About the Paper

The descriptive analysis of Buzan and Waever on the Southern Africa Regional Security Complex (RSC) in the post-Cold War seems to present important misconceptions regarding the RSC boundaries and, especially, polarity (unipolarity, exercised by South Africa). This article asks “what are the boundaries of CRS Southern Africa and its internal distribution of power in the post-Cold War, especially between 2000 and 2010?” The argument is that, contrary to what the authors say, the Southern Africa RSC includes the countries of the Great Lakes region of Central Africa and is characterized by an emerging bipolarity. These factors are the result mainly of the regionalization of the conflict of the Great Lakes since the late 1990s and the rise of Angola as a regional power in terms of material capabilities.

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South Africa Regional Security Complex: The emergence of bipolarity

BY IGOR CASTELLANO DA SILVA
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Igor Castellano da Silva is a PHD candidate at the International Strategic Studies Doctoral Program (PPGEEI) of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Brazil. He is also a researcher at the Brazilian Centre of Strategy and International Relations (NERINT) and is funded by the Coordination of Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES). Currently, he holds the position of Administrative Director of the South American Institute of Policy and Strategy (ISAPE), Brazil. He has an undergraduate degree in International Relations and a Master's degree in Political Science by the same University (UFRGS), and experience in International Relations and Strategic Studies. His focus areas are: State Capacity, National Power and the State-building process; armed conflicts in Africa; the role of Africa in global politics; and the foreign and secure policy of Southern African countries.
Abstract

The descriptive analysis of Buzan and Waever on the Southern Africa Regional Security Complex (RSC) in the post-Cold War seems to present important misconceptions regarding the RSC boundaries and, especially, polarity (unipolarity, exercised by South Africa). This article asks ‘what are the boundaries of CRS Southern Africa and its internal distribution of power in the post-Cold War, especially between 2000 and 2010?’ The argument is that, contrary to what the authors say, the Southern Africa RSC includes the countries of the Great Lakes region of Central Africa and is characterized by an emerging bipolarity. These factors are the result mainly of the regionalization of the conflict of the Great Lakes since the late 1990s and the rise of Angola as a regional power in terms of material capabilities.

Keywords: Regional Security Complex, Southern Africa, boundaries, polarity, South Africa, Angola.
Introduction

The adaptation of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever's Regional Security Complex (RSC) descriptive model for the African case is problematic. This is due mainly to the fact that in most countries in the region, the process of building state structures is very incipient. In the case of Southern Africa, the situation seems to differ by the more advanced process of state-building in some countries and the existence of historical interstate rivalries in others. However, Buzan and Waever's descriptive analysis about power distribution in the region, post-Cold War, seems to have significant gaps. This could partially be a result of the impossibilities to address the most current political reality of the period between 2000 and 2010, as their book was published in 2003.

From this context, this paper asks 'what are the boundaries of the Southern Africa RSC and its internal distribution of power in the post-Cold War, especially after the year 2000?' The hypothesis is that, contrary to Buzan and Waever’s claims, the Southern Africa Regional Security Complex encompasses the countries of the Great Lakes region of Central Africa and is characterised, in the post-Cold War, by an emerging bipolarity. On the first point, the essential aspect is the movement of regionalisation of the Great Lakes conflicts witnessed since the late 1990s. On the second point, it should be noted that if the polarity of any Regional Security Complex is defined by the number of regional powers, the rise of Angola to such a position, at least in terms of material capabilities, seems to question the authors' argument that the Southern Africa RSC is unipolar i.e. centred in South Africa. Political stability resulting from the end of the Angolan civil war, high levels of the country’s economic growth in the last decade and maintenance of robust military forces and expenditure seem to validate this perception. However, it is necessary to corroborate or falsify the argument empirically. Thus, this paper aims to verify the dynamics of domestic and regional security that influenced the delimitation of boundaries of Southern Africa RSC during the 2000s and to measure the level of power held by the countries belonging to this RSC, trying to identify the number of regional powers and, consequently, the region’s polarity.

The text is divided in three sections. The first presents Buzan and Waever’s adaptation of their RSC model to Africa, specifically Southern Africa, and identifies the main failings in this task. The second section questions the authors’ views of the Southern African RSC boundaries through a description of the evolution of security dynamics which involved the countries in the region at domestic and regional levels in the 2000s. The third and final section seeks to measure the degree of power of the countries in the region through an analysis of their material capabilities (GDP, GDP per capita, population, military expenditure and conventional military capabilities). In addition, the study relies on a quantitative and a qualitative assessment of military capabilities to compare the regional powers (poles) and to identify specific characteristics of regional polarity (type of balance).
The Regional Security Complex (RSC) descriptive model of Buzan and Waever brings undeniable advances to the study of international relations, in Lakatosian terms. One must first note that the model is situated in a contemporary theoretical debate that focuses on the importance of regions in international relations, as presented by Kelly and sustained by Lake and Morgan, Katzenstein, Lemke, Buzan and Waever and Hurrell. In summary, regions are currently acquiring a growing value in international relations because of empirical and theoretical factors. In the first case (empirical) the argument is supported by the positions which highlight the relevance of geography and territoriality concerning security issues, the volatility and ephemerality of great powers’ strategic interests and the existence of a neo-regionalist trend in post-Cold War. In the second case, it is imperative to refer to the fact that regional security studies seek to give partial answers to the limits of parsimony, to the restrictions of the process of overlay, to the efforts of the Lakatosian progress of the area and to the perspectives of studies that relate the structure of the international system to the regional structures of power.

The RSC model takes those empirical and theoretical factors into account. Starting from the proposition of RSCs as ‘geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence’, Buzan and Waever’s model is distinguished by the sophistication of its conceptual framework, by the possibilities it gives to the expansion of neorealism explanatory character to regional levels and by its potential to enable the integration, albeit preliminary, between national and human security.

On the other hand, there are important gaps in the authors’ model, mostly related to the lack of rigour in the operationalisation of concepts such as polarity (number of great and regional powers), polarisation (configuration of alliances) and boundaries. As a consequence, the measurement of these elements in each region is problematic. In what is related to polarity, the measurement of countries’ material capabilities in each region is absent in their descriptive analysis. Consequently, there is a lack of concrete evidence to consider a country a regional power. There are also omissions about how
this concept of polarity works within a sub-complex (a designation to poles and the relationship between poles of the sub-region and the region). As a result, the authors excessively privilege the relationships of polarization (amiities and enmities), in spite of the fact that they measure this concept through random variables that change from region to region. With regard to the boundaries, the authors do not give precise criteria for identifying the limits of an RSC.

Likewise, for the African case, the operability of the RSC model also involves major difficulties. These relate mainly to the fact that there is some incompatibility between a model built on a state-centrist perception and a region where the volume and intensity of interstate relations are relatively reduced vis a vis the domestic security dynamics of the countries within that region and the interstate dynamics in other regions of the globe. On the other hand, a hypothetical position could be held, that the model essentially doesn’t apply to the region and would therefore seem untenable. This view would suffer from the basic mistake of trying to find reality when looking to ideal types. In addition, Buzan and Waever anticipate in the opening chapters of their book, possible differences among regions. Such could occur by any particular preponderance of domestic, interstate, interregional or global dynamics within a complex. Consequently, the case of sub-Saharan Africa seems to fit in with the reality that domestic security dynamics take precedence over the other levels.

This reality is linked to the process of state-building in the region. As the authors point out, in Africa the artificial transplantation of the European form of the state, of liberal models of economic development and of Westphalian type international relations, resulted in a system composed mainly of relatively weak states with respect to their primary capabilities. The relative stability of the interstate system contributed significantly to this reality, which was derived from the territorial inviolability and the rigidity of ineffective boundaries.

Since the colonial experience on the continent, a relatively stable environment was built through the empowerment of people from the coast (economic model focused on the external sector) and the establishment of rigid boundaries. This feature continued in the post-colonial period through the freezing of national boundaries and the banishment of wars of aggression by the international regimes of the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). As a result, Letter Box politics became legitimised, as did as the existence of a juridical, rather than empirical, type of sovereignty. This sort of artificial sovereignty was depicted, in practice, when the political elites who controlled capital were in possession of the state sovereignty, although they did not control interior regions of the country. There was, therefore, the predominance of patrimonial policies in the central government and the existence of warlords and islands of coercion, rival to state power, in the hinterland. This resulted in the preponderance of internal threats to state security.

According to Buzan and Waever, the historical consequence was a state composed of simultaneously pre-modern, modern and postmodern structures. This combination was characterised by the coexistence of (i) ethnic groups that often serve as a basis to the formation of political identities, (ii) formal
state structures and regimes characterised by patrimonial and personalistic character, and (iii) integrationist ideologies (Pan-Africanism) and continental (OAU) and regional institutions (relative stability in interstate relations).

Different types of states within a region affect the way the security dynamics unfold in that particular region. Consequently, due to this peculiarity in the formation of African states (weakness of state structures), the domestic security threats were prevalent throughout the region's history, including the post-Cold War era. The domestic level would therefore be predominant in security dynamics, though no African civil conflict has been confined to a single territory. The main feature of this reality is the presence of internal actors who rival state authority and who generally claim strong relationships with post-traditional structures (ethnic ties – managed or not) and have the support of other African states (political basis for Proxy war\(^\text{12}\)), control regions rich in natural resources and establish strategic partnerships with foreign economic interests. Variations of these cases range from warlords such as Charles Taylor and Jonas Savimbi, to tribal/spiritual leaders such as Lord's Resistance Army).

Based on this general statement on sub-Saharan Africa, Buzan and Waever assume that the security interactions among countries in the region are, since independence, too weak to define a security complex. This is because, (i) the OAU was characterised as a political rather than a security forum (acceptance of boundaries and against apartheid) (ii) the unique states involved in security issues beyond their sub-regions were Nigeria and South Africa and (iii) other remote interactions were due to mere contact between political elites. Thus, Sub-Saharan Africa would fit into a case of unstructured RSC. The definition of this concept is ‘the simplest model of an unstructured security region is one in which the units are too weak as powers to generate security interdependence on a regional level. No regional RSC exists because the units do not become each other’s main security concern. The image is of a security constellation dominated by the domestic level, and perhaps also by the interregional and global levels’

Thus, according to Buzan and Waever, sub-Saharan Africa would internally present, in the post-Cold War, the following combination of security clusters: two Regional Security Complexes, a pre-complex and a proto-complex. West Africa and the Horn of Africa would be, according to the authors, RSCs in process of formation. West Africa would be a proto-complex, in which, despite the centralising role of Nigeria, ‘regional dynamics are still too thin and weak to think of the region as a fully fledged RSC’. In the Horn of Africa, one would witness a pre-complex, in which ‘bilateral security relations seem to have the potential to bind together into an RSC, but has not yet achieved sufficient cross-linkage among the units to do so’. On the other hand, Southern Africa would configure an RSC, characterised by unipolarity and the prominence of South Africa, which would be supported by economic dominance over its neighbours. The authors also suggested, as a factor supporting the unipolarity, the predisposition of the states in the region to accept the leadership of South Africa, based on the hope of regional growth and the existence of a security core. Buzan and Waever also rate the Great Lakes region of Central Africa as an RSC itself. This RSC was formed after the First and Second Congo Wars and does not include the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) due to its entry into SADC\textsuperscript{13} in 1997 and its subsequent incorporation to the Southern Africa RSC. The Great Lakes RSC would therefore be composed of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and only the north-eastern provinces of the DRC.

In addition to problems related to the perception that sub-Saharan Africa does not rank as an RSC (insufficient interactions) and the classification of West Africa as a pre-complex (reduced dynamics) and the Horn of Africa as proto-complex (low interdependence), one could identify two deficiencies in the analysis of the authors regarding sub-Saharan Africa. The first is that the Great Lakes region is characterised as a complex itself and the second is that the Southern Africa RSC would be characterised by unipolarity, exercised by South Africa. The following sections address these two main points.
Southern Africa RSC: Security Dynamics and Boundaries

Any coherent critique of Buzan and Waever’s attempt to adapt their descriptive model to the case of Southern African countries should start dealing mainly with structural problems such as the delimitation of boundaries. For this, one could focus on a deviant and clearly problematic element presented by the authors, namely the existence of a Regional Security Complex of the Great Lakes of Central Africa split from the central government of the DRC, and from the major part of its territory. According to the authors, the major part of the DRC is included in the Southern Africa RSC, which is also partially proposed here. This implies, on the one hand, that there is a minimal agreement on the existence of a Southern Africa RSC including, at least, the major part of the DRC. On the other hand, major efforts should focus on the problematic north-eastern boundary and could be guided by the core question ‘are the other Great Lakes countries such as Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, plus the north-eastern territory of the DRC part of an autonomous RSC, separated from the central government of the DRC, or are they necessarily attached to the DRC and, therefore, possibly integrated into the Southern Africa RSC’? To give a coherent answer to this question, it is important to assess and update the main security dynamics which integrate the countries in geographical Southern and Central Africa, in order to conclude whether, in fact, they may configure autonomous security complexes as the authors propose.

This section is divided into two parts. The first subsection tries to update the main security dynamics that might integrate the countries of the region in the same complex (regional dynamics). This involves an analysis focused on both the demand for security (existent threats) and in its supply (actions, processes and institutions aimed at suppressing these threats). It will be noticeable that these dynamics often have direct relationships with domestic security dynamics, still latent in all African countries. The second part seeks to put into question the existence of a Great Lakes RSC and to suggest an alternative boundary delimitation of the Southern Africa RSC.
The domestic and regional security
dynamics, 2000-2010

Domestically, the main security threats in the region in the 2000s were present in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Burundi, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

The Second Congo War began in 1998 and continued formally until 2003. Besides the participation of different armed forces in the region, the war involved the presence of proxy groups operating on Congolese territory. Among the participating groups, one can cite the RCD-Goma (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma) – Rwanda proxy – and the RCD-K-ML (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Libération of -Kisangani/Mouvement Democratie) and MLC (Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo) – proxies of Uganda. The usage of these groups sought to reduce material and moral costs implicated in the war.

On the side of Congolese government, there was the funding and support to foreign groups rivals to the government of Rwanda (Interahamwe militia; ex-FAR, ex-members of the Armed Forces of Rwanda; and ALIR, Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda) and national groups of popular militia (Mai Mai) to help in the fight against aggressor troops. Foreign groups had a well-defined military structure and generally relied on the presence of ex-soldiers of the former Hutu government of Rwanda. In the case of the Mai Mai groups, they had little training and great heterogeneity. Even more than other groups in combat, they drew on tactics of irregular warfare. Internal threats in northeastern Congo have also emerged during the armed conflict. The rivalry of ethnic-based groups in Ituri (Hema and Lendu) was manipulated by external forces (Uganda and Rwanda) and has become an open conflagration, which only had signs of shrinkage in 2006.

Despite the formal end of hostilities of the Second Congo War in 2003, a ‘state of violence’ remained in the country. Foreign armed groups continued to use the territory of the DRC as a basis for the extraction of resource, war operations and acts of terror against local populations usually linked to rival groups. Among the insurgents, we can cite the CNDP (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple), the FDLR (Forces Democratique du Liberation of Rwanda) and LRA (Lord's Resistance Army). The result of this no-war/no-peace situation is the accumulation of more than 1.6 million deaths since the end of the Second Congo War. In this context, rape became a weapon of war, which is used even by the integrated national armed forces, since 1998, 200,000 cases of rape have been reported in the DRC.

In Angola, after the resumption of the war in 1998, UNITA was defeated in conventional terms in 2000. However, the adoption of guerrilla tactics by the insurgent group brought a halt to the conflict, which was broken only in February 2002 with the death of Jonas Savimbi in combat and the military victory of the FAA (Angolan Armed Forces). Consequently, the formal ceasefire established in Luanda on April 4, 2002, was succeeded by a demobilisation program that sought to reintegrate into society about 100,000 men from UNITA. Of these, only 5,000 were admitted to the armed forces and national police. Financing difficulties hindered the process, which took place with virtually no external involvement or assistance. As an extra
action, the government created a security agency to establish central control and monitoring of diamond reserves, limiting the mobilisation of resources that could be used for conflict. The stability was achieved following the success of the UNITA demobilisation process.19

It is also important to note the security threats in the Cabinda enclave – a territorially displaced region responsible for production of about half of the domestic oil. It should be remembered that the control of the historic conflict in the region had already been obtained with the Angolan intervention in the DRC (1997 and 1998) and Congo-Brazzaville (1997). However, separatism returned to the security agenda when forces of FLEC (Frente de Libertação do Estado de Cabinda) urged the government of Portugal to facilitate the independence of the enclave, by kidnapping Portuguese citizens. In response, the MPLA, noting that it would not surrender the independence of the enclave, waved a willingness to negotiate. This more flexible position was abandoned in 2002 when the demobilisation of troops in the Congos and the victory against UNITA allowed the deployment of troops in the distant region to the military suppression of separatism. Thus, after September 2002, the repositioning of military and intelligence capabilities authorised military offensives that resulted in the defeat of most of the FLEC forces. In early 2004 the rebels were largely defeated, considering that military bases and guerrilla leaders (as the commander of the armed forces) were captured. The situation paved the way for peace talks and the creation of the Cabinda Forum for Dialogue (Fórum Cabindês para o Diálogo – FCD), established in February 2006. The mechanism tried to gather and integrate different Cabinda leaderships so that there was a common agreement with the central government, which would only be accepted by the latter when the separatist forces (FLEC factions) had settled their differences and integrated a unitary movement. The peace agreement was established in August 2006 with the directive that the enclave would remain as a part of Angola, assuming a special status. Furthermore, it was guaranteed amnesty for all insurgents, the demilitarisation of the movement and the integration of 500 men in the armed forces and national police in January 2007.

Finally, organised crime is another internal security problem in Angola and involves the trafficking of diamonds, narcotics and small arms. Major networks were established during the war with UNITA and the wars in the Congos are still present today.20

In South Africa, the relative domestic stability post-Apartheid did not eliminate insider threats to national security. During the decade, there was an increase in crime and the emergence of nostalgic ultraconservative wings of the old regime. In the first case, it should be noted that high rates of unemployment and mass illegal migration originating from countries with great instability in the region contributed to the expansion of violence and organised and cross border crime in the country. The crime rate remains high; nearly 19,000 people were murdered between April 2005 and March 2006, and nearly 55,000 people were raped in the same period. The situation led to an increase in the policing from 156,000 men in 2006 to almost 195,000 in 2010. In the second case, after the arrest of Afrikaners officers of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in September and October 2002, the emergence of organised groups as part of a ‘Boer Force’ was seen, which, however, is well infiltrated and does not have a sufficiently clear strategy that could threaten state or regime security.
Moreover, the spread of HIV/AIDS has worried organized groups of society and the government itself. However, despite the widespread adoption of the concept of human security, the South African government, mainly in the Thabo Mbeki mandate, initially opposed a global securitisation of the issue as part of an ideological resistance and proposed a national and sociological conception to the problem which embraces, for example, the possibility of a ‘parallel import of much cheaper generic HIV/AIDS medicines’.

In Burundi, the 2003 peace talks led to the signing of a power-sharing protocol in October between the government and the armed group CNDD-FDD (Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie), confirming the entry of the civil war rebels into the transitional government. However, clashes with the FNL (Forces Nationales de Liberation) followed until 2006. In March 2003 the African Union established a mission in the country (AMIB), which was supplemented in 2004 (resolution 1545) by a UN operation (ONUB).

In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe’s government has treated domestic opposition as a matter of national security. Police attacks in markets, public places and homes have intensified and involved the kidnapping of possessions, destruction of evidences and arrests. Operation Murambatsvina led to the destruction of 700,000 homes in order to deter a protest against the increase in food prices, inflation of 129 per cent and unemployment levels of 70 per cent, and in an attempt to punish saboteurs and subversive elements (IISS 2005:306). Moreover, since 2003 the vicious circle of economic decline has brought consequences to the military forces that once took up a position of regional prestige and leadership, as in the case of intervention in the Congo War. The situation led to the dismissal of soldiers due to lack of food in training fields and the maintenance of an average wage which amounts to half of what is necessary for the purchase of the national food basket. As a result, the government has cut the size of the armed forces by 25 per cent.

In regards to regional dynamics, the main security threats involving the countries of the region had connections with transnational crimes, increasing in migratory flows and insurgent groups operating in different territories.

With regard to transnational crime it may be mentioned, besides the case of South Africa where the increased flow of illegal immigrants contributed to the growth in crime and violence related to xenophobia, the example of Congolese criminal networks acting in Angola. Since the end of civil wars in both countries, Congolese have crossed the border to prospect for diamonds illegally. The situation succeeded in hampering relations between the two countries, which had already been strained since the death of Laurent Kabila and the ascension of Joseph Kabila. The foreign armed groups still active in eastern Congo, as well as the FDLR, also rely on the porosity of the borders with Uganda and Rwanda to drain the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources. National armed groups, especially those in the region of Ituri, have also adopted this method of financing.

The transnational armed activity of groups such as the FDLR and LRA is another element of regional dynamics. The FDLR operates in the DRC, but has an agenda of military opposition to the Rwandan Tutsi government of Paul Kagame. In this sense, the group’s actions are based primarily on terrorism against people linked to Tutsi communities both in the DRC and Rwanda.
The LRA maintains the objective of establishing a salvationist theocracy in Uganda, in opposition to Museveni’s government. However, its base of operations is unstable. The group moved from Uganda to border areas in southern Sudan and northern DRC and is currently located in the southeast of the CAR (Central African Republic). The LRA acts indiscriminately against local populations of these countries.

Regarding interstate rivalries, it is important to emphasise again the continuity, until 2003, of the Second Congo War, which involved seven countries in southern Africa, divided between aggressors Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi and defenders DRC, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Countries like Zambia and South Africa remained neutral, but actively participated in peace negotiations. Another rivalry began in 1999 between Uganda and Rwanda, during that armed conflict. The dispute, which led to direct confrontations on Congolese territory, was primarily related to the control of the city of Kisangani, the country’s third major city, which is strategically important in the war for the access to Kinshasa. Finally, smaller interstate disputes continued between Namibia and Botswana in relation to the border dispute on the inundated island of Kasikili/Sedudu in the Chobe River. However, that conflict remained at the diplomatic level.

On the supply side of security, it should be mentioned among the most important processes, joint programs of Security Sector Reform (SSR), joint military operations and the creation of a regional brigade under the auspices of the SADC and AU. The main Security Sector Reform programs in the region established in the last decade were those in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola. In the case of the DRC, the reform involved the integration of national insurgent groups active in the Second Congo War and in some further armed conflicts (MLC, RCD-G, RCD-K/ML, RCD-N, FNI, UPC, Mai Mai, etc.) into the national armed (making an integrated force, the FARDC) and police forces. In addition to several extra-regional actors, Angola and South Africa have participated in the training process and reform of these new forces, processes that are, nevertheless, far from being accomplished.

In Angola, the reform of the armed and constabulary forces started in the 1990s with the first integration of UNITA insurgents in national institutions. With the failure of the process and the resumption of the struggle by UNITA in 1998, further reforms continued in the military, especially with regard to the doctrine and modernization of the structures (as we shall see later). In this process, the private military company from South Africa, Executive Outcomes, provided the main services which enabled the renewal of the FAA and the military victory against UNITA in 2002. From there, the new Angolan SSR included the integration of a small part of the rebel forces and was held almost without external support.

Joint military operations were also an important element of security agenda integration among many countries in the region. There have been several joint operations in the war against UNITA. In this case, the Armed Forces of Namibia were officially present in Angola to assist in operations, given that the rebel forces sporadically penetrated the neighbouring territory and plundered Namibian populations.

In the case of the FDLR, since 2005 there have been several unauthorised incursions by Rwandan troops in eastern DRC in an attempt to demobilise
insurgents, which were historically allied with the government of Laurent and Joseph Kabila. This has led to diplomatic deadlock between the two countries and the possibility of renewed interstate war. However, with the emergence of the threat of the CNDF (supposedly allied to the Kagame government) in the territory of the DRC, Joseph Kabila's government realised the need to cease its tacit support for the FDLR and solicited assistance from Rwanda to demobilise the new group that claimed to be a defender of Tutsi. As a result, there was the restoration of diplomatic relations and the establishment of a military agreement for the suppression of both armed groups in late 2008. Since 2009, joint military operations have begun to take place on Congolese territory, which allowed the complete demobilisation of the CNDF and the weakening of the FDLR.

To fight LRA there was a similar mechanism. In 2004, the UPDF (Ugandan People's Defence Force) carried out Operation Iron Fist, after it had signed an agreement with Khartoum in 2002 allowing operational access to southern Sudan. Although many insurgents had been captured and amnesty rights had been extended to members of the group, the LRA continued their operations. In 2005 the regional cooperation was intensified. In October there was the creation of two joint military centres between DRC, Uganda and Sudan to coordinate trilateral operations against the group. However, the main operations came in 2009 after DRC and Uganda signed a military agreement in December 2008. Consecutively, Operation Lighting Thunder, though it failed to disband the group, dismantled most of its bases in the DRC, what forcing them to flee to CAR. Currently, new multilateral initiatives are underway to complete suppression of the armed group. We can cite, for example, the creation of a Regional Brigade with joint forces of Uganda, DRC, Sudan and CAR, and logistical support from US forces.

There was also the strengthening of the security supply in the region by the establishment, in August 2007, of a Regional African Standby Force, which operates under the auspices of SADC and the African Union's African Standby Force. The force is called the South African Development Community Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG) and is composed of 6,000 troops. The national contributions in the form of troops will be kept in the home countries. The only permanent structure will be the planning staff in Gaborone, Botswana and consists of military, police and civilian officials. Botswana has also been selected as the organisation's logistics warehouse. This force includes 14 SADC countries except Seychelles, and has held regular military exercises.

To sum up, one could note that some regional domestic security dynamics are linked to regional dynamics themselves especially in cases of activities of armed groups in neighbouring territories and of transnational criminal networks, as well as security problems arising from migratory waves related to political persecution, economic crises and poverty. One already realises that the statement generalised to sub-Saharan Africa may falsely claim that domestic threats are necessarily more important or unrelated to regional dynamics. Moreover, it is possible to observe the centrality of security dynamics involved in interstate matters and the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This question is directly connected to the northern boundaries of Southern Africa RSC and the existence of the Great Lakes RSC.
The boundaries of the Southern Africa RSC

The description of the security dynamics of the Southern Africa RSC made in the previous subsection already suggests a close connection between this complex, according to the configuration suggested by Buzan and Waever, and the existing security dynamics in the Great Lakes of Central Africa. This subsection argues that the existence of a Great Lakes RSC, comprising Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the eastern provinces of the DRC, seems suspect. This position is a result of two conclusions about Buzan and Waever’s study on the matter and the evaluation of three hypotheses regarding the reality in the region after 2002/2003. Before starting this task it is important to review some concepts which remind us what is critical to the delimitation of boundaries of an RSC.

First of all, one should examine the concept of RSC itself. According to the authors’ update of Buzan’s 1991 concept, an RSC is ‘a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another’. Three main elements are clearly the pillars of this definition.

The first one is security. For the authors, ‘security complexes are regions as seen through the lens of security. They may or may not be regions in other senses, but they do not depend on, or start from, other conceptualisations of regionness’. Accordingly, cultural, economic or historical elements are not crucial to an RSC delimitation, as ‘this is a reading of the world political development through the perspective of security’

The second element is interdependence. RSCs must configure security interdependence in comparative and relative terms. This is because ‘in order to qualify as an RSC, a group of states or other entities must possess a degree of security interdependence sufficient both to establish them as a linked set and to differentiate them from surrounding security regions.’ Thus, the comparative and relative aspects mean that the security interdependence should be, ‘markedly more intense between the states inside such complexes than between states inside the complex and those outside it’.27
The third element that holds the RSC definition is securitisation. For the authors, RSCs ‘are socially constructed in the sense that they are contingent on the security practice of the actors. Dependent on what and whom they securitise, the region might reproduce or change.’ Therefore, there’s a necessary integration between the demand of security (threats) and its action or intention to supply solutions. It’s not just what Lake called ‘security externalities’ (here we refer to as threats) that link units in an RSC, but the response of those units in the face of those threats. In this interpretation, Buzan and Waever include in their definition, intentionally or not, the projection of power states as an important element, but only to the extent that it is reflected in real security dynamics. Those security dynamics could be found in ‘war, mass expulsions, arms races, large-scale refugee movements, and other emergency measures that link to actual security issues that are on the agenda’. In short, RSCs ‘are defined [...] by the actual patterns of security practices’

Finally, before going to the empirical work one should look at the practical question of how to trace RSC borders. According to the authors, to trace the RSC empirically one needs to look at the pattern of security connectedness of adjacent units. In other words, their security dynamics. This pattern is composed of a chain of interconnected security issues being successfully securitised Beyond this conceptual presupposition, the authors don’t give ‘any precise criteria for identifying the members of a security complex’ or for tracing its boundaries. Difficulties emerge consequently, mainly for the African case. For African RSCs, it is usually hard to delimit the connectedness between units, mainly because of the weakness of the state and the ‘significant presence of informal actors in the overall security picture’ in the continent, more than anywhere, ‘the tricky bit is actually specifying what falls on which side of the boundary’ So, there’s a need to admit some level of arbitrariness. As an example of the complexity of the case and the particularity of the Southern Africa region, James J. Hentz stated that ‘Southern Africa is not so much an unstructured Regional Security Complex where local states cannot project power, as it is a Regional Security Complex structured by the inability of states to project power to their own peripheries’).

Starting with the empirical analysis of the boundaries of the Southern Africa RSC we begin with an interpretation of Buzan and Waever’s conclusions. The first analysis asks ‘why did the authors integrate the DRC in the Southern Africa RSC in the post-Cold War period?’ The answer is based on the perception that the authors had witnessed a process of geographical expansion of the Southern Africa security dynamics since the middle 1990s. Accordingly, Southern Africa RSC ‘has extended its boundaries to include a swathe of Central Africa’ and ‘there seemed little doubt that the Southern African complex had extended its boundary northward; mainly to include DR Congo.

There seem to be two plausible reasons for this conclusion, which neither of the authors show explicitly. The first one is related to the transnational and regional character of the Second Congo War (1998-2003). As previously noted, this armed conflict was the largest element linking the countries in the region in the last decade with regard to security issues. The conflict was
considered by many as the African World War, especially by the death toll, 3.8 million and the forces involved 10 armed forces altogether and almost 15 proxy guerrilla forces. The main forces involved were, on the defender side, DRC, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, and the aggressor side, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. Despite the small number of troops from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, their presence was essential to block the advancing of aggressor forces and to defend Congolese territorial integrity. Without the support of regional forces, under the auspices of SADC, the regime of Laurent Kabila probably would last a few days and would give space to an environment of even more intense, widespread looting. Thus, the Second Congo War can be considered an indicator of the integration of the region on security issues in a war of unprecedented proportions for the African continent.

For instance, Karin Dokken considers the Congolese conflict ‘a large regionalised war’, where the “the neighbouring countries intervened in the DRC with their own rationales, and several localised conflicts became regional’. Calling the analysis of Mills and Norton, Dokken affirms that ‘the international security aspects of the Rwandan refugee crisis have been widespread they have ranged from local cross-border destabilisation to the regionalised war in the DRC, where more or less all the countries of the region have been involved.’ With security and economic interest becoming more latent over the years, the war got so complex that it was impossible to understand the conflict without also understanding its regional/transnational aspects.

The second reason for Buzan and Waever’s conclusion might be the process of regional institutional expansion verified in Southern Africa during the 1990s. During that decade the regional institutional reform that established the new SADC included a scope of organs that would work on security issues (represented by the Organ on Politics, Security, and Defence and the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee), a real possibility of security interventions and the admission of new members. The DR Congo was centrally involved in this process. So the fact that the ‘DR Congo was inside SADC’ and that it should count for its integration into the Southern Africa RSC, as seems to be the authors’ perception, should not be viewed as a simple institutionalist position. The DR Congo’s integration into SADC was centrally important to its local security dynamics to become regional after the decision of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia to intervene in the war on behalf of the organisation.

Another aspect that contributed to the regionalisation character of the conflict is the great amount of valuable natural resources that were located in conflict zones and that have become one of the main reasons for the continuation of the military operations by the countries involved in the conflict as well as by transnational. Based on this analysis we agree with Buzan and Waever, and conclude:

Conclusion 1 – Buzan and Waever seem to be right. Until 2002/2003 DR Congo was likely to be linked to the security dynamics of the Southern Africa RSC.
The second interpretation of the author’s conclusions start by asking, ‘why did Buzan and Waever see DR Congo separated from the security dynamics that gather Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and even the north-eastern part of its territory in a same security complex?’ Two factors emerge as possible answers.

The first one is the supposed historical detachment of the Congo from the north-eastern part of the country. This is mainly a result of the poor infrastructure that historically integrated the country in an unsuccessful manner. Its eastern and north-eastern section has always been a region where the reach of the state was reduced and internal conflicts usually appeared. However, one could not affirm that the central government of the Congo had no important influence in the security dynamics of that region. Actually, the opposite situation has been historically perceived.

In the sociological and practice origin of the conflicts in the region, the DRC government, and formerly Zaire’s, has always been directly involved both in training and financing of armed groups, as well as in practicing policies that have stressed or eased the region and in direct military action.

The first major conflict in the region (First Congo War) was triggered by the political, financial and military support of the former Congolese president Mobutu Sese Seko to groups such as Hutu Interahamwe militia and former FAR (Rwandan Armed Forces) officers and soldiers which, after they had committed the genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda, fled to eastern Zaire. This attitude, combined with the policy adopted since 1982 when Mobutu started to pursue the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda communities which are of Rwandan origin and depriving them the previously granted right to citizenship and treating them as scapegoats of the crisis of his regime. With the arrival of the 1990s, the tensions worsened facing the growth of xenophobia in the Congo and the divisions in Rwanda. Then, Mobutu realised he could profit politically if he took advantage of one side of the conflict. Later, Laurent Kabila used the same expedient. Despite having risen to power by his discourse of anti-Mobutism and defence of the Congo Tutsi which are part of the Banyarwanda and the Banyamulenge group, he drew on the support of the same Hutu based groups, now gathered in the acronym ALIR, to defend himself from aggressors of the Second Congo War (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi). In the middle of this war, another group began to receive support from the central government of the DRC, the FDLR.

In the Ituri conflict, the Congolese state also had an active role by managing and militarily equipping and financing rivalry between Hema and Lendu factions. Ethnic rivalries between Hema and Lendu and Geger and Ngiti groups had been manipulated and transformed into serious conflicts over territory by colonial administrations and Mobutu, which favoured the Hema. Later, Joseph Kabila’s government funded and trained Ngiti and Lendu militia groups against the Uganda backed UPC (Hema). At stake was the control of areas rich in natural resources, mainly gold and, recently, oil and gas.

The other answer to the question could arise from the reality of partition that the country experienced during the most part of the Second Congo War. According to Buzan and Waever, with the temporary partition of the DRC, Central Africa seemed to be ‘emerging as an RSC.’ One could argue that the alliance of the aggressor countries and the control of the eastern and
north-eastern parts of the Congo by those countries excluded the central government of the DRC from the major security dynamics of the Great Lakes' region.

However, three arguments seem to invalidate this proposition. Firstly, the main security dynamics of the Great Lakes' region overflowed to Congo's national territory, as the theatre of operations of the Congo War was within its territory and involved regions that exceeded the eastern and north-eastern part of the country. Secondly, the alliance of the aggressor countries was very fragile and Uganda and Rwanda started to become opponents within the war. This gave the DRC government and its allied groups space to act inside the zones controlled by the aggressor countries, such as Ituri. Thirdly, the aggressor countries had no complete control of the eastern and north-eastern regions of the DRC. The regions were at many times the frontline of the conflict and some territories were even recovered by the defence alliance. There were also proxy armed groups on behalf of the defence alliance that infiltrated and sometimes were established in the eastern part of the country, showing no complete control of the region by the aggressor countries.

Therefore, it could be said that there is insufficient evidence that the central government of the DRC, and even the SADC countries that established troops in Congo (Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia), were excluded from the Great Lakes' security dynamics.

**Conclusion 2 – Buzan and Waever seem to be mistaken. DR Congo is linked to the security dynamics of the Great Lakes in post-Cold War.**

The combination of the first and the second conclusions result in the statement that the DR Congo is attached to both Southern African and Great Lakes RSC in post-Cold War. However, Buzan and Waever are careful to ponder that, alternatively to the model of Lake and Morgan, their RSC model doesn't permit the existence of overlapping complexes, as RSCs 'are mutually exclusive'. As a logical conclusion, the Southern African and the Great Lakes RSCs should be part of the same complex or alternative solutions should be evaluated, as we are going to present soon.

Before we ultimately work with this conclusion, an assessment of the region's reality in the period after Buzan and Waever's analysis ought to be made. It's important to ask, 'are the two conclusions presented by the authors' study confirmed after 2002/2003?'. To answer this main question we work with three hypotheses. i) After 2002/2003 the DR Congo became detached from the Great Lakes security dynamics. ii) After 2002/2003 the DR Congo became detached both from the Great Lakes and Southern African security dynamics. iii) After 2002/2003 the DR Congo became detached from the Southern African security dynamics and began to integrate only the Great Lakes RSC. Below we give possible evaluation of those statements.

The first hypothesis seems to be false, mainly because of the characteristics of the current Great Lakes' conflicts. Firstly, the disintegration of the 'Zaire/DR Congo centred conflict pattern', expected with the end of the partition of the Congolese territory with the formal resolution of the Second Congo War, hasn't been seen. In fact, all the armed groups that continued to operate after the war have used the Congo as their central operational base.
It should also be remembered that the origins of the main current conflicts had their base in Congo. It is important that the main security problems of the Great Lakes are directly related to the instabilities generated by the type of resolution of the Second Congo War (only formal and insufficient). One can identify two elements that cause instabilities related to the resolution of this war.

The first refers to the fact that most of the warring groups of the Second Congo War were automatically integrated in the armed forces and national institutions (bureaucracy and political system) due to power-sharing mechanisms in a frame of almost complete absence of state capacities necessary to ensure and enforce the integrity of institutions. This process a) created incentives for the emergence of new armed groups claiming political gains and inclusion, and to the armed fight of groups and actors already integrating in the system aiming new demands; and b) contributed to the crystallization of non-primordial ethnic differences. In this case, the Congolese state has no monopoly of coercive power, its instruments of power-sharing work in order to delay its achievement and to dissolve the already scarce political and military power. The second phenomenon relates to the fact that the groups that were not included in the state and political systems were not defeated (including the LRA and the FDLR). The inability to defeat them is related to the Congolese military’s inability and to the foreign interests in the maintenance of these groups. The operational costs to the United Nations Mission for the Stabilisation of the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) and its program for the disarmament of foreign groups acting inside the DRC (DDRRR) interfere in this problem. MONUSCO is the largest UN peacekeeping in operation today and extremely costly, yet its success is hardly visible.

The fact that the succeeding conflicts of the Second Congo War have had their causes at least partially related to the war suggest its character of indissociation with broader regional security, including at least the participation of the DRC and even extrapolating exclusive dynamics of the Great Lakes as the Second War integrated Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia.

Besides the fact that its historical and natural interference in the East remains problematic, the DRC government is the main actor in the operations against the armed groups operating in its eastern territory. With the formal end of the conflict in 2003, despite the promises of President Joseph Kabila to stop supporting FDLR, it became of vital importance to the control of the region for the state to access operations against Tutsi-based guerrillas, such as the CNDP. Due to the extensive support of the Congolese government, the FDLR have acquired sufficient capacity to act autonomously, attacking local populations and pillaging regions rich in natural resources like gold, cassiterite and coltan. The rivalries in the region of Ituri, exacerbated by the Congolese central government, remained after the formal end of the Second Congo War and caused more destruction in the region, which only experienced the end of hostilities between local groups in 2008, when the LRA actions began to intensify in the DRC.

Finally, another argument that may invalidate the first hypothesis is that the Great Lakes countries also do not appear to have reduced the priority of the region in terms of security since the end of the Second Congo War. Important military operations that led Rwanda and Uganda armies into the
Congolese territory seeking, respectively, the LRA and the FDLR, represent their involvement together with Congo in Great Lakes security dynamics. Rwanda for its part, had previously supported the emergence of Nunda’s CNDP within DRC to combat FDLR, which caused some constrains with the Joseph Kabila government.

The second hypothesis, ‘after 2002/2003 the DR Congo became detached both from the Great Lakes and Southern African security dynamics’ also seems to be wrong due to the falsity of the first hypothesis. If DR Congo is not detached from the Great Lakes security dynamics, the second hypothesis is, at least, partially false.

In consequence, there is one hypothesis left, regarding the DR Congo detachment from the Southern Africa RSC. This point is critical as there may be multiple interpretations, because the period concerned is restricted and modifications seem still to be happening. However, we argue in two directions, one based on history of the security relations and another based on contemporary events.

Historically, as argued before, it is relevant that the settings of the security dynamics of the beginning of the decade have strongly influenced the settings of the rest of the decade. The magnitude of the Second War was so huge that the participation of the regional players considerably influenced the later conflicts. For example, Zimbabwean troops trained 3,000 men at Karina in Kinshasa who became part of the current FDLR. In the case of Angola, its participation in the war guaranteed the inviolability of the western part of the country. Despite their small number, Angolan troops had central importance in the protection of the coastal Congolese cities in response to the Rwandan blitzkrieg in the beginning of war. Moreover, despite the poor state of maintenance, Angolan air power was a decisive advantage in the war and guaranteed the defence of Kinshasa, even against a possible attack from Mbandaka. Also, the continuity of its alliance with the DRC central government was one of the main factors that prevented the resumption of the interstate war after 2003. Since the end of the conflict, Rwanda and Uganda incursions to the Congolese territory were frequent and only ceased with the Angolan declaration in August 2006 that 30,000 troops were prepared in the Cabinda region to be used against any Rwandan invasion.

In the case of South Africa, it’s relevant to remember that the country was a key mediator in the resolution of the Second Congo War, especially through the role of President Thabo Mbeki. After the failure of peace talks mediated by Zambia and Ethiopia, the beginning of a new phase of talks from 2001 resulted in unprecedented advances due to, among other things, South African diplomatic strength and skills. It is also true that South Africa greatly influenced and pressured the belligerent countries to a negotiated peace, a formal and fragile process which unintentionally produced conditions for the continuity of the instability inside the country, as mentioned before. The role of South Africa was also fundamental to the creation and the later maintenance of the MONUC, as it was the main sponsor of the mission, which has become one of the main actors in the eastern conflicts.

Concerning events since 2003, the binding of Congo with the countries of Southern Africa is no longer one of military alliance in the context of an
armed conflict. It became a political-security alliance for the pacification of the country. In this sense we may mention the essentiality of Angola and South Africa in the security dynamics that directly involve the DRC. Firstly, both were some of the main countries that have trained Congo integrated security forces, although the process is still incomplete and flawed.

Angola has played a central role in the process of Security Sector Reform of the DRC. It has trained the second FARDC Brigade in Kitona which was later deployed in the East to fight LRA, and another two Congolese brigades; it has assisted in the formation and training of the Police d’Intervention Rapide (PIR), one of the few security forces that have effective coercive capacity and which monitor public life and guarantee Kinshasa’s security; it has trained a presidential guard dominated by Katangan officers and 1,000 men of the Integrated Police Unit and it has also given ‘provision of equipment, transportation, lethal weapons, ammunition, food, medical care and a training centre at Kasangulu.’ South Africa has also participated in a protagonist way to the advisory and training of Congolese armed forces and police under the Security Sector Reform programme. In 2004 it signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement with the Congolese transitional government focused on integration of armed forces as a result of an emergency plan with a focus on the Congolese elections. The agreement later included Belgium and resulted in a joint South African-Belgian operation to train the FARDC Third Brigade in Karina. The country also trained the first Rapid Reaction Battalion of the FARDC and ‘a Special Police Services Unit for pre-electoral preparations’ and has given support to registration and census in the demobilisation and integration process as part of the emergency plan.

Secondly, both countries have given essential aid to block the occurrence of a new war in the Congo in tense situations. Angola announced that it would retaliate against any Rwanda invasion of eastern Congo, as shown before. Stability in the DR Congo is crucial to Angola as an escalation of a greater conflict in the country would probably worsen arms traffic and illegal exploitation of natural resources in its only territory with the inflow of population and possibly armed groups from the neighbouring territory, as happened before. South Africa, for its part, ensured the moderation of passions, the maintenance of the cease-fire agreement and more forceful actions by the troops of MONUC in crisis situations such as the massacre at Gatumba in 2004. It is also centrally important to note that South Africa is still nowadays the African country which leads the UN mission in DR Congo, which, despite its deficiencies, is also responsible for the security stabilisation in the eastern provinces. MONUC, and after MONUSCO, was the main peacekeeping mission to South Africa for the whole decade. It has headed the list of UN peacekeeping missions in which South Africa was involved, in terms of sending troops. In other words, South Africa sent the largest number of troops to DR Congo in the decade. For instance, since 2003 no less than a thousand South African troops have constantly occupied the Congo. Also since 2003, South Africa has become the main African contributor in terms of troops to the mission in DR Congo.

The solution of Great Lakes conflict seems to be critical to South Africa mainly because of its interests with the security stability of the SADC region, which could collaborate with a better environment for investment, and to
prevent larger instabilities related to migration influx, since Congolese nationals are one of the top groups that seek security (both asylum and illegal migration) in the more stable South African society and better opportunities in the largest regional economy. Maybe for those reasons South Africa also has a relevant economic projection to the region, as the country’s investments have become a big incentive for the development of the Congolese economy since the 1990s and especially in the 2000s. It becomes clear that South Africa has been indispensable to and deeply involved in Great Lakes’ security dynamics.

The Congo’s security interaction with other Southern African countries also suggests the existence of bonds even stronger in regional terms, such as the dialogue of the Great Lakes countries where Tanzania and Zambia, formally part of Buzan and Waever’s Southern Africa RSC, participate in all negotiation processes. SADC has also contributed in a complementary way to the maintenance of the DR Congo integration in regional security issues. It continues to be a relevant source of debate and deliberation on regional crises and instabilities. This could be seen in the process of implementation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO), which alongside the Mutual Defence Pact of 2004, has become a clearer guideline and an enabling instrument for the implementation of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. SADC is also a possible source for effective security supply, as was the intention of the SADCBRIG, created in 2007.

This analysis suggests that the third hypothesis is also false. After 2002/2003, the DR Congo has not detached from the Southern African security dynamics. Instead, it has remained bound to Southern Africa RSC as Buzan and Waever had foreseen.

In short, Congo is significantly integrated both into the Southern Africa and the Great Lakes security dynamics. As Buzan and Waever’s model doesn’t permit the existence of two or more overlapping RSCs, one may deal with three possibilities to solve this dilemma. Firstly, Congo as a buffer state within a new Southern Africa RSC which integrates both Buzan and Waever’s Southern Africa and Great Lake RSC. Secondly, Congo as an insulator that would isolate Buzan and Waever’s Southern Africa RSC from its Great Lake RSC. Thirdly, Congo as just a normal member of a new Southern Africa RSC which integrates both Buzan and Waever’s Southern Africa and Great Lake RSC, with the possibility of the existence of two sub-complexes; one centred in Great Lakes conflicts and the other in South Africa's securitisation issues.

Both the first and the second hypotheses are very unlikely. This is a logical conclusion resulting from the revision of both concepts. According to the author’s definition, ‘a buffer is internal to an RSC, where it keeps powers of the region apart. An insulator is located in the zone of indifference between RSCs, helping to keep separate from each other two or more sets of regional security dynamics.’

DR Congo doesn’t keep the regional powers or candidates for such a post apart, as is the case of Uruguay in South America. As we are going to see below DR Congo also seems to be an important aspirant to the position of regional power in terms of material capabilities in next decades, if it can overcome its internal centrifugal forces. Consequently, being a buffer state is
not a very probable characteristic of the Congo. On the other hand, DR Congo
doesn’t seem to be an insulator that separates the Southern Africa and the
Great Lakes RSC. On the contrary, it is the main centre of integration of both
RSCs security dynamics; if it was not for the Congo, most Southern African
countries would hardly be involved in the security dynamics of the Great
Lakes.

Consequently, through a logical conclusion based on the reasoning
presented above, which was constructed with conclusions and analysis of
hypotheses through the assessment of empirical evidences, it is very likely
that the Southern Africa RSC and the Great Lakes RSC are, mostly because of
the position and security dynamics of the Congo, integrated in the same RSC.
In short, the relevance and the transnational and regional character of the
security dynamics presented in the DR Congo make it a key country which
defines the northern boundary of the Southern Africa RSC.

It is also true that one can find two main cores of security dynamics
within this new and larger Southern Africa RSC. One core is centred in the
Great Lakes and the other around South Africa, as the country is the main
regional ‘securitising agent’. This situation is commonly seen when an RSC
is composed of different sub-complexes, which is also often the solution for
problems of overlapping membership, as seems to be the case of the DR Congo.
In Buzan and Waever’s words, ‘sub-complexes represent distinctive patterns
of security interdependence that are nonetheless caught up in a wider pattern
that defines the RSC as a whole. The device of sub-complexes eliminates
most of what might otherwise occur as disturbing cases of overlapping
membership between RSCs, for example if the Gulf and the Levant were seen
as separate RSCs, Iraq would be a member of both, but with these as sub-
complexes, Iraq can be a member both of the Gulf sub-complex and of the
wider Middle Eastern one.’ DR Congo would occupy the same position in the
new Southern Africa RSC that Iraq does in the Middle East responsible for the
security interaction of the two sub-complexes.36

Therefore, based on the exposed arguments, the Southern Africa RSC here
comprises of 15 countries, namely South Africa, Angola, Botswana, Burundi,
DR Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The map below graphically
represents this thematic area.
Map 1 – The Southern Africa Regional Security Complex

Note: Map drawn from the centre (Azimuthal Equidistant Projection), radial scale 500km/cm, produced with the Software AZ PROj v. 1.1.6beta5, Jan. 2002
Source: http://wm7dnet/azproj.shtml
Author: Castellano 2011
As shown in the first section of this paper, Buzan and Waever emphasise that South Africa holds the regional unipolarity in Southern Africa RSC by its economic dominance over neighbours and the predisposition of regional states to accept its leadership. This section attempts to validate this proposition in the 2000s and to include, based on methodological guidelines of neorealist theory of International Relations, indicators related to material capabilities to evaluate the polarity of the region.

If it is sufficient to say, ‘that for the idea of polarity to work as a definition of the system level it requires a single, identifiable concept of great power,’ then it is also significant to consider a concept of regional power to access the polarity of the region.

For being a great power or a regional power, the main element that defines that quality is the existence of a substantial gap of power between the country in analysis and the countries within the level in question, global or regional. In short, what matters is the gap between the country aspiring to be a power and the rest. 29 This is the main element that sustained the evaluation made by Douglas Lemke of the regional powers in the regions he analysed in 2010.

The next open question is, ‘gaps in what terms?’ In other words, ‘what are the criteria/elements which a country should present in excess compared to other regional members to be considered a regional power?’ For Buzan and Weaver as for Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, Nolte, Destradi, Nabers and Schirm there are two main groups of elements that should be taken in consideration. The first group comprises elements traditionally used by theoretical realism; the material capabilities. On the side of defensive realism, Kenneth Waltz highlights the distribution of material capabilities among the factors that compose the structure and consider factors such as territory, population, natural resources, wealth, military strength, political stability and competence as necessary qualities of a power that determine system polarity. On the side of offensive realism, John Mearsheimer argues that the ability of states to maximise power in the system relates to the availability of concrete power (military capability, especially armies) and potential power (population size and wealth). The second group is more linked with behavioural criteria, such

**Southern Africa RSC:**

**The Polarity**

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as the formal recognition of a country as a regional leader and the necessity that political calculations of the regional members take into account the main powerful states.

Besides the importance of behavioural aspects to the establishment of a regional leadership and to consolidate a country as a regional power, one could sustain, as neorealists do, ‘identity and behaviour of regional powers should be determined by the regional distribution of these capabilities.’ In other words, the material capabilities are a precondition for those behavioural aspects to work properly. In practice, the behavioural criteria of Buzan and Weaver eventually led to the expansion of the concept of regional power and, consequently, to difficulties in measuring the degree of power of states and to establish a hierarchy between the elements. In the case of their own study they were careless about the evaluation of material capacities and focused on behavioural aspects with a low level of rigor and systematisation. In none of the region studies of Buzan and Waever is there a real assessment of the material capabilities of the regional members or comparative studies among the countries by using important indicators related to material capabilities.

In the case of the Southern Africa RSC, for example, that are many statements presented to support the proposed unipolarity based in South Africa, but no empirical evidence is shown. For instance, they have assumed that South Africa is ‘a giant compared to its neighbours’; a ‘regional great power’; ‘dominant to an unusual degree’. The country would have a ‘dominant position’; a ‘longstanding economic dominance’; and a ‘high percentage of resources of the region’. Beyond the supposed disproportional material capacities, for which the authors don’t present any concrete evidence, there’s also the behavioural argument. The authors suggest a ‘readiness of the other states in the region to accept South African leadership’. On the other hand, they paradoxically sustain that lately South Africa has ‘failed to provide regional leadership’, that there are some ‘mistakes in South Africa’s handling of its leadership role’ and some ‘difficulty of agreeing in practice on how to divide roles and responsibilities’ exists in the region. Those later statements may logically invalidate their own argument of the unipolarity, as their concept of regional power contains behavioural aspects, such as leadership.

Here, it’s not argued in favour of the elimination of the behavioural elements of power but we propose an example of approach to evaluate material capabilities and to use those elements as the primary task in power evaluation. In this section we propose to give a partial rigour to the identification of regional powers. Rigour because we intend to give empirical indicators that will sustain our arguments. Partial because we only focus on material capacities of the countries, an approach more aligned with the neorealist theory.

Among the material capabilities, those relating to the potential power (GDP and population) and concrete power (size of the army and weapons) may be mentioned. As the results will show, the polarity of the RSC seems directed toward an unbalanced bipolarity. South Africa has economic and military power disproportionately superior than all other countries, but Angola has stood out among the other countries in the region due to the puissance of its economic growth, size and experience of its armed forces and the experience acquired after the victory in their civil war and some stability operations in neighbouring countries.
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<th>DR Congo</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
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<td>33,000</td>
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Notes:
* Includes Military Health Service professionals;
** Includes civil staff working in the quartermaster of AF; Data not available for Swaziland.
Sources: IISS, 2010; WB, 2011
As an initial task, one seeks to assess the size of the security forces in the region (see Table 1). The first impression, however, is suggestive; South Africa does not have the largest security forces. It lies behind the DRC and Angola. The second impression is even more suggestive, the DRC has the largest security forces in the region with 140,000 men. However, it is worth mentioning that this number is totally misleading. There are two reasons for this; the first is that it represents a process of expanding of the Congolese Armed Forces, intensified in 2008 when the country’s total military contingent went from 51 to 120 thousand. This explosion in the number of troops was due to the beginning of a second phase in the integration process of the belligerents of the Second Congo War and the armed conflicts of the State of Violence into the national forces. The second reason results from the first; the Armed Forces of the DRC are typically ineffective. This is because the integration process was full of shortcomings, related to the scope of the programs and the scarcity of resources. As a result, one of the great villains of the current ‘state of violence’ is a part of the Congolese Armed Forces itself which attacks national populations, plundering, murdering and sexually abusing some communities.

Thus, a figure more consistent with the reality of the 2000s is presented for the year 2007 (see Figure 1) in which Angola, and not the DRC, appears as having the greatest military contingent in the region. It is important that this fact remains true to this day, if only the forces effective and responsive to a chain of command and control are counted (C2). Moreover, currently, Angola has one of the highest proportions of security forces/population in the RSC (see Figure 2).

**Figure 1 - Southern Africa: Military personnel, 2007 (thousands)**

![Figure 1](source: COW, 2011)
Besides representing the largest effective military contingent in the region, the FAA acquired considerable experience in recent decades with the clash of regular and irregular threats. In the case of conventional threats, we can mention (i) the SADF (South Africa Defence Forces under apartheid) in support of UNITA, (ii) the UN/TA armed groups in battles adopted regular tactics and (iii) Rwandan troops during the Second Congo War. In the case of irregular battles, the guerrilla tactics adopted by UNITA in various moments of the civil war should be remembered, especially on occasions when they were at a disadvantage, as in the period after the year 2000.

In the case of South Africa, its last relevant conventional war was waged in Cuito-Cuanavalle, when a relative parity of forces in relation to Angola was observed. However, one stresses that Angola fought with the help of 20,000 Cubans and in its own territory. On the other hand, currently the main SANDF experience of war is with peace missions, which raise questions about its real ability to fight in regular combat.

However, the economic superiority of South Africa in relation to its neighbours (see Figure 3) enabled the country to direct considerably higher resources to the defence sector during the 2000s (see Figure 4). These features favoured an important process of modernization of the Armed Forces conducted in the last decade, as discussed below. Furthermore, although there is economic and social pressures to control and reduce these costs in post-apartheid South Africa, the small proportion of these resources in relation to GDP (see Figure 5) would, at least in theory, leave space to an increase in expenditure in a sustainable manner (usually up to approximately 5% of GDP). This disparity in favour of South Africa is also found in other materials capacities evaluated below.

However, it is worth mentioning that, with an exponentially higher increase during the decade, in 2010 Angola’s military spending exceeded that of South Africa. In addition, throughout the decade the country has maintained a prominent position among other countries in the region. The data suggests that throughout the decade Angola, despite having an inferior position against South Africa, held important distinctions in relation to
Figure 3 - Southern Africa: GDP, 2000-2009 (current USD)

Figure 4 - Southern Africa: Military expenditure by country, higher than USD200 million, 2000-2009 (const 2009 USD, million)
other countries in the complex. With respect to absolute military spending (see Figure 4), excluding South Africa, all other countries of the complex (including those not represented in the figure) totalled together over the decade, only a little more than a half of Angola’s expenses. Angolan military spending growth during the decade was significant and in 2010 the sum of the expense of other countries was less than half of Angola. Specifically, in 2010 Angola had accumulated 42.14 per cent of expenditures in Southern Africa, South Africa had 41.72 per cent of the expenses and all other countries remained with 16.15 per cent.

In regards to GDP, it should be remembered that Angola has recorded the highest growth in the region in the last decade (see Figure 6). The increase was also observed in the country’s absolute GDP. The Angolan national income accounts for more than three times the GDP of the next country in the ranking (see Figure 3), even considering the economic downturn in 2008. Furthermore, this ratio tends to remain constant at least until mid-2010, according to the IMF (see Figure 7). The growth was also present in the country’s per capita GDP, which was US$ 4,081.22 in 2009, more than twice the average for the region (US$ 1,833.71) and relatively close to that of South Africa (US$ 5,785.98). However, it should be noted that economic growth in the last decade is centrally based on massive increases in oil prices and on the expansion of its exploitation. As a result, the increase in GDP per capita does not necessarily mean that there was some distribution of the national wealth. There is a fragile economic dynamism in Angola, while South Africa has a relatively diversified economy, but it has been hard hit by the crisis of 2008.

With regard to military equipment, South Africa is disproportionately more technologically advanced, but Angolan largely exceeds the capabilities of its neighbours. Moreover, the equipment profile of the two countries differs with regard to the type of war and the doctrine adopted. On the one hand, Angola has a strength profile that combines mobility and regular capacity. On
Igor Castellano da Silva

the other, South Africa maintains a profile of force directed to participation in peacekeeping missions, which involves the need for prompt establishment of troops, and to national and regional defence against maritime threats (piracy and illegal fishing). These profiles have centrally influenced the process of modernisation of both countries’ forces in the last decade.

**Angolan and South African military modernisation**

Before describing the process of military modernisation which both countries have been through in the last two decades (qualitative analysis), one should
display a current photograph of the military inventories of their armed forces (quantitative analysis). Based on the databases of the IISS and Jane’s the table on below shows the simplified equipment configuration of the two countries.

South Africa has superior numerical superiority in regard to the naval forces. This superiority also exists in a quality grade, considering that the country, unlike Angola, has submarines and frigates (as discussed below), while Angola has to be content with only a reasonable anti-ship defence system with patrol aircraft (operated by the Air Force) and missile defence on

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Inventory</th>
<th>Angola (IISS 2010)</th>
<th>Angola (Jane’s 2009)</th>
<th>South Africa (IISS 2010)</th>
<th>South Africa (Jane’s 2009)</th>
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<td>107,000</td>
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<td>4 Types</td>
<td>5 Types</td>
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Note: Cells in blue correspond to higher capacities.
Sources: IISS, 2010; Jane’s, 2009a e 2009b
Author: Castellano, 2011
the ground. However, the capabilities of both countries seem more equivalent in the case of air and ground forces. In the Air Force, although South Africa has modern multirole aircraft, Angola has a diverse set of relatively modern aircraft for air combat and attack, and holds between 8 and 14 Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker fighter jets, with capacity and range comparable to the South African JAS39D African Gripen. On the one hand, both fighters have similar missile and simple weapons capabilities (weapons of approximately 30 mm and hard points for a maximum of six missiles). On the other hand, the Angolan fighter is faster (2,500 km/h against 2,204 km/h), has greater flight range (3,530 km against 3,200 km), higher service ceiling (18,500 m against 15,240 m) and higher maximum load (30,450 kg against 14,000 kg). In the army, although older, the T-72 Angolan MBTs can cope with the South African Olifant Mk1A in conventional combat. Despite the weakness of his turret armour, the T-72 weapons are greater than the Olifant’s (125 mm against 105 mm) and can reach similar speeds (approximately 60 km/h).

However, any quantitative analysis is incomplete without a more qualitative assessment of capabilities which in this case, involves an understanding of the modernisation process of the armed forces.

In Angola, in spite of past cooperation with most countries in the region, the recent threats of internal guerrilla groups operating on its soil and abroad (usually backed by rival neighbour regimes) continue to favour the legitimacy of high spending on the defence, of robust armed forces and of an equipment profile which includes capabilities for regular warfare. Thus, ‘Angola retains sufficient hardware and troops to make it a regional military power in sub-Saharan Africa. Massive conscription expanded the overstretched Angolan Armed Forces to give it a quantitative, if not qualitative, edge over any other military in the region’ During the war against UNITA, Angola developed one of the most powerful militaries on the continent. By 2002, her forces were established in the territory of three of its four neighbours (DRC, Congo and Namibia), with occasional struggles on the border of Zambia.

Regarding the modernisation of forces, it is noteworthy that the FAA was trained by Portugal assessors in the 1990s and by South African and North American private military companies since 1993. One can also cite a military training agreement signed with Russia in 2000, encompassing technical support for the operation of newly purchased equipment from countries of the former USSR. It should be noted that after 1999, rising oil prices enabled a process of relative modernisation of the FAA, especially in the Army and the Air Force, in a period that also encompassed the final phase of the fighting against UNITA. The arsenal from Eastern Europe helped centrally in the successes against insurgents in the 2000s. Between 1998 and 2000 Angola purchased stocks of the Warsaw Pact, among them 320 MBTs (Main Battle Tanks), 160 AIFVs (Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles), more than 100 artillery pieces, 46 multi-rocket launchers, some attack planes Sukhoi Su-22 Fitter (reinforcing the existing inventory of these planes) and some attack helicopters Mi-24 Hind. Obtaining qualitative benefits was also embraced by the acquisition of some units of more modern equipment, such as the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker. Other weapons, parts and advisers were agreed with Russia in 1999.

The exception to the modernisation program was the Navy, which had already lost all its combat and patrol ability and half of its staff in the year
1990, due to the focus in the war against UNITA, which never developed maritime presence. In 2002 it was reported that the Angolan Navy did not have reliable ships and vectors, which opened room for occasional South African presence. More recently, in 2004, an initial cooperation with the Namibian Navy allowed the establishment of coastal fishing patrols by utilising the neighbouring country vessels. Moreover, the development of the oil sector has pushed the government to reconsider the construction of a coastal defence force. Currently, the Navy uses the Air Force's air-to-air vectors and does not utilise several bases along the coast.

The FAA has undergone training through a contract with a private US company, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), and with the International Military Education and Training (IMET). US aid came primarily to the Navy, due to greater concern with oil exports from its third largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa and the second largest destination for US investment in Africa, after South Africa. In September 2005, there was also the Med-Flag 2005, a naval exercise involving 700 Angolan and 200 American troops.

The army's modernisation process, which received large amounts of relatively modern equipment since the late 1990s, also encompassed training programs established by South African private companies (especially Executive Outcomes). Links with China were also established in 2007 an agreement on military-technical cooperation was signed, which will be implemented in the form of supplies of military equipment, to be delivered. Currently, senior officers of the two countries have a program of experiences exchange.

Regarding the Air Force, it had been trained in the 1990s by Executive Outcomes (1993-1996), the American Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) and Portuguese teams of instructors.

Until the 1990s the Angolan military doctrine mixed aspects of Portuguese military thinking with Soviet, Cuban and Warsaw Pact schools. In the mid-1990s the resumption of the war by UNITA caused a subtle change in this framework. The external advisors of Executive Outcomes enabled a refinement of the Soviet era style, by creating new and reduced Operational Manoeuvre Groups. These are battalions with reduced formation and conventional capability, but much faster and more flexible. As a result, the units have become smaller and more agile, making it difficult for UNITA to face conventional combat in the resumption of war in 1998. The new line enabled combined formations of artillery, motorised and mechanised infantry and armoured cavalry. This reality has led the insurgents to be defeated as a conventional threat in 2000, pressing them to modify the standard of combat to guerrilla tactics.

Thus, it is noteworthy that, although the formation has been specialising in the mobility profile, the conventional strategy remained present in the FAA and visible in the size of the army and the profile of recent acquisitions (MBTs).

Finally, the largest on going reform of the Angolan armed forces is the structuring of a more concrete national army of conscripts. This has been done by four current priorities, (i) increasing the professionalism of the armed forces, especially in the army, (ii) increasing the combat readiness of
soldiers, (iii) increasing the organisation, control and registration of staff and equipment (iv) increasing the imposition of discipline, and (iv) improving the living conditions of soldiers and increasing the rate of literacy among the military.

Concerning South Africa, it is important to remember that the country has the best equipped and trained military in sub-Saharan Africa, with significant operational experience. The country also has a Military Industrial Complex under construction with the presence of companies such as Denel (aerospace equipment), Advanced Technologies and Engineering (avionics and weapons systems), Grintek (avionics and traffic control), and Reutech (tactical communications equipment, mine detector and electronic fuses). The political importance of these strategic industries could be seen when, in 2006, the government saved Denel from financial losses that could result in bankruptcy, depositing almost R2 billion in the parastatal organisation.

Despite these advances, it should be noted that post-Apartheid, the SANDF has undergone unfavourable changes, both internally and externally. Internally, it had to distance itself from the internal coercive role attributed to apartheid security forces. Externally, there was a need to build forces that did not alarm its neighbours, still traumatised by the history of the SADF’s destabilising role in the region. As a result, a force of regional vocation was built, but centrally based on the legitimacy exercised by peacekeeping mandates. This profile was supported by a portentous process of modernisation of the armed forces in the 2000s.

Following successive reductions in military spending in the 1990s, which ultimately affected the operational readiness of the forces and reduced the number of military bases, South Africa has gone through an extensive process of equipment modernisation throughout the 2000s. The 12 year long purchase program, the 1999 Strategic Armaments Package (SAP), totalled more than US$ 6 billion and was directed almost exclusively at marine and aeronautics.

Among the navy’s equipment, priority was given to (i) the control of maritime Exclusive Economic Zone against illegal fishing and piracy; (ii) the carrying out of support tasks to maritime peacekeeping missions and (iii) the patrol of oil regions on the continent’s Atlantic coast. The main equipment purchased were four frigates class MEKO A-200 and three diesel-electric submarines (both bought from Germany), as well as four Lynx helicopters to equip the frigates. In the Air Force the purchase list was composed of 26 Gripen JAS39D and C, 24 Hawk trainer aircraft and 30 utility helicopters Agusta Westland A109UH.

The modernisation also involved the increment of vectors. Embarked missiles (spear) Umkhonto were established in the new MEKO frigates, new models of self-propelled artillery Denel/GDLS 105mm were presented. In order to establish elements of rapidly deployable air-transported artillery and the establishment of a joint program with Brazil for the development of the agile short-range air-to-air missile (AAM) A-Darter, whose prototype is being produced by Denel. Thus, the SANDF has confirmed its standing as the most modern armed forces in the continent.

However, two main issues put pressure on the profile and the regional role assumed by the SANDF, which has established peacekeeping and
reconstruction tasks in Burundi, Ivory Coast, DRC, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Nepal and Sudan, and supported electoral processes in Comoros, DRC, Madagascar and Lesotho in recent years, totalling almost 4,000 military abroad. The first issue was the option to modernise the armed forces throughout the decade, which caused between 30 per cent to 40 per cent of the budget to be directed exclusively to the military purchases program, leaving few resources for training and operations spending. The second factors were the national economic difficulties that emerged, at the same time, pressures on defence spending to remain below 2 per cent of the GDP, and the negative effects of deterioration of resources committed to defence due to inflation and currency devaluation. This reality favoured the reproduction of incertitude about the viability of the regionalised profile of South African forces. Some experts spoke of the need for increased spending by 30 per cent in 2011 so that the SANDF could support its regionalised force profile. The armed forces’ modernisation program also generated additional costs with training and integration of new structures and systems. If not prescribed in a DoD rubric, it may end up draining the resources dedicated to the establishment of regional operations.

Moreover, in spite of the prodigious modernisation program in South Africa, throughout the 2000s, the army was marginalised in relation to the Air Force and the Navy under the purchase program. As a result, the army is currently too small to sustain its current missions and there is a lack of resources for training, maintenance and purchase of vital equipment. Positive signs were given in 2007 with the publication of a plan to increase the army’s budget in the Defence Update. Seeking to generate greater flexibility and mobility in the army, which is the backbone of peace efforts in the continent, the government established a new structure for the organisation and committed to prioritise purchases for this force.

Another problem present in the SANDF is staff shortages in terms of quantity and quality. This became aggravated by the post-apartheid policy of racial quotas, creating a shortage of qualified officers to meet the requirement of a reduced white contingent. Moreover, there seems to be little identification between the army and the population, which causes difficulties in the recruitment of volunteers. The number of people able to take on military tasks and are reaching military age in South Africa would suggest the opposite (see Figures 8 and 9), but currently, the SAAF has just 38 per cent of the required number of fighter pilots, 60 per cent of technicians, 72 per cent of helicopter pilots, and 68 per cent of transport pilots.

**Figure 8 - Southern Africa: Manpower fit for military service, 2010**

![Graph showing manpower fit for military service in Southern Africa, 2010](source: CIA, 2011)
The end of conscription and compulsory military service is another source of this problem. The system was replaced by a force of volunteers. It is important to note that the DoD sought to cut the size of the armed forces in order to reduce operational expenses since the early 1990s. Thus the paradox of having an ambition to sustain a force for regional stability and a policy of budget cuts and staff was apparently resolved by a doctrine which assumes that their actions will only occur if preceded by peace agreements. This implies that their role in combat is reduced to the extent that in peace operations (even in missions of peace enforcement) the activities of the armed forces are considerably reduced compared to conventional military operations, specifically with regard to attrition and friction. An example of this is that within the largest UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, with a mandate clearly under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the actions of the peace force are of surgical character and of material and logistical support to heavier military operations by the FARDC.

Therefore, despite the extensive modernisation of forces during the 2000s and its declared regional vocation, the SANDF seems to face practical problems in sustaining South Africa as a single pole in Southern Africa. It can be concluded with the analysis of the material capabilities of the Southern Africa countries, especially the two major players, that Angola is an emerging local power to the regional power, or is already a regional power exercising an unbalanced polarity in relation to South Africa.

**Shared vulnerabilities**

Despite the preponderance of these countries as poles of the Southern Africa region, it is necessary to highlight some shared vulnerabilities. The first refers to demographic issues, the second, to problems concerning the concept of security adopted by each country.

In the context of population issues, although both countries currently hold a large percentage of urban population, and this view remains to the year 2050 (see Figures 10 and 11), the scenario does not seem so favourable...
regarding their absolute population compared with other countries in the region (see Figures 12 and 13). It is estimated that Angola will continue in 2050 as only the seventh country in the region in terms of absolute population. In relation to South Africa, it is assumed that the country will move from second to the fourth place in terms of population size, suggesting the loss of some relative power on the continent. The situation seems to be a direct result of the low rate of population growth that South Africa presents to the larger countries in the region (see Figure 14). Data of particular concern, especially for South Africa, refers to the growth prospects of its workforce by the year 2050 (see Figure 15).

This demographic framework may have implications for the capacity of countries to sustain their economic development, their military capacity and therefore their position in the region. What can also be learned from the various figures is that, in case there is a positive response to the stabilisation of conflicts in the Great Lakes region and an appropriate reform of its security forces, the DRC may become a new hub in the region. Its population growth and especially its workforce can generate positive results for the country’s position in the region. It should be noted that since the splitting of Sudan in early 2011, the DRC is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa in territorial terms.
In the context of the adopted concept of security, neither Angola nor South Africa appear to have a sense of security that is able to effectively gather the region under its leadership due to a variety of reasons. In the case of Angola, it is because of its excessive focus on internal security. In the case of South Africa, it is related to the concept of human security.

Angola’s security concept is based on national security. This concept stems from its historical experience with the civil war, when the greatest threat to the state was within its borders. In adopting this concept, Angola seeks to prevent the formation of new forces’ claims of power and rivalry to the state and to consolidate the process of state-building. However, the external result of this conceptual approach is that Angola only interferes in the region when security issues could disrupt its own internal security. Its participation in the wars in the DRC and Congo-Brazzaville and its alliance with Namibia to suppress UNITA are indicators that seem to support this perception. Even more recently, Angolan support to the training of security forces of the DRC seems to be due to the fact that the security of its neighbour directly affects its national security. This is evident when one sees that Angola does not think twice about expelling Congolese citizens from the country.

The exception to this rule can be perceived also in the case of the DRC when, in 2006, Angola once again demonstrated that the government of dos Santos would assist Kabila in the case of an invasion by Rwanda, even where the threat of UNITA had been demobilised.

However, even with attitudes based on concerns about national security, Angola ended up acting at times as an actor in stabilising the region, seeking to block the war of aggression and assistance from central government against insurgent groups. Thus, history suggests that this model, even if focused on domestic concerns, can stabilise the region unintentionally. On the other hand, its focus on national security, sometimes translated into non-interventionism, can block the development of more regular and incisive regional policies. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire in 2011, the objection to an AU intervention facilitated space for French action, showing how this self-centred security perception may be harmful in avoiding extra-regional interventions in the continent.47

In the case of South Africa, human security and non-interventionism, except those supported by mandates of international organisations, are the basis of the adopted security concept. The construction of this security posture was directly related to the construction of new armed forces in post-apartheid and sought different political interests, such as (i) a basis for legitimacy in society, (ii) to find elements that could assimilate the different factions integrated into the armed forces, (iii) to avoid topics that could bring conflict to its own forces and (iv) to establish an ethical role which could assimilate the different factions within the armed forces with the society.

The result of this policy was the refusal to defend territorial integrity and condemn the war of aggression in the two wars of interstate character in the region (First and Second Congo Wars), which created 3.8 million deaths in total. This resulted in a division within SADC and checked the posture of the organisation as a force to intervene in armed conflicts in the region.48
In short, there is a paradox between the fact that South Africa has the continent’s strongest military and the fact that it does not interfere in heavy combat and conflicts centrally related to regional stability. Its military capacity could be translated into the blockade of wars of aggression, in a regional alternative to extra-regional interventions, and in military aid tasks in counter-insurgency operations against destabilising transnational and national groups within the continent. Today the tasks are restricted, especially, to peacekeeping missions and aid to the reform of security forces after peace accords. In this case it implies that power-sharing agreements (as the one produced, with South African mediation, in the DRC and Burundi and defended by the country in case of Angola) are more desirable than those supported by a military definition on the battlefield (such as the one in Angola).

The above table summarises the findings of this section regarding the polarity of the Southern Africa RSC during the 2000s. During the decade, the economic primacy of South Africa was constantly being followed by Angola, which has always stood out among the other countries in the region. With regard to military factors, the capacity of both countries became a little less asymmetric. Angola has the largest military and recent experience with regular and irregular war. South Africa has a better balance between the forces, which are structured for a more advanced stage of modernization.

Finally, the graph also suggests future demographic problems and the possibility of the rising of the DRC as a regional power, which will be conditioned by its ability to solve the current internal conflicts.
Conclusion

This article tried to make a contribution to Buzan and Waever's attempt to apply the Regional Security Complex's model to Southern Africa. More specifically, it sought to analyse the security dynamics, to limit the boundaries and to assess the polarity of the RSC during the 2000s. This task was accomplished in three stages.

The first outlined the peculiarities that involve the application of the RSC model to the African case. Moreover, it pointed out the main analytical flaws committed by the authors in adapting their model to Southern Africa. Among them, we can mention the classification of the Great Lake of Central Africa as an RSC by itself, separated from Southern Africa; and the perception that the Southern Africa RSC is characterized by unipolarity, exercised by South Africa. The following sections sought to present an alternative interpretation of these points, using the study of the security dynamics present in the 2000s, mostly not included in the work of the authors.

The second section described these dynamics, divided into domestic and regional levels and intended to review the Southern Africa RSC's boundaries. We concluded that Buzan and Weaver seemed to be right to include DR Congo into the Southern Africa RSC, but wrong to detach it from the security dynamics of the Great Lakes region. For the period after the author's book, three hypotheses were evaluated and we concluded that DR Congo is still integrated both to Southern Africa and Great Lakes RSCs. As the model doesn't permit overlapping RSCs, we concluded that Buzan and Waever's Southern Africa and Great Lakes RSCs are integrated into the same RSC, here called the Southern Africa RSC. This is due mainly to the position and the security dynamics within the DR Congo. In short, our argument is based on three main realities (i) the impossibility to detach the DRC (the whole country) from the security dynamics of the region; (ii) the interconnection between the region's security dynamics and characteristics of the Second Congo War, which was a typically regionalized conflict; and (iii) the necessary connection between the conflicts in the region after 2003 and the policy of South Africa and Angola as regional powers.

The third and most important section assessed the type of polarity in the Southern Africa RSC, based on indicators of material capability with data for the 2000s. With the analysis of indicators such as GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth, size of the armed forces, military expenditure and military
expenditure to GDP, it became apparent that although South Africa is the country with the largest economic capabilities of region, Angola stands out among the other countries, especially for its economic and military capabilities. Consequentially, little doubt remains that during the last decade Angola has become at least partially a regional power (in terms of material capability). Additional studies are necessary to assess the behavioural aspects of its power. This could expand the finding to a full measurement according to the author’s concept, which embraces both material capability and behaviour.

A brief assessment of the military capabilities of the two regional powers was then presented in order to identify the specific characteristics of polarity. From this exercise it was noted that the South African National Defence Forces (SANDF) are more modern and have maritime capabilities superior to the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). However, these latter forces have relevant land and air capabilities, aided by their extensive experience in regular and irregular wars, guaranteeing the material basis for Angola’s position as a regional power. The data supports, therefore, the interpretation that there is an unbalanced bipolarity in Southern Africa in favour of South Africa, but qualifies Angola as a power distinct from the rest of the region. Even with this reality, vulnerabilities presented by both countries suggest that this position is not guaranteed. Future demographic problems and the adoption of inadequate security concepts seem to act as variables which may affect the stability of the power of both countries.

For future work we also suggest the development of studies to assess (i) the existence of a sub-Saharan Africa RSC, which could contain, it is assumed, three sub-complexes (of West Africa, the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa); (ii) the security relations between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa (Maghreb) seeking to verify if these regions are part of different or same RSC; and (iii) what are the power poles of a possible African Regional Security Complex.
Notes and References

Notes

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2 According to Buzan and Waever (2003), for non-global powers the main security threats are the geographically closest and related to the regional level. For the authors, as well as for Thompson (1975), Lemke (2002), Lake (1997) and Lake and Morgan (1997), “most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones” and “most states historically have been concerned primarily with the capabilities and intentions of their neighbours” (Buzan and Waever 2003:4).

3 The penetration of great powers into other regions is limited by a cost-benefit logic which balances strategic interest with overstretching problems. In regions of relatively low strategic relevance, the room for regional powers is greater, as Katzenstein (2000) suggests, for post-Cold War reality. However, these regions continue to be a potential target of global powers, as they can be of strategic interest to emergent powers, such as China, India and Brazil, and even because strategic interests of traditional global powers are more or less volatile and ephemeral. In the case of Africa for example, after the Cold War and the USA’s failure in Somalia War, there was a strategic detachment of that traditional global power from Africa, which changed greatly since the War on Terror and the perception that the weakness of some African states could propitiate a safe haven to terrorist groups.

4 According to some authors, the post-Cold War period has been a period of uncertainty, where the superpower’s inability to permanently affect all regions (overstretch) has opened room for regional dynamics and a neo-regionalist trend which has been seen with the emergence of many regional integration processes (Kelly 2007, Katzenstein 2000, 2005). There are, however, uncertainties about the future of the international system and even the possibility of the collapse of neo-regionalism, with the emergence of a new superpower for example (Kelly 2007:199).

5 The excessive parsimony of general theories about the international system generates insufficiency to explain the particular situations in some regions (i.e. regions where weak states predominate) (Kelly 2007:201).

6 The global powers’ penetration in different regions is not a one way process. Local powers use global powers’ interests and patronage to pursue local policies and the global powers should be aware of this reality (i.e. Kissinger mistake in Angola) (Kelly 2007:200, Visentini 2010). Therefore, “since regions matter more in the current era, the costs of underrating them could be even higher” (Buzan and Waever 2003:41).

7 There is great knowledge value in expanding the scope of IR studies, even in the face of difficulties, costs and opposite expectations of the academic dominant community (escape the comfort zone). To create or enhance theories basing them on new empirical studies may be the first step in this task.

8 Regions’ specificities (polarity and polarisation) seem to interfere in the capacity/power degree of the countries within them and these countries’ positions in face of other regional or global powers (international system).
According to the authors, ‘the regional level may or may not dominate, but it will nearly always be in play in some significant sense, and cannot be dropped out of the analysis’ (Buzan and Waever 2003:52).

Among them it may be mentioned the internal and external coercive tasks and the extraction of resources from population through taxation (Tilly 1996:158).

Christopher Clapham (2005) uses the term “Letter Box sovereignty” to refer to a situation where whoever opens the letters at the presidential palace and receives invitation to represent the state at the United Nations and other international bodies is, in practice, the legal representative of the sovereignty.

Proxy War - Armed conflict fought by proxy. Its main feature is inter-subjectivity, the degree of autonomy between the forces waging the battle and its propagators, or financiers. Hence the term “proxy”, to indicate the categorisation content to something that is not just a simple relationship of principal and executor (Loveman 2002:50).

SADC - Southern African Development Community. Intergovernmental organization with headquarters in Gaborone (Botswana). It aims at the integration and political, economic and security cooperation among the countries of Southern Africa. Its role is complementary to the African Union. The current member countries are: South Africa, Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

This text implicitly rejects perspectives that deal with the mere existence of institutions of integration as an indication of the existence of a security complex. The position adopted here represents an attempt to make use of more rigorous criteria for the evaluation of what generates an RSC, what defines its boundaries and what integrates different countries within it. In this case, the proposal is clearly a perspective that integrates security threats and projection of force by states.

Although the method suggested by Buzan and Waever for the analysis of security dynamics of RSCs adopt the description in four levels (domestic, regional, interregional and global), the description of the security dynamics of the Southern Africa RSC proposed here focuses only on the two first levels of analysis. This is justified because the goal of this description is solely to identify the boundaries of Southern Africa RSC, which gives a secondary place to the analysis of interregional and global security dynamics.

The State of Violence is defined by three main principles: the unilateralism, the securing of flows supported by interventions and media coverage. Unilateralism refers to the predominant reality of new conflicts in which violence is committed unilaterally and that more and more often unarmed targets are the focus of the means of destruction. The securing of flows is related to the current almost indistinguishable differentiation between the interior and the exterior, between the enemy and the criminal, and the role of new actors such as mercenaries (Private Military Companies), nongovernmental organizations, international armies, mafias, warlords, etc. The media coverage refers to the importance of image in contemporary conflicts, deciding the meaning and significance of further violence (GROS 2006, 2007 and 2008).

One of the causes of the situation was the inconsistencies in the peace process of the Second Congo War. This mechanism has failed to give an effective solution for foreign forces still exist in the country and, by integrating the forces in national institutions and civil bureaucracy and military of the state, turned out to encourage the armed struggle as an effective mean to demand for space in power. Moreover, the number of troops in the new integrated national army, the FARDC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo), was uncontrollably large compared to the last peace process in Angola, for example. While in the DRC there was a need to demobilize 200,000 men by integrating 40,000 troops into the FARDC, in Angola only 5,500 troops (including UNITA and FLEC) were integrated, in a moment when the national forces had gained the military victory.

At the higher levels, 30 UNITA generals were incorporated into the FAA and three UNITA brigadiers were established in Angola National Police (ANP).

Only a few skirmishes remained in the rural environment between remnants of UNITA and the MPLA popular militia. The clashes took place in July 2004 (Moxico) and February (Huambo), March (Mavinga) and April 2005 (Moxico). However, this did not threaten the ceasefire.

With regard to small arms, it should be noted that both the central government and UNITA had handed AK-47s, grenade launchers and landmines to civilians to assist their side in the war. In relation to drugs, lack of safety at sea made Angola one of the major distribution centres for maritime narcotics trafficking between South America, Southern Africa and Europe. With regard to
diplomatic relations, economic mismanagement, adverse weather conditions and HIV pandemic. The negative impacts of a quick-fire land reform have generated a fall in agricultural production.

21 The split of the aggressor faction was complemented by the support of each of these countries to insurgent groups that could demobilise the rival national troops.

22 In addition, some reports also admit that 2,000 Zimbabwean troops were withdrawn from the DRC and established in Angola to take part in Operation Restauro in September-October 1999, which, however, seems unlikely and doesn’t fit with the proposed timeline for this work (Jane’s, 2009:64).

23 Although has not accomplished effective missions, the SADCBRIG promoted in September 2009 the Dolphin exercise in South Africa, which was preceded by a map exercise in Angola in January 2009 and succeeded by a command post exercise in Mozambique in April same year. In Dolphin exercise, 7000 troops simulated the most difficult situations to be faced by the Brigade. In two of them, a peace mission of based on a Chapter VII mandate and a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, there was the establishment of combined military police and civilian personnel and the interoperability of the force was tested by using different means of transport (air, highway, railway and waterway). Moreover, troops speaking different languages (Portuguese, French and English) were mixed in different configurations. After the exercise, SADCBRIG declared it could already establish its forces anywhere in Africa and beyond. Apart from the optimism, it is important to recognise that there are still central deficiencies in the ability of the force to equip, fund and sustain itself (IISS 2010:286). Among its shortcomings, there are difficulties for the planning team to inspect countries capabilities due to security concerns; the countries’ pledged forces and capabilities have been often not readily available; the “operational standard of the SANDF must be considered much higher than that of many of its SADC partners”; the organisation still needs to improve its civilian component; and there is a lack of funding to the maintenance of the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Zimbabwe (Mandrup 2009:15–17).

24 We define securitisation as a process that involves “the designation [by an actor] of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience” (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998:27).

25 It is also important to note that this interdependence has a huge geographical aspect. As ‘territorial security dynamics are still greatly dominant’ the territorial adjacency is central to the establishment of security interdependence (Buzan and Waever 2005:467). Consequentially, “largely territorial (and in practice often regional) structuration shapes most security affairs” (Ibid).

26 Real GDP contracted by 15 per cent (IISS, 2004:543), due to international sanctions, economic mismanagement, adverse weather conditions and HIV pandemic. The negative impacts of a quick-fire land reform have generated a fall in agricultural production.

27 One of the problems of Lemke (2002) is that he focuses too heavily on military relations between states and the capabilities of the armed forces as a phenomenon that binds countries to a region (local hierarchy). He does not consider other elements of security dynamics that could also integrate a region. For instance, externalities – as a state of internal instabilities can affect an entire region. As a result it becomes very inefficient to evaluate the security integration in regions where there is a lot of weak states, like Africa. Another difficulty is dealing with a phenomenon that is very present in the reality of the African wars that is the Proxy War that integrates into regions common security issues, even with no power projection capability of states (the operate just by manipulating internal groups of other states, not as front interstate rivalry).

28 The authors ‘map how things are securitised: who or what is defined as the (origin of) threats, and whom the actor targets in counter measures’ (Buzan and Waever 2003:462).

29 One of the problems of Lemke (2002) is that he focuses too heavily on military relations between states and the capabilities of the armed forces as a phenomenon that binds countries to a region (local hierarchy). He does not consider other elements of security dynamics that could also integrate a region. For instance, externalities – as a state of internal instabilities can affect an entire region. As a result it becomes very inefficient to evaluate the security integration in regions where there is a lot of weak states, like Africa. Another difficulty is dealing with a phenomenon that is very present in the reality of the African wars that is the Proxy War that integrates into regions common security issues, even with no power projection capability of states (the operate just by manipulating internal groups of other states, not as front interstate rivalry).

30 In Nord Kivu, increase in xenophobic harassments and open attacks made the Banyarwanda community (Hutu majority) to seek external allies (dividing itself in front of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict) and to create militias in the region, encouraged by the arrival of former FAR allies of Mobutu (then hungry for new political clients). In Sud Kivu, many Banyamulenge (Tutsi) frustrated with the removal of fundamental citizenship rights joined the staff of the FPR (Front Patriotique Rwandais). With the growing flow of refugees from neighbouring countries and rising rumours that Rwanda had been seeking to capture territories from Zaire to create a Tutsi kingdom in the Congo, the Banyamulenge began to suffer persecution, arrests, violent demonstrations and threats of expulsion.
which was a reason for their massive inflow to the AFDL (Aliance de Forces Democratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire).

31 This has been the case of conflicts between Enyelle and Munzaya groups since late 2009 and early 2010, which has called to arms to acquire agriculture and fishing rights.

32 This is an example of the CNDP, which was led by a General already integrated in the new arrangement of the Congolese army, Laurent Nkunda, who claimed the complete suppression of the FDLR and was supported and encouraged by Rwanda.

33 This is the case of Mai Mai xenophobic groups who have claimed to be authentic Congolese and have become increasingly politically differentiated from other ethnic groups – which had not occurred earlier.

34 The Mission of the United Nations in Congo (MONUC) was established on November 30, 1999 (S/RES/1279, 1999) by the UN Security Council and remains today in the country. Recently, the mission has its name changed to UN Mission for the Stabilisation of Congo (MONUSCO) (S/RES/1925, 2010) and its mandate renewed until 30 June 2012 (S/RES/1991, 2011). Currently, MONUSCO is the largest UN peacekeeping mission, excluded the hybrid AU/UN mission in Darfur, with the participation of more than 59 countries, consisting of 16,819 military personnel, 741 military observers, 1,354 police and 4,391 civilian personnel and volunteers (UN, 2011).

35 Just in last year the total costs of maintaining MONUSCO were $1.35 billion (IISS, 2010:286–287). This year, the approved annual budget increased to $1.41 billion (A/C.5/65/19, 2011), the most part of it (75%) is composed of costs related to military and police personnel (57%) and to infrastructure, transportation and communications (35%). This value would be enough to complete more than a half of the entire Security Sector Reform program in the Congo – evaluated at $ 2 billion (Hanson, 2010). We must remember that, depending on how this reform is made: the DRC could become capable of making the pacification of the country in a much more autonomous way and could dispense many of the MONUSCO troops, avoiding exorbitant international expenses.

36 On 3 August, 1998 three planes were hijacked from Goma airport by the Rwandan army, which landed at Kitona base with the commander James Kabarebe on board. On August 6, Kabarebe and his men took Moanda and Banana, raising concerns to Kinshasa and regional diplomatic moves. Nevertheless, the Rwandan-backed rebels continued to advance. On August 15, Kabarebe took the Inga hydroelectric and cut power to Kinshasa. Instantly, Kabila flew to Lubumbashi for safety, fearing to lose the capital. On August 16, rebels occupied Mbanza-Ngungu (130 km from Kinshasa), while L. Kabila sought external support, guaranteed next day. On 21 August, Angolan troops entered the DRC. They came from Cabinda, forcing most of the rebels and Rwandan troops not just to retreat from the cities captured during the offensive toward Kinshasa, but even to withdraw the very western Congo.

37 Since Joseph Kabila became president in 2001 investments from South Africa have been directed in considerable amounts to the country, mostly in the areas of energy and infrastructure (Prunier 2009:262). The peak of this tendency was the recent signing of an agreement between Jacob Zuma and Joseph Kabila for the construction of the Grand Inga Dam Project that will involve around $10 billion of investments and the establishment of the largest hydroelectric power plant in the world - with the capacity to produce 40,000 megawatts and to deliver energy to more than half of the continent’s 900 million people (Daily 2011, Palitza 2011). Moreover, South Africa currently seems to support an autonomous project of exploitation of the region’s natural resources, especially hydrocarbons of Lake Albert, and together with Italy demarcates with the Franco-British neoconservative project represented by oil companies like Tullow and Total (Kavanagh 2010, Manson 2010, Sambu and Turana 2010, PT 2010).

38 Another question related to Southern Africa boundaries is ‘why aren’t the Indian Ocean islands close to Africa linked to the Southern Africa RSC?’ Buzan and Waever do not even wonder about such possibility. As an RSC is delimited by security interactions, the detachment of the Indian Ocean islands seems to be a natural result of the distance of those countries from the security dynamics of the other mainland. One could argue that the political crisis in Madagascar and mediation by some countries on the continent suggest its link to the Southern Africa RSC. However, the political crisis in Madagascar has not been more than a political issue for the other countries in the region. There hasn’t been a security crisis involving such dynamics (war, armed conflict) to integrate other countries in the region, and the participation of Madagascar in SADC is not sufficient to guarantee its belonging to the Southern Africa RSC.

39 ‘During the Cold War (when most of the theoretical apparatus of International Relations was constructed), the existence of bipolarity made this seem easy to do. There was a big gap between...
40 The process was marked by atomisation. This is because the focus has been accomplished without the construction of a permanent national army with unified training and which could contribute to the social formation of the soldiers, as has been the case in Angola. This was, partially, a result of the lack of coordination between bilateral partners in the case of training of integrated forces and the large number of partnerships without an integrated programme and focused on short-term (Boshoff 2008, Wolters and Boshoff 2006, Jane’s, 2009c). It should also be noted that initial option for the process of mixage (former rebels are placed with other troops, but their units are not dissolved, only juxtaposed) over the brassage one (they are individually mixed and redistributed geographically) resulted in difficulties in establishing hierarchy and command and control over integrated forces, mainly over the ones that kept parallel command structures. There was also insufficient funding and misuse of scare resources (ICG 2006). This was a main result of the lack of coordination between international donors, largely due to disputes over leadership of the process (Boshoff et al, 2010) and important international constraints that block multilateral resources directed to restructuring the military (ICG, 2006). As a final result there was a distrust of the rebel groups about the whole process.

41 The Angolan economy was directly favoured by the end of civil war and the rising oil prices with the proximity of the Iraq War (the sector accounts for 50 per cent of GDP). Some authors claim that the country can overcome in the near future the oil production of Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, tripling its production and becoming the largest oil producer in Africa (Jane’s 2009:7). The mining of diamonds also bring some comfort to the Angolan economy, especially after the approval of the Kimberley Process certification scheme. However, oil and diamonds were the only sectors of the economy that actually worked after the war. Fishing, coffee production and the industry collapsed with the armed conflict. The country’s infrastructure was also destroyed by the war, which gives central importance to its partnership with China. Currently, huge investments are needed to reopen access to the interior and clear landmines (Jane’s 2009a: 7). There is still dependence on food imports and a deficit in revenue of 36 per cent (oil is excluded from the calculation (IISS 2004:343).

42 South Africa has the most developed economy in Africa and is characterised as the dominant power economically, diplomatically and strategically in the environment of Southern Africa (Jane’s 2009b: 4). It represents a third of the product of sub-Saharan Africa, much of its military spending and a major source of foreign direct investment in the continent. The South African economy was also particularly had hit by the economic crisis of 2008, the consequence of capital outflows and the resulting drop in revenue and the deterioration of the budget, which is undermined by accumulated inflation from previous years, which reached 10 per cent in 2010. During the 2000s, the economy gained new impetus with the increase in employment, appreciation of government bonds and the consequent increase of national reserves. However, good results were carefully considered. The government has chosen to establish fiscal prudence and has sought budget surplus, which resulted in significant effects relating to restraint in military spending.

43 It should be noted that in spite of the modernisation process, the equipment purchased do not represent new generations of equipment and in some cases serve only to be a source of spare parts.

44 The air force had also ordered in 2006 eight Airbus A400M cargo to replace its fleet of C-130 that was coming to an end of service life. The project would have benefited the national armaments industry, especially companies like Denel and Aerosud, which would participate in the production of the aircraft’s embarked electronics and avionics, generating an income of at least $ 400 million for the companies. However, in November 2009 the government abandoned the project and the planned purchases because of escalating costs and significant delays in the delivery of the products (IISS 2010:291). One can also suggest that the problem is related to the fact that the government had established that the funds for this purchase would come from additional funding. However, the Treasury has adopted a tough stance insisting that the funds should come from the defence budget, which proved the increasing pressures on training, maintenance and other purchases (IISS, 2007:259).

45 From 2008 there has been a structural change in the army, after the publication of the document ‘Vision 2020’ in 2006. A new divisional structure has been established: ‘Introduction of administrative staff structures similar to the G1 sections seen in many other armed forces. This is due to be followed by the establishment of land, training and support commands, along with ten brigade head-quarters, and one mechanised and one motorised division headquarters. South Africa’s Special Forces Brigade will to continue to operate under the authority of the chief of joint operations and the president’ (IISS 2008:277).
In terms of purchases it may be cited the Hoefyster Project (contract of 264 IFVs to replace the Ratel), Project Vistula (purchase of more than 1,300 tactical logistic vehicles, 733 of 8 wheels and 579 of 6 wheels), the Project Sapula (new family of APCs to replace the 30 years old Casspir and Mamba), a system for ground-based air-defence (GBADS), involving multiple batteries of SAMs Starstreak. However, these projects seem to be subject to the country’s economic performance in 2011, except in the case of the Project Hoefyster won by Denel, for the production of a new generation of IFVs with 5 variants based on the Finnish vehicle Patria (IISS 2008:277).

It is very important to Angola to self-perceive as an actor of regional responsibilities. Its current experience with the reconstruction of the army after years of civil war and the focus on building a cohesive national army of conscripts could serve as a model for countries in the region experiencing post-civil war instabilities (DRC, Burundi, and Rwanda).

As an exception it may be cited the 1998 intervention in Lesotho, a country vital to the internal security of South Africa.

References


South Africa Regional Security Complex: The emergence of bipolarity?


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