

EU-Turkey Relations: A Visa Breakthrough?

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Executive Summary

In June 2012 the European Council authorized the European Commission to begin talks with Turkey on visa liberalisation. The Council also presented Turkey a list of official requirements for visa-free travel, known as a “visa liberalisation roadmap.” On 16 December 2013, Turkey accepted the EU’s roadmap. The process of implementing it will require vital reforms such as improving its border management, establishing an asylum system, and improving its human rights record. Visa liberalisation holds out a promise of restoring trust between the EU and Turkey, unlike any other measure that might be implemented in the coming years. Progress towards visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens would create a win-win situation, it would be good for Turkish students and businesspeople, and tourism from Turkey could provide a boost to European economies. By 2015, Turkish citizens might be able to travel to 30 EU member states and Schengen countries without a visa. This would be the most important breakthrough in EU-Turkey relations since the launch of EU accession talks in 2005.

In June 2012 the European Council authorized the European Commission to begin talks with Turkey on visa liberalisation.¹ The Council also presented Turkey a list of official requirements for visa-free travel, known as a “visa liberalisation roadmap.”

On 24 September 2013, the European Court of Justice delivered a judgment² that made clear to everyone in Ankara that the only realistic way for Turks to obtain visa-free travel was to successfully complete the visa liberalisation process. The issue at stake before the court was visa-free access to EU countries for Turkish citizens based on rights emanating from the Association Agreement with the EU. At the centre of this court case was Leyla Demirkan, a 20-year old Turkish woman who had asked the German consulate in Ankara in October 2007 for a visa. Her request was denied. She went to court, arguing that Germany’s visa requirement for Turkish citizens was illegal. The European Court of Justice rejected her claim. This ruling made it clear that the abolition of the visa requirement will not be achieved through court rulings.

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1 Council of the European Union, *Council conclusions on developing cooperation with Turkey in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs*, 21 June 2012, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/lsa/131103.pdf.

2 Court of Justice of the European Union, *Judgment in case Leyla Ecm Demirkan v Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (C-221/11), 24 September 2013, <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?cid=38014>.

On 16 December 2013, Turkey accepted the EU’s roadmap.³ The process of implementing it will require vital reforms: among other things Turkey will have to improve its border management, establish an asylum system in line with international standards and improve its human rights record. Once these conditions are met, the European Commission will submit a proposal to the Council to take Turkey off the list of countries that require a Schengen visa.

Visa liberalisation holds out a promise of restoring trust between the EU and Turkey, unlike any other measure that might be implemented in the coming years. As Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stated in December 2013 visa-free travel could trigger “a psychological revolution [...] In Europe, the way they look at Turkey will change, and in Turkey, the way they look at Europe will change.”⁴

But will the visa liberalisation process succeed? Will Turkey carry out the required reforms? And if it does, will the EU keep its word and treat Turkey fairly?

Why Visa Liberalisation Matters

In 1963, more than half a century ago, Turkey and the EU signed an Association Agreement. In the half century since then the European continent has seen dramatic change. Regimes have collapsed (fascist, communist, military dictatorships); states have disappeared; borders have been redrawn across Europe. In 1963 a majority of Turks, and a large majority of Turkish women, was illiterate. The total population was less than 30 million. The average life expectancy stood at 48 years. By 2010 it had risen to 74 years.

Throughout this half century the bonds created in 1963 have remained solid. However, today this relationship clearly suffers from deep distrust. A central policy question for the future of EU-Turkey relations is the question what “Europe” means to a new generation of Turks, the 31 million young people below age 24 in one of Europe’s youngest nations? This is a generation coming of age after the end of the Cold War. It does not remember the days when ties between Turkey and the West were based on fears of a common Soviet enemy. How much life, how much promise will there be in that relationship looking forward?

3 European Commission, *Cecilia Malmström signs the Readmission Agreement and launches the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue with Turkey* (IP/13/1259), 16 December 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1259_en.htm. See also: *First Meeting of the EU-Turkey Visa Liberalization Dialogue. Agreed Minutes*, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/agreed%20minutes%20ve%20annotated%20roadmap.pdf>.

4 Cited in ESI, *Why a EU visa liberalisation process for Turkey is in both the EU’s and Turkey’s interest*, <http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=446>.

Today Turkey has a population of 76 million people whose median age is 30 years (the median age of the EU-27 is 42). This young generation is the most educated in Turkey's history. 20 million Turks attend school; 3.5 million go to university. The number of pupils attending Turkish secondary schools has doubled in one decade. And yet it is this generation that suffers most from the visa requirement.⁵

During research the European Stability Initiative (ESI) has come across recent cases when even Turkish students who had been accepted for Erasmus programs at EU universities were denied a Schengen visa.⁶ The visa requirement also blocks young Turks from simply taking a budget flight or packing a backpack to join the EU-inter-rail generation and explore the EU. It poses problems for entrepreneurs, Turks as well as EU businesspeople, who have invested in Turkey and have Turkish employees. While Turks today travel abroad more than ever before, the most striking increases in terms of destination in the past decade were to Georgia, Syria (before the war), Azerbaijan and East Asia. In the EU only Greece and Italy saw similar increases in the number of Turkish tourists (see Annexes: Table 1). It is not a coincidence that both of these countries also have visa application rejection rates in Turkey of 1 percent or less.⁷

The European Union's Erasmus exchange program, the biggest university exchange program in the world, also shows much untapped potential for contacts. Turkey joined it in 2004. Since then the number of Turkish students spending from 3 to 12 months at another European university has gone from 1,100 to 10,100 in six years. However, while the trend is positive, the potential for further exchange is huge. The number of Turkish Erasmus students is just one third of the number of German Erasmus students, and much lower than the number of Erasmus students from (much smaller) Poland⁸ (see Annexes: Table 2).

Of course it is not only students who have limited contacts with their European counterparts: this is true for a whole generation of young Turks, who have no personal experience of the EU. A recent survey found that only one in ten young Turks (age 15 to 29) ever left the country.⁹ Even in Istanbul only 13 per cent of young Turks have been abroad. Twice as many young men than women travelled. And those who travel mostly go to neighbouring, non-EU countries.

The EU understood that for citizens from Poland or Bulgaria to believe in a common European future, they had to be able to travel freely. In 2009, the European Parliament marked the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Iron Curtain with a debate among 20-year olds from across the EU. "What does Europe mean to you?", the participants were asked. "Freedom to travel" was the most popular response.¹⁰ It is an issue of huge importance for the future EU-Turkey relations that young Turks can give a similar answer soon.

Why Visa Liberalisation is Realistic

In 1991, the EU lifted the visa requirement for Polish citizens travelling to Schengen countries. In 2001 and 2002, it abolished it for Bulgarians and Romanians. In 2009, it was time for Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. In 2010, visa-free travel arrived for citizens of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Annexes: Table 3). In 2014 Moldovans will also be able to travel visa free to the EU. Georgia is hoping to achieve the same one year later. Since 2008 visa liberalisation has been both one of the boldest and the most successful EU policy in its neighbourhood.

5 More on this: ESI, *Happy Anniversary? EU-Turkey relations at age 50 - An appeal*, 12 September 2013, p. 6, <http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/Happy%20Anniversary%20-%20EU-Turkey%20relations%20at%20age%2050%20-%20An%20appeal%20-%2012%20September%202013.pdf>.

6 Ibidem.

7 ESI, *Facts and figures related to visa-free travel for Turkey. Background reader*, 15 June 2012, <http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/Turkey%20-%20Facts%20and%20figures%20related%20to%20visa-free%20travel%20for%20Turkey%20-%2015%20June%202012.pdf>.

8 ESI, *Happy Anniversary? EU-Turkey relations at age 50 - An appeal*, cit., p. 5.

9 Ibidem, p. 6.

10 ESI, *Cutting the Visa Knot. How Turks can travel freely to Europe*, 21 May 2013, p. 2, http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=139.



If one tries to understand why this is so one has to take a closer look at the interests behind and the design of this process. Until now it was always very similar. In 2008, when the EU launched a visa liberalisation process for five Western Balkans states, each of them received a "visa roadmap" with close to 50 specific and demanding conditions. Balkan leaders also received a clear promise that they would be treated fairly.¹¹ The EU then monitored progress at every step, sending many fact-finding missions to the field. These missions were led by the European Commission, but also included experts from EU member states. When countries fulfilled the EU's conditions (ranging from passport security to improved border control to intensified police cooperation with the EU) in 2009 and 2010, it was easy to verify this, and even sceptical member states were convinced. Then the visa requirement was lifted.

This process was always based on the recognition of mutual interests, including the interest on the part of the EU to have credible partners to help it protect its own security and borders. The countries which wanted visa free travel contributed to making Europe as a whole safer.

Starting with the Balkans the process of assessing progress has also been designed in a robust manner. It was vital for its success that it was merit-based, strict but fair. As the ESI Schengen White List Project advisory board, chaired by former Italian Prime Minister Giuliano Amato, wrote in 2008 about the process:

The EU's conditions are demanding. To meet them requires money and effort. But their fulfilment will make the whole of Europe, not just the Western Balkans, safer. Having well-secured borders, regulated asylum procedures, forgery-proof passports and police structures able to cooperate with law enforcement agencies throughout Europe is a good in itself. It is cooperation, not exclusion, which works best in fighting organised crime and illegal migration [...] We call on leaders in the Western Balkans to carry out the required reforms. We are glad to see civil society in the region increase efforts to monitor progress. We call on EU leaders and institutions to take this process seriously. The EU must not postpone rewarding countries that have made serious efforts to meet its demanding conditions. It is appropriate for the EU to be strict; it is incumbent upon it to be fair.¹²

The success of the reform process also required that it be transparent. The citizens of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia had to know what had been asked of their governments in order to hold them accountable for progress (or lack thereof). The European public deserved to know about the far-reaching reforms that the countries are undertaking in order to keep the EU safe and to prevent illegal migration, organised crime and terrorism. The process itself became more credible and resistant to

11 Gerald Knaus, "The time is now: changing EU visa policy on Turkey", in *ESI Newsletter*, No. 2/2012 (13 March 2012), http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=67&newsletter_ID=57.

12 ESI, *Strict but fair. The Declaration*, 19 March 2009, <http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=343>.

manipulation as a result.¹³

What Turkey Brings to the Table

There are many areas where the EU has security interests that a roadmap process for Turkey would help address, and where Turkey can help the EU immediately. One such area is reducing irregular migration to the EU via Turkey's land and maritime borders. The other is readmission of irregular third-country migrants who reach the EU through Turkey.

The visa roadmap suggests a host of measures aimed at achieving "a significant and sustained reduction of the number of persons managing to illegally cross the Turkish borders either for entering or for exiting Turkey." These range from deploying more and better-trained border guards and modern equipment at the borders to improving border controls and working closely with Frontex, the EU's border agency.

Turkey has already begun to make serious efforts in 2012. In 2011 - between September and December - 26,500 irregular migrants were detected crossing the land border. In 2012 the number was only 500.¹⁴ Since then this trend has continued. This also has profound implications for the second area where Turkey can help the EU: readmission of third-country nationals. If fewer migrants cross Turkey en route to the EU, there are also fewer that Turkey would have to take back. If Turkey continues to cooperate with both Frontex and Greece, the numbers are bound to remain significantly lower than between 2008 and 2011.

Concerning readmission, although Turkey has now signed a readmission agreement, even if it ratifies it now it is under no legal obligation to take back third-country nationals for three years. There are in fact very good reasons to believe that requests for readmission of third-country nationals would turn out to be far less frequent than many sceptics in Turkey suggested during debates in recent years.

In February 2011 the European Commission presented an evaluation of all twelve readmission agreements then in force with the EU.¹⁵ It concluded that, leaving out Ukraine, a total of only 91 applications were filed under all the readmission agreements. The reason is that some member states, as a matter of policy, only send migrants back to their countries of origin, and never to their countries of transit. The study concluded that "the third-country national clause is actually rarely used by member states, even with transit countries like the Western Balkans."¹⁶ As for Ukraine, the experience is also telling. Like Turkey, Ukraine has been a major transit country for irregular migrants. It concluded a readmission agreement with the EU, which entered into force on 1 January 2008 and which stipulated a two-year transitional period concerning the return of third-country nationals. Many Ukrainians were alarmed, convinced that the readmission agreement would "turn Ukraine into a storehouse for illegal migrants," as one tabloid wrote.¹⁷ Just before the transitional period expired, a nationalist party leader called the agreement "a crime against the nation." Experts estimate that just the first wave of migrants that will be sent to Ukraine immediately after 1 January will reach 150,000 people," he warned.¹⁸ Reality proved to be very different. Instead of 150,000, only 398 third-country nationals (and 71 Ukrainian citizens) were returned to Ukraine in 2010. In 2011, it was even less: 243 third-country nationals. In 2012, the number of returned third-country nationals dropped to 108.

The only important number of requests for readmission of third-country nationals to Turkey would likely come from Greece. Turkey has had a bilateral readmission agreement with Greece for more than a decade already. Between 2002 and 2011, Greece submitted 101,500 requests, almost exclusively third-country nationals. Turkey accepted 11,500 requests. 3,700 migrants were actually returned to Turkey. However, in the first six years of the readmission agreement between Greece and Turkey, the average annual number of requests for readmission from Greece was below 5,000. With current effort on the border showing an effect already, this is a realistic figure to base assessments on.

It would be a strong political signal if Turkey offered to effectively take back from Greece up to 5,000 third-country nationals a year as a measure of good will. This would be a very impressive improvement of the current situation. What would the costs to Turkey be if it made such an offer? The negotiated agreement specifies that the country requesting the readmission of an irregular migrant has to bear "all transport costs incurred" until "the border crossing point of the Requested State."¹⁹ The costs in Turkey after readmission are also manageable. In recent years, Turkey itself has apprehended more than 40,000 irregular migrants per year. It has deported around 25,000 people per year. It should be able to cope with an additional 5,000 migrants returned from Greece. Since there is no legal obligation under the readmission agreement to take back third-country nationals for three years, it remains up to Turkey to increase or decrease this figure.

At the same time the reforms listed in the roadmap would strengthen cooperation between Turkish and European law enforcement bodies across the board. Among the provisions listed in the roadmap are the following:

- Take necessary steps to ensure effective and efficient law enforcement co-operation among relevant national agencies [...];
- Reinforce regional law enforcement services co-operation [...] including by on time sharing of relevant information with competent law enforcement authorities of EU Member States;
- Effectively cooperate with OLAF and EUROPOL in protecting the Euro against counterfeiting;
- Strengthen the capacities of the Turkish Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) [...];
- Continue implementing the Strategic Agreement with EUROPOL;
- Conclude with EUROPOL and fully and effectively implement an Operational Cooperation Agreement.²⁰

In short, one major reason why it is realistic to expect a success in the roadmap process is that seen from the EU it is based not (just) on political concerns to improve relations but also on concrete security interests. The reforms Turkey is asked to carry out will help protect EU citizens. This is important, since it is EU ministries of interior or justice who have the most say when it comes to taking the decision to lift the visa requirement in the end.

The Visa Roadmap and Human Rights

To recognise that the visa process is focusing on security issues does not mean that it does not also have many other dimensions. One of the most important concerns human rights. Among the conditions listed in the Turkish visa liberalisation roadmap are these:

Revise - in line with the ECHR and with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law, the EU acquis and EU Member States practices - the legal framework as regards organised crime and terrorism, as well as its interpretation by the courts and by the

13 Gerald Knaus, "The EU is not a Belgian company' and other European visa stories", in *ESI Newsletter*, No. 2/2009 (20 March 2009), http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=67&newsletter_ID=36.

14 ESI, *Cutting the Visa Knot*, cit., p. 14.

15 European Commission, *Evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements* (COM(2011) 76 final), 23 February 2011, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=celex:52011dc0076:en:not>.

16 Ibidem, p. 9.

17 Cited in ESI, *Cutting the Visa Knot*, cit., p. 16.

18 Ibidem.

19 European Commission, *Proposal for a Council decision concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation* (COM(2012) 239 final), 22 June 2012, art. 16, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=celex:52012pc0239:en:not>.

20 European Commission, *Roadmap Towards a Visa-Free Regime with Turkey*, 13 December 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/docs/20131216-roadmap_towards_the_visa-free_regime_with_turkey_en.pdf. See also ESI, *Cutting the Visa Knot*, cit.

security forces and the law enforcement agencies, so as to ensure the right to liberty and security, the right to a fair trial and freedom of expression, of assembly and association in practice.²¹

In light of current concerns over the state of these fundamental rights in Turkey the importance of including these provisions in the roadmap is obvious.

In addition the roadmap considers the rights of refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey:

Provide adequate infrastructures and sufficient human resources and funds ensuring a decent reception and protection of the rights and dignity of asylum seekers and refugees; Persons who are granted a refugee status should be given the possibility to self-sustain, to access to public services, enjoy social rights and be put in the condition to integrate in Turkey.²²

There are provisions concerning the victims of human trafficking in the roadmap:

Sign and ratify the Council of Europe's Convention on Action against Human Trafficking [...]. Provide adequate infrastructures and sufficient human resources and funds ensuring a decent reception and protection of the rights and dignity of victims of trafficking [...].²³

Given the experience of the EU following visa liberalisation with the Balkans the following provision in the roadmap, relating to the situation of Roma, is also likely to be a focus:

Develop and implement policies addressing effectively the condition of the Roma social exclusion, marginalisation and discrimination in access to education and health services, as well as its difficulty to access to identity cards, housing, employment and participation in public life.²⁴

Finally, there is the matter of non-discrimination of sexual minorities. In the Western Balkans, as well as in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine the EU insisted on legal provisions guaranteeing non-discrimination of sexual minorities. In fact, for over a decade, Turkish LGBT organizations have also been campaigning for the explicit integration of "sexual orientation" and "gender identity" in the article on equality of the Turkish Constitution. The EU has also highlighted the issue of LGBT rights in Turkey in its Progress reports:

There was repeated application by the judiciary of the principle of 'undue provocation' and reduced sentences due to the 'good behaviour' of perpetrators of crimes against LGBTI persons. [...] Instances of discrimination against LGBTI individuals were frequent. There were cases of police officers, teachers and bank personnel being dismissed from their jobs due to the disclosure of their sexual identity. [...] The Penal Code and the Law on Misdemeanours were used against transgender persons in a discriminatory and arbitrary manner.²⁵

Recently, on 25 December 2013, efforts to draft a new constitution came to an end. The Constitution Reconciliation Committee of the Turkish Parliament formally abolished itself. Thus the issue of finding a clear legal basis for non-discrimination - in legislation such as the Penal and Labor Code - remains unresolved. Currently the only law in Turkey that directly refers to sexual orientation is the Turkish Armed Forces Health Ability Regulations; Article 17 of which refers to homosexuality,

transvestism, and trans-sexuality as illnesses (psychosexual disorder).²⁶

It remains to be seen if human rights organisations in Turkey and in the EU will be able to use the liberalisation process to advocate effectively for the realisation of these rights, as was the case most recently in Moldova.

The Need for Advocacy - Following Reform

Once the Commission concludes that Turkey has met all the conditions it will issue a legislative proposal to amend Council Regulation 539/2001.²⁷ The Commission's proposal is then sent to the Council and the European Parliament. The parliament decides by simple majority. In the Council, the proposal will require a qualified majority. No single EU member state will be able to block it.

ESI has outlined a possible strategy how to achieve a qualified majority.²⁸ Turkey first secures the support of five already Turkey-friendly EU member states that have many votes or are particularly influential: Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden. They should come out and state that - if there is a good record of reform and continued strong results from cooperation with Turkey on migration and readmission - they would be prepared to vote for lifting the visa by 2015. Turkey also secures the support of a large number of smaller member states that have already declared their support or are likely to be supportive: Bulgaria, Croatia (which joined the EU on 1 July 2013), Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia. Finally Turkey secures the support of Germany. Under the current voting system including Croatia, this would be enough votes. In this case the votes of Austria, Cyprus, Luxembourg, France and the Netherlands are not needed (see also Annexes: Table 4).

To achieve this Turkey would certainly need to engage in active diplomacy and outreach to persuade a critical number of EU member states to vote for visa liberalisation. Again, there are many successful precedents, from Serbia to Moldova, how to best make this case in EU capitals.

Towards a Happy End? Not Yet

In conclusion, progress towards visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens would create a win-win situation. Reforms necessitated by the roadmap process would improve the human rights situation in Turkey. The situation of illegal aliens would benefit from changes to Turkey's asylum system. So would the situation of the LGBT community. At the same time increased Turkish cooperation with Frontex would help Greece remain in Schengen and allow Bulgaria and Romania to join without further delay. EU-Turkey relations would improve.

Visa-free travel would be good for Turkish students and businesspeople, and tourism from Turkey could provide a boost to European economies, especially Greece. It would above all change perceptions of the EU among Turkey's young generation. If things go well, and both Turkey and the EU do what they have committed to do, Turkish citizens might be able to travel to 30 EU member states and Schengen countries by the end of 2015 without a visa. This would be the most important breakthrough in EU-Turkey relations since the launch of EU accession talks in 2005. Considering its direct impact on millions of Turkish citizens it would rival the impact of the Customs

26 In January 2013, a review of the Turkish Armed Forces' disciplinary system "defined homosexuality as 'unnatural' and envisaged that 'morally indecent' personnel would be discharged. [...] In addition, the military's Medical Competence Regulation continued to refer to homosexuality and trans-sexuality as illnesses". European Commission, *Turkey 2013 progress report*, cit.

27 European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders ..., 15 March 2001, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=celex:32001r0539:en:not>.

28 ESI, *How Turkey can get on the Visa White List in Seven Steps. Background Paper*, 21 March 2012, <http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI%20Ankara%20Paper%20II%20-%20Turkey%20and%20the%20Visa%20White%20List%20in%20seven%20steps%20-%2021%20March%202012.pdf>.

21 European Commission, *Roadmap Towards a Visa-Free Regime with Turkey*, cit.

22 Ibidem.

23 Ibidem.

24 Ibidem.

25 European Commission, *Turkey 2013 progress report (SWD(2013) 417 final)*, 16 October 2013, p. 59, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=celex:52013sc0417:en:not>.

Union concluded between Turkey and the EU in 1995. It is hard to exaggerate the potential importance of this process.

However, until this happens it will be necessary to mobilise a large number of people and institutions. Much will depend on the Turkish government, its focus and reform efforts; but the role of the political opposition and civil society, pushing the government to take the

roadmap seriously while supporting needed reform efforts, will also matter. A lot will then depend on the communication of results. Once reforms have been carried out it is vital that the European Commission establishes this clearly and communicates it also to critical member states. Then the role of civil society and the media in the EU, dispelling false fears and recognising and articulating the interest in the EU in this process, will also be crucial.

Annexes

Table 1. Refusal rates applications from Turkish nationals in 2011

	Short-stay visas applied	Short-stay visas issued	Refusal rate (%)
Germany	156,165	141,114	9.6
France	117,919	113,913	3.4
Italy	100,242	99,032	1.2
Greece	62,329	62,039	0.5
Netherlands	41,523	38,601	7.0
Spain	32,598	31,828	2.4
Czech Rep.	18,027	16,728	7.2
Hungary	14,314	14,116	1.4
Austria	13,242	11,961	9.7
Belgium	12,412	10,631	14.3
Sweden	7,860	6,946	11.6
Poland	7,414	7,111	4.1
All Schengen countries	624,361	591,950	5.2

Source: ESI, *Facts and figures related to visa-free travel for Turkey*, cit., p. 3.

Table 2. Erasmus student sent per country, 2010

	Outgoing	Total population (million)
1. Spain	36,186	46
2. France	31,747	65
3. Germany	30,274	82
4. Italy	22,031	60
5. Poland	14,234	38
6. UK	12,833	62
7. Turkey	10,095	72
8. Netherlands	8,590	17
9. Belgium	6,824	11
10. Portugal	5,964	11

Source: ESI, *Happy Anniversary? EU-Turkey relations at age 50 - An appeal*, cit., p. 6.

Table 3. Visa-free travel and GDP per capita in South East Europe

	Visa-free travel	GDP per capita 2011 EU average is 100
Albania	2010	30
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2010	30
Macedonia	2009	35
Serbia	2009	35
Montenegro	2009	42
Bulgaria	2001	46
Romania	2002	49
Turkey	?	52

Source: ESI, *Cutting the Visa Knot*, cit., p. 2.

Annexes

Table 4. Council voting scenarios for Turkish visa free travel

	Current voting system (it can also be requested between November 2014 and March 2017) 234 votes needed	Double majority system (from 1 November 2014) 55 per cent of member states, at least 15 states representing 65 per cent of the EU population
	Votes	Inhabitants (millions)
Friends of Turkey		
Italy	29	60.8
Poland	27	38.5
Romania	14	21.4
Spain	27	46.2
Sweden	10	9.5
Likely to be supportive		
Bulgaria	10	7.3
Croatia (from 1 July 2013)	7	4.4
Czech Republic	12	10.5
Denmark	7	5.6
Estonia	4	1.3
Finland	7	5.4
Greece	12	11.3
Hungary	12	10
Latvia	4	2
Lithuania	7	3
Malta	3	0.4
Portugal	12	10.5
Slovakia	7	5.4
Slovenia	4	2.1
Interim total	215	256
<i>Germany</i>	29	81
TOTAL	244 votes (enough)	20 member states of 26 = 77 per cent (enough) 337.5 million inhabitants = 67 per cent (enough)

Source: ESI, *Cutting the Visa Knot*, cit., p. 20.