



Brazilian and European Perspectives on the Global Security Order

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Abstract

In his statement the author presents three theses and goes on to substantiate them. He argues that the US “pivot” to Asia is, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future, the most important power shift in international affairs, destined to also shape the global security order. Combating threats identified by the European Union in 2003 and 2008 remain a common challenge no less for the BRICS states and the international community of states. The 6th EU-Brazil Summit held in Brasilia in January 2013 may stimulate a new level of cooperation between these strategic partners.

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ANALYSIS

Preliminary Remarks

Excellencies,
Distinguished Colleagues,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, I should like to thank Director Dane, the representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Brazil, for inviting me to this high-level conference in Rio de Janeiro. It is always a great pleasure for me to return to this Cidade Maravilhosa.

Sitting in Panel 1, “Brazilian and European Perspectives on the Global Security Order” my statement shall focus on three questions and three theses:

1. What are the Main Elements of the Global Security Order and are they Suitable for the 21st Century?

Thesis: Although we observe the rise of new powerful state actors – such as the BRICS states – the US “pivot” to Asia is, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future, the most important power shift in international affairs, destined to also shape the global security order.

A cursory glance at the international security landscape shows important power shifts in international affairs, an acceleration of globalization dynamics, the spread of modern information technologies and a diversification of powerful actors in world politics.

We have been observing the steady rise of new powerful state actors, such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – the so-called BRICS-states. I contend, however, that the most important strategic shift since the Cold War was initiated when U.S. President Barack Obama announced the strategic ‘pivot’ to Asia in November 2011.¹ This decision was based on the assessment that the geopolitical relevance of Asia has grown considerably. Clearly, it has been the rise of China as a major Asia-Pacific and world power that is the driving force behind U.S. initiatives. In this context the US will deploy the majority of overseas naval and air forces to the Asia-Pacific region.

Similarly, NATO, an important anchor in the Global Security Order, is turning its attention to the Asia-Pacific region. After his return from South Korea and Japan in April this year (2013), Mr. Rasmussen, NATO’s Secretary General, pointed out in a press conference in Brussels that NATO’s partnerships with Japan and South Korea is a key aspect in facing security challenges and insuring stability in the region.²

¹ „Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing Toward Asia”, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, March 28, 2012, www.fas.org/spp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf

See also: Ralph D. Thiele, “Strategic Shift Towards Asia – A European Perspective”, in: International Relations and Security Network (ISN), Center for Security Studies (CSS), April 2013, ETH Zurich, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail?id=163380>

² Monthly press conference by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, April 19, 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-06773672-E7BAEBA7/natolive/opinions_99749.htm



Furthermore, in their *Guidelines on the EU's Foreign Policy in East Asia* of June 2012 the Council of the European Union emphasized its strong interests in the Asia-Pacific region.³

In addition to these “tectonic” developments the security landscape is very much influenced by two “game changers”: the global economic and financial crisis of 2008 and developments in North Africa and the Middle East - the so-called “Arab Spring” or “Arab Awakening”.⁴

The challenges to our security are rapidly shifting. Evidently, conflicts *between* states are continuously on the wane, whereas *internal* conflicts dividing societies within countries, for example, in fragile or failed states, are becoming increasingly common.

New players, such as the BRICS states make vital contributions to crisis prevention, conflict settlement and post-conflict peacebuilding. Together with these latter and their regional organizations, the EU and NATO can build a broad and robust global security and crisis management architecture fit for the future.

Besides stabilizing factors in the global security order, such as NATO and the EU, the United Nations, OSCE, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund etc. still play an important role; but we all know how difficult it is for the UN Security Council to speak with one voice, blocking necessary decisions to stabilize the global security order.

The refusal of the Saudi government on October 18 to accept a rotating seat on the U.N. Security Council, which pointed out that the Council was incapable of ending wars and resolving conflicts, makes it very clear that the present Global Security Order has to be improved.⁵

2. What are the Main Threats to Global Order and Stability?

Thesis: *Combating threats identified by the European Union in 2003 and 2008 remain as much a common challenge for the BRICS states and the international community of states.*

At its summit meeting in December 2003 the European Council tasked the then EU High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, to draft a European Security Strategy (ESS). Entitled “*A Secure Europe in a Better World*”,⁶ this document analyzes and defines for the first time the EU's security environment, identifying key security challenges and subsequent political implications for the EU.

Five key threats were identified: Terrorism, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Regional Conflicts, State Failure, and Organized Crime.⁷

Four years after the adoption of the European Security Strategy the member states tasked the High Representative at the December 2007 European Council to examine and improve the implementation of the strategy.

³ Council of the European Union, *Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia*, no. 11492/12, General Secretariat, Brussels, 15 June, 2012, http://eeas.europa.eu/asia/docs/guidelines_eu_foreign_sec_pol_east_asia_en.pdf

⁴ Fred Tanner, “Deficiencies in Global Governance and Implications for Defense Education”, in: *CONNECTIONS The Quarterly Journal*, vol. XI, no. 4, fall 2012, p. 1-9.

⁵ AL ARABIYA NEWS, “Saudi Arabia officially rejects U.N. Security Council seat”, November 13, 2013, <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/11/13/Saudi-Arabia-officially-rejects-U-N-Security-Council-seat.html>

⁶ “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/european-security-strategy/>

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3-4.



In 2008, the resulting document confirmed the enduring validity of the 2003 ESS and identified three additional challenges: Cyber Security, Energy Security and Climate Change.⁸

All these risks and challenges continue to be relevant and constitute the focus of the European Union in 2013. We can address these points in greater detail during the discussion.

3. What Common Interests do Emerging and Established Powers Share, and how should they Cooperate?

Thesis: The 6th EU-Brazil Summit held in Brasilia in January 2013 may stimulate a new level of cooperation between these strategic partners.

In 2007 Brazil became a strategic partner of the EU,⁹ and yet, to date cooperation between these partners has unfortunately demonstrated limited results. Nevertheless, for both sides the 6th EU-Brazil Summit held in Brasilia in January 2013 may foster a new impulse for more fruitful cooperation.¹⁰

The global financial crisis and its domino effects, the need for financial recovery and renewed growth in Europe, the global demand for multilateral security initiatives – keeping in mind the US’s growing reluctance to act as a unilateral security provider, and the launch of new regional projects in South America – challenge decision-makers in the EU and in Brazil to enhance cooperation.¹¹

In a tentative political and economic international system they share a number of common objectives which aim to deepen their cooperation in the fields of trade and investments, business, energy and climate, security and conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance and development aid, education, science and technology and regional integration.¹²

It is in such areas that both sides can cooperate. In spite of the fact that the EU is already Brazil’s main trading partner, representing approximately 23 % of its total trade and the country’s biggest foreign investor, there is still ample scope for augmenting the cooperation.¹³

At this year’s summit the EU Commission agreed to sign the Charter of Brasilia, which envisages future trilateral initiatives to support electoral processes in Portuguese-speaking countries.

⁸ Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World –, Brussels, December 11, 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf

⁹ Brazil-European Union Relations, in: Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazil%E2%80%93European_Union_relations

¹⁰ EU-BRAZIL SUMMIT. EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH BRAZIL, European Commission Memo, 18 January 2013 (Brasilia, Brazil, January 24, 2013), Brussels, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-17_en.htm
See also: “Enhancing the Brazil-EU Strategic Partnership: From the Bilateral and Regional to the Global”, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, <http://www.ceps.be/book/enhancing-brazil-eu-strategic-partnership-bilateral-and-regional-global>

¹¹ Elena Lazarou, “The Sixth EU-Brazil Summit: business beyond the usual?”, EUROPEAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS OBSERVATORY (ESP), Policy Brief 8, March 2013, p. 1, <https://www.google.de/#q=ESP+the+sixth+eu-brazil+summit%3A+business+beyond+the+usual%3F>

¹² Ibid, p. 3

¹³ Ibid, p. 3



Following the EU-Brazilian Summit in January 2013, the President of the EU Commission, José Manuel Barroso, opted to strengthen cooperation between Brazil and the EU by formally establishing a high-level dialogue in the form of a working group. The group's aim is to explore industrial cooperation opportunities, focusing on innovative sectors and technology and improving the environment for business and investment. The results constitute the preparatory groundwork for the 7th EU-Brazil Summit in 2014.¹⁴

As an optimist, I am confident that Brazil and the EU will be able to use their strategic partnership not only to deepen their bilateral relations, but will also play an important role in making our planet more secure.

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Remarks: Opinions expressed in this contribution are those of the author.

The present statement was presented by the author at the 10th International Security Conference “Forte de Copacabana” on November 29, 2013 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The conference was organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) and supported by the Delegation of the European Union to Brazil. The “Forte de Copacabana” is designed as a forum for dialogue between Europe and Brazil. It aims to bring together participants from a wide range of professional backgrounds to discuss current security issues of interest on both sides of the Atlantic the goal of which is to foster dialogue and cooperation between Europe and Brazil.

¹⁴ See: “Enhance industrial cooperation with Brazil – w in-win for business on both sides”, European Commission – Memo/13/858, Brussels, 10 October 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-858_en.htm



About the Author of this Issue

Dr. Peter Roell has been president of the Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy (ISPSW) in Berlin since January 2006. His previous appointments were as senior advisor for foreign and security policy at the Permanent Representation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the EU in Brussels. In Germany, Dr. Roell served as director of the Asia-Pacific, Latin America and Africa (Sub-Sahara) branch and at German embassies in the Near and Middle East and in Asia.

Dr. Roell studied sinology and political sciences at the universities of Bonn, Taipei and Heidelberg. He gained his Ph.D. from the Ruprecht-Karls-University in Heidelberg.

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