Conflict and conflict resolution in Africa: Engaging the colonial factor

Interethnic conflict in Jonglei State, South Sudan: Emerging ethnic hatred between the Lou Nuer and the Murle


Fragility and the State: Post-apartheid South Africa and the State-Society Contract in the 21st Century

Strengthening ethical political leadership for sustainable peace and social justice in Africa: Uganda as a case study
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Lay-out by Keegan Thumberan.
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The important issue of outcomes has been mentioned in a few previous forewords of this journal. In one case the reference was to the results of historical processes discussed in an article, and in another it was to monitoring the results of an attempt to balance the goals of reconciliatory peace and retributive justice. In a few other cases, the importance of taking outcomes of research seriously and implementing them where appropriate was emphasised. It may be worthwhile to quote from the two paragraphs:

[The articles could be understood as communicating] a strong encouragement to take research outcomes seriously, by being on the lookout for meaningful ideas, or implications of ideas, or implementations of ideas, and being oriented towards putting such possibilities into practice. By so doing, we can contribute to a wider acceptance of the value of research, and especially also to the greater effectiveness of our attempts to deal with conflict (Vol 2, No 2, 2002).

Having read an article, we secondly have to move into the mode of responding. Although the word, or metaphor, ‘lesson’ may remind us of our childhood responses to formal lessons, we should now be able to think more deeply and widely. In those days, our typical reaction was to memorise content and be prepared to give appropriate feedback in a test or examination. There were the cases, however, when we embraced bits of learning as worthwhile belongings for the rest of life. In our present
era of outcomes-oriented education (and less of an obsession with mere content), more learners may have such an experience. It is something of this kind that may also happen when an academic article is read in which an innovative insight or a best-practice suggestion is shared. But then, of course, the acquired insight or skill has to be put into practice. We learn by doing, and inversely, by doing it becomes evident to ourselves and to others that we have indeed gained the learning concerned. Especially when the doing takes place spontaneously and creatively, it shows that the learning has been internalised (Vol 11, No 3, 2011).

Without using the term ‘outcomes’, however, similar encouragements have been given in other forewords. For instance: ‘From the editor’s desk then, my best wishes for meaningful reading and implementing’ (Vol 12, No 3, 2012). Such reminders and wishes may be taken approvingly and endorsesly by most readers, but some may dislike them and dismiss them as platitudinous directives. All we can say in response to such criticism is that we feel urged, not only as publishers but also on behalf of our authors, to promote the actual utilising of findings and recommendations which can improve the effectiveness of ways of dealing with conflict.

With regard to the journal, and also with regard to all ACCORD’s work, we feel convinced that our desire to promote such implementation is justified, but we also realise that there are limitations that should be complied with. On the one hand, we hope and trust that conflict-resolving attitudes, approaches and procedures will be put into place where needed, and that peace-restoring outcomes may indeed be reached. In any particular situation, therefore, we eagerly follow the daily news, taking note of what the parties are doing, or not doing. On the other hand, however, we have to refrain from anything that might be perceived as inquisitiveness or pressurising. There are many fields in which probing into outcomes may be acceptable and productive, but in ours it can be counterproductive and should therefore be carefully handled and sometimes even deliberately avoided. Our purpose, after all, is not to coerce people to apply our suggestions, so that we can boast about success rates. We merely offer our facilitation, and sometimes – when there seems to be a need for high-key
mediation – our recommendation, but then we leave it to the people concerned to make use of it or not. In any case, if parties in conflict happen to be unwilling to utilise the experience and expertise of conflict-resolving practitioners, they cannot be manipulated into willingness. Willingness that is not willingly arrived at can obviously not be genuine willingness.

What can and should be done, however, is to look at and learn from outcomes in a receptive and responsive mode. I was fortunate to learn the potential value of documenting and studying outcomes twenty-six years ago – in one of my first interviews with a conflict resolution organisation. I referred to this lesson in my paper, ‘ACCORD’s commitment to research: Possibilities and planning’, a month after joining the ACCORD team (twenty years ago). And since then, I have quite often used this very significant example in training sessions, papers and presentations. Two brief quotations give the gist of what volunteer research assistants discovered in dispute resolution sessions:

From ... methodical observations and the discussion they generated among trainers, patterns gradually emerged. It became apparent, for example, that in the hearings that showed dramatic change – when disputants arrived hostile and left cooperative – the transition was seldom observable as a progression. Rather, they observed a single moment – the ‘turning point’ or ‘breakthrough’ – in which the tone of the discussion changed, the atmosphere suddenly lightened, and hostility was supplanted by curiosity about the other disputant. ...

The curious thing about these moments was that the content of the discussion at the time was not particularly momentous and sometimes was almost trivial. But from that point on, disputants shifted their focus, so that instead of fighting one another, they united to battle the problem.

(The Community Board Program 1986:8-9)

Through the years I have become more and more convinced that the outcomes of those talks between disputants – in a multi-cultural city – were representative of similar talks all over the world, and that the outcomes of that research project contain findings that can be applied everywhere. What those researchers found
about the breakthrough to (mutual) understanding should constantly remind us about the cruciality of inner, attitudinal transformation. This is indeed a miracle which no third party can bring about, but it is something towards which third parties and fellow human beings can nevertheless pave ways.

We trust that the material in this issue will equip us better and inspire us more to keep on paving such ways regardless of all the daunting challenges and discouraging opposition we may encounter. There are the tragic histories of colonial domination and ethnic hatred. There are the deplorable realities of selfish leadership and imperfect decisions. But there are also the possibilities of breakthroughs to understanding and unselfishness. Leaders might become personally and/or politically willing to be accountable and ethically responsible, to allow participatory democracy and to render service to their people. Ethno-cultural groups may become tolerant and coexistent. In a post-colonial Africa, the time-proven *ubuntu* way of being human may be lived interpersonally, interethnically, interculturally and internationally.

Taking into account then the justification to be interested in outcomes, but also the reservation with which this interest should be handled, we wish to extend an invitation to our readers to give us some feedback they may be inclined to share. On our survey form there are a few dotted lines on which to mention an example of the way in which you have made use of content you found particularly meaningful. But it may be that you know about a conflict-resolving outcome (or a non-conflict-resolving one with an important learning element in it) which deserves an article to be written about it. We will sincerely appreciate such responses – and we will treat them with care, confidentiality and sensitivity. Thank you very much.

**Source**
Conflict and conflict resolution in Africa: Engaging the colonial factor

Fonkem Achankeng I*

Abstract

By engaging the colonial factor in African conflicts, this article seeks to understand the ineffectiveness of efforts at conflict management in overcoming the disasters that brought the conflicts to the African continent. It claims that conflict in Africa does not always stem primarily from crises of national governance and the failure of governmental institutions in African countries to mediate conflict, and revisits the colonial factor as the root of many conflicts in Africa. The article reconsiders the conflict management and conflict resolution debate and indicts former colonial powers and powerful organisations for maintaining colonial-style approaches to African conflicts at the expense of a desire to address the fundamental issues that divide the parties to the different conflicts. It argues that the colonial factor ought to be a consideration in attempts to address African conflicts because the roots of many post-colonial conflicts in Africa remain buried in Africa’s past and, specifically, in the colonisation and de-colonisation processes. Making the claim that conflict resolution is more than the suppression or perhaps the elimination of overt violence, it argues that envisaging and/or imposing peace-keeping forces at every turn on various African conflicts does not provide the desired durable outcomes.

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Introduction

I am sure that none of you would want to rest content with the superficial kind of social analysis that deals mainly with effects and does not grapple with underlying causes (Martin Luther King Jr 1963).

The conflict resolution community seems to pursue conflict resolution efforts in Africa from a variety of purposes and interests and with policies that are often replete with ambiguities and contradictions. This situation may be the reason why many African conflicts may be silenced but remain largely unresolved. As Zartman (2000:3) has pointed out, although African conflicts involve the activities of seasoned peacemakers using the best of personal skills and recently developed knowledge about ways of managing and resolving conflicts, international efforts at conflict management have not been particularly effective or efficient in overcoming the disasters that have brought them to the continent. The critical question then is how we understand the problem of conflict resolution in Africa when the actors, mainly external to Africa, propagate the idea of peace and conflict resolution corresponding mainly to their own interests and view of Africa and the world.

Although some scholars on conflict in Africa (Obasanjo 1991, Anyang’Nyong’o 1991 and Msabaha 1991) agree that conflict in Africa stems primarily from crises of national governance and from the failure of governmental institutions in African countries to mediate conflict, this article engages the colonial factor as the root of many conflicts in Africa. It argues that this factor must be taken into consideration in the attempts to address African conflicts because the roots of many post-colonial conflicts in Africa, such as the recent case of South Sudan, remain buried in Africa’s past and, specifically, in the colonisation and de-colonisation processes. The article also argues that conflicts at sub-national and national levels in Africa are of several types, and that imposing peace-keeping forces as has often been the case, or merely imposing new political and economic institutions on the various African conflicts, may not provide the desired durable outcomes. Furthermore, and based on the same premise, the article questions how far a just and equitable future can be structured on an unjust past.
The Colonial legacy as basis of conflict

Some scholars, including Mokwugo Okoyo (1977), Bonny Duala-M’Bedy (1984), Claude Ake (1985) and Herman J. Cohen (1995), consider the numerous conflicts in Africa as a natural consequence of Africa’s colonial past. Okoyo (1977:93), for example, posits that ‘political instability is rooted in the very structure of society and, for most new countries, in the colonial past’. He also adds that ‘Africa’s post-colonial present can be said to have been fashioned for Africa by Africa’s colonial past’. Subscribing to this viewpoint, Ambassador Herman J. Cohen (1995) asserted that ‘the sources and consequences of Africa’s internal conflicts have their roots in colonialism, the subsequent processes of de-colonisation and state formation, and the ensuing crisis of nation building’. For Cohen, the colonial state was fraught with contradictions. As he put it, ‘The modern African state was created by colonial powers out of ethnic and regional diversities, and rendered conflictual by gross inequities in power relations, and in the uneven distribution of national wealth and development opportunities’ (Cohen 1995:11). In other words, the basis had been created for many of the conflicts experienced in post-independence Africa. Duala-M’Bedy (1984:10), subscribing to this viewpoint, asserted that ‘the problems being experienced by modern African States are based on our colonial experience’.

Cohen (1995:11) also indicted the de-colonisation process when he observed that in many countries the contradictions of the colonial state were passed on to the independent states through a flawed process of de-colonisation. He argued that ‘conflict, recurring instability, and bad governance in Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi can be traced back to the hasty and unprepared granting of independence by Belgium in 1960’. He also considered the major wars in Angola and Mozambique as arising out of ‘panic de-colonisation from a revolutionary and chaotic Portugal in 1974-75’. Insofar as the war in Sudan was concerned, he traced it to ‘the manner in which the Anglo-Egyptian administration brought the North and the South together, but kept them apart under a separatist policy for most of the Condominium rule, and then left them in a centralized unitary state without constitutional guarantees for the disadvantaged South’.
(Cohen 1995:12). These are only some examples of the conflicts in Africa which
General Obasanjo (1991) described aptly as the continent with the greatest number
of conflicts.

It is important to underscore that, like the afore-mentioned conflict cases, the
roots of many current conflicts – latent and manifest – including the cases
of Western Sahara and British Southern Cameroons, can also be traced to
colonialism and the de-colonisation process. This being the case, any thinking
which regards the colonial factor as irrelevant today may be misplaced. The need
for a colonial analysis remains pertinent because the workings of colonialism’s
culture are still with us and because post-coloniality is highly engaged with
colonialism (Thomas 1994). As this scholar of colonialism’s culture has argued,
‘[I]f we had transcended colonial images and narratives more comprehensively,
perhaps we would not need to discuss them at all, but there is no emptiness
at present in which such a confident silence can be heard’ (Thomas 1994:195).
In the case of British Southern Cameroons, for example, the United Kingdom
(UK) failed to nurture a United Nations (UN) Trust Territory to Statehood in
accordance with the UN Trusteeship Agreement. Rather, the UK lobbied the
UN to hastily lump together British Southern Cameroons and a Trust Territory
of France without constitutional guarantees for the disadvantaged former
British Territory of Southern Cameroons. While the on-going Western Sahara
conflict is about the right of self-determination afforded other former European
dependencies, the conflicting situation in Côte d’Ivoire following the death of
the country’s first President, Houphouet Boigné, is also closely associated with
the nature of the country’s independence and political leadership.

Cohen’s assertion has a major implication for understanding the various
conflicts and the attempts to resolve such conflicts on the continent. If the
causes and consequences of the conflicts have their roots in colonialism, the
processes of de-colonisation and state formation, and the ensuing crisis of
nation-building, then any attempt to resolve the conflicts must also transcend
the concepts of ‘new institutions that will increase participation, legitimacy,
and redistribution’ and ‘good governance’ (Cohen 1993:7) recipes to also
address other root causes of the problems. From the perspective of this analysis,
the ‘crises of internal governance’ and ‘new institutions’ in Africa can both be traced to the colonisation and the de-colonisation of Africa. Any discussion of ‘internal or national governance’ therefore cannot exclude the structure of the state and the political leadership as inherited from colonialism, given that the basis for African states and political leadership in most of the continent is colonial.

Bryson and Crosby (1992:3) defined leadership as the ‘inspiration and mobilization of others to undertake collective action in pursuit of the common good’. Considered from this standpoint, political leadership in many parts of Africa even today can hardly be said to be African leadership because it was, for the most part, imposed on the people by colonial powers. Okoyo (1977:93) described the situation in the following words: ‘Colonial rule was for all practical purposes military rule and by a simple transference the new political class which inherited the mantle of the colonial masters also inherited the latter’s concept of leadership role that was structured in authoritarian terms’. Examples are legion in Africa where the colonial machine did very little to prepare Africans for self-rule and, consequently, for good governance. In any case, no self-rule had been envisaged in the first place, and so the only education dispensed to the ‘natives’ was just enough to prepare them for subordinate positions as messengers and junior clerks in the colonial civil service. A majority of African leaders and the people in leadership roles at independence were chosen by the colonial masters from among this group. Once in power, they held tight to power, and usually with the support of the former colonial powers who gave the power to them in the first place.

African independence and African political leadership can be seen to be very closely related. Former colonial masters were not in search of good leaders of the people. The concern of the colonial masters at independence and beyond, for the most part, was to hand power to a group of cronies whose mission was always not to ‘govern their people well’ but to protect the interests of the metropole. In this regard, many political leaders of Africa, especially those in the former French colonies, were and continued to be imposed upon the people with almost no consideration for good governance. As University of Port Harcourt’s Professor Claude Ake (1985:1212) put it, ‘the circumstances of African history
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conspired to produce an elite which could not function because it had no sense of identity or integrity and no confidence, did not know where it was coming from or where it was going. The examples of the military and economic pacts concluded by French-speaking African leaders with France at independence are cases in point. In many cases, these pacts have not been rescinded half a century after independence and that is why former French colonies either still have the French military stationed in the countries or continue to call on France for military intervention as in the recent cases of Central African Republic and Mali. Let us now consider the basis of African nations or states, and the concepts of power and governance.

Colonial rule, power and governance in Africa

In Africa, the concept of state or nation is based on Africa’s colonial past. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union places emphasis on respect of state boundaries inherited at independence. African states have also remained spheres of influence of former colonial powers, and no power in the world has been interested in changing that situation. Duala-M’bedy (1984:10) asserted that ‘the European concept of state has had a strong influence on African countries and that it was this concept of state that led to drawing up of arbitrary borders throughout Africa’. Such Eurocentric thinking, reinforced by technological and scientific achievements, is still very present in Africa. This is why most western literature on conflicts in Africa may still need further clarification in regard to specific conflict types. Some light will be shed on the typology of African conflicts later on in this analysis.

Political repression and non-respect for human rights are synonymous with bad governance. Political repression in Africa goes back to Africa’s colonial legacy. Colonial rule was the antithesis of democracy, because it was premised on the usurpation of the fundamental right of self-determination and of the fundamental human rights of citizens and peoples. Okoyo’s (1977) work underscored the fact that whatever legitimacy colonialism possessed was derived not from any set of agreed rules or consensus, but from the monopoly of the means of coercion and violence, and by its divide-and-rule strategies aimed at intensifying the cleavages (class, tribal, religious) inherent in the social
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structure and at prolonging its rule. Colonial rule never raised the issue of good government. The only issues were power and violence, and that remains the tradition of politics that African leaders took to independence in their respective nations. These African leaders have not only retained the politics of power and violence, but many of them have also continued to reinforce the tradition. Ake (1985:1213) argued strongly that ‘because many leaders in Africa were insecure when they inherited power, they continued to cling tenaciously to the idea of the ruler’s exclusive claim to power’. This situation is verifiable in many African countries where leadership has been clinging to power for twenty, thirty or forty years – from Uganda and Sudan, through Chad and Cameroon, to Angola, Zimbabwe, and others. Power and bad governance, traditions inherited from colonial rule and the nature of de-colonisation, have been a major source of conflict in Africa. Although viewed in general terms as African conflicts, there is need to point out that conflict in Africa does not only vary from case to case, it is often traceable to colonial rule and the de-colonisation process. Let us now turn our attention to an examination of the various conflicts in order to categorise them.

Reconsidering African conflicts

Cohen’s analysis focused on violent conflict in Africa, but this included the violent way in which intolerant regimes usually deal with political problems that could have been resolved through the political process and without violence. Any realistic appreciation of post-colonial African conflicts must begin with their origins or causes. The literature on African conflicts appears to view the conflicts mainly in general terms as intra-national or inter-ethnic. This view holds good to some extent, but it is far from being the general trend. Cohen (1996:1) asserted that most ‘African wars were civil wars’, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook, for instance, also advanced the argument that ‘more than half of the major armed conflicts in Africa occurred within national boundaries’ (Lingren et al. 1991:347). The statement, ‘occurred within national boundaries’, is understood to mean the same as the umbrella description, ‘intra-national’. Although the geo-political space in which a conflict occurs may be a nation-state, there is the need to make one clarification in this analysis. It is
that the conflicts occurring within a national boundary in Africa have different stakes and different root causes. The classification of African conflicts as mainly inter-ethnic and intra-national seems to have won great acceptance within the conflict resolution community. That classification, which appears to stem from Western knowledge of and consideration for African societies, may need to be expanded further. In this regard, an attempt to focus on the various types of conflicts in Africa from the standpoints of the subject or nature of the dominant issues involved in each category is important.

A close examination of the various conflicts occurring in Africa reveals two broad categories, namely intra-state and inter-state conflicts. Each of these two broad categories can be broken down further into what has been referred to as 'relatively abstract dimensions of conflict' (Kriesberg 1982:183; cf Burton 1990). These dimensions, in Kriesberg’s words, include the issues in contention (resources and interests or values and ideology), the arenas in which the conflict is waged (families, communities, countries, or regions) and the contending parties (persons, organisations, classes, or peoples). In the light of these dimensions, we can consider African conflicts as belonging to the following six types: inter-ethnic conflicts, inter-state conflicts, liberation conflicts, civil rights conflicts, annexationist conflicts, and political transition conflicts. Each conflict type is discussed briefly below with examples provided.

1) **Inter-ethnic conflicts**: Opposing tribal or ethnic groups are mainly found within national boundaries although the inherent problems of artificial borders caused by colonialism have resulted in some ethnic groups being found in two, three or even more African countries. These conflicts are very recurrent although with less gravity in terms of the numbers of casualties, refugees and displaced persons, and the spread of disease, famine and environmental devastation. The examples of clan fighting in Somalia and Liberia where the control of power at the centre was/is one of the main issues are the high point of inter-ethnic conflicts, but these are only the exception and not the rule – given that inter-ethnic conflicts occur over any number of issues ranging from politics to socio-economic issues such as religion, culture or land and other scarce resources. Inter-ethnic or inter-tribal conflicts abound in many countries of Africa. In post-colonial Africa, these conflicts are greatly exacerbated by
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the neo-colonial arrangements that characterise many African governments. In many African countries where leadership remains in the same hands and continues to serve colonial interests, state apparatus are known to sponsor some inter-ethnic conflicts as a divide-and-rule strategy.

2) **Inter-state conflicts:** These are conflicts between the governments and sometimes peoples of two different countries. These conflicts have been relatively few in Africa in spite of the problems caused by artificial borders inherited from colonialism and the lumping together of different nations to make up new countries at independence. Some inter-state conflicts have occurred mainly over disputed territories like the Chad-Libya conflict over the Aouzou strip. There was also the case of the Tanzania-Uganda war that toppled Idi Amin in Uganda. Others included the Kenya-Somali war (1963-1967), the Somali-Ethiopian conflict (1964-1978), the Egypt-Libya conflict (1977), the Eritrea-Ethiopia border conflict (1998-2000) and the 1994 Cameroon-Nigeria conflict over the disputed oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula.

3) **Liberation conflicts:** Liberation conflicts are those conflicts that involve entire nations or peoples who find themselves within the territorial boundaries of given countries by colonial and colonising arrangements. Often, these people waged war to liberate themselves when they were unable, through dialogue and the political process, to correct what Cohen (1995) termed the contradictions of colonial rule in some cases, and the failures of de-colonisation in others.

The people seeking to liberate themselves usually did not have any feelings of belonging and commitment and, consequently, were not concerned about sharing in the colonising country’s power and resources. These conflicts arose, rather, from the aspirations of a people to assert their fundamental human right of self-determination, as contained in the UN Charter. A few cases of liberation conflicts in Africa include the Eritrean War of independence; the South Sudan war; the Namibian War of independence; and the Cassamance conflict in Senegal. These conflicts are similar to the Quebec Sovereignty Question in Canada and the Chechnya conflict in Russia.

In Africa, however, it is sometimes difficult to classify these conflicts from a purely western standpoint in regard to the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ in
international law. The point here, however, is that the people who seek to liberate themselves and their territory consider themselves as having been compelled by colonial forces to live with a different group, often with great incompatibilities as in the case of South Sudan and the others cited above. Some of these conflicts have been termed, albeit erroneously, as secessionist conflicts.

4) Civil rights conflicts: Civil rights conflicts arise mainly over issues of participation, distribution, and legitimacy in the politics and governance of nations (Lasswell 1936). In civil rights conflicts, a section of a country may wage a conflict because the people (or a group) consider the social framework as structured to exclude or marginalise them, and therefore seek to correct the situation. Unlike liberation conflicts discussed above, civil rights conflicts always occur within the same nation. To a very large extent, the stakes are participation and distribution at the centre. The issue in civil rights conflicts is to give the people a fair share of their country’s power and resources, and thereby enhance their sense of belonging and commitment. Like the Civil Rights Movement in America, the people who wage civil rights struggles recognise that they too are part of a given country and only want to be recognised as such and to have the full right for a fair share. Some examples of civil rights conflicts in Africa are the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, the struggle for majority rule in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), the Tuareg uprising in Mali, where the group found itself virtually estranged from national life, and the Algerian Berbers fighting against the ruling Arab class. To a considerable extent, Burundi and Rwanda also have some ingredients of civil rights conflicts. In this conflict type, the stakes are mainly those about who is where, who gets what, how and when (Lasswell 1936). These conflicts have been the most widely known and studied of Africa’s conflicts. This category of conflict may be best addressed by new political and economic institutions and good governance – for instance, ‘power sharing through proportional representation and federal structures’ (Cohen 1993:7).

Civil rights conflicts, when left unresolved, can escalate into civil wars as in Liberia, Somalia, Mozambique, Angola, Congo, Chad, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. On the basis of the considerations described above, certain conflicts occurring within the national boundaries of given ‘nation-states’ should not be seen simply as intra-national conflicts or classified too quickly as
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‘internal affairs of States’. This error has, very often, led to drastic consequences in Africa. The Eritrean Independence War was, until the country’s independence in 1993, erroneously considered as an internal affair of Ethiopia just as the war in South Sudan was for long considered as Sudan’s internal affair. The international community continues to make this error of judgment in the case of the Southern Cameroons Question (Annan 2000) and in considering the Western Sahara conflict not as a case of Moroccan irredentism against an indigenous desire for independence (Zunes and Mundy 2010:xxiii), but in considering the territory as part of Morocco.

5) Annexationist conflicts: Annexationist conflicts arise when one nation annexes another nation in part or wholly, or where two nations lock horns over interests that belong to neither of them from the point of view of history and international law. This class of conflict is a curious one, and there are not many examples on the African continent currently. Two cases, however, stand out prominently. These are the Western Sahara conflict involving Morocco and the British Southern Cameroons restoration of independence and sovereignty conflict in post-colonial Cameroon Republic. In both cases, Morocco and Cameroon Republic went beyond their borders to annex and ‘colonially occupy’ Western Sahara in 1975 and British Southern Cameroons in 1961 respectively, contrary to the UN Charter, the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (United Nations General Assembly 1960), and the African Union Constitutive Act in its Article 4. Both the Western Sahara situation and the British Southern Cameroons’ case are examples of conflict caused by backdoor deals of colonial powers that effectively sold out the fundamental right of the people of those nations to determine their own destiny (McGovern 2010:xiii). Annexationist conflicts are similar to liberation conflicts because the nations so annexed and colonially occupied (often with the connivance of colonial forces) seek to liberate themselves and their territory. In spite of the condemnation of colonialism, in spite of the breach of international law, and in spite of the incompatibility theory of plural states espoused by Woodrow Wilson in 1919 (Esthus 1991) and other scholars including Walzer, Kantowicz and Higham (1982), Furnival (1986)
and Smith (1986), the world community does not only orphan these conflicts (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2005), but considers them, albeit erroneously, as secessionist conflicts.

The conflict between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and La République du Cameroun over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula in the Gulf of Guinea is annexationist in type because the Bakassi Peninsula is said to belong neither to the Federal Republic of Nigeria nor to La République du Cameroun. The following facts on the conflict are contained in The London Communiqué of June 1995 (Southern Cameroons National Council 1995):

The Southern Cameroons was administered jointly with the Federation of Nigeria from 1919 to 1958 and during this period, all the survey maps which were prepared by the Federal Ministry of Lands & Surveys in Lagos recognised the Bakassi Peninsula as being an integral part of Southern Cameroonian territory. The 1961 unification of the Southern Cameroons and La République du Cameroun gave rise to the Federal Republic of Cameroon, which did share a maritime border with Nigeria, with the Bakassi Peninsula becoming part of the Federal Republic of Cameroon ...

Following the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon in 1972 and the effective secession of La République du Cameroun from the union in 1984 and the symmetrical return of the Southern Cameroons to the status of a UN Trust Territory, that [sic] La République du Cameroun ceased to share a maritime boundary with the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The westernmost maritime boundary of La République du Cameroun is at the estuary of the Mungo River. At the same time, the people of Southern Cameroons consider that the present occupation of the Bakassi Peninsula by the Nigerian Army, though provoked by the hostile behaviour of gendarmes from La République du Cameroun, is entirely illegal. Consequently, the case which has been filed at the International Court of Justice against the Federal Republic of Nigeria by La République du Cameroun, and which is based on the presumption that it is the successor state to the defunct Federal Republic of Cameroun, has no foundation in International Law because La République du Cameroun has no locus standi in the Bakassi Peninsula ...
This excerpt exposes some of the contradictions of colonialism and the process of de-colonisation which were always in keeping with the colonial culture of constructing non-Europeans as subhuman. Colonial administration did not only treat colonial subjects as too far behind to govern themselves (Thomas 1994:152), but this consideration probably caused the colonial masters to treat colonised people as objects whom they pushed around as they knew how – as evidenced by this case of British Southern Cameroons. The curious nature of this kind of conflict is that the disputed territory belongs to neither of the warring parties in the conflict. Whereas in the Western Sahara Conflict, Algeria fought against Morocco alongside the indigenous Polissario Front, the Bakassi Peninsula belongs to neither of the two nations that claim the territory. This conflict is erroneously referred to as a border conflict between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and La République du Cameroun whereas from a historico-legal standpoint, the two neighbours did not share a common border anywhere near the disputed Bakassi Peninsula at independence in 1960.¹

In the case of British Cameroons, the nationalists consider that part of the strategy and the hidden agenda of ensuring the annexation of the British Southern Cameroons was, from the very beginning, a ploy of the United Kingdom and Western colonial powers to dispense with the territory. Considering the annexation and colonial occupation of British Cameroons as a colonial conspiracy masterminded by Britain and the West within the Cold War context to deprive the territory of its independence, British Southern Cameroons nationalists notified La République du Cameroun, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the International Court of Justice and the United Nations that the Bakassi Peninsula belongs to British Southern Cameroons.²

6) Political transition conflicts: Mainly within states, political transition conflicts arose in many African countries out of rising tensions resulting from a stalemated transition to the democratisation of political life in the 1990s. This phenomenon is described by Cohen (1996:6) as ‘blocked political systems

¹ East Timor formerly in Indonesia, and Tibet in China appear to belong to this conflict category.
² See interpleader to the ICJ in the 1994 Bakassi Peninsula Case between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and La République du Cameroun.
that can no longer resolve individual or group differences through nonviolent procedures'. The case in Africa has been the transition to participatory democracy. Although the democratisation process has experienced some success in a few countries such as Benin and Botswana, and recently Ghana, South Africa, and Tanzania, the examples of many other African countries, including Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Central African Republic and Côte d’Ivoire, are far from inspiring any hope for the future of democratic rule. The Zimbabwe political transition since independence and the Kenyan conflict arising from the last election and complicated by the charges of the Prime Minister and his Deputy by the International Criminal Court are other examples of political transition conflicts. In some of the cases mentioned above, violent conflict came about by the annulment of a free and fair democratic process and, in others, serious internal political violence began after what the people saw as flaws occasioned by heavily rigged elections, winners seeking to exclude some actors or whole sections of the country, or incumbents being unwilling to submit to the will of the people as expressed through the ballot box. In some other cases, these conflicts have not yet led to severe violence mainly because the situations were greatly repressed. However, Cohen (1996:6) cautioned that there is ‘great threat of severe violence in the near future’ in this area. What appears clear from the difficulty experienced in the political transitions in many of these countries is that the governance record is very akin to the colonial style of governance inherited in the respective countries. The leadership only replicated the colonial leadership style which was for all practical purposes military rule since it was structured mainly in authoritarian terms. Two decades and more after the democratic struggles started in the 1990s, these countries continue to be ruled by Presidential decree in spite of the existence of ‘democratic parliaments’ and plans to introduce ‘Senatorial’ processes. In the case of one of these ‘new African democracies’, the Senators were elected only by Councillors whose term of office had long elapsed. It was also curious in Cameroon to note that 30 of the 100 members of the Senate of the country were appointed by the President. These kinds of governance manoeuvres in a post-colonial situation remain consistent with the inherited tradition of political power and dominance of the colonial administration. As Thomas (1994:4) pointed out, modernity itself
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can be understood as a colonialist project in the special sense that both the societies internal to Western nations, and those they possessed, administered and reformed elsewhere, were understood as objects to be surveyed, regulated and sanitised.

After cataloguing and categorising the different conflict types in post-independence Africa, it may now be appropriate to highlight the debate on conflict resolution and conflict management, consider the main intervention agencies and examine the different approaches employed to deal with the different conflicts.

Conflict resolution or conflict management?

Stephen Ryan (1990:50) has asserted that too often conflict resolution is used as a cover-all term that fails to face up to the different processes involved in the reduction or elimination of violence. This statement seems to be very evident of the African conflict situation especially when scholars and practitioners alike refer to the handling of conflict in Africa. It is necessary to explore the main features of conflict resolution and conflict management, two approaches in conflict scholarship, in order to better understand and assess the motivations and actions of intervening agencies or actors. The first major difference between the two approaches concerns the desire or not to raise the fundamental issues that divide the parties to a conflict. Proponents of the resolution approach favour the raising of fundamental issues because they believe that conflict can be resolved. As Mitchell (1989:9) pointed out, not merely will disruptive conflict behaviour cease and hostile attitudes and perceptions at least be ameliorated, but the ultimate source of conflict (that is, the situation of goal incompatibility) will also be removed so that no unsatisfied goals remain to plague the future.

Proponents of the management approach, on the other hand, believe that attempts to resolve conflicts are unrealistic, so rather than dealing with basic issues, attention should be concentrated on ameliorating the symptoms of the conflict, and in this way reducing suffering (Ryan 1990:102). Scholars of the resolution approach argue that the unsolvable nature of a particular conflict is more apparent than real. They maintain that it may be incorrect to view conflicts
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in zero-sum or win/lose terms, and that positive sum or win/win outcomes may be possible if we base our thinking on different assumptions. John Burton (1979; 1984; 1987; 1990), for example, calls for the adoption of a human needs approach, arguing for a paradigm shift in how we analyse conflicts. For Burton, most conflicts arise because one or more groups are denied their basic human needs as advanced by Galtung (2004), Doyal and Gough (1991) and others.

The second major difference between the two approaches relates to the chances of obtaining a self-sustaining settlement or outcome. Light (1984:151) claimed that conflict resolution offers a more viable outcome to conflict, because it converts the conflict into a shared problem, setting up a process in which both sides participate equally in finding solutions which are acceptable to both and which, therefore, are self-sustaining. Those who advance the management approach argue rather that given the lack of a community of interest, the most that can be hoped for is the suppression or perhaps the elimination of overt violence. One wonders whether the latter view is not the basis for all the peacekeeping forces prescribed for conflicts in Africa over the decades.

The third main difference concerns the role of the third party in responding to violence. Many proponents of the resolution approach tend not to believe in enforced settlements, a process upheld by proponents of the management school. In the resolution approach, the consent and contentment of the parties to a conflict are central. The solution to the conflict in this approach ought not to be imposed from outside. In this case, the third party plays a vital role, but only to the extent that the third party facilitates the interaction process. Edward de Bono (1985:76) popularised much of the thinking on how this can be done. As he put it:

In a conflict situation the two parties are unable to stand outside their own perceptions. In order to move from the argument to the design mode there is a need for a third party. The third party is not a go-between, negotiator or mediator. The third party acts as a mirror, an overview, a provider of provocation and creativity and a director of thinking.

While Burton (1979:120) on his part suggested that enforced settlement is not resolution of conflict, Groom (1986:86) also favoured the resolution of a conflict
above a settlement, arguing that resolution is not a settlement imposed by a victor or a powerful third party, but rather a new set of relationships freely and knowledgeablely arrived at by the parties themselves.

This situation is different from the management of conflict viewpoint. Ryan (1990:105) has pointed out that even the term management implies a certain amount of arm-twisting, and to do this effectively power is required. The belief, according to Ryan, that basic issues cannot be resolved logically encourages the assumption that the natural state of affairs between the parties is conflict and that a third force is needed to ensure an acceptable degree of order and stability. This will have to take the form of a coercive intervention, sometimes by military or paramilitary forces; sometimes through economic measures. A review of conflict intervention in Africa over the decades reveals that conflict resolution in Africa has rather been about conflict management since it has focused mainly on a certain amount of arm-twisting and coercive intervention with military and para-military forces. Zartman (2000:2) has indicated that the United Nations Security Council deployed nine peace-keeping missions to Africa in the 1990s alone.

The point in this analysis is that proponents of the management approach favour coercive interventions and are less scrupulous in seeking the consent of all the parties. Ryan (1990:106) cited the example of the London Conference of 1959 which resulted in the independence of Cyprus to illustrate the point that in the management approach the third parties may try and impose a solution by working behind the backs or above the heads of one or more of the main contenders. He explained that Archbishop Makarios was forced by Britain and Greece to accept conditions he did not approve. In Africa, the idea of conflict resolution has been colonial in design and implementation in that the solutions are more often coercively imposed on the weaker parties. While former colonial powers have been largely involved in the former colonies, as in the recent case of the French military intervention in Mali, conflict management in the continent’s violent conflicts by former colonial powers has been coercive. Like the Cyprus situation, there are conflict cases in Africa in which powerful third parties have also worked behind the backs or above the heads of some contenders. In these situations, the focus has been on the use of power at the disposal of former
colonial states to impose whatever solution was in the interest of the intervening powerful third-parties (Webb, Koutrakou and Walters 1996; Skjelsbaek and Fermann 1996). Skjelsbaek and Fermann indicated that even in the mediations undertaken under the auspices of the UN, the actor in international relations supposedly with claims to impartiality and neutrality, these vested interest considerations seem to be in play always. One typical example is the treatment John Ngu Foncha and the Southern Cameroons received from the United Kingdom, the United Nations, France and La République du Cameroun in 1961 (Munzu 1995:1). With the foregoing discussion on intervention approaches in African conflicts, one may want to inquire about the nature of the history of intervention in African conflicts.

**Intervention actors and approaches**

**Intervention agencies or actors**

A review of intervention efforts in African conflicts in the last two or three decades of the 20th century brings out two main trends in regard to the main actors or agencies and the intervention approaches involved. The first trend shows that the main actors intervening in African conflicts were almost entirely from outside of Africa. These were individuals, countries, groups of countries, institutions and organisations. As Herman Cohen pointed out, until 1993 Africa was almost totally dependent on outside entities for conflict management (1996:2). Some of these outside entities or actors included former colonial masters, international organisations and foreign powers like the United Nations, the European Community, and the United States of America; as well as regional efforts like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD)3 in East Africa, and a number of non-governmental actors such as former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Julius Nyerere. The second strong idea that emerges from intervention literature is the increasing emphasis on conflict management rather than resolution as the intervention approach in Africa.

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3 In 1996 the name of this Organisation was changed to Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).
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Conflicts in the different sub-regions of Africa

From the examples provided earlier, one can affirm that the conflict management approach has been the dominant approach in African conflicts. Examples taken from the different sub-regions of Africa are illustrative. In East Africa, the war in South Sudan, the collapse of the State in Somalia, and the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, the situation in Ethiopia as well as the wars in former Zaire, are significant examples of protracted conflicts. These conflicts were only addressed superficially, their intensity notwithstanding. In spite of all the urgency concerning the conflict in Burundi, the focus was mainly on diplomatic interventions by several agencies and actors. These interventions ended up with the establishment of War Crime Tribunals with none of the actors giving any consideration for the need to address the deep concerns of the parties in the conflict. The tribunals seem to have been intended for punishing individuals chosen for destruction by the powerful stakeholders rather than for unearthing the causes of conflict that remain deeply rooted in the respective societies. It is difficult to imagine how the War Crimes Tribunal in Rwanda helped to bring justice to the situation bred, for instance, by colonialism and the de-colonisation process in Burundi and Rwanda. The case was not different in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

In the case of the intractable fratricidal war in South Sudan, intervention was mainly intermittent from 1990 and undertaken by the Djibouti-based IGADD/IGAD. In spite of the colonial basis of this conflict, it was difficult for many years to state any willingness on the part of the agencies to seek a lasting solution by addressing the profound causes of conflict. Cohen (1996:4) summed it all when he affirmed that East Africa in general was a sub-region where neither the African Unity (AU) nor the international community had been able to advance conflict management significantly beyond humanitarian intervention.

In West Africa, ECOWAS has, since 1990, been involved in peace-keeping operations. The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone were two situations in which ECOWAS sent in troops with financial and material support from the international community, notably the United States (Cohen 1996). In spite of
the huge cost of the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in terms of human lives and material, the peace-keeping interventions focused mainly on achieving what these actors termed ‘peace and stability’ (Cohen 1996:6).

**Intervention by individual external powers**

As stated earlier, former colonial powers have been involved in the efforts to address conflicts in Africa. Some of these efforts undertaken in the 1990s included negotiations between Angola’s factions coordinated by the Portuguese in 1990-1992; the mediation efforts of the Italians in the civil war in Mozambique during 1991-1993; and the efforts of the United States with regard to Ethiopia in 1990-1991 and Somalia in 1992-1993. The United States, within the framework of the African Conflict Resolution Act of 1994, engaged with the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in an effort to get the Organisation’s conflict management mechanism off the ground. French intervention in post-colonial African conflicts came mainly under the umbrella of the European Union. France and Britain also sponsored a number of conferences in 1994-1995 in some African capitals to facilitate dialogue on the development of consensus on conflict management policy along specific lines, including inter alia the development of conflict management approaches tailored to African circumstances under African leadership. France also provided funding through the Paris-based multilateral Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation (ACCT) for launching a West African ‘Observatory’ or watchdog based in Dakar, Senegal, to focus on 1) prevention and settlement of conflicts and 2) democratic transition in West Africa. France also supported the development of an inventory of available military assets in West Africa for an eventual AU and/or a sub-regional peace-keeping contingent (Cohen 1996:5). France also intervened militarily in some of her former colonies such as Côte d’Ivoire (2003 and 2010), Chad (2008), Mali (2013) or in the Central African Republic, the claim being to achieve what became known as ‘peace and stability’ rather than to resolve the respective conflicts by proceeding with both sides participating equally in finding solutions acceptable to both and, therefore, self-sustaining.
International organisations

The international organisations involved in African conflicts are mainly the UN and the OAU/AU. The UN, for instance, has intervened in African conflicts since independence as in the case of Congo Leopoldville or Kinshasa. In the last two decades of the 20th century, the UN intervened in Mozambique's Civil War; the Angolan Civil War; the Namibian Independence Conflict; Western Sahara, and the Rwandan genocide of April to July 1994. The bulk of these interventions were in the form of peace-keeping. The report of a former Secretary-General of the UN on this subject is pertinent to this analysis. In his annual report on peace-keeping to the General Assembly, Boutros Ghali noted his exploration of the possibility of building up a stockpile of military equipment in Africa (mostly leftovers from terminated UN peace-keeping operations) for use on short notice by African contingents (Cohen 1996:6). This remark by the UN Secretary-General illustrated the superficial approach employed by the world body in regard to conflicts in Africa.

The OAU on its part was, until 1990, virtually non-responsive to African conflicts because of its sacrosanct doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. William J. Foltz and I. William Zartman, two experts on the work of the Organisation, viewed the non-intervention situation and shared their views with regard to OAU’s non-intervention. While Zartman (1984:41) considered that there is no OAU in matters of African conflict; there are only members and their interests come first, Foltz (1991:349) viewed the OAU as most conservative having six of the seven principles enumerated in Article III of its Charter designed to serve in part or in whole to protect the autonomy of member states from interference or coercion by other members or by the Organisation as a whole. In keeping with the instructions from African Heads of State and Governments, the OAU conflict management mechanism tried to intervene in conflicts such as the one in the Republic of the Congo in 1993 following the 1992 democratic election problems, and the conflict in Burundi after the assassination of a President in October 1993 was followed by instability and massive violence. Such OAU intervention has not been different from the examples of the UN. Like the UN, the OAU has mainly emphasised the conflict
management approach consisting of peace-keeping forces to reduce or eliminate violence rather than the desire to address the fundamental issues which divide the parties to the conflict. Stationing peace-keeping forces as in the Central African Republic (1996), Sudan (2004-2006, related to the Darfur conflict) or in Somalia (2007) can only be a temporary measure rather than a ‘conflict resolution’ approach. Whatever the case, OAU intervention through peace-keeping has been seriously bogged down by three fundamental principles: namely, non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, territorial integrity, and inviolability of the boundaries inherited from colonisation (Cohen 1996:2-3).

In addition to these fundamental problems of principle, other problems continue to be a challenge to AU peace-keeping missions. Some of these obstacles include inadequate trained troops, funding, and political willpower among AU nations to effectively intervene in all of Africa’s conflicts. From a conflict resolution standpoint, the critique by Feldman (2008:267) that ‘without strong AU military forces capable of providing effective interventions, many African conflicts will either remain unresolved or depend on forces outside the continent to attempt to impose a non-African solution on them’ is misplaced because military forces do not ‘resolve conflict’; they only succeed in some cases to reduce the violence. Conflict resolution is more than making or keeping peace.

The international community

One can safely state that the international community was, toward the end of the 20th century, responsive to the African conflict situation if one considers the number of seminars and conferences organised around the theme of conflict management in Africa as a reliable indicator. The general tendency was for donor governments to support capacity-building in the continent to deal with its conflicts. Apart from the US, the leaders of this conflict management support were France and Britain – Western governments with colonial, economic and political stakes and the longest history of military-to-military relations in the continent (Cohen 1996:4). From the foregoing, it is evident that ‘conflict resolution’ in Africa has been colonial in some form whether it was designed and implemented by individuals, countries, groups of countries, institutions or organisations.


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Conclusion

This article set out to engage the colonial factor in conflict and conflict resolution in Africa and to revisit the colonial dominance in Africa’s post-coloniality. It argued that numerous conflicts in post-colonial Africa have their roots in colonialism and the failure of the de-colonisation process, and also that the effort to resolve African conflicts may not have been very successful (Zartman 2000:3) because of the colonial considerations of intervening powers and organisations and the approach in use. The article claims that the realities of Africa’s colonial past that are very determinant on the continent’s post-colonial situation are profoundly important not only for scholars of African conflicts, but also for practitioners who intervene in search of solutions. Attempts to resolve any of the conflicts must consequently not continue to ignore these underlying causes. Efforts to ‘manage’ the conflicts are not likely to produce lasting resolution as shown by the recurrent stalemated nature of Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Western Sahara, and British Southern Cameroons among many others. The ‘new institutions and good governance’ recipe advocated by some practitioners, is a limited prescription.

The typology of African conflicts highlighted in the article could surely be greatly enriched by a careful exploration of the various conflict types viewed from the perspective of the different issues in contention. Conflicts in each category will only be satisfactorily resolved when they are addressed in relation to their specific root causes. The point at issue is that there are different types of conflicts in Africa. Consequently, each conflict needs to be analysed on its own merits and addressed as a specific case rather than using the strait-jacket peace-keeping approach in every conflict as has been the case for decades. Whether the emphasis is in 1) forced assimilation, 2) repression, whereby armies have been imposed on conflicting parties, 3) avoidance to frustrate the aspirations of seemingly less powerful or less organised parties, or 4) suppression of overt physical violence, the interventions have been coercive, and coercive interventions are only impositions of the powerful. From the standpoint of this article, these different options externally imposed, usually by working behind
the backs or above the heads of one or more of the parties involved in conflict, have had colonial underpinnings, such as arrangements without the consent and cooperation of the parties or of some of them.

While the consensus on intervention in African conflicts has mainly favoured the conflict management approach along the specific lines of power and military force through peace-keeping in different conflict locations, the language used also appeared to be colonially cavalier as in the concept known as ‘the development of conflict management approaches tailored to African circumstances …’. Although conflict situations are always specific, attempts to resolve the different conflicts ought to be about the desire to raise and address the fundamental issues that divide the parties to a conflict rather than the simple desire to reduce or eliminate violence as has been the case.

The foregoing are some of the complex and deep-rooted concerns which must be addressed in conflict resolution efforts in Africa. It will be difficult for the conflict resolution community to see its way around these concerns without a renewed openness to address Africa’s colonial past. If the conflict resolution community is to have any chance of reaching durable outcomes to the conflicts in Africa, it has to look beyond the narrow assumptions on which it has usually operated. The policy of the blind eye is just as inadequate as imposing an army of occupation on a given people or nation in conflict, as has been the case in several conflicts in Africa. Equally, the AU idea to set up an African Peace Keeping Force as outlined by the UN-organised Millennium Summit in September 2000 can only produce colonial-style repressive measures rather than provide durable outcomes to Africa’s conflicts. By envisaging peace-keeping forces in the 21st century, the AU leadership may be making the error of keeping Africa in the colonial mindset while the rest of the world advances in the democratic respect of dialogue and human and people’s rights in the resolution of conflicts. The question remains whether there is the political will at the African Union, the United Nations, and among former colonial powers to move beyond the colonial-style desire to merely suppress or perhaps eliminate overt violence.
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Interethnic conflict in Jonglei State, South Sudan: Emerging ethnic hatred between the Lou Nuer and the Murle

Yuki Yoshida* 

Abstract 
This article analyses the escalation of interethnic conflicts between the Lou Nuer and the Murle in Jonglei State of South Sudan. Historically, interethnic conflicts in Jonglei were best described as environmental conflicts, in which multiple ethnic groups competed over scarce resources for cattle grazing. Cattle raiding was commonly committed. The global climate change exacerbated resource scarcity, which contributed to intensifying the conflicts and developing ethnic cleavage. The type of conflict drastically shifted from resource-driven to identity-driven conflict after the 2005 government-led civilian disarmament, which increased the existing security dilemma. In the recent conflicts, there have been clear demonstrations of ethnic hatred in both sides, and arguably the tactics used amounted to acts of genocide. The article ends with some implications drawn from the Jonglei case on post-conflict reform of the security sector and management of multiple identities.

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Introduction

After decades of civil war, the Republic of South Sudan achieved independence in July 2011 and was recognised as the newest state by the international community. However, South Sudan has been plagued by the unresolved territorial dispute over the Abyei region with northern Sudan, to which the world has paid much attention. Less attention has been paid to the country’s instability and frequent intertribal clashes, especially in Jonglei State. Traditionally, clashes between the two ethnic groups, the Lou Nuer and the Murle, have been observed in Jonglei. The conflicts occurred when one ethnic group entered territories of others to compete over scarce resources, such as land and water necessary for cattle grazing. The migrations due to the influence of climate change were a trigger of those clashes. Although some human casualties were occasionally observed, cattle raiding was the main objective of the conflicts because cattle were sources of wealth and sustenance for many pastoralist communities in Jonglei.

The type of warfare, however, has significantly changed after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005, and the government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) conducted a disarmament campaign solely targeting the Lou Nuer. This uneven disarmament destabilised the country, sharpening the ethnic cleavage and security dilemma between the Lou Nuer and the Murle. The security dilemma eventually led to armed clashes, which fuelled ethnic hatred. The recent clashes are evidently more than just cattle raiding. Rather, they are characterised by indiscriminate killing of civilians with a clear demonstration of mutual hatred. Despite longstanding interethnic clashes between the two tribes, the emergence of ethnic hatred is apparently a recent phenomenon.

The questions this article attempts to answer are the following: How can existing theories explain the occurrence as well as the recent escalation of conflicts between the Lou Nuer and the Murle in Jonglei? To what extent can this conflict be regarded as an ‘ethnic conflict’? The first section discusses theoretical frameworks relevant to the selected case. The second part presents the application of the theories to the Lou Nuer-Murle conflicts. Finally, the third part examines the recent emergence of ethnic hatred by considering both
groups’ perspectives. I argue that conflict between the Lou Nuer and the Murle has experienced a drastic shift from pastoralist war to ethnic conflict motivated by an increasing security dilemma and mutual hatred.

Theoretical frameworks

Environmental conflict

Libiszewski (1992:3) defines environmental conflict as the ‘struggle for scarce natural resources’. Natural resources that are sources of wealth as well as prerequisites for sustenance directly or indirectly contribute to producing food and energy, providing living space, and maintaining one’s health (Bob and Bronkhorst 2004:12). Scarcity of resources can be divided into several different categories: 1) physical scarcity (the available amount is finite), 2) geopolitical scarcity (unequal distribution of resources on the earth), 3) socio-economic scarcity (unequal distribution of wealth gained from natural resources), and 4) scarcity caused by human-led environmental degradation. Bob and Bronkhorst (2004:15) further argue that perceived or actual scarcity of natural resources, such as water and land, plays an essential role in environmental disputes because resource scarcity would be a direct threat to human security. The worst-case scenario would be an outbreak of interethnic/intergroup conflict over existing resources for survival (Libiszewski1992:14). Several scholars also agree that ‘the more scarce the resource, the more bitter the fight’ (Le Billon 2001:564).

The impact of global climate change on people’s lifestyle has been recognised as an accelerator of environmental conflict. Climate change threatens human security by making issues of resource scarcity more ‘complex and intractable’ (Brown, Hammill and Mcleman 2007:1142). In particular, less precipitation and extended drought as a result of warmer temperature have accelerated degradation of water and land resources (Raleigh and Urdal 2007:677). In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an intergovernmental body that provides scientific assessment of risks of climate change, identified Africa as the most vulnerable region in the world to climate change because of its rudimentary capability to adapt (Brown, Hammill and Mcleman 2007:1145).
The Christian Aid charity also estimates that the negative effects of climate change would kill more than 184 million people in Africa before the end of the twenty-first century (Nordås and Gleditsch 2007:629).

Facing resource scarcity in their areas, pastoralists have to decide whether they stay home or leave arid land in search for better resources. Reuveny (2007:658) argues that pastoralists in the less developed countries (LDCs) tend to leave the affected areas, believing that the net benefit from migrating is greater than that for not doing so. Leff (2009:189) identifies lack of pastoralists’ capacities in LDCs to adjust themselves to climate changes as a rationale for migration. Such migration is common in Africa during dry seasons or periods of drought (Leff 2009:192).

Climate change-induced migration has the potential to erupt into communal conflicts.¹ Nordås and Gleditsch (2007:633) argue that the likelihood of conflict increases when the migrants enter the territories of other tribal groups that might also suffer from resource scarcity. The increase of competition between the hosts and migrants is inevitable as the population within the area increases, while resources available decline (Young and Sin’Oei 2011:19). Such a tense situation commonly results in various forms of violence, such as looting and killing (Nordås and Gleditsch 2007:634). In addition, resource competition can develop into ethnic animosity if the hosts and migrants belong to different ethnic groups (Reuveny 2007:659). Several exacerbating factors include longer droughts, which make migrants stay longer in hosts’ territories, leading to more frequent clashes (Leff 2009:192). Unclearly defined land boundaries and ownership also prolong conflict by allowing the hosts and migrants to make claims to justify their rights (Bob and Bronkhorst 2004:18). Brosché and Elfversson (2012:38) argue that although such conflicts do not typically produce large-scale human casualty and are often solved by non-violent means, they occasionally turn into violent conflicts.

¹ Brosché and Elfversson (2012:35) define communal violence as ‘violent conflict between non-state groups that are organised along a shared communal identity’. The communal identity is often associated with ethnic or religious identity.
Realism – ‘Intrastate’ security dilemma

Realism, one of the international relations (IR) theories, can be used to explain the dynamics and potential consequences of an intrastate security dilemma. Realists believe in the anarchic nature of international politics, where there is no overarching government that provides security to all (Jackson and Sørensen 2010:59). The anarchic situation inevitably motivates states to ensure their own security by reinforcing defensive capabilities, which is likely to threaten the security of others (Posen 1993:28). In response, those who are threatened in turn develop their own defensive capacities, eventually threatening the security of those who initiated the reinforcement. This endless round of arms race is referred to as the security dilemma.

Once trapped into a security dilemma, it is difficult for states to manoeuvre outside of it. Uncertainty about others’ intentions creates mistrust and fear of being cheated and harmed (Roe 1999:184). Hence, being fearful of others’ malign intents, cooperation on disarmament is unlikely in the anarchic international system. An increased security dilemma can motivate states to initiate pre-emptive measures based on the assumption that a first offensive strike would be more effective than defensive operations to survive and achieve greater security (Posen 1993:29). Under the anarchic situation where no state is guaranteed its security and others are perceived as potential threats, ‘the occurrence of security dilemmas always remains a possibility’ (Roe 1999:186).

A security dilemma can also occur in the intrastate context, if, as Posen argues, ‘conditions are similar to those between states in the international system’ (quoted in Roe 1999:188). The hard rationalist approach suggests that, under the circumstance where there is no functioning government that can provide security to its citizens, anarchy is likely to emerge (Kaufman 2001:19). Anarchy, together with a group’s tendency to associate the identity of others with a danger (Posen 1993:31), often compels the groups to mobilise their security measures, including pre-emptive war, which aim to threaten the security of others but, in turn, undermine the security of those who first mobilised. The real dilemma conflicting parties face is between maintaining the status quo that makes them
insecure and developing armament that consequently makes them insecure as well. An intrastate security dilemma will thus emerge through similar processes as those seen in international security dilemmas.

An intrastate security dilemma is often associated with groups’ identities, such as ethnicity or religion. Kaufman (2001:19) illustrates how an ‘ethnic security dilemma’ precipitates violent conflict among ethnic groups. An ethnic security dilemma often indicates groups’ fear of extinction, which justifies ‘hostile attitudes toward the other group and extreme measures in self-defense …’ (Kaufman 2001:31). Young and Sing’Oei (quoted in Kaufman 2001:26) elaborate that the hostility toward ‘them’ increases the unity of the group and encourages group members to view every incident through the ethnic lens, which solidifies ethnic hatred. Horowitz (quoted in Kaufman 2001:29) stresses that ‘emotions … are what drive ethnic violence’. Diamond (1987:121) also highlights that those who are fearful of extinction and tend to strike first are often marginalised in society. Once the marginalised group initiates an attack on the other, a perceived threat becomes a real threat (Roe 1999:191), which exacerbates an existing security dilemma. The worst-case scenario would be that ethnic groups are trapped into a spiral of an ‘action-reaction process’ (Roe 1999:196). As Kaufman (1996:157) puts it, ethnic animosity and fear of extinction seemingly activate the security dilemma, which can erupt into ‘mass-led violence’.

In the post-conflict context, disarmament campaigns led by a state or external actors can engender or aggravate an intrastate security dilemma. Armed factions are often unwilling to disarm because the security sector of the fragile state is not trusted and often incapable of providing common security. In this case, disarmament makes the parties vulnerable to potential attacks by a rival (Walter 1999:134). The parties often view even a slight possibility of being attacked as an extremely grave risk (Walter 1997:340). Some groups might see others’ disarmament as a ‘window of opportunity’ to initiate a war because they perceive their military capabilities as superior to those of others and believe that relative security will be greatly enhanced by pre-emptive operations (Posen 1993:33). This consequently worsens the existing security dilemma. Moreover,
a weak state often uses coercive measures on certain ethnic groups to maintain social cohesion (Roe 1999:197), which engenders an ethnic security dilemma.\(^2\) Post-conflict disarmament could thus be a source of an intrastate security dilemma.

**Application of theories**

**Background**

Jonglei State, home to about 1.3 million people in 11 counties, is the largest and most populous state in South Sudan (United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan [UNMISS] 2011:5). It is a multiethnic state inhabited by several ethnic groups, such as Dinka, Nuer, and Murle (International Crisis Group [ICG] 2009:28). Most communities depend on agriculture, including agropastoralism and pastoralism, which provides more than 80 percent of domestic employment (Food and Agriculture Organisation [FAO] 2010:3).

Jonglei is also known as one of the least developed regions in the world, lacking basic infrastructure due to decades of civil war and being marginalised by the central authority. Because Jonglei lacks functioning roads, most of its parts become inaccessible during the rainy season, which hinders timely security response (ICG 2009:16). The underdevelopment has also made poverty persistent in the region. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, about 48 percent of the population in Jonglei is living below the poverty line (Omondi 2011:2). The level of food insecurity has also been significantly high. According to FAO (2010:7), since 2008, approximately 39 percent of the population faces food insecurity, and 30 percent faces severe food insecurity.

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\(^2\) Roe (1999:197) identifies four common features of a weak state: 1) lack of ability to satisfy the basic economic needs of its citizens, 2) a weak state identity as well as absence of social cohesion, and 3) internal instability caused by the two preceding elements as well as inability to effectively manage ethnic differences.
Environmental conflict

Cattle grazing

Environmental conflict provides an appropriate lens to explain the traditional aspect of interethnic conflicts in Jonglei. In South Sudan, cattle are crucial assets for all ethnic groups because cattle are ‘a primary currency for these groups, representing wealth and social status, and are used for compensation and the payment of wedding dowries’ (Rands and LeRiche 2011:7). Roughly 80 percent of the population depends on cattle grazing to survive, and the livestock industry has been one of the largest sources of employment (Ferrie 2012:5). Because cattle are directly related to the survival of these groups, people often enter territories of other ethnic groups and loot cattle. Not only are looted cattle used for sustaining people’s lives, they are also sold in exchange for small arms (Rolandsen and Breidlid 2012:54). Although the primary targets in these clashes were cattle, use of such weapons as protection has increased the human lethality of conflicts.

Although cattle grazing requires water and pasture land, not all ethnic groups in Jonglei have access to those resources due to physical as well as geopolitical scarcity. Hence, during dry seasons or periods of drought, those who inhabit arid land migrate with their cattle to territories of other ethnic groups to compete for resources, often resulting in violent conflicts (Richardson 2011). The lack of clarification on ownership has often deadlocked disputes. Additionally, the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan has not yet stipulated the legal framework for pastoralists’ grazing rights (Agbor and Taiwo 2012:14). Cattle raiding and interethnic clashes have historically been observed in Jonglei, particularly when the Lou Nuer whose land was often affected by droughts migrated to territories of other ethnic groups, such as the Dinka and the Murle.

3 The boundaries and ownership of land in Jonglei are not clearly defined. The International Crisis Group report states, ‘Contested borders have been redrawn and the counties and payams renamed so frequently that it is difficult to find a map that is an accurate representation of the state. Many disputes were exacerbated following the 1991 SPLM split and the dual administration of the area that ensued. These issues are further complicated by refugee return, violence-induced displacement, and the demarcation of constituencies ahead of the elections’ (ICG 2009:17).
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in search of water and pasture for cattle grazing (Rands and LeRiche 2011:7). The empirical observations also suggest that the areas where the migrants and the hosts confront each other often became conflict sites (Omondi 2011:6). Migration of the Lou Nuer has thus been a trigger of interethnic clashes in Jonglei for centuries.

**Impact of climate change**

Climate change has been an exacerbating factor of resource scarcity in Jonglei, which resulted in the frequency and intensification of interethnic clashes. Little annual rain and extended drought caused by climate change have ‘reduced the number of accessible water points and other vital resources, forcing pastoralist communities to travel further into neighboring tribal areas for sustenance’ (Small Arms Survey 2012:6). While average temperature increase of the earth since the 1950s is about 0.1°C per decade (Reuveny 2007:657), the temperature in South Sudan has increased 0.4°C per decade, which is the most rapid increase in the world over the last 30 years (United States Agency for International Development [USAID] 2011). Additionally, rainfall during summer has decreased by 10-20 percent since the mid-1970s. As a consequence of higher temperature and little precipitation, the frequency and duration of droughts increased, which has reduced the number of water points and turned lands arid. Within an environment gravely affected by climate change, it is safe to assume that the likelihood of conflicts is high. Due to extended droughts, the migrating Lou Nuer would sometimes have to stay longer in lands of the Murle or Dinka, where more people compete over declining resources to survive at the expense of others. Thus, migratory practices dictated by the environmental degradation ‘bring communities with long-standing relationships of animosity into closer proximity’, contributing to the frequent outbreak of conflicts (Richardson 2011).

**Ethnic security dilemma**

**Disarmament**

The series of recent interethnic clashes beginning in 2009 can also be viewed through the lens of the ethnic security dilemma that was gravely exacerbated after the civilian disarmament conducted between December 2005 and
May 2006. Based on the authorisation of disarmament in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) conducted a civilian disarmament campaign in Jonglei, targeting the Lou Nuer first (Young and Sing’Oei 2011:21). However, this group refused to surrender arms as they believed the targeted disarmament to be a concerted attempt by the central authorities to weaken their fighting capabilities. This would increase the Nuer’s relative insecurity as compared to that of other ethnic groups (ICG 2009:11). After negotiations between the GoSS and the Nuer failed, the state authority turned to coercive disarmament, in which the White Army4 and SPLA soldiers engaged in a series of fights (Rands and LeRiche 2011:11). As a result, while over 3 000 arms were collected, approximately 1 600 soldiers and hundreds of civilians were killed (Garfield 2007:17). The GoSS and SPLA were planning to disarm Murle militias as well, but the plan was not implemented due to concerns of the international community regarding potential casualties following the disarmament (ICG 2009:11). Subsequently, another round of disarmament, led by the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and targeting Murle militia, resulted in the collection of a small amount of arms, suggesting that people were successfully hiding some of their weapons to prepare for potential armed conflicts (Leff 2009:197).

The fact that the GoSS and SPLA failed to simultaneously disarm all ethnic groups in Jonglei made the Lou Nuer extremely vulnerable to the Murle which regarded themselves as the Nuer’s victims and claimed to have the right to retaliate against the Lou Nuer (Rands and LeRiche 2011:8). Uncertainty between the Lou Nuer and the Murle regarding their fighting capabilities exacerbated the security dilemma. After the completion of the first round of the disarmament

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4 The White Army was a ‘loosely organized’ Lou Nuer youth militia that operated mainly in Jonglei state up to 2006 (Rolandsen and Breidlid 2012:51). The army was originally created to protect community property and cattle but at times it fought in the civil war. Since the CPA allowed only the SPLA and SAF to continue operations in South Sudan, and because of the forcible disarmament, the White Army started dissolving. However, it has been said that the White Army, comprising both Lou Nuer and Dinka youth, has revived in Jonglei and has been involved in the killing and displacement of Murle (Rands and LeRiche 2011:10).
campaign in 2006, the Lou Nuer gradually rearmed themselves by looting collected arms (UNMISS 2011:6). However, viewing the situation of the Lou Nuer remaining weakened as a window of opportunity, the Murle attacked them in Akobo County in January 2009, killing about 300 Lou Nuers (Small Arms Survey 2012:3). This was followed by retaliation of the Lou Nuer in March, which resulted in the deaths of 450 Murle. The clashes in 2009 were the most fatal in the post-CPA period (UNMISS 2012:6), and there is no doubt that the two ethnic groups are trapped in the spiral of an ‘action-reaction process’. Although another disarmament campaign targeting both the Lou Nuer and the Murle was conducted between August 2009 and March 2010, both groups resisted and apparently succeeded in hiding some of their weapons. The security dilemma was clearly an essential source of resistance to disarmament. Thus, the 2006 disarmament is the primary reference point of escalation of the security dilemma between the Lou Nuer and the Murle, which erupted into a cycle of brutal attack and revenge.

State’s lack of capacity

The lack of government capabilities to provide security to its citizens, which created a state of anarchy within the country, also made the ethnic groups resist disarmament and feel responsible for their own security. The UNMISS (2012:26) reported that both the national police and the security forces lacked capacities to provide security because of inadequate logistical, human and financial resources and the difficulty of accessing many of the regions which lack functioning roads. The absence of a formal justice system has also created a lawlessness situation and resulted in a culture of impunity, in which perpetrators of violence are rarely prosecuted (ICG 2009:15).

There are two major security apparatus in South Sudan: the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) and SPLA. The quality of SSPS is ‘abysmal’, however (ICG 2009:19). Because the SSPS was often outnumbered and outgunned by armed pastoralists, it failed to stop interethnic clashes. Lou Nuer youth have expressed their grievances against the SSPS, which always failed to arrest the Murle, who conducted cattle raiding, murder, and abduction (UNMISS 2011:9). Most of the SSPS personnel are former SPLA soldiers, ‘who were not asked to join the
post-CPA army and thus are mostly second-tier quality or worse’ (ICG 2009:19). In addition, many personnel are old and lack proper training and education. The absence of police stations in Jonglei also prevents the SSPS from responding timeously to communal violence. Moreover, because police is not seen as an attractive occupation for qualified youth in South Sudan, recruitment of young people will continue to be a challenge.

The credibility of the SPLA has also been questioned. Although the SPLA as a national army of South Sudan is responsible for dealing with external threats, it is often mobilised to halt domestic incidents due to SSPS’s lack of ability to do so (ICG 2009:20). However, the SPLA does not intervene in every interethnic clash, which creates ‘confusion among communities about its role and mandate’ (2009:21). Ethnic identities of SPLA soldiers explain the inconsistent responses. A local journalist interviewed by the International Crisis Group revealed that soldiers tend to abandon their original mandate and ‘often stand with their tribe’, when the interests of their groups are at stake. Recently, some SPLA personnel were arrested and punished due to their heavy use of force in the local conflicts in which they intervened, which discouraged the SPLA from further involvement. Corruption within the SPLA has also undermined the legitimacy of the organisation (Leff 2009:194).

**UNMISS’s lack of capability**

The presence of international actors in South Sudan has also not successfully improved the security situation or consolidated peace. In July 2011, the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 1996 established the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) with a civilian protection mandate. However, due to lack of personnel and equipment, UNMISS often failed to provide security in a timely and effective manner (Saferworld 2011). When thousands of Lou Nuer youth were mobilised for a retaliatory attack against the Murle in December 2011, UNMISS was able to deploy only half of its troops due to a lack of helicopters (Small Arms Survey 2012: 9). Locals also criticised UN peacekeepers for not being able to reach places that are inaccessible by helicopter. Furthermore, UNMISS was silent about obvious human rights violations committed by the SPLA during the disarmament campaigns. UNMISS thus far
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has not helped the parties overcome the security dilemma by assuring them of security. In sum, ethnic groups in Jonglei are reluctant to disarm because 1) they need arms to protect their communities and cattle from other ethnic groups, 2) disarmament has not been conducted to all ethnic groups simultaneously, making disarmed groups insecure, and 3) in Jonglei, there is virtually no security apparatus that can equally and effectively protect citizens and maintain internal stability. All three reasons were the causes and effects of the security dilemma.

Characteristics of recent clashes

Intensification of conflicts

Since the series of lethal attacks and revenges between the Murle and the Lou Nuer in 2009, which changed a perceived ethnic security dilemma to a real threat, the objective of the attacks is no longer merely cattle raiding, but also massive civilian killing. In February 2011, the clash between the two groups was initiated by the Murle’s attacks on the Lou Nuer in Uror County, resulting in the deaths of 8 people including local chiefs (Ferrie 2012:2). In April and June, the Lou Nuer conducted retaliatory attacks, in which 600-700 people were killed, hundreds of thousands were displaced, and children and women were abducted. In August, Murle retaliation killed more than 600 Lou Nuer (UNMISS 2011:11). The most fatal clash in 2011 was the attack of 8 000 Lou Nuer youth on the Murle communities in Pibor County between 23 December 2011 and 9 January 2012 (2011:12). The attack resulted in more than 1 000 deaths (Small Arms Survey 2012: 3). This was immediately followed by retaliation from Murle youth, which lasted until 4 February. Although a large number of cattle was looted through these conflicts, there is no doubt – in light of the significant increase in human casualties – that the aim was not only cattle raiding.

The proliferation and availability of high-powered small arms in Jonglei is one of the exacerbating factors for casualties in these conflicts. Historically, primitive tools, such as sticks, spears, and machetes were used to carry out cattle raiding and violence (ICG 2009:1). However, in the recent clashes, the use of sophisticated weapons, including AK-47s, rocket launchers and machine guns, has increased the lethality of the conflicts. The ethnic groups often gain weapons
Emerging ethnic hatred

In the recent clashes, it is important to investigate the emerging ethnic hatred between the Lou Nuer and the Murle and its application to actual tactics. For instance, when a large number of Lou Nuer youth attacked Murle communities in December 2011, they did not only loot cattle and kill some Murle, but also destroyed churches and a clinic, which turned out to be the only functioning medical clinic in the county (UNMISS 2011:18). In addition to their large scale, organised and systematic attacks, Genocide Watch (2012) also reported that the Lou Nuer indiscriminately killed women, children and the elderly in Murle communities. In fact, before entering Murle communities, the Lou Nuer announced ‘their intent to commit genocide’ by stating, ‘We have decided to invade Murle land and wipe out the entire Murle tribe on the face of the earth’ (Genocide Watch 2012). After Lou Nuer youth retreated from the Murle communities, the walls of schools and other buildings were covered by hate messages that explicitly showed their intent to destroy the Murle as an ethnic group, such as ‘We come to kill all of Murle’ and ‘We come again don’t sit again in your payam’ (UNMISS 2011:15). The Lou Nuer also expressed their hatred against the Murle through the mass media (Rands and LeRiche 2011:12). In short, the mobilisation of a large number of youth, attacks on infrastructure in the communities, indiscriminate killing of non-combatants, and verbally expressed ethnic hatred suggest that Lou Nuer actions can be best interpreted as genocide against the Murle.

In contrast, fear of extinction and grievances due to decades of marginalisation have led the Murle to initiate strikes against the Lou Nuer. Historically, the minority Murle have been marginalised socially, economically, and politically. Other ethnic groups in Jonglei discriminate against the Murle, view the Murle
as “‘backward” or “hostile”…’ and always label them as perpetrators of violence and cattle raiding (Rands and LeRiche 2011:12). Additionally, the Murle are often ‘harassed in town and insulted when they are heard using their own language’ (Young and Sing’Oei 2011:18). The Murle were not even allowed to receive development funding, which made their communities remain underdeveloped and entrapped in the cycle of poverty (Ferrie 2012:6). Moreover, the Murle have been politically marginalised. On one hand, most of the senior governmental positions are occupied by either Dinka or Nuer – including the presidency (Dinka) and the vice-presidency (Nuer) (ICG 2009:2). The Dinka and the Nuer are also well represented in state government, including the governorship (Dinka) and the deputy governorship (Nuer) (ICG 2009:12). On the other hand, the Murle are underrepresented at all levels largely because the elections tend to be voted along ethnic lines (Ferrie 2012:7). Hence, their voices are hardly reflected in both national and state policies, which led to their grievances and ethnic animosity against dominating groups. Furthermore, because the Lou Nuer enjoy better access to technology and communication networks than the Murle, they are able to promote their own narratives of each event domestically and internationally (Small Arms Survey 2012:6). In fact, international actors have only responded to the clashes initiated by the Murle because the Lou Nuer utilise their connections with humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who are only aware of the narratives of the Lou Nuer (Ferrie 2012:7), which also fuel Murle animosity against the Lou Nuer. This is how the Murle have developed their identity as victims and have come to regard the Lou Nuer as aggressors (Rands and LeRiche 2011:8).

Their victimisation effectively served as a justification for the Murle to commence war against the Lou Nuer, which made the Lou Nuer highly insecure and exacerbated the ethnic security dilemma. Looking at the recent fighting features of the Murle, their targets were not only cattle, but also civilians, implying that they were motivated by ethnic hatred and grievances against the Lou Nuer. In the most recent clash of February 2013, initiated by heavily armed Murle youth, 103 people were killed, most of whom were the elderly, women, and children who failed to escape (Gettleman 2013). This suggests that Murle
grievances against the Lou Nuer oppression have developed into ethnic hatred, changing the original objectives of the assault and intensifying the brutality of the conflicts.

Moreover, considering Lou Nuer hate messages and their intent to eliminate Murle communities, the clashes might develop into greater-scale mass killing or genocide. The inhumane acts and tactics undertaken on both sides, and particularly the repeated Nuer expression of ‘intent’ to destroy the Murle communities, led Genocide Watch to categorise Lou Nuer-Murle conflicts as Stage 7 (Extermination) of its eight-stage indicator of genocide (Genocide Watch 2012). ‘Extermination’ can quickly become a mass killing, namely ‘genocide’. Perpetrators of genocide often regard their enemies as subhuman to justify the use of any inhuman tactics against them. In the worst-case consequence, genocide could be followed by counter-genocide, in which those who were attacked retaliate, and the genocide eventually becomes a cycle. Needless to say, extermination has been happening in Jonglei.

**Conclusion**

The characteristics of Nuer-Murle conflicts have changed over time from resource-driven to identity-oriented conflict. The conflicts in the pre-CPA period are well explained through the lens of environmental conflict, in which the two ethnic groups fought over scarce resources. The level of competition was heightened by the negative effects of climate change. More frequent climate change-induced migration increased the likelihood of conflicts. The lethality was also exacerbated due to the proliferation and use of small arms. Considering that both ethnic groups already possessed weapons for cattle raiding, a security dilemma was already in place in the pre-CPA period. The transition from resource-driven communal conflict to security dilemma-driven conflict occurred when the GoSS failed to simultaneously disarm all ethnic groups in the post-CPA period. In the absence of reliable security apparatus, the uneven disarmament made disarmed Lou Nuer highly insecure, whereas armed Murle who had been oppressed by the Nuer viewed the situation as an opportunity to pre-emptively strike their enemies. The 2009 Murle attack changed a
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perceived security dilemma into a real threat and crystallised ethnic hatred. The culmination of ethnic hatred is evidenced through the intense brutality of following attacks involving indiscriminate killings against non-combatants and destruction of the communities. At this point, the clashes are beyond the scope of the environmental conflict. They are now fighting an ethnic conflict, in which both parties are trapped in the security dilemma.

Implications

One of the lessons learned from this case is in fact not about the role ethnic identity plays in this conflict, because the mere presence of ethnic hatred does not necessarily cause armed clashes. Rather, it is about the potentially devastating effects of security reforms in post-conflict states. Under the circumstances where there is mistrust between different ethnic groups, they are highly sensitive to their relative fighting capabilities, which engenders a security dilemma and sometimes leads to ethnic hatred, as observed in Jonglei. Disarmament can alleviate such a dilemma only if all parties concerned are disarmed around the same time and in a similar manner, and if the information is accurately communicated to them through legitimate institutions to remove uncertainty. To make ex-combatants cooperative with disarmament, the state institutions should adequately reform their security sectors so that ex-combatants’ security after they abandoned their weapons is ensured. An even disarmament and drastic improvement of domestic security apparatus in South Sudan can alleviate the interethnic tension.

The other lesson would be the way in which post-conflict states manage multiple identities in their societies. Although it is challenging to completely eliminate inter-group inequalities, the governments should still avoid overtly inequitable and discriminatory practices and effectively respond to and contain grievance among those who feel relative exploitation once it emerges. Also, the governments should be able to take legal measures against hate speech targeting specific groups because it could easily influence people’s sentiments and create an environment conducive for mass mobilisation. One way to promote interethnic coexistence would be that the governments in collaboration with civil society organisations (CSOs) provide a forum for intergroup dialogue with the aim of lessening mutual tension and mistrust.
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Abstract

The seizure of Goma by the Mouvement du 23 Mars rebellion in November 2012 has precipitated a review of the peace strategy implemented in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Great Lakes region thus far. As a result, the Congolese government and other peace stakeholders in the Great Lakes region and beyond signed the Addis Ababa Peace and Security Cooperation (PSC) Framework in February 2013, paving the way to the adoption, a month later, of Resolution 2098 by the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Notwithstanding the constructive criticisms these two policy documents have received due to, amongst other things, the shortcomings they may harbour, this article argues that the Addis Ababa PSC Framework and Resolution 2098 have the potential of instilling a new dynamics into the search for peace and stability in the DRC and the Great Lakes region. Rather than dismissing them for their

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possible inadequacies, these two policy documents ought to be embraced as important stepping stones in the much needed overhaul of the peace strategy that has dominated peacemaking and peacebuilding initiatives in the DRC and the Great Lakes region in the past two decades.

Introduction

On 20 November 2012, the Congolese rebel movement known as the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) took over control of the city of Goma from the Congolese government. However, the M23 rebellion actually started as early as April 2012 when a number of soldiers who previously served under the banner of the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) between 2006 and 2009 mutinied from the Congolese national army before establishing the M23 a month later. The M23 thus derives its name from the peace agreement signed between the DRC government and the CNDP on 23 March 2009 in the city of Goma. This agreement aimed at ending the rebellion waged by the CNDP against the government with the former accusing the latter of failing to protect the country’s Tutsi population from the threat of extermination posed by the Rwandan Hutu rebels of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). The official motive behind the former CNDP combatants’ mutiny and their subsequent decision to establish the M23 thus centred on the displayed lack of willingness on the part of the Congolese national government to fully implement the March 2009 peace agreement (CNDP 2012).

But beyond mere motives for the war, the take-over of Goma by the M23 brought to the fore the question of the relevance and adequacy of the ongoing stabilisation process in the DRC. Firstly, it was an indictment to the Congolese national security forces, who were still incapable of guaranteeing internal security and protecting the country’s borders. Secondly, the M23 ‘prowess’ raised uncomfortable questions regarding the suitability of the overall peace strategy of the United Nations (UN) – through its large mission in the country, the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO). Thirdly, the Goma crisis also became an endless reminder of the regional intricacies belying the persistent instability in eastern DRC at a time when Rwanda and Uganda stood accused of providing logistical, financial, tactical and human support to the M23 (UN Group of Experts 2012).
There was thus consensus among Congolese socio-political stakeholders and their external partners that the take-over of Goma by the M23 constituted a turning point towards the adoption of a new approach in dealing with the continued instability in eastern DRC.\(^1\) It is in this context that the governments of the DRC and nine other countries from the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)\(^2\) as well as South Africa signed the Peace, Security

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1. However, it ought to be recalled that as early as July 2012, the Congolese and Rwandan governments had agreed in principle on the deployment of a neutral force tasked with monitoring their common borders as well as eradicating all negative forces operating in the Great Lakes region. This position was endorsed by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in August 2012 although no practical steps were taken in mobilising such a force in real earnest. See Radio Okapi (2012).

2. The other nine ICGLR countries that signed the Addis Ababa PSC Framework are Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the region (henceforth the Addis Ababa PSC Framework) in Addis Ababa on 24 February 2013. The signing of the Addis Ababa PSC Framework was facilitated by the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, and paved the way to the adoption of Resolution 2098 by the UN Security Council on 28 March 2013. Whereas the Addis Ababa PSC Framework lists specific actions to be carried out by the DRC government, regional states and the international community in their ‘synchronised’ effort toward peacemaking and peacebuilding in the Great Lakes region, Resolution 2098 provides the legal framework for the deployment within MONUSCO of an ‘intervention brigade’ empowered, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to neutralise and disarm all armed groups still posing a threat to state authority and civilian security in the DRC’s North Kivu province.

This article analyses the Addis Ababa PSC Framework and the UN Security Council Resolution 2098. It interrogates their ability to deliver on their ambitious promise of contributing decisively toward the search for peace and stability in the DRC and its surrounding Great Lakes region. The central argument of this article is that, notwithstanding the shortcomings they may harbour, the Addis Ababa PSC Framework and Resolution 2098 have the potential of instilling a new dynamics into the search for peace and stability in the DRC and the Great Lakes region. In this regard, rather than dismissing them for their possible inadequacies, this article calls for an embrace of these two policy documents as critical stepping stones in the much needed overhaul of the peace strategy that has dominated peacemaking and peacebuilding initiatives in the DRC and the Great Lakes region in the past two decades.

Before turning to a detailed analysis of the Addis Ababa PSC Framework and Resolution 2098, it appears important to lay the background to the article by revisiting the evolution of the DRC since the official end of the power-sharing transition in December 2006.

From the CNDP to the M23: The dynamics of elusive peace in the DRC

It has been argued elsewhere that, given its sheer levels of destruction, the Second Congo War (1998–2003) qualifies as the world’s deadliest conflict since World War
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II (Malan and Porto 2004:1). In this context, the peaceful deconstruction of the overall conflict\(^3\) behind the war (as symbolised by the signing of the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the 2002 Global and Inclusive Accord) represented one of the most commendable instances of successful peacemaking intervention on the African continent in recent years. But of importance as well was the successful completion of the all-inclusive power-sharing transition mechanism that managed the DRC between July 2003 and December 2006. Conceived as a confidence-building tool for the divisive Congolese parties to the Global and Inclusive Accord, the infamously complex power-sharing mechanism enabled the DRC to hold its first competitive multiparty and democratic elections in 41 years.

The completion of the transition brought about widespread optimism among the Congolese population and international peace stakeholders with regard to the possibility of consolidating peace in the country. In fact, one of the assumptions behind the international community’s commendable involvement in the success of the 2006 elections was that the latter would not only resolve the problem of deficient legitimacy of the ruling class (considered as one of the causes of the conflict), but also provide international interveners with a clearly identifiable and coherent government with which to partner in the peacebuilding process. One among many critical pillars on which the post-transition peace efforts in the DRC were expected to be grounded was, of course, the reform of the country’s security sector. In this regard, efforts geared toward the establishment of a new and integrated security sector in ‘post-war’ DRC started as early as the very establishment of the transitional institutions. However, just as was the case with the civilian/political sphere, if not even more, the process of defining a new consensual framework for the reform of the Congolese security sector was very protracted and fraught with long-drawn-out disagreements and uncertainties. As Reyntjens (2007:310) observes, ‘[a]lthough a new integrated general army staff was theoretically put in place in September 2003, command structures remained divided and the merging of the former government forces and the rebel groups into a national army proved difficult on the ground’.

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\(^3\) It would be mistaken to approach the conflict experienced by the DRC in the last two decades in ‘singular’ number. Such reference seeks merely to conform to the existing literature on the matter while recognising the ‘plurality’ of the conflict, representing ‘an aggregate of different conflicts with different dynamics’ (Wright 2008:81).
The most significant stumbling block to the entire Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) process was undoubtedly the refusal of a number of former senior military officers (mostly Tutsi) of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie – Goma (RCD-Goma) to be deployed outside the Kivu region (citing security concerns), followed by their call for a differentiated DDR process for their troops, to be based on mixage\textsuperscript{4} rather than the agreed upon brassage\textsuperscript{5}. The disagreements between the transitional government and these reluctant RCD-Goma military officers led to the establishment of the CNDP by renegade General Laurent Nkunda on 26 July 2006.

As the CNDP rebellion raged on between 2006 and 2009, two peace agreements were signed in Goma, namely the Acte d’engagement and the Goma Peace Agreement in January 2008 and March 2009 respectively. The Acte d’engagement constituted the culmination of the Conference on Peace, Security and Development of the Kivu provinces organised by the DRC government from 6 to 26 January 2008. The conference targeted all regional (Kivu) stakeholders – including public institutions, civil society and more importantly armed groups. In this regard, the Acte d’engagement was designed to serve as a testimony of commitment by the Congolese government and all Congolese armed groups still active in the Kivu region to desist from any further military confrontations and work toward full demilitarisation, demobilisation, reintegration and reinsertion (DDRR).\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{4} Mixage involved the coming together of already constituted battalions belonging to different belligerent groups to form new brigades. This means that the battalions would preserve their internal structure, organisation and leadership. Its consequence was the emergence of brigades that lacked cohesion and coherence, devoid of any capacity to operate as units.

\textsuperscript{5} Brassage consisted of building all units of the new national and integrated army from scratch, ensuring that all the new units from the lowest level upward were inclusive of all wartime belligerent groups. Furthermore, the units thus integrated were to be deployed wherever the army’s national leadership saw fit.

\textsuperscript{6} It should be noted that although only nine armed groups, including the CNDP, signed the Acte, there were 22 of them at the Goma Conference (Schrank 2012:318). Most of them were at the time paper organisations, more interested in the daily financial allowances (US$ 135) earmarked for all participants to the conference.
On its part, the March 2009 Goma Peace Agreement only involved the DRC government and the CNDP under the leadership of General Bosco Ntaganda. The latter had just wrested the control of the rebellion from its politico-military leader, General Laurent Nkunda, as the two disagreed over the necessity of entering into direct peace negotiations with national government. The Agreement provided, amongst other things, for the transformation of the CNDP into a political party, an amnesty for crimes committed by its forces during the war (excluding war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of genocide), the appointment of some of its civilian leaders to politico-administrative positions in the provincial (North Kivu) government as well as the integration of its combatants into the national army through the \textit{mixage} process.

The \textit{Acte d’engagement} and the Goma Peace Agreement paved the way to the dissolution of the CNDP and several \textit{Mai-Mai} groups followed by the reintegration of several of their combatants into the national army. However, difficulties arising from the \textit{mixage} strategy and government ineffectiveness as well as the non-completion of the security sector reform process meant that the Kivu region remained unstable in spite of the signing of these two peace agreements. Within a year of the signing of the Goma Peace Agreement, not only did the majority of armed group signatories of the \textit{Acte d’engagement} ‘re-become’ active, but also the number and size of armed groups in Kivu continued to increase exponentially (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009:480-481). In the meantime, while the \textit{mixage} process had brought about parallel lines of command within the military, the \textit{Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo} (FARDC) continued to be notorious for their ill-discipline. Both these factors were significantly hampering their ability to carry out their crucial mandate of neutralising and disarming ‘negative forces’, which functioned as peace spoilers in eastern DRC.

The M23 was established on 6 May 2012. The majority of its civilian and military leaders as well as rank-and-file combatants were remnants of the CNDP which was itself an offspring of the RCD-Goma, the rebel movement established by Rwanda in August 1998 in its attempt to unseat Laurent-Désiré Kabila following the collapse of the AFDL-led regional alliance that coalesced in October 1996 to topple the Mobutu regime. In fact, the initial communiqué establishing the M23 was signed by the High Command of the military wing of the CNDP, the \textit{Armée}
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_Nationale Congolaise_ (ANC), as represented by its spokesperson Lieutenant-Colonel Vianney Kazarama. Furthermore, the communiqué provided that the M23 was simply designed to serve as a stream within the CNDP, which was a huge contradiction to Congolese laws regulating both political parties and the military – emphasising that political parties may not harbour military wings and soldiers may not get involved in politics. In this context, beyond the official claims around the incomplete implementation of the March 2009 agreement between the CNDP and the Congolese government, the main reason for the emergence of the M23 (and even the speedy involvement of Rwanda and Uganda) may be found in President Kabila’s ‘attempt ... to rotate ex-CNDP soldiers out of the Kivus in a bid to [both] smash the ex-CNDP parallel chains of command’ within the North Kivu military region and ‘to break up the “mafia” controlling the east of the country’ (Jones 2012b). In fact, a recent report by the US-based Enough Project details the linkage between the M23 rebellion and the race for the control of illegal gold trade networks, worth US$ 500 million per year, in a geographical area extending from North Kivu to the Ituri district (De Koning and the Enough Team 2013).

Just like the metaphorical last straw that breaks the camel’s back, the contradictions surrounding the emergence of the M23 as well as the regional support to its rebellion led to a concerted effort for the re-qualification of the peace strategy in the DRC and the Great Lakes region. The result was the signing of the Addis Ababa PSC Framework in February 2013, followed by the adoption of Resolution 2098 by the UN Security Council a month later.

**The Addis Ababa PSC Framework: An appraisal**

The Addis Ababa PSC Framework is a converged expression of commitment by the member states of the ICGLR (joined by South Africa) and the SADC as well as the international community (represented by the UN and the African Union [AU]) to charting a new path toward building sustainable peace in the DRC and the Great Lakes region. It emerged as a response to the persistent instability in eastern DRC (as symbolised by the M23 rebellion) and the continued interferences of neighbouring states, in spite of the signing of several internal
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and bilateral peace agreements. The Framework therefore contains specific prescriptions to all peace stakeholders in the DRC and the Great Lakes region working toward the return of peace, stability and normality in the DRC and the region.

As stated in its very opening paragraph, the motivation behind the formulation of the Addis Ababa PSC Framework stems from the recurring cycle of conflict and persistent violence perpetrated by Congolese and foreign armed groups in the eastern part of the country (Paragraph 1). If anything, the latest crisis in North Kivu, symbolised by the resumption of fighting between the DRC government and the M23, has not only demonstrated that the ‘current’ approach to peace in the DRC is ‘untenable’, but also provided ‘a window of opportunity to address the root causes of conflict and put an end to recurring cycles of violence’ (Paragraph 4). The crisis has thus highlighted the need for a revised stabilisation approach, ‘based on a better understanding of the causes and dynamics of conflict’ (International Alert 2012:12).

Entrenched in a regional perspective, the Addis Ababa PSC Framework primarily addresses all member states of the ICGLR sharing borders with the DRC, namely Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo, Angola and Zambia. This original group of primary stakeholders is further joined by South Africa as well as by the UN, the AU and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as secondary stakeholders committed to assisting the primary stakeholders in their effort to make and build peace in the region. To this effect, the Addis Ababa PSC Framework details specific responsibilities to be delivered upon by each of the stakeholders as a condition for the return of sustainable peace to the DRC and the Great Lakes region. In this regard, the government of the DRC is requested to demonstrate renewed commitment to ‘continue, and deepen security sector reform, particularly with respect to the Army and Police; to consolidate State authority, particularly in [the East], including to prevent armed groups from destabilizing neighbouring countries; to make progress with regard to decentralization; to further economic development, including with respect to the expansion of
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infrastructure and basic social service delivery; to further structural reform of Government institutions, including financial reform; and to further the agenda of reconciliation, tolerance and democratization’ (Paragraph 5.1).

On their part, state signatories to the Framework are enjoined to demonstrate renewed commitment ‘not to interfere in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries; to neither tolerate nor provide assistance or support of any kind to armed groups; to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring countries; to strengthen regional cooperation including deepening economic integration with special consideration for the exploitation of natural resources; to respect the legitimate concerns and interests of the neighbouring countries, in particular regarding security matters; to neither harbour nor provide protection of any kind to persons accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, acts of genocide or crimes of aggression, or persons falling under the [UN] sanctions regime …’ (Paragraph 5.2).

Lastly, the international community – led by the UN – is requested to provide unfettered support to the DRC government and the other state signatories through a number of activities. Firstly, the UN Security Council shall continue to provide support to the long-term stability of the DRC and the Great Lakes region. Secondly, there shall be a renewed commitment by bilateral partners to remain engaged in supporting the DRC and the region, including with appropriate means to ensure long-term sustainability; and to support the implementation of protocols and priority projects of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes region. Thirdly, there shall be a renewed commitment to work towards the revitalisation of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) and support the implementation of its economic development and regional integration agenda. The UN shall undertake a strategic review of MONUSCO that aims to strengthen support to the DRC government to enable it to address security challenges and extend state authority. Lastly, the UN Secretary-General shall appoint a special envoy to support efforts to reach durable solutions in a multi-track plan that allows the convergence of all initiatives in progress (Paragraph 5.3).
In order to promote the inclusive and systemic principles upon which the Addis Ababa PSC Framework is premised and thus ensure the achievement of its overarching goal, a ‘regional oversight mechanism’ is put in place. Comprising the leaders of the 11 state signatories as well as the UN Secretary-General, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, the Chairperson of the ICGLR and the Chairperson of the SADC – all acting as the guarantors of the full implementation of the Framework Agreement, the regional oversight mechanism (also known as the 11+4 mechanism) is tasked with reviewing, on a regular basis, progress with regard to the implementation of the regional commitment outlined in the Framework, ‘with due regard for the national sovereignty of the States concerned’ (Paragraph 7).

The regional oversight mechanism is tasked with developing a detailed plan for the implementation of the Framework, including the establishment of benchmarks and appropriate follow-up measures. It is requested to work in close collaboration with the AU, the ICGLR, the SADC and all other international partners, including the European Union (EU), Belgium, France, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA). As the leader of the focus country around which the Framework is designed, the President of the DRC is requested to put in place, within the government, a national oversight mechanism in order to accompany and oversee the implementation of the national commitments for reform contained in the Framework. Working in collaboration with the UN, the AU, the World Bank, the African Development Bank and other bilateral and multilateral partners, the national oversight mechanism would operate in full respect of the sovereignty of the DRC (Paragraphs 9 and 10). Of utmost importance, lastly, was the call for MONUSCO to work closely with the government of the DRC (Paragraph 11).

Overall, the Addis Ababa PSC Framework ought to be commended for at least three reasons. Firstly, it places adequate emphasis on the primacy of the DRC government as the key actor in determining the success or failure of the peace plan to be developed (Paragraph 5). Secondly, the Framework adopts a holistic approach toward peacemaking and peacebuilding within the DRC which ought to encompass actions in as diverse areas as the security sector reform,
the affirmation of state authority and institutional reforms, decentralisation and democratisation, infrastructure building and the delivery of basic social services, socio-economic development as well as national reconciliation. Thirdly, the Framework clearly spells out the responsibilities of regional states, indicating in the process their responsibility or role in the failure of previous peace plans in both the DRC and the region.

Notwithstanding the positive dimensions mentioned above, the Addis Ababa PSC Framework contains a number of grey areas that, if left unchecked, may harden its future full implementation and/or success. To begin with, although centred on the membership of the ICGLR – especially those sharing borders with the DRC – the Framework proposes a problematic definition of the ‘region’ by including South Africa. The inclusion of South Africa raises questions not only due to its perceived alignment to the DRC government but also due to the fact that it is not party to the previous pacts and agreements signed within the framework of the ICGLR that the Addis Ababa PSC Framework seeks to complement. Of importance as well is the ‘over-optimistic’ approach adopted by the PSC Framework as it fails – perhaps for diplomatic reasons – to acknowledge that some of the regional states have been at the centre of the disruption of previous peace efforts. It therefore assumes that all regional states will work in harmony toward peace in the DRC and the region by, amongst other things, neutralising Congolese and foreign armed groups identified as the real or perceived peace spoilers. It even goes as far as including all of them into the regional oversight mechanism tasked with developing the implementation plan of the Framework and reviewing its actual implementation. In so doing, the Framework fails to take into consideration the conflicting perceptions some of the state parties or signatories hold of each other’s role in the conflict.

Furthermore, in spite of acknowledging that the ‘current path is untenable’, the Framework commits to ‘building on the efforts already underway’ by the ICGLR and the SADC (Paragraph 4). The Framework also falls into the trap of some misguided international discourse bent on linking the current instability in the Great Lakes region with the problem of unequal natural resources distribution. It therefore calls for, as a strategy for peace, the ‘strengthening of
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regional cooperation including deepening economic integration with special consideration for the exploitation of natural resources’ (Paragraph 5.2.4).

Surprisingly, no recognition whatsoever is made of the shortcomings of the international players’ role (including the UN’s role) in the current impasse of the peace process in the DRC and the Great Lakes region. Instead, international actors are merely presented as the providers of support to the regional actors as they work toward peace in the region. At most, the UN is enjoined to undertake a strategic review of MONUSCO with the aim of strengthening support to the government ‘to enable it to address security challenges and extend State authority’ (Paragraph 5.3.4).

Nevertheless, it ought to be recalled that the Addis Ababa PSC Framework was not designed to be an end in itself. Rather, it aimed to lay the basic principles upon which the UN – working in close collaboration with the DRC government, regional states and other stakeholders – was expected to ground its revised DRC peace strategy as symbolised by the Security Council Resolution 2098 analysed below.

The UN Security Council Resolution 2098: Not so much groundbreaking!

On 28 March 2013, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2098, providing, amongst other things, for the establishment within MONUSCO, of an intervention brigade tasked with neutralising and disarming (non-state) armed groups who were still threatening state and human security in the North Kivu province of the DRC. The Resolution was designed to materialise the commitments expressed by peace stakeholders in the DRC and the Great Lakes region in the Addis Ababa PSC Framework. At the same time, it sought to provide the implementation modalities to these commitments thus materialised. Just like the Addis Ababa PSC Framework, Resolution 2098 locates the justification for a new peace strategy for the DRC and the Great Lakes region in the recurring cycles of conflict and persistent violence perpetrated by Congolese and foreign armed groups that continue to plague the area (Preamble, Paragraphs 4; 8-14). Furthermore, the resolution reiterates the
Security Council’s strong condemnation of any and all external support to the M23 through troop reinforcement, tactical advice and the supply of equipment and materiel (Preamble, Paragraph 11) – all charges laid against Rwanda and to a lesser extent Uganda by the 2013 report of the UN Group of Experts. At the same time, it condemns the destabilising role of the Congolese security institutions including the mass rapes committed in November 2012 in Minova and surrounding villages by soldiers of the national army (FARDC) (Preamble, Paragraph 19).

Undoubtedly, the specificity of Resolution 2098 lies in the Security Council’s decision to establish within MONUSCO an intervention brigade tasked with neutralising armed groups, contributing to reducing the threat posed by such groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and, in so doing, making space for stabilisation activities (Paragraph 9).

In terms of Resolution 2098, the Intervention Brigade will be deployed for an initial period of a year and will consist, inter alia, of three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion and one Special Force and Reconnaissance Company. The brigade will be headquartered in Goma and will operate under direct command of the MONUSCO Force Commander (Paragraph 9). While the Intervention Brigade is set to have ‘a clear exit strategy’ (Paragraph 10), the duration of its deployment in the DRC will be ultimately determined by its performance on the ground and more importantly the extent to which the UN will be satisfied with the progress made by the DRC government with regard to implementing its commitments under the Addis Ababa PSC Framework as well as ‘the establishment and implementation of a national security sector reform roadmap for the creation of a [national] “Rapid Reaction Force” able to take over responsibility for achieving the objective of the Intervention Brigade’ (my emphasis) (Paragraph 10). Furthermore, the resolution provides that ‘future reconfigurations of MONUSCO and its mandate should be determined on the basis of the evolution of the situation on the ground and, in the context of implementation by the Government of the DRC and all other signatories of
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the PSC Framework, progress towards [two main] objectives’ (Paragraph 11), namely reduction of the threat posed by armed groups and stabilisation through state re-affirmation and democratic consolidation.

Paragraph 9 of Resolution 2098 emphasises that the Intervention Brigade shall be deployed ‘within the authorized troop ceiling of 19,815, on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping ...’. The brigade shall ‘carry out targeted offensive operations ... either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC, in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law ... to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups on state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities’ (Paragraph 12.b).

The most positive aspect of Resolution 2098, just as was the case with the Addis Ababa PSC Framework, is undoubtedly its unequivocal reminder to the DRC government of its primacy with regard to peacemaking and peacebuilding in the country. It is indeed very commendable that the Security Council clearly seeks to end once and for all the persisting attitude on the part of the DRC government of deflecting its fundamental responsibilities as a state – including those in the area of civilian protection and preservation of territorial integrity – to the international community as represented by MONUSCO. In this regard and in conformity to the Addis Ababa PSC Framework, the Resolution stresses that ‘the Government of the DRC bears primary responsibility for security, protection of civilians, national reconciliation, peacebuilding and development of the country ...’ (Preamble, Paragraph 24). It therefore urges government ‘to remain fully committed to the implementation of the PSC Framework and to protecting the civilian population through the swift establishment of professional, accountable and sustainable security forces, the deployment of Congolese civil administration, in particular the police, judiciary and territorial administration and the establishment of rule of law and respect for human rights ...’ (Preamble, Paragraph 24).
However, the most disappointing shortcoming of the resolution is its disturbing silence regarding the failure of the UN’s own (and the overall international) peace strategy in the DRC and the Great Lakes region. Instead, the Resolution praises MONUSCO for the ‘significant sacrifices’ it has made in ‘its efforts to improve peace and stability in the DRC’ (Preamble, Paragraph 30). Should this bias be attributed to the logical difficulty associated with any human exercise where an interested actor is expected at the same time to play referee? Or should the explanation be found in the overall attitude that governs West-led interventions (including through the UN) on the African continent where such interveners regard themselves as ‘knights in shining armour, seeking to assist Africa’s economic recovery, spread democracy and contribute to conflict-management efforts’ (Adebajo 2008:227)?

But beside the shortcoming above relating to the refusal by the UN to criticise its mission in the DRC, a number of criticisms have been mounted against the UN Security Council (for adopting Resolution 2098) by an array of actors, sometimes for conflicting reasons. Firstly, the Security Council has been criticised for aligning itself with the Congolese government and setting itself against all non-state Congolese armed groups including the M23, some of which may have legitimate grievances that require adequate attention. This view is fully shared by the M23. As early as 2 April 2013, the group wrote a letter to the National Coordinator (DRC) of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), alerting him of the potential humanitarian consequences that ‘the war planned by the UN Security Council is expected to bear on the innocent populations of Rutshuru and Nyiragongo territories in North Kivu’ (M23 2013).

Secondly, the Security Council has been criticised for what is considered as an attempt on its part to resolve what are actually political and governance problems with military means. As Paddon (2013) vehemently argues, rather than ‘the lack of forcefulness in MONUSCO’s mandate …, [t]he UN’s ability to play a constructive role in the DRC has been constrained by the absence of a credible political process to which the parties are committed, and by the international community’s selective and inconsistent engagement in the country’. However, notwithstanding the relevance it may carry for its call for dialogue between stakeholders within the DRC and the Great Lakes region, a close examination of this criticism reveals that it is, to a large extent, both disingenuous and
naive. It fails to depict the balance between political undertakings and military interventions clearly expressed in Resolution 2098. It also fails to realise that, in spite of the RCD-Goma securing high political and military positions in the transitional institutions (2003-2006), its core troops still resisted the integration process. In so doing, this criticism falls into the trap of circular thinking that assumes that all armed groups operating in eastern DRC, including the M23, are simply freedom and democracy fighters driven by genuine grievances and merely ‘demanding good governance in [their] country’ (Bisimwa cited by BBC 2013).7

Furthermore, by assuming that peace enforcement cannot bring radical change in eastern DRC, this criticism fails to learn from the history of both the UN and the DRC. In fact, some four decades ago, it was not until the UN Operation in Congo (ONUC) fully assumed its enforcement mandate that the fragile post-independence Congolese state was able to regain full control over its Katanga province, then controlled by a secessionist leadership operating in collusion with and for the interests of foreign (mainly Belgian) forces.8 So, if the experiences of the early 1960s are anything to learn from, what is currently needed in the DRC is not the intervention brigade provided for in Resolution 2098, but rather the radical transformation of the mandate of the entire MONUSCO into peace enforcement. Only such a perspective bears the potential of avoiding MONUSCO remaining the redundant actor it has come to be known as.

Thirdly, for those who have for a long time favoured a decisive military action to deal with opportunistic armed groups inclined to seeking rent and/or advancing the interests of neighbouring countries in eastern DRC, the Security Council has been accused of being both opportunistic and dishonest rather than driven by a genuine concern to make a difference in the DRC and the Great Lakes region. In fact, by rushing into the debate over the nature and the control of the intervention force, the Security Council was simply preoccupied with saving the face of MONUSCO at a time when it is increasingly perceived – rightly or wrongly – as more part of the problem in eastern DRC than the solution. Questions have therefore been raised on the Security Council’s decision regarding both the size of the intervention brigade and its geographical scope. In this regard, while praises have been sung to the UN for the new mandate

7 Bertrand Bisimwa is the current political leader of M23.

8 For lessons from ONUC that may apply to MONUSCO, see Bosco (2013).
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provided to MONUSCO, it is but ill-informed to expect a 3 069-force brigade (in a force comprising over 19 000 troops) to make any significant difference in a province (North Kivu) spanning almost 60 000 square kilometres, larger than Rwanda and Burundi combined. Furthermore, the decision by the Security Council to restrain the operational zone of the intervention brigade to North Kivu (a province simply forming part of an instability area extending from Ituri district to northern Katanga) is nothing short of puzzling.

The DRC government and the UN: Primary stakeholders in the success or failure of the ‘new’ peace strategy

The Addis Ababa PSC Framework and the UN Security Council Resolution 2098 constitute two important policy documents designed to contribute toward making and building peace in the DRC and the Great Lakes region. However, the two policy documents can only achieve the ambitious goals entrusted to them if the different actors involved are able to fulfil adequately and effectively their respective obligations as clearly defined in these documents. According to Adebajo (2011:7), three critical factors contribute to peacekeeping missions’ success, namely ‘the interests of key permanent members of the UN Security Council in resolving the conflict in question coupled with their eagerness to mobilise the necessary diplomatic and financial support; the willingness of belligerent parties to cooperate with the UN in implementing peace accords and the development (by the UN) of an effective strategy to deal with spoilers; as well as the co-operation of regional players in the peace process including their provision of diplomatic and/or military support to the peacekeeping effort’. So, to what extent are the DRC government, the UN and regional actors likely to contribute towards ensuring the successful implementation of the Addis Ababa PSC Framework and Resolution 2098?

The DRC government: Assuming sovereignty as responsibility

An array of approaches and theories has been put forward in order to explain the persisting instability in the DRC. Yet, they all tend to converge around the issue of chronic governance failure that has plagued the country since independence in 1960. The dominant features of governance failure throughout the DRC’s
post-colonial experience include the inability of successive regimes to entrench constitutionalism and genuine participatory politics, the ‘institutionalisation’ of corruption and ‘privatisation’ of the public sphere, the personalisation of power and the prevalence of a de jure or de facto ‘presidentialist’ system, the collapse of the socio-economic infrastructure as well as the persistent mismanagement of the national economy. The ultimate result of this chronic governance failure has been the ‘de-institutionalisation’ of the state or, in other words, the continued disruption of the Congolese state-building process.

In this regard, all successive regimes that have ruled over the DRC since independence have assumed state sovereignty in terms of its relating rights and benefits, including the right to rule without being questioned by any superior authority while enjoying the political and other benefits and prestige accruing from their privileged political positions. At no time have they internalised, in any systematic political sense, the idea of sovereignty in terms of their responsibilities and accountability vis-à-vis the society. As Kambala (2010:2) observes, since independence, ‘successive regimes on the territory of the DRC have literally failed’ while the state has been unable to fully ‘exercise Westphalian sovereignty and most importantly ... to provide ... basic services to its people.’

In this context, it is thus encouraging that both the Addis Ababa PSC Framework and Resolution 2098 detail in non-ambiguous terms the array of responsibilities to be delivered upon by the Congolese government in the implementation of the new peace strategy. Although no guarantee exists that government will deliver on all these responsibilities (in fact past experiences even discourage any optimism to that effect), the adoption of such a perspective by the international community constitutes a critical step in the (right) direction of compelling the Congolese government to assume full responsibility for the country’s security, peace and socio-economic development. To this end, perhaps more than just highlighting the duties to be borne by the Congolese government throughout the implementation of the new peace strategy, the international community – led by the UN – ought to take upon itself to devise diplomatic and other strategies that ensure that the Congolese government does not renege on its responsibilities contained in the Addis Ababa PSC Framework and Resolution 2098. Of course, achieving such a goal represents a far more difficult task than
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can be anticipated. Firstly, a very successful implementation of the Addis Ababa PSC Framework and Resolution 2098 may actually threaten the political survival of the current ruling elite as many of its members benefit directly or indirectly from the ongoing instability in the country. Secondly, given the nature of the UN as an intergovernmental organisation and the core principles upon which its peace interventions are undertaken, the UN needs the Congolese government as much as the latter craves for UN assistance. As De Carvalho (2007:46-47) correctly puts it, ‘if the government believes that the gains of more freedom of action in its own country are superior to the gains provided by the presence of the mission, it [may] start pressuring the peacekeeping mission to leave’.

The United Nations: Navigating between the Charter and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine

In the post-Westphalian world system, the onus of ensuring the national security and protecting the territorial integrity of a state lies with the particular state government of the day. However, in the post-Second World War era, the UN is entrusted with the responsibility of complementing the efforts of individual states or groups of states in the area of peace and security. As enshrined in its Charter, the UN has the primary (and exclusive) responsibility of ensuring international peace and security.

But beyond the Charter, the primacy of the UN with regard to preserving international peace and security is further emphasised in non-ambiguous terms in the Responsibility to Protect doctrine that the UN embraced since 2005. According to this doctrine, individual states have the responsibility to protect their populations from war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide (ICISS 2001). However, should a state display incapacity or unwillingness to protect its population or even become a security threat to the latter, the UN has the duty to intervene either unilaterally or in collaboration with the state in order to address all threats to civilian protection (ICISS 2001). In this context, it is therefore not exaggerated to argue that the UN bears as much responsibility for the successful implementation of the PSC Framework and the success of the
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intervention brigade as the DRC government itself. This becomes even clearer when considering that the intervention brigade has been deployed within and under the total command and control of MONUSCO.

Although both the PSC Framework as well as Resolution 2098 have fallen short of explicitly criticising the UN and its peacekeeping missions in the DRC (MONUC9 and MONUSCO) for their shortcomings, it is a well documented fact that the peace strategy adopted by the UN for the DRC since 1999 has been to a significant extent inadequate and detached from the reality and complexity of the conflicts on the ground (Soderlund et al. 2012). In fact, in a joint press statement released on 16 May 2013, a week before their joint visit to the DRC, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and World Bank President Jim Yong Kim argued that in order to put an end to the recurring tragic conflicts in the DRC, there is need for a new strategy that moves away from merely managing crises and their consequences and rather focuses on addressing the root causes of the problems (Radio Okapi 2013). The fact that this view is also enshrined in Resolution 2098 is a tacit admission by the UN that its past peace strategy for the DRC and the Great Lakes region had not been grounded on a sound analysis and understanding of the conflicts that ought to be addressed.

Criticisms have equally been levelled against MONUSCO and its predecessor, MONUC, for their weak mandate. In late 2008, Spanish General Vicente Diaz De Villegas resigned merely three weeks after assuming the position of MONUC force commander citing a ‘dangerous mission creep’. He emphasised that, unless granted a clear peace enforcement mandate, MONUC could not be expected to contribute decisively to the advent of durable peace in the DRC (Reynaert 2011:17). The views expressed by General De Villegas echoed provisions already contained in the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Although the Agreement did not specifically use the phrase ‘peace enforcement’, its signatories called for a UN-led peacekeeping mission empowered to track down and disarm all armed groups (my emphasis); identify all perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide and report their cases to an appropriate international criminal court; and employ both persuasion and coercion in the implementation
of initiatives and activities relating to the Demobilisation, Disarmament, Reintegration, Resettlement and Repatriation (DDRRR) processes (Linell 1999:21-22). Yet, until the eruption of the M23 rebellion in May 2012 followed by the fall of Goma to the rebels some six months later, the UN was yet to fully heed the calls contained in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and General De Villegas’ statement above.

Instead, the transformation of MONUC into MONUSCO in July 2010 could be regarded as a ‘survival strategy’ on the part of the UN mission after the Congolese government openly called for its withdrawal from the country by the end of 2010. Furthermore, the decision by the UN to deploy the intervention brigade appears as another expedient strategy by the global body to maintain itself at the centre of the peace process in the DRC. This is insofar correct as when ICGLR member states (supported by their SADC counterparts) called for the deployment of a neutral force in eastern DRC, they did not envisage this force as part of MONUSCO, perhaps as a result of their lack of trust into the UN stabilisation mission. In the end, it appears that a compromise was found as the intervention brigade falls under MONUSCO command while the brigade command has been entrusted to Tanzanian General James Mwakibolwa.

**Dealing with other national and regional role players**

Beside the DRC government and the UN, the success of the new peace strategy will also depend on the actions of the other internal and regional role players that have stakes in the ongoing peace efforts in eastern DRC and the Great Lakes region. At the national (DRC) level, successive UN reports have demonstrated the extent to which senior Congolese officials within government institutions continue to undermine efforts designed to entrench principles of good governance in the country. Some, including senior army officers, have gone as far as transacting with armed groups keen to controlling resource-rich areas, even

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10 It ought to be noted that this author does not believe that the Congolese government was right in requesting MONUC to start withdrawing from the country as early as 2009. The pretence by the government of being able to ensure national security and defend the country’s territorial integrity has since been exposed as recently exemplified by the national army’s inability to defeat the M23 rebellion, notwithstanding the alleged support provided to the latter by Rwanda.
supplying them with weapons (Global Witness 2013a; Soderlund et al. 2012:18). Furthermore, there is need to relook at the issue of local armed groups and militias (including the Mai-Mai), focusing specifically on the conditions that contribute to their emergence and maintenance. While the intervention brigade has been empowered to confront these groups and eventually disarm them, the military effort ought to be complemented by government commitment to breaking off support to its allies among these groups, tackling the land issue, re-affirming the national security forces as well as strengthening government institutions at the provincial and local levels. Lastly, the DRC government, working in partnership with the UN and its other international partners, ought to design clear reconciliation initiatives to be implemented at the local, provincial and national levels. In short, the Congolese government needs to embrace the precepts of good and responsive governance.

At the regional (Great Lakes) level, adequate attention ought to be paid to Rwanda and Uganda which have repeatedly been involved in the DRC either directly or through the provision of support to armed groups opposed to the Congolese government. It has been argued that, in recent years, Rwanda and Uganda have come to regard continued instability in their respective border regions with the DRC as consistent with their national security and the financial interests of their ruling elites (Jones 2012a; 2012b). As a recent report by Global Witness (2013b) revealed, minerals (mainly tin and tantalum) smuggled out of Congo into Rwanda are ‘launched through the country’s domestic tagging system and exported as “clean” Rwandan material’. In this regard, perhaps, what is currently needed is a movement beyond mere diplomatic normalisations and joint military operations (without necessarily discounting their positive aspects) to explore additional strategies for peace in the Great Lakes region.
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Co-operation, Louise Mushikiwabo, as ‘aberrant’ and ‘shocking’, coming from a ‘sympathiser’ of the FDLR who does not understand what he is talking about (Muhame 2013). A few days later, President Kagame (cited by Rutayisire 2013) qualified Kikwete’s suggestion as ‘utter nonsense’, due to either ‘ignorance’ or ‘an ideological problem’.

Kikwete’s proposal and the debate it has sparked bring to the fore a very important dimension of the persistent instability in eastern DRC and the ongoing peace effort in the DRC and the Great Lakes region, namely the issue of foreign armed groups operating on Congolese territory. There is no doubt that the intervention brigade, due to amongst others its limited geographical scope, cannot address effectively this complex issue. Yet, in the absence of a clear commitment from Rwanda and Uganda to agree to some form of political dialogue with these groups, the Congolese government is reminded that the re-affirmation of the country’s national security forces should undoubtedly be regarded as the most important tool in any strategy aimed at bringing durable peace back to the country’s eastern region.

Conclusion

Fifteen years have already elapsed since the eruption of the Second Congo War in August 1998. By 2003, massive international pressure and assistance compounded with a sense of national pride from Congolese socio-political stakeholders enabled the establishment of a transitional mechanism that seemed to pave the way to the country’s recovery. The successful completion of the transition as symbolised by the widely praised 2006 elections further strengthened the shared optimism regarding the possibility of a brighter future for the DRC and its people.

However, seven years since the official end of the transition, the DRC remains a fragile society while its peace and stabilisation processes stand on shaky ground. The seizure of Goma by the M23 in November 2012 served as a testimony to the impasse of the recovery process. The embarrassment it brought to the Congolese government, the UN and the countries believed to be providing support to the rebellion, namely Rwanda and Uganda, became the much awaited turning point
for a radical evaluation of the relevance of the peace strategy being pursued in the DRC and the Great Lakes region in the past two decades. The result was the signing of the Addis Ababa PSC Framework on 24 February 2013 that paved the way for the adoption of Resolution 2098 by the UN Security Council on 28 March 2013.

The Addis Ababa PSC Framework and Resolution 2098 are premised on the need for more assertive interventions in the political and diplomatic arena as well as the military field as critical components to the search for durable stability and sustainable peace in the DRC and the Great Lakes region. While some have criticised the new strategy for being little and arriving late, others have disputed its ability to make any significant contribution to peace and stability in the DRC and the Great Lakes region because of its blatant bias towards an unresponsive Congolese government and its inclination to prioritising military solutions to political problems.

Whereas there is some relevance in the different criticisms levelled against the new peace strategy represented by the Addis Ababa PSC Framework and Resolution 2098, it would be mistaken for peace stakeholders in the DRC and the Great Lakes region (including the Congolese government and the UN) as well as analysts to regard these two policy documents as an end in themselves. Rather, they should be considered as critical stepping stones toward the much needed overhaul of the peace strategy that has dominated peacemaking and peacebuilding initiatives in the DRC and the Great Lakes region in recent years.

Lastly, the Addis Ababa PSC Framework and Resolution 2098 cannot be regarded as a panacea. Their success will to a large extent depend on the ability of the DRC government and the UN (through MONUSCO) to fulfil effectively their respective roles as primary stakeholders in the DRC peace process. Furthermore, there is need to maintain a balance between political processes (as clearly stated in the Addis Ababa PSC framework) and the military action entrusted to MONUSCO’s intervention brigade (as provided for in Resolution 2098). Only such an integrated approach has the potential of ensuring that the Congo’s neighbours (mainly Rwanda and Uganda) with interests in the Congo’s
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peace process as well as Congolese and non-Congolese armed groups still active in the eastern region and bearing legitimate grievances become active agents in the successful implementation of the new peace strategy.

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Fragility and the State: Post-apartheid South Africa and the State-Society Contract in the 21st Century

Lesley Connolly*

We stand at a crossroads: the one road, lined with securocrats, the plundering of the public purse and the attacks on our democratic institutions, if taken, will create imbalance where law and justice cannot be reconciled with morality as our institutions will be perceived to be illegitimate … the other road is harder and requires us to bind ourselves to our just laws and act against those who break them (George Bizos 2013).

Abstract

The notion of a fragile state has changed over the last decade to encompass countries with only pockets of stability in an otherwise functioning state. This broadened spectrum of fragility is a positive move for the international sphere in that it highlights areas of weakness in states which could have a detrimental effect of the country and provides recommendations for building up resilience in these fragile states. Most commonly, one needs to undertake state-building measures which will re-legitimise the state-society contract – meaning that the expectations of the society from the state are in balance with what the state can provide to the people. Throughout 2012, South Africa experienced more service delivery protests than in the three years prior. Issues such as education, employment and wage disputes were ripe in the country and across the globe.

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It became clear that pockets of fragility were creeping into South Africa and the state was no longer able to meet the needs of the people. In a new democracy, increasing fragility is dangerous, as it could spread to increased violence and protest, which could ultimately destabilise the country and the region as a whole. This paper argues that some aspects of South Africa’s sectors are weakening, and that changes need to be made to renew the state-society contract and build up resilience in these areas of fragility in order to prevent future protests and violence.

Introduction

For most of the twentieth century, South Africa’s people endured an oppressive system of discrimination and inequality. With the end of the apartheid system in the 1990s, the country transitioned to a democracy under its first legitimately elected leader, former President Nelson Mandela. Amongst a number of state-created redress institutions, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), established in 1995, enabled many South Africans to learn hidden truths about their recent past and to confront and even forgive some of those perpetrators who came forward and confessed to their roles in an unjust past. This enabled them to achieve a form of closure on the pain and issues of the past. The country broke away from the ways of apartheid and instituted new mechanisms to provide housing, education, health care and other vital social services. An imagined contract emerged between the new state and its citizenry in regard to their expectations of the new democratic order. A form of equilibrium and legitimacy was gradually achieved between the state and society. However, in recent years South Africa has experienced a massive increase in what have been termed ‘service-delivery’ protests, often accompanied by violence, strikes and civil unrest. In 2009, there were 105 such service protests, rising in 2010 to 111 protests recorded in all nine provinces. In July 2012, the number of protests reached an all-time monthly high, with more protests occurring in the Western Cape than in any other province (Managa 2012:1). This increase in protest suggests that some societal expectations are no longer being met, and that South Africa is being moved towards a state of disequilibrium and perhaps even illegitimacy. According to ‘fragile-state’ theory (OECD/DAC 2007a), when a
state no longer provides to its society what is expected or demanded of it, then that country is moving towards a fragile-state situation. Such a condition can be dangerous for newly-transitioned societies for they are more likely to be prone to violence and unrest than older and more mature ones.

This paper looks at the current political system in South Africa and the political dynamics within it. It argues that with the recent increase in service-delivery protests in South Africa and the changing nature of the political dynamics of the country, the state-society contract is weakening and the possibility exists that the state is moving towards a condition of fragility.

Part One: Theory

The state and fragility

Thinking around the notion of a fragile state has changed greatly over the past decade: whereas previously most countries seen as fragile were low income, today almost half are middle income. The result has been a move towards the classification of states based on a fragility spectrum, as outlined in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding’s 2013 document entitled A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding [2011]). Fragility, it suggests, indicates similar characteristics to that of a failed state but does not imply complete collapse of all areas of the state. What it does do, however, is to draw urgent attention to pockets or sectors of fragility within the state which, in other respects, could be functioning well (Hilker 2012:4). The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (OECD 2012:19) defines a fragile state as one where ‘state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations’ (OECD 2012:19). In a fragile setting, aspects of the quality of the political settlement establishing the rules of the game become flawed (especially in terms of its exclusionary nature), are not resilient and/or have become significantly undermined or contested. A common situation in which fragility arises is primarily when a government is
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unable to meet the demands of its people and legitimacy is lost; and when the ‘social contract’ or the state-society contract binding state and society together in mutually reinforcing ways frays and the state is not seen as delivering services to the people (Menocal 2011:1716).

This state-society contract notion is one which derives from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s writings on the social contract and refers to an imagined contract between a state authority and its people, forged in the belief that states act in the best interests of their subjects and thereby earn and maintain a sense of legitimacy in their eyes. However, once the state begins to act consistently against the people’s interests, the contract is breached, a crisis of legitimacy can develop and the likelihood of the state collapsing into conflict increases. The state-society contract is similar to this and is predicated upon three central points: 1) the *expectations* that a given society has of its governing state; 2) the *state’s capacity* to provide services, including security, and to secure revenue from its population and territory to provide these services (in part a function of *economic resources*); and 3) the *elite’s willingness* to direct state resources and its capacity to fulfil social expectations. The contract is crucially mediated by the existence of *political processes* through which the bargain between state and society is struck, reinforced and institutionalised. Finally, *legitimacy* plays a complex additional role in shaping expectations and facilitating the political process (OECD 2008:17). The notion of fragility suggests that when this state-society contract is disrupted, even if only in certain societal aspects, the society weakens and the likelihood of unrest increases.

The measure of fragility is useful for new democracies in that the *New Deal* (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding [2011]) outlines a scale of fragility which indicates areas in which this fragility is most dangerous, and the implication that when the size and prevalence of these pockets of fragility within a country reach a ‘tipping point’ based upon this scale, the risk of susceptibility to instability increases and local, national, regional and sometimes global consequences may be imminent (Menocal 2011:1716). More countries can be included within the analysis of fragility, which may allow for deeper investigation into ways in which fragility matters and into approaches or methods that can be taken to address fragility. Policies and programmes aimed
at decreasing fragility will differ depending on which criteria are assumed to be fundamental. Furthermore, an inaccurate understanding of fragility may cause cases of genuine fragility to be overlooked. In the long term, the idea of talking about fragile states will allow more actions to be taken in specific areas and countries in order to prevent further collapse which, in the long-run, will reduce the likelihood of national, regional or global crisis (OECD 2012:35).

**Recommendations to increase stability and resilience**

Fragility resides at one end of a spectrum which has resilience at the other end. Resilience, in this context, would refer to the ability of a state to cope with the changing nature of the expectations of a society and maintaining thereby the state-society contract (OECD 2008:18). Building up resilience would fall under Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) which is defined by the African Union (AU) as ‘a comprehensive set of measures that seek to: address the needs of countries emerging from conflict, including the needs of affected populations; prevent escalation of disputes; avoid relapse into violence; address the root causes of conflict; and consolidate sustainable peace’ (AU PCRD 2006:4). One way of doing this is state building. State building is a means of building resilience and thus preventing conflict; it will enable equilibrium to be restored to a society and the state-society contract resurrected in order to prevent the country from derailing into full-scale conflict or civil war. State building is different from peacebuilding and refers to the ‘purposeful action to develop capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating mutual demands between state and society groups’ (OECD 2008:14). It is the process of building a state to serve its citizenry more effectively (Fukuyama 2004:17). Peacebuilding is generally associated with post-conflict situations in countries which have experienced internal warfare, and can be defined as ‘actions undertaken by national or international actors to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ (OECD 2008:13). It is focused on transforming society by strengthening human security and addressing fundamental grievances, horizontal inequalities and the root
causes of violence (Menocal 2011:1718-1719). Both peacebuilding and state-building processes are conflict-prevention measures and are seen as vital to a stable society, but occur at different stages in the society’s life span.

The OECD’s *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* (OECD 2007a) assert that state building should be the central objective of fragile states and is vital in establishing an effective, legitimate and resilient state. Menocal (2011) elaborates on this by arguing that in its simplest formulation, state building refers to the set of actions undertaken by national and/or international actors to establish reform and strengthen state institutions where these have been seriously eroded or are missing. Yet, as with peacebuilding, the concept of state building has also evolved considerably over time. From a narrow preoccupation with building or strengthening formal institutions and state capacity, there has been an important shift within the international development community towards recognising that the state cannot be treated in isolation and that state-society relations are central to state-building processes. As such, the core of state building has come to be understood in terms of an effective political process through which citizens and the state can negotiate mutual demands, obligations and expectations. A fragile state is one which cannot deal with such societal needs and prevents effective development in the country. A fragile state is dangerous because of the large likelihood of violence and protest in the state, which would be further destabilising to any peace processes and development which might have been taking place in the post-conflict country.

Thus, one can see the links between state building and conflict prevention. Conflict prevention tries to tackle the causes of instability, build resilience and thereby prevent conflicts occurring. The international community is now making greater efforts towards bolstering state capacities, in particular by strengthening the ability of the organisation to practice preventive diplomacy and to employ and support mediation in order to head off potential crises at an early stage. Referring to the United Nations’ *Agenda for Peace*, conflict prevention also extends well beyond traditional preventive diplomacy to involve a broad constellation of United Nations entities operating across a wide range of relevant
disciplines – poverty-eradication and development, human rights and the rule of law, elections and the building of democratic institutions, the control of small arms; all similar aspects to that of building up a state (Boutros-Ghali 1992:15-16). Often conflict prevention focuses on looking at the root issues of tension in a society and addressing those through training and capacity development in the community in order to pre-empt these issues heightening into protest, uprising, violence or conflict.

In order to achieve successful state building, a nuanced understanding of the causes of fragility (the root causes of conflict) in their various manifestations, as well as an appreciation of how this understanding should shape both the policy and the practice of state building, is required. Disequilibrium can arise as a result of extremes of incapacity, and/or elite behaviour, or crises of legitimacy. Resilient states are able to manage these pressures through a political process that is responsive. States that lack effective political mechanisms may be unable to manage the consequences – social disruption, unrest and violence, etc. This links to the five core principles of the AU PCRD, namely: African Leadership, national and local ownership, inclusiveness, equity and non-discrimination, cooperation and cohesion, and capacity building for sustainability (AU PCRD 2006:6-8), which should be included in any state-building measures. They must be locally owned and aim to develop the capacity of the people in order to ensure a long-lasting peaceful existence.

This paper seeks to show how aspects of fragility have seeped into areas of South African governance by looking at major policy problem areas in 2012, each of which highlights state shortcomings, if not failings. This paper will draw on aspects of state building to highlight recommendations by which the South African government could build resilience.

**Part Two: Case study of South Africa**

**A brief summation of the apartheid system**

Racially based discrimination in South Africa did not start with the apartheid government in 1948 but had its roots in the arrival of the first Europeans from
Holland in 1652. During the subsequent Dutch and British dominations of the Cape Colony, racial discrimination against the indigenous inhabitants, especially the Khoikhoi and the San, was intensified. The descendants of the Dutch, who became known as Afrikaners, were dissatisfied with the British hold over South Africa and in the mid-1800s established their own inland republics. Clashes between the British coastal colonies and the inland states culminated in the Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902), which ended with British authority being extended over the Afrikaner states which then became British colonies. In 1910, the four colonial areas of the country were united as the Union of South Africa. An uneasy power-sharing arrangement between the English-language speakers and the Afrikaners held sway until 1948, when the National Party took power in an all-Afrikaner coalition arrangement (Saunders and Davenport 2000:21-377).

From 1948, racial discrimination was institutionalised under the system known as apartheid. Initially, the aim of the apartheid system was to maintain white domination while extending racial separation into all spheres of social, political and economic life. Starting in the 1960s, a plan of ‘Grand Apartheid’ was executed, emphasising the territorial separation of the African people on a largely ethnic basis. By the 1970s, the National Party had effected a massive re-engineering of South African society involving the segregation of every aspect of life – housing, hospitals, schools, buses, public benches, etc. A passbook or racial identity document was provided to every person of colour to be kept on them and shown on demand at all times. Inter-racial sexual relations and marriages were prohibited; and the interaction in general between races was kept to a minimum (Saunders and Davenport 2000:377-460).

This system of segregation was maintained until the 1990s when the legal framework of apartheid began to be dismantled in a series of reforms proposed by the last National Party leader, F.W. de Klerk. In a March 1992 referendum, a majority of whites endorsed President De Klerk’s reforms. Despite continuing violence in the country, negotiators led by Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) and De Klerk agreed in 1993 on a timetable for

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1 The 1948 Government was a coalition of two Afrikaner political groups, the National Party and the Afrikaner Party of Dr Havenga. In the early 1950s, the Afrikaner Party dissolved in the NP with Havenga being given a senior cabinet post.
the implementation of majority rule. After a plea from Mandela at the UN in September 1993, remaining international sanctions on South Africa were lifted. In October 1993, De Klerk and Mandela were awarded Nobel Peace Prizes. On 27 April 1994, the first democratic election in South African history resulted in Nelson Mandela becoming South Africa’s first democratic president and the country started down a new path of ensuring equality and dignity for all (Saunders and Davenport 2000:460-506).

The transition to democracy

A huge task faced the new government of South Africa in 1994, namely, ‘to undo the apartheid policy legacies – of poverty, inequality and racial segregation of service – in order to create a single, efficient public service that delivered on the basic needs of all citizens’ (Managa 2012:2). In order to achieve this, the government passed various acts to encourage societal transformation and to remove all past discrimination policies from the statute books. The dismantling of apartheid’s policies was a drawn-out process as parliament grappled to rescind the multitudes of discriminatory laws and to replace them with others that upheld the principles of democracy, justice and equality in a divided and racially-stratified society. These acts focused on rectifying the inequalities of the past by providing opportunities for previously disadvantaged groups to enjoy rights and freedoms hitherto denied them. The cornerstones of these rights and freedoms are highlighted in the Bill of Rights in the 1996 Constitution. The ANC government also instituted in 1994 a development plan to deal with issues of social justice and socio-economic rights. This was known as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which pledged to develop the country, meet the basic needs of people and build the economy. The RDP aimed to address the issues of housing, jobs and inadequate education in the country. In terms of housing, the objective was formulated as follows: to establish ‘decent, well-located and affordable shelter for all by the year 2003. In the short-term, the aim is to build one million new low-cost houses in five years. These houses will be funded by government and by business through a national housing bank and a national home loan guarantee fund. Government will provide subsidies and make sure that poor people can get finance for housing’ (The White Paper
In terms of employment, the RDP envisaged to attain a ‘5% growth of the economy and to create between 300,000 and 500,000 jobs in industry, trade and commerce within five years’ (The White Paper 1994). In terms of education, the aim was that ‘as soon as possible there will be 10 years of free and compulsory education for all children’ (The White Paper 1994).

The RDP transitioned, in the mid- to late-1990s, into the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme, which was more macro-economically based but still centred on the same principles. The GEAR plan, in turn, transitioned into the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) in 2008, which envisaged a so-called ‘developmental state’ halving unemployment and poverty by 2014. These three plans, over time and collectively, established in the political imaginations of South Africa’s citizenry a set of guidelines about what to expect from their government; it was the foundation for a post-apartheid state-society contract.

The status of delivery in South Africa

By the end of 2012 more protests – many, if not most, of them involving violent conflict and the destruction of property – were being recorded in South Africa than in the heyday of the struggle against the apartheid regime in the 1980s. There are many reasons offered for these protests but the primary one is dissatisfaction with the delivery of basic municipal services such as running water, electricity and sanitation, especially in townships and urban informal settlements. High unemployment, high levels of poverty, poor infrastructure, and the lack of houses add to the growing sense of dissatisfaction in these poor communities (Managa 2012:3). These protests come also in the wake of promises made during election periods that all or most of these issues would be addressed.

When looking at social conditions in South Africa, the likelihood of protests over a lack of service delivery should come as no surprise. Even though unemployment levels have dropped since 1994, they remain unacceptably high with one in four adults of working age without paying jobs. Most crime levels have fallen, with the prominent exception of murder, but infant mortality rates have increased for the first time since the mid-1980s, life expectancy for
black South Africans has declined and the rapid increase in access to education for black South Africans had slowed since the boom period of the 1980s and 1990s. Only 50% of the black age cohort was making it to matric and only 30% were passing.

Looking at the results of the 2011 South African census, things have not changed significantly in the last five years. Starting with education, only 28.5% of those 20 years or older have completed high school while only 33.8% of the population has some form of secondary education, and 10.5% of all people have no schooling of any form (SAPA 2012a).

There are close to 1.3 million households in South Africa without access to piped water, the majority of them black households. A quarter of households in the Eastern Cape do not have access to electricity; more than 22% of Eastern Cape residents do not have access to piped water, the census shows. Just over half of households have access to a flush toilet while two in ten use a pit toilet without ventilation. In Gauteng one in every hundred households is without any toilet facility whereas in Eastern Cape one in eight households has no toilet facility. In terms of housing, RDP houses are no longer a priority in the provincial budget and the considerable number of stalled or blocked housing projects has further negatively affected electricity provisions, piped water and toilet access (SAPA 2012b).

Two major state failings in 2012 highlight the shortcomings, if not failings, of the post-apartheid order. One, the lack of delivery of textbooks, and two, the Marikana massacre of striking miners. Each of these cases illustrates a serious conflict situation which has arisen because both the national government and the provincial authorities have failed or are perceived to have failed to provide for the basic needs of the people.

1. The Limpopo textbook crisis

In August 2012, it emerged that schools in South Africa’s northernmost and largely rural Limpopo province had not received their complement of textbooks for that school year. In fact, most schools finished the year without the books. It was later discovered that several thousands of the printed textbooks in good
condition had either been shredded or dumped in open fields rather than delivered. Further investigations then revealed that Limpopo was just one example of a nationwide inadequacy and mismanagement in the procurement and delivery of schoolbooks, and further, that the Basic Education Department had known for at least five years that its provision of schoolbooks was inadequate across South Africa. In September 2012, the press reported that 80% of a sample of 200 schools nationwide had not been provided with enough textbooks for all pupils to have their own copies. The Mail and Guardian claimed to be in possession of another unpublished report based on a survey in 2012 that found about 30% of workbooks had failed to reach schools by April 2011. A third, publicly available report showed that every second 16 to 18 year-old pupil interviewed in 2007 and 2008 indicated that they had had to share desks and textbooks. Compiled by Social Surveys Africa and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, this report, entitled National Study on Access to Education, was presented to the department in 2009 (John 2012).

Furthermore, as of October 2012, it was found that within South Africa 3 544 schools had no electricity supply and 804 only a sporadic and unreliable one; 2 402 schools had no water supply and 2 611 an unreliable one; 913 schools had no ablution facilities and 11 450 were still using pit-latrines toilets; 2 703 schools had no fencings; 79% were without any library and only 7% of those schools with libraries carried any stock; 85% had no laboratory and only 5% had stocked labs; 77% were without any computer centres and only 10% had equipped computer centres; 17% of schools were without any sporting facilities (Veriava 2012).

Two civil society organisations, Section 27 and Equal Education, took the School’s Education ministry to court in October 2012, demanding that minimum norms and standards for every school be set, which would include a set of regulations that will stipulate the basic level of infrastructure that every school must meet in order to function properly. These regulations will relate to important infrastructure like toilets, running water, electricity, libraries, safe classrooms and perimeter security. The policy will also stipulate that no school can operate without having a certain level of basic infrastructure. This will allow
schools to hold government accountable and put pressure on the government to deliver (Equal Education 2012). An out-of-court agreement was made whereby the department would make its best effort to implement the standards. However, to-date in late 2013, this has not happened.

Education receives the largest single slice of South Africa’s budget. In the 2012-2013 financial year, Basic Education’s allocation was R152.1 billion – 15% of the entire national budget. In 2010, Minister Motshekga promised that ‘norms and standards for the physical teaching and learning environment will be set at the national level by the department of basic education’ (John 2012). These would be ‘effective from 2010-2011 financial year’ (John 2012), Motshekga’s June 2010 policy document declared. However, as of late 2013 these policies have not even been published. Clearly, the basic right to education in South Africa is not being met and is likely to stay this way for the foreseeable future. Until such issues as poor infrastructure, poor and lazy teachers and lack of resources are addressed the promise will remain just that, thus creating a pocket of fragility within the state and heightening the potential for protest, conflict and violence.

2. The Marikana miners strike

The decline in productivity of the mining sector in 2012 was stark. A contributing factor was worker unrest. It began at the Lonmin platinum plant in Rustenburg in mid-2012 where miners were demanding an increase in wages from R4 000 to R12 500 per month. The strike turned violent on 16 August when police opened fire on protestors, killing more than 30 and injuring 78. The strike then spread to other mines, including Amplats, Blesbok and Samancor. This brought the total number of mines striking to five across the gold, platinum and chrome sectors. Eventually the Lonmin mining strike was settled with a deal which resulted in a pay rise akin to what was being asked: the lowest paid underground worker would earn between R9 611 and R8 164, a winch operator would earn between R9 883 and R 8 931, a rock drill operator would earn between R11 078 and R9 063 and production team leader would earn between R13 022 and R11 818. The other strikes were subsequently resolved but none received as high an increase as the Lonmin workers. South Africa did suffer as a consequence of its credit rating
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*being downgraded and there is speculation that Anglo American Platinum will cut thousands of permanent jobs to ensure its long-term survival* (Gunnion 2012).

The Lonmin strike illustrated many of the realities of South Africa 19 years into its democracy, some being the monopolisation of social issues by politics, growing inequality as well as the increase in the use of violence by protestors, but likewise perhaps the harsh reality that that (the use of violence) is the only route seen as being effective. The issue goes even deeper, however, to point to the fact that this was yet another strike in South Africa where the miners felt that they had no avenue to negotiate and mine-owners claimed they did not have the money to give any raises, even whilst Lonmin’s chief executive receives an annual pay package equivalent to what the average rock-drill operator would earn in 400 years on the job. The miners are not provided accommodation near the mines and have to use their monthly salaries to either pay the vast travel costs or find alternative accommodation, whilst, in many cases, supporting a family back home.

This all points to the fact that in 19 years of democracy, typically low-paid black men are forced to migrate long distances from home in order to take up some of the most difficult and dangerous of jobs. In 2010, 128 legal mineworkers lost their lives. This is a marked improvement from the 309 in 1999, but still illustrates the harsh realities of the job and the increased dissatisfaction with the lack of development promised by the government, thus illustrating a pocket of fragility in the state and a weakened state-society contract and potential towards that of a conflict-prone state.

**What are the causes of the protests and the implications?**

While it can certainly be argued that for some social strata and in some sectors in South Africa things are improving, there is still a huge disparity within vast portions of the population lacking the most basic necessities of life. According to Jay Kruuse, head of the Rhodes University-based Public Service Accountability Monitor, a major reason for the lack of improvement in the country is that ‘weak capacity, oversight and political leadership within municipalities have further eroded efforts to drastically improve access to such service’ (Managa 2012: 3).
This links directly to the argument that the state-society contract has, in many municipalities, fractured because not enough is being done to meet the demands of the people in those areas and the public is therefore beginning to respond not only on the streets and on the mines but to a degree also at the ballot box. The ANC’s share of the potential national vote (those who voted for the ANC expressed as a percentage of the total number of eligible voters) has fallen from 53.8% in 1994 to just 38.8% in the 2009 election, which brought the Zuma government to power (Managa 2012:4). Violent protest action against the state has increased over the past five years. The police reported that in 2011, they were dealing on average with four protest actions per day whilst the consultancy Municipal IQ reports a tenfold increase in major service-delivery protests since 2004 (Managa 2012:2).

However, there is an alternative argument which should be considered. Have expectations changed and risen in the society because the government has been providing more services to the people? Has this increased the expectations that the citizens now demand of their government? Or, are there more protests because the state has claimed that they will provide specific services which they have not delivered and thus expectations have not been met? Ted Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation refers to the tension between one’s actual state or life condition and what one feels it should be; as Gurr puts it, the ‘perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities’ (Gurr 1970:37). The intensity and scope of the sense of deprivation strongly determines the potential for collective violence. The more intense and prolonged a feeling of frustration, the greater the probability of aggression. Relative deprivation can happen in three ways: 1) ‘Decremental deprivation’—value expectations remain constant while capabilities fall (for example: immigrants are taking over unskilled jobs, lowering conditions for unskilled labour); 2) ‘Aspirational deprivation’—value expectations rise while capabilities remain the same (for example: exposure to a better way of life could raise what you expect for yourself, even though you cannot get it now); 3) ‘Progressive deprivation’ [the J-curve]—expectations grow [we expect continued growth] and capabilities do to, but capabilities either do not keep up or start to fall (for example: modernisation, depression in a growing country, or other change could cause this (Gurr 1970:37).
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*Progressive deprivation* is a complex notion to be considered within South Africa. This would involve looking at what was promised, what has been provided and what the people want today. One cannot overlook the fact that the ANC has delivered much over the past 19 years in many aspects. There can be little doubt that what has been delivered has produced some significant improvements in the basic living conditions of poor people as corroborated by Living Standard Measure data. Since 1994, for every shack constructed in South Africa, 12 formal homes have been built. Many more now have access to clean water and electricity. Between 1996 and 2010 the proportion living on less than US$2 a day fell from 12% to 5%. The racist legislation of apartheid has been abolished. The new constitution is liberal and inspiring. What has to be taken into account, however, is that while the government has introduced changes which have led to an increase in the living standards of underprivileged people, it had no means, whether through education or labour market access, to allow the same people to continue climbing the living-standards ladder. It follows that it could be explained as a form of progressive deprivation whereby the expectations of people grew and so too did their access to capabilities, but, over time, this access to new services was not maintained and a form of deprivation and dissatisfaction set in.

Following this argument, if we are right to assume that the ANC has delivered as realistically as it could and that there is nothing more it can do to curb the protest and instability, then what is needed – if the ANC wishes to remain in power – is a reformulation of the policies in the country to move away from redress and redistribution towards growth and employment.

However, on the other hand, it can be argued that those at the bottom of the social ladder have experienced little or no change in the 19 years of democracy (Daniel and Southall 2012:20-21). Reflecting upon the Marikana mining strikes, these protesters were still working and living in conditions similar to that of miners working under the apartheid government – far from their families, in poor and dangerous working conditions, placed in unsatisfactory living conditions and all this for a minimal wage. Very little had changed for them.
in the past 19 years and thus protests about a lack of service delivery and poor wages took place. The government was unable to meet their expectations in the society and the contract was weakened.

The central point in both sides of the argument is that the government is seemingly unable to provide what the people now demand and expect. The unmet expectations have resonated in the increased service-delivery and wage protests, most of which were violent, as seen throughout 2012. If one refers back to the state-society contract, this contract has, regardless of the reasoning, been weakened and a form of equilibrium has been lost. This increase in protests is a sign that the country is moving towards a fragile situation, one characterised by a fundamental lack of effective political processes that can bring state capacities and social expectations into equilibrium. The fragile setting is not to say that the country is now at the point of being a failing or failed state but when looking at the fragility spectrum, there are aspects of the state that are indeed fragile, despite others functioning well or reasonably well – the tax-collection system, for example. It cannot be concluded that the government does not have the will to provide for the people, but only that they are physically not doing so at the moment. Furthermore, one cannot conclude that the government in South Africa is illegitimate. They are the majority elected party and have been since 1994. However, the fact that there has been such a vast increase in service-delivery protest implies that expectations are not being met and that people are dissatisfied with their current situation, which seems to point towards the fact that people are losing faith in the government to provide for them. The tendency towards protest has almost become legitimised as the means to air dissatisfaction in the country. This does not prove that the state-society contract is completely broken but does indicate that the situation is flawed and that the contract has weakened. If the situation is not rectified and conflict prevention measures are not used, it could develop into further widespread political protest and unrest, which could culminate in loss of support for the government as a whole and a slide towards that of a fragile state.
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Recommendations to South Africa to increase stability and resilience

In South Africa, there is a need to execute effective conflict-prevention and state-building measures: ‘purposeful action to develop capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating demands between the state and society groups’ (OECD 2008:14). There is a need for the state to develop a longer-term vision of, or perspective on, the policy-making process. This would involve taking into account its specific social and economic context and setting itself a series of immediate, medium- and long-term goals. It would need to be a common vision shared among all aspects of society in order to ensure the legitimacy and buy-in of the people. This can be done by reforming political institutions to be more inclusive of its citizens, more transparent in their actions and more effectively upholding the rule of law.

Recommendation One: Develop a more transparent and effective system of checks and balances

In South Africa, Parliament is supposed to act as the accountability watchdog over the executive, but since the Mbeki years it has not done so effectively. It has rather become more of a lapdog for the executive. Its lack of accountability can partly be put down to the country’s electoral system of party-list proportional representation for general and provincial elections, which renders individual Members of Parliament not answerable directly to voters, but to party managers who determine their ranking on the list. Only at the lowest level – the municipalities – is there a system of constituencies (or ‘wards’) and then only for half of the seats.

In South Africa, the National Assembly is composed of 400 members directly elected by universal adult suffrage for a five-year term. The composition of the National Assembly is determined by proportional representation. One-half of the seats in the National Assembly – 200 seats – are filled from regional lists submitted by the political parties, while the remaining half is filled from national lists submitted by the parties, or from regional lists where national lists are not submitted. Party lists may consist of both a national list and a list for each region. The total number of candidates in a party list cannot exceed the number of seats in the National Assembly. The lists are closed, so electors may
not choose individual candidates in or alter the order of such lists. The number of seats a party holds in Parliament is proportional to the number of votes the party receives in the election. For example, in the 2009 election, the ANC received 65.9% of votes, which translated into 264 seats out of 400, and the first 264 people on the ANC list filled those seats (Alvarez-Rivera 2010). Once the ruling party has been elected, the President is then appointed by Parliament and sworn in. Once sworn in, the President is removed as a Member of Parliament but remains Head of State and Head of Government. This means politicians have little incentive to provide for their voters; and in many cases, as warned by Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) then chair, Zwelinzima Vavi, ‘different lifestyles and material realities are creating a leadership which is not fully in tune with what members are facing’ ( Letsola 2012). Disenchantment with unions and with the leaders makes wildcat strikes more likely thus increasing the fragile nature of the state and causing more destabilisation and potential for widespread conflict as was seen in Marikana in 2012.

**Recommendation Two: Building up the opposition**

Thus far in South Africa’s post-apartheid history the party-political opposition has posed little threat to the ANC’s dominance, except for a ten-year period in KwaZulu-Natal and currently in the Western Cape. In the 2009 general elections, an ANC splinter group, the Congress of the People, won just 7.4% of the vote (Daniel 2009:1). It has since spluttered on, amid infighting, financial difficulties and the defection back of some prominent members to the ANC. The Inkatha Freedom Party, which governed KwaZulu-Natal is withered away. In the 2009 national election, it won less than 5% of the vote. That leaves the Democratic Alliance (DA) which won 16.66% of the national count as the main political opposition to the ANC (Daniel 2009:7). However, so far it has failed to win over poor, black voters in any sizeable numbers. The DA governs the Western Cape which is the only province without a black African majority of voters, but is yet to win another province. Despite having a black deputy leader, the perception amongst most black Africans is that it is a ‘white party’. The DA must therefore find a way to broaden its appeal without losing its existing supporters in order to become a viable challenger to the ANC dominance (The Economist 2012).
With a viable challenge from the opposition, the government might then be catapulted into upholding the state-society contract for fear of being removed from power; a vital point for state building and conflict prevention.

Without an effective or large enough opposition inside Parliament, the most important check on the ANC comes from outside party politics. Lobby groups and NGOs have a commendable history of holding the government to account and stepping in where it fails, although funding, whether it comes from the government or from donors, is limited. The media, too, remain critical. Some fear that a pending ‘secrecy bill’, a law intended to protect state information, will be used to stifle criticism of the government. The law has not yet been promulgated into law, and in the meantime the media, in particular sections of the press, continue to chastise the government about its poor performance and lambast it over corruption. Most important are South Africa’s courts – especially the highest-ranking Constitutional Court – which have long been hailed as a safeguard against the ANC’s authoritarian and corrupt tendencies (The Economist 2012).

**Recommendation Three: Develop a more inclusive participatory mechanism which citizens can use to advocate for change and air their grievances.**

At present, whilst there has been an increase in the number of eligible voters, an increase in the number of registered voters since 1999, and an overall increase in total votes cast since 1999, the number of people actually casting a vote between 1999 and 2004 actually decreased. In addition, the proportion of the voting age population voting for the ANC over the years has shown a steady and marked decline from 53.8% in 1994 to 38.8% in 2009. Furthermore, despite the increasing electoral margins for the ANC from 62.6% to 69.7% in the first ten years of democracy, the proportion of eligible people of voting age actually voting for the ANC has significantly decreased. In addition, the number of people registering to vote and those who actually come to the polls and vote is decreasing too with only 77.3% of the registered voters actually voting in the 2009 elections. A reason behind this could be the major dominance of the ANC in the party system, which has led to increased voter apathy and thus decreased political participation (Schulz-Herzenberg 2009).
Voter apathy is a dangerous trend in a state as it allows elite dominance to grow. If there is no threat to prospects for re-election, the value of elections as a means to discipline elite behaviour is eroded. Political uncertainty is good for democracy because it keeps politicians alert and makes them responsive to the citizenry (Schulz-Herzenberg 2009) and this uncertainty is maintained in a society where the electoral system motivates members of society to vote.

A move to make the system more participatory and allow citizens to feel they are more involved in the political system would make the chance of participation levels increasing realistic. Historically, in South Africa, protests have been the only recourse that the majority population had to display their dissatisfaction with the apartheid government, given that a large majority of the population were unable to vote or engage in any real civic participation before 1994 (Managa 2012:2). Where now, in many cases, promises made for services are perceived as not being fulfilled, the tendency is to resort to the street. It is a cycle of frustration which ultimately leads to protest. If citizens, however, are able to communicate effectively and see a positive impact, then the chance of them trusting the system is higher. This too, will ensure that the citizens feel that their best interests are represented in the decision-making process.

**Recommendation Four: Develop a mechanism of accountability for action promised**

There too should be the development of a mechanism which ensures that government, particularly at local or municipal level, starts implementing the provisions contained in the Constitution which provides an effective form of accountability for promises made. Furthermore, there is a need for a sector of society, in addition to the government, which is able to hold these departments accountable, whether it is civil society, the opposition or the judiciary.

A lack of expertise has left many municipalities inadequately staffed, resulting in deteriorating service delivery. Although it must be acknowledged that some municipalities lack adequate funds to carry out their constitutional mandate to improve service delivery, some simply resort to under-spending the allocated funds due to lack of leadership and technical-competency skills. (Managa 2012:3). In order to address the poor state of our the delivery of services, there
needs to be a move to strengthen the human and resource capacity of the country, which will enable local government to deliver its constitutional mandate to the public, strengthen the national and provincial oversight and supervision of local government affairs, and allow prompt intervention to take place. There too needs to be a move to address the growing corruption and nepotism in the government and a mechanism to hold senior officials accountable when they fail to disclose their business or pecuniary interests. Mechanisms to enhance public belief that the government is always acting in their best interest can ensure legitimacy is maintained, the state-society contract is strengthened and the likelihood of violence decreased. This may be the only way to move the country away from becoming a fragile, weak state to one that is able to adapt to the changing expectations of the public.

State-building initiatives in South Africa to strengthen the notions of democracy, checks and balances, opposition and accountability will enable the society to move further away from the threat of a fragile state. State building is a key tenet of conflict prevention – in order to address issues before they derail into full-scale violence and, in some cases, civil war. Executing activities to address not only the issues at hand – the delivery of textbooks to one school, the increase in wages at one mine – would fundamentally change the structures of the society which dictate the inherent inequality and marginalisation. Drawing on the African Union’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development framework, this process must have aspects of local ownership and be inclusive of all citizens of South Africa. There must be a means of capacity building to ensure that any changes are sustainable. Finally, the process must be cooperative, led by South Africans to ensure the change meets the needs of the people. By addressing these structural issues present in the society, as illustrated in South Africa, one would be able to better prevent future conflict – conflict which could push a country, such as South Africa, which is already in a fragile situation to that of a fragile state.

**Conclusion**

A functional state-society contract is the foundation of a stable state, one in which there is consequently little potential for violence or destabilisation.
This contract is founded upon an understanding of the expectations between a society (the people) and a government. Where expectations are not being met, the potential of the citizenry becoming dissatisfied with the state increases and so does the potential for violence. In this paper, the proposition has been that the post-apartheid state has within it pockets or areas of fragility which are weakening the state as a whole. In South Africa, with the transition to democracy, a series of promises for ‘a better life for all’ were made to the population of the country. Nineteen years after this transition, there are still several sections of society for whom life has not significantly improved or who perceive that it has not changed sufficiently. The promise of equal education, jobs and better living conditions remains to them an illusion and this has led to escalating levels of discontent in the form of often violent protests and service-delivery strikes. In 2012, more protests were recorded in South Africa than since the end of the apartheid era. The Marikana mining massacre was one of the bloodiest protests since the insurrections of the 1980s and early 1990s. The status of education and the provision of resources in South Africa are dismal and the prospect to achieve a better life for so many in the townships and the far-flung provinces like Limpopo appears increasingly slim.

It is not argued that the government has not attempted to improve life for the people. In some aspects, it has indeed been successful, but it appears increasingly unable to meet the growing demands and expectations of the poor masses in the society. Whether it is because the government has given people false expectations or whether their expectations have increased over time is largely immaterial. The fact is that the state-society contract of 1994 is fraying and weakening, large sections of the poor appear to have lost some faith in the government’s ability to meet their needs, and destabilising conflict between state and society has become prevalent. South Africa, it seems, is developing more pockets of fragility potentially leading the country towards long sequence of violent protests, and there is a vital need for conflict prevention measures to be put in place.

However, it should to be remembered that South Africa, as a post-conflict country, may have an advantage over other countries in similar situations in that it does have a thriving democratic order with free and fair elections and a strong rule of law system. The country has a firm foundation upon which it can rectify the
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weakened contract and undertake the necessary conflict-prevention measures which will enable the state to again obtain buy-in from the people and recreate that balance between the state and society which prevailed in the heady days of South Africa’s democratic dawn. Countries newly transitioned from conflict to a peaceful democratic society carry a risk that the negotiated agreements and peaceful development could unravel back into conflict situations. It is for this reason that this paper argues that it is vital to identify issues which cause tension in the society and to deal with them earlier rather than later; to address the roots of grievances of a society and reform the situation to one where the state and society are in equilibrium and conflict is at a minimum – thus moving away from a fragile state situation and towards a peaceful, stable and resilient situation.

Sources


Strengthening ethical political leadership for sustainable peace and social justice in Africa: Uganda as a case study

Evelyn Mayanja*

Abstract

The crisis of ethical political leadership is responsible for Africa’s underdevelopment and insecurity, and its social and structural injustices. Strengthening ethical political leadership is trepiditious, given the deeply engraved status quo that appeals to political elites who command power and benefit from the system through semi-democratic, semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regime types. Using an interdisciplinary approach of peace and conflict studies, the paper analyses the crisis and proposes a model for strengthening political leadership through African *Ubuntu* ethics and the involvement of local, national and international actors to achieve sustainable peace and social justice.

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Introduction

The deficit and crisis of ethical political leadership pose enormous challenges to Africa. Bad leadership manifested by persistent human rights violation, bad governance, dysfunctional institutions, patronage, electoral fraud, manipulation of ethnic differences, corruption and personalisation of power hinder the prevalence of peace and social justice. Powerful political elites feed on the state, prey on the weak, use national resources for self-aggrandizement, and deprive citizens of collective goods such as medical care, good education and employment. When people’s human needs are not met, protracted social conflicts and wars are inevitable (Burton 1990; Sandole 2001). It is presumptuous to assume that the change of guards at the helm of society, either through coup d’états or fraudulent elections, will lead to sustainable peace and justice. Strengthening ethics is fundamental to the crisis, necessitating a moral imagination, creativity and networking of actors at national and international levels. The best is still to come for Africa. The model of Botswana’s economic and political success, along with the courageous leadership of Nelson Mandela, Joachim Chisano of Mozambique and Kofi Annan’s leadership at the United Nations, hold promises for Africa. We can do better with transformed political leadership. Research, education and praxis are key to envisioning interventions towards ethical political leadership.

In searching for preventive and transformative measures to the political leadership crisis, it is crucial to consider some poignant questions. What leadership is needed for Africa, and Uganda in particular? Can the current leadership be trusted to retain legitimacy and credibility while developing constructive and

1 Philosophical definitions of ethics exist since the time of Plato and Socrates. Ethics studies what is right or wrong, justice, fairness, virtues, duties and obligations. For the leader to be ethical, it is implied in this paper that he or she is moral, accountable and not corrupt, fair and does not manipulate or abuse people for his/her own advantage. Such ethics is found in one’s heart, worldview and value system.

2 Botswana is one of Africa’s success stories where due to good leadership and governance, the country’s desolate position (as was the case in almost all African nations at independence) has been transformed into an upper middle class majority of the population. The leadership deficit in many African countries has hindered economic development and peace. Botswana’s experience illustrates that good leadership is key to a nation’s peace and development.
meaningful policies to address the crisis, and if not, how can they be ousted peacefully? What went/is wrong in the system and how can it be rectified non-violently, given that first post-colonial African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere strived for nationbuilding but their successors lost the plot (Adamoleku 1988; Assensoh 1998). How does ethical political leadership come about given that those who assume leadership positions have witnessed only ruthless, violent, power-thirsty and corrupt leaders? If African political leadership does not change, which legacy will remain for future generations? What role can the international community play to strengthen ethical political leadership in Africa? What theories and praxis can help in averting the leadership crisis?

Using an interdisciplinary approach of peace and conflict studies (PACS), the article analyses the deficit of ethical political leadership and proposes a model of strengthening ethical political leadership in Uganda as a mirror to Africa. The first part contextualises and conceptualises the leadership crisis in Africa with emphasis on Uganda. The second part examines the relationship between leadership transformation and peace from a PACS perspective. The third part examines the role of African Ubuntu ethics in strengthening ethical political leadership and proposes a framework for intervention.

1. Contextualising and conceptualising the leadership crisis in Africa

Africa is rich in natural and human resources, presents ‘a rich mosaic of tremendous diversity of countries and peoples’ (Schraeder 2000:2), and is a continent in transformation, which scholars refer to as the ‘African renaissance’ (Mangu 2006; Schraeder 2000). However, due to bad leadership, Africa remains politically, economically and socially underdeveloped, with a legacy of poverty and hunger, civil wars and violent conflicts (Agulanna 2006; Ali and Mathews 1999; Museveni 2000). The 2012 Ibrahim Index of African Governance revealed the severity of the leadership crisis and governance to the extent that the Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership was not awarded (Ibrahim 2012). Many African leaders lack an ethical commitment to good governance,
respect for human rights and rule of law, and to responsibility and accountability – all of which could guarantee that Africa’s resources are harnessed towards healthy living for all citizens (Lyons and Deng 1998).

Africa’s leadership crisis is manifested by trends of corruption, persistent abuse of power, lack of respect for the Constitution, and failure to create an environment for the continuous evolution of succeeding generations of young African leaders with competence, integrity, vision, commitment, and skills for peacebuilding and social justice (Mutibwa 1992; Ngwane 2003). While the struggle for independence was spearheaded by some ‘first-rate political leaders, the nation-building phase has not only failed to produce leaders of comparable stature, but has also witnessed a decline in the achievements’ – aggravated by unethical leadership and bad governance (Adamoleku 1988:95). Uganda is no exception to this trend. In light of this evident crisis, I would like to delve into the leadership trends that characterise Uganda’s context.

The Tarnished Pearl of Africa: Uganda

Uganda, once the pearl of Africa, is now, in its fifth decade of independence, experiencing ‘a chronic state of backwardness’ (Mutibwa 1992:127) resulting from personalisation of power, corruption and authoritarianism. The country has had eight presidents, the majority of whom came to leadership through military coup d’états (Schraeder 2000:367).

President Museveni (2000:10) asserts, ‘Uganda has been very unfortunate in having particularly bad leadership’. Museveni’s acquisition of power was considered a hybrid\(^3\) of revolutionary leadership on the continent, but it gradually lost traction (Mutibwa 1992; Tripp 2010). Structural imbalances that underlie social conflicts are enormous, as political leaders plunder the state and the economy for themselves while the majority of the population suffer poverty, mass unemployment, repression, and denial of basic rights and dignity. About 85 percent of Ugandans practise subsistence agriculture in rural areas, live in

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\(^3\) ‘Hybrid’ leadership is a type that would be ethical and democratic, and thereby different from the prevailing approaches across the continent. It would be characterised by good governance, regular, free and fair elections, rule of law and respect for human rights, and by enhancing citizen participation, transparency and accountability.
abject poverty with high income inequality aggravated by the political elite’s corruption, the government’s huge spending, and the education system that never prepares the youth to be job creators (Kiiza 2012). For example, Mutibwa (1992) argues that Uganda has been reduced to ruins and has not addressed the distortion inherited from the colonial era.

Three leaders4 manipulated the national Constitution to maintain power, knowing that being ousted forcefully implies not only loss of access to state patronage, but also imprisonment, exile or death (Nsubuga 1999). Museveni, ruling since 1986, tactfully thwarts democratic processes. Multipartyism remains nominal while election fraud subtly takes place. Museveni keeps promising prosperity for all while he and his immediate hanger-on exploit national resources for personal gains. The executive controls the legislature and the judiciary, and the rule of law is replaced by the law of the ruler (Abdul-Raheem, Biney and Olukoshi 2010). While Uganda ranks among the world’s poorest nations, Uganda’s military spending in 2009 was US$328 mn, in 2010 it increased to US$450 mn and in 2011 defence spending was US$471 mn (Ken 2011).

Establishing sustainable peace, security, social justice, functional institutions, and democratic governance is impossible without ethical leadership. Multifaceted national and international approaches to leadership, involving stakeholders from the youngest to the oldest need to be envisioned.

**Envisioning an ethical political leadership**

According to Ackerman (2004:448), ethical leadership ‘is the result of a tough, and often conflict-ridden process of institutional design’. There is neither a mechanical formula nor an independent theory to respond to the crisis of leadership on the African continent. Ethical leadership does not emerge spontaneously, out of natural goodness or nobleness of heart of charismatic bureaucrats. Strengthening ethical political leadership entails a peaceful ‘mental and structural revolution’ (Ngwane 2003:1), to alter the system that enables

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4 Obote ruled Uganda twice (1962-1971, 1980-1985). Idi Amin Dada staged a coup d’état, took over power and ruled from 1971 to 1979. President Museveni acquired power through a coup d’état in 1986 and has ruled since then.
unethical people to assume political leadership (Mutibwa 1992). Urgently needed are short and long-term strategies for inculcating ethical leadership values from childhood. Maathai (2009:111) asserts that ‘unless Africans from all levels of society recognize and embrace the challenge of leadership, Africa will not move forward’. Crucial is the breaking of the chain of self-serving, self-subservient and egoistic political leaders, while focusing on sustainable structural transformation (Hampson and Mendeloff 2007).

Dealing with systemic problems necessitates the examination of the entire system – ‘its dynamic and structure’ (Lederach 1997:26). Important also is the transition from violence to sustainable peace, from divisive ethnic politics to the politics of unity, from coercive power to integrative power, and from dictatorship to democracy, justice, constitutionalism, citizen participation, accountability, and the rule of law (Boulding 1990; Museveni 2000; Mutibwa 1992).

Raising consciousness is crucial for citizens to realise that the way things are is not how they should be, and that the way political leaders are leading their nation requires urgent improvement. Freire (1999) suggests that liberation necessitates raising political consciousness of the oppressed to become aware of the context in which they live and its impact on their lives. The leadership crisis is a latent conflict where some citizens are unaware of power imbalances and injustices that affect their lives. Thus, Curle (1990:9-10) proposes ‘three forces’ to establish and preserve a ‘constructive order’, namely the ‘active force’ that fosters development in terms of ‘purposeful growth and change’; the ‘passive force’ of peacemaking, which builds and restores a state of harmony; and the ‘neutralising force’ of education as a source of knowledge and attitude that enhances development and peace. Africa has religious and cultural ethical elders, who must be instrumental in educating citizens and speaking truth to political leaders (Abdul-Raheem et al. 2010; Curle 1990). Curle (1990:54) observes: ‘If leaders know that we are aware of something of which according to our social or religious principles we should disapprove, yet say nothing, they may suspect both our courage and our integrity’.

Strengthening ethical leadership necessitates the application of transformation tools (Curle 1990), coupled with the ‘moral imagination, the capacity to imagine something rooted in the challenges of the real world yet capable of giving birth
to that which does not yet exist’ (Lederach 2005.ix). Mediation, reconciliation, justice, and peacemaking are benchmarks to transforming the crisis (Curle 1990; Lederach 1997). The trend of not involving women, children and youth in decision-making needs to change, given that the mother is the primary educator of every person (Byrne and Senehi 2009).

In the following section, I explore the gap in current PACS literature, and propose interdisciplinary approaches to transform the leadership crisis with emphasis on Uganda. I believe that current developments in PACS have not addressed ethical political leadership as a major contributor to peace and justice. Yet, its interdisciplinary approach potentially provides mechanisms for strengthening ethical political leadership, and understanding how the leadership deficit in Africa contributes to the continent’s conflicts, wars and underdevelopment. I believe that African ethics, practices, and methods may provide remedies to the crisis.

2. Political leadership and peace scholarship

PACS literature that deals with conflict resolution/transformation does focus on exploring the root causes, but rarely considers the deficit of ethical political leadership as a root cause to conflicts across the globe. For example, Sharp and Paulson (2005:25) admit that long standing conflicts, injustices, oppression and violence are ‘created or maintained by the actions of individuals and groups that control State apparatus, using its vast resources, bureaucracy, police and military forces to implement and enforce their own will’. However, they do not propose remedies towards solving the leadership problem. Lederach (1997) examines the role political leaders play in conflict transformation, but does not consider bad leadership as cataclysmic in exacerbating conflicts. Great leaders, particularly Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., devised non-violent resistance to political oppression, but did not accentuate strategies for strengthening ethical leadership (Burrowes 1996; Galtung 2011; Sharp and Paulson 2005). In establishing the roads to peace, Galtung (1996) proposes democracy, respect for human rights, and bringing the government closer to citizens, but does not underline bad leadership as a contributor to undemocratic systems and does not highlight measures for strengthening good and democratic leadership.
Peacebuilding and pre- and post-conflict processes, including those of the UN in nations such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia, tend to focus on peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and economic rehabilitation, but not on transforming leadership. Without transforming the process of creating leaders, conflicts are only temporarily settled. When new leaders come to power, they do not only replicate the mistakes of their predecessors, but they also heighten the tyrannical rule to sustain them in leadership. For example, in Uganda, when president Museveni came to power, he acknowledged the ‘price of bad leadership’ that had dehumanised Ugandans, and he declared his rule as a ‘fundamental change’ (Museveni 2000:3, 10). Yet his regime is proving to be no different. Like the former Ugandan dictators (Idi Amin and Obote), Museveni came to power through a coup d’état, gerrymandered the constitution to sustain his rule, administers the state as a family business, and takes advantage of people’s abject poverty to disenfranchise voters by buying them off with items such as a kilogram of sugar, and vote rigging (Abdul-Raheem et al. 2010; Mutibwa 1992). Uganda is once again failing in ethical leadership and governance, and gradually sinking into insecurity and structural injustices.

I consider it crucial therefore, in the following section, to explore strategies and processes for strengthening ethical political leadership for sustainable peace and social justice in Uganda and Africa at large. I propose an interdisciplinary approach based on Ubuntu ethics.

3. Political leadership ethics: Ubuntu approach

Ethics comprises principles and concepts that guide humans between right and harmful behaviours (Paul and Elder 2006). In the Cambridge dictionary of Philosophy, ethics is used interchangeably with morality (Audi 1999), and is concerned with what is right, fair, just or good in essence; what we ought to do, and not just what is convenient or congenial to the majority (Preston 2007). According to Northouse (2004:302), ethics pertains to the leader’s being and actions, characterised by ‘respect, service, justice, honesty and community’. Central to ethical leadership is the responsibility to respect people’s dignity, to be sensitive to their needs as opposed to egoistic self-aggrandizement, and to create an environment of nurturance, trust, empathy, forgiveness and reconciliation (Heifetz 1994).
In Africa, *Ubuntu* philosophy is the ethical code that holds hope for a political leadership renaissance. *Ubuntu* is rooted in humanness, respect for human dignity, love, relatedness, communion of beings, and promotion of the collective good. *Ubuntu* offers an indigenised African framework that would add a unique flavour and impetus to leadership. Leadership would be service to society and not ‘a money spinning business venture; or a rare opportunity to feather one’s nest and bequeath material security to one’s offspring’ (Kumuyi 2007:19). Whereas democracy is gaining currency in Africa, it is liable to fail if it is not rooted in humanness. *Ubuntu* springs from *Muntu* (a human being), a word found in all *Bantu* languages in Africa, meaning being human and concerned with others, summed up in the maxim ‘I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am’ (Mbiti 1969:108-109). It is the collective consciousness, solidarity, and humanness of every person (the living, the living dead and the unborn), in relation with supernatural beings and nature (Mbiti 1969). *Ubuntu* means that a person becomes a person through other persons’ (Lötter 1997:46). Living in communion with others is ‘a morality of “conduct” rather than a morality of “being”’ among people who are interconnected (Gyekye 1996:58-62). Karsten and Illa (2001:613) observe that ‘Ubuntu expresses an African view of the world anchored in its own person, culture, and society which is difficult to define in a Western context’. *Ubuntu* implies living virtuously in a spirit of caring and community, responsiveness and dignity, peace and harmony, getting rid of what dehumanises and destroys life. Virtues of kindness, generosity, hospitality, honesty, compassion, forgiveness, and solidarity are components of *Ubuntuism*. *Ubuntu* [...] speaks of the very essence of being human. [We] say [...] ‘Hey, so-and-so has ubuntu.’ Then you are generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly and caring and compassionate. You share what you have. It is to say, ‘My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours.’ We belong in a bundle of life. We say, ‘A person is a person through other persons.’ [...] A person with ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are (Tutu 2000:35).
In political leadership with the state as a human community, the core of *Ubuntu* is humanness, interdependence, caring, sharing, fostering participation, and service for the collective good. It is about the leader’s integrity, honesty, justice, and accountability, as opposed to rampant corruption, human rights abuses, clinging to power, vote rigging, and bad governance (Agulanna 2006; Cartwright 1983; Gray and McPherson 2001). Iconic African leaders mirrored *Ubuntu* in various ways. Nelson Mandela’s humanness and community sense is illustrated by his selfless attitude of reconciliation, forgiveness, endeavours to unite all South Africans, and care for the vulnerable. Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* (familyhood) philosophy fostered care for all the vulnerable in Tanzania, to the extent that he retired without owning a decent house or having amassed wealth. Seretse Khama transformed Botswana’s economy, from once among the world’s poorest nations to a powerful engine, when corruption was uprooted and resource revenues were utilised for infrastructure, health and education. While in other African nations with a depository of minerals, civilians languish in poverty as revenues serve political leaders’ interests, these three leaders served their constitutional terms of office and gave way to other leaders. ‘Will their examples ever be followed by leaders and would be leaders in Africa today and in coming decades?’ (Maathai 2009:112).

Arguing for *Ubuntu* does not mean that there were no abuses of power in pre-colonial African communities. Slave trade by African merchants was commonplace (Davidson 1980; Meillassoux 1991), and discrimination of women, ethnic violence, and power abuse remained prevalent (Achebe 1996; Dangarembga 1989). However, in traditional kingdoms such as Buganda, although the kings ascended to power through lineage and were believed to possess divine powers, they were ousted once they betrayed the expectations of the ruled (Ayittey 1991; Mayanja and Bisaso 2010).

*Ubuntu* ethics also implies respecting constitutional leadership’s term limit instead of self-perpetuating in power. Examples of long-ruling presidents are: Yoweri Museveni of Uganda since 1986, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe since 1980, Teodore Obing Nguema Mbugo of Equatorial Guinea since 1979, Paul Biga of Cameroon since 1982 and José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola since 1979. Maathai (2009:114) observes: ‘The pathology of power only intensifies the
longer a leader remains in office’, and thwarts ethical leadership. When President Museveni came to power, Uganda was envisaged to be a model of democratic rule, people empowerment, participation, and accountability, particularly through the ten points programme (Mutibwa 1992; Tripp 2010). Thus, Melo, Ng’ethe and Manor (2012:23) observe ‘two Musevenis’ – the ‘first Museveni’ who was ethical, established the Local councils (LCs) for citizen participation, and vowed to empower the vulnerable; and the ‘second Museveni’ who manipulates the constitution to extend his presidential term, suppresses political opposition, is corrupt, patronising, and least of all cares about the collective good.

There cannot be ethical leadership without society’s return to *Ubuntu* ethics (Salawu 2012). Traditionally, *Ubuntu* was transmitted to children and adults alike through stories, proverbs, myth, folklore, art, poetry, theatre and songs. It is the *Ubuntuism* that I learnt from my mother’s life: examples and teachings that empower me to see the gap in Africa’s ethical political leadership. Needed is the inculcation of African ethics using both traditional and modern means (television and social media). The family is the basic institution for value education, yet in Uganda, the family is weakening. Poverty, HIV/AIDS, war and the degradation of the moral fabric disempower families from playing their parental educational roles. The crisis of leadership reflects the struggles of the family. Conversely, schools have the potential of passing on *Ubuntuism*, if teachers are conscientised. In summary, I propose that varied actors and institutions need to collaborate to teach ethical leadership values grounded in *Ubuntu* philosophy if peace and social justice are to ensue. Considering that no ideology is absolutely sufficient for social transformation, scientific approaches are important to complement *Ubuntu*.

4. Approaches for strengthening ethical political leadership

A closer look across Africa illustrates ‘personal rule’ where presidents and their hangers-on become corrupt, and empty national coffers and resources for personal aggrandizement (Cartwright 1983:2). The following section examines the interdisciplinary psychological, political, economic and peace approaches envisaged for ethical leadership interventions, with *Ubuntu* as the foundation for their implementation.
Social psychology

Steinberg (2005) asserts that there is a relationship between personality and leadership. Personality is the springboard of the leader’s ethical and cultural characteristics (Masciulli, Molchanov and Knight 2009). Ensuring the building of good personalities from childhood is an intervention towards resolving the leadership crisis. The inner character of the person develops from infancy onward, which highlights the importance of inculcating *Ubuntu* in early socialisation processes. However, when political candidates are campaigning, it is difficult to have accurate data on their early life, let alone people in the society who can interpret the data effectively. Autobiographies tend to focus on adult achievements and not on early life history. Childhood and adolescent inferences that politicians divulge to the media tend to be self-serving, and fail to provide data for psychological analysis.

Psychologists, particularly Freud, pinpoint stagnation in the developmental stages (oral, anal, phallic, latent and genital) as affecting adult life, and suggest that caretakers need to ensure a successful accomplishment of those stages. In the socialisation process, a healthy family environment and schools are vital to character formation and leadership training. According to Jansen (2011), the crisis of ethical political leadership is a crisis of parental and educational leadership. It is a crisis that manifests the neglect of *Ubuntu* in the family and schools. For example, Gandhi prided himself in the contribution of his mother to his character and integrity, which are vital to leadership (Gandhi and Fischer 2002). In his autobiography, Nelson Mandela recounts how his teachers encouraged students to become leaders: “We were told by our teachers: ‘Now you are at Fort Hare (the oldest black university in South Africa), you are going to be a leader of your people’” (Mandela 2010:26).

In Uganda, parents and teachers tend to use corporal punishment and harsh language in correcting children, which implicitly correlates aggression with power. These trends could spring from the violent, oppressive and brutal reality to which Ugandans are exposed (Museveni 2000; Mutibwa 1992). Volkan (2001) underscores the impact of transgenerational trauma whereby a traumatised generation of society passes on the trauma to future generations through stories.
and behaviours. Parents and teachers need to heal and to learn positive parenting skills that empower and teach children life-giving approaches to leadership and power. Children learn to be leaders, peacemakers or aggressors from home. However, while childhood experiences are crucial, an adult politician is responsible for fostering his or her personal change. For example, Nelson Mandela witnessed various forms of violence and abuses, but strove for personal change that enabled him to work with different races and classes of people to end apartheid in South Africa. Thus, Jansen (2011) argues that in difficult times, social change is impossible without personal change and courage, grounded in one's convictions, self-awareness and self-transformation.

Maslow’s hierarchy of needs underscores the satisfaction of human needs before an individual can attain self-actualisation and empower others. Ideally, ethical political leadership requires an individual who has attained self-actualisation, transcendence and freedom, exemplified by leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Julius Nyerere. Mandela’s transcendence is illustrated by his forgiving his oppressors after spending twenty-seven years in prison. As a leader, in accordance with Ubuntu that values every person, he strove to unite and to empower South Africans as he declared:

I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die’ (Mandela 1990:181).

Transcendence and self-actualisation are unachievable without rigorous self-reflection and emotional intelligence to overcome egoism, selfishness and greed. Thus, Curle (1990:23) proposes that it is important to dig out the ‘illusory sense of “I”, the cravings and antipathies and guilt without which ethical leadership is unattainable’. It is for this reason that Ubuntu centres one’s existence in interconnectedness to the community – I am because we are – versus egoistic self-aggrandizement common among African political leaders. One way to achieve transcendence and self-actualisation is through a life-giving spirituality.
Ethics and spirituality

Political leadership in Africa will be served well by leaders with a sound spirituality marked by ethical principles and behaviour. Wong (1998:364) defines spirituality as the element which ‘involves ultimate and personal truths’. Among the prominent world leaders such as Gandhi, Mandela and Martin Luther King Jr., none was without a sound spirituality. Spirituality is what motivates a person to live in a mode that is truly fulfilling and life giving. Ubuntu fulfils the person, and empowers the person to be generous, hospitable, forgiving and loving in a community where humanity is inextricably interconnected (Tutu 2000).

Bhind and Duignan (1997) argue for a restoration of ethics and spirituality in leadership. Leaders who fail to transcend egoism, are self-subservient and ruthless in the ‘promotion and protection of “I”’ (Curle 1990:189). Such leaders lose humanness, the core of Ubuntu, in the struggle for power and material riches, forgetting that earthly life is temporary.

Given the history of war, violence, political and ethnic hatred in Uganda, leadership transformation requires a capacity for forgiveness and non-violence from leaders and citizens, without which the country will never have peace. Forgiveness sustained by love and hope are crucial to addressing the crisis of leadership. Love in this sense is the highest good, and not sentimentalism; it is understanding and being compassionate with goodwill for all people, rooted in respect for human dignity and the mystery and sacredness of every human person (Washington 1991). Mandela was able to rebuild South Africa with a government where ex-revolutionaries sat alongside ex-enemies because of his capacity to forgive his oppressors. In his quotes, Nelson Mandela (2012) underscores that forgiveness is a powerful weapon that liberates the person and removes fears: ‘As I walked through the door towards the gate that would lead to my freedom, I knew if I did not leave my bitterness and hatred behind, I’d still be in prison’. I suspect that this resolution is rooted in Mandela’s high state of Ubuntu philosophy consciousness. Human nature has its strengths and limitations, its potential to do good or harm. Ubuntu consciousness can influence our human nature towards the good. Where there already is harm, a peaceful future lies in forgiveness. Tutu (2000) asserts that there cannot be a promising future without forgiveness.
Forgiveness and reconciliation entail the engagement of the heart, and wisdom necessary for leadership (Curle 1990). The heart is the source of love, considered to be the most transformative power in the world (Washington 1991). The intellect alone, or merely being driven by power and politics, never leads to comprehensive life-giving decisions. Lederach (1997:25) argues that ‘more than hard politics is needed to support sustainable transformation and change in the society’. It is the Ubuntu wisdom that approaches power with care for the collective good, knowing that ‘when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, treated as if they were less than who they are’ the whole human race diminishes (Tutu 2000:35).

Politics and power

According to Kenneth E. Boulding (1990), the broadest meaning of power is the capacity to foster social change and to achieve common goals. Appropriate use of power is key to preventing the spread of unethical political leadership that violates citizens’ dignity and rights, and is contrary to Ubuntu ethics. Democratic rules and policies agreed upon by all citizens or their legitimate representatives are crucial (Hydén 2006). It is unethical when politicians who consider themselves to be above the law lead a nation as though it were a private business (Hydén 2006).

In Uganda, political powers are exercised primarily through the intimidation of citizens. Political leaders control the security organs, and invest hugely in sophisticated weapons, even using them against citizens who dare to challenge a leader’s malpractices. Important is the rebalancing of power without recourse to military or physical power, where the parties ‘recognize one another in new ways ... and increase the level of awareness of their interdependence through mutual recognitions’ (Lederach 1997:65). Leaders need to realise that their legitimacy comes from the people, who they should serve, and not the gun. Urgently needed is the practising of legitimate political power through democratic processes and not coup d’états or fraudulent electoral processes.

Museveni (2000:176) asserts that Uganda must have democracy and democratic practices that empower citizens to ‘choose their government and influence its policies’ and to guard against ‘sectarianism and opportunism’. (But did he walk...
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the talk?) Ottaway (2007) also argues that democracy is a system suitable for healing political divisions, as it facilitates transition from dictatorship and helps nations rebuild after civil wars. Civic education is crucial to empower citizens, security organs, political parties, the legislature, judiciary, and the media to make democracy irreversible (Ottaway 2007). Accordingly, ‘democracy is a precondition for African Renaissance and the terminus *ad quem* of our common struggle’ for a unique leadership model rooted in *Ubuntu* (Mangu 2006:150).

Afro-pessimist Eurocentric scholars and some African leaders argue that democracy is a Western invention and not applicable to Africa. Democracy, however, is at the core of *Ubuntu* that values every person’s contribution. What is foreign to Africa is the majority versus the minority concept of western democracy (Mandela 1994). African traditional systems of government such as the Buganda Kingdom, practised democracy long before the colonial period (Mangu 2006; Mayanja and Bisaso 2010). Mandela (1994) recounts how his leadership was influenced during childhood while observing the regent and his court where everyone who wanted to speak, spoke, and where democracy meant that all men were listened to, that the leader spoke last and that a decision was taken together as an interconnected people.

Citizen engagement in the political processes is necessary to tame African leaders’ authoritarian tendencies. Ho-Won Jeong (2005:83) argues that to avoid militarised conflicts, citizens need to have access to decision-making institutions since ‘concentration of power in state institutions’ controlled by ‘one group aggravates social and political cleavages’. Ackerman (2004:447) argues that ‘co-governance’ is the best way to tap into society’s energy. As stated by the United Nations; ‘Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his [or her] country, directly or through freely chosen representatives … The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government’ (United Nations 1948:#21). This will of the people cannot prevail where dictators control the security organs. A transition from militarisation to civilian rule will promote ethical leadership, while police and military training in *Ubuntu* will empower them to respect human rights and dignity, and to foster non-lethal security methods.
Institutions and procedures of democracy need to be remedied, especially with regard to competitive, multiparty electoral processes and citizen freedom to exercise their political rights and responsibilities (Gaventa 2006). Ackerman (2004:448) argues that the ‘celebration of free and fair elections is one of the most powerful pro-accountability mechanisms in existence’, that ensures that suitable candidates lead the nation. Citizens will express their will and consent on who leads them when the electoral process is not marred by fraud, voter intimidation or persecution of candidates as it is the trend in Uganda. Adherence to Ubuntu would safeguard against these abuses of power. Equal justice is critical when settling disputes between the ruling and other political parties. This might ensure that political election malpractices and collusion with the electoral commission are tackled justly. It is also crucial to establish a ministry of peace and social justice to deal with issues of peacebuilding, national reconciliation and social justice.

The practice of assuming power through coup d’états and manipulating the constitution to extend presidential term limit during the rule of Milton Obote, Idi Amin and Museveni is unethical. The constitutional provision on the presidential term limit must never be altered without people’s consent through a referendum. Respect for the rule of law and the separation of power between the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive is fundamental to ethical leadership. The United Nations asserts that ‘respect for and promotion of the rule of law and justice should guide all activities and accord predictability and legitimacy to their actions’ (United Nations 2012:§2). Leadership interventions need to ensure that law courts do not favour only the ruling elites or having justice ‘sold like a commodity to highest bidders’ (Museveni 2000:21). A strong parliament, motivated by the Ubuntuism of ‘I am because we are’ and not manipulated and bribed by the executive, is fundamental to strengthening ethical leadership.

Leadership succession by young people motivated to serve beyond personal interests is long overdue. The future of any nation with a vision is invested in the young. Ubuntu philosophy encourages the initiation of the young into leadership as was the case for Nelson Mandela. Uganda needs a generation of critical youth to rise and refuse to be cowed into abusive and corrupt politics where they ‘serve as door mats for the system’s authoritarian boots’
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(Ngwane 2003:1). The academia and critical think-tanks that carry out research and analysis of key government agencies, which could even be published in the media, are instrumental in cultivating critical minds. Burrowes (1996:80-81) argues that intellectuals have the responsibility to speak the truth to the powerful and expose their lies, yet since the state is ‘the source of their power, prestige and economic reward’, they resort to trends of ‘obedience, self-deception and an uncritical attitude’.

**Socio-economics**

The leadership crisis will be transformed if the economy empowers the vulnerable. Paczynska (2008:238) argues that economic growth and expansion of the middle class is fundamental for the ‘emergence of a vibrant civil society which in turn places ever greater pressure on the state to establish more participatory forms of governance’. For example, in developed nations where the majority of the population are economically stable, civil war is unlikely. Meeting citizens’ human needs is a long term solution to the leadership crisis. Poverty reduction, employment provision, and economic security ameliorate not only the leadership crisis, but also insecurity (Jeong 2000; Paczynska 2008).

Structural transformation that challenges inequalities at national and international levels is crucial. According to the dependency theory, modernisation and globalisation foster Africa’s structural dependence on Western economic and technological powers (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009). The core oppresses the periphery at the national and international levels. In *An agenda for peace*, Boutros-Ghali (1992:33) advocated that the UN and the international community need to provide ‘support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities’ to establish and strengthen democracy. At the national level, economic rehabilitation and human-centred integral development are prerequisites to the transformative process (Jeong 2000; Jeong 2005; Museveni 2000). To meet citizen needs and tackle structural injustices, the society needs to address communal disintegration aggravated by lack of values, and of relationships and meaning found in community and civic life (Dukes 1999). Neglect of *Ubuntu* ethics of caring and sharing is a major source of the leadership crisis in which corruption is entrenched. Community-based
incentives to strengthen self-reliance are important, given that aid through the
government gets embezzled by the corrupt government officials (Jeong 2005;
Museveni 2000).

Corruption must be eradicated if leadership is to improve. The 2012 East
African Bribery index ranked Uganda as the highest in the region, at 40.7%
(Transparency International 2012). Strong measures to prevent corruption and
white-collar crime in public institutions are key to leadership reform. Uganda's
ministry of Ethics and Integrity, and the Inspector General of Government
(IGG) are ideal organs to tackle corruption, but their purpose is futile since they
are controlled by very corrupt officials. For ethical leadership to thrive, elected
officials must be held accountable by the citizens (Hershey 2012). Corrupt
leaders must be investigated; imprisoned and required to return stolen funds
with interest. Local and international bank accounts of African political leaders
must be frozen when convicted of corruption.

Peace

While the entire peace theory is fundamental to leadership, this section
underscores three elements: 1) the necessity of electing individuals who are on
the side of peace, 2) the cultivation of a peace culture through education, and 3)
national reconciliation.

Transforming leadership cannot occur without peace, necessitating the election
of peacemakers and mediators into leadership. Humanness, ‘more than hard
politics’, is needed to establish ethical leadership (Lederach 1997:24). It is a big
mistake to elect criminals and tyrants into national leadership. It is inconceivable
that warriors who have killed, recruited children into their rebel groups, raped
and committed atrocities against humanity become leaders. Uganda's history,
characterised by colonial oppression, ‘political and constitutional instability’
and the ‘struggles against the forces of tyranny, oppression and exploitation’
reconciliation and healing. Because of such a history, Ugandans are more
traumatised than we think, and sadly when they become leaders, they often
reflect what they experienced and maybe even govern with feelings of hatred.
As Freire (1999) puts it, the oppressed internalise the image of the oppressor,
adopt his guidelines and become oppressors. I have witnessed political leaders and citizens who are angry and always wonder why. When there is a protest, Ugandans do not only burn car tires, but burn people with petro-filled tires. They threaten those of different ethnic groups and kill. In political rallies, politicians slander and demean each other. Colonialism and the intermittent wars stripped Ugandans of their humanity and moral consciousness. Needed is a peacemaker, one capable of dialoguing to embody peace, reconciliation and forgiveness as Nelson Mandela did, and of working towards healing the country. The leader’s non-violence and peace will gradually lead to a humane society – as happened among the Iroquoian people of North America (Rice 2009). More than twenty civil wars have been fought in Uganda, and violence is part of the status quo. Such a predicament can hardly guarantee sustainable security and peaceful coexistence. Mutua (2007) argues that Uganda cannot recover, unite and rebuild without reconciliation and confronting the ills that have tormented people for five decades. Lederach (1997:24) poses that reconciliation needs to engage ‘the restoration and rebuilding of relationships’, as a journey to the sacred place of our humanness (Lederach 1999). ‘Without forgiveness’ and reconciliation, ‘there really is no future’ (Tutu 2000:255). Mutua (2007:21) proposes three steps to reconciliation and recovery: 1) Objective and courageous confrontation of the atrocities. Such a process must be ‘national, inclusive, transformational, and cathartic’. 2) Although the government needs to facilitate the process, it must neither control nor own it. An independent, objective and authentic body of wise people must be entrusted with the responsibility. 3) The process must include ‘especially those who have been aggrieved’ regardless of the ‘nature, seriousness, or severity of their grievances’. All Ugandans, are affected either as perpetrators, bystanders or victims. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa can serve as an example to bring the perpetrators to confession and justice, and the victims to compensation and reconciliation between and among individuals and groups. Without reconciliation and healing, transgenerational trauma continues to wound our posterity (Volkan 2001), aggravating the leadership crisis. Narratives
of peace counteract the narratives of war, violence and revenge (Matyók et al. 2011) propagated by the media and violent political speeches, which, according to Galtung (2011), are socio-political obstacles to a culture of peace.

A culture of peace (Boulding 2000; Galtung 2011), established through peace and civic education for all citizens, is fundamental to preventing the leadership crisis. A combination of the indigenous and the world religions’ approaches to good leadership and peacebuilding are great resources (Funk and Woolner 2011; Galtung 2011; Hamdesa 2011). The young and adults alike, should learn practices of peace, ethical leadership, social justice, forgiveness, reconciliation, nonviolence and environmental care. Important is to empower women who are the first educators of all children to pass on Ubuntuism, leadership skills, and a culture of peace.

To strengthen ethical political leadership, the approaches of socio-psychology, ethics and spirituality, politics and power, socio-economics and peace are inextricably linked. With Ubuntu at their centre, and implemented systematically with the involvement of national and international actors, they form a framework that would transform the leadership crisis.

5. Strengthening ethical political leadership: An integrated framework

This section suggests a multidisciplinary framework that draws from various disciplines, actors and processes to strengthen ethical political leadership in line with all that has been explained above. The ethical leadership crisis in Uganda and Africa does not explicitly make headlines in global newspapers. While the international community mobilises for humanitarian and peacekeeping measures when wars and violence leave citizens in inhumane conditions, no equal efforts are made to mitigate the leadership crisis. A multidisciplinary framework is proposed to ensure the involvement of varied actors at the national and international levels in averting the leadership crisis.

Shape of the framework

The constituent parts of the interdisciplinary approach revolve around Ubuntu ethics. Social psychology, economics, political science and power, ethics
and spirituality, and peace are presented in a cyclic manner around *Ubuntu* to suggest the principle of systemic thinking and the community sense of ‘I am because we are and because we are therefore I am’ (Mbiti 1969:108-109). Everyone’s contribution counts. The logic is that ‘the whole is greater than the sum of its parts’ (Diamond and McDonald 1996:4). The actors in each track are different, yet they need to network and to complement each other to establish interventions to the crisis.

In every track, research, education and praxis are crucial. Research involves the academia, think-tanks as well as informal research to generate knowledge. Education entails the passing on of the research findings, and leadership values through civic and peace education to all citizens. Mandela (2012) asserts: ‘Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world’. Praxis includes acting and empowering citizens to non-violently strive towards leadership transformation. To ensure the sustenance of whatever is functional, it must begin with the family and be accompanied by monitoring and evaluation.

**Promoting ethical political leadership: An integrated framework**
## A working matrix for the structural framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tracks</th>
<th>National actors</th>
<th>International Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Psychology</td>
<td>Parents, especially the mothers, the ministry of education, teachers, the community, institutions that contribute to a child’s development, and women’s movements.</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), States and diplomats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics and Spirituality</td>
<td>Religious, cultural, community leaders, the media and ministry of ethics.</td>
<td>International Group of Elders including former Archbishop Tutu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>A critical mass of citizens, the government, political parties, the electoral commission, the military and the police, the legislature and judiciary, the ministry of peace and social justice, academicians and critical think-tanks</td>
<td>African Union, United Nations, powerful nations, International governments and NGOs, and World or African social forums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>Local businesses, the government and social movements</td>
<td>Private investors, multinational corporations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and other donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>The family, ministry of education, the ministry of peace and social justice, parents, teachers, academicians, think-tanks, the media, the military and police, telephone companies, all citizens</td>
<td>International Criminal Court, individuals and organisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Track 1: Political leadership transformation through psychology

As mentioned before, no strategic theory for social change is complete or satisfactory without recourse to human behaviour (Burrowes 1996). The national actors under this track are: 1) The ministry of education who should design compulsory national curriculums that foster holistic development focusing on leadership and value education. 2) The parents and educators who need to be empowered and trained to guide children in the socialisation process. 3) The community who must reinforce *Ubuntuism* for mutual support. 4) Political leaders who will need to foster their psychological development, rise above egoism and greed, and work towards transcendence, life-giving relationships and self-actualisation (Curle 1990). Maathai (2009:113) suggests that ‘the realization of good leadership could start with an African president or prime minister stepping forward and declaring: We have a problem in our country. We are cheating and undermining ourselves, and we need to change’, adding that he or she will imbibe the ethical values of honesty, fight corruption for the collective good and put human beings above the accumulation of wealth.

Track 2: Political leadership transformation through ethics and spirituality theory

Ethics and spirituality, rooted in *Ubuntu* that values the community, humanness and wellbeing of every person, are major interventions in the leadership crisis and nation building (Bhindi and Duignan 1997). Spirituality rooted in respect and love for the other, alongside trust, authenticity, humility and peace among others will liberate the country.

The major actors at this level are, firstly, the leaders in 1) the cultural, 2) religious and 3) community spheres. These leaders bear social and religious responsibilities, and they need to guide society according to social and religious principles. Ugandans adhere to either African traditions or modern religions or both, which could be used as an avenue to rebuild the nation. Rootedness in a genuine spirituality leads to integrity, care and generosity, which are fundamentals in *Ubuntu*. Leaders have the responsibility to denounce malpractices of corrupt political leaders. For example, Bishop Desmond Tutu contributes greatly to the liberation and rebuilding of South Africa and he could be a model for others.
4) The Media should combine traditional and modern modes of communication to pass on values. 5) The ministry of ethics should advise the government to be ethical in its practices, especially with regard to transparency and corruption. At the international level, Global Elders, a group of 12 wise men and women, would offer expertise and guidance to political and religious leaders (Telegraph 2007).

**Track 3: Political leadership transformation through power and politics**

Democracy and diplomacy are peaceful processes for nation building where there is legitimate power derived from free and fair elections (Diamond and McDonald 1996). It is important to have functional checks and balances on political leaders. Coercive ‘power over’ citizens, backed up by violence, needs to be transformed through collective action to become ‘power to’, which empowers and results in ‘greater justice’ (Gill 2012:34). To be strengthened, is ‘power over oneself’, manifested by self-respect, honesty, integrity, humility and respect for others, which leads to ‘power with’ the citizens through citizen participation and horizontal accountability (Burrowes 1996:84). In this process, the implementation of governmental laws and policies is fundamental to political leadership.

The national actors in this track are: 1) A critical mass of citizens, empowered through political and civic education. According to Maathai (2009:115), for ethical and democratic leadership to prevail, an informed ‘critical mass’ is crucial to protest, monitor government action, call leaders who violate their rights and collective good to ethical practices. 2) The government needs to practise democracy, constitutionalism, positive peace, citizen engagement, respect for opposition political parties and respect for human dignity and rights including press freedom and freedom of expression. Political leaders think ‘ethically, politically and imaginatively in relation to different forms of power and a range of social and ecological constraints’ facing Uganda (Gill 2012:34). 3) Political parties need to give voice to and represent the political perspectives of citizens. 4) The Electoral Commission should act justly and not only in favour of the ruling Government. 5) The military and the police have to serve national interests beyond the rulers’ interests, following human rights frameworks.
6) The legislature and judiciary should work independently from the executive to foster the common good and the rule of law. 7) The ministry of peace should develop a coherent paradigm of sustainable peace across the nation and within government. The ministry would design an agenda for peace, establish and support activities that promote a culture of peace, be assertive about non-violence, spearhead civic education, coordinate plans for national reconciliation, and design strategies to prevent violent conflicts. 8) Academicians and critical think-tanks must generate knowledge through research and praxis to convince political leaders and citizens that change is needed. Progressive political entities need to be grounded in ‘a realistic consideration of how existing structures and forms of power either constrain or facilitate the full realization of human capabilities and potentials, as the necessary framework for visualizing new social and political relations’ (Gill 2012:34).

At the international level the major actors include: 1) The African Union, to strengthen its peer review mechanism, renounce leaders who assume power undemocratically including those who commit electoral fraud, and reinforce ethical leadership, insisting on the resignation of political leaders who fail to abide by the ethical code. 2) The United Nations, to assist Africa not only with peace keeping but to tackle the root causes of bad leadership, without which nations relapse into violence. 3) Powerful nations could also help in uprooting dictators, and refuse to sell arms to them or to rebel groups. 4) International governments and non-governmental organisations could be instruments of peace and sources of education for ethical leadership. 5) World or African Social Forums are to spearhead ‘prefigurative and strategic’ politics (Gill 2012:183) to generate social change by educating politicians and citizens to act in line with the principles envisioned for the prosperity of tomorrow’s world.

**Track 4: Political leadership transformation through economic theory**

At the national level, corruption should be curbed by dismissing and imprisoning corrupt officials and compelling them to return the embezzled funds with interest. Structural transformation that fosters human security and social justice
Strengthening ethical political leadership: Uganda as a case study

is needed to change the entire system of processes, policies, institutions and structures that provide for human needs and to build an economically stable citizenry (Botes 2003; Burrowes 1996; Burton 1990).

Actors at the national level are: 1) The government, who could bridge inequality gaps and ensure changes in the decision-making processes which concentrate power and resources in the minority of elites and constrain the majority. 2) Social movements, non-government organisations, critical think-tanks, university students, civil society, media houses and other actors who should challenge the financial and cultural supremacy of the government. 3) Business people who could support education programmes for leadership transformation and peacebuilding, establish ‘peace through commerce’ movements and make peacebuilding a constituent part of business life, with special emphasis on women and youth (Hauss 2010:217).

At the international level the actors would include: 1) the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation – all of which could challenge bad governance and assist in punishing corrupt political leaders. 2) International non-government organisations, particularly the Mo Ibrahim Foundation that rewards African leaders for good governance, could invest in leadership training and establish an academy for training future political leaders. 3) Foreign investors, multinational corporations, and developed nations should detest the practices of corrupt political officials to achieve their business goals.

Track 5: Political leadership transformation through peacebuilding

It is important to elect peace lovers into leadership, peace education and national reconciliation positions. The national actors are: 1) The ministry of peace, established to develop a comprehensive paradigm for sustainable peace across the country, by supporting activities for promoting a culture of peace thorough ethical leadership. It would also design processes and systemic responses for reconciliation and reconstruction where political animosity has caused conflicts and citizens need to be trained in ethical leadership and peace. 2) The ministry of education can design curriculums for peace education and ensure that it becomes a compulsory subject and that teachers are trained to present it.
3) Academicians and religious leaders could establish mechanisms for national reconciliation and forgiveness in collaboration with the ministry of peace and social justice 4) The media could foster reconciliation by eliciting apologies from perpetrators of conflict-causing conduct. 5) The afore-mentioned actors could work with the military and police to transition from hostilities and violence toward community reconciliation and respect for human rights. 6) Telephone companies could use the social media for peacebuilding purposes.

Actors at the international level are: 1) The International Criminal Court, who could empower the structures of the African Union and nations in ethical leadership. Money spent on convicting African tyrants could be used to better the infrastructures of health and education. 2) Generous individuals and organisations could assist in the establishment of leadership academies for good education.

**Conclusion**

Lack of ethical political leadership is holding Africa back. Strengthening ethical political leadership is key to rebuilding Africa as a powerful engine, given her natural resources and human capital. *Ubuntu* philosophy holds hope for transforming Africa’s ethical political leadership crisis and preventing a similar crisis in the future. *Ubuntu*'s focus on humanness, human dignity, the collective good, and interconnectedness of all beings is fundamental to building Africa as it grapples with the leadership crisis, conflicts and underdevelopment. The strength of psychology, economics, ethics, spirituality, politics, peace and social sciences would complement *Ubuntu* to achieve the desired goal. The enormity of the problem requires the involvement of stakeholders at the national and international levels. The involvement of women and children is critical to ensure the inculcation of *Umbuntuism* and leadership in future generations. The best is still to come for Africa. Research, education and praxis are crucial to consistently envision, monitor and evaluate interventions in the crisis.

A framework should be established and leadership transformation should be implemented. National and international actors need to network in dealing with those who are in leadership positions and at the same time prepare the
youth to become good leaders. While all interventions are important, building a culture of peace is the foundation of ethical political leadership. Such a culture will open the way to electing peaceful people into leadership positions. I believe that the journey of liberating Africa lies in ethical leadership. Thus, I consider it crucial to establish leadership academies for training present and future leaders. Special attention needs to be given to parents and educators who socialise children at a tender age. Given Uganda’s predicament where the majority of the population are youth, hope lies in offering good education to the young who will take the leadership mantle. I am optimistic about the prospects of an Africa with strengthened ethical leadership. If the youth are trained in *Ubuntu* philosophy to value and prioritise every person in our nations, they will become responsible, democratic, and even revolutionary leaders who will spearhead ethical leadership and governance for sustainable peace and social justice.

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Evelyn Mayanja


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Evelyn Mayanja


Strengthening ethical political leadership: Uganda as a case study

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Evelyn Mayanja


Book review

Civil Wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1960-2010

Emizet Francois Kisangani* 2012

ISBN 978-158826-826-8

Reviewed by Martha Mutisi
International Consultant: Peace, Security and Governance

The book, Civil Wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1960-2010 by Emizet Francois Kisangani, is an analysis of the various civil wars in the Congo. As a point of departure, Kisangani gives the term ‘civil wars’ a new meaning because in this book, this term encompasses secession conflicts, ethnic wars, revolts, rebellions, invasions, and mutinies. After lumping these various forms of violence together as civil wars, Emizet Francois Kisangani tries to answer why the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has endured a history of protracted and changing forms of violence for the past fifty years. With such a question as a conundrum for our time, this book will be relevant to many types of readers including

* Dr Emizet Francois Kisangani is a Professor of Political Science at Kansas State University. He holds an M.A. in Economics from the University of Oregon and he received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Iowa (1994).
students of peace and security studies, conflict resolution practitioners, political scientists, international development and international relations experts as well as historians who have an interest in the genealogy of violence.

Using an elaborate analytical framework labelled as ‘process tracing’, Kisangani offers a systematic analysis of several episodes of violence in Congolese history. While the author relies mostly on secondary data to base his conclusions, his analysis demonstrates the intricate connection between micro and macro processes, portraying the multitudes of DRC conflicts as a microcosm of the national, regional and international correlates of war. One of the commendable aspects of Kisangani’s analysis is his recognition that the DRC conflicts are expressions of populations who have suffered decades of marginalisation, and patronage politics at the hands of colonisers, political elites and the international community alike.

By advancing the theory of political exclusion as the reason for the instability in the DRC, this book makes a departure from the usual primordial explanations of identity conflict in Africa. With a total of 221 pages, Kisangani’s book is a well written and persuasive piece of literature, providing articulate reasons for the persistence of the DRC’s conflicts over the past five decades. For a novice to Congolese history, this book provides an illustrative and elucidative piece of analysis which furthers the understanding of one of Africa’s intractable conflicts which has proved to be more than a handful for the regional and international community. Kisangani takes an ahistorical approach by analysing various episodes of civil wars in the DRC beginning with the Mobutu era, and then concludes with an analysis of the current 21st Century internal instability, especially in the Eastern DRC.

Kisangani analyses the conflicts in the DRC by categorising the various epochs into periods of formation, consolidation and finally collapse. The formation stage is described as the time the colonial state was consolidated by King Leopold II of Belgium. Kisangani notes that during the formation stage, the Belgian King engaged in socio-economic and political processes that were designed to exploit the country’s natural resources while unequivocally controlling the population. These processes included setting up administrative apparatus for the International Association of Congo (IAC) which was based in Brussels,
establishing an army, the Public Force, and finally passing laws. The second stage is the phase from consolidation to collapse which was essentially the Mobutu era, which lasted for thirty-two years (1965-1997). Kisangani describes the contradictions that characterised the Mobutu era; the positive side being his ability to install a strong state and a sense of nationhood among Congolese people and the negative side being Mobutu’s ruthlessness, paternalism and insatiable power. In sum, Kisangani is not convinced by the positive dimension of Mobutu, labelling his more affable side as ‘legitimation devices’, or strategies that were designed to maintain his hold on power.

Kisangani’s book manages to problematise the Congolese crisis by following the historical trajectories of various civil wars – allowing the reader to unpack the historical evolution of this conflict, which began with the Belgian King Leopold’s ‘coercive state apparatus’ which was epitomised by ‘political repression …’ (p. 13). Kisangani also highlights the roots of state paternalism in the DRC, which became evident during the Belgian colonial era and was apparent in the way in which ‘Belgians isolated their colony from the world, and isolated Congolese people from one another’ (p. 14).

Kisangani challenges some of the quantitative analyses of the African conflicts which do not fully interrogate data nor attempt to contextualise the findings. He exposes contradictions in some of the extant literature which had used statistical data to demonstrate how during the colonial era, the DRC was one of the most industrialised African countries (apart from South Africa). Kisangani dilutes the argument by such scholars such as Lacroix (1967) and Prunier (2009) who seem to be subtly aggrandizing the colonisers and praising them for bringing development to the DRC. For example, Kisangani disproves the statistics presented by Merlier who says that by 1958, the DRC had 35% of its adults employed, a percentage which was unmatched anywhere else in Africa. Kisangani demystifies such an analysis and exposes the ‘selective observation’ that typifies such assessments. Instead, he argues that it does not tell the entire story, pointing out how most of these co-called employed adults were ‘unqualified workers, farm labourers and petty clerks’ (p.14). Kisangani highlights how the Belgian colonial system was paternalistic, keeping natives uneducated or minimally educated. Indeed, by the time the DRC gained independence from the Belgians, it had no political elite because of the absence of an educated middle
class. Perhaps the root of insecurity and instability in this troubled country can be traced back to this system of rudimentary education for natives, which has ensured that political elites in the contemporary DRC continue to manipulate and exclude the citizens.

Kisangani dismisses the apologist explanation of ethnic conflict, explaining how identity politics were nurtured in the DRC over the past century. During the colonial era, political association was prohibited, hence native Congolese congregated around cultural groups which were known as ‘evolues’. These cultural groups naturally had ethnic undertones such as the Confederation of Tribal Associations of Katanga and the Baluba of Katanga (pp. 15-16). With these examples, Kisangani shows how ethnicisation of association had its roots in a denial of the freedom of association, which left Congolese with their ethnic identity as one of the few things that they could freely flaunt.

By categorising civil wars into groups such as ‘civil war of legitimacy’, ‘civil war of replacements’ and ‘civil war of convenience’ (p. 4), Kisangani furthers the notion of variability in the causes and expression of violent conflict. However, in general, Kisangani argues that despite the differences among these civil wars, the common thread is the politics of exclusion. The author posits that while historical factors might differ, the political elites tend to use exclusion as the rationale for mobilising the population to revolt or rebel.

As such, despite its claims to dissociate from extant literature, this book is somewhat reminiscent of the writings of Paul Collier who explores the theme of ‘greed and grievances’. Kisangani posits that legitimacy alone is not enough to mobilise masses. He advances the notion that politically excluded elites attempt to recapture the state by mobilising the population while flaunting the tenets of democracy, human rights and accountability. In reality, the reason for the civil wars would be the political elites’ quest for economic gain and consolidation of power. They continue to view government institutions as means to access power and resources. As such, Kisangani is not convinced of the genuine desire for inclusion as the driving force for the several conflicts in the DRC.

This dismissal of the DRC political leadership of all epochs by Kisangani and the imagery of continued manipulation of DRC governments by political
elites presented in this book could have resulted from the fact that there was a power vacuum, and the inability to deliver human security and development to the Congolese population. However, there are challenges with the ‘greed and grievance’ perspective as it tends to negate the sincere feelings of frustration and relative deprivation that compel many of the disenfranchised and excluded actors into violent conflict. Nonetheless, for a 221 page long analysis, this book does a good job of highlighting the causes of the problems in the DRC, and, by separately examining the various civil wars, offers insights into this African problematic. The author analyses several layers of the civil wars in DRC from the revolts against Mobutu to the anti-Kabila and the present-day wars which include many rebel groups.

In this analysis, Kisangani is cognizant of the role of global forces and dynamics in the DRC crisis and ensures that the reader appreciates how super-power involvement in this Central African nation dates back decades. The author takes a swipe at the United Nations, particularly highlighting how in 1960, Dag Hammarskjöld, then the United Nations Secretary-General, refused the request from the DRC Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, to end the Katanga secession. The author also briefly discusses the role of Cold War politics and the resource dimension of the DRC crisis, which resulted in the dismissal of Patrice Lumumba and a coup by Colonel Mobutu in September 1960.

While the book offers a comprehensive analysis of the DRC conflicts, it is clearly androcentric as Kisangani does not attempt to examine the gender dimension of the violence in the DRC. Yet the history of the DRC violence cannot be considered fully captured if it missed the voices of women who bore the brunt of the violence, and the women who also played a role towards shaping attempts at peacebuilding and peacemaking. Even though the book is primarily an analysis of the explanations of the violent conflict, this account still would have been more complete by adding one of the critical voices in peace and security – gender.

Even though he also uses qualitative lenses, Kisangani’s interest in quantitative assessments of civil wars is reflected by his definition of civil war, which he defines by ‘death toll and duration’ (p. 4). This is perhaps done for pragmatic
reasons so that the author can focus on a certain cluster of forms of violence that affected the DRC. However, the challenge is that such discourse tends to result in the simplification of the reality and experience of violence.

Perhaps, one of the major challenges of this book is that it spends a lot of time focusing on the causes and explanations of the DRC conflicts to the detriment of presenting succinct strategies on how the protracted conflict can be resolved. While sustainable and effective prognosis of conflict is aided by an informed and comprehensive diagnosis of conflict, the author does not strike a good balance between conflict analysis and conflict resolution. The book borders on a historical rendition of civil wars, and for the contemporary reader who is interested in the DRC from a policymaking and practice perspective, it certain is quite difficult to keep up with the number of conflicts that are presented. However, in defence of the author, Kisangani’s dwelling on the nature and causes of the civil wars in DRC provides a holistic perspective on the genealogy of violence in this region. In addition, towards the end of the book, Kisangani provides policy recommendations for conflict resolution. The author emphasises the centrality of the politics of exclusion in the multitude of DRC wars, and therefore highlights how any effective conflict intervention should focus on engendering inclusion and political participation.

Another recommendation emerging from Kisangani is the need to address impunity in the DRC. Specifically, Kisangani calls for the Western international community to ensure that political elites who committed over fifty years of atrocities and human rights violations in the DRC are brought to justice. For the DRC and other countries affected by violent episodes of conflict and human rights violation, this is an important issue that has taken centre stage in conflict resolution processes, particularly in the design of peace agreements and in post-conflict reconstruction strategies, including transitional justice. While impunity is a key theme in the Congolese tapestry of war, it is somewhat disappointing to note that Kisangani spends quite a great deal of his time implicating the international community in the DRC's crisis, and yet concludes by calling on their assistance. Kisangani argues that it is up to the international community to stop the rent-seeking behaviour that is currently characteristic
Kisangani calls on the international community to ‘stop wasting money on government projects that sustain rent-seeking projects,’ (p. 218) and urges them instead to support research and development.

Kisangani concludes his analysis by almost extrapolating almost the exact words from the World Bank’s World Development Report: Conflict, Peace and Security (2011) when he posits: ‘Good governance and economic growth can create a virtuous circle that sustains the positive development and positive peacefulness of the polity’ (p. 221). While discontent with five decades of state patronage might cause one to dismiss the role of government in the Congolese socio-economic and political fabric, utter dismissal of the role of the state seems naïve and blind to the reality that neo-liberal peace theory has not done much towards assuaging the Congolese challenge. Although the DRC conflicts have an external dimension, the tendency for the author to internationalise the DRC solution defeats the notion of ownership of African challenges.

Overall, this book provides a useful resource for scholars and practitioners for understanding the truncated and interconnected nature of conflict in the DRC, spanning more than five decades. The book is not only useful for understanding the DRC conflicts but insights thereof can be drawn and applied to the examination of the African peace and security environment. Such an analysis is useful because it foregrounds informed and context-specific transformation of the conflict.