NORTHERN UGANDA CONFLICT ANALYSIS

Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS)

September 2013

REFUGEE LAW PROJECT

SAFERWORLD

International Alert.

Northern Uganda Conflict Analysis

Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS)

Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS)

SEPTEMBER **2013**

Acknowledgements

This report is a product of the Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS), a partnership bringing together three organisations: International Alert, Refugee Law Project and Saferworld. RLP provided the original concept and terms of reference and conducted the preliminary analysis. The report was written by Monica Llamazares with valuable inputs from Stephen Oola, Robert Senath Esuruku, Capson Sausi, Louis Okello and ACCS management team Hesta Groenewald (Saferworld), Chris Dolan (Refugee Law Project, RLP) and Richard Businge (International Alert). The analysis and validation of the findings was conducted by Stephen Oola as team leader, Monica Llamazares, Robert Senath Esuruku, Eunice Ouko, Denis Jjuuko and Okello Daniel. This study was funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) under ACCS. The report reflects the views and opinions of ACCS, not those of DFID. The consortium is also grateful to all stakeholders and participants across the eight PRDP sub-regions who validated the findings of this study. Finally, the conflict analysis would not have been possible without the invaluable inputs from Pius Ojara and Geraldine O'Callaghan, both of DFID.

The overall aim of ACCS is to assist DFID and partners in strengthening the potential of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) to address the causes of conflict in a way that is itself conflict-sensitive, and which can contribute to sustainable peace and stability. Within this, ACCS has three major objectives: monitoring the extent to which interventions under the PRDP, particularly those funded under DFID's Post-Conflict Development Programme (PCDP), succeed or fail in achieving peacebuilding aims (International Alert); contextual analysis of the overall recovery process (conflict indicators, issues and dynamics) to provide early warning as and when necessary (RLP); and evidence-based advocacy, targeted recommendations, and technical support to improve the recovery and peacebuilding impact of the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and other PRDP stakeholders (Saferworld). Each consortium agency leads on one output, supported by the other partners.

The consortium is grateful to the UK Department for International Development (DFID) for its financial support to the project.

The maps in the report were designed by Jane Stevenson and the overall report design was done by Marketing Support Services, with contributions from Opiny Shaffic.

©Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS)

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher

Contents

Northern Uganda Conflict Analysis i

Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS) i

Executive summary viii

Introduction xii

The Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) xiii

Scope and methodology of the conflict analysis xv

Key concepts xvi

Outline of the report xvii

1. National conflict drivers in Uganda – understanding the context 1

a) Regional instability 1

b) Economic disparities and unequal distribution of wealth 2

c) Resource competition 2

d) Poor governance and democratic deficits 3

e) Human rights abuses and erosion of civil liberties 4

f) Lack of truth, reconciliation and transitional justice 4

g) The politicisation of ethnic identity 5

h) North-South fault line 5

i) Corruption and personal greed 6

j) Tensions between cultural institutions and government 7

Conclusion 7

2. Conflict drivers in northern Uganda – a regional-level analysis 9

a) Competition over natural resources and property: land, oil, forests and minerals 10

b) Youth exclusion 25

c) Creation of new districts and poor local governance 27

d) Inadequate post-conflict truth, reconciliation and transitional justice processes 31

e) Generational and gender conflicts 36

f) Perceptions of neglect over poor service delivery and infrastructure 40

g) Perceptions of marginalisation over distribution of development assistance 45
h) IDP return and reintegration challenges 47
i) Ongoing insecurity and inadequate DDR 48
j) Environmental degradation and natural disasters 50
k) Tensions between traditional structures and local government 51
Conclusion 52

3. Conclusion and recommendations 54

3.1. Addressing conflict legacies and grievances: enhancing the conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding impact of the PRDP 56
3.2. Key thematic recommendation on cross–cutting issues 58

Bibliography 68

Annex 1: Sub-regional conflict maps 71
a) Bunyoro sub-region 71
b) West Nile sub-region 72
c) Acholi sub-region 74
d) Lango sub-region 75
e) Teso sub-region 77
f) Elgon sub-region 78
g) Bukedi sub-region 79
h) Karamoja sub-region 80

Annex 2: Incidence of conflict drivers in the PRDP sub-regions 83

Annex 3: List of data collection events implemented by ACCS, 2011–2012 84
International Alert: 84
Refugee Law Project: 84
Saferworld: 85

Glossary of acronyms

ACCS	Advisory Consortium for Conflict Sensitivity
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AC	Amnesty Commission
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CBG	(Ministry of Local Government) Capacity-Building Grant
CAR	Central African Republic
CFRs	Central Forest Reserves
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRTs	Demobilisation and Resettlement Teams
DPRTs	District Peace and Reconciliation Teams
FDC	Forum for Democratic Change
GoU	Government of Uganda
ICD	International Crimes Division
IDPs	Internally displaced persons
IA	International Alert
ICC	International Criminal Court
JLOS	Justice Law and Order Sector
LCs	Local Councillors
LFRs	Local Forest Reserves
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
M23	March 23 Movement
MP	Member of Parliament
NAADS	National Agricultural Advisory Services
NFA	National Forestry Authority
NEMA	(Uganda's) National Environment Management Agency
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NOC	National Oil Company
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NUREP	Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Programme
NUSAF I/II	Northern Uganda Social Action Fund I and II
NUYDC	Northern Uganda Youth Development Centre
OHCHR	(United Nations) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PCDP	Post-Conflict Development Programme
PMC	PRDP Monitoring Committee
PRDP I/II	Peace Recovery and Development Plan I and II
RLP	Refugee Law Project
RDC	Resident District Commissioner
RPF	Rwandese Patriotic Front
SGBV	Sexual and gender-based violence
SPLA	Sudanese People's Liberation Army
TJWG	Transitional Justice Working Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UFM	Uganda Freedom Movement

ULC	Uganda Land Commission
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNLA	Uganda National Liberation Army
UNRF/II	Uganda National Rescue Front/II
UPA	Uganda People's Army
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force
UPF	Uganda Popular Front
UWA	Uganda Wildlife Authority
VTIs (NUYDC)	Vocational Training Institutes (Northern Uganda Youth Development Centre)
WBNF	West Bank Nile Front

List of tables

Table 1: Districts within the PRDP II sub-regions
Table 2: Entry into/exit out of poverty (2005-2010)
Table 3: Increase of districts
Table 4: Percentage of respondents perceiving that DRMs are addressing SGBV satisfactorily
Table 5: Dispute resolution mechanisms used by those who perceive that DRMs are addressing SGBV satisfactorily
Table 6: PRDP sub-regional breakdown
Table 7: Internal displacement in northern Uganda

List of maps

Map 1: Sub-regions covered by PRDP II
Map 2: Status of licensing in the Albertine Graben of Uganda, August 2012
Map 3: Mineral resources in Uganda

Map 1: Sub-regions covered by PRDP II[1]



Table 1: Districts within the PRDP II sub-regions[2]

Acholi	West Nile	Karamoja	Lango
Gulu	Adjumani	Abim	Apac
Kitgum	Maracha	Amudat	Kole
Amuru	Koboko	Kaabong	Lira
Pader	Moyo	Kotido	Oyam
Agago	Arua	Moroto	Amolatar
Lamwo	Yumbe	Nakapiripirit	Dokolo
Nwoya	Nebbi	Napak	Otuke
	Zombo		Alebtong
Teso	**Bukedi**	**Elgon**	**Bunyoro**
Katakwi	Busia	Manafwa	Bulisa
Kumi	Tororo	Bukwo	Masindi
Soroti	Pallisa	Kapchorwa	Kiryandongo
Kaberamaido	Butaleja	Kween	
Serere	Budaka	Mbale	
Ngora	Kibuku	Bududa	
Amuria		Sironko	
Bukedea		Bulambuli	

1 Office of the Prime Minister, 'Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) Phase II, July 2012–June 2015', November 2011.

2 The government is currently in the process of approving a further 20 districts that will raise the number of local administrative units from 112 to 132, including the northern districts of Kapelebyong, Kilak, Nabilatuk, Omoro and Pakwach.

Executive summary

PRDP I made substantial inroads in assisting the return and rehabilitation of communities and institutions affected by over two decades of insurgency and armed hostilities in northern Uganda, but was also fraught with many challenges. Six years after the guns fell silent, and months into the second iteration of the Peace, Recovery and Development Programme, the question of whether northern Uganda is truly at peace remains unanswered in many people's minds. To address it requires due consideration to regional and sub-regional conflict drivers, within the context of national-level democratisation and development challenges that confront the country as a whole some fifty years after independence. This report speaks to all three levels, and to the interconnections between them, by synthesising and elaborating on data collected by the three members of the Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS) over the period 2010–2012. It aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of conflict drivers that have the potential to undermine development and peacebuilding efforts underway in PRDP II. It focuses on people's perceptions of whether the PRDP and associated interventions are in fact bringing them up to a par with the rest of the country and increasing the likelihood of long-term peace and stability. It offers recommendations from both the ACCS team and a wide range of community members who were consulted during an intensive validation process in September 2012.

This conflict analysis reveals that many communities in northern Uganda appear to be in a state of latent conflict, with increasingly frequent manifestations of overt conflict in the form of clashes between communities and government officials (district, UWA, NFA), violent community disputes over boundaries or resources, or sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) amongst other examples. The inadequately addressed legacies of the war with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), fuelled by new and long-standing grievances (such as historic marginalisation) are keeping communities in a state of latent conflict where trigger events can lead to a rapid escalation of violence. The conflict drivers identified in this analysis (such as land grabbing, corruption, or competition over natural resources) are supporting this cycle and pushing communities in the North towards what many respondents believe is an inevitable return to overt conflict, whether in the form of increasing social unrest or more organised violence. As grievances grow, so does the potential for trigger events already taking place in the North to lead to greater unrest and more organised forms of violence.

Conflict issues play out differently in each of the eight PRDP sub-regions according to the history and specificities of each area, though all are undergoing dramatic social and economic changes that could cause social instability even as other indicators may improve. With this in mind, the conflict analysis report highlights some of the specificities of each sub-region, but also pulls together the issues that affect all sub-regions across the board.

The key findings are that the following issues remain the most serious threats to long-term peace across the PRDP area:

- Conflicts over land and other natural resources (including oil, grazing, forest and other reserves).
- Changing gender relations during and after the conflict, which have contributed to high levels of domestic and sexual and gender-based violence.
- Youth unemployment, disillusionment and lack of opportunity, which create a risk of violent activities – whether criminal or political – and of continued economic and social disparity between the PRDP regions and the rest of the country.
- Incomplete or inadequate transitional justice, reconciliation and return processes that leave people depressed, in conflict with each other, their neighbours and authorities, and with a sense that the war is still not completely 'over'.

While some of the above issues are also found in other parts of Uganda, what is significant for the northern regions is the particular interplay and overlay of issues. For instance, the West Nile and Acholi regions are both affected by direct impacts of conflict (displacement, social discord, psychosocial trauma, dealing with former combatants) as well as the presence of significant natural resource disputes (land, oil, gazetted areas) and interest in exploiting land for investment purposes. Where several of these key issues occur in one sub-region, the risk of complex conflict dynamics – and for trigger events to set off violence – is significantly higher. This was recognised in PRDP II through the classification of sub-regions as priority areas by combining the significance of the conflict impact with population numbers.

However, in addition to the higher risk caused by multiple conflict dynamics present in one area, the northern regions have an additional layer of what can be called a historic discourse of conflict and marginalisation. The history of the area means that every event, decision and intervention from government is often seen against a history of violence and exclusion. For instance, when nodding disease was diagnosed in northern Uganda, people's reaction was not purely one of concern about a new health threat, but instead there were widespread rumours that the disease was somehow orchestrated, that the government had poisoned food assistance during the war or otherwise infected people deliberately. It is this mistrust that the PRDP interventions so far have not sufficiently addressed, and that will continue to colour people's perceptions about whether the northern parts of the country are being brought into the national fold in a transparent and equitable manner.

Karamoja could be considered somewhat distinct from the other regions, as the only sub-region with a dominant pastoralist and agro-pastoralist livelihoods system, alongside more than 40 years of food and general insecurity. Karamoja exhibits the lowest indicators in the country in terms of poverty, economic and social opportunities, and human development. The region is also vulnerable to regional instability across the borders with Kenya and South Sudan, while there is increased interest in mineral and precious metal exploration in the area. From a policy perspective, although Karamoja is included in the PRDP, a large proportion of investment and government policy direction does not come through the PRDP, but through the Karamoja Integrated (formerly Disarmament and) Development Plan. Even in the policy framework therefore, one could argue that Karamoja is only partly being targeted in terms of its status as a PRDP region, while also being targeted as a special region with unique problems.

The **national**-level analysis reveals a number of conflict drivers that affect Uganda as a whole, including: regional instability; economic disparities and unequal distribution of wealth; resource competition; poor governance and democratic deficits, human rights abuses and erosion of civil liberties; politicisation of ethnic identity; lack of truth, reconciliation and transitional justice; the North-South fault

line; corruption and personal greed; and tensions between cultural institutions and government. These issues are more likely to drive conflict in the North as they interact with the legacies of two decades of civil war on the one hand, and the grievances expressed by many northern Ugandans in relation to their perceived marginalisation and neglect on the other. Moreover, the conflict drivers identified at this level are also impacting upon the relationship between the North and the state and its institutions, underpinning socio-economic and political fault lines and regional and local drivers of conflict.

At the **regional** level, despite visible differences between sub-regions that were either directly, sporadically or marginally affected by the LRA conflict, a number of common conflict drivers are to be found. Perceptions of neglect arising from poor service delivery and under-developed infrastructure cannot be resolved in the absence of post-conflict truth, reconciliation and transitional justice processes through which the relationship between state institutions and the people can be repaired. They are being deepened by emerging conflicts over natural resources and property (notably oil, forest and minerals), land and boundary disputes in areas of return, and a proliferation of new districts, a process that appears to weaken governance rather than bringing it closer to the people. The inadequacy of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, when juxtaposed with high levels of youth unemployment and disenfranchisement, gives rise to widespread fears that this sector of the population may engage in armed violence. Moreover, the rapid socio-economic changes that the region has undergone since the cessation of hostilities in 2006 have impacted upon gender relations, as shifting roles have contributed to high levels of domestic violence and SGBV, which in turn continue to drive conflicts within families and communities.

At a **sub-regional** level it is possible to see how the national and regional-level conflict drivers are manifested on a day-to-day basis.

- In **Bunyoro** communal land is being sold into private hands while returnees are in conflict with community members who stayed behind. Land is being grabbed in the hope that oil will be found underneath. Commercialised agriculture is undermining subsistence livelihoods in a context of environmental degradation and food insecurity.
- **West Nile** shows similar patterns of land and resource disputes, contested boundaries, multiplication of districts, tensions over the promise of oil, frustrations over lack of justice, and failure to compensate ex-soldiers and provide redress to victims of past wars.
- In neighbouring **Acholi** historic perceptions of neglect are reinforced by allegedly unequal distribution of development and services and the unexplained phenomenon of nodding disease; land disputes between returning IDPs are intensified by oil exploration-related land grabs, and gazetting of land by the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA). Patterns of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) accompany shifting gendered power relations, while youth unemployment and crime, difficulties in return and reintegration, and the establishment of new districts with inadequate capacity also undermine stability.
- **Lango** sub-region is also subject to land grabbing (compounded by incursions of pastoralists from western Uganda and fears that non-Ugandans can buy up land or properties to the detriment of the local business community), resource conflicts, inadequate transitional justice, and the establishment of new districts despite unresolved corruption allegations against the judiciary, police and district authorities alike.
- In **Teso**, conflict displacement-related land disputes and land grabbing are further aggravated by environmental disaster-induced displacement and food insecurity.

In this context, inter-ethnic tensions, family breakdown and SGBV are widespread, while newly established districts lack the capacity to effectively tackle these issues.

- **Elgon** sub-region is affected by displacement from neighbouring conflicts, land gazetting by the UWA, poor infrastructure and service delivery, and youth disenfranchisement and resultant involvement in crime. All these problems are exacerbated by inadequate responses to the 2010-2012 landslides, while ex-combatants are also mobilising to claim compensation.
- **Bukedi**, bordering with Kenya, is affected by land and mineral disputes and changing agricultural practices, the establishment of new districts in a context of corruption and electoral malpractice, and the volatile combination of acute poverty, unemployment and youth disenfranchisement, and gender and family conflicts.
- **Karamoja** continues to be plagued by insecurity and intra-Karimojong tensions, which mask processes of mineral exploration and land grabbing/land gazetting, as well as government-driven decentralisation processes which intensify conflicts between pastoralist and agro-pastoralist groups and livelihoods, which in turn are expressed in gender conflicts, cattle raiding, environmental destruction and youth unemployment.

The relative failure of PRDP I to engage communities adequately undoubtedly perpetuated widespread perceptions of neglect and a corresponding scepticism about any centrally-driven attempts to improve governance. The report strongly recommends much more explicit mechanisms of dialogue between government and communities, including participatory conflict analysis, strengthened communication with relevant stakeholders, implementing partners and beneficiaries, and targeting beneficiaries in ways which identify the impact of activities and outcomes on key relationships such as those between direct and indirect beneficiaries, beneficiaries and surrounding communities, local government and communities, and between diverse communities within a particular target area. The report also recommends a significant increase in funding for Strategic Objective 4 of the PRDP II, promotion of individual and community repair, national reconciliation processes, and the development of local-level peacebuilding matrices and dispute resolution strategies.

Introduction

"The silence of the guns in this region is not a symbol of peace prevailing."
(Community representative, Soroti, 19 September 2012)

The armed conflict between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda[3] – once described as the worst forgotten humanitarian crisis in the world – was one amongst many to affect post-independence Uganda, but was exceptionally protracted and brutal in its impact on the civilian population.[4] Direct hostilities subsided following the signing of a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the GoU and the LRA in 2006, under the mediation of the Government of South Sudan.[5] The subsequent Juba peace talks, while not ending the LRA insurgency, did pave the way for the LRA to cross into eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. In the resultant relative calm northern Uganda was declared a post-conflict region, thus opening the doors for recovery.[6]

While Uganda currently enjoys relative stability, it is still in many respects a divided country, both politically and economically, with a legacy of multiple and cyclical conflicts and grave human rights violations, and a correspondingly weak sense of national identity that will lay the foundations for future conflicts if left unaddressed.[7] The origins of armed conflict in northern Uganda can be traced to the deeply rooted ethnic mistrust instigated by the colonial rulers.[8] The British colonial administration recruited many from the northern region as labourers in plantations in central and southern Uganda and later into the armed forces, while many civil service jobs went to individuals from the central and southern regions of the country.[9] These events created a division between the northern and southern regions, with the latter becoming more developed while the former remained poorer with its population relying on cattle keeping as the main source of livelihood.[10]

Since independence, subsequent governments have also contributed to the country's ethnic divisions. During Obote's first regime from 1962 to 1971, the Acholi and Langi

3 The use in this analysis of the term northern Uganda to refer to the eight sub-regions covered by the PRDP does not endorse a specific geographical or political designation of the area. Northern Uganda, as defined by the PRDP, encompasses the North-West (West Nile and Bunyoro) sub-regions, Central North (Acholi and Lango) sub-regions, and North-East (Karamoja, Teso, Bukedi and Elgon) sub-regions. These regions have been variously affected by armed conflicts, while lagging behind the rest of the country in terms of the indices for human development. (Office of the Prime Minister, Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP), 2007).

4 Jan Egeland, UN Special Representative for Humanitarian Affairs, during his visit to northern Uganda in 2003.

5 See Juba Peace Agreements at www.beyondjuba.org/BJP1/peace_agreements.php.

6 The LRA remains active in neighbouring Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as well as in the Central African Republic (CAR). Today, a joint regional and international military force continues to hunt LRA fighters in the jungles of the DRC, CAR and South Sudan, with spillover effects into Uganda.

7 Dolan, Chris, *Uganda Strategic Conflict Analysis* (Kampala: Swedish International Development Agency, 2006).

8 Kasozi, Abdu B. K., *The social origins of violence in Uganda 1964–1985* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994).

9 Gersony, Robert, *The Anguish of Northern Uganda: Results of a Field-Based Assessment of the Civil Conflicts in Northern Uganda* (Kampala: USAID Mission Report, 1997).

10 Esuruku, Robert Senath, 'Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda', in Dolan, Chris et al, eds, *Where Law Meets Reality: Forging African Transitional Justice* (Cape Town: Refugee Law Project and Fahamu Books, 2012).

were the majority in the armed forces as well as in political offices, and Obote relied upon them to stay in power.[11] They became a target of mass killings after Idi Amin Dada took over from Obote in a coup d'état. As well as military personnel, civilians, politicians and intellectuals were all targeted. Thousands of Acholi were killed and many fled the country.[12] Following the successful overthrow of Amin and eventual takeover of power by the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) in 1986, the 'ethnicisation' of politics continued. Soon after taking power, Museveni's NRA/M was accused of committing human rights abuses[13] in the name of crushing rebellions in the North,[14] and hostility towards the government resulting from those military campaigns remains palpable today amongst many communities in northern Uganda.

The concentration of wealth and political power in the South laid the foundations of economic and political exclusion, while the military responses by the government to unrest in the North have further cemented the grievances that define North-South relations today. Uganda has come a long way from the turbulent and violent history of domestic political instability, mayhem, armed violence and coups d'état which characterised the immediate post-independence era from 1962-1986. The government claimed during the 2011 elections to have pacified more than 28 conflicts in the period 1986-2011, while ACCS identified over 22 different armed conflicts in Uganda between 1986 and 2004.[15] Six years after the guns fell silent, the question of whether northern Uganda is truly at peace remains unanswered in many people's minds,[16] while the fear of a relapse into violent conflict continues to be raised by communities consulted by ACCS for this and previous research.[17]

The Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP)

The Government of Uganda's Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) was unveiled in 2007 as an overarching framework to guide efforts to rebuild the North in order to "[stabilise] the northern regions in order to consolidate peace and thereby lay the foundations for recovery and development" and "bridge the existent gap between the North and the South in terms of economic development".[18] A number of development partners, both local and international, intervened to help the PRDP achieve its objectives. PRDP I came to an end in 2012 and was replaced with PRDP II, due to run to 2015,[19] after which government programmes for northern Uganda will likely be folded into the National Development Plan (NDP).[20] PRDP I made some inroads in supporting

11 RLP National Reconciliation and Transitional Justice (NRTJ) Audit, focus group discussions in Arua, 2–8 October 2011, available at beyondjuba.org/NRTJA/index.php.

12 Ginyera-Pincywa, A.G., *Northern Uganda in National Politics* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1992).

13 Refugee Law Project, *Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda* (Kampala, Refugee Law Project Working Paper No. 11, 2004). See also Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick, 'Collapse, War and Reconstruction in Uganda: An Analytical Narrative on State-Making', Crisis States Research Centre and LSE, Working Paper No. 27, 2008); andNabudare, Wadada, *The Hidden War: The Forgotten People War in Acholiland and its Ramifications for Peace and Security in Uganda* (Kampala: Human Rights and Peace Centre and Liu Institute for Global Issues, 2003).

14 The other major rebel groups that operated during this time include the Uganda People's Army (UPA) in Teso, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Kasese, and the West Bank Nile Front (WNBF) and Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II) in West Nile. Apart from the political conflict in the other areas of the North, inter-clan and inter-tribal armed cattle raids in Karamoja have also resulted in insecurity, death and low development, much like in the war areas. The Karamoja situation has affected communities not only inside Karamoja, but also in the neighbouring Acholi, Lango and Teso sub-regions.

15 Refugee Law Project, *Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda*, *op. cit*.

16 RLP, 'PRDP II, What Needs to Change: Views from *Te-yat*', ACCS Report, 19 May 2012; Saferworld NGO Forum: CSO memorandum presented to the PRDP Monitoring Committee, June 2012.

17 According to Collier and Hoeffler, once a country has experienced a civil war, it is significantly more likely to experience additional episodes of violence. They argue that "90% of conflicts initiated in the 21st century were in countries that had already experienced a civil war." Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War', *Oxford Economics Papers*, vol 56, issue 4 (2004), pp 563–595.

18 Office of the Prime Minister, Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP), 2007, www.opm.go.ug/projects/peace-and-recovery-development-plan-prdp.html.

19 Office of the Prime Minister, 'Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) Phase II, July 2012-June 2015', November 2011.

20 *Ibid.*

the return and rehabilitation of communities and institutions affected by over two decades of insurgency and armed hostilities in northern Uganda. There is relative peace and stability in most parts of the region, some rehabilitated infrastructure, an enhanced police presence, improved economic potential and gradual return and reintegration of formerly displaced persons.[21]

The absence of overt violence in the last few years has led to improved community confidence in sustained peace and security,[22] thus creating an enabling environment for the recovery process to deepen. According to the PRDP mid-term evaluation and data gathered and presented by the Northern Uganda Data Centre (NUDC)[23] on the infrastructural achievements of PRDP, some districts performed better than others, with newer districts posting poorer performances compared to 'parent' districts.[24] Infrastructural improvements, especially of schools, health centres and police posts, were not all accompanied by corresponding increases in staffing.[25] Strategic Objective 4 of the PRDP I, aimed explicitly at peacebuilding, was underfunded and concentrated on demobilisation and reinsertion of former combatants. Little was done to deal with the physical and psychological impact of the conflict on victims and survivors and full reintegration of former combatants remains a work in progress.

The mid-term review of PRDP I acknowledged that the PRDP principle of integrating conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity into interventions was not sufficiently implemented. It also highlighted that progress towards Strategic Objective 4 had been slower than in other areas.[26] Recommendations for strengthening this type of activity and the overall conflict sensitivity of PRDP II interventions were included in the PRDP II document and monitoring framework.

Just months into PRDP II, a massive corruption scandal within the Office of the Prime Minister has undermined the credibility of the office to manage the plan, while reinforcing perceptions amongst northern Uganda's communities of the central authorities' disregard for their welfare. The situation has put the entire PRDP II in jeopardy, and many citizens of northern Uganda take this as further evidence of political marginalisation – a lack of political will to bring northern Uganda up to the development levels of the rest of the country.[27] As donors regroup and try to disentangle the urgency of continuing to support peace and recovery from the imperatives of discontinuing funding through central government systems, the need for a comprehensive understanding of actual and potential conflict drivers has become of paramount importance.

In 2010 ACCS found that existing studies identified a common set of conflict drivers, including political and socio-economic marginalisation, exclusion and inequity; militarisation and violence as a means to resolve conflict; deep-seated regional, tribal

21 See 'PRDP I: Impact on Post-Conflict Recovery in Northern Uganda', RLP-ACCS Baseline Survey, 2010.

22 International Alert.*Monitoring Peace and Conflict Impacts of the PRDP in Acholi and Lango Sub-Regions*, forthcoming. Respondents in Acholi and Lango reported 79 percent confidence in sustained peace and security in 2011. However, these percentages declined by an average of 9 percent between 2011 and 2012.

23 See 'Facilities Implemented under the PRDP Framework in Acholi Sub-region by Sub-county (2010-2011)', UG-Northern Uganda Data Centre – PMC-22 AO_12 June 2012, Acholi PRDP Interventions.

24 The term 'parent district' refers to the original district from which a newly established one has broken away. In Acholi sub-region for example, 'parent' districts like Gulu and Kitgum performed better in most of the sectors (education, health and water) than the newly created districts of Amuru, Nwoya, Agago, Lamwo and Pader. For details, see UG-NUDC – PMC-22 AO_12 June 2012, Acholi PRDP Interventions.

25 See 'Counting the Cost of PRDP in Acholi Sub-region', RLP-ACCS Briefing Note; and Office of the Prime Minister, 'Mid-Term Review of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda' (June 2011), available at www.scribd.com/doc/63970986/Mtr-Final-Report-23-June-2011-1.

26 Office of the Prime Minister, 'Mid-Term Review of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda', *op. cit.*

27 According to a participant at the PRDP review workshop held in Lira in December 2012, in a civil war the rehabilitation of the vanquished cannot be championed by the victor given that such rehabilitation would be perceived as a potential threat to the victors' superiority. In other words, the rebellious ethnic groups in northern Uganda, having lost the war against a government dominated by westerners and southerners, should not expect any serious effort to rehabilitate them as this may threaten the victorious groups' dominance and control. RLP PRDP Review Workshop, Lira, 16-17 December 2012.

or ethnic cleavages; and gross violations of human rights.[28] They also consistently identified the need for national reconciliation processes involving all stakeholders in the country.[29] The present conflict analysis finds that these issues remain outstanding, despite two years of further investment and intervention by development partners. A greater understanding of the political economy of the conflicts in northern Uganda is needed, as well as greater socio-economic and political inclusion of the North. This conflict analysis report, which looks at key conflict drivers at national, regional, and sub-regional levels, is a significant step towards comprehensively identifying and analysing conflict drivers to ensure interventions are conflict-sensitive in ways which allow them not just to do no harm, but also to do some good.

Scope and methodology of the conflict analysis

Specific objectives of the conflict analysis:

- To identify the key conflict drivers in northern Uganda and its sub-regions;
- To inform conflict-sensitive programming by actors operating in post-conflict northern Uganda by highlighting conflict drivers that influence or are influenced by post-conflict recovery and development interventions;
- To make targeted policy and programmatic recommendations to improve responses to the identified conflict drivers.

Although the data gathered by ACCS since 2010 includes quantitative data, the analysis focuses strongly on teasing out the perceptions of people in northern Uganda about whether their situation has moved towards long-term peace and security. The analysis process therefore did not include assessments of PRDP I progress *per se* (e.g. monitoring numbers of health centres or schools built), since this monitoring task is undertaken by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and other government departments. The analysis also did not conduct assessments of specific donor-supported or government programmes to review whether they are effectively addressing the issues raised by communities. Conducting some specific studies to this effect could be a follow-up activity for ACCS if deemed useful.

The initial stage of the multi-level conflict analysis involved an extensive desk review, as well as the compilation and analysis of existing ACCS materials collected during the initial two years of ACCS fieldwork (2010–2012).[30] These included: baseline surveys,[31] media monitoring, ACCS reports,[32] consultation and meeting minutes, workshop reports,[33] and monitoring of peace and conflict indicators.[34] This informed much of the analysis of national-level drivers of conflict between northern Uganda and the centre. This review of existing documentation was enhanced by the

28 See for example Refugee Law Project, *Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions in Northern Uganda*, *op. cit.*; Dolan, Chris, *Uganda Strategic Conflict Analysis*, (SIDA, 2006); Refugee Law Project, *Conflict, Justice and Reconciliation in Teso: Obstacles and Opportunities*, 2008 (www.refugeelawproject.org/briefing_papers/RLP.BP0801.pdf); Refugee Law Project,*Negotiating Peace: Resolution of Conflict in Uganda's West Nile Region*, 2004; Saferworld, 'Karamoja Conflict and Security Assessment', 2010 (www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Karamoja conflict and security assessment.pdf); International Alert, *Enabling Peace Economies through Early Recovery – Perspectives from Uganda*, 2009 (www.international-alert.org/resources/publications/enabling-peace-economies-through-early-recovery-perspectives-uganda); International Alert, *Building a Peace Economy in Northern Uganda: Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Recovery and Growth*, 2008 (www.international-alert.org/resources/publications/building-peace-economy-northern-uganda); International Alert, *Harnessing Oil for Peace and Development in Uganda*, 2009 (www.international-alert.org/resources/publications/harnessing-oil-peace-and-development-uganda); 'USAID/Northern Uganda Peace Initiative, 'Analysis of Lessons Learned From Past Efforts to End the Conflict in Northern Uganda', 2006 (pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADL279.pdf); DED, *Pastoral Conflict in the Karamoja Region of Northeastern Uganda*, 2010; Northern Uganda Peace Initiative,'Issues Paper on the Development of Conflict Resolution and Peace Building Policy for the Government of Uganda', 2006; Coffey's Options Report, USAID: Uganda ICAF Summary, November 2010.

29 'Review of Literature on Conflict Analysis', Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS), 2010 (unpublished).

30 For a comprehensive list of data collection activities carried out by ACCS during the past two years please see annex 3.

31 RLP, 'When is it Our Turn?' PRDP Baseline Survey, 2010; Saferworld, Perception Survey of Northern Uganda Youth Development Centre, 2012.

32 RLP, *PRDP I: Impact on Post Conflict Northern Uganda*, PRDP baseline survey, 2010; International Alert,*Unlocking economic opportunities for war-affected youth*, youth perception survey in Acholi and Lango.

33 See bibliography for details of these.

34 See International Alert. *Monitoring Peace and Conflict Impacts of the PRDP in Acholi and Lango Sub-Regions*, forthcoming.

collection of additional data about emerging conflict drivers at the regional and sub-regional levels. The methods used to collect primary data included structured and non-structured individual and group interviews with community representatives (men and women, elders and youth, urban and rural residents), local government officials, and religious and cultural leaders. A final round of validation and consensus-building workshops was held in all eight sub-regions of the PRDP region (Bunyoro, West Nile, Acholi, Lango, Karamoja, Teso, Elgon, and Bukedi) from 10–29 September 2012, where the draft findings of the report were presented and discussed with key stakeholders in the field.[35] Participants from local government, civil society and communities endorsed the findings as well as contributing to the sub-regional and local levels of analysis with specific conflict drivers and recommendations.

Key concepts

A number of key concepts have been used in this analysis to help us understand and define the complex realities in northern Uganda.

- ***Conflict:*** A conflict exists when two or more individuals or groups have what appear to be incompatible goals. Conflict is a normal part of human and social interaction, and conflict can lead to positive change if it is handled constructively (peacefully) as opposed to destructively (violently). Northern Uganda is no longer experiencing armed conflict, but neither is it at peace as many issues, dynamics and processes continue to drive conflict today. Grievances remain unaddressed, and the risk of trigger events pushing communities from latent to overt conflict (whether in the form of social unrest or organised armed rebellion) remains high.
- ***Conflict drivers:***[36] For the purpose of this research, conflict drivers refer to *issues* that contribute to conflict. Conflict drivers are distinct from conflict legacies, grievances or triggers (see below). However, the conflict drivers' potential to fuel new or exacerbating existing conflicts is linked to their interaction or relationship with existing grievances (e.g. perceived marginalisation of the North), conflict legacies (e.g. ongoing displacement or psychosocial wounds) or conflict triggers (e.g. events that lead to escalation of violence).
- ***Conflict legacies:*** Refers to the enduring consequences or impact of violence, for example destroyed infrastructure and livelihoods, physical and psychosocial wounds, broken social fabric, or displacement.
- ***Grievance:*** Grievances can be defined as actual or supposed circumstances regarded as just cause for complaint that create a sense of injustice amongst individuals or groups. Grievances can fuel latent conflict by supporting conflict drivers, e.g. perceptions of neglect by the authorities or unequal access to services.
- ***Latent conflict:*** Exists whenever individuals, groups, organisations, or nations have differences, but those differences are not great enough to cause one side to act to alter the situation. Latent conflict is often rooted in long-standing economic inequality, in groups' unequal access to political power, and also unresponsive government. Differential power, resources, differing interests or values all have the potential to move communities from latent to overt conflict or violence if a trigger event occurs.[37]
- ***Conflict triggers:*** Latent conflicts can escalate into overt or violent conflicts if trigger events push individuals or communities into mobilisation around the historic or current grievances that have fed the latent conflict in the first place. Triggers can be any event or threat of an event that causes fear or instability.

35 For details of these workshops see chapter 2, p. 57.

36 PRDP II includes the mitigation of potential conflict drivers as one of its guiding principles, citing land disputes, inadequate reintegration of ex-combatants, and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) as examples. However, the document does not provide a specific definition to guide the conflict analysis or conflict driver mitigation work of partners.

37 Brahm, Eric, 'Latent Conflict Stage', Beyond Intractability, September 2003. www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/latent-conflict, accessed 30 January 2013.

Examples of conflict triggers in northern Uganda include demonstrations and police responses, and clashes between communities and government officials or investors over land and access to resources.

The diagram below illustrates three distinct but complementary aspects of the relationship between legacies, grievance, and drivers, and how this relationship underpins the cycle from latent to overt conflict.[38] The *unaddressed conflict legacies* can be conceptualised as a departure point and constant backdrop to the process, while the arrows represent the *grievance* that underpins and feeds the conflict cycle. The *conflict driver* is the issue that sets and keeps the conflict cycle in motion. In this context the potent mixture of legacy, grievance, and conflict driver sets the stage for a trigger event that may push communities from latent to overt conflict.

Conflict drivers and conflict stages



In light of this conflict analysis, many communities in northern Uganda appear to be in a state of latent conflict with increasingly frequent manifestations of overt conflict in the form of clashes between communities and government officials (district, UWA, NFA), violent community disputes over boundaries or resources, or SGBV amongst other examples. The above diagram can help us piece together a powerful conflict narrative: the inadequately addressed legacies of the LRA war, fuelled by new and long-standing grievances (such as historic marginalisation) are keeping communities in a state of latent conflict where trigger events can lead to a rapid escalation of violence. The conflict drivers identified in this analysis (such as land grabbing, corruption, or competition over natural resources) are supporting this cycle and pushing communities in the North towards what many respondents believe is an inevitable return to overt conflict, whether in the form of increasing social unrest or more organised violence. As grievances grow, so does the potential for trigger events already taking place in the North to lead to greater unrest and more organised forms of violence.

Outline of the report

The report is structured around three levels of analysis of conflict drivers in Uganda: national, regional and local.

38 ACCS, *Grievance and Conflict Cycle*, 2013.

- **Chapter 1** succinctly examines the key conflict drivers present at the national level, which are also present in northern Uganda but are manifest in context-specific ways, while defining North-centre relationships and dynamics.
- **Chapter 2** critically examines key cross-cutting conflict drivers affecting northern Uganda and presents recommendations to address each.
- **Chapter 3** collates concluding remarks while presenting a set of broader recommendations on how to ensure that PRDP II's interventions are conflict-sensitive and have maximum peacebuilding impact.
- The **Annexes** include eight sub-regional conflict maps highlighting key conflict drivers affecting communities at the sub-region, district and sub-county levels.

1

National conflict drivers in Uganda – understanding the context

This chapter offers an overview of the key conflict drivers found at the national level that affect Uganda as a whole but have a direct and tangible impact in the North. In no particular order these issues are more likely to drive conflict in the North as they interact with the legacies of two decades of civil war on the one hand, and the grievances expressed by many in northern Uganda in relation to their perceived marginalisation and neglect on the other. Moreover, the conflict drivers identified at this level are also impacting upon the relationship between the North and the state and its institutions, underpinning socio-economic and political fault lines that in turn drive conflicts at regional and local levels. Understanding the nature of current conflict drivers in Uganda as a whole and their impact in the North is the key to enhancing the conflict sensitivity and positive impact of international and national efforts to build peace in the region.

National conflict drivers

- Regional instability
- Economic disparities and unequal distribution of wealth
- Resource competition
- Poor governance and democratic deficits
- Human rights abuses and erosion of civil liberties
- Politicisation of ethnic identity
- Lack of truth, reconciliation and transitional justice
- North-South fault line
- Corruption and personal greed
- Tensions between cultural institutions and government

a) Regional instability

Contestation over international borders between Uganda and its neighbours has a tangible impact on the security and safety of communities living in the border areas. For example, between Uganda and South Sudan there are continued tensions over alleged encroachments between communities north of Adjumani and Moyo districts in West Nile and their South Sudanese counterparts.[39] In 2000 these resulted in a number of attacks by South Sudanese who claimed the land was theirs,

39 RLP National Reconciliation and Transitional Justice Audit, focus group discussions in Adjumani, 25 September–1 October 2012.

and this has since escalated. Similarly, there are tensions between the Dinka from South Sudan and the Madi in Uganda over Elegu border land.[40] In August 2011, thirty Madi from Moyo were abducted by armed groups from South Sudan. Two abductees remained missing at the time of writing.[41] Given its geostrategic location, Uganda has for long been the regional hub for refugees, hosting displaced persons from Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan/South Sudan, DRC and Somalia. The ongoing conflicts within South Sudan and between the two Sudanese states, and renewed insurgencies in eastern DRC have led to a renewed influx of refugees and asylum seekers in different parts of the country, disrupting much-needed service delivery and economic recovery.[42]

Between February and August 2012, an estimated 2,858 refugees crossed the border from South Sudan into Uganda fleeing violence.[1] Community representatives in West Nile noted that the influx has already triggered land conflicts and added additional demand for the already over-stretched services within the sub-region.[2]

1 UNHCR Kampala office, Factsheet, 31 August 2012. See also RLP-ACCS Rapid Assessment Report, 2012

2 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops for northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

b) Economic disparities and unequal distribution of wealth

Uganda's GDP reportedly grew by 5.2 percent in 2010, and a further 6.7 percent in 2011.[43] However, this seemingly positive picture has not translated into an equitable distribution of resources across the country. While the proportion of Ugandans living in absolute poverty has generally declined, poverty levels in northern Uganda remain higher than the national average.[44] Although national income poverty fell from 56 percent in 1992 to 31.1 percent in 2006 and 24.5 percent in 2009-10, in the northern region 46.2 percent of citizens remain poor. While Uganda's national infant mortality rate stands at 76 per 1000 live births, the average rate for the North is 106 per 1000 live births.[45] The North's human poverty index (HPI) of 30.7 percent compares unfavourably with those of the Central region (20.19 percent), Western region (20.56 percent), and Eastern region (27.11 percent).[46] There remains a significant gap between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' in Uganda today, with a widespread perception of accumulation of wealth in the country through misappropriation of public funds and resources, which fuels grievance amongst communities in the North.[47]

c) Resource competition

There has been a rise in conflicts over minerals, oil, forests, and the land where these resources are found, which have taken an increasingly militarised and violent character.[48] Geological studies indicate that Uganda has a rich and diverse mineral

40 See RLP, 'Ownership, Resettlement and Accountability: The Elegu Land Dispute', Situational Analysis Report, September 2012, www.refugeelawproject.org/accs/activity_briefs/The_Legu_Land_Dispute_in_Nothern_Uganda.pdf.

41 RLP National Reconciliation and Transitional Justice Audit, focus group discussions in Adjumani, 25 September-1 October 2012.

42 See Ssekika, Edward, 'Congolese influx worries government', *The Observer*, March 14, 2012, www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17664&Itemid=114.

43 Index Mundi, www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?v=66&c=ug&l=en, accessed 20 October 2012.

44 IMF, *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper: Uganda Poverty Eradication Action Plan*, March 2000, www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/2000/uga/01/, accessed 23 June 2012.

45 Ministry of Education and Sports, 'Education Needs Assessment for Northern Uganda', 2008.

46 UNDP, *Uganda Human Development Report 2007: Rediscovering Agriculture for Human Development* (Kampala: UNDP, 2007).

47 Recently, an accountant in the Office of the Prime Minister and several staff members were arrested and charged with swindling billions of shillings of public funds.

48 RLP, 'Is it Oil, Land or Investment Triggering Increasing Land Dispute in Lakang Village of Amuru District?', ACCS Situation Report, 2 October 2012; see also 'Guns in Oil Region', *The Independent*, issue no 219, 22-28 June 2012; and 'Land Grabbing in Oil Region', *The Independent*, issue 215, 25-31 May 2012.

resource base with substantial economic potential. The authorities have surveyed approximately 80 percent of Uganda, with much of the 80 percent located in the North.[49] Alleged under-exploitation, misallocation, limited information to the public, and inequitable distribution of these resources continues to be a grievance for many.[50] Negative impacts on livelihoods are also fuelling tensions.[51] The lack of a clear national legislative framework to guide the first steps of the nascent oil industry, and the secrecy surrounding dealings between the government and international oil companies, are fuelling mistrust and frustration amongst Ugandans.[52] At national level a dispute between the president and MPs over powers allocated to ministries led to scuffles in parliament[53], while allegations of corruption and lack of transparency at central, regional and local levels abound.[54] Forest resource mismanagement by the authorities[55] is also driving conflict in Uganda, as communities have accused the National Forestry Authority (NFA) of corruption.[56] The allocation of forest land for commercial exploitation has brought local communities across the country into conflict with the NFA, while the establishment of national parks and natural reserves[57] has fuelled conflicts between local communities and the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) as communities have been cut off from traditionally harvested forest resources. These issues are compounded in the North by the comparatively higher poverty rates, and prevalent perceptions by communities that investors are plundering their wealth in collusion with the authorities.[58]

d) Poor governance and democratic deficits

Poor governance and democratic shortcomings fuel conflict within institutions and between institutions and citizens. The removal of presidential term limits has sparked fears of possible turmoil in a presidential transition, while the popular unrest and police crackdowns during the 2011 elections were indicative of frustration with the government in some sections of the population. The perception that ethnic politics dominate service provision and governance institutions continues to fuel conflicts between different interest groups in Uganda. Government responsiveness to citizens' demands for service delivery remains insufficient. While the Ugandan state presence is now visible in most parts of the country, service delivery eludes many people outside urban areas. Even where services are provided, the quality remains a key concern. The lack of responsive and accountable state institutions, coupled with poor service delivery, is largely associated with widespread corruption, patronage and lack of local government capacity to respond to citizens' demands.[59] In the North, the poor governance and democratic shortcomings experienced by all Ugandans are coupled with pronounced perceptions of neglect, which fuels grievance and drives conflict at local levels of governance.

49 Department of Geological Survey and Mines, 'Uganda: Mineral Sector for National Economic Development', www.uganda-mining.go.ug/dgsm-flyer-low-res.pdf.

50 See *Uganda's Black Gold: Challenges of Managing Oil Discovery in Uganda*, RLP video, 2012, www.refugeelawproject.org, accessed 2 December 2012.

51 International Alert, *Oil baseline report: Governance and livelihoods in Uganda's oil-rich AlbertineGraben* (Kampala: International Alert, 2012).

52 *Ibid.*

53 'Speaker Kadaga demands disciplinary action over oil bill fracas', Oil in Uganda, 30 November 2012. www.oilinuganda.org/features/law/speaker-kadaga-demands-disciplinary-action-over-oil-bill-fracas.html - more-2153.

54 Regional and local manifestations of this crucial conflict driver will be explored in chapter 2.

55 A dossier submitted to the central authorities in 2008 reported gross mismanagement of the country's forest resources resulting in losses of over 6 billion shillings from dubious tree harvesting transactions. 'Uganda: Angry Museveni to Swing Axe On Thieving National Forestry Bosses', *The Independent*, 22 April 2011, allafrica.com/stories/201104260992.html, accessed 5 October 2012.

56 See Nabwowe, Angella, *Gaps in the Management of Forest Reserves: A Potential Time Bomb* (Accord Publications, forthcoming).

57 There are 698 gazetted forest reserves in Uganda, of which 506 are Central Forest Reserves (CFR) and 192 Local Forest Reserves (LFR). The CFRs, which account for 30 percent of the national forest cover, are managed by the NFA while the LFRs are managed by local governments (*ibid.*).

58 ACCS consultation workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

59 See International Alert PCI baseline report for Lango and Acholi, July 2012.

e) Human rights abuses and erosion of civil liberties

The inability of state institutions to peacefully arbitrate socio-political contestations has seen growing intolerance by the government towards dissenting views, the violent suppression of opposition groups by the police, and a clampdown on civil liberties, including the right to protest. This is compounded by the militarisation of public spaces, a fact cited by communities consulted as contributing to an atmosphere of fear. Community representatives expressed concerns at the prominent role of the army in politics at central and local levels of governance, while lamenting the "narrowing of the political space" as state repression increases through the projection of power by the police and UPDF.[60] This concern has been deepened by repressive responses by police and army to popular demonstrations and political opposition.[61]

Civil society and media freedom are also heavily curtailed, as evidenced in numerous crackdowns on critical civil society voices and the media.[62] The introduction of laws to restrict freedom of association is seen as a threat to personal liberties, freedom of association and media freedom. The 2006 NGO Amendment Act granted extensive powers to the NGO Board and gave it the mandate to de-register a non-governmental organisation, a power that has been used to curtail dissenting and opposition voices in civil society. The Anti-Homosexuality Bill (2009, 2012), as well as posing a threat to individual liberties, will, if passed, seriously reduce the social and political space for civil society. The erosion of human rights and civil liberties and the clampdown on the views and voices of the opposition not only undermines democracy but fuels popular discontent and social unrest by denying the peaceful articulation and resolution of grievances in the public arena. In the North, the repressive behaviour of the state serves to reinforce the perception of an aggressive and repressive state, thus undermining the legitimacy of institutions.[63]

> The state summoned an international NGO and a local partner for publishing a report implicating the state in land grabbing[3] and also threatened to de-register NGOs, including the Refugee Law Project, for speaking out to protect the rights of minority groups in Uganda.[4]
>
> 3 See Vadal, John, 'Uganda threatens to expel Oxfam', *The Guardian*, 10 May 2012, www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2012/may/10/uganda-oxfam-land-grabbing-claims; and Uganda Land Alliance, 'Apologize or Face Closure – Government tells Uganda Land Alliance', 30 April 2012, ulaug.org/2012/04/kampala-–-apologise-or-face-closure-government-tells-uganda-land-alliance/.
>
> 4 See Human Rights Watch, World Report: Uganda, January 2012. www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/uganda_2012.pdf.

f) Lack of truth, reconciliation and transitional justice[64]

The current transitional justice agenda in Uganda builds on the signing of the 2007 Juba Agreement on accountability and reconciliation. However, the Juba talks were not completed and the government has implemented only certain provisions of the agreement, despite its rhetorical commitment to implement them to the fullest extent possible.[65] Intended to end armed insurgencies, reconcile victims and perpetrators, and open doors to peaceful resolution of conflicts, the Amnesty Act remains one of Uganda's only effective peacebuilding initiatives to date. From its creation in 2000, a temporary lapse in May 2012 and eventual reinstatement on May 24th 2013, the Amnesty

60 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

61 'Police to use military tactics, says Kayihura', *Daily Monitor*, 18 June 2012. in2eastafrica.net/uganda-police-to-use-military-tactics-says-kayihura/.

62 See Human Rights Watch, *Curtailing Criticism: Intimidation and Obstruction of Civil Society in Uganda*, August 2012, hrw.org/reports/2012/08/21/curtailing-criticism.

63 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10–29 September 2012.

64 This section examines the 2000 Amnesty Act and the broader process of justice at the national level. Chapter 2 looks at the impact of the lack of a comprehensive transitional justice process on prospects of reconciliation between communities in the North.

65 Greenawalt, Alexander K. A., 'Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal Court', *Virginia Journal of International Law*, vol 50, no. 107, 2009.

Act[66] has already facilitated the return of over 26,288 former combatants fighting against the Government of Uganda.[67] The controversial lapsing of the Act in 2012 had raised questions about how to end the remnants of insurgent groups (LRA and ADF) and how to build sustainable peace and comprehensive transitional justice in Uganda. The pursuit of holistic transitional justice initiatives, as envisaged in the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) Strategic Investment Plan III, remains a daunting challenge, even though a draft TJ Policy has already been presented by JLOS.[68] The 3rd Draft TJ Policy as it is still leaves a lot to be desired. There is no provision for victim's reparation in the immediate, inter-mediate and for the long run within the Policy. There are scanty provisions within the policy which foster acknowledgment, truth-seeking and a process for national healing and reconciliation. The OPM's attempts to develop a national peace policy hit a snag due to lack of proper consultation. Despite this, the JLOS policy drafting process was even more secretive. As a result, the government-led and government-owned transitional justice processes, without broader participation and inclusion of civil society voices, cannot bring the transformation needed in societies emerging from conflicts. Six years on, many communities consulted by ACCS lament the lack of closure, restoration and reconciliation processes that would heal the rifts between the North and the Ugandan state and amongst the peoples of the North.

g) The politicisation of ethnic identity

The complex relationship between identity, ownership and belonging (citizenship) continues to undermine the nation-building process in Uganda. The country remains deeply divided along ethnic lines, reflecting the perpetuation of colonial 'divide and rule' strategies by successive Ugandan governments. Ethnic loyalty remains a predominant basis for political alliances in Uganda,[69] as well as access to, retention and distribution of political power. This polarises society and feeds into growing secessionist tendencies by groups which perceive their communities to be excluded from the political process.[70] Under the current administration these divisions are being reinforced by a decentralisation process perceived as 'ethnicised',[71] which in some cases has led to localised violence.[72] The link between identity and inclusion or exclusion from power and wealth has been openly articulated by community leaders in the North, and constitutes a powerful grievance.[73] There is a risk, as has been the pattern historically, that ethnic sentiments will be mobilised to challenge state authority through violent means.

h) North-South fault line

The deliberate division of the country into productive (southern) and non-productive (northern) zones by the British established a historical conflict fault line in Uganda.[74]

66 The Amnesty Act of 2000 offered pardon to all Ugandans engaged in acts of rebellion against the government since 26 January 1986, offering a blanket amnesty to all combatants who surrendered. An Amnesty Commission (AC) was established by parliament to oversee the implementation of the act's provisions, while Demobilisation and Resettlement Teams (DRTs) were charged with implementing the decommissioning of arms, demobilising, resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants who opt for amnesty (or 'reporters') at the sub-regional level, with offices in Gulu, Kitgum, Arua, Kasese, Mbale and Kampala. See Refugee Law Project, *Whose Justice? Perceptions Of Uganda's Amnesty Act 2000: The Potential For Conflict Resolution And Long-Term Reconciliation*, Working Paper no. 15, February 2005.

67 See Enough Project, 'The End of Amnesty in Uganda: Implication for LRA Defection', August 2012, www.enoughproject.org/files/GuluDispatch.pdf.

68 See Justice Law and Order Sector Strategic Investment Plan 2012–2015.

69 For example, the Acholi Parliamentary Group, the Buganda Parliamentary Group and the Karamoja Parliamentary Association all formed to voice ethnic and geographical grievances born out of a sense of collective deprivation and to gain political recognition.

70 The notion of establishing a Nile Republic has been put forward by leaders from northern Uganda, and Buganda's quest for autonomy has been an issue since independence. During the Transitional Justice Audit people from Karamoja and West Nile asked whether they really had no choice but to belong to Uganda.

71 The creation of new districts based on ethnic identity will be explored in chapter 2.

72 See Habati, MubatsiAsinja, 'Tribal politics explodes: Kasese, Bundibugyo tense ahead of by-election', *The Independent*, issue no 225, 3–6 August 2012.

73 ACCS consultation workshops in northern Uganda, 10–29 September 2012.

74 RLP National Reconciliation and Transitional Justice Audit (NRTJ) Audit, focus group discussions in Arua, 2-8 October 2011, available at beyondjuba.org/NRTJA/index.php.

The divide and rule strategy has been maintained and exploited by successive post-independence governments.[75] The perception of marginalisation and asymmetrical power relations is evident in the north of the country. This unequal level of development and inequitable access and distribution of power and national resources remains a key conflict driver in Uganda.[76] The community leaders consulted by ACCS asked why no Karimojong has ever been appointed as cabinet minister for Karamoja. Scrutiny of political appointments, military promotions, access to government scholarships at home and abroad, and equal opportunities for skills enhancement in strategic sectors of the economy reveal gross disparities between ethnic groups and regions.[77] However, ACCS research has noted some improvement of perceptions about this issue, with 31.3 percent of respondents in 21 districts of the North perceiving a decrease in the levels of competition and grievance between northern and southern Uganda. A large proportion of respondents (36.3 percent) did not know whether or not there was a decrease in the levels of competition and grievance between northern and southern Uganda. The remaining 32.4 percent remain a stark reminder of the need to close this crucial fault line.[78]

i) Corruption and personal greed

In the 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 10 of the 11 countries with a CPI score lower than 2 ('highly corrupt') were classified by the Uppsala Conflict Database as experiencing conflict.[79] Corruption undermines key pillars of sustainable peace, including the rule of law and the civic contract. According to Transparency International East Africa's Bribery Index 2012[80] Uganda is the most corrupt country in the East African region.[81] Corrupt practices have become institutionalised in most public bodies and sectors of the economy, undermining vital service delivery programmes and confidence in the government.[82] Several commissions of inquiry and parliamentary audits have revealed widespread and systemic corruption in the army, police, judiciary, revenue authority, national social security fund, OPM and the Ministry of Finance.[83]

> The PRDP corruption scandal An October 2012 report by Uganda's Auditor General uncovered fraud amounting to trillions of shillings meant for post-conflict recovery programmes, perpetrated by officials within the OPM through unauthorised payments and transfers of PRDP money. The audit revealed that of the €22.9 million received on two PRDP budget support accounts between 2009 and 2011, €12.6 million has been misappropriated.[5]
>
> 5 Auditor General, 'Special Investigation Report on the Allegations of Financial Impropriety in the Office of the Prime Minister', available at www.scribd.com/doc/110684957/The-full-final-report-into-the-loss-of-billions-of-shillings-in-the-Office-of-the-Prime-Minister.

Communities in the North noted their frustration at the government as the NRM "went to the bush to fight corruption" only to see corruption becoming

75 Apuuli, Kasaija Philip, 'The International Criminal Court and the LRA Insurgency in Northern Uganda', in *The Resolution of African Conflicts*, ed Alfred Nhema and Paul TiyambeZeleza (Ohio University Press, 2008).

76 See RLP, 'When is it our turn?', ACCS PRDP Baseline Survey, 2010.

77 See 'Muhoozi's Meteoric Rise to the Top', *Daily Monitor*, 29 August 2012, www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Muhoozi+s+meteoric+rise+to+top/-/688334/1489062/-/l41mur/-/index.html.

78 International Alert, *Monitoring Peace and Conflict Impacts of the PRDP in Acholi and Lango Sub-Regions*, forthcoming.

79 The exception was Turkmenistan. Zaum, D. and Cheng, C., 'Corruption and Peacebuilding', Anti-Corruption Research Network, corruptionresearchnetwork.org/resources/frontpage-articles/the-role-of-corruption-in-peacebuilding, accessed 8 February 2013.

80 Transparency International, East African Bribery Index 2012, www.tiuganda.org/, accessed 5 November 2012.

81 Kasoma, Aloysious, 'Uganda leads corruption indices in East Africa', *Independent Magazine*,30 August 2012, www.independent.co.ug/news/news/6352-uganda-leads-corruption-indices-in-east-africa.

82 'Full Statement: Donors threaten to cut aid over corruption', *The Observer*, 3 March 2012,,www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7514&Itemid=59. See also Cheme, Marie, 'Overview of Corruption in Uganda', *Anti Corruption Resource Centre Brief*, 4 March 2009, available at www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-in-uganda/.

83 'Report of Judicial Inquiry into Corruption in the Uganda Police Force', available at books.google.co.ug/books/about/Report_of_the_Judicial_Commission_of_Inq.html?id=1g0VAQAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y; Bogere, Hossein, 'Corruption Irks First Lady', *The Observer*, 14 February 2012, www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7244:corruption-irks-first-lady&catid=34:news&Itemid=114.

institutionalised.[84] This has impacted upon support for this government.[85] Community leaders consulted by ACCS shared their constituents' disgruntlement with the prevalence of corruption in high public offices, with some warning of the potential for violent mobilisation as a result.[86]

j) Tensions between cultural institutions[87] and government

The tension between the Government of Uganda and cultural leaders is another key national-level conflict driver in the country. Tensions are manifest at central and local levels over who legitimately represents the interests of Ugandan communities.[88] Relations between the government and traditional institutions have deteriorated as the government increasingly perceives some cultural leaders as challenging its authority.[89] In December 2010, the government promulgated the Institution of Traditional or Cultural Leaders Act to regulate cultural leaders' involvement in politics. The act defines the role of a cultural or traditional leader, stating that they "shall not have or exercise any administrative, legislative or executive powers of government or local government".[90]

The conflict between the Buganda kingdom and the government,[91] which exemplifies these tensions, culminated in the Buganda riot of 2009 after the central government moved to prevent Ronald Muwenda Mutebi, king of Uganda's largest ethnic group, from visiting a part of his territory.[92] A more recent dimension to the ongoing conflict is the efforts by cultural institutions to lobby for a share of oil revenues. In particular, the Omukama of Bunyoro-Kitara kingdom has spearheaded a joint lobbying effort with cultural leaders in other oil exploration areas, calling for environmental protection and a share of oil revenues in the Albertine Rift Valley.[93] In the North, growing tensions between government authorities in districts where oil exploration is ongoing and cultural leaders are already palpable as the fight over oil revenues gets under way.[94]

Conclusion

This chapter examined the conflict drivers that are hampering peacebuilding and state-building efforts in Uganda and how these are manifest in the North. The issues

84 *Ibid.*

85 See Mubangizi, Michael, 'Museveni or Besigye?Who can be trusted to stop corruption', *The Observer,*12 December, 2010, www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11332&Itemid=59.

86 ACCS consultation workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

87 Following the abolition of kingdoms by President Obote in 1967, the NRM government reinstated them through the promulgation of the 1995 constitution. In 2010, 13 cultural institutions were recognised by the government in the Institution of Traditional or Cultural Leaders Bill: Ker KwaroAcholi (Rwot David Onen Acana II), Ker Alur (RwotUbimu Phillip OlarkerRauni III), ObukamabwaBunyoroOmukama (Solomon GafabusaIguru I), Buruuli chiefdom (Isabaruli Constantine ButamanyaMwogeziMwatyansozi I), ObwakyabazingaBwaBusoga (the Kyabazinga of Busoga), ObwakamuswagaWaKooki (Kamuswaga Apollo SansaKabumbuli II), Lango chiefdom (Won NyaciYosamOdur), ObusingabwaRwenzururu (Omusinga Charles Wesley Mumberelivmangoma), Obwakabakabwa Buganda (SabasajjaKabaka Ronald MuwendaMutebi II), Teso chiefdom (Emorimor Papa Augustine OsubanAdugala), TiengAdhola chiefdom (His Highness KwarAdhola Moses Stephen Owor), ObukamabwaTooro (Omukama Oyo NyimbaKabambaIguruRukidi IV), InzuyaMasaaba (Umukuuka Wilson WeasaWamimbi). See www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/bill/2010/24.

88 The British colonial authorities recognised that traditional leaders and cultural institutions played a positive role in managing and representing the interests of Uganda's diverse communities. Following the country's independence from Britain, President Obote abolished the federal system and established the Republic of Uganda in the 1967 constitution, outlawing Uganda's kingdoms. See Quinn, Joanna R, 'Ethnic Conflict in Uganda', paper presented at 'Why Neighbours Kill: Explaining the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations', conference held at The University of Western Ontario, 4-5 June 2004.

89 Cross-Cultural Foundation of Uganda, *Culture in governance: does it work? Four Ugandan experiences* (Kampala: CCFU, 2010); ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

90 Institution of Traditional or Cultural Leaders Bill, No. 24, 7 December 2010.

91 The Buganda kingdom has since driven efforts to promote greater federalism in Uganda as a solution to the conflict between the government and Uganda's traditional institutions. In an official presentation to the Uganda Constitutional Review Commission in 2005 the kingdom demanded the re-establishment of a federal system of government, and the restoration of the kingdoms' lost land and privileges. See 'Government cautioned over granting federal selectively', *New Vision*, www.newvision.co.ug/mobile/Detail.aspx?NewsID=632206&CatID=1, accessed 7 November 2012.

92 '10 reported dead in Kampala riots', *Guardian*, 11 September 2009, www.guardian.co.uk/katine/2009/sep/11/uganda-news, accessed 5 November 2012.

93 For details on the local manifestations of this conflict driver please see chapter 2, section k, p. 78.

94 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

identified affect all parts of Uganda, but have more severe consequences for conflict in the North as they are compounded and underpinned by comparatively higher levels of poverty and socio-economic and political exclusion, in part due to the two decades of conflict experienced in the region. Moreover, prevalent and well-founded perceptions of neglect and marginalisation constitute powerful grievances that fuel the conflict cycle, as they compound conflict drivers that could tip communities from latent to overt conflict if trigger events of significance were to occur.

2

Conflict drivers in northern Uganda – a regional-level analysis

"PRDP has failed to restore the glory of the North ... the conflicts destroyed people's pride and dignity. People need to see the restoration of infrastructure, institutions, and society for the animosity against the government to fade away – otherwise they will continue to perceive the conflict as ongoing."
(Community representative, Soroti, 19 September 2012)

Many of the conflict drivers identified at the national level are also evident at the regional/PRDP level, though they are manifest in locally specific ways. Common to all PRDP sub-regions are a complex and long-standing set of issues, many closely interlinked and cross-cutting in nature. These regional-level conflict drivers affecting the North contribute to a collective sense of a marginalised and neglected North and together constitute what a participant in a recent ACCS-hosted workshop described as a "ticking time bomb".[95] The conflict drivers affecting the eight PRDP sub-regions must be considered within the context of pervasive issues affecting the country as a whole, though they affect the North more severely. They must also be seen in relation to enduring conflict legacies that communities are struggling to overcome, corrosive grievances that fuel resentment and anger, and the potential conflict triggers that may ignite this potent mix.

The dangerous combination of acute poverty, high youth unemployment, socio-economic and political exclusion, unaddressed legacies of war, and a widespread perception of marginalisation and neglect by the state that fuels deep grievances, is to be found in all eight sub-regions of the North. For example, the government's 2012 Poverty Status Report indicates that while the proportion of Ugandans living in absolute poverty has generally declined, poverty levels in northern Uganda remain higher than the national average, as shown in the table below.[96] This illustrates the development differentials between the North and the rest of the country that fuel the grievances of communities in the North.

95 ACCS validation workshop, Tororo district, Bukedi sub-region, 24 September 2012.

96 Ministry of Trade, Planning and Economic Development, 'Poverty Status Report: Poverty Reduction and the National Development Process', 2012.

Table 2: Entry into/exit out of poverty (2005–2010)

Region	Initially poor (% of population)	Proportion of poor who escaped poverty (%)	Proportion of non-poor who fell back into poverty (%)
Central	16	76	10
Eastern	36	57	19
Northern	61	45	29
Western	21	57	19
Kampala	4	100	1
Rural	34	58	19
Urban	14	54	4
Uganda	31	60	15

A further critical layer to consider in the analysis of regional-level conflict drivers is the impact of the wars in the North on the different sub-regions. The PRDP II recognises that the physical and social infrastructure in some sub-regions was more severely affected than in others, thus presenting different reconstruction and peace-building challenges. Some sub-regions are identified as having been ***most directly affected*** (Acholi, Karamoja, parts of West Nile and Lango), others were ***sporadically affected*** (parts of West Nile, Bunyoro, Teso, and Lango) while the rest were only ***marginally affected*** by spillover events related to the conflict (Elgon, Bukedi, and parts of Bunyoro and Teso).[97] Unsurprisingly, this research found that the severity of conflict drivers related to conflict legacies (such as a lack of reparations, transitional justice, and displacement-linked land disputes) is closely linked to the degree of conflict impact. Another very significant factor determining the incidence and severity of conflict drivers related to land disputes is the potential or proven existence of natural resources, particularly oil and minerals.

Regional cross-cutting conflict drivers

- Competition over natural resources and property: land, oil, forests and minerals
- Youth exclusion
- Inadequate post-conflict truth, reconciliation and transitional justice processes
- Generational and gender conflicts
- Creation of new districts and poor local governance
- Perceptions of neglect over poor service delivery and infrastructure
- Perceptions of marginalisation over distribution of development assistance
- IDP return and reintegration challenges
- Ongoing insecurity and inadequate DDR
- Environmental degradation and natural disasters
- Tensions between traditional structures and local government

a) Competition over natural resources and property: land, oil, forests and minerals

"If oil is not handled well, it will cause conflicts; it's already causing conflicts."
(Community representative, Masindi, 10 September 2012)

The end of armed conflict in northern Uganda has opened up economic opportunities but the region continues to be affected by disputes over land and natural resources, including oil, gold, timber, and the agricultural potential of the soil. Community representatives consulted by ACCS identified land and natural

97 See PRDP II map on page 7 of this report.

and mineral resources as the most prominent conflict drivers in the region. The resource-rich land of northern Uganda is highly contested and insecurity of tenure is widespread. As investors and the government move in to exploit these resources, conflicts over land are only going to increase in numbers and intensity.

Land use in Uganda is administered through both statutory and customary law as stipulated by the 1995 constitution and the 1998 Land Act, with issues of tenure insecurity arising from the ambiguities and contradictions found between the two systems.[98] Widespread extreme poverty and a complex tenure system leave communities vulnerable to property rights abuses and exposed to a growing risk of violent conflicts. Government surveys of oil and mineral deposits suggest that northern Uganda is a resource-rich area, though years of war and underdevelopment means that much of its wealth remains unexploited.[99] A lack of public awareness about the exact location and abundance of valuable resources leads to speculation and rumours, while private investors' exploration activities, though often well within the bounds of the law, are perceived with suspicion by local communities and lead to conflicts.[100] Community leaders have noted that insufficient consultation and participation of local communities in the process of exploration and exploitation of resources found in their land is creating resentment and driving conflicts across all sub-regions.[101] Moreover, whereas conflict resolution efforts by local actors have been able to deal with smaller rural land disputes involving members of the same community, larger disputes involving investors and/or the government have proven resilient to resolution.[102]

> The incidence and severity of disputes over resources in the eight sub-regions depends upon the type of resource to be found and its value, the status of the land where the resource is found, the participation of local communities, and the roles of local government and private investors.[6]
>
> 6 *Ibid.*

Community leaders also lamented the challenges in seeking redress and remedy at the local level for communities affected by land and resource-related disputes.[103] Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms are not recognised or supported by the authorities, while the formal system faces challenges of its own. The Local Council (LC) II Court Committees are the first point of contact for local-level disputants, and they handle all non-criminal offences including land and resource-related disputes. Due to a court ruling declaring their tenure unconstitutional after the failure to hold mandated elections in 2005, their dispute resolution activities have been undermined by questions about their status and the legality of their work.[104] LC II committee members consulted for an ACCS study on land dispute mechanisms at the local level noted that since the court ruling they had noticed a decline in cases referred to them as communities were losing confidence in the local justice system. The rise in the incidence and severity of land and resource-related disputes coupled with the erosion of local-level dispute resolution systems undermines peacebuilding efforts in the North and presents a risk of renewed conflict.

98 UN Peacebuilding Programme, *Identification of Good Practices in Land Conflict Resolution in Acholi*, November 2011.

99 Department of Geological Survey and Mines, 'Uganda: Mineral Sector for National Economic Development', www.uganda-mining.go.ug/dgsm-flyer-low-res.pdf.

100 International Alert, *Governance and Livelihoods in Uganda's Oil-rich AlbertineGraben*, 2012.

101 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10–29 September 2012.

102 Human Rights Focus and UN PeacebuildingProgramme, 'Land Conflict Monitoring and Mapping Tool for the Acholi Sub-region', December 2012.

103 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

104 Article 181 (4) of the 1995 constitution stipulates that all local government councils shall be elected every four years. This means that following the expiration of the LCs' legal mandate in 2005, and according to a Constitutional Court ruling, the government has been in breach of the constitution. The government has argued that until sufficient funds can be allocated for the ballot the current LCs will remain in place. 'Violating Uganda's constitution with infinity', *The Independent*, 20 August 2011, www.independent.co.ug/News/news/4509-violating-ugandas-constitution-with-infinity, accessed 5 November 2012.

a.i) Land and boundary disputes

"If they want to grab our land, we will mobilise the residents."
(Community representative, Kitgum, 14 September 2012)

"People are acquiring guns to protect and settle land disputes. In Teso there could be a violent conflict between clans over land."
(Community representative, Soroti, 19 September 2012)

Land and boundary disputes were cited by community leaders as two of the most prominent conflict drivers across the eight sub-regions of northern Uganda. They noted that contested land would be the most likely cause of a return to violent conflict in the North if left unaddressed. This fact is also recognised in the PRDP II document as being an escalating source of conflict in 69 percent of districts in the North.[105] A UNICEF report has identified land disputes as pervasive and making up roughly 94 percent of cases before local courts in the North,[106] while a UN Peacebuilding Programme-commissioned report has noted that, despite an apparent decrease in smaller intra-community rural land disputes in Acholi sub-region between 2011 and 2012, over 18,000 households are still affected.[107] Moreover, around 19.2 percent of disputes in Acholi have involved violence in the affected communities, and these have proven to be less susceptible to conflict resolution interventions.[108]

The 2011 Land Act published by the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development recognised that such disputes were a problem across the country. However, specific issues affecting the North such as land rights of returnees, widespread grievances towards the authorities and their perceived collusion with investors and developers, or long-standing inter-communal conflicts, make this a pressing conflict driver in the North.[109] Moreover, households headed by women (which represent almost a quarter of all households in northern Uganda) are at particular risk of being denied access to land by their relatives, as are orphans and other child-headed households. Traditional institutions involved in the mediation of land disputes have not in all cases paid due regard to national and international human rights norms, in particular with respect to age and gender equality.[110]

ACCS research has noted that land conflicts have had a negative impact on service delivery and infrastructure, particularly health centres and schools. Customary land tenure is making development difficult due to the prevalence of claims made in the face of public service development projects. As a result of years of displacement many people have lost a sense of historical boundaries, since most of the customary rights are undocumented. Poverty was noted as a significant driving factor in all these land conflicts, and the increasing commercialisation of land, teamed with communities' growing realisation of its worth, is dramatically increasing land disputes.[111] Whereas at present localised disputes over contested land only occasionally escalate into violence, community leaders consulted by ACCS hinted at the possibility that their constituents may organise themselves to protect their land rights in the future.[112]

Land disputes involve diverse parties, pitching individuals against their own families, clan against clan, or community members against district authorities and/

105 Office of The Prime Minister, 'Peace, Recovery And Development Plan For Northern Uganda (PRDP) Phase II, July 2012-June 2015', November 2011, p. 4.

106 Knutzen, A. and Smith, A., 'UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme – Uganda Conflict Analysis', October 2012.

107 Human Rights Focus and UN PeacebuildingProgramme: 'Land Conflict Monitoring and Mapping for the Acholi Sub-region', December 2012.

108 *Ibid.*, p. 13.

109 Ministry of Lands, Housing And Urban Development, Uganda National Land Policy, March 2011.

110 Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), *Peace, Recovery and Development: Challenges in Northern Uganda*, March 2010, www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/D15CF62D20C90469C12576FE002EEFA4/$file/Uganda+briefing+paper+-+March+2010.pdf.

111 International Alert.*Monitoring Peace and Conflict Impacts of the PRDP in Acholi and Lango Sub-Regions*, forthcoming..

112 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

or private investors, amongst others. The issues, dynamics, causes and effects of these conflicts are intricate and vary from place to place. The conflict parties also vary, but land disputes are often inter-family, inter-tribal or intra/inter-clan conflicts, with local governments, government institutions like the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) and the National Forestry Authority (NFA), and private commercial investors playing a prominent role. The key conflict drivers include competition over commercially valuable land, fraudulent transactions, illegal occupation, contested boundaries, misinterpretation or poor understanding of the land laws and post-conflict return policies. The problems are more acute in the newly established districts. Many of these districts are facing problems around the demarcation of boundaries, which divert attention and resources from much-needed service delivery, and they receive little support or guidance from the Ministry of Local Government.[113]

The majority of landholding in the North is traditional tenure (76 percent, as opposed to 54 percent in the East and 47 percent in the West) with land rights inherited according to customary practices.[114] Customarily, land was not a sellable commodity but freely transferable through gifts, kinship and inheritance.[115] The land is not titled and boundaries are often identified using landscape and physical vegetation.[116] In some customs, there is a continuum of rights and interests in customary land, which is seen as belonging to the dead, the living and those yet to be born.[117] Many returnees are now seeking to individualise communal land to protect their property rights, leading to clashes within affected communities.[118] The sale of communal or customary land can be considered an infringement on common interest and readily triggers conflicts. Land remains an important factor in shaping the socio-economic and political relationships between individuals, investors, and the state.[119]

Land grabbing in northern Uganda

A 2011 report defines land grabbing in northern Uganda as "the acquisition of land by a public, private enterprise, or individual in a manner that is illegal, fraudulent, or unfair, taking advantage of existing power differences, corruption, and breakdown of law and order in the society", which occurs when society is characterised by weak land governance and the land and property rights of the most vulnerable are not protected.

Land grabbing can happen through a number of legal or illegal means:

- grabbing through gradual encroachment, e.g. state forest, wetlands, parks
- grabbing through borrowing land, e.g. for sharecropping
- grabbing through seizing opportunities, e.g. after death of head of family
- grabbing by use of force and intimidation, e.g. military force, witchcraft
- grabbing using the existing justice system, e.g. weak courts, local councils
- grabbing by exploiting dependency, e.g. guardians of orphaned children

The difficult transition from customary land to private ownership, coupled with a lack of knowledge amongst many ordinary citizens about land legislation and the difficulty in obtaining property titles, has left many northern Ugandans vulnerable to abuses of their property rights. Moreover, traditional and customary instruments (rules, norms, and regulations) that used to provide security of tenure to vulnerable groups like widows, children, the disabled and the elderly have been eroded through

113 'Land conflicts are a threat to stability in the northern area', *Observer*, 21 June 2012, www.observer.ug, accessed 15 October 2012.

114 Oworaga, N., 'Conflict in Uganda's Land System', Africa Portal, 21 June 2012, africaportal.org/2012/05/14/conflict-uganda.

115 RLP Transitional Justice Audit, Kitgum, 12-16 November 2011.

116 IOM, UNDP, NRC, *Land or Else: Land-Based Conflict, Vulnerability, and Disintegration in Northern Uganda*, October 2010, uganda.iom.int/documents/Land.Or.Else.Oct.2010.FINAL.pdf.

117 RLP-ACCS, 'Certificates of Customary Ownership: A Roundtable Discussion on Perceptions, Implications, and Challenges with Stakeholders from Acholi Sub-region', *Conflict Watch*, issue 7, October 2012.

118 Rugadya, A. M. et al., 'Analysis of Post-Conflict Land Policy and Administration: A Survey of IDP Return and Resettlement Issues and Lessons', World Bank Report, 2008).

119 IOM, UNDP, NRC, *Land or Else: Land-Based Conflict, Vulnerability, and Disintegration in Northern Uganda*, *op. cit.*

two decades of forced displacement.[120] In some cases traditional leaders have sold or loaned customary land to government or private investors without adequate consultation and/or compensation to those affected, leading to escalating conflicts in previously peaceful communities.[121] Informal land transactions are rapidly increasing, especially in urban centres in northern Uganda, with cases of youth with legitimate access and rights to land selling plots of lands for cash without the consent or engagement of traditional authorities, resulting in community and inter-generational conflicts.[122] While some disputants in land conflicts have legitimate motives, many others are driven by greed and the desire to acquire land for private benefit.

The incompatibility between communal and individual interests over land has resulted in conflicts frequently erupting into violence across districts in the North. For example, in Otuke district (Lango sub-region) a clan leader was killed in July 2012 by community members opposing a deal giving away 300 acres of customary land to the government for cattle rearing by the district.[123] Communities consulted by ACCS described the issue as a "ticking time bomb" for renewed violence in northern Uganda, as tensions rise over land use, access and ownership.[124] Community representatives in Acholi noted the high risk of violence associated with land disputes, citing land grabbing by illegal occupants as the most frequent cause of conflicts and describing how vulnerable individuals and families are being chased away from their properties with threats of violence.[125] Some described these "unregulated land economics and interests" as the basis of the explosion of land conflict in the sub-region, with key district officials pointing to investment opportunities as a causal factor.[126]

A UN report about land conflict resolution in Acholi sub-region noted that approximately 94 percent of cases before Local Council Courts were related directly to land. The report cites a strong preference amongst community members to solve land issues at the local level, though there appears to be little knowledge in the community of statutory and customary land laws, and widespread confusion about the procedures, courts and institutional bodies responsible for land issues.[127] Long delays in court proceedings fuel frustration amongst land disputants, with many instances of conflicts escalating to violence. This is compounded by the decline in the role of cultural leaders in mediating such disputes, with the resulting gap in access to justice driving conflict across the North. Acholi community leaders noted that the decline in prominence of cultural institutions has led to a rise in the incidence and severity of land conflicts, as they are increasingly unable to effectively mediate to resolve the disputes.[128] For example, between January and March 2012, at least five people were reported killed in violent land disputes in the villages of Lakang, Apar and Pabbo in Amuru district (Acholi sub-region).[129]

At the heart of many land disputes is the potential for material gain through the sale, purchase and/or misappropriation of communal property. For example, in West Nile controversy surrounds the allocation of land for oil exploration and land acquisition

120 Mabikke, S. B., 'Escalating Land Grabbing in Post-Conflict Regions of Northern Uganda: A Need for Strengthening Good Land Governance in Acholi Region', paper presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing, 6-8 April 2011, p. 9. www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/559E6E0144289C5CC12579F900453C0B/$file/Samuel+B+Mabikke+_+FINAL.pdf.

121 See RLP, 'A Synopsis of Land Conflicts in Acholi Sub-Region', September 2012.

122 Mabikke, 'Escalating Land Grabbing In Post-Conflict Regions of Northern Uganda', *op. cit.*, p. 14.

123 'Relatives of Otuke Land Clash Victim Demand Compensation', Uganda Radio Network, ugandaradionetwork.com, accessed 5 October 2012.

124 ACCS consultation workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

125 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Kitgum, 14 September 2012.

126 Refugee Law Project, 'Situation Brief – Border Or Ownership Question: The Apaa Land Dispute', Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity, 9 September 2012.

127 UN Peacebuilding Programme, *Identification of Good Practices in Land Conflict Resolution in Acholi*, November 2011.

128 *Ibid.*

129 'Land disputes threaten Northern peace', IRIN, 12 April 2012, www.irinnews.org, accessed 5 October 2012.

by investors without local consultation.[130] Confrontations and evictions in the district of Amuru (Acholi sub-region) to pave way for commercial sugar production and a wildlife reserve for tourism are long-standing and well documented.[131] In Teso sub-region, the sale of communal land for commercial purposes by individuals is widespread and fuelling conflicts within and between families and clans. Community representatives consulted by ACCS noted that the acquisition of weapons by community members in response to growing land disputes could lead to violent clashes between clans.[132] In the sub-region of Elgon land disputes are also apparently on the rise, with land grabbing for commercial exploitation of resources being the primary reason. In some cases the disputes over resources are violent, such as the cross-boundary incidents reported between residents of Budaka district in Bukedi sub-region and Mbale district in Elgon over the shared Namatala wetlands.[133]

Often the role of central and local authorities in facilitating land acquisition by investors is controversial and fuels the disputes, while instances of government officials illegally acquiring land have also been cited. In Karamoja, the central government has allocated land for mineral exploration and exploitation without consulting the local authorities and community, fuelling tensions between locals and foreign investors in the sub-region.[134] In Lango sub-region, a member of parliament (MP) controversially misappropriated a large parcel of land belonging to the community for commercial cattle-rearing, but the land is suspected to have some valuable minerals as well.[135] Government acquisition of land for development projects has also raised tensions amongst communities in the sub-region. The dam project on the River Manafwa in Elgon sub-region has been systematically rejected by communities who fear loss of livelihoods resulting from changes in the river bank where they cultivate, and who claim not to have been consulted about the plans. Around 3,000 residents of Bushiende, Busoba and Busiu sub-counties claim ownership of land in Namakye on the River Manafwa which the government has earmarked for the construction. In September 2012, the army and police fired bullets and tear gas to disperse residents protesting against the planned construction.[136]

The aggressive policies of investors and the authorities have been cited as fuelling disputes. In Bunyoro sugar companies have purchased vast areas of land and encouraged farmers to abandon traditional crops such as cassava or maize in favour of sugar cane to sustain production, and allegations of harassment and illegal acquisition of land are spreading fear amongst local farmers.[137] Communities have begun to mobilise in response to aggressive land acquisition by investors and the lack of protection by the authorities. In Zeu sub-county in Zombo district (West Nile) eight clans have spearheaded a complaint against a tea production company after accusing them of having illegally acquired 1,285 hectares of land in collusion with the local government. The residents allege that after legally selling 500 hectares for tea growing to the company, it proceeded to claim an additional 785 hectares, claiming to have purchased them from the local government. The dispute has been ongoing since 2008, and in 2011 locals set fire to trees planted by the company.[138] More recently

130 See 'Hon Christine AbiaBako, Col. Kulayigye: Land Grabbing is a reality in Northern Uganda', *Daily Monitor*, 18 October 2012, www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Commentary/Col++Kulayigye++land+grabbing+is+a+reality+in+northern+Uganda+/-/689364/1535724/-/n9ey8xz/-/index.html, accessed 18 October 2012.

131 See *Shoot Us All Down*, and *Land for Every Ugandan?! The Apaa Eviction of March 2012*, RLP video productions.

132 *Ibid.*

133 ACCS consultative workshops, Mbale, 21 September 2012.

134 See RLP, 'Is it Oil, Land or Investment Triggering Increasing Land Disputes in Lakang, Amuru District?', ACCS Situation Report, 2 October 2012, www.refugeelawproject.org/accs/activity_briefs/Is_It_Oil_Land_Or_Investment_Triggering_Increasing_Land_Dispute_In_Lakang_Village_Of_Amuru_District.pdf.

135 'MPs Protest Otuke Land Giveaway', *Daily Monitor*, 20 July 2012, mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/MPs+protest+Otuke+land+give+away/-/691252/1458002/-/format/xhtml/-/128jad4z/-/index.html.

136 'Uganda May Lose UGX 55 B Dam Project', Uganda Radio Network, 12 September 2012, ugandaradionetwork.com, accessed 12 October 2012.

137 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Masindi, 10 September 2012.

138 Okethwengu, B., 'Disputed land ownership stalls proposed Uganda tea plant', African Agriculture, 26 August 2011, www.africanagricultureblog.com/2011_08_01_archive.html, accessed 15 October 2012.

residents have petitioned parliament to intervene, as they claim their pleas to local government to address the conflict have failed to resolve the dispute.[139] The affected clans have threatened to continue mobilising their communities if their land rights are not respected.[140]

In Amuru district (Acholi), a long-standing dispute between the communities and a sugar producing company reached the High Court after local leaders challenged the acquisition of 20,000 hectares of land in 2008 to cultivate sugarcane as fraudulent.[141] The legal case was lost in 2012 on the grounds that the land given to the company by the district Land Board was public land, and not customary land as argued by the community affected by the land acquisition. The dispute has caused a great deal of anger amongst communities. More recent moves to acquire additional land and expand production by the same company have met with public opposition leading to the deployment of military personnel to protect the company's assets, and arrests and mistreatment of some residents.[142] The potential presence of oil deposits under the land that the company wants to acquire has fuelled tensions, as the community's perception is that the private investor acquiring land where oil is found will be the sole beneficiary of oil revenue.[143] The focus on crop production as a way of addressing the Karamoja food security problem, at the expense of pastoralism and agro-pastoralism, is a potential driver of conflict as many agricultural development interventions target the 'green belt' where water and grazing land is found.[144]

In 2011 Bunyoro kingdom rejected a request by the government to give 900 hectares of land in Masindi district to Kinyara Sugar Works, reportedly to increase sugar production in the country. The land on which the existing Kinyara factory sits is also contested, with the kingdom claiming it is their property.[7] Community representatives claim that district officials who questioned the relationship between the central government and Kinyara Sugar were "pushed out of their seats".[8]

7 'Uganda: Bunyoro Rejects Proposal to Give Land to Kinyara', New Vision, 6 September 2011, allafrica.com/stories/201109070047.html, accessed 15 October 2012.

8 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Masindi, 10 September 2012.

Displacement and return continue to fuel land disputes, with many returnees unable to recall and trace the boundaries of their land due to their lengthy displacement and changes in the landscape. Land grabbing means that boundary disputes are the most frequent type of conflict between returnees and relatives or neighbours, while many remain displaced because their land is unclaimed or illegally occupied.[145] Institutions tasked with regulating land ownership and addressing land disputes at local level, such as District Land Boards and Area Land Committees, lack the necessary capacity and means to survey land, leaving vast areas of land open to contested claims and potential conflicts.[146] Community members often revert to traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution, or more worryingly take matters in their own hands with deadly consequences for individuals, families and communities. Community representatives noted that land disputes were on the rise in West Nile, with many war-displaced having returned to find their land illegally occupied and still today unable to claim their property rights due to a lack of effective access to the courts.[147] In Bunyoro, the sub-region hosting the second-largest number of IDPs in the North, cases of violent land disputes between returnees and illegal occupants

139 'Land Dispute: Zombo Residents Petition Parliament', Uganda Radio Network, 7 September 2012, ugandaradionetwork.com, accessed 15 October 2012.

140 Report from ACCS Community Dialogue in Abanga, 11 April 2012.

141 'Judge Orders Madhvani to Answer for Fraudulent Amuru Land Transaction', Uganda Radio Network, 8 April 2012, ugandaradionetwork.com, accessed 10 October 2012.

142 'Amuru leaders oppose Madhvani sugar project', *Observer*, 12 October 2012, www.observer.co.ug, accessed 15 October 2012.

143 Refugee Law Project, 'Is it Oil, Land or Investment Triggering Increasing Land Dispute in Lakang Village of Amuru District?', ACCS Situation Report, 2 October 2012.

144 Saferworld, 'Tracking key conflict and security dynamics in Karamoja – an update', May 2012.

145 UN Peacebuilding Programme, *Identification of Good Practices in Land Conflict Resolution in Acholi*, November 2011.

146 Office of the Prime Minister, PRDP II Final Document, July 2012.

147 ACCS consultative workshop in northern Uganda, Arua, 12 September 2012.

were also reported.[148] There were also reported cases of IDPs hosted in Masindi district attempting to sell the land that had been allocated to them during their displacement, leading to conflicts with their host communities.[149] In Teso sub-region, land encroachment and grabbing occurred during and after the war. Many displaced returned to find their land occupied, which in turn led to further encroachment and illegal occupation through secondary displacement.[150]

Contested boundaries between sub-regions, districts and sub-counties are a source of conflict across northern Uganda, and the issue was raised as a significant conflict driver by community leaders consulted by ACCS. Disputes over boundaries are often linked to historically contested land and often fuelled by the natural resources to be found in those areas. The creation of new districts without clear borders is also fuelling disputes between 'parent' and new districts, as uncertainty and opportunity drive attempts by residents and investors to annex land before boundaries are finally determined.[151] For example, a border dispute between the Iteso and Karimojong communities in Katakwi (Teso sub-region) and Napak (Karamoja sub-region) erupted in 2008 when cross-border incursions began. In February 2011, a group of Napak residents stormed Oyeselem in Katakwi district and settled in the area. The Karimojong trespassers inscribed the district name 'Napak' on trees located about seven kilometres into Katakwi, raising fears amongst the locals of that it was an attempt to redraw the boundaries between the two districts and consequently the two affected sub-regions.[152] Bukedi and Elgon sub-regions are also locked in a conflict, as their respective districts of Budaka and Mbale have disputed the border demarcation in the Namatala wetland since 2004. The conflict between the two districts was fuelled by the decision of the Uganda Land Commission (ULC)[153] to alter the boundary separating them, a process Budaka leaders have asked to be halted until an agreement has been reached on the controversial maps.[154]

Land conflicts in Acholi

As of February 2012, the majority of all civil and criminal cases filed with the police in Lamwo district were said to be land-related, while the majority of conflicts between clans over the past two years are also land-related.[9] In Pader district, there are about 20 cases of land disputes in each sub-county.[10] In Amuru districts there are violent land conflicts involving Lakang and Apaa local communities on one hand and the company Madhvani, the Uganda Wildlife Authority, Amuru district and Adjumani district local governments on the other.[11]

9 ACCS consultative workshop, Kitgum, 14 September 2012.

10 Participant, Pader District Local Government, oral presentation, 16 February 2012, Gulu.

11 For a comprehensive overview of land conflicts in Acholi see RLP, 'A Synopsis of Land Conflicts in Acholi Sub-Region, September 2012.

More recently an incident took place in Acholi sub-region in August 2012 when a confrontation between the locals of Apaa village in Amuru district and surveyors from the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development left many injured following police intervention. The scuffle broke out as surveyors carrying out a demarcation assessment south of Apaa village were allegedly placing the village within Adjumani district without adequate consultation with those affected. The dispute is ongoing and awaiting government mediation.[155] Land disputes in West

148 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

149 'Masindi IDPs sell land illegally', *The New Vision*, 13 April 2009, www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/16/677891, accessed 2012.

150 ACCS consultation workshop, Soroti, 19 September 2012.

151 The issue was raised in parliament in April 2012, when the MP for Moyo asked the Ministries for Land and Local Government to assist in resolving a dispute with Yumbe following the establishment of the latter as a new district. Parliament of Uganda: Hansard, 17 April 2012, www.parliament.go.ug/hansard/hans_view_date.jsp?dateYYYY=2012&dateMM=04&dateDD=17, accessed 2 October 2012.

152 'Napak and Katakwi Locals Fight Over Border', *The Monitor*, 4 February 2011.

153 The Uganda Land Commission (ULC) was established by the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. Article 238 (1) provides for the establishment of the ULC as an autonomous body and article 239 (1) describes its functions thus: "Uganda Land Commission shall hold and manage any land in Uganda vested in or acquired by the Government of Uganda in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and shall have other functions as may be prescribed by Parliament."

154 'Budaka boss blames border fights on land commission', *The Daily Monitor*, 21 December 2011.

155 *Ibid.*

Nile have also pitched local communities against their neighbours in other sub-regions, with conflicts reported in areas bordering Acholi districts such as Bibya at the Amuru-Adjumani border, Apaa and Elegu. In Adjumani district, 60 community leaders from Ofua sub-county stormed the district offices in September 2012 demanding the redrawing of their boundary with Iterekwa sub-county. The sub-counties are fighting for ownership of Mungula and Odu parishes.[156]

In the sub-region of Bukedi, land disputes were also described as "rampant" and identified as the "biggest threat to stability", with disputes over resource-rich wetlands and boundaries engaging other sub-regions (Elgon) and several districts within Bukedi sub-region (Budaka, Butaleja and Tororo).[157] The Namatala wetland is the main source of income for the majority of the population living around the two districts. The wetland has been at the centre of a border dispute between the Bagwere and Bagisu farmers since 2004, with 17 people killed on both sides of the sub-regional boundary as a result of incursions by both sides. The most serious was in January 2010 when more than 150 farmers from Kamonkoli sub-county in Budaka district raided the contested wetland and killed a farmer from Bungokho-Mutoto sub-county in Mbale district (Elgon sub-region). In response a group of Bagisu farmers armed with machetes crossed over into Bugwere and killed two people.[158] Attempts by the authorities to negotiate a boundary between the two sub-regions have failed to resolve the conflict.

The gazetting of fertile land in Karamoja

Approximately 54 percent of the land in Karamoja is reserved for wildlife conservation, 12 percent is forest reserves and 24.8 percent is earmarked for mineral exploration, leaving only 10 percent available for cultivation.[12] Competition over fertile land for grazing and agriculture has led to violent clashes between communities, and between communities and the authorities.[13] Community members perceive the gazetting of fertile land as a hostile act by the authorities to deprive them of their livelihoods, especially as much of the gazetted land is amongst the most fertile in the sub-region. District officials recognised that gazetting fertile land denies important sources of livelihoods to communities, particularly at a time when Karimojong are being encouraged to embrace 'agriculturalism' as a more sustainable way of life, noting that affected districts are in negotiations with the central government to de-gazette parts of the Karamoja 'green belt'.[14]

12 'Tenure in Mystery: Status of Land under Wildlife, Forestry and Mining Concessions in Karamoja Region', Associates Research Uganda with support from Trocaire Uganda and Oxfam GB, quoted in 'Uganda: Conflict Over Grazing Land in Karamoja', *Daily Monitor*, 9 February 2011.

13 *Ibid.*

14 *Ibid.*

Another frequent source of land conflicts is protected areas, such as national parks, which prevent or limit access to traditional sources of livelihoods for many communities. If a community finds itself residing inside the boundaries of a national park or natural reserve, agreements between the affected communities and the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) about controlled exploitation of resources are coupled with support initiatives whereby tourism revenues are reinvested in the communities. However, many communities have been cut off from sources of livelihoods by the establishment of national parks or natural reserves, or claim not to be receiving their share of the revenues, leading to conflicts with the UWA. The conflict between the UWA and residents of Apaa village, in Pabbo sub-county, Amuru district in Acholi, escalated in February 2012 when the UWA, under the guidance of Ministry of Tourism, commenced the eviction of approximately 6,000 people alleged to be living in the East Madi wildlife reserve. The residents claim that the contested area is customarily owned and has not been legally gazetted by the UWA. Statements from UWA officials indicated that part of Apaa was gazetted by parliament for a game reserve in 2002. Yet, research by ACCS found that the UWA

156 'Sub-counties clash', *Daily Monitor*, 26 September 2012.

157 ACCS consultative workshops, Tororo 24 September 2012.

158 'Three killed in Budaka wetland clashes', *Daily Monitor*, 20 November 2011, mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/-/691252/1275948/-/format/xhtml/-/qheowj/-/index.html, accessed 15 October 2012.

was unable to produce any legal documents to support its claim.[159] In Karamoja, the Pian-Upe game reserve in Moroto and Nakapiripirit districts has grown to incorporate large areas of land from which local communities have been displaced, leading to concerns about a lack of transparency and consultation with residents, as well as contestation over the legality of the land acquisition procedures.[160] Other areas that have been gazetted for protection include fertile land between Napak and Abim districts, where communities displaced after their land was gazetted are currently engaged in clashes with the UWA in an attempt to return to their former homes.[161] There are also increasingly violent confrontations between communities attempting to grow crops in gazetted land in Mt Elgon National Park and the UWA, despite agreements for controlled use of forest resources being in place.[162]

a.ii) Oil-related conflicts

"We are just custodians of the minerals and not owners because there is an invisible person in government who owns the minerals for us."
(Maj. Kakooza Mutale, presenting Bunyoro kingdom petition for a 12.5 percent share in oil revenue to parliament.[163])

The nascent oil industry in Uganda today poses a credible threat to stability in the Albertine Graben. In the oil-rich sub-regions of West Nile, Bunyoro, and Acholi disputes over the sale and/or misappropriation of land are rife, while conflicts between local communities on one hand and private investors and government on the other are widely reported.[164] The discovery of oil has sparked land scrambles as well as disputes over future revenue shares.[165] Unfulfilled expectations of employment opportunities and income by communities residing in oil-rich areas have fuelled tensions. An ACCS study surveying perceptions of communities residing in oil-rich areas of the Albertine Graben (including Bunyoro, Acholi, and West Nile) cited increased employment opportunities and income for 57.1 percent and 50.6 percent of respondents.[166] Even before the first barrel is extracted fears are growing that the region will see a return to violence if popular grievances surrounding the manner in which oil exploration has been managed are not addressed. The fear of popular resistance has led to an increase in the deployment of security forces and the proliferation of private security companies guarding oil infrastructure.[167]

The conflicts around oil, like all other resources in Uganda, are fuelled by the lack of trust in government and its institutions.[168] The oil project has thus far been shrouded in secrecy. There is frustration amongst communities about their alleged exclusion from employment in the exploration activities taking place in their communities, which some community leaders claim is a deliberate strategy to keep operations hidden from local scrutiny.[169] Against the backdrop of mistrust already existing between northerners and government institutions, oil exploration has only worsened existing cleavages.[170]

Community members consulted by ACCS stated that powerful and well-connected individuals within government have acquired land on or near oil exploration sites, putting them in a position to benefit from compensation when oil is discovered and

159 Refugee Law Project, 'Situation Brief – Border Or Ownership Question: The Apaa Land Dispute', Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity, 9 September 2012.
160 Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE), 'Government's Plan To DegazettePianUpe Game Reserve And Its Implications', 2005, www.acode-u.org/documents/InfosheetNo12005.pdf.
161 ACCS consultative workshop, Moroto, 28 September 2012.
162 *Ibid.*
163 See Ruti, Kiconcho, 'Bunyoro Kingdom demands for a share of oil resources', *Daily Monitor,* 1 June 2012.
164 *Ibid.*
165 See Matsiko, Haggai, 'Guns in Oil Region', *The Independent*, issue no. 219, 22-28 June 2012.
166 International Alert, *Governance and Livelihoods in Uganda's Oil-rich AlbertineGraben*, March 2013, p. 24.
167 See Haggai Matsiko, 'Guns in Oil Region', *op. cit.*
168 Mutaizibwe, Emma and Ssekika, Edward, 'Bunyoro angry with Museveni on oil sharing', *The Observer,* 21 June 2012.
169 ACCS consultation workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.
170 International Alert, 'Harnessing Oil for Peace and Development in Uganda', *Investing in Peace*, issue 2, September 2009.

Map 2: Status of licensing in the Albertine Graben of Uganda, August 2012



Source: Petroleum Exploration and Production Department, Ministry of Energy and Minerals.

exploited. Local political leaders have taken the role of 'gatekeepers' to oil-related opportunities and resources, while the community at large feels excluded from the process.[171] In Bunyoro sub-region, oil exploration activities in Bulisa, Masindi and Kiryandongo districts have led to complaints by local residents of unlawful evictions and inadequate compensation following land acquisition by private investors.[172] Community representatives consulted by ACCS spoke of land purchases before the oil discoveries were made public by individuals in Bulisa who obtained the land titles for very low prices. After the discovery of oil was made public the individuals, families or clans who had sold the land felt deceived and many are now claiming their land back.[173]

Also in Acholi, many land disputes are linked to the exploration for oil currently under way in three of its districts, namely Amuru, Nwoya and Lamwo.[174] There are

171 *Ibid.*

172 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Masindi, 10 September 2012.

173 *Ibid.*

174 Lamwo district leaders said "all the sub-counties in Lamwo have land-related disputes, with the highest number of cases in Paluga sub-county, Padibe West, PalabekOgili and Palabek Game, Lokung and MadiOpei." Presentation, chairman of LCV, Lamwo district, 16 February 2012, Gulu.

reports of land evictions, land grabbing and conflicts between local communities and government officials, as well as institutions leasing land without adequately consulting communities or seeking landowners' consent. For example, in Nwoya district almost 3,000 people faced eviction after an oil company was leased land by the government, a move that has caused widespread anger.[175] Community leaders report panic amongst local residents who fear losing their land, with people rushing to obtain land titles and growing cases of land grabbing and increasingly violent disputes.[176] Acholi cultural leaders are voicing their grievance at being excluded from the process and are mobilising the support of their communities to claim an equitable share of the oil revenues once extraction begins.[177]

Confrontations between local communities and oil companies have taken place over issues such as contested recruitment processes or delayed or insufficient compensation for land expropriation.[178] Community leaders cited grievances amongst residents affected by oil exploration activities in Bulisa (Bunyoro sub-region) who have not been adequately compensated, with a complaint about the issue having been lodged to the parliament.[179] In West Nile, oil exploration by a Ugandan company proved unsuccessful in Arua district, and this led to the shifting of activities to Moyo district. While communities in Arua complained of waste left at the exploration sites becoming a health hazard, residents in the new exploration sites of Moyo District have complained that the compensation rates offered to those displaced or affected by the exploration activities are too low.[180] Since exploration began in 2009 oil has also bred conflict between the districts of Yumbe and Arua over a border area suspected to contain oil deposits. Leaders from both districts claim that Ewanga (bordering Rigbo sub-county in Arua and Odravu sub-county in Yumbe) is within their district, hoping to benefit from the investment opportunities being offered by the oil exploration company.[181] In Nebbi, cultural leaders have demanded that an international oil company extracting oil in the district invest more substantially in community development,[182] while local residents expressed grievances about their alleged exclusion from employment and the secrecy surrounding the activities.[183] Despite investment in community development by oil companies, conflicts with local communities are on the rise, as noted by community leaders in the three oil-rich sub-regions of the North.[184]

Oil exploration also has an impact on the socio-economic landscape, with operations disrupting or damaging sources of livelihood. Development of an oil refinery is expected to displace over 30,000 people in the nine villages of Nyahaira, Kyapoloni, Bukona, Kabaketo, Nyamasoga, Rugashate, Katooke, Kijumba, and Kitegwa as well as part of Kaayera in Hoima district. Because of the lack of clear information about what is likely to happen, some people have abandoned growing both food and cash crops for fear of being evicted before the crops mature.[185] Moreover, an increased

175 'Thousands face eviction in Nwoya District after Government leases land to oil company', *The Acholi Times*, 6 August 2012.

176 RLP, *Shoot Us All Down: The Lakang and Apaa Land Conflict*, September 2011.

177 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Kitgum, 14 September 2012.

178 International Alert, 'Harnessing Oil for Peace and Development in Uganda', *op. cit.*

179 'Tullow Uganda assures Bulisa residents of compensation over oil well', WeInformers, 3 September 2011, www.weinformers.net/2011/09/03/tullow-uganda-assures-bulisa-residents-of-compensation-over-oil-well/, accessed 15 October 2012.

180 Neptune has responded to both allegations claiming that the remains at the former exploration sites are not waste. District officials stated that they await guidelines from the National Environmental Agency on how to safely dispose of the said waste, while noting that compensation rates are set by the government. 'NEMA Delays Neptune Oil Exploration in West Nile', Uganda Radio Network, 23 November 2011, ugandaradionetwork.com, accessed 15 October 2012; 'Abandoned Oil Exploration Waste Worries Arua Residents', Uganda Radio Network, 6 June 2012, ugandaradionetwork.com, accessed 10 October 2012.

181 'Arua and Yumbe Fight Over Area Suspected To Contain Oil Deposits', Uganda Radio Network, 23 January 2009, ugandaradionetwork.com, accessed 15 October 2012; 'Yumbe Leaders Petition Museveni over Border Dispute', Uganda Radio Network, 20 July 2012, ugandaradionetwork.com, accessed 15 October 2012.

182 The international company is Total. 'Nebbi cultural leaders express oil expectations', *The Daily Monitor*, 20 June 2012, mobile.monitor.co.ug/News, accessed 10 October 2012.

183 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Arua, 12 September 2012.

184 ACCS consultation workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

185 International Alert, *Governance and Livelihoods in Uganda's Oil-rich AlbertineGraben*, March 2013.

influx of labour migrants to oil-rich districts has fuelled tensions between locals and the newcomers, particularly if the latter are perceived as benefiting from oil-related activities.[186] Disparities between different districts or even households are heightened as some benefit more directly from oil-related investment, leading to resentment and conflict between communities. The way in which the sector has been managed from above and the insufficient consultation and collaboration between companies and local communities have undermined accountability and ownership of the exploration project, while fuelling mistrust and anger.[187]

There is palpable resentment amongst those sub-regions in the North that do not have oil, as news spreads of infrastructure investment to facilitate exploration travels to areas where infrastructure is in desperate need of repair. Sub-regions without oil perceive the oil-rich areas as receiving more attention and investment from government and private investors, while noting that the potential for local development following commercial exploitation of oil will leave behind sub-regions that do not have oil.[188] While traditional leaders from oil-rich sub-regions in western Uganda have come together to advocate for a greater share of oil revenue at sub-regional and district levels, the northern sub-regions which are also believed to have oil resources but are not yet part of the discussion remain divided and harbour strong feelings of marginalisation.

Oil exploration installations seen at Murchison Falls game park

Photos by Henry K. Komakech

The discovery of oil has had an impact on the economic, social and cultural dimensions of communities through changing their means of livelihood, including fishing, agriculture, livestock and hunting among others. Communities consulted by ACCS perceived increased restrictions on access to firewood, fishing activities, wild game and access to cultural sites, which constitute important sources of livelihood for them. This concern was particularly strong in Acholi and Bunyoro regions, where oil exploration activities are more intense. Increased restrictions on collecting firewood would have a significant impact given that firewood is a source of fuel for cooking, while reported restrictions on fishing are likely to affect income and livelihoods negatively and may infringe on communities' right to employment and meaningful livelihoods. Overall, though the community members were optimistic that oil production would contribute positively to increased employment opportunities, some were sceptical about the benefits that would accrue from oil because their youth and children are likely to be employed largely in casual jobs due to a lack of qualifications.[189]

a.iii) Forest-related conflicts

Like land and oil, the mismanagement of forest resources by government and private investors is pitching them against communities in escalating conflicts across the

186 See Matsiko, Haggai, 'Living in Fear of Oil Waste: Expectations of Oil Cash Give Way to Anxiety as Oil Waste Regulations Delay', *The Independent*, issue no. 218, 15–21 June 2012.
187 International Alert, 'Harnessing Oil for Peace and Development in Uganda', *Investing in Peace*, issue 2, September 2009.
188 ACCS consultation workshops in northern Uganda, 10–29 September 2012.
189 International Alert, *Governance and Livelihoods in Uganda's Oil-Rich AlbertineGraben*, *op. cit.*

North. Community leaders consulted by ACCS described forest-related conflicts as being on the rise.[190] The allocation of forest land for commercial exploitation has brought local communities into conflict with the NFA over the lack of consultation and participation in a process that has a significant impact on their livelihoods.[191] Tension over access to and use of the Lendu Forest Reserve in Nebbi district (West Nile sub-region) has also seen skirmishes between locals and commercial timber companies, where some areas have been cleared of trees without licences being acquired, angering residents.[192] In Zombo district, also in West Nile, the local community has accused the NFA of mismanaging and degrading the Lendu Forest Reserve. The tensions have occasionally flared into violent clashes, with authorities evicting local people who in turn set ablaze portions of the forest reserve.[193]

Often a lack of direct dialogue between commercial investors and local communities sparks the dispute, with negative perceptions amongst residents of any attempt by outside investors to establish legitimate enterprises in their areas driving the conflict. Participants shared the prevalent perception of "investors being synonymous with land grabbing".[194] Conflicts over illegal cutting of timber have escalated and confrontations between local communities and private contractors have been reported in Elgon sub-region. Communities fear the depletion of natural resources traditionally enjoyed by their communities, and there are allegations of corruption and collusion by district officials.[195]

Meanwhile, encroachment on protected forests by local communities also leads to conflicts with the NFA. More than 1000 people who have been cultivating in Omier Central Forest Reserve (CFR) in Nebbi district (West Nile sub-region) were given a four-month ultimatum in September 2012 to vacate the forest land or be forcefully evicted. The move has drawn protests from both residents and Alur kingdom officials, who claim to have given the land to the encroachers in 2006 when they began to cultivate it. The UWA is also currently engaged in several disputes in the North, and encroachers are dealt with harshly. In May 2012, for example, UWA game rangers led by a team of soldiers and police destroyed crops and demolished houses of alleged encroachers in East Madi Game Reserve in Amuru district (Acholi sub-region).[196] In July 2012 a group of disarmed former combatants in Nakayot and Napetolim villages in Lorengecora sub-county, Napak district (Karamoja sub-region), protested against possible eviction by the UWA. All the parties are claiming ownership of the land on which the government resettled former combatants, which is part of Karamoja's green belt.[197]

a.iv) Minerals-related conflicts

"Our limestone is ferried from here, taken to Tororo, used to make cement and the cement is called Tororo cement."
(Karamoja community representative, Transitional Justice Audit, Nakapiripirit, 3–8 October 2011)

Northern Uganda boasts large deposits of valuable stones and minerals like gold, limestone, copper, tantalum, tin and phosphate.[198] Although the 1995 constitution places all minerals under the custody of the government, the 2003 Mining Act prescribes that "revenue shall be shared amongst the central government, the local government and the lawful occupants of the land" (section 98.2) and that districts

190 *Ibid.*
191 *Ibid.*
192 G. Tenywa'Report reveals dubious deals by NFA', *New Vision*, 31 October 2009.
193 *Ibid.*
194 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10–29 September 2012.
195 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Mbale, 21 September 2012.
196 'Kamuntu to mediate in Amuru UWA land conflict', Uganda Radio Network, ugandaradionetwork.com, accessed 5 October 2012.
197 'Napak Residents Threaten to Strip Naked Over Evictions By UWA', Uganda Radio Network, 13 April 2012, ugandaradionetwork.com, accessed 5 October 2012.
198 Newman, Harold R., 'The Mineral Industry of Uganda', USGS 2008 Minerals Yearbook: Uganda.

are responsible for receiving and forwarding applications for various mineral rights, arbitrating compensation, resolution of disputes and granting of licences.

Map 3: Mineral resources in Uganda

Source: Uganda Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, 2012

In 2008, the government gazetted customary land in the areas of Mawero, Akipenet, Alupe and Aguriat in Busia district (Bukedi sub-region) and allocated it to a South African mining company, evicting over 6,000 residents who had to mobilise to obtain adequate compensation.[15] Communities consulted by ACCS have cited frustration amongst residents at not benefiting from the exploitation of the resources to be found in their land.[16]

15 'Busia Residents Demand Compensation for Land Lost to Gold Mine', Uganda Radio Network, 20 June 2008, ugandaradionetwork.com, accessed 4 October 2012.

16 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Masindi, 10 September 2012.

While most of these valuable minerals remain underexploited, the potential wealth derived from extracting minerals has already sparked tensions in mineral-rich regions in the North. In 2009 the government concluded a World Bank-funded airborne geophysical study of over 80 percent of the country's landmass to map mineral deposits.[199] Due to ongoing security concerns, the survey did not include the Karamoja sub-region.[200] Communities consulted noted that this has fuelled uncertainty and reinforced perceptions of exclusion amongst local communities, generating disputes as investors move into the area for tentative exploration operations.[201] Reports of licences being awarded to companies away from public scrutiny and of companies operating fraudulently with expired exploration licences and failing to comply with their obligations towards the local community are fuelling resentment.[202]

The sale of communal land to private investors in mineral-rich areas, for example in Moroto district of Karamoja, is also on the rise, and increasingly fuelling conflicts amongst community members and between communities and local government officials and investors. Participants described residents' fear of having their land taken by investors and the government, with reports of "secret surveys" being carried out on their land. They noted that investors showed up to begin mining exploration activities without previous knowledge of the local residents, which fuels resentment and mistrust.[203]

The Karamoja region is believed to have Uganda's largest deposits of valuable minerals such as gold and limestone and has the potential to become the "next frontier of mineral exploitation after oil in the Albertine region".[204] According to an August

199 Department of Geological Survey and Mines, 'Uganda: Mineral Sector for National Economic Development', www.uganda-mining.go.ug/dgsm-flyer-low-res.pdf.

200 As of mid-2011, according to officials at the Department for Geological Survey and Mines, plans had been drawn up to extend the survey to Karamoja, but funding for this extension remained absent.

201 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Moroto, 28 September 2012.

202 'Secret gold mining sparks conflict fears in Karamoja', *The Observer*, 27 May 2012, observer.ug, accessed 7 October 2012.

203 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Moroto, 28 September 2012.

204 Mutaizibwa, Emma, 'Secret gold mining sparks conflict fears in Karamoja', *The Observer*, 27 May 2012, observer.ug, accessed 7 October 2012.

2011 compilation by the Department of Geological Survey and Mines, the potential gold reserves are significant. Karamoja is also endowed with other minerals like limestone, uranium, marble, graphite, gypsum, iron, wolfram, nickel, copper, cobalt, lithium, tin, base metals, lead and talc.[205] In a presentation to the Karamoja Working Group in February 2013, the Ecological Christian Organisation (ECO) estimated the contribution of mineral income from Karamoja to the local economy to be 27.4 billion shillings.[206] Around a quarter of Karamoja land is earmarked for mineral exploration and mining concessions are being awarded to private companies while communities are denied access to vital sources of livelihoods. Community leaders report that private companies are taking advantage of ignorance, poverty and illiteracy to stealthily acquire land with mineral potential in the region.[207] Karamoja parliamentarians have accused officials in the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development of giving out land and mining licences to investors without adequate involvement of district authorities or knowledge of the local people who communally own the land, warning of the likelihood of violence by local people wishing to take their land back.[208]

As new mineral-rich areas are found in the North, conflicts are already flaring up between districts, investors and local landowners.[209] For example, community leaders in Bukedi noted escalating disputes between investors and local communities over suspected minerals deposits like phosphates, lime, and gold. Communities expressed expectations that mining companies would create jobs and invest in community development, though often the opposite has been the case, with the authorities and private investors expelling goldsmiths from the mines, a crucial source of livelihoods for local communities.[210] Community leaders consulted by ACCS noted that landowners often wrongly believe that minerals found on their property belong to them, and thus when the authorities grant licences, landowners believe they are being defrauded. A lack of transparency and public information about such transactions fuels anger amongst communities. For example, in June 2012 two investors were attacked by a mob as they attempted to off-load equipment for gold mining in Rupa sub-county, Moroto district (Karamoja sub-region).[211] The licensing of mineral exploration without adequate community involvement will continue to drive conflict in many parts of the region and escalate as more mineral sites are identified and licensed for exploitation.

b) Youth exclusion

The increasing feelings of hopelessness amongst youth arising from poverty, unemployment, low educational attainment and poor governance constitute part of a global pattern in areas of armed conflict.[212] A DFID-commissioned study found significant links between youth exclusion and violence in fragile states. Most of the factors underlying youth exclusion in the study are found in Uganda, including "unemployment and lack of opportunities; unequal and inappropriate education; poor governance and weak political participation; gender inequalities and socialisation; and a legacy of past violence."[213] The legacy of violence is particularly relevant in the North. The study warns that "structural factors alone are insufficient to explain youth violence", and that other factors like "recruitment, coercion

205 *Ibid.*

206 The Karamoja Working Group brings together donors and NGOs; meeting held at the Irish Embassy in Kampala, on 27 February 2013.

207 'Tenure in Mystery: Status of Land under Wildlife, Forestry and Mining Concessions in Karamoja Region', Associates Research Uganda with support from Trocaire Uganda and Oxfam GB, quoted in 'Uganda: Conflict Over Grazing Land in Karamoja', *Daily Monitor*, 9 February 2011.

208 The leader of the Karamoja Parliamentary Group, Fr. Simon Lokudu, in *ibid*.

209 RLP, *Land for Every Ugandan: A Synopsis of Land Conflicts in Acholi Sub-region*, 2012.

210 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Masindi, 10 September 2012.

211 See Ariong, Steven, 'Investors barred from putting up gold mining plant', *Daily Monitor*, 30 June 2012.

212 Amarasuriya, Harini, Gündüz, Canan and Mayer, Markus, *Rethinking the nexus between youth, unemployment and conflict: Perspectives from Sri Lanka* (London: International Alert, 2009).

213 Hilker, L. M. and Fraser E. M., *Youth Exclusion, Violence, Conflict and Fragile States*, report prepared for DFID by Social Development Direct, www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/CON66.pdf.

and indoctrination, identity politics and ideology, leadership and organisational dynamics and trigger events" are also relevant.[214] As is the case with other conflict drivers identified in this report, youth exclusion has the potential to ignite conflict in the North due to the specific legacies and grievances amongst youth in the region.

The Youth Venture Capital Fund

The 2012 Uganda-wide Youth Venture Capital Fund launched by the Ministry of Finance in partnership with DFCU Bank, Stanbic Bank and Centenary Bank has made available a venture capital fund of 25 billion shillings to support the "growth of viable and sustainable small and medium enterprises by the youth in the private sector" through loans and mentoring services from the participating banks.[17] However, delays in disbursement of funds and lack of clarity about criteria have led to protests by angry youth whose expectations had been raised by the initiative. District officials in the North raised concerns about the potential for social unrest if such initiatives were not handled carefully, with a risk of perceptions of exclusion and marginalisation being reinforced. In Gulu, district officials noted frustration amongst youth who were unable to access the fund and did not understand why the criteria were not clear,[18] while in Teso, community leaders expressed concern at the anger generated amongst youth who were also unable to access the funds and were claiming that "their money is being embezzled by banks."[19]

17 Ministry of Finance, Planning and Development, Youth Venture Capital Fund, 2012, www.finance.go.ug/index.php/component/content/article/8-in-the-press/112-the-youth-venture-capital-fund.html.

18 'Gulu Speaker Urges Uganda Youth to Demand for a Full Ministry', *The Acholi Times*, 23 July 2012, www.acholitimes.com, accessed 22 October 2012.

19 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Soroti, 19 September 2011.

Youth unemployment in Uganda is not a uniquely post-conflict phenomenon. The 2009/2010 Uganda National Household Survey revealed that the general proportion of youth unemployment rose from 44 percent in 2005/2006 to 48 percent in 2009/2010.[215] The high population growth rate poses a challenge to the country, with young people constituting almost 78 percent of 34 million Ugandans.[216] The issue of youth unemployment poses particular political, economic and social challenges to peacebuilding in northern Uganda, where thousands of young people have returned from displacement to a shattered socio-economic environment.[217] Over 80 percent of youth in northern Uganda are unemployed or unemployable in the formal sector due to low qualification levels.[218] Many have military experience, having been either abducted by the LRA or recruited into local militias by the government. Youth in the post-conflict environment of northern Uganda have very limited access to and control over key assets, including land and physical and human capital. Many are poorly educated and depend for their livelihoods on low-productivity subsistence agriculture and the informal sector, where returns on labour and capital are generally low. A 2012 UNICEF report highlighted the challenges facing Ugandan youth, including the specific issue of alcohol abuse amongst disenfranchised youth. Children, youth and women interviewed in the Acholi sub-region repeatedly referred to this as a major source of conflict at the community level.[219]

Although important reforms to promote vocational and technical skills have been initiated in both the formal and informal sectors by the government and development partners, their impact has been limited. The Northern Uganda Youth Development Centre (NUYDC) and its associated Vocational Training Institutes (VTIs) still face many challenges relating to how many young people they can reach, the quality of the training they can provide, and the extent to which this training is recognised as a valid qualification by prospective employers.[220] A 2012 study indicated that the labour

214 *Ibid.*

215 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Uganda National Household Survey 2009/2010,Socio-Economic Module.

216 Esuruku, Robert Senath, 'Conceptualising Youth Identity and National Unity in Uganda',unpublished paper, 2013.

217 UNDP, *Returning to Uncertainty? Addressing Vulnerabilities in Northern Uganda*, livelihood study, www.fafo.no/nyhet/return2uncertanity.pdf.

218 International Youth Fund, *Navigating Challenges, Building Hope: A Cross-Sector Situational Analysis on Youth in Uganda*, Youth Map Uganda, uganda.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/YouthMap Uganda Exec Version.pdf.

219 Knutzen, A. and Smith, A., 'UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme; Uganda Conflict Analysis', October 2012, p. 45.

220 Saferworld, Perception Survey of Northern Uganda Youth Development Centre, 2012.

market in northern Uganda is characterised by a mismatch between labour skills on offer and the skills needed by employers. Young women are more affected by adverse labour market conditions than young men because they face distinct constraints such as early marriages and/or pregnancies, and having to juggle domestic and work responsibilities.[221] Moreover, training offered to youth in vocational skills such as carpentry, tailoring or mechanics is often not based on sound market analysis, with little demand for the relatively large workforce qualified in these fields.[222]

Youth and socio-economic opportunities[20]

- ACCS research documenting youth perceptions of socio-economic opportunities in the sub-regions of Acholi and Lango in 2011 noted a deep sense of hopelessness and frustration about a lack of opportunities to lift youth and their communities out of poverty.
- Youth acknowledged the value of vocational centres offering training skills in tailoring, carpentry and mechanics in the region, but poor coordination among agencies providing these services and a failure to link them to adequate labour market analysis has led to a large supply of skilled labour in these fields for which there is little demand. One respondent noted that "we go for training in certain skills thinking that we will get jobs. When we complete, then we realise there are too many of us who have the same training and the work is not there for all of us."
- The research revealed a lack of community support for youth, with many attributing insecurity to the disenfranchisement of youth, which contributes to inter-generational conflict.

20 International Alert, *Youth perceptions on economic opportunity in Northern Uganda, Findings from Acholi and Lango*, 2012.

Many youths have returned to their communities and found that their status as returnees, former abductees or ex-combatants has a negative impact on their ability to integrate in their communities. For example, a study of youth perceptions in Acholi and Lango showed that the status of over 87 percent of respondents in the above categories was known to their neighbours, and that in many cases this had resulted in their stigmatisation and scapegoating for crime and breaches of community peace.[223] Many youths noted perceptions in their communities that ex-combatants are involved in crime, an accusation that they claim is unjust.[224] Communities consulted by ACCS reported that most jobless ex-combatants are frustrated, with one youth claiming that they were "better off as rebels than in their current state."[225] Already there are calls for young ex-combatants who were previously denied land to defend Acholi communities from land grabbing.[226] In Bukedi, community representatives expressed concerns about a generation of "disenfranchised youth, many former combatants, with high illiteracy rates, and no hope for a future, turning to crime and anti-social behaviour." This drives conflict by increasing insecurity in communities.[227] Following the disarmament campaigns in Karamoja, the promise of increased development has not been delivered, causing mistrust and hostility towards the state.[228] The hopelessness, fear, and frustrations felt by many young Karimojong are incentives to acquire weapons to protect themselves and could fuel the motivation for revenge attacks, which may lead to an escalation of conflict.[229]

c) Creation of new districts and poor local governance

The creation of new districts coupled with the related failure to deliver adequate services was mentioned as a prominent conflict driver breeding frustration and resentment

221 International Alert, *Post-war economic opportunities in northern Uganda: Implications for women's empowerment and political participation*, September 2012.

222 International Alert, *Youth perceptions on economic opportunities in northern Uganda: Findings from Acholi and Lango*, 2012.

223 International Alert, *Youth perceptions on economic opportunities in northern Uganda: Findings from Acholi and Lango*, 2012.

224 *Ibid.*

225 *Ibid.*

226 IOM et al., *Land or Else: Land-Based Conflict, Vulnerability, and Disintegration in Northern Uganda* (Kampala: IOM, UNDP and NRC, 2010).

227 *Ibid.*

228 *Ibid.*

229 Saferworld, 'Tracking key conflict and security dynamics in Karamoja – an update', May 2012, www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Uganda%20PPP%20report.pdf.

amongst communities. The number of districts in Uganda has seen a drastic increase, from 34 in 1991 to 132 in 2012. Article 179 of the 1995 constitution permits the creation of new districts based on "effective administration and the need to bring services closer to the people." Community members noted that the establishment of so many new districts "has more to do with ensuring and rewarding political loyalty, and less to do with improving service delivery."[230] While the rationale behind the establishment of many new districts includes improving service delivery and more effective resolution of ethnic conflicts, the majority of community representatives consulted asserted that neither objective has been achieved. They argue that the opposite has been the case, with over-stretched resources hampering service delivery by the new offices and the establishment of ethnic-based districts exacerbating inter-ethnic tensions.[231] The views expressed by community representatives contrast somewhat with the findings of a recent assessment by the Ministry of Local Government.

In the PRDP region alone, the number of districts has increased from 25 to the current 56 as indicated in the table below:

Table 3: Increase of districts

Region	Original number of districts	Total number as of 2012
West Nile	5	8
Acholi	3	7
Lango	2	8
Bunyoro	1	3
Karamoja	5	7
Teso	3	8
Bukedi	3	6
Elgon	3	9
Total	25	56

The 2011 Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Government[232] showed that out of a total of 21 districts established since 2010,[233] 10 were rewarded for a comparatively good performance, six were penalised for failing to meet minimum standards, and three remained at the same level as the previous assessment.[234] Out of the 21 new districts covered by the 2011 assessment, nine are in the North: four were penalised (Napak in Karamoja sub-region, Kibuku in Bukedi, Kole in Lango, and Bulambuli in Elgon), two rewarded (Nwoya in Acholi, Serere in Teso), while three remained unchanged since the previous assessment (Ngora in Teso, Kiryandongo in Bunyoro, Alebtong in Lango).[235] The picture both in Uganda as a whole and in the North in terms of the performance of new districts is therefore varied, with some new districts performing better than others. However, the striking trend is that out of 15 districts in the whole country penalised for not having met the minimum conditions of service provision and functionality, 12 are

230 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Arua, 12 September 2012.

231 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

232 The report measured the performance of districts in a number of sectors, including the quality of the development plan, staff functional capacity, communication and accountability, budget allocation, procurement capacity, local revenue, gender and HIV/AIDS mainstreaming, and functionality of departments and directorates.

233 Mitooma, Rubirizi, Bushenyi, Ngora, Napak, Kibuku, Nwoya, Kole, Kalungu, Bukomansimbi, Lwengo, Namayingo, Luuka, Kiryadongo, Ntoroko, Serere, Alebtong, Gomba, Buvuma, Butambala and Bulambuti.

234 Ministry of Local Government, Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Governments 2011, Final Synthesis Report 2012, www.molg.go.ug/publications/271-annual-assessment-of-minimum-conditions-and-performance-measures-for-local-governments-2011.

235 *Ibid.*

in the North.[236] This may account for the general frustration about service delivery, which the creation of new districts is failing to effectively address.

However, specific challenges faced by newly established districts are having an impact on service delivery. Across the North new districts continue to depend on 'parent' districts for technical capacity and financial services. A number of civil servants from the parent districts are posted to support the start-up processes and ensure that the new districts' status is improved and relevant plans and programmes are set up. Existing staff in the sub-counties that form the new districts remain, while departmental heads are transferred from the parent districts. Moreover, in some cases the creation of new districts simply means that the existing officials now have to provide additional services in the new districts that have been created.[237] The Ministry of Public Service only approves recruitment for what they consider 'critical positions' as defined by the district; when newly created posts remain vacant, the performance of both parent and new districts suffers.[238] In certain districts, civil society organisations and politicians are relied upon to implement activities within the district departments.[239]

The new districts lack financial autonomy and human and technical capacity to deliver services and constitute a huge strain on the government budget due to their high administrative cost.[240] For example, communities consulted by ACCS in Bunyoro[241] noted that residents initially welcomed the idea of creating new smaller districts to "bring services close to the people, but the failure to deliver services has brought resentment."[242] They expressed their disappointment and wished that existing districts had been given additional resources instead of creating new ones which further depleted their capacity. The gap in service provision is increasing social tensions and resentment, with community representatives consulted for this research voicing allegations of corruption, patronage and deliberate exclusion from access to services and participation. Moreover, in some sub-regions tensions are growing due to resentment on the part of some community leaders whose expectations of employment in the new districts were disappointed.[243]

The creation of many new districts has also resulted in disputes between new and parent districts over boundaries and revenue. Most of the new districts were delineated with unclear borders. This is breeding tensions between communities at the sub-region, district and sub-county levels as they compete for limited resources.[244] Examples of boundary disputes exist throughout Acholi sub-region. Agago district is involved in a boundary dispute with the authorities of Abim district, accusing the latter of conspiring to extend its boundaries into Agago by 3 km. Disputes also exist between Nwoya and Adjumani over Apaa; and between Gulu, Adjumani and Amuru over Elegu, Lamwo and Kitgum respectively. Some boundary disputes have taken on ethnic dimensions, such as the Acholi-Jonam dispute over Te-Got Apwoyo portion in Nwoya.[245]

The often tribal or ethnic character of the new administrative units has also served to divide northern Ugandans further and entrench patronage. As in other sub-

236 Amuru (Acholi Sub-region), Napak (Karamoja), Kole, Oyam and Otuke (Lango), Katakwi, Soroti, Kaberamaido and Amuria (Teso), Kibuku (Bukedi), Kapchorwa and Bulambuli (Elgon).

237 Saferworld meeting with the Lira Technical Planning Committee, 20 Oct 2011.

238 Saferworld discussions with Gulu District Local Government Principal Personnel Officer on local government conflict-sensitivity capacity building.

239 Refugee Law Project, 'Breeding Fragmentation, Beyond Juba Project', Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity, Briefing Paper no.1, 2009; and Saferworld, Meeting with Gulu District Resource Pool, 2012.

240 'Would more ministers speak!',*Saturday Vision*, 1 September 2012.

241 Bulisa and Kiryandongo were carved out of Masindi district in 2006 and 2010 respectively.

242 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Masindi, 10 September 2012.

243 *Ibid.*

244 Refugee Law Project, 'Breeding Fragmentation, Beyond Juba Project', Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity, Briefing Paper no.1 2009; and RLP, *Land for Every Ugandan: A Synopsis of Land Conflicts in Acholi Sub-Region*, September 2012.

245 RLP, *Land for Every Ugandan*, *op. cit.*

regions, community representatives in Acholi noted the perception amongst their constituents that new districts[246] had been created to reward political loyalty or along ethnic lines, and that they had failed to deliver services.[247] Participants noted conflicts emerging between some of the new districts and their parent districts over staff allocation, resource sharing and boundaries, particularly between the parent districts of Gulu and Kitgum and their respective offshoots Amuru and Lamwo. Lamwo district is embroiled in land disputes instead of addressing the emerging health calamity of nodding disease,[248] while Amuru suffers from an absentee workforce, leading to tensions between the district officials and their constituents who have difficulties in accessing services.[249] The creation of new districts is also a significant conflict driver in the West Nile sub-region, where Koboko (2005), Maracha (2006) and Yumbe (2006) were carved out of Arua, while Zombo (2009) was split from Nebbi district. Communities consulted by ACCS noted growing fragmentation and division along tribal and party lines as a result.[250]

The establishment of new districts has also led to discontent amongst Lango residents, as they are perceived as rewarding political support for the government and have failed to provide services. In Lango sub-region, Oyam (2006) and Kole (2010) were carved out of Apac district, while Lira District was split to create Amolatar and Dokolo (2005), Otuke (2009), and Alebtong (2010). Communities in the new districts complain of wrangles between the different branches of local government, and as is the case in Acholi, this has "diverted attention from crucial service delivery while communities have lost trust in government." Participants noted that local governance is marred by allegations of corruption and political wrangles between the civil service and legislative branches of districts.[251]

Participants viewed the establishment of new districts in the Teso sub-region[252] as having "set local people against each other",[253] while in Elgon sub-region[254] decentralisation has given rise to tensions between clans and cultural leaders as new cultural institutions and leaders have been established in new districts after breaking away.[255] In the sub-region of Bukedi,[256] communities consulted spoke of how this fragmentation along ethnic lines has fuelled tribal tensions, as members of minority communities in the newly created districts complain of being marginalised and excluded from public sector jobs.[257] Moreover, it has driven communities to lobby for further districts to be established as they seek to gain political and administrative control over their land. Participants noted the growing perception that decentralisation is not about "bringing services closer to the people, but an opportunity to gain power at the local level."[258]

246 Amuru was split away from Gulu in 2006, while Nwoya was carved out of Amuru in 2010. Pader (2001), Lamwo (2009) and Nwoya (2010) were split from Kitgum, and Agago was carved out of Pader in 2010.

247 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10–29 September 2012.

248 Odong, Jackson, 'Land Conflicts are a Threat to Stability in the Northern Area', *The Observer*, 21 June 2012, www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19402:land-conflicts-are-a-threat-to-stability-in-the-northern-area&catid=37:guest-writers&Itemid=66.

249 'Refugee Law Project, 'Breeding Fragmentation, Beyond Juba Project', Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity, Briefing Paper no.1, 2009.

250 *Ibid.*

251 *Ibid.*

252 The new districts of Bukedea (2007) and Ngora (2010) were established out of Kumi, while Amuria (2005) and Serere (2010) were carved out of Katakwi and Soroti respectively.

253 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Soroti, 19 September 2012.

254 Mbale district gave way to Sironko (2000), and Bulambuli was split from Sironko in 2009. Bududa (2006) was carved out of Manafwa, while Kapchorwa was split to form Bukwo (2005) and Kween (2010).

255 Community representatives, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Mbale, 21 September 2012.This refers to the mounting tension in Bugisu kingdom (comprising Mbale, Manafwa, Sironko, Bududa and Bulambuli districts) over the creation of a parallel cultural institution, the Ibudduda cultural kingdom, based in the district of Bududa which broke away from Manafwa district in 2006. 'Bugisu Cultural Dispute Deepens', Uganda Radio Network, ugandaradionetwork.com, 10 September 2012.

256 The districts of Busia, Butaleja and Budaka were split from Tororo and Pallisa respectively in 2005.

257 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops in Northern Uganda, Tororo, 24 September.

258 *Ibid.*

The government was in the process of approving a further 20 districts[259] in 2012, which would have raised the number of local administrative units from 112 to 132.[260] However, critics including MPs and the Minister of Finance managed to convince the government to temporarily halt their establishment, noting that the resources invested in establishing and running the new offices would divert crucial funds from service provision across the country.[261]

d) Inadequate post-conflict truth, reconciliation and transitional justice processes[262]

"Why is it that lawyers did not demand some truth telling before amnesty was granted?... People's stories need to be heard ... In our traditional justice victims and perpetrators come together, there is acknowledgment, confession, compensation and reconciliation. People need closure."

(Community representative, Soroti, 19 September 2012)

The lack of a comprehensive transitional justice process to repair the relationship between the people of northern Uganda and the state was identified as a key driver of conflict in the northern sub-regions. Whereas the lack of such a comprehensive process at national level has undermined state-building efforts, the same gap has left communities across the North with deep-seated grievances against one another that continue to drive conflicts today. The impact on civilians of military and counter-insurgency operations in the North during the LRA and other insurgencies were enormous, and though efforts are being made to reconstruct infrastructure, services, institutions and livelihoods, no tools or resources have been allocated to comprehensively deal with the past. Respondents throughout the region pointed to wartime atrocities committed by some ethnic groups mobilised during the conflicts. For example, community members talked of an Acholi stigma arising from their responsibility for past violence, and provided similar explanations for why the Karimojong are struggling to move beyond the 'cattle raider' label.[263] This enduring collective attribution of responsibility is manifest in the competitive and often conflictual relationships between sub-regions, districts and even sub-counties over resources or boundaries. Across all the PRDP sub-regions, even though armed violence has ceased, ex-combatants, victims and their communities continue to battle with physical and psychosocial ailments that hamper their participation in the recovery process.

The African Youth Initiative Network (AYINET), an NGO providing support for victims of the LRA conflict based in Lira, has documented scores of survivors living with untreated injuries and unable to access medical and psychosocial support. Between July and December 2011 AYINET screened over 574 victims from a total of 31 sub-counties across the six districts of Agago, Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum, Lamwo and Pader in the Acholi sub-region of northern Uganda, with some victims presenting multiple complications.[21] As part of the UN-PBF project, AYINET has facilitated medical treatment for 574 of the adults and children screened, with 85 of the victims (14.8 percent) still awaiting further assistance but with no funding. Their anger at delays in awarding restoration and compensation for losses of both movable and immovable property resulting from war (including, crucially, cattle) threatens stability and the prospects of sustainable peace in the region.[22]

21 See AYINET, *Surgery, Medical and Psychosocial Rehabilitation for Victims of War*, UN Peacebuilding Fund, 2012.

22 See *Untreated Wounds*, RLP video, 2012..

259 The new districts are: Bunyangabu, Butebo, Bugweri, Kagadi, Kakuuto, Kakumiro, Kapelebyong, Kasanda, Kazo, Kilak, Kitagwenda, Kyadondo, Kyotera, Nabilatuk, Namisindwa, Omoro, Pakwach, Rubanda, Rukiga and Rwampara.

260 'Cabinet approves 20 new districts', *The Observer*, 1 July 2012, www.observer.ug.

261 'Museveni tired of new Districts', *The Observer*, 11 March 2013, www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=24134Itemid=114.

262 Chapter 1 examined the Amnesty Act 2000 and the broader process of justice at the national level; this section looks at the impact of a lack of a comprehensive transitional justice process on prospects of reconciliation between communities in the North.

263 Community representative, West Nile sub-region, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Arua, 12 September 2012.

Efforts by the government and development partners to assist war-torn communities in the North to heal have been insufficient. The PRDP I, even though lacking in the healing component, got stolen along the way by officials within the OPM. The designing of the transitional justice framework has largely been centralised within the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS), with limited contributions from other stakeholders including critical line ministries (like Health, Gender and Education), civil society and local communities. The result has been the prioritisation of formal punitive justice processes – which to date have had limited impact on promoting peace and reconciliation amongst communities in the North.[264] Coordination between the relevant government departments, which is critical for a successful transitional justice process, also appears to be lacking.[265] Civil society organisations working on transitional justice issues remain weak and isolated, without the capacity to access funding, influence government processes and shape the discourse locally or nationally.

Although an assessment of PRDP I found that more efforts needed to be focused on the strategic objective of building peace and reconciling communities in the North, the total budgetary contributions for PRDP II allocated to this objective were reduced from $17.5m to $12.5m. Out of four objectives, the one which includes peacebuilding and reconciliation activities received only 3 percent of the total budget, while the other 97 percent went to the other three objectives.[266] As such, PRDP II remains as much of a three-legged table as PRDP I. Furthermore, PRDP II proposes that off-budget donor project activities rather than core government grants should provide support to traditional and transitional justice processes. While some types of interventions are perhaps best undertaken by non-government actors, giving no responsibility to the government for interventions under this objective could send a message to affected communities that the government does not want to take responsibility for this work, and could create problems of institutional leadership and coordination if it has no 'institutional home' within government.[267]

Though the implementation of the 2000 Amnesty Act did facilitate an end to hostilities, and in some cases enabled communities to take forward their own local reconciliation processes, it has not supported a broader process of reconciliation and reparations. The manner in which the amnesty was implemented was cited as a significant conflict driver in some communities. Representatives noted that it has also fuelled conflicts at the local level by failing to adequately compensate and integrate former combatants, while neglecting the needs of victims.[268] A report by UN OHCHR and UN Women in Uganda[269] accused the Amnesty Act of interfering with victims' right to an effective remedy, including reparations as well as the right to truth, hampering prospects for reconciliation. The UN argues that by stipulating that no form of punishment can be imposed by the state against reporters, it prevents victims from seeking a civil remedy for acts committed against them. Moreover, the Act compromises the victims' right to truth since it does not impose any requirements on the reporters for full disclosure on their participation in the conflict.[270] This view was supported by few community representatives, who lamented the lack of a truth and reconciliation process to support the amnesty granted to ex-combatants. However, this research also found widespread recognition of the role of the Amnesty Act as a peacebuilding and reintegration tool which is

264 The most visible achievements have been the enactment of the ICC Act and the creation of the International Crimes Division, which is yet to have a successful trial.

265 The lack of coordination was brought up during the Kwoyelo trial and the Amnesty discussions.

266 Office of the Prime Minister, 'Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) Phase II, July 2012-June 2015', November 2011.

267 Saferworld/NGO Forum: CSO Memorandum Presented to the PRDP Monitoring Committee, June 2012.

268 Refugee Law Project, *Whose Justice? Perceptions Of Uganda's Amnesty Act 2000: The Potential For Conflict Resolution And Long-Term Reconciliation*, Working Paper no. 15, February 2005.

269 'UN Position on Uganda's Amnesty Act', UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in collaboration with UN Women, May 2012, footnote to p. 3.

270 *Ibid.*

still needed to bring an end to the currently 'displaced' LRA conflict, and to build confidence across the North.[271] As a result the Act was fully reinstated on May 24th following a civil society petition to Parliament after an initial suspension of Part II which provided for grant of Amnesty.

Newspaper caption of abducted LRA children still in captivity provided by NMPDC

The prevailing sense of denied justice continues to impact upon survivors' ability to rebuild their lives and to move forward and beyond the many cleavages that continue to divide Uganda and specifically the North.[272] Representatives from local government, civil society and cultural and religious institutions consulted by ACCS across the eight sub-regions emphasised the deeply held sense of injustice amongst their communities due to a lack of reconciliation and reparation efforts following the devastating effects of the wars in the North.[273] For example, community representatives in West Nile, a sub-region directly affected by the LRA war, noted that a lack of transitional justice activities continues to drive conflict in their constituencies today.[274] The massacre of an unknown number of civilians in Ombachi (Arua district) in 1982 by Obote's UNLA forces was raised as a contentious issue,[275] as there have been no attempts to identify the victims, bring the perpetrators to justice, or compensate the victims' families. "How do we dry the tears of the relatives?" said a community member from the affected district.[276] Also in Acholi, in Mucwini (Kitgum district) 56 civilians were killed on 24 July 2002 by the LRA after the escape of one of the residents from its captivity. Although ten years have elapsed, communities describe the failure of the authorities to investigate and compensate and the alleged involvement of a local clan as still driving conflict today.[277] Community representatives in Teso talked about "unresolved legacies of past violence that, if unaddressed, will trigger new conflict." They described palpable tensions between "victims and perpetrators living side by side in the absence of reparations" that are hampering peace and stability in many communities.

Some community leaders in the North explicitly criticised the amnesty implementation process for "failing to promote truth-telling, healing and reconciliation of communities by reducing such a complex process to the handing over of a certificate."[278] In Lango, where parts of the sub-region were directly affected by the LRA war, issues of reparations and transitional justice more broadly were brought up as significant drivers of conflict. Community leaders noted that Amnesty Act certificates had been awarded to former combatants "without a proper act of acknowledgement of responsibility,

271 Refugee Law Project (RLP), forthcoming: National Reconciliation and Transitional Justice Audit-Compendium of Conflicts in Uganda 1962–2012
272 See 'To Move Forward, We Must Look Back', Refugee Law Project press statement, 2006.
273 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.
274 See PRDP II map on page 7 of this report.
275 Kasozi, A.B.K., *The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 1964-1985* (McGill-Queens University Press, 1994).
276 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Arua, 12 September 2012.
277 *Ibid.*
278 Cultural leader, workshop held in Lira (Lango sub-region), 17 September 2012.

forgiveness of community, or reconciliation."[279] Community representatives in Lango also noted that the lapse in the Amnesty Act while some ex-combatants have still not been adequately integrated lingers as a security threat and potential grounds for violence., Little support has been given to facilitate integration following the issuance of certificates of amnesty, leaving victims and perpetrators to face each other.[280]

Similar concerns were raised in Teso, where communities noted that the strong focus on perpetrators had left victims with "physical and psychological wounds, unable to heal." As a community representative pointed out, "as the fighting parties resolved their differences, victims were forgotten ... why should perpetrators be rewarded while victims are left out?"[281] Community leaders in Teso complained that perpetrators did not need to tell the truth before receiving their amnesty certificate, having to recount only basic information about their role in the conflict including which rebel group they belonged to and what types of activities they were involved in (e.g. direct combat, collaboration).[282] Moreover, the return of ex-combatants to their former homes, including abducted children and those born in captivity, is contributing to land disputes in Lango as families and clans struggle to facilitate their integration into their communities without adequate government support.[283]

Transitional justice in the North has focused on demobilisation and compensation, though considerable challenges have undermined both processes. Ex-combatants have remained the focus of the interventions, though many of them are disappointed and express the feeling of having been lured out of the bush with promises that never materialised. The grievances of combatants who had fought alongside government forces to quell the LRA rebellion are fuelled by inadequate compensation and allegations that "assistance is only being made available to NRM supporters."[284] Many harbour physical and psychological wounds that have not been treated, while a lack of employment opportunities renders them marginalised and socially excluded.[285] The consensus amongst community representatives consulted by ACCS is that follow-up of those who came forward and surrendered their weapons has been inadequate, with promises of gratuity payments to veterans frequently unmet, breeding anger amongst former combatants.[286] An ex-combatant noted that "when you sign the amnesty, they ask you what you want to do … there is an implication that the government is prepared to help. That form, it raises your expectations."[287]

The threat to security posed by disgruntled former combatants is a manifestation of how this issue drives conflict in the North. Acholi community members warned that "those demobilised have not been adequately supported to reintegrate; we have disarmed their guns but not disarmed their minds."[288] They note that competing promises of payment have been made during election campaigns. When these fail to materialise time and time again, the bitterness towards the government amongst former combatants grows.[289] In Lango, communities warned that illegal weapons remain in the hands of former militias who have not been demobilised and pose a threat to security.[290] The issue of 'selective' compensation was cited by Teso community representatives as fuelling tensions. Disgruntled ex-combatants who have not yet received the support promised continue to pose a threat to security,

279 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Lira, 17 September 2012.
280 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Lira, 17 September 2012.
281 *Ibid.*
282 'UN Position on Uganda's Amnesty Act', UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in collaboration with UN Women, May 2012, p. 14.
283 *Ibid.*
284 *Ibid.*
285 *Ibid.*
286 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.
287 Refugee Law Project, *Whose Justice? Perceptions Of Uganda's Amnesty Act 2000: The Potential For Conflict Resolution And Long-Term Reconciliation*, Working Paper no. 15, February 2005.
288 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Kitgum, 14 September 2012.
289 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Kitgum, 14 September 2012.
290 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Lira, 17 September 2012.

especially as many have not yet surrendered their weapons to the authorities.[291] In Elgon, ex-combatants have organised into groups to lobby for their entitlements. Some have been successful in obtaining government support, creating tensions with other such groups and their communities.[292] The process of disarming Karimojong and the failure by the government to fulfil commitments to provide alternative livelihoods to those surrendering their guns has also fuelled tensions between communities and the authorities.[293]

Another grievance that makes the lack of adequate transitional justice a driver of conflict is the failure to restore or compensate for cattle lost during the LRA war. In Acholi, the failure by the authorities to account and compensate for cattle taken during the conflict has not been adequately addressed following the cessation of hostilities. Community leaders in Arua claim that Karimojong raiders ventured deep into Acholi during the LRA war to steal cattle, accompanied by government forces.[294] In Bukedi, the issue of inadequate compensation for ex-combatants and for cattle stolen during the LRA war is also a significant driver of conflict in the sub-region. Local government officials noted that some cattle re-stocking is taking place but recognised that the issue is often mismanaged and politicised, fuelling frustration amongst affected communities.[295] Karamoja community leaders noted that the process of compensation for lost cattle remains contentious. The government committed to compensate for the loss of cattle that was placed under UPDF protection during the LRA war. However, as this process was not adequately documented many will not receive this compensation. Moreover, the compensation criteria also remain a point of contention between Karimojong and the authorities. In early 2012 Karimojong elders met the president and handed over documentation for the lost cattle. However, no progress in resolving the outstanding claims has been seen by the communities, leading to resentment.[296]

When asked about transitional justice, many community members raise the issue of compensation and reparations. The essence of amnesty – namely legal and social forgiveness – is being obscured by the issue of financial gains, while victims and their communities continue to harbour a sense of having been forgotten.[297] Amnesty certificate award ceremonies are held and attended by community leaders and government officials but the events "do not include a meaningful component of forgiveness and reconciliation between perpetrators and victims", contributing to "perpetuate grievance as opposed to offering redress and closure" to affected communities.[298] Moreover, the amnesty process has proven challenging to former abductees such as 'forced wives' and child soldiers, who see themselves as victims rather than perpetrators.[299] Many of the reintegration support services in the North have been provided by different NGOs with little funding, which has limited the reach and impact of interventions.

A better balance between perpetrators and victims, compensation and reparations, and punitive and restorative justice is needed in order to comprehensively address the needs of war-affected communities in the North. Greater political will and more resources are required to complete the transitional justice process started by the Amnesty Act, and communities need to be engaged more meaningfully to determine the nature and extent of the process. Transitional justice is crucial in sub-regions where the brunt of

291 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Soroti, 19 September 2012.
292 *Ibid.*
293 Saferworld, 'Karamoja Conflict and Security Assessment', September 2010, www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Karamoja conflict and security assessment.pdf.
294 *Ibid.*
295 *Ibid.*
296 *Ibid.*
297 *Ibid.*
298 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Lira, 17 September 2012.
299 *Ibid.*

the LRA war was most felt, particularly given the difficulties accessing justice in the region. The question of reparations to victims and survivors of conflicts in the country as a whole has been neglected, and there are no guarantees that violent armed conflicts will not reoccur. The physical and psychological harm that people suffered throughout the conflict has not been addressed, and access to justice for individual and community wrongs remains a challenge for the majority. Individuals are still living with the trauma of forced displacement, sexual violence, torture, and physical wounds and mutilations that need to be addressed. Without the needed physical and psychological repair, it will remain difficult for affected individuals and communities to perceive that justice has been done and to meaningfully engage in a broader process of social rehabilitation, reconciliation or development.

e) Generational and gender conflicts

Across all the PRDP sub-regions significant socio-economic and cultural changes have been brought about by the two decades of armed conflict as well as the changing post-conflict environment. Communities across the eight sub-regions cite the impacts of a changing political economy as key conflict drivers, for example changes in gender roles as a result of development initiatives to empower women. The post-conflict recovery process has to grapple with the tension between the old and new social realities. ACCS research revealed significant perceptions of emasculation in the face of socio-economic changes; a participant noted that after being forced to abandon cattle rustling the men had "now become women" and had resorted to working with their wives to cultivate.[300] One worrying indicator of such conflicts is the prevalence of domestic violence in general, and of SGBV in particular.

SGBV in Karamoja[23]

- ACCS research in Abim, Moroto and Kotido districts of Karamoja in 2012 noted the high prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence in these communities (ranging from 20-30 cases reported per month, the most common being defilement and rape) and that most cases are not reported due to cultural traditions and practices, particularly those associated with marriage and courtship that may condone SGBV.
- Most victims of SGBV are being denied justice, particularly in the negotiation of compensation packages. Rape cases were found to be vulnerable to undue influence and manipulation in both formal and informal mechanisms. The majority of the cases are handled locally/culturally and very few cases are taken to courts of law.
- Sometimes parents choose to manage cases of their daughters being defiled within their communities instead of pursuing the legal avenue, in order to benefit from compensation agreements that are frequently part of informal dispute settlements.
- There is a prevalence of female genital mutilation in some areas of the sub-region.
- Frequently offered explanations for the prevalence of SGBV included the stress of poverty on family life leading to violence between husband and wife, and alcoholism.
- The role played by sensitisation interventions such as radio, dramas and talk shows in combating such practices was recognised, with dramas considered to be the most effective.

23 *Ibid.*

Communities consulted by ACCS in West Nile noted that the generational gap between old and young is driving conflicts in the sub-region, with family authority breaking down and youth challenging authority, causing tensions in communities.[301] The challenges to cultural institutions and traditions posed by greater community participation in development interventions, and the increased participation of youth and women in public life, were cited by communities consulted in Lango as sources of tensions between generations and between men and women.[302] In Teso, community representatives noted that, as in other sub-regions, social changes have fuelled conflicts

300 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Moroto, 28 September 2012.
301 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Arua, 12 September 2012.
302 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Lira, 17 September 2012.

within families and communities as women and youth mobilise and challenge the status quo. Participants warned that the "generational gap between old and young is being exploited by politicians mobilising youth to gain power", while the youth have "memory only of war and hate" dividing communities and fuelling conflict.[303] New constituencies with specific and distinct protection and development needs have arisen from the war, including orphaned children, widows, ex-child soldiers, growing numbers of unemployed youth, those born in IDPs camps, and those born in captivity in LRA hideouts. Communities are struggling to integrate this new reality into a decimated social fabric, a process that is generating conflicts across the North.[304]

The changing economy was also identified as a significant conflict driver in the North, as development interventions challenge traditional ways of life. For example, in Karamoja conflicts have been reported between pastoralist and agriculturalist communities in the sub-region. Community representatives noted that cattle grazers used to move their herds around freely, but now new district demarcations and regulations about access have placed restrictions on traditional practices which are undermining livelihoods and fuelling tensions. More notably, there is an ongoing dispute between grazing communities in the districts of Kotido and Abim.[305] Moreover, as Karimojong communities are encouraged by development interventions to embrace agriculture as a more sustainable way of life, conflicts between those who want to protect traditional Karimojong culture and those who would like to modernise the sub-regional economy arise.[306] The changing livelihood strategies are impacting upon gender roles and family and social structures, as Karimojong men are now engaged in agriculture, a practice that was traditionally the domain of women who grew crops in domestic gardens and managed food security in the home. Moreover, despite the push towards agricultural livelihoods, cattle remain a symbol of social status and an important pillar of Karimojong society. A Karimojong man without cattle is not highly regarded by his community, and cattle are a key element of marriage dowries. Participants noted the need to soften the blow of the changing economy by supporting communities, while finding a compromise between the pastoralist and agriculturalist approaches to livelihoods.[307]

Gender relations have changed dramatically during and after the war. Women now occupy prominent positions at all levels of government and are represented in many civil society organisations, while in some communities men are struggling to redefine their role in society after the conflict. Communities report growing tensions between men and women within families around access to and control of land.[308] Another reported trend is the resentment felt by men towards development interventions specifically targeting women in their communities.[309] Ignorance amongst communities about women and children's rights is partly to blame, and there is a need for community sensitisation.[310] Key manifestations of gender tensions include increased reporting of some forms of SGBV and domestic violence.[311] Early and forced marriages are also still prevalent amongst many communities. In Acholi and Lango sub-regions a pattern of increasing gender-based violence, homicide and domestic violence, including cases of women killing men, has been reported.[312] Community leaders in Lango noted that the rise of women's "prominence in the public sphere has generated tensions amongst

303 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Soroti, 19 September 2012.

304 Rugadya, Margaret A., 'Unveiling Gender, Land and Property Rights in Post Conflict Northern Uganda', Associate Research Occasional Paper, November 2008, www.mokoro.co.uk/files/13/file/lria/gender_land_property_rights_postconflict_n_uganda.pdf.

305 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Moroto, 28 September 2012.

306 Saferworld, 'Tracking key conflict and security dynamics in Karamoja – an update', May 2012, www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Uganda PPP report.pdf.

307 *Ibid.*

308 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

309 Community leader, ACCS consultative workshop in Lira, 17 September 2012.

310 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Kitgum, 14 September 2012.

311 RLP, Limitations to Access to Justice for SGBV in Acholi Sub-region', forthcoming.

312 RLP, 'Women Killing Men', Situational Analysis Report, 2011.

families and communities that need to be managed and which can lead to domestic disputes and SGBV."[313] According to ACCS research the highest incidence of SGBV in the North is in the sub-region of Karamoja.[314]

Karamoja youths celebrating good harvest season. Photo by ACCS team

On a positive note, awareness about SGBV amongst communities appears to be growing. ACCS research covering 21 sample districts from across the eight PRDP sub-regions noted that cases of SGBV were being addressed 'satisfactorily'[315] by community dispute resolution mechanisms (DRM) according to 77.1 percent of respondents. This percentage was highest in West Nile (81 percent), followed by Karamoja (77.8 percent), and lowest in Bunyoro (36.4 percent). In Lango it was 50 percent and in Acholi it was 49.1 percent. However, 30 percent of SGBV cases were not reported to any authority or conflict resolution mechanism. Among the 228 respondents who reported that dispute resolution mechanisms satisfactorily addressed SGBV, 48.2 percent sought redress from the LC courts, while 37.7 percent used the clan system, or matters were resolved at family level as shown by the tables below.[316]

Table 4: Percentage of respondents perceiving that DRMs are addressing SGBV satisfactorily

Region	Involved in any conflict at personal level in past 2 years?		Was the personal conflict SGBV?		Was the SGBV reported to any authority?		Indicator Did the authority respond to the SGBV matter satisfactorily?	
	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
West Nile	138	18.4	53	38.4	42	79.2	34	81.0
Karamoja	194	35.2	135	69.6	72	53.3	56	77.8
Control	95	16.8	52	54.7	39	75.0	27	69.2
Teso	139	32.6	81	58.3	64	79.0	42	65.6
Bukedi	27	15.2	20	74.1	15	75.0	9	60.0
Elgon	40	21.4	34	85.0	25	73.5	14	56.0
Lango	137	36.5	40	29.2	32	80	16	50.0
Acholi	318	41.8	70	22.0	53	75.7	26	49.1
Bunyoro	68	36.2	19	27.9	11	57.9	4	36.4
Total Total/Average	**1156**	**29.0**	**504**	**43.6**	**353**	**70.0**	**228**	**64.6**

313 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Lira, 17 September 2012.

314 Consensus panel for the International Alert PCIs baseline report held in Moroto, August 2012.

315 The term 'satisfactorily', as it was used in relation to the ability of the dispute resolution mechanisms to address cases of SGBV, is relative according to testimonies received during the field baseline process. Communities are inclined to use informal methods to resolve SGBV, whether through the mediation assistance of local councillors, cultural leaders or direct negotiation between the parties involved, and often such methods are viewed as satisfactory, as they lead to harmonisation and reconciliation of the parties involved rather than aggravating the situation further through the threat of formal prosecution.

316 International Alert, *Monitoring Peace and Conflict Impacts of the PRDP in Acholi and Lango Sub-Regions*, forthcoming.

Table 5: Dispute resolution mechanisms used by those perceiving that DRMs are addressing SGBV satisfactorily

		Male		Female		Total	
		No.	%	No	%	No.	%
Option that satisfactorily responded to the SGBV case	LC system	49	50.5	61	46.5	110	48.2
	Clan system	36	37.2	50	38.2	86	37.7
	Police and court	8	8.2	15	11.5	23	10.1
	Mediation options (religious leaders, politicians, traditional leaders)	4	4.1	5	3.8	9	3.9
	Total	97	100	131	100	228	100
No. of authorities approached before case received satisfactory response	1	51	52.6	76	58	127	55.7
	2	36	37.1	44	33.6	80	35.1
	3	10	10.3	11	8.4	21	9.2
	Total	97	100	131	100	228	100

According to the Police Annual Incidence Report for the northern region, 1737 and 1848 SGBV-related cases were reported in 2010 and 2011 respectively, illustrating an upward trend.[317] Respondents noted that incidents of rape, for example, are taken seriously and survivors seek medical attention and police assistance with the support of their communities. However, some respondents made the case that victims' fear of stigmatisation prevents many from reporting rape, whether to the formal authorities or traditional structures. Moreover, the challenges of having to travel great distances to health facilities, police stations and courts often deter survivors from pursuing the matter, with many opting instead to use local cleansing rituals and mediation as an alternative form of closure. Male respondents described some of the forms of domestic violence inflicted on men at home by their spouses, including denial of food and women battering their husbands when they come home drunk. It was noted that men fear that reporting domestic violence will strip them of their masculinity and social status.[318]

Difficulties accessing justice for survivors of SGBV further compound the issue and threaten to drive conflict amongst affected communities. The main obstacles are affordability and the long distances to relevant institutions and services. A 2012 ACCS study found that the average distance between the main towns in Acholi and police stations, hospitals, and magistrate courts were 33 km, 36 km, and 40 km respectively.[319] The same study noted that the typical cost of pursuing justice in the formal system for a case of SGBV was approximately 250,000 shillings, which is beyond the means of most Ugandans.[320] The difficulties in accessing justice mean that many survivors have to rely on informal community-based processes. An important dimension of SGBV is that each clan is responsible for the acts of its members and holds the right to intervene in matters that involve its members. This means that instances of SGBV can also lead to broader community conflicts.[321]

317 *Ibid.*

318 RLP, 'Limitations to Access to Justice for SGBV in Acholi Sub-region', forthcoming.

319 *Ibid.*

320 Medical examination 15,000 shillings; police form 3 to report the incident, 3,000; transport to attend court proceedings 144,000; accommodation during proceedings 90,000; total 252,000 shillings. Cost for a respondent from Nwoya district in Acholi sub-region who pursued a case of defilement of his daughter through the courts in Gulu in 2011.

321 RLP, 'Limitations to Access to Justice for SGBV in Acholi Sub-region', *op. cit.*

f) Perceptions of neglect over poor service delivery and infrastructure

"Bad roads hamper access to the few urban-centred services. In Amuru district, people living in certain areas are almost cut off from institutions such as the police and health centres. It takes a whole day to ride from Apaa to Labongogali to access medical services."

(Youth, Amuru district, Acholi sub-region, October 2011)

The government has acknowledged disparities between the North and South in terms of access to basic services and quality of infrastructure.[322] Poverty rates in northern Uganda are far higher than those in the rest of the country, while key development indicators such as infant mortality, maternal health or the incidence of HIV/AIDS also remain significantly worse in the North.[323] This reflects in part the ways in which years of war and massive displacement not only destroyed infrastructure but also denied access to key services to the majority of northern Ugandans. Additionally, northern Uganda has specific needs and vulnerable groups requiring special assistance as a result of the war. For example, the North has the highest incidence of persons with disabilities in Uganda as a result of landmines, explosive remnants of war and other war-related injuries including mutilation by the LRA.[324]

A Trailer stuck on Soroti-Abim road. ACCS File Photo

Though some improvement has been noted through specific programmes under the PRDP and Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) I and II, like building staff houses and health centres, adequate service provision and infrastructure remain elusive for the majority.[325] Poor infrastructure and the failure of state institutions to deliver basic services was raised as a significant barrier to peacebuilding by stakeholders consulted in 2010 and already contributing to resentment towards state institutions.[326] Though significant investment in infrastructure development in the North has taken place since, perceptions of neglect appear not to have shifted. Districts remain ill-equipped to deliver and oversee service provision and construction/maintenance of infrastructure, while most communities experience difficulties in accessing health, education, basic utilities such as electricity and potable water, and social services.[327] At the community level, reasons given to ACCS for dissatisfaction with services provided in education, health and vocational skills training included inadequate staffing and the need to travel long distances in order to access services. Overall, health care services were rated as the most lacking, with 19.9

322 'Northern Uganda Peace, Recovery and Development', Special Report, December 2011, Independent Publications Ltd.
323 *Ibid.*
324 RLP, 'What About Us?', Urban IDP Bulletin, 2009.
325 RLP, 'Thrown Along The Way: Community Perspectives on Conflict Drivers in the Implementation of the PRDP for Northern Uganda', p. 7.
326 RLP, PRDP Baseline Survey 2010 in fourteen districts in northern Uganda, October to December 2010.
327 Saferworld, Notes from a scoping visit to Karamoja: Kaabong, Kotido and Abim, 12–16 March 2012.

percent of all mentions, followed by education services (17.1 percent), road networks (13.8 percent) and water provision (12.6 percent).[328]

District officials consulted by ACCS blame the decay in local level service provision on a decline in funding from the central level, while difficulties in reaching communities in order to disseminate information about what district support is available and how to access it has widened the gap between local authorities and citizens.[329] Programme 6 of the PRDP (local government enhancement) was designed to address this problem and aimed to strengthen service delivery capacity. However, no additional funds were provided for this component on the assumption that existing donor funding would be sufficient.[330] Equally, community members consulted in 21 sample districts for PRDP intervention noted that local government responses to their needs, especially in regard to health and education, were just above average; this was largely attributed to their limited participation in planning processes, insufficient community mobilisation and inadequate staffing.[331] The situation is even worse in the Karamoja region where for decades people have suffered high levels of conflict and insecurity alongside dismal development indicators and severe poverty levels. Districts in Karamoja have failed to attract and retain staff in critical positions in engineering, health and education due to the squalid conditions of work. The community services departments at the district and lower local government level are all understaffed, yet they are responsible for community mobilisation and citizen involvement in government development programmes.[332]

Greater infrastructure investment in the North through the PRDP has led to a relative improvement in road conditions, crucial to ensure greater access to services. According to a government assessment of PRDP I, 40,000 km of new roads were constructed and 1,904 km of roads rehabilitated or repaired between 2009 and 2012.[333] Some districts have seen a marked improvement in road conditions. For example, in Gulu the total road length in good condition increased from 174.2 to 215.1 km in the financial year 2009/10 and from 215.1 to 249.2 km in 2010/11. However, many roads remain in need of repair, while shoddy work and poor maintenance has already rendered some of the built or repaired roads impassable. The impact of limited freedom of movement on communities' livelihoods and development prospects was seen by communities consulted by ACCS as a significant driver of conflict. Moreover, difficulties in travelling the long distances between communities and services such as health centres or courts were also cited as contributing to isolation and frustration.[334]

Community representatives consulted claim that some sub-regions have benefited more from road (re)construction than others, as those with current oil exploration projects have had roads upgraded to facilitate the transportation of equipment and personnel by oil companies. Road conditions in Karamoja are among the worst in the country, a fact that community leaders attribute to deliberate neglect by the authorities. In May 2012 several Karimojong parliamentarians accused the government of neglecting road construction in the sub-region, with the MP for Kaabong district pointing out that Karamoja remained the only sub-region in

328 International Alert, *Monitoring Peace and Conflict Impacts of the PRDP in Acholi and Lango Sub-Regions*, forthcoming.

329 Saferworld training sessions for Lira and Gulu districts, November 2011.

330 Office of the Prime Minister, 'Mid-term Review of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda' (Draft 7th), 2011.

331 International Alert.*Monitoring Peace and Conflict Impacts of the PRDP in Acholi and Lango Sub-Regions*, forthcoming.

332 Saferworld, Notes from scoping visit to Karamoja, March 2012.

333 'Preparing for PRDP II', a presentation to the 7th PRDP Monitoring Committee Meeting by OPM Permanent Secretary Mr. Pius Bigirimana, Kampala, 21 June 2012.

334 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012; International Alert.*Monitoring Peace and Conflict Impacts of the PRDP in Acholi and Lango Sub-Regions*, forthcoming..

Uganda without a tarmac road.[335] Poor infrastructure was also cited as a significant conflict driver in Bunyoro, with road damage from the transportation of heavy oil exploration equipment prompting communities to mobilise to express their frustration against the oil companies and the districts. In September 2012 irate communities blocked and seized tractors belonging to Kinyara sugar factory, accusing the firm of damaging their roads and refusing to repair them.[336] Poor road conditions are also driving communities to mobilise in Elgon sub-region. Participants reported interventions by groups of youth who organise themselves to fill potholes in upcountry roads. This involves "setting up road blocks and collecting money from drivers that in some cases has led to scuffles."[337] In Lango, stakeholders noted the anger of residents at "collapsing infrastructure and services", while noting their disappointment that allegedly "no PRDP money has been earmarked to repair roads in the sub-region."[338]

The health service infrastructure in northern Uganda remains thoroughly inadequate. Poor health facilities, shortage of staff, low salaries and lack of staff housing were identified by respondents for this research as the key challenges to health service delivery.[339] According to Gulu district's development plan, most of the health facilities are not functional because of factors including failure to attract and retain staff, partly due to poor remuneration because of the decline in local revenue collection and lack of accommodation. A lack of qualified staff plagues the sector: this is again exemplified by Gulu, where only 41 percent of the 432 health workers are qualified. With the exception of the clinical officers, all other medical departments are understaffed.[340] In Bunyoro, community leaders noted that poor pay and lack of investment has left health centres and schools to decay and public workers having to resort to private business to meet their basic financial needs.[341]

Community representatives in Acholi also raised nodding disease and the failure by health authorities to effectively tackle the issue as a significant driver of conflict. Community perceptions that the government is partly responsible for its development are common, while allegations are often made that insufficient support and information is being provided to affected communities.[342] Some believe that food provided by the government and international aid agencies is the cause; others believe it was caused by the use of chemical weapons during the war against the LRA insurgency. Funds allocated to target the disease and support affected communities have not reached the affected districts. For some, this is further proof of a deliberate attempt by the government to "finish the Acholi".[343]

Despite progress in building schools and health facilities in the North through programmes such as the PRDP, staffing these facilities adequately remains a challenge, with communities reporting empty classrooms and health centres. The low attraction and retention of skilled and competent staff has been attributed to poor work conditions, including low salaries and wages compared to the remuneration offered by the private sector and non-governmental entities.[344] Difficulties in accessing key social assistance were also identified as breeding resentment amongst communities in the North.[345] Within Northern regions,

335 'Karamoja MPs cry of government neglect, demand for roads', UG Pulse, 11 May 2012, www.ugpulse.com/uganda-news/government/Karamoja-mps-cry-of-government-neglect-demand-for-roads/25271.aspx, accessed 8 November 2012.
336 'Kinyara tractors seized over road', *Daily Monitor*, 13 September 2012, mobile.monitor.co.ug/News, accessed 3 October 2012.
337 ACCS consultative workshop in northern Uganda, Mbale, 21 September 2012.
338 ACCS consultative workshop in northern Uganda, Lira, 17 September 2012.
339 International Alert.*Monitoring Peace and Conflict Impacts of the PRDP in Acholi and Lango Sub-Regions*, forthcoming.
340 Saferworld review of the Conflict Sensitivity of Gulu District Development Plan 2011–2016.
341 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Masindi, 10 September 2012.
342 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Kitgum, 14 September 2012.
343 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Kitgum, 14 September 2012.
344 Saferworld discussions with Gulu District Resource Pool on local government conflict-sensitivity capacity building, 2012.
345 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

differences in assistance create further risks of fuelling perceptions of neglect - in a recent meeting between PCDP implementers and ACCS in Kampala, the Private Sector Foundation Uganda (PSFU) reported that of the £13m Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SME) grant from DFID, Karamoja had received only 1 percent.[346] Stakeholders in Elgon noted that abject poverty and a breakdown in service provision have destroyed social safety nets, leading to social exclusion of vulnerable groups such as street kids and an increase in drug and alcohol consumption by disenfranchised youth, and undermining community safety.[347]

Access to and affordability of justice remain a challenge for the majority of northern Ugandans. Structural obstacles to accessing justice are not only related to distances or cost, but also to the fact that court proceedings are conducted in English in urban settings, which can be alienating for those coming from rural areas.[348] Community members in Bunyoro noted that difficulties in accessing justice to settle community disputes frustrated communities. What might begin as a dispute between individuals quickly escalates, dragging families, clans, and tribes into the conflict.[349] Community leaders cited the inefficiency and lack of accountability of the judiciary as a driver of conflict leading frustrated residents to take justice into their own hands due to long waits or resort to 'mob justice' following what they see as controversial judgements.[350] Acholi community representatives noted that the inaccessibility of courts for the majority of communities due to cost or long travel distances was further hindering access and leading to escalating disputes, particularly related to land, with many cases of 'mob justice' reported.[351] In Teso a lack of access to courts for the majority is also increasing conflicts amongst residents,[352] with many reportedly turning to witchcraft or 'mob justice' to resolve land and other disputes.[353] The lack of access to courts due to costs or long delays in delivering justice has led to disputants taking matters into their own hands and resorting to traditional healers to resolve their conflicts.[354]

The poor quality and limited equipment at district and sub-county offices also poses challenges to the delivery of public services. For example, the records office in Lira district has only two computers providing information management services to the education, health and other service departments.[355] This is further hampered by a lack of institutional commitment to capacity enhancement, demonstrated by insufficient budgetary allocations despite the establishment of the Local Government Capacity Building Unit and the Capacity Building Technical Working Group at the Ministry of Local Government. For example, the ministry's Capacity Building Grant (CBG), which was set up to improve staff capacity, has not received sufficient funds to satisfy the demand for such assistance in the northern districts of Uganda.

Districts lack sufficient district engineers to help with the implementation of programmes under the District Development Plans and PRDP-supported projects. This, coupled with a shortage of staff, means that reconstruction funds are being disbursed without adequate government oversight and capacity, fuelling frustration amongst residents. The districts' low capacity to supervise infrastructure work has also seriously hampered the delivery of services, with many health and education facilities either shoddily built or not completed at all. The districts of Kaabong and

346 Meeting held at Protea Hotel, Kampala, 15 February 2013.
347 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Mbale, 21September 2012.
348 RLP, *Access to Justice for Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Survivors in Acholi Sub-region*, draft report, 2012.
349 ACCS consultation workshop, Masindi, 10 September 2012.
350 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Masindi, 10 September 2012.
351 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Kitgum, 14 September 2012.
352 *Ibid.*
353 Focus group discussions with women, Tubur sub-county, Soroti, 8 November 2011, and civil society organizations in Soroti district, 11 November 2011.
354 Focus group discussion with men in Tubur sub-county, Soroti, 8 November 2011.
355 Saferworld notes on the CSA Work Plan Development Meeting with Lira District Local Government Resource Pool, 2011.

Kotido do not have district engineers, while the engineering department in Abim has only one qualified engineer. According to the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) coordinator in Abim, lack of qualified engineering staff has halted progress in several community development projects.[356] Some communities have demonstrated against inadequate reconstruction of service infrastructure. In Lamwo district (Acholi sub-region) residents rejected a market recently constructed by an unnamed contractor.[357] There are other examples in the region of communities rejecting PRDP projects due to the poor quality of contracted work; for example in Koboko (West Nile) residents recently rejected a reconstructed school because of shoddy work.[358]

Many blame the failure to deliver services on corrupt practices at local levels of government. For example, community representatives consulted attributed the poor state of infrastructure like roads and inadequate service delivery to the misappropriation of resources allocated to those sectors.[359] In Bukedi sub-region, communities' frustration is rising due to the perception that poor service delivery and deteriorating infrastructure is closely linked to corruption. In Karamoja, community leaders noted that the intended peacebuilding aims of the PRDP and service delivery as a whole had been undermined by claims of funds being misappropriated by government officials or mismanaged by contractors.[360] Residents complained of significant levels of corruption, with political favouritism leading to the selective implementation of development programmes.[361] In Karamoja, communities consulted for the Saferworld conflict and security assessment complained that they had not seen the benefits of the various development projects because these had been hijacked by the elite to favour their clansmen and relatives. They reported reduced confidence in their leaders due to corruption.[362]

Efforts to rebuild infrastructure in the North are acknowledged by community leaders. A recent report by ACCS noted that 52.1 percent of respondents positively assessed the responsiveness of local government to community needs.[363] Notably, there have been improvements in Acholi and Lango with 11 percent and 9 percent more respondents respectively acknowledging the responsiveness of local government. However, amongst the 37.1 percent who recognise the responsiveness of their local governments,[364] many believe that inadequate service delivery and failures to repair and maintain infrastructure are the outcome of at best neglect and at worst a "deliberate attempt to keep the North down."[365] Participants noted that popular discontent with the authorities is growing and that "one day this anger will burst."[366] Communities consulted across the North argued that the association of service failures with corruption breeds discontent and frustration towards local government, and hinders people's ownership and participation in government projects at the local level.[367] Moreover, "people are becoming empowered to demand their rights," leading to growing conflict unless mechanisms to articulate and address grievances peacefully are developed.[368]

356 Notes from scoping visit to Karamoja, Saferworld, March 2012.
357 'Residents Reject Border Market Over Shoddy Work', Uganda Radio Network, 4 September 2012, ugandaradionetwork.com/a/story.php?s=45131, accessed 8 November 2012.
358 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshop s in northern Uganda, Arua 12 September 2012
359 RLP Transitional Justice Audit, Teso, 8-12 November 2012.
360 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Moroto, 24 September 2012.
361 *Ibid.*
362 Saferworld, 'Tracking key conflict and security dynamics in Karamoja – an update', May 2012.
363 International Alert, *Monitoring Peace and Conflict Impacts of the PRDP in Acholi and Lango Sub-Regions*, forthcoming.
364 *Ibid.*
365 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Kitgum, 14 September 2012.
366 *Ibid.*
367 RLP Transitional Justice Audit, Teso, 8-12 November 2012.
368 *Ibid.*

g) Perceptions of marginalisation over distribution of development assistance

"The PRDP has failed to unite sub-regions under a common aim to reconstruct the North; instead it has divided us further."
(Community representative, Lira, 17 September 2012)

The implementation of the PRDP and other development programmes has made some progress in addressing the neglect identified in the previous section, but the lack of understanding of this framework locally and lacklustre impact on the ground can be blamed for unwittingly reinforcing perceptions of marginalisation amongst some communities in the North, thus fuelling tensions between the sub-regions. The distribution of PRDP funds serves as an example of the highly politicised and contested nature of fund allocations.

Table 6: PRDP sub-regional breakdown[369]

Sub-region	% of total PRDP II budget
West Nile	21
Acholi	20
Lango	19
Karamoja	16
Teso	8
Bukedi	6
Bunyoro	5
Elgon	5

The lack of awareness or understanding of the criteria for fund allocation, which are based on damage inflicted by the war and population size, has given rise to accusations of favouritism towards some communities to the detriment of others. This in turn fuels inter-communal conflicts. ACCS research noted that 63.7 percent of respondents consulted in 21 districts in the North perceived other regions as benefiting more from government investment than their own regions. The highest-rated suggestion for how government should address imbalances was through ensuring equitable resource allocation, cited by 25 percent of respondents.[370] For example, in Gulu district protests were staged against a reduction in PRDP support from 5.9 billion shillings in PRDP I to a projected 2.4 billion shillings in PRDP II, as district officials believed that other less needy areas were being favoured while their district met the criteria of significant war impact and large population.[371] In West Nile, despite the fact that this sub-region will benefit the most out of PRDP II,[372] communities have complained about perceived inequality in fund allocation between sub-regions and even districts. In Acholi the unequal distribution of PRDP funds is "pitching districts against one another in their competition for support," with local government officials arguing with each other about "which districts suffered the most during the war" to justify their demand for greater support.[373] In Bukedi, representatives noted the perception amongst their communities that the sub-region

369 Office of the Prime Minister, 'Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) Phase II, July 2012-June 2015', November 2011.

370 International Alert, *Monitoring Peace and Conflict Impacts of the PRDP in Acholi and Lango Sub-Regions*, forthcoming.

371 'Gulu protests cut in development funding', *Observer*, 1 February 2012, www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16913:gulu-protests-cut-in-development-funding-&catid=34:news&Itemid=114, accessed 8 November 2012.

372 West Nile will receive 21 percent of the total budget, the largest percentage of all sub-regions. See table 6 in chapter 2, section g, p. 70, for a breakdown of all PRDP II sub-region allocations.

373 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

has been neglected because "they did not start their own war," a view reinforced by the allocation of more funds to the areas most affected by war.[374]

Communities consulted by ACCS believe that the politicisation of PRDP implementation by districts and community leaders is to blame for the conflicts and tensions, which have undermined solidarity and cooperation between communities in the North. Communities complained that they struggled to obtain information and access to social assistance funds (e.g. youth fund, PRDP, NUSAF), with a growing perception that deliberate exclusion is behind this. Furthermore, participants noted that their constituents believe unequal distribution of assistance benefits groups in power, which creates inter-communal tensions. Lango community representatives noted a lack of awareness among the population about the PRDP's aims and scope, which leads to mismanaged expectations and frustration. The fact that some cultural institutions in Acholi sub-region have received support from PRDP funds was also described by community representatives as having fuelled tensions between different cultural institutions in the North. In Teso, community leaders noted that community resentment over poor service delivery and the alleged politicisation of the PRDP has undermined its peacebuilding impact. In Elgon, community leaders lamented that expectations generated by the inclusion of the sub-region in the PRDP have not been fulfilled, resulting in growing anger towards the authorities.[375]

Communities consulted in all sub-regions noted that more public information is needed to increase awareness of PRDP activities across the North, as unclear implementation guidelines for districts were also partly to blame for some of the failures of the initiative, and in turn for the mistrust and resentment that it has generated. Representatives consulted by ACCS acknowledged that this was due to a lack of sensitisation about the aims of PRDP as well as a lack of knowledge about the PRDP projects actually being implemented in their own districts. Enhanced community participation in PRDP decision-making processes at the local level would also increase ownership. This issue was raised in Teso, where community leaders noted that "when a borehole malfunctions, the community run to the district and say 'your borehole is broken,'" while instances of vandalism against project facilities and equipment have also been noted.[376]

As sub-regions compete for government attention and support, their willingness to cooperate with one another in pursuit of shared goals is undermined by conflict. A lack of transparency and insufficient community consultation in the planning and implementation of PRDP projects has led to the identification of the programme as a key conflict driver in the region.[377] Consultative meetings were held by the PRDP II planning team of the Office of the Prime Minister in the four sub-regions of Gulu, Lira, Soroti and Mbale, but these were attended mainly by district officials.[378] Community leaders cited a lack of meaningful engagement with the community as undermining ownership and fuelling mistrust of the PRDP.[379] The manner in which PRDP funds are disbursed at sub-regional and district levels is also a significant conflict driver; issues such as a lack of transparency in tendering procedures, the poor quality of some of the work carried out, competition between districts for funds and some cultural institutions receiving financial support, are all seen as driving conflict across the eight sub-regions.[380] A community representative who participated in mid-term review meetings for PRDP I implementation in Lango and Acholi noted the highly competitive environment that the implementation of the

374 *Ibid.*
375 *Ibid.*
376 *Ibid.*
377 *Ibid.*
378 Office of the Prime Minister, 'Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) Phase II, July 2012-June 2015', November 2011, p. 6.
379 ACCS consultation workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.
380 *Ibid.*

plan has created, with leaders from all sub-regions claiming they "had suffered more during the war than others."[381]

However, communities acknowledge that the PRDP has made some contributions to the infrastructural recovery of the North, though this endeavour is still very much a work in progress. Many argued that for PRDP II to fulfil its potential, more emphasis is needed on community engagement and transparency so that the PRDP can win the hearts and minds of northerners.[382] There is a need to prioritise Objective 4 for sustainable peacebuilding and reconciliation in order to consolidate the Juba peace dividend,[383] while sensitising the community about the PRDP and government services and creating more forums for dialogue on the PRDP between district officials and community leaders.[384]

Communities explicitly described the underdevelopment and comparatively greater poverty levels in the North not only as a consequence of war and displacement, but as a direct outcome of the government deliberately "keeping the North down."[385] UNICEF noted in a recent study that "perceptions of government favouritism" towards central and south-western Uganda were unlikely to be dispelled by ongoing development interventions, and that in terms of driving conflict, "the perception of inequality may be as important as the reality."[386] Poverty breeds despair, disgruntlement and potentially conflict, especially if coupled with a sense of deliberate marginalisation and neglect when others within the country are becoming wealthier. This dynamic is often dangerously manipulated by community and political leaders to strengthen their support base.[387] The PRDP has failed to adequately engage communities in consultation, planning and implementation of projects and has itself become a conflict driver in the North. A lack of transparency has given rise to allegations of corruption, fuelling tension between sub-regions, districts and sub-counties, as well as conflicts between district authorities and communities, and between ethnic groups that consider others to be favoured by its assistance.[388]

h) IDP return and reintegration challenges

The majority of the 1.8 million internally displaced people (IDPs) who lived in camps at the height of the LRA war have returned to their areas of origin or resettled in new locations since the 2006 ceasefire agreement.[389] Following the promulgation in 2008 of the Camp Phase Out Guidelines by the Office of the Prime Minister, some owners of land where IDP camps had been established began pressuring IDPs to leave.[390] Uganda was one of the first countries in the world to develop a formal policy on IDPs in 2004, and in January 2010 Uganda became the first state to ratify the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa (Kampala Convention).[391] The 2004 National Policy on IDPs guarantees the right of the displaced to freely choose between return, local integration or settlement elsewhere in the country.[392]

381 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshop s in northern Uganda, Lira, 17 September 2012.
382 Refugee Law Project, 'PRDP II, What Needs to Change: Views from *Te-yat*', ACCS Report, 19 May 2012.
383 Office of the Prime Minister, 'Peace, Recovery and Development Plan For Northern Uganda (PRDP) Phase II, July 2012-June 2015', *op. cit.*
384 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Tororo 24 September 2012.
385 ACCS consultation workshops in northern Uganda, 10-28 September 2012.
386 Knutzen, A. and Smith, A., 'UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme: Uganda Conflict Analysis', October 2012, p. 31.
387 *Ibid.*
388 ACCS consultation workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.
389 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 'Uganda: Need to focus on returnees and remaining IDPs in transition to development', 24 May 2012, www.internal-displacement.org/uganda-overview-may2012.pdf.
390 *Ibid.*
391 *Ibid.*
392 Office of the Prime Minister, National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons, August 2004, www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/ E144C92E313CB097C12570C400504361/$file/National+Policy+for+IDPs.pdf.

Table 7: Internal displacement in northern Uganda

- There are still around 30,000 displaced people in the sub-regions of Acholi, Bunyoro, Teso and West Nile.
- 19,986 reside in camps that have already been officially closed, 9,325 in transit sites, and 465 in active camps.
- At the end of 2011 the following numbers of IDPs were registered in the respective districts:
  - Acholi sub-region: Amuru 6,779, Gulu 3,512, Kitgum 4,287, and Pader 6,677.
  - Bunyoro sub-region: Masindi 6,500.
  - Teso sub-region: Amuria 120, Katakwi 600.
  - West-Nile sub-region: Adjumani 1,301.

As IDPs have returned, land disputes in return areas have increased as many returnees have been unable to recall or agree on the exact boundaries of their land. Some early returnees took advantage of the fact that former neighbours had not yet returned by moving the boundaries of their land, something which is likely to further disadvantage vulnerable IDPs who have not yet returned.[393] An estimated 65 percent of land disputes in the North have taken place in land abandoned by IDPs, while traditional land dispute mechanisms have been eroded by displacement.[394]

Support for reintegration in areas of return has been largely inadequate, with difficulties accessing basic services and no sustainable means of livelihood.[395] Community representatives consulted for this report noted that the return of IDPs has put a strain on basic services. In all the sub-regions where IDPs have returned the incidence of land disputes in relation to return were noted.[396] For example, in Acholi sub-region the return process has been marred by service provision challenges like inadequate access to water, scarce livelihoods opportunities, minimal food security, remote health and educational services and insufficient law and order structures in areas of return, as well as disputes over land and property that continue to affect return movements and the sustainability of reintegration. In Gulu and Kitgum, some respondents hailed the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) and National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) as having provided benefits for some former IDPs in ways that are helping them rebuild their lives.[397] But the positive impact has been limited to a few individuals and undermined by perceptions of favouritism, if not corruption, and the fact that these programmes are not equitably available to all, increasing tensions amongst communities.[398]

i) Ongoing insecurity and inadequate DDR

'Though the guns have been physically removed and some communities have been disarmed, psychologically the people are still armed. If you ask a Karimojong now whether or not they want guns, they would say yes. The fear of insecurity and threats to livelihoods must also be removed."

(Community representative, Moroto, 28 September 2012)

In the early 2000s, during the peak of the Lord's Resistance Army insurgency in the North, the government recruited over 3,000 people into auxiliary forces to help boost the UPDF efforts. But following the ceasefire many retained their guns, while

393 Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC): *Peace, Recovery and Development: Challenges in Northern Uganda*, March 2010, www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/D15CF62D20C90469C12576FE002EEFA4/$file/Uganda+briefing+paper+-+March+2010.pdf.

394 Mabikke, S., April 2011, quoted in Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Uganda Country Profile, 24 May 2012, www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountrySummaries)/0DFAE854B2E94F8BC12579FF00288316?OpenDocument&count=10000.

395 'Northern Uganda's displaced people are left to fend for themselves', *The Guardian*, 24 January 2012, www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/jan/24/northern-uganda-displaced-people-out-in-cold, accessed 3 October 2012.

396 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

397 See 'OPM NUSAF II, Testimonies of beneficiaries of NUSAF 2 in Acholi sub-region', Special Pullout, *Saturday Vision*, 1 September 2012.

398 See RLP, 'From Arid Areas into the Desert: IDP Policy Implementation 2006-2012', forthcoming.

inadequate demobilisation and reintegration support has left many disgruntled. Efforts to disarm the Karimojong yielded some results, but the heavy-handed approach employed resulted in widespread human rights abuses by military officers.[399] Other northern sub-regions are also believed to harbour illegal firearms, and despite the relative success of the disarmament interventions, communities consulted by ACCS made a direct link between weapon availability, disgruntled ex-combatants, disenfranchised youth and current insecurity in their communities.[400] In Bunyoro stakeholders noted a "culture of violence that prevails in the community," which remains a significant conflict driver. Community leaders noted that the failure to successfully demobilise, compensate, and reintegrate ex-combatants was a factor.[401] These sentiments were echoed in Teso, where community leaders noted a prevailing "culture of the gun" which has led to deadly disputes between families and clans over land.[402] Security perceptions amongst communities consulted by ACCS appears to have worsened in Acholi (9.4 percent reduction in the percentage of respondents with confidence in sustained peace and security, from 79.2 percent in 2011 to 69.8 percent in 2012) and Lango (1 percent reduction, from 79.7 percent in 2011 to 78.7 percent in 2012). Overall, out of 3,982 respondents across the PRDP sub-regions, 68.8 percent expressed confidence in sustained peace and security in their communities.[403]

The availability of illegal arms continues to threaten security in many communities consulted by ACCS.[404] All expressed their wish to see a reduction in the presence of weapons, though many still lack confidence in the UPDF's ability to provide security following the disarming of communities while also fearing confrontations between the police and those keeping illegal weapons.[405] Communities have noted that financial incentives to encourage the surrender of weapons would be more effective, while others had noted that the initial lapse of Part II of the Amnesty Act may have discouraged some people from coming forward and surrendering their weapons for fear of prosecution.[406] Asked why they thought civilians might want to own guns, respondents to a 2010 Karamoja conflict and security assessment conducted by ACCS cited the failure by government to protect them from other ethnic groups and protection of livestock as the key factors that could lead them to re-arm. Communities consulted cited an ongoing feeling of insecurity across Karamoja districts.[407] The UPDF launched a voluntary disarmament exercise in Lango sub-region in August 2012, hoping to recover the many guns still believed to be in the hands of residents in all eight districts of the sub-region even though very few guns and UXO have been discovered.[408] In Acholi, following the expiration of a failed ultimatum issued locally for the voluntary surrender of weapons, the UPDF had planned a mandatory disarmament process to kick-start in August 2012 but this never took off. Both exercises will employ a community-based approach instead of the feared and controversial 'cordon and search' operations undertaken in Karamoja. The UPDF hopes to establish committees with community participation to raise awareness and mobilise people to encourage the handover of weapons.[409]

399 Saferworld, 'Tracking key conflict and security dynamics in Karamoja – an update', May 2012, www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Uganda PPP report.pdf.

400 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

401 The GLU Amnesty Commission in Gulu conducted a survey in Acholi prisons and found that 42 percent of inmates were former combatants, with an advocacy officer quoted as saying "they are committing crimes as a result of frustration … many of them are so aggressive." Quoted in 'Uganda: Lack of funding stalls ex-combatants' reintegration', IRIN News, 18 June 2012, www.irinnews.org/report/95672/UGANDA-Lack-of-funding-stalls-ex-combatants-reintegration.

402 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Soroti, 19 September 2012.

403 International Alert, *Monitoring Peace and Conflict Impacts of the PRDP in Acholi and Lango Sub-Regions,* forthcoming.

404 Saferworld, 'Tracking key conflict and security dynamics in Karamoja – an update', *op. cit.*

405 'UPDF to Launch Another Disarmament Exercise in Acholi Sub-region', *Acholi Times*, 6 August 2012, acholitimes.com, accessed 22 October 2012.

406 'Uganda: New disarmament effort seeks community involvement', IRIN News, 1 August 2012, www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/501fb9f92.html, accessed 22 October 2012.

407 Saferworld, 'Tracking key conflict and security dynamics in Karamoja – an update', *op. cit.*

408 'UPDF Launches Voluntary Disarmament in Lango', Uganda Radio Network, 8 October 2012, ugandaradionetwork.com/a/story.php?s=46227, accessed 21 October 2012.

409 'UPDF to Launch Another Disarmament Exercise in Acholi Sub-region', *Acholi Times*, *op. cit.*

Current government assessments of improved security and successful disarmament in Karamoja do not seem to reflect the continued insecurity felt by communities and the fact that significant numbers of illegal weapons still remain in civilian hands.[410] Communities consulted by ACCS cited an ongoing feeling of insecurity across all districts. While the UPDF has reduced its presence as a result of successful disarmament, concerns remain about their decreased capacity to protect communities from increasing cattle raids carried out by groups in South Sudan and Kenya.[411] Participants noted that significant numbers of weapons remain in the sub-region amongst isolated Tepeth communities in high mountainous areas, though a recent initiative between the police, Moroto district and civil society managed to secure the surrender of a number of weapons.[412] Furthermore, guns have been passed across the border between fellow Pokot, undermining disarmament efforts and emphasising the need for a concerted regional approach.[413] Participants complained that disarmament has not been equally implemented within and beyond the sub-region, leaving those who have been fully disarmed vulnerable. This has led many to re-arm in order to protect their families, property and cattle.[414]

j) Environmental degradation and natural disasters

Environmental degradation and natural disasters were identified by communities in some of the sub-regions as a significant conflict driver, in terms of their impact on food scarcity, livelihoods, competition for dwindling natural resources and changing climatic conditions. The northern and north-eastern sub-regions have witnessed changing weather patterns and severe flooding causing crop and property destruction, a factor blamed for the breakdown of infrastructure and growing food insecurity.[415] Moreover, government responses to the issue were viewed by affected communities as inadequate, thus causing tensions between communities and the authorities. A 2010 report by Uganda's National Environment Management Agency (NEMA) noted that the country was facing severe environmental problems including "soil erosion and declining soil fertility, deforestation, pollution of land, water and air resources, loss of biodiversity and over-harvesting of forests, fisheries and water resources" that are likely to aggravate poverty in many areas, including the North.[416] As natural resources are depleted, competition could fuel conflicts.

Communities consulted by ACCS in Elgon and Teso sub-regions spoke of their fear that, as traditional livelihoods are undermined by environmental degradation due to climate change and economic development, and worsening poverty and marginalisation, a lack of disaster preparedness and support from the authorities would fuel inter-community conflicts.[417] In Elgon over 300 people have died in separate landslides in Bududa, Bulambuli, Manafwa and Sironko districts in the last two years.[418] Livelihoods have been permanently destroyed, while the delay by the authorities in providing relief and support to the affected communities has angered many. Respondents recalled how food was collected and delivered to a nearby warehouse where it was left for days while those displaced by the disaster were in desperate need of food. A timely intervention by local residents and civil society actors meant that the much needed aid was eventually released. The whole sub-region remains

410 Saferworld, 'Tracking key conflict and security dynamics in Karamoja – an update',*op. cit.*

411 Police officer, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Moroto, 28 September 2012.

412 Community representative, ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Moroto, 28 September 2012.

413 *Ibid.*

414 Police officer, ACCSconsultative workshops in northern Uganda, Moroto, 28 September 2012.

415 See RLP, 'Situational Brief on Impact of Floods in Acholi Sub-region and Implications for Post-conflict Recovery', September 2012.

416 National Environment Management Agency (NEMA), State of the Environment Report for Uganda, ,2010, www.nemaug.org/reports/national_state_report_2010.pdf.

417 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10–29 September 2012.

418 'Bugisu MPs Slam GovtOver Delay To Relocate Mt. Elgon Residents', Uganda Radio Network, 28 August 2012, ugandaradionetwork.com, accessed 8 October 2012.

at risk of further landslides, and few preventive relocations have been implemented by the authorities, leaving thousands in danger of similar disasters in future. In July 2012 the Uganda Red Cross said 3,368 people in the eight districts of Elgon were at serious risk of potential landslides and needed to be relocated.[419] In 2010, after a landslide in Bududa district killed more than 300 people, the government allocated 6.4 billion shillings to relocate about 30,000 people from the slopes of Mt Elgon, but no money has been disbursed for the relocation by May 2013.[420]

Oil exploration activities are also having a negative impact on the environment and affecting oil bearing communities' access to natural resources and livelihoods. An ACCS study found that 51 percent of respondents consulted in the oil-rich regions of the Albertine Graben (including the PRDP sub-regions of Bunyoro, Acholi, and West Nile) reported increased restrictions on fishing, while 45 percent reported restrictions on access to firewood. Coupled with the unfulfilled expectations of employment opportunities and other benefits by communities living in the affected areas, this constitutes a significant driver of conflicts.

k) Tensions between traditional structures and local government[421]

"As a cultural institution representative, I don't believe what the government or the opposition say."

(Cultural leader, Mbale, 21 September 2012)

Tensions between cultural institutions and local government were cited by community representatives as a conflict driver in most sub-regions of the North. Both institutions compete for legitimacy in a context of inadequate service provision and general disappointment with the authorities.[422] Moreover, in the context of growing land disputes, it was noted that conflicts between government and investors on the one hand and cultural institutions on the other are also on the rise as cultural leaders are custodians of the contested land.[423] Though many community representatives praised the role of cultural institutions in filling service and governance gaps at the local level, others questioned the inclusion of cultural institutions in formal government and believed this would generate conflict.

In West Nile community leaders noted that tensions between districts and cultural institutions were driving conflict between communities that were loyal to either district officials or cultural leaders. In Teso, community representatives noted that the political influence of some cultural leaders has compromised their legitimacy and undermined their role as peacemakers. This was noted to be partly due to the dependence of cultural institutions on government funding.[424] Moreover, in Bukedi some community representatives noted that the role of cultural institutions in tackling popular discontent and conflicts at the local level was ambiguous. Some questioned the representativeness of cultural institutions, accusing them of being instruments of political mobilisation for the government, though noting their usefulness as most people have "no access to government institutions and services, but they have access to their cultural leaders."[425] Teso community leaders called

419 'Eight districts at risk of more landslides', *New Vision*, 9 July 2012, www.newvision.co.ug/news/632791-eight-districts-at-risk-of-more-landslides.html, accessed 10 October 2012.

420 'Bugisu MPs Slam Govt Over Delay To Relocate Mt. Elgon Residents', Uganda Radio Network, *op. cit.*

421 For an overview of the legal framework and role of cultural institutions see chapter 1, section j, p. 27.

422 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, 10-29 September 2012.

423 *Ibid.*

424 "A local government may by resolution provide privileges and benefits to a traditional or cultural leader as the local government thinks necessary." This includes honorariums, transport, family educational grants, amongst other financial support for recognised cultural institutions.Institution of Traditional or Cultural Leaders Bill, no. 24, 7 December 2010, www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/bill/2010/24.

425 *Ibid.*

for a clearly defined division of labour that would reduce disputes between district officials and cultural leaders, while Elgon community leaders noted the distinct but complementary role that cultural, religious and state institutions should perform. Attempts to curtail the role of cultural institutions are generating tensions and undermining their role as custodians of communal land and their capacity to resolve disputes a community level.[426]

The current dispute between the cultural institutions and the central government over resource sharing and greater autonomy for the kingdoms (see chapter 1 on national conflict drivers) may negatively affect the relationship between districts and cultural institutions, not least because, as cultural leaders demand a share of the oil revenue so that they can invest it in service provision in their communities, they place themselves in direct competition with districts. Proposals delivered to parliament in May 2012 by a coalition of cultural leaders demanded a share of royalties from oil revenue for cultural institutions greater than that allocated to districts, a move that analysts have warned could lead to increased inter-ethnic tensions.[427] The Public Finance Bill 2012 states that the central government will receive 93 percent of oil revenues, while the remaining 7 percent will go to the districts in the exploration and production belt. However, cultural leaders from the oil-rich sub-regions want their own 12.5 percent share while recommending that districts get 10 percent.[428]

The share of oil revenues that the traditional leaders are demanding could amount to hundreds of millions of dollars a year once extraction begins, and it is thus unlikely to be granted. However, the central government is planning to give a percentage of royalties to districts, and a portion of that may be passed on to cultural institutions. The 2012 bill states that "a district may, in consultation with the ministries responsible for culture and local governments, grant a share of the royalties due to the district to a cultural or traditional institution."[429] Giving districts the responsibility for whether or not to allocate valuable resources and political power to cultural or traditional institutions is already fuelling tensions at the local level. Despite these tensions, the role of traditional leaders in addressing conflicts at the community level was acknowledged by local government officials as well as community representatives.[430]

Conclusion

A divided northern Uganda is slowly recovering from decades of conflict and underdevelopment and, despite modest progress in rebuilding infrastructure, much work remains to be done before the North can truly declare itself to be at peace. Many communities in northern Uganda appear to be in a state of latent conflict with increasingly frequent manifestations of overt conflict in the form of clashes between communities and government officials (district, UWA, NFA), violent community disputes over boundaries or resources, or SGBV amongst other examples. The absence of widespread overt violence masks resilient conflict drivers that are undermining existing development and peacebuilding efforts. The identified conflict drivers' potential to fuel new conflicts or exacerbate existing ones is linked to their interaction with conflict legacies (e.g. ongoing displacement or psychosocial wounds) or existing grievances (e.g. historical marginalisation of the North).

426 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Mbale, 21 September 2012.

427 Makerere University History and Development Studies academic NdebesaMwebestya quoted in 'Cultural leaders' demands could cause conflict, analysts say', Oil in Uganda, 31 July 2012, www.oilinuganda.org/features/economy/cultural-leaders-demands-could-cause-conflict-analysts-say.html, accessed 12 October 2012.

428 'Bunyoro angry with Museveni on oil sharing',*Observer*, 21 June 2012, www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=19407&Itemid=114, accessed 5 November 2012.

429 Public Finance Bill, No. 5, 2012, Part VII, Section 71.8 on sharing of revenues from royalties.

430 ACCS consultative workshop in northern Uganda, 10–29 September 2012.

The inadequately addressed *legacies* of the LRA war, fuelled by new and long-standing *grievances*, are keeping communities in a state of latent conflict where *conflict drivers* (e.g. land grabbing or youth disenfranchisement) can lead to an escalation of violence if significant trigger events take place. The potential for an escalation of violence is therefore linked to the incidence and degree of gravity of the three elements. Those areas where the conflict legacies are the greatest (for example the sub-regions identified by the PRDP as most directly affected by the LRA war), or communities where grievances are most compellingly felt and articulated and conflict drivers are evident, remain the most vulnerable to overt violence. Many communities in the North remain trapped in conflict cycles that are supported by drivers and fed by grievances, pushing them towards what many respondents believe is an inevitable return to overt conflict. As grievances grow and drivers become more entrenched, the potential for trigger events already taking place in the North to lead to greater social unrest or increasingly organised forms of violence increases. In order to build sustainable peace in the North and pave the way for development it is necessary to address the three dimensions of the conflicts identified: the drivers, the legacies, and the grievances.

3

Conclusion and recommendations

Though armed conflict has come to an end in northern Uganda, social tensions that erupt into violence occur periodically and continue to threaten development and peacebuilding efforts. The analysis in this report has shown that whereas the conflict between the LRA and the GoU in northern Uganda has ended, the description of the region as a post-conflict area fails to convey the reality on the ground. The LRA insurgency is no longer active in the region but its legacy remains visible and alive in the minds of the local populace, both through the ongoing security challenges posed by small arms and light weapons and the enduring physical and psychological wounds still crippling many in the North. Furthermore, conflict drivers such as land grabbing and competition over natural resources affect the region. Many of the grievances that led to the outbreak of violence in the North in the past continue to be raised by community leaders today, including marginalisation, neglect and political exclusion by the authorities. Many legacies of the conflict remain unaddressed, in terms of physical as well as psychological damage to communities and individuals. The lack of a comprehensive transitional justice process in the North and non-existent or inadequate compensation for war-inflicted losses also contribute to driving conflict today. The inadequately addressed *legacies* of the LRA war, fuelled by new and long-standing *grievances*, are keeping communities in a state of latent conflict where *conflict drivers* (e.g. land grabbing or youth exclusion) can lead to an escalation of violence if significant trigger events take place.

Chapter 1 examined the key conflict legacies and drivers hampering peacebuilding and state-building efforts at the national level. It found that past conflicts continue to haunt communities today, whether as unhealed wounds of war or as ongoing grievances linked to marginalisation and neglect by the state, as cited by many community representatives consulted by ACCS. The issues identified are affecting many parts of Uganda, but have a more severe impact in the North as they are compounded and underpinned by comparatively higher levels of poverty and socio-economic and political exclusion. Moreover, prevalent and well-founded perceptions of neglect and marginalisation constitute powerful narratives that fuel the conflict cycle, as they compound conflict drivers that could tip communities from latent to overt conflict if trigger events of significance were to occur. **Chapter 2** examined the conflict drivers affecting the PRDP sub-regions, which are a complex and long-standing set of issues, many closely interlinked and cross-cutting in nature. Each of the eight sub-regions experienced the wars in the North in different ways, but all were affected in one way or another either through direct engagement in hostilities or through the spill-over effects of displacement and underdevelopment that

characterise post-war northern Uganda. According to community representatives in all eight sub-regions, conflicts between sub-regions, districts and communities over issues such as land, resources, and borders are on the rise and becoming increasingly violent. Communities are experiencing varying levels of overt conflict, as legacies, grievances, and current drivers create fertile ground for trigger events to lead to an escalation of violence, whether in the form of social unrest or confrontations with the authorities.

ACCS monitoring of the identified conflict drivers between 2011 and 2013 found that conflict legacies and grievances continue to dominate the post-war discourse in the North. They compound conflict drivers, contributing to a collective sense of a "marginalised and neglected North", and constituting what a participant in a recent ACCS-hosted workshop described as a "ticking time bomb".[431] Despite efforts by the PRDP and other development interventions in northern Uganda, legacies of past conflicts as well as deep-seated grievances are yet to be addressed. They continue to fuel the cycle of conflict that many communities are trapped in around the drivers identified in the analysis.

Despite a commitment by the government and international actors to rebuild northern Uganda, and the explicit articulation of the need to invest more in reconciliation and peacebuilding activities under PRDP II's Strategic Objective 4, more needs to be done to specifically address the conflict drivers identified in this report. Out of the four PRDP objectives, the one which covers peacebuilding and reconciliation receives only 3 percent of total budget, while the other 97 percent of the funds is allocated to the other three objectives.[432] Though communities consulted by ACCS acknowledge the progress made by government and donor interventions in rebuilding infrastructure, many lament that this alone will not deliver peace and that the real risk of a relapse into conflict exists unless communities' grievances are meaningfully addressed and specific interventions are implemented to build peace from below.

This report finds that ongoing conflicts in the PRDP region have the potential to undermine programmes' impact if unaddressed. In turn, conflict-insensitive programming has the potential to worsen existing conflicts and ignite new ones unless more efforts and resources are directed at conflict resolution and comprehensive transitional justice initiatives. It is therefore essential that conflict drivers are understood and closely monitored throughout programme cycles, and that conflict analysis and conflict sensitisation tools and methodologies are mainstreamed into these programmes. Moreover, the findings of this report strongly suggest that a process of truth-telling and reconciliation and more robust peacebuilding programming are crucial to ensure that a return to violence is avoided and that northern Uganda stays firmly on the path to sustainable peace and development.

In order to tackle the unaddressed legacies of war, pervasive community grievances, and the conflict drivers identified, two sets of targeted recommendations are presented. The **first** tackles *conflict legacies* and *community grievances* by offering guidelines to make the PRDP more conflict-sensitive in order to enhance its effectiveness, while setting out specific measures to increase the peacebuilding impact of the PRDP through the strengthening of relevant components. The **second** includes recommendations addressing each of the key *cross-cutting conflict drivers* identified by this report that go beyond the PRDP to guide the interventions of all relevant stakeholders in the North.

431 ACCS validation workshop, Tororo district, Bukedi sub-region, 24 September 2012.

432 Office of the Prime Minister, 'Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) Phase II, July 2012-June 2015', November 2011.

3.1. Addressing conflict legacies and grievances: enhancing the conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding impact of the PRDP

The PRDP was developed to address the legacies of decades of war, such as decimated infrastructure, ongoing displacement or psychosocial trauma, through the reconstruction of infrastructure, institutions and communities. Many of these legacies remain at least partially unaddressed, and this continues to undermine the overall impact and effectiveness of the PRDP. The planning, implementation and assessment of the PRDP has been criticised by communities as not inclusive, transparent, or participatory enough. This undermines ownership and fuels the grievances of communities that perceive such shortcomings as the outcome of neglect and marginalisation. This in turn compromises two key aspects of the PRDP: to win the hearts and minds of the people of northern Uganda, and to rebuild the social contract between communities in the North and the state. The PRDP has great potential to be a peacebuilding and state-building tool, but the insensitivity of the program to community needs undermines these key potential outcomes. PRDP I has recognised this fact and recommends the conflict sensitisation of its activities.[433] The added value of making the PRDP conflict-sensitive goes beyond its impact on and responsiveness to conflict. Making the PRDP conflict-sensitive will strengthen the overall programme by mainstreaming approaches and tools that enhance inclusion, transparency and participation, as well as making PRDP interventions more responsive to sub-regional/district contexts and conflict dynamics on the ground.

PRDP conflict-sensitivity checklist[434]

- A conflict analysis of the relevant sub-region, district, sub-county, parish or village must be included in needs assessment, development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all PRDP programmes and projects.
- The more participatory the conflict analysis, the more relevant it will be, so sufficient time and resources for the analysis must be allocated, while ensuring the inclusion of key stakeholders, including beneficiaries.
- Conflict responsiveness must be mainstreamed into PRDP activities by linking the conflict analysis findings to key parameters of the programme/project (what the programme/project will do; who will implement it; who the beneficiaries or participants will be; where, when and how it will be implemented) and allowing flexibility and adaptability to potential changes in context and relationships.
- Communicate the need to make all aspects of the programme/project conflict-sensitive and to produce appropriate evidence of conflict sensitisation activities to relevant stakeholders, implementing partners and beneficiaries.
- PRDP activities must target beneficiaries in a conflict-sensitive way by identifying the impact of the activities and outcomes on key relationships, such as those between direct and indirect beneficiaries, between beneficiaries and surrounding communities, between local government and communities, and between different communities in the target area.
- PRDP activities must aim to minimise negative impacts while promoting positive impacts on key relationships through inclusive partnership-building interventions.
- Implementers must consult and communicate frequently and openly with relevant stakeholders and ensure transparency by sharing information about activities proactively and in locally relevant ways (e.g. local radio or leaflets in local languages instead of posting information on a website).

433 Office of the Prime Minister, 'Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) Phase II, July 2012-June 2015', November 2011.

434 Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, "How-to Guide to Conflict Sensitivity", February 2012.

- PRDP programmes and projects must manage expectations throughout the implementation cycle through effective communication with all relevant stakeholders.
- PRDP programmes and projects must tackle negative community perceptions about their activities through openness and transparency, while developing systems to incorporate feedback and be accountable to relevant stakeholders throughout the project/programme cycle.
- PRDP programmes and projects must include participatory exit strategies that take into account the potential negative impact of terminating their activities on key relationships and the local context, and find ways to minimise it.

PRDP activities must include a budget for making the intervention conflict-sensitive, as 'soft' programme/project components like 'participation', 'transparency' and 'communication with communities' can turn out to be costly activities that may require for example, outsourcing expertise or services, transport, venues, materials, interpreters, or media campaigns. The establishment of a **conflict sensitivity component**[435] under PRDP Strategic Objective 4 would enable stakeholders implementing projects under PRDP II to tap into resources to support their conflict sensitisation activities.

Strengthening the peacebuilding impact of the PRDP

Despite the fact that the 2011 mid-term review of the PRDP found that "conflict drivers such as land, youth unemployment and inadequate reintegration of ex-combatants" had not been adequately assessed or addressed, the proposed PRDP II Strategic Objective (SO) 4, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation, is unlikely to comprehensively address the above conflict drivers and others identified in this research. Moreover, a PRDP that does not prioritise this strategic objective is unlikely to effectively tackle the unaddressed conflict legacies and pervasive community grievances identified. In order to strengthen the peacebuilding impact of PRDP II and support the greater focus on conflict sensitisation and community dispute resolution articulated in the PRDP II document, the government of Uganda and its development partners should pay heed the following recommendation:

- SO4 needs a **significant increase of targeted funds** (including the proposed **conflict sensitivity fund** above) and a robust commitment from the government to contribute to its implementation and success. Currently SO4 receives only 3 percent of the total PRDP II budget, and it is to be disbursed through off-budget donor project activities instead of core government grants. This may signal a lack of government commitment to this objective, calling for a more prominent role for relevant central and local authorities. However, this arrangement does provide a unique opportunity for development partners to have a direct and tangible impact on peacebuilding in the North by engaging local governments and civil society and should be utilised to implement the recommendations included in this report.
- Taking this DFID-funded conflict analysis as a departure point and an example of good practice for post-conflict development interventions, all development partners should ensure that their PRDP interventions in the North are fully sensitive to conflict through the mainstreaming of **conflict-sensitive approaches** as part of all programme/project cycles, as well as **conflict and peace impact assessment of all PRDP projects implemented.**
- There is need to compile a set of specific peacebuilding indicators for each district and develop **district peacebuilding matrices** for the PRDP to guide the above conflict sensitisation activities, including community-owned indicators and

435 The said fund could be managed initially by ACCS on behalf of development partners, and disbursed in partnership with local government, civil society, development partners, and relevant private sector actors through agreed upon, appropriate and participatory mechanisms at sub-regional and district level. Saferworld has relevant technical expertise in conflict-sensitive development interventions, and as a member of the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium (see www.conflictsensitivity.org), is in a position to assist partners to develop and implement conflict sensitive inputs and strategies.

means of verification, and agreed targets for all conflict drivers in the sub-region. The peacebuilding matrices should be developed with the participation of all relevant stakeholders, including development partners, international and local NGOs, cultural and religious leaders, and community representatives, and tap into relevant programs and local initiatives.

There are two programme areas under SO4: Reintegration and Resettlement, and Community Dispute Resolution and Reconciliation. Whereas the activities under the former appear comprehensive, the latter requires the following additional measures and intervention by both government and development partners to ensure its effectiveness:

- *"Enhancing the roles of community level mechanisms, taking into account how traditional and formal mechanisms interact"* – PRDP II fails to describe in detail how these mechanisms will be enhanced, or how the tensions between formal and informal mechanisms will be resolved. In order to address these shortcomings, existing traditional mechanism in each sub-region must be mapped and a needs assessment to identify and overcome challenges to their effectiveness must be urgently carried out. **District/sub-county/parish dispute resolution strategies** (to be incorporated into the district peacebuilding matrices above) should then be developed in collaboration with all relevant stakeholders to strengthen dispute resolution capacities and effectiveness. Modalities to establish new synergies or support existing ones between the formal and traditional systems should be explored and supported.

Although PRDP II development partners are requested to "support conflict analysis and mapping" to "identify and address local conflict drivers", the related "creation of space for reconciliation processes" is vaguely indicated to require support from development partners in delivering training without stating who should be trained and to what aim.

- Specific **interventions to support formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms** identified in the sub-regional dispute resolution strategies above should be developed with relevant stakeholders. This support should be guided by the targets and indicators included in the district peacebuilding matrices, in a dedicated section to support dispute resolution mechanisms. Such activities should be developed by tapping into the existing peacebuilding resources and/or ongoing programmes in the intervention context, e.g. District Reconciliation and Peace Teams (DRPTs) and relevant NGO/civil society networks.

PRDP II has successfully identified key areas where stronger commitment is needed to ensure that the strategic objective of peacebuilding and reconciliation is realised. However, inclusive and participatory institutional/policy frameworks need to be devised to ensure that the good intentions articulated in the document become a tangible reality to communities in the North still affected by conflict.

3.2. Key thematic recommendation on cross–cutting issues

Competition over natural resources and property: land, oil, forests and minerals

To the central Government of Uganda

- Establishment of district oversight forums including relevant district departments, CSOs, cultural and religious leaders, community leaders and investors to monitor, collate and share information regarding resource exploration/extraction and commercial land development activities to promote transparency and lawful investment.

- The above forums to promote transparency in the oil industry by sharing information about licensing and impact on affected communities' property rights.
- Disseminate the land policy and relevant legislative acts widely in local languages and in accessible local media or public information forums to increase awareness.
- Support access to fair compensation rates for those affected by exploration or commercialisation of land and resources through information campaigns, engagement and discussion with the landowners, free legal aid, and support CSOs working on these issues.
- Reform the conservation laws and provide effective compensation for affected communities.

To the sub-regional/district levels of the Government of Uganda

- Build capacity of lower-level local council courts and area land committees to tackle natural resources and property conflicts in the North.
- Recognise and engage traditional leaders in dispute resolution mechanisms.

To development partners and international agencies/NGOs

- Support the above government-led processes and facilitate consensus-building amongst international stakeholders on joint approaches to tackle natural resources and property conflicts in the North.

To community leaders[436]

- Document and disseminate principles and practices of customary land tenure to enhance awareness amongst relevant stakeholders, and promote knowledge of relevant land policy/legislation to ensure communities' awareness of applicable communal and individual property rights.
- Ensure a balanced approach between communal and individual property rights to ensure equitable access and enjoyment by all community members
- Collaborate with lower-level local council courts and area land committees to tackle natural resources and property conflicts.
- Participate in mechanisms established to oversee resource exploration/extraction and commercial land development activities.

To communities and local civil society

Support local government and cultural institutions' efforts to tackle conflicts over natural resources and property in the North.

Participate in mechanisms established to oversee resource exploration/extraction and commercial land development activities.

Youth exclusion

To the central Government of Uganda

- Strengthen the youth department in the Ministry of Gender and enable the National Youth Council to effectively develop and implement relevant policies and programmes to tackle youth exclusion in the North.
- Adequately support the activities of the Northern Uganda Youth Development Centre (NUYDC) and its Vocational Training Institutes (VTIs) so as to allow youth currently undertaking vocational training to complete their studies; the support should also target admission of specific groups like ex-combatants.

436 For the purpose of these recommendations, 'community leaders' is a broad category encompassing cultural institutions, clan leaders and elders, as well as other forms of legitimate representation adopted by communities.

- Relax conditions for access to the Youth Venture Capital Fund for communities in northern Uganda, and expedite access to the fund.

To the sub-regional/district levels of the Government of Uganda

- A job-market needs assessment and skills survey should be undertaken in each district to reveal the real demand for new labour, feeding into a training needs review that avoids the duplication, redundancy and frustration currently experienced by recent trainees.
- Develop affirmative action training and capacity building programmes in collaboration with the private sector and community leaders to increase employment opportunities in the oil and mineral exploitation sector for youth in the North, and institute programmes that specifically target youth placement in employment opportunities.
- Improve young people's access to micro-credit, particularly for women, to address the widely expressed need for start-up funds to commence economic activities.

To development partners and international agencies/NGOs

- Support the above government-led measures and earmark funds for youth programming in northern Uganda.
- Ensure that donor-funded youth programming develops adequate follow-up strategies for skills training to ensure continuity and linkages to the job market.
- Support the implementation of "job fairs" across the districts of the North, and promote linkages between the NUYDC, relevant district departments, youth groups and higher secondary/higher education institutions.

To community leaders

- Engage youth in local governance and decision-making processes and facilitate the appointment of young men and women to substantive positions within cultural institutions.

To communities and local civil society

- NGOs should be encouraged to establish constituencies of alumni who can serve as role models for youth beneficiaries after their withdrawal from the field.
- Promote the de-stigmatisation of youth and their social inclusion by engaging young men and women in community service-type initiatives.

Inadequate post-conflict truth, reconciliation and transitional justice processes

To the central Government of Uganda

- Develop appropriate transitional justice policy and legislation (e.g. reparation policy and the proposed national reconciliation bill) to promote individual repair and social healing for national reconciliation.
- Increase funding and support for victims of the war (physical and psychosocial) at individual and community levels to enhance healing and empowerment.
- Adopt a multi-sectoral approach to addressing the transitional justice agenda by working with relevant line ministries (Health, Education, Justice, Gender and Labour, OPM, etc.) to ensure government responsiveness to people's needs and restore people's confidence and trust in the government.

To the sub-regional/district levels of the Government of Uganda

- Support the roles of cultural/religious leaders and CSOs in mediation, dialogue, documentation, research and advocacy to contribute to the reintegration and peacebuilding processes in the region.
- Adequately support the activities of the Demobilisation and Resettlement Teams (DRTs) to implement their roles as prescribed in the Amnesty Law.
- Balance the focus on prosecution with reparations to victims and ensure that appropriate budgetary support exists for both punitive and restorative elements of the transitional justice process.

To development partners and international agencies/NGOs

- Support the government-led development of a comprehensive reparation policy and earmark funds to support community-based transitional justice processes.
- Support capacity building for civil society organisations to articulate grassroots community voices in promoting accountability and reconciliation in a national platform.
- Target development interventions to areas identified by communities through transitional justice processes to consolidate the peace dividends.

To community leaders

- Collaborate with local authorities and relevant stakeholders to support transitional justice processes at the local level.
- Offer public support to individuals (perpetrators and victims) who agree to engage in transitional justice processes and encourage support from their communities.

To communities and local civil society

- Support and participate in transitional justice processes at local levels.

Generational and gender conflicts

To the central Government of Uganda

- Promote gender equality through enhanced support and visibility for the Directorate of Gender and Community Development within the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development.
- Earmark legal aid support for SGBV victims to tackle all aspects of the aftermath of the crime, including medical examinations, travel to police and courts, legal fees, and adequate compensation packages following convictions.
- Promote community policing approaches, including specialised training for community police units on how to deal with SGBV in order to build trust within the communities to report cases as well as strengthening police responses.
- Implement community awareness campaigns on SGBV and articulate a zero-tolerance stance towards SGBV by government institutions, including law enforcement agencies and the judiciary.
- Promote positive images of youth and develop policies that encourage inter-generational cooperation.

To the sub-regional/district levels of the Government of Uganda

- Promote gender equality through enhanced support for district gender officers to develop and implement relevant inclusion policies and programming.

- Promote cooperation between traditional leaders and youth in civil society through the development and implementation of inter-generational community development initiatives.
- Strengthen and support community-based SGBV victim support services.
- Provide training and support to relevant service providers dealing with victims of SGBV, including health care professionals, social services, police and courts.
- Engage cultural leaders to develop an integrated approach to formal/informal justice processes for victims of SGBV, whereby both punitive and restorative aspects are supported if so chosen by SGBV victims.
- Ensure that *if* community-based/informal justice processes are chosen by SGBV victims, it does not exclude them from accessing appropriate state support.
- Identify and support SGBV focal persons in different health facilities charged with taking the lead on SGBV cases and making referrals to other actors to ensure that survivors get the medical care and judicial redress that they require.

To development partners and international agencies/NGOs

- Support the above government-led measures and earmark funds for SGBV programming in northern Uganda, especially research, awareness raising, and community-based support for victims.
- Ensure the conflict sensitisation of interventions to empower women, by mainstreaming the concept of broader community benefits and the inclusion of men to ensure community support for projects and their outcomes.
- Support research to understand the prevalence and specific nature of SGBV in the North, and develop programming sensitive to issues such as the relationship between masculinity, identity and prevalent cultures of violence in the North.

To community leaders

- Support women and youth participation in community decision-making processes and appoint youth and women to key positions within cultural institutions.
- Collaborate with local-level authorities and relevant institutions to tackle SGBV at community level and promote a zero-tolerance stance towards SGBV by cultural institutions.
- Collaborate with local authorities to develop an integrated approach to formal and informal justice processes to deal with SGBV, whereby both punitive and restorative aspects are supported if so chosen by SGBV victims.
- Ensure that informal justice processes do not compromise the right to access to justice, support and compensation (if appropriate) for victims of SGBV.

To communities and local civil society

- Support efforts by the authorities and community leaders to promote gender equality and youth engagement, and encourage the participation of women and girls in such initiatives.
- Implement and participate in community-based initiatives to complement SGBV awareness-raising campaigns at central and district levels, including both radio (more accessible to men and boys) and drama (more accessible to women and girls).
- Promote the inclusion of women, men, girls and boys in such initiatives to sensitise the whole community about preventive and supportive approaches targeted at potential perpetrators and victims respectively.

Perceptions of neglect over poor service delivery and infrastructure

To the central Government of Uganda

- Ensure availability and accessibility of key services, including through improved infrastructure as articulated in the PRDP, in order to improve confidence in government and tackle the grievances associated with perceived marginalisation and neglect amongst communities in the North.
- Allocate adequate resources to build the capacity of district staff as foreseen under the Local Government Capacity Enhancement Programme and Programme 6 of the PRDP.
- Address corruption at all government levels through thorough investigation, prosecution of culprits and recovery of stolen assets, as well as providing timely information to affected communities about the steps taken to tackle misappropriation of public funds on order to build public confidence.

To the sub-regional/district levels of the Government of Uganda

- Promote community participation in the delivery of key services through the engagement of cultural institutions and the appointment of community focal points for key service sectors, where information can be regularly shared and collected and services tailored to community needs.
- Support community services and other relevant departments, including through the implementation of regular outreach activities to remote areas of each district to ensure access to services and inclusion of all communities.
- Ensure information about services and relevant forms are available in local languages and use appropriate means to reach community members who are unable to read or write.
- Ensure that key technical posts charged with supervision of infrastructure projects are filled as a matter of priority through a fast-track recruitment process of qualified candidates to be recruited locally, or include incentive packages for qualified candidates prepared to relocate to the North if the relevant skills are not found locally.

To development partners and international agencies/NGOs

- Support the above government-led measures and earmark funds for the development of district staff service delivery capacity and for the support of community participation in local governance.
- The ACCS consortium should undertake an analysis of the consultative process used by local authorities at community level to establish the extent to which effective participation by the citizenry takes place, and identify opportunities and strategies for better engagement and the incorporation of conflict sensitivity in development planning.

To community leaders

- Support the efforts of districts to deliver services to communities and facilitate community participation in local governance.

To communities and local civil society

- Support and participate in district initiatives to reach out to and consult communities.
- Through the proposed community focal points for key services, mobilise communities' participation in planning and delivery of services.
- Report any gaps in service provision to the relevant authorities, including MPs.

Perceptions of marginalisation over distribution of development assistance

To the central Government of Uganda

- Establish and support eight sub-regional PRDP II planning and oversight forums to include representatives from each district, development partners, cultural/religious leaders, civil society, communities and private sector representatives, and make all meetings and activities public and transparent.
- Support information campaigns to raise awareness of all PRDP II activities in each sub-region/district/sub-county/parish, including locally appropriate ways to disseminate information about PRDP implementation including criteria for fund allocation.

To the sub-regional/district levels of the Government of Uganda

- Ensure all aspects of the design, tender, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of PRDP II projects are conflict-sensitive, including mandatory conflict and peace impact assessments.

To development partners and international agencies/NGOs

- Support efforts by the eight sub-regional PRDP forums and the districts to oversee and strengthen PRDP II projects through capacity building and providing technical expertise.
- Promote community participation in planning and development of PRDP community-based projects at district level, and link it up to the proposed sub-regional oversight forums.

To community leaders, communities and local civil society

- Participate in and support the eight PRDP forums to enhance community participation and ownership of PRDP II.

Creation of new districts and poor local governance

To the central Government of Uganda

- Devise clear criteria and minimum standards required for the creation of functional and sustainable districts and consult widely with communities before establishing any further districts once the current moratorium expires.
- Provide adequate and urgent resources to new districts to ensure adequate service delivery.
- Prioritise and provide support for the resolution of ongoing conflicts between 'parent' and new districts undermining adequate service provision.
- The Ministry of Public Service and district service commissions should be supported to fill vacant positions in both old and new districts, to increase their ability to meet their functional needs and to respond to the development needs of the communities.

To the sub-regional/district levels of the Government of Uganda

- Parent and new districts should cooperate and ensure the provision of adequate services to their constituents through interim arrangements until new districts become self-sufficient.
- Parent and new districts embroiled in disputes should seek to resolve them promptly through the support of third parties, e.g. the Ministry for Local Government or MPs; and ensure the participation of communities in order to make the resolution process public and accountable.

To development partners and international agencies/NGOs

- Support and facilitate cooperation between parent and new districts to ensure adequate service provision
- Facilitate community participation in local government through the support of civil society organisations working on good governance.

To community leaders, communities and local civil society

- Support and facilitate cooperation between parent and new districts to ensure access to services for all communities.
- Support bottom-up conflict resolution processes between parent and new districts.

IDP return and reintegration challenges

To the central Government of Uganda

- Renew efforts to ensure the sustainable return of the remaining 30,000 IDPs, including through protection interventions to support often vulnerable cases.
- Renew efforts and ensure adequate resources are available to districts and civil society groups providing support to past and future returnees.

To the sub-regional/district levels of the Government of Uganda

- Strengthen the District Return and Reintegration teams and the District Land Boards so they can effectively address land matters affecting returnees, through conflict resolution skills (mediation, dialogue), advocacy and capacity building on land-related matters.

To development partners and international agencies/NGOs

- Advocate for sustainable solutions to the ongoing displacement of the over 30,000 remaining IDPs.
- Prioritise capacity building and support for district departments dealing with the return and reintegration of the displaced.
- Support civil society initiatives to research, document, advocate and support return and reintegration processes.

To community leaders, communities and local civil society

Renew efforts to support the reintegration of returnees and participate in outreach activities to remaining IDPs by their communities.

Ongoing insecurity and inadequate DDR

To the central Government of Uganda

- Consolidate the implementation of voluntary civilian disarmament programmes and roll out small arms control measures throughout the North with active involvement of community leaders.
- Support community policing approaches and increase the representation of northern communities in the police force.

To the sub-regional/district levels of the Government of Uganda

- Promote community safety through participatory engagement and dialogue with communities and community police to develop district community safety plans and initiatives.
- Expedite and strengthen support to ex-combatants to enhance community safety.

To development partners and international agencies/NGOs

- Promote cross-border community safety initiatives engaging police and community leaders from border regions in northern Uganda, Kenya, DRC and South Sudan in order to address the challenge of small arms proliferation.
- Support a comprehensive mapping exercise to assess the availability of small arms in communities in the North.
- Earmark funds to support the development of community policing approaches and capacity for the police force in Uganda.
- Support community-based peer support initiatives for ex-combatants and ex-abductees.

To community leaders, communities and local civil society

- Promote community safety by facilitating dialogue and consultation between communities (especially key constituencies such as youth, women, ex-combatants) and relevant institutions, e.g. districts, community police.

Environmental degradation and natural disasters

To the central Government of Uganda

- Strengthen the environmental conservation policy and legal framework to promote sustainable and conflict-sensitive development.

To the sub-regional/district levels of the Government of Uganda

- Proposed district community safety plans (see p. 92) to include adequately resourced disaster risk reduction strategies and mechanisms to strengthen capacity and coordination amongst relevant stakeholders.
- Districts affected by environmental or natural disasters should develop adequate preventive measures and compensation packages in case of forced relocation of affected communities.

To development partners and international agencies/NGOs

- Support districts' capacity to respond to environmental challenges and natural disasters.
- Advocate for the prioritisation by relevant ministries of assistance to those still displaced following the most recent floods.

To community leaders, communities and local civil society

- Proactively participate in district efforts to prepare for environmental or natural disasters.

Tensions between traditional structures and local government

To the Government of Uganda (central, sub-regional, district levels)

- Support institutional partnerships and a clear division of roles and responsibilities between districts and legitimate cultural leaders to ensure adequate service provision and to promote public participation in local governance.

To development partners and international agencies/NGOs

- Advocate for and support the above partnerships as a means to promote enhanced access to services where appropriate.

To community leaders, communities and local civil society

- Through their involvement in the proposed sub-regional oversight forums (see p. 90 above), facilitate cultural leaders' engagement in ensuring equitable access for communities to revenues from resource exploitation.

Bibliography

Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE), 2005. 'Government's plan to degazette Pian Upe game reserve and its implications'. www.acode-u.org/documents/InfosheetNo12005.pdf.

African Youth Initiative Network (AYINET), 2012. *Surgery, Medical and Psychosocial Rehabilitation for Victims of War.* Kampala: UN Peacebuilding Fund.

Amarasuriya, Harini, Gündüz, Canan and Mayer, Markus, 2009. *Rethinking the nexus between youth, unemployment and conflict: Perspectives from Sri Lanka*. London: International Alert.

Apuuli, Kasaija Philip, 2008. 'The International Criminal Court and the LRA Insurgency in Northern Uganda'. In *The Resolution of African Conflict*, ed. Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza. Ohio University Press.

Cheme, Marie, 2009. 'Overview of Corruption in Uganda'. Anti-Corruption Resource Centre Brief, 4 March 2009. www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-in-uganda/.

CIDI, 2005. 'WATSAN Project for Soroti IDPs: the entry point to conflict prevention and peacebuilding'. Newsletter.

Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., 2004. 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War'. *Oxford Economics Papers*, vol. 56, issue 4, pp. 563–595.

Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012. 'How-to Guide to Conflict Sensitivity'.

Cross-Cultural Foundation of Uganda, 2010. *Culture in governance: does it work? Four Ugandan experiences*. Kampala: CCFU.

DED, 2010. *Pastoral Conflict in the Karamoja Region of Northeastern Uganda*.

Dolan, C., 2006. *Uganda Strategic Conflict Analysis.* Kampala: Swedish International Development Agency.

Enough Project, 2012. 'The End of Amnesty in Uganda: Implication for LRA Defection'. www.enoughproject.org/files/GuluDispatch.pdf.

Esuruku, Robert S., 2012. 'Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda'. In *Where Law Meets Reality: Forging African Transitional Justice*, ed. Chris Dolan et al. Cape Town: Refugee Law Project and Fahamu Books.

Esuruku, Robert S., 2013. 'Conceptualising Youth Identity and National Unity in Uganda'. Unpublished paper.

Gersony, Robert, 1997. *The Anguish of Northern Uganda: Results of a Field-Based Assessment of the Civil Conflicts in Northern Uganda*. Kampala: USAID Mission Report.

Ginyera-Pincywa, A.G., 1992. *Northern Uganda in National Politics*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick., 2008. 'Collapse, War and Reconstruction in Uganda: An Analytical Narrative on State-Making'. London: Crisis States Research Centre and LSE, Working Paper no. 27.

Government of Uganda, Ministry of Education and Sports, 2008. 'Education Needs Assessment for Northern Uganda'.

Government of Uganda, Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2011. Uganda National Land Policy.

Government of Uganda, Ministry of Local Government, 2012. Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Governments 2011, Final Synthesis Report 2012. www.molg.go.ug/publications/271-annual-assessment-of-minimum-conditions-and-performance-measures-for-local-governments-2011.

Government of Uganda, Ministry of Trade, Planning and Economic Development, 2012. 'Poverty Status Report: Poverty Reduction and the National Development Process'.

Government of Uganda, Office of the Prime Minister, 2004. National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons. www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/E144C92E313CB097C12570C400504361/$file/National+Policy+for+IDPs.pdf.

Government of Uganda, Office of the Prime Minister, 2007. Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda. www.opm.go.ug/projects/ peace-and-recovery-development-plan-prdp.html.

Government of Uganda, Office of the Prime Minister, 2011. 'Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) Phase II, July 2012 – June 2015'.

Greenawalt, Alexander K. A., 2009. 'Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal Court'. *Virginia Journal of International Law*, vol. 50, no. 107.

Human Rights Watch, 2012. *Curtailing Criticism: Intimidation and Obstruction of Civil Society in Uganda*. hrw.org/reports/2012/08/21/curtailing-criticism.

Human Rights Watch, 2012. World Report 2012: Uganda.

IDMC, 2012. 'Uganda: Need to focus on returnees and remaining IDPs in transition to development'. www.internal-displacement.org/uganda-overview-may2012.pdf.

IMF, 2000. *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper: Uganda Poverty Eradication Action Plan*. www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/2000/uga/01/, accessed 23 June 2012.

International Alert, 2008. *Building a Peace Economy in Northern Uganda: Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Recovery and Growth*. Kampala: International Alert.

International Alert, 2009. *Enabling Peace Economies through Early Recovery: Perspectives from Uganda*. Kampala: International Alert.

International Alert, 2009. *Harnessing Oil for Peace and Development in Uganda*. Kampala: International Alert.
International Alert, 2012. *Post-war Economic Opportunities in Northern Uganda: Implications for Women's Empowerment and Political Participation*. Kampala: International Alert.
International Alert, 2012. *Youth Perceptions on Economic Opportunity in Northern Uganda: Findings from Acholi and Lango*. Kampala: International Alert.
International Alert, 2013. *Oil Baseline Report: Governance and Livelihoods in Uganda's Oil-Rich Albertine Graben*. Kampala: International Alert.
International Alert. *Monitoring Peace and Conflict Impacts of the PRDP in Acholi and Lango Sub-Regions* (forthcoming).
International Youth Fund, 2011. *Navigating Challenges. Building Hope: A Cross Section Situational Analysis on Youth in Uganda.* Youth Map Uganda, Volume 1: Main Report.
IOM et al. 2010. *Land or Else: Land-Based Conflict, Vulnerability, and Disintegration in Northern Uganda*. Kampala: IOM, UNDP and NRC.
IRIN, 2012. 'Uganda: New disarmament effort seeks community involvement'. www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/501fb9f92.html, accessed 1 August 2012.
Kasozi, A. B. K., 1994. *The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda*. McGill-Queens University.
Mubangizi, M., 2010. 'Museveni or Besigye? Who can be trusted to stop corruption'. *The Observer*, 12 December 2012. www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11332&Itemid=59.
Newman, Harold R., 2008. 'The Mineral Industry of Uganda'. *2008 Minerals Yearbook: Uganda*, U.S. Geological Survey.
Oworaga, N., 2012. *Conflict in Uganda's Land Tenure System*. Africa Portal. www.africaportal.org/articles/2012/05/14/conflict-uganda's-land-tenure-system.
Nabudare, W., 2003. *The Hidden War: The Forgotten People War in Acholiland and its Ramifications for Peace and Security in Uganda*. Kampala: Human Rights and Peace Centre and Liu Institute for Global Issues.
Nabwowe, Angella. *Gaps in the Management of Forest Reserves: A Potential Time Bomb*. African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Conflict (ACCORD) Publications (forthcoming).
National Environment Management Agency (NEMA), 2010. State of the Environment Report for Uganda, 2010. www.nemaug.org/reports/national_state_report_2010.pdf.
Northern Uganda Peace Initiative, 2006. 'Issues Paper on the Development of Conflict Resolution and Peace Building Policy for the Government of Uganda'.
'Northern Uganda Peace, Recovery and Development'. Special Report, December 2011. Independent Publications Ltd.
Quinn, Joanna R., 2004. 'Ethnic Conflict in Uganda'. Paper presented at 'Why Neighbours Kill: Explaining the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations', conference held at the University of Western Ontario, 4-5 June 2004.
Refugee Law Project, 2004. *Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions in Northern Uganda*. Working Paper no. 11, February 2004.
Refugee Law Project, 2004. *Negotiating Peace: Resolution of Conflict in Uganda's West Nile Region.*
Refugee Law Project, 2005. *Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda's Amnesty Act 2000: The Potential for Conflict Resolution and Long-Term Reconciliation*. Working Paper No. 15, February 2005.
Refugee Law Project, 2006. 'To Move Forward, We Must Look Back'. Press statement.
Refugee Law Project, 2008. *Conflict, Justice and Reconciliation in Teso: Obstacles and Opportunities*. Briefing Paper no. 1, December 2008.
Refugee Law Project, 2009. 'What about us?', Urban IDP Bulletin
Refugee Law Project, 2010. 'PRDP I: Impact on Post-Conflict Recovery in Northern Uganda', Baseline Survey.
Refugee Law Project, 2011. National Reconciliation and Transitional Justice Audit (NRTJ) Audit focus group discussions, September-November 2011. Available at beyondjuba.org/NRTJA/index.php.
Refugee Law Project, 2011. 'Women Killing Men'. Situational Analysis Report.
Refugee Law Project, 2012. 'PRDP II, What Needs to Change: Views from *Te-yat*'. ACCS Report, 19 May 2012.
Refugee Law Project, 2012. 'Situation Brief – Border Or Ownership Question: The Apaa Land Dispute'. Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS), 9 September 2012.
Refugee Law Project, 2012. 'Is It Oil, Land Or Investment Triggering Increasing Land Dispute In Lakang Village Of Amuru District?'. ACCS Situation Report, 2 October 2012.
Refugee Law Project, 2012. 'Changing the Lens', video on assessment in the Karamoja sub-region. www.refugeelawproject.org/video_advocacy.php?vidName=We_Died_Long_Time_Ago.
Refugee Law Project, 2012. 'Certificates of Customary Ownership: A Roundtable Discussion on Perceptions, Implications, and Challenges with Stakeholders from Acholi Sub-region'. *Conflict Watch*, issue 7, October 2012.
Refugee Law Project, 2012. 'A Synopsis of Land Conflicts in Acholi Sub-Region'.
Refugee Law Project, 2012. Ownership, Resettlement and Accountability: The Elegu Land Dispute'. Situational Analysis Report, www.refugeelawproject.org/accs/activity_briefs/The_Legu_Land_Dispute_in_Nothern_Uganda.pdf.
Refugee Law Project, 2012. 'Situational Brief on Impact of Floods in Acholi Sub-region and Implications to Post-Conflict Recovery'.
Refugee Law Project, 2012. 'Thrown Along The Way: Community Perspective on Conflict Drivers in the Implementation of the PRDP for Northern Uganda'.
Refugee Law Project. 'Limitations to Access to Justice for SGBV in Acholi Sub-region' (forthcoming).
Refugee Law Project. 'From Arid Areas into the Desert: IDP Policy Implementation 2006-2012' (forthcoming).
Refugee Law Project. 'National Reconciliation and Transitional Justice Audit-Compendium of Conflicts in Uganda 1962-2012' (forthcoming)
Rugadya, A. M. et al., 2008. 'Analysis of Post-Conflict Land Policy and Administration: A Survey of IDP Return and Resettlement Issues and Lessons'. World Bank Report.
Rugadya, Margaret A. 2008. 'Unveiling Gender, Land and Property Rights in Post-Conflict Northern Uganda'. Associate Research Occasional Paper. www.mokoro.co.uk/files/13/file/lria/gender_land_property_rights_postconflict_n_uganda.pdf.
Saferworld, 2010. 'Karamoja Conflict and Security Assessment'. www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Karamoja conflict and security assessment.pdf.
Saferworld, 2010. 'Karamoja Conflict and Security Assessment – Executive Summary'. www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Karamoja Exec Summary.pdf

Saferworld, 2012. Perception Survey of Northern Uganda Youth Development Centre.
Saferworld, 2012. 'Tracking key conflict and security dynamics in Karamoja – an update'. www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Uganda PPP report.pdf.
Transparency International, 2012. East African Bribery Index 2012. www.tiuganda.org/, accessed 5 November 2012.
Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), 2006. '2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census: Analytical Report'. www.ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/pdf documents/2002 CensusPopnSizeGrowth AnalyticalReport.pdf, accessed 15 November 2012.
Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2011. Uganda National Household Survey 2009/2010, Socio-Economic Module.
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and UN Women, 2012. 'UN Position on Uganda's Amnesty Act'.
UN Peacebuilding Programme, 2011. *Identification of Good Practices in Land Conflict Resolution in Acholi.*
UNDP.2007. *Returning to Uncertainty? Addressing Vulnerabilities in Northern Uganda.* Livelihood study. www.fafo.no/nyhet/return2uncertanity.pdf.
UNDP, 2007. *Uganda Human Development Report 2007: Rediscovering Agriculture for Human Development*.
UNHCR Kampala office, 2012. Factsheet, 31 August 2012.
USAID – Northern Uganda Peace Initiative, 2006. 'Analysis of Lessons Learned From Past Efforts to End the Conflict in Northern Uganda'. pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADL279.pdf.

Annex 1

Sub-regional conflict maps

Many of the conflict drivers analysed at national and regional levels are manifest in specific and localised dynamics in each of the eight PRDP sub-regions. This annex summarises the key conflict drivers and targeted recommendations[437] identified by participants of validation workshops held in Bunyoro, West Nile, Acholi, Lango, Teso, Elgon, Bukedi and Karamoja between 10 and 29 September 2012.[438] During the meetings the interim findings of the conflict analysis at national and regional levels were presented and discussed, while conflict drivers for each of the sub-regions were identified in participatory discussions. The eight sub-regional conflict maps highlight how the issues explored at the national and regional levels undermine peace and development in northern Uganda's communities in painfully tangible ways. They offer a snapshot of the prominent conflict drivers fuelling tension amongst communities in all eight sub-regions, some of which are already escalating into violent conflicts.

a) Bunyoro sub-region[439]

Bunyoro sub-region currently consists of the districts of Buliisa, Hoima, Kabaale, Kiryandongo and Masindi. The area covered by the above districts borders the traditional Bunyoro Kitara kingdom. The sub-region is home mainly to the Banyoro and Bakungu ethnic groups. The Banyoro speak Runyoro, a Bantu language. According to the 2002 national census, the Bunyoro sub-region was home to an estimated 459,490 people at the time.[440] While Bunyoro was only marginally affected by the LRA conflict, the sub-region has played host to waves of refugees and IDPs, the latest being refugees from post-election violence in Kenya and resettled IDPs from the Bududa landslides in 2010. In Bunyoro communal land is being sold into private hands, and even as returnees come into conflict with community members who stayed over land, the same land is being grabbed in the hope that oil will be found underneath it. Commercialised agriculture is undermining subsistence livelihoods in a context of environmental degradation and food insecurity.

437 The sub-regional recommendations convey the views of the district officials, representatives from Government institutions, cultural leaders, civil society organisations, and community representatives consulted, and do not represent the views of ACCS.

438 All sessions were well attended (with an average of 10–17 participants) and included a balanced representation of local government officials, cultural and religious leaders, and civil society actors. Each of the eight meetings included participants from diverse age groups and professions, and though women participated in each of the eight sessions, only 26 attended out of a total 108 participants. Women in attendance participated very actively and contributed meaningfully to the process. All 108 participants rated the purpose and participatory methodology of the workshops highly, and many acknowledged the need to address conflicts still hampering community development and peacebuilding in northern Uganda. Most participants noted the accuracy of the interim findings presented "which truly reflect the situation in the region", and valued the opportunity to expand upon conflict drivers at the local level to convey "the reality on the ground".

439 Validation workshop held in Masindi, 10 September 2012, attended by thirteen community representatives, including local district officials, police, civil society members and cultural leaders.

440 Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), '2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census: Analytical Report', October 2006, www.ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/pdf%20documents/2002%20CensusPopnSizeGrowthAnalyticalReport.pdf, accessed 15 November 2012.

With the discovery of oil the sub-region has witnessed an increase in land grabbing and other resource-based conflicts, all of which are causing fresh waves of displacement.

Sub-regional conflict drivers:

- Land conflicts over communal land sold privately
- Land grabbing related to oil exploration in Bulisa
- Speculation about oil prospects in Masindi
- Poor compensation to landowners affected by oil exploration activities
- Sugar cane-related land expropriation, cash crops undermining sustainable livelihoods
- Inadequate reintegration support to returnees
- Land disputes between returnees and host communities
- Creation of new districts
- Environmental degradation and food insecurity
- Former combatants not adequately compensated
- Border dispute with DRC exacerbated by oil exploration

b) West Nile sub-region[441]

The **West Nile** sub-region is comprised of the districts of Arua, Adjumani, Koboko, Maracha, Terego, Nebbi, Moyo, Yumbe and Zombo, and according to the 2002

441 Validation workshop held in Arua, 12 September 2012, attended by twelve community representatives, including local district officials, civil society members and cultural leaders.

population census was inhabited by 1,918,140 people at the time.[442] The sub-region is primarily inhabited by the Alur, Lugbara, Kakwa, Madi, Okebu, Jonam, Kuku and Lendu people. After the overthrow of Idi Amin, the West Nile sub-region experienced several armed insurgencies, including the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) I, West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) and the UNRF II. The region has also experienced spillover conflicts and influxes of displaced people from northern Uganda, southern Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Sub-regional conflict drivers:

- Land conflicts linked to returns and commercial exploitation of resources
- Land disputes over ownership in families and clans
- Contested boundaries between districts
- Oil exploration activities, e.g. environmental hazards, low compensation following land expropriation, secrecy surrounding exploration, expectations of employment and community development
- Lack of transitional justice and redress for victims
- Lack of reparations for ex-combatants and poor reintegration of former militias
- Unequal distribution of development assistance
- Creation of new districts along ethnic lines
- Generational conflict, e.g. undermining of traditional leaders, mobilisation of youth
- Influx of large numbers of refugees and clashes with locals over resources, e.g. water

442 UBOS, '2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census: Analytical Report', *op. cit.*

- Lack of ownership of development interventions
- Inadequate service delivery (health facilities, education)
- Food insecurity
- Crime and insecurity
- Lack of awareness of legal rights
- Contested international borders with South Sudan and DRC
- Social unrest linked to youth discontent
- Tensions between religious communities
- Tensions between traditional leaders and local government
- Incursions by cattle grazers (in the past from Karamoja, now from the West)

c) Acholi sub-region[443]

The **Acholi** sub-region includes the districts of Gulu, Amuru, Nwoya, Kitgum, Pader, Lamwo, and Agago, and in 2002 was inhabited by 1,083,973 people.[444] The Acholi are a Luo ethnic community who speak a Western Nilotic language. The Acholi sub-region suffered the greatest impact of the LRA war, being the epicentre of LRA activities and abductions. Over 90 percent of the population in Acholiland were displaced and spent over a decade in IDP camps.[445] There are recent cases of secondary displacement to urban areas, while

443 Validation meeting held in Kitgum, 14 September 2012, attended by seventeen community representatives, including local district officials, civil society members and cultural leaders.

444 UBOS, '2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census: Analytical Report', *op. cit.*

445 See 'Uganda Humanitarian Profile 2012' at www.ugandaclusters.ug/dwnlds/0010IM/2011/11-01-2011/2012_Uganda_Humanitarian_Profile.pdf.

those who returned to remote rural locations lack basic services. There are significant numbers of victims of human rights violations and conflict-related atrocities perpetrated by the LRA and government forces during the insurgency.[446] In Acholi historic perceptions of neglect underpin conflict drivers such as frustration at perceived unequal distribution of development assistance and the unexplained phenomenon of nodding disease. Land disputes between returning IDPs are intensified by land grabs related to oil exploration and gazetting of land by the Uganda Wildlife Authority. Patterns of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) accompany shifting gendered power relations, while youth unemployment and crime, difficulties in return and reintegration, and the establishment of new districts with inadequate capacity also undermine stability.

Sub-regional conflict drivers:

- Perceptions of neglect over inadequate service provision and infrastructure
- Unequal distribution of assistance in the North
- Land conflicts: land grabbing by returnees and others, escalation of land disputes due to inadequate access to justice, transition from communal to individual ownership, illegal land sales, UWA land gazetting and encroachment
- Oil exploration-related land grabbing and sales
- Lack of truth telling and reconciliation between groups in Acholi and of transitional justice more broadly in the region
- Challenges to local governance: district-level tensions between civil service and councillors; interference in land issues by politicians; conflicts between districts and cultural institutions; conflicts between political parties following shift of support in last elections from FDC to NRM.
- Establishment of new districts: contested boundary demarcations, conflict between 'parent' and new districts, and new districts' lack of capacity
- Challenges in the return and reintegration process and ongoing displacement
- Nodding disease; community perception of government responsibility, poor governmental response and lack of information
- SGBV and shifting gender power relations
- Youth unemployment and youth crime
- Animal-human conflict and clashes with UWA (Nwoya district)
- Inter-clan conflict
- Alleged cattle rustling by Karimojong
- Hostility towards 'outsiders' business interests

d) Lango sub-region[447]

The Lango sub-region under the PRDP is categorised as central north. It consists of the districts of Alebtong, Amolatar, Apac, Dokolo, Kole, Lira, Oyam and Otuke. The sub-region is home mainly to the Langi ethnic group which speaks Lango, a Western Nilotic-Luo language closely related to Acholi, Alur and Jopadhola. At the time of the 2002 national census, the sub-region was home to 1,425,233 people.[448] Lango sub-region is categorised by the PRDP as a directly affected sub-region. The over two decades of war between the Government of Uganda and the LRA caused significant population displacement and destroyed infrastructure and services. Lango sub-region is subject to land grabbing (compounded by incursions of pastoralists from

446 *Ibid.*

447 Validation workshop held in Lira, 17 September 2012, attended by sixteen community representatives, including local district officials, civil society members and cultural leaders.

448 UBOS, '2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census: Analytical Report', *op. cit.*

western Uganda and fears that non-Ugandans are buying up land or properties to the detriment of the local business community), resource conflicts, inadequate transitional justice, and the establishment of new districts despite unresolved corruption allegations against judiciary, police and district authorities alike.

Sub-regional conflict drivers:

- Land grabbing and land disputes (returnees, boundaries, inheritance)
- Resource conflicts around use of water
- Inadequate transitional justice and demobilisation of former militias
- Poverty and marginalisation
- Poor infrastructure (road, bridges) and popular discontent at perceived budgetary neglect of the sub-region
- Resentment that many peace building initiatives have focused on Acholi (UNDP NU Peace Fund)
- Conflicts over project allocation, perception as politically driven
- Establishment of new districts not welcomed by residents affected
- Conflicts between civil service and legislative branches of districts
- Discontent about corruption allegations against the judiciary, police, and districts
- Tension between cultural institutions and increased demands of participation by communities
- Shift in family/gender relations and increased SGBV
- Suppression of freedom of expression and harsh police responses to youth demonstrations
- Acholi-Lango conflict, and conflicts with other sub-regions (migration, cattle grazing)

- Incursions by cattle grazers from western Uganda
- Fears over non-Ugandans settling and buying land in the sub-region

e) Teso sub-region[449]

The Teso sub-region currently consists of Amuria, Bukedea, Kumi, Kaberamaido, Katakwi, Ngora, Soroti and Serere districts. Teso refers to the traditional homeland of the Ateso-speaking people known as Iteso. In the 2002 census it was the fifth–largest sub-region, with 1,190,054 people.[450] The Teso sub-region has experienced numerous armed conflicts and cattle raids.[451] In Teso conflict displacement-related land disputes and land grabbing are further aggravated by environmental disaster-induced displacement and food insecurity. In this context, inter-ethnic tensions, family breakdown and SGBV, mob justice and witchcraft have been reported.

Sub-regional conflict drivers:

- Land conflicts and land grabbing due to displacement
- Inadequate transitional justice
- Arms proliferation (formerly in the hands of militia)
- Inter-ethnic tensions, perceived neglect in favour of Acholi

449 Validation workshop held in Soroti, 19 September 2012, attended by fourteen community representatives, including local district officials, civil society members and cultural leaders.

450 UBOS, '2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census: Analytical Report', *op. cit.*

451 Community Integrated Development Initiatives (CIDI), 'WATSAN project for Soroti IDPs: the entry point to conflict Prevention and Peace building, newsletter, 2005; and focus group discussions conducted in Soroti district.

- Establishment of new districts
- Politicisation of PRDP
- Displacement and food insecurity due to heavy rains and flooding
- Border dispute with Karamoja and ongoing cattle raids
- Inaccessible judicial system and mob justice and witchcraft as alternatives
- Family breakdown and SGBV

f) Elgon sub-region[452]

The **Elgon** sub-region under the PRDP is also known as the Bugishu sub-region. It consists of the districts of Mbale, Manafa, Bududa, Sironko, Bulambuli and Bukwe. The sub-region is home mainly to the Gisu people, also called Bagisu (singular Mugishu) and various smaller tribes including the Bashana and Sabiny. The Bagishu speak Lugisu, a dialect of Lumasaba, a Bantu language. According to the 2002 national census, the Bugisu sub-region was home to 1,191,723 people at the time.[453] Although the region was not directly affected by the LRA conflict, it received displaced persons, while some communities were mobilised into the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel group. The greater part of the sub-region is mountainous and prone to flash flooding and mudslides during heavy rains, leading to deaths, displacement and loss of livelihoods. There has also been occasional spillover of instability from neighbouring sub-regions, such as rebel group activities in Teso and cattle raids from Karamoja. The sub-region is also affected by displacement, controversial land gazetting by UWA, dam construction,

452 Validation workshop held in Mbale, 21 September 2012, attended by ten community representatives, including local district officials, civil society members and cultural leaders.

453 UBOS, '2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census: Analytical Report', *op. cit.*

poor infrastructure and service delivery, youth disenfranchisement and resultant involvement in crime, All these have been exacerbated by landslides in 2010-2012 to which the government responded inadequately, as well as ex-combatants mobilising to claim compensation.

Sub-regional conflict drivers:

- Land grabbing and conflicts over resources
- UWA gazetting fertile land for national park leads to encroachment, as UWA not sharing resources
- Community discontent at dam construction project
- Deforestation due to illegal logging; communities suspect district and police involvement
- Landslides in 2010-2012 and insufficient government assistance
- Establishment of new districts
- Poor infrastructure and service delivery
- Youth disenfranchisement and crime
- Ex-combatants mobilising to claim compensation

g) Bukedi sub-region[454]

454 Validation workshop held in Tororo, 24 September 2012, attended by fourteen community representatives, including local district officials, civil society members and cultural leaders.

The **Bukedi** sub-region under the PRDP consists of the districts of Busia, Tororo, Palisa, Buteleja, and Budaka, and in 2002 was inhabited by 1,282,474 people.[455] The sub-region is home to a number of ethnic groups like the Jopadhola, Iteso, Samia, Bagwere, Bayala and Banyoli. Several languages are spoken including Dhopadhola, Lusamia, Ateso, Lugwere and Lunyoli. The Bukedi sub-region was affected by LRA and UPA insurgents from Acholi and Teso sub-regions respectively. Being a border region, Bukedi has occasionally seen cross-border insurgent groups entering into or fleeing from Uganda. The sub-region is affected by land and mineral disputes and changing agricultural practices, the establishment of ethnically based districts in a context of corruption and electoral malpractice, and the volatile combination of acute poverty, unemployment and youth disenfranchisement, and gender and family conflicts.

Sub-regional conflict drivers:

- Land disputes over boundaries and land grabbing
- Investors clashing with local landowners over exploitation of minerals
- Establishment of new districts along ethnic lines
- Local governance undermined by allegations of corruption and electoral bribing
- Impact of PRDP not felt and poor contracting services frustrating communities
- Poor road conditions and infrastructure
- Acute poverty, unemployment, and youth disenfranchisement
- Misinformation regarding access to social and other assistance and alleged fraudulent disbursement of development funds leading to popular discontent
- Unequal distribution of assistance amongst communities
- Change in agriculture (cash crops) leading to food shortages and no protection for farmers
- Gender and family conflicts
- Disparity in education provision in the sub-region

h) Karamoja sub-region[456]

The **Karamoja** sub-region comprises the districts of Moroto, Kotido, Kaabong, Nakapiripirit, Amudat, Abim and Napak, and in 2002 was inhabited by 936,323 people.[457] The sub-region has suffered perennial conflicts underpinned by a high level of insecurity, cattle raiding and inter-ethnic violence. The main ethnic groups that inhabit the Karamoja region include the Bokora, Pian, Matheniko, Jie, Pokot, Tur, Dodoth, Ik and Tepeth. The Karimojong have occasionally attacked neighbouring communities during cattle raids, but also suffered incursions by the LRA and other insurgent groups.

The security challenges in Karamoja relate to the negative impact of harsh climatic conditions on livelihoods, porous borders with South Sudan and Kenya, easy access to small arms within the population, cattle raiding and prolonged political and economic marginalisation. The recent disarmament process in Karamoja has significantly reduced gun possession, restored relative peace and spurred economic recovery in some parts of the sub-region.[458] However, there are still areas that are volatile, particularly on the borders between Karamoja and the Toposa and the Dinga

455 UBOS, '2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census: Analytical Report', *op. cit.*

456 Validation workshop held in Moroto, 28 September 2012, attended by twelve community representatives, including local district officials, police, civil society members and cultural leaders.

457 UBOS, '2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census: Analytical Report', *op. cit.*

458 Saferworld, 'Karamoja Conflict and Security Assessment', September 2010, www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Karamoja conflict and security assessment.pdf.

of South Sudan, and between the Pokot and the Turkana of Kenya. Internally there are still tensions between the Dodoth/Jie and the Pokot and the Pian. Allegations of human rights abuses by Local Defence Units (LDU), the UPDF and police abound in some areas like Pokot.[459]

Karamoja continues to be plagued by insecurity and intra-Karimojong tensions, all of which tend to mask the underlying and less well known processes of mineral exploration, land grabbing and land gazetting, as well as government-driven decentralisation processes which intensify conflicts between pastoralist and agro-pastoralist groups and livelihoods, which in turn are expressed in gender conflicts, cattle raiding, environmental destruction and youth unemployment. As one of the sub-regions most affected by the LRA war, issues of transitional justice and reparations are also driving conflicts amongst the Karimojong. Acute poverty, poor service delivery, crumbling infrastructure and perceived marginalisation were described by participants as driving conflict in the sub-region and not having been effectively addressed by current development interventions. Duplication of development projects and conflict-insensitive interventions are frequently reported, with NGOs "competing" for beneficiaries.[460] Community representatives described land disputes as widespread in Karamoja, with acquisition of land in the sub-region for the purpose of establishing game reserves or to commercially exploit minerals such as gold or uranium pitching residents against the UWA, local government and commercial investors.[461]

459 RLP, interview with district officials in 'Changing the Lens', video on assessment in the Karamoja sub-region, April 2012, www.refugeelawproject.org/video_advocacy.php?vidName=We_Died_Long_Time_Ago.

460 ACCS consultative workshops in northern Uganda, Moroto, 28 September 2012.

461 ACCS consultative workshop, Moroto, 28 September 2012.

Sub-regional conflict drivers:

- Mineral exploration and land grabbing
- UWA-gazetted reserve and reduction in access to grazing land and farming opportunities
- Establishment of ethnic districts and boundary disputes over access to resources
- Compensation for lost cattle not forthcoming and inadequate compensation for disarmed youth
- Insecurity due to unequal disarmament of different ethnic groups and presence of remaining weapons
- Insecurity in border areas with South Sudan and Kenya due to flow of arms and cattle raids
- Tensions between different Karimojong groups
- Changing Karimojong economy: conflicts between pastoralist and agro-pastoralist approaches and gender relations
- Acute poverty and perceived economic and political marginalisation
- Poor governance, service delivery and infrastructure
- Perceived corruption in PRDP and other development interventions by government and international agencies
- Duplication of development projects and divisive, conflict-insensitive interventions
- Environmental destruction and reduction of grazing land
- Youth unemployment

Annex 2

Incidence of conflict drivers in the PRDP sub-regions

The table below consolidates the incidence of conflict drivers (CDs) across the PRDP sub-regions as collected during the September 2012 validation workshops. CDs affecting more than three sub-regions are considered cross-cutting and would require broader interventions, while those affecting less than three have been listed as localised and would require more targeted interventions.

	Bunyoro	West Nile	Acholi	Lango	Teso	Elgon	Bukedi	Karamoja
Conflict Drivers – Cross-Cutting								
Natural resources and property	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Youth exclusion	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
New districts and poor local governance	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Inadequate post-conflict transitional justice	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Generational and gender conflicts		X	X	X	X		X	X
Poor service delivery and infrastructure		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Distribution of development assistance		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
IDP return and reintegration	X	X	X		X			
Insecurity and inadequate DDR	X	X	X		X	X		X
Environmental degradation and natural disasters	X				X	X		X
Tensions between traditional structures and local government		X	X	X	X		X	
Conflict Drivers – Localised								
Tensions between religious and/or ethnic communities		X			X			X
Nodding disease			X					
Tensions between clans			X					
UWA/animal/human conflict			X					
Cattle rustling			X		X			X
Hostility towards 'outsiders', e.g. migrants, refugees, investors			X	X				
Corruption in local government			X	X			X	
Witchcraft/mob justice					X			

Annex 3

List of data collection events implemented by ACCS, 2011–2012

International Alert:

- Field consultations in PRDP regions on Peace and Conflict Impact (PCI) study (March 2011)
- Regional baselines in the PRDP regions for the PCI study (April-June 2011)
- Qualitative validation meetings for PCI information generated (July 2011)
- CSOs meeting in Lira for agencies involved in PRDP monitoring in Acholi and Lango region (September 2011)
- Youth perception survey in Acholi and Lango region (March-September 2011)
- Dialogue meeting on investment in Acholi region (March 2012)
- PCI quantitative baseline study for Acholi and Lango (August-November 2011)
- Mapping of SMEs in Acholi and Lango sub-regions (July 2011)
- DFID-PCDP annual review (November 2011)
- ACCS radio talk shows on Radio Mega FM in Gulu (March-September 2012)

Refugee Law Project:

- Conceptual frameworks for early warning and measuring peace dividends (October 2010)
- Literature review of conflict analysis in Northern Uganda (November 2010)
- Baseline survey in fourteen districts in Northern Uganda (October-December 2010)
- Sexual and gender-based violence and persecution assessment in Lira (October-December 2010)
- PRDP stakeholders validation workshop (March 2011)
- Radio talk shows in Lango sub-region and some parts of Teso, Bunyoro and Acholi sub-regions on Radio Wa (89.8 FM) in Lira (March-November 2011)
- Community dialogues on PRDP and PCDP in Lango, Acholi and West Nile (March 2011 to present)
- Local community leaders workshop (30 June to 1 July 2011)
- *'Shoot Us All Down': the Lakang and Apaa Land Conflict*, video (September 2011)

- DFID-PCDP annual review (November 2011)
- RLP website and listserve, including Facebook platforms such as PRDP and RLP (ongoing)
- *Land for Every Ugandan?! The February 2012 Apaa Eviction*, video documentary (February 2012)
- Rapid assessment on Nodding Syndrome in northern Uganda (February 2012)
- TV talk show on NTV, Uganda about Nodding Syndrome (February 2012)
- *Te-Yat* radio talk show on Radio Mega 102.1 FM, every first and third Saturday of each month (May 2012 to present)
- *Gwoke ki kuku* radio programme on Radio Mega, held every third week of the month (May 2012 to present)
- Conflict Watch Newsletter (May 2012 to present)
- Rapid assessment on the tribal conflict in South Sudan, asylum seekers and refugees and its implication on post-conflict recovery in northern Uganda (May 2012)
- Civil society organisations (CSOs) consultative meeting on PRDP II (June 2012)
- 'Youth Unemployment', public dialogue on the state of youth (July 2012)
- Video screening of three documentaries, *Shoot Us All Down*, *Land for Every Ugandan*, and *Untreated Wounds* with members of the donor group, DFID officials, JLOS and other civil society actors at the Town Hall, British High Commission (July 2012)
- Thematic research on land and resource-based conflict:
- 'Land and Investment: Balancing Local and Investor Interests in Purongo Sub County, Nwoya District' (August 2012)
- 'Situation Brief – Border or Ownership Question: the Apaa Land Dispute between Amuru and Adjumani' (September 2012)
- 'Ownership, Resettlement and Accountability: The Elegu Land Dispute in Northern Uganda between Amuru and Adjumani' (September 2012)
- 'Is it Oil, Land or Investment Triggering Increasing Land Disputes in Lakang Village of Amuru District?' (September 2012)
- 'Situational Brief on Impact of Floods in Acholi Sub-region and Implications for Post-Conflict Recovery' (September 2012)
- 'Certificates of Customary Ownership: A Roundtable with Stakeholders from Acholi Sub-Region' (October 2012)
- Public dialogue on resource-based conflict, land and post conflict recovery, held jointly with Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies, Gulu University (November 2012)
- Northern Uganda Peacebuilding Conference, organised by Gulu University and the UN in Uganda (April 2012)
- Conflict-sensitive justice round table with stakeholders in northern Uganda (July 2011)
- *Uganda's Black Gold: Blessing or Curse*, public screening and discussion (November 2012)
- Conflict analysis review and validation exercises (May-November 2012)

Saferworld:

- Conflict sensitivity capacity assessments for Lira and Gulu resource pool and the Northern Uganda Youth Development Centre (2011)
- NUYDC perceptions survey (2011)

- Meetings with Local Council II court committee members in Gulu, Amuru and Nwoya (July-September 2012)
- Training on conflict-sensitive approaches to development (CSA) for Gulu and Lira districts resource pool (October-November 2011)
- CSA training for Gulu and Lira districts technical planning committee members (February and May 2012)
- CSA training for Gulu municipal staff and councillors (March 2012)
- CSA training for the Northern Uganda Youth Development Centre's management and staff (December 2011)
- Discussions with Gulu Principal Personnel Officer on ULGA's local government staff capacity building initiative (June 2012)
- Meetings with Area Land Committees in Gulu, Amuru and Nwoya (July-September 2012)
- Saferworld field assessment of the conflict sensitivity of NUYDC, PSFU, NUSAF and ULGA
- Meeting with Nwoya speaker and NUSAF beneficiaries (August 2012)
- Meeting with Gulu district Local Council 5 chairperson (October 2011)
- Conflict analysis of Gulu municipal council (July 2012)
- Saferworld's ACCS project annual review meetings with PCDP stakeholders (June 2012)

This report is a product of the Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS), a partnership bringing together three organisations: International Alert, Refugee Law Project and Saferworld. RLP provided the original concept and terms of reference and conducted the preliminary analysis. The report was written by Monica Llamazares with valuable inputs from Stephen Oola, Robert Senath Esuruku, Capson Sausi, Louis Okello and ACCS management team Hesta Groenewald (Saferworld), Chris Dolan (Refugee Law Project, RLP) and Richard Businge (International Alert). The analysis and validation of the findings was conducted by Stephen Oola as team leader, Monica Llamazares, Robert Senath Esuruku, Eunice Ouko, Denis Jjuuko and Okello Daniel. This study was funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) under ACCS. The report reflects the views and opinions of ACCS, not those of DFID. The consortium is also grateful to all stakeholders and participants across the eight PRDP sub-regions who validated the findings of this study. Finally, the conflict analysis would not have been possible without the invaluable inputs from Pius Ojara and Geraldine O'Callaghan, both of DFID.

The overall aim of ACCS is to assist DFID and partners in strengthening the potential of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) to address the causes of conflict in a way that is itself conflict-sensitive, and which can contribute to sustainable peace and stability. Within this, ACCS has three major objectives: monitoring the extent to which interventions under the PRDP, particularly those funded under DFID's Post-Conflict Development Programme (PCDP), succeed or fail in achieving peacebuilding aims (International Alert); contextual analysis of the overall recovery process (conflict indicators, issues and dynamics) to provide early warning as and when necessary (RLP); and evidence-based advocacy, targeted recommendations, and technical support to improve the recovery and peacebuilding impact of the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and other PRDP stakeholders (Saferworld). Each consortium agency leads on one output, supported by the other partners.

The consortium is grateful to the UK Department for International Development (DFID) for its financial support to the project.

The maps in the report were designed by Jane Stevenson and the overall report design was done by Marketing Support Services, with contributions from OpinyShaffic.

Cover Image: Map of Uganda highlighting the PRDP districts

REFUGEE LAW PROJECT (RLP)

Plot 5, 7 & 9 Perryman Gardens, Old Kampala
(Opposite Old Kampala Primary School)
P.O. Box 33903
Kampala, Uganda
Tel +256 (0)414 343 556 (Reception)
Tel +256 (0)414 235 330 (Director)
Fax +256 (0)414 346 491
Email info@refugeelawproject.org
Website www.refugeelawproject.org

SAFERWORLD

UK Office
The Grayston Centre
28 Charles Square
London N1 6HT, UK
Tel +44 (0)20 7324 4646
Fax +44 (0)20 7324 4647
Email general@saferworld.org.uk
Website www.saferworld.org.uk
Registered charity no. 1043843
A company limited by guarantee no. 3015948

Uganda Office
PO Box 8415
4th Floor, NIC Building
Pilkington Road, Kampala
Uganda
Tel +256 (0)414 231130 /
+256 (0)414 231150

INTERNATIONAL ALERT

UK Office
346 Clapham Road
LONDON
SW9 9AP
United Kingdom
Tel +44 (0) 20 7627 6800
Fax +44 (0) 20 7627 6900
Email general@international-alert.org
Website www.international-alert.org

Uganda Office
PO Box 70641
Ruth Towers, Plot 15A, Clement Hill Road
Kampala
Uganda
Tel +256 (0) 414 347 200 /
+256 (0) 312 265 614
Fax +256 (0) 414 347 204

REFUGEE LAW PROJECT

SAFERWORLD

International Alert.