Table of Contents:

Welcome from the Editors .................................................................4

I. Articles

Terrorism Financing Methods: An Overview ........................................5
by Michael Freeman and Moyara Ruehsen

Hezbollah’s Organized Criminal Enterprises in Europe .......................27
by Matthew Levitt

Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and the Globalization of Supply ..............41
by Joel Hernández

Draining the Ocean to Catch one Type of Fish: Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Global Counter-Terrorism Financing Regime ..................62
by Aimen Dean, Edwina Thompson, & Tom Keatinge

II. Resources

The Art of Searching: How to Find Terrorism Literature in the Digital Age 79
by Judith Tinnes

Literature on the Financing of Terrorism .............................................112
selected by Eric Price

III. Book Reviews

Counterterrorism Bookshelf: Capsule Reviews of 13 Books .................131
by Joshua Sinai

reviewed by Alex P. Schmid

IV. Announcements

TRI’s Country Networks of PhD Theses Writers ..................................141
V. Notes from the Editor

About Perspectives on Terrorism.................................................................143
Welcome from the Editors

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume VII, Issue 4 (August 2013) of Perspectives on Terrorism at www.terrorismanalysts.com. This issue has been prepared at our American editorial office in the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts Lowell (www.uml.edu/ctss). The next issue will be prepared in the journal’s European office by the Editor-in-Chief, Alex Schmid, and his team.

This is a special “single theme” issue, offering insights and analyses about financial activities of terrorists, with a particular emphasis on one of the world’s most powerful and well-financed groups—the Lebanese Shia militia Hezbollah. In the first piece, Michael Freeman and Moyara Reuhsen offer a brief tour through the complex world of terrorist strategies for raising and moving funds. Then Matthew Levitt offers a case study of Hezbollah’s European criminal enterprises. Joel Hernandez follows him with a detailed case study of the intersections between Hezbollah and global trafficking networks, including the infamous Mexican cartel Los Zetas. The final article by Aimen Dean, Edwina Thompson and Tom Keatinge is especially policy-relevant, containing six recommendations that ought to be heeded, especially with regard to Somalia where the implementation of ill-considered counter-terrorism measures could harm those most in need of assistance rather than the terrorists.

This issue also features an excellent, state-of-the-art guide on how to conduct advanced literature reviews in the field of Terrorism Studies, authored by our own Judith Tinnes, along with book reviews by Joshua Sinai and Alex Schmid, and a bibliography of books, articles and reports on the financing of terrorism by our regular contributor Eric Price from Vienna.

Sincerely,

James J.F. Forest
Co-Editor
I. Articles

Terrorism Financing Methods: An Overview
by Michael Freeman and Moyara Ruehsen

Abstract

How do terrorists move money? This article examines six of the most widely used methods: cash couriers, informal transfer systems (e.g. hawala), money service businesses, formal banking, false trade invoicing, and high value commodities. When terrorists move money, they choose methods that take into account issues of: volume, risk, convenience, simplicity, costs, and speed. This article analyzes the methods according to these issues. It draws on multiple cases and examples, including the most recent cases of Hezbollah’s and al Shabaab’s use of money service businesses, and many others.

Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, U.S. federal agents received a tip-off from a confidential informant that a Yemeni sheik was raising money in Brooklyn for al-Qaeda. The sheik had allegedly boasted in recorded conversations that he had raised as much as US $20 million for Osama bin Laden. Some of the money was raised in cash donations, but cash is bulky and difficult to move. Depositing the cash in a formal bank and wire transferring it to Yemen would have raised red flags. So the sheik arranged to have the bulk cash shipped in cargo. When the agents arrested two men at Kennedy Airport in October 2001, they found US $140,000 of cash hidden in cardboard boxes along with honey jars.[1] It wasn’t the first time the honey trade had been used to disguise the movement of money. In the months leading up to 9/11, the same Yemeni honey trading businesses imported over-invoiced honey to disguise money flowing to the United States. [2]

How terrorists move money, and how this can be disrupted, is often overlooked. Instead, scholars and policy-makers focus on either the sources of terrorist financing or the things terrorists spend money on, like weapons and the attacks themselves.[3] Yet the movement of money is a critical intermediary step. Terrorist groups often raise money in places different from where they are located and different from where attacks might take place. For terrorist groups to be effective, they must be able to move money from its origins to the operational areas where it is needed. These transfers of money represent potential weak points which the state can target to more effectively disrupt the terrorist organization and its operations.

Given the range of possible methods for terrorists to move funds, why do terrorist groups choose a particular method or combination of methods from the possible options? The following section will explore what the broad attributes might be for the movement of money. The
subsequent section will describe the primary methods used to transfer money and will include how each method has advantages and disadvantages according to the attributes laid out in the earlier section. The final section will discuss how better countermeasures can be developed to better address the movement of terrorist finances.

Attributes

When terrorists move money, what kinds of issues might they be thinking of? Based on some evidence, as well as assumptions and inferred behavior, terrorists seem to choose methods of moving funds that take into account issues of: volume, risk, convenience, simplicity, costs, and speed.[4]

Volume: The ability to move more money with each transaction makes it easier for terrorist groups to fund an operation. However, not all methods are capable of moving an equal volume of funds. Methods like formal banking, hawalas, and money transfer businesses can theoretically transfer an infinite amount of money in a single transaction. In contrast, moving bulk cash is limited by the size and weight of the cash being transferred, with US $1 million in US $100 bills weighing over 20 pounds; and in US $20 bill denominations, more than 100 pounds. Such a load would also take up a lot of space. Despite what is often portrayed in the movies, a typical briefcase can fit just over US $250,000 in used US $100 bills, or a mere US $50,000 in US $20 bills.

Risk: For terrorist groups, there are several types of risks they might face depending on the method of fund transfer. Among the most obvious risks is that the transfer itself will be detected by authorities. For example, a transfer between two banks is much more likely to be monitored, recorded, and discovered, than a transfer of cash that crosses the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. A related element of risk comes from the varying degrees of anonymity associated with each method of moving funds. Some methods, like formal banking, require institutions to follow “know your customer” (KYC) practices, while others, like hawalas or cash, allow for more anonymity.

Another risk for terrorists is the reliability of different methods. There is a high degree of certainty that transfers made between banks and between hawalas, for example, will be made accurately and completely. Cash transfers, on the other hand, may be less reliable because of the opportunities for theft along the way. And because of their bulk, they may be more vulnerable to seizure by law enforcement.

Convenience: Depending on their physical location, some methods for moving funds may be more or less convenient for a terrorist group. For example, using cash or hawalas to move money into or out of tribal areas in Iraq or Afghanistan is much more convenient than using formal banks. Likewise, al-Qaeda’s alleged trade in West African conflict diamonds was more convenient than using cash or gold to move funds.[5] West Africa is geographically distant from South Asia, but diamonds are easy to hide, and therefore much more convenient than cash. Gold is less
convenient because of its weight and bulk, but given the importance of gold for dowries in both
South Asia and the Middle East, and the number of large gold souks throughout the region, large
shipments of gold in the form of high-end jewelry will not attract much notice. The convenience
of a particular method will clearly depend on geographic/topographic features (like an
uncontrolled border) as well as demographic (cultural, ethnic, linguistic) factors.

**Simplicity:** Everything being equal, terrorists would prefer methods that require the fewest
number of steps, the lowest level of technology, and the least amount of skill. Given these
parameters, terrorists are less likely to engage in elaborate money laundering schemes that involve
numerous actors and that require dozens of complicated steps to obscure the trail of money. Using
a scheme like the black market peso exchange, for example, would be much more complicated
than a series of wire transfers through multiple bank accounts.[6]

**Costs:** Put simply, moving money requires the payment of fees. Western Union and
MoneyGram charge users a transaction fee that can range anywhere from 1-10% depending on
the amount being transferred and other transaction variables. Likewise, hawalas charge between
0.5-2.5% on each transaction. Even moving cash across borders may require side payments to
border guards or customs officials.

**Speed:** Terrorists want to move money as quickly as possible to their final destination in order
to fund their operational needs. Hawalas, for example, allow for transfers to occur relatively
quickly, while formal banking may require deposits to sit for a day before they clear. Bulk cash
smuggling can vary depending on how far the cash needs to move, and how many borders it
needs to cross. A false trade invoicing scheme probably requires the longest amount of time to
complete.[7]

**Methods**

This section highlights the most used methods as well as some methods that are not used, but
have been raised as potential future methods. For each method, we offer a description of the
method, some examples of how terrorists have used the method, and how we might think about
each method according to the attributes described above. The methods are presented from most
simple to most complex.

**Cash Couriers:** Using couriers to move physical cash is the “simplest and oldest way of moving
value.”[8] When criminals move cash across international borders, they typically conceal it in
vehicles, packages, luggage, or anything else that can hold large physical volumes of cash.[9]
Oftentimes, where borders are uncontrolled or where the state’s resources are strained, criminals
do not even conceal the cash.[10]

AQ relied on couriers to move money in the 1990s and before the 9/11 attack. According to the
9/11 Commission Monograph, al-Qaeda used money changers to transfer US $1 million from the
UAE to Pakistan and then used couriers to transfer the funds as cash into Afghanistan. For the
9/11 attack itself, “Khalid Sheik Mohammed delivered… US $120,000 [in cash to] Abdul Aziz Ali in Dubai… [who] then used the cash to wire funds to the hijackers in the United States.”[11] Khalid Sheik Mohammed also gave thirteen of the hijackers US $10,000 each as they left Pakistan. These hijackers brought cash and traveler’s checks with them as they entered the U.S. and deposited the funds at banks such as Bank of America, SunTrust, and other smaller banks. Others, like Ramzi Binalshibh and Mustafa al Hawsawi also used cash to fund the attack. Zacarious Moussaoui brought in the most cash, US $35,000, which he declared with Customs as he entered the country. (See Figure 1 for some of the cash transactions before the 9/11 attack.)

**Figure 1: Cash Transfers before 9/11 Attacks**

Cash couriers are used by other groups as well. For example, foreign fighters traveling to Iraq to join AQI often brought cash with them. According to the captured records from Sinjar (on the Syrian border in northwestern Iraq), of the 590 records of foreign fighters, 149 brought cash to AQI after entering Iraq. In general, almost all the different nationalities had close to the same rate of fighters contributing money (about 20-30%), but the Saudi fighters contributed the largest amount in an absolute sense. They also comprised 22 of the 23 fighters who brought in more than US $1,000.[12] Overall, these cash transfers were estimated to make up over 70% of AQI’s budget, highlighting the importance of this mechanism for both raising and moving funds into the organization.[13]
Likewise, Jemaah Islamiyah has used cash couriers in the past as their primary method of moving funds. Before the Bali bombings in 2002, JI used two Indonesian laborers working in Malaysia to transfer over US $15,000 between terrorist members. Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the al-Qaeda deputy and mastermind of 9/11, used a Pakistani courier to deliver US $50,000 to a JI leader in 2003 after the Bali attack.[14] JI also used cash transfers and couriers to move about US $8,500 to the bombers of the Atrium Mall in Jakarta in 2001.[15]

Security is an important consideration when using cash couriers. Terrorist networks will presumably use only trusted personnel to move the money. Another consideration is speed. Transferring funds with couriers is much slower than electronic means. It also requires some complex planning and coordination if couriers need to arrange the transfers.

Informal Transfer Systems: There are several types of informal financial networks, such as Hawala/Hundi in South Asia, Fei ch’ien in China, Phoe Khan in Thailand, and Door-to-Door in the Philippines.[16] These networks often have traditional roots and ethnic ties, and operate in places where the formal banking sector is less established or where large ethnic diasporas live. They are estimated to be part of a US $500 billion global remittance system.[17] Although most countries have legalized hawala (thinking that the networks will be easier to police if they operate openly), many hawaladars (hawala dealers) continue to operate illegally because of prohibitively high licensing and registration fees. Hawala networks were especially scrutinized after 9/11 due to evidence that al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) used them.

Hawala networks in the Middle East and South Asia operate in the following manner: a worker in Dubai wants to send US $1,000 back to his wife in Pakistan. He finds a hawaladar and gives him the funds. The hawaladar contacts a fellow hawaladar (often an extended family member running a linked operation) in Pakistan. The hawaladar in Dubai gives both the worker in Dubai and the hawaladar in Pakistan a transaction code. The worker’s wife goes to the hawaladar in Pakistan and gives him the code. If the codes match, the hawaladar in Pakistan gives his wife the rupee equivalent of US $1,000 minus a small fee. (Note that no funds have actually crossed borders.)

To settle the accounts, the simplest method is for the hawaladars to wait for a similar value of transactions to move in the other direction. As this rarely occurs, the hawaladars will periodically (weekly, or monthly) balance their books by using money service businesses, smuggling high value commodities, or false trade invoicing transactions to transfer funds.

Although most customers use hawala for legitimate purposes, several terrorist groups have used hawalas to move money. Before 9/11, al-Qaeda “moved much of its money by hawala.”[18] They used “about a dozen trusted hawaladars” (as well as some unwitting hawaladars) in Pakistan, Dubai, and elsewhere in the Middle East.[19] While AQ used hawalas prior to 9/11, they did not use them specifically for the 9/11 plot.[20]
Besides al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Toiba used hawala networks to move funds before their 2000 Red Fort attack in Delhi. Likewise, Dawood Ibrahim transferred funds via hawala networks before the 1993 Mumbai attack.[21] In Iraq, terrorist groups have used hawala: two Iraqi Kurds were arrested for using hawalas to move part of nearly US $150,000 to finance Ansar al-Sunna/Ansar al Islam.[22] Based on an author’s interview with a U.S. Special Forces colonel, we also know of coalition operations undertaken against hawaladars that were knowingly moving funds for Iraqi insurgent groups. Jemaah Islamiyah also used hawaladars to transfer about US $2,500 before a 2001 attack.[23]

A more recent example is the case of the would-be Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad. In February 2010 Mr. Shahzad’s handlers in Pakistan (Tehrik-e-Taliban)[24] arranged for US $4,900 to be sent via an unregistered hawala network operated by two brothers, one of whom, Aftab Ali Khan, was an illegal Pakistani immigrant living in Brookline, Massachusetts. On February 24 or 25th Mr. Ali Khan met Mr. Shahzad just outside of his Massachusetts apartment to hand over US $4,900 in cash.[25] There was no suggestion in any subsequent investigations that Mr. Ali Khan knew what the money would be used for. He was merely completing an anonymous business transaction.

In April Mr. Shahzad received an additional tranche of funds from the Pakistani Taliban. Perhaps because of the inconvenient distance between Boston and New York, another hawala network was used. This new network, operated by Mohammad Younis on Long Island and his brother in Pakistan, was also unregistered.[26] On April 10th, just three weeks before the bombings, Mr. Younis spoke to Mr. Shahzad by phone and arranged a meeting in a parking lot in Ronkonkoma, New York to hand over US $7,000 sent by Mr. Shahzad's Pakistani Taliban handlers.[27]
Hawala and other informal transfer systems are fast, with transactions happening usually within hours, perhaps up to a day or slightly more for transactions to the more remote regions. They are also relatively anonymous. Hawaladars keep records, but these may often be done in their own shorthand, and their bookkeeping methods vary. They may even be more reliable than other methods, like money service businesses, which serve similar communities. They are also relatively inexpensive compared to other methods, charging just 1-2% for transfer fees and often offering a more competitive exchange rate—this is the primary reason why people use them. They are also convenient, operating in areas underserved by traditional banking. In Afghanistan, for example, Thompson notes that hawaladars operate in even the most remote areas of the country. In the United States, informal transfer systems are required to register with FinCEN. In Afghanistan, there has been a similar effort to regulate the hawala network but both Afghanistan’s geography and the weakness of its institutions have prevented much progress.

Money Service Businesses: The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) defines money service businesses (MSBs) as “currency dealers or exchangers; check cashers; issuers [or redeemers] of traveler’s
checks, money orders, or stored value cards; and money transmitters.”[33] In the United States alone there are over 33,000 registered MSB’s. [34] Money service businesses are generally subject to the same regulations and laws as banks, and are subject to regulatory audits. However, unlike banks, MSBs do not follow similarly rigorous “know your customer” (KYC) procedures. Banks will only conduct transactions with people holding accounts at that bank, and those account holders must provide a significant amount of personal information when they open the account. MSBs, on the other hand, do not require that customers have existing accounts. Customers only need to present a valid form of ID. Most MSBs, and particularly the more established money transmitters such as Western Union, transfer funds quickly (within minutes to most locations), are minimally expensive for transfers larger than US $1,000, and offer low risks of detection, especially if the MSB is unregistered.

In February 2013, a federal jury in San Diego convicted four Somali immigrants of conspiring to fund al Shabaab, a militant terrorist group in Somalia.[35] While all four men were involved in raising funds, one of them, Issa Doreh, worked at the Shidaal Express, a registered MSB from which he sent funds directly to one of al-Shabaab’s leaders, Aden Hashi Ayrow, who was in regular telephone contact with one of the other defendants. Months of wiretapped telephone conversations led to additional arrests in two related cases in St.Louis, Missouri and Minneapolis, Minnesota. Again, the goal was to raise funds for al-Shabaab and wire transfer those funds through registered MSB’s, getting lost in the traffic of numerous legitimate remittances sent by the sizeable Somali immigrant communities in those cities. (See Figure 3)
Before al-Qaeda officially existed, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi Yousef, and Wali Khan Amin Shah used a large MSB in the UAE, Al Ansari Exchange Establishment (AAEE), to move funds for the Operation Bojinka plot in 1995.\[36\] Al-Qaeda also made extensive use of MSBs in their financing of the 9/11 attacks. An AQ financier, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali deposited almost US $120,000 at two MSBs in Dubai: the Wall Street Exchange Center and the UA Exchange Center. The money was transferred to the hijackers’ U.S. bank accounts through the MSBs’ correspondent accounts at the Royal Bank of Canada and Citibank, respectively. Even though the MSBs in Dubai required identification, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali used aliases. His transactions also appeared unremarkable among the millions of MSB transactions flowing out of that jurisdiction. A second financier, Binalshib, transferred about US $8,500 via two Traveler’s Express/MoneyGram transactions and two Western Union transactions.\[37\] (See Figure 4)
Perhaps the terrorism financing case study that highlights the role of MSB’s most glaringly is the complex Hezbollah financing case that entrapped and eventually undid Lebanese Canadian Bank in 2011. While the Lebanese Canadian Bank case has many layers (and more will be said about the case in the next section), one critical component of the money laundering operation allegedly run by Hezbollah involved the placement of cash into money service businesses located in Beirut. These MSB’s had accounts with Lebanese Canadian Bank. The scheme originated in the Western Hemisphere with drug proceeds from Ayman Joumaa’s drug trafficking network. Although Joumaa, himself, was not a member of Hezbollah, he had loose connections with the organization, and found in them a willing partner in crime.

Joumaa’s drug proceeds were laundered through a complicated scheme involving the purchase of used cars from Lebanese-owned dealerships in the United States.[38] The used cars were shipped to Africa where they were sold for cash. Additional drug cash was co-mingled with the proceeds of the car sales, and this cash was sent to at least two money service businesses in Beirut, including Elissa Exchange and the Hassan Ayash Exchange (See Figure 5). Both of these MSB’s were allegedly complicit in the scheme, and allegedly earned commissions on their laundering services, which went straight into the coffers of Hezbollah. When the scandal was laid bare, both MSB’s were shut down, and Joumaa’s drug trafficking network was forced to find another channel through which to launder their funds.
According to a recent Treasury sanctions designation in April 2013, it did not take long for Joumaa to find a new channel for laundering his funds. Elissa Exchange and Hassan Ayash Exchange were soon replaced by two other Beirut-based, Hezbollah-linked money services businesses: Kassem Rmeiti & Co. for Exchange and the Hawali Exchange Co.[39] The designation by Treasury alleged that between March 2011 and October 2012 Rmeiti Exchange collected bulk cash, issued cashier’s checks and facilitated cross border wire transfers for a variety of criminals, including “Hezbollah affiliates.” (See Figure 6) Hawali Exchange was charged with similar, albeit more complex, transactions. Such designations essentially bring a financial institution’s operations to a halt, as it becomes almost impossible to conduct U.S. dollar transactions. The designation decision set a new precedent, for it was the first time Treasury had used Section 311 of the Patriot Act against a money service business. Previous designations had been limited to formal banks.
Figure 6: Hezbollah Financing Scheme Post-2011

Up until this case and the successful efforts on the part of the U.S. Treasury Department to take down four well-known Lebanese money services businesses, MSB’s had been considered an advantageous method for moving terrorist funds. They allow for the relatively inexpensive and speedy transmission of funds, their omnipresence is convenient, and even though their cash reporting threshold is low, it is still possible in theory to move a large volume of funds at any given time. But the risks have changed in recent years. Previously, MSB’s flew under the radar and faced a lower risk of external audits or careful scrutiny by financial regulators. Renewed attention on their activities has put them in the spotlight, and many MSB’s in North America are now finding it difficult to establish accounts with formal banks, who do not wish to take on the additional risks.

**Formal Banking:** The formal banking sector includes depository financial institutions (DFIs) – banks, saving and loans, and credit unions – which are the sole entities permitted “to engage in the business of receiving deposits and providing access to those deposits” through a payment system of checks, electronic networks, credit and debit cards, and bank-to-bank transfers.[40] The
formal banking sector is heavily regulated in the West, and increasingly so in most emerging market countries. In the U.S. laws like the Bank Secrecy Act (and its most recent amendments in Title III of the USAPATRIOT Act) require banks to maintain records, know their customers, report transactions over US $10,000 and report suspicious transactions of any amount. However, banks are still vulnerable to abuse by terrorists and other criminals.

Banks can be a vehicle for criminal financing in a variety of ways. The most convenient arrangement for a terrorist would be a bank that asks no questions, such as the former al-Madina Bank in Lebanon. Alternatively, the bank could have a crooked employee, who facilitates the laundering and movement of funds under the nose of unwitting supervisors, as happened with Lebanese Canadian Bank. And if a bank is not careful, it could also be used for criminal activity by way of correspondent accounts or payable-through-accounts of correspondent banks, as was the case with HSBC. And finally, there may be instances where a bank does all it is required to do with respect to customer due diligence, but the transactions still fail to set off any red flags, as happened with the 9/11 hijacker accounts.

Al-Madina Bank, and its subsidiary, United Credit Bank (UCB), represent a notorious case of deceitful corruption. When their crimes were uncovered in 2003, their unorthodox transactions caused the bank’s collapse and the loss of depositors’ funds. Purchased by two Lebanese-Saudi brothers in 1984, the bank soon fell under the de facto control of a woman named Rana Qoleilat, who started out as a mere executive assistant, but was soon given power of attorney to conduct transactions on behalf of the two owners. According to prosecutors’ allegations, Ms. Qoleilat knowingly facilitated the laundering of funds by Saddam Hussein’s sanctioned regime, conflict diamond dealers, Russian mafia groups, and an arms dealer for Hezbollah.[41] She is also alleged to have embezzled funds from the bank to enrich powerful Syrian generals and politicians during the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. However, because the bank was run like a Ponzi scheme, the entire operation eventually collapsed. Most depositors eventually recovered their funds, but the owners lost an estimated US $1.5 billion.[42]

The Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB), mentioned earlier, was implicated in Hezbollah financing at a number of levels. The bank held accounts for money service businesses that were allegedly laundering and earning commissions for Hezbollah, but the bank was also held liable for allowing a handful of crooked senior bank managers to structure cash deposits right under the unwatchful eye of compliance staff.[43] These crooked employees received funds from Hezbollah couriers, who would bring the bulk cash directly from the airport, and deposit the funds at a nearby LCB branch.

Even when a bank carefully scrutinizes its employees, it can still be used for terrorism financing by way of contaminated correspondent accounts. Correspondent accounts are accounts set up to allow off-shore banks to conduct transactions in a key currency such as the U.S. dollar. For example, any foreign bank that wishes to conduct dollar transactions must first set up a
correspondent account with a U.S. bank to process those dollar transactions. Correspondent accounts are an unavoidable tool for conducting international transactions. The problem arises because the U.S.-based bank cannot guarantee that the foreign correspondent bank is carefully screening its own customers and its customers’ activities. That is why correspondent relationships take time to establish. Most large international banks will not set up a correspondent relationship with an overseas bank without first conducting an on-site visit and evaluation of the other bank’s risk compliance regime. Unfortunately, such due diligence and care was not undertaken by HSBC-US when it continued to maintain a correspondent account relationship with al-Rajhi Bank of Saudi Arabia, after several allegations of connections to terrorism financing. The first allegations arose in 2005 when two individuals were indicted for using al-Rajhi bank to send money to violent extremists in Chechnya. Additional concerns arose in 2007 when the contents of a 2003 CIA report were leaked. The report found that “senior al-Rajhi family members have long supported Islamic extremists and probably know that terrorists use their bank.”[44] In spite of all of these red flags, HSBC-US continued to conduct correspondent account transactions with al-Rajhi Bank until they were investigated for many additional compliance failures.

In the execution of the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda used the formal banking sector as their primary method of moving and storing funds. All told, they deposited around US $300,000 in U.S. banks, and spent all but US $36,000 of that before the attacks. About US $130,000 of the funds the hijackers used came through bank-to-bank transfers (including through MSB correspondent accounts at banks) and the rest was deposited as cash. Once these funds arrived in the United States they were deposited in accounts at Union Bank of California and Sun Trust Bank in Florida, among others. All the hijackers opened accounts at these U.S. banks with their real identities. They accessed their funds with ATM and debit cards. An additional US $47,600 was deposited in overseas banks: US $9,600 in Saudi British Bank in Saudi Arabia, US $8,000 in a Citibank branch office in the UAE, and US $30,000 in a Standard Chartered Bank branch in the UAE. Two of the hijackers accessed these overseas accounts with ATM and Visa cards.[45] What is remarkable is that most of these transactions, because of their relatively small size and the lack of suspicion about the would-be hijackers, would not have set off any red flags even today.

Formal banking has several advantages and disadvantages for terrorist groups. In general, banks are largely regulated and therefore pose higher risks for terrorists of detection by investigators. Al-Qaeda, however, overcame some of these drawbacks by utilizing bank branches in the UAE and Pakistan, which at the time lacked much regulatory oversight, and by allowing mostly low-level (unknown to law enforcement) operatives to use banks for the 9/11 plot.[46] They are safe and convenient, but can be expensive (based on fees and exchange rates), and can be slow if the banks hold the money for a period of time before authorizing transfers.[47]

False Trade Invoicing: One of the most difficult laundering methods to detect is false trade invoicing, which is why it is estimated to be the one of the most heavily utilized methods by both
organized crime and terrorist groups for moving funds internationally.[48] False trade invoicing disguises the transmission of value from one jurisdiction to another. This can be done through over-invoicing or under-invoicing.[49] If a U.S.-based terrorist purchases some American honey, and then exports that honey to Yemen, he could overprice the shipment by US $100,000 without attracting much attention. When the Yemeni importer pays for the overpriced honey, some of that money will go towards paying off the U.S. honey producer. The additional US $100,000 goes right into the pocket of the fellow terrorist in the U.S., who arranged for the shipment. According to one government source, this is believed to have happened in the months leading up to 9/11.[50]

When investigators followed leads connected to the 9/11 hijackers they ran into a number of suspicious transactions related to the Middle East honey trade. Thanks to a tip-off from a confidential informant, agents rushed to Kennedy Airport to find two suspects stashing US $140,000 in cash inside a honey shipment bound for the Middle East.[51] Learning of the suspicious honey transactions, Professor John Zdanowicz at Florida International University took it upon himself to run through all of the Commerce Department data on honey imports and exports between the U.S. and al-Qaeda watch list countries in the months leading up to 9/11. What he found raised a number of eyebrows, particularly for honey exported to Yemen. Although Yemen is known for its honey trade, importing 600 metric tons per year and exporting its own special brand of honey from the ancient Sidr tree,[52] these transactions were nevertheless highly unusual, suggesting the surreptitious movement of funds from Yemen to the U.S. The investigation ultimately led to the listing of the Yemen-based Al Nur Honey Center, Al Nur Honey Press Shop and the Al-Shifa Honey Press for Industry and Commerce on OFAC’s list of designated terrorism-related entities.[53]

Of all of the methods of moving terrorist funds, false trade invoicing offers many advantages for criminal organizations. While it is not simple and can be quite time consuming, it is incredibly convenient if the group already has front companies to conduct the transactions. Traditionally, the risk of detection has been quite low, but with the continued establishment of Trade Transparency Units (TTU’s) around the world, this risk is rising. In addition to assisting with port security, Trade Transparency Units attempt to scour big data, searching for unusually priced transactions.[54] While this method is unlikely to catch falsely-invoiced shipments in real time, the paper trail related to the discovered transactions can be a starting point for money laundering and terrorism financing investigations.

*High-value commodities:* Valuable commodities like gold and diamonds offer yet another convenient method for transmitting value across borders. Gold is an especially reliable form of transportable payment during times of strife, or when fiat currencies are heavily devalued or not easily convertible. Gold can also be smelted into any shape and disguised for easy transport. Its weight, quality and price can be easily determined, and it is nearly impossible to trace its origin.[55] In addition to these advantages, gold is extremely important in Middle Eastern and South
Asian cultures. Bridal dowries are often presented in the form of high quality gold jewelry. The region is also home to the world’s largest gold souks (markets), so the transport of gold by travelers is not likely to raise eyebrows. For these reasons, it should come as no surprise that gold has been offered as a reward incentive by both al Qaeda and the Taliban for would-be jihadists.

[56] Other groups such as the militant right-wing Posse Comitatus in the U.S., and the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan, have been known to store and trade gold.[57]

Diamonds and their use by terrorists groups are more controversial, with researchers divided over the reliability and weight of the evidence. There is little doubt that Hezbollah has a hand in the diamond business, especially give the large Lebanese diaspora involved in the African diamond trade.[58] What is more controversial is the extent to which al Qaeda and its affiliates have used diamonds to store or move value. The first allegations arose not long after 9/11 when Douglas Farah, a Washington Post reporter at the time, declared a connection,[59] but there were many doubters. A brief FBI investigation soon after 9/11 turned up nothing, but more evidence began to surface in the following years, especially with the capture and questioning of Ahmed Ghailani in Pakistan in 2004. Ghailani, a senior al-Qaeda operative, confessed to buying conflict diamonds and spent a great deal of time traveling in and out of West African conflict zones between 1999 and 2002.[60] There were also a lot of questions raised about Aafia Siddiqui, an MIT-trained Pakistani microbiologist and al-Qaeda sympathizer, who was captured by U.S. forces and now sits in a Texas prison, sentenced to 86 years for trying to kill Americans. She is alleged to have traveled to Liberia to purchase conflict diamonds prior to 9/11.[61] Why would al-Qaeda resort to the diamond trade? After the 1998 East African embassy bombings the Clinton Administration froze more than US $220 million of assets belonging to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The organization needed to convert its remaining assets into something transportable, which could not easily be traced or seized.[62]

Gold and diamonds clearly offer many obvious advantages for a terrorist. Diamonds are especially easy to transport and hide, and both are easy to convert into cash. But obtaining diamonds and gold from the source (such as African mines) is neither simple nor convenient. They need to be transported by hand, and that always carries the risk of seizure or theft. Where valuable commodities continue to play a major role is in settling hawala accounts, for both criminal and law abiding hawaladars.[63]

Other methods: The methods described above are the most common way terrorists move money. However, it is worth mentioning that there are other methods that criminals use, but, so far, have not been used extensively by terrorists groups. One relatively new, and widely discussed, method is the use of stored value cards (SVCs).[64] “Closed” cards are tied to a particular business, while “open” cards, like prepaid debit cards, can be used anywhere. These cards, especially the open ones, “provide a compact, easily transportable, and potentially anonymous way” to move funds.[65] While drug dealers and money launderers have used SVCs, terrorists...
have not been known to use them in any meaningful way.[66] Likewise, casinos are often mentioned as a venue for criminal money laundering, but we have found no evidence that terrorists utilize them for moving funds. As another example, digital currencies, like Bitcoin, are increasingly being used by criminals, especially drug dealers, but we have seen little evidence that terrorists are using them.[67] A 2008 report lists several examples of criminals using new payment methods (NPMs), like digital currencies, stored-value cards, and mobile payments, but lists just a single example of terrorists selling phone cards to raise funds.[68]

Conclusion

To sum up, terrorist groups utilize multiple methods for moving funds, demonstrating how they are flexible and adaptive; when one method becomes riskier or costlier, they move to other methods. Terrorists also take advantage of legal and regulatory differences between states, finding the seams where they can work. This makes stopping terrorist financial flows a challenging problem.

To counter the movement of terrorist funds, there are reporting requirements for banks and non-bank financial institutions, as well as a loosely coordinated international regime consisting of organizations like the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units which share financial intelligence, and FATF-style regional bodies that evaluate member states’ compliance regimes. It is beyond the scope of this article to describe the full regime here, as others have done so more than adequately.[69] This regime has had a mixed record of success, despite insufficient international coordination, deficient capacity, and inadequate implementation in many countries. For example, al-Qaeda especially, but also Jemaah Islamiyah, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Hamas, and the Abu Sayyaf Group have been unable to maintain their levels of violence because of financial difficulties.[70] Additionally, financial data has been a key component in prosecuting terrorism cases, with FBI special agents often making use of SAR filings. This is because financial transactions leave “footprints” for law enforcement agencies to intercept and follow. And even when investigations do not begin with suspicious financial transactions, financial records can provide key evidence in piecing together the details of a case, as it did with the would-be Heathrow liquid explosive bombers in 2006.[71]

Despite these successes, there are also failures and challenges. For example, as the 9/11 Commission noted, the regulatory regime in place before 9/11 did not fail, rather it was “never designed to detect or disrupt the transactions of the type that financed 9/11.”[72] The point here is that there is no way to create a perfect regulatory and enforcement regime that can stop all criminal transactions. Nor would we want such a heavy regime, because then it would also impose costs on the vast majority of legal, legitimate transactions that occur within the financial system.
To return to the attributes described earlier, there is little countries can or should do to affect many of them, because so many methods are used for legitimate purposes. We do not want to decrease the potential volume of funds that can be transferred with any method (with the exception of cash transactions); nor do we want to make methods costlier, slower, more complex, or less convenient.

Instead, the focus should be on making the risks of detection higher. Specifically, this means enhancing regulatory compliance at the ground level and improving international collaboration, cooperation, and capacity building, as well as prioritizing enforcement with non-compliant countries.[73] Making the transfer of funds riskier can be especially effective against the many terrorist groups who place a high value on the internal control of their operatives, even at the risk of operational security. For many groups, like al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq and North Africa, they obsessively demand that their members keep detailed records of their financial transactions. Their choice of “control” over “security” provides an important vulnerability that states can exploit.[74]

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Notes


[16] Passas, “Informal Value Transfer Systems, Terrorism and Money Laundering,” is the most thorough analysis of Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS). We are really describing what he calls “informal funds transfer systems” (IFTS), which are the more traditional, informal systems. Passas lists many more examples of informal transfer systems on pp. 25-26.


[24] Tehrik-e-Taliban is also known as the Pakistani Taliban.


[26] Neither hawaladar was ever convicted of knowing anything about the Times Square bomb plot. Aftab Ali Khan was jailed for visa fraud and operating an unlicensed hawala and subsequently deported to Pakistan in May 2011. Mr. Younis was granted leniency for coming forward and cooperating with law enforcement. He avoided jail, paid a small fine and was also deported back to Pakistan.


[31] Thompson, Trust is the Coin of the Realm. See Chapter 6, which explains well how they are critical for facilitating all manner of aid transfers, family remittances and foreign trade transactions.

[32] Based on interviews with former U.S. Department of Treasury officials.


[37] All figures taken from Roth et al, “Monograph on Terrorist Financing,” Appendix A.


[45] Roth et al, “Monograph on Terrorist Financing,” Appendix A.


[54] For a good explanation of TTU’s, see http://www.ice.gov/trade-transparency/


[56] Cassara and Jorisch, On the Trail of Terror Finance, p. 97.

[57] Cassara and Jorisch, On the Trail of Terror Finance, p. 97.


[61] Farah, Blood From Stones.


[64] “U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment,” includes SVCs as a MSB.


[73] Levitt and Jacobson, “The Money Trail,” pp. 43-43 have a well-thought out list of recommendations on this topic.

Hezbollah's Organized Criminal Enterprises in Europe
by Matthew Levitt

Abstract

Hezbollah plots in Europe over the past year exposed a return to violent operations being conducted by the Iranian supported Lebanese Shi’ite group. Plots in Bulgaria and Cyprus led to a rigorous debate among European Union member states over whether or not to ban the organization’s military wing. But this only marks Hezbollah’s return to violent operations in Europe. Hezbollah has long used Europe as a staging ground for operations to be carried out elsewhere, as a logistical hub, and as a place where the group and its supporters could raise funds through a variety of criminal enterprises. The focus of this article is the wide variety of criminal activities Hezbollah engages in, revealing a global network that conducts extensive criminal operations throughout Europe.

Hezbollah plots in Europe over the past year have led to a rigorous debate among European Union (EU) member states over the efficacy of adding the military wing of Hezbollah to the EU’s list of banned terrorist groups (which they did in July of this year). But Hezbollah plots in places like Cyprus and Bulgaria are far from the totality of Hezbollah activities in Europe. Indeed, Hezbollah has long used Europe as a staging ground for operations to be carried out elsewhere, as a logistical hub, and as a place where the group and its supporters could raise funds through a variety of criminal enterprises. the latter is the focus of this article.

“Special Operations Abroad”

In June, Germany’s domestic intelligence agency reported that Hezbollah’s uses German-based mosques and their affiliated organizations to raise funds for the group.[1] In fact, Germany has long been a center of Hezbollah activity in Europe, and for years German security officials saw Hezbollah’s terrorist chief Imad Mughniyeh, in close concert with Iran, as the key leader of the group’s efforts related to “planning, preparing and carrying out terrorist operations outside of Lebanon.”[2] Bassam Makki’s 1989 plot to bomb Israeli targets in Germany offers one stark case in point but Hezbollah’s activities in Germany did not end there. In 1994, for example, Germany issued a warning related to the possible entry into the country of “a group sent by Mughniyeh to carry out attacks against U.S. targets.”[3] According to Hezbollah scholar Magnus Ranstorp, several senior Hezbollah commanders shared responsibility with Mughniyeh for the group’s “special operations abroad” in Europe, including Hussein Khalil, Ibrahim Aqil, Muhammad Haydar, Kharib Nasser, and Abd al-Hamadi.[4]
Over time, the Hezbollah support network in Germany would grow. According to the annual reports of Germany’s domestic intelligence service, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, some 800 members or supporters of Hezbollah lived in Germany in 2002. That number increased to around 850 by 2004 and to 900 by 2005. Among “Arab Islamist groups” in Germany, Hezbollah had become the second largest by 2005.[5]

That year, a German court deported a Hezbollah member who had lived in the country for twenty years. Though Germany had not banned Hezbollah as a terrorist group, the Dusseldorf court ruled the man was “a member of an organization that supports international terrorism” and refused to extend his visa.[6] German security agencies “intensively watch” groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, German minister of interior Wolfgang Schaeuble commented in summer 2006. He noted that one reason for his concern was that “in the past, there were attempts to recruit suicide attackers in Germany.”[7] The latest report shows that there are now 950 Hezbollah members, with 250 of them in Berlin. One way that money raised by supporters goes to the group is through a charity called Orphan Project Lebanon, which is also the branch that “promotes suicide bombings.”[8]

Currently in Germany, and in almost all of the EU member states, this type of fundraising is illegal because Hezbollah is not listed as a terrorist organization (only fundraising that is explicitly for the military wing of Hezbollah is banned). This allows Hezbollah to raise money in Europe hand-over-fist like the Red Cross. However, Hezbollah raises funds in a variety of other ways that are explicitly criminal worldwide and notably in the EU where a debate on whether or not to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization is taking place.

**Criminal Enterprises**

Hezbollah’s involvement in crime stems from a few different motives, the basic necessity of funding, insurance from failure of patrons’ contributions, and as a way to establish independence from its patrons. In the past it was estimated that Hezbollah received somewhere between US $100-$200 million a year from Iran and additional resources from Syria. The past few years however, these partners have not been as generous with their funding. Iran is undergoing devastating economic sanctions and the Syrian state is caught up in a civil war. Today, these realities impact Europe as Hezbollah operatives’ criminal activity increases, including narcotics trafficking, money laundering, fraud and counterfeiting. And, once again, Hezbollah’s activities in Europe have turned violent, as exposed in the successful attack in Bulgaria in July 2012.

In March 2013 a Cypriot court convicted Hossam Yaccoub—a dual Swedish-Lebanese citizen—and sentenced him to four years. Among other charges, Hossam Yaccoub was convicted of participation in an organized crime group and the preparation of a criminal act. The head of the three-judge panel declared: “It has been proven that Hezbollah is an organization that operates under complete secrecy. There is no doubt that this group has multiple members and proceeds
with various activities, including military training of its members. Therefore, the court rules that Hezbollah acts as a criminal organization.”[9] This is the most recent and prominent case of Hezbollah acting as an organized criminal group in Europe, but in fact, Hezbollah has been acting as an organized criminal group for years.

Despite being discovered in several cases, Hezbollah operatives continue to run one of the largest and most sophisticated global criminal operations in the world. These criminal activities have strengthened Hezbollah and made it more difficult for Western nations to counter. In the 2013 SOCTA (Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment) report, Europol identified several “crime enablers.” These included, “logistical hotspots, diaspora communities, corruption, the use of legal business structures, cross-border opportunities, identity theft, document forgery, and violence.”[10] Hezbollah exploits all of these, not only in Europe, but worldwide. Most of the publicly available material regarding Hezbollah activities in Europe comes from US investigations. Hezbollah has long been designated as a terrorist organization by the US government; therefore its law enforcement and intelligence agencies have legal authority to pursue investigations into Hezbollah activities. This is now the case in Europe as well, but again only for alleged military wing members. Nearly all the cases involving Hezbollah are transnational in nature allowing even US investigations to uncover some Hezbollah activity in Europe. Due to these limitations, it is likely that there is more activity that has not been discovered.

**Narco-trafficking**

Hezbollah has taken advantage of cross border opportunities to traffic arms, cash, and drugs. In 2008, German authorities at the Frankfurt airport arrested two Lebanese men carrying more than eight million euros raised by a Hezbollah cocaine smuggling ring. The two had trained in Hezbollah camps, however, they were not arrested for terrorist or militant activities, but for cocaine trafficking. The subsequent investigation led to a surprising discovery, traces of cocaine on the bills along with the fingerprint of an infamous Dutch drug kingpin.[11] A year later, two other men from the same ring involved in moving drugs from Beirut into Europe were arrested in house raid in Speyer.[12] In 2009, Admiral James Stavridis, then commander of U.S. Southern Command, noted an expanded presence of terrorist drug traffickers in West Africa, which had become their “springboard to Europe.”[13] By late February 2012, Yuri Fedotov, head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, informed the UN Security Council that “The West African transit route feeds a European cocaine market which in recent years grew four fold… We estimate that cocaine trafficking in West and Central Africa generates some US $900 million annually.”[14]

In January 2011, one of the largest Hezbollah narcotics trafficking and money laundering schemes was disrupted. The U.S. Department of Treasury identified Ayman Joumma, along with an additional nine persons and nineteen businesses involved in the scheme. A Drug Enforcement Administration investigation revealed that Joumma laundered as much as US $200 million a
month from the sale of cocaine in Europe and the Middle East through operations located in Lebanon, West Africa, Panama, and Columbia, using money-exchange houses, bulk cash smuggling, and other schemes. Joumma’s network laundered money through Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) accounts, which he used to execute sophisticated trade-based money laundering schemes. For example, LCB used U.S. correspondent banking relationships to send suspiciously structured electronic wire transfers to U.S.-based used car dealerships, some of which had already arisen in other, unrelated drug-related investigations. The proceeds of the used car sales were ultimately repatriated to Joumma’s network in Lebanon.[15] In June 2013, the LCB was fined US $102 million for its role in laundering the money.[16]

Nine months after his designation as a narco-trafficker in February 2011, Ayman Joumma was indicted on charges of conspiracy to distribute narcotics and money laundering, including coordinating cocaine shipments for sale in the United States.[17] Joumma had first emerged on DEA agents’ radar when he placed a call to a phone tied to Chekry Harb, a Hezbollah-affiliated drug trafficker in Colombia. Joumma had arranged for the proceeds of cocaine sales to be picked up at a Paris hotel and then laundered back to Colombia, but the pickup turned out to be a sting operation. Listening in on the line, agents heard Joumma nonchalantly muse, “I just lost a million euros in France.” Cell phones seized at the Paris hotel tied Joumma, himself a Lebanese Sunni Muslim, to Hezbollah.[18]

Stolen Goods and Weapons Trafficking

This was not the only U.S. investigation to expose Hezbollah’s criminal links to Europe. For example, in the late 2000s Hassan Karaki was helping lead a broad criminal conspiracy to sell counterfeit and stolen currency to an undercover FBI informant posing as a member of the Philadelphia criminal underworld.[19] In a parallel plot overseen by Hezbollah politician Hassan Hodroj, Hezbollah sought to procure a long list of sophisticated weapons in a black market scheme involving Hezbollah operatives across the globe.

In the Philadelphia case an undercover officer posed as someone who could fence stolen goods to the group of suspected Lebanese criminals. Members of the group bought what they believed to be stolen property from the undercover agent and sent the merchandise to destinations as diverse as Michigan, California, Paraguay, Brazil, Slovakia, Belgium, Bahrain, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. The money for these purchases came from Danni Tarraf, a German-Lebanese procurement agent for Hezbollah with homes in Lebanon and Slovakia and significant business interests in China and Lebanon.[20] Tarraf wasted little time before asking whether the agent could supply guided missiles and 10,000 “commando” machine guns from the United States.[21] With that, a massive Hezbollah criminal fundraising and weapons procurement case was all but delivered to investigators on a silver platter.[22]
When Tarraf visited the United States in March 2009, the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and its member agencies put on a show, giving him a tour of a fake criminal network capable of procuring many of the weapons Tarraf sought for Hezbollah through his company, Power Express. Law enforcement officers concluded that Power Express essentially “operated as a subsidiary of Hezbollah’s technical procurement wing.” [23] In another meeting three months later, Tarraf was very clear about why he wanted guided and shoulder-fired missiles: they had to be able to “take down an F-16.” Tarraf showed the undercover agent exact weapons specifications on the internet as the FBI taped the conversations and captured the computer search records. Within weeks Tarraf and the undercover agent met in Philadelphia again, where Tarraf paid the agent a US $20,000 deposit toward the purchase of Stinger missiles and 10,000 Colt M4 machine guns. Tarraf noted that the weapons should be exported to Latakia, Syria, where Hezbollah could shut down all the cameras when the shipment arrived. [24]

In November 2009, Tarraf visited the United States one last time to inspect the missiles and machine guns the undercover agent had procured for him. [25] On November 21, 2009, Tarraf was arrested on terrorism and other charges and quickly confessed in full, admitting to being a Hezbollah member, receiving military training from the group, and “working with others to acquire massive quantities of weapons for the benefit of Hezbollah.” [26]

Given Tarraf’s global contacts, investigators saw him as the most valuable target of their operation. But their next priority was Dib Hani Harb, the son-in-law of senior Hezbollah official Hassan Hodroj and a close associate of Hezbollah militant Hasan Karaki. While an undercover agent worked to build Tarraf’s trust, an FBI source worked another angle of the case, building rapport with Moussa Ali Hamdan, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Lebanon involved in petty crime but also well connected to senior Hezbollah officials. [27] In late 2007, Hamdan met with someone who promised to deliver a reliable flow of bulk stolen goods—cell phones, laptops, game consoles, and automobiles—that Hamdan could resell for a nice personal profit. But Hamdan’s new supplier was actually an FBI source, who helped authorities unwind an extensive international Hezbollah network.

Counterfeit and Stolen Currency

As the business relationship between the two men grew, Moussa Hamdan introduced the FBI source to the Hezbollah official mentioned earlier, Beirut-based Dib Hani Harb. In a conversation with the source, Harb explained that Iran produces high-quality counterfeit currencies in facilities staffed by people in the Baalbek working eighteen hours a day to produce the fake bills for Hezbollah’s use. Harb was shopping for a buyer. Hezbollah officials would need approval to sell the source this particular type of high-quality counterfeit currency, he added. The necessary approvals apparently came through, because two months later Hamdan and the source were hashing out the details of a deal for US $1 million in counterfeit U.S. currency to be sold at
around forty cents to the dollar. But something strange happened when Hezbollah officials in Lebanon sent sample counterfeit notes to the source for inspection. The supposedly counterfeit notes were in fact genuine currency.[28]

Law enforcement officers thought Hezbollah was trying to scam the source by passing off genuine bills as extremely high-end forgeries and then providing low-end forgeries when the deal actually came through. In fact, Hezbollah suddenly had an acute interest in dumping a stockpile of genuine currency stolen by Hezbollah supporters around the world. In support of its international terrorist activities, Hezbollah had a program in place through which Hezbollah supporters sent stolen currency to Iran for later use by Imad Mughniyeh and members of Hezbollah's IJO. Following Mughniyeh's assassination, a decision was made to sell the stockpile of stolen money.[29]

So it was in early December 2008, just about a week after Moussa Hamdan and the source met outside Philadelphia to discuss plans for the sale of the counterfeit bills, that the source found himself on the phone with Dib Harb in Beirut discussing plans to buy stolen currency at a rate of about sixty-five cents to the dollar. The scene was now set for a meeting in person to firm up the relationships underpinning the source's illicit dealings with Hezbollah. After receiving another photo album containing a new batch of stolen currency, the source traveled to Beirut in mid-February to meet Harb's boss, Hasan Antar Karaki, who seemed at ease, unguardedly discussing Hezbollah and his own ties to the group.[30]

Karaki reiterated to the source that the stolen currency could not be spent in Lebanon because it was “blood money” Hezbollah smuggled from Iran through Turkey and Syria into Lebanon. Some of the money—just under US $10,000—was money stolen from Iraq, the source was told, explaining why Hezbollah was sensitive the funds be spent in small amounts only, and not in Lebanon. Karaki's assistant followed up on the meeting, not only sending samples of counterfeit US $100 bills but European €200 notes as well.[31] In April 2009, Karaki sent Harb to meeting in southern Florida with the source and the source's purported Philadelphia crime boss. The men negotiated terms for the sale of stolen U.S. currency and multiple counterfeit currencies. According to Harb, the eighteen- to twenty-hour days worked by Hezbollah's representatives to counterfeit U.S. dollars also included currency from “Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the European Union.”[32] At one point, Harb showed the undercover agent a Swedish krona bill with stains from a dye-pack security system used by banks to mark stolen funds. According to Harb, the bill was part of a US $2 million bank heist Hezbollah supporters pulled off in Sweden. He explained that Hezbollah cells conduct robberies all over the world and send the money to Iran, where it is held before ultimately being distributed to Hezbollah in Lebanon.[33]

Karaki sent Dib Harb to an April 2009 meeting in southern Florida with the source and the source's purported Philadelphia crime boss. The men negotiated terms for the sale of the stolen
U.S. currency and multiple counterfeit currencies. All told, the Hezbollah officials provided the source a little less than $10,000 in counterfeit U.S. currency.[34]

Harb also explained that Hezbollah does not just produce counterfeit currency, but false European documents as well. Karaki is a major figure in Hezbollah’s forgery operations, a role that would also allow for the production of forged passports and visa stamps if desired. He offered several varieties of passports, explaining that the Italian passports he acquired were genuine books from Italian immigration officials. He also noted that Czech passports were possible to obtain as well. In fact, at the moment he had a man traveling to the Czech Republic for the purpose of obtaining passports. A few months after the meetings in Florida, Harb and Karaki delivered a couple other varieties in the form of fraudulent British and Canadian passports to the source using the pictures and biographical information he had provided.[35]

The meetings in southern Florida went so smoothly that the source was invited back to Beirut in mid-June to meet senior Hezbollah officials, including Karaki and Harb’s father-in-law, Hassan Hodroj, who served on Hezbollah’s political council. Publicly described as a Hezbollah spokesman and the head of its Palestinian issues portfolio, Hodroj was also involved in Hezbollah’s procurement arm.[36] Hodroj knew what he wanted: 1,200 Colt M4 assault rifles, which the source said he could procure for US $1,800 apiece. Hezbollah only needed “heavy machinery,” he added, for the “fight against the Jews and to protect Lebanon.” Like Dani Tarraf, Hodroj wanted the weapons shipped to the port of Latakia, Syria, which he described as “ours.”[37]

Before the meeting ended, Hodroj broached one more subject: Hezbollah’s desire to procure still more sensitive items from the United States, specifically communication and “spy” systems. Hodroj confided that he was involved not only in weapons but also technology procurement for Hezbollah and asked him to keep his eyes open for technologies that could help Hezbollah secure its own and spy on its adversaries’ communications. In the meantime, Hodroj directed the source to work through Dib Harb to complete the deal for the M4 machine guns.[38]

While investigators succeeded in luring Dani Tarraf back to the United States, bureaucratic infighting undermined their effort to do the same for Dib Harb.[39] The case came to a head in November 2009, when authorities rolled out three sets of indictments and exposed a Hezbollah politician’s role in global arms deals and criminal enterprises.

Money Laundering and Smuggling

Further US investigation exposed still other types of Hezbollah criminal activities with ties to Europe. With so many successful fundraising schemes at the ready, Hezbollah needed effective means of moving the proceeds of its criminal enterprises to Lebanon. Often, operatives would send money back with friends, relatives, or others from the Lebanese community who were traveling to Lebanon. Some were couriers by happenstance, pleased to help a friend transport money home, possibly not even aware the money was intended for Hezbollah. Others were
knowing participants who willingly carried funds to Lebanon for Hezbollah, either out of ideological devotion or for a fee. But Hezbollah never put all its eggs in one basket, using hawala dealers (informal value transfer systems based on trust), money-service businesses such as Western Union, charities, and various old-fashioned smuggling techniques to move money to Lebanon. In some cases, the means Hezbollah operatives used to move their money also effectively laundered the money as well.

Whatever money he raised in the United States, Mahmoud Youssef Kourani who had furtively entered into the United States through Mexico in 2001,[40] was confident he could get it back to Hezbollah. Once, Kourani told an FBI informant that he had recently sent US $40,000 in money orders and cash to Hezbollah and could send as much money back to Lebanon as he liked because a friend who worked at the Beirut airport helped smuggle the money into the country.[41] Nine different FBI informants independently identified Kourani as a Hezbollah operative, alternately describing him as a Hezbollah fundraiser, member, and fighter.[42]

Hezbollah supporters in the United States also had access to an airport employee much closer to home. From 1999—three years after immigrating to the United States from Lebanon—until his arrest in 2007, Riad Skaff worked as a ground services coordinator for Air France at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport. With an active airport security badge, Skaff had full access to all secure areas of an international terminal. For a fee, Skaff smuggled bulk cash packages onto airplanes, circumventing security inspections. At one point, Skaff told an undercover agent posing as an individual seeking to smuggle US $25,000 in cash to Lebanon, “I am in charge of the plane, everything…. It is dangerous, if they catch [me], they take me to jail…. “ Skaff did smuggle the money onto an Air France flight to Paris, noting to the undercover agent that millions of dollars pass through Paris to Lebanon daily. Skaff later smuggled US $100,000 and a cellular jammer on another Paris-bound flight for the undercover agent. A month later, he smuggled a package containing four night vision rifle scopes and two night vision goggles onto a Paris-bound flight. [43]

In a government sentencing memorandum filed after Skaff pleaded guilty to all the charges against him, prosecutors put Skaff’s illicit conduct in the context of Hezbollah support activity. Arguing that Skaff’s conduct “in essence was that of a mercenary facilitating the smuggling of large amounts of cash and dangerous defense items for a fee,” prosecutors noted he was fully aware the items were destined for Lebanon, “a war-torn country besieged by the militant organization, Hezbollah.”[44] Prosecutors never accused Skaff of being a Hezbollah supporter, just a criminal happy to accommodate the needs of potential Hezbollah supporters for a fee.[45]

Hossam Yaacoub in Cyprus

These investigations reveal a global criminal network, including longstanding and substantial networks in Europe. The latest example of Hezbollah’s ability to operate freely within Europe
comes from the case of Hossam Yaacoub, whose trial and conviction in Cypriot court opened a window into the other types of activities that Hezbollah is involved with in Europe. In contrast to recent Hezbollah plots in Bulgaria in January and July 2012, which led to largely intelligence investigations that did not lend themselves to sharing much information publicly, a treasure trove of information has poured out of the trial in Cyprus of Hossam Yaacoub, the Lebanese-Swedish dual citizen and self-confessed Hezbollah operative arrested just days before the Burgas, Bulgaria bombing.

Yaacoub was arrested—just two weeks prior to the deadly attack in Bulgaria, where five Israelis and a Bulgarian bus driver were killed when a bus exploded leaving the airport in Burgas—after performing a surveillance operation on the airport in Cyprus. Yaacoub not only was helping to plan similar operations in Cyprus but in fact had already helped carry out other “missions” in Europe. As a dual citizen, he used his legitimate Swedish passport to perform several courier missions for Hezbollah. In the first, in 2008, he delivered a large, thin envelope to a person in Antalya, Turkey. Then, in 2009, he traveled to Lyon France where he picked up a bag from one person using identification signs and code words and transported it to another, again using identification signs and code words. On the second mission, he went to Amsterdam, where he retrieved a cellphone, two SIM cards, and unknown object wrapped in newspaper, which he brought back to Lebanon.

Yaacoub was sent to Cyprus in 2009 for the express purpose, according to his account of the instructions his Hezbollah handler gave him, “to create a cover story for people to get to know me, to keep coming with a justifiable purpose and without giving rise to suspicions.” He traveled to Cyprus via Dubai to strengthen his cover, and spent a week vacationing in Ayia Napa at Hezbollah’s expense. When he returned to Cyprus two years later he would be able to say that the idea for importing merchandise from Cyprus came to him while on vacation there in 2009.[46]

Then, in December 2011 and again in January 2012, Aiman sent Yaacoub back to Cyprus “to create a cover story” as a merchant interested in importing to Lebanon juices from a specific local company in Cyprus. He was also tasked with collecting information about renting a warehouse in Cyprus. “I did all these things after receiving clear instructions from Hezbollah, so to have Cyprus as a basis [sic] and be able to serve the organization,” he said. Yaacoub maintained he did not know why Hezbollah wanted this base of operations, but speculated “perhaps they would commit a criminal act or store firearms and explosives.”[47]

Yaacoub conceded to police that his December 2011 visit to Cyprus actually involved several separate missions. First, his Hezbollah handler tasked Yaacoub with scoping out a parking lot behind the Limassol Old Hospital and near the police and traffic departments. He wanted Yaacoub to take pictures and be able to draw a schematic of the area on his return. Yaacoub was to specifically look for security cameras, if payment was required on entry, if car keys were left with a parking attendant, if there was a security guard, among other observations. Yaacoub was also told
to find internet cafes in Lamassol and Nicosia, which he marked on a map, and to purchase three
SIM cards for mobile phones from different vendors on different days, which he did. He also
found good meeting places, such as at a zoo in Limassol and outside a castle in Larnaca. In the
event a meeting was necessary, Yaacoub would receive a text message. A text about the weather
meant to go to the Foinikoudes promenade in Larnaca that day at 6 PM. If no one showed up,
Yaacoub was to return the following day at 2:00 PM, and then again the next day at 10:30 AM.
Aiman also wanted Yaacoub “to spot Israeli restaurants in Limassol, where Jews eat ‘kosher,’” but
an internet search indicated there were none. Later, in January 2012, Yaacoub was instructed to
check out the Golden Arches hotel in Limassol, collect brochures and reconnoiter the area (he did
survey the area, but the hotel was being renovated).[48]

“Hezbollah knows Cyprus very well,” Yaacoub told police, adding he thought his
taskings were intended to update the group’s files “and create a database.” He insisted
he was not part of any plot “to hit any target in Cyprus with firearms or explosives,”
adding that he would have had the right to refuse the mission if asked to do such a
thing.[49] Yaacoub expressed support for “the armed struggle for the liberation of
Lebanon from Israel,” but was “not in favor of the terrorist attacks against innocent
people.”[50]

Then, he added: “I don’t believe that the missions I executed in Cyprus were connected with
the preparation of a terrorist attack in Cyprus. It was just collecting information about the Jews,
and this is what my organization is doing everywhere in the world.”[51]

On March 21, a Cypriot criminal court convicted Yaacoub of helping to plan attacks against
Israeli tourists on the island last July. In their 80-page decision, the judges rejected Yaacoub’s
defense that he collected information for Hezbollah but did not know what it would be used for.
There could be no “innocent explanation” of Yaacoub’s actions, the court determined, adding that
he “should have logically known” his surveillance was linked to a criminal act.[52]

Conclusion

Hezbollah is once again extremely active in Europe, but no longer limits itself to fundraising
and logistics as it did for many years. Speaking last August, just weeks after the Cyprus and
Bulgaria plots, a senior US government official bluntly stated: “We assess that Hezbollah could
attack in Europe or elsewhere at any time with little or no warning.”[53] More recently, in its
annual Country Reports on Terrorism the US State Department noted that 2012 showed “a
marked resurgence of Iran’s state sponsorship of terrorism, through its Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), its Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), and
Tehran’s ally Hizballah.”[54] Europe is no exception and as the debate on whether to designate the
group as a terrorist organization continues it is important to bear in mind that under the EU’s
Common Position 931, “a designation provides for a freezing of all funds, other financial assets
and economic resources belonging to the persons, groups and entities concerned” and “are subject
to enhanced measures relating to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.”[55] Given Hezbollah’s extensive criminal network, it is clear that such a designation would be a powerful policy prescription, and until the EU takes such a step Hezbollah’s criminal and terrorist activities will remain at high levels.

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Notes


[3] Ibid.


[34] United States of America v. Hassan Hodroj et al, Indictment.


[38] Ibid.


[43] United States of America v. Riad Skaff, Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, No. 07CR0041, United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, May 27, 2008;


[47] Ibid.


[49] Ibid.


[51] Ibid.


Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and the Globalization of Supply
by Joel Hernández

Abstract

This case study analyzes the diversification of both terrorist groups and drug traffickers and the convergence between the two types of organizations in recent decades. As financial markets have become globalized, so have opportunities for illicit groups to transact with each other. The article builds on the collapse of Lebanese Canadian Bank in 2011 after its designation by the U.S. Treasury Department as a money-laundering financial institution tied to global drug trafficking and to Hezbollah. It follows the trajectory of two Hezbollah-associated drug kingpins: Ayman Joumaa, who facilitated trade between Hezbollah and the Zetas, and Maroun Saade, who was apprehended attempting to connect Hezbollah to the Taliban. In its analysis of the histories, motivations, and relationships among these three groups, the article reflects on relationships currently in existence between terrorist and drug-trafficking organizations, and on the implications of the possible directions these relationships might take in the future.

2011 was an eventful year for Michele Leonhart, Preet Bharara, and Neil MacBride. Working through the Treasury Department and the U.S. Federal Court system, they took on Hezbollah and its errant banker, and dismantled a US $329 million money-laundering scheme run out of the ninth-largest bank in Lebanon, and underwriting a global drug trafficking network by means of which Hezbollah transacted with Los Zetas and attempted to transact with the Taliban as well. The legal record that Leonhart, Bharara, and MacBride left behind reveals, in intriguing detail, a few strands of the intricate transactional webs that link together terrorists, drug traffickers, and money launderers, across continents and oceans.

What follows is their story and its context.

The Puppeteers: Ayman Joumaa and Maroun Saade

DEA Investigator Michele Leonhart was ready to go public. Her five year-investigation of a suspicious Lebanese-Colombian hotel owner named Ayman Joumaa had uncovered a network that “coordinated the transportation, distribution, and sale of multi-ton shipments of cocaine from South America... operating in Lebanon, West Africa, Panama, and Colombia.”[1] Acting on her findings, on January 26, 2011, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control labeled Joumaa as a Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker, along with nine individuals and nineteen entities affiliated with him. About two weeks later, on February 10, the Treasury Department tightened the screws on Joumaa by exposing his clients—revealing links between
Joumaa’s network and Hezbollah as well as Los Zetas—as well as his banker—designating Lebanese Canadian Bank and its subsidiaries as a “financial institution of primary money laundering concern.”[2]

A few days later, on Valentine’s Day, Leonhart and U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara announced the unsealing of charges against Mr. Maroun Saade and six associates—including an alleged associate of Hezbollah—with “conspiracy to engage in narco-terrorism... conspiracy to provide material support and resources to terrorists—namely, the Taliban... and conspiracy to acquire and transfer anti-aircraft missiles.”[3]

On December 13, 2011, following up on the DEA and Treasury Department’s work, U.S. Attorney Neil MacBride formally charged Joumaa with drug trafficking and money laundering.[4] Two days later, to close off the year, Bharara filed a civil complaint against Lebanese Canadian Bank and its affiliates, shedding further light on their money-laundering activities.

The stories of Mr. Saade, Mr. Joumaa, and the erstwhile Lebanese Canadian Bank, present a fascinating view into a global web of illicit activity linking geographically distant and ideologically distinct terrorist groups. This network explains both the extraordinary resilience of Hezbollah and the Taliban, and the meteoric rise of the Zetas. It also provides a convincing explanation why military operations against any of these groups have succeeded only at the tactical level, while failing to strategically defeat them. The Taliban speak disingenuously when they snicker that “you have all the watches, but we have all the time”[5] at their adversary: they enjoy, in fact, much more than a mere chronological advantage over the ISAF. Hezbollah, the Taliban, the Zetas, and a host of other transnational criminal groups play interlocking roles in a global network of mutually supporting commercial exchanges, by means of which they fund and replenish each other’s treasuries and armories.

This paper will begin with a historical and ideological background of the two terrorist groups and the drug-trafficking organization cited in its introduction. It will then bore into each group’s relationship with drug trafficking, analyzing the practical and ideological foundations for their use of this particular mechanism, and reflect on the relationship between global terrorism and drug trafficking. It will then return to the developing legal actions against Ayman Joumaa, Maroun Saade, and Lebanese Canadian Bank, and close with a brief discussion on the practice of countering international crime by means of juridical and fiduciary interdiction.

**The Chameleon: Hezbollah**

Most grievously remembered for the bombing of the American and French Barracks at Beirut International Airport in 1983, which killed 241 U.S. Marines and 58 French paratroopers, Hezbollah has shown a remarkable degree of adaptability in its three decades and counting of simultaneous terrorist, political, and charitable activity. As a traditional terrorist group, Hezbollah is nimble and boasts an impressive tactical reach, having staged attacks as far away from its home
base as India and Argentina. Among the first modern terrorist organizations to systematically employ suicide bombing,[6] Hezbollah has deployed cells to strike at Israeli—as well as Jewish non-Israeli—targets worldwide, and is also strongly suspected of having carried out the brutal assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005. [7] Buenos Aires stands out in its suffering at the hands of Hezbollah, having endured attacks against the Israeli Embassy to Argentina that killed 29 people in 1992,[8] and against the Asociación Mutua Israelita Argentina that killed 85 people in 1994.[9] In 2012 alone, active Hezbollah cells surfaced in Thailand, Georgia, India, and Bulgaria, although all but the last cell failed to execute their attack plans.[10]

Hezbollah also operates as a paramilitary force along Lebanon’s southern border with Israel. While it keeps a close secret of its force levels, it is believed to currently field between 5,000 and 7,000 part-time soldiers, although recruitment rates have grown significantly since the 2006 war with Israel. Hezbollah is currently believed to be capable of fielding 25,000 soldiers in case of a national emergency.[11] Hezbollah is also believed to possess an arsenal of as many as 50,000 rockets of varying range, allowing them to strike as far south as Eilat;[12] Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned in 2010 that Hezbollah’s missile arsenal dwarfs that of most states, and that Hezbollah may also possess chemical and biological weapons.[13] Acting in concert with Iran, Hezbollah may have even developed some capability in aerial drone surveillance, and claims to have thus penetrated Israeli air space at least twice in recent years.[14] Hezbollah clashed with Israeli occupation forces in southern Lebanon continually prior to the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, and fought a month-long engagement with the IDF in the summer of 2006. Although Hezbollah simply does not have the capability to defeat the IDF on the field, the moral victory it claimed following its 2006 defeat outsized its material losses; Hezbollah is believed in any case to have replenished its arsenal well beyond its stockpile as of 2006.[15] Lest any doubt remain as to Hezbollah’s recuperation from that conflict, the game-changing effect of its 2013 intervention on behalf of the Assad regime in the ongoing Syrian civil war speaks volumes about its capacity in conventional military action.[16]

An influential player in Lebanese politics, Hezbollah currently claims only a small minority of Parliamentary seats, but nonetheless holds two Cabinet Ministries, and controls, through political alliances, eighteen out of thirty Cabinet seats.[17] Hezbollah’s entry into mainstream politics is the product of adaptation. In its first manifesto, the Open Letter of 1985, Hezbollah clamored that it was simply “intolerable for Muslims to participate in… a regime which is not predicated upon the prescriptions (ahkam) of religion and upon the basis of the Law (the Shari’a) as laid down by Muhammad”[18] and called for the “establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon modeled on Iran’s Islamic Republic.”[19] In the next half-decade, however, it would come to accept the state apparatus as established by the Taif Agreement, and agree to partake in national elections beginning in 1992, at which time it would secure a foothold in the Lebanese Parliament that it has retained since then. Its 2009 electoral program would go as far as to call for a “state that is
committed to applying the rule of law on all constituents within a framework of respect for public freedoms, and impartial application of citizens’ rights and duties, irrespective of religious sect, home region, or the citizen’s views.”[20]

Hezbollah also operates as a welfare-state-within-a-state in Lebanon, providing “monthly support and supplemental nutritional, educational, housing and health assistance for the poor... there are also Hizballah-affiliated schools, clinics and low-cost hospitals.”[21] The soft power that Hezbollah thus projects finds expression in the words of former Lebanese President Émile Lahoud, a member of Lebanon’s Christian community,

“…for us Lebanese, and I can tell you a majority of Lebanese, Hezbollah is a national resistance movement. If it wasn’t for them we couldn’t have liberated our land. And because of that, we have a big esteem for the Hezbollah.”[22]

Hezbollah’s influence thus rests on the twin pillars of its image as a liberator and salvation army, and on the coercive power it can project, via intimidation as well as outright violence, when moral suasion falls short. Yet welfare is expensive—as are armaments. The portrait of Hezbollah is thus incomplete, without a look at its funding streams—one which will have to wait, another few pages, while we introduce the Taliban and the Zetas.

The Purist: The Taliban

Formed in 1994 in Quetta, Pakistan, after a fratricidal the internal war that followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and its withdrawal roughly a decade later, the Taliban are a movement of Afghan and Pakistani Deobandi Muslim, ethnic Pashtuns—although the record reflects that “all Taliban are Pashtuns, but all Pashtuns are not Taliban.”[23] Operationally split between an Afghan and a Pakistani wing, the Taliban operate from both sides of the Durand Line. The Afghan Taliban have been fighting for the best part of nearly two decades to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state in Afghanistan, dominated by the Pashtun tribe and governed by sharia law, while the Pakistani Taliban fight ferociously to protect their autonomy within Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

Afghan Pashtuns dominated Afghan politics from the formation of the Kingdom of Afghanistan in 1747 until the Soviet invasion of 1979.[24] Secular government based on the Soviet model was universally rejected in Afghanistan, and the country broke down into an orgy of violence. The heavily mechanized Soviet occupation troops killed as many as 1 million Afghans during the course of their ten-year occupation,[25] roughly 7% of the nation’s population. By the time of the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan had been reduced to “a state of virtual disintegration... divided into warlord fiefdoms... [where] all the warlords had fought, switched sides and fought again in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals and bloodshed.”[26]

By 1994, Afghanistan was a wasteland begging for a savior. Enter the Taliban: presenting themselves as a pure, uncorrupt alternative to Afghan warlords, and bolstered by crucial support
from the Pakistani government, the Taliban fought their way across the Durand line and took Qandahar in November of 1994.[27] From there they swept west and north to capture Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif in 1995, and north to capture Kabul in 1996, visiting unspeakable atrocity unto conquered populations and imposing strict sharia along their way.[28] Although the Taliban never secured total control of Afghanistan, they ruled roughly 85% of national territory until 2001, when the post-9/11 U.S. invasion relegated the Taliban from the major cities into rural areas and into the tribal areas of Pakistan.[29] After ousting the Taliban, NATO labored to install a plural government in Kabul, led by Pashtun Hamid Karzai but also inclusive of its Tajik and Uzbek allies of the Northern Alliance—a coup in the eyes of tribal Pashtuns.[30] The collapse of the Taliban wrought abject disaster unto Pashtun communities of Northern Afghanistan, visited upon them in the form of “a wave of attacks on Pashtun communities... [resulting] in mass displacement and communal impoverishment... [including] summary executions, rape, denial of access to agricultural land, and widespread looting of livestock and movable property.”[31]

At the present moment, the Taliban form a fearsome insurgent threat to ISAF forces, as well as the Afghani and Pakistani governments. The Taliban had an estimated 36,000 active fighters as of March 2010, supplied mainly with light, general-purpose machine guns and grenade launchers. [32] The Afghan Taliban pose a serious threat to the stability of Afghanistan once the ISAF withdrawal is complete. They are active throughout the tribal areas of both Pakistan and Afghanistan, from which they can easily reach ISAF forces in Afghanistan or stage attacks on the Afghan government. The Pakistani Taliban are no less threatening, and are continually involved “against the wishes of Mullah Omar... in attacks against Pakistani military and security forces inside Pakistan.”[33]

The Taliban’s goals are somewhat more difficult to assess than their capabilities. Both as a response to persecution, and as a function of their tribal (rather than institutional) political structure, the Taliban’s political goals tend toward inscrutability. Taliban pronouncements have oscillated between unambiguous declarations of the movement’s intention to recover the control it once enjoyed over Afghanistan,[34] to conciliatory messages such as Mullah Omar’s August 28, 2011 Eid-al-Fitr message, which called for an Afghanistan where “all ethnicities will have participation in the regime and portfolios will be dispensed on the basis of merits... the policy of the Islamic Emirate is not aimed at monopolizing power.”[35] Reputed voices—namely that of eminent Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid—surmise that the Taliban have learned from their demise in 2001 that they are simply not capable of administering the whole of Afghanistan, and are ready to cut a power-sharing deal with the government in Kabul,[36] which might at once satisfy some of the human rights and governance concerns of the international community, and the confessional prerogatives of the Taliban, in a post-ISAF, modern form of *cuius regio, eius religio*. 

PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

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The prospects for a negotiated power-sharing agreement, however, appear murkier than either Omar’s pronouncements or Rashid’s speculation. In mid-2012, Taliban representatives dismissed Afghan President Karzai as a puppet and chafed at the “ever-changing position” of American negotiators,[37] while the utter failure of the U.S.-brokered attempt to host talks between the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan in Qatar in the summer of 2013 reveals in no uncertain terms the former group’s contempt for Karzai’s government and for the idea of interlocution with it.[38]

The Psychopath: Los Zetas

Although Los Zetas are decidedly not a global terrorist organization in the same sense as Hezbollah and the Taliban, they enter this study by virtue of their association with a terrorist group. Los Zetas came into being in 1997, cherry-picked out of the GAFES—Mexico’s elite special operations corps, assembled with the explicit purpose of fighting against Mexican cartels—by Osiel Cárdenas, a rising force within the Gulf Cartel seeking the best bodyguard contingent Mexico could produce.[39] As Cárdenas consolidated his leadership within the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas expanded from a personal guard to a full-force mercenary army. The capture of Cárdenas in 2003, however, dealt his organization a heavy blow. The Gulf Cartel was able to mitigate this loss with the firepower it gained from its alliance with Los Zetas—but only for as long as Los Zetas consented to their subordinate role. Smelling blood in Gulf’s decline, Los Zetas opted for schism with their benefactors in a 2007 internal vote.[40] A cold peace held until early 2009, when the Gulf Cartel’s attempt seize the border city of Reynosa from Los Zetas prompted them to turn their firepower—which had served the Gulf Cartel so well in friendship—against their former ally in war.[41]

In the two years following this rupture, Los Zetas arguably became the most powerful drug cartel in Mexico—at very least posing a worthy challenge to the Sinaloa Cartel for primacy in Mexico’s criminal underworld.[42] As if tasked with personifying Mexico’s Faustian descent into generalized violence, Los Zetas made sadism their trademark. A comprehensive list of Zeta atrocities might stretch into infinity; anecdotes can serve as guide to Los Zetas’ use of psychopathic violence as a tactic: the beating to death with a two-by-four of a female police officer in Nuevo Laredo, in front of her stunned colleagues, as a warning against crossing the Zetas;[43] the 2010 San Fernando Massacre, when Zeta elements intercepted a northbound bus near the village on San Fernando, abducted the seventy-five migrants on board to an isolated farmhouse, executing them methodically;[44] or its reprise in 2011, when Zeta members abducted hundreds of travelers from multiple buses to pit them against each other, in gladiator-style fights to the death, and dumped their bodies in mass graves.[45]

The meteoric rise of los Zetas required that they expand their capacity. Expand they did, effectively becoming “the first major crime syndicate to broadly diversify their activities,”[46]
enriching their portfolio with the addition of kidnapping and extortion; smuggling of humans and contraband; theft of petroleum, vehicles, and human organs; and money laundering.[47] In parallel to their brazen public operations within Mexico, Los Zetas also developed vast underground drug-and-arms trafficking and money-laundering networks within the United States, as far away from the border with Mexico as in Chicago, where authorities arrested twenty people, including five alleged members of a Zeta cell, and seized about US $12 million in cash and 250 kilograms of cocaine in November of 2011.[48] In March 2013, the ominously-named Tremor Enterprises, an Oklahoma-based corporate breeder and trainer of quarter horses, was revealed to operate as the front for a multi-million dollar scheme laundering dirty Zeta money through the U.S. horse-racing circuit and stallion breeding industry.[49]

If at their peak, Los Zetas controlled nearly the entirety of Mexico’s eastern seaboard,[50] as this article goes to press the Zetas may well be facing terminal decline. Zeta capo Heriberto Lazcano Lazacano, the grand strategist atop an otherwise decentralized operation, died in October of 2012 in a shootout with Mexican Marines, depriving the Zetas of his both his organizational skills and his vision.[51] His successor, Miguel Treviño Morales, lives to commit atrocity rather than to command it; under his leadership of Los Zetas retained power by virtue of intimidation, but ceased growing.[52] In any event, Morales was captured by Mexican marines in July of 2013, and while the consequences of his apprehension have yet to play themselves out, the likeliest outcome forecast by Mexican drug war analysts is one of fragmentation and descent.[53] As per security expert Alejandro Hope, of the Mexican Institute for Competitiveness, Treviño’s demise could represent “the last nail in the coffin of the Zetas as a cohesive organization at the national level.”[54]

Operating in the spaces between Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Mexico, were Ayman Joumaa’s and Maroun Saade’s networks, acting as proverbial quartermasters for Hezbollah, and Los Zetas, moving their drugs, money, and weapons across the globe in a systematic and highly organized manner, and attempting, although failing, to link up with the Taliban as well. As their respective histories demonstrate, these three organizations are vastly different from each other and operate in distinct—and geographically isolated—theaters. Nonetheless, the international network that each of these organizations has tapped into, by the hands of Ayman Joumaa and Maroun Saade, points at the existence of a problem much larger than either terrorism or drug trafficking on their own: the existence of global illicit exchange markets, and the convergence between transnational drug trafficking and international terrorism that these exchanges have underwritten.

The Convergence

In spite of the significant geographical distance separating Hezbollah and the Taliban, and the distinct environments in which they operate, logistical imperative has guided each group away from theological injunction, and toward the embrace of drug trafficking to complement or replace
flagging alternative revenue streams. In this process, Hezbollah and the Taliban created sophisticated international distribution networks, expanding their operations far beyond the maintenance of political control and the pursuit of their ideological objectives within their home countries.

By all means, drug cultivation was, and remains, endemic to both Hezbollah's and the Taliban's home regions. Marijuana cultivation was rampant in the Bekaa valley in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when the Lebanese civil war had disrupted most economic activity in the state, and when the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon opened a funnel for the trafficking of Lebanese hashish into Israel. Explains Matthew Levitt:

Following the establishment of Hizbullah in the early-1980s-recruiting heavily from key Bekaa Valley tribes and families - it benefited from a religious edict, or fatwa, issued in the mid-1980s providing religious justification for the otherwise impure and illicit activity of drug trafficking. Presumed to have been issued by Iranian religious leaders, the fatwa reportedly read: "We are making drugs for Satan—America and the Jews. If we cannot kill them with guns, we will kill them with drugs." According to an FBI report declassified in November 2008, "Hizbullah’s spiritual leader... has stated that narcotics trafficking is morally acceptable if the drugs are sold to Western infidels as part of the war against the enemies of Islam."

Fatwa and sales to infidels notwithstanding, the recourse to drug trafficking remains the product of necessity for Hezbollah's cash-hungry operations. Hezbollah General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah unequivocally condemns drugs as a scourge, one which he fought to the length of cooperating with Rafiq Hariri's government—for at least as long as Hezbollah allowed Hariri to live.[56] Yet Nasrallah's discomfort with the drug scourge has not impeded his organization from using it to its immense benefit. Operation Titan, carried out by U.S. and Colombian authorities in 2008, exposed and “dismantled a cocaine-smuggling and money-laundering organization that allegedly helped fund Hezbollah operations... laundering hundreds of millions of dollars of cocaine proceeds a year and paying 12 percent of those profits to Hezbollah.”[57] Among those arrested in the sting figured Chekry Harb, a Lebanese kingpin living in Colombia and believed by Colombian officials to keep close telephone contact with Hezbollah officials and to frequently travel to Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt.[58]

In April 2013, the Treasury Department again accused Hezbollah of international drug trafficking and blacklisted Kasseimi Rmeiti & Co. for Exchange and Halawi Exchange Co., two Lebanese money-exchange houses which had effectively taken over the money-laundering operation previously carried out by Lebanese Canadian Bank.[59] At an April 23 press conference announcing the designations, Treasury Department Under Secretary of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen unambiguously charged that “Hezbollah is both a full-fledged terrorist organization... and an enterprise that increasingly turns to crime to finance itself.”[60] DEA
special agent Derek Maltz, at the same press conference, accused Hezbollah of operating like a drug cartel, adding that

*Drugs and terrorism coexist across the globe in a marriage of mutual convenience. As state-sponsored terrorism has declined, these dangerous organizations have looked far and wide for resources and revenue to recruit, to corrupt, to train, and to strengthen their regime. Many drug-trafficking groups have stepped up to fill that revenue void.*

[61]

As did Hezbollah, the Taliban faced an awkward task in “managing the apparent disconnect between their Islamic ideology and the illicit drug trade.”[62] But popular favor was on their side. After all, the Taliban had risen to power “because an exhausted, war-weary population saw them as saviours and peacemakers... they disarmed the population, enforced law and order, imposed strict Sharia law and opened the roads to traffic which resulted in an immediate drop in food prices. These measures were all extremely welcome to the long-suffering population.”[63] This *Pax Talibana* allowed the resumption of poppy cultivation; under Taliban rule a small plot producing just 45 grams of opium per year could earn its owner over a thousand dollars—a fortune in rural Afghanistan.[64] To reconcile Deobandi faith and drug production,

*The Taliban have provided an Islamic sanction for farmers... to grow even more opium, even though the Koran forbids Muslims from producing or imbibing intoxicants. Abdul Rashid, the head of the Taliban’s anti-drugs control force in Kandahar, spelt out the nature of his unique job. He is authorized to impose a strict ban on the growing of hashish, ‘because it is consumed by Afghans and Muslims’. But, Rashid tells me without a hint of sarcasm, ‘Opium is permissible [sic] because it is consumed by kafirs [unbelievers] in the West and not by Muslims or Afghans.[65]*

The expedient is remarkably similar to that used by Hezbollah, banning (read: wishing away) the consumption, but not the production and trade, of opium and heroin.[66] The abysmal state of Afghan finances at the time of the Taliban ascension to power—not to mention the economic calamity wrought by Talibanization—only magnified the relative value of poppy cultivation and intensified the romance between the Taliban and heroin production: the poppy harvest doubled from 2,248 to 4,565 metric tons between 1996 and 1999. At this point, international pressure against Afghan drug production (as well as the Taliban regime’s dismal human rights record) prompted Mullah Omar to command a one-third reduction in the poppy harvest that would reduce the harvest to 3,276 metric tons in 2000.[67] In spite of this reduction, the harvest still fetched an estimated total value of US $900 million, dwarving Afghanistan’s $130 million in legal exports, and generating more than one third of Afghanistan’s $2.5 billion GDP, for that same year.[68]

Mullah Omar turned the screws in June 2000, prohibiting opium production in all Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan. Production plummeted to 185 metric tons in 2001,[69] choking off rural income and inviting starvation to Afghan tables.[70] Neither did the Taliban stop
puppetteering heroin production after their fall from power; quite the contrary, they continued to “successfully [manipulate] international prices for heroin to their advantage, ordering farmers to grow, or not grow poppies depending on requirements, and stockpiling thousands of tons of opium to hedge the market and insulate themselves from coalition intervention efforts.”[71] The poppy harvest rebounded after the fall of the Taliban—as of 2010, Afghanistan was exporting 900 tons of opium and 375 tons of heroin per year, and had built up a two-year inventory of surplus product [72] awaiting export.

Los Zetas, for their part, came at this convergence from the opposite direction. Born of the drug trade, Los Zetas faced no moral qualms engaging in trafficking. They suffered a stiff challenge, however, early in their institutional life, when President Calderón deployed military force against Mexican drug cartels, to which Los Zetas responded by adopting certain attributes of terrorist groups. Los Zetas, who simply “never looked at themselves as a drug trafficking organization,”[73] were distinctly well-disposed for the challenge of morphing from an assassination force into a “military group whose primary goal is to control territory.”[74] Following their schism with the Gulf Cartel, the Zetas consolidated their control of the state of Tamaulipas, and expanded beyond it into at least sixteen Mexican States.[75] While their presence grew most concentrated along Mexico’s eastern coastline and along the Texas-Mexico border, the Zetas also made efforts at securing intersecting corridors, from north to south and from east to west along the whole of Mexico—identified as the “Zeta Cross” by investigative journalist Samuel Logan.[76] The growth of Los Zetas saw them expand not only onto physical, but also psychological territory: Los Zetas saw them expand not only onto physical, but also psychological territory: Los Zetas took up the perverse meme of filming the execution of its victims and disseminating the footage to families, when seeking ransom, or broadcasting them more openly to inspire fear and respect.

The convergence here described between drug trafficking and terrorism certainly follows a valid internal logic. Terror organizations generally do “not require massive sums of money for their operations, but must finance training, infrastructure needs, equipping their members, bribing local officials, recruiting, and logistics.”[77] Yet what funds they need they certainly can, and have, raised by means of drug trafficking; the Al-Qaeda-related terrorist cell that carried out the 2004 attack at Atocha Station in Madrid raised a substantial amount of its operating funds through the sale of hashish.[78] As explains former DEA Chief of Operations Michael Braun,

There are many similarities between a terrorist organization and a global drug cartel. Both oppose nation-state sovereignty, function best in ungoverned spaces, depend on mutual shadow facilitators, have no regard for human rights, rely on the hallmarks of organized crime such as corruption, intimidation, and violence, and are highly sophisticated organizations that operate with the latest technology. Most analysts believe that FTOs copied their decentralized structure of cells and nodes from drug cartels. Both FTOs and drug cartels often rely on the same money launderers and have a capacity to regenerate themselves when dealt a blow, often reemerging in a
new or unrecognizable form. The main difference is motivation; drug cartels are motivated entirely by profit, whereas terrorist organizations have political or ideological motivations.[79]

Motivation thus emerges as the key wedge between sometimes remarkably similar drug trafficking and terrorist organizations. This wedge merits a close look, as it conditions the strategic environment in which each of these groups operates, and the imperatives they must respect in order to thrive.

The political, geographic, and martial environments in which Hezbollah, the Taliban, and Los Zetas operate have placed distinct requirements on each group's evolution and trajectories. Hezbollah, in its aspiration to moral legitimacy as the vanguard of a millenarian struggle against the state of Israel, has proven willing to leave titular control of Lebanon's political administration, in exchange for which it has obtained a national platform to project its political objectives.[80]

While Hezbollah's strategic theater does not extend beyond Lebanon and its neighboring states, its tactical landscape is effectively global.

The Taliban, for their part, aspire to the exercise of a unique theological mandate in Afghanistan—one that fails to translate in any obvious manner into clear political objectives.[81] Unlike Hezbollah, however, the Taliban's capacity for military projection is limited, and their political objectives are at best regional, confining both their strategic and tactical theaters exclusively within Central Asia. They may inveigh against the West, but the Taliban simply lack the capacity to strike against the West in a major way—other than by attacking Western personnel or assets in their home region. Upon completion of the ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, Western nations will thus have withdrawn not only outside the limits of the Taliban's tactical grasp, but also beyond their strategic horizon—so that, notwithstanding the risk of international terrorist groups being provided sanctuary in a re-Talibanized Afghanistan, the West could well just rely on its absence to serve as a bulwark against future Taliban attack. While both Hezbollah and the Taliban depend on drug trafficking for at least part of their revenue, their primary objectives remain broader and far more exalted than any single funding mechanism.

For their part, Los Zetas seek neither Hezbollah's international legitimacy, nor the Taliban's theological supremacy. At the peak of their power, Los Zetas' strategic imperatives were twofold: to retain their capacity to move illicit products across Mexico, and to preserve their markets for drugs and arms within the United States (staving off recent incursions by rivals, notably by the Sinaloa Cartel,[82] has recently become an additional, and increasingly important, objective). In keeping with these interests, Los Zetas' operational expansion south and west of their home base in Tamaulipas was axonal rather than expansive, concentrated on securing corridors rather than entire regions.[83] To the north, moreover, their expansion was clandestine; overt acts of violence by Los Zetas north in the United States have been so few as to appear negligible in comparison to the scourge they have visited upon Mexico. Coming from a group as sadistically violent as Los Zetas, this restraint reflects sound strategic thinking—their admittedly perverse
entrepreneurialism simply does not allow the deployment of systematic violence within the United States. While Hezbollah and the Taliban harbour deep-seated animosity towards the West, Los Zetas actually benefit considerably from their enterprise in the United States—easily obtaining weapons and reaping astronomic proceeds from drug sales.

To be certain, Los Zetas’ motivations for holding their fire against the United States are far from noble, offering no reason from complacency from the part of U.S. authorities. Los Zetas, by every measure, are a violent and dangerous organization whose savagery has destroyed countless lives in Mexico. The amount of firepower at their disposal, the scope of their territorial control, and their use of generalized violence as a tool of psychological war elevate Los Zetas far above the category of a simple organized crime syndicate. Los Zetas, furthermore, have formed ad hoc, transactional relationships with associates of Hezbollah.

It would be an error, however, to confuse this commercial relationship with a strategic alliance. Although the possibility of such an alliance developing would be plausible, there is no conclusive evidence of it having been consummated. The utter failure of a 2011 Iranian plot to have Zeta operatives murder the Saudi ambassador to the United States [84] attests to Los Zetas’ unwillingness to buck their own interests when it comes to their presence in the United States. Although illicit markets have certainly become a point of contact for otherwise vastly different criminal groups—one where political terrorism, theocratic ultra-nationalism, and narco-insurgency fund and equip each other—commerce and imitation do not make amalgamation.

Strategic alliance or not, however, the links such as these exist between the Zetas and foreign terrorism, however embryonic, warrant careful consideration. In spite of the vast geographic and ideological chasms that separate Hezbollah and Los Zetas, these groups have deftly identified a mutual interest—as well as lucrative gains to be made—in crossing in order to conduct trade with each other. The attempts of Hezbollah associates to extend this network to the Taliban reflect the seriousness of the threat. The scope, volume, and sophistication of these transactions merit profound study; a study into which the downfall of Lebanese Canadian Bank - to which we now return - opens a fascinating view.

See you in Court

The world into which Leonhart, Bharara, and MacBride peered with their shakedown of Mr. Saade, Mr. Joumaa, and Lebanese Canadian Bank, is a world in which the erstwhile bank’s US $329 million worth of laundered proceeds amounts to pocket change. Although US $329 million worth of pocket change can still finance hefty arms purchases, the object of interest is not so much the specific amount of money as the network through which it circulated. Among his many money-laundering schemes, Hezbollah associate Ayman Joumaa controlled a web of some 30 Lebanese-owned export firms, shipping used cars from the United States to West Africa and combining the revenue from this trade with the of Colombian cocaine sold in the United States—
with Los Zetas serving as faithful mules between 2005 and 2007.[85] Another of Joumaa’s schemes involved “perhaps the richest land deal in Lebanon’s history, the US $240 million purchase... of more than 740 pristine acres overlooking the Mediterranean.”[86]

Hezbollah is uniquely positioned to initiate these kinds of cross-continental drug-and-weapons trafficking schemes for a number of reasons. Its home base provides a propitious environment for international commerce, licit and illicit, as Lebanon sits at the “crossroads for all manner of trade, [owing] much to the flourishing of a worldwide diaspora... through criminal elements in these émigré communities, Hezbollah has gained a deepening foothold in the cocaine business.”[87] The depth and sophistication of the Lebanese banking system, quantitatively and qualitatively a positive outlier within the Middle East and North Africa region, and among emerging markets,[88] allows Hezbollah access to a capital base large enough to provide lines of credit to enable large-scale drug and weapons purchases, while also allowing Hezbollah-allied bankers to conceal dirty money behind the appearance of legitimate transactions and clean bank accounts.

Furthermore, as a legitimate political force within Lebanon, Hezbollah enjoys diplomatic advantages usually unavailable to terrorist groups. Why take the risk of crossing borders illegally or falsifying passports when the Government of Lebanon can just as easily provide a legitimate one? Hezbollah members in Europe are able to take advantage of intra-European mobility to direct and plan operations against Israeli people and assets in Europe—as well as European links to the Israeli government to penetrate its enemy. So long as Hezbollah retains its dual identity as a terrorist group and political movement, it will retain the diplomatic cover that makes its ongoing global operations possible.[89]

Los Zetas began transacting with Hezbollah in 2005, by the hand of Ayman Joumaa. As per Preet Bharara’s allegations in the complaint against Lebanese Canadian Bank, Joumaa coordinated the shipment from Colombia to Mexico of no less than 85 metric tons of cocaine sold to Los Zetas between 2005 and 2007.[90] Los Zetas moved approximately US $850 million through Joumaa’s money-laundering network in that same time period.[91] Joumaa’s dealings with Los Zetas saw them collude across the whole of Central America, “[coordinating] the shipment of multi-thousand kilogram quantities of cocaine from Colombia to Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico... whose ultimate destination... was the United States.”[92] Although the 85 million tons of cocaine and US $850 million they circulated through Ayman Joumaa’s network are no small amounts, neither did they ever comprise a majority of Los Zetas’ total operations or revenues. The total yearly income of Mexican and Colombian drug cartels is estimated between US $18 and $39 billion;[93] Los Zetas themselves raise only 50% of their operating budget from cocaine trafficking—complementing it with income from “extortion (10-15 percent), methamphetamines and heroin (5-10 percent), immigrant smuggling (5 percent), contraband, (5 percent), and miscellaneous activities (10-15 percent).”[94]
Although Maroun Saade did not succeed at engaging the Taliban in commerce with Hezbollah, the intent behind his failure warrants consideration. James Motto, investigator for the U.S. Attorney’s office for the Southern District of New York, provided a rich description of Mr. Saade’s weapons-for-heroin bartering network in his deposition for Saade’s indictment. In November and December 2010, a DEA operative masquerading as a Taliban associate held a series of meetings with Saade and his associates in West Africa and the Ukraine to negotiate the exchange of a multi-ton shipment of Afghan heroin for a cache of weapons including, but not limited to, pistols, automatic rifles, Stinger and Javelin missiles, and night-vision equipment, to be used against American forces in Afghanistan. Motto further stated for the record that Mr. Saade, and at least one of his associates, had links to Hezbollah and counted on the Lebanese group to supply the weapons to be transacted. [95] Although Saade’s misstep in trying to conduct illicit business with undercover agents would ultimately make a farce of his efforts, the record of his deeds raises the ominous possibility that a similar transaction, had it been carried out with veritable Taliban associates, could have led to a successful exchange. The success of Hezbollah’s commerce with Los Zetas makes it patently clear that, given the opportunity, it could have likely pulled off such an exchange.

Even though the Taliban did not, in this instance, transact with Hezbollah, they nonetheless rely on numerous other channels to distribute Afghan heroin worldwide. Mired in their respective conflicts against Israel and the United States, Hezbollah and the Taliban have pulled off a brilliant feat in turning their enemies into major sources of funding. So long as there is a market for hashish in Israel, and for heroin in the United States, money will continue accruing to Hezbollah and the Taliban, and fund the planning attacks against American and Israeli citizens and military personnel.

As per Los Zetas, what ultimately spelled their decline was a combination of their excessively de-centralized operating structure [96] and popular revulsion against their sadistic violence,[97] handicaps which no amount of Hezbollah-assisted fundraising could have mitigated. The cautionary tale to be gleamed from the record of Zeta cooperation with Ayman Joumaa’s network need not decline along with Los Zetas’ fortunes, however. Whereas fears of a strategic alliance between Hezbollah and the decentralized Zetas turned out to be a dud, the much more centralized and hierarchical Sinaloa Federation [98] could well see value, that Los Zetas failed to recognize, in consummating a formal, trans-continental alliance with Hezbollah, or with other terrorist groups.

**Conclusion**

Neither Hezbollah, the Taliban, nor Los Zetas will be defeated on the battlefield. The millenarian goals of the first two groups, and the operational latitude of the latter (and of other Mexican drug cartels) in Mexico’s rule-of-impunity governance, are simply immune to military
action. The inherent danger posed by any of these groups should thus not be seen as a factor of their ultimately immutable motivations, but rather of their capabilities. If the commercial networks linking these groups together form the foundation of these capabilities, then the interdiction of these exchanges offers a unique, non-military opportunity to degrade the capacity of both terrorist and drug-trafficking organizations.

Although the collapse of Lebanese Canadian Bank offers a promising illustration of the potential impact of juridical action in the fight against global terrorism, one must also acknowledge the fact that the loss of L.C.B. fell short of presenting Hezbollah with a Lehman Brothers moment. There were doubtless dozens of candidates ready to take the place of the shuttered bank—among them, Kasseimi Rmeiti & Co. for Exchange and Halawi Exchange Co., introduced in the opening pages of this article as recent targets of follow-up action from the Treasury Department, and in any event, the US $102 million settlement that Bharara secured as settlement in his suit against Lebanese Canadian Bank is unlikely to deliver a knockout punch to financial infrastructure of international drug-and-arms trafficking.[99] By the same token, there was likely no shortage of kingpins ready to take over Maroun Saade’s operations upon his arrest, and there will likely be just as many ready to perpetuate Ayman Joumaa’s operations if he is apprehended as well.

Rommel’s adage, whereby “battles are decided by the quartermasters before the first shot is fired,”[100] remains valid today, although in circumstances that have evolved far beyond those surrounding its first iteration seven decades ago. This evolution finds its illustration in the staggering volume of material and monetary exchange described in this article, and in the lead role handed to investigators and prosecutors in containing these groups by means of fiduciary interdiction. Just as illicit trade between terrorist and drug-trafficking organizations has become systematized, so must interdiction efforts be elevated and sustained at the same scope and level.

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Notes


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[10] Thanassis Cambanis, "With the Burgas Bombing, Hezbollah Returned to its Roots."


[20] Ibid., p. 126.


[27] Ibid., p. 27.


[31] Ibid., p. 12.


[41] Ibid., p. 197.


[47] Ibid., pp. 51-52.


[61] Ibid.


[63] Rashid, p. 35.

[64] Ibid., p. 117.

[65] Ibid., p. 118.


[69] Ibid., p. 81.


[71] Johnson, p. 5.


[74] Ibid.

[75] Rubén Mosso, “”Los Zetas” dominan más territorios que “El Chapo.”“

[77] Ibid.


Recognising that the rest of this issue looks in greater detail at how terrorists move money, this article will begin with just a brief review of one of the most resilient methods of fundraising for Jihad that we believe is not well understood – ‘Tajheez al-Ghazi’ – as well as the use of fundraising auctions and the ‘justification’ of criminality. It will then evaluate the international community’s response to the terrorist financing threat, and, in particular, review the interaction of the global CTF framework with fragile states and the impact on financial inclusion. The article concludes by recommending some improvements to a regime that has grown relatively unchecked over the past decade and which, some suggest, has tried to ‘catch one type of fish by draining the ocean’. [1]

Funding is clearly important for terrorist groups. Personnel records seized from al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) revealed the minute detail with which finances were managed, maintaining spreadsheets, expense reports, and receipts. This provided invaluable intelligence to Coalition forces, and demonstrated how critical financial housekeeping was for AQI’s operations.[2] Similar financial prudence can be found in al-Qaeda’s Manchester Manual, which advised operatives to divide finances into funds on the one hand to be invested for financial return and on the other to be saved for operations, and to spread the funds amongst the members of a cell so that if captured the source of the cell’s financing is protected.[3] This article examines the extent to which the global counter-terrorism finance (CTF) regime has achieved the objectives set following 9/11, namely to infiltrate and shut down terrorist-financing. It also addresses the wider consequences of this CTF regime, particularly its effect on fragile states and Somalia in particular.

**Financing Terrorism: The Reality**

**Proxy jihad**

There is now a substantial body of literature on the fundraising and transportation methods of terrorist finance. However one of the most resilient methods of fundraising for jihad is not so well understood. Based on interviews with 65 former and current jihadist operatives in the field of recruitment, fundraising and movement facilitation,[4] we argue that if, over the years, this had been better understood, the international community might have developed a more proportionate, nuanced, and targeted CTF regime.
There are many examples from the Qur’an which illustrate the importance of giving generously to the cause of jihad and the war effort. Islam recognised from the beginning that wars, whether defensive or offensive, cost money. Therefore Islam devised a mechanism by which people would voluntarily contribute, and contribute generously, to the war effort while considering such contributions as charity. As history shows, early Muslims took this message to heart. Contributions to the Jihad took many forms: some provided arms and shields, others food and livestock, or horses and camels. The most common method of contribution is ‘Tajheez al-Ghazi’ – simply defined as fitting or arming a soldier, which allows for those who cannot, or will not, join the jihad physically for whatever reason, to achieve the honour and heavenly reward of waging jihad by proxy. The Prophet Muhammad encouraged this type of sponsorship: ‘Whoever arms a Ghazi then he would be considered a Ghazi, and whoever looked after the family of an absent Ghazi, he will too be considered a Ghazi’ (Bukhari, 2630). More popular than shields, armour, and horses is now money, which is paid to individuals aspiring to make their way to jihad theatres of conflict.

Jihad volunteers are the life and blood of such theatres in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, North Africa and Syria today. Therefore, without Tajheez being readily available for potential Jihadists the ability of groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban to sustain their level of activity in these theatres would be severely limited. From primary research that covers the period from 1991 to mid-2012, it emerged the Tajheez cost per jihadist was between US $3,000 and $4,000 in Bosnia (due to the number of countries that the volunteer needed to pass en route and the need to cover the cost of his AK-47), and US $2,000 to reach Afghanistan and have enough money to cover basic needs. In the case of the roughly 100 foreign jihadists who made it to Chechnya, the cost of Tajheez skyrocketed to more than US $15,000 per person due to the difficulty of entering Chechnya.

As jihad theatres emerge around the globe and attract public and media attention, local individuals, clerics and small fundraising cells organically emerge to organise and collect funding for Tajheez. Again, primary research conducted by one of the authors indicates that four out of ten Jihadists received their Tajheez from money raised or contributed by women. The funds are collected in cash, handled by individual and small cells, with almost no banking transactions occurring or with funds moving through officially registered charitable channels. Some contributors use their own credit cards to purchase tickets for traveling jihadists. Tajheez relies on hundreds of outlets, whether they are clerics or coordinators, dispersed over dozens of countries and with no organisational links between them or to a central authority, making it impossible to track them all. What unites them is a common cause.

The use of cash in mobilising jihadist recruits over the past two decades has clearly been one of the most effective and successful tools in the hands of radical Islamists. Using cash and relying on the goodwill and the secrecy or trust of thousands of contributors, clerics, and coordinators, has
not only helped evade the scrutiny of authorities, but also allowed them to deliver the most important weapon of all; new recruits for the cause.

**Auction Fundraisers**

Auction fundraising evenings are also held to support armed struggle. In the autumn of 2012, one of the authors of this article attended such an event held on behalf of the Free Syrian Army in one of the Gulf countries as an observing guest. The sponsors of the fundraising evening, including a member of the national parliament and a senior judge, announced to those present that they were fundraising specifically for MANPADS (a shoulder-launched, anti-aircraft system). The aim was to empower the rebel Free Syrian Army to shoot down the helicopters and fighter jets of the Syrian regime’s air force. Sufficient money was raised to cover the cost of 11 missiles (each costing US $75,000). Those who donated the money were told by the organisers that they were saving the lives of women and children in Syria who are subjected to daily bombardment by the air force of President Assad, and by paying for those missiles they should feel proud to have participated in relieving many civilians from this hell.

While it is widely accepted that the struggle of the Syrian people against Assad’s dictatorship is a legitimate aspiration, it is also important to highlight the presence of al-Qaeda and jihadist elements within the ranks of the Syrian opposition forces; indeed it is generally acknowledged that they are some of the most organised, well-armed, and effective of the opposition forces,[6] raising the risk that al-Qaeda might exploit the Syrian conflict to divert weapons and funds, as in previous cases, to other jihad theatres such as Afghanistan, Yemen and North Africa.

**The Justification of Use of Criminal Means**

As the insurgencies against the US, NATO, and their regional and local allies have grown, so has the need to secure additional funds to sustain such efforts. For the past fifteen years, some radical clerics have provided theological justifications for theft and other illegal financial gains in order to finance jihad. London-based clerics such as Abu Qatada (now in Jordanian custody) and Abu Hamza (now in US custody) led the way in providing a theological basis for theft and criminality to obtain financial aid for jihad. They justified this based on certain interpretations of Islamic theological principles by dividing the world into ‘Darul Islam’ (the land of Islam) and ‘Darul Harb’ (the land of war). According to both clerics and their followers, almost all lands that are not governed by their strict interpretations of Sharia rules are ‘Darul Harb’ – even Saudi Arabia did not escape being classified as such.

Based on such extreme interpretations, some clerics gave a free hand to their followers, allowing jihad operatives in Australia, Europe, and North America to commit ‘legitimate’ fraudulent acts against banks, telecommunication companies, and government welfare programmes. Members of certain North African and Pakistani communities were particularly
active in this type of criminality, with credit card fraud being a favourite method. Mortgage fraud
and loan fraud, enabled by a proliferation of fake European passports and identity documents
were also popular, stemmed but not eradicated by the introduction of ‘chip and pin’ credit and
debit cards as well as biometric passports.

The Global CTF Regime: Intentions and Realities

The first step of the Bush administration post-9/11 was to sign Executive Order 13224 with the
aim of launching ‘a strike on the financial foundation of the global terror network’ and to ‘starve
the terrorists of funding’.[7] The White House hailed CTF a success within 100 days of the attacks,
reporting that ‘assets of more than 150 known terrorists, their organizations and their bankers
have been frozen by the United States. 142 countries have issued freezing orders of their own. The
result: more than US $33 million in terrorist assets have been blocked inside the United States,
more than US $30 million more have been blocked abroad by our partners in the international
coalition.’[8] Despite this outcome, Osama bin Laden seemed unconcerned, claiming in an
interview in October 2001 with a Pakistani newspaper that Al-Qaeda’s finances were organised by
backers who were as ‘aware of the cracks inside the Western financial system as they are aware of
lines on their hands’. [9]

The importance of CTF has been emphasised by several Western leaders following further
terrorist plots; for example, in light of the foiled transatlantic ‘liquid-bomb’ plot in 2006, then-UK
Chancellor Gordon Brown said in a speech to Chatham House:

‘What the use of fingerprints was to the 19th century, and DNA analysis was to the
20th century, so financial information and forensic accounting has come to be one of
today’s most powerful investigative and intelligence tools available in the fight against
crime and terrorism.’[10]

Brown went on to call for the creation of a ‘modern Bletchley Park’ with ‘forensic accounting of
such intricacy and sophistication’ that it can achieve the same results as the code-breakers of the
Second World War.

These examples highlight two of the core elements of the CTF debate, namely (in the words of
Jonathan Winer, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Law Enforcement
under President Clinton) the ‘big ideological divide’ between ‘the asset freezers and the people
who want to follow the money as it changes hands’.[11] Bin Laden’s confidence also brings to the
surface the larger existential question about the CTF regime as a whole, for where there are
cracks, there will always be a way to move money – thus, should states invest the majority of their
effort attempting to cover those cracks, or should they strive to address the root cause of the
threat?
A Polarised Debate

The relative merits and burdens of CTF have certainly generated a polarised debate, from those who see it as critical to the fight against terrorism and meaningfully curtailing the ability of terrorists to act – for example, former Treasury Secretary John Snow who claimed in 2004 that, ‘The work to track and shut down the financial network of terror is one of the most critical efforts facing us today, and we have achieved important successes in the mission to bankrupt the financial underpinnings of terrorism’[12] – to strong critics such as anti-money laundering specialist Dr Dionysios Demetis who has labelled the CTF effort a ‘farce’. [13] A study undertaken for a 2011 IMF report on the effectiveness of the global AML/CTF programme makes disappointing reading, and supports the view that compliance and implementation remain poor.[14]

One of the most vocal groups currently opposing the impact of the global CTF regime is the Somali money service business (MSB) community based in the US and the UK. These businesses are continually being forced to adapt operating procedures and enhance compliance systems under the threat of loss of their bank accounts [15] and the perceived lack of understanding amongst ‘outsiders’ of their unique situation and the business model they have to operate as a result.[16]

Ultimately it is the financial services industry – both formal and informal – that is on the frontline of CTF. As noted by former Assistant Secretary for Terrorist-Financing, Juan Zarate, ‘there has been an enormous burden placed on financial and commercial actors since 9/11’.[17] For these companies, compliance with CTF requirements is a financial balancing act, a judgment between, on the one hand, blind compliance with whatever regulations are published through fear of the reputational and financial damage caused by exposure as non-compliant, and, on the other hand, the considerable and increasing cost[18] (estimated at £250 million and over US $1 billion per annum in the UK and US respectively[19]) of implementing AML/CTF regulations.

Recent Banking Trends

As primarily private sector, shareholder-owned companies, financial institutions seek to defray or reduce this cost in a number of ways, each of which has an inadvertent negative consequence for CTF. In some cases, particularly where NGOs and MSBs are concerned such as in the Somali case, and where legitimate clients are unable to meet the more stringent customer due diligence requirements, banks are terminating relationships and service provision as this class of client is simply ‘unbankable’. [20]

In other cases, where possible, financial service providers seek to rid themselves of regulatory burdens and costs by closing down their operations or withdrawing services from a particular jurisdiction – for example withdrawing correspondent banking services or the provision of bank accounts to so-called ‘Politically Exposed Persons’, an ever-broadening categorisation. And finally,
the burden of this increased regulation is likely to lead to more expensive transaction costs. This encourages customers to seek cheaper means of moving their money, which inevitably means operating in the informal and unregulated sectors. In turn, this reduces the ability of the authorities to monitor cash movements, thus damaging efforts to prevent the global financial system from being misused, and in many cases leading to exclusion from the financial system – precisely the reverse of what the authorities have been trying to achieve.

Within the financial services industry, there is clearly a belief that these rising compliance costs are disproportionate to their outcomes, are poor value-for-money, and, due to inconsistent global application, a competitive disadvantage to strict adherents. The additional compliance has resulted in a significant burden of reporting and monitoring requirements for the formal financial sector. To protect its reputation, a financial institution is motivated to report excessively, and has no incentive to consider the quality of the data it submits to its national authority. ‘Suspicious Activity Report’ filings (or SARs), for example, have increased dramatically, swamping the authorities – the US Treasury Department’s FinCEN has seen SARs rise by a factor of ten since 9/11, reaching a total of over 1.5 million in 2011.[21] The number of SARs filed in the UK over the same period has experienced a rise of similar magnitude to almost 280,000 as of September 2012.[22] Given the amount of raw information provided to the authorities and their track-record in managing large volumes of data, it is questionable whether they are actually able to follow up and act upon many of the submitted suspicious activity reports. In developing nations, matters are worse, with law enforcement and regulatory authorities often too inefficient or corrupt to process the majority of reports that are made.

Smaller operators, such as the Somali money transfer companies that find it expensive to keep up with the compliance requirements, complain that it is the mainstream banks that are responsible for the bulk of deliberate and inadvertent facilitation of the movement of billions in criminal money, despite their heavy investment in AML/CTF systems. For example, HSBC received a record US $1.9 billion penalty for deliberately breaking sanctions and providing a conduit for ‘terrorists, drug lords, and rogue regimes’[23]. The digital money service Liberty Reserve, which held seventeen bank accounts, is said to have helped criminals to launder US $6 billion around the world.[24] This shows not only that even the largest and most sophisticated institutions are still vulnerable to abuse, but that there is an important question of proportionality that must be addressed in the application of the global CTF regime.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

Post 9/11, the key to starving terrorists of funding was believed to lie in the globally co-ordinated development and enactment of guidelines, and thus global authorities turned to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Established at a G7 summit in Paris in 1989 to spearhead the fight against criminal money-laundering, particularly in the drugs-trade, FATF quickly became
the thought-leader for global CTF. Its original mandate had been to examine money-laundering techniques, review national and international prevention activity, and propose remedial measures and international standards. After 9/11, as the international community urgently sought to boost the global CTF regime, it seemed logical to extend the FATF mandate to include terrorist-financing.

FATF published its Eight (increased to Nine in 2004) Special Recommendations on Terrorist-Financing,[25] endorsing the UN’s CTF efforts under UNSCR 1267 and 1373, calling upon countries to criminalise terrorist-financing and to freeze assets accordingly, and aiming to set international standards for cooperation, reporting suspicious transactions, and regulating and controlling NGOs, wire transfers, and cash couriers.

There is no doubt that using FATF and its pre-existing AML communication and implementation framework allowed global CTF efforts to advance more rapidly. However, taking this existing regime and directing it against the financing of terrorism implied that there is significant commonality between (drug) money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Yet that is not the case. Terrorist-financing originates from a diversity of sources, ranging from state sponsorship, to individual donations and petty crime. Furthermore, in contrast to most money laundering, it is not undertaken for profit.

FATF made several further flawed assumptions when grafting nine extra anti-terrorist measures onto the existing forty anti-crime measures. For example, they assume that individual nations have a level of control that is in reality ‘often lacking’[26]; that information is easily available in each country it visits; that first-world standards apply in the ‘Global South’; and that complying (if that were possible) with its Recommendations is as high a priority for all countries as it is for FATF’s sponsors – this is often simply not the case where greater, existential social and security issues deserve the more urgent attention of a government.[27] Indeed the level of engagement and alignment of countries critical to the successful implementation of a global CTF strategy is often questionable. The Wikileaks U.S. Government cable files shine a light on this shortcoming, with a US State Department cable revealing in December 2009 that ‘it has been an ongoing challenge to persuade Saudi officials to treat terrorist-financing emanating from Saudi Arabia as a strategic priority,’ and in the case of Kuwait that ‘it has been less inclined to take action against Kuwait-based financiers and facilitators plotting attacks outside of Kuwait.’[28]

**Financial Exclusion and Marginalisation: The Unintended Consequences**

Against this background of significantly tightened global AML/CTF standards and the withdrawal by banks of many financial services deemed too risky (or not sufficiently profitable to justify the perceived risk), it is important to consider the consequences of these actions on the important matter of financial inclusion. As the FATF notes, ‘...applying an overly cautious approach to AML/CFT safeguards can have the unintended consequence of excluding legitimate
businesses and consumers from the financial system’[29] – a side-effect that is particularly prevalent in high-risk and fragile state environments such as Somalia.

According to the World Bank, ‘three quarters of the world’s poor do not have a bank account, not only because of poverty, but [also] the cost, travel distance and amount of paper work involved in opening an account.’[30] For many of these 2.5 billion people, informal mechanisms play an important role, in particular as a means for delivering much-needed assistance through diaspora remittances and investment to hard-to-reach places.[31] In Muslim communities, many use the traditional method of hawala (or simply ‘transfer’), which attracted the acute attention of law enforcement agencies and regulators when they searched how the attacks of 9/11 were financed. Islamic charities and the third pillar of Islam – zakat – also offer a vital source of supplementary income across the Middle East, Africa and South East Asia. Much like the informal financial system, however, seen as vulnerable to diversion to terrorism and criminality.

Research undertaken by the World Bank and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) reaches important conclusions with regards to the interaction between the provision of financial services to the poorer sectors of society and the establishment of an effective AML/CTF regime. The research notes that these objectives are ‘complementary’ as ‘without a sufficient measure of financial inclusion, a country’s AML/CFT system will safeguard the integrity of only [the formal] part of its financial system... leaving the informal and unregistered components vulnerable to abuse.’[32] Broadening financial inclusion should be seen as a key and desirable element of establishing an effective AML/CTF policy and thus steps taken by banks and authorities that exclude users from the financial system and make the use of the underground economy appear more attractive are counterproductive.[33]

The challenges facing remittance payments destined for Somalia from the UK and other Western nations is a current case in point. The vast majority of these transactions are small but critical for the recipient. According to data provided by several members of the Somali Money Service Association (SOMSA) in the UK, the average transaction for many remitters is a mere £25 per person, whilst three Minnesota-based members of the Somali-American Money Service Association (SAMSA) in the US provided information to the American Refugee Committee indicating that the average transaction size is $170[34]—these funds are almost certainly destined for some of the world’s poorest people.

On balance, in the case of fragile states such as Somalia, the creation of greater financial inclusion is likely to benefit security rather than detract from it, and global regulatory authorities thus need to monitor closely whether the counter-terrorism measures they promote support or undermine security. For instance, given the instability of Somalia, many have emigrated to find work and protection. As a result, remittance flows from the diaspora, currently estimated at US $1-2 billion per annum,[35] are extremely important to the welfare of family members who remain in the homeland or refugee camps in neighbouring countries. Often, no formal, viable
financial link exists to connect these families with their overseas source of money, thus restricting the flow of payments to these people leaves open a vacuum that can be filled by assistance from local terrorist organisations such as al-Shabaab, leading to increased support for the organisations that the international security community is trying to restrict via CTF measures.

Other consequences may also follow: the inability of large Somali populations based in border regions, such as the world’s largest refugee camp in Dadaab (Kenya), to receive supplementary support from family members abroad may lead to national security concerns in countries hosting substantial and growing Somali refugee populations; diaspora communities in Western nations frustrated by their inability to transfer funds may experience an increase in radicalisation, and as highlighted by a Somali cab driver in Minnesota in response to a question about what he thinks would happen if the banks shut down the accounts of Somali money transfer companies: ‘If there is no hawala, there will be no more people in Somalia. They will move to another place. Maybe join their families illegally’. [36]

In Afghanistan, there is evidence of over a decade of misguided engagement with financiers there, leading to marginalisation of the very sector that could contribute to the growth of the economy and to lifting the country out of poverty. Policymakers shared a lack of understanding of the innovative yet informal systems that emerged during crisis and conflict periods, encouraged by the Bush administration’s view of starving terrorists of funds (leading to the attempted closure or disruption of hawala networks). [37] If the Western donors and Coalition troops had constructively engaged with financial networks such as hawala earlier, then they would have been able to assess how to work with them creatively in important areas such as facilitating payments to police, military, and other government workers. Such a strategy would have been likely to have encouraged traditional actors to move to a more modern system, which would then support the current ‘transition’ process.

Counter-Terrorism Finance: A Regime Fit-for-Purpose?

From a standing-start in 2001, the efforts of the US Treasury Department were graded A-minus by the 9/11 Public Discourse Project in December 2005. [38] Yet this grade was for effort, not the effectiveness of the proliferation of policy papers, recommendations, and guidance that emerged around the AML/CTF regime. Likewise, in assessing FATF-compliance, countries and financial institutions are judged by supervisors often more interested in ‘box-ticking’ rather than the effective implementation of these global standards – standards which are often irrelevant and/or impossible to implement given the circumstances of a particular country situation. It is hard to imagine FATF receiving such a lofty grade.

Too much emphasis has been placed on ‘regulatory ritualism,’ [39] creating global and national standards that rely primarily on paper compliance, rather than engagement with the target audience.
Conclusion

Based on a cursory review of the reality of terrorist financing per se, several conclusions emerge. Throughout the beginnings of the modern Jihad during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, money was moving freely through banking channels without great scrutiny. There was also widespread use of couriers with large pouches. Following 9/11, and with advances in fraud detection and prevention technology implemented by banks and other financial institutions (for example biometric passports, ID cards, and ‘chip and pin’ technology), groups such as al-Qaeda have certainly faced increased challenges.

However, as the world’s governments and financial authorities became more sophisticated in their hunt for terrorism finance following 9/11, Al-Qaeda’s terrorists adopted simpler, under the radar methods to avoid detection. These methods did not just extend to the movement of finance, but also to the exchange of information and instructions between leaders and cells – avoiding almost all means of direct electronic communications through cell phones and emails became the best tool of survival for many of al-Qaeda’s leaders, cells and operatives. Instead al-Qaeda and other Jihadist groups placed greater emphasis on the ‘human element’ when exchanging money, messages, information and instructions to avoid the American’s ability to monitor electronic signals. Al-Qaeda’s use of human couriers for such tasks is well documented, and it enabled Bin Laden to escape detection for almost a decade.

The intense regulatory and governmental pressure on the formal and informal financial services sector has led terrorist financiers to find means of raising and moving funds outside regulated channels, leading to unintended negative consequences from the CTF regime, such as the rise in kidnap-for-ransom, the increase in financial exclusion, and the mounting cost of compliance. With such a large portion of terrorist-financing activity occurring outside the formal financial system, the burden placed on those within that system appears on the whole increasingly wasteful and redundant.[40]

What therefore can be done to improve and focus the contribution that CTF makes to international security? We offer the following six recommendations by way of conclusion.

Recommendation 1: Dialogue

Traditionally, the relationship between financial service providers in high risk corridors and those administering the AML/CTF regime has been confrontational,[41] characterised by inflexibility and an unwillingness or inability to consider alternative points of view. This is not helped by the fact that each also derives legitimacy from different audiences – international institutions gain legitimacy from ‘above’ through state structures, whereas more informal markets gain legitimacy from ‘below’ through domestic concerns of the people or local dynamics.[42] The lack of constructive dialogue or engagement between the two forms of economic governance has contributed to inappropriate and ineffective regulatory regimes that are oblivious to the realities
on the ground. A more open dialogue must occur between these communities so that companies attempting to formalise and improve their standards have the opportunity to share their concerns, and understand the perspective of regulators and banks.

In addition to improving dialogue between the more informal and formal spheres, information must flow in both directions between the regulators and the banks, and intelligence should be shared. KPMG’s 2011 Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey revealed that a significant proportion of banks desire ‘more guidance’ and a more ‘collaborative’ and focused approach, noting ‘there’s no sharing of information back from government... it’s a waste of energy without [providing] key information to us.’[43] Financial institutions have highly sophisticated systems for sorting through the millions of pieces of data they receive from their various business lines each day. Given the right guidance by the authorities, the financial industry could provide higher quality, valuable data to the security services. Developing this connection into an effective partnership is critical to the upgrading of CTF efforts.

Recommendation 2: FATF Reform

In 2011, the IMF characterised FATF’s assessment policy as being comprehensive and inflexible, without taking into account the circumstances of individual countries.[44] Certain participants of FATF recognise the extent of the burden their proscriptive and detailed model imposes on businesses and nations, adding costs and compliance demands that are significant and in many cases simply unachievable. In preparing for its next round of country reviews due to begin shortly, FATF is aiming to ‘zoom out’ and encourage a more ‘risk-based approach’. Whilst the new Recommendation 1 is a welcome step, encouraging the ‘efficient allocation of resources across… AML/CTF regimes,’[45] it is critical that a more nuanced approach is taken that reflects local realities and risks, moving away from the current burdensome, rigid, and granular requirements, that are often irrelevant at best and counterproductive at worst.

Recommendation 3: International Cooperation

International cooperation must be significantly, and willingly, enhanced. A 2010 study of FATF mutual evaluation data by the AML/CFT Group revealed that of 156 countries, 122 and 130 respectively were non- or only partially compliant with Special Recommendations I and III (‘Ratification and Implementation of UN Instruments’ and ‘Freezing and Confiscating Terrorist Assets’).[46] Simply put, after almost 10 years of effort, approximately 80 per cent of countries were not meeting the most basic standards.

Why is this so? Clearly some of the failure comes from a lack of technical capability, for example where identity verification is not possible, or where a lack of cooperation between ministries and political parties makes passing laws challenging. But the primary reason is that for many countries, the relevance of CTF is unclear at best, and at worst is seen as a self-serving
Western-sponsored initiative. Thus, to secure true international political support and reverse the negative perception caused by hasty and unwarranted designations, the sponsors of the global CTF regime must demonstrate that these efforts are effective in reducing crime and terrorism, and that they are manifestly as important as the existential social and security issues that many partially compliant and non-compliant countries already face.

Recommendation 4: Financial Inclusion of the Unbanked

A concerted, apolitical effort should be made to address the dilemma of facilitating the fast, efficient and cost-effective flow of finance to the poorest people in the world, while fighting terrorism. The UK Government’s project on whether and how principles of a ‘safe corridor’ can be established to facilitate legitimate payments while isolating criminal and terrorist finance is a current case in point. Part of this task will involve addressing the specific vulnerability presented by and to the humanitarian sector.[47] Another element will involve addressing the delicate task of migrating people from traditional and informal funds transfer systems to engagement with modern and formal systems such as ‘mobile money’. This also requires the collaboration of many different parties.

Recommendation 5: Cashless Systems

The bypassing by terrorist organisations of much of the financial and banking system via the use of cash couriers, the transfer of high value items such as diamonds and gold, and the use of charitable services for health and welfare provisions, renders the task of monitoring and policing such operations almost impossible. Compliance teams at banks cannot trace cash once it leaves the bank cashier; and their investigative teams cannot determine if the charities that bank with them are providing clandestine services for families of deceased Jihadists, or building clinics for dual use of both civilians and Jihad militants. Even if bank compliance teams were to investigate, the deception is of such a magnitude that only professional intelligence agencies could uncover it.

Therefore, money transfer companies serving high-risk corridors where remittances are key for livelihoods support and survival should plan to convert their operations to cashless systems. This involves collaboration with telecommunication companies at the global and national levels. Even then it will remain extremely difficult to assess the motivation behind a person’s money transfer. Somali money transfer companies are deeply frustrated by the demand from banks that they report any transactions that appear as though they are intended to support terrorism – it is as difficult for them as discerning how someone in the West will spend cash they withdraw from an ATM.
Recommendation 6: Prevent Terrorism at the Source

Since 9/11, considerable effort has been made to target the raising of both legitimate and illegitimate financing by terrorists, and to inhibit the flow and distribution of these funds, with the closing of NGOs, Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS), and the ratifying and implementation of UN and FATF resolutions and recommendations. But the dispersed and clandestine nature of the fundraising efforts by al-Qaeda and other Jihadist groups make it almost impossible to disrupt. Even if dozens of Tajheez coordinators and fundraisers were to be arrested and their assets confiscated, this would represent only a very small percentage of the overall number of fundraisers and Tajheez coordinators/recruiters in operation. The reality on the ground shows that others always emerge to replace those arrested.

Terrorist organisations have also adapted their operational methods, by turning to greater use of criminal fundraising techniques (kidnap-for-ransom, bank robbery, internet fraud, etc), exploiting new payment technologies that often remain outside the purview of regulators, focusing more closely on domestically-sourced finance, and seeking to limit their electronic footprint to the greatest extent possible by using IVTS and cash couriers.

As Victor Comras (who worked for the UN Security Council al-Qaida and Taliban Monitoring Group) observes, ‘Much of the investigation and research related to al-Qaeda has dealt with its funding mechanisms and not with the motivation that has generated the donations and dedication that has supported it.’[48] If the authorities are truly to ‘starve’ terrorists of funds, the source needs to be stemmed and donors need to be dissuaded from providing their support. The global CTF regime must therefore work with other multilateral organisations to blunt the most powerful fundraising tools in the armoury of terrorist organisations, namely a sympathetic ideology and general social misery caused by authoritarian regimes, for ‘as long as there is a desire for people to contribute to radical Islamist causes, they will find a way to do so.’[49]

One of the most effective means to prevent the diversion of unwitting Muslim people’s funds to terrorism is to introduce doubt about those whom they have entrusted with their money. Out of faith and trust, some people hand over their money to clerics or operatives thinking that it will be delivered to the poor. In cases where they have been deceived by those who harbour hidden Jihadist sympathies, the authorities should publicise these by showing clearly how they have used the money – either for Jihadist causes or to lavish certain luxuries on themselves. Targeting the integrity of those collecting the money with such motives will be a far more effective strategy than simply arresting them or seizing their assets.

The global CFT effort is at an important juncture. The easy tasks – improving standards in willing countries and at willing corporations – have largely been achieved. Yet many vulnerabilities remain, and new ones are emerging as terrorist organisations evolve. It is therefore critical that CTF efforts adapt to reflect the changes terrorist organisations are undergoing, and avoid wasting ‘resources on countering threats of the past.’[50] Policymakers need to rethink why
they have a CTF strategy, what are the explicit goals of this strategy, and how these goals are being benchmarked and measured. They should acknowledge and reflect the evolving shape of terrorist organisations and their operations, and if these goals are not being achieved then they should have the courage to modify, replace, or scrap them. It appears that since the initial urgency that ‘something must be done’ to target terrorist-financing in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, strategy in this arena has at best stagnated, and at worst continued down a sub-optimal path. Therefore significant reassessment is needed urgently. Without goal-setting and benchmarking, the CTF regime will continue unchecked on its current course, inflicting unnecessary cost and burden on corporations and nations, and restricting well-intentioned access to financial services for people in need, leading to greater use of the informal and black economies. This is clearly not the way CTF will play an effective role in international security.

About the Authors:
Aimen Dean and Dr Edwina Thompson share an extremely privileged level of access to some of the most opaque financial systems in the world. They collaborate because of their complementary knowledge and commitment to sharing a better understanding of systems that often evade the purview of government regulators. Edwina has conducted primary research into the hawala systems of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia between 2000-2013, and continues to be consulted for expert contributions by various governmental, banking and NGO fora. Aimen has an unrivalled and also first-hand understanding of the methods of terrorist fundraising and funds transfer in the Middle East. This article draws heavily on their respective research.

Tom Keatinge is a banker with nearly 20 years’ experience. He recently completed a sabbatical year studying for a Masters in the War Studies Department of King’s College London where he wrote his dissertation on the question of the role played by the global counter-terrorist financing effort in international security. Significant portions of this article are drawn from practitioner interviews and literature reviewed for his dissertation.

Notes


[4] This is the result of primary research on the Afghan Jihad against the communist regime in the 1980s and beyond; the Bosnian and Chechen Jihad effort in the mid- and late 1990s; Jihad training camps in Afghanistan from the mid-1990s until late 2001; post-9/11 Jihad theatres such as Iraq from 2003 until 2008; Afghanistan from 2005 until late 2011; Yemen from 2009 until late 2011; and Syria from late 2011 until mid-2012.
Further detail and rationale for numbers cited in this section can be found in Dean, Aimen A. (2012) *Holy Money: Understanding the World of Jihadist Finance*.

[5] Examples include: ‘And wage Jihad with your wealth and your lives in the cause of God,’ Qur’an 9:41; ‘The ones who have believed, emigrated and striven in the cause of Allah with their wealth and their lives are greater in rank in the sight of God. And it is those who are the recipients of his reward,’ Qur’an 9:20.


[15] See the websites set up in response to the perceived crisis in the UK ([www.somsa.co.uk](http://www.somsa.co.uk)) and US ([www.samsausa.org](http://www.samsausa.org)).

[16] As opposed to other financial corridors, MSBs are the only form of financial service provider in Somalia (with the exception of two, small and highly localised operations); MSBs are thus used by all international organisations and companies operating there. Without them the flow of funds would be severely disrupted, having dire humanitarian and security implications within and beyond Somalia. Furthermore, the nature of Somali society is such that technology is viewed as poor substitute for the social, trust-based verification that they have used historically.


At the most extreme end, the Coalition in Iraq launched an early campaign to shut down the hawala system in Baghdad over one night, called Operational Maul-a-hawala. This was unsuccessful due to the lack of appreciation of its importance to the running of the legitimate economy; it had to be ‘reinstated’.


Thompson, Edwina A. Trust is the Coin of the Realm , op. cit. pp.268-78

It should be acknowledged that money-laundering cases such as those revealed involving HSBC in 2012 and the recently revealed activities of Liberty Reserve highlight the need for appropriate systems and monitoring at financial institutions; they are certainly not blameless.

See Thompson, Edwina A. Trust is the Coin of the Realm , op. cit., chapter 2. In Chapter 8, the author also explores the various ‘bargains’ that take place between the two at the operational level in a country such as Afghanistan.

Ibid., p.279.

KPMG (2011), Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey 2011: How Banks are Facing Up to the Challenge, p.9 & p38


Author interview (2012).


Comras, Victor D. (2005) ‘Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups,’ Strategic Insights IV(1)


II. Resources

The Art of Searching: How to Find Terrorism Literature in the Digital Age

by Judith Tinnes

Abstract

This guide provides an overview on information retrieval techniques for locating high-quality literature on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Starting from general considerations on conducting a literature search – taking into account the specifics of terrorism studies – instructions are provided on how to find particular literature types by using different search methods and information retrieval systems, followed by information on how to refine a search by employing focused search strategies. The explanations are enriched with numerous links to recommendable resources. The included examples are focused on terrorism studies, but the general search mechanics can be applied to other research domains as well.

The Internet – A World Library?

The Internet is sometimes called a world library, which has rendered research support organisations (including the traditional library) superfluous. For scholarly communication the “network of networks” is undoubtedly the most important innovation since Johannes Gutenberg invented the printing press in 1450. Its advantages are obvious: It is accessible at any time from everywhere, can be used quickly and easily, allows flexible kinds of interaction with information (for example, reading texts online, saving and printing documents, copying and pasting excerpts) and even enables users to produce their own content, be it textual or multimedia, independently of the selection thresholds of commercial publishers – thus creating an “information democracy”.

However, in spite of all these valuable benefits, the disadvantages of the Internet must not be ignored, especially by serious researchers who require high-quality, objective, and reliable information. The efficiency of online retrieval is restricted by information overload, irrelevant ballast, and quality differences leading to imprecise or invalid search results. Moreover, the bulk of web content is technically unreachable by search engine crawlers (so-called Deep Web content[1]). Free and commercial resources are mixed, the latter often employing complex, opaque license models. All these characteristics are the very opposite of the attributes typically found at a traditional research support facility.

Information professionals offer services to optimise information retrieval by evaluating, selecting, acquiring, organising, and providing resources for their patrons. If they do not have the information themselves, they point people to good material that is housed elsewhere.[2] With their expertise, they assist users in finding information and train them in using retrieval systems.
Precisely because the quickly expanding Internet content “is rather disorganized, and any mechanism to make sense of it is welcome”[3], research support today is more important than ever – users need the assistance of an “expert intermediary”[4] to meet their information needs. This added value, which presupposes sophisticated intellectual work, is the main difference to consider when comparing materials provided by research support organisations to those presented by full-text search engines. While the former are selected and manually indexed by information specialists – i.e. humans – the latter are automatically collected and indexed by search engines – i.e. machines that cannot compete with the intellectual skills of the human mind. On the other hand, only the data processing capacity of search engines can (at a rudimentary level) cope with the quickly growing amount of full-text and multimedia items on the web. The conclusion of these considerations is simple: A search will only be successful if one uses both machine-indexed and human-indexed materials rather than relying exclusively on a single type of materials. The same is true for particular search methods and retrieval systems: Each of them, as Thomas Mann observes:

> has distinct advantages and disadvantages (both strengths and weaknesses); and each is capable of turning up information that cannot be reached by the other [ones].

> Information that lies in a blind spot to any one method of searching, however, usually lies within the purview of one or more of the other means of inquiry.[5]

Consequently, if researchers want to master the art of searching, they have to know which search method(s) and retrieval system(s) are best suited for their particular research purpose.

This guide provides an overview of information retrieval techniques for locating high-quality literature on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Starting from general considerations on conducting a literature search – taking into account the specifics of terrorism studies – instructions are provided on how to find particular literature types by using different search methods and information retrieval systems, followed by information on how to refine a search by employing focused search strategies. The explanations are enriched with numerous links to recommendable resources. The included examples are focused on terrorism studies, but the general search mechanics can be applied to other research domains as well.

**General Considerations on Literature Search**

*The Specifics of Terrorism Literature*

Every research field has its own specific attributes that influence its literature landscape and also the way to search for literature. Important aspects of the terrorism literature corpus include the following:

- 9/11 has been a trigger event for terrorism research. Though the roots of terrorism research precede 9/11 by many decades, the attacks on the U.S. have caused many
conflict scholars and academics from a variety of disciplines to shift their attention toward understanding the causes and consequences of terrorism. As Young and Findley noted, “The amount of research on terrorism being published in political science journals has doubled several times over what it was pre-9/11.”[6]

- Terrorism is an interdisciplinary subject but not an independent discipline. Though terrorism has numerous facets and affects many aspects of human life, it has not yet been established as an independent academic discipline.

- Terrorism research is often conducted by one-time or transient researchers. These researchers contribute only a single study or a small amount of studies during one or two years and then move on to other research fields. Only a small core of researchers is committed to the field and publishes continuously over a larger time period.[7]

- Terrorism has a large research periphery. Terrorism literature is characterized by a massive dispersion across multiple academic disciplines. While there are a few journals (like Perspectives on Terrorism) that focus exclusively on this area of research, most contributions are published in the periphery of the field; that is, in publication outlets that belong to other disciplines and that once in a while publish a single or a few article(s) on terrorism.[8]

- Terrorism is a highly subjective topic. “Terrorism” is not a neutral but pejoratively charged term which makes it challenging to find unbiased information. The information realm of the media (and the Internet in particular) has turned into a battlefield where opponents spread misinformation and propaganda mixed with credible information.

Hence, when searching for literature, terrorism researchers are confronted with a fast growing body of mainly interdisciplinary publications scattered over a large number of publication outlets and written by irregular contributors to the field. Compared to traditional disciplines with established publication outlets and a core authorship, in terrorism research the possibility of missing important contributions is considerably higher. Moreover, the evaluation of the literature needs extra efforts to filter out biased resources.[9] Locating high-quality terrorism literature is therefore an important aspect of conducting terrorism research and is “by no means a simple intellectual operation. […] It involves complicated acts of evaluation and decision making”[10] and should thus not be treated as a negligible low-level mental activity.

Hermeneutic Approach

Sebastian Boell and Dubravka Cecez-Kecmanovic propose a hermeneutic approach towards literature reviews, illustrating how developing an understanding of a relevant body of literature is not a linear process but circular in nature. Engagement with the literature deepens understanding
and influences the way every new publication is interpreted – for example, researchers are becoming more familiar with specialized terms, research approaches, and names of core authors and publication outlets. This process helps them to improve subsequent search operations. Therefore, it is not advisable to identify all relevant literature on a subject in a first step and engage with the literature in a subsequent step. Researchers should rather start a literature search with locating a small set of highly relevant resources (instead of huge sets of documents whose relevance cannot be sufficiently judged) and read them, then return to search, go on with reading the next set of documents, and iterate these activities until a point of saturation is reached.[11]

Build Up Your Own Research Tool Box

Regular contributors to the field are strongly advised to build up a collection of useful core and peripheral sources for literature retrieval as this effort will pay off as a time saver and helps to avoid missing important content. In 1934, British librarian Samuel C. Bradford formulated a bibliometric law describing the distribution of papers on a specific subject in scientific periodicals. According to Bradford’s law of scattering, “there are a few very productive sources, a larger number of sources which give moderate production, and a still larger number of [items with] constantly diminishing productivity.”[12] This means that during a literature search, many relevant publications will be scattered over a vast amount of peripheral publication outlets. Such is the case with the diverse array of terrorism research sources, as noted above.

At the beginning of the literature retrieval process, researchers should at first identify the core sources of the field (journals, institutions, conferences, etc.). According to Avishag Gordon, a core journal “is dedicated to the central themes of the specific scientific field. It carries the name of the field in its title (in most cases).”[13] This definition can be expanded to non-journal sources, such as governmental or non-governmental institutions that regularly publish relevant materials, e.g., the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) or the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). As core sources account for a high percentage of relevant literature, it is advisable to regularly hand-check them (i.e., browsing the table of contents of core journals or visiting the publications sections of institution homepages) in order to avoid missing important content.

If one bears Bradford’s law of scattering in mind, it becomes evident that it is not sufficient to rely exclusively on core sources, as by ignoring peripheral sources, one will exclude many important materials. Gordon defines a peripheral journal as a “journal that occasionally publishes articles about terrorism but is dedicated mostly to another field of study.”[14] As the relevance of peripheral sources is often not discernible at first sight, it requires considerable effort to identify them. Methods for locating core and peripheral sources are described below.
Searching for Terrorism Literature

Secondary Literature

Researchers who start engaging with a new subject should initially focus their search on secondary literature. This publication type does not contain original research but synthesizes, analyses, or reviews original research contributions.

A good entry point into a subject is an encyclopedia. Encyclopedia articles give a broad overview of the established knowledge on a topic, provide background information, outline the most important facts, and list selected references to highly relevant literature. Usually, subject encyclopedias are better suited than general encyclopedias because they are written by experts in the field, are focused, and provide more details. Encyclopedias are often published in print-form by renowned publishers, undergo rigorous editorial control, and can therefore be considered authoritative high-quality information sources. To retrieve encyclopedias, researchers should use databases focusing on reference works. Examples are: Reference Universe, Credo Reference, or Guide to Reference.

Handbooks convey similar information as encyclopedias but with a stronger emphasis on practice, procedures, and other “how to” directions to provide “actionable” rather than theoretical knowledge. They are concisely written to enable readers to quickly find answers in field situations. [15] Both encyclopedias and handbooks are written for non-specialists.

Textbooks are designed for educational purposes. They provide a foundation for the understanding of a particular topic (including a historical outline). Thematically, textbooks are organised in short units adaptable to teaching lessons. The content of each unit is prepared didactically, and often an instructor’s resource guide is provided.

Examples of encyclopedias, handbooks, and textbooks on terrorism include:

Review articles (not to be confused with book reviews) provide a state-of-the-art overview on a particular subject. As they typically explore a large amount of relevant literature, they are more exhaustive than encyclopedia or handbook articles and their reference list is more comprehensive than selective. Literature reviews provide orientation into an area, introduce specific terms, concepts, and research streams and their relationship to each other, point out shortcomings in earlier research, and highlight research desiderata. Literature reviews are also valuable in light of the knowledge explosion and the consequent impossibility of reading everything. They often address readers who already have a basic knowledge on a subject. Literature reviews can either be found as a separate literature type or as parts of other publications (literally, every primary research article or doctoral thesis contains a review section). Frequently, academic journals have dedicated sections for literature reviews.

Bibliographies are a true gold mine for literature retrieval. Often, they are manually compiled by information specialists or renowned experts in the field, who conduct the laborious work of retrieving, evaluating, and selecting relevant resources on a particular subject from widely scattered (including less-known) sources. The main advantage of bibliographies is to save researchers the trouble of reinventing the wheel by providing them with a one-stop overview listing of sources already determined to be relevant. Bibliographies are published in print or in electronic format. In the latter case, researchers should carefully assess the individual(s) who compiled a bibliography to obtain clues on the reliability and objectivity of its contents. Perspectives on Terrorism regularly publishes bibliographies on different terrorism topics (see the Appendix for a content listing). The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) maintains an extensive resource portal named "Teaching About Terrorism." Part of the collection is the "Terrorism and Counterterrorism" bibliography produced by faculty and researchers of the Combating Terrorism Center. Also, researchers can retrieve bibliographies on expert homepages; see for example Christian Bleuer’s "Afghanistan Analyst Conflict Bibliography" or Aaron Y. Zelin’s "Jihadi Studies Bibliography", as well as his "End of the Year" and "Articles of the Week" series on his blog Jihadology.

Secondary sources are easy to identify because they often carry terms for their function in the title (e.g., "encyclopedia", "bibliography", "references", "resources", "handbook", "review"). Therefore, using such terms in a keyword search in library catalogues, databases, or search engines combined with keywords or phrases for the subject of interest (e.g., "terrorism", "political violence", or "suicide attacks") may deliver satisfactory results. Subject headings in library catalogues (e.g., the Library of Congress Subject Headings, LCSH) or field search operations in
full-text or reference databases (such as Web of Science, or EBSCO Academic Search Complete) are particular helpful to narrow a search to specific literature types.

Citation Search

After having identified a set of highly relevant resources, it is advisable to scan the reference lists of these publications to retrieve further records. This retrieval method – often called “snowballing” – enables researchers to find relevant literature more quickly and easily than by most other retrieval strategies. Usually, being cited by the author of a core resource is a seal of quality for a publication: The author credits the resource he/she deemed valuable by citing it. However, researchers should always check the context in which a resource is cited, as a publication might also have been quoted to rebut its main hypothesis or to question its methodology. Moreover, researchers should keep in mind that the resources they identify by snowballing cannot be more recent than the article citing them (i.e. are inherently older).

Citation searching, the mirror-image of snowballing, is the method of choice to search for cited references forward in time, to subsequent publications.[19] It allows researchers to identify resources that have cited a particular publication and can therefore be useful to track the scholarly discussion on a specific topic. The two most widely used citation databases are Web of Science (Thomson Reuters / ISI) and Scopus (Elsevier). Citation search (and snowballing as well) have a central advantage over term-based search methods: As their basis is a particular citation, researchers do not have to specify search terms and therefore do not run the risk of missing important content due to the use of unsuited search vocabulary. Citation databases are currently limited to journal articles. Other literature types, such as books or reports, are not covered. Another shortcoming is the bias of citation databases: The major providers prefer internationally-focused subscription-based journals from English-speaking countries in North America, Western Europe, and Australia, and ignore the bulk of other-language journals with a more regional scope. Open-access journals are underrepresented as well. For example, though it is the most-read journal in the field, Perspectives on Terrorism is presently not indexed by Web of Science.

A very useful source for identifying core resources in a particular research domain is a citation analysis, i.e. a study that examines the patterns and frequency of citations in a specific field. In terrorism research, examples of citation analyses include:

Snowballing, citation searching, and citation analyses help researchers to identify the core authors of a field. Based on this knowledge, they should extend their search to publication lists of highly influential and productive authors to locate further relevant records.

**Journals**

Presently, peer-reviewed academic journals are the most important vehicle for scholarly communication. Since the beginning of scholarship, their numbers have increased from a handful to more than 26,700[20] making it nearly impossible to maintain a comprehensive account of the relevant periodicals in a particular field. Due to the short turnaround times for journal manuscripts, journal articles are predestinated to convey up-to-date information, meeting the needs of very dynamic research fields – like terrorism studies. Most peer-reviewed articles are published in subscription-based journals that hide their contents behind a pay-wall locking out readers whose institutions cannot afford the expensive licensing fees or who are not affiliated with an academic institution.[21]

The open-access (OA) movement tries to overcome this grievance by encouraging and facilitating free access to scholarly information.[22] OA can be subdivided into Green and Gold OA: The former model allows authors to publish their article in a subscription-based journal, but additionally requires them to self-archive it in a freely accessible institutional repository or on their homepage.[23] However, the free version is often not identical to the officially published article, as many publishers only allow self-archiving of preliminary versions of an article (e.g., before peer-review). This may confuse readers about which version is the official one; additionally, the preliminary versions are often not suited for citation purposes. Some publishers permit self-archiving only after a temporal delay, a so-called embargo, usually ranging from several months up to six years. In contrast, the Gold OA model requests that scholars publish their article in an OA journal, a journal that makes all of its contents immediately accessible to its readers at no cost. Though increasing, the percentage of OA articles is currently relatively low (36% in the social sciences, with only 1% of it Gold OA).[24]

OA publishing is sometimes associated with low-quality content. However, numerous OA journals apply the same rigorous quality control measures as their subscription-based cousins. To evaluate the quality of an OA journal, researchers should consult the “About” section of the particular journal. Existence of a peer-review procedure (ideally by external reviewers), an
editorial board comprised of members from countries all over the world, and a regular publication schedule are indicators of a quality academic periodical.

There are many ways to locate relevant journals in a field. As every retrieval system is limited in its coverage, researchers are recommended to always use multiple systems for their literature search. A convenient tool to identify relevant publications are journal bibliographies compiled by experts. Examples of journal bibliographies include:

- Charles Jones et al. (2010-): Access to Mideast and Islamic Resources (AMIR). URL: http://amirmideast.blogspot.de

Serials directories comprise thousands of bibliographic records of peer-reviewed journals and other periodicals in print and electronic format. Usually, they can either be browsed by subject and alphabetical categories or be keyword-searched. See for example Ulrichsweb (subscription via ProQuest) or the Electronic Journals Library (free; run by the University of Regensburg, Germany). The Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ) currently indexes more than 9,400 OA journals, roughly half of them are searchable at article level. Journal TOC is the largest free collection of scholarly journal tables of contents. It indexes more than 22,000 journals (including around 5,700 OA journals) from 1795 publishers. Users can search the collection for journals and journal articles. JSTOR is a subscription-based digital library comprising the archives of more than 1,900 journals, dating back to the first volume ever published. It is searchable at title and article level. A recommendable print source is The Standard Periodical Directory.

Database publishers provide coverage lists detailing which sources are indexed for a particular product. These lists can usually be browsed alphabetically and/or by subject categories. Examples for coverage lists are the Thomson Reuters / ISI Master Journal List or the content lists of EBSCO's International Security & Counter-Terrorism Reference Center (ISCTRC).

Snowballing, citation searching, and citation analyses are useful tools to retrieve relevant journals as well. Researchers should pay attention to titles that they repeatedly encounter in reference lists of various relevant articles, as redundancy indicates the importance of a journal for a particular field.

Another way to locate relevant journals is searching publisher homepages. Examples for publishing houses supporting terrorism studies are Cambridge Journals, De Gruyter, Elsevier, IOS Press, NOVA Publishers, Palgrave Macmillan, SAGE, Springer, Taylor & Francis, and Wiley. Often, publishers provide readers with the possibility to be alerted when a new journal, issue, or article by a specific author or on a specific (sub-)topic in their field of interest becomes available. [25]
To identify periphery journals, researchers are advised to keyword-search periodicals to evaluate their relevance. For example, if a search for the keyword “terrorism” reproduces hundreds of results, the journal is probably relevant, while only a handful of results indicate that terrorism is rather not in the scope of this publication. However, when applying this method, one must set the amount of returned results in relation to the total content volume of a journal – a recently established journal will hardly produce a large number of results.

Finally, researchers are recommended to monitor websites that introduce new journals; two of them are NewJour and La Criée.

Grey Literature

The term “grey literature” refers to non-conventional, informally published materials (e.g., e-books, reports, working papers, white papers, research briefs, fact sheets, or maps). Grey literature is produced by a broad spectrum of actors in the field, including academic, governmental, and private institutes, organisations, companies, and individual experts. To retrieve this type of literature, extra efforts are required as it is “neglected by most library catalogs and databases”[26], rarely advertised or marketed by its producers, and frequently hidden in the Deep Web and thus unreachable to search engines. Besides, grey literature often lacks bibliographical standards, meaning that basic reference information such as author name(s), publication date, or publishing body may be difficult to identify. However, engaging in extra retrieval efforts will pay off, because grey literature is an invaluable source of information. It encompasses a broad range and variety of materials. Many of the publications are original, covering topics in a thorough, in-depth fashion, often surpassing in length conventional journal articles.

Researchers are recommended to build up a collection of websites providing grey literature tailored to their specific needs. To locate publications at a particular website, researchers should search for the relevant section (often entitled “Publications”), which can be retrieved either by browsing or via the site map. A Google search with the site operator (e.g., publications site:ctc.usma.edu) may also deliver satisfactory results. There are several collections of grey literature sources on the web, saving researchers the trouble of reinventing the wheel. Examples are:

Dissertations

Doctoral dissertations are a treasure trove for information retrieval. They provide extensive up-to-date information on nearly every imaginable topic. Usually, they contain a thorough literature review on the subject they cover. Doctoral theses are qualification works supervised by highly qualified academic staff and can therefore be considered valid information sources. They can be found in institutional repositories or at national libraries (such as the U.S. Library of Congress, the British Library, or the German National Library). Pan-national or international federated networks aggregate multiple library collections under a single interface. Examples are the DART-Europe E-theses Portal and the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations (NDLTD).

Commercial indexing services offer extensive collections of references, abstracts, and full-texts of doctoral theses. The most common provider is the ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Database (PQDT). It includes nearly 3 million searchable citations to dissertations and other theses from around the world from 1743 to the present (over 1 million titles are available as full-texts in PDF format; over 2 million can be purchased as printed copies).

Books

In the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism studies, books have been underutilised in favour of journal articles or other short literature types that are more compatible to everyday working situations where tight deadlines are common[27] and up-to-date information is required. However, books provide a thorough, detailed in-depth level of knowledge that articles cannot offer. They can be distinguished into monographs and edited volumes: While the former are written by a single author or a group of authors and cover a single subject (or an aspect of it), the latter consist of several chapters written by different authors, harmonized by an editor. Each chapter covers a particular aspect of a subject ranging from general introductory to very specialized topics. Often, large multivolume edited publications offer a wealth of case studies and thematic research essays. Usually, academic publishers apply rigorous editorial control standards for submitted book manuscripts in order to secure a high-quality outcome.
The traditional tools for book retrieval are library catalogues. The largest library catalogue to date is OCLC’s WorldCat. The free online service allows users to search the holdings of tens of thousands of national and international libraries simultaneously. It focuses on books, video and music CDs, and DVDs. Other extensive catalogues are the Library of Congress Online Catalog and the catalogue of the British Library. Many countries maintain federated library catalogues enabling users to search many regional library collections at once; for example, in Germany, the Karlsruher Virtueller Katalog provides a one-stop interface for searching multiple federated catalogues in German-speaking countries. The powerful search can be expanded to international catalogues as well.

When using library catalogues for literature retrieval, researchers have to bear one important thing in mind: Most library catalogues focus on books and index on title rather than article level. This implies for periodicals that only the journal title is indexed but not the titles of the individual articles. To retrieve literature on article level, researchers have to rely on other sources, such as databases, academic search engines, or bibliographies. Literally, every library catalogue provides holding information. Researchers should start their book retrieval by searching the catalogue of their local library. If it does not hold a book, they should try to request a copy through inter-library-loan.

An easy-to-use book retrieval system is Google Books. The free service enables users to search the full-texts of a vast amount of books from many different publishers. The amount of accessible information depends on the copyright status of a particular book as well as on the individual arrangements Google made with book publishers and some major libraries. A book search result is presented in a special interface enabling users to preview pages and sometimes the full-text of a book. Usually, the whole book can be keyword-searched (for each occurrence, text snippets are presented), while the page preview is restricted to particular parts of a book. Most publishers allow at least the display of the cover page, imprint page(s), and table of contents – making Google Books a powerful tool to verify bibliographic information and search for content details. This feature is of special importance for edited books: While libraries increasingly include a table of contents for edited volumes in their catalogue records, many edited books are still indexed at title level only. Google Books is bridging this gap. Some library catalogues such as WorldCat offer a Google Books API, allowing users to open the Google Books Preview directly from a catalogue record.

Another source for book retrieval are book reviews. Many academic journals (e.g., Perspectives on Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and Critical Studies on Terrorism) have dedicated book review sections to which they release critical evaluations of recently published books. Besides, most databases provide the option to narrow a search to this specific literature type. While most book reviews focus on a single book, some reviews cover several books at once and are therefore particularly valuable. Examples are:
In the digital age, books are not only published in print but also in electronic format. Digital books (e-books) come with expanded usage capabilities (e.g., full-text search, bookmarking and highlighting features, clickable tables of contents, display of abstracts at chapter level) which allow readers to quickly mine and spot relevant information. Many publishers offer e-books in formats compatible for e-book readers (e.g., Kindle) or other mobile devices. E-books can be purchased directly from a publisher. Examples for publishing houses selling e-books on terrorism or counter-terrorism are Cambridge University Press, De Gruyter, Elsevier, IOS Press, NOVA Publishers, Palgrave Macmillan, Praeger Security International, SAGE, Springer, Taylor & Francis, and Wiley. Some publishers release special book series on terrorism-related topics (see for example the NATO Science for Peace and Security Series by IOS Press or the Focus on Terrorism Series by Nova Publishers). Commercial content providers (e.g., Questia), offer subscription-based access to e-book collections from many different publishers. Academic libraries enable their patrons to access licensed e-book collections at no cost. Moreover, governmental and non-governmental organisations and private companies provide OA e-books on their webpages (see the previous chapter on grey literature).

News

Terrorism research is a very dynamic field heavily influenced by contemporary political events. Therefore, researchers cannot exclusively rely on academic literature but require current information on world affairs. To stay informed they have to monitor the news. News are produced by a variety of outlets. However, finding reliable news is a challenging task because the information realm of the digital age has turned into a battlefield. In an internal letter dated 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: “I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media.”[28] Terrorists and their opponents publish biased accounts of events to support their cause. Hence, terrorism researchers should never rely on a single news outlet but always cross-check information over a broader range of sources to verify it.
Researchers are advised to build up a bookmark collection of handpicked trustworthy news sources tailored to their specific needs. This collection should not only comprise links to websites of major news networks, newswires, newspapers, or broadcasters (like Reuters, The New York Times, The Christian Science Monitor, BBC, or CNN), but should also consider outlets relevant to specific research purposes, e.g., if one tracks a hostage taking in Pakistan, it is recommendable to not only rely on sources from the Western hemisphere but also on regional outlets (such as Dawn, The Express Tribune, or GEO TV). Many national or regional non-English news sources provide a (though often limited) English version of their content (see for example the German news magazine Der Spiegel or the Panarabian newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat).

A popular tool for news retrieval is Google News. The machine-indexed news site aggregates news from several thousand news sources worldwide (including blogs), groups news stories by category, offers personalization features (most importantly: an alert service), and a variety of search options (such as date filtering). News Resource Guides (such as Kidon Media-Link and ABYZ News Links) compile a broad spectrum of news outlets around the world. Commercial vendors provide fee-based access to news databases containing full-texts of hundreds of different newspapers. These collections can be keyword-searched and are customizable (e.g., with regards to a particular topic). Examples are ProQuest, Factiva (Dow Jones), and Nexis (LexisNexis). Some providers, e.g., the World News Connection, offer translations of international news items from many different newspapers and broadcasting stations. Usually, academic libraries have licensed one or more subscription-based news service(s) that can be freely accessed by their patrons. Private companies in the field of terrorism research offer subscription-based specialized news services. Examples are IHS Jane’s, the SITE Intelligence Group, and the Middle East Research Institute (MEMRI). There are also several OA news services specializing in terrorism and security news, such as Homeland Security News (The National Terror Alert Response Center) and Terrorism News (Maryland Coordinating and Analysis Center). Most news outlets, database providers, and libraries offer customizable e-mail or RSS alert features, notifying readers when a new article in their field of interest becomes available.

Blogs

Focusing on topics of very specialized interests and being updated in short intervals, blogs are a priceless source for topical and thematic information. They can be considered a main pillar of “citizen journalism”: Offering people with no professional journalistic education a platform to share their knowledge and personal views, they constitute a counter-weight to the mainstream media. The quality of blog contents is very diverse ranging from well-founded commentaries and primary source analyses by academics and professional experts to unqualified hate speech by laymen. While the blog format is also employed by governmental or non-governmental institutions, news outlets, or other corporate entities, most blogs are maintained by a single or a few private person(s).
Many terrorism research blogs publish well-founded analyses of primary source materials (e.g., statements, video, and audio publications by terrorist organisations), point to news sources or expert literature, and also provide links to additional relevant websites (so-called “Blogroll”). This information aggregation function makes them the tool of choice for keeping informed on particular (sub)topics. Several bloggers in the field run accompanying Twitter accounts where they tweet news headlines and information on newly released publications by terrorist and counter-terrorist organisations, enabling readers to track events in almost real-time. The intertwined, multidirectional communication structure of the Blogosphere (comment/retweet options, voting features, etc.) can be very valuable to follow scholarly and professional discussions between terrorism experts.

There are several highly recommendable blogs in the field of terrorism research. A few examples are: Jih@d, Jihadology, Views from the Occident, Jihadica, Threat Matrix and Abu Susu’s Blog.

Due to the large number and quality differences, identifying reliable blogs is a challenging task. A good place to start a search is the Blogroll of expert blogs as it points readers to sources already determined to be relevant. Expert-compiled resource guides provide a broad range of hand-picked links to blogs and other informative sources, see for example:


To expand their blog search, researchers are advised to use blog search engines such as Google Blogs, Technorati, ICEROCKET, and the Blog Search Engine. These specialized retrieval systems enable users to search indexed portions of the web for blogs and blog postings.

Legal Information

Terrorism research is often intertwined with legal issues which can be very complicated especially in the case of global terrorism where jurisdictions of different countries are involved. A free search tool for legal information is Legal Scholar, a segment of Google Scholar containing legal opinions and court decisions from U.S. courts. To search Legal Scholar, researchers should go to the U.S. version of the Google Scholar website and activate the radio button next to “Legal Documents” below the search field.
A renowned commercial provider for legal information is LexisNexis, offering fee-based access to different kinds of legal full-texts (focus: Anglo-American law). Many countries have governmental or commercial providers for national law information (in Germany, for example, juris is an established supplier). Free resource guides and specialized directories such as GlobalLex and the Internet Law Library offer information about the legal systems of many countries and international jurisdictions.

**Primary Sources**

Terrorism is a communication strategy[29]. Terrorist organisations and individuals publish large amounts of texts, videos, audio files and other materials to rally people to their cause. In the digital age, they exploit the Internet as a prominent vehicle for the distribution of their materials[30]. When studying terrorism, researchers are advised to access these primary sources whenever possible instead of blindly relying on secondary sources, as these may contain only excerpts of an original publication (as is it often the case with terrorist videos broadcasted by the mainstream media), or may contain errors or misinterpretations (e.g., in the past, mainstream media outlets have repeatedly ascribed threat messages by terrorist sympathizers to “genuine” terrorist organisations).

Several expert publications regularly provide links to primary sources and well-founded analyses of primary source materials. A frequently updated publication is Aaron Y. Zelin’s blog Jihadology. Beyond free analyses, the site offers a fee-based translation service for Jihadist materials in multiple languages (including Arabic, Urdu, Pashto, Uzbek, and Russian). The Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group (JWMG) of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) provides several free Jihadi websites monitoring services: Alerts, Insights, and Periodical Reviews. Commercial research support companies such as the SITE Intelligence Group, IntelCenter, IHS Jane’s, the Middle East Research Institute (MEMRI), or the Middle East Observatory (MEO) offer subscription-based access to large collections of primary sources (including translations) targeted at the needs of specific customer groups.

As primary sources often cross-link to other primary sources, snowballing is a fruitful method to retrieve additional terrorist propaganda outlets. Terrorist organisations usually exploit filehosters such as Uploadstation, Zippyshare, Archive.org, Bayfiles, or Rapidshare to upload their materials. Subsequently, they distribute the download links to a few core forums and websites where they are picked up by sympathizers who further spread them to a variety of lesser-known outlets. Googling download links (e.g., http://www.uploadstation.com/file/E5DSt8U) may therefore be a satisfactory technique to retrieve further terrorist propaganda outlets – the search mechanism resembles a citation search.

Thousands of terrorist videos and audio messages can be found on social media websites such as YouTube, LiveLeak, or Facebook. However, the bulk of these materials are either sympathizers’
own “fan” creations or re-distributed materials that have initially been published elsewhere. Those materials must be treated with caution because they may be edited or even faked.

Institutional and Disciplinary Repositories

Many universities and research institutions maintain document servers to provide their employees with a platform for freely distributing and long-term archiving their work-related publications (e.g., working papers, reports, dissertations, or journal articles). These so-called institutional repositories have gained importance in the context of the OA movement as in recent times, several hundred institutions and funding agencies have implemented policies making self-archiving (Green OA) mandatory for their members. An example for an institutional repository is the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), the premier repository for research and engineering information for the U.S. Department of Defense. Disciplinary repositories are cross-institutional repositories focusing on a specific scholarly discipline, for example the Social Science Open Access Repository (SSOAR) and the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) for the social sciences. The most authoritative retrieval system for locating OA repositories is the Directory of Open Access Repositories (OpenDOAR). It lists more than 2,200 repositories from all around the world enabling users to search for both repositories and repository contents.

General and Disciplinary Databases

Databases are produced by renowned companies or research support organisations with high academic and technical expertise. They are the method of choice for searches at article level as they do not limit their indexing on book or periodical titles (as do most library catalogues) but also cover more granulated information such as journal article and book chapter titles. Databases can be subdivided into reference and full-text databases. While the former contain only the bibliographic information required for the mere retrieval of a resource, the latter provide access to the complete document. Another criterion to classify databases is their content: General databases are multidisciplinary in nature and therefore not confined to a specific academic field, whereas disciplinary databases focus on a particular scholarly discipline (e.g., PsycInfo for psychology) or research domain (see the following chapter).

Databases are selective: While some of them cover a broad spectrum of publication types (e.g., journals, magazines, newspapers, monographs, edited volumes, dissertations, and grey literature), others refine their content to peer-reviewed academic journals. Before inclusion, a publication is evaluated by expert staff in terms of quality, topicality, formal integrity, and other criteria. If the publication has met the selection thresholds, its content (or relevant parts of it) is indexed by multiple facets and enriched with metadata information. Hence, databases provide users with a rich set of search features including Boolean operations, field search, date filtering, and language specification. The most powerful advanced search feature of databases are controlled vocabularies
(such as subject headings and thesauri) facilitating semantic disambiguation and helping users to find the appropriate search terms. However, this added value has its price: Most databases are subscription-based, only affordable to academic libraries or other institutional bodies.

Usually, academic institutions license databases from content aggregators such as ProQuest, EBSCO, HighWire, and ingentaconnect. Those vendors offer multiple databases under a unified interface allowing users to simultaneously search different databases for a specific search term (a so-called cross-search). Furthermore, it is possible to search each subfile separately – by doing so, users can exploit the search features of a particular database to the maximum. The configuration of a subscription varies from institution to institution depending on which components are contained in a licensed package. “In other words,” as Thomas Mann explains, “it doesn’t mean much to say, simply, that you 'have access to ProQuest' – the real question is 'which of the many components of ProQuest are included in your local subscription?'”[31] Members of subscribing institutions can access an aggregator's search interface from the IP address range of the particular institution (meaning, they can either log in from computers that are part of the institution’s intranet or from an external PC by using a VPN connection and access data).

Several research support organisations provide free information retrieval systems that allow users the simultaneous searching of multiple disciplinary databases. Examples are the International Relations and Area Studies Gateway (IREON), maintained by the German Information Network International Relations and Area Studies (FIV) and PubPsych, maintained by the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID).

If a database does not provide access to the full-text of a required article, researchers are advised to check whether the article is available through other licenses of their institution’s library. Journal directories and e-resource access and management services such as Serials Solutions, TDNet, or the Electronic Journals Library enable researchers to look up library holding information for particular journals. These services identify which electronic journals are available through a library’s subscriptions (either for the journal homepage or via a licensed database), with notes on how many years of coverage are available for each journal within each subscription.[32] If an article is not licensed by an institution’s library, researchers should try to request a copy via inter-library loan or a commercial document delivery service (usually, this is charged with a small fee). Often, publisher licenses permit the sending of journal articles by e-mail to a restricted number of other persons. Hence, if a researcher notices that a journal is not available at his or her local library but at a colleague’s institution, requesting the required article from this colleague may be a successful approach. As the amount of Green OA increases, it is highly recommendable to search for a self-archived version of the article at an author’s homepage or institutional repository. To do so, researchers are advised to enter the title of the article in quotation marks in the search box of a major search engine and narrow the search to PDF files (e.g., “Islam, Jihad, and Terrorism in Post-9/11 Arabic Discussion Boards” filetype:pdf). Contacting the author directly and
kindly asking him/her to sent the article may bring a solution as well, as most academics are happy to see people showing interest in their research activities. Many publishers offer a pay-per-view option for articles – however this should be considered the very last choice as the requested fees are usually fairly expensive.

There are several ways to locate databases. Usually, academic institutions provide information on their library homepages about which databases they subscribe to and how to access them. Asking reference librarians at a local institution helps researchers learn quickly which databases are available in their field and which access options exist. The Database Infosystem (DBIS), maintained by the Regensburg University Library, covers more than 10,000 profiles of international databases (including 3,800 OA databases). The profiles can be keyword-searched or browsed either alphabetically or by academic discipline. An advanced search menu enables users to conduct very precise search operations. DBIS also provides holding information for institutions in German-speaking countries. An extensive reference guide in print form is the annually published Gale Directory of Databases, listing more than 14,000 international databases.

Researchers have to bear in mind that databases are selective – e.g., they do not cover every journal in a field and the included journals are often not indexed from cover to cover. “For this reason, even if two databases index the same journal the coverage of articles might differ.”[33] Usually, database vendors or content aggregators provide coverage lists, documenting which particular sources are indexed. Due to coverage limitations, researchers are advised to always employ several different databases in order to avoid missing important publications.

Specialized Databases

Most specialized databases are produced by experts in the field. Selectivity is their main advantage: Contrary to general or disciplinary databases, they focus on a specific research domain, excluding any irrelevant content. Specialized terrorism research databases enable researchers to search for a broad spectrum of reference and full-text records (academic or professional literature, attacks statistics, group, incident, or country profiles, etc.). Examples of terrorism databases include:

- **Database Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Radicalization (Leiden University):** covers current research projects on terrorism, counter-terrorism, radicalisation, and future forecasts. A selection of annual reports and counter-terrorism strategies of the leading intelligence agencies is included as well.

- **Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, START):** provides information on over 104,000 terrorist attacks around the world from 1970 through 2011.
• **International Security & Counter-Terrorism Reference Center (EBSCO):** contains over 1.5 million records from peer-reviewed journals and other full-text periodicals, books, and reference works, reports and analyses from leading experts and consultancies, primary source documents from government agencies, legislatures, and NGOs, in-depth background information summaries on persons, organisations, places, and events relating to homeland security and international terrorism, and an image collection.

• **RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents:** covers 36,000 worldwide terrorism incidents from 1972 through 2009 (further updating announced).

For an extensive review of terrorism research databases, see:


**General Search Engines**

Designed to cope with the exponentially growing amount of documents, multimedia files, and other materials on the World Wide Web, search engines enable researchers to conduct keyword searches over a large volume of websites. As only the data processing capacity of machines can (at a rudimentary level) handle the billions of WWW items globally available, search engine technology relies on machine indexing. Consequently, one of the most important things users have to bear in mind when using a search engine is that “there is virtually no human selectivity involved in determining what webpages are included in the search engine's database”[34]. Hence, contrary to intellectually indexed retrieval systems, the quality evaluation has to be done by the user him/herself.

A search engine's content is acquired by using a spider software which – starting from a list of given URLs – crawls the web for new websites and page updates and stores the retrieved content. By means of an indexing software, the full-text of the websites is indexed word by word. A further program – the search engine in the narrow sense – matches a user's query with the relevant items in the database. The centerpiece of this software is the so-called ranking algorithm – it determines the order in which the retrieved results are displayed to the user, trying to place the most relevant records at the top of the page. To compute the relevance of a page, search engines use different ranking criteria, such as the popularity of a website (measured by the number of links pointing from external websites to the page in evaluation), the number of retrieved keywords (the more keywords from a user's query are contained in a particular page, the higher is its relevance score), or the location of the keywords (the position of a keyword in the title, URL, heading, or initial paragraph of a document is scored higher than its appearance in the text body).
On its HTML interface, a search engine provides users with different search options ranging from simple keyword searching to complex Boolean operations. Prefixes such as filetype: (restricts the results to specific filetypes, such as .pdf or .jpg) or intitle: (retrieves pages containing a user-requested keyword in the title) allow users to filter results for excluding potentially irrelevant ballast. The search operations can either be specified through a menu – researchers are advised to use the advanced search menu to optimise results – or by qualifying a term directly by inserting it together with prefixes or Boolean syntax in the default search box. The exact configuration of search options and retrieval syntax varies from search engine to search engine, and search engine technology is subject to constant change. Hence before conducting a search, researchers should consult a search engine's online instructions page to become familiar with the engine's specifics. Online video tutorials teach researchers quickly and easily the basic and advanced search features of a particular search engine. A recommendable online course focused on Google is Power Searching with Google.

To date, Google is the most powerful search engine with regard to database size, search functionality, ranking mechanism, and additional services. However, it is important to keep in mind that – though indexing billions of webpages – Google (and other search engines as well) do not cover the whole web. Actually, the biggest part of the web is not indexable at all – these portions of the Internet are often referred to as the Deep Web.[35] Because the search engine technology of different systems varies, every search engine will display different results for the same keywords, hence it is advisable to use more than one search engine to make a search more exhaustive.

Sometimes, a website indexed by a search engine cannot be accessed any more because it has been removed. In this case, researchers should try to retrieve an archived snapshot of the website by inserting the defunct URL in the wayback machine, an archive of over 240 billion webpages from 1996 onwards. The wayback machine is also very useful to retrieve older versions of a website to find previous content or to get an impression of a website's historical development.

To locate search engines, researchers are recommended to use search engine directories, such as Search Engine Colossus, the Search Engines category of the Open Directory Project, and the Wikipedia list of search engines which compile links to international and local search engines from all over the world. Web searching user guides provide background information on search engines, compare their search functionalities, and report on modifications and new features. Examples are Search Engine Watch, and Search Engine Showdown. Deep Web directories such as Complete Planet compile links to major Deep Web websites.

Specialized Search Engines

While general search engines cover every topic and indexable content, specialized search engines confine their indexing on specific subjects, geographic regions, or content types.
Specialized search engines can be located with the previously mentioned search engine directories. Of particular importance for researchers are academic search engines. These retrieval systems cover scholarly and academic content only. The most prominent of them is Google Scholar. It indexes peer-reviewed journal articles (including preprints), academic books, theses, conference proceedings, grey literature, abstracts, patents, and legal documents. Due to agreements with publishers, governmental and non-governmental organisations, universities and other academic institutions, Google Scholar has gained permission to index databases that would be otherwise beyond the reach of search engine technology (Deep Web content).

Google Scholar provides specific search features that are not available at the general Google search interface: For example, clicking on the title of a record will take researchers to an abstract page of the retrieved resource. If a full-text version is available, a link to it (including information on its file format and hosting source) is provided at the right hand of the particular result. For each result, metadata information such as author, publication year, and source, is displayed. Via the “Cited by” link, researchers can look up which articles in Google’s index have cited the particular resource. The “Cite” link will open a window with a citation template for MLA, APA, and Chicago style including import links for different citation managers. By clicking on “Related articles”, similar articles (identified by an automatic word matching) will show up. Additional to these specific search features, Google’s general search functionality – including advanced search options such as date filtering, Boolean operations, and prefixes – can be employed as well. For more information on how to use Google Scholar, researchers are encouraged to read this tutorial on the Google homepage.

Beyond Google Scholar, several other recommendable academic search engines exist. Examples include Microsoft Academic Search, Scirus, and BASE. Every academic search engine produces different results and has its own retrieval syntax specifics. Hence, researchers are advised to use more than one engine for a particular search purpose and should consult the online instruction pages to get information on each engine’s specifics.

Refining your Search: Search Strategies

To be successful, a literature search has to be well-planned. Hence, before starting, researchers should try to define their information needs as exactly as possible and break it down into component parts. What concepts are involved? What are appropriate keywords, synonyms, related terms and phrases? What information sources are best suited for the particular search purpose?

Carefully documenting the search process helps researchers to keep track of the search terms, sources, and retrieval systems they have used. To keep a search topical, it is advisable to note the date, when a relevant source or retrieval system was last visited. This will enable researchers to later seamlessly continue a search until present time. Logging a search will also make it easier to
transparently describe for readers the undertaken research steps in the literature review section of an article.

As most literature searches have to be realized within a limited time-frame, researchers have to find the right balance between the precision and the completeness of a search: Narrow searches may omit relevant documents, while wider searches will retrieve more documents making a more laborious selection necessary.[36] For the sake of completeness, the usage of a broad pool of retrieval systems and methods is advised (see the previous sections of this Guide). To optimise the precision of a search, researchers should employ different search strategies to refine their results. The most important strategies are the identification of appropriate search terms and the accurate application of retrieval syntax.

**Identifying Appropriate Search Terms**

Every literature retrieval system is text-based, so the choice of search terms is a decisive factor for the success or failure of a search. As mentioned previously, a literature search is a hermeneutic process: Reading helps researchers become more familiar with specialized terms, enabling them to improve further searches. Hence, the identification of appropriate search terms is not a linear process but evolves over time. At the beginning of the search process, researchers should reflect on which terms or phrases are best suited to conceptualize their topic. In the next step, they should specify synonyms, related terms, or variant phrases. Dictionaries or thesauri – particularly those integrated within databases – can be a fruitful inspiration source for this purpose. So are library catalogues or databases: Researchers can look up records of articles that are exactly on target and check which indexing terms have been assigned by professional indexers to describe them. Another useful approach is identifying highly relevant articles and scanning them for terms best expressing a topic.

The most important thing to bear in mind when choosing search terms is the difference between uncontrolled (i.e., free text) keywords and controlled vocabularies or subject classifications. Keyword searching is the most often practised search strategy in the Internet age. The bulk of machine-indexed retrieval systems (most notably search engines) is designed for – and refined to – keyword searching. The main reason for the popularity of keyword searching is its ease and speed: A user enters a keyword in the search box and the search engine matches the query against its index, returning within seconds the results algorithmically determined to be the most relevant. A search engine reliably returns all indexed documents containing the requested keywords – but only these keywords – meaning that it is unable to identify resources lying in “blind spots”. Blind spots are caused by “the unpredictability of the many variant ways the same subject can be expressed, both within a single language [...] and across multiple languages”[37]. In Philipp Lenssen’s words “a keyword is also literally a key: without the key, the door remains locked.”[38] For example, if a document includes a synonym instead of a user-requested keyword,
it will not be retrieved. Current search engines provide users with an option to search for similar results, however researchers should know that these related pages are retrieved by an automatic matching of the words in the text of a retrieved document against other documents without any intellectual involvement. While it may sometimes be necessary to find documents containing the exact keywords, most literature searches have the aim to retrieve as many relevant resources on a topic, regardless whether they include the keywords a user had in mind or other – but equally relevant – terms s/he did not think of before.[39]

Spelling can also be problematic. For example, a researcher may enter “al-Qaeda” as a keyword, and the search results may omit all items referencing “al-Qaida.” The same holds for other terrorist groups with multiple spellings, like “Hezbollah,” “Hizbollah,” Hizballah and “HizbAllah.” A search engine must therefore incorporate algorithms that can take into account such variations in spelling, in order to ensure the most comprehensive search results. At present, this functionality is not state of the art for major search engines such as Google.

Another problem inherent to keyword-searching is caused by the semantic ambiguity of the natural language: The meaning of words depends on their context, e.g., the phrase “lone wolf” in context of terrorism (i.e., a self-radicalised person planning or perpetrating a terrorist attack) means something different than a “lone wolf” in sociology (i.e., a human loner, outsider), or a “lone wolf” in biology (an animal driven from the pack). To date, no “binary thinking” software algorithm is able to reliably solve this interpretation problem. Hence, a terrorism-related keyword search for that phrase will return irrelevant clutter from the other semantic domains.

Intellectually indexed retrieval systems (such as library catalogues or databases) offer keyword-searching as a basic option but additionally provide more sophisticated search functionality involving controlled vocabularies and subject classifications. Subject classifications assign resources to different pre-organised classes, which are subdivided into several levels of sub-classes of increasing granularity (e.g., violence>political violence>terrorism>suicide terrorism). Due to the arrangement in classes, a semantic context is created, eliminating ambiguity. The main advantage of a subject classification is its recognition effect: By browsing through different classes and sub-classes, users recognize in a systematic manner more conceptual approaches to a topic than they would have identified by themselves. This mechanism is comparable to browsing a library bookshelf: When searching for a particular book, it often happens that one discovers an even more relevant book only because it stands next to the one initially sought.

Controlled vocabularies consist of predefined authorized terms (often called subject terms) which have to be manually assigned by human indexers following specific rules. Documents are exclusively tagged with these terms regardless whether they actually include the terms or synonyms, different spellings, or other-language words so that all topical items are described by the same indexing terms. This standardized collocation approach – only realizable by laborious intellectual work – solves the problem of variant expressions: If a researcher uses the appropriate
controlled vocabulary term, s/he will receive all relevant documents from a database covering a specific concept, regardless of the words authors used to express it. Powerful controlled vocabularies include cross-references pointing users who entered inappropriate free text terms to the appropriate controlled vocabulary terms. A common form of a controlled vocabulary is a thesaurus – a word net whose terms are connected by different relations (e.g., synonym, antonym, broader term, narrower term, etc.), providing semantic clusters that eliminate ambiguity. Usually, the word net is browsable, sometimes even in a visualized form. A thesaurus is not only suited to identify appropriate search terms in the retrieval system it belongs to but can also be a good inspiration for finding proper terms for keyword searches in search engines. Examples for controlled vocabularies (and subject classifications as well) are the U.S. Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH) or the Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) by the U.S. National Library of Medicine.

**Applying Retrieval Syntax**

Most retrieval systems provide multiple refining options to limit or expand the number of retrieved results. Usually, the syntax triggering the options can either be entered directly along with the search terms in the main search box or can be requested by specifying natural language options in the advanced search menu. While the latter method is easier to implement, the first one is the more powerful. In any case, the syntax gives a retrieval system additional information on how to further process the inserted terms. As search technology is both system-specific and subject to constant change, researchers are advised to visit the online instruction pages of their favourite retrieval systems once in a while to stay informed about syntax details. The most common types of retrieval syntax are outlined below.

The Boolean operators AND, OR, and NOT enable researchers to select different sets of documents and combine the results. The Boolean AND limits the total results set to documents containing all terms a user has entered (in a mathematical sense: the intersecting set); e.g., the query terrorism AND media retrieves documents containing both keywords and excludes results comprising only one of them. AND will decrease the number of results. It can be applied to connect different concepts. With the Boolean OR a user can request results which include at least one of the terms or all of them (the set union); for example, terrorism OR media will return documents containing either terrorism or media as well as both terms. OR expands the number of documents. It is handy to include synonyms in a single query. The Boolean NOT excludes documents containing a particular term from the results, thereby limiting the number of records; e.g., terrorism NOT suicide will exclude all documents including the term suicide – even if the term terrorism is contained (difference quantity). NOT should be applied with care as it may block more results than wished. Some retrieval systems support the use of parentheses to indicate the order of operations, e.g. (terrorism AND media) OR (terrorism AND internet) NOT Mexico. While the functionalities of Boolean operators are the same across different retrieval systems, the
syntax triggering them is not. To mention a few examples: While some retrieval systems use a plus sign to express AND, entering a plus sign in Google along with a term (e.g., +terrorism) prompts Google to search for the keyword in its social networking and identity service Google+. In Google, NOT is requested by entering a minus sign in front of a word (e.g. terrorism -mexico). The major search engines use an implicit AND, meaning that they automatically AND all entered terms. Stop words (i.e., terms with limited meaning, such as conjunctions or pronouns) are ignored by many retrieval systems – Google is an exception here.

Proximity operators such as ADJ, NEAR, or AROUND enable users to conduct fairly precise searches. They request a result not only to contain all entered keywords but also to include these close to each other. Employing proximity operators reduces the possibility that keywords appear in undesired contexts. The actual operator name, the order in which the terms may appear, and the allowed distance between the keywords are system-dependent. Some retrieval systems (for example, Google) enable users to specify exactly the maximum number of words allowed to occur between search terms.

Even more restrictive is a phrase search. Entering a phrase enclosed in quotation marks (e.g., “suicide terrorism”) will prompt a retrieval system to return documents containing the exact phrase, i.e., the words must appear next to one another in exactly the same order the user entered them. A phrase search is the method of choice to search for connected terms (e.g., personal names, direct quotes, or article or book titles).

While a phrase search is used to decrease the amount of results, word truncation is employed to expand the number of records by searching for different variations of a search term. A truncation symbol (also called wildcard), often a question mark, an exclamation point, or an asterisk, is used to replace one or more characters of a term, enabling users to search with the stem or root of a word. A retrieval system will return all documents beginning with the particular character string (e.g., terror* will give back documents containing words such as terrorists, terrorism, or terrorizing). Word truncation should be used with care because it may produce unwarranted clutter, e.g., searching for terror* will also return records dealing with the PC game Terrordrome.

A field search allows users to search for keywords occurring in specific database fields of a record, such as the author, title, keywords, abstract, document type, publication year, or subject field. While these search features can be easily specified in the advance search menu of a retrieval system, the quickest way to employ them is to use prefixes to qualify a term directly when entering it in the main search box. The syntax for prefixes is variant across different retrieval systems, for example, WorldCat uses au: for author, while author: is used in Google Scholar. A very powerful method to zero in quickly on highly relevant resources is restricting a search to the title field. However, researchers will inevitably miss important resources due to the many variant ways a topic can be expressed. In contrast, searching for terms contained in the full-text of a
resource will return a vast amount of resources, including much irrelevant clutter. Narrowing a search to the abstract field is therefore often a good compromise.

By the help of a controlled vocabulary users can find all items in a retrieval system indexed under a particular topic, making a search exhaustive and highly precise. Researchers are therefore advised to use this option whenever available. Controlled vocabulary search functionality is provided by human-indexed retrieval systems such as library catalogues and databases whereas it is absent in search engines. While controlled vocabulary searches are more powerful than keyword searches, they are usually not intuitive and more complex to implement as they require a user to have knowledge of the specific vocabulary. Controlled vocabularies are often system-specific and thus not standardized across different retrieval systems. Hence, users should visit the online instruction pages of a retrieval system to learn how to use a particular vocabulary. To call up the controlled vocabulary search options, researchers usually have to go to the advanced search page, as keyword search is the default setting for most retrieval systems. When uncertain about what controlled terms to use, researchers should call up relevant documents to check which terms professional indexers have assigned to describe them.

*Last but not Least: Ask a Human*

In the digital age, researchers might be tempted to conclude that a simple keyword search with machine-indexed online retrieval systems is the quickest and most convenient way to retrieve literature. However, solely relying on machine-power (“hard skills”) can get them stuck plowing through vast amounts of low-quality results and irrelevant clutter, wasting much of their precious time. When researchers recognize that a lot of valuable information is not encoded in computer systems but in human minds, they may opt to use an alternative approach: Talking to humans (“soft skills”) will enable them to reach their objective more efficiently and effectively and may also lead them to information that cannot be found anywhere else. This outcome is worth overcoming any personal inhibitions to contact other people. In most cases, people who are asked for help will not be dismissive but rather flattered that they are considered knowledgeable.

There are several complementary approaches to employ soft skills. Asking a librarian will provide researchers with shortcuts to literature they cannot reach on their own. Librarians share well-founded expertise on where to retrieve relevant high-quality resources in their library and point patrons to useful materials housed elsewhere. To counter-balance people's tendency to rely solely on the Internet and avoid traditional libraries, librarians engage in efforts to find new and flexible ways to distribute their collections on new devices and try to serve their patrons by offering user-oriented online services, e-books, and technology training classes.[40] They have thorough knowledge on which retrieval systems are best suited for a particular search purpose and are well-versed in the syntax of different electronic retrieval systems. Additionally, they are familiar with the landscape of traditional print sources. As “the ideal library expert on terrorism
knowledge is hard to find in a non-specialized library”[41], researchers should choose from among the library staff the librarian whose field of competence is most closely related to terrorism research (e.g., political science or criminology) and describe their specific information needs as clearly as possible. During personal conversation, a good librarian will reveal aspects of a search question researchers were probably not aware of beforehand.

Asking a terrorism expert will provide researchers with unanticipated insights into the expert’s specific domain of terrorism research. Experts can name the core authors, publications, conferences, and research approaches in their field – information of this kind is especially valuable for novices who struggle to get a comprehensive understanding of the research landscape. Most experts are flattered when people show interest in their research activities and may even share brand-new resources such as unpublished manuscripts or other kinds of work in progress. By talking to an expert, researchers may get immediate corrective feedback on their work, including constructive criticism on weak points of their hypotheses – an interactive feature no computer-based retrieval system can offer. Moreover, personal conversations can build the basis for collaboration: When discovering collective research interests, researchers may be inspired to team up with each other (e.g., for embarking on new research projects or co-authoring papers). A good starting point for communication is contacting authors of relevant books or articles. Many publication outlets require authors to provide corresponding information or at least the name of their affiliation. In the Internet age, numerous researchers have homepages, blogs, profiles on institutional webpages, or accounts in social networks with contact options. Another way to make contact is networking.

In the digital age, networking is easier than it has ever been. Social networking services such as Facebook, Xing, or Mendeley enable researchers to easily contact colleagues from all over the world to collaborate with them. Online discussion groups offer opportunities to get in contact with terrorism experts as well. By the help of message-board search engines such as Omgili, researchers can scan millions of online discussion forums for conversations related to their topic of interest. Professional and academic associations, societies, and networks such as the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), the Terrorism and Political Violence Association (TAPVA), or the German Middle East Studies Association for Contemporary Research and Documentation (DAVO) serve to bring together academics, professionals, policy-makers, think-tanks, and NGOs. Currently, the TRI is in the process of establishing national networks of PhD thesis writers. So far, seven national networks have come into existence in the UK, The Netherlands and Flanders, Russia, the U.S., Canada, South Africa, and Australia. In Germany, the Terrorism Research Network serves a similar purpose. The Database of Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Radicalization (Leiden University) lists current research projects on terrorism, counter-terrorism, radicalisation, and future forecasts with each record containing contact data. Finally, international and national conferences provide multiple opportunities to get into personal contact with researchers and professionals in the field.
Addendum: Further Literature

This guide has been conceptualized in article format, which requires summarizing and omitting further details. Researchers are therefore encouraged to read additional literature to deepen their knowledge on information retrieval. Some recommended readings are provided below:


Also, in conjunction with Reuser’s Information Services (RIS), IHS Consulting offers a fee-based [Open Source intelligence (OSINT) collection and analysis training service](http://www.reusers.org/services/). The program aims at enabling researchers to more effectively collect and analyse information and produce better quality publications.
### Appendix

Table A1: Bibliographies published in Perspectives on Terrorism (status: June 2013).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Issue</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benjamin Freedman</td>
<td>Terrorism Research Centres: 100 Institutes, Programs and Organisations in the Field of Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, Radicalisation and Asymmetric Warfare Studies</td>
<td>4(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berto Jongman</td>
<td>Internet Websites and Links for (Counter-)Terrorism Research</td>
<td>5(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinators of TRI's National Networks</td>
<td>Preliminary and Partial Inventory of PhD Theses and their Authors</td>
<td>7(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David C. Hofmann</td>
<td>Review Essay: Twenty Important Journal Articles on Radicalisation to, and De-Radicalisation from, Terrorism</td>
<td>6(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David C. Hofmann; Alex P. Schmid</td>
<td>Selected Literature on (i) Radicalization and Recruitment, (ii) De-Radicalization and Dis-Engagement, and (iii) Counter-Radicalization and Countering Violent Extremism</td>
<td>6(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Price</td>
<td>Bibliography: Inside Terrorist Organisations</td>
<td>6(4-5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography: Literature on Terrorism in History</td>
<td>6(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography: Literature on the Future of Terrorism (including Trends)</td>
<td>6(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dissertations and Theses on (Counter-)Terrorism and Political Violence (1980-2010)</td>
<td>4(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Literature on Al-Qaeda since 2001</td>
<td>7(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Literature on Kidnapping for Ransom and for Political Concessions</td>
<td>7(2)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Literature on Refugee Situations (including Internally Displaced Persons) and Terrorism (incl. other forms of Political Violence and Armed Conflict)</td>
<td>7(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Literature on Right-wing and Vigilante Terrorism</td>
<td>5(5-6)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Literature on Terrorism, Media, Propaganda &amp; Cyber-Terrorism</td>
<td>6(1)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Literature on Victims of Terrorism</td>
<td>6(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Literature on Terrorism and Political Violence</td>
<td>4(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selected Literature on Conflict Prevention, Crime Prevention, Terrorism Prevention, and Violence Prevention</td>
<td>5(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Price</td>
<td>Selected Literature on Human Rights and Terrorism</td>
<td>4(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Price, Alex P. Schmid</td>
<td>Selected Literature on Radicalization and De-radicalization from Terrorism</td>
<td>4(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Price</td>
<td>Selected Literature on Terrorism and CBRN Threats</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Price</td>
<td>Selected Literature on Terrorism and Organized Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eric Price</td>
<td>Selected Literature on Terrorism and Political Violence/Conflict in Africa since the Second World War</td>
<td>5(3-4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eric Price</td>
<td>Selected Literature on Terrorism and Religion</td>
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<td>Gillian Duncan</td>
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<td>Jaclyn A. Peterson</td>
<td>Three Bibliographies: (i) Drones and Targeted Killing, (ii) Prosecuting Terrorism, and (iii) Enhanced Interrogation Techniques v. Torture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joshua Sinai</td>
<td>Review Essay: Top 50 Books on Terrorism and Counterterrorism</td>
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<td>Joshua Sinai</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Bookshelf</td>
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<td>Joshua Sinai</td>
<td>Terrorism Bookshelf: Top 150 Books on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judith Tinnes</td>
<td>100 Core and Periphery Journals for Terrorism Research</td>
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<td>Judith Tinnes</td>
<td>230 Websites and Blogs for Terrorism Research</td>
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<td>Judith Tinnes</td>
<td>Literature on Terrorism and the Media (including the Internet): an Extensive Bibliography</td>
<td>7(1)</td>
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About the Author:

Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., studied Information Science and New German Literature and Linguistics at the Saarland University (Germany). Her doctoral thesis dealt with Internet usage by Islamist terrorists and insurgents. While working for several research support organisations, she has gained expertise in information retrieval, librarianship and electronic publishing. Currently she works in the Research & Development department of the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID) (http://www.zpid.de) for an open-access publishing project. In her spare time, she works as an Editorial Assistant for Perspectives on Terrorism.

Notes


In a recent citation analysis, Bullis and Irving found out that the references in their citation data corpus were dispersed among 325 journals indexed by the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) indicating the multidisciplinary nature of terrorism research. (cf. Daryl R. Bullis; Richard D. Irving (2013, March): Journals Supporting Terrorism Research: Identification and Investigation into their Impact on the Social Sciences. College & Research Libraries, 74(2), p. 123. URL: http://crl.acrl.org/content/74/2/119.abstract)
One method to check the objectivity of an online resource is to look up who owns the domain of a website via http://whois.net. The "About" Section of a website may offer useful information as well, though it should be treated with care, because – other than with Whois.net – the information is published by the site owners themselves and may be biased or misleading. The Evaluation Resource Quality research guide by the Valparaiso University and the website The Virtual Chase, maintained by the law information portal Justia.com, provide helpful evaluation criteria for judging the quality of websites.


ibid., p. 404. The definition can be applied to non-journal sources as well.


cf. Sebastian K. Boell; Dubravka Cecez-Kecmanovic (in press), op. cit.


cf. Thomas Mann (2005), op. cit., p. 143.

cf. ibid., p. 133.


This implies that the decision whether an article is self-archived or not lays in an author’s hands. However, in recent times, several hundred institutions and funding agencies have implemented policies making self-archiving mandatory for scholars. For more information see: Yassine Gargouri et al. (2010, October): Self-Selected or Mandated, Open Access Increases Citation Impact for Higher Quality Research. *PLoS ONE*, 5(10), Article e13636. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0013636 and Jingfeng Xia et al. (2012, January): A Review of Open Access Self-Archiving Mandate Policies. *portal: Libraries and the Academy*, 12(1), pp. 85-102. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/pla.2012.0000


August 2013


[34] Randolph Hock (2010), op. cit., p. 61.

[35] see footnote [1]


[37] Thomas Mann (2005), op. cit., p. 102.


**Literature on the Financing of Terrorism**

Monographs, Edited Volumes, Non-conventional Literature and Prime Articles published since 2001

selected by Eric Price

NB: some of the items listed below are clickable and allow access to the full text; those with an asterix [*] only have a clickable table of contents


Salomon, M.E. (et al.) (eds.) Casting the net wider: Human rights, development and new duty-bearers Antwerp; Oxford: Intersentia


Non-conventional Literature


Bayor, D.N. (2011) The impact of non-banking financial institutions on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing in Latin Americas and the Middle East [thesis]. Thomas Jefferson School of Law


National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States [http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf]


Thompson, R. J. (nyp) Combating terrorist financing and money laundering in a failed state: The consequence of regulating Hawala system in Somalia [thesis]. University of Melbourne


Prime Journal Articles


Baldwin, Jr, F. N.: The financing of terror in the age of the Internet: willful blindness, greed or a political statement? *Journal of Money Laundering Control* 8 (2) 2005 pp.157-158


Basile, M.: Going to the source: Why Al Qaeda’s financial network is likely to withstand the current war on terrorist financing. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27 (3, May) 2004 pp.169-185


Bell, R. E.: The confiscation, forfeiture and disruption of terrorist finances. *Journal of Money Laundering Control* 7 (2) 2004 pp.105-125


Bennett, B.: Cinematic perspectives on the war on terror: The Road to Guantanamo (2006) and activist cinema. *New Cinemas: Journal of Contemporary Film* 6 (2) 2008 pp.111-126


Brathwaite, R.: The electoral terrorist: Terror groups and democratic participation. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25 (1) 2013 pp.53-74


Cassella, S.D.: Terrorism and the financial sector: Are the right prosecutorial tools being used? *Journal of Money Laundering Control* 7 (3) 2004 pp.281-285

Chatain, P-L.: The World Bank’s role in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. *International Law FORUM du droit international* 6 (2) 2004 pp.190-193


Demetis, D. S.: Data growth, the new order of information manipulation and consequences for the AML/ATF domains. *Journal of Money Laundering Control* 12 (4) 2009 pp.353-370

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Horgan, J. & Taylor, M. Playing the green card: Financing the Provisional IRA - Part 2. Terrorism and Political Violence, 15 (2) 2003 pp.1-60


Hunt, J.: The new frontier of money laundering: How terrorist organizations use cyberlaundering to fund their activities, and how governments are trying to stop them. *Information & Communications Technology Law* 20 (2) 2011 pp.133-152

Idler, A. Exploring arrangements of convenience among violent non-state actors. *Perspectives on Terrorism* 6(4-5) 2012 pp.63-84


Kishima, K.: Japan’s efforts in the global fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. *Journal of Money Laundering Control* 7 (3) 2004 pp.261-263


de Koster, P.: The threats that terrorist and subversive organisations pose, particularly by penetration, to the stability and integrity of financial institutions and markets. *Journal of Money Laundering Control* 13 (2) 2010 pp.132-138

Kumar, A.: Terror financing in Bangladesh. *Strategic Analysis* 33 (6, October) 2009 pp.903-917

Latimer, P.: Bank secrecy in Australia: terrorism legislation as the new exception to the Tournier. *Journal of Money Laundering Control* 8 (1) 2005 pp.56-65


Murphy, D. P.: Canada’s laws on money laundering and proceeds of crime: The international context. *Journal of Money Laundering Control* 7 (1) 2004 pp.50-60


Picarelli, J.T. Osama bin Carleone? Vito the Jackal? Framing threat convergence through an examination of transnational organized crime and international terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24(2) 2012 pp.180-198


Ping, H.E.: The measures on combating money laundering and terrorism financing in the PRC: From the perspective of financial action task force. *Journal of Money Laundering Control* 11 (4) 2008 pp.320-330


Roberge, I.: Misguided policies in the war on terror? The case for disentangling terrorist financing from money laundering. *Politics* 27 (3) 2007 pp.196-203

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Ryder, N. & Turksen, U.: Islamophobia or an important weapon? An analysis of the US financial war on terrorism. *Journal of Banking Regulation* 10 (4) 2009 pp.307-320


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See also resources on the Internet:


The Countering Terrorist Financing Network [http://www.terroristfinancing.com/]


Financial Action Task Force [http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1_1_00.html]

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network [http://www.fincen.gov/]

Financing terrorism – Congressional Research Service Reports (CRS) [https://opencrs.com/search/?q=financing+terrorism]


The Terror Finance Blog. [http://www.terrorfinance.org/]

Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, The U.S. Department of the Treasury [http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/]


About the Compiler: Eric Price is a Professional Information Specialist who for many years worked for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since his retirement he works as an Editorial Assistant for Perspectives on Terrorism.
III. Book Reviews

Counterterrorism Bookshelf: Capsule Reviews of 13 Books

by Joshua Sinai

The following are capsule reviews of important books recently published on terrorism and counterterrorism-related topics.


An examination of the Lebanese Hizballah from its origins in 1982 until 2009. Although the book's overview of Hizballah is only 110 pages in length, what makes it especially valuable are the additional 100 pages that provide a selection of the organization's primary ideological documents (including its charter), as well as the appendices, such as a lexicon of Hizballah's theological principles and portraits of Hizballah and Lebanese leaders. The authors are French academic experts on Hezbollah.

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Originally published in French, this fascinating 2010 memoir by Usama bin Laden’s former chief bodyguard provides an insider’s account of life in al Qaida prior to 9/11. Nasser al-Bahri had served with bin Laden from 1996 to 2001, when he succeeded in escaping from Afghanistan following the overthrow of the Taliban regime, eventually making his way to Yemen, where he was arrested. Al-Bahri, born in Saudi Arabia to Yemeni parents, was radicalized by extremist jihadists in his teens. He then proceeded to join jihadist militants in Bosnia and Somalia, eventually making his way to al Qaida’s Afghanistan headquarters in Tarnak Farm. There he was spotted by bin Laden and was rapidly promoted to head his personal security unit. Of particular interest are the author’s descriptions of various assassination attempts against bin Laden, al Qaida’s inventory of armaments, the security measures instituted to protect bin Laden, portraits of the organization’s leaders and their families, as well as the group’s links with the Taliban and Pakistani security services. The author concludes that “The Jihad movement will never agree to negotiate with the West unless all its legitimate claims are met. The Clash of Civilizations has many days ahead of it.”

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As explained by the editor, the contributors to this volume attempt to examine “from an interdisciplinary legal and policy perspective the challenges posed to humanitarian law as weaker, non-state combatants use forbidden tactics to offset their military disadvantage, and as irregular warfare becomes a common means for weaker parties to achieve political goals that they could not accomplish through established channels.” Such an examination is warranted today, the editor writes, because the changing patterns of asymmetric conflict are forcing legal practitioners to reexamine the traditional laws of war, particularly the Hague Rules, the customary laws of war, and the post-1949 law of armed conflict, which are no longer relevant in accounting for the way non-state groups, whether terrorist or guerrilla forces, are waging their protracted insurgent campaigns. This volume is a highly important contribution to the study of the interplay between international and military law and the response measures by democratic governments to terrorist insurgencies.


An important and innovative comparative and theoretical examination of how disparate insurgent organizations such as the Lebanese Hizballah, the Palestinian Hamas, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) decide to transform themselves from terrorists into political organizations, using the electoral process by their “political wings” to attempt to become legitimate political actors in their societies. The author argues that the classic theory of the democratization process, which views violence and elections at opposite ends of the political spectrum, is inadequate to explain the negotiation and disarmament process that is necessary for peaceful resolution of protracted terrorist conflicts. To remedy this theoretical shortfall, the author develops an alternative model that explains the reasons terrorist groups create political wings to compete in elections, and how this organizational choice affects their subsequent decisions about their armed struggle. One might argue that while such an electoral option was wholeheartedly embraced by the IRA, it was never genuinely adopted by Hamas and Hizballah – nevertheless, the author’s conceptual framework and case studies are an important contribution to understanding the types of measures that governments need to adopt in order to engage with their terrorist adversaries who may have finally entered the phase in which they are ready to transform themselves into legitimate political actors, which is the precondition necessary to peacefully resolve their conflicts and bring about their political integration into society.

In this important study, the author examines the factors leading, in some cases, to the failure of peace accords that attempt to resolve their societies’ protracted civil wars, thereby plunging them once again into armed conflict, while in other cases peace accords survive and succeed in sustaining themselves for the long-term. Fifteen cases of civil wars in Africa, Asia, the Caucasus, and Latin America are examined. The author finds that some explanations for the outbreaks of civil war – such as poverty, conflict over natural resources, and weak states – are less causative than the crucial factor of political exclusion, while the inclusion of former adversaries in post-conflict governance plays a decisive role in sustaining peace accords for the long-term. Thus, those involved in post-conflict reconstruction must remain fully engaged in supporting the newly-elected governments, to ensure that they include former combatants in power-sharing and governance.


A highly authoritative and up-to-date study about the protracted civil war in Sri Lanka, which was terminated with the military defeat by government forces of the separatist Tamil Tigers in 2009. The author discusses the evolution of the military measures that ultimately won the intractable insurgency - a conflict which for many years was viewed as unwinnable by the Sinhalese government’s forces - although its military victory came at the cost of human rights violations (and the Tamil insurgents engaged in such violations as well). Also discussed are lessons learned about terrorist tactics by the Tamil Tigers that have been emulated by terrorist groups such as Hizbollah, Hamas, as well as al Qaida-affiliated groups in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia. The author also discusses whether the Sri Lankan government’s counterinsurgency tactics are worthy of being implemented by other governments facing their own protracted terrorist insurgencies.


Although much of this conceptually innovative study focuses on the impact on the self-identity of women in patriarchal Muslim societies around the world, the author also provides a valuable discussion of the connection between tribal patriarchy and radicalization into Islamic extremism through an innovative tool he has developed, which he terms the tribal patriarchy index. To analyze this process of radicalization, he draws on empirical data about Islamists who have been convicted under terrorism laws in Britain and France because, he writes, “they provide us a lens into two very different responses to patriarchy and to religion.” He concludes that one of the
factors driving such men (and particularly immigrants) in Britain and France to embrace extremism is that they “generally are disproportionately (compared with women) stuck at the bottom rungs of the social ladder. Combined with the dynamics of patriarchy, discrimination, and religious politics, this state of affairs has an alienating effect on poorer second- and third-generation Muslim men.”

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An interesting, well-written and highly provocative survey of the history, evolution and trajectory of modern terrorism, from its beginning in early modern Europe up to the contemporary period. Of special interest is the author’s unique interpretation of terrorism (which is not generally accepted in the terrorism studies discipline), which attempts to “integrate” the “violence of governments and insurgencies into a single narrative format as a way to understand terrorism in its broadest historical representation.” To validate this approach, the author selects significant historical cases, such as 19th century Russian revolutionary and tsarist terrorisms, government and anti-government terrorism in 19th century and early 20th century Europe, terrorism in the United States, Communist and fascist authoritarian terrorism, ideological terrorism during the Cold War, and terrorism in the contemporary period. With the traditional notion of state legitimacy being contested by insurgent and government forces, the author finds that the use of terrorist tactics has become part of a violent contest for control of state power between those in government and the competing terrorist insurgents. Although one may disagree with the author’s contention that terrorism has since evolved into a competition between insurgents and state security forces that employ similar violent behaviors and tactics, this book is nevertheless a highly useful, intellectually sophisticated and thought-provoking “alternative” history of terrorism and counterterrorism.

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In this highly insightful, empirically-based theoretical and comparative study, the author (a political sociologist and one of Italy’s foremost experts on terrorism) argues that “clandestine political violence” (another term for terrorism) falls into four general types: left-wing (in Italy and Germany), right-wing (in Italy), ethno-nationalist (in Spain), and religious fundamentalist (for instance, in Muslim societies). A common conceptual framework is employed to analyze the causal mechanisms that operate at the beginnings of such underground movements, during their persistence, and at their demise, as well as within the context of the interactions between them and the state. Also examined are the ways in which the different violent actors “cognitively
construct the reality they act upon,” as well as their internal dynamics. Empirical evidence is used to illustrate the crucial cyclical phases that characterize these cases of “clandestine political violence.”

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The contributors to this insightful volume employ a multidisciplinary approach from the fields of history, strategy, anthropology, ethics, and mass communications to examine effective strategy and policy options (including the costs, risks, and benefits of each alternative option) to terminate the involvement by the United States and its allies in Afghanistan’s protracted civil war. Some of the findings reached by the contributors are that, following the Western withdrawal from Afghanistan, a strong, legitimate central government in Kabul is unlikely to emerge; that fewer remaining coalition forces (used in creative ways) might achieve better results on the ground than a larger, more conventional presence; and that Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly Pakistan, should be encouraged to become more actively involved in the conflict’s “endgame.” Such an approach, they believe, while not ensuring “complete peace” in Afghanistan, will likely create a self-sustaining security system that will be able to restore order in the wake of violent outbreaks.

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In this groundbreaking and highly informed study, the author examines the writings of jihadist theoreticians, such as Sayyid Qutb, Abd al-Salam Faraj, and Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, in order to “decode” al Qaida’s strategy against its adversaries, with particular focus on its warfare against America. The author finds that such jihadist ideas have more in common with the principles of Maoist guerrilla warfare than mainstream Islam, with leading al Qaida strategists such as Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri influenced not only by Salafist ideologues, but also the guerrilla strategies of Mao, Che Guevara, and even General Giap, the mastermind of the Viet Cong successful insurgency. The author applies this theoretical framework to analyze al Qaida’s insurgencies in places such as Yemen. He concludes that al Qaida’s “political-military strategy” is a “revolutionary and largely secular departure from the classic Muslim conception of jihad.” Once the political, military, socio-economic, cultural, ideological, psychological, and international dimensions of al Qaida’s revolutionary strategy are properly understood, the author concludes, they will contribute to substantially upgrading the countermeasures employed by America against al Qaida and its affiliates.

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The contributors to this conceptually interesting and provocative volume utilize the framework of what they term a political “moral panic” to examine the lessons and legacies of the United States-led “Global War on Terror.” One of their general findings is that terrorists (in the form of 9/11’s catastrophic attacks) have “prevailed” by forcing the United States to change its “way of life,” with transportation, trade, communications and other daily activities disrupted, even when “the pace and intensity of terror attacks have abated.” Also of concern to the contributors is that what were expected to be “temporary security measures and sacrifices of liberty” adopted in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 type terrorist events soon became “more or less permanent.” To examine how such constraints on civil liberties ensued, the contributors examine the social, cultural, and political drivers underlying the “war on terror” in which “perceived” threats to individuals and institutions have affected the targeted countries’ “social norms and values, civilization, and even morality itself.” To validate this thesis, a wide range of case studies are examined, including the United States involvement in Africa, Afghanistan and Iraq. The concluding chapter argues that “we all lost the ‘war on terror,’ because real external security threats were reconstructed by a political moral panic into a dysfunctional miasma of national insecurity,” and that “deconstructing the politics of fear” is required to “unpack moral panic, and reconstruct a rational assessment of threat, normative commitment to the rule of law, and global social imaginary.”

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In this important and authoritative study, the author (a veteran academic expert on Islamist movements) examines the evolution and current status of the Muslim Brotherhood, which achieved “a level of influence nearly unimaginable before the Arab Spring.” The book was written prior to the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in early July 2013, so some of its conclusions need to be revised when its new edition is published, but, nevertheless, the author’s analysis paves the way for understanding how it became the “resounding victor” in Egypt’s 2011-2012 parliamentary and presidential elections. Drawing on more than one hundred in-depth interviews as well as Arabic language sources, the author traces the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt from its founding in 1928 to the fall of Mubarak and the elections of 2011-2012. She also compares the Brotherhood’s political trajectory with those of its counterpart Islamist groups in Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco, including highlighting their internal divisions. Interestingly – and presciently (in light of the ouster of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood from
power) – the author finds that Muslim Brotherhood parties in the Middle East are not proceeding along a linear path toward greater moderation, but that their trajectory is marked by tensions and contradictions, in which “hybrid agendas” embrace “themes of freedom and democracy [that] coexist uneasily with illiberal concepts of Shari’a carried over from the past.” Understanding such political and doctrinal nuances provides a glimpse into these organizations’ predicaments as they attempt – whether successfully or not – to find the appropriate balance that will enable them to sustain themselves in the Middle East’s currently uncertain turmoil and upheaval.

About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’.
The central thesis of this book by Guido Steinberg, a former advisor to the German Federal Chancellery, is that there was no such thing as a global jihad prior to 2001: “…the internationalist scene and ideology we witness today developed only after September 11, 2001, and that the jihadist movement has been going through an internationalization process ever since…” (p.13). With this novel perspective, Dr. Steinberg, an Islamicist by training now working at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin, takes a position that is at odds with much of American thinking on the origins of “global terrorism”. For Steinberg, Al-Qaeda was, until late 2001, basically an Egyptian-Saudi Arabian armed resistance project aiming at the overthrow of the regimes of two countries, rather than envisioning a ‘global jihad’. What was an exclusive Arab phenomenon in 2001, became internationalised in terms of ideology, strategy and social base in reaction to the “global war on terror”, attracting Pakistanis, Afghans, Turks, Kurds, Uzbeks as well as American and European converts among others, thereby crossing national, regional and ethnic lines of division (p. 17).

While the title German Jihad suggests a narrow German focus, Steinberg’s exceedingly well-written volume is considerably broader in scope, covering developments in Central Asia, Turkey, Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan as they relate to Germany. Steinberg is not sparing in his critique of Germany’s policies in Afghanistan, where German troops constitute the third largest contingent after the United States and Great Britain. He makes clear that “…the German presence in the Kunduz region was based on a fatal miscalculation borne out of a lack of awareness of the area’s recent history” (p.208), with Germany being “…utterly unaware of the importance of Kunduz for the Taliban” (p. 213) - inter alia in terms of routing heroin towards the Russian market. The German intelligence community had, prior to 9/11, no idea that Al-Qaeda was using Germany for preparing these attacks, due - according to Steinberg - to a “peculiar mixture of ignorance and arrogance” (p. 38). He is even more critical of the policies of the United States and some of its other allies, arguing that after 9/11 it “would take several more years and several mistakes by al-Qaeda’s adversaries to further internationalize the jihadist movement” (p. 16). However, he also sees among the jihadists indigenous factors at work for going global: “…the increasing attractiveness of internationalist ideology among young Muslims themselves” (p.29). On the one hand, he attributes going global to the “classical jihadist internationalism,” that is, “the conviction that every individual Muslim, no matter where he or she lives, is obliged to fight non-Muslims who occupy Muslim territory” (p.32). Yet he also sees “revolutionary nationalism” (focusing on the “near enemy”) and “modern internationalism” (focusing on the “far enemy”) informing contemporary jihadist thinking whereby the “modern internationalists” or “global jihadists” try to combine the fight against the near and the far enemy. (p.33). In Steinberg’s...
view, it was the American-led intervention in Iraq in 2003 that mobilized the strongest of these three currents: “Giving al-Qaeda the opportunity to base its argumentation on classical internationalist thought most likely saved the organization from demise after 2001” (p. 34).

A considerable part of German Jihad focuses on the rise of Salafism among Muslims and converts in Germany. He distinguishes between the “organized jihadists” (who act as integral parts of Al-Qaeda), the “independent jihadists” (who lack outside support) and the “new internationalists” (a hybrid variant consisting of those who radicalize independently and subsequently traveled to Pakistan to gain access to Al-Qaeda) (p.44). In this book, Steinberg also portrays the rise of political and jihadist Salafists in Germany. They numbered no more than a few hundred members in 2001, but by 2012 had grown to between 5,000 (official estimate) and 10,000 (Steinberg’s estimate) members, “guided” by some 50 Salafist-controlled mosques. (p.131).

One of the many virtues of German Jihad is that it also pays appropriate attention to the online activities of the jihadists, such as those of the Global Islamic Media Front whose videos were given wide coverage not only on the Internet but also by mainstream German-language media, making one of the jihadist producers, Mohamed Mahmoud, rejoice: “By God, the video has had an effect. The deeds will, Inshallah, follow” (p.135). In fact, a stream of some hundred jihadist propaganda videos lured several waves of German jihad tourists - altogether more than 200 men and women - to Waziristan, where some of them formed the German Taliban Mujahideen, an “international brigade” subordinate to the Islamic Jihad Union of Uzbekistan. About the “type of guys” among them, Steinberg notes: “All of them went through deep personal crises until jihadism gave their life a new orientation, a feeling of group security, and promised adventure” (p. 146). While nearly useless as a fighting group in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, they were successful on the propaganda front and, upon their return to Germany, constitute a danger to public security as some of them have attempted to carry out attacks on behalf of their masters in Waziristan.

Steinberg does not refrain from placing blame where blame belongs: “In the German case, political and military fickleness had arguably contributed to the jihadists choosing Germany as an attractive target.” The result of all this is, as he puts it, “a consolidated Jihadist scene in Germany” (p.237) that will form a domestic threat for years to come because “Al-Qaeda’s ideology has spread among young Muslims in Europe” (p.247). Hence his call to rethink Germany’s domestic counterterrorism strategy. Steinberg points to “a severe weakness in human intelligence, including a lack of qualified personnel.” While this problem persists, his call that “The Salafist scene will have to be monitored much more aggressively than it has until now in order to control the situation” (p. 252) appears to be belatedly followed by German authorities, given the wave of recent police actions.

Steinberg also offers sound foreign policy advice: ”What is needed is a mode of action stressing that the United States and Europe have an interest in stability and an equally important interest in incremental change toward the rule of law and greater popular participation in government” in
countries that are affected by jihadist activities. (p.251). All in all, Steinberg has written an excellent study, demonstrating the complex interplay between foreign and domestic factors both on the side of the jihadists and their government opponents.

**About the Reviewer:** Alex P. Schmid is Editor-in-Chief of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’ and a Visiting Research Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) in The Hague.
IV. Announcements

TRI's Country Networks of PhD Theses Writers

The mission statement of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) is *Enhancing Security through Collaborative Research*. TRI has been encouraging young scholars who are in the process of writing their PhD theses to link up and collaborate with fellow researchers in their own countries. As a result, post-graduate students have begun to interact for their own mutual benefit and for the greater good of the wider research community. Currently, the following networks exist:

**The United Kingdom**
Country coordinator: Gordon Clubb; E-mail: <G.Clubb@leeds.ac.uk>.

**The Netherlands and Flanders (Belgium)**
Country coordinator: Daan Weggemans; E-mail: <dweggemans@icct.nl>.

**Russia**
Country coordinator: Position vacant as current TRI's coordinator Yulia Netesova; E-mail: <julianetesova@gmail.com> is on maternity leave; nominations for a replacement are welcome.

**The United States**
Country coordinator: Neil Shortland; E-mail: <ndshortland@gmail.com>.

**Canada**
Country coordinator: Nick Deshpande; E-mail: <nick.deshpande@gmail.com>.

**South Africa**
Country coordinator: Petra Harvest; E-mail: <petra.harvest@absamail.co.za>.

**Australia**
Country coordinator: Levi-Jay West; E-mail: <lwest@csu.edu.au>.

**Norway**
Country coordinator: Cato Hemmingby; E-mail: <cathem@phs.no>.
Spain

Country coordinator: Miguel Peco; E-mail: <coordinator@tri-sp.net>.

Should you be a post-graduate researcher from one of these countries and wish to join your national TRI network, you should contact the country coordinator directly. In all other cases, contact TRI's Director, Alex P. Schmid (E-mail: <apschmid@terrorismanalysts.com>) who will then explore with you and other members of the wider national TRI network how best to set up a PhD theses writers network.

Notice for PhD Researchers

V. Notes from the Editor

About Perspectives on Terrorism

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts, United States of America.

PT is published six times per year as a free peer-reviewed online journal available at [www.terrorismanalysts.com](http://www.terrorismanalysts.com). It seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. The editors invite readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our free on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles - but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal's articles are peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to.
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