

CONFLICT TRENDS

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EDITORIAL

BY VASU GOUNDEN

The United Nations (UN) Global Compact Leaders Summit 2013 was held in New York on 19–20 September, as a precursor to the UN General Assembly meetings. The summit reinforced two important truisms about peace in the 21st century: first, there is a crucial peace–development nexus; and second, the triad of government, civil society and the private sector working with each other, or to complement each other, are positioned as the key actors for securing peace and development.

The complexity of the peace–development nexus, as well as the challenges of conflict in this century, are underpinned by the disruptive forces of humanity’s rapid demographic and technological transformations. These forces are vividly exemplified by the tens of thousands of young protesters who were mobilised by civil society for street protests in Cairo through social media, as well as through the insurgents’ live-tweeting of their attack on Nairobi’s Westgate shopping mall. No government can manage the complexities of this century on its own. They need partnerships with civil society and the private sector.

In this regard, the post-2015 development agenda has taken a great leap forward in highlighting the theme of conflict, violence and disaster within the broader agenda of peaceful, just and resilient societies. Civil society representatives have long been advocating for this shift, and will no doubt support its inclusion. For those in the fields of peace and development, there will be little debate on the substance of the recommendations contained in the UN’s Report of the High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda.

However, in the aftermath of the 2011 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-led Libyan intervention, and with the ongoing events in Syria, the most contentious debates will focus on the principles, approaches, financing and implementation of the post-2015 development agenda. On the question of principles, two important criteria will be debated with regard to the post-2015 development agenda. First, how universally applicable will the new goals be? Will the goals apply to all UN member states or will some states be exempt? Second, with what consistency will the

goals be implemented? And again, will some countries be excluded from the firm benchmarks developed?

On the question of approach, two important dimensions will be tested. First, will the new goals, indicators and targets embedded within the post-2015 development agenda be contextualised for the varying development trajectories of specific countries, or will they be uniformly applied to all member states in pursuit of idealised outputs, outcomes and impact indicators? Second, on the specific question of achieving the goal of inclusive governance, will we seek this change through dialogue or through military intervention?

This leads to the question of how to finance these new goals. If we accept that there is a causal link between security and development and, consequently, that insecurity leads to fragility and fragility impedes development, then it must follow that our financial commitment to conflict prevention and peacebuilding should match our investment in development. So, too, if we accept that dialogue leads to more sustainable peace and development, then it must follow that our investment in the instruments of conflict prevention and peacebuilding must match our investment in the instruments of war.

Beyond these crucial debates, and in light of the peace–development nexus, the first step towards successfully implementing the post-2015 development agenda is to emphasise and support the peaceful resolution of disputes. There are three ways to resolve a dispute: we can go to war, we can go to court, or we can engage in dialogue. Every government in the world has a ministry of defence and a ministry of justice. However, except for Nepal, Costa Rica and the Solomon Islands, no other country has a ministry of peace. If we want to achieve sustainable development for all countries in the 21st century, peace must be at the centre of national, regional and global efforts to transform our planet. **A**

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AFRICA'S CONCEPT OF 'UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT' – HOW APPROPRIATE?

BY DIRK KOTZÉ



Introduction

Egypt is the latest example of the African Union's (AU) decision to declare events as an "unconstitutional change of government", and to suspend Egypt's AU membership on 5 July 2013.¹ This is premised on the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007),² which was preceded by the Algiers Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (1999) and the Lomé Declaration for an Organization of African Unity (OAU) Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (2002). At present, four AU members are suspended for the same reason: Madagascar, Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Egypt. However, the regime changes in 2011 in Tunisia and Egypt, and in 2012 in Mali, were not treated in the same fashion – regardless of the fact that the changes which occurred did not follow a constitutional route. One of the pertinent questions, therefore, is: in the case of Egypt, what were the significant differences between the developments in

2011 and in 2013, and did the AU's response in terms of the African Charter provide an effective diplomatic instrument to approach or resolve such situations?

Constitutionalism Versus Legitimacy

The African Charter identifies five actions as unconstitutional changes of government. The first three are forms of armed intervention – namely a *putsch* or *coup d'état* against a democratically elected government, any intervention by mercenaries to replace such a government,

Above: The African Charter considers three forms of armed intervention – namely a *coup d'état* against a democratically elected government, any intervention by mercenaries to replace such a government, or any replacement of such a government by armed dissidents or rebels – as unconstitutional change of government.



Former Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo attends a confirmation of charges hearing in his pre-trial at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Gbagbo is charged with crimes against humanity committed during the 2011 civil war sparked by his refusal to accept the election victory of rival Alassane Ouattara (19 February 2013).

or any replacement of such a government by armed dissidents or rebels. The fourth possibility is a refusal to accept the results of a legitimate election, and refusal by an incumbent government to hand over power to the winning party or candidate. Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo's refusal in 2010/11 to accept his defeat is such an example. Fifth, constitutional or legal manipulation – such as an attempt to eliminate competition by disqualifying candidates or to extend the presidential term of office to a third term – is also considered as unconstitutional. This moral or legal regime of the AU has a number of implications.

The first implication is that it applies only to developments *after* 2007. Therefore, the regimes of presidents who were rebel leaders when they assumed power, like Uganda's Yoweri Museveni or Rwanda's Paul Kagame, are not affected by it. The African Charter's Article 25 uses the principle of lustration to disqualify the perpetrators of an unconstitutional change from participating in any subsequent elections or to hold public office in any state institution. However, coup leaders who had won presidential elections before 2007 are still today incumbent heads of state. Accordingly, it creates a dichotomy that complicates the Charter's moral authority.

The second implication of the Charter's regime is that it concentrates only on *elections* as a democracy instrument. Its premise is that an election automatically grants a government its legitimacy, and that if an election is granted the status of being free and fair, then by definition it is regarded as democratic. So far, the AU still has to disqualify a parliamentary or presidential election as not free and fair. On the one hand, it is understandable that a disqualified election will cause a diplomatic nightmare for the AU and individual states, because they will not be able to maintain diplomatic relations with the host government. On the other hand, the AU is willing to suspend a member, resulting in almost the same diplomatic consequences. The main point is that the standards set for legitimate ('free and fair') elections are very low, and therefore it is relatively easy for governments to claim their constitutional authority and legitimacy. A good example of this predicament is the last Egyptian presidential election, which was won by President Hosni Mubarak in 2005 with a majority of almost 97% of votes. This was followed in December 2010 with parliamentary elections, in which his party achieved a similar landslide victory. The international community raised some concerns about the elections, but still recognised the government.³ Just a few months later, in 2011, the same government was overthrown in a popular



The African Charter concentrates only on elections as a democracy instrument. Its premise is that an election automatically grants a government its legitimacy, and that if an election is granted the status of being free and fair, then by definition it is regarded as democratic.

revolt – and then the international community accepted the revolt and government change also as legitimate. It raises the question about what is the inherent authority of an internationally accepted election (as the basis of constitutionalism) if it can be undone by a popular (extra-constitutional) uprising, which is equally acceptable for the international community (and the AU)?

The third implication of the Charter is that it concentrates on armed or military interventions. However, it is silent on the status of an armed national liberation struggle. For example, Morocco is governed by a constitutional dispensation and still considers Western Sahara as part of its territory. Will the Polisario struggle in Western Sahara therefore constitute an unconstitutional change of government?⁴ Furthermore, what about non-military or unarmed popular uprisings or movements aimed at unseating an unpopular but elected (and therefore constitutional) regime?

A feature of the African Charter that should be kept in mind when considering its application and suitability is that it represents a broader phenomenon of international relations – it not only represents mainly national states but it also protects the status quo of those states, irrespective of their governments' democratic status. Consider the fact that the African Charter was adopted by the government

representatives of states in the AU. Their instinct is to protect incumbent governments against any threats. This point is further corroborated by the amendment to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, which identifies the “grave circumstances” under which the AU’s “responsibility to protect” principle can apply. In addition to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, the amendment added “a serious threat to legitimate order” as another circumstance for external AU intervention.⁵ This, therefore, implies that if a regime is ‘threatened’ by a popular uprising, the AU has the responsibility to intervene and protect that regime, even if it is autocratic but elected (and, therefore, constitutional or ‘legitimate’).

This latter point can be developed further by contemplating whether constitutionalism is always synonymous with democracy. Most states are founded on a constitution – irrespective of the nature of their governments. Hence, it is well known that constitutions can be associated with both autocratic and democratic governments. So long as a government acts in accordance with its constitution, it is deemed as constitutional. The same logic applies to elections, and it can be concluded that the majority of governments are constitutional even if some of them are undemocratic. It reaffirms the view that constitutionalism



Madagascar's President Andry Rajoelina casts his ballot at a polling centre in Ambatobe, on 25 October 2013. The people of Madagascar began voting in a presidential election they hope will end a five-year crisis and rebuild investor confidence, to mend an economy that has been crippled since Rajoelina seized power in a 2009 coup.

is biased towards the status quo and is less attentive to legitimacy and democracy. Unfortunately, the idea that a constitution should be a social contract that legitimises the central authority is true in many instances, but remains an ideal in many other states. These perceptions or views about international relations and the legitimacy prerequisites of states are also relevant for the African Charter.

Case Examples

Given the nature of international relations, ranging from anarchy (for the realists) to institutionalised peacemaking (for the liberals),⁶ the question is whether the African Charter stands any chance to prevent military coups or regime changes by rebel movements – or, when it does happen, can it respond decisively against it? This directs us to issues of how enforceable the Charter is. Did criteria emerge in the course of its application so that moral judgements about governments and about the consistency of its application can be made?

Four recent cases – Madagascar, Mali, CAR and Egypt – provide some brief answers. All these countries except Mali have been denounced by the AU as an unconstitutional change of government.

In the case of Madagascar, the coup in March 2009 commenced in the form of demonstrations, led by Andry Rajoelina, against President Marc Ravalomanana.⁷ Rajoelina was supported by the Malagasy military which, in turn, were supported by French and domestic business groups.⁸ The military forced Ravalomanana to resign and transfer his powers to a military council which, in turn, transferred them to Rajoelina as the president of the High Transitional Authority (HAT). The Southern African Development Community (SADC) appointed former president Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique as the mediator, and he commenced with talks between Rajoelina, Ravalomanana and two former presidents in the second half of 2009. Rajoelina participated in the talks as the transitional president, and SADC did not follow the Charter's spirit in denying him this status. In the Maputo Accords, and later in the SADC Roadmap, Rajoelina's status was formalised through SADC's mediation. The African Charter also allows for sanctions against the suspended member, but the question is how effective this is in restoring a constitutional dispensation. In Madagascar, the sanctions imposed on the regime leaders produced mixed results. The United States (US) and the European Union (EU) applied them strictly, while China and France continued unhindered with

their diplomatic relations with Madagascar. China even exploited the opportunity to enhance its trade in oil and rosewood with Madagascar. The constitutional dispensation was also affected by the situation. In 2011, the Rajoelina regime announced a new constitution and presented it to a national referendum, which was boycotted by all the opposition movements. As a result of the boycott, the international community did not recognise the referendum and, by implication, also did not recognise the constitution. It can be viewed as an unconstitutional change of the constitution. Moreover, one of the constitutional articles changed the minimum age of a presidential candidate to accommodate Rajoelina, and it introduced a six-month residential requirement for candidates – which, in effect, eliminated Ravalomanana, who was still in exile in South Africa. This new constitution was therefore also designed to eliminate some potential candidates.⁹ While the legitimacy of the constitution can be debated, it did gradually assume the status of the operating constitution for the election. Hence, its six-month residential requirement was the basis on which Ravalomanana's wife Lalao and former president Didier Ratsiraka were disqualified by SADC as presidential candidates in August 2013.

While the African Charter stipulates that perpetrators of unconstitutional changes cannot participate in any future elections, Rajoelina was not disqualified for that reason. Arguably, a political game plan of reciprocity was used in which Lalao Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka had to be disqualified to reciprocate for Rajoelina's disqualification as a candidate. At the same time, Marc Ravalomanana's marginalisation had to be reciprocated with Rajoelina's exclusion, so that both protagonists in the political crisis could be kept away from the election. The Charter did not play any role in these decisions.

The developments in Mali and CAR are important cases with two different outcomes. Between January and April 2012, Tuareg rebels effectively separated the north of Mali (known as Azawad) from the rest of the country. In desperation, the Malian military staged a coup in March 2012 against the government of President Amadou Toumani Touré for not responding to the Tuareg insurgency. The military established the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State and, in April 2012, it was forced by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to restore the constitution.¹⁰ In a deal between the coup leaders and ECOWAS, the civilian Dioncounda Traoré was appointed as interim president and as head of the transitional



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Dioncounda Traoré (left) is flanked by coup leader Captain Amadou Sanogo after Traoré was sworn in as Mali's interim president on 12 April 2012.



Rebel leader Michel Djotodia assumed the Central African Republic presidency in March 2013.

government, in preparation for the election. ECOWAS's decisive reaction to pressurise the junta into establishing an interim civilian transitional authority convinced the AU to not denounce the events in Mali as an unconstitutional regime change, regardless of the military coup. In December 2012, the UN Security Council authorised the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) to intervene in Mali. However, a month later, Mali successfully appealed to the French for military assistance against both the rebels and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (QIM) in the north. In July 2013, a successful presidential election was concluded.¹¹

CAR, on the other hand, reaped the consequences of a long civil war (2004–2008), following which President François Bozizé Yangouvonda reneged on his peace agreement (Global Peace Accord, 2008) with the rebels, in the sense that the Seleka rebels were not demobilised or integrated into the military and the promised unity government did not materialise. In December 2012, several rebel movements came together and took control of the north and central parts of the country. They repeated their accusation that Bozizé violated earlier agreements with them. In January 2013, peace talks were held and agreement was reached about a coalition government that would include Seleka. However, in March, the coalition collapsed and Bozizé fled the country ahead of the advancing rebels.

Rebel leader Michel Djotodia assumed the presidency in March 2013 and reinstated Bozizé's prime minister, together with a multi-stakeholder (including rebels) transitional government (called the National Transition Council). The regional organisation the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is not institutionally as well established as ECOWAS or SADC, and could therefore not play the same role in directing the situation towards a negotiated transition. The AU, EU and the International Organisation of Francophonie therefore treated the situation as an unconstitutional regime change, despite the fact that the autocratic practices of the Bozizé regime were well known.¹²

The events immediately before and after 3 July 2013 in Egypt are the most difficult to assess, not only in terms of the African Charter but also to determine the exact nature of the regime change.¹³ The AU responded very quickly to denounce the events as an unconstitutional change.¹⁴ For many, the unconstitutional aspect of the change would not be in dispute – but rather, why it was treated differently from the events in 2011.¹⁵ Also not in dispute is that since the armed forces' declaration of a state of emergency and ElBaradei's resignation, the civilian component has disappeared and the government has become a de facto military regime. The main question is, therefore, whether

the change *itself* on 3 July 2013 was legitimate and whether the African Charter could appropriately relate to it?

The ensuing debate in many parts of the world was reduced to the issue of whether it constituted a military *coup d'état* or rather an uprising similar to the 2011 events. For the AU and Turkey, it was unquestionably a coup, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the US and several European states did not condemn it immediately. The main argument for why the 2013 events were regarded a coup and, therefore, substantially different to the 2011 events was that the Egyptian president, Mohamed Mursi, was elected and therefore popularly legitimised, compared to Mubarak, who did not enjoy the same legitimacy. This argument, however, disregards the fact that elected governments can become unpopular or even undemocratic (such as the elected Nazi government in the 1930s). The question, then, is whether an unpopular government can be replaced by popular action before the next election. In a parliamentary system with a prime minister as majority leader (instead of a directly elected president), a government can be removed by a motion of no-confidence before the next election – it is therefore done by constitutional means, but not by an election. The argument supporting popular legitimacy can be summarised by saying that in Egypt, a mass movement was galvanised by a petition against the Mursi government, which culminated in the Tahrir Square demonstrations.

THE RIGHT TO PEACEFUL PROTEST AS PART OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION IS REGARDED AS A UNIVERSAL CONSTITUTIONAL HUMAN RIGHT

According to this argument, the movement was not instigated or mobilised by the military, and therefore it constituted a legitimate foundation for Mursi's removal.¹⁶ That the final step – to suspend the constitution and detain Mursi – was taken by the military, is a serious complication for this argument. The fact that the military did not assume the position of president and rather established a civilian-based interim government, renders it similar to the Malian situation. The AU, however, treated it differently.

The cases briefly mentioned provide insight into the implications of the African Charter's application. They provide reasons for the following three conclusions about the 'unconstitutional change' doctrine. The first common feature of the four cases that appear to have made an impact was whether the coup leader assumes the position of president or appoints a civilian president and a multi-stakeholder civilian interim government. Judgement regarding the legitimacy of a change in government also depends on whether rebels are included in the government. If the military or rebels remained outside the government,

the AU did not condemn the regime change. Second, if the military suspended the constitution, it added weight to the AU's condemnation. Third, the role of regional organisations can also influence the situation. ECOWAS's response in Mali was assertive and arguably convinced the AU to support the interim arrangements, while SADC and ECCAS could not manage the same outcome. In the case of Egypt, there was no African regional organisation that intervened, and the Arab League remained ambivalent about the developments.

A preliminary conclusion is, therefore, that the AU pays more attention to the nature of the steps taken or mechanisms established *after* the regime change than to the nature of the change *itself*. Despite its use of the phrase 'unconstitutional *change*', the AU appears not to concentrate on the different types of changes listed in the Charter, but rather on the military or rebels' conduct after the change. This implies that the AU makes less of a judgement about the legitimacy of the change and concentrates more on what happens subsequent to the change. Depending on its judgement of the military's conduct afterwards, the AU retrospectively either condones the government change or condemns it as unconstitutional. The AU's different responses in Mali and Egypt (2013) partly illustrate this point.

At the same time, it should be said that Egypt does not really fit into these conclusions. After the 2011 uprising, Mubarak's powers were transferred to a military council that ruled for approximately a year until the election, and this was internationally acceptable (including to the AU). On the other hand, in 2013, Mursi's powers were transferred to an interim civilian government, but the AU condemned it – while in the case of Mali, it was accepted.

Conclusion

The AU's 'unconstitutional change of government' doctrine appears to be principled and provides a consistent and predictable guideline on how to respond to government changes not based on election processes. At the same time, a relatively uncritical stance towards elections is assumed that cannot distinguish in practice between democratic and autocratic governments, because the criterion of 'free and fair' elections is not robust enough to draw that distinction. States and continental organisations are also unwilling to apply it stringently. Therefore, all elected governments are automatically considered constitutional and also legitimate. The doctrine's implication is that it does not provide for legitimate government changes by other means. The complication is that several examples exist of current African governments originally established by non-electoral means – such as Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire/DRC (Laurent Kabila) and, lately, also Tunisia and Egypt. South Sudan is an example of a new state formed in 2011, which is primarily the product of a (unconstitutional) civil war, though finalised by a negotiated agreement.

The right to peaceful protest as part of the freedom of assembly and association is regarded as a universal

constitutional human right. How far does it stretch and can it be used to change a government? Can such a constitutional right have unconstitutional consequences? The AU's African Charter cannot address these questions, and therefore the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt will always cast doubts on how applicable it is for a spectrum of situations in which electoral legitimacy is not appropriate as the main or only criterion for governmental legitimacy. **A**

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Endnotes

- 1 The Egyptian events in July 2013 were preceded by a petition movement, launched by Tamarod in April 2013, to call for President Mohamed Mursi's removal from office. This was supported by the main opposition movements involved in the revolt against President Hosni Mubarak in 2011. At the end of June 2013, protests by about 14 million Egyptians demanded Mursi's immediate resignation. They protested against the declining economy and security situation, and Mursi's increasingly autocratic conduct. In July, the demonstrations turned violent. As a result, on 3 July 2013, the defence minister and military chief General Abdul Fatah al-Sisi announced Mursi's removal and the constitution's suspension. The new interim government consisted of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court as president, and the main opposition leader, Mohamed ElBaradei, as vice president. These changes were publicly endorsed on 3 July by the Dean of the al-Azhar University as the highest Sunni authority in Egypt and by the Coptic Orthodox Pope. The complication is found in the combination of civilian and military participation in these events. [Al Jazeera (2013) 'Interactive Timeline: Egypt in Turmoil', 17 August, Available at: <<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2013/08/2013817122637981237.htm>>. Accessed on: 10 October 2013.]
- 2 African Union (2007) 'African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance', Available at: <www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/text/Charter%20on%20Democracy.pdf>. Accessed on: 15 September 2013.
- 3 Shenker, Jack (2010) 'Egypt's Rulers Tighten Grip Amid Claims of Election Fraud and Intimidation', *The Guardian*, 30 November, Available at: <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/30/egypt-poll-electoral-fraud-claims>>. Accessed on: 10 September 2013.
- 4 After the demise of the Franco regime in Spain in the 1970s, Morocco annexed the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara. Morocco claimed that it restored its territorial integrity, which was violated by French and Spanish colonialism. In response, the Sahrawi nationalists formed the Polisario Front and commenced with a liberation war for independence and self-determination, supported by Algeria. In 1991, the UN imposed a ceasefire on both sides. No progress has been made with the referendum on the territory's future and, therefore, Morocco still demands recognition for its constitutional authority in Western Sahara. Several African states have already recognised the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. [Joffé, George (2009) 'Western Sahara: Conflict without End?', Available at: <<http://www.peacebuilding.no/layout/set/print/Regions/Africa/Publications/Western-Sahara-Conflict-Without-End?>>. Accessed on: 10 October 2013.]
- 5 African Union (2003) 'Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union', Available at: <http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/PROTOCOL_AMENDMENTS_CONSTITUTIVE_ACT_OF_THE_AFRICAN_UNION.pdf>. Accessed on: 12 September 2013.
- 6 See Walt, Stephen M. (1998) *International Relations: One World, Many Theories*. *Foreign Policy* (Spring), pp. 29–46.
- 7 The demonstrations were prompted by a combination of factors: economic development that improved the formal economy but not the poor; Rajoelina's personal vendetta against Ravalomanana; French resistance against Ravalomanana's opening of the Malagasy markets to the German, American, Japanese and other economies; and the French's close relationship with the Malagasy military.
- 8 Ravalomanana, Marc (2010) Interview with the author on 20 April. Johannesburg, South Africa.
- 9 Kotzé, Dirk (2013) *The Responsibility to Implement: SADC's Challenges as Mediator in Madagascar to Convert the Peace Deal into Implementation*. Unpublished paper, presented to the Thomas Ohlson memorial conference From Civil War to Strong Peace in Africa, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 18–20 April 2013.
- 10 Al Jazeera (2012) 'Malian Coup Leaders Given Ultimatum', 30 March, Available at: <<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/03/2012329214032818296.html>>. Accessed on: 18 September 2013.
- 11 Deschamps-Laporte, Laurence (2013) 'Understanding the Malian Crisis and its Actors'. *Democracy in Africa*, 7 April, Available at: <<http://democracyin africa.org/understanding-the-malian-crisis-its-actors>>. Accessed on: 11 October 2013; International Crisis Group (2013) 'Mali: Security, Dialogue and Meaningful Reform', Africa Report No. 201, 11 April, Available at: <<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/mail/201-mali-security-dialogue-and-meaningful-reform.aspx>>. Accessed on: 10 October 2013.
- 12 International Crisis Group (2013) *Central African Republic: Priorities of the Transition*. Africa Report No. 203, 11 June. Brussels: ICG; International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) (2013) 'Central African Republic: FIDH condemns the Coup d'état Calls for Immediate Cessation of Violence and the Restoration of Constitutional Order', 26 March, Available at: <<http://www.fidh.org/en/africa/central-african-republic/Central-African-Republic-FIDH-condemns-the-coup-d-Etat-calls-for-immediate-13099>>. Accessed on: 10 October 2013.
- 13 See endnote 1 for background information.
- 14 African Union (2013) 'Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 384th Meeting on the Situation in the Arab Republic of Egypt. Jul.05.2013', Available at: <<http://au.int/content/communiqu%C3%A9-peace-and-security-council-african-union-au-its-384th-meeting>>. Accessed on: 20 September 2013.
- 15 The Egyptian uprising in 2011 erupted soon after major demonstrations in Tunisia overthrew the government of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. A significant feature of the developments was that the military did not suppress the demonstrations and, later, police and military even joined them. When it became clear that he could not counter the process, Mubarak resigned and the Supreme Military Council assumed his powers as an interim government to prepare for presidential and parliamentary elections at the end of 2011. The AU and the international community – including the US – accepted these developments as the beginning of a new era in Egypt. [El-Ghobashy, Mona (2011) 'The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution'. Middle East Research and Information Project *MER 258 (People Power)*, 41 (Spring), Available at: <<http://www.merip.org/mer/mer258/praxis-egyptian-revolution>>. Accessed on: 9 October 2013.]
- 16 See also Kotzé, Dirk (2013) 'Egypt – is it an Illegitimate Military Coup?' *News24*, 8 July, Available at: <<http://voices.news24.com/dirk-kotze/2013/7/egypt-is-it-an-illegitimate-coup/>>. Accessed on: 8 July 2013.

BEYOND 'WESTGATE': TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE AND CONFLICT RESPONSIVE COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY

BY PAUL NANTULYA



REUTERS / THE BIGGER PICTURE

Introduction

The audacity, scale and meticulously sophisticated planning that went into the 21 September 2013 terrorist attack on Westgate mall in Nairobi, Kenya, suggests that Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, an Al-Qaeda-linked organisation better known as Al-Shabaab, might have taken its capacity to strike outside Somalia to a new level. This article examines the policy implications of the attack from a counterterrorism and conflict resolution perspective. It provides a brief historical overview of Al-Qaeda's activities in the East Africa and Horn of Africa regions, followed by an examination of the evolution of Al-Shabaab. Internal crises

affecting the organisation are also discussed. The article concludes by making a case that defeating Al-Shabaab requires the strategic and calculative application of soft and hard instruments of state power, in the context of a multifaceted and sophisticated national security strategy that confronts the immediate threat while addressing the root causes of the Somali conflict.

Above: Kenyan soldiers take their position at the Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi, where Al-Shabaab militants stormed into the mall and opened fire on innocent people (24 September 2013).



New recruits belonging to Somalia's Al-Shabaab rebel group celebrate during a passing out parade at a military training base in Afgoye, west of the capital city, Mogadishu (February 2011).

Al-Qaeda's Activities in East Africa and the Horn of Africa

In 1992, Osama Bin Laden's trusted lieutenant, Mohamed Atef al-Masri ('the Egyptian') – also known as Abu Hafsa al-Masri – then Al-Qaeda's Africa regional leader, visited Somalia to explore opportunities of attacking United States (US) forces stationed there to deliver humanitarian assistance.¹ After assessing capabilities, he dispatched a team of Al-Qaeda veterans there in 1993 to conduct operations. Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), an extremist Somali organisation, hosted the Al-Qaeda element, which is believed to have established some training camps.² Al-Qaeda's chief instructor at the time, Ali Mohammed, who is currently serving a life sentence in the US for participating in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, trained AIAI fighters, some of whom might have participated in a December 1992 attack on a hotel in Yemen where US Air Force personnel were staying.³

Some unclassified intelligence information suggests that AIAI fighters were also responsible for shooting down two US Black Hawk helicopters and killing 18 US military personnel during the October 1993 battle in Mogadishu.⁴ AIAI is also believed to have provided sanctuary to three alleged Al-Qaeda operatives complicit in the US embassy bombings –

Fazul Abdullah Mohammed from the Comoros, who was killed in 2011 in a shootout with the Somali National Army; Abu Talha al-Sudani ('the Sudanese') from Sudan, who is believed to have been killed in 2007, either by a US drone strike or in a shootout with the Ethiopian Army; and Kenyan Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, who was killed in September 2009 in Somalia during a raid by US Navy Seals.⁵

Despite investing heavily in establishing a franchise in Somalia, Al-Qaeda also experienced significant difficulties.⁶ First, Somalia was a difficult operating environment in terms of moving logistics, establishing a communications infrastructure and moving fighters in and out of selected bases. Second, and probably more important, Al-Qaeda had overestimated the degree to which Somalis would accept Jihadi ideology, especially without financial incentives.⁷ While Somali clan leaders and warlords shared Al-Qaeda's goal of expelling Westerners, their immediate interest was the power of their own clans.⁸ Al-Qaeda operatives also failed to understand the Somali cultural approaches to Islam.⁹ Somali Islam extols Sufism as opposed to the Salafi beliefs that underlie Jihadi ideology.¹⁰ Al-Qaeda experienced vigorous pushback from Somali Sufi clerics on this particular point. The group also failed to understand the Somali attachment to clans and subclans – loyalties that, in most



The black Al-Shabaab flag is emblazoned with the *Shahada* (declaration of faith) in white text.

cases, transcend religion and religious beliefs. In addition, the Somali culture of inclusive and decentralised democratic decision-making is incompatible with the secretive and top-down decision-making approach favoured by Al-Qaeda. Although the organisation managed to penetrate a few clans, it has so far failed to create unified coalitions under a coherent ideology. This explains its inclination to infuse as many foreign fighters into Somalia as possible to provide a layer of control in the leadership, as well as operational control and the ideological direction of Jihadi organisations.

Evolution of Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab’s founders broke away from AIAI in the mid-nineties and reconstituted themselves as the youth militia of the Islamic courts. These courts first emerged in 1991 to fill the void created by the collapse of the Somali state. Some early AIAI leaders include the Afghanistan-trained Ibrahim Haji Jama Mead, also known as Ibrahim al-Afghani (‘the Afghan’); Sheikh Muktar Robow (also known as Abu Mansour); and Aden Hashi Farah Ayro. Al-Afghani, a founder of Al-Shabaab, was killed by his colleagues in June 2013. Robow, who narrowly escaped a similar fate, is reportedly in talks with the African Union Mission in Somalia

(AMISOM), a multinational coalition of African military forces leading the counterinsurgency campaign against Al-Shabaab and protecting the fragile Federal Government of Somalia.¹¹ Ayro was killed in 2008 by a US drone strike.¹² In late 2006, the Ethiopian army dislodged the courts from Mogadishu after repelling an attack on their positions in Baidoa. Al-Shabaab subsequently morphed into an Islamist nationalist insurgency, which initially appealed to the historical rivalries between Somalis and Ethiopians and the deep Somali cultural aversion towards perceived foreign intrusion. As the group lost more territory to AMISOM, however, its goals became mixed with Al-Qaeda ideology. Fatalistic practices such as suicide bombings, use of human shields and beheadings – which were non-existent before 2006 and completely alien to Somali culture – became commonplace.¹³ Ayro’s death set the stage for more formal links with Al-Qaeda. His successor, another Afghanistan-trained fighter, Sheikh Ahmed Abdi Godane (also known as Muqtar Abdurrahman Abu Zubeyr), committed the organisation more firmly to global Jihadi objectives. Under him, Al-Shabaab has avoided nationalist slogans and refused to use the Somali flag, which it replaced with a black flag emblazoned with the *Shahada* (declaration of faith) in white text.¹⁴ On 20 September 2009, the group released a video titled *At your Service Osama*, pledging total allegiance to Osama Bin Laden.

The Al-Qaeda leader’s response was cautious. In a letter retrieved from Bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, by US Navy Seals, the Al-Qaeda chief castigated Godane’s ruthlessness and cautioned his eager supplicant to avoid harming too many Muslims in attacks and to “remain devout, patient and persistent in upholding high moral values”.¹⁵ Bin Laden’s favoured choice to lead Al-Shabaab, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, was killed on 7 June 2011 after making a wrong turn and driving into a government roadblock in Mogadishu. He was reportedly misdirected by Al-Shabaab operatives on the orders of Godane – an act that might have further strained relations between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda, had Bin Laden still been alive.¹⁶ The Al-Qaeda leader’s replacement, Ayman Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri (also known as Ayman al-Zawahiri), has been more tolerant of Godane’s apparent excesses. He formally approved the merger between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda on 12 February 2012.¹⁷

Internal Problems in Al-Shabaab

Since the merger, high-level disagreements over ideology and tactics have rocked the organisation and led to the emergence of two camps: one in favour of a local Somali agenda, and the other a global Jihadist agenda. In addition, several fighters have been executed on Godane’s orders for a range of offences including allegations of infiltration by Western intelligence agencies, causing numerous defections – including the mass surrender of 200

fighters to AMISOM forces in September 2012.¹⁸ To insulate himself from reprisals, the Al-Shabaab leader is believed to have shifted responsibility for his personal security to the group's foreign-trained, elite Praetorian Guard, known as the Amniyat – a highly trained and specialised unit of operatives whose roles vary from gathering intelligence to carrying out assassinations, reconnaissance, counterintelligence operations and bombing missions.¹⁹

The role of foreign fighters appears to be a central issue in the organisation's internal upheavals. On 12 September 2013, 10 days before the Westgate attack, US-born fighter Omar Hammami – also known as Abu Mansour al-Amriki ('the American') – and British fighter Osama al-Britani ('the Briton') were gunned down on Godane's orders. Al-Amriki, one of Al-Shabaab's most prominent foreign commanders, had earlier called on "the leaders of Jihad" "to intervene and find a fundamental solution to the bitter situation that currently engulfs the Somali foreign fighters".

THE ROLE OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS APPEARS TO BE A CENTRAL ISSUE IN THE ORGANISATION'S INTERNAL UPHEAVALS

"The brothers from al-Qaeda in Somalia have tried for two decades and failed to change the situation in spite of their tremendous efforts. Despite the propaganda from some Somalis that they are on board with global jihad, their past and present actions indicate that all they want is internal work for local purposes."²⁰

"We are afraid that this conflict might end soon in the favor of those who do not want the battalions of global jihad to take off from Somalia... and therefore I ask you in the name of Allah to come to the aid of your Mujahideen brothers, and to rein in the internal strife before it is too late."²¹ Following this appeal, two senior Al-Shabaab fighters – Sheikh Maalim Burhan (also known as Sheikh Abdihamid Hashi Olhaye) and Al-Afghani, then second-in-command and a close Godane confidant – issued a *fatwa* supportive of Al-Amriki and critical of Godane.²² Al-Afghani had previously brought the plight of foreign fighters to the attention of Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. "If we are afraid of foreign players stealing the outcomes of jihad, today we are witnessing a reality that indicates that an internal deviation could lead to losing the profits of our effort in vain," he explained.²³ On 19 June 2013, Al-Afghani and Burhan were executed in the southern town of Barawe by Godane loyalists.²⁴

To forestall growing rifts over these killings, Al-Shabaab's propaganda campaign during the Westgate attack sought to demonstrate that foreign fighters were still central to the organisation. The group's initial claims that 29-year-old suspected UK terrorist, Samantha Lewthwaite, and other

Western citizens were involved in the attack, should be seen in this context. Although the plight of foreign Jihadis might presumably complicate Godane's dealings with Al-Qaeda, he must be keenly aware that the territory he controls – which is about the size of the US state of Texas – is by far the largest contiguous territory presently available to Al-Qaeda. Ten years of sustained counterterrorism operations have constrained the organisation's freedom of movement, making Somalia an attractive location and the continued merger with Al-Shabaab an attractive proposition. "Our struggle is a long one and Jihad is in need of safe bases,"²⁵ Zawahiri announced in his recent 'Jihad guidelines'. Godane might therefore be more important to Al-Qaeda in the immediate term, despite the growing discontent among foreign fighters in his ranks.

Towards a Comprehensive Strategy

Reconstructing the Somali State

Several failed attempts to create a centralised government in Somalia suggest that statebuilding models imposed from outside are culturally problematic in the Somali context, unless they are reinforced by the reinvigoration and integration of Somali mechanisms of bottom-up, people-centred governance that also apply modern democratic standards.²⁶ Somalia's strong and locally rooted mechanism, known as *Xeer*, which solves



Members of Somalia's Al-Shabaab militant group parade during a demonstration to announce their integration with Al-Qaeda, in Elasha (13 February 2012).



Soldiers serving with AMISOM and the Somali National Army successfully recapture Buur-Hakba from Al-Shabaab (28 February 2013).

disputes peacefully and permits people to participate equally in electing their leaders, might provide a sound basis to integrate formal institutions with indigenous structures. Its successful application in Somaliland and Puntland could provide a viable model for policy consideration.²⁷

Understanding Al-Shabaab's Means for Conducting Operations

Al-Shabaab exploits Somalia's social and cultural cleavages and leadership failures. It combines domestic insurgency with domestic and international terrorism. Its needs are as follows: a cadre of senior leaders and commanders, territory to train, replenish and raise revenues, a constant supply of funds and weapons, foreign fighters, public support (mostly through coercion) and an ideology. Defeating the threat requires the systematic and sustained application of pressure and counterforce on all these points in a denial strategy that mixes military and non-military elements of national power along multiple lines of effort, while addressing Somalia's medium to longer-term governance challenges.

The Proposed Approach

The strategy proposed works with AMISOM troop-contributing countries and foreign partner nations to deny Al-Shabaab its means of sustenance, while investing in longer-term measures to build a consensual, democratic and inclusive state in Somalia. It is based on three key assumptions: first, internal tensions over the group's national and global goals are likely to continue and may

lead to splits; second, the Federal Government of Somalia is likely to remain fragile and dependent on AMISOM's military backing for its survival; and third, there is a high probability that more attacks outside Somalia will be planned. In light of these assumptions, African and international policies toward Somalia should be adjusted to adopt a comprehensive strategy based on the following formula:

$$CS = HP + SP (PI, SC, IM, DA, DIP)$$

CS stands for a comprehensive strategy, which should integrate and apply hard power (HP) and soft power (SP) instruments more closely. Hard power (HP) refers to coercive or kinetic tools, including the use of military force.²⁸ Soft power (SP) refers to persuasive instruments, including diplomatic, informational and political tools.²⁹ The formula proposes the application of political instruments (PI), strategic communications (SC), immigration measures (IM), development assistance (DA) and diplomacy (DIP) as the most appropriate soft power instruments in the effort.

Hard Power Instruments

- **Military instruments (AMISOM, regional military forces involved in Somalia, foreign militaries and the Somali security services)**

The military effort should centre on the application of sustained combat power to remove Al-Shabaab from its remaining strongholds. AMISOM, which leads the counterinsurgency effort, is the lead instrument. Its strength and kinetic capabilities should be increased. Military action by non-AMISOM forces should serve AMISOM's strategic objectives and theatre campaign plans – a requirement that urgently calls for a regional counterterrorism vision and strategy. Sustained capacity-building for the Somali security services should continue. Foreign military support should lend niche capabilities that are either underdeveloped or lacking in the region. These include hostage rescue and tactical operations, signals intelligence (SIGINT), foreign instrumentation intelligence (FISINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). Offensive counterintelligence should be applied to penetrate the Amniyat, as this elite Al-Shabaab unit has been designed to survive on its own even if the organisation is dismantled.³⁰

- **Economic instruments (foreign governments, including the US)**

The application of economic measures against Al-Shabaab financiers and operatives will be an effective piece of the effort. Internal tensions within Al-Shabaab are partly fuelled by fears of betrayal on account of initiatives like the US Department of State Rewards for Justice Program, an initiative that provides monetary rewards in exchange for information leading to the capture or elimination of high-value targets. Al-Shabaab's top leaders and commanders all appear on its list. This programme should be supported by multilateral and unilateral efforts to disrupt Al-Shabaab's



Al-Shabaab members strategically recruit and exploit at-risk, impressionable youth.

international and regional financial transactions and deter Al-Shabaab's actual or potential state sponsors.

Soft Power Instruments

- **Political instruments (African and foreign partners and the Somali government)**

This political effort should establish lines of trust across clans and subclans and promote inclusive political institutions and processes.

Some tools might include:

- **Traditional governance:** African and international partners should work with the Federal Government of Somalia and the broader structures of Somali society to support bottom-up and people-centred governance.
- **Amnesty:** This has been used as a conflict resolution instrument in several contexts including South Africa, Uganda and Guatemala. African partners and Somali authorities should continue to employ it strategically to encourage more defections from Al-Shabaab and engage reconcilable elements in reconciliation efforts.
- **Community development committees (CDCs):** These have been applied effectively in Rwanda, South Sudan and Afghanistan as tools for involving communities in local governance. Their application in Somalia could be useful, given the Somali cultural attachment to decentralised and diffused decision-making.

- **Strategic communications and information operations (African and foreign partners and the Somali government)**

Al-Shabaab's strategic exploitation of several communications platforms to recruit, offer incentives, disseminate propaganda and provide training material to at-risk and impressionable youth in Africa and Western countries merits close attention. The strategic communications and information operations element of the proposed strategy should, therefore, focus on five objectives: exposing the incompatibility between Islamic teachings and Jihadi ideology, exploiting the rift between local and foreign fighters and objectives, encouraging more defections (especially among the Amniyat), promoting credible voices within the Somali population, and countering Al-Shabaab's messaging strategy in Africa and the West.

- **Immigration measures (African and foreign partners and the Somali government)**

African and international partners should work closely to strengthen border control and immigration procedures, and monitor the travel behaviour of suspected fighters.

- **Development assistance (African and foreign partners)**

Development assistance should build local capacities to provide crucial social services including education, healthcare, poverty reduction and support to small



Four suspected members of Al-Shabaab, all in their mid-twenties, were captured during a joint security operation by AMISOM and Somali security services and were found in possession of a rocket-propelled grenade, two sub-machine guns and 84 rounds of ammunition (22 March 2012).

businesses. Increasing investments in AMISOM's soft power capabilities, including its civilian component, will also be vital.

- **Diplomacy (African and foreign partners)**

Diplomatic instruments should enhance close coordination, timing and sequencing between African and foreign partners, and closely support the strategic communications and information operations objectives.

Conclusion

The instruments outlined here – military, political, strategic communications, immigration, economic sanctions, development and diplomacy – should be applied together and in the context of a comprehensive, well-coordinated and sequenced approach. The strategy is based on the premise that the application of kinetic instruments on their own can only achieve limited tactical aims. Military power needs to be integrated into a long-term strategy that supports the development of a truly inclusive, consensual and democratic Somali state and an open civil society, to be better able to address the grievances that drive young men and women to join Al-Shabaab. Local drivers for Jihadi recruitment among

the relatively more affluent young men and women in the West should also be addressed. Two additional issues should be borne in mind: first, African and international partners should invest in a long-term process, because it will take time to dislodge Al-Shabaab and even longer to address the root causes of state failure in Somalia. Second, great care should be taken to ensure that Somali and Muslim communities are not profiled and subjected to mistreatment, as these would provide propaganda and recruitment opportunities to Al-Shabaab and, ultimately, compromise counterterrorism objectives.

On 5 October 2013, the US Navy Seals 'Team Six', which captured Osama Bin Laden, reportedly launched a pre-dawn assault in Barawe, Somalia, to capture Godane.³¹ Although the assault was aborted for reasons that are still unclear, such operations are likely to continue, suggesting that the international community shares the African interest to defeat Al-Shabaab and create conditions for a lasting peace in Somalia. It now behoves African and international partners to translate this common interest into an infinitely more comprehensive strategy, which goes beyond addressing the immediate terrorist threat by focusing attention on the political and social dimensions of the Somali crisis

in a framework that applies all available instruments of statecraft in a calculative, timely and comprehensive manner. The Westgate victims deserve no less. **A**

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INTEGRATING AFRICA AND THE POLITICS OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION IN THE PROCESS OF UNSC REFORM¹

BY JONATHAN OSHUPENG MASENG

Introduction

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the most powerful and influential organ of the United Nations (UN). The main responsibility of the UNSC, as conferred to it by the UN, is to maintain international peace and security. Membership of the UNSC is composed of representatives from 15 countries. Of the 15 members of the UNSC, five are permanent members – the United States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK), China, Russia and France. The inclusion of these countries as permanent members of the UNSC was premised on them being the victors of World War II. Each of these five permanent members of the UNSC has veto power over any matter voted on by the organ. Thus, all five permanent members of the UNSC must agree to endorse any decision for it to pass.

The remaining 10 non-permanent members of the total membership of 15 countries are chosen based on various regions of the world, which include the Western European and Others Group, the Eastern European Group, Latin American and Caribbean Group, the Asian Group and the African Group. Because the structure of the UNSC does not necessarily represent the geographic and political demographics of the world, it necessitated calls to reform UNSC. Such calls have focused on the permanent inclusion of regions not permanently represented in the UNSC.

Above: The United Nations Security Council is the most powerful and influential organ of the United Nations.



Foreign ministers representing the permanent five member countries (United Kingdom, France, Russia, United States of America, China) of the United Nations Security Council pose together with the Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon (third from right) at the United Nations headquarters in New York (15 September 2013).

As such, Africa has specifically developed a common position, titled ‘The Ezulwini Consensus’.

This article seeks to examine the political factors surrounding reform in Africa and the role of external forces on the reform question. It examines whether South Africa and Nigeria are partners or contenders in the UNSC reform process. The roles of regions, specifically through regional economic communities (RECs) and other external players interested in the outcome of the UNSC reform process, is also examined.

The African Union Position on UNSC Reform

The calls for UNSC reform and the inclusion of Africa with two permanent seats are necessitated by the reality that more than three-quarters of the UNSC’s engagements are on African affairs. Calls to reform the UNSC have gained great strength in recent years, because the power to approve or disapprove what actions the UN should take is entirely based on positions of the permanent five members – a process

that lacks proportional representation of the world regions. Africa, a 54-nation continent, has a representation of only two non-permanent members, without veto power, in the UNSC.² As such, regional powers and other member states of the UN have been calling for greater representation and power than their 10 rotation-based or non-permanent seats in the UNSC and their minimal voting influence in the organ.

In 2005, the African Union (AU) adopted “the common position on the proposed reform of the United Nations”,

THE CALLS FOR UNSC REFORM AND THE INCLUSION OF AFRICA WITH TWO PERMANENT SEATS ARE NECESSITATED BY THE REALITY THAT MORE THAN THREE-QUARTERS OF THE UNSC’S ENGAGEMENTS ARE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS



John Ashe, president of the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly, chairs the Assembly's annual debate on reform of the Security Council and the Council's work (7 November 2013).

which is commonly known as The Ezulwini Consensus. This position advocated that Africa be fully represented in all UN organs, specifically the UNSC.³ Full representation for Africans meant that the continent should be granted not less than two permanent memberships of the UNSC with all privileges, including veto power, and an additional five non-permanent member seats.⁴ The Ezulwini Consensus thus intensified calls for African inclusion in the UNSC. However, there are many political factors that cannot be ignored with regard to UNSC reform. The first factor is the politics around South Africa and Nigeria's roles in the African political spectrum.

South Africa and Nigeria: Hegemonic Contenders or Partners in Reform?

The ascendance of South Africa and Nigeria as non-permanent members of the UNSC was coupled with the dilemma of both states leading the African agenda or working in separate and different political directions in the UN body.⁵ As such, the dominance of both countries in the African political dispensation places them in a position of either being hegemonic contenders or possible partners in the UNSC reform process. Nevertheless, as dominant players in the African political dispensation, both states are obliged to advance the continental agenda of The Ezulwini Consensus. Although both Nigeria and South

Africa are no longer non-permanent members of the UNSC⁶, there are threats of the two countries pulling in different directions rather than working on a common African goal. This assumption is based on the fact that both countries have been at loggerheads with one another on various continental matters.⁷ Two main issues highlight the rift and hegemonic contest between Nigeria and South Africa.⁸ First, South Africa tried to upstage Nigeria in West Africa by projecting itself as a peace broker in Côte d'Ivoire, beyond and in opposition to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) plan. Second, the two countries held opposing positions regarding the recognition of the Transitional National Council (TNC) as the Libyan interim government. Nigeria recognised the TNC, while South Africa wanted a more inclusive interim structure.

Nigeria and South Africa being locked in hegemonic battles poses a risk of fragmented positions on the African agenda for UNSC reform. A common continental position on UNSC reform is highly likely to be compromised because both countries, in many cases, have not supported each other on continental issues. As an example, South African diplomats have cited Nigeria as a major impediment in South Africa's bid to obtain the AU Commission chair.⁹ This was coupled with the deportation of Nigerians by the South African government, and the retaliation of the Nigerian government by deporting South African nationals.¹⁰

The tense hegemonic and diplomatic contestation between South Africa and Nigeria could become a very destructive rift between two of Africa's influential and leading states.

Both South Africa and Nigeria are possible candidates for permanent seats in the UNSC since the evolution of the discourse on UN reform and African representation in the UNSC. Although The Ezulwini Consensus requires serious support and commitment by all African countries, it is silent on which of the African countries should occupy the seat, should UNSC reform become a reality. Although African states harbour the rhetoric of African unity in advancing for UNSC reform, with the ultimate goal of having a permanent seat(s) for the continent in the UN body, there are realistic threats of power politics and national interests surfacing. Hence these two leading countries are likely to exercise a realistic approach of national interests to the question of UNSC reform, thereby seeking to gain a seat for themselves rather than pushing for a continental approach driven by unity and African interest (and not individual country interest). In this process, the politics of South Africa and Nigeria out-manoeuvring one another comes into play – even if it translates to retrogressive rather than progressive UNSC reform. The magnetism of securing a permanent seat –

even without the significant veto power – could possibly be satisfactory motivation to create divisions between Africa's dominant states, in particular Nigeria and South Africa.¹¹

Realities of Regional Representation and External Forces

The question of UNSC reform appears to build diplomatic antagonism between continental regional blocs. This is because at the heart of the battle for UNSC seats are South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and francophone African states. In the African continent, the struggle for influence in the reform process has created a negative split that has brought how the continent's lead states view each other into sharp relief.¹² Thus, the UNSC reform question poses a serious threat to the hopes of African continental integration, in that there are external forces seeking to take advantage of the reform process to advance their interests. There also appear to be divisions within the AU, sparked by RECs whose interest is to ensure that they are represented within the UNSC.

SADC and BRICS: South African Support Base

South Africa will likely rely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for support in ascending a permanent seat in the UNSC. SADC's support for South Africa

UN PHOTO/PAULO FIGUERAS



The United Nations General Assembly elected, in one round of voting on 17 October 2013, five new non-permanent members of the Security Council - Chad, Chile, Lithuania, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. The new Council members will begin their two-year terms on 1 January 2014.



President of the ECOWAS Commission, Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo (Left), and Gerard Araud, permanent representative of France to the United Nations, chat during a meeting with Security Council members in Abidjan (21 May 2012).

is quantified by the fact that SADC threw its weight behind South Africa to get a second term for a non-permanent seat in the UNSC for the period 2011–2012, and also that, most recently, SADC stood behind South Africa in its bid to ascend the AU Commission chair. In addition, it goes without saying that South Africa has and continues to play a pivotal role within the SADC region, and has thus become the region's economic and political engine. South Africa's involvement in continental and regional peacekeeping missions is indicative of acceptance of responsibilities inherent in regional leadership. Beyond SADC countries, the association of major emerging national economies Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – the BRICS countries – will also express support for South Africa, primarily because of the close ties among its members. Considering that both Russia and China are members of BRICS and also permanent members of the UNSC, it is likely that these two states will support South Africa's bid. Both Russia and China¹³ have also expressed the importance they attach to South Africa in global politics, and support the country's desire to find space and a greater role in the UN,¹⁴ particularly the UNSC.

Although the support by SADC and BRICS is significant for South Africa, the question that remains is whether other

African states are considering South Africa as a candidate for one of the permanent seats, should reform be possible. This must be considered bearing in mind that the penetration of South Africa into the rest of Africa, coupled with perceptions that South Africa views itself as only being part of Africa geographically but, in contrast, culturally part of Europe, has not endeared it to the rest of the continent.¹⁵ It is quite doubtful whether some African states will support South Africa's candidacy for the UNSC.

Francophone Countries – Stumbling Block for South Africa?

The recent battle for the AU Commission chairpersonship between South Africa and Gabon (a francophone country) could be an indicator that South Africa could face opposition from francophone Africa on the question of permanent inclusion into the UNSC. This would not only be based on the political contestation within the AU, but because former French colonies also seek to gain a seat in the UNSC. This is evident in Senegal's suggestion that UNSC reform should provide two seats for Africa: one for francophone countries and the other for English-speaking countries.¹⁶ In this regard, opposition by francophone countries will likely equate

NIGERIA'S REMARKABLE INVOLVEMENT AND LEADERSHIP IN REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING HAS PROVED ITS ABILITY TO ASSUME THE KIND OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ASSOCIATED WITH PLAYING A HIGH-PROFILE ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, SPECIFICALLY IN THE UN

with opposition by France (a permanent member in the UNSC) – which, most obviously, would prefer a francophone country occupying a UNSC permanent seat than any other African country. This is based on the premise that France is keen on increasing its power in the UNSC through its former colonies, as it is influential in the political affairs of francophone Africa. The major reason for France's hold on its former colonies is that francophone Africa has an unhealthy reliance on aid from France, and other forms of political and financial assistance. It is not surprising, therefore, that France's advocacy for Africa's permanent inclusion in the UNSC is based on a permanent seat being occupied by a francophone country. This will increase and advance France's power and interest in the UN body but will likely compromise critical African peace and security issues, as France will seek

to prioritise its peace and security (and those of its former colonies) over the needs of the rest of the African continent.

Navigating Nigeria in the UNSC

Besides the candidacy of South Africa and any of the francophone states, considering Nigeria's political and economic dominance in West Africa and ECOWAS, surely Nigeria will count on support from ECOWAS in its bid to get a UNSC permanent seat? Nigeria's leadership role in regional cooperation and integration led to the creation of ECOWAS, and it goes without saying that the country has been able to project itself as a regional pillar and driving economic force on which the region relies.

Nigeria's oil resources place it under significant consideration of an UNSC seat, specifically by the USA.¹⁷ As a result, Nigeria does not only count on ECOWAS for support, but likely also the potential support of the USA, because of its oil reserves. Nigeria's remarkable involvement and leadership in regional peacekeeping has proved its ability to assume the kind of international responsibility associated with playing a high-profile role in international politics, specifically in the UN.

What of Arab African States?

The fourth candidate that might seek a permanent UNSC seat is an Arab African state – in particular, Egypt. The candidacy of Egypt for a permanent UNSC seat is motivated by its "heavyweight role in Arab, African and Islamic arenas".¹⁸ Domestically, Egypt's occupation of a UNSC



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Nigeria's oil resources place it under significant consideration for a United Nations Security Council seat, specifically by the United States of America.

permanent seat will rely on support from the Maghreb. Most significantly, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region might likely support Egypt's permanent inclusion in the UNSC. However, it is noteworthy that in the wake of the Arab Spring, a shift from the old to new guard of leadership has been experienced across the MENA region. Thus, the political vacuum created by the Arab Spring has opened political opportunities for Islamic organisations that had previously been banned from participating in all formal and informal political processes. In this process, the locus of power and the dynamics of the political spectrum have shifted.¹⁹ Egypt's role hangs in the balance, considering its unfavourable domestic political affairs and the regional dynamics that may arise. On the global political front, the importance of MENA as an energy-rich region suggests that many global powers, such as the USA, will employ significant measures to have influence over the region. Such measures could possibly include the question of UNSC reform and support for the inclusion of a North African state as a permanent member of UNSC. To this end, the likelihood of contestation for UNSC candidacy by Arab African countries is an inevitable possibility. However, should this possibility become a reality, divisions are eminent within Arab Africa and, more broadly, within MENA.

Conclusion

The question of UNSC reform has the potential to further disintegrate an already fragmented continent. While on the surface Africa seems to be united on The Ezulwini Consensus, in reality the wishful ambition of having two permanent seats in the UNSC has the continent pulling in four different directions, as outlined previously. Central to this equation is that the long-term vision of African continental integration will be dealt a seriously negative blow by the different forces behind UNSC reform. Although African countries have voiced that who represents Africa in the UNSC should be an AU decision, it appears that the five permanent members of the UNSC have a significant say on which African countries should represent the continent in the UNSC. These countries will, therefore, play a role in undermining continental integration. BRICS and Middle East countries will also likely have a negative impact on continental integration, through their influence on South Africa and the Maghreb states respectively. Solidarity and unity between African states hangs in the balance, as a result of advancing UNSC reform and democratic space for Africa on global affairs. This article highlights that advocating for UNSC reform has likely introduced four further forces of African continental tension. **A**

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Endnotes

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- 3 African Union (2005) 'The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: "The Ezulwini Consensus"', Ext/EX.CL/2 VII, Addis Ababa, 8 March, Available at: <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/AU_Ezulwini%20Consensus.pdf>. Accessed on: 5 November 2013.
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MANAGING COMPLEX POLITICAL DILEMMAS IN WEST AFRICA: ECOWAS AND THE 2012 CRISIS IN GUINEA-BISSAU

BY FESTUS KOFI AUBYN

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Introduction

This article examines the initiatives and actions undertaken by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) under its normative frameworks on democracy and good governance to respond to the 2012 political crisis in Guinea-Bissau. Since independence in 1974 from Portugal and the end of armed conflict that confronted the country between 1998 and 1999, Guinea-Bissau has never shown signs of political stability, despite the sustained efforts by ECOWAS and other international partners to restore durable peace in the country. Indeed, it remains

Above: Since its establishment in May 1975, ECOWAS has played a critical role in promoting peace, security, good governance, democracy and economic development cooperation in West Africa.



Map No. 4063 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS
June 2012

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

one of the countries in West Africa where no democratically elected president has ever completed a term in office since independence. The most recent development of this was in April 2012, when the army staged a military *coup d'état* that suspended the country's second round of presidential elections, which were scheduled for 29 April 2012. The military coup represented yet another major setback in the country's quest to curb its long history of misrule and political instability. Constitutional order has still not been restored, but there is a transitional government in place that

GUINEA-BISSAU HAS NEVER SHOWN SIGNS OF POLITICAL STABILITY, DESPITE THE SUSTAINED EFFORTS BY ECOWAS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS TO RESTORE DURABLE PEACE IN THE COUNTRY

is working towards legislative and presidential elections in November 2013.

This article examines the effectiveness – or otherwise – of the initiatives and responses initiated by ECOWAS to resolve the 2012 political and security crises in Guinea-Bissau with the support of the wider international community. To put ECOWAS's intervention in context and proper perspective, the article begins with a discussion on ECOWAS's normative frameworks on democracy and good governance in West Africa. Next, a concise background to the crises in Guinea-Bissau is provided. This is followed by an assessment of ECOWAS's responses to the political quagmire in Guinea-Bissau. The article concludes with some pragmatic proposals on how the role of ECOWAS in finding a peaceful negotiated settlement and a lasting peace in Guinea-Bissau should evolve before and after the elections in November 2013.

ECOWAS's Normative Frameworks on Democracy and Good Governance

Since its establishment in May 1975, ECOWAS has played a critical role in promoting peace, security, good



People prepare to vote in the 2012 Guinea-Bissau elections.

governance, democracy and economic development cooperation in West Africa. Originally conceived and established to foster regional integration and economic cooperation, the unstable nature and plethora of conflicts in the West African subregion compelled ECOWAS to move beyond its economic objectives to include peace and security as a major priority, and to institutionalise conflict prevention and management as a core activity. Consequently, in response to the myriad governance and security challenges in West Africa, ECOWAS member states have adopted a number of declarations and protocols. In July 1991, ECOWAS first adopted a declaration on political principles, which among other things enjoined all member states to promote the human rights of their citizens and ensure their liberty and inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic processes the framing of the society in which they live. These constitutive principles were later incorporated into the ECOWAS revised treaty of 1993, which further emphasised the promotion and consolidation of democratic systems of governance in the region.

In 1999, as part of the institutional and normative transformation of ECOWAS, a protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security was adopted.¹ This protocol forms the backbone of West Africa's security architecture. It recognises economic and social development and the security of people and states as inextricably linked. The protocol commits member states of ECOWAS to promote and consolidate democratic governance, protect

fundamental human rights and freedoms, respect the rules of international humanitarian laws and preserve the equality of sovereign states, their territorial integrity and political independence. Building on this protocol, a supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance, which forms the foundation of ECOWAS's approach to coups and the democratisation process, was enacted in December 2001. This protocol established the guiding principles that helped foster participatory democracy, good governance, rule of law, respect for human rights and a balanced and equitable distribution of resources in the region. In particular, the protocol emphasised that access to power must be through free, fair and transparent elections, with zero tolerance for power obtained through unconstitutional means, strict adherence to democratic principles and decentralisation of powers at all levels.² However, despite the fact that the protocol has all the criteria to prevent unconstitutional changes of governments and support for member states to organise credible elections, the record of implementation, oversight, compliance and possible sanctions against member states that fall foul of these principles have been weak.³ This major weakness has accounted for most of the crises that has engulfed the subregion over the past decades, of which Guinea-Bissau is no exception.

In spite of the limitations mentioned, in January 2008 the ECOWAS conflict prevention framework (ECPF), which encapsulates all the principles inherent in the aforementioned protocols, was adopted. The ECPF classifies conflict prevention into two categories, namely:



The Guinea-Bissau ruling party presidential candidate Carlos Gomes Júnior votes in the capital city, Bissau on 18 March 2012. He was favoured to be elected president in the second round of elections scheduled for April 2012, but on 12 April 2012 the army arrested him, suspended constitutional order and disrupted the second round of elections.

1. operational prevention, which involves early warning, mediation, conciliation, preventive disarmament and preventive deployment using interactive means, such as good offices and the ECOWAS Standby Force; and
2. structural prevention, often elaborated under peace-building initiatives and comprising political, institutional (governance) and developmental reforms, capacity enhancement and advocacy on the culture of peace.⁴

However, despite the robustness of the ECPF, the perennial problem of generating the political will among ECOWAS leaders to initiate domestic policies and decisions to complement the principles and mechanisms contained in the document has hindered its effective implementation.

Understanding the Context of the 2012 Political and Security Crises in Guinea-Bissau

Guinea-Bissau has suffered from increasing political instability since the civil war in 1998–1999, and efforts to resolve the various challenges facing the country by the international community have proven futile. The country took another dangerous turn on 12 April 2012, when the army arrested the prime minister and candidate of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), Carlos Gomes Júnior, who was likely to be elected president in the second round of the presidential election that was scheduled for 29 April 2012.⁵ The coup suspended the constitutional order and disrupted the second round of the presidential election. But more importantly, it

also demonstrated the tense relations between civilian and military elites that have marred the progress of the country since independence in 1974. According to the putschists, they were motivated by a ‘secret deal’ discovered between the government and the Angolan technical military and security mission in Guinea-Bissau (MISSANG), which sought to undermine the powers of the military.⁶ MISSANG has been in Guinea-Bissau under the framework of the ECOWAS and Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) roadmap on defence and security sector reform.⁷ However, their presence in the country has fuelled tensions between the government and the army, which accuses former prime minister Gomes Júnior of using MISSANG to bolster his own position and weaken the leadership of the military. The military has consistently opposed the presence of MISSANG and persistently called for their withdrawal. However, Gomes Júnior has remained resolute in retaining MISSANG. And with him leading in the first round of elections in March 2012, the army feared a possible decision to extend the mandate of MISSANG if he were re-elected. This sequence of events formed the background of the *coup d’état*. However, it must be stated that the coup was also stimulated by the inability of the electoral process to deliver uncontroversial results. Although the election was declared free, fair and transparent by international observers, five candidates – including Kumba Yalà and Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo, who had polled second and third respectively – rejected the results, claiming registration flaws and voting fraud.⁸



ECOWAS denounced and condemned the April 2012 military coup in Guinea-Bissau and demanded the immediate restoration of constitutional order to allow for the completion of the ongoing electoral process. ECOWAS also imposed targeted sanctions against the junta leaders and diplomatic and economic sanctions against the country.

Accordingly, they demanded the annulment of the elections and the conducting of fresh elections.

ECOWAS's Response to the Political Quagmire

The 2012 *coup d'état* in Guinea-Bissau received “unanimous” condemnation internationally, and especially from ECOWAS and the African Union (AU). Consistent with its principle of zero tolerance for power obtained by unconstitutional means, as enshrined in the supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance, ECOWAS reacted promptly to the unconstitutional changes of government in Guinea-Bissau. It denounced and unreservedly condemned the coup and demanded an immediate restoration of constitutional order to allow for the completion of the ongoing electoral process.⁹ It also rejected the Transitional National Council, established by the military command to govern the country for a two-year period. And upon the refusal of the military junta to accede to its demands for a one-year transition, ECOWAS imposed targeted sanctions against the junta leaders and diplomatic, economic and financial sanctions against the country. Under intense pressure, the military command officially stepped aside for a transitional government to be established, with the mandate to organise elections within a year. Consequently, ECOWAS lifted its sanctions and deployed a 629-man police and army contingent, known as the ECOWAS Mission in Bissau (ECOMIB), to help with

security sector reform, support the transition process and facilitate the departure of MISSANG.

To some extent, the intervention by ECOWAS yielded some positive results: it brought some modicum of stability to the country and also accelerated the departure of MISSANG, which was cited by the military command as the reason for the April coup. But, in spite of this positive development, the intervention by ECOWAS was initially prejudiced by its inability to broker an inclusive transitional government. The transitional government excluded Gomes Júnior's PAIGC and only included the opposition parties and other technocrats. For instance, Nhamadjo, loser of the presidential election, headed the transitional government, while Rui Duarte de Barros, a member of the opposition who was also accused of supporting the coup in April 2012, was allocated the position of prime minister. Conspicuously missing in the transitional arrangement were members of PAIGC – the unofficial winners of the March 2012 elections and the largest political party in the country. This unfortunate situation, however, placed ECOWAS in a biased position, putting the unity of the major political stakeholders in the country in jeopardy.

Moreover, ECOWAS failed to reconcile its position on the transitional arrangements with the CPLP. However, it is useful to note that the legacy of rivalry between ECOWAS and the CPLP in Guinea-Bissau pre-dates the April 2012 coup. While ECOWAS, pushed by Nigeria, Senegal, Côte

d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, supported a year's transition, member states of the CPLP, especially Portugal and Angola, preferred a stabilisation force by the United Nations (UN) and an immediate resumption of the presidential vote. The UN, AU and the European Union (EU) also differed with ECOWAS on the issue of recognising the transitional government. For instance, at the time that ECOWAS lifted its sanctions on Guinea-Bissau, AU sanctions on the country were still active, creating credibility problems for both organisations. Indeed, the rifts between all these stakeholders that had a shared goal of restoring constitutional order and contributing towards lasting peace in Guinea-Bissau has posed serious threats to the transition process. This notwithstanding, the successful conduct of a joint assessment by the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS and the CPLP from 16–21 December 2012 was an encouraging sign of increasing cooperation and harmonisation of positions among these international and regional actors. The fact that there is now the creation of a more inclusive transitional government, the election of the president of the National Electoral Commission, the creation of the National Commission for Planning and Strategic Coordination and the revision of the electoral code for the conduct of the general elections on 24 November 2013, is a plus for ECOWAS and other regional actors.

Towards a Peaceful Negotiated Settlement and Lasting Peace in Guinea-Bissau


There is no doubt that the upcoming presidential and legislative election, set for 24 November 2013, is critical to the restoration of political stability and democracy in Guinea-Bissau, taking into account the end of the transition period on 31 December 2013. In this regard, all outstanding challenges need to be resolved, including the establishment of an improved electoral register and the adoption of a code of conduct that will allow all political stakeholders to participate safely in the electoral process. The pursuit of a constructive and inclusive dialogue by the transitional government, aimed at building consensus on these issues, is also imperative. More importantly, the transitional authorities, with the support of ECOWAS and the wider international community, should also ensure that the impending national elections in November 2013 are credible, transparent, inclusive and democratic, so that the outcome will be acceptable to all political actors.

Beyond the elections, there should also be concerted international action by ECOWAS, the CPLP, AU, UN and the EU to continue the defence and security sector reform processes that were ongoing before the coup and renew the fight against drug trafficking, which is the country's major bane. The establishment of the UN Integrated Office for



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Guinea-Bissau President Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo attends an ECOWAS meeting in Nigeria (11 November 2012).



Leaders and representatives from ECOWAS arrive for a summit on the crisis in Mali and Guinea-Bissau, in Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast (27 February 2013).

Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) to fight against drug trafficking and organised crimes, in collaboration with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), is a positive development. However, there is the need for a regional response by ECOWAS to consolidate the efforts of the UN. Moreover, support for the socio-economic stabilisation of the country and the fight against impunity and promotion of human rights and justice should also be priorities. Last, the military command, which still remains influential in the country, should be totally excluded from the political arena. The military needs to refrain from any acts that are likely to jeopardise the process of inclusive dialogue, national reconciliation and the implementation of reforms, which are key to the long-term stability of Guinea-Bissau. Towards this end, there is the need for effective civilian oversight and supervision of defence and security forces in the aftermath of the elections. In summary, there is the need for profound reforms in all the major sectors of the country's political, governance, defence, security, justice and institutional systems. Undertaking all these reform processes is essential, and represents the only panacea for the country's long-term stabilisation and prosperity. **A**

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REVOLUTION IN NORTH AFRICA: IMPETUS FOR POLITICAL TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY OR SUBREGIONAL INSECURITY?

BY ABOSEDE OMOWUMI BABATUNDE



REUTERS / THE BIGGER PICTURE

Introduction

The revolution in the North African Arab world (known as the Arab Spring), which started in Tunisia and spread to Egypt and Libya, was the first time that a popular uprising had overthrown autocratic leaders. While the movements in Tunisia and Egypt achieved regime change through relatively peaceful protests, the Libyan revolt succeeded through armed rebellion.¹ The Arab Spring may be the beginning of a wave of revolution that will spread beyond the Middle East and become a global contagion. A new order is taking shape from North Africa to the Middle East, but as the dust settles, will the quest for human dignity and democracy continue?

It is hardly contentious to assert that the 21st century populations of many states in Africa are stirring politically

Above: A Lebanese activist carries a caricature during a protest in solidarity with anti-government protesters in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain, in front of the Arab League headquarters, in Beirut (October 2011). The caricature depicts (from Right-Left) Tunisia's former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt's former President Hosni Mubarak, Libya's former leader Muammar Gaddafi, Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh and Syria's President Bashar Al-Assad.



Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali visits Mohamed Al Bouazzizi, the protester who set himself alight during a demonstration against unemployment, at a hospital in Ben Arous (28 December 2010). Bouazzizi, a vegetable seller, died on 5 January 2011, igniting nationwide protests that forced President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to flee the country.

and seething with unrest. People are becoming acutely conscious of social injustice to an unprecedented degree, and are growing resentful of their perceived lack of political dignity. The nearly universal access to radio, television and, increasingly, the Internet, is creating a community of shared perceptions and envy that can be galvanised and channelled by demagogic political or religious passions. These energies transcend sovereign borders and pose a challenge to existing states as well as to the existing global hierarchy.

There have been over 60 democratic uprisings since Portugal in 1974 and a total of 323 revolutions since 1900, and they have always happened unexpectedly.² As Shirky observes, popular uprisings are created over time, and emerge when a closed society's open secrets become "public truths".³ This implies that uprisings became inevitable when the people could no longer bear the autocratic and repressive rule of their governments. While elites were becoming rich at unprecedented levels, more people lived below poverty levels and lacked access to basic services, such as housing and health, or basic commodities, such as bread.⁴ Is the Arab Spring an impetus for political transition to democracy in North Africa and democratic consolidation in sub-Saharan Africa? This article examines the implications of the revolution for democratisation processes in North Africa and security in sub-Saharan Africa.

Citing the example of what occurred in the Tunisia revolt, Shirky refers to "shared awareness" of the regime brutality.⁵ He implies that Tunisia was not in a state of grinding poverty, but rather people felt a lack of professional fulfilment because of the failure of the government to provide gainful employment for them. According to him, this explains why a young man, Mohamed Bouazizi, was not professionally happy. He had to contend with the realities of being a street vendor to provide for his family. He was continually harassed by the omnipresent police over his lack of trade licence. Feeling excluded and defeated, Bouazizi's breaking point came on 17 December 2010 when he was slapped twice across the face by a female police officer for being unable to pay the bribe she demanded, leading to the confiscation of his goods. The humiliation inflicted was very painful, and he set himself on fire. He died two weeks later. This incident sparked what became the Arab revolution.

While crediting the social media for its triumph over the Tunisian government's complete censorship of information-sharing, and for spreading the news about Bouazizi's actions, Nolam notes that on the same day Bouazizi set himself on fire, people saw stark evidence of the brutality of the regime under which they had lived for two decades.⁶ During the revolt in Tunisia, while the security agencies initially supported the government, they later turned against the



Anti-government protesters attend a rally to commemorate the first anniversary of the death of Mohamed Bouazizi (pictured in the posters). The banner reads: “We are all Bouazizi” (17 December 2011).

government and detained its allies. The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia caused its president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, to flee his homeland. As Bouazizi’s name and deeds become immortalised, the key question is: why did his actions ignite a ‘fire’ across the Arabic world that shows no sign of letting up, and what is the solution? According to Abdalla, despite the proliferation of education and higher degrees, various governments across the Middle East had, over time, fallen short of societal expectations in their provision of employment and basic services.⁷ Instead, the besieged Arabic regimes depended upon repressive laws for survival, alienating themselves from the Arab youth in the process.

Egypt became the next North African Arab state to undergo ‘the Tunisian effect’, when Egyptians revolted against dictatorship, neoliberalism and imperialism. The Hosni Mubarak administration was not only undemocratic and corrupt, it had also pursued a programme of privatisation and deregulation that destroyed welfare services and local industries, increased unemployment and poverty, and significantly widened the gap between the rich and poor. Efforts by Mubarak to avert the revolt through the formation of a new government and promises of dialogue were ineffective. What gave the uprising a boost was the support received from the security agencies – particularly the Egyptian army, which not only acknowledged the legitimate

rights of the people to protest but also assured them that the armed forces would not use force against the people during the demonstrations.

The role of the social media in enabling the youth to mobilise and depose autocratic regimes was crucial in the Arab revolution. Social media has not only made the Arab world’s ‘hidden truths’ public, but has also created a shared responsibility among the Arab youth, thereby lifting them from their humiliating isolation from the wider world and the political scene. The Arab awakening can be encapsulated in one very expressive and politically charged concept that has been absent from the North African Arab political arena for too long: “the people.”⁸

In Libya, months of violent conflict culminated in the killing of former Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. A report of the International Crisis Group notes that Gaddafi was able to hold onto power for so long for a simple reason: the nature of the state he created.⁹ Throughout his rule, he ensured that there was no institution strong enough to challenge him. This included the army, which he deliberately kept weak and divided, and bereft of a serious middle-ranking officer corps or well-trained rank and file troops. Unlike in Egypt or Tunisia, the Libyan army was in no position to act as a neutral buffer between the protesters and the regime, let alone play a decisive role in forcing Gaddafi to leave. The



People gather at Tahrir square in Cairo, Egypt to protest against Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi's decision to grab sweeping new powers (24 November 2012).

armed nature of the Libyan movement is undoubtedly very significant for the future. As the rebel-led Libyan authority exercises state power, their conduct towards Gaddafi loyalists and supporters will be a crucial indicator of their ability to produce a viable settlement in Libyan society. What kind of boost will such uprisings give to the emancipatory movement across the Arab world?

Indeed, the political, economic and social ramifications of the Arab uprising are still unfolding. As youth populations in Yemen, Jordan, Syria, Algeria and Morocco begin to demand improved economic conditions and a more active role in their government, the long-term impact of the Arab revolution will become more clear.¹⁰ The revolution has also sent a strong signal to other dictators in the Middle East, North Africa and across sub-Saharan Africa that the people can no longer tolerate oppression. Indeed, the removal of these North African dictators should be a lesson to despots

THE RECENT REVOLUTIONS CAN BE CONSIDERED TRIUMPHS FOR DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM

who never hold elections, but still retain power by crushing all opposition. The recent revolutions can be considered triumphs for democracy and freedom. Yet, there is no gainsaying the fact that across much of the Arab world, popular uprisings could very well lead to governments that are not necessarily more free or democratic than those they replace.

Political Transition to Democracy in North Africa

Unprecedented popular demonstrations in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya led to the overturning of a century of autocratic rule in North Africa. The Arab Spring has largely not spread south of the Sahara, but Africans are now less willing to stand by and accept stolen elections, gross abuse of power and inequality. The Arab revolution has cemented the belief that transitions to democracy are never a smooth affair. Libya has proved to be the most perilous quest for political transition. Democracy is gaining ascendancy in Africa; however, as Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, collapsing the old regime in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya is the easy part; building a functioning civil society is the real challenge.

As democracy advocate and theorist Carothers states, democracy breakout and transition has two initial stages.

In the first stage, a dictator will be toppled, while the second stage involves the more daunting job of building a new democratic form of governance and making it deliver what people need in the way of livelihood and security, in addition to rights and justice.¹¹ While it is too early to tell how well democracy will flourish across the North African Arab region, a different trend has been set for human political aspirations.¹² Shehadi argues that the Arab democratic revolution – if that is what it proves to be – is spreading.¹³ The experiences of protest and change in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Morocco and Yemen may vary substantially, Shehadi notes, yet they also seem to be components of a great collective shift, which will have reverberations far beyond the region.

However, Abdalla argues that as past experiences indicate, succeeding in toppling a dictatorial regime and building democratic institutions are no guarantee for implementing democratic reforms that will lead to development and prosperity.¹⁴ Democracy is not just a matter of establishing institutions; it is also a culture.¹⁵ Yaakoub further argues that in the Arab world, democratic institutions were established before democratic thinking – unlike the Western experience, where modern thinking paved the way for the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, which led to the establishment of democratic systems. In his view, herein lies where the North African Arab people will find the contrast

between the prevailing mass culture – which is religiously fundamental, militantly revolutionary, autocratic or dictatorial – on the one hand, and a democratic culture, on the other. Yet, one obvious fact – as the democratic experience of Eastern Europe has shown – is that democracy cannot be exported or imported; it has to emerge from the people in question.

Abdalla points out that similar experiences, such as democratic uprisings in the Philippines and Bangladesh, revealed that successful struggles for democracy in 1986 in the Philippines and 1991 in Bangladesh did not necessarily bring about improvement in people's lives. Rather, poverty is still rampant, democracy is dysfunctional, to say the least, and development has not progressed to the level of expectations that people had at the time of the revolutions. If anything, Bangladesh and the Philippines are representative of the reality into which the Arab world must avoid being trapped, while the case of Iran is a reminder that it is possible for a popular uprising to result in the unexpected – that is, a resurgence of Islamist extremists.

Turkey is an example of a successful transition to democracy. While events such as those in Turkey might ideally be possible, one needs to remember that it took Turkey several decades to achieve what it is has today.

The Arab democratic transition is being hampered by the impatience of those driving the Arab awakening. As Fischer states, democracy that does not translate into regular



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People shout slogans on hunger and poverty during an anti-government protest in Cairo, Egypt (22 February 2013).



Immigrants, fleeing unrest in Libya, unload their belongings in Agadez, northern Niger (September 2011).

dinners on the table is a democracy that is bound to fail.¹⁶ There is, therefore, a need for economic aid and the opening of the European Union and United States markets if the West wants to contribute to the success of the Middle East's democratic awakening. Abdalla argues that the example of South Korea, in terms of successful development and the institutionalisation of effective democracy after the 1987 popular movement, provides hope to the Arab revolutions.¹⁷

In this light, Yaakoub states that the challenge for the Arab world in the coming days is the absence of an Arab model for democratic governance that can be referred to and used as a source of inspiration.¹⁸ Yaakoub cautions that this affects the present as it affected the past, despite attempts by some to create a commonality between the notion of the Islamic *shura* and democracy.¹⁹ In this regard, those seeking to shield the millions of Arabic people from further upheaval and uncertainty might have to think about how to meet the aspirations of the unemployed and economically excluded, whose departure from the previous regime was not their ultimate goal.

Implications for Regional Security in Sub-Saharan Africa

The North African Arab uprising has far-reaching implications for regional security in sub-Saharan Africa. A tragedy of epic proportions may develop in some African

countries that border the nations in revolt. These states are often not equipped to deal with the flood of refugees that result. For example, tens of thousands of people fled Libya in the wake of the civil war that erupted there and a refugee crisis is building in Niger, where truckloads of refugees are arriving every day following a treacherous journey across the Sahara desert. The return of Gaddafi's armed mercenaries also threatens to destabilise a number of democratising Sahelian countries, notably Mali and Niger. The revolt that led to the death of Gaddafi in Libya will have a regional impact. For Egypt and Tunisia, they hold the long-term prospect of a like-minded neighbour who will no longer bear social injustice and lack of political dignity. For rulers in Syria and Yemen, the revolution poses some existential questions – such as, is there a lesson for leaders who hold on to power at all costs? What is at stake and to what extent will these leaders go to win?

The death of former Libyan leader Gaddafi was not the end of Libya's problems. There will be complex effects throughout the Sahel region. The major challenges ahead are enormous and not least are issues of security in the country, the potential proliferation of Libyan weapons and the prospects for a smooth political transition. Libya has also been a leading funder of the African Union, accounting for roughly 15% of its total annual operating budget.²⁰ Accordingly, the rapid drawdown of Libyan assets may

destabilise certain African economies.²¹ Likewise, the flow of unsecured arms and mercenaries from Libya could spark greater and extended instability in a number of African countries, particularly Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sudan and Guinea. The recent coup in Mali will add a new layer of insecurity to the Sahara region battling Al-Qaeda agents, coupled with a flood of weapons trafficked from Libya since the fall of Gaddafi. The incipient Tuareg uprising in Mali is also part of the fallout from Gaddafi's decline, as it resulted in the uncontrolled movement of weapons and armed elements in the region.

A new report from the International Crisis Group focuses on the potentially strained relationship between Chad and Libya's Transitional National Council (TNC) and the loss of remittances from Chadian workers in Libya.²² There is also a strained relationship between Libya and Algeria. The fall of Gaddafi – an old ally of the Algerian regime – has left Algeria in an awkward situation in its relations with Libya. Algeria has tainted its relationship with the deposed Libyan government, but it still seeks to build a friendly relationship with the post-revolution administration.

The scope of threats and changes transpiring in the North African Arab region requires stronger counter-terror collaboration between the region and the West. The need for tighter arms control in the region should be seen as a topmost priority. The threat from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the implications of the Libyan crisis in terms of arms proliferation and the uncontrolled movement of armed elements, endanger peace and security in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, the possible implications of Libyan unrest on regional stability should be urgently addressed. It requires strong international cooperation to uncover Libyan weapons, especially land-air missiles that may have fallen into the hands of terrorist groups.

Conclusion

The revolutions in the North African Arab world have the components of a great collective shift, which have and will continue to have reverberations far beyond the region. The subsequent resignations of long-time autocrats in Egypt and Tunisia, the toppling of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, and a shift toward constitutional monarchy in Morocco have dramatically reshaped state-citizen relations in this long-static region. With tentative steps toward democracy, long-held assumptions of public passivity and the inviolability of stable, autocratic states in the Arab world have withered. Indeed, the Arab Spring gave a major boost to the emancipatory movement across the Arab world. As the political, economic and social ramifications of the Arab uprising continue to unfold, the long-term impact of the Arab revolution will become clearer. **A**

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MALI'S TEACHABLE MOMENT: THE PRIMACY OF CIVIL AUTHORITY IN SECURITY SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE

BY CHRISTOPHER HOLSHEK



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As Kenya, Niger, Nigeria and other countries contend with a newly surging threat of terrorism, it is tempting, especially from outside Africa, to look at African security sector shortfalls as essentially a function of improving military capabilities at tactical and operational levels, particularly for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Yet, the May 2012 *coup d'état* in Mali and, more importantly, the restoration of civil governance going on there now, offers an opportunity to understand the problem of security sector development – and especially security assistance provided from outside Africa – from a much broader and more strategic peacebuilding perspective. Doing so may

serve more than to avoid the pitfalls of focusing foreign assistance largely on the security sector in general and security assistance efforts on military combat training in particular, which turns out to exacerbate the internal instabilities of weak and fragile states. It may also lead to stronger security institutions and civil-military relations that come closer to addressing the real drivers of conflict, thus reducing the vulnerabilities emblematic of fragile states

Above: Renegade Malian soldiers appear on state television to declare that they had seized power in the country (22 March 2012).



Malian soldiers undergo training in urban combat, conducted by the European Union training mission in Koulikoro (August 2013).

that violent extremist organisations look to exploit in the first place.

The Security Sector may be the Problem before it is the Solution

No doubt, weak civil-military relations and institutions in Mali are chief among causal factors that led to the 2012 coup, after the Mali Defence and Security Forces (MDSF) were unable to prevent Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) from taking over a broad swath of northern Mali and then using it to mount attacks outside those borders. However, the surprisingly swift collapse of what was perceived to be one of Africa's more enduring democracies was due more to internal than external factors. The MDSF, like so many security forces in such vulnerable states, has been poorly led, equipped, organised and trained, as well as fragmented and incapable of keeping its soldiers from committing atrocities against civilians. There were widespread reports of human rights abuses before and during the coup, as well as for months following French military intervention in January 2013. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and others reported on MDSF reprisals when it returned to northern Mali, where it has had a history of repressive military administration. Additional reports have indicated that some military officers and other officials may be linked to the drug trade, which is far more established and widespread than AQIM.

Herein lies the first vital lesson for security assistance in an environment and an era in which the security of tribal communities is at least as critical as the security of states, and in which the security sector goes far beyond the military to include police, justice and other internal security instruments. Poor governance and weak civil society institutions; socio-economic shortfalls, especially with respect to youth and women; illicit activities, such as transnational drug and human trafficking; and poor civil-military relations, evidenced by the behaviour of one's own security forces, may pose an even greater threat than terrorism. These factors, in fact, exemplify the comprehensive drivers of conflict in which spoiler groups such as transnational criminal networks and terrorist organisations seek to find advantage.

The civil-military performance of forces such as the MDSF suggests that it and other African security forces may have been trained with an improper focus. Much European and most United States (US) involvement in Mali and the rest of Africa has zeroed in on terrorism, which most locals do not perceive to be their main existential challenge. Despite more recent US Africa Command (AFRICOM) rhetoric, military-to-military efforts to build partnership capacity have been overwhelmingly resourced (by as much as 9:1) for tactical train and equip programmes for partnership warfighting capability, rather than more strategic institution-building and the education of officers on their civic responsibilities.



The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was launched with a ceremony in Bamako marking the transfer of authority from the forces of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to the United Nations mission (1 July 2013).

It is not that there was a lack of help to African militaries preparing to deal with emerging security challenges – there may actually have been too much of the wrong kind of training, relative to other security sector development requirements. The US Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) initiative to shore up national forces fighting terrorists spent US\$353 million from 2005 to 2010, then programmed over US\$600 million more over the next five years, with a broadened mandate including strengthening counterterrorism capabilities and institutionalising cooperation among regional security forces; denying support and sanctuary through targeted development assistance; promoting democratic governance; discrediting terrorist ideology; and reinforcing bilateral military ties.

Compounding this perception of imbalanced security assistance is the increased operation of unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and targeting of terrorists in Africa, including Mali. In addition, TSCTP civil-military operations (CMO) training has been modelled on US doctrine, which stresses defeating terrorists and other threats more than helping to build governance and civil authority. Two years before the coup in Mali, a Department of Defense programme manager assessment of Trans-Sahel CMO training noted that it risked exacerbating unhealthy civil-military balances there. In the aftermath of the coup in

Mali, US State Department official Todd Moss determined that the US “was too narrowly focused on counterterrorism capabilities and missed the bigger picture”, while former AFRICOM Commander General Carter Ham recognised its failure to pass on “values, ethics and military ethos” in its security sector assistance to date.¹

The Primacy of Civil Authority

This leads to the second and paramount insight of this article: if the central focus of peace and stability is effective governance and human security, and the central nexus of a broader security sector is the civil-military relationship, then the primacy of civil authority is at the crux of peace and security, democratisation and security sector development and assistance in conflict areas such as Mali. Establishing a strong, sustainable civil-military relationship that institutionalises the primacy of civil authority and links security sector development to civil society peacebuilding efforts is at the heart of addressing the main drivers of conflict, as integral – and not additional – to the professionalisation and capacity-building of security forces.

The primacy of civil authority must, therefore, be integral to all international security assistance efforts, whether in Africa or elsewhere. A key way to build confidence in, as well as the capacity of, security forces is in-depth leadership education training on military



The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali provides training in crowd control for the Malian police force (June 2013).

subordination to civilian rule, and for military support of civil dialogue and reconciliation at community levels, as well as the designation, education and training of civil-military specialists. Moreover, inculcating a public service ethic among junior as well as senior police, paramilitary and military leaders as integral to their professional code, for example, helps temper poor behaviour and thus improve the civil-military relationship over time. In other words, civil-military civics comes from the bottom up even more than the top down.

There are signs that things are changing for the better. For one, international peacekeeping and peacebuilding assistance to Mali seems to be well-framed. The United Nations (UN) Multidimensional Integration Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), building up to 11 200 troops and 1 440 police, is the first UN field mission that implements UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2086 of January 2013, which reinforces the concept of mission integration in the UN Capstone Doctrine and multi-dimensional peacekeeping from a full-spectrum perspective. UNSCR 2086 also sees peacekeeping as “early peacebuilding” and stresses the importance of transition management. It emphasises that “integrated action on the ground by security and development actors requires coordination with national authorities in order to stabilize and improve the security situation and help in economic recovery, and underlines the

importance of integrated efforts among all United Nations entities in the field to promote coherence in the United Nations’ work in conflict and post-conflict situations”.²

MINUSMA has assumed the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) charge to “contribute to the rebuilding of the capacity of the [MDSF]” to meet concerns about “continued interference” of some MDSF in the work of the transitional authorities. Under UNSCR 2100, MINUSMA’s mandate includes the protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance and national and international efforts towards rebuilding the Malian security sector. Some of the original French intervention force remains to perform counterterrorism support, while Mali’s newly elected president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, has called on nearby nations to create a regional multilateral force that could intervene quickly to respond to these threats, rather than depend on Western forces.

Meanwhile, hundreds of British and European Union Training Mission (EUTM) troops have deployed to “train and advise... under the control of legitimate civilian authorities, in order to contribute to restore their military capacity with a view to enabling them to engage in combat operations aiming at restoring the country’s territorial integrity”.³ Although most of the training is tactical in nature, the EUTM is taking care to include leadership training and professional ethics instruction, even though such changes

PERHAPS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IS IN HOW MALI ITSELF IS APPROACHING ITS OWN EFFORTS TO LEAD SECURITY SECTOR DEVELOPMENT – REFLECTING ANOTHER PRINCIPLE THAT, FIRST AND FOREMOST, SECURITY SECTOR DEVELOPMENT BEGINS AT HOME

in organisational culture require intensive steady-state engagement for years, not just months. Still, at the closing ceremony for the EUTM training of the Elou Battalion, MDSF Chief of Staff General Ibrahim Dahirou Dembele exhorted graduates of the first 10-week course “to give the best of yourselves to earn the trust placed in you”, and set the example that symbolises the new Malian army.⁴

The US is also taking a new approach. The lifting of the suspension of foreign assistance to Mali was predicated on the new government having taken “tangible steps to assert civilian authority over the military”.⁵ The third of six assistance priority areas is to support rebuilding security institutions and security sector reform in coordination with multilateral partners and the government of Mali, with greater emphasis on institution-building, commensurate with a new approach to security sector assistance under

Presidential Policy Directive 23. In anticipation of this, AFRICOM Director of Strategy, Plans and Programs, Major General Robert Hooper, noted the “underlying premise of our institutional capacity-building efforts is that military forces must be subordinate to civil authority and accepted as legitimate members of a civil society based on the rule of law”.⁶ Still, surging US security assistance in Africa is geared largely “to train and advise indigenous forces to tackle emerging terrorist threats”.⁷

Security Sector Development Begins at Home

Perhaps the most significant change is in how Mali itself is approaching its own efforts to lead security sector development – reflecting another principle that, first and foremost, security sector development begins at home. Although the new government has stressed advancing the operational effectiveness of the MDSF, it has also recognised the need for much better civil-military governance than before the coup. Al Maamoun Baba Lamine Keita, Ambassador of the Republic of Mali to the US, pointed out that the crisis in Mali demonstrated the need for “African governments to become more transparent about defense spending and budgeting. Taking greater ownership of African security will require that the defense sector becomes more accountable to parliaments than is currently the case.”⁸

Among its first acts, the new government has dismissed the military committee on reform, comprised



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Malian *gendarmerie* check the luggage of passengers on a bus at a checkpoint in Sarakala (18 January 2013).



A military delegation from Bamako meets with the commander of the Chadian contingent of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali, during the delegation's visit to northern Mali (27 July 2013).

of officers who led the 2012 coup, including General Amadou Sanogo. In addition to tackling corruption, the government's Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission is looking to identify the armed groups eligible to participate in the national dialogue, record human rights violations, help strengthen social cohesion and national unity, and focus on dialogue and peace. Inclusion of the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA) and other offshoots of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) that have expressed their willingness to participate in collective dialogue will be essential for the reconciliation process, as well as to the reconstitution of the MDSF as a force more representative of Malian society. Despite recent Tuareg unrest, the government is reaching out to them in reconciliation, including the partial release of political prisoners charged with war crimes and other abuses.

In some localities in the north, paramilitary units (*gendarmerie*) are accompanying regular military units to question detainees and investigate disciplinary lapses by soldiers, as a confidence-building measure. The MDSF has been accepting this practice, with the encouragement of Human Rights Watch and other groups. Using the *gendarmerie* as a civil-military check-and-balance in the field has merit and promise, but it is not yet clear whether this is effective and sustainable or whether the *gendarmerie* is appropriately organised, trained and authorised to perform this role. Nevertheless, such practices are tacit recognition of the division of labour between police and

gendarmerie forces, whose primary mission is internal community security, and the military, whose main task is to protect against external threats.

Getting the Multilateral Act Together

While all of these efforts at security assistance and security sector reform are indeed promising, they remain largely uncoordinated. This poses the risk of being at cross-purposes and diminishing the intended outcome of both better operational performance and civil-military governance. The development of security sector capacity based on the imposition of a foreign nation-state system on natural (that is, tribal) boundaries has proven to be counterproductive. Disaggregated operational doctrines and civil-military models can simply overwhelm the absorptive capacity of host nation institutions, as well as run counter to national cohesion and unity of purpose, contributing to the cleavages that characterise weak and fragile states. Western countries and organisations must, therefore, resist the tendency to reach for what is familiar to them but is not necessarily appropriate for those they are assisting.

US CMO training in Africa, for example, is very much a carry-over of US counterinsurgency and counterterrorism practices from Iraq and Afghanistan, slanted towards winning hearts and minds in order to find the 'bad guys' and eliminate them. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European Union (EU) civil-military cooperation



French soldiers look on as Malian soldiers practice manning a checkpoint and arresting a suspect (May 2013).

(CIMIC) doctrine is, likewise, more tactical and operational than strategic, and has as its core aim to assist fulfilment of the military mission, rather than uphold civil governance and authority and develop civil society. In any case, these operational practices are based on a Western view of the problem, and not on an African perspective.

Whilst US, EU or NATO security sector tactical training and civil-military capacity development assistance are no doubt helpful, none of these civil-military models alone is best suited for security sector development assistance in Mali or Africa. In addition to being threats-based, military-centric and not African, they do not stress the primacy of civil authority sufficiently, lack robust transition management strategies and do not incorporate a more strategic peacebuilding approach that features civilian leadership, bottom-up human security, local ownership and ‘whole-of-society’ capacity development.

Greater reference to a more appropriate, universal civil-military model would go far to mitigate the unintended impacts of differing and often confusing concepts in countries such as Mali, and help get the multilateral act together. Specifically, civil-military capacity development to peacekeeping troop-contributing country forces in Africa should be based on international frameworks such

as UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC), which was developed and validated largely in Africa.

UN-CIMIC, which is more about coordination among the civilian, police and military components of the international presence than a function of military command and control, is not a doctrine. Rather, it is the international civil-military framework for UN-mandated peacekeeping forces, including the African Union and other regional peace and security organisations. Based on international legal frameworks, peacekeeping principles and international criteria on the use of force, its leading principle is the primacy of civil authority and it centres its activities on civil-military transition management – from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Adaptive and culturally sensitive, it integrates universal principles for peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance, human rights, security sector development and so on.⁹

Accordingly, security assistance programmes such as the US State Department Global Peace Operations Initiative and Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance should refer first to international peacekeeping frameworks as the baseline for training and building partnership capacity, rather than rely primarily on US doctrines and

then bring in multilateral norms. In addition, in order to foster greater sustainability, the effort should be more indirect – the training of trainers and building civil-military education and training institutional capacities, rather than direct training to military personnel and units. The implied task, of course, is that EU, NATO and US government civil and military players in Africa will need to be more familiar with UN-based peacekeeping and peacebuilding, security sector development and civil-military coordination if they are to help their clients learn them.

All of this illustrates another important insight. For the US in particular, its interests in Mali, the region and Africa per se are better pursued multilaterally, through more sophisticated strategies than employed in the Middle East and Central Asia – in a careful balance between multilateral and bilateral approaches that are more sensitive to regional and local determinants than one's own national security imperatives. As threats, challenges and opportunities impacting Mali and Africa take on more multilateral and regional dimensions, security assistance approaches must correspondingly incorporate more multilateral and regional approaches – working by, with and through such partners as much as possible to minimise the foreign military footprint. In the Sahel, this means working through the Global Counterterrorism Forum to identify capacity-building needs in the region and mobilise the necessary support and expertise needed to meet these challenges. It also means full implementation of the UN Integrated Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel.

At all levels of interaction, the delivery of security assistance must itself be a demonstration of the primacy of civil authority as the paramount principle of security sector reform, and any advisory efforts should take into account more local and legitimate human security concerns, rather than externally driven anxieties about terrorism and insurgency. Rebalancing security assistance towards institution-building under a broader, civil society-centric understanding of security; referring to multilateral frameworks to improve regional collaboration on security challenges; and, most of all, integrating the primacy of civil authority in all aspects of the applied civil-military relationship, is not just something external actors should look to do. Africans should, likewise, lead their own security sector development based on these principles, in order to demand adherence to them from security assistance providers.

Precisely because of the recent spate of terrorism in Africa, Mali offers a teachable moment in conflict transformation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The primacy of civil authority – a key component of any democratic civil society – must be integral to all international security sector-related efforts in Africa, in practice as much as policy. More an application of strategy than tactics, it helps mitigate the 'slippery slope' of deepening and unending non-African security engagement

on the continent, driven by a constant obsession with 'bad guys' that leads to the exacerbation of the drivers of conflict, which opens opportunities for terrorists and other illicit organisations to exploit. What this all portends, especially for external actors, is a more humble, collaborative and demonstrative form of security assistance and thus security sector development in Africa. **A**

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RAISING AFRICA AND THE PARADOX OF ITS MEDIA IMAGE: CAN AFRICAN JOURNALISTS FINALLY RESCUE THE SITUATION?

BY HAWA NOOR MOHAMMED

Introduction and Background

In an increasingly globalised world, border porosity between nations has heightened, leading to new levels of interdependence between states as never witnessed before. The effect of this is the massive transnational flow of goods, people, technology and information, which has contributed to increased awareness in cultures and exchange of ideas that were previously enclosed and segmented. The free flow of information beyond national borders also translates to change in the action of, among others, the mass media – due to the fact that besides it being an agent of

the process, it is also influenced. More content diversity and cross-border partnerships are therefore some of the expected changes in the sector, calling for more research,

Above: Persistent negative media representation of Africa still exists. The images of Africa that foreigners often receive include unending political riots, fraudulent elections, burning villages, violence in various forms, war-torn towns and cities and diseased people.

professionalism and strict observance of media ethics while handling such a bulk of diverse information.

As transnational events unfold, reports of new levels of optimism concerning Africa's development and portrayal in the international media have also been witnessed. Topping the list is an unexpected example of a shift in stand by *The Economist* magazine, which about a decade ago referred to Africa as the hopeless continent,¹ to a now hopeful one² – something that has been echoed by *Time* magazine. This was a surprise to many. The motivation behind the new title can be understood based on historical events concerning Africa's image in the international – mostly Western – media in the past decades, which generated both controversy and debate, characterised by counter-accusations on the fairness of such reports.

It is against this backdrop that this article will first trace the historical synopsis of the negative portrayal of Africa in the media, followed by an assessment of the current situation and the existing gaps, before finally looking at the stake of African media practitioners in intervening in the situation through fairness in reporting. The basis of this article is secondary literature and an empirical study conducted in Kenya in 2010.³

Stereotypes about Africa: The Genesis

In the 5th century BC when Greek historians visited the unexplored world, they portrayed Africa as being inhabited by savages and non-human creatures, as opposed to the superior Caucasians. Long after that, Charles Darwin's evolution theory⁴ in the 19th century replicated the stereotypes further by portraying Africans as a still-evolving race – something that further informed 18th and 19th century European explorers' perceptions. When colonisation started in the late 20th century, reproduction of the prejudices and biased images continued such that Africa was viewed on the basis of its problems, hence contributing to the treatment of Africans with absolute inhumanity to justify the need for their 'civilization' through colonialism. Accounts and images of these events are documented in films, books and travel reports that portray colonised Africa falsely to support colonisation.

Later, the 1960s portrayal of developing countries in Western media started sparking accusations of a breach in journalistic codes of conduct on the part of Western journalists, which was seen as the cause for an imbalance in the international flow of information. Efforts to rectify the problem led to the formation of the late 1970s 16-member MacBride Commission – a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) panel that was charged with the responsibility of investigating and recommending ways for more representation and equitability in global media representation. This was, however, short-lived. After massive work, the recommendations of the panel – titled *Many Voices One World*, calling for a New

World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) – were quashed by the United States (US) on suspicion of being attempts to suppress freedom of the press by a few self-seeking developing countries' leaders. This marked an impasse in the discussions, resulting in increased marginalisation and capitalisation on negative news and ethnocentric metaphors in the selection and processing of reports, particularly about Africa, in the following decades. Edward Said elaborates on this discourse in depth in *Orientalism*,⁵ in relation to the Middle East case, which is also relevant to Africa.

The Persistent Problem

On revisiting the dynamics almost five decades since the call for a NWICO, persistent negative media representation of Africa still generates debate. Terms such as 'dark', 'hopeless', 'disease manifested' (particularly HIV/AIDS) and 'war-torn', to name but a few, are still in use to refer to Africa, both informally and in mass media. An observer thus summarised this comment: "Framed by media reports, the image of Africa especially for Americans consist of tales of unending political riots, cases of fraudulent elections and scenes of drug-crazed teenage soldiers burning villages, amputating hands and feet of their foes and raping women, both young and old."⁶

It is such negative reports that promote stereotypical perceptions and contribute to fuelling racial animosity, given the power of the mass media to influence. People who have never been to the continent often come to believe that "Africa is one place where everyone speaks 'African', practises an 'African' religion and suffers from an 'African' disease or is a subject of a corrupt 'African' regime."⁷

AS TRANSNATIONAL EVENTS UNFOLD, REPORTS OF NEW LEVELS OF OPTIMISM CONCERNING AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT AND PORTRAYAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA HAVE ALSO BEEN WITNESSED

The Myth about 'Tribe' and 'Africa'

A common example on the use of the terms 'tribe' and 'Africa' enhances an understanding of the issue at hand. Notwithstanding the reality that Africa is comprised of 50-plus countries, reference to it is often that of a homogeneous single entity, yet the same is less applied in reference to other continents. It is, therefore, common for Africans with dark skin complexions to be easily mistaken as hailing from Africa and not their specific countries of origin – yet, in some instances, such people may not even originate in Africa. Contrary to dominant perceptions, Africa is one of the most diverse continents, comprising thousands



Journalists and employees of the Daily Monitor newspaper, with their mouths taped shut, take part in a protest against the closure of their premises by the Uganda government, following a police raid that disabled the newspaper's printing press (20 May 2013).

of ethnic groups and languages. An underestimation of its diversity in projecting it as one homogenous entity, especially in the mass media, is a gross oversimplification.

The use of the term 'tribe' as opposed to 'ethnic group' also amounts to simplification, especially when used together with other negative connotations such as poverty, disease, civil war and so on. The term is a biased connotation that was used to depict the primitivism of those Africans who lived unsophisticated traditional lifestyles during colonial times, yet it is still synonymously used with the term 'ethnic group' in mass media today. Kenya's 2013 presidential election, portrayed as a contest of "tribal alliances", is an example where the use of these terms was evident.⁸

The change to fairer reporting, such as *The Economist's* 'Africa Rising' article, can easily lead to a perception that globalisation has promoted intercultural understanding, such as a shift in negative perceptions about Africa from an aid recipient to a business partner. This may, however, not necessarily translate to change from past dominant

perceptions, due to the fact that stereotypical reporting is still highly evident in global mass media, including in Africa.

Root Causes: Status Quo or Professional Neglect?

The problem of Africa's media perception is not entirely a standoff between Western media and Africa, but more of a professional loophole – the failure of strict adherence to journalistic ethics while handling media reports about Africa. These ethical codes of conduct emphasise a high level of professionalism, which guides media practice – truthfulness, accuracy, objectivity, fairness and impartiality,⁹ among others – yet the practice of these virtues has remained a challenge for most journalists. Previous studies in this area have identified a number of factors¹⁰ that influence the behaviour of Western media and its reporting about Africa:

- commercial interests;
- political interests;
- social-cultural and language barrier among journalists;
- limited freedom of the press in some African countries;
- and

- poor infrastructure that hinders news accessibility in most rural African countries.

It is therefore neither a matter of reporting or not reporting about news unfolding in Africa, nor total negativity, but questioning the imbalance in information flow that motivates prioritisation of the continent's negative news and an underprojection of its positive news. In most instances, these stories have often been framed in line with existing stereotypes to draw audience attention – so what appears to be the truth for the layman, perhaps because of the existence of 'some aspects of truth' in it, has a strengthening effect of the same pre-existing images in the receiver's mind if they match. This process is called framing, in the agenda-setting role of mass media. This is what is sold to an audience curious to know more about a particular subject and depending on how well placed they are to filter out facts from exaggeration, dominant images are sustained in the process.

One story that was aired by Cable News Network (CNN) about Kenya's 2013 presidential elections¹¹ reveals not only stereotypical selection and the framing of stories, but also a breach in professional conduct. The title read 'Kenya's Armed and Ready to Vote'¹² and the story was an alleged stage-managed scene of a local criminal gang named Mungiki, preparing themselves for a fight ahead of the presidential elections. This provoked criticism,¹³ especially

in the social media, for being a creation of CNN journalists on the ground.

The support for such dominant stereotypical discourses by the media is an indication of the shortfall in observance of journalism ethics, which also results from political influence in the media's editorial policies. Related risk in such reports is the promotion of generalised images leading to the impression that the problem has affected or is affecting a whole rather than a part of a group. In reference to the previously mentioned CNN story about Kenya's election, the average viewer believed that violence was again forthcoming during the 2013 presidential elections, as was witnessed in 2007–2008. This generated fear for Kenyans, and for foreigners who planned to travel to Kenya at that time. Also, while reporting about other minor conflicts occurring in the remote outskirts – some of which are recurrent and resource-related – the commonly created impression is that the whole country or all its people are at war with each other.

Whereas it is the duty of the mass media not to ignore but to inform its audience, it is problematic to give an overly distorted impression aimed at drawing the attention of the audience for the sake of profit. Editorial policy also influences the selection of media content and prioritisation of news, based on the interest of the media entity. Therefore, the minimal importance given to Africa's success



REUTERS / THE BIGGER PICTURE

Journalists interview a wounded Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) rebel fighter at a military base in Muti village, Rwanda (28 November 2012).

MASS MEDIA, BEING THE INFORMER, ENTERTAINER AND EDUCATOR OF SOCIETY, HAS A CRUCIAL ROLE TO PLAY FOR DEVELOPMENT, CONFLICT PREVENTION AND, ULTIMATELY, PEACE TO BE REALISED

stories are mainly based on the fact that since the fall of communism, Africa lost its global significance, leading to it being ignored by the West as well as its media.¹⁴ Adding to this is the powerful – and mostly North-South – technology and information flow, which has contributed to making the audience in Africa more receivers and less producers of its own information; resulting in more consumption of external foreign content than from the internal African media.

Social-cultural and language barriers between the West and Africa have also contributed to the invisibility of Africa's diversity, which would otherwise be interesting for the world to know about. A 2009 work by John Middleton and Kimani Njogu¹⁵ elaborates the barrier as being caused by little interest among Western journalists assigned to cover Africa to learn local languages for easy communication and

understanding the significance of Africa's socio-cultural issues. Similarly, empirical research by Lutz Mücke¹⁶ relates the problem of negative coverage of Africa by German media to the shortage of German correspondents based in Africa. According to him, the few correspondents based either in Nairobi, Kenya, or Johannesburg, South Africa, have little or no time at all for thorough background investigations, leading to a culture of shallow reporting and quick Internet searches instead of interviews and the live witnessing of events on the ground. Understandably, however, poor infrastructure coupled with limited press freedom in some, if not most, African countries is a major obstacle. Even if foreign correspondents had the interest to venture deeper and uncover unheard and full stories, it becomes difficult to do so.

Problematic Intervention by African Media Practitioners

Mass media, being the informer, entertainer and educator of society, has a crucial role to play for development, conflict prevention and, ultimately, peace to be realised. This includes ensuring that it reports on its contents with strict adherence to the principles of journalism. Whereas this has not often been fully witnessed in Western media's reporting on Africa, the African media



UN PHOTO/PASQUAL GORRIZ

Intercultural exchanges for journalists will enable an improved understanding of cultures and promote cooperation. Here, 16 Lebanese journalism students capture the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in their daily routines. Each student explored the responsibilities, daily activities and culture of their assigned UNIFIL contingent (May 2012).

fraternity can affirm its responsibility and do a better job, based on the fact that they understand the continent better and so are better placed to portray objectivity. Such roles do not mean a compromise in ethical standards, but an alternative in the fairer projection of Africa's success stories to counter the replication and Eurocentric style of reporting on Africa in most local media.

Such an effort, however, would require sacrifice and a coordinated approach between decision-makers in media institutions and practitioners. This would allow for specialisation and a culture of expertise to counter the currently dominant and shallow one size fits all style. The merit of specialisation¹⁷ is that practitioners gain sound expertise through research and exhaustive reporting of issues from all angles, such as conflict reporting, gender reporting, race and ethnicity relations reporting, culture reporting and so on. Such capacity will therefore allow for expert reporting and an exploration of rich and unheard of content that would, with time, trickle down to media consumers and correct past misconceptions and promote racial reconciliation.

Another option for intervention to bridge the gap between the West and Africa is the increased exchange of information to facilitate intercultural exchanges.¹⁸ This will not only enable an understanding of cultures, but also promote joint projects and cooperation to improve the profession. Such exchange programmes are already in place, but most of them are aimed at enhancing conventional journalism skills for developing countries' journalists. An integration of research and more content in such programmes – specifically on how to report about Africa – will therefore add value. However, this will only work if political and commercial biases are set aside to pave the way for self-conscious and responsible journalism practice, which has some professional loyalty and patriotism and is free from historical prejudices.

Conclusion

With the seemingly changing attitude about Africa, especially in Western media, an understanding and exploration of earlier ignored issues for a fair telling of its story is of significance. The foundation for such action is change in the attitude of media practitioners, particularly African journalists. Mass media is crucial, given its influential power – and if Africa is to rise to the level of being able to benefit its own peoples, its media should be part of this process. Media must emphasise the hardly featured professional values of accuracy, fairness, transparency and integrity. A reconstructed image of Africa is a historical process of correcting the existing overrepresentation of its negatives and underrepresentation of its positives. There must be a reclamation of Africa's significant contribution to the world, but this can only be achieved if the African media fraternity reflects on and reviews its loyalties and self-consciousness about its own continent. **A**


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BOOK REVIEW

REVIEWED BY DAVID-NGENDO TSHIMBA



INTEGRATED PEACE-BUILDING: INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO TRANSFORMING CONFLICT

| | |
|-----------|-----------------------|
| Editor | Craig Zelizer |
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Acknowledging that the field of peacebuilding has grown from a small group of scholars, practitioners and organisations on the margins of international affairs to a phenomenon that is now beginning to influence official policy and practice in the halls of Washington DC, Paris, Addis Ababa, Geneva and elsewhere, Craig Zelizer magnificently interweaves a peacebuilding narrative from 15 academics and practitioners researching and working across a myriad of sectors, to highlight innovative approaches to transforming conflicts. This makes the case for integrated peacebuilding. The outcome is a compilation of 10 chapters that link different sectors to peacebuilding.

In discussing the business of peacebuilding Zelizer cautions that although many practitioners are motivated by altruistic desires to alleviate suffering, violence and predation, the business of aid for peacebuilding work remains a multibillion-dollar industry that often involves the consideration of political and economic factors. Furthermore, Zelizer underscores that as much as the field is growing in terms of programming and support, the total amount dedicated to peace and conflict funding in relation to overall development remains small. Frustratingly, United States (US) funding for conflict mitigation and reconciliation totalled over US\$700 million in 2010 and the total US international aid budget was US\$39 billion in 2010, while total US defence spending in 2010 was over US\$600 billion (Congressional Research Service, 2011).

Andria Wisler, on international development and peacebuilding, underscores that nearly two-thirds of development programming now operates within conflict-affected countries. Given the current status of underdevelopment in conflict-affected countries and communities, Wisler argues that it is both a moral and practical imperative to get beyond the chicken-and-egg debate: whether peace is a prerequisite for development or whether development is a necessary condition for peace. The argument for an inclusivist approach to integrating development and peacebuilding is timely given parallel shifts in both sectors, with the movement in peacebuilding from national to human security and the trend from strictly economic growth to human development in international development.

Mike Jobbins, on humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding, reminds us that unlike other forms of development assistance, which target long-term growth and structural change, humanitarian aid focuses on saving lives and responding to the immediate aftermath of an emergency. However, the intersection of international assistance and local politics has made the humanitarian enterprise much more complicated, particularly in violent and divided societies. Hence, conflict sensitivity means not only considering the potential adverse effects of assistance in a given conflict or crisis environment, but also how humanitarians understand the systemic political impact of their presence. The key challenge is not the



Environmental changes around the world – both natural and human-induced – are occurring at alarming rates, and are expected to aggravate conflicts in the future.

necessity of conflict sensitivity, but the degree to which it should be included in operational planning and budgeting.

Evelyn Thornton and Tobie Whitman, on gender and peacebuilding, underscore that efforts at gender mainstreaming – ensuring that the different needs of women and men are taken into account in all peacebuilding policies and interventions – have largely failed. This is based on the fact that in the past two decades, women comprised less than 8% of participants in more than a dozen key negotiations. A main challenge is how to leverage the support of gender-sensitive men who value more equitable processes and want to mainstream gender in peacebuilding. By better understanding the costs of inequality and the myriad ways women contribute to peacebuilding, and developing creative strategies for mainstreaming gender, Thornton and Whitman hope new practitioners and scholars will be better equipped to reap the dividends of inclusion.

On peacebuilding and the private sector, Shawn MacDonald posits that corporations are a party to many of the social conflicts plaguing societies around the globe. A number of companies have fuelled tensions by exploiting

natural resources; the extraction of valuable resources often enables parties to finance conflict. Many conflicts that are labelled as ‘political’ or ‘ethnic’ are often more about control and exploitation of natural resources, where corporate interests are significant. While the movement toward business contributing to peacebuilding grows, business leaders are often reluctant to change, because it is unclear what their role should be.

Qamar-ul Huda and Katherine Marshall, on religion and peacebuilding, reflect on contemporary peacebuilding challenges, which include the difficulties facing failing or weak states and the influence of religion in the ‘war on terrorism’ or ‘countering violent extremism’. Although religion is often associated with violence, faith and interfaith leaders stress the core ideal that religion fundamentally centres on peace. Whereas the roles of religion in conflict and peacebuilding are complex, varied and often the subject of controversy, a specific, distinctive feature ascribed to religious peacebuilders is their understanding of reconciliation and forgiveness.

On environmental change and peacebuilding, Ashley Laura MacArthur highlights that environmental changes around the world – both natural and human-induced – are occurring at alarming rates, and are expected to aggravate conflicts in the future. The pursuit of peace, therefore, depends on our ability to understand and overcome environmental challenges in the coming decades. Integrating an understanding of the relationship between environment, conflict and peace into the conflict resolution field, and integrating conflict resolution principles into initiatives focused on environmental conservation and restoration, will strengthen the capacity of practitioners and environmental specialists alike to respond effectively to emerging challenges.

MANY CONFLICTS THAT ARE LABELLED AS ‘POLITICAL’ OR ‘ETHNIC’ ARE OFTEN MORE ABOUT CONTROL AND EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, WHERE CORPORATE INTERESTS ARE SIGNIFICANT

Sam Feigenbaum, Rachel Goldberg and Rhea Vance-Cheng, on security and peacebuilding, underscore that while the fields of peacebuilding and security may at first appear to have contradictory goals, both strive to achieve peace, security and the establishment of a safer world. They further argue that the integrated frameworks – the hard-soft power continuum, human security, responsibility to protect and development–diplomacy–defence (3D) security – are a marriage of peacebuilding and security theories, and offer new theoretical designs to better suit

the changing global security environment. One significant challenge presented by integrated peacebuilding is protecting the humanitarian space. For successful and sustainable collaboration to occur, a shared operational language, linked channels of communication and a unified institutional structure are of paramount importance.

J.P. Singh, on media and peacebuilding, reminds us that communication is about storytelling, and it is hard to find agreement when stories are told from diverse perspectives. Integrated peacebuilding as applied to media is, therefore, Janus-faced: how does professional media handle conflict within its own ranks, and how does media contribute to or alleviate human conflict? At times, both parts are relevant in the same conflict. Singh points out that our current media-rich environments are as conducive to escalating conflict as they are to de-escalating it.

On health and peacebuilding, Paul Charlton argues that although the fields of health and conflict have a long history of interaction, they are often framed as activities operating in two fundamentally different domains. Increasingly, such assumptions are being challenged, and the wide domain of the health sector seems to offer a unique perspective that can be leveraged to reduce conflict and build peace. Violence and war stand in opposition to health, while positive peace aligns with it. Therefore, health professionals who work in conflict regions have, at a minimum, a responsibility to ensure they do no harm – a duty that requires knowledge and skills borrowed from the peacebuilding field.

Brian Kritz, on the rule of law and peacebuilding, explains that the notion of the promotion and protection of the rule of law (ROL) as an international issue blossomed since the end of the cold war. The context of conflict or post-conflict scenarios – where the gaps in the rule of law sector are vast and encompass a number of areas, from law enforcement, corrections and the judiciary to highly disputed issues such as compensation and land tenure – does place an emphasis on ROL as a vital issue of good governance, global security, diplomacy and international development. The hope is that the creation or re-establishment of stable national institutions will eventually provide security, foster development and protect human rights worldwide. Kritz believes that for the future ROL practitioner, such a state of flux will allow for the implementation of new ideas, new approaches and innovation into the ROL agenda.

Zelizer concludes the book with a significant remark: conflict-affected societies face an overwhelming number of challenges that range from poor economic performance, destroyed or underdeveloped infrastructure and significant population displacement, to weak or non-existent legal and political institutions, lack of healthcare services and ongoing violence. It is important to emphasise, however, that integrated peacebuilding is not a magic bullet that will end conflict, more so given that building peace is hard work, and many times, unfortunately, setbacks and failures take place at all levels.

Ultimately, the richness of its content and various contributions renders this book a must-read for students and practitioners of conflict and peace studies. Does the book's 15-point set of recommendations, portrayed as key lessons for integrated approaches to peacebuilding, offer the best solutions for the future of peacebuilding work in most of the developing world? It is hard to say definitively; however, the book does offer innovative approaches and clearly highlights the many challenges 21st century peacebuilders face. **A**

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