

**EUROPEAN
FOREIGN POLICY
SCORECARD
2014**



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EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2014

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Even though producing this year's Scorecard was a collective effort, any mistakes in the text remain the responsibility of the authors.

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Foreword

The Compagnia di San Paolo is one of the largest independent foundations in Europe and one of the main private funders of research in the fields of EU affairs and international relations. Over the past few years, the Compagnia has progressively consolidated its profile in these fields, signing strategic partnership agreements with institutions such as the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Istituto Affari Internazionali. Our overall goal is to foster a truly European debate on the main issues the EU faces and to encourage the emergence of a European political space.

It is against this background and as part of the Compagnia's commitment to support research on the European integration process, that we continued the co-operation with the European Council on Foreign Relations on the fourth edition of the European Foreign Policy Scorecard. We highly appreciate this co-operation with ECFR and we sincerely hope that this project will intensify the dialogue among various European stakeholders - both institutional and from the civil society - with the goal of strengthening our understanding of Europe's role as a global player.

Piero Gastaldo
Secretary General
Compagnia di San Paolo

Preface

It is a pleasure for us to present the 2014 edition of the European Foreign Policy Scorecard, an ECFR initiative that aims to achieve an overall evaluation of the foreign-policy effectiveness of the EU during the course of the past year. We were particularly pleased to note that Europe's overall foreign-policy performance was markedly better in 2013 than in 2014, partly because of some high-profile successes.

Now in its fourth year, the Scorecard continues to be an important tool for tracking trends in the development of European foreign policy. We therefore put emphasis in continuity in the methodology in order to enable meaningful comparison between European foreign-policy performance in 2013 and the previous three years.

As in the first three years of the Scorecard, we assessed the performance of EU actors as a collective, rather than looking at any institution or member state in particular. We focused on policies and results rather than on institutional processes in our evaluation of the effectiveness of Europe as a global actor. European policies were assigned 'unity' and 'resources' scores, each graded out of 5, with a third score, 'outcome', measured out of 10, which was used to determine results. The sum of these scores was then translated into a letter grade for each component.

The role played by individual member states on individual components, slimmed down from 80 to 66 to make the document as a whole more streamlined, continued to be evaluated. Researchers in each of the now 28 member states helped to classify each member state into three nominal categories: as being either a 'leader', a 'supporter', or a 'slacker' on a selection of these components.

Whereas such a categorisation involves political judgments, we have made sure to explain our reasoning for each of the categorisation in the relevant components.

A full description of the methodology of the Scorecard can be found on ECFR's website at <http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard>. As always, the Scorecard project will continue to transform as the EU itself transforms, and any views and feedback on the findings in this year's edition and the way it assesses European foreign-policy performance are most welcome.

Vaira Vike-Freiberga and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
January 2014

Introduction

Europeans had two remarkable foreign-policy successes in 2013. In April, High Representative Catherine Ashton announced an agreement that should settle the most difficult and dangerous of the problems between Belgrade and Prishtina. The agreement, the product of difficult talks facilitated by the European Union that began in 2011, paves the way for Serbia to begin accession talks with the EU and for Kosovo to take an important step down the same path. In November, the new Iranian government and the E3+3 agreed to pause the activities the other side found problematic – enrichment on the one hand and sanctions on the other – and to take some initial steps back in each area. The interim deal opens the real prospect of a solution to the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme without military action – an objective that Europeans, led by the E3 of France, Germany, and the UK, have pursued since 2002. In the case of Kosovo, the most important steps have been taken; for Iran the major work lies ahead. But in both cases Europe made huge progress in 2013 towards achieving its long-term objectives.

In part because of these two high-profile successes, Europe’s overall foreign-policy performance ranked significantly higher than in 2012, a year in which there were some signs of stabilisation and resilience after two difficult years dominated by the euro crisis, and the foundations were laid for this year’s successes. The neighbourhood continued to present complex challenges – in particular, the conflict in Syria worsened even further and the EU had a high-profile setback when the Ukrainian government decided not to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. Europeans were also divided among themselves on issues such as the dispute with China over solar panels. Nevertheless, 2013 was a good year compared to the previous three. There was improvement in performance on relations with China (from C+ to B-), Wider Europe (from C+ to B-), and the Middle East and North Africa (from C+ to B-). On the other hand, Europe performed worse than in 2012 on relations with Russia, and on multilateral issues and crisis management.

Figure 1

European Performance on the six issues in 2013

	2013		2012		2011	
	Score /20	Grade	Score /20	Grade	Score /20	Grade
Relations with China	11.0	B-	9.7	C+	9	C
Relations with Russia	10.2	C+	11.0	B-	10	C+
Relations with the United States	11.6	B-	11.7	B-	11	B-
Relations with Wider Europe	10.8	B-	10.3	C+	9.5	C+
Middle East and North Africa	10.5	B-	10.3	C+	10	C+
Multilateral issues and crisis management	12.0	B-	12.6	B	12.9	B

Europe's strategic toughness

The two big foreign-policy successes of 2013 originated in different eras. The Iran breakthrough was inherited from a different, pre-crisis Europe – in particular, from the determination of the E3 to avoid a repeat of the Iraq debacle. The initiative on Kosovo, by contrast, was taken not by the member states before the crisis but by Ashton in 2011. But though they originated in different eras and took place in different parts of the world, the two cases have many features in common. In each case, there was excellent collaboration between the EU and the member states most involved. In both cases, European policymaking challenged US approaches – but once Europeans had asserted their approach, they benefitted from excellent co-operation with the US. In both cases, many of the participants claim that the personal skills of Ashton were an important or even the indispensable factor.

Most importantly, however, European toughness and persistence played a major role in both cases. Europeans made demands of the Serbs on Kosovo that former Serbian President Boris Tadić had said were “impossible”. They also put in place the toughest sanctions ever against Iran – and set a standard which other countries such as Japan and South Korea subsequently followed. Europeans invested significant resources in their approaches and held reasonably firm to their conditions. Admittedly, the two agreements were also both made possible

by domestic elections: Hassan Rouhani in Iran wanted to re-engage with the West; the Nikolić/Vučić coalition in Serbia was less scared of enemies from the right than the centrist Tadić. In both cases this also reflected a popular desire to move on and improve economic conditions rather than hang on to dubious symbols of national prestige.

Figure 2

Most successful policies in 2013

	Unity	Resources	Outcome	Total	Grade
22 Relations with the US on trade and investment	4	5	9	18	A
32 Relations with the US on Iran and weapons proliferation	4	5	9	18	A
53 Iran	4	5	9	18	A
35 Kosovo	4	4	9	17	A-
27 Relations with the US on the Balkans	4	4	8	16	A-
33 Overall progress of enlargement in the Western Balkans	5	4	7	16	A-
57 European policy on non-proliferation and the arms trade	4	4	8	16	A-
2 Investment and market access in China	5	4	6	15	B+
17 Relations with Russia on energy issues	4	4	7	15	B+
56 European policy in the G8, G20, IMF and WTO	4	4	7	15	B+
10 Cooperation with China on environment and energy	5	4	5	14	B+
11 Trade liberalisation with Russia	5	4	5	14	B+
24 Relations with the US on counter-terrorism	4	3	7	14	B+
29 Relations with the US on the Middle East peace process	4	3	7	14	B+
52 Middle East Peace Process and state-building in Palestine	4	4	6	14	B+
64 Somalia	4	4	6	14	B+

Europeans had sought to stabilise the Balkans since the NATO military intervention in Kosovo and in particular to take steps towards normalisation between Serbia and Kosovo since 2004. Ashton had invested heavily in the talks, which went through 10 rounds since they began in 2012. The agreement she announced in Brussels in April 2013 represents a huge step forward for the region and its relations with the EU. Serbia in effect accepted that the north of Kosovo would remain part of Kosovo under Kosovo law, in exchange for recognition of the rights of the ethnic Serb communities. Agreement on these issues provides hope that violence can be avoided in the future and opens up the possibility for Kosovo to establish contractual relations with the EU, though much work remains to be done to implement fully what has been agreed and to bed the agreement down in the lives of ordinary people in the north.

The interim agreement on Iran's nuclear programme had seemed impossible just a year ago. It was part of the diplomatic approach to Iran for which Europeans pushed ever since President George W. Bush declared Iran to be part of an "axis of evil" in 2002. In order to avoid another war in the Middle East, the British, French, and German foreign ministers developed an approach of critical engagement to Iran. They first brought the rest of the EU on board and then persuaded Russia first, then China, and finally a reluctant US to support the policy. This led to the E3+3 talks, which began in 2007 and finally produced the Joint Plan of Action agreed in Geneva. The European approach was always predicated on trying to get the US to negotiate directly with Iran, and this strategy seemed to come to fruition with the tentative contacts between American and Iranian officials before the surprise election of Hassan Rouhani as Iranian president in August. A long-term, comprehensive solution still has to be negotiated over the next 12 months. But that this is now even a possibility is a huge step forward.

The unstable neighbourhood

The breakthroughs on Iran and Serbia and Kosovo can be seen as a reward for the *acquis diplomatique* to which we referred in the first edition of the Scorecard – that is, the collection of areas in which Europeans define common policies and collectively defend their interests in the world. Mainly as a result of these two successes, the mean overall grades for Wider Europe and the Middle East and North Africa went up. However, these two high-profile successes took place in areas – the eastern and southern neighbourhoods – in which Europeans generally struggled in 2013. The increasing instability in Europe's neighbourhood continued as the conflict in Syria worsened and Russia competed with the EU in post-Soviet space. Though the Serbia–Kosovo deal suggests that the EU still has

some power of attraction in the Western Balkans, its soft power elsewhere in the neighbourhood is increasingly contested.

Figure 3
Least successful policies in 2013

	Unity	Resources	Outcome	Total	Grade
30 Relations with the US on the Syrian conflict	1	2	1	4	D+
50 Syria	1	2	2	5	D+
25 Relations with the US on intelligence cooperation and data protection	2	2	2	6	C-
18 Diversification of gas-supply routes to Europe	2	3	2	7	C-
23 Relations with the US on economic issues	2	2	3	7	C-
38 Rule of law, democracy, and human rights in Turkey	3	2	2	7	C-
39 Relations with Turkey on the Cyprus question	3	2	2	7	C-

In the southern neighbourhood, Europeans struggled either to respond to the worsening crisis in Syria or to find a longer-term approach to the region that gives them leverage. Europeans continued to be divided about how to respond to the intensification of the conflict in Syria: in May, after France and the UK pushed to arm the rebels, the EU's arms embargo collapsed; in August, France and the UK were also the most hawkish after use by President Bashar Assad's regime of chemical weapons (though the subsequent defeat of Prime Minister David Cameron in parliament meant that the UK could not in the end be part of any military action). Apart from its humanitarian assistance for the Syrian refugees, the EU as such remained disengaged from the conflict in Syria. Though an agreement to remove and destroy chemical weapons was reached, it was brokered by Russia and the US rather than the EU, and the conflict continues.

Meanwhile, the EU's response to the military takeover in Egypt in July illustrated the limits of the ENP as the basis of EU policy in the southern neighbourhood. When the military staged its coup in Egypt, Ashton successfully used her leverage to secure a meeting with deposed president Mohammed Morsi. However, the

military felt secure enough to reject external mediation and public statements by member states have done little to put it under pressure. The evident risk is that, faced with little and waning influence in the region, Europeans might give up and declare the Arab Spring a failure. In policy terms, this could mean abandoning promotion of democracy and human rights in the region and reverting to the old policies that put security and stability first.

In the eastern neighbourhood, Europe found itself increasingly at odds with Russia, which put pressure on post-Soviet states such as Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine to integrate with it rather than the EU. During the course of the year, Europeans were relatively united and resolute: when Russia banned Georgian wine in 2005, the EU found it impossible to offer access to the EU market to compensate; when Russia applied similar pressure in 2013, the European Commission gave Moldova special access to the Single Market – a sign that the Lisbon Treaty is helping the EU align its foreign and domestic policies. However, European hopes that Ukraine – the most important post-Soviet state from a European perspective – would sign an Association Agreement and DCFTA with the EU were dashed in November when the Ukrainian parliament voted against the agreement and the release of Yulia Tymoshenko from prison. Days later, President Vladimir Putin announced a \$15 billion loan to Ukraine and a cut in energy prices. This prompted much soul-searching in Europe about the “loss” of Ukraine.

In retrospect, where Europe went wrong was to expect President Viktor Yanukovich – long seen by many as a Kremlin ally – to choose the EU over Russia, particularly when the EU was unwilling to match Russia’s offers to bail out the Ukrainian state. As Joschka Fischer has argued, Europe played for high stakes without having the cards to do so. However, subsequent pro-EU protests in Independence Square in Kiev showed many in Ukraine still see their future in European terms. Although Ukraine has not signed the agreement, Yanukovich has been weakened, and the protests have made it impossible for Ukraine to join the customs union. Moreover, the opposition is less divided and weak than it was before the Vilnius summit. A new government may be elected in 2015 and could sign the Association Agreement after all. Thus, although developing a coherent policy towards Russia remains a challenge, the situation is not as bad as it seemed in the immediate aftermath of Vilnius.

Power Europe and technocratic Europe

In the introduction to last year's edition of the Scorecard we wrote that Europe's ability to convert its resources into power depended to a large extent on whether the EEAS could become the effective diplomatic service envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty. The successes on Serbia and Kosovo and on Iran – and the failures elsewhere – suggest that the EU achieves results when “power Europe” (the member states) empowers “technocratic Europe” (the EU institutions). Both were significant personal triumphs for Ashton and her style of diplomacy. In fact, having been vilified for much of her time in office, Ashton suddenly found herself the object of effusive praise in 2013 for single-mindedly pursuing the deal between Serbia and Kosovo and representing the EU in negotiations on Iran. But, at the same time, neither success would have been possible without backing from member states.

These two big successes of 2013 might suggest that “power Europe” and “technocratic Europe” are coming together and that European foreign policy is becoming more coherent. But, again, the overall picture is more complex. On some other issues, member states were quite prepared to undermine the EU institutions during the course of the year. Perhaps the most spectacular – and potentially damaging – example of this in 2013 was in the dispute with China over solar panels. The European Commission has a mandate to represent member states on trade issues and in September 2012 launched its biggest ever investigation into Chinese subsidies of solar-panel manufacturers. But, in 2013, member states such as Germany and the UK publicly undermined the tough approach taken by Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht.

Activism and leadership

In 2013, EU member states seemed to devote more time and attention to foreign policy than they had in the previous three years. In December, the European Council even discussed defence issues for the first time since the crisis had begun – though, because of resistance from France, Germany, and the UK, it agreed only modest steps to improve defence infrastructure rather than military co-operation and to discuss the issue again this year. But, although member states were somewhat more engaged on international issues in 2013, foreign policymaking was – perhaps as a result of this – also more confrontational and there were fewer identifiable coalitions than in 2011 and 2012 as member states seemed to pursue unilateral foreign policies.

In the past we have often found that the most activist countries in the EU have emerged as the de facto leaders of European foreign policy. But leadership does not simply come from having good ideas and committing resources to them; it also requires other countries to want to follow. This year we have found a greater distinction between activism and leadership as many of the bigger member states have subtly changed their approach to the EU.

France was undoubtedly the most activist EU member state in 2013. It undertook a military intervention in Mali in January, offered support for a US military strike on Syria after the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons in August, insisted on concessions from Iran in the second round of the E3+3 talks the same month, and led another military intervention, this time in the Central African Republic, in December. But France was a leader that often had few followers and sometimes acted alone. Although it was willing to co-operate with European partners where they agreed with its policy (at the end of 2013, President François Hollande called for the EU to fund military operations undertaken by member states), it was also willing to operate outside the EU framework where necessary. It also took a big gamble by insisting on further concessions from Iran in the second round of talks in Geneva in November – though it ultimately paid off and produced what from a European perspective is generally regarded as a better deal.

Alongside France, the UK sought first to arm the rebels in Syria and then to support the idea of military strikes after Assad's use of chemical weapons. But Cameron's mishandling of a parliamentary vote on Syria in August meant that the UK could not take part in military action. Some saw in the parliamentary vote a shift away from the liberal interventionism of the Blair years that Cameron had continued, for example in the Libya intervention in 2011. But perhaps more emblematic of British foreign policy in 2013 was Britain's apparent abandonment of its previous commitment to human rights in pursuit of inward investment – particularly its approach to China. It seemed to pursue a more modest, commercially driven diplomacy that emphasises the idea of a "global race" and bilateral trading links over more ambitious policy goals.

Meanwhile, Germany, which had been the top leader in the previous two years, seemed to be somewhat absent from foreign policymaking this year – in part, perhaps, because of the election in September, in which Angela Merkel was elected to a third term as chancellor. There was, however, a surprising development in German foreign policy – the emergence of a more critical stance on Russia. Berlin played a leading role in European attempts to persuade Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership countries to sign free trade agreements with the EU. It also

played a crucial role supporting Ashton in the negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia and played a key role on TTIP – a German priority. But it undermined the European Commission in the dispute with China over solar panels. By seeking to exempt the OPAL pipeline from the Third Energy Package, it also continued to undermine European attempts to reduce dependence on Russian gas. We identified Germany as a “slacker” four times in 2013 – more than any other member state apart from Greece.

Thus each of the big three member states seemed to undergo a shift in their approach to foreign policy in 2013. It could even be argued that France became more “British” in its approach, the UK became more “German”, and Germany became more “Polish”. However, perhaps a more significant shift is the way that the big three have seemed collectively to become less central to European foreign policymaking than in the past. Three other member states have stepped into the vacuum that they have left. In particular, Sweden has shown leadership on a wide range of issues – putting it on a par with the E3 in the number of components on which it plays an active role. Its activism extends from work alongside Poland in the eastern neighbourhood, to its support for Turkish membership, and traditional strengths such as welcoming refugees, support for multilateralism, and development aid.

Italy, a country that has punched below its weight in previous years, made a remarkable comeback in 2013. In the last three years, Italian leaders have unsurprisingly focused on the euro crisis and the country’s economic problems. Thus, in 2012, Italy led on only three components of European foreign policy (though it was a “slacker” significantly less than in 2011). But, after taking over in April, the government of Prime Minister Enrico Letta re-engaged at a European and international level and led on 10 components. In particular, it played a constructive role in the neighbourhood and was an outspoken supporter of a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Syria. It also increased development aid for the first time in several years. The dramatic improvement in Italy’s performance suggests again that personalities can make a difference in foreign policy.

Poland is another country that has cemented its role as a leader of European foreign policy. In 2013, Poland successfully used the alliances on Russia and Eastern Europe that it has built in recent years to advance an ambitious agenda in the eastern neighbourhood. It used alliances with Sweden and Germany in particular to push for assistance to eastern partners and visa-free travel. Although Warsaw’s activism is perhaps more focused on its own neighbourhood than Sweden’s or Italy’s, the Polish government made a point of showing activism

outside its immediate region. This included a role in pushing the idea of inspections for Syria’s chemical weapons with the Russians, organising trips to the Middle East and, together with Italy, Spain, and Sweden, supporting the idea of a European Global Strategy.

Figure 4

“Leaders” and “slackers” among EU member states

LEADERS	On no. of components	SLACKERS	On no. of components
France	12	Germany	4
UK	11	Greece	4
Germany	10	Bulgaria	3
Sweden	10	Cyprus	3
Italy	9	Slovenia	3
Poland	5	Spain	3
Spain	4	UK	3
Austria	4	France	2
Estonia	4	Ireland	2
Slovakia	4	Italy	2
Lithuania	3	Netherlands	2
Denmark	3	Portugal	2
Finland	3	Austria	1
Latvia	3	Belgium	1
Luxembourg	3	Croatia	1
The Netherlands	3	Hungary	1
Belgium	2	Romania	1
Hungary	2	Sweden	1
Ireland	2	Czech Republic	0
Romania	2	Denmark	0
Cyprus	1	Estonia	0
Malta	1	Finland	0
Portugal	0	Latvia	0
Bulgaria	0	Lithuania	0
Croatia	0	Luxembourg	0
Czech Republic	0	Malta	0
Greece	0	Poland	0
Slovenia	0	Slovakia	0

Two transatlantic stories

If Europe's two big foreign-policy successes in 2013 were the culmination of ambitious policies developed before the euro crisis began, the question is whether Europeans are still capable of such ambition now. Europeans are still struggling to build institutions in response to the euro crisis and to create growth – and are therefore both less focused on foreign policy and more focused on economic objectives within foreign policy. So could Europeans produce successes like the breakthroughs on Iran and on Serbia and Kosovo in the future? Or are the two success stories of 2013 merely the “long tail” of the EU's pre-crisis halcyon days?

In fact, just as two long-term European foreign-policy projects finally produced results, Europeans also undertook an ambitious new project that could be equally important in the long run. In his State of the Union speech in January 2013, President Barack Obama announced that the EU and the US would begin negotiations on a free trade agreement, TTIP, that would aim to reduce non-tariff barriers between Europe and the US and, according to the European Commission, could bring economic benefits for the EU of €119 billion a year (and €95 billion a year for the US). Media attention focused on France's attempt to exempt its cultural sector but, by the end of the year, three rounds of negotiations had been completed. We gave Europe an A for relations with the US on trade and investment.

TTIP could be the EU's next big success story, but, like Iran and Kosovo, it could also take a decade to yield results. In particular, TTIP is unlikely to produce huge immediate economic benefits in the short term. In fact, recent research suggests that some parts of the EU may even suffer in economic terms from the trade diversion effects that TTIP is expected to produce. Nevertheless, in the long term, a transatlantic free trade area could have important strategic as well as economic benefits. Together with the parallel Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), it could allow Europeans to set new standards in global trade and investment and even give an impetus to the reinvigoration of multilateral trade talks. Some even see TTIP as a way to reinvent the West for the 21st century – the geo-economic equivalent of an alliance.

However, just as European and American governments were uniting around the importance of a trade deal, transatlantic unity was undermined by former US intelligence officer Edward Snowden's revelations about NSA surveillance and spying on EU governments. In particular, it was revealed that the NSA had tapped German Chancellor Angela Merkel's mobile phone. This led to a serious

crisis in transatlantic relations, and in particular German-US relations, and also to an intra-European split between the UK, which co-operates with the US as part of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangement, and other member states. The public outrage that the NSA has spawned could be more damaging to the transatlantic relationship than the Iraq war was a decade ago.

If it were up to leaders, it would be easy to envisage the two sides of the Atlantic kissing and making up. But governments – along with their intelligence services – are increasingly boxed in by public opinion. European publics are still smarting from the perception that US intelligence agencies are as oblivious to the rights of allies as they are scrupulous at upholding the rights of their own citizens. This could still have consequences for TTIP as fears about data privacy make it more difficult to have mutual recognition of regulations on digital services and government procurement. There will be resistance to give American companies access to European government programmes if they leave a “back door” open for US intelligence agencies. Rather than becoming the economic foundation for a new Atlantic century, the deal that emerges could therefore be so riddled with opt-outs and exemptions that it has little effect.

In 2013, we gave Europeans a C- for their performance on relations with the US on intelligence co-operation and data protection in 2013, compared to an A in 2010 and a B+ in 2011 (there was no comparable component for 2012). The change in the scores represents a change of perspective that the Snowden revelations will bring about. It shows that the European intelligence services were willing co-conspirators in measures that undermined European civil liberties. This will be harder with the intensification of scrutiny that Snowden has inspired.

In other words, there were two transatlantic stories in 2013: one of intensified co-operation on trade and investment; and another of increasing European distrust of the US on intelligence and data protection. So far, European leaders have resisted linking the two stories and TTIP negotiations have not been derailed. In other words, things could have been worse in 2013. But TTIP negotiations will continue in 2014 and the agreement will have to be ratified by the US Congress and the European Parliament, which may link data protection issues to TTIP. As a result, there may be more friction between Europe and the US this year at a time when, in order to agree an ambitious and complex trade deal that goes into sensitive areas of policy, they need to co-operate more closely than ever.

The calm before the storm?

Overall, 2013 was a good year for European foreign policy with some major achievements and the possibility of strategic breakthroughs in the future. However, many of the foreign-policy challenges that Europeans faced in 2013 could blow up in 2014. Syria still has the potential to metastasise across the region; the Iran nuclear deal could still fall apart; and there is much potential for instability on Europe's eastern flank.

Meanwhile, the increased focus on foreign policy by member states in 2013 was in part a function of the relative stability within the eurozone. Following ECB President Mario Draghi's promise in the middle of 2012 to do "whatever it takes" to save the euro and the subsequent introduction of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), the euro crisis has become less acute. But there are no guarantees that this stability will continue through 2014. In particular, although a banking union was agreed at the European Council in December, it falls short of what many economists think is necessary to restore Europe's banking sector to health and produce liquidity in the periphery. But more likely, and more worryingly, there could be a resurgence of political turmoil in 2014 – in particular, if Eurosceptic parties do well in the European Parliament elections. In this context, it seems unlikely that European leaders will have as much headspace for foreign affairs next year unless they choose to make it. Let us hope that they do.

China

Overall grade

B-

Overall grade 2012 **C+**

Overall grade 2011 **C**



	2013	2012	2011
TRADE LIBERALISATION AND OVERALL RELATIONSHIP	B	C+	C+
1 Formats of the Europe–China dialogue	B	B-	C+
2 Investment and market access in China	B+	B-	C+
3 Trade disputes with China	B-	B	B-
4 EU-China solar panels case	B-	n/a	n/a
HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE	C	C	D+
5 Rule of law and human rights in China	C	C	D+
CO-OPERATION ON REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ISSUES	B-	B-	B-
6 Relations with China on Syria, wider Middle East and North Africa	B-	n/a	n/a
7 Relations with China on DPRK and East Asia security challenges	B-	B	n/a
8 Relations with China on Africa	B	B-	B-
9 Co-operation with China in global governance institutions	B-	C-	C-
10 Co-operation with China on environment and energy	B+	B+	B+

China completed its power transition in March 2013 when government positions were filled five months after the new leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took over. President Xi Jinping asserted his authority and ideological control with a campaign against corruption. However, he has not yet found a solution to China’s domestic social and economic problems. In foreign policy, China sought to enhance its position as the dominant power in the region. China clashed with India and the Philippines over territorial issues, but pressure was increasingly directed at Japan, which was also a test of its alliance with the US. China was determined to strengthen its own relationship with the US, but on the basis of recognition as a “big power”, as Xi put it at his meeting with President Barack Obama. As China also sought to enhance relations with Russia, India, and major partners in Africa and Latin America, Europe did not seem to figure highly on China’s political agenda. The relationship was defined more by economic issues – in particular, a trade dispute initiated by the EU.

The EU, on the other hand, sought Chinese co-operation on Syria, Mali, and the Iranian nuclear problem, issues on which China was more co-operative than in previous years. In the area of trade, the EU accelerated ongoing negotiations

for preferential trade agreements with Asian countries, starting a new one with Japan. The move contrasts with the slow progress of talks with China on public procurement, investment, an early warning mechanism to defuse trade disputes, and a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement which seems to have gone nowhere after five years of negotiation. As 2013 drew to a close, China seemed to be more forthcoming: after agreeing to a high-level economic dialogue it had stalled for two years, and reaching a compromise over the solar panel dispute (the country's first ever compromise over an anti-dumping measure), Beijing suddenly proclaimed the opening of talks on a free trade agreement as a priority.

The solar panel dispute dominated the first half of the year. It was a priority for China because of the increase in sales of Chinese solar panels to Europe – and to the US, which had also slapped anti-dumping duties on China a few months before. But Chinese manufacturers have created a production capacity that surpasses by far the size of the global market. Playing on its strength as a potential investor, and on possible retaliation against European firms, China lobbied EU member states effectively and undermined support for the European Commission's tough approach. Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht found himself almost completely isolated (France was the only vocal supporter). Germany's public stand against the sanctions was a heavy blow.

Trade policy itself, one of the EU's key achievements, began to unravel. De Gucht's resolve – much criticised behind the scenes by governments, which did not want a showdown with China – saved the day, although the compromise that was eventually reached was also the result of a negotiation between European Commission President José Manuel Barroso and Prime Minister Li Keqiang. Under the agreement, Chinese firms can avoid sanctions by agreeing to a minimum price. Tensions remain high on other issues (such as the subsidies offered to China's telecom giants), but the very principle of an EU trade policy, which was threatened by the total lack of solidarity among member states, has been preserved. Given the coming change at the head of the European Commission, the question of whether any strong negotiating position can be upheld remains open, as member states routinely undercut each other and the Commission in front of Chinese officials.

The second half of the year was more positive. With the adoption of the “EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Co-operation”, the EU–China summit held in Beijing in November proved fruitful. Both sides declared themselves willing to strengthen the “strategic partnership”, mapping areas of special interests and areas of enhanced co-operation in the coming years. The summit committed to achieving an investment treaty, but by pushing suddenly for a free trade treaty

and hinting that it is open to talks with the US on joining the TPP, China may have switched the issue again at the top of the EU–China relationship. The European Commission, which has never encouraged “shallow free trade agreements”, takes the view that such an agreement makes sense only if it enables market access for European companies. De Gucht sent a clear signal to the Chinese government to be ready to make concessions it has not granted to other partners in preferential trade agreements. Other European leaders who want Chinese investment in their domestic economies, such as British Prime Minister David Cameron, again undercut the Commission by pressing for a speedy outcome.

Thus 2013 left Brussels weakened in relation to China. There were no high-level meetings between EU officials and Chinese leaders until November (except at the G20 summit in September). Meanwhile, leaders and officials from several member states met the Chinese president and prime minister in China. Xi didn’t travel to Europe in 2013, while Prime Minister Li visited Germany and Romania – but not Brussels. Furthermore, just a few days after the successful EU–China summit, the second 16+1 meeting between China and Central and Eastern European countries was held in Bucharest. However, the EU member states involved had consulted the European Commission in advance on decisions adopted there and agreed not to dilute common rules. Unlike last year, therefore, they have not been identified as “slackers”.

The experience from new Chinese initiatives directed to selected member states should teach the EU important lessons for relations with China in the coming years. First, the co-ordination between bilateral relations of member states with the overall framework of the EU–China relationship has taken priority. Absent a new united push or resolve that would ensure that the Commission’s trade negotiation mandate remains truly confidential, there is an increased likelihood that trade and investment bargaining with China will be dominated by the highest bidders, and lowest common denominator positions will prevail. A second priority is to keep bilateral investment treaty (BIT) negotiations on track. While China sees in these negotiations a tool to guarantee minimal rules for what is already free access with very few restrictions (unlike in the US), Europe has the objective of opening up investment and public procurement prospects in China. Securing an outcome of the negotiations that meet the objectives will be a test of the EU’s strategic partnership with China.

01 FORMATS OF THE EUROPE-CHINA DIALOGUE

The EU and China adopted a plan for strategic co-operation, but a coherent approach was complicated by member states' bilateral relations with China.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	2/5	3/5	3/5
Resources	2/5	3/5	3/5
Outcome	5/10	5/10	7/10
Total	9/20	11/20	13/20

B

2011 C+ 2012 B-

During the first half of 2013, which marked the tenth anniversary of the EU–China Strategic Partnership and was overshadowed by the EU–China solar panel dispute, there were no high-level meetings between the EU and the new Chinese leadership: although High Representative Catherine Ashton travelled to China in April, she did not meet President Xi Jinping or Prime Minister Li Keqiang. In May, Li visited Europe (Germany, Iceland, and Switzerland), but did not stop in Brussels. He instead sent his envoy to discuss the solar panels case.

After the provisional settlement of the solar panel dispute, the atmosphere in EU–China relations improved. In October, the High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue was held for the first time since 2010. This discussion prepared the ground for the 16th EU–China Summit, which took place in November – the first opportunity for European Commission President José Manuel Barroso and European Council President Herman Van Rompuy to meet the new Chinese leaders in person. The summit adopted the “EU–China 2020

Strategic Agenda for Co-operation”, which, if fully implemented, would expand greatly sectoral co-operation. China and the EU also agreed to open negotiations on a BIT (bilateral investment treaty) and launch a new EU–China Innovation Co-operation Dialogue, which supplements a plethora of EU–China dialogues covering almost all areas of the relationship.

The development of a coherent European approach to China continued to be complicated by member states' bilateral relations with China. Chinese leaders met the heads of state of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, and the Netherlands. The second 16+1 meeting between China and Central and Eastern European countries was also held in Bucharest. However, the EU member states participating in the forum had consulted the European Commission in advance, and agreed that any infrastructure deal financed as a result of a broad €10 billion package advertised by China would follow EU rules on public markets and tenders. The Commission was also represented.

02 INVESTMENT AND MARKET ACCESS IN CHINA

The EU and China opened negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty, which the EU used to discuss market access concerns.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	3/5	5/5
Resources	3/5	4/5	4/5
Outcome	5/10	4/10	6/10
Total	12/20	11/20	15/20

B+

2011 B- 2012 B-

The EU wants China to create a level playing field in market access, respect intellectual property rights and meet its WTO obligations. In 2013 the most important event was the decision to open negotiations on a BIT (bilateral investment treaty). After opening negotiations on a free trade agreement with Japan and the TTIP with the US, launching negotiations with China is another important EU initiative to liberalise economic relations with major trade and investment partners. It is the first mandate given to the European Commission to negotiate a standalone investment agreement following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

Initial discussion about the BIT took place at the EU–China summit in September 2012, and in May the European Commission formally asked the member states for a mandate to open negotiations with China. In Beijing in June, Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht confirmed that the two main objectives of the negotiations would be the improvement of protection of EU investments in China and Chinese investments in Europe, as well

as better access to the Chinese market. In discussion with Chinese officials, he also raised European concerns related to market access in some sectors such as cosmetics and medical devices, as well as licensing and market access issues in the area of financial and telecommunication services.

In October, the Commission received a mandate from member states to negotiate the BIT, and at the EU–China summit in Beijing in November both sides agreed to start negotiations. The BIT is in the interest of China, which feels excluded from TTIP and TPP and the EU’s trade deals with its neighbours. By suddenly declaring its preference for an even broader free trade agreement, China may be trying to shift attention away from the requirements it needs to meet for the BIT. Given its overall trade surplus with Europe, China can afford the status quo as long as the EU does not achieve more far-reaching results with other major Asian partners.

03 TRADE DISPUTES WITH CHINA

As the European Commission initiated new important anti-dumping investigations, China sought the support of individual EU member states.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	4/5	3/5
Resources	3/5	3/5	4/5
Outcome	5/10	6/10	5/10
Total	11/20	13/20	12/20

B-

2011 B- 2012 B

Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht has emphasised on many occasions that Europe would continue to take necessary actions to combat unfair trading practices through dispute-settlement procedures in the WTO or domestic trade defence measures. The Commission has the power to investigate trade complaints and impose punitive tariffs, but such decisions have to be approved by member states. In practice, this gives China the possibility to pressure individual governments to oppose the measures.

As well as the solar panel dispute (see component 4), there were other trade disputes pending or initiated by the EU or China in 2013. In February, a WTO panel confirmed that China's anti-dumping duties on X-ray security scanners from the EU were in breach of WTO anti-dumping rules. These duties had been imposed by China in January 2011, after the EU had decided to impose anti-dumping duties on cargo scanners from China in June 2010 – making it look like a retaliatory action against the EU. The EU also challenged WTO anti-dumping duties (introduced

in November 2012) on solderless steel tubes from the EU, a key sub-component for nuclear plants where China now seeks a commanding position. In 2013, China threatened to impose anti-dumping duties on imports of selected products from the EU such as wine and luxury cars, but did not proceed after the solar panel dispute was settled. Important European Commission investigations continued into subsidies to China's telecom industry giants Huawei and ZTE.

During meetings with officials from member states in 2013, China often raised the issue of trade disputes, indirectly or directly asking member states for amicable settlements. Unwilling to jeopardise their bilateral relations and afraid of retaliatory measures by China, member states became less vocal in support of EU measures against Chinese imports. In particular, David Cameron systematically undercut the European Commission and promoted Britain as far more progressive on trade than other EU member states during his trip to Beijing in December.

04 EU-CHINA SOLAR PANELS CASE

Europeans were deeply divided by the solar panel case, the biggest trade dispute of the year. But, despite disunity, the settlement was a positive outcome for Europe.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	n/a	n/a	0/5
Resources	n/a	n/a	5/5
Outcome	n/a	n/a	6/10
Total	n/a	n/a	11/20

B-

2011 – 2012 –

In September 2012, the European Commission launched an anti-dumping investigation against Chinese photovoltaic manufacturers after a case was brought by a German manufacturer. In the first half of 2013, it became the major issue in EU–China relations as it concerned about €21 billion of Chinese solar panels sold in the EU. Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht explained that the EU objective was “to remove the injury to European industry caused by illegal dumping, and at the same time ensure that European users and customers benefit from cheap supply of solar panels”.

While France, Italy, and Spain strongly backed De Gucht, at least 15 other member states voiced their opposition to punitive tariffs on Chinese solar panels. Perhaps most significant was Germany, which Li Keqiang visited at a crucial stage in the dispute on his first trip to Europe as prime minister. After he met Chancellor Angela Merkel, she officially criticised the Commission’s plan to impose tariffs on Chinese solar panels. De Gucht came under pressure not only from China and

some member states, but also from the Alliance for Affordable Solar Energy, a lobby group of Chinese and European companies, which also opposed the planned tariffs.

In June, the Commission finally decided to impose provisional tariffs of 11.8 percent on Chinese solar panels but gave China two months to settle the dispute before a higher level of duties was implemented. Beijing responded by announcing an investigation into European wine and polysilicon exports (the powder substance for solar panels) into the country, which put additional pressure on the EU and some member states to find a quick and acceptable solution and avoid a trade war. In late July, after intense discussions, China and the European Commission agreed to set a minimal price on solar panels. The European Commission was weakened by the failure of member states collectively to back it. Nevertheless, despite the disunity, the settlement was a positive outcome for Europe.

05 RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA

The EU discussed issues with China and published statements criticising the detention of activists. Political repression in China continues, but the CCP has signalled some changes on some specific issues of concern for the EU.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	2/5	3/5	2/5
Resources	1/5	3/5	2/5
Outcome	2/10	2/10	4/10
Total	5/20	8/20	8/20

C

2011 D+ 2012 C

Rule of law and human rights are among the core values that the EU aims to promote in the world but one of the most sensitive issues in relations with China. In 2013, rule of law problems and human rights violations continued in China, despite announcements by China's new leaders that fighting corruption and strengthening the rule of law are among their political priorities. Europeans welcomed such announcements but stressed the need to implement necessary measures to achieve these priorities. They also criticised China for detaining civil rights activists who advocated the rule of law, transparency, social justice, and other concerns of Chinese society, and called on China to respect the right to freedom of expression. One area where China is signalling change is the death penalty: the CCP has announced the number of capital offences would be gradually diminished. Oddly, however, the EU seems not have taken notice.

Another round of the EU–China dialogue took place in June, in Guiyang, but it was the usual exchange of views without tangible

progress on individual problems the EU had previously raised. In September, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, Stavros Lambrinidis, visited China, including ethnic Tibetan areas in Qinghai Province and the Tibet region. During his visit, he presented a long list of the EU's issues of concern: restrictions on the freedom of expression; prosecution, arrest, and detention of people for peacefully expressing their views; the human rights situation in minority areas, including Tibet and Xinjiang; freedom of religion and belief; and the death penalty. Some member states such as Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Slovenia, and the UK raised human rights at the UNHRC in October and in meetings with Chinese officials, but few openly criticised China. It is therefore difficult to speak of any "leaders" in this area of European foreign policy. However, the UK, traditionally a supporter of human rights in China and which increasingly focused on promoting exports and inward investment in 2013, stands out as a "slacker".

06 RELATIONS WITH CHINA ON SYRIA, WIDER MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

China backed the UNSC resolution on Syria and supported the agreement on Iran's nuclear programme.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	n/a	n/a	3/5
Resources	n/a	n/a	3/5
Outcome	n/a	n/a	5/10
Total	n/a	n/a	11/20

B-

2011 – 2012 –

The EU wants Chinese co-operation in dealing with problems in the Middle East and North Africa, especially when doing so requires diplomatic solutions through major powers' mediation or resolutions adopted by the UNSC. In 2013, two major issues were high on the agenda: the conflict in Syria and the Iranian nuclear programme.

Europeans struggled to find a common position on Syria and therefore did not have a common objective in relation to China. But some EU member states wanted to arm the Syrian opposition, and after a chemical attack in Damascus in August were even ready to back a US-led military response. But China – which had vetoed three UNSC resolutions on Syria in 2012 – was opposed to a UNSC resolution on Syria mandating military action. This opposition was based largely on the lesson China drew from the Libya crisis in 2011, when it abstained in the UNSC vote on a “no-fly zone” but saw the resolution used by Western powers to remove Muammar Gaddafi from power. As a result, although China does not have a strategic stake in

Syria (although it has backed Iran and, by extension, Hezbollah), it sided with Russia in opposing action against the Assad regime. It did, however, condemn the chemical attack in Damascus, called for a full UN investigation, and, at the end of September, supported the UNSC resolution to remove and destroy chemical weapons in Syria.

Europeans were more united on policy towards Iran and, by extension, about what they wanted from China. China's role in negotiations with Iran within the framework of E3+3 (France, Germany, and the UK plus China, Russia, and the US) was overshadowed by that of other participants. Its basic position is that Iran has the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and it sees dialogue and diplomacy as the solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and is opposed to unilateral sanctions. China supported the interim agreement achieved during talks in Geneva in November.

07 RELATIONS WITH CHINA ON DPRK AND EAST ASIA SECURITY CHALLENGES

The EU's role in the security sphere in East Asia remains limited. It is largely inactive on North Korea and embarrassed by the growing maritime disputes in the region.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	n/a	4/5	5/5
Resources	n/a	3/5	1/5
Outcome	n/a	6/10	5/10
Total	n/a	13/20	11/20

B-

2011 – 2012 B

While Europeans want stability in Asia because of their economic interests in the region, they do not perceive potential instability as a direct threat to European security. As a result, they play only a limited role on East Asian security issues (except, perhaps, in terms of arms sales). In June 2012, the EU released updated guidelines on its foreign and security policy in East Asia. The document basically argued for legal resolution, arbitration of disputes, and humanitarian action, while stressing continued reliance on the US as the main security guarantor.

For China, the most important security issues in its neighbourhood include the North Korean nuclear issue, the dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, as well as the territorial conflict with the Philippines. More broadly, China claims a huge maritime domain, which overlaps with that of many other neighbours and would eventually bring China beyond the “first island chain” into the open Pacific and imply a future regional parity with the US. In 2013, in reaction to provocative North

Korean actions, China backed a UNSC resolution imposing additional sanctions.

The EU supported these sanctions against North Korea and released statements condemning its nuclear threats, but did not take a stand on maritime disputes in the region. In particular, it did not express a position on China’s restrictive definition of freedom of navigation in its Exclusive Economic Zone. When, in December, China extended the zone into the airspace above the East China Sea, the EU did release a declaration of concern and called on all sides to exercise caution and restraint. The EU–Japan Joint Summit statement also provided some encouragement to Japan in its diplomatic efforts. France and the UK led on East Asian security by deepening security co-operation with Japan, in particular on defence equipment. But, on the whole, Europe remained a spectator in what could emerge as the most important geopolitical competition of the 21st century.

08 RELATIONS WITH CHINA ON AFRICA

Although European and Chinese interests differ, China seemed more willing than before to engage in addressing security challenges in Africa.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	3/5	4/5
Resources	3/5	3/5	3/5
Outcome	5/10	5/10	6/10
Total	12/20	11/20	13/20

B

2011 B- 2012 B-

The EU wants to co-operate with China in Africa in the framework of trilateral dialogue and co-operation on peace, stability, and sustainable development, as described in a European Commission communication in 2008. The EU identified four areas for such co-operation: peace and security; support for African infrastructure; sustainable management of the environment and infrastructure; and agriculture and food security. This was the response of the EU to the rising engagement of China in Africa. Among the priorities of the EU in Africa, peace and security is the area in which the EU is the most willing to co-operate with China. China's interests differ from those of the EU and it has a special focus on infrastructure development. But in recent years China has become more involved in addressing security challenges and has taken a more flexible approach towards the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, as Chinese facilities and workers have become the targets for attacks and kidnapping in Niger, Nigeria, and Sudan.

In 2013, China increased its participation in peacekeeping missions in Africa. It co-operated with European forces in Mali, and in May it announced it was sending 500 combat troops under the UN – a first. The anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden was another area of co-operation. The Chinese government has dispatched 37 warships and 10,000 naval personnel to the waters of Somalia, escorting more than 5,000 vessels. Actual co-ordination remains minimal, but in 2013 European and Chinese naval forces jointly escorted World Food Programme ships carrying aid to Somalia and discussed a joint counter-piracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden. Europeans also worked with China within the Africa–China–EU Expert Working Group on Conventional Arms. The group met a few times in 2013 to discuss opportunities for EU–China co-operation in preventing illegal trade in small arms and light weapons in African countries.

09 CO-OPERATION WITH CHINA IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS

China was more co-operative in global governance institutions, but its position was closer to that of other emerging powers.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	2/5	3/5
Resources	2/5	2/5	3/5
Outcome	2/5	2/10	6/10
Total	7/20	6/20	12/20

B-

2011 C- 2012 C-

The EU wants China to take more responsibility for addressing global security and economic challenges, especially through co-operation at the UN and G20. Under its new leadership, China seemed a more constructive partner in consultations with Europe in response to crises that occurred in 2013. In March, it supported UN sanctions against North Korea. After vetoing three UNSC resolutions against Syria in the past, China supported the resolution adopted after the chemical attack in Damascus. In November, it proved co-operative in the framework of the E3+3 in Geneva talks on Iran's nuclear programme. It was also willing to play a more active role in the UN peacekeeping operations and contributed combat troops to the French-led mission in Mali in 2013. This represented a shift in the Chinese approach towards peacekeeping operations: its participation in previous missions had included only logistical and medical personnel.

The EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Co-operation, adopted in November,

included reinforced co-operation in multilateral forums, including co-ordination before major meetings. But China perceives itself as a representative of developing countries in discussions among big powers. In a position paper for the UNGA in September, for example, China called for UNSC reform and better representation for developing countries. In 2013, it was not the EU but other emerging powers that held consultations with China before major international meetings. Before the G20 summit in St Petersburg, the BRICS countries held an informal meeting to prepare a common position. Before the UN Climate Change Conference, in Warsaw in November, China adopted a common position with Brazil, South Africa, and India that fell short of European expectations. At the G20 summit, China agreed to the EU's proposal for setting up the automatic exchange of tax information among G20 members. In short, although China seemed willing to take a more active role in global governance in 2013, its position was often far from that of the EU.

10 CO-OPERATION WITH CHINA ON ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY

The EU and China developed bilateral dialogues on energy and environment. Difficult climate talks left some hope for a climate deal.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	4/5	5/5
Resources	4/5	5/5	4/5
Outcome	7/10	6/10	5/10
Total	15/20	15/20	14/20

B+

2011 B+ 2012 B+

The EU supports China in moving to a low-carbon economy, tackling environmental problems, and addressing climate change. Through dialogues on energy, environment, climate, and urbanisation, the EU contributes to raising awareness of China in those fields, while its incredibly high level of air pollution creates much domestic anxiety, but much less international outrage. In recent years, China has launched several programmes on energy conservation, renewable energy development, and climate change, and put important energy and climate change targets in the 12th Five-Year Plan. Learning from the European experience, China launched a pilot carbon emissions exchange, in Shenzhen in June and later in several cities, on the way to the establishment of a national emissions trading system in 2016.

At the EU–China Environmental Policy Dialogue in July, both sides agreed to enhance co-operation on such issues as biodiversity, chemicals, sustainable consumption and production, and air pollution. The EU and China also agreed

to launch two new initiatives: the EU–China Environmental Sustainability Programme and the Environment Forum to be convened every two years. Sustainable development became one of the four pillars of the EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Co-operation.

The EU also seeks Chinese co-operation in working out a global climate change agreement. But, in global climate talks, European and Chinese positions often diverge. At the UN Climate Change Conference, in Warsaw in November, they clashed above all on two issues. The first concerned the issue of “loss and damage” and the question of historical emissions, supported by China and rejected by the EU and other developed countries fearing automatic compensation in case of events related to climate change. The second concerned the form of the obligations to be submitted by parties. On this issue, the EU confronted China. In the agreed text in Warsaw, the word “commitments” was replaced with the much weaker “intended contributions”, an outcome that did not fully satisfy the EU.

Russia

Overall grade

C+

Overall grade 2012 **B-**

Overall grade 2011 **C+**



	2013	2012	2011
TRADE LIBERALISATION AND OVERALL RELATIONSHIP	B-	B	B
11 Trade liberalisation with Russia	B+	B+	A-
12 Visa liberalisation with Russia	C+	B-	B-
HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE	C	C	C-
13 Rule of law and human rights in Russia	C	C+	C-
14 Political freedom in Russia	C	n/a	n/a
EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES	C+	B-	B-
15 Relations with Russia on the Eastern Partnership	C+	B-	C+
16 Relations with Russia on protracted conflicts	C	C+	C+
17 Relations with Russia on energy issues	B+	B	B-
18 Diversification of gas-supply routes to Europe	C-	C+	B-
CO-OPERATION ON REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ISSUES	B-	B-	C+
19 Relations with Russia on the wider Middle East	B-	B	B-
20 Relations with Russia on the Arctic	B-	B	n/a

In the previous edition of the European Foreign Policy Scorecard, the EU's relations with Russia emerged as a surprising success story: where Europeans were once divided, they were now united. This positive background is part of the reason why the EU's Russia policy during 2013 looks somewhat disappointing: one would have hoped that the EU would have managed to translate its unity of analyses into at least marginally effective policies. Sadly, this did not happen in 2013. But neither did the member states retreat into pursuing purely bilateral relationships with Russia. Even though different countries prioritised different issues and there was not always a common line in the EU's exchanges with Russia, basic strategic unity remained, waiting to be utilised.

2013 was the year when President Vladimir Putin's regime, weakened by the protests that took place in 2011 and 2012, consolidated itself. Overt political repression remained selective – possibly influenced by infighting among the loyalist elites, who prefer different ways of dealing with dissent. There were few new political arrests and an amnesty announced in December ended many of the political court cases which had been dragging on ever since the protests of 2012 or, in the case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a decade longer. Regional

elections even saw some relatively free and fair votes – the Moscow mayoral election being the most prominent example. At the same time, the Kremlin upgraded its control over elites, demanding a higher degree of loyalty than used to be the case and further limiting the space for free exchanges. The December amnesty did away with some prominent symbols of the arbitrary justice system, but left the system itself intact. The political opposition tried to organise itself but is not yet in a position to pose a real challenge to the powers that be.

Having lost the support of urban liberal groups, the Kremlin resorted to conservative values and illiberal rhetoric to mobilise the rest of society. As a result, the human rights situation deteriorated to new lows, with sexual, racial, and national minorities as well as political protesters being affected. Most prominent among the measures was legislation adopted in late June that bans “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations to minors”. Condemned by rights organisations as highly discriminatory, it prompted an outcry in the West and a new wave of homophobia in Russia. Criticism by Europeans of discriminatory measures was used by Russian spin-doctors to portray the West as “decadent and amoral”.

Europeans were taken aback towards the end of the year when Moscow’s threats and pressure prevented Ukraine from signing an Association Agreement with the EU in the framework of the Eastern Partnership policy. Europeans were insufficiently aware of the real nature of discussions going on inside Ukraine, or between Kiev and Moscow, and unable to answer Russian pressure on either a political or an economic level. Torn between normative and geopolitical approaches towards Ukraine, the EU in the end played neither well. Europeans were also unable to influence Russian policy in the Middle East, and in particular on Syria. Having spent years trying to persuade Russia to act more decisively on Syria, Europeans suddenly lacked a role as well as a common position when Russia finally moved in September and brokered an agreement to remove and destroy chemical weapons.

In theory, Europeans have some leverage over Russia as its most important trading partner. Russia also wants visa-liberalisation from Europe and has a stake in the success of the Sochi Winter Olympics, which take place in February, as well as other upcoming international events, such as the G8 summit in the summer. But Europeans have not managed to use this leverage to influence Russia’s political behaviour. They have not found a comprehensive approach in their relations with Russia – one that would allow them to co-operate with Russia where appropriate, and use this co-operation to put pressure on Moscow

on human and political rights questions, rather than allow the Kremlin to use it to legitimise the regime at home.

Trade and energy were the only spheres where the EU managed to demonstrate its strength and resolve. In July, frustrated by Russia's unwillingness to implement WTO rules, the EU filed a complaint with the WTO, requesting consultations on Russian legislation and effectively launching the WTO dispute settlement process. The anti-trust case against Gazprom also continued. After a year of investigation, mainly in Central and Eastern Europe, the European Commission started to prepare a charge against Gazprom, which could cost the company up to €11 billion.

As a result of the Commission's resolve, together with the Third Energy Package, there is now discussion in Russia about whether to split up Gazprom into a transport and extraction company. As other companies on the Russian energy market such as Rosneft and Novatek emerge, Gazprom is losing its export monopoly. Member states have not undermined the European Commission on the anti-trust case. But not all member states will achieve the objectives of the internal energy market as demanded in the Third Energy Package. At the same time, the German government supports Gazprom's attempt to exempt the OPAL pipeline, which links Nord Stream with the European gas network, from the Third Energy Package.

The EU's diversification policy also suffered a major blow in 2013 with the cancellation of the Nabucco pipeline by the Azerbaijan lead consortium of the Shaz Deniz 2 gas field. Nabucco was the key project of the EU's Southern Gas Corridor and was cancelled in exchange for the much smaller and shorter Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). This will give Turkey and Azerbaijan a greater role in the project. TAP was also supported by Italy – the final destination of the pipeline. At the same time, the Russian-led South Stream made progress: final agreements were reached with the transit countries and the pipeline began to be constructed on the Russian side. Beside Gazprom, stakeholders in South Stream include Italy's ENI, Germany's Wintershall, and France's EdF.

11 TRADE LIBERALISATION WITH RUSSIA

Rather than following WTO rules, Russia defended itself against them. The EU used WTO mechanisms to fight back.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	5/5	5/5	5/5
Resources	3/5	4/5	4/5
Outcome	8/10	5/10	5/10
Total	16/20	14/20	14/20

B+

2011 A- 2012 B+

Europeans want to see further trade liberalisation in Russia. However, since Russia joined the WTO, in August 2012, it has sought to avoid further liberalisation and to avoid even following WTO rules. The EU believes Russia is in breach of the rules in a long list of areas. The most prominent breach concerns recycling or scrapping fees for foreign-produced cars. The EU filed a complaint with the WTO, requesting consultations, and then launched a formal dispute-settlement process in the autumn. As a result, Russia revised the legislation, which penalised foreign producers. Changes came into effect on 1 January, but the EU is not convinced that discrimination will end in practice. Also, past experience has shown that when Russia removes barriers in one area, it almost always introduces new ones in other areas. Other outstanding disagreements with Russia concern livestock imports and pulp and paper.

In the second half of 2013, Russia also waged a covert trade war against some of the Eastern Partnership countries. In particular, it banned selected imports from Moldova and Ukraine in an apparent attempt to dissuade them from signing Association Agreements with the EU. In the same vein, Russia punished Lithuania, which held the rotating EU presidency, by banning the import of its dairy products, citing phytosanitary problems. It is in principle possible, according to WTO rules, to ban imports of certain goods, but the importer needs to single out concrete producers and show exactly how their production is sub-standard. Russia has done none of that. In theory, the EU could use WTO mechanisms to protest against such behaviour. But this is difficult because Russia's covert sanctions are "a moving target". It can easily switch between different import articles against which it discriminates, and the WTO's slow legal procedures make it hard to respond quickly enough.

12 VISA LIBERALISATION WITH RUSSIA

The EU insisted that Russia needed to meet the technical requirements for visa-free travel before a deal could be discussed, but floundered on details.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	5/5	3/5
Resources	3/5	3/5	3/5
Outcome	4/10	4/10	4/10
Total	11/20	12/20	10/20

C+

2011 B- 2012 B-

In 2013, it became clear that Russia would not achieve its goal of having visa-free travel with the EU by the time of the Sochi Winter Olympics. Technical process continued throughout 2013, but the human rights situation in Russia as well as the overall atmosphere of the relationship – made worse by the clash over the Eastern Partnership – prevented the EU from speeding it up. In December, the European Commission published a report that outlined the many outstanding concerns and did not give a clear green light to go ahead. Many member states also rightly insisted that Russia should not get visa freedom sooner than some of the Eastern Partnership countries that have done more to meet the criteria.

European unity briefly collapsed over the contentious issue of so-called service passports. Russia wants thousands of service passport holders to gain visa-free entry to the EU as diplomatic passport holders have since 2007. The EU has been against it, for reasons that have to do with security (there is no good overview of how such passports are given out in

Russia), parity (service passports are not very commonly used in the EU countries, although there are exceptions), and fairness (preferential treatment of service passport holders would effectively favour the representatives of the regime, rather than the civil society groups whom the EU nominally wants to endorse). Germany has led the blocking minority on the service passport issue. In March, it seemed to change its mind when foreign and interior ministers wrote to the European Commission asking for visa liberalisation for Russian service passport holders, which caused considerable confusion among other EU member states, but it subsequently backtracked.

The EU could have done a better job of informing the Russian public about the conditions of visa freedom. In this context, the publication in March of the hitherto restricted “common steps” document, which outlines the contours of the technical process, was a step in the right direction.

13 RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA

In 2013, the human rights situation in Russia deteriorated to new lows as sexual, racial, and national minorities as well as political protesters were affected. The EU failed to use its leverage.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	4/5	4/5
Resources	2/5	3/5	2/5
Outcome	2/10	2/10	2/10
Total	7/20	9/20	8/20

C

2011 C- 2012 C+

The most prominent development in human rights in Russia in 2013 was the adoption in June of legislation that bans “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations to minors”. It was condemned by human rights organisations as highly discriminatory and prompted an outcry in the West and calls to boycott the Sochi Winter Olympics. Meanwhile, on the ground in Russia – traditionally a conservative country when it comes to minority rights – it prompted a new wave of homophobia. Many same-sex couples are now afraid of losing custody of their children or their jobs and are considering emigration. Russian politicians and state-owned media used criticism by European leaders to portray the EU as a “decadent” place in which traditional values were in decline.

In 2013, for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, compulsory psychiatric treatment was used as de facto punishment for political protest. In October, Russia’s Investigative Committee announced that it had completed its probe into Mikhail Kosenko, who was arrested as a participant

of political protests in 2012, and asked the Prosecutor-General’s Office to refer him to a mental health institution for compulsory treatment. The situation of racial minorities also deteriorated – the influx of Central Asian and Caucasian immigrants to big Russian cities has fanned an anti-immigrant mood that increasingly finds expression in nationalist riots. The human rights situation is probably the worst in the Northern Caucasus, but the EU’s presence there is close to non-existent – and even getting information is now complicated.

The EU’s annual human rights report, compiled by the member states’ embassies in Moscow in collaboration with the EEAS, was highly critical of all abuses. Sweden stood out as the most principled member state. Germany also criticised Russia but, given its relationship with Russia, could perhaps have done more. Italy avoided criticism in the hope of persuading Russia to be of help in solving the Syrian crisis.

14 POLITICAL FREEDOM IN RUSSIA

In 2013, Russia implemented new laws restricting political freedom. The EU was critical but unable to find new ways of supporting political activism in Russia.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	n/a	n/a	4/5
Resources	n/a	n/a	2/5
Outcome	n/a	n/a	2/10
Total	n/a	n/a	8/20

C

2010 – 2011 –

Europeans seek to improve political freedom in Russia and have higher expectations than in a country such as China. But, in 2013, Russia implemented a set of restrictive laws hampering work conditions for NGOs, restricting freedom of assembly, re-criminalising slander, and re-defining treason. During the spring and early summer, prosecutors searched more than 2,000 NGOs; those that were found to be in breach of the new legislation were fined. Six NGOs were forced to close under various pretexts. In July, Alexei Navalny, a prominent opposition figure, was convicted and jailed on a fabricated case, only to be released pending appeal a day later. He was therefore able to participate in the mayoral elections in Moscow, which this time were remarkably fair, with official and unofficial counts differing by just a few percentage points. Many rank-and-file protesters arrested for allegedly causing riots on 6 May 2012 also spent the bulk of 2013 behind bars. The December amnesty that brought freedom to many of them did away with the prominent symbols of the arbitrary legal system but left the system itself intact.

There was also a further deterioration in media freedom, as direct government pressure became more forceful and fearful media owners self-censored. In December – exactly at the time when the protests in Ukraine peaked – a major overhaul of state-owned media was announced. This will result in a merger of several channels into a single holding under the leadership of a notoriously illiberal TV-commentator and possibly the closure of the RIA Novosti news agency, which had tried to maintain respectable journalistic standards.

European leaders protested about restrictions on political and media freedom in Russia and in particular about Navalny's imprisonment. But the EU has not yet figured out how to respond to the situation or how to help Russian civil society now that laws restricting foreign donations are in place. A few member states such as Estonia and Finland were sympathetic to political asylum requests from Russia.

15 RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA ON THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

In 2013, Europeans were at odds with Russia, which successfully undermined a DCFTA with Ukraine.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	4/5	4/5
Resources	3/5	4/5	4/5
Outcome	3/10	3/10	1/10
Total	10/20	11/20	9/20

C+

2011 C+ 2012 B-

After years of more or less ignoring the EU's Eastern Partnership policy, Moscow changed its policy fundamentally in 2013. At the Vilnius summit in November, Ukraine was expected to sign a DCFTA with the EU, and Georgia and Moldova were expected to sign free trade agreements. Moscow saw this as a threat and sought instead to integrate post-Soviet countries in a Russian-led customs union and in a Eurasian Economic Union that is incompatible with DCFTAs. Moscow put Armenia under pressure to join the customs union and tried to stop its integration into the EU by questioning its security guarantees to Azerbaijan. Russia also responded to the EU's rapprochement with Ukraine with a ban on the import of Ukrainian products to Russia. Russia also increased pressure on Moldova by restricting the supply of energy and labour migration and banning the export of some goods to Russia.

Europeans were relatively united: Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle made a strong statement that Russian pressure on Eastern Partnership states

was unacceptable. Member states were led by Sweden and Poland, which created the Eastern Partnership. Other leaders included Hungary, which kept the issue on the agenda of the Visegrad Four; Lithuania, which prepared the Association Agreements in its role as EU president; and Romania, which increased trade and energy links with Moldova in order to reduce its dependence on Russia. German Chancellor Angela Merkel was also publicly critical of Russia.

However, Europeans underestimated Russian pressure on Eastern Partnership countries and were unable to make the Association Agreements attractive enough for some autocratic leaders in the region, who are interested in the kind of short-term benefits, such as credits and low gas prices, that Russia offers. Since the EU cannot compete with Russia in this area, it should focus its policy more on society than on elites. At the same time, the EU needs to find a response to Russia's Eurasian Union project – a direct challenge to the EU in the region.

16 RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA ON PROTRACTED CONFLICTS

Russia used assertive behaviour in some breakaway regions to put pressure on Eastern Partnership countries not to sign agreements with the EU at the Vilnius EaP summit. The EU had no means to answer in a meaningful way.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	4/5	4/5
Resources	3/5	3/5	2/5
Outcome	3/10	3/10	2/10
Total	10/20	10/20	8/20

C

2011 C+ 2012 C+

2013 brought no breakthroughs in the resolution of protracted conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Tensions increased in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Russia seemed to support both sides of the conflict by selling arms to Azerbaijan and signing an agreement on military-technical co-operation with Armenia. In September, Russia used Armenia's military dependence to blackmail the country into joining the Russian-led customs union and refraining from agreements with the EU. The Minsk Group (the OSCE conflict-resolution mechanism supported by the EU) remained ineffective, mainly due to the parties' intransigence. Elections in Azerbaijan also had a paralysing effect.

The EU's helplessness was also exposed in South Ossetia, where the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) could do nothing but protest in the face of the aggressive Russian tactic of installation of fences along the administrative boundary (and allegedly also moving the boundary deeper into Georgian territory). That said, the presence of EUMM remains

crucial at a time when both Russia's and Georgia's security-related concerns and consequently tensions increase ahead of the Olympics and the G8 summit, both in Sochi.

As the year ended, Transnistria stood out as the biggest potential source of new tensions. Moscow is likely to try to use the region as leverage to prevent Moldova from signing an Association Agreement with the EU – something that the EU, in turn, is trying to speed up. Russia has already increased its military presence in Transnistria. In December, Transnistria's president, Yevgeny Shevchuk, proposed a draft law that would bring Transnistria into Russia's legal system if Moldova signed an Association Agreement with the EU – a countermeasure that mirrors the EU's suggestion that Moldova harmonise its regulations with those of the EU.

17 RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA ON ENERGY ISSUES

After a year-long investigation, the European Commission prepared charges in the anti-trust case against Gazprom.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	4/5	4/5
Resources	3/5	4/5	4/5
Outcome	5/10	5/10	7/10
Total	11/20	13/20	15/20

B+

2011 B- 2012 B

Over the last few years, there has been a decline in the export of Russian gas to the EU – in part because of changes in the global energy market such as the emergence of shale gas and an increase in the production of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and in part because of a decrease in demand for gas in Europe. In 2013, Russian gas supply to the EU increased for the first time since 2009. LNG has grown to 20 percent of European gas supply compared to pipeline gas. Russia is still responsible for around one third of the EU's gas supply but most experts say this number will not grow in the foreseeable future. Because of the implementation of the Third Energy Package and the EU's anti-trust case against Gazprom, the European Commission has put Gazprom and the Russian government under pressure to rethink its monopoly policy and its blocking of the EU's unbundling process.

In 2013, after a year of investigation, the Commission started to prepare charges against Gazprom, which could cost the company up to €11 billion. Many EU member states are bringing their legislation in line with the Third Energy Package. The Commission launched infringement procedures against laggards, though it seems to accept that the Internal Energy Market objectives will not be achieved in 2014 as scheduled. If the EU maintains its unity and resolve as it did in 2013, this could have a fundamental impact on energy relations with Russia. New players on the Russian energy market such as Novatek and Rosneft have an interest in breaking Gazprom's export monopoly, which could increase competition in the EU. The growing volumes of LNG will change the model of Russian gas sales from long-term contracts to spot market prices that make the EU member states more flexible.

18 DIVERSIFICATION OF GAS SUPPLY ROUTES TO EUROPE

The cancellation of the Nabucco pipeline was a setback for the EU's diversification policy because the alternative TAP pipeline has a much lower volume.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	3/5	2/5
Resources	4/5	3/5	3/5
Outcome	5/10	4/10	2/10
Total	12/20	10/20	7/20

C-

2011 B- 2012 C+

The Nabucco pipeline, the key project in the EU's Southern Gas Corridor and diversification policy, was finally cancelled in July by the Azerbaijan-led consortium that owns the Shaz Deniz 2 gas field, the main supplier for both pipelines. Instead, it chose the much shorter Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which is led by BP and has a lower capacity than Nabucco. TAP will use an existing pipeline infrastructure to bring Caspian gas to the EU through Turkey. As a result, Turkey and Azerbaijan will play a much more important role for the infrastructure than they would have with Nabucco. Italy will now be the final destination of the pipeline instead of Austria.

Member states were divided about these pipeline projects. Italy lobbied against Nabucco and supported the TAP pipeline, and saw the decision to cancel Nabucco as a diplomatic victory. At the same time, ENI is still one of the main stakeholders in the competing Gazprom-led South Stream project, which has even greater capacity than Nabucco. The South Stream project progressed in 2013 as the consortium

signed agreements with all of the transit countries. The involvement in South Stream of other European energy companies such as Germany's Wintershall and France's EdF makes the project more likely to become a reality, even with its high costs. Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger criticised Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Slovenia among others for signing a bilateral agreements with Russia as part of the South Stream project.

A further development that undermined European unity was the German government's support of Gazprom's attempt to exempt the OPAL pipeline, which links Nord Stream with the European gas network system, from the Third Energy Package. This would undermine competition. Because of the European Commission's unbundling policy, the OPAL pipeline is only operating at 50 percent capacity. Meanwhile, Europe continued to resist the exploitation of shale gas: several Central and Eastern European member states such as Bulgaria limited or banned fracking.

19 RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA ON THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST

Europeans were unable to persuade Russia to change its policy on Syria but co-operated more closely on Iran.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	5/5	3/5
Resources	4/5	4/5	2/5
Outcome	5/10	4/10	6/10
Total	12/20	13/20	11/20

B-

2011 B- 2012 B

Moscow's policy on Syria was based not so much on support for President Bashar Assad as opposition to the culture of interventionism and regime change and a fear of chaos and extremism. Led by France, Germany, Italy, and the UK, Europeans spent the first half of 2013 trying but failing to persuade Russia to act to stop Assad massacring his own people. However, disagreements subsequently opened up between EU member states about whether to support military intervention in Syria after evidence emerged of the use of chemical weapons. In particular, France and the UK were more hawkish than other member states. These disagreements, together with US President Barack Obama's unwillingness to undertake military action, offered an opening to Russia. The Kremlin skilfully used it by brokering a deal to remove and destroy chemical weapons, which averted military intervention but also by implication legitimised Assad. Europeans backed the chemical weapons deal and were supportive of a second round of Geneva talks, which took place in late January 2014, but the real diplomacy is

now between Russia and the US and their interlocutors in the Middle East.

The EU and Russia co-operated more closely on the question of Iran's nuclear weapons programme. Their basic objectives are similar: neither wants a nuclear-armed Iran or a military strike on Iran. Russia is particularly concerned about the destabilising effects that either of these scenarios would have on its unstable southern neighbourhood. However, the EU and Russia differed in their assessment of the situation and on tactical questions such as the nature and severity of sanctions – Russia supported UN sanctions against Iran but was critical of the EU's unilateral sanctions. When a prospect for breakthrough emerged in 2013, Russia was firmly on-board. But Moscow also did not fail to use the deal to advance its other agenda – a few days later it announced that the solution of the Iranian nuclear issue also meant that NATO's missile defence shield had become redundant.

20 RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA ON THE ARCTIC

The EU moved closer to Russia's vision of Arctic governance but did not achieve its goal of observer status in the Arctic Council.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	n/a	4/5	5/5
Resources	n/a	4/5	3/5
Outcome	n/a	5/10	3/10
Total	n/a	13/20	11/20

B-

2011 – 2012 B

The EU moved closer to Russia's vision of Arctic governance but did not achieve its goal of observer status in the Arctic Council.

The melting of Arctic ice is transforming the region into a hotspot of economic expansion and geopolitical competition. The EU's longstanding goal has been to be part of this development by acquiring observer status in the Arctic Council and it has been seeking Russia's support for the bid. However, in May, the EU's second attempt at observer status was derailed because of resistance from Canada, with whom the EU has a dispute over seal-fur trade. Russia has indicated that it would not object to observer status for the EU if all other Arctic Council members approved it. However, the true nature of Russia's position will be tested if and when the EU sorts out its dispute with Canada. The EU assumes that its observer status will be active from the moment Canada drops objections, but Moscow has hinted that the EU may still need to wait and apply again during the next ministerial meeting, which is due only in 2015.

In recent years, the EU's official vision of Arctic governance has changed. In 2008, the EU said that it wanted the Arctic Ocean to be governed multilaterally as humankind's common heritage. It has now come round to the position that some Arctic states, and Russia among them, always held: that the Arctic should be divided up among the littoral states according to the UNCLOS. This may have helped to soften up Russia on the issue of observer status. However, at a deeper level, the EU and Russia have very different visions for the Arctic: while Russia emphasises sovereignty, ownership, and economic gain, the EU focuses on co-operation. In 2013, Russia started to restore its military bases in the area and reacted furiously when Greenpeace activists, sailing under a Dutch flag, tried to board a Russian oil platform in the Pechora Sea. Russia arrested 30 activists and accused them of piracy; they were only released months later.

United States

Overall grade

B-

Overall grade 2012 **B-**

Overall grade 2011 **B-**



	2013	2012	2011
TRADE LIBERALISATION AND OVERALL RELATIONSHIP	B-	B-	B-
21 Reciprocity on visa procedures with the US	C+	C-	C-
22 Relations with the US on trade and investment	A	B+	B-
23 Relations with the US on economic issues	C-	n/a	n/a
CO-OPERATION ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES	B-	B-	B-
24 Relations with the US on counter-terrorism	B+	B-	B+
25 Relations with the US on intelligence cooperation and data protection	C-	n/a	B+
26 Relations with the US on NATO, arms control and Russia	C	C+	C-
27 Relations with the US on the Balkans	A-	B-	B
CO-OPERATION ON REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ISSUES	B-	B	B
28 Relations with the US on Egypt and the wider Middle East	B-	B+	B+
29 Relations with the US on the Middle East peace process	B+	C-	C-
30 Relations with the US on the Syrian conflict	D+	A-	n/a
31 Relations with the US on Asia	B-	B-	n/a
32 Relations with the US on Iran and weapons proliferation	A	A-	A-

2013 was a year when big things – both good and bad – happened in the transatlantic relationship. On the positive side, the EU and the US launched TTIP negotiations and the E3+3 negotiated an interim deal with Iran on its nuclear programme. Both were significant achievements for EU foreign policy and were contingent upon close co-operation with the US. The successful negotiation of an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo is not on the same scale as a transatlantic issue but it is also a significant accomplishment and builds on decades of co-operation between Europe and the US.

However, on the negative side, transatlantic co-operation on the response to Syrian President Bashar Assad’s use of chemical weapons against civilians was a disaster that painfully unfolded in public. The revelations by Edward Snowden of US spying on European leaders including German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the collection of metadata in Europe sparked a public outcry and a serious crisis between the EU and the US. Finally, in November 2013, Ukraine rejected an Association Agreement with the EU, thus dealing a major blow to EU and US efforts to integrate Eastern Europe into the West, although popular pro-

EU demonstrations showed that the West continues to appeal to ordinary Ukrainians. The negative developments cancelled out the positive developments and the EU got a B- grade, as it did last year.

The incomplete positive and negative developments of 2013 raise lots of questions for the future. Can TTIP be concluded? Will there be a final agreement with Iran on its nuclear programme and will it work or turn out to be a Middle Eastern version of the failed deals with North Korea? Can the fallout from the Snowden revelations be contained? Others, like Syria, will rumble on. In some ways, what comes next will determine how we perceive what has just happened. If TTIP or the negotiations with Iran fail, analysts will comb through the past 12 months for evidence of overreach or naivety. If they succeed, the verdict will be much kinder – ten years after the invasion of Iraq, the transatlantic alliance will once again be seen to be shaping the future instead of being captive to events.

At this stage, though, it is fair to offer a preliminary assessment that transatlantic relations are as strong as they have been for some time. Real progress has been made. TTIP would be the world's largest ever bilateral free trade agreement. The West has been struggling with Iran's nuclear programme since the early 2000s. Europe and the US are closely aligned on most of the other major issues of the day. Even on the crisis points, such as the Snowden affair, the closeness of the relationship prevented spillover into other areas of co-operation, at least for the moment. The setback in Ukraine was not the result of a transatlantic disagreement – Europe and the US worked together but lost. The lesson is about the need for a better strategy, not for greater co-ordination.

The major exception, of course, was Syria. Europe was divided internally and the more hawkish states were at odds with the Obama administration. France wanted the US to do more to back the rebels but in Washington that just resurrected fears that it would be left carrying the can if things turned sour. The aftermath of the Assad regime's chemical weapons attack on civilians was particularly damaging to the relationship. Although there was substantial progress towards the removal of chemical weapons without military intervention, governments were seen as unable to deliver what they promised. Europe was marginalised as Russia took advantage of the situation. And the regime was given an enhanced legitimacy due to its new role as an indispensable partner in the disposal of chemical weapons.

There are several reasons for concern in this period of strong transatlantic co-operation. The first is the trend line. The prevailing view in the US is that Europe is in a slow but real long-term decline, which may be somewhat offset if negotiations on TTIP succeed. The volatility of the first years of the euro crisis has been replaced by a protracted period of economic stagnation from which there appears to be no escape for several years at least. European defence budgets continue to decrease and are hollowing out Europe's military capacity. Thus, the capabilities gap between the US and Europe will continue to grow. Germany seems to be embracing a more pacifist non-interventionist foreign policy that places it at odds with France and the UK. And there are still doubts as to whether the EU will survive the decade intact. This perception will have a cost.

The second reason for concern is the possibility of an American retrenchment from the Middle East. Although the US refocused its diplomacy on the Middle East and Europe in 2013, there is little doubt that its long-term intention remains to rebalance its presence and strategy towards East Asia, which showed worrying signs of instability and crisis in 2013. Through this prism, US diplomacy in the Middle East actually has the purpose of solving problems, such as the Iranian nuclear programme, so the US can disengage further from the region. It is debatable whether or not the US can insulate itself from regional instability but there is little doubt that Europe cannot. Moreover, Europeans have reason to doubt whether the US will come to its aid – whether in North Africa or the Balkans – if their interests are at stake but those of the US are perceived not to be.

The third reason for concern is the gap between policymakers and the foreign policy elites and national governments and the public. Snowden is a case in point here. His revelations came as little surprise to European leaders or the foreign policy establishment but they shocked the public – especially younger voters – and raised the political costs of intelligence co-operation with the US. Similarly on TTIP, it is embraced by leaders on both sides of the Atlantic but could fall prey to populist sentiment if not managed carefully. Overall, though, 2013 was a good year for the transatlantic relationship. Europe did not get everything it wanted but it got quite a bit. There are new points on the board even if long-term concerns remain.

21 RECIPROCITY ON VISA PROCEDURES WITH THE US

Four EU member states are still excluded from the US Visa Waiver Program (VWP) but provisions for reform of the VWP were included in the bill for comprehensive immigration reform.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	2/5	2/5	2/5
Resources	2/5	2/5	3/5
Outcome	3/10	3/10	5/10
Total	7/20	7/20	10/20

C+

2011 C- 2012 C-

Current US immigration law provides for a visa waiver programme whereby citizens of a country that meet certain criteria can visit the United States for up to 90 days without a visa as long as they register in advance with the Electronic System of Travel Authorization (ESTA) and pay a small fee. The criteria include a refusal rate for visas for citizens of the country in question of less than three percent. Three EU member states far exceed this refusal rate threshold – Poland (9.8 percent), Romania (17 percent), and Bulgaria (18 percent) – and are therefore excluded from the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). Cyprus, with a refusal rate of 1.9 percent, is also excluded due to the Cyprus dispute. These states have been actively lobbying for an expansion of the VWP but to little avail.

Although the four states continue to be excluded, there was significant progress on this matter in 2013. The Obama administration backed a bill providing for comprehensive immigration reform and it passed in the Senate although it has since stalled in the House of Representatives. One minor provision in the bill provides

for a change in the criteria for the VWP whereby countries with a visa “overstay” rate of less than 3 percent could join as long as they meet a refusal rate of ten percent –over three times that of the current standard. Poland, for instance, has an overstay rate of only two percent and would therefore meet the new standards. In addition to the immigration bill, supporters of an expansion of the VWP introduced additional pieces of legislation that would include some of the excluded EU member states, although none have yet passed.

The fact that a revision of the VWP is included in proposals for immigration reform is an advance for European policy on this issue. The Obama administration is expected to renew its push for the immigration reform bill in the spring of 2014 and even if it fails then it is likely to come back on the agenda at a later stage.

22 RELATIONS WITH THE US ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT

The EU and the US launched negotiations for a transatlantic free trade area – a monumental undertaking.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	4/5	4/5
Resources	3/5	4/5	5/5
Outcome	5/10	7/10	9/10
Total	11/20	15/20	18/20

A

2011 B- 2012 B+

In 2013, the EU achieved one of its most ambitious goals of recent times with the launch of negotiations for a transatlantic free trade area, formally called TTIP. The groundwork had been laid for this initiative in 2012 with the High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth and was launched when President Barack Obama adopted it in his State of the Union address in January 2013. The EU had backed the initiative earlier. TTIP may be the most monumental undertaking by the alliance since NATO enlargement in the 1990s. It promises to boost US and European GDP by 1 percent a year. Perhaps even more importantly, a comprehensive agreement could set new standards in global trade, provide an impetus for the reinvigoration of multilateral trade talks if it is designed as an open agreement (like the EU–US Telecommunications Agreement, which others later joined and which defined the worldwide standard), and reaffirm the relevance and centrality of the transatlantic alliance in the 21st century. It would also help counteract the perception of a decline of Europe and the West.

Europeans – particularly Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK – invested considerable time in selling the agreement in the US, both as a measure to increase economic growth and as a strategic initiative. France insisted on an exemption for its cultural sector but this has not yet spread to other sectors and three rounds of negotiations had been completed by the end of the year. Although the dispute over the Edward Snowden revelations on the NSA did not derail the talks, that possibility remains. In particular, the European Parliament might link data protection to TTIP. Ratification in the US also remains difficult – Obama has not yet received Trade Promotion Authority, which is practically a necessity for ratification. Europeans will be closely monitoring the fate of the TPP, which is much further along in the process. If that is ratified, it will increase the chances of getting TTIP through Congress.

23 RELATIONS WITH THE US ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

The easing of the sovereign debt phase of the euro crisis has reduced tensions with the US, although differences remain on Germany's macroeconomic policy.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	n/a	n/a	2/5
Resources	n/a	n/a	2/5
Outcome	n/a	n/a	3/10
Total	n/a	n/a	7/20

C-

2011 – 2012 –

The euro crisis made for a difficult few years of transatlantic economic diplomacy between 2009 and 2012. Americans worried that the eurozone posed the greatest threat to global economic recovery and disagreed with the EU and ECB's focus on austerity and a tight monetary policy. Meanwhile, European officials generally believed that the US was largely responsible for the crisis and failed to grasp the nature of the euro's problems and the rationale behind the EU's response. They urged Washington to put its own house in order before lecturing others.

This tension eased somewhat in 2013 following ECB President Mario Draghi's declaration in August 2012 to do "whatever it takes" to save the euro and the OMT programme that followed. This dramatically reduced the sovereign debt pressures on troubled members of the eurozone periphery. While the fundamental causes of the euro crisis had not been fully dealt with, one of its most visible manifestations had been, at least temporarily. Americans, and some Europeans, worried that the crisis had just entered a new phase – a protracted

economic stagnation – but the respite led to an improvement in transatlantic economic relations, which helped pave the way for the launch of TTIP.

Differences remained between the US and Germany on macroeconomic policy. In April 2013, while visiting Germany for the first time as Treasury Secretary, Jack Lew publicly called for Germany to rebalance its economy towards consumption. In a report in October 2013, the US Treasury officially criticised both Germany and China for running a large current account surplus. Germany rejected the criticism and made its irritation with the US clear. The new German coalition government is focused both on the current account and on investment but will entail no new borrowing. Tensions could ease if it leads to a rebalancing but serious concerns remain about whether the new spending is properly directed and will be sufficient.

24 RELATIONS WITH THE US ON COUNTER-TERRORISM

President Obama modified his use of drones in response to domestic and international pressure but Guantanamo Bay remained open and the Snowden revelations threaten transatlantic co-operation.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	3/5	4/5
Resources	3/5	3/5	3/5
Outcome	7/10	6/10	7/10
Total	14/20	12/20	14/20

B+

2011 B+ 2012 B-

Since 9/11, European governments have simultaneously assisted with and sought to alter US counter-terrorism policy. While assisting with deep intelligence and military co-operation to track down, capture, or kill members of al-Qaeda and their affiliated organisations, they sought to alter US policy on torture and indefinite detention in Guantanamo Bay. The election of President Obama in 2008 promised to close the transatlantic gap. However, Obama was unable to close Guantanamo without the co-operation of Congress. In May 2013, the European Parliament passed a resolution on the hunger strike by prisoners in Guantanamo. The resolution stated that “the fight against terrorism cannot be waged at the expense of established basic shared values, such as respect for human rights and the rule of law”, and showed continuing European opposition to the use of Guantanamo Bay.

The Obama administration also pioneered a new type of counter-terrorism policy – a drone war – that became more controversial internationally in 2012 and 2013. In response to these concerns,

Obama made a speech in May, in which he suggested that the “war on terror” might be nearing its end and introduced new policy restrictions on the use of drones. The changes brought the US somewhat closer to European views, and the numbers of strikes decreased throughout the year. Nevertheless, the EU failed to draw the US into meaningful discussions on common legal standards and did not manage to clarify and articulate its own views on when drone strikes were permissible.

Finally, the Snowden revelations about NSA spying in Europe (see component 25) threatened to damage EU–US counterterrorism policy. For instance, in October 2013, the European Parliament voted to suspend the SWIFT data-exchange agreement with the US because of concerns that it was being used for purposes other than to combat terrorism. However, talks on data protection between US Attorney General Eric Holder and European Commission Vice President Viviane Reding showed signs of progress on privacy rights for foreign nationals, with an agreement expected in the spring of 2014.

25 RELATIONS WITH THE US ON INTELLIGENCE CO-OPERATION AND DATA PROTECTION

Edward Snowden's revelations of NSA phone-tapping of European leaders and data collection in Europe rocked the transatlantic relationship.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	n/a	2/5
Resources	3/5	n/a	2/5
Outcome	7/10	n/a	2/10
Total	14/20	n/a	6/20

C-

2011 B+ 2012 -

In June 2013, Edward Snowden began leaking information about NSA activities to the Guardian and the Washington Post. These leaks included information about the NSA's collection of metadata of European citizens, often in collaboration with European intelligence agencies, and the tapping of the mobile phones of several European leaders including German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The Snowden revelations sparked a public outcry in Europe, especially in Germany, and what some analysts have called the worst crisis in transatlantic relations since the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The European response to the revelations was complicated by divisions on two fronts. Firstly, there are divisions between the governments. The UK played an active role in the NSA's activities as part of its membership of the "Five Eyes" – a group of five Anglosphere countries that pools its intelligence resources and agree not to spy on each other – while other governments were the targets of the surveillance (another group of countries were not revealed to have been targeted). Sweden also co-

operates closely with the UK and the US (in particular the NSA) on intelligence. There is also a division between the public – which was largely unaware of the NSA's activities and was deeply concerned by it – and governments that co-operated in the collection of metadata.

The Obama administration initially responded with a shrug of the shoulders and said that it was only caught doing what all countries try to do, which is to spy on each other if the opportunity presents itself. But, as it became clear that the revelations were generating real public concern and threatened to derail the TTIP negotiations and other forms of co-operation, the US shifted to private discussions to address some of the issues arising out of the controversy. Obama accepted that Europeans had legitimate concerns and assured his European allies that the tapping of leaders' mobile phones was not ongoing. In 2014, European countries are likely to look for guarantees on data protection and privacy rights for their citizens.

26 RELATIONS WITH THE US ON NATO, ARMS CONTROL AND RUSSIA

The EU and the US were united but relatively unsuccessful in their approach to Russia in 2013.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	2/5	2/5	2/5
Resources	2/5	2/5	2/5
Outcome	2/10	5/10	4/10
Total	6/20	9/20	8/20

C

2011 C- 2012 C+

Relations between the US and Russia worsened significantly in 2013 because of substantive differences on how to respond to Syria's civil war, including the regime's use of chemical weapons; domestic issues in Russia such as its harassment of gay people; and President Vladimir Putin's decision to offer asylum to Edward Snowden. Apart from Snowden, where European formal support for US efforts to arrest Snowden were somewhat counterbalanced by general concern at his revelations, the EU was at one with the US and shared its assessment that Putin's Russia will be much more difficult to deal with than former president Dmitry Medvedev's.

At the beginning of its second term, the Obama administration signalled an interest in a new agreement that reduced stockpiles of nuclear weapons to build on the New START treaty and provided greater transparency on missile defence, but Putin was uninterested. The US and the EU worked closely together to advance EU Association Agreement negotiations with Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia. At the time of writing, negotiations with

two of these (Armenia and Ukraine) fell apart because of Russian economic and political pressure, although in Ukraine huge public demonstrations took place to protest against Russian coercion and President Viktor Yanukovich's response. The US appears aware of the stakes and is working closely with Europeans to support Georgia and Moldova against Russian pressure.

While it is not quite right to say that relations between the West and Russia are at a post-Cold War low – 1999 and 2008 were arguably worse – they are more competitive and fraught now than in the early years of the Obama administration. The only silver lining was Russia's co-operation in removing the regime's chemical weapons from Syria, although France and the UK felt aggrieved that the US worked bilaterally with Moscow instead of through NATO. In NATO, Europe continues to be divided on Russia, as it was at the Chicago summit in 2012, with Eastern and Central European member states more concerned by Putin than Western European governments are.

27 RELATIONS WITH THE US ON THE BALKANS

The Brussels agreement between Serbia and Kosovo was a major step forward but, as the situation in Bosnia deteriorates, the US is not engaged.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	2/5	2/5	4/5
Resources	4/5	4/5	4/5
Outcome	7/10	5/10	8/10
Total	13/20	11/20	16/20

A-

2011 B 2012 B-

Relations between the EU and the US on the Balkans were generally good going into 2013 and bore fruit with the April agreement in Brussels on Serbia and Kosovo. While the US continues to be the leading country in pushing for international recognition of Kosovo, the EU took the lead in facilitating negotiations, principally by tying normalisation of relations to Serbia's bid for EU membership. The agreement also provides a path for Kosovo to negotiate an Association Agreement. The US plays a critical and indispensable role while NATO and the OSCE also significantly contributed to the effort. The deal was strongly supported by the US, the UN, NATO, and the OSCE.

Previously, the EU's role was hampered by internal divisions. Five EU member states – Spain, Cyprus, Greece, Romania, and Slovakia – still do not recognise the independence of Kosovo because of close relations with Serbia and/or fears of bolstering secessionist movements in their own country. However, several have indicated a softening of their stance in

light of the Brussels agreement, raising the prospect of a common EU position.

The situation on Bosnia is, unfortunately, worse. The US supports Bosnia's integration into the EU and NATO but it has reduced its role there over the past decade and handed responsibility to the European Union, which is not necessarily a bad thing. However, the Dayton Agreement appears not to be working and ethnic tensions in Bosnia are re-emerging. In October 2012, while on a visit to the region, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and EU High Representative Catherine Ashton criticised the Bosnian government's backsliding on reform. Little has improved since. The prospect of integration into the West has proven to be insufficient to drive reform of the Bosnian state. Secretary of State John Kerry has yet to visit the Balkans and there has been no US diplomatic initiative. It is unclear whether increased US engagement in Bosnia would help the situation, particularly since any such engagement would be limited.

28 RELATIONS WITH THE US ON EGYPT AND THE WIDER MIDDLE EAST

The US and Europe are aligned on Egypt but the prospect of a US retrenchment from the region is causing concern in some European states.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	5/5	4/5	4/5
Resources	3/5	4/5	3/5
Outcome	6/10	6/10	5/10
Total	14/20	14/20	12/20

B-

2011 B+ 2012 B+

US and European views on Egypt have been closely aligned in the aftermath of the turmoil that affected the Morsi government, the coup that deposed it, and the military regime that followed it. Both the US and the EU were concerned with the coup but were unwilling to go so far as to completely cut off aid and dramatically increase the pressure on the military. The EU took a slightly more forward-leaning stance in expressing concern – EU High Representative Catherine Ashton was the first Western official to visit Morsi since his ouster and imprisonment after she made it a condition of her trip to Egypt in late July. Both the EU and the US want Egypt to do more to restore democracy but they are unwilling and/or unable to do anything significant to pressure Cairo in this regard and both have concerns about what would happen if democracy were immediately and fully restored.

Although the differences on Egypt may be small, there is a larger issue at stake. In parts of Europe, particularly France, it is believed that the US is engaged in a strategic retrenchment from the Middle East. According to this perspective, the US will continue to have vital interests in the region but it will no longer seek to shape the future of the region as a whole. Paradoxically, the flurry of US diplomacy in the Middle East is perceived by many in the region – especially the Gulf Arabs and Israel – as having the purpose of reducing America’s role there over the long term. Washington continues to strongly contest the “strategic withdrawal” narrative. This assessment is giving rise to some anxiety in Europe. If the US plays less of a role in the region, will Europe have to pick up the slack? Will the new strategic environment change how Europe pursues its own interests? This will continue to unfold in 2014.

29 RELATIONS WITH THE US ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

The unexpected revival of the Israel–Palestine peace process in 2013 is welcome news for the EU – although 2014 may bring new challenges.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	2/5	2/5	4/5
Resources	2/5	3/5	3/5
Outcome	2/10	2/10	7/10
Total	6/20	7/20	14/20

B+

2011 C- 2012 C-

At the beginning of 2013, virtually no one in the US or the EU expected a revival of the Middle East peace talks. President Obama gave no indication of his intention to invest heavily in the process. The fact that the US did make such an investment and that it paid off in restarting negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, at least temporarily, was almost entirely down to one decision – the president’s choice of John Kerry as Secretary of State. Kerry took office determined to put in the long hours of diplomacy necessary to convince parties to restart the talks. In August, he succeeded. Israel and the Palestinians agreed to implement a series of confidence-building measures to allow talks to proceed. The US appointed Martin Indyk as the new envoy to lead the negotiations.

This development was not without transatlantic tensions. In July 2013, before Kerry’s announcement, the EU enacted a ban on financial aid to Israeli institutions that work in territory occupied after the Six-Day War of 1967. The ban prohibits the issuing of grants, funding, prizes, or scholarships by the EU (although not

its member states) unless a settlement exclusion clause is included. The ban was strongly condemned by Israel as sabotaging the US peace plan and by Kerry, who asked for a postponement. Some Europeans believe it may have assisted the process by increasing pressure on the Israeli government.

The revival of the Middle East Peace Process accomplishes a core European foreign policy objective since 9/11. The EU is the single largest donor to the Palestinian Authority and European leaders have repeatedly encouraged the US to invest in the revival of the peace talks. The US has placed a time limit on negotiations and intends to issue a proposed agreement in the spring of 2014. If the talks fail at that stage, Europeans may be faced with a new crisis in the Middle East, which could include the collapse of the Palestinian Authority.

30 RELATIONS WITH THE US ON THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

Transatlantic diplomacy over Syria was fraught for the first half of 2013 and was shambolic in August as Europe and the US tried to respond.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	n/a	4/5	1/5
Resources	n/a	4/5	2/5
Outcome	n/a	8/10	1/10
Total	n/a	16/20	4/20

D+

2011 – 2012 A-

In early 2013, Britain and France pressed the US to do more to aid the rebels and advance the fall of President Assad's regime. As time passed, Europe accepted the Obama administration's reluctance to get involved, mainly because of the rise of radical Islamist opposition groups. Then, in August, the Syrian regime was revealed to have used chemical weapons on a civilian target, resulting in over 1,400 fatalities. The US, backed by France and the UK, demanded a military response to punish the regime and deter it from further use of chemical weapons. After over a year of arguing that military intervention would be ineffective, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic struggled to build public support for action. British Prime Minister David Cameron's loss of a crucial parliamentary vote and the subsequent decision to rule out any involvement in military operations increased pressure on Obama to go to Congress.

At the G20 meeting in St Petersburg, France and the US tried to rally international support for action. Germany's failure at the

summit to sign a statement condemning the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime highlighted divisions within the EU and Germany's turn towards non-intervention, though it signed the statement the next day. The decision by Obama to go to Congress before launching a military strike infuriated France and called into question the administration's capacity to deliver on what it promised. The seemingly accidental diplomacy between John Kerry and his counterpart Sergei Lavrov, whereby Russia acted as a broker for the removal of chemical weapons from Syria, then made the Syrian crisis a bilateral US-Russian affair. The removal of the chemical weapons was tempered by the legitimacy it lent to Assad. From the perspective of relations with the US, though, matters were even worse. Europe was divided, the commitment given by Obama was undermined by Congress, Russia appeared to come out on top, and the civil war raged on.

31 RELATIONS WITH THE US ON ASIA

Although the US was pre-occupied by the Middle East in 2013, its long-term intention is to rebalance towards East Asia. Meanwhile, Europe is deepening its own strategic engagement with the region.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	n/a	3/5	3/5
Resources	n/a	2/5	2/5
Outcome	n/a	7/10	7/10
Total	n/a	12/20	12/20

B-

2011 – 2012 B-

At first glance, the gap between Europe and the US on the rebalancing towards Asia narrowed in 2013 as the Obama administration executed a shift of its own back towards the Middle East. In particular, Secretary of State John Kerry made the Middle East the centrepiece of his foreign policy and appeared relatively uninterested in East Asia. But despite Kerry's focus on the Middle East, the broader trend of rebalancing continued, driven largely by the Defense Department and the White House. In fact, the aim of the intensified US diplomacy in the Middle East was to fix specific problems in the region – such as the Iranian nuclear programme and the Israel–Palestine peace process – in order to dramatically reduce or at the very least reshape its role. Thus, in the medium to long term, the intention is still to rebalance US engagement towards East Asia.

Europe increasingly recognises that it has a stake in a successful US rebalancing towards Asia. For instance, an inadvertent conflict between China and Japan would directly threaten the global economy and the post-World War II international order.

On the economic front, if the Obama administration cannot secure Trade Promotion Authority to finalise and ratify TPP, it may be impossible to ratify TTIP. Thus Europeans continue to look for ways to increase their co-operation with the US in Asia. The leaders of several EU member states, including France, pushed the issue of Asia in meetings with their American counterparts. The Netherlands pushed to include Asia in the Working Party on Transatlantic Relations (COTRA). High Representative Catherine Ashton visited East Asia five times (compared to three visits by Kerry). Nevertheless, much remains to be done. In time, the refocusing of US diplomacy on the Middle East may well be seen as a temporary diversion from the strategic shift towards Asia.

32 RELATIONS WITH THE US ON IRAN AND WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

The E3+3 successfully negotiated an interim deal with Iran on its nuclear programme and are negotiating a final comprehensive agreement.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	4/5	4/5
Resources	5/5	5/5	5/5
Outcome	7/10	8/10	9/10
Total	16/20	17/20	18/20

A

2011 A- 2012 A-

The negotiation of an interim deal between the E3+3 and Iran in November 2013 was a significant accomplishment for US foreign policy and the EU gave it very important support. The EU championed the E3+3 process as a diplomatic alternative to war and it was chaired by High Representative Catherine Ashton. Although the negotiations had been ongoing for some time, the unexpected election of President Hassan Rouhani in August gave them a major boost. Rouhani's election and his policies vindicated the US and EU's approach of tough sanctions with negotiations.

The US shared Europe's assessment that Rouhani's election provided a rare opportunity to agree an interim deal and deepened its engagement. While welcoming direct talks between the US and Iran, the EU3 were also keen that the process not become a purely bilateral affair. France was the most forthright in this regard and took a harder line on the terms of an interim deal. The differences between France and the US bubbled to the surface in November 2013. French Foreign Minister

Laurent Fabius insisted that Iran should halt construction of the Arak plutonium facility, which led to a short delay in the negotiations in November. But although several media reports indicated that Washington was frustrated with Fabius, the Obama administration quickly adopted the French position as its own.

The interim deal provides for a six-month suspension of Iranian nuclear activity in exchange for some sanctions relief and negotiations for a final and comprehensive agreement. But although the interim deal was an achievement in itself, the next phase will be much more difficult. It is not clear if the E3+3 will remain united, especially if an imperfect deal is the only one on offer. If the negotiations fail, there is also the question of whether the sanctions relief already offered will be reversed or extended, thus making the interim deal permanent.

Wider Europe

Overall grade

B-

Overall grade 2012 **C+**

Overall grade 2011 **C+**



	2013	2012	2011
WESTERN BALKANS	B	B	B
33 Overall progress on enlargement in the Western Balkans	A-	B+	B
34 Rule of law, democracy, and human rights in the Western Balkans	B-	B-	B+
35 Kosovo	A-	A-	B+
36 Bosnia and Herzegovina	C	C	C
TURKEY	C	C	C-
37 Bilateral relations with Turkey	C+	C-	D+
38 Rule of law, democracy, and human rights in Turkey	C-	C-	C-
39 Relations with Turkey on the Cyprus question	C-	C-	D+
40 Relations with Turkey on regional issues	C+	B-	C+
EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD	B-	C+	C+
41 Rule of law, democracy, and human rights	B-	C	C
42 Relations with the eastern neighbourhood on trade	B	A-	B+
43 Relations with the eastern neighbourhood on energy	C	C	B+
44 Visa liberalisation with the eastern neighbourhood	B-	B-	B-

The EU made some important achievements in Wider Europe during 2013, which are reflected in the improvement in the overall grade from C+ to B-. Croatia joined the EU on 1 July – the first new member state since 2007 – and the EU-mediated agreement between Kosovo and Serbia was a historic achievement that paved the way for the inclusion of the Serb-majority north into Prishtina’s jurisdiction and makes it possible for Serbia to embark on membership talks in 2014. Kosovo will also sign an Association Agreement – a first step towards its future inclusion into the EU. In neighbouring Albania, the general election in June resulted in a smooth transfer of power to the opposition Socialists, headed by Edi Rama – a remarkable event given the longstanding, bitter history of party polarisation and contested polls. EU representatives on the ground exerted a moderating influence and helped secure a positive outcome.

However, Europeans have no reason to be complacent about the Western Balkans. Economic growth remains at very modest levels after the dip into negative territory in 2012 and key countries such as Serbia face a severe fiscal crisis and remain critically dependent on IMF support. A robust recovery is needed to create

the economic underpinning for institutional reforms demanded by the EU. From the deadlock in Bosnia's complex power-sharing system to the lack of a credible opposition in Serbia or Macedonia, the region's politics are also stagnant. Civil society remains passive, even in comparison to immediate neighbours such as Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. While the EU remains high on the political agenda, the extent of its transformative impact is far from clear.

Developments in Turkey's tangled relations with the EU were mildly encouraging, albeit from a very low starting point. For the first time since 2010, a new chapter (on regional policy) was opened after France lifted its veto in February. European leaders also debated launching negotiations on two more chapters (on fundamental rights and the judiciary, and justice, freedom, and security) that are much more political in nature. Turkey and the EU also signed a readmission agreement, a key stepping stone to visa-free access to Schengen – a longstanding Turkish demand. Turkey's leadership is also keen to find a solution to the Kurdish issue, including through constitutional reform, and is pursuing dialogue with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan. These developments give Europeans an opportunity to recover some of the leverage it had lost in recent years as accession negotiations stalled.

The Gezi Park protests against the AKP government that began in May showed that some citizens feel that Turkey had veered away from the democratisation path and reflect to some extent the failed promise of Europeanisation. In the absence of a strong external anchor, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government has instituted a majoritarian and increasingly illiberal governance system, with civil society mobilisation substituting for the missing checks and balances. But, because it is so internally divided on Turkey, the EU has a limited ability to support domestic change – if it even still has ambitions to do so. Europe and Turkey also disagreed on some foreign policy issues in 2013: apart perhaps from France, few EU member states shared Turkey's bellicose attitude to the civil war in Syria.

The EU faced a major setback in the eastern neighbourhood when Ukraine failed to sign an Association Agreement and DCFTA at the Vilnius summit in November. The DCFTA with Ukraine was the most comprehensive the EU had ever negotiated and was meant to set an example for the other states of the region. In the event, however, the common neighbourhood with Russia became a key area of conflict with Moscow as its pressure on Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine undermined the EU's integration policy. Led by Germany, Europeans pressed for the release of Ukrainian opposition politician Yulia Tymoshenko, which brought some progress in the Ukrainian judicial and legal system. But shortly before the Vilnius summit

in November, some Europeans – especially Central Eastern member states – were prepared to drop the issue of Tymoshenko’s imprisonment and became more willing to make compromises for signing the agreements. Modernisation of the Ukrainian gas-transit pipeline was also hampered by Russian pressure and differences between EU member states, although reverse flow of gas to Ukraine was extended in 2013.

A second setback in the eastern neighbourhood was the decision of the Armenian government to join a customs union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan after Russian President Vladimir Putin threatened to withdraw its security guarantee to Armenia. Armenia’s decision to join the customs union will stop the completion of a DCFTA with the EU for the time being. Brussels has yet to find a way to respond to this pressure and has no strategy on how to deal with the Russian-led customs union – a direct challenge to the EU’s DCFTAs. On the other hand, the EU initialled Association Agreements and DCFTAs with Georgia and Moldova at the Vilnius summit. The presidential election in Georgia marked an important step forward for the country which brought a change of leadership in a post-Soviet country in peaceful free and fair elections. Moldova, now the closest of the six Eastern Partnership countries to the EU, met all benchmarks for visa liberalisation, which led to the decision of the Commission to recommend the lifting of visa requirements. Moldova also adopted a new energy strategy. Germany, Sweden, and Poland played an important role to bring Moldova closer to the EU.

One final significant European achievement in 2013 was the opening in May of the European Endowment for Democracy. Although its budget of around €14 billion is much less than expected, it means that the EU now has a flexible instrument for supporting civil society in its neighbourhood. Its creation is also timely: with the small successes in Georgia and Moldova and the big failure in Ukraine, the EU will have to recalibrate its instruments. Above all, 2013 illustrated that Europeans need to find a way to respond to Russian pressure on Eastern Partnership countries.

33 OVERALL PROGRESS OF ENLARGEMENT IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

There was good progress on enlargement, including the accession of Croatia. However, a number of countries were left behind as entrenched problems remained unresolved.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	4/5	5/5
Resources	4/5	4/5	4/5
Outcome	5/10	6/10	7/10
Total	13/20	14/20	16/20

A-

2011 B 2012 B+

Europeans are collectively committed to enlarge the EU to include the Western Balkan states, though there are internal differences about the pace of the process and some are worried about issues such as immigration. Despite these issues, however, the process continued to move forward in 2013. Croatia joined according to schedule and immediately took initiative to advance its neighbours towards the EU. Following the Brussels agreement with Kosovo (see component 35), Serbia was given a conditional green light to start membership talks “in January 2014 at the very latest”. In particular, Austria, France, Italy, Germany, and the UK pushed for progress with Serbia, although Germany was keen to push back all enlargement-related decisions until after the general election that took place in September. The European Council in December gave a green light to start negotiations in January.

Albania is another hopeful case. There was some violence in the run-up to the parliamentary election in June but following the landslide victory by the opposition Socialist Party there was a smooth transfer of power. The EU had made a problem-

free electoral process a key precondition for granting Tirana candidate status. But, despite the smooth transition, some EU member states continued to doubt Albania’s commitment to comprehensive reform in areas such as corruption, organised crime, and judicial reform. At the European Council in December, European leaders postponed the decision about whether to grant Albania candidate status until June 2014. The delay was requested by Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands (which held a parliamentary vote on the issue), and the UK.

Meanwhile, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina remained stalled after a further failure to overcome obstacles – in particular, the name dispute between Macedonia and Greece and constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In June, the European Council authorised the European Commission to start talks with Kosovo over a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). Negotiations began in October and, according to Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle, could be completed by the spring of 2014.

34 RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

There was no noticeable improvement in democratic consolidation, human rights, and the rule of law, though Albania passed a critical test.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	4/5	4/5
Resources	4/5	3/5	3/5
Outcome	7/10	5/10	5/10
Total	15/20	12/20	12/20

B-

2011 B+ 2012 B-

Europeans closely monitor the region’s democratic performance and there is a broad consensus that enlargement policy should be based on the strict application of membership conditionality. That empowers the European Commission, as well as the European Parliament, to drive policy, and no member states come out in favour of a more lax approach reflective of strategic interest. But there was no noticeable improvement in 2013 and long-term challenges persisted. The only bright spot was Albania, where the June elections saw a smooth transfer of power from the incumbent Democrat Party of Sali Berisha to the opposition Socialists headed by Edi Rama (also see component 33). Though there was some violence in the run-up to the election, the smooth transition represented progress: both the parliamentary polls of 2009 and the 2011 municipal elections had been contested and led to a political standoff that lasted for months. Represented by a European Parliament mission, the EU played a positive, moderating role. In Montenegro, on the other hand, the opposition contested the outcome of the tight presidential race that gave Filip Vujanović a third term.

Elsewhere concerns remained, including about the capacity of opposition to compete and hold governments accountable. Macedonia’s Social Democrats boycotted parliament for more than three months after their members of parliament were evicted from the chamber during the budget vote in December 2012. Only mediation from Fiile, then European Parliament member Jerzy Buzek and country rapporteur Richard Howitt (also an MEP) convinced them to return and take part in the local elections in March–April. In September, Serbia banned a gay-pride rally in Belgrade for the third consecutive year, citing threats of right-wing violence. Fears are also growing that Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić’s anti-corruption crusade might compromise democratic rules. Bosnia’s first post-war census exposed lingering tensions between the ethnic communities, though popular protest against the legislative deadlock preventing newborn children from acquiring citizen numbers proves there is space for civic politics across communal boundaries.

35 KOSOVO

The deal between Prishtina and Belgrade over Northern Kosovo was a big success for Europeans and in particular for High Representative Catherine Ashton.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	4/5	4/5
Resources	4/5	4/5	4/5
Outcome	8/10	8/10	9/10
Total	15/20	16/20	17/20

A-

2011 B+ 2012 A-

Europeans have pushed hard for normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Prishtina, and although five EU member states still do not recognise Kosovo, they did not prevent major progress in 2013. The breakthrough on the critical issue of Serb-majority municipalities in Northern Kosovo is a big success story for the EU and in particular for High Representative Catherine Ashton. Under the landmark deal reached in April, after 10 rounds of talks, Serb-majority municipalities north of the Ibar are to be integrated into Kosovo but granted wide-ranging autonomy in areas such as policing and justice. Local elections in November and December, including in the north, were the first serious test. Trouble in Northern Mitrovica forced a repeat of the first round, but roughly a fifth of the Serbs turned up at the polling stations, making the elections legitimate. Candidates supported by the government in Belgrade won overwhelmingly across Serb municipalities in both the north and south. In September, Belgrade and Prishtina also reached a deal on telecommunications and energy.

The normalisation process is linked to progress on EU enlargement. The European Council rewarded Belgrade for the deal with Kosovo by taking a conditional decision to open membership talks by January 2014. Meanwhile, in October, Kosovo was given the opportunity to launch negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), which, if all goes smoothly, could be finalised as early as the spring of 2014. Thus significant progress was made with Kosovo despite the absence of complete unity on recognition of Kosovo. This was possible because the Lisbon Treaty allows the EU to conclude an SAA without having to involve member states as signatories. Prishtina continued to implement an EU roadmap of reforms tied to the promise of visa liberalisation. Member states that made a particular contribution to progress in 2013 included Austria, France, Germany, Italy (whose new foreign minister, Emma Bonino, made her first foreign visit to Serbia and Kosovo), and the UK.

36 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

2013 was another lost year for Bosnia and Herzegovina as political deadlock persisted. Civic activism crossing ethnic boundaries is the EU's best bet.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	3/5	3/5
Resources	3/5	3/5	3/5
Outcome	2/10	2/10	2/10
Total	8/20	8/20	8/20

C

2011 C 2012 C

For years, the EU's key demand to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has been to implement the Sejdić–Finci judgment of the European Court of Human Rights and end discrimination against the small number of individuals who do not belong to any of the three constituent communities (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs). Although Bosnia's continued failure to do so prevents it moving to candidate status, no member states are willing to actively push for relaxing conditionality to avoid BiH slipping behind other countries in the region. In 2013, there were some positive signs in BiH. In particular, there was an outpouring of popular anger over the failure to issue babies with personal documents needed to travel abroad for treatment and to pay war pensions on time. These developments raised hopes for a civic turn in the country's politics, which have traditionally been fragmented along ethnic lines. The BiH football team's qualification for the 2014 World Cup in Brazil also bolstered the sense of togetherness in a divided society.

However, ethnic divisions remain and the first census carried out since 1991 raised fears that they might even deepen. While the results will not be announced until mid-2014, they may show a decline in the Croats and even Serb share of the population because of large-scale emigration. Such data could in turn fuel centrifugal tendencies and challenge the power-sharing system underwritten by the EU and the US. In a speech in Belgrade in November, Serb leader Milorad Dodik argued that BiH should split into two. Because of its dysfunctional politics, BiH also lags behind in a number of technical areas covered by the EU. The European Council and officials on the ground are frustrated by lack of progress in key sectors such as public procurement and the fight against corruption. The country is under threat of losing some funds under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance programme. The EU's concerns are shared by the US, but there has so far been no major joint push to break the deadlock.

37 BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH TURKEY

EU–Turkey relations improved as stalled accession talks were restarted with the launch of a new chapter, and visa-free travel became a real prospect.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	2/5	3/5	3/5
Resources	2/5	2/5	3/5
Outcome	1/10	2/10	3/10
Total	5/20	7/20	9/20

C+

2011 D+ 2012 C-

In 2013, the EU pursued a more cohesive line on Turkey than in previous years. The goal was to resuscitate stalled accession negotiations and regain some lost leverage. France led the way, with President François Hollande taking a more pragmatic approach than his predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy. In June, the General Affairs Council resolved to open talks on Chapter 22 (Regional Policy). But at the insistence of Germany – which has emerged as the arbiter between member states that want more engagement and those that want to block the process – the negotiations were deferred until after its general elections in September, subject to a positive assessment by the European Commission’s regular report. Europeans, including Chancellor Angela Merkel, criticised the government’s heavy-handed suppression of protests in Istanbul and other Turkish cities. But they stopped short of freezing negotiations altogether. Rather, they saw keeping talks afloat as a way to help Turkey improve its democratic performance.

As talks on regional policy were officially launched in November, the debate moved on to Chapters 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (justice, freedom, and security), which are considered more political. Belgium, Italy, and Sweden argued that the chapters should be opened and Germany was a cautious supporter. Cyprus, on the other hand, blocked the decision by linking it to a deal on the town of Famagusta. On the question of visa liberalisation, another crucial issue, relations suffered a setback after the European Court of Justice ruled that the Association Agreement did not entitle Turkish citizens to visa-free access to the EU. Effectively, the judgment brought the two parties back to the political track. In December, Turkey signed a long-delayed readmission agreement with the EU in exchange for a visa liberalisation roadmap. It reserved its right to cancel the deal should the EU decline to lift visas after technical conditions were met.

38 RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY

Anti-government protests exposed the AKP's authoritarian tendencies. The Kurdish opening holds promise but the EU remained a bystander.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	3/5	3/5
Resources	2/5	2/5	2/5
Outcome	2/10	2/10	2/10
Total	7/20	7/20	7/20

C-

2011 C- 2012 C-

Events in Turkey during 2013 illustrated the challenges in consolidating democratic rule in Turkey, where Europeans have few levers to influence domestic politics because accession talks have been stalled in recent years. In March, imprisoned Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan announced an initiative to resolve the Kurdish issue, the product of prolonged negotiations with Ankara. In September, the AKP government announced the so-called Democratisation Package, the first key step to implementing the peace process by granting linguistic rights to Kurds and making concessions to smaller ethnic minorities. However, the inter-party parliamentary committee charged with the redrafting of Turkey's constitution stalled, notably on issues such as the definition of Turkish citizenship.

The wave of protests in the summer, triggered by the decision to redevelop Gezi Park, off Taksim Square in downtown Istanbul, led to even greater polarisation, with disparate groups coalescing against Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's increasingly authoritarian style of

leadership. The authorities responded with a heavy-handed crackdown. In December, a large corruption scandal prompted high-profile arrests and a cabinet reshuffle and exposed the bitter, behind-the-scenes fight between Erdoğan and the influential movement led by the cleric Fethullah Gülen. The turmoil is likely to derail Erdoğan's plans for a presidential constitution ahead of the first direct elections for a head of state in August 2014.

Europeans were caught off-guard and struggled to find a coherent response to these developments. The Erdoğan government was criticised by all member states, notably by Merkel, and by the European Commission in its regular monitoring report, which was published in October. But Europeans were divided about whether to stonewall Ankara or to seek leverage through opening Chapters 23 and 24 in the membership talks (see component 37). The Democratisation Package helped restart the accession negotiations, though it is unclear whether this will produce results.

39 RELATIONS WITH TURKEY ON THE CYPRUS QUESTION

The banking crisis that hit Cyprus prevented progress. The Cyprus question also continued to undermine the EU's policy on Turkey.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	3/5	3/5
Resources	1/5	2/5	2/5
Outcome	1/10	2/10	2/10
Total	5/20	7/20	7/20

C-

2011 D+ 2012 C-

The EU would like to see a solution in Cyprus but it is largely a bystander in the prolonged unification negotiations. In 2013, the stalemate continued after UN-mediated talks between the two communities had all but ground to a halt in January 2012. UN special envoy Alexander Downer hoped to restart negotiations in October in line with the preference of Cypriot Turks and Ankara. But, after an acute banking and financial crisis hit the Greek part of the island in March, reunification was inevitably downgraded as a priority.

Nicos Anastasiades, the Cypriot president elected in February, conditioned the resumption of talks on a joint statement with Turkish leader Derviş Eroğlu, in favour of a single, sovereign state, as well as a return of Famagusta's ghost town of Varosha/Maraş to UN control. By contrast, Cypriot Turks and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu talk of a step-by-step, direct results-oriented process. Turks have not given up their stance that unification should happen on the basis of two "founding states" accepting to form a

common entity, which is not acceptable to the Greeks. Furthermore, they did not respond to Anastasiades' proposal on Varosha, which also involves opening the Famagusta port by placing it under EU supervision in exchange for a lifting of Cyprus' veto over Chapters 23 and 24 in the accession talks (see component 37). These divergent expectations prevented talks from resuming, despite an informal meeting between the two Cypriot leaders in November.

The EU struggles to influence both Turkey and Cypriot Turks as it is a party to the conflict rather than a mediator. It continued to insist that Turkey should implement the 2004 Ankara Protocol and allow Greek Cypriot ships and aircraft into its harbours and airports in exchange for unfreezing a range of chapters in the accession negotiations. But, as in previous years, this linkage failed to produce results in 2013.

40 RELATIONS WITH TURKEY ON REGIONAL ISSUES

Europeans had little impact on Turkey's hawkish approach to the crisis in Syria and diverged on Egypt and Iran.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	4/5	4/5
Resources	3/5	3/5	3/5
Outcome	3/10	4/10	3/10
Total	9/20	11/20	10/20

C+

2011 C+ 2012 B-

In 2013, EU member states tried to maintain a common front with Turkey on the war across the border in Syria. Yet the EU was itself divided: while France took a hawkish stance similar to that of Turkey, others such as Germany opposed direct intervention. The conflict is now spilling over into Turkish territory – more than 600,000 refugees have crossed the border and bloody bomb attacks wrecked the town of Reyhanli in May. Europeans were concerned that Ankara is more open to co-operating and allegedly running weapons for radical Islamist militias such as Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS in order to fight the regime more effectively and contain Syria's Kurds. But, in mid-October, Turkey declared that it had hit positions of ISIS and Erdoğan declared that jihadis were not welcome in his country. Despite its reservations, however, Turkey followed the US and supported the Geneva II talks that finally began in January 2014.

The EU and Turkey diverged on Egypt. After the coup against President Mohammed Morsi, an ally of the ruling AKP, Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Cairo. Europeans, on the other hand, chose to maintain links and did not cut financial aid. On Iran, Turkey was again aligned with France: both took a more cautious approach to the newly elected Iranian President Hassan Rouhani than other EU member states and the Obama administration. The interim agreement on Iran's nuclear programme brokered by the E3+3 created further complications for Ankara, which has long tried to balance the Islamic Republic not only in Syria but also in Iraq and Lebanon. In 2013, there was a rapprochement between Turkey and Israel after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu apologised for the 2010 flotilla incident. However, neither the EU as such nor its member states played a significant role in this rapprochement.

41 RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Ukraine made some improvements to its electoral and judicial system, and there was also some progress in Georgia, where a new president was elected.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	3/5	3/5
Resources	3/5	4/5	4/5
Outcome	1/10	1/10	4/10
Total	8/20	8/20	11/20

B-

2011 C 2012 C

Some progress was made on the rule of law and democracy in the Eastern Partnership countries in 2013. For much of the year, led by Germany, Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden, EU member states pressed for the release of Ukrainian opposition politician Yulia Tymoshenko and linked it to the Association Agreement and DCFTA, which they were hopeful Ukraine would sign. But shortly before the Vilnius summit in November, some member states – in particular, the Baltic states and Poland – were prepared to drop the issue of Tymoshenko’s imprisonment and became more willing to make compromises for signing the agreements. Partly as a result of European pressure, Ukraine made several improvements to its electoral and judicial system, but failed to implement more important laws on public prosecution authorities, the police, and electoral legislation.

In Georgia there was improvement in institutional impartiality and reform of the justice system. In fair and free presidential elections in October, the era of Mikhail Saakashvili came to an end

and Giorgi Margvelashvili of the Georgian Dream party was elected. Presidential elections in Azerbaijan in October, on the other hand, did not meet OSCE standards. The incumbent president, Ilham Aliyev, exerted strong pressure on the opposition and was re-elected without real alternative candidates. Similarly, major challengers to President Serzh Sargsjan were not able to run in presidential elections in Armenia in February.

From 2014, the EU will increase funding for Eastern Partnership countries even more with regard to progress in areas such as human rights and the rule of law, which will lead to more money for Georgia and Moldova based on the principle of “more for more”. In the future, the EU will also have a new instrument in the form of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED), which started its grant-making activities in May. However, the EED, which began as a Polish initiative, has a budget of only €14 million – mainly because big member states such as Germany limited their contributions.

42 RELATIONS WITH THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD ON TRADE

The failure to sign a DCFTA with Ukraine was a big setback for the Eastern Partnership, but member states remained united.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	5/5	4/5	4/5
Resources	4/5	5/5	4/5
Outcome	6/10	7/10	5/10
Total	15/20	16/20	13/20

B

2011 B+ 2012 A-

In 2013, Europeans focused on trade, and particularly the establishment of a “common economic area”, in the run-up to the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in November. But one week before the summit, the Ukrainian government decided not to sign the DCFTA with the EU. The main reason was economic: Ukraine has huge budget problems and is struggling to pay back foreign debts as its currency reserves decline. Russia offered Ukraine lower prices for gas and more economic co-operation if it joined its own customs union instead of signing the DCFTA and Association Agreement with the EU. The failure to sign the agreements was a setback for the EU, but EU member states at least showed unity by refusing to lower their offer to President Viktor Yanukovich.

The EU completed negotiations on Association Agreements and DCFTAs with Moldova and Georgia. Armenia’s decision to join the customs union with Russia in September made it impossible to sign a DCFTA for the time being (DCFTAs between the EU and Eastern Partnership countries are incompatible with membership of the

customs union). In August, the European Investment Bank signed a Framework Agreement with Azerbaijan to enable the bank to start financing projects there. The bank is now able to finance projects in all Eastern Partnership countries. In July, it announced new funding for small and medium-sized enterprises.

However, the focus on trade agreements have somewhat sidelined issues of democracy and human rights. Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle said that free trade is the primary “instrument for political association and economic integration”. Association Agreements, which will include free trade agreements, will replace partnership and co-operation agreements with Moldova and Georgia.

43 RELATIONS WITH THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURS ON ENERGY

There was no progress on the Ukrainian gas-transit system but reverse flow helped to diversify Ukrainian energy supply from Russia.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	5/5	3/5	3/5
Resources	4/5	2/5	2/5
Outcome	6/10	3/10	3/10
Total	15/20	8/20	8/20

C

2011 B+ 2012 C

In 2013, Eastern Partnership countries somewhat half-heartedly tried bring their energy regulation into line with that of the EU in order to enter the European energy market. In January, Georgia applied for full membership of the Energy Community (EC), but it needs first of all to bring its legal framework on energy efficiency and renewable energy in line with EC legislation. Ukraine, which has been a member of the EC since 2009, was criticised for a lack of progress and co-operation in areas such as environmental issues and energy efficiency. Above all, its failure to liberalise its gas and energy market has hindered much-needed investments in Ukraine's energy infrastructure; doing so could help to limit its dependence on Russian gas imports. While Moldova adopted a new energy strategy and an energy efficiency plan, it is still lagging behind on environmental issues and the regulation of the gas market.

Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle raised concerns that Russia might misuse energy pricing to dissuade Eastern Partnership countries, in particular Moldova and Ukraine, from signing

agreements with the EU. The Commission supported the modernisation of the Ukrainian gas transmission system and stressed the need for Ukraine to continue to develop its energy sector in line with the commitments it has made as a member of the EC. No progress was made regarding a trilateral consortium from the EU, Russia, and Ukraine to manage Ukraine's gas-transit system. The European Commission is still waiting for a proposal from Ukraine.

Among EU member states, Estonia and Slovakia made particular efforts in 2013 to help Eastern Partnership countries reduce their dependence on Russia. Estonia made some progress in the decision to build a small regional liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal to reduce dependency on Gazprom and forced its national gas company (which is partly owned by Gazprom) to divest ownership of gas pipelines. Slovakia and Poland offered reverse flow to Ukraine, and Slovakia invested in the modernisation of the technical infrastructure on the Ukrainian border.

44 VISA LIBERALISATION WITH THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD

Moldova made the greatest progress in reforming its visa legislation and the European Commission recommended lifting visa requirements.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	3/5	3/5
Resources	3/5	3/5	3/5
Outcome	5/10	5/10	6/10
Total	12/20	11/20	12/20

B-

2011 B- 2012 B-

Border management and migration are key areas in the dialogue on visa liberalisation between the EU and Georgia and Moldova, and an integral part of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan. In 2013, the EU signed a €16 million deal to improve Georgia's border management, strengthen its capacity to manage migration, enhance its ability to fight cross-border crime, and reduce human trafficking. The Visa Facilitation Agreement with Ukraine came into effect in July.

As the reports on the visa implementation of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plans with Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia show, Moldova made the greatest progress. – met all the benchmarks, including a safe system for biometric passports, reform of the interior ministry, and improved border checks, particularly in Transnistria. At the Vilnius summit, the European Commission recommended lifting visa requirements for Moldova, and most member states seem to support doing so. On the other hand, Ukraine, which started negotiations on visa liberalisation earlier than Moldova, did not meet requirements in 2013.

Georgia received a Visa Liberalisation Action Plan only in 2013 but is making fast progress. At the Vilnius summit, the EU signed a visa liberalisation agreement with Azerbaijan that allows Azeris to get visas faster, more cheaply, and with less bureaucracy. Belarusian citizens received more EU visas per capita than any other Eastern Partnership country in 2013.

Progress in visa liberalisation in 2013, particularly in the run-up in Vilnius, was driven by the northern and central European countries, in particular Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. But even Germany, which was always critical with regard to easing visa ease, was more willing to push the topic forward than in the past.

Middle East and North Africa

Overall grade

B-

Overall grade 2012 **C+**

Overall grade 2011 **C+**



	2013	2012	2011
REGIONAL ISSUES	C+	C	B-
45 Rule of law, human rights, and democracy	C+	C	C+
46 European Neighbourhood Policy in the MENA region	C+	n/a	n/a
47 Regional security	C	n/a	n/a
NORTH AFRICA	C+	B-	B-
48 Egypt	C+	B-	C+
49 Libya	B-	B-	B+
LEVANT	C+	C	C
50 Syria	D+	C	C
51 Regional fallout of the Syrian conflict	C	n/a	n/a
52 Middle East peace process and state-building in Palestine	B+	C+	C-
GULF	B+	B-	C+
53 Iran	A	B-	B-
54 Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council and Yemen	B-	n/a	n/a

If 2012 was a year in which the EU's lack of a political approach to the changing Middle East and North Africa region disappointed, 2013 was the year in which the irrelevance of the ENP to major developments in the southern Mediterranean became clear. The EU's performance worsened in the Middle East and North Africa in 2013. The challenges in the region are undoubtedly huge: a complex environment riven by a civil war in Syria, a military-dominated Egypt, growing sectarian tensions, and a barely concealed power struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia. What makes it even more challenging for the EU is the attempt by the US – for decades the partner in the region whose lead the EU followed – to gradually extract itself from entanglements in the Middle East and “pivot” towards Asia. This dynamic situation presents opportunities as well as obstacles, but the EU has not yet found a new role in the region.

In 2013, there were even clearer disagreements in approach between different EU member states than elsewhere. In addition to the now familiar “north-south” member state divide on how the EU uses trade, aid, and political leverage over the

longer term in its neighbourhood, EU member states also disagreed about how to deal with crises. France and the UK, in particular, operated largely outside the EU framework on Syria. France and the UK were in favour of arming rebel groups, which led to the de facto lifting of the EU arms embargo in May. In response to the regime's use of chemical weapons in Damascus in August, they supported a military intervention in spite of strong opposition from EU partners. However, after the British parliament voted against it, the US stepped back from the idea as Russia pushed for internationally overseen chemical weapons removal in agreement with President Bashar Assad's government and a diplomatic process. The French government also surprised E3+3 colleagues in the second round of Geneva talks on Iran's nuclear programme in early November when it raised concerns about the deal on the table – apparently without prior discussion with its European colleagues.

The EU's response to the military overthrow of Mohammed Morsi's government in Egypt in July highlighted the extent to which the ENP no longer provided a useful framework for engagement in North Africa. EU states had little confidence in their influence in tackling severe backsliding in the political transition of such a key regional actor, and as a result they settled on a common position which indicated to the rest of the region that the EU's commitment to upholding the rule of law and democratic development was, at best, highly conditional. The EU continued to engage with General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's interim regime and to provide non-military aid, but this approach failed to win the EU leverage to really impact on the emerging situation in Egypt in the second half of the year.

Overall, then, while Europeans' technocratic engagement through the ENP has continued with some successes such as the signature of a limited mobility partnership with Morocco in 2013, its policy framework failed to help the EU to tackle first order issues in the wider region. There were, however, two important exceptions to this trend this year. First, under the stewardship of High Representative Catherine Ashton, the E3+3 achieved a historic interim deal in the nuclear talks with Iran. Second, the EU's guidelines on financing to settlements gave a signal of intent to make a clear distinction between engagement with Israel and engagement with settlements. But, despite these two successes, three overarching challenges mean that European engagement in the Middle East and North Africa could be even more complex for Europeans in the years to come.

Firstly, as the Arab Spring turned sour and bloodshed and instability spread across this strategically vital region, Europe has been unable to play any effective security role. As the member states have feuded over Syria, the EU's contribution to regional

stability has been confined to a small and much-delayed border assistance mission (EUBAM) to Libya and to humanitarian aid. Though some member states such as Italy and the UK have been more active, Europe as a whole has opted for a literally marginal role. It made progress in Somalia and the Sahel but left the Mali intervention to France and thus confirmed that CSDP ambitions are now limited to training and advisory tasks. The evident reluctance of the “Big Three” member states to engage in any renewed strategic discussion at the EU level (as urged by Sweden) suggests that they prefer it this way.

Secondly, there has been no debate, let alone agreement, on how Europe should address the growing sectarian crisis in the Middle East and North Africa. Although the positive outcome of the second round of talks on Iran’s nuclear programme in November could represent a first step along the long road to a regional deal, the EU does not appear to have a broader plan. Nowhere do the paradoxes of the regional crisis and Europe’s response come together more acutely than in Iraq, where Europe is providing the increasingly repressive government with ongoing support in order to help it quash a revived insurgency that is directly tied to the same Sunni rebel movement that Europe backs in Syria.

Finally, the EU has no policy towards the Gulf, which is growing in importance as an actor across the Middle East and North Africa. In fact, it is increasingly hard to conceive of any event in the region in the coming years in which the Gulf powers will not be significant. Europe therefore needs to reflect on how it wants to work with this growing force. The actions in 2013 of some member states, such as France, which has particular ties to Saudi Arabia, suggested that they see the region above all in commercial terms. But these bilateral economic relationships put the EU at risk of divide and rule in the coming years if they are not integrated into a more collective, strategic approach to the region.

45 RULE OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY

The response to the military takeover in Egypt cast a long shadow over European states' support for democratic values in the MENA region.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	2/5	3/5
Resources	2/5	2/5	3/5
Outcome	5/10	4/10	3/10
Total	10/20	8/20	9/20

C+

2011 C+ 2012 C

The EU's objectives on the rule of law, human rights, and democracy in the MENA region for 2013 are unchanged from last year. In particular, it aims to protect fundamental rights in the transitions in Tunisia and Egypt; to support the construction of a democratic state in Libya; to push Algeria, Morocco, and Jordan towards political reform; to maintain a consistent line on the rule of law with the Gulf states; and to call for accountability in the Syrian conflict. However, the situation in Egypt changed dramatically in 2013. Not only did the military takeover in Egypt in July expose the continued dominance of the unreformed deep state there, but also the European decision to co-operate with General Sisi's regime to try to convince it of the benefits of a reformist approach has clouded the EU's engagement with transitions across the region. It sent a strong signal to other neighbouring countries that the EU had little commitment to supporting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

The EU also struggled to support a broader enabling environment for democracy to take root. Tunisia remains a democratic leader, and the EU faces less competition as a partner for co-operation there, which is rightly recognised in allocation of EU funds. However, the transition in Tunisia is delicately balanced, with ongoing political violence and a turbulent neighbourhood. In Libya, progress in the development of a constitution was overshadowed by a crisis of state authority and a rapidly declining security situation on which the EU has failed to impact. While relations with Algeria and Morocco remained stable, the EU was unable to leverage reforms either in the political field or on the socio-economic factors that continue to threaten stability across the region. Jordan, which has been hard-hit by the refugee crisis from the Syrian conflict, was not in a position to prioritise internal reform.

46 EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY IN THE MENA REGION

Implementation of the ENP continued but failed to impact on the major challenges in the changing southern Mediterranean region.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	n/a	n/a	4/5
Resources	n/a	n/a	2/5
Outcome	n/a	n/a	3/10
Total	n/a	n/a	9/20

C+

2011 – 2012 –

Following the review of the ENP in 2011, Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle told the European Parliament in October 2013 that the objectives of the ENP in the southern neighbourhood were implementation and delivery. He highlighted the importance of political engagement, improved access to markets, better mobility, and strong and consistent focus on reforms. At an operational level, Europeans led by the Commission made some progress on these objectives. “More formore” came to life in the announcements in November of €150 million of SPRING (Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth) funds. Tunisia received €55 million in recognition of its apparent commitment to tackling the obstacles on a genuine path towards democracy; Morocco received €48 million; Jordan and Lebanon €21 million each; and Libya €5 million. In terms of market access, DCFTA negotiations began with Morocco and preliminary discussions were almost completed with Tunisia, though it will be some time before deals are concluded.

Migration partnerships remained a major stumbling block, with many member states concerned about the implications of increased inflows to Europe, especially after the tragedies at Lampedusa in October. While an EU–Morocco mobility partnership was signed in June 2013, this only included a few member states willing to co-operate (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) and focused on managing borders rather than facilitating movement in a way that is beneficial for the Moroccan economy. However, at a political level, it is hard to detect the impact of the ENP in the MENA region. Overall, funds are limited compared to other investors and EU member states were unable to unite around how policy should respond to more complex challenges. There was no agreement on the idea of “less for less” or on how to react to the military coup in Egypt in July, and the ENP has provided no guidance as to how to support the broader region on the fallout from the Syrian conflict.

47 REGIONAL SECURITY

Though engaged in Somalia and the Sahel, the EU was almost completely absent as a security actor in the MENA region.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	n/a	n/a	3/5
Resources	n/a	n/a	2/5
Outcome	n/a	n/a	3/10
Total	n/a	n/a	8/20

C

2011 – 2012 –

2013 saw the Arab Spring turn sour, with the coup in Egypt, persistent chaos in Libya, and the cataclysm in Syria destabilising Iraq and Lebanon. Yet the EU's sole significant security contribution in this strategically vital region was a small border management assistance mission in Libya, arriving almost two years after the country started haemorrhaging arms and mercenaries. Lacking any credible military representatives or defence profile, the EU was unable to engage effectively with the military powerbrokers calling the shots from Algiers to Baghdad.

France, Italy, Spain, and the UK supported closer security co-operation in the region in 2013, but generally preferred to work with North Africa through other groupings such as the 5+5 (that is, France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain plus Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia) or bilaterally, according to their various interests in controlling illegal migration or securing commercial advantage. Italy assigned €250 million, largely for security projects in Libya, for which it also provides military personnel. Germany joined France

and the UK as a big arms supplier to the region and received major new orders from Algeria and the Gulf. Malta also played an outsized role in regional security by training Libyan soldiers and Somali security forces and by participating in anti-piracy operations.

The EU's focus was further south, with six missions (two of them military ones) deploying some 2,000 personnel (mostly afloat) from Somalia to Mali, supporting local governments against pirates and Islamists and other insurgents. The EU made further progress in Somalia and provided security training and advice, as well as substantial development and humanitarian aid, in the Sahel. In particular, the EU made new pledges in 2013 of €1.35 billion to Mali and €650 million to Somalia. But the decisive intervention in Mali was conducted by France rather than the EU, which thus passed up the perfect opportunity for a first-ever Battlegroup deployment. This tacitly confirmed that ambitions for CSDP are limited to training and advisory roles in the context of the "comprehensive approach".

48 EGYPT

After the military takeover in July, Europeans were united around a weak position and had little influence on developments in Egypt.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	4/5	3/5
Resources	2/5	3/5	3/5
Outcome	5/10	5/10	3/10
Total	10/20	12/20	9/20

C+

2011 C+ 2012 B-

2013 was a tumultuous year in Egypt, centred on the pivotal moment on 3 July when the army deposed President Mohammed Morsi following large public demonstrations against his leadership. After the installation of an interim regime, security forces began a crackdown against Muslim Brotherhood officials and supporters. More than a thousand people were killed, large numbers of Brotherhood officials were arrested, and affiliated media were closed down. The interim authorities launched a roadmap that involved the drafting of a revised constitution to be followed by parliamentary and presidential elections in 2014.

Early in the year, the EU had pursued a determined campaign of mediation between the country's political forces, building on its standing as an interlocutor that is seen as neutral by all sides, with Special Representative Bernardino León in a leading role. These efforts made headway, but were ultimately defeated by the inability of Egyptian parties to find common ground. After Morsi was removed, European officials continued their attempts

at mediation and High Representative Catherine Ashton was the first foreign leader to meet Morsi after his arrest. European leaders collectively decided to avoid labelling the military's action as a coup, in part to preserve their neutrality and in part because some believed Morsi had lost credibility as a leader.

The EU's response to the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood was critical but muted: it suspended some military aid but decided to continue assistance that benefitted the Egyptian people. While some member states pushed for a stronger line, there was a broad consensus in favour of a response that would not alienate the regime. But, with reconciliation in Egypt off the agenda and the security forces in control, the EU found itself simply hoping that more moderate political forces would eventually prevail. Throughout the year, the all-consuming nature of Egypt's political crisis meant there was little take-up for European co-operation.

49 LIBYA

Europeans paid limited attention to Libya and focused on security issues. They had little impact on the transition.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	4/5	4/5
Resources	5/5	2/5	2/5
Outcome	7/10	5/10	5/10
Total	15/20	11/20	11/20

B-

2011 B+ 2012 B-

Libya was not at the top of the agenda for most European policymakers except those in Italy and, to a lesser extent, other Mediterranean countries. While Europeans were relatively united, they focused narrowly on the security situation, which remained a significant challenge and, if anything, grew during the year. Europeans aimed to help the central government build army and police forces to thwart the militias and building capabilities to control borders. Meanwhile, little was done on the political side of the transition. The division of labour with the UN mission left out the EU on most of the important dossiers such as constitution formation or national dialogue.

The European Council and the prime ministers of Italy, France, Germany, and the UK expressed support for Prime Minister Ali Zeidan. These EU member states, along with Turkey and the US, participated in a training mission for 15,000 new Libyan soldiers, which, after being approved at the G8 in Northern Ireland in the summer of 2013, kicked off only in the autumn of 2013. This is

one of the two main EU projects in Libya, along with the €30 million spent for the EUBAM mission for capacity building in border control, which started in May and will take time to yield results. Minor socio-economic funding was also approved, including €10 million programme to set up support services for small and medium-sized firms seeking to expand (though part of these funds will be spent on technical expertise for a new framework EU–Libya agreement) and €5 million to bring treatment of detainees in line with international standards.

In the absence of action on the political context (national dialogue, transitional justice, inclusiveness, and rule of law), these measures have for the moment yielded few results. The situation in the country has deteriorated to the point where militias have ultimately jeopardised energy supplies to Europe.

50 SYRIA

Europeans provided humanitarian support to Syria but were divided and ineffective in supporting either political or military solutions to the conflict.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	3/5	1/5
Resources	3/5	3/5	2/5
Outcome	2/10	2/10	2/10
Total	8/20	8/20	5/20

D+

2011 C 2012 C

As Syria’s civil war intensified in 2013, Europeans aimed to negotiate a political transition, avoid complete state breakdown, and empower a moderate opposition over extremist forces linked to al-Qaeda. But they had little success in achieving these objectives. Throughout the year, Europeans were both divided and ineffective and found themselves increasingly marginalised, though they did contribute significant humanitarian aid to neighbouring states. On the ground, the situation continued to deteriorate and the worst-case scenario increasingly looks like the most likely.

Europeans were divided above all about whether to supply weapons to the Syrian rebels. In May, after France and the UK threatened to break the EU arms embargo, any notion of a common approach disappeared. In August, there was a further split over the question of military action in response to the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime. Again, France and the UK, which wanted to support military action, were on their own. However, the British parliament’s subsequent rejection

of military action unintentionally made room for a political agreement to remove and destroy chemical weapons, which was brokered by Russia. But divisions between member states highlighted European ineffectiveness as a meaningful actor in the crisis and High Representative Catherine Ashton was apparently unwilling to engage on the issue.

The outcome of the Geneva II political process is as yet unclear, but whether or not it succeeds, Europe cannot be said to be particularly consequential in making it happen. Following the British parliamentary vote, the US government chose to deal unilaterally with Russia on chemical weapons and the advancement of a political process. France, which maintains the most forward-leaning position of any EU member state, has been the most sceptical of engagement with Iran – a necessity for any political solution to the Syrian conflict – while supporting an assertive Saudi position. Meanwhile, the opposition movement on which Europe has focused has little influence on the ground.

51 REGIONAL FALLOUT OF THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

Europeans provided significant humanitarian support to Syria's neighbours but did little to address the Iran–Saudi proxy battle fuelling the regional conflict.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	n/a	n/a	2/5
Resources	n/a	n/a	3/5
Outcome	n/a	n/a	3/10
Total	n/a	n/a	8/20

C

2011 – 2012 –

The conflict in Syria has significant regional implications, from unprecedented refugee outflows to the proliferation of arms and the spread of violent political – and increasingly sectarian – instability. Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey have already been significantly destabilised by the Syrian crisis and the spillover is likely to worsen. Europeans sought to contain the refugee problem and help neighbouring states, particularly through the provision of significant humanitarian aid. As of November, the EU and individual member states had provided €1.55 billion in humanitarian support since the crisis began, with €515 million coming from EU humanitarian budgets and €1 billion from the member states. The UK and Germany were particularly generous, offering €590 million and €221 million respectively. For the UK, this represents the largest single funding commitment ever made in response to a humanitarian disaster. By contrast, France, a leading European voice on Syria, contributed only €31 million.

Europeans also provided some limited security support, particularly to Lebanon and Jordan, including equipment and training to local security forces. But this was not enough to meaningfully shape local developments, especially given the increasingly combustible regional environment. In July, the EU listed the military wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation in response to its alleged involvement in the July 2012 Burgas bombing in Bulgaria, but nonetheless kept open channels to the political wing to ensure ongoing dialogue with Lebanon's most influential domestic actor. However, Europeans were unable to respond to the broader regional struggle for hegemony between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which is directly feeding the Syrian conflict and making containment increasingly difficult to sustain. Until an effort is made towards a regional accord, the Syrian crisis will continue to amplify violent regional instability.

52 MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND STATE-BUILDING IN PALESTINE

EU policy was slightly more incisive than in 2012. Europeans have slowly started to modify Israel's cost-benefit calculations about the occupation.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	3/5	4/5
Resources	2/5	3/5	4/5
Outcome	2/10	3/10	6/10
Total	7/20	9/20	14/20

B+

2011 C- 2012 C+

In 2013, Europeans worked more effectively than in the past on making clear the distinction between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs). Peace talks resumed in the summer thanks also to combined EU and US efforts, but had not yielded any significant results halfway through the self-imposed nine months' timeline. There was continued slippage in EU-supported Palestinian state building, with Palestinian Authority (PA) finances and the Palestinian economy continuously deteriorating. Absent tangible results on the political track, the EU state-building project in the OPTs seems doomed to fail.

High Representative Catherine Ashton pushed for a growing distinction in policy towards settlements in the OPTs and Israel. In April, 13 EU foreign ministers expressed their support for such an approach; Ireland and Spain were particularly active in pushing for it. In July, the European Commission issued guidelines that denied EU "grants, prizes and financial instruments" to Israeli entities based in the OPTs. While affecting only 0.5 percent of relevant EU project funding for Israel, these guidelines

provoked a relevant reaction in Israel and proved to be a concrete step towards affecting Israel's cost-benefit calculations about the settlements enterprise. The European Commission maintained a firm position in ensuing negotiations about Israel's inclusion in the Horizon 2020 EU scheme for support on research and development, and the Israeli government promised to compensate settlers for the loss incurred because of the guidelines.

Meanwhile, EU-Israel co-operation continued to thicken: in June, an "Open Skies" agreement paved the way for more direct flights between Europe and Israel; in October, Israel became a partner in the EU's Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) for co-operation on navigation satellites. The EU continued to assist the PA through the PEGASE programme (€156 million) and to refugees through donations to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Notwithstanding the financial crisis of both the PA and UNRWA, which worsened in 2013, Europe remains the largest donor to the Palestinians.

53 IRAN

In the second round of talks on Iran's nuclear programme in November, the E3+3 overcame a brief moment of disunity to broker a historic agreement.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	5/5	4/5
Resources	3/5	4/5	5/5
Outcome	4/10	3/10	9/10
Total	11/20	12/20	18/20

A

2011 B- 2012 B-

During the last decade, Europeans have been united behind the twin-track policy of dialogue with and sanctions against Iran in response to its nuclear programme. In 2013, following the election of Hassan Rouhani as Iranian president, this approach led to an unprecedented interim deal. Three rounds of negotiations were held in Geneva, led by High Representative Catherine Ashton. The second round ended without agreement after France challenged the anticipated deal and broke the E3+3's confidentiality protocols by announcing that talks had failed. But the third Geneva meeting, a week later, produced an interim joint agreement in which Iran accepted France's demand to suspend construction of the Arak nuclear facility. The E3+3 thanked Ashton for her role in brokering unity. Pursuant to the interim deal, the EU28 will suspend certain sanctions on Iran in January 2014.

The success in negotiations with Iran was a vindication of the EU's twin-track approach, led by the E3, and in particular sanctions, which began to bite in 2013 and severely impacted Iran's oil exports.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) annulled the decision of some member states to impose EU financial sanctions on Iranian companies incorporated in the EU. In response, member states took steps to re-impose sanctions against Iran's main cargo-shipping line but delisted some entities.

However, Europeans did not substantially engage with Iran beyond the nuclear deal. For example, Europeans were conspicuously absent at Rouhani's inauguration. Only Italy was forward-leaning in engaging with Iran (though the UK, which had shut down its embassy in Tehran in 2011, took a step towards normalising relations by appointing a reciprocal non-resident chargé d'affaires). A European Parliament delegation visited Iran in October to discuss the nuclear talks and regional issues. A separate trip in December by the EU parliamentary delegation engaged Iran in talks regarding its human rights policies and potential for expanded trade ties between Iran and the EU.

54 RELATIONS WITH THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL AND YEMEN

EU member states co-operated with the Gulf states on a bilateral basis. They should be more strategic in the future.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	n/a	3/5
Resources	1/5	n/a	3/5
Outcome	5/10	n/a	5/10
Total	10/20	n/a	11/20

B-

2011 C+ 2012 n/a

Co-operation with the GCC states and Yemen focused on four main issues in 2013: the war in Syria; military intervention in Egypt to remove the Islamist government; Yemen's transition; and conflict in Bahrain. Overall, European policies were unclear and lacking unity as member states pursued their own bilateral relationships.

The Egyptian military's move to remove President Mohammed Morsi, install a new government, and unleash a crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood took most by surprise. Europeans avoided outright condemnation while making clear their concerns for stability and offering to involve itself in mediation. However, France and Britain took a softer line, and Saudi Arabia even used Paris as the place to issue public warnings to the West against withdrawing its support. Europeans failed to work with the Gulf states to give mediation efforts a better chance. There was also a lack of focus on Syria and Iran. Saudi Arabia and France co-ordinated hawkish positions favouring intervention in Syria and with regard to the E3+3 talks. The EU rallied in the end, with widespread praise for High Representative

Catherine Ashton's effort in mediating the landmark deal in November, but European success on Iran seemed to come despite rather than because of its relationships with the Gulf states.

Britain took an increasingly dovish approach towards Bahrain and boosted its trade with Manama, but the EU appeared disengaged. In Yemen, Europeans left mediation efforts to UN envoy Jamal Benomar, but obstruction by former regime loyalists is likely to delay presidential and parliamentary elections due in 2014. There is an opportunity for Europeans to help the process, a possibility enhanced by popular disaffection with Washington over a perceived priority for drones over reconciliation and development. Given the possible gradual return of Iran to global respectability and Gulf perceptions of US disengagement, now is the time to engage.

Multilateral Issues & Crisis Management

Overall grade

B-

Overall grade 2012 **B**

Overall grade 2011 **B**



	2013	2012	2011
KEY ELEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM	B+	B-	B-
55 European policy at the UN (includes UNSC, GA, HRC, and UN reform)	B-	C-	C+
56 European policy in the G8, G20, IMF, and WTO	B+	B-	C+/B-
57 European policy on non-proliferation and the arms trade	A-	B-	B
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE	B-	B+	B+
58 European policy towards the ICC and international criminal tribunals	B-	B+	B+
CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT	B-	B-	B+
59 Climate change	B-	B	A-
60 Development aid	B-	B-	B-
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF	B-	B+	B-
61 Humanitarian aid	B	B	n/a
62 Response to Syrian refugee crisis	C+	n/a	n/a
PEACEKEEPING	B-	B-	B
63 Mali and the Sahel	B	C+	n/a
64 Somalia	B+	B+	B+
65 The Sudans, DRC and CAR	C+	B-	B-
66 Afghanistan	C+	B-	C+

Events in 2013 severely tested Europe's ability to manage both fast-moving crises and complex multilateral negotiations. Conflicts in Africa highlighted divisions over military action within the EU, as France intervened in Mali and the CAR with limited support from other member states. France and the UK continued to play a prominent role in diplomacy over Syria at the UN, but were sidelined by the US and Russia during the August–September chemical weapons crisis. EU High Representative Catherine Ashton scored a success with her management of nuclear negotiations with Iran but many other multilateral processes made little headway. There was particular disappointment about the very weak outcome of climate change talks in Warsaw in November.

France was at the centre of arguments over European policies. Having tried to avoid intervening in Mali in 2012, Paris sent in troops on 11 January 2013 to prevent Islamists taking over the south of the country. Although EU member states offered political support, only a small number, most notably Britain, provided significant military assistance. Although the EU deployed a training mission to reform the Malian army and the Netherlands offered attack helicopters and commandos to the parallel UN peacekeeping force, French officials complained about the EU's caution, and especially Germany's scepticism. In late 2013, France felt compelled to intervene in CAR, another former colony in chaos. But other EU countries had little interest in CAR, and the UK did not wish to deploy the troops it had on standby as part of the EU Battlegroup system to help quell this crisis.

African governments were more willing to send troops to Mali and CAR, with financial support from the EU, the US, and other Western powers. European donors' support for African missions – including funds from the African peace facility – remains crucial to security on the continent. However, the need to find money for these new operations in Francophone Africa while continuing to finance the large-scale African Union operation in Somalia created tensions within the EU, especially between France and the UK. Rebel and terrorist attacks in Somalia dampened previous optimism about the country's future.

Paris was also frustrated by a lack of progress over Syria at the UNSC in 2013, as was Britain (Luxembourg, a temporary member of the UNSC, gained some credit for pressing the humanitarian aspects of the crisis). After the Assad regime's large-scale use of chemical weapons in August, and the ensuing debate about military action, Paris was infuriated by the Obama administration's decision to negotiate a solution bilaterally with Moscow. A French effort to involve the ICC in the issue failed. But France would once again take an independent diplomatic line in talks over confidence-building measures with Iran, delaying a deal out of concern that it put insufficient pressure on Tehran.

Some commentators have argued that France's military and diplomatic assertiveness is meant to offset its lack of leverage in debates inside Europe on the future trajectory of the EU. It is not clear that Germany, which is especially wary of new engagements in Africa, will support French global policies indefinitely. Many smaller EU members are also sceptical. Meanwhile, the UK's status as a force in both crisis management and multilateral diplomacy

was undermined by its parliament's vote against military action in Syria in September, which suggested that London's room for manoeuvre in future crises will be reduced. More broadly, the Obama administration's direct negotiations with Russia over Syria pointed to a long-term decline in Europe's multilateral leverage. If Washington, London, and Paris engage in further public splits over Syria or Iran, this decline may become more pronounced.

Other European multilateral initiatives were more successful in 2013. Ashton's orchestration of the nuclear talks with Iran won widespread praise, although secret bilateral discussions between the US and Iran provided the impetus for progress. Britain presided over the G8 competently, forging agreements on financial transparency and taxation (conversely, Russia's hosting of the G20 summit in St Petersburg was overshadowed by the Syrian crisis). British Prime Minister David Cameron also made a substantial contribution to debates on the future of international development, co-chairing a UN panel on the future of aid targets after the present Millennium Development Goals come to term in 2015. Europeans can also take credit for the agreement of the first UN conventional Arms Trade Treaty, which was completed in April. This document, which was nearly finished in 2012 but put on hold in part to avoid friction with the US gun lobby prior to the American elections, is the product of painstaking diplomacy over many years by EU member states including Bulgaria, the Nordic countries, and the UK.

By contrast, UN climate change talks in Warsaw delivered a vague – yet still contentious – international commitment to table proposals for reducing carbon emissions by 2015. Climate activists criticised the decision to hold the talks in Poland, which, with its coal-heavy economy, is often the backmarker in EU environmental debates. Representatives from developing countries attacked European and other Western negotiators for failing to offer sufficient promises of financial assistance to help tackle climate change. It seems probable that climate diplomacy, once seen as a banner issue for the EU in the global arena, will become even uglier, while time is running out for agreement on curbing carbon emissions.

If climate issues have the potential to upset European multilateral diplomacy, new challenges are also emerging on the crisis management front. Austria withdrew its peacekeepers from the long-running UN operation on the Golan Heights due to threats from Syrian rebels; Ireland had to offer a contingent at short notice to stop the mission falling apart. The Syrian conflict could pose

further dilemmas for European peacekeepers in the region, including those in southern Lebanon, in 2014. Meanwhile, European militaries had to watch and wait while the US and Afghan governments negotiated over whether American forces will remain in the country after NATO withdraws in 2014. If US troops do stay on, some European trainers may also remain – even if the EU’s interest in Afghanistan has waned.

55 EUROPEAN POLICY AT THE UN (INCLUDES UNSC, GA, HRC, AND UN REFORM)

EU policy at the UN was largely driven by events and there was little progress on longer-term initiatives on UN reform and peacekeeping.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	2/5	2/5	3/5
Resources	3/5	2/5	4/5
Outcome	4/10	3/10	5/10
Total	9/20	7/20	12/20

B-

2011 C+ 2012 C-

In 2012, EU member states had played a significant role in forging majorities in favour of resolutions putting pressure on Syria in the UNGA and the UNHRC. Similar diplomatic efforts continued in 2013, but with reduced momentum and expectations. In the UNSC, France and the UK remained active on Syria but were sidelined by Russia and the US during the chemical weapons crisis in September. Luxembourg, a temporary member of the UNSC, worked with Australia to raise the issue of the humanitarian fallout from the Syria crisis, despite Russia opposition. Moscow relented and backed a statement calling for humanitarian access to besieged communities in September, although this had little real effect.

Against this background, there was little serious discussion of UN reform in 2013. The main exception was an improvised proposal by France to place limits on UNSC vetoes during mass atrocities, which President François Hollande presented to the UNGA in September, but it is unlikely to make rapid progress. The president of the UNGA invited Belgium to sit on a

special advisory group on UNSC reform in October, but the EU is split on this issue. Again, few major changes are likely soon.

Ireland tried to stir up debate about increasing European contributions to UN peacekeeping during its presidency. This had only limited impact, but the Irish offered troops to the UN at short notice when Austria pulled a contingent from the Golan Heights in June due to threats from Syrian rebels. The Netherlands and Nordic countries also offered troops to the UN peacekeeping force in Mali, and UN officials hope more EU members will follow suit after ISAF closes. Meanwhile, Britain continued to limit the ability of the EEAS to represent the EU at the UN, for example by arguing that the EEAS could not chair a sub-committee of the UN Peacebuilding Commission dealing with CAR. Overall, the EU is still not the sum of its parts across the UN.

56 EUROPEAN POLICY IN THE G8, G20, IMF, AND WTO

Britain successfully stewarded the G8, the EU made progress with the US on TTIP, and the WTO reached a landmark agreement on trade, but the IMF clashed with the eurozone.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	n/a	3/5	4/5
Resources	n/a	5/5	4/5
Outcome	n/a	4/10	7/10
Total	n/a	12/20	15/20

B+

2011 C+/B- 2012 B-

Britain invested significant diplomatic capital in its presidency of the G8 in 2013. Its June summit in Northern Ireland delivered progress on tax and other issues. Given the similar energy that France put into its G8 presidency in 2011, it is clear that the EU members of the G8 will continue to defend it against accusations of irrelevance. Russia hosted the G20 this year, but the St. Petersburg summit in September was overshadowed by the Syrian chemical weapons crisis. The European delegations at the Russian summit looked confused when Germany was one day late in adding its support for a declaration calling for action against Syria backed by Britain, France, and the US. But at least this was the first G20 meeting since 2010 that was not dominated by the euro crisis.

The EU and the IMF continued to cooperate closely over the eurozone (which currently receives 60 percent of IMF disbursements) although tensions over how to deal with Greece in particular flared up in public in mid-2013. The European Commission reacted irritably to IMF suggestions that it had misunderstood how

to promote growth in Greece, and some EU officials argued that the IMF should reduce its role. Nonetheless, the IMF, the Commission and the ECB have continued to work together, often facing public anger.

European trade diplomacy made more progress, especially with the launch of talks on TTIP with the US, announced at the G8 summit after last-minute intra-EU wrangling over French demands to protect the audio-visual sector from competition. While many obstacles remain and large industrial lobbies on both sides of the Atlantic need to be convinced – and talks were complicated by the Snowden affair (see component 25) – TTIP is now a major political goal for the EU. Brussels also closed in on a trade deal with Canada. Concerns that such limited agreements will undermine the WTO were eased when the organisation reached a deal on easing international trade, in Bali in December, involving a sensitive India–EU compromise on subsidy issues.

57 EUROPEAN POLICY ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND THE ARMS TRADE

The EU played a major role in the agreement of the Arms Trade Treaty and diplomatic progress with Iran, although it was thrown off-balance by Syria's use of chemical weapons.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	4/5	4/5
Resources	5/5	4/5	4/5
Outcome	4/10	3/10	8/10
Total	13/20	11/20	16/20

A-

2011 B 2012 B-

Europeans played a limited role when North Korea tested a nuclear weapon in February, as China and the US negotiated sanctions against Pyongyang that were approved by the UNSC. But, as the year progressed, the EU played a larger role in diplomacy over both WMD and conventional arms. In March, European diplomats played a major part in UN negotiations on the first Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). This had come close to completion in 2012, but the Obama administration baulked at approving it for fear of offending the US gun lobby in an election year. The UNGA was finally able to sign off on the ATT in April, although powers including China, India, and Russia abstained on the text (the US has since said it will ratify the document). The Nordic countries and the UK had pushed hard for its completion, while Bulgaria played an important technical role in guiding negotiations. Although the treaty is relatively weak, it is a success for persistent European diplomacy through the UN.

By contrast, Europeans were caught off-guard by the Syrian chemical weapons

crisis in August and September. While Britain and France initially appeared ready to act militarily, the US chose to negotiate a deal on destroying Syria's chemical arsenal instead. A number of EU members were able to offer the UN and the OPCW technical support. Denmark offered ships to transport chemical weapons while Italy provided naval facilities (the EU has long been a major financial supporter of the OPCW).

Finally, Ashton was at the centre of negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme in November. Although the impetus for a confidence-building agreement with Tehran came from secret talks between the US and Iran, Ashton was praised for steering final discussions through the EU3+3 mechanism. France briefly held up an agreement, demanding tighter limits on Iran's nuclear facilities, but this was generally agreed to have strengthened the agreement. The Iranian case will almost certainly be the central test for non-proliferation diplomacy in the coming year, and the EU remains at the centre of this process.

58 EUROPEAN POLICY TOWARDS THE ICC AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS

Europeans failed to involve the ICC in Syria, despite repeated attempts, but managed to defend it from African efforts to limit the court's reach.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	4/5	4/5
Resources	4/5	3/5	3/5
Outcome	7/10	7/10	5/10
Total	15/20	14/20	12/20

B-

2011 B+ 2012 B+

European defenders of the ICC faced a difficult year as they tried to involve it in the Syrian crisis and defend its role in Africa. In January, all EU member states except Sweden signed a letter coordinated by Switzerland demanding that the UNSC should refer Syria to the ICC (Sweden argued that a referral might make it harder to come to a political agreement with the Syrian government). The letter had little effect, as China, Russia, and the US all remained opposed to involving the ICC. However, as the bloodshed in Syria worsened, EU member states again called on the UNSC to invoke the ICC. In September, with the chemical weapons crisis apparently likely to end in US-led strikes on Syria, Germany (in this case supported by Sweden) called for the ICC to lead an investigation. After the US negotiated the deal to destroy Syria's chemical arsenal with Russia, France indicated its discontent by floating a UNSC resolution invoking the ICC. American officials pushed back hard against this option, and the final UN resolution did not mention the court.

Meanwhile, African leaders were increasingly critical of the ICC's role on their continent. In November, the African members of the UNSC tabled a resolution calling for it to delay criminal proceedings against Kenya's president and vice-president over mass killings conducted in 2007–2008. This bid had momentum after the Nairobi shopping-mall massacre. The European members of the UNSC, the US, and their allies abstained on the proposal, denying it enough votes to pass. A compromise deal was later made to limit the amount of time the Kenyans spend in The Hague during their trials. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia also continued to conduct its final cases. In 2014, European policymakers may also have to deal with the fallout from the "Hariri Tribunal" set up to investigate the murder of the former Lebanese leader, which is very likely to implicate Syrian officials.

59 CLIMATE CHANGE

Europeans appeared divided over the bloc's own climate change targets for 2030, and UN climate change talks in Warsaw failed to deliver any significant breakthroughs.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	5/5	4/5	3/5
Resources	4/5	3/5	3/5
Outcome	7/10	6/10	5/10
Total	16/20	13/20	11/20

B-

2011 A- 2012 B

Debate over climate change policy within the EU gathered momentum in 2013, but there was a disappointing lack of progress at the global level. In March, the European Commission released a paper outlining potential climate and energy targets up to 2030, to replace existing goals for 2020. As the Commission noted, the EU's next round of targets will shape its negotiating position in UN talks on a global climate change deal that is supposed to be completed in 2015. In October, a group of 13 EU member states calling themselves the Green Growth Group released a document calling for ambitious post-2020 targets, reforms to the EU's carbon-trading system, and an activist position in the UN process. The group consists almost entirely of western and northern EU states and includes only two (Estonia and Slovenia) from the 2014 enlargement group. This points to a division within the EU over the balance between environmental and economic concerns. Poland, with its coal-heavy economy, is often cited as the hardest-line opponent of a strong climate change agenda. There was criticism when Warsaw was chosen

to host the annual round of UN climate negotiations this year.

In the end, the Warsaw talks were overshadowed by splits largely beyond Poland's control. Developing countries and NGOs accused Western states of failing to make serious offers of aid to compensate for the costs and damage of climate change. The negotiators finally agreed that all states should publish climate change strategies by early 2015 before potentially decisive talks in Paris. Critics observed that this timetable leaves relatively little time for serious negotiations on the basis of the national plans once they are published. In 2014, Europeans will have to resolve their differences over the 2030 targets. Warsaw produced some small success including the launch of a fund backed by the UK, Norway, and the US to tackle deforestation. But there is a strong sense that the UN talks lack momentum, and further tensions lie ahead with major non-Western economies and carbon emitters including China and India, making real deals on climate change difficult.

60 DEVELOPMENT AID

EU member states diverged in their commitment to maintaining development aid levels but were active in debates about new targets to succeed the Millennium Development Goals.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	2/5	2/5
Resources	3/5	3/5	3/5
Outcome	6/10	6/10	6/10
Total	12/20	11/20	11/20

B-

2011 B- 2012 B-

EU member states followed divergent aid strategies as the financial crisis continued. Some traditional big spenders such as Denmark, Sweden, and the UK increased their aid spending and others such as Germany and Belgium kept spending roughly level or slightly reduced. While Spain has had to make further deep cuts to its development budget, Italy increased its spending for the first time since the financial crisis, adding €100 million to its aid budget (although this still adds up to less than €300 million or roughly one third of its pre-crisis level). Smaller donors under financial pressure such as Cyprus, Greece, and Hungary also made cuts. However, all three Baltic states managed to increase their (admittedly small) aid budgets. Luxembourg, which increased spending, continues to have the highest per capita aid budget in Europe.

The European Commission manages roughly one third of all development funding coming from the EU but NGOs raised concerns that aid flows would fall victim to haggling over the Multiannual

Financial Framework for 2014–2020, which was finally agreed in November. The Commission had proposed a figure of €70 billion for external spending in this period, but the final bargain allocated €59 billion to this area.

Meanwhile, EU member states were active in debates over development targets to succeed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). British Prime Minister David Cameron co-chaired a panel convened by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on a potential post-2015 framework (the panel also included representatives from France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the European Commission). Other EU member states, including some that have had to cut their aid budgets, made diplomatic investments in these debates, and Ireland has facilitated talks on the MDGs. Although the Cameron panel's report, released in May, was generally well-received, there were signs that developing countries will push back against some of its recommendations that are perceived as furthering a Western agenda.

61 HUMANITARIAN AID

Europeans generally maintained spending on humanitarian aid and contributed to the response to the typhoon in the Philippines in November.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	n/a	4/5	2/5
Resources	n/a	4/5	4/5
Outcome	n/a	5/10	7/10
Total	n/a	13/20	13/20

B

2011 – 2012 B

European spending on humanitarian aid mainly remained level or increased in response to crises. Syria remained the single biggest humanitarian crisis (see component 62) but there was also a need for a response to the collapse of CAR and the typhoon in the Philippines. The largest humanitarian donors such as the Nordic countries and the UK have already been disbursing funds at a high rate in recent years, so did not see major increases in 2013, but other EU members, ranging from Belgium to Hungary, did raise their contributions. Among traditional humanitarian players, Spain has been the worst affected by the euro crisis, cutting its humanitarian spending from €40 million to €20 million between 2012 and 2013. Greece’s humanitarian budget has been almost completely wiped out, and Cyprus has similarly seen its funds drop.

Given the pressure on individual states’ budgets, the European Commission continues to play an outsize part in humanitarian aid. At the beginning of 2013, the Commission had set aside €660 million for humanitarian aid, but this was

raised to just over €825 million in June and €1.145 billion in August. This remains an area in which there is a strong EU identity, and the commissioner in charge of humanitarian aid, Kristalina Georgieva, has boldly pushed the boundaries of her mandate, for example taking an activist approach in response to the CAR crisis. By the end of 2013, the Commission was the largest donor to CAR (although it had far less than the sums involved in cases such as Syria) and had set up an “air bridge” to get aid workers to Bangui.

Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in November also tested European humanitarian budgets, and the UK, the Commission, and Germany were among the leading financial responders (although Japan, South Korea, and non-Western donors such as Saudi Arabia also made significant pledges). The UK also sent military vessels and personnel to assist, although their presence was overshadowed by American naval help.

62 RESPONSE TO SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

Europeans made financial contributions to the response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria but were less generous in accepting refugees.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	n/a	n/a	2/5
Resources	n/a	n/a	3/5
Outcome	n/a	n/a	5/10
Total	n/a	n/a	10/20

C+

2011 – 2012 –

The humanitarian crisis in Syria dwarfed other emergencies in 2013. In June, the UN launched appeals aiming to help roughly 13 million Syrians inside and outside the country at a cost of €4.4 billion. The financial response from EU member states varied considerably. By the end of the year, the UK had committed a total of nearly €600 million to the crisis and Germany over €200 million. By contrast, France pledged only €15 million in 2013 (and €30 million since the crisis began), despite its political engagement in Syria. Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden were also notable donors, while Belgium, Ireland, and Finland all made it a priority. Italy and Spain put a significant percentage of their limited funds towards the crisis. As in broader humanitarian affairs, the European Commission has helped fill funding gaps, offering over €500 million from the start of the crisis to late 2013.

Although Syria's neighbours have borne the brunt of the refugee crisis, Bulgaria has had to shelter between 5,000 and 10,000 in 2013, though it was slow to respond. Over 11,000 Syrians have been arrested trying to

cross into Greece, and concerns have been raised about the conditions in which they are kept. Cyprus and Romania has also been obvious destinations for refugees. The UNHCR has tried to persuade other European governments to take in some Syrians to relieve the pressure on those countries nearer the crisis. Sweden announced that it would offer vetted Syrians permanent residence (by which point there were estimated to be nearly 15,000 in the country) while Germany has offered 5,000 places. But other member states were less welcoming: France and Finland offered to take 500 refugees each and most other European governments indicated that they were willing to accept just ten or 15. Even Sweden and Germany's offers must be compared to the fact that there are two million Syrian refugees in the Middle East.

63 MALI AND THE SAHEL

France intervened decisively in Mali, but most other European states offered limited or late assistance.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	n/a	4/5	2/5
Resources	n/a	4/5	3/5
Outcome	n/a	2/10	8/10
Total	n/a	10/20	13/20

B

2011 – 2012 C+

France intervened in Mali in January 2013 to halt Islamist forces advancing on the capital, Bamako. It rapidly went on the offensive and restored government control over almost all major population centres. A select group of EU countries offered military support – mainly airlift – during the initial phase of operations, including Belgium, Britain, Denmark, and Spain. Germany was accused of failing to assist, but it also offered aerial support to the French as the mission continued. The main gap in EU support was in combat forces: proposals to deploy a French-German-Polish EU Battlegroup to Mali were dismissed on the grounds that it might have to go to Syria. African countries sent troops instead.

A number of member states offered financial support to an African mission that operated alongside the French until the summer, although their funding moved slowly. Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, and the UK were also among the lead contributors of personnel to a mission to train the Malian army. The Czech Republic and Poland also made

significant contributions. France was, however, frustrated by difficulties in finding protection forces for the trainers. In July, a UN peace operation (MINUSMA) replaced the African force. It initially had to rely on poorly equipped African troops, but Denmark and Sweden offered air assets and intelligence personnel, as did Norway. Most importantly, the Netherlands pledged attack helicopters and commandos to MINUSMA, giving it greater specialised capacities than most UN missions. Ireland considered deploying soldiers to MINUSMA, but switched them to the Golan Heights instead to make up an emergency shortfall of peacekeepers there. Following elections in July and August, the new Malian president pledged to restore the country's honour and unity. But, after a lull, insurgent attacks on international personnel began to increase and France was not able to withdraw its forces as quickly as it had initially hoped.

In addition to the training mission in Mali, an EU capacity-building operation (EUCAP SAHEL Niger) began training security personnel in neighbouring Niger.

64 SOMALIA

The EU has made progress in supporting stability in Somalia and scored striking success fighting piracy off the coast, but disorder and Islamist threats persist.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	4/5	4/5
Resources	4/5	4/5	4/5
Outcome	6/10	7/10	6/10
Total	14/20	15/20	14/20

B+

2011 B+ 2012 B+

At the start of 2013, there was optimism that Somalia could finally break out of its long cycle of instability thanks to military efforts by the African Union (AU) and political work by the UN. The EU has supported both organisations, especially by funding the AU force through the European Commission’s African Peace Facility, training the Somali army and conducting anti-piracy patrols. The EU has also launched a third mission, EUCAP Nestor, aimed at building up East African maritime capabilities to address piracy, which only started to make progress in late 2013. But the situation in Somalia remained unstable throughout the year. A French commando raid in January ended with the death of hostages. AU forces continued to make progress against Islamist forces but sustained major casualties. The UN moved an increased number of personnel into Mogadishu, but they were also the target of terrorist attacks. It is increasingly clear that stabilising Somalia will be tougher than it seemed in early 2013.

The UK remained the most diplomatically active EU member state. It organised an international conference on Somalia in May 2013 and used its G8 presidency to highlight the country’s needs. London seconded a senior diplomat, Nicholas Kay, to run the enhanced UN mission. It also provides the headquarters for the EU naval mission off the Somali coast (EU NAVFOR), which as of December involved one ship each from France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Naval actions have proved effective: there were just 11 pirate incidents off Somalia in the first 11 months of 2013, the lowest figure since 2006. Italy also played a greater role in Somalia in 2013: it deployed a new commander for the EU training mission assisting the country’s army and increased political and institutional support. Member states also made significant financial contributions to Somalia – in particular Germany, Sweden (which doubled its development aid to Somalia), and the UK.

65 THE SUDANS, DRC AND CAR

France belatedly intervened in the Central African Republic but few other EU member states showed any interest in the crisis and were reluctant to draw resources away from other parts of Africa.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	4/5	4/5	2/5
Resources	2/5	3/5	3/5
Outcome	6/10	4/10	4/10
Total	12/20	11/20	9/20

C+

2011 B- 2012 B-

Multiple crises had the potential to engulf central Africa at the start of 2013. Aggressive militia groups were active in the eastern DRC, Sudan and South Sudan remained on the brink of war, and the primarily Muslim Seleka rebel group threatened to overthrow the government in the CAR. The EU's leverage in these crises varied considerably. Member states played a decreasing role in managing tensions between the Sudans, where China, the US, and the AU are now the decisive external actors. Britain and France played an important role in planning and mandating a new UN-flagged intervention brigade in the DRC, which defeated the main rebel group in the region. The curtailment of aid to Rwanda, which has backed the rebels, helped prepare the way for the UN's offensive.

CAR proved to be the most vexing crisis of all. In December 2012, France, the former colonial power, had ruled out intervening to defend CAR's government from Seleka. But, in March, the rebels seized the capital, Bangui, and French troops stood by as the country descended into chaos. Paris began

to agitate for an intervention alongside African governments, but the UK, supported by the US, questioned the operational and financial viability of either an AU- or UN-led peacekeeping force in CAR – especially if this would draw resources away from Somalia. After the humanitarian situation in CAR worsened markedly in the second half of 2013, EU humanitarian officials argued for military action. After Britain and France resolved their differences, France intervened in December, backed by an AU force with substantial European Commission funding. But London and Washington continued to query the case for a larger and more expensive follow-on UN peacekeeping mission. While the UK had troops on standby as part of the EU Battlegroup system in the second half of 2013, it indicated that these would not be available for CAR, where violence increased despite the French deployment.

66 AFGHANISTAN

A small number of European states remained seriously militarily committed to Afghanistan, but they are diminishing adjuncts to the US presence.

	2011	2012	2013
Unity	3/5	4/5	2/5
Resources	3/5	3/5	3/5
Outcome	4/10	4/10	4/10
Total	10/20	11/20	9/20

C+

2011 C+ 2012 B-

Europe's role in Afghan security is much diminished. Of the 84,000 troops under NATO command in the country in December, 8,000 came from the UK; 3,000 from Germany; 3,000 from Italy; and 1,000 each from Poland and Romania. Most other European countries still have some personnel on the ground, but rarely more than a couple of hundred. Meanwhile, the EU's police and rule of law mission (EUPOL Afghanistan) fields 350 personnel. EUPOL has prioritised improving the physical infrastructure for training Afghan police, including a crime management college and police staff college. However, the future of the European security presence in Afghanistan has been largely dependent on negotiations between the US and Afghanistan over the future American military presence. While NATO intends to complete its current mission in 2014, Washington has aimed to maintain some troops in the country. This US presence could provide a framework for some residual European military training activities and the continuation of EUPOL,

which is currently mandated to operate until the end of 2014.

Washington and Kabul debated the precise terms of a post-NATO military presence through 2013, with the US seriously considering withdrawing entirely. By the end of the year it seemed probable that a US force would stay on, although the terms remained sensitive. Europe's future in Afghanistan has thus depended largely on negotiations over which it had no control. The UN will remain in Afghanistan after NATO exits. A senior European official, Ján Kubiš of Slovakia, was in charge of the UN assistance mission throughout the last year, and had to make some serious financial cuts. Denmark has played a prominent role in thinking through the UN's role after 2013. China and Russia, fearful of terrorist spillover, are likely to support any initiatives to strengthen the international presence next year. But Europe as a whole is suffering severe Afghanistan fatigue, and the EU is likely to do relatively little for a country that it once aspired to build.

Tables



Unity (out of 5)	Resources (out of 5)	Outcome (out of 10)	Total (out of 20)	Score Grade
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RELATIONS WITH CHINA

				10.98	B-	
Trade liberalisation and overall relationship				12.75	B	
01	Formats of the Europe-China dialogue	3	3	7	13	B
02	Investment and market access in China	5	4	6	15	B+
03	Trade disputes with China	3	4	5	12	B-
04	EU-China solar panels case	0	5	6	11	B-

Human rights and governance				8.00	C	
05	Rule of law and human rights in China	2	2	4	8	C

Co-operation on regional and global issues				12.2	B-	
06	Relations with China on Syria, wider Middle East and North Africa	3	3	5	11	B-
07	Relations with China on DPRK and East Asia security challenges	5	1	5	11	B-
08	Relations with China on Africa	4	3	6	13	B
09	Co-operation with China in global governance institutions	3	3	6	12	B-
10	Co-operation with China on environment and energy	5	4	5	14	B+

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

				10.19	C+	
Trade liberalisation and overall relationship				12	B-	
11	Trade liberalisation with Russia	5	4	5	14	B+
12	Visa liberalisation with Russia	3	3	4	10	C+

Human rights and governance				8.00	C	
13	FRule of law and human rights in Russia	4	2	2	8	C
14	Political freedom in Russia	4	2	2	8	C

European security issues				9.75	C+	
15	Relations with Russia on the Eastern Partnership	4	4	1	9	C+
16	Relations with Russia on protracted conflicts	4	2	2	8	C
17	Relations with Russia on energy issues	4	4	7	15	B+
18	Diversification of gas-supply routes to Europe	2	3	2	7	C-

Co-operation on regional and global issues				11	B-	
19	Relations with Russia on the Greater Middle East	3	2	6	11	B-
20	Relations with Russia on the Arctic	5	3	3	11	B-

COMPONENTS BY ISSUE

Unity (out of 5)	Resources (out of 5)	Outcome (out of 10)	Total (out of 20)	Score Grade
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RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

11.56 B-

Trade liberalisation and overall relationship					11.67	B-
21	Reciprocity on visa procedures with the US	2	3	5	10	C+
22	Relations with the US on trade and investment	4	5	9	18	A
23	Relations with the US on economic issues	2	2	3	7	C-

Co-operation on European security issues

11 B-

24	Relations with the US on counter-terrorism	4	3	7	14	B+
25	Relations with the US on intelligence cooperation and data protection	2	2	2	6	C-
26	Relations with the US on NATO, arms control and Russia	2	2	4	8	C
27	Relations with the US on the Balkans	4	4	8	16	A-

Co-operation on regional and global issues

12.00 B-

28	Relations with the US on Egypt and the wider Middle East	4	3	5	12	B-
29	Relations with the US on the Middle East peace process	4	3	7	14	B+
30	Relations with the US on the Syrian conflict	1	2	1	4	D+
31	Relations with the US on Asia	3	2	7	12	B-
32	Relations with the US on Iran and weapons proliferation	4	5	9	18	A

RELATIONS WITH WIDER EUROPE

10.83 B-

Western Balkans					13.25	B
33	Overall progress of enlargement in the Western Balkans	5	4	7	16	A-
34	Rule of law, democracy, and human rights in the Western Balkans	4	3	5	12	B-
35	Kosovo	4	4	9	17	A-
36	Bosnia and Herzegovina	3	3	2	8	C

Turkey

8.25 C

37	Bilateral relations with Turkey	3	3	3	9	C+
38	Rule of law, democracy, and human rights in Turkey	3	2	2	7	C-
39	Relations with Turkey on the Cyprus question	3	2	2	7	C-
40	Relations with Turkey on regional issues	4	3	3	10	C+

Eastern Neighbourhood

11.00 B-

41	Rule of law, democracy, and human rights	3	4	4	11	B-
42	Relations with the eastern neighbourhood on trade	4	4	5	13	B
43	Relations with the eastern neighbourhood on energy	3	2	3	8	C
44	Visa liberalisation with the Eastern Neighbourhood	3	3	6	12	B-

COMPONENTS BY ISSUE

Unity (out of 5)	Resources (out of 5)	Outcome (out of 10)	Total (out of 20)	Score Grade
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MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**10.54 B-**

Regional Issues					8.67	C+
45	Rule of law, human rights, and democracy	3	3	3	9	C+
46	European Neighbourhood Policy in MENA region	4	2	3	9	C+
47	Regional security	3	2	3	8	C

North Africa**10.00 C+**

48	Egypt	3	3	3	9	C+
49	Libya	4	2	5	11	B-

Levant**9.00 C+**

50	Syria	1	2	2	5	D+
51	Regional fallout of Syria conflict	2	3	3	8	C
52	Middle East Peace Process and state-building in Palestine	4	4	6	14	B+

The Persian Gulf**14.5 B+**

53	Iran	4	5	9	18	A
54	Relations with Gulf Cooperation States and Yemen	3	3	5	11	B-

COMPONENTS BY ISSUE

Unity (out of 5)	Resources (out of 5)	Outcome (out of 10)	Total (out of 20)	Score Grade
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**MULTILATERAL ISSUES AND
CRISIS MANAGEMENT**

				12.02	B-	
Key elements of the international system				14.33	B+	
55	European policy at the UN (includes UNSC, GA, HRC and UN reform)	3	4	5	12	B-
56	European policy in the G8, G20, IMF and WTO	4	4	7	15	B+
57	European policy on non-proliferation and the arms trade	4	4	8	16	A-
International justice				12.00	B-	
58	European policy towards the ICC and international criminal tribunals	4	3	5	12	B-
Climate change and development				11	B-	
59	Climate change	3	3	5	11	B-
60	Development aid	2	3	6	11	B-
Humanitarian relief				11.5	B-	
61	Humanitarian aid	2	4	7	13	B
62	Response to the Syrian refugee crisis	2	3	5	10	C+
Peacekeeping				11.25	B-	
63	Mali and the Sahel	2	3	8	13	B
64	Somalia	4	4	6	14	B+
65	The Sudans, DRC and CAR	2	3	4	9	C+
66	Afghanistan	2	3	4	9	C+

CLASSIFICATION OF MEMBER STATES

Unless otherwise stated, member states are supporters

RELATIONS WITH CHINA

	Use of high-level contacts to strengthen to Europe's strategic approach to China (see component 1)	Asian security issues in bilateral dialogue (see component 7)	Trade disputes with China, support for Europe's tough stance on anti-dumping investigations (see component 3)	Support Europe's tough line on solar panel case (see component 4)	Support strong European position on Tibet, rule of law and human rights (see component 5)
Austria					
Belgium					
Bulgaria					
Croatia					
Cyprus					
Czech R.					
Denmark					
Estonia					
Finland					
France		leader		leader	
Germany				slacker	
Greece					
Hungary					
Ireland					
Italy				leader	
Latvia					
Lithuania					
Luxembourg					
Malta					
Netherlands					
Poland					
Portugal					
Romania					
Slovakia					
Slovenia					
Spain				leader	
Sweden					
UK		leader	slacker		slacker

CLASSIFICATION OF MEMBER STATES

Unless otherwise stated, member states are supporters

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

	Support European Commission in resisting Russian pressure on Eastern Partnership countries (see component 15)	Relations with Russia on Energy Issues (see components 17 and 18)	Support strong European position on rule of law and human rights and press freedom (see component 13)	Action to pressure Russia to use its leverage to stop conflict in Syria (see component 19)	Action to pressure Russia to use leverage to engage new Iranian government in nuclear negotiations (see component 19)
Austria		slacker			
Belgium					
Bulgaria		slacker			
Croatia		slacker			
Cyprus					
Czech R.					
Denmark					
Estonia					
Finland					
France				leader	leader
Germany	leader	slacker	leader	leader	leader
Greece		slacker			
Hungary	leader	slacker			
Ireland					
Italy		slacker		leader	
Latvia					
Lithuania	leader				
Luxembourg					
Malta					
Netherlands					
Poland	leader			leader	
Portugal					
Romania	leader				
Slovakia					
Slovenia		slacker			
Spain					
Sweden	leader		leader	leader	
UK				leader	leader

CLASSIFICATION OF MEMBER STATES

Unless otherwise stated, member states are supporters

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

	Putting Asia on the agenda with the US (see component 31)	Support pushing the US in placing the use of drones into a broader legal framework (see component 24)	Pushing for TTIP (see component 22)	Pushing for a tough European response to the Snowden revelations on US spying (see component 25)	Pushing for translating cooperation to shape the course and outcome of the Syrian civil wa (see component 30)
Austria					
Belgium					
Bulgaria					
Croatia					
Cyprus					
Czech R.					
Denmark					
Estonia					
Finland					
France	leader		slacker		leader
Germany			leader		
Greece					
Hungary					
Ireland					
Italy			leader		
Latvia					
Lithuania					
Luxembourg					
Malta					
Netherlands	leader		leader		
Poland					
Portugal					
Romania					
Slovakia					
Slovenia					
Spain					
Sweden			leader	slacker	
UK			leader	slacker	leader

CLASSIFICATION OF MEMBER STATES

Unless otherwise stated, member states are supporters

RELATIONS WITH WIDER EUROPE

	Support strong line on the release of Tymoshenko (see component 41)	Support efforts to achieve a visa-free regime with Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova (see component 44)	Efforts to diversify energy supply in Europe to reduce dependency from Russia (see component 43)	Steps to support opening Chapter 23 and 24 in accession negotiations with Turkey (see component 37)	Support for a strong European position Serbia and Kosovo negotiations (see component 35)
Austria					leader
Belgium				leader	
Bulgaria					
Croatia					
Cyprus				slacker	
Czech R.					
Denmark					
Estonia		leader	leader		
Finland					
France				leader	leader
Germany	leader				leader
Greece					
Hungary		leader			
Ireland					
Italy				leader	leader
Latvia		leader			
Lithuania	leader	leader			
Luxembourg					
Malta					
Netherlands					
Poland	leader	leader	leader		
Portugal					
Romania		leader			
Slovakia		leader	leader		
Slovenia			slacker		
Spain					
Sweden	leader			leader	
UK					leader

CLASSIFICATION OF MEMBER STATES

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

	Pushing for a clear European response to the conflict in Syria (see component 50)	Pushing for a strong EU response to the military takeover in Egypt (see component 48)	Pushing through agreement on eligibility of occupied territories grants, prices etc (see component 52)	Pushing for comprehensive European strategy towards Iran following elections (see component 53)	Support closer security cooperation in the North Africa region in 2013 (see component 47)
Austria					
Belgium					
Bulgaria					
Croatia					
Cyprus					
Czech R.					
Denmark					
Estonia					
Finland					
France				leader	leader
Germany				leader	
Greece					
Hungary					
Ireland			leader		
Italy				leader	leader
Latvia					
Lithuania					
Luxembourg					
Malta					leader
Netherlands					
Poland					
Portugal					
Romania					
Slovakia					
Slovenia					
Spain			leader		leader
Sweden					
UK				leader	leader

CLASSIFICATION OF MEMBER STATES

MULTILATERAL ISSUES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

	Increase in development aid (see component 60)	Increase in humanitarian aid (see component 61)	Steps taken to assist Syrian refugees/IDPs (see component 62)	Steps taken to support French intervention in Mali/ support AFISMA and MINUSMA (see component 63)	Support for Somalia (see component 64)
Austria	leader	leader	leader		
Belgium	slacker	leader			
Bulgaria	slacker		slacker		
Croatia					
Cyprus	slacker	slacker	leader		
Czech R.					
Denmark	leader	leader	leader		
Estonia	leader	leader			
Finland	leader	leader	leader		
France	slacker			leader	leader
Germany	slacker	slacker	leader		leader
Greece	slacker	slacker	slacker		
Hungary					
Ireland	slacker	slacker	leader		
Italy		slacker	leader		leader
Latvia	leader	leader			
Lithuania					
Luxembourg	leader	leader	leader		
Malta					
Netherlands	slacker	slacker	leader		
Poland					
Portugal		slacker	slacker		
Romania	slacker				
Slovakia	leader	leader			
Slovenia	slacker				
Spain	slacker	slacker	slacker		leader
Sweden	leader	leader	leader		leader
UK	leader		leader		leader

Abbreviations

CAR	Central African Republic
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECB	European Central Bank
EEAS	European External Action Service
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
FTA	Free Trade Area
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
ICC	International Criminal Court
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NSA	National Security Agency
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PA	Palestinian Authority
TTIP	Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
TTP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Conventions on the Laws of the Sea
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WTO	World Trade Organization

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