

The Role of the European Union in International Non-proliferation and Disarmament Assistance

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Defining the Scope of International Assistance

While states are responsible for honouring any commitments to one another that they make, it has become obvious that they are not always capable of doing so. Where the failure to implement agreed undertakings reflects a lack of financial or technical capacity rather than a deliberate effort to undermine the terms of an agreement it is preferable for all parties to offer assistance rather than criticism and punishment. Since the end of the Cold War a new type of international cooperation has taken place as states have rendered practical assistance to one another to reduce common threats arising from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as weapons-related materials and expertise. In broad terms this assistance has been of three types: facilitating the dismantlement and destruction of weapons; the establishment of a safe and secure chain of custody over weapons or other items; and demilitarization and conversion projects.

These types of measures are usually associated with Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR). Originally, the name of a specific programme managed by the US Department of Defense, the acronym “CTR” is now used both in Russia and elsewhere to cover a wide range of practical measures intended ‘to reduce the dangers posed by the old Soviet Union’s massive Cold War arsenals’.¹

While countries other than the United States did carry out some assistance activities of a broadly similar kind to those undertaken by the US during the 1990s, the number of countries willing to invest the large financial sums

¹ Luongo, K. and Hoehn, W. E., ‘Reform and Expansion of Cooperative Threat Reduction’, *Arms Control Today*, June 2003, p. 11.

needed to undertake major programmes in Russia and elsewhere did not really begin to expand until 2002. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks carried out in New York and Washington in September 2001 CTR has been seen as a necessary element of the wider efforts to counteract terrorism.

The acronym “CTR” is probably not specific enough to indicate the main objective or scope of a number of the measures that are being planned and undertaken. The expression ‘international non-proliferation and disarmament assistance’ or INDA is preferred in this paper. INDA consists of practical measures, jointly implemented and with consent on the territory of one state by a coalition of parties that may include states, international organisations, local and regional government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the private sector with the objective of eliminating weapons and/or preventing the horizontal proliferation of weapons.

This expression would exclude certain types of project that have been carried out under the umbrella of CTR. For example, projects intended to contribute to the safe operation of nuclear power plants would be excluded from the scope of INDA although they are sometimes included within the scope of CTR.

It was stated above that the United States has been by far the most important donor of international assistance in this area since the end of the cold war. Most of the CTR activities that have been carried out have been carried out in Russia.

The geographical scope of international non-proliferation and disarmament assistance has become progressively broader in the face of changing threat assessments and changes in the international security environment. While Russia remains the single most important location for this type of assistance, projects are also being carried out in other places, most notably Ukraine but also in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as well as a number of countries that are not part of the former Soviet Union.

Senator Richard Lugar, a key figure in the development of US assistance to the former Soviet Union, has made clear his view that activities of the kind associated with CTR need to be conducted in all countries with nuclear, biological and chemical weapon programmes.² A growing number of proposals and recommendations are beginning to emerge (many of them from non-governmental organisations) for new countries and locations where international non-proliferation and disarmament assistance measures might be applied.

To illustrate with an example, the US-based 2001 Nuclear Threat Initiative³ (NTI) has identified large quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) located at the sites of civilian reactors and other nuclear facilities in over 40 countries. Even in cases where this material is subject to safeguards to reduce the risk of

² Senator Richard G. Lugar, 'NATO After 9/11: Crisis or Opportunity?' Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, 4 March 2002, available at URL <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0203/doc06.htm> .

³ See <http://www.nti.org/>

diversion to nuclear weapons production, the NTI was concerned that much of it was stored at ‘inadequately guarded’ sites.⁴

From a functional perspective, assistance programmes have focused on nuclear, biological (BW) and chemical weapons (CW) and long-range missile systems used to deliver nuclear weapons. However, cooperative threat reduction cannot be said to be exclusively a part of traditional military security since projects that have been supported have been carried out in pursuit of objectives such as environmental protection and nuclear safety that have no traditional military dimension and do not apply to weapons as usually defined.

Some of the projects that have been carried out in the military domain have been undertaken primarily to support environmental protection objectives. For example, in Northwest Russia a number of states and local authorities from the Nordic region have been working to clean-up the nuclear legacy of the Cold War⁵. Conversely, some projects carried out in cooperation with the civilian nuclear power sector and the regulatory authorities responsible for non-military nuclear facilities have been undertaken in response to nuclear weapon proliferation-related concerns.

⁴ ‘Proliferation Threats Facing the United States’, Testimony of Charles B. Curtis, President, Nuclear Threat Initiative before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 19 Mar. 2003. Curtis was citing findings in an NTI-sponsored study. Bunn, M., Wier, A. and Holdren, J. P., *Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: a Report Card and Action Plan* (Harvard University Mar. 2003). In essence there are two options regarding such sites, to upgrade security or to remove dangerous materials from them. There have been at least five cases in which material has been removed from sites to more secure storage in another country. These cases were in Kazakhstan (November 1994), Georgia (April 1998), Serbia and Montenegro (August 2002), Romania (Sept. 2003), Uzbekistan (Sept. 2004). Additional shipments have been scheduled but not yet carried out from Romania.

⁵ See the website of the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership : <http://www.ndep.org/>

From a functional perspective, new kinds of projects have been identified that could probably only be implemented with international assistance. For example, states are currently discussing how to revise the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in light of the potential risk of “radiological terrorism”, i.e. the use of radioactive sources and materials in a radioactive dispersal device or “dirty bomb”⁶. Projects are almost certain to be needed in future to help states improve the quality of accounting and protection related to stocks of radiological materials in line with changes to the Code.

In a number of cases issues that have been part of discussions with Russia about assistance requirements have resisted efforts to develop and implement specific programmes and projects. For example, questions remain about the status of equipment, materials, facilities and personnel that were connected to the Soviet programme to develop biological weapons⁷.

Another example of an issue that has not been possible to address adequately in cooperation with Russia is related to the implementation of Presidential commitments in the early 1990s to reduce the size of stockpiles of so-called non-strategic nuclear weapons—weapons not subject to arms control agreements. In the early 1990s Russia lacked suitable storage facilities for

⁶ An international conference on this issue was organised in France by the IAEA from 27 June to 1 July 2005; see: <http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/Announcements.asp?ConfID=134>

⁷ “We (the US government) believe, based on available evidence, that Russia continues to maintain an offensive biological weapons program in violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention”, testimony of Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary for Verification and Compliance, US State Department, before the US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, 4 March, 2003, available at: <http://www.state.gov/t/vc/rls/rm/18736.htm>.

nuclear weapons, leading to concerns about whether weapon dismantlement and storage under the unilateral initiatives would be accomplished in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound manner. While this issue has been partially addressed through projects such as the construction of the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility, questions remain about the number, status and security of Russian nuclear weapons that are not subject to arms control agreements.

The overarching objectives of international non-proliferation and disarmament assistance projects are established in other processes. The INDA projects can help to implement a policy agenda but, even if taken collectively, they do not establish one. In practice, in the past CTR has reached back into other processes for elements that are needed for successful project implementation.

Experience has demonstrated that agreed objectives and subsequent decisions about a legal framework for cooperation have proved to be critical in helping to design and develop successful projects.

The most extensive and successful CTR projects have been coupled to the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements—in particular START-I and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). However, CTR measures have also been used to implement a policy agenda established in the field of environmental protection, where discussions in Northern Europe have led to the progressive development of agreed objectives that have subsequently been absorbed into the Northern Dimension for the policies of the Union—part

of the European Union (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).⁸ In another example, in the field of nuclear safety and accounting for and securing radiological materials, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (which is a specialized agency of the United Nations) has played a key role in the development of agreed standards that particular projects can use as a point of reference. While these activities are now being examined to see what contribution they might make in countering potential acts of mass impact terrorism, they were initiated as part of a programme aimed to improve environmental protection and public safety.

The programmes related to nuclear safety and environmental protection cannot be discarded because they are important *per se* but also because they are central to projects that are already in an advanced stage of planning or actually underway. If it is agreed that more resources need to be focused on threats related to mass-impact terrorism, there is a risk that programme coverage might broaden still further to include projects intended to reduce societal vulnerabilities by protecting critical infrastructure. For example, assistance could logically include international cooperation to reduce the vulnerability of society in cases where the national power grid, the chemical industry or the information technology and telecommunications infrastructure are subject to attack. These are important issues and this extension will have to be undertaken in parallel with the completion of existing work. However, to maintain focus projects related to critical infrastructure protection, nuclear

⁸ The Northern Dimension was established at the European Council meeting in Dec. 1998 based on the *Commission Communication on a Northern Dimension for the Policies of the Union*, COM/98/0589 Final, Brussels, 25 Nov. 1998, available at URL http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/doc/com1998_0589en.pdf.

safety and environmental protection should not be conflated with non-proliferation and disarmament projects. There is a need for a separate programme for INDA planning and for project implementation and this should be limited to preventing access to WMD by states or groups planning to carry out mass impact terrorist acts.

Looking at the projects that have been conducted, are being conducted or are currently being discussed within the general area of INDA the following list can be compiled along functional lines:

1. Enhancing the physical security of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium;
2. Placing HEU and plutonium beyond use in a weapon or nuclear explosive device;
3. Enhancing pathogen safety and security;
4. Accelerating the destruction of chemical weapons;
5. Reducing the risk of diversion of chemical weapon precursors to illegal use;
6. Reducing the risk that trade in dual-use items (materials, equipment and technology) will contribute to illegal WMD or missile programmes;
7. Reducing the risk that scientific knowledge will be applied in illegal WMD and missile programmes;
8. Enhancing the security of radiological source material;
9. Facilitating the destruction of ballistic missiles and their infrastructure;
10. Ensuring the widest possible adoption of the most modern and effective export control legislation;
11. Enhancing the effectiveness of export control enforcement;
12. Strengthening border security and management (WMD related);
13. Facilitating cross-border law enforcement cooperation (WMD related).

This list illustrates that INDA programmes will continue to generate a large project load. Increasing the scope of the definition of INDA runs the risk that

the lack of a clear organizing principle for assistance as well as an ever-expanding diversity of participants and projects will lead to a lack of ownership in the process that could in turn undermine the ability to define and implement programmes.

Attempting to develop coherence through an institutional mechanism by bringing the activities under the umbrella of one organisation or under the leadership of one country may be theoretically attractive. However, such an approach would be very difficult to arrange in practice. International non-proliferation and disarmament assistance projects have been discussed in different locations and by different constellations of states. Representatives of states and international organisations have conducted these discussions, which have also included participation by local government, the private sector of industry and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Therefore, successful activities will require states to work together effectively in a number of different organisations as well as more informal arrangements over an extended period. Sustaining this kind of cooperation, including assuring the allocation of the requisite financial resources, further reinforces the case for a clear and agreed set of objectives.

Organising EU Delivery of International Non-proliferation and Disarmament Assistance

Recent experience has underlined that the future agenda for INDA will be a result of iterative discussions among states and other actors rather than being

established at one time and in one forum. This is certainly true for the European Union, including both its Member States and the other parts of the EU: the Member State representatives in Brussels that meets in the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Council Secretariat (and in particular the staff of the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana⁹) and the European Commission. However, during the past few years, a number of documents and processes have been agreed that are beginning to establish the main priorities for the European Union INDA over the next decade.

The USA has undoubtedly been at the forefront in shaping the international discussion based on the priorities identified in its National Security Strategy.¹⁰ The US effort to persuade other countries (including the EU) to adopt complementary and synergistic policies has made the G8 group of industrialized countries one important forum for discussion and information exchange.¹¹ (See other articles on this question in the present publication).

⁹ A Personal Representative of the High Representative on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Ms Annalisa Gianella, was appointed in Oct. 2003; see: http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=744&lang=en&mode=g.

¹⁰ After a period in which its commitment to CTR was called into question, in September 2002 the US National Security Strategy stated that the USA was committed to 'enhance diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls and threat reduction assistance that impede states and terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction. . . . We will continue to build coalitions to support these efforts, encouraging their increased political and financial support for nonproliferation and threat reduction programmes.' The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Sep. 2002, p. 14.

¹¹ The G8 is an informal group in which Canada, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the USA participate. The EU is represented by the President of the European Commission and by the leader of the country that holds the presidency of the European Council at the time of the G8 summit meeting.

The G8 efforts notwithstanding, the European Union has its own internal reasons for paying greater attention to the issue of non-proliferation and certain aspects of disarmament:

- First of all the EU is making an effort to emerge as a global player, including the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) and a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in which action against the proliferation of WMD plays an important part.
- Second, the EU is trying to respond to threats from weapons of mass destruction—which are an increasingly serious concern to Member States. A number of steps in this direction were taken after 1998 but the pace of development quickened after September 2001.
- Third, the deep crisis precipitated by preparations for war in Iraq in 2002–03 led to subsequent efforts to repair relationships both within the EU and in trans-Atlantic relations, a process that led to a further convergence in approaches between the US and the EU.

In the past, the failure of the EU to develop a coherent strategy to address the threat posed by weapons proliferation was a barrier to the development of a programme of mutually supportive trans-Atlantic activities. The EU has now remedied this deficiency. First, it adopted on 17 December 1999 a CFSP Joint Action establishing a Cooperation Programme for Non-proliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation¹², as part of its June 1999 Common Strategy on Russia¹³. Then, it adopted, in December 2003 at the level of heads

12 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/npd/cja99.pdf. The Joint Action was valid for 1999-2003 and was prolonged by a new Joint Action on 24 June 2003 for one year (see: http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/1_15720030626en00680068.pdf). It was used to contribute to the financing of three chemical weapons destruction facilities in Russia for up to €12m.

13 See: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/com_strat/russia_99.pdf. The Common Strategy on Russia was initially adopted for the period 1999-2003; it was prolonged until 24 June 2004 (see: <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st10/st10213en03.pdf>). Relations between the EU and Russia now take place within the framework of the “Four Common Spaces” established by the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (see: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm#inst).

of state or government, a EU Security Strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, which identified the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as one “key threat” facing the European Union.¹⁴ On this basis it developed a Common Strategy against WMD¹⁵ (the Basic Principles¹⁶ of which had been agreed in June 2003 along with a priority Action Plan¹⁷ for immediate implementation).

As part of the Action Plan, the expression “cooperative threat reduction” is used for the first time by the European Union, and the document clearly envisages an expanded set of EU measures in this field. Moreover, and of critical importance, the current Russian government has reconfirmed that it sees cooperative threat reduction and disarmament assistance as an important element in its security policy¹⁸.

While these documents are likely to play an important role in shaping the future perspective of EU contributions, at present there is no single overall framework for delivering EU activities. Each of the EU Member States that has

¹⁴ The document noted that ‘proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security’. The European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council on 12 Dec. 2003 is available at http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=391&lang=en&mode=g.

¹⁵ EU Strategy Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, 13 Dec. 2003. See: <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/st15708.en03.pdf>.

¹⁶ Basic Principles for a EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Council of the EU, 10 June 2003, Council Document 10352/03 at <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st10/st10352en03.pdf>.

¹⁷ Action Plan for the implementation of Basic Principles for a EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Council of the European Union, 13 June 2003, Council Document 10354/1/03 at <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st10/st10354en03.pdf>.

¹⁸ See the Joint Declaration between the European Union and the Russian Federation on Strengthening Dialogue and Co-operation on Political and Security Matters, Rome, 6 Nov. 2003: “(...) We remain actively committed to the cooperative efforts on non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control”; available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2003/11/55350.shtml>.

an INDA programme maintains its own national control over project development, financing and implementation. The European Commission is responsible for financing and implementing other relevant programmes, in particular in Russia.

The development of INDA programmes will also be connected to the future perspectives for the CFSP and the future institutional development of the EU. To meet their commitments under the G8 Global Partnership the EU Member States will maintain national assistance programmes that will have to be coordinated with one another and with the programmes of non-EU states. The creation of a European Union Minister for Foreign Affairs is envisaged in the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, leading to the creation of a single office charged with conducting the CFSP,¹⁹ the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs is also to make proposals on how to develop further the common foreign policy. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs is also to be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission and responsible for both handling external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external relations and action. In this way the policy making function will be united with the financial and human resources needed for policy implementation. In addition, the Constitutional Treaty provides for an extension of the 1992 "Petersberg tasks"²⁰ until now accepted for the ESPD (humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking) to the areas of disarmament operations,

¹⁹ Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, adopted by consensus by the European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003, Submitted to the President of the European Council in Rome, 18 July 2003. See: http://europa.eu.int/constitution/en/1stoc1_en.htm

²⁰ See Western European Union Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992, at: <http://www.weu.int>.

military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization.

Member State activities

The EU Member States have been conducting INDA programmes since the early 1990s. However, these programmes have been small both in relation to the activities of the United States and to the scale of other types of assistance (such as support for economic development and humanitarian relief).²¹

The commitments made under the Global Partnership will require very significant increases in the scale of INDA programmes, even taking into account the fact that, in the first years of the Global Partnership, spending was delayed by the negotiation of framework agreements and bureaucratic obstacles. Comparing the financial data in Table 1 (spending commitments and the pattern of past spending) illustrates the scale of the individual and the collective increases in spending that will be needed if EU countries are to meet their commitments under the Global Partnership. In comparison with the period 1992–2002, total EU spending will have to increase by a factor of more than eight between 2002 and 2012 from approximately €600 million to over €5 billion. Most of this increase will be accounted for through increased

²¹ The most comprehensive overview of assistance from European countries is contained in Robert J. Einhorn and Michèle A. Flournoy eds. *Protecting against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for the Global Partnership Vol. 3, International Responses*, (CSIS: Washington D. C. Jan. 2003).

spending by Member States and in certain cases the sums involved are dramatic increases.²²

As a whole, the EU (Member States and common budget) contributes for about a quarter of the total Global Partnership pledges; this is consistent with its relative economic weight in the world. While the combined GDP of the EU and the US equals 57% of the world GDP²³, their joint contribution to the Global Partnership funding reaches 75%. In comparison, Japan's contribution (\$0.2bn) represents 10% of the total funding, while its GDP equals 12.3% of world GDP²⁴. However, in relative terms, EU Member States dedicate to the Global Partnership between 0.2% (France, UK) and 0.5% (Germany) of their military expenditures, i.e. a comparable proportion to that of the US, much more than Japan but much less than Russia (see Table 3 below). As a percentage of GDP, the overall pledges of EU countries that are G8 members range from 0.004% (UK) to 0.006% (Germany, Italy), slightly less than the US, much more than Japan and much less than Russia (see Table 4 below). This demonstrates how much more funding would be available if Global Partnership members would reallocate resources, especially within their overall official development assistance (ODA) programs, as shown in Table 5 below.

²² For example, the contribution by Italy should grow from annual spending of around €0.6 million in the period 1992–2002 to average annual spending of €100 million over the course of the initial phase of the Global Partnership.

²³ See: <http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL30608.pdf>.

²⁴ See: http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/japan/index_en.htm.

Table 1. Summary of European Union Financial Contributions and Commitments (in million euros)

(a) Source: European Commission. (b) Source: G8 Global Partnership Working Group Annual Report presented at the Gleneagles Summit, July 2005 (<http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2005gleneagles/>) and Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (<http://cns.miis.edu/research/globpart/funding.htm>).

Country/Institution	1992–2002 (a)		Committed 2002- 2012(b)
	Committed	Estimated spent	
Denmark			17.2
EU Commission TACIS	196.0	184.0	1,000
EU Joint Action	15.5	12.0	
Finland	2.0	1.5	15
France	147.0	77.0	750
Germany	72.8	70.5	1,500
Italy	44.1	6.1	1,000
Netherlands	14.0	2.3	24
Sweden	11.6	10.8	36
UK	113.7	4.8	750
TOTAL	616.7	369.0	5,070

Looking at the current project activities as reported by the EU Member States, it can be seen that the main area of INDA strictly speaking (excluding nuclear safety and security) is currently chemical weapon destruction, helping Russia to meet the conditions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Broadly speaking, of course, nuclear activities remains pre-eminent, and important

activities are carried out in the areas of nuclear material protection, control and accountancy (MPC&A) which have an impact on non-proliferation.

Table 2: Main projects carried out by EU Member States²⁵

(funds committed for 2003-2006²⁶ in million euros)

Member State	Nuclear	Chemical	Biological
Denmark	- NDEP ²⁷ : 10 - Nuclear Safety: 6.2	- Outreach: 0.1	
Finland	- NDEP: 2 - Nuclear Safety: 7.425 - Nuclear Safeguards: 0.69	- Destruction: 0.589 - Outreach: 0.15	
France	- NDEP: 40 - Nuclear Safety: 38.3 - Plutonium Disposition: 72 - Weapons Destruction: 1 - Submarine dismantlement: 11 - Nuclear Waste: 7 - RTG ²⁸ Dismantlement: 3	- Destruction: 6	- Biosafety: 5
Germany	- NDEP: 2 - Nuclear Safety: 32.5 - Submarine Dismantlement: 151	- Destruction: 78.5	
Italy	- Submarine Dismantlement: 360	- Destruction: 372.7	
Netherlands ²⁹	- NDEP: 10 - Plutonium Disposition: 2.84	- Destruction: 12.01	
Sweden	- NDEP: 6	- Outreach: 0.222	Biosafety &

25 Source: GPWG Consolidated Report on (G8) Global Partnership, July 2005, available at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/PostG8_Gleneagles_GPWGAnnualReportAnnex2005.pdf.

26 Some funding may be for shorter or longer periods. Please check detail in above-mentioned document.

27 Northern Dimension Environmental Program of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); see: <http://www.ndep.org/>.

28 RTG : Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generators used by Russia in lighthouses (strontium nuclear sources).

29 Source : Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (<http://cns.miis.edu/research/globpart/funding.htm>).

	- Nuclear Security: 1.1 - Nuclear Safety: 4.24		Biosecurity: 0.1
UK	- NDEP: 0.014 - Submarine Dismantlement: 43.1 - Nuclear Security: 0.145 - Nuclear Safety: 52.76 - Scientist Employment: 9.57	- Destruction: 101	
TOTAL	873.75	571.27	5.01

Comparing the past activities of Member States with the list of functional areas where it is agreed that additional work is required and taking into account the current national financial perspectives for EU Member State activities, it is clear that most of the work in implementing INDA still lies in the future.


In the absence of a coherent agreed framework within the EU for delivering INDA the way in which Member States choose to use their resources is still primarily a product of internal decision-making—albeit informed by the information obtained in processes like the Global Partnership about activities in other states.

The wide range of functional areas in which INDA is likely to be required will make it impossible for most countries to be active in all areas. For most EU Member States it would be more productive to choose one particular functional area in which all or most national efforts will be concentrated. Given the differences in perspective of the countries that are the most critical INDA actors, this lack of a EU-wide agreement is a problem but not fatal to the overall EU effort. It is likely that at least some EU Member States could

gravitate towards supporting activities in all of the functional areas³⁰.
However, this state of affairs does suggest two recommendations:

- First, in line with the functional approach proposed above, states should think about how to develop a EU-wide “toolbox” of INDA project management expertise along with a register of technical skills providers that can be of value in a range of different locations in the future.
- Second, while the Member States will be free to develop their own national programmes, a degree of specialisation should be developed consciously within an agreed framework that includes a method for linking the specialized resources and that can be used to facilitate information exchange.

Table 3³¹




30 The fact that the UK and France are the only two EU Member States possessing nuclear weapons and having conducted chemical and biological weapons programs in the past gives them a useful expertise to cooperate on INDA projects in the three categories of WMD.

31 Reproduced from :


http://www.sgppproject.org/publications/GPUupdates/GP_update_2_&_Supplemental.pdf

Table 4³²



Source: GDP data from 2003 CIA World Factbook, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>.

Table 5³³



Source: Net Official Development Assistance in 2002, OECD.

32 Reproduced from : http://www.sgpproject.org/publications/GPUupdates/GP_update_2_&_Supplemental.pdf

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The European Commission

The European Commission has delivered assistance in a number of ways. First, the Technical Assistance Programme for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) has supported a number of activities that are relevant to non-proliferation and disarmament. In financial terms the single most important activity financed under TACIS has been support for the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) in Moscow. Second, a Joint Action was agreed in 1999 that made financing available for non-proliferation and disarmament assistance to Russia from the part of the common EU budget that is set aside for the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The commitment undertaken at the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis is also likely to have a significant impact on the scale of the activities carried out by the Commission. At present the scale of Commission financing for INDA-type projects is approximately €40 million per year. This level of spending in the period 2003–2006 (the period between the creation of the Global Partnership and the end of the current EU budget cycle) will have led to total spending of roughly €200–250 million up to that point. This means that to meet its Kananaskis commitment the EU will have to set aside €750–800 million for INDA type activities in the next budget cycle (2007–123), which would entail annual spending of around €120 million—a threefold increase.

At present the question of how these resources (assuming they are actually allocated in the next budget cycle) will be used is currently a subject for

discussion within the EU. However, it is not at all clear what the outcome of that discussion will be.

One theoretical approach would be to increase the scale of funding for existing programmes, the lion's share of which are in Russia. This could make a very large volume of financing available for a relatively small number of projects in Russia and thereby accelerate their completion. For projects that are too large (and expensive) to be financed by any individual Member State or even by two states acting together, this option might be very useful. Alternatively, the financing could be made available to support projects in new functional areas. In this case the Commission would be in a position to finance a much larger number of projects than today. Another issue, should the financing be made available for use in new functional programmes, is whether the specific projects generated should be tied to any particular location (i.e. Russia) or whether the financing should be available to support projects in new countries and regions.

The European Union will also have to consider how this future budget will be used in light of the changes noted above under the future Constitution for Europe. The timetable for the creation of the position of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs is not entirely clear. However, this action together with the decision that the Minister will also be a Vice-President of the Commission will mean that, by the time the new budget is adopted, there might be an entity in Brussels able to propose a far-reaching and ambitious INDA programme and

also to finance its implementation through a process that is largely independent from the activities carried out by the Member States.

It should also be noted that the financial regulations for the delivery of assistance to support the external relations of the EU are under review. If the changes currently proposed are implemented, the Commission would have much more flexibility than is now the case in the range of partners that it could engage in projects. For example, the Commission is currently heavily constrained in contracting with agencies from governments of non-EU Member States, agencies from international organisations, private sector companies from outside the EU and non-governmental organisations. In future the Commission may have an increased range of options regarding the authority to contract with these types of actor. Ultimately, however, one should remember that all the funds that the Commission may use originate from the Member States through the EU budget.

Taken together these overall changes could facilitate the “sectorization” of INDA so that different countries within the EU as well as the Commission can play a leading role in different functional and perhaps also in different geographical areas while still being able to make an effective contribution (most likely in the form of financing) across the wider spectrum of problems that need to be addressed.

While this may be the case in future, in the short term the development of INDA programmes will have to be accomplished within the existing rules and financial perspectives.

In order that the contribution can be maximized, a number of issues and problems need to be addressed under three headings: identifying INDA projects to be supported; financing selected INDA projects; and implementing these projects successfully (including evaluating the implementation to apply lessons learned, thereby further increasing effectiveness).

Identifying Projects to be Supported

While it is possible to identify a number of characteristics that seem to improve the probability for EU support to INDA efforts in the near term (such as benefits to national industry from participation), one factor seems to be particularly important. The EU Member States seem most willing to participate in activities that help to implement international agreements or support international cooperation efforts. This is in line with the EU commitment to “effective multilateralism”.

On the basis of its Security Strategy, the EU is developing a common assessment of the threat posed by the weapons of mass destruction. It has taken some steps in this direction by tasking the Situation Centre³⁴ attached to the

34 According to the EU Council Decision of 22 January 2001 setting up the Political and Security Committee (PSC) (2001/78/CFSP) :”On the basis of the proceedings of the PSC, the Secretary-General/High Representative directs the activities of the Situation Centre. The latter supports the PSC and provides it with intelligence in conditions appropriate to crisis management.”

EU Council Secretariat with developing and updating a document that can be the basis for such an assessment. In future this common threat assessment could help in identifying INDA projects and selecting priority areas for action. In spite of this, at present EU INDA policy is not threat-driven in the way that US policy is. Various agreements do exist, however, that codify commitments that all EU Member States agree to be beneficial from their national standpoint. The existence of these agreements already gives some coherence to INDA and it is not coincidental that the greatest EU contribution thus far has been devoted to supporting projects that will help Russia to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, as noted, the negotiation and implementation of such legal frameworks may have also delayed the start of some projects, resulting in the difference between funding commitments and actual spending.

It should be recognised that the existence of an overarching agreement is not a prerequisite for all projects. Small, short-term projects in particular have been and can in future be conducted on an ad hoc basis. These are likely to have been designed to address a very specific problem that emerges at a time when governments are sensitized to the potential negative impact of failing to act quickly.³⁵ The G8 also encourages contributions of smaller states to projects

³⁵ A past example would be the assistance given by France, Germany and the United Kingdom in the early 1990s to help Russia consolidate nuclear warheads into more secure storage locations. Andrei Frolov, *Germany and the Process of Excess Nuclear Weapons Elimination in Russia*, PIR Center, Autumn 2003, available in English at URL <http://www.sgpproject.org/resources/Frolov%20on%20Germany.html>.

already conducted by key actors such as the US, the UK, France or Germany within existing agreements. This technique is known as “piggy-backing”³⁶.

At the same time, there are examples where it has been impossible for European states to mobilize even the very small resources needed to facilitate some projects in the absence of some other enabling international process—if not an agreement then in the form of an ad hoc cooperation arrangement.

The role of the G8 Global Partnership has been noted. Another good example would be the projects that have been carried out at short notice with US financial support to remove orphan radiological sources from locations very close to Europe (such as Romania and Serbia) where there is a doubt about the capacity of the local authorities to organise safe and secure storage. These projects (which cost very little and are carried out in countries that are neighbours of the enlarged EU) could have been implemented by the IAEA in cooperation with Russia using financing provided by one or more of the EU Member States without difficulty. In reality it has been left to the United States (together with financial support from a US non-governmental organisation, the Nuclear Threat Initiative) to implement these programmes.

At the same time, it is likely that some or all EU Member States will support the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) proposed by the United States in

36 See: http://www.sgproject.org/publications/SGPIssueBrief/Carson_Jan2005.pdf.

May 2004 in a speech by the Secretary of Energy³⁷. This initiative is intended to provide international support for countries' national programmes to identify, secure, remove and/or facilitate the disposition of vulnerable nuclear and other radiological materials and equipment around the world. While EU support might be mobilized through the GTRI, it is apparently not possible for the EU to take an independent initiative of this kind either individually or collectively.

If the successful development of a larger and more comprehensive INDA programme correlates with the adequacy of the overarching framework created by international agreements, it follows that, in the future, INDA should not be pursued as an alternative to seeking progress in various international and multilateral frameworks. On the contrary, progress in multilateral processes will play a useful facilitating role. There are a number of areas where these types of linkages should be explored more actively than at present.

Some elements of a likely INDA programme assume that certain weapons—nuclear weapons not addressed by existing arms control agreements would be one example—are surplus to requirements. However, in the absence of agreements it is not possible to determine what is surplus and therefore available for destruction, neutralization or conversion. While INDA clearly requires the consent of the authorities of the country where projects will be carried out and cannot be imposed, it is equally clear that in practice donor governments see it as an opportunity to influence the choices of those

³⁷ See a description of this programme at :
http://www.energy.gov/engine/doe/files/dynamic/264200491138_Vienna_GTR_Fact%20Sheet_FINAL1_052604%20.pdf

authorities through dialogue. EU donors are not likely to accept the catalogue of projects put to them without discussion.

Further progress in a number of areas of arms control and disarmament would undoubtedly help “unlock” significant assistance. In the area of nuclear weapons, the successful completion of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)³⁸ can be offered as another example where such a synergy could almost certainly be found. However, in a number of very important cases the key to unlocking cooperation from EU partners would seem to lie in finding a way to revitalize the commitment to disarmament in the United States and Russia.

Without this element of diplomatic ‘give and take’, it might be difficult to maintain the linkage between INDA and tackling the threat of proliferation to states and to terrorist groups effectively. This is because some of the most serious proliferation concerns currently exist in areas where projects have been most difficult to develop.

For example, while past projects may have provided an indirect means to discover more about Russian biological warfare capacities, they have been no more successful in resolving remaining concerns in this area than other processes. In the area of BW, a decision on how to resolve the problem of Russia’s status regarding the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention

³⁸ The issue of the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes has been discussed for years at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) without success due to differences on the scope and verification of such a treaty; see the CD 2004 Annual Report at: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/632/62/PDF/G0463262.pdf?OpenElement>.

(BTWC) would also open the way for practical cooperation that could help to reduce proliferation risks.

To take another example, Senator Sam Nunn—certainly one of the leading figures in cooperative threat reduction—has stated that ‘the most effective, least expensive way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to secure nuclear weapons and materials at the source’³⁹. However, under current conditions CTR programmes cannot secure Russian nuclear weapons, while there are many more sources of weapons grade and weapons usable nuclear material than Russian stockpiles.

Further agreements on reductions to nuclear weapon arsenals, other than those currently subject to the 2002 Russian–US Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)⁴⁰, as well as agreement to ban the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons could enhance the prospects for successful projects and also address concerns about proliferation to states or to groups planning to carry out mass-impact terrorist acts.

Recent experience has suggested that important states—most notably Russia and the USA—have not seen sufficient reason to modify their national security policies and plans in ways that could facilitate such agreements.⁴¹ In time, the

39 2002 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 14–15, 2002. See:

<http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/conference/speeches/nunntranscript.pdf>.

40 For the text of the Treaty, see: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_06/docjune02.asp.

41 A recent SIPRI book has documented the retreat from cooperation and transparency in the nuclear area after significant gains were made in the late 1980s and early 1990s. See in particular Alexander Pikayev, ‘Transparency and Security in Russian–US Nuclear Relations’ in Nicholas Zarimpas ed. *Transparency in*

clear and demonstrable linkage between successful arms control and the successful implementation of practical measures of great mutual interest to Russia and the USA might help to bring about a renewed commitment to future progress.

Apart from arms control, the agreements that are currently being discussed to create a more comprehensive set of rules on nuclear safety and security are being modified to take into account the current threat environment. There is a considerable political momentum behind the processes now being conducted within the IAEA to modify a number of important conventions that establish agreed standards in this area. Once these agreements are concluded, they should be of great help with establishing INDA priorities and defining the practical details of projects that can help to implement the conventions.

In the area of BW-related agreements there appears to be much less momentum and a risk that what is being developed is what Amy Smithson has called an ‘uneven patchwork’ that could be exploited fairly easily by proliferators and terrorists.⁴² There is an emerging view that it will be necessary to strengthen bio-safety and bio-security. The entry into force of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity in September 2003 can be seen as one step in the process of creating a more

Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political and Technical Dimensions, SIPRI (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2003).

⁴² See, for example, the Prepared Statement by Amy Smithson, Director of the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Project, Henry L. Stimson Center, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 19 Mar. 2003, at: <http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/SmithsonTestimony030319.pdf>.

common framework for regulations.⁴³ The protocol is intended to help ensure an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology, taking into account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on cross-border transfers. However, in comparison with the nuclear safety and nuclear security field, the framework of agreed rules and the capacities of specialized agencies are much weaker. Moreover, while rules and procedures to oversee and regulate biological research have been developed nationally, there is not an international agreement on what such rules and procedures should cover.⁴⁴ In addition, there needs to be more coordination between the fora on civil uses and those on dual-uses of biological agents, such as the Group of Experts of the States Party to the BTWC, which has been discussing ways of overcoming the US opposition to a verification protocol of the 1972 Convention while improving implementation and transparency as well as risk awareness among scientists⁴⁵.

In Europe the EU is likely to be the framework in which to develop common rules and regulations to govern these kinds of issue area. The enlargement of the EU might mean that assistance to Member States that need it could be arranged where it is needed either at the EU level using common resources or through cooperation between Member States. More broadly, the next steps in the European integration process might lead to a regional approach to INDA

⁴³ The text of the protocol and other related materials can be accessed at URL <http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp> .

⁴⁴ Kellman, B., Mütke-Lindgren, O., *Summary of National Laws and Measures for Counter Terrorism Regulation of Biology*, Programme on Preventing Disease Weaponization, Aug. 2003. See the Report of this Workshop at: http://www.law.depaul.edu/institutes_centers/ihri/_downloads/geneva_workshop.pdf.

⁴⁵ See documents on this process at: <http://www.opbw.org/> .

around the periphery of the enlarged EU as non-Member States receive assistance to harmonize their national rules, policies and procedures to emerging EU standards, in particular on export controls of dual-use goods and technology. Countries in Southeast Europe as well as Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine are countries that might fall within this strategy. In future, the application of such measures in North Africa might also be explored.

While existing mechanisms allow states to evaluate requests for assistance that are put to them against the background of more complete information, at present states are not proactive in finding INDA projects. No overall catalogue of problems that need to be solved has been created that might help identify INDA requirements. Such a catalogue could be the basis for more active approaches to states where problems are believed to exist that could have a wider impact if not addressed, in order to investigate the prospects for developing cooperative projects.

Most of the energies of current mechanisms have been put into facilitating the definition and implementation of project ideas that have been put to them by states, most notably by Russia. There are a number of bodies currently undertaking the task of trying to coordinate the various INDA projects under discussion. It can be demonstrated that existing mechanisms are flexible enough in their geographical coverage, mandate and working procedures to be able to coordinate planned activities.

EU Approaches to the Coordination and Management of INDA

At the national level, states are beginning to think about their overall approach to INDA in light of the anticipated increase in the scale of funding and the number and tempo of projects. First and foremost, this has required efforts to coordinate the actions of different parts of government at the national level to integrate planning, budgeting, implementation and project evaluation into a single system. A higher level of international information exchange is also taking place.

Within the G8 Global Partnership, this exchange initially took place in a Senior Officials Group (SOG) under the French G8 Presidency. After January 2004 a new Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG) took responsibility for exchanging information about the national efforts to implement the Global Partnership under the guidance of the Senior Officials Group, which continues to take an active interest in the Global Partnership but now also considers wider G8 efforts in the area of non-proliferation. Also in the frame of G8 activities, a Multilateral Plutonium Disposition Group (MPDG) has coordinated the planning and financing of a programme intended to dispose of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium in Russia and ensure that it is not used in any nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device (a programme that regrettably has not yet been implemented pending the approval by the MPDG of an agreement between Russia and France).

In general, states have tried to use existing mechanisms to exchange information about implementation of INDA projects rather than creating new

mechanisms or arrangements. For example, in the area of chemical weapon destruction, interested experts have been meeting on the margins of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In the area of managing the radiological materials associated with nuclear-powered general purpose submarines being decommissioned by the Russian Navy, a number of coordinating mechanisms—perhaps too many—have been identified, notably the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) under the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the IAEA Contact Experts Group, and the Council of the Multilateral Environmental Nuclear Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR).

There are a number of areas where coordination appears to be weak or lacking. One such area is nuclear material protection, control and accountancy (MPC&A), where a greater coordination might be arranged in future under the auspices of the IAEA. Another area where there appears to be less focused information exchange and discussion appears to be the area of biosafety and security, in spite of some efforts to promote awareness of the biological proliferation risks⁴⁶.

However, it cannot be concluded from this that additional coordination mechanisms are needed. Moreover, as the anticipated expansion in project

46 See, for instance, the work accomplished by the Geneva Forum (<http://www.geneva-forum.org/>) or the Bio-Weapons Prevention Project (<http://www.bwpp.org/>) and the International Seminar initiated by France and Switzerland and hosted by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, on 9-10 June 2005 (<http://www.gcsp.ch/e/meetings/Events/Other-Events/2005/BC%20Weapons%20Seminar/summary.htm>).

activities takes place governments need to keep in mind that a number of mechanisms that are already available are underutilized. Inter-governmental coordination arrangements within the UN and NATO in particular are currently underutilized while a stronger role for the IAEA seems likely to go hand in hand with the strengthening of agreements in the area of nuclear security. Therefore it will be important for states to honour their pledges to provide the necessary assistance to the IAEA. This assistance is not only financial but also includes identifying national experts and assets that can be included in the international project teams, which the IAEA is increasingly likely to have to create and coordinate, and making sure that these assets are available when needed.

The scope for discussion of additional projects under the auspices of the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) seems to be particularly wide given the progressive expansion in the technical coverage of projects being financed by the PfP Trust Fund⁴⁷.

From the perspective of the EU, the tendency to use existing processes to facilitate cooperation among Member States, between states and the European Commission and between the EU and non-Member States seems sensible. The Commission already participates in the G8, the Northern Dimension (including NDEP and MNEPR), the European Nuclear Cities Initiative (ENCI), the ISTC and the Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine (STCU). There are other processes in which the Commission is not present (such as those in the UN and

⁴⁷ See a list of projects financed by the Fund at : http://www.namsa.nato.int/inits/ammo_trust_e.htm.

NATO) but where the EU has become accustomed to participating through actions organised by the country holding the EU presidency.

Given this more extensive participation by the EU in INDA and given the institutional development within the EU, there is a great deal of logic in developing a critical mass of experts in one place by linking the resources of the Council of the European Union and the European Commission more effectively. Moreover, regular interaction between this consolidated body of experts and existing inter-governmental bodies such as the Council Working Groups—and in particular the Working Group on Non-proliferation (CONOP)—would also be a logical development prior to the creation of new structures under the Constitution for Europe.

The financing of projects does not appear to have been a major obstacle to their implementation in the past, mainly because of the modest level of project activities. On the contrary, there are more cases of INDA project money going unspent than cases of good projects falling through for lack of a sponsor.

The annual reports on Global Partnership implementation submitted by G8 members suggest that the overall development of the financing will be adequate to cover the costs of projects currently anticipated. However, although the availability of financing for projects seems unlikely to be the main obstacle to implementation in the near term, it is not as clear that the additional resources that are certain to be required to meet the full Global Partnership commitment will be available over the next 7 years.

More serious financial problems appear to arise at the project level rather than at the wider level of securing macro-commitments from states. In particular, problems appear to arise where it is necessary to harmonize specific acts needed to carry out projects with financial allocations made through national budget processes that are organised on a strict a calendar or fiscal year basis. A number of processes do exist that offer greater flexibility and discretion in financing projects but a number of these—such as the NDEP Fund managed by the EBRD—are only available for a narrow range of INDA projects.

The next EU budget may offer an opportunity to create a single source of discretionary funding large enough to support ambitious programmes provided that the regulations for the delivery of EU external assistance can be modified to introduce greater flexibility.

Project Implementation

The consent and cooperation of the national authorities in the country where a project is implemented is imperative and this paper suggests that the approach adopted by these authorities is the single most critical factor in project implementation. After the adoption of the Global Partnership a question in the mind of many was the one posed by Kenneth Luongo, Executive Director, Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC): ‘what will Russia do politically and financially to make this process work effectively and

to clear away impediments to progress that have developed over the past 10 years?’⁴⁸

The failure to develop a coherent national approach to foreign donors in the country where projects will be carried out has greatly increased the difficulties of project implementation in Russia. Agencies and individuals at the national, regional and city administrative levels took decisions (or alternatively refused to take decisions) that hampered the development and implementation of projects because they evaluated what was required of them against the narrow interests of their particular institution without a wider understanding of the process they were being asked to contribute to.

Russia has taken steps to facilitate the implementation of projects, and if this more coherent national approach could be codified, that would be the best way to increase the overall effectiveness of the process. At the same time, agreements that establish the objectives and legal framework for cooperation at the project level are recognized to be necessary elements of successful project implementation.

The best solution would be to create a mutually supportive and comprehensive set of agreements on arms control, environmental protection, nuclear safety and security, biosafety and security and INDA, supported by a web of bilateral agreements, to provide specific guidance on the rules for the delivery of non-proliferation and disarmament assistance in the countries where projects are

⁴⁸ Luongo, K. N., “Perspectives on the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, testimony to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 9 Oct. 2002, at http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/whatsnew/100902_sfrc_testimony.html.

being carried out. Achieving this scenario is a long way off, if it can be accomplished at all.

The pattern of bilateral agreements vis-à-vis Russia is itself something of a patchwork at present with some countries having agreements in place, some countries having agreements under negotiation that have not been finalized and other countries lacking agreements. Negotiations usually include issues such as liability in case of accident, tax status of foreign staff or access to sites. Within the EU, countries are seeking a flexible solution to the problem of how to implement projects in Russia in the absence of bilateral agreements. In a number of cases, the contributions of individual EU Member States are considered too small to justify creating such agreements. In these cases, teams are being created within which Member States can channel their contributions to particular projects through processes carried out under the leadership of states that already have the requisite legal foundation in place. Among EU Member States, for example, Germany and the United Kingdom have bilateral agreements with Russia establishing the rules for cooperation.

The EU Commission also lacks a single agreement setting out the basis for an INDA programme with Russia and has not considered it realistic to engage the Russian government in talks on creating such an agreement in circumstances where projects have been small in scale or delivered through processes like TACIS or organisations like the ISTC that already have a legal framework in place. Whether this can continue to be true if the Commission becomes responsible for managing an INDA programme worth €120 million per year is

not clear. Apart from the scale of financing, there are other potential barriers to the creation of a bilateral Commission-Russia agreement, such as the reluctance on the Russian side to provide what is still considered sensitive military information to the Commission.

In the past, the Commission itself has taken advantage of the bilateral agreements between Member States and Russia to implement elements of the Joint Action. The Commission has financed projects to conduct research on plutonium disposition that were carried out by France and projects related to chemical weapon destruction that were carried out by Germany. This model in which the Commission finances projects that are implemented by Member States might be utilized more extensively in future.

Concluding Observations

The political prospects for developing effective INDA are currently favourable and states are putting in place the necessary administrative and financial resources to translate political commitments into projects. Under these circumstances, INDA seems certain to become a valuable instrument that can be used alongside other measures in managing security threats of current concern.

At the same time, the pace at which projects are developed and implemented needs to be accelerated if INDA is to fulfil its potential as one instrument to tackle current security threats.

In the future, the EU (defined to include both the Member States and the common institutions located in Brussels) will spend more money on INDA, carry out more projects and also carry out a wider range of projects, many of which will be both different kind from those that it has carried out in the past and in different locations.

There is a need for the European Union to develop its thinking about the place of INDA in a long-term (in all probability indefinite) set of programmes and measures that are necessary to make good on the EU commitment to help combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction more effectively.