Workshop report

St Malo and European Security and Defence: Much Ado about Nothing?!

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Executive Summary
At the bilateral meeting at St Malo in 1998 France and the United Kingdom agreed to move European integration forward and establish a European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In the subsequent years, the European Union (EU) brought to life the necessary institutions, procedures, and capabilities for civilian and military crisis management operations under CSDP.
Fourteen years after St Malo and ten years after the first CSDP operation was launched, the workshop allowed many of the visionaries involved in shaping the origins of European security cooperation to reflect on what had been achieved. The gravity of including security and defence in the European Union framework in 1998 is often sidelined in today’s debates. The EU has integrated in many ways beyond what was deemed feasible and had surprised many practitioners and academics in the first years by the dynamic development that unfolded.
At the same time, CSDP was an innovation and not a revolution. It allowed member states to continue business as usual in defence. Instead, duplication and excessive storage of tanks, jet fighters and equipment for territorial defence persists in most member states. Despite the current challenges, CSDP proved its value and the firm opinion was that European security cooperation is there to stay. Yet, much more needs to be done to ensure its relevance.

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Introduction
The Franco-British summit at the French coastal resort of St Malo in December 1998 paved the way for the establishment of an EU security and defence policy. The Joint Declaration thus gained almost mythical status in studies of European security. St Malo initiated the development of a European ‘capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises’. Initiatives for European security cooperation, such as the battle group concept, a 60,000 rapid reaction force, the deployment of 28 crisis management operations employing up to 10,000 personnel and the establishment of the European Defence Agency all owe their existence to this initiative.

Fourteen years later, a decade after European Security and Defence Policy was declared operational, the diplomats responsible for drafting the document were invited, along with senior policy-makers and leading analysts from France, the UK, and several other member states, to share their insights and discuss the origin, contemporary challenges and future of European security and defence. The workshop revisited the expectations raised at St Malo and critically reflected on achievements and shortcomings through four different prisms:

1. The impact of the Euro-crisis and financial austerity on defence cooperation.
2. The organisational, institutional and capability challenges that had to be overcome and constrain CSDP to this day.
3. The need critically to assess the track record of implementing European security and defence policy, notably through the CSDP operations.
4. A discussion on the future challenges and opportunities for European security cooperation.

In the assessment of those present, an atmosphere of benevolent scepticism and a propensity to overstep comfortable boundaries made the vision of European security cooperation possible. Most of the original drafters and analysts were disillusioned by the current floundering despite EU governments facing the same pressures and petty differences in EU defence. Surprisingly, the British, having blocked CSDP and
emphasized NATO, are disappointed by the EU’s track record. France since returning to NATO has happily used the organisations for military campaigns and owing to a decade of frustrating experiences with the EU has lost the appetite to drag the other 27 member states along. Since November 2010 the two largest military powers in Europe decided, again bilaterally, to cooperate much closer in security and defence, yet outside the EU framework. This report synthesises the main points raised at the workshop under Chatham House rules, synthesising the information conveyed but not attributing it to individual speakers.
St Malo was a watershed and the first successful European security cooperation outside the transatlantic framework, after the failures of the European Defence Community and the limited success of the European Security and Defence Initiative with the Western European Union. The French and British Prime Minister agreed on the text on Friday, 4 December 1998, noting that the ‘Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so’.

Only one day before, no agreed language had existed. This was largely as a result of political sensitivities surrounding two countries bilaterally launching defence cooperation on behalf of the European Union. The UK had prevented European security cooperation in the past so that any shift in British policy towards taking a leading role could only be taken by Prime Minister Tony Blair, together with President Jacques Chirac.

To make an agreement possible, two senior diplomats, Sir Emyr Jones Parry and Gérrard Errera, thrashed out the text during a long day of negotiations on 3 December. Without even water for much of the day, reaching a compromise on the text became pressing. The two diplomats had agreed in the early morning hours of 4 December and slipped the text under the doors of the Prime Minister and the President. The compromise held up under the scrutiny of the two leaders when France gave in to a reference to NATO upfront in the text. The French demand for ‘autonomous’ European Union action could then remain. For the UK it was important that NATO was prioritized for crisis management operations, with the EU as second option and using NATO assets as third alternative.

The enabling factor of the St Malo declaration was Tony Blair’s decision to take a leading role in European policy. Developing European security and defence cooperation was a more comfortable policy area for the UK to take a lead in an EU policy than in any other area. The Balkan wars and the looming Kosovo crisis had a similar impetus to ensure Europe would be able to act militarily and invest in ‘strengthened armed forces that can

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react quickly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology.\(^2\)

The significance of the declaration was such that it has enabled the EU to take decisions over the whole spectrum of intervention, including economic, development, trade, foreign and security policies. As the decision was taken without prior consultation with the US, the response by Madeleine Albright three days later was measured but clear. CSDP was to avoid: decoupling from NATO, duplication of capabilities and discrimination against NATO members.\(^3\) As America's closest partner, the UK also had to explain the implications of St Malo for transatlantic security. Repeated travelling to Washington was required to assure the US of the value of European security cooperation and how it would support NATO although British diplomats felt at times that these assurances did not last much longer than the meetings in Washington.

Within NATO, the UK government also had to reassure the Turkish government about its future security within NATO given Greek EU membership. The Kosovo campaign showed how dependent the EU was on US capabilities. Yet, Turkey accepted EU access to NATO’s capabilities only after years of negotiation with the Berlin Plus agreements of 2002.

Based on St Malo, the Helsinki Headline Goals declared in 1999 that the EU should be able to deploy a force of up to 60,000 by 2003, capable of carrying out the full range of the Petersberg tasks. The Treaty had foreseen the EU being ‘given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning’. This required new institutional structures in Brussels to perform these tasks, while having to fit into the broader scope of existing structures, policies and instruments. The procedures and institutions were swiftly put into place and since 2003 some 28 operations have been launched in, for example, Aceh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Kosovo, Iraq, Somalia, the DR Congo and Afghanistan.

However, many of the initial hopes of St Malo have not materialised. One of its key targets was increasing and developing security and defence capabilities. Few Member

\(^2\) Ibid.  
States responded. Europe maintains too many troops – of which only a fraction can be deployed – and similarly too many tanks and combat aircraft but very limited airlift capacity. Rather than driving capabilities, for sceptics, European security cooperation has become an excuse for free riding as has always been possible in NATO. Over time, institution-building became something of an end in itself.

For European security cooperation to be successful, it needs to be implemented in a comprehensive way, especially when both the EU and NATO are operating in the same theatre. With the economic crisis, member states serious about defence can no longer afford duplication. There is therefore an even stronger logic for EU member states to rationalise their production and purchase of equipment and to integrate and coordinate their efforts so that the EU can develop its comparative advantage across the political and civilian security sectors. The EU and the member states also need to work not only more closely with the United Nations, but also with regional organizations such as the African Union. Often overlooked outside the UK is that well-organized European security needs to be complemented by better understanding and collaborating with the United States.

One can judge the significance of St Malo, not as in the workshop title of ‘Much Ado’ – but also as ‘much more to do’. In other words, it is a work in progress – and it should be seen in this light. Much has been done but much more needs to be done by the EU institutions and the member states, including working more systematically with NATO – the key UK demand for European security cooperation. Similarly, the operational nature of CSDP and the goal of an effective CSDP seem to have slipped. For both, the political will and readiness to use CSDP are necessary.

In the discussion on the level of EU ambition it was highlighted that the 60,000 deployable troops committed in the Helsinki Headline Goal were an indicator of European military capacities that could undertake engagements of higher intensity. On the other hand, it was argued that the focus should be more on preventing violence on the scale of the Balkan wars in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. For CSDP operations, less than 10,000 personnel were deployed at any given time, a far cry from the ambitions
of the Helsinki target. The impact of this limited capacity on the responsibility to protect, of which the EU has been a main proponent, was therefore in question. Subsequently, the difference of interpretation of ‘autonomous EU action’ by the UK and France was raised. The French emphasis on autonomous EU operations could be seen as provocation to NATO if it included rapid yet uncoordinated action. For the UK, in contrast, NATO remained the primary reference point for security operations. Acting through the EU also meant keeping a dialogue with the United States and NATO. From the UK perspective, looking back at European CSDP engagements, it was critical to keep others informed early to avoid later problems even if this created some delay.

A third point raised was the impact of the Anglo-French bilateral cooperation (the Lancaster House Treaties) on CSDP. It could be seen as a pragmatic response to the disappointment of still falling European capabilities. On the other hand, the financial pressures on the UK and France was pushing them to cooperate in order to be able to keep a defence posture with global capability. Given that CSDP was always a sovereignty concern for France and the UK, increasing bilateral cooperation could be a model for the benefit of European capabilities.

On the transatlantic dimension it was pointed out that the difficulty of rationalising forces and organizing the defence-industrial sector was a concern in the US as much as in Europe. This suggests ample scope for cooperation even if capabilities and defence expenditure levels are fundamentally different.

Another key point of discussion was whether St Malo and the CSDP have been successful because of the political attention it received, the newly established institutional structures, or the increase in military cooperation and the various initiatives launched. A major disappointment has been that ‘paper capabilities’ had never materialized, but had provided some Member States with an excuse for inaction.

Projecting the perceived ‘failure of CSDP’ might mean subsuming it within NATO to reap the benefits of its good initiatives. However, in response it was questioned whether NATO was a better benchmark for improving European capabilities, as it also had not been particularly successful, Libya notwithstanding. There was common agreement that the EU’s advantage of being able to use the full range of policy instruments remained
 уникальным и поэтому было бы полезно保留，因为北约的定义由其军事和国防角色决定。

**In concluding the debate** it was stressed that the European Union’s agenda in recent years had been dominated by the economic crisis and the politics of austerity. Future European crisis responses will therefore be determined in equal measure by circumstances and external events as they are by pre-planning and EU action. The end of the Cold War and the Arab Spring have both forced the Union to look ahead and anticipate change. Often, slower changes are underestimated, such as the US ‘pivot’ to the Pacific. Keeping European resources and capabilities for a safe and secure Europe depends fourteen years after St Malo as much on the internal as on the external dimension.
Session II: EU defence cooperation and military capabilities in an age of austerity

The following session explored how best to maintain military capabilities during a period of austerity. Pooling and sharing resources to reduce costs was regarded as an obvious solution but difficult to put into practice.

Strategic thinking in an age of austerity

The process of streamlining Europe's defence is being carried out at different speeds by different EU member states, often in regional groupings such as between the Nordic or Benelux countries. It also advances to different degrees. While the Benelux countries, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, have been successful and might prove a model for others, the majority of EU countries are still resistant to engaging in pooling and sharing to any significant extent. Identifying opportunities for member states to eschew particular capabilities or invest on the basis of common need is far from straightforward. So far the process has been exclusively bottom up without sufficient top-level coordination.

One difficulty has been that, while the Foreign Affairs Committee signed off on 11 projects under the title of 'Pooling and Sharing', none of these has progressed beyond the signing of declarations of intent. A closer linkage between agreements on capability clusters by a number of countries and the development of capabilities with longer time-horizons is needed. The example of the Benelux cluster is useful in this regard as they flagged up loss of national sovereignty, autonomy and defence-industrial interests as problems but weighed this against the potential loss of capacity involved in not maintaining air forces. This resulted, for example, in savings when setting up a joint helicopter command and pooling resources for one airbase for fighter jets as well as a second for airlift carriers.

Looking ahead, more consideration of cooperation regarding dual use is necessary at European level, such as satellites that can be used for both military and civilian purposes. In this regard, an important indication is how member states will relate to the
Commission’s Task Force on Defence Industries and Markets, stemming from the Cypriot Presidency’s non-paper on EU military capabilities.

A solution for a group as diverse as the 28 EU members cannot be reached at the tactical level, via a focus on individual pieces of equipment. It requires a coordinated long-term strategic plan. Reaching a consensus on such a plan with agreed objectives, against the background of austerity, is all the more urgent given the US pivot to Asia and the Pacific.

There is thus, according to some, a need for a European Defence review to take place before the European Council discusses CSDP in December 2013.

Convergence and divergence in EU security and defence policy

The next presentation argued that insufficient attention is paid to assessing when, where and to what extent EU countries deploy their military forces and if member states are converging in their military activities. In the academic literature, the claim that EU member states are converging in their threat assessments and security cultures has been made continuously since the start of CSDP. This literature has anticipated a deepening of cooperation through a processes of socialization, where diplomats and military officials meet increasingly frequently and come to share a common situation analysis, threat assessment and converge around a European response. A crucial indication of convergence between member states would be evidence of shared deployment patterns.

A comparison of the EU member states over the last ten years shows that countries have continued to differ significantly in their defence policies. While France and the UK contribute more personnel to military operations than any other member states, they often act unilaterally or bilaterally and not via multilateral channels. Other countries, such as Germany, contribute almost all their personnel to multilateral security operations. Generally, the highest military deployments of EU countries were under NATO command, followed by the large US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, contributions to the US-led Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns divided the European Union in 2003 with some countries making support for the US a priority, while others abstained completely. In addition, the non-NATO members in the EU, such as Austria, Finland or Sweden often support UN peace operations more strongly than the NATO
members. Based on this it was concluded that member states did not show a trend towards convergence in their overall security and defence policies.

Based on the EU’s track record, it emerges that member states converged more in the early years of CSDP, from 2003 to 2006 and have since shifted their priorities away from European security cooperation. From 2006 to 2009, EU member state support for CSDP operations was highly selective and revealed diverging strategic priorities and preferences. While all members but Malta provided personnel to the operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina that launched in 2004, only a handful deployed personnel to the Chad operation in 2007. The analysis therefore rejects the claim that EU member states are converging in their security and defence policies. Instead, it underlines the importance EU states still attach to national efforts and national policies.

**European defence cooperation and capabilities**

The last presentation in this session emphasized how defence cooperation is affected by the political climate of austerity and financial constraints, the geopolitical constraints of different member states and strategic constraints. These constraints derive from changing threat assessments and divergent attitudes towards the use of force. Key questions that need to be addressed in this regard include whether militaries are trying to become smarter given the geopolitical and fiscal constraints? Secondly, are European militaries prepared to cooperate with each other given the changed notion of threat? And thirdly, to what extent is European transformation driven by the wholly different level of US force capabilities and its different conception of threat?

In terms of European strategic thinking, the European Security Strategy of 2003 was a useful way forward. It also spelled out to the outside world how the EU perceives and interprets its security role. The feedback was not always positive, but it was important for the EU to be seen as a strategic actor. Yet whilst the EU’s ambitions were clearly communicated, its actions were far less impressive. The EU has not come close to deploying the goal of 60,000 troops pledged in 1999, while none of the specifically developed EU Battle groups has ever been used. EU member states also chose not to use the EU to intervene in Libya.
In particular, distinct national approaches emerged well before the onset of the economic crisis. Germany’s strategy, for example, is very much affected by its geopolitical position at the heart of Europe, protected by an Eastern and southern buffer zone. Yet, its position in the last 20 years has changed considerably, from refraining to engage in military intervention abroad to large contributions in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Yet, its national position clashed with most EU member states when it abstained from the Libya intervention in the Security Council. Similarly, Chancellor Merkel intervened to stop the proposed merger of British Aerospace Systems (BAE) with the Franco-German European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS).

Fiscal constraints on defence budgets require EU member states to prioritise equipment purchases relevant to the most likely theatres for intervention. The technological innovation of the United States can only be matched if EU member states pool their resources. Priority areas for military cooperation are cyber-security, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and intelligence.

In the discussion following the three presentations, it was pointed out that achieving consensus on military interventions was difficult. The examples used were the Libya intervention and the reluctance of both the EU and NATO to intervene. Agreement on where the EU can act was in new EU priority areas such as counter-piracy and security sector reform. The EU is in danger of being marginalized if it proves unable to act.

Referring to the issue of convergence in member states’ security policies, it was noted that the diplomatic and military field should be seen as separate. While EU member states might not show convergence of their deployment patterns, this is taking place to a larger degree regarding diplomatic action. Preparing, agreeing on and cooperating in the numerous EU operations was valuable in itself, even if success was limited in terms of their mandate, aims and objectives.

It was emphasised that German cooperation is not carried out as a prelude to intervention, but as a means of improving ties and interoperability with its neighbours. Germany has slowly learned to engage militarily again, but is focusing mostly on post-conflict reconstruction, an area where many lessons still have to be learned.
A last comment proposed that the EU security policy was not designed to prevent conflicts or engage in them, but that the CSDP served internal European functions, fostering common cultures and understandings, and, secondly, serving as a platform for wider EU and other external action and intervention.
Session III: CSDP at a crossroads: effectiveness or irrelevance?

The Huffington Post featured an article on the morning of the workshop demanding that the United States pull out of NATO in order to transfer its organisational capacities to CSDP whilst retaining the North Atlantic Treaty. The United States is becoming increasingly frustrated about the lack of European investment in defence. Even before the end of the Cold War, Washington had been urging its European partners to take on greater security responsibilities, especially in the European neighbourhood. Therefore, whilst any assessment of CSDP has to consider how effective it has been in meeting its own stated objectives, it also cannot ignore the expectations it has created externally. Deployment is one indicator; another is financial commitment.

Libya was a first litmus test since the Lisbon Treaty came into effect for European leadership in its neighbourhood, and it proved itself ‘magnificently unprepared’ for action, or any proactive crisis management across the Mediterranean. Following the Arab Spring, no clear European objectives existed, no common vision for EU actions. The European Union’s ambition ‘to do international relations’ differently has not stood the test of time. A window of opportunity will present itself after the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. In the post-Afghan future, the United States has already decided that Europe will not remain the key priority. It will remain an important partner, but not the most important US security concern. Similarly, most EU countries cannot engage in the future area of engagement of the US – the Indian Ocean, Pacific and the East China Sea.

Alternative options for EU policy-makers are as follows:

1. Ditch CSDP despite the investment that has occurred and despite the US support for it;
2. Continue in a virtual competitive relationship with NATO while accepting that the US does hard and Europe soft power, with non-EU NATO members playing each side off against each other. Given the problem of establishing a European HQ, the EU could seek to ’Europeanise’ SHAPE and thereby pass the burden of European defence back to the Europeans.

3. Integrate CSDP into a NATO that is pre-eminently a military and not a political alliance – as outlined in the Vedrine Report⁵.

Each of these options raises difficult issues. President Obama expects the EU to play a greater role and it is a common belief in Washington that Europeans should do more for themselves. Even more seriously there is the question of whether Europe itself is serious about assuming responsibility and leadership. Europe needs to solve the Euro-crisis, but so far too many EU member states have been happy to cash in on the US defence umbrella, and others commit too little to declared targets in terms of common procurement. The European Defence Agency (EDA) is still too weak to play a leading role in this.

The tension between the US and the EU will persist. Currently, the US still gains a great deal from the Alliance, both politically and economically. However, it recognises that Europe will do little while the US is happy to pay. With pressure from Congress and a growing public disenchantment with military operations, the US will face increased pressure on its own defence budget.

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Session IV: Organising European security and defence: the institutional, administrative and capability challenges

Focused on the more institutional challenges of organising European Security and Defence, it was argued that we can only understand and evaluate CSDP if we remind ourselves of its actual purpose. One presentation detailed out the functions CSDP performs for EU member states, while a second provided insights into the civilian capability process. The two concluding presentations discussed the EU’s cooperation with other international organisations and the ability to respond swiftly and comprehensively once crisis occur.

Functionality and the development of CSDP

Despite the overwhelming focus on impact, effectiveness and capabilities, it is important to keep in mind that CSDP has both internal as well as external functions. It exists to serve both with, perhaps, a stronger focus on the internal dimension of CSDP. Three main functions can be distinguished: building a European identity, managing conflicts between EU institutions, and managing Europe’s retreat from power politics.

1. Identity Building: CSDP has served to build a European identity amongst its citizens, politicians and policy-makers through the external projection of European power. According to this view, CSDP helps to give meaning to the wider European project. For example, most of the discussion in Europe since the end of the Cold War has been a debate on ‘grand strategy’ and the nature of the EU. This in turn allows citizens to identify themselves with the European project.

2. Managing Internal Institutional Conflicts. The second dimension is that coordinating the mandate of EU operations and deploying personnel to operations in the name of the EU serves as an instrument to manage internal conflicts between the EU’s institutions. For example, the creation of the European External Action Service is an example of a rational institutional design that is intended to function as a bridge between three different institutions: the member state-oriented Council, the technocratic European Commission and the more political crisis
management bureaucracy. In building these institutions, the EU engages in almost permanent internal coordination of the various positions and in managing internal differences and rivalries.

3. Managing Europe's Retreat from Power Politics. The third purpose of CSDP is to allow most of the European member states to retreat from power politics in the international system. CSDP here serves the purposes of retaining some level of relevance. Most European states are more concerned with welfare than warfare. Here, the joint operations and military deployments show externally that the EU is still capable of engaging, while it allows member states to detach themselves.

Understanding these internal functions of CSDP helps to understand the perceived inefficiency, ineffectiveness and wastefulness of the European bureaucracy. European security cooperation is an important project for the EU and its member states, but it serves internal functions as well as external ones.

Civilian capability development for CSDP

The following presentation looked at the challenges of civilian capabilities, namely identifying, training, selecting, deploying and re-integrating civilian personnel for the EU’s operations in places like the Balkans, Afghanistan, the DR Congo or the Middle East. When CSDP started, the novelty of creating civilian capabilities was stressed frequently by policy-makers and commentators. What is omitted when talking about civilian capabilities is that the skill-set of working abroad and supporting the administration in a foreign environment had been common on the part of member states in the past. However, these colonial ministries, administering overseas territories have been dissolved and the experiences and lessons learned are mostly forgotten and neglected.

In contrast to military CSDP operations, where member states could easily draw on the military, few trained experts exist that could be deployed abroad and work as legal advisers, police officers or prison experts whether in the Congo, Afghanistan or Iraq. Member states largely copied the military model to second mostly personnel who served as government officials in the public administration, police or legal system, instead of
using the open market for recruitment. As a result they had to create a process and mechanism to develop the ability to access civilian capacities from member states’ administrations. The outcome was the Civilian Headline Goals of 2008 and 2010, with the underlying civilian capability development plan. The planning process was again copied from military procedures but kept separate from the Military Headline Goals. The 2008 Headline Goal of December 2004 set out targets for the purpose of operations that would help to stabilise, reconstruct, or strengthen institutions. Based on various illustrative scenarios member states pledged to make available a certain amount of civilian personnel that could be deployed to these operations. The development plan laid out the way forward for member states.

The next 2010 Civilian Headline Goal agreed in November 2007 was aligned with the military Headline Goal and included a civil-military scenario and the development of technology to make cooperation between states easier. Progress was measured by national reports and review meetings but was often slow as no lessons existed from EU missions and not all lessons from NATO or the UN could be easily translated.

In practice, providing sufficient civilian personnel has been challenging because civilian capacities are in the jurisdiction of three to four different ministries in each member state. Coordination, therefore, often involves the Minister of Interior and the Police, the Foreign Ministry, the Justice Ministry and the Ministry of Defence. Processes had to be set in motion to ensure that the numbers pledged by governments could be made available when personnel were needed. In addition to being trained, civilian personnel need to be released by their Ministry. While member states differ in their national structures, the foreign ministry is usually responsible for coordinating at the European level.

Looking back at the civilian capability development process of the last ten years, four drivers can be identified:

1. EU ambitions,
2. National Strategies,
3. Lessons Learned, and
4. External demands, such as the European response to the Arab Spring.
While considerable progress has been made and much work was invested in creating a working system, little harmonization among the very diverse processes in member states has been achieved. While the drivers – EU ambitions, national strategies and lessons learned – are in place, and despite increasing external demands, civilian capability development has lost the high profile and attention it received in the first years of operation.

Partners in CSDP: The EU’s Cooperation with International Organisations

The next presentation looked at the EU’s cooperation with International Organisations. In CSDP, inter-organizational coordination and cooperation has been an issue from the outset. CSDP started as compromise between France and the UK and therefore has been institutionally intertwined with NATO. This fundamental inter-linkage with NATO has given credibility and legitimacy to CSDP at the beginning, important specifically for the UK and the United States. Similarly, the EU has been a fervent advocate of ‘effective multilateralism’ and emphasized cooperation with the United Nations. CSDP is therefore partly an effort by member states to fill the gap and strengthening the impact of the UN without deploying directly to UN operations. Concrete examples of this are the EU taking over from the UN Police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in Kosovo and launching EU bridging operations when UN troops could not be deployed quickly enough or had to be reinforced (such as in Chad and the DR Congo). Yet, deep inter-organizational rivalries between the EU and other organizations persist and sometimes can lead to sub-optimal, overall outcomes.

One instance, where inter-organizational rivalry and harmful duplication occurred can be observed in relation to the rapid intervention UN peacekeeping tool in Copenhagen, the Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN operations (SHIRBRIG). Created in 1997 in the aftermath of the atrocities in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Somalia, 16 out of the 23 member states and observer were EU countries. Yet, with the development of the EU Battlegroups and facing severe internal problem, member states decided to close down SHIRBRIG in 2009, two years after the EU Battlegroups were launched. Due to resource competition and conflicting political interests, EU member states previously
active in UN peacekeeping and within SHIRBRIG decided to focus their attention and resources on the new EU Battlegroups. However, while SHIRBRIG was deployed several times and most actively supported by the EU’s Nordic countries, the Battlegroups have so far not been deployed. This raises important questions about inter-organizational rivalries, CSDP and the EU’s commitment to effective global peacekeeping through the UN. Operation Artemis in 2003 has often been cited as a prime example of successful EU-UN cooperation. The EU’s relatively quick and effective response on that occasion had provided CSDP with an important degree of credibility in the eyes of the European public and non-European public, even though the mission was limited in time, scope and sustainability. Subsequent, EU responses to UN requests for help have been more delayed, as, for example in the Darfur region in Sudan. The African Union sent a request to NATO and the EU for an airlift for their peacekeepers but it took the EU and NATO over three months to decide on which organization should in the end respond to the request, with the result that two simultaneous airlift operations were deployed by both organizations without much coordination.

On balance, policy-makers seem to have spent much of the time trying to find a politically delicate inter-organizational balance between NATO, the EU and the United Nations rather than seeking out the most efficient and effective response. In the future, the overall aim of CSDP and the inter-linked question of the level of cooperation between the EU and its partner organizations needs to be addressed.

**Comprehensive action in EU crisis management?**

The final presentations on institutional, administrative and capability challenges focused on the EU’s ability for crisis response. When the European Union needs to react to a crisis or disaster abroad, the first problem is not one of capacities, but of swift and decisive internal policy-making. Based on a multitude of actors, path dependencies and parallel lines of command, the EU’s crisis response system is fragmented and very complex. In the past it often produced responses that were both uncoordinated and delayed.
The first instance of a complex crisis after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty was the earthquake in Haiti. The EU’s response took place within such an uncoordinated way (both EU-internally and externally) that seven overlapping missions (by EU member states and the EU institutions) were launched. This was highly visible on the ground and featured prominently and critically in the media. As a direct result, the EU’s High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission, Catherine Ashton established a new Directorate for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination with the aim of streamlining the EU’s crisis response. Based on the commitment to a ‘comprehensive approach’ of European external action, the task of the Directorate is to act as a hub of the EU’s institutions and to coordinate the EU’s activities in the immediate aftermath of a man-made crisis or natural disaster.

The numerous lines of communication of the EU’s institutions make coordination difficult because situational assessments, information and knowledge are very limited and fragmented at first and can only be exchanged over time. One example when all member states reacted, yet very differently, was in the aftermath of the Fukushima crisis. Member states could not agree on travel advice for their citizens. However, this was not because member states wanted to disagree or simply had different standards for their citizens but because political, financial and economic concerns very quickly impacted on shaping national policies. In these instances, where issues touch the core of sovereignty, no government or government agency wishes to settle on who is in charge to avoid duplication and confusion. The old cliché still holds true: everybody wants coordination but at the same time resists being coordinated.

In terms of crisis response and crisis preparedness there are unfortunately too few positive examples of the key internal actors assembling quickly around a table to coordinate action. The creation of a new ‘crisis platform’ within the EEAS to address this problem could serve to identify which agencies are responsible in member states and other international organizations to ensure information sharing and where possible coordination. The EU’s Directorate for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination is attempting this task. Its success will be defined by the next crisis and only if all actors join and accept it as platform for coordination.
In the following discussion, it was noted that CSDP had been a very positive identifier for citizens over a long period of time. This confirms the internal identity-building role. For legitimising CSDP and to justify the use of force on behalf of the Union, a new narrative about Europe and the projection of power with positive examples would be needed. However, accepting the use of force at the Union’s level can take some time and have unintended consequences, it was noted. A second point emphasised that the EU needs to be flexible in using soft or hard power. The example of EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina was cited when the Commander of the operation affirmed that he did not need 7,000 soldiers but 2,000 accountants to tackle the problems he saw as priority concerns.
Session V: Assessing the first ten years of CSDP operations

Perhaps the most fundamental question is whether CSDP has achieved, through its policies and operations on the ground, its aims, ambitions and goals? However, based on the differences of opinion on the purposes of the European Common Security and Defence Policy, two different perspectives were used to evaluate the first ten years of CSDP. The first presentation focused on critically assessing the first ten years of CSDP operations. The second presentation used a wider prism on the scope of CSDP and analysed the difficulty of burden-sharing in the EU, undermining performance in European defence.

EU Performance in Crisis Management

The benchmark or measuring stick to hold CSDP against is often difficult to define. On the one hand, the ideal that mostly small EU missions could contribute substantially to ‘positive peace’ in areas of prolonged civil war is overly optimistic. On the other hand, it is not sufficient to merely assess whether EU operations fulfilled their mandate. For EU mandates this has been visible when mandates were vague and limited in scope but both the population in the crisis country and the EU member states expected much more of the EU. Thus fulfilling the mandate meant failure was reported by anyone other than the EU bureaucrats. A third yardstick for the EU’s engagement is its normative ambition to be as a force for good internationally.

The examples of Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (March to December 2003), Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (June to September 2003) and EUFOR Chad (January 2008 to March 2009) were chosen as three distinct EU efforts of preventing relapse and managing violent conflict, as well as building trust in the security institutions.

For the operations, EU member states lacked consensus and clarity on what they were hoping to achieve with the operation and how the mandate should be crafted. As a result the differences were therefore often mediated with less specific mandates. At the same time the operations had to engage with the population and be accepted by them in order
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to ensure successful implementation on the ground. Four criteria were therefore developed to assess the success of three selected CSDP operations:

1. *Internal goal attainment:* The first criterion addresses whether the operation achieved its mandate.

2. *Internal appropriateness:* The second criterion evaluates the internal success of a mission by judging if it reached the mandate in an appropriate, efficient and timely manner.

3. *External goal attainment:* This third criterion asks if the operation managed to prevent the escalation and intensification of the conflict and was perceived externally as a success.

4. *External appropriateness:* The fourth criterion questions if in the external view of the operation it was proportionate and discriminating in its use of force.

According to these criteria, Concordia, Artemis (EUFOR DRC), EUFOR Chad/CAR might be considered successful, or at least partially successful overall.

Internally, EU action was supported by former neutral and non-aligned EU member states and also by non-member states. Externally, the modesty of the goals is seen critically. But even if the operations are only seen as limited successes externally, they still contributed positively to the situation on the ground and were well received by the host state authorities.

**Burden-sharing in EU and NATO**

The second presentation assessed CSDP from a burden-sharing perspective, comparing the Common Security and Defence Policy with NATO. The premise is that the EU is not unique but can be compared to other alliances. A key indicator is the contribution of each member to the maintenance of the alliance. Despite all the efforts of European institution-building, if confronted with alliance theory, the theoretical expectations paint a dim picture of the success of CSDP. And if benchmarked, CSDP has not resulted in any new military capacity. It also has not developed appropriate structures for civilian operations if this were the EU’s main function. The main question is therefore, why the EU has performed so badly?
Alliance theory addresses problems of collective action, free-riding and distribution of costs. The key issue stems from the inability to exclude a country in Europe from the protection other countries provide, allowing them to benefit without contributing to the effort. For example, guarding the Mediterranean benefits the Czech Republic even if it does not contribute to the effort. From this perspective the EU seems more prone to inaction because EU member states are very unequal with large states, such as Germany, France, the UK and Italy not always willing to commit resources to the Union and smaller states free riding and avoiding covering their share. A second essential problem is that EU member states can reap more private benefits from cooperating with outside partners than contributing their fair share to European security. For example, maintaining preferential access to US intelligence provides more benefits for the UK than investing in more intelligence sharing at the European level. Similarly, good neighbourly relations with Ukraine provide more benefit to Poland and Slovakia than investing in the EU.

If we apply the logic of burden sharing to the CSDP, France is the only country that is a net contributor to it. Germany and the UK are largely free riding. The argument is based on an economic model that compares the protection of citizens, the economy and borders of any member in contrast to their military expenditure and participation in CSDP operations. These benefit and burden scores are assessed as a share of the EU’s total. Based on this, it was argued that NATO provides a more effective vehicle for Europeans to project power abroad.

Similarly, for some CSDP operations only a very selected number of member states, often only two or three, provided 90 percent of the military personnel. Such a restricted participation in the operations begs questions about the legitimacy of the operations as truly ‘European’ operations. It also points to deficiencies in ensuring the support of all member states for the purpose of the operation. In addition, EU member states are not fully agreed on what functions CSDP should serve and if it should develop into an alliance or rather as a platform for coordinating security policy. Germany as a leading country in the EU has been very careful, for example, in its use of force and deployment
of military resources, with clear preferences for conflict prevention over crisis management efforts.

If we look back at the last ten years to assess the impact of CSDP, we have to admit that the EU has fallen behind the United States even more in terms of building up military capacities. The EU has embarked on a large number of missions but their impact, legitimacy and support to them is questionable. Alliance theory, using individual rational actions to explain suboptimal solutions for the alliance as a whole offers an answer to why CSDP has not been more successful.

In the discussion it was questioned whether assessing CSDP as an alliance missed the point of what CSDP is about. The large number of operations in only ten years of operations should be seen as a success. While some operations cannot be seen as successes, a good number had also not been too costly, too weak or too limited but had proven CSDP's worth, cost-efficiency and effectiveness. The example of the EU training mission in Somalia was used to illustrate that limited efforts can generate substantial impact in improving the security situation in the country.

Another comment added that delays or disunity in particular instances should not be taken as failure of CSDP, as CSDP serves to manage differences. The ability to launch a NATO mission in Libya, even though not done as CSDP operation, can still be seen as a success of European security.

An additional comment pointed out that the EU had already carried out operations under the framework of the Western European Union and questioned if this offered lessons for CSDP. A final comment noted that it is difficult to assess if CSDP has made only a marginal contribution to peacebuilding and instead that the EU’s success will need to be measured by its ability to comprehensively use all the instruments at its disposal, in particular since the Lisbon Treaty was adopted.
Session VI: European security cooperation in the decade ahead

In the sixth and final session participants discussed the future of European security cooperation. The impact of the economic crisis and the resulting propensity of adversity as well as questions of efficiency and joint capabilities were key issues. Another key theme was the transforming, increasingly multipolar international system and consequences for Europe, its partners and allies. Five different perspectives were heard:

The first view noted that some essential questions about European security cooperation will be as prevalent after the workshop as they were 14 years ago at St Malo. At their core they refer to dialectic questions about the purpose and strategic choice of European security cooperation. The first one is that analysts need to be clearer on what European security cooperation can be for. In this regard, more discussion needs to focus on whether the threats identified in the European Security Strategy of 2003 are still relevant and what the role of CSDP is to address and mitigate these threats.

Secondly, Europe’s relations to Russia will continue to define European security policy and therefore need more prominence in terms of debate. Is Russia still regarded as a threat or are there options to engage with Russia as a partner? Whether it is a threat or partner, we need to refine how to work with Russia in the Arctic, in Asia, as a neighbour to EU states and in the near abroad.

Similarly, we need to address the future role of the United States for and in European security. How much will the US pivot towards Asia and who will this affect Europe? What does it mean for ensuring European security and for engaging in Asia? The same question will have consequences on the role of the EU in the neighbourhood. Is NATO or the EU the organisation of choice for the near abroad and how will their relationship change? This question has been mooted for years, but will remain relevant and redefined over time. For example, EU leadership has focused on the Euro-crisis but sidelined European defence. How does a growing Euro-scepticism affect European defence, for example with a UK outside the EU?

In response to the critical assessments of CSDP, it is not useful simply to see it as policy but also to bear in mind the reputational costs of giving up European security cooperation. On the other hand, Europe developed for decades as symbol for civilian
cooperation. Is CSDP undermining this identity of the European Union rather than fostering it? Last, but not least, we cannot ignore that member states are deeply divided over the use of force which undermines the EU becoming a serious security actor. This we will have to take into account for any future scenario of European security cooperation.

The second input noted that the next five years do not look very promising for the EU making major progress in the field of common security and defence. But to what extent does it actually matter that CSDP has not achieved what many had hoped for, based on the St. Malo declaration? If the aim of St Malo was to end the decline in defence spending and to develop capabilities, then the EU and the member states have clearly fallen short. The European Defence Agency, for example, has been given limited resources and only plays a marginal role.

But even if the resources would have been developed, the remaining question is if the EU and member states would use them? The EU Battlegroups have never been deployed. In addition, there is no coherent or consistent leadership in security cooperation as there was on the completion of the single market or on monetary union. The UK and France have simply been too unreliable and at times too ambivalent about CSDP. The EU was founded on renouncing the use of war. Therefore it is perhaps not surprising that the EU is particularly ill-adapted for the use of military power.

In looking at the policy developments coming out of the European institutions, their initiatives in CSDP are often misleading and short-sighted when it comes to strategy and risk analysis. This includes the lack of a clear definition of European policies and their subsequent implementation in the South China Sea, Middle East and North Africa, but even in Europe’s backyard. There has been too much an obsession with institutions and whether the EU can act rather than doing what is necessary. Too often declarations disguise inaction.

The alternative to obsessing about CSDP is the EU and its member states become more proactive in NATO. But at the same time, and even in support of a more active NATO presence, the EU needs to improve coordination among European capitals. It is
particularly important that Member States plan and communicate their defence cuts. Lastly, even if it does challenge the EU’s institutional structures, smaller group and clusters of cooperation among the members can lead to enhance ‘European’ capabilities. And a capable Europe is the ultimate aim.

A third input asserted that the previous assessments of CSDP were fundamentally flawed but NATO itself has also not brought about an improvement in European capabilities. Most of the capabilities that NATO can access were paid for by the US. CSDP has allowed the EU to respond independently to crises and conflicts in their own neighbourhood. The ability to act autonomously from NATO is important and what St Malo was about.

But effective European security cooperation clearly demands greater capabilities. Rather than stressing the possible negative implications of cooperation in small groups of members or clusters of cooperation, we have to see the advantages. The Lancaster House Treaty framing Franco-British cooperation can be an engine for further EU integration if several such ‘small islands of cooperation’ are linked up. And we have to admit that closer Franco-British cooperation was not possible without a rapprochement over European security. Nor does it make much sense outside a European framework. In short, more pooling is crucial, especially in intelligence, planning, and in the field of maritime security, which is a global domain and European interests here range from Somalia, to the Arctic and to the South China Sea.

A collective framework, even if cooperation takes place in smaller groups, is critical to increase efficiency and effectiveness. And such a framework will foster collective action, reducing the transaction costs that occur when falling back on ad hoc frameworks and coalitions that are brought together at the very last minute. The Libya intervention has shown that NATO is an instrument, a service provider. It is very good in command and control, but not as a political forum. As such NATO’s operations make the EU more relevant. NATO is also used because the EU lacks adequate planning capacity necessary for early and preventive action, including rapid intervention. But, in contrast to the EU’s critics, there been much greater dynamism and European action than the EU is credited
for. Success is not rightly measured in terms of the deployment of troops if a training mission is more successful than a ground troop operations.

Looking ahead, EU member states nonetheless need to come to terms with the reality that small-scale civilian operation will not always be sufficient. Military intervention might still be necessary and therefore European planning is critical even if not all Member States participate in the resulting operations. Distributing burdens unevenly does not need to imply a divided Europe. It may simply mean that there will be several smaller ‘engines’ or ‘motors’ driving the process towards a more effective CSDP.

**Focusing on the bilateral dimension, it was outlined** there can be no question that the EU can be a global power. The question is rather whether the EU has the will and the means to match this. The EU is one pole in the international system, a great power if it acts together. At the moment, the international system is moving into a multipolar system with power shifting towards Asia, forcing Europe to act to remain relevant. And yet, at the same time, Europeans are hesitant to provide the required resources and sustained commitment required to ensure Europe stays relevant globally.

Looking ahead, it may be that once Europe emerges from the crisis, Italy and Spain will be more willing and able to invest and contribute to the EU’s security and defence capacities, but this remains uncertain. The largest European economic power, Germany, is unlikely to become more interested in military operations outside Europe. Its decision to abstain on the Libya intervention caused frustration in France and the UK and increased concern about the ability to use forces that included German contingents. It follows that the future of European defence lies therefore very much with the Franco-British alliance, despite their different attitudes towards the European Union. And France and the UK have more in common than their attitude to the use of force. Both are permanent members of the UN Security Council and both see themselves as global players. Both take the initiative when they deem it necessary or appropriate even if they are not, on their own, great powers. The Lancaster House Treaties are an expression of this realisation. The Treaties are based on two pillars, cooperating regarding nuclear deterrent and cooperating on common defence, including joint expeditionary forces.
France and the UK will determine the future of European security cooperation. For this, it is important to chart their trajectories. Both have changed considerably since adopting the St Malo declaration. France has outgrown its Gaullist legacy with a much greater emphasis on cooperation. It now even includes cooperation in the defence industries and is willing to share capabilities. The UK similarly has come some way in participating in European security, far more active than simply being the extended hand of the United States in Europe. European security cooperation has allowed both countries to recognise that since they can no longer have full capabilities for all tasks, they have to undertake future developments together in order to match their future ambitions as European powers with global reach.

**Concluding the debate** it was asserted that the future of European security cooperation will be defined by its threats. Russia has been for decades and will remain a worry for EU and NATO’s member states and therefore its aims, ambitions and intentions will be subject to continuous study. On the question of the United States pivoting towards Asia, this is a challenge but America’s position is always being debated. But it is a pressing issue for Europe as it comes when progress in CSDP is still limited and financial austerity gives little wiggle room. In addition, the EU still does not have a serious planning or analytical capacity, which limits its foresight capacity. The EU is the biggest aid donor, but this is completely separate from crisis management. This is not explainable to most citizens yet is an important issue that needs sorting out.

One of the essential but neglected pillars of European security is to engage much closer with Turkey. Turkey is a part of the solution to Europe’s security as it is an important player in the Middle East and Northern Africa and bridges the gap between the secular European states and the increasingly perceived threat of religious extremism.

The Lancaster House Treaties can provide an excuse for the ‘big two’ to do less through Brussels. The possibility of a British exit from the EU would be a new complicating factor. As the UK is a leading actor in CSDP, as well as acting as bridge between Europe and the US, an exit would also have very significant consequences on NATO. It could damage transatlantic relations and the European Union far beyond security policy. Given
the extent of current Euroscepticism in the UK, it is difficult to see the UK firmly embedded in the EU system, yet alternatives and their costs also need to be weighed in here. The St Malo declaration provided a European vision for France and the UK to the benefit of the EU. Under the current circumstances business as usual might not be sufficient. Therefore, the December 2013 European Council on defence might add a new dynamic to France, the UK and the European Union’s security and defence policy.
Conclusion
Fourteen years after St Malo and ten years after the first CSDP operation was launched, the workshop allowed many of the visionaries involved in shaping the origins of European security cooperation to reflect on what had been achieved. There was consensus among participants that the gravity of including security and defence in the European Union framework is often sidelined in today’s debates. The EU has integrated in many ways beyond what was deemed feasible and had surprised many practitioners and academics in the first years by the dynamic development that unfolded. Little criticism was raised about the swift institutional developments in the years following St Malo, yet the institutions need to be geared and reoriented towards quicker and more decisive action to satisfy the purpose they are meant to serve, crisis management.

Regarding the operation of CSDP, the assessment was mixed. On the one hand, CSDP can be seen to serve mostly internal functions, undermining a serious evaluation. As one of the original drafters confirmed, CSDP was launched for European ‘autonomous’ action, not to build a European identity. In this regard, the operations need to be handled much more pragmatically and given the autonomy to implement their mandate, rather than being micro-managed from Brussels.

At the same time, CSDP was an innovation and not a revolution. It allowed member states to continue business as usual in defence. This meant almost no new capabilities were created. Instead, duplication and excessive storage of tanks, jet fighters and equipment for territorial defence persists in most member states. And Europe has fallen far behind the technological innovation and development of the United States, but it has also done so despite the pressure exerted by the US in the NATO context.

On the wider questions of a European Union security policy, political leaders need to ensure they are doing what is necessary to make CSDP work. This is pressing as it is now very real for soldiers to die for the European Union. To facilitate this, member states need to change their attitude and return to the vision and leadership they demonstrated when creating CSDP. Similarly, more serious capability development (both civilian and military) is urgently required. In order to meet the security challenges ahead, more coordination and cooperation is needed in Europe. Whether this takes places in NATO or the EU framework is less important than it taking place.
In the political context of a financial, economic and Euro crisis Euro-sceptic opinions are easily pushed to the fore and national sentiments receive popular support. Similarly, most of the 28 member states saw governments change since 2008, leading them to try to hold on to their power, rather than yielding sovereignty and pool resources in an area as sensitive as defence. In this context, CSDP is also at a juncture. Shrinking defence budgets, the US pivot to Asia and the troops returning from Afghanistan will require the European states to think long and hard about the future. The US will remain a partner, but how it views its security guarantees for Europe will change. Thus, cooperation can continue within NATO but at the expense of being ignored by the United States when its help is needed. Alternatively, Europe can strengthening CSDP to become a partner to the United States with a much wider toolbox than only military intervention, leveraging the EU’s historical, diplomatic and financial ties as a Union of states pursuing coordinated policies in security and defence.

In conclusion, the workshop allowed a very sober, down-to-earth assessment of CSDP’s achievements and shortcomings after the hype of the first years had evaporated. Whatever the perspective shared, CSDP proved its value and the firm opinion was that European security cooperation is there to stay. Yet, much more needs to be done to ensure its relevance.
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