



Institute for Security Studies

# POLICY BRIEF

## RECOMMENDATIONS

South Africa suffers from a lack of political accountability and increased voter apathy. After the May 2014 elections, it is recommended that the South African parliament consider:

- Reforming the current party-list system by implementing the 2003 Van Zyl Slabbert commission of inquiry recommendations to move South Africa's electoral system towards a mixed-member proportional system.
- Introducing mandatory voting for local, provincial and national elections that penalises non-voters.
- Adding a 'none-of-the-above' option to ballot papers in combination with the introduction of mandatory voting to allow voters to express dissatisfaction with established parties.
- Focusing on values and ethics; the need to fix education; the importance of economic growth; the need for a revitalisation of a common and active South African citizenship and the importance of implementing the National Development Plan and the associated social compact.

## Forecasting South African election results

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### SUMMARY

This policy brief provides additional detail on the Bafana Bafana, Mandela Magic and Nation Divided scenarios first set out in the 'South African futures 2030' study released by the Institute for Security Studies in February 2014. The focus in this publication is on possible national election results in 2014, 2019, 2024 and 2029.

Amongst many considerations, four factors appear decisive in setting South Africa on the political scenarios described. The role and leadership of the African National Congress is central to all, but developments within the Congress of South African Trade Unions, which is profoundly split along political and ideological lines and is facing the loss of its largest member, could imply the start of new political alignments. Additional factors are rising voter apathy and the ability of opposition parties to mobilise the young black vote in their favour.

The lack of accountability within South African politics and increasing voter apathy are important considerations that detract from growth and stability prospects, and the policy brief concludes with a number of strategic recommendations.

### BUILDING ON PREVIOUS WORK

South Africans go to the polls on 7 May 2014 in elections that are widely seen as the beginning of a fundamental realignment in the country's politics.

In February 2014 the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) released a study on the future of South Africa. That paper, 'South African futures 2030: how Bafana Bafana made Mandela Magic',<sup>2</sup> set out different scenarios that extended over national and provincial elections in 2014, 2019, 2024 and 2029. Each scenario was based on a complex interplay of social, political and economic developments that combined to deliver an integrated set of possible outcomes, including substantially different levels of carbon emissions, individual wealth, access to basic services and the like. None were either worst or best-case scenarios, but set out the probable implications of current developments and choices on the long-term future of South Africa and the wellbeing of its citizenry.

The paper was careful in acknowledging the sterling progress that democratic South Africa has made in many areas, particularly in the delivery of social services and the alleviation of deep-seated poverty. Many challenges remain, however.

The purpose of this policy brief is to provide additional detail on the party political scenarios sketched out in the longer 'South African futures 2030' paper, including the forecasting of potential electoral outcomes associated with each pathway.

Amongst many considerations, four factors appear decisive in setting South Africa on the political scenarios described in the pages that follow. The role and leadership of the governing African National Congress (ANC) is central to all. Beyond its amazing longevity and the iconic status of Nelson Mandela, the ANC is an organisation with a deep sense of history, credited with the achievement of liberation. What happens within the ANC reverberates across much of South Africa, and its policy choices will continue to dominate for the next decade or longer. There is widespread dissatisfaction with service delivery, corruption and lack of engagement by elected leaders, compounded by expensive policy failures such as the implementation of e-tolling in Gauteng and the weakness in key structures of the Congress, such as its Youth and Women's leagues. Despite this, the ANC appears set to retain a large majority at the national level during the May 2014 elections. President Jacob Zuma is particularly unpopular in Gauteng, yet despite the latest revelations about corruption and the abuse of power in the use of public funds to upgrade his personal homestead at Nkandla, the ANC appears set to retain power in all but the Western Cape.

A recent consideration with important potential impact on future politics are developments within the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which is facing the loss of its largest member, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA). This could imply the start of new political alignments; a development that would have unforeseen consequences. The split within COSATU has been a long time coming and is indicative of the complex divisions within that organisation, and its complicated relationship with the ANC. The ANC remains a broad nationalist movement, but is normalising in the sense that considerations of power and access to resources are steadily increasing in importance. Previous ideological differences (and those between the 'external' ANC and the 'internal' United Democratic Front) are giving way to struggles about patronage.

This is not the situation within COSATU, which is profoundly split along political and ideological lines. Today, large public-sector unions consisting of teachers and police personnel make up more than a third of COSATU's members, and these members generally have middle-class aspirations that are very different from the working-class aspirations and outlook of their factory-floor comrades in a union such as NUMSA. The public sector unions within COSATU have largely abandoned their adherence to Marxism-Leninism and believe in continued alignment with the ANC – an alliance that provides a political career path for ambitious trade unionists even into cabinet itself. On the other hand, key leaders within NUMSA and its allies have given up on changing the ANC from within to bring about the radical economic change that its members would like to see.<sup>3</sup>


After the May 2014 elections, NUMSA may launch the nascent United Front and Movement as a political party, which could have an important impact on politics during the 2019 elections – particularly on reducing the prospects of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). This development would bring greater political balance to South Africa and allow the ANC to claim the broad ideological centre. It could also free the ANC to proceed more readily with the implementation of a clear growth path as set out in the National Development Plan (NDP). In this manner, as is the nature of scenario analysis, the current mediocre economic trajectory of 'Bafana Bafana' could morph into a much more positive outcome.

A third consideration is the extent to which – and the manner in which – young voters (the so-called 'born frees') will participate in the upcoming elections. Certainly, the relatively low levels of registration among young people for the elections support the view that voter apathy is rising, with more than a third of South Africa's potential voters indicating that they are not interested in politics and elections.<sup>4</sup> This is potentially the most important factor over time. Currently the majority of South Africans vote on the basis of party loyalty instead of alternative policy choices – a trend that will decline with each election and steadily erode the advantage of the ANC, which benefits from its associated liberation dividend. This introduces the fourth and final consideration, namely the extent to which a party such as the Democratic Alliance (DA) is able to maintain its momentum and gain the support of black voters.

## THE CURRENT AND NEXT PARLIAMENT

Figure 1 presents the current allocation of the 400 seats in the South African national assembly. The number of voters who voted for the ANC in 2009 increased by 6,6 per cent

Figure 1 Current seats in the national assembly



Note: the category 'Others' includes the Independent Democrats (ID), which is set to disappear with the 2014 elections, African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), Freedom Front Plus (FF+), United Democratic Movement (UDM), United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP), African People's Convention (APC), Minority Front (MF) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).

from the previous elections in 2004 to 11,7 million. The official opposition, the DA, saw its share of voters increase from a much lower base by 34,4 per cent to just more than a million, and it increased its representation to 67 seats.<sup>5</sup> The DA currently governs the Western Cape, the only province not controlled by the ANC.

During the 2009 elections the ANC gained 65,9 per cent support and the DA 16,7 per cent. About 77 per cent of eligible South Africa voters (i.e. nationals above 18 years of age constituting 34,4 million potential voters) registered for the elections and 17,9 million voted. Eventually, the ANC gained 264 seats in the current national assembly with the support of 60 per cent of all potential voters.<sup>6</sup>

Figure 2 presents the results from the Ipsos/Sunday Times random probability survey that was conducted in February/March 2014, as well as the second round of the Ann7 convenience poll (released 3 April) in percentage support and seats in the national assembly.<sup>7</sup> Both organisations are in the process of doing follow-up surveys, and the results in Figure 2 should therefore be treated with care. The general expectation is that the ANC will lose support, the DA gain support and the EFF becomes the third or fourth largest party in parliament. Some smaller parties such as the UDM, the IFP and possibly COPE could become regional parties.


This would be a parliament dominated by the ANC with about three times more representatives than the official opposition, and able to defeat any initiative should it enforce party discipline and wish to do so.

The noise surrounding the EFF reflects a populist appeal built around the media image of its leader. Both polls forecast that the EFF will become the third largest party in parliament, although significantly smaller than the official opposition. Its growth thereafter may be quite limited. Its appeal is heavily dependent upon the personal fortunes of Julius Malema, who may be barred from holding public office following due legal process. In addition, the appeal and impact of EFF parliamentarians may be negated by their lack of resources, experience and limited ability to contribute to the myriad of committees that conduct the actual work of parliament. Furthermore, in the longer term, 'survey data repeatedly shows that South African voters are repelled by exclusionary parties, and often prefer to vote for parties that they perceive are broadly representative, especially of race'.<sup>9</sup> The origin of the EFF

Figure 2 Ipsos and Ann7 survey results

| Party        | Percentage of voters |            | Seats      |            |
|--------------|----------------------|------------|------------|------------|
|              | Ipsos                | Ann7       | Ipsos      | Ann7       |
| ANC          | 66                   | 64         | 265        | 248        |
| DA           | 23                   | 19         | 92         | 76         |
| EFF          | 4                    | 5          | 15         | 20         |
| COPE         | 1                    | 4          | 3          | 20         |
| IFP          | 1                    | 4          | 5          | 16         |
| Agang        | 0,4                  | 0          | 2          | 0          |
| Others       | 5                    | 4          | 19         | 20         |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>100</b>           | <b>100</b> | <b>400</b> | <b>400</b> |

Figure 3 Seats in the national assembly and provincial control in 2029 under the 'Bafana Bafana' scenario



lies in lack of opportunity within the ruling party and the potential for collaboration with and eventual absorption by the ANC is ever present.

### 'BAFANA BAFANA' – MUDDLING ALONG

The nation's current development pathway, called 'Bafana Bafana' in the earlier ISS paper (after the beleaguered national soccer team), is essentially the story of a perennial underachiever. Things get better but the country never succeeds in breaking free from the limits of moderate economic growth, inequality and poverty.

The forecast for the South African economy under the 'Bafana Bafana' scenario is that it grows at an average rate of 3,8 per cent per year up to 2030, but that international investment remains modest and the country runs a consistent trade deficit with much of the rest of the world. Furthermore, the South African manufacturing sector continues its slow decline in terms of its percentage contribution to GDP and the country muddles along. Without fracking in the Karoo that would boost the economy after 2019, South Africans would generally be much worse off and the country would steadily lose its leadership capacity in Africa, and its global iconic status.<sup>10</sup> Amongst many other characteristics, 'Bafana Bafana' reflects a future within which the dominance of the ANC (and voter disillusionment with politics generally) results in a steady decline in voter registration and low voter numbers as a proportion of the total voting-age population. Although none of the existing (or newly established) opposition parties are able to capitalise on the disgruntlement

vocalised in most mainstream media, support for the ANC declines slowly and still stands at an impressive 54 per cent even in 2029.<sup>11</sup>

Under the associated electoral forecast, the ANC obtains 228 seats in the national assembly during the 2024 elections and 216 in 2029, and is able to govern without alliance considerations. The forecast of seats in the national assembly for 2029 is presented in Figure 3. At this point many current parties, including the IFP, Agang, the EFF and Cope may have ceased to exist, with members opting to leave politics, or join the ANC or one of the larger opposition parties. The DA, still the official opposition, at this stage has 144 seats in the national assembly and a left-wing party (established by NUMSA in 2015) has 28 seats. At provincial level the DA by 2029 probably governs in the Western Cape, Gauteng and the Northern Cape, and has an estimated 36 per cent support at national level. The ANC probably runs four provinces and is the largest party in a coalition government in the Free State and North West.

### ‘THE FUTURE IS ANC’ OR ‘THE RISE OF MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY’?

Two alternative political pathways could result in the much more positive ‘Mandela Magic’ outcome, namely ‘The Future is ANC’ and the ‘Rise of Multiparty Democracy’. Both scenarios would see South Africa achieve a gross domestic product some 23 per cent larger by 2030 than under the ‘Bafana Bafana’ scenario. These are the storylines of a country with a clear economic and developmental vision that is pursued across all sectors of society. Team South Africa enters into a social compact to implement the NDP after the May 2014 elections, and despite very different political outcomes during these and subsequent elections, the key stakeholders across all sectors of society agree to work together in important areas to achieve a winning country strategy.

‘The Future is ANC’ sees the liberation party retain its current majority in parliament with each election. ‘The Rise of Multiparty Democracy’ envisions that the ANC dips below 50 per cent support during the 2024 elections, requiring it to enter into a coalition to continue to govern. Under this scenario a strong DA has, by 2029, only 12 fewer seats in the national assembly than the ANC. Both scenarios envision that NUMSA and its allies in the labour movement establish a new left-wing party that succeeds in capturing 10 per cent of the vote by 2029, which translates into 40 seats in the national assembly. However, the momentum of a growing and prosperous South Africa limits the appeal of a party wedded to the concepts of Marxism-Leninism of old in a rapidly changing and globalised world.

The 2029 forecast of political representation is presented in Figures 4 and 5. In these scenarios, government manages to transform the civil service and assume the role of regulator and facilitator, encouraging entrepreneurship and innovation, relying to a greater extent on the private sector as the engine of growth and employment. Whereas the dynamics of competition drives

Figure 4 Seats in the national assembly and provincial control in 2029 under ‘The Future is ANC’ scenario





Figure 5 Seats in the national assembly and provincial control in 2029 under ‘The Rise of Multiparty Democracy’ scenario





improvement in delivery under 'The Rise of Multiparty Democracy', the impact of a leadership transition and party reforms such as an end to slate voting underpins the potential for growth under 'The Future is ANC'.<sup>12</sup>

Probably only Mpumalanga, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal will still have an ANC majority under 'The Rise of Multiparty Democracy' scenario by 2029. Coalitions could govern in the Eastern Cape and the North West.


## 'A NATION DIVIDED'

The fourth scenario, called 'A Nation Divided' presents a very different picture. It reflects a South Africa that steadily gathers speed downhill as factional politics and policy zigzagging open the door to a populist policy response by the ANC as a self-serving effort to retain power. 'It is not one set of decisions or developments that might cause the former Rainbow Nation to spiral down to even worse levels of social violence, unemployment and poor performance.'<sup>13</sup> The South African economy under 'A Nation Divided' scenario is forecast to be around 18 per cent smaller than under the 'Bafana Bafana' scenario, with the average income per person also being much lower.

The South African futures 2030 paper by the ISS argued that the events that could trigger the unfolding of 'A Nation Divided' scenario could have its origins in a very poor showing by the ANC in the May 2014 elections, which would see its support plummet and the EFF gaining eight per cent voter support and 32 seats in the national assembly. The result would be a near revolt within the ANC with the prospect of substantial losses at the local government level during the 2016 municipal elections. Coming on top of the Public Protector's report on the abuse of public money, the pressure on President Jacob Zuma would be huge and his future uncertain. The party responds by adopting a raft of populist policies ahead of the 2019 elections at a massive long-term cost to the country. These measures, including the ramping up of social grants at the expense of investment in infrastructure and education, would allow the ANC to do relatively well in 2019, but again sees some slippage in its support thereafter. The longer term costs of its populist policies would become evident from 2024 with slower economic growth, very limited growth in employment, and higher levels of social discontent. Already in 2017 South Africa's credit rating is at junk status, and outward capital flight replaces inward foreign direct investment as the most prominent feature of the country's external finances.

Having deterred investment to unlock shale-gas reserves through onerous black and government ownership requirements, the country eventually opts for nuclear power, despite the lower energy requirements of its much smaller economy. The ANC still emerges as the largest party in government during the 2029 elections with 38 per cent electoral support, but this is down from the 49 per cent it achieved in 2024. Under this scenario, the left-wing United Front and Movement party has 108 seats in the national assembly by 2029, and this, along with new

Figure 6 Seats in the national assembly and provincial control 2029 under 'A Nation Divided' scenario



entrants on the political scene, keeps DA support levels modest at 29 per cent, translating into 116 seats.

Over the longer term poverty levels increase substantially from those forecast under 'Bafana Bafana' (see Figure 7). Lower economic growth translates into less wealth and far fewer job opportunities. Inequality increases and domestic protests steadily escalate as the country is trapped in a vicious cycle. 'Ongoing labour unrest, service-delivery protests and violent xenophobic attacks polarise communities, with full-blown racial conflict among coloured, Indian and black communities becoming a common occurrence. Effectively marginalised from a closed-shop, capital-intensive economy, poor South Africans take to the streets with greater frequency and in larger numbers'.<sup>14</sup> South Africa's manufacturing sector in 2030 is expected to be almost R644 billion smaller than would be the case with either 'The Future is ANC' or 'The Rise of Multiparty Democracy'.

The results from the 2029 elections under 'The Nation Divided' scenario are presented in Figure 6 and reflect an ANC that, having lost its majority in the national parliament, is only able to govern with the support of either the left-wing United Front and Movement or in coalition with the DA. The picture at provincial level is probably quite muddled (and difficult to foresee), with shifting allegiances and competition between provincial and national elites. The DA possibly governs in the Western Cape, Gauteng and the Northern Cape, whilst the ANC and various alliances led by the ANC may govern in Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and the Free

State. The United Front and Movement could govern the North West and Eastern Cape.

## COMPARISONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

The impact of the electoral choices and policies facing South Africans in the years ahead is perhaps most starkly represented in Figure 7, which sets out the forecasts for levels of absolute poverty under the different scenarios.

It is evident from Figure 7 that an increase in social expenditure in reaction to the populist pressure that occurs in 'The Nation Divided' scenario reduces poverty in the short to medium term. However, this happens at the expense of investment in education and infrastructure, which drive long-term growth and wealth creation. As a result, the number of South Africans living in the most extreme poverty (i.e. below R14 a day, roughly equivalent to the standard of \$1,25 used internationally) declines in the medium term. However, in the longer term, beyond 2020, the failure to invest in infrastructure, research and development, and healthcare has debilitating results. The numbers of those living in poverty come down much more rapidly in 'Bafana Bafana' and scenarios that assume the implementation of the NDP ('The Future is ANC' or 'The Rise of Multiparty Democracy') to 5,5 million and 4,3 million respectively, compared to the 'A Nation Divided' scenario number of 6,4 million – a scenario where absolute poverty numbers remain largely static.<sup>16</sup>

The support of the two largest political parties, the ANC and the DA under the four scenarios is presented in Figure 8. It should be evident that neither a decrease of support for the ANC or increased support for the DA is assured over the longer term.

Various additional calculations underpin the speculative results presented in this policy brief. Previous work done on the potential size of the South African population<sup>17</sup> published by the African Futures Project<sup>18</sup> forecasts a significantly larger South African population at around 66 million people by 2030 than had previously been estimated (although slightly different for each scenario). However, once migrants and persons below voting age are removed, the total number of voters (known as the eligible voting age population, or EVAP) only ranges from 33,1 to 34,1 million people by 2030, depending on the associated scenario.<sup>19</sup>

The estimates of eligible voters were used as a basis upon which to impose estimated registration percentages (the actual number for the May 2014 elections is already known) and the percentage of actual voters. These percentages are presented graphically in Figure 9. Voter registration and voting increase as elections become more contested (such as during 'The Rise of Multiparty Democracy' scenario) and decrease when there is little chance of a change in government (such as during 'Bafana Bafana' and 'The Future is ANC' scenarios). Voter turnout is becoming an important factor in election results.

Figure 7 Levels of poverty under different scenarios (log normal comparison)






Figure 8 ANC and DA support as a percentage of voters under different scenarios



## CONCLUSION

The political scenarios presented in this policy brief could readily be overturned by a number of developments. A split in the ANC and/or an inability of the DA to build on the multi-racial progress that it has made under Helen Zille are two such developments. Another could be a

**Figure 9** Percentage of eligible voter age population that registers and votes



decision by the ANC to recall President Zuma based on the impact of the Public Protector’s findings on Nkandla should the party fare badly in May 2014. These developments could result in a very different political outcome as early as 2019. The ousting of former president Thabo Mbeki resulted in the establishment of COPE in 2008. Despite a bumbling start, it captured an impressive 7,4 per cent of the vote in 2009 and had the potential to attract much larger support thereafter were it not for its internal squabbles.

Other wild cards may also intrude. The much talked about establishment of a worker party by NUMSA that features prominently in these forecasts may either not happen at all, or may prove a damp squib with most members retaining voter allegiance to the ANC. As South Africa’s manufacturing sector continues to shrink in relation to the size of the services sector, industrial workers already find themselves a divided minority. Finally, COSATU may split even further, resulting in the fracturing of labour as a political force as reflected in recent developments between the National Union of Mineworkers and the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) in the mining sector. In the process, the once powerful NUM would be reduced to a minority union in a sector it once dominated.

Changes are also bound to occur amongst smaller parties such as the IFP, which may be marginalised by the breakaway National Freedom Party at provincial and national levels, whilst a current national party such as COPE may eventually only play a provincial and local role.

These examples should indicate the largely illustrative nature of the scenarios set out here, but they do not obviate the utility of scenarios as a useful exercise to frame and inform discussions on alternative political futures.

Although government does not stride omnipotently across all aspects of South African life, much depends on the quality of parliamentary representatives on party lists and, to a lesser extent, the quality of the opposition and the strength of civil society. Given the absence of a constituency-based system, the lack of political accountability within South African politics has a very negative impact upon service delivery, and hence the call by the South African futures 2030 paper for the implementation of the 2003 Van Zyl Slabbert commission of inquiry recommendations on the implementation of a mixed-member proportional system.

Voter apathy is an important consideration that will influence voting outcomes going forward. The number of South Africans choosing to register and vote has generally declined since 1994. Whilst the 18 to 29 year age group represents 34 per cent of the voter-age population, less than half the total, or 5,5 million potential voters only, have registered to vote in the May 2014 elections. Only 21 per cent of potential voters aged 18 and 19 years have registered. Schulz-Herzenberg calculates that the number of potential voters aged 18 and above who chose not to vote increased from 14 per cent in 1994 to 40 per cent in 2009.<sup>20</sup> Voter participation during local elections is typically lower.

Voter participation varies in each of the scenarios, with an average of between 40 000 and 57 000 voters required to elect a single member to the national assembly during the next four national elections. In time, low registration numbers and voter apathy could wash through the entire electoral system, starkly reducing the quality of South African democracy. Against this background, the post-May 2014 parliament should consider introducing mandatory voting for local, provincial and national elections that penalises non-voters, but combines that duty with the addition of a ‘none-of-the-above’ option on the ballot paper<sup>21</sup> that would permit voters to express dissatisfaction with established parties. The potential impact of such a change would be to empower parties that represent the unemployed and marginalised, which is a large constituency without current representation in parliament. However, it could also advantage the ANC, which might benefit from a large pool of passive voters who support the ruling party, but are complacent in their belief that it will inevitably triumph during elections. An opposition party such as the DA, which typically levers additional support owing to the activism of its members, would be potentially disadvantaged, but South Africans will generally be the winners. Voting is the most important democratic responsibility of all South Africans and once the dust from the May 2014 elections settles, mandatory voting should be added to the reform of the current party-list system.

The earlier ISS paper also noted the need for a focus on values and ethics; fixing education; economic growth and employment; a revitalisation of a common and active South African citizenship, regional integration, the revitalisation of the Department of National Defence and Veterans and the importance of implementing the National Development Plan.

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## NOTES

- 1 The author would like to express appreciation for comments received from Prof. Steven Friedman, Director, Centre for the Study of Democracy, and Dr Julia Schünemann of the ISS
- 2 Jakkie Cilliers, South African futures 2030: how Bafana Bafana made Mandela magic, ISS paper 253, February 2014, available at <http://www.issafrica.org/publications/papers/south-african-futures-2030-how-bafana-bafana-made-mandela-magic>
- 3 Carol Paton, Class divide splitting Cosatu will not be bridged easily, in *Business Day*, 10 March 2014, 11
- 4 <http://www.ipsos.co.za/SitePages/Support%20for%20political%20parties.aspx> (accessed on 10 March 2014).
- 5 Collette Schulz-Herzenberg, Trends in party support and voter behaviour, 1994–2009. In R Southall and J Daniel (eds), *Zunami! The 2009 South African Elections*, Johannesburg: Jacana & Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2009)
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Gareth van Onselen and Jan-Jan Joubert, Two-thirds ANC majority on cards, *Sunday Times*, 23 March 2014, 1. TNA reporter, SA is heading for change, *The New Age*, 28 March 2014, 1 and Special Correspondent, ANC blazes ahead, *The New Age*, 28 March 2014, 17
- 8 Ibid. This is the Ipsos moderate voter turnout scenario
- 9 See the analysis of Collette Schulz-Herzenberg, Malema will hit a glass ceiling, *Cape Times*, 4 November 2013, 11
- 10 Cilliers, South African futures 2030, 14
- 11 Ibid., 1–2
- 12 Ibid., 15
- 13 Ibid., 1
- 14 Ibid., 20
- 15 Reproduced from *ibid.*, 23
- 16 Ibid., 23
- 17 Ara Go, Jonathan Moyer, Mickey Rafa & Julia Schunemann, Population futures: revisiting South Africa's National Development Plan 2030, African Futures Paper no. 7, posted 16 October 2013, available at <http://www.issafrica.org/futures/publications/papers/population-futures-revisiting-south-africas-national-development-plan-2030>
- 18 The African Futures project is a partnership between the ISS and the Frederick S Pardee Centre for International Futures, University of Denver. See [www.issafrica.org/futures](http://www.issafrica.org/futures).
- 19 The data is drawn from the forecasts done within the International Futures forecasting system hosted by the University of Denver.
- 20 Data taken from C Schulz-Herzenberg Powerpoint presentation dated 3 February 2014 entitled 'Trends in party support and voter behaviour, 1994–2014
- 21 Views on the advantages and disadvantages of compulsory voting differ widely. For a summary see *The Economist* explains: Where is it compulsory to vote? Posted 19 September 2013, available at <http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/09/economist-explains-10>, (accessed 14 March 2014).

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