Articles
Eduardo Marques

Christian Edward Cyril Lynch
The institutionalization of Brazilian Political Thought in the Social Sciences: Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos’ Research Revisited (1963-1978)

André Freire and Kats Kivistik
Mapping and Explaining the Use of the Left-Right

Renata H. Dalaqua
“Securing our Survival (SOS)”: Non-State Actors and the Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Convention through the Prism of Securitisation Theory

Ítalo Beltrão Sposito
Foreign Policy Change in Brazil: Comparing Castelo Branco (1964-1967) and Fernando Collor (1990-1992)

Research Note
Cristiane Lucena
Human Rights and Development – An International Political Economy Perspective

Book Review
Denilson Bandeira Coêlho
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# Contents

## Abstracts
- 5

## Articles
- 8

### Eduardo Marques
- 8

### Christian Edward Cyril Lynch
- The institutionalization of Brazilian Political Thought in the Social Sciences: Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos’ Research Revisited (1963-1978)
- 36

### André Freire
- Mapping and Explaining the Use of the Left-Right Divide Across 14 Countries from Five Continents
- 61

### Kats Kivistik
- “Securing our Survival (SOS)” : Non-State Actors and the Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Convention through the Prism of Securitisation Theory
- 90

### Ítalo Beltrão Sposito
- Foreign Policy Change in Brazil: Comparing Castelo Branco (1964-1967) and Fernando Collor (1990-1992)
- 118

### Research note
- Cristiane Lucena
- Human Rights and Development – An International Political Economy Perspective
- 145

### Book reviews
- Denilson Bandeira Coêlho
- The Diffusion of Good Government: Social Sector Reforms in Brazil by Natasha Borges Sugiyama
- 161

## Contributors
- 167

## Acknowledgements
- 170
Eduardo Marques

Public policies are produced by connections between several actors, within institutional environments and crossing organizational boundaries, but detailed analyses of the environments in which politics occur are relatively rare in Brazil. I believe the concept of governance could help to bridge this gap. However, this concept has different meanings and has been circulated in Latin America with quite confusing and cacophonous meanings. In this analytical essay, I build a definition of governance based both on local debates and the recent international literature, which can be of use to study urban policies in Brazil, going beyond government but specifying the elements under investigation.

The article starts by critically discussing the uses of the concept of governance in Latin America and especially in Brazil, highlighting some of the most important problems of the existing analyses, so as to forge an alternate operational definition. I then discuss the most relevant political actors present in Brazilian urban policies and later use these elements to discuss the governance of policies regarding the production of the built environment.

Keywords: Governance; urban policies; government; political actors; Brazil.

The institutionalization of Brazilian Political Thought in the Social Sciences: Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos’ Research Revisited (1963-1978)
Christian Edward Cyril Lynch

In this article I shall analyze the content of Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos’ research, carried out between the decades of 1960 and 1970, and in the end
perform an assessment of his contribution to the studies of Brazilian political thought. In summary, from his research there emerged a thesis for the existence of a national political culture; that Brazilian political thought was its intellectual product *par excellence* and that it would not be possible to comprehend the rugged Brazilian political process without studying this phenomenon.

**Keywords:** Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos; Brazilian political thought; political science.

**Mapping and Explaining the Use of the Left-Right Divide**
**André Freire and Kats Kivistik**

This study is about mapping and explaining the use of the Left-Right divide across 14 countries from 5 Continents and relies on the richness of the post electoral mass surveys from the Comparative National Election Project: 14 countries and 18 elections spread over 5 continents. The paper shows not only how extensively the LR divide is used in these 14 countries, but also explains variation across both individuals and countries in terms of the factors determining LR recognition and use. Overall, it is shown that, although seen world-wide, the LR divide (both for self-placement and party placement) is more present in long consolidated and middle-aged democracies and countries with freer media systems than in new democracies and societies with less free media systems. In the case of parties LR placement, party size also counts: larger parties are more easily placed. Additionally, we also show that LR recognition is more socially and politically determined in long consolidated and middle-aged democracies and in countries with more freedom of the press than in new democracies and in systems with less free media system. These findings add to the existing knowledge about these topics because previous studies were either country/Continent specific, or, if global in nature, never invested in explaining individual and system variation across 14 from 5 Continents. Besides, these findings mean that in the long term probably the new democracies will converge with the long consolidated or middle-aged ones, but this is an empirical question to be researched in future studies.

**Keywords:** Left-right; America; Europe; Africa; Asia.

**“Securing our Survival (SOS)”**: Non-State Actors and the Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Convention through the Prism of Securitisation Theory**
**Renata H. Dalaqua**

This article analyses the security practices of the anti-nuclear movement in the post-Cold War period through the prism of securitisation theory. By exploring Buzan and Wæver’s conceptual developments on macrosecuritisations, the practices involved in the struggle against the Bomb are interpreted as securitising moves, in which the anti-nuclear movement is the leading securitiser. In the capacity of securitising actors, nuclear abolition activists argue that nuclear disarmament, under a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), would be the only way to protect humankind from the threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons. The empirical analysis of these non-state actors and their campaign for a NWC shows that, despite uttering security, the anti-nuclear movement has so far failed to achieve the proposed security measure, that is, nuclear disarmament. Nonetheless, securitisation has been instrumental for these non-state actors as a way of
raising an issue on the agenda of decision-makers and urging them to take action.

**Keywords:** International Relations; non-state actors; nuclear disarmament; securitisation theory.

**Foreign Policy Change in Brazil: Comparing Castelo Branco (1964-1967) and Fernando Collor (1990-1992)**

Italo Beltrão Sposito

In this article, I intended to develop an analytical schema to analyze moments of redirection in Brazilian Foreign Policy. The schema encompasses the following logic: sources from national and international contexts may influence the domestic political arena, leading to the opening of a policy window and the rupture of stabilizers, which together may form a scenario prone to reform in terms of foreign guidelines. In this context, the decision makers may opt to promote a foreign policy change (FPC). To apply this model, we chose two administrations that are substantially different as to their international system and their political scope, even though both are considered by the Brazilian foreign policy literature as restructuration periods. By studying these administration’s foreign policies, we tested the utility of this model and accomplished a comparative analysis seeking similarities amongst these chancing processes.

**Keywords:** Sources; stabilizers; change; foreign policy.

**Human Rights and Development – An International Political Economy Perspective**

Cristiane Lucena

This research note provides a critical review of the recent literature on the consequences of development and democratization for the protection of human rights. It identifies common lessons and grounds for further research in the field. This literature takes a series of paradoxes that challenge conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between development and democratization as its starting point, on one hand, and the protection of human rights, on the other. To that effect, several unintended adverse consequences of economic development and movements toward democracy for the protection of civil and political rights are identified. The literature focuses on rights to physical integrity, leaving important questions unanswered when it comes to civil liberties and second-generation rights. The article systematizes new knowledge produced by this literature, translates it into recommendations for research and identifies opportunities for new investigations.

**Keywords:** Human rights; development; democratization.

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Public policies are produced by connections between several actors, within institutional environments and crossing organizational boundaries, but detailed analyses of the environments in which politics occur are relatively rare in Brazil. I believe the concept of governance could help to bridge this gap. However, this concept has different meanings and has been circulated in Latin America with quite confusing and cacophonous meanings. In this analytical essay, I build a definition of governance based both on local debates and the recent international literature, which can be of use to study urban policies in Brazil, going beyond government but specifying the elements under investigation.

The article starts by critically discussing the uses of the concept of governance in Latin America and especially in Brazil, highlighting some of the most important problems of the existing analyses, so as to forge an alternate operational definition. I then discuss the most relevant political actors present in Brazilian urban policies and later use these elements to discuss the governance of policies regarding the production of the built environment.

Keywords: Governance; urban policies; government; political actors; Brazil.

Introduction

Public policies are based on the connections between several actors, within institutional environments and crossing organizational boundaries. These interactions involve conflicts, interests, ideas and inequalities in political resources. Although
these ideas are almost undisputed in the international literature, they tend to have only a small influence in Latin American social sciences. I believe the concept of governance can be key to introducing these ideas. However, it has several different meanings (Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998) and perhaps some authors have expected more from it than a concept can deliver (Kooiman et al, 2008). In Latin America, governance has had quite confusing and cacophonic meanings, some of them the product of an uncritical incorporation of the international dissemination of the concept. In this article, I will build an analytical definition of governance based both on local debates and on the recent international literature in order to broaden the focus of policy studies in Brazil beyond government, and to particularize the elements under investigation at the same time. The production of empirical analyses lies ahead as a research agenda targeted to map the existing local governance patterns and to bridge politics and policies analytically.

The article is divided into three parts, beside this introduction and the conclusion. I will start by critically discussing the uses of the concept of governance in Latin America and especially in Brazil, highlighting some of the most important problems of the existing analyses so to forge an alternate operational definition. The second section discusses the most relevant political actors present in Brazilian urban policies. The third section uses these elements to discuss the recent governance of policies for the production of the built environment in São Paulo. In the concluding section, I will summarize the main elements under analysis.

The Ideas of Governance in Latin America and Brazil – Restructuring the Brazilian State and Deepening Brazilian Democracy

Governance has been used with very different meanings. It is not in this article’s remit to discuss the definitions in the international literature, since this has already been done by authors such as Rhodes (1996) and Stoker (1998). The concept has been used to shed light on a wide variety of themes, and has been considered as a structure (of rules and institutions), as processes (or ways of producing policies), as a mechanism (to forge cooperation or to reduce transaction costs, for example), and also as a strategy, or governancing (Levi-Faur, 2012).¹

This section discusses the most common uses of the concept of governance in Latin America and in Brazil. In some cases, governance only serves as a metaphor for government (Ivo, 1997), according to some international debates (Wilson, 2000; Wilson, Spink, 85x748 ¹ Important reviews have already been made by Rhodes (1996) and Stoker (1998). A systematic compilation of governance uses can also be found in Levi-Faur (2012).
In other cases, the concept means the government of policies which present strong interdependency, such as metropolitan issues (Azevedo and Mares-Guia, 2000) or water management (Abers and Keck, 2009; Jacobi, 2005), with varying emphases on social participation.

In general, however, governance in Brazil is associated with two different forms of organizing government, leading to two diverse sets of results, considered very different in political terms. But as we will see, there are several similarities between these uses. Firstly, they are both associated with local changes in government that have happened since the return to democracy, although under the influence of different global tendencies and of the international migration of ideas. They are associated with the two main political forces that polarize electoral competition in this country, but are both associated with proposals based on strong suspicions of the State.

Public Management, State Reduction and the Integration of Private Actors

In this case, the term governance emerged in the 1990s to designate a specific process of policy-making involving state agencies and private actors, with a clear association with State reform, in dialogue with international debates on State reduction and new public management. Governance in this case is based on diagnostics of State failures and would be ‘fresh and wanted news’, something to be built by specific policies in order to reform the State apparatus, enabling better policies with less government.

Many are the lines which led to this view of governance that sees the State in a negative light, influenced by the New Public Management perspective in Western countries since the 1970s, especially regarding the management of their economies and the contention for public spending (OECD, 1995). More efficiency and accountability in the public sector was achieved by introducing competition with private companies, as well as by importing private sector management tools into State agencies. A central element became the reduction of bureaucracy and the removal of some public management sectors away from political control by submitting them to market control. However, it soon became clear that the mere neoliberal prescription centered only on reducing the State was not going to be sufficient for promoting development.

Rhodes (1996) sustains that the term governance has had six uses in the international literature: minimal state, corporate governance, new public management, good governance, social-cybernetic systems and self-organizing networks.

One of the most disseminated uses of governance is in business administration and focuses on corporate governance – Rhodes’s (1996) second use.
Part of the international debate even questioned the assumptions used to justify market efficiency in new State functions, especially the regulatory ones, echoing neo institutionalism in economics. So instead of less State, the task would involve reformulating the State to separate the role of regulator from the role of conductor of development. The creation of new agencies was necessary for regulating and promoting the private production of public goods, whether by introducing private competition to public agencies or by privatizing the provision of public services. This would demand the construction of incentive structures and regulatory institutions to lead actors, including the State, to act in accordance with public interest. The latter should be distinguished from the interests of the State, and for this reason, regulation activities would be placed outside of the control of political institutions.

In the Brazilian case, the arrival of these ideas also meant the interruption of our long cycle of import-substitution industrialization and the breaking down of political coalitions based on national developmentalism (Diniz, 2003). State reform and particularly policies of public spending adjustments were strongly influenced by these ideas, although in Brazil social policies remained separate from this type of influence, being impacted by policy-specific processes.

The local discussions on State reform were intense, although most of them happened during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administrations, which fully embraced this. According to this view, governability and governance should be kept separate and understood as two different State capacities. Governability refers to the conditions that guarantee public policymaking, while governance should be understood as the “financial and administrative conditions that a government has for transforming into reality the decisions it makes” (Bresser Pereira, 1997, p. 7) or “the capacity to effect the decisions of governments” (ibid, p. 18).

These ideas were especially supported after the creation of MARE – the ‘Ministry of Federal Administration and State Reform’, presided over by economist and academic Luis Carlos Bresser Pereira, a political entrepreneur of these ideas in the years that followed. The proposal included a redrawing of State boundaries, defining exclusive areas for state action and others which would be either made public (but not state-owned) or privatized. The reform managed to approve several legislations, but was not successful when it came to implementation, according to its own formulator (Bresser, 2001). The debate on the reform was intense, although focused mainly on the government’s views disseminated by publications by the Ministry (several of them with the Minister himself as author) and the National School of Public Administration – ENAP (see Araújo, 2002, for example) affiliated to the Ministry. For obvious reasons, this literature was marked by strong optimism.4

4 It is worth noting that there were some voices questioning the effects of these transformations even inside the debate. For example, in a book co-edited by the Minister himself titled ‘State
The reform produced consequences both in terms of policies and political debates concerning the State, but the accumulation of knowledge about the ways in which the State operates and its relations with actors from its surroundings was quite restricted. This was due to the fact that the reform was based on the assumption that the State could be thought of as if it were outside the political system or even separate from politics. Except for the studies on regulatory agencies, this line of analysis declined quite steadily from the 2000s, largely due to the victory of a political coalition which once again placed State reform at the center of the agenda (and of political disputes) through redistribution and economic development led by the State. The speed of the decline of State reform in academic debates reveals how much the research agenda in Brazilian social sciences is oriented by political conjunctures instead of research problems, making the accumulation of long term knowledge a difficult task.

Another line of analysis which disseminated a governance concept close to this in Latin America and Africa came from multilateral organizations, especially the World Bank and the OECD. In the 1980s, these organizations promoted policies of structural adjustments in poor countries which ignored local contexts and political conditions. A generation of policy failures in development programs led to rising criticisms against these organizations, and their next generation of policies incorporated, at least in part, local political dynamics and institutions. Themes like corruption, institutional construction, consensus building, accountability, legitimacy and sustainability entered the agenda of these institutions strongly from the 1990s. This agenda clearly dialogues with State: “Africa needs not just less government but better government…” (The WORLD BANK, 1989, p. 5). Governance is defined in a broad and imprecise manner, as “the exercise of political power to manage a nation’s affairs” (p. 60), although this is associated with the promotion of good governance—“a public service that is effective, a judicial system that is reliable and an administration that is accountable to its public” (p. xii).

According to Moore (1993, p. 2), these ideas, as expressed in World Bank (1992), can be read as “a set of signals intended to influence the thinking of the rest of the world, notably the governments of the Bank’s client countries about what constitutes good government, and therefore what they should themselves be doing independently of the Bank”. Despite the fact that institutional designs and political regimes were out of the Bank’s reach and that these have never been the object of intervention by donors and multilateral agencies, the idea of governance opened a path to influence government structures and capacities. Therefore, in this case also, the term is associated with a set of positive elements concerning government activities, as well as with an agenda that could lead to produce them, by promoting several other agendas of institutional reform. The State is a possible source of inefficiency, but this can be solved by developing new institutions.

Reform and the New Public Management’, Spink (1999) stated that “it should be pointed out here that a more detailed examination of the history of the attempted public administration reforms should, at least, raise serious doubts concerning the optimism and course of current activities” (p. 142). However, the general tone of the debate was of strong expectation and even some triumphalism.
Democratic Governance/Social Participation

For another significant part of the literature in Latin America and Brazil, the concept of governance is connected to issues of social participation, democracy, social control and social movements in several policy areas. In a way, governance here occupied the same role that the idea of *poder local* (local power) had occupied in the 1980s. This concept was used in Brazil during the redemocratization process with no connection to international debates on local power and was used to describe a mixture of decentralization, democratization and participation at local levels.\(^5\)

In empirical terms, this literature focuses on the recent creation of participatory institutions in the aftermath of Brazilian redemocratization, including the creation of Policy Councils, Participative Budgeting and National Conferences (Abers and Keck, 2009; Cardoso and Valle, 2000; Frey, 2007; Jacobi, 2005; Ribeiro, 2012; Santos Jr., 2002). These were sometimes seen as spaces of deliberative democracy, but were also considered by others as neocorporatist arenas (Cortez and Gugliano, 2010).

Most of this production does not specify the concept of governance they are working with, although most of the texts suggest that the definition includes certain government results – “more accountability from municipal governments concerning social policies and the demands of their citizens; the acknowledgment of social rights for all citizens; opening channels for broad civic participation by society” (Santos Jr., 2002, p. 88). It is also in this sense that Ribeiro (2012) assumes that low levels of associativism and the existing political culture hinder the advancement of metropolitan governance (p. 12). Although a precise definition is not presented, apparently it involves normatively defined government results in decentralized environments, where local participative policy-making is grounded in intergovernmental cooperation (p. 72). This could also happen through networks in participatory arenas (Frey, 2007). The main thematic areas that use the notion of governance as a strategy to enhance participation are urban studies (Frey, 2007; Ribeiro, 2012; Santos Jr., 2002), housing (Cardoso and Valle, 2000) and the environment (Abers and Keck, 2009; Jacobi, 2005).

As with the previous literature, the State is seen with suspicion, in this case due to being a source of control and tutelage, which can be softened by developing social control and institutionalized participation. Similarly to the previous perspective, the term governance may be applied only when the policy process contains certain elements or leads to

\(^5\) This use is absent from both Rhodes’s (1996) and Stoker’s (1998) classifications. Democratic governance and participation, however, also appear in international debates, but usually associated with the idea of collaborative governance such as in Ansell (2012).
certain results. But while the former is interested in changes in the institutional design that lead to efficiency, this one is interested in changes that enlarge participation.

Although there are exceptions, the majority of this production does not consider the intense transformations brought about by democracy to State/society relationships in Brazil, except for some references to federalism. The consequence is that this literature thus undermined two central elements—the importance of political parties and the specificities of recent public policy reforms. At least in part, this is caused by still thinking participation and social movements are associated with autonomy, as if their mobilizations were not built within tight networks that tie them to other social actors (including the State) and as if their demands were not socially built in constant dialogue with political frames and with sets of rights and policies consolidated in (and by) political institutions.

A more recent literature on social movements in Brazil, in contrast, departs from the neoinstitutionalist concept of fit, bringing to the center of the analysis the multiple connections between State and civil society organizations (Gurza Lavalle, Castello and Bichir, 2008; Tatagiba, 2011). Having kept a safe distance from the idea of the autonomy of movements, this line of investigation produces a better understanding of the multiple connections between mobilizations and political institutions and could generate a fruitful dialogue with the expanded notion of governance presented here.

Finally, a methodological element must be raised. By defining governance only as policy designs and policy processes that lead to good results (however they are defined—by efficiency or participation), these literatures hamper the possibility of discovering why good results are produced. In methodological terms, this implies the problem of selection by the dependent variable. It is possible to understand success only if cases of success and failure are compared. Similarly, if studies of governance include only the cases with desirable results, they will not be able to achieve their own goals.

It is worth noting a third group of studies which, although does not constitute a debate in itself, is located between State reform and democratic governance and anchors the idea of governance within the political system through the idea of accountability. However, for some of these authors, a strong normative dimension remains in the definition of governance. Boschi (2003) defines governance as “formats of public management which, founded in the interaction between public and private, would assure transparency in the formalization and efficacy of the implementation of policies” (p. 1). This normative bias is also present in Diniz (2003), who, after thoroughly discussing the origin and nature of the recent State transformations, defined governance as the “state action capacity to implement policies and attain collective targets” (p. 22). Governance, then, is more associated with a (positive) capacity than with a configuration of actors/relations within certain institutions. Ckagnazaroff (2009) follows a similar direction, defining democratic
governance as “processes deriving from the relationship between government and civil society in the attainment of public objectives” (p. 24).

In reality, few authors have considered the links between institutions and actors and simultaneously kept a safe distance from normative visions of the concept, avoiding the pre-definition of political outcomes. Azevedo and Mares-Guia (2000, p. 10) do this when they state that governance “surpasses the dimension of administrative performance, also involving the system of interest intermediation, especially when it refers to the ways organized groups from society participate in the process of definition, oversight and implementation of public policies”. Subsequently, in an empirical analysis of the way metropolitan agencies in Belo Horizonte operate, they keep a simultaneous focus on institutions and on political process. In yet another contribution, Azevedo (2000) expresses that “governance is not limited to the institutional and administrative format of the State or to more or less efficacy by the State apparatus when implementing policies … the concept of governance qualifies the manner of using this authority”.

In my opinion, none of these concepts is fully applicable to the study of urban policies in Brazil. In fact, these interpretations have resulted in the dissemination of fictions about policies and about the politics that surround them. There are at least seven important fictions, which can be summarized as follows:

a. From government to governance – Governance has been presented as an alternative to government, but there is no arrangement among actors that could replace government in terms of policy-making (Stoker, 1998), whatever the design. This idea, sometimes implicit, probably originates from the anti-state bias of the two hegemonic paradigms listed above. Any governance arrangement involves large quantities of government and of plain and old State actions.

b. Governance is necessarily positive – This is true only if at least one of three conditions are present in politics: i) political actors should always be operating for the common good; ii) certain actors should always behave this way, and they should be hegemonic; iii) some institutions should force them to do it. Political systems vary substantially but it does not seem logical to expect any of these alternatives in a realistic political world. But this assumption appears in different forms in the governance literature.

c. Governance makes hierarchies disappear, by producing horizontality– There are good reasons to sustain neither the elimination of hierarchies, nor their substitution for horizontality. In fact, against common sense, even networks are full of hierarchies considering positions, structures, accesses and flows. Besides that, actors participate in political processes with the resources available to them and, as resource inequalities have not been diminished by the mere inclusion of other actors in policy-making, there are no reasons to believe in plain horizontality.
d. Similarly, by promoting participation, governance could mean more democracy – the literature in public policies has already shown that depending on policy design, but also on political processes, institutionalized participation may lead to capture from organized groups, especially within corporatist structures, and not to democracy (Pierre, 2011).

e. Governance as efficiency or capacity – Already present in the literature discussing State reform, this problem survives to date due to the idea that local governance is “processes deriving from the relationship between government and civil society in the attainment of public objectives” (Ckagnazaroff, 2009). Differently, Le Galès (2011) defines governance as a “process ... to attain particular goals”. The replacement of ‘public’ by ‘particular’ here removes the normative drive and allows the analyses to find several empirically possible results. Everything may go wrong even if all the ‘good’ institutional designs are present, and finding out whom these goals benefit must be a product of the analysis and not part of the concept’s definition.

f. Governance involves prescriptive or normative dimensions – This use of the concept would leave us free to conjecture about ‘good government’ or ‘best practices’. An obvious observation regarding the first expression is the specification of to whom government should be good to. As we have already been aware since at least Joseph Schumpeter, it is not simply possible to specify a general will or a common good in politics.

g. Additionally, the idea of best practices – Rhodes’s (1996) fourth use of governance – was recently intensely disseminated by the World Bank. Although this idea was not produced by the social sciences (nor by academic debates, in fact), it has been influencing discussions on poverty and on social policies since the 1990s. In Brazil, some authors have tried to develop an alternate concept of good practices (Farah, 2007), which differs from the World Bank’s because it allows several possible solutions for each policy problem. Although this is an important development, both ideas assume that: i) policies can ‘travel’ between contexts and ii) the design and implementation of good policies mainly involves finding good technical solutions. And it is more than established that policies ‘travel’ with great difficulty to different local conditions. In fact, political science has already shown since at least the 1950s that political processes – actors, conflicts, alliances – and local conditions (institutions among others) are the elements that define how State initiatives will reach their end. In fact, we learn more about the functioning of governments and their policies by studying the ‘worst practices’ (and understanding what did not work) than by studying the best.

How do we define governance then, in order to take advantage of the potentialities of the concept without incurring the problems discussed above? Following Stoker (1998) and Le Galès (2011), I define governance as sets of State and non-State actors interconnected by formal and informal ties operating within the policy-making process and embedded
in specific institutional settings. Let us take a closer look at the various elements of this definition.

The distinctions between State and society and between politics and policies are analytical and although each of these fields is associated with specific characteristics, actors and other different elements, numerous forms of connection are present among them, influencing the political process. All policy-making phases involve multiple State and non-State actors who act and exert their influence on policies. The concept of governance allows a systematic incorporation of other non-State actors, but accepts the existence of blurred boundaries (Stoker, 1998) between them.

Moreover, the policy-making process is hardly ever autarchic in the sense of power emanating from a single decision maker or implementer, and organizations depend on others (Stoker, 1998). We have known this at least since Lindblom’s idea of disjoined incrementalism, which proved the intrinsic interactive nature of the subject, predating the idea of interactive governance of Kooiman et al (2008) by a few years.

Differently from very important references in the literature (Rhodes, 1996), however, I do not believe governance is only self-organizing networks, but also the institutions and organizations that surround these actors, as well as their configurations and power resources or, to use an old fashioned expression, the existing ‘power structure’.

Following this same line of reasoning, governance should be understood as arrangements among actors based on networks of relations, and distinct from other arrangements organized by i) markets or ii) hierarchies (Rhodes, 1996; 2006). Although agreeing again with the centrality of networks, I believe this is not necessarily the best interpretation we can have, since networks are present in these other spheres as well. In markets, they structure exchange relations – as a wide literature on economic sociology has shown – and in organizations (including the State), hierarchies are combined and superposed with networks, as thematized by Hugh Heclo and later by the policy networks literature (Laumann and Knoke, 1987). Networks are the fabric of society and they are present in various and mutating forms connecting actors in diverse ways.

Besides that, the idea of governance admits the incorporation of informal and even illegal processes which, on many occasions, affect policies. These have sometimes been understood as noises, defects or minor problems that should (and can) be eliminated, therefore not worthy of analytical attention, even for the policy networks literature (Laumann and Knoke, 1987), centered only on formal and intentional ties. From my perspective, a significant part of the policy-making process involves informal activities and relations. Several of the existing organizational ties are, in fact, personal and informal relationships mobilized on formal occasions but constructed for other purposes or with no purpose at all.
Additionally, a significant part of policy processes involve negative elements, failures, errors and even illegal processes. This happens not only in Latin America, but also in countries with much more consolidated institutions, as exemplified by iron triangles in the US (Fiorina, 1989) or by the difficulties in steering networks between organizations in Europe (Rhodes, 1996). The concept of governance may precisely allow the incorporation of such dimensions empirically, but an aprioristic positive interpretation of governance prevents this from happening. As previously mentioned, it is only the inclusion of these ‘dark sides’ of governance that can allow us to discover why they happen.

Lastly, the idea of governance enables the incorporation of various arrangements between actors and institutions into a single analytical concept, making many situations comparable. There exist several types of governance, something already discussed by Pierre (2011) and Stone (1993) using the concept of types of regime. But the idea stated here is not just the existence of several governance patterns, considering their diverse characteristics. Several of them may coexist in the same place and at the same time, for example, in different policy areas. The comparative study of those patterns may suggest important ways in which to understand how different configurations of actors, institutions and networks interact to create diverse governance conditions. The following sections explore this for the case of São Paulo.

**Actors, Institutional Legacies and Policies**

In the case of urban policies, it is possible to theoretically discuss the importance of four groups of actors in urban governance patterns –bureaucracies and state agencies from different levels of government; politicians and political parties; private companies that retrieve their valorization processes from the production of the city and social movements. In Brazil, one of the most general institutional features to be considered is federalism, with three tiers of government. In the large majority of policy sectors today, federal government plays an important decision-making role, but local governments (states or municipalities, depending on the policy) have prominent roles in service delivery and on implementation (Arretche, 2012). Policy legacies, however, tend to be marked by the histories of each sector, which define policy responsibilities for each level of government. In the case of urban policies, planning, land use control, public transportation by bus, and garbage collection are provided by municipalities, while public transportation by rail, policing and environmental regulations are clearly under state control. Housing, traffic control, sanitation and drainage are provided by both states and municipalities depending on the presence of local companies and concession agreements. A substantial part of these services is contracted
to private companies, which helps to explain the importance of the urban capitals discussed below.

These features of Brazilian federalism give important specificities to the formation of local political coalitions. Differently from the case of the US, local governments have access to relatively stable financial resources for policies in Brazil, as they do in Europe (Harding, 1997). In the large and richer municipalities these come from both local tax bases (land property and services) and federal transfers, but even small and poor municipalities have access to funds from automatic and earmarked federal transfers (Arretche, 2012). So, although promoting growth may be an important political goal (and powerful political discourse), it is not the most common and stable base for elite coalitions, such as in the case of Molotch’s (1976) growth machines. On the other hand, in the Brazilian case, private companies are central for electoral campaign financing, both through legal and illegal contributions. But this may be achieved by establishing strong relations with private contractors of public services and public works. So, urban coalitions in Brazil may be based on land production and urban renewal, but also on large scale public construction projects. This may happen for political reasons, but not for fiscal reasons.

Another important institutional feature is the presence of what the literature has called coalition presidentialism. Since the return to democracy, no Brazilian president has had control over the legislative houses, but the large majority of the approved legislation has been sent by the presidency and approved. This has been due to a combination of legislative powers in the hands of the presidency and several institutions within the legislative chambers that gave great power to party and congressional leaders, forging party discipline. Additionally, occupation of key institutional positions in the executive has been intensely negotiated between the presidency and the parties, leading to a presidential model with strong traces of parliamentarism. The result is a strong executive (contrary to the hypothesis of the hegemonic literature), but with its strength depending on negotiations with the parties (Figueiredo and Limongi, 1999).

The role of the judiciary branch has also been reinforced, both with regards to some tendencies towards a judicialization of politics and to the new roles occupied by the Ministério Público, entitled by the Constitution as the defender of so-called diffused rights. Due to this responsibility, the Ministério Público may start judicial processes without the involvement of the individual or the group whose right has been violated. This new institution has produced important effects on social policies.

Although national, these characteristics are also present at the state and municipal levels. Existing studies suggest that in cities, or at least in São Paulo, the role of aldermen is minor in terms of proposing legislation (especially legislation which is not in the mayor’s agenda), except for the approval of major urban legislations such as Master Plans and
Land Use laws, when aldermen occupy a key role in decision-making processes, and when different social groups intensely lobby the legislative. But most of the time, their influence on policies is carried out by occupying executive positions, in exchange for legislative support. At least since the mid-1980s, this power has been exercised through the control of the aldermen over a significant part of the local services delivered by the regional administrations (now Submunicipalities) responsible for small street paving, garbage collection and other daily maintenance services. Recent administrative decentralization reforms have enlarged the list of services provided by these decentralized units. These local powers are granted by mayors to aldermen, since they almost never win majorities electorally, and have to build broad party alliances. Local bureaucracies tend to be feeble in the majority of municipalities, although their capacities are growing fast, in great part due to federal induction (Arretche, 2012).

Besides politicians and political parties, elite actors include for profit enterprises, or urban capitals. But by urban capitals I do not mean collective or individual actions of capitalists interests located in cities in some form of local corporatism.

The truly relevant group of capitals for urban policies is the one that extracts their valorization processes directly from the production and functioning of the city. They include at least three different types, considering their relations with the State and the role of urban land in their valorization processes.

A first type of urban capitals includes the development industry, already addressed by Marxist urban sociology. Their valorization cycles are strongly dependent on land availability and become crystallized in specific locations. Their products are sold directly in the market, which tends to be competitive, except for projects built in very important locations. During each cycle, these capitals interact with building companies and with landowners (and may superpose them), but their profits have very different origins. While building companies seek industrial profits and landowners charge for land use, developers profit from the development of projects which change land values by changing land use. Since land is not produced, its price is associated with the uses it receives. By changing the land use, developers change land prices, creating their profit. The State influences profit rates by creating regulations and planning, but it is not a direct buyer. The stronger emphasis of the literature on the role of these actors is justified by their capacity to transform land occupation and, by doing so, to create spatial tendencies that influence entire regions of the city. In the case of São Paulo, the most important collective actor representing the sector is SECOVI, the developers’ association. Its collective action is usually observed during the approval of municipal laws – Master Plans, Land Regulations etc. –, lobbying for the sector, although the pressure during most of the time tends to be individualized.
Considering the centrality of land use transformation in their actions, the interests of developers are strongly entrenched in space.

The development industry has changed in São Paulo in the last few decades, in part following the changes in the national housing markets. At least three production cycles have happened since the return to democracy. The first two – from 1985 to 1993 and from 1993 and 2003 – were highly concentrated spatially in the expanded center and focused on higher income production, especially during the first period (Marques, 2005). Shimbo (2012) recently showed the existence of a third cycle starting in 2004, with a much larger amount of housing units of lower value aimed at the lower middle classes and constructed by larger companies, enabled by developers’ capital going public in the stock market from 2006 (Shimbo, 2012). During this new cycle, the market share of low and middle income units increased substantially and the location of the projects tended to be less concentrated in the central areas.

The second type of urban capitals includes those involved in the production of urban infra-structures. In terms of production process they have similarities in common with the construction industry in general. They organize industrial processes – combining production factors to create merchandise, but in this case land is not an issue, or at least not a central issue for their valorizations processes. Location is defined by the buyers of their services, namely private developers (who create settlements that need infra-structure) or the State (which buys urban infra-structure generally), and the availability of land is solved by these buyers. As I suggested in Marques (2000 and 2003), the large majority of this market works as an oligopsony – several sellers but few large buyers, which are mainly State agencies creating bids and contracting public works. Therefore, price formation and the quantities and qualities of products in these markets depend substantially on what happens within the State. These markets have, as a consequence, intrinsic political features, and private companies have strong incentives to try to influence what happens within the State. For this reason, political corruption tends to be present.

A third and last group of capitals involves urban service providers such as transportation and garbage collection. As in the previous case, the State is almost the only buyer, repeating the oligopsonic structure of competition, as well as the political nature of the market. Differently from it, however, the contracts are not located in time and space, but spatially scattered and temporally long lasting, and the importance of urban land is low. This creates specificities for governance patterns, as we will see later. Another specificity is that in this case, it is the functioning and maintenance of the city that are at stake, which makes this sector much less affected by financial and fiscal crises than the previous ones.

An additional remark about urban capitals must to be made, considering their centrality among national private companies in Brazil. Considering the historical construction
of the Brazilian economy, both the State and private foreign companies played major roles from the 1930s, with a new important surge in the 1970s. They became engaged, respectively, in infrastructure/intermediary goods and in the most modern branches of the transformation industry (Lessa and Dain, 1982). Brazilian capitals specialized mainly in banking – a sector which was intensely privatized in the 1990s – and construction, one of the sectors in which Brazilian multinationals operate nowadays. This happened at all levels of the federation, leading to a strong involvement of local elites with construction and development companies. A considerable number of mayors and municipal secretaries are owners or co-owners of construction firms or urban development companies, which obviously creates great difficulties for the production of planning policies or the establishment of land regulations. This political difficulty is even greater because land has always been a very important economic asset for local elites, given the historical weaknesses of the country's financial markets.

At the other end of the social structure are popular actors. Social movements in São Paulo were very strong in the 1970s and 1980s and important actors of regime change during the transition from the military regime to democracy (Sader, 1988). During the 1980s, the metropolis hosted important movements and associations, mainly organized around health, sanitation and housing demands. From the 1990s, these movements forced an increase in service delivery, but also had a more diffuse effect associated with rerouting the local agenda towards distributive policies. This is especially true of the development of infrastructure policies in the peripheries and the creation and dissemination of slum upgrading initiatives. The production of large self-construction housing programs in the municipality of São Paulo and in other cities of the region was definitely influenced by (and sometimes pressured by) housing social movements. In this case, these local experiences created new policy alternatives, as well as a large policy community.

Urban social activism also became more heterogeneous from the 1990s, in part due to the presence of other channels of participation and political action under democracy, including NGOs and participation in public policy delivery. The sole issue in which social movements still tend to actively produce direct political actions in São Paulo is housing, especially the Central tenements movements, promoting the occupation of vacant building in the central area (Tatagiba, 2011).

At the same time, the democratic policy reforms substantially enhanced participation in policy processes through Policy Councils and Conferences (Tatagiba, 2011). Civil society organization has therefore been occupying a new role, going from ‘active centrality’ to ‘passive centrality’, according to some authors (Gurza Lavalle, Castello and Bichir, 2008). Councils spread during the 1990s in local governments and in the Cardoso administrations also became present at the federal level, as well as enforced locally by federal policies.
On the other hand, more recently, several national Conferences according to policy were developed in order to enhance participation and include a larger number of participants than the ones seen in regular policy Councils.

This participation, together with the return of electoral politics, signified a very important increase in service delivery for the poor. Investments in the peripheries and the reduction of inequalities in access were issues that used to oppose left and right-wing governments until the 1990s, but presently all governments express the political will to face them (even if only in political discourse). The same can be said about slum upgrading policies, initiated in left-wing administrations but later spread to all governments. I believe this is due to several victories by the left (and the social movements) in a political environment increasingly controlled by elections, which dislocated the agenda towards more redistributive directions.

The Governance of Urban Policies

In Brazil, the abovementioned actors interact in various ways according to the existing literature. In fact, for a significant number of authors, the interpenetration between State and private actors was one of the constitutive characters of the Brazilian State. This lead to the formation of “bureaucratic rings” connecting groups from the State and the private sector (Cardoso, 1970) to the privatization and segmentation of the State or the constitution of highly privatized and poorly targeted social policies. This replaced the “intermediary organizations” present in other countries – political parties, trade unions and volunteer organizations. So, the Brazilian interest intermediation is distant both from European corporatism and US lobbying, involving actors personally connected to State agents. And consequently, the main arenas for political conflicts alliances and negotiations are not legislative bodies, or formal participatory institutions.

However, for this literature, interest intermediation would involve piecemeal, localized, intentional ties oriented towards a ‘privatization of the State’. In Marques (2000 and 2003), I sustained a more continuous, sociological effect, connecting State and non-State actors through networks of individual bonds constructed over time, within policy communities based on what I called the relatively stable ‘relational fabric of the State’ (Marques, 2000).

This is also different from what the policy domain literature (Laumann and Knoke, 1987) has sustained, since these networks could just be part of larger social networks involving entities from within and without the State and linked by different types of connections. The framing of such a fabric might influence the political conflicts taking place inside the State, since actors use the relative positions they occupy as power resources.
Besides that, this fabric would intermediate the permeability of the State to actors located both in society and in markets, specifying the interest in the intermediation patterns of each policy. So, the main arenas for political conflicts, alliances and negotiations would be State agencies and policy communities (and their networks). I will return to this in greater details in the next section.

Considering this, however, how are urban policies governed in São Paulo? The following discussion presents the existing patterns considering the literature. It is important to stress that these patterns sometimes interpenetrate, reinforcing or contradicting each another. Three broad patterns are present in São Paulo involving: i) universal social policies, ii) policing and violence control and iii) infrastructure policies, urban services, large urban projects and land use regulations. This paper details the analysis of the latter, associated more directly with the production of the city’s built environment; the general features of the other two can be found in Marques (2012). This governance pattern, however, includes several subgroups, considering the different legacies and configurations of the actors and institutions involved. Therefore, the following discussion analyses four subtypes, considering their characteristics.

Large Infra-structure Policies and Public Companies

Policies are formulated and implemented within large state companies, with relatively low control from the outside. The decision and implementation arenas are internal to technical communities centered in the state companies. Policy change is sometimes produced by the technical community’s internal dynamics, such as generational changes. But this may also happen through transformations in the connections between the community and the executive (Marques, 2000), although sometimes even elected politicians have difficulty controlling the technical communities who run the policies (Marques, 2003), depending on institutional and political elements. The role of legislative bodies and of collective lobbying is minimal. The main form of access involves the use of social networks by private interests to reach public officials. Their collective interests are associated with the adoption of certain policy solutions, as well as with influencing the bidding processes in terms of prices and conditions. Individual companies, in turn, are interested in being selected for public contracts. When corruption occurs, it is associated with illegal schemes aimed at producing victories in public bids in exchange for illegal private contributions to parties during elections, although in all cases individual there are also gains for the ‘operators’ of the schemes. It is a mistake, however, to consider that the large majority of policy is decided or influenced by corruption. The decision process tends to be technocratic, albeit influenced by both the interests of political parties and private companies. This pattern is
not specific to urban policies and includes several areas associated with the production of large infra-structures (urban sanitation, subway, electricity and metropolitan trains, but also power dams, ports etc.).

This governance pattern was inherited from the military governments, when a special combination of closed decision processes within strong technocratic communities, special private access and lack of electoral controls were behind the expansion of the large majority of policy sectors. This pattern is especially present in policy sectors centered on state companies.

As mentioned previously, I call this interest intermediation pattern ‘State permeability’, associated with the relational fabric of the State and studied in detail in Marques (2000 and 2003). The first study analyzed water and sanitation infrastructure policies in the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro carried out by a state-owned company – Cetapi – from 1975 to 1996. The company was created in 1975 following the merger of two Brazilian states into one (the former states of Rio de Janeiro and Guanabara) resulting in mergers of the existing agencies (in this case, three companies were merged to create a new one). The second study analyzed road infrastructure policies – paving, opening roads, curbs and gutters, minor drainage, bridges, viaducts and tunnels – developed by the Municipal Department between 1975 and 2000 in São Paulo. Therefore, these policies were developed in very different settings regarding insulation, career standards and availability of financial resources. In political terms, while Rio de Janeiro was marked by political polarization and alternation of power, in São Paulo there was a stable hegemony of a single political group throughout the period.

These investigations showed that the relational fabric of the State is composed of an overlap of thematic networks of connected communities including State technicians or bureaucrats, people demanding policies, contractors, and politicians and officials who occupy elected or designated positions. These networks have an inertial character, structuring the State from within, government after government. The relational fabric of the State thus builds continuities that structure influences, alliances and political oppositions and gives unequal access to instruments of power to particular actors.

The structure of this relational fabric results in political disputes polarized by groups associated with the political groups who hold institutional power. As the ordinary management of policies is dependent upon the mobilization of parts of the network, institutional office holders (especially elected ones) negotiate alliances with individuals from the policy community, exchanging positional power (originated from positions in the network) for institutional power (coming from positions in office). Still, this structure is also influenced by the political choices of relevant actors as these connections are built and broken throughout the policy process. In reality, changes in this fabric might be the result
of deliberately political strategies by some governments, who face opposition to their policies from parts of the network (Marques, 2003).

Networks also configure the relations between the public and private domains, explaining State permeability. This is because individuals, organizations and companies from the inside or the outside of the State are connected by several types of intentional and non-intentional ties constructed throughout the life trajectories of individuals. In this sense, private companies operate by mobilizing their own positional power and by exchanging positional for economic power, breeding corruption. However, once again, political choices matter, and the strategies adopted by actors occupying the most important institutional offices affect the way in which permeability occurs.

**Urban Services**

A second variation of this pattern is present in urban services such as public transportation and garbage collection. These services used to be provided directly by public agencies until the 1980s, but nowadays they are also contracted out by local governments to private contractors in the vast majority of the cases. All important decisions concerning contracts are administrative and therefore taken by State agencies directly, with no legislative interference. Although similar to the previous pattern, some differences must be highlighted. A first important difference concerns the State agencies themselves. While in the previous governance pattern policies were produced by public companies, in this case they are formulated and implemented by agencies with lower insulation (departments and secretariats). These agencies usually do not have their own budget or their own revenue, and usually count on less stable bureaucracies, which migrate to and from other agencies, failing to develop a strong sense of community. All these elements reduce their insulation with respect to the private and political actors present in the policy community. A second group of differences concerns the private contractors. The State is again the sole or one of the sole buyers on this market, repeating the oligopsonic character of the market. But while in the previous case private contractors were hired to provide a service located in time and space (to build an infra-structure at a specific moment in time), in this governance pattern the contract involves the provision of a service for a certain period and in a certain spatially delimited region. While in the first case the State agencies must develop capacities to inspect and approve the products, in this case a much more sophisticated capacity must be developed – regulation.

In both cases the companies are interested in winning contracts and influencing the prices and quality of services. But while in the previous case quality was something quite technical, in this case it directly involves the services users – the citizens –, making this
governance pattern politically more important. In this case, a key feature is the relationship between the financial arrangements of policies and the payment of private providers. These may be paid directly, but tariffs and taxes may also be deposited in a fund, together with public treasure funds, paying more to the providers than what is received from the system and generating subsidies to the services (such as buses in São Paulo). Additionally, while funding in the previous case involved ‘investment’, in this case it includes the ‘operational costs’ of managing the city. So, in periods of financial crisis, the previous governance pattern tends to shrink, but this one continues to work.

Community networks also bind contractors, bureaucrats and politicians together, but in this case the strength of the policy community is smaller and the role of external actors is therefore much larger. Large scale policy changes are also more common due to the lower insulation of the community. This may obviously be positive since the policies tend to be more accountable to electoral changes. On the other hand, these policy sectors may also have their key policy decisions influenced more easily by private interests. Due to these factors, corruption is also more common than in the previous governance pattern, although this obviously varies substantially.

**Large Urban Projects which Involve Exceptions to Urban Regulations**

The third subtype involves the decision and implementation of large urban projects and equipment, including urban renewal initiatives and the construction of large iconic buildings, which usually involve approving exceptions to land use and urban legislations. These processes are centered on local government actors, who coordinate closed decision processes within a network of actors connecting local politicians, construction companies, large scale developers and top municipal bureaucracies. In this case, the presence of foreign ideas about redevelopment, as well as of international actors involved in projects around the globe, is often substantial. In fact, this is the only governance pattern that receives a substantial influence of global flows of ideas, interests and projects.

This pattern mixes non-decisions (in the sense given to the term by Bachrach and Baratz, 1963) with specific decisions influenced through networks and State permeability. At least in São Paulo, major land use and zoning legislations such as Master Plans, Land Use and Zoning laws are approved in the legislative under pressure by several actors and social groups, in opened and conflictive processes characteristic of the production of regulatory policies (Lowi, 1964). This was the case of the 2002 Master Plan (the first approved by the local legislative since 1972) and the Land Use Law that followed it. In both cases the development industry and several ‘not in my backyard’ associations from rich neighborhoods
managed to reduce the impact of distributive instruments included in the Plan by the left-wing government. Regardless of the results, the process was open and relatively participative, but these regulations approved from time to time remain as frozen references.

Differently, when large projects are created, it is quite common that substantial changes in urban regulations are approved for specific regions of the city. One way to do this is through the so-called Urban Operations, which allow the government to relax building and urbanistic parameters in delimited areas of the city to implement large scale renewal projects. To operationalize these Operations, the municipal government sells building potential (above the limits established by the law) to developers, in a strategy to capture land surpluses for the State. Although there must be formal approvals by the local legislative, which establishes the details of the Operations, including their perimeter, these happen in quite closed decision-making processes. These projects involve mainly top municipal decision makers, aldermen and developers in decision making, and bureaucracies in their implementation. Citizens and organized civil society actors stay away from these processes, which feed informal political grammars and corruption. Local politicians and aldermen participate in the process, both within the limits of the coalition presidentialism already discussed. On the other hand, the connections between construction firms, development companies and political parties are yet to be studied. The broad future of the city is usually decided on by these investments, which involve special zoning schemes for large areas of the city, changing land values, traffic and infrastructure and employment distribution (Bonduki, 2010).

This governance subtype is also marked by the fact that land is not really governed in Brazil, at least not in the active sense of planning. In fact, the large majority of Brazilian local governments try to avoid the political conflicts associated with the redistributive character of land policies, but at the same time benefit the interests of specific developers. Therefore, regardless of all the increase in participation in social policies in Brazil (which involve a specific governance pattern discussed in Marques, 2012), the decisions about the most important local development strategies remain concentrated within the government and influenced by the same economic forces that were important in the 1970s and 1980s. This happens mainly through non-institutionalized influence, maintaining the pattern of covert action through social networks associated with State permeability.

This has been the case of the decision process that led to the largest public works in the 1980s and 1990s in São Paulo. These works reached around US$ 4.2 billion and enabled the expansion of the business center to the Southeast (from Avenida Brigadeiro Faria Lima to the Berrini/Marginal Pinheiros region) within the perimeter of the Urban Operation. Much information about these projects in São Paulo, associated with the institutional format of “Operações Urbanas”, is discussed in detail by Bonduki (2010).
Enforcement of Building Regulations and Construction Approval

The last governance subtype is the simplest and is associated with small changes and the enforcement of urban regulations concerning zoning, building norms and construction approval. Zoning and building regulations are established by municipal laws, approved by the local legislative and enforced by municipal bureaucracies and agencies. In the case of regulatory policies, coalition formation for approving legislation tends to be very unstable, since it must be based on common interests and not on logrolling (Lowi, 1964). Although regulatory policies do represent a generalization of the rule, as stated by Lowi (1964), the establishment of exceptions is certainly specific and potentially very profitable. Consequently, important negotiations occur during the approval of these legislations, but the implementation of existing regulations involves piecemeal changes in what is and is not allowed, benefiting specific developers and constructors. A great part of these processes are in the hands of street-level bureaucracies and simultaneously involve decisions and (many) non-decisions.

In this case, changes in regulations involve intense lobbying processes (and corruption) of bureaucrats by individual builders and developers to interpret the law in their favor, as well as of aldermen to change specific points in the regulations (in some cases concerning only a small part of a block), leading to ad hoc specific changes that benefit very particular interests. In other cases, the governance of building regulations also involves the non-application or plain disobedience of rules, enabled by the discretionarity of street level bureaucracies. This may or may not be connected to broader electoral financial arrangements, since local aldermen are connected with electoral bases.

Considering the amount of detail presented, I have summarized the main features of these patterns in the chart below. As we can see, the types of issues involved in the decision making process are quite different. In the first two patterns the types of intervention, their location (punctual in the first and network-like in the second) and the contracts with private providers are the main issues at stake. The third pattern involves decisions about the type of project, its location and spatial limits and its urbanistic parameters (involving accepted exceptions of existing regulations), while in the fourth pattern the application of existing regulation in piecemeal projects is the main subject. Regarding the decision-making process, the two former patterns involve closed and technocratic processes, although with higher insulation in the first case. In fact, the fourth case involves just the administrative implementation of rules, but which we know are marked by discretionarity.

In all patterns, State bureaucracies, private companies and politicians are present, but involving different actors, specifically and with different characteristics. Street level bureaucrats, for example, are important only in the fourth governance pattern, and
developers (probably the most discussed urban private actor) are relatively unimportant in the first two patterns. In the first three patterns, actors are connected by community networks centered on the relational fabric of the State, with decreasing centrality of the state agencies responsible for the policy and increasing fragmentation. In the fourth case, actors are connected by fragmented connections. In all governance patterns, the local legislative tends to be irrelevant, except for the third case, when the approval of legislation is necessary, as in the fourth type, but with aldermen acting as individuals.

Finally, location and land tend not to be an issue in the first two patterns, especially involving legal expropriations to allow construction. In the third pattern, location and land are at the center of the whole governance pattern, since interests are localized, as is the distribution of projects gains. The situation is similar in the last case, but regarding only the location of the project/building under discussion.

**Chart 1.** Main features of the four governance patterns of built environment production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance patterns</th>
<th>Large infra-structure/ public companies</th>
<th>Urban services</th>
<th>Large urban projects which involve exceptions to urban regulations</th>
<th>Enforcement of building regulations and construction approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main decisions</td>
<td>Types and location of public works; construction contracts</td>
<td>Types of services; location; service provision contracts</td>
<td>Location; urbanistic parameters; construction contracts</td>
<td>Approval of developments, buildings and reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision process</td>
<td>Very closed (technocratic with permeability)</td>
<td>Very closed (technocratic with permeability)</td>
<td>Relatively closed (approved by local chambers)</td>
<td>Administrative (implementation discretionarity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Insulation</td>
<td>High (state agencies)</td>
<td>Low (departments)</td>
<td>Low (departments)</td>
<td>Low (departments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant actors</td>
<td>State agencies and bureaucracies; construction companies; top decision makers/politicians</td>
<td>Bureaucracies; service providers; top decision makers/politicians</td>
<td>Bureaucracies; land owners; development industry; top decision makers/politicians</td>
<td>Street level bureaucracies; land owners; development industry; ordinary citizens; street level politicians/ aldermen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations between actors</td>
<td>Community network tightly centered on the relational fabric of the State</td>
<td>Community network loosely centered on the relational fabric of the State</td>
<td>Community network loosely centered on the relational fabric of the State and segmented by spatial and political cleavages</td>
<td>Fragmented connections between actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative/ aldermen</td>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
<td>Approved at local chambers - aldermen relevant as individuals within policy networks</td>
<td>Aldermen relevant as individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space and urban land</td>
<td>Not very important, concerning only legal expropriations</td>
<td>Not very important.</td>
<td>Very important in terms of location and limits, but also considering effects on the land market</td>
<td>Important, but very localized in terms of both interests and effects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own.
Conclusion

As we have seen, the Latin American literature has incorporated the concept of governance with several different meanings. Predominantly, however, governance has been used to describe: i. State efficiency, reachable through State reforms; ii. Participatory processes in public policies, understood as local and deliberative democracy. Although these two uses of the concept are considered opposite by the authors involved in each debate, they have several similarities. They are both based on prescriptive perspectives and associate governance with good, efficient, democratic and horizontal government, regardless of the ways in which these elements may be defined.

I agree that governance can be a very useful concept for studying governments and State actions in the region, but only if the concept is redefined. The concept must incorporate both good and bad government actions, as well as institutions, actors and the networks that bind them together. Both formal and informal relationships must be considered, as well as illegal processes and practices. Additionally, several different kinds of governance patterns may coexist in different policy areas at the same time (or even on different levels of the same one). Only if the whole variability of the political processes and institutional designs which surround and structure policy production are taken into account will comparisons be possible, enhancing the accumulation of knowledge about the relationships between politics and policies.

From this critical discussion of the literature, I define governance as sets of State and non-State actors interconnected by formal and informal ties operating within the policy-making process and embedded in specific institutional settings. With this concept in mind, I discussed here the presence of at least four broad governance patterns in urban policies targeted at the production of the built environment in Brazil. These patterns organize the production of policies on: i. large infra-structure policies, ii. urban services, iii. large projects, and iv. daily enforcement of land use and construction regulations. These patterns coexist with each other, and involve different features such as different groups of actors, degrees of State insulation, accountability and participation and specific institutional designs. The importance of the space and location of the projects also varies substantially.

If we travel from the first to the fourth pattern, we will find greater importance of urban space, land and location, as well as of the local legislatives (and their actors). At the same time, the patterns will present less bureaucratic insulation. Their networks will be more fragmented and less centered around State agencies and the relational fabric of the State. While construction companies and service provides are the main private interests
in the first two patterns, developers appear at the center of the last two, although builders will still be present, but with less importance.

This suggests a preliminary interpretation of the issue. Governance patterns of urban policies are apparently the product of different combinations of the spatial characteristics of the issues at stake in each governance pattern (which influence the ‘list’ of interests involved), as well as of the institutional and organizational structures created to formulate and implement the policies (which also ‘add’ other actors). Policy and urban legacies, as well as previous network structures, influence and specify the combinations of the two broad elements cited above.

However, only the production of studies about other cities and policies may confirm or change this analytical description and lead us to a better understanding of the main elements involved in the workings of the State, not only in Brazilian cities, but also abroad. The specificities of each case in terms of legacies, spaces, institutions and actors must be used as input for formulating broader interpretations. An agenda organized around those elements may help us bridge the gap between policies and politics in cities, going beyond governments, but still considering the centrality of States.

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The institutionalization of Brazilian Political Thought in the Social Sciences: Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos’ Research Revisited (1963-1978)

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In this article I shall analyze the content of Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos’ research, carried out between the decades of 1960 and 1970, and in the end perform an assessment of his contribution to the studies of Brazilian political thought. In summary, from his research there emerged a thesis for the existence of a national political culture; that Brazilian political thought was its intellectual product par excellence and that it would not be possible to comprehend the rugged Brazilian political process without studying this phenomenon.

Keywords: Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos; Brazilian political thought; political science.

Introduction

Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos’ research on Brazilian political thought began in 1963 when he was head of the philosophy department at the Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies (ISEB). It originated from a request by Álvaro Vieira Pinto, his former professor at the National Faculty of Philosophy and head of the institute at the time. Vieira Pinto intended to address the shortage of bibliographic records that could be used as an adequate reference source, which would be able to expand the accepted canon of works representative of Brazilian philosophy. In the company of Carlos Estevam Martins, Wanderley Guilherme dedicated himself to reading works from the 18th and 19th century in the rare books section at the National Library and at the library of the Social Service of Commerce (SESC). As he gradually lost interest in the metaphysical themes
within this literature, Wanderley discovered, as if casually, works by several authors who were listed as philosophers as well as others not included in this category, which versed on Brazil’s society and politics in the 19th century. Wanderley then began his “conversion” process towards the social sciences in detriment of a philosophical production (though not of philosophical themes, whether in epistemology or political theory, as evidenced by his production). Most likely, this ISEB period marks the moment of his discomfort towards the prevailing modes for analyzing Brazilian thought, a discomfort that when formalized as a theoretical problem lies in the origin of his articles concerning this issue. Within the ISEB there was barely any possibility to consider past Brazilian thought, since the colonial nature of such past was considered to be an impediment for any consistent and autonomous intellectual production.

It was also during his ISEB period that he came into contact with the works of Guerreiro Ramos on Brazilian political thought, such as Efforts in theorizing Brazilian reality; The ideology of order; The ideology of jeunesse dorée; and The sociological subconscious. As we known, Guerreiro was the only professor at ISEB who called out to the fact that, in spite of a slow process of surmounting their “colonial” cultural condition, there was a lineage of Brazilian intellectuals who, ever since the 19th century, stood out in the struggle for the autonomy of national thought and whose contributions should be redeemed in a context of establishing a Brazilian social science. In fact, contrary to the hegemonic perspective in the ISEB and in Guerreiro Ramos’s argumentation, Wanderley Guilherme’s initial readings at the National Library and SESC were an indication for him that not only was there originality in Brazilian thought prior to the 1950s, but also of the fact that the Isebian theses – considered to be original by members of the institute (especially by Hélio Jaguaribe) – had already been partially developed in works previously neglected by reason of their alleged compliance to a colonial mentality.¹ The claim that a Brazilian intellectual elite existed and that their thought should be studied by those seeking to comprehend Brazil’s contemporary dilemmas set up, from this period onwards, a research thesis and a horizon for Wanderley Guilherme on Brazilian political thought. And thus the gathering of such bibliographic material gave him motivation for more; he now wished to compile “as thoroughly as possible, the social, philosophical, and political Brazilian thought during

¹ According to the author himself, this critique to the ISEB’s self-image was the main content of his last course in that very own institution just before its closing due to the military dictatorship. The biographical information was retrieved from two main sources. The first is the interview listed as Appendix II in Marcelo Sevaybricker Moreira’s master dissertation, The critical dialogue with polyarchic theory in Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos’ political thought, defended in the Department of Political Science at UFMG in 2008. The second is the Memorial presented by Wanderley Guilherme to the Department of Social Sciences at IFCS in UFRJ in the year of 1993 for the occasion of the Exam for Head Professor of Political Science.
the 19th and 20th centuries while also attempting to isolate some constants within Brazilian intellectual development” (Santos, 1965, p. 93).

The new research would begin in 1964 and was to last circa 2 years. With the military coup and ISEB being consequently shut down by the new regime, the regular research would only be resumed in the following year with the creation of the former Rio de Janeiro University Research Institute (IUPERJ, currently IESP-UERJ). The investigation would unfold until 1978 at least, being comprised of six articles or reference essays, which shall be object of analysis in this article. They are: 1) Preliminaries of a Sociological Controversy (1965); 2) Brazilian Sociopolitical Imagination (1967); 3) Bibliographical Roadmap for Brazilian Sociopolitical Thought (1967); 4) The Roots of Brazilian Political Imagination (1970); 5) Paradigm and History: the bourgeois order in the Brazilian social imagination (1978); 6) The Liberal Praxis in Brazil: proposals for reflection and research. (1978). I shall examine the content in each one of these texts so as to reflect on their contribution for the study of Brazilian political thought.

**Preliminaries of a Sociological Controversy (1965)**

The first result of the research was published in September 1965 in an article titled Preliminaries of a Sociological Controversy in the journal Revista Civilização Brasileira. The article argued against the political scientist Antônio Otávio Cintra, who had previously waged on a redirection in the Brazilian social sciences towards the North American empirical-quantitative paradigm. By aligning himself with a comprehensive sociology counter to positivism, Wanderley Guilherme argued in this first article that human and social facts did not only possess a brute and objective existence, just like natural phenomena, but they also incorporated meaning, conferring them with a decisively human character. For these reasons, the problem of elaborating a Brazilian social science was not reduced to acquiring modern investigative techniques; it had a historical connotation that was impossible to be ignored (Santos, 1965, p. 84). Even though he agreed with the need for more rigorous work methods, this should not reach a point where quantitative and qualitative techniques are opposite to one another. Besides, the opposition between a comprehensive and a generalizing sociology did not exhaust the alternatives in the social sciences. The elimination of dogmatic postulates seemed indispensable to him in order to “consider the science problem as a whole, and science in an underdeveloped country in particular” (Santos, 1965, p. 92). Brazilian intellectual production needed to be investigated without preconceived certainties not for antique inventory purposes or for an evolutionary prehistory of the Brazilian social sciences (as he believed Florestan Fernandes had done), but to “understand how truth emerges or begins to emerge from error itself” (Santos, 1965, p. 85).
Considering that “Brazilian social thought” had not yet received any systematic treatment and that the ISEB methodological controversy was interrupted due to the closing of the institute in 1964, Wanderley called for a continuation of the research and presented in this article his first hypotheses and concepts on what he still called at the time the “history of ideas in Brazil”. In his judgment, a preliminary reading of the examined material allowed him to detect that contrary to what was believed by the ISEB, the critical allegations concerning the Brazilian subordination to European formulations was not new: the debate surrounding the “problem of the subsidiary nature in Brazilian intellectual production” could already be found in a “larval stage” in the major debates of the 19th century (Santos, 1965, p. 86). Even though the cultural alienation category was considered to be of some progress, Wanderley Guilherme argued that by separating alienated and “authentic” thought, the Isebians had confused name with concept and reduced alienated thought to the condition of erroneous thought, which did not seem reasonable to him. If in spite of the “alienated” theories, Brazil still managed to resolve decisive issues in its history – such as independence, abolishment of slavery, and industrialization – then there were two possibilities: either these theories were in tune to the Brazilian reality (which would contradict the hypothesis of alienation as a concept), or historical evolution occurred randomly to national conscience (which would contradict the Hegelian hypothesis that history holds a logic). Wanderley considered the first hypothesis to be correct: Brazilian intellectuals pragmatically arranged foreign intellectual products, “transfiguring their original meaning and adapting them to the country’s prevailing conditions”. The Hegelian cognitive apparatus – a prevailing characteristic in Brazilian academic analyses that used the alienation category – was unable to confer intelligibility to the real intellectual process (Marx himself, Santos argued, preferred to embrace the “praxis” category) (Santos, 1965, p. 94). Rather than “alienation”, a more adequate concept to describe the process of assimilating foreign theories would be the concept of “mediation”.

Bibliographical Roadmap for Sociopolitical Brazilian Thought (1967)

Assisted by a group of scholarship students, Wanderley Guilherme sought to define within the universe of Brazilian authors and works, those which could be listed as being constitutive of a “Brazilian sociopolitical thought”. Starting from a research in books, periodicals, bibliographic bulletins and editorial archives, he and his team compiled an ample list of works considered to be social and political analyses between 1870 and 1965; a list that would only be published 35 years later: the Bibliographical Roadmap for Sociopolitical Brazilian Thought (Santos, 2002, p. 259-267). The list excluded texts devoted to methodology; those considered to be strictly historiographical, anthropological, economic,
in the field of social psychology, and works dedicated to the exposition or criticism of specific authors (Santos, 2002, p. 13-14). Selected from a bibliographical research carried out within 45 bibliographic volumes and 23 collections of periodicals and bulletins, the impressive listing of three thousand texts is organized in two sections: in the first we find a list of articles published in periodicals; and in the second a list of books. The two lists are equally periodized spanning three moments in Brazilian political history: 1870-1930; 1931-1945; 1945-1965. The final chronological mark is clearly pragmatic: it coincides with the bibliographical research period (1965). However, there is no explicit justification for the initial starting point in the listing or in the articles published immediately before or afterwards.

However, an understanding of the choices behind these temporal milestones is relevant insofar as it clarifies what Wanderley considered to be not only the par excellence period for Brazilian political thought, but also as to the reasons behind this choice. For both him and Guerreiro Ramos, the study of such thought was particularly relevant not because it meant for a contribution to the “progress of the social sciences” (an expression which still held a positivist undertone, of which he was skeptical), but to contribute to the “knowledge of the Brazilian political processes” (Santos, 1970, p. 147). In other words, Brazilian political thought represented a precious source for explanatory hypothesis for all those interested in comprehending the “political contemporaneity” from the perspective of the dynamics of national modernization (the “Brazilian revolution”). Well, “contemporaneity” began with the democratic regime established after the fall of Estado Novo, and therefore corresponds to the period between 1945 and 1965. As for the “Brazilian revolution”, it had begun with the 1930 Revolution, and one could expect that the more fertile hypotheses on this process would be produced in the subsequent 15 years (for this reason, Wanderley would dedicate the best of his efforts to examine the Brazilian production during the “Vargas Era”, that is, the so called “authoritarian thought”). As for the initial milestone being set at 1870, it is symptomatic that the Roadmap had adopted the same initial research milestone used by Guerreiro Ramos in 1955 for Efforts in Theorizing the National Reality. Therefore, for Wanderley that would also implicitly be the milestone for the period “predecessor of modern times”, which had begun in 1930 (Santos, 1970, p. 147).

**Brazilian Sociopolitical Imagination (1967)**

With the objective of critically examining the contempt held by the Brazilian social sciences towards the “history of Brazilian sociopolitical thought”, Wanderley Guilherme published his second article on the issue in 1967: *The Brazilian Sociopolitical Imagination*. In order to characterize the status of his research object, it was not possible at that point
to bypass or to ignore the dispute that took place during the 1950s between Guerreiro Ramos, in Rio de Janeiro, and Florestan Fernandes, in Sao Paulo, concerning the scientific or pre-scientific nature, respectively, of the Brazilian intellectual production. Between qualifying the intellectual reflection that marked Brazilian political thought as scientific, according to the nationalized perspective on science adopted by Guerreiro, and labeling it as pre-scientific, according to Florestan’s universalism, Wanderley preferred to avoid the dilemma by adopting a middle ground. It if seemed unreasonable to him to consider the type of reflection characteristic to Brazilian political thought as “rigorously scientific”, it would just the same be misleading to discard them “by a vague, imprecise and therefore unscientific designation of the ‘ideological and scientific’” (Santos, 1967, p. 182).

In pursuit of an intermediate category, he resorted to the one of “social imagination”. The concept had been coined not long before by Wright Mills in an article in which he sought to call attention to the socio-scientific intuition that guided the work of social agents, such as journalists, educators, and liberal professionals (Mills, 1965, p. 11 e 25). Wanderley then adapted Mills’ category to denote the particular political reflection produced in Brazil by those public intellectuals, which according to him expressed the series of intellectual representations on political process disseminated within the national public space since the independence: it was the “Brazilian political imagination”. 2 While acting within the public sphere, this “public-intellectual” was not a social scientist, but neither were they a mere vehicle for commonplace knowledge. The “opinion makers” were people who rationalized political events, interpreting and explaining them to the larger public. Therefore, they converted private opinions into public beliefs. The conflicting evaluations on political issues stemmed primarily from differences in in the opinion makers’ personal expertise and personal dispositions, sense of urgency, and the availability of heterogeneous and fragmented data. Besides, the political imagination was linked to both the past and the future. To the past for the reason that multiple previous events were bound into a preliminary rational explanation regarding what had happened; and to the future because the political imagination would delimit the horizon of expectations by which all political actors acted. If everyone would act according to an evaluation of the possible consequences of their acts, their actions would depend of the worldview provided to them by the political

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2 “Here, ‘political imagination’ refers to the type of political evaluation that some men of an educated perception and committed to the public in one form or another are compelled to make. With no time or/and ability to carry out a careful research, these analysts are forced to mobilize all available information in order to offer a rational explanation for their audience. It is natural, therefore, that the final product is an illustrative mixture of economic data, social indicators, cultural traces and political rumors and that the main development sources are political journalists, economics and political leaders” (Santos, 1970, p. 137).
imagination. This is why it was “the first laboratory where human actions (...) are treated as raw material, processed and transformed into political history” (Santos, 1970, p. 138).

By this point, Wanderley Guilherme was harsh critic of all previous studies which attempted to delimit Brazilian political thought. The analysis criteria hitherto adopted were based on post facto rationalizations – such as the claim that all of Brazil’s cultural past was alienated, essayistic and non-scientific; or colonial and non-national. Besides, the interpretive matrices employed – of an institutional and evolutionary nature – was too dependent on temporal accidents. The step-based scheme of a “institutionalization of scientific-social activity” adopted by Florestan in order to assess the scientific or non-scientific nature of an autochthonous sociopolitical work was criticized by Wanderley as being “rudimentary”; considered to be based on an unacceptable historiographical positivism, since it multiplied anachronisms (Santos, 1967, p. 186). Guerreiro Ramos was the only scholar whose work effectively collaborated to the study of the “history of Brazilian sociopolitical thought”. Not only did he abandon the premise that the Brazilian cultural production was irrational or arbitrary in regards to the real sociopolitical process, Guerreiro also rejected the formal-positivist criteria dependent on “temporal chronology accidents”, preferring instead to classify authors according to the inductive or deductive nature of their analyses and establishing a set of explanatory categories in the dichotomies therein present, therefore investigating the leads left by the author of *Sociological Reduction*, correcting its eventual deficiencies, excesses and gaps. But, firstly, there was a need to proceed with the “rigorous (bibliographical) survey of the Brazilian cultural past” (Santos, 1967, p. 190).

**The Roots of Brazilian Political Imagination (1970)**

The fourth product from Wanderley Guilherme’s research was an article titled *The Roots of Brazilian Political Imagination* and its objective was to identify the prevailing dichotomous explanatory patterns within Brazilian political imagination: “The tendency to represent social life as a continuous struggle between two groups of conflicting phenomena is the most important characteristic in the Brazilian political imagination” (Santos, 1970, p. 137). By considering the political literature in order to encompass the 1964 military movement, Wanderley asserted that regardless of their judgment on the event, the authors had a tendency to explain it from a polarized view concerning causes and phenomena. Mass participation, communism, corruption, administrative disorder, demagogy, governmental inefficiency, all of these were phenomena that, while independent from one another, were presented as a whole by those who argued in favor of the coup d’état. Their opponents, in turn, behaved just the same by placing in a positive spectrum the defense of democracy, industrialization and national independence, and clumping in a negative
spectrum issues such as imperialism, ruralism, the legislative power and authoritarianism – as if all of these phenomena maintained a connection. Therefore, what defined the explanatory pattern behind the Brazilian political imagination was the analysts’ dichotomous perception of the conflict (Santos, 1970, p. 145).

What are the origins, however, of a similar pattern? For Wanderley, the dichotomous explanation resulted in a political culture which provided a “default latent analysis” to the producers of Brazilian political imagination. In other words, there was a historically and culturally established dichotomous explanatory paradigm prior to the 1964 movement. Besides the socialization by basic social values and norms, the political maturation of a community underwent the intellectual conversion of their analysts to certain culturally crystallized perceptions, which were relatively autonomous, both in the places occupied by them within the socioeconomic structure as well as in the empirical daily life of politics. This was the main reason as to why resorting to Brazilian political thought was essential: even if it did not happen to contribute to the “progress of social sciences”, its study was indispensable to the “knowledge of Brazilian political processes” (Santos, 1970, p. 147). Therefore, the first and decisive step in this direction was to overcome the scientismist prejudice, primarily diffused by Florestan Fernandes and that impeded “Brazilian intellectual history” to be known and examined beyond institutional accidents.

Naturally, the acknowledgment of a Brazilian political culture carried an embedded risk of attributing a “Brazilian character” or a “national psychology” to Brazilian thought. Wanderley circumvented such risk by calling attention to the historical and “modern” condition of the dichotomous style of political perception, which would have surfaced only by the late 1800s. During the Empire, another type of analysis prevailed, which understood politics as a permanent struggle for power by able and experienced men whose political orientations varied according to the tactical results produced (Santos, 1970, p. 148-149).

By this point, there was a reaffirmation of the criticism towards the previous approaches by other social scientists concerning their institutionalist bias, which resulted in contempt towards Brazilian political thought “for the only reason that it was produced before the founding of schools of Social Sciences”. Only 12 articles written in the previous years were dedicated to understanding, organizing and criticizing Brazilian political thought. These were, in chronological order: 1) Fernando de Azevedo, *Brazilian Culture – introduction the study of culture on Brazil* (1943); 2) Djacir Menezes, *La Science Politique au Brésil au cours des trente dernières années* (1950); 3) Costa Pinto and Edson Carneiro, *The Social Sciences in Brazil* (1955); 4) Guerreiro Ramos, *Efforts in Theorizing the Politically Oriented National Reality from 1870 until now* (1955); 5) Guerreiro Ramos, *The Jeunesse Dorée Ideology* (1955); 6) Guerreiro Ramos, *The Sociological Subconscious – study on the 1930s Brazilian political crisis* (1956); 7) Djacir Menezes, *La Sociologie au Brésil* (1956); 8) Fernando de Azevedo, *The Sciences in Brazil* (1956); 9) Florestan Fernandes, *Sciences and Society in Brazil’s Social Evolution* (1956); 10) Florestan Fernandes, *Socio-Historical Development in Brazil* (1957); 11) Florestan Fernandes, *The Pattern of Scientific Works of Brazilian Sociologists* (1958); e 12) Guerreiro Ramos, *The Ideology of Order* (1961).
The change would have started in the early years of the Republic, with the slow decline of human agency as the raw-material for explanation and its replacement for economic and social issues. For some of the first analysts, there was a need to decide over to potentialities for the country – to be industrial, economically autonomous, independent and sovereign, or a monoculture, economically dependent and colonized. Euclides da Cunha was argued to have been the first great author to establish an “intellectual formula for the political analysis that lay ahead: discovering a dichotomy to which the origin of eventual crises may be rationally attributed; proposing a political alternative for the reduction of the dichotomy”. This was the “basic structure of the paradigm” (Santos, 1978a, p. 45), which would be often repeated during the First Republic by studies marked by “contrasts, oppositions and polarizations” (Santos, 1970, p. 150).4

Within this paradigm change process, the 1930 Revolution would have been the watershed moment by generalizing the dichotomous explanatory pattern and, with it, the conviction that the origins of the latent crisis that crossed Brazilian society should be sought in the unfolding of some contradiction (Santos, 1970, p. 152). During the first half of the 1930s, all first line analysts recurred to the dichotomous explanatory pattern, regardless of their ideological positions, whether reformists, conservative or indecisive. After the Estado Novo, the dichotomous approach returned in the articles in the Cadernos do Nosso Tempo journal and in the ISEB’s intellectual activity, consolidating itself as a reflexive paradigm where the Brazilian intellectuality of a generation would mature (that is, the 1960 decade). Once the existence of “a long residual historical tradition of political analysis in Brazil” (Santos, 1970, p. 155), was proven, Wanderley Guilherme accentuated the productivity of returning, developing and verifying in Brazilian contemporaneity certain explanatory hypotheses expressed by post-revolutionary authors: “There will hardly be among the contemporary theories a good hypothesis on Brazilian politics that has not already been developed during the 1930s” (Santos, 1970, p. 156).

Paradigm and History: the Bourgeois Order in the Brazilian Social Imagination (1978)

At the end of the 1970s, Wanderley Guilherme published the two most important articles of his research: Paradigm and History: the bourgeois order in the Brazilian social imagination and Liberal Praxis in Brazil: proposals for reflection and research.

4 In passing, Wanderley argues that the discussion concerning race almost always had the purpose of pointing out to how the “Brazilian type” was constituted and describing the dichotomous historical formation. But this would only hold true for the “serious analysts”, something not applied to the second line ones such as Paulo Prado (Santos, 1970, p. 151).
Paradigm and History: the bourgeois order in the Brazilian social imagination was an inflated consolidation of previous articles by which Wanderley systematized and updated his reflections, introducing new hypotheses and digressions, and, finally, presenting an unprecedented result. In the introduction, Wanderley Guilherme affirmed that – as it had happened everywhere else – the social sciences in Brazil were founded and developed by the combined influence of the accommodation of the knowledge produced in the central countries and the internal stimulus of national history. Since each country and its subsequent culture acquired “national individuality at the same time in which it is integrated in universal history”, this would overcome the polarization between science and non-science, universality and particularity (Santos, 1978a, p. 17). The different shades of the social sciences in each country stemmed from how each nationality absorbed and transmitted the foreign production as well as from the interaction between national events and scientific reflection. The process where a national science arose had begun with “Brazil’s insertion in universal history”, that is, with the discovery of the country; however, he recognized that given the tight connection between the Portuguese State and the Second Scholastic, scientific modernity in our world only dated back to the *pombalino* period5. The proclamation of independence triggered a new period for Brazilian intellectual development, operated by schools of higher education in the Empire and reverberated by the parliamentary and journalistic tribunes. With the foundation of the first superior schools for political, social and economic sciences, the type of sociopolitical reflection produced in Brazil increased its quantitative and qualitative threshold between 1919 and 1935; as for the attempts to reinvent the national social patrimony, there was the reaffirmation of the thesis that the decades of 1920 and 1930 were a privileged moment for our sociopolitical reflection, and whereby the authors of the 1950s and 1960s merely reproduced with more sophistication. The misconception that during this period a “dawn of Brazilian thought” took place and the subsequent indifference to any previous intellectual production was initially attributed to the authoritarian interim of the Estado Novo regime, which would have interrupted the stimulating “efforts in theorizing the national reality” (Santos, 1978a, p. 23), and secondly, to the overvaluation of the impact represented by the foundation of new schools in social sciences, under the direction of foreign professors.

It was with this point that Wanderley Guilherme presented once again his updated and increased critical diagnosis of the “state of the art” in the field of studies on Brazilian

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5 This narrative towards Oliveira Martins, which attributed Portugal’s cultural backwardness to its jettisoning of modernity by means of the Counter-Reform and the Second Scholastic, apologetic to Pombal’s modernizing work was incorporated by Wanderley my means of the “excellent works” by Paulo Mercadante and Antônio Paim, who were at the time dealing with the production of the history of ideas in Brazil through the broad angle of philosophy (Santos, 1978a, p. 59).
thought. The existing analyses could be grouped according to the criteria employed: institutional, sociological and ideological. The passage concerning the first of those matrices reiterated the passage in *The Brazilian Sociopolitical Imagination* – with only a few alterations in style – and reproached the previous studies by Costa Pinto, Fernando de Azevedo, Djacir Menezes and Florestan Fernandes for conferring centrality to the emergence of higher learning institutions in the social sciences. The reference to the sociological and ideological matrices however, brought forth an innovation: in an attempt to explain the variations in the concerns of the social investigators, the sociological matrix was considered to be conducted by the socioeconomic structure. These variations could be a consequence of occurring changes in the socioeconomic structure (Florestan Fernandes) or to infer the attributes or dimensions of social thought from the social process (ISEB). As it happens, most of the authors classified in this matrix, such as Edgar Carone, would have settled in describing the aspects of the social picture and exposing the authors’ ideas in the assumption that there would be enough evidence of a relation between the two. As for the articles by Florestan regarding the foundation of the social sciences in Brazil, these would have been no more than a series of frustrated attempts from a sociology of knowledge. Even though his analyses were more “stimulating and fertile with suggestions” among those produced by the “sociological matrix”, the revered chief in the *Paulista* sociology had failed by allowing himself to be taken away by the belief that the “mere enunciation and description of the attributes of social processes would be enough evidence to support the functional dependence relation between the content of thought and the unfolding of empirical social history” (Santos, 1978a, p. 28 e 31).

By examining these authors, Wanderley began the second part of the article with a question: was there an appropriate manner for examining these authors who comprised Brazilian political thought in order to do justice to their condition of analysts? And if so, what would it be? At this point he engaged in an interesting methodological interlude by which he argued that there was no given method that could be pointed out as adequate *a priori*: “There is no such thing as a single history of political and social ideas in Brazil, nor of the social disciplines by the time of their institutionalization, which would allow us to discard all others as false (...). It all depends on the usefulness of the envisaged objective” (Santos, 1978a, p. 57). And here, underlying this argument was the issue of uniqueness or multiplicity of the objects of knowledge. If the investigator assumed that there is a single and real meaning of social phenomena, he should, as Hegel would, conceptually articulate them to their temporal development, disregarding anything that conflicted with it as irrelevant. However, if one believed in the multiplicity of objects of knowledge, the researcher should recognize that any ideas elaborated in a given historical period would produce consequences, many of which are unexpected. It seemed to him that in regards to the social
sciences, this relativist epistemology was more adequate (Santos, 1978a, p. 34). It would then be possible to investigate the history of ideas with several goals, such as verifying its impact on the perception of the problems; evaluating the most influential intellectual paradigms during a certain period; examining how ideas were deployed to attack or to defend certain political organizations; or to ascertain its effect on the employed methodologies.

Within this field of known possibilities, Wanderley pointed out two possible forms to describe the “evolution of social sciences in Brazil” (that is, the history of Brazilian sociopolitical thought). The first possibility was guided by the patent content in the published works. This guidance was an important novelty. Up until then, Wanderley Guilherme’s main concern had been to understand how past analysts (his “predecessors”, so to speak) represented the dynamics of Brazilian politics prior to the 1930 Revolution and elevated their conclusions to the condition of a “political science” valid as being “imagination”. For this reason, Wanderley’s previous articles did not reveal an interest in examining Brazilian thought as a set of proposals or world visions by each author – a hypothesis that would lead to the examination of the patent content in the discursive proposals within their respective historical contexts. Likewise and for the same reason, the research had the initial 1870 threshold, leaving the majority of the monarchic period in the background and regarding it as a “pre-modern” era for Brazilian reflection. Wanderley now sought to fill those blanks, even if partially, throughout the seven pages where he described the development of “Brazilian sociopolitical thought” starting with the independence period and based on themes addressed by the works and relating them to the political agenda of each historical period. The assumption was that different stages in the national construction process demanded certain needs or specific successive tasks from the political class, which would then be reflected in the works produced within an environment of debate. Thus, Viscount of Uruguai and Nabuco stood out in the imperial debate concerning the national State; while Euclides, Romero and Alberto Torres privileged issues pertaining to the social organization during the First Republic.

However, Wanderley persisted with the thesis – even if attenuated – that the first decade of the Vargas Era would have been the *par excellence* period for Brazilian political thought. It was during those seven years that the agenda for a modern Brazil emerged and, for better or worse, within it was the justification for studying other historical periods. To his judgment, the Isebian merit mostly lay in the fact that they had practically limited themselves to the development of themes privileged by Brazilian thought during the 1930s. By using the patent content of the articles as criteria Wanderley concluded a narrative for the evolution of the social sciences in Brazil, seen as the history of Brazilian political thought and underscoring the successful institutionalization and expansion of homonymous courses, which had taken place in the previous two decades.
The second possibility of a rational ordinance in the history of this development resided in the description of manners by which social reality appeared to be structured in the analysts’ perceptions. Thus followed a somewhat altered reproduction, although with no changes in the general argument concerning the paradigms on the perception of political conflict – the “Machiavellian” and the “dichotomous”, outlined in The Roots of Brazilian Political Imagination. If the pages dedicated to the republican period did not display substantial changes when compared to the articles published eight years earlier, the same cannot be said of the treatment given to the authors of imperial period, much more refined than in the previous articles. Even if he reiterated that monarchic thinkers nourished an individualistic vision of political conflict, to Wanderley Guilherme it now seemed that only propagandists such as Ferreira Viana could be reduced to it. There were two more complex groups of authors who flaunted different characteristics. The first group – of which Zacarias and Tavares Bastos were exponents – would analyze Brazilian reality by the prism of already existent doctrines; the second group was more concerned with the effectiveness of those doctrines by means of a “sociological” examination of the country’s reality – and here the paradigmatic author was Viscount of Uruguai. This greater sophistication in the classification of imperial authors foreshadowed what is probably the most important part of the article, in which he unprecedentedly inquired about the reasons as to why a tradition or specific political culture was formed in Brazil and which considered reality to be dichotomous (Santos, 1978a, p. 42).

In order to answer his own inquiry, Wanderley brought forth the proposition that in reality all Brazilian political thought (or at least the most valuable and important part) was driven by the need to overcome an authoritarian and fragmented social reality, considered to be backwards for the attainment of an ideal liberal and capitalist (bourgeois) society – in turn considered to be modern. For this reason, analysts tended to present their arguments in a polarized manner: since they joined, on the one hand, what was perceived to be backwards, and on the other hand, what was considered to be modern. Even if the authors agreed as to the objective to be reached, they disagreed as to the more convenient strategies to reach such desideratum. Ever since the empire one could identify the presence of two families or intellectual lineages within Brazilian political thought, which agreed to the ends but diverged as to the means. Conservative politicians and authors (the “saquaremas”), such as Viscount of Uruguai, realized that the State was a privileged agency for social change since it would be the only agent able to establish the conditions for the practical attainment of the dominant preferences and political values: the establishment of a liberal order. Hence the defense for the expansion of the State’s regulatory capacity, embodied in a centralized and bureaucratized State, without which privatism, fragmentation and slavery could be not overcome. Such strategy contrasted with the one adopted
by liberal authors and politicians (the “luzias”), such as Tavares Bastos who argued for decentralization and parliamentarism and were consequently liable to an “institutional fetishism”, by believing – in an anti-historical and universalist manner – that the “institutional routine would create the social and political automatisms adjusted to the normal works of a liberal order” (Santos, 1978a, p. 51).

As one could see, by this stage the Empire was no longer a “prehistory” of modern Brazilian political thought and was converted instead in the gestation period for its main division: the different strategies sought by authors in search of a model for political modernity. With effect, resulting from the consecration of the dichotomous style of analysis, the twentieth century’s rupture with the previous century revealed itself to be more deceptive than real. By underlining the hiatus between the real country and the legal country and by refusing institutional fetishism and disbelieving the possibility of a liberal order without the State’s intervention, the “authoritarian” thinkers of the 1930s emerged as the “true successors” for the Second Reign saquaremas. It was the endurance of an oligarchic and landowning structure that justified the imperative of “continuing the expansion of the regulatory and symbolic capacity of the public power and to further ensure its extractive capacity with the objective of financing the expansion of a modern bourgeois Brazil” (Santos, 1978a, p. 53). Despite their disagreements as to the role of public power as well as other issues, all of them speculated over the most suitable way for Brazil to achieve a liberal order. In the meantime, the national State needed to be strong; and only afterwards could be it be weakened. The thematic as well as the conception of society held by the 1930 authoritarians would reappear in the ISEB production by Guerreiro Ramos and Hélio Jaguaribe, who continued to call for the expansion of the bourgeois order by means of a national-developmentalism. Meanwhile, the Udenists cultivated an institutional fetishism and continued to proceed as the Empire’s liberal doctrinaires, demanding a classic liberal institutionalism, which in that context could only benefit oligarchic privatism. However, Wanderley Guilherme underlined that in that moment the situation was undergoing a transformation (1978): the military regime had created a national scale market society and had reduced our backwardness to a residual situation. Because of this, traditional supporters of an instrumental authoritarianism – them too! – had begun to demand for the emergence of classic liberal institutions. This time around the risk was that Brazil would once again fall in the opposite end, with the transition from authoritarianism to a new oligarchic liberal regime, led by a minimal State, captured by private interests, and uninvolved with the tackling of social liabilities.
The Liberal Praxis in Brazil (1978)

The second article published as a book chapter was titled *The Liberal Praxis in Brazil: proposals for reflection*, and it dealt with Brazilian political thought. It was an essay on the ups and downs in establishing a liberal order, understood as “a certain vision as to how society and government could be organized as opposed to a religious control of society and to the establishment of a public property agenda by any power transcendent to society” (Santos, 1978a, p. 68). The article was rooted on the conclusions found in *Paradigm and History* concerning the near consensus of Brazilian analysts towards the need for a modern liberal society and in their essential divergence as to the means towards such goal. The “liberal praxis” in the article’s title therefore referred not only to the attempts carried out in creating this society, but also to the hardships faced amidst this task. The first part of the article is comprised of an interpretation of the events related to the historical process in building a Brazilian liberal order, destined to demonstrate that the adoption of liberal politics many times produced effects opposite to those desired. The argument reads that the liberalism dilemma was firstly and unequivocally expressed by Oliveira Vianna: it was not possible for a liberal political system to properly thrive in the context of an authoritative, familial and parental (i.e., anti-liberal) society. In order to promptly reach a democratic order, instead of an institutional based classical liberal system, a certain dose of authoritarianism was deemed necessary to crush the obstacles of its advent, still present in such a backwards society. The full impact of a reading of *Brazilian Political Institutions* is noticeable on Wanderley Guilherme’s interpretation, which led him to later reading of Viscount of Uruguai (an author whose work was not featured in the research’s initial bibliographic threshold), thus allowing him to ground the Isebian intellectual tradition in a much more remote past than he initially imagined.

Even though they were described at the end of *Paradigm and History*, it was only now that the two main traditions of Brazilian political thought would be properly named: *doctrinaire liberalism* and *instrumental authoritarianism* (Santos, 1978a, p. 93). Doctrinaire liberals were political actors and their respective associations, who since the 19th century conveyed the belief that “Brazil’s political-institutional reform, just like anywhere else, would naturally stem from the formulation and execution of general adequate rules”. Led by Rui Barbosa and Assis Brasil, the doctrinaire liberals of the 1920s believed that in order to overcome a situation of backwardness, clientelism and fraud, which marked the Republic, one would need only to eliminate corruption and renew the governing staff by means of wholesome institutional reforms, leading therefore to electoral fairness, an independent judiciary and a professional bureaucracy. However, after the 1930 revolution, it became clear that Getúlio Vargas preferred to trail the path opened by the Tenentist
movement. Even though they equally aspired for a liberal order, the “instrumental authoritarians” realized that the prescriptions administered by the doctrinaire liberals would not be enough to reach such objective. Getúlio also realized that the reintroduction of a liberal scaffold would re-enthrone the oligarchies which had previously benefited from this situation during the First Republic. After the fall of Estado Novo, the doctrinarian liberals regrouped in the National Democratic Union (UDN), whose agenda was not substantially different to the one of previous decades. The major difference was in the change of tactic: after the second consecutive defeat to the Getulismo representatives in the 1951 presidential elections, the liberals turned towards coupism, a position grounded in an alleged manipulation of an ignorant and needy electorate by the “populist” forces. Within this context, considered by them to be a swindle of the “spirit” of constitutional institutions, the doctrinarian liberals felt comfortable to impede the deepening political degradation and authoritarian populism by means of an open plea to a military coup (Santos, 1978a, p. 99).

As for the other “intellectual family”, it was necessary to distinguish between two types of authoritarianism supporters present in Brazilian political thought: the first were ontologically authoritarians, while the second were only instrumentally authoritarians. Among the first we can find, for example, the Integralists, who based their authoritarianism in the natural inequality among men so as to justify the exercise of power in the hands of those more capable. Among them we can also find Azevedo Amaral and Francisco Campos, who believed that although all men were naturally equal, the authoritarian exercise of power had become inevitable in modern times. These authors considered authoritarianism to be a permanent – and not transient – political medication for the Brazilian political order, which pushed them away from “the oldest and most resistant form of authoritarian thinking in Brazil”: the instrumental authoritarianism (Santos, 1978a, p. 103). Ever since the country’s independence there was the belief that the State should be responsible for “setting the goals for which society should fight for, since society itself was unable to do so, and attempting to maximize national progress” against the forces of backwardness and parochial interests. Being therefore different from the ontologically authoritarians, the instrumental authoritarians also distinguished themselves from the doctrinarian liberals for not believing that social change could derive merely from the establishment of liberal institutions. By believing that “the authoritarian exercise of power, due to its greater potential for reformism, would be the most swift mean to edify liberal society”, it then seemed legitimate and adequate for the instrumental authoritarians to leave the State “to expansively regulate and manage social life” (Santos, 1978a, p. 103). The paradigmatic book in this line of thought would be Brazilian Political Institutions by Oliveira Viana. After some considerations on the difficulties faced in Brazil for the accomplishment of the instrumentally authoritarian project, both during Estado Novo
as well as during the military regime, the conclusion once again underlined – just as the one in Paradigm and History – the need to group together the ideals of political freedom and social justice, which in turn demanded a separation between political liberalism and economic liberalism.

The 1970 Decade and the Controversy Surrounding “Brazilian Authoritarian Thought”

Paradigm and History and The Liberal Praxis in Brazil became classic texts in Brazil and were used in the following decades for studies concerning Brazilian political thought in Masters and PhD postgraduate programs at the former IUPERJ (currently IESP-UERJ), making their way into other institutions where masters and doctors therein graduated would eventually work. The success in this dissemination of research results, however, does not mean that it was exempt from criticism. These soon evolved into a controversial debate concerning “Brazilian authoritarian thought” circa 1975 – that is, in a period of distension for the military regime.

A first version of Paradigm and History was in circulation since at least 1974-1975; therefore, when it was finally published in Bourgeois Order and Political Liberalism three years later it had already suffered several public critiques from Bolivar Lamounier and Hélgio Trindade. The criticism was particularly focused on the article’s final section, which interpreted Brazilian thought from a shared “bourgeois paradigm”, pursued by both lineages of thinkers (doctrinarian liberal and instrumental authoritarians) essentially divided in their divergence as to what should be the most adequate way to achieve this goal. Lamounier’s criticism came in the form of a chapter in the book General History of Brazilian Civilization, which was dedicated to the formation of the so called “Brazilian authoritarian thought” during the First Republic. Accused of being sympathetic to a “instrumental authoritarian” lineage and contrary to political liberalism, Wanderley had supposedly committed the mistake of incorporating “the self-image of authoritarian thought itself towards Oliveira Viana” and the Isebian “nationalist historicism of the 1950s”, which associated the “strengthening of public power with development and social progress”. According to Lamounier, Brazilian authoritarian thought did not desire a liberal society; it was authoritarian tout court; making for a true “State ideology” which opposed an authentic liberal ideology that had the market, and not the State, as its matrix. According to Lamounier, Wanderley himself belonged to a specific “family” of Brazilian thought: “enlightened authoritarianism” (Lamounier, 1977, p. 382). As for Hélgio Trindade, while he encompassed Lamounier’s criticisms, he focused however on defining the Integralist authors (Santos, 1978a, p. 55). In 1976 he published an article in which the attacked the interpretation of
the so called authoritarian thinkers, considering it to be excessively generalist. Besides, Wanderley allegedly had used out of context excerpts in his thesis in order to reinforce his interpretation of a dissimilarity between integralists and fascists (Trindade, 1976, p. 126-135).

By his own account, Wanderley was preparing to publish a second version of *Paradigm and History* which would contain his rebuttal to the criticisms coming from Trindade and Lamounier, placing them in a section of the article intended to examine the explanatory matrices used by Brazilian political thought analysts. Differently to the institutional or sociological matrix, the ideological matrix was concerned with approaching Brazilian political thought “with the explicit objective of finding its own conceptual characterization independently from the hazards of empiricism” (Santos, 1978a, p. 31). The first representative author is Guerreiro Ramos; here Wanderley would reproduce a passage from *The Brazilian Sociopolitical Imagination* which highlighted the pioneer nature of his work and underline the developments introduced by in the field of study. The other authors mentioned as belonging to this matrix were Trindade and Lamounier, criticized for employing analytical categories which erased any trace of ideological differences between the authors. By equating categories such as anti-liberalism, authoritarianism and right-wing radicalism, Trindade’s work was arguably marked by a “complete confusion (...) between the concepts of authoritarianism, corporatism, fascism, right-wing, and eventually even of monarchy” (Santos, 1978a, p. 30-31). In turn, besides dissolving the relevant nuances and differences between the authors, Lamounier would have created others of scarce or dubious analytical value. In particular, he criticized the “confusing notion of ‘State ideology’” created to examine authoritarian thought insofar that it stemmed from the assumption – in itself “ideological” – that the market model dispensed a normative concept of State; these assumptions contradicted “any serious analyses of the relation between the States bureaucratic apparatus and the several existent social groups” (Santos, 1978a, p. 32).

Regardless of the merits or successes of the disputes and rebuttals, the controversy involving the three scholars in the 1970s contributed to consolidate that field of studies. There was an implicit consensus in the discord: at no time did the parties involved question the dignity of a tradition of political thought in Brazil prior to the institutionalization of the social sciences, nor the relevance of its study for the understanding of Brazilian politics. At no time did they recuperate the Hegelian analytical apparatus when examining intellectual-political history, nor did they nourish doubts as to the autonomy of the political in face of the socioeconomic. Old issues were definitely surpassed, which during the 1950s and 1960s haunted the field, concerning mimetism, the originality or authenticity of Brazilian thought, which still persevered under a certain Marxist sociology. This consensus concerning the ground rules of Brazilian political thought research can also found in
the most important works published during the second half of the 1970s: Evaldo Amaral Vieira, Jarbas Medeiros, Maria Tereza Sadek and Francisco Iglesias. With good reason, by the end of that decade, Bolívar Lamounier could declare himself to be satisfied: “nowadays, Brazilian political thought is a field of studies fully legitimate and fully vaccinated against the virus of ideological schematism” (Lamounier, 1978, p. 11).

Conclusion: a Research Assessment

The research by Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos was a landmark for Brazilian political thought studies within the social sciences. First of all, it produced a disciplinary framework of the object. Its pragmatic and moderate epistemological perspective allowed to overcome dilemmas until then imposed by resulting oppositions, be it from a philosophical Hegelianism, predominant at ISEB – “critical conscience”, “authenticity”, “rational thought” versus “naive conscience”, “alienation”, “colonial thought” –, or be it from a scientific positivism adopted by the USP sociology during the mid-1950s – by opposing “science’ versus “non-science” or “essayism” –, which displayed a contempt for Brazilian thought, considered to be peripheral or inferior. The formation of a national scientific knowledge no longer depended on a bona fide transplant of foreign processes (Florestan) or on a need to found a national social science (Guerreiro). On the other hand, contrary to what was sustained by academic Marxism, Brazilian political thought could not be merely reduced to an ideological expression of the class to which its authors belonged. If there is no doubt that Brazil’s peripheral condition reflected itself on the national production, this did not lead to inferior analyses, but instead a dichotomous approach that was adopted by national authors committed to a modernizing ideal, which led them to relate, on the one hand, the causes that competed for the perceived backwardness and, on the other hand, the factors that could surpass this situation. In summary, Wanderley Guilherme’s research brought forward the thesis that there was a national political culture; that Brazilian political thought was, par excellence, its intellectual product and that it was impossible to understand the rugged Brazilian political process with studying it.

Secondly, the research brought a clear definition of its statute and its competent given name: the objective was to study “Brazilian sociopolitical thought” and, in particular, the “political imagination” therein present. Even though these expressions may seem interchangeable, the first one is broader than the second. Brazilian Sociopolitical Thought was made up of “articles and books written by Brazilians with the study object geared towards the social or political aspects of Brazilian society” (Santos, 1970, p. 147). As for Political Imagination, it did not refer to sociopolitical thought as a universality of writings, but “to the type of political evaluations that some men with an educated perception and
committed with the public in one way or another are compelled to make (...) in order to offer a rational explanation for their audiences” (Santos, 1970, p. 137). For Wanderley, what mattered most was “to learn about Brazilian political processes” by means of identifying the “political imagination” diffused in “Brazilian sociopolitical thought”. One could criticize the “rushed analysts” classification given by him to the ones responsible for the production of the “Brazilian political imagination”; after all, every political author is also an actor, which by means of his writing attempts to somehow influence the public sphere. But this classification is understandable in a context in which Wanderley Guilherme’s primary concern was to give to the “Brazilian political imagination” a dignity that was questioned by Florestan Fernandes’ sociology. Hence the expressions “political imagination”, “social imagination”, and “sociopolitical imagination”, employed since the beginning of the controversy so as to oppose the idea of reducing relevant thought to “social science”. These were the efforts that contributed to a foundation of a Brazilian political science that did not suffer from the continuity solution that could be seen in the establishment of the Sao Paulo sociology (Lamounier, 1982, p. 407, 409 e 417).

However, the prevailing name to designate the discipline was not “Brazilian political imagination”, but “Brazilian sociopolitical thought”. This change of preference in the terminology was not a major change within the perspective inaugurated with the term “imagination”; instead, it signaled a moderation in the need to employ that specific term to refer to the analyzed phenomenon. Until the mid-70s articles it was less relevant to determine which term carried more precision to characterize the study object than to criticize the basic “ideology vs. science” duality, which needed to be eliminated so that the dignity and relevance of Brazilian political reflection prior to the establishment of the social sciences could be asserted and, quite possibly, provide their continuity to the reflections produced by opinion makers not dedicated to the scientific study of society, and independently from the results of these sciences. Once the dignity of the object was ensured, Wanderley was unconcerned with further critical elaborations as to what term should baptize the field of study; and so, “Brazilian sociopolitical thought” that began to enjoy a positivity which, during the first articles, seemed to be reserved solely to the “Brazilian political imagination”.

Thirdly, the research defined the perimeter for Brazilian political thought within the social sciences. By deliberately excluding from the research “work that was strictly historical, anthropological, psychological, economic, methodological and scholastic” (Santos, 2002, p. 14), Wanderley organized the field of studies of Brazilian political thought. The analyses of Brazilian society only interested Wanderley Guilherme’s research insofar as it would lead to the furnace of “political imagination”\(^6\). Beyond the relation of established

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\(^6\) The evolution of the titles in the works published mirrors his growing desire in specifying
precedence in the very designation more often employed by him – sociopolitical thought –, this perspective of subordinating the social to the political reveals itself when Wanderley articulates the research’s guiding question: “In what way does social reality appear to be structured in the perceptions of the social analysts of the past? And more specifically, how do they see this development within the political dispute? (Santos, 1978a, p. 41). Therefore, by pursuing how politicians and political analysts diagnosed Brazilian society for practical purposes of political intervention, he moved away from the “history of ideas in Brazil”, of a broad nature, as were the history of philosophical ideas by Miguel Reale and Cruz Costa, but also from the amorphous “social thought” by Djacir Menezes as well as from the social-literary perspective of Antônio Cândido. Therefore, it was no longer even a “Brazilian social thought”, understood as being the history of Brazilian culture, nor a “Brazilian social and political thought”, understood as a set of analyses on politics and society. From that we can safely affirm that his research is constitutive of the field of studies on Brazilian political thought within the sphere of the social sciences7.

In fourth place, Wanderley Guilherme’s research considered the characterization of Brazilian political thought to be inseparable from practice. The active and pragmatic character of such “imagination” provided “schemes” of rational explanation which gave order and made legible the heterogenous data used by the political analyst. If imagination necessarily works from the ordination of what already took place, it establishes a horizon of possibilities in which any political action may be conceived and take place. In this sense, the product of its creation directly falls on the present context, guiding and rationally legitimizing the actions of its actors (Santos, 1970, p. 138). It is this very decisive pragmatic element, which in The Roots of Brazilian Political Imagination is subjacent to the concept of “praxis” and would later serve for an analysis of Brazilian liberalism in Bourgeois Order and Political Liberalism. Even though the notion is vague, the pragmatic element is unmistakable (Santos, 1978a, p. 67). The few alterations in the second edition of the article Liberal Praxis in Brazil, twenty years later, did not alter the main formulation concerning how “ideas translate into behavior – and political ideas as strategic guides for action”

the research object as being essentially political: In Controversies, the object was designed as “Brazilian social thought”; in Imagination it changed to “sociopolitical imagination”; in Roots of Imagination it was merely “Brazilian political imagination”. It is true that in Paradigm and History the expressions “social imagination”, “social and political thought”, “sociopolitical thought” and “social thought” were used interchangeably. However, this occurred in this article for a punctual and contingent reason: by consolidating and expanding the previous articles, the essay also attempted to trace an “evolution of the social sciences in Brazil” and not only of political science. Also present in this article, the eventual returns by the author to the expression “social” should not therefore fool us.

7 This founding characteristic of the research is recognized even by his critics, such as Bolívar Lamounier (1982, p. 430) and Gildo Marçal Brandão (2007, p.25).
The institutionalization of Brazilian Political Thought in the Social Sciences: Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos’ Research Revisited (1963-1978)

(Santos, 1998, p. 9). In this sense, what remains is the conviction that, contrary to sociological or philosophical theory, political theory is always linked to practice and for this reason its study cannot eliminate *a priori* the pretext of its non-scientific or ideological dimension.

This examination of Wanderley Guilherme’s research cannot be concluded without touching on the largest controversy of his research: the *instrumental* label conferred to a portion of Brazilian authoritarian thought. In a time when Iberian and Latin-American political scientists discussed the authoritarianism issue with the background attempt to discuss the deepening of democracy in their countries it was a true provocation to qualify an author such as Oliveira Viana as a liberal in values and goals. Without a doubt, a great deal of the controversy that followed is due to the fact that there was no clarity or safety as to the meaning of the terms “bourgeois order” and especially “authoritarianism” in his last articles. Be it as it may, it is often forgotten that in his interpretation of Oliveira Viana, Wanderley Guilherme based himself exclusively on the reading of *Brazilian Political Institutions* – a work that does not deal with the issue of capitalism nor the market and that does not advocate for any regime of exception. In this framework, as long as the concept of “bourgeois order” is understood as equivalent to a State of a democratic rule of law the “Authoritarian State” considered in the sense that Oliveira Viana himself uses in that work – of a modern State, interventionist and, as such, geared towards social wellbeing and the safeguarding of civil rights –, his qualification of an instrumental authoritarianism remains pertinent. Otherwise, Wanderley does not merely praise Oliveira Viana and criticizes him once again.

Regarding the consequences of this controversy, the boldness in praising Oliveira Viana, at a time when his books could be found bedside to some of the most important heroes of the military regime, exposed Wanderley Guilherme to being attacked from both the left and the right as being sympathetic to authoritarianism; for both sides he was considered to have merely incorporated – in Bolívar Lamounier’s expression – the “self-image of Brazilian authoritarian thought”. However, in sight of an attentive reading of his articles, the provocation seems to lack foundation. The first and most evident resides in the fact that these articles often contain criticism towards authoritarianism, for both Estado Novo and the military regime (Santos, 1978a, p. 39). Besides, contrary to what is often believed, at no point did Wanderley present the Estado Novo and the military regime as materializations of “instrumental authoritarian” thought. Instead, what is argued is that Wanderley criticizes Oliveira Viana for his belief in the advent of an untraceable governing patriotic elite, which would change Brazilian political culture, and for his inability to grasp the transformative meaning behind urbanization and industrialization, as experienced by Brazil since the 1930s, preferring instead to consider the Country, even late in life, as being essentially rural (Santos, 1998, p. 49).
those experiences, for being purely authoritarian, would have been frustrated opportunities to implement such an ideal. And more: even the João Goulart administration was pictured as a futile attempt at instrumental authoritarianism. This meant that: firstly, the instrumental mentality was not exclusive to the right, and could also be encompassed by the left; secondly, that instrumental authoritarians suffered as much as doctrinarian liberals with the vicissitudes of political reality. The problematic in “liberal praxis in Brazil”, however, was not merely about the revealed inability by doctrinarian liberals to establish a bourgeois order by importing liberal instructions, but also of the inability shown by instrumental authoritarians to materialized an institutional and political order that would not be purely authoritarian (Santos, 1998, p. 49-51).

The apparent sympathy towards instrumental authoritarians by Wanderley Guilherme can also be attributed to two further – and less controversial – factors. Firstly, the analyses throughout history carried out by the instrumental authoritarian “lineage” seemed to him to be qualitatively superior to those done by doctrinarian liberals. Besides noticing that the same institutions did not always produce the same effects universally, due to changes in culture and development stage of political communities, the instrumentals believed that the establishment of order could not occur spontaneously by mere force of the social game, a belief shared by the liberal doctrinarian liberals. For the instrumentals, the social world was maintained by an orchestrated political action (Santos, 1978a, p. 49-51). That is, his worldview was at the same time more “political” and more “realist” than his rivals; consequently, he was closer to an ideal of political science harbored by Wanderley. Secondly, in a universe lacking a democratic and national liberalism, the instrumentals were almost always the social carriers for progressive values, with which the author identified himself. Throughout Brazilian history, the saquaremas statesmen, the Tenenetist movement leaderships in the 1920 and 30s, and the national-developmentist intellectuals of the 1950s and 60s seemed to him to have better represented the national interest and the democratic cause than liberal graduates, always attached to state oligarchies, adverse to social equality and supporters of free trade. This sympathy by Wanderley Guilherme towards values advocated by instrumental authoritarians does not however imply in a reduction of the author to their condition, but instead to recognize that for the historian of political ideas there is no foul in recognizing the progressive dimension of such movements, actors or even political regimes, which, in spite of being authoritarian, seem to him to have contributed, in certain historical contexts for the progress of the national cause.

In summary, while he was producing his research in Brazilian political thought, Wanderley Guilherme was not charmed by the instrumental authoritarian agenda, instead, he was concerned with shattering the dilemma between oligarchic liberal order and
progressive authoritarianism in which Brazil’s political history seemed to be imprisoned, by differentiating political and economic liberalism in order to condemn an authoritarian State without condemning an interventionist State (indispensable for reducing the country’s social indifference). When the military regime was in a strain, Wanderley alerted to the danger of replacing a military nationalist and interventionist authoritarianism by an atomistic and oligarchic liberalism, a desire shared by a portion of the regime’s opposition, which according to him had a “UDN-ish” mentality, being true “conservative wolves transfigured in progressive lambs”\(^9\). Future democratic institutions should not be designed according to the doctrinarian liberal costume or by the instrumental authoritarian costume (at that point argued by him to have disappeared through exhaustion). The imposition was that from a dictatorship a democratic liberal State would be born, and one that would not be minimal; a State sufficiently robust to architect public policies capable of raising the population’s living standards to “higher grounds than collective wellbeing” (Santos, 1978b, p. 80). Evidently this was not an instrumentally authoritarian position; it was a social-democratic stance: “The conversion of an authoritarian system into a stable democratic regime depends on the existence of a strong and democratic socialist party, capable of competing on the right against parties which, in name of human liberties wish to maintain alive as much as possible an unjust economic and social order; and able of competing on the left against parties which, in name of social justice, consider the democratic issue to be one for fools or madmen. Socialist and democratic parties tend to convert in the political center of history” (Santos, 1978b, p. 16-17). Not only does his analytical interpretation on Brazilian political thought appear to remain current; the same holds true to the subjacent ideological program.

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\(^9\) At the same time in which he was writing *Paradigm and History* and *The liberal Praxis in Brazil* (1974), Wanderley emphasized in newspaper articles on the early Geisel administration’s political conjuncture, the need to “uphold the defense of civil and minority rights without necessarily claiming for a society where the market mechanism is the exclusive resource allocator and distributor of goods (...). The incidence of authoritarian systems in the contemporary world poses the challenge of reconciling civil liberties with the limitations of an exclusively predatory privatism” (Santos, 1978b, p. 35-36).


Mapping and Explaining the Use of the Left-Right Divide*

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This study is about mapping and explaining the use of the Left-Right divide across 14 countries from 5 Continents and relies on the richness of the post electoral mass surveys from the Comparative National Election Project: 14 countries and 18 elections spread over 5 continents. The paper shows not only how extensively the LR divide is used in these 14 countries, but also explains variation across both individuals and countries in terms of the factors determining LR recognition and use. Overall, it is shown that, although seen world-wide, the LR divide (both for self-placement and party placement) is more present in long consolidated and middle-aged democracies and countries with freer media systems than in new democracies and societies with less free media systems. In the case of parties LR placement, party size also counts: larger parties are more easily placed. Additionally, we also show that LR recognition is more socially and politically determined in long consolidated and middle-aged democracies and in countries with more freedom of the press than in new democracies and in systems with less free media system. These findings add to the existing knowledge about these topics because previous studies were either country/Continent specific, or, if global in nature, never invested in explaining individual and system variation across 14 from 5 Continents. Besides, these findings mean that in the long term probably the new democracies will converge with the long consolidated or middle-aged ones, but this is an empirical question to be researched in future studies.

Keywords: Left-right; America; Europe; Africa; Asia.

* The data necessary to reproduce numerical results can be found in http://bpsr.org.br/files/arquivos/Banco_Dados_Freire_Kivistik.html
Introduction

After the French Revolution, the idea of a left-right (LR) divide gained great importance in mass politics (Bobbio, 1994; Caramani, 2004; Laponce, 1981). At the individual level, the division between left and right functions as an instrument to reduce the complexity of the political universe; at the systemic level, it functions as a code of communication (Fuchs and Klingermann, 1990).

In spite of all the theories about the “end of ideology” (Aron, 2002; Bell, 2000; Lipset, 1987), the “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1989) and about a certain overcoming of the division between left and right (Giddens, 1996), the truth is that these same theories have been shrouded in an ideological character and, soon after being defended, have been followed by the appearance of new ideological forms or a renewed prominence of the “old” ideologies (Heywood, 2003). Furthermore, various studies have documented the remaining (or even increasing) importance of electors’ positions on the LR (or liberal-conservative in the US and some other countries) scale as a defining factor for their voting choices in several regions of the world: in long consolidated democracies in Europe and North America (Franklin et al, 1992; Gunther and Kuan, 2007; Gunther and Montero, 2001; Van der Eijk et al, 2005), in new/middle-aged democracies in Southern and Eastern Europe (Gunther and Kuan, 2007; Gunther and Montero, 2001; Kitschelt et al, 1999; Markowski, 1997), in Latin America (Gunther and Kuan, 2007; Luna and Zechmeister, 2010) and in at least some countries in East Asia (Jou, 2010; Lee, 2007).

Additionally, studies about mass political attitudes based on opinion surveys and other sources have shown that in «less central» parts of the world a very large majority of citizens (as well as political experts) not only recognize the LR/liberal-conservative divide, but are also able to place the political parties «correctly» on such a scale (Barnes, 2002; Colomer and Escatel, 2005; Dalton, 2006; Dalton, Farrel and McAllister, 2011; Evans and Whitefield, 1998; Freire, 2006a; Gunther and Kuan, 2007; Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Jou, 2010; Kitschelt et all, 1999; Lee, 2007; Luna Zechmeister, 2010; Markowski, 1997; Noël and Thérien, 2008; Zechmeister, 2006 and 2010). Moreover, it has been shown that in several regions of the world, individual LR self-placement is also anchored in issue attitudes and value orientations (Dalton, 2006; Freire, 2006b and 2008; Freire and Belchior, 2011; Inglehart and Klingerman, 1976; Gunther and Kuan, 2007; Knutsen, 1997, 1998; Knutsen and Scarbrough, 1995; Lee, 2007; Luna Zechmeister, 2010; Markowski, 1997; Noël and Thérien, 2008; Zechmeister, 2006 and 2010).

Having established the continued relevance and usefulness of the LR divide for both long consolidated and new democracies, and therefore the relevance of studying these topics to understand the functioning of democratic political systems, one could reasonably
ask: what relevant elements can be added to this area of knowledge? With the present study about mapping and explaining the use of the LR divide across 14 countries from five continents, we believe that we can add the following: first, we can add relevant data and interpretations given the richness of datasets from the *Comparative National Election Project* (CNEP I-III). The richness relies on the diversity of countries included that allows us to compare and explain variation in LR recognition and use across 14 countries from five continents, i.e., on a scale never done before (usually these type of analyses are continent or country specific: Freire, 2006b and 2008; Freire and Belchior, 2011; Knutsen and Scarbrough, 1995; Lee, 2007; Luna Zechmeister, 2010; Markowski, 1997; Zechmeister, 2006 and 2010; some cross continent analyses done before map LR recognition but neither explain variation across individuals nor across countries: Dalton, 2006; Gunther and Kuan, 2007; Noél and Thérien, 2008). The reader should bear in mind that CNEP I-III includes post electoral mass surveys from 14 countries and 18 elections (cases) from five continents: Europe, North and South America, Africa and Asia. We have relevant data for the present paper from the following cases included in CNEP I-III: Argentina 2007, Bulgaria 1996, Chile 1994 and 1999, Greece 1996, Hong Kong 1998, Hungary 1998 and 2006, Italy 1996 and 2006, Mexico 2006, Mozambique 2004, Portugal 2005, South Africa 2004, Spain 1996 and 2004, USA 2004, and Uruguay 1994 and 2004.2

Considering all this, we believe that we can advance scientific knowledge about the recognition and use of the LR divide across 14 countries from five continents by pursuing the following objectives: first, at the individual level, we want to know and explain how extensively the LR divide is used (LR self-placement: LR SP/ LR party placement by citizens: LR PP) in the 14 countries. Second, mostly using the two step hierarchical regression (multi-level modelling) approach (Achen, 2005; Jusko and Shively, 2005; Lachat, 2008), we want to explain variation across countries in terms of the factors determining LR recognition and use. These findings add to the existent knowledge about these topics because previous studies were either country/continent specific, or, if global in nature, never invested in explaining variations across individuals and countries.

But there is more about the relevance of these topics. On the one hand, this fresh CNEP I-III data will allow us to update information about the levels of LR recognition and use worldwide. But on the other, we do not know from previous studies if the structure of individual determination of LR recognition is the same worldwide or not. If it is similar (for example, if education, political interest, media exposure, and party identification work in the same direction as in Europe and North America), then the differences in overall

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2 For the US in 1992 and Greece in 2004 we have information about the level of LR recognition but not enough information (relevant variables missing) to explain variation both at the individual and the country level.
recognition and use between countries might be due to compositional differences in the aggregate levels of education, political interest, media exposure and party identification in the different countries, and some convergence between countries might be expected in the future when those compositional differences are reduced. But if that structure of determination is rather different, then country specific macro events should weigh more to explain LR recognition and use, and thus convergence between countries will be less probable in future. Moreover, this situation would also raise serious doubts about the possibility of comparing mass use of the LR schema worldwide. We will also try to specify the impact of some macro-level factors (age of the democratic regime, freedom of media, and level of educational development) on LR recognition and use. Again, if these macro-level explanatory factors are indeed relevant to explain variations in both the overall levels of recognition and in the structure of determination, as we expect, then we should see some convergence between countries when democratic regimes (from non-Western parts of the world) become more mature, freedom of the press is more solid, and social development more advanced. This would also give indications of the heuristic value of LR for comparing mass political attitudes and behaviour worldwide.

We will proceed as follows: in the second section, we will review the theory about LR recognition and formulate hypotheses. In the third section, data and methods will be presented. In the fourth and fifth sections, we will analyse the questions related to LR recognition and use. We finish with our conclusions.

**Theory and Hypotheses**

Following Converse’s study (1964), we assume that if people recognize the labels left and right, if they are able to place themselves and parties on the LR continuum, then it is reasonable to claim that this is at least one indicator that these ideological concepts are still meaningful and valid. Therefore, in order to assess the importance of LR concepts, we will first analyse the levels of LR SP and how that recognition is influenced by individual and country level factors. Data from advanced Western democracies confirm, for instance, that on average LR is widely understood by almost 90% of people (Knutsen, 1998; McAllister and White, 2007). The other regions of the world are less studied; nevertheless, the existing research supports the idea that, although usually to a variable

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3 Of course, there are other indicators of the meaningfulness and validity of the LR divide. See Van der Eijk et al, 2005 for the impact of LR on the vote and Noël and Thérien, 2008: 32-82 for the consideration of “clashes over social equality”/substantive policy content in terms of “social justice”. However, we believe that our option is more adequate because is it less demanding to compare new and long consolidated democracies and because it does not make assumptions about a one-dimensional meaning regarding the LR divide.
extent, LR is widely recognized and used by the mass publics in very different regions of the world (Barnes, 2002; Colomer and Escatel, 2005; Dalton, 2006; Evans and Whitefield, 1998; Freire, 2006a; Gunther and Kuan, 2007; Jou, 2010; Kitschelt et al, 1999; Lee, 2007; Luna Zechmeister, 2010; Markowski, 1997; Noël and Thérien, 2008; Zechmeister, 2006 and 2010).

Although it is known that the LR divide is widely recognized and used by mass publics in several regions of the world, cross continent comparisons are less common (but see Dalton, 2006; Gunther and Kuan, 2007; Noël and Thérien, 2008). Moreover, none of these rather scarce “global studies" tried testing the individual-level and macro-level determinants of citizens’ LR recognition and use across countries from different regions of the world. It is precisely this gap we intend to fill with our paper. First, at the individual level, we want to know how extensively the LR divide in the 14 countries from the five continents under scrutiny is used. Second, at the macro level, we want to explain variation across countries in terms of the overall level of recognition and use, and in terms of the impact of the individual level determinants on LR recognition and use.

Traditionally, the recognition and utilization of the LR divide is associated with the sophistication and awareness of individual citizens – more sophisticated people understand these ideological labels better and in a more coherent way (Freire, 2006a; Freire and Belchior, 2011; Kitschelt and Hellemans, 1990; Zechmeister, 2006). The most popular way to conceptualize this is through education. In addition to education, a person’s political interest and age are most often said to increase the level of recognition and use of the LR divide. The more educated and politically interested people are, the more familiar they are with ideological terms, as they have more resources and motivation. Usually, other aspects being held constant, older people are more aware of political terms because they have had more time to learn them through socialization. Only in cases of regime change may this be questionable, because then one could expect young people to adjust to the new situation more quickly (Freire, 2006a). But there are still other factors that have been shown to explain LR recognition like media exposure and party identification – people with more media exposure and stronger levels of party identification are also more likely to be better informed about and/or engaged in politics and therefore are also expected to show higher levels of LR recognition and use (Freire, 2006a; Freire and Belchior, 2011; Kitschelt and Hellemans, 1990; Zechmeister, 2006). From previous findings, we have derived our individual level hypotheses:

**Hypothesis on education and LR recognition:** more educated people recognize and utilize the terms LR better than the less educated;

**Hypothesis on political interest and LR recognition:** more politically interested people recognize and utilize the terms LR better than the less interested;
Hypothesis on age and LR recognition: others things being held constant, older people recognize and utilize the terms LR better than younger people.

Hypothesis on media exposure and LR recognition: more informed people recognize and utilize the terms LR better than the less informed;

Hypothesis on party identification and LR recognition: people with stronger levels of party identification recognize and utilize the terms LR better than those with weaker levels of party identification.

The problem with the latter two hypotheses is that questions about media exposure and party identification were not asked in all countries taking part in the CNEP I-III, therefore, these two additional variables will be used only in a limited way. Of course this is a common problem when we use secondary survey data but it is not necessarily an obstacle to producing good quality research (Kiecolt and Nathan, 1985), namely because the 19 cases/countries from four Continents and survey data available for them allow us to perform tests on a global scale done never before. In the present paper we will test the model with only a subset of variables (age, education, political interest) for the 19 cases/countries (see Tables 5.1 to 5.4 below), but we will also test the full model for all the cases/countries (13) where all variables are available (data not shown in the tables but findings mentioned in the text). Thus, there is some element of cross validation in these two types of tests and the findings are quite robust, as we will demonstrate. Moreover, regarding the explanatory factors/independent variables (age, education, political interest, media exposure, party identification) used to explain LR recognition and use (at the individual level), they follow the so-called “political sophistication model” and are pretty common in the literature about LR conceptualization among the mass publics (see Converse, 1964; Freire, 2006b; Freire and Belchior, 2011; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990; Kitschelt and Hellemans, 1990; Klingemann, 1979; Zechmeister, 2006). As for the macro level explanatory variables (see below), they will be deduced from the theoretical literature cited below.

Let us now pass to the macro level. The formation of ideological (and partisan) identities is a process that continues to evolve during individual socialization (Barnes, McDonough and Pina, 1985; Campbell, 1980; Converse, 1964, 1969; Freire, 2006a; Niemi et al, 1985). Moreover, it is strongly dependent upon an existing environment of effective partisan and ideological differentiation, associated with the existence of free political competition. In authoritarian regimes up to the beginning of their democratic transitions, parties were usually a proscribed reality and ideological differences were repressed. Despite the repression of partisan and ideological pluralism, at times it did exist, although it was very limited. Therefore, the conditions for the formation of ideological (partisan) identities were severely reduced, especially when comparing these new regimes to older democracies.
Even in competitive political environments, for individuals to identify themselves with certain LR ideological areas, it is necessary that such political organizations and notions, as well as the image and content that define and/or are associated with them, consolidate their presence in the political and media arenas (Barnes, 2002; Barnes, McDonough and Pina, 1985; Converse, 1969; Gunther and Montero, 2001; Niemi et al, 1985). Thus, politicization and political intermediation are preconditions for the formation and relevance of LR attitudes by mass publics (Beck et al, 2002; Gunther and Kuan, 2007). Moreover, the usual instability associated with new party systems is yet another reason for a lower level of LR recognition by citizens in new democracies (Dix, 1992; Freire, 2006a; Gunther and Kuan, 2007; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005; Rose and Munro, 2003).

Therefore, we expect that in long consolidated democracies and more developed societies individual level variation in terms of recognition and use of the LR divide is more determined by education, income, political interest, media exposure, and strength of party identification than in new democracies and less developed countries. In the latter regimes and societies, lower levels of LR recognition are more widespread, thus more determined by cultural, historical and political factors than by individual level factors. Thus, we derive our macro level hypotheses:

**Hypothesis on the age of democratic regime and the overall level of LR recognition and use across countries**: the longer the democratic tradition in a country (as measured by “the numbers of years since the last democratic transition”), the higher the level of recognition and utilization of the LR divide by mass publics.

**Hypothesis on the age of the democratic regime and the individual level determination of LR recognition and use across countries**: the longer the democratic tradition in a country, the more the level of recognition and utilization of the LR divide by mass publics is determined by individual level determinants (age, education, political interest, strength of party identification, and media exposure).

**Hypothesis on the level of social development of societies and the overall level of LR recognition and use across countries**: The more socially and politically developed a country (as measured by “the Freedom House index of overall press freedom” and “the percentage of people with secondary education or more”) the more the level of recognition and utilization of the LR divide by mass publics.

**Hypothesis on the level of social development of societies and the individual level determination of LR recognition and use across countries**: The more socially and politically developed a country, the more the level of recognition and utilization of the LR divide by mass publics is determined by individual level determinants.
Mapping and Explaining the Use of the Left-Right Divide

Table 1. Typology of countries in terms of age of the democratic regime and level of development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of development of societies: percentage of persons with secondary education completed or more</th>
<th>New democracies: up to 24 years since the last transition</th>
<th>Middle-aged democracies: between 26 and 41 years since the last transition</th>
<th>Long consolidated democracies: more than 41 years since the last transition</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low level: up to 31.3%</td>
<td>Hong Kong 1998 (1)</td>
<td>Portugal 2005</td>
<td>Italy 1996</td>
<td>4 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain 1993</td>
<td>Mozambique 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level: between 31.7% and 49.40%</td>
<td>Bulgaria 1996</td>
<td>Greece 2004</td>
<td>Italy 2006</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chile 1994</td>
<td>Spain 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greece 1996</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level: more than 49.40%</td>
<td>Argentina 2007</td>
<td>USA 1992</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chile 2000</td>
<td>USA 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13 (14)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20 (21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
1) Polity IV for “time elapsed since the last democratic regime transition”;
2) “Percentage of persons with secondary education completed or more” – computed from the CNEP mass surveys in each country.

Notes:
1) Hong Kong is not a democracy, especially not at the time of the survey, as can be clearly seen in the Freedom House report for that country in 2002. See http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2002&country=2471 (retrieved on 29/09/2011). Moreover, the country was considered “partly free” and scored a 5 in terms of “political rights” (on a scale from 1, “the most free”, to 7, “the least free”). Thus, this case was either considered “missing” in our macro level analysis or scored with the value “0” for the number of years since the last democratic transition.

In Table 1 we cross “the numbers of years since the last democratic transition”, an indicator of the level of democratic consolidation in each country, with an indicator of the level of socio-economic development, “the percentage of persons with secondary education completed or higher”. In the breakdowns for each variable in Table 1 there is, of course, some degree of arbitrariness: they are made by taking into account the average point in each distribution, as well as the dispersion around the mean. But there is also some substantive sense in the breakdowns: for example, we consider “new”/“young” democracies those of 24 years or less since the last democratic transition and the middle-aged democracies those between 26 and 41 years old. The long consolidated democracies have been so for more than 41 years. Moreover, when we look at the countries/years in each group,
we see that the partition makes sense politically. Similar notes could be made about the partition concerning “the level of development of societies”. However, we should bear in mind that our dataset has a larger number of new democracies (13) than middle-aged (3) or long consolidated democracies (4). We can see that in terms of the level of development, there are many more cases with middle (7) and high (9) levels of development (16) than with low levels (4). Moreover, we can say that there is a reasonable spread of different regimes across each level of social development. Thus, although new democracies are in greater quantity, we are convinced that both the richness and uniqueness of the CNEP I-III data and the reasonable variation in macro independent variables allow us to proceed with our analysis.

Finally, we have a third set of two hypotheses that apply only to the recognition of the location of parties in the LR scale (LR PP):

*Hypothesis on party size and the overall level of LR recognition and use across countries*: the higher the (electoral) size of the two parties under recognition taken together, the higher the overall level of recognition of parties’ location on the LR scale.

*Hypothesis on party size and the individual level determination of LR recognition and use across countries*: the higher the (electoral) size of the two parties under recognition taken together, the higher the recognition determination of parties’ location on the LR scale by the independent variables in each country.

We expect this effect because larger parties have more chances of being recognized, especially by the more educated, politically interested and older voters, as well as by those with more media exposure and stronger partisan attachments. First, because they are probably older than the smaller parties. Second, because the policy proposals of larger parties usually receive more media attention. Third, because larger parties usually have more resources to publicize their actions and mobilize voters.

**Data, Methods and Operationalization**

In order to accomplish our objectives and test the hypotheses, we use as many countries and election surveys from the CNEP I-III dataset as possible, a solution that is variable according to the different objectives and information available. We usually use around 12-13 and 17-19 cases.

To estimate the impact of macro-level items on the country level of determination in LR recognition we use the multi-level technique known as “two-step hierarchical regression” (Achen, 2005; Jusko and Shively, 2005). At the individual level (first step), we use logistic regressions to explain variation in our dependent variables in each country. At the
macro level (second step), we pick up the regression coefficients from the first step and consider them as our dependent variables.

First, as Jusko and Shively (2005: 12-13) note, the “two-step strategy draws heavily on the statistical foundations of the hierarchical linear models... but maintains many of the advantages of both portioning and pooling strategies... And it accomplishes this without loss of efficiency as compared to pooling strategies”, and with more flexibility as we will explain below. In the first step, we estimate separate logistic regressions to explain the LR recognition in each one of the 12-19 cases. Education, Political Interest, Age, Media Exposure, and Strength of Party Identification are the independent variables at level one. The regression coefficients from the first step are then taken as the dependent variables for the second step, where the independent variables are system level, and the cases (“N”) are the 12-19 countries/election surveys. We acknowledge that a larger N would have been better, but it is important to stress three things. First, while ideally N should be greater than or equal to 30, statistical simulations for N=10 reveal “the regression coefficients and lowest-level variance components are again estimated without bias”, and only “the group-level variance was over-estimated, with a bias up to 25 per cent” (Maas and Hox, 2005: 90, 91). Since we have 12-19 groups, and are mainly interested in explaining variation in the regression coefficients, we can conclude the sample size at step two is adequate, even if far from ideal. Second, in cross-country comparative political analysis, larger samples for the second step are rather rare, but robust findings have been found with 26 (Jusko and Shively, 2005), 16 (Lachat, 2008), 15 (Weldon, 2006), and 13 groups (Freire and Kivistik, 2013). Moreover, studies about LR among the mass publics usually rely on an even smaller number of cases/countries in level 1: for example, around 13 and 6 cases in Freire and Kivistik (2013) (using CNEP III data); 13 cases in Freire (2006a, 2006b); 13 cases in Knutsen (1997) (the latter three studies using European Value Study 1990-1999 data). Third, by using the robust standard errors procedure we can be reasonably sure about the robustness of our findings.

Additionally, when we want to explain cross country variation in the overall level of LR recognition (self and parties) and in the overall level of individual determination of LR recognition, we will proceed in yet another way. Using the “percentage of persons that can locate themselves (or the parties) in the LR scale” as our dependent variable, we then regress these values on a set of independent variables. Or using R²'s for each country, from the individual level models to explain LR recognition, we then regress these values on a set of independent variables.
Left-Right Recognition Across 14 Countries from Five Continents

To begin with, we will analyse LR recognition across countries. First, we will describe the material from each country, then we will proceed to testing the hypotheses at the micro and macro levels.

**Table 2. Left-right self-placement (LR recognition) in five continents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (1)</th>
<th>Percentage of persons that placed themselves in LR scale (2)</th>
<th>Percentage of persons that placed themselves in LR scale but collapsing «false centrists» (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US92</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UR94</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL00</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR04</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP93</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL93</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU06</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>GR96</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>UR04</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT06</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>PT05</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BU96</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT96</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP04</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MZ04</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU98</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US04</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA04</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HK98</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR07</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MX06</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
(1) Countries organized by descending order of overall level of recognition.
(2) Can place themselves in scale (values 1-10); 0 – DK, NA, Missing values.
(3) Can place themselves in scale (values 1-4 and 7-10); 0 – values 5-6 plus DK, NA, Missing values.

Values -1 and system missing are treated as DK, except in the case of CL93, IT06, MX06 PT05, US92, US04 and UR94, where they have been left out of the analysis.

The first measure to evaluate LR recognition in a society is the proportion of people who have placed themselves on the LR scale. As we can see (Table 2), the percentages vary
a lot across countries. The general level of recognition accounts for more than three-quarters of the respondents and in Mexico, less than half of the respondents. So we can conclude that the concept is known at large over the world, like many other studies did before us (Dalton, 2006; Gunther and Kuan, 2007; Noël and Thérien, 2008). The expected tendency should be that long consolidated democracies have a greater proportion of recognizers than newer ones and that the level of recognition is increasing with the passage of time in new democracies (Freire, 2006a), but the data confirms this tendency with some deviations. The lowest levels of ideological recognition are in Latin America (Mexico: 46; Argentina 53 percent), Asia (Hong Kong: 69), Africa (South Africa: 70; Mozambique: 73), and Eastern Europe (Hungary: 76). But some consolidated democracies in some years (US 2004, Spain 2004, Italy 1996) are not that much above the level of the new democracies just mentioned. Of course, there are always some short-term factors that explain variation in the same country across relatively short periods of time. For example, we know that the case of Italy, due to the strong turbulence in the Italian party system since 1994, is perhaps an example of that situation (Freire, 2006a). This is probably the case also for the US 2004 and Spain 2004, namely because data from US 1992 and Spain 1993 are much more in line with our expectations.

In any case, taking all countries together, we can still say that in older democracies (in Europe and North America: US 1992) the average level of LR recognition is much higher than in newer democracies in Africa, Asia and Latin America: long consolidated and middle-aged democracies are overwhelmingly at the top of Table 2, first column. Nevertheless, some people might argue that central categories in a LR scale are often used by non-sophisticated citizens as a kind of “no answer” (NA)/“don’t know (DK)”: “false centrists”. To avoid possibly misleading results, in columns three and four of Table 2 we present the same result as before but after collapsing the probably “false centrists” (categories 5 and 6 in 1-10 LR scale). The results seem to be even clearer than before, but exceptions still remain: at the bottom of column 4 we find mainly new democracies, but Portugal is also there; at the top, among long consolidated democracies, we also find Mozambique, Uruguay and Hungary. Nevertheless, to have a clearer picture about this we need to proceed with the regression analysis. But before that, we analyse LR recognition in terms of the LR location of one or two of the largest parties in each country (Table 3).
Table 3. Left-right recognition of parties’ location in the LR scale in five continents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (1)</th>
<th>Percentage of persons that placed one of the two largest parties in the LR scale (2)</th>
<th>Country (1)</th>
<th>Percentage of persons that placed the two largest parties in the LR scale (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GR96</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>GR96</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR04</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>SP93</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP93</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>IT06</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT06</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>GR04</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL93</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>UR04</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UR94</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>CL93</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT96</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>UR94</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UR04</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>SP04</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP04</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>HU06</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU06</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>PT05</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT05</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>IT96</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MZ04</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>US04</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BU96</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>BU96</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US04</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>MX06</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA04</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>MZ04</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR07</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>SA04</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MX06</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>AR07</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HK98</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>HK98</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
(1) Countries organized by descending order of the overall level of recognition.
(2) Can place the two largest parties in the LR scale (values 1-10); (1) Can place one of the two largest parties in the LR scale (values 1-10); (0) – DK, NA, Missing values.
Values -1 and system missing are treated as DK, except in the case of CL93, IT06, MX06, PT05, US92, US04, and UR94 where they have been left out from the analysis.

In Table 3 we present the percentage of respondents in each country that have placed the two largest parties on the LR scale. It is remarkable that in almost all countries (except Hong Kong, Mozambique, South Africa, and Argentina) more than two-thirds of the respondents have been able to do that. Of course, in this case we are not dealing with “correct” or “wrong” placements, for example, left-wing parties that are located on the right, or vice-versa. Nevertheless, the difference between older and newer democracies seems to somehow be present again when using this measure. Countries with relatively long democratic traditions (Greece 1996 and 2004, Spain 1995, Italy 2006) seem to be well represented among the group, which has the highest levels of recognition of parties’ LR location, and those with few democratic years (Bulgaria, Hong Kong, Mexico, Mozambique, South Africa) have lower levels of recognition, but several exceptional cases are still present.
The results of the OLS regressions to explain cross country variation in the overall level of recognition reveal the following (Table 4): first, in terms of self LR recognition, freedom of press and age of democratic regime work in the expected direction – countries with more freedom of press (lower values in the Freedom House’s scale of freedoms) and with longer time elapsed since the last democratic transition do show higher levels of recognition. However, the age of the democratic regime is only significant when the dependent variable is self LR recognition and “false centrists” were collapsed. Conversely, freedom of press always works in the expected direction and in a significant way.

For self LR recognition when “false centrists” are collapsed, there is a factor that works contrary to expectations: the higher the level of education in a country, the lower the level of recognition. It is not easy to explain this, nevertheless, we can conclude that both political socialization in the democratic regime (self) and mass media political intermediation (self and parties) are factors that have a significant effect on the overall level of LR recognition.

Table 4. Explaining macro level variation in the overall level of LR recognition: self and parties’ location on LR scale – OLS regressions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>LR recognition self</th>
<th>LR recognition self (collapsing “false centrists”)</th>
<th>LR Recognition major party</th>
<th>LR Recognition two major parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic regime</td>
<td>0.0483</td>
<td>0.1606***</td>
<td>0.0091</td>
<td>-0.0021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Years)</td>
<td>(0.580)</td>
<td>(2.541)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(-0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.971)</td>
<td>(-0.603)</td>
<td>(-1.977)</td>
<td>(-2.170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop. Secondary educ.</td>
<td>-0.1680</td>
<td>-0.4839**</td>
<td>-0.2145</td>
<td>-0.1014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or higher (%)</td>
<td>(-0.807)</td>
<td>(-2.273)</td>
<td>(-1.307)</td>
<td>(-0.500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party size</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.1419</td>
<td>-0.2207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.835)</td>
<td>(-0.923)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>108.6837***</td>
<td>74.0741***</td>
<td>115.0647***</td>
<td>115.6894***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.966)</td>
<td>(5.805)</td>
<td>(10.992)</td>
<td>(7.714)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>0.362</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1) Hong Kong collapsed because it is not a democracy; other cases collapsed due to missing data in the macro variables.
2) The dependent variables are the percentage of respondents in each country/year that are able to place themselves or the two largest parties on the LR scale.
3) The robust standard errors procedure is used: robust statistics in parenthesis.
4) Non-standardized regression coefficients and probabilities associated with significance tests are shown in the table, beside R2 and N.
5) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

From Table 4 to Table 6.3 we present the error margins for the estimations of the coefficients as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This means the probability of rejecting H0 when the null hypothesis (i.e., b/regression coefficient = 0) is true. Thus, we only consider rejection of the null hypothesis when the probability of a false rejection (i.e., the error margin) is below 1% (0.01), 5% (0.05) or 10% (0.1).
### Table 5.1. Explaining individual LR recognition (self) across countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>LR recognition: 1, yes, 0, no</th>
<th>LR recognition: 1, yes, 0, no (with false centrists: 5-6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Variables B Wald</td>
<td>B Wald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 06</td>
<td>Constant 1.01*** 30.17</td>
<td>.18 1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest 1.56*** 68.38</td>
<td>.81*** 58.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60+ years -.66*** 7.50</td>
<td>-.39* 5.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nagelkerke R square .24</td>
<td>.13 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N of cases 814 -</td>
<td>814 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary 98</td>
<td>Constant -.84*** 15.50</td>
<td>-.42*** 14.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education .71*** 27.36</td>
<td>n.s. n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest .91*** 69.00</td>
<td>.73*** 94.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45-59 years .54** 8.40</td>
<td>n.s. n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nagelkerke R square .21</td>
<td>.21 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N of cases 1155 -</td>
<td>1149 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US 04</td>
<td>Constant -2.59*** 58.57</td>
<td>-2.99*** 91.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education .95*** 52.85</td>
<td>.82*** 52.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest .74*** 70.95</td>
<td>.55*** 48.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nagelkerke R square .19</td>
<td>.14 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N of cases 1190 -</td>
<td>1190 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal 05</td>
<td>Constant .52*** 2.39</td>
<td>-.65*** 28.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education .37* 4.23</td>
<td>n.s. n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest .77*** 47.47</td>
<td>.24*** 12.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60+ years .45** 3.63</td>
<td>n.s. n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nagelkerke R square .13</td>
<td>.02 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N of cases 1087 -</td>
<td>1087 -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1) binary logistic regression, forward stepwise method, countries separately;
2) *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p <0.05;
3) Forward stepwise method: only variables with significant impact are considered and presented in the table.
4) In case of age, the 29 years or younger group is the reference group.
5) Countries ordered according to descending strength of the Pseudo R2.
6) Dependent variable: 1) LR recognition: 1, yes, 0, no (cannot place self on scale plus NA and DK); 2) Idem but with “false centrists” (5-6) also as 0, no.
### Table 5.2. Explaining individual LR recognition (self) across countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>LR recognition: 1, yes, 0, no</th>
<th>LR recognition: 1, yes, 0, no (with false centrist: 5-6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Variables</td>
<td>B</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.91**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>.80***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60+ years</td>
<td>-.47*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nagelkerke R square</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N of cases</td>
<td>1148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.45**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>.84***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nagelkerke R square</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N of cases</td>
<td>1127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.49***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>.89***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nagelkerke R square</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>.40*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30-44 years</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45-59 years</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.64***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45-59 years</td>
<td>.53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nagelkerke R square</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>1167</td>
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</table>

Notes: See table 5.1.
### Table 5.3. Explaining individual LR recognition (self) across countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>LR recognition: 1, yes, 0, no</th>
<th>LR recognition: 1, yes, 0, no (with false centrists: 5-6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Wald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina  07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of cases</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 96</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.55***</td>
<td>14.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59 years</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+ years</td>
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<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R square</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>N of cases</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece 96</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>130.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>.56***</td>
<td>30.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+ years</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R square</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of cases</td>
<td>1198</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain 93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.25***</td>
<td>207.62</td>
</tr>
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<td>Interest</td>
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<td>20.66</td>
</tr>
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<td>60+ years</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R square</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of cases</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique 04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Interest</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+ years</td>
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<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R square</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of cases</td>
<td>1068</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: See table 5.1
Mapping and Explaining the Use of the Left-Right Divide

Table 5.4. Explaining individual LR recognition (self) across countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>LR recognition: 1, yes, 0, no</th>
<th>LR recognition: 1, yes, 0, no (with false centrists: 5-6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Wald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa 04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.34</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.54***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>10.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R square</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of cases</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria 96</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>.96***</td>
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</tr>
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<td>N of cases</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>4.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>7.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R square</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of cases</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay 94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.08***</td>
<td>20.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>n.s</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>.62*</td>
<td>5.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R square</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of cases</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: See table 5.1

The findings about which individual level variables have an effect on self LR recognition are in Tables 5.1-5.3. First, when we compare the explanatory power of the model,

When the dependent variable is a dichotomy (1, the respondent is able to locate him/herself in the LR scale, 0 otherwise), like in Tables 5.1-5.4, we use Logistic (L. Reg.) instead of OLS regressions. In L. Reg. we estimate instead the probability of success of a phenomenon (1, the respondent is able to place him/herself in the LR scale). Thus, the relationship between the independent and dependent variables is not linear – it is better described by an S. So, a logarithmic transformation is needed to transform a non-linear relation into a linear one: this is done by the logit (Jovell, 1995). The regression constant (a) represents the value logit of the probability of an event happening when the value of the independent variable (X) is zero. The regression coefficients (b) now represent the change in the odds ratios’ logit for an event to happen, for one unit change in the independent variable (X). The odds ratios represent the ratio of the probability of success for a specific event (LR recognition) vis-à-vis the probability of failure for that same event (LR non-recognition). Because it is easier to
it seems that the effect of the sophistication level of LR recognition is usually larger in Europe and in the US than in countries from other regions of the world, although with some exceptions. It seems to indicate that in Europe and the US we find our expectations more easily (more educated, politically interested and older people are usually more able to recognize the LR divide), and that in other regions of the globe levels of recognition, or a lack of them, are socially more diffuse. Thus, in these latter countries, political and cultural factors probably weigh more than in Europe and the US. In the case of Europe, Bulgaria is the exception, with one of the lowest levels of determination. But this might mean that the lower explanatory power of the model that we find in non-European and non-North American regions can also be found in some new democracies from Eastern Europe (Freire, 2006a). Anyhow, it is clear that the effect of the sophistication varies a lot: from 0.02 in Uruguay 1994 to 0.24 in Italy 2006. When we consider an alternate treatment of the dependent variable by collapsing “false centrists”, the major effect is to usually depress the strength of the $R^2$ (columns 5 and 6 of Tables 5.1 to 5.4).

If we look at the variables' impact we see that quite often the only variables that have a significant impact on LR recognition are education and/or political interest. The only countries where age is more important than education are Portugal in 2005 and Italy in 2006. Other elements worth highlighting are the following: first, age is often irrelevant; second, in some cases (Hungary 2006, Italy, Chile 1993, and Portugal) the effect of age is negative. This means that the oldest group (AgeD3: 60 years old or more) in these countries is less aware of LR than the youngest cohort (18-29 years old), a syndrome that was found to be characteristic of new European democracies elsewhere (Freire, 2006a). However, in CNEP I-III this seems not to be the case: first, there are long consolidated or middle-aged democracies with a negative effect, and we cannot see the same results in several other new democracies of the CNEP I-III sample. Overall, however, we would say that the results point in the expected direction: more education, age and political interest are usually associated with higher levels of self LR recognition. However, the effect of age is variable across countries.

interpret, we usually consider the inverse of that measure ($e^b$), which allows us to read the coefficient as the change in the odds ratio of a certain event happening associated with one unit change in the independent variable (X). Since the dependent variable is not an interval variable, we cannot make estimations for regression coefficients using ordinary least squares (OLS), so the maximum-likelihood method is used instead. The Pseudo $R^2$ is the equivalent measure for the level of variance explained ($R^2$) in OLS regressions, even if less robust. Finally, the Wald statistic allows us to see which variables have more importance to explain variations in the dependent variable by testing the null hypothesis ($b = 0$).
Of course, one could reasonably argue that the previous models are underspecified: media exposure and strength of party identification are missing. This omission is because if we want to include these two extra factors, we pass from the 18 cases under scrutiny to 13. Nevertheless, we performed new regressions for the 13 countries with the relevant variables testing the effect of “media exposure” and “strength of party identification”, besides the other three variables (due to spatial limitations, these tables are not shown here). There are basically three conclusions. First, the impact of the new independent variables is always relevant and the R²’s usually increase. Second, both factors boost the level of LR recognition. Third, when both are available, both have an independent and significant impact, but in any case these factors (or at least one of them) appear among the most relevant factors to explain individual level variation in LR recognition. Thus, both media political intermediation and political socialization have an impact on LR recognition.

Due to spatial limitations, we cannot show the tests of the models to explain individual level variation in the recognition of the two largest parties’ LR position across countries. Contrary to what we find in terms of self LR recognition, in the case of parties’ LR recognition we now find a mix of long consolidated (US 2004) and new democracies (Bulgaria, Hong Kong, South Africa) with the highest R²; and at the bottom of the ranking, with the lowest R², we find both new (Mexico, Uruguay 2004, Spain 1993) and middle-aged (Greece 2004) democracies. Thus, we have a more mixed situation in terms of the impact of the age of the democratic regime and level of development on LR recognition. About the variables that have a significant impact on the recognition of parties’ location on the LR divide, we conclude that the pattern of determination is rather similar to the one found for LR SP.
**Table 6.1.** Explaining cross-national variation in individual level determination of left-right recognition (self and two major parties)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables:</th>
<th>R2 for individual level determination of LR recognition in each country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR recognition (self) explained by 3 variables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic regime</td>
<td>0.0008*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Years)</td>
<td>(2.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of press</td>
<td>-0.0096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop. Secondary educ.</td>
<td>-0.0007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.674)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Size</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.1162*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1) The robust standard errors procedure is used: robust statistics in parenthesis.
2) Non-standardized regression coefficients and probabilities associated with significance tests are shown in the table, beside R² and N.
3) Individual level determination of LR recognition by 3 variables (education, political interest, and age) or 5 variables (education, political interest, age, media exposure, and strength of party identification).
4) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
**Table 6.2.** Explaining cross-national variation in self left-right recognition – 2nd Step of the Two Step Hierarchical Regression (Beta coefficients) – only for countries that have all independent variables at the individual level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variables: regression coefficients for sophistication model (self)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Political interest</th>
<th>D1-age</th>
<th>d2-age</th>
<th>d3-age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic regime</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0045</td>
<td>-0.0008</td>
<td>-0.0019</td>
<td>-0.0032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Years)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(1.744)</td>
<td>(-0.302)</td>
<td>(-0.808)</td>
<td>(-1.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of press</td>
<td>-0.2553*</td>
<td>-0.0698</td>
<td>-0.1401</td>
<td>-0.1949</td>
<td>-0.3955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.882)</td>
<td>(-0.262)</td>
<td>(-0.601)</td>
<td>(-1.172)</td>
<td>(-1.493)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop. Secondary educ.</td>
<td>0.0066</td>
<td>-0.0103</td>
<td>0.0080</td>
<td>0.0042</td>
<td>0.0148*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.323)</td>
<td>(-1.539)</td>
<td>(0.966)</td>
<td>(0.687)</td>
<td>(1.874)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.5654***</td>
<td>0.9809***</td>
<td>-0.0857</td>
<td>0.2838</td>
<td>0.0296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.282)</td>
<td>(3.523)</td>
<td>(-0.283)</td>
<td>(0.842)</td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1) The robust standard errors procedure is used: robust statistics in parenthesis.
2) Non-standardized regression coefficients and probabilities associated with significance tests are shown in the table, beside R² and N.
3) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Let us now pass to explaining cross-national variations in a systematic way. First, we take the country by country $R^2$s (from the models to explain individual level determination of LR recognition) as our dependent variables and the macro-level items as our independent variables. From these tests we can conclude that LR recognition (self and parties) is always more socially and politically determined in long consolidated (or middle-aged democracies) than in new democracies. Freedom of press also has the expected effect (more freedom of press implies more determined profiles of LR recognition), but these effects are only significant when the fully specified models (i.e., those including education, political interest, age, media exposure, and party identification) are taken into account. Finally, unexpected results are present again for education: lower levels of determination in LR recognition in societies with higher levels of education.

Finally, we come to the second step of the hierarchical regressions, i.e., now we want to explain cross country variation in the patterns of determination of LR recognition for each and every predictor (“education”, “political interest” and “age”) – Tables 6.2-6.3. Our dependent variables are now the regression coefficients for the impact of “education”,
“political interest” and “age” on LR recognition in each country, and our independent variables (second step) are the macro-level items. Overall, what we can see in Table 6.2 for LR self recognition is that there are only two significant macro-level factors. Freedom of press boosts the impact of “education” on LR self recognition. Countries’ overall levels of education boost the impact of “D3 - age” upon LR self recognition: in countries with larger percentages of persons with a secondary education or more, the oldest cohort (“D3 - age”) has a significantly higher level of LR recognition than the youngest cohort (reference group: 18-29 years old).

In the case of parties’ LR recognition, only the variable “age of the democratic regime” has a significant effect, and only on the impact of “political interest”: in older democracies any individual “political interest” has more chances of increasing the level of parties’ LR recognition than in new democracies.

Summing up, we conclude that although cross country variation on the strength of the impact of the sophistication model (Tables 5.1-5.4; Table 6.1) and in the overall level of LR recognition (Table 4) can be clearly explained by macro level factors (age of democratic regime, freedom of press, and education), the case is less clear when we want to explain cross country variation in the impact of each individual level explanatory factor (Tables 6.2 and 6.3).

Concluding Remarks

We tried to understand and explain, both across individuals and countries from five continents, the level of recognition of the LR divide at the mass level. Previous studies have concentrated either on European cases or, when using a more global approach, on a description of patterns across countries/regions, and were less focused on explaining those differences. Thus, the present study contributes with unique data and approaches to the understanding of the use of the LR divide across the globe.

In terms of LR recognition (both for self and parties), we used CNEP I-III data from around 18-21 cases/countries in five continents. In line with previous studies, we found that the LR divide is widely recognized around the globe, although usually less in non-European and non-North American regions. What was less known was that at the individual level, the usual suspects (the sophistication model: “education”, “political interest”, “age”, “strength of party identification”, and “media exposure”) were valuable to explain individual level variation in LR recognition, not only in Europe and North America (US) but also in Asia (Hong Kong), Africa (South Africa and Mozambique) and in Latin America (several countries). Thus, this pinpoints the country differences in overall levels of LR recognition and might be due to compositional differences in the aggregate levels of education,
political interest, media exposure, and party identification in the different polities, and also that some convergence between countries might be expected in future, when and if these compositional differences are reduced.

Moreover, we found that cross country variation in the total strength of the impact of the sophistication model ($R^2$) and in the overall level of LR recognition can be more easily explained by macro level factors (age of democratic regime, freedom of press, party size, education) than when we want to explain cross country variation in the impact of each individual level explanatory factor. In the first case, the overall level of LR recognition is more dependent on macro level factors: age of the democratic regime (only for self LR recognition when collapsing “false centrists”) and freedom of press (for all dependent variables: self and parties) both boost the overall level of LR recognition in a country.

But in the second set of situations, concerning cross country variation in the impact of each individual level explanatory factor, we found that in terms of self LR recognition macro level indicators only have an impact on “education” and “age: oldest cohort vs. youngest cohort”: in more free media systems (for “education”) and in more educated societies (age), “education and age” have more of an impact on individual level self LR recognition, respectively. In the case of parties’ LR recognition, we concluded that in long consolidated (or middle-aged) democracies, “political interest” has more impact on LR recognition than in new democracies. Thus, in the latter polities the determination of individual level parties’ LR recognition is less dependent upon political interest and is therefore more diffuse, i.e., more dependent upon macro-level political and cultural factors.

Overall, however, we found that LR recognition (for self and parties) is more socially and politically determined (at the individual level) in long consolidated democracies and in systems with more freedom of press than in new democracies and in systems with not so free media systems. Thus, both the age of the democratic regime and freedom of press explain cross country variation in the individual level determination of LR recognition across countries. Consequently, there are reasons to expect some convergence between countries when democratic regimes (from non-Western parts of the world) are more consolidated, there is more freedom of the press, and the level of social development is stronger. Moreover, the evidence shown, concerning both the individual level and macro level of determination of LR recognition and use, gives clear indications of the heuristic value of the LR scale for comparing mass political attitudes and behaviour worldwide.

To conclude, some cues for future research are due. We found that not only is LR widely recognized and used across countries from five continents, although usually more so in Europe and North America, but also the individual level determinants LR recognition are heuristically useful world-wide. And we also found that both the sophistication models (for LR recognition) work better in long consolidated (or middle-aged) democracies and
in freer societies. But does this really mean that in the long term new democracies will converge with the long consolidated (or middle-aged) ones? This is certainly an empirical question that cannot be answered here. Moreover, we acknowledge that both the micro and macro models are relatively poor in terms of explanatory factors considered, but this is due to the limitations of the CNEP I-III survey data available, as well as the small number of cases at the macro level and the research design adopted (a comparative variable oriented and synchronic approach). There are clear tasks for future research either using more cases or more in-depth historical approaches based on case studies.

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Mapping and Explaining the Use of the Left-Right Divide


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“Securing our Survival (SOS)”: Non-State Actors and the Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Convention through the Prism of Securitisation Theory*

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This article analyses the security practices of the anti-nuclear movement in the post-Cold War period through the prism of securitisation theory. By exploring Buzan and Wæver’s conceptual developments on macrosecuritisations, the practices involved in the struggle against the Bomb are interpreted as securitising moves, in which the anti-nuclear movement is the leading securitiser. In the capacity of securitising actors, nuclear abolition activists argue that nuclear disarmament, under a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), would be the only way to protect humankind from the threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons. The empirical analysis of these non-state actors and their campaign for a NWC shows that, despite uttering security, the anti-nuclear movement has so far failed to achieve the proposed security measure, that is, nuclear disarmament. Nonetheless, securitisation has been instrumental for these non-state actors as a way of raising an issue on the agenda of decision-makers and urging them to take action.

Keywords: International Relations; non-state actors; nuclear disarmament; securitisation theory.

Introduction

The history of the peace movement has been the subject of several outstanding books and the impact the “arms control transnational network” had upon

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1 The author would like to thank Dr. Matthieu Chillaud, the supervisor of the MA dissertation that resulted in this article, and the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions. Responsibility for any error or omission lies solely with the author.
international politics during the Cold War has been vastly researched and now constitutes a well-established literature in the field of international relations. Nevertheless, a deep understanding of the advocacy of nuclear disarmament as an attempt to securitise nuclear weapons is yet to be presented.

In order to overcome this gap and shed light on the role of discourse as an important non-material source of power in international military affairs, the present article examines the campaign led by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) through the prism of securitisation theory. Exploring Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s conceptual developments on macrosecuritisations (2009), it was possible to interpret the practices involved in the struggle against the Bomb as securitising moves in which the anti-nuclear movement is the leading securitiser – that is, the actor that mobilises different resources with the purpose of constructing a specific issue as a threat.

With the purpose of identifying patterns of representation and establishing networks of meanings that are invariably present in the construction of threats, a discourse analysis of the most central texts produced by anti-nuclear NGOs advocating for the establishment of a NWC was conducted. It became clear that, despite uttering security, the anti-nuclear movement has thus far failed to achieve the proposed security measure. Nonetheless, this attempt at securitisation has been instrumental for these non-state actors, as the alarmist tone of the discourse has provided them with a loud voice in international military affairs.

Before presenting the empirical analysis and its main findings, an overview of the macrosecuritisation concept will be provided. This theoretical exercise seems particularly worthwhile as there are few studies that make use of this higher-level securitisation framework.

By adopting a fresh perspective on the study of the anti-nuclear movement, this article intends to provide a better understanding of the power of non-state actors in international politics, and also to highlight the instrumentality of securitisation as a way of raising an issue on the agenda of decision-makers and urging them to take action (Vuori, 2008, p. 76).

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2 For a great account of the history of the nuclear abolition movement, see the three volumes of Lawrence Wittner’s collection The struggle against the Bomb (Wittner, 1993, 1997, 2003). On the arms control transnational network of the Cold War, see Adler (1992) and Risse-Kappen (1994).

3 In this article, NGOs are defined in conformity with the United Nations legal framework that governs NGO participation, Resolution 1996/31 of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). According to this resolution, “any such organization that is not established by a governmental entity or intergovernmental agreement shall be considered a non-governmental organization”. In this resolution, “organization” may refer to NGOs at the national, subregional, regional and international levels (UN Economic and Social Council, 1996).
Understanding Macrosecuritisations

Throughout the years, Buzan and Wæver have employed the securitisation framework, mainly in studies dealing with regional security dynamics. Recently, however, the authors came to the conclusion that the study of securitisation processes involving referent objects placed at the system level had been somewhat neglected. The efforts regarding the American-led “Global War on Terrorism” (GWoT) and the growing visibility of the transnational environmental movement motivated these authors to conduct a modest revision of their original framework, adjusting it to the study of higher-level securitisations.

In “Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: reconsidering scale in securitisation theory” (hereafter, “Macrosecuritisation”), Buzan and Wæver adopted a slightly critical approach to refer to their previous focus on the regional level. The authors stated that elements of realist thinking were evident in the predominance of states and national security concerns in what could be considered “an egotistical model of security” (Buzan and Waever, 2009, p. 256). Although this model came close to reality, it was not appropriate to analyse particular occasions when over-arching international security problems dominated the global structure of security. To remedy this weakness, they proposed the concept of macrosecuritisation, which denotes securitisations on behalf of referent objects located at levels higher than the middle one and “which aim to incorporate and coordinate multiple lower level securitisations” (Buzan and Waever, 2009, p. 257).

As could have been anticipated, these higher order securitisations share many of the features that characterise lower level ones. Macrosecuritisations also require securitising actors, which mobilise different resources, with the purpose of constructing a specific issue as a threat, on behalf of a referent object and before the relevant audience(s). Nonetheless, due to their particular macro quality, macrosecuritisations usually establish hierarchical relations with other securitisations, possibly incorporating or coordinating them. Another distinguishing feature of macrosecuritisations is that, when powerful, they can “operate as the interpretive framework for other securitisations” (2009, p. 265).

This was the case during the Cold War, when security concerns at lower levels were re-articulated and framed in terms of the East-West conflict. In order to properly identify a macrosecuritisation, one can compare it to other lower level securitisations, according to three different criteria. The obvious one concerns the level of the referent object: individual, group, unit, civilizational, system or global. A second aspect for comparison refers to comprehensiveness; that is, the extent to which the macrosecuritisation effectively reaches and structures securitisations in different sectors. According to this criterion, different degrees of comprehensiveness will determine whether the securitisation is a niche, a partial or inclusive one. A third point for consideration would be the degree of success
achieved by the macrosecuritisation, which can be evaluated according to the level of support demonstrated by the relevant audience. Buzan and Wæver (2009) carefully point out that the degree of success does not strictly determine “whether something is a macrosecuritisation or not, but whether it is a powerful one” (p. 259).

It is interesting to note that the authors avoid establishing firm standards that determine whether or not a macrosecuritisation has been put in place. Instead, they propose that the analyst observe the power of a securitisation indirectly, assessing the impact it has on security constellations. This lack of concrete criteria to evaluate whether or not a securitisation has occurred is one of the main criticisms facing the Copenhagen School.4 5

The idea of constellations had already figured in other texts by authors associated with the Copenhagen School, usually in the context of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). Nonetheless, in “Macrosecuritisation” the concept is re-examined from a macro perspective. In this sense, the authors refer to constellations as sets of interlinked securitisations and their respective cross-levels, cross-sectors relations. Thus, it becomes clear that constellations are generated by macrosecuritisations, which structure and organise interdependent securitisations (Buzan and Waever, 2009, p. 259). Therefore, the study of security constellations allows the security analyst to see the “bigger picture”; that is, the large-scale patterns of interlinked securitisations. On some occasions, these patterns are marked by the existence of a powerful macrosecuritisation, which incorporates and/or frames many of the lower level securitisations. Through such processes, macrosecuritisations can generate system-spanning constellations – as was the case of the Cold War (Buzan and Waever, 2009, p. 268).

4 In the monograph Security: a new framework for analysis (Buzan et al., 1998), there are passages in which the authors state that the securitising claims must be accepted by the relevant audience and exceptional measures must be adopted so that a securitisation can be achieved (Buzan et. al., 1998, p. 26). Nevertheless, on other occasions, Buzan et al. (1998) lower their standards, affirming that the permission to “break free of the normal procedures and rules” already signifies that a securitisation has been accomplished (p. 25). In one of these confusing statements, the authors affirm that “the exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects” (p. 25). However, they do not explore the dynamics of this intersubjective process, nor do they elaborate on what their understanding of “normal political procedures”, “relevant audience” and “substantial political effects” is. This might be a conscious decision, since all these categories can be considered case dependent, and establishing rigid parameters would perhaps make the securitisation framework impractical. Yet, the absence of a frame for how securitisations are successful or not has led to disparate understandings of what the construction of a threat image exactly entails. For critical assessments of the Copenhagen School, see Balzacq (2011a) and Stritzel (2007).

5 The term “Copenhagen School” became a commonly used shorthand to refer to the collective work of Buzan, Wæver and other scholars associated with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI).
Yet, establishing powerful macrosecuritisations can be quite expensive and involve strenuous efforts. Political capital and other sorts of resources are employed by the securitising actors in different practices that can contribute to the construction of a threat. In the case of macrosecuritisations, Buzan and Wæver argue that the creation of universalist ideologies, embracing strong political claims, facilitates the establishment and maintenance of the threat image. Since these universalist beliefs provide a basis for the creation and reinforcement of core identities, they also make the construction of shared understandings and shared threat perceptions possible. Not surprisingly, universalisms play a big part in the process of winning over the relevant audiences – domestic and international ones. Based on the main argument in which the ideology is rooted, Buzan and Wæver (2009) identified four types of universalisms: inclusive, exclusive, existing order universalism and physical threat universalism (pp. 260-61).

They argued that each kind of universalism influences the dynamics of the macrosecuritisation and their respective constellations in different ways. The anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation of the Cold War, for instance, was based on a variant of physical threat universalisms, since the securitising actors argued that nuclear weapons posed a threat to the physical fate of humanity (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 261). In this case, particular features of the alleged threat, such as its unparalleled power of destruction and its indiscriminate nature, underpinned a securitisation that could eventually be full-scale.

Macrosecuritisation of Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War Period

In the context of the Cold War, Buzan and Wæver approached the anti-nuclear securitisation from the perspective of the activists who have been advocating for nuclear disarmament ever since the first bomb was dropped in 1945. From this point of view, Buzan and Wæver (2009) stated that “oppositional civil society groups” were the main carriers of this macrosecuritisation (p. 270) and therefore provided an innovative account of the anti-nuclear movement during the Cold War. According to them, anti-nuclear securitisers construed the threat of nuclear weapons in connection with other security concerns, like the devastation of the environment caused by nuclear tests and the danger of war between the rival superpowers. Connecting various concerns pertinent to discrete sectors, the anti-nuclear movement was capable of establishing an inclusive macrosecuritisation (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 259).

From the viewpoint of nuclear non-proliferation, this was a relatively successful macrosecuritisation; nuclear proliferation was established as a threat and arms control mechanisms and the NPT regime were put in place to avoid this problem. Evidently, the anti-nuclear movement was not the only actor interested in preventing proliferation. At the
same time that non-proliferation represented the “genuine fear that the spread of nuclear weapons would increase the chance of them being used”, it also had a strong appeal for the two superpowers, who sought to maintain their privileged status and military pre-eminence (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 270). From the perspective of disarmament, however, the anti-nuclear movement was not able to convince the relevant audience that outlawing and eliminating nuclear weapons constituted an appropriate solution to the nuclear threat.

Taking these mixed results into account, Buzan and Wæver (2009) provided the general picture of this securitisation, affirming that “Compared to the dominant securitisation pattern of the Cold War, securitisatin of nuclear weapons, though aiming at universality, was much less widely held […] But it nevertheless represented a durable and in some ways influential minority macrosecuritisation with an active global following” (p. 270).

Although succinct, this assessment of the anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation of the Cold War is of enormous importance for several reasons. Remarkably, it signified a change of posture towards the securitisation of nuclear weapons. Before this article, Buzan and Wæver had only mentioned the securitisation of nuclear weapons in situations where states were the securitising actor and proliferation in specific countries was in fact the issue being constructed as a threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 55; Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p. 13). The focus on the global level allowed the authors to see the securitising efforts made by the anti-nuclear movement that, until then, had been overlooked by the literature on securitisation. In “Macrosecuritisation”, Buzan and Wæver not only confirmed that securitisation is a process that can take place at every level but they also strengthened the claim that non-state actors can effectively play the role of securitisers. As a result, they inaugurated a new perspective on the study of the anti-nuclear movement, asserting the feasibility of examining the nuclear abolition discourse as an attempt to securitise the existence of nuclear weapons.

**Security Dynamics after the Cold War and the Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC)**

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to the East-West conflict and the ideological rivalry that had underpinned the bipolar power structure. According to Buzan and Wæver (2009), the end of the Cold War was “a massive act of macrodesecuritisation”, which led to the extinction of the security constellation that had been generated by the two rival macrosecuritisations (p. 270). As for the perceived threat posed by nuclear weapons, it was largely diluted amid the wave of general optimism that became apparent in international relations during the early 1990s.
Even though cooperative patterns of relations started to emerge between the US and Russia and there was an intensification of international negotiations concerning arms control agreements and reductions, these did not necessarily mean that steps towards complete elimination of nuclear weapons were being taken. As the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)\(^6\) continued to include nuclear deterrence in their defence doctrines, the wave of optimism that followed the end of the Cold War soon turned into disappointment. It became clear to nuclear abolition activists that none of the NWS considered nuclear disarmament a viable option. Moreover, the persistence of vertical and horizontal proliferation,\(^7\) as well as the inability to put an end to nuclear testing, reminded the anti-nuclear movement of how distant the world was from nuclear abolition.

Despite the lessening of international tensions and the decrease in popular mobilisation, peace activists and nuclear abolition organisations kept on lobbying for nuclear disarmament. By different means, nuclear abolition activists and NGOs continued to draw attention to the dangers posed by the very existence of nuclear weapons. Considering the nuclear threat an urgent question, a matter of life and death to all humanity, these abolitionists conducted campaigns and staged demonstrations that were charged with securitising claims. In order to tackle this problem, the anti-nuclear movement suggested that different steps be taken, all leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. According to them, the time to act was always “now”; otherwise, proliferation would continue to take place. In the nuclear abolition discourse, an increased number of nuclear weapons represented a bigger chance they would be used – destroying “whole cities, populations, countries or even civilisation” (HILL, 2007).

Among the main campaigns of the anti-nuclear movement in the post-Cold War period are the fight against nuclear tests, the World Court Project – which requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons – and the Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC). The latter emerged in the 1990s, after the ICJ issued its verdict, comprising six different findings. Remarkably, one such conclusion was the declaration that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects” (International Court of Justice, 1996).

\(^6\) Nuclear Weapon States are here defined in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); that is, the countries which have manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967 - China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. See the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968).

\(^7\) Horizontal proliferation is used to refer to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by hitherto non-nuclear weapon states. Accordingly, vertical proliferation refers to the further development, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon states.
In 1996, as a follow-up to the ICJ’s ruling, the UNGA first adopted a resolution calling on all states “to commence multilateral negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear-weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination” (UN General Assembly, 1996).

Despite this apparent consensus on the idea of a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), it had been met with scepticism by those who asserted the unlikelihood of obtaining agreements on the legal and technical requirements of such a treaty. In the absence of concrete proposals coming from states, experts from different organisations came together and drafted themselves a model NWC. It was a draft of a legally binding international convention, regulating the elimination and institutionalising the prohibition of the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. Equipped with this new tool, a network of nuclear abolition INGOs and NGOs started campaigning for international negotiations leading to the establishment of a NWC as the solution to the nuclear threat.

Collaborating with states willing to advance the goal of nuclear abolition, the anti-nuclear movement managed to include the model NWC in the “general and complete disarmament” agenda of the fifty-second session of the UNGA, in 1997. At the request of Costa Rica, the Model NWC was translated into the UN official languages and circulated to the UN member states. In his introductory letter, the Ambassador of Costa Rica presented the Model NWC as an initiative by civil society, aimed at creating legal instruments in order to achieve the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. He also stated his belief that states should carry through with this enterprise (UN General Assembly, 1997a). This was an important moment for the nuclear abolition movement. As the draft reached national delegations, there was a real chance that it would be incorporated into their discussions. However, with regard to the resolutions adopted by this session of the UNGA, no substantive progress on nuclear disarmament was achieved apart from the second resolution on the follow-up of the advisory opinion of the ICJ (UN General Assembly, 1997b).

As a document for discussion, the Model NWC that circulated in the UNGA received comments, criticisms and suggestions for improvement. It was then reviewed by a consortium of experts and published in Security and Survival: The case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (1999); a book by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), the International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms (IALANA), and the International Network of Engineers and Scientists against Proliferation (INESAP). In addition to the improved version of the Model NWC, Security and Survival contained comments and critical questions regarding different aspects of the treaty. Intended to a broader audience than the political elite, this publication also contained advocacy
statements, poetry, cartoons and pictures related to the subject of nuclear weapons. In addition to the printed version, the book was also made available online.

The campaign for a NWC continued to be one of the major projects of the anti-nuclear movement throughout the 2000s. In 2007, as the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world became once again part of the security establishment’s rhetoric, the Model NWC and the texts that were part of Security and Survival were updated and reprinted. In this context, IPPNW, IALANA and INESAP came together again and published Securing our Survival (SOS): The case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In accordance with the title, securitising claims permeated all the different texts contained in this book.

Again in 2007, Costa Rica submitted a working paper on the NWC to the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee (NPT Preparatory Committee, 2007). Additionally, the Costa Rican and Malaysian governments requested that the updated model NWC be circulated in the sixty-second session of the UNGA (UN General Assembly, 2008). Regarding the resolutions adopted by this session of the General Assembly, not much progress was made, except for the annual resolution on the follow-up of the ICJ’s advisory opinion (UN General Assembly, 2007).

Nevertheless, 2007 marked the beginning of a revival of interest in the cause of nuclear abolition. The Wall Street Journal op-ed “A world free of nuclear weapons” (2007), signed by former US Secretaries of State George P. Shultz and Henry A. Kissinger, together with former Secretary of Defence William J. Perry and former Senator Sam Nunn, is commonly referred to as the starting point of this trend. This op-ed had repercussions at the national and international levels, generating a wave of positive responses coming from different parts of the world (Dalaqua, 2011).

In that same year, different nuclear abolition INGOs joined efforts and launched the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). An umbrella organisation, ICAN included NGOs from all around the world. Modelled on the successful International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), ICAN’s main objective was to promote the “security action”, the abolition of nuclear weapons through the establishment of a NWC.

As the calls for nuclear disarmament grew stronger, the WSJ published another op-ed signed by Schultz et al. in the beginning of 2008. Under the title “Toward a nuclear-free world”, the four American statesmen reinstated the opinion expressed in the previous year and affirmed the need to reduce reliance on the “deadliest weapons ever invented”. According to them, the world was facing a “nuclear tipping point” and it was necessary to act fast to avoid the “nuclear precipice” and end nuclear weapons as a threat to the world (Schultz et al, 2008).

Likewise, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon presented his five-point plan on nuclear disarmament. Addressing a meeting organised at the United Nations by the East-West
Institute, Ki-moon mentioned the threats posed by nuclear weapons, which he said can have “horrific consequences”. With the purpose of overcoming the nuclear threat, the Secretary-General put together a plan. Already in the first point, he urged all NPT parties, in particular the NWS, to consider negotiating a NWC without delay (Ki-moon, 2008).

Strengthening the calls for a nuclear weapon-free world, the Global Zero movement was launched in December 2008. Congregating high-profile political figures and former politicians and officials of the Cold War era, Global Zero defended phased and verified reductions, as well as a binding agreement to eliminate all nuclear weapons by a certain date (Global Zero Commission, 2009). The political and social capital of the members of this group proved to be a catalysing factor and, shortly after it had been founded, Global Zero representatives held meetings with military officials and political leaders from key countries, such as the US and Russia (Corera, 2008).

Far more prominently than ever before in the post-Cold War period, nuclear weapons were being depicted by top-rank politicians and high-level state officials as a threat to the survival of humankind. In the US, this endorsement of the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons set the political mood for the presidential campaign that was under way in 2008. Soon after coming to power, President Obama gave voice to his “vision of zero”, during the so-called “Prague Speech”. In the capital of the Czech Republic, in April 2009, President Obama enunciated his belief on the feasibility of a world free of nuclear weapons. According to him,

The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War […] Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of a global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up […] And no matter where it happens, there is no end to what the consequences might be – for our global safety, our security, our society, our economy, to our ultimate survival […] So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons (The White House, 2009).

Sensing a window of opportunity, nuclear abolition activists intensified their lobbying practices before and during the 2010 NPT Review Conference. A day prior to the Conference, 15,000 people gathered at an anti-nuclear rally in New York, on May 2, 2010. At the Conference, 28 countries specifically referred to a NWC. Additionally, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) – representing 118 countries – voiced demands for a time-bound

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8 Signatories included former US President Jimmy Carter, former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, former German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and former British Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind. For the complete list of signatories, see http://www.globalzero.org/full-list-signatories [Retrieved on 21 July 2011].
commitment to achieve nuclear abolition under a NWC (Wright, 2010, pp. 52; 53). This time, the Conference agreed on a final agreement, in which efforts aimed at commencing negotiations on a NWC were finally acknowledged (NPT Review Conference, 2010).

**Trying to Securitise Nuclear Weapons in Different Settings**

The analysis of the main developments involving the securitisation of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War period supports the view of securitisation as a complex, historical process. As such, they involve a plurality of practices, actors and audiences. Even though state actors have incorporated securitising claims to their rhetoric, this article seeks to investigate the securitisation of nuclear weapons from the perspective of its long-standing advocates, the anti-nuclear movement. Through this approach, the present article intends to advance the study of non-state actors’ engagement in international military affairs and to shed light on the possible instrumentality of securitisation as a way of raising an issue on the agenda of decision-makers and urging them to take action.

The array of different practices involved in the securitisation promoted by the anti-nuclear organisations points to the existence of various “battle fronts” where the construction of nuclear weapons as a threat is fought; that is, it is negotiated between the securitiser and the audiences. In order to gain a better understanding of the variations in the form, content and success of different securitising moves, Salter (2008) borrowed the concept of “setting” from Goffman’s dramaturgical analysis (p. 322). According to Salter (2008), “the setting of a securitising act includes the stage on which it is made, the genre in which it is made, the audience to which it is pitched, and the reception of the audience” (p. 328). This dramaturgical approach comes to remedy the exaggerated emphasis on the internal elements of discourse that is part of the speech-act model proposed by the Copenhagen School. As Salter has observed, the success of a securitisation cannot be reduced to the formal syntax of the speech; it is also related to the existence of a common, social grammar, which encompasses the “particular history, dominant narrative, constitutive characters, and the structure of the setting itself” (2008, p. 331).

The different settings in which the securitising actors usually stage their performance are the following: the popular, the elite, the technocratic and the scientific (Salter, 2008). Affecting the way in which the securitiser chooses to present its claims are the different audiences comprised in these settings, as well as the specific rules and procedures that govern them. Employing Salter’s classification of settings, it is possible to identify the main moves and their respective audiences in the securitisation of nuclear weapons conducted by the nuclear abolition movement (see Table 1). It is important to remember that,
in reality, these different settings are all connected, “as they are part of the same policy-making process” (Léonard and Kaunert, 2011, p. 74).

Table 1. Four settings in which the anti-nuclear movement stages its securitising moves

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Setting</th>
<th>Main audience</th>
<th>Main stages</th>
<th>Main securitising moves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite</td>
<td>Top-rank politicians</td>
<td>The UNGA and the institutional bodies of the NPT review process</td>
<td>Discussions in the Senate/Parliament; debates in the UNGA and in the NPT Review Conferences; international workshops; high-level political meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>General public</td>
<td>Mainstream media, the Internet.</td>
<td>Movies; documentaries; music; newspaper articles; popular demonstrations; paper handouts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific</td>
<td>Academics, scientists and arms controllers.</td>
<td>Expert conferences</td>
<td>Academic publications; expert conferences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technocratic</td>
<td>Civil servants</td>
<td>Conference on Disarmament and the UN Disarmament Commission.</td>
<td>Debates and negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and the UN Disarmament Commission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Technocratic Setting

If it is true that “the restrictions of mandate and bureaucratic thinking will predominate in technocratic politics” (Salter, 2008, p. 331), then there is no doubt that the CD and the United Nations Disarmament Commissions (UNDC) are, in this case, the main stages of the technocratic setting. These two multilateral fora are characterised by intense debates about their own procedural rules and lack of progress regarding substantial disarmament issues. Moreover, both institutions have quite restrictive policies governing the participation of civil society organisations.

In the CD, for instance, very little of what happens during the many weeks in which the Conference is convened is open to NGOs. Nonetheless, nuclear abolition organisations have found ways to lobby national delegations and engage with the work of the Conference. They can request the official documents of the plenary meetings and follow online reports of NGOs that are present in Geneva and are therefore aware of the discussions inside the CD. NGOs also have the right to submit documents to the CD and to make written material available to members of the Conference twice a year.

In 2004, the CD agreed to host one informal meeting with NGOs per annual session. However, this can only occur once the CD has adopted a programme of work, which does not happen very often. After 10 years of impasse, the CD was able to adopt a programme of work in 2009. However, the Conference failed to adopt a framework for implementation before the annual session.
the rules of the CD so that NGOs can be more effectively included in the process, but no substantial improvements have been achieved thus far.10

Even though there is little public interest in the UNDC, anti-nuclear NGOs try to follow these meetings. During spring, when the Disarmament Commission meets, the organisations that can make their way to New York hold panel discussions in connection with the UNDC agenda. In order to engage with the member states, NGOs try to organise these events in partnership with national delegations. These informal meetings are one of the stages that nuclear abolitionists created to present their securitising moves in the technocratic setting.

The Scientific Setting

The scientific setting is mostly made up of nuclear scientists and arms controllers. Considering that these experts possess authoritative knowledge on subjects that are relevant to policy projects, it is tempting to see them as an “epistemic community” (Haas, 1992). This representation, however, may be misleading. As Johnson (2009) has already noted, there are difficulties in presenting these actors as a unified community (p. 198). The political fragmentation of these scientists and arms controllers and the fact that they actually provide competing information and advice makes it more prudent to characterise them in terms of epistemic groups rather than a single community.

Even though this is a somewhat restricted environment, organisations that focus on research and are part of the network of nuclear experts have managed to promote a discourse in favour of nuclear abolition in the stages of the scientific setting.11 This is not that difficult, considering that a large number of scientists are openly concerned with the military use of nuclear technology and supportive of the goal of nuclear disarmament. While there is a long tradition of calls for nuclear zero coming from the scientific rank,

ended. When it resumed its work in 2010, the programme of work had to be renegotiated among members, who failed to come to a consensus. Since then, the Conference has not been able to adopt any programme of work and it ended its 2010, 2011 and 2012 sessions without any progress on substantive issues.

In the past few years, the Conference has allowed members of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) to read out a statement on the occasion of International Women’s Day. This has been the only chance members of NGOs have had to address the delegates during an official session.

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) are all examples of organisations that, to varying degrees, promote securitising moves in the scientific setting.
one should not overlook the arguments of scientists and arms controllers that advocate for “nuclear security” – which usually involves an increased budget being allocated to further development of nuclear military technology so as to increase the safety, security and reliability of nuclear arsenals.

Evidently, science and politics are very much intertwined in the securitising moves conducted in this setting. For instance, amid the CTBT negotiations in the 1990s, the feasibility of a global system monitoring nuclear tests was a prominent topic of scientific research. Different conferences were organised with the purpose of debating monitoring techniques, which required scientific input from the disciplines of seismology, hydroacoustics, infrasound and radionuclide. Since these scientific exchanges were part of the political battle surrounding the CTBT completion and its subsequent entry into force, they were also part of the different securitisers' moves in favour of disarmament or deterrence. As the CTBT remains in limbo, the CTBTO – the organisation in charge of the Treaty – continues to promote these scientific meetings, at the same time as it tries to spark the necessary ratifications to bring it into effect.12

Although this setting is not completely accessible to the general public, securitisers have explored scientists' expert knowledge in securitising moves aimed at popular or elite audiences. Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the inspections it conducted figured constantly in the political discussions of the US and the UK (Roe, 2008). At present, IAEA inspectors, weapons specialists, scientists and engineers have taken part in the controversy related to the Iranian nuclear programme. Talks about nuclear fuels, the levels of uranium enrichment and the different types of nuclear reactors frequently present a mix of scientific, political and security issues.

The Popular Setting

Securitisers' moves in the popular setting declined greatly after the end of Cold War. The turnout in public events aimed at strengthening the calls for nuclear abolition is definitely smaller now than it used to be during the apexes of the movement, in the late 1950s and 1980s. Even so, anti-nuclear activists have continuously used opinion poll results to make the case for abolition, arguing that the general public is in favour of a total elimination of nuclear weapons.

12 In recent years, the CTBTO has hosted the Symposium on Synergies with Science (2006), the International Scientific Studies Conference (2009) and the Science and Technology Conference (2011, 2013). The objective of these meetings was to discuss and explore advances in science and technology relevant to test ban verification and the Treaty’s entry into force.
The sources of those opinion polls vary and so does the reliability of such data. Nevertheless, it has been shown that, accurate or not, statistical data can have a real impact on securitisation processes – especially when picked up by the media (Léonard and Kaunert, 2011, p. 69; 70). This, however, has not been the case of the anti-nuclear movement, which remained largely ignored by the mainstream media throughout the 1990s and the 2000s. Counterproliferation, instead of disarmament, has been the perspective favoured by the media to address matters of nuclear security. Accordingly, the controversial nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea have been extensively covered, but the linkages between nuclear proliferation and the lack of progress towards disarmament have been left unexplored (Tyson, 2004, p. 61).

Other means of communication have contributed to securitisation processes, such as the documentary films *An Inconvenient Truth* (2006) and *Countdown to Zero* (2010). From the same producers, the two movies conveyed the sense of urgency associated with the threats of global warming and nuclear weapons, respectively. In what can be seen as a major securitising move in the popular setting, *Countdown to Zero* featured interviews with leading statesmen and experts, who recounted real life situations in which nuclear weapons had almost been used, as well as times when major nuclear accidents could have happened but were just averted. The Global Zero movement, which promoted the movie to large audiences, described *Countdown to Zero* as “a chilling wakeup call about the urgency of the nuclear threat” (Global Zero, 2010).

*Countdown to Zero* opened in movie theatres in different countries, but is currently available online for download. On the internet, one might also find other films, videos, songs and texts that portray the existence of nuclear weapons as an existential threat to human survival. As Vaughn (2009) has observed, securitising moves on the internet can be quite relevant, especially if they are primarily available through news sources or other media outlets (p. 274). Famous musicians, actors, leaders and political figures who support nuclear disarmament also strengthen securitising moves in this setting.

**The Elite Setting**

Although securitising actors may require the support of several audiences, the elite setting comprises the central audience of this particular securitisation. Since it is constituted of political leaders who are influential at the global, regional and national levels, this setting effectively congregates audiences “whose attitude has a direct causal connection with the desired goals” (Balzacq, 2005, p. 185); that is, state representatives who have the formal power to start negotiations on a NWC. Even though this setting comprises a variety
of stages, the most important ones are the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees.

The UNGA has played a significant role in world affairs involving arms control and disarmament norms. Several declarations and resolutions have first been adopted in the United Nations before producing conventions and treaties (Lewis and Thakur, 2004, p. 19). Although not all arms control agreements have been crafted inside UN fora, all the different treaties banning biological and chemical weapons, as well as landmines and cluster munitions, have been developed with the support of a significant number of governments, international organisations and UN agencies. In this particular case, it is expected that a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons will need the support of the UNGA and the UNSC (Andreasen, 2009).

The empowering audience, the one that has the ability to enable the securitising actor to adopt the measures that would tackle the threat, can also be found in the NPT regime and its institutional bodies. As the NPT review process has been gradually opened to NGO participation, the idea of a NWC started to receive more attention from the states’ parties. So far, the apex of this trend occurred in the latest NPT Review Conference, in 2010, when numerous states mentioned the NWC in their statements and efforts aimed at commencing negotiations on the NWC were acknowledged in the final document for the first time (NPT Review Conference, 2010).

Still, in the elite setting, it is quite difficult for nuclear abolition organisations to reach the audience. The asymmetry of power between states and non-state actors inside Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGO) and other multilateral fora is significant. Members of civil society organisations can only attend sessions designated as open and, even then, they might not have the right to participate in the discussions. Under special circumstances, NGOs may be allowed to address plenary sessions – but that has not happened frequently in the most important meetings.

Taking all of this into account, it is clear that the elite setting is the most challenging one in this securitisation. In order to understand the obstacles preventing the macrosecuritisation of nuclear weapons from becoming a successful endeavour, it is imperative to analyse in detail the practices of the securitisers in this setting.


In the elite setting, the securitisers are the nuclear abolition organisations that have more prominently conducted securitising moves in the UNGA and the institutional bodies
of the NPT, mainly: the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IP-PNW), the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA), the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) and the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). The time frame analysed encompasses the period from 1997, when the draft NWC was circulated in the UNGA for the first time, to the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

In between these two events, the securitisers delivered presentations at the NPT Review Conferences of 2000 and 2005, as well as the NPT Preparatory Committees of 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008 and 2009. The datasets available for each of these occasions varied. In addition to the written statements that were always accessible, it was possible to analyse video footage of the NGOs’ presentations at the 2005 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. Audio records of the presentations delivered during the 2007 Preparatory Committee were also examined. The two versions of the NWC that became official UN documents of the fifty-second and sixty-second session, together with the introductory letters signed by representatives of Costa Rica and Malaysia, were included in the empirical analysis. The same is true for the working papers on the NWC submitted to the NPT Review Conferences of 2000, 2005 and 2010, as well as the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee [See Table 2 for an overview of the dataset analysed. The complete list of reviewed documents can be found in Dalaqua (2011), Appendix 1].

Table 2. Overview of the data analysed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occasion</th>
<th>Dataset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fifty-second session of the UNGA</td>
<td>Official documents and resolutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1997)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 NPT Review Conference</td>
<td>Working paper on the NWC; NGO presentations (written statements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 NPT Preparatory Committee</td>
<td>NGO presentations (written statements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 NPT Preparatory Committee</td>
<td>NGO presentations (written statements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 NPT Preparatory Committee</td>
<td>NGO presentations (written statements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 NPT Review Conference</td>
<td>Working paper on the NWC; NGO presentations (video footage and written statements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 NPT Preparatory Committee</td>
<td>Working paper on the NWC; NGO presentations (audio records and written statements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixty-second session of the UNGA</td>
<td>Official documents and resolutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 NPT Preparatory Committee</td>
<td>NGO presentations (written statements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 NPT Preparatory Committee</td>
<td>NGO presentations (written statements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 NPT Review Conference</td>
<td>Working paper on the NWC; NGO presentations (video footage and written statements)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As one anonymous reviewer noted, the anti-nuclear organisations represented in these international fora are often based in European and North American countries.
**Methodology**

With the purpose of understanding the process through which this specific public issue – the existence of nuclear weapons – becomes a security concern at the global level, discourse analysis is used to uncover the structures and practices that are involved in the construction of a threat. By employing discourse analysis, other securitisation studies have been able to map the “emergence and evolution of patterns of representation which are constitutive of a threat image” (Balzacq, 2011b, p. 39). Following this practice, it is expected that discourse analysis of the most central texts produced by the securitising actors will shed light on the sources, mechanisms and effects of the construction of nuclear weapons as a threat to the survival of all humankind.

Traditionally, discourse analysis has been mainly concerned with the content of the discourses, rather than the larger process in which such discourses are immersed. A range of scholars who considered such a focus to be misleading started to promote a different conception of discourse analysis, which became known as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 1992; Wodak and Meyer, 2001). Considering that discourse is a part of social life and is therefore inherently intersubjective, scholars associated with the CDA perspective have argued that discourse should be studied in its interaction with other discourses. Moreover, they have asserted the need to take into account the larger contextual frame in which discourse is produced, delivered and consumed (Hardy and Phillips, 2004).

From the perspective of the CDA, discourses are considered social practices, as well as representations of social practices. Discourses are resources that are activated by people in the construction of meaning about the world as much as they are practices that structure the meaning in use (Balzacq, 2011b, p. 39). As Fairclough (2003) has demonstrated, any process of “meaning-making” is invariably intersubjective and context dependent. Likewise, constructing a given issue as a security concern presupposes interaction between the securitising actor and the relevant audience(s), which are all situated in a specific time and place.

In order to fully understand the discourse promoted by the securitiser, it is necessary to develop a framework for analysis in which the speakers’ interlocutors are properly represented and the immediate and distal contexts are also taken into account. Therefore, for the purpose of guiding the discourse analysis of the selected case studies, a customised

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14 Although the term “text” strongly suggests written language, it is used here to refer to a more diverse set of forms. A materialisation of discourse, texts can include a variety of signs (written and spoken utterances, symbols, pictures, music) - all capable of conveying meaning in a certain context (Balzacq, 2011b, p. 39).
framework for analysis was developed. Following Balzacq’s (2011b) suggestion, it comprises three different levels: agents, acts and context (p. 35).

The first level encompasses the actors and relations that structure the securitisation, while the second one comprises the discursive and non-discursive practices that underwrite the securitisation process. The third level provides for the way contextual factors can empower or disempower the securitising actors (Balzacq, 2011b, p. 35; 36).

This methodological construction is intended to facilitate the study of the securitisation process as a whole. If the levels of analysis follow Balzacq’s proposal, the same is not true for the constituent analytics within each level. The framework here developed deviates reasonably from his proposed scheme, as items particularly relevant to the study of the anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation have been introduced. The overall result is a comprehensive yet practical framework for analysis (see Table 3).

Table 3. Framework for discourse analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 1 - agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Securitising actors (identity; social capital; authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Audience(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Referent object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Other relevant actors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 2 - acts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific grammar of security:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Existential threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Urgency/ Point of no return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Possible way out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Meaning of security$^1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Associative arguments$^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Intertextuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Heuristic artefacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Links with other securitisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 3 - contexts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13. Immediate setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Distal context</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1) From a hermeneutical perspective, Ciută (2009) argued that the meaning the securitising actors attribute to the concept of security should also be part of the study of securitisation.
2) Vaughn (2009) has shed light on the important role associative arguments can play in the construction of security threats. If the securitiser successfully associates different security concerns, the audience(s) will be able to identify larger implications of the alleged threat.

Findings

The findings of the empirical analysis revealed a consistent discourse, with no substantial variations throughout the years. The securitisers behave professionally, following the protocols of the stages and adjusting their language and the content of their discourse to the audience’s frame of reference. They base their social capital upon notions of
representativeness, introducing themselves as “we the people” and stating “we represent millions of people worldwide” (Hall, 2005). Technical expertise is another source of social capital, as the securitisers often mention their experience with the Landmine Ban and the Cluster Munitions Convention (UN General Assembly 1997a, 2008; Williams, 2010).

Frequently, NGO members portray themselves as representatives of the people, in opposition to the audience, who they see as representatives of states. This differentiation is intended to increase the securitisers’ moral authority, as seen in the following statement: “while governments remain the ultimate decision-makers, it is NGOs that allow citizens across the globe to partake in the political process and make their voices heard” (Hall, 2005). Also, by emphasising the power of the audience, who they say can put the relevant security action in place, members of nuclear abolition organisations try to put pressure on representatives of states: “we need more statesmen with a political will to take us to total nuclear disarmament. Ladies and Gentlemen, this is the time and here is your chance” (Ramdas, 2000).

In the elite setting, the securitisers follow the specific grammar of security, arguing that the existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to the survival of humankind. In making of the threat, the securitiser commonly uses three main sources of arguments: (1) particular features of nuclear weapons, (2) potential incidents involving nuclear weapons and (3) foreseeable consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. They always depict an alarming situation in which the NPT is in crisis and the world is on the verge of a nuclear catastrophe: “Mr Chairman, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, more bad news” (Cipolat, 2007). The “bad news” exposed by the securitisers primarily refer to the NWS’ lack of commitment to disarmament measures. Their failure to disarm is usually presented in connection with the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries (Burrroughs, 2005, 2009).

Accordingly, the securitisers argue that the time to act is now, otherwise, another use of nuclear weapons will most likely follow, as “the world does not have the luxury of too much more time” (Williams, 2010). Finally, they present the abolition of nuclear weapons under a NWC as the only alternative to a horrifying future, saying that “going down to three zeros, as in 1000, is not enough” (Weiss, 2009), “abolition is the only way” (Hall, 2005).

The anti-nuclear activists also try to delegitimise nuclear deterrence and dissociate it from the notion of security, affirming that nuclear deterrence provides only an illusion of security (Snyder, 2008) and the possession of nuclear weapons does not make people and states safe. In their view, the “nuclear balance of terror” fosters insecurity rather than security (Spies, 2005). Conversely, they always identify disarmament with security.
In addition to security utterances, securitisers employ economic factors that can enhance their case against nuclear weapons, like the estimated costs of producing, replacing, maintaining and operating nuclear warheads in each of the NWS (Cabasso, 2007; Loretz, 2007). They also make use of legal arguments, such as the legal obligation to disarm, as stated in Article VI of the NPT and the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, which asserted that such legal obligation must be fulfilled (UN General Assembly 1997a, 2008; Mitchel, 2009; Weiss, 2000). The securitisers also argue that the use of nuclear weapons should be considered a war crime, as well as a crime against humanity (Johnson, 2010). Additionally, political reasons are present in the securitising claims, since the securitisers frequently mention UNGA resolutions and declarations made by the UN Secretary General in favour of nuclear disarmament.

The constraints imposed by the rules governing this setting have, in fact, encouraged the anti-nuclear organisations to work together. In face of the limited time they have to address the audience, the activists focus on the common positions within the movement and avoid exposing internal disagreements. As one speaker put it: “we enter this room with a clear sense of purpose and a unified voice” (Snyder, 2004). Another consequence of the procedural limitations is the scarce interaction between the securitiser and the audience, as the three-hour session devoted to the NGOs is consumed by presentations and commonly ends with no time left for an exchange of ideas and discussions.

Finally, it was possible to see the impact of the larger contextual configuration on the securitising discourse. After the 2005 NPT Review Conference, in which the NPT states failed to adopt a final document with concrete recommendations for preventing proliferation or moving toward nuclear disarmament, the securitisers raised the alarmist tone of their discourse. Moreover, the nuclear explosions conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the suspicions around the Iranian programme and reports of an emerging nuclear black market were all contextual factors that served to strengthen the urgency of their calls.

Remarkably, since 2007, the securitisers have been depicting a favourable political configuration regarding the commencement of negotiations on a NWC, arguing that “the security environment is changing, the cold war fogs are clearing” (Johnson, 2010). They continue to emphasise the negative developments surrounding the NPT regime, but they also highlight the growing political support for nuclear disarmament. In the securitising discourse, not only does the world need to move towards nuclear abolition now but the current political configuration is also favourable to it. This fortunate temporal coincidence has served to enhance the urgency of adopting the security measure even more, since the securitisers argue that action must be taken now, before “night falls again” (Johnson, 2010).
Conclusion

The new nuclear disarmament momentum, evident since 2007, and the developments regarding the concept of macrosecuritisation demonstrated the relevance and the viability of examining the nuclear abolition movement from an original perspective. Although the causal influence of the nuclear abolition movement on the political decisions regarding acquisition, use or dismantlement of nuclear weapons is beyond the reach of the theory of securitisation, and perhaps beyond the reach of any theory (Vuori, 2010, p. 275), the securitisation framework provided the lens through which to examine the anti-nuclear macrosecuritising discourse.

Combining this theory with discourse analysis, it was possible to see that, in the campaign for a NWC, the anti-nuclear organisations present the logic of zero as driven by a threat. As Buzan et al. (1998) have observed, to phrase things in security terms is always a choice, “not an objective feature of the issue or the relationship itself” (p. 211). In principle, the logic of disarmament could be driven by other factors, such as legal, political, economic or moral arguments. However, states have usually framed nuclear weapons in terms of threat/defence and, while addressing this audience, the securitisers tread a similar path.

Certainly, genuine fear that these weapons may be used again exists, but this does not fully explain the decision to promote a securitising discourse. In the military sector, the logic of threat has usually provided the optimal base for a successful argument. The instrumentality of the securitising discourse becomes apparent; in this case, the alarmist tone of the discourse provides these non-state actors with a loud voice in international military affairs. As Vuori (2008) has noted, “security can be utilized for achieving several political aims” (p. 76). This particular securitisation process is aimed at raising an issue on the agenda of decision-makers and urging them to take action.

Admittedly, the continued existence of (thousands of) nuclear weapons demonstrates that the anti-nuclear discourse has failed to reach its final objective. However, as the issue is again being discussed as part of a wider political debate reassessing the costs and benefits of nuclear deterrence, the endorsement of the description of the threat as existential might become stronger and more widespread.

Even though the solution proposed by the securitisers has so far been rejected and there are no indications that serious negotiations on a NWC will happen any time soon, there is no reason to rule out this possibility. As Krepon (2007) has noted, “nuclear disarmament is a process, not an on-or-off switch”. Similarly, every securitisation is a historical process (Balzacq, 2005, p. 193) and this one has been going on for more than half a century and might continue for as long as it takes.
Many are sceptical of the feasibility of nuclear abolition. It is true that nuclear weapons, like any other human creation, cannot be “disinvented”. They can, however, be prohibited and dismantled. As Acton and Perkovich (2009) have observed, civilisation has been capable of doing so in cases where the artefacts in question were considered too dangerous, damaging or morally objectionable to continue living with (p. 17). For instance, the mass-scale gas chambers used by Nazi Germany have not been disinvented, but they are nevertheless not tolerated (Ibid.). Similarly, there is nothing intrinsic to nuclear weapons that makes their elimination impossible. It is up to us – academics, scientists, activists, political leaders, NGOs – to work on the conditions that will lead to the establishment of an international regime capable of verifying the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and minimising the risk of cheating. It is by no means an easy task, but political will and leadership coupled with monitoring technologies can overcome the large majority of the possible obstacles on the way to zero.

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“Securing our Survival (SOS)” : Non-State Actors and the Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Convention through the Prism of Securitisation Theory


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“Securing our Survival (SOS)”: Non-State Actors and the Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Convention through the Prism of Securitisation Theory


Foreign Policy Change in Brazil: Comparing Castelo Branco (1964-1967) and Fernando Collor (1990-1992)

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In this article, I intended to develop an analytical schema to analyze moments of redirection in Brazilian Foreign Policy. The schema encompasses the following logic: sources from national and international contexts may influence the domestic political arena, leading to the opening of a policy window and the rupture of stabilizers, which together may form a scenario prone to reform in terms of foreign guidelines. In this context, the decision makers may opt to promote a foreign policy change (FPC). To apply this model, we chose two administrations that are substantially different as to their international system and their political scope, even though both are considered by the Brazilian foreign policy literature as restructuration periods. By studying these administration’s foreign policies, we tested the utility of this model and accomplished a comparative analysis seeking similarities amongst these chancing processes.

Keywords: Sources; stabilizers; change; foreign policy.

Introduction

The object of this article is a specific theme within Brazilian Foreign Policy (BFP), the foreign policy change (FPC), which will be discussed by means of a compared analysis between two administrations: Humberto Alencar de Castelo Branco (1964-1967) and Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992). We set off from the perception that this phenomenon took place in both of the aforementioned administrations. Our objective is to identify how the FPC process took place by replicating an analytical framework specifically developed to analyze this process in countries with institutional and political frameworks similar to Brazil. Therefore, it will be possible to identify and to systematically
discuss the influence of the independent variables (IV) on the research’s dependent variable (DV), the FPC.

We also aim to find similarities as to the stance of the two presidents when they decided for a shift in foreign policy, and therefore analyze if there are patterns in the actions of the executive and the Ministry of External Relations (MER) during times of foreign policy redefinition. The objective is to analyze the change process – the implementation, its causes and conditions, primarily – by opposing the foreign policy of the analyzed administrations to the previous one, with little attention towards the subsequent administration (the FPC will always be analyzed in the transition between two executive mandates, even if the transition is not a necessary condition).

FPC is still an underexplored subject within the literature dealing with BFP and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Domestically speaking, there is a predominance of paradigmatic studies and foreign policy history. In these, the focus lies on continuity and its causes, with no further investigations as to the motives and moments of rupture (Cervo and Bueno, 2002; Lima, 1994; Pinheiro, 2000 and 2004; Saraiva, 2003; Vizentini, 2008). In international terms, the literature on the matter has commonly argued for continuity and consensus as the adequate behavioral pattern, with a predominance of studies on continuity patterns instead of focusing on specific change scenarios (Gilpin, 1981 apud Rosati et al, 1994).

The choice behind these administrations is attributable to both being widely different periods – in regards to their historical and political domestic context, international system (IS) etc – with a relative consensus within the literature as being cases of FPC, even if discrepancies do exist as to the degree in such changes (Casarões, 2011; Cervo and Bueno, 2002; Lima, 1994; Pinheiro, 2000 and 2004; Vizentini, 2008).

The article unfolds in the following manner. In the next section there will be a theoretical discussion regarding the literature on FPA and BFP geared towards the explanation of the proposed analytical scheme used to analyze FPC cases. In the following two sections this theoretical framework is then applied to analyze the Castelo Branco and Fernando Collor administrations. In the fifth section the discussion will be centered on the occurrence of FPC in these administrations with basis on a checklist that enumerates the points which define the degrees of FPC within these processes. In the section after a comparison aims to find patterns to identify the main determinants and motives for the FPC; in it, there is also an attempt to discuss some possible contributions that this article may bring towards the specialized literature as well as its weaknesses and an agenda for future research. Lastly, some final considerations will be woven.
Theoretical Discussion

Firstly, we believe it is important to underline that, since the focus is on the domestic political processes that results in foreign policy, the State will not be analyzed as a “black-box” (Rynning and Guzzini, 2001). Within this perspective, foreign policy is treated as a public policy whose formulation and implementation are defined by decision-makers, taking into consideration domestic imperatives, although differentiated from others by having influence over and/or being influenced by issues connected with the IS (Pinheiro and Solomón, 2011).

A differentiation among the “phases” of foreign policy seems useful to us when discussing our object. According to Papadakis and Starr (1987) foreign policy can be conceptualized as: (1) a product (output), according to its substantive content; (2) as a process during which its development and implementation takes place; (3) as a behavior, which refers to the product implementation. Therefore, foreign policy may have different conceptual applications: (1) the set of ideas and values used by the State in order to legitimize its overseas activity based on a construct referred to as “national interest”; this in turn is fashioned by means of a (2) “complex process of interaction between many actors, differentially embedded in a wide range of different structures. Their interaction is a dynamic process, leading to the constant evolution of both actors and structures” (Hill, 2003, p. 28); and the results of this process are perceived as (3) “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor in international relations” (p.3).

Since the article will analyze the process by which changes in foreign policy are developed it will be required to consider all of these stages: the project, the decision-making process, and the implementation. Firstly, it’s important to analyze the new foreign policy project advocated by the Brazilian government given that both the analyzed governmental discourses argued towards the necessity of redirecting BFP. And the decision-making process is of an utmost importance since it deals directly with the dependent variable in this article, considering that the FPC is a result of the actions of actors with political capital within the domestic sphere. Lastly, based on an analysis of the Brazilian external behavior we can argue as to which are the main characteristics of the FPC, its effects on agents and structures related to BFP and on foreign policy itself (degree, range, period etc).

Thus, the FPC will be considered as a set of initiatives that aimed to establish a new international behavioral pattern for Brazil. The FPC does not necessarily have the desired effect nor the initially predicted duration since they usually occur at moments when a country does not have enough bargaining power to produce the aimed effects and/or in moments when a political and economic crisis is in place, resulting in the need for...
emergency decisions – and these may also lead to future revisions of the previously made decisions (Gustavsson, 1999; Volgy and Schwarz, 1994).

**Methodology**

The chosen method was the *method of agreement*, which aims to analyze cases with different characteristics in the IV and with similar behavior to the DV (Mill, 1973 apud Van Evera, 1997). A qualitative comparison presumes a probabilistic causality (not necessarily deterministic) in that a set of conditions may increase the chances of a result or to predict its outcome. For an efficient comparative analysis to take place there is the need to follow a common conceptual framework and to deal with the problem of selection and judgment biases (Sartori, 1994). Therefore, an adequate analytical scheme was developed for cases of FPC in which similar causes and conditions are specified so that they may be systematically compared.

The analysis of the periods will be carried out by means of a replication of an analytical scheme with an “*input-output*” logic that relates the sources of the domestic and international environments with the foreign policy; the theoretical and methodological bases for the theoretical framework stem from studies on foreign policy change within the FPA literature.

The scheme was developed with the intent of answering the main questions concerning the DV: (1) What is a FPC? (2) How does it occur? What are the main sources of change and continuity (intervening independent variables)? (3) When? In which moments does this process have a higher chance of occurring? (4) Who? Which actors have the power to promote a FPC (intervening shaping variables)?

The operational and international logic between the variables follows the chain explained by Figure 1 below:

**Figure 1. Chain of Variables**

[Diagram showing the chain of variables]

Source: Author’s own.
Generally speaking, the literature considers that a FPC will occur or be determined by the interaction between the independent and intervening variables. On the one hand, there are the *stabilizers or restrictions*, factors that influence the environment responsible for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy in favor of continuity (restrictive intervening variables). On the other hand, there are *sources* of change (independent variables), influenced by the IS and the domestic context, which could favor a FPC. A rupture of these *stabilizers* leads to an “opening” of a *policy window* – an exceptional moment that gives room for extraordinary political actions – that may be perceived by decision-makers as an inadequate foreign policy concerning the incentives of domestic and international *sources*, and thus, resulting in a FPC. The latter will only occur if so decided by the actors with the power to make such decisions, seen as intervening shaping variables, since they will be the ones responsible for reading the *sources*, taking advantage of the *policy window*, and defining the expected outcome. Even with this division, it is hard to delimit theses phases within the change process as well as to establish clear boundaries for the types of variables.

That being said, we pass on to point (1). The literature has already developed several change typologies, such as: (a) a distinction between adaptation and restructuration/redirection, with the first being a more common change and the latter more radical one (Holsti, 1982); (b) a four degree change scale according to the depth of the implemented FPC (Hermann, 1990; Rosati, 1994).

Another analyzed factor is the duration period for the change, which, if it has a gradual nature, is closest to the adaptation type; if the change occurs quickly then there is more identification with the redirection cases (Volgy and Schwarz, 1994). The temporal issue at stake here is more closely related to the process of change itself – the sense of urgency would facilitate the process – and not with the duration of the FPC effects.

Furthermore, the authors also call attention to: the importance of the FPC to cover multiple thematic fields in order for it to be more significant (Volgy and Schwarz, 1994); to the possible influences of the process on bureaucracies specialized in foreign policy (Kleystra and Meyer, 2001); to the possibility of a change in posture towards the *hegemon* (Hagan, 1989).

Regarding point (2), the main concepts discussed by the literature are the sources and the stabilizers. The sources are factors related to the IS and to domestic politics (fundamental structural conditions), which may encourage a FPC; they are the independent variables within the scheme (Goldmann, 1988; Gustavsson, 1999; Hermann, 1990). Niklasson (2006) uses the term “change promoter”: “*any factor within or outside agent A that, while stabilizers are held constant, increases the likelihood that A will abandon, or considerably modify, policy P.*” (p. 45).
As for the stabilizers, they appear as barriers to the reading of sources by the decision-makers, affecting these actors’ sensitivity level towards their surroundings; the restrictive intervening variables are the ones that affect: a) the probability that an event (source) will indeed lead to a redirection; b) the extent to which a change process will continue, resulting in a FPC (Goldmann, 1988; Volgy and Schwarz, 1994).

The change processes would have a greater chance of occurring during certain moments (3), conceptualized by the specialized literature as the policy window, the moment in which the stabilizers would be “ruptured”, increasing the decision-makers’ sensibility towards the sources.

The idea of a policy window was taken from the literature concerning processes of political reform, called space windows by Kingdon (1984 apud Gustavsson, 1999), which refers to periods in which political actors take advantage of a specific conjuncture, so as to insert their political proposals in the agenda, and to persuade other actors to support a certain solution in order to overcome the political inadequacy in the surrounding conditions. Policy windows are moments in which the political costs for change became smaller, making it so that the actors become more interested in carrying out the desired reforms as quickly as possible.

Such moments would have the following characteristics: (a) low level of commitment by the new administration towards the previous foreign policy; (b) interdependence between foreign policy and other public policies; (c) economic or political crisis (Gustavsson, 1999); (d) change in the political regime – here defined and classified in a similar manner as to Hagan (1989) –, as well as any change in the main body of political leadership, the group who controls the central political structures in the national government.

Actors with enough power to implement a FPC would be those that are members of the Ultimate Decision Unit (UDU) (4), agents with the ability to compromise the government’s resources with no possibility of a reversal by part of other actors (Hermann, 1990). For the Brazilian case the main actors in foreign policy are the President and the MER. For this reason, the presidential interest in themes concerning foreign policy can be determinant in the choice of the international guidelines for a governmental administration (Lima, 1994), considering that presidential diplomacy is strongly tied to domestic interests (Danese, 1999). Therefore, change would depend on the decision-makers and would have a greater chance of occurring if there was interest and involvement by part of the leader and if the problem was seen as essential for the maintenance of the regime (Hermann et al, 2001). Based on this discussion, a checklist was designed with the objective of classifying the government administrations among the degrees of FPC; the more points that are complied with, the more drastic the change. The points are as follow: (I) multidimensionality of the themes affected by change; (II) new normative bases for foreign policy; (III)
a process that took place within a short time span; (IV) change of stance towards the United States (USA); (V) effects on the bureaucratic structure. Therefore, a FPC could merely be an adaptation of a country’s international behavior, but the larger the number and degree in meeting the points highlighted above, the more drastic the FPC will be. The words and quoted concepts highlighted in italic during the governmental analyses refer to classifications and points in the analytical scheme. A general visualization can be seen in figure 2, which summarizes the “input-output” scheme.

Figure 2. Input-output analytical schema

Source: Author’s own.

Castelo Branco Administration

In the following section we will carry out an analysis of the Castelo Branco administration (1964-1967), according to the previously proposed scheme. We will argue that the sources indicated a need for change and ongoing circumstances led to the “rupture” of stabilizers, therefore ensuring legitimacy and justification for the deployment of a new “national project” with direct consequences to foreign policy. Topics (1) and (2) deal with the domestic policy sources (political regime support), points (3) and (4) deal with the domestic economic sources (economic conditions and public-private relations), points (5) and (6) deal with international political sources (external pressure and institutional apparatus) and points (7) and (8) with international economic sources (economic and financial
systems). The following symbolize the stabilizers: (i) bureaucratic (rules and standard norms), (ii) ideas (institutional and political), (iii) domestic (political fragmentation and presence of the opposition) and (iv) international (system structure and stability). Each one of these points is part of a structure within the proposed analytical scheme to analyze the sources, conditions and resultants of the FPC process.

(1) With the opposing forces abolished from the political system, the regime established by the 1964 coup d’état had sufficient domestic political support to develop its national project. Generally speaking, the political arena was divided into two major groups (Martins Filho, 1996; Simões, 2010; Vizentini, 1998): (a) liberal or legalistic sector (the “castelistas”) who advocated for a short term regime in order to reform the State and to deter the communist threat; (b) the hardliners, comprised of supporters of a military and economic nationalism and who pressured for the continuity of the military regime. Within this system, the rival political group advocated for a radicalization of the regime instead of being an opposing force (iii). The state of emergency measures carried out by the Institutional Act (09/04/1964) assured the president the mechanisms to “nullify” forces allied with the previous regime. The effective number of parties (defined by 1/(1 – F), in which F= party fragmentation index) was 1 in 1964 and 1965, rising to 1,782 in 1966 and 1967 (Alvarez et al, 2003), thus indicating a low political fragmentation.

This political scenario also allowed for the regime to implement changes within the MER, with consequent effects on its institutional ideology (ii). The first post-1964 Chancellor, Vasco Leitão da Cunha, managed to establish an internal committee to evaluate the employees’ relation with the old regime, thus avoiding the establishment of a General Information Committee (GIC) – headed by a military member – which resulted in only four compulsory retirements, a laughable number when compared to other ministries (Almeida, 2008). The counterpart would be the abandonment of previous foreign policy guidelines (Independent Foreign Policy – IFP1).

Changes were introduced to the MER’s bureaucratic structure (i). One could say that a process occurred in which more power was granted to the Ministry on subjects concerning commercial policy (Decree No. 50.332 from 10/03/1961 and Law Nº 4.669 from 08/07/1965), and following the military regime’s objective in conferring “technical competence” to the bureaucracies. In a complementary way, by means of Law Nº 4.415 (24/09/1964), the regime changed its promotion criteria, replacing the seniority item by

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1 Central premises: seeking to diversify commercial partners, detailing of ideological issues, independent posture, emphasis on South-South relations (Cervo and Bueno, 2002), and “[...] had as its principles the expansion of Brazilian exports to any country, including the socialists, the defense of international law, self-denomination and non-intervention [...]” (Vizentini, 1998, p.22).
merit, a possible ploy to replace an objective criteria (years of career) for a subjective one (merit).

In the security field, the Planning and Study Group (PSG), established by Decree N° 46.804 (11/09/1959), became an institutional means for decision-making in international politics and an important channel for delegating “several clearly executive responsibilities [...] to the Secretary-General of the National Security Council (SG/NSC)” (CRUZ, 2009, p. 282).

The Itamaraty also began to operate in the field of security through the Center of Foreign Information (CIEx), founded by Pio Correa in 1966. The center was initially founded to monitor and investigate Leonel Brizola’s actions in Uruguay, but was later extended to other several countries due to its success and the allocation of its founder to the General Secretariat of Foreign Policy in the MER (Cruz, 2009).

(2) The coup d’état also led to a change in the elite’s social composition. The group that legitimized the overthrown regime supported a national capitalist development project, primarily composed by the autonomous national bourgeoisie, urban middle-class, popular masses and constitutionalist military personnel. The regime change led to a policy direction (including foreign policy) towards the contemplation of other societal sectors which supported the coup: the bourgeoisie associated with international capital, especially with American capital, the “[...] more modern sectors of the urban middle-class [...] the military and civil bureaucratic elites who controlled Brazil’s State apparatus” (Martins, 1975b, p. 19).

(3) The economic conditions presented a problematic situation, conferring legitimacy to the changes. The inflation rate displayed a tendency towards growth: already at a very high rate in 1962 (51.84%), it increased in 1963 (70.08%), and reached its peak in 1964 (91.88%) (Alvarez et al, 2003). The variation in the per capita income also expresses a deterioration trajectory, with a decline in 1963 (-2.3%), low growth in 1964 (0.4%), and a new downturn in 1965 (-0.5%) (Reis, 2003).

(4) As for the institutional conditions of the domestic economic relations, a large portion of the measures undertaken by the team led by Roberto Campos, Minister of Planning and the organizer behind the Governmental Economic Plan of Action (PAEG), aimed to reestablish good relations with international investors. For this purpose, the new regime founded a series of financial institutions, aiming to establish “rational and technical-scientific criteria” and to change the relationship between the State and the financial sector: Law N° 4.595/1964 founded the National Monetary Council and the Central Bank of Brazil, both designed to independently conduct the monetary policy; Law N° 4.728/1965 reformed the capital market and redefined the operational rules for financial agents (Dreifuss, 1981).
(5) The IS structure in 1964 was considered to be bipolar and was not undergoing any structural changes. The strain in the USA-USSR relations had not yet begun and thus, we classify the IS as “static bipolar” (iv) – dominated by two superpowers and structurally stable. Therefore, even if the initial hypothesis states that a static bipolar IS could be a restriction to a FPC, the approximation policy towards the US seems to be a choice “encouraged” by this source, since there was pressure for the weaker countries to align themselves with one of the Cold War blocks.

(6) Within this IS the international organizations (IO) would have the role of legitimizing this structure. The leadership of both superpowers made it hard to adopt a neutral or independent position and the IO functioned as communication channel between both parts so as to promote this coercion; these institutions did not adopt coercive postures themselves, but perpetuated the prevailing order (Cox, 1993).

There was also a regional “wave” of foreign policy readjustment (iv). Regime change processes occurred in some countries within the continent (such as Argentina in 1962, and the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Honduras in 1963) in similar molds as to Brazil and with similar consequences to domestic, foreign and economic policies: rise of US backed authoritarian regimes, alliance with international financial groups and a domestic political base within the traditional domestic elites (Ayerbe, 1992).

(7) The international economic indicators also pointed towards the need for change. In the initial period of the new regime, the Brazilian economy was walking in the world’s opposite direction; the world growth rate increased 3.15% in 1962, peaking at 5.39% in 1964 and once again decelerating in 1967, but still maintaining a 2.59% growth (Alvarez et al, 2003).

(8) The international economic institutional conditions became more favorable after the reforms in the economic landmarks – as referred in (4). Consequently, the financial help in the regime’s early moments grew once again and reverted a tendency: from US$15.1 million in 1964 to US$122.1 million in 1965, and US$129.3 million in 1966. The guarantee of foreign company rights also led to a rise in international investments in the country, with an increase in the period ranging from 1963 to 1968 of US$ 169 million to US$ 481 million (Ayerbe, 1992).

According to the proposed scheme, such sources would have led to a FPC prone scenario – the policy window. This conjuncture is comprised by the jointure of the following points.

(a) Low government commitment to the previous administration’s foreign policy. The 1964 MER report shows that: “one of the first steps taken by the ‘Revolution Government’ was to verify the sinuous course which […] strayed from our diplomatic tradition and escaped the basic principles of our historical formation” (MER, 1964: 3 – author’s quotation
marks). The commitment of the new regime to the previous foreign policy was extremely low since its legitimacy was tied to the anticommunist struggle.

(b) In the early days of the military regime, there was a very close relation between the adopted external policy and other policies that comprised the “national project”, partially developed in discussions within the Superior War School (SWC – ESG in Portuguese). Some important measures undertaken by the Castelo administration had an “esguiana” inspiration, such as: the foundation of the National Information Service (NIF) by Decree-Law No 4.341(13/061964); Decree-Law No 314/1967 concerning the National Security Law (NSL); Decree-Law No 200/1967 concerning Administrative Reform (Miyamoto and Gonçalves, 1993). Castelo Branco himself expressed, during a speech when handing out the diplomas for the Diplomatic Career (31/07/1964), the existing correlation between domestic and external policy (MER, 1966).

(c) One of the main characteristics of the policy window, as raised by the literature on FPA, refers to the crisis scenario. In the domestic sphere, Brazil was undergoing political and economic crises (points argued within this section).

(d) Besides the policy window category, another important factor is the regime change. In the analyzed case, the change in the regime happened by extra-constitutional mechanisms. According to Hagan’s typology (1989), which classifies regime changes in five gradations, change would be considered to be more radical (“type 5”) when there is a replacement of the group in power by another group with an opposite political vision and by means of a revolution or coup d’état.

**Fernando Collor Administration**

In the following section the Collor administration will be analyzed by following the same logic as the previous section.

(1) The 1998 Constitution gave broad powers to the President in comparison with the Legislative Power, a condition that would have been enough in order to implement the changes discussed below, even if without broad domestic political power (the president formed a minority coalition). The “National Reconstruction Project” implementation, present in his Inaugural Speech (Collor, 1990), was only made possible since Brazil has, since 1988, one of the highest rates of concentration of power in the Executive, with: power to veto legislation approved in Congress; exclusive power to issue decrees; exclusivity to propose legislation on certain issues (Brasil, 1988).

Therefore, the fragmentation of the political system (iii) was not a greater obstacle to the process of State reform or for a trade liberalization aimed at competitive insertion
within the international economy, which doesn’t mean that Congress played a role in this process.

(2) Due to changes in the economic power of the business elites there was a change in the elite’s social composition and beliefs resulting in a loss of bargaining power by part of the unions and in an apparent consensus by the elites concerning the need for market reforms. Besides, the process of changes in ideas and values (ii) was also intensified by the exhaustion of the State-developmentalism model, associated with the military regime and with the 1980s economic crisis (Armijo and Faucher, 2002). The same happened with the political elite, who began a process of trade liberalization in 1988 by reducing the number of banned import items from 2400 to 1200 and with a process of gradually reducing customs fees in 1987 (Ricupero and Didonet, 1995 apud Guimarães, 2005).

(3) As for the domestic economic sources, the scenario presented several crisis indicators. In 1988 and 1989 the external debt reached the values of US$ 102.555 and US$ 99.284 million (Cerqueira, 1997). The variation in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which had once reached a growth of almost 8% in 1986, began a downwards tendency during the following years: 3.6% (1987); -0.1% (1988); 3.3% (1989); -4.3% (1990). Inflation, the main Brazilian concern in the early years of the 1990 decade, presented frightening numbers: 147% (1986); 228% (1987); 629% (1988); 1430% (1989); 2947% (1990) (World Bank, on line).

(4) The institutional conditions of the relations between economic groups and the State also changed. The reforms carried out by Collor aimed to reestablish the trust of international investors and to obtain better negotiation conditions with creditors. While still early in the mandate, the president used Provisory Measures (PM) to initiate the reforms in his “National Reconstruction Project” (COLLOR, 1990). Provisory Measures 145 and 158 (Laws 8.016/90 and 8.032/90) restructured taxation rules for the import and export of goods; the PM 151, 155 and 157 (Laws 8.029/90, 8.031/90 and 8.018/90) abolished agencies of the federal public administration and started the privatization process; PM 162, 168 and their “reissues” 172, 180 and 184 reformed the conditions of the operation in the financial market and introduced the Cruzeiro.

The same legislative powers were also used to promote changes in the MER’s structure (i). Decree Nº 99.261 (23/05/1990) instituted a change in the House’s organization, dividing the General Secretariat in three instances. According to an interview given by Francisco Rezek (Collor’s first Chancellor) to Casarões (2011): “the tripartition would then serve to avoid a concentration of power […] which could […] reduce the president’s control over the ministry’s structure” (p. 160). PM 150 changed the rules concerning retirement and career promotion.
Itamaraty’s role in defining the BFP during the Collor Administration is a matter of controversy. Batista (1993), for example, consigns the FPC process to the president, arguing that the MER had no participation. Arbilla (2000) considered that the elimination of the Secretary General of Foreign Affairs position and the adoption of a model of “imperial presidentialism” by Collor led to a breakage of consensus within the diplomatic corporation and to “Itamaraty’s marginalization”, in the BFP’s definition. Conversely, Celso Amorim (1997) asserts that the MER had a counterweight role and advocated for thriftier negotiations in order to obtain concessions as an answer to the Brazilian trade openness. Ambassador Flecha de Lima, however, considers that there were two distinct groups in the FPC period: liberal and nationalists, being that the former supported Collor’s national project (Casarões, 2011). Moreira (2001 apud Casarões, 2011) notes that the MER was a resistance focus to changes, advocating for a gradual opening, a position similar to the one defended by Celso Amorim.

We consider that the Itamaraty sought to act so that the FPC would be less radical and more gradual, while trying to bring its own foreign policy project to the foreground. The MER’s exclusion argument in defining foreign policy seems less plausible when we consider the historical agency of this organ. The MER adaption process to the conditions imposed by Collor may have resulted in the alteration of its institutional ideology (ii).

(5) The IS structure was undergoing a transition period, which could mean a favorable scenario for a FPC. It would be the ideal moment to take advantage of the end of a rigid bipolar system and of the structural transition period and readjust the external agenda. The most “natural” path would be to follow the agenda of whichever world leader emerged at the end of the Cold War. In Latin America the “neoliberal reforms” were pervasively adopted, save for the particularities adopted by each country during their liberalization process (iv).

(6) At the top of the IO’s agenda was the commerce negotiations and the “new issues” (copyrights, human rights and the environment). In these areas there was strong foreign pressure concerning Brazil’s behavior (iv). On the environmental issue, the President sought to build a positive image of the country by claiming that development would no longer be tied to pollution (in a speech at the XIV General Assembly of the United Nations). On the human rights issue, the country participated in the 1990 World Summit for Children and later sanctioned the Child and Adolescent Statute (07/1990); the President also signed an act to guarantee the Yanomamis their right to an area of 35 thousand square miles (MER, 1992). These initiatives represented a new Brazilian stance in face of international pressure, considering that Sarney argued that industrial progress was tied to pollution and faced harsh international pressure in regards to the indigenous issue during his administration (Prado and Miyamoto, 2010).
International economic sources showed that the Brazilian economy followed the world tendency during this period, but with worse indicators due to inflation and external debt. The world GDP per capita presented the following variations: 1,5% (1986); 1,7% (1987); 2,8% (1988); 2% (1989); 1,2% (1990); -0,6% (1991); 0,6% (1992) (World Bank, online).

In addition, the Prime-rate (American agency) international interest rates continued to grow, making it even more difficult to pay off the external debt (Cerqueira, 1997).

The economic institutional conditions also directed Brazil towards change. In 1988, the Mid-term review (negotiation stage of Uruguay Round, which took place in Montreal) introduced the Trade Policy Reviews, an instrument to increase the transparency of Member-States with the objective of impeding “free-riders” (Brazil being considered one of them) and forcing members to implement structural reforms in their domestic spheres (World Trade Organization, on line). Additionally, there was also pressure from the IMF for a readjustment of the economic policy according to the new neoliberal model (Batista, 1994).

As for the policy window,

(a) the presidential speeches demonstrated a low governmental commitment to the previous administration’s foreign policy. Ever since the electoral period, Collor had plans to change the foreign policy course. In his inaugural speech he stressed the need for foreign policy “to answer to the moment of affirmation of the popular will, which – urgently – demands for the modernization of Brazil […] interdependence demands that every government act be a permanent combination of internal and external variables” (Collor, 1990: 20).

The president also advocated that BFP should “reflect the general conviction that this country wants to change, and quickly do so” (MRE, 1990. p.7). His intention to change the third world profile, to update the international agenda and to improve relations with the United States (Hirst and Pinheiro, 1995), shows that the President did not wish to continue the previous government’s foreign policy, identified with the globalist paradigm.

(b) There was a strong link between foreign policy and other public policies. The link between the domestic and foreign spheres was based on a neoliberal ideal, which proposed to decrease the role of the State in the economy in order to overcome the ongoing crisis since the 1980s. Therefore, the president took measures in the domestic sphere so as to increase credibility in the eyes of external investors and creditors: financial-economic stability, exchange liberalization, end of subsidies and development of a new legislation for the fiscal, property and administrative spheres (Mello, 2000).

(c) The domestic scenario was one of crisis. Besides the poor economic indicators – already shown in this article – the political leadership also endured a legitimacy crisis.
After the failure of the diretas já (popular movement for presidential direct elections) the indirect election of Tancredo Neves had an important political meaning, but his death before he could take office resulted in low political legitimacy for the new leader (vice-president Sarney) (Prado and Miyamoto, 2010). Within this scenario, the political legitimacy for the first democratically elected president after 20 years depended directly on his administration’s economic results.

(d) The regime change, despite having occurred within the rules established by the 1988 Constitution, represented the first direct presidential election in Brazil after a lengthy period marked by a closed regime. The most important impact was the replacement of the group in power and the removal of a major portion of the military personnel holding executive positions. If we consider Hagan’s typology (1989) with its 5 types of regime change, the Collor Administration transition could be characterized as “type 4” – the second most drastic degree of transition among political groups in power – since there was an almost complete replacement of the group in power without, however, the occurrence of a coup d’état.

**Argument and Checklist**

After the analysis of each one of these periods, the checklist items, which form the basis to determine the FPC levels, will be discussed.

(I) **Multidimensional change.** In both cases there was a proposal for a change in the “national project”, with an impact on several areas.

During the Castelo administration the following areas were affected: a) security, national security was replaced by hemispheric security, with the instrumentalization of the hemispheric defense thesis as protection from the communist infiltration and relativization of the autonomy paradigm (Garcia, 1997); b) economy, laws that altered economic regulations aimed to attract international investments and loans, replacing the previous administration’s nationalist model; c) regional policy sought to become the United States preferred ally and thus conferring a leadership position to Brazil in the southern part of the continent (Miyamoto and Gonçalves, 1993); d) reading of the IS; based on the East-West division, as opposed to North-South, more prominent in the previous administration (Lima, 1994).

Collor’s political project also encompassed a change in several thematic areas as well as priorities in the Brazilian international agenda. The inclusion of issues such as the environment, human rights, and the abdication of nuclear weapons meant a reconstruction and reorganization of foreign priorities. Additionally, there were changes in the areas of:
commercial policy, science and technology and security (nuclear weapons) (Cruz et al., 1993).

(II) Conceptual change. The process was steeper with Castelo, who redefined the concepts for autonomy and sovereignty, adapting them to an idea of collective security – a model of shared sovereignty thought to be more adequate to stop the communist advance within the region. There were changes in the concept of non-intervention and self-determination, making them only applicable to “free nations” – see here Brazil’s support to the intervention in the Dominican Republic (DR) at the OAS and to Portugal’s colonialist policy at the UN, both justified by the argument that communist forces within these countries (DR and Portuguese colonies) were undermining the self-determination of its populace.

This posture represented a change to Jânio’s administration, who refrained to vote in favor of Portugal in issues concerning the African conflict (Martins, 1975). Moreover, generally speaking, the globalist paradigm was replaced by Americanism (Viana, 1975).

Collor primarily used the concepts of “modernization”, “change” and “international inclusion”. The first one was coupled with changes in the economy by means of privatization and economic opening as well as the idea of “leading Brazil towards the first world” through a “complete overhaul of Brazilian politics” (Collor, 1990). However, it would not be correct to say there was an abandonment of the BFP’s conceptual basis, since the principles for Brazilian international relations were institutionalized by the 1988 Constitution. Arbilla (2000) considers that the conceptual bases for foreign policy after the end of the Cold War were only established after the ascension of Celso Lafer. The early stage of Collor’s administration, however, could be seen as a transition period within BFP’s conceptual outline, during which the president took advantage of a “void” in the BFP’s conceptual framework so as to insert concepts that would become constant in his electoral speeches.

(III) Timeframe. In both administrations, measures that aimed for a FPC were taken right at the beginning of the mandates. Castello presented the basis for his foreign policy as early as his famous speech at the MER, in 31/07/1964. The mandate revocation processes and replacement of important offices also occurred rapidly. The concern towards communists also appears as early as the first letter by Castelo to the MER, according to Viana (1975).

During the Collor administration, the process to change the Brazilian development model had already began during the Sarney mandate with the introduction of an economic liberalization. However, Collor gave continuity and further developed the process; besides, “swiftness” was one of the marks for the changes implemented by the president. Together with Rezek, it justified the need to promoted changes and legitimized such actions with his electoral-political capital.
(IV) Distance level towards the hegemon. Castelo promoted a rapprochement towards the US, made explicit by his support to intervene in the DR, and his advocacy for creating the Inter-American Peace Force as well as defending the American anti-communist policies. According to a quantitative analysis by Hagan (1989), Brazil moved from a “moderately anti-US” stance to a “moderately pro-US” (respectively, 2/5 and 4/5 in the author’s scale), which illustrates a new type of behavior for Brazil in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Counter intuitively, Amorim Neto (2011) did not find a convergence increase in regards to the IFP period (measured by the average coincidence of votes among Brazil and the US in the UNGA – variable with a scale from 0 to 1), with the military administration being inferior (0,61) to Jango’s (0,64). Even so, the author indicates a significant increase in the concordance of issues concerning policy and security, with an increase from 0,63 to 0,71. An investigation in the author’s data would be necessary so as to identify the reason behind such discrepant results – unfortunately, none of the two databases are available online for replication.

In a very similar manner, one of the main objectives behind Collor’s foreign policy was to remove the tensions in the bilateral relations with the US (Hirst and Pinheiro, 1995). The adhesion to reforms encouraged by the hegemon was already an important step towards the removal of frictions and a bilateral rapprochement. In the UNGA voting, Amorim Neto (2011) pointed towards a decrease in the US-Brazil convergence, reaching an average index of 0,14 during the “collorida”2 administration. Also for this reason, and differently to some authors (Batista, 1993; Cervo and Bueno, 2002; Mello, 2000), we do not consider his external policy to be an alignment with the US.

(V) Changes in the bureaucratic structure. Firstly, Castelo Branco altered the role for the Minister of State. The last Minister during the Goulart Administration was João Augusto de Araújo Castro (1963-1964), closely identified with the IFP and was alongside Jango during the controversial special mission to Moscow and Beijing (1961). The most memorable episode during his time in office as Minister was his “Three Ds” speech at the UNGA (Lamarão, 2007). With Vasco Leitão da Cunha, however, there was the promotion of reforms, such as: change in promotion criteria; substitution of overseas representatives; coordinating the “witch hunt” in the MER. These projects outline Vasco’s administrative and managerial profile as opposed to Araújo’s role as a foreign policy formulator.

Secondly, the reforms reached/attained the division of labor among ministries and the portfolio of tasks performed by the Itamaraty. With Castelo, the change in the MER’s role occurred by means of a new structure in the Propaganda and Commercial Expansion Services (SERPRO) and the MER’s exclusivity in Brazil’s overseas commercial promotion.

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2 Translator’s note: Here we find the use of a wordplay with the Portuguese word “colorida” (colorful) and a reference to Fernando Collor.
On the one hand, the inclusion of SG/CSN as a new decision-making body for security and military inclusion in diplomatic missions represented a loss of institutional power. On the other hand, the Ministry also went on to act in the security area with the CIE. These new measures meant for an *increased importance of the Itamaraty within the federal structure*.

With Collor, it is also possible to notice a change in the *minister’s role*. Sarney’s last Chancellor, Abreu Sodré, was appointed to accommodate political interests and to establish a governing coalition, with little influence in the House; as a result, the General-Secretary Paulo Tarso assumed the role of Chancellor (Casarões, 2011). As for Rezek’s indication – a name coming from outside the corporation and who went on to defend Collor’s foreign project policy – could have represented an “instrumentalization” by the minister on the part of President so as to gather support within the house for his already defined project. In the *division of labor among departments and portfolio of tasks performed by the ministry*, the federal administration reform, by means of the PM 150, had a considerable effect. The dismemberment of the General Secretariat led to a new division of labor, while the change in retirement laws led to a new personnel configuration. As for the establishment of the Latin American Integration Department within the MER, it represented the pursuit for maintaining competence in a specific area and to oppose the recently founded Extraordinary Ministry for Latin American Integration Affairs.

Lastly, as for the *importance of the ministry in the federal structure*, the last relevant change indicator for the MER in face of the other ministries was the transference of the international political and economic competences to the Ministry of Finance, Economy and Planning (MFEP). However, it is difficult to pinpoint if this meant a significant change in the Itamaraty’s importance *vis-à-vis* other bureaucratic agencies. According to Amorim (2003), the MER had to act in order to ensure its competence in some areas, such as regional integration policy.

During the Castelo Branco administration, the FPC “fulfilled” practically all points raised by our qualitative analysis. This leads us to classify the analyzed FPC as a change in international orientation (Hermann, 1990) or restructuration (Rosati, 1994); the most extreme in the authors’ four degree change scale. As for Collor, we consider it to be more suitable – since some points in our scheme were not contemplated and some changes had begun during the Sarney administration – to classify it as a change of problem or objective (Hermann, 1990), or reform (Rosati, 1994) – the third among the four FPC levels proposed by the authors.
Comparison in Search of Patterns

In this section a comparative analysis will be developed between the two administrations in order to identify patterns among the analyzed situations, and which could indicate towards some of this article’s possible contributions to the specialized literature.

Firstly, we identified the importance of structural shocks or exceptional moments for the promotion of a broad change project, factors related to a crisis – discussed alongside the policy window concept. Even though the FPC literature has already argued for the existence of a FPC in the analyzed administrations, an analysis had not yet been carried out with a specific methodology so as to base its argumentation; it merely stressed some signs of change (Cervo and Bueno, 2002; Lima, 1994; Pinheiro, 2000; Saraiva, 2003; Vizentini, 2008). The analytical framework is also a contribution in itself, since it may be used to analyze other FPC situations in Brazil or in countries with similar political systems.

Secondly, we considered that both the domestic and international contexts were of utmost importance for the change processes. At the same time, we consider that during the Castelo Branco Administration, domestic issues had more weight, while international factors had more weight during the Fernando Collor Administration, as pointed out by Flávia Mello (2000). However, it is not possible to prove that there was in fact a difference in weight for the internal and external contexts concerning the FPC.

The larger weight to the domestic sphere during the Castelo administration would result from a more recent and radical political rupture, while the international scenario at the time was not undergoing drastic changes. For Collor, the most recent and radical change took place in the international sphere, which was undergoing a transition period between two types of systems. Internally, the change resultant from the redemocratization was a more gradual process, with a similar effect on the FPC.

It is equally dangerous to claim that the FPC would have been less radical for these reasons; for such, it would be necessary to compare a larger number of cases. A valid argument is that the extralegal mechanisms, used for the complete replacement of the agents in power of the State, would be justifiable only if it also resulted in a turnaround in several political areas. For Collor, in spite of the change being announced in his national project, a failure in following through the plan would not undermine the legitimacy of his administration in such a determinant manner. The development of more detailed and conceptually richer change scales is another point in which the literature needs to advance.

Thirdly, the analyzed periods also represented substantial changes in structure, roles, tasks, and in the Itamaraty’s areas of operation and in the Chancellor’s function. Our interpretation is that these changes were political maneuvers so as to guarantee the success of the FPC process, that is, the presidents acted so as to diminish the MER’s influence in
issues concerning foreign policy at the same time in which it increased its own influence, even if that did not mean excluding the ministry from decisions. The discrepancy between foreign policy on the one hand, and national and international environmental changes on the other, shows that sometimes the bureaucratic agencies – identified with pattern continuity and institutionalization – do not adapt in the same velocity as the domestic political game, which would explain the direct actions by the president so as to promote the changes in foreign policy.

Fourth, while we suggested that the head of government had an essential role in the FPC we did not disregard the importance of other actors. The arguments are those already presented by the literature: the president’s interest is determinant in the MER’s relative autonomy in defining the foreign policy (Lima, 1994); a leader will opt for a redirection if there is interest and an active involvement in foreign policy and if the issue is considered by him to be essential to the maintenance of the regime (Hermann, 1981; Hermann et al, 2001). Therefore, the presidents used their office authority so as to legitimize their innovative projects for foreign policy: Castelo Branco justified the need for a FPC through society’s support towards his government and to reestablish the political order and to ward off the “communist threat”; Fernando Collor relied on his electoral-political capital and based the legitimacy of his modernizing project by means of the population’s demands for new directions for Brazil. Furthermore, the crisis scenario ensured greater decision-making power to the leaders.

Nevertheless, we do not consider the “predominant leader” concept by Hermann and Hermann (1989) to be adequate in order to describe the decision-making structure of these administrations due to the weight this category infers to the actor – decision as the result of the leader’s individual choice –, even if the authors’ definition states the importance of the leader’s sensibility towards the political context for determining the outcomes and results.

In the studied cases, a more adequate theoretical framework to analyze the problem should include other relevant actor involved in foreign policy formulation and execution. One suggestion would be a structure that could allocate the president at the top of the decision-making structure at the same time in which the Legislative and the bureaucracies could respectively influence the decisions, remodeling the president’s draft laws and negotiating deals, or approaching the final result to the political ideas defended by these institutions.

In both situations there is a pattern in the president’s posture which led to an implementation of a different foreign policy model, but we do not consider, however, that this meant an exclusion of the Itamaraty from foreign policy development. Since the president is situated at the top of the decision-making hierarchy, if he nominates a chancellor who
supports his ideas, he manages to have an interlocutor to provide him with information and ensures an important actor within the Itamaraty’s political game. Moreover, the MER needs to follow superior orders and does not have sufficient power to directly or individually curb the presidential initiatives.

Fifth, among the several decision-making structure models presented by the FPA literature, we consider that the one closest to the administrations in question was the Truman Administration (1945-1953). This decision-making structure may be adequate for moments in FPC. According to George (1988), Truman attempted to weaken the bureaucratic politics by strengthening the role of the heads in each ministry, council or department, by delegating responsibilities to them. This is consistent with the studied cases due to the importance of some people, such as Roberto Campos, Vasco Leitão da Cunha and Juracy Magalhães for Castelo Branco; and Zélia Cardoso, Francisco Rezek, Marcos Azambuja, Marcílio Marques Moreira and Rubens Ricupero for Fernando Collor. Besides, some of these names, such as Juracy, Zélia and Marcílio, occupied more than one important office during the administrations they participated in, which shows their importance for the respective presidents.

In Truman’s model, the president sought to hear the opinions and reports of specialists on certain issues and only then emit a decision, centralizing the responsibilities for the decisions taken. These characteristics were also present in both administrations: Castelo Branco would carry out periodic meetings with the SG/CSN, where he would obtain consensus and support for measures that would be taken, and his relations with the US were accompanied by the presence of Juracy Magalhães in the embassy; Collor carried out several meetings with his economic team while at the same time centralizing the responsibilities for personally leading the economic plan.

Final Considerations

In closing, we will discuss questions left unanswered by our analytical framework and carry out a final assessment.

Initially, what were the main reasons behind the FPC? Besides the already analyzed variables, some complementary factors could also be of influence: a) The regime’s survival or legitimacy could be tied to a FPC if the initial objective of the administration was tied to such a need; in these situations, the leader’s political costs in promoting change becomes lower to those arising from continuity; b) For the Brazilian case, since the State is the main economic force, the governmental policy is related to the economic field and, therefore, a decision to promote changes in the economic policy will lead to influences in foreign policy; the latter becoming one of the tools so as to achieve the State’s objective
in promoting economic development; c) The FPC can also be a way to distance oneself from the previous administration, a way to present the new regime’s intention to promote changes in several spheres, with foreign policy being only one of them.

Secondly, the feedback idea (not discussed within the article, but featured in figure 2). We consider that after a FPC took place in the analyzed administrations, such process occurred. This would be the result of a considerable change in foreign policy leading to dissatisfaction in sectors identified with the status quo, which would then act accordingly in order to reestablish the replaced policies. In addition, after a certain period, it becomes possible for the decision-makers to analyze the results of a certain policy, being able to opt for the replacement of practices considered to be inefficient.

During the Castelo Branco Administration, its replacement by Costa e Silva represented the ascension of actors identified with the “hardline” sector. Some sectors advocate that the second military president resumed traces of the IFP and changed the Brazilian stance further from the US (Cervo and Bueno, 2002; Cruz, 2009; Martins, 1975; Pinheiro, 2000).

At the end of the Fernando Collor Administration, Celso Lafer developed a new paradigm for BFP, taking into account the progress achieved during this period, but seeking to resume traditional traits of the MER (Lafer, 1993). The change in the ministry’s command is also considered by the literature to be a moment of readjustment (Arbilla, 2000; Mello, 2000; Vieira; 2001).

Lastly, we consider that the literature needs to advance in the analysis of FPC cases for the following reasons: redirection processes, in spite of their emergency characteristic, may have long term effects, becoming the line of action for subsequent long periods of stability. Actions related to FPC have a stronger impact on IS actors since they are marked by a more pronounced behavior by part of the States; and additionally, because they occur during periods of crisis, when the actions of the main actors in foreign policy are more exposed to the public, thus allowing researchers to collect rich information in regards to how decisions are taken. Lastly, we also consider the importance of advancing the development of theoretical frameworks, such as the analytical scheme presented in this article, for developing systematic analyses that allow for better grounded inferences.

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Human Rights and Development – An International Political Economy Perspective

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This research note provides a critical review of the recent literature on the consequences of development and democratization for the protection of human rights. It identifies common lessons and grounds for further research in the field. This literature takes a series of paradoxes that challenge conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between development and democratization as its starting point, on one hand, and the protection of human rights, on the other. To that effect, several unintended adverse consequences of economic development and movements toward democracy for the protection of civil and political rights are identified. The literature focuses on rights to physical integrity, leaving important questions unanswered when it comes to civil liberties and second-generation rights. The article systematizes new knowledge produced by this literature, translates it into recommendations for research and identifies opportunities for new investigations.

Keywords: Human rights; development; democratization.

Introduction

Over the last two decades, the field of human rights has attracted the attention of scholars in Political Science and International Relations working within an international political economy framework. These scholars bring to this research agenda well-established knowledge on democracy and development, drawing from a prolific scholarship. When researchers set out to explore the relationship between human rights and development – and, for that matter, human rights and democracy – they do call on this scholarship to frame their efforts and to guide their exercise.

The systematic evaluation of the level of human rights protection around the world was well under way when the effort to study the relationship between human rights and
development started, which meant that there was data to carry out large-N studies. Organizations such as Freedom House and databases such as the Political Terror Scale were already committed to providing a systematic overview of the state of human rights protection in the world on a regular basis. The availability of this data prompted a research agenda that relied on quantitative methods and formal modeling. Inevitably, findings and research design choices from the literature on development and democracy influenced this new endeavor.

It is not surprising that we find an important segment of the literature that looks at human rights and development to be predominantly quantitative. I will come back to this aspect of the research agenda later, to point to specific shortcomings in this literature that could perhaps be best addressed through the use of in-depth case study analysis. The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the research that analyzes democracy and democratization as they relate to the protection of human rights. Section 3 focuses on the relationship between economic development and the protection of human rights, and analyzes the role of several economic tools in the promotion of better human rights practices by states. Section 4 identifies areas for further research and opportunities to deepen our knowledge through the study of specific aspects of a problem, via case study. The last section is the conclusion.

**Democracy and Democratization**

International political economy approaches to the relationship between democracy and democratization, on one hand, and the protection of human rights, on the other, have faced several issues of measurement. Measures of democracy vary, but the several measures available have in common the fact that they treat data on a categorical basis\(^1\). The most well-known and widely used database to measure regime type (Polity IV, in its most recent version)\(^2\) provides a scale that ranges from negative ten (-10) to positive ten (+10), based on several indicators of democracy. The Polity scheme consists of six component measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition from 1800 to 2010. More specifically, the measure is composed of six indicators: regulation of chief executive recruitment, competitiveness of Executive recruitment, openness of Executive recruitment, Executive constraints, regulation of participation, and competitiveness of participation. Clearly, several of the indicators used to

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\(^1\) For a comprehensive list of the composite measures of democracy see Bueno de Mesquita, Downs, Smith, and Cherif (2005; 440-441).

\(^2\) The website for the project can be found at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm [last visited on July 14, 2012].
measure regime type within the Polity IV project overlap with measures of human rights protection. This presents problems of endogeneity, as one cannot disentangle the causal relationships at work. Regardless of the limitations of this database, it remains central to the research agenda that seeks to explore the impact of democracy and democratization on the level of human rights protection. This is true for all but one of the articles that I will review next, namely texts by Christian Davenport, Beth Simmons, and Todd Landman.

To that effect, Bueno de Mesquita, Downs, Smith, and Cherif (2005a) offer an attempt to unpack what might be hidden in Polity’s measure of democracy, with respect to human rights protection. Their article disaggregates the indicators used in Polity IV to explore the impact of each indicator on the protection of rights to physical integrity. The analysis spans from 1976 to 2001. Surprisingly, multiparty competition (competitiveness of participation) appeared as the key to improvement in rights protection. In other words, when moves toward democracy begin to reach a level where parties compete with each other for positions in power, one observes a clear improvement in the protection of rights to physical integrity – but not before! This is as important a finding as it is worrisome. It is important to understand that not all indicators that “together” signal shifts in regime type impact the quality of human rights protection equally. Nevertheless, from a policy standpoint, the fact that only after multiparty competition is established do we observe significant improvements in the protection of rights to physical integrity is problematic, because party competition is usually the last stage of the process of democratization and the one that can take the longest to attain. In other words, this finding is bad news when it comes to the aftermath of democratization processes with respect to human rights protection.

The findings in this article echoed earlier research that sought to disentangle the impact of democracy and democratization – separately – on human rights protection. In fact, Davenport (2004) emphasizes the contribution of decades of empirical research to establish that democracy does indeed lead to lower levels of repression. According to this literature, democratic institutions (1) eliminate the desire for repression, (2) the need for repression, and (3) the capacity to repress (Davenport 2004; 539). But what happens during the democratization process? Davenport proposes that democracy has two distinct effects: the pacifying effect and the “taming” effect. The former has been well studied in the literature and is supported by his research, with new nuances; the latter is also present in his overview of 137 countries from 1976 to 1996. The finding regarding the “taming” effect of democracy and democratization indicates that states lower repression while

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3 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) argue that the structure of government finance, understood as a leader’s ability to mobilize foreign aid and natural resource rents, influences the level of repression. Leaders who are better endowed with respect for these two sources of economic leverage will limit the provision of public goods associated with democracy, such as freedom of assembly, transparency, and freedom of the press.
continuing to restrict political behavior, often through restrictions of civil liberties, such as freedom of expression, freedom of press, and the right of assembly. Finally, Davenport identifies an unintended adverse impact of democratization on the level of human rights protection. More specifically, the process of democratization – as measured by the level of constraints imposed on the Executive – appears to be correlated with more repression. This finding is corroborated in the article by Bueno de Mesquita et al mentioned above. In fact, restrictions on the Executive and elections, for that matter, are not sufficient to attain improvements in the protection of rights to physical integrity, as multiparty competition has to be in place before one can observe significant improvements in these rights.

Democracy, thus, remains a key variable in the study of human rights protection, from the international political economy perspective. An earlier work by Andrew Moravcsik has explored the rationale for behavior amongst three categories of countries, grouped according to their regime type: established democracies, new democracies, and unstable or non-democracies (Moravcsik 2000). The article analyses the preferences of these three categories of states during the negotiation that led to the creation of the European Court of Human Rights in 1953. Common wisdom, rooted in our pre-conceived ideas about democratic regimes, would expect established democracies to support a strong court, which Moravcsik characterizes as a regime that contemplates compulsory jurisdiction and the right to individual petition. Surprisingly, during this four-year negotiation, support for a strong regime came from the new democracies: Austria, France, Italy, Iceland, Ireland, and Germany (continuous democracy since a date between 1920 and 1950, as opposed to established democracies: continuous democracy since a date before 1920). Moravcsik does not find much room to account for this paradox within the traditional international relations scholarship; he proceeds to offer a new theoretical paradigm, within which behavior by the new democracies could be explained as an attempt to “lock in” the gains from democratization and to protect this asset from future attempts against the regime. Because established democracies are less prone to such risks, they are not ready to incur the costs of delegation associated with a strong international human rights regime. Moravcsik’s work has important implications for research on international human rights regimes, as other scholars have departed from similar assumptions to account for state behavior with respect to the signing and ratification of international human rights treaties, on one hand, and the impact of these actions on the level of protection, on the other.

In a similar vein, Beth Simmons’ 2009 book, Mobilizing for Human Rights, offers an unmatched effort for comprehensively assessing the motivations of states to sign and ratify the six core treaties that form the international human rights regime. The book sets off to ask whether signing and ratifying these treaties has any influence on state behavior regarding the protection of the rights contemplated thereto, and if so, how this influence
can be understood within a theoretical framework. Her analysis deals with the well-established link between economic development and higher levels of human rights protection – a subject I will come back to in the next section – and takes a new approach by incorporating domestic constraints into the model. It also accounts for states’ cultural and religious backgrounds. She identifies three patterns of behavior amongst the countries in her project: those that ratify and comply with treaty requirements, those that ratify and do not comply (false positives), and those that do not ratify but comply nevertheless (false negatives). She is mostly interested in explaining behavior by these two latter groups. In particular, a better understanding of the motivations of “false positives” could help scholars and practitioners involved with policy design and implementation. For Simmons, ratification of human rights agreements is a rational decision, whereby states think about expectations regarding the net costs associated with joining the regime, given a set of preferences and state practice. Ratification is therefore “rationally expressive,” because the decision to join a regime sends a message to the international community as well as to peers in the region. Regional effects and emulation are a big factor in her explanation for false positives behavior. As the number of ratifications of a human rights treaty increases in a region, outsiders are compelled to join, even though they have no intention of complying. This explains why the most repressive regimes have actually signed and ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture.

Simmons’ contribution is particularly innovative and important when it comes to the analysis of the domestic constraints associated with the ratification and implementation processes. She treats them as legal integration costs, and they come in two sorts: ex ante and ex post legal integration costs. Ex ante costs refer to the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative within ratifying countries, and to the legal regime in place (civil law v. common law). Ex post costs refer to uncertainty and adjustment costs, and to costs of irreversibility. The higher the legal integration costs, the more skeptical a state will be toward ratification and compliance. She proceeds to test several hypotheses empirically in order to assess the impact these costs would have on the rate of ratification, on the use of reservations and on the decision to join additional protocols that strengthen treaty commitments through the delegation of adjudicative powers. Very generally, her results indicate that states with a British legal heritage, or those where a version of common law dominates, ratify at a lower rate and are more skeptical towards delegating powers through additional protocols. They also submit more reservations. Regarding the cultural and religious background, another strong finding is consistent across models: Catholics ratify at a higher rate, submit fewer reservations and are more likely to join additional protocols, delegating adjudicative powers and allowing individuals to petition directly to
treaty bodies. These results are followed by a finding of strong regional effects that corroborate the “emulation” argument she proposes.

To conclude this overview of the recent literature, within the field of international political economy, that analyzes the impact of democracy and democratization on the level of human rights protection I discuss the book by Todd Landman, who, together with Beth Simmons, followed the investigation launched by Oona Hathaway in her 2002 article. All three scholars have consistently found that democracies ratify human rights treaties at a higher rate than non-democracies. But whether ratification has any observable impact on the level of protection is not a consensual issue. Hathaway found no significant relationship between ratification and improvements in the level of protection. A few years later, and using an extended version of the same dataset, Landman arrived at a more optimistic finding: ratification — or the very existence of an international human rights regime, is starting to have an impact on state behavior (Landman 2005). Based on his analysis, he suggests that democracies ratify at a higher rate and protect at higher levels. Amongst democracies, those that belong to the fourth generation (1990-1994) ratify more and with fewer reservations, but protect less.

The work discussed in this section focuses on the role of democracy and democratization in the level of human rights protection, addressing first generation rights. The authors unveiled important relationships, and in all cases they controlled for intervening factors, which has become standard practice in the field. A non-exhaustive list of the several control variables that they incorporate in their models includes: the occurrence of conflict, internal and international, population size, trade and economic development. In the next section I will focus on the scholarship that has treated development as an independent variable, looking for causal relationships between development and the level of rights protection. For this literature, in turn, regime type will be mostly treated as a control variable.

**Economic Development**

Research on the relationship between development and the protection of human rights can be organized in at least two groups: first, articles that address the consequences of economic development for rights protection too simply, second, articles that focus on specific instruments of economic development, such as foreign investment, preferential trade agreements, World Bank and International Monetary Fund programs, international aid — and their impact on the protection of human rights. In both cases, the literature is dealing with first generation human rights, and, for the most part, rights to physical integrity. I will follow this structure and present research that has shifted the way scholars have traditionally looked at political structures, development and well-being, followed by
three articles that analyze the impact of specific instruments of development on rights protection.

The 2003 book by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Morrow and Siverson, *The Logic of Political Survival*, offers a fresh perspective on international relations theory and its contribution to understanding phenomena in real world politics. The book introduces an innovative way to look at political structures and the way politicians mold these structures to pursue their own self-interest. It departs from the assumption that every leader wants to remain in power and that therefore political survival is their first and foremost preference. The decisions leaders make in a polity are oriented towards securing his or her political survival, and the decision to protect the rights of individuals under their jurisdiction is no exception. To that end, human rights protection falls under the category of public goods, *strictu sensu*, in that protection of those rights meets the criteria on non-excludability and non-rival consumption. In simple terms, once these goods are made available anyone in the polity can enjoy their benefits; moreover, consumption (or enjoyment) by one group does not diminish the supply of the good for other groups.

With these preliminaries in mind, every polity consists of a group of residents, some of whom have the capacity to take part in deciding who the leader will be. Individuals who can participate in the selection of the leader belong in a group called the selectorate. Similarly, in every polity there is a leader (or leadership) and a challenger who wants to replace the leader. In order to remain in power, the leader needs the support of a winning coalition or the group of individuals drawn from the selectorate, whose support is essential if the leader is to stay in power. The winning coalition can be very small – as in most authoritarian regimes – or quite large, like electing majorities in a democracy. According to the model, leaders dealing with a small winning coalition will choose to reward these individuals with private goods in exchange for their support. Private goods are adequate here because the group of beneficiaries is small, otherwise it would become prohibitively expensive to do so. In large winning coalition regimes, as most democracies are, because leaders cannot compensate their loyal supporters with private goods they turn to the provision of public goods instead. Human rights protection is one amongst various forms of compensation that fall under the public good category. It is easy to understand how the authors account for the fact that the level of human rights protection is higher amongst democracies – precisely the regimes that are characterized by large winning coalitions.

Another applicable contribution, drawing directly from their research, relates to the dynamic aspect of their model, especially regarding economic development. They show

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4 For an overview of the traditional explanations of economic development – or wealth, and the protection of human rights, see Poe, Tate, and Camp Keith (1999) and Milner, Leblang, and Poe (2004).
how large winning coalition regimes are generally correlated with higher GDP per capita and growth rates, while small winning coalition regimes tend to be poorer, on average (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2001). As the size of the winning coalition grows, for example, during transitions to democracy, growth rates shrink and GDP per capita goes down – even below pre-existing small winning coalition levels! This finding indicates that the “road to democracy” is problematic and can sidestep into authoritarian recesses quite easily. This result goes hand in hand with the analysis of the consequences of democratization for the protection of human rights offered in the previous section. Nevertheless, once a polity reaches a certain threshold, growth resumes and GDP per capita reflects the new scenario.

Results from this research agenda bring insightful warnings to scholars and policymakers working with human rights protection in transitional societies. Commitments to higher levels of protection may be – and often are – self-serving to the leadership, who will have to combat declining economic performance as a consequence of the shift from an emphasis on the provision of private goods to the provision of public goods, human rights included.

A nuanced discussion within the same general framework is offered by Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2005b). As the title of the article, Development and Democracy, suggests, the authors seek to investigate whether the common wisdom that economic development inevitably leads to democratization holds true. They begin by looking at examples that defy widely held beliefs regarding the link between development and democracy: Russia and China are the culprits. In these two cases, one sees steady economic growth unmatched by significant improvements along the democratic scale – with well documented implications for human rights protection. They proceed to argue that leaders have become increasingly savvy when it comes to managing growth spurts and spillovers to prevent the empowerment and mobilization of the middle classes, which, according the traditional story, would bring about democratization and accountability. Leaders do so by differentiating between coordination goods and traditional public goods. The former are essential to development, while the latter are key to enabling empowerment and mobilization – ultimately bringing about democratization. To be clearer, coordination goods involve things like accessible higher education, political rights, freedom of press and human rights, more broadly. Traditional public goods, in their analysis, consist of things like infrastructure, public health, primary education, transportation, and security. These are essential for economic activity to take root and bloom. Curtailing the provision of these goods would adversely impact economic growth itself. So leaders choose the best of both worlds: growth, which compensates their winning coalitions, in the traditional non-rival consumption pattern, with the political status quo that results from a deliberate effort to
halt political mobilization through the withholding of coordination goods. Other examples include Cuba and Venezuela. An empirical study of 150 countries, between 1976 and 1999 found that economic growth accompanied by effective restriction of coordination goods delays democratization by 5-10 years (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2005b).

Leaders’ concerns with their political survival is the key concept in this research agenda. The model challenges the old-fashioned view of democracy as a heuristic asset, to demonstrate that leaders governing a democratic country are no less self-interested than those heading an authoritarian regime. Strategies for political survival will vary in each case, with important consequences for human rights protection. But the attentive scholar and practitioner may want to keep an eye on his or her policy goals, discounting the rhetoric that is often present in democratic discourse. Skepticism is also the word of order in the three articles that I discuss next, which deal with economic tools and their effectiveness in attaining improvements in rights protection.

The first article, by Emily Hafner-Burton, investigates whether preferential trade agreements that address human rights have an impact on the level of rights protection in the target country (Hafner-Burton 2005). She discusses two mechanisms of influence that are well researched in the literature: persuasion and coercion. Persuasion is widely studied and advocated amongst constructivist international relations scholars, for whom the preferences of states are constantly being shaped by other states involved in the process. In other words, preferences and choices of action are socially influenced. Persuasion is a prominent mechanism to reach conformity with norms and rules. Conversely, the second mechanism discussed in the article, coercion, draws from a rationalist approach to state behavior, closer to the realist and institutionalist international relations scholarship. Coercion presupposes the capability to impose a credible threat and the means to implement it. It also requires that the threat represent a meaningful loss for the target country. Hafner-Burton’s research design offers ample opportunity to observe the two mechanisms at work, as her dataset of preferential trade agreements negotiated by the European Union and the United States with various countries contemplates both mechanisms. Indeed, some agreements include a soft clause whereby states that are entering the agreement commit to improving the situation of human rights in their territory. In these soft agreements, there is no penalty for failing to comply. The other set of agreements, so-called hard agreements, include the same human rights clause, but condition the continuation of the agreement to real improvements in the level of rights protection. In other words, if the target country does not improve the situation of human rights in its territory, it will lose the trade benefits associated with the agreement.

After exploring the argument in favor of coercion and discussing several cases, she proceeds to the empirical part of the analysis, which covers 176 countries from 1976 to
2001 and is circumscribed to physical integrity rights. She finds no evidence that preferential trade agreements that include a soft human rights clause have an impact on the level of rights protection. Agreements that include a hard clause raise the probability that a country will provide better protection. Her findings offer valuable insights into the operating mechanisms of any tool that embeds a threat, such as economic sanctions, for example. Based on her model, one would expect economic sanctions that seek to improve the situation of human rights protection in the target country to operate in much the same way.

Subsidies from Hafner-Burton’s article on preferential trade agreements fed another – more ambitious – book project, where she deepens the analysis to the case-study level in order to explore the role of policymakers and the Executive, the Legislative, unions and non-governmental organizations in negotiating preferential trade agreements that include human rights clauses (Hafner-Burton 2009). From the outset, she articulates that the preferences of these actors are subject to the impact of institutions and to the role of power. Based on her case studies she argues that preferences within the Executive tend to prevail, despite the growing role of civil society and the dynamic of Executive-Legislative relationships in both the U.S. and the European Union. Along the way, she reveals the dominant concern from the American perspective, which is labor standards and the prohibition of child labor, whereas within the European Union the preoccupation centers around the protection of civil liberties and the electoral process. Her case studies are nicely woven to explore the theoretical propositions regarding the role of preferences, institutions and power.

In a similar vein Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko analyze the role of foreign capital with regard to human rights protection (2001). In order to capture specific forms of capital inflow, the authors created the concept of foreign economic penetration, which can take one of four forms: i. foreign direct investment; ii. portfolio investment; iii. debt (international loans by private companies); and iv. government aid. They review competing explanations and expectations regarding the role of foreign capital, with implications for hypotheses related to human rights protection. Their empirical analysis covers 43 countries, between 1981 and 1995, and looks into the protection of rights to physical integrity as well as other political rights and civil liberties. Their results show that portfolio investment is associated with higher levels of protection of rights to physical integrity, whereas foreign direct investment seems to improve the protection of civil liberties and other political rights. Debt levels are correlated with lower levels of protection for all categories of rights covered in their analysis.

The authors acknowledge the lack of consensus in the literature regarding the consequences of foreign capital for the protection of human rights. The empirical record on the subject is at least mixed. For more on this topic see Henderson 1996, and Meyer 1996; 1998.
This article reinforces the argument according to which economic instruments of influence that are based on coercion seem to have an impact on human rights protection. In the case of foreign direct investment and portfolio investment, the threat to withdraw the capital operates as if it was a sanction. It represents the “stick” part of the argument in the classic carrot vs. stick story. Their finding regarding the impact of debt levels deserves to be further explored and is worth a dedicated investigation.

I will now discuss an article that analyzes the impact of World Bank adjustment agreements on the protection of human rights within receiving countries (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006)\(^6\). The authors begin by acknowledging the selection bias problem that affects their research: the World Bank quite naturally focuses its actions on countries that are poor and that have big populations. These two characteristics are well studied in human rights literature, and appear to be correlated with worse levels of human rights protection. Thus, the World Bank’s actions target regimes that have traditionally been the worse violators. The authors attempt to account for the selection bias through several statistical techniques. They proceed to formulate and test three hypotheses, using a dataset comprising 442 adjustment agreements that were implemented throughout the years. The authors find strong evidence for the first two hypotheses: the negotiation hypothesis, according to which during the negotiation of an agreement with the Bank, one should observe an improvement of rights protection; the second hypothesis – the implementation hypothesis – expects the level of protection to decrease when the implementation of the agreement takes place. The logic that informs both hypotheses is quite similar. Leaders need to impart their resolve and ability to address the human rights situation within their territory to World Bank officials. These negotiators can easily walk away from the negotiation if leaders fail to show this resolve during the negotiation, through observable better human rights practices. After the negotiation is over, during the so-called implementation phase, leaders no longer have the same incentives. Moreover, they will most likely face the impact of adjustment policies in their economies, which often generates greater demands from incumbents, dissent and, commonly, repression – hence the worse record of human rights protection following the implementation of World Bank adjustment agreements. The authors find empirical support for both hypotheses.

Aside from World Bank programs, general assistance is also dispersed through foreign aid, often bilaterally. The impact of aid on human rights is a development from recent research in Political Science that seeks to look at aid as an instrument to promote the political survival of leaders – both from the donor and the recipient countries’ sides\(^7\).

\(^6\) For more on the impact of structural agreements on human rights protection see Pion-Berlin 1984; Franklin 1997; Camp Keith and Poe 2000.

\(^7\) Several authors have studied the impact of foreign aid from an economic perspective. Among
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) modeled the pattern of donations amongst OECD countries between 1960 and 2001, and found that aid transfers improve the survival of political leaders in both donor and recipient countries. The same is not true for poverty alleviation. The study follows earlier work by the same authors (2007), wherein the focus was on American aid alone.

The group of articles presented in this section discusses the role of and causal mechanisms behind selected economic tools and their influence on human rights protection. The findings of this literature challenge conventional wisdom regarding the World Bank and its policies of poverty alleviation and development, with important implications for other international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund. Overall, the literature presented here suggests that states and private actors enjoy a better human rights record when it comes to devising and implementing economic tools of influence. I refer specifically to the use of preferential trade agreements that contain hard human rights clauses by states and to foreign economic penetration by firms as well. The same is not true for foreign aid, where the literature suggests that states prioritize personalistic preferences regarding the political survival of leaders, often to the detriment of the humanitarian goal of poverty alleviation and human rights.

**Economic Development Questions Unanswered and Further Research**

Several questions remain open regarding this research agenda. This recent international political economy investigation of human rights issues has focused on well-established relationships within the connected fields of democracy, development, and trade. As a consequence, the questions that guided the investigation mirrored the nature of the inquiry formulated elsewhere, without always accounting for the peculiarities of human rights as a topic.

Examples of questions that offer good territory for future research include the nature of the transition to democracy of states that have become democratic within the timeframe of the investigation. We know very little about the pros and cons of negotiated transitions. They appear to present a lesser threat for the protection of human rights, but evidence is scattered and the theoretical explanations lacking. Related to that, processes

of democratization often entail the incorporation of dissident groups that used to operate outside of the political spectrum, if not in plain illegality. These groups may have resorted to terror or insurgent techniques, but, historically, we have observed cases where they became part of the political game and began to voice their political preferences within a (more) democratic discourse. In the same vein, the literature on economic sanctions has found that amongst authoritarian regimes, different categories of regimes are affected in specific ways, therefore making the success of sanctions and their impact on human rights protection somewhat contingent on regime characteristics (Escriba-Folch and Wright 2010). This literature identifies four categories of authoritarian regimes, and which among these personalist regimes are most at risk when it comes to consequences of sanctions for the political survival of leaders⁸. This research suggests that not all repressive regimes are alike, so perhaps short of full democratization, practitioners should look for alternative outcomes as a stepping stone toward a better record of rights protection. Finally, we need to expand our knowledge into the territory of other first generation rights. Understandably, the literature has focused on rights to physical integrity because the data available limits the scope of the investigation of other categories of rights. But as some of the research suggests, other rights and civil liberties are equally important for securing a sustainable and long term political regime that is committed to the highest levels of human rights protection.

To summarize, this article identifies four areas for further research:

i. Negotiated v. abrupt transitions

ii. Incorporation of dissident political groups

iii. Nature of the authoritarian regime

iv. Beyond rights to physical integrity

Following this trend, the literature has focused primarily on empirical studies of well-documented phenomena. More recently, normative approaches that build on some of these empirical findings have emerged. Among them, the 2013 book by Emilie Hafner-Burton, *Making Human Rights a Reality*, stands out. In it, the author advocates that states – especially states that are well positioned to act (stewards) – should focus on strategies that work, even if these do not overlap with the more general norm of rights protection. The author highlights the role of coincidence, coercion, and persuasion as effective strategies to promote rights protection, suggesting that there is no general solution for every case, but rather, that scarce resources should be allocated in the most efficient way possible.

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⁸ There is a growing literature on the impact of economic sanctions for the protection of human rights. Even though this topic is beyond the scope of this article, those interested in the subject can find more about the consequences – often of an adverse nature – of economic sanctions for human rights in Escriba-Folch and Wright (2010), Peksen (2009), Peksen and Drury (2009), Carneiro and Elden (2009), and Wood (2008).
Final Remarks

This research note discussed the recent scholarship within the field of international political economy that has analyzed various factors shown to impact the level of human rights protection – focusing on rights to physical integrity. The article systematized this literature into two broad categories: research dealing with the consequences of democracy and democratization for human rights protection, and research dealing with development and related economic tools for the level of rights protection.

The findings in both categories of literature challenge conventional wisdom rooted in the benevolent consequences attributed to both democracy and development. Primarily through quantitative analyses, the authors point to several unintended adverse consequences of democracy (and democratization) as well as development for the protection of human rights.

A better understanding of the causal mechanisms behind some of these consequences may assist researchers in the quest for recommendations that can successfully mitigate – if not eliminate – these adverse outcomes. We hope to have contributed to this effort by inviting researchers to take a closer look at the issue.

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Diffusion of Good Government: Social Sector Reforms in Brazil

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The book Diffusion of Good Government: Social Sector Reforms in Brazil by Natasha Sugiyama is one of the most important recent contributions to a literature dedicated to confronting the policy choices made by States who face the persistence of poverty and social inequality in Latin America. With a theoretical and methodological support that mixes traditional and sophisticated approaches to the study of the formation of new agendas, the author presents an original analytical vision of the factors which orient the mechanisms behind the formulation of public policies in countries with a complex institutional arrangement, such as Brazil, a highly decentralized federation with specific attributes as to the definition of a social protection network. The author’s central interest is to investigate why and how these social reforms originate and are diffused among sharply distinct governmental units in terms of their administrative capacity, fiscal contribution, socioeconomic development, and political and cultural history. In order to develop her analysis the author selects two programs implemented in the country from the mid-1990s, which currently represent two of the main national policies in health and education: Family Health Program and School Grant Program1 (Programa Saúde da Família and Programa Bolsa Escola). Therefore, based on the municipal adherence to both programs, the object of the research is to investigate why ideas which represent social solutions arise and are adopted by a set of governments in time. According to theorists such as Heclo (1974) and Kingdon (2011), these ideas are proposals marked by new forms and

1 The School Grant Program was incorporated to the Family Grant Program (Programa Bolsa Família) as of 2003.
resources potentially applicable in a conservative system dominated by traditional rules and models for public policies. In a rereading that approaches classical views such as the one by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) concerning the institutional changes in anarchically organized systems, Sugiyama then becomes interested in explaining the factors that motivate similar political behavior within contexts of diffuse social reforms. To this goal the author defines a multi-method research framework that brings together qualitative and quantitative approaches with an extensive fieldwork, comparing major cities and applying the Event History Analysis (survival analysis) statistical model with an interest in analyzing the factors that explain the different time periods for adopting the programs among government leaders.

According to the author, the advantage in applying survival analysis is that the model allows us to annually observe the interdependence among jurisdictions, thus allowing for a more thorough analysis of the internal and external determinants in diffusion processes. In diffusion studies that seek to investigate the political behavior of actors in political decision-making, the determinants employed in the analysis are based in three explanations: political incentives, ideology and the role of social networks.

Starting from this approach, the author skillfully develops and adapts each one of these theoretical perspectives in order to test how electoral motivations, ideological formation or participation in social networks influence or motivate political actors to emulate innovative social programs. By treating these schools of thought as rival explanations, the author points out, in reference to Walker (1969), that more electorally competitive jurisdictions probably replicate more policies since the actors act rationally in the sense of attending the voters’ social demands. When referring to Mullins (1972), the author signals that certain principles or worldviews guide ideological preferences and, to this sense, political actors in an ideological spectrum closest to the left are eventually more inclined to adopt innovative institutional designs. Following in the footsteps of Balla (2001) and other scholars, Sugiyama examines if the participation of actors in social networks – professional associations, for example – would increase the odds of diffusing political practices thanks to the information exchange or socialization of norms. Still in the first chapter Sugiyama makes it clear to the reader that the State of the Art of her research was built on arbitrary selections in order to enable and to operationalize the research’s theoretical-conceptual and methodological framework. Therefore, the research focuses on municipalities with a population higher than one hundred thousand inhabitants, making for a total universe of 224 cases, according to the IBGE data from the year 2000.

In the second chapter the author dedicates herself to the historical debate that illustrates the utility of diffusion theories in political science as well as developing an original argument so as to present the framework of her investigation. As described, the concept of
diffusion is an issue in dispute by the specialized literature within this field of analysis. In a simple and objective manner, Sugiyama informs the reader that, in spite of a hodgepodge of denominations such as “contagion”, “waves” and “transference” used to describe the phenomenon of replication of political events, such positions in fact attempt to explain the issue of diffusion of an innovative political solution. The difference is that the contagion effect is applied to cases in which replication occurs in an extremely fast manner due to advantageous attributes of the policy at stake. The waves are episodes that occur after long periods of stability in the political system and which configure themselves as almost inevitable events, such as re-democratization processes, where the regime transition of a country decisively influences the transition of another country.

The transference of policies differs from the previous ones because, hypothetically, it generates some type of learning among the actors and consolidates effective institutional actions. But what brings these perspectives together to the point that the author opts for simplifying the concept of diffusion is precisely her reluctance in assuming a priori the rationale of the decision for the adoption of new policies. Instead, the employed premise is that the adoption of new policies is an autonomous decision that takes place over time as a result of one or several factors in an interconnection amongst potential adopters. By restraining from the traditional impulse of defining a pure theoretical framework and delineating instead a multidimensional notion to examine the diffusion of Family Health Program and the School Grant Program, the author contributes to the theoretical debate by arguing that the diffusion process is a dynamic process, which takes place over a time, and where the probability of governmental administrations adopting the programs is directly correlated to previous decisions by different administrations. In synthesis, by illustrating the complexity in explaining political behavior in social reforms, the author alerts that, even in an indirect manner, the diffusion of a program cannot be mistaken for an automatic copying process or for a typical decentralization process. This is because the adoption of programs such as the Family Health Program and the School Grant Program generate administrative and budget costs, as well as commitments for accomplishing certain social goals, both being elements that impact governmental administrations distinctively. Within this perspective, even though she does not substantially advance the discussion, Sugiyama makes it clear that the results which mark the dissemination of a policy model depends on how the adopters – in this case, the local governments – were influenced by the political system. That is, the analysis lies not on the positive or negative aspects of innovation, but it does leave some clues to be further investigated in future works concerning the protagonism of local actors, which since the Federal Constitution of 1988 were given legal autonomy to create their own policies, and thus turned the municipalities into policy laboratories.
The subsequent chapters are dedicated to an empirical analysis with the objective of providing causal explanations for the adoption of the Family Health Program and the School Grant Program. In the third chapter the conceptual-theoretical framework is structured in the survival analysis statistical model in order to test the influence of electoral competition, ideological convictions, social network connectivity, and other independent variables in the emulation of health of education programs. In the study, each logistic model measured the risk of the “adoption” to happen by means of annual observations. As for the School Grant Program the observations were spread out between 1995 and 2003 for the Family Health Program from 1994 until 2003. The results of the statistical regressions show that factors such as ideology and social networks decisively influenced the diffusion of both programs. As underlined by the author, in spite of the striking differences between the School Grant and the Family Health Program, and their different replication rates among the municipalities, both policies were disseminated by similar determinants. The analysis for both the School Grant Program and the Family Health Program reveals that the effect of electoral competition was null, which means that the adoption of such programs was not motivated by electoral disputes in either case. Such result contradicts a long tradition in the rational choice literature and is clearly closer to a sociological approach, since the study highlights that the actors’ motivation is influenced by factors of a social nature and not by individual choices interested in political reelection. Other variables that could potentially influence the diffusion of policies were tested as being the effects of geographic neighboring and other control variables that represent internal needs, such as the municipal Human Development Index (HDI-M), which aggregates several indicators for well-being, population size, and federal funding for the specific case of Family Health Program. The results interestingly reveal that high levels of HDI-M and the larger size of a city were only significant for the adoption of the School Grant Program, and that informal networks such as geographical proximity and federal spending mattered for the diffusion of the Family Health Program. By questioning her own research findings in the concluding section of this chapter, Sugiyama casts a relevant research question and wonders if in fact the proxies used to measure the main model variable reflect the real political dynamics in the emulation of the programs. This is the key for accommodating a classical methodological debate within the political sciences, which, to some extent, sometimes divide these approaches to the point of not recognizing pure statistical findings. Therefore, with the clear intention of placing forward a complementary methodological mix, the author seeks to add, by means of a process-tracing method, the qualitative elements that more appropriately clarify interest issues, such as if mayors considered adopting programs in order to increase their reelection prospects, the importance of social networks for the municipal political life or even if ideology affects a local level decision making process.
Therefore, chapters 4 and 5 are constructed so as to better illustrate the results from the applied research and describe in detail the political and institutional context that marked the health and education reforms during the 1990s. In these sections of the book the author underlines how reformist objectives within each sector were built to allow for the adhesion of local governmental administrations. However, at the same time, Sugiyama reminds us that the proposals for reforming the social field present several veto points due to the fact that their objectives seek to increase equity, and thus challenge the actors' status quo and limit the political patronage of typically clientelistic arrangements. Despite similar challenges for their attainments, both programs have distinct fundamental bases concerning their implementation viability. The argument is that the School Grant Program emerged as a simple idea to partially solve education issues that directly afflicted families, and thus perpetuate intergenerational poverty in the country. The solution found in order to increase school attendance and, consequently, the children's school performance and progression, besides allowing for those responsible for the children to work for longer periods of time, was to expand the students' time period in the educational system and to set up a monetary transfer to poor families. As for the Family Health Program, the argument is that the program was created from a complex solution since it took place amidst the health reform where controversial issues were being debated, such as the paradigm change for medical treatment, the municipalization of services and the rules for policy funding by means of regulation. Political reforms of such nature counteract in a set of institutions and actors and generate high reorganization costs for entities that form and represent professionals in sectors such as universities and labor unions. But one of the merits of this work is precisely to unveil the black box of the formulation process behind the analyzed programs so as to comprehend the motivations of local actors who, even when faced with several barriers, decided to emulate the Family Health Program and the School Grant Program. By analyzing the events in the state capital cities of São Paulo, Brasília, Belo Horizonte and Salvador during the period of three majoritarian elections, the author concludes that for both cases the electoral competition does not explain the decisions to emulate or to reverse the adoption of either program. On the contrary, the interviews illustrate that ideology, as well as the affiliation to social networks, prompted mayors to diffuse such experiences. On the one hand, highly competitive political environments such as in the city of São Paulo would only come to adopt the Family Health Program and the School Grant Program during the Workers Party administration (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT), the partisan institution more closely tied to social networks and to a reformist ideology. On the other hand, the PT did not adopt the School Grant Program in the city of Belo

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2 The analyzed period for Brasília encompasses the administrations between 1994 and 2002 and for the other three capitals the administrations between 1993 and 2004.
Horizonte, and in Brasilia there were reversal situations. In Sugiyama’s view the results show that, in spite of the expected logic of an explanation centered on political incentives, the decisions were mostly guided by ideological conditions or social beliefs, allowing her to conclude that the commitments for social justice and the connections between actors were the most relevant elements.

In the book’s final chapter, one of the emblematic results informed by the author is that when the decision to emulate is mostly motivated by ideology there is a higher probability of a reversal decision. This happens since the adoption is then strongly centered in the policy maker’s individual actions. In situations where the program is adopted due to norms in professional networks, replication happens more swiftly and the decision becomes stable over time, considering that the adoption is motivated by an institutionalized pattern consolidated during the course of governmental administrations. In summary, by focusing on the reformist agenda of local governments the hereby analyzed work inaugurates and consolidates a research agenda that places the Brazilian case as the most promising study laboratory for diffusion of public policies. Furthermore, she alerts to the need of reinterpretations of historical phenomena that have been studied under the light of a normative approach or by simplistic models that have privileged the role of the central government and dismissed the internal municipal determinants or the actors’ political behavior. Lastly, the book holds great scientific merit for hereon instructing comparative researchers concerned with explaining similar phenomena in other countries.

References


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