



ISSUE BRIEF

BY AMY HAWTHORNE

Getting Democracy Promotion Right in Egypt

JANUARY 2014

Three years into Egypt's post-Mubarak transition, the near-term prospects for democratization are bleak. The military-security alliance that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi, Egypt's first freely elected president, in July 2013 is consolidating power. Government repression against the Islamist opposition, and more recently against secular dissenters, is harsher and society is more polarized than in any point in recent memory.

Since the January 2011 uprising, the United States has struggled to balance longstanding security interests in Egypt with a stated desire to support Egyptians' aspirations for democracy. The country's political turmoil and pushback from Egyptians have created an especially difficult environment for US democracy promotion efforts. The US administration has made its share of significant missteps, too. These include an overabundance of soaring rhetoric about US support for Egyptian democracy, followed by a failure to act decisively at times when democracy was under severe threat; unrealistic expectations about how long a democratic transition would take; and too much focus on securing ties with Egypt's rulers (Islamist or military) at the expense of relations with its people.

Now that Egypt has entered a new phase of democratic reversal, the United States should reposition and clarify its stance. Since the July 2013 coup, however, the US government's approach has become even more confusing. The US administration did not declare Morsi's ouster a coup, and did not suspend aid to the Egyptian government as many believe US law requires. In his United Nations (UN) General Assembly address in September 2013, President Barack Obama seemed to characterize democracy as secondary to core US security interests in Egypt but also described democracy as his administration's "overriding interest" there, and stated that US "support will depend upon

Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East

The Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council studies political transitions and economic conditions in Arab countries and recommends US and European policies to encourage constructive change.

Egypt's progress in pursuing a more democratic path."¹ In October, to signal its displeasure with the violent crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood (but not with the coup itself), the US administration announced it would hold back portions of military and economic assistance, including major weapons systems prized by Cairo.² This was an unprecedented move toward a close Arab ally. However, statements by Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel praising the military-backed government's progress on its "road map for democracy," coupled with White House silence amid mounting repression, undercut the message that the suspension of assistance meant to send.³

- 1 Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly," September 24, 2013, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/24/remarks-president-obama-address- united-nations-general-assembly>.
- 2 Elise Labott, "US Suspends Significant Military Aid to Egypt," CNN.com, October 9, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/09/world/meast/ us-egypt-aid>. US military aid is currently \$1.3 billion annually and economic aid is \$250 million annually.
- 3 On the road map, see "Egypt Military Unveils Transitional Roadmap," *Ahram Online*, July 3, 2013, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/75631.aspx>. On Kerry's remarks, see Michael Gordon and Kareem Fahim, "Kerry Says Egypt's Military Was 'Restoring Democracy' in Ousting Morsi," *New York Times*, August 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/world/ middleeast/egypt-warns-morsi-supporters-to-end-protests.html?_r=0; Michael Gordon, "Egyptians Following Right Path, Kerry Says," *New York Times*, November 3, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/04/world/ middleeast/kerry-egypt-visit.html>; and Chuck Hagel, "Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium," October 23, 2013, <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/ transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5324>. On divergent White House and State Department public messaging on Egypt, see Josh Rogin, "Kerry Defies the White House on Egypt Policy," *The Daily Beast*, November 18, 2013, <http:// www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/11/18/exclusive-john-kerry- defies-the-white-house-on-egypt-policy.html>.

There is no quick solution to Egypt's crisis of democracy. The United States does not have abundant influence or room for maneuver, and needs to deal with the Egyptian government on a range of issues. But a democratic outcome in Egypt is profoundly in the US interest, despite signs of the Obama administration's doubts.⁴ There is more the United States could do now to make a positive difference over the long run, which is how US efforts need to be oriented. A new approach would express in a more concerted and concrete manner US concerns with the undemocratic path Egypt's present leaders have chosen. It also would seek to broaden ties between American society and nascent constituencies for democracy in Egypt.

Does Democracy in Egypt Matter?

Some who believe that the United States should downgrade or even abandon democracy promotion in Egypt make two major arguments.⁵

The first is that a democratic Egypt is not essential to protecting core US security interests maintaining Egypt's peace with Israel, countering violent Islamist extremism, securing US military overflights of Egyptian territory and expedited transit through the Suez Canal, and keeping Cairo in the US camp on regional priorities such as preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. Proponents of this view contend that the United States must have good relations with whatever Egyptian leadership is in power to advance these goals. They point out that Egypt's lack of democratic progress has not jeopardized such interests so far.

The second assertion is that the United States cannot play a positive role. This view holds that with the toppling of US ally Hosni Mubarak and the rise of new leaders seeking to assert more independence from the United States, US influence (although never huge) has declined precipitously. The Egyptian government will make its own decisions regardless of what the United States says. Furthermore, pressing too hard on democracy will only antagonize Egyptian counterparts and hinder security cooperation. In addition, the argument goes, there is no constituency for US democracy promotion among the Egyptian public.⁶

4 Mark Landler, "Rice Offers a More Modest Strategy for the Mideast," *New York Times*, October 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/world/middleeast/rice-offers-a-more-modest-strategy-for-mideast.html?_r=0.

5 For expositions of this point of view, see Aaron David Miller, "America Has Nowhere to Go On Egypt," *New York Times*, November 11, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/12/opinion/america-has-nowhere-to-go-on-egypt.html>; Miller, "Obama's Egypt Policy Makes Perfect Sense," *ForeignPolicy.com*, August 19, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/19/obama_egypt_middle_east_policy_makes_perfect_sense#sthash.54XzLYQv.dpbs; and Steven Simon, "America Has No Leverage in Egypt," *New York Times*, August 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/opinion/america-has-no-leverage-in-egypt.html?_r=0.

6 As Obama bemoaned in his September 24 speech to the UN General Assembly, "America has been attacked by all sides of this internal conflict, simultaneously accused of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, and engineering their removal from power."

What the United States Can Do

Both arguments outlined above are shortsighted. Advancing US strategic interests ultimately depends on Egyptian stability—and repression cannot stabilize today's Egypt. Authoritarian measures are unlikely to quell roiling popular discontent given the diverse sources of mobilization and resistance; instead they will fuel extremism. An Egypt caught in endless cycles of political strife will not tackle its severe economic and social problems. Efforts to crush the Brotherhood, stifle dissent, and put down a rising Islamist insurgency will strain Egypt's weakened state capacity further; under such conditions, the government cannot be an effective US partner.⁷ A failing state in the Arab world's most populous country is a dangerous prospect for the region, Europe, and the United States.

The only way Egypt will achieve lasting stability is to create an inclusive, consensus-based system of government involving all key political forces. This may seem an unimaginable task now. The role of the Muslim Brotherhood, an illiberal and widely distrusted yet deeply rooted movement, will be particularly hard to resolve. But Egypt has changed since 2011 in ways that make a lasting reconstitution of an authoritarian system unlikely. At present, anecdotal evidence and press coverage suggest that much of the Egyptian public strongly supports the newly repressive path. But Egyptian public opinion post-2011 has shown itself to be fickle. The January 25, 2011, uprising unleashed not only generalized public demands for change but also new social movements, dominated by young Egyptians with a distinct pro-democracy, anti-status quo mindset. They demand accountable government, human rights, and dignity. They believe in citizen activism and entrepreneurship to solve Egypt's social and economic problems. These movements are not yet politically cohesive or electorally significant, but they have the potential to play a more significant democratizing role in the years to come.

The second argument—that "America's advice and preaching" has little impact, as one put it⁸—underestimates the influence that Western democracies can have in transitions from authoritarian rule. Of course, indigenous factors are always the main drivers of democratization. But as political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way explain in their important study of how authoritarian systems democratize, the question in a globalized world is not whether international actors influence transitions, but how

7 On the potential weaknesses of the Egyptian state, see Lina Attalah, "A State in Shackles," *Mada Masr*, January 1, 2014, <http://madamasr.com/content/state-shackles>.

8 Miller, *New York Times*, November 11, 2013.

they do so.⁹ As the world's most powerful democracy and as Egypt's key ally, the United States is hardly the ineffectual bystander that some suggest.¹⁰ Instead, for better or worse, the United States is one of the main external actors helping to shape Egypt's trajectory.

Drawing from Levitsky and Way's framework, the United States has two types of potential democratizing influence in Egypt: leverage and linkage. Leverage involves a government's "vulnerability to external democratizing pressure."¹¹ The US government could apply leverage by providing or withholding, on the basis of Egypt's democratic progress (or lack thereof), important benefits that the country's leaders seek. Linkage is more indirect. It refers to the network of social, political, cultural, educational, and economic ties that connect democratically oriented individuals and institutions in a transitioning country to their Western counterparts.¹² Although US (and Western) leverage and linkage are much more limited in Egypt than, for instance, in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, nor are they absent. The challenge for the United States is to use what leverage and linkage capacity it does possess more shrewdly.

There are three main benefits that Egypt, or at least parts of its ruling establishment, seeks from the United States. One is big-ticket US weapons, such as F-16 fighter jets, that Egypt's armed forces have received for decades through US military aid and continue to covet as status symbols. A second is US economic engagement—job-creating investment, technological know-how, tourism, and trade. In contrast to huge infusions of cash from the Arab Gulf countries, this would help Egypt thrive, not just survive. In 2010 US foreign direct investment (FDI) in Egypt stood at nearly \$12 billion, a 28 percent increase over the previous year, and some quarter million Americans were among the 14 million tourists visiting Egypt.¹³ Both US FDI and tourism have since dropped precipitously. The US government can help encourage such economic engagement (or not) through a range of policy measures that signal confidence in Egypt.

Egypt also wants US legitimization of its political system as a democracy. This can be offered through praise (or silence) on Egypt's human rights and democracy performance, or withheld through criticism

and pressure. Given the recent media campaigns and government statements in Egypt rejecting foreign and especially US "interference," it may sound implausible that Egyptian leaders are concerned with such stamps of approval. Yet important members of the Egyptian ruling class and intelligentsia want to burnish the country's reputation to help Egypt attract essential economic and diplomatic support. They know that Egypt is vulnerable on its human rights record, especially after the coup overthrowing its first freely-elected president. A favorable reputation among Western allies and partners also bolsters the government's domestic legitimacy. US democratic endorsement in particular smooths the military-backed government's path.

Since Morsi's ouster, Egyptian officials have made extensive efforts to convince the international community of the new government's democratic credentials. In an interview with the *Washington Post*, Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, arguably the most popular and important official in Egypt today, expressed bitterness that the United States did not see Morsi's removal as justified.¹⁴ Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy launched a global diplomatic campaign to secure support for the road map.¹⁵ The Egyptian government hired a US public relations firm to bolster the country's democratic image in Washington.¹⁶

Some argue that US criticism only causes Egypt to dig in its heels. But on occasions when the United States, together with its European partners, have focused intensively on human rights issues (such as urging the Mubarak and Morsi regimes not to adopt repressive civil society laws), diplomacy has had an impact.¹⁷ Such efforts have been sporadic, however. Over time, more consistent US (and European) criticism of Egypt's democracy record and other negative international attention could increase the political cost to the regime for sustaining authoritarian practices; when international pressure dovetails with domestic

9 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 38.

10 Simon, *New York Times*, August 19, 2013; Miller, November 11, 2013.

11 Levitsky and Way, p. 40.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 43.

13 US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, "2010 United States Travel Abroad," http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2010_US_Travel_Abroad.pdf.

14 "Excerpts from Washington Post Interview with Egyptian Gen. Abdel Fatah Al-Sissi," by Lally Weymouth, *Washington Post*, August 3, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/washington-post-interviews-egyptian-gen-abdel-fatah-al-gen-sissi/2013/08/03/6409e0a2-fbc0-11e2-a369-d1954abcb7e3_story.html.

15 Doaa El-Bey, "Hand in Hand: Popular and Official Diplomacy Collaborated This Week to Show the World a True Picture of the 30 June Revolution," *Al Ahram Weekly*, August 28, 2013, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/3907/17/Hand-in-hand.aspx>.

16 Joel Gulhane, "Foreign Ministry Reveals 'Anonymous Third Party' Relationship with US Lobby Firm," *Daily News Egypt*, October 27, 2013, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/10/27/foreign-ministry-reveals-anonymous-third-party-relationship-us-lobby-firm/>.

17 Indeed, as one Egyptian activist noted, the Egyptian government is concerned about the prospect of sustained, coordinated, visible Western criticism of Egypt's human rights record, especially in prestigious international fora such as the United Nations, and goes to great diplomatic lengths to forestall such pressure. Author's private discussion, Brussels, November 2013.

demands, the costs become high indeed.¹⁸ The case of Mexico, while far from a perfect analogy, is instructive. In the 1990s, as the country was seeking to join the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and attract foreign investment, the US Congress, the American media, and US labor and human rights communities generated intense scrutiny of Mexico's one-party rule and its manipulated elections. The high cost of defending its image in the United States, combined with growing domestic reform pressures, helped push Mexico to democratize.¹⁹

As for linkage, it is created through educational and cultural exchanges, civil society interactions and advocacy networks, media coverage, and other such transnational, people-to-people connections. Linkage contributes to democratization in two main ways. Such societal-level interactions serve as channels for diffusion of democratic norms and practices, which can strengthen pro-democratic forces over time. Linkage also builds transnational democratic solidarity by expanding the constituency overseas in support of democracy, intensifying the "international reverberations" of repression and magnifying domestic pressure on a rights-abusing government.²⁰

At present, US linkage with Egypt is quite weak, as a result of geographic distance, lack of shared cultural heritage, anti-American sentiment, and the mutual ambivalence that has permeated official bilateral relations for some time. Some barriers cannot be overcome but linkage in some areas still can be scaled up. To cite one metric, in the 2012-13 academic year, just 2,608 Egyptians (out of a population of 85 million) came to the United States for higher education.²¹ By contrast, Jordan, with 6 million people, sent 2,109 students to the United States last year; Iran sent nearly 9,000.²² American soft power—in the form of our higher education system, culture of creativity and technological and scientific innovation, entrepreneurship, and democratic institutions—represents untapped potential in this regard. The affluent, educated Egyptian diaspora in the United States is an additional advantage.

In expanding linkage, the focus should be on spurring meaningful interaction with key constituencies in Egypt that share democratic values and that want a more open system. Specifically, this is the emerging cohort of young pro-democracy, entrepreneurially

minded Egyptians. Linkage is not mainly about classic democracy aid programs. US universities could offer many more scholarships for Egyptian students, US companies could offer more internships for Egyptian entrepreneurs, and US nonprofits could mentor more Egyptian civic organizations. To be sure, expanding linkage is an indirect, soft, and decidedly long-term democracy promotion tool. But given the slow, fitful way democratization is likely to unfold in Egypt, it is a tool worth using better.

Toward a More Effective Approach

The reality is that as long as the core US security interests in Egypt remain relevant, concerns about democracy—even a military coup against an elected government—are not going to drive the relationship, and the United States will not walk away from Egypt. The US foreign policy establishment fears the costs to security interests (including Israel's security) would be too high for such a rupture.

The United States can still integrate democracy promotion efforts into its policy in ways that are perhaps more modest than many democracy advocates (including this author) would consider ideal, but that are more likely to be sustained over time throughout the tumult of Egyptian politics and bilateral relations. Indeed, sustainability, through a realistic message and consistent implementation, is one of the most important attributes of a successful policy, and one notably lacking in the US approach to Egypt to date. Strong, visible White House engagement is also required; this is what the Egyptian government would take most seriously.

The US approach also should draw from three key lessons from post-2011 Egypt. Perhaps the most glaringly obvious lesson is that the Egyptian military, the dominant force in the political system for the foreseeable future, is not a pro-democracy actor. Since 2011 the United States has at key moments seemed to underestimate the military's authoritarian predilections. The United States should not be blinded by the military's pledge to "restore democracy" or expect it to voluntarily cede any space to civic forces.

A second lesson is that elections in post-Mubarak Egypt have created conflict, rather than built the consensus crucial to moving a democratic transition forward. The various votes have not been preceded by any attempt at consensus among all key political forces on new rules of the political game. Upcoming votes to implement the roadmap will be even more polarizing, due to the overall repressive environment and the exclusion of the Brotherhood. The United States should focus less on elections. It should concentrate instead on the underlying framework for democracy and rights,

18 Levitsky and Way, pp. 40-43.

19 Ibid., pp. 149-61.

20 Ibid., pp. 43-46.

21 Institute of International Education, "International Student Totals by Place of Origin, 2011/12-2012/13," *Open Doors Report on International Educational Exchange*, 2013, <http://www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students/All-Places-of-Origin/2011-13>.

22 Ibid.

specifically on protecting core freedoms such as the rights of association, expression, and due process of law. These rights are crucial for Egyptians to keep open even a small space to advocate peacefully for accountability and democratic change and to sustain a kernel of pluralism in the public sphere.

A third lesson is that Egypt's willingness to pursue security cooperation with the United States stems from its definition of Egyptian national interests, not only from receiving \$1.5 billion each year in aid from Washington. Contrary to some expectations in Washington, Egypt has continued to cooperate with the United States after the recent partial aid suspension. This indicates that the United States has more leeway to reconfigure some aspects of the security relationship than is often assumed.

Employing Leverage

The United States should use its *combined* leverage in four areas: democratic legitimization; military aid, security cooperation, and economic engagement.

Democratic legitimization. Building on Obama's remarks at the UN General Assembly, the US administration should deliver a clear message to the Egyptian leadership: "We will continue to work with you on our mutual security goals. We share important strategic interests, but not democratic values at present, and our relationship needs to reflect our concerns about your approach. Until repression eases and real democratic progress is underway, we will not offer our democratic seal of approval or have the most robust ties possible."

As described above, US diplomacy should focus on core human rights issues. US government officials should speak frankly in private and in public with Cairo about areas of disagreement, and avoid approbation in the absence of genuine democratic progress. Striking a positive public tone, as Kerry did in his November 2013 visit to Cairo, only weakens US leverage.

The United States also should make clear that it is prepared to work with European allies to discuss Egypt's human rights record in international fora (e.g., the UN Human Rights Council). Such a multilateral effort would likely get Cairo's attention immediately. The Obama administration claims to prioritize multilateral approaches to democracy promotion, yet efforts to coordinate a strategy with our closest democratic allies have been patchy. The administration could designate a senior official to coordinate such diplomacy.

Military aid. The United States should use the opportunity of the recent aid suspension to restructure a portion of the annual \$1.3 billion military aid. Given the complexity of this aid program, this will need to

be a gradual process. One goal would be to make US military assistance more relevant for the main security threats that Egypt faces today, which emanate from the insecurity of Egypt's borders and growing violence in the Sinai Peninsula, rather than from conventional interstate war. This means replacing some funds for tanks and F-16s, which Egypt does not need more of but covets as prestige items, with more capacity building and technology to face emerging threats.²³ Indeed, the administration has already begun such discussions with Egypt.²⁴ A second, equally important goal would be to signal displeasure with the military's support for repression by reducing these prestige items. The United States also should inform Egypt that if repression continues, it will look at winding down aid perks for Cairo, such as the ability to use interest generated from the foreign military financing (FMF) account for US weapons purchases.

Security cooperation. The United States should explore contingencies for US military overflights of Egyptian territory and expedited transit through the Suez Canal.²⁵ Worries that Egypt would deny such access if the United States pushes too hard on democracy have inhibited democracy promotion, but there are alternatives.

Economic engagement. The United States and the European Union should work together to put a significant economic engagement package on the table that draws on Western strengths in investment, trade, technology, innovation, and economic reform. They should build support within the Egyptian private sector, while making clear to the Egyptian government that they will not push for the package until political conditions improve. The United States also should redirect more of its bilateral economic aid into support for the private sector.

Expanding Linkage

Even in the current hostile environment in Egypt, the US government could still take some initial, measured steps to expand linkages with Egyptian society. First, it could announce significant funding for scholarships, exchanges, and professional development programs that select young Egyptians based on merit. Second,

23 Julia Simon, "Egypt May Not Need Fighter Jets, but the US Keeps Sending Them Anyway," National Public Radio, August 8, 2103, <http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2013/08/08/209878158/egypt-may-not-need-fighter-jets-but-u-s-keeps-sending-them-anyway>.

24 House Foreign Affairs Full Committee Hearing, "Next Steps on Egypt Policy," 113th Cong. (October 29, 2013) (statement of and Q&A with Derek Chollet, assistant defense secretary for international security), <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/hearing-thursday-october-24-2013>.

25 Michael O'Hanlon, "The US Can Afford to Rethink Aid to Egypt," *Washington Post*, August 22, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/access-to-suez-is-convenient-but-not-essential-for-us/2013/08/22/224a001c-09d9-11e3-9941-6711ed662e71_story.html.

it could help catalyze greater engagement by US nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector. The White House could for instance convene a series of summits bringing together major players such as universities, foundations, companies, and civic groups to discuss broadening people-to-people ties. The White House could appoint a high-level advisory committee composed of prominent Egyptian-Americans, private sector, education, and NGO representatives with links to Egypt, and other respected figures.

Addressing the Problem of US Credibility

Suspicion in Egypt of the United States as a promoter of democracy is a genuine problem. This stems from resentment of US policies in the Middle East, memories of American support for the Mubarak regime, the pervasiveness of conspiracies about foreign meddling (a legacy of Egypt's colonial experience), and US missteps since 2011. At times, the "deep state" also tries to stir up negative public opinion to deter Washington from pushing hard on democracy.

Attitudes toward the United States are more complex than they appear on the surface. Many Egyptians will never accept a US role, but others, including the educated, young, pro-democracy cohort, are more ambivalent than permanently hostile toward such US engagement. They dislike many aspects of US policy, but also may seek to benefit from what US society could offer in terms of education, professional development, and other civic linkages to help develop their nation. They would like to be taken seriously and treated with respect. Improving US credibility with this critical constituency is a huge challenge and will take years. Despite its frequent assertions of support for "the Egyptian people," the Obama administration has never even really begun this effort.

Such outreach and engagement should not involve large amounts of democracy aid, which would be counterproductive in the current Egyptian climate. However, steady funding and diplomatic attention from international donors for the core independent human rights groups in Egypt, which are under increasing government pressure, is needed; the United States should help coordinate this.

Conclusion

Will the Obama administration be willing to implement a strategy that requires sustained efforts over several years, increases tensions in an important security relationship, and may not yield immediate positive results? Administration officials frequently say that democracy in the Middle East will take generations and that the United States is committed for the long haul.

Yet in practice, US democracy policy toward Egypt has been notably superficial and impatient.

The answer depends in part on changes in the regional strategic environment in the coming years. For example, a US-Iran nuclear deal or Israel-Palestinian peace could change US security calculations regarding Egypt and expand space for democracy promotion. By contrast, the emergence of an Islamist insurgency in Egypt could focus the United States once again on counterterrorism cooperation with a repressive Egyptian government, especially in the event of attacks on American targets.

It remains to be seen whether Obama wants to plant the seeds for a positive legacy in the most populous Arab country. It is worth noting that in the past, the United States has been able to achieve foreign policy goals that at first seemed even more impossible and unrealistic than helping to bring about a democratic Egypt.

Recommendations

- Avoid praising Egypt for false democratic progress; deliver a clear high-level message (publicly and privately) on the importance of fundamental human rights; pursue these issues in multilateral fora and in close coordination with European allies
- Restructure military aid and security assistance to reduce perks for Cairo and to redirect resources toward emerging security priorities; look to reduce US security dependence on Cairo in other ways
- Develop with European partners an appealing economic engagement package that is contingent on democratic progress and stabilization
- Support a significant expansion of exchanges, scholarships, and other people-to-people links between Egyptians and Americans

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1030 15th Street, NW, 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20005
(202) 778-4952, AtlanticCouncil.org