


Southern Flows:

WMD Nonproliferation in the Developing World

Edited by Brian Finlay



The
Stanley
Foundation

STIMSON

SOUTHERN FLOWS
WMD Nonproliferation in
the Developing World

Edited by Brian Finlay

A Project of
The Stanley Foundation
and Stimson

2014

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Foreword

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to present to you *Southern Flows: WMD Nonproliferation in the Developing World*, an important study that captures the insights of several years of collaborative work to develop an effective approach to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Global South.

Over the course of the last seven years, Stimson and the Stanley Foundation have worked together to help the global community implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). The resolution's mandate calls on all member states to control sensitive weapons, materials, and technologies of mass destruction in order to prevent terrorist acquisition of these deadly capabilities. This volume is the culmination of the work our two institutions have undertaken together. Its relevance has been validated by a continued terrorist interest in obtaining weapons of mass destruction and, more recently, by the crisis in Syria and the resulting importance of preventing extremists and terrorists from gaining access to Syria's chemical weapons.

Resolution 1540 has led to many efforts to inform, influence, and cajole all UN member states to comply, even as it met with challenges stemming from a perceived lack of legitimacy and enforcement authority. Perhaps

most distressing is the endemic absence of implementation capacity among most countries to fully comply with the mandate. Like many UN resolutions, Resolution 1540 set broad standards for all countries but offered little preparation or allocation of resources for the varied needs of countries to comply with its provisions. This challenge has been most acutely felt in the countries of the Global South.

Recognizing the widening gulf between objectives and reality on the ground, Stimson developed a creative approach to the implementation dilemma by listening to the needs of countries with little or no history or experience with policies to counter WMD and subsequently identifying positive synergies between their national-development and soft-security goals, and the global obligations of Resolution 1540. The Stanley Foundation brought to this effort more than 50 years of relationships with UN member states and an incomparable convening authority to operationalize the Stimson model. Through this cooperative endeavor, we were able to develop and hone a flexible and bottom-up approach to understanding the unique security and development challenges in six regions of the Global South: the Caribbean, Central America, Eastern Africa, the Middle East, the Andean region, and Southeast Asia. Critically, the effort was put into operation as a result of the willingness of the government of Finland to experiment with innovative approaches to bridging the policy divide between security objectives and development imperatives. In so doing, Helsinki became a pioneer and model in better leveraging assistance resources to help meet proliferation threats around the globe.

The ensuing work entailed extensive research, a series of workshops and field interviews with a wide range of government officials and regional specialists, and six regional assessments prepared in a close collaboration between the two institutions. Our teams also developed an informal network of national governments, regional organizations, and civil society groups to test and deepen the concept of this “whole-of-society” approach to development and security. Most importantly, the project led to tangible new activities in many of these regions that pay direct dividends to economic development and security. All of these activities have demonstrably aided the fuller and more effective implementation of Resolution 1540 in the developing world. This new volume gives voice to experts in each of the regions who were asked to evaluate how this approach—linking development and security

assistance for win-win outcomes—has worked in their respective neighborhoods. The results vary. In the Western Hemisphere and in Africa, the judgments are largely positive, and local governments, regional organizations, and the international donor community have embraced our innovative approach. The outcomes are more mixed in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. In the former case, governments failed to adopt the model for reasons more fully detailed in this volume. And in the latter case, efforts have yet to fully mature, making a full assessment of long-term effectiveness difficult.

We hope you will find this new book a stimulating read. It is our belief that Resolution 1540 remains perhaps the world's only equitable multilateral framework to counter WMD terrorism that, if implemented more innovatively, would bolster national, regional, and global security.

We are particularly proud of the work done by our colleagues, ably led by Stimson Managing Director Brian Finlay, to demonstrate the effectiveness of a new form of public-private partnership in which two nongovernmental organizations were able to make an important contribution to the UN mandate by finding smart ways to implement this ambitious objective. We have been gratified to hear from UN officials as well as national political leaders and heads of regional organizations that this approach led to more successful compliance with the spirit and the letter of the resolution.

Sincerely,



Keith Porter
President
The Stanley Foundation



Ellen Laipson
President and CEO
Stimson



Introduction

Brian Finlay

Almost everyone in today's world feels insecure, but not everyone feels insecure about the same thing. Different threats seem more urgent to people in different parts of the world. Probably the largest number would give priority to economic and social threats, including poverty, environmental degradation and infectious disease. Others might stress inter-State conflict; yet others internal conflict, including civil war. Many people—especially but not only in the developed world—would now put terrorism at the top of their list. In truth, all these threats are interconnected, and all cut across national frontiers. We need common global strategies to deal with all of them, and indeed, Governments are coming together to work out and implement such strategies, in the UN and elsewhere. The one area where there is a total lack of any common strategy is the one that may well present the greatest danger of all: the area of nuclear weapons.

—UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, November 28, 2006¹


In April 2004, gathering in New York City, the 15 members of the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to pass Resolution 1540.² The measure mandated an array of global supply-side controls over sensitive weapons, materials, technologies, and

know-how. Three years after the events of September 11—and on the heels of astonishing revelations that rogue Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan had shared weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies with North Korea, Iran, Libya, and potentially even Al Qaeda—the resolution intended to rectify the inadequacies of the existing control regime and the particular challenge of WMD proliferation to nonstate actors.

Yet even as each of the 15 Security Council members cast a vote in favor of the resolution, for the 80 percent of the world's population living on less than \$10 a day, far more immediate security and development threats were rightly being prioritized.³ For instance, in the same month that Resolution 1540 was promulgated, more than 100 suspected Jemaah Islamiah militants were killed during attacks on security outposts in Thailand's Muslim-dominated southern provinces. In Damascus, Syria, a bomb explosion and gun battle between security forces and a terrorist group killed four people and left a UN building badly damaged. In a village in southern Kyrgyzstan, a landslide left 33 people dead and a nation struggling to recover. That year in sub-Saharan Africa, 1 in 12 adults was newly infected with HIV/AIDS, as life expectancy trends continued to plummet.⁴ Also in 2004, Colombia retained its rank as the largest producer of cocaine, and homicide rates across the country remained among the highest in the world—upwards of 490,000 deaths resulted from armed violence in that year alone.⁵

Amid pervasive economic deprivation, human insecurity, deteriorating public health, lack of access to basic education, poverty, hunger, and environmental degradation, it was little wonder that Resolution 1540 was met by much of the world with a significant measure of disinterest bordering on disdain. Even though questions of legitimacy over the Security Council's authority to exercise a Chapter Seven action were largely resolved, two full years after enactment of the resolution, 62 countries had failed to fulfill even the most basic requirement by submitting an initial progress report to the 1540 Committee in New York—the entity responsible for monitoring implementation of the 2004 resolution.⁶ Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of nonreporting states were countries of the Global South.

Figure 1: Geographic Dispersion of Nonreporting States as of April 2006



Source: United Nations, *Report of the Committee Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)*, September 12, 2011.

Of course, it was not merely a lack of prioritization that drove indifference. The unenthusiastic response to Resolution 1540 was also built upon a complicated nonproliferation history among many nonnuclear-weapons states across the Global South. Ever since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was negotiated in 1968, the common thread connecting global efforts to stem the flow of weapons of mass destruction was the strategy of technology denial: provided that the components of a weapon could be locked away, then proliferation was presumed to be manageable. For much of the developing world, this had the practical effect of preventing the southward flow of advanced technologies. But, while this strategy has proven to be generally effective in past decades, its discriminatory nature combines with an array of changing forces to challenge its practicality and relevance in the 21st century.

The latter half of the 20th century was characterized by global trading patterns that were generally predictable. Commerce, while international in scale, was relatively leisurely in pace; and although the forces of globalization and trade liberalization were gathering in the latter decades of the Cold War, they had not yet matured to a level where diverse networks of both licit and illicit middlemen facilitated access to the dual-use market for thousands of new and smaller independent producers, as is the case today.⁷ In regard to the nuclear threat, the

scientific community capable of marrying weapon components to fissile material was limited in size and strictly governed by the permanent five members of the Security Council, who exercised a monopoly on strategic offensive weapons. These factors both reinforced and strengthened an effective technology-denial regime. Likewise, prior to the biotechnological revolution, the lion's share of advanced biological capabilities that could successfully weaponize a pathogenic agent or toxin was found in the most industrialized states of the Northern Hemisphere. This meant that while countries of the developing world were a potential threat in terms of acquisition, they were viewed as unlikely to contribute, knowingly or not, to the proliferation supply chain.

That strategy, coupled with little upward pressure on breakout to additional countries because of superpower suasion, meant that the proliferation challenge was largely manageable. With a limited number of nuclear states, with know-how and materials under nearly exclusive control of the five permanent members of the Security Council, with a nonpermissive global regime, and with downward pressure from the superpowers on their allies to prevent them from going nuclear, prevention translated into restriction of supply. Although enforcing restrictions on biological and chemical materials was more difficult, and cheating by committed proliferators was more routine, no state broke the taboo of using a nuclear weapon after the first atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Sporadic use of chemical weapons and even accusations of bioweapons use happened but were far from an everyday occurrence. Globalization would help redraw the proliferation landscape.


WMD Nonproliferation and the Global South

There can be little doubt regarding the tangible benefits of globalization in the last quarter century. Skyrocketing rates of global foreign direct investment and global trade, technology democratization, the accelerated movement of goods and services, and the spread of innovation have led to growing literacy rates and improved access to education, not to mention a remarkable pace of economic development. In the last five years alone, more than half a billion individuals have escaped the grinding poverty associated with living on less than \$1.25 per day.⁸

While development specialists celebrate these trends, security analysts are rightly concerned that an increasingly interconnected world yields a lengthening proliferation supply chain for WMD technologies. Increasingly, even in sophisticated dual-use sectors, innovation and manufacturing is occurring in the Global South, which has traditionally represented the widest regulatory and enforcement vacuums. So-called trickle-up innovation means that countries once thought to be on the periphery of the information age are instead becoming central to it.

Due to a lack of experience with dual-use industrial or innovative competences, real capacity shortfalls in enforcement, or competing national priorities, many governments in the developing world have become fertile environments for proliferant activities.⁹ Lacking adequate export and border controls, customs enforcement, police and judicial capacity, and sufficient rule-of-law standards, or pressed by skyrocketing violence resulting from transnational criminal activities, or internal public health crises (to name but a few challenges), these sometimes weak and fragile states are incapable of or unwilling to adequately implement global nonproliferation standards. The result is that despite significant nonproliferation investments over the last decades, the international community continues to find itself vulnerable to WMD proliferation to nonstate actors.

Figure 2: The Modern Proliferation Supply Chain



Countries Contributing to the Modern Proliferation Supply Chain. Countries in red have either been knowingly or unknowingly implicated in the A. Q. Khan affair, or have been listed on the International Atomic Energy Agency Illicit Trafficking Database.

Recent incidents of proliferation are instructive. Figure 2 indicates the number of states whose territories have been used or whose companies were knowingly or unknowingly complicit in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documented incidents of materials trafficking, or were otherwise implicated in the A.Q. Khan affair. Although governments across the developed world were clearly complicit, the surprising distribution of developing world countries involved reflects their newfound role in innovating, manufacturing, financing, transshipping, or otherwise contributing to the efforts of committed proliferators. For these reasons, the failure to fully and effectively implement Resolution 1540 in countries of the Global South could have as important implications to the proliferation supply chain as similar failures in more technologically developed regions.

Roadblocks to Success

Looking beyond the widespread failure by 62 member states to submit an initial report to the committee a full two years after their mandate to do so, some concluded that with little material evidence of systemic implementation of the resolution readily evident on the ground, Resolution 1540 was stillborn. Those governments most active in proliferation prevention continued to exhort its positive implications, while governments representing the widest gaps in terms of preventive capacity remained largely indifferent to their obligations. By 2006, four discrete hurdles to the full and effective implementation of Resolution 1540 had come together to stymie progress toward sustainable realization of its mandate:

The Legitimacy Deficit

The legitimacy question was at once a legal and a political issue. As noted earlier, prior to the resolution's adoption, several states questioned whether it was the role of the Security Council to "prescribe legislative action by member states." Others argued that they had become subject to laws that they had no hand in drafting. Despite these reservations, however, all states have agreed under UN Charter Article 24 (1) that on issues of international peace and security, the Security Council acts on their behalf, and as such, they also have agreed to be bound by its resolutions. Over time, legal objections to the council's action under Resolution 1540 faded, even as questions of political prioritization surfaced.

Lack of Prioritization

As noted above and in light of competing demands on stressed governance structures, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is, not unreasonably, a generally low priority for developing countries. In some cases, enhanced security is mistakenly viewed as deleterious to national growth and competitiveness. In this vein, Resolution 1540 itself is viewed by some as another exercise driven by the North's security interests to the detriment of economic development in the South. Furthermore, many national leaders reasonably inquire, "Given the breadth of existing human security challenges and other critical development priorities, how can governments be expected to divert scarce resources to manage the WMD supply chain?" To overcome this barrier to progress, wealthy donor nations either need to offer better incentives or threaten laggards with consequences for failure to comply. Because forcing compliance would likely only create greater animosity and resistance to supporting the objectives of the resolution, the offering of more attractive incentives for compliance is a more efficacious strategy for facilitating progress on Resolution 1540 implementation—although such a strategy had not been comprehensively developed by the committee and interested donor governments as late as 2006.

Inadequate Capacity for Implementation

Many states have inadequate human and financial resources to comply with the countless aspects of the resolution. Also, various different agencies or actors within any single government must be involved in assessing the status of legal mechanisms and enforcement capabilities required by the resolution. Many states that had not submitted their progress reports on meeting the resolution's requirements lacked not just the will but also the capacity to do so. Numerous organizations and actors have been involved in raising awareness about the resolution and the importance of facilitating universal compliance with the reporting requirements as a first step. However, fulfillment of the reporting obligation can only help spur implementation if the reports are of sufficient quality and specificity to delineate what assistance is required.

Mixed Quality of Reports and Inadequate Assistance

A significant impediment to Resolution 1540 implementation has been the mixed quality of the reports received from states, and the

mismatch between offers for assistance and requests. Over the course of the past decade, the preponderance of requests for assistance has been financial in nature, while the majority of offers have been for technical assistance. This troubling mismatch has significantly hobbled efforts to move beyond information sharing and awareness raising to the development of tangible implementation projects in theater. In many instances where assistance other than financial have been put forward, the requests often have been so general that donor states could not act on the call. The 1540 Committee has streamlined the reporting process by developing a matrix for the initial roster of requirements, and by producing a relatively simple form for assistance requests. Nonetheless, in general, assistance offers remain sporadic, unpredictable, and demonstrably unsustainable.


From Posturing to Pragmatism: Beyond Boundaries in the Global South

In response to this burgeoning North/South divide on the full and effective implementation of Resolution 1540, and the global nonproliferation regime more generally, the Stimson Center, a nonprofit public policy think tank, joined with the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop an innovative approach that would build more pragmatic engagement on the nonproliferation issue.

Both partners recognized that a modernized nonproliferation strategy that successfully built buy-in among governments of the developing world must begin with changing the terms of the then-current debate. Continued and often sanctimonious appeals by economically more advanced governments to legal mandates, to the dire human and financial costs that a WMD incident could yield, or even to tangible evidence of proliferation itself had systematically failed to inculcate robust adherence to the nonproliferation regime across much of the developing world. The partners concluded that a new approach that inspired sustained and pragmatic engagement with these new proliferation-capable actors was necessary. In short, only by appealing to the higher priority interests of countries in the Global South—on both sides of the security/development divide—could countries be transformed from recalcitrant “targets” of our nonproliferation policy into sustained advocates for effective nonproliferation engagement.

Fortuitously, when considered more innovatively, much of the generous assistance offered by wealthy industrialized governments in the name of nonproliferation is directly applicable to the more immediate challenges facing countries of the Global South (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Dual-Benefit Resolution 1540 Assistance



For instance:

- Assistance provided to enhance border and export controls can also aid the prevention of small-arms or drug trafficking and promote efficiencies at transit hubs for legitimate commodities. These, in turn, facilitate trade expansion, business development, and national competitiveness within the global supply chain.
- The same resources and capacities necessary to detect the illicit movement of terrorists across borders can also help address human trafficking—a growing moral priority for many governments across the Global South.
- Detecting and responding to biological weapons requires a functional disease-surveillance network and a public health infrastructure.
- Assistance proffered to develop pre- and post-WMD incident response enhances governments' capacity to detect an earthquake or respond to a tsunami.
- Governments' pursuit of energy diversification through nuclear power can be aided and accelerated with technical and capacity-building assistance from nonproliferation accounts, all while reinforcing global confidence in a government's adherence to the regime.¹⁰

An important note is that while the objectives of the donor may differ from those of the recipient partner, in each of these cases, the modalities of engagement are the same. Therefore, proffered nonproliferation assistance designed to prevent the spread of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons may be accepted by the recipient as economic-development assistance; as capacity-building assistance to address seemingly unrelated trafficking challenges related to drugs or small arms; as tertiary educational aid; or as public health assistance. Despite the incongruity in actors, perception, and objectives, the results are the same and include, significantly, sustainable interest in and implementation of nonproliferation programming.


During his tenure as UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan famously remarked that long-term security is not possible without development, and that there is no development in the absence of security. Although

leaders in the developed world have incorporated this language into their policy speeches, the relationship between these diverse policy portfolios has not been translated into concrete action.

Of course, such an approach presupposes both a willingness among recipient partner governments to build innovative new partnerships with the international donor community and a willingness on the part of the donor states to pursue effective “whole-of-government” and even “whole-of-society” programming to meet a wider variety of domestic and international needs and priorities. Although the rhetoric of cooperation has pervaded the talking points on both sides of this divide, a survey of Resolution 1540 outreach efforts in 2006 yielded little evidence of large scale government programming that bridged siloed foreign security and development aid.

This disjuncture is clearly reflected by even a cursory survey of national budgets. Today, top-line development assistance worldwide is approximately \$106 billion, while total military expenditures exceed \$1.105 trillion. Yet the record of Resolution 1540 adoption across the developing world suggests that until there is a greater financial allocation of resources toward poverty eradication, trade enhancement, energy security, infrastructure development, public health, and other “soft” security priorities, the developed world will be continually challenged by a growing array of “hard” security threats—including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Figure 4 depicts the existing stovepiped assistance generally practiced by donor governments around the world. Failure to leverage these accounts has resulted in an assistance regime that is not only often unsustainable; it suffers from a diminished return on investment.


Figure 4: Current Security and Development Assistance Model



A better coordinated whole-of-society approach that integrates security and development assistance more effectively provides mutually reinforcing conditions for success and sustainability across a wide range of foreign policy goals. The partners therefore concluded that addressing the capacity-building needs of the recipient state will foster the conditions for sustainable implementation of Resolution 1540 and provide a viable approach for holistically addressing the state’s political will, capacity needs, and ultimate buy-in of the assistance being offered.

Of course, helping to meet the state’s development priorities cannot be presented as a quid pro quo arrangement, but instead should be viewed as a starting point for developing a package of assistance that will both strengthen the state internally and, simultaneously, enable it to support broader nonproliferation goals. Figure 5 depicts the benefits of better coordinating security assistance and military expenditures with official development assistance. The goal is not to militarize development aid but to use the vastly more significant appropriations for security and defense to meet parallel development goals.

Figure 5: Proposed Model of Sustainable Development and Security



Beginning in 2007, in an expanded partnership with the Stanley Foundation, a private, not-for-profit operating foundation, Stimson began constructing a loose consortium of governments, regional organizations, and civil society groups in an effort to prove the effectiveness of this dual-benefit model of nonproliferation engagement. The partners agreed that although development and security programs are treated as conflicting priorities in national budgets, untapped opportunities existed to leverage each in mutual support.¹¹ This “Beyond Boundaries” approach entailed not simply a reallocation of resources but also a

wiser, more strategic expenditure of those investments. Stimson and the Stanley Foundation proposed to pilot this innovative whole-of-society approach to bridging the security/development divide in cooperation with the government of Finland.

It is well acknowledged that traditional donor governments seek to integrate resources and skills across multiple agencies and functional specialties to better promote development, good governance, and security. As noted, while these whole-of-government approaches enjoy wide rhetorical support, little evidence of systemwide adoption of this approach can be identified. Although many donor governments recognized the merit behind the Beyond Boundaries approach, most recognized that they lacked the institutional capacity to break down the deep institutional stovepipes between their domestic-development functions and their hard-security nonproliferation activities. Much to the credit of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government in Helsinki successfully brokered a collaboration between these diverse constituencies to underwrite this experimental approach.

At the request of the then-chairman of the 1540 Committee, Ambassador Peter Burian of Slovakia, the first practical demonstration project was launched in the Caribbean Basin. Until that time, the Caribbean's relationship with the 1540 Committee had been marked by a lack of reporting or underreporting. Moreover, no evidence of pragmatic implementation of the resolution could be found amid the abject lack of interest across the region in the nonproliferation policy arena. Rather than focusing on the region's unmet security obligations as defined by the Security Council, the Beyond Boundaries approach in the Caribbean concentrated on dual-benefit aspects of available nonproliferation assistance to economic development, disaster relief, citizen security, and public health. Viewed through that lens, governments of the region began to see Resolution 1540 not as a burden but as an opportunity for meaningful capacity building. As a result, sustained buy-in was obtained from participating Caribbean governments, and today all of the countries in the region have taken the first step toward compliance with the UN resolution, submitting a report to the 1540 Committee on steps taken and future implementation plans.

Governments of the region banded together to go further. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) hired a full-time regional nonproliferation

coordinator—the first of its kind—to address nonproliferation capacity shortfalls jointly across all 14 governments of the region. The coordinator also engages with individual states to develop updated national reports and to initiate the development of national action plans to implement Resolution 1540. In the span of three years, after decades of benign neglect, the Caribbean region has emerged as a bright spot of nonproliferation responsibility in the developing world as a direct result of a better pairing of interests and concerns. New programming by the IAEA, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and Interpol, and new bilateral efforts with the American and Canadian governments were launched with an eye to implementing Resolution 1540 while providing more immediate knock-on benefits to other higher priority goals of the 14 CARICOM member states.

Beyond Boundaries: Findings and Progress

A similar model was subsequently applied in Central America, Eastern Africa, the Middle East, South America, and Southeast Asia. Each of these efforts demonstrated varying degrees of success. This volume traces the successes and the failures of this more innovative approach to nonproliferation engagement and offers lessons learned that are instructive for further outreach—especially to countries of the Global South. In all of these regional chapters, the authors offer insights often unique to each geographic context. For instance, it should come as little surprise to international policymakers that execution of a nonproliferation outreach strategy in oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council countries is very different than the approach necessary to entice sustained engagement in economically less well-off East African governments. Nonetheless, across each of these chapters, a set of common themes becomes evident.

Perhaps most importantly, the chapters demonstrate that priorities and political contexts differ far more dramatically on the North/South axis than on the South/South axis. In other words, the failure to prioritize nonproliferation as the “greatest national security threat” facing countries of the developing world was a common theme, even if the higher priority concerns differed from country to country across the developing world. Yet despite these national discrepancies, the dual-benefit model offered tangible and practical support to at least some of each region’s higher priority concerns. In most cases, where

these links to nonproliferation were identified on the national agenda, and capacity-building assistance was ultimately provided, that aid helped to reinforce the notion that Resolution 1540 was not merely a reporting burden but a unique opportunity. As such, a wider and more fruitful basis to discuss security concerns—including proliferation—resulted. By way of example, the economic benefits to trade facilitation discussed by O’Neil Hamilton in Chapter 1 provided a unique opportunity to generate political support for the resolution in the same way that the border-security assistance proffered to Kenya to manage the corrosive threat of small-arms trafficking did, as described in the chapter about Eastern Africa by Ambassador Ochieng Adala. These insights can and should provide policymakers with clear cues as they seek to build sustainable nonproliferation programming in developing countries around the globe.

Similarly, in each geographic case, the receptivity to the theme of WMD nonproliferation varied markedly. As described by Alexander Chacón in his chapter on the Central American experience, WMD nonproliferation engagement is widely accepted as a component of the region’s security strategy. Yet for most governments in the Middle East region, where potential threats are arguably the greatest, as elucidated by Al-Sharif Nasser bin Nasser, use of similar language has resulted in the build-up of hostility toward those countries that have failed to fully implement their own disarmament obligations under the nonproliferation treaty.

But perhaps even more notably, in virtually every geographic context in the South, the economic and development challenges were consistently viewed as inextricably tied to security concerns. As a result of their tumultuous history, Latin American governments have a deeply held conviction regarding the centrality of democracy and the rule of law to their economic success and human security. But while this theme is demonstrated ably by Ana Maria Cerini in her chapter on the Andean region, it has equally demonstrable manifestations in Noramly bin Muslim’s depiction of Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) approach to bridging the divide between development and security. Better understanding the regional concerns and historical contexts of our nonproliferation targets will inevitably lead to more sustainable and productive partnerships.

Although rhetoric regarding the need to more closely coordinate security and development assistance has a growing salience in the developed world, little evidence of sustained implementation of a joint approach is apparent. It is worth noting that such a discrepancy is attributable not only to the need for poorer countries to better rationalize resources, but equally to policy stovepipes built by governments of the developed North. Recognition of the central importance many of these governments place on the indivisibility of security and development, and the diverging lexicon used to describe enduring threats, should encourage those most preoccupied with the enduring threat of WMD proliferation to consider an approach that is sensitive to, and simultaneously addresses, diverse challenges.

And finally, a recurring theme across each of the six regional chapters remains the dramatically varied resource base between North and South to effectively implement even the most basic provisions of the resolution. Each of the chapters references capacity shortfalls. In some cases, the challenges may be technical in nature—for instance, insufficient legal capacity to identify gaps in existing law described by Cerini. In other instances, the challenges are financial in nature, again described aptly by Adala and Noramly. And in yet others, it is simply a human resources issue, a point made by Hamilton. Unlike governments of the developed North, which often benefit from large foreign ministry-based departments dedicated to nonproliferation, in most cases in the Global South, governments may have one official responsible for the nonproliferation file along with a dozen or more related and even unrelated issues. The penchant for multiple well-meaning donor governments to engage and offer assistance without the benefit of coordination leaves beleaguered staff in the developing world overtaxed and unable to sustain activities over the long term.

Yet even despite the shortfalls described by each of the authors in this volume, it is worth noting that over the course of the past seven years of this initiative, at no point did any representative of any country engaged call into question the conviction that weapons of mass destruction should not be allowed to fall into the hands of terrorists or others who would do us harm. Indeed, the lion's share of government officials engaged were deeply concerned with the prospects of WMD terrorism. Yet in virtually every case, these officials could point to a long list of far more pressing, far more serious, and far more immediate

threats to their citizens than the seemingly ethereal threat posed by WMD proliferation. This reality speaks to the need to recalibrate the North's enduring strategy to force a common threat perception on our partners abroad.

Those rightly preoccupied by the enduring threat of WMD proliferation and the rise of catastrophic terrorism will do well to remember the wider objective behind our outreach to the rest of the world: to save lives. Yet in the West, it is easy to lose sight of this objective as we confront the more targeted urgency of keeping nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons out of the hands of terrorists or proliferant states. For one billion of our new nonproliferation interlocutors in the Global South, one bad cold, the loss of a job, the illicit acquisition of a gun by a criminal, or one unfortunate interaction with a corrupt law-enforcement officer can mean certain death. In such an environment, the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is irrelevant. For people who live in these desperate circumstances, moving out from under them is quite rightly their all-consuming struggle. Unless and until we can better tailor our nonproliferation programming to recognize, to validate, and to respond to these pressing concerns, our engagement will not only be overly costly and wasteful but ultimately unsuccessful.

In sum, the Beyond Boundaries model offered one unique public-private partnership to address an array of interconnected threats to our global system. It demonstrated that changing that system is eminently achievable, that nongovernmental organizations have a unique new role to play, and that in the end, the sum total of humanity's shared necessities far outstrips our seemingly divergent goals.

Endnotes

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Caribbean

Editor's Note

Two years after adoption of Resolution 1540 by the Security Council, and one full year after the deadline for reporting on national implementation of the resolution, no Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member state had fulfilled the most basic obligation under the resolution. More distressing still was the lack of recognition on the part of most member states of the broad swath of obligations the resolution imposed—much less a dedication of domestic resources to develop and implement national action plans to meet them.

Although countries of the Caribbean Basin have seldom been viewed as hot spots for proliferation, the region's strategic position at the mouth of the Panama Canal, its recognition as the "third border" to the United States, and its inadequate capacity to detect and thwart a range of trafficking hazards posed serious implications for global security. As a result of globalization and widening global flows of goods and technology, there is growing concern among intelligence agencies around the world that terrorists intent on developing and using a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon in a catastrophic incident are being drawn to the developing world. Not only do these countries often represent inadequately policed safe havens from which to plan and perpetrate attacks, they are increasingly accessing advanced technologies necessary to contribute to the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) supply chain.

The Caribbean is no exception. An airliner hijacked from an airport in the Caribbean—as was attempted in Montego Bay, Jamaica, in April 2009—could reach the United States or points south within the hour. Islamic radicals are taking advantage of the lawlessness in some areas of Latin America and the Caribbean by establishing safe havens and raising money. And the market across the region for falsified passports, visas, and other identifying papers creates a vulnerability that terrorists might easily exploit.

Insecurity in the Caribbean also has implications beyond the region's immediate neighbors. Though small in terms of population and economic activities, the region constitutes a significant and expanding junction for international trade. For instance, in 2011, ports in Latin America and the Caribbean handled over 41.3 million twenty-foot equivalent units of cargo, representing an increase of 11.1 percent in comparison to the previous year.¹ Terrorists and other criminal elements could disrupt or take advantage of shipments transiting the Caribbean to move illicit products or even fabricated WMD to points around the globe.

Throughout their history, the individual economies of the Caribbean islands have relied on rather modest exports of fish, bauxite, iron, nickel, petroleum, and timber. Far and away, however, tourism has remained the mainstay of the region's economy. The Caribbean economies were the most severely affected by the terrorist attacks of 9/11, after Afghanistan and its immediate neighbors. For instance, tourism officials in the Dominican Republic reported a loss of \$450 million in revenue from September 11, 2001, through December 2002. Throughout the region, the tourism industry remained essentially stagnant until spring 2003, dealing a crippling blow to the already fragile economies of the Caribbean.

While numerous attempts at market expansion have been made through export diversification and off-shore banking, the struggle to develop the political and economic infrastructure necessary to respond to market fluctuations as well as the loss of competitiveness in key export sectors remains a continuous challenge for most Caribbean governments. More recently, though, with close proximity to an expanding Panama Canal, and as a focal point for North/South Atlantic trade and trade with the east and northern coasts of South America, the Caribbean is emerging as a growing hub for transoceanic trade.

Recognizing the opportunities globalization can yield, a large number of transshipment ports have been developed in the region: in the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Barbados, St. Lucia, Guadeloupe, and Trinidad and Tobago. Additional transshipment ports are either under construction or are being planned. This represents a significant opportunity for economic development across the region—but also represents new opportunities for local and transnational criminal organizations to move contraband.

As always, capitalizing on the benefits of increased trade has brought with it the darker side of globalization. Long caught in the crossfire between the world's biggest suppliers and consumers of cocaine, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Caribbean is increasingly suffering the consequences of the international drug trade, small-arms trafficking, and, accordingly, the rise of violent youth gangs. A 2010 report by the UNODC found that murder rates (often linked to the drug trade) in the Caribbean—at 21 per 100,000 population annually—are among the highest in the world.² The report also found that while transshipment of cocaine to the United States, the most significant flow in economic terms, appears to be in decline, and that cannabis production for export from Jamaica, the largest cannabis producer in the region, appears to be in a slump, large quantities of drugs continue to transit the Caribbean. In 2005, it was estimated that about 10 tons of cocaine transited through Jamaica, while 20 tons transited through Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Crime is stifling the economies of these countries, and where violent crime and corruption flourish, socioeconomic development lags and democracy is undermined. Much of this is a result of the region's inability to adequately secure its ports and borders.

Without the capacity to ensure safe, reliable movement of goods through Caribbean ports, the sustainability of the region's plans for economic diversification is in doubt. For governments of the region, nowhere is the intersection of development and security more apparent than in the domain of export controls and port/border security. Caught between the constraints on their plans for economic diversification and development, and the growing challenges associated with transnational crime and endemic poverty, it is of little surprise that governments of the region were reluctant to refocus their attention and limited resources to implementation of Resolution 1540.

In 2005, the Stimson Center joined the Stanley Foundation and the government of Finland to pilot its first Beyond Boundaries exercise. The effort sought to better understand the array of challenges facing Caribbean states. Representatives from the 14 members of CARICOM described a host of challenges—inadequate public health, insufficient preparation for and responsive capacity to natural disasters, youth gangs, underdevelopment, drug and small-arms trafficking—and an array of indigenous responses that all too often lacked sufficient resources. In the end, Caribbean governments determined that the need for increased attention to economic growth and diversification was a central starting point. For governments across the region, the central focus of their near-term efforts was port security. Yet while Northern donor governments consistently viewed the challenge as one of WMD security, drug and weapons trafficking, and counterterrorism, regional governments more often characterized these same threats in more human and development terms—poverty, lack of competitiveness, and inadequate infrastructure.

The consortium of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), national governments, and regional organizations, including the Organization of American States and CARICOM, saw an opportunity to better sync these diverse needs and perspectives. Over the course of the next four years, the Beyond Boundaries effort—previously known as the Next 100 Project—worked closely with regional governments to operationalize a model of engagement that met the mandate of Resolution 1540 while simultaneously proffering necessary assistance in port modernization and development, police and customs-control training, and a plethora of other activities. While in many cases international assistance was drawn from security accounts for counterproliferation and counterterrorism, the recipient partner more often viewed that assistance as core to economic development and diversification, or ameliorating so-called soft-security challenges. The net result was a more sustainable win-win approach that satisfied both donor and recipient partner's highest priority needs.

In this chapter, Jamaican diplomat and CARICOM executive O'Neil Hamilton describes the successes and challenges of the Beyond Boundaries approach in the Caribbean Basin. The model would go on to serve as a template for action in other regional contexts that are described in greater detail in subsequent chapters of this volume.

Chapter 1 Nonproliferation in the Caribbean Basin

O'Neil Hamilton

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the international community elevated the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to nonstate actors to the highest of global priorities. Although national capitals in the developed world followed public commitments with a broad set of tangible actions to prevent WMD proliferation, for much of the Global South, the security context of a post-9/11 world was dramatically different. For the Caribbean, 9/11 was not just one of the clear hemispheric and global security implications related to catastrophic terrorism. It was an event that portended significant regional implications in relation to the Caribbean's very economic viability. In the year subsequent to the events of 9/11, states within the Caribbean inclusive of the Dominican Republic lost close to a billion dollars of tourism-related revenue, along with tens of thousands of jobs, as tourists—primarily from the United States—remained understandably homebound.

The intersection of security threats and development challenges following 9/11 could not have been clearer as the region sought to balance global security obligations with longstanding soft-security and development priorities. Contemporary approaches aimed at linking security and development in the Caribbean can be traced to two occurrences in spring and fall 1997. In May that year, the United States and Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member states convened a major symposium in Barbados under the theme “The Caribbean/United States Summit Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean,” which was attended by US President Bill Clinton and all the CARICOM leaders.³ The resulting Bridgetown Declaration of Principles highlighted the nexus between development and security and represented a “call to arms” for CARICOM states in partnership with the United States to address long-standing and critical priorities.⁴

The second occurrence, in September that year, was the decision by the World Trade Organization to end a preferential trading agreement that governed access of the region's bananas to the European market.⁵ This represented a watershed moment for the Caribbean's

contemporary economic history and required several CARICOM states to revise and recast long-term approaches and strategies to their economic development.

The events of the last 16 years, therefore, have demanded that regional governments confront a postindependence economic environment in which these small, undiversified economies, with high vulnerability to external shocks, quickly fashion alternatives to stabilize their economies and to position them for economic growth. On the security front, CARICOM states have been forced to respond to an influx of small arms and light weapons and to deal with the deleterious impact of a growing drug trade and spiraling gun-related crime, which has ensued from this confluence of events.⁶

It is therefore understandable that the proliferation of WMD, the trade in strategic goods and related technology, and the adoption of important correlate security measures, such as the implementation of effective export controls, have not been key items on the region's agenda, from a security and certainly from a development standpoint. Undoubtedly, there is an appreciation by regional leaders of the threats posed to Caribbean security and an awareness of the inherent risks prevailing in the current security environment, particularly since the September 2001 attacks and the terrorist acts in Madrid in March 2004 and in London in July 2005. There is also the realization in the region that the potential use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials, weapons, and related technology are important security considerations. These states are also cognizant that issues such as chemical waste control, disease surveillance and treatment, and nuclear-fuel-cycle management are no longer afterthoughts on the security landscape and of relevance only to highly industrialized states in the Global North.

States of the region also have had an appreciation of the rationale behind the institution of global instruments, such as Resolution 1540. Yet notwithstanding this awareness, CARICOM leaders have, understandably, remained principally focused on meeting traditional security and development needs, with minimal attention being given to proliferation. In such an environment, and if, indeed, WMD terrorism remains a threat, the international community has a responsibility to help the region effectively meet its obligations under the three nonproliferation regimes.

The Prevailing Regional Economic Environment

Over the last 15 to 20 years, CARICOM's attempt to promote regional economic and trade integration has been fostered by facilitating and enhancing mechanisms, such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative with the United States and the Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union.⁷ These mechanisms, which have been aimed at increasing market access, attracting and encouraging sustainable investment, and enhancing regional economic competitiveness, have seen some success. However, structural challenges, including difficulties managing and financing bilateral and multilateral debt, significant balance-of-payment problems, and high debt-to-GDP ratios, continue to frustrate regional economies and inhibit development.

In addition to trade-related concerns, CARICOM members have also had to confront significant costs related to the mitigation and reduction of the impact of natural disasters to which the region is highly vulnerable. In addition to hurricanes and flooding, which are perennial occurrences in several countries in the region, CARICOM states have also had to deal with catastrophic events such as the aftermath of the devastating earthquakes in Haiti in January 2010, and volcanic eruptions in Montserrat. On the public health front, CARICOM member states have also had to grapple with and commit resources to such key areas as environmental health, the strengthening of existing public health systems, dealing with chronic noncommunicable diseases, and the prevention and control of communicable diseases—all areas demanding significant capital outlays.

Contemporary Security Concerns

Along with this broad swath of economic challenges, CARICOM states have continued to struggle with a range of important security concerns that have necessitated the commitment of significant resources, in addition to the forging of regionwide approaches within the Caribbean to deal with these critical issues. While measurable progress has been made in stemming the volume of illegal narcotics transiting the region from South America, the recurrent challenges historically associated with the drug trade—money laundering, the proliferation of small arms, the prevalence of violent criminal activity, and the suborning of the judicial process—remain of significant concern in CARICOM states.

Despite concrete successes throughout the region in thwarting the illicit drug trade, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in an October 2011 report, described the Caribbean as “the most important destination for the laundering of cocaine related trafficking income.”⁸ Net inflows of cocaine-related funds into the Caribbean amount to some \$6 billion, equivalent to 2.3 percent of the region’s overall GDP. Indeed, when this reality is assessed against the background that eight Caribbean nations or territories are designated as jurisdictions of “primary concern” in a 2012 report from the US State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, one can fully comprehend why regional leaders have placed emphasis on attending to these trenchant concerns and appropriating scarce resources to deal with them.⁹ By contrast to the seemingly ethereal threat of WMD proliferation, the drug trade and attendant criminal activity has rightly occupied the lion’s share of attention among regional leaders.

Again, while current drug-trafficking rates can in no way be compared to those that existed in the region during the mid- to late 1980s, the reality is that drug-related violence has not seen a commensurate abatement. In the last five years, several CARICOM member states have recorded murder rates substantially higher than occurred during periods of significantly higher trafficking activity. This has been fostered by a growth in small-arms trafficking into and through the region.

Further complicating this influx of small arms and attendant rising violent crime in these countries has been the return of thousands of criminal deportees to the region over the past ten years, which has served to place undue pressure on jurisdictions that have had to absorb them.¹⁰ Currently, the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Division (ICE) provides three to five days advance notice to a receiving country regarding a criminal deportee’s scheduled removal from the United States.¹¹ In addition, ICE only volunteers the specific charge that occasioned the deportee’s most recent incarceration. Therefore, if the deportee has been convicted of a violent crime in the past or has a criminal history of multiple convictions for serious offenses, this information would not normally be available to the receiving state upon removal from the United States. As a result, small states, such as those in the Caribbean region, continue to face challenges in putting in place required contingencies to manage the reentry of former offenders

who typically arrive in these states with minimal support systems and resources, given their many years of residence in other jurisdictions. This has contributed to the transnationalization of criminal activity, as these criminals return to the region with well-established ties to international criminal networks operating in the United States.

In summary, the confluence of these economic and security challenges, in particular, constitute functional obstacles for CARICOM member states to adequately and effectively focus on their obligations with respect to Resolution 1540 and the other attendant nonproliferation regimes. For meaningful progress to be made in putting in place enabling legislation essential to preventing proliferation as well as the needed training in technology required to ensure the discovery, identification, and interdiction of strategic goods, continued engagement with the international community is necessary.

Assistance from International Donors/Intergovernmental Support

The role of the international community in advancing nonproliferation in the Caribbean can be effectively summarized by a single declarative statement: absent the involvement of the international community, activities aimed at implementation would be negligible or nonexistent. Indeed, this finding is relevant not just to Resolution 1540 but also to obligations pertaining to the three nonproliferation regimes as well: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

On Resolution 1540, by 2006, only two member states had submitted reports that adequately reflected national activities aimed at fulfilling legislative, regulatory, and administrative obligations under the resolution. Apart from cursory statements delineating aspects of national legislation focused on terrorism or other areas, such as the control of pesticides, reports from the region to the 1540 Committee largely reflect the general state of inaction that characterized implementation efforts across the region and in several other states in the Global South. While states, when reminded of their reporting obligations, signaled the requisite national political commitment to fully assume their responsibilities under Resolution 1540, it must be noted that

without exception, each state also reported significant difficulties in meeting these obligations, citing capacity challenges and deficiencies in evaluating responses and obtaining required reports from relevant line ministries and agencies. Indeed, the myriad competing development challenges being faced by these small states, compounded by small bureaucracies and minimal national budgets, have served to prevent effective gains in nonproliferation.

Moreover, major deficiencies in the communications process after the adoption of Resolution 1540 led to a failure of having member states link the resolution to other higher order priorities, which would transform the resolution from a bureaucratic burden into a tangible benefit. Attempts at engaging CARICOM members centered almost exclusively on the “what” as opposed to the “how” in relation to Resolution 1540 implementation. These “what” discussions largely focused on required activities that CARICOM states viewed as being arcane and irrelevant to their present security priorities. Absent from the process was an implementation roadmap that provided states with basic legislative and administrative benchmarks that needed to be met, given the fact that no CARICOM state was or is a participant in any meaningful trade in strategic commodities.

It is clear that this was an area of major deficiency when Resolution 1540 was adopted in 2004, as a significant bloc of states in the Global South were effectively left to their own devices in fashioning effective implementation approaches. In addition, it is important to note that the environment at the time of the resolution’s adoption was largely influenced by earlier resolutions, such as UNSCRs 1267 and 1373, which these states viewed as being largely onerous from a reporting standpoint.¹² As a result, member states became conditioned to a process of nonreporting and, more importantly, a working protocol that regarded action on Resolution 1540 as a largely optional exercise.

States were unresponsive despite multiple requests from the 1540 Committee to furnish reports on activities being undertaken to advance implementation. Similarly, requests for information regarding other activities, such as the establishment of national implementation coordinating groups or national action plans to aid the implementation process, were generally met with no response.

Reorienting Priorities: Implementing Resolution 1540

Without question, the transformation of the CARICOM bloc from an inactive bystander to an active stakeholder in advancing global nonproliferation goals and in implementing Resolution 1540 has been principally due to effective nongovernmental leadership, significant support from the Organization of American States, and active assistance from a troika of UN members.

An important component of this support has been the funding of a range of activities, including the CARICOM Resolution 1540 regional coordinator, as well as other initiatives aimed at building nonproliferation capacity within the region. The success of the CARICOM initiative has also demonstrated the effectiveness of jump-starting the implementation process by focusing on the area of greatest need—building country-stakeholders on the national level that are capable of engendering horizontal engagement across their national governments.

An essential prerequisite to increasing and maintaining national action on nonproliferation is the ability to fundamentally change threat perception at key policy and operational levels within governments. Traditionally in the Global South, the topic of proliferation has occurred almost exclusively within the domain of small arms and light weapons, with the underlying assumption being that strategic trade is either minimal or nonexistent. Moreover, a prevailing view has been that the region's vulnerability to any chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear event or any occurrence involving strategic commodities was also highly unlikely. Therefore, to the extent that most states in the Global South, such as those composing CARICOM, have had reason to focus on CBRN issues, this engagement has emanated from obligations stemming from the three nonproliferation regimes, as well as other mandates such as Resolution 1540.

The lack of a concerted focus on CBRN-related threats does not suggest, however, an unaware or disengaged Caribbean public. There is broad appreciation that chemical agents are generally highly toxic and that biological agents, such as anthrax or infectious disease-causing agents, can wreak havoc on any society. While most experts are convinced that the acquisition and/or use of a nuclear weapon is extremely difficult, security planners and those responsible for fashioning security

policy in the Caribbean are well aware that nonstate actors can combine a traditional explosive device with radioactive material to produce a so-called dirty bomb.

Thus, eliciting state action through changing threat perceptions involves transforming state perceptions of the degree of the threat. In other words, success in elevating Resolution 1540, or proliferation in general, to a more central place on the regional security agenda depends on whether states are convinced not simply of the mere existence of the threat but also its potential severity and its impact on their safety and security.

Instituting Effective Nonproliferation Measures

Without question, existing threat perceptions go a long way in determining the extent to which states commit resources to activities aimed at preventing proliferation, such as the implementation of effective national export controls.

Instituting effective export controls constitutes a barrier to nonstate actors or other entities being able to acquire materials, equipment, and technology that states or other illicit networks need to produce or to obtain WMD and related delivery systems. Resolution 1540 speaks to the need for states to have this as a central focus, with operative paragraphs 3(c) and 3(d) in the resolution actually mandating this activity. However, due to the perception on the part of several states that the global trade in strategic goods is a largely managed, well-regulated, and highly controlled activity, the urgency to implement and/or strengthen export controls has also been diminished.¹³

In this vein, a similar reality exists in relation to putting in place measures to improve and enhance border and port security. For states to make informed determinations about potential activity that can undermine security—both in the traditional and nontraditional domains—the effective management of these entry points is fundamental to accurately assessing supply-chain integrity and, more specifically, the very nature of outbound trade. This is key to threat reduction and is also the very basis of establishing a credible export-controls structure, particularly when this approach is also complemented by rigorous inspection protocols pertaining to inbound trade.

Again, the CARICOM-UNSCR 1540 Implementation Programme is a clear example of the utility of cooperative threat-reduction initiatives and how assistance programs designed in close cooperation with recipient states can help these states achieve their nonproliferation objectives.

The current CARICOM initiative, which seeks to implement a legislative and regulatory framework to manage strategic trade in the region, has been funded by the US State Department's Export Control and Related Border Security Program, which is administered by the Office of Export Control Cooperation in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation.¹⁴ A corollary activity is to develop and enhance the capacity of customs and other enforcement entities to detect, identify, and interdict illicit transfers at the region's ports and borders.

The initiative has been particularly beneficial in acquainting CARICOM member states with the notion that adopting enabling legislation is not simply an onerous exercise that distracts them from other more critical and pressing national development priorities; instead, it is an opportunity to position these states for investment in sectors that previously would not have been possible. Additionally, the increased vigilance that largely governs global strategic trade has meant that supplier states generally have legislation in place which prohibits local industry from doing business with other companies, institutions, or states that themselves have not enacted legislation to prevent proliferation.¹⁵

Absent these strictures in national law, countries effectively signal to potential investors that the existing national environment is not conducive to this type of economic engagement, thereby reducing the prospect for creating jobs in new and important growth sectors. To move CARICOM states closer to this realization, the nongovernmental community, which has already been working to develop a reference legal framework to manage strategic trade in the region, has also been educating officials at the policy level, as well as local industry, about the economic benefits that could accrue from enacting laws to prevent proliferation.¹⁶

This process of developing appropriate nonproliferation legislation has had the additional effect of encouraging CARICOM member states to focus on the utility of export controls in other areas and to assess compliance with embargoes and sanctions on a broader scale. In addition

to focusing on the control of items in relation to end users in the CBRN realm—including dual-use items that meet certain specified technical standards, and some of their components and associated technology and software—there is an incentive to engage in greater scrutiny of exports that may be used to support internal repression, contribute to regional instability, or promote the violation of human rights.

Industry Engagement in Support of Nonproliferation Goals

Generally speaking, in the Caribbean, industry continues to view itself as tangential to the promotion of supply-chain security despite being the primary source of products and technology that attract controls. The private sector largely views end-use controls, the administration of end-user checks, and certifications as potential impediments to trade. The prevailing assumption is that adopting strategic trade controls and strengthening domestic proliferation prevention will constitute *de facto* barriers to trade, as opposed to enhancing conditions for increased trade, primarily in high-tech goods and technology.¹⁷ A key challenge, therefore, is to encourage industry to see its role as being critical to the establishment of a robust and sustainable export-control system and to dispel the notion that ensuring secure trade is the exclusive purview of governments.¹⁸

Likewise, cooperation between countries with significant capacity and states with minimal experience and expertise in managing strategic trade is key to determining whether a specific commodity (currently of concern in a questionable shipment) has been frequently exported; whether the exporter connected to the shipment has had license applications denied for a similar commodity; or whether the end user in question has attempted to obtain this commodity through other shippers.

Cooperation with entities in the international community also helps countries like those in the Caribbean to navigate the proliferation landscape by reducing and simplifying the complexity of the various strategic export-control lists, by grouping commodities by physical appearance and category rather than by function, and by focusing primarily on appearance, notable features, key parameters, special markings, typical packaging, sizes, weights, monetary values, etc.¹⁹

Benefits of Effective Capacity Building

Perhaps one of the greatest deficiencies in the current global approach to dealing with proliferation has been the inability to effectively make the case that capacity-building efforts that support the implementation of domestic proliferation controls can be helpful in meeting important traditional national security and development challenges. Even after recent regional experiences in mounting significant preemptive security arrangements and counterterrorism protocols during the 2007 hosting of the Cricket World Cup in the Caribbean, there is still limited awareness of the utility of these experiences in confronting traditional security concerns.

Since the inception of the CARICOM-UNSCR 1540 Implementation Programme, however, there has been progress in making these linkages. Caribbean governments' engagement with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was instrumental in demonstrating how closely related response procedures to the deliberate use of a chemical agent were when compared to similar procedures in managing an emergency response to a chemical spill.²⁰ For first responders, the operational similarities and the management protocols that would be employed in both instances can be made very clear.

Similarly, for both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Pan-American Health Organization, efforts to acquaint public-health officials of the CARICOM region with how increasing national capacities to respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency could also be effective in mounting a response system in the aftermath of a hurricane or a major catastrophe such as an earthquake has helped to build core support for WMD engagement across the Caribbean Basin.

In meeting the core priorities of the region, these examples are abundant; for instance, the dual-use benefit of conventional detection and interdiction techniques—the use of scanning and other technology, and the application of surveillance procedures used in preventing illicit narcotics and small-arms trafficking—to advancing nonproliferation objectives. Also, approaches used in intelligence gathering and in the investigative process when countering money laundering are not dissimilar from methodologies used in preventing the operation and financing of proliferation networks.

As previously noted, improving existing national capacity for disease surveillance also strengthens a country's capability to respond to a national emergency occasioned by the deliberate use of a biological weapon such as anthrax. Therefore, if there is appropriate public investment in improving a country's ability to respond to natural outbreaks, there will also be a commensurate increase in that state's ability to deal with bioterrorism.²¹ To this end, enhancing global cooperation with the international community to meet national obligations under the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention can also serve to build national capacity to detect, report, and respond to outbreaks of disease, whether deliberate, accidental, or natural. Furthermore, these activities would also position states to meet their obligations in implementing the World Health Organization's International Health Regulations (IHR).²²

It is worth mentioning that discussions within the intergovernmental community subsequent to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1977 in April 2011, which extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee for ten years, have centered on developing approaches to fulfilling national obligations under Resolution 1540 through increased cooperation in areas that would enhance public health, such as a concerted action in the areas of biosafety and biosecurity.²³

Along with increasing current regional capacity in disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and disease containment, undertaking concrete efforts to improve disease-response capacities and facilitating the full implementation of the IHR in preventing the spread of epidemics would also redound to the benefit of CARICOM members while meeting important Resolution 1540 goals.²⁴

The Role of the Next 100 Project in Furthering Nonproliferation Aims

Without question, the single most effective initiative that has accounted for an unprecedented level of engagement on Resolution 1540 has been an innovative approach called the Next 100 Project developed by two nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).²⁵ This effort has represented a novel attempt to incentivize the Resolution 1540 implementation process by urging the international community to encourage nonproliferation efforts by states in the Global South by helping these states attend to other development priorities at the same time.

In order to actualize this process, several UN members have provided assistance in a range of areas. This multilateral effort has resulted in the staging of several important capacity-building initiatives that strengthened the capability of CARICOM member states to establish credible national nonproliferation structures. Key to this process has been the funding of a regional implementation coordinator by the United States, as well as the funding of a major legislative regional effort to enact laws to prevent proliferation.

This engagement has spurred CARICOM member states into action, particularly with respect to furnishing necessary reports to the 1540 Committee and encouraging member states to partner with the NGO sector in conducting “gap analyses” of existing national legislation in order to address deficits in current law. This process has also allowed Resolution 1540 to be firmly placed on the regional security agenda and in the security discourse within the Caribbean. There is now substantial engagement across several government ministries and related agencies in each CARICOM member state on Resolution 1540, which had not occurred prior to 2008. Much work remains to be done, but it can be asserted that the prospect for sustained engagement in preventing proliferation is on a firmer footing now than it has ever been.

While satisfactory progress has been made, it is important to note that the core recommendation of the Next 100 Project’s report in 2009 has not been met. The initiative proposed an innovative “whole-of-society” approach to bridging the security/development divide that “would leverage donor investments in both security assistance and development assistance,” which would serve to ensure that these states increased their stakeholder portfolios in advancing national nonproliferation efforts. The report also suggested that this approach would help to guarantee the sustainability of these investments and ensure a positive return for the international donor community. On this front, there is still much work to be done.

To realize these objectives, the original design also called for three key things: the identification of new sources of assistance to address endemic threats in the developing world, such as poverty, corruption, infectious diseases, and economic underdevelopment; the adoption of a new engagement model that addresses the causes of proliferation, rather than its symptoms; and reinforcing the legitimacy of the United Nations to respond to transnational issues.²⁶

Again, while there has been much discussion about the merits of this approach by governments around the world as delineated in the report, there has not been, over the four years since its tabling, movement to address these pending issues. An important observation also relates to the vast differential between global expenditures on security assistance as compared to development funding. CARICOM member states that attended a February 2008 forum in the Dominican Republic that looked at ways to facilitate the implementation of Resolution 1540 fully endorsed the report's findings that greater attention to key day-to-day soft-security concerns—including eradicating poverty, enhancing trade, promoting energy security, aiding infrastructure development, and attending to public health issues—would, in the end, serve to reduce hard-security threats—including terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.²⁷

Since the inception of the CARICOM-UNSCR 1540 Implementation Programme, a major point of emphasis has been the development of a structured narrative that would deliver a comprehensive message to CARICOM members that efforts made by them to meet their obligations under the resolution would simultaneously serve to advance ongoing traditional national security and development priorities. As a result, all workshops and trainings that have been staged under the aegis of the program have sought to satisfy a central objective, which is to ensure that training provided in improving emergency management and disaster response; enhancing port, border, or maritime security; and preventing illicit trafficking would all have the dual-use utility of being applicable on the traditional security front as well as in managing strategic trade and preventing proliferation.

This emphasis is in recognition of the unique geographic environment in which the Caribbean exists. The CARICOM member states are situated in one of the most disaster-prone regions of the world, with high vulnerability to an array of natural disasters.²⁸ Against the background of disturbing global trends that indicate both natural and man-made disasters are expected to increase fivefold over the next 45 years due to environmental degradation, rapid urbanization, and disease in the developing world,²⁹ it is of critical importance that CARICOM states develop innovative and creative approaches to meet these challenges, even as they attend to security obligations, including those on the proliferation front.

The case of Grenada, a CARICOM member state that has been very engaged in furthering national nonproliferation efforts and in fully assuming its obligations under Resolution 1540, has been instructive in this regard. In September 2004, Hurricane Ivan, a category three storm, made landfall in Grenada and resulted in the destruction of 90 percent of the country's housing stock and infrastructure. Only two of the nation's primary and secondary schools survived severe damage. Essential utilities such as electricity, water, and telecommunications were severely curtailed. In the agricultural sector, Grenada experienced 100 percent and 85 percent losses of its banana and nutmeg crops, which constitute that country's principal exports.³⁰ In total, the storm accounted for losses estimated at \$889 million, or approximately 200 percent of Grenada's GDP. In July 2005, a mere ten months later and in the middle of the rebuilding of infrastructure destroyed by Hurricane Ivan, Grenada suffered a direct hit from Hurricane Emily, which occasioned losses estimated at \$15.8 million, or 12.9 percent of its 2005 GDP.³¹

With evidence pointing to a growing frequency and intensity of these storms, there is need to foster even greater cooperation with the international community, as well as with intergovernmental organizations with competences both in responding to mass casualty scenarios as well as in preventing proliferation. Therefore, closer interaction with entities including the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA), and the World Health Organization, as well as other donor states, constitutes a critical part of developing an adequate security posture in the Caribbean that is equipped to deal with a range of strategic as well as traditional security eventualities.

In this regard, the issue of sustainability also takes on added importance. From 2006 to 2007, the CARICOM Secretariat conducted a regionwide threat assessment to determine areas of vulnerability to a possible terrorist attack and to develop effective preventative, preemptive, and response mechanisms to ensure that regional and national security systems were sufficiently strengthened and were responsive to the existing threat environment.

The assessment indicated significant areas of vulnerability, which CARICOM states immediately moved to address both nationally as

well as multilaterally. As the Next 100 Project's 2009 report observed, notwithstanding specific requests for counterterrorism and other non-proliferation-based assistance, the responses received, in many cases, were not sufficient to either the scope of existing needs or the degree required to meet demands. Consequently, six years after the hosting of the Cricket World Cup, there remain key deficiencies in the region's ability to respond to an asymmetric event involving chemical, biological, or radiological materials. In addition, sustaining detection and interdiction capacity, which was developed to respond to the possible use of explosive devices during the games, has also been a challenge for several member states.

Notwithstanding the ongoing challenges, the important lesson for CARICOM states, which ensued from their experience in putting in place security arrangements for the Cricket World Cup, has been the significant value of cooperative security arrangements and the benefit of pooling security resources to achieve a common set of security objectives that can be sustained and built on long after a designated event. It was this realization that provided a functional rationale for the initiation of the CARICOM-UNSCR 1540 Implementation Programme.

The lesson for the international community, as has been clearly underscored in the findings of the Next 100 Project, is that successful and sustainable engagement to achieve nonproliferation goals must be predicated on equally successful and sustainable engagement in the key areas that are fundamental to the economic viability and prosperity of small developing states in the international system, including those in the Caribbean.

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Central America

Editor's Note

Few regions of the world better illustrate the intimate nexus between human development and security than does Central America. A region of inherent economic and social promise, its fortunes have been frustrated by a plethora of overwhelming security challenges related to small arms, drugs, and criminal gangs. Although a long and innovative roster of instruments has been developed to counter these scourges, a lack of technical and financial support has often prevented their full realization. Moreover, institutional vulnerabilities at the local and state levels have further complicated the implementation of national and regional strategies designed to break this cycle of violence and underdevelopment. The global economic downturn now threatens to reverse progress made to date and again place countries of the region squarely on a downward economic and security trajectory.

According to a recent report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, no issue has had a greater impact on stability and development in Central America than crime. The region has emerged as the most violent in the world, with the average number of homicides in Central America in 2010 rising to 38 per 100,000 people—almost four times the global average. While these statistics are rooted in a complex array of social, political, and economic circumstances that have depressed economic opportunity and inflated levels of violence, Central American scholars

and regional government officials generally agree that their security and development challenges are rooted in the culture of illegality embodied most graphically by the triple threat of small-arms proliferation, drug trafficking, and criminal and youth gangs.

Addressing these growing threats to citizen security and economic prosperity in Central America will require not only the preservation of existing assistance streams but also the identification of innovative new sources of technical and financial assistance. Using Resolution 1540, governments of the region could identify novel streams of assistance to address capacity shortfalls to improve customs facilities and migratory border facilities, receive training for the tracking of illegal immigration, improve capacities to prevent money laundering and drug and human trafficking, enhance the training of public and private officials linked to maritime trade, improve human resources and legal infrastructures, and strengthen the competencies of government institutions. This dual-benefit assistance would not only promote global nonproliferation, it would address directly the critical security and downstream development concerns of Central American governments: the drug trade, small-arms trafficking, and the growth of organized criminal gangs.

Immediately on the heels of the successful demonstration of the Beyond Boundaries model in the Caribbean region, and working in close cooperation with the 1540 Committee, the Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation joined the Organization of American States to scale that success across countries of the Central American Integration System (SICA): Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Belize, and the Dominican Republic. The objective was to leverage donor investments in both security assistance and development assistance so as to ensure recipient state buy-in and an enduring return on investment across a wider range of local needs and global imperatives. In short, our goal was to (1) identify new sources of assistance to address endemic threats in Central America, including poverty, corruption, infectious diseases, and economic underdevelopment; (2) expand a successful new engagement model that treats the root causes of proliferation, rather than its symptoms; and (3) reinforce the legitimacy of the United Nations as an effective mechanism to address transnational issues.

As explained in this chapter by Alexander Chacon, formerly with SICA, the engagement has led to a remarkable level of political buy-in among states of the region. A marked receptivity to both the global objectives of Resolution 1540 and the local implementation of the resolution was seldom doubted in national capitals across Central America. In turn, SICA was mandated to provide intraregional coordination between governments and serve as a point of contact with the 1540 Committee in New York. National points of contact were established, and new programmatic activities on the ground, working with the international donor community and international organizations like the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency, resulted. Alas, in the case of Central America, the lack of sustainability ultimately led to the premature shuttering of these efforts. Interestingly, while regional leaders continued to support the program, the lack of sustainability resulted from the donor community's failure to provide renewed support for the burgeoning efforts on the ground. This failure should serve as a clarion call to the international donor community to ensure that the generation of interest in nonproliferation capacity building must be met with a commensurate commitment to sustainably resourcing the engagement of countries across the developing world.

Chapter 2 Nonproliferation in Central America

Alexander Chacón

Across the board, Central American countries have witnessed skyrocketing rates of violent crime, which have generated a complex security situation that national and regional remediation efforts have proven unable to adequately address. Despite significant domestic and foreign investment in regional security efforts over the course of the past decade, worsening cross-border criminality linked to the unchecked flow of small arms and narcotics through the region has negatively impinged upon human security, consuming nearly 8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), as well as prospects for near- and long-term economic growth and development.¹

According to a recent report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, no issue has had a greater impact on stability and development in Central America than crime. Perversely, the phenomenon of globalization that has brought so many benefits to Central America has also enabled organized criminal networks in the region to become more sophisticated and generate massive profits at the expense of legitimate actors. These networks' robust economic capacity enables them to exercise power through violence across national boundaries, negatively influencing even the effective operation of the state itself. The reach, influence, and breadth of impact of organized crime on the human condition necessarily elevate its prevention to the highest of security priorities for the region as a whole and to every constituent country of the Central American Integration System (SICA).²

Of course, the pervasive presence of organized crime is not only alarming in terms of the security of the region but has also become increasingly detrimental to regional economic development. Governments across the region have become acutely aware that insecurity has yielded an environment incapable of generating optimum business and investment opportunities that are key to facilitating economic growth. This anemic prosperity, in turn, has been a central impediment to improving overall quality of life, including progress in terms of education, health, safety, housing, and other core objectives of the state.


Although other local, regional, and global security and development concerns may impinge upon the well-being of their citizens, leaders across the region have rightly viewed the management of transnational organized crime and associated linkages with local criminal groups (gangs) as a central priority. For Central American governments, the breadth and depth of the challenge is bewildering. Transnational organized criminal groups in the region have been responsible for a complex web of interrelated security threats, from the trafficking of a wide variety of contraband to armed violence resulting from near unchecked access to small arms and light weapons to a culture of criminality and localized corruption. Although organized criminal entities may be currently capturing the most international attention, these groups are by no means the only—and perhaps not even the most significant—threat to human security in Central America. Local *maras*, or gangs, which have gradually proliferated in several countries of the isthmus, are increasingly allying themselves with, and are supported by, transnational organized crime groups. In turn, this has translated the persistent threat of violence to the local level and helped to further diminish prospects for growth and development, even at the tactical level.

Likewise, transnational organized criminal groups have proven equally flexible in the management of their business operations. Organized criminal activities are increasingly being facilitated by the phenomenon known as “payment in kind.” This refers to drug traffickers swapping product within the region in exchange for services, thus promoting intraregional trafficking and drug consumption, and contributing to greater social deterioration.

In short, the intersection of transnational organized crime, local youth gangs, money laundering, arms trafficking, drug dealing, and other forms of contraband trafficking has created a cyclical threat of ever-worsening violence and underdevelopment (see Figure 6). The sheer complexity of these intersections has to date befuddled local and international policymakers, who are ill-equipped to manage the hyperflexible networking and innovation that facilitates each of these worsening challenges. Stovepiped responses at the national, regional, and global levels have proven inadequate to the task of addressing the threat, much less managing it. It therefore follows that regional responses to these challenges must be as multimodal as the threats themselves. Where Central American governments have managed to

coordinate across multiple threat portfolios, sharing resources and building political support, evidence of progress has been witnessed. One such opportunity has availed itself under Resolution 1540.

Figure 6: Geographical Vulnerability: Traffic from South to North



Organized Crime and Cycle of Violence in the Region

Source: Office of the Secretary General, SICA.

A Common Security Strategy in Central America

In order to ensure that criminal elements are not allowed to outmaneuver the state, it is important that all governments of the region work together in developing strategies and initiatives to combat this threat. Central American leaders have made clear that this process should be driven by state-led regional or subregional efforts but include participation from civil society, the private sector, and academia.

Certain measures have already been developed to this end, for instance, the Central American Security Strategy.³ The strategy represents a substantive political commitment at the highest level between governments of Central America and the international community. The strategy was developed based on the principle of shared responsibility while establishing solid and sustainable terms for lasting security cooperation. This concept of shared responsibility suggests a joint effort between countries of the region and the so-called group of friends to address mutually relevant security and development challenges whose roots may reside in Central America but whose negative impacts extend globally.⁴

The strategy also built upon a growing sense of shared interdependence across the region whose origins extended two decades prior.

In 1991, recognizing their interdependence in terms of security, economic growth, and development, governments of the region formed SICA. The main purpose of this union was to promote Central American integration as well as peace, freedom, democracy, and development. Its main source of financing comes from contributions made by member countries mainly for the execution of specific projects that aim to promote international cooperation. SICA had also developed a regional security model reflected in the Democratic Security Treaty Framework (DSTF) of 1995, which is based on the principles of democracy, institutional strengthening, and consolidation of the rule of law. The model represents a basic instrument of the regional security strategy that establishes coordinated security actions adopted by member states. The promotion and disclosure of human rights violations is an additional pillar of the system, and a fundamental component of the development of the Regional Security Strategy.

For the execution of security policies, SICA works with the Central American Security Commission and individual member states. Learning about the institutional workings of SICA enables one to have the opportunity to understand the dynamics of integration, regional security, and the details in the processes of defining a particular agenda. Regional level coordination strengthens both the national and regional capacities needed for the improvement of border controls, ports, and airports, as well as the prevention and reduction of controlled substances used in the manufacture of illicit drugs.

Regional security has been a topic of interest for all member countries of SICA. The current context, as noted above, is characterized by a growing wave of violence that has an impact on countries' development aspirations in various dimensions. The priorities of the region are thus broken down into components with regard to specific projects, actions, and activities. Prevention is highlighted, such as in terms of youth violence, armed violence, gender-based violence, smuggling of migrants, the trafficking of persons, climate change, and so forth. For Central American governments, these are the pressing issues that must be addressed in order to provide for the daily security and long-term economic well-being of their citizens.

Of course, physical measures to help prevent or disrupt criminal behavior are only one element of good governance. Strengthening confidence

in the judiciary and providing training in public ministries on the rule of law are also significant priorities for regional governments. To this end, a major effort was made by SICA and its member states to address each of these elements as components of a common security strategy for the region.

Enhanced coordination across multiple common-threat portfolios has yielded tangible benefit to the region in terms of overall resources allocated to addressing the problem set. Based on an analysis made by the United Nations Development Programme, as a percentage of GDP, from 2006 to 2010, security spending increased in most countries in the region, in part as a result of growing rates of criminality but also as a reflection of the newly coordinated activities promoted by SICA in cooperation with its member states. The analysis reveals that regional security spending increased from 2.28 percent to 2.66 percent of GDP.⁵ The main expenses by the countries have been focused on institutional strengthening, rehabilitation, reintegration and prison security, prevention of social violence, and combating crime.

Figure 7: Security Spending as Percentage of GDP

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Belize	2.51	2.86	3.11	2.87	2.82
Costa Rica	1.57	1.72	2.05	2.31	2.46
Guatemala	2.31	2.27	2.22	2.31	2.16
El Salvador	2.93	2.82	3.27	3.51	3.46
Honduras	2.22	2.56	2.66	3.00	2.77
Nicaragua	3.40	3.55	3.35	3.54	3.08
Panama	2.10	2.08	2.09	2.28	2.85
REGIONAL	2.28	2.30	2.44	2.63	2.66

Source: United Nations Development Programme regional headquarters, June 2011.

Regrettably, projects related to the nonproliferation of WMD have not yet been widespread in Central America for the simple reason that the issue is not yet a high priority for regional governments. Most

governments in the region, while recognizing its importance as well as their global obligation to implement an array of treaties and UN Security Council resolutions, cannot justify the redirection of scarce human and financial capital away from other, more pressing threats. Yet despite this disjuncture, the framework of implementing WMD treaty obligations and Resolution 1540 could be viewed as an opportunity to promote the concept of the dual-benefit model in the region.⁶

Cooperation to Counter WMD in the Central American Region

In addition to extending the scope of Resolution 1540 for ten more years, addressing regional problems through regional solutions is a basic premise of the April 20, 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1977. That resolution reiterates UN member states' commitment to promoting nonproliferation compliance and urges international, regional, and subregional organizations to cooperate with the 1540 Committee. One opportunity may reside in better linking existing regional activities to proffered assistance. Such an approach would not only develop opportunities to build upon an existing framework to address high-priority concerns of regional governments, it also promises to incentivize governments by offering tangible new assistance to satisfy outstanding capacity gaps.

The last review process of the SICA security strategy highlighted the need to obtain new resource streams due to SICA's limited availability of funding to cope with the magnitude of growing security threats. Meanwhile, members of the international donor community have expressed interest in the region due to the spill-over security implications for their own national contexts. The link between the need for security assistance and opportunities under Resolution 1540 presents innovative opportunities to fill urgent gaps in capacity—as defined by regional governments in the security strategy—while complying with global nonproliferation mandates, including Resolution 1540.

In order to address the issue of WMD nonproliferation in Central America, it is essential to cite the DSTF as a legal instrument that provides the region with the institutional framework required for the implementation of policies regarding security issues. Article 34 of the DSTF states:

The Parties undertake to refrain from acquiring, maintaining or permitting the stationing in or transit through their territories of weapons of mass and indiscriminate destruction, including chemical, nuclear and bacteriological weapons. The Parties also undertake not to construct or permit the construction of facilities for the manufacture or stockpiling of such weapons in their respective territories.⁷

From the standpoint of state nonproliferation, Central America represents a success story in remaining a nonnuclear-weapons region. From a wider prevention standpoint, however, neither Central American states nor SICA have the financial resources necessary to convert the DSTF into an efficient mechanism for proliferation prevention more broadly, including to nonstate actors.

The region has, in the last decade, committed seriously to international counterterrorism efforts and expressed full support for initiatives of this nature, both at the political and normative levels. Likewise, many of the points included in the Regional Security Strategy are also related to the needs outlined in another subregional strategy on combating the drug trade in Central America. To date, that plan has only generated offers of technical cooperation and none in terms of financial cooperation. The growing trafficking routes through the region, combined with increasing ties to transnational organizations, pose a worrisome potential for the trafficking of WMD items or weapons.

One cost analysis in the frame of the new security strategy budgeting process found that full implementation could cost an estimated \$71.8 million over a period of three years for the seven countries of the region. The goals of the Combating the Diversion of Controlled Substances in Central America project are integrated with another project called the Strategy on Combating Crime Related to Drug Interdiction, Drug Trafficking, and Proceeds in Central America. No cooperation offers have been reported on this second project either. The cost estimated is \$1.4 million for the same seven countries for a period of three years. This has left open unmet security needs for Central American governments in their highest priority areas. Because many of the same capacities needed to implement this counterdrug work is directly relevant to other priorities,

including proliferation prevention, effectively building together these approaches could yield positive and sustainable results.

International Cooperation and Assistance for Proliferation Prevention

Following initial outreach by the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), and civil society in 2009 and 2010, SICA, Stimson, and the Stanley Foundation convened a regional gathering of member states to discuss the nexus between Resolution 1540 obligations and other high priority concerns affecting regional governments. Working groups at the meeting identified linkages between the implementation of Resolution 1540 and, *inter alia*, the establishment of controls on border crossing posts; application of the rule of law; the prevention of human, drug, and arms trafficking; and the prevention of chemical, biological, and conventional arms smuggling. Subsequently, the SICA Secretariat sent a formal request for technical assistance to the chair of the 1540 Committee. Recognizing the direct benefits of Resolution 1540 implementation for meeting high priority concerns seemingly unrelated to WMD nonproliferation and prevention, member states agreed to a coordinated approach to implementing the resolution that would be tied to the region's common security strategy. Canada responded to the request and offered support and financial assistance to establish the position of a Resolution 1540 regional coordinator in SICA.⁸ A central component of the coordinator's mission is to identify links between the Regional Security Strategy, for which there was widespread political buy-in, and Resolution 1540 assistance.

Nonproliferation had not proven to be as high of a priority as it could have been in the renewed security strategy. For example, throughout the components of regional training outlined for 2013, identification of chemical precursors was only considered in some planned actions on education and training of police officers, judges, prosecutors, and other actors. However, the strategy does delineate support in actions to fight trafficking of chemical precursors in the region to prevent the manufacturing of illicit drugs, which have not traditionally been linked to global nonproliferation mandates.

For Central America, the common issues related to Resolution 1540 most notably refer to the activities related to drug trafficking,

specifically with regard to chemical precursors. Chemical refinement is closely related to the purification of cocaine; however, the dangerous substances involved could also eventually serve as components for the manufacturing of chemical weapons. This connection continues to provide a unique window through which the WMD issue can be made more relevant to member states.

Likewise, in terms of regional coordination to combat organized crime, it is important to have strong institutions and well-prepared human resources to perform the operations of seizure, custody, storage, disposal, or destruction of chemical precursors of this nature. It is also essential to have technical and financial resources to facilitate their destruction. SICA countries have achieved successful seizures as a result of police, safety, health, environment, and legislation coordination between two or more countries. However, none of the countries have sufficient financial resources to carry out the destruction of chemical precursors because of high technical and operational costs. Little attention has been given to this topic except for some specific actions conducted by the OAS in coordination with SICA.

It is, thus, important for the region to identify new sources and opportunities of available financial and technical assistance related to Resolution 1540 that can simultaneously help improve capacity building related to drug trafficking, the prevention of the trade in chemical precursors, small- and light-weapons trafficking, border security, customs control, organized crime, money laundering, human trafficking, and illicit migrant trafficking, among other issues.

Furthermore, due to the transboundary nature of these issues, governments' national security policies are being better aligned with wider regional perspectives and approaches. In short, regional problems require regional solutions. Ensuring a more efficient use of scarce resources has required interinstitutional coordination. In this respect, SICA's Secretariat has helped to not only market the benefits of Resolution 1540 to member states but also ensure that resources are used in a coordinated and efficient manner. SICA objectives and aspirations regarding human rights and, in particular, people's security and their properties, moreover, complement Resolution 1540 and present opportunities to establish a strategic alliance with the 1540 Committee and its experts.

Gauging Dual-Benefit Impacts

The most concrete example of the dual-benefit approach in Central America has been the SICA 1540 project. In addition to facilitating a regional point of contact, the project convened forums to discuss topics on the resolution, ranging from challenges facing countries to a regional vision for implementation to creating a national focal point to national implementation strategies with the possible technical support of international organizations. Additionally, the SICA 1540 project has established strategic partnerships with the 1540 Committee, the United Nations Disarmament Office, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the OAS, among others, resulting in training and capacity-building efforts by those organizations. As a direct result of SICA's work over the course of 2012, much progress has been made toward meeting the objectives of Resolution 1540 in every SICA member state. Therefore, despite its early termination in 2013, the SICA 1540 project should be judged a success.⁹

Lessons Learned from Regional Engagement, and the Path Forward

The SICA 1540 project started the process of promoting the full and effective implementation of Resolution 1540 through the establishment of a regional focal point. The approach opened new avenues to share and coordinate resources, made more efficient use of available external assistance for training, provided for institutional strengthening, and yielded enhanced integration of WMD nonproliferation mandates into existing organizational activities, trainings, and objectives. In the future, SICA will be better positioned to help all member states fulfill their obligations under Resolution 1540, and do so more efficiently and sustainably.

Perhaps more importantly, however, the SICA 1540 project began to build pragmatic support for nonproliferation across the region. For instance, early in the program, SICA distributed a questionnaire to obtain feedback regarding the development of national action plans for Resolution 1540 implementation. Interest in the concept was significant, with all member states actively collaborating with the sub-regional organization to develop interdepartmental commissions and national points of contact for the purposes of building the requisite support for a national implementation strategy.

Member states came together to share best practices and experiences, and to gather information to accelerate coordinated implementation of Resolution 1540. Establishing networks of this sort has been especially useful in identifying opportunities to bring experts to Central America for international technical support and financial resources. The networks built within countries, between countries of the region, and with countries around the globe providing assistance has proven an invaluable and long-term spin-off benefit.

Not only did the dual-benefit model offer tangible benefits to meet urgent security and development needs in the region, it built upon a politically suitable vehicle in the security strategy. However, moving forward, it is critical to involve more decision makers and political leaders in the region to ensure sustained local buy-in. This means that it is necessary to have unconditional support at a high political level, which will, in turn, facilitate the work at a technical level and help retain momentum among key players. The participation of the diplomatic leadership from the respective ministries of foreign affairs is, therefore, essential.

Significantly, this is a challenge not only among governments of the region but also among donor governments. Unless durable and sustainable funding can be provided, the promotion of Resolution 1540 could ultimately contribute to unhelpful backlash among recipient partner states. From a regional point of view, the Resolution 1540 coordinator position is fundamental because it is a human resource that promotes, facilitates, and articulates the relevant processes full time. At the same time, the coordinator, in cooperation with national authorities, identifies the real needs of each country and offers a regional approach to manage the resources that will not only benefit the implementation of the resolution and its themes but will also reinforce other topics specific to regional and national security and development objectives and daily institutional tasks.

Indeed, even as national awareness of Resolution 1540 germinated in the region, it was quickly cut short by a lack of sustained interest and investment on the part of the donor states. This waning interest in Resolution 1540 will likely prove a significant impediment to gaining buy-in from governments around the world.


As next steps, SICA members should consider even more specific objectives, including:

- Promote a process for a regionwide coordinated action plan for the implementation of Resolution 1540.
- Provide a common resource for all member states on the issue of Resolution 1540 and WMD nonproliferation more broadly.
- Facilitate more regularized member state reporting to the 1540 Committee.
- Continue the process for regional and national capacity building relevant to implementation of Resolution 1540 and simultaneously provide capacity to meet other high priority challenges.
- Encourage the harmonization of the legislation in force in SICA-member countries regarding the implementation of Resolution 1540.
- Develop strategic alliances with the private sector and other civil society actors.
- Build Resolution 1540 implementation objectives into existing SICA outreach efforts and national implementation strategies.

In sum, the SICA 1540 project offered an opportunity to expand regional institutional capacity within the framework of nonproliferation. It also demonstrated that nonproliferation issues involve a variety of sectors, including environment, health, defense, customs, and security. It therefore created a role for the respective ministries of foreign affairs and others to coordinate and facilitate the process of implementation and gave them tangible reasons for doing so beyond the meeting of seemingly ethereal national obligations propagated in New York. In this sense, sustainable financing of regional coordination efforts is central to ensuring long-term success in Central America.

Endnotes

- ¹ Sergio Ramos, “Central America: Organized Crime Costs Central America Billions,” InfoSurHoy.com, May 8, 2013, http://infosurhoy.com/cocoon/saii/xhtml/en_GB/features/saii/features/main/2013/08/05/feature-01.
- ² SICA is the institutional framework for Central American integration, established by the states of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, with the participation of the Dominican Republic as an associate state. The main purpose is to promote Central American integration and set up a region of peace, freedom, democracy, and development. Its main source of financing is contributions made by its member countries mainly for the execution of specific projects that promote international cooperation. The projects are developed in accordance with the fundamental principles, and comply with the rules, of the United Nations Charter and the Organization of the American States. SICA has also developed a regional security model reflected in the Democratic Security Treaty Framework of 1995. This framework is based on the principles of democracy, institutional strengthening, and consolidation of the state of law, as well as on governments elected by universal, free, and secret ballot. The model counts as a Regional Security Strategy basic instrument that establishes coordinated security actions adopted by the countries of the region. The promotion and disclosure of human rights is a pillar of the system and a fundamental component for the development of the Regional Security Strategy. For the execution of the security policies, SICA works with the Central American Security Commission and individual member states.
- ³ Secretariat General of the Central American Integration System, Central American Security Strategy, June 2011, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dcam/dv/ca_security_s/ca_security_s_en.pdf.
- ⁴ The group of friends emerged from the International Conference in Support of the Security Strategy held in Guatemala in 2011. The friends are countries, international organizations, and organisms that have worked together to achieve the objectives of the SICA proposal in relation to the Regional Security Strategy.
- ⁵ UN Department of Public Information, Information on Security Spending and Justice in Central America: 2006–2010, June 2011: 4, http://www.regionalcentre/undp.org/images/stories/novedades/informe_gastopublico.pdf.
- ⁶ The dual-benefit model refers to assistance not only promoting global nonproliferation but also addressing directly the critical human-security and development aspirations of member state governments.
- ⁷ Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2007, I-34456, December 15, 1995: 226, http://idw.csfederalismo.it/attachments/242_Framework%20Treaty%20on%20democratic%20security%20in%20Central%20America.pdf.
- ⁸ The SICA 1540 project promoted the process of implementation of UNSCR 1540 during the period of October 2011 to September 2012, with strong support from Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
- ⁹ The SICA 1540 project was supported by Canada, but it was developed for a one-year term only. Regrettably, there were policy changes with Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s administration.



Eastern Africa

Editor's Note

According to the World Bank, more than half of the people in sub-Saharan Africa live in poverty. In certain regions of Eastern Africa, the poverty rate exceeds 80 percent. Amid such abject poverty, one of the greatest menaces is ill health and societies' inability to care for their sick and to prevent the spread of diseases. Whereas contracting an infectious disease in much of the developed world can mean a difficult life, to many in Eastern Africa it means certain death, followed by a spiral of poverty and deprivation for surviving family members. The World Health Organization reports that 72 percent of all deaths across Africa are directly attributable to infectious diseases, compared to 27 percent in all of the organization's other regions combined. Their wider impact on economic development and grinding rates of poverty is ultimately not knowable.

New and festering conflicts also contribute to the shackles of poverty, as widespread violence across several Eastern African countries hampers prospects for economic growth and diversification. Inter- and intrastate violence is made more lethally efficient by the millions of small arms and light weapons in circulation on the continent. Armed conflicts have forced millions to leave their homes, and without shelter, food, and water for significant periods of time, these people become increasingly vulnerable. Compounding this vicious circle of

deprivation—and perhaps in part because of it—is the growing threat from terrorist organizations preying upon not only Western targets in Eastern Africa but also upon innocent local populations.

In short, extreme poverty, poor public health opportunities, internal political strife, interstate wars, trafficking in small arms, and terrorism fuel a continuous cycle that prevents large swaths of the continent from participating in much of the positive economic momentum that other parts of the world are either beginning to experience or have been enjoying for decades.

Since the end of the colonial era, regional leaders across Africa have struggled to define a successful and sustainable pathway out of this vicious circle and into a virtuous one marked by development and increased security and stability. Inarguably, to begin ameliorating the gruesome challenges, a wide variety of novel and increased human, technical, and financial capacity-building measures will have to be put into place. For instance, with regard to public health, specialists point to a laundry list of near-term goals, including:

- Development of a functioning and effective disease-surveillance system and response capacity.
- Training of more skilled health care workers, especially in remote areas.
- Improvement of laboratory capacity to confirm diseases by building skilled labor, instituting more targeted training, and providing equipment and supplies.
- Enhancement of the capacity of the public health system to respond effectively after a disease outbreak is discovered with an adequate prophylactic and/or treatment regimen.

In the case of meeting the deadly and corrosive menace of small-arms and light-weapons trafficking across Eastern Africa, governments and experts from the region consistently point to the need for:

- Enhancing human and technical capacity at border points, including more and better-trained and equipped guards, improved arms-detection gear and techniques, as well as enhanced surveillance systems and scanners.

- Reforming the judicial and law-enforcement systems to ensure a rigorous deterrent and adequate prosecutorial capacity in the event of illegal possession of, and trade in, small arms and light weapons.
- Improving regional harmonization of legal and enforcement systems, as well as improving systems for, and frequency of, information exchange and joint strategies to combat the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons.

And finally, when it comes to the growing threat posed by regional terrorist activity, many governments in the region have sought to:

- Enhance training for police, judges, and prosecutors.
- Advance expertise related to the drafting and adoption of relevant counterterrorism legislation, including formal legal mechanisms for extradition, mutual legal assistance, and information sharing across the subregion.
- Increase awareness among key constituencies, including prosecutors, judges, and law enforcement of national or regional counterterrorism objectives and strategies.

Leaders across sub-Saharan Africa have made clear that these are their core priorities. Although a significant amount of international development assistance has been provided to the region to build public health infrastructures, promote the rule of law, and address the underlying conditions that may contribute to terrorist fervor, a wealth of evidence suggests existing resources have been insufficient. Amid the global economic crisis and diminishing streams of traditional aid, identifying novel streams of assistance will be critical to sustaining or building upon the gains that have been made toward improving Africa's condition.

To that end, in 2010, the Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation began working closely with a series of governments across Eastern Africa to demonstrate an innovative “whole-of-society” approach that seeks to better leverage existing resources, identify innovative new streams of assistance, and bridge the unproductive divide between security and development. In this chapter, Ambassador Ochieng Adala,

executive director of the Africa Peace Forum and the former permanent representative of Kenya to the United Nations, argues that links between security and development have yielded examples of pragmatic capacity building on the ground. Whether defined by the Japan International Cooperation Agency's innovative investment in "one-stop" border processing in Kenya that expedited trade and provided greater transparency to cross-boundary flows, or as joint investments by the defense and environmental communities to prevent wildlife trafficking, leveraged funding has helped the sustainable implementation of Resolution 1540.

Chapter 3

Nonproliferation in Eastern Africa

Ochieng Adala

As the intersection between security and development becomes a growing focus among policymakers across much of the developed world, it is notable that Africa has borne direct witness to their inseparability throughout much of its history. Although a significant amount of international development assistance has been provided to Africa to, *inter alia*, build health infrastructures, promote the rule of law, and address the underlying conditions that may contribute to terrorist fervor, a wealth of evidence suggests that these substantial resources have been insufficient in meeting the magnitude of the challenge. The inability to better leverage and coordinate diverse streams of assistance has been inhibitive. To that end, this report proposes an innovative “whole-of-society” approach that seeks to better leverage existing resources, identify new streams of assistance, and bridge the unproductive divide between security and development.¹

This chapter will attempt to present an overview of regional insecurity—traditional and nontraditional—and the threats it poses to Eastern African states, which are already perceived as conflict-prone. It will examine existing regional and subregional instruments, namely the Nairobi Declaration of March 2000, the Nairobi Protocol, and Best Practice Guidelines, all of which attempt to address relevant issues of antiterrorism and nonproliferation, albeit from the perspective of small arms and light weapons (SALW). It will then highlight the importance of UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540 (Resolutions 1373 and 1540) to the Eastern Africa situation and contextualize the numerous conflicts in the subregion in general, and in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development countries in particular. And finally, it will examine the impact of a dual-benefit model of assistance in Eastern Africa, drawing upon the nexus between security and development.

Situation Analysis—Peace and Security in Eastern Africa

Guaranteed peace and security, based on good governance and sustainable development, are the pillars upon which a successful modern

state is built. Sub-Saharan Africa has been perceived as a fragile geopolitical region, and a zone of dangerous conflicts, perennial wars, and political instability. The inability of many governments on the continent to guarantee their citizens certain fundamental rights has yielded cyclical underdevelopment in addition to near-term human insecurity. In Africa, the often quoted phrase, “Without peace there can be no development, and peace can only be achieved through good governance,” comes into focus.

Persistent political violence and war have been major obstacles to development in Africa, driving away foreign investment and leading to poverty. It is estimated that, on average, civil wars on the continent result in a 2 percent reduction in the rate of economic growth and can lead to nearly a 15 percent reduction in country incomes.² The impact on vital infrastructure, including transportation, telecommunication, water, health, and sanitation can accurately be described as disastrous. This is to say nothing of the human toll: deaths in the millions, refugees, and internally displaced persons. Worldwide, Africa alone accounts for more than 25 percent of the total refugees and more than 50 percent of the total number of internally displaced persons.³

Traditionally, state security was of utmost importance as states sought to protect themselves from external invasion and therefore focused more on threats of a political nature as opposed to human security. This phenomenon was more obvious during the Cold War era. According to one analysis, sub-Saharan Africa is “an extremely weak and volatile regional sub-system in the globalizing world system [in which] pervasive and persistent violence has confounded efforts to improve economic capacity and performance.”⁴ That report, however, observes that although the peace-building capacities of African states are generally weak, “there are some signs of improvement in recent years.”⁵ One would assume that this is in reference to the conscious efforts being made by the African Union (AU) at a continental level to resolve conflicts by peaceful means, either through the AU Peace and Security Council or the various regional economic centers.⁶ A shift in the African Union’s policy toward engagement from the previous policy of noninterference has also helped a great deal in deterring African leaders from engaging in reckless military adventures against democratically elected leaders, as was the norm in the 1960s and 1970s.⁷

Some of Africa's current traditional security threats and conflicts owe their origins to the colonial as well as Cold War eras. The collapse of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), known then as Congo-Leopoldville, occurred immediately after it achieved independence in June 1960, and its ramifications persist to the present day. This also is true with the contemporary enmity between Somalia and Ethiopia, where the then two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, facilitated massive injections of conventional weapons to balance out each other's military might.⁸ The antecedents of many of these ongoing conflicts and challenges belie the cliché, "African solutions for African problems." It is a gross assumption to say that most of the conflicts, and for that matter, major security problems, facing Africa today are exclusively the creation of Africans.

Of course, the political history of sub-Saharan Africa paints only part of the picture. Factors such as resources, poor governance, and unequal distribution of material resources have become instrumental in fueling conflicts. These factors, coupled with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region, have led to some of the most intractable conflicts in the world. Competition for resources can manifest itself in interstate as well as intrastate conflicts, as witnessed in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, and the DRC, as well as between Sudan and South Sudan in more recent times.⁹ The competition is often between various groups, internally or outside the state, vying for power so as to be able to control resources in mineral and oil-rich countries, and in the process attracting foreign attention, which either supports the exploitation or tries to prevent the deterioration in human security.

Insecure borders have been one of the major problems for Africa since decolonization, hence the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) 1964 Cairo Declaration on maintaining, as inherited, the boundaries of newly independent African states that were arbitrarily drawn between 1880 and 1901 by the European powers.¹⁰ The Cairo formula was not endorsed by the Kingdom of Morocco and the Republic of Somaliland and has remained a thorny issue even among the OAU countries that accepted it. The European powers—the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain—whose senior diplomats and other officials partitioned Africa among themselves "based [that partitioning] on what they were told

had been acquired for them by agents of their governments who had been sent to Africa.”¹¹ As one author summarized:

In partitioning the African continent among themselves, the European governments hardly took into consideration the interests of the African people living in the areas concerned. Almost all of the boundaries they drew up in this way cut across existing states, some of them across homogeneous ethnic groups or families, separating them into two or more territories. The classic example of this was the division of ethnic Somalis into five different territories, respectively called British Somaliland, French Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, plus two other territories that became parts of Kenya and Ethiopia, respectively.¹²

The trigger for conflict, moreover, is usually the complementary ethnic communities found on either side of the common border, or, in recent years, the discovery of resources—oil and other minerals—along the common border.¹³

Colonial legacy notwithstanding, it is fair to point out that Africa should have devised ways of diffusing or solving some of its security threats and challenges, which have affected or delayed the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Africa’s nontraditional security threats include extreme poverty in spite of Africa being one of the most mineral-rich continents; pervasive corruption that deprives the majority of citizens of their fair share of resources; refugees and internally displaced persons, which are the consequences of bad governance and nonobservance of human rights; lack of preparedness and inadequate provisions to mitigate consequences of natural and man-made disasters; and the spread of HIV/AIDS and other preventable diseases. Some problems, for example political violence, persist largely because of the lack of political will to address them, in spite of the fact that the African Union and its predecessor, the OAU, have adopted elaborate resolutions, agreements, treaties, charters, and conventions pertaining to resolution of conflict.¹⁴ Ratification and implementation in good faith of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, for example, could greatly contribute to the solution of many of Africa’s internal problems that arise from electoral malpractices, thus greatly reducing intrastate tension and civil wars.

First Among Intolerable Equals: The Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons

Although African countries are plagued by a devastating array of reinforcing security and development challenges, there can be little question that the illicit flow of SALW into and between these countries ranks among the most corrosive modern challenges on the continent. The Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa was adopted in March 2000, well before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on US soil. Even as advanced Western governments focused with new zeal on the prospects of catastrophic WMD terrorism after 9/11, the focus of the declaration remained on the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons. Many African governments observed the continued devastating consequences of the proliferation of those arms and weapons in sustaining armed conflict and “abetting terrorism ... and other serious crimes” in the region.¹⁵

Across the continent, untold numbers of people are killed by small arms and light weapons every year. Border security as a means of preventing the proliferation of SALW, human trafficking, and the smuggling of prohibited commodities was also uppermost in the minds of the government ministers at the 2000 meeting in Nairobi. One of the far-reaching observations in the Nairobi Declaration is the acknowledgement by the ministers that “the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the region has been exacerbated by internal political strife and extreme poverty, and that a comprehensive strategy to arrest and deal with the problem must include putting in place structures and processes to promote democracy, the observance of human rights, the rule of law and good governance, as well as economic recovery and growth.”¹⁶

Two important points deserve special attention. First is the report of a 2012 study conducted on behalf of the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons. It indicates that between 530,000 and 680,000 (and probably as many as 1.1 million) firearms may be in civilian hands in Kenya.¹⁷ Second is what is contained in the findings of another study also conducted in Kenya in 2012 by the Hague-based International Center for Counter-Terrorism regarding

why so many Kenyan youths not from the mainstream Muslim faith are being recruited to join al-Shabaab, the Al Qaeda affiliate based in Somalia responsible for the September 2013 attacks on a Nairobi shopping center. The report concludes that poverty drives youngsters in the slums, often with limited education and no prospects for jobs, into the hands of recruiters.

It is important to mention with some detail the provisions of Best Practice Guidelines for the simple reason that the ongoing Diplomatic Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) uses very similar language, thus making it easier for the majority of its signatory member states to comply.¹⁸ In practical terms, however, only Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, South Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, and the DRC have shown some consistency in support for various UN First Committee and General Assembly resolutions on the ATT. This affords a unique opportunity for governments of the region to support the dual-benefit model in Eastern Africa.

A Dual-Benefit Model in Eastern Africa

Recognizing the financial, technical, and political interest gaps between global nonproliferation obligations on the one hand and the urgent needs across a spectrum of security and development priorities on the other hand presents an opportunity to creatively bridge this gap with mutually leveraged assistance.

For instance, the proliferation of small-arms trafficking; the growth in organized crime, human trafficking, and terrorist activity; and underdevelopment all share a common denominator in East Africa: border insecurity. Porous borders impact all facets of society: they fuel conflicts and armed violence, diminish prospects for economic growth, and facilitate incursions by terrorists, as in the recent case of Al-Shabaab incursions into Kenya, including the September 2013 attack on the Westgate shopping center. Building border security capacity in Eastern Africa is eminently important, not only to achieve broader regional security and development goals but also to create the framework necessary for implementing the ATT, Resolution 1540, and other international mandates.

The legally binding Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region

and the Horn of Africa bears a few similarities with certain wider global mandates, including Resolutions 1373 and 1540. Resolution 1373 aims to deny safe havens to those who finance, plan, support, or commit acts of terrorism, thus giving states an important tool to use as a benchmark in placing barriers to the movement, organization, and fundraising activities of terrorist groups. It highlights the link between international terrorist groups and transnational criminal syndicates involved in myriad illicit activities, including trafficking in drugs, small arms and light weapons, and people; money laundering; and the proliferation of WMD material.

Resolution 1540 mandates all member states of the United Nations to implement a set of supply-side controls related to the nonproliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and criminalization and enforcement provisions, particularly adoption and enforcement of laws that prohibit any nonstate actor from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring, or using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery; to develop and maintain effective physical protection measures, including satisfactory border controls and law-enforcement efforts to detect, deter, and prevent illicit trafficking.¹⁹ The Nairobi Protocol, as stated earlier, focuses on the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Similarities with the above Resolution 1540 provisions, however, come in focus in Articles 3 (Legislative Measures) and 10 (Import, Export, Transfer and Transit of SALW).

Each state party to the Nairobi Protocol is required, under Article 3, to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its national law the following, when committed intentionally: illicit trafficking in SALW, illicit manufacturing of SALW, and the illicit possession and misuse of SALW. Under Article 10, each state shall establish and maintain, in accordance with its own national law, an effective system of export and import licensing or authorization, as well as measures on international transit for the transfer of SALW.²⁰ Consequently, there should be no difficulty for all Eastern African countries to ratify the protocol (it became operational in 2009), or to implement both Resolutions 1373 and 1540 in good faith. State parties that have ratified the protocol are Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Republic of Sudan, Rwanda, Uganda, Djibouti, DRC, and Burundi.²¹

Innovative opportunities to build national Resolution 1540 implementation action plans together in a complementary way abound. The Regional Center on Small Arms Secretariat (RECSA), together with various National Focal Points and a select group of nongovernmental organizations, held a series of workshops between September 2004 and April 2005. The conclusions drawn from these forums were developed into Best Practice Guidelines on SALW, which has been described as the most progressive and detailed set of guidelines on arms-transfer controls that has been agreed upon at the state level to date. Member states of RECSA approved the document in June 2005.²²

The guidelines cover, in an elaborate and detailed manner, five major areas:

- Stockpile management, record keeping, marking, collection, and disposal.
- Import, export, transfer, and transit of small arms and light weapons.
- Tracing and brokering.
- Public awareness raising and public education.
- Legislative measures, operational capacity, and mutual legal assistance.²³

The Best Practice Guidelines, therefore, situate the Regional Center on Small Arms as the focal point in the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol, and, hence, as an important partner in the implementation of Resolutions 1373 and 1540.

Operationalizing the Dual-Benefit Model

In 2012, the Africa Peace Forum, working with the government of Kenya, Stimson, and the Stanley Foundation, sought to operationalize this dual-benefit model of engagement. The main objective was to attract international aid to backfill border-security-capacity shortfalls in Eastern Africa and, in turn, achieve higher priority security and development objectives in Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Tanzania, ultimately with fewer financial and technical resources.


While the government of Kenya has multiple border-action plans, it lacks a cohesive strategy that links critical gaps with international assistance opportunities. A comprehensive Border Security Action Plan would provide a cohesive strategy recognizing both security and development challenges that stem from border insecurity. It would also link identified gaps to assistance available under mechanisms such as the ATT, Resolution 1540, and bilateral assistance.

A deeper understanding of regional priorities and development objectives in the subregion and around the world leaves one with an improved focus on security assistance and the finding that mutual benefit can equally accrue to the largely traditional-security-focused donors and their partners. The goal is to initiate innovative thinking on how the panoply of relevant constituencies can begin to promote more sustainable engagement by developing a concept in which the security and development communities, North and South, and donors and recipients can operationalize joint and sustainable activities on the ground in a win-win environment. The dual-benefit model offers a unique opportunity for Kenya to improve its border security and at the same time realize the attendant development benefits.

Endnotes

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- ² Paul Collier, *Security and Development: Issues for the UN—A Paper for the United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, 2004.
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- ¹⁴ These include the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights; the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons; the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; the African Union Non-Aggression and Defence Pact; the African Charter on the Welfare of the Child; and the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.
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- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, fifth bulleted item.
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The Middle East

Editor's Note

Widely considered to be the cradle of civilization itself, the Middle East not only boasts the origin of many major religions, it is a part of the world rich in history, culture, and natural resources. Regrettably, the region is also afflicted with the internecine discord that all too often accompanies those physical and social attributes. Festering religious conflict, uneven population distribution and access to resources, and radically divergent levels of gross domestic product and living standards all feed a complex political, economic, and social landscape across the region.

For many international security analysts, the Middle East is the very representation of the potentially daunting confluence of two insidious trends: global proliferation and the rise of catastrophic terrorism. In this sense, security in the region is more often defined by outsiders in terms of the grave threat posed by nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The case of Iran as the global security cause célèbre is indicative of the often one-dimensional prism through which the region is viewed and solutions considered.

For regional analysts and inhabitants of the Middle East, however, security is more often characterized in very different terms. For instance, despite sitting upon more than 55 and 40 percent of global

oil and gas reserves respectively, the Middle East is remarkably deficient in an even more critical natural resource—fresh water. With a rapidly growing population of some 370 million people, making up 6 percent of the global total, the region has only about 0.7 percent of the world’s available fresh water. For some governments of the region, the prospect of running out of fresh water is a proximate threat. With per capita water availability well below the water-scarcity line, Jordan, for example, is on the top-ten list of most water-scarce countries in the world, and many fear that Yemen will be the first country to literally run dry.

Intimately connected to growing shortages of potable water in the Middle East is the wider need for energy diversification. Even those governments of the region rich in fossil fuels are well attuned to rising indigenous energy demands and the need to seek energy alternatives to effectively operate, for example, energy-intensive water-desalination facilities to meet urgent human and agricultural needs. To date, over a dozen countries of the region have announced plans to pursue civilian nuclear power programs. There are serious questions as to whether or not the pursuit of nuclear energy makes sound financial sense, particularly at the scale currently being discussed, and in the face of solar and other renewable energy options.

Regardless of how these internal discussions resolve themselves, what is clear is that an expanded nuclear power capacity is currently being prioritized by numerous governments across the Middle East as a central component of economic growth and development strategies. However, in addition to serious technical and financial obstacles, these plans have the potential to be frustrated, or at a minimum delayed, by global nonproliferation mandates. The global nonproliferation regime is legitimately seen by the international security community as critical to ensuring security, but not unreasonably viewed by some in the region as a direct challenge to economic growth and development objectives.

Of course, water scarcity and energy diversification are not the only high-priority security issues faced by governments of the region. As by-products of globalization, an increasing array of transnational criminal activities—from the proliferation of dual-use technologies and the global drug trade to contemporary human slavery, small-arms trafficking, and the counterfeiting of intellectual property—have

become so widespread they threaten to overwhelm the capabilities of even well-intentioned governments to mitigate their destructive effects. Beyond their immediate human impact, they conspire to suborn government authorities and degrade the rule of law, and they can lead to state failure and, ultimately, the need for foreign military intervention.

The Middle East is as attractive a host to such transnational criminal activities as any other region around the world. For example, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that on average, 105 metric tons of heroin flows across the Afghan border into Iran annually en route to Western, Central, and Eastern Europe. The ravages of opiate consumption have been well-documented in the Islamic Republic, which has one of the largest opiate-user populations in the world and whose population consumes more than 17 tons of heroin every year. As a result, organized criminal groups in Iran have forged strong connections with Afghan and other trade networks, extending their potential for destructiveness well beyond the borders of those two countries.

In a similar vein, Dubai has long enjoyed a reputation as a free-trade paradise. The diminished oversight that has fueled the lucrative and hyperefficient trade through that emirate has also given rise to significant levels of money laundering and the illegal transshipment of contraband, ultimately threatening the long-term viability of its business model. And incursions by Houthi rebels on the Yemeni-Saudi Arabia border, for instance, test the physical security of both countries and threaten to inflame insurgent and even terrorist sympathies in that part of the world.

In short, for governments of the region, security is more often defined in economic, political, and social contexts rather than in broad geostrategic terms centered on the proliferation threats and global terrorism concerns most relevant to Western governments. What is clear is that without a full appreciation of the interconnectedness of security and economic/development issues, and a willingness to bridge their natural divisions, a lasting stability based upon economic prosperity will not be achieved in the Middle East.

In recognition of this fact, the Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation joined with the Riyadh-based King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies to introduce the Beyond Boundaries model in countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Bahrain,

Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. A first priority was to correct the misperception on the part of all governments, particularly those in the developed North, that the recitation of legal mandates will instinctively elevate the proliferation issue among target constituencies. Neither financial assistance, one-off trainings, nor high-tech equipment have yielded enduring solutions or long-term commitments to the nonproliferation regime—particularly where there are competing demands that may not be commensurate with instituting and maintaining the instruments of nonproliferation.

Rather, what was discussed with regional partners across the GCC was a “whole-of-society” approach to bridging the security/development divide in the Middle East that would leverage donor investments in both security assistance and development assistance, so as to ensure recipient state buy-in and an enduring return on investment. Of course, Resolution 1540 is one tool that could be used to this end. Through its use, governments of the region could, for instance, identify novel streams of assistance—both technical and financial—to address capacity shortfalls in pursuit of safe nuclear power generation. Such a strategy would accelerate energy-diversification options and respond directly to the enduring challenge of water scarcity, while solidifying their participation as responsible members of the global nonproliferation community.

Similarly, enduring economic and security threats to national governments resulting from the undetected trafficking of drugs, dual-use items, and other contraband; the unchecked movement of terrorist or insurgent groups; and the illicit laundering of money call for many of the same responses necessary to fully implement Resolution 1540. Targeted assistance to less wealthy governments designed to strengthen government capacity to inspect and interdict unauthorized transfers within and across borders, to develop legal and regulatory standards on trafficking, to build legal capacity, or to provide inspection equipment and training at key choke points would go far in ameliorating immediate national security challenges prioritized by regional governments while reinforcing the rigor of the global nonproliferation regime. In short, this dual-use assistance model would not only promote global nonproliferation, it would address directly the critical security and downstream development concerns of Middle Eastern governments.

In this chapter by Al-Sharif Nasser bin Nasser, who is the managing director of the Middle East Scientific Institute for Security based in Amman, Jordan, the author discusses the strengths and failures of this approach. Despite widespread success of the Beyond Boundaries model in other geographic contexts, and the senior-level buy-in to the approach among some in the Middle East, the implementation record by the Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation in the region is characterized by more failures than successes. Bin Nasser enumerates these shortcomings and points to both strategic-level failures—such as the use of language and the negative connotations the phrases “weapons of mass destruction” and “proliferation” have generated across the region—and tactical-level prioritization of issues that led to the suboptimal implementation of the dual-benefit approach. The author also guides us through some of the complex regional politics that grips the Middle East, particularly in the midst of the so-called Arab Spring, as additional fodder for failure of the Beyond Boundaries enterprise, while pointing to more efficacious approaches that might be adapted to ensure success.

Chapter 4 Nonproliferation in the Middle East

Al-Sharif Nasser bin Nasser

The Middle East is coping with a myriad of security and developmental challenges. No issue is as cross-cutting between these two spheres as is resource pressures, specifically pressures over water and energy resources. The 2009 Arab Human Development Report emphasizes the importance of the relationship between resource pressures, environmental sustainability, and human security in the Middle East.¹ Moreover, the impact of environmental factors on regional security and stability is seen as a root cause of several previous conflicts in the region and is increasingly being recognized as a trigger for potential future conflict. Environmental factors are equally critical for economic development and growth.

On the issue of water, a number of experts posit that the region has entered a stage of water poverty. These claims are based on data of available renewable water resources, which, in per capita terms, are one-seventh the global average. It is believed that by the year 2025, 300 hundred million people in the Arab world will be living under conditions that the United Nations defines as “absolute water scarcity,” with only about 500 cubic meters of water available per person per year. In contrast, the United States currently uses close to 70,000 cubic meters of water per person per year.²

On the issue of energy, projections are that demand in the Middle East will increase by 77 percent by the year 2035.³ Figures show that net regional electricity generation alone would have to nearly double by 2035, to 1.3 trillion kilowatt-hours, to meet this growing demand.⁴ There are serious questions about how this demand will be satiated and what political and socioeconomic disruptions may take place as a result.

Keenly aware of the environmental factors’ importance in security and development, key regional figures such as HRH Prince El Hassan Bin Talal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan have called for an “energy/water nexus” as a building block for a new and sustainable Middle East. This proposal focuses on the role that electricity and

water interdependence could play in stabilizing the region. It parallels the example of collaborative coal and steel production in post-World War II Europe.⁵

Traditional security experts do not attach as much importance to water and energy as critical components of national security. Understandably, they continue to place greater emphasis on more immediate, tangible, and conventional threats, such as regional military balance, terrorism, and the various manifestations of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This emphasis on hard-security dynamics is not characteristic of the Middle East alone but mirrors global trends. Consider, for example, that in 2009, net development assistance worldwide was just under \$120 billion, while total military expenditures for the same year exceeded \$1.5 trillion.⁶

Further complicating the security/development divide is the Arab Spring, or Arab Awakening. Transition countries already in a post-regime-change phase are witnessing widespread lawlessness and are exporting instability well beyond their borders. The growing security vacuum in the Sinai Peninsula following the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, for instance, has had a direct impact on regional energy security and illicit trafficking, exacerbating existing security and development challenges. The Arab Gas Pipeline, which once provided Jordan with about two-thirds of its natural gas needs, has been attacked 16 times since the downfall of the Mubarak regime in February 2011, leading to an annual loss of about \$2.4 billion to Jordan.⁷ This figure accounts for over a quarter of the total annual budget deficit.⁸ Increased lawlessness in the Sinai Peninsula has also had a direct and negative impact on regional security because of the increased trafficking of people and arms through the region, and because of its growing choice as an operational base for radical militant groups.⁹

Countries that are still undergoing some form of transition, such as Syria, are posing an even greater risk to regional security and development. Experts claim that Syria is either on the brink of, or is undergoing, sectarian conflict or breakup, both of which will have direct and negative consequences for regional security and stability. Jordan, for instance, is believed to be hosting over 560,000 Syrians, only around 160,000 of whom are being hosted in a UN-administered refugee camp, which is now Jordan's fifth-largest city by population.¹⁰ The current

total number of Syrians residing in Jordan represents over 10 percent of the country's population. Equally concerning, Syria is becoming the formative experience for a new generation of radical militant fighters. As was the case in Afghanistan during the 1980s, the funding of some of these groups may seem like an expedient alternative to full-scale foreign military intervention, but with it will undoubtedly come longer-term consequences that may not readily be obvious. Another critical aspect of the unrest in Syria is the safety and security of Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles, both in the interim period during the conflict and once the conflict has reached a resolution of some kind. Despite the plethora of analyses and predictions about these stockpiles, the international community is facing an unprecedented challenge: Syria is the first country in possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that is witnessing a full-blown civil war.

Though conflict in Syria has raised the profile of chemical and biological weapons in the region, the level of concern, particularly among the general public, is well below the threat level. Unless there is further large-scale misuse of these stockpiles, these concerns will likely remain temporary and will fail to generate a broader discussion about the future of nonproliferation in the Middle East. The concerns, or lack thereof, are symptomatic of a broader regional attitude toward the proliferation of WMD. As with previous instances when chemical weapons have been used in the region—by Egypt during the Yemen conflict of 1963–1967 in support of South Yemen against royalist troops in North Yemen, or by Iraq against Iraqi civilians and Iran—regional interest is short-lived and largely reactive.

Proliferation Prevention in the Middle East

There are a number of possible explanations to account for this outlook on the nonproliferation regime. One common explanation is that the WMD threat is constantly overshadowed by the regional military balance between Arab states and Israel. Coupled with a tendency to associate WMD with nuclear weapons alone while disregarding chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, and given that Israel is the only country in the region in possession of nuclear weapons, any effort to promote the nonproliferation agenda cannot be wholly separated from support for, or acceptance of, Israel's continued strategic military superiority. Additionally, the claim that Saddam Hussein was seeking a

nuclear capability, used to support the US-led war against Iraq in 2003, now widely accepted to be false or misguided, fuels suspicions that the nonproliferation agenda is being used selectively and intermittently as American interests dictate. Rumors of a US “grand bargain” with Iran that would allow the latter access to nuclear technology in exchange for other understandings on key regional issues will also exacerbate these suspicions. The net result is that the issue of nonproliferation has become muddled with a number of other regional and international political factors.

Notwithstanding these explanations, a more likely one to account for the regional outlook is that the nonproliferation construct remains an outdated, Cold War formulation that has yet to be made relevant to the region in a 21st century context. Broadly speaking, in Western views, the nonproliferation construct was redefined and made current after 9/11 once the link between WMD and nonstate actors was established.¹¹ This shift in paradigm was completed and formalized in 2004, and following the exposure of the A.Q. Khan network, by Resolution 1540, which specifically addresses nonstate proliferation. The resolution expresses “grave” concerns posed “by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-state actors ... may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.” There has been no corresponding paradigm shift relevant to the Middle East.

A number of states in the Middle East are working seriously to implement Resolution 1540. However, across the region it is clear that the link between nonstate actors and proliferation has not been as wholly embraced in the way that it has been both accepted and internalized by predominantly Western countries. To begin with, there is likely a wide gulf between these Western countries and the Middle East about the threat assessment originating from proliferating nonstate actors. Though there have been at least two cases in the region where nonstate actors sought to use, or did successfully use, chemical weapons, the region still does not perceive itself as a likely target of proliferating nonstate actors.¹² It would certainly be an anomaly if nonstate actors indigenous to the Middle East used WMD against their own people.¹³ This is not to suggest that nonstate actors would oppose these types of attacks on moral grounds; they would likely refrain from committing these types of attacks out of a belief that it would result in a loss

in their own public support. For instance, the Amman bombings of 2005, which were carried out by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi and left over 60 dead and 115 injured, are likely to have been considered a gross miscalculation by Al Qaeda leaders in retrospect. A poll conducted by the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project shows that support for Osama bin Laden in Jordan plummeted 60 percent following the attacks. When assessing the threat posed by proliferating nonstate actors, regional security officials are likely aware of the calculus of nonstate actors that attacks against the region using WMD would carry with them negative consequences for their public support.¹⁴

Aside from the argument that the region does not consider itself a likely target of a WMD-possessing nonstate actor, regional security officials may also consider the probability of nonstate proliferation to be much lower than do their Western counterparts. This may be rooted in a divergence of opinion about the extent to which nonstate actors actually aspire to secure WMDs. It could also be a result of broader security-culture attitudes: the fact that nonstate actors never secured or used nuclear weapons in the past seems to shape the region's prediction about the future probability (or lack thereof) of this occurring. Contrary to this, Western security culture is more likely to incorporate low probability events such as "Black Swans" or "What if" scenarios into their threat perception. As such, cultural attitudes in the Middle East are limiting when it comes to nonstate proliferation, and as a result, this potential threat is overlooked. Meanwhile, cultural attitudes in the West have a motivating effect, and as a result, the threat is treated seriously no matter if it is remote. There have been a number of studies about the relationship between the cultural fatalism of Arab and Muslim societies and their perceptions of safety culture. Though the ethnographic evidence to support the claim that this is mirrored on security issues, especially issues like nonproliferation, is absent, this may be a question for future research.

The Arab Spring also undoubtedly factors into the shaping of regional attitudes toward nonproliferation and, by extension, Resolution 1540. The main question that presents itself is whether post-regime-change states hijacked by radicals and former nonstate actors—as some suggest will happen or has happened—will pursue WMD acquisition. Another equally relevant question revolves around the prospects for transition countries to attach importance to Resolution 1540 or any

other nonproliferation regime. Given the number of other pressing priorities that transition states are dealing with, nonproliferation activities are likely to be minimal at best if not altogether absent.

The summary of this analysis is that regional compliance with Resolution 1540 and the nonproliferation regime more widely should be seen as distinct from regional buy-in to Resolution 1540. Compliance is measurable and demonstrable, while buy-in is a more problematic metric—especially for policymakers who need to make decisions and develop recommendations based on quantifiable data. Suffice to say that buy-in will occur when countries work toward implementation out of self-interest and not out of concern that there may be consequences stemming from noncompliance. Again, the case of Syria is telling. Syria was widely recognized in 2005 as a country that was excelling in its reporting behavior on Resolution 1540, suggesting somehow that it was more advanced in implementation than other countries in the region.¹⁵ It has since become clear that Syria was proliferating throughout that time. Added to this is a growing prospect of a regional disaster resulting from the misuse of Syrian chemical and biological weapons stockpiles.¹⁶ This raises important questions for other regional countries about the importance or relevance of Resolution 1540 in addressing or limiting proliferation.

Looking Ahead

There is a generally accepted belief that overall implementation of Resolution 1540 by countries in the Middle East is poor in comparison to other regions. Recently, observers have commended the Caribbean and Central America as two regions that have made great strides toward implementing Resolution 1540. It could be argued that the success for both regions is closely linked to the concept of leveraging nonproliferation assistance to address other security and developmental needs. In the case of the Caribbean, a common interest across the region was identified that, once addressed, met a regional development requirement and also contributed to Resolution 1540 implementation. The common economic interest among Caribbean nations to expand and facilitate trade within their region and beyond required a serious investment in port security. This was fulfilled using nonproliferation assistance because it *inter alia* improved the region's implementation of Resolution 1540. In the case of Central America, drug trafficking

was considered by most if not all countries of the region to be a hindrance to economic development and foreign investment, as well as to have a corrosive impact on citizen safety and welfare. This required, among other things, a serious investment in border security, which was in turn met by nonproliferation assistance. This assistance has not only contributed to counterdrug efforts, it has helped to improve the region's progress toward Resolution 1540 implementation.

No similar success has been witnessed in the Middle East. There are a number of reasons why it has been difficult to replicate these successes in the region. To begin with, the uniqueness of the region as it relates to the threat needs to be considered. Though the threat of proliferation by nonstate actors is a global one, with a wide range of countries positioned on the supply chain, it remains very much tied to terrorism committed by nonstate actors (mis)representing Islam and the Middle East. This should have been motivation for involving the Arab and Muslim world in developing the solution that later took the form of Resolution 1540. Mandating countries to adhere to a global nonproliferation standard in which the concerned region was largely uninvolved in developing has left Muslim and Arab countries feeling amiss about the resolution. Pakistan and Algeria were the only two Muslim countries on the Security Council during the drafting phase, and both voiced their reservations. Similarly, nine other states considered Muslim countries out of a total of 21 countries raised concerns about Resolution 1540 not being negotiated in a multilateral forum. This historical examination is not intended to be polemical, particularly considering that the multilateral treaty route is plagued with its own problems. Rather, it is meant to emphasize the importance of cooperative approaches and avoiding rushed solutions that are subsequently difficult to implement.¹⁷ At best, this could guide international engagement with the region more effectively. At worst, it could present valuable lessons learned for future nonproliferation resolutions and engagement across the region.

Another reason why it has been difficult to replicate the successes of the Caribbean and Central America in the Middle East is that identifying a clear and strong common development priority or interest across the region is far more challenging. The primary reason for this is that the Middle East is a much larger geographic region than both the Caribbean and Central American regions (about 55 times larger than the Caribbean

and 25 times Central America),¹⁸ which fundamentally diminishes commonalities across developmental priorities. In addition, there is a much larger wealth gap in the Middle East than in either the Caribbean or Central America. In terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, for instance, that of the highest ranking country in the Middle East, Qatar, is 118 times higher than that of the lowest ranking country, Comoros. As for the Caribbean, the GDP per capita of the highest ranking country, the Bahamas, is 30 times higher than that of the lowest ranked country, Haiti. In Central America, this gap is even smaller. The GDP per capita of the highest ranking country, Mexico, is around five times higher than that of the lowest ranking country, Nicaragua.¹⁹

The issue of the wealth gap within the Middle East has often been cited by a number of authors as a major reason for the varied level of Resolution 1540 compliance. While there are countries lacking the financial capacity to take steps toward Resolution 1540 compliance, resource-rich countries may have these financial resources but come up short on human and technical expertise needed to improve compliance.²⁰ And, there are countries that lack both. Though there are a number of commonalities across the Arab Middle East relating to identity and culture, there are fewer commonalities when it comes to developmental priorities and issues impacting daily life because of these disparities.

Another significant difference between the Middle East on the one hand and Central America and the Caribbean on the other hand lies in the difference in the role of the major intraregional organizations, namely the Arab League, the Central American Integration System (SICA), and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). In the latter two areas, subregional organizations have played a key role in motivating implementation actions on behalf of their member states. The primary difference is that the goal and role of the latter two are very much tied to integration of countries within their regions. This is significantly different from the Arab League's stated goal of working as a coordinator between Arab states. CARICOM, for instance, was established as a common market in 1972 and was transformed in 1989 into a single market and economy. SICA's goals are even more ambitious, aiming for "regional unification." The charter of the Arab League, on the other hand, falls well short of this, clearly stating that the organization's main goal is the "strengthening of the relations between the member-states, the coordination of their policies in order to achieve

co-operation between them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.” The result is that the Caribbean and Central America share common development priorities and policies because these regions are aiming for, or moving toward, integration as a goal.

One potential solution to deal with this obstacle is to divide the broader Middle East region into three subregions of geographically more proximate countries where commonalities in developmental priorities and outlook are more likely to exist. These might comprise the Maghreb countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya; the Mashreq countries of Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt; and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Yemen.²¹ This approach may be useful in narrowing down development priorities across smaller regions, but it will do little to further the goal of enhancing a comprehensive and effective implementation process across the Middle East region as a whole. It may also serve to widen the capacity gap across the region, alienate some subregions or countries, and lead to missed opportunities to realize synergies between neighboring countries that belong to different subregions.

A Strategy for Success: Finding Common Interest on Nonproliferation

Finding a common interest across such a wide region, with such varied governance models and financial capabilities, is by no means an easy task. As a result of the regional shortage in buy-in, one way to generate greater interest in nonproliferation across the region is to define it away from its military/security dimension. When looking at the types of proliferation threats stemming from WMD, greater attention needs to be accorded to the accidental and natural consequences of the misuse of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear technologies. One way to capture this is through the concept of civil protection.

The excessive focus on the deliberate misuse of WMD has kept the regional focus of nonproliferation efforts in the military/security domain. This in turn fuels the persisting regional attitudes toward nonproliferation, which is viewed either within the context of the regional military balance with Israel or as a peripheral security threat

to the region absent evidence of WMD acquisition by nonstate actors and absent belief that such nonstate actors would be willing to use such weapons. This view has had the unintended consequence of limiting, or even crippling, the role that could be played by civil society and civilian organizations on nonproliferation issues.

To a varying degree, civilian institutions and organizations in the region, including civilian governments, are uninvolved in issues that are considered within the domain of the military/security establishment. This is a characteristic of regions where there is lower joint civilian-military governance. Intra-regional organizations that do enjoy some clout, such as the Arab League and the GCC, could further and are furthering cooperation on issues like nonproliferation, but they are plagued with bureaucracy, political infighting, and politicking. There is also a serious gap in the technical capability of the region's civil society that prevents it from playing a more active role in addressing nonproliferation issues. On the whole, there are no organizations in the region possessing the technical and financial capabilities of Western organizations that could support compliance and implementation challenges.

One potential commonality across the Middle East region is the importance that states and their various organizations attach to their ability to protect citizens from harm, whether natural, deliberate, or accidental. This commonality, referred to as civil protection or civil defense for the purposes of this paper, centers on the state's ability to offer protection against chronic or sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. For instance, it could include emergency response against national disasters or attacks. Considering that the provision of civil protection is seen to be directly linked to the development of country, it could inarguably be an existing priority for all countries in the region that could be leveraged to support nonproliferation efforts and also Resolution 1540 implementation.

In Jordan, for instance, the Middle East Scientific Institute for Security is involved in regional infectious-disease surveillance activities on foodborne diseases that indirectly raise capacity to deal with other biological threats. Similarly, because Dubai has become a major transshipment and regional commercial center, the emirate's ability to detect and isolate suspect cargo is critical in maintaining its position. This

is why the port of Dubai was the first Middle Eastern port to join the US Department of Energy-sponsored Megaports Initiative.

Enhancing civil defense creates a benefit for countries looking to adopt and further their work on the nonproliferation agenda. In the existing nonproliferation formulation, and especially on Resolution 1540, there is only a consequence (albeit unclear) for noncompliance. Furthermore, it will be a departure from the existing formulation of working to combat an existing condition, such as the “war on terror,” to one where work is being conducted in support of a desired outcome, namely a safer society for citizens.

The refocus on civil protection, away from the military dimension, would be an effective means to challenge existing regional attitudes toward the nonproliferation agenda. By broadening the discussion about chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats to include risks of radiological incidents at industrial sites or pandemics, the regional threat perception will alter drastically and will be made more relevant to the security and safety of the region. It will also increase the probabilistic forecasting about CBRN incidents from one that is currently a distant threat to one that is closer to home. Redefining the nonproliferation construct in the form of civil protection will also allow for greater buy-in through widened civilian involvement.

Jordan and Civil Protection

Historically, Jordan’s location bordering Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, and Israel has made the sanctity of the country’s borders a main pillar of its national security. The more recent interest and investment in border security over the past seven years or so, however, is not tied to the conventional or strategic threats that were once posed by its neighbors. While there is no one single reason to explain the country’s more recent interest in border security, it could be argued that it is largely motivated by the broader concept of civil protection.

In its annual report in 2010, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime claims that criminal networks are overlapping and even converging in vulnerable parts of the world. The report describes how these networks feed on poverty and instability, sow violence, fuel an expanding market for illicit drugs, and grow strong with

help from corruption and money laundering.²² This well-established relationship between narcotics, transnational organized crime, and terrorism is an important factor in Jordan's national security because of the nation's location as a transit country for illicit trafficking and its presence alongside states that are witnessing various degrees of instability. For instance, in the period following the US invasion of Iraq and the security vacuum this led to, Jordan was under threat from a number of terrorist organizations in Iraq, such as Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, whose funding as an Al Qaeda affiliate was largely driven by transnational organized crime, trafficking in particular. These groups were responsible for carrying out two major terrorist attacks that led to the death of Jordanian and other civilians in Amman and Aqaba in 2005, while an undetermined number of other operations were foiled. Furthermore, in the period leading up to these attacks, concerns had already been raised in Jordan and the international community about high levels of radioactive scrap metal coming in from Iraq to Jordan, causing panic and raising public health concerns.²³ Likewise, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency had written to the Security Council to inform members of the "theft" of nuclear material and 350 metric tons of high explosives as a result of widespread "looting" of government facilities and military industrial sites in Iraq.²⁴

In order to further enhance civil protection against the threats posed by nuclear material out of regulatory control and potential future attacks against civilians in Jordan, Jordanian authorities recognized the need for an integrated approach in dealing with the threats posed by transnational crime, trafficking, and terrorism, believing that they cannot be tackled in isolation. According to the US Department of State, Jordan sits at the crossroads of the drug trade in the Middle East, and while it neither produces nor consumes significant amounts of illicit drugs, its location between drug-producing countries to the north and drug-consuming countries to the south and west have made it a transit country for illicit drugs (see Figure 8). While internal drug distribution is growing, Jordanian authorities believe that domestic narcotics use will remain a small fraction of that which is transited through the country. Reports indicate that about 85 percent of all seized illicit drugs coming into Jordan are bound for export to other countries in the region.²⁵

Figure 8: Jordan and Its Neighbors



Source: www.wordtravels.com.

The main trafficking routes through Jordan are:

- Afghanistan, Turkey, Syria, Jordan to destinations in Israel (commonly known as the heroin route)
- Latin America, European airports to destinations in Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon (commonly known as the cocaine route)
- Lebanon, Syria, Jordan to destinations in Israel and the GCC (commonly known as one of two hashish routes)
- Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria, Jordan to destinations in Israel and the GCC (also known as the hashish route)
- Eastern Europe, Turkey, Syria, Jordan to destinations in the GCC (commonly known as the Captagon route)

Since 2006, Jordan has adopted a number of policy initiatives and law-enforcement efforts focused on disrupting the triangular relationship between narcotics, transnational organized crime, and terrorism with a view to enhance the country's national security and protect its civilian population.

In 2006, Jordanian authorities sought to upgrade their border-security capabilities through the provision of advanced detection equipment and customs capacity building. This engagement included training and technical assistance focused on border-enforcement techniques and methods. A Joint Border Security Program that entailed the installation of a suite of monitoring and communications equipment along a 50-kilometer stretch of Jordan's border with Syria was launched. This area has historically presented the highest risk of illicit infiltration and smuggling across Jordan's border, and it accounted for the greatest number of interdictions by Jordanian law enforcement.²⁶

Jordanian authorities also initiated upgrades at all of the country's major land border crossings and its only seaport. These upgrades included, but were not limited to, a number of radiation-security upgrades that are connected to an information-sharing network, enabling officials to examine all inbound and outbound containers for radioactive and nuclear materials regardless of whether they are carrying cargo or not.²⁷ Other screening equipment was primarily used for weapons screening but could also detect density anomalies that indicated the presence of drugs and/or other contraband. Jordanian authorities also received vehicle-based radiation-monitoring systems to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials.

Jordan also established an Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Intelligence Unit and joined a Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force, where it actively volunteers to host training events and activities.²⁸ Jordanian authorities have also established excellent working relations with the US Drug Enforcement Agency and routinely hold training exercises.

Jordan's interest in addressing the interlinked threats posed by narcotics, transnational organized crime, and terrorism can be interpreted through a civil protection perspective. These efforts, however, had a knock-on or catalytic effect by supporting the nonproliferation agenda

and broader nonproliferation efforts. In some areas this link is clear: when border security was upgraded at crossings and elsewhere to deal more effectively with narcotics and transnational crime, the radiation-detection portals that were installed to counter the illicit trafficking of radiological material clearly supported a global nonproliferation effort. In other areas, the causal effect was less evident: once security at border crossings was raised, the training of customs personnel also needed to be improved, and accordingly, more advanced training on commodity identification and dual-use goods was adopted. The interest also had a catalytic function. Nowhere is this clearer than in Jordan's announcement at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in 2012 that it would form counter-nuclear smuggling teams.

There are other numerous examples where Jordan's interest in enhancing civil protection played a positive role in impacting broader nonproliferation efforts. Jordan's efforts to secure radiological sites at hospitals and industries, for instance, had a strong civil protection component but also had a related nonproliferation function. Efforts described earlier on infectious-disease surveillance on foodborne diseases also led to the creation of a cadre of professionals able to promote best practices on biosafety and biosecurity at academic and research institutions.

Jordan's effort in enhancing civil protection and civil defense has played a strong role in widening buy-in on the importance of CBRN issues. It has created a space for civil society—such as experts from academic institutions, national laboratories, and the private sector—to participate in issues once considered entirely within the military/security domain. The strong civilian and scientific components on issues spanning the civil protection/nonproliferation divide necessitates that experts from civilian institutions are involved, even in leading capacities at times.

Conclusion

A number of mistakes may have been committed in the path toward developing and adopting Resolution 1540. Despite this, there is a need to be forward looking and to consider ways in which the resolution's implementation could be supported. Further extending the mandate of the resolution through the year 2021 was an important step in demonstrating the seriousness and long-term commitment of its sponsors toward its realization and removing any lingering questions about its

longevity. However, implementation of Resolution 1540 will not be achieved by the sheer dint of reiteration of its importance and its legally binding nature. Any chance of its meaningful implementation in the Middle East rests on its ability to become relevant to regional priorities.

Almost ten years ago, Resolution 1540 was facing an impasse because there was insufficient understanding in many regions about the resolution and the responsibilities of UN member states toward the reporting requirements and other obligations. Today, that steep learning curve has been passed as a result of greater institutional capacity and an increase of legal-regulatory harmonization for Resolution 1540 implementation among member states. This illustrates the importance of viewing implementation as being both gradual and process-driven.

Since its inception, the resolution has been facing an array of challenges relating to the contrasting levels of implementation in different regions. The dual-benefit model for responding to nonproliferation concerns offers an alternate and creative approach to address the lower implementation record of regions where either the resources (financial or technical) or the interest is unavailable to further the resolution's implementation. At the heart of this model is the idea that genuine compliance can only be achieved through buy-in. This model has proved successful in the Caribbean and Central American regions because nonproliferation assistance was structured in a way that also met developmental needs in both regions. It is successful because it challenges a number of flaws in the existing donor-recipient model, mainly that it does not take into account local priorities and interests and promotes a one-size-fits-all solution.

The concept of civil protection could be considered a common development interest across the Middle East that could be linked to nonproliferation assistance in the absence of other commonalities across such a large region with contrasting technical and financial resources. Civil protection is one of the most basic obligations of any state toward its citizens, regardless of its level of development or democratization. It is something that regional governments could consider a source of pride.

Redefining the nonproliferation construct in civil protection terms alone is insufficient without actively working to create a role for regional entities. While efforts to engage the Arab League and the GCC

(albeit as a subregional entity) should continue, as they would be the natural clearinghouse or potential future Resolution 1540 coordinators for regional governments, a parallel track should also be considered in supporting the region's civil society organizations that are working on nonproliferation issues. Regional civil society organizations do not exhibit the inertia that has come to characterize large regional bodies like the Arab League and the GCC. They are well-situated to champion a nonproliferation agenda that can genuinely incorporate, reflect, and promote local concerns and priorities through a tailor-made approach. They can also assist regional governments in reshaping legitimate development requests in a nonproliferation context in order to secure a greater share of international funding.

Civil society organizations can be effective interlocutors with the mass public and are able to raise awareness at a variety of levels in a way that governmental organizations or regional organizations like the Arab League or the GCC might find difficult. Apolitical scientific organizations in particular can effectively bring together a variety of stakeholders in a neutral space who may otherwise not meet due to domestic politics and competition over jurisdiction. These organizations also have an advantage over international organizations because governments are understandably reluctant to expose their vulnerabilities to foreign organizations, even when their capacity is greater than domestic ones. The first-ever Civil Society Forum in support of Resolution 1540 was held by the United Nations in January 2013 and recognized the critical role of civil society contributions to national and international efforts to implement the resolution's key requirements.²⁹ There is a need to translate this goodwill into tangible engagements across the Middle East region.

Resolution 1540 is at the crossroads in the Middle East. The window of opportunity to salvage its legitimacy is limited. The repercussions of this are unclear. This resolution is the first instance where the Security Council has chosen to be a legislator rather than hold to its traditional role as an enforcer, as is the case with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Any efforts to maintain or increase the level of implementation should start with a more thorough appreciation of the prevailing threat perceptions in the region, as well as regional attitudes toward the nonproliferation agenda. Only then can the redefinition of the nonproliferation construct take place in a more fitting context.

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The Andean Region

Editor's Note

One need not delve too deeply into the history of the Andean region—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru—to recall an era of widespread political violence, military coups and dictatorships, rampant crime, and pervasive economic dislocation. Although governments of the region continue to struggle with the aftermath of that tumultuous period, the emergence of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights across much of the region in the latter decades of the 20th century helped reverse trending violence, promote economic stability, and inoculate the region against dangerous backsliding. Today, despite the recent global economic downturn, the Andean region has managed to maintain relatively high rates of economic growth. Unfortunately, that growth has not been accompanied by reduced levels of inequality—and in some cases, it has once again coincided with growing social conflict.

An abundance of small arms and light weapons that fuel violent crime, gang and youth violence, extortion, terrorism, and the drug trade are enduring challenges for regional governments. The high volume of arms—an estimated 2.4 million illegal weapons in Colombia alone—can be linked to elevated homicide rates throughout the Andean region. Add to these dynamics nonstate actors like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the National Liberation Army in Colombia, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, and the Shining Path in Peru,

which prey on societies and spoil opportunities for social and economic progress. Meanwhile, public health scourges, partly the result of urbanization and lack of access to basic health care services, have exacerbated inequality. Likewise, the lack of access to clean water for the poor rural population has appalling effects on children's health, occasionally introducing skyrocketing rates of diarrhea, parasitic fever, and hepatitis. Water insecurity has opened new vectors for diseases across the region, leading to child mortality rates as high as 20 percent in Bolivia and Ecuador. And regrettably, in some countries of the region, a backsliding from the protections of the democratic model have been witnessed as of late, foreshadowing more troubling trends in both the security and prosperity baskets.

While these are the security and development issues that dominate domestic and regional dialogue, for Western audiences, hard-security concerns—including the proliferation of nuclear weapons (especially to nonstate actors) and terrorism—continue to absorb a disproportionate share of the political discourse and capacity response. The level of political and financial resources exerted by the developed North in implementing Resolution 1540 is a case in point. Soon after promulgation of that resolution, it became clear that asking developing nations of the Andean region to divert attention and resources from more immediate national and regional challenges—from public health and citizen security to the closely held imperative of legal capacity building and rule of law—to the seemingly distant threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism is not only unreasonable but also unlikely to succeed, if not from a lack of political will then from a sheer lack of implementation capacity in many of these countries.

As has been noted throughout this volume, without the sustained buy-in of those countries increasingly viewed as prominent and potential links in the global terror/proliferation supply chain—either as emerging dual-use technology innovators and manufacturers, as critical transshipment points and financial centers, or as breeding grounds for terrorist operations—it is infeasible to exercise sufficiently preventative controls over the movement of sensitive nuclear, chemical, and biological materials and/or technologies and over the malicious activities of terrorist entities.

In 2012, the Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation joined with the Organization of American States and the government of Colombia to introduce the Beyond Boundaries model to countries of the Andean region. The growing interconnectedness and interdependence between traditionally siloed threat portfolios suggest that mutually addressing regional security, underdevelopment, and the rule of law is key to preventing them from metastasizing into international security threats. The capacity needed to prevent WMD proliferation and undermine the conditions conducive to terrorism is intimately connected to the capacity needed to fulfill economic, development, and human-security objectives of national governments throughout the Andean region. This realization offers a unique opportunity to capitalize on dual-benefit assistance and leverage international security assistance to promote human security, sustainable economic development, and the rule of law.

In this chapter, former 1540 Committee expert Ana Maria Cerini speaks to the centrality of legal reforms in underwriting the near- and long-term security and development objectives of Latin American governments widely, and Andean states specifically. In the wake of a turbulent recent history, regional leaders all speak to the importance of an effective internal judicial system that will guarantee their people the exercise of their fundamental rights and inoculate states against a return to their tragic past. Cerini argues that sensitivity to this core value will yield a more effective relationship across a range of international objectives, including the nonproliferation of WMD to nonstate actors.

Chapter 5 Nonproliferation in the Andean Region

Ana Maria Cerini

There can be little question that uneven development across the Andean region—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru—has had a corresponding effect on human security in each of these countries. Factors such as poverty, scarce access to health care, inadequate education, and the inability to plan for and respond to natural disasters have a negative impact on people's daily lives, increasing relative levels of insecurity in the region and across Latin America. These factors, as well as the deterioration of an internal economy, are conducive to crime, theft, and violence at every level.¹ For decades, these have been the transcendent issues against which governments of the region have struggled.

The lack of sufficient resources to combat these adverse catalysts facilitates the organization of delinquent groups such as drug cartels, human traffickers, and illicit arms traffickers. In turn, these groups find in these unfavorable circumstances a fertile ground to promote their ideologies and to recruit followers, thus having a decisive impact on the insecurity of the wider region.² Over time, reinforcing networks of these organized criminal nonstate actors operate across porous borders and metastasize at the subregional, regional, and global levels.³ Reputed connections between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and drug traffickers in Western Africa are indicative of the new transnational criminal environment wrought by the forces of globalization.⁴

It is unrealistic to assume that states of the region can single-handedly combat these transnational security threats while simultaneously waging war against long-standing local and national criminal entities. Meanwhile, governments of the Andean region are being influenced by other variables, including the unfavorable socioeconomic circumstances rooted in the region that have limited the capacity of the state to mount a coordinated response to criminality and economic underdevelopment.⁵

Historically, organized criminal groups in certain Latin American countries—in particular in the Andean countries—have sought to legitimize their fight against the authorities and the institutional order. They have acted under the premise of social justice, equitable distribution of

wealth, class struggle, and so forth. In this way, they have worked to justify their disdain for the established judicial order, the rule of law, and/or government policies. These groups, which often act with terrorist characteristics, operate against the institutional order as guerrilla groups, making it especially difficult for the government to segment them from the civilian population and, ultimately, break them up.

In the national legal context of the state, these entities are seldom identified as “warring groups” in order to avoid assigning them legal status. In many cases, they control a large part of the population or territory where they establish themselves, thus forcing the government to create mechanisms to negotiate peace agreements. The cases of the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, FARC in Colombia, the Zapatista Army in Mexico, and the *maras* (gangs) in Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala are indicative of the breadth and sophistication of well-financed and organized criminal groups.⁶

Regrettably, the passing of time and the return to democracy in the majority of the countries in the region did not stop the development of existing organized crime. In large measure, this is due to the dividends obtained from illicit activities, the relative weakness of the government entities to combat it, and corruption at different levels of government across the region.

Other countries of Latin America have seen the emergence of clandestine warring factions as a result of political disagreements. The majority of them emerged as a response to external ideologies such as Marxism-Leninism and the specific current of thought of the time—including, for instance, the Montoneros in Argentina and Tupamaros in Uruguay.⁷ Their, an armed struggle, became their strategy to seize power, with terrorism as their main tactic. Over time, many of these groups were successfully taken apart by the state, often in an extreme fashion, and sometimes by dispensing with the rule of law and ignoring human rights. Today, with democracy reestablished, it is believed that these groups will no longer pose a credible threat, and, in-country, it is often assumed that the state has developed an effective insulation against the reformulation of these threats to peace and security.

Of course, security is one of the essential pillars of democracy. The promotion of security requires the state to foster an internal judicial system that guarantees its people the exercise of fundamental rights, promotes

stability, and, in turn, fosters conditions necessary for socioeconomic growth and development. The recent history of the region demonstrates that the link between security, peace, and development is not evident anywhere around the globe more than it is in Latin America. Economic prosperity cannot be attained unless government safeguards the security of citizens' legal rights through judicial protection.⁸ In this regard, the intersection of these three elements—human security, economic prosperity, and democracy and the rule of law—are the fundamental building blocks of an effective state. For Andean governments, the simultaneous pursuit of these objectives has been systematically hobbled by a lack of sustained resource streams. The collapse of any one of these pillars undercuts progress made in the others.

The Urgency of Legal Standards

At the international level, in order to achieve growth and security, all states need to recognize the importance of enforcing peace while respecting the rule of law. Completely independent states no longer exist. Rather, the luxury of isolationism has been replaced with an overarching need to forge relations among states, and between states and nonstate actors. Such an environment requires policies that can share common business, commercial, social, and/or security objectives in order to succeed. Between governments, these policies are the foundation of agreements, treaties, and norms that ensure joint action aims toward a common objective: to achieve international peace and security and obtain economic growth and prosperity.

We understand, therefore, that in order to develop and maintain a coherent international interaction aimed at security and prosperity, each state must have an internal judicial system that will guarantee its people the exercise of their fundamental rights. Such a system must also foster relations among nations based on respect for their institutions and develop a framework of accountability for stipulated obligations adopted in international, regional, and subregional forums. Therefore, successful states should not only develop policies in accordance with the demands of the international community, but also, in the exercise of their sovereignty, they should take the necessary concrete steps to enforce compliance of the rules by their people. Ideally, these policies have been established to include the required demands of the different agreements and treaties in which a particular government is bound.

To the extent that we enter into new agreements at a global level, it behooves each state to analyze the existence of possible gaps in different sectors, particularly for those that have been created to control and prevent threats to international security. States should also promote the creation of internal judicial policies that are effective and necessary to guarantee the compliance of said agreements.

In principle, all states extol national and international peace and security. However, there are several factors that destabilize the security of any country and make it difficult to comply in a timely fashion with external agreements and other global mandates. These factors include politics, the economy, the relative level of a nation's development, its traditions and history, and such unusual factors as natural disasters and wars. These are determining factors that can weaken and delay the implementation of measures geared toward combating threats to international security at a domestic level.

While the absence of security in a specific state may have common roots in many countries, it is ultimately a response to specific and categorical elements with varying degrees of influence on the state or region to which it belongs. This absence of security in any given country makes it impossible to compare and contrast varying levels of development from country to country. It also makes it impossible to hope for the same level of implementation of global obligations, including the uniform implementation of Resolution 1540.

As a result of the escalation of terrorist acts in the world and the increase in criminal activities by nonstate actors, which posed a potential threat with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1540 in April 2004. This resolution established a series of mandates on UN member states. The primary objective of Resolution 1540 is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems by nonstate actors, regardless of their intent to commit or not commit terrorist acts. In order to comply with this objective, the Security Council requires all states to adopt legal and control measures that are effective and necessary, and in accordance with their internal procedural system. These rules prohibit in an appropriate and effective manner all activity by nonstate actors related to the development and possession of weapons of mass

destruction. The resolution helps create effective measures to control dual-use materials to avoid the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems.

All measures and legal standards have as their objective the protection of legal rights. These are also called “legally protected rights.” In the case of Resolution 1540, the legally protected right is peace and international security. This right is threatened by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems. Resolution 1540 asserts that protection of legal rights should be guaranteed at the national level by all states.

The degree of threat is determined by the magnitude of the damage caused by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction regardless of success, or whether or not the actor has the intent to cause damage. We must take into account the difference in terrorist crimes in which the intent to commit a punishable act must be present for it to constitute a crime. In the case of Resolution 1540, the manufacturing, production, possession, transfer, transport, storage, and/or use of this type of weapon will be perceived as an abstract danger. Concrete damage or a situation of real danger will not be necessary. The mere possibility of damage is enough to constitute a crime. In this case, the spirit of the resolution rests on regulating the potential to cause damage. The international community has relevance to peace and international security because it demands total prevention of possible danger. Consequently, the mere threat of manufacturing, production, possession, transfer, transport, storage, and/or use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and their delivery systems, would constitute a crime that should be internally regulated by all states.

Any of these activities, objectively labeled as dangerous and carried out by nonstate actors, constitute a real threat. They also generate the opportunity to cause substantial damage to public safety and weaken the protected legal right—namely, peace and international security. The intent of nonstate actors becomes irrelevant, whether it was to cause concrete damage in the form of terrorism or to obtain financial or political gain.⁹

The prior intent to provoke an act of terrorism would indicate that there were preparatory acts to cause damage. The act would no longer be merely an act of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but rather an act related to terrorism. Resolution 1540 mentions this

possibility in operative paragraph 2—the intent to commit acts of terrorism. However, intent is not considered a determining factor to constitute the crime of proliferation as indicated.

Resolution 1540 is part of a new effort by the international community to prevent possible situations that would threaten peace and international security. Through this resolution, the international community hopes to control any activity by nonstate actors that could lead to extreme danger. This measure is intended to regulate potentially dangerous objects/situations.

To that effect, it behooves states to take concrete actions to avoid any activity that could lead to a proliferation of this type of weapon or its delivery systems. To that end, it is necessary to rely on the appropriate judicial structure, a structure that considers the necessary penal, civil, and administrative rules to pursue, stop, and penalize the nonstate actors that fail to comply with the duties requested therein. Resolution 1540 treats all member states equally, holding every state accountable to comply with its obligations under the resolution. The fact that a state belongs to a specific region that lacks possession of weapons or sensitive materials does not exempt it from adapting its rules to the demands of the resolution.

In contrast with other nonproliferation arrangements, Resolution 1540 was approved under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Consequently, it legally pertains to all UN member states, and although it is directly aimed at the states (operative paragraphs 1 and 2), the indirect goal of the resolution is to prevent any activity that could end in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems by nonstate actors. Therefore, each state, by virtue of its sovereignty, must undertake a review of existing legal standards before deciding what measures it should create or modify in order to comply with Resolution 1540.

National Implementation in Andean and Other Latin American Countries

At the time of the adoption of Resolution 1540, preventative measures related to the nonproliferation of WMD in Latin America had not been robustly developed. For most governments, such standards were

deemed unnecessary because countries of the region did not possess these types of armaments. Moreover, states that previously did not possess WMD believed that they had little to no capability to develop them, and by extension, they did not deem it necessary to implement more-rigorous preventive standards nor the judicial structure required by the Security Council resolution. These states were facing other urgent problems discussed above that posed more-pressing threats to safety and stability. Thus, for most countries of the region, proliferation prevention never became a significant national priority.

In a region threatened more by conventional arms, the drug trade, lawlessness, corruption, and economic underdevelopment, logic indicated that the implementation of national guidelines to control activities related to WMD needed to take a back seat to a far more urgent agenda. Moreover, limited human and financial resources precluded elevated enforcement of global nonproliferation mandates.

In order for this calculus to evolve, a cost-benefit analysis of the adoption of the measures required by the resolution is needed. Countries need to evaluate the remote probability that the circumstances that the resolution intends to regulate may surface. They must also consider the lack of real urgency to confront an abstract danger. The implementation of legislative reforms in various sectors of government would require the use of limited financial resources and limited trained personnel.


An analysis of states in the region indicates that most did not possess the appropriate internal legislation to meet the demands of Resolution 1540 to ban and control the activities of nonstate actors in 2004. In spite of this, they were signatories to the main treaties of nonproliferation. In this manner, they were complying with another recommendation indicated in the resolution, the recommendation that promoted the ratification and total compliance of the treaties pertaining to nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (operative paragraphs 8 [a], [b], and [c]). Additionally, all the states in Latin America are parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which went into effect in April 1969. The treaty declares the region a nuclear-weapon-free zone and has demonstrated nearly 50 years of success.

The ratification and internal implementation of these different international agreements supplement the requirements of Resolution 1540,

and vice versa. By formally adopting and implementing the national measures required in the conventions, protocols, and treaties related to the nonproliferation of WMD, states will also be implementing requirements derived from Resolution 1540. In this manner, the complementarity among the various international agreements and Resolution 1540 becomes evident in the internal implementation by the states.¹⁰

The figures below indicate the status of national implementation of Resolution 1540. These data are based on the states' latest matrices approved by the 1540 Committee. The matrices are developed by using reports submitted by countries to the committee. They also employ data obtained during presentations in different workshops or seminars, data published on the official Web pages of each state, and data offered by relevant international organizations.¹¹


Figure 9 reflects the status of ratification of the treaties on nonproliferation by Latin American states. It is clear that legal adherence to the main treaties related to the nonproliferation of WMD is nearly universal across Latin America.



Source: Latest state matrices approved by the 1540 Committee, in November/December 2010.

Yet despite the near universal recognition by Latin American countries of the nonproliferation regime, Figure 10 demonstrates an acute lack of practical enforcement of many of the core competencies mandated by the treaties and by Resolution 1540. Beyond the immediate challenge of building political support for more-sustained engagement, this lack of practical enforcement is the central disconnect preventing more-effective adherence to the regime.

Figure 10: Challenges of Resolution 1540 Enforcement



Source: Latest state matrices approved by the 1540 Committee, in November/December 2010.

Cooperation With and Assistance From International, Regional, and Subregional Organizations

Operative paragraph 7 of Resolution 1540 specifically recognizes that some states need external support to fulfill the required duties. The paragraph urges the states that have the capability to provide assistance

and support to other states with gaps in their legal infrastructure, a lacking policy structure, or insufficient experience in implementing the demands.

Similarly, Security Council Resolutions 1810 (2008) and 1977 (2011) specifically urge the 1540 Committee to actively cooperate with international, regional, and subregional organizations through mutual collaboration, assistance, exchange of experiences, and needed information related to the implementation of the resolution. Resolution 1977 encourages the committee to take advantage of the experience that civil society and the private sector can offer to guide the states on the issue of practices, models, and guidelines to better implement internally the duties required by the resolution.

From the moment Resolution 1540 was adopted, organizations supporting nonproliferation—such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Implementation Support Unit of the Biological Weapons Convention—have collaborated with the 1540 Committee by providing support tools to the states in their areas of expertise and in accordance with the policy of cooperation stipulated in the resolution.

This practice, driven by the committee, mimics long-standing practices adopted by other international, regional, and subregional organizations, as well as nongovernmental organizations. Cooperation encompasses different sectors of work and different objectives, including legislative, statutory, and financial assistance; personnel training; and customs-control-evaluation assistance. The main goal of the committee is to raise awareness and sensitize the states on the importance of implementing Resolution 1540 internally, while maintaining harmony with Resolutions 1810 and 1977.

Regional Cooperation

In spite of the efforts by the committee and the support of the different organizations, numerous obstacles have blocked the expeditious implementation of government actions required by the international community. In the Latin American region, just like in Africa and parts of Asia, the main source of insecurity is the illicit trafficking of small arms. These weapons are used by criminals, gangs, and transnational

organizations not just to kill but to facilitate other crimes such as drug trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, and so forth. As noted, this reality feeds a presumption that nonproliferation is an important but ultimately lesser priority.

To this we add a historic lack of collaboration among the Latin American governments to establish a common front that would benefit the interests of the region. The recurring border disputes, internal conflicts, and political changes adopted by the presiding governments—in many instances in contradiction with the previous administration and the neighboring countries—counteract the interests of the region and diminish prospects for regional collaboration.¹²

Although differences in political ideology in the different governments of Latin America remain, the widespread establishment of democracy in the countries of the region reveals that many of these differences have been overcome, and today more value is placed on joint collaboration among the countries of the region in facing transnational threats. An example would be the creation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). This organization has the crucial mission of promoting the development of the countries in the region and relies on their unification to solidify peace, democracy, development, and security. To that end, regional advisory committees within UNASUR have been created to analyze and propel urgent issues to promote regional development. These governmental committees encompass the areas of health, social development, infrastructure and planning, education, culture, science, technology and innovation, the problem of drugs at the international level, defense, economy and finance, and energy. The integration of development and security within a common strategy is not unique but is characteristic of subregional and regional approaches in the Americas. Nonetheless, similar to the national contexts, even when there is strong political support, a persistent lack of capacity often frustrates the wherewithal of these organizations to implement the components of developed strategies.

In 2011, a consortium of regional and subregional organizations, national governments, and the nongovernmental community came together to develop a strategy that would facilitate the implementation of Resolution 1540. This Beyond Boundaries initiative focused on better linking other essential priorities of regional governments

considered crucial to a better development of the country. The initiative favored the importance of planning and coordinating the implementation of the duties outlined in Resolution 1540 through a subregional organization. Finally, it linked prevention and control to other, more-crucial issues of the region, such as illegal trafficking of conventional weapons, drug trafficking, and the movement of other contraband.¹³

The Andean Community: Steps Toward a Subregional Coordination

Taking into consideration Article 4 of the Declaration of San Francisco de Quito on the establishment and development of an Andean Peace Area, the consortium sought to clarify the important role regional organizations can play in assisting the 1540 Committee with internally implementing Resolution 1540 and exploring the benefits of designating a regional coordinator who would work on behalf of all member states of the Andean Community. Their goal was to give the Andean Community a regional focus in order to reach a solution to the threats to security and solve problems caused by a lack of development. This initiative allows the adoption of necessary measures to prevent the proliferation of WMD and terrorism and to resolve critical problems of the region.

The approach gave the states in the region the opportunity to provide information on the measures taken and implemented as they relate to Resolution 1540. As a result, representatives from Bolivia and Ecuador became aware of the need to initiate a process to adjust their legislation in light of the gubernatorial accomplishments of other countries in the Andean Community. Finally, they agreed to consider a review, and, where necessary, adoption, of measures needed to comply with the resolution.

Although a decision regarding the critical points of interest of Resolution 1540 was not reached immediately, the Andean Community Commission pointed out that it would start a process of consultation among the members. The purpose would be to continuously work on potential future actions through the Andean Community Commission and UNASUR. The Andean Community Commission also acknowledged flaws in its information system and consequently explained that UNASUR is working on a viable policy regarding security in the

region. Similarly, it added that an agreement had not been reached by the organizations regarding the coordination of individual and collective actions of implementation.

State/Civil Society Partnerships

Since the adoption of Resolution 1540 by the Security Council, several international, regional, and subregional organizations, and even civil society actors have offered support, within their means, to states of the region in order to assist with internal implementation. This relationship, as well as the support provided by able states and organizations, has been viewed in a positive light. Every action taken to support and assist reflects an awareness among Latin American states of their WMD nonproliferation obligations.¹⁴

It is clear that the guidance provided will help to develop a course of action or identify flaws or gaps in the internal legal system. Ultimately, it will be up to each state to determine when and how actions will be implemented according to its own best practices and priorities. On the other hand, it is imperative that the states become aware of the importance of the resolution. However, tangible implementation is tied to a number of factors: the political and legal structure of each state, and the legal channels that must be followed to implement the required rules. All these are factors in determining the necessary or relevant course of action to be taken by the varying sectors of government.

Optimizing Results

There are already several proposals for better implementation of Resolution 1540, including proposals listed in the Security Council Committee 2011 report and the ones submitted by international, regional, and subregional organizations. Other examples are the proposals offered by the Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation in each of their Beyond Boundaries reports. Some of the following measures would support the implementation of Resolution 1540 by improving coordination and communication with the United Nations and other international organizations:

- Improve communication between the states or organizations providing assistance and the requesting states. In order to obtain effective

results, special attention should be given to the discrepancy between the support requested and the support selected.

- Optimize the coordination of assistance in the relevant departments of government.
- Enhance coordination among donors to assist the requesting states. In the past, there have been instances where different areas of government were providing the same type of assistance to the same requesting state. These different areas of government were unaware of each other's actions. If everyone has the same information, duplication of assistance will be avoided.
- Maintain effective tracking of the international assistance provided to a country or region. This should be done in coordination with the 1540 Committee and other supporting organizations. One of the problems or common flaws is the lack of follow-up of each project.

There are also numerous opportunities to build capacity and share resources at the regional level. Across the Andean region, and more broadly in Latin America, governments should:

- Promote initiatives for the creation of a prevention policy at the regional level, including the creation of guidelines that are congruent with existing regional policies and with international security mandates.
- Raise awareness of every state's responsibility and ability to prevent and respond to the threat of WMD proliferation.
- Enhance communication cooperation with developed countries to help detect and deter illegal exports from the region.

Ultimately, the responsibility for implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540 lies with the national government. Andean governments should consider the following in order to optimize the potential benefits of the resolution:

- Develop adequate legislation that would meet the demands put forth by Resolution 1540 that is consistent with existing laws.

- Increase the severity of penalties and sentences in the case of crimes related to WMD.
- Facilitate the exchange of experiences and the sharing of best practices at the regional level.
- Raise awareness of the danger brought about by any activity derived from the proliferation of WMD. Encourage a regional campaign to sensitize the population about the issue of insecurity and its causes, building upon existing outreach in parallel security spheres.
- Unless already in place, create an internal organization to coordinate government actions required to fully comply with international demands pertaining to public safety, including Resolution 1540. This would facilitate all communication, both internally and externally.
- Launch a comprehensive study of the existing legal gaps related to agreements on nonproliferation and security. To formulate a coherent legislative foundation, efforts should be made to coordinate the existing or programmed plans of assistance put forth by the international organizations. A joint project is the best way to avoid redundant expenditures and efforts while at the same time optimizing results.

Conclusion

The requirements under Resolution 1540 are so diverse that they cannot be achieved by a single national authority. Because the resolution encompasses the areas related to nuclear, chemical, and biological products and their delivery systems, it necessitates a broad spectrum of public and private talents in order to fully understand and comply with its mandates. Unless customs offices, private banks, departments of finance, and the public and private transportation industries all coordinate to enforce the resolution, effective implementation is not possible.

These demands constitute an arduous task for developed countries, even more so for those in the developing world. Resolution 1540 will be very difficult to implement due to several variables, including internal problems dealing with human resources, the lack of

financial resources to carry out needed reforms, and the lack of technology required to adopt new measures. This lack of capability, compounded by a slow decision-making operative system in government and the need to tend to other, more-urgent priorities, makes it difficult to implement the obligations of Resolution 1540 at a reasonable speed.

The international community has contributed to backfilling these capacity shortfalls. It is joined in its efforts by regional and sub-regional organizations and civil and academic societies. The effort provided by the international community is paramount to the states' ability to comply with the duties expected of them to safeguard international public security and ensure the conditions necessary for economic development.

In this context, the Beyond Boundaries initiative promoted by civil society and other regional organizations in developing countries has made a significant contribution. The initiative sensitizes states in the region to the imperative need to comply with the duties specified in Resolution 1540. It also addresses a regional program aimed at necessary reform in other areas of security, and, significantly for countries of the Andean subregion, it identifies practical pathways to help promote the legal reform and standards development that is so critical to continued stability across all of Latin America. These reforms are complementary and urgently needed in the region from both a security context as well as a context of long-term growth and development.

It takes time to make the legislative reforms needed to implement different measures to improve public security. The commitment of several state agencies at different levels of government is also required. As we know, it takes time and much effort to undertake even the first step of legislative reform in order to obtain an adequate result on enforcement. In Latin America, it is more convenient to adopt norms that would simultaneously encompass critical problems in internal public safety and the international demands in Resolution 1540. Governments have benefitted, and could clearly benefit more, from an approach that seeks the simultaneous application of human security, rule of law, and development objectives.

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- ¹³ For more information on the *Beyond Boundaries* (known as *Más allá de las Fronteras* in the region) initiative, see <http://www.stimson.org/programs/managing-across-boundaries> and <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org>.

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Southeast Asia

Editor's Note

Over the past 30 years, globalization has revolutionized virtually every facet of modern international relations. From whom we talk to and how we talk to them to our newfound interconnectedness and interdependence, the landscape of modern global relations has opened heretofore unprecedented opportunities in every corner of the planet. The net positive result has been soaring economic growth and burgeoning prospects for peace and prosperity. Southeast Asia, in particular, has witnessed an average economic growth rate of more than 5 percent per year over the past decade. As a direct result of their newfound access to the global economy, countries in the region have made significant strides in terms of their socioeconomic development. Today, Southeast Asians enjoy greater access to education, clean water, and health services than ever before. In just 20 years, for example, the region has halved the proportion of people living on less than \$1.25 per day. Southeast Asian economies have also managed better than most others in the face of the global economic crisis. The region has already returned to precrisis medium-term growth prospects, even while much of the rest of the world remains mired in near-economic stagnation.

Yet despite this remarkable progress, current and emerging obstacles threaten to prevent countries of the region from capitalizing on their full potential. Notably, the region faces growing energy shortfalls,

maritime security challenges including piracy, and the trafficking in humans, drugs, and small arms. These perils affect not only the most vulnerable communities and peoples of the region, but together they can overwhelm legitimate state structures and disrupt the licit flow of goods upon which the region has come to depend. In short, the very forces of globalization that have fostered growth and development now threaten to undercut and ultimately erode past gains. Regrettably, most governments of the region lack the financial, human, and technical capacities necessary to fully address these burgeoning threats. It is this subset of human-security and development issues that focuses the attention of national governments across the region.

Yet for many Western governments preoccupied with addressing global security threats, Southeast Asia is seen as vulnerable to a potentially more alarming set of forces. By 2004, it was determined that some countries of the region had become a central entrepôt for the A.Q. Khan black market nuclear network. Technologies produced and perhaps even innovated in the region had contributed to the nuclear programs of Libya and North Korea, among others. Meanwhile, terrorist organizations with global ambition such as Jemaah Islamiyah had taken root with cells in Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. While significant concerns for regional leaders, proliferation and even terrorism were necessarily subjugated by more pressing demands on government resources across much of Southeast Asia.

Addressing these interconnected challenges—from hard security to soft security to development—clearly requires the development of an expanded human, legal, technical, and financial toolkit. In many cases, the same tools necessary to address the hard-security threats of weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism are the very same as those needed to meet the soft-security and development challenges prioritized by the region.

Recognizing this, in 2012, the Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation launched *Beyond Boundaries in Southeast Asia*. As in other regions, our goal was to hasten an innovative approach that would better leverage existing resources, identify new streams of assistance, and bridge the security/development divide. Specifically, the model presented to regional leaders sought to demonstrate how international security assistance not only meets global counterterrorism and

nonproliferation mandates but also facilitates local capacity to address human-security and development needs—both of which remain the central focus for Southeast Asian governments as the undercurrents of globalization threaten to reverse the remarkable gains witnessed over the last quarter century.

The effectiveness of this approach had been proven in other regional contexts, including in the Caribbean and Central America. Yet the unique regional characteristics of Southeast Asia and the unprecedented confluence of transnational ills—including small-arms, drug, and human trafficking; money laundering; uneven economic development; crime; terrorism; and counterfeit goods—that have grown up alongside globalization made translation of this model to the region not only particularly daunting but especially critical.

In this chapter, Noramly bin Muslim, the International Atomic Energy Agency's former deputy director general, reflects on the application of the Beyond Boundaries model to the Southeast Asian subregion. He points to an impressive array of synergistic interests between the high-priority goals of Southeast Asian governments—primarily in the economic development and human-security portfolios as defined by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Vision 2020—and the nonproliferation objectives of Resolution 1540. Although application of this model remains in its infancy, he concludes that early indications demonstrate the promise of mutually self-interested engagements to both transcendent global concerns and local security and development imperatives.

Chapter 6 Nonproliferation in Southeast Asia

Dr. Noramly bin Muslim

On August 8, 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in Bangkok by the five original member countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Over time the organization grew to its current complement of ten states. Brunei Darussalam joined on January 8, 1984, Vietnam on July 28, 1995, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Myanmar on July 23, 1997, and Cambodia on April 30, 1999.

The ASEAN Declaration states that the aims and purposes of the association are to (1) accelerate economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in the region and (2) promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries in the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.¹

In accordance with the first objective, the ASEAN Economic Community was designed to help facilitate development of a single market and production base, a highly competitive economic region, a region of equitable economic development, and a region fully integrated into the global economy. However, while ASEAN was established originally to achieve salient economic objectives for governments across the subregion, it is equally true that regional leaders have come to recognize the importance of, and interlinkages between, prosperity, peace, and security.

For instance, ASEAN Vision 2020 was adopted in Kuala Lumpur in 1997 by the regional leaders on the 30th anniversary of the founding of the organization. At that meeting, the congregation agreed on “a shared vision of ASEAN as a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies.”²

The objectives of Vision 2020 were defined to include:

- Promote financial sector liberalization.
- Accelerate the development of science and technology.
- Enhance food security and international competitiveness of food, agricultural, and forest products.
- Meet the ever-increasing demand for improved infrastructure and communications.
- Enhance human-resource development in all sectors of the economy through quality education and the upgrading of skills, capabilities, and training.
- Work toward world-class standards that will contribute a harmonized system to facilitate the free flow of ASEAN trade.
- Promote an ASEAN customs partnership.
- Enhance intra-ASEAN trade and investment in the mineral sector.

These priorities involve maintaining regional economics and financial stability; implementing the ASEAN Free Trade Area and free flow of investment; accelerating the linearization of trade in services and the free flow of professionals; developing science and technology and human resources in all sectors of the economy; promoting food security; improving infrastructure and communication, and developing multimodal transportation networks; promoting open-sky policies; facilitating goods in transit; and integrating communication networks.

In accordance with ASEAN's Vision 2020, governments across the region agreed that prospects for peace, security, and economic growth are interlinked. Even amid the most serious economic downturn since the Great Depression, economic growth and quality of life have been improving substantially across Southeast Asia. Yet along with this marked progress, the necessity for enhanced security to protect against economic backsliding became apparent. Not only did this

necessitate meeting the immediate security challenges endemic to the region, including human and drug trafficking, armed violence, and money laundering, it also meant that governments across the region were obliged to more fully implement global mandates—most notably, Resolution 1540.

Not surprisingly, many ASEAN countries have concerns similar to those of other developing countries in other regions, as well as Non-Aligned Movement member states, when it comes to Resolution 1540. These concerns include serious reservations about establishing controls on movements of strategic goods that might hamper economic growth and trade. The widespread perception is that such controls place a heavy burden on governments and industry financially and could render implementing countries less competitive in the global marketplace. On the other hand, strengthened governance and adopting strategic trade controls can help positively shape a country's future in trade, tourism, and foreign investment. Development of a strategic trade control system in a given country may also promote the importation of high-tech goods and technology.

There are two key areas in which government measures to prevent weapons-of-mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and thwart terrorist activities will reinforce each other and could ultimately help underwrite economic prosperity. The primary approach lies in controlling financial activities, which will enable government authorities to monitor and, if necessary, freeze financial assets of suspects found to be contributing to operations of terrorist groups or to the unauthorized transfer of proliferation-sensitive goods. The second is in the strengthened capacity to monitor flows of arms, drugs, biomaterials, and people across borders. Strong enforcement controls across borders for the purposes of preventing WMD proliferation could allow governments to detect movements of militants and arms intended for terrorist purposes. In short, implementation of global mandates such as Resolution 1540 could yield both near- and long-term benefits to economic stability and growth.

Regional Integration

Since the 1997 declaration of ASEAN Vision 2020, some progress had been achieved in various declared undertakings. The ASEAN

Secretariat has published a statistical data book on the economic and development achievements of ASEAN from 1998 to 2010. The selected statistical tables reflect some of the most prominent achievements made by ASEAN member states and their trading partners. The data collected, and relevant statistical information published by the ASEAN Community Statistical System on general economy, trade, foreign direct investment, tourism, communication, labor force, population, and social development are available to the public.⁴ In four key declared areas of importance to ASEAN's future development, the region has witnessed a positive trajectory since the adoption of Vision 2020, including:

- Overall growth in ASEAN's top 20 export commodities, reflecting a growing industrial development across the region.⁵
- Expansion in ASEAN trade, including both intra-ASEAN trade and extra-ASEAN trade.⁶
- Declining infant mortality rates, reflecting the state of health of the population, medical facilities, and quality of life.⁷
- A growth in tourist arrivals per host country, reflecting an improved quality of life and national security situation within the region.⁸

A survey of recent statistics indicates that the regional grouping has made the most progress in economic integration, with the aim of achieving an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. The region has witnessed remarkable economic expansion in recent years—even amid the global financial crisis of 2008. The average annual economic growth rate of ASEAN's member nations during the 1989–2009 timeframe included Singapore with 6.73 percent, Malaysia with 6.15 percent, Indonesia 5.16 percent, Thailand 5.02 percent, and the Philippines 3.79 percent. This economic growth was greater than the average Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation economic growth, which was 2.83 percent over the same period.⁹

Figure 11: ASEAN Population and Territory

Country	Total land area (sq km)	Total population (thousand)
Brunei Darussalam	5,765	415
Cambodia	181,035	15,269
Indonesia	1,860,360	234,181
Lao PDR	236,800	6,230
Malaysia	330,252	28,909
Myanmar	676,577	60,163
Philippines	300,000	94,013
Singapore	710	5,077
Thailand	513,120	67,312
Viet Nam	331,051	86,930
ASEAN	4,435,670	598,498

Source: ASEAN Finance and Macroeconomics Surveillance Database and IMF, World Economic Outlook April 2011.

The proportion of population that is employed has also increased over time, and in 2010, 60.8 percent of the population in the ASEAN 5 (Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand) was estimated to be employed, with Singapore having the highest rates of employment.¹⁰

The net enrollment in primary education has also generally increased, from 86.9 percent in 1990 to 90.6 percent by 2010. Myanmar and Thailand showed the greatest advances, significantly narrowing the gap with other ASEAN countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines).¹¹ Girls and boys have almost equal opportunities to attend primary and secondary education, with the boys at a slight advantage.¹²

Many of these positive trends are directly attributable to an explosive growth in intraregional and international trade. The value of ASEAN trade reached \$2 trillion in 2010, an increase of 33.1 percent from just five years prior, owing to the expansion in trade with both intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN partners.¹³ Intra-ASEAN trade has grown to \$470 billion in 2009 from \$376.2 billion a year earlier, topping \$519.7 billion by 2010.¹⁴

The ratio of exports to gross domestic product (GDP) rose steadily in tandem with the ratio of imports to GDP. ASEAN countries continued to register trade surpluses for 2010 amounting to \$96 billion, as demand for ASEAN export products remained strong. This has yielded an unprecedented period of economic growth and expansion.¹⁵

Exports have played a leading role in the rapid economic development of ASEAN, centering significantly on agricultural and mineral resources. As each country develops its industrial base, manufactured exports increase, including increases in electronics, electrical machinery, and motor vehicles and spare parts. This includes the export of high-technology goods, including those with potential dual-use WMD applications. The growth of ASEAN's export sector has been staggering, and the region is now becoming one of the most trade-dependent in all of Asia.

Export commodities can be broken down into two groups: high-value goods and low-value goods. The high-value exports generate significant amounts of added value in their production, including electronic integrated circuits and micro assemblies, automatic data-processing machines, optical readers, parts of and accessories for computers and office machines, printing machines, electrical appliances, and motor vehicles and spare parts. The low value-added goods include petroleum oils, crude petroleum, palm oil and its fractions, natural rubber, and copper ores and concentrates. Singapore and Malaysia dominate ASEAN high-value exports, although across the region every state is registering expansion into high-tech sectors. Such exports represent not only a near-term prerequisite for growth, but a long-term necessity for development and sustainability.¹⁶

Figure 12: ASEAN Top 20 Export Commodities 2010

Commodities	Value (US \$ Mn)	Share (%)
Electronic integrated circuits and microassemblies	97,644	9.1
Petroleum oils, not crude	61,945	5.8
Automatic data-processing machines, optical readers, etc.	40,779	3.8
Petroleum gases	34,107	3.2
Crude petroleum oils	28,699	2.7
Parts/acc. of computers & office machines	26,646	2.5
Palm oil & its fraction	26,057	2.4
Natural rubber, in primary form or plates	20,512	1.9
Coal, briquettes, ovoids & similar solid fuels man. from coal	19,852	1.9
Diodes/transistors & similar semiconductor devices, etc.	17,109	1.6
Printing machinery, machines used ancillary to printing	12,926	1.2
Gold, unwrought or in semimanufactured forms	11,468	1.1
Parts & access. of motor vehicles	10,140	0.9
Electric appliance for line telephony	9,854	0.9
Television receivers (incl. video monitors projectors)	8,613	0.8
Motor cars & vehicles for transporting persons (except public transport motor vehicles)	8,606	0.8
Copper ores and concentrates	7,658	0.7
Rice	7,351	0.7
Prepared, unrecorded media (no film) for sound etc.	6,679	0.6
Electrical appliances for electrical connection	6,593	0.6
Top 20 export commodities	463,240	43.3
Others	607,701	56.7
Total	1,070,941	100.0

Source: ASEAN Community in Figures 2011.¹⁷

For ASEAN to maintain its status as an emerging market, regional leaders have recognized that a number of key policies must be adopted to maintain, nurture, and attract high value-added industries. For instance, ASEAN needs to create a genuine integrated single market. Trade and customs procedures must be modernized. Rules and procedures should be standardized. Investment in infrastructure across the region will be critical for factory needs, such as efficient ports, roads, railways, and airports; cheap and reliable electricity; good telecommunications; and skilled human resources. As ASEAN evolves into a more knowledge-intensive and technology-oriented society, more trained human resources are needed, not all of whom can be trained without outside help.

Different countries in ASEAN specialize in different manufactured exports. There are new challenges facing ASEAN, such as establishing a single market, lowering/eliminating the intra-ASEAN tariff, and establishing the ASEAN Economic Community through innovation and entrepreneurship.

Although governments of the region have recognized that tourism dollars cannot assure long-term prosperity, tourism remains for the foreseeable future a key element of prosperity. In 2010, tourist arrivals to ASEAN countries reached 74 million. Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore remained the favorite tourist destinations.¹⁸

The growth of the tourism industry in recent years has been high, especially within ASEAN. The region encourages tourism investment, although the extent varies from country to country. The emphasis is on value for money spent, with the hope that this will fund economic growth and encourage more visitors. Tourism companies and operators cooperate with site stakeholders and government ministries, and it is not uncommon for the private and government sectors to work together to achieve this synergy. Eleven priority sectors of integration have been identified and included in the ASEAN Framework.¹⁹

For ASEAN countries, tourism remains a valued income earner. However, there are areas that need attention if the industry is to thrive and grow. Tourism in one country inevitably competes with tourism in another. Competition is more pronounced than cooperation, even if tour companies—and tourists—cross borders. Airlines and airports

and cities compete to be tourist hubs. Attractions in one country compete with those in another. Even the wildlife is a competing commodity. The poorer nations have trouble funding their tourist infrastructure and training those in their service industry, and often lose much of the income to outsiders when constructing and refurbishing hotels and transport. Poor information and communications technologies sometimes decrease the tourist experience. This competition means that cooperative marketing opportunities are lost. In this area, national priorities override regional objectives.

Of course, where there exists vast movement of people, there are also security-related issues that can discourage tourism. Unstable political conditions impact arrivals, such as when recent political unrest in Thailand stranded tourists for days and discouraged future travel. Regional crises, such as terrorism (e.g., the Bali bombing), avian flu, and the possibility of tsunamis and earthquakes, all discourage tourism. Unnecessarily negative travel advisories issued by some developed nations to their citizens can devastate tourist areas, as can contagious diseases and alarmist media coverage. Conversely, tourists are reassured by better crisis management, including the way in which countries manage the threat of terrorism, piracy, and political kidnapping.

Across the board, positive economic trends have yielded corresponding trends in development indicators. Two examples are the region's increase in maternal health and a corresponding decline in the rate of infant mortality. Countries in Southeast Asia and their health-system reforms can be categorized according to the stages of development of their prosperous health care system. The challenges and priorities are based on the different stages of socioeconomic development.

ASEAN countries as a whole have cut infant mortality rates by more than half since 1990. Despite this progress, each year an estimated 150,000 children die before they reach age one, with about 410 infants dying each day in the region. But compared with just a decade ago, trends are improving significantly.²⁰

Much of this success is attributable to growing access to advanced medical support. Since 1990, ASEAN has significantly reduced the number of births not attended by skilled health personnel. Despite the progress, in 2010, one out of five births were still unattended by skilled health

personnel. Currently, 44 women die each day of pregnancy-related causes, and the progress toward reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters based on the Millennium Development Goals has been slow.²¹

Clearly, maintaining a secure environment is central to any number of regional priorities, from trade facilitation to health to tourism promotion. Despite the soaring rates of growth, governments of the ASEAN region are generally ill-equipped to institute, and in most cases finance, robust security mechanisms to protect their newfound prosperity.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540

Resolution 1540 was adopted unanimously in April 2004 as a response to the growing threat that nonstate actors might acquire and use WMD. As it was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it is a legally binding document that requires all UN member states to implement domestic legislation to prevent nonstate actors from manufacturing, acquiring, or transporting WMD within or from their territory. On April 27, 2006, the Security Council extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee for two years with the adoption of Resolution 1673, which reiterated the objectives of Resolution 1540 and expressed the interest of the Security Council in intensifying its efforts to promote full implementation of the resolution.

On April 25, 2008, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1810, which extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee for three years with the continued assistance of experts. On April 20, 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1977, which reaffirmed that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery constitute a threat to international peace and security, and extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee for ten years. The Security Council thus recognizes that full implementation of Resolution 1540 by all states is a long-term task that will require continuous efforts at global, regional, and national levels.

Of course, there are many related global, regional, and bilateral legal instruments with which ASEAN member states must be in compliance to ensure that the ASEAN region is safe from acts of terrorism. These instruments, conventions, agreements, initiatives, and other multilateral and bilateral agreements are vital to oversee the success of the

implementation of Resolution 1540. Many of these instruments are important to the well-being of the ASEAN states, but due to political differences and national interests, some countries have only selectively signed, ratified, and enforced them, while others are still in noncompliance. With competing national and regional priorities, building a culture of compliance across ASEAN has been a unique challenge.

For instance, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the most universally accepted arms-control treaty, with only three holdout states worldwide (India, Israel, and Pakistan) and one state that decided to withdraw (North Korea). The treaty was concluded in July 1968 and entered into force in March 1970. It is based on the three pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use, and has been signed and ratified in every ASEAN state. Yet in other areas, ASEAN governments' records of adherence to global obligations have been more problematic. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which obligates its member states not to carry out any nuclear weapon test or any other nuclear explosion, has been signed by all ASEAN countries but ratified by only seven. Brunei, Myanmar, and Thailand have not yet ratified it, perhaps because of legislative inertia, lack of information, or the view that they will never be able to acquire such nuclear technologies anyway. Adherence is similarly spotty with regard to membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and adherence to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and a host of other international arrangements aimed at promoting nonproliferation.

This inconsistent record of adherence to global efforts to prevent the diffusion of WMD and related technologies suggests that prospects for full and effective implementation of Resolution 1540 are questionable. This may be due to lack of understanding regarding international obligations or norms, a lack of trained personnel to implement those obligations, and insufficient financial resources. In addition to other competing regional priorities, governments of the region often do not see such adherence to Resolution 1540 as a priority, compared to socioeconomic development, and hence, there is no political interest in introducing greater funding or diverting scarce human resources.

In general terms, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has been supportive of the member states' commitment to and implementation of

Resolution 1540. The forum called on participating states to provide additional input on national implementation as appropriate to the 1540 Committee as part of the ongoing process of resolution implementation. The ARF insists on working toward capacity building to help member states meet their obligations under Resolution 1540 and other WMD commitments.

Yet it is clear that the ASEAN region does not have the necessary expertise, competency, legal frameworks, and infrastructure to cope with the plethora of agreements, conventions, and initiatives in this field of nuclear and weapons security. Often, convention agreements are of no interest to countries that do not view the threat of WMD as a current priority. Countries are more concerned with economic development, improving their quality of life, and guarding those elements of the regional economy that have yielded the recent surge in prosperity, health, and security discussed previously. Looking at the number of signatories to the legal instruments put before ASEAN states, there is no overriding commitment from ASEAN member states to be party to such agreements and conventions. ASEAN member states sign or ratify only those agreements and conventions that are of interest to them, or those that may positively affect their economic development and well-being. Furthermore, they are unlikely to sign, much less ratify, an agreement if it is likely to be costly to implement or tangential to their national objectives.

To fully implement such agreements and conventions, ASEAN member states would need to reassess their priorities and begin making domestic investments, or seek assistance from the United Nations or developed countries with meeting the nonproliferation challenges and implementing Resolution 1540. It is important to note that the rationale for lacking interest in nonproliferation among ASEAN member states differs considerably. Some have purely political reasons for their lack of interest in the WMD preventative regime. Some ASEAN states categorically refuse to adhere to and/or implement some of the existing instruments, particularly the newest unilateral nonproliferation and counterproliferation requirements, outside of universally negotiated agreements. Still others view these instruments with suspicion, asserting part of a hidden Western agenda meant to hinder trade. Jakarta, for example, has repeatedly expressed skepticism about the need for extensive strategic trade controls in developing economies.

Nonadherence to and/or slow implementation of nonproliferation and other related instruments by some Southeast Asian countries is sometimes solely due to a capability problem. Other states lack the necessary human, financial, structural, and institutional capability to fully endorse existing instruments. International nuclear law, for example, is a highly specialized field requiring specific training and experience; some states do not see any need or value in investing in such specialists and believe that they have more pressing priorities than focusing on what they consider to be very improbable and remote security threats. Even directing the services of a government lawyer to deal with the implications of these conventions can be onerous to a small, underdeveloped nation.

ASEAN Economic Growth and the Potential for Proliferation

ASEAN has grown from a group of nations joined together for economic growth to a global hub for many manufacturing sectors and other industries. In an effort to protect this newfound prosperity, ASEAN has emphasized regional cooperation through the three pillars of security, sociocultural integration, and economic integration. For those most concerned with the enduring threat of WMD proliferation, this singular regional focus on economic growth and development should be seen as an opportunity rather than an obstacle to engagement.

ASEAN, as the previous discussion demonstrated, has made significant strides as a whole in economic development, enjoying access to education, information, technology, good health services, clean water, and an improved working environment, and peace with its neighbors. ASEAN member states are investing heavily in trading, manufacturing, and new technologies, substantially boosting their exports. Some companies in the region are offshore firms from developed countries, capitalizing on cheap skilled labor, cheaper production costs, less taxes to pay, and being close to markets. But others have cutting-edge technologies of their own. One of the main export commodities of ASEAN is electronics. Such an environment means a dramatic increase in both the opportunities and capabilities for producing dual-use materials and equipment for potential use in WMD programs.

Although there are no nuclear power plant facilities in the region other than research reactors, accelerators, and cyclotrons (and only small

quantities of nuclear material, as well as a few uranium and thorium deposits), the industries with precision-engineering capabilities have been able to manufacture and fabricate high-precision components of dual-use suitability needed for manufacturing WMD. The case of A.Q. Khan is a well-known example of how these dual-use technologies in a region of weakened controls might be exploited by nonstate actors.

The ASEAN tourism industry has been growing very rapidly. Tourism involves the movement of people and the use of money and resources for the development of resorts, transportation improvement, and service hospitality. People travel because they feel safe in the countries they are visiting. However, money, smuggled drugs, and small weapons are always on the move. Terrorists and nonstate actors may capitalize on the free movement of tourists, seeing them as opportunities to move their money, resources, and bases within the region. Special attention to security must be in place to ensure the safety of tourists and tourist facilities and to ensure they are not a cover for more nefarious activities.

Several countries in the region are also major transit and transshipment hubs where smugglers of proliferation-sensitive goods can exploit the region's ports and sea-lanes if relevant controls are not in place. Strengthening WMD proliferation controls in Southeast Asia as mandated by Resolution 1540 is key to international security.

Strengthened border and export controls are as important for tackling the challenges of trafficking of arms, drugs, and people as they are for countering terrorism, piracy, and preventing WMD proliferation. Key countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia) in the region have experienced booming development of industries that rely on dual-use/proliferation-sensitive goods and technologies, such as electronics, precision engineering, biotech, and chemicals. A unique geography also demands additional efforts on behalf of governments in the region in order to enhance the security environment. Specifically, Southeast Asian governments face the challenge of securing difficult terrain, extensive maritime borders, and small boat traffic. Additionally, due to their location at the intersection of important sea-lanes, governments in the region deal with a high volume of cargo traffic and must provide adequate transit and transshipment controls in order to prevent smuggling of sensitive items.

Security analysts also note that the region's loose financial controls allow nonstate actors to raise, transmit, and launder terrorist funds. Al Qaeda and its affiliates are also known to be active across Southeast Asia. The potential linkage between these terrorist entities and the capacity to contribute to the proliferation supply chain makes Southeast Asia an increasingly important player in global nonproliferation efforts.

Across Southeast Asia, perhaps no two issues better illustrate the dangerous new potential for proliferation than the growth in civilian nuclear power capability and the burgeoning biotechnology sector.

Nuclear Power

As the ASEAN region industrializes and prospers economically, ensuring a secure supply of energy becomes of prime importance to national governments. Current energy sources are oil, gas, coal, hydro, and biomass, with only a small fraction being solar and wind. Though there are no civilian nuclear power plants in ASEAN countries at the moment, currently there is a growing interest in civilian power in many countries of the region—namely Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines. The ASEAN Energy Plan of Action has been agreed on with regard to civilian nuclear energy, gas and oil plants and pipelines, and ASEAN grids. Preparations are under way for instituting the necessary infrastructure and human-resource development, for building the legal framework, and for sharing information on safety. Competent regulatory bodies, university courses, training, public awareness, and outreach programs are being put in place. Though there is still some negative public opinion and political sensitivity regarding nuclear power, training and infrastructure building continues.

Although ASEAN energy authorities and planners lack the capacities needed to build and safely operate power plants, many plans are being implemented. In Malaysia, the National University of Malaysia (UKM) has courses in nuclear science and radiation protection. The school organizes three international courses yearly on nuclear engineering together with the Tokyo Institute of Technology, the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (spring course), and Bordeaux University (summer course). The UKM law faculty is introducing a

graduate course, and the Technology University of Malaysia gives an undergraduate degree in nuclear engineering. The Malaysian government is reviewing all acts and regulations pertaining to nuclear energy. The national nuclear regulatory body is being strengthened, and the government has created the Malaysian Nuclear Power Company to spearhead the development of a nuclear power program.

ASEAN partners with many national institutes of higher learning and/or research institutes to organize regional meetings on issues related to nuclear power, safeguards, nuclear safety, nuclear security, and sharing of information. Nuclear power is poised to become an important source of energy for Malaysia. Elsewhere in the region, Vietnam is making progress toward operating a civilian power capacity, but programs in Thailand and Indonesia have been delayed due to the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear reactor disaster in Japan.

ASEAN could make headway in the management of the front and back ends of the nuclear fuel cycle. Finding a regional solution for spent-fuel management would help to minimize the costs as well as optimize safety, security, and nonproliferation goals. The IAEA has created a special project in this area for the ASEAN region. For ASEAN countries acquiring nuclear power, Resolution 1540 must play a role to ensure that they adopt strict standards of nonproliferation and transparency without becoming a barrier to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The absence of strict attention to proliferation concerns has the potential to complicate long-term energy plans and promote international security threats.

Biotechnology

While there are no known chemical or biological weapons within the region, ASEAN countries have a large number of private and government laboratories for manufacturing specialized dual-use chemicals, pharmaceutical products, and growth media for tissue cultures. Microbiological research work deals with dangerous pathogens and sensitive bioagents. Some countries have begun establishing advanced bioresearch labs in order to develop vaccines against highly infectious diseases. Malaysia has several biosafety level 3 labs, including those facilities at the Veterinary Research Institute. Indonesia and Thailand will be moving in a similar direction, especially in the manufacturing of vaccines. Strengthening biosafety and biosecurity practices at medical

and biofacilities will help mitigate the risks of inadvertent infection of facility employees or accidents involving bioagents and prevent unauthorized access to sensitive biomaterials.

Biorelated proliferation risks facing Southeast Asia are connected with three regional trends: emerging diseases, reemerging diseases, and growing biotech industries. Effectively detecting, containing, and treating emerging and reemerging diseases requires governments in the region to work with highly infectious pathogens and bioagents, thereby creating opportunities for their misuse. The growth of the biotechnical industry and related scientific research leads to the expansion of dual-use bioexpertise and the development of dual-use goods, possibly presenting a proliferation risk if not properly regulated.

Southeast Asia is one of the regions most vulnerable to infectious disease because of dense population levels and economic underdevelopment. The region is particularly susceptible to outbreaks of disease such as dengue fever, Japanese encephalitis, and severe acute respiratory diseases.

ASEAN governments recognize the challenge facing the region. Biosafety and biosecurity have attained an increased level of attention in recent years in light of concerns about new global security threats arising from terrorism, emerging infectious diseases, and the rapid expansion of dual-use biological materials, technology, and locally acquired expertise. However, legislative and enforcement gaps, limited capacity, and the need for assistance remain as challenges to implementing Resolution 1540 in the region.

Resolution 1540: Prospects for Implementation in Southeast Asia

ASEAN can and should be a key actor when it comes to minimizing the global WMD threat. Its growing economies will increasingly rely on high-technology goods that can present a proliferation risk if not properly regulated. Many ASEAN countries and industries do not address critical obligations, notably in trade, finance, and transshipment controls. Though Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines have embarked on the development of enhanced export controls, most of the ASEAN states have weak legal and regulatory systems and mechanisms to effectively control such activities.

There are several internal security threats in Southeast Asia, and terrorists and/or insurgent groups are operating in at least five ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand). The existence of piracy, the growth of counterfeit products, international smuggling, profiteering, money laundering, and human slavery all have direct and very serious implications for the protection of dual-use materials and sensitive technology that can be used to developed WMD.

Advancements in microprocessors, data-processing and communication technologies, precision engineering, and chemical and biotechnical industries will introduce additional dual-use goods that need to be secured or controlled. Several countries in the region are important transit and transshipment hubs that can be exploited by smugglers trafficking in WMD goods.

Some progress has been made toward implementation of Resolution 1540. For instance, Malaysia adopted the Strategic Trade Act, a law that went into effect in January 2011 and requires all traders to apply for a permit before engaging in export, transit, transshipment, or brokering involving dual-use equipment and materials. The Ministry of Trade and Industry is responsible for its implementation; customs and police officers have undergone special training for the job.

In the main, however, implementation of Resolution 1540 has been anemic in Southeast Asia. Yet there are early signs of regional government interest in Resolution 1540 as an instrument that could benefit local conditions. For instance, Malaysia has expressed a willingness to consider requests from other ASEAN states for assistance in the areas of legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation, and/or resources for fulfilling the provisions of Resolution 1540. Many universities have special courses in bio and chemical safety and radiation protection, and play host to international conferences related to safety, security, and safeguards. The Philippines has indicated that it is prepared to cooperate with states willing to provide training for its first responders and assistance in developing more-stringent border controls, stronger physical protection of its research reactor, appropriate laws governing border monitoring, and enhanced and upgraded container and cargo security measures. Thailand has also stated that it will welcome assistance in implementing Resolution 1540, notably while developing more-effective national export, transit,

and transshipment controls over WMD, their means of delivery, and related dual-use items. Bangkok has also sought advice in identifying WMD-related materials and dual-use items. Additionally, Thailand has asked to host training courses and workshops to exchange views and experiences on how to effectively address the transport of illicit WMD and related materials, trafficking, and brokering.²²

These requests and their connection to other, higher order priorities across the ASEAN region should be viewed as an opportunity for sustained engagement on proliferation prevention. The dual-benefit model adopted in other regions of the globe is one of the most promising mechanisms in implementing Resolution 1540 in developing countries, including the ASEAN region. It highlights the importance of human-security and development opportunities in a region like Southeast Asia. The model links together various intangible and physical instruments in the implementation of Resolution 1540 operative measures.

Nonetheless, there are very real political, economic, and cultural constraints on fully realizing the benefits of Resolution 1540 assistance. Many measures implemented by ASEAN countries have been based on economics and the availability of financial resources, competent human resources, legal infrastructure, education, a sound public health infrastructure, and environmental standards. These fundamental issues should be reviewed on a regional as well as national basis across ASEAN countries.

ASEAN member states have been implementing Resolution 1540 and other nonproliferation measures at their own pace depending on the resources available. Exploring linkages between Resolution 1540 requirements and ways to improve trade, manufacturing capability, quality of life, peace, and prosperity may help build political buy-in across the region. Some member states are undertaking activities at national and regional levels, unaware that these may be part and parcel of the instruments of the UN resolutions. They may come in the form of conferences, workshops, seminars, university courses, outreach, and public-information services, or professional trainings. A systemic analysis of what activities are being conducted and necessary actions would be a positive step in the right direction and help to better coordinate needs with resources. The dual-benefit approach described in this volume is a step in this direction, but it has yet to be meaningfully operationalized in Southeast Asia.

Conclusion

Adherence to and implementation of nonproliferation treaties, agreements, and other related instruments varies greatly in Southeast Asia. Although progress has been made over the past few years, much remains to be done. In the nuclear nonproliferation domain, all ten ASEAN countries are state parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Bangkok Treaty, although three states have yet to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and many still need to enhance their safeguard agreements with the IAEA in order to improve confidence levels that they are not engaging in illicit activities. In the biological and chemical nonproliferation and disarmament realms, the region has endorsed the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention regimes, with the notable exception of Myanmar, which has signed but has yet to ratify them. ASEAN states also need to enhance their biochemical safety and security frameworks as their industries in this domain grow steadily. In the case of international conventions and measures designed to improve nuclear safety and security, including the full and effective implementation of Resolution 1540, adherence by ASEAN states is still lacking. In large measure, this is due to a lack of political buy-in combined with a dearth of human and financial resources.

The ARF has addressed nonproliferation and disarmament issues in many of its meetings. The forum has suggested that ASEAN file a request for Resolution 1540 assistance on behalf of the region, which could lead to the process of developing relevant model legislation based on regional expertise, experience, and external assistance. The ASEAN Secretariat could also serve as a clearinghouse for expertise sharing and assistance, and could develop standards and benchmarks for domestic trade and protection controls.

There is little doubt that implementing these initial steps can be achieved without the involvement of outside assistance providers. Such efforts would serve the interests of all Southeast Asian countries because they would strengthen regional cooperation and security.

As noted, ASEAN supports the implementation of Resolution 1540 and has contributed positively to this process, mostly indirectly

through training, conferences, workshops, human-resource development, university courses, engagement of banking and financial institutions, outreach programs and public engagements through various instruments, and awareness-raising mechanisms related to nonproliferation and counterterrorism. For obvious reasons, ASEAN cooperation is more focused today on more-immediate challenges, including nuclear energy, nuclear safety, and nuclear security than on biological and chemical weapons or even the proliferation of WMD technologies. Many of the cooperative mechanisms have been incorporated into the ASEAN action plans. However, biological threats and biorisk management have begun to gain more attention. Biosecurity and bioterrorism are priority areas in the ARF Work Plan on counterterrorism and transnational crime. Biosafety courses, research, and seminars are being introduced at universities, hospitals, and research institutions.

ASEAN consistently stresses the need to address nonproliferation and disarmament issues in a balanced, comprehensive, and nondiscriminatory manner. There is concern about how to strike a balance between fulfilling the nonproliferation commitments and ensuring the legitimate rights of countries to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. ASEAN cooperation concerns are primarily with state-to-state obligations on economy, development, and quality of life, while the requirements of Resolution 1540 are focused on nonstate actors.

Implementation of Resolution 1540 remains a national responsibility. Though there is a trend to harmonize the common laws and regulations among states pertaining to international obligations, such as nuclear safety, security, and safeguards, this will take time, as there is a lack of competent, qualified human resources in member states able to undertake such responsibilities. External help is required.

There is a clear synergy of interest between the high-priority goals of Southeast Asian governments and the nonproliferation objectives of Resolution 1540. Identifying the capacity-building needs of the economically poorer and less-developed states will greatly help in the implementation of Resolution 1540 within ASEAN by initiating a conversation based on mutual interests. For instance, the nonproliferation goals of Resolution 1540 and the countries'

objectives in the public-health sector can be met with an integrated approach; domestic measures taken to implement proliferation controls on dangerous pathogens, sensitive bioagents, and biotechnology will directly benefit government capacity to prevent, detect, and mitigate outbreaks of highly infectious diseases. ASEAN's current focus on both civilian power generation and trade expansion serves as a perfect springboard for exploring the linkages between government priorities and Resolution 1540 nonproliferation objectives.

Endnotes

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UN Security Council Resolution 1540: The Next 10 Years

By Brian Finlay

In 2014, the international community will celebrate the tenth anniversary of the adoption of Resolution 1540 by the UN Security Council. The resolution, which mandated a suite of supply-side controls to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to nonstate actors, was passed in April 2004. This mandate reflected the widespread concern about the lengthening WMD-proliferation supply chain, which as a result of globalization is extending to more countries and more corners of the globe than ever before.

However, after the first two years of outreach by the 1540 Committee—which was spearheaded primarily by wealthy Western governments—there was little evidence of widespread implementation across much of the developing world. Although the ostensibly delinquent governments in the Global South recognized the importance of proliferation prevention, for most of them, the reality of WMD terrorism, while horrific, was ultimately not as immediate a threat as soft-security and development challenges. In short, proliferation prevention is not and never will be the highest priority for many in the Global

South. It certainly will not be one worthy of diverting human and financial resources too scarce to adequately address even higher priority concerns.

Yet recent incidents of sensitive technology transfers indicate that the WMD-proliferation challenge is no longer merely a phenomenon facilitated by the most technologically advanced governments. Rather, dual-use technologies are increasingly being innovated, manufactured, and transshipped by private actors amid deep regulatory vacuums around the world. Often these dual-use technologies are overseen by governments with little capacity—and occasionally, little interest—to prevent their illegal acquisition. Thus, the lackluster embrace of Resolution 1540 by many governments was in keeping with the traditional North-South dichotomy on matters of security.

In such an environment, it has become incumbent upon those most seized by the proliferation threat to break traditional approaches to nonproliferation. Often these efforts require developing models of engagement where not only Western hard-security demands are satisfied but also where developing countries' higher priority soft-security and development needs are equally validated—and ultimately ameliorated.

In 2006, the Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation were joined by the government of Finland to conceptualize and implement an innovative new approach to proliferation prevention in the Global South. This strategy—a dual-benefit, nonproliferation engagement—necessitated an unparalleled new “whole-of-society” methodology that leveraged a wider spectrum of interests and capabilities. It required a new recognition on the part of the national security community that development and human security interests are equally critical factors in long-term safety and stability. And it demanded a willingness to widen the dialogue to include not only a more expansive variety of government interests and ministries but also new contributors from outside of government, in the private sector and in civil society.

This new approach operated on the understanding that in order to address the security challenges of our modern and globalized era, we must appeal to the enlightened self-interest of our partners in the

developing world. Doing so is the only way to transform these partners from recalcitrant targets of our nonproliferation policy into sustained advocates for nonproliferation engagement.

By borrowing upon the good work and preexisting relationships built over decades by government-development agencies, soft-capacity providers, and nongovernmental interests, the nonproliferation community can not only ensure near-term interest and long-term sustainability to its programming, it can also make meaningful contributions to economic growth and development.

Over the last seven years, this so-called Beyond Boundaries approach promised to yield tangible nonproliferation activities that were not only more sustainable but also ultimately cost less because of the effective merging of resources across multiple portfolios. By facilitating intelligence partnerships among our project partners in international and regional organizations; national governments in the Caribbean, Central America, the Andean region, the Middle East, Eastern Africa, and Southeast Asia; and civil society and private sector organizations, the dual-benefit model fundamentally altered engrained approaches to proliferation prevention across countries of the Global South.

This volume has presented some of the lessons learned in the process. For instance, in the Caribbean, project partners successfully linked assistance provided to enhance strategic border and export controls with companion aid to prevent the trafficking of small arms and narcotics. This assistance, in turn, promoted efficiencies at transit hubs, facilitating trade expansion, business development, and national competitiveness within the global supply chain. Also in the Caribbean Basin, assistance proffered to develop pre- and post-WMD incident response enhanced governments' capacity to detect earthquakes.

Similarly, the project team helped new efforts aimed at the prevention of human trafficking, a growing moral priority for many governments across Southeast Asia, by opening the door to new resources and capacities necessary to detect the movement of terrorists across borders. By identifying financial streams of assistance from the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction for the detection of biological incidents, the team helped

promote the creation of a functional disease-surveillance network and a public health infrastructure in the Andean region. And in the Middle East, the team helped to link governments' pursuit of energy diversification through nuclear power with technical and capacity-building assistance from nonproliferation accounts. This approach held the simultaneous promise of being possible while reinforcing global confidence in government adherence to the global nonproliferation regime, thus expediting regulatory approval and international confidence.¹

In addition to the material implementation of Resolution 1540, the Beyond Boundaries initiative also demonstrated the meaningful role that civil society can play in conceptualizing and ultimately realizing policy change at the global level, as well as the convergence of transnational challenges.

In part as a result of the global financial crisis, the international security community regularly comments on the denouement of the United States as a superpower and the concomitant rise of a multipolar global system. Yet as the international security landscape continues to shift, it should also be clear that it is not merely the relative power of individual states that is shifting, but the fundamental role of the state as a singular actor on the world stage. In many instances, the very privileges that granted states predominance in international relations are evolving into encumbrances on their ability to meet transnational criminal and proliferant activities.

As transnational policy innovation, the rapidity of decision making, and the execution of strategy become increasingly important in the face of substate international actors who can move quickly and seamlessly across borders, governments have proven incapable of keeping pace, as witnessed by growing trends of criminality around the globe. Indeed, even the most cursory review of the state of the world today leaves little doubt that it is being challenged by a growing array of vexing security threats that do not respect national borders nor the policy stovepipes that have been developed by governments over time to mitigate their destructive impact. Consider the following:

- One quarter of the annual \$4 billion small-arms trade is unauthorized or illicit. Every day around the world, 1,000 people die because of guns, most often trafficked across borders.²

- According to the US government, approximately 800,000 incidents of international human trafficking occur every year. This figure does not include the millions who are trafficked within their own countries. The International Labor Organization estimates that 12.3 million people around the world are in forced labor, including bonded labor, forced child labor, and sexual servitude. Other estimates range up to 27 million individuals.³
- From January 1993 to December 2007, 303 incidents involving unauthorized possession of radiological materials and related criminal activities were confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency's Incident and Trafficking Database. Fifteen illicit nuclear-proliferation incidents reported to the database involved highly enriched uranium and plutonium.⁴ Just five or six kilograms of highly enriched uranium—about the size of a grapefruit—would be sufficient to build a crude terrorist nuclear weapon capable of killing tens of thousands of people with a single attack.
- The spread of counterfeit goods has become global in recent years, and the range of goods subject to intellectual property infringement has increased significantly. According to a study of the Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce, counterfeit goods make up 5 to 7 percent of world trade. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation believes that the first bombing of the World Trade Center, in 1993, was financed by the sale of fake Nike and Olympic T-shirts by followers of Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman.⁵
- As the international financial industry ballooned through the 1990s, it brought with it a proportional expansion in money laundering. By 1998, the director of the International Monetary Fund estimated the global flow of dirty money to be 2 to 5 percent of the global economy. More recent estimates place the flow of laundered money at upwards of 10 percent of the global gross domestic product.⁶
- According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the global drug trade is worth an estimated \$322 billion annually, with 52,356 metric tons of opium, cannabis, cocaine, and amphetamine-type stimulant produced each year.⁷ The economic costs alone of drug abuse in the United States have been estimated at \$182 billion per year.⁸

The size and scope of these challenges—together or even individually—are so vast that they threaten to overwhelm the capabilities of even well-intentioned governments to defeat them. Some have even gloomily concluded that humanity is destined to lose in its struggle against this dark side of globalization. But these disturbing statistics aside, history also shows that uncontrollable violence fomented by these global ills is not inevitable. Mass violence on down to low-level criminal behavior can be tempered, and even prevented, with proactive engagement, habits of preventive investment, and more-effective mechanisms for controlling the production and movement of destructive weaponry, technologies, and illicit substances. Increasingly, these tools are the purview of industry and civil society rather than governments.

With the Beyond Boundaries initiative, Stimson and the Stanley Foundation have demonstrated that wider collaborations with constituencies inside—but perhaps even more importantly, from outside—of government can lead to more-effective and sustainable measures to address transnational challenges. In this case, a consortium of governments, international organizations, industry, and civil society came together to translate the nonproliferation of WMD from an ethereal threat for most of the world into a resource-sharing mechanism to address long-term security and development challenges.

In short, as a result of the Beyond Boundaries model, new assistance streams were developed around the globe, linking the hard-security priorities of donors to an array of higher priority development needs in the Global South. New programmatic activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Interpol, and others were launched in countries once disconnected from those organizations' mandates. In several cases, most notably in the Caribbean and Latin America, governments in those regions became assistance providers, sharing knowledge, training, and resources in innovative South-South partnerships.

Over seven years, the Beyond Boundaries approach also migrated from the margins of official outreach by Resolution 1540 donor states in the Global North to mainstream policy discussions by these governments. The 1540 Committee itself now routinely recognizes in its formal work plans and in its less formal outreach the value of linking Resolution 1540 assistance to the priorities of recipient partners.

The tenth anniversary of Resolution 1540 yields an important opportunity for the international community to reflect upon the successes and failures of its decade-long engagement. Even the most cursory reflection of that history indicates that the traditional nonproliferation policy toolkit is becoming increasingly irrelevant to developing countries, where proliferation threats are seemingly growing the fastest due to lack of the resources needed to manage the intersection between technological innovation and illicit activities. If proliferation threats are to be managed in the 21st century, then this reality must give impetus to more-inventive approaches to nonproliferation engagement.

In sum, while it is clear that the Beyond Boundaries approach bridging security and development is not a panacea to evolving proliferation challenges in the Global South, it is a necessary component of any proliferation policy that aims to remain relevant in an era of globalization. By thinking creatively about how to address these growing threats, proliferation can be better managed while mutually addressing the (rightful) higher priority concerns of the developing world.

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Appendix

Resolution 1540 (2004)

**Adopted by the Security Council
at its 4956th meeting,
on 28 April 2004**

The Security Council,

Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery,* constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming, in this context, the Statement of its President adopted at the Council's meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January, 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,

Recalling also that the Statement underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,

Affirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the

Definitions for the purpose of this resolution only:

- * **Means of delivery:** missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use.
- * **Non-State actor:** individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution.
- * **Related materials:** materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multi-lateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.

proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter,

Affirming its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the importance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully in order to promote international stability,

Welcoming efforts in this context by multilateral arrangements which contribute to non-proliferation,

Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be used as a cover for proliferation,

Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors* such as those identified in the United Nations list established and maintained by the Committee established under Security Council resolution 1267 and those to whom resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery,

Gravely concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials,* which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a threat to international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, sub-regional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security,

Recognizing that most States have undertaken binding legal obligations under treaties to which they are parties, or have made other commitments aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have taken effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive materials, such as those required by the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

and those recommended by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources,

Recognizing further the urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery,

Encouraging all Member States to implement fully the disarmament treaties and agreements to which they are party,

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,

Determined to facilitate henceforth an effective response to global threats in the area of non-proliferation,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides that* all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;
2. *Decides also* that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;
3. *Decides also* that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:
 - a. Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;

- b. Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;
 - c. Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;
 - d. Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations;
4. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all members of the Council, which will, calling as appropriate on other expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination, on the implementation of this resolution, and to this end calls upon States to present a first report no later than six months from the adoption of this resolution to the Committee on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement this resolution;
5. *Decides* that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;
6. *Recognizes* the utility in implementing this resolution of effective national control lists and calls upon all Member States, when

necessary, to pursue at the earliest opportunity the development of such lists;

7. *Recognizes* that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions;
8. *Calls upon* all States:
 - a. To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;
 - b. To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done, to ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral nonproliferation treaties;
 - c. To renew and fulfill their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes;
 - d. To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws;
9. *Calls upon* all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery;
10. Further to counter that threat, *calls upon* all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials;

11. *Expresses* its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be required to this end;
12. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Resolution 1673 (2006)

**Adopted by the Security Council
at its 5429th meeting,
on 27 April 2006**

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), hereafter the 1540 Committee (S/2006/257), and reaffirming its resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004,

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Endorsing the work already carried out by the 1540 Committee, particularly in its consideration of the national reports submitted by States pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004),

Recalling that not all States have presented to the 1540 Committee their reports on the steps they have taken or intend to take to implement resolution 1540 (2004),

Reaffirming its decision that none of the obligations in resolution 1540 (2004) shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Noting that the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States, including the adoption of national laws and measures to ensure

the implementation of these laws, is a long-term task that will require continuous efforts at national, regional and international levels,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reiterates* its decisions in and the requirements of resolution 1540 (2004) and emphasizes the importance for all States to implement fully that resolution;
2. *Calls upon* all States that have not yet presented a first report on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement resolution 1540 (2004) to submit such a report to the 1540 Committee without delay;
3. *Encourages* all States that have submitted such reports to provide, at any time or upon the request of the 1540 Committee, additional information on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);
4. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the 1540 Committee for a period of two years, with the continued assistance of experts, until 27 April 2008;
5. *Decides* that the 1540 Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation by all States of resolution 1540 (2004) through a work programme which shall include the compilation of information on the status of States' implementation of all aspects of resolution 1540 (2004), outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, and which shall address in particular all aspects of paragraphs 1 and 2 of that resolution, as well as of paragraph 3 which encompasses (a) accountability, (b) physical protection, (c) border controls and law enforcement efforts and (d) national export and trans-shipment controls including controls on providing funds and services such as financing to such export and trans-shipment, and in that regard:
 - a. *encourages* the pursuit of the ongoing dialogue between the 1540 Committee and States on the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including on further actions needed from States to that end and on technical assistance needed and offered;

- b. *invites* the 1540 Committee to explore with States and international, regional and subregional organizations experience-sharing and lessons learned in the areas covered by resolution 1540 (2004), and the availability of programmes which might facilitate the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);
6. *Decides* that the 1540 Committee will submit to the Security Council a report no later than 27 April 2008 on compliance with resolution 1540 (2004) through the achievement of the implementation of its requirements;
7. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Resolution 1810 (2008)

**Adopted by the Security Council
at its 5877th meeting,
on 25 April 2008**

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004 and 1673 (2006) of 27 April 2006,

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming the Statement of its President adopted at the Council's meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,

Reaffirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be used as a cover for proliferation,

Affirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter,

Reaffirming its decision that none of the obligations in resolution 1540 (2004) shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Noting also that international cooperation between States, in accordance with international law, is required to counter the illicit trafficking by non-State actors in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials,

Endorsing the work already carried out by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), hereafter the 1540 Committee, in accordance with its fifth Programme of Work,

Bearing in mind the importance of the report requested in paragraph 6 of resolution 1673 (2006),

Noting that not all States have presented to the 1540 Committee their national reports on implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), and that the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States, including the adoption of national laws and measures to ensure implementation of these laws, is a long-term task that will require continuous efforts at national, regional and international levels,

Recognizing in that regard the importance of dialogue between the 1540 Committee and Member States and stressing that direct contact is an effective means of such dialogue,

Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, regional, subregional and international levels, as appropriate, in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security,

Emphasizing in that regard the importance of providing States, in response to their requests, with effective assistance that meets their needs and stressing the importance of ensuring that the clearinghouse function for assistance is efficient and accessible,

Taking note of international efforts towards full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including on preventing the financing of proliferation-related activities, taking into consideration the guidance of the framework of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reiterates* its decisions in and the requirements of resolution 1540 (2004) and emphasizes the importance for all States to implement fully that resolution;
2. *Again calls* upon all States that have not yet presented a first report on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement resolution 1540 (2004) to submit such a report to the 1540 Committee without delay;
3. *Encourages* all States that have submitted such reports to provide, at any time or upon the request of the 1540 Committee, additional information on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);
4. *Encourages* all States to prepare on a voluntary basis summary action plans, with the assistance of the 1540 Committee as appropriate, mapping out their priorities and plans for implementing the key provisions of resolution 1540 (2004), and to submit those plans to the 1540 Committee;
5. *Encourages* States that have requests for assistance to convey them to the 1540 Committee, and encourages them to make use of the Committee's assistance template to that effect; urges States and international, regional and subregional organizations to inform the Committee as appropriate by 25 June 2008 of areas in which they are able to provide assistance; calls upon States and such organizations, if they have not done so previously, to provide the 1540 Committee with a point of contact for assistance by 25 June 2008;

6. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the 1540 Committee for a period of three years, with the continued assistance of experts, until 25 April 2011;
7. *Requests* the 1540 Committee to complete its report as set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 1673 (2006), and to submit it to the Security Council as soon as possible but no later than 31 July 2008;
8. *Requests* the 1540 Committee to consider a comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and to report to the Council on its consideration on the matter by no later than 31 January 2009;
9. *Decides* that the Committee should submit an annual Programme of Work to the Security Council before the end of each January;
10. *Decides* that the 1540 Committee shall continue to intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation by all States of resolution 1540 (2004), through its Programme of Work which includes the compilation of information on the status of States' implementation of all aspects of resolution 1540 (2004), outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, and which addresses in particular all aspects of paragraphs 1 and 2 of that resolution, as well as of paragraph 3 which encompasses (a) accountability, (b) physical protection, (c) border controls and law enforcement efforts and (d) national export and trans-shipment controls including controls on providing funds and services such as financing to such export and trans-shipment;
11. *Decides* in that regard to:
 - a. *encourage* the pursuit of the ongoing dialogue between the 1540 Committee and States on their further actions to implement fully resolution 1540 (2004) and on technical assistance needed and offered;
 - b. *request* the 1540 Committee to continue to organize and participate in outreach events at the regional, subregional and, as appropriate, national level promoting States' implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

- c. *urge* the 1540 Committee to continue strengthening the Committee's role in facilitating technical assistance for implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including by engaging actively in matching offers and requests for assistance through such means as assistance templates, action plans or other information submitted to the 1540 Committee;
 - d. *encourage* the 1540 Committee to engage actively with States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to promote the sharing of experience and lessons learned in the areas covered by resolution 1540 (2004), and to liaise on the availability of programmes which might facilitate the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);
 - e. *request* the 1540 Committee to provide opportunities for interaction with interested States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to promote implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);
12. *Reiterates* the need to enhance ongoing cooperation between the 1540 Committee, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban, and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism, including through, as appropriate, enhanced information sharing, coordination on visits to countries, within their respective mandates, technical assistance and other issues of relevance to all three committees, and expresses its intention to provide guidance to the committees on areas of common interest in order better to coordinate their efforts;
13. *Urges* the 1540 Committee to encourage and take full advantage of voluntary financial contributions to assist States in identifying and addressing their needs for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), and requests the 1540 Committee to consider options for developing and making more effective existing funding mechanisms, and to report to the Council on its consideration of the matter by no later than 31 December 2008;
14. *Decides* that the 1540 Committee will submit to the Security Council a report no later than 24 April 2011 on compliance with

resolution 1540 (2004) through the achievement of the implementation of its requirements;

15. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Resolution 1977 (2011)

**Adopted by the Security Council
at its 6518th meeting,
on 20 April 2011**

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004, 1673 (2006) of 27 April 2006 and 1810 (2008) of 25 April 2008,

Reaffirming that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming the need for all Member States to comply fully with their obligations and fulfill their commitments in relation to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,

Reaffirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be misused for proliferation purposes,

Remaining gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non state actors may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery,

Reaffirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter,

Reaffirming its decision that none of the obligations in resolution 1540 (2004) shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Noting that international cooperation between States, in accordance with international law, is required to counter the illicit trafficking by non-State actors in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials,

Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts at national, regional, subregional and international levels, as appropriate, in order to strengthen a global response to the serious challenge and threat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,

Emphasizing the need for States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, to strengthen export controls, to control access to intangible transfers of technology and to information that could be used for weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, to prevent proliferation financing and shipments, and to secure sensitive materials,

Endorsing the work already carried out by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), hereafter the 1540 Committee, in accordance with its programmes of work, including the establishment of the working groups for facilitating implementation of the Programme of Work,

Recognizing States' progress in implementing resolution 1540 (2004), while noting that States have taken fewer measures in some of its areas,

Endorsing also the valuable activities of the 1540 Committee with relevant international regional and subregional organizations,

Taking note of international efforts towards full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including on preventing the financing of

proliferation-related activities, and taking into consideration the guidance of the framework of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),

Noting that not all States have presented to the 1540 Committee their national reports on implementation of resolution 1540 (2004),

Further noting that the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States, including the adoption of national laws and measures to ensure implementation of these laws, is a long-term task that will require continuous efforts at national, regional and international levels,

Recognizing, in that regard, the importance of dialogue between the 1540 Committee and Member States and stressing that direct contact is an effective means of such dialogue,

Recognizing that many States continue to require assistance in implementing resolution 1540 (2004), emphasizing the importance of providing States, in response to their requests, with effective assistance that meets their needs, and welcoming the coordinating and facilitating role of the 1540 Committee in this regard,

Stressing, in that regard, the need of enhanced assistance and collaboration among States, between the 1540 Committee and States, and between the 1540 Committee and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations in assisting States to implement resolution 1540 (2004),

Recognizing the importance of progress towards achieving the goals and objectives of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit as a contribution to the effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004),

Calling on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress acts of nuclear terrorism including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions, and through appropriate measures to reinforce the existing legal framework with a view to ensure that those committing offences of nuclear terrorism are effectively held accountable,

Endorsing the 2009 comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 and taking note of the findings and recommendations contained in its final document,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

1. *Reiterates* its decisions in and the requirements of resolution 1540 (2004), and re-emphasizes the importance for all States to implement fully that resolution;
2. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the 1540 Committee for a period of 10 years until 25 April 2021;
3. *Decides* that the 1540 Committee will conduct a comprehensive review on the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), both after five years and prior to the renewal of its mandate, including, if necessary, recommendations on adjustments to the mandate, and will submit to the Security Council a report on the conclusions of those reviews, and decides that, accordingly, the first review should be held before December 2016;
4. *Again decides* that the 1540 Committee should submit an annual Programme of Work to the Security Council before the end of each May, and decides that next Programme of Work will be prepared before 31 May 2011;
5. *Decides* to continue to provide the 1540 Committee with the assistance of experts, and to this end:
 - a. *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish, in consultation with the 1540 Committee, a group of up to eight experts (“group of experts”), acting under the direction and purview of the Committee, composed of individuals with the appropriate experience and knowledge to provide the Committee with expertise, to assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate under resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008) and this resolution, including through facilitation of assistance to improve implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);
 - b. *Requests*, in that regard, the 1540 Committee to consider recommendations for the Committee and the group of experts on expertise requirements, broad geographic representation, working methods, modalities, and structure, including consideration of the feasibility of a coordination and leadership position of

the group of experts, and to present these recommendations to the Security Council no later than 31 August 2011;

Implementation

6. *Again calls* upon all States that have not yet presented a first report on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement resolution 1540 (2004) to submit such a report to the Committee without delay;
7. *Again encourages* all States that have submitted such reports to provide, when appropriate or upon the request of the 1540 Committee, additional information on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including, voluntarily, on States' effective practices;
8. *Encourages* all States to prepare on a voluntary basis national implementation action plans, with the assistance of the 1540 Committee as appropriate, mapping out their priorities and plans for implementing the key provisions of resolution 1540 (2004), and to submit those plans to the 1540 Committee;
9. *Decides* that the 1540 Committee shall continue to intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation by all States of resolution 1540 (2004), through its Programme of Work, which includes the compilation and general examination of information on the status of States' implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) as well as States' efforts at outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation; and which addresses in particular all aspects of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of that resolution, which encompasses (a) accountability, (b) physical protection, (c) border controls and law enforcement efforts and (d) national export and trans-shipment controls including controls on providing funds and services such as financing to such exports and trans-shipments; and includes, as necessary, specific priorities for its work, taking into account its annual review on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), prepared with the assistance of the group of experts before the end of each December;
10. *Urges* the 1540 Committee to continue to engage actively with States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to promote the sharing of experience, lessons learned and effective practices, in the areas covered by resolution 1540 (2004), drawing in particular on information provided by States as well

as examples of successful assistance, and to liaise on the availability of programmes which might facilitate the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), while bearing in mind that customized assistance is useful for the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) at national levels;

11. *Encourages*, in that regard, the 1540 Committee, with the support of necessary relevant expertise, to actively engage in dialogue with States on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including through visits to States at their invitation;
12. *Requests* the 1540 Committee, with the support of the group of experts, to identify effective practices, templates and guidance, with a view to develop a compilation, as well as to consider preparing a technical reference guide about resolution 1540 (2004), to be used by States on a voluntary basis in implementing resolution 1540 (2004), and in that regard, encourages the 1540 Committee, at its discretion, to draw also on relevant expertise, including, civil society and the private sector, with, as appropriate, their State's consent;

Assistance

13. *Encourages* States that have requests for assistance to convey them to the 1540 Committee, and encourages them to make use of the Committee's assistance template to that effect;
14. *Urges* States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to inform the Committee as appropriate of areas in which they are able to provide assistance; and calls upon States and such organizations, if they have not done so previously, to provide the 1540 Committee with a point of contact for assistance by 31 August 2011;
15. *Urges* the 1540 Committee to continue strengthening the Committee's role in facilitating technical assistance for implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), in particular by engaging actively, with the support of the group of experts, in matching offers and requests for assistance, through such means as visits to States, at the invitation of the State concerned, assistance templates, action plans or other information submitted to the 1540 Committee;

16. *Supports* the continued efforts of the 1540 Committee to secure a coordinated and transparent assistance process that provides timely and ready availability of information for States seeking assistance and for States prepared to provide assistance;
17. *Encourages* meetings on assistance issues with the participation of the 1540 Committee, between States prepared to offer assistance, States requesting assistance, other interested States, and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations;

Cooperation with International, Regional, and Subregional Organizations

18. *Calls upon* relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to designate and provide the 1540 Committee by 31 August 2011 with a point of contact or coordinator for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004); and encourages them to enhance cooperation and information sharing with the 1540 Committee on technical assistance and all other issues of relevance for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);
19. *Reiterates* the need to continue to enhance ongoing cooperation among the 1540 Committee, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban, and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism, including through, as appropriate, enhanced information sharing, coordination on visits to States, within their respective mandates, technical assistance and other issues of relevance to all three committees; and expressing its intention to provide guidance to the committees on areas of common interest in order to better coordinate their efforts;

Transparency and Outreach

20. *Requests* the 1540 Committee to continue to institute transparency measures and activities, inter alia by making fullest possible use of the Committee's website, and urges the Committee to conduct, with the participation of the group of experts, regular meetings open to all Member States on the Committee's and group's activities related to the aforementioned objectives;

21. *Requests* the 1540 Committee to continue to organize and participate in outreach events on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) at the international, regional, subregional, and, as appropriate, national level, and promote the refinement of these outreach efforts to focus on specific thematic and regional issues related to implementation;

Administration and Resources

22. *Recognizes* that implementation of the mandate of the 1540 Committee requires sustained support and adequate resources; and to that end:
 - a. *Endorses* the existing administrative and logistics support to the 1540 Committee from the Office for Disarmament Affairs, and decides that the Committee should report to the Council by January 2012 on the possibility of strengthening this support, including through strengthening of ODA's regional capacity to support the implementation of the resolution at regional, subregional and national levels;
 - b. *Calls upon* the Secretariat to provide and maintain sufficient expertise to support activities of the 1540 Committee as outlined in the present resolution;
 - c. *Encourages* States that are able to do so to provide resources to the Office of Disarmament Affairs to assist States in implementing their 1540 obligations, and to make available "in kind" contributions or cost-free training and expertise to the 1540 Committee to help the group of experts meet requests for assistance in a timely and effective manner;
 - d. *Invites* the 1540 Committee to consider developing, in close cooperation with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and other United Nations bodies, ways to utilize and maintain expertise, including, in particular, of former experts of the group, that could be made available for specific missions and assistance needs regarding the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

- e. *Urges* the 1540 Committee to continue to encourage and take full advantage of voluntary financial contributions to assist States in identifying and addressing their needs for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), and requests the 1540 Committee at its discretion, to promote the efficient and effective use of the existing funding mechanisms within the United Nations system;

23. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Resolution 2055 (2012)

**Adopted by the Security Council
at its 6795th meeting,
on 29 June 2012**

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004, 1673 (2006) of 27 April 2006, 1810 (2008) of 25 April 2008, and 1977 (2011) of 20 April 2011,

Recalling its decision in resolution 1977 (2011) to extend the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), hereafter the 1540 Committee, until 25 April 2021,

Emphasizing the 1540 Committee's significantly increased workload over the course of its mandate,

Recalling, in that regard, its decision in paragraph 5 of resolution 1977 (2011) to continue to provide the 1540 Committee with the assistance of experts,

Requests the Secretary-General to increase the size of the group of experts referred to in paragraph 5 (a) of resolution 1977 (2011) to up to nine experts.

About the Authors

O'Neil Hamilton

O'Neil Hamilton is the regional coordinator for the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member states. He has served the CARICOM Secretariat and the government of Jamaica in several capacities and has advised senior government and security officials in CARICOM member states in a range of areas related to regional security. Hamilton is also a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center.

Hamilton was also special adviser to CARICOM's Ministerial Subcommittee on Resource Mobilization for Crime and Security, adviser to the CARICOM Council of Ministers Responsible for National Security and Law Enforcement, and special adviser to Jamaica's minister of national security. Prior to and during the hosting of Cricket World Cup 2007, Hamilton coordinated the region's security-diplomacy effort on behalf of CARICOM and was seconded to CARICOM's Ad Hoc Committee on Security, in which capacity he advised the ministers of national security of Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, in addition to Jamaica. During his tour at the Embassy of Jamaica in Washington, Hamilton also served as his government's representative to the 5th Evaluation Round of the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission. Hamilton holds bachelor's degrees in government and sociology from the University of Texas at Austin and a master's degree in international public policy from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

Noramly bin Muslim

Professor Emeritus Noramly bin Muslim is in the department of science and technology at the National University of Malaysia and is a visiting professor at the College of Engineering, Universiti Tenaga Malaysia. Until recently, he also served as the chairman of the Malaysian Atomic Energy Licensing Board. He served as the UN International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) deputy director-general and head of its department of

technical assistance and cooperation, where he coordinated the IAEA Technical Assistance Program in Vienna. Noramly has also served as the head of the Malaysian Nuclear Research Centre and head of the Defence Research Centre of Malaysia. He has held several appointments at the National University of Malaysia, including deputy vice chancellor (research and development). He has honorary doctorates of philosophy (science) from the National University of Malaysia and the University of Malaysia Sabah for his contributions to the community, the nation, academic development, and the development of science and technology in Malaysia. He also has an honorary doctor of letters degree from the University of Western Australia for his contributions to internationalism, and his national awards include Malaysian federal and state honors.

Al-Sharif Nasser bin Nasser

Al-Sharif Nasser bin Nasser is the managing director of the Middle East Scientific Institute for Security based in Amman, Jordan. In this position, he focuses on furthering scientific and technological solutions to some of the challenges facing the region, with a specific focus on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) issues. Nasser is also the head of the Middle East Regional Secretariat, the first of eight secretariats to be established globally under the European Union's Centres of Excellence initiative on CBRN issues.

Previously, Nasser worked in the office of His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan, where he last served as senior analyst in the Foreign Affairs Directorate. During that time, he managed several bilateral and thematic files and led analytical studies on Jordan's regional and international relations.

Nasser is also involved with numerous organizations. He served as the chairman of a leading insurance company in Jordan and currently serves as the vice chairman of a public national commission offering support to injured and disabled veterans, as well as the president of a charity that offers therapeutic riding services to children with special needs. He received his master's degree in Near Eastern studies from Princeton University and his undergraduate degree in environmental science and policy and business management from Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts (2001). Nasser is also the chair of the Princeton alumni committee in Jordan.

Ochieng Adala

Ambassador Ochieng Adala, a career diplomat, is currently the acting executive director of the Africa Peace Forum. He retired in April 1994 after 30 years in Kenya's foreign service, having been Kenya's ambassador and high commissioner to Zambia and the southern African countries of Mozambique, Lesotho, Malawi, Botswana, and Swaziland (1977–1983); ambassador to Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia (1984–1988); and permanent representative to the United Nations in New York (1992–1993). He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Cuttington College and Divinity School in Liberia (1963) and a postgraduate diploma in international relations from the University of Geneva Institute for Higher Education (1967). He has participated at the Pugwash Annual Conferences on Science and World Affairs since 1999 and was elected a member of the Pugwash Council for 2002–2012.

Ana Maria Cerini

Ana Maria Cerini is an attorney at law at the University of Buenos Aires in Argentina. She has served as an expert affiliated with the work of the United Nations Security Council committee established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1540, assisting the 1540 Committee in facilitating the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1673, and 1810, as well as performing specific tasks in implementing the committee's program of work. During her tenure, Cerini stressed cooperation with the Organization of American States Inter-American Committee against Terrorism and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs to support conducting consultations with Latin American countries in designing a capacity-building plan in coordination with all relevant national authorities to support the implementation of UNSCR 1540. Cerini also cooperated with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in several workshops and with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in the pilot workshop on legislation organized for the national implementation of the treaty with Mexico, Panama, and the Dominican Republic, in relation to obligations required by Resolution 1540.

Alexander Chacón

Alexander Chacon is a legal adviser at the National Ombudsman's Office of Costa Rica, responsible for directing and monitoring agreements as a result of negotiations between interministerial representatives of the public sector. He is also the director and professor for the Democratic Security and Regional Integration course for the Central American Integration System (SICA) regional online training plan. While at SICA, he was a pioneer of the team responsible for starting the Democratic Security Unit of the General Secretariat (SG-SICA). Chacon was also the technical adviser to the Legal Subcommittee of the Central American Security Commission and delegated to participate in international forums and meetings as a speaker on behalf of the SG-SICA. He was in charge of coordinating the issue of personal data protection as the focal point for the Latin American Network. Chacon has also served as the 1540 regional coordinator for SICA in charge of promoting the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 for all SICA member states.

He is a member of the Bar Association of Costa Rica and the Association of Professionals in Politics and International Relations of Costa Rica. Chacon holds a bachelor's degree in political science with emphasis on government and public policies from the University of Costa Rica.

Brian Finlay, Editor

Brian Finlay is the managing director of the Stimson Center, a non-profit public policy think tank in Washington, DC. He also directs the center's Managing Across Boundaries initiative. That effort looks for innovative government responses—at the international, national, and regional levels—and for smart public-private partnerships to mitigate transnational security threats and ameliorate development challenges. His areas of expertise include nonproliferation, transnational crime, countertrafficking, supply-chain security, and private sector engagement. Finlay is also an adjunct instructor in the School of International Service at American University in Washington, DC.

Prior to joining Stimson, Finlay served as executive director of a Washington-based lobbying and media campaign focused on counterterrorism issues, a senior researcher at the Brookings Institution, and a program officer at the Century Foundation. He was a project manager for the Laboratory Center for Disease Control/Health Canada and worked with the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. He sits on the advisory boards of Trojan Defense LLC, a start-up technology firm focused on supply-chain security, and BlackMarketWatch.org, a European nonprofit organization working to prevent the trade in counterfeit and other illicit goods. He is also a member of the board of directors of iMMAP, a pioneering organization leading the way in the effective use of information management practices in the service of humanitarian relief and development.

Finlay has authored and coauthored numerous books, monographs, and reports, and is widely published in academic and policy journals and magazines. He is frequently asked to provide expert analysis and commentary on transnational and development challenges to media outlets around the world. Finlay holds a master's degree from the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, a graduate diploma from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and an honors bachelor's degree from the University of Western Ontario.

About the Project

The goal of the Beyond Boundries initiative is threefold:

- To identify new sources of assistance to address endemic threats in the developing world. These include poverty, corruption, infectious diseases, and economic underdevelopment.
- To expand a successful new engagement model that treats the root causes of proliferation rather than its symptoms.
- To reinforce the legitimacy of the United Nations as an effective mechanism to address transnational issues.

A joint initiative of the Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, the project aims to develop scalable, sustainable, and replicable pilot efforts that pragmatically pair states in need of development assistance with those states willing to offer such assistance under the auspices of national security.

Unlike traditional assistance measures, this effort helps bridge the gap between soft-security (development) and hard-security (nonproliferation) objectives, thereby addressing identified in-country needs of the Global South while building state capacity to manage and ensure the sustainability of nonproliferation and global security efforts. The result is less duplication of effort and more efficient utilization of limited resources for the global good. Further information can be found at <http://www.stimson.org/programs/managing-across-boundaries/>.

About the Stanley Foundation

The Stanley Foundation advances multilateral action to create fair, just, and lasting solutions to critical issues of peace and security. Our work is built on the belief that greater international cooperation will enhance global governance and spur global citizenship. The foundation frequently collaborates with a wide range of organizations using different forums, formats, and venues to engage policy communities. We do not make grants.

Our programming addresses profound threats to human survival where improved multilateral governance and cooperation are fundamental to transforming real-world policy. Current efforts focus on policy improvement to prevent genocide and mass atrocities, eliminate the threat of nuclear terrorism, and drive collective and long-term action on climate change. The foundation also works to promote global education in our hometown of Muscatine, Iowa, and nearby.

A private operating foundation established in 1956, the Stanley Foundation maintains a long-term, independent, and nonpartisan perspective. Our publications, multimedia resources, and a wealth of other information about programming are available at *www.stanleyfoundation.org*.

About Stimson

The Stimson Center is a nonprofit and nonpartisan think tank that seeks pragmatic solutions for some of the most important peace and security challenges around the world. Stimson's analysts make the center a trusted source of expert knowledge, fresh perspectives, policy prescriptions, and creative ideas. Through rigorous, in-depth analysis driven by facts rather than ideology, Stimson focuses on:

- Strengthening institutions for international peace and security.
- Building regional security.
- Reducing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and transnational threats.

By engaging policymakers, policy implementers, and nongovernmental institutions as well as other experts, Stimson is able to craft recommendations that cut across political party lines and are actionable and effective.

The Stimson Center has been honored as one of the top think tanks in the world and received the prestigious MacArthur Award for Creative and Effective Institutions in 2013.

About the Managing Across Boundaries Initiative

The Managing Across Boundaries program works to address an increasing array of transnational challenges, from WMD proliferation and the global drug trade to contemporary human slavery, small-arms trafficking, and counterfeit intellectual property. The initiative looks for innovative government responses at the national, regional, and international levels, as well as smart public-private partnerships to mitigate these threats. Our experts and researchers work to conceptualize and catalyze whole-of-society solutions to the most pressing transnational challenges of our day.

In 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1540. Its goal was to prevent the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through mandatory adoption of global supply-side controls over sensitive materials, technologies, and know-how. After several years, however, it became clear that the resolution's implementation was lagging in important regions, particularly in the Global South.

For developed countries, terrorism—particularly involving the use of WMD—is a high-priority threat. But for many countries in the developing world, other issues such as poverty, disease, illicit arms trafficking, and lack of access to education are far more immediate concerns that rightly take precedence. Reconciling these differences in threat priorities became imperative in order to assure the successful implementation of Resolution 1540 worldwide.

In response to the challenges posed by this artificial divide between security and development, Stimson and the Stanley Foundation launched an initiative that explored the methods by which governments, civil society, and industry could integrate the priorities of developing world governments with the Resolution 1540 mandate.

This volume synthesizes our seven-year endeavor, which involved extensive research, field workshops and interviews, and assessments in six regions of the Global South. It assesses the successes and the challenges of our "whole of society" approach to implementing Resolution 1540 through the eyes of experts in the Caribbean, Central America, the Andean region, the Middle East, Eastern Africa, and Southeast Asia.

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