THE POLITICS
OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

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Foreword

The present anthology is part of the Security and Defence Studies under the Danish Institute for International Studies. The project was made possible through a research grant from the Danish Ministry of Defence. Responsibility for the contents of the anthology rests entirely on the individual contributors. The views expressed in the present anthology are personal and should be treated accordingly.

The appalling act of terrorism that shocked the world on March 11th, 2004 came as the anthology was in the final stages of editing. We were obviously tempted to reedit the volume in light of the atrocity, which so painfully underlines the reality of the new security threats. We eventually decided to proceed without further changes. These inhuman acts of terrorism should not be included as a last-minute addition to the anthology. We will never be able to make sense of senseless cruelty, but through the current debate on the future of European security and defence policy, we may hope to be able to contribute to the realisation of a secure Europe in a better world.

Copenhagen, March 2004
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

Jess Pilegaard, Danish Institute for International Studies

The present anthology offers a comprehensive and balanced analysis of the challenges facing the European Union and the EU member states in their efforts to strengthen the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The following chapters have been selected to provide the reader with a broader understanding of the central issues affecting the further development of the ESDP. Taken as a whole, the anthology offers an overview of the emerging ESDP and the central challenges facing it. Considered as a reader, the anthology comprises nine chapters offering updated and detailed analytical treatment of subjects ranging from security strategy, via military capabilities and intelligence cooperation, to the challenge of thinking about ‘homeland security’ in a European context.

The idea for this anthology was born out of a desire to bridge the gap between the highly specialised and updated policy reports that are regularly produced by think-tanks and the more academic volumes that are often stronger on theoretical analysis. The present anthology thus targets an audience that is fairly conversant with the background of European security and defence policy. A historical chapter offering a chronological account of European defence efforts from the European Defence Community onwards is not included, nor is the general process of European integration dealt with at any length. The anthology basically starts from the current state of play in the ESDP, offering a comprehensive analysis of the key challenges facing the EU and its member states today.

Chapter two includes a discussion of different analytical approaches to the study of the ESDP, but the anthology is not intended as a theoretical contribution to the
debate on European security. The original synopsis for the present anthology focused explicitly on the need to ‘ground’ the debate on the future of the ESDP in a more sober and realistic assessment of the practical challenges confronting Europe. Judging from the rhetoric of European security and defence policy, the EU has acquired the capabilities to make it more than just a ‘civilian superpower’, effectively adding hard military instruments to the all-round tool-box that has become a hallmark of the EU as an international actor. However, leaving aside the EU’s capacity to produce rhetoric, the ESDP remains a project rather than an actual policy. Europe is beginning to think strategically, but it lacks a common strategic culture, the efforts of Europeans in this regard still being hesitant and unconvincing. EU member states face a number of immense challenges on the road towards an effective and credible ESDP, and the present anthology can be seen as a sympathetic yet critical effort to highlight the gap between rhetoric and reality.

The different contributors to the anthology generally agree that stronger European cooperation in the fields of security and defence policy is a necessity. The present situation, where most European states are spreading their limited resources across national, European and transatlantic security arrangements, is inefficient and weakens the impact of European armed forces. Insufficient resources are being spread too thinly, reflecting the absence of a common strategic approach to security and defence policy. Only through collaborative efforts can Europeans hope to acquire the operational effectiveness that will permit them to play an active role in international security. Leaving aside the political question of the desirability of strengthening the ESDP, the contributors to the present volume mainly focus on current problems and the efforts that are being made to overcome them.

OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

In Chapter 2 Jess Pilegaard (DIIS) provides a thematic overview of key challenges facing the development of the ESDP and discusses a number of different analytical approaches to the study of European security and defence policy.
In Chapter 3, Jean-Yves Haine (ISS-EU) presents an analysis of the efforts to develop a ‘security strategy’ for the European Union, and more generally, of European efforts to become a ‘strategic actor’. Haine emphasises the distinctively European character of the security strategy and the current efforts to develop the Union into something more than a ‘soft power’ in international relations.

In Chapter 4, Lisbet Zilmer-Johns (DIIS) presents an analysis of the ESDP debate in and around the Convention on the Future of Europe. This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the proposed changes to the Treaty, including the so-called ‘solidarity clause’ and the strengthened emphasis on the fight against international terrorism.

In Chapter 5, Major-General G. Messervy-Whiting (Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy, University of Birmingham) provides a detailed overview and analysis of European cooperation in the field of intelligence gathering and analysis. Messervy-Whiting presents an assessment of the operational capabilities achieved since 2000, stressing the difficulties of multilateral intelligence cooperation and the strengths as well as the limitations of the present system.

Chapter 6, by Daniel Keohane (Center for European Reform), presents an analysis of the challenges involved in equipping the ESDP with efficient and credible military capabilities. Keohane emphasises the tremendous gap between the political aspirations of the ESDP and the harsh realities on the ground, as few European states have managed to initiate fundamental reforms of their armed forces. Keohane also assesses the utility and realism of different measures designed to improve the cost-efficiency of military spending in Europe.

In Chapter 7, Andrzej Karkoszka (Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces) presents an analysis of Poland’s approach to the ESDP and the consequences of the Eastern enlargement for the future of the ESDP. Karkoszka provides an in-depth analysis of the political and military challenges facing not only Poland but also the EU itself from the need to integrate the new member states.
A realistic assessment of the prospects of the ESDP must obviously take into account the political visions and policies of the United States. In Chapter 8, Daniel Hamilton (Center for Transatlantic Relations) presents an analysis of US views on the development of the European Security and Defence Policy, in which he stresses the political differences between the various US approaches to the European agenda, thus providing a more balanced assessment of US views.

In the penultimate chapter (Chapter 9), Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen (DIIS) provides a disturbingly provocative assessment of European security, stressing the need for Europeans to take the challenge of Homeland Security seriously. Prompted by the tragic events of September 11th, the US has taken the lead in this area, even though geography and demographics make Europe equally if not more vulnerable to terrorism than the US. This assessment of European efforts to combat international terrorism raises pertinent questions as to the balance between external security (ESDP) and ‘homeland defence’ (internal security).

In the final Chapter 10, Lisbet Zilmer-Johns and Jess Pilegaard present a theoretical discussion of the issues raised in the anthology in an effort to understand the dynamics of European security and defence policy.
CHAPTER TWO
The European Security and Defence Policy and the development of a security strategy for Europe

Jess Pilegaard, Danish Institute for International Studies

TOWARDS A COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY?

The present chapter argues that the current approach to European security and defence policy is neither adequate nor sustainable. Insufficient resources are being spread too thinly, leaving the European Union and its member states with a rather limited capacity for international force projection.\(^1\) Existing agreements in the field of security and defence are best regarded as short-term compromises in a more long-term process of adaptation to the changing global security agenda. More fundamental reforms will be necessary sooner or later, and maintaining the status quo is therefore not an option. The first part of this chapter expands on this claim, arguing that the European Union is facing a number of challenges that will require fundamental changes in the European approach to security and defence policy.

It is not possible to appreciate the challenges facing the Union without an understanding of the dynamics of European cooperation in this field. An understanding

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of the politics of European security and defence policy is therefore critical. The efforts to reach a political consensus on a ‘security strategy’ are of special interest in the present context, as the bulk of the necessary security and defence reforms depend on a clarification of the aims and objectives of the European Union as an international security actor.2 The second part of the present chapter therefore proceeds with an analytical overview of the political landscape in Europe, as it relates to the current security and defence challenges facing the Union.

PRESENT SECURITY AND DEFENCE CHALLENGES

For the past decade, EU member states have attempted to come to terms with the new international security environment and to adapt their military strategies and force structures to the changing realities on the ground. This process has taken place at both the national and multinational levels, in cooperation with NATO allies and partner countries. The 1990s witnessed intense institutional jockeying by Western governments eager to influence the contours of the so-called European security architecture. In the immediate wake of the revolutionary changes of 1989, Western Europe and the United States worked feverishly to ensure the continuation of existing multilateral security institutions. As Robert J. Art has explained, Western governments feared that a weakening of these institutions would lead to an upsurge in nationalism and ultimately the re-nationalisation of defence and security.3 In short, Western European governments continued to regard security as indivisible and consequently felt compelled to cooperate in order to achieve national security. Determined efforts were thus made to consolidate international

cooperation in the European Community (later the European Union), NATO and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE).  

Notwithstanding the important achievements in terms of developing a common European security framework (i.e. the EU’s Common European Foreign and Security Policy and NATO’s European Security and Defence Identity), the United States and her Atlanticist allies in Europe have managed to retain NATO as the central military security organisation in Europe. This process of institutional positioning was accompanied by attempts to formulate new strategic doctrines and defence policies for the Western allies. However, the rapidly changing security environment that characterised the 1990s was hardly conducive to the formulation of long-term security policies and strategies. There was broad agreement that the existing force structures – geared as they were to a massive conventional war with the Warsaw Pact – were rapidly becoming obsolete. It was more difficult to agree on a suitable replacement, and after a decade of efforts to reform, only a handful of countries seem to have achieved anything resembling a comprehensive defence reform.

While the temptation to re-nationalise security and defence policy was strongly resisted in favour of continued multilateral security strategies, the European security ‘architecture’ never quite achieved the solidity implied by this metaphor. Moving from a system of collective defence (passive reaction) to one of collective security (active pro-action) presupposes the development of a political consensus on the positive values and objectives of the security community in question. This process proved more painful and complicated than envisaged, and is far from having been completed. In the absence of a political consensus on the goals and objectives of security cooperation, it is difficult to launch an effective and targeted

5. Art (1996), op cit. See also Howorth (2002), op cit., section 1.2.
defence reform. There is strong agreement on the desirability of sustaining the existing cooperative frameworks, but a large part of the motivation would seem to be negative rather than positive (i.e. a fear of the alternatives rather than a positive agenda for action).

The Western community is facing a new range of threats and risks, which necessitates the development of new approaches to international security and the formulation of new security strategies. However, it is difficult to agree on the exact nature of these threats and how best to counter them. Notwithstanding the indivisibility of security, the distance between Washington D.C. and Brussels seems to have grown considerably within the past decade, and it is increasingly acknowledged that the Europeans need to develop their own platform for security and defence policy. It is this recognition which has led to the development of a security strategy to help guide the future workings of the ESDP. The following presents an overview and discussion of central challenges facing the European Union in its efforts to implement the security strategy and strengthen its security and defence policy.

A common strategy for an uncommon actor

Perhaps the single most serious impediment to achieving progress on the ESDP has been the lack of a truly common strategic framework. As William Wallace emphasises, ‘[a] shared sense of global responsibilities, actual and potential threats and appropriate responses to those threats is an essential foundation for a coherent foreign policy’. Achieving this ‘commonality of purpose’ is indispensable in overcoming the tyranny of the 15-cum-25 sovereign decision-makers in the EU. In a governance system that has no government, the best hope for achieving greater coherence and consistency is to create a common strategic framework that will inform the foreign and security policy thinking of the different member states.

8. Wallace (2003), op cit., p. 3.
After the policy divisions of autumn 2002 to spring 2003, there was a stronger recognition of the need for a common strategic outlook for the Union. The draft strategy presented by the High Representative of the CFSP, Dr Javier Solana, in June 2003 therefore received an enthusiastic welcome as a step in the right direction.

It is expected that, in time, the EU security strategy will develop into a broader security policy (more akin to the US National Security Strategy than to NATO’s Strategic Concept). However, it is clear that the EU cannot and will not recreate the type of military capacity that the United States has at its disposal. It will consequently have to develop a different and distinct approach to security and defence policy. Still, for the first time ever, the EU has the contours of a common threat assessment, emphasising not only the security risks of the 1990s (such as regional instability), but also the threats emanating from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and failed states.

At present, there is relatively little controversy over the contents of the security strategy. However, this could well be a consequence of the lack of any public debate over the substance of the document. The process of implementing the strategy and prioritising the security and defence policy is bound to provoke substantial disagreements between the member states. The latter may view security as indivisible, but the threats and risks that dominate the international security agenda are not necessarily ranked in the same manner in all European capitals. Middle-range powers like Poland and Spain have very different security concerns, just as small countries (e.g. Luxembourg) face a strategic environment that differs markedly from the environment facing larger countries (e.g. the UK).

Moving forward but looking backward: the problem of strategy

A famous quotation by the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard reads, ‘Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards’. Much the same could arguably be said of strategic thinking: The most accurate security threat assessments are obviously ex-post rationalisations, but strategy must necessarily look forward into the unknown. Nonetheless our strategic thinking is invariably coloured by the past and whether we like it or not, we often do plan for the future by looking backwards.

The agenda of the Franco-British St. Malo Summit of December 1998 was thus heavily influenced by the crisis in Kosovo. The objectives were relatively clear: 1) To enable the European Union to act military when the United States, for whatever reason, is disinclined to do so; and 2) to supplement the civilian instruments of the EU with ‘hard’ military capabilities. While the challenge issued at St. Malo certainly remains relevant, it has in some ways been overshadowed by the tragic events of September 11th 2001 and the ensuing struggle to combat international terrorism. Security policy can no longer be construed as a primarily external activity centred on traditional military defence. A security strategy for the EU will thus have to be defined in an environment marked by rapid change and fundamental alterations to the way in which both Europe and United States ‘think’ security and defence policy. The security strategy, with its focus on the terrorism-WMD-failed state nexus, is thus very much a product of its time and a reflection of the most recent security thinking.

15. See Biscop & Coolsear (2003), op cit., pp. 3-4.
Developing a common security strategy for the EU is just the first step. The real challenge is to develop the capacity for the common strategic thinking that is necessary to continue developing and adapting the strategic outlook of the Union. The EU cannot hope to cover the security concerns of the 25 member states in a single document. The security strategy must be a generic document capable of generating flexible, common responses to a wide spectrum of unknown challenges that may or may not emerge. This quality does not reside in the document, but in the preceding process of conceptualisation and the subsequent process of interpretation.

Developing the EU’s ‘toolbox’

From one angle, the EU is arguably well positioned to confront the emerging security agenda, including the challenge of international terrorism. The EU has a broad range of politico-diplomatic and external economic tools that are arguably crucial in the campaign to eradicate or contain international terrorism.\(^\text{16}\) It has a relatively well developed consultation and decision-making procedure, and over thirty years of experience in formulating common positions on issues related to the external relations of the EU.\(^\text{17}\) From another angle, however, the European Union is facing a number of important constraints stemming from the institutional organisation of Europe and the inadequacy of its hard military capabilities.

The institutional constraints are related to the problems of coordination and coherence in the policies of the Union.\(^\text{18}\) The efforts to identify and demolish so-called terrorist cells requires active cooperation at different levels of authority in the EU and the controlled coordination of policy areas that are regulated under very different institutional mechanisms (i.e. cross-pillar coordination between

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especially the second and third pillars of the Union). In the words of the CFSP High Representative, Javier Solana, ‘A more effective foreign and security policy begins with the political will to use all the available instruments in a coordinated and coherent way. [...] We can use our diplomatic, economic, and financial muscle to influence the behaviour of recalcitrant parties and aggressors’. There are thus substantial potential benefits from synchronising or coordinating the many faces of European foreign policy. The potential benefits are of special interest in light of the new security threats facing Europe (terrorism, regional instability, migration etc.). These threats are probably best handled through the use of both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power, that is, through a mixture of economic, political, and military instruments. The EU has most of the ‘tools’, but must learn to coordinate them better.

Arming the civilian superpower?
In terms of international engagements over conflict resolution and peacekeeping, the European Union and its member states are arguably pulling their weight, as compared to the United States. The Europeans have provided more than eighty per cent of the ground forces that have been deployed in Kosovo and are shouldering a similar burden in terms of reconstruction and financial assistance. While the EU may be yet to realise its full potential as an international security actor, there can be no doubt that it does play a tremendously important role as an international civilian power. The EU is a ‘heavyweight’ in terms of international development assistance to the developing world and official assistance to countries

19. Andréani, Bertram and Grant warn of the danger of member states government effectively side-lining the European Commission in their efforts to develop the ESPD further. An isolated, inter-governmental ESDP will forego many of the potential advantages and synergies in strengthened cross-pillar cooperation in the field of security. See G. Andréani, C. Bertram, and C. Grant (2001), Europe’s Military Revolution, London: Centre for European Reform, pp. 44, 52.
in transition. The sheer economic and political importance of the EU makes it an anchor of stability in Europe, promoting international stability and respect for democracy and the rule of law. However, the EU’s contribution as a civilian power arguably presupposes the existence of a military power, able and willing to pave the way for subsequent civilian efforts to have an impact. In the present international system, this implies a marked dependency on the United States.

Efforts are being made to address the lack of ‘military muscle’ by developing a stronger and more coherent European capacity to project military force. Leaving aside divergent political views on the desirability of actually ‘arming’ the EU (and the disagreements over the political aims of such a process), some fundamentals are relatively clear. If the European Union is to be able to engage effectively in military interventions outside the European mainland, substantial reforms and investments are necessary. Notwithstanding the creation of a European rapid reaction force of up to 60,000 men, the fact remains that humanitarian interventions, crisis management, projection of stabilisation forces and extraction of EU citizens is currently impossible without the active involvement of the United States or – as an absolute minimum – Great Britain and France. This implies that the international projection of force (and consequently the protection of the interests, values and ideals of the European and the international community) depends on the active interest of a very limited number of states in the international system.

22. Cf. the 1999 ESDP headline goal of 50-60,000 men (up to fifteen brigades) plus air and naval forces. The force should be sustainable for at least twelve months, implying (with rotation and national support) a commitment of up to 350,000 European troops. See Hagman (2002), op cit., p. 36. Other estimates are somewhat lower (see e.g. Rasmussen (2002), op cit., p. 42; Howorth (2000), op cit., p. 38). Such estimates are obviously subject to uncertainty, dependent as they are on the criteria employed in calculating direct and indirect support.

Equipping the European Union with even a modest capacity for military force projection is a tremendous challenge. As a 2001 Rand study emphasised, ‘thus far, the rhetoric behind the ESDP has proceeded far more rapidly than has the acquisition of the resources required to turn the concept into a reality, whether through the provision of additional resources or the reallocation of existing resources.’ While there may be a near-consensus on the desirability of giving some substance to the ESDP in terms of operational capabilities, the issue does raise a number of highly controversial political questions in Europe. The political controversy surrounding especially the ends – but also the means – of the ESDP has resulted in series of half-hearted political compromises that have so far failed to address the core issues of European security and defence. As Wallace cynically sums up the Helsinki Headline Goal, ‘The declared objective was to create a force without any explicit purpose, ready for deployment to undeclared lands, in response to undefined threats. Hardly surprisingly, most national parliaments felt no sense of urgency in meeting Helsinki’s declared goals.’

There is consequently a growing discrepancy between the emerging threats and challenges that are likely to dominate the international security agenda in the coming years, and current European defence postures. ‘The national interests of Germany are now being defended at the Hindukush’, claimed the German Minister of Defence, Peter Struck, in an interview, begging the question of why Germany is still unable to deploy her military forces on the new front lines. Following the end of the Cold War, only a handful of European countries have managed to launch comprehensive defence reforms. The vast majority have settled for a less ambitious policy of ‘muddling through’. Ad hoc austerity measures and piece-meal ‘across-

24. Charles Wolf Jr., and Benjamin Zycher (2001), European Military Prospects, Economic Constraints, and the Rapid Reaction Force, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. The same study estimates that the ESDP/Rapid Reaction Force would cost anywhere in between $24 billion and $56 billion, counting only investments, while excluding operations and maintenance. See also Quinlan (2003), op cit.
the-board’ cost reductions have left most European states with armed forces that are reduced in size, but not yet reformed so as to engage the new security environment effectively. Ironically, the passing of the Cold War has in fact made the use of military force much more probable. The rigidity of the former bipolar system has been replaced by a much more fluid and indeterminate international distribution of power. Limited wars and armed conflicts that were near-unthinkable during the Cold War have materialised, prompting a re-evaluation of security thinking, policy and strategy. An efficient military capacity is becoming increasingly important for overall foreign policy and diplomacy. In the words of NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson:

‘The days of planning for massive armored clashes in the Fulda Gap are behind us. Today, we need forces that can move fast, adjust quickly to changing requirements, hit hard, and then stay in the theater for as long as it takes to get the job done: this means that today military forces must be mobile, flexible, effective at engagement, and sustainable in theater.’

At a time when the need for the projection of international military force seems to become ever more apparent, most European states have sought to cash in on the so-called ‘peace dividend’. A common short-term solution to this dilemma has been the development of dual defence structures: traditional armed forces trained and equipped for territorial defence within the NATO framework have been supplemented with international ‘rapid reaction forces’ that can operate under different lines of national and international authority. Some of the savings realised through massive force reductions in terms of territorial defence have thus been redirected towards more modern, internationally deployable forces. The European trend is thus towards reduced territorial mass armies co-existing with smaller international units.

However, given the limited funding that is made available, these dual structures are hardly sustainable. While traditional armed forces are becoming increasingly symbolic, the capacity for international force projection is severely limited. In a number of European countries, the territorial armed forces have become incapable of mounting a concerted and credible national defence. Reduced funding is being spread ever more thinly among armed forces that were originally developed in accordance with the concept of comprehensive territorial defence (including typically an army, navy, air force and home guard, in addition to civilian staff). Limited funding is simultaneously being invested in modern military units designed and trained for international assignments (and triple-hatted for NATO, UN and EU operations). With falling or stagnating defence budgets, however, only a handful of European countries have the infrastructure to deploy these units effectively—a fairly inefficient allocation of resources, reflecting an inability or unwillingness to define the future rationale of the armed forces in Europe.

Safeguarding the ‘transatlantic link’

The recent US-led campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein was a disturbing demonstration of the widening gap in military technology between the United States and her closest ally, the United Kingdom. If the UK is finding it increasingly difficult to cooperate effectively with the United States in military operations, it has probably already become impossible for the majority of the European members of the NATO Alliance. While the United States has invested heavily in recent years in the so-called ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’, her Euro-

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... Have been falling ever further behind. This widening gap is gradually undermining the NATO Alliance as an effective vehicle for pro-active military action outside the European mainland.

The emerging trend of US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’ (Afghanistan, Iraq) raises a number of difficult questions for the present allies of the United States. The ‘coalitions’ are extremely asymmetric, the auxiliary contingents becoming less and less compatible with US forces and consequently being relegated to an increasingly symbolic role. At the same time, the decision to join a given US-led coalition (the arguments in favour often being quite compelling from a political point of view) often has a detrimental impact on the overall sustainability of the armed forces of the contributing nation. For example, it has been estimated that the UK’s participation in the most recent Gulf War has in fact swallowed up the equivalent of the national defence budget for two years to come, effectively preventing the UK from undertaking a similar undertaking in the foreseeable future. In order to fit in with ad hoc US-led coalitions, junior partners are being forced to stretch their forces and financial resources to the limit, thus complicating long-term planning efforts. The European NATO allies remain an important political resource for the United States. However, despite recent efforts to bolster practical cooperation and interoperability (e.g. the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the NATO Response Force), Europe’s relevance in terms of modern military fighting capacity is falling drastically behind.

34. Keynote lecture given by Dr Christopher Coker, London School of Economics and Political Science, at the DIIS seminar on the Future of Defence Policy, Friday May 2nd 2003, Danish Institute of International Studies, Copenhagen.
35. There are, however, significant differences between European countries, with the United Kingdom and France being in the lead. See Future Military Coalitions (2002), op cit. See also Jacques Isnard, ‘A l’OTAN, des responsables américains louent le savoir-faire de l’armée française’, Le Monde, October 8th 2003.
The American strategy of ‘shock and awe’ probably had the strongest political impact in Europe. It provided a sobering experience, influencing current thinking on the necessity and desirability of strengthening the European Union as a security actor.\(^3\) If the European members of the NATO Alliance are intent on safeguarding the traditional ‘transatlantic link’, i.e. ensuring a continued dynamic partnership with the United States, they will have to strengthen their military potential. The European Union and its member states is an invaluable strategic partner of the US in terms of reconstruction and socio-economic development, but, lacking the ability to make meaningful contributions to military campaigns, the Europeans are being forced to accept a secondary role in shaping international security developments. This division of labour (military-civilian) is hardly in the interest of the Europeans, who will be left looking on from the sidelines. This cannot be in the interest of the United States, whose military expenditure is already stretched to the limit. And it is certainly not in the interest of the ‘partnership’ between the two continents, which is becoming increasingly lopsided.\(^3\) The comparative advantages of Europe and the United States may in principle be complementary, but in practice this need not be the case.\(^3\)

**Summary: Europe at a crossroads?**

European politicians have always had an extraordinary ability to avoid or postpone fundamental debates and decisions about the so-called *finalité politique* of the European integration project. The European integration process has arguably always functioned best without a clear understanding of the ultimate political

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36. A process that had already began after the first Gulf War and which gained further momentum in connection with the painful experience of European powerlessness during the tragedy in ex-Yugoslavia. See Andréani, Bertram and Grant (2001), op cit., pp. 53, 54.
38. See e.g. *Future Military Coalitions* (2002), op cit.: ‘A “division of labour” approach to coalition operations would constitute a flawed and counterproductive operational solution to the failure to address transatlantic cooperation issues’ (p. 37). This approach, which is arguably an attempt to make a virtue of necessity, is simply not an option. See also Andréani, Bertram and Grant (2001), op cit., p. 76.
objectives of the Union. The open-ended nature of the integration process has made it possible for the different member states and the different national and transnational political movements to identify with the efforts to develop the European integration project further. It is therefore somewhat misleading to speak of the European Union as being at a crossroads. The EU embodies a number of very different projects for different political groups in Europe. In some ways, it is confronted with a perpetual crossroads: either to move forward towards increased – but politically ambiguous – European cooperation, or to slide backwards, thus weakening the integration process. Hence the political image of the European integration process as a bicycle that must keep moving forward in order not to come to complete stop. The ultimate destination, though, remains unclear.

In the present context, however, the notion that the EU is at a crossroads is being evoked in a more limited but also more focused sense. The basic argument is that the European Union and its member states are faced with a number of fundamental challenges in terms of security and defence. These challenges are slowly eroding the status quo and will eventually force the Union and its member states to institute more fundamental security and defence reforms. At present, the Union and its member states are ill equipped to tackle the emerging international security agenda. They lack a common strategic outlook, and most European military force postures are outdated and inappropriate for the types of assignment that are emerging and that are likely to emerge in the years to come. Given the rapidly rising costs of research and technology intensive military hardware, the Europeans


40. The image was originally suggested by Walter Hallstein, the first President of the European Commission.
are being more or less forced to increase their military cooperation (possibly, but not necessarily, within the EU). These structural changes open up new possibilities in terms of further developing the Union’s common security and defence policy.

However, developing common European responses to current security and defence challenges is a tremendous political undertaking. The issues involved are politically contentious, and it will be difficult to reach a consensus on the form and substance of a common security and defence policy. As Marc Otte stresses, ‘[T]wo kinds of gaps have to be filled: the first is a transatlantic one [i.e. the widening capability gap]; the other is a gap among Europeans themselves [i.e. the strategic policy gap]’. 41 Developing a common political vision of the EU as security actor and mobilising the resources required to implement this vision are the most formidable political challenges facing the European Union today.

ANALYSING THE POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

In order to appreciate the character of the challenges facing the Union and to assess the Union’s ability to meet them, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of European cooperation in this field. Different theoretical assumptions about the EU will lead to different expectations as to its capacity for strategic action and thus to different assessments of the potential for actually strengthening the ESDP.

The efforts to develop a ESDP can be seen as a logical outgrowth of the European integration process. In this view, economic integration led to the abolition of barriers and restrictions on the free movement of goods, labour and capital. This type of integration saw the establishment of new common policies, such as the Common Commercial Policy. The introduction of common policies has strength-

41. Otte (2002), op cit., p. 52. See also Thiele (2002), op cit., p. 80, on the technological and strategic policy gaps.
ened the international presence of the European Community and its successor, the European Union, which in turn has spurred a rise in expectations on the part of the outside world. Economic integration and increasing international expectations have forced the Union to develop common external policies, including a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The achievements of the past can only be consolidated by further strengthening the process of political and economic integration. In this perspective, the ESDP is an integral part of the European integration dynamic: for better or for worse, the EU is an international actor whose policies and actions have wide-ranging consequences for the international system as a whole. In order to assume the responsibilities that its economic and political influence gives it, the Union must also strengthen its ability to act as an international security actor.

The alternative approach places greater emphasis on the member states and their national interests. In this perspective, the ESDP is first and foremost a political creature. It is not the logical and inevitable outgrowth of European integration, a so-called ‘functional’ spill-over from increasing economic cooperation. On the contrary, it is a political process driven by individual EU member states, who are motivated by a multitude of factors and are therefore not necessarily pursuing the same or even similar objectives. The effectiveness and efficiency of the CFSP and the ESDP will therefore not improve markedly unless there is political agreement on the need for a stronger Europe in international affairs (i.e. ‘policy convergence’).

This traditional debate between (neo)functionalist and intergovernmentalist theories of European integration is arguably somewhat dated, but these differences of approach are still influencing the theoretical debate. Analytical approaches that conceptualise the Union as a relatively coherent actor (i.e. focusing on the whole rather than the individual parts)42 can thus be juxtaposed to theoretical approaches that work from the bottom-up (i.e. focusing on the units rather than the whole). Similarly, while some researchers assume that the national interests of member states are inextricably

linked with the Europeanization process, others maintain that the preference formation is exogenous (i.e. prior to and distinct from the process of integration).

Notwithstanding the richness of the theoretical debates in this field, it is fair to say that most explanatory frameworks emphasise the interests and actions of the member states. No one will deny that the political interests and policies of the member states are a necessary – if not sufficient – explanatory variable in explaining European efforts in the field of security and defence policy. In order to understand the potentials and limits of the ESDP, therefore, it is necessary to understand the political forces at work in the current European landscape.

The political landscape

As suggested above, Europe would seem to be at a historical crossroads, forced to make a number of important decisions, whether to safeguard what is or to create something new.

While the idea of a distinct national-territorial defence is on the retreat, most countries insist on maintaining the basic contours of a traditional territorial defence and would consequently shun the idea of developing integrated defence frameworks under a multinational command. In some ways, the typical European nation state is arguably locked in an inefficient local optimum: the defence posture is inadequate to mount a credible national defence, but still sufficiently important to quell critical questioning of the rationale of ‘mini-mass armies’ organised on a national scale. Basically, if Europe wants to make efficient use of armed forces on a larger scale, the...
member states will have to invest more nationally and pool their resources at the multinational level.

Current security thinking in Europe shows elements of both continuity and change. National positions have evolved significantly during the past decade, making it difficult – or perhaps, rather, potentially misleading – to present a ‘snapshot’ overview of current positions. The political debate on the ESDP has arguably become increasingly ‘European’ in that the same fundamental questions are being raised across the continent. Instead of discussing the parameters of the national debate in individual member states, what follows is an attempt to define the main lines of thought at the macro-European level by critically examining existing approaches to and classifications of the European security debate.

‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe

The US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, provoked his European audience when, at a press conference in early 2003, he suggested that there was now a political divide between Western Europe (‘Old’ Europe, signifying essentially France and Germany) and Central and Eastern Europe (‘New’ Europe, Poland being its main representative). Whereas ‘Old’ Europe was becoming increasingly lethargic, ‘New’ Europe was ready to assume its responsibility in the global struggle against terrorism and rogue states.

46. See Howorth (2000), op cit, p. 53, who argues that ‘there were, throughout the debates on ESDP, no clearly definable “camps”’. Each country adopted a position on each separate problem which combined realist or rational choice national interests, historical-institutional specificities and the cultural values and norms appropriate to its historical and social traditions. It is really impossible and in any case inappropriate to try to put these countries into “camps” – other than in the most simplistic terms of Europeanism/Atlanticism as defined by the Franco-British couple.

47. The statement came on January 22nd 2003 at a high point of the Iraq crisis in a dialogue with the media. A journalist had asked the Defence Secretary about the opposition of France and Germany to the war, to which Rumsfeld replied: ‘Now you are thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the centre of gravity is shifting to the east and there are a lot of new members. And if you just take the list of all the members of NATO and all of those who are invited in recently – what is it, 26, something like that? [But] you are right. Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem’.
Notwithstanding the fact that a large proportion of the supposedly ‘Old’ Europe is arguably ‘New’ (i.e. Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Spain) were closer to the Polish policy response than to the Franco-German reaction), Rumsfeld’s distinction did have some political resonance. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are still in the midst of a massive process of political and economic transition. They are highly dependent upon the goodwill of Western governments and are thus essentially *demandeurs* in the present international system. They have to accept whatever is on offer and are not really in a position to challenge the decisions made by Western governments, especially the US government.

For the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the internal Western divisions over Iraq were a source of considerable tension, since it forced them to choose between their main allies. However, unpleasant though this may have been, the decision to support the US-led coalition was hardly surprising. For one thing, the majority of the Central and Eastern Europe countries had achieved a relatively satisfactory (if not generous) accession deal with the European Union at the December Summit in Copenhagen. They had the accession deal (and were thus outside the reach of any immediate ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’), but were still ‘outside’ the EU (and therefore under less peer pressure from their future partners). In addition, a number of the older EU members were already part of the US-led coalition, thus lessening the dilemma for their eastern neighbours. Finally, in matters involving hard military security, they can hardly be faulted for placing greater confidence in the security guarantees of the United States than the political declarations of the Union.

The political significance of the divisions that arose during the Iraqi crisis can easily be overstated. This was never a division between an ‘Old’ and a ‘New’ Europe – assuming that these adjectives mean anything. The political debacle over the war in Iraq was extreme, as were the positions adopted by the Western governments. The

countries of Central and Eastern Europe are no less European and no more ‘pro-Atlanticist’ than the average West European government.49

Europeanists vs. Atlanticists

In the decade following the reunification of Germany, the debate on European security was often cast in terms of an opposition between Europeanists and Atlanticists, i.e. those favouring the development of an independent security and defence capacity for the EU, and those preferring a continued reliance on the NATO alliance. As discussed above, this distinction is becoming increasingly irrelevant. No European government advocates the development of a European security and defence policy that is wholly autonomous of NATO and the United States. All European governments acknowledge the necessity of continuing and even strengthening security and defence cooperation with the United States.50 At the same time, European governments seem in principle to have accepted the need to strengthen the ‘European’ contribution to the Western security community (i.e. strengthening the military capabilities of the European allies).51

The staunchest proponent of a distinct European voice in international security and defence has traditionally been France, and this objective is certainly still present in French foreign policy thinking (as shown by the calls for a multipolar system, with the EU acting as a counterweight to the United States).52 However, an equally important element in French strategic thinking has arguably been its pragmatic acceptance of the fundamental power differentials between Europe and the United States. Paris has always been conscious of the limitations inherent in the European approach (if for no other reason than because France herself was never willing to

50. On this policy convergence in Europe, see e.g. Andréani, Bertram and Grant (2001) op cit.: 13 ff., 37.
51. Whether this commitment ‘in principle’ will be implemented ‘in fact’ remains to be seen. On the convergence of European security thinking, see Future Military Coalitions (2002), pp. 1-3.
compromise her own sovereignty and independence in this field). French thinking has certainly evolved markedly during the past decade, as exemplified by the strong presumption of several observers that France would eventually have supported the US-led coalition in the most recent Gulf War.\footnote{According to Stanley Hoffmann, the French President had actually earmarked troops for participation should the UN weapons inspectors find evidence of weapons of mass destruction. See Stanley Hoffmann, ‘America goes Backward’, \textit{New York Review of Books}, Vol. 50, No. 10, June 12th 2003.} Notwithstanding the inflated rhetoric of the transatlantic skirmish, the French government is presumably well aware of the necessity of continued cooperation with the United States in the field of security and defence policy.\footnote{See Claire Tréan, op cit. See also Howorth (2000), op cit., pp. 12-22; Andréani, Bertram and Grant (2001), op cit., p. 13.} Similarly, the French government clearly recognises that the ESDP depends on the active participation of the United Kingdom.\footnote{Charles Grant (2004), ‘Stumbling Towards Unity’, \textit{Global Agenda}.}

The British government, on the other hand, has come to accept the need for stronger European cooperation on security and defence policy. The United Kingdom has been one of the firmest supporters of the ‘transatlantic link’ and the primacy of the NATO alliance. The British government has made it absolutely clear that it would not accept any European plans or ideas that could serve to weaken the ties across the Atlantic. However, it has simultaneously become more interested in the possibility of equipping the European Union with a credible military capacity, seeing a stronger ESDP as a European contribution to maintaining the ‘transatlantic link’.\footnote{Howorth (2000), op cit., p. 29.} With the French rapprochement to the NATO alliance and the American insistence that the European allies should shoulder a larger part of the security and defence burden, the idea of an ESDP has gradually become more palatable to the British government.

Following the launch of the US-led war against international terrorism, the United Kingdom appears to be giving a higher priority to bilateral security and defence cooperation with the United States, as reflected in the sizeable British contributions to the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the British government...
has laboured intensively since the end of the Iraq campaign to repair its strained relationship with France and Germany. These diplomatic efforts culminated in December 2003 in what appeared to be a new trilateral agreement on the future development of the ESDP.57

Germany has also moved considerably during the past decade. In connection with the most recent Gulf War, the German government was castigated for its unwillingness to support or condone the US-led coalition, provoking both national and international debate about the responsibility and ‘proper role’ of Germany in the new Europe. In spite of the similarities between the German positions in the Gulf Wars of 1990-91 and 2003, it should be noted that Germany has in fact abandoned its former policy of non-intervention by sanctioning the deployment of ground troops outside German territory. Chancellor Schröder’s coalition government thus committed combat aircraft to NATO’s 1999 Serbia campaign and stationed over 8,000 troops in Bosnia and Kosovo in 2000.58 German troops have also been deployed in both Macedonia (over 1,000) and most recently in Afghanistan (almost 3,000 pledged, including approximately 300 special forces). Also, German naval forces are currently deployed off the coast of Djibouti. More generally, the German government has bolstered its force projection capability, which would be of immense importance in possible future EU-led military operations.59

The traditional labels of ‘Europeanist’ and ‘Atlanticist’ are thus becoming ever less applicable in Europe. In the aftermath of the wars in the Balkans and the most recent Gulf War, European governments have been forced to reassess policies and positions adopted following the ending of the Cold War. The current debate is not between positions at the ends of a continuum, but rather in the middle ground, between Europeanists who accept the necessity of working with the United States and Atlanticists who accept the necessity of working through the European Union.

59. Eleventh Report of the Select Committee on European Union, the House of Lords, op cit.
Neutrality and pacifism vs. expeditionary activism

A different approach to the ESDP centres on strategic culture. The basic argument is that ‘[i]f the ESDP is to be used as an active instrument …, there has to be a underlying agreement among the participating countries about the nature of the world and about how to react in accordance with this perception of the world’.60 In this view, this ‘underlying agreement’ would become the strategic culture of the ESDP, and the central question is therefore whether the strategic cultures of the EU’s current and future member states are compatible.61

Seen from this angle, the members of the European Union are a very diverse group. The United Kingdom and France have traditionally been posited as military activists, with a history of global military engagements.62 They both have relatively strong armed forces and a certain capacity to project force internationally (witness their operations in Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast respectively). More importantly, they have demonstrated a willingness to use military force in international politics. In spite of the harsh allegations levelled against France for her reluctance to endorse an invasion of Iraq in early 2003, few would claim that France is a pacifist nation.

Germany, on the other hand, is often portrayed as the exact opposite of France and the United Kingdom, a pacifist, inward-looking nation that has forsaken the use of military force. Notwithstanding the 1994 ruling of the Constitutional Court establishing the constitutionality of out-of-area deployment, German strategic culture remains essentially defensive and arguably also anti-militaristic. When confronted with negative opinion polls in the run-up to the fall 2002 national elec-

tions, Chancellor Schröder embarked on a campaign of open opposition to US sabre-rattling vis-à-vis Iraq. The gamble paid off, with German antipathy towards war translating into an SPD majority on polling day. German strategic culture may be undergoing changes currently, but its evolution is likely to be slow and gradual.

The Scandinavian countries represent another tradition altogether, typically described as pacifistic and non-aligned. However, there are significant differences between the different Nordic countries, and national positions have changed considerably since the passing of the Cold War. In the course of a decade, Denmark has changed from being a ‘reluctant ally’ to being an active participant in international military operations, not just at the lower end of the Petersberg tasks, but also including armed conflict (Afghanistan) and actual warfare (Iraq). Sharing more than 1,000 kilometres of border with Russia, Finland is arguably the Scandinavian country whose security and defence policy has changed the least following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Finland continues to rely on a national-territorial defence posture coupled with an international commitment to peace-keeping operations. Similarly, Sweden maintains a policy of armed non-alignment coupled with a strong tradition of international activism within the framework of the United Nations. Finnish and Swedish international activism is primarily concentrated at the lower end of the Petersberg tasks, with a strong preference for conflict-prevention and peace-keeping.

The states that are about to join the European Union are, for obvious reasons, slightly more difficult to categorise in terms of strategic culture. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are undergoing tremendous changes currently, with wide-ranging defence reforms gradually being implemented. The past is presumably a poor guide to their future strategic orientation, but a number of observa-

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64. See e.g. Heiselberg (2003), op cit.
tions are nevertheless warranted. With extremely limited military capabilities, the Central and Eastern European Countries have no choice but to rely on international military cooperation. While Czechoslovakia briefly contemplated a number of different scenarios of armed neutrality, the fact remains that none of these countries are capable of mounting a credible territorial defence. NATO thinking is having a strong influence on the defence reforms currently taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. Given that they are now continuously ‘rubbing shoulders’ with mainstream Euro-Atlantic defence structures and strategic thinking, the emerging military establishments in the region are likely to develop a more activist international orientation than a fair number of the current members of the European Union.

The changing security environment is bound to have an impact on the strategic cultures of both current and future EU member states. There is a discernible convergence at the level of security and defence policy, centred on NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept (calling for more flexible and deployable capabilities). However, it remains to be seen whether these changes will lead to mutually compatible national strategic cultures, thus facilitating the evolution of a common European strategic culture.

The different theoretical approaches to the political landscape in Europe have one important thing in common: They are relatively open-ended, signalling significant changes in the politics of European security and defence policy. Standard concepts and assumptions that previously offered a fairly sensible assessment of different national positions are no longer adequate. There are obviously important elements of continuity, but the policy changes that can be witnessed point to increasing common ground between the actors within the ESDP and thus new opportunities for increased cooperation in the field of security and defence.

Summary
The European Union and its member states are facing a number of serious challenges in the field of security and defence policy. The existing frameworks and commitments are best seen as the result of interim compromises, and Europeans
will sooner or later have to make some difficult decisions about how to strengthen their international military capacity. New security threats, the need for new and improved military hardware and the changing dynamics of international security cooperation rule out the possibility of continuing with ‘business as usual’. Transforming the European Union into a credible and effective international power will require difficult decisions.

Whether the EU and its member states will rise to the challenge is another matter. The past decade has witnessed significant movements in the European political landscape. The relative stability of the earlier bipolar system has given way to a rapidly changing strategic environment, while the positions adopted during the Cold War have changed significantly as a consequence of the momentous changes in the international security environment. Western European governments are still trying to come to terms with the new security challenges and their policies, and outlooks are consequently more ambiguous and open than they have been for years. The subsequent chapters will shed more light on the progress achieved, and the possibilities and limitations of the ESDP.
CHAPTER THREE
The Union Inaugural Address

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In June 2003, at the Thessaloniki Council in Greece, the European Union approved a major document entitled *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, which represents the first draft of a genuine security strategy for the Union, the final version of which was endorsed in December 2003. The timing of this paper largely explains its content. After the transatlantic divisions over Iraq and the exclusion of the Union itself from the crisis, some EU actors were keen to repair the damage with the United States. This document could be seen as a first attempt to bridge the gap with Washington by acknowledging the common threats faced by both sides, especially international terrorism, where, despite the crisis over Iraq, transatlantic cooperation was excellent. Stressing agreement was thus a clear priority.

A strategy document is always a tentative exercise by nature. It is more about visions than strategic interests, more about attitude than policies. This is even truer for an organization of 25 independent states. The wording was indeed crucial. It is no coincidence that general formulae and ambiguous concepts are used in the document. Behind every such concept lies a difficult negotiating process. For example, the concept of ‘pre-emptive’ engagement was replaced by ‘preventive’ engagement, because the original wording was deemed too controversial for some member states. Likewise, some countries underlined the continued salience of the old Bosnia-type security risks while others were keen to stress the new emerging

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threats of terrorism and WMD proliferation. As far as the instruments were concerned, there was an intense debate between a ‘hawkish’ approach to world problems and a softer view of the exercise of European power. These debates were for the most part healthy and fruitful. They helped to enhance the consciousness among European leaders and officials that in order to fulfil its international responsibilities, the EU cannot reduce itself to its civilian component, however important this may be. Moreover, the lessons of the Iraqi crisis were quickly learned. The deep internal divisions were a painful reminiscence of the European paralysis in the Bosnian conflicts where the nascent CFSP failed to deliver on its early promises. Barely six months after the Iraqi war, which by European standards is a very short amount of time, the Union has agreed on a broad security strategy.

This document is thus historic. For the first time, the Union has begun to think strategically. The process of European integration has resulted in a ‘post-modern’ system in which a genuine democratic peace has been built, an institutional order progressively constructed and an increasingly ‘amalgamated security community’ has emerged. This endeavour was mainly an inward-looking development that is still under way with the new draft constitution that is currently being scrutinised after the failed Intergovernmental Conference of December 2003. But besides this internal dimension and purpose, in this document the European Union is addressing its external dimension in a comprehensive manner. The reasons behind this awakening are twofold: since the Iraqi crisis, a recognition that, divided, the Union is powerless; and before the official entry of ten new members, an acknowledgement that, with 450 million people, the Union cannot turn its back on the world around it.


A NEW AMERICA, A NEW EUROPE

The recurrent privilege of the United States was that the tragedy of power politics was for the most part a remote reality that existed only in foreign and remote places, and was rarely an emergency lived from inside. With the fall of the Twin Towers, America rediscovered a real and dangerous world. September 11th was clearly a historical moment, a period of ‘tectonic shifts’, as US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice has put it, similar to the rise of the Soviet challenge at the end of the 1940s. President Bush, like President Truman, proceeded to a global analysis of the threat, but unlike his predecessor, Bush favoured a unilateralist approach in tackling the new challenge of international terrorism. This unilateralism, which derived from absolute confidence about U.S. supremacy in the world, was one of the key reasons behind the transatlantic divisions caused by the Iraqi crisis. The unilateral tone and the global scope of the ‘war on terror’ led to diverging security perceptions and interests across the Atlantic. The gap between an increasingly revisionist USA and a generally status quo-oriented Europe took a dramatic turn in Iraq.4 The pre-Iraq war period saw one of the deepest NATO crises since Suez. But the divide was not limited to transatlantic relations: it cut deeply across Europe at a moment when delegates from the EU member states were discussing a new draft constitution, whose aim was to bring more coherence to European affairs, including foreign policy.

The strategic reasons for waging a preventive war against Iraq seemed self-evident to the Bush administration. Disarmament, regime change and democracy in the Middle East were reinforcing arguments for the President. The case presented to the international community was, however, confusing. Generally, the United States tends to colour strategic necessities with an idealistic blend. In the case of Iraq, it

4. The term ‘revisionist’ is not intended to be pejorative but simply depicts the relationship between a state actor and the international system. The term was first used by Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946. For further developments of this notion, see Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration, Essays in International Politics, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962, pp. 81-102.
was the other way around. Washington shaded its main objective of regime change with strategic motives linked to disarmament and terrorism. Contrary to a basic realist analysis, the White House tended to attribute to Saddam Hussein malicious intentions first and hypothetical capabilities second. Reversing this order of priorities, most Europeans focused on Saddam’s current capabilities, while disregarding past behaviour. They were more or less ready to recognize the remote threat that a nuclear Iraq was likely to pose to the region in the future, but they did not support regime change by force, something that seemed too provocative a gesture to a country that had had nothing to do with September 11th. In other words, Saddam Hussein was indeed a confirmed liar but ultimately he was not a danger. Precisely because Iraq was a war of choice, not a conflict of necessity, and because military victory was preordained, the debate evolved rapidly from the particular case to general principles, from disarming Saddam to Washington’s use of force, from the opportunity for a second UN resolution to the relevance of the UN itself, from a specific demand of assistance by Turkey to NATO’s raison d’être.

This represented too great a challenge to the European Union. The Union’s attitude was thus essentially reactive. If it had set out its own definition of a ‘material breach’ of Resolution 1441, specified the conditions under which force might be used and laid down a precise timetable for action, it would have been able to foresee events and to strengthen its position in Washington. Instead, EU foreign ministers decided to formally hand over the Iraqi affair to the UN, without addressing the strategic case at hand. In doing so, they in fact gave a free hand to the permanent European members of the UN Security Council, France and Great Britain, that is, the two countries with the most opposed views vis-à-vis the United States. Not very surprisingly, London and Paris decided to focus on the legitimacy of the UN, while ignoring the European framework. As a result, the EU became irrelevant.

5. Although governments were aligned differently, public opinion throughout Europe was largely opposed to the war.
This painful reality contrasted with the ambition expressed at the Convention for a larger role for the EU in foreign and security policies. The Convention, which began in 2002, was established to prepare for the consequences of the enlargement by the ten new countries that would become official members of the EU in May 2004. This ‘big bang’ would increase the diversity of the Union and complicate even further the already arcane decision-making process at the EU level. Building a consensus with 25 members could lead the Union into producing nothing but minimal, delayed measures, confusion and inaction. In foreign and security policy, the Convention envisaged several ways of avoiding these pitfalls. First is the possibility of ‘structured’ cooperation, whereby countries who wanted to deepen their own security relationships could do so without waiting for agreement at 25. In other words, if Germany and France wanted to set up a joint capacity to plan and conduct military operations, they would be allowed to do so, even if other members declined to follow them. The Convention’s most visible innovation was the creation of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, who would coordinate national positions and represent the Union abroad. This ambition of a more coherent and active Europe in foreign and security policies contrasted heavily with the display of division during the Iraq crisis. Nonetheless, this aspiration is widely supported by public opinion throughout Europe. A recent poll by Eurobarometer indicates that more than 75% of the European public supports the idea of a common army. The discrepancy between the weight of the Union in economic and financial affairs and its absence in world politics is a constant matter of regret for a majority of EU citizens. The Iraq crisis demonstrated the necessity of a common strategy for the Union.

6. This is somewhat different from the Tervueren initiative between Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Germany of April 29th 2003, where the four countries declared their intention to set up just such joint capability even outside the Union framework. In their declaration, it is stated that ‘Dans le souci d’améliorer les capacités de commandement et de contrôle disponibles tant pour l’Union européenne que pour l’OTAN, les quatre Ministres de la Défense entreprendront les démarches nécessaires en vue d’établir, pour l’année 2004 au plus tard, un quartier-général multinational déployable pour des opérations conjointes et qui serait basé sur des quartiers-généraux déployables existants’. This triggered fierce hostility in Washington and London. However, Prime Minister Tony Blair has basically agreed to an independent headquarter inside the ESDP infrastructure. The text is available at http://www.diplomatic.be/fr/press/homedetails.asp?TEXTID=6279
SOFT POWER PLUS

An inward-looking Europe thus ceased to be a possibility with America being engaged in a global agenda that had serious direct and indirect consequences for the Union. The opening premise of the document, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, is a basic recognition that ‘… the European Union is inevitably a global actor … Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.’ In short, the Union could not have postponed its strategic dimension any longer. It is not, of course, the first time that such a lesson has been drawn. The tragedy of Bosnia and the poor performance of EU capabilities in the Kosovo conflict led to the Saint-Malo agreement and the Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999. This time, however, the ambition is much broader than just fixing crisis-management capabilities: the aim was to draft a comprehensive security strategy. Originally drafted by Javier Solana, the High Representative for CFSP, the document has two significant characteristics.

First, it is a threat-driven document, a dimension never addressed as such by the Union. It identifies five major threats: international terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. In this environment, the Union recognized that the traditional form of defence, the territorial line of Cold War practice, is a thing of the past. The first line of defence now lies abroad. If this analysis may sound familiar in comparison to the US National Security Strategy of September 2002, the message to Washington is in fact considerably nuanced. First, Europe is at peace, not war. Even though the possibility of an al-Qaeda attack against the territory of the Union is duly underlined, the document is not a call to arms or an appeal for homeland defence. Secondly, though the security threats may be similar, their management is not. In the Union’s view, addressing these threats cannot be limited to military force: while not excluding it, the Union intends to take a broader approach, combining the political and the economic, the civil and the military. Regarding terrorism, there will be no effective solution that is not

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global. Regarding WMD proliferation, strengthening international regimes and progressive conditionality remain the best means of countering proliferation. Without excluding the use of force, the Union clearly rejects a strategy of preventive strike. Lastly, while the Union recognises that ‘failed’ or failing states – not, be it noted, ‘rogue states’, a category that does not exist in EU terminology – are a major source of instability, it advocates as a remedy the extension of good governance rather than regime change. Thus a more diversified and comprehensive strategy has emerged from the EU’s analysis of the post-9/11 environment. In brief, for the Union the world is indeed more dangerous, but also more complex.

Second, the strategy builds on the Union’s *acquis* and identity in security policy. It is based on three pillars – extending the zone of security around Europe, strengthening the international order, and countering the threats mentioned above – and two key concepts: ‘preventive engagement’ and ‘effective multilateralism’. The first of these concepts refers to the Union’s approach to stability and nation-building. This is far more comprehensive than the military method favoured by Washington, since it includes police personnel – the Union has a reserve force of 5000 police who could be sent abroad – civil administration and civil protection officials, and civilian authorities and justice officers to strengthen the rule of law. This specific approach is now being extended to new neighbouring countries like Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. This in turn demands a new strategic partnership with Russia, which remains an indispensable actor in the region, as the Kosovo conflict showed. The European Commission President, Romano Prodi, has set out a vision of the EU offering its neighbours ‘everything but institutions’. The aim is to promote the emergence of a ‘ring of friends’ across Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean,

8. In a declaration agreed in May 2003, the Union set out its strategy regarding WMD proliferation: ‘Political and diplomatic preventative measures (multilateral treaties and export control regimes) and resort to the competent international organizations (IAEA, OPCW, etc.) form the first line of defence. When these measures (including political dialogue and diplomatic pressure) have failed, coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law (sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of shipments and, as appropriate, the use of force) could be envisioned. The UN Security Council should play a central role’. See http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76328.pdf
bound together by shared values, open markets and borders, and enhanced cooperation in areas such as research, transport, energy, conflict prevention and law enforcement. This strategy of ‘preventive engagement’ encapsulates the European way of dealing with instability, which includes rapid troop deployments, humanitarian assistance, policing operations, enhancement of the rule of law and economic aid. Therein lies the Union’s added value and a specific know-how, a dimension that is lacking in the US arsenal, where, as Condoleezza Rice once said, the 82nd Airborne are not supposed to help kids go to kindergarten. European troops, by contrast, do this. This US weakness is Europe’s strength.

The second concept, ‘effective multilateralism’, captures the essence of the Union’s ruled-based security culture. The security strategy stresses that ‘the fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority’. Having suffered more than any continent from attempts by one actor to dominate the others, from what used to be called universal monarchy and balance-of-power politics, secret diplomacy and the major wars that followed, the Union is keen to stress the core fundamental values of the UN charter, based on the sovereignty of its units and the legitimacy of collective action. Because the true meaning of international norms and rules lies in the definition of what is and what is not permissible in the international arena, the Union reaffirms that, as a matter of principle, the UN Security Council should remain the forum for legitimizing the use of force. But it also recognizes that rules need enforcement. ‘We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken’. The ‘effectiveness’ element implies that, in emergency situations, immediate action is not always compatible with the formal application of international public law. The precedent set by Kosovo and the preventive war against Iraq represent the unwritten limits of what is allowed and what is not.

Clearly, the Venusian image of a Kantian Europe has been modified towards a more realist conception of the Union’s security interests.

Both concepts, ‘preventive’ engagement and ‘effective’ multilateralism, are by nature elusive notions that will only receive more precise definitions when concrete situations arise. They nonetheless represent a significant departure from a civilian-only Union: the use of force, albeit as a last resort, is deemed necessary in specific circumstances. This message, soft power plus, should be welcomed in Washington.

**CLARIFICATIONS TO BE MADE**

Drafting a common strategy raised numerous challenges: to reach an agreement sufficiently broad to include widely different strategic traditions, but precise enough to become a motor of international action; to maintain credibility in the eyes of the major international actors, above all the United States; and to address the new threats without renouncing the Union’s particular *acquis* and identity. At that level, the Solana doctrine is a major success. Nonetheless several tensions run through the document.

The first tension is the precarious balance between realism and idealism. Of course, every foreign-policy initiative contains both dimensions, and there is always a false antagonism between these two poles. Nonetheless, for the Union, these two dimensions represent national sensitivities. The risk of disagreements and divisions inside the Union is real. For example, the deliberately vague notion of ‘preventive’ engagement carries a message of a more proactive Europe, but at the same time, it solemnly echoes UN principles. If humanitarian tasks are obvious examples of uncontroversial preventive actions, a UN *mandate* is not considered an obligation. There was no specific mandate for the intervention in Kosovo, but it was nevertheless perceived as legitimate by a majority of EU members. As far as terrorism is concerned, it should be noted that some big European players have introduced the concept of ‘pre-emption’ in their doctrinal thinking and their official doctrine. So it seems odd that the wording ‘pre-emption’ was ultimately changed. Behind this
potential confusion lies the old debate about UN Article 51 over its range of application and the elusive notion of ‘immediate danger’. As far as WMD are concerned, the new assertiveness of the Union regarding the Iranian nuclear programme is a good indicator of the progress achieved. The display of unity among the ‘big three’ differs sharply from their ongoing disagreements about Iraq. Yet it remains to be seen whether the agreement reached October 2003 will bear fruit. In any case, theological discussions on the matter are useless and pragmatism will be the rule.

The second potential conflict revolves around the status of the Union as a global actor or regional power. For some European countries, especially the newer members, the new threats cannot replace the old ones. Internal instability, ethnic conflict, civil war, drug-trafficking and criminal networks seem real enough to them. These risks must remain a priority of the Union. But for others, the EU security agenda must address the new post-9/11 environment, especially WMD and international terrorism. There is a hierarchy of priorities that remains to be clarified. Behind this problem lies in fact a deeper uncertainty about the ultimate borders of the Union. The enlargement of the EU may have been a success, but it immediately raises the issue of whether there should be a fresh round of enlargement. Given the willingness to shape a more active neighbourhood policy, the scope of this strategy may seem far-reaching. Ukraine, the southern Caucasus and the Black Sea basin are now direct neighbours. This tension between the EU as a regional stabilizer and the EU as a global actor becomes apparent whenever Russia is mentioned. Moscow is seen as an essential partner for an effective policy in Moldova or Belarus; at the same time, Moscow’s policy of cooperation with Iran could become a serious problem. In any case, this policy will require a serious security dialogue with Russia. Lastly, the paper remains silent about Turkey, while underlining the threat that a country like North Korea might represent to the Union. Given these

shifting lines, the Union encounters difficulties in finding the right balance between its regional priorities and its global role.

The third tension concerns whether the Union is an actor or just a reference. With the enlargement, 75 million people who have lived under Communist domination are now joining the ‘old’ Europe. A security doctrine for 25 independent countries is indeed unique in the world. These countries have different, if not diverging, security cultures and heritages. Some members are still officially neutral, some barely have an army, while others have a nuclear deterrent and world influence. The sheer heterogeneity of the Union’s members means that decisions in foreign policy will be extremely difficult to take. The Convention has proposed several ways of avoiding the pitfalls of indecision and inaction, including the creation of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and the possibility of ‘structured cooperation’ in defence matters. Nonetheless, the intergovernmental nature of foreign policy is essentially reaffirmed in the draft Treaty. In this respect, it is clear to everybody that agreement between London, Paris and Berlin is a pre-condition for any decision to be taken. In other words, the coordination of national interests is a prerequisite for the expression of a genuine European interest. The Strategy calls for the creation of a stronger EU diplomatic service. This could lead to fundamental changes in the formulation of the Union’s foreign policy. An epistemic and diplomatic community could enhance the identification and pursuit of a truly European interest in world affairs more systematically. The voice of Europe is more often than not diluted in a multiplicity of national diplomatic solos that seem cacophonous if not inconsistent. This is particularly the case when the Union has to engage Washington. The coordination of the diplomatic services of EU members as well as the reinforcement of the EU representation in Washington would dramatically enhance the influence of Europe, provided of course that the US administration is also ready and willing to engage and to listen.

As far as actual operations are concerned, the Union relies on two specific methods. One is to implement the Berlin-plus agreement, which allows the Union to use NATO assets where the Alliance as such is not engaged. This was the case in Macedonia, where the Union took over NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony on
March 31st 2003. This will also be the case when the Union takes over from NATO operations in Bosnia. The other is to rely on a ‘lead’ nation to provide the bulk of the assets required for an operation abroad and to coordinate the efforts of the other EU countries. This happened in the case of Operation Artemis in Africa in the summer of 2003. In both cases, however, the Union is more a reference than a genuine actor. The reason is simple: as such, the Union does not have the necessary capabilities on its own. In other words, there is no such a thing as a European force that could be deployed by the collective decision of the 25 foreign ministers. So far, the Union’s foreign and security policy is nation-based. Since there is no rule of majority voting in the CFSP, and since defence relies in practice on a very few countries, the Union remains more of a reference than a genuine actor.

**AMBITIONS TO BE MET**

Sharing more global responsibilities, enhancing an effective multilateralism and adopting a policy of preventive engagement are ambitious goals that will remain unfulfilled unless the current gap between ends and means can be overcome. The security strategy demands a major improvement of the Union’s capabilities. Paradoxically, the short-term impact of the document will not be felt in the international arena but in the internal landscape of the Union. Even though the Union is the world’s largest provider of aid and contributes forty percent of the regular UN budget, foreign and security policy at the EU level currently has a budget of 35 million Euros, which is woefully insufficient. Most of the effort concerns defense. The new ambition of the Union has serious implications at the operational level. Current planning assumptions envisage a virtual maximum geographical radius for EU military crisis management of approximately 4,000 km from Brussels. With an enlarged Union, the potential radius for purely humanitarian operations stretches as far as 10,000 km from Brussels. These rough figures do not, however, constitute an official EU ‘doctrine’, nor are in any way binding politically.
projection and sustainability of forces. Several improvements must be addressed now in order to have an adequate defence tool ready in 2010.

The first urgency is to transform armed forces. This will entail first conversion from conscription to professional army, as well as adopting network-centric techniques of warfare that until now have been introduced only in Sweden and Britain, and partly in France. In any hostile environment, the risks of casualties remain too high. The Union must enhance modernization of its capabilities in order to fight according to criteria laid down by modern democracies. At a minimum, effective C4ISR, i.e. command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, is an absolute requirement. To achieve this goal, incentives must be put in place for member states that will not dramatically increase their defense budgets. To this end, a European fund could be envisaged to support the future Defence Agency. In the same vein, research and development activities must be better funded and coordinated. The rather sad story of the A400 M aircraft – nearly ten years to produce a very specific and not very demanding capability – should not be repeated. Common procurement and common programmes in developing and maintaining capabilities could lead to rapid benefits. In short, the Union has to spend its money better.

The second priority is deployability. The Union has nearly one-and-a-half million men under arms, and the member states spend around 160 billion Euros a year on defense. Yet the Union barely has any means to deploy these troops. According to defense experts, the Union has something like fifty brigades that could be deployed rapidly. If we apply the classic sustainability requirement, the Union should be able to deploy seventeen brigades. At Helsinki in December 1999, the Union defined its headline goal objectives. The aim was to put at the Union’s disposal forces capable of carrying out all the Petersberg missions, including the most demanding, in operations up to army corps level, i.e. 50,000 to 60,000 troops. This target, framed according to the precedent set by the Bosnian conflict, was supposed to be met at the end of 2003. However, it was concluded last October that this target was now
out of reach and that a new and more flexible Headline Goal 2010 will be considered. In any case, given the move to a far more ambitious security framework, this instrument of crisis-management which was formatted after the Bosnian experience, seems obsolete. Most importantly, severe shortfalls remain: strategic transport, air-to-air refueling, air-to-ground surveillance, all-weather strategic theater surveillance capabilities, combat search and rescue, electronic intelligence and precision-guided munitions. The European Capabilities Action Plan, launched in October 2001, recognized this necessity. The current NATO Response Force process is also supposed to help this transformation. The support it enjoys among Europeans demonstrates than this current revolution in warfare cannot be missed by Europeans, even if technology is a mean to provide more flexibility and effectiveness. Technology per se is not an end in itself. But budget constraints will continue to put severe limits over the necessary adaptation of European forces to its new strategic environment. In short, the Union effort must move from the quantitative to the qualitative.

Thirdly, improvements in planning are necessary. A permanent planning cell at Union level that will have a better understanding of forces at their disposal is unavoidable. This does not mean an anti-NATO Europe but forms part of what has been called ‘constructive duplication’. Moreover, since European operations do exist, they should be backed up by a common doctrine. Behind a European defense policy lies a fundamental question: will European countries be friends forever? If the answer is yes, then there should be no difficulty in implementing horizontal specialization among member states in which particular niche capabilities could become collective assets for the Union. The obvious reluctance to proceed along that road means that national security still remains paramount. Yet, one’s real sovereignty consists of one’s ability to act. If the current trend of

12. One of the most recent proposals in this respect is the idea of the battle-groups (1,500 troops) that was agreed at the meeting between the ‘big three’ in February 2004. This underlines the current focus on deployability and rapidity, one of the key successes of Operation Artemis.
defence budget cuts coupled with dominant national framework persists, very few
countries in Europe would be able to act. Multinational integration, resources and
capacity pooling, and role specialization are the only way to proceed, especially for
the smaller states of the Union.

The security strategy recognizes that the privileges of the post-modern world are
not shared elsewhere and that, to protect and to project stability, soft power may
not be enough. This in turn requires a ‘European revolution in military affairs’. The
European security strategy opens the way to a more responsible Europe in security
affairs. Yet, the Union is not a nation state. That is why the document is historic. If
there is a precedent to it, it should be George Washington’s Farewell Address of
1796. Then as now, the ultimate challenge was to foster unity among member
states. George Washington’s genius was to combine idealistic ambitions and power
necessities. The challenge for Europe is similar: to develop a world role that com-
bines European values and interests. But Europe lacks the geographical advantage
of the young American republic, which, sheltered by the surrounding oceans, could
adopt a policy of benevolent neutrality. The international environment will sooner
rather than later demand that the EU’s new ambition be met. The credibility of the
Union is now at stake.
CHAPTER FOUR
The Convention, the IGC and the great powers: the ESDP and new security threats

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INTRODUCTION

One challenge for the Convention on the future of Europe and the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that followed it was to overhaul the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and ‘modernize’ it to adequately reflect the changing nature of international security in the wake of September 11th. The purpose of this chapter is to present the answers that were given to the challenge and to offer some explanations as to why these were the answers. The chapter will show that the EU is increasingly becoming a joined-up security actor linking civil and military resources as well as internal and external aspects of security.

The chapter falls into three parts. The first two discuss the question in relation to the Union’s external security and its internal security. The first part, on external security, discusses the proposals to strengthen the EU’s ability to conduct crisis management and project stability. These proposals are based on the expectation that the Union as a whole will be unwilling and unable to carry out high-intensity operations. This will be left to an avant-garde of countries moving at a greater speed in their development of capabilities. In the second part, on internal security, a discussion follows of the proposal for a solidarity clause, which deals mainly with the Union’s internal security, but which is nevertheless linked to the ESDP and the
Union’s external security. The aim of the solidarity clause is to protect civilian populations against terrorist attacks, which will require a robust arrangement to ensure immediate assistance in response to a major emergency. Otherwise, the Union risks raising expectations it cannot meet.

In the third part, I shall outline some conclusions on why the debate in the Convention and the IGC led to the above responses. I argue that the process that led to the result was fundamentally intergovernmental and presented a new compromise between the Atlanticist and Europeanist visions of European defense. One exception is the solidarity clause, which relates to internal security and can be seen as an area in which European policy-makers were mainly reacting to their increasing interdependence rather than advocating national positions. The further development of the ESDP has consequences for the relationship between the EU and the leading defense organization, NATO. I shall end by outlining the possible implications for the EU-NATO partnership.

**EXTERNAL SECURITY: PROJECTING STABILITY**

The aim of the Convention relating to security and defence was an overall update of the ESDP to address the new security threats relating to both external and internal security. The first objective was to reconsider the projection of military force in the light of new security threats. In the words of the Convention’s Working Group on Defence:

> "The ESDP was defined and developed on the basis of the challenges and threats as evaluated in the 1990s. There can be no doubt that this definition of threat has been overtaken by international events. After September 11th, the threat is no longer defined solely by the risk of conflict between States and ethnic groups. The situation is more one of a global insecurity characterised by less clear-cut risks, including those linked to international terrorist organisations or the use of..."
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weapons of mass destruction, which elude the provision made for conflict management in the traditional sense.1

Hence, the aim of the Convention was – belatedly – to define the role of the ESDP in view of the new security threats, specifically terrorism. September 11th spurred a wide range of EU initiatives, but mainly in the area of police and justice. The EU demonstrated a high level of diplomatic activity to bolster the international coalition behind the fight against the Taleban regime, but there were no specific proposals on the role of ESDP in the face of the new security threats, which differ from the threats that the ESDP had originally been developed to address. Was the EU to have a military role in combating terrorism, or was it to retain its focus on projecting stability in the neighbourhood? Was the EU to adopt a security guarantee to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks, or was any notion of collective defence to remain outside the Treaty?

Thus, the events of September 11th reopened the question of the purpose of ESDP, but it took a year before the debate really took off, with the joint Franco-German proposal to the Convention on security and defence, presented by the two foreign ministers in November 2002, shortly after they had joined in the work of the Convention.2 The proposal ended the exclusive Franco-British cooperation over the ESDP, which had been its pivot since the Saint-Malo Declaration in

1. The European Convention, ‘Final report of Working Group VIII – Defence’, CONV 461/02, p. 14. It is stated in the document that ‘some members of the Group do not share this view’. The basis for this disagreement is unclear, but some member states were opposed to the description of the terrorist threat as the new main security threat, while others disagreed with the claim further down in the text that public opinion was calling for a European defense. Eurobarometer 59, Spring 2003, confirms that international terrorism is EU citizens’ main fear. Eurobarometer 60, Autumn 2003, shows support among EU citizens for the EU as decision-making body on European defense (45 percent) compared to national governments (24 percent) and NATO (15 percent), but there are great national differences concerning who should take decisions on European defense policy.
December 1998. It brought forward the underlying tension between the Atlanticist position, with the United Kingdom as its leading exponent, and the Europeanist vision represented by France. Saint-Malo was a compromise between developing European security in close cooperation with the United States and NATO and strengthening Europe’s capacity to act independently. The Franco-German proposal signalled that the Saint-Malo deal was off and indicated a general shift, as Germany left its previous position as balancer of the two poles and moved closer to the Europeanist vision.

Eventually, the Franco-German proposal proved not to be so different from the British proposal put forward in the Convention. Both proposals stressed the need for flexibility in an enlarged Europe, where there are significant differences in the strategic outlook and military capabilities of the member states. But France and Germany were mainly occupied with allowing a core Europe to move ahead within an EU framework with as few constraints as possible. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, wanted flexibility to allow an avant-garde to move ahead in the development of military capabilities, but was hesitant towards the idea of a core Europe, which it felt could decouple the avant-garde from the EU as a whole and eventually from NATO as well. The summit between Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg in April 2003 which led to the proposal of a European headquarters only confirmed those fears, but it also made it clear to the United Kingdom that she should be prepared to make a new compromise with France and now Germany if she was to retain her pivotal role in European defence. At a tripartite summit held in Berlin on 20th September 2003, Germany, the United Kingdom and France reached agreement on the basis for a new compromise on the ESDP, thus turning the bilateral pivot into a directoire.

It is remarkable that, after the presentation of the draft treaty by the Convention in June 2003, the proposals concerning security and defense were hardly discussed at the Intergovernmental Conference. Instead, the debate was contained within the

trilateral negotiations between Germany, the United Kingdom and France. The full result was not presented to the other EU members until the summit in Brussels on December 12th 2003, and only after Washington D.C. had given its consent. The proposal was generally well received by the heads of state and government, but as the summit was unable to agree on a new treaty as a whole, the new treaty text on ESDP was not formally approved. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the proposal presented to the summit in Brussels will form the basis for the further development of the ESDP. Besides the fact that there was political agreement on the final proposal, most elements in the proposal can be implemented without treaty changes. Hence, further development of the ESDP is possible without agreement on the Constitution, and already there are now proposals for a Defence Agency and for developing capabilities for rapid response, which may only involve a smaller group of member states.

How did the Convention, the following IGC and the three big powers envisage an update of the ESDP in relation to the new security threats? In the following, the question will be answered by looking at three areas that were discussed: 1) the scope of military tasks to be undertaken by the Union; 2) the development of the necessary means and capabilities to assume these military tasks; and 3) the protection of the EU member states and their populations against security threats.

THE SCOPE OF THE MILITARY TASKS

The draft constitution does not extend the scope of the Petersberg tasks which range from humanitarian relief to ending regional conflicts. The proposal to add disarmament operations, military assistance tasks, conflict-prevention and post-conflict stabilisation are merely a refinement of the Petersberg tasks and do not go

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4. The final proposal was presented by the Italian Presidency in doc IGC 60/03 Add 1, 09.12.2003. The agreement on a planning cell is reflected in the Conclusions from the Brussels Summit December 2003.
beyond the current scope.\textsuperscript{5} In fact, all the tasks can be seen as belonging to the lower rather than higher end of the Petersberg tasks. Plans during the Spanish presidency to reconfigure the ESDP to include counter-terrorism were strongly contested by the United Kingdom and others, who were in favour of leaving the military fight against terrorism to NATO. Counter-terrorism did not become a new Petersberg Task, and a passage was merely added to the draft that all the Petersberg tasks ‘may contribute to the fight against terrorism’ (Article III-210). Therefore, the redefinition of the Petersberg tasks does not specifically address new security threats, such as terrorism and proliferation, which were to be identified as key threats in the security strategy, and the reason is probably two-fold.\textsuperscript{6} As indicated in the debate over the EU’s security strategy, the EU does not agree over the use of force against terrorism in the sense of pre-emptive action. Furthermore, the larger countries were more concerned about introducing the flexibility that would allow a smaller group to carry out high-intensity military operations than with updating the whole Union so that it could deal with the new security threats.

The development of means and capabilities

The question of flexibility led to the Convention’s proposal of structured cooperation, according to which member states ‘whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria’ and who are prepared for ‘the most demanding missions’ were to establish structured cooperation.\textsuperscript{7} The proposal raised a number of questions concerning the purpose of flexibility and the relationship between the group involved in structured cooperation and the Union as a whole. The Convention’s proposal was not very clear, and it could be interpreted as allowing a small group of countries – for


\textsuperscript{6} European Security Strategy, \textit{A Secure Europe in a Better World}, Brussels, December 2003. High Representative Solana was tasked by the EU foreign ministers in May 2003 to draft a security strategy. A first draft was presented in June 2003, and the final version adopted at the summit in Brussels December 2003.

instance, Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg that were involved in the summit of April 2003 – to establish a ‘closed club’ with its own structures and the ability to decide its own operations. These concerns were put to rest through the negotiations between the three big member states, which resulted in changes to the Convention’s proposal. Structured cooperation was made more transparent vis-à-vis the member states outside it, and it was made easier for other member states to join at a later stage. Furthermore, a protocol was presented laying out the criteria for joining the structured cooperation. The wording of the protocol made it clear that the main purpose of structured cooperation was to develop military capabilities, as the participating member states would commit themselves to providing, by 2007, targeted combat units with support elements, including transport and logistics, capable of deployment within a period of 5-30 days, and sustainable for an initial period of 30 days (extendable up to 120 days), for high-intensity tasks.

The criteria, which resemble those for NATO’s Response Force, are likely to be similar to the new headline goal for the EU’s military capabilities, which will be decided on in June 2004. The deadline for the new headline goal will be 2010, but an avant-garde is to meet the criteria three years earlier. Hence, the British ideas on structured cooperation carried the day, and emphasis was placed on the creation of an avant-garde, which could act as a stimulus to the other member states in developing capabilities.

Further development of military capabilities is not going to await treaty changes, as was demonstrated by the proposal made by Germany, the United Kingdom and France in February 2004 for an EU Rapid Response. Following up a Franco-British proposal of November 2003, and as a forerunner to structured cooperation, the countries propose the development of capabilities to be able to respond to requests by the United Nations and supply an interim emergency force within

8. The original headline goal was that the member states should be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days 50-60,000 troops.
fifteen days. The operations are likely to be in Africa, and should be capable of operating under a Chapter VII mandate. The EU Rapid Response will consist of battle groups formed by one nation alone or by a multinational solution. The three countries have already confirmed that they will provide one battle group each and have invited other EU members to contribute, provided they meet the criteria in terms of ‘military effectiveness’, i.e. that they can provide a battle group, including strategic lift capabilities, which is able to meet the fifteen-day target and trained for combat operations. The target date for the EU Rapid Response is the same as for structured cooperation, that is, 2007.

Closely related to structured cooperation and the development of capabilities is the Defence Agency, which is open to all member states and has the following tasks: 1) to assist in identifying contributions to the EU’s military headline goal and evaluating the observance of those commitments; 2) harmonising operational needs and cooperation on procurement; 3) further multinational projects; 4) to support defence technology research. The tasks are a mixture of an organised review of the headline goal process and of cooperation on armaments, which is currently moving at a slow pace within the EU, as well as outside it. The Council has already set up a team to prepare for the setting up of the Agency before the end of 2004. The Agency is likely to encompass all EU members, since all member states contribute to the military headline goal.¹⁰ Concerning cooperation on armaments, specific groups may be set up. The six current member states that make up Ninety percent of European defence production are likely to insist that only countries with sufficient resources and technology can join specific cooperation on armaments.

Finally, there was the question of operational planning, which, from the outset, was where the three big countries disagreed the most. The United Kingdom wanted to stick to the formula set out at the NATO Summit in Washington in April 1999, according to which NATO’s strategic headquarters (SHAPE) would supply opera-

¹⁰ Except Denmark, which has an opt-out on EU defence cooperation.
tional planning for EU-led operations. In case of an autonomous EU-led operation, a national headquarters, which in practice meant the German, British or French headquarters, would be in charge of operational planning. The proposal at the summit between Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg held in April 2003 to set up a European military headquarters in Tervuren that would have the ability to plan autonomous EU-led operations was met with the strong disapproval of the United States and the Atlanticist members of the EU, mainly because of bad timing. Eventually, the United Kingdom was persuaded to accept the need for common planning facilities, partly so as to reach an acceptable compromise on structured cooperation and mutual defence in the trilateral negotiations, but partly because of experience with the planning for Operation Artemis in Bunia (Congo).

The latter was an example of the kind of operation that the United Kingdom and France both want the EU to do, as demonstrated by their joint proposal for an EU rapid response capability. Such interventions are likely to be needed in Africa, where NATO does not have any special interest or expertise. The alternative, then, is to task one of the national headquarters, as was the case with Bunia, where a French headquarters was in charge. The problem with using national headquarters is that they are not multinational from the outset and have to be modified to reflect the nationalities of those taking part in the operation.

The compromise was to set up a planning cell responsible for generating the capacity to plan and run an EU-led operation, if neither NATO nor any national headquarters is able to provide the planning needed. The most interesting aspect of this is that the planning cell is to do both civil and military planning, and in particular to develop expertise in managing the civil/military interface. Developing expertise in civil/military planning will allow the planning cell to develop in a way that can be considered ‘constructive’ duplication, rather than ‘unnecessary’ duplica-

11. According to the Washington Summit Communique, there is assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities, as well as to NATO capabilities and common assets. The modalities were agreed on with the adoption of the EU-NATO Declaration in December 2002, and are referred to as ‘Berlin-plus’.
tion of NATO.\textsuperscript{13} If a division of labour develops between EU and NATO and/or if the EU is to specialize in operations where close coordination between the civil and military components is vital, it may be that NATO’s SHAPE is not well suited to planning and running the kind of operations that the EU wants to lead. Joined-up operations with a strong interlinkage between the civilian and military components may become the Union’s hallmark, in which case neither SHAPE nor national headquarters may have the expertise needed. Therefore, the planning cell is to be demand-driven, though, according to the document approved at the Brussels summit in December 2003, further development of the scope or nature of the planning cell will be decided upon by the Council. The Americans were right in pointing out that, with the decision to develop common European planning capabilities outside of NATO, a seed had been planted. But the EU has made sure that the seed cannot grow automatically: it will require unanimous agreement in the Council for the planning cell to grow into something that will duplicate SHAPE’s expertise in planning military operations.

In conclusion here, the Union as a whole is to continue focusing on humanitarian relief and peace-supporting operations, and an avant-garde within the EU will eventually be able to perform high-intensity operations. In relation to the key threats identified in the security strategy, the EU as a whole is to retain its focus on dealing with conflicts between states and ethnic groups, while the fight against terrorism will center on stabilizing failing states in order to prevent terrorist networks from taking root. In the final version of the security strategy, the phrase ‘preemptive engagement’ was changed into ‘preventive engagement’ in order to avoid confusion with the term ‘preemptive action’. Hence, the ESDP was not updated to include preemptive actions against terrorist networks and WMD-proliferating states. Instead, the formation of an avant-garde capable of performing high-intensity operations and the gradual development of a ‘strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention’\textsuperscript{14} would allow the EU


\textsuperscript{14} European Security Strategy, p.17.
to intervene at an early stage in a failing state in order to prevent threats to European security, such as terrorist networks and organized crime.

A common aspect of the proposals was reinforcing the link between civil and military resources. The refinement of the Petersberg tasks through the inclusion of conflict-prevention and post-conflict stabilization only underlines the need for a strong civil component that is closely coordinated with the military effort. The most innovative suggestion was the proposal for a planning cell which is to do both civil and military planning and develop expertise at the civil/military interface. In practice this implies that the planners should also be able to carry out police missions and especially prepare for cooperation between military forces and the police on the ground. Such expertise is already called for with respect to the planned take-over of SFOR. Eventually, it has already been decided that an EU-led operation in Bosnia will be carried out using NATO assets, including NATO planning, and therefore it is unclear when the civil/military expertise will be called for. Given the emergence of present hot spots and failing states, it is fair to conclude that it will be needed.

EU members did not just discuss projecting military force for crisis management. The question of mutual defense again turned out to be a contentious issue.

The defence of EU member states
With the threat of invasion being close to non-existent, it was not evident that the introduction of a security guarantee in the EU should be considered of great importance. In the security strategy, EU members agreed that ‘with the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad’. The terrorist attack on September 11th did nevertheless lead to the proposal by Europeanist member states to introduce collective defence into the Treaty. The aim was to demonstrate solidar-

15. The sentence was included in Solana’s draft security strategy and later adopted by the member states in the final version.
ity among the member states, which was also the main reason why NATO’s Article 5 was invoked after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. But the proposals in the Convention and NATO’s decision to invoke Article 5 only underlined the confusion over the notion of collective defence at a time when a terrorist attack, not armed aggression, is considered the main threat.

The Convention’s proposal was to allow a smaller group of member states to cooperate on mutual defence, thus taking account of the position of the four non-aligned countries, Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland. Eventually, the proposal became one of the main issues to be negotiated between the three largest member states. A security guarantee that is merely written on a piece of paper may not be of much value. In the case of NATO, the validity of its mutual defence clause (Article 5) is backed by its integrated military cooperation, including its command structure and defence planning. Therefore, if member states cooperating on collective defence wanted more than a ‘paper guarantee’, they would need to build military structures to back the security guarantee. Alternatively, they could ask NATO to implement the security guarantee, as was the case with Article V of the Western European Union.\(^{17}\)

From the outset, the United Kingdom was opposed to collective defence in the EU, but in order to reach an overall agreement with Germany and France, a compromise was needed. The first option, which was to duplicate NATO’s military structures in the EU, was unacceptable to the United Kingdom, as it was likely to weaken NATO. The second option (i.e. delegation to NATO) had the advantage of stating once and for all NATO’s primacy in Europe’s collective defence, and this was the compromise reached by the three countries.\(^{18}\) The Italian Presidency put the proposal forward in the IGC, but now the security guarantee was to cover all member states. This was unacceptable to the four non-aligned states, and the text was then modified to lessen the obligation to assist a member state that had been the victim of armed

18. NATO’s then General-Secretary, George Robertson, pointed out in an interview that the proposal meant that NATO’s role as the foundation of Europe’s security was, for the first time ever, to be written into an EU treaty. Thomas Lauritzen, ‘NATO-chef: Militær enegang umulig for EU’, *Politiken*, 13.12.2003.
aggression. Nonetheless, the non-aligned states still considered that the language entailed an obligation. Wording was therefore added to the clause to the effect that it did not ‘prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states’, that is, the non-aligned would not be legally committed to provide assistance.

It is difficult to assess the advantages of introducing a ‘soft’ security guarantee into the EU. First of all, it created problems for the non-aligned members, which were forced to oppose a legal text on an issue that they agreed with in principle. The Swedish Prime Minister afterwards said that the mutual defence clause did not entail an obligation to assist, though at the same time he could not imagine that Sweden would not assist with military troops if a fellow member state became the victim of armed aggression. Secondly, the whole process is highly revealing in showing that the EU will not address the issue of deterrence, as it is left to NATO to implement the security guarantee. Regarding external security, the military role of the Union is still limited to the Petersberg tasks. To the extent that the EU will pursue the fight against terrorism through the use of force, this is likely to be by stabilizing failing states in the neighbourhood rather than through pre-emptive action against terrorist networks.

The introduction of collective defence was intended to demonstrate solidarity among EU member states, but in reality the expression of solidarity will only result in concrete EU assistance in the case of a terrorist attack, and only after the attack has taken place – as envisaged in the solidarity clause.

19. The wording in the Convention’s proposal was that other states ‘shall give it [the victim state] aid and assistance’, while the final text reads that they ‘shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance’, CIG 60/03 ADD 1.
INTERNAL SECURITY AND THE SOLIDARITY CLAUSE

The Convention proposed that the ESDP should also address the issue of internal security, which was described in the following way:

"The events of 11th September prompt consideration not only of the need to project stability outside the Union but also the need to ensure security within the European Union, particularly for the protection of the civilian population and democratic institutions. A purely national framework is no longer enough. At the same time, public opinion is calling more than ever for security and protection and appears to be very much in favour of European defence. It is therefore for the Convention to consider how the gap between expectations and reality could be overcome."

22

September 11th made it clear to many Europeans that there is a direct threat to European security. The war in the Balkans called for European engagement through the conduct of Petersberg tasks, but in spite of official rhetoric, these conflicts were not seen as a direct threat to the security of member states. September 11th changed this, as it became obvious that anyone could be the victim of a terrorist attack. The first response of the Union was to strengthen cooperation on police and intelligence, but at the European Council in Seville in June 2002, the heads of state and government addressed the need to explore the use of military or civilian capabilities to protect their populations against the effects of terrorist attacks. In other words, it was suggested that the ESDP should play a role in internal security. Eventually, the legal response was that the military capabilities developed within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in the second pillar of the Union, could only be used in third countries, not within the Union. 24

The ESDP is an integral part of the CFSP in the second pillar, which is exclusively

23. It must be emphasised that this article was written prior to the bombings in Madrid March 11th 2004.
aimed at external action. Civil protection is one of the four priority areas in the EU’s system of civil crisis management. It therefore follows that the ESDP can be used for civil protection outside the EU, but not within it. Therefore, military resources can be centrally coordinated to assist a civilian population outside the EU, but not citizens of a member state that has been hit by terrorism.

The Convention was determined to allow military capabilities to be used within the Union to protect its populations against terrorism. It therefore proposed a solidarity clause, which guarantees mutual assistance in case of a terrorist attack or a natural disaster on EU territory. The proposal is innovative in two ways. First, it introduces the possibility of using the ESDP’s military assets in relation to the EU’s internal security, thus underlining the close links between external and internal security. Secondly, it calls for the use of all the EU’s instruments, including military resources, thus making effective action dependent on the close coordination of military and civil capabilities.

The Convention stressed that the solidarity clause should not be confused with a clause on collective defence, but arguably it is difficult to make this distinction in practice. The only time that NATO’s security guarantee (Article 5) has been invoked was following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, and NATO’s security guarantee is today de facto directed against the same threat as the solidarity clause, namely terrorism. But the solidarity clause only provides for assistance in the territory of the member states, thus excluding retaliation and deterrence. Another contentious issue was the call for mutual assistance to ‘prevent the terrorist threat’, as this was seen as suggesting pre-emptive action as envisaged in the United States Security Strategy of 2002. It is clear from the introduction to the solidarity clause that the obligation to assist presupposes that a terrorist attack has taken place. But to avoid confusion, a provision was added to a final draft of the Convention’s proposal that prevention would only

25. ‘Should a Member State fall victim to a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities’; Article III-231.
take place inside the Union, thus ruling out pre-emptive action against a terrorist network outside it. Taken together, the solidarity clause and the collective defence clause stress that the Union will not use military force outside the EU to prevent a terrorist attack, whether such action is pre-emptive or deterrent in nature. Obviously, the wording does not rule out the use of military assets inside a member state to prevent a terrorist attack. In theory, a member state that has received a warning of major terrorist attacks might consider the need to call on the troops of another state to protect its key infrastructure. In practice, however, any such warning will most often not be timely or precise enough to permit a call for foreign military assistance, and European cooperation over preventive actions is likely to focus on police and intelligence, not the military.

The solidarity clause is closely related to the existing Community Mechanism, through which member states can request assistance in the case of natural disasters like floods, forest fires or oil spills. The Commission is responsible for passing on the request to the other member states, as well as for maintaining databases on experts, teams, medical resources, etc. The solidarity clause can be seen as a deepening of the Community Mechanism through the integration of military resources, as well as a strengthening of the Mechanism by making assistance mandatory.26

To fulfil such a commitment, the EU must be able to coordinate across both sectors and borders. This involves actors representing different sectors with diverse cultures and traditions, such as soldiers, medical doctors, experts on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents (CBRN), policemen and emergency response services. Prior planning and training is a precondition for effective response in the case of a major terrorist attack. The Working Group on Defence proposed setting up a pool of specialised civilian or military civil protection units to undertake joint training and intervention coordination programmes. Joint civil-military teams might also be envisaged, for instance, a bio-terror team consisting of military experts,

26. It follows from the wording of the introduction to the solidarity clause that it is mandatory, i.e. ‘shall assist’. In an earlier draft it is stated in the comments that ‘assistance should be triggered automatically at the request of the Member State in question’, CONV 685/03, p. 73.
medical doctors, laboratory technicians and the relevant equipment, such as transport, laboratories, decontamination, cleaning facilities and possibly a field hospital.

Rapid response is fundamental in most civil emergencies, and unity of command is a precondition for it. The question is, who will ensure unity of command? According to the Convention’s draft Treaty, the Political Security Committee (PSC), with support of ESDP structures (the Military Committee and the Military Staff) and the Committee on Internal Security (in charge of Justice and Home Affairs), will be instrumental in dealing with requests for assistance. It could be envisaged that the EU will deal with such requests in accordance with the procedures laid down for crisis management. That would give a key role to the PSC and to the Military Committee tasked with the adoption of an operational plan, the designation of a command structure, including headquarters, and ensuring the formal acceptance of the member states for the use of their experts and capabilities. The problem is that, in civil protection, the standard response time is twelve hours, and that even a shortened version of crisis management procedures is unlikely to produce a coordinated EU response in such a short time. The alternative is that the member state that has been struck by disaster has the overall responsibility for planning and coordination. Member states will contribute to a database in Brussels, and the PSC will be responsible for matching the needs of the member state affected with the capabilities listed in the database, leaving it to that member state to coordinate the EU’s contributions. In that case, EU bodies, including the Military Committee and the Military Staff, would only assist to the extent required.27

Therefore, it is unclear what the solidarity clause will mean in practice. Does it imply extended use of military resources and even the use of a military chain of command in civil protection, or is it simply an extension of the Community Mechanism to include military resources? There is no clear answer as yet, since the specific arrangements for the solidarity clause are to be defined subsequently. As argued above, the solidarity clause is most likely to be an extension of the com-

27. Interview with EU diplomat.
munity mechanism, and the ESDP structures may only have a supporting role. It will also be a huge task to accommodate the many different national practices in the area of civil protection. For instance, in Denmark responsibility for civil protection was recently transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Defence, while in the Czech Republic the opposite happened. Nevertheless, the solidarity clause is potentially important for the future development of European security cooperation. It may take a major terrorist attack in Europe, exposing the arrangements behind the solidarity clause as insufficient, before it develops into something more substantive. The important aspect is that a new treaty will allow such extended coordination of civil and military resources in civil protection. Further development will then depend on public and political demand, and maybe a major incident. But it seems that the clause should be exactly what ‘the doctor ordered’. Given that terrorism is considered a key security threat to European security, what is called for is a comprehensive approach, with close coordination of civil and military resources, as well as the ability to cross the boundary between internal and external security to deal with a threat that is fundamentally transnational. Developing a European version of homeland security is an area with great potential for further integration. The solidarity clause is one example hereof, and it may turn out to be an area that enjoys public support and even stimulates a demand for further European integration. The public is unlikely to accept a reference to legal problems as an excuse for the Union not to mobilise all its resources, including military ones, in the event of a terrorist attack. Especially in areas with limited national expertise, for instance CBRN terrorism, it makes sense to coordinate the available resources centrally.

Implications for the ESDP?
The potential impact of the solidarity clause on security cooperation evolves from its very coordination of civil and military resources, as well as the interlinkage between internal and external security.
As terrorism shows, and as stated in the Security Strategy, ‘internal and external aspects are indissolubly linked’. The solidarity clause was limited to internal security in order to avoid confusion with collective defence, but the involvement of ESDP structures and instruments is likely to dilute further the barriers between internal and external security.

The close cooperation between the Union’s internal and external instruments may be mutually reinforcing. The solidarity clause calls for the European Council to assess the terrorist threat to the Union regularly, and it might be necessary to create a central intelligence body to draw up information from diplomatic, police and military resources. So far there has only been limited cooperation between the intelligence cooperation within Justice and Home Affairs and the intelligence cooperation within CFSP and ESDP. There has been great reluctance to share information, especially on the part of police cooperation insisting it only deals with activities inside member states. If there is a demand for the Union to do more to prevent terrorist attacks or limit their consequences, it is necessary to make intelligence cooperation more operational. Another issue is the coordination of different professional communities, such as soldiers, police officers and first responders. They may be used to working together in national civil protection, but decisions concerning lines of command are going to be difficult. This is illustrated by the ongoing debate within the ESDP on the possibility of placing police forces under military command in crisis management operations. This creates problems especially for northern member states that lack paramilitary forces like the French Gendarmerie. Such discussions are likely to resurface when dealing with internal security.

Furthermore, there may be feedback to the ESDP itself through its involvement in internal security, depending on its final role in implementing the solidarity clause. There may be calls for the development of military capabilities to deal with home-

land security if member states with scarce assets and budget constraints decided to pool resources for homeland security as is done for international crisis management, for instance, by investing in Theatre-based Missile Defence (TMD) and other air defence assets to protect the major European airports.\(^{30}\) Another, more likely scenario is the pooling of CBRN protection equipment. Such dual-use capabilities would also be included in the EU’s force planning in the form of the Headline Goal Catalogue listing the military capabilities needed, as they would be an integral part of the EU’s crisis-management capacity as well. This is, of course, a future scenario, but the trend in European countries, as in the United States, is to reconsider the use of military forces for homeland security. As part of the ongoing reform of defence in Denmark, for instance, there is now a proposal that the Danish armed forces should concentrate on homeland security and international engagements, abolishing their traditional territorial defence structures.\(^{31}\) It is still early days in European cooperation on homeland security, but the opt-out member Denmark could become a model for a form of European security and defence cooperation that focuses on projecting stability and homeland security while bypassing territorial defence.

Finally, the solidarity clause has the advantage of superseding the Atlanticist/Europeanist division over the role of NATO. ESDP involvement in homeland security is an area where the EU has a comparative advantage over NATO and its concept of total defence. During the Cold War, total defence was aimed mainly at defending a country against armed aggression rather than protecting the population as such. Thus, civil protection contributed to the military effort and was subordinated to military planning. Today, the threat is directed against society itself and its infrastructure, protecting the population being the central requirement. The military role in total defence has moved into the background and protection of the civil society into the foreground, implying a careful mix of civil and military capa-

\(^{30}\) Rob de Wijk, DIIS Conference on Homeland Security. It should be noted that TMD is of limited use against MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defence Systems).

bilities to confront the terrorist threat and minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack. This involves a wide range of policy sectors, from energy, communications and information technology to intelligence and military cooperation. All these areas are covered by EU cooperation, but they are not an integral part of NATO. Therefore, to the extent that military resources are involved in homeland security, the Union framework seems the more relevant.

WHY THIS OUTCOME?

The debate in the Convention took place during a period of great turbulence, and the proposals made by the Convention were at the time only one of many suggestions concerning the EU’s role in the world post-September 11th. The great European powers met in different formations and presented proposals, which had a significant impact on the debate over security and defense. First, the three great powers were split, with the United Kingdom not participating in the summit between Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg held in April 2003. When finally the three great powers decided to work towards a common agreement, this was done with little or no involvement of their EU partners, but the close involvement of the United States.

Therefore, in concluding my reflections on the very process leading to an agreement on the Union’s role in external security, three lessons are to be drawn. First, EU security and defense is more a matter of traditional intergovernmental negotiations than formal negotiations and treaty provisions. The big countries did not choose merely to channel their views on ESDP into the Convention and the IGC, which at the time was the formal platform for debate on the future of the Union. Secondly, European security and defense is very much driven by the great powers in the EU, namely the United Kingdom and France, and increasingly Germany. Thirdly, the United States still has a key role in the development of the ESDP.
None of these lessons are really new. Treaty provisions have never been the driving force behind the development of security and defense cooperation. The Saint-Malo initiative of December 1998, which led to the development of the ESDP, was based on the experience of European military impotence when faced with the war in the Balkans, not misgivings about the Amsterdam Treaty, which had not even been put into effect. Secondly, the initiative was driven forward by the great powers with the joint Franco-British Saint Malo declaration and the subsequent involvement of Germany, which took over the EU Presidency in January 1999. Finally, the project was only allowed to move forward with the decision at the NATO Summit in April 1999 and thereby the United States agreeing to give EU access to NATO capabilities and planning assets.

All this suggests that the development of the CFSP and ESDP remains a fundamentally intergovernmental process, with the member states as the main actors. The main driving force behind such changes is still provided by external factors in the international system and the response of member states to those factors, rather than some internal logic of integration from which a need is created for common policies and institutions in the area of foreign, security and defense policy.

Nevertheless, the debate on the EU as a security actor suggests exceptions to the general rule of intergovernmentalism. On some issues, EU actors were instrumental in proposing new areas of cooperation in security and defense. This is not to suggest that supranational institutions in the areas of security and defense are developing, but rather that the increasing degree of interdependence is leading member states to take steps towards common policy-making. One example of this is the proposal for a solidarity clause, which immediately gathered broad support in the Convention and among member states, despite its potential for stimulating further integration in the area of security and defense cooperation.

The proposal for a solidarity clause can be seen as a reaction by member states to their increasing interdependence, with calls for increased cooperation in the area of internal security, including civil protection. The intergovernmental explanation would be that the solidarity clause was a substitute for collective defense, on which member states found it difficult to agree. As argued above, the solidarity clause provides the sort of homeland security that is needed to counter terrorism, and it has the potential to stimulate further European security cooperation. Therefore, it would not be plausible to argue that member states agreed on a solidarity clause in order to maintain national control over security, since the clause might itself stimulate further European integration.

The result of the push and pull between, on the one hand, nation states striving to maintain their sovereignty and, on the other, interdependence leading the same nation states to seek common solutions, is a Union that is developing into a joined-up security actor distinct from NATO. But NATO is a cornerstone of European security, and the Union’s role in European security will to a large degree depend on its relationship with NATO.

WHAT ABOUT NATO?

The prospect of the EU becoming a security actor distinct from NATO remains important for the future development of the relationship between the ESDP and NATO and thus the EU and the United States. American support for the further development of the ESDP will depend on whether or not the ESDP is viewed as complementary to NATO. The debate following the Iraqi war clearly demonstrated that European consensus on ESDP remains contingent on American consent.

The debate in and around the Convention did not clearly define the relationship between the EU and NATO. The scope of the Petersberg tasks still indicates a division of labour, with the Union as a whole maintaining its focus on the lower end, while NATO wants to strengthen its ability to do high-intensity fighting
through the creation of the NATO Response Force. But structured cooperation and the proposal to create EU battle groups are aimed at creating the same kinds of capabilities in order to carry out the most demanding operations. It follows that there may be competition between the EU and NATO, as they both draw on the same limited pool of deployable forces. If NATO decides that the units assigned to the NATO Response Force are to be locked throughout the six months of standby, then the EU would be prevented from using their most capable forces for any EU-led operation at the same time. The argument that there will be no competition, as the EU will focus on peacekeeping while NATO concentrates on high-intensity operations, no longer seems valid, as the EU has finally expressed its willingness to develop capabilities for combat operations.

Alternatively, a geographical division of labour may emerge, with the EU taking over crisis management in Europe and developing capabilities for operations in Africa, while NATO is involved in Afghanistan and might have a future role in Iraq.

In the area of collective defence, the argument can be made that the division of labour has become less clear. Armed aggression against an allied EU member will invoke a security guarantee in NATO as well as the EU, but NATO will take the lead. It would be more confusing if a terrorist attack were to lead to NATO’s Article 5 being invoked while the EU invokes its solidarity clause. But basically the EU has made it clear that collective defence is NATO’s sole responsibility. The EU member states will demonstrate their solidarity by assisting a member state struck by a terrorist attack, but prevention through deterrence or pre-emptive action is not envisaged. This is to be left to NATO or individual nation states.

The main difference between the EU and NATO is thus likely to be in their roles as security actors. If the EU continues its development towards becoming a joined-

up security actor with close coordination of civil and military policy responses, both internally and externally, then the differences between the EU and a military alliance such as NATO are likely to become still more apparent. But the tensions between the Atlanticist and Europeanist visions are likely to resurface from time to time, as France pushes for a clear military identity in the EU to allow the Union its own place in a multi-polar world, while the United Kingdom stands firm on the need to work closely with the United States.

CONCLUSION

The aim of the Convention was to update the ESDP to confront the new security threats, notably terrorism. The answer was not to engage in pre-emptive action against terrorist networks or WMD-proliferating states. Instead, the Union should strengthen its capabilities to stabilize failing states in order to prevent terrorist networks from taking root. On the question of protecting the civilian population against terrorist threats, a solidarity clause received broad support, and it was argued that such a guarantee of civil protection was more relevant than mutual defense.

The response to the challenge of updating the ESDP has failed to provide clear answers concerning whether the EU is moving closer to or further away from a common security and defense policy, and whether it is becoming a hard power or merely a soft power plus. In this chapter, I have shown that the only common factors behind the different developments within the ESDP are related to linking the Union’s civil and military resources, as well as, increasingly, internal and external security. The EU has available a wide range of civil foreign-policy instruments, ranging from diplomacy to economic aid and assistance, from trade to police and judicial cooperation. Furthermore, the Union deals extensively with internal security in the area of police and judicial cooperation, as well as the protection of key infrastructure. Therefore, proposals within the ESDP that could lead to close coordination between civil and military resources and to some extent to the linking of internal and external security were generally well received by the member states. In the
CHAPTER FOUR

process of redefining the ESDP, the member states seemed to be agreed that the hallmark of the EU as a security actor should be the comprehensive and coherent use of civil and military resources, both externally and internally. There are two explanations for the development of the EU as a civil/military security actor. First, politically it allows member states to overcome the Atlanticist/Europeanist division, as the Union brings added value to crisis management and can present itself as complementary to NATO rather than its competitor. Secondly, the comprehensive use of civil and military resources for both external and internal security seems to be the logical response to the terrorist threat, which makes the traditional division between soft and hard power obsolete and transcends the distinction between internal and external security.

The negotiations on the ESDP were basically an intergovernmental process leading to a compromise between the Atlanticist and Europeanist visions of European defense. Nevertheless, in the area of internal security, the argument was made that the proposal for a solidarity clause was a reaction by the member states to their increasing interdependence, rather than a compromise based on fundamental national positions. Increasing European integration has led to interdependence in areas relating to the security of Europe’s citizens from the terrorist threat, and the proposal for a solidarity clause can be seen as a reaction to this. It was argued that the solidarity clause, like homeland security as such is one of the areas that are most likely to stimulate further European integration.

The EU’s evolution into a joined-up security actor underlines in what way the Union is different from a military alliance such as NATO.

The Brussels summit ended in failure, and the only thing to be adopted was the idea of a planning cell. But the failed negotiations had only a limited impact on the development of the ESDP, demonstrating that, in this area, treaty changes are of less importance. The scope of the Petersberg tasks remains the same, and the security guarantee confirms the current situation, with NATO being responsible for collective defence. A forerunner of structured cooperation is already in the pipeline, with the proposal by Germany, the United Kingdom and France to
establish an EU Rapid Response. The Defence Agency is already in the process of being formed, and a director has been named. Finally, the solidarity clause, which was de facto implemented at the Brussels Summit March 25th 2004. The solidarity clause cannot be formally implemented within the current treaty, but the terrorist attack in Madrid March 11th led to a political commitment by the member states to act ‘in the spirit of the solidarity clause’.34

Therefore, the EU does not have to await treaty changes in order to strengthen its military capabilities and develop as a joined-up security actor.

CHAPTER FIVE
Intelligence cooperation
in the European Union

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INTRODUCTION

Before the year 2000, there was virtually no intelligence cooperation within the institution of the European Union. There were, of course, vigorous networks of both bilateral and multilateral intelligence cooperation, throughout the continent of Europe, between states. National intelligence agencies have always had dealings with combinations of their peers – combinations which have depended on principles such as identified long-term and short-term common interests, trust and reciprocity. The depth of this cooperation has varied not only between states but also between the various intelligence disciplines. For example, the human intelligence (HUMINT) agency of State A might have a particularly close professional relationship with the HUMINT agency of State B, whereas the signals intelligence (SIGINT) agency of the same State A might be closer to the SIGINT agency of State C. Within the field of defence-related intelligence, there was also a highly formalised system of intelligence cooperation within the NATO alliance, mainly in the field of threat assessment, and driven until the 1990s by the needs of the Cold War.

1. The views expressed in this paper are the author’s alone.
2. This chapter covers intelligence cooperation in the fields of foreign and security policy and defence at the politico-strategic level. It does not seek to cover cooperation below this level, nor other forms of intelligence cooperation, such as in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs.
Defence intelligence cooperation within the institution of the EU started in the year 2000 as part of the development of the ESDP dossier, which was given impetus by the 1999 Helsinki meeting of the European Council. By 2003, a system for such cooperation had not only been designed and the design endorsed by all the principal stakeholders, but a brand-new multinational and multi-service (‘combined joint’ in military-speak) intelligence staff was also up, running and producing intelligence for its entire range of customers. Broader intelligence cooperation in the domain of foreign and security policy followed hard on defence’s heels. It is important to make it clear up front that we are not referring here to any creation of an ‘EU intelligence service’, in the same way that the ESDP initiative has not led to any creation of an ‘EU Army’, ‘Navy’ or ‘Air Force’. What the EU has developed is a system for delivering a high-quality EU intelligence product, fused from national and some non-national contributions, to its CFSP/ESDP customer base.

The backdrop to these developments included the fact that the EU’s politico-military structure had started to take on flesh in the autumn of 1999 in the Justus Lipsius building, the EU Council’s main building in Brussels, with the arrival of Dr Javier Solana as the first Secretary-General/High Representative, of Pierre de Boissieu as the Deputy Secretary-General, and of the first members of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, now known simply as the Policy Unit. In early 2000, the interim Political and Security Committee and the Military Committee held their first meetings, and the design for a brand-new military directorate-general was completed, being officially approved by the end of that year. By spring 2001, an EU Military Staff was forming up and moving from the Justus Lipsius building to the purpose-adapted Kortenberg building some seven hundred metres away. It did so not alone but along with all its key non-military colleagues in the EU’s politico-military structure, such as the bulk of the Directorate-General for External Affairs, the Policy Unit and the Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN). By the end of 2001, the Political and Security Committee and the Military Committee had ceased to be

‘interim’ and had taken their place as official Council bodies, while the EU Military Staff had been declared as having attained ‘full staff capability’, i.e. the capability of carrying out all aspects of its mission statement.4 The year 2002 saw all elements of the politico-military structure beginning to work together effectively and productively; the development of a large number of concepts, policies and procedures, including a handbook of crisis-management procedures; the EU’s first-ever crisis-management exercise, CME 02; the launch of an EU police mission in Bosnia; and the watershed of a long-awaited agreement between the EU and NATO on ‘Berlin-plus’. By spring 2003, the EU had launched its first-ever military operation, Operation Concordia, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – an operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities – and, by summer 2003, its second military operation, Operation Artemis, in Ituri Province of the Democratic Republic of Congo – an operation without recourse to NATO.

This chapter seeks to outline how the rapid turnaround in intelligence cooperation was achieved, looking at some of the driving design factors, some of the key enabling factors and the development of intelligence product, before offering some thoughts for the future.

Throughout this chapter, as indicated in italics, a mythical EU-led peace support operation (Operation Zeus) in a fictitious coastal West African country in the year 200X will be used to illustrate some of the more technical points. The EU decided to launch Zeus, following an appropriate UN Security Council Resolution, as a short, sharp, rapid-reaction operation to secure and stabilise the principal entry points to the country and its capital, prior to the arrival of a larger UN force with a broader and longer-term mandate. The UK’s offer to the EU to be the ‘framework state’ for this operation was

4. See below under ‘Treaty provisions’. The EU Military Staff, at around 130 people, including support staff, is approximately half the size of NATO HQ’s International Military Staff (IMS).
The primary objective of any intelligence system should be to provide what the customers need in a timely and user-friendly format. In the EU’s case, the principal customers are the actors in the politico-military decision-making process. These include the EU Military Committee and the Political and Security Committee; the High Representative; other in-house Council actors, such as the Directorate General for External Affairs and the Policy Unit; the Commission; and, during an EU-led crisis-management operation, the chain of command. No single customer from amongst this list is invariably more or less important than any other: priorities vary according to the stage reached in the decision-making process, who is about to do what, and whether there is an operation in progress.

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SOME DRIVING DESIGN FACTORS

The Customer is King

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\[i\) Persuant to the Le Touquet summit agreement of February 2003\]

\[ii) Persuant to the French/German/UK ‘food for thought’ paper presented to the PSC on February 18th 2004\]
In so far as military operations are concerned, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) is a vital piece of the EU’s politico-military machinery. Meeting at its most senior level, it is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the member states. The normal format of the EUMC is the Military Representative level, consisting of senior Brussels-based General/Flag Officers representing their Chiefs of Defence. It is the EUMC which delivers to the EU decision-making machinery the unanimous advice of the Chiefs of Defence on all military matters. Experience quickly showed that the most efficient way to deliver intelligence product to this customer was through short, sharply focused audio-visual briefings at the beginning of the relevant agenda items, coupled with the dissemination of written reports, wherever possible delivered in advance by electronic means to the Brussels-based delegations.

The political control and strategic direction of EU-led operations can now be delegated by ministers direct to the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which takes its input on military issues from the EU Military Committee and, on non-military issues, from the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. As with the Military Committee, experience quickly confirmed that even shorter, sharper audio-visual presentation was the most effective way of providing key intelligence product.

The High Representative is both the principal in-house customer for intelligence product and, it proved, one of the most challenging to service. Solana’s high-level and worldwide political activity was both hectic and subject to change at very short notice. His main needs proved to be quick, preferably verbal readouts at short notice. Face to face contact in Brussels was preferred, but inevitably, telephone or e-mail contact at a greater distance often proved necessary.

5. For example, the first intelligence request that Solana passed to the author was in April 2000 for basic information about the terrorist organisation which at that time was holding some EU citizens hostage in the Philippines. Solana had learnt a few minutes earlier that the member states had agreed that he should fly the following day to represent the EU position on this issue personally to the President of the Philippines. A quick answer, derived from open sources, was delivered verbally within thirty minutes. During a stopover en route, Solana received by hand from a representative of one member state hard copy of a product compiled from classified material.
The Directorate-General for External Affairs had always dealt with foreign affairs issues for the Council and was organised on a classic regional directorate basis, together with certain directorates dealing with cross-regional issues. It was authorised – fairly late in the day compared to the other in-house teams – to recruit a slim, additional ‘pol-mil’ directorate, which started to develop a critical mass in late 2001. The main task of the Policy Unit was to provide forward thinking on foreign and security policy issues for the High Representative, but it also became drawn into expeditionary, hands-on diplomacy in the EU’s high-priority areas of concern, such as the Balkans and the Middle East. For both these in-house actors, the main requirement was to be able to exchange working-level information and to network on a continuous basis, both face to face and by electronic means.

The Commission, and in particular its recently created External Affairs Directorate-General, was, both *de facto* and *de jure*, a vital player in the EU’s overall politico-military structure. However, at the time of writing, its contribution across the structure has not yet fully matured, partly for reasons of residual intra-institutional ‘turf protection’ between the EU’s first pillar (Commission) and second pillar (Council Secretariat) actors. Its main customer need was similar to that of the in-house Council actors, but with the disadvantage of a lack of collocation. Where face-to-face networking was not possible, a less than satisfactory recourse to the transmission of hard-copy product had often to be made.

For the operation commander and his headquarters during an EU-led operation, the challenge was not only to provide him with ‘top-down’ intelligence but also to design a system to ensure that the intelligence staffs all the way down the command chain received directly all the available feeds they needed and were also alive to what needed to flow ‘bottom up’. In other words, once an EU-led force was deployed to the area of operations, the command chain became not only a customer but also a prime source of intelligence input to the EU’s politico-strategic level. The ideal solution to these needs was the acquisition of a web-based system; until such time as this became feasible, secure IT and communications links, including a videoconferencing facility, were an absolute necessity.
THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

Treaty provisions
What the EU can and cannot do is governed by the Treaty of the European Union. Another driving design factor was therefore what the Treaty had to say about the CFSP and ESDP. The former is mainly covered by Article 11 which, amongst other things, talks to: safeguarding the fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union; strengthening the security of the Union in all ways; and preserving peace and strengthening international security. ESDP is covered principally by Article 17, which includes references to the progressive framing of a common defence policy, and the Petersberg tasks including humanitarian and rescue missions, peace-keeping, and the use of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Thus the Treaty provided a solid basis for a global, holistic approach to the design of the EU’s intelligence architecture. The main rules governing this design were the EU Military Staff Terms of Reference. These had the status of a Heads of State and Government-level (European Council) decision and included the Military Staff’s mission, function and outline organisation. The mission included the tasks of early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning in relation to the potential Petersberg missions. These tasks clearly pointed towards a proactive, robust and effective defence intelligence component.

The intelligence cycle
The intelligence cycle of activity includes the main steps of collection, collation, interpretation, assessment, dissemination and system feedback. The EU decision-making machinery’s prime need is for assessed intelligence, the steps of collection, collation and interpretation being part of the spectrum of capabilities offered to the EU by the member states. The main exceptions to this were that some collation and interpretation would also be available, in the imagery intelligence (IMINT) field, from the EU’s Satellite Centre Agency at Torrejon; and that, during an EU-led operation, the chain of command would, in the theatre of operations, be engaging in the entire intelligence cycle of activity, with the intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets being made available by the participating states.
The need for a joint assessment process was another key driving design factor. One of the Policy Unit’s officials had been instrumental in getting the EU Council’s interim Situation Centre up and running. During 2002, the Joint Situation Centre developed from being co-led by the Policy Unit and the EU Military Staff into being directed by one full-time official working for the High Representative. The primary purpose of this development was to create the conditions whereby member states’ non-military intelligence agencies could feel comfortable enough to contribute selected intelligence product to the EU via the Situation Centre. The defence intelligence organisations of the member states had, in 2000, already agreed to do this for selected military intelligence product via the Intelligence Division of the Military Staff. In 2003, the Joint Situation Centre was

6. The term ‘joint’ in this context refers to the coming together of the relevant military and non-military components.
also developed to provide the platform for the twenty-four hour monitoring of the EU’s current operations and for the presentation of a coherent package of briefings for all customers on current situations around the world.7

There was also a need to situate the intelligence function firmly within an overall information management architecture for the EU and not to let it operate as some separate, stand-alone entity. To this end, the EU Military Staff quickly drafted not only a military information operations concept, but also encouraged the EU Council General Secretariat to design an overarching information management concept paper, subsequently issued in September 2001.

**Benchmarking**

Another driving design factor was the desire – given the luxury of a virtually ‘clean-sheet’ opportunity to design the best possible achievable intelligence system by benchmarking against the best existing systems in the member states – international organisations and non-governmental organisations, taking the best elements from each and leaving the least best behind.

**SOME KEY ENABLING FACTORS**

It was quickly evident that the key internal stakeholders, who controlled all the main management tools, such as the release of finance, personnel policy, the allocation of office space and policy for IT and Communications and other major equipment projects, had to be brought on board. They were indeed, and it was mainly thanks to them that the intelligence cooperation function was able to take its place so quickly in the overall EU Council structure.

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One of the first key decisions was to give all aspects of security, including the need for modern, secure IT and communications, the high priority required to gain the confidence of key external stakeholders that what they put into the EU’s intelligence system would be safely looked after. It was decided that the cast of CFSP/ESDP ‘workers’, including all those engaged in the intelligence function, should be moved to the purpose-adapted Kortenberg building. In doing so, the disadvantage of being some seven hundred metres away from face-to-face contact with many of the key in-house customers in the Justus Lipsius building was accepted. The first visit of the Military Staff design team and of security experts to the Kortenberg took place in April 2000. By May 2001, adaptation of the building had been largely completed and the ‘workers’ were moving in. In between, in July 2000, another key enabling factor – the interim security agreement between the EU and NATO – had been signed. An overarching communications and information systems concept was quickly drafted and, by December 2001, had been accepted by all the stakeholders, being ‘noted’ by the Political and Security Committee. The long-range vision was of a ‘web-pull’ of information over a secure wide-area network, with the bandwidth to permit a secure videoconferencing facility. The short to medium-term vision was to adapt what was currently available to build various layers or ‘onion rings’ of systems. Thus a secure local-area network was quickly designed for the whole Kortenberg CFSP/ESDP community, and a separate, stand-alone, secure intelligence local-area network designed for the defence intelligence function within this community. The first terminals were delivered in October 2001, and interim system accreditation was achieved in January 2002. Informal discussion was launched with NATO’s BICES8 Agency in April 2000. After much debate between member states, the detailed requirement was accepted by EU stakeholders and formally put to the BICES Agency in March 2003. Videoconferencing trials with existing equipment and bandwidth were successfully carried out in late 2001 and early 2002 with two of the potential operational headquarters (UK and France); its first operational use was in March 2003, when the

8. BICES is a secure, web-pull system for the distribution of defence intelligence, mainly but not exclusively between NATO nations.
Political and Security Committee came to the Joint Situation Centre to conduct a live dialogue with the EU Police Mission Commander in Sarajevo.

The key external stakeholders were the Chiefs of the Defence Intelligence Organisations (CDIs) of the member states, without whose full support no system of effective EU defence intelligence cooperation could work. Informal bilateral discussions with them were started in July 2000, with a first low-key ‘conclave’ of CDIs being held in Brussels – though not in an EU facility – in September 2000. By November 2002, the fourth such conclave was being held in an EU building and was attended, for part of the time, at least, by Solana. Conferences with all the potential elements of the EU’s chain of command for military operations were begun in December 2001, informal contacts with NATO headquarters, SHAPE and UN headquarters in New York having already been started from August 2000 onwards. Every effort was made, from Solana downwards, to keep the US administration and its intelligence agencies accurately informed as to what the EU was doing in this field throughout the design phase, with the first high-level Department of Defence visitor being briefed in Brussels as early as March 2000.

Within the vital field of the development of the EU’s military capabilities to achieve the Helsinki Headline Goal, in 2002 equipment capability action panels started focussing on challenging intelligence-related capability needs, such as strategic-level IMINT, SIGINT, early warning and distant detection, and battle damage assessment and in-theatre surveillance and reconnaissance (to pull together ‘recognised land, sea and air pictures’). In parallel, a military intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) concept for EU-led operations was quickly worked up and issued in November 2001.

THE DESIGN TAKES SHAPE

So, having pulled all these factors together, the presentation given to that very first conclave of CDIs in September 2000 outlined the need for an Intelligence Division (INT), where the personnel would be seconded to the EU Military Staff, normally
for a tour of duty of three years, from their defence intelligence services. In other words they would, wherever possible, be intelligence professionals and would be provided with a secure IT and communications link back to their national service. The EU in its turn would provide each of them with a secure room which, in addition to meeting the EU’s security standards, could also be adapted to meet any additional national security criteria. INT’s mission would be centred on the Military Staff’s core tasks of early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. INT would be organised into three branches: a small branch dealing with policy issues; another small branch dealing with requirements issues in the main intelligence disciplines; and a large production branch to produce and deliver the intelligence to the customers. Production would be organised into the same four geographic groupings as the other main actors in the EU politico-military structure, namely the Balkans; the Middle East and Africa; countries to the east of Europe; and the rest of the world. Product would, in descending order of preference, be web-based, audio-visual, verbal and – only where none of these means were possible or appropriate – in hard paper copy. INT would be empowered, as tasked by the Director-General of the EU Military Staff, to take the initiative in studying and reporting on a particular issue – in other words, it could act or react quickly to new developments. It would also maintain a small ‘front-end cell’ in the Joint Situation Centre to act principally as INT’s feed to and from a joint assessment process and, during operations, into and out of the monitoring of the operational situation.

From the start, great emphasis was laid on the need for high-quality personnel to be assigned to INT by the member states. While the four top posts (division and branch heads) were to be open for any member state to bid for, an equitable spread of the working-level posts between the member states was agreed, which also played to the particular strengths of each national Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO). For example, officers from Austria, Greece and Italy were assigned to posts covering the Balkans and officers from Finland and Sweden to ‘east of Europe’ posts. INT would be provided with a secure, stand-alone local-area network, equipped with excellent internal search facilities, which would be the default means of handling all elements of its intelligence processing functions. The member state DIOs would be asked to provide INT in response to a regularly updated and agreed ‘global overview’ watch list, with periodic assessed intelligence
product (not raw data), which would, wherever possible, be pre-sanitised for release ‘at fifteen’, in other words to all the member states. They would also be asked to respond to specific questions from INT, particularly during crisis management or an EU-led operation. A very important principle adopted from the very beginning was that all member state DIOs would, in turn, receive copies of all INT’s intelligence reports.

The Chiefs of Defence Intelligence at that first conclave gave an informal ‘green light’ for this design to be put into effect. The first secure IT and communications link was established in May 2001, shortly after the move into the Kortenberg facility. By the summer of 2002, fourteen out of the fifteen member states’ DIOs had established such links, and fourteen were providing defence intelligence already pre-sanitised to enable its release to all fifteen. Non-national inputs included open sources of information (OSINT), from contracts entered into with four civilian firms from November 2001 onwards; geographical information (GEO) from the GEO specialist of the EU Military Staff; and IMINT from the EU Satellite Centre. The OSINT strand was developed after consultation in particular with the Swedish DIO, one of the world leaders in this field. A first conclave of GEO experts from the member states was held in February 2002, leading to the establishment of an EU Military Staff GEO database in October 2002. Initial informal contacts with what was then the WEU Satellite Centre started as early as April 2000, the first product coming on line soon after the Centre officially became an EU agency in 2001.

INT, as an integral part of the EU Military Staff, played its full part in the internal training programme leading to the declaration, in December 2001, that ‘full staff capability’ had been achieved, as well as in the development of the EU’s first-ever crisis-management exercise in June 2002. But its progress can perhaps best be measured by looking at some of the milestones in the EU’s intelligence product, resulting from both the military assessment process, then the development of joint assessment in the Kortenberg facility. The first product – not strictly speaking an intelligence one, but nevertheless a test product of the interim Joint Situation

9. So-called ‘Requests For Information’ or RFIs.
Centre, which was still then located in the less than fully secure Justus Lipsius building – was a joint ‘press summary’ which started in December 2000. The EU Council’s press office was, of course, already producing press summaries for its senior customers, but the Situation Centres product was in effect a periodic open source intelligence summary tailored for its developing CFSP/ESDP customer base.10 In March 2001, the developing Intelligence Division started a test periodic ‘military highlights’ summary tailored for the same customer base and again derived from open sources.11 The move to the Kortenberg was accompanied by the first test audio-visual presentation by INT of a military intelligence report (INTREP),12 on a current situation, to an internal Council General Secretariat audience headed by the Deputy Secretary General. This was quickly followed, in July 2001, by the first audio-visual intelligence briefing13 to the EU Military Committee. The Joint Situation Centre produced its first periodic joint intelligence summary, at that stage derived from open source intelligence alone, in September 2001.14 The Chairman of the EU Military Committee came to INT for the first time in October 2001 to receive a classified audio-visual briefing;15 the first SECRET-level intelligence report was produced by INT later that month for senior in-house customers, necessarily, at that stage, in hand-carried hard-copy format. November 2001 saw the first of what then became the regular classified audio-visual INT briefings to each meeting of the Military Committee. By January 2002, INT had given its first ‘early-warning hotspots’ presentation, and also,

10. For example, items would be grouped under regional headings, such as: the Balkans, Middle East, East of Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas.
11. Items would again be grouped under regional headings, but focus on armed forces highlights, such as the introduction of a new weapons system in the armed forces of a Middle Eastern country, or the latest assessment of the military situation in a sub-Saharan country.
12. An INTREP focuses on one particular item of intelligence, normally adjudged to be of high enough value and time sensitivity to warrant separate reporting in advance of the next periodic (e.g. weekly) intelligence summary (INTSUM), a round up normally grouped under regional and/or topic headings.
13. It was on the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM).
14. It was, coincidentally, put out on 9/11, and included, under the topic of global terrorism, a paragraph on the generic threat posed by Osama bin Laden.
15. The subject was the situation in Afghanistan.
together with the Policy Unit, jointly drafted the first global overview watch-list paper for agreement by the EU’s politico-military structure. By the summer of 2002, this global overview document had become the agreed basis for the Situation Centre-led joint assessment programme, and other key players, such as representatives of the Commission’s External Affairs Directorate-General, had come aboard this process. A sufficient ‘critical mass’ of intelligence experts from some of the key civilian intelligence agencies had by then arrived in the Joint Situation Centre for it to be able to issue its first SECRET-level intelligence report. Also by then, sufficient secure voice equipment had been acquired to enable a classified military intelligence report to be passed personally to Solana while he was in the field. The joint assessment process was also sufficiently underway for the first joint risk assessment to have been issued to assist in the politico-strategic level planning of the first EU-led operation. Thus, by the end of 2002, both stakeholders and customers had developed sufficient trust in the designed intelligence system and sufficient confidence in the professionalism of its output to rely on it for decision-making, which could have life or death implications for deployed personnel of the EU Member States.

As a final step in the design of the system for defence intelligence cooperation, a military intelligence structures concept paper was issued to document what had been designed. After the anticipated lengthy debates among member states’ representatives, it was eventually agreed by the EU Military Committee in February 2003.

16. The topic was terrorist-related.
17. Lengthy debates were anticipated because it is a challenge, with such a sensitive topic, to strike the right balance of length and level of detail in an official paper so as to generate unanimity. Writing too much may lead to the level of technical detail becoming too great for the non-technical Brussels-based representatives and to the technical experts back in the capitals starting to ‘over-contribute’ on detailed issues. Writing too little may lead to everyone wanting more! As far as the author is aware, no one has yet attempted to draft an official paper for agreement by the member states under the existing system of non-defence-related intelligence cooperation.
Prior to Operation Zeus, for example, the fictitious West African country had featured for some time on the EU’s global overview watch list, resulting in heightened levels of input from the member states, both by their defence intelligence organisations to INT in the Military Staff and by civil intelligence services to their officers in the Joint Situation Centre. During the past two months, each meeting of the EU Military Committee and of the Political and Security Committee had received, from the Joint Situation Centre, a joint civil-military audio-visual update on the latest developments and on the assessment of future events. Hot intelligence reports had regularly been passed by Joint Situation Centre duty personnel to the High Representative prior to key top-level meetings. A key input into the overarching EU strategic concept for the mythical country, drafted by a small crisis-response coordinating team, including officials from the Commission, had been the joint risk assessment worked up in the Joint Situation Centre. The Political and Security Committee had agreed both the risk assessment and the strategic concept, having agreed the military advice received from the Military Committee, prior to deciding to recommend to Council (i.e. ministers) that Operation Zeus be launched. Officials in the Commission participated in all key elements of the decision-making process.

SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE

One emerging challenge will be that posed by the developing EU vision of CFSP, as embodied in the new EU Security Strategy entitled *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, in particular the section on ‘Policy implications for Europe’. Some commentators are still calling for a common EU threat-assessment as a pre-condition to implementing the Strategy – as already indicated, such assessments started falling into place from the summer of 2002 onwards. A key element of the Security Strategy will undoubtedly continue to be bound up in wider EU-US issues. So far as EU-led operations are concerned, the US may well continue to view them as non-threatening and often even helpful to its interests. In this context, it may well
prove possible to develop further intelligence cooperation between the EU and US intelligence and security agencies.

For example, in the mythical Operation Zeus, the US Administration signalled to the EU at a very early stage in the process of formulating the UN Security Council Resolution that, although it saw no role for NATO in such an operation, it would be prepared to offer some strategic-level capabilities bilaterally with the EU, short of committing US forces in the theatre of operations. The offer was gratefully accepted and, in addition to several C-17 sorties (strategic airlifts), the US Administration also agreed to release for EU use some suitably sanitised but still highly classified near real-time IMINT and SIGINT feeds to Operation Zeus’ chain of command (i.e. to the multinationalised EU Operation HQ at PJHQ Northwood and to the multinationalised EU Force HQ deployed afloat with the carrier group).

A related challenge for intelligence cooperation in the EU will be the future of CFSP/ESDP in the context of the draft Constitutional Treaty. As far as Petersberg tasks are concerned, the draft Treaty currently proposes new wording: ‘missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter’ (Article 40); ‘shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation’. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories’ (Article III-210). A ‘solidarity clause’ (Articles 42 and III-231), to deal – inside the Union – with the consequences of ‘a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster’, is also proposed, as is the creation of a ‘European Armament, Research and Military Capabilities Agency’ (Articles 40 and III-212). The High Representative’s assessment, at the time of writing, is that these elements of the draft Treaty should not prove controversial. Intelligence cooperation within the EU will undoubtedly need to be broadened to embrace a whole range of new
security issues in a more coordinated manner, for example between the CFSP/ESDP and Justice and Home Affairs, so as to achieve a better interface between the external and internal counter-terrorist domains.

One challenge which the EU is already facing after May 2004 is how the CFSP/ESDP dossiers can be worked effectively with 25 members. In the field of intelligence cooperation, there will be a need to bring the intelligence elements of the new member states, many of whom may start by seeing the EU through largely NATO eyes, successfully into the EU family. All the new members will have the potential to make a valuable intelligence contribution, and all will undergo the usual security certification procedure to ensure that they have and are applying the controls needed to be able to safeguard classified EU information. Enlargement for INT itself has been based on well-argued, specific additional needs and the capabilities being offered, as opposed to any form of revised quota system. By having a ‘points of contact system’ with the candidate countries up and running effectively since 2001, the EU Military Staff has in effect been a market leader within the Council’s General Secretariat since the start of this run-up period.

The EU has the unique capacity for an international institution of being able to add real value in a crisis-management situation, anywhere in the world, by bringing to bear a comprehensive set of tools, ranging from the political and diplomatic, through the economic and judicial, to security and defence, and backed by a developing intelligence tool. The levers of power for the different tools lie in different parts of the Union structure, principally the Council, the Commission, and increasingly, the European Parliament. The main challenge in delivering real added value in practice is therefore likely to lie in improving the lateral bridging between the EU Council and the Commission’s worker teams, while seeking a more comfortable accommodation with the Parliament. In the meantime, it will be important to keep the intelligence elements of the CFSP/ESDP team mentally and physically close together. The collocation achieved to date under the Kortenberg project was a success in this respect, and should be extended if and when the opportunity is taken to move the team closer to its customer base.
Last but not least, as in any commercial enterprise, the customer's legitimate intelligence requirements must remain king. The prime purpose of the 'intelligence' should be, while acting always within the law and within the relevant guidance, to get a high-quality product to the right people within such a timeframe that it is of real value to the customer's key activities. An intelligence management system needs to be put into effect to support each and every commander of an EU-led operation to make the best use of the intelligence capabilities made available by the states contributing to that operation. Indeed, this concept of supporting the operation commander should remain uppermost in the minds of all the national intelligence agencies when the civil or military personnel of EU member states are deployed on operations and lives are put at risk.
CHAPTER SIX
ESDP and military reforms

Daniel Keohane, Centre for European Reform

Fifteen European Union countries spend roughly €160 billion collectively on defence, which is not an insignificant amount of money. And this figure will rise to roughly €175 billion after ten more states join the Union in May 2004. In fact, the EU is the world’s second biggest defence spender after the US. However, EU member states spend their defence money very poorly. The EU spends about half what the US spends on defence but the Europeans do not get near half of US military capability. For example, while the US has over 200 long-range transport planes that can carry the heaviest loads, the EU has four – the UK is currently leasing four C-17 planes from the US.

The Iraq conflict in 2003 exposed Europe’s lack of military muscle even more than was the case in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The transatlantic equipment gap is widening and Europeans are finding it increasingly difficult to fight with the Americans. For example, most European armies lack the new communications technologies that allow the Americans to engage in ‘network-centric warfare’, which allows a commander to watch the deployment of friendly and hostile forces in a battle space, in real time, on a single screen and then order precision strikes.

Moreover, if the US is occupied with other crises elsewhere around the globe, Europeans cannot always expect the Americans to save the day. This is part of the rationale behind the EU’s defence policy, namely that Europe will be able to conduct autonomous military operations. But without new equipment, European soldiers might not even make it to the battlefield. To illustrate, European troops
needed US planes to take them to Macedonia in 2001 because most European armies do not have adequate transport capabilities.

European governments have been slowly reforming their armies since the end of the Cold War, by shifting from a focus on territorial defence to an emphasis on international deployments. But if they wish to continue to fight with the Americans, or conduct a wide range of autonomous missions, Europeans need to reform their militaries further. Military reform is not easy and encompasses a number of areas, such as types of troops, equipment acquisition and development, and doctrine. Europe has only slowly woken from the slumber of Cold War military thinking, and some countries are more awake than others.

However, there are some grounds for cautious optimism. Military reform is now widely recognised at the EU level as absolutely necessary if the EU is to fulfil its security aims. The draft EU constitution (under negotiation at the time of writing) contains measures that will encourage further military reforms in Europe (of which more later). But even if the constitutional treaty is finalised during 2004, when it comes to defence policy, the real challenge for EU governments – particularly in the area of improving their military capabilities – will be to put the agreements they have made on paper into effective practice.

THE NEED FOR MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Europe will not convince anyone in Washington – or elsewhere – that they are serious about the ESDP unless they make good the important capabilities that they currently lack. There is no reason for Europe to invest in many of the high-tech capabilities on which the US spends money. For example, it is not clear that Europe needs dozens of military satellites or miniature robotics for intelligence gathering.

The US, for its part, runs a global military and makes contingency plans to influence (coercively) the behaviour of a great many states. It has a theory of war that depends on wielding blows from the air – including if need be, blows against
societal and industrial infrastructure. Therefore, the US needs a huge range and variety of military assets, which Europe would only need if it shared US objectives. Though most Europeans pay lip service to US objectives and global operations at NATO, it is clear that there is little if any domestic appetite for most of these missions. For example, most of the European countries that supported the US position on Iraq contributed little if anything to the actual fighting because of domestic concerns, though many of these same countries have sent peacekeepers since the formal war ended.

However, if the Europeans are going to operate alongside US forces at all, they do need things like secure communications, the ability to fight at night and satellite-guided bombs. And if they are going to run autonomous EU missions, they will need some very basic types of equipment. For example, the British Ministry of Defence has drawn some lessons from the British capture of Basra in the Iraq war – an operation that would be at the upper end of the range that the EU is likely to undertake. The British only just had enough mortar-locating radars, transport helicopters and roll on-roll off ferries. Most other EU countries would have had even less of such essential equipment.

British and French forces have more of the capabilities that matter than other European countries. For example, Britain and France have air-launched Storm Shadow cruise missiles that they have been jointly developing. However, all EU countries, including Britain and France, need to do more on capabilities.

**COMMITMENTS APLENTY**

NATO members agreed on a programme, a list of 58 priorities, in 1999, called the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), to focus European procurement efforts on particular needs. By 2002, the DCI had proved to be a failure, as less than half of the programmes were funded. At the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002, NATO governments agreed on a new procurement programme – the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). The PCC, a list of eight requirements, focuses on
critical areas such as secure communications, precision-guided weapons, air and sea transport, and air-to-air refuelling. Fewer and more precise than the earlier DCI, the Prague commitments have a greater chance of being implemented.

Particular governments have agreed to take responsibility for the implementation of each of the eight goals, such as Germany for transport planes. (After years of delay, the German government gave the seven-country A400M transport plane project the go-ahead in May 2003.) Encouragingly, groups of NATO governments signed up to some hard numbers, such as the procurement of ten to fifteen refuelling aircraft and a forty-percent increase in the stock of satellite-guided bombs. Furthermore, the NATO countries finally agreed to develop a fleet of airborne ground surveillance aircraft, on the model of the AWACS early-warning fleet that NATO already has. These aircraft, like all the other new capabilities, would be available for either NATO or EU missions.

At the Helsinki summit in December 1999, EU leaders agreed that the Union should develop a more robust security and defence policy. It was decided that the EU should be able to carry out autonomous military missions, ranging from humanitarian relief to separating the warring factions in a civil war. However, Europe’s meagre contribution to the NATO campaign in Kosovo that same year highlighted the continent’s lack of military muscle. EU governments therefore also signed up to a number of military capability goals, referred to in official documents as the ‘headline goal’. The aim was to set up a so-called ‘rapid reaction force’ of 60,000 troops, plus additional air and naval forces, by the end of 2003. That deadline has since passed. How did the EU fare?

EU members – old and new – committed 100,000 troops, 400 combat planes and 100 ships to the force. Although these figures look impressive, all these troops and assets already existed and are also available for NATO or UN missions. What is more important – and more difficult to show – is what new equipment governments

1. NATO Prague Summit Declaration, November 21st 2002.
have purchased to satisfy EU requirements. Governments are trying to fill the remaining gaps, but with static defence budgets this process will take some time. The former Chair of NATO’s Military Committee, General Klaus Naumann, has observed that the EU will not have a real military intervention capability until at least 2010.2

To improve its performance, since the beginning of 2002 the EU has its own procurement programme – the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) – which, like the NATO Prague programme, aims to focus European efforts on acquiring particular crucial assets. More significantly, the EU’s equipment goals compliment NATO’s in most areas except for network-centric warfare capabilities. Officials involved in the ECAP process claim that 120 out of 144 specified gaps have been filled. Yet some of the remaining gaps are among the most important, such as air-to-air refuelling and transport planes.

But the ECAP did introduce two important ideas that were later adopted by NATO members at the 2002 Prague summit. The first idea is the concept of a ‘framework nation’ to take the lead in procuring a particular common asset. The Netherlands, for example, is leading a collective effort to acquire precision-guided munitions, and Spain is doing the same for air-to-air refuelling planes. The second ECAP innovation is that governments must come up with interim arrangements to fill their capability gaps if their products are scheduled to arrive only years down the line. The first deliveries of the A-400M transport plane will not arrive until at least 2009, and in the meantime Germany is leasing transport planes from other countries, like Ukraine. The German Ministry of Defence used Ukrainian planes to take its troops to Afghanistan in 2002.3

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3. Sometimes lease assets are not available. In December 2002 Ukrainian transport planes were not available for military missions because they had already been booked to deliver Christmas presents.
Deploying forces

In 2003, the EU sent peacekeepers to Macedonia with NATO’s help as well as to the Congo. The EU is likely to run further military missions in the future. US priorities are North Korea, Iran and Iraq. America will not often want to become involved in conflicts in the band of instability that runs around the EU’s eastern and southern flanks and stretches down to sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the EU has considered deploying peacekeepers to replace Russian troops in the Transdnistria region of Moldova.

In addition, the EU could play a useful role in giving the UN the rapid reaction capability that it currently lacks. The UN can usually raise enough peacekeepers. What it cannot do so easily is find troops for an intervention force to fly into a crisis zone as soon as bloodshed starts. For example, the UN was unable to intervene quickly enough in East Timor in 1999. The Bush administration is unlikely to provide the UN with US forces. But the EU could be willing to help the UN: countries such as Britain and France have elite forces which can move into a warzone at short notice.

However, even though the EU has more soldiers than the US, most EU states have too many immobile conscript troops and too few elite forces. If the Europeans are going to succeed as peacekeepers and peacemakers, they need to make a big investment in professionalisation (some countries like Britain, France, Ireland, Spain and the Netherlands already have professional forces) in respect of both training and equipment. The new EU member states have only a very limited capacity to engage in high-intensity warfare.

4. The fifteen EU member-states have roughly 1.6 million troops between them, while the US has 1.4 million. The EU number will rise to 1.9 million when ten new states join the Union in 2004. And NATO Europe – which includes countries not yet ready to join the EU, like Bulgaria, Norway, Romania and Turkey – has over 2.3 million soldiers. These estimates are based on figures taken from ‘The Military Balance 2003-2004’, International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Future EU missions need to deploy rapidly, and when they get there they are more likely to face a problem from guerillas than from conventional tanks and aircraft. The Europeans therefore need more professional troops that can move at short notice, plus special forces which are skilled at using intelligence. That is why, when Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair met at Le Touquet in February 2003, they agreed that the EU should be able to deploy air, sea and land forces within five to ten days. That would be a great improvement on the EU’s current plan for a so-called reaction force that should be able to move at sixty days’ notice.

In February 2004, the French and British governments proposed that the EU should have seven to nine ‘battle groups’, each of 1,500 troops, which could be deployed within two weeks. The battle groups should have extensive air and naval support, including transport and logistical support. This proposal also forms one of the criteria for joining the EU defence avant-garde group that is included in the draft constitutional treaty (of which more later).

EU member-states would have until 2007 to meet this commitment, and there are basically three ways that they could do this. First, a government could put together a national battle group. In reality, only France and Britain could do this easily, although Germany, Spain and Italy should be able to develop their own battle groups. For other countries – and perhaps even Germany, Spain and Italy – another option is for a lead or ‘framework’ nation to form the core of a battle group, other countries joining in to supply some troops or equipment to fill in the gaps of the lead (and main contributor) country.

The third option would be for countries to form fully multinational units, similar to the Strasbourg-based Eurocorps, which brings together soldiers from five countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain). For smaller countries in particular – especially if they would prefer not to just ‘plug into’ a lead nation – this is a politically appealing way of pooling troops with other countries of similar size and military resources to ensure that they can contribute, and most importantly keep a seat at the EU defence decision-making table. For example,
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania might find that forming a Baltic battle group is the only way that they could contribute to EU battle groups.

EU leaders should support this initiative and beef up the numbers of elite and special operations forces that are available for EU missions. This effort should reinforce NATO’s own plan for a rapid reaction force: the same troops would be available to the EU and NATO. At the November 2002 Prague summit, President Bush called on the Europeans to increase their military might by creating a NATO response force of 20,000 elite troops with supporting air and sea components. The idea behind this force is to make NATO’s military organisation more useful for dealing with today’s security environment.5

There are some signs of progress: some countries are scrapping conscription. France and Spain have already moved from conscription armies to an all-professional military, while Italy is proceeding apace with similar measures. These reforms may free up more money for new equipment.

Germany has not yet managed to drop conscription completely, but a series of reforms to the Bundeswehr are increasing the number of ‘crisis reaction forces’ that are available for operations outside Germany. Germany currently has more troops deployed on peacekeeping missions (about 10,000) than any other EU country apart from the UK. By 2010, Germany will have a 35,000-strong ‘intervention’ force for combat operations and a 70,000-strong ‘stabilizing’ force for peacekeeping. To pay for this, the Germans are sensibly getting rid of large stocks of weapons that were designed for conflicts that are now unlikely to materialise. There is little point in any European country maintaining large numbers of aircraft that can only deliver ‘dumb’ bombs.

Smaller countries are also restructuring their armed forces. Sweden is reducing from 29 to eight the number of brigades focused on territorial defence, while increasing the forces available for international deployment. Other small countries are being encouraged to develop ‘niche capabilities’ in areas where they already have a comparative advantage. For example, the Czech Republic would continue to invest in its renowned anti-nuclear-biological-chemical units ahead of other types of military assets. Moreover, EU governments have already met all their civilian capability headline goals. The EU can provide 5,000 policemen for international missions, 1,400 of whom can be deployed within thirty days.

**POOLING ASSETS**

Static defence budgets and inadequate spending on equipment are only part of the problem. Europeans also waste many of their existing military resources and need to think imaginatively about using their assets more efficiently. One improvement would be for countries to pool more of their military capabilities. In areas such as air transport, the maintenance of fighter aircraft, medical facilities and the delivery of supplies, there is much money to be saved through the creation of pooled operations. NATO’s existing AWACS and future airborne ground-surveillance fleets are examples to be followed. Such pooling will require small groups of countries to move ahead and show that it can be done.

At the Franco-British summit in February 2003, the two governments agreed to improve interoperability among their aircraft carriers and, in particular, harmonise activity cycles and training, so that one carrier is permanently available to support EU missions. There is also some discussion in Paris and London about jointly

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developing their future aircraft carriers, which are due to come into service around 2015.\(^8\) One member of the European Parliament (MEP) and former head of UN forces in Bosnia, Phillipe Morillon, proposes going much further than the Franco-British aircraft carrier agreement. Morillon suggests that the EU should set itself ‘the medium-term objective of providing support, with a European or even a Euro-Mediterranean fleet, for the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, until possibly taking over from it if the Americans so requested.’\(^9\)

Aircraft offer the best opportunities for saving money through pooling because of their high purchase and maintenance costs and the fact that many nations buy the same type. For example, the Benelux Air Task Force combines fighter aircraft from three countries that can be deployed as a single squadron. Such cost-cutting measures also help ensure that different armies can work together – a crucial requirement for a successful military coalition.

Given that Europe badly needs more airlift, the EU should create a pool of transport aircraft, starting with the 136 Hercules C-130 transport aircraft owned by ten EU countries. The fleet would be available to EU members, to the EU collectively or to NATO. However, in order to achieve significant cost savings, the fleet would have to operate from one main base, with squadrons dispersed to serve national needs. A single planning, servicing and logistics organisation would support the force. Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg pledged to work on a common air-transport command at a defence mini-summit in April 2003. The decision by the French and German governments in July 2003 to set up a joint ‘top gun’ school for their attack helicopter pilots and mechanics is also a small step in the right direction.

Similarly, five of the smaller EU countries own 430 F-16 fighter aircraft between them. Germany, Italy and the UK operate 570 Tornados, and since 2003 these


three countries plus Spain have started to deploy Eurofighters. In all these cases, pooling the support operations could yield considerable savings.\textsuperscript{10}

EU leaders also need to pay more attention to the military potential of space-based technologies. The current focus of European space efforts, Galileo, a satellite navigation system due to be launched in 2008, was originally conceived as a civil project but could perform some military tasks. For example, many of America’s ‘smart’ bombs and cruise missiles in the Iraq war were steered towards their targets by satellite navigation signals. Similarly, European soldiers on peace-support missions in the Balkans or elsewhere could use Galileo to define their positions or steer their munitions.

Europe also needs its own intelligence-gathering assets. This is because access to as much good information from as many sources as possible is the most important element for any military operation that Europe can expect to launch in the coming years. The French already have two small spy satellites, and more powerful satellites are due to be launched in 2004. Germany is building a series of radar observation satellites that can look through clouds. Helpfully, the output from these satellites will be made available to their European partners. Five European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain) are currently working out a list of common requirements for their future observation systems, but this process should go further towards the building of an integrated, common observation system. The benefits to Europe would be enormous, and the costs are not prohibitive. According to French military chiefs, a European observation system would cost slightly more than €2 billion over ten years.\textsuperscript{11}

As well as sharing assets in the sky, Europe should also pool more intelligence assessment on the ground. The EU’s draft constitution says that the EU should

\textsuperscript{10} Tim Garden and Charles Grant, ‘Europe could pack a bigger punch by sharing’, Financial Times, December 17th 2002.

‘regularly assess the threats facing the Union in order to enable the Union to take effective action’. The thinking behind this clause is correct. Member states are already making tentative moves towards sharing more internal security intelligence assessments at the EU level through Europol. The Situation Centre in the EU Council Secretariat assesses some military intelligence from member states, but EU governments should increase the number of political assessments they share with their EU partners.

**HOW TO SPEND IT**

Perhaps more notably, so far the EU, like NATO, has not yet managed to convince member states to increase significantly the amount of money spent on defence. In fact, despite the global campaign against terrorism and the increasing awareness of the dangers associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the present political climate and other pressures on public purses do not augur well for rises in defence spending. However, Britain managed to increase its defence spending slightly in 2003, while France has increased its procurement expenditure. Germany’s defence budget, on the other hand, will be slashed by almost €30 billion from 2004-2009. This means Germany is on track to spending a measly 1 percent of its GDP on defence. By contrast, Britain and France spend roughly 2.5 percent of their GDPs on defence, while Italy is close to 2 percent, the Netherlands about 1.6 percent, and Spain spends an under-whelming 1.2 percent of its GDP on defence.

Four countries provide roughly 75 percent of EU defence spending – the UK and France (45 percent) and Germany and Italy. Add the Dutch and Spanish defence budgets to the four bigger countries, and these six account for 86 percent of EU spending. Even if the other nineteen EU countries re-programme their defence

12. For more on this, see Adam Townsend, *Guarding Europe*, Centre for European Reform, May 2003.
spending and focus on ‘niche’ activities, how the six largest (and richest) countries spend their defence budgets has an enormous impact on overall EU figures.

Although increasing defence spending has become something of a mantra in the European debate, the political realities are such that defence expenditure is unlikely to increase significantly in the foreseeable future. However, even if they are unable to increase their defence budgets, European governments must at least spend their existing financial resources better by spending more on research, development, and procurement. The US spent $40 billion on research and development in 2001, whereas France, Germany and the UK – the main European purchasers and producers of arms – spent a total of approximately $7 billion. Moreover, while the US spent $60 billion on procuring new equipment in 2001, France, Germany and the UK combined spent just $16 billion.14

One improvement would be if the share of spending on procurement and R&D could be raised to the same level as in the UK and France (which serve as the benchmark). Currently the divergence between EU members is massive: the UK and France spend roughly 35 percent of their total defence budgets on procurement and R&D, compared to Belgium, which only spends 10 percent. Collectively EU member-states spend €40 billion on procurement and R&D out of a total defence expenditure of €160 billion. Apart from Britain and France, only Portugal, Finland and Sweden spend one-third or more of their defence budgets on R&D and procurement.

EUROPE’S NEW DEFENCE AGENCY

European leaders also need to improve how they cooperate in purchasing and developing weapons systems. It is clear that European governments need to extract more value out of each euro they spend on research, development and

procurement (RD&P). EU governments therefore need to think more about collective RD&P. Many political obstacles have held back armaments cooperation in Europe, and institutions such as NATO have so far failed to overcome them. NATO lacks the authority and mechanisms to force governments to meet their commitments. The EU should therefore also become directly involved in armaments cooperation as part of its broader defence policy. Given its relative success in forcing governments to do what they signed up to in other policy areas, only the EU is likely to make member state governments stick to their commitments.

In February 2003, Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac agreed to the creation of a new ‘defence capabilities development and acquisition agency’, tasked with encouraging member states to boost their military capabilities. The new agency would work on harmonising military requirements, coordinating defence R&D and encouraging the convergence of national procurement procedures. EU leaders backed the Franco-British capabilities agency at the Thessalonika summit in June 2003, and the agency should become operational during 2004.

The agency falls under the general responsibility of Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for foreign and security policy, and Nick Witney, a Briton, will head it. At the beginning the agency will not have a procurement budget, so it will not buy equipment, nor manage multinational programmes. Instead its first task will be to coordinate the existing network of bodies involved in European armaments cooperation.

The first such body is OCCAR, a four-country organisation that brings together Britain, France, Germany and Italy. OCCAR’s key task is to bring about more efficient management of multinational armaments programmes. OCCAR’s first major programme is the seven-country A400M transport plane, which is being built by Airbus. The second body that the EU agency will cooperate with is the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO), which has nineteen

member states and promotes cross-border R&D projects. However, WEAO has not had much success so far, mainly due to a lack of funding – it receives less than one per cent of the €10 billion spent each year on defence R&D in the EU.

A third issue the agency will address is the integration of the EU’s defence market. Governments have allowed some cross-border consolidation in the defence sector, which has led to the creation of cross-border companies, like the Franco-German-Spanish firm EADS. However, the European defence market, unlike its commercial cousin, remains fragmented into many national pieces. By some estimates a single defence market for defence goods would save European governments between ten and twenty percent of their acquisition money each year. EU governments spend around €30 billion on defence procurement collectively each year, so a single market could save them up to €5 billion per annum. The six main European arms-producing countries signed the so-called ‘Letter of Intent’ in 1998 to harmonise some of their armaments regulations, but this has not yet had much impact. The European Commission would like to take on this task and is preparing proposals to open up Europe’s defence market. However, given the sensitive nature of the defence market, governments are reluctant to give regulatory power to the Commission. Thus, a single defence market in Europe remains some way off.

But perhaps the most important role the new agency could play is a political one. During 2004 EU governments will agree on a new headline goal, a list of capability commitments that governments will agree to meet by 2010. This will probably require member states to acquire assets like unmanned aerial vehicles to increase their military prowess. The agency will evaluate and report annually on member states’ progress towards meeting these commitments. If these reports were made public, the agency could then ‘name and shame’ those member states that are holding up progress and put them under political pressure to improve their performance.

In short, if the EU agency does manage to improve European cooperation in armaments, the beneficiaries would include a more competitive defence industry; armed forces that would get badly needed military equipment at a better price; and taxpayers who would get better value for money.

**AN AVANT-GARDE FOR EU DEFENCE**

At the time of writing, after the collapse of the Brussels summit in December 2003, EU governments are still negotiating a constitutional treaty. One of the most contentious issues was defence policy, but thanks to a compromise between France, Germany and the UK at the Naples foreign ministers’ meeting in November 2003, that issue will no longer make or break the constitutional negotiations.

Until the Naples agreement, however, it looked as if defence would be the most difficult issue to resolve at the inter-governmental negotiations. At their own summit on April 29th 2003, Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg agreed to cooperate more closely on defence matters in seven ways. Six of these were not particularly controversial, but the seventh, for the establishment of an EU operational planning staff in the Brussels suburb of Tervuren, was.

There are many technical arguments for and against an EU operational planning cell. For example, if the EU is to conduct autonomous operations, it will need its own operational planners. The argument against it is that the EU can rely on NATO planners at SHAPE for a so-called Berlin-plus operation, like that in Macedonia, when it decides to work with NATO; or else the EU can use a national headquarters, duly modified to reflect the nationalities of those taking part in the mission, as it did for the mission to Bunia in Congo, controlled by a French headquarters.

These technical arguments, however, were not the issue. The headquarters proposal, strongly backed by Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac, was of huge political importance. The four governments involved were the same four who opposed the Iraq war. Those European countries that supported the US over Iraq
(Britain, Spain, Italy, and most of the candidate member states) were suspicious of its real motives. Many in the Bush administration in Washington saw in any European military headquarters a direct competitor with NATO and concluded that the idea was nothing more than an anti-US proposal.

However, during the summer of 2003 emotions started to subside. Tony Blair was worried that the French and Germans might go ahead without the British, thereby denying the UK influence over European defence policy – the one policy area where Britain can lead in Europe. At the same time, however, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder came to the conclusion that a European defence policy without the British would not be credible. Meeting in Berlin in September, Schroeder, Chirac and Blair sketched out the framework for a compromise on European defence, and in late November the details were finally agreed.

The deal involves three elements. First, the EU will deploy a small group of operational planners to SHAPE, NATO’s planning headquarters near Mons. This group will work to ensure a smooth relationship between the EU and NATO on ‘Berlin-plus’-type missions, when the EU borrows NATO assets. There will also be a new unit of about thirty operational planners for the EU’s military staff, which currently consists mainly of ‘strategic planners’, whose job is to advise EU foreign ministers on the operational plans that may come out of SHAPE or a national military headquarters. The new unit will help with the planning of EU military missions. It has been agreed that, whenever the EU conducts an autonomous EU mission, a national headquarters will normally be in charge. However, if there is unanimous consent, the EU may ask its operational planners to play a role in conducting such a mission. However, they would need beefing up with additional resources before they could run a mission on their own.

Secondly, EU governments should agree that the constitutional treaty includes articles on ‘structured cooperation’, so that an avant-garde group can be established for European defence. Given that EU countries have very different military capabilities, closer cooperation among a smaller group of states makes sense in principle as it could do much to improve the EU’s overall military effectiveness.
Aside from the much-documented transatlantic gap, there is also a large capabilities gulf between EU member states, a gulf that will widen with the accession of ten new members in 2004.

To narrow this gulf, in November 2002 the French and the German governments proposed that an avant-garde group of states with higher level capabilities, a willingness to carry out the most demanding tasks and a desire to cooperate should ‘develop new forms of cooperation, particularly by harmonizing the planning of military needs, pooling capabilities and resources, and sharing out tasks’. The final report of the European Convention Working Group on Defence built on the Franco-German proposal by calling for a ‘defence Euro-zone’, based on the presumption that participating countries would have certain pre-identified interoperable forces and integrated command-and-control capabilities. The wording of the final treaty was amended to make it clear that this avant-garde group is to take the lead in developing military capabilities, rather than establishing a politicalised ‘European Defence Union’ in competition with NATO.

As currently worded, the draft constitution allows a group to establish structured cooperation without the consent of all EU members. The new wording also makes it clear that all member states which meet the prescribed criteria will be allowed to join the avant-garde group. The Italian government, which held the EU presidency at the time of the Naples meeting, drafted a protocol that would define the criteria for deciding who can join the structured cooperation. These criteria are based on military capabilities, and member states have until 2007 to meet them.

Thirdly, the treaty articles on mutual military assistance were amended. The article was watered down, with references to members aiding each other ‘in accordance

with Article 51 of the UN Charter’ and to NATO remaining ‘the foundation of members’ collective defence and the forum for its implementation’. Thus the EU will not be making any claims to be a collective defence organisation of a sort that might rival NATO.

CONCLUSION

Although the EU, like NATO, has not yet managed to convince European governments to rapidly improve their military capabilities, the process of military reform in Europe will continue. The real question is, at what pace? That will be partly determined by whether or not member states meet their battle-group commitments by 2007, as well as on how effective the new EU defence agency is at convincing member states to buy new equipment sooner rather than later.

But perhaps the biggest factor that will drive military reform in Europe for the foreseeable future will be more EU missions. Undertaking military operations and learning lessons from them is the best way to know what types of equipment are useful, what is required for future deployments, and what types of skills troops need to perform their missions adequately.

The EU will take in ten new members in May 2004 and will have a new frontier. New borders mean new responsibilities, particularly with fragile states such as Moldova, and unstable regions like the Caucasus and Africa on Europe’s doorstep. Across the Atlantic, US priorities are still focused on North Korea, Iran and Iraq, and Washington, therefore, does not want to become involved in conflicts around the EU’s eastern and southern flanks.

Nor should Europeans wait for the US to put out their fires: this, after all, was the principal rationale behind the Anglo-French initiative at Saint-Malo in 1998 to develop a robust EU defence policy. In addition, these conflicts may not always require peacekeeping deployments, but more dangerous interventions as well. For example, the British capture of Basra in the Iraq war would be at the upper end of
the range that the EU is likely to undertake. In such situations, the UK will be fighting alongside French, German, Italian and Spanish soldiers, not Americans. That is also good for the US. If the Europeans are able to look after their own backyard, that would mean one less region for the US to worry about. Moreover, a more effective EU defence policy that results in much-improved European military prowess might even convince the Pentagon to use NATO for military interventions and not just peacekeeping.

NATO and the EU should not compete with each other. In the years to come they will sink or swim together. Many conceivable EU military missions will need to draw upon NATO assets, such as military planning expertise. If the Europeans were to succeed in boosting their military capabilities, American respect for NATO would grow, and the EU itself would benefit since it would rely on the same military assets. If they fail both NATO and the EU will suffer.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Poland and the ESDP

Andrzej Karkoszka, Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces

The eastward enlargement of the European Union may have several repercussions for both old and new members, for the character and management of the Union’s existing institutions and for countries still outside but in the vicinity of the Union. These consequences are predominantly political and economic, in the sense that they entail a major extension of liberal democratic systems of government on the continent and a substantial increase in the geographical size of the single, common market. In the strategic sense, the stable and military conflict-free zone in Europe will be extended to cover most of the continent, including some areas that historically have been notorious as hotbeds of both worldwide and regional conflagrations. Extending to the western rim of Russia and Ukraine, the Union may enable their engagement in the integration processes and thus have a beneficial influence on the course of developments in these pivotal countries from the point of pan-European security. On the other hand, their vicinity brings the EU closer than ever to the core of the post-Soviet conundrum, with a number of volatile spots with an uncertain future, like Transdniestra, Nagorno Karabakh, Chechnya, Abkhazia and the countries of Central Asia. The EU is becoming a major factor in shaping the continent’s security by assuming new responsibilities in this domain. The execution of this responsibility requires a unified assessment of the geo-strategic situation at the East and a common response to the challenges created by the new neighbourhood.

The EU’s new members are required to accept fully the acquis communautaire, namely the whole body of legal, technical, social and economic laws, norms and principles. They are on the demanding side, willing to sacrifice their national habits and
norms and re-mould them according to the Union’s standards. These new states are also, with one or two exceptions, much poorer and less politically influential than the states of the Union. The Union’s bureaucracy and its older members often take it for granted that this docile attitude on the part of the ten newcomers will also apply to the sphere of foreign and security policy. Nothing could be more wrong, as the experience of the last year has shown. As the common EU foreign and security policy does not yet exist, and the new states have specific and well-grounded foreign-policy agendas, they want their views to be incorporated, not subsumed by the agenda of the larger nations. Moreover, as the security and defence posture of the Union is only now assuming some sort of coherent shape, the new members want to have an equal chance in taking part in its definition, since their security concerns are quite serious and justified, though they may differ somewhat from the concerns of the older members. The notion of solidarity, so often invoked in the economic domain of the Union, is of even greater importance in the domain of security.

POLAND AMONG THE TEN CANDIDATES

The forthcoming enlargement of the EU will substantially increase the number of members. Their sheer number will certainly complicate bureaucratic procedures and decision-making processes within the Union. However, it seems probable that the new members will rarely be able to act in a unified way as their economic and political interests vary considerably. The only common feature of this group of states is the small size of their economies and populations. Hence, in order to pursue their interests, they will most probably look to ally themselves with the larger of the existing member states, perhaps those with which they already have long-standing interactions or else with a group of smaller members, finding with them a more common base of resistance to the domination of the larger states. This observation may not apply so easily to Poland, whose economy and population are more commensurate with those of the medium or larger member states. In several other important indices, however, as Table 1 below shows, Poland is comparable to the sum of all the other nine candidate states.
**Table 1: Poland and the New EU Members**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>GDP 2002</th>
<th>Military Budget</th>
<th>Military Forces</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1000 km²)</td>
<td>(millions)</td>
<td>(US$ billions)</td>
<td>(US$ billions)</td>
<td>(1000 soldiers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>10.28</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>10.2</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
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<td>Estonia</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>1.383</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>9.85</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>4.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>13.9</td>
<td>0.359</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>0.624</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>6.55</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sum of 9</strong></td>
<td>422.516</td>
<td>36.284</td>
<td>221.5</td>
<td>5.437</td>
<td>154.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>312.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland as % of 10</strong></td>
<td>42.50%</td>
<td>51.50%</td>
<td>45.90%</td>
<td>41.80%</td>
<td>51.40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Military Balance 2003-04*

However, in spite of this dominant position, Poland neither aspires nor has a mandate to lead the group of the newcomers, all of whom are looking to the more affluent and influential older members of the Union for leadership. The efforts to
harmonize the interests of the group within the Visegrad framework were only partially successful.

The Polish armed forces are the largest among the candidate states, and the recent decision of the Polish government to earmark a sizeable unit to the EU Rapid Response Force makes her participation considerable in comparison to any of the other new members and most of the old ones. Taking into account half a century of a high level of participation in UN peace-keeping operations and Poland’s active role in all NATO and a number of EU military and police operations, Polish readiness to take part in the EU’s security and defence cooperation and policy is far from trivial. But it is not the only or the most important reason why Poland’s inclusion is significant for the future political arithmetic of the Union’s internal and external policy. Poland’s geo-strategic location, with borders to Russia/Kalinin-grad, Belarus and Ukraine, adds a new dimension to the eastward policy of the Union. Another factor making Poland’s entry to the EU significant is her excellent relations with both the United States and all the major member states of the Union. Poland’s support for, and substantial participation in, the US war against the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq admittedly caused temporary irritation in a number of West European capitals, but, in view of her equally strong desire to integrate fully with the Union, this may in time be of an asset to both transatlantic and European relations.

POLAND’S VIEW OF ESDP AND THE EU’S SECURITY STRATEGY

The most authoritative recent exposition of Polish security and defense policy in general and its attitude towards the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in particular is to be found in ‘The Strategy of National Security of the Polish Republic’, a document signed by the president of Poland on 8 September 2003. According to this document,
Poland as a member of the Union will actively participate in the mechanism of CFSP. […] We shall actively participate in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as an indispensable addition to the CFSP and as a mechanism, which creates a favorable framework for the improvement of operational capabilities of the member states. Poland as a member of NATO and EU shall support the building up of the military and civilian capabilities within the Union, which will be simultaneously a European pillar of NATO and which will utilize the Alliance’s assets. On her side Poland will undertake efforts to bring an appropriate input both military and civilian into the Union’s capabilities. In this context it will be of importance to gradually harmonize procurement and the European arms market so that it will assure utilization of specific competences and experiences of all members of the EU. The efforts of the EU in the operational capabilities and the Prague commitments on NATO defense should be mutually supportive and complementary. The peacekeeping operations organized by the EU will be, among other activities, a natural consequence of such relationships. It is desirable for Poland, as a member of both organizations, that stable and institutionalized cooperation between these two organizations exists, so that full complementarity is assured between the activities of NATO and EU. Thus we shall embark on and will support initiatives directed at structural reinforcement, cooperation and working relationship of both organizations, guaranteeing maximal effectiveness in the utilization of assets available to both of them. The European identity in sphere of security and defence is to assure the EU the status of an increasingly more important partner of the USA. At the same time the American presence in Europe, including the military one, is to continue in strengthening the perception of security in the transatlantic and European dimensions. […] The Polish armed forces are involved in the shaping up of security in the direct neighbourhood of Poland and on the entire European territory through the development of military cooperation with other states. They
participate in strengthening of the international order by being included in the operations carried out by the UN, OSCE, NATO, EU, and also by ad hoc coalitions. [...] The armed forces are obligated to prepare and maintain a potential of expeditionary forces, enabling them to participate in operations of crisis response and peacekeeping operations taking place on and beyond the territory of Poland in the frame of NATO, EU and the UN.

The general principles of Polish policy regarding participation in the EU’s security and defence policy, the ESDP, and the relationship between the EU and NATO are laid out clearly and firmly here. There is no doubt that these principles set out several obligations which are taken very seriously, as they are strongly supported by the majority of the population and most of the political parties represented in parliament, as well as others active outside parliament. This attitude on the part of Polish society was expressed in both public polls on Poland joining NATO and a referendum on Polish entry into the European Union. The sound and unequivocal support of Poland for a strong European security and defence policy, facilitating the far-reaching integration of the European nations, was confirmed as recently as 15th January 2004 by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz. Speaking about the possibility of the creation of a ‘hard core’ within the Union of states that are willing to undertake enhanced cooperation, he expressed Poland’s readiness to join such a core, as long as such a step facilitates the process of integration and is open to any state wishing to join. Cooperation in stemming illegal immigration, drug-trafficking and, in particular, military cooperation were indicated as possible areas of such enhanced cooperation.

The enlargement of the Union by ten new members will add a new strategic dimension to EU security policy. Several of these states have long borders and strong political and economic links with the post-Soviet region, in particular with Russia and Ukraine. Poland intends to enrich this direction of the EU policy, mindful of the potentially beneficial impact of good economic and political relations on her security. Poland does not conceal its desire to be the proponent of a strong engagement by the EU with its eastern neighbours and has been trying on
its own to develop positive relationships with them. Particularly evident here is her strong support for Ukraine’s pro-Europe aspirations, based on the assumption that developments in this large and populous state are the key to the future stability of the entire region. Ukraine’s pivotal geo-strategic position is often overlooked by the West European states. And, with regard to Russia, the Union’s strategy is more a compilation of individual members’ relations rather than a cohesive policy. Since, according to both official and public opinion in Poland, Europe as a political, economic and cultural entity does not end at the River Bug, the European process of integration must eventually encompass Russia, Ukraine and Belarus too, as far as their respective internal developments and attitudes will permit. This eastward engagement of the Union will become particularly relevant after the forthcoming entry of Romania and Bulgaria, which will give the Union direct involvement in the Black Sea region. What was once a matter of the ‘global’ policy of the Union, like developments in Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Crimea, the Middle East and even central Asia, will become a matter of direct relevance to its security. In particular, relations with Turkey will increase in strategic importance, as they will then be shaped by much wider and more complex security concerns than the current issue of the fate of Cyprus.

Until now, the ESDP and the Union’s security strategy have not been developed in any meaningful way with the participation of the new members. This may change once they assume formal membership. However, the inclusion of this large number of new states in the Union may also mean the continuation of their inactivity in matters of common security strategy, given that their experience of being involved in shaping this strategy has not, so far, proved very encouraging. Hopefully, the larger states of the Union will learn how to accommodate their methods of leadership so that the interests of the newcomers are not ignored.

THE POLISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE HEADLINE GOAL

Following the EU Helsinki summit and the subsequent conference on military contributions to the headline goal, Poland defined its contribution already in 2001:
from its land forces, some 1500 soldiers in two battalions (one paratrooper battalion from the 6th airborne brigade for the EU Rapid Reaction Force and one battalion of the air cavalry from the 25th Air Cavalry Brigade); from its air force, one SAR air group and one transport aircraft (An-28); from its navy, two ‘Krogulec’-type mine-sweepers and one support and rescue ship. Additionally, one small unit of the military police is being trained for EU tasks (in addition to a nearly 100-person civil-police unit, which is already operating in Kosovo).

Bearing in mind the EU’s plans for the further development of available forces by 2010 and Poland’s forthcoming membership of the EU in 2004, Poland intends to review its contribution. Although the forces earmarked for EU operations are less than those planned for NATO’s Rapid Reaction Force and other allied forces, they will come from the same pool, thus assuring a high level of interoperability and readiness. Their dual-hatted allocation conforms to the concept of the harmonious development of military capabilities of both organizations. There are a number of specialized units, like the anti-terrorist and special forces units and chemical defence units, as well as other assets (a tactical movement coordination center, for example), which could be prepared for joint operations. Moreover, Poland is ready to cooperate in the areas of cartography and satellite photography. One particular aspect of the Polish contribution is its existing involvement in multinational military cooperation: the Polish-Lithuanian and Polish-Ukrainian battalions are already fully operational, and have already been taking part in the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo operations respectively.

Poland views the EU Capability Action Plan (ECAP) as being complementary to the NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative approved in Prague. If it is used efficiently and purposefully, which so far has not entirely been the case, the ECAP may prove a very useful way of improving the coordination of European efforts to create joint military capabilities. Poland expressed satisfaction at being admitted to this endeavour, despite the fact that it was not yet an EU member, and it is taking an active part in the EU working groups by developing a number of projects. Out of several such groups, Poland expressed an interest in working on an operational headquarters, air-to-air refuelling, combat search and rescue, strategic airlift and,
possibly, in NBC protection group. It is no coincidence that these areas are exactly those in which Poland participates within NATO or has accepted a national specialization within the alliance.

In sum, Poland’s planned contribution to EU military operations is not very large, but it is quite reliable and fully commensurate with its present military, financial and technical capabilities. According to the commentaries coming from Warsaw, this contribution will be reviewed and modified once Poland acquires full membership in the EU, depending on requirements and actual capabilities.

DEFENCE REFORM ON THE WAY TO NATO AND THE EU

The military contribution of Poland, and even more so of the other new member states, to NATO and the EU will inevitably be limited. Two factors contribute to such predicament: first, the poor state of their economies, and secondly, the state of their armed forces. While the first factor will take a long time to be overcome, the second depends on the success of the on-going and in some cases well-advanced transformation of military structures, which in its turn depends on political will and on the resources that are devoted to this task. Polish defence expenditure over the last decade has been quite constant, hovering at the level of 2% of GDP, which indicates a serious effort, but in terms of actual financial resources this translates into some 3.6 billion euros, less than half of what is generated by Spain and less than half the Netherlands’ defence budget. The structure of Poland’s defence budget is still shaped predominantly by personnel costs, with only a small portion, some ten percent on average, being spent on modernization and procurement. As a result of these budgetary deficits and the requirements of NATO membership, the armed forces are developing in an imbalanced way, those prioritized for NATO contingencies being better equipped and trained than the rest of the forces. As a result, overall spending on maintenance, investments and training is inadequate. A ‘two-tier’ force is emerging, a small force that is fully capable of operating
with NATO forces, and the remainder, the bulk of the armed forces, with low readiness and degraded military capabilities.

The transformation of the Polish armed forces is an on-going process, having proceeded gradually over the last fifteen years. The army was reduced from 460,000 to its current strength of 160,000, re-deployed through the abandonment of several hundred garrisons, and restructured in terms of command system and the composition of units. Democratic oversight of the armed forces and the defence policy of the state was firmly established, the general staff being incorporated fully into the civilian Ministry of Defence. Staff operations are now less a matter of the command function, which has been delegated to the commands of the respective categories of forces, and more directed towards taking the leading role in force and operational planning, as well as assuring the ‘jointness’ of the armed forces.

Several long-term plans aimed at modernizing and restructuring the armed forces have been developed over the past decade. Most of them have struggled to balance the needs of the military with the actual financial abilities of the state. Though each stage in the process has brought some positive results, none of the plans has been fully successful. The latest of these programmes is a six-year development programme prepared by the government in 2001 and adopted by parliament. The act was passed by an overwhelming majority, reflecting a national consensus on the defence needs. The new left-wing coalition government now in power has taken up this programme, marking a departure from previous practice of every new government coming up with its own solution to defence problems. This continuity in national defence efforts and the adoption of a longer-term perspective regarding the development of the armed forces are seen as a blessing, as the officer corps and society at large was already showing ‘reform fatigue’ caused by the constant revisions and debates over the issue.

The new programme envisages armed forces of 150,000 soldiers, of which 55% are to be career servicemen. Two-thirds of the officer corps is to consist of non-commissioned officers, a very ambitious proposition in the Polish conditions. A large number of senior officers will have to be released from the army, which will be
very expensive and require a special programme of professional retraining. There are no plans to create an all-volunteer force. A switch to a career army would take some ten years and cause a significant, possibly unbearable increase in defence expenditure. Moreover, some believe that Poland, being located on the periphery of the NATO area, still needs ample reserves to beef up its regular forces in the event of a mobilization. Some forty percent of military infrastructure is to be transferred to the civil economy through privatization, thus creating additional proceeds for the military budget. Procurement plans envisage the purchase of several new weapons systems, such as multi-role aircraft, armoured personnel carriers, anti-tank missiles, several types of warship, radiolocation networks, and electronic warfare and communication systems on the tactical and operational levels.

The main concept behind the new plan to transform the Polish armed forces is to convert them from heavy, mechanized and armoured forces, focused on defence of the national territory, into light, mobile forces capable of operating abroad. The organizational aspect of this process was the creation of two mechanized corps commands in May 2001. The corps is in command of a major share of the Polish operational land forces, comprising immediate reaction, rapid reaction, and core forces. Four divisions (three mechanized and one armoured cavalry) and six brigades (two mechanized, one armoured, one coastal defence, one air-mobile and one airborne assault) form these forces. One division is assigned to the Multi-national North-East Corps, and one armoured cavalry brigade is committed to the NATO reaction force, coming under the German armoured division structure. Each Polish mechanized corps has one artillery brigade, one engineering brigade and several other specialized units. The two existing military district commands perform the role of territorial commands and are responsible for logistics, host national support, administration and territorial defence. To carry out this last task, they include seven territorial defence brigades designed to operate in the fixed areas. The present eighteen military brigades are becoming much lighter and more mobile, including the ability to be transported by air. The restructuring aims at making battalion-strong units operationally self-sufficient and capable of independent action. With a similar concept guiding the restructuring of the navy and the air force, the Polish army will be converted into a much more manoeuvrable force.
able to perform various duties in crisis-reaction mode, according to the requirements of NATO and, possibly, the EU.

It seems that the process of transforming Poland’s military structures, as well as those of the other East European states, and of making their management compatible with Western democratic standards, has reached a level comparable to those existing in NATO and existing EU member states. All the appropriate institutions and modalities for the operation of these forces within a democratic system of government are in place. What still remains to be achieved in these states, most of whom aspire to membership in both organizations, is technical modernization facilitating their cooperation with the most advanced armies. This process of technical modernization cannot, however, be based entirely on purely Western technology. The East European states do not have the financial resources to buy only Western technology, nor do they want to resign completely from using their own arms industry as a source of weapons systems. The incorporation of this military-industrial potential into transnational Western arms companies would constitute the best possible form of assistance for purposes of modernization. However, this would require a much more magnanimous approach by the more advanced states to the problems of Europe-wide military production.

POLAND’S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS

It may safely be stated that Poland’s involvement in international peacekeeping and peace-making operations comes from a long tradition, based on a specific Polish history, in which a concern for the freedom and independence of other nations was seen as part and parcel of the country’s own two centuries of national struggle for reunification, independence and defence of the national territory. The sense of the indivisibility of peace and security in the European context is strong at the grassroots level. There is also a long history of Polish participation in international peace operations, stemming from somewhat different political considerations, which made Poland the only state within the Warsaw Pact that was ‘permit-
The readiness of Polish society and the political establishment to become involved in activities undertaken by the international community, and in particular by its current allies, is seen as proof of a deep commitment to the common cause and to values, like those of the EU, and in particular to the mutual security guarantees like those provided by NATO. The strength of these mutual commitments is not a theoretical issue in Poland, where the consequences of its West European allies’ guarantees in 1939 – verbal but not immediately material – are still remembered. This is why Polish public opinion was shaken by the prolonged delay in NATO’s reaction to the Turkish invocation, for the first time in the alliance’s history, of Art. IV of the Washington Treaty.

A willingness to share the political, material and human burdens linked to any military operation aimed at the preservation of stability, conflict resolution or peacekeeping does not mean taking an easy approach to the matter. The moderate resources of the Polish state do not permit substantial involvement in international military operations. However, on many occasions Polish politicians have reiterated their view of the fundamental importance of international law, the inviolability of
every state’s sovereignty and the primary responsibility of the United Nation’s Security Council in preserving the world’s peace and stability. There is also a growing acceptance in Poland of the overriding pre-eminence of human rights and the necessity of preserving human life in considering the advisability of military action. The ultimate humanitarian reasons for any joint international military action should not be forgotten in the political squabbling between the five permanent members of the Security Council, who should be able to resolve their difference promptly in order to establish a consensus. Thus, the actions of NATO in the former Yugoslavia over Kosovo and of the US-led coalition in Iraq received relatively wide support in Poland because of their assumed legitimacy, even though they were not entirely sound on legal grounds.

As far as the present and future operations of the EU are concerned, Poland views them as proof of the increased responsibility of the Union for the region’s security and stability. The Polish contribution to Operation Concordia in Macedonia has been tangible in terms of military patrols and the Polish presence in the headquarters at Skopje.

**ESDP AND NATO: MUTUALLY REINFORCING OR COMPETING?**

The gradually increasing European-based security and military cohesion seems to be a logical build-up of the general process of the European integration. According to Polish thinking on the matter, the Union should be able to react to any crisis influencing security in Europe and should also be a leading factor in global security. The Union has a unique range of instruments – unmatched by those of any other organization or state – that it can operate in pursuing crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction. The development of a specifically military capability will complete this inventory by adding a factor of dissuasion, deterrence and, if the need arises, hard military force. However, the level of maturity of this budding military capability is still not very advanced and it cannot as yet be treated as any form of security alternative to the existing NATO provision.
The tendency towards making the ESDP more robust is laudable, but it should not
be aimed at fully emancipating Europe from its existing ties with the US. Such an
objective would be contrary to the vital interests of several states in Europe, in-
cluding Poland, and could only lead to the break up of NATO. For this reason,
y any proposal to create a formal obligation of common defence among the EU
member states would mean directly supplanting the similar commitment that exists
in NATO and covers the great majority of EU member states. This view is not at
odds with Poland’s positive attitude regarding the principle of ‘solidarity’, which
can be invoked in the case of a terrorist attack and should lead to a mutual assist-
ance and cooperation. However, this principle could not apply to areas outside
Europe or to pre-emptive operations involving the use of military force.

A rational measure of duplication of structures and activities between the EU’s
ESDP and NATO is perhaps unavoidable. The EU authorities must set up a well-
developed staff to execute the host of preparatory measures required to bring the
headline goal to fruition, as well as to plan for future contingencies with regard to
the expanded scope of the Petersberg missions. However, a recently discussed pro-
posal to establish a complete EU headquarters and commands for its future forces,
able to carry out a full spectrum of operational planning as part of ‘enhanced
military cooperation’, seems too much like an intentional duplication of the exist-
ing NATO military command structure. There may be more sense to the suggest-
on of having the EU planning and commanding staff open to the presence of the
respective representatives from NATO planning and command structures.

At present and well into the future, NATO’s strategic and operational capabilities,
which are based predominantly on US assets, will represent an indispensable back-
up for any type of EU military operation. They also ensure the necessary ‘escalation
dominance’ in case of any difficulties that such an operation may encounter.
By ensuring the availability of NATO assets, the ‘Berlin-plus’ agreement is a good
basis for a strategic partnership between the two organizations.
THE AMERICAN ‘CONNECTION’

For Poland and a number of other states, the prospect of ‘rivalry’ between the two organizations, NATO and the EU, is unacceptable. The two organizations are regarded as complementary circles of political, economic and military interaction between friendly and politically homogeneous states engaged in various complex processes and pursuing different, even at times contradictory, but not antagonistic, national interests. Some refer to the two circles as a ‘civilizational alliance’. The recent rift within this alliance of democratic states should teach us four lessons. First, interactions between the states that belong to these two circles cannot be based on the hegemonic position and unilateral policy of even the strongest state, like the USA. Secondly, multilateralism is not a necessity for the weaker states, but it is the best way for any state to participate in the modern world of today. Thirdly, military solutions to most contemporary international challenges is only one of many possible methods to be tried, and only after all the other ways have been fully explored. Of course, this does not mean that military forces should be discarded a priori or not accepted as one of a range of legitimate and effective methods of action. Finally, relationships between the allied states cannot be pursued in open opposition or hostility to the principal partner. The worst outcome of a fundamental breakdown, however remote and improbable it may seem, in the existing framework of Transatlantic cooperation, would be the re-nationalization of security policies in Europe. This would be disastrous for all states, particularly those of Central Europe, located between Germany and Russia and potentially always exposed to pressure from either side.

The American military presence in Europe is no longer needed because of a Cold-War-type threat from an adjacent area. Russia is slowly democratizing and modernizing its political system, and although it has not yet passed the point of no return on its road towards becoming a liberal, affluent and non-imperialist democracy, it is unlikely to pose a military threat in the years to come. It is now the USA which needs Europe as a staging area for its worldwide military operations. Given that this is the case, the actual deployment of US forces in Europe can be shaped, in terms of both their best location and their numbers, by taking more into
account purely American interests. For Europe itself, the US presence is increasingly symbolic. What really counts now is the robustness of America’s political, economic and military engagement in the world’s events and in issues in which European security interests are at stake. This can best be obtained through NATO and through cooperation between NATO and the EU.

Bearing in mind their national history, it is not surprising that Poles are distrustful of state-sanctioned pacifism in a world full of dictators and armed conflicts. On numerous occasions, Western states have showed clearly dubious or double moral standards in their dealings with authentic social movements struggling for independence and with dictatorial or oppressive regimes. This is why most East European societies have strong misgivings about the opposition of some political circles to the Iraq operation of 2003. They see this opposition as anti-Americanism rather than a superior moral stance, the anti-American crusade of some countries smacking of a desire for political compensation for their own loss of global influences or, in other cases, being simply a means of strengthening their own positions. Notwithstanding misgivings about the crudeness of its methods and the overbearing unilateralism on part of the present US leadership in relation to its allies, it cannot be denied that it is only the US today which has both real power and the political willingness to use it in defence of common US and European values and interests.

**MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION**

Proposals to develop a common European military industry as part of the common security and defence policy need no more arguing. The ESDP creates a new and badly needed impetus to such efforts. If successful, the new initiative concerning the establishment of a new institution to organize such efforts may help to bring European military potential more in line with the new security agenda of the Union. Moreover, a harmonization of military production, based in part on joint procurement planning and common R & D efforts, would appear to be the best possible remedy for falling European defence budgets and the steadily diminishing
internal weapons market in Europe. These new initiatives, which are aimed at incorporating the experience of already existing mechanisms like OCCAR or the Letter of Intent Framework Agreement, seem to be gaining wide acceptance, though the actual shape of such an institution is not yet clear. For example, the unequal rights of states in the OCCAR's procedures should not be perpetuated in the new institution, which should be open to all states that are willing to join.

The proposed armaments agency is raising great hopes, particularly in the less technologically advanced and financially weaker states of the Union, as well as in all the prospective new members, like Poland, which has observer status in the Informal Advisory Group. All of these states, some already participating in the Western European Armament Group, are pursuing ambitious programmes of restructuring and modernization, partly with a view to transforming their armed forces into EU (and NATO) inter-operable units. However, if past experiences are anything to go by, the weaker partners, with their uncertain qualitative input and few resources, are not easy to incorporate into cooperative agreements. There is a natural tendency for ‘cooperation of the strong’ to develop, based on competence rather than a willingness to participate. If only the market forces are to operate in this regard, this will certainly lead to a ruthless elimination of the weaker partners. In effect, these less advanced states would then be relegated to a position as permanent buyers of advanced weapon systems produced in other states. And the fact is that the weaker arms industries of the prospective new members often represent a large share of the national economy and the labour market. Their elimination, rational though it may seem in some West European capitals, is therefore not acceptable locally. These industries should be treated at least as supplementary to the mainstream or final assembly lines, which might require a measure of capital investment and goodwill. The desire to create a common defence-goods market may lead to a gradual dilution of Article 296 of the Union’s Treaty, which allows domestic military markets to be protected on grounds of national security and other vital interests. While this tendency to abandon protective norms is desirable in theory, it may be difficult for some states to accept without special measures moderating its negative impact on their own military industries.
A truly European military industrial market may not be created if only the supply side is organized on an increasingly common basis, with the demand side, that is, the ‘customers’ of military production, remaining organized entirely on a national basis. Thus, it seems that the future EU agency should also address the potential for common weapons procurement, regulations concerning the export of military and dual-purpose products, the standardization of military production, and other areas influencing the creation of a future EU-wide military capability. The military headline goal should also become a political guideline in terms of achieving far-reaching coherence in the national defence policies of EU members.
American political leaders and security experts are ambivalent about the European Union’s project to build a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) – to the extent that they are paying any attention to it at all.

For the past half century, US political leaders have expressed support, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, for a more cohesive Europe that could act, effectively and confidently, as America’s partner on the European continent and in the wider world. Yet when Europeans have actually moved to establish truly ‘common’ foreign security and defense policies, they have often been faced with American concerns that such coherence may become inward-looking and exclusive or based on ‘lowest-common-denominator’ consensus-building within the EU, and thus weaken the primacy of the NATO Alliance or impede US leadership and freedom of maneuver.

This ambivalence is reflected in the official attitude of both the Clinton and Bush Administration toward ESDP, which has been that of conditional support. The

1. This article updates an earlier chapter by the author in Esther Brimmer ed., The EU’s Search For A Strategic Role: ESDP and Its Implications for Transatlantic Relations, Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2002.
Clinton Administration’s support was conditioned by what Secretary of State Madeleine Albright termed the ‘three D’s’: no discrimination against non-EU NATO members, no decoupling of European and North American security, and no duplication of NATO’s operational planning system or its command structure. ‘No duplication’ was never defined, nor was it ever intended to mean that the EU should not develop certain capabilities that already existed in the Alliance; indeed many of the Clinton Administration’s efforts, such as the NATO Defense Capability Initiative, sought to prod the Europeans into developing precisely such capabilities. This distinction has been lost on many analysts.2

The Clinton Administration used these concerns to frame and guide its support for a more cohesive and responsive European foreign policy, and above all, for a more capable European defense. The Kosovo war affirmed to American leaders that not enough European armed forces were ready for the diverse, rapidly evolving challenges of the post-Cold War world. In American eyes, Europe has been sluggish in its efforts to manage the shift away from the massed, terrain-based forces necessary for the Cold War toward more mobile, deployable and sustainable forces and improved lift, logistics and intelligence capabilities. Kosovo underscored European dependence on the US for precision-strike capability, surveillance and intelligence assets, refueling, lift, and high-end command and control systems.

Republican political leaders who were openly skeptical and even scornful of ESDP during the Clinton years have, since joining the Bush Administration, essentially continued the Clinton Administration’s approach of conditional support tied to pressure for improved European military capabilities. President Bush basically reiterated the three D’s during his first meeting with other NATO Heads of State and Government in Brussels on June 13th 2001:

2. Madeleine K. Albright, ‘The right balance will secure NATO’s future,’ Financial Times, December 7th, 1998; the three D’s were subsequently amended by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson into the three ‘Ts’: indivisibility of the transatlantic link; improvement of capabilities; and inclusiveness of all Allies’.
‘We agreed that NATO and the European Union must work in common purpose. It is in NATO’s interest for the European Union to develop a rapid reaction capability. A strong, capable European force integrated with NATO would give us more options for handling crises when NATO, as a whole, chooses not to engage. NATO must be generous in the help it gives the EU. And similarly, the EU must welcome participation by NATO allies who are not members of the EU. And we must not waste scarce resources, duplicating effort or working at cross purposes.’

FOUR AMERICAN APPROACHES

Official US support for ESDP has been consistent, but it remains shallow. In part this reflects the domestic American struggle between a number of perspectives on ESDP. Any attempt to characterize such views as ‘schools of thought’ inevitably risks giving the debate more coherence and prominence than it really has, and it also risks downplaying the considerable overlap that exists between some of these perspectives. Nonetheless, drawing out such distinctions may help to illuminate the different ways in which American opinion leaders think about the issue.

ESDP supporters are primarily centrist Democrats and Republicans who believe that the United States needs a strong and coherent European Union as a partner on the European continent and beyond. They are concerned by Europe’s relative weakness, and believe that US-European power asymmetries are not healthy for either side. They believe that American popular support for a continuing US role in Europe is related to the perception that America’s European allies are willing and

3. Author’s italics. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Availability with President Bush and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, June 13th 2001.
able to assume more responsibility not only for their own security but also for defending common interests of the transatlantic community in the wider world, and see ESDP as a possible expression of that commitment. They accept that common foreign and security policy is a logical next step in the European integration process and that it can help to avoid the re-nationalization of European defense. They support ESDP as an initiative to improve European capabilities that, if developed with care, can also be mutually reinforcing with such NATO initiatives as the Prague Summit capability commitments and the NATO Response Force.

Supporters also believe that ESDP could equip the EU to assume the lead in the Balkans or to engage, if necessary, in areas such as Africa, where the US is unlikely to play a prominent role. They believe the United States should welcome a European capability for crisis management in situations where NATO – meaning, in practice, the United States – would decide not to become engaged. They welcomed the EU’s civilian headline goal, as set forth at the June 2000 Feira and June 2001 Göteborg European Council meetings, that EU member states should by 2003 be able to make available up to 5,000 police officers (of which 1,000 within 30 days) for EU contributions led by international organizations (UN or OSCE) or for autonomous EU missions; provide up to 200 experts in the rule of law field; establish a pool of experts to undertake civilian administrative tasks; and make available civil protection intervention teams of up to 2,000 persons that can be deployed at very short notice. Looking to future challenges, supporters believe that ESDP and the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) could both become vehicles for both US-EU and NATO-EU efforts to counter terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and to cooperate in civil emergency disaster relief, humanitarian relief and information security – all potential elements of collaboration under what one might term ‘transatlantic homeland security.’ In short, supporters believe that if ESDP and CFSP are developed and implemented properly, they can become the vehicles for a stronger, outward-looking Europe and a more balanced, global partnership with the United States.

Skeptics include conservative Atlanticists and many members of Congress, who question the wisdom of ESDP and the prospects of its success. They don’t believe
that the Europeans have the will or the wallet to achieve their goals. They are weary of repeated European capability pledges that go unfulfilled. They are concerned that ESDP could lead European governments to close or restrict European arms markets to U.S. competition. In short, they believe ESDP at best to be a meddlesome distraction from more serious security challenges, and at worst as a pernicious effort to counter US influence. According to this perspective, ESDP is simply one more example that the grand project of European integration has gone off the rails and is being defined less in terms of positive European ideals and transatlantic partnership and more in terms of ‘autonomy’ and as a counter to US power.

While the skeptics are concerned with what they see as divisive trends, another group – one could call them ‘the decouplers’ – believe that such divisions could benefit the transatlantic relationship. They believe that Europe is basically secure and that the U.S. faces more serious challenges elsewhere – the Greater Middle East, South Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region. They don’t believe that tiresome battles with the French or with Brussels bureaucrats over the arcane details of ESDP are worth their time or energy. Decouplers believe that if Europe can use ESDP to improve its own capacities and provide stability on its own continent, this could free the US to devote its own energies to these other, more serious regional threats.

For the decouplers, ESDP has become a convenient excuse for American burden-shedding in Europe. Decouplers seize on European rhetorical excesses – such as the EU’s declaration of ‘some operational capabilities’ for ESDP at the Laeken European Council in December 2001 – as ammunition for their domestic argument that the EU is ready and willing to take over certain US responsibilities. They welcome the Bush Administration’s concept of ‘backfilling’, which would assign to Europeans the prime responsibility for low-intensity missions and operations, notably in the Balkans, and thus free US military forces for high-intensity combat missions, and more generally for the management of ‘hard’ security issues, particularly in the Middle East and Asia. According to this view, such ‘backfilling’ could be the first step toward a new transatlantic ‘division of labour’ whereby
Europeans take on certain missions and Americans others. Decouplers are not numerous, but they do occupy influential positions in the upper reaches of the Pentagon and the White House and include a number of US Senators.

A fourth group, rising in prominence, are the ‘transformationists’. They include many defense intellectuals and senior military officers. They view ESDP through the prism of the revolution in military affairs that is transforming the entire way the US military approaches preparedness and warfare. This tremendous change is sparked by various factors, including massive US defense spending, the introduction of advanced technologies, and accompanying revolutions in the communications and information industries. Transformation is not only about money, technology or capability, however. These innovations are beginning to affect how the US organizes and trains for warfare, even how it thinks about it – and the pace of change is accelerating.

US military services are making dramatic strides in changing the way they fight. They are shifting from force-oriented to capability-oriented approaches to military planning; from attrition-based force-on-force warfare to effects-based operations; from terrain-based to time-based capabilities; and from segmented land, sea and air services to shared awareness and coordination across all military services, or what is termed the ‘joint’ force. They are focusing more on asymmetric threats. They are focusing on smart weapons, space-based systems, and C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) capabilities that can be used to synchronize and ‘leverage’ the capabilities of the entire force, and technologies and practices that can save manpower and increase lethality and survivability.4

The US Navy’s new doctrine of network-centric warfare, the US Army’s shift toward light, flexible and quickly deployable units that can be integrated into information networks, the US Air Force’s development of the global strike task force, the US Marine Corps’ shift from intermediate staging bases to direct projection of naval combat power on to onshore targets, the creation of the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), and the replacement of NATO’s Atlantic Command with Allied Command Transformation to experiment with different doctrines and to drive transformation throughout the US military and NATO as well are only a few examples of the changes underway. These innovations are fueled by large increases in spending and a $400 billion defense budget.

Seen from this perspective, ESDP seems almost quaint – and largely irrelevant. Transformationists question whether America’s European partners have truly grasped the dimensions of change underway and wonder whether they are prepared to make the decisions needed to fight alongside the Americans or even to be militarily valuable partners for the United States. The 2001 US Congressional Budget Office report on burden-sharing, which on the whole provides a balanced picture of European contributions, concludes that ‘a failure by many of NATO’s European members to keep up with technological advances could render them incapable of operating alongside US forces in future military conflicts’.5

The gaps are striking. First, there are gaps in sheer spending. Although Europe’s overall economic potential rivals that of the United States, European spending on military power is half that of the United States. Second, there are wide gaps in defense research and development (R&D) spending. The US spends close to six times what EU nations spend on military R&D. US expenditure on military R&D alone is greater than Germany’s entire defense budget. Third, there are spending gaps per service member. US spending per active duty service member is almost four times that of Europe’s. Fourth, there are gaps in the cost-effectiveness of spending. Although Europeans spend about half what the US spends, they get less

than 50% return in terms of capability, and little of it is spent on the power-projection missions of most relevance to the US.6

These disparities add up to an enormous gap in capabilities between US forces and even the most modern of European NATO forces. This transatlantic divide, in turn, is exacerbated by equally wide gaps among European forces themselves. Proportionately, whatever the measure of effort, the discrepancies between European leaders and laggards are even greater than those between Europe and the United States.

As a result, transformationists are increasingly resigned to transatlantic military divergence. They do not fault Europeans for failing to deal with the challenges faced in the past – they simply believe that US and European leaders have different future priorities for their military forces. Most European governments do not perceive the same magnitude of new threats or imagine themselves fighting the kinds of wars that are driving US innovation. Therefore, adapting their military forces to ensure they could win those wars is not a priority. Even if expectations were more closely aligned, Europeans would be constrained by the size and allocation of funds in their defense budgets. As a result, the Europeans are developing fewer innovations and experiencing less change in the most advanced military capabilities.

According to this perspective, ESDP is not responsible for the divergence between the US and European forces, but it could aggravate the problem. While the US is concentrating on high-technology improvements – such as striking targets precisely from great distances and integrating air and ground operations – rather than

focusing on peacekeeping, the EU is focusing on crisis-management – getting forces into a region in a timely way and establishing basic communications for passing information within a multinational force. While EU defense planners concentrate on constructing multinational forces that can operate together at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, the US armed forces are accelerating their efforts to exploit the information and communications technologies that are transforming US forces at the higher end.

In short, the transformationists believe that the US and European militaries are no longer looking at the same military tasks, which means that the two sides are becoming progressively less able to plan, train and operate together. If this is the case, they believe, then it won’t really matter whether a neat new set of NATO-EU cooperative mechanisms are agreed, because neither side will be likely to resort to them. They are much more focused on a new transatlantic gap – not merely a capability gap, but a looming ‘transformation gap’, that is, a potential breach in strategic orientation, spending priorities, conceptual and operational planning and training.

CONTINUED AMBIVALENCE

Despite their quite different starting points, these approaches do share some common ground. All are concerned more with the tensions arising from Europe’s current relative weakness than from any potential – and quite theoretical – tensions resulting from future European strength. Most believe that the US should welcome further European political and economic integration within the EU to the degree that it is accompanied by EU commitment to share international security and defense burdens. But even those who support ESDP’s potential are concerned that European force commitments and capability pledges too often tend to be little more than empty exercises in European self-assertion. Americans across the board are weary of repeated European efforts and pledges that seem to melt away with the next spring thaw. Experience has shown that, when European rhetoric exceeds European reality, the US usually has to pick up the pieces.
All – even most American supporters of ESDP – believe such efforts must avoid creating an EU caucus within NATO. This has been a key US concern – the potential for European views on security, and especially defense, to develop into fixed or semi-fixed positions, integrally tied into the intricate political trade-offs involved in European integration, without sufficient transparency to the US, and before the US engages in the process via NATO. US officials are concerned that such a dynamic has the potential to transform Alliance deliberations into formal negotiations between autonomous parties. They are also concerned about the opposite dynamic – that the EU fails to agree on a position, thus blocking potential NATO action through sheer indecision.

Concern is also shared about duplicative operational planning, which would contribute to the very transatlantic divergences many Europeans ostensibly seek to avoid. Having more than one place where operational planning takes place could produce different outcomes that would complicate any situation involving NATO-EU cooperation, especially escalation of a crisis from an Article 4 to an Article 5 contingency.

American ambivalence has been showcased over the past few years. On the positive side of the ledger, a set of key NATO-EU cooperation documents, known in the jargon as the ‘Berlin-plus’ package launched during the Clinton Administration, was finalized after rather painful and prolonged negotiations on March 17, 2003.7 The ‘Berlin-plus’ arrangements comprise four elements: assuring EU access to NATO operational planning; making NATO capabilities and common assets available to the EU; developing NATO European command options for EU-led operations, including the European role of NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied

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7. The term ‘Berlin-plus’ is a reference to the site of the 1996 meeting where NATO ministers agreed to create a European Security and Defense Identity and make Alliance assets available for that purpose. The EU and NATO established formal relations in January 2001, but the breakthrough came in December 2002, with the adoption of the EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP (for full text, see NATO Press Release (2002) 142).
Commander Europe (DSACEUR); and adapting the NATO defense planning system to allow for EU-run operations.

These cooperative arrangements facilitated the EU’s Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, a peacekeeping mission it assumed from NATO on April 1st, 2003. Daily EU-NATO operational coordination takes place in Bosnia and Herzegovina (where NATO-led forces are deployed in SFOR and the European Union has a police mission) and in Kosovo (where NATO-led forces are deployed in KFOR and the European Union is responsible for economic reconstruction). The EU conducted an ‘autonomous’ peacekeeping operation in the Congo in the summer of 2003 and is set to take over from NATO in Bosnia in mid-2004, with the UK as the lead nation. NATO and EU experts are working together on the EU’s European Capabilities Action Plan and NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitments.

Tensions resumed during the raw months of the transatlantic crisis over Iraq, however, when those European nations most opposed to US intervention in Iraq proposed the establishment of an independent military headquarters, with an independent planning capacity, for a new small core of EU nations committed to deeper defense integration. The Bush Administration reacted with alarm, and US Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns labelled the effort ‘the greatest threat to the future of the alliance’.8

An uneasy resolution was finally reached in December 2003: a small EU operational planning cell is being established within SHAPE to plan for ‘Berlin-plus’ contingencies, and NATO can liaise with the EU Military Staff in Brussels, which will have additional planning capacity for EU civilian operations and civil-military missions. This bitter interlude underscored once again how difficult it is to advance real partnership between NATO and the EU, despite the hard-won practical

arrangements now in place. Differences over strategy and respective roles have been shelved, not solved.

**ESDP: TEAPOT TEMPEST OR TRANSATLANTIC BELLWETHER?**

At times, the almost mind-numbing detail associated with efforts at NATO-EU cooperation makes it easy to reduce this issue to a policy wonk’s nightmare: hopeless, but not serious. But ESDP and NATO-EU cooperation are not marginal technical issues. They are emblematic of a central debate: how – and whether – Europe and the United States can align the grand experiment of European integration with a strategic shift of the transatlantic partnership to tackle together the challenges posed by the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world. Unfortunately, the allies are ducking this fundamental question, preferring instead to squabble over technical details.

Those in Europe who believe that they must weaken NATO to strengthen ESDP are only likely to achieve an insecure and incapable Europe unsure of itself and its role in the world. If they want Washington to support ESDP, they must produce real capabilities and assume real peacekeeping responsibilities, for instance in Bosnia. Those in the United States who believe that strengthening ESDP means weakening NATO are only likely to achieve a lonely superpower unable to count on the added abilities and resources of its allies when it comes to facing new threats and risks. If they want European support for US initiatives, they must be willing to allow allies to develop the capacity to do so.

ESDP was originally intended to address challenges posed by the post-Cold War strategic transformation of the 1990s, when the grand transatlantic Alliance lost the

enemy that held it together, Europe was beset by continuing turbulence across the European continent and great human tragedy in the Balkans, and West Europeans discovered that they remained unable themselves to stabilize their continent. The strategic debate at the time revolved around the question whether the United States and Europe were prepared to adapt and expand their partnership to the threats and opportunities posed by the collapse of communism and Soviet power in the eastern half of the continent. After great hemming and hawing, and tremendous human tragedy, the answer was ‘yes’. Europeans and Americans engaged in the Balkans, defined a new partnership with Russia, and expanded the zone of stability that once encompassed half of Europe to embrace the entire continent. In the process, they deepened and broadened their partnership beyond the traditional NATO model and included closer US-EU cooperation as part of a dense network of institutional cooperation that also spawned the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy.

While the original Petersberg tasks guiding the development of ESDP are broad and vague enough to incorporate the full spectrum of military activity, the clear focus of ESDP’s headline goal and accompanying activities is to equip the EU with a capacity for regional stabilization on or near its borders. Such a capacity would be a vast improvement on the EU’s record during the 1990s and should be welcomed by Americans.

Since September 11th, however, Europe and America find themselves in a second period of strategic transformation and redefinition. The post-9/11 strategic issue is whether the United States and Europe are once again prepared to adapt their partnership to address a diverse and dangerous set of challenges ranging far beyond the European continent.10 As this debate unfolds, there is some question in the United States how – and whether – ESDP as originally conceived will be relevant to this new agenda.

If ESDP was primarily about stabilizing the periphery of an increasingly stable Europe, can it also become the vehicle to equip Europeans to act far beyond their continent? If ESDP was originally intended to make Europeans marginally more effective at policing their own backyard, can it or should it be adapted to defend European societies from elusive terrorists, failed states or aggressive dictators in regions far away from the European homeland? If ESDP was originally intended to prevent future Bosnias, can it be adapted to prevent future Afghanistans? Or future Iraqs? Europeans are ambivalent about the answers to these questions, which in turn exacerbates American ambivalence about the entire ESDP enterprise.

A synergistic relationship between the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) and the NATO Response Force could reconcile this mutual ambivalence. The NRF is not intended to interfere with the ERRF; their missions are different. The NRF is designed for high-intensity combat and expeditionary strike missions, whereas the ERRF is currently intended primarily for peacekeeping and other Petersberg tasks. The NRF, with only 21,000 troops, will also be much smaller than the ERRF, which will have 60,000 ground troops and enough air and naval assets to bring the total to 100,000. The two are also structured differently: the NRF will be assigned to NATO’s integrated command; the ERRF is intended to advance EU goals. Each could be used to advance common transatlantic interests, regardless of institutional affiliation. The NRF is smaller, so its budget costs will be low, totaling $3-4 billion per year for investments. Since the forces assigned to the NRF already exist, there is no requirement for extra spending on manpower or operations. Certainly Europeans have to set priorities, but they possess the manpower and budgets to support both the NRF and the ERRF, and should not have to choose between them. The key is ensuring that the ‘dual-hatting’ of forces does not result in conflicting crisis-response duties.11

In short, there are ways to reconcile an evolving ESDP with diverse national interests within Europe and across the Atlantic, if the political will is there to do so. The United States is likely to continue its conditional support of an evolving ESDP, but the conditions of such support remain important. Although there are different American perspectives on ESDP, and much more of a debate within US leadership circles about its desirability than seems to be appreciated in Europe, there are some shared concerns about ESDP and what it may say about Europe’s ability to engage on the most vital challenges facing the transatlantic partnership.
INTRODUCTION

Although America traditionally saw itself as protected by vast oceans and weak or friendly neighbours, the attacks of September 11th 2001 catapulted her policymakers into a new area of security concerns: how best to protect an open, complex, and interdependent society from large-scale terrorism?

Internationally, the US went on the offensive. Its declared war on those who wittingly harbor terrorists, caused the downfall of the Afghan Taliban regime and the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and is now placing countries like Syria and Iran under pressure.

Domestically, the US embarked on a broad effort to enhance the protection of its homeland. This effort included measures within the field of intelligence and justice, border security, vulnerability reduction, infrastructure protection, and establishing capabilities to protect civilians in the case of a large-scale attack. With the greatest government restructuring in more than fifty years, the domestic efforts were given an institutional anchor in a new Department of Homeland Security.
The European reaction to September 11th was more measured. After a brief period of complete sympathy with the US, the notion emerged that the US was over-reacting. Differences over the appropriateness of a military response to international terrorism and the US policy in Iraq caused one of the worst transatlantic rifts in recent memory.

Less noticed were the differences in the domestic response to September 11th on the two sides of the Atlantic. A number of European countries already had experience of domestic terrorism and measures in place to combat it within the areas of intelligence, justice and law enforcement – the traditional field of counter-terrorism. Most of these countries reacted to September 11th by strengthening these existing instruments. However, there were no bureaucratic adjustments comparable to that undertaken in the US, and vulnerability reduction and protection against catastrophic terrorism were granted relatively low priority.

This chapter describes the domestic response to September 11th in the US and Europe respectively. It argues why the American approach to homeland security ought to be of interest to Europeans and discusses why and how Europe should organize its own efforts to protect civil populations against the new terror.

THE US RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11TH: HOMELAND SECURITY

The US was not completely unacquainted with domestic terrorism when the 9/11 hijackers caused the most deadly terrorist incident in history. In 1993 a failed attack on the World Trade Center caused a dozen casualties, and in 1995 a massive car bomb reduced the federal offices in Oklahoma City to rubble. But the illusion of a secure homeland was not decisively discarded until the fatal attacks of September 11th. Thus, US policy-makers had to develop instruments to protect the homeland virtually from scratch.
Yet, the dust had barely settled before a White House Office of Homeland Security was up and running, charged with coordinating the overall national response. The appointment of Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge – a widely respected former Congressman and long-standing friend of President George W. Bush – to head the new Office won broad applause. The Office immediately identified four priority areas, informed by the vulnerabilities exposed by the attacks of September 11th and the anthrax letters of the fall 2001: better prepared first responders, improved capabilities to deal with a bio-attack, enhanced border security, and improved sharing of intelligence between different federal agencies.1

Meanwhile, think tank reports were published, legislation introduced, budgets increased. The Federal Aviation Administration took action to strengthen airport security; the FBI was re-oriented to focus on prevention rather than investigation; the Department of Defense restored defense of the homeland as its main priority; and the Department of Health and Human Services boosted its nascent bio-terror research programmes.

Discussions about overall strategy remained on the margins for a while. Priority was given to instant vulnerability reduction and, despite the efforts of the White House Office for Homeland Security, different federal agencies each acted within their area of responsibility, giving the American response a rather inchoate character.2

Despite a general perception of urgency and Tom Ridge’s close ties with President Bush, efforts to enhance the protection of US borders by integrating the US Coast Guard, Customs and the border enforcement functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service foundered on bureaucratic resistance. An attempt to induce

improved sharing of intelligence between various federal agencies also created limited results. Various government agencies still keep around a dozen separate terrorist watch lists and refuse to share them with each other.³

The proposal to create a new Department of Homeland Security, put forward in May 2002, and President Bush’s National Strategy for Homeland Security, presented the following month, aimed to introduce more coherence. The strategy outlined the triple goal of preventing attacks, reducing vulnerability and minimizing damage from such attacks as do occur. To that end it called for upgraded and tightly integrated efforts in six critical mission areas – intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counter-terror and law enforcement, protection of critical infrastructure, protection against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats (CBRN threats), and emergency preparedness and response.⁴

The increased sharing of intelligence between police, customs and immigration authorities would make it more difficult for known or potential terrorists to enter the US. Stronger domestic counter-terrorism measures, the fusion of intelligence from a greater number of different sources, and enhanced analytic capabilities would increase the chance of interdicting attacks. Tightened standards for port security, increased resources for the US Coast Guard, and physical inspection of more of the containers crossing US borders would make the smuggling of dangerous materials that could be used in a terrorist attack more difficult.

Inside the US, particularly vulnerable or attractive targets, such as nuclear and chemical plants, symbolic buildings and monuments and important government


installations should be hardened or physically protected. Critical physical and cyber infrastructure was to be mapped in order to devise better ways of protecting it and, since the ownership of much of this infrastructure was in private hands, new strategies for public-private cooperation were to be devised.

Finally, the training, equipment and inter-operability of first responders were to be upgraded and an extensive information campaign introduced to educate and inform the public about how to react in the case of different forms of attack.

To ensure the implementation of this vast programme and coordinate its various elements, a new Department of Homeland Security, combining units from more than twenty federal agencies, was set up, and Governor Tom Ridge appointed as its Secretary. By March 2003 most of the agencies concerned had joined this Department, creating an almost 190,000-strong bureaucracy with a yearly budget of more than $40 billion.

A number of crucial homeland security functions remained outside the new department. Local and state governments continue to play key roles in the areas of health, police work and emergency response. Moreover, several different federal agencies remain involved, such as the FBI, the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Energy. Finally, the private sector is an important player in areas like infra-structure protection and transportation security.

The Department of Homeland Security functions as the key point of contact for state and local-level actors as well as the private sector. The White House Office of Homeland Security has been established as a policy-planning and cross-governmental coordination unit at the federal level.

**HOME LAND SECURITY ABROAD**

Most of the activities of the new US Department of Homeland Security have focused on the domestic situation. Yet, based on a philosophy of the need to push
the perimeter of defense as far out as possible, the Department and other federal agencies have initiated international cooperation in a number of areas.

The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security have pushed for international cooperation in the areas of law enforcement and intelligence. The number of judicial attachés at American representations abroad has been increased, the FBI and Europol have entered into a number of liaison agreements, and common American-European investigative teams are being established. The US Coast Guard is involved in training personnel responsible for border security in a number of European countries. Moreover, in order to enhance border security without placing undue obstacles in the way of international trade, the US and Canada have entered into so-called ‘smart border’ agreements. The programme, which it is planned to extend to Mexico in the near future, entails a voluntary expanded security screening of persons, transporters and companies, who are then permitted to jump the normal inspection line at the border.

The US has also pushed for enhanced maritime and harbor security within the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and for tighter air transportation security and higher standards for travel documents within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The Container Security Initiative (CSI) entails agreements between American authorities and the harbor authorities of the twenty largest export harbors in Europe and Asia to permit American inspectors to pre-screen shipping containers destined for the US.

The Department of Homeland Security has also announced its intention to promote cooperative research programmes with American allies in order to develop better homeland security technologies, such as improved censors for the detection of dangerous materials and early warning in case of an attack. Finally, cross-border cooperation between the US, Canada, and Mexico in the area of emergency preparedness and crisis reaction has been initiated to permit an effective response and mutual assistance in the case of an attack spilling over the border.
A LAYERED DEFENSE

American homeland security spans a vast area. As shown above, it covers multiple societal sectors, numerous professions and many levels of government. Despite the creation of an organizational anchor in the form of the Department of Homeland Security and the attempt to formulate a national strategy for homeland security, the challenge of creating a coherent and integrated response remains substantial. Yet, this seemingly amorphous response reflects the challenge: everything is a potential target, and numerous objects can function as potential weapons. The attacker, moreover, operates anonymously, frequently from within the society being targeted.

The various American initiatives can be regarded as a homeland defense in more layers consisting of the measures described above. Defense starts on the international level, with various multilateral and bilateral agreements. It continues at US borders, with reinforced patrolling, upgraded technology etc. Behind the borders, domestic counter-terrorism and protective measures in the area of infrastructure and transportation constitutes a third layer. Finally, the defense is rounded off with a coordinated emergency preparedness and response system.

Lacking a simple and unitary solution to the challenge posed by the new terror, this layered defense, which the US is currently in the process of setting up, should increase the chances of interdicting attacks before they can be carried out, while improving the resilience of American society if attacks are not interdicted.

EUROPE’S RESPONSE: COUNTER-TERRORISM

In Europe, the attacks of September 11th prompted a somewhat different reaction. When the hijacked aircraft hit their targets in New York and Washington, individual European countries were well positioned to respond in the areas of intelligence, law enforcement, and justice – the traditional fields of counter-terrorism. Cooperation between secret services and police agencies inside individual European countries had improved during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, as waves of
terrorism hit France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Britain. A number of countries thus already had experience of terrorism and measures in place to counter it. Most reacted to September 11th by strengthening existing counter-terrorism instruments further.

Legislation expanding the powers of the intelligence agencies, police authorities and prosecutor’s offices was passed by national parliaments at extraordinary speed. Additional funding was provided for these agencies, and a number of countries that had not had special anti-terror legislation prior to September 11th enacted such laws.5

At the European level, the 1990 Schengen Agreement and the cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs introduced with the 1991 Maastricht Treaty provided a framework in which police cooperation and data-sharing between national authorities was already taking place. The attacks on the US added further impetus to this nascent cooperation in the field of internal security.6

Thus, within a few months of September 11th, the Council had agreed a common European definition of terrorism, the harmonization of penalties for terrorist crimes, a common arrest warrant, and provisions for the freezing or seizure of terrorist assets.7 Moreover, a common European list of organizations and persons

linked to terrorist activities was established; a new agency, Eurojust, composed of high level magistrates and prosecutors, was created to assist in investigating cross-border crimes; and a counter-terrorism unit was established within Europol, the European Police Office in The Hague.8

The efforts to reduce societal vulnerabilities and strengthen protective capabilities were, in contrast, significantly weaker and less focused. It was indicative of the difference in priority granted to counter-terrorism and protective measures that the first five of seven priorities identified in the EU’s anti-terrorism action plan of September 2001 related to creating or strengthening instruments and cooperation within the spheres of intelligence, police and justice. Only one – air transport security – was protective in nature. The final priority related to strengthening the integration of counter-terrorism efforts within the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).9

Eventually, it was decided to establish a communication network for the exchange of urgent information about chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear threats (CBRN threats). Furthermore, towards the end of 2002 the Council approved a programme to improve the Union’s ability to support member states’ efforts in the area of civil protection. It recommended a variety of initiatives, such as stronger risk-analysis capabilities, measures to protect vulnerable infrastructure, better monitoring arrangements for the rapid detection of CBRN attacks, improved stocks of vaccines, and reinforced research and development activities. However, since the task of civil protection remained within the area of competence of mem-


ber states, the programme had no legal implications and the Union provided no funding to promote its implementation.\textsuperscript{10}

A Council proposal to name a ‘European Civil Protection Coordinator’ and create a ‘Civil Protection Agency’ – initiatives that might have upgraded Europe’s protective efforts – found limited resonance. Though some countries were interested in creating a coordinator with political weight and an agenda setting role, most apparently preferred a narrow focus on the technical and operational aspects of civil protection.\textsuperscript{11}

Individual European countries did strengthen their protective capabilities to different extents. Some increased funding for emergency preparedness agencies, established bio-terror research centers, and verified or increased national stockpiles of vaccines. But responsibility for the various protective initiatives remained scattered among different cabinet-level ministries and services, such as health, energy, commerce, transportation and research.\textsuperscript{12} The inter-ministerial bodies and committees charged with coordinating the overall national efforts against terrorism con-

\textsuperscript{10} Council Document 13941/1/02; Council Document 15861/02.
continued to be dominated by the traditional counter-terrorism ministries, justice, interior and defense.\(^\text{13}\)

In other words, protective efforts were also given a relatively low priority by the individual states, and coordination of the various measures was less well institutionalized than coordination of the traditional counter-terrorism efforts – the offensive side of homeland security.

**THE FUTURE COURSE**

The European Convention's draft constitution contains a number of provisions relating to the fight against international terrorism. The so-called solidarity clause stipulates that EU members should come to each other's aid in the case of a terrorist attack or natural disaster, using all available civil and military means. Moreover, the draft suggests a gradual move towards an integrated management of the EU's external borders. This would entail a harmonization of procedures and equipment, as well as a greater focus on security in controlling the flow of persons and goods into the Union.\(^\text{14}\)

By including a solidarity clause, EU leaders are signaling that Europe takes the new terror seriously and is determined to defend itself against it.\(^\text{15}\) Thus, the provisions of the convention's draft constitution indicates a dawning interest in the protective side of homeland security, as well as a recognition that an effective effort presupposes close European cooperation.


Yet, as argued above, creating capabilities to do this effectively is still proceeding too slowly. Currently equipment, standards and procedures vary considerably across the EU; civil protection remains an area of member-state competence; and the Union has not provided any funds to promote upgraded and more even standards in the area.

THE STATE OF EUROPEAN DEFENSES

In sum, the European response to September 11th was concentrated within the areas of intelligence, justice and law enforcement. Enhanced powers given to national intelligence agencies and police forces were supplemented by reinforced procedures for European counter-terrorism cooperation. The efforts were provided with an institutional anchor in the Council and the Directorate-General for Justice and Home Affairs.

European protective efforts, in contrast, still consist of a patchwork of point solutions contributed by the Union, member states and individual ministries, agencies and services within the latter. Currently Europe operates with only a single layer of defense against large-scale terrorism, as opposed to the multiple layers that the US authorities are currently in the process of building.

The US approach to homeland security is far from unproblematic, and European counter-terrorism efforts anything but negligible. But whereas Europe’s earlier experience with terrorism is a valuable asset from which the US could learn, it might also pose a certain danger – the danger of relying on old solutions to address problems that require new responses.

National intelligence services and police forces may suffice in dealing with the old form of limited terrorist violence as experienced by Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. But, as September 11th made clear, terrorists no longer operate under self-imposed limits as to the number of civilian casualties they are willing to inflict. High body counts have apparently become an end in itself, and large-scale orche-
strated and synergistic attacks have become an al-Qaeda hallmark. Combined with the continued democratization of technology and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, this lends new poignancy to an old problem.\textsuperscript{16}

The shock of September 11\textsuperscript{th} forced American policy-makers to look at the problem of terrorism and societal vulnerabilities with fresh eyes. The question is, to what extent is the American attempt to set up a broad and integrated homeland defense relevant to Europe as well?

\section*{EUROPE’S VULNERABILITY}

The attacks in Madrid in March 2004\textsuperscript{17} might confirm what we already know from intelligence, arrests and interrogations, namely that Europe should not consider itself immune to the new terror. The continent served as a logistical base for the September 11\textsuperscript{th} attackers and has itself been the target of a number of foiled plots. The US embassy in Paris, the Christmas market in Strasbourg, a US base in Belgium and US military facilities in Great Britain were among the planned targets of terrorist groups located in London, Rotterdam and Frankfurt. There is no doubt that cells sympathizing with al-Qaeda are active in Europe.\textsuperscript{18}

Europe shares many of America’s vulnerabilities, with its long, porous borders, open societies, population and asset concentrations, a plethora of potential soft targets, and dependence on critical infrastructure, which again depends on networked IT systems. Furthermore, many European countries have done a poor job


\textsuperscript{17} At the time of writing, it appeared increasingly clear that groups affiliated with al-Qaeda might have been involved in the train bombings in Madrid on March 11th 2004.

\textsuperscript{18} Non-confidential report on the terrorism situation and trends in Europe, EU TE-SAT 14280/2/02, pp. 19-27.
of integrating their sizeable Muslim minorities, creating alienated groups on the fringes of society. Such groups not only provide recruitment potential for extremist anti-West organizations, but might also supply the logistical base and support structure that terrorists need to carry out attacks in Europe or elsewhere.

Even assuming that the US remains first in the line of terrorist fire, there are a number of scenarios in which a strike against the US would hit Europe almost immediately. An undetected biological attack on a major US airport could hit Europe within seven hours – the time it takes an aircraft to cross the Atlantic. A cyber attack on computer networks in either Europe or the US would also hit both almost simultaneously. The US and Europe are also linked by various transportation, trade and financial networks, meaning that an attack on either side of the Atlantic would inevitably reverberate on the other side as well.

Arguably, large-scale terrorist violence in Europe is not a distant prospect but a realistic possibility. Therefore, Europe ought to take an interest in current US efforts within the area of protection and the reduction of vulnerability.

A EUROPEAN HOMELAND?

Arguably it makes no sense to talk about a European homeland. As opposed to the states in the US Federation, Europe’s nation states retain sovereignty in a number of key areas, such as intelligence, defense, police, health and civil protection. From a formal or strictly judicial point of view, there is no European homeland.

Yet, although the European Union does not have at its disposal all the political instruments it needs to conduct an effective broad-based homeland security strategy, it certainly makes sense to talk about one European homeland in a functional sense: The vulnerability of individual European countries makes them so interdependent that none of them can effectively protect their citizens on their own. Bio, nuclear or cyber terror against one European country is likely to hit numerous Europeans from different countries. A chemical or radiological attack on a Euro-
European capital might have consequences for several countries in the region. Even conventional attacks are likely to cause ripple effects far from their target in today’s increasingly complex and interdependent societies. Moreover, as the creation of a free internal European market proceeds, competitive pressure on providers of, for example, energy or transportation services would, in the absence of agreed common security standards, result in the lowest common denominator. Clearly, effective homeland security would require close European cooperation.

The total elimination of the terrorist risk is clearly impossible, and even a reduction of risk along US lines will certainly turn out to be very expensive. It is up to each individual society to determine how many resources it is willing to devote to reducing its vulnerability and increasing response capabilities. Moreover, there are limits to what the European Union can and should do. Intelligence and defense are likely to remain member-state prerogatives, and a common EU police force is still a distant prospect. Issues of legitimacy and accountability regarding EU homeland security activities also remain to be addressed.19

Nevertheless, when the potential victims of a terrorist attack are to be numbered in the thousands, it is arguably time to upgrade common European preventive and protective measures in the areas where a lack of efforts in one country makes every European less secure.

ORGANIZATIONAL STREAMLINING

Obtaining an overview of the functions and responsibilities of homeland protection in Europe today represents a significant challenge. A vast diversity of national bureaucratic set-ups combined with several directorate-generals and numerous committees, networks and agencies at the EU level. For example, as many as thirteen different working parties and committees with various institutional affiliations were involved in the drafting of the Union’s programme for protection against CBRN threats. A variety of different networks and expert groups were also engaged, spanning the fields of civil protection, health and pharmaceuticals, animal, plant and food safety, energy, transportation, the environment and telecommunications. In the aftermath of September 11th, officials maintained that coordination between the relevant agencies was reasonably good, at least at the national level, but they also noted that it depended a great deal on the sense of urgency that prevailed in that period.20

Currently, the Council and the Commission are responsible for coordinating instruments and initiatives within their respective areas of competence. But arguably, the sheer complexity of the field and the variety of actors, institutions and organizations involved means that effective coordination will require some bureaucratic consolidation, as well as the full-time attention of an organization dedicated to the purpose. Moreover, in times of relative quiet on the terrorism front, top politicians will naturally turn their attention to other pressing problems. Meanwhile, it is unlikely that bureaucracies that have been created for different purposes and have their own priorities and allegiances will keep concentrating on homeland protection and coordination with the various other relevant agencies at the local, national, European and international levels.21 Finally, though the cost-effectiveness of homeland security measures is extremely difficult to measure, the creation of an institutional anchor charged with comprehensive responsibility increases the

21. The decision of EU leaders on March 26th, 2004 to appoint a European anti-terrorism coordinator might go some of the way towards solving this problem.
chances that, with time, efforts will be concentrated in the areas where the payback in terms of added security are the highest.

A DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR HOMELAND PROTECTION

One possible solution would be to create a European directorate-general for homeland protection. Such an organization would differ from the US Department of Homeland Security by focusing mainly on protection – the area where European efforts are most seriously lacking – instead of on both counter-terrorism and protection, like the US Department of Homeland Security. In the efforts to secure the European homeland, it would thus complement and liaise closely with the Justice and Home Affairs Council and the Directorate-General for Justice and Home Affairs, without either merging with them or swallowing up their own functions.

The EU has already the competence to issue standards in a number of critical homeland-security areas, such as food safety, transportation and nuclear safety. In many instances, it would thus be a question of upgrading the importance of defense against terrorism in terms of how current responsibilities are exercised. This could be achieved by transferring units responsible for food safety, communicable and emerging diseases, air and maritime security, and nuclear safety respectively from the Directorate-Generals for the Environment, Health and Consumer Protection, and Energy and Transportation to a new directorate-general for homeland protection.22

22. For instruments and legislation in the area of nuclear safety and security, cyber security, maritime safety, air safety and threats to health, see the EU’s official websites, respectively,
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/index_en.htm,
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/transport/themes/maritime/english/safety/index_safety.html,
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/transport/air/safety/index_en.htm
This would ensure sustained attention and better coordination between various European efforts to protect itself against large-scale terrorism. By ensuring a significant streamlining and upgrading of the field of protection, the creation of a directorate-general would also further the potential for effective international coordination of vulnerability reduction and protection. Whereas international partners and private-sector actors currently have to find their way around a vast diversity of frequently very complex national and EU-level institutional arrangements, a directorate-general would provide an easily identifiable and dedicated interlocutor in Brussels.

NEW EU COMPETENCIES

As already mentioned, the European Union already has competence in a number of homeland security-related fields. However, in some additional areas, where member states currently have the competence, European vulnerability interdependence is so high that effective protection requires new community competencies. Common and binding standards in the areas of biopreparedness, infrastructure protection and cyber security will be crucial in order to protect civil populations effectively and prevent competitive internal market pressures resulting in the lowest common security denominator.

Of course, common standards would have to take into account the fact that vulnerabilities and needs vary from country to country and from site to site. Instead of spelling out particular steps, they should focus on the goals to be obtained in terms of reduced vulnerability and improved resilience. Moreover, to ensure the effectiveness of protection against terrorists who think strategically and innovate tactically, it will be crucial to create a feedback loop between practitioners in the field and planners in Brussels.

Promoting an organizational culture in which insights do not invariably originate at the center, but instead are permitted to trickle up from decentralized networks of practitioners – an organizational culture very different from that currently pre-
dominating in Brussels – will be a great challenge. Yet, the so-called ‘method of open coordination’, in which common procedures emerge out of an exchange of best practice instead of centrally issued standards, might be increasing in significance. The European Convention’s draft constitution has recommended an expanded use of the method in, for example, social policy and labour market affairs. The application of this procedure in formulating, evaluating and updating common standards for homeland protection would contribute towards an effective and flexible European defense.

The creation of a directorate-general for homeland protection would improve European defenses significantly. But core competencies would remain at the level of the member states. To ensure the most effective protection of the individual European citizen, consolidation within the homeland protection field should therefore be complemented with intensified cooperation across these different policy areas and levels of government.

The European Convention’s draft constitution suggests the creation of the post of European Foreign Minister. This person would be represented in both the Commission and the Council and thus, while hopefully providing the EU with a more united external face, also help bridge the institutional divide within the Union. Attaching a deputy foreign minister for homeland security to this foreign minister might help provide the kind of cross-governmental leadership that will be needed for an effective European homeland security policy.

CONCLUSION

On the domestic front, the US and Europe reacted differently to the new terror. Whereas the US embarked on a broad effort covering counter-terrorism, systematic vulnerability reduction and the development of protective capabilities, European efforts were concentrated mainly in the area of counter-terrorism, relying on intelligence services, law-enforcement and justice. These European instruments remain indispensable in dealing with the new terror. However, arguably they
do not suffice – and unless we brace ourselves for an Orwellian world of surveillance and control, intelligence agencies will never be able to interdict all attacks. Some will inevitably happen. Therefore, it is crucial to upgrade Europe’s protective efforts and create a defense in more layers.

Certainly, the intellectual, organizational and practical challenges posed by homeland protection are daunting. Everything is a potential target, the attacker operates anonymously, is willing to die for the sake of harming others, and has more and more destructive weapons at his disposal. Thus, inevitably, the efforts to provide protection against large-scale and complex terrorism will involve a substantial measure of learning by doing, and inevitably most policy-initiatives and bureaucratic constructions will have to be re-adjusted along the way.

Re-organizing for European homeland protection and transferring new competencies to the EU level are not ultimate answers to the question of how to protect Europe’s civil populations effectively. However, these measures would at least institutionalize homeland protection as a long-term EU concern, create institutions dedicated to the challenge, provide for a more rational and effective way of approaching it, and make sure that the issue does not slide down or off the political agenda in times of relative quiet.
The aim of the present volume has been to provide an overview of the central challenges facing the European Union in terms of developing a common security and defence policy. In so doing, the contributors have, perhaps unsurprisingly, raised more questions than they have answered. This reflects the open-ended nature of the political processes that are currently taking place in Europe: The future of the ESDP cannot be determined by mechanically analyzing a fixed set of clearly identifiable variables. A host of known and unknown factors are currently impinging on the development of the ESDP, and an even larger number of unknown future developments will influence the further course of events. Prediction and scenario-building is a thankless task these days, and while it seems reasonable to assume that significant changes are under way, it is much more difficult to make out the different possible trajectories of change.

The second chapter of the present volume claimed that retaining the status quo was not a viable option. The existing modalities of European security and defence policy are simply not sustainable because they fall short of satisfying either national or multilateral requirements of effective military force projection. Current budgetary allocations are not necessarily insufficient, but they are spread too thinly across a multitude of different security and defence frameworks. Since the end of the Cold War, most European states have slashed defence expenditure without initiating fundamental reforms of their armed forces. Most states consequently entertain
what are in effect miniaturized versions of the mass armies they developed during the Cold War. These force structures are not adapted or equipped to handle the new security threats.

If Europeans – individually and collectively – want to be a credible actor in international security, they will have to reassess their current security and defence policies, and especially their spending patterns. Europe has the economic muscle and political clout to be an active force in international security, and the individual members of the Union arguably have the potential building blocks that could make the EU a credible military force as well. For this to happen, however, things will have to change. Western Europe prospered under the benign security regime of the United States, which fostered a liberal security community underpinned by common values and ideals. The basic building blocks of the system are currently changing, however, and Europe will have to adapt in order to safeguard this security community. ‘If we want things to stay as they are, they will have to change’, professes the young Tancredi to his uncle, the Prince of Salina, in Lampe-dussa’s *The Leopard*. Much the same could be said of European security at the beginning of the 21st Century: If Europe wants to remain at the centre of the international security debate, it must strengthen its capacity to project military force.

The preceding chapters have offered an overview of the central challenges facing the Union in the further development of the ESDP. Instead of trying to summarise the vast material presented by the contributors, this final chapter will take a few steps back and attempt to make sense of developments from a theoretical perspective.

At the beginning of the volume, a cursory discussion of different theoretical approaches to the study of European integration was presented. It was argued that the interests and policies of the member states were of paramount importance in understanding the ESDP. Few would question the relevance of the state-centric perspective in making sense of European security and defence policies, but, as the preceding chapters have shown, there are also dynamics that cannot be reduced to the simple categories of theoretical intergovernmentalism. This chapter will conse-
quently revisit the theoretical agenda, suggesting other ways of analyzing the political developments that are currently taking place in relation to the ESDP.

**REVISITING THE CONCEPT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**

One of the leading figures in early integration studies, Ernst Haas, defined integration as ‘the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and larger centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states’. The early integration theories were quite optimistic in assuming that the process of integration would be linear and self-reinforcing, thanks, *inter alia*, to the process of spill-over. The latter concept was defined by Charles Lindberg as ‘a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth.’ Integration in one field naturally leads to integration in others, and as the capacity and authority of the new centre grows, still more citizens will shift their 'loyalties, expectations, and political activities' towards the new centre. The creation of a customs union between the members of the European Community thus necessitated the development of a common commercial policy. Likewise, the creation of an internal market necessitated the development of a common agricultural policy to replace the divergent and discriminatory national policies.

The optimism of the early integration theories made them an easy target for criticism (and caricature) when the integration process ground to a halt because of political differences between the member states. Integration theory fell in disrepute, and more traditional, state-centric intergovernmentalism invaded the field of study. One of the early traditionalist critics, Stanley Hoffmann, suggested that a division of labour might be called for, leaving supranationalists to toy around with the low politics of economic integration, while the field of high politics would remain the exclusive domain of intergovernmentalists. National governments might be enticed to pool their sovereignty in policy fields that do not threaten the very core of their national authority, but they would certainly reject the idea of granting other states a say in questions of their own ‘national security’. In matters of life and death, risk-averse governments prefer to keep a tight rein.

The ESDP is thus the last place one would imagine supranational theories having any explanatory relevance, this being the archetypical example of so-called high politics. It is nevertheless worth considering the relevance of the integration theories in making sense of current political developments in Europe.

From the preceding chapters, it is possible to suggest a number of factors that are enabling closer collaboration in the fields of security and defence policy. The integration pull is provided by the converging interests of EU members. This factor basically amounts to the traditional intergovernmentalist position: integration is proceeding because the governments of the EU member states support the process. Following the Saint-Malo Summit of 1998, the majority of the member states espoused the ambition of creating an effective ESDP with a distinct European capacity for international force projection, including a rapid reaction force of 60,000 men. The interests and motives of the member states are varied, but there would seem to be an increasingly common recognition that a certain capacity for


military action is an essential element in the efforts to make the Union a credible, international actor.

The adoption of a security strategy in December 2003 is another example of policy convergence in Europe. Member states have previously been reluctant to broach the issue, lest the efforts to develop a common security strategy revealed fundamental and unbridgeable differences. However, the debacle over Iraq made it clear that the EU had to take a clear stand on the new security threats. Without a common policy line, the EU could only react to American initiatives in the struggle against terrorist networks and WMD-proliferating states. The adoption of the security strategy is likely to intensify cooperation in the area of security and defence. The ability to agree on the definition of key threats to European security reflects the emergence of an increasingly common threat perception, which is obviously an important precondition for moving from a purely reactive to a proactive security policy. Negotiating a common position remains an intensely political affair, where other strategic interests come into play. Member states will have different (domestic) priorities and different views on the transatlantic relationship or on bilateral relations with relevant third parties. But having defined the salient threats in a common strategy beforehand, the Union does not have to start the formulation of a common position with a debate on whether terrorism, weapons of mass destruction or failing states are relevant threats to the security of the EU.

Being a negotiated document, the security strategy obviously contains language that is open to interpretation. Disagreements over the exact meaning of the wording are therefore likely to emerge at the level of implementation. Also, a common security strategy does not necessarily lead to a common strategic concept concerning the use of military force. As emphasised in Chapter two above, the member states are a very diverse group when it comes to strategic culture. Some have long-standing traditions of military activism, of promoting values abroad using both civilian and military means, while other member states have a predominantly pacific culture. As argued in Chapter 4 on the debate on ESDP in the Convention and the IGC, the introduction of flexibility, with structured cooperation alongside a mutual defence clause that does not include all EU members, is effectively an
acknowledgement of the diversity in strategic outlook within the Union. However, past differences are not necessarily a reliable guide to future behaviour: recent events would seem to suggest that the EU could indeed be developing a common strategic culture. While Operation Artemis in Bunia, Congo, was heavily dependent on French contingents, it included combat troops from the United Kingdom and Sweden (traditionally non-aligned) and non-combat troops from Germany and Belgium. Operation Artemis suggests that the EU is indeed capable of developing a ‘strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention’.

On a more general level, the very development of the ESDP, and the close intellectual and practical link between military and civilian resources in crisis management, suggests agreement on a common approach, where the use of military force is seen as only one of a number of instruments in the EU’s so-called ‘toolbox’.

A convergence of national interests is obviously a necessary condition for the ESDP to develop, but it is hardly a sufficient explanation, in that it does not shed any light on why interests are converging. Member states obviously find it advantageous to cooperate in this field, but in order to understand why, we may have to move beyond the limits of traditional intergovernmentalist theory.

The concept of ‘spill-over’ is probably too controversial to be useful in the present context, but the basic idea remains persuasive: the common external policies of the Union, especially the Common Foreign and Security Policy, must be backed by a certain capacity for action if they are to be credible. Issuing a common demarche to warring parties is one thing – getting them to listen is quite another, and the latter is more often than not a function of the capacity for resolute action to back up the demarche. The European Union may possess a strong capacity for peacekeeping, reconstruction and development, but the application of these foreign policy

5. The operation also enjoyed support from South African, Brazilian, and Canadian troops.
instruments presupposes a certain capacity for international force projection. The EU cannot deploy humanitarian aid, police forces or election observers without a minimum capacity for military force projection. Sometimes, you may need the stick to offer the carrot, and if the European Union wants an international role, it must include some military instruments in its toolbox.

Other factors are simultaneously pushing in the direction of increased cooperation. The integration push includes the structural constraints stemming from the rising costs of military technologies and the increasing expectations of third parties. In terms of structural constraints, EU member states are finding it increasingly difficult to keep abreast of military-technological developments. As the hi-tech component of modern military equipment is increasing, the cost structures are gradually becoming prohibitively expensive. Similarly, large-scale acquisition programmes and investments in research and development are increasingly going beyond the scope of national European economies. These changes were clearly spelled out in Chapter 6, on defence reform. The smaller member states and the most recent newcomers from Central and Eastern Europe are already feeling the pinch, and some member states have already been forced to shelve projected acquisitions and modernization programmes. In light of the immense costs of maintaining a modern fleet of fighter planes, a number of Central and Eastern European countries are thus considering different long-term leasing options being offered by Western aircraft industries. In this sense, the (European) nation state may no longer be the appropriate or optimal framework for organizing military defence. When forced to choose between obsolete weapon systems or common weapon systems, the chances are that most member states will opt for the latter (or, as is perhaps more likely, a mixture of both).

While the citizens of Europe may have been reluctant in ‘shifting their loyalties’ to the new centre, their expectations and political activities are increasingly focused on Brussels. For all the methodological limits to opinion polls, it is striking to note the

growing popular support for a European defence.\textsuperscript{9} Even more important, perhaps, are the external expectations of third parties towards Europe.\textsuperscript{10} This may seem somewhat dated in light of the political debacles of 2003, which saw both Washington and Moscow in hectic bilateral consultations with the capitals of Europe (rather than Brussels), but the argument still stands. The analysis of the European security strategy presented in Chapter 3 of the present volume suggests that it should be seen as part of a transatlantic dialogue; the Europeans reassuring the United States that they share the same security concerns. The US administration may prefer bilateral contacts over a multilateral dialogue, but it nonetheless expects the European Union to have a policy on international security matters. The expectations of other (and smaller) third parties are even more pronounced and decidedly focused on the common institutions of the Union. The countries located on the periphery of the Union are obviously a case in point. Demands and expectations are placed upon the Union, and by reacting to them the Union is reinforcing its international presence, thus feeding what could become a process of positive reinforcement.

We are witnessing a process of European integration in a policy field that has traditionally been perceived as the exclusive domain of sovereign nation states. The latter obviously retain the upper hand in this process, but a traditional intergovernmental perspective is hardly adequate in explaining the processes that are currently taking place.

\textbf{THE EUROPEANIZATION OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY?}

The concept of ‘Europeanization’ has gained increasing prominence in recent years, spurring a lively theoretical debate about the two-way influence between the member states and the common policies and institutions of the EU. The concept

\textsuperscript{9} Eurobarometer 60, autumn 2003.

has been used in a number of different contexts and remains somewhat ambiguous from an analytical perspective.\(^\text{11}\) It nonetheless captures an idea that is crucial in the present framework, namely the notion that the fundamental preferences (i.e. interests and visions) of the member states are affected by the integration process. Being a member of the European Union changes the way a given state thinks, talks and negotiates. Being a member of a club involves some element of socialization and adaptation. The institutional context matters.

Johan P. Olsen suggests a number of different approaches to the concept of Europeanization, two of which will be highlighted in the following.\(^\text{12}\) First, the concept can be used to analyze the development of institutions at the European level, that is, the development of some central capacity for action, coordination and coherence. Secondly, the notion of Europeanization may shed light on the central penetration of national systems of governance, that is, the adaptation of national systems of governance to a European centre and European norms. This second conceptualization opens the door to an analysis of the different patterns of influence between member states and between the different levels of authority in the European Union. Seen through this lens, Europeanization is not just standardization from Brussels, but the diffusion and consolidation of ideas and practices in the European governance network.

The first type of Europeanization, i.e. the development of new institutions at the European level, is exemplified by the emerging EU policy on homeland security and the solidarity clause. When faced with transnational security threats such as terrorism, a Union without internal borders is almost forced to intensify internal cooperation. There is a strong argument for close coordination between sectors, instruments and policy communities. As argued in Chapter 4, the Convention’s proposal for a solidarity clause received broad support, with national policy-makers reacting on the basis of increasing interdependence rather than national positions.


\(^{12}\) See Olsen, op cit., pp. 923-4.
The call in Chapter 9 for an EU directorate-general for homeland protection would represent a step towards the Europeanization of homeland security. The tragic events in Madrid on 11th March 2004 are likely to speed up the process of Europeanizing homeland security, as evidenced by the decision made at the Summit in Brussels on March 25th 2004, to implement the solidarity clause and the appoint a security coordinator.13

The development of the security strategy is another example of Europeanization at work. Central EU actors were instrumental in coordinating inputs and elaborating the strategy. As discussed in Chapter 3, the drafting of the strategy was mainly driven by the High Representative, Javier Solana, and his top aides. They were in close contact with the national actors, but the momentum was distinctly European.

The two approaches to Europeanization mentioned above were clearly relevant in the development of the EU’s intelligence cooperation, as described in Chapter 5. Intelligence cooperation is an example of the ‘integration logic’, whereby the development of the EU’s crisis management capacity requires the Union to take further action by developing a common intelligence capacity (i.e. the development of EU-level institutions as described in the first approach). At the same time, the very process of establishing common intelligence structures underlines the close interplay between the national and the European levels (cf. the second approach to Europeanization). In the words of Major-General Messervy-Whiting, the people involved in establishing intelligence cooperation had ‘the luxury of a virtually ‘clean sheet’ and thereby the opportunity to design the best possible achievable intelligence system by benchmarking against the best existing systems in States, international organizations and non-governmental organizations, taking the best elements from each and leaving the least best behind.’ Hence, the European level was penetrated by national ‘best-practices’, which over time are likely to penetrate back into national systems, as they adapt to the circumstance of having to deliver input to the EU level while simultaneously receiving its output.

Following this line of reasoning, the member states are part of a unique political union, which influences the way in which they react to external events. As shown by several empirical studies, the gut reaction in many European capitals is not, ‘How should we react in order to best protect our national interests?’, but rather, ‘How will our partners in the Union react to this development, and what are the chances of achieving a common position?’

Thinking at the level of the national capitals has changed during the past forty years of European integration. As ever, the ‘logic of integration’ coexists with the ‘logic of diversity’, and the smaller member states, who most obviously lack the capacity to fend for themselves, are more amenable to this process of socialization. However, even the larger member states are evidently influenced by the routinization of intense consultation and collaboration, suggesting that there is indeed more to the process of European integration than the collusion of rational utility-maximizers.

Defined in this manner, the Europeanization approach suggests that the factors that are pulling and pushing for greater integration in the fields of security and defence policy are being channelled through national decision-making systems that are increasingly Europeanized. The structural conditions that are making it increasingly difficult for smaller states to maintain a modern capacity for effective force projection are common to all states in the international system. The rising costs of state-of-the-art military equipment is not a solely European phenomenon. However, the Western European reaction to this structural constraint is arguably distinctly European. There is a tradition of seeking common solutions to common problems, which seems to outweigh the logic of diversity that is typically associated

14. The concept of Europeanization denotes a process that is not specifically tied to the European Union (Olsen, 2002: 922). The same process could in principle be relevant in other systems of governance. However, the process has arguably been most developed within the European system of governance.
with so-called ‘high politics’. In some ways, it seems easier for Europeans to agree on matters of common security and defence policy than on fishing quotas.

EUROPEANIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The above discussion might be faulted for focusing too much on the internal aspects of Europeanization: the broader framework of international political relations must obviously also be taken into account. The process of Europeanization is not a purely endogenous phenomenon. The transatlantic wrangles of 2003 divided the members of the European Union, but the depth and importance of these lines of conflict should not be exaggerated. Any open political conflict among EU members stands out precisely because it deviates from the consensual mode of policymaking that has become a hallmark of the Union. Even at the height of the Iraq conflict, the political distance between London and Paris was arguably less than the distance separating London and Washington. The debacle did not stop the European integration process or impede work in the Convention. For all the differences that have been provoked and accentuated by the Iraq crisis, the longer-term effect of the US-led campaign may actually be to reinforce the commonality of purpose inside the Union. When faced with fundamental crises, Europeans have until now relied on the same solution, namely more integration. External events have shaken the integration project, but in hindsight, the major crises of European cooperation have all led to renewed and intensified efforts at integration.

Whatever the political differences separating Europeans from one another, the EU does emerge as a relatively coherent political community that is clearly distinct from both the United States and the regions neighbouring the Union to its east and south. This is not to belittle the strong political and cultural ties between the different regions, especially the broader Western security community (i.e. NATO), but merely to suggest that the Union is emerging as a distinct voice in international relations, an advocate of a distinctively European approach to international politics and international security. This process is obviously all the more pronounced given the present tensions arising from the fight against terrorism, but it is in some ways re-
miniscent of the role that was thrust upon Europe in the days of the Cold War. Then as now, West Europeans sought to position themselves as interlocutors and bridge-builders. Witness the following excerpt from the declaration of the European Commission on the occasion of the achievement of the customs union on 1st July 1968:

> At a time when the organization of the world on the scale of old sovereign nations is yielding place to organization at the level of continents, it is important that the errors of the past should not be repeated at this higher level, that the clash of nations should not give way to the clash of entire continents. Consequently, it is Europe’s duty to organize cooperation and association with the other main groups in the world.

Some 35 years have elapsed since then, but these words are as relevant as ever, and the diplomatic approach they represent has further evolved.

The import of these observations is that the European Union is developing a distinct approach to international security and defence policy not in isolation, but in reaction to wider political developments. The EU is formed not only according to the logic of its own internal development, but also in reaction to global lines of political conflict. This process is neither linear nor smooth, but it has the potential to gradually reinforce itself. Whether by design or as the result of wider political developments, the EU is developing a stronger presence and identity in international relations.
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Basic Concepts of European Security and Defence Policy

CFSP and ESDP

CFSP is the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in the second pillar of the Union. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is an integral part of the CFSP.

Petersberg tasks

The Petersberg tasks, which constitute the EU military missions, are defined in the Treaty as ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.’

Politico-military structures

At the Nice Summit in December 2000, the EU decided to set up bodies to plan for, organize and supervise military operations. The EU set up a Political and Security Committee (PSC) as well as a European Military Committee (EUMC) supported by a 135 strong European Military Staff (EUMS), for early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning.

Helsinki Headline Goal

At the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 the Heads of State and Government adopted the Helsinki Headline Goal, which stated that member states should be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days, and sustain for at least a year, military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 personnel, with additional air and naval elements as necessary. A list of the capabilities needed was drawn up in the Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue (HHC); national contributions forming the EU’s reservoir of forces were pledged at the Capabilities Commitment Conference (November 2000), and summarized in a Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC).
‘Berlin-plus’
At the NATO Summit in Washington in April 1999, NATO decided to give the EU access to NATO planning capabilities, as well as to NATO capabilities and common assets. The modalities were agreed with the adoption of the EU-NATO Declaration in December 2002, and the final decision concerning the nature of this relationship came into effect on February 17th 2003. The modalities are known as Berlin-plus. The name refers to the NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin 1996, where it was agreed to build an effective European pillar in NATO.

When the EU undertakes an operation, it will choose whether or not to have recourse to NATO assets and capabilities using the Berlin-plus arrangements. The EU made use of Berlin-plus in its operation in Macedonia, and it will also be the case with the take-over of NATO’s SFOR in Bosnia by the end of 2004.