GUIDELINES FOR THE SUBMISSION OF MANUSCRIPTS

The Canadian Military Journal welcomes the submission of manuscripts on topics of broad significance to the defence community in Canada, including, but not limited to, security and defence policy, strategy, doctrine, operations, force structures, the application of technology, equipment procurement, military history, leadership, training and military ethics.

Forward-looking pieces which present original concepts or ideas, new approaches to old problems and fresh interpretations of current events are especially welcome. Authors are asked to note the following general guidelines:

- Manuscripts may be submitted in either official language.
- As a general rule, manuscripts of major articles should be between 3500 to 6000 words in length, including endnotes. However, shorter pieces are also welcomed, especially views and opinions that engage in the debate on relevant issues, as are letters to the editor.
- Manuscripts must be submitted in electronic format, on disc or by e-mail, in MS Word. E-mail address: cmj.mcm@forces.gc.ca.
- Manuscripts should be accompanied by appropriate graphs, charts, photographs, maps or other illustrations aiding the reader to grasp the content. All images transmitted electronically or on disc must be in MS Word or PowerPoint format for translation purposes. If in doubt, contact either the Editor-in-Chief or the Publication Manager for guidance.
- Manuscripts must conform to standard academic style, using Oxford English or Petit Robert spelling, with endnotes and references. Endnotes should be embedded and not attached. Multiple endnotes per reference are confusing to the reader and therefore totally unacceptable as formatting for the Journal. Abstracts and bibliographies are undesired. All bibliographic material is to be contained in the end notes. Consult recent editions for examples of appropriate formatting.
- Acronyms and military abbreviations should be used sparingly, but, if unavoidable, they may be used in the body of the text provided that the term is written out in full the first time it is used, followed by the abbreviated form in brackets. On the other hand, military jargon and slang terms should, as a rule, be avoided.
- All submissions must be accompanied by a brief (one short paragraph maximum) biographical sketch of the author which includes current appointment, telephone number, e-mail address and mailing address. Appropriate excerpts for publication will be chosen by the Editor.

Specific and detailed guidance for book reviews is contained in the on-line version of CMJ at www.journal.forces.gc.ca.

All manuscripts normally (unless commissioned) will be reviewed anonymously by at least two external readers from the Editorial Board, so serving members of the Canadian Armed Forces and civilian employees of the Department of National Defence are not required to obtain prior approval for publication before submitting a manuscript.

The Deputy Minister and Chief of the Defence Staff have delegated authority to approve manuscripts for publication in the Canadian Military Journal to the Editor acting on recommendations of the Editorial Board, so serving members of the Canadian Armed Forces and civilian employees of the Department of National Defence are not required to obtain prior approval for publication before submitting a manuscript.

Manuscripts may be submitted in either official language.

Acronyms and military abbreviations should be used sparingly, but, if unavoidable, they may be used in the body of the text provided that the term is written out in full the first time it is used, followed by the abbreviated form in brackets. On the other hand, military jargon and slang terms should, as a rule, be avoided.

GUIDELINES FOR THE SUBMISSION OF MANUSCRIPTS

The Canadian Military Journal invites the submission of manuscripts on topics of broad significance to the defence community in Canada, including, but not limited to, security and defence policy, strategy, doctrine, operations, force structures, the application of technology, equipment procurement, military history, leadership, training and military ethics.

Forward-looking pieces which present original concepts or ideas, new approaches to old problems and fresh interpretations of current events are especially welcome. Authors are asked to note the following general guidelines:

- Manuscripts may be submitted in either official language.
- As a general rule, manuscripts of major articles should be between 3500 to 6000 words in length, including endnotes. However, shorter pieces are also welcomed, especially views and opinions that engage in the debate on relevant issues, as are letters to the editor.
- Manuscripts must be submitted in electronic format, on disc or by e-mail, in MS Word. E-mail address: cmj.mcm@forces.gc.ca.
- Manuscripts should be accompanied by appropriate graphs, charts, photographs, maps or other illustrations aiding the reader to grasp the content. All images transmitted electronically or on disc must be in MS Word or PowerPoint format for translation purposes. If in doubt, contact either the Editor-in-Chief or the Publication Manager for guidance.
- Manuscripts must conform to standard academic style, using Oxford English or Petit Robert spelling, with endnotes and references. Endnotes should be embedded and not attached. Multiple endnotes per reference are confusing to the reader and therefore totally unacceptable as formatting for the Journal. Abstracts and bibliographies are undesired. All bibliographic material is to be contained in the end notes. Consult recent editions for examples of appropriate formatting.
- Acronyms and military abbreviations should be used sparingly, but, if unavoidable, they may be used in the body of the text provided that the term is written out in full the first time it is used, followed by the abbreviated form in brackets. On the other hand, military jargon and slang terms should, as a rule, be avoided.
- All submissions must be accompanied by a brief (one short paragraph maximum) biographical sketch of the author which includes current appointment, telephone number, e-mail address and mailing address. Appropriate excerpts for publication will be chosen by the Editor.

Specific and detailed guidance for book reviews is contained in the on-line version of CMJ at www.journal.forces.gc.ca.

All manuscripts normally (unless commissioned) will be reviewed anonymously by at least two external readers from the Editorial Board, so serving members of the Canadian Armed Forces and civilian employees of the Department of National Defence are not required to obtain prior approval for publication before submitting a manuscript.

The Deputy Minister and Chief of the Defence Staff have delegated authority to approve manuscripts for publication in the Canadian Military Journal to the Editor acting on recommendations of the Editorial Board, so serving members of the Canadian Armed Forces and civilian employees of the Department of National Defence are not required to obtain prior approval for publication before submitting a manuscript.

Manuscripts may be submitted in either official language.

Acronyms and military abbreviations should be used sparingly, but, if unavoidable, they may be used in the body of the text provided that the term is written out in full the first time it is used, followed by the abbreviated form in brackets. On the other hand, military jargon and slang terms should, as a rule, be avoided.

GUIDELINES FOR THE SUBMISSION OF MANUSCRIPTS

The Canadian Military Journal invites the submission of manuscripts on topics of broad significance to the defence community in Canada, including, but not limited to, security and defence policy, strategy, doctrine, operations, force structures, the application of technology, equipment procurement, military history, leadership, training and military ethics.

Forward-looking pieces which present original concepts or ideas, new approaches to old problems and fresh interpretations of current events are especially welcome. Authors are asked to note the following general guidelines:

- Manuscripts may be submitted in either official language.
- As a general rule, manuscripts of major articles should be between 3500 to 6000 words in length, including endnotes. However, shorter pieces are also welcomed, especially views and opinions that engage in the debate on relevant issues, as are letters to the editor.
- Manuscripts must be submitted in electronic format, on disc or by e-mail, in MS Word. E-mail address: cmj.mcm@forces.gc.ca.
- Manuscripts should be accompanied by appropriate graphs, charts, photographs, maps or other illustrations aiding the reader to grasp the content. All images transmitted electronically or on disc must be in MS Word or PowerPoint format for translation purposes. If in doubt, contact either the Editor-in-Chief or the Publication Manager for guidance.
- Manuscripts must conform to standard academic style, using Oxford English or Petit Robert spelling, with endnotes and references. Endnotes should be embedded and not attached. Multiple endnotes per reference are confusing to the reader and therefore totally unacceptable as formatting for the Journal. Abstracts and bibliographies are undesired. All bibliographic material is to be contained in the end notes. Consult recent editions for examples of appropriate formatting.
- Acronyms and military abbreviations should be used sparingly, but, if unavoidable, they may be used in the body of the text provided that the term is written out in full the first time it is used, followed by the abbreviated form in brackets. On the other hand, military jargon and slang terms should, as a rule, be avoided.
- All submissions must be accompanied by a brief (one short paragraph maximum) biographical sketch of the author which includes current appointment, telephone number, e-mail address and mailing address. Appropriate excerpts for publication will be chosen by the Editor.

Specific and detailed guidance for book reviews is contained in the on-line version of CMJ at www.journal.forces.gc.ca.

All manuscripts normally (unless commissioned) will be reviewed anonymously by at least two external readers from the Editorial Board, so serving members of the Canadian Armed Forces and civilian employees of the Department of National Defence are not required to obtain prior approval for publication before submitting a manuscript.

The Deputy Minister and Chief of the Defence Staff have delegated authority to approve manuscripts for publication in the Canadian Military Journal to the Editor acting on recommendations of the Editorial Board, so serving members of the Canadian Armed Forces and civilian employees of the Department of National Defence are not required to obtain prior approval for publication before submitting a manuscript.

Manuscripts may be submitted in either official language.

Acronyms and military abbreviations should be used sparingly, but, if unavoidable, they may be used in the body of the text provided that the term is written out in full the first time it is used, followed by the abbreviated form in brackets. On the other hand, military jargon and slang terms should, as a rule, be avoided.
Vol. 13, No. 4, Autumn 2013

CONTENTS

3 EDITOR’S CORNER
4 LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

ETHICS
6 ASSESSING AND MANAGING ETHICAL RISK IN DEFENCE
   by J. Peter Bradley and Shaun P. Tymchuk
17 VALUES, ETHICS, AND MISSION COMMAND:
   TRUST AS A CONSCIOUS ACT OF FORCE
   by Daniel H. McCauley

DIVERSITY
25 DIVERSITY RECRUITING: IT’S TIME TO TIP THE BALANCE
   by Chantal Fraser

MILITARY PHILOSOPHY
36 CLAUSEWITZ AND THE BLUE FLOWER OF ROMANTICISM
   by Bill Bentley

VIEWS AND OPINIONS
45 TEACHING EXCELLENCE:
   A NEGLECTED OPPORTUNITY FOR DND LEADERSHIP
   by Adam Chapnick
48 AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE: WHEN THE ENEMY IS TOO CLOSE
   by Pascal Lévesque
53 CARRYING THE TORCH FORWARD:
   THE REVITALIZATION OF THE PATROL PATHFINDER CAPABILITY
   by Cullen Downey and Nick Deshpande
58 INDIVIDUAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION (IT&E)
   MODERNIZATION FOR THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES
   by Debbie Miller
62 MAY PEACE BE UPON US
   by Garrett Lawless
66 ACQUISITION OF INNOVATIONS IN A TIME OF RAPID CHANGE:
   SOME OBSERVATIONS
   by Robert J. Glickman

COMMENTARY
71 REFLECTIONS ON SEARCH AND RESCUE
   by Martin Shadwick
77 BOOK REVIEWS

Canadian Military Journal / Revue militaire canadienne is the official professional journal of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence. It is published quarterly under authority of the Minister of National Defence. Opinions expressed or implied in this publication are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Forces, Canadian Military Journal, or any agency of the Government of Canada. Crown copyright is retained. Articles may be reproduced with permission of the Editor, on condition that appropriate credit is given to Canadian Military Journal. Each issue of the Journal is published simultaneously in print and electronic versions; it is available on the Internet at www.journal.forces.gc.ca.

ISSN 1492-465X

Vol. 13, No. 4, Autumn 2013 • Canadian Military Journal
NOTE TO READERS

As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for “translation of original quote”, indicates to the readers that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.
Welcome to the Autumn 2013 edition of the Canadian Military Journal. As I pen these words, we are actually still enjoying summer in the ‘Great Green North,’ but inevitably, this too shall change.

Quite an eclectic issue this time out, and since we have an unusually high (and welcome) number of ‘Views and Opinions’ pieces, I have been obliged to restrict the number of major articles to four in order to minimize our individual mail-out rate charges in accordance with Canada Post’s relatively-recent tariff increases with respect to the new weight guidelines.

We have two articles dealing with ethics and the military in the issue. ‘Taking the point,’ Peter Bradley and Shaun Tymchuk chose as their mandate to raise consideration of “…ethical risk analysis, the process by which [one] can assess their organization’s vulnerability to wrongdoing and to respond appropriately when misconduct occurs.” After exploring the subject thoroughly, the authors very refreshingly make a number of useful specific recommendations with respect to the assessment of ethical risk, many of which are rather readily available to our military. Next, from ‘south of the border,’ retired USAF Lieutenant Colonel Dan McCauley, now an assistant professor of national security strategy and theatre campaign planning at the US Joint Forces Staff College, discusses moral leadership from the American perspective, and how it affects mission command. “This article posits that to achieve trust, one must begin with an understanding of values – its origins and development, and the effects of multiculturalism.”

Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Chantal Fraser then explores the world of diversity recruiting, contending that it is very important that the personnel serving Canada’s armed forces reflect the demographics of the Canadian population-at-large. She opines that, given our shifting demographics, “…the Canadian military can and must significantly increase the percentage of women, visible minorities, and Aboriginal peoples who serve their country in uniform.” Rounding out the last of our major articles, the Canadian Defence Academy’s own Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Bill Bentley takes a fresh look at the military philosophy of Carl von Clausewitz, with a specific attempt to provide “…a clear understanding of the relationship between the thought of Carl von Clausewitz and German Romanticism,” and how a grasp of this relationship, “…greatly enhances our understanding of how this Prussian military thinker constructed his unique theory of war, and what he meant by it.”

As promised, we have an inordinate number of opinion pieces in this issue. Adam Chapnick, Deputy Director of Education at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, leads with a compelling argument for the establishment of centres of teaching excellence in the military context throughout our armed forces. He is followed by Cullen Downey and Nick Deshpande, who make a strong case for the revitalization of our army’s patrol pathfinder capabilities. Then, the distinguished academic Robert Jay Glickman, currently a Professor Emeritus in the Department of Spanish and Portuguese at the University of Toronto, focuses upon this era of rapid change in which we live, then discusses the ways in which these changes affect “…recruitment, deference to authority and training. “Glickman then makes a suggestion, “…with respect to the acquisition of innovations that can increase the military’s institutional and operational effectiveness.”

Garrett Lawless, an air mobility pilot with the CAF currently serving as a Military Assistant to the Minister of National Defence, then offers, given that in the age in which we live, classical war is either dead or the human race is doomed, war in this age of economic globalization “…is also prohibitively bad for business, and the new requirement for a stable and lasting peace is the provision to all humans of a future worth living for.” Captain Pascal Lévesque, a military lawyer, then draws an interesting comparison between the Canadian and the American military justice systems. Finally, Lieutenant-Colonel Debbie Miller, the Senior Staff Officer for Strategic Planning at the Canadian Defence Academy in Kingston, sings the virtues of Individual Training and Education (IT&E) modernization for the Canadian Armed Forces, and argues that “…IT&E Modernization will meet operational requirements by creating a modern, agile, integrated learning environment with global access that empowers Canadian Armed Forces personnel.”

We then offer resident defence commentator Martin Shadwick’s reflections upon search and rescue with respect to the Office of the Auditor General’s report on the subject, and close with a number of book reviews to hopefully pique our readership’s interests.

Until the next time.

David L. Bashow
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal
Complexity Theory is not to be confused with Computational Complexity Theory. The latter creates a science because it provides knowledge systematically; the former does not. Complex Computational Theory is a branch of applied mathematics, and its analysis and conclusions would be true and valid even if no complex computational problems existed. Complexity Theory, in its applications, seems to be a branch of applied mathematics also; but it has no analysis, no theorems, no variables, and no co-variant relations of its own; and it seems to require the existence of something in matter to express itself. As the author himself admits, “…Complexity Theory lacks integrated theoretical foundations… The complexity research field is not yet mature and is more akin to a loose network of interconnected and interdependent ideas.” The field lacks, in other words, the very things which make a science, a science.

If Complexity Theory created a science as Computational Complexity Theory does, then with a single analysis and a set of variables and equations Complexity Theory would be able to forecast the shape of snail shells, the butterfly-induced tornados of Texas, the outbreak of the next world war, and optimize package delivery, as the author suggested the theory either could do or has done. However, the analysis and the associated common set of variables and equations by which these events could be forecasted have not yet been discovered. The past successes which the author claimed for Complexity Theory told us nothing new, or amounted to facts that can be obtained by common sense observation.

What would be pernicious is an embrace of the belief that somehow Complexity Theory could be predictive of human decisions, and especially the outcome of an extended chain of decisions. Such belief would be wrong. Every decision maker is always capable of choosing not to do what his judgement tells him is necessary. To say otherwise is to impute determinism to human behaviour that hitherto has gone undetected. The theory also has no way of accounting for human creativity and adaptiveness, since these traits are inherently unpredictable in their products. Consequently, to suggest that Complexity Theory might be able to solve the problem of defeating a decentralized terrorist group, stabilizing a region, building trust with residents, and gaining advantage over an enemy force in the battlefield is to place unwarranted faith in a single scientific analysis - if it comes into being.

Military theorists, strategists, and tacticians do employ the products of other disciplines in their calculations. These imported products constitute forms of knowledge. A commander may base a decision upon a weather forecast, and a weather forecast is a product of the science of meteorology. He may employ a topographical map in planning an operation, and a map is the empirical knowledge of geography expressed through the art of cartography. His chief of artillery may promulgate ballistics tables for his new artillery pieces, and ballistics tables are products of the science of ballistics. All the Commander needs to know are the products of these other disciplines; he does not himself need to be a meteorologist, a geographer, a cartographer, or an expert in theoretical ballistics. He needs to be knowledgeable about results, not of the details by which these results are obtained. (Clausewitz referred to this fact as the “Great Simplification,” which explained why great wartime commanders sometimes arose from occupations quite unrelated to the military, while learned pedants never turn out to be great commanders.)

The reason why the products of meteorology, empirical geography, and ballistics are employed in the calculations of strategy, tactics, and military science is that these products are knowledge. Their propositions are true in reality. Their truth content does not rely upon their being useful the military. The bridge marked on the map really exists at the position indicated. The artillery piece, fired at a particular azimuth and elevation, will cause the shell to land at the position desired. There is a powerful element of certainty about knowledge; and the commander who has his own complex problems to solve needs certainty (or at least reliability) in as many of his input variables as possible. Uncertainty and unreliability are only slightly better than misleading information, to the commander. To describe a problem as a complex one with extreme sensitivity to unknown boundary conditions is trivial, for tells the Commander nothing that his common sense has not told him already.

Since Complexity Theory is not organized as a science, what it offers, at best, is uncertainty. We cannot be reasonably certain that the non-trivial, empirical conclusions Complexity Theory reaches about its subject matter are true in reality. The non-trivial conclusions it reaches are unreliable in actual practice. Trial and error conducted under a fancy name is still trial and error. This being the case, the suggestion that Complexity Theory ought to be embraced by military theorists amounts to a request for an admission to respectability that is not deserved. It asks for validation on the basis of promises. Until Complexity Theory can demonstrate that it offers knowledge unique to itself, there is no reason for military theorists, strategists, and tacticians even to look at it.

For Complexity Theory to have knowledge unique to itself the theory needs be able to create a science. The analysis, the variables and equations of the theory need to be true and valid even when they are not expressed in matter. The theory, according to the author, has not yet reached that stage of development.

Yours truly,
Vincent J. Curtis

Mr. Curtis, MSc, began his post-university career as a research scientist for the Ontario Research Foundation. He then started a scientific consulting business and later a manufacturing business, both of which he still runs.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear CMJ,

In his article in Vol.13, No.2, entitled *Active Protection Systems: A Potential Jackpot to Future Army Operations*, Captain Michael MacNeill very logically and articulately laid out the justification for soft-bubble protection for infantry and armour personnel. Losses such as those suffered at Verrieres Ridge in Normandy are unacceptable, militarily or politically. It is time to protect our front-line ground troops as well as we protect our air and sea forces, with expensive but effective alternatives to heavier armour. Drones and better near-range intelligence will help as well. Soldiers are too valuable to be thrown into battle without adequate protection and support.

Major (ret'd) Charles Hooker
Royal Canadian Corps of Signals

Dear CMJ,

Peter Denton’s review of my book *Winning the War on War* (Summer 2013 issue) contains a number of factual errors. He writes that “the body count in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to spiral into the millions.” I devoted four pages of my book (which he does not reference) to DRC mortality estimates. Regardless whether you conclude as I do that the “millions” estimates are too high, data indisputably show a steady decline of mortality rates in the DRC since the main war ended in 2003.

Denton goes on to say that today’s little wars, such as in Iraq or the Central African Republic, are “just as real and violent as any European war to those who are its victims.” This is literally true, as I mention in the book, in the sense that a war victim is just as dead if he or she dies in a skirmish in the bush in central Africa or dies in the siege of Stalingrad. However, this does not make the two events equivalent, or show that we have made no progress by moving from World Wars to today’s low-intensity conflicts.

Finally, Denton is simply flat-out wrong to say that the “structural death toll caused by famine, disease, lack of clean water” and so forth make our time “just as tinged with the blood of innocents as has always been the case.” The undisputed data on these scourges show dramatic improvements since the Cold War ended. From 1990 to 2012 worldwide, 2 billion more people gained access to clean water, annual deaths of children under five dropped from 12 million to 8 million, and measles death fell by 85 percent (all despite population growth of almost 2 billion people). In my view, the decline of armed conflict worldwide has contributed to this progress, mostly by helping economic growth, but whatever the cause nobody can deny these gains exist.

The positive trends of recent decades could reverse in the future, as I have often noted, and indeed the war in Syria has pushed world battle death totals back upward, though not yet close to Cold War levels. Policy makers worldwide, from the Canadian Forces on down, should analyze what succeeds and fails in mitigating armed conflicts, so that good policies can help reduce future violence. Getting the facts right would be a good place to start.

Joshua S. Goldstein
Professor Emeritus of International Relations
American University, Washington DC
ASSESSING AND MANAGING ETHICAL RISK IN DEFENCE

J. Peter Bradley and Shaun P. Tymchuk

In recent years, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) experienced a number of highly publicized cases of wrongdoing, ranging in severity from neglect of professional duties, to murder.1 While these episodes varied in the extent to which transgressors violated accepted standards of behaviour, the misconduct was destructive on many levels, causing grievous harm to victims, tarnishing the reputation of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the CAF, and diverting resources from other important work. Together, these transgressions and others like them indicate that DND and the CAF can expect violations of this nature to occur again in the future.

Recognizing that DND and the CAF, like all human systems, will experience ethical failures at times, the aim of this article is to raise awareness about ethical risk analysis, the process by which defence leaders can assess their organization’s vulnerability to wrongdoing and to respond appropriately when misconduct occurs. We will commence this work by showing why it is important for members of the defence community (service members and civilians alike) to behave ethically. Second, we explain what we mean by the term ‘ethical risk.’ Third, we provide some thoughts on managing ethical risk. Fourth, we outline a process for assessing ethical risk. Fifth, we close with some recommendations on how DND and the CAF can protect themselves from the harmful consequences of ethical failure.

The Importance of Ethical Behaviour

There are at least six reasons why military personnel and defence employees should behave ethically. First, Canadian law and the international law of armed conflict require it. Second, unethical behaviour by members can seriously damage the credibility of the military institution at home and erode vital public support, as we saw in the case of the Canadian
Airborne Regiment in Somalia. Third, ethical misbehaviour by even a few individuals at the tactical level can result in mission failure at the strategic level. For example, the guards and interrogators who tortured detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq became known in the United States defence community as “...the six guys who lost us the war.”

Fourth, Canada’s success in military missions requires that its forces work well with allied forces and local people in operational theatres. Unethical behaviour by military personnel can undermine these relationships, jeopardize operational outcomes, and damage the international reputation of the CAF and the nation. For example, when Sub-Lieutenant Jeffrey Delisle was convicted in 2013 of selling secrets to the Russians, some commentators suggested his transgressions might make allies reluctant to share intelligence with Canada in the future.

Fifth, some types of unethical behaviour, like theft and waste, can be very expensive. Finally, moral distress and psychological injury can incapacitate soldiers who participate in or even witness ethical violations.

The CAF does not have an official definition of ‘ethical risk,’ but it has two definitions of ‘risk.’ The first describes risk as “any circumstance which exposes a decision maker or course of action to some hazard which may produce either a negative effect or else prevent or impede the attainment of one or more objectives.” The second defines risk as “…a possible loss or negative mission impact stated in terms of probability and severity.”

Building upon these definitions of generalized risk, our definition of ethical risk has four parts: (1) ethical risk manifests in the form of a wrongdoing, which has ethical, moral, or legal overtones; (2) the wrongdoing is caused (intentionally or not) by agents of the military, namely anyone working for the military, whether they are soldiers, sailors, or air personnel in uniform, civilian employees of the military, or contractors who may have been temporarily hired for specific missions; (3) the wrongdoing has the potential to impact negatively on the force’s ability to perform its mission, and by mission, we mean...
the full range of military activities conducted in operations, training, or in garrison; and (4) ethical risk can be reduced before the wrongdoing occurs and mitigated, to some extent, thereafter.

We recognize that wrongdoing is a broad concept, and therefore list in Table 1 a range of unethical, immoral, and illegal behaviour that defence leaders might encounter in their units.

### Managing Ethical Risk

Managing ethical risk is about anticipating, preventing, mitigating, and surviving ethical failures. Consequently, an effective ethical risk management program should focus upon preventing ethical failures before they happen, and responding to misbehaviour after it has occurred.

### Preventing Ethical Violations

The military has several tools at its disposal for preventing transgressions, including ethics (professional), codes and regulations, selection, training, and socialization.

*Codes.* DND and the CAF jointly endorse a code of values and ethics, and the CAF has a code of conduct. For the Canadian Army, *Duty with Discernment*, goes beyond the above-mentioned codes to describe in detail the ethical obligations of “ethical warriors” in operations.

While most organizations have an ethics code or a similar list of encouraged (or prohibited) behaviours, there is some doubt about the effectiveness of these codes. They are less effective in organizations where the behaviours needed to survive in the organization differ from those espoused in the code. That said, there is evidence that codes can have an effect.

*Enforcing codes and regulations.* Organizations are usually more adept at punishing unethical behaviour than rewarding ethical behaviour. Because the CAF has many mechanisms in place for rewarding exemplary actions, it could easily find a way to acknowledge exceptionally ethical behaviour. One possibility is to establish an honour like the Golden Whistle Award presented by the Ottawa-based discussion group, “Peace, Order and Good Government.”

*Recruiting and selection.* Unethical behaviour could be prevented to some degree by strengthening CAF selection standards, but the gains in this area would be minor, and screening procedures at CAF recruiting centres are already lengthy.

*Ethics training.* Most Western nations provide ethics instruction to their military personnel, but there is little evidence that such instruction is effective. To date, there has been only one published study on the effectiveness of military ethics training, and the results were positive. Using scripted instructional materials and movie vignettes, leaders in a U.S. Army Stryker Brigade in Iraq delivered battlefield ethics training to 3500 of the brigade’s soldiers. After the
training, a smaller group of soldiers completed a survey from which researchers determined that the instruction had contributed to lower levels of battlefield ethics violations, and increased willingness to report wrongdoing.18

Some researchers have suggested that ethics instruction is more effective when it is included within professional training rather than taught as separate courses. Providing ethics training in the form of stand-alone courses delivered by civilian experts or others from outside the professional community will simply reinforce the notion that ethics is not a core military competency. Conversely, having it taught by organizational leaders will demonstrate that ethics is an integral element of military operations.

Socialization. While soldiers can learn a great amount from formal training sessions, one should not underestimate the impact of informal, vicarious learning. Research has shown that the ethical attitudes and behaviour of individuals are shaped by co-workers and immediate supervisors,19 a point which is regularly reinforced in military literature. A case in point is the inspirational leadership and outstanding moral example provided by Air Commodore Leonard Birchall during three-and-a-half years of confinement in Japanese prisoner of war camps during the Second World War.20

Responding to Ethical Violations

When organizations experience a serious ethical violation, they must respond in ways that will preserve their ethical integrity and reputation, demonstrate that unethical conduct is not tolerated, minimize the costs of the unethical actions, restore the damage done, and provide assistance to the victims and perpetrators.21 The organizational response to ethical wrongdoing will be most effective when it is based upon the following principles:

Understanding and learning. Investigations of ethical misconduct fundamentally seek to understand the root causes of ethical risk within the organization, so that effective remediation can occur. The completed investigation should inform decision making on any remedial action required. Stripped of personal detail, the results should also be shared extensively to demonstrate commitment to ethical performance and compliance, and to further ethics training and education.

Communication. Proactive and candid communication with both internal and external audiences is essential when serious ethical breaches come to light.22 Military personnel and the Canadian public expect senior leaders, as stewards of the military profession, to speak for the institution in dire situations, and to do so in an honest and forthright manner. Anything less will fail to satisfy the inevitable thirst for information, and risk further damage to the reputation of the organization.23

For an excellent example of messaging in response to ethics violations, readers should view the video of Lieutenant-General David Morrison, Chief of Army in Australia, speaking out against alleged sexual misconduct by some soldiers and officers. Carried first on internal military media and then public Australian media, his message was unequivocal: Such behaviour is inconsistent with Australian values, and “… those who think that it is OK to behave in a way that demeans or exploits their colleagues have no place in this army.”24

Punishment. Prompt and fair sanctions must be the inescapable consequence of serious violations of an organization’s ethical code of conduct.25 Accordingly, The DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics states that CAF members who fail in their ethical obligations may be subject to change of duties, disciplinary action under the National Defence Act, or administrative action including release from the CAF.26 Consequently, when sentencing Captain Semrau
following his conviction on the charge of disgraceful conduct, the presiding military judge stated that it was necessary to send a clear message to all concerned that such behaviour is unacceptable, and it will not be tolerated.27

Assessing Ethical Risk

The idea behind ethical risk analysis is to identify threats and vulnerabilities before they lead to ethical failure, so that they can be eliminated or their severity of impact reduced. Unfortunately, ethical risk analysis may not be well understood in the defence community. Chief of the Defence Staff Guidance to Commanding Officers directs commanding officers (COs) to manage ethical risk, but it does not provide any advice on how to accomplish it.28 The Army Ethics Program (AEP) recommends that COs assess unit ethical risk prior to assuming command, after taking command, and when warned for an operational mission; however, the methods suggested for this do not make use of established CAF operational planning and operational risk management procedures.29 This apparent gap between precept and process might cause some commanders to overlook ethical risk analysis in their unit mission planning, or to treat it as a lower priority activity. There is clearly a need to incorporate ethical risk in CAF doctrine and procedures for operational planning and operational risk management, but that is a subject for another article. For the present, we will provide some practical suggestions on how to assess ethical risk. Essentially, ethical risk analysis involves two steps: considering where the threats are, and gathering hard data, from surveys and other measures, to confirm the extent of potential risks.

A Conceptual Framework for Analysing Ethical Risk

Ethical risks are context-dependent, meaning that they will vary according to environmental characteristics like geography, type of work one is engaged in and such. For example, many of the ethical threats facing military personnel who work in logistics are different than those facing medical staff and personnel in other occupations. At the same time, there are threats and vulnerabilities which are ubiquitous, such as the influence of charismatic, immoral peers and leaders.

We recommend analysing ethical threats and vulnerabilities at three levels – the environment, the organization, and the individual – in order to consider all potential risks. There are unique risks at each of these levels, but some risks spill over to other levels, manifesting themselves in slightly different ways, depending upon the level observed.

The environment. Many of the environmental factors which influence ethical attitudes are based in the social and political norms that shape society. These social and political influences are pervasive and often subtle, so much so that individuals are often unaware of their impact.

The fortunes of political leaders in democratic nations turn on the support they receive from their electorate, so they tend to emphasize the positive and downplay the negative, a practice which is apparent to all, but especially so for government officials and military officers who work at senior levels. One potentially harmful consequence of this influence can be reluctance of some senior leaders to
communicate frankly about defence matters. (We are not talking here about military secrets which should be kept from potential enemies.) High-level decisions impact on many stakeholders, and sometimes, there are strong pressures to act in a particular way that will benefit some stakeholders over others. Transparency ensures that decision makers will consider the implications for all who may be affected. But when there is a lack of transparency, decision makers are more susceptible to decision-making errors like justification, self-deception, and ‘groupthink,’ and are more likely to choose options which are ethically flawed. For more specifics on this issue, see Professor Stephen Saideman’s article in which he criticizes DND for a lack of openness and a habit of denying the existence of problems.30

Another environmental level risk stems from the desire within the political-military sphere to minimize the danger facing one’s soldiers in operations. In the Western World, this has led to what Martin Shaw calls risk-transfer war, a style of fighting which relies upon precision weapons and media management.31 Employing precision weapons transfers the risk of personal injury and death from one’s own soldiers to enemy combatants and non-combatants, but it can also lead to the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force (a violation of just war principles and international law). Managing the media has its own ethical risk, particularly when officials withhold information which should be reported.

The organization. The culture of an organization, if it is ethically challenged, can lead unit members to commit ethics violations. (Organizational culture refers to the spirit of an organization and the values and beliefs shared by its members.)34 Four aspects of an organization’s culture can lead its members to either engage in sound ethical behaviour or unethical actions.35 First, there are the norms, which are rules within an organization, many of them informal and not written down, that guide the social behaviour of unit members. As an example, a unit that prides itself on getting the job done at all costs may inadvertently encourage its members to bend or break rules for wrong reasons. Second are the unit’s leaders, those who have the ability to influence the perceptions and actions of other unit members. Informal and lower-level unit leaders are important here, because research has shown that “…it is co-workers and immediate supervisors, not distant executives, who often serve as role models for ethical behaviour at work.”36 Third is the extent to which unit

“The fortunes of political leaders in democratic nations turn on the support they receive from their electorate...”
members obey authority figures and comply with unit regulations. Responsible obedience is required here, not blind obedience, because passive subordinates conforming to or colluding with bad leaders can create unethical units.37 The best units, from an ethical perspective, consist of unit leaders with high moral principles who would never encourage their subordinates to engage in unethical actions, and responsible followers who can distinguish lawful direction from unlawful direction and have the moral courage to resist the latter. Fourth relates to the extent to which a unit holds its members accountable for their actions. Those units which promote accountability are more likely to have members who behave ethically than units which fail to punish unethical behaviour or neglect to reward morally superior actions. For a practical example of how these four elements of organizational culture can lead to unethical consequences in a military unit, the ethical failings of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia in 1993 is an instructive case.38

Careerism is an ethical threat. It thrives in the military because most individuals wish to be promoted, but it is a two-edged sword. On the positive side, the prospect of promotion can encourage people to work hard and to seek greater responsibility, thereby contributing to the organization. But careerism can also entice individuals to avoid their professional responsibilities by playing it safe, creating no waves, and being ‘politically correct.’39 At its worst, careerism can also lead subordinates to curry favour with their superiors by engaging in unethical behaviour, such as complying with ethically ambiguous orders, keeping problems quiet, failing to voice dissent when a situation calls for it, and basically ‘going along’ to get ahead.40 The Report of the Somalia Inquiry gives a thorough account of careerist behaviours related to the selection and screening of personnel for the Canadian Airborne Regiment, actions which no doubt contributed to the Regiment’s ethical failures in Somalia.41

Competition among individuals, units, or organizations that is not kept in check can result in an unhealthy lack of cooperation, which, in turn, can lead to neglect of some stakeholders’ interests and ultimately cause ethical failures. On reading about the disagreement around the proper management of detainees in Afghanistan,42 one wonders if competition between military officers and officials from other components of Canada’s Afghanistan effort may have contributed in some way to the development of unsatisfactory detainee handling procedures, which resulted in scandal.

Military leaders cannot take corrective action if they do not know what needs to be fixed, so an important aspect of a unit’s ethical culture is the effectiveness of the unit’s system for reporting ethical failures to the chain of command. Usually, there are few problems in this area if the misconduct is witnessed by a leader, but it is less certain that a member who is not in a leadership position will report any misconduct he or she observes. Given that an important function of the Canadian military ethos is to “create and shape the desired military culture of the Canadian Forces,”43 the CAF may have difficulty building a desirable culture if a sizeable portion of its unprofessional behaviour goes unreported. This is where internal ‘whistle-blowing’ mechanisms, such as the Army’s Lamplighter program, can play an important role.44 But such mechanisms will only be effective if members report infractions, leaders take action, and members recognize that the system is working.

CAF leadership doctrine states that the institution must be a learning organization, one that openly encourages the debate of new ideas, critically examines its successes and failures on an ongoing basis, and learns from experience.45 The Canadian Public Service values the “self-reflective” learning organization for its ability to challenge its basic assumptions about how results are achieved, openly discuss its weaknesses, and courageously correct itself.46 Although CAF leadership doctrine does not emphasize the link between organizational learning and ethics, this theme is explicit in the Government of Canada’s Management Accountability Framework.47 Regrettably, there are several recent indicators which suggest that DND and the CAF may be falling short of learning organization norms.

The first is the recent decision to discontinue the Officer Professional Military Education Program (OPME).48 OPME consisted of a half-dozen courses (one of which was a university level course in leadership and ethics), which junior officers had to complete to advance in rank, but were also taken by many others for personal
The details of the new program have yet to be published, but early indications suggest the replacement program will fall short of the learning organization standard for ethics.

The second is the lack of opportunities for defence personnel to engage in public dialogue on ethics issues. DND and the CAF held about a half-dozen annual ethics conferences – called the Canadian Conference on Ethical Leadership – between 1996 and 2006, but they were discontinued. Similarly, an ethics symposium for general officers ran for several years in the early-2000s, but this activity appears to have ceased as well. On a more encouraging note, the Army recently collaborated with Queen’s University to host a conference on the subject of ethical warriors in June 2013.49

The individual. While the environmental and organizational influences can seem abstract and their impact difficult to determine with certainty, they ultimately manifest themselves in the concrete actions of individuals where they are directly observable. The success or failure of military units depends upon the actions of its members, and, as previously mentioned, any system relying upon human performance is bound to have failures (as we so frequently observe in newspaper reports and newscasts).

At the individual level of analysis, ethical risks appear in the form of cognitive, motivational, and physical limitations of individual military members. For greater precision in analyzing these limitations, we can view ethical competence as consisting of four components: moral awareness, moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral action.50 Individuals with low levels of moral awareness are less able to perceive the ethical demands of a particular event, hence they may not know what to do,51 and are therefore more likely to make unethical choices. Moral judgment refers to the ability to reason through the moral implications of a particular situation to identify the most moral course of action. According to Kohlberg, an early researcher in this field,52 some individuals at the lower end of the moral development scale will decide what is right on the basis of self-interest. Most adults operate a little higher on the scale, making decisions on the basis of normative influences, such as rules, regulations, and the opinions of others (most military personnel function at this level). A smaller group performs at the highest level of moral judgment and makes their moral choices on the basis of ethical principles. Judgment is related to intelligence, and like awareness, it can be improved with education and training. Moral motivation is like moral courage or will, so morally motivated individuals are able to subordinate their self-interest to higher-order ideals. Moral action refers to the ability to bring the three moral components of awareness, judgment, and motivation together to perform an observable, ethical act.

Three points warrant emphasis here. First, all four of the above-mentioned moral components can be viewed as abilities, so some people will be stronger in these capacities than others. Second, research has shown that moral awareness and judgment are most responsive to ethics instruction, but there are also a few studies showing that actual behaviour can be improved with moral training.53 It is still not known how best to raise levels of moral motivation, but training may also help here, along with strong ethical examples.
gleaned from unit peers and leaders. Third, all of these moral competencies are vulnerable to decision-making errors and biases, so training sessions should devote some time to instructing individuals how to avoid mistakes in their decision making.

In addition to the moral capacities discussed above, personal disposition, attitudes, mood, and emotion can also influence ethical functioning. Individuals who are low on empathy are more likely to overlook the interests of others, and more likely to participate in harmful acts against others.54 This is a potential problem in cohesive military units, where it is not uncommon to disdain members of out-groups. What may start as simple dismissal or rejection of an out-group can escalate into abuse in the absence of strong discipline or leadership. Ego strength is a strong antidote to unethical influences,55 because it enables individuals to self-regulate and to resist harmful impulses. Fortunately, ego strength can be strengthened with training and experience. Locus of control also has an impact upon moral behaviour.56 Individuals with an external locus of control believe that what they do will have little impact upon eventual outcomes, so they are more susceptible to unethical influences than individuals with an internal locus of control who believe that their actions can affect outcomes in some way. Leaders need to recognize that it is relatively easy for subordinates to adopt an external locus of control, particularly if they think their efforts are insignificant and have little impact upon the organization’s performance. Ethics training can address this by requiring everyone to take responsibility for the organization’s professional reputation.

Studies show that some job-related attitudes are associated with organizational misbehaviour. In particular, individuals who are dissatisfied with their jobs and/or have low levels of commitment to their organization are more likely to engage in workplace misconduct.57 We also know, both from academic studies and from practical military experiences such as the My Lai massacre in 196858 and the Somalia scandal in 1993,59 that emotions like anger and frustration can lead soldiers to engage in immoral behaviour.

Measuring Ethical Risk with Surveys

A number of measures have been developed for use in evaluating ethical risk, but most are owned by private firms and are only available to clients who purchase them.60 Fortunately, there are a number of tools within DND and the CAF which, with some minor revisions, could be used in assessing ethical risk. These are the Defence Ethics Program surveys,60 the Human Dimensions of Operations surveys,61 and three surveys originally developed for evaluating the AEP.62 Another source of information which could be useful in ethical risk analysis is the Annual Report of the Judge Advocate General to the Minister of National Defence on the Administration of Military Justice in the Canadian Forces, which gives an overview of the summary trials and courts martial conducted in the CAF.63
Recommendations

1. Integrate ethics into regular practices. Ethics needs to be viewed as integral to military operations and a matter of importance to leaders, supervisors, and commanders, not a discretionary activity managed by staff or ethics experts.

2. Incorporate ethics training into professional training. Ethics instruction should be embedded within unit training, professional development activities, and career (i.e., leadership) courses to underscore ethics as a vital aspect of all defence work. Ethics training should rarely occur as a distinct, stand-alone activity.

3. Develop ethics training materials for unit leaders. Instructional materials should be developed by ethics experts for unit ethics training (i.e., scenarios, instructor notes, and presentations) and made available to everyone by placing these materials on the DEP website or other DND/CAF websites.

4. Encourage leaders to be ethical role models. Serving as an ethical role model for one’s subordinates should be recognized as an important part of the leader’s job, reinforced in leadership training, and assessed in performance evaluation reports.

5. Include ethical risk analysis in operational planning doctrine and training. Ethical risk analysis should be an integral element of the CAF operational planning process (OPP) and operational planning doctrine should be revised to give direction on how to consider ethical factors in OPP. Similarly, ethical risk management should be an integral element of the CAF operational risk management process, and should be covered in operational risk management doctrine.

6. Employ surveys in ethical risk assessment. Surveys currently used to measure ethics issues, like the DEP, HDO, and AEP surveys, should be reviewed and revised where practicable to make them more useful in assessing ethical risk. If necessary, new surveys should be developed to gather information on ethical threats and vulnerabilities.

7. Poll service members on ethical risks. DND employees and service members are a valuable source of information on ethical risk, and they should be canvassed to provide examples of ethical threats and vulnerabilities they have witnessed.

NOTES


29. AEP para 5.b (3), Annex B (Supplement to Chapter 3 of CDS Guidance to COs; Commanding Officer’s Unit Ethics Plan), paras S-304.4, S-305.2, S-305.7, S-307.1, at http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land terre/aep-peal/lfcoc-ocft/annexb-eng.asp.

30. Stephen Saideman, “The Canadian Forces have a dangerous habit of denial,” in The Globe and Mail,


38 According to internal CAF communication dated 1 November 2012, the OPME Program will cease to be delivered on 30 April 2013. (Para 2 of Canadian Forces General (CANFORGEN) message 218/12, dated 011212Z November 2012).


45 According to internal CAF communication dated 1 November 2012, the OPME Program will cease to be delivered on 30 April 2013. (Para 2 of Canadian Forces General (CANFORGEN) message 218/12, dated 011212Z November 2012).


53 According to internal CAF communication dated 1 November 2012, the OPME Program will cease to be delivered on 30 April 2013. (Para 2 of Canadian Forces General (CANFORGEN) message 218/12, dated 011212Z November 2012).


55 According to internal CAF communication dated 1 November 2012, the OPME Program will cease to be delivered on 30 April 2013. (Para 2 of Canadian Forces General (CANFORGEN) message 218/12, dated 011212Z November 2012).


57 Michael Bilton and Kevin Sim, Four hours in My Lai (London: Viking, 1992).


VALUES, ETHICS, AND MISSION COMMAND: TRUST AS A CONSCIOUS ACT OF FORCE

Dan McCauley

“The earth always belongs to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct…. Every constitution then, and every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force, and not of a right.”

Thomas Jefferson, 1789

Introduction

The U.S. Constitution never became the ‘living’ document that changed every generation as Thomas Jefferson envisioned. Instead, its principles and core values have remained steadfast throughout the centuries against many internal and external challenges, some mere fads, and others far graver. Circumstances change, however, and the conditions that existed when Jefferson, James Madison, and others established a fledgling nation uncertain of its continued existence have changed to one today in which the United States is positioned as the world’s sole superpower. As the nation matured, each change in environmental condition required a reexamination of its underlying principles and values. The abolishment of slavery, women’s suffrage, the establishment of social security, and gay rights are examples of such introspection and reevaluation.

Although the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have changed the Joint Force in ways not yet fully known, there are visible signs that the values and ethics that have been the hallmark of U.S. operations suffer from neglect, or, at a minimum, are fraying around the edges. Examples of this neglect are evident throughout the Joint Force. Last summer, a military court convicted an Air Force instructor, one of 12 implicated in a sexual misconduct scandal, of raping one female recruit and sexually assaulting several others. Seven Army soldiers and two Marines received administrative punishment as part of the continuing Secret Service prostitution scandal from the spring of 2012. Additional fallout

Dan McCauley is a National Defense University assistant professor at the Joint Forces Staff College located in Norfolk, Virginia. Professor McCauley is a retired United States Air Force pilot and currently instructs national security strategy and theater campaign planning for senior US and international officers. He is pursuing his doctorate in Strategic Leadership.
from that scandal resulted in one Air Force member reprimanded, while final decisions are pending on two Navy sailors.\(^4\)

Moral leadership not only consists of ethical beliefs and assumptions, but also actively and positively supports what is just or right. Moral decisions must be in consonance with ethical principles, unselfish,\(^5\) and positively reflect the Profession of Arms and those who are the guarantors of the Constitution.\(^6\) Every generation, including this one, must determine how it will live collectively and according to what agreed upon values. The Joint Force’s ability to define and inculcate its values or code of conduct across the Joint enterprise is critical to reducing the tension between competing operational and cultural requirements and in fully instituting the concept of mission command.

To achieve Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Martin Dempsey’s vision of mission command, trust must be the cornerstone of the effort.\(^7\) Without trust, shared understanding and intent will be nothing more than empty platitudes that are acknowledged but ignored throughout the joint force. Without trust, a joint culture will espouse one set of values while acting upon another. This article posits that to achieve trust, one must begin with an understanding of values—its origins and development, and the effects of multiculturalism. Next, ethics or values-in-action are shown as the linkage between values and trust. Third, trust is explored as an intervening variable between a leader and organizational success. Fourth, leadership as expressed in mission command is analyzed. Finally, recommendations are proposed for developing trust throughout the Joint Force.

Values and Culture

In 1789, Thomas Jefferson wrote to his old friend, James Madison, that each generation was sovereign and that the rights and laws of one generation should not impede or limit future generations. Thus, each successive generation must determine through active measures the laws by which that generation will abide. Madison acknowledged Jefferson’s logic, but argued that there is value in stability, and “…without such continuity there is no nation.”\(^8\) As Madison clearly tells Jefferson, each generation is not self-contained or purely self-interested; rather each builds upon the other making improvements to be subsequently improved upon by later generations. Although Madison’s position was far more rational and logical, Jefferson’s point was that actions of past generations should not impede or limit...
their successor’s ability to act as they see fit. Each generation must understand the hard-earned sacrifices from previous generations as espoused in laws and values, and interpret them for application to the current context.

Whereas laws are legally binding, values are defined as “constructs representing generalized behaviours or states of affairs that are considered by the individual to be important.” Values provide the foundation for the Profession of Arms, which the Joint Force uses as a guide for personal and professional purposes. Values influence a person’s perception of situations and problems, and they influence preferences, aspirations, and choices. Often unspoken and taken for granted, values are frequently difficult to articulate. Part of the difficulty in defining values is that a range of behaviours may satisfy stated values, and contextual nuance often shapes value application. In all global organizations, personal or organizational values frequently conflict with other value systems, rather than supporting one another. In a multicultural strategic environment, the lack of a strong institutional commitment from Joint leadership regarding values and codes of conduct provides subordinates with little foundation for behaving ethically.

Espoused values are “…the articulated, publicly announced principles and values that the group claims to be trying to achieve.” These values reflect a sense of what ought to be as opposed to what currently is. In essence, espoused values propose solutions about what the group or institution thinks is right or wrong, and what will or will not work. Within the group, leaders use their influence to persuade subordinates to adopt certain espoused values. Until the group takes action, however, and the members have observed the outcome of that action, a shared basis for understanding does not exist. If the espoused value works reliably and undergoes group or institutional validation, it then becomes a value. Individuals and groups learn that certain values work to reduce ambiguity in a group’s core functional area, such as in overseas operations. Organizational philosophies that embody codified values serve as a guide for addressing uncertainty and can predict most expected behavior within the environment.

Ethics

Ethical theory dates back to the early Greek philosophers, and the word “ethics” is derived from the Greek word “ethos,” meaning “character.” Ethics describe the kinds of values and morals an individual, organization, or community desires. With regard to leadership, ethics has to do with how leaders behave and their virtuousness. In his letter to Madison, Thomas Jefferson was alluding to a generation’s character and virtue. Jefferson believed that each generation was essentially the trustee of the nation’s values for future generations. When a trustee holds something in usufruct, there is an expectation that the worth of the item in question is not diminished in any way. In fact, it speaks volumes about the trustee’s character if improvements are not made.

The examples of recent unethical or immoral behaviour exhibited by current members of the Joint Force speak to a lack of character or ethics. The lack of ethics undermines the trust that the American populace and the world expects, and impedes the ability of future generations of Joint Force warriors to execute operations successfully around the world.
by their ethics.” Ethical theories fall within two broad domains: conduct and character. Theories that deal with conduct focus upon the consequences of one’s actions and the associated rules governing behaviour. The consequences of an individual’s actions determine the goodness or badness of a particular behaviour. Virtue-based theories are theories of character, and focus upon an individual’s disposition. These theories state that virtues are not innate, but learned and reinforced over time through familial and community enforcement.

Ethics is central to leadership. The values promoted by a leader establish and reinforce organizational values and have a significant effect upon the behaviour exhibited by personnel. Through the creation of a deep sense of moral values, and by conveying high levels of honesty and integrity when interacting with subordinates, leaders enhance subordinate social identification with the organization. Leaders must understand that their behaviour, good or bad, sends a strong message to the organization and directly affects how personnel think, decide, and act.

Ethical codes are formal statements of an organization’s values regarding expected personal social responsibilities; they clarify to personnel what the organization stands for and its expectations for personal conduct. Although written codes are important, it is essential that leaders and commanders support and reinforce the codes through their actions, including rewards for compliance, and discipline for violations. Moral codes become problematic when individuals attempt to apply those values, originally espoused as good or bad, to specific situations. It is the application of values that makes the behavioural outcomes complicated, and that differs across cultures.

Trust

Jefferson’s letter to Madison illustrates that he understood the often short-sightedness and present-mindedness of humankind, and he offered caution for decision makers. He rightfully asserted that those entrusted with the present generation must not violate the rights of future generations. A trustee is assumed to have the needs and interests of his or her clients in mind when acting on their behalf. A leader, much like a trustee, must also serve the needs and interests of his or her subordinates when acting on their behalf.
The key attributes of mission command are understanding, intent, and trust (Figure 1). Trust is defined as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability, based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.” As applied to mission command, trust informs the execution of intent and must be resident at every level of the Joint Force. In other words, trust is the intervening variable that ties the independent variable, leadership, to the dependent variable, organizational success (Figure 2). A lack of trust severely limits intent and understanding and hinders the ability of the Joint Force to operate effectively. For trust to have its most far-reaching effects, it must not only reside within individuals, but also within an organization’s culture.

Leadership, as the independent variable, creates a sense of trust that, in turn, leads to organizational success. Similarly, subordinate trust in leadership is a crucial element in the effectiveness of a leader. An organization that has developed trust between its leadership and subordinates reaps a number of direct and indirect benefits. For example, trust increases communication, cooperation, and information sharing; it increases satisfaction with and perceived effectiveness of leadership; it enhances organizational citizenship behaviors; it decreases personnel turnover; it improves team and organizational performance; and it increases organizational stability.

Joint leaders who possess deep personal values and convictions and act accordingly build credibility and earn their subordinates’ respect and trust. Through the encouragement of diverse perspectives and the development of collaborative networks, leaders create an ethical environment that subordinates can recognize and emulate. Leaders directly influence their subordinates’ self-concepts through collaborative relationships, and aligning organizational and personal values and beliefs. By clearly conveying their values and vision to subordinates and engaging in discourse, leaders quickly develop the foundation upon which trust is built.

Trust exists at every level within an organization: individual, team, leadership, organizational, and inter-organizational. Group or organizational experiences and interaction strengthen or weaken the manner in which trust is developed. Misalignment between senior leadership and members of an organization often occurs because of a failure of senior leaders to prioritize goals. As a result, this obligates mid-level leaders or commanders to address this failure, which often results in mixed signals and conflicting messages that undermine trust and confidence in all levels of leadership. Competing initiatives should be avoided if at all possible because the existence
of many, rapidly shifting priorities destroys the credibility of the organization and undercuts the credibility of any change efforts.37

Leadership and Mission Command

The commander is the central figure in mission command38 and span of control directly affects his or her ability to communicate effectively with subordinates. Commanders of smaller organizations typically have more direct power and influence than in larger organizations because leadership is not diffused through layers of management. In smaller organizations, subordinates easily recognize commanders and constantly observe their behaviour. Therefore, commanders in smaller organizations possess a strong potential to establish high ethical standards for all decisions. Joint commanders whose organizations operate in unfamiliar or foreign landscapes may need to adjust ethical standards or expectations. If the commander fails to provide the proper environmental and ethical guidance, some personnel may engage in ‘rogue’ behaviour in an attempt to achieve their objectives. In other words, some personnel may fail to distinguish when crossing the line of good judgment and commit unethical acts when attempting to navigate their way through unfamiliar environments.39 With that mind, leaders throughout the organization must espouse, and, more important, model ethical behaviour.40

In mission command, values must not be abstract and theoretical—they must be acted upon. To achieve organizational goals, commanders must first communicate the desired outcomes to their subordinates and develop behavioral expectations to achieve those outcomes. Once identified and taught, subordinates must live by those expectations, and commanders must constructively confront those who violate them (Figure 3). Culture is ultimately defined by what commanders expect and what commanders tolerate.41 Trust in commanders is extremely important for the Joint Force as missions and tasks are highly complex, and they routinely call for high levels of interdependence and cooperation. Ultimately a reflection of values, trust is on display for all to see and judge.42

Figure 3: Values, Ethics, and Mission Command
Recommendations for the Joint Force

As Joint Force commanders become ethically attuned, they must learn to view the world through a variety of lenses, developing a personal sense of right and wrong. They must learn to interpret the influences that affect individual and group behaviour. In addition, commanders need also to develop sensitivity for U.S. public expectations. For current and future Joint Force commanders, this makes leadership extremely challenging as ethics become partly improvisational and intuitive. If commanders expect subordinates to alter their values and behaviour freely and to align them more closely with those of the organization, subordinates must trust their commander’s integrity and credibility. Commanders must understand that only a values-based organization—one that espouses and lives by its core values every day—can provide the Joint Force with the requisite creativity and critical thinking skills necessary to operate in a dynamic strategic environment. Commanders can take the following steps to develop and institutionalize trust throughout their organizations:

- **Develop organizational values.** Values serve as a guide for dealing with the uncertainty of inherently difficult events or unfamiliar situations. They provide individuals with a sense of what is right and wrong and enable organizations to respond more effectively in times of adversity.

- **Promote ethical behaviour.** Values strengthen an individual’s sense of right and wrong and provide guidelines for expected behaviour. Subordinates with a strong understanding of organizational values know the right thing to do when encountering difficult or unfamiliar circumstances.

- **Reinforce a values-based organizational culture.** Values provide the foundation for an organization’s culture. Given today’s multicultural organizations and operating environments, the development and modeling of supranational values that complement specific subgroup cultures will reinforce the desired expectations.

- **Foster a sense of community.** Shared core values create a sense of community in organizations. As subordinates start to understand they are working toward a common goal and share the same values as the organization, they develop a sense of cooperation and commitment.

- **Promote a learning environment.** Subordinates who have a sense of ownership within an organization are more likely to take risks or seize opportunities to improve their skills and practices. A sense of community helps individuals feel more connected to their work and, as a result, become more creative and open to new ideas and practices.

- **Support leadership development.** Values training teaches future leaders that by linking their personal values to organizational values and living them, leaders set a positive example for those around them and influence the behaviours of others.
Commanders must develop a sense of morality and a desire to act in the long-term interests of others. Moral commanders demonstrate high degrees of ethical conduct time and again and view themselves as the organization’s “standard bearer.” A commander’s ethical behaviour carries a powerful message to subordinates that directly influence what they think, and ultimately, how they act. Over time, the ethical behaviour of a leader affects everyone within the organization and becomes a part of its culture.47

Conclusion

Most Joint organizations today are constrained by so many rules and regulations that even commanders at the highest levels do not have to ‘lead’ anyone anywhere. Many of today’s leaders simply follow policy, obey regulations, and operate at the head of the organization. Such leaders lead only in “…the sense that the carved wooden figurehead leads the ship.”48 Mission command is not an unthinking process—it challenges commanders to “…develop mutual trust and understanding and exercise moral nerve and restraint.”49 Thus, mission command requires commanders to take a far more active role in developing shared understanding and trust within their organizations.

Every day, unanticipated events demand near-instantaneous decisions that have no straightforward answers. These decisions can have long-term implications for personnel, organizations, and nations. Often times, the costs associated with a decision are unknown until well after the fact. The uncertainty associated with decision-making creates a tension between what one can readily adapt to and what one must unequivocally oppose, especially when confronting the powerful and resisting external pressure.50 It is this very uncertainty that demands institutional values and a code of conduct to guide51 the Joint Force as it executes operations around the world.

As Thomas Jefferson wrote over 220 years ago, if laws and values are to be extended from one generation to the next, it takes a conscious act of force. As the United States, and the Joint Force in particular, transitions from two major conflicts while continuing to execute operations around the world, there is an opportunity and responsibility to reflect upon the lessons learned. Although Jefferson’s main argument raised as many questions as it answered, he provided a concept for current Joint leaders to begin the integration of the lessons learned into a code of conduct for future generations of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. The Joint Force, specifically its senior leadership, must determine how war has changed the force; it must determine the Joint Force’s collective values;52 and it must “decide and act on the best course of action to follow,”53 to implement the concept of mission command.

NOTES

2 M. Dempsey, (2012a). Chairman’s strategic direction that the carved wooden figurehead leads the ship.  
6 Dempsey (2012a).
9 Ball (2000).
12 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Daft (2010).
30 Dempsey (2012b).
32 Avolio et al. (2004).
34 Avolio et al. (2004).
38 Dempsey (2012b).
40 Daft (2010).
44 Simons (1999).
45 Runy (2008).
46 Dempsey (2012b).
49 Dempsey (2012b), p. 5.
50 McCoy (2007).
51 Runy (2008).
52 Dempsey (2012a).
DIVERSITY RECRUITING: IT’S TIME TO TIP THE BALANCE

Chantal Fraser

“Base your expectations not on what has happened in the past, but rather on what you desire for the future.”

~Ralph Marston

Introduction

The Canadian military has a rich history with respect to diversity. English and French speaking Canadians and Aboriginal peoples have served in or with the Canadian military throughout our history. Black Canadians first served in the War of 1812. Women first served in uniform as nurses during the Northwest Rebellion in 1885. Chinese and Japanese Canadians have served since the early-1900s. Canadian Sikhs served in the First World War. Canada was one of the first nations to open all military occupations to women, along with Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. The dress regulations have been adjusted to accommodate cultural and religious differences. For example, Aboriginal members may wear braids, and Muslim women may wear a hijab. Aboriginal peoples, women, and visible minority Canadian Armed Forces members have achieved the highest ranks: General Officer/Flag Officer and Chief Warrant/Petty Officer First Class.

For the last decade, the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (CFRG) has met or exceeded the majority of the Strategic Intake Plan goals (recruiting goals set by occupation and environment). However, the group still has difficulty recruiting for some occupations, such as Pharmacist. Thousands of people apply to join the CAF each year, and many go away disappointed.

With our impressive history and the current level of interest in serving in the military, does it really matter if the CAF reflects Canadian population? Given the projected Canadian demographics, I contend that it does. Not to put too fine a point on it, but the face of Canada continues to change, and so must the CAF as it moves into the future and represents the face of the Canadian public it defends.

Canadian Demographics

Canada has an increasingly diverse population and workforce. In 2009, women constituted more than half the available labour pool. In 2008, 62 percent of undergraduate degrees and 54 percent of graduate degrees were granted to women. These numbers are expected to continue to rise. Statistics Canada projects that by 2031, three out of ten young Canadians will be members of a visible minority group, less than two-thirds of Canadians will belong to a Christian religion, and 30 percent of our population will have a mother tongue other than English or French. Statistic Canada Census reports from 2001, 2006, and 2011 also show a downward trend of Canadians speaking English (56.9 percent) and French (21.3 percent) as their mother tongue. Those considered to be visible minorities have a higher propensity to complete post-

Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Chantal Fraser, CD, MBA, served for 28 years in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). In her last position as Senior Staff Officer Plans at the Canadian Defence Academy, she managed the CAF Aboriginal Programs, and worked closely with the Directorate of Human Rights and Diversity, and the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group, on topics related to Recruiting, Employment Equity, Personnel Generation, and Retention.
secondary education in part due to the importance placed upon education by their families. The majority of the visible minority populations are concentrated in our three biggest cities, Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. Statistics Canada projects that by 2031, the Aboriginal population will be between 4 - 5.3 percent of the population, and that the average age of Aboriginal peoples will continue to be several years younger than that of the non-Aboriginal population. The percentage of Aboriginal peoples completing post-secondary education is growing, but is still significantly lower than that of the non-Aboriginal population. This is in part due to the lower percentage of Aboriginal peoples who complete high school. A large percentage of Aboriginal Canadians live in or near urban centres.

What is Diversity?

The terms Diversity and Employment Equity (EE) are sometimes used interchangeably and often incorrectly. Diversity is much more inclusive than EE referring “… to people from a variety of backgrounds, origins, and cultures, who share different views, ideas, experiences and perspectives. Diversity includes: Age, Beliefs, Culture, Ethnicity, Life experiences, Skills and abilities.”

Employment Equity means appropriate representation of designated groups at all areas and levels of an institution. The Employment Equity Act states “designated groups” (DGs) means women, aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities and members of visible minorities. “Members of visible minorities” means persons, other than aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race, or non-white in colour. The CAF does actively not recruit persons with disabilities due to the bona fide occupation requirement of Universality of Service. However, CAF members who become disabled and continue to meet the Universality of Service requirements are welcome to remain in uniform. The CAF EE goals are: 25.1 percent for women, 11.8 percent for visible minorities, and 3.4 percent for Aboriginal peoples.

In 2011, Rear-Admiral Smith, then the Chief of Military Personnel (CMP), stated: “The capacity of any group is greatly enhanced when it enjoys a diversity of contributions in terms of expertise and experience. Furthermore, to remain credible in a democratic society, both DND and CF must enjoy the support and the confidence of the Canadian public. A major factor of that support involves how representative it is of the population. Thus, its composition must reflect the gender and ethno-cultural composition of Canadian society.” If the CAF wants to remain credible, it is important to make a concerted effort to increase the number of women, visible minorities, and Aboriginal members in the CAF.
According to the on-line Merriam-Webster Dictionary, a goal is the end toward which effort is directed. This is not to be confused with a target, which is a fixed number or percentage of minority group members or women needed to meet the requirements of affirmative action. 14

While the percentages of serving CAF Designated Group (DG) members is substantially lower than the current EE goals, we must not forget that significant progress has been made since the DGs were first measured and reported upon in 2003. In addition, while something must be done to reverse the recent trend of recruiting a smaller percentage of women, let us not forget that the number of women in the CAF is almost ten-fold what it was 50 years ago.

The Directorate of Human Rights and Diversity (DHRD) calculates the CAF EE goals, utilizing a Workforce Analysis (WFA) Methodology that was developed in 2004 and approved by Human Resources and Skills Development Canada and Treasury Board. The Canadian Human Rights Commission, as the CF’s EE auditor, reviews and endorses the EE goals. While writing this article, I was informed that the WFA Methodology is acknowledged to be flawed by both internal and external stakeholders, and that it is under review. A Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPRA) research project is underway to propose a new improved measure of the Military Factor Effect and a new WFA Methodology that can be used to set future CAF EE goals. That being said, I still believe that the current goals are reasonable and achievable, and, quite frankly, low, considering the actual availability in the work force of women, visible minorities, and Aboriginal peoples. While the number of DG members in occupations similar to those in the CAF has been lower than the overall availability of DG members in the work force, those numbers are increasing, and will continue to increase, given changing Canadian demographics.

For example, when the propensity for women to join the military was studied over 10 years ago; it was measured at 20 percent.15 In 2007, 40 percent of the subset of the Canadian population interested in joining the CAF were women.16 The same report identified that the subset of the Canadian population interested in joining the CAF included 10 percent Aboriginal peoples, 31 percent visible minorities, and only 59 percent white Canadians.17 I believe that other factors are responsible for the lower recruiting numbers of DG members. As an example, in the RCMP, which is arguably another non-traditional militant career, women form 20.4 percent of the regular members. 18

A 2011 report indicated that 51 percent of Chinese-Canadian youth considered a career in the military as a last resort. However, 34 percent disagreed with this view.19 The report identified three methods of influencing the Chinese-Canadian population opinion of military careers: meeting Chinese-Canadian veterans who had achieved success after their military career; seeing Chinese-Canadian CAF members, particularly senior ranking individuals, in recruitment efforts; and communicating in Mandarin and/or Cantonese.20

A 2012 report on the propensity for Asian- (not including Chinese) and Arab-Canadian youth identified that the military...
was seen as a career of last resort (40 percent). However, an equal proportion (41 percent) disagreed with this view. The same research identified that this group reported that they were more likely to consider a military career (21 percent) than the general public youth (13 percent). The research brought forward three challenges facing the recruitment of this group: parents and the community are unwilling to recommend a military career; the perception that it is easier and more prestigious to achieve professional success through civilian universities; and only one percent identifies the military as a preferred career, likely due to the lack of successful examples from within their community.

The reality is that the face of Canada is changing, and it is time to take focused positive action towards increasing diversity. One factor that should be remembered when analyzing the current CAF EE and diversity statistics is that statistical information regarding gender and first official language are tracked in the Human Resources Management System. At any given time, a report can be pulled to determine those statistics. However, the disclosure of whether a person is a visible minority, Aboriginal, or a person with disabilities is gathered through the voluntary completion of Parts B of the Self-Identification Census (or the Self-ID census), which was initiated in 2001. I know that some visible minority and Aboriginal people are not self-identifying, due to a desire to be recognized by their own merits. They do not want to receive additional opportunities based solely upon their ethnicity. They do not seem to realize that self-identifying does not affect a person’s career, as the information is kept strictly confidential. The data generated through the Self-ID census is only used for statistical purposes.

A complete census would help project a more accurate picture of CAF demographics, which may increase the likelihood of DG members enrolling in the military.

It is conceivable that there are more Aboriginal and visible minority members than are currently being accounted for. I only self-identified as Metis near the end of my career, as the form did not ‘get on my radar’ until then. Serving Aboriginal NCMs want to know, “where are the Aboriginal officers?” I encourage any serving members who have yet to self-identify to do so.

Those who are interested in playing a more active role in diversity recruiting should look into the newly revamped CFRG “Recruiter for a Day” program. CAF members, who are also in at least one of the Designated Groups, will have the opportunity to register to participate in recruiting initiatives across Canada. Having more women, visible minorities, and Aboriginal CAF members in uniform appearing in public will help combat the widespread misperception that the military is only for Caucasian males.

The CAF has stated that it intends to make efforts to meet the EE goals. As of the autumn of 2011, CFRG reported upon the success of achieving the Strategic Intake Plan, which is tied to finding sufficient qualified candidates for each occupation and for the Aboriginal Special Measure programs. CFRG also reported on the overall number of DG members recruited, but this information was not accorded nearly the same importance as meeting the overall goals by occupation. CFRG, like most organizations, has a history of paying attention to the things that are measured. DHRD sets CAF EE goals by occupation and DG. Given that
there is still quite a gap between the EE goals and the percentage of DG members currently serving, if the CAF is serious about increasing the diversity of our military, CFRG should be directed to exceed the current EE plan recruitment goals and should report on progress made by occupation and DG on at least a yearly basis.

The vast majority of visible minority Canadians live in metropolitan areas. In order to increase the number of visible minority recruits, metropolitan recruiting centres should be given proportionally higher visible minority goals than the recruiting detachments in small cities and rural areas. An effort should also be made to have visible minorities and women as staff at the Metropolitan Recruiting Centres. Recruiting Centres in urban areas with high populations of Aboriginal peoples should be staffed in part by Aboriginal CAF members, and should be given a proportionally higher goal for Aboriginal recruitment.

Reaching the Tipping Point

Malcolm Gladwell was named as one of Time Magazine’s 100 Most Influential People in 2005. He is the author of several books on how people communicate, interact and succeed. Gladwell’s first book The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference outlines three characteristics that define how social epidemics take place. The “Law of the Few” recognizes that a few people, whom Gladwell categorizes as: connectors, salesmen and mavens, are those who have the greatest influence spreading social change. “Stickiness Factor” refers to making the message memorable. Gladwell also speaks of how context reinforces a message. Lastly, Gladwell’s “Rule of 150” refers to how groups perform much more effectively when they are kept small, that is, under 150 people.

There is some validity in modelling our Diversity Recruiting efforts upon Gladwell’s Tipping Point theory. When those who hold social power decide that the military is a good career path for their community members, they will influence them to apply to join the CAF. However, in order to reach those people the CAF has to present the recruiting messages in a ‘sticky’ way. The best way to do so is in small groups of 150 or less. The following sections describe how the CAF could tip the balance towards increasing diversity.

Influencer Events

Research has consistently shown that the best way to attract minority groups to an organization is to have people they can identify with who are already serving in that organization do the outreach. In 2012, CFRG began holding Influencer Events targeted at those holding influence with young women and visible minorities. I had the privilege of being one of the officers who met with Women Influencers in Halifax in March 2012. CFRG gathered over 20 serving women to share their experiences with 50 women who worked in career counselling roles at colleges and universities and job placement agencies. In addition, several young women (peer influencers) attended the three-day event. In Human Resources parlance, the women were given a realistic job preview of what it would be like to serve in the Royal Canadian
Navy, and, by extension, the CAF. During this outreach event, I learned that women held several misconceptions about military service. Many believed that if they joined the military they would be subject to harassment and/or assault. They also thought that they would have to conceal their femininity and that they would not be able to have families. In addition, they had concerns about the physical fitness requirements. Meeting with serving CAF women alleviated their concerns. Many of the participants shared that they had dreamed of a military career only to be dissuaded by their families or other key Influencers in their lives. The feedback from this session was overwhelmingly positive. The Women’s Influencer events continue to take place, indicating that CFRG is taking positive action towards reversing the decreasing percentage of women to join the CAF in recent years.

Tailored Recruiting Messages

I propose that the CAF ‘tweak’ the recruiting message to make it more ‘sticky’ for the targeted DGs by focusing upon both the career opportunities and upon the practicalities of military service. The military is one of the few organizations where everyone is paid equally, based upon their rank and qualifications. Unlike many civilian organizations, gender and ethnicity do not negatively affect a person’s pay and benefits. Further, there exists a superlative benefits package, including full medical and dental, subsidized maternity and parental leave, and a defined benefit pension plan. No prior job experience is required; the CAF trains and educates people for their designated military occupation. This includes fully subsidized post-secondary occupation for a variety of professions. The profession of arms should also be explained particularly to visible minorities as many families in that group influence their children to follow a professional career, but focus upon “…traditional professions such as law, medicine, engineering and business.”

The message delivered to visible minority and Aboriginal Influencers should also include the transferrable leadership skills that can be brought back to the community upon retiring from the military.

In addition to the traditional marketing methods of print ads, radio, and television commercials, and the FORCES.CA website, targeted social media campaigns, such as the Women Canadian Armed Forces Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/pages/Women-Canadian-Armed-Forces-Femmes-Forces-arm%C3%A9es-canadiennes/415132768542364?ref=ts&fref=ts should be implemented for visible minorities and Aboriginal peoples. The Women CAF Facebook page showcases serving Canadian women, and it shares mainstream media articles about women in the CAF.

Realistic Job Preview - Special Measures Programs

A n effective way to directly educate DG members about the military is to provide them with an enhanced realistic job preview, a ‘try before you buy’ program. The CAF currently runs several programs for Aboriginal peoples; that are considered Special Measures programs under the EE Act. These programs allow Aboriginal peoples the opportunity to experience military service for a specified period of time with no obligatory service on completion of the program. All staff who with these programs are required to complete the Aboriginal Awareness Course (AAC).

The Canadian Armed Forces Aboriginal Entry Plan enables Aboriginal peoples to experience three weeks of training similar to the Basic Military Qualification (BMQ) course. This allows the candidates an opportunity to decide if they would like to have a military career. The results are overwhelmingly positive, with 85 percent of the graduates from the last two years applying to join the military while still on course. The Aboriginal Summer Programs Bold Eagle, Raven, and Black Bear are six-week reserve BMQ courses that include all the training taught to mainstream
Canadians, as well as an Aboriginal culture component. In the last two years, over half of the graduates have indicated their intent to join the military. There is often a delay of a year or two, as these candidates are strongly encouraged to complete high school before joining the armed forces. Completion of the BMQ helps some of the candidates to graduate high school, as several provinces recognize the military training for high school credits.

The newest of these programs is the Aboriginal Leadership Opportunity Year (ALOY), conducted at the Royal Military College (RMC) in Kingston, Ontario. In this program, up to 20 Aboriginal Youths are given the opportunity to complete up to a full year’s worth of university level credits, while learning military skills, leadership, and participating fully in a sports program, as well as other RMC clubs. In addition, there are Aboriginal Culture awareness activities such as smudging, drumming, and singing. Since its inception in 2008, half the ALOY graduates have applied for further CAF service. In January 2013, Acting Sub-Lieutenant Nicole Shingoose became the first ALOY graduate to be commissioned as an officer upon graduation from RMC.

Context - Systemic Changes

There are systemic changes to context that can be undertaken to further encourage DG members to join the CAF. While there has been a concerted effort to portray a diverse face through CFRG, with changes to the FORCES.CA website, recruiting commercials and posters, the CAF has yet to put in place a system to ensure that images used in leadership and other professional publications acknowledge the diverse face of serving military members. While there is no policy currently in place, there are several examples of CAF publications that reflect diversity, for example, "Duty with Honour: Profession of Arms in Canada". This policy could be promulgated by the Public Affairs Branch and the Directorate of Human Rights and Diversity. In addition, this policy could be included in the Chief of Defence Staff Guidance to Commanding Officers chapter entitled Human Rights and Diversity. This chapter should also ask Commanding Officers to encourage their personnel to complete the Self-ID Census.

As previously mentioned, there should be a concerted effort to post DG members to recruiting centres. This should be taken one step further by posting more DG members to the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School (CFLRS). The CFLRS staff should receive Awareness Training regarding the multicultural nature of Canada.

Retention – the second half of the story

While recruiting a higher percentage of DG members is fundamental to increasing the Diversity of the CAF, retention is equally important. The 2009/2010 Annual Report on Regular Force Attrition indicated that women’s attrition was no different from men’s in their early career. This changed at nine years of service and beyond, when the levels of attrition for women were generally higher than that of men. Visible Minority and Aboriginal Attrition is difficult to measure, due to
the high percentage of people who chose not to self-identify. “For officers, attrition at 9 and 20 YOS (Years of Service – Ed.) is higher for Aboriginal peoples and visible minorities than members who belong to neither of these designated groups. … For NCMs, attrition at 0 and 20 Years of Service is lower for Aboriginal peoples and visible minorities than for members who belong to neither of these designated groups.”30 Research has identified several retention incentives that would be beneficial to women, visible minorities, and Aboriginal peoples, and, by extension, all other military members. Three of these incentives are highlighted here: Mentoring, Flexible Work Arrangements, and Affordable Childcare.

Mentoring

Mentoring has proven to be extremely effective with women and visible minorities, particularly when the one being mentored can relate to the mentor by reason of sharing gender or ethnicity.31 A Mentoring program that allows people to select a mentor with whom they can identify could encourage DG members to pursue a long term military career. When I retired from the military last year, the DND Mentoring Program was only open to those in the Public Service. This program could be expanded to include all DND and CAF members. Further, the search function could be expanded to include the ability to search beyond job functions, interests, language, and gender, to ethnicity and religion. If this task is deemed too complex for the current program, there are “off the shelf” mentoring programs that can be customized to DND/CAF that would facilitate an all-encompassing mentoring program.

Flexible Work Arrangements

lieutenant-Colonel Telah Morrison’s Military Defence Studies paper, “Striking the Balance to Become an Employer of Choice: Solutions for a Better Work-Life Balance in the CF,” outlines the business case for Flexible Work Arrangements (FWA). Morrison’s seminal work on striking the right work life balance to make the CF an employer of choice offers concrete suggestions on how FWA currently in place for the Public Service could be used for military members. The following figure was taken from Morrison’s paper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy/Program</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part-Time Work</td>
<td>Permanent position, but fewer hours/days than a regular work week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job-Sharing</td>
<td>Full-time position with duties and responsibilities shared among two or more part-time employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexible Hours of Work</td>
<td>Employee works standard number of hours per day, but has some choice in start and finish times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compressed, or Variable Work Week</td>
<td>Extended hours per day in return for periodic days off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telework</td>
<td>Work from home on a regular basis, but not necessarily every day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Public Service Flexible Work Arrangements (FWA).32
Several of these flexible work arrangements are currently being used informally throughout the CAF. These policies could be formalized and implemented within the current construct of part-time (Reserve Force) and full-time (Regular Force) service. Such policies would no doubt be welcomed by many military members, and they would increase the retention of highly skilled personnel. Morrison provided examples of one male and one female officer who could have been actively employed, using ‘telework’ rather than being forced to be on extended leave without pay while their military spouses were posted outside of Canada.

**Affordable Childcare**

Morrison also makes the business case for the CAF establishing Affordable Childcare. She recommends building a program similar to that established by the U.S. Department of Defence by expanding in the services already in place at many of the Military Family Resource Centres. This program would increase the deployability of CAF members, reduce the number of lost days, and contribute to higher retention of qualified personnel. As 62 percent of CAF members have children, this retention initiative would ‘work across the board.’ While this would benefit all military families, it is likely to increase retention of women at their mid-career point, as traditionally, women have borne the majority of childcare responsibilities. In the past, there has been a trend of women leaving the military as they started their families.

Mentoring, FWA and affordable, reliable, and flexible childcare would be excellent retention initiatives that could answer in part the Military Personnel Retention Strategy, Annex A – CMP CF Retention Strategy Campaign Plan, Item Number 26, “Examine career/family balance options for women at mid-career.” While the immediate impact may be more readily measureable for women, these initiatives are likely to help retain both men and women. They may also help recruit and retain visible minorities and Aboriginal peoples, whom research indicated are less likely to join the military, due in part to the high likelihood of being posted away from their communities.

**Conclusion**

The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces have time and again proven that they are up to the challenge of adjusting their cultures to better reflect diversity policies should be communicated and celebrated by leadership to demonstrate support.

In July 2013, Catalyst released *Flex Works*, a report based upon 50 years of research, which listed core concepts related to workplace flexibility. The four core concepts most relevant to this article are as follows. Implementing flexibility programs can be expensive, but the benefits usually outweigh the costs. Industries and professions with roles that cannot be performed virtually can still include flexibility options for workers. Flexibility policies can demonstrate an organization’s commitment to diversity and inclusion by including modern definitions of family. And formal
Canadian mores. The Canadian military can and must significantly increase the percentage of women, visible minorities, and Aboriginal peoples who serve their country in uniform. Canadian demographics are shifting, and these groups will represent two thirds of Canada’s population by 2031. For those who think my math is sketchy, here is how I arrived at that figure. Statistics Canada speculates that by 2031, visible minorities will constitute 30 percent of the population, and Aboriginal peoples will constitute at least four percent of our population. It is safe to assume that half the members of these groups will be women. My math consists of 34 percent (visible minorities and Aboriginal peoples), times 0.5 (removing women to avoid duplicate accounting), plus 50 percent (women in Canada), for a total of 67 percent. If changes are not made now, our military will cease to reflect the Canadian population.

I believe that the CAF can initiate the recommended recruiting and retention initiatives listed in this article, and significantly increase the Diversity of the CAF. I used to do business planning for the CAF Aboriginal Programs, and I know how much it costs to recruit CAF members. I am confident that the funds saved by lowered attrition will offset the costs of implementing these programs.

Tailoring the recruiting message to DGs, and delivering this message through Influencers Events, Social Media efforts, such as Facebook and Twitter, and through the continuation and possible expansion of Special Measures programs, for example, implementing three-week realistic job preview programs for women and visible minorities, would all help the CAF reach the ‘tipping point’ in recruiting a more diverse military.

This would be re-enforced by making systemic changes to the context in which the public sees the military, such as ensuring that all recruiting centres, advertising, and publications celebrate the diverse face of the military.

A formal Mentoring program, FWA, and affordable childcare would have a positive impact upon the retention of quality individuals, regardless of their gender or ethnicity. Research indicates that these programs would encourage greater retention of women, and could increase the recruitment and retention of all visible minorities and Aboriginal peoples.

In addition, the success of these efforts will be substantially increased if CFRG regularly reports upon the progress of recruitment efforts aimed at DGs. Change efforts are substantially more effective when they are observed, analyzed, and reported upon.

I will conclude by quoting Gladwell.

In the end, Tipping Points are a reaffirmation of the potential for change and the power of intelligent action. Look at the world around you. It may seem like an immovable, implacable place. It is not. With the slightest push – in just the right place – it can be tipped.
DIVERSITY


2 Demographic means relating to the dynamic balance of a population especially with regard to density and capacity for expansion or decline. Online Merriam-Webster dictionary at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/demographics.


12 The Employment Equity Act.


17 Ibid., p. v.


20 Ibid., p. 54.


22 Ibid., p. 9.


27 Browne, p. 19, and Fonseca, p. 17.

28 Browne, p. 34.


34 Browne, p. 24.

35 Fonseca, p. 17.
CLAUSEWITZ AND THE BLUE FLOWER OF ROMANTICISM: UNDERSTANDING ON WAR

Bill Bentley

The search for the blue flower of Romanticism is an attempt either to absorb the infinite into myself, to make myself one with it, or to dissolve myself into it.

~ Frederick von Hardenberg
(Novalis: Romantic philosopher and poet)

Introduction

War amongst the people, hybrid war, unrestricted warfare, counter-insurgency (COIN), stabilization operations, culture wars, new wars versus old wars, terror wars, these are examples of the conceptualization of war and conflict that have emerged in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Currently overshadowed by the contemporary security environment, there remains the historically most prevalent form of conflict; that of high intensity state-on-state war. The work of one man first published 181 years ago can be very helpful in understanding both the nature and character of all these types war and conflict in the 21st Century, regardless of how they are described and explained, however imperfectly, in today’s relevant literature, military colleges, and other policy making fora. In this regard, a clear understanding of the relationship between the thought of Carl von Clausewitz and German Romanticism greatly enhances our understanding of how this Prussian military thinker constructed his unique theory of war, and what he meant by it.

As to his actual influence extending throughout the 20th Century and into the 21st Century, there are numerous testimonials to the impact and value of General Carl von Clausewitz’s life-long attempt to develop a theory of war and conflict that aimed, not at prescription, but at a deep understanding of the phenomenon itself. Four will suffice here to make the point. T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia) was a great admirer of On War, finding it logical and fascinating. He

Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Bill Bentley, MSM, CD, PhD, a former infantry officer, is currently Senior Staff Officer Leadership at the Canadian Defence Academy in Kingston, Ontario.
considered Clausewitz the intellectual master of all writers on the subject of war. More recently, H. T. Hayden, editor of Warfighting: Maneuvre Warfare in the US Marine Corps, stipulates that Clausewitz’s On War is the definitive treatment of the nature and theory of war. According to W. B. Galleie, a British philosopher and Second World War infantry major, the years 1818-1832 saw the writing and eventual publication of the first, and to date, the only book (On War) of outstanding intellectual eminence on the subject of war. Finally, one of the leading strategic theorists still writing today has concluded that “…for as long as humankind engages in warfare, Clausewitz must rule.”

Discussion

The subject of these accolades, Carl von Clausewitz, was born in Burg, Prussia, in 1780, and joined the Prussian army at the age of twelve. From 1792 until 1815, he fought against the French revolutionary and Napoleonic forces at the battles of Valmy, Jena, Borodino, Leipzig, and Waterloo. In 1818, he was appointed Director of the Prussian War Academy in Berlin, and for the next 12 years, devoted himself to writing about war, and especially, to the construction of his theory of war expounded in his masterpiece, On War. He joined his lifelong friend and mentor, General von Gneiseneau, on campaign in Poland in 1830, where he died of cholera in 1831. The unfinished manuscript of On War was published by his wife, Marie, in 1832.

On War was translated into French in 1849 and English for the first time in 1874. It has subsequently been translated into several languages, including Russian, Japanese and Chinese. Notwithstanding its growing availability, the book was little read for 40 years after it first appeared in 1832. Rather, theorists and practitioners, such as Willison in Prussia, Camon in France, Henderson in England, and Halleck and Mahan in the United States, were more influenced by the work of Clausewitz’s contemporary, Antoine Jomini, especially his Art of War. Jomini’s theory drew heavily from empiricism and positivism, and sought straightforward rules and even laws of war and strategy, which Jomini believed could be applied regardless of historical or geopolitical context. As will be explained herein, Clausewitz strenuously objected to this approach. Clausewitz, however, rather suddenly received widespread belated recognition after the wars of German unification against Denmark, Austria, and especially France in 1870-1871, and to a significant degree, his influence then eclipsed that of Jomini. This interest was sparked by virtue of the fact that the military architect of these startling successes, General Helmut von Moltke, frequently cited von Clausewitz’s On War as one of the major intellectual and theoretical influences that shaped his strategic thinking and the associated campaigns.

Nonetheless, On War remained notoriously difficult to interpret and to fully understand. It was often misquoted and frequently referred to without having been read carefully, if at all. Except for a few dedicated, serious scholars of On War, this remains largely the case today.

A large part of the difficulty in this regard has been the failure to place Clausewitz’s thought firmly in the relevant intellectual context. It is necessary to read On War, as John Lynn has recently argued, not as a work that expresses eternal truth about war, but within the intellectual context that generated it. It is a Romantic work, and like the broader intellectual and cultural movement of Romanticism, it cannot be understood apart from the intellectual paradigm that it challenged – the dry rationalism...
of the Enlightenment. There is no doubt that the Enlightenment was itself a very complex movement that should not be reduced to a few platitudes. Taken as a whole, the Enlightenment (circa 1687-1789) sought to establish the intellectual foundation for a political system without divine sanction, a religion without mystery, a morality without dogma. Such was the edifice the Enlightenment thinkers believed man now had to erect.

Science would have to become something more than an intellectual pastime; it would have to develop into a power capable of harnessing the forces of nature to the service of mankind. Science was the key to happiness. With respect to the material world, once it was in his power, man could order it for his own benefits and for the happiness of future generations. Such are the “notes” by which the 18th century is readily identifiable. But for the Romantics, from Coleridge, Chateaubriand, Herder, and Heine, through Schelling and Hegel, a vision of the Enlightenment emerged that was as cold, timeless, monotonous, and as calculating as the bourgeois who had supposedly embraced it. In their view, the Enlightenment enshrined mechanism as the model to explain all phenomena of matter, life and mind. Teleological causes, such as Thomism backed by the Catholic church, had been inverted in Bacon’s terms as “barren virgins.” “Any work they supposedly accomplished could be turned over to efficient mechanical causes.”

Romanticists, scientists, philosophers, historians, as well as artists, were reacting against what they considered the desiccated rationalism that prevailed during the Enlightenment period in Europe. Romanticism as an intellectual movement, therefore, can be understood as an overwhelming international tendency which swept across Europe and Russia at the end of the 18th Century and beginning of the 19th Century in reaction to earlier neo-classicism, mechanism, and rationalism embodied in Enlightenment thought. More than simply a return to nature, the realm of imagination or feeling, it was a synthesizing nature that transformed the entire character of thought, sensibility, and art. Romantic scientists and philosophers, especially those in Germany such as Georg Hegel, Wolfgang Goethe, Friedrich and Auguste Schlegal, and the renowned historian Leopold von Ranke, were determined to look at nature and society holistically, to see ‘wholes’ and relationships, rather than discrete events and phenomena. In other words, they rejected the analytical, reductionist, and linear approach to breaking things apart to study them that was so characteristic of the methodology embedded in Enlightenment philosophy.

One of the leading intellectual historians of the 20th Century, Isaiah Berlin, characterized the Romantic movement as follows:

_The importance of Romanticism is that it is the largest recent movement to transform the lives and thought of the Western world. It seems to me to be the biggest single shift in the consciousness of the West that has occurred, and all of the shifts which have occurred in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries appear to me in comparison less important and at any rate deeply influenced by it._

Since Clausewitz was born in 1780 and died in 1831, his life spanned almost exactly the very height of the Romantic Movement, especially in Germany where it was openly philosophical and all-embracing. Clausewitz was certainly not a professional philosopher, but he was, nonetheless, a man of a particularly philosophical bent of mind. He read voraciously and broadly, far beyond the field of military history. He was also scientifically literate, reading mathematical treatises and attending lectures just as science was turning to the serious study of biology and advances in the theories of statistics and probabilities. His major work, _On War_, still sought to
provide a reasoned understanding of war, just as were the efforts of many of his contemporary theorists in France and England, as well as Germany. However, he insisted upon recognizing the inherent limits of analytical reason when grappling with such a dynamic and complex phenomenon as war in the same way that thermodynamicists came to trade the mechanistic claims of complete predictability for a more stochastic understanding of the natural world. In fact, Clausewitz was strongly influenced by the most prominent Romantic scientists and philosophers in Germany at the time; men such as Fichte, Schelling, Goethe, and Hegel.

After the battle of Jena in October 1806, Clausewitz was interned in France, where he met and became close friends with Auguste Schlegal, one of the ‘leading lights’ of European Romanticism. Then, during the hiatus between Clausewitz’s return to Berlin in 1808 and his entry into Russian service in 1812, he partook of the rich intellectual life of that city. Through her contacts, Clausewitz’s wife Marie seems to have introduced her husband to Achim von Arnim, an important Romantic folklorist, dramatist, and poet, and Wilhelm Humboldt, a philosopher and educational reformer. These two urged Clausewitz to join the Christian-German Symposium, a group that met for discussions every two weeks. A list of its active participants reads like a ‘Who’s Who’ of leading Berlin Romantics, including Fichte, Schleiermacher, von Kleist, Muller, Brentano, and Auguste Schlegal’s brother, Frederick. Later, when Clausewitz returned to Berlin in 1818 to head the War Academy, he met still other philosophers and cultural figures, and he became close friends with Georg Hegel. Von Arnim also came back into Clausewitz’s life, along with his wife Bertina, a considerable Romantic author and editor in her own right.

The influence that the Romantics had upon Clausewitz can be found throughout On War, but four major examples will serve to illustrate the point in this short article. First, an account of the implications of Romanticism’s adherence to Idealist philosophy, as opposed to the Materialism underlying much 18th Century philosophy, and underpinning Rationalism and Empiricism. Second, the role of the political in the social life of humankind. Third, the role of history in shaping Romantic thought. And fourth, the dialectical reasoning utilized in most Romantic argumentation.

In Romantic Idealism, a Particular is first in order of existence, since to know that a thing exists, we must know something about particular or determinate things. This is because, if it exists, a Universal exists only in Particulars. A Universal, however, is first in order of explanation, because to know what a thing is, we must be able to specify some of its properties, some features that it shares in common with other things. Hegel, for example, thought that Universals do not exist in the temporal world as such, but only “en re” manifested in particular things. He thinks that Universals only exist in things, even though their meaning is not reducible only to them. Similarly, Goethe argued in the field botany that the outward forms may change in countless ways, yet the idea of a formative principle remains the same. Goethe called this formative principle the Urpflange. The archetypical plant is no specific plant anywhere in nature, nor is it to be understood temporally.

For Hegel, the ultimate Universal is Absolute Spirit, consisting of the trinity of religion, art, and philosophy. These are spheres that transcend the Particular, but find their highest realization temporally in the modern state. Clausewitz postulates a remarkably similar construct when it comes to war, and one that mirrors...
the state in terms of the people, the army, and the government. The Universal of war is described as follows:

War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always makes war a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of the element of subordination as an instrument of policy which makes it subject to reason alone.

According to Clausewitz:

The first of these aspects mainly concerns the people, the second the commander and the army, and the third the government. The passions that are kindled in war must already be inherent in the people, the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.

Finally:

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law deep rooted in their subject yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless. Our task, therefore, is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies like an object suspended between three magnets.16

Thus, Clausewitz has established the Universal concept of war, which is eternal. Throughout history, this Universal has manifested itself in innumerable Particular wars. Hence, the nature of war does not change, but the specific character of any given Particular war will vary enormously. That is, while the outward shape and material dimensions of war may shift continuously, the essence of war remains unchanged.

Clausewitz then turns to consider real world war, and concludes that there are two kinds of war:

War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to overthrow the enemy—to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent thus forcing him to sign whatever peace we please; or merely to occupy some of his frontier districts so that we can annex them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations.17

Therefore, Absolute War, as it appears in On War, is an ideal, an abstraction that in turn governs reality, as do all Ideas in Idealism.

Turning to the question of policy, politics, and reason, most of the theorists and practitioners of war in the 18th Century readily acknowledged that there had to be a political objective to justify war. Here, they were reflecting a relationship identified at least as far back as Aristotle, when he wrote that “…the only merit of war is to yield a political result.”18 These theorists, however, then took considerable pains to separate politics and policy...
from military strategy and the conduct of war once hostilities commenced. This, Clausewitz flatly rejected. Again, the connection with Romantic thought and philosophy is clear. The Romantics were, indeed, some of the first thinkers in the modern era to reaffirm the importance of the political, to make politics again “the first science” as Aristotle once made it. In the spirit of Aristotle, Frederick Schlegal would write, “political judgement is the highest of all viewpoints.”

This belief leads Clausewitz to perhaps his most famous and certainly most quoted thought:

War is simply a continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase “with the addition of other means” because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essence that intercourse continues irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which military events progress and to which they are restricted are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace.

According to Clausewitz, warfare has its own grammar, but not its own logic – the latter is provided by policy. Clausewitz goes even farther to stress this point, obviously addressing those military officers who might think they can avoid political influence once war has been embarked upon.

Policy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details. Political considerations do not determine the posting of guards or the employment of patrols. But they are the more influential in the planning of the war, of the campaign and often even the battle.

In other words, there is no such thing as “a politics free zone in war. This is a reality that modern military strategists/generals/admirals should always factor into their thinking.

The way in which Clausewitz understood history and applied it in his theory of war was also profoundly influenced by the Romantic philosophy of history. During the Enlightenment, the utility of history was viewed in two related ways. One, history was used to show how everything from antiquity onwards had slowly moved in a progressive manner to achieve the state of near perfection achieved in 18th Century Europe. Thus, each preceding era could be seen as following often imperfect steps to a teleological end-state which was the Enlightenment. Two, history could be used to discover regularities and historical laws, which could then be applied and then faithfully followed.

The Romantics disputed this view of history, and their rejection of it had a profound influence upon the philosophy and practice of the discipline of history, an impact felt up to the present. That is, that although the Romantic Age did not invent history, as some scholars of Romanticism sometimes seem to suggest, it did invent Historicism. Historicism is a philosophy of history that postulates that everything in the social and political domains has a history. All laws, institutions, beliefs, and practices are subject to change, and each is the result of a specific historical development. Hence, no thing in the social and political world is eternal. In this case, we should examine all human beliefs, practices, and institutions within their historical context, showing how they arose of necessity from their specific economic, social, legal, cultural, and geographic conditions. Hence, Leopold von Ranke’s celebrated dictum that every age enjoys a direct relationship with God. Closely associated with this position, historians of this school of history view society as an organism, an indivisible whole, whose politics, religion, morality, and legal system are inextricably intertwined.

In reference to this latter point, Clausewitz advises that in war, more than elsewhere, the part and the whole must always be thought of together. As he states: “In war, as in life generally, all parts of a whole are interconnected and thus the effects produced however small, their cause must influence all subsequent military operations and modify their outcome to some degree, however small.” Remarkably, here, Clausewitz has anticipated one of the significant findings of modern complexity theory – that is, the principle of non-proportionality.

Finally, in accordance with the philosophy of Historicism, and closely following von Ranke, Clausewitz concludes:

We wanted to show how every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions. Each period, therefore, would have held to its own theory of war, even if the urge had always and universally existed to work things out on scientific principles. It follows that the events of every age must be judged in the light of its own peculiarities.
Here, of course, Clausewitz was not talking about the Universal concept of war, but rather of the Particular wars as they occurred throughout history.

With regard to the dialectical mode of thinking employed by Clausewitz throughout *On War*, we must understand that the whole drive of the Romantic orientation was to hold opposites in tension, not to submerge them into an imagined unity. It was to experience the conflicts, the contradictions of experience, not to ‘think them away.’ It was toward reality, not towards a metaphysical escape from reality. Clausewitz expressed his own interpretation of this orientation this way:

Where two ideas form a true logical antithesis each complementary to the other, then fundamentally each is implied in the other. If the limitations of our mind do not allow us to comprehend both simultaneously and discover by antithesis the whole of one in the whole of the other, each will, nevertheless, shed enough light on the other to clarify many of its details.

We have already seen that, from the outset, Clausewitz claimed there were two kinds of Particular war, and he extracted many conclusions from a dialectical analysis of this state of affairs. Logically derived from this duality, Clausewitz discerned that there were, therefore, two kinds of strategy – the strategy of annihilation, and the bi-polar strategy.

In the strategy of annihilation everything results from necessary causes and one action rapidly affects another; there is, if we may use the phrase, no intervening neutral void. Since the whole series of engagements is strictly speaking linked together, since in every victory there is a culminating point beyond which lies the realm of losses and defeats, in view of all these intrinsic characteristics of war we say there is only one result that counts: final victory. Until then nothing is decided, nothing won and nothing lost. In this form of strategy we must always keep in mind that it is the end that crowns the work. Within this concept strategy is indivisible and its component parts (the individual victories) are of value only in their relation to the whole.

Contrasting with this extreme view is another view no less extreme, which holds that strategy consists of separate successes each unrelated to the next, as a match consisting of several games. The earlier games have no effect on the later. All that counts is the total score and each separate result makes its contribution toward the total.

This paradigm of military strategy has important implications in the modern era. The 20th Century saw two global wars executed through a strategy of annihilation, and such a strategy conceivably could be employed again in the future. However, for all of the early part of the 21st Century, the appropriate strategy has been a bi-polar strategy, carefully balancing the need to go to the battle pole with a variety of actions on the non-battle pole – economic, diplomatic, information, and so on.

Having dealt with the concept of strategy, Clausewitz then examines the relationship between a related duopoly; that between strategy and tactics. “According to our classification tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement, strategy the use of engagements for the object of the war.” During this examination,
Clausewitz concludes that *engagements* mean *fighting*. The object of fighting is the destruction or defeat of the enemy. The enemy in the individual engagement is simply the opposing fighting force. By contrast, in strategy, there is no such thing as victory. Part of strategic success lies in timely preparations for a tactical victory; the greater the strategic success, the greater the likelihood of a victorious engagement. The rest of strategic success lies in exploitation of a victory won. Thus, the original means of strategy is victory – that is, tactical success; its ends in the final analysis are those objects which will lead directly to peace.31

The strategic theorist Colin Gray captures the essence of Clausewitz’s conception of strategy for the modern era:

*Strategy is virtual behaviour, it has no material existence. Strategy is an abstraction, though it is vastly more difficult to illustrate visually than are other abstractions like love or fear. Because strategy is uniquely difficult among the sub-systems of war and conflict few indeed are the people who can shine in the role. Their number can be increased through education, though not by training and not at all reliably by the experience of command and planning at the operational and tactical levels of warfare.*32

Metaphorically, strategy is the mental, intellectual bridge between politics and the grammar of war – operational art and tactics.

The next significant duality or logical antithesis is that between the attack and the defence. Clausewitz argues here that the defence is the stronger form of war with a negative aim; whereas, the attack is the weaker form of war with a positive aim. “If the defence is the stronger form of war yet has a negative object, it follows that it should be used only as long as weakness compels, and to be abandoned as soon as we are strong enough to pursue a positive act.”33 He then derives one of his most important concepts from this dialectic – that of the culminating point.

*If the superior strength of the attack – which diminishes day by day – leads to peace, the object will have been attained. There are strategic attacks that have led directly to peace, but these are in the minority. Most of them lead up to the point where the remaining strength is just enough to maintain a defence and wait for peace. Beyond that point the scale turns and the reaction follows with a force that is usually much stronger than that of the original attack. This is what we mean by the culminating point of the attack.*34

The concept of the culminating point remains a critical consideration in all campaign planning at the operational level in the modern era.

The last dialectical relationship that will be dealt with in this article is that between the moral (or psychological) and the physical. As usual, Clausewitz contends that other theorists and practitioners, although aware of the element of moral(e) in war, sought to submerge this issue in their search for more scientific rules, adherence to which would reduce the potential negative impact of the psychological factor. Clausewitz would have none of that!

*The effects of physical and moral factors form an organic whole which, unlike a metal alloy, are inseparable by chemical processes. One might say the physical seems little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious weapon, the finely honed blade.*35
Here, Clausewitz’s metaphor exquisitely captures the more prosaic axiom – the moral is to the physical as three is to one.

Explicitly relating this relationship to his dialectical mode of thinking, Clausewitz adds:

They (other theorists) aim at fixed values, but in war everything is uncertain and calculations have to be made with variable quantities. Other theorists direct the inquiry exclusively towards physical quantities whereas all military activity is intertwined with psychological forces and effects. Other theorists consider only unilateral action whereas war consists of continuous interaction of opposites.86

As the conflicts of the 21st Century have amply demonstrated, Clausewitz’s view of moral/psychological factors must now include what we understand as the cultural dimension of war and conflict.

The Romantic influence found throughout On War certainly extends beyond the four examples provided in this short article. On War is suffused with the understanding that every war is an inherently complex, non-linear phenomenon. In a profoundly unconfused way, Clausewitz understood that seeking exact, analytical solutions does not fit the reality of the problems posed by war and conflict. This is a quintessential Romantic position with regard to society as a whole. The theme of war as an organic, not mechanical, activity is also a central Romantic idea. Finally, the widespread use of metaphors, a very characteristic tendency in Romantic writing, helps place Clausewitz firmly in the Romantic circle.

Concluding Remarks

Carl von Clausewitz clearly has exerted an inordinate influence upon political and military thought throughout the world. In the case of the former domain, Lenin, Mao Tse-Tung, Gorbachev, and Kissinger were keen students of Clausewitz. In the latter case, to that list must be added von Moltke, Alexander Svechin, J.F.C. Fuller, Eisenhower, and Colin Powell. For many more less well known practitioners, theorists, and scholars, their thought and theoretical viewpoint were significantly shaped by exposure to On War. Very few of these individuals were thoroughly grounded in the subject of European Romanticism. Obviously then, much can be derived from Clausewitz without this background. On the other hand, a deeper understanding of why he framed his thought, precisely what he meant, and, therefore, a more philosophical appreciation of the great master’s work, is only fully achieved by placing him firmly in the proper intellectual context.

A valuable by-product of this intellectual effort is to make oneself more aware that all theory and the practice it generates, is related in often ill-understood ways to the underlying intellectual, cultural, spirit of the age. Thus, the question can and should be asked: What is helping to shape military theory today? What has been the impact of the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, complexity theory, information technology theory, advances in cognitive sciences, or the near-eclipse of Positivism in mainstream social sciences, and the ascendancy of interpretive sociology and Constructivism on prevailing and evolving military theory, in what has been called the post-modern era? For example, the more extreme versions of the recent Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) could not survive the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and the implications of complexity theory. Similarly, the concept of Effects-Based Operations (EBO) has fallen prey to the concept of “war amongst the people,” a concept derived from changes in the social sciences.

The marriage of intellectual history to the study of military theory is an underestimated relationship, and much profit can be gained by working to make this relationship a much stronger partnership.
Canadian military history, particularly the popular kind, almost inevitably focuses upon how the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) themselves, the country as a whole, or Canada’s political leadership have made a difference in world affairs. Whether it is Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard’s more recent command of a multinational force in Libya, the more than one million Canadians who served during the Second World War, or Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden’s willingness to stand up to the British and French in the later stages of the Great War, the national narrative cannot seem to get away from the idea of a country ‘punching above its weight’ in world affairs.

And for good reason. A nation of just 35 million with a military of just 100,000 and a defence budget of $20 billion cannot expect to be treated as a great power by virtue of its size and strength. Canadians, then, have generally effected change in global military affairs by identifying the value-added that they might bring to a conflict, and by excelling in those fields that have provided openings for smaller states to make a difference.

To maintain Canada’s international credibility among its military allies in a time of significant government cutbacks, it behoves the Department of National Defence to identify new – cost effective – domains where Canada, and the Canadian Armed Forces more specifically, might make their mark. Issues for which size does not matter, but the assets that Canada does bring to the table – intellectual capacity, professionalism, communication skills – are critical to mission success.

One such area, long neglected by the CAF and its superiors, is teaching excellence in the professional military context. To its credit, the Canadian Armed Forces invest far more in the continuing education of their people than any other federal department in Canada. Moreover, members of the CAF are often called upon to assist smaller war colleges in the establishment of, and subsequent development of, curricula and training programs around the world.

Never, however, does the CAF seem to have considered making the primary (academic) arms of its professional military education program – specifically, the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) in Kingston and the Canadian Forces College (CFC) in Toronto – centres for teaching excellence. In other words, the CAF’s professional military education system is certainly admired for the quality of the curriculum and perhaps the design and organization of the programs, but never have I heard representatives from another war college – or from a civilian institution – speak of RMCC or the CFC as the home of the best teachers in the country or the Western world. It is not that...
our faculty – civilian and military – are necessarily ineffective. Indeed, many are admirable instructors; rather, it is that little serious attention has been paid to the quality of teaching (and its effect upon student learning) that is conducted.

To be more specific, while teacher training certification programs (that, to be fair, certainly range in quality) have sprung up at a number of post-secondary civilian academic institutions, professors at RMCC typically look to Queen’s University for opportunities for such professional development. While universities across the Western world have established centres for teaching and learning excellence across their campuses – through which experts in pedagogy and academic technology support faculty members interested in improving their ability to promote deep learning among their students – RMCC has done no such thing. There is no requirement to learn how to teach, or, for that matter, to study anything related to student learning while pursuing a PhD in War Studies, nor do the military teaching faculty at the Canadian Forces College undergo anything more than a cursory introduction to teaching and learning in advance of their taking up full-time roles in the post-graduate-level classroom.¹

In RMCC’s, and DND’s defence, war colleges and similar military educational institutes around the world are not, collectively, any better. To the best of my knowledge, no Canadian allies have formalized a rigorous program to ensure that professional military education in their country is delivered by qualified, certified, post-secondary military educators. And that is why the Department of National Defence, and the CAF in particular, is faced with a tremendous opportunity. For what would be a relatively minimal cost, DND could transform Canada into the centre for teaching excellence in professional military education.

How could this be done? I see three specific areas that would require investment and/or change: (1) intellectual infrastructure; (2) hiring and promotion processes; and (3) branding.

First, the CAF, through the Canadian Defence Academy, might consider creating the first-ever internationally accredited (by the globally recognized Staff and Educational Development Association) post-secondary professional military education teaching certification program. Such a program could be housed in a new centre for teaching and learning located, at least provisionally, at RMCC. Such a certification program could be offered (either through travelling instructors or through the distance learning format) to academic and military instructors in war colleges around the world.

Second, as is becoming standard practice at leading civilian universities, RMCC could require all faculty to submit teaching dossiers as part of their applications for positions and promotions. Doing so will require hiring boards at RMCC to learn how to evaluate such dossiers, which will make the establishment of a centre for teaching and learning all the more important). The
process of creating dossiers, or portfolios – which provide objective evidence of a commitment to and success in the promotion of student learning – will force educators to take stock of their efforts in the classroom in a rigorous, evidence-based manner. Explicit recognition of the value of the scholarship of teaching and learning in assessments of faculty research output would be another positive step. And on the military side, similar metrics might be developed to better evaluate the contributions uniformed faculty to the learning experience of their officers.

Finally, RMCC might create greater opportunities to recognize excellence in teaching among its faculty. Increasing the number of awards that recognize a faculty member’s impact upon student learning (from one) would be a start; creating a grant for research into the scholarship of teaching and learning would be another step; and assigning a new teaching and learning centre the responsibility to nominate qualified faculty for external teaching awards would be a third. An equivalent way to reward superior teaching and facilitation among the military faculty at merit boards is also necessary.

Taken together, these steps could transform the Canadian professional military education system, already a very good one, into a noteworthy example of Canadian distinctiveness and excellence on the international stage at a time when low-cost, high impact projects are at a premium.

Adam Chapnick, PhD, is the deputy director of education at the Canadian Forces College and an associate professor of defence studies at the Royal Military College of Canada.

NOTE

1 To its credit, over the last half decade, the Canadian Forces College has increased the rigor of its training significantly, particularly for those staff who work in house. The training for on-line instructors remains rather limited.
AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE: WHEN THE ENEMY IS TOO CLOSE

Pascal Lévesque

Introduction

You have just been sexually assaulted by your supervisor. Deeply shaken, all the more so since he is a ‘brother in arms,’ you gather up your courage and file a complaint at your unit. But they do not believe you. Worse, they imply that you are lying and treat you like a troublemaker. In desperation, you go directly to the military police, who conscientiously take down your statement. However, at the end of the investigation, you are told that what happens next depends upon the decision that the authorities at your parent unit make. But they seem indifferent to your fate. They even try to silence you by threatening you with legal action (malfeasance, false complaint, adultery). Much to your chagrin, the perpetrator is moving on in his career with few-to-no consequences. You are psychologically devastated and struggle with staying in an organization you used to trust where you were destined for a brilliant career. Overwhelmed by dark thoughts, you consider putting an end to it all . . .

In The Invisible War, that scenario is shown as occurring all too frequently in the United States Armed Forces. The documentary film, written and directed by Kirby Dick, depicts a disturbing state of affairs through the stories of victims who, according to estimates, are among some 19,000 people who were sexually assaulted (in incidents ranging from sexual touching to rape) in 2010. The film, which was nominated for Best Documentary Feature at the 2013 Oscars,1 shows that in the American military justice system, it is essentially the chain of command that appoints an investigator, decides whether or not to move forward with the case, and, if so, appoints a prosecutor. The filming of the documentary coincided with a class-action lawsuit to change that process. Twenty-five women and three men argued that the U.S. Secretaries of Defense who have served since 2001 have failed to implement legislation adopted by Congress aiming to reduce the high rate of impunity with regard to sexual assault in the armed forces, and that this failure deprives victims of their constitutional right to be protected by the law.2 They are now appealing the decision of the trial judge, who determined that, despite the troubling allegations, it was better not to get involved because matters of military discipline should be left to the political branches that are accountable to the elected officials.3
A delicate subject handled thoughtfully

Though he is dealing with a hot topic, the director shows restraint. There is no voiceover making inflammatory statements to provoke the audience’s indignation. Rather, it is the interviewees’ stories that touch the viewer with their authenticity. When a victim looks away from the interviewer to try to recall the tragic events and when, in mid-sentence, the victim is suddenly overcome with emotion, even the most dispassionate of jurists is moved. One might wonder why some victims were given more screen time than others. It could well be that the choice and length of the stories were motivated by cinematographic or legal considerations (some people may not have authorized the use of their full story in the film). In addition, the filmmakers give others a chance to speak: loved ones and retired military members talk about their sense of helplessness in the face of a victim’s suffering and their disbelief at the administration’s decision to close the case despite the overwhelming evidence. On that point, the filmmakers gave representatives from the U.S. Forces chain of command a chance to explain the measures in place to prevent sexual assault and respond to complaints. But at some points, their responses are so clichéd and ambiguous that we are left wondering whether they have deliberately painted themselves into a corner in a media war they have already lost.

An appeal to the American public

Make no mistake—The Invisible War is not a scientific documentary or a legal study that paints a complete picture. Even though the film states ‘right off the bat’ that all of the statistics cited come from the U.S. Department of Defense, it may question it when the film informs us that, in cases of suspected sexual assault, only a minuscule number of them will lead to jail time for the perpetrators. That reality is not unique to the American military justice system; in any criminal justice system, there is a bottleneck of reported cases. The analysis would have to be pushed further, and American military justice would have to be compared with civilian justice or similar military justice systems in that respect, in order to explain any disparities. For example, studies should be referenced to support the conclusion that the low number of...
complaints from victims of sexual assault in the United States Armed Forces can be explained in part by those victims’ shame and fear of reprisal.5

Essentially, The Invisible War is an appeal to the American public, and particularly its elected officials, that attempts to convince them of the importance of making major changes to the U.S. military justice system regarding the way allegations of sexual assault are handled. We see numerous meetings between the victims and members of Congress, both Republicans and Democrats. It will be clear to a litigator that it was probably on the advice of their lawyer, Susan Burke, that the victims agreed to bring their stories to the screen. And the strategy seems to have worked—not long after the first public screening of the film in January 2012, the U.S. Secretary of Defense at that time, Leon Panetta, adopted new rules aiming that, for greater transparency, response to complaints of serious sexual assault not be exclusively reserved for commanders, and that commanders be required to report such cases to a special court martial level, normally a colonel.6 To further protect complainants, they are offered the chance to transfer to another unit to distance themselves from the alleged perpetrators.7 The Department of Defense also took measures to standardize and improve the quality of the training for commanders and recruits alike on complaint prevention and response.8 However, according to Nancy Parrish, President of Protect Our Defenders, an American organization that advocates for military victims of sexual assault, the reforms do not go far enough to break the culture of silence in the face of abuse of authority.9 During her testimony before the United States Commission on Civil Rights in January 2013, Ms. Parrish said that she agreed with the idea of an independent audit of sexual assault investigations and trials.10 In response, Major-General Gary Patton, Director of the Department of Defense Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, cautioned against measures that would completely remove commanders from the process, given their interest and their expertise in maintaining discipline among their troops.11

The Wilkerson case

But before the Commission could make recommendations to President Obama and Congress on how to proceed,12 events intervened. In early March, the news that Lieutenant General Craig Franklin had overturned a guilty verdict reached in Lieutenant Colonel James Wilkerson’s case made headlines in the American media.13 Lieutenant Colonel Wilkerson had been convicted in November 2012 of sexual assault by a court martial made up of five officers.14 The dismissal of the verdict was all the more controversial because Lieutenant General Franklin, who acted as the convening authority, did not give a reason for his decision, although he was not required to under the law.15 In addition, his decision went against the recommendation of his legal
Even though Lieutenant General Franklin later defended his decision to Michael Donley, Secretary of the Air Force, nothing worked. Faced with what appeared to them as a symptom of a defective system, members of Congress advocating for reform redoubled their efforts. In the momentum generated by the documentary, a number of other acts were introduced. The proposed measures include establishing the position of special prosecutor for the victims; mandatory release from the forces, at a minimum, for perpetrators of the most serious sexual crimes; the creation within the military justice system of a chain of command able to respond more independently to sexual assault complaints; and increased prevention measures, particularly banning individuals with previous sexual offence convictions from enrolling. Feeling those winds of change, the new Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, in addition to the measures already announced by his Department, decided to limit the convening authority’s power to overturn a court martial verdict to the most minor of cases. The new measures also require any commander who modifies a sentence or the verdict for a minor infraction to set out the reasons for that decision in writing.

The situation in Canada

Although it is by no means perfect, the Canadian military justice system is quite different from that of the United States. In response to the tragic incidents that occurred in Somalia in 1994, a series of measures were adopted in order to better prevent incidents and respond to complaints. Those measures include the adoption of legislation in 1998 establishing greater independence and transparency for actors in the military justice system (police officers, prosecutors and judges)—a reform the documentary advocates for the American military justice system. For example, complaints of sexual assault are investigated by the National Investigation Service (NIS). The NIS is authorized to lay charges and can, if a commander refuses to take action, bring the case directly to a higher authority, which refers the case to the Director of Military Prosecutions. Also, a wide-ranging harassment prevention and resolution program, for all types of harassment, was put in place. Moreover, there is a zero tolerance policy for sexual misconduct, which leads to an investigation and remedial measures that can include, in the most serious cases, the release of the member at fault. In their most recent annual or special reports, neither the Canadian Armed Forces Ombudsman nor the Chair of the Military Police Complaints Commission identified a systemic issue regarding the way sexual assault complaints are handled. The same goes for the two independent reviews of the National Defence Act conducted by former judges Lamer in 2003 and LeSage in 2011 that focused in particular upon the military justice system.
Should we therefore conclude that in the Canadian military justice system, all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds? Far from it. A single sexual assault will always be one too many. What is more, sexual assault is even harder to bear in a military context because the perpetrator is a brother [or sister] in arms. Not only does that add to the victim’s personal tragedy, it greatly undermines unit cohesion. However, the American situation shows us that the measures adopted by the Canadian Armed Forces about 15 years ago to ensure that complaints are investigated, that legal action is taken and that the accused are judged by military members outside of the chain of command, seem to be the right way forward.

Lieutenant-Commander Pascal Lévesque, CD, M.A., LL.M., is currently a legal officer at the Canadian Forces Military Law Centre of the Canadian Defence Academy. His duties include teaching the law of armed conflict to officer cadets at the Royal Military College of Canada. During his military career, he has successively served as a unit legal advisor, a litigator and a military justice policy development advisor. His master’s thesis was on the expeditiousness of the court martial system.
CARRYING THE TORCH FORWARD:  
THE REVITALIZATION OF THE PATROL PATHFINDER CAPABILITY

Cullen Downey and Nick Deshpande

These comrades of ours are our lifeline.
Give them the best of your arrows and spears
and press good luck into their handshakes.

~Odysseus, upon dispatching a reconnaissance party on
the Island of Scheria as recounted in Homer’s Odyssey

Introduction

The Canadian Armed Forces’ Patrol Pathfinder (PPF) capability has undergone much change throughout its storied history, owing to variance in the realms of force development, force generation, and force employment. More recently, PPF training was re-initiated at the Canadian Forces Land Advanced Warfare Centre (CFLAWC). After a training gap of five years and significant reconceptualization, a pilot serial took place at Canadian Forces Base Petawawa in 2011, and it graduated ten candidates. This marked the beginning of the military’s efforts to revitalize the Patrol Pathfinders after a hiatus. The significance was patent: there is a strategic imperative for Pathfinders to remain within the commander’s gamut.

While history is replete with examples of the reconnaissance function playing a pivotal role that determines the outcome of critical operations, there lacks a comprehensive account of the exploits of the Canadian Patrol Pathfinder. This absence is intricately linked to the lack of doctrinal development that would otherwise sustain the capability and allow for related planning for its future. Moreover, current and future intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms will not replace Patrol Pathfinders as they execute a pivotal role on the ground as autonomous and animate human beings. It is from this perspective that we offer the following analysis and commentary.

The aim of this article is twofold: (1) to inform the Defence Team and other stakeholders about the development of the Canadian Armed Force’s PPF capability, and; (2) to provide prescriptive recommendations about the capability’s future. The desired outcome is the initiation of a more fulsome and broad-based discussion about PPFs and the supporting PPF program as a critical operational component, and force generation capability across the future projected spectrum of warfare. Ultimately, a greater understanding of the function throughout the Canadian Armed Forces will enable more effective employment of Pathfinders within their capacity as a vanguard reconnaissance force.

This article will proceed as follows: it will first describe the patrol pathfinder capability with respect to structure and training. It will then explore the strategic context in which PPF development occurs, with a view to specifically highlight the effects associated with adaptive dispersed operations. Various mission profiles for which Pathfinders can expect to be employed are

Vol. 13, No. 4, Autumn 2013  •  Canadian Military Journal 53

Credit: DND photo CB2011-0215-02 by Corporal Katie Hodges
then described. Finally, the article turns to a prescriptive section is integrated into a look at the future of the PPF before some concluding remarks.

**The Patrol Pathfinder**

According to doctrine still in development, a Canadian Patrol Pathfinder is an expert at insertion and extraction techniques by air, land, or sea. He or she must be proficient in the establishment of drop zones, landing zones, beach sites, and tactical airstrips for follow-on forces and is prepared to advise commanders on the Pathfinder phase in joint operations. A PPF grouping, which can range in size from a detachment to a platoon, is inserted through various means, usually well forward of friendly lines. It is currently envisioned that PPF with supporting enablers will be grouped together as a platoon sized brigade-level asset. In garrison, Pathfinder-qualified personnel usually form a section of the reconnaissance platoon within each infantry battalion. Historically, Pathfinders have been a joint capability nested within the Army; such an arrangement needs to be codified within a force employment concept. While their doctrine, tactics, techniques and some equipment are similar, Canadian PPF are not considered special operations forces.

A commander is able to deploy a PPF group in isolation at distances that outreach the integral capabilities of typical conventional reconnaissance platoon assets. PPF are trained to operate as a self-sustained organization until relieved by a follow-on force, or tasked with subsequent operations. Pathfinders’ advanced skill sets are essential to penetrate areas of interest and provide the intimate knowledge and situational awareness required for the expeditious and effective insertion of fighting forces by land, sea, or air. Should it be ordered to do so, and in rare instances, PPF must be prepared to assume the follow-on force’s mission if it is unable to insert or reach an objective. As such, personnel are required to be familiar with all phases of a given operation.

In addition to preparations tasks, Pathfinders provide a commander and his staff both a better appreciation of time and space, and the ability to mitigate or manage risk. They are human barometers that will more often than not represent the first human sensors on the ground. Their role is especially manifest in a new theatre of operation. That said, a PPF group can be expected to be employed across the spectrum of conflict, to include humanitarian assistance in an area beset by natural disaster or the evacuation of non-combatants. As such, Pathfinders must be familiar with the diverse mission types to which they can be expected to contribute. Likewise, planners must be familiar with the Pathfinder role, and how the capability can be appropriately leveraged to achieve mission success.

The training for such tasks is especially arduous. The PPF course is driven by a strategic imperative to build expertise within every infantry battalion. As per the 2010 Army Training Authority implementation directive, “…the target audience is army officers and non-commissioned members deemed physically fit, able to work under extreme stress, severe conditions and in a hostile environment with minimal support.” Given the high threshold to entry, screening at the unit level is very important. The Patrol Pathfinder possesses a set of skills that are related, but distinct, from those of an advanced reconnaissance patrolman.

Pathfinders must be in top physical and mental condition to withstand the rigours of long range patrolling, long periods in uncomfortable circumstances, and to work long hours with minimal rest. These personnel must remain operationally effective during long periods under the stress and pressure associated with the conduct of PPF missions in isolated situations. As they can be expected to operate in enemy-held territory, members must be intimately familiar with survival, escape, resistance, and evasion (SERE) techniques. PPFs must be able to execute an evasion plan of action if inadvertent contact with the enemy takes place in the course of an operation. If captured, Pathfinders must be able to withstand interrogation. Hence, SERE practice is an important component of the PPF course, and it permits a commander to accept a level of risk commensurate with the deployment of isolated forces well forward of friendly lines. Moreover, the SERE training package makes the Pathfinder distinct from other conventional reconnaissance forces.

Recent training events have validated the format and content of the course as well as the role and employment of Canada’s Patrol Pathfinders. During Exercise *Trillium Response* in Moosonee, Ontario, a PPF element conducted a suitability assessment of an airstrip prior to the arrival of a main body via a CC-130 *Hercules* aircraft. The group was able to relay vital information to both the pilots and the ground force commander, as well as to provide security during landing. Further, during Exercise *Trident Fury*, the Pathfinders conducted similar suitability assessment tasks in a maritime context. A joint team comprised of Royal Canadian Navy clearance divers and Pathfinders established a beach site
for both insertion and extraction, established a drop zone for the insertion of a sniper team, reconnoitred link-up points, marked casualty evacuation sites, and acted as a continuous point of contact for the commander for joint planning and coordination, among other tasks. In conducting these tasks, PPF fulfilled a specialized mission for the commanders that other elements could not perform.

These training events were intended to reflect the environment in which PPF and military forces writ large can be expected to operate. Moreover, they served the equally vital role of putting the PPF capability on display for commanders and soldiers across all environments to better appreciate its design and value. Both of those notions are shaped by the strategic context in which the military exists and evolves.

**Strategic Context**

With a baseline understanding of the PPF capability, it is important to explore the context in which it is expected to be developed, generated, and employed. While there are many of relevance, we focus here upon adaptive dispersed operations (ADO). Given that PPF, like any other military organization, are only useful according to their direct relevance to the larger force employment structure, the ADO concept has an important bearing on the employment of Pathfinders and is worth discussing at some length.

An understanding of the PPF role likewise demands a generalized consideration of the nature of conflict that will shape the types of operations in which Canadian Armed Forces can reasonably expect to be engaged. Conflict has more recently and is likely to continue to feature highly adaptive, technologically-enabled actors that conduct irregular warfare in a hybridized fashion. That is to say, their actions across the tactical, operational, and strategic planes will blend conventional and unconventional approaches to best focus limited capabilities on our (i.e. a coalition’s) perceived weaknesses. Adversaries will operate on both physical and non-physical planes, such as the cyber domain or within the minds of a civilian population.

The CAF has oriented its Force Development apparatus to become proficient in such a context. In general, strategic planners subscribe to the notion of warfare that will require a force that is adept at adaptive dispersed operations. ADO is characterized by “…coordinated, interdependent, full spectrum actions using widely dispersed teams across the moral, physical, and informational planes of the battlespace.” Such a multi-dimensional appreciation of the operating environment demands a collection posture that is dynamic, is continuous, accounts for variance across an ethno-demographic spectrum, is relevant to both a rural and urban interface, and other considerations.

As such, PPF could be a vital component of efforts during ADO as they can facilitate the more rapid deployment of forces into areas that might otherwise be non-permissive to exploit an adversary’s vulnerable nodes and disrupt his decision-action cycle. At the same time, PPF can enable a force’s swift transition from one operation to another by shaping a new objective area. Ultimately, commanders can achieve tactical decisiveness by committing forces with a greater assurance of a successful and rapid insertion within the context of a preparatory PPF supporting operation.

Pathfinders must have an appreciation for the dynamics associated with diverse insertion methods, modern conflict and ADO as they can be expected to contribute to and lead the planning in a joint context. Such planning is likely to include, not only full spectrum operations, but also humanitarian relief and non-combatant evacuation operations.

**Mission Profiles**

The PPF capability has been on display and has contributed to mission success in recent years. A common misconception concerns the lack of PPF operations during the Afghanistan campaign (Operations Apollo, Archer, and Athena), which has led to some to question the relevance of the course and capability as a whole. While not officially termed Pathfinder operations, PPF-qualified personnel executed vanguard reconnaissance tasks in support of company- and battle group-sized manoeuvres that were essentially in accordance with the PPF doctrinal function. It is important to recognize these critical contributions, which illustrate the requirement for a formed PPF element during Full Spectrum Operations to fulfill a specialized function.

Enabling the warfighting effort in a kinetic battlespace will remain central to the PPF role; however, the Canadian Pathfinder is trained to operate across the spectrum of warfare, as reconnaissance and the establishment of insertion/extraction sites are critical phases of nearly all operations. This can potentially include Pathfinder tasks in support of humanitarian assistance, or the...
evacuation of non-combatants. While historically they have not been employed in such a capacity, exercises have confirmed a PPF group’s ability to do so.

Under Contingency Plan Renaissance, a Disaster Assistance Response Team is tasked to provide relief efforts following a major disaster anywhere in the world. Recent examples include Operation Hestia (Haiti) following an earthquake in 2010, Operation Plateau (Pakistan) following an earthquake in 2005, and Operation Structure (Sri Lanka) following an earthquake and tsunami in 2004. In each instance, task tailored forces launched quickly to provide relief to vulnerable persons in the form of fresh water, rescue operations, waste management, reconstruction, and basic health care. Such operations illustrate the unique challenges of inserting into a disaster zone, where infrastructure and lines of communication may have sustained considerable damage.

Contingency Plan Angle outlines the conduct of Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), in which military forces facilitate the mass departure of willing Canadian Entitled Persons (CEP) and other nationals from a country that has likely experienced considerable deterioration, such that departure via conventional means (i.e. commercial aviation) is untenable. Operation Lion (Lebanon) in 2006, and Operation Bandit (Haiti) in 1988, are both examples of Canadian non-combatant evacuation operations. Angle is usually executed in a coalition context and the type and size of a force package in contingent on the circumstances and the operating environment’s permissibility.

The PPF role for both Angle and Renaissance is innate. As naval vessels or air assets can be employed in this effort, suitable landing zones, drop zones, beach zones, and austere airstrips must be identified and marked for either the arrival of aid or an extraction force. In the case of Angle, a PPF group can be tasked to establish and mark an extraction point for CEPs. Where shore access exists, Pathfinders will likely form a component of an Amphibious Scouting Group along with clearance divers to deploy from a Canadian naval vessel. The ASG can then reconnoitre, assess, mark, and secure beach sites, or move further inland as required. For both Renaissance and Angle, PPF can be tasked to conduct initial terminal guidance for Canadian or coalition assets.

There is a heavy emphasis upon coordination, since these mission profiles are executed in a joint, interagency, multinational, and public context. Of note, following the massive earthquake in Haiti in 2010, the Canadian task force had planned for the initial airborne deployment of Pathfinders and a Parachute Company Group. However, airspace coordination (among other factors) precluded the execution of this course of action.

The PPF skill set is organic to enable various types of operation, across all types of terrain for most types of threats (enemy) and risk (environment). Given members’ intimate involvement in planning all aspects of the Pathfinder phase of a given operation, the job demands an understanding of the operational planning process, especially the intelligence preparation of the operating environment as contributors, advisors, and autonomous collectors. Future training events will need to incorporate the Pathfinders during the conduct of these types of operations to properly validate and showcase the capability’s value and role rather than notionally play out critical phases of an operation (as tends to happen).

The Future of the Canadian Pathfinder

For the Pathfinder capability to evolve, remain relevant and be readily employable, defence planners may consider the following prescriptive points.

1. **Clearer strategic guidance.** While the PPF course and infantry battalions’ reconnaissance platoons are sustaining the capability in a meaningful way, very little has actually been institutionalized, especially when it comes to employing Pathfinders as a joint capability. To ensure the Pathfinder capability remains extant and evolves, it is imperative that clear direction and guidance from the strategic level is issued. Such direction and guidance might confirm force structure, command relationships, force employment, force development (i.e. required skill sets), and doctrinal development.

2. **The establishment of a Pathfinder Group held at division level.** PPF should become a standing unit that exists at either the division or brigade level. This unit would act as both the centre of excellence and force generation node. Canadian Forces Land Advanced Warfare Centre would continue to force develop (i.e. train) the capability. Such a
move would put Canada in line with allies such as the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, and Brazil, all of which have proven their PPF capability in contemporary and diverse operating environments.

3. Publication of a Force Employment Concept. A force employment concept (FEC) would address the first two points and provide the necessary blueprint to allow commanders to effectively field PPF groupings during exercises and operations. Too often, during the planning and conduct of exercises, the Pathfinder phase is omitted. This is a detriment to planners, training audiences, and Pathfinders alike, and it hinders the CAF’s efforts to confirm readiness.

Conclusion

Canada’s Patrol Pathfinders represent an important and unique capability available to a commander. They are primed to execute the initial phase of most operations involving the insertion of forces into a new or immature theatre. They also are trained to play a critical role in the evacuation of non-combatants, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and other high value tasks that implicate conventional forces. This article has considered that role in some detail while providing an overview of the capability’s employment. Further, despite its relative and necessary brevity, it has also outlined some recommendations for consideration, with a desire to spark further discussion and debate. Future engagements (academic or otherwise) about the PPF capability might consider its history in more detail, the nature of PPF operations, and Allied Pathfinder capabilities.

Captain Cullen Downey, a graduate of the United States Ranger School, has a Light Infantry background, having served as a platoon commander within Parachute Company, 3rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment as the battalion’s reconnaissance platoon commander. He is currently in charge of the Patrol Pathfinder Cell at the Canadian Armed Forces Land Advanced Warfare Centre.

Captain Nick Deshpande is a Canadian Army intelligence officer, and has previously served with CANSOFCOM and 3rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment. He is currently a team leader with the Army Intelligence Group implementation team.

Both authors would like to gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Captain Matt Tamsett (3 PPCLI) and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret’d) Steve Nash (The RCR).

NOTES

1 The Pathfinder capability resided in the airborne reconnaissance force of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. With the Regiment’s disbandment in 1995, there was no longer a valid and relevant force employment concept.
2 Typically up to 72 hours.
Seems too good to be true? Let me provide you with an overview on the Individual Training & Education Modernization initiative, as well as what is presently being facilitated by the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA).

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is known for the individual and collective high-level performance of its personnel. It does not mean that the IT&E system is perfect. In the current IT&E system, nine strategic gaps were identified, which served to motivate the creation of the IT&E Modernization Strategy. This Strategy guided the Training Authorities/ Designated Training Authorities (TA/DTA) partnership in the development of CAF Campus, which is described in the CAF Campus Operational Framework. It should be noted that on 19 June 2013, IT&E Modernization was endorsed by Armed Forces Council (AFC).

So what is included in this initiative? In other words, what can it do for you? It will allow you to enter a portal that will provide boundless access to a myriad of applications, anywhere and anytime. This approach will break down the ‘stovepipe’ construct of the present IT&E system, thereby fully leveraging all IT&E initiatives and investments and ensuring that the organization, processes, doctrine, and policy evolve in concert with the learning methodologies and tools employed in CAF Campus. CAF Campus will provide effective management of IT&E while preserving the TA/DTA structure. It will leverage the authorities of the Professional Development Council (PDC) members and participants to oversee the transformation of the CAF learning culture. Acting as an integrator, it will supervise a transition in capabilities and approach that will achieve the required synergy, cooperation, and strategic governance.

There will be a significant transformation of the CAF learning culture that will be motivated by the implementation of this modern learning architecture. CAF Campus will affect traditional training approaches and embrace the nature of a true modern learning organization. The opportunity to achieve these strategic advantages cannot be disrupted. As such, the transformation will be supported by an overarching management plan and well-tailored communications to prevent institutional inertia from causing a retreat to traditional approaches.

CAF Campus modernizes IT&E in three domains: Governance; Training Authority and Designated Training
Authority Capabilities; and Common Capabilities. Although critical to overall efficiency, it is not the common capabilities that will represent IT&E Modernization to the IT&E community. Front and center in this new approach will be the reconfiguration of the following organizations to meet their unique requirements:

- Learning Support Centres (LSC) — will provide integrated learning development functions, and IT&E specialist consultancy services that will be essential to the TAs/DTAs, FCoEs and TEs when conducting needs assessment, analysis, design, evaluation, validation, intelligent contracting and rationalization of IT&E;

- Functional Centres of Excellence (FCoE) — will lead, coordinate and maintain the intellectual foundation and authoritative body of knowledge within their assigned area of expertise in support of IT&E;

- Training Establishments (TE) — will provide cadres of instructors, standards staff and IT&E managers engaged in learning delivery regardless of physical location or delivery environment; and

- Learning Sites (LS) — temporary or permanent locations providing physical and/or virtual learning environments shared by multiple FCoEs and TEs.

As for the Common Capabilities, they will be provided by CDA to avoid redundancy and to enable ready access to essential capabilities, including point of need IT&E, as well as pan-CAF collaboration to support all IT&E phases with access to a greater spectrum of best practices and talent than
any TA/DTA could achieve on its own. These capabilities will be grouped into three categories: Strategies and Programs (Prior Learning Assessment Review, Rationalized Training Delivery, and so on), Support and Services (Research and Development, Instructor Development Program, and so on), and CAF Campus Enterprise Engine (CAFCEE). CAFCEE will be the technical backbone to CAF Campus, providing access to the tools that support CAF Campus, and, in particular, enabling a collaborative learning environment and ubiquitous and asynchronous access to IT&E. The CAFCEE was not conceived as a ‘stand-alone’ system.

The LSC network will be equipped to provide a common baseline of integrated learning development services, consultancy services, and support services. The LSCs will provide the main development capabilities and IT&E specialist consultancy services, centralized contracting, and the rationalization of IT&E. Each LSC will participate in a virtual development network that will enable sharing of expert advice and best practices. In some cases, individual LSCs will be equipped with specialty capabilities that will serve the entire LSC network. All LSCs will be reinforced with development tools and other support services from the CAF Campus Common Capabilities. The main development capability for the Designated Training Authorities (DTAs) will be provided by the CAF LSC. In addition to the LSCs, some development and common service will also be accessed at satellite LSCs that are linked to an LSC and the entire development network. The LSCs will be virtual, physical, or some combination thereof, and will provide support to one another. They may be a section within a headquarters, or a stand-alone unit with the necessary establishment, authority and funding to meet their mandate. The specific design of each LSC depends upon the intended scope of activity, and it is determined by a combination of factors, including the TA’s development and common services requirements and the specialized capabilities that specified TAs will provide to the entire development network. For example, the production of holographic maps or images is an expensive capability that would be established at a single LSC to support all TA/DTA requirements. While the LSCs operate under the ownership of each TA, the establishment and evolution of the LSC network consistent with a CAF-wide standard level of capability is a CDA HQ Capability (IOC):

- Learning Support Centres — will provide the main learning content development capability and IT&E specialist consultancy services;
- CAF Campus Enterprise Engine — will include the operating platform, related capabilities and key tools. A digital learning management system with 24/7 access to learning, with a learning content repository;
- Performance Management Framework — will provide metrics to guide strategic and operational decisions regarding the ongoing evolution of CAF Campus, and will provide Program Alignment Architecture (PAA) inputs; and
- Common Capabilities — will include the enterprise tools and capabilities that enable the efficient application of modern instructional techniques.

This CAF-wide learning initiative serves as a national reference for all learning projects and related research agendas within the CAF/DND, and allows the IT&E community to promote, share, or request projects. Through pan-CAF collaboration, CAF Campus will provide access to a greater diversity of experience and talent than any TA/DTA could ever provide on its own. The CAF Campus environment is modern and adaptable, where multi-use mobile learning devices access wireless internet-based learning networks. In fact, technology plays a secondary role in support of the CAF Campus, which will adapt by responding in concert with other elements of the CAF to changes in operational and institutional requirements, changes in operational tempo and the discovery of more effective and efficient learning methodologies. The Campus framework will allow the synchronization of HR and IT&E, supporting ‘just-in-time’ training and career-long individual development. The CAF CEE supports not just access to learning content but also access to support resources and collaboration via online learning communities where learners, instructors and developers can share, build and tailor learning content and supporting applications.

It is envisioned that improved resource management, in concert with the reduction in formal training, reduces infrastructure, and operational equipment requirements, will yield savings. At present, the IT&E system consumes $1.6B annually; a 1 percent efficiency improvement would produce $16M in annual savings, and a 10 percent improvement would produce $160M in annual savings. CAF Campus is committed to using the approach of continuous improvement and rationalization of learning content and organization, including the supporting doctrine, policies, and procedures.

The following four projects were selected to support the Initial Operational Capability (IOC):

In the end, the CAF Campus positions the CAF to maintain its operational edge in the face of resource constraints and an increasingly complex and challenging security environment. It is a strategically driven, pan-CAF synchronized performance oriented learning architecture that supports the transformation of the CAF learning culture for the 21st Century.

To the day-to-day user the fundamental facilities of the LSC coupled with the functionality of the Enterprise Engine are of most interest, as they are readily available aspects that anyone can use, anywhere, at anytime, basically point of need for the user.

Every CAF member will be a user, and will have access to the tools (virtual resource centre, learning plan, 3D models, R&D reports, synthetic environments, serious games, micro-blogging, and so on), and resources appropriate to their particular status as a learner, instructor, content developer, instructional designer, or training manager/administrator when and where they are needed.

IT&E Modernization will meet operational requirements by creating a modern, agile, integrated learning environment with global access that empowers Canadian Armed Forces personnel.

Come visit us and see what it is all about at:

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-elearning/index.page or
http://www.forces.gc.ca/fr/training-elearning/index.page

Lieutenant-Colonel D.L. Miller, OMM, CD, is the Senior Staff Officer Strategic Planning at the Canadian Defence Academy in Kingston. She holds a Master of Arts in History and a Master of Defence Studies from the Canadian Forces College.
MAY PEACE BE UPON US

Garrett Lawless

Were aliens to visit us, would there be cause for alarm? In his book *Hyperspace*, Machio Kaku argues that any life form capable of intergalactic travel could only come in peace. His reasoning focuses on a nomenclature that he applies to the nature and quantity of energy that a civilization is able to harness. Levels 0 (consumed food) and 1 (fire) permit the possibility of a war-promoting culture thriving because using energies at these levels for the purposes of war will not necessarily extinct a species. Level 2 however, represents the harnessing of nuclear power, and so introduces the possibility of total auto-annihilation. This developmental level is a kind of ‘moment-of-truth’ for a species; because any civilization that manages to reach this stage in the mastering of nature will either kill itself, or else embrace peace. As it is predicted that any kind of intergalactic travel will require at least level 3 energy control (the equivalent of mining small stars such as our sun), should any extraterrestrial alien life ever visit us, we will have no reason to fear them, for to achieve what they have achieved and still exist, they must have become a peaceful race.1

Stephen Hawking disagrees, and he looks to our own species as proof. When considering how within human history, superior civilizations have treated less advanced ones following initial contact, it is easy to see his point. The European discovery of North America did not result in positive effects for the indigenous populations. However, there is an important point that Hawking misses when presenting his fears. While European civilization was much more technologically advanced than the tribes of North and South America, they remained, in the vernacular of Kaku, a level 1 species. Considering the current cultural advances that level 2 civilizations are making today, alien prospects are much more promising; colonialism is dead, slavery is dying, percentages of populations that perish in wars is dropping, crime and violence are down, civil liberties are up, and rapid advances in education, science, and technology are globalizing.2 In this way, when Western military organizations consider the conflicts that they may face in the future, and the challenges for which they should then be preparing, it will be valuable to shift focus away from the conduct of classical war and move it instead towards more tangential defence issues, such as economic development and local governance. In the nuclear age, classical war between major powers is either dead, or we are doomed. Encouragingly, in an age of economic globalization, war is also prohibitively bad for business, and the new requirement for a stable and lasting peace is the provision to all humans of a future worth living for.

The first serious warning that human civilization needed to embrace peace or face extinction pre-dates the nuclear age,
although only marginally. Jan Bloch was a Polish banker and wrote an extensive economic analysis of classical war within the industrial age that existed at the turn of the last century. Given the capabilities of that age, Bloch predicted bankruptcy and revolution as the new spoils for any advanced nation that went to war against another similarly advanced nation. A decade-and-a-half later, Bloch’s warning was ignored and the First World War erupted, proving unquestioningly that the spoils of war had changed just as Bloch had predicted. However, the mistakes of the Great War were not over at its conclusion. The immodest impositions placed upon Germany within the terms of the Treaty of Versailles set the world upon the path to the Second World War, and ultimately, towards the expedited discovery of nuclear power and weapons.

The good news is that the Second World War represents the last time that major powers have directly gone to war against one another. Extrapolating from Bloch’s economic analysis of classical war in his age, and adapting it to the modern age, the advanced nations of the world appear to have recognized that the new fruits of war are no longer just bankruptcy, but extinction. As a result, war has become limited to smaller clashes where major powers, if they are even involved directly, do not employ anything near the limits of their combative capability. Today, when war between major powers is considered hypothetically, such as a war between China and the U.S., it is nearly always spoken of in terms of a looming Cold War; as if anything else is simply inconceivable. So what of the remaining clashes among smaller powers, or where a major power engages a smaller power? Are these to remain the new war of the future, or is there hope that these too may become inconceivable?

In 1976, Richard Dawkins introduced the idea of the meme. In the same way that the gene represents the unit of transmission for human biology; the meme, which is defined as any idea or behaviour that spreads within a culture, represents the unit of transmission for our cultural evolution. Similarly, war can be understood to be a cultural contagion that acts as a meme. When one points to discrete causes of war, such as resource scarcity, inequality, or sociopathic leadership, the underlying root of the problem is not understood. Taken existentially, war really occurs when a culture accepts war, and is avoided by cultural rejection. These other tangential factors may certainly be strong attributes of particular wars, but the decisive factor in the decision to go to war remains the presence of a militaristic culture, where a population either glorifies war or even just accepts it. Sadly, history shows that national leaders often love war, and that even when they do not, because they otherwise mistakenly feel that war is an inevitable part of human nature, they invariably fail in their attempts to prevent war.

So, is war an inescapable facet of human existence? If it is, then now that our species has reached Kaku’s second level of energy stewardship, we are surely doomed. However, if war is simply a cultural meme, we may take hope in our understanding of how culture develops, that war can become a part of our inglorious past in the same manner as so many other horrors that we no longer embrace. The provision of some genuine understanding of cultural evolution is obviously beyond the scope of this short article. However, consider that humans generally adopt their attitudes towards experiences in life from example responses that they have witnessed in others previously, and that the way that these external experiences are passed to other members within a culture, so modifying their emotional and intellectual responses to stimuli, is through memes. The possibility and efficiency through which these memes may travel among and between humans is based entirely upon the scope and power of the communicative vehicles existent within society. Thus, in an age of globalization and rapid technological advance, the capacity to transmit a peace meme ubiquitously is a very real possibility, and this is grounds for optimism. For this meme to take root and spread efficiently, it will be helped greatly if it can be linked to another cultural meme already accepted and believed in within global populations. So it is, that within the increasingly materialistic world that we presently find ourselves within, perhaps the most promising meme to begin with is the idea that war is, quite simply, bad for business.

A capitalist, free-market economy must enjoy peaceful cooperation if it is to thrive. Divisions of labour between states obviously cannot function effectively when war exists between these same states, and so war will be economically inhibited between states that are trade partners. The corollary to this assertion is that no-war scenarios are not necessarily good for business either. Certainly, the risk premiums associated with as-of-yet unrealized war between posturing states can certainly have detrimental effects on investment and trade. Also, it remains uncontestable that Keynesian disciples may rightly assert that government spending for war stimulates the national economy, and with ample historical references. However, more recent experience shows that today, even short wars against weak states can prove exceptionally costly, and if these wars persist the economic effects can be devastating. Indeed, the U.S.’s recent war in Iraq risked and won politically unacceptable casualty rates, deep economic recession, and deep international unpopularity and resentment that have directly affected trade relationships.

The idea that trade partners are unlikely to go to war with one another is not unusual. Most often, this idea is expanded to encompass the notion that democratic nations will not go to war with each other; but it is a mistake to presume that simple democracy leads to peace. Indeed, as first pointed out by John Stuart Mill, within politically heterogeneous societies, democracy risks violence as cultural sub-groups will compete for political favour, particularly if political systems are perceived to be weak or corrupt. Rather,
the political system that appears to hold the most promise for peace is democratic liberalism. Within this construct, free trade and the free mobility of labour mean that one’s standard of living is de-linked from territorial expansion.16 This of key importance, for it is only when foreign intervention holds the promise of economic advantage that war may be profitable and a national culture may become bellicose. But as globalization expands and liberalism grows in influence, the opportunity to find such advantages are diminishing17 and with it, so are the reasons to go to war.

Whatever disadvantages war may impose upon modern economies, it cannot be forgotten that the reason for the relative peace that exists among the world’s advanced powers is due in part to the existential threat associated with nuclear war. Were all of the world’s nuclear capabilities removed, it is possible that classical war would still be avoided on account of Jan Bloch’s economic warnings about non-nuclear industrial war, but nuclear auto-annihilation remains the more formidable prohibitive threat. Thus, one idea that is gaining some strength among some defence planners seeking to reduce the chances of future wars is to encourage and assist certain politically stable powers to become nuclear powers themselves. For example, were the U.S. to permit certain Asian democracies to arm themselves with nuclear weapons, the U.S. would then enable these nations to assure their own security from the threat of China, rather than have the U.S. accept responsibility for their defence.18 Such action would save the U.S. significant treasure, particularly if China becomes more aggressive in the region; but more importantly, a nuclear Taiwan would be a much more effective deterrent against Chinese military aggression than the U.S. promise of protection.

Sanctioned nuclear proliferation of this sort would effectively amount to an ‘all-in’ bet that humanity will be able to leave its warring ways behind and embrace peace. Understandably, the idea does strike fear in the hearts of many defence planners, and it is this fear that impedes the meme’s progress. If the bet loses, the consequences are simply too great; but what gets missed in this line of reasoning is the fact that the bet has already been made. Significant nuclear weapons are already held by the U.S., China, Russia, North Korea, Israel, Britain, France, India and Pakistan. While increasing the number of nations with nuclear capabilities can be argued to increase the statistical probability of nuclear war, political actions to prevent proliferation appear too often to be based upon weakly-veiled xenophobia rather than mathematics.19

So, what will war in the near future look like? Neglecting the unimaginable, wars will probably look much as they do today. Until the world as a whole is brought into productive trade relationships within a liberal democratic construct, wealthy states will continue to intervene in poor states, and then attempt to help those states develop into more advanced states with socio-political structures to enable lasting peace through effective trade.20 While it is a relatively easy matter for an advanced state to defeat a weak state militarily, counter-insurgency operations will likely become increasingly common. More importantly, the ability of military planners to become familiar with issues such as economic development and local governance, and so to include these issues as primary foci within overall operational planning will also become of key importance. As war becomes confined to areas where populations simply feel that their future is not worth living for, the fulcrum of peace will become the provision of hope.21 Specifically, nations at risk of war need to be brought up to a political and economic level such that war becomes counterproductive, and ultimately, this will mean establishing and nurturing a local economy fortified by trade.

No poor country has ever become wealthy without trade, but trade alone is not enough.22 Additionally, good governance is required
because a burgeoning economy must be tied to governance policies that lift people out of poverty and distribute benefits equitably across and within the developing nation. This means the construction of roads, ports, electrical power facilities, and other such national infrastructure projects. In cases where there has been no military intervention working as a catalyst to these measures, simple aid-for-trade partnerships hold great promise, but in cases where there has been military action, it will be of primary importance that the eventual need for these structures is recognized and understood from the outset of operations planning. For the transformation to be effective, the operation will need to be a holistic one that encompasses battling insurgency and corruption while concurrently establishing and maintaining a political climate where construction can begin on infrastructure projects aimed at facilitating future trade.

So, is it really possible that classical war is over? This is an exciting proposition, and hopefully, it is also one that will inspire great human enterprise towards peaceful pursuits; but before true peace settles on our planet, humanity will continue for some time to struggle with conflicts erupting within weaker states. In these states, success should be defined as the provision of hope through good governance, effective trade, and distributive wealth. If these can be accomplished, then the peace meme may flourish globally, and perhaps war will finally leave us for good. This is an ambitious but not impossible objective. Achieving it will mean that our militaries will need to become adept at operations that assist and enable economic development and good governance. Such focus will likely mean that these new skills will be developed at the expense of degradation in more core fighting capabilities, but we must believe that the requirements for such capabilities are not what they used to be. Major classical war cannot be allowed to happen ever again. Alas, if it does, highly skilled fighters and powerfully equipped war forces will not make any difference to the outcome whatsoever. The bet on peace has already been made. In two centuries time, humanity will either be capable of intergalactic travel, or it will be no more.

Major Garrett Lawless is an Air Mobility pilot in the Royal Canadian Air Force, and is currently working as a Military Assistant to the Minister of National Defence. He has an undergraduate degree in Electrical Engineering and a Master of Arts degree in Security and Defence Management and Policy from the Royal Military College of Canada, as well as a Master of Defence Studies from the Canadian Forces College.

NOTES

7 Horgan. 2012.
10 Dawkins.
14 Hegel.
15 Murphy.
17 The Economist.
20 Peter Holmgren and Kostas Stamoulis. *Food Security and Agricultural Mitigation in Developing Countries: Options for Capturing Synergies.* (Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2009).
22 Carothers and de Gramont.
ACQUISITION OF INNOVATIONS IN A TIME OF RAPID CHANGE: SOME OBSERVATIONS

Robert Jay Glickman

Introduction

This brief opinion piece will list a number of the major characteristics of the age of rapid change in which we live, discuss some of the ways in which these realities affect recruitment, deference to authority, and training, and make a suggestion with respect to the acquisition of innovations that can increase the military’s institutional and operational effectiveness.

A Look at Reality Today

In 1924, Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain was published and became one of the most thought-provoking books of the 20th Century. The following quote was among the many unforgettable assertions that bejewel that book: “A man lives not only his personal life, as an individual, but also, consciously or unconsciously, the life of his epoch and his contemporaries.”
With this in mind, we may ask about the characteristics of life in our time. Once we do, we will see that we are well aware of some of the major ones that affect us all. What may not be as clear is how these features are connected, and what bearing they have on the military. This is the subject of the present article—a brief examination whose fundamental aim is to stimulate thought and, perhaps, debate.

**Novelty**

A ceaseless rush of novelty is a fact of life today. We are relentlessly besieged by new products, new concepts, new fashions, new turns of phrase—so much new all the time, that the effort to keep current with the world around us raises tension and takes our breath away. Just to learn the latest ‘lingo,’ just to keep in touch with advances in science, business, and the arts; just to stay abreast of changes in style and satisfy the needs that marketers have created in us; just to keep up with the news—news that is always ‘breaking’—all of this is a daily marathon that we run. So much to see, so much to learn, so much to do. So much, so fast!

**Speed**

Today, we are all exposed to an extremely high degree of velocity. We try to make life easier in as many ways as we can. We do so, for example, by using the speed-dial feature on our telephone instead of inputting each number separately, by signing up for hi-speed Internet service, by picking up some fast food at McDonald’s, by subscribing to Netflix in order to see a movie instantly.

Speed is constantly with us. Merchants incessantly ‘machine-gun’ their ads to us on the radio, TV, telephone, and Internet. Family, friends, and ‘spammers’ persistently ring us, text us, e-mail, and ‘tweet’ us. The world is full of movement, an endless pulse of sight and sound—and it beckons us to absorb its penetrating rhythm and move in concert with it. As the commercial says, “Life doesn’t wait. Why should you?” If you want twice as much of that product, “Call in the next two minutes.” If you want to play the game, you have “A Minute to Win It.” And if you object to someone’s opinion, you can use your Twitter account to ‘talk back’ quickly. In his insightful book Consumed—a detailed discussion of marketing and its effects on society—Benjamin Barber states that “Speed [meaning velocity] is a drug like any other that must be taken in ever higher doses just to maintain its hold over the psyche.”

**Miniaturization**

Miniaturization also characterizes life today. We have observed a trend toward downsizing for several decades already. In the corporate world, not only have the organizational structure and the number of employees been reduced, but there has also been a contraction of corporate names into diminutive acronyms: The Hudson’s Bay Company has morphed into HBC; Kentucky Fried Chicken into KFC; Dun and Bradstreet into D&B.

We have seen a similar trend in communications. In the realm of computer hardware, huge mainframes have been successively replaced by desktops, laptops, iPads, and iPhones. And imagine: those 100 gigabytes of data that have been generated over several months can now be stored in a miniscule memory stick.

‘Small’ has also affected radio, television, and Internet transmission where broadcasters have added two new strategies: narrowcasting to specific audience groups and egocasting to the individual.

‘Small’ is also a dynamic area of interest in science, where fields such as genomics and nanotechnology are daily becoming more and more attractive to the research community.

And we have witnessed a concomitant compression of military assemblages: large armies have been supplanted in battle first by compact fighting units, then by tight bodies of special operations, and now, among our fiercest enemies, by individual suicide bombers and IEDs—each of which, progressively, has had the advantage of giving more ‘bang for the buck.’

As seen in the worlds of business, communication, science, and the military, miniaturization has forcefully intruded into the lives of us all.
until a winner is chosen. At each step in the evaluation process, the flaws of each competitor are revealed to a national or international audience—an audience which, in certain cases, participates in the voting. The losers are many. The disappointments are great.

It seems as though we are being inspected, scrutinized, examined, and assessed all the time. Someone is always checking us out to see if we meet their criteria. Those who search for employment know the feelings that competition can generate. Lots of contenders. Judges at every step. Very few jobs. Lots of regrets.

And in the military, competition is present as well. Competition within the ranks. Competition *within* and *between* the services and branches. Competition between the military sector and civilian society for the nation’s scarce resources.

**Effects upon the Military**

What are the effects of all this upon the military? For instance, how can recruiters identify today’s ‘Colin Powells-to-be,’ whose uniform will give them “a sense of belonging,” make them feel “distinctive” . . . see themselves as “a member of a brotherhood,” and crave the “discipline, the structure, the camaraderie” that are the essence of the military experience? How will the ‘me-me,’ novelty-seeking, talkback teens, who let it all hang out be converted into spit-and-polish, “Yes, Sir” team players in a “compliant collective”?

In view of questions such as this, excellence in recruitment is paramount. As General Walter Natynczyk reminded us: “We need to ensure we have the right people, with the right experience, doing the right tasks.” Once a careful selection is made, the issue of training must be thoroughly considered. According to Major-General [now Lieutenant-General – Ed.] J. M. M. Hainse (then) of Canada’s Army Training Authority, “…excellence in training is the greatest single factor in the achievement of operational excellence.” If General Hainse is right in saying that “…training must be command driven—leaders must understand training and use it to develop competent, cohesive, confident and disciplined organizations,” how will those leaders successfully train enough personnel to operate the new systems that are acquired—and do so in a cost-effective manner?

As we know, in a time of irregular, asymmetric, and netcentric warfare, requirements can change very rapidly. This imposes distinctive challenges upon leaders, trainers, and trainees. While commercial ‘off-the-shelf’ aids, such as simulation technologies, interactive training programs, and performance measurement tools might suffice in some instances, it is often necessary to create special instruments to fill gaps where shortfalls in training are encountered. As a result, great pressure is placed upon all personnel involved in the training effort. What will have to be done to keep this reality uppermost in the minds of the leaders? Obviously, the leaders themselves must undergo training as well—the kind of training that is appropriate for their station, responsibilities, and capacity to meet the challenges of innovation, especially in times of political, economic, and social change.

How will the military sensibly, efficiently, and cost-effectively modernize its forces in spite of the onslaught of purchasing schemes by policy makers and civilian lobbyists who sometimes craft unwanted, irrelevant, and expensive proposals? What position should it take in the debate with respect to which fighter aircraft should be purchased to protect Canada’s security, and, in the process, support the nation’s aerospace industry, yet not endanger the nation’s financial well-being? How will it minimize disruptive inter-service competition for shrinking financial support? Finally, how will it avoid fraud, waste, and abuse within the services, and prevent unscrupulous contractors from saddling the nation with continual cost-overruns?

As a corollary to this, we might ask, in a world characterized by rapid change, to what extent will the pace of innovation be influenced by factors such as tradition and standard operating procedures? We recall, for example, the frustrations experienced by Lieutenant Colonel Timothy O’Neill, founder of West Point’s engineering-psychology program, whose Dual-Tex camouflage system “…was shelved by military brass, who refused to believe something so artificial-looking could work.” That was back in 1976. But as we know, similar responses to innovation have taken place throughout military history.
One of the questions related to this issue is: to what degree will the age of members of the military affect their interest in and acceptance of innovations? Who will specialists in diffusion of innovations theory cite as the early adopters of new ideas, devices, and procedures? And who will they show to be the laggards? In other words, will age be the principal influence on the military’s acceptance of innovations? Will tradition, convention, and deference to authority be the key determinants? Or will the acceptance of innovations be determined mainly by an awareness of current trends, and a knowledge of current needs?

What effect will technological change in civilian life have upon the military? For example, how easy will it be to expand its present internets and intranets with secure social networking systems like Yammer? And to what extent will such systems help to overcome some of the barriers to innovation raised by the military’s command structure?

Reality today—characterized by ceaseless novelty, ever escalating speed, ubiquitous miniaturization, omnipresent competition, stress on youth and freedom of choice—puts the military under tensions greater than any experienced in the past, and increases the scope of situational awareness that it must develop in order to insure its effectiveness. But let us be clear: the type of situational awareness referred to here is much broader and deeper than the kind that General David Petraeus spoke of in his 2007 discussion with the Nassau Weekly. What is meant by situational awareness in the present article is not an awareness that lets you “…just stare at a location and really gain a knowledge … that is so substantial that you can then pull the trigger and take out a bad guy.”

No. The situational awareness meant here is a knowledge far beyond that of specific targets in countries where we carry on combat operations. In point of fact, answers to the questions that the military is asking, or needs to ask in order to improve its level of excellence, not only depend upon a knowledge of actualities abroad, but also hinge upon a broadly inclusive analysis of our own culture in the past, and an intimate familiarity with current realities in the civilian world—the complex, dynamic, and interrelated world of business, science, education, demographics, politics, and so forth.

Chris Hedges is right when he says: “Those who suffer from historical amnesia . . . and have nothing to learn from the past, remain children. They live in an illusion . . .” But the same can be said of those who are ignorant of the realities of the present. And this is what must be emphasized here. To be successful, every organization, including the military, must cultivate an eagerness to know as much as possible about the world that has produced it, and in which it currently exists.

This type of intelligence is not covert, but open. It is similar to the kind that is usually gathered by our embassies in foreign countries, when the issue is not to hunt out terrorist cells or discover other types of belligerencies, but to gain a knowledge of as many aspects of the country as possible, so that effective policies and practices toward it can be established here at home.

Back in 2002, stressing the fact that “…large, complex institutions generally find it difficult to deal with experimental ideas and revolutionary concepts,” Professor Martin Rudner suggested that the Defence Intelligence arm of the Canadian Forces could “…provide a singular focal point for a coordinated, integrated, and synchronized effort to explore and exploit the attributes of information technology for future CF capabilities development requirements.”

Chris Hedges is right when he says: “Those who suffer from historical amnesia . . . and have nothing to learn from the past, remain children. They live in an illusion . . .” But the same can be said of those who are ignorant of the realities of the present. And this is what must be emphasized here. To be successful, every organization, including the military, must cultivate an eagerness to know as much as possible about the world that has produced it, and in which it currently exists.

This type of intelligence is not covert, but open. It is similar to the kind that is usually gathered by our embassies in foreign countries, when the issue is not to hunt out terrorist cells or discover other types of belligerencies, but to gain a knowledge of as many aspects of the country as possible, so that effective policies and practices toward it can be established here at home.

Back in 2002, stressing the fact that “…large, complex institutions generally find it difficult to deal with experimental ideas and revolutionary concepts,” Professor Martin Rudner suggested that the Defence Intelligence arm of the Canadian Forces could “…provide a singular focal point for a coordinated, integrated, and synchronized effort to explore and exploit the attributes of information technology for future CF capabilities development requirements.”
VIEWS AND OPINIONS

Few would argue with Rudner on this point. However, in addition to serving as a focal point for a knowledge about the potential value of information technology, Defence Intelligence could also act as “...a focal point for a coordinated, integrated, and synchronized effort to explore and exploit the attributes” of open intelligence from sources that could increase the military’s institutional and operational effectiveness.

Let it be plain. Gathering open-source intelligence here at home is not only an issue of ‘keeping tabs on the bad guys’ whose activities might adversely affect the military’s successful execution of its assigned tasks, but also of ‘learning from the good guys.’ One of the ways to do this is to create watch lists for innovations of potential usefulness to the Forces. Many such innovations are described in wellsprings of information, such as patent databases, many of which are used for many purposes, among them to decrease visibility by bending light around objects. As explained by Bruce Barcott in “Invisible, Inc.,” the problem with these technologies is how to make them work. According to Shelley Risk, Director of Policy Research Professor Emeritus at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, and 16 percent are laggards who resist adopting the innovation for the longest time. The majority, 34 percent are members of the late majority, 34 percent form the early adopters, 34 percent become early adopters, 34 percent form the early majority, 34 percent are members of the late major- 90 percent are laggards who resist adopting the innovation for the longest time.

Robert Jay Glickman, PhD, is a Professor Emeritus in the Department of Spanish and Portuguese, University of Toronto. Building upon his experience in the U.S. Army’s Counter-Intelligence Corps, Professor Glickman has researched and written on political, sociological, and military issues in the Americas, and has done research on knowledge acquisition, transfer, and utilization in multidisciplinary environments.

NOTES

1 Thomas Mann (1875-1955) was a German novelist, short story writer, social critic, philanthropist, and essayist who was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1929. In the 1930s, he attacked the concepts of National Socialism and the practices of its supporters. After Hitler came to power, Mann took refuge in the United States. The Magic Mountain (Berlin: Fischer, 1924) was first translated into English by Helen Tracy Lowe-Porter and published by Knopf (New York, 1928).

2 Benjamin R. Barber, Consumed: How Markets Corrupt Children, Infantilize Adults, and Swallow Citizens Whole (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008), p. 98. In this book, Barber, a renowned U.S. author who has advised political leaders in the United States and abroad, portrays a global economy that no longer aims to manufacture goods, but primarily to manufacture needs.

3 Nanotechnology is used for many purposes, among them to decrease the visibility of potential military targets through the design of specially made fabrics which decrease visibility by bending light around objects. As explained by Bruce Barcott in “Invisible, Inc.,” these fabrics, called metamaterials, “…interact with light to produce what’s known as a negative index of refraction,” in The Atlantic 308 (July/August 2011): p. 84.


8 Ibid., p. iii.

9 The nature of the dynamic relationships at play between these factors can be examined by application of the Neo-Institutional Framework, a tool effectively used especially in political science. It facilitates an understanding of the causes and consequences of policy evolution, helps to identify complex elements of the decision-making process, and identifies where and how influential power sources exert their weight on policy change over time.


12 In “Dual Texture – U.S. Army Digital Camouflage,” Guy Cramer describes O’Neill (U.S. Army, Retired) as “the father of digital camouflage,” at http://www.uniteddynamics.com/dual- texture/, accessed 15 November 2012. Dual-Tex is a computer-designed pixilation system used to create macro and micro patterns for camouflage. In the 1990s, O’Neill was instrumental in designing CADPAT (Canadian Disruptive Pattern), which was officially adopted as the standard Canadian Army camouflage pattern in 1997.
Valuations and critiques of Canada’s national search and rescue system—or portions thereof—continue to appear with an almost predictable regularity. Offerings in recent years have included a May 2009 audit of the fixed-wing search and rescue (SAR) aircraft project by DND’s Chief Review Services (CRS), an April 2009 Summative Evaluation of the Contribution to the Civil Air Search and Rescue Association (CASARA), also from CRS, the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence study of SAR response times, the 2011 report on Arctic sovereignty and security by the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, and two refreshingly blunt National Research Council reports on the Statement of Operational Requirement for the fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft. Other contributions to the expanding literature have included Search and Replace: The Case for a Made-in-Canada Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue Fleet by Michael Byers and Stewart Webb (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and the Rideau Institute, June 2012) and, most recently, the Spring 2013 report from the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) of Canada.

Tabled on 30 April 2013, the OAG audit examined whether “federal organizations are ready to respond to incidents that require search and rescue, have implemented prevention activities to reduce the number and severity of such incidents, and adequately administer search and rescue activities. We examined federal organizations’ state of readiness to respond to such incidents, and whether human resources, equipment, and information technology systems are in place to respond.” The audit “focused on federal support to marine and air search and rescue activities” and included the relevant functions of “National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard, and Transport Canada. We did not audit provincial and municipal search and rescue activities, nor did we examine search and rescue activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.”

“Overall,” the OAG found that “federal search and rescue activities have met established minimum standards of readiness to respond when people in distress need assistance. However, two factors present significant risks to readiness: the continued availability of sufficient numbers of trained [SAR] personnel, and the maintenance of aging equipment. Significant improvements are needed if the Canadian [Armed – ed] Forces and the Canadian
Coast Guard are to continue to adequately respond and provide the necessary personnel, equipment, and information systems to deliver SAR activities effectively.” While the “Canadian [Armed] Forces and the Canadian Coast Guard adequately respond to air and marine SAR incidents,” argued the report, ongoing “staffing and training challenges are impacting the sustainability of SAR operations. SAR activities have also been affected by the Royal Canadian Air Force’s continued use of older airplanes that require extensive maintenance and of helicopters that are either insufficient in number or less capable of responding to incidents.” In addition, “the information management system used to manage search and rescue cases does not adequately support operational requirements and is nearing its breaking point. System failures, such as the one experienced in 2009, could delay responding to an incident. A replacement system is not expected until 2015-16, and National Defence does not have a plan to address this gap.” Although the audit team concluded that the SAR “roles and responsibilities are clear at the operational level for the Canadian [Armed] Forces and the Canadian Coast Guard, the departments do not have a common set of principles for coordinating with other levels of government on national matters. In addition, the National Search and Rescue Secretariat [NSS] has not implemented its 1986 mandate to establish a national policy framework, nor does it have the ability to measure overall federal program performance.”

On readiness, the OAG noted that “the minimum state of readiness for Air Force rescue squadrons as measured by reaction time is to have the tasked assets depart within 30 minutes, from Monday to Friday between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., and within two hours on evenings and weekends” but took note of a 2012 military study that concluded that “the current state of readiness does not reflect the busy periods of commercial fishing and recreational activity.” The OAG’s own audit “found that, without increasing the number of hours worked, shifting the regular weekly schedules could have increased readiness for SAR alerts by 9 percent in the Victoria SAR region, 32 percent in the Trenton region, and marginal amounts in the Halifax region.” It also found that the military “does not regularly review whether its states of readiness are still appropriate to meet expected needs” and that “current readiness standards were set using the resources available rather than a needs analysis.” The OAG recommended that “National Defence should systematically analyze its search and rescue data, including its states of readiness, so that its provision of service is based on current and anticipated SAR needs.” DND’s in-report response agreed with this recommendation, stating that it “will review its approach to ensure that it captures and systematically analyzes data and, through [Defence Research and Development Canada], will continue to examine the performance of [RCAF SAR] assets in order to ensure that SAR response meets the aeronautical and maritime SAR needs of Canadians…” DND’s response also posited that “the recently initiated National Defence/Canadian Forces and Fisheries and Oceans/Canadian Coast Guard Search and Rescue Operational Governance Committee will improve on the analysis and annual report of aeronautical and maritime SAR incidents…so that provision of services continues to be based on current and anticipated aeronautical and maritime needs.”
On the nettlesome question of human resources, the OAG expressed concern over shortages of SAR personnel, including pilots, flight engineers and Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) air controllers and assistant air controllers, the loss of experienced personnel (thereby placing “more pressure…upon less experienced [aircrews]”), and difficulties—including a shortage of aircraft—in training SAR aircrew. The OAG recommended that DND “should assign a sufficient number of [SAR] personnel to continue to meet operational needs and provide for the necessary training, professional development, and leave of search and rescue personnel.” In its response, DND reported that the RCAF “currently staffs its [SAR] squadrons to 100 percent of the target personnel levels and will continue to ensure that SAR services are delivered effectively. National Defence will continue its assessment of relevant policies and their applications in relation to SAR squadrons’ staffing levels, and will determine options to address any identified concerns.” A sceptic might note, however, that determining options is no guarantee that any those options will actually be implemented.

On the materiel side of the SAR ledger, the OAG took note of recent improvements in the availability rate of the 14-strong CH-149 Cormorant fleet, but cautioned that “corrosion from salt water is increasing maintenance needs, with at least two helicopters always in maintenance”. The report added that the Cormorants once assigned to CFB Trenton had been replaced by CH-146 Griffons on a “temporary basis”—what a marvelously elastic term!—but faulted the Griffon for its modest size and range and lack of de-icing. The OAG noted that the CC-130 Hercules, the backbone of the fixed-wing SAR fleet, lacked “the sensors and data management systems found on modern SAR [aircraft]” and confronted increasing availability issues. Its stable mate, the CC-115 Buffalo, was likewise criticized for age-related availability issues. The OAG report recommended that DND “should give priority to the acquisition of new aircraft that are best suited for search and rescue activities and ensure that it has sufficient numbers of these aircraft resources to meet [SAR] needs on an ongoing basis.” DND’s response agreed with this recommendation, adding that contract award for the new fixed-wing SAR aircraft was “expected” in 2014-2015, that the Cormorant had flown “a record number of hours in 2012”, and that the Griffon fleet “has undergone enhancements, which are allowing it to provide a more robust SAR capability.”

On governance, the OAG’s report examined “whether the government has developed a [SAR] policy and whether there is an appropriate governance structure to plan, coordinate, monitor, analyze, and report on current and future SAR activities and needs.” The results were not encouraging. “In spite of the many reports and recommendations” over the years for “a national SAR policy, we found that there is still no such policy nor an overall federal policy, planning framework, clear statement of expectations for federal SAR services, or ability to measure overall federal SAR effectiveness. The national SAR system involves federal, provincial, and territorial organizations, so the development of a policy
framework would need to include all of these stakeholders. The National Search and Rescue Secretariat (NSS) has made efforts over the years to establish a policy and governance framework, but it has not been successful.” In the absence of a policy “to articulate federal priorities and performance expectations for [SAR], the Canadian Forces and the Canadian Coast Guard each set their own priorities and make their resource allocation, delivery, and procurement decisions.” The OAG also reported that there was no “national performance measurement framework”, even though “the NSS was given responsibility to develop” such a framework. The OAG consequently recommended that “National Defence, in consultation with Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Transport Canada, and other federal departments, and the provinces and territories, should take steps to improve the governance structure, including developing objectives, performance indicators, and reporting that would enhance [SAR] service and coordination.”

DND agreed, stating that “effective governance and coordination among federal departments and with provinces and territories is essential”, and noting that the “recently initiated National Defence/Canadian Forces and Fisheries and Oceans/Canadian Coast Guard Search and Rescue Operational Governance Committee will work to enhance coordination of their respective federal responsibilities for aeronautical and maritime SAR activities. This, in turn, will assist overall coordination. Furthermore, National Defence/Canadian [Armed] Forces, with the support of relevant federal departments, will assess the SAR governance structure at the federal level to determine whether it is optimally designed to effectively execute the SAR mandate across departments and to ensure appropriate coordination with federal-provincial and other responders.”

On 2 May 2013, soon after the tabling of the OAG report—and certainly no coincidence—then-defence minister Peter MacKay announced a six-point plan “to improve Canada’s national Search and Rescue System.” The package included a quadrennial review of SAR to be “led by the Minister of National Defence as and how we can work together to ensure those needs are met.” Other elements included the “seasonal optimization” of SAR readiness postures (i.e., “expanded” search and rescue “posture shifts to maintain flexibility to seasons, which already exists during the lobster harvest and Northern activity peak-periods”), an improved SAR asset management system whereby “bases will improve the management and tracking of assets to proactively inform Joint Rescue Coordination Centres of equipment status”, and $16.2 million for the development of satellite-aided search and rescue (i.e., the Medium Earth Orbit Search and Rescue (MEOSAR) and Low Earth Orbit Search and Rescue (LEOSAR) satellite projects “to improve real-time situational awareness and improved vessel tracking.”

Rounding out the package were the completion of the renovated Joint Rescue Coordination Centre in Halifax and a “revamped and improved beacon registration and information website for Canadians.” The minister also noted, in a seemingly deft political touch that went essentially unnoticed, that “as part of this exercise, savings and efficiencies in the Department of National Defence, including some of the funds currently allocated to supporting the [CC-144 Challenger Administrative Flight Service] fleet, will be re-allocated to frontline priorities that include search and rescue as a no fail mission for the Canadian Armed Forces.” The following weeks witnessed still further pronouncements on SAR, ranging from the approval of $955,828 (via the SAR New Initiatives Fund) to help equip the Newfoundland and Labrador Search and Rescue Association with a Standardized Radio Real Time Tracking System to a $15 million contract to Kelowna Flightcraft for depot-level maintenance on the CC-115 Buffalo and CC-138 Twin Otter (although the latter is not a primary SAR asset). It was also reported that defence minister MacKay had directed DND to take a second look at whether some of the nine surplus American VH-71 presidential helicopters—originally acquired as a source of spares for the Cormorant—could be made operational for the SAR role.
The OAG’s Spring 2013 audit of search and rescue correctly focused upon readiness, human resources, materiel resources, information management and technology, prevention activities and governance. It also offered up some useful findings and recommendations. That said, the omission of provincial and municipal, and RCMP, search and rescue activities—although not surprising, given the focus on “federal support to marine and air” SAR activities and the potential for jurisdictional challenges over audits related to provincial and municipal SAR activities—was unfortunate, given the resulting inability to offer thoughtful analysis of the burgeoning and increasingly contentious issues associated with ground SAR (or incidents on ice where the distinction between land and marine SAR is blurred). On air and marine SAR, additional references to the roles of the volunteer sector, the private sector (which, does, after all, maintain the Cormorant fleet and would be affected by changes in the readiness posture) and secondary and tertiary military SAR assets, would have helped to produce a more holistic analysis. Some observers also would have welcomed a report with additional ‘bite,’ and point to the report’s comparatively mild critiques of the Cormorant, Griffon, Hercules and Buffalo. The report, for example, only flags sensor and data management deficiencies in the case of the Hercules, when in fact, all four types suffer, to varying degrees, from such weaknesses.

The governance component of the OAG’s report, although well-written, also has drawn attention for its comparatively modest length (the report devotes more space to prevention activities and emergency beacons than governance, even though one could argue that deficiencies in governance have for decades been at the root of Canada’s search and rescue problems) and for its comparatively mild recommendation on governance. Did DND’s unveiling of a new National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces and Fisheries and Oceans/Coast Guard Search and Rescue Operational Governance Committee (about which little is known publicly) to enhance coordination on aeronautical and maritime SAR—and the pledge that “National Defence/Canadian [Armed] Forces, with the support of relevant federal departments, will assess the SAR governance structure at the federal level to determine whether it is optimally designed to effectively execute the SAR mandate across departments and to ensure appropriate coordination with federal-provincial and other responders”—subtly fuel a belief in the OAG that improvements in SAR governance were proceeding apace, and thus less in need of a strong jolt from the report? Also intriguing is the degree to which the governance component critiqued the tiny National Search and Rescue Secretariat. Those criticisms are technically correct, but it would have been helpful to fully acknowledge that the NSS has consistently lacked the structure, authority and resources to fulfill its stated mandate.

DND’s in-report responses to the OAG’s recommendations consistently expressed agreement—given the evidence and recommendations there was little else that DND could do—but the expertly-crafted responses left abundant quantities of ‘wiggle room,’ and tended, with some exceptions, to be short on potentially troublesome specifics. Then defence-minister Peter MacKay made some useful points in his announcements of 2 May 2013 and
subsequently, but his six-point improvement package tended to be seen as a rather thin gruel. A Toronto Star editorial, for example, argued that the minister had only “danced around the edges of the [SAR] problem.” Certainly the quadrennial review, arguably the flagship of the package, would have been a more useful exercise had the timeline for consultation, research and writing not been so breathtakingly compressed. The then-minister also found himself taken to task, by a number of observers, for his perceived attempt to ‘pass the buck’ to other government departments for the seemingly unending delays in the fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft project.

Where does this leave us? The OAG’s report offered some useful findings and recommendations which, if followed up in a thorough and prompt manner, should materially improve the state of search and rescue in Canada. That said, the range of issues and challenges explored by the OAG—be they related to readiness, human resources, materiel resources, information management and technology, prevention activities or governance—is enormous and clearly cannot be resolved overnight. The new fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft, for example, now appears to be progressing, but no one should breathe easier on this file until operational aircraft start surfacing at squadron level. Similarly, in a heavily stovepiped and bureaucratized environment with an expanding array of stakeholders, governance alone continues to present profound challenges. Although DND promised action on the governance front, one cannot help but wonder if a Cabinet-directed review, a comprehensive and thoroughly holistic review, of the national search and rescue system—a latter-day version of the Cross Report of 1982—might still represent the best way forward.

Martin Shadwick teaches Canadian defence policy at York University. He is a former editor of Canadian Defence Quarterly, and the resident Defence Commentator for the Canadian Military Journal.
BOOK REVIEWS

by Sam McBride
Granville Island Publishing
Vancouver, 2012
210 pages, $24.95
ISBN: 978-1-926991-10-8
Reviewed by Jurgen Duewel

I must admit my first reaction on seeing this book on my desk was to question myself, Fritz who? After all, anyone named Fritz Peters sounds more like someone who served on the German side. However, as it turns out, nothing could be further from the truth. Fritz was born in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island in 1889. His ancestors were United Empire Loyalists who moved to Canada after the American Revolution. Unfortunately, even after reading the book, the reader will know more about Fritz’s family than about Fritz himself. The author attempts to compensate for this lack of historical data with respect to Fritz and his exploits by relying quite heavily upon letters that were written by Fritz to and from his family. As a consequence, the book is quite short, and it tends to make for uneven reading.

The primary reason that not much is known about Fritz is that he spent most of his adult life outside Canada. He joined the Royal Navy (RN) in 1905, and his combat exploits are impressive. During the First World War, he was decorated for bravery in the Battle of Dogger Bank. In 1915, he was given command of a destroyer, and was mentioned in dispatches for bravery in rescuing survivors at sea. (Peters was also awarded a total of two Distinguished Service Crosses and the Distinguished Service Order for gallantry during the First World War – Ed.). The author does a commendable job in painting a picture of this man who would be unrecognizable to most Canadians today. Undoubtedly brave, he was, however, ‘more British than the British.’ One cannot help but note the following passage in his letter to his mother after the death of his brother in the trenches: “It is the price of Empire, I pray God I fall in the same manner with my face to the enemy.” In another example, as written to his sister: “There is only one thing—the King and Empire.” It was not surprising to learn that Fritz developed a ‘mid-Atlantic’ dialect, something that would have garnered him only scorn if he had served in the Royal Canadian Navy. Alas, the feeling would have been mutual, as Fritz was openly hostile to western Canadians, believing them to be more like Americans than Canadians, at least in accordance with his definition of a true Canadian (i.e., British-Canadian).

As stated earlier, Fritz’s bravery was never in question. During the Second World War, by which time he should have been retired, he led the naval assault on Oran Harbour in Algeria. He was badly wounded in this action and was awarded the Victoria Cross and the American Distinguished Service Cross or his gallantry in action. Unfortunately he would never receive this medal in person, as he was killed when the aircraft in which he was being transported crashed in the approaches to Plymouth harbour on his return to England after the battle.

McBride’s telling of the story of Fritz Peters, to whom he is distantly related, suffers from a lack of research material. It is not surprising that so little is known about Peters in Canada, in that his exploits were carried out in British uniform, as opposed to other Canadian VC recipients, such as Lieutenant (N) Hampton Grey. Finally, the book’s publisher has not done ‘the best job’ of editing. There are a number of editorial errors contained within, including the carrying over of words from a previous chapter into the following chapter.

Fritz Peters is someone of whom Canadians should probably know more. My guess is that if Fritz had been a little more ‘Canadian,’ we probably would know more about him.

Lieutenant-Commander (ret’d) Jurgen Duewel, CD, MA, PhD, was a Maritime Surface Officer on staff at the Canadian Defence Academy in Kingston until the summer of 2013. He recently completed a doctorate in Educational Leadership.

Behavioural Conflict – Why Understanding People and their Motivations will Prove Decisive to Future Conflict
by Major General Andrew Mackay (ret’d), and Commander Steve Tatham
220 pages, $29.95
ISBN 13-978-1-73039-468-8
Reviewed by Rita LePage

Behavioural Conflict is written by two, seasoned British military officers – Army Major General Andrew Mackay, who commanded 52 Brigade in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, and Navy Commander Steve Tatham, PhD, CO of 15 PSYOPS Group, and it is based on their work in preparing 52 Brigade to deploy – specifically in the area of influence operations. While the authors discuss previous conflicts, from the Balkans in the 1990s, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, and Gaza, to the Iraq war, 52 Brigade’s ISAF deployment is the case study upon which the book revolves.
The authors describe how they addressed 52 Brigade’s pre-deployment training in subject areas that received little attention in previous deployments – influence operations. The reality that their soldiers had little understanding of the culture into which they were deploying – and therefore were inadequately equipped to understand and predict let alone influence behaviours – drove the requirement for enhanced training in the areas of social psychology, anthropology, and behavioural economics.

Mackay and Tatham collaborated to do extensive Target Audience Analysis (TAA) of the local population with which their soldiers would interact. The goal was to understand the population as a group – not simply to understand attitudes, but to understand motivation, ultimately seeking to design a campaign with the goal of changing behaviour. The behaviour they sought to change was anything negatively impacting the mission while reinforcing positive behaviour. An important part of the campaign design was to delegate to the lowest level, the soldier, the ability to apply influence based on events, activities, sentiment, and circumstances at play at the time.

The book presents statistics which suggest significant success. Using TAA as the basis for understanding societal motivation towards behavioural change, 52 Brigade, during its deployment, suffered 13 killed in action – .16 percent deaths in relation to the size of its deployment. This is then compared with the percentage of deaths in UK deployments in the same area of responsibility before and after 52 Brigade which experienced .73 percent, .25 percent, .43 percent, .30 percent, and .38 percent fatal casualties respectively. 52 Brigade suffered half the deaths of some deployments, and as much as four times fewer deaths than others.

US General Stanley McChrystal, in the Foreword to the book writes, “…most counterinsurgency is local. Andrew Mackay and Steve Tatham never lose sight of this in their study on the role of individual motivation and behaviour in conflict …In war, they have seen what it takes to alter behaviour up close – and it shows.”

The Canadian Armed Forces lag behind many (if not all) our closest allies in the development of a capability which, in conflicts such as Afghanistan, seeks to bring influence to the forefront of campaign planning and execution. While nations such as the UK, US, Germany, Denmark, France and others, as well as NATO, have invested considerable resources into the development and implementation of Influence and Strategic Communication (StratCom) – think of it as “operations in the information environment” – the CAF has done little forces-wide to study, adapt, and adopt the concept. There are pockets of activity. The Influence Activities Task Force (IATF) at Land Force Doctrine and Training System Headquarters (LFDTS HQ) in Kingston, Ontario, stands out as a leading initiative in this emerging area of operations, but throughout the CAF the concept is little known, and even less studied.

Every CAF member should get interested, and quickly, and to this end, I highly recommend Behavioural Conflict. The book explores an important element of modern conflict: that the extant practice of influence activities in particular and StratCom more generally being a second thought, an add-on, to kinetic operations, might be ‘getting the whole thing wrong.’ Mackay and Tatham make a credible argument for influence-led operations, of which kinetic operations are only a part.

And the CAF should take notice.

Lieutenant-Colonel LePage is the Director of Public Affairs Operations (Military Strategic Communication) at ADM(PA), NDHQ, and has spent the past three years developing NATO’s Strategic Communication capability at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

---

**The Insurgents – David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War**

*by Fred Kaplan*

*New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013*

*418 pages, $32.00*

**Reviewed by Alain Cohen**

Thirty years after chronicling the development of US nuclear strategy in The Wizards of Armageddon, Fred Kaplan has published a gripping tale about the makers of the latest revolution in warfare. This is the story of the ‘COInDinistas,’ the rebellious vanguard of officers and civilians who steered the US military towards adopting a different method of fighting their asymmetrical enemies.

In other words, The Insurgents is the story of the wizards of less than Armageddon.

The story of how the US military was unstuck from its conventional mindset over the last decade of war begins with John Nagl, an Armored Cavalry officer who had fought in Desert Storm and then gone to Oxford to obtain his PhD. His dissertation, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, compared the US Army’s campaign in Vietnam to the British Army’s in Malaya, on the premise that failure in the first case, and success in the second, was predicated upon each army’s ability to learn and to adapt. Given Nagl’s junior rank and age, he is cast as the unlikely agent provocateur at the center of the struggle to transform the US military into a ‘Learning Organization.’
A triumvirate of revolutionary officers – mentors and protégés – emerges from Mr. Kaplan’s book through the stories of Generals John Galvin, David Petraeus and Lieutenant-Colonel Nagl. All are spawned from WestPoint’s elitist incubator of critical thinking, the Social Sciences Department. (From within it, added to this bold trio of soldier-scholars are a cast of characters familiar to the observer of military affairs: Influential generals like Pete Chiarelli, Jack Keane, Ray Odierno and H.R. McMaster; military advisors like Kalev Sepp and David Kilcullen; and academics like Conrad Crane, Sarah Sewall, and Fred Kagan.)

The Insurgents is written in clear and rapid prose. Mr. Kaplan provides a digestible overview of the development of counterinsurgency doctrine culminating in a joint US Army and Marine Corps field manual (FM 3-24). As can be expected from an author-analyst of Mr. Kaplan’s caliber – the Slate Magazine columnist holds a PhD from MIT – the text is insightful and highly informative. Perhaps most interesting are the ‘golden nuggets’ that his research provides, such as the following long lost observation a clairvoyant David Petraeus had made in a 1986 article: “We in the military…tend to invent for ourselves a comfortable vision of war…one that fits our plans, our assumptions, our hopes, and our preconceived ideas. We arrange in our minds a war we can comprehend on our own terms, usually with an enemy who looks like us and acts like us.”

Much of the book is devoted to chronicling the chain of blunders that led up to and followed the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. While offering fresh insights, Mr. Kaplan follows a similar narrative to the excellent works by veteran journalist Tom Ricks (Fiasco and The Gamble) and by Greg Jaffe and David Cloud (The Fourth Star). In some ways, Mr. Kaplan has written a sequel to these, critically describing the Stanley McChrystal and Petraeus years in command in Afghanistan from 2009 through 2011.

Despite the book’s subtitle, General Petraeus is not the centerpiece of Mr. Kaplan’s work. The analysis of the general’s time in Afghanistan is facile at times. The author seems intent upon finding the fundamental flaw, the big contradiction, to NATO’s approach in the Kingdom of Insolence, despite being a firm believer in the theory underpinning the counterinsurgency doctrine employed by McChrystal and Petraeus. The main flaw in Mr. Kaplan’s final analysis is structural. Despite his understanding of the distinctions between policy, doctrine, and strategy, these seem to be deliberately confounded at times to set the stage for critique. The result is a condemnation of counterinsurgency doctrine on the basis of errors in policy and strategy.

Mr. Kaplan ‘holds his biggest punches’ until the very final chapter. His main argument against the employment of counterinsurgency doctrine is that the intellectual revolution overextended itself, turning the doctrine into a dogma that was blindly and sometimes irresponsibly applied. Regrettably, however, Mr. Kaplan only skims some of the important issues that must be dealt with in a work of this scope. He does not challenge, for instance, the artificially dichotomized distinction between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Nevertheless, Mr. Kaplan gets many of the big ideas right. After years of hard slugging, he comments, “…the American Army had evolved into a different institution. It was more flexible, more adaptive; it was, in John Nagl’s phrase, a “learning organization.””

The timeliness of Mr. Kaplan’s book cannot be overemphasized. As the US Army and Marine Corps prepare to issue a revised edition of FM 3-24, one hopes that it will be further refined to make clear that waging a counterinsurgency campaign is not a guarantor of victory, but only an enabler of statecraft, affording time and space for politico-economic progress to take place within the security bubble it provides, albeit at a high price.

Current events demonstrate that the resurgence of small wars by proxy in a multi-polar environment is at least as likely to occur as force-on-force clashes. Special Forces and conventional expeditionary forces ought to be prepared to accomplish a full-spectrum of missions – from diplomacy-driven advisory roles to rapid interventions in support or in defiance of teetering regimes. Hence, a relevant counterinsurgency doctrine will remain one important tool amongst others in a military toolbox that will continue to see use even in the wake of the Iraq and Afghan wars.

A 1983 Foreign Affairs review of Mr. Kaplan’s first major publication, The Wizards of Armageddon, notes: “The story of the remarkable civilians who developed the novel field of nuclear strategy…is told admirably well. Even those who are familiar with this story will find fascinating new details here…An absorbing work which is more scholarly and less sensational than the title implies.” This time around, The Insurgents has the merit of being equally absorbing, but no more scholarly than and just as sensational as its title implies. (That is not a bad thing.) Whether you agree with some or all of Mr. Kaplan’s objections to the latest revolution in warfare, this book will make you think.

Major A.A. Cohen is a Reserve Force infantry officer with the Fusiliers Mont-Royal in Montréal. He is the author of Galula (Præger, New York, 2012).
This publication is an expanded edition of the author’s 1999 book A Call to Arms: The Organization and Administration of Canada’s Military in World War One. This was not a narrative history of our nation’s wartime effort. Rather, it outlined, in considerable detail, the organizational structure of the arms and services of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) and the method by which they were sustained in the field. The best description of this work is that it is the equivalent of a staff officer’s handbook on the organization and operation of the CEF in the field. Based upon constructive feedback and additional research, the author, who is an acknowledged amateur authority on the history of the Canadian Army in the Great War, revised the original work and expanded it with enough new information to warrant a second volume.

These changes have made A Nation in Making into a comprehensive examination of the organization principles of the army, the conduct of recruiting, home defence, the operation of detention camps, mobilization, training, and organization of the army. It also examines the naval and air services, Canadian service with Imperial formations and forces (Royal Navy, British Army and the Royal Air Force and its antecedents), assistance to allied forces, the auxiliary military services, and civilian support organizations and initiatives. Several appendices also provide additional useful information, including a summary of military operations, medals, and decorations to the CEF, full-colour reproductions of formation insignia and patches, details on dress, weapons, and equipment, demobilization procedures, and a dictionary of trench slang. Any entry in these two volumes will leave readers with an appreciation of how things were done in units and formations as opposed to the specific stories of campaigns and battles.

A good example to illustrate this point exists in Chapter 21, which examines artillery and trench mortars. The Great War was noteworthy for changes in the command and employment of artillery, which also modified the role that corps and army headquarters played in operations. The author illustrates the evolution of Canadian artillery units, with reference to detailed charts and tables depicting the structural history of the Canadian Corps artillery. Critical to the operation of this combat arm was the support provided by the army service corps, which maintained several ammunition columns, oversaw the ammunition parks, and played a role in the movement of the guns, either by using horses or mechanical transport. Indeed, the logistical aspects of this large artillery organization are a fascinating topic that is very well covered. This chapter, like many of the others, uses numerous tables to depict additional detail, such as the technical characteristics of ordnance, ammunition stocks per gun, recruitment areas of each battery, and the ammunition columns. Other charts depict the communication from forward observers to the guns or mortars. The detail provided is impressive and all the other combat arms are presented in a similar manner.

Unfortunately, this is not the case for the Canadian Naval Service and the Canadian air services. Both topics are dealt with far too briefly; the growth of the navy itself was noteworthy as it expanded from almost nothing in 1914, to operating, almost four years later, nearly 200 vessels, a naval college, a wireless service responsible for 200 stations, two dockyard facilities, and various store depots. It had also begun forming a naval air service. In the author’s defence, however, documentation on the organization history of the Royal Canadian Navy or the air services during this period may be difficult, if not impossible, to locate.

Readers may also criticize the lack of notes. However, the extensive bibliography reveals the great number of manuals, published reports, and secondary sources consulted in the preparation of this study. Having prepared a similar, albeit less comprehensive examination of army formations in the Second World War, I can attest to the difficulty of citing the sources for every organization diagram, chart, or description.

Regardless of the lack of attention given to naval and air topics, A Nation in Making is an impressive reference work. No other single published work or Internet source offers the level of detail with respect to the organizational history of the Canadian services in the First World War as that which is presented in these two volumes, making it a work that Great War historians and students operational and sustainment doctrine during the Great War will find useful well into the future.

Major Grodzinski, CD, PhD, is an armoured officer and assistant professor of history at the Royal Military College of Canada. Although his primary interest rests with 18th and 19th Century conflicts, he does, from time to time, venture into contemporary history.