapted to allow the head of delegation from the EEAS to be a sub-delegated officer of the Commission to manage financial resources including the EDF under the responsibility of the Commission.[14]

In the Burkina Faso and Ghana delegations the following division has been operationalised: the head of delegation, the political advisor and the administrative section are officially EEAS staff, and the heads of cooperation, operational sections, contract and finance are EC staff (mainly from DEVCO). In terms of staffing, in Burkina Faso the delegation comprises 60 employees in total including both expatriate staff (22) and local staff (38). Of these 60 employees, 21 are from the EEAS and 39 from the European Commission.

[14] "In order to comply with the principle of sound financial management, Heads of Union Delegations, when acting as sub-delegated authorising officers of the Commission, should apply the Commission rules and should be subject to the same duties, obligations and accountability as any other sub-delegated authorising officer of the Commission. For those purposes, they should also refer to the Commission as their institution" (European Parliament and Council 2010, paragraph 8)

Two different accounting and staff management systems have been established for EEAS and DEVCO budgets respectively. The head of delegation is the only person who is allowed to access and manage both accounting systems. When the head of delegation is absent, he or she has to be replaced by two persons, one from the EC and one from the EEAS. This internal division in the delegations has the consequence that a chief of cooperation is not allowed to authorise any expenses linked to the administrative section (for instance office supplies), whereas a political advisor from the EEAS is not allowed to manage support in his field of competency such as elections when they are financed by the EDF. The division also means that staff in the delegations have different conditions and systems of promotion. Finally, the process of annual evaluation of EC officials' performance is no longer made by the head of delegation but recentralised to the EC central administration.

The future relations between the EC and EEAS at country level are not clear for EU officials. Some expect that in the future the EU may get two separate country offices, "the procedures being at the limit of absurdity", while others expect that the current hybrid status will continue or that integration of the EC and EEAS will increase. Currently, delegations sometimes receive instructions from parallel EEAS and Commission circuits and it is not always clear to staff what instruction to follow. Therefore, relations in Brussels between the EC and the EEAS are very important for the daily functioning of the delegations.

Concerning development cooperation, delegations play a significant role at country level. They have sufficient technical staff to take up leadership positions in donor–government coordination mechanisms. Amounts of financial development assistance are sufficient for EU delegations to be classified among the major donors. Paradoxically, it is a widely held opinion that the delegations do not use their potential for political influence sufficiently. Individual member countries sometimes have a bigger political influence and/or visibility at country level. One of the explanations is that measures to reinforce the political and diplomatic role of the EU delegations are recent compared to the situation of member state embassies and that it also takes time to build new relations with partner governments.[15]

While a transformation process is underway in the role and organisation of EU delegations, it is very open how it will evolve. It depends on central level action but also

[15] In this respect in the first years after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty EU delegations have been taking much time to explain their new role to partner governments.

on delegation staff and dynamics in country level collaboration among EU member states and delegations. The EEAS does bring changes to the former system, which are likely to affect EU development cooperation by adding emphasis on foreign policy and security issues. Different country contexts and the use of different financial instruments are likely to contribute to diversity among countries.

4. Division of labour and complementarity

The issue of division of labour and complementarity is examined in the current section on three different levels. First, the EU delegations and member states act within the wider organisation of donor–government relations, which is linked to the aid effectiveness agenda. Second, the ongoing process of 11th EDF programming is analysed including the EU joint programming initiative in Ghana. Third, the issue of division of labour and complementarity is also examined regarding the links between development cooperation and external action.

The EU in the broader context of donor–government coordination

In both Ghana and Burkina Faso, an organisation for donor–government collaboration has been developed and established. These structures are not specific to the EU and include most donors. The structures are mainly based on sector coordination groups where the budget support group plays a leading role. In addition, donors meet in heads of missions and heads of cooperation groups. Lead donors in each sector are responsible for dialogue with government.

In Ghana a joint donor strategy was established in 2007 and followed by a common agreement, the 'Government of Ghana Development Partners Compact' (Ghana Government 2012), synthesising the overall principles and objectives for donor–government collaboration in a ten-year perspective (from 2012–2022).[16] These common documents do not replace individual donor strategies and agreements. Also in Ghana, EU donors agreed on starting a joint programming process that will be further explained below. In Burkina Faso the World Bank and the African Development Bank started a joint programming process in 2012; no other donors so far make joint country programming.

OECD statistics on aid concentration and fragmentation show similarities and differences in aid patterns of the two counties. With more than 30 donors, the two countries under study have relatively many active donors. On the OECD

[16] Signed by 15 donors and the Ghana Government.

Figure 3. Aid proliferation and fragmentation in Ghana and Burkina Faso (2011)

	Burkina Faso	*Ghana*
Number of donors.[17]	33	32
Total CPA (country programmable aid) disbursements in USD million.	854	1690
Average CPA per donor	26	53
Number of significant aid relations: 1) the donor provides a higher share of aid to the partner country than the donor's overall share of global aid and/or 2) the donor is among the largest donors that cumulatively account for at least 90% of the partner country's aid.	23	17
Number of insignificant aid relations.	10	15
Aid fragmentation ratio (non-significant relations as a proportion of total donor relations).	30%	47%
Average number of donors per sector.[18]	15.8	15.6
Average number of sectors per donor.	6.1	6.0
Broad average sector concentration ratio i.e. the proportion of country sectoral relationships where donors provide more than their average share of country CPA to the sector, and/or where the donors are among the top donors in the sector.	64%	56%
Narrow average sector concentration ratio i.e. the proportion of country sectoral relationships where the donors provide more than their average share of country CPA to the sector and are among the top donors in the sector.	36%	30%

Source: OECD statistics on aid fragmentation

indicator of aid fragmentation, the ratio is higher in Ghana (45%) than Burkina Faso (30%) implying that the proportion of relatively small aid relations in Ghana is higher than in Burkina Faso.[19] Aid fragmentation in lower middle income countries such as Ghana is generally higher (average of 47% in 2009) than in lower income countries such as Burkina Faso (average of 36% in 2009) (OECD 2011: 69). In both countries donors on average cover around six sectors, representing a trend towards

[17] Micro aid relations below USD 250,000 are excluded from the analysis.

[18] OECD statistics are based on 12 sectors (Environment, General Budget Support, Government and Civil Society, Other Production Sectors (Forestry, Fishing, Industry, Mining, Construction, Trade Policy and Tourism), Education, Health Population Policies and Reproductive Health, Other Social Infrastructure, Economic Infrastructure, Agriculture, Multi sector. Sector divisions are made differently by donors and government at country level.

[19] The aid fragmentation ratio is relatively stable over time. The ratio was 45% in 2007 and 44% in 2009 for Ghana. For Burkina Faso the ratio was 30% in 2007 and 28% in 2009.

increased concentration.[20] Both countries have high average numbers of donors per sector (more than 15). According to the sector concentration indicators, aid is slightly more concentrated in Burkina Faso than Ghana i.e. a higher proportion of significant country sectoral relationships where donors provide more than their average share of country CPA to the sector and/or are among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the sectoral CPA to the sector.

Division of labour has been on the agenda for more than five years in both countries under study and several donor mapping exercises and studies on division of labour have been made.[21] As noted, we do not have commonly-agreed indicators on division of labour and no agreement on an 'optimal division of labour'. Different points of view were identified from the interviews on progress in division of labour: "despite goodwill, operational progress on division of labour is limited" (Burkina Faso). "We have made several studies but did not proceed to major actions" (Burkina Faso). "We mainly work on improving the sector level where progress was achieved" (Burkina Faso).[22] "We have a fairly good division of labour" (Ghana). "We have a de facto degree of division of labour" (Ghana). "While some say that we have a fairly good division of labour, we have a problem of duplication of efforts" (Ghana). "Division of labour is a valid idea but it is difficult to implement" (Ghana).

Recently in Ghana a new initiative was taken. Instead of conducting another study on division of labour, donors carried out mapping by collecting detailed information among them. They met at head of cooperation level in November 2012 to identify potential orphan or overcrowded sectors. They esteemed that it was not necessary to take any action in nine out of sixteen identified sectors. However, seven sectors were potentially overcrowded or orphan and further action was deemed necessary. In December 2012, it was decided that donors would proceed to enter into dialogue with the Ghana government on the issue of division of labour on the basis of this mapping.

Many donors concentrate on two or three main focal sectors but continue to intervene in other areas as well on a smaller scale. The current programming exercise of the 11th EDF is exceptional in the sense that the interpretation of 'three sectors' seems

[20] Aid in both countries shows a trend towards more concentration. In 2009 the average of sectors per donor was 8.2 in Burkina Faso and 7.7 sector in Ghana, See Bürcky 2011: pp. 23 and 36.

[21] For Burkina Faso see Scumacher and Sawadogo 2010. In addition, a study on division of labour was prepared during 2012 (financed by the German cooperation). For Ghana, a major study in 2008 on division on labour was undertaken by the Japanese cooperation and in 2012 a group of heads of missions conducted a mapping.

[22] Referring to division of labour among the donors working in a sector, for instance working on different themes or geographical regions, using lead donor arrangements and joint modalities.

to be narrow and exclude actions in non-focal areas marking a difference from the 10th EDF. Whereas the EU institutions currently attempt to concentrate action in the framework of the EDF, European Commission budget lines and, potentially, regional EDF programmes to come at a later stage, will cover other sectors as well. It means that within EU development cooperation two potentially opposite tendencies take place: concentration via the EDF but intervention in non-focal sectors, for instance via calls for proposals for thematic budget lines designed at central level for several countries or regions. Other major donors, such as the World Bank, do not plan significant concentration and continue to intervene in nine to ten sectors in both Burkina Faso and Ghana.[23]

Contributing to improving division of labour 'delegated cooperation', implying that one donor delegates authority to another donor to act on its behalf, is increasingly used. Delegation is both practiced among EU member countries and EU delegations and with other donors. According to a study on development cooperation in Burkina Faso, the proportion of delegated cooperation in administration of funds increased from 4% in 2008 to 28% in 2010 of total development assistance disbursements (Schumacher and Sawadogo 2010: 26).[24] Delegated cooperation is also frequently used in Ghana, including delegated technical assistance.

Interviews with officials from both governments and donors confirmed that the partner governments did not take leadership in division of labour processes. A government is composed of many sector ministries with different interests concerning division of labour, making it difficult for the ministry of finance in charge of division of labour to be decisive. Division of labour is a process with both technical and indeed political ramifications. One of the basic problems that donors and governments struggle with in both countries is the definition of 'sectors'. Many sectors cut across institutional divisions (for instance the mandate of different ministries) and sector division is subject to tensions. Governments are also reluctant to start telling donors where to intervene feeling they risk losing financial support. The idea of flexibility and internal decentralisation within donor organisations in order to support national ownership is far from current practice. Donors have preferences for specific sectors and also, sometimes, geographical localities and regions in the country because of their specific development policy, strategic considerations and former experiences.

[23] In Ghana, the World Bank planned to stop intervening in the education sector but the Ghana government and other donors convinced the Bank to continue.

[24] The study only covers around 80% of development assistance to Burkina Faso as not all donors sent responses to the survey.

Ghana and Burkina Faso are part of the EU fast track initiative on division of labour (see Council of the EU 2011a: annex 1, page 25). It was striking on the ground that this initiative was not broadly known among member states and that it was not used in monitoring. According to the Council of the EU document cited above, Germany is lead facilitator on the fast track initiative in both countries but it is not clear in practice what this specific position entails. In Ghana, Germany together with other European donors has been taking the lead on the issue of division of labour. In Burkina Faso, Germany has taken initiatives such as financing a study on division of labour. A working group of government and donor representatives including the EU delegation, UNDP, France and Germany examines how to further proceed on division of labour.

11th EDF programming, the role of delegations and member states

The 11th EDF is planned for the period from 2014–2020. The overall amount of funding is not yet decided, but programming at country level has started in order to be ready for funds to be committed in 2014. Different to former programming experiences, the EU delegations are not necessarily editing country strategy papers and the EU response may be based directly on national strategies if they are deemed sufficient. While the overall programming cycle cannot be adapted to those of national strategies or other donors, a certain synchronisation is possible by dividing the cycle into 'sub-periods'. Planned reviews within the period of implementation provide an opportunity to change priorities in each country. Consultation of national actors has begun, including both government and non-state actors. However, formal negotiation with partner governments will only take place when the multi-annual financial framework for the 11th EDF has been decided by member states.[25] The deadline for the delegations to send a first draft to the EEAS was fixed for 30 September 2012. Consultation of EU member states locally is also foreseen and joint programming is recommended when possible. Whereas delegations play a major role in country programming, decision making takes place at headquarter level. First, country meetings and inter-service consultations take place, involving EEAS, DEVCO and all line directorate generals of the Commission. At a later stage, the EDF committee, involving member states, will examine the proposed programming document.

[25] The EU is negotiating the budget for 2014–2020. Although the EDF is not part of this budget, decision making about the budget of the 11th EDF is linked to these negotiations. Budget negotiations were not concluded by time of writing (April 2013) and have taken longer than foreseen.

Figure 4. Differences between 10^{th} and 11th EDF programming processes*

- The EDF and Development Cooperation Instrument programming are now synchronised and similar.
- The overall cycle from 2014–2020 is fixed but flexibility is built into the programming process with the possibility of defining sub-periods in order to align to national programming cycles. Instead of proceeding with one standardised midterm review for all countries, the periods for reviews are defined in each country context. The review process, involving the EDF committee, allows for changing priorities.
- As a rule, EU delegations base programming on national strategies. Only in exceptional circumstances does the EU delegation draft a strategy document.
- It is recommended that member states proceed to joint programming, and potentially other donors as well.
- All cooperation is to be concentrated in three focal sectors whereas the 10th EDF programming guidelines allowed for interventions in non-focal sectors as well.
- There is now an option to mobilise funds for unforeseen needs from a so-called 'B allocation' – which is particularly intended for fragile countries. In a change from before, the amount of the B allocation is no longer defined in advance for each country.
- ACP countries also separate allocation to civil society organisations support.

*The current guidelines for 11^{th} EDF programming might be modified when the financial framework for the 11^{th} EDF is decided by member states.

The issue of EU complementarity regarding the current process of 11^{th} EDF programming has two dimensions. First, the option of joint EU programming is now on the agenda. Second, quite how mutual complementarity in development cooperation between EU institutions and member states is to be established is still a challenge.

In the case of Burkina Faso, 11^{th} EDF programming included consultation of member states at country level in the first semester of 2012. Joint programming was not on the agenda of EU member states and the EU delegation at that stage.[26] From the EU delegation point of view, one explanation given was simply that Burkina Faso had not been chosen as a pilot country and that, therefore, the EU delegations and member countries are waiting to see the experience from other

[26] Later in 2013 Burkina Faso will number among the second wave of the 27 countries progressively adopting joint programming.

countries. The member states in the country were not all aware of the option to proceed to joint programming and knowledge about what joint programming actually implies was lacking.

The EU delegation consulted member states both individually and collectively in the process, as well as other donors and national actors. The delegation hereafter informed member states about the focal sectors proposed to Brussels. The delegation did not share analysis and written documents with member states or partner governments, as it was waiting for comments from headquarters in November 2012. Programming in Burkina is based on the national strategy SCADD (Stratégie de Croissance Accelérée et de Développement Durable) running from 2011 to 2015. The EU delegation has proposed a review in 2015–2016 in order to adapt to potentially changing country priorities with the new national strategy.

Several member states would have preferred to receive the written documents on the 11th EDF programming including the analytical parts. One of the member states representatives explained that it is better to include member states at an early point because later on in the process member states are consulted in Brussels and they in turn ask country representations for their views. Another member state representative found that the World Bank was more transparent as it had circulated a country programming proposal among all donors for their views.

The EU delegation did not take a lead in promoting joint programming. A 'wait and see attitude' seemed to be adopted. As Burkina Faso was not chosen as a pilot country for the joint programming exercise, the delegation preferred to wait and to observe the experiences in other countries. Officials explained that while the EU promotes joint programming, it is extremely complicated in practice because of different programming cycles and because the EU institutions and member states are not likely to easily agree. Member states are particularly likely to resist if the delegation imposes something such as a new programming cycle.[27]

Among some member states, it seemed that information about joint programming was simply lacking at country level. In addition, most member state representations did not perceive any advantage in joint EU country programming. One of the arguments was that it did not make sense to proceed to EU initiatives because the biggest issue of coordination in Burkina Faso is among the biggest donors, respectively the

[27] In the case of Ghana an agreement was found on a programming cycle from 2017 (see below).

EU (EDF), the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the US.[28] However, when the World Bank and the African Development Bank proceeded to joint programming in 2012 neither the delegation nor member states expressed interest in joining this experience. The French foreign ministry recently held seminars to promote EU complementarity including joint programming to staff based in the embassies. The intention is that they will now go on to initiate a dialogue with the delegation and other member states about moving in a joint direction.

In Ghana, the 11th EDF programming was conducted as part of a joint EU programming exercise. Heads of mission took the decision to participate in the pilot exercise of joint EU programming in February 2012. The EU delegation and member states agreed upon a joint analysis and decided to base new country programming on a compact that was signed by the Ghana government and donors for the period from 2012–2022. The joint programming process, facilitated by the EU delegation, has involved intensive collaboration at head of cooperation level in 2012 which has contributed to a strong dynamic of EU coordination in Ghana. In addition, the delegation and member states started a process of drawing up a 'joint framework document'[29] with the aim of defining a joint politico-strategic vision. Ghana is thus placed at the forefront of the broader EU unification process in external action.

It is too early to analyse the impact of joint programming, the process being in its infancy. The analysis provides a 'snapshot' of joint programming at quite an early stage of the process. However, the case of Ghana highlights some potential issues of general relevance concerning implementation in practice. These include the issue of synchronisation of programming cycles, the definition and flexibility of the joint programming exercise as well as the relations between member states, EU delegations, partner governments and other donors.

The EU delegations and member states in Ghana were confronted with the difficult issue of synchronising programming cycles. The country programming cycle of

[28] According to OECD statistics the top five donors in Burkina Faso in 2011 (measured in official development assistance in millions of USD) were World Bank (207), EU institutions (151), France (89) African Development Bank (84) and the US (65). Other EU member states are top ten donors: Netherlands (54), Germany (48) and Denmark (39). Taking into account the amount of development assistance provided by the World Bank and the EU institutions, complementarity at that level seems highly important.

[29] Joint framework documents integrate all aspects of EU external action and all EU tools/instruments defining strategic lines of action, and a broad policy mix referring to the EU and Member States instruments and policies to be used in a country or region taking into account diplomatic and political aspects (Common Foreign and Security Policy, political dialogue, democracy and human rights, etc.), development cooperation, humanitarian aid, security, and the external projection of internal policies, see (EC and EEAS 2011: 7).

the government does not coincide with the 11th EDF cycle from 2014–2020 and second member states have various cycles that do not coincide with each other, the government or the EDF. Several member states had signed bilateral strategies with three to four year cycles in 2011–2012. In this context, the delegation and member states proposed programming in two phases separated by a mid-term review. The first phase (2014–2017) may be considered as a transition to joint programming or 'interim period' in accordance with EEAS-EC guidelines for 11th EDF programming (EEAS and EC 2012: 12). From 2017–2020, EU delegation and member states' country programmes should be synchronised and joint.

According to the interviews, the exact meaning of joint programming was subject to some uncertainty at country level. The EU experience is conducted with a bottom-up and experimental approach and it is largely left to the delegations and member states at country level to define the process and content.[30] As outlined in section 2, joint programming involves core elements such as joint analysis and joint response to a partner country's national development strategy, identification of priority sectors of intervention, in-country division of labour and an indicative financial allocation per sector and per donor, but it is open to the EU delegations and member states to find the adapted approach and design in each case. According to headquarter staff, this flexibility in definitions has been deliberately chosen in order to avoid imposing a rigid framework from central level. Currently, in the National Indicative Program, the delegation and member countries in Ghana are working with an adapted model of the 11th EDF model and the delegation is waiting to see if it will be accepted for 11th EDF programming by headquarters.

At this stage, in Ghana, the level of collaboration in a future joint programme is not yet decided. The joint programming process is likely to favour shared analysis and reviews among EU donors, for instance a joint annual review of development cooperation is foreseen. It may also lead to developing a new vision of EU division of labour.

Flexibility is another important issue which is being discussed at country level. Government priorities are likely to change with national elections. A series of other factors and opportunities may arise during the programming cycle including the

[30] The Commission made a communication providing guidelines for drafting country strategy papers and joint multiannual programming in 2006. However, these guidelines have to some extent been outdated because country strategy papers are no longer edited when it is possible to base country programming on national strategies. Programming guidelines for the 11th EDF and the development cooperation instrument has a section on joint programming providing overall guidance (EEAS and EC 2012: 12-14). DEVCO and the EEAS have mobilised specific support to delegations for joint programming in terms of information sharing, feedback and experts to facilitate the processes when needed.

change of aid modalities and phasing out of classic grants-based development cooperation.[31] How far will EU donors be able to integrate this flexibility within joint programming decisions? The design of the 11th EDF allows for very little flexibility as most resources have to be programmed within three sectors and no funding is left for other initiatives. As stated by Makhan, the strength of multiannual programming of the EU is predictability of funds but its weakness is the inability to respond to initiatives emerging within the implementation period (2012: 110. On the issue of flexibility see further section 5). In this context, member states may have to find ways to compensate for the lack of flexibility within the EDF in the context of a joint programme. The use of the so-called 'B envelope' in the European Development Fund will also be an option depending on how it is designed.

Whereas the member states in Ghana have signed up to the joint initiative, it is not certain that the latter will replace individual country programming. In the case of Denmark, for instance, a new five-year procedure for development cooperation programming which involves the Danish Parliament is to be trialled in Ghana starting in 2013–2014. It is not clear to the Danish representation how this procedure will be coordinated with the joint EU exercise which will take place from 2017–2020. This issue highlights the importance of harmonising programming cycles at central level among EU member states and EU institutions.

In a legal context of parallel competences between member states and EU institutions, how binding are the engagements made in a common strategy and programme? Potential adaptations of a common programme made by the EU institutions headquarters in Brussels cannot have the authority to frame EU member states' plans. The same difficulty arises if EU member state national parliaments and headquarters make adaptations without agreement from Brussels (see Görtz and Keizer 2012: 8). Programming guidelines foresee that the Commission will adopt the EU parts of the programming, taking into account the contributions proposed by the member states, while the member states' parts in the programming will be transmitted by the heads of mission to their relevant capitals recommending them for adoption and formalisation in accordance with their internal procedures and requirements (EEAS and EC 2012: 13). One of the member state representatives noted that if policy changes occurred on the domestic political scene implying changes of strategy or priorities in development cooperation, this might affect engagements made in a joint programme.

[31] The security aspect in West Africa is another important point. A state formerly considered to be stable, Mali, has recently rapidly turned into a highly fragile state. This crisis, of course, has important implications for development cooperation and highlights the need for rapid response and adaption among donors.

One of the differences compared to Burkina Faso is that member states in Ghana are fully informed about 11th EDF programming as they are directly involved in the process. Still, at the time of the study, some of the member states did not agree with the proposed sector choices for the 11th EDF in Ghana. In the programming of the 11th EDF an EU delegation is always placed in a mediating position between headquarters, member states, partner governments and other actors at national level. In addition, staff in the delegations may also have different visions and interests about future orientations. If member states want to influence the process, arguments need to be very strong and it is an advantage to build alliances.

The government of Ghana was informed about the process of joint EU programming at high level during Article eight consultations in June 2012 (see below). A workshop including national actors was also held in November 2012. With programming centralised in the EU system, the room for manoeuvre of the Ghana delegation in this case was limited. At the time of the workshop the delegations had not yet received comments from headquarters on sector proposals for the 11th EDF. As mentioned above, when the multi-financial framework for the EDF is decided, formal national consultations with partner governments are foreseen in all countries, including regional seminars with the presence of EU headquarters representatives.

Official policy documents on EU complementarity and division of labour emphasise that action should be based on the principle of national ownership and not be counterproductive to wider donor–government coordination mechanisms. Interviews with government and non-EU donors pointed to the importance of information sharing and transparency in order to avoid making an exclusive EU process that is separated from the broader donor–government coordination dynamics in Ghana. Several interviewed persons made reference to similar joint programming exercises having been conducted internally among different agencies of the US present at country level (Country Integrated Strategies) and the United Nations (the so-called United Nations Development Assistance Framework, the UNDAF). They took up the issue of balance between time consumption and results achieved in terms of increased coherence, in particular the risk of making joint programming exercises that are excessively time-consuming.[32] Some of the member state representatives expressed the fear that internal EU coordination and joint programming will take time away from broader donor coordination. In this vein, one of the member state

[32] It is an interesting point that EU joint programming is not unique and takes place in parallel to similar processes at the level of other organisations and, therefore, mutually learning from these experiences is highly relevant.

representatives explained that the time factor is very important for small bilateral agencies. If a bilateral EU donor uses one day a month on EU meetings concerning joint programming plus the time needed for reading and analysing documents, staff are likely to use less time on other coordination mechanisms.

Whereas the joint programming process in Ghana is contributing to a strong dynamic of EU coordination, the interviews showed that EU member countries and delegations still face many challenges and policy dilemmas concerning division of labour and complementarity in the two countries under study. These include defining the levels of internal collaboration and EU collaboration versus broader donor collaboration.

Political dialogue and other policy areas

The role of the EU institutions is increasingly 'multifaceted' (EC 2011: 3). For delegations, this implies working on a broad range of issues in development cooperation and external action. One of the ideas is also that EU coordination and collaboration will broaden at country level to take into account all aspects of European external action including diplomatic and political aspects of the aforementioned 'joint framework documents'.

The political dimension of the Cotonou Agreement foresees that the EU and partner governments will "regularly engage in a comprehensive, balanced and deep political dialogue leading to commitments on both sides" (EC 2010, revised Cotonou Agreement: Article 8). This dialogue, according to the text, is to be conducted in a flexible manner and to include both informal and formal channels. In Burkina Faso formal Article eight dialogues between the government, an EU delegation and selected EU member states are organised around twice a year. The most recent dialogue was organised around security in the northern regions of the country, and food security. In Ghana the most recent dialogue in June 2012 touched on many topics including the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), the political situation and human rights, and it also allowed for introducing joint EU programming at a high level of government. One of the member state representatives described the process as very professional, with an internal division among member states and the EU delegation having been agreed upon before the meeting.

In addition, EU delegations and member countries take common, formal, diplomatic 'initiatives' with the governments in both countries on international issues, especially human rights. Common initiatives are combined with bilateral initiatives that are not necessarily coordinated. For instance, the procedure for common initiatives is rather convoluted, as member states have to agree at central level on EU positions. Therefore, for some strategic issues, the delegations discover that a member state has already communicated its position to the national government before the common position has been arrived at.

Some meetings of political advisors from the EU delegation and member countries were organised in both countries but meetings were not regular. Not all embassies have political advisors and views are divided on the necessity of whether or not to install a regular mechanism which would be parallel to meetings of heads of cooperation and heads of mission. The idea of political advisors meetings would be to prepare heads of mission meetings and to discuss specific political issues such as elections.

None of the delegations shared political reports with member countries. From the Ghana experience, it appeared that shared analysis among EU member states and the delegation concerning the last presidential and parliamentary elections in December 2012 was a positive experience that allowed for timesaving within each organisation. Concerning confidential reports, a practical communication problem was expressed in both countries: coded sending systems are vertical from each representation to its headquarters, not horizontal among EU delegations and member country embassies at country level. Sometimes, confidential hard copies are distributed at country level but this method is, of course, not optimal. It would be a positive sign concerning information sharing to develop a horizontal coded system at country level. Ideas on physical cohabitation of member states and EU representations in 'houses of Europe' would be another solution to this problem (see further next section).

Concerning trade, Ghana took some initiatives in relation to EU coordination, whereas coordination was not developed in Burkina Faso. In both countries, 'trade' is discussed in sector groups among all donors and government. In Ghana an initiative had been running with some EU exchange meetings in 2011, but currently the post concerning trade is vacant in the EU delegation and the meetings have stopped. Initiatives on trade are likely to be taken up again with several member states expressing the idea of developing a platform for coordination on trade.

Trade, and in particular negotiating trade agreements, is an exclusive competency of the EC which is managed at regional and central level, not at country level, in the two country cases. The regional centre for discussing Economic Partnerships Agreements, EPAs, is Nigeria in West Africa where the headquarters of the ECOWAS is located. One explanation for why trade in many countries is not a dynamic issue for in-country coordination is that the issue is blocked by the fact that EPAs are not signed (see Makhan 2012). In a broader context, the EPAs are meant to bring trade and development policy closer by linking the negotiation and implementation of the EPAs to EU development support strategies including Aid for Trade. Thus, without the EPAs, currently it is difficult to address important linkages between trade and development at country level within the EU framework.

Trade also highlights another dimension of EU coordination. Member states have common interests in some areas but also find themselves in competition concerning opportunities for trade. Promoting and protecting national enterprises is a major concern for some member country embassies but it is less common to promote *European* trade opportunities as a whole. In addition, trade relations have been developed for years, especially by former colonial powers.

Concerning trade, the situations of Burkina Faso and Ghana are very different. Several member states have major trade interests in Ghana while France is the only major European trading partner with Burkina Faso. In addition, trade issues are becoming increasingly important in Ghana with its new situation as lower middle income country. In 2011, with EU imports of EUR 3,465.6 million and EU exports of EUR 2,910.8 million, Ghana ranks respectively as number 52 (imports) and number 54 (exports) among countries who are trading partners with the EU.[33] The rank of Burkina Faso among EU trading partners is 146 in imports and 112 in exports, with EUR 63.3 million (EU imports) and EUR 499.6 million (EU exports).[34]

In Burkina Faso, the EU delegation was in charge of a Schengen Visa coordination group. Whereas the EU institutions do not have the competency to provide visas, the legal framework does allow for engaging in coordination. One of the advantages of a coordination group was the possibility to avoid 'visa shopping', meaning that the same persons try to obtain a Schengen visa in different European Embassies.

Consular services have country coordination groups concerning the security of European citizens and evacuation plans. Member states take the lead on this issue, for instance France has a consolidated experience in this field in Burkina Faso. The delegations may provide material and financial support in areas such as transport for

[33] EU directorate for trade statistics Ghana, EU bilateral trade and trade with the world, 2011.

[34] EU directorate for trade statistics Burkina Faso, EU bilateral trade and trade with the world, 2011.

evacuation, but they are not entitled to take responsibility in the direct organisation of the security of European citizens.

Security in a broader sense, concerning the stability of the country, is not a subject for specific coordination at country level in Burkina Faso or Ghana. Both countries are relatively stable but armed conflict in the Sahel is a regional concern that directly touches the northern regions of Burkina Faso. Member states act within specific historical agreements with the countries and bilateral military cooperation. Information is only shared to some extent. One of the interviewed delegation officials stated that sometimes the delegation see member state soldiers in the country and they do not know the purpose of their visit. To some extent the level of secrecy and confidentiality concerning military operations hinders country level exchange of information concerning security. In general, bigger member states are better informed than the EU delegations on these issues because the delegations do not have intelligence units or security advisors. Capacities on security and defence issues have recently been developed within the EU framework but it has not yet implied a transformation at country level, at least not in the two country cases under study. The situation is likely to evolve and be different in those African countries where the EU plays a more central role regarding security (for instance Ivory Coast, Niger and Mali as well as Somalia). One case was reported in Burkina Faso where a member state had been bilaterally called in to a strategic meeting on regional security by the government then decided to involve the EU delegation and drew them into the meeting as well. European coordination on other policy areas is likely to evolve in relation to context-specific issues in each region and country. In the case of Burkina Faso some member states asked for more collaboration on security issues in the EU, taking into account the unstable situation in the Sahel, specifically for more exchange of information and common analytical work. In Ghana, on the other hand, trade issues are becoming increasingly important with its new status as a lower middle income country and the above-mentioned coordination platform is underway.

The reform of external assistance has involved the transfer of management responsibility in development cooperation to delegation level but it is much less clear how delegations are involved in politico-strategic issues and other policy areas. In this respect, one of the interviewed member state representatives made an interesting point: the more EU headquarters involve delegations, the more dynamic in-country coordination is likely to be. By involving the country-level representation in decision making, including visits to the partner country, EU headquarters contribute to stimulating country-level EU coordinating activity.

5. Challenges and opportunities

The EU is a system with many decision-making levels and actors, including member states and common European institutions. EU coordination at country level takes place in a context of parallel competencies where member states often have long historical traditions in each country, both in terms of development cooperation and foreign policy. From an organisational point of view each member state has its own form of organisation of development cooperation that is more or less integrated into Embassy structures. The EU has to manage diversity and continuously prove that common EU initiatives represent an advantage compared to bilateral initiatives or other international groupings.[35]

At the level of EU delegations and headquarters

While different reforms of the 2000s have contributed to improving the efficiency of aid delivery, the staffing in delegations and the capacity to engage in common arrangements, some barriers still exist in the institutional structure that make the EU relatively bureaucratic, rigid, centralised and inflexible compared to most member state organisations. Several member state representatives explained that they expected that EU development cooperation would only be able to react slowly to new initiatives or needs at country level, a situation which bodes ill for the possibility of the delegations to play a role as leaders and coordinators. Differences are notable concerning decision making procedures and financial engagements. EU Delegations have to involve headquarters for all initial financial decisions[36]. Meanwhile some member states may take decisions for amounts exceeding several millions of euros at country level. The decision making process in the EU system for a project proposal is rather long, taking around 18 months from the moment when the delegation sends the proposal to Brussels.

As mentioned in the previous section, most funding for the 11th EDF has to be programmed in advance in the three sectors of concentration. In a context of crisis the EU may rely on other instruments than the EDF, such as the instrument of stability or humanitarian action, for rapid responses. It is difficult within EDF procedures to respond rapidly to other political, social or economic changes in

[35] Member states are not tied to the EU. The EU is just one among several relevant institutional frameworks in which they can operate (see Lehne 2012: 8).

[36] Once a financing agreement is signed, delegations and partner governments take decisions on implementation, leaving room for some autonomy and flexibility at country level.

the countries outside the strategic moment of the mid-term review. The EDF is criticised for its limited flexibility once funds have been programmed and for its rigid and cumbersome procedures. However, some flexibility has been introduced with the so-called 'B envelopes' that can be mobilised for unforeseen needs (Gavas 2012: 16). The recent DAC peer review proposes changes to the financial framework of the EDF introducing more flexibility such as the possibility of leaving funds unallocated (OECD 2012: 70).

While progress was made in order to allow the EU to engage in joint arrangements, procedures for basket funding are excessively complicated. The EU system has made very rapid procedures for approving set-ups for delegated cooperation and budget support but not for basket funding, which needs a very complicated prior five-step audit. In Burkina Faso, for instance, Denmark and Switzerland were engaged in a common basket fund in the decentralisation sector. The EU delegation found that it was too complicated from the point of view of procedures to engage in this common basket fund and opted for sector budget support, easier to implement within the EU system.

Control and centralism in the EU system is to some extent linked to fear of bad management. Since the fraud allegations that led to the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999 many measures have been introduced into the system to improve control over use of funding and the objective of justifying funds is very dominant 'We have to justify every euro'. This leads to an internal culture with focus on procedures and accountability, sometimes to the detriment of quality, flexibility and complementarity. One of the EU officials explained that thinking about procedures and systems is dominant in the EU institutions; for instance when a new action is conceived, one of the first interrogations is always about defining what is possible within the procedures: "We make self-censorship, we think about systems and what is possible with our procedures" (Interviewed EU official, 2012).

Staffing remains an essential issue to consolidate capacities for EU coordination and leadership in the delegations. The recent OECD-DAC peer review recommends that delegations be exempted from eventual cutbacks in staffing (2012: 69). The review also recommends further specialisation and qualification of staff which remains a problem within the EU system (ibid 68). Many questions on career development in the EEAS remain open, along with the possibility of switching from the EC to EEAS, which is important for keeping qualified staff in the delegations.

The intervention of headquarters and centralised decision making are a continual challenge for division of labour and complementarity at country level. This is also the case for bilateral cooperation as will be further explained below. While some powers in implementation of development cooperation were transferred from central to country level in the context of devolution in the 2000s, financial decisions and programming functions remain centralised in the EU system. Currently, changes in sector focus are effected in the context of the new 'Agenda for Change' which was decided by the European Commission and the Council. These changes in sector focus involve focusing on governance as well as inclusive and sustainable growth (Council of the EU 2012: paragraph 13). EU headquarters, for instance, directly recommended that EU development cooperation in Burkina Faso and Ghana withdraw from working in the transport and infrastructure sectors not included as focal areas in the new Agenda for Change. These sectors have historically been focal areas of the EDF and are also defined as an area of comparative advantage of the Community in the European Consensus (European Parliament et al. 2006: paragraph 77–79). It appeared at country level that information about these major policy changes had not been broadly communicated to the actors concerned by EDF programming. It is important to note that efforts to specialise development agencies may positively contribute to the overall division of labour among donors. However, specialisation also involves that country offices then have a limited room for manoeuvre concerning the sectors they propose and possibilities to take partner government priorities, in-country division of labour and complementarity issues into account become limited.[37] In addition, in the EU system programming of thematic instruments at central level still works rather independently from country programming exercises, representing a challenge for complementarity issues.[38]

The co-existence of DEVCO and EEAS with powers in development adds to the complexity of headquarter decisions. Delegations are very prudently avoiding communicating preliminary analysis and sector proposals concerning the 11th EDF programming to actors at country level before they get the comments from headquarters. In this context the study points to the risk that decisions about 11th EDF country programming will become centrally steered and mostly an internal affair

[37] The issue of donor specialisation draws attention to the importance of coordination among donor headquarters to avoid that all donors focus on the same sectors and leave others. Currently, many donors seem to include energy as focal area including the EU institutions and this might lead to a concentration of donors in that sector.

[38] In this context, it is foreseen that programming cycles between geographic and thematic instruments will be synchronised, thus ensuring coherence by programming at the same time. However, programming of the regional component of the EDF has been delayed.

Figure 5. Levels of centralisation and decentralisation in decision making in the EU in the programming of development cooperation.[39]

A study of EU capacities on joint programming includes a survey of decentralisation in decision-making processes for 21 member states and the European Commission (HTSPE 2011: 26-27). The study argues that decentralised decision making is important for country level joint programming because when donor country representatives are empowered to take funding and strategy decisions they are better positioned to participate in strategy negotiations with the partner country. The results are based on self-assessment by the organisations answering the question: how decentralised would you say you are in terms of allowing programming decisions to be made at the country level? The results are the following:

Fully decentralised: The country office is granted the authority to decide on budgeting and overall country strategy. 4.55% of respondents: Netherlands.

Partially decentralised: Formal, delegated authority in some areas of programming. 31.82% of respondents: Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

Some decentralisation. Country representatives provide substantive input or are procedurally required to participate in country strategy programming. 18.18% of respondents: Germany, Finland France and Hungary.

Centralised. Formal decision making is still made at headquarters but country offices can play a key role and frequently a strategic or de facto lead role: 45.45% of respondents: Belgium, Czech Republic, Cyprus, European Commission, Greece, Spain, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia.

of the EU institutions, to the detriment of dialogue with partner governments and complementarity concerns at country level.

At the level of member states and relations with delegations

Member state organisations are diverse and have different positions concerning EU development cooperation. However, some common trends were observed, indicating that member state representations are faced with many additional and sometimes competing concerns to pursuing goals of increased complementarity and division of labour.

[39] On the basis on a study realised in 2011 before the current joint programming processes.

Currently some donor representatives at country level point to fatigue with the aid effectiveness agenda compared to the period of enthusiasm with the first two high level forums (Paris 2005 and Accra 2008). Other concerns such as value for money, financial accountability and combatting corruption are described as current priorities for headquarters. The old issue of visibility is also still compromising joint approaches. When political personalities, presidents or ministers, visit a partner country, it is important for country representations to be able to 'wave the flag' especially through visible results such as construction of strategic infrastructure. Some member state representatives are personally dedicated to complementarity and division of labour issues. When they spend time on these issues it is not rewarded by headquarters.

A study on joint EU programming points to similar conclusions. At a time of shrinking national budgets, donors are under increasing pressure to demonstrate efficiency and results in their aid spending. This is often translated into a call for more bilateral control of aid programmes. However, joint efforts might exactly have advantages that can contribute to increases in impact of aid and decreases in costs, but this is insufficiently communicated to electorates and parliaments in member countries (HTSPE 2011: 120). Conversely, in some cases financial crisis in member states sometimes provides an incentive for working more closely with EU delegations (see below).

Central level political priorities and commitments are also complicating the possibilities at country level to promote complementarity and division of labour. One of the current trends is for international commitments by ministers or heads of government to support global initiatives covering many countries at the same time; for instance health in the case of France and maternal health care and malaria in the case of the United Kingdom. Consequently, by central directive, bilateral country programmes are forced to include specific, often minor, actions in other than the chosen focal sectors.

Predictability is also a problem for some member countries. For instance, the Swedish country representation waited for around two years from 2010 for headquarters' approval of a proposed country strategy for development cooperation with Burkina Faso. During this period, the Swedish representation was not able to engage in planning of future joint initiatives. The final decision taken by the Swedish government in December 2012 was to withdraw support to Burkina Faso. The financial crisis in Europe is also contributing to some uncertainty on the future of development cooperation, for instance for Spain and Italy in Ghana.

The basis for EU collaboration in development cooperation is not automatically and always a unity of interests. As one of the EU officials stated: "We defend nations, not a common European culture". Historical ties with partner countries and geopolitical strategies also vary from member state to member state. Notwithstanding these differences, a political will to collaborate at country level is manifest. One of the reasons for this is the financial crisis, which is leading member states to cut back resources in bilateral agencies and close embassies. According to the interviews, this crisis provides incentives for member states to cultivate relations with EU delegations. Another reason is linked to the positive results of the reforms of external assistance and the evolving role of the EU in global forums.[40] Member states that consider the EU to have become a progressive donor are exceedingly positive towards EU collaboration. It also means that drivers for common EU initiatives and coordination at country level are not only the EU delegations but also member state representations.

In this context, collaboration is generally very positive in both countries. However, three different types of problem were also identified, showing some of the challenges to EU collaboration in practice. First, member states sometimes consider delegations to be too dominant and the EU frameworks to be not flexible enough i.e. programme cycles.[41] Second, some member states with smaller development programmes feel that they do not count in the common meetings and therefore they simply decide not to share information. Third, some EU officials, on the other hand, have the impression that EU delegations are more transparent than member states. They share information and provide support and do not feel that this is reciprocated. For instance, concerning sensitive and difficult issues member states hide behind the EU but then suddenly move to the forefront to stand alone as national entities, once problems have been solved.

The country studies point to the importance of approaches and methods of coordination by the EU delegations. In some exceptional cases in the two countries under study, a top-down approach appears to have been used by EU officials. In these cases member states distanced themselves from EU coordination. Taking into account the political and legal realities with parallel competences of EU institutions and member states in development cooperation, the coordination role of EU delegations

[40] See Gavas 2013 on the EU and global public goods.

[41] The 2014–2020 overall programming cycle is fixed but some flexibility has been introduced within the cycle as mentioned previously.

is most likely to be efficient in situations where delegations adopt a flexible approach facilitating horizontal coordination. The latter implies identifying approaches and solutions in common, based on the experiences and capacities of both EU delegations and member state representations. Globally, the Ghana joint programming exercise, where the EU delegation and member states are finding solutions in common, is an example of horizontal coordination.

Inclusion of member state officials in the EEAS has the potential to facilitate better coordination between member states and EU institutions, both at central and local level. It provides more direct access for member states to EU institutions with the possibility of increasing the political will to support European integration regarding development and foreign policy issues. However, whereas member state diplomats are supposed to owe first loyalty to the EU rather than their home countries and to report home via official channels, an observer notes that the fact that member states seek to get their nationals into important positions in the EEAS hierarchy suggests that these requirements may not always be observed (Furness 2012: 85). Close links between member states and the EEAS via member state diplomats is an opportunity to favour information sharing and trust. According to some of the interviewed member state diplomats in the EEAS, EC staff in the past had a tendency to see member states as a 'constraint' while they, on the contrary, push for more collaboration and information-sharing with member states. The challenge at country level is, however, to ensure that the links are not too close between some member states and the EU delegation to the detriment of relations with other member states.

Common housing of EU delegations and member states is a new opportunity for EU collaboration in several countries. In Burkina Faso the delegation is currently enlarging its buildings and inviting member states to join the delegation. Austria is currently examining the possibility of joining the EU delegation buildings. In Ghana, several countries including France, Denmark and Germany have been examining the possibility with the EU delegation to find a common housing arrangement.

6. Conclusions

This study points to new opportunities for promoting EU complementarity and division of labour. At country level some demand for coordination and joint action from member states has emerged. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty enlarges the scope for joint action moving towards closer collaboration on foreign policy. Transfer of management responsibility to delegations in the 2000s and the legal changes of the Lisbon Treaty have paved the way to strengthening the role of EU delegations in coordination at country level. New initiatives are emerging in development cooperation and political dialogue such as joint analytical work and joint arrangements.

The study points to two main challenges. First, while some measures and reforms have been implemented, major constraints within the EU system for promoting dynamics of complementarity at country level remain, in terms of rigidity of some procedures as well as complexity and centralisation of decision making processes. In addition, current reorganisation in Brussels, with the establishment of the EEAS and shared powers between EEAS and DEVCO on development issues, has led to additional complexity in the institutional set-up influencing the daily functioning of delegations. In this context, the study points to the risk that decisions about 11th EDF country programming will become centrally steered and mostly an internal affair of the EU institutions to the detriment of dialogue with partner governments and complementarity concerns at country level. Second, while member state organisations are generally more flexible and decentralised, other political priorities and visibility concerns sometimes lead the attention away from complementarity and division of labour concerns.

The experience of joint EU programming in Ghana confirms that promoting complementarity and division of labour among EU delegations and member states is a complicated process. Operational challenges include synchronising programming cycles, adapting programming procedures and formats and conceiving new forms of decision-making processes. Therefore full joint programming will only be possible from 2017. The level of collaboration among member states and the EU delegation is still to be defined, including potentially proceeding to more strategic decisions on EU complementarity and division of labour in Ghana. It is too early to form a judgement on the impact of joint programming, the process being in its infancy. Joint programming is a pragmatic means to advance division of labour in development cooperation and to contribute to a broader EU unification process at politico-strategic level. It seems from the first experiences in Ghana that the process is likely to contribute to mutual understanding and joint action among EU member states and delegations, as well as joint analytical work including joint development cooperation reviews.

Two major risks emerge concerning stronger internal EU coordination and complementarity: they concern relations to the wider donor community and to partner governments. The interviews pointed to the need for sustaining dialogue and transparency to the outside while the EU delegations and member states progress with internal coordination. Therefore, if too much pressure is put on EU actors to proceed rapidly, it might compromise national ownership and donor-wide coordination.

Achieving the legal objectives of mutual complementarity in EU development policy is not a once and for all action or decision. Conditions for development cooperation are changing and approaches evolve. Each member state and EU institution takes decisions on these issues from a different perspective. For instance, while a certain consensus had developed on using programme approaches and budget support around 2005 with the Paris Declaration, many donors are currently reviewing their position and strategies. The challenge is to avoid situations of 'EU split' at country level.

It will be important to observe tendencies in the years to come concerning the building up of the EEAS and the evolving relations and modalities of collaboration with the Commission. With the new institutional construction, member states get more direct access to European institutions at implementation level than before. However, it is not certain whether the process will lead to more European integration or to more battles among member states attempting to use common institutions as instruments for implementing national and diverging foreign policy agendas. In addition, the new and complex institutional set-up with DEVCO and EEAS acting in parallel in development cooperation risks leading to a repetition of the 'Kafkaesque' structures and procedures in the EU system that the reform process of the beginning of the 2000s attempted to simplify.

There are no easy shortcuts to implementing the various commitments on EU division of labour and complementarity in development cooperation. The study highlights, exactly, the complexity of the legal basis and the institutional set-up for development cooperation in the EU, involving many actors and political compromises. It is possible, though, to identify four salient issues for further consideration at policy level.

First, it is recommended that flexible and horizontal approaches to EU coordination be promoted at country level i.e. EU delegations should play a role as facilitator and find solutions and modalities in common with member states. Top-down approaches risk creating resistance among member states. Shared analysis, for instance, may save time in the different country representations and contribute to creating a common vision.

Second, at the level of the EU institutions, it is particularly important to build on the results of the reforms of the 2000s furthering transfer of powers to delegations, more rapid and simple procedures and decision-making processes. The context has changed with the establishment of the EEAS and it is essential to continue to evaluate the distribution of functions between country and headquarter level, the capacities of staff and the procedures. In addition, and as recommended by the OECD: "deepening investments in expertise and knowledge of staff in EU institutions is also potentially a means to improve the reputation and add real value from a Member State perspective" (OECD 2012: 68).

Third, the current experience of joint EU programming is an essential measure towards EU complementarity and division of labour. Conducted with a flexible and experimental approach it is critical to ensure capitalisation and exchange of experience among the involved countries.

Finally, it is suggested that member states invest in EU collaboration at country level by providing specific training of staff and by allocating the necessary resources to promote and monitor EU division of labour. If member states want to accelerate and influence implementation of commitments on complementarity and division of labour, their participation in monitoring of progress at country level is central. Recently, the Council conclusions on the operational framework for aid effectiveness foresaw strengthened monitoring of the EU code of conduct on complementarity and division of labour with in-country missions (Council of the EU 2011a: paragraphs 1 and 9). In this respect, it would be relevant to use monitoring in order to learn from experiences and report challenges met in practice. Member states may also organise specific training and channels of information to staff in country representations concerning new instruments, legal frameworks and Council decisions at EU level.

Some will set a very high bar for complementarity and division of labour in the EU, and thus consider that current progress is largely insufficient. Others, more pragmatically, find that the fact that EU delegations and EU member states meet regularly at the level of heads of mission and heads of cooperation, exchange information and proceed to joint action and dialogue is a significant step. A major lesson from this study is that emphasis on implementation processes is a priority, including allocating sufficient of the necessary resources as well as monitoring and learning from experiences, in order to further complementarity and division of labour.

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