



JANUARY 2014

DISRUPTIVE
DEFENSE PAPERS

Zone Defense

A Case for Distinct Service Roles and Missions

By CDR Clay Beers, USN; LtCol Gordon Miller, USMC;
COL Robert Taradash, USA; and Lt Col Parker Wright, USAF



Center for a
New American
Security

Acknowledgements

This research project would not have been possible without the support of the great team at the Center for a New American Security and the unique fellowship opportunity provided by our military services. The authors would like to thank Robert Work for his leadership in supporting this initiative and Shawn Brimley for his motivation and substantial help in developing the foundations for this paper. We are grateful to the numerous supporters who read through multiple drafts and provided pivotal guidance that shaped its final outcome. We would also like to thank Dr. Nora Bensahel and Liz Fontaine for their excellent reviews, editing and production help.

The authors retained editorial autonomy throughout the publication process. The authors alone are responsible for any error of fact, analysis or omission. The views expressed here are the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Center for a New American Security, the Military Services, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Cover Image

U.S. Marines assigned to Reconnaissance Platoon, Battalion Landing Team 1/4, 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) conduct live fire training aboard the *USS Boxer* at sea January 8, 2014. The 13th MEU is deployed with the Boxer Amphibious Ready Group as a theater reserve and crisis response force throughout the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility.

(CPL. DAVID GONZALEZ/U.S. Marine Corps)

J A N U A R Y 2 0 1 4

Zone Defense

A Case for Distinct Service Roles and Missions

By CDR Clay Beers, USN; LtCol Gordon Miller, USMC; COL Robert Taradash, USA;
and Lt Col Parker Wright, USAF

The views expressed here are the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Center for a New American Security, the Military Services, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

About the Authors

CDR Clay Beers, USN is a Senior Military Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

LtCol Gordon Miller, USMC is the Senior Commandant of the Marine Corps Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

COL Robert Taradash, USA is the Chief of Staff of the Army Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

Lt Col Parker Wright, USAF is a Senior Military Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

About this Report

This report will not offer specific recommendations for service roles and missions realignment. Rather, it will highlight the imperative for the Department of Defense (DOD) to do so and will identify some specific mission areas for review. The intent is to encourage DOD to reduce unnecessary redundancies and assign emerging missions, technologies and concepts to the appropriate service. The report does not suggest a reassignment of core service roles and missions nor discuss the options surrounding an appropriate mix among active-duty, national guard and reserve forces to conduct those missions.

“No basic changes in the present roles and missions of the armed services are necessary but the development of new weapons and of new strategic concepts, together with the nine years operating experience by the Department of Defense have pointed up the need for some clarification and clearer interpretation of the roles and missions of the armed services. We have recognized the need for a review of these matters ... to improve the effectiveness of our overall military establishment, to avoid unnecessary duplication of activities and functions, and to utilize most effectively the funds made available by the people through Congress.”¹

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE C.E. WILSON, NOVEMBER 26, 1956

By CDR Clay Beers, USN; LtCol Gordon Miller, USMC; COL Robert Taradash, USA; and Lt Col Parker Wright, USAF

I. INTRODUCTION

As it has done from time to time, the Department of Defense (DOD) needs to seriously re-examine the military services' roles and missions as it adapts to the current fiscal and strategic environment. The department faces one of its most consequential periods in terms of a shifting threat environment, new and emerging mission areas and a diminished defense budget. Numerous developments are challenging DOD to evolve, including the emergence of cyberspace attack capabilities, the proliferation of unmanned and autonomous systems, the growth of anti-access and area denial capabilities, the rise of China and the attendant geopolitical ramifications, the spread of decentralized and hybrid threats to urban population centers and an increasingly contested and congested space environment. Simultaneously, the department is struggling to address the impacts of the nation's longest sustained ground war coupled with the fiscal constraints of the Budget Control Act and sequestration. This demands tough strategic choices.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) scheduled for release in February 2014 likely will adjust DOD's *ends* by signaling modifications to the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) and likely will introduce new *ways* with a revised force-sizing

construct and operational concepts.² DOD must complement this work with a concerted effort to make the most of its available *means*; a smaller defense budget demands efficiencies. With Congress unlikely to endorse DOD's proposed compensation reforms or additional base closures, the department must look elsewhere for the required savings.³ One area DOD should target for efficiencies is the services' continued development of unnecessary overlapping capabilities. Twelve years of combat in an abundant fiscal environment encouraged the services' development of excessive duplicative capabilities. It is increasingly clear that the Department of Defense can no longer afford the status quo that enables excessive redundancy.

*The Department of Defense
has an opportunity to refresh
the services' roles and missions
now to best position the force
for decades to come.*

The lack of clear and distinct roles and missions among the services permits them to develop redundant capabilities. Historically, indistinct service roles and missions, coupled with emerging technologies during periods of shrinking budgets have exacerbated service rivalries and wasted limited resources. The department must direct clearer distinctions among the services' roles and missions in order to develop the most capable, efficient and effective joint force the budget allows. This will require changing the Department of Defense mindset for roles and missions. A better division of labor and service specialization will reduce excessive redundancies, provide a better vector to focus service capability development and

free up resources to reinvest on other priorities.⁴ The Department of Defense has an opportunity to refresh the services' roles and missions now to best position the force for decades to come.

As part of its congressionally mandated review, the National Defense Panel (NDP) should look at the force-sizing constructs in the QDR through the lens of service roles and missions as it makes its independent assessment.⁵ Further, the secretary of defense should initiate a new round of consequential debates that deliver real distinctions for the services to develop effective capabilities for the joint force commander. Once the review is completed, the department should delineate service roles and missions in an updated Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.01 "Functions of the Armed Services and Its Major Components." It should also consider designating mission stewardship through executive agency and explore options for additional service-like authorities. These steps would enable the secretary of defense to direct redundancy where prudent, while eliminating excessive overlap that the department can no longer sustain. It is vitally important that DOD take a hard look at the services' roles and missions to ensure they are providing the joint commanders the most effective force that the nation can afford.

II. ROLES AND MISSIONS EVOLUTION

The initial roles and missions debates can be traced to a rather resilient agreement by the service chiefs at Key West, Florida in 1948. However, the Key West Agreement's intentional ambiguities and endorsement of shared missions led to continued interservice friction and the development of redundant capabilities for decades. In recent years, DOD de-emphasized service roles and missions and relied instead on a joint-requirements-driven approach to manage capabilities and minimize unnecessary duplication. As a result, current DOD guidance on roles and missions does not draw the sharp contrasts necessary to focus capability development.

Defining Service Roles and Missions

“Roles and missions” describes the broad and enduring purposes of the services. They are rooted in the debates over legislation to establish a unified military after World War II and were initially codified to define what each service could and could not do. Delineating roles and missions was unnecessary prior to establishing the Department of Defense in 1947; the demarcation between land and sea warfare was clear. The Navy and the Army had separate Cabinet seats, departments and budgets. The merger of the Department of the Navy and the War Department and the establishment of the independent United States Air Force raised service concerns about who would do what in the new Department of Defense. The services struggled to achieve consensus on their roles and missions.⁶

Congress included general guidance for service roles and missions in the National Security Act of 1947. On the same day he signed the bill, President Harry Truman issued Executive Order 9877, which the War and Navy departments had drafted, to provide further specificity on service roles and missions. Concerned about differences in the legislation and the executive order, the services pushed for immediate clarifications.⁷ This would be the first of many interservice battles over roles and missions in the



President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of Defense James Forrester on the lawn of the Little White House in Key West, Florida, 1948.

(Photo courtesy of Harry S. Truman Library & Museum)

new DOD. Defense Secretary James Forrester convened the service chiefs at Key West in March 1948 to negotiate a compromise. There, the service chiefs agreed that there would be no attempts to abolish the Marine Corps, but they capped its size at four divisions and agreed it would not train and equip parachute and glider forces. The Air Force agreed to provide close combat and logistical air support to the Army. Strategic air warfare was assigned to the Air Force as a primary function, and the Navy would be able to attack inland targets with organic aviation assets.⁸ The Key West Agreement, as it became known, was approved by Truman the following month and issued by Forrester as “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

Key West Legacy

The Key West Agreement provided additional clarification needed to address the fundamental

Unfinished Business

The Key West Agreement did not specify the extent to which the Navy would engage in atomic bombing of inland targets. Though it designated strategic air warfare as a primary function of the Air Force, it gave the Navy a collateral function to participate in the overall air mission. The Air Force feared that the Navy was attempting to establish a separate strategic naval air force.¹⁰ For its part, the Navy wanted to ensure that the Air Force could not restrict its participation in the atomic mission.¹¹ The defense secretary again convened the service chiefs, this time at Newport, R.I., to resolve the dispute. The Air Force was formally designated executive agent for the atomic mission, and the Navy was authorized to participate in atomic bombing, both tactically in support of naval operations and strategically in support of the overall effort. The Newport Conference endorsed both services' participation in the atomic air mission and gave both services the latitude to develop competing capabilities. Thus, the Navy continued to develop the supercarrier while the Air Force pressed ahead with its new long-range heavy bomber, the B-36 Peacemaker.¹² In the zero sum contest over the department's resources, both services actively campaigned against the other's weapon system.

Ultimately, budget pressures and a new defense secretary, Louis Johnson, contributed to a programmatic decision when the supercarrier was scuttled in April 1949, but not before both services

The problem, of course, with the Key West Agreement is that it largely failed to avoid the tremendous redundancy and duplication among the military services.⁹

SENATOR SAM NUNN, JULY 1992

had invested significant resources in the research and development of their respective programs.¹³

Ill-defined roles and missions for guided missiles resulted in similar waste. The Key West Agreement did not address the issue of guided missiles, leaving all the services to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles independently. For its part, the Army argued that it should be responsible for all surface-to-surface missile development since such missiles were mere extensions of field artillery. The Air Force disagreed, citing the original transfer agreement, which assigned the Air Force control of strategic missiles and pilotless surface-to-surface aircraft from the Army in 1947.¹⁴ Frustrated with the department's inability to streamline the guided missile program, President Truman appointed an independent missile czar to root out waste, but he proved ineffective in corraling the services' independent and uncoordinated missile programs.¹⁵

A number of coordinating committees and internal/external reviews all struggled to codify and enforce service-specific functions for guided missiles for more than a decade. When the department was pressed to accelerate fielding of the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) in light of the perceived "missile gap," it endorsed both an Air Force program and a joint Army/Navy program. Again, the department elected to share mission space rather than assign ownership to a single service.¹⁶

Finally, in 1956, the DOD issued guidance that the Air Force would be responsible for operational employment of all IRBM forces.¹⁷ The department's disparate struggle to field an operational guided missile force again highlights the difficulty in managing shared missions without clearly defined and enforceable lanes.

disputes after the unification in 1947. However, as is the case with many compromise documents, the agreement was either silent or intentionally ambiguous on remaining matters of disagreement. Where the services could not draw clear lanes, it listed collateral functions and sanctioned mission overlap. This allowed each service to interpret the document according to that service's perspectives. The intentional ambiguity and shared mission space left fertile ground for future interservice disputes. Where there was ambiguity or mission overlap, unnecessary redundancy and waste followed. The fierce battles between the Navy and Air Force over the atomic mission and among all the services over guided missile capabilities highlight the unfinished business from Key West.

The difficulties that plagued the early Defense Department in establishing distinct roles and missions for the services are no different today. First, the services are reluctant to relinquish established missions. It has proved difficult to overcome the institutional momentum of existing programs. Second, roles and missions are often viewed as zero sum games, where one service's gain is seen as another's loss. The battle for validated roles and missions is a battle for relevancy and resources. Third, relying on another service to provide a critical capability requires a great deal of trust. The services are inclined to seek self-reliance so they are not dependent on another service to provide a critical capability. Fourth, new technologies, mission areas and concepts of operation are difficult to align within existing structures. Each service sees merit in adopting new capabilities and emerging missions. While they explore new approaches, there are unclear boundaries as each looks to establish mission space.¹⁸

The Key West Agreement did not overcome all of these challenges to settle the matter of service roles and missions, but it did establish a point of departure for all subsequent debates. Today's service functions as articulated in DODD 5100.01 show a clear lineage to the Key West Agreement.¹⁹



Soldiers of U.S. Army Alaska's 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, off load from a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III aircraft on the flightline at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, Sept. 10, 2013, as two C-17s loaded with paratroopers assigned to 1st Squadron (Airborne) 40th Cavalry Regiment taxi on the runway for a related parachute assault training mission.

(JUSTIN CONNAHER/U.S. Air Force)



U.S. Marine Corps Assault Amphibian Vehicle 7A1s from the 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, 1st Marine Division, advance towards the shoreline from the *USS Harpers Ferry* (Landing Ship Dock-49) while conducting a beach landing training exercise during Dawn Blitz 2013 at Green Beach on Camp Pendleton, Calif., June 23, 2013.

(LANCE CPL. DARIEN J. BJORN DAL/U.S. Marine Corps)



U.S. Army Seventh Special Forces Group (Airborne) soldiers exit from the ramp of U.S. Air Force C-130 high performance aircraft over Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., July 26, 2012.

(PFC. STEVEN YOUNG/U.S. Army)

The original roles and missions assignments have not changed substantially since then, though the department has provided more than a dozen formal clarifications to the Key West language. Using the Key West framework, DOD has been able to draw prudent roles and missions distinctions that align joint responsibilities predominantly, if not exclusively, in a single service. DOD has consolidated intertheater and intratheater airlift under Air Force stewardship.²⁰ Similarly, the Air Force serves as DOD's executive agent for space and provides the majority of service-provided space capabilities for DOD.²¹ The Army does not field fixed-wing close air support platforms and relies predominantly on the Air Force to provide that service. The Army is solely responsible for developing airborne doctrine, procedures and equipment. The Marine Corps is solely responsible for developing the same for amphibious operations.²²

DOD Shifts to Joint Capabilities Approach

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 presented an alternative to the roles and missions debates and promoted a new avenue to address duplication and waste. After Goldwater-Nichols, the services primarily functioned to provide ready forces to the combatant commanders. This shifted the balance of power from the services to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and unified commands, and empowered the joint requirements management process, superseding traditional service capability development. Rather than better defining roles and missions, the department focused on better defining unified command requirements. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), led by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), was established in 1986.²³ It began to take shape as a counterweight to service capability development

in the mid-1990s when the JROC initiated Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments and began to recommend changes to service budget proposals. DOD began to think of roles and missions less as distinct service lanes and more as joint capability portfolios. Consequently, the traditional roles and missions debates were sidelined in favor of a capabilities-based, requirements-driven approach. This shift was endorsed by the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions, which explicitly rejected the Key West framework: “Fundamentally, it is a mistake to take the traditional ‘who gets what’ view of roles and missions that concentrates on Military Services. Rather, the emphasis should be on ‘who needs what’ in terms of joint military capabilities.”²⁴

Congressionally Mandated Reviews Lacking

Despite DOD’s shift in thinking, Congress remained interested in clarifying traditional service lanes as a vehicle to reduce cost. Goldwater-Nichols established for the first time a legislative requirement for the Department of Defense to report periodically to Congress on the roles and missions of the armed services.²⁵ The requirement for a triennial roles and missions review was later incorporated into the QDR, but the reviews offered no impetus for significant roles and missions changes nor did DOD show any inclination to update its roles and missions guidance.²⁶ In response, Congress included a new provision in the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act mandating a distinct quadrennial roles and mission review to “ensure that core mission areas are defined and functions are assigned so as to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces.”²⁷

The first Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRMR), issued in January 2009, was an unsatisfying response. In its only real mention of service roles and missions, the report referred the reader to an updated DODD 5100.01.²⁸ Revised for the first time in more than two decades, the new directive refreshed the terminology and added contemporary mission sets. When it included new sections on the Office of

the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the DOD Inspector General, and U.S. Special Operations Command, it did not offer any recommendations for realigning or delineating service-specific functions.²⁹ Instead, the report cataloged the various DOD and joint management and policy initiatives in four focus areas: irregular warfare (IW), cyberspace, intratheater airlift and unmanned air systems. Rather than assign specific service functions, it affirmed roles for all services in each. For IW, it dodged making a specific recommendation on the mix of special operations and general purpose forces for this mission. The report noted the department’s investment in cyberspace capabilities but offered no service-specific functions in the cyber domain. For intratheater lift, it assigned the now defunct C-27J transportation aircraft to both the Air Force and the Army. The report highlighted the coordinating work of the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Task Force and the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force, which were focused on delivering capabilities rather than eliminating duplication and inefficiencies across the services.

The most recent QRMR, issued in April 2012, was also silent on the assignment of service functions and lacked a roadmap for specific choices required in assigning service roles and missions for DOD. The 2012 QRMR detailed the key investments of the Fiscal Year 2013 President’s Budget and protected capabilities across the 10 Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces as defined by the DSG, but offered little more.³⁰ Congress has registered its dissatisfaction with DOD’s QRMRs and has called for a Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of the department’s conduct of the process.³¹ Together, the 2009 and 2012 reports’ reliance on a joint capabilities portfolio perspective of roles and missions failed to provide additional distinction to guide the department in the reduction of unnecessary duplication. The reports solidified the trend to endorse mission overlap in the name of jointness rather than to draw clear distinctions among the services.

III. MANDATE FOR CHANGE

Indistinct Roles and Missions Hamper Joint Requirements Processes

The lack of clarity in service roles and missions has hamstrung DOD's ability to manage joint capability development, reduce unnecessary mission overlap and avoid wasteful spending. DOD requires both distinct service roles and missions and an empowered joint requirements management structure. The JROC structure relies on clear roles and missions as a critical front-end component of its processes. The services are required to "develop service-specific operational concepts and experimentation *within core competencies*" and to "determine service or joint capability requirements and capability gaps *traceable to assigned functions, roles, and missions*."³³ When those core competencies and assigned roles and missions are broadly defined, the services risk developing redundant capabilities.

Unfortunately, the current DODD 5100.01 does not draw the necessary distinction. It tasks every service to organize, train and equip forces to operate in all domains across the range of military operations.³⁴ Rather than sharply define the service functions, the directive lists broad mission sets for each of the services, reflecting their enduring contributions to the joint force. It highlights some of each service's unique capabilities but does little to focus the services' capability development.

The lack of an effective filter to focus service capability development is a weakness of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), which seeks the best joint solution for the joint requirement, regardless of assigned service function. When a requirement is validated, all services are able to propose material solutions.³⁵ The JROC appoints gatekeepers for each Joint Capability Area, but they typically screen for promising solutions rather than consider redundancies across the services. Wartime budgets have

*Without clear guidance from the Department of Defense on what to do with its resources, the services are forced to try and do everything.*³²

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
PANEL ON ROLES AND MISSIONS, 2008

exacerbated the tendency for the JROC to engage in service log-rolling. When the JROC has made hard choices, it is often too late in the process to realize substantial cost savings. According to the Government Accountability Office, "a significant amount of time and resources can be expended in technology development before the JROC gets to formally weigh in."³⁶

Deliberately Manage Redundancy

There is utility in redundancy, especially in matters of national security when the stakes are so high. Reasoned, deliberate redundancy may be necessary – in fact, promoted. Redundant capabilities give the joint force commander multiple options to address varied, operational problems. Specificity is the enemy of flexibility, and there is benefit to redundancy as it provides the ability to tailor the service capability mix as different situations demand unique approaches. Additionally, diversifying capability development with parallel programs minimizes risk if one program does not mature on schedule. Allowing redundant capability development also leverages interservice competition to promote an optimal solution.³⁷ DOD has sustained certain capability overlaps when necessary. Despite frequent charges that the services field "four air forces," the department has consistently defended these "aviation arms



An Air Force B-2 bomber and 16 other aircraft from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps flew over the *USS Kitty Hawk* (CV 63), *USS Ronald Reagan* (CVN 76) and *USS Abraham Lincoln* (CVN 72) carrier strike groups during a joint photo exercise (PHOTOEX) that kicked off exercise Valiant Shield 2006. The Kitty Hawk Carrier Strike Group participated in Valiant Shield 2006, the largest joint exercise in recent history. Held in the Guam operating area, the exercise included 28 Naval vessels including three carrier strike groups. Nearly 300 aircraft and approximately 22,000 service members from the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard participated in the exercise.

(CHIEF PHOTOGRAPHER MATE TODD P. CICHONOWICZ/U.S. Navy)

essential to their specific roles and functions.”³⁸ Similarly, the nuclear triad has been preserved as intentional strategic redundancy. However, redundancy comes at a cost. In today’s fiscal environment, DOD cannot afford excessive duplicative capability development, especially if driven by service parochialism. Redundancy that occurs without a conscious and deliberate choice, which has been allowed to continue to propagate among the services, does not lead to an efficient and effective joint fighting force and is a luxury DOD can no longer afford. The department must be clear in identifying areas where prudent overlap among the

services would foster enhanced joint operations and maximize the benefit from limited resources, while preserving core competencies.

Specialization Maximizes Resources to Deliver the Best Joint Force

Rather than each service building a force that can respond to every threat everywhere, the department must harness each service’s unique capabilities to respond to specific threats.³⁹ If the Department of Defense as a whole is going to maintain a full-spectrum capability, it must direct a better division of labor among the services. The

An Interdependent Force



U.S. Air Force Joint Terminal Attack Controllers and Tactical Air Control Party Airmen from the 124th Air Support Operations Squadron conduct over-watch and Close Air Support (CAS) training during Operation Mountain Fury, the squadron's official annual training exercise being held this year in the Idaho Sawtooth National Forest, July 13. The 124th ASOS is conducting a variety of training exercising during Operation Mountain Fury, including small unit tactic, mounted patrols with HMWVV's and CAS missions.

(STAFF SGT. ROBERT BARNEY/U.S. Air Force)

The services currently rely on one another to provide critical enablers in many key mission areas. The medical evacuation of troops on the Afghanistan battlefield, for example, is an interdependent operation in which wounded warriors are transported to the nearest critical care facility in theater by any available aircraft, regardless of service. From there, Air Force aircraft transport the patient out of the combat theater to the Army's Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany, where medical personnel of all services work side by side. The Marine Corps has always relied on the Navy to provide medical,

dental and religious ministry support for its combat formations at all levels.

All of the armed services rely on the Army to provide veterinarian services to conduct food safety and security inspections and supporting all of the services' working animals, ranging from explosive-detection dogs to pack mules for mountain warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan to the dolphins in the Navy Marine Mammal Program. Air Force controllers were first employed in Army formations to better integrate air power with ground maneuvers in the Korean War.

Today, the Army relies on the Air Force to provide Tactical Air Control Party, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers, and Combat Control Teams as part of combat formations to advise and employ joint and coalition air power. All of the services rely on the Air Force to provide access to the Global Positioning System's precision location and time information for units, vehicles and weapons systems. The services are further integrating support operations through the worldwide joint basing of personnel and equipment. This level of interdependence makes the joint force both more effective and more efficient.

It is clear that the department cannot manage unnecessary redundancy using current joint processes alone; it requires clear distinctions among service roles and missions to focus service capability development upfront.

services cannot currently meet all of the combatant commander's steady state requirements, and they cannot afford to create overlapping capabilities while leaving gaps in other mission areas. The department must update the service roles and missions to divide responsibilities for meeting these challenges in a way that does not charter every service to address every challenge. Without clear boundaries, the services are left to develop whatever capability they can fund, so they naturally migrate to those missions they perceive will attract resources. Clearer roles and missions will force the services to develop unique contributions that, when aggregated, provide the joint force commander the full spectrum of capabilities needed to prevail in a range of contingencies. Furthermore, greater clarity and specificity on roles and missions will identify areas where one service can assume risk because another service provides that capability in the appropriate capacity. Definitively assigning a service function mitigates the requirement for implied trust among the services because it obligates a responsible agent to cover that joint capability. Ultimately, it reassures the individual services that they can take risk in one mission area because another service has been directed to provide that capability.

Window of Opportunity

The fiscal and strategic environment favors new action on roles and missions for a number of reasons. First, both OSD and the JCS are much stronger relative to the services than they were during previous roles and missions debates. DOD has not leveraged this strength to revisit roles and missions in a meaningful way since the Goldwater-Nichols Act empowered them. They are now in a position to draw and enforce much sharper distinctions than they were previously. Second, the joint requirements process has proved both its utility and its shortcomings in managing mission overlap and redundant capability development. It is clear that the department cannot manage unnecessary redundancy using current joint processes alone; it requires clear distinctions among service roles and missions to focus service capability development upfront. Third, the services are facing severe budget cuts, which may make them more willing to rely on burden-sharing opportunities. Lastly, the number of new missions and new technologies that DOD is attempting to institutionalize while simultaneously reshaping the force after more than a decade of sustained combat harkens back to previous eras when DOD has successfully clarified service roles and missions. The DOD must capitalize on this opportunity to refine service roles and missions as a complement to the work of the QDR. The next QRMR is scheduled for 2016; that is too late to issue revised guidance. The department must move quickly to codify updated service functions if it hopes to realize any new efficiencies in the near term.

IV. CONTEMPORARY ROLES AND MISSIONS OVERLAP ISSUES

As the military enters another interwar period with dwindling resources, the services are fighting for their share of defense funding for new domain-crossing technologies and concepts and that will significantly affect the way the future force engages emerging threats to our national interests.⁴⁰

Three particularly consequential mission areas where service roles and missions need to be clarified: unmanned aircraft systems, cyberspace and Phase 0 operations.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems

One of the most impactful service-crossing innovations in the last decade has been the use of unmanned aircraft systems, both for intelligence and strike operations. The need to immediately field capabilities to support warfighter requirements during a decade of sustained combat operations rightfully precluded any demands for efficiency. Absent an authoritative department strategy, the procurement of unmanned aircraft systems has resulted in significant overlaps across the services.

Currently, the services are developing 15 separate UAS platforms of varying weights, speeds and altitudes, with a total investment of \$37.5 billion during the next four years.⁴¹ In addition to the platforms, there is substantial duplication in 42 separate UAS payload development programs and among 10 of the 13 ground control stations currently being developed by the services, even though as much as 90 percent of the software overlaps in these systems. Although DOD has created interoperability working groups within the UAS Task Force, these organizations do not have the authority over the services for programmatic consolidation or termination.⁴² In response to the other services' UAS development and current

Additional Service Roles and Missions Review Areas

There are numerous DOD missions with ambiguous responsibilities and excessive redundancy. A full roles and missions review should, at a minimum, also examine the following missions currently performed by the services listed below.

1. Weapons of mass destruction response and elimination (Army, Marine Corps, Special Operations Forces)
2. Nuclear deterrence (Navy, Air Force)
3. Global response force (Army, Marine Corps, Special Operations Forces)
4. Air and missile defense (Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force)
5. Riverine operations (Army, Navy)
6. Close air support to ground forces (Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force)
7. Combat support and combat service support (i.e., medical, legal, religious ministry, military police and corrections, research and development, acquisition, installation support) (Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force)

fiscal constraints, the Air Force has indicated that it plans to divest a portion of its permissive UAS capabilities.⁴³ Such a move will further encourage the other services to develop organic capabilities to fill a presumptive gap in coverage.

Cyberspace

Responding to the Air Force's attempt to stake out a leading role in cyberspace, former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates issued a memorandum in November 2008 promulgating guidance for the development of cyberspace



A U.S. Army MQ-1C Gray Eagle armed with Hellfire missiles revs up before taking flight at Camp Taji, Iraq.

(CPT JASON SWEENEY/U.S. Army)



The U.S. Navy Triton is specially designed to fly surveillance missions up to 24 hours at altitudes of more than 10 miles, allowing coverage out to 2,000 nautical miles.

(BOB BROWN/U.S. Navy)

forces. The memo tacitly acknowledged that all services operate in and through cyberspace and have a common requirement for cyber capabilities. A year later, DOD established U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) as a subunified command under U.S. Strategic Command. All of the services are actively manning cyber forces across all three specified mission areas: defending the nation with national mission teams, supporting combat operations with combat mission teams and defending DOD information networks with cyber protection teams. A survey of U.S. Cyber Command and its service components suggests that the future military cyber force will total nearly 57,000 personnel.⁴⁴ Yet, USCYBERCOM has not directed the services to contribute capabilities distinct from one another. As a result, the services are pursuing service-specific approaches to developing long-term capability requirements geared toward service-specific cyberspace requirements.⁴⁵ The roles and missions problem is more pronounced in the cyber domain because it lacks the physical

domain characteristics that naturally provide distinct missions to the different services; the services risk building similar capabilities in different ways to conduct the same mission. The absence of a department-level strategy with a definition of roles and missions in the cyber domain will lead to significant duplication and overlap of capabilities across the services.

Phase 0 Operations⁴⁶

The services are staking their claims on steady-state shaping and deterring operations as the military moves from a pre-9/11 force of home-station training to a forward deploying force.⁴⁷ This trend is upsetting the historically unique roles for each of the services. In the past, Special Operations Forces regularly worked with partner nations to assess and improve their security situations, while the Army, Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force primarily conducted major exercises with partner and allied nations. The geographic combatant commands' appetite for Phase 0 operations risks significant overlap among the services in this area, especially in the land domain. U.S.



Sailors aboard the U.S. Navy guided-missile cruiser *USS Lake Erie* (CG 70) direct an Army OH-58 Kiowa Warrior helicopter from the U.S. Army 25th Combat Aviation Brigade (25th CAB) off the coast of Hawaii during joint training operations. The 25th CAB is expected to participate similarly in other training exercises in 2014. Both 25th CAB air crews and *USS Lake Erie* flight deck crews have training qualification requirements that can be met by these joint operations.

(CHIEF MASS COMMUNICATION SPECIALIST JOHN M. HAGEMAN/U.S. Navy)

Special Operations Command, the Marine Corps and the Army are all positioning themselves as the best force suited to support Phase 0 operations, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Service-led initiatives such as Regionally Aligned Forces, Pacific Pathways and Strategic Landpower do not outline distinct service missions that would prevent this overlap. The Department of Defense needs to provide the services guidance on their primary mission responsibilities in Phase 0 operations instead of letting the services make their own decision about the force size and mix required for this mission.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

The National Defense Panel Should Highlight Unnecessary Mission Overlap and Wasteful Redundancy in its Review of the QDR. The NDP should explicitly assess service roles and missions.⁴⁸ Noting the deficiencies in the most recent QRMR, the NDP should consider service function assignment as it independently examines and assesses the proposed force structures in the QDR. Its final report should highlight continuing capability duplication and mission overlap and point to the need for greater roles and missions distinctions. Specific mention by the NDP would encourage the kind of DOD review and associated changes that are required to make meaningful changes. Any assessment of the QDR that is not paired with a discussion of service roles and missions will diminish the likelihood of DOD refocusing service functions.

The department must also conduct an honest, china-breaking roles and missions review of the services, with the intent of drawing distinct lanes.

DOD Should Initiate a New Roles and Missions Review that Focuses on Service Responsibilities Vice Capability Portfolios. In addition to updating the Guidance for Employment of the Force, the secretary's operational guidance, and the budget guidance for the next cycle, the department must also conduct an honest, china-breaking roles and missions review of the services, with the intent of drawing distinct lanes.⁴⁹ The department must embrace the opportunity to provide greater distinction in service roles and missions. As the



Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno, far left, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert, second from left, Marine Corps Commandant James F. Amos, second from right, and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Welsh III testify on the impacts of sequestration on national defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee in Washington on Nov. 7, 2013.

(CHIEF PETER D. LAWLOR/U.S. Navy)

services rarely cede mission space to one another, clarifying service roles and missions will require departmental direction and buy-in from the service chiefs. Any successful review of roles and missions will require the personal involvement and investment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to move beyond the current approach. Additionally, the department has tended to give the authority to develop capabilities to multiple services when the services cannot agree and there are disputed mission areas. The secretary of defense must guard against this and only assign shared missions when it makes operational sense to do so. The Joint Chiefs should re-examine the service-assigned functions and divest those roles and missions that are not core to the individual service; they should determine where common capabilities can be consolidated. Assigning ownership of a mission set or capability to a single service would draw the sharpest distinction and provide the clearest guidance for the services. This may not be appropriate for all missions, but the department should consolidate wherever possible.

DOD Should Revise DODD 5100.01 to Draw Distinctions and Add Enforcement Based on the Roles and Missions Review. Codifying the results of the secretary of defense's roles and missions review into a revised DODD 5100.01 "Functions of the Armed Services and Its Major Components" is the most important step in delineating the service roles and missions. Although the current version of DODD 5100.01 was updated in 2010, it did not provide the kind of distinction among service functions that the current fiscal and strategic environment demands. This revised directive should task the services to provide specific capabilities rather than give broad or open-ended permissions to do so. Additionally, the directive should provide specific restrictions among the services from encroaching on the mission areas of the other services. As part of the JCIDS process, the services should be required to explicitly link a particular capability to a DODD 5100.01-assigned mission as part of their Initial Capability Developments. The JCIDS gatekeepers must then ensure that the services are maintaining the established lanes before validating the service solution. Furthermore, the directive must hold the services accountable for fulfilling their assigned functions. DOD should consider implementing periodic reviews and establishing a joint process to assess compliance. This enforcement aspect must be part of the directive to preclude the services from neglecting their roles and missions responsibilities to one another. The new directive would provide the appropriate filter to better enable the JROC processes to eliminate unnecessary duplication and ensure that gaps do not exist.

DOD Should Designate Executive Agency Where Appropriate. DOD designates an executive agent when there is no other method to focus DOD resources on a specific area or areas of responsibility in order to minimize duplication or redundancy.⁵⁰ The secretary of defense assigns the specific responsibilities, functions and

authorities that involve two or more DOD components. Executive agency is an optimal avenue to streamline the development of capabilities that are required across the services. This authoritative construct provides unity in purpose by aligning service capabilities under a lead service or department activity. This is especially useful when the output is more programmatic and physical in nature, such as acquiring a common vehicle or platform that each service can then tailor to its mission set.

If the secretary of defense determines that certain roles, missions or programs have cross-service applicability, he should assign executive agency to a single service to provide oversight and prevent unnecessary duplication. For example, the Department of Defense has designated the secretary of the Air Force as executive agent for space. In this capacity, the secretary of the Air Force exercises DOD-wide responsibilities for developing long-term space mission-area capability. There are real efficiencies to be gained by streamlining and consolidating stewardship under a single service through the executive agency program.

DOD Should Consider Assigning Service-Like Responsibilities. U.S. Special Operations Command is the only joint command that also has service-like responsibilities to train, organize and equip its forces.⁵⁴ This gives the commander of USSOCOM wide authority and responsibility to both build and employ special operations forces.⁵⁵ USSOCOM relies upon the services primarily to provide the entry-level recruitment, training, education and management of service forces that develop into special operations forces. The service-like authority, codified in federal law, requires the joint commander to man, train and equip the mission-unique joint forces. It provides the joint commander with the separate funding necessary to ensure that the multiservice forces are trained in the advanced skills and have the mission-specific equipment necessary for success in missions that

UAS Mission Stewardship

In 2005, the Air Force proposed that it be designated the DOD executive agent for medium- and high-altitude unmanned aircraft vehicles (those operating above 3,500 feet). The Air Force projected savings of up to 10 percent in medium- and high-altitude UAS programs by consolidating the service-unique efforts. The other services dissented and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council endorsed using the Joint Unmanned Aircraft System Material Review Board and the Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Center of Excellence to address the Air Force's concerns about redundant development. With the Air Force Predator and Army Warrior UAS programs bumping up against each other, the Air Force again proposed executive agency in 2007. This time, the JROC

endorsed the Air Force bid and called for the Air Force to establish a joint program office to streamline UAS acquisition, but not to direct operational employment. However, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England disagreed and directed the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics to create a task force to better coordinate the department's myriad UAS programs.⁵¹

The resulting Task Force UAS (TF UAS), as described in DOD's January 2013 "Report to Congress on Addressing Challenges for Unmanned Aircraft Systems" is "intended to encourage cross-service cooperation" and "provides a forum for influencing concepts, requirements, and design decisions." Reminiscent

of the ineffective DOD committees that managed guided missile development, the TF UAS lacks the authority necessary to force the services to eliminate waste and duplication in development and procurement of unmanned aircraft systems. TF UAS does not have the authority to terminate redundant programs nor force their consolidation.⁵² Instead, the task force focuses on airspace integration, interoperability, frequency and bandwidth, and logistics and sustainment. The GAO concluded, "If the preference for service-unique solutions persists in the absence of department-wide strategy, so will the potential for overlap in the future."⁵³ Thus, GAO recommends that DOD reconsider appointing a single entity to manage the department's UAS programs.

support all of DOD. This unique status has worked well for USSOCOM for the last 27 years and is a model that would be preferred when creating a new service is not desired, but there is a strong demand for centralized service-like requirements.

Additionally, the development of similar service-like commands could eliminate redundancy in service program funding by giving that authority to the joint force commander. Allowing service-like responsibilities would also centralize the development of unique capabilities for mission-specific forces and could provide the unique functions necessary for mission success, provide a mechanism to prevent multiple-service procurement and minimize duplicative overhead and bureaucracy. The secretary of defense should consider recommending new legislation

that gives service-like responsibility and authority (organize, train and equip) to a functional joint commander for unique global mission sets where continued service responsibility is detrimental to the development of that capability. Such a move would free the services to focus on providing capabilities that align with their core competencies.

Time for a Cyber Force?



U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Joel Melendez, Naval Network Warfare Command information systems analysis, U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Rogerick Montgomery, U.S. Cyber Command network analysis and U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Jacob Harding, 780th Military Intelligence Brigade cyber systems analysis, analyze an exercise scenario during Cyber Flag 13-1, Nov. 8, 2012, at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. Cyber Flag strategically focuses on exercising the command's mission of operating and defending the Department of Defense networks across the full spectrum of operations against a realistic adversary in a virtual environment.

(SENIOR AIRMAN MATTHEW LANCASTER/U.S. Air Force)

Retired Navy Admiral James Stavridis has argued for a distinct cyber force that operates as an independent service. He suggests, "It is time we considered the creation of a U.S. Cyber Force for many of the same reasons we needed a U.S. Air Force."⁵⁶ He asserts that such a move would focus DOD's currently disparate cyber effort. He claims it would improve command and control in the cyber sphere as well as eliminate

operational rivalries, discontinuities and inefficiencies among the services' varied approaches to cyber training and equipping.

An alternative to creating a new military service would be to give U.S. Cyber Command service-like responsibilities. Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter stated in June 2013: "I don't rule out that over time we may decide to combine all

of that [U.S. Cyber Command and its forces] into something that would be like USSOCOM, only cyber."⁵⁷

Doing so may enhance USCYBERCOM's own command and control, policy, training standards, authorities, resourcing and acquisition while streamlining the presentation of forces to the geographic and functional combatant commanders.

VI. CONCLUSION

As the nation prepares to enter this extended period of evolving threats, diminished budgets and emerging mission areas, the Department of Defense can no longer afford the status quo that enables parochial redundancy and inefficiency. Without a comprehensive and directive roles and missions review to complement the QDR, the services will continue to defend parochial programs, develop redundant capabilities and unintentionally waste limited resources. The Department of Defense has an opportunity to refresh the services' roles and missions, which would enable a more effective, interoperable and efficient joint force that would free up resources to reinvest on other priorities.

Recent roles and missions reviews have evolved to focus excessively on broad joint capabilities. Three specific examples of areas where directive guidance from the Department of Defense could reduce or garner efficiencies and enable a more capable joint force are unmanned aircraft systems, cyberspace and Phase 0 operations. The National Defense Panel should encourage the Department of Defense to initiate a meaningful review of service roles and missions, moving beyond the capabilities portfolio approach to one that produces tangible distinctions between service functions. Based on this recommendation, the secretary of defense should conduct a review of services' roles and missions and publish an updated DOD Directive 5100.01 that provides sharp distinctions among the services' functions that are more enforceable and enduring. Where shared missions are desired, the secretary of defense should consider either executive agency or service-like functions to provide the clearest possible guidance for the services. It is vitally important that the Department of Defense clarifies guidance on the services' roles and missions to ensure the most efficient and effective joint force that the nation can afford.

As the nation prepares to enter this extended period of evolving threats, diminished budgets and emerging mission areas, the Department of Defense can no longer afford the status quo that enables parochial redundancy and inefficiency.

ENDNOTES

1. Department of Defense, *Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense* (November 26, 1956), as reprinted in Richard I. Wolf, "The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions," Air Staff Historical Study, Office of Air Force History, Washington, DC (1987), 294.
2. Every four years since 1993, DOD has conducted a comprehensive review of its strategy, policies, force structure and programs to refine and redirect guidance for the Pentagon to build its future force for the coming years. The 1993 Bottom-Up Review evolved into the 10 U.S.C. § 118, "Quadrennial Defense Review," which mandated the QDR since 1997. The QDR is designed to rebalance DOD's strategies, capabilities and forces to address today's conflicts and tomorrow's threats at a low to moderate level of risk.
3. Public Law 112-239, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013*, January 2, 2013, Section 672, "Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission"; and Public Law 113-66, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014*, December 31, 2013, Section 2711, "Prohibition on Conducting Additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Round."
4. As the 2013 Strategic Choices and Management Review pointed out, balancing investments in future capabilities while ensuring a ready force will be a challenge.
5. 10 U.S.C. § 118.
6. The Navy feared losing naval aviation and the Marine Corps, the Army required guarantees that the Air Force would continue to provide the same level of air support it had as the Army Air Corps, and the Air Force needed to stake out roles and missions as a wholly independent and equal service. The Navy demanded to maintain organic capabilities to ensure the operational effectiveness of the naval force. The Army and Air Force argued for less redundancy to generate greater efficiencies across the new department.
7. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, 52-314 O (October 16, 1985), 432-435.
8. As recorded in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Key West Conference memorandum for record, March 26, 1948.
9. Sam Nunn, "The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul the Services' Roles and Missions" (U.S. Senate, Washington, July 2, 1992).
10. The development of a flush-deck supercarrier (which would allow for larger aircraft) and two nuclear-capable bombers fueled these concerns.
11. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, 346.
12. Jeffrey G. Barlow, *Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945-1950* (Washington: United States Government Printing, 1995), Chapter 5.
13. Barlow, *Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945-1950*, 182-191.
14. Jacob Neufeld, "The Development of Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force 1945-1960" (Office of the Air Force History, 1990), 53, <http://www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100924-024.pdf>.
15. *Ibid.*, 66, 80.
16. *Ibid.*, 121-122.
17. Department of Defense, *Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense*, 300.
18. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, 444-445.
19. DODD 5100.1 was first issued in March 1954. It codified minor updates to the Key West Agreement to include adding the Marine Corps as a separate service, updating the unified command structure and reflecting increased authorities of the secretary of defense. The directive was most recently updated in 2010 and was redesignated DODD 5100.01 at that time.
20. DOD established the Military Air Transport Service by merging Air Transport Command and the Naval Air Transport Service in 1948. The Military Air Transport Service became Military Airlift Command and later Air Mobility Command. In 1966, the Army and Air Force agreed that the Air Force would be responsible for fixed-wing intratheater airlift, while the Army would provide rotary-wing intratheater airlift. See *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, 437.
21. The Air Force was designated the executive agent for space by DODD 5101.2 in 2003.
22. When roles and missions have been delineated, the responsible service has not always provided the level of support the other services expect. The lack of an enforcement mechanism that commits the service to provide the assigned capability has resulted in gaps when the responsible service fails to deliver the assigned capability. When services are able to walk away from assigned missions, it incentivizes the other services to develop organic capabilities to support themselves. See Morton Halperin and David Halperin, "The Key West Key," *Foreign Policy*, no. 53 (Winter, 1983-1984), 114-130.
23. The CJCS first established the JROC in 1986. After the Goldwater-Nichols legislation was passed, the new VCJCS became the JROC chair. The JROC has been legislatively mandated since 1996.
24. Department of Defense, *Directions for Defense: Report of the Commissions on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces* (May 24, 1995), 1-4.
25. Public Law 99-433, *The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, October 1, 1986, Section 153.
26. Public Law 107-107, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002*, December 28, 2001, Section 921.

27. Public Law 105-85, *The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998*, January 28, 1998, Section 941.
28. DODD 5100.1 was designated DODD 5100.01 at this time.
29. Lindsey Eilon and Jack Lyon, *Evolution of the Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components,"* DOD White Paper (April 2010), provides a thorough review of the 2010 updates.
30. The 10 missions are: counterterrorism and irregular warfare; deter and defeat aggression; project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges; counter weapons of mass destruction; operate effectively in cyberspace and space; maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent; defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities; provide a stabilizing presence; conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations; and conduct humanitarian, disaster relief and other operations.
31. Jason Sherman, "Lawmakers say DOD Gave 2012 Roles and Mission Review Short Shrift," *Insidedefense.com*, June 7, 2013, <http://insidedefense.com/201306072436927/Inside-Defense-Daily-News/DefenseAlert/lawmakers-say-dod-gave-2012-roles-and-mission-review-short-shrift/menu-id-61.html>; and Amanda Palleschi, "House Authorizers Criticize DOD's 2008 Roles-And-Missions Report," *Insidedefense.com*, May 25, 2011, <http://insidedefense.com/Inside-the-Pentagon/Inside-the-Pentagon-05/26/2011/house-authorizers-criticize-dods-2008-roles-and-missions-report/menu-id-148.html>.
32. U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Panel on Roles and Missions, *Initial Perspectives* (January 2008), 62.
33. Department of Defense, *Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council*, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5123.01F (January 10, 2012), B-6 - B-7, emphasis added.
34. DODD 5100.01P directs the military departments to coordinate with each other "to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical administration; eliminate duplication; and assist other DOD Components in the accomplishment of their respective functions." It directs all services to "provide conventional, strategic, and special operations forces to conduct the range of operations." It further tasks the services to "provide unique capabilities to the joint force commander across all domains" for ISR, special operations, personnel recovery, counter weapons of mass destruction, building partner capacity, forcible entry operations and missile defense. It also directs all services to operate "organic land vehicles, aircraft, cyber assets, spacecraft or space systems, and ships or craft."
35. James H. Kurtz and John H. Crerar, "Military Roles and Missions: Past Revisions and Future Prospects," IDA Paper P-4411 (Institute for Defense Analyses, March 2009), 40.
36. Government Accountability Office, *DOD Weapon Systems: Missed Trade-off Opportunities During Requirements Reviews*, GAO-11-502 (June 16, 2011), 8, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/319725.pdf>.
37. See Stephen Peter Rosen's "Service Redundancy: Waste or Hidden Capability" in *Joint Force Quarterly* (Summer 1993) and Harvey M. Sapolsky's "Interservice Competition: The Solution, Not the Problem" in *Joint Force Quarterly* (Spring 1997) for a full discussion of the benefits of service competition.
38. The need for four air forces was first defended by General Colin Powell in *CJCS Report on the Roles, Missions, and Function of the Armed Forces of the United States* in February 1993 and later in Department of Defense, *Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces*, 2-31. This argument against restructuring was counter to the congressional belief and interest as a cost-saving measure.
39. Mark Gunzinger suggests that the services should be tasked to prepare for different contingencies based on the services' unique attributes and the likely character of the potential conflict. See Mark Gunzinger, "Shaping America's Future Military: Toward a New Force Planning Construct" (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, June 2013), 39.
40. Department of Defense, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (September 10, 2012), 7.
41. All of the statistical data for this section comes from: Government Accountability Office, *Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue*, GAO-12-342SP (February 28, 2012), 26-27, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-342SP>. For example, the GAO faulted the Navy for investing nearly \$3 billion in developing a service unique variant of the Air Force Global Hawk without conducting a study to determine the cost effectiveness of using the existing platform nor a quantitative analysis to justify a distinct variant.
42. Jeremiah Gertler, "U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems," R42136 (Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2012), 7, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42136.pdf>.
43. W.J. Hennigan, "Global Hawk drone flies into budget battle between Pentagon, Congress," *Los Angeles Times*, December 6, 2013, <http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-spy-drone-lives-20131206,0,3203229.story#axzz2q714zhbh>.
44. One survey of U.S. Cyber Command and its service components suggests the force will total some 57,000 personnel (U.S. Cyber: 5,000; Air Force: 16,000; Navy: 14,000; Marines: 800; Army: 21,000).
45. Government Accountability Office, *Defense Department Cyber Efforts: More Detailed Guidance Needed to Ensure Military Services Develop Appropriate Cyberspace Capabilities*, GAO-11-421 (May 20, 2011), 17, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-421>.
46. These steady-state operations are also known as theater security cooperation, building partner capacity and security force assistance.
47. Michèle Flournoy and Janine Davidson, "Obama's New Global Posture: The Logic of U.S. Foreign Deployments," *Foreign Affairs*, 91 no. 4 (July/August 2012), 55, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137717/michele-flournoy-and-janine-davidson/obamas-new-global-posture>.
48. 10 U.S.C. § 118.
49. The Guidance for Employment of the Force is the secretary of defense's classified strategic guidance to the combatant commanders and includes

guidance for deliberate planning, global posture and global force management. It is a companion piece to the CJCS-produced Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

50. Department of Defense, *DoD Executive Agent*, DOD Directive 5101.1 (November 21, 2003), 2.

51. Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), *Department of Defense Report to Congress on Addressing Challenges for Unmanned Aircraft Systems* (September 2010), 3.

52. Gertler, "U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems," 5-8.

53. Government Accountability Office, *2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue*, Government Accountability Office, 27.

54. 10 U.S.C. § 167, "Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces."

55. U.S. Special Operations Command is charged with developing special operations strategy, doctrine and tactics; training special operations forces; developing and acquiring special operations-specific equipment; and submitting and executing a special operations-specific budget.

56. Admiral James Stavridis (Ret.), "Why the nation needs a US Cyber Force," *The Boston Globe*, September 29, 2013, <http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/09/29/why-nation-needs-cyber-force/quM4WWdJOh0FoSyE7rmxJI/story.html>.

57. Ashton B. Carter, "Remarks by Deputy Secretary Carter at the Center for a New American Security on Defense Priorities in an Era of Constrained Budgets" (The Willard Hotel, Washington, June 12, 2013), clarification added, <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5256>.

About the Center for a New American Security

The mission of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) is to develop strong, pragmatic and principled national security and defense policies. Building on the expertise and experience of its staff and advisors, CNAS engages policymakers, experts and the public with innovative, fact-based research, ideas and analysis to shape and elevate the national security debate. A key part of our mission is to inform and prepare the national security leaders of today and tomorrow.

CNAS is located in Washington, and was established in February 2007 by co-founders Kurt M. Campbell and Michèle A. Flournoy. CNAS is a 501(c)3 tax-exempt nonprofit organization. Its research is independent and non-partisan. CNAS does not take institutional positions on policy issues. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the authors.

© 2014 Center for a New American Security.

All rights reserved.

Center for a New American Security

1152 15th Street, NW
Suite 950
Washington, DC 20005

TEL 202.457.9400
FAX 202.457.9401
EMAIL info@cnas.org
www.cnas.org

Production Notes

Paper recycling is reprocessing waste paper fibers back into a usable paper product.

Soy ink is a helpful component in paper recycling. It helps in this process because the soy ink can be removed more easily than regular ink and can be taken out of paper during the de-inking process of recycling. This allows the recycled paper to have less damage to its paper fibers and have a brighter appearance. The waste that is left from the soy ink during the de-inking process is not hazardous and it can be treated easily through the development of modern processes.





Center for a
New American
Security

STRONG, PRAGMATIC AND PRINCIPLED
NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICIES

1152 15th Street, NW
Suite 950
Washington, DC 20005

TEL 202.457.9400
FAX 202.457.9401
EMAIL info@cnas.org

www.cnas.org

ISBN 978-1-935087-81-6

5 0999 >



9 781935 087816



Printed on Post-Consumer Recycled paper with Soy Inks