The European Neighbourhood Policy: An instrument for security community building

Pernille Rieker
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to present a framework for investigating whether and how the EU manages to promote security and stability beyond its borders through its neighbourhood policy. There is general agreement that the European Union has been engaged in promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods since the 1990s. Further, that this policy has been particularly successful for countries with membership prospects, and that the enlargement process has been viewed as an important security policy tool. Now that the enlargement process seems to be approaching a saturation point, it makes sense to investigate the role of the EU beyond candidate and potential candidate countries, asking whether the EU may have a security policy role to play in its neighbourhood. The overall ambition of this paper is to provide a better understanding of the functioning of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – a specific regional policy that might replace the enlargement process as the EU’s major instrument of security policy. The following three claims are emphasised in this paper: First, that it is the successful projection of rules and values beyond EU borders that will determine the impact of the EU as a security actor. Second, that the level of integration between the EU and its neighbours depends on three dimensions: the scope of the association agreements, the level of participation in the EU and the level of adaptation to EU rules and norms. Finally, that domestic support for closer integration with the EU in the neighbouring countries is a necessary condition for the EU to succeed as a regional security actor. The paper presents a theoretical framework for understanding the ENP as an instrument for building a security community and undertakes a comparative study of the functioning of the ENP in the South (Morocco and Tunisia) and the East (Ukraine and Moldova).

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1. Introduction

Does the EU have a role as a provider of regional security policy beyond its borders? If so, through what mechanisms does it work? Do these mechanisms differ in the EU’s Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods? These are the main questions addressed in this paper.

There is general agreement that the European Union has been engaged in promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods since the 1990s. Further, that this policy has been particularly successful for countries with membership prospects, meaning that the enlargement process has been viewed as an important security policy tool. Now that the enlargement process seems to be approaching a saturation point, it makes sense to investigate the role of the EU beyond candidate and potential candidate countries, asking whether the EU may have a security policy role to play in its neighbourhood. The overall ambition of this paper is to provide a better understanding of the functioning of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – a specific regional policy that might replace the enlargement process as the EU’s major instrument of security policy.

I begin by proposing a theoretical framework for understanding the ENP as an instrument for building a security community. Next, I undertake a comparative study of the functioning of the ENP in two partner countries in the South (Morocco and Tunisia) and two in the East (Ukraine and Moldova). The empirical comparison is based on four individual case studies written according to the framework presented in this paper, but also presented as independent working papers (Baltag and Bosse 2014, Batora and Navratil 2014, Bremberg and Rieker 2014, Dandashly 2014).¹

¹ All these papers have been prepared within the framework of a common project funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. Integration and regional security

2.1 The EU as a regional security actor
There is a sizeable literature on whether the EU is a global actor, as well as what kind of actor it is. Oddly enough, much less has been written about the EU as a regional power or an institution for building a security community in its neighbourhood. In the 1950s, Karl Deutsch developed the concept of a ‘security community’, which he saw as a form of international cooperation that, under certain circumstances, could lead to integration (Deutsch 1957). He argued that a security community was formed by participating actors when their people, and their political elites in particular, shared stable expectations of peace in the present and for the future. Adler and Barnett build on the work of Deutsch in their edited volume, Security Communities, from 1998 (Adler and Barnett 2008). In the chapter on Europe, Ole Wæver states that Western Europe is a security community, but adds that Europe as such is better understood by the concept of ‘desecuritization’ (Wæver 1998). However, he says little about the potential of the EU as an institution for building security communities beyond its borders. In Regions and Powers, Wæver together with Barry Buzan present a revised version of Buzan’s Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) from 1983 (Buzan and Wæver 2004). They argue that Europe must be understood as a Regional Security Complex with the integration process at its core. Still, they say little about the actual security mechanism of such a complex, other than noting the argument that security is ensured by the fear of a return to a situation dominated by balance of power. In addition to these seminal works in the field of security studies, there are important contributions that address various regional dynamics of the EU enlargement process (Bicchi 2006, Zielonka 2008, Börzel and Risse 2012a) and the ENP. Surprisingly, however, these processes are not usually analysed from a security-policy perspective – at least, this does not seem to have been the main focus.

While there are good reasons to argue that the EU member-states together form a security community (Wæver 1998), the question is whether there is a security community building process going on beyond the Union’s border, and whether the ENP also can be understood as an important instrument in such a process.

The fact that there are important processes of transition just outside the EU’s borders to the south and east, likely to have a massive impact on the EU as such and its member-states, makes this an important and timely topic to study. In the South, the Arab awakening might have impact on the EU – positively if the transition is successful, but
negatively if the transition leads to a series of failed states, conflicts and greater fundamentalism (Whitman and Juncos 2012). In the East, the EU faces challenges, including democratic failure (Delcour 2012) and even social unrest and revolutionary tendencies, as the world has been witnessing in Ukraine. Such a development might have negative consequences for the EU. It is therefore in the Union’s interest to contribute to the continuation of positive developments in these countries – but is the EU capable of doing so?

The EU has the potential to promote security and stability through the externalization of rules and values through its Neighbourhood Policy. The question is whether it has succeeded. Through a comparative study of the most advanced partner countries in the European Neighbourhood, this article aims to provide more general insights about the relationship between regional integration, partnerships and security.


2.2 The EU as a security community building institution
My argument is based on the overall assumption that the EU is primarily a regional security actor, and that it is the development and successful projection of common rules and values beyond EU borders in various policy areas that constitutes the basis for the EU as a security actor. While this is not new, it is often taken for granted and the mechanisms through which this regional security actor operates are largely understudied. I wish to investigate these mechanisms more closely, to provide better understanding about the functioning of the EU as a security community building institution beyond its borders.

My first assumption is that successful projection of rules requires a certain level of integration of the partner countries in question into the EU, and that such an integration also needs domestic support/domestic incentives. By examining both the level of integration and the level of attraction, I hope to go beyond the top–down approaches that have tended to dominate the literature on external Europeanization. While building on the literature that sees external Europeanization as the development of (democratic) good governance beyond EU borders (Freyburg, et al. 2009), this article also understands this as a process that can lead to security community building.

For such a process to succeed, two conditions have to be met. First, the partner country must achieve a certain level of integration with the EU, which in turn is dependent on its capacity to integrate. And
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second, the partner country must see the EU as more attractive than other regional actors.

On this basis, I will make two claims concerning security community building or security governance. First, that the level of integration with the EU is dependent on three dimensions: the scope of the agreements, the level of adaptation to EU norms and rules, and the level of participation in the EU. In addition, the domestic institutions and capacities must facilitate rather than obstruct such a process of integration. Second, that how attractive the EU is perceived as being is linked to domestic support for closer integration; and that such domestic support, in turn, depends on the effectiveness of the ENP and the relative attractiveness of this policy compared to the policies offered by competing external actors. In the following, I present the various dimensions of both the level of integration and the level of attractiveness as well as their theoretical underpinnings.

2.2.1 The level of integration
As mentioned, the level of integration is dependent on three dimensions: the scope of the association agreements, the level of participation, and the level of adaptation. The higher an ENP country ‘scores’ on these three dimensions, the more EU-integrated it can be said to be. If also the EU is perceived as attractive by the people, then we may argue that the country has become an integral part of the European security community. How, then, are the three dimensions of integration and their theoretical underpinnings linked to security and stability?

The scope of association agreements

Here we assume that the broader the scope of the association is – in terms of the policy areas covered – the more integrated will the associated country be. In turn, this can be expected to have positive effects on security and stability in the region. This builds on the basic neo-liberal argument of the relationship between interdependence and security, or that a high degree of interdependence leads to greater interstate cooperation and is therefore a force for stability (Keohane and Nye 1977).

The interdependence argument is also at the basis of the integration process as such. After all, it was precisely the wish for lasting peace and stability among the European countries after two disastrous world wars that made it so important to integrate important national coal and steel industries and subsequently other important policy areas until a political union was established several decades later. While also other factors have contributed to peace and stability in this part of the world, there is little doubt that stronger economic integration has been an important instrument in creating peaceful co-existence in Europe.
Still, the recent integration process goes somewhat beyond the interdependence logic in the sense that it also implies political integration. According to Buzan and Wæver, a reversal of this process is highly unlikely (even in times of serious crisis), since any form of fragmentation of the European integration process would have even deeper negative security-policy consequences (Buzan and Wæver 2004). Interestingly, there is a will and possibly a functional need to externalize this logic by making it valid also beyond EU borders.

The enlargement process, and more recently the ENP, has been recognized as a continuation of this idea (Lavanex 2004, Kelly 2006, Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008, Lavanex and Schimmelfenning 2009, Rieker 2012). This understanding of European security is premised on a security concept which sees the very process of development of common rules and values within various policy areas, as well as the successful projection of these rules and values beyond EU borders, as constituting the basis for the EU as a security actor.

In this sense, the EU has developed towards what Adler and Barnett have termed a ‘tightly coupled security community’ (Adler and Barnett 1998, see also Rieker 2006). Whereas a loosely coupled security community is low in political integration, a tightly coupled one is characterized by a high degree of political integration. The EU, being the result of an integration process and thus something in-between an international organization and a federal state, has gradually evolved and moved towards becoming a more and more tightly coupled security community.

While relations between the EU and the associated members can also be characterized by interdependence, the asymmetry between the two makes it fruitful to supplement this approach with insights from what is often referred to as the ‘theory of hegemonial stability’ (Krasner 1976, Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, Pedersen 2002). Whereas complex interdependence may create peace and stability, regional stability is often dependent upon a hegemon that can establish norms and rules and then superintend their functioning by enlightened use of its capability to encourage other members to comply with these norms and rules. In the literature on European integration, these processes are often referred to as ‘Europeanization’ (Radaelli 2000, Featherstone 2002, Olsen 2002). While this literature is primarily interested in uncovering the mechanisms through which such processes of norms are transferred or compliance takes place, there has also been an increased interest in studying the externalization of these rules and norms beyond the EU as such (Lavanex 2004, Lavanex and Schimmelfenning 2009).

The present project investigates the scope of the association agreements between the EU and selected ENP countries, based on the assumption that the more areas these agreements cover and the more
binding or committing they are, the more important is the EU as a regional security actor.

*Degree of adaptation/Europeanization*

Simply getting an overview of the scope of the agreements, however, is not sufficient. It is also important to get a grip on the degree of adaptation in terms of adjustment made to EU rules, norms and values at the national level. As well as determining the degree of adaptation to EU rules (or 'Europeanization'), such an analysis may also be able to show whether these adaptations are real, or mere window-dressing.

In a special issue of *Journal of European Public Policy* from 2009 this topic is examined in relation to the EU's various categories of neighbours. In their introductory article, Lavanex and Schimmelfennig discuss the concept of ‘external governance’, which seeks to capture the expanding scope of EU rules beyond EU borders. Their article examines the theoretical foundations of the concept and identifies various institutional modes through which this external governance can be said to be effective (Lavanex and Schimmelfenning 2009). They distinguish between three sets of factors – *institutions, power, and domestic structures* – and argue that differences in these factors may explain why the degree of adaptation to EU standards varies among the categories of ‘neighbourhood’ countries. According to an institutionalist explanation, the modes and effects of external governance are ‘automatically’ shaped by internal EU modes of governance and rules. By contrast, the power-based explanation focuses on the extent to which the EU has the power to enforce compliance in one way or the other. This power will exist only if there is perceived interdependence between the EU and the country in question. While such a power structure has existed between the EU and candidate countries, it is not necessarily present in relation to the ‘neighbourhood’ countries. Moreover, there may be differences in the domestic structures of the neighbouring countries that facilitate compliance to varying degrees.

How then can we investigate the effectiveness of Europeanization or ‘external governance’ in relation to these neighbouring countries? This is a pertinent question, as it can be linked to our assessment of the effectiveness of the EU as a regional security actor. There is one methodological difficulty here, however: how to determine how much adaptation to EU rules is due to pressure from the EU and how much is rather an effect of EU rules being part of larger international standards? (Barbé, et al. 2009) However, with a focus on the areas of particular interest to the EU and with a process-tracing approach, carefully examining the temporal order of the various changes and the arguments used in justifying these changes, this challenge may be overcome.
Here I am less concerned with how compliance takes place, and more interested in the extent to which it takes place, and whether it has a positive effect on stability and security. In this connection, it is important that this adaptation is real. One important indication that the adaptation is real and not simply window-dressing is if these changes also lead to institutional changes, budget increases, and the like. We also need to be able to identify adaptation both in relation to the policy areas covered by the individual association agreements, and in relation to the more specific ENP criteria concerning democracy promotion, respect for human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development. I will assume that the higher degree of real adaptation with evidence of implementation, the more important is the EU will be as a regional security provider in its neighbourhood.

Degree of participation

The level of integration and thus also interdependence and stability depends not only on the scope of the agreement and the level of adaptation to EU rules and norms, but also on the level of actual involvement or participation of the associated country in various EU policies. The higher the degree of participation in EU policies and the more committed a country is, the more likely will it be to build a security community. Writing in the 1950s, Karl Deutsch developed the concept of a ‘security community’, which he saw as a form of international cooperation that, under certain circumstances, could lead to integration (Deutsch 1957). Deutsch argued that a security community was formed by participating actors when their people, and their political elites in particular, shared stable expectations of peace in the present and for the future. This perspective represented an important break with previous perspectives on macro-politics. His approach was more oriented towards the actual practices of the participating states and how these practices contribute to develop a common identity and a ‘we-feeling’. Whether or not a common identity is necessary is not obvious, but at least some kind of shared expectations of peaceful co-existence based on interdependence and trust should be present.

According to Pouliot, however, it is certain diplomatic practices that lead to the establishment of a security community (Pouliot 2008, 2010). In his theory of practice of security communities, he argues that peace exists in and through practice when the practical sense of security officials makes diplomacy the self-evident way to solve interstate disputes. Integration is thus dependent on the extent to which the partner country participates in various EU policies, as this

\[ \text{http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm} \]
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The capacity of domestic institutions to change

As Börzel and Risse argue, Europeanization ‘is unlikely to take place unless domestic actors in politics or society take them up and demand reforms themselves’ (Börzel and Risse 2012a: 11). Whether or not such support exists might hinge on some of the other scope conditions under which Börzel and Risse expect diffusion processes to occur and succeed: degrees of limited statehood, democracy versus autocracy and power asymmetries (Börzel and Risse 2012a: 11-14). In a special issue of West European Politics, several case studies investigate these scope conditions; the conclusion which might be drawn is that successful Europeanization and diffusion of ideas is possible, but depends on favourable domestic institutions and political climate (Börzel and Risse 2012b).

To get an analytical grip on the role of domestic factors in these processes, it might be fruitful to explore the local social structures (Stinchcombe 1965) and their potential for mediating the impact and implementation of externally projected standards, as these may have implications for the absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) of a country undergoing processes of reform. Such an approach may contribute to show that the process of adopting standards is not a unified one, but evolves as a multi-layered set of processes involving various standardization dynamics in a range of policy fields (Batora and Navratil 2014).

2.2.2 The level of EU attractiveness

While high scores on the above-mentioned three dimensions, for the respective partner countries, are important for the ENP to succeed and for the EU to be considered as a security community building institution in its neighbourhood, this is not sufficient. Also the level of support from the domestic political leadership and important constituencies in the partner country will be crucial if the EU is to succeed as a regional security actor.

There are reasons to believe that the stronger (and more democratic) the institutions in the partner country are, the more likely it is to have domestic support for the reforms proposed by the EU. However, we argue that this will be the case only if closer integration with the EU is perceived as attractive by domestic public opinion and the domestic authorities and important constituencies.

The attractiveness of the EU in each partner country will depend on what the individual partner country is likely to receive from the EU in terms of financial assistance, market access, visa policy and the like: in other words, on whether the EU is capable of delivering what it
promises. This point is particularly relevant in a time of economic crisis when the EU might be somewhat less willing to contribute, which might lead to less partner-country domestic support for further integration.

The level of attractiveness can also be challenged by other external actors with interests in the same region and whether this competition weakens or strengthens the EU’s ability to externalize norms and rules. For instance, the EU may face competition from powerful actors like Russia to the east and Saudi Arabia to the south.
3. Comparing EU’s security community building in the East and South

In this paper I now apply the framework presented above and present a comparative examination of four ENP countries – two in the east (Ukraine and Moldova) and two in the south (Morocco and Tunisia). These four ENP partner countries have been chosen since they are considered to be the most advanced ENP states in each region. Of all the 16 EU partner countries, Ukraine and Moldova are considered to be the most integrated into the EU in the eastern neighbourhood, and likewise for Tunisia and Morocco in the southern neighbourhood. Thus, they can be seen as being ‘most-likely cases’: we would expect positive results in these four countries if the ENP is to be considered as a successful regional security policy instrument.

The empirical analysis here is based on four individual case studies (Baltag and Bosse 2014, Batora and Navratil 2014, Bremberg and Rieker 2014, Dandashly 2014), which in turn have based their analysis on a range of national sources that have provided information about the various dimensions of the level of integration and the level of attractiveness or domestic support for EU integration. The association agreements and action plans have been important for identifying the scope of the cooperation. In addition, the annual progress reports prepared by the European Commission have been important for identifying the level of adaptation and participation, as well as various statistics and indexes. Beyond that, all authors have conducted interviews with representatives of the authorities in the four partner countries.

My systematic comparison of these four cases starts with the ENP approach and its effects in the countries situated in the same region, and ends with a more general comparison of this approach in the East and in the South. This will enable us to draw some more general conclusions about the functioning of the ENP as a security community building instrument.

3.1 ENP East: Comparing Ukraine and Moldova
Until recently Moldova and Ukraine were on a similar track towards a closer integration with the EU. Both had finalized negotiations on the Association Agreement and, although the Ukrainian final step had been postponed for some time due to the imprisonment of Yulia
Tymoshenko, they both had an opportunity to sign the agreement at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in November 2013. While Moldovan government decided to sign the agreement, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych decided to enter into a Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan instead. The sudden U-turn on the part of the Ukrainian authorities has proven to have dramatic consequences, immediately leading to massive demonstration and revolutionary tendencies in the country. This has made the future of EU–Ukraine relations (as well as Ukraine–Russia relations) uncertain.

Here, however, we study the level of integration that Ukraine had reached before these latest events. Turning first to the content of the association agreements that the EU has negotiated with Ukraine and Moldova, we see that their scope is actually quite comprehensive, as they are largely comparable to the 35 chapters that a candidate countries has to negotiate. Although structured differently, the association agreement covers almost all the same issues. Both are highly ambitious documents that expect a wide range of reforms to be implemented, a high degree of participation in EU programmes and in regional development, with cross-border and civil society cooperation (Baltag and Bosse 2014, Batora and Navratil 2014).

The fact that Ukraine has decided not to sign the agreement means that EU–Ukraine relations (at least for the time being) continue to be regulated by the PCA from 1994 (Batora and Navratil 2014). And even though the Moldovan government did sign the agreement in November 2013, certain Russian pressures are also felt there. As Baltag and Bosse note, one can still not completely exclude a change in policy in Moldova like that witnessed in Ukraine (Baltag and Bosse 2014).

As to level of adaptation, Moldova was categorized by the 2013 EaP index as the best performer in terms of approximation, coming in first among the six EaP members. Ukraine was number three after Georgia (see Table 1.).

Table 1. Approximation rate of EaP countries to the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector cooperation</th>
<th>Country approximation indices (1=best performer; 0=worst performer)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice, Freedom and Security</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and Economic Cooperation</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Baltag and Bosse (2014: 10)
According to Batora and Navratil, the main reason why Ukraine has struggled with adaptation to EU norms and regulations is that the various EU requirements challenge established ways of how things are done in Ukraine, in turn creating tension within state institutions (Batora and Navratil 2014).

The level of participation seems quite limited for the Eastern European partners. While it is basically non-existent in Ukraine due to incompatible institutional structures (Batora and Navratil 2014), the participation of the Moldovan officials has been limited to the working groups on migration or border management (via FRONTEX). Still, Moldovan participation seem to have had noticeable Europeanization effects (Baltag and Bosse 2014).

With these observations in mind, and taking into account the comprehensive scope of the AA and the DCFTA, we may conclude that Moldova has indeed achieved a certain level of integration with the EU, but that this is more limited in the case of Ukraine. In particular, Ukraine seems to be struggling to reach a certain level of adaptation and participation; Batora and Navratil see this as due largely to the fact that its institutions are not modified and the local social structures are not compatible with EU standards, which also results in lower absorptive capacity (Batora and Navratil 2014).

As we have seen, there are some challenges concerning integration – especially in Ukraine – but how attractive is the EU in these countries? According to the European Neighbourhood Barometer (EU Neighbourhood Barometer 2012a), perceptions of the EU are rather positive. In Moldova 55% of had positive perceptions of the EU, while only 12% had negative perceptions (the remainder being either neutral or had no opinion). In Ukraine 44% had a positive view, while only 10% said their perceptions of the EU were negative (EU Neighbourhood Barometer 2012a: 35). As for how they perceive their country's relationship with the EU, we see that Moldovans viewed it in a slightly more positive manner that did Ukrainians. Further, 62% of the Moldovans surveyed deemed the relation ‘fairly good’ or ‘good’ (in contrast to 8% who found it ‘fairly bad’ or ‘bad’). In Ukraine, 41% characterized the relationship as ‘fairly good’ or ‘good’ (whereas 30% found it ‘fairly bad’ or ‘bad’) (EU Neighbourhood Barometer 2012a: 44).

The recent events in Ukraine have also shown that the country is torn between Russia and the EU. According to an opinion poll conducted by Interfax-Ukraine in November 2013, membership in the EU is favoured by 39% of the Ukrainians surveyed, while 37% prefer the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Ukraine is also split geographically: the EU is mostly chosen over the Customs Union in the western and central regions (69% vs. 11%; 43% vs. 27%), while the Customs Union is more popular in the southern and eastern
regions (51% vs. 29% and 61% vs. 15%). This is also a generational issue: EU entry is supported especially by young Ukrainians (52% of respondents aged 18–29 and 41% of those aged 30–39), while the Customs Union is favoured by older citizens (41% of respondents aged 50–59, 42% of those aged 60–69, and 48% of respondents above the age of 70) (Interfax-Ukraine 2013).

Even though the EU has a more positive image in Moldova, Russia also has a certain attraction. As the contribution by Baltag and Bosse indicates, the proportion of those favouring integration with the EU has risen in recent years, but the population still remains divided when asked to choose between joining the EU (33% in 2011, 16.1% in 2012, 44.7% in 2013) or the Customs Union (45.6% in 2011, 22.5% in 2012, 43% in 2013). Interestingly, when asked which country should be a major strategic partner of Moldova, most people thought of Russia (60.5%) before the EU (23.2%). In contrast, the 58% of respondents identified the EU as the actor that most effectively assisted economic development in Moldova, as against the 25% who mentioned the Single Economic Area with Russia (Baltag and Bosse 2014 pp).

Moldova and Ukraine are the two ENP Eastern partner countries that receive the most of the EU financial support allocated to that neighbourhood (see Table 2). With the recent decision to increase this budget line, allocations to countries that comply with ENP norms (according to the ‘more for more’ principle) will continue to rise.

Table 2. EU financial support to Eastern ENP countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007–2010*</th>
<th>2011–2013*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>157.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>122.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>120.4</td>
<td>180.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>209.7</td>
<td>273.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>470.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1034.5</td>
<td>1203.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures in €mill.
Source: [http://www.easternpartnership.org/programmes/country-allocations](http://www.easternpartnership.org/programmes/country-allocations)

On the other hand, Russia is also supporting these countries financially. For instance, in December 2013 Russia offered to buy $15 billion of Ukrainian government bonds and sharply reduce – by 33% – the price of natural-gas exports to the country (Rayman 2013).

This means that it is likely that short-term costs/benefits of cooperation with the EU are weighed against the costs/benefits of an alternative (short-term) course of action (e.g. non-implementation of EU legislation).
In Ukraine, such considerations have led to a defection (at least temporary) from the AA/DCFTA process. Whether a similar U-turn may happen in Moldova is difficult to say. However, according to Baltag and Bose, the EU still seem to have a more important power of attraction in Moldova, perhaps due to a stronger sense of affiliation with the EU than in Ukraine (Baltag and Bosse 2014).

3.2 **ENP South: Comparing Morocco and Tunisia**

There are internal differences in ENP South as well. The most obvious difference between the two countries in focus here is that, while Tunisia has gone through a revolution and established an electoral democracy since 2011, Morocco has undergone a process of less profound changes, with a non-elected monarch still in power. According a 2013 Freedom House report, however, both countries are considered ‘partly free’, with Tunisia having a slightly better score than Morocco on political rights and both countries scoring equally with regard to civil liberties (see Table 3).

As to **level of integration**, both countries already have an association agreement with the EU: Tunisia signing in 1998 and Morocco in 2000. Both countries have also been awarded special status in their relationship with the EU. Morocco was granted ‘advanced status’ in 2008, Tunisia was given a ‘privileged partnership’ in 2012. While the designations differ, the content is the same, emphasizing the EU’s special commitment as well as the willingness of these countries to integrate further with the EU. In practical terms this means that the EU has established ‘roadmaps’ for expanding the scope of these two countries’ relations with the EU. The EU has also recently launched negotiations on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, as well as signing mobility partnerships with both countries.

With regard to **scope**, these agreements are comprehensive, as they cover more or less all chapters of the **acquis** in one way or the other. This means that, in terms of scope, they do not differ very much from the association agreements negotiated with Moldova and Ukraine.

Concerning the **level of adaptation**, however, the differences between these agreements become more apparent. When the EU emphasizes that both Tunisia and Morocco score fairly well (Bremer and Rieker 2014; Dandashly 2014), we should bear in mind that it is **alignment** to ENP norms and regulation that the EU requires in relations to their Southern partners. Even though these countries have been granted a special status among the Southern partners, the EU still raises concerns about the lack of democracy and judicial independence in Morocco and the difficulties linked to the consolidation of a real democracy in Tunisia based on mutual recognition of the different parties (Bremer and Rieker 2014, Dandashly 2014). In addition to the on-going process of alignment, the two countries have also been eager to **participate** in various EU policies. Due to their special status,
both countries have regular meetings with the EU. Both countries have also been active in contributing to the EU’s internal security, with a particular focus on fighting illegal immigration (Bremberg and Rieker 2014, Dandashly 2014). Further, Morocco has also participated as a third country in some of the EU’s CSDP missions (Bremberg and Rieker 2014).

Both Morocco and Tunisia have strong affiliations with Europe, linked to their historical ties to France (and Spain in the case of Morocco) and to the fact that both countries still have a high number of their own citizens living in Europe. This affiliation is perhaps particularly strong in Morocco due to its geographical closeness to Europe – in fact, Morocco even applied for membership in the EU in 1987. Even though the commitment to its Southern partners has been stressed and confirmed, the amount of funding that the EU transfers is still relatively limited, seen in relations to the challenges facing these countries. Table 3 shows the overall budget for bilateral EU assistance to partner countries in the framework of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which has been made known through the National Indicative Programmes (NIP) 2011–2013, released by the European Commission. However, this funding is far more important, compared to the EU support to Moldova and Ukraine. For instance, Morocco received €58 mill. for the 2011–2013 period, whereas Ukraine received €470.1 mill. for the same period.

Table 3. EU financial support to Southern ENP countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007–2010*</th>
<th>2011–2013*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>141.7</td>
<td>149.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>195.8</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>139.5</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>580.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>87.33</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>729.3</td>
<td>1650.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures in € mill. For some countries, figures on allocations for 2007–2010 are not available

Also in the South there are other regional actors that strive for influence. For instance, Saudi Arabia has provided some US $3.7 billion in aid to countries affected by Arab Spring. While most of this has gone to Egypt and Jordan, $750 million has been given to Tunisia and $1.25 billion to Morocco. While these sums are not insignificant, it seems as if the potential long-term benefits of greater integration with
the EU are still perceived as more important (Bremberg and Rieker 2014, Dandashly 2014).

To some extent this is also confirmed by the European Neighbourhood Barometer from 2012 for the Southern partners (EU Neighbourhood Barometer 2012b), which shows that 69% of Moroccans surveyed had positive perceptions of the EU, while only 4% had negatives perceptions (the remainder were either neutral or had no opinion). In Tunisia 56% held positive views, and only 9% said that they had negative perceptions of the EU (EU Neighbourhood Barometer 2012b: 35). When asked about how they perceive the their country's relationship with the EU, 86% of the Moroccans surveyed found the relation ‘fairly good’ or ‘good’ (only 7% found it ‘fairly bad’ or ‘bad’). The figures for Tunisia are fairly similar: 80% characterized the relationship as ‘fairly good’ or ‘good’; and 12% found it ‘fairly bad’ or ‘bad’) (EU Neighbourhood Barometer 2012a 42). In this sense Saudi Arabia does not represent any real alternative to closer integration with the EU.

Morocco and Tunisia are less integrated into the EU than the two Eastern ENP countries analysed above. However, the agreements they have with the EU are still quite far-reaching and the results are also quite promising: both countries seem to be progressing with gradual alignment with ENP norms.

3.3 ENP East and ENP South
The European Neighbourhood Policy covers 16 countries – six in the East (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) and ten in the South (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia). Unsurprisingly, there is huge variety in how this policy is implemented. While we find differences within each region, the main difference is still between the EU’s approach to the East and to the South. This is due to geographical and cultural factors, but also to the different historical relationships that have existed between the EU and its eastern and its southern neighbourhood.

While it is difficult to define where the EU’s eastern borders should be drawn, this is not disputed in the southern neighbourhood. On the other hand, relations between the EC/EU and the countries on the other side of the Mediterranean have a longer history, since these relationship started to develop already under the Cold War. Moreover, the EU is not really challenged in the South by any powerful regional actor, as is the case in its Eastern neighbourhood. It is therefore hard to say which of the two regions will be more integrated into the European security community in the future. This will depend not only on the approaches taken by the EU and by Russia, but also on domestic factors in the partner countries, as clearly shown by recent developments in Ukraine.
However, it is the fact that it is not obvious where the enlargement process to the east ends and where the neighbourhood policy begins that constitute the main difference between these two approaches. While membership is not perceived as a future possibility for the partner countries in the South (at least not since Morocco's application for membership was turned down in 1987), this is still a long-term ambition for most of the partner countries in the East – even though the EU has not yet opened up for the possibility of future membership for any of these countries. There are also disagreements among the current member-states on this issue. The practical implication of this is that while the EU is reluctant to discuss the possibility of future membership with its Eastern partner countries, its approach to the East is still far more similar to the enlargement process than is its approach to the South.

As the case studies have shown, the EU is more severe in requiring real adaptations to the EU acquis in recent negotiations on Association Agreements (AAs) with Moldova and Ukraine, while a certain alignment to ENP norms seems to suffice in the South. This is why both Tunisia and Morocco have had AAs and free trade agreements with the EU since 1998 (Tunisia) and 2000 (Morocco). By contrast, Moldova has only recently signed an Association Agreement (2013) after a rather cumbersome process, and the Ukrainian authorities decided to reject a similar agreement. Due to differing requirements and expectations, these agreements vary in content. Moldova’s AA is far more ambitious and foresees a higher level of integration with the EU than the agreements that both Tunisia and Morocco have negotiated with the EU. As argued by Batora and Navratil, the primary difference between the EU’s Southern and Eastern partners lies in the in extensive economic convergence and adoption of EU legal and technical standards in the latter case (Batora and Navratil 2014).

As EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Füle stated in an interview with Radio Free Europe in May 2013:

The first thing to remember is that the Association Agreements on offer for the Eastern Partners do not include a path to EU membership – nor do they explicitly exclude one. So the deal is not as sweet as those offered to the countries in the Western Balkans, which received paths to membership, but it offers a whole lot more than Association Agreements with Morocco and Tunisia, which excluded eventual membership. It took Croatia 12 years from signing a stabilization and
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association agreement with Brussels to joining the club. Turkey signed its association back in 1962 and is still waiting.\(^3\)

The proposed budget for the new European Neighbourhood Instrument is €15.4 billion for the period 2014–2020, which represents a 27% increase compared to the budget of the previous ENPI instrument.\(^4\)

In line with the revised Neighbourhood Policy launched in 2011, ENI support will focus on the following areas:

- promoting human rights and the rule of law
- establishing deep and sustainable democracy and developing a thriving civil society
- sustainable and inclusive growth, including progressive integration in the EU internal market
- mobility and people-to-people contacts, including student exchanges
- regional integration, including Cross-Border Cooperation programmes.

The instrument is also meant to be flexible and follow the ‘more for more’ principle, whereby the countries that are the most willing to undertake reforms in line with the ENP norms will receive the most. That makes it difficult to foresee how the funds will be used and which of the two regions will receive more. According to EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Füle and Commissioner for Development Andris Piebalgs, the EU will

...allow for more differentiation and for giving incentives for best performers who genuinely implement deep and sustainable democracy, including respect for human rights, and agreed reform objectives.\(^5\)

It is clear that the EU’s decision to increase the ENP budget, as well as the recent revision of its approach, came as the direct result of the Arab Spring and therefore indicates the EU's intention to strengthen its neighbourhood policy in the South. However, with the recent dramatic

\(^3\) http://www.rferl.org/content/eu-association-agreement-explained/25174247.html
\(^4\) http://www.enpi-info.eu/ENI
events in Ukraine there might be changes in how the EU perceives its role in the East and in the South.

There are security challenges in both regions, not improbably linked to the lack of consolidated democratic institutions. According to the 2013 Freedom House report, all four countries are considered as ‘partly free’ even though all except Morocco have established democratic political systems. As shown in Table 4, Moldova scores highest on political rights and civilian liberties, but the differences are not so great, even though Moldova has had a democratic system ever since 1990.

Table 4. Freedom, political rights and civilian liberties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political system</th>
<th>Freedom</th>
<th>Political rights*</th>
<th>Civilian liberties*</th>
<th>Political system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moldova Parliamentary democracy (since 1990)</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine Parliamentary democracy (since 1991)</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco Authoritarian monarchy characterized by gradual political liberalization</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia Parliamentary democracy (since 2011)</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Each country is assigned a numerical rating from 1 to 7 for both political rights and civil liberties, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free.

As we have seen, there are differences in the EU’s approach towards its Eastern and its Southern neighbourhoods. While the approach in the East is more similar to the enlargement process with requirements of adaptation to the *acquis*, the approach towards the South has been a more flexible process, supporting and stimulating positive developments with the requirement of alignment. However, if we had to evaluate which of these two approaches has been more successful as an instrument for security community building the answer would not be self-evident.
4. Concluding remarks

As recent events have shown, the European neighbourhood is clearly not yet an integrated part of the EU security community. This is evident in many of the EU’s southern partner countries in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, but also in the east with the recent events in Ukraine. We asked: Does the EU have a role as a regional security policy provider beyond its borders? If so, through which mechanisms does it work? And do these mechanisms differ in its Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods?

While the EU has not been the main actor directly involved in the domestic revolutionary events in the south or more recently in the east, the EU still plays an important role. It was also the Ukrainian people’s frustration over the government’s decision to finally reject the Association Agreement with the EU that led to the protests in the first place. Moreover, the European Neighbourhood Policy has gained renewed attention as a result of these events. It has been revised and strengthened. However, its mechanisms are clearly not set up for dealing with crises. The current ENP functions best as an instrument for supporting positive processes initiated by domestic forces in the partner countries. In this sense, it has the potential to contribute to long-term security community building. Interestingly, it seems that the process in the South, with its focus on alignment with ENP norms rather than the cumbersome process of adaptation to the EU acquis, might prove to be a more fruitful approach for countries where national absorptive capacity still is limited – at least while the long-term goal is building a security community, not achieving full EU membership.
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