

Deploying the Best: Enhancing Training for United Nations Peacekeepers

PROVIDING FOR PEACEKEEPING NO. 5

ALBERTO CUTILLO



Cover Image: Police women march at the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) commemoration of the International Day of United Nations Peacekeepers at the Arc Compound. May 29, 2011. UN Photo/Albert Gonzalez Farran.

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
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Providing for Peacekeeping is an independent research project that seeks to help improve the quality of military and police capabilities available for peacekeeping. The project serves as a hub for researchers, governments, and peacekeeping practitioners around the world to deepen their understanding of—and find new solutions to overcome—the capability challenges that imperil the effectiveness of peace operations. The project is implemented in partnership with Griffith University and the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its partners and to its generous donors whose contributions make projects like this possible.



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Abbreviations

ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
C-34	General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
CoESPU	Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPET	Division for Policy Evaluation and Training
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
FPU	Formed Police Unit
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
IAPTC	International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres
IPU	International Police Unit
ITS	Integrated Training Service
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSU	Multinational Stability Unit
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAV	Operational Assessment Visit
PDT	Pre-Deployment Training
PDV	Pre-Deployment Visit
SAAT	Selection Assessment and Assistance Team
SLIP	Senior Leadership Induction Program
SML	Senior Mission Leaders Course
SPAT	Special Police Assessment Team
STM	Specialized Training Materials
TCC/PCC	Troop- and Police-Contributing Country
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNMO	UN Military Observer
UNSMOC	United Nations Staff Officers and Military Observers Course

Executive Summary

Among the many elements that determine the success or failure of United Nations peacekeeping operations, the effectiveness of individual peacekeepers plays a prominent, though often underestimated, role. But “effectiveness” is an elusive concept. It is the product of a number of factors, ranging from the will of peacekeepers to the quality and suitability of their equipment; from timely deployment to strategic planning; from logistics to financial support. Ongoing efforts to improve the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping cover all these areas and more, including training, as a means to ensure that UN peacekeepers are adequately prepared to accomplish their tasks.

While the importance of training was recognized in the Brahimi Report (2000), which contained a number of recommendations in this area, only in 2008 did the UN draft its first comprehensive strategy for training, and this is still in the process of being implemented. This study discusses the main elements of that training strategy and evaluates the extent of its progress. Training peacekeepers for service with the UN is not, however, the exclusive responsibility of the UN Secretariat. Member states also have a crucial role to play. The UN’s strategy will succeed only if member states play their part. This study therefore also examines the role of UN member states, focusing on a case study of one prominent international training center: the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Italy.

Assessing whether the UN’s current strategy is delivering results is not simple, especially given the absence of criteria to measure the performance of peacekeepers, either individually or at the military-contingent level. While this study acknowledges that significant efforts are underway, it also highlights that more needs to be done to ensure that UN peacekeeping operations have access to the right people with the right skills.

KEY FINDINGS

UN Training Strategy

The UN’s training strategy remains at an embryonic stage and needs to evolve on the basis of current and future evaluations. Assessing the quality of training provided to UN peacekeepers should be done in the broader context of measuring the

“effectiveness” of individuals and units. To date, however, no systematic performance indicators exist to evaluate UN peacekeepers. Proposals have recently been circulated to address this issue but their implementation will require time, considerable effort, and the overcoming of political opposition.

The Global Peacekeeping Training Architecture

In the last twenty years, there has been a considerable increase in the number of public and private as well as national, regional, and international centers providing training for UN peacekeepers. This represents significant potential capacity but also poses challenges in relation to the dispersion of funding and the coordination of various training actors, including on doctrine, policy guidance, and certification. There is a need to ensure that training, no matter where it is done and by whom, adheres to common standards and produces peacekeepers with the necessary skill sets. The UN is at the heart of the global training architecture, but it can achieve meaningful results only with the support of member states.

Training Institutions

Measures to ensure that all trainees are eventually deployed to UN peacekeeping operations (or serve as national trainers for peacekeepers) have been inadequate. More generally, the challenge for the international training system is to ensure that those who are trained actually deploy on UN missions. Equally important, training institutions have shown limited interest in evaluating the quality of trained personnel. Tracking the quality and measuring the added value of training should be put at the center of efforts of all interested parties, including the UN, member states, and training institutions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations/ Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS) and member states should develop a joint methodology to evaluate the readiness of military contingents for UN peacekeeping missions. Member states should support proposals (including providing moderate funding) that seek to strengthen accountability and enable peacekeeping evaluation as a prerequisite for targeted and needs-based training.

- Member states should support an initiative to create an independent mechanism for pre-deployment evaluation of training skills and knowledge, with the understanding that contingents that do not meet minimum UN standards do not deploy.
- DPKO/DFS should assume the lead in coordinating training activities by expanding their role as standard-setter and by providing official recognition of high quality training institutions and their curricula.
- Member states should accept that minimum training standards set by DPKO/DFS are mandatory and work with national training institutions to make sure those standards are systematically incorporated into their curricula.
- International training institutions and regional training centers of excellence should agree (through memoranda of understanding with DPKO/DFS) to provide, upon request by interested troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs), support to develop their national training capacities. Training activities provided in this respect should incorporate DPKO/DFS minimum training standards.
- DPKO/DFS should exchange information with recognized training centers about future as well as past deployments, in order to track how trainees are used.
- The UN, member states, and training centers should work together to develop an advanced methodology to track the quality of trained personnel and to measure the added value of training to peacekeeping operations.

Introduction

The role of training in the success or failure of UN peacekeeping operations is generally understated. It is often taken for granted or considered less relevant to the outcome of an operation. But the UN's historical experience has shown that under-prepared peacekeepers cost lives and endanger missions. In practice, special training is needed because UN peacekeeping involves more than the basic military tasks for which soldiers are—or

should be—already trained. If soldiers might have managed in early UN observation missions, tasked with straightforward and limited mandates, this is not the case in modern multidimensional operations, where a number of different and sophisticated skills are required.

One of the early pioneers of peacekeeping, former UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld, was keenly aware of the problem when he stated that “peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers but only soldiers can do it.” The implication is that a typical soldier or police officer is not naturally a good peacekeeper, unless s/he acquires critical knowledge and skills that only specific peacekeeping training can provide. For this reason, peacekeeping training needs to be understood as a crucial part of effective UN operations.

In recent years, the UN has taken steps to implement the Brahimi Report's recommendations with regard to training.¹ In particular, in May 2008 the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) set out a three-year “UN Peacekeeping Strategy,” accompanied in October of that year by the first “Strategic Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment.” These documents are the cornerstone of ongoing efforts to establish a coherent though constantly evolving training strategy.

This study evaluates this UN training strategy. While addressing the entire spectrum of training activities for all components of peacekeeping operations (military, police, and civilian), it focuses on pre-deployment training for uniformed personnel. This is especially relevant since it is the area where the role and responsibility of several actors (the UN, member states, and training centers) intersect. It is here, therefore, that the need for a strategic and coordinated approach is most needed.

The study then examines the “global training architecture” more broadly. This phrase is used repeatedly in UN documents but remains largely undefined. After identifying the respective roles of the different partners, this report focuses first on the role of member states in training their national troops and police before deployment in UN peacekeeping operations. It then looks at the activities carried out by the UN DPKO/DFS and their

1 United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 17, 2000, also known as the “Brahimi Report.”

interaction with member states and training centers in pre-deployment training (PDT), in particular through the production of standard training materials and certification of training courses. Finally, the study briefly surveys training activities conducted by specialized training institutions, including a case study on an international training center, which specializes in police training. Policing was chosen because the high number of police officers participating in UN peacekeeping operations is a relatively new phenomenon, and because they have relatively well-defined roles, which, for training purposes, represents a favorable opportunity to develop standards. The study examines how the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) has discharged its mandate, in particular through its cooperation with the UN, and its experience in terms of evaluating its courses. It concludes with an assessment of CoESPU's activities with a view to identifying strengths and weaknesses.

Training for UN Peacekeeping

During the Cold War, peacekeeping developed in an ad hoc fashion and UN member states paid limited attention to training. Given the relatively straightforward nature of most early observation operations as well as the small number of countries actively involved in peacekeeping, training activities for prospective UN peacekeepers were limited and provided by a handful of training centers.²

In 1965 the UN General Assembly created the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) to conduct a comprehensive annual review of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects.³ In 1989, a C-34 report encouraged member states “to establish national training programmes for military and civilian personnel for peace-keeping operations and, in this connection, request the Secretary-General to prepare training manuals, which member states might wish to use as guidelines for their national or regional training

programmes.”⁴ This set the basis for the division of labor between the UN and member states in terms of peacekeeping training. A few years later, in 1991, the UN produced its first training guidelines for military personnel involved in peacekeeping. In 1995, for the first time, an entire section of the C-34's report was devoted to training. More recently, in its 2012 report, the section entitled “Best Practices and Training,” included seventeen paragraphs, and there were multiple other references to training scattered throughout.⁵

The 2012 report of the C-34 aired political statements on the importance of training—in general and in connection with specific functions (e.g., protection of civilians, gender, and rule of law)—and a number of specific requests addressed to the UN Secretariat, as well as recommendations to member states and training institutions. However, this should not be mistaken for a comprehensive and consistent approach to training on the part of the committee. Instead, it reflected a general trend toward micro-managing the activities of the UN Secretariat, while leaving a certain level of ambiguity over crucial issues, such as respective roles and competences, and accountability. This is not surprising, given the fact that the report is adopted by consensus, and therefore reflects—precisely through its lack of a single vision and its ambiguities—the widely diverging views of member states on many key issues.

The work of the C-34 notwithstanding, training has received less attention than other factors thought crucial for effective peacekeeping, arguably for two reasons: because of its technical nature and because the link between training and performance is elusive and hard to track, especially in the absence of agreed frameworks to assess peacekeepers' performance. An internal UN audit report released in May 2010 noted that within the DPKO's Office of Military Affairs there was “no methodology or standards for the evaluation of the performance of military contingent units in peacekeeping missions.”⁶ The consequences of this absence are very relevant to training (and are

² One of the first training centers was the International Peace Academy (IPA), which was founded as an independent nonprofit in 1970 at the urging of UN Secretary-General U Thant. IPA became the International Peace Institute (IPI) in 2008.

³ UN General Assembly Resolution 2006 (XIX) (February 18, 1965), UN Doc. A/RES/2006 (XIX).

⁴ UN General Assembly Resolution 44/49 (December 8, 1989), UN Doc. A/RES/44/49, para. 6.

⁵ UN General Assembly Resolution 66/297 (September 24, 2012), UN Doc. A/RES/66/297. This resolution adopted the C-34's *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, UN Doc. A/66/19 (September 11, 2012).

⁶ UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, “Audit Report: Office of Military Affairs,” Assignment No. AP 2009/600/02, May 28, 2010.

discussed further below).⁷

The importance of training was also emphasized by the Brahimi Report, which placed its role in peacekeeping effectiveness on a par with other crucial elements, such as political support and rapid deployment.⁸ The report viewed training as part of the “managerial” approach that should be adopted in dealing with peacekeeping and noted that “in order to function as a coherent force the troop contingents themselves should at least have been trained and equipped according to a common standard.”⁹ It went on to suggest that the UN establish “minimum training standards” to be incorporated in the memorandum of understanding (MoU) that potential TCCs would sign with the Secretariat before deploying on a particular mission.¹⁰ On this basis, the report concluded that “the Secretariat should, as a standard practice, send a team to confirm the preparedness of each potential troop contributor to meet the provisions of the memoranda of understanding on the requisite training and equipment requirements, prior to deployment... those that do not meet the requirements *must not deploy* [emphasis added].”¹¹

Among the various other references to training contained in the Brahimi Report, at least one, related to police personnel, is worth mentioning in this context, since it touches upon the critical question of how “to transform a disparate group of officers into a cohesive and effective force.”¹² In this case, the recommendation is addressed to member states, which are “encouraged to enter into regional training partnerships for civilian police in the respective national pools in order to promote a common level of preparedness.”¹³ In relation to

policing, the report recommended that the UN set training standards and guidelines for adoption by training centers.¹⁴

THE UN PEACEKEEPING TRAINING STRATEGY

As in many other areas, implementation of the Brahimi Report has been slow and uneven on the issue of training. This is especially true of those recommendations addressed to member states. The UN Secretariat, for its part, has made some significant adjustments to its activity.

The more ambitious idea of a new comprehensive UN training strategy was adopted only in 2008, following a request by the General Assembly, which, through its Fifth Committee, asked the secretary-general to advise it on progress in training in peacekeeping.¹⁵ In response, the secretary-general reported on the work carried out by the Integrated Training Service, within the newly created Policy Evaluation and Training Division, servicing both DPKO and Department of Field Support (DFS).¹⁶ This included a strategic needs assessment¹⁷ and a training strategy.¹⁸

The new peacekeeping training strategy was developed with a view to addressing the priority training needs of UN peacekeepers, as identified in the needs assessment, and to making the most effective use of training resources.¹⁹ The process involved widespread consultations inside the UN (at headquarters and in the field), with member states, and training centers. In December 2010, following a new request by the Fifth Committee, an updated report was presented, which notably concluded that a “peacekeeping training architecture” had been established, based on a shared

7 See also Paul D. Williams, “Training and Equipping Peacekeepers,” in “US Engagement in International Peacekeeping: From Aspiration to Implementation,” edited by Don Draus, Robert A. Enholm, and Amanda J. Bowen, Washington, DC: Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping, October 2011, available at http://effectivepeacekeeping.org/sites/effectivepeacekeeping.org/files/11/PEP_U.S.-Engagement-in-International-Peacekeeping%2010.19.11.pdf.

8 “In other words, the key conditions for the success of future complex operations are political support, rapid deployment with a robust force posture and a sound peace-building strategy... These changes—while essential—will have no lasting impact unless the Member States of the Organization take seriously their responsibility to train and equip their own forces.” Brahimi Report, paras. 4 and 5.

9 *Ibid.*, para. 114.

10 *Ibid.*, para. 116.

11 *Ibid.*, para. 117 (c).

12 *Ibid.*, para. 121.

13 *Ibid.*, para. 126 (b).

14 *Ibid.*

15 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/266 (June 30, 2006), UN Doc. A/RES/60/266, Section I, para. 4.

16 UN General Assembly Resolution 63/680 (January 14, 2009), UN Doc. A/63/680.

17 DPKO Integrated Training Service, “Report on the Strategic Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment,” October 2008.

18 DPKO Integrated Training Service, “UN Peacekeeping Training Strategy,” May 2008.

19 UN General Assembly Resolution 63/680, para. 2.

understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders and entities involved in peacekeeping training.²⁰

Three main phases of peacekeeping training are identified in the UN strategy:²¹

1. *Pre-Deployment Training (PDT)*: refers to generic, specialized, and, where appropriate, mission-specific peacekeeping training that is based on UN standards and takes place prior to deployment to a DPKO-led mission. This training is delivered by member states to military and police personnel/units in their home country and by the Integrated Training Service (ITS) for civilian personnel.
2. *Induction Training*: refers to training that is delivered to DPKO/DFS headquarters staff upon arrival at UN headquarters in New York or mission-specific training that is delivered in a DPKO-led mission. This may include generic and specialized training, including training for military police and civilian personnel.
3. *Ongoing Training*: refers to any training or learning activity for peacekeeping personnel (military, police, or civilian) undertaken during their assignment at headquarters or in the field subsequent to induction training.

While each type of training is important, pre-deployment training is foundational. Ideally, members of UN peacekeeping operations should be deployed only once they have received comprehensive preparation, so that they can be fully operational and ready to face their assignments from day one. Induction and ongoing training have limitations given the other competing tasks that need to be performed during a deployment. Post-deployment training can only fill mission- or context-specific gaps ex-post facto. It is likely to have only limited impact absent extensive and appropriate training prior to the deployment.

Another relevant distinction in the training strategy concerns the three main components of

peacekeeping operations: military, police, and civilian. Each component requires a different training approach, not only to take account of the diverse nature of their respective functions, but also in light of the different recruitment and deployment modalities. Usually, civilian personnel are recruited individually through a system of vacancies and selection processes. This allows the UN—at least in principle—to ensure that the selected individuals have the requisite skills and experience needed for the role they are to fulfill. In contrast, most of the military are recruited collectively as formed units (infantry battalion, engineering company, etc.).²² Police contributions use both methods, as more than half are recruited and deployed in large units, called Formed Police Units (FPU), while the rest are selected in smaller units or individually.

Another significant difference in the selection of civilian, as opposed to uniformed peacekeepers, is that the former apply mainly in their personal capacity, while the latter apply through their national authorities (usually, Ministry of Defense for the military and Interior/Justice Ministry for the police). As a consequence, the latter have normally gone through a pre-selection and vetting process. Among uniformed personnel, a special category—in terms of training requirements—is that of UN military observers (UNMOs), whose tasks and training needs are better defined than those of other uniformed personnel. In fact, UN guidelines on the training of UNMOs were released as early as 1997.²³ UNMOs are military officers assigned to serve with the United Nations or other international organizations on a loan basis by governments of contributing countries. The guidelines assume that “many of the skills required of a military observer are taught or developed during the normal course of a military officer’s career.”²⁴ In addition, sending countries are expected to conduct specific national-level preparation and training for their UNMO personnel.

20 UN General Assembly Resolution 65/644 (December 21, 2010), UN Doc. A/65/644. Integrated Training Service (ITS) has just completed (June 2013) a second training needs assessment, which reviews the effectiveness of existing peacekeeping training and makes a number of recommendations to address priority cross-cutting training needs across all staff and among different categories of personnel.

21 UN Policy Evaluation and Training Division, “Peacekeeping Resource Hub: About Peacekeeping Training,” available at www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/PeacekeepingTraining.aspx?page=about&menukey=_12_1.

22 A small percentage of military personnel, such as staff officers or other specialized military personnel, are recruited individually.

23 UN Training Team, “United Nations Training Guidelines for the Training of Military Observers,” *International Peacekeeping* 5, No. 1 (1998): 127–136.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 129.

Training activities can have general or specialized content. The former is meant to provide trainees with skills and knowledge that are required regardless of their specific area of expertise (UN's basic role and structure, international law, safety and security, sexual exploitation and abuse, code of conduct, etc.). The latter targets specific functions (human resources management, logistics, computer skills, language skills, etc.). Specific ad hoc activities are mandatory for senior leaders through two programs: the Senior Leadership Induction Program (SLIP) and the Senior Mission Leaders Course (SML). The SLIP is designed to provide newly appointed senior leaders in a UN peacekeeping operation with an orientation on peacekeeping issues, such as the main challenges faced when implementing mandates and the relationship between the field and UN headquarters. The SLIP is facilitated by ITS and is a mandatory program, usually held twice a year at UN headquarters in New York. The SML is designed to prepare potential mission leaders for a UN peacekeeping operation. The course is organized jointly by a host member state and DPKO, represented by ITS. The objectives of the SML course are to prepare potential mission leaders for the roles and responsibilities of senior leaders in UN peacekeeping operations and to enable member state officials responsible for UN peacekeeping issues to better understand how current UN peacekeeping operations are managed.

Efforts to refine and implement the UN training strategy were included in the broader framework of peacekeeping reform set out in the 2009 DPKO/DFS New Horizon non-paper.²⁵ The guiding principle of this initiative is that of a capability-driven approach, defined as follows:

A capability-driven approach moves away from a “number intensive” strategy to one that focuses on the skills, capacity and willingness of personnel, as

well as materiel, to deliver required results. It demands clear operational tasks and standards for UN personnel that are linked to appropriate guidance and training, and to the equipment required to perform those tasks.²⁶

The first step to building future capabilities, according to the New Horizon, is to work with member states to set out clearer operational standards for critical mandate tasks to be used in the design of training materials and in pre-deployment preparation.

The non-paper also recognized that “incoming personnel need training before they deploy to build the knowledge and skills to perform in the mission. Despite steady improvements in training for leadership roles and generic training modules, *under-prepared personnel still deploy to the field* [emphasis added].”²⁷ To overcome this serious problem, New Horizon called for a peacekeeping partnership to build an “effective global training network.” This could draw upon experienced personnel, bilateral and multilateral programs, and networks of regional training centers.

THE PEACEKEEPING TRAINING ARCHITECTURE

Recurring emphasis on “partnership” and “networks” in the UN strategy reflects broad agreement that peacekeeping training is a joint endeavor, between member states and the UN.²⁸ Within this shared endeavor, is it possible to identify who does what? According to the second report of the secretary-general on the progress of training in peacekeeping, mentioned above,²⁹ the UN Secretariat has exclusive responsibility for induction and ongoing training for all peacekeeping personnel (military and civilians).³⁰ The UN Secretariat also has exclusive responsibility for pre-deployment training for civilian personnel, while member states have the responsibility to deliver pre-deployment training to military and

25 DPKO/DFS, “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping,” July 2009.

26 DPKO/DFS, “A New Partnership Agenda,” p. 29.

27 DPKO/DFS, “A New Partnership Agenda,” p. 31.

28 Over time, a shift in the language of pertinent General Assembly resolutions adopting the C-34 report has occurred. In 1993, the first resolution addressing this issue stated that “the training of peacekeeping personnel is primarily the responsibility of Member States” (UN General Assembly Resolution 48/42 [December 10, 1993], UN Doc. A/RES/48/42, para. 45). The following year this statement was qualified, “while the training of peacekeeping personnel is primarily the responsibility of Member States, the United Nations should establish basic guidelines and performance standards and provide descriptive materials” (UN General Assembly Resolution 49/37 [December 9, 1994], UN Doc. A/RES/49/37, para. 47). The latest C-34 report “reiterates the shared responsibility of the troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat in providing adequately trained personnel with the professional background, expertise and capabilities required according to United Nations standards” (UN C-34, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, para. 248).

29 UN General Assembly Resolution 65/644, para. 4.

30 This seems logical, since these phases of training take place in the field, where peacekeeping operations are deployed, or at UN headquarters.

police personnel. This division of labor seems appropriate given the modalities of recruitment of the different components described above.

However, although TCCs and PCCs have primary responsibility for pre-deployment training, the UN Secretariat also plays an important role in this area, especially in setting common standards and certifying the quality of training courses. This section focuses on pre-deployment training for uniformed personnel, looking at specific activities carried out by member states and the UN. The final part considers the additional roles played in this area by public and private training institutions.

Member States

Some countries consistently maintain large contingents in peace operations. For them, participation in peace operations is no longer an exceptional event, nor a niche job, but rather has been institutionalized by the security sector as a valuable opportunity to conduct tasks widely supported by public opinion and that receive generally positive media attention.³¹ It can also be valuable in terms of sharing experiences with other armed forces and international organizations. In such countries, training national troops for peace operations has become part of the general training curricula. Moreover, since troop rotation is normally planned well in advance, special training (both generic and country-specific) for international operations is offered in the months preceding deployment. In most UN member states, however, this is not the case.

The development of military curricula is generally managed by the national authorities without the direct involvement of the UN or any other international organizations. Given the varied nature of peace operations, the focus of national curricula also varies, depending mainly on the primary interests of each country in different types of interventions and its past experience as a

contributing country. For these reasons, while current national training programs are generally considered conducive to achieving better capability for operating in multinational environments, it cannot be assumed that UN-recommended pre-deployment training for uniformed personnel is part of these curricula. The UN Secretariat presumes that all troops participating in peacekeeping operations have undergone basic military training. The organization thus limits its training guidance to knowledge and skills that are specific to UN peacekeeping.³² It should be recognized, however, that not all soldiers come with the same military training.

Another way for a member state to enhance the knowledge and skills of its peacekeepers is by offering training courses to foreign troops and police. It is interesting to note that countries where the national curricula do not focus on UN peacekeeping might at the same time provide training for foreign personnel specifically meant to meet criteria that fit UN peacekeeping principles and norms.³³ Some notable examples of international training centers are discussed below.

The United Nations

As mentioned above, in 1989, General Assembly Resolution 44/49 asked the secretary-general to prepare a training manual “which Member States might wish to use as guidelines for the national or regional training programmes.” The underlying rationale for this was based on recognition that good soldiers are not necessarily good peacekeepers, contradicting a notion widely shared at that time.³⁴ While the General Assembly’s position has evolved into calling more strongly for TCCs and PCCs to appropriately align their training modules with the training materials produced by the UN Secretariat, the adoption of UN standards by member states is not mandatory. This is reflected in the language of recent

31 In the Italian Army, for instance, troops participating in peace operations are drawn from all eleven existing territorial brigades. In India, however, given the size of the military (1.325 million), only personnel and units that achieve high levels of performance at home are selected for UN missions.

32 See, for instance, United Nations, *UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards, Specialized Training Materials for Staff Officers*, First Edition (New York: UN, 2011), “this STM has been developed based on the presumption that, qualified military staff officers would have at least completed their national basic staff courses as part of their career progression . . . this STM is not intended to substitute national training doctrines of Troop Contributing Countries but to provide guidance to the trainers of Military Staff Officers’ Courses in order to harmonize the different doctrinal perspectives and also to establish a baseline standard for pre-deployment training for military staff officers at Force and Sector headquarters in UNDPKO/DFS led peacekeeping missions.”

33 See, for instance, the US State Department African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, which since 1997 has provided training and non-lethal equipment to over 176,000 peacekeepers from African partner militaries in 206 contingent units. See Williams, “Training and Equipping Peacekeepers.” ACOTA is based on UN-approved programs of instruction.

34 See, for instance, Franz Kernic, “The Soldier and the Task: Austria’s Experience of Preparing Peacekeepers,” *International Peacekeeping* 6, No. 3 (1999): 113–128.

pronouncements from the General Assembly on this issue. For instance, the 2012 C-34 report noted the “opportunity to ensure that there is coherence and a common view of the roles and responsibilities of the actors engaged.”³⁵

As discussed in more detail below, the only actor capable of giving coherence to the peacekeeping training architecture is the UN. Acknowledging this raises the question of whether the UN DPKO/DFS should be assigned a more authoritative role, with the goal of ensuring that all personnel deployed on its missions have been trained and possess the requisite skills and capabilities. This is certainly what the Brahimi Report recommended—that the UN Secretariat verify, prior to deployment, that all uniformed personnel have received the minimum acceptable level of training according to UN standards.

Besides efforts to set standards and elaborate pre-deployment training materials, the UN Secretariat has worked to expand induction and ongoing training—for which it has full responsibility—as a (partial) substitute for inconsistent pre-deployment training. In addition, at the request of the C-34, DPKO has started activities that are somewhere in between PDT and induction training.³⁶ For instance, it has provided training orientation within the context of assessment team visits prior to the deployment of troops.³⁷

Within the UN system, the Integrated Training Service (ITS) is “the principal office responsible for peacekeeping training.”³⁸ According to the UN secretary-general’s first report on the progress of training in peacekeeping:

The Service has responsibility for the oversight of all United Nations peacekeeping training and for providing relevant policy, guidance and support. It is also responsible for providing current peacekeeping training standards for all phases of training, based on departmental priorities and policies, lessons learned and best practices. The Service disseminates the

standards to all peacekeeping training partners, including Member States and field missions and is tasked with providing technical support and guidance on the design, delivery and evaluation of peacekeeping training to continually improve the consistency and quality of training, whether in the field or at Headquarters. The Service is required to provide enhanced support to Member States and field missions, and is responsible for monitoring the implementation of peacekeeping training standards and for evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of training activities.³⁹

ITS works with partners within and outside the UN system, especially the major offices within DPKO and DFS, which all have a training focal point responsible for coordinating and managing the training in their area of specialty. Similarly, in each UN field mission there is either a training focal point or an integrated mission training center, with responsibility for delivering mission-specific induction and ongoing training to all peacekeepers in the field. ITS staff at the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, provide mandatory pre-deployment training to all civilian staff immediately prior to their deployment to the field.

Although it is the responsibility of TCCs and PCCs to conduct the pre-deployment training of their uniformed personnel, there are important roles for the ITS in this area too. In October 2009, DPKO and DFS identified five areas in which the ITS could support member states and training centers:⁴⁰

1. establish PDT standards, training materials, and learning tools;
2. provide assistance with the development of PDT plans and curricula;
3. provide training-of-trainers support;
4. facilitate information knowledge sharing and bilateral partnerships between training institutes;
5. provide “recognition” for eligible military and police peacekeeping PDT courses.⁴¹

35 UN C-34, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, para. 249.

36 “The Special Committee continues to encourage the Secretariat to make full use of the Integrated Training Service and Office of Military Affairs assessment teams before deployments to identify any shortfalls and assist in addressing these.” *Ibid.*, para. 246.

37 This kind of assistance has been provided once in 2012, according to an ITS briefing.

38 UN General Assembly Resolution 63/680, para. 8.

39 *Ibid.*

40 DPKO/DFS, “Support to Military and Police Pre-Deployment Training for UN Peacekeeping Operations,” UN Doc. Ref. 2009.21, October 2009.

41 Official ITS UN training recognition certifies that a particular Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) course adheres to relevant UN standards. Recognition by the UN is only provided upon request of member states or training institutes and, while strongly recommended, is not mandatory. The recognition is applicable to PDT

Each of these functions potentially plays an important role in assisting member states in their provision of adequate PDT training to their uniformed personnel, as well as in setting the conditions for more uniform and standardized trainings.

Within the UN system, another entity—the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)—also delivers training for peacekeepers. UNITAR was founded in 1963 as an autonomous body within the UN system to provide training to both UN staff and diplomats from newly independent member states. It has progressively developed a wide range of training activities in the area of peace and security, including its Peacekeeping Training Program, which mainly consists of a “train-the-trainer” program in cooperation with the main peacekeeping training institutions in Africa.

Training Institutes

Besides member states and the UN, training institutes play a prominent role in the overall architecture. While a few institutions have been offering training courses for potential peacekeepers for a long time, in the last twenty years the expansion of peacekeeping operations and the considerable increase in the number of TCCs and PCCs has led to a proliferation of institutions, curricula, and courses worldwide. The International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) was created in 1995 with the aim of facilitating the exchange of information among these institutions.⁴² It currently has a membership of 265 institutions, made up of government security and justice agencies, universities and other academic institutions, think tanks, private consulting firms, and regional and international organizations.

The first institutes were located in Western

countries, typically within respective Ministries of Defense, since their main goal was to provide training to their own troops before deployment in peace operations. Only later did some of them open their courses to foreign participants.⁴³ In the 1960s and 1970s, a limited number of international centers were created—mainly in Western Europe and in North America—to train military and civilian professionals of all nationalities in peacekeeping. Training centers also opened in Africa, Latin America, and Asia at a later stage, with the emergence of TCCs from these areas. Often they worked in partnership with international organizations and donor countries. At the same time, several institutions in Europe and North America opened their courses to potential peacekeepers from other countries, while others launched activities dedicated exclusively to training third country nationals, mainly from developing countries. As mentioned above, this has been the approach of the United States over the last fifteen years.⁴⁴

Other international centers have recently been created in developing countries with financial support from foreign donors. Notably, the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana opened in 2004 and oversees the pre-deployment training activities of the Ghanaian Armed Forces and provides civilian, police, and military Peace Support Operation Training Programs. It also acts as a training hub across West Africa.

One concern about the proliferation of training institutes is the inconsistent quality of the programs on offer.⁴⁵ As a partial response to this problem, ITS created a website to quickly disseminate training standards and other relevant materials.⁴⁶ In 2010, a limited access area of the website (called the Peacekeeping Training Community of Practice) was developed “to serve as a collaborative tool

courses only and does not certify training institutions or individual trainers. Once granted, course recognition is valid for four years. At the moment there are approximately thirty approved courses (both military and police). Due to staff limitations, ITS can only manage a limited number of requests for recognition, prioritized on the basis of the impact of the courses on peacekeeping operations and geographical balance.

42 Since 2005, the Centre for UN Peacekeeping in New Delhi fulfills the duties of the IAPTC secretariat.

43 Richard N. Swift noted in the mid-1970s that “Scandinavian countries have assumed an international training function” with training modules offered by the UN staff officers and military observers course (UNSMOC), which opened in 1965 in Sweden, followed by more institutions in other Nordic Countries. Richard N. Swift, “UN Military Training for Peace,” *International Organization* 28, No. 2 (1974).

44 For more on the two main programs run by the State Department, GPOI (Global Peace Operations Initiative) and ACOTA, see Williams, “Training and Equipping Peacekeepers.”

45 See, for instance, Mark Malan “Building Institutions on the Run” in *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*, edited by Donald C.F. Daniel, Patricia Taft, and Sharon Wiharta (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), pp. 89–118.

46 UN Policy Evaluation and Training Division, “The Peacekeeping Resource Hub: Policy, Lessons Learned and Training for the Peacekeeping Community,” available at www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbps/Pages/Public/Home.aspx.

between the Integrated Training Service and all peacekeeping training practitioners including developers, instructors and training administrators from different centres.”⁴⁷ The platform offers an environment where various institutions share training best practices and advice. Institutions are provided with access once they designate a focal point and provide a list of trainers to ITS for whom user profiles are created. In addition, ad hoc efforts by some training institutions toward a greater standardization and quality improvement are ongoing.⁴⁸ However, this is an area where a stronger coordinating and, to a certain extent, regulatory role could be played by the UN. In particular, the UN could create incentives for training institutes to accept its certification of the quality of their courses, as will be detailed in the findings and recommendations outlined below.

In the last twenty years, there has been a considerable increase in the number of public and private as well as national, regional, and international centers providing all kinds of training activities for UN peacekeepers. This represents significant potential capacity but also poses challenges in relation to the dispersion of funding and the coordination of various training actors, including on doctrine, policy guidance, and certification. The UN is trying to affirm its role at the heart of the global training architecture, identifying respective roles and responsibilities and setting standards. However, the UN can achieve meaningful results only with the support of member states. This is particularly relevant in the context of multidimensional operations, which require peacekeepers to have sophisticated skills and to operate in a cohesive and coordinated way. One of the key challenges is to make sure that training, no matter where it is done and by whom, adheres to common standards and produces peacekeepers with the necessary skill sets.

Case Study: The Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU)

The following case study examines the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), created in 2005. It provides an assessment of its activities by examining how CoESPU has discharged its mandate, in particular through its cooperation with the UN and its experience in evaluating its courses.

Stability police training was chosen as a case study for this paper because of the growing number of police officers participating in UN peacekeeping operations, as well as the importance of their tasks. In addition, stability police have a relatively well-defined and limited role, which for training purposes makes it easier to define standards. While police training is a relatively new area for UN peacekeeping, in some respects the UN has been able to make greater strides in systematizing training and assessing preparedness for the police than it has for the military. For this reason, some best practices and lessons learned might also be relevant to military training.

POLICE SELECTION FOR UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Deploying the right people, with the required skills and knowledge, is challenging for all categories of UN peacekeepers and, just as a good soldier does not necessarily make a good peacekeeper, the same applies to a good police officer, in the absence of proper and specific training. In addition, police—more so than the military—are in direct daily contact with the local population. Therefore their behavior needs to be more attuned to local context and regulations than most military functions; hence the need for more context-specific training and a broader sensitivity to cultural differences.

47 ITS, "Peacekeeping Training," slide presentation delivered to the C-34, February 11, 2013, slide no. 14.

48 See, for instance, the work carried out by the European Group on Training (EGT), a network of European training institutions, which is supported by the European Commission and specializes in training of civilians. In addition to offering courses, EGT develops and publishes training curricula endorsed by all its members and approved—informally—by European institutions. See EGT's website, available at www.europeangroupontraining.eu/.

Within DPKO, training for police officers is handled by the ITS, but the Police Division plays an important role in several aspects related both to training and assessment of police officers and units before their deployment. ITS is responsible for producing specialized training materials (STM) for individual police and FPU, and for certifying training courses. The Police Division also certifies trainers, who in turn dispense pre-deployment training to individual officers and assist member states that do not have training facilities to find training capacity in their region or bilateral donors to fund training.

The Police Division relies on two distinct mechanisms for assessment, one for individual police and one for FPU. The first is based on the Selection Assessment and Assistance Team (SAAT), which has been recently revised, raising basic requirements through a more comprehensive language test, computer skills test, and higher shooting and driving requirements. Around thirty-five TCCs have been visited by the SAAT, and officers that pass the SAAT exam remain in the UN database for two years. In relation to FPU, the Police Division is currently revising the guidelines for pre-deployment verification. This system is based on the Special Police Assessment Team (SPAT), which visits PCCs prior to deployment and before rotations of new units. The team verifies the performance of FPU through a series of tests, which include individual tests for FPU commanders. In addition, the UN now requests that FPU be put together at least six months prior to their deployment in a UN mission, thus allowing for more thorough pre-deployment training. This kind of assessment is more common than pre-deployment visits (PDVs) for the military, which focus more on assessing the equipment than testing the capabilities of the troops. SPAT visits actually appear to be close in form to the Brahimi Report's recommendations.⁴⁹

BACKGROUND

At their 2004 meeting in Sea Island, leaders of the G8 adopted an "Action Plan for Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations."⁵⁰ This involved supporting other countries in training their national forces to make them more effective in peace operations. The Action Plan made an explicit pledge to develop activities aimed at supporting UN-led operations and made a specific commitment to train a total of approximately 75,000 troops worldwide by 2010, with a special focus on Africa.⁵¹ As part of this training target, special emphasis was put on police forces, through a commitment to both continued support to existing centers dedicated to training Carabinieri/Gendarme-like forces, and by supporting relevant new initiatives. In particular, the G8 countries pledged to "support the Italian initiative to establish, on a multinational basis, an international training center that would serve as a Center of Excellence to provide training and skills for peace support operations. The center will build on the experience and expertise of the Carabinieri, Gendarmerie and other similar forces to develop Carabinieri/Gendarme-like units of interested nations, including those in Africa, for peace support operations."⁵²

In March 2005 the "Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units" (CoESPU) was established by the Carabinieri in Vicenza, Italy. CoESPU is based on a partnership between Italy and the US, with the former providing the facilities and most of the human resources, and the latter contributing financially, through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), run by the United States Department of State, to meet the participants' costs (travel and per diem). The deputy director of the center is the only American official based in Vicenza. Besides the Italian staff (mostly recruited from the Carabinieri), some of the instructors come from different countries worldwide and include a growing number of former trainees.

49 In a confidential interview with a Police Division staff member at UN headquarters on December 19, 2012, it was mentioned that in November 2012 a formed police unit (FPU) about to deploy to a UN mission did not pass the Special Police Assessment Team (SPAT) visit and therefore its deployment was delayed by two months to allow for additional training. This might well be a rare case where the Brahimi Report's recommendation that "those that do not meet the requirements *must not deploy* [emphasis added]" was actually applied.

50 Available at www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2004/action-6.pdf.

51 According to the G8 agreement, "All peace support operations and other related activities undertaken by G-8 members under this initiative would be in accordance with the UN charter. Moreover, given the fact that most of the peace support operations around the world, particularly those in Africa, are operating under the aegis of the UN and with a UN Security Council mandate, all actions undertaken by the G-8 to expand global capability for peace support operations should be implemented in close cooperation with the UN, in accordance with its technical standards, and take into account the recommendations of the Brahimi Report." Ibid.

52 Ibid.

CoESPU's operational modalities were in part defined in the G8 Plan of Action, according to which the initiative would:

- Operate training programs, including “train the trainer” courses and pre-deployment training for specific missions;
- Develop common doctrine and common operational standards for employing Carabinieri/Gendarme-like forces in peace support operations, specifically with regard to crowd control, combating organized crime, high risk arrests, prison security, protection of sensitive facilities, election security, VIP security, and border control;
- Provide interoperability training with the relevant military forces; and
- Interact with academic and research institutions in related areas, such as humanitarian law, human rights, criminal law, prison management, and civil-military cooperation.⁵³

On the basis of these general guidelines, the activity of CoESPU has been focused on “train the trainer” pre-deployment courses for high- and middle-level officers. The understanding has been that once they returned to their countries they would either be deployed in peace support operations, or train local security forces prior to their deployment in such missions.

As for the content of the course, the reference model for this type of policing is the concept of Stability Police, which was developed mainly in the 1990s to bridge the “security gap” in the Balkans between purely military forces deployed by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which lacked basic police competencies, and the traditional international police observers who had been deployed in earlier “traditional” peacekeeping operations. The Carabinieri, in particular, developed the Multinational Specialized Units (MSU) model, which was adopted by NATO, while other international organizations implemented alternative stability police models, such as the European Union's Integrated Police Unit (IPU) and the Formed Police Units used by the UN and the African Union. While MSUs are robust police forces with military status and their chain of

command is entirely military, FPU are civilian police forces under civilian command. IPU represent a “compromise” between the two models, since they are formed of both civilian and military police. IPU's chain of command can vary, but they are typically under civilian command.

ACTIVITIES

CoESPU set a target of training 3,000 police officers by 2010, following the “train the trainer” approach, which would allow for another 4,500 police to be trained in their home countries, making a total of 7,500 trainees (10 percent of the global target set by the G8 at Sea Island). The number of people trained in Vicenza by the end of 2010 met the original target, since it reached the 3,010 figure, coming from twenty-three countries. 52 percent of trainees originated from sub-Saharan Africa, followed by Asia (26 percent), the Middle East (14 percent), and Europe (8 percent). “Train the trainers” courses were attended by 95 percent of the trainees. However, no figures are available concerning the number of people who have subsequently been trained by those who attended the courses in Vicenza. This is an issue discussed in more detail below.

Two main courses were provided in this phase:

- High-level: for staff officers ranking from lieutenant colonels to colonels and their civilian equivalents. This consists of four-and-a-half weeks of classes (approximately 150 classroom hours) in international organizations, international law (including international humanitarian law), military arts in peace support operations, tactical doctrine, operating in mixed international environments with hybrid chains of command, and the selection, training, and organization of police units for international peace support operations.
- Junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers (sergeant majors to captains) and their civilian equivalents: This course covers the material taught in the high-level course with an emphasis on training in the more practical aspects, including checkpoint procedures, VIP security and escorts, high-risk arrests, border control, riot control, election security, and police self-defense techniques.⁵⁴

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Nina M. Serafino, “The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009.

In 2010 the first phase of CoESPU was completed and a new program adopted for the period 2011–2013.⁵⁵ In 2011–2012, 654 officers were trained, with a higher percentage coming from Asia than in the previous phase: Africa (41 percent), Asia (35 percent), Middle East (16 percent), and Europe (8 percent). Following a request by the UN, eight additional countries (all traditional UN PCCs) have been added to the list of potential trainees.⁵⁶ Key to the new phase is a strengthened relationship with DPKO. In fact, despite the explicit connection between CoESPU's mission and UN peacekeeping, it was only in June 2010 that a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the Center and DPKO was signed.⁵⁷ This represented a turning point in the relationship between the two institutions and the first time DPKO entered into such an agreement with a training center.⁵⁸ The MoU identifies areas of cooperation and their modalities. In particular, CoESPU undertakes to ensure the full compliance of its training programs and curricula with UN standards. It also agrees to consult regularly with the UN on the list of countries and personnel profiles considered for training, and to give priority in the provision of its training services to PCCs already contributing FPUs to UN peacekeeping operations and to countries likely to become future PCCs. CoESPU also offers rapid training assistance (e.g., mobile teams) to PCCs which, in coordination with DPKO, intend to deliver training in accordance with UN standards.

DPKO, for its part, agreed to make use of CoESPU programs and activities, its doctrinal expertise and its training facilities and resources. It also agreed to facilitate interaction between CoESPU and PCCs. In this respect, DPKO provides updated lists of current FPU PCCs and recommends that participating countries consider deploying officers who have been trained by CoESPU according to UN standards and curricula. It also updates CoESPU on the number of officers deployed in UN police peacekeeping operations

who were trained at CoESPU. As a consequence, CoESPU curricula are now focused on directly supporting future deployments in UN peacekeeping operations. These include:

- Civil-police-military high-level courses aimed at ensuring better mutual understanding and cooperation among these three components of UN peacekeeping operations;
- FPU commander courses;
- Protection of civilian courses;
- Sexual and gender-based violence courses;
- High-risk police operations courses;
- FPU training and mentoring courses, normally split in two parts, one to be held in Vicenza and the second one in the recipient country (mobile mentoring team);
- Advisory teams in support to regional training centers (particularly in Africa);
- Mobile assistance teams, deployed in countries shortly before FPU deployment in UN peacekeeping operations.

All courses are based on UN training modules, complemented by additional materials, skill tests (driving, shooting, language, etc.), and simulations. At the end of each course, candidates are evaluated through a final exam in order to receive a diploma, which attests whether or not they have achieved the required skills and knowledge.

Since no CoESPU course has yet been recognized by the Integrated Training Service (ITS) of the Division for Policy Evaluation and Training (DPET), verification of their adherence to UN standards has to be done through the participation of UN Police Division staff in the final part of the courses. This has practical limitations (also due to staff and financial constraints) and therefore in a recent trilateral meeting (held in New York in December 2012) CoESPU, the US Department of State, and DPKO agreed to speed up ITS/DPET recognition of at least some of the courses offered by CoESPU.

55 The final declaration of the 2011 G8 Summit in Deauville indirectly acknowledges the completion of the first phase of CoESPU. See G8 Declaration, *Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democracy*, para. 92 at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/speeches-statements/pdf/deauville-g8-declaration_en.pdf.

56 While not directly relevant to this study, CoESPU is also carrying on training activities outside the cooperation framework with the UN at bilateral and multilateral levels.

57 The memorandum of understanding between the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations was finalized in New York on June 29, 2010.

58 DPKO announced in a recent briefing to the C-34 (February 2013) its plans to develop a template for the MoUs to be signed with some training institutions to better define the nature of their partnership. This proposal is discussed in the "Findings and Recommendations" section of this study.

CHALLENGES

Training delivered at CoESPU has often been praised, including by DPKO.⁵⁹ Also, the doctrinal contribution provided by CoESPU, as a hub for developing common operational procedures for the employment of Carabinieri-like forces in Peace Support Operations, has been beneficial to the UN system. CoESPU, however, has not put in place rigorous mechanisms to monitor the outcome of its training activities. The current system foresees that countries sending their personnel to Vicenza appoint a focal point to facilitate future contacts; sending countries also agree, through an exchange of official notes, to keep CoESPU informed of subsequent employment of the trainees. However, with a few exceptions, this provision has not been implemented. In addition, the exchange of information between DPKO and CoESPU foreseen in their MoU (and particularly the provision by which DPKO is to update CoESPU on the number of officers deployed in UN police peacekeeping operations trained at CoESPU) has not yet been fully implemented.

The need to demonstrate the concrete impact of training activities was not initially a focus for Italy or the United States. In 2010, however, in line with a recommendation made by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), the US Congress conditioned further funding (beyond 2012) on CoESPU tracking the actual deployment of trainees.⁶⁰ In addition, in recent years other training institutions have launched competing courses for police training, some of them based on alternative methodologies that place a stronger focus on capacity building of local training institutions, therefore requiring that some training activities be

conducted on-site.⁶¹ This growing competition represents an additional motivation to demonstrate the outcomes of CoESPU activities.

The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and US Department of State jointly finalized in 2011 a “Tracking of Deployment” project to sensitize PCCs to (1) make sure that personnel attending the courses are subsequently either employed as trainers or directly deployed to peace operations; and (2) fulfill their original commitment to report about the subsequent service of the trainees. In addition, Italian and American embassies in the twenty-three sending countries have been instructed to conduct bilateral demarches with the local authorities (mainly, Ministry of Interior, Defense or Justice) in order to gather information on former trainees. To facilitate those demarches, CoESPU has provided for each country a list with the relevant biographical information on each trainee. A year after the launch of the Tracking of Deployment project, the Department of State provided its findings, which were deemed sufficient by Congress to approve additional funding for 2013.⁶² However, the mapping exercise remains largely incomplete. Figures available show that for the first phase (2005–2010), at least 545 trainees (17 percent) had been subsequently deployed to peace operations, and ninety-nine (3 percent) took on training responsibilities. For the second phase, including 191 trainees, a significantly higher percentage of training/deployment was seen (a combined 52 percent). However, a significant number of sending countries did not report at all, or provided partial response. These figures therefore likely underestimate the real numbers of trainees who eventually deploy or take on training responsibilities.

59 For instance, after DPKO Assistant Secretary General Dimitry Titov visited the Center on June 11, 2011, he sent a letter to CoESPU Director General Umberto Rocca, praising the “absolutely remarkable quality of CoESPU’s courses.” Further, President Barack Obama sent a letter to then Italian prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, in October 2009, wherein he refers to “the formidable training programs for Carabinieri in Vicenza.” See Italian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York, “UN Peacekeeping and Italy’s Role,” available at www.italyun.esteri.it/Rappresentanza_UNU/Menu/L_Italia_e_l_ONU/Pace_e_Sicurezza/Missioni_di_pace/.

60 “Recommendation: To enhance GPOI’s effectiveness, better identify program outcomes, and ensure proper screening for human rights violations, the Secretary of State should provide additional guidance to US missions to help the United States and Italy collect data on the training and deployment activities of COESPU graduates in their home countries.” US Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained But United States Is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed,” Report to Congressional Committees No. GAO-08-754, June 26, 2008, available at www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-754.

61 CoESPU started providing this kind of training in 2012 with the Jordanian police, devising a four-week long course in Jordan as the second phase of a training program started in Vicenza. This formula is to be replicated in 2013 with other countries.

62 “Comments: The Department of State noted . . . that GPOI has been examining mechanisms to improve data collection on the activities of COESPU graduates and is developing a systematic approach for the gathering of post-training data. In May 2010, State informed GAO that it and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs distributed a survey of COESPU partner countries to provide at least a mid-course analysis of post-graduation employment of students. In May 2012, State noted that since March 16, 2011, the United States and Italy, working with twenty-three GPOI/COESPU partner country ministries of foreign affairs, have implemented a data collection effort which tracks COESPU graduate (a) deployments to actual peacekeeping missions/operations and (b) employments in peacekeeping/capacity-building activities. State provided a sample of its Graduate Tracking Data as of May 14, 2012, to document its compliance with this recommendation.” US Government Accountability Office, “Peacekeeping.”

An analysis of available data on the trainees by country of origin shows rather uneven results, with rates of their successive employment in UN peacekeeping operations and/or training for national peacekeepers ranging from 0 percent to 95 percent.⁶³ Again, these figures represent only the minimum level of effective deployment, since responses provided are largely incomplete. Incomplete or inaccurate tracking, while not exclusive to CoESPU, is clearly a weak point of the program. Actual low deployment rate of trainees, however, might be an even more serious issue of concern, since human and financial resources would be largely wasted if those trained do not deploy.⁶⁴

In addition to the incompleteness of the data gathered on deployment, the Tracking of Deployment Project does not attempt to assess the quality of trained personnel. This remains the single biggest flaw in ongoing efforts to improve peacekeepers' training. Measuring the impact of training programs on peacekeepers is difficult for both methodological and practical reasons; however, the availability of more empirical data, both at the field level and within training institutes would certainly allow some progress.⁶⁵ ITS is working in this area through an impact evaluation exercise, which it is requested to run periodically, according to the UN Peacekeeping Strategy.⁶⁶ The second report of the secretary-general on progress on training in peacekeeping extensively refers to efforts made to create a comprehensive database of training activities and to identifying a correct methodology, in particular by applying the "return on investment evaluation methodology," to evaluate the impact of training.⁶⁷ Despite these promising references, no public data have been released so far.

Findings and Recommendations

UN TRAINING STRATEGY

1. The UN's training strategy remains in its early stages and needs to mature. Assessing the quality of training provided to peacekeepers should be seen

in the broader context of measuring their effectiveness, both individually and as contingents. Presently, however, there is no agreement among parties involved on systematic performance evaluations of peacekeepers.

- Member states, including through the C-34, should provide clear and consistent political guidance to strengthen accountability, and support measures that enable the evaluation of UN peacekeeping as a prerequisite for targeted and needs-based training.
- DPKO/DFS should develop an objective methodology for evaluating the performance of uniformed personnel in peacekeeping missions. Member states should offer guidance in support of such a proposal and be ready to provide funding to support it financially.

2. DPKO/DFS working with TCC/PCCs should develop a methodology for more thorough assessments of troop preparedness during pre-deployment visits (PDVs). Member states should accept that, in line with the Brahimi Report's recommendations, contingents that do not meet minimum UN standards should not deploy. Some good practices already adopted by the Police Division, such as the Special Police Assessment Team (SPAT) could be piloted also for TCCs.

3. On the basis of the results of more thorough PDVs and occasional operational assessment visits (OAVs), the Secretariat should identify TCCs and PCCs which need targeted assistance in developing new, or adjusting current capabilities to meet minimum standards, including through dedicated training packages.

- Member states should approve additional resources for OAVs and the necessary training activities identified as a result of those assessments.

THE GLOBAL PEACEKEEPING TRAINING ARCHITECTURE

4. The growth in the number of centers providing training for UN peacekeepers represents a huge potential for more competitive and qualified

63 The highest deployment rates were reported by Togo (140 deployments out of 148 trainees) and Egypt (83 out of 89).

64 In an informal conversation between the author and UN Police Division officials, the tentative figure of an overall 25 percent rate of deployment was mentioned as realistic.

65 For some limited examples of both, see David Curran, "Training for Peacekeeping," *International Peacekeeping* 20, No. 1 (2013): 80–97.

66 DPKO Integrated Training Service, "UN Peacekeeping Training Strategy," p. 3.

67 UN General Assembly Resolution 65/644, para. 17.

training, but requires enhanced coordination among the various actors, including on doctrine, policy guidance and certification. This is particularly relevant in the context of multidimensional operations, which require peacekeepers with sophisticated skills to operate in a cohesive and coordinated way to fulfill their complex mandates.

- DPKO/DFS should assume the lead in this coordinating effort by expanding their role as standard setter for training materials, in consultation with TCCs and PCCs. In turn, member states should provide additional funding to the UN to allow ITS to expand substantially its capacity to respond to requests for the official recognition of military and police courses.

5. Minimum UN training standards should be verified before deployment as a condition for deployment.

- Member states, individually and through a joint commitment in the C-34, should accept that minimum training standards set by DPKO/DFS are mandatory and work with national training institutions to make sure that those standards are systematically incorporated into their curricula.

6. DPKO/DFS should identify, on the basis of a set of objective criteria, international and regional training institutions of excellence and enhance partnerships with them, in particular to assist TCCs and PCCs that do not currently possess the technical/financial capacity to provide high-quality training for all their personnel.

- International training institutions and regional and subregional training centers of excellence should agree (through MoUs with DPKO/DFS) to provide training support to interested TCCs/PCCs. Training activities should be recognized by the UN (see 2.1) and include “train the trainer” courses and other capacity-building measures aimed at developing, within a reasonable timeframe, national training capacities of TCCs and PCCs.


CoESPU AND OTHER TRAINING INSTITUTIONS

7. The challenge that all actors (UN, TCCs/PCCs, and training centers) face is twofold: to deploy all those who are trained and to train all those who are deployed. CoESPU offers high-quality training in accordance with UN training standards. However, measures to ensure that all trainees are eventually deployed to UN peacekeeping operations (or serve as trainers for national peacekeepers) have been inadequate.

- Through a formal exchange of letters with sending countries, CoESPU should stress that the PCCs are obligated, in exchange for receiving training, to (1) select individuals to be trained on the basis of their expected use, either as trainers for national peacekeepers or for deployment into UN peace operations; and (2) provide annually, for a period of at least five years after completion of a course, aggregate and (when possible) individual information on the career developments of all graduates, with particular reference to deployment in UN peacekeeping operations.
- The United States and Italy should assist CoESPU in getting the requested information through their bilateral relationships with PCCs.
- DPKO/DFS should regularly exchange more detailed information with CoESPU and other recognized training centers about UN deployments to help track the deployment of trainees.

8. Tracking the quality of trained personnel and measuring the added value of training should be at the center of efforts of all interested parties: the UN, member states, and training institutions.

- DPKO/DFS, which has already launched an evaluation of the impact of training on improved performance, should seek member states’ and training centers’ support and cooperation to develop a practical and objective methodology and a means of implementation.



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