

The Italian Civil Security System

IAI RESEARCH PAPERS

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Edizioni Nuova Cultura



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Natalino Ronzitti

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Executive Summary

Italy is exposed to a wide range of natural hazards, such as landslides, flooding, and in particular earthquakes. The Italian complex civil security system is based on a flexible interaction among its numerous institutional actors. Depending on the profile of crisis, the central government and/or the local levels (municipalities, provinces, regions) intervene together with voluntary organizations and to a lesser extent private actors.

The Italian civil security system is based on the presence of civil defence and civil protection domains. While civil defence primarily regards *intentional* acts, such as terrorism or intentional release of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) agents, civil protection mainly concerns safeguarding, rescuing and assisting the population as well as protecting and recovering goods in the event of *involuntary* natural or man-made disasters. This has led to the development of a system of crisis management with dedicated branches for the two categories and complementarity among actors at the operational level. A National Service deals with Civil Protection, under the coordination of the Civil Protection Department within the Presidency of the Council of Ministers at governmental level. A Civil Defence Department is established within the Ministry of Interior. The presence of civil defence and civil protection domains entails two different budgets within the civil security system. In 2012, EUR 1,747,977,737 were allocated to the Fire Brigades, Public Rescue and Civil Defence Department, and EUR 1,670,392,269 were given to the Civil Protection Department.

Italy's dominant crisis management approach is primarily based on civilian activities but in some cases the military contributes as well, particularly the Army, the Carabinieri, and the Navy. The civil security system adopts an all-hazards approach to crisis management, and adjusts its interventions to each specific situation. Italy has widespread risks throughout the territory, and has therefore developed a response system based on the principle of *subsidiarity*: the action starts from the local level and involves the relevant administrations upwards. Disasters are classified in three different types based on extension, intensity and responsiveness of civil protection: "type a" (municipal level), "type b" (provincial and regional) and "type c" (national).

The Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers adopted on 5 May 2010 (G.U. No. 139, 17 June 2010) represents one of the cornerstones of the Italian crisis management approach, as it modifies the composition and competences of some of the existing actors and introduces new ones. From the top political and institutional level the following national decision-making bodies are in place: President of the Council of Ministers; Council of Ministers; Strategic Political Committee; National Decisional Centre; Situation and Planning Interdepartmental Unit.

Concerning the political dimension, the primary responsible actor for crisis preparedness and response is the mayor. In the event of a national emergency, the primary executive responsible is rather the President of Council of Ministers, who acts through the National Civil Protection Department and directs and coordinates the activity of the operational structures of civil protection.

Regarding the operational dimension, the civil defence crisis management system has been activated in view of the Millennium Bug and reportedly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In contrast, the civil protection system has dealt with several crisis. The biggest one was the 2009 earthquake of magnitude 5.8 which hit the Province of L'Aquila claiming the lives of 309 people, injuring thousands of citizens, causing tens of thousands displaced persons and provoking severe material destruction.

The external dimension of the Italian civil security system is characterized by both multilateral and bilateral cooperation, particularly with neighbouring countries in the Mediterranean region, including active participation to projects PICRIT, FIRE4, PPRD-South EUROMED.

The awareness of citizens' responsibility to protect their lives and environment has increased in recent years, as showed by the growth of voluntary organizations. Half of the Italian citizens (49%) perceives natural and man-made disasters as the most likely threats, and the percentage of Italians concerned about earthquakes (58%) is much higher than the EU average (22%). As of November 2011, 60% of Italian citizens believe that Italy is doing enough to fight terrorism, while 52% think the country is doing enough to manage natural and man-made disasters. Moreover, 28% of Italian citizens feels informed on crisis preparedness, in line with the European average (29%). Tools such as the pamphlet "The Civil Protection Handbook for Families" are used to increase information, while the Safe School Project has the objective to educate children and teachers to cooperation, solidarity, and self-control, so that they are able to behave correctly during emergency situations. In addition, the training activity of

the Civil Protection Department aims, in particular, to promote the growth of a shared “culture of civil protection”, including common operational procedures to be implemented throughout the country, while the National Fire Brigades provide “internal” and “external” training programmes. Finally, in 2005 there was the first official terrorist attack simulation/drill in Milan, involving 2,000 people and relevant actors of the civil security system.

Undoubtedly, volunteer organizations play a decisive role in Italy’s civil security system by providing human resources and qualified support both in preparedness and response phases. The Italian Red Cross has around 160,000 volunteers, 5,000 employees and 1,000 offices throughout Italy. For example, a specific aspect of the Italian civil security systems is the solidarity role played by the Catholic Church.

While in the past the private sector predominantly expected to be protected by the State, nowadays it is becoming increasingly aware that it should be more active. The case of Critical Infrastructures (CI) deserves particular attention as private actors are owners of CI and/or manage their security: they have to comply with EC Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructures (ECI) and the assessment of the need to improve their protection that was implemented in Italy with Legislative Decree No. 61/2011 (G.U. No. 102, 4 May 2011).

An example of professional inquiry assessing the effectiveness of the civil security system is the trial against seven members of the Civil Protection Commission accused to have overly reassured L’Aquila citizens before the 2009 earthquake. The first non-definitive judgement sentenced them to six years in jail for failing to give adequate safety warnings. The judgment was heavily criticized from the international scientific community on the assumption that natural disasters cannot be forecast or ruled out with absolute certainty.

About the 54%, are not aware that the EU coordinates civil protection both inside and outside the Union. This is confirmed by the fact that about 69% of Italian citizens declare to be not “Well informed” or “Not very well informed” about civil protection activities of the EU. An overwhelming majority of Italian citizens (82%) believes that a coordinated EU action in dealing with disasters is more effective than actions by individual States, perfectly in line with the EU average (82%).

Introduction

This IAI Research Paper extensively draws from the work conducted within the project “Analysis of Civil Security Systems in Europe” (ANVIL)¹. The ANVIL project is a Framework Programme Seven (FP7) Security Program Coordination and Support Action, co-funded by the European Commission. The research activities started in March 2012 and lasted until February 2014. The project involved 12 partners from 11 different countries in Europe, including academia and think tanks: Research Management AS (Norway, project coordination); Utrecht University (the Netherlands); Swedish Institute for International Affairs (Sweden); University of Essex (UK); Institute for International Relations (Croatia); Hellenberg International (Finland); Istituto Affari Internazionali (Italy); Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (Germany); Swedish National Defence College (Sweden); University of Belgrade/Faculty of Security Studies (Serbia); Foundation for Strategic Studies (France); Adam Mickiewicz University (Poland).

The ANVIL project delivered on the analysis of twenty-two European country studies, including nineteen EU Member States and three non-EU countries: Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In addition, the ANVIL project analysed eight regional organizations dealing with various aspects of civil security in Europe: Barents Euro-Arctic Region – BEAR; Baltic Sea Maritime Cooperation – BSMC; Council of the Baltic Sea States – CBSS; Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative for South-Eastern Europe - DPPI SEE; Helsinki Commission – HELCOM; International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River – ICPDR; International Sava River Commission – ISRBC; Visegrad Group.

The project’s aim was two-fold. Firstly, it sought to provide an in-depth and updated mapping of the rather unknown reality of civil security systems in Europe. Secondly, it aimed at looking for good practices among

¹ All information on the project and the published material can be found on the website <http://anvil-project.net>.

analysed countries as well as for possible EU added value in this field. Civil security is a dynamic area of European cooperation: there have been many trans-boundary disasters in Europe and the need to know more about the preconditions for further European cooperation emerged, by starting from national diversities and patterns.²

The Istituto Affari Internazionali contributed to all phases of the research project, including the effort to develop a common methodology led by the University of Utrecht and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. In particular, IAI has prepared Italy's country report, and has been responsible to develop the Mapping Protocol used to analyse the aforementioned regional organizations.

By drawing on such work, this Research Paper presents an extended and reviewed version of Italy's country report, aimed to provide to scholars, practitioners, and stakeholders, a comprehensive and understandable picture of the complex and evolving Italian reality.

This complex exercise has been supported by interviews to Italian stakeholders that kindly provided their valuable views in different phases of the study. A list of the interviewees' affiliation can be found in Bibliography (Interviews). No opinion has been directly attributed to a specific stakeholder.

In order to explain the rationale and limits of such analysis some preliminary clarifications are necessary on the methodology adopted to analyse the Italian case study. According to the Analysis Framework laid down as a basis for the research activity,³ civil security systems are defined as "all national policies, bodies and mechanisms aimed at crisis preparation and response to enhance the safety and security of citizens". The Analysis Framework recognizes that civil security systems in Europe show a great variety of rules, structures, policies, and practices, which reflect the variety of threats and risks affecting each European country. Not surprisingly, every country analysed has developed a unique approach to safeguard citizens' security and safety, according to its historical and cultural context, as well as to the national constitutional and legal framework. The bottom line is that there is no "one-size-fits-all" approach to civil security.

Four analytical dimensions have been identified as the basis for all country studies, in order to map such a differentiated landscape. First,

² ANVIL WP6 Information Sheet.

³ Dr. Sanneke Kuipers from Utrecht University was responsible to develop the Analysis Framework for ANVIL project.

the cultural and historical aspects of the civil security system have been addressed, including both administrative tradition and government/social culture. Second, the legal/constitutional aspects of the civil security system have been tackled, encompassing: the legal framework (“statutory basis”); the political dimension concerning executive responsibility, policy formulation and accountability; the operational dimensions referring to implementation agencies, operational tasks and responsibilities, and accountability; the external dimension, in terms of bilateral relations with other countries and provisions for multinational or bilateral cooperation related to the civil security domain with EU Member States and non-EU countries. Third, the relations between the civil security system and citizens have been considered, in terms of expectations from the latter and information/education from the former. Fourth, the role of the private sector in civil security has been analysed, including profit oriented and non-profit organizations.

The country studies also looked at the quality of civil security systems, in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy. These three quality measures proved to be extremely difficult to define; nevertheless, an analytical effort was made in order to collect relevant indicators in this regard. Obviously, different systems can be equally effective, also considering the diversity of risks and crisis affecting European countries. Finally, the Analysis Framework envisaged, for each country study, a specific focus on the relation between the national civil security system and the EU civil protection mechanism and policies.

On the basis of the aforementioned Analysis Framework, a common Mapping Protocol⁴ was elaborated to steer the twenty-two country studies and to achieve comparable analysis. First, the four analytical dimensions were further detailed. For instance, regarding cultural and historical aspects, factors taken into account include earlier experiences with critical crisis and disasters, dominant threat perception, conception of the government role in times of crisis. Concerning legal/constitutional aspects, it is worth noticing that they determine the lines of authority connecting civil security system to the broader political context. They also influence the role played by lead authorities and the extent to which authority is delegated from the political to the administrative level. With

⁴ Prof. Mark Rhinard and Mette Bakken from the Swedish Institute of International Affairs were responsible for developing the Mapping Protocol for the country studies within the ANVIL project.

regard to the relations between the civil security system and the citizens, it should be stressed that the dominant role enjoyed by the State during the Cold War has changed in the last two decades, by shifting more responsibilities to citizens and by putting a greater emphasis on societal resilience. Finally, critical infrastructures are increasingly owned and/or operated by private companies and the latter can be responsible for the security of public critical infrastructures, therefore the role of the private sector in civil security has increased together with a more complex relation with public authorities. Finally, the relation between national civil security system and the EU has been included in the analysis, by looking at both Union's support to national crisis management and the country's contribution to European civil security activities.

The very same definition of "crisis" is subject to different interpretations by official documents from European and national authorities as well as by the academic literature and interviewed stakeholders – a debate which is beyond the scope of this paper. The adopted working definition of "crisis" refers to serious, materializing threats to the well-being of citizens and the integrity and functioning of critical infrastructures. In particular, the "signature crisis" is defined as a major crisis that is kept as a central feature of the collective memory of the country. Typical examples of signature crisis are the Utoya shootings occurred in Norway in 2011, the L'Aquila earthquake happened in Italy in 2009 and the Estonia ferry accident of 1994. In contrast, "typical crisis" are characterised by their frequency, and whilst having major repercussion (i.e. in the way that they can threaten peoples' lives) they usually have a more narrow scope than signature crisis. Examples of this kind of re-occurring crisis are flooding in the Netherlands, storms in Sweden, forest fires in Spain and Portugal. Considering typical and signature crisis together is important to understand how a civil security system works, both out of a state of emergency and when it is tested at critical junctures.

For the sake of clarity and comparison, according to the Mapping Protocol all crisis are grouped into four categories. The first category includes natural disasters and infectious diseases, such as earthquakes, wild fires, floods, landslides droughts, epidemics, etc. The second group encompasses industrial disasters and transportation accidents that cause great damages, injury and/or the loss of human lives, resulted from accidents, negligence and/or incompetence, like chemical or nuclear incidents, plane or train crashes, etc. The third cluster refers to failures of critical infrastructures, for example regarding electricity grids or pipelines, which may lead

to critical supply problems and may also occur as a consequence of other crisis such as natural disasters. By borrowing the UN definition of terrorist attacks, the fourth category includes acts “intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” - like the London transports bombing in 2005. Every country study has considered not only specific crisis occurred in the national territory, but also the case of 2009 N1H1 flu in order to assess how different systems responded to the same kind of crisis - although the disease affected in different ways various European countries.

In general terms, the process of crisis management can be described according to four phases: prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. Prevention aims to prevent risks or threats from developing into a crisis and/or reduce the effects of disasters. For example, prevention is achieved through analysis of risks and vulnerabilities, as well as identification and evaluation of hazards, which in turn provide information useful to address potential threats and mitigate risks. Prevention does encompass a wide-range set of activities, from intelligence gathering to development of new laws and regulation, to the construction and maintenance of infrastructures such as dikes. Preparedness refers to the efforts of reducing the impact of large-scale crisis on a society, for instance through the set up of surveillance and early warning systems, the procurement of necessary equipment and materials, adequate planning, and capacity building at central and local level. Response involves the mobilisation of first responders, agencies and organizations in the aftermath of an actual incident, in order to address its immediate effects. These efforts may vary according to the type of crisis, and can include the deployment of emergency personnel (fire brigades, police, etc.), the activation of certain procedures, coordination efforts across and between governments, etc. Finally, recovery starts when immediate needs have been addressed and focuses on restoration. As recovery and prevention involve almost all government activities and can endure for long time, this Research Paper focuses on preparedness and response in order to provide more accurate analysis of these two crucial phases of the crisis management process.

List of Acronyms

AII	Adriatic Ionian Initiative
AIIC	Associazione Italiana esperti in Infrastrutture Critiche (Italian Association of Experts on Critical Infrastructures)
ANAS	Azienda Nazionale Autonoma delle Strade Statali (National Autonomous State Routes Board)
ANSF	Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza delle Ferrovie (National Agency for Railways Security)
CASE	Centri Abitativi Sismicamente Ecocompatibili (Households Earthquake-Proved)
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CCM	Centro nazionale per la prevenzione ed il controllo delle malattie (National Centre for Disease Prevention and Control)
CDN	Centro Decisionale Nazionale (National Decisional Center)
CEI	Conferenza Episcopale Italiana (Italian Bishops Conference)
CI	Critical Infrastructures
CITDC	Commissione Interministeriale Tecnica per la Difesa Civile (Technical Interdepartmental Commission for Civil Defence)
CNR	Consiglio Nazionale della Ricerca (National Research Council)
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CoPS	Comitato Politico Strategico (Political Strategic Committee)
ENAC	Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile (National Board for Civil Aviation)
ECI	European Critical Infrastructure
ENAV	Ente Nazionale di Assistenza al Volo (National Board for Flight Assistance)
ERA	European Railway Agency
EDA	Elaboratore Distacchi Automatici (Automatic Detachments Calculator)
EU TEREX	European Union Tuscany Earthquake Relief Exercise
FAI	Federazione Anarchica Informale (Informal Anarchical Federation)

FIRE	Force d'Intervention Rapide Européenne (European Rapid Intervention Force)
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
IAI	Istituto Affari Internazionali
ILI	Influenza-Like Illness
ISPRA	Istituto Superiore per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale (Institute for Environmental Protection and Research)
MAP	Moduli Abitativi Provvisori (Temporary Housing Units)
MIC	Monitoring and Information Centre
MUSP	Moduli ad Uso Scolastico Provvisorio (Temporary Schooling Units)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NISP	Nucleo interministeriale situazione e pianificazione (Situation and Planning Interdepartmental Unit)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
UN	United Nations
PSO	Piano di Sicurezza dell'Operatore (Operator's Security Plan)
R&D	Research and Development
R&T	Research and Technology
SIC	Segreteria Infrastrutture Critiche (Critical Infrastructures Secretariat)
SERIT	Security Research in Italy
SSI	Sala Situazione Italia (Italy Situation Room)
SMOM	Sovereign Military Order of Malta
TWIST	Tidal Wave in Southern Tyrrhenian Sea
UARS	Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite
WHO	World Health Organization

Overview

Italy has a complex civil security system, based on a flexible interaction among its numerous institutional actors. Depending on the profile of crisis that the country has to deal with, the central government and/or the local levels (municipalities, provinces, regions) intervene together with voluntary organizations and, to a lesser extent, with private actors. The Italian civil security system is based on the presence of civil defence and civil protection domains that has led to the development of a system of crisis management with dedicated branches for the two domains and complementarity among their actors at operational level.

The system has progressively reached such equilibrium by moving from a primacy of civil defence in the Cold War era towards the current greater role of the civil protection. This evolution has implied frictions among different institutional actors involved in the shift of competences and power. Today the civil security system still witnesses a certain degree of overlap between the two domains coupled with the above-mentioned substantial complementarity. The President of the Council of Ministers (*Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri*), being the apex of Italian executive power, ensures the coordination among different institutional actors involved in the two domains. Italy's national territory is exposed to a wide range of natural hazards. From a geological point of view, Italy is one of the Mediterranean countries with the highest seismic risk due to its particular geographic position at the convergence of the African and Eurasian plates. This results in the great dynamism of its territory that is at the basis of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. Similarly, the risk of natural disasters such as landslides, mudflows and flooding is high. Moreover, the risk of technological and industrial disasters is widespread throughout the Italian territory, particularly in the highly industrialized northern regions. Risks come from big and small industrial complexes and factories, as well as from transportation of dangerous substances by road, rail, water and air. In the last fourty years, the economic damage caused by seismic events has been assessed at around EUR 80 billion which adds to the damage to historical, artistic and monumental heritage. This is mainly due to the high population density and to the considerable fragility of certain buildings. In addition, as a consequence of the poor territorial management, town planning goals

have not always been met, leading to the construction of buildings in highly dangerous areas vulnerable to natural disasters (as epitomized by the Genova flooding in November 2011, in particular in the Foce quarter area¹).

The most important crisis affecting Italy's civil security system from 2000 to 2013 are shown in the table below:

Table 1 - List of relevant crisis 2000-2013

Month/ year	Crisis Description	Site/ Area of crisis	Crisis category	Damage		
				# of person killed	# of person injured	# of person affected
09/2000	Flood	Soverato	Natural disaster	12		
10/2000	Flood	North Italy	Natural disaster	23		40,000
10/2002	Earthquake	Molise	Natural disaster	90	100	3,000
10/2002- 01/2003	Volcano eruption	Catania	Natural disaster			1,120
09/2003	Electricity black-out	Italy	Infrastructure failure			32 milion (electricity consumption)
04/2009	Earthquake	L'Aquila	Natural disaster	309	1,500	65,000
06/2009	Train derailment + leakage of gas and toxic materials	Viareggio	Transporta- tion accident + industrial disaster	31	17	
2009	H1N1	Italy	Infectious disease	260		2,000
10/2009	Mudslide	Messina	Natural disaster	37	95	2,000
01/2012	Costa Concordia disaster	Isola del Giglio	Transportation accident	32	110	4,232
05/2012	Earthquake	Emilia Romagna	Natural disaster	28	350	45,000
05/2013	Cargo ship accident	Genoa	Transportation accident	9	4	
11/2013	Flood	Olbia	Natural disaster	18		2,700

¹ The term "foce" means "estuary"

Besides the relevant crisis shown by the table above, it shall be reported that during the 27th G8 Summit in July 2001 the city of Genoa experienced severe protests, with almost 200,000 demonstrators. Many of these were injured over the course of the event and the 23-year-old activist Carlo Giuliani died during clashes with the police. Many people were arrested but they were in most cases released shortly thereafter because judges declared the charges invalid. The G8 meeting was held inside a “Red Zone” in the town center that had been declared off-limits for non-residents and surrounded by check-points. Fears of a terrorist attack had also led to an air exclusion zone around the city. The Italian government suspended the provisions of the Schengen Treaty for the duration of the event, in order to monitor the arrival of many protesters from across the Europe.

Italy is also exposed to the terrorist threat to a variable degree, depending mostly upon domestic factors. Between 2000 and 2012 one of the most relevant terrorist attacks was the assassination of the top labor jurist Marco Biagi by Red Brigades in 2002.² Italy has experienced the return of the terrorist threat by left-wing and, in particular, high attention is paid to anarchist groups such as the Informal Anarchist Federation (*Federazione Anarchica Informale*, FAI). Moreover, the economic and financial crisis has also intensified the threat against financial institutions, banks and State fiscal agencies. Furthermore, according to EUROPOL reports from 2003 (first publication) to 2012, there have been several arrests related to Al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired terrorism, although the country has not been affected by major religiously-inspired terrorist attacks.³

Notwithstanding the absence of an official National Security Strategy identifying the main security threats and response guidelines at a strategic level (and according to some observers this absence entails that it has not been formally defined what “civil security” is), the ongoing evolution of the legal context for crisis management has developed a semantic framework with the aim of providing a common terminology at the inter-ministerial level:⁴

- “Crisis situation”: any situation able to involve or endanger the national interest, that can originate from the perception of a po-

² Global Terrorism Database, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&country=98&count=100.

³ A list of EUROPOL reports from 2003 to 2013, https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_publications/37.

⁴ Art. 2 of the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 5 May 2010 (G.U. No. 139, 17 Jun 2010).

- tential hazard or in coincidence with significant events;
- “Emergency situation”: a dangerous situation that requires specific, urgent, necessary, and exceptional actions and measures;
 - “International crisis”: events that trouble the relations between States, or at least likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and that may affect or jeopardize national interests;
 - “National interests”: set of elements and activities whose damage can jeopardize the State; the greater is the interest, the greater is the possible damage;
 - “National security”: set of measures for the protection of national interests;
 - “Prevention measures”: measures and preparation activities to address a hypothetical crisis situation, including the identification of decision-making process, planning, operational planning and the training of personnel at different levels;
 - “Response measures”: measures that are adopted and activities that are carried out to avoid a particular situation could degenerate into a crisis situation;
 - “Management measures”: measures that are adopted and activities that are carried out in a crisis situation to avoid, or at least limit, the damage and to reduce its duration;
 - “Counter measures”: set of measures aimed at the prevention, response and management of crisis situations.

As already said, Italy’s civil security system is characterized by the presence of the civil protection and civil defence domains. While civil defence primarily regards *intentional* acts, such as terrorism or intentional release of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) agents, civil protection mainly concerns safeguarding, rescuing and assisting the population as well as protecting and recovering goods in the event of *involuntary* natural or man-made disasters. It is worth mentioning that civil protection tasks can potentially be significantly broad. For example, in September 2011 the Civil Protection Department monitored the re-entry in atmosphere of NASA’s satellite UARS (Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite). UARS entered the Earth’s atmosphere with the possibility of satellite fragments falling on the Italian territory. For this reason, from 22 to 24 September 2011, convened by the Head of the Civil Protection Department, an Operating Committee gathered in permanent session in

order to follow the UARS trajectory.

In 1992, Italy organised the civil protection domain as a “National Service”: a system in which different actors at municipal, provincial and regional levels act in concert with private actors and voluntary organizations to provide efficient preparation and effective response to the crisis. Its coordination and promotion are carried out by the Civil Protection Department. Civil protection and civil defence depend on two different administrations even though, at the operational level, the set of competences and functions are complementary and coexisting. The Civil Protection Department is part of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (within the Government), while the Fire Brigades, Public Rescue and Civil Defence Department is part of the Ministry of Interior, responsible for civil defence. The latter is a system that it is not subject to decentralization while civil protection is an open system and it can be subject to decentralization to varying degrees.⁵ This kind of decentralization entails many civil protection units at municipal, provincial and regional levels,⁶ which may have different size and capabilities, as well as different performances. The National Civil Protection Service includes the National Health Service, which is also highly decentralized.

Italy’s dominant crisis management approach is primarily based on civilian activities. In some cases limited to particular and severe situations (see below “type c” events) the military can contribute to the crisis management and this is positively considered.⁷ In fact, the use of Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force and Carabinieri) is envisaged both for civil protection and civil defence and consists of logistic and operational support, personnel and equipment, as well as expertise in the prevention phase. The Armed Forces’ tasks are defined in Law No. 331/2000 (G.U. No. 269, 17 Nov 2000) related to “Rules for the institution of the professional military service”. Art. 1.5 states that “the Armed Services contribute to safeguarding free institutions and carrying out specific tasks in circum-

⁵ Francesco P. Palmeri, *The Organization of Civil Defence*, Intervention on the occasion of the roundtable on “L’organizzazione della Difesa Civile del Paese a fronte del terrorismo internazionale” (Civil Defence Organization of the Country, Facing International Terrorism), IASD, Rome, 6 April 2004, http://ssai.interno.it/download/allegati1/instrumenta_22_02_-_palmeri.pdf.

⁶ For a list of regional civil protections see Civil Protection Department, *Componenti del Servizio Nazionale (National Service’s Components)*, <http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/it/componenti.wp>.

⁷ Interview, Rome, April 2013.

stances of public danger and in other cases of extraordinary necessity and urgency.”⁸ The Armed Forces, especially the Army, play a cooperative role (*concorsoale*) and intervene only following a request of the Prefect. The coordination with the National Civil Protection Service is ensured by the Defence Chief of Staff at the national level and by the Regional Military Commands at regional level.⁹ In this context, Carabinieri play a twofold role as military corps with police duties: Carabinieri respond directly to the Ministry of Defence in case of military tasks,¹⁰ and depend “functionally” on the Minister of Interior with regards to law enforcement and public security tasks. Moreover, they support the Nation Civil Protection Service in case of calamity and natural disasters.

Italy’s civil security system seems to adopt an all-hazards approach to crisis management, and adjust its interventions to each specific situation. As a consequence, the response to each type of crisis is generally managed by a single basic structure under the authority of the Government, and in particular of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. During severe disasters or specific states of emergency, different ministries, agencies, organizations, institutions and actors cooperate under the lead of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Italy has widespread risks throughout the territory, and has therefore developed a response system based on the principle of *subsidiarity*: action starts from local level and involves the relevant administrations upwards. As a consequence, authority and responsibility for crisis preparation and response rest at local level with an up-scaling of authority when a crisis spreads across administrative entities and/or the crisis overwhelms local capacity. Disasters are classified in three different types based on extension, intensity and responsiveness of civil protection: “type a” (municipal level), “type b” (provincial and regional) and “type c” (national).¹¹

- “Type a” events entail the intervention of single administrations through ordinary measures. In this case, the mayor is responsible for addressing and coordinating the operational activities togeth-

⁸ Law No. 331/2000 (G.U. No. 269, 17 Nov 2000).

⁹ See Part IX of Ministry of Defence, *Libro Bianco (The White Paper)*, 2002, http://www.difesa.it/approfondimenti/archivioapprofondimenti/libro_bianco/Pagine/Parte_IX.aspx.

¹⁰ For the list of military tasks provided by Carabinieri see Art. 89, 90, 91, 156 and 157 of Legislative Decree No. 66/2010 (G.U. No. 106, 8 May 2010).

¹¹ Civil Protection Department, *Attività sui rischi (Activities on Risks)*, <http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/en/rischi.wp>.

er with voluntary organizations.

- “Type b” are events that involve the coordination of different local administrations of two or more municipalities through ordinary measures. In this case, the Prefect, the province and the region manage the crisis and coordinate the emergency response by assisting the affected population.
- “Type c” events (i.e. natural calamities) require extraordinary means and power to be exercised for a limited period of time. Following the request of regional administration, the Council of Ministers declares a state of emergency. In this particular case, the Civil Protection Department assumes the coordination of response activities together with the prefect and regional, provincial and local administrations.

1.

Cultural and historical aspects of the civil security system

1.1 ADMINISTRATIVE TRADITION

The civil security system has been influenced by the evolution of the Italian institutional and legal context. For several centuries, until 1861, Italy was characterized by the presence of different, separated and autonomous State authorities, including municipalities and kingdoms. Then, from 1861 to 1943, the Italian State featured a strong central government and the build up of a number of national ministries and agencies. During this period, the local authorities were the municipalities and the provinces. No regional authorities existed. The State had a strong provincial delegate, the prefect (*prefetto*) with wide competences on internal security. In accordance with the Constitution adopted in 1948, the Italian Republic has experienced a strong role of the Parliament and a system of checks and balances which significantly limits the powers of the President of the Council of Ministers who is Italy's head of government appointed by the President of the Republic on the basis of the existing Parliamentary political majority.

Governance and administrative structure

Italy is a parliamentary republic with a rigid Constitution. The 1948 Constitution established a bicameral Parliament including the Chamber of Deputies (630 seats) and the Senate of the Republic (315 seats), which have the same powers.¹ The characteristics of the Italian political and institutional system seem to match those outlined by Lijphart's theory on consociational democracy: coalition cabinet; balance of power between executive and legislative power; mutual veto; rigid constitution; equality

¹ Art. 56 and 57 of the Italian Constitution.

between ministers with a prime minister only *primus inter pares*; proportional representation. The 1948 Constitution also created the regional level of political and administrative public authority, which was implemented in the 1970s and further enhanced in the 1990s-early 2000s.

The republic consists of municipalities (*comuni*), provinces (*province*), metropolitan cities² (*città metropolitane*), regions (*regioni*) and the State (*Stato*). The 14 Metropolitan Cities identified by the Government are Italian administrative institutions which will enter into force in 2014. The Metropolitan City, as defined by Law, includes a large core city and the smaller surrounding towns that are closely related to it with regard to economic activities and essential public services, as well as to cultural relations and to territorial features. Municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities and regions are autonomous entities with their own statutes, powers and functions according to the principles defined in the constitution.³ Italy is subdivided into 8,100 municipalities, 110 provinces and 20 regions. Fifteen regions have an “ordinary statute” (*regioni a statuto ordinario*) with exclusive legislative power with respect to any matters not expressly reserved to State law, European law and international treaties.⁴ Five other regions have a “special statute” (*regioni a statuto speciale*) providing further legislative powers vis-à-vis the State, i.e. by enabling them to enact legislation on some of their local matters. Beside the municipalities, there are 223 mountain communities (*comunità montane*): according to Art. 27 of the Legislative Decree No. 267/2000 (G.U. No. 227, 28 Sep 2000), the mountain communities are unions of municipalities and local authorities established between mountain municipalities.

Italy is characterized by an imbalanced geographical distribution of

² The 14 Metropolitan Cities identified by the Government are Italian administrative institutions which will enter into force in 2014. The Metropolitan City, as defined by law, includes a large core city and the smaller surrounding towns that are closely related to it with regard to economic activities and essential public services, as well as to cultural relations and to territorial features.

³ This is the framework of the Italian legal system laid down in Art. 114 of the Italian Constitution (Title V, Part II) as amended by the reform carried out in 2001 (Constitutional Law No. 3 of 18 October 2001), which redefined the Italian institutions’ set-up and relations according to the principles of autonomy and subsidiarity.

⁴ Regions with *ordinary* statute: Abruzzo, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Emilia-Romagna, Lazio, Liguria, Lombardy, Marche, Molise, Piedmont, Tuscany, Umbria and Veneto. Regions with *special* statute: Friuli Venezia Giulia (1963), Sardinia (1948), Sicily (1948), Trentino-Alto Adige (1948), Aosta Valley (1948).

population: according to the latest census,⁵ 45.8% of Italian population live in the northern area of the country, 19.5% in the central part, and the remaining 34.7% is located in the South and in the islands. More interestingly, at the local level, there is a great disproportion in the level of inhabitants in municipalities. In fact, the population in municipalities ranges from 30 inhabitants to more than 2,600,000: Italy is characterized by the presence of the so-called “dust municipalities” (*comuni polvere*) an expression that refers to 1,936 municipalities (out of the total of 8,092) whose population is below 1,000 inhabitants.

The Prefecture is the local branch of the government with a representative office in each province, responsible for the implementation of ministerial directives as well as for the civil defence and civil protection at provincial level. In addition, he/she supervises the coordination of response activities together with the president of the region and with the mayors of municipalities affected by the crisis. Only in case of the declaration of state of emergency the prefect operates as a delegate of the President of the Council of Ministers.

Another important actor of the civil security system is the mayor who has the responsibility for civil protection and manages the volunteers, the local police and other local resources. He/she does not have power over national agencies. The mayor responds to emergencies through the activation of Municipal Operational Centre (*Centro Operativo Comunale*) that coordinates the rescue services and operational forces.

The Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers adopted on 5 May 2010 (G.U. No. 139, 17 June 2010) represents one of the cornerstones of the Italian crisis management organisation, as it modifies the composition and competences of some of the existing bodies and introduces new ones. From the top of the political and institutional level there are the following national “decision-making” bodies:

- President of the Council of Ministers is the Head of the Government (i.e. the Prime Minister). According to Art. 95 of the 1948 Constitution, “the Prime Minister directs and coordinates the activity of the ministers”. The Italian Prime Minister has less power than some of its European counterparts and acts as a *primus inter pares*. The Prime Minister is not authorized to request the disso-

⁵ National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), *15° Censimento popolazione e abitazioni 2011* (15th General Population and Housing Census 2011), 9 October 2011, http://www.istat.it/it/files/2012/12/volume_popolazione-legale_XV_censimento_popolazione.pdf.

- lution of the Parliament or to dismiss ministers.
- Council of Ministers is composed of the President of the Council of Ministers, the Ministers and the Undersecretary to the Presidency of the Council.
 - Strategic Political Committee (*Comitato Politico Strategico, CoPS*) formed by the President of the Council of Ministers and the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Economy and Finance. This body provides national strategic guidance in crisis situations. It meets exclusively during a state of crisis, and builds on the elements previously elaborated by the technical staff. The CoPS includes the Undersecretary of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the General Secretary of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the General Director of Security Intelligence Department, the Head of Civil Protection Department, diplomatic and military advisers, the Secretary General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chief of Defence Staff, General Director of public security and the Head of Fire Brigades, Public Rescue and Civil Defence Department.
 - The National Decisional Centre (*Centro Decisionale Nazionale, CDN*) is the support site of the Strategic Political Committee (and alternatively of the Council of Ministers, this was the case for example in the immediate aftermath of 9/11), devoted to the information flow management and the decision-making. The decision room, control room and situation room are the modular elements working in close functional connection with the corresponding key points of the single ministries and the intelligence services. The National Decisional Centre supports the consultations with ministries and relevant State administrations, in accordance with the various competences specified by the law.

The Government is therefore the main actor involved in crisis management, in consultation with the Parliament. There are also national “coordination” bodies including the Situation and Planning Interdepartmental Unit (*Nucleo interministeriale situazione e pianificazione, NISP*). The NISP supports the CoPS and the President of the Council of Ministers. The NISP is composed of two representatives from each of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Defence; one representative from the Ministry of Economic and Finance and one from the Ministry of Health; one representative from the Civil Protection Department; one

representative from the Security and Intelligence Department as well as one from the Internal and External Intelligence and Security Agencies; one representative from the Department of Fire Brigades, Public Rescue and Civil Defence. The NISP performs several tasks related to the prevention and preparation activities, as well as during crisis situations. For example, the NISP defines one or more “national positions” to be put forward within international organizations participated in by Italy. It keeps the situation up to date, according to the communications of international organizations, through the exchange of information between ministries and agencies, and, when deemed appropriate by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the direct exchange of information with the diplomatic missions.

The crisis management structure of civil defence

The NISP can be supported by the Technical Interdepartmental Commission for Civil Defence (*Commissione Interministeriale Tecnica per la Difesa Civile*, CITDC) as one of the supporting and consulting bodies for the technical coordination of civil defence activities. Indeed, the 2010 Decree states that “for specific aims, the NISP can be supported by other Interdepartmental Commissions, research committees and study working groups” in relation to particular and specific issues.⁶

The CITDC is supervised by the Ministry of Interior. It was established by a Decree of the Minister of Interior of 28 September 2001. The CITDC is chaired by the Head of the Fire Brigades, Public Rescue and Civil Protection Department. It includes the representatives of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, State administrations (Defence, Interior, Health and other Ministers as needed), by the National Autonomous State Routes Board (*Azienda Nazionale Autonoma delle Strade Statali*, ANAS), the National Inspectorate of the Military Body of the Italian Red Cross (*Ispettorato Nazionale del Corpo Militare della Croce Rossa*, INCMCR), the Institute for Environmental Protection and Research (*Istituto Superiore per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale*, ISPRA), the National Board for Civil Aviation (*Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile*, ENAC), the National Board for Flight Assistance (*Ente Nazionale di Assistenza al Volo*, ENAV), and relevant private companies participated by State such as *Trenitalia*, *Poste Italiane*, etc. The CITDC supports the NISP and ensures the coordi-

⁶ Art. 6, par. 5, Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 5 May 2010.

nation of civil defence at a central level. The Prefects ensure coordination at the local level, and the operational phase is implemented by the Armed Forces, Carabinieri, Police Forces and civil protection.

The crisis management structure of civil protection

With Law No. 225/1992 (G.U. No. 64, 17 Mar 1992) Italy has organised civil protection as a “National Service”. Accordingly, the Civil Protection National Service consists of central and peripheral State administrations, regions, provinces, municipalities, national and territorial public agencies, and other public and private institutions and organisations present on the national territory. The President of the Council of Ministers provides for the co-ordination of the National Service and for the promotion of civil protection activities through the Civil Protection Department.

The Department has a leading role, in agreement with regional and local authorities, on projects and activities for the overall prevention, forecast and monitoring of risks as well as intervention procedures. As far as the intervention procedures are concerned, the Italy Situation Room⁷ (*Sala Situazione Italia*, SSI) acts as a national operational room, based within the Civil Protection Department. The SSI operates 24 hours a day through SISTEMA, its national coordination system: in ordinary time the room receives, demands, collects, processes and verifies information about ongoing emergencies, in the national territories and abroad. It also captures all relevant information on interventions and policy measures at local and regional level. In case of emergency it becomes essential in order to support the Civil Protection Operational Committee (see Figure 1) and guarantees the implementation of Committee’s dispositions through the operational structures of the National Civil Protection Service. The SSI includes the staff of the Civil Protection Department and a representative of the National Fire Brigades, Armed Forces, State Police, Carabinieri, Italian Finance Police, the State Forestry Corps, Port Authority - Coast Guard and Italian Red Cross.

As already mentioned, the Department has a leading role but, over the years, the responsibility of the main part of civil protection activities has progressively moved from the State to local authorities. Indeed, the Legislative Decree No. 112/1998 (G.U. No. 92, 21 Apr 1998) and the reform

⁷ Civil Protection Department, *Sistema (System) at Italy Situation Room*, http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/en/schede_tecniche.wp?contentId=SCT19970.


of Title V of the Constitution as brought about by Constitutional Law No. 3/2001 (G.U. No. 248, 24 Oct 2001) redefined the civil protection organization, by transferring important functions to the local authorities – including operative ones – and by introducing a profound restructuring also for the remaining State authorities.

The regions are responsible for civil protection and in particular for risk assessment, emergency forecasting and prevention programmes for their territory, on the basis of national directives. The most important regional tasks can be summarised as follows: drafting regional programmes for risk prevention and forecasting; launching interventions through the National Fire Brigades in case of a crisis caused by an emergency or an imminent danger; formulating the guidelines for the drafting of emergency provincial plans.

The provinces are mainly responsible for the forecasting and prevention activities. They carry out, at the provincial level, forecasting and risk prevention activities established by regional programmes and plans through the adoption of the necessary administrative acts; draft provincial emergency plans on the basis of the regional guidelines; supervise how the provincial structures of the emergency services are set up by the civil protection, including the technical services to be activated in case of disasters.

The functions ascribed to the municipalities concern particularly the emergency preparedness, setting of plans and response activities such as activation of first relief service to the population and urgent interventions. Law No. 100/2012 (G.U. No. 162, 16 July 2012) confirms, without significant innovations, the relevant role assigned to the municipality, and particularly to the mayor as the local authority of civil protection. The municipalities launch forecasting activities and risk prevention interventions established by regional programmes and plans; adopt decisions, including those concerning the emergency preparation, necessary to assure first emergency relief in case of disasters at the municipal level (“type a” of disaster); draft municipal and inter-municipal emergency plans in the form of association or cooperation and through the Mountain Communities to control that these are implemented on the basis of regional guidelines.

Figure 1 – Civil protection organization and tasks




Source: IAI elaboration based on Civil Protection Department

The Civil Protection Department coordinates the response to natural disasters, catastrophes or other events that for intensity and extent should be faced with extraordinary powers and means. The Department divides its activities following a “risk-based approach”: (1) Seismic risk; (2) Volcanic risk; (3) Hydro-meteorological risk; (4) Fire risk; (5) Health risk; (6) Nuclear risk; (7) Environmental risk; (8) Industrial risk. In cases of “type c” events, the Head of Department convenes the Civil Protection

Operational Committee which ensures the joint management and the coordination of the emergency activities. The Operational Committee is made up of representatives of: Civil Protection Department; Fire Department; Armed Forces; each of the Police Forces - Italy has 5 Police Forces: Carabinieri, State Police (*Polizia di Stato*), Italian Finance Police (*Guardia di Finanza*), Penitentiary Police (*Polizia Penitenziaria*), State Forestry Corps (*Corpo Forestale dello Stato*) - State Forestry Commission; Italian Red Cross; National Health Service; national voluntary organizations; Italian National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Economic Development; National Mountain Rescue and Speleological Corps; Port Authorities; Institute for Environmental Protection and Research; National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology; National Research Council; regions designated by the unified State-Regions-Cities conference. In addition, regional and local civil protection interested in specific emergencies can also participate in the Operational Committee.

In emergency situations, the definition of the chain of command and the coordination take place in a flexible way. In addition, the government may appoint an extraordinary Commissioner either through *ad hoc* legislation or by the use of a law decree. Often the extraordinary Commissioner coincides with the Head of the Civil Protection Department.

Figure 2 - Italian civil security system overview



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1.2 GOVERNMENT/SOCIAL CULTURE

According to the five-dimensions analysis provided by the Geert Hofstede's Index, Italian society seems "to believe that hierarchy should be respected and inequalities amongst people are acceptable. Italy as a whole

seems to have an individualistic culture, especially in the big and rich cities of the North. In Southern Italy, this dimension does vary and less individualistic behaviour can be observed where the family network and the group one belongs to are important social aspects.”⁸ Finally, Italy seems to show a high sense of competition, coupled with a high score on uncertainty avoidance which means that Italians are not comfortable with ambiguous situations. As a result of its traditions and history, Italy seems to have a short term orientation culture. However, such efforts to classify a wide range of extremely different countries worldwide shall be balanced by an in-depth and country-based analysis of national culture, in order to avoid risks of misunderstanding, stereotyping and over-simplification. For example, Italian social culture is used to deal with complexity and uncertainty generated by both different local traditions and complex legal and institutional framework.

The World Value Survey puts Italy in the group of Catholic European countries with a stable degree of Traditional/Secular-rational values and with a high degree of self-expression, even if lower than other comparable countries.

According to opinions recently expressed by managers of civil defence, a weak “emergency culture” in Italy emerges. Despite the several calamities which have historically characterized the territory, there have been no major progresses towards an awareness of risks and a consequent capacity of planning adequate behaviours in the inevitable emergency situations. An exception is represented by the Safe School project (see Chapter 3.3).

Another aspect to mention is the insufficient respect for the prevention rules established in the town plans of land management, together with the presence of unauthorized buildings in highly dangerous areas from a hydro-geological point of view.⁹ Such cultural aspect weakens the action of the crisis management system, since it increases vulnerabilities and undermines the effectiveness of management.

On the other hand, it should be mentioned that from the 1960s to the

⁸ Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, Michael Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations. Software of the Mind*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 2010.

⁹ For an analysis of the minimal structural conditions of a urban settlement that has to be guaranteed see Fabrizio Brammerini, Gian Paolo Cavinato, Valter Fabiotti, (eds.), “Strategie di mitigazione del rischio sismico e pianificazione. CLE: Condizione limite per l'emergenza”, in *Urbanistica Dossier*, No. 130 (May 2013), <http://www.inuedizioni.com/it/node/830>.

1980s Italy successfully faced a persistent and strong domestic terroristic threat, which has led the public opinion to develop a solid awareness and sensibility on this issue. In turn, this background has contributed to create a condition in which Italian citizens seem to generally accept counter-terrorism measures deemed necessary in order to ensure and safeguard their lives, such as those adopted after 9/11 attacks.

2.

Legal/constitutional aspect

2.1 STATUTORY BASIS

The evolution of the legal and institutional framework of the Italian crisis management system was driven by several disasters that struck Italy's yielding improvements in disaster preparedness, prevention, response and recovery provisions.¹

The civil defence legislation

To date, Italy has not developed a specific legislation defining the scope of civil defence.² According to Article 14 of Legislative Decree No. 300/1999 (G.U. No. 203, 30 Aug 1999) the Ministry of Interior – in its capacity as institution responsible for security and safety – is entrusted with civil defence. The civil defence system was officially activated twice at national level to deal with the Millennium Bug in December 1999 and reportedly in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

The legal framework related to the operational and planning domain of civil defence is composed by confidential documents and dispositions issued by the Minister of Interior and the Fire Brigades, Public Rescue and Civil Defence Department.³ However, with regards to the planning level in case of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) risks, a National Civil Defence Plan has been developed in order to define threats, identify the possible scenarios, as well as measures to be undertaken. This Plan is the cornerstone to draft the “descendants” and “sector plans” (*Piani discendenti e di settore*), as well as the 103 provincial plans pre-

¹ Massimo Lanfranco, *La Difesa Civile nel XXI secolo:dalla cooperazione civile - militare all'integrazione delle forze*, PhD Thesis, mimeo 2012, p. 31-32.

² Istituto Alti Studi per la Difesa (IASD), *Quaderni della 53° Sessione*, No. 53/8 (2001-2002).

³ Fulvio Toseroni, *Protezione e difesa civile. Storia, organizzazione, pianificazione ed analisi delle minacce future*, Roma, EPC Libri, 2009.

pared by the Prefects. In order to test their functionality and operational effectiveness, these plans are subject to periodic exercises.

The civil protection legislation

Law No. 996/1970 (G.U. No. 317, 16 Dec 1970) is the first law to outline an overall framework of civil protection interventions. It defined the concept of civil protection and specified the notion of natural calamity and catastrophe. However, Law No. 996/1970 only regulated the relief to be provided immediately after the event: the regulation implementing the law was approved only after 11 years (in 1981) and after disastrous earthquakes hit Friuli in 1976 and Irpinia in 1980, mentioned above. At that time, the crisis management was very different: it was characterized in both cases by slow rescue operations and lack of coordination and triggered a debate on how to overcome the old operational system by assuming that civil protection could embrace forecasting and preventing activities.

This situation paved the way for the creation of the “National Civil Protection Service” which was institutionalized by Law No. 225/1992 (G.U. No. 64, 17 Mar 1992). Historically, Law No. 225/1992 represented a move from a centralized phase of crisis management to a decentralized one. The civil protection structure was thoroughly reorganized as a coordinated system of competences provided by the administrations of the State, regions, provinces, municipalities and other local authorities, public bodies, the scientific community, volunteers, professional boards and any other institutions, including private ones. As a result, the role of regions, provinces and municipalities was significantly increased with regards to prevention and forecasting. However, the operative capabilities remained under the responsibility of the central and peripheral administration of the State, and the government maintained the power to declare a state of emergency.

The Legislative Decree No. 112/1998 (G.U. No. 92, 21 Apr 1998) further transferred important civil protection functions to the local authorities, and reformed the State role in this regard. Finally, the Constitutional Law 3/2001, which changed the overall relations between State and regions, for the first time introduced in the Constitution the function of civil protection. It was put under concurrent competence (*competenza concorrente*) of State and regions, which means the State sets the fundamentals of policies, the main guidelines and the general objectives by the law, while the regions determine specific laws and rules to achieve the established objectives.

Law No. 401/2001 (G.U. No. 262, 10 Nov 2001) assigned to the Prime Minister the supervision of State role in civil protection, and the Civil Protection Department was established within the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. This enhanced the role of national government with regard to civil protection. As a counterweight to the re-found centrality of the role of the Prime Minister, a joint State- Regions-Local Authorities Committee was established in the Prime Minister's Office. One of the important innovations of Law No. 401/2001 was the introduction, among the competencies of the Civil Protection Department, of the so-called "Major Events": important and public "events of particular organizational complexity in terms of safety, public order, mobility, reception and medical assistance, which requires the adoption of extraordinary and urgent measures, to ensure regular development of the event."⁴ For example, events such as the G8 summits involve both security aspects – for example the protection against terrorist attacks – and the coordination of various branches of the civil security system, including different ministries and various levels of local and central authorities. In these circumstances the government could declare a Major Event and task the Civil Protection Department to act as point of contact among different actors involved in order to ensure an adequate management of the event. The definition of Major Events was amended by Law Decree No. 343/2001 (G.U. No. 262, 10 Nov 2001) which broadened the category of Major Events under the competence of the Civil Protection Department to include also those events that did not require the declaration of state of emergency.⁵ This raised significant criticisms related to the management of funds and tenders by the Civil Protection Department in case of events that hardly required the adoption of extraordinary and urgent measures for safety and security reasons. Following Law No. 100/2012 (G.U. No. 162, 16 July 2012) the management of Major Events still falls within the competence of civil protection but only for those events requiring the declaration of the state of emergency.⁶

The Autonomous Region of Trentino Alto Adige, and especially the two Provinces of Trento and Bolzano that enjoy a special statute, need to be tackled separately since civil protection is ruled by the local legislation.

⁴ Civil Protection Department, *Glossary*, http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/en/glossario.wp?request_locale=en&letter=G

⁵ Patrizia Calzolari, "Grandi eventi non più competenza della protezione civile", in *Il Giornale della Protezione civile*, 1 marzo 2012, <http://www.ilgiornaledellaprotezione civile.it/?idart=5265>.

⁶ Interview, Rome, May 2013.

Contemporary to the adoption of Law 225/1992, the autonomous Province of Trento adopted the provincial Law No. 2/1992 of 10 January 1992 (O.B. of Trentino South-Tyrol No. 3, 21 Jan 1992) and amended by the following provincial Law No. 9/2011 of 1 July 2011 (O.B. of Trentino South-Tyrol No. 27, 5 Jul 2011). According to the latter, the Province is in charge of civil protection functions, meaning: regulation, planning, organization, coordination and control of civil protection. The Provincial Board defines civil protection policies, whose implementation is promoted and coordinated by the President of the Province. The President of the Province is also responsible for the declaration and revocation of the state of emergency.

According to the principle of subsidiarity, civil protection actions shall be coordinated among the president of the province, municipalities, and valley communities, with the involvement of volunteers' organizations. As far as the civil protection plans are concerned, they are organized in three levels: local, supra-municipal and provincial. Provincial Law No. 9/2011 also establishes the Provincial Emergency Unit that regulates the relationship with State authorities and relevant structures of rescue and acts as unique director for all bodies and structures devoted to crisis management.

As concerns the Province of Bolzano, emergency and crisis management are coordinated according to three levels: at the municipal level, at the district level and the provincial level. The President of the Province is the main responsible person for civil protection. Each municipality has an operational centre for civil protection, and according to the territory involved in a crisis situation the district Operational Centre and the operational Provincial Centre can also be involved. The Province of Bolzano has its own service for forecast and alert in case of particularly dangerous meteorological events. Such system is supported by the so-called Functional Centre that aims at improving the forecasting, evaluation and alert phases when it comes to civil protection.⁷

2.2. POLITICAL DIMENSION

As already mentioned, the civil protection system in Italy is based on the principle of decentralization/subsidiarity, but in constant liaison with the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, on an up-scaling base of responsibility.

⁷ Provincial Law No. 15/2002 (O.B. of the Autonomous Province of Bozen/Bolzano No. 54, 31 Dec 2002, Suppl. 1).

The primary responsible actor of crisis preparedness and response is the mayor, who disposes of the resources of its municipality to tackle the specific risks of its territory. The role of the mayor is in fact to guarantee the public order and security of citizens. In case of a calamity, the Civil Protection National Service assesses whether the local resources are sufficient to face the event or whether support of provincial, regional and at last national forces is needed.

Instead, in the event of a national emergency, the primary executive responsible person is the President of Council of Ministers who acts through the National Civil Protection Department, in accordance with regional authorities.

The Council of Ministers is responsible for declaring the state of emergency in case of natural disasters, catastrophes or other events whose intensity and extent require extraordinary powers and means on a proposal of the President of the Council or the President of the Region affected by the crisis (in case of “type c” events). As a consequence, the Head of the Civil Protection Department takes “extraordinary powers” and related measures may be taken in derogation from the provisions in force. In case of declaration of a state of emergency, the Civil Protection Department may define the measures, approved by the President of the Council of Ministers, to respond to disasters. According to Law 100/21012 (G.U. No. 162 of 13 July 2012) the Head of the Civil Protection Department can appoint a Deputy Commissioner to implement civil protection interventions necessary in emergency situations.

As concerns the protection of private property vis-à-vis the common good, the case of emergency (more precisely the case of emergency, crisis and war) also impacts on the right to private property which is restrained by strong rules that apply on such events. It is also worth mentioning that private property in Italy has been subjected to protection for a relatively short period of time (100 years).⁸

Apart from the state of emergency, Law No. 185/1992 (G.U. No. 51, 2 Mar 1992) on the National Solidarity Fund regulates the declaration of state of calamity, concerning the contribution given to face damages to agricultural, productive and commercial infrastructures and activities, following exceptional atmospheric or meteorological events (for instance anomalies in the seasonal temperatures or precipitations). On such events, the President of the Region may request to the Minister of Agriculture to declare the state

⁸ Interview, Rome, July 2012.

of calamity, which allows the affected regions to have access to the National Solidarity Fund.

While the state of calamity refers to crisis affecting specific sectors, the state of emergency is declared when crisis and disasters undermine the functioning of the majority of society structures. The state of emergency and calamity cannot be declared simultaneously. For instance, the state of emergency was declared on the occasion of the earthquake in May 2012, hitting the Region of Emilia Romagna, and after the environmental disaster caused by Costa Concordia on 13 January 2012. Instead, the state of calamity was declared in the Region of Campania after the exceptional rainfalls of January 2013, and in the Region of Lazio as a consequence of a landslide in April 2013.

As we already mentioned under section 2.2, the Ministry of Interior is the competent body for civil defence⁹ and it is supported, at the local level, by the Prefectures. At the same time, since civil protection is a Department of the Presidency, its intervention more directly relates on the President of the Council and to the Government at large. This largely explains the obvious preference demonstrated by many Italian Heads of the Government toward Civil Protection, especially if it can give a greater visibility and the impression that the personal commitment of the President has been instrumental for increasing the level of aid and its effectiveness. Thus, the interventions of the Department have generally been characterized by a high level of visibility and “personalization” (the special powers attributed to the Department Head by the President of the Council of Ministers increase such visibility). It also allows for the swift utilization of special emergency funds and other reserve funds otherwise immobilized or unavailable, thus giving to the President a great leverage over the Ministries normally administering the public budget autonomously.

2.3 OPERATIONAL DIMENSION

Civil defence crisis management

The civil defence crisis management system has been activated twice, in view of the Millennium Bug, on the basis of the circular of the President

⁹ Art. 14 of the Law Decree No. 300/1999 (G.U. No. 203, 30 Aug 1999).

of the Council of Ministers adopted on 3 December 1999 (G.U. No. 290, 11 Dec 1999) – and during the 9/11 terrorist attacks. On the first occasion, a specific task force to manage the possible event was established at the National Decisional Centre (*Centro Decisionale Nazionale*, CDN) with the tasks of coordinating and monitoring at the strategic level the evolution of the possible crisis deriving from the Millennium Bug. It comprised a Committee, named Committee Year 2000, chaired by the Under-secretary of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and composed by the Ministers of the Interior, of Defence, Transports, Communication, Health, Industry and Trade, who monitored the evolution of situation as concerned their area of competence. The Committee was supervised by the then-Prefect of Rome who monitored and coordinated its functioning. The Military Advisor to the President of the Council and the Official responsible for Telecommunications also supported the Committee.

This task-force was in constant contact with the seats of the major national infrastructures (transports, telecommunications, trains, airports, energy) and also with the civil protection. The task force assessed the conditions of all infrastructures over the following three months: starting from phones and radio operators, to banks and financial services (online payments and accounts), verifying the functioning of defence-related technologies covering also defence industry, health system, and communications. No damages were recorded in any of them, neither in the seats of the diplomatic and consular services deployed abroad. No anomalies were recorded also regarding the environmental sphere, especially with reference to industrial activities engaged in the processing of dangerous materials. In the end, the Millennium Bug did not hit the system in Italy and the task-force was discharged in March 2000. Beyond these particular cases, the civil defence planning has been activated several times at provincial level, according to the 103 provincial plans established by Prefects.¹⁰

Civil protection crisis management

As outlined in the introduction, Italy has been regularly affected by natural hazards, thus civil protection crisis management has been activated more frequently than civil defence. The mayor is the first public authority responsible for civil protection on the territory. He/she has the task to

¹⁰ Interview, Rome, May 2013.

cope with the initial phases of a calamity and provide relief to the population, by coordinating the local operative structures including the civil protection volunteers. The mayor responds to emergencies through the activation of Municipal Operational Centre (*Centro Operativo Comunale*) that coordinates the rescue services and operational forces. Following the up-scaling approach (the principle of *subsidiarity*) if the municipality cannot cope with the emergency on its own, the province, the prefecture, and the region intervene by activating the available resources for the areas affected by the calamity.¹¹

In “type c” events, the national Government intervenes: the President of the Council of Ministers assumes direct responsibility operating through the Civil Protection Department. According to the principle of *subsidiarity*, the administration nearest to the citizens intervenes first, while the superior administrative levels – provincial, regional, national – intervene if the lower administration is not able to cope with the event with its own means.

Emergency actions are planned according to the principles of the “Augustus method” and, above all, according to the Directive of the President of the Council of Ministers dated 3 December 2008 (G.U. No. 36, 13 Feb 2009). The Augustus method represents the cornerstone for the planning of emergency response at the various levels of competence. Besides providing flexible guidelines for emergency response, it identifies clearly the working method and the procedures to apply in order to maximize synergy and coordination among the available resources in response. On the basis of the Augustus Method the response is organized in three parts: information collection, identification of objectives and of responsibilities, and operational flexibility during support activities. In other terms, the Augustus methods defines diversified response plans (according to the types of risks) which eventually combine through flexibility at the operational level.¹²

The 2008 reform establishes the Operational Committee to ensure coordination of the emergency response activity. The Committee is chaired by the Head of Civil Protection Department, and includes representatives of the Operational Structures of the National Civil Protection Service and of public and private bodies and administrations which manage the emergency together.

¹¹ Civil Protection Department, *Seismic Risk Emergencies*, http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/en/emerg_it_sismico.wp.

¹² Fulvio Toseroni, *Protezione e difesa civile*, cit.

In order to monitor the evolution of an ongoing emergency, the Civil Protection Department needs to be informed about the characteristics of the phenomenon and about the local system's ability to cope with the emergency. The reference point of the National Service of Civil Protection is the coordination centre SISTEMA, inside the Italy Situation Room which receives, requests, analyzes, checks and disseminates the information, and alerts the structures responsible for managing the emergency. The room operates 24h a day as a support centre to the Operational Committee, and implements its decisions through the structures of the Civil Protection National Service. The SSI includes the staff of the Civil Protection Department and a representative of the National Fire Brigades, Armed Forces, State Police, Carabinieri, Italian Finance Police, the State Forestry Corps, Port Authority - Coast Guard and Italian Red Cross.

Illustration of the civil security system: earthquake

This section covers a typical crisis case that Italy faces on a regular basis. As explained, seismic activity is relatively common in Italy, therefore the functioning of the security system when a state of emergency is declared in case of earthquake will be analysed. In this case, the Civil Protection Department takes the lead of response activities and the Head of Department coordinates the response measures in order to assist the population affected by the crisis.

On 6 April 2009, an earthquake of magnitude 5.8 hit the Province of L'Aquila claiming the lives of 309 people, injuring thousands of citizens, causing 64,391 displaced persons and provoking severe material destruction. In few hours, the Fire Brigades, the voluntary organizations part of the Civil Protection National Service and the Army were deployed in L'Aquila from all over Italy to search and rescue the people victim of the earthquake.

On the very same day, the state of emergency was declared by the President of the Council of Ministers, and the Head of the Civil Protection Department Guido Bertolaso was appointed special Commissioner with the extraordinary powers to take any action to assist population hit by the earthquake and respond to the emergency.¹³ Actually, the Commissioner took a strong leading role with respect to the local authorities for the fol-

¹³ Ordinance of the President of the Council of Ministers No. 3747 of 12 March 2009 (G.U. No. 67 of 21 Mar 2009).

lowing 10 months. The operational headquarter was established in the Police Academy of Coppito. On 6 April 2009, any taxation or payment or trial involving residents in the municipalities hit by the earthquake was suspended until 31 December 2010 and then until 31 December 2012.¹⁴

Within three days, tents were established to host around 33,000 displaced persons providing accommodation and meals, under the coordination of the Civil Protection Department and with the support of Armed Forces, Italian Red Cross and other profit and non-profit organizations, while other 10,000 displaced people were located in hotels in the Abruzzo Region and in neighbourhood regions (Lazio, Umbria, Marche) played by the Civil Protection Department.

On 9 April 2009, seven Integrated Operational Centres were established in the area hit by the earthquake to coordinate response activities. In particular, Fire Brigades and Civil Protection Department fulfilled the task to check the buildings damaged by the earthquake to enlist those safe to be inhabited and those to be repaired, and put in place the temporary structures to prevent further damages to the latter. People able to rent a flat and/or to find an autonomous accommodation (i.e. hosted by relatives and friends in surrounding areas) were reimbursed up to 400 Euros pro capita.

The primary and secondary schools were allowed to complete the academic year earlier in order to let students to obtain the related degree. The payment of electricity bills was suspended.

On 15 April 2009, a military force of 700 units was tasked to patrol the city centre of L'Aquila and other major towns to avoid robbery in the abandoned houses. On the same day the Prefect of L'Aquila was appointed Deputy Commissioner.

On 21 April 2009, the Commissioner was tasked to launch an information campaign to communicate the measures undertaken to manage the crisis to local population. The Commissioner was also tasked to set up the procedures to build temporary houses (*Moduli Abitativi Provvisori*, MAP), whose areas were identified by 17 July 2009. On 28 April 2009, the Commissioner was tasked to set up the procedures to build Households Earthquake-Proved, (*Centri Abitativi Sismicamente Ecocompatibili*, CASE).

On 1 May 2009, two other Deputy Commissioners were appointed to support the crisis management, and the mayors of the municipalities

¹⁴ Ordinance of the President of the Council of Ministers No. 3790 of 9 July 2009 (G.U. No. 166 of 20 Jul 2009).

hit by the earthquake were tasked to implement the decisions taken by the Commissioner. On 11 May 2009, the 17 areas to build the CASE centres were allocated and most of them were close to the villages hit by the earthquake.

On 9 July 2009, the Commissioner was tasked to set up the procedures to build temporary schools (*Moduli ad Uso Scolastico Provvisorio*, MUSP) including kindergartens, primary schools and secondary schools, whose areas were identified on 31 July 2009. By September 2009, all schools and universities – whose admission fee was cancelled for two years - regularly began the academic year, and 99% of students returned to the classrooms.

By December 2009, 17,000 displaced people were located in the 17 CASE centres, and 7,000 were located in the MAP. At the same time, around 18,500 citizens rented a house, found an autonomous accommodation or stayed in a hotel, whose costs were reimbursed by the Civil Protection. Few hundreds were located in the police academy of Coppito and in a military barrack nearby. As a result, all tents – which had been hosting up to 33,000 people for 8 months – were closed.

In February 2010, the Head of the Civil Protection Department handed over the Commissioner seat to the Governor of Abruzzo Region, Gianni Chiodi. The response phase ended and the recovery phase began.

H1N1 in Italy

Italian health authorities at national and regional levels share the responsibility for public health. In particular, the National Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (*Centro Nazionale Controllo e Prevenzione delle Malattie*, CCM) acts as a bridge between the Ministry of Health and regional governments regarding surveillance, prevention and responding to emergencies. It was set up by Law No. 138/2004 (G.U. No. 125, 29 May 2004) and by the Circular of Ministry of Health of 1 July 2004, then amended by the Decree of the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Policy of 18 September 2008 (G.U. No. 245, 18 Oct 2008), which redefined its structure. The Strategic Committee is the political steering committee of the CCM, chaired by the Health Minister and including representatives of the regions, the Department for Civil Protection and the Ministry of Defence.

In Italy the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus was faced with an integrated response, mainly based on the 2006 National Pandemic

Preparedness and Response Plan.¹⁵ Overall, from week 31 (27 July – 2 August) of 2009 to week 17 (26 April – 2 May) of 2010, there have been approximately 5,600,000 cases of influenza-like illness (ILI) who received medical attention (with almost 2,000 laboratory-confirmed cases of influenza from May to October 2009). A total of 1,106 confirmed cases were admitted to hospital for serious conditions, of which 532 were admitted to intensive care units. There were 260 reported deaths due to pandemic influenza, a much smaller number compared to deaths caused each year by seasonal influenza.¹⁶ Approximately 870,000 first doses of the pandemic vaccine were used, representing a vaccine coverage of only 4% of the target population.

After the first pandemic influenza alert was announced by the World Health Organization (WHO) in late April 2009, a National Crisis Management Committee, headed by the Minister of Health, was established with the aim of coordinating the strategies related to preparedness, response and communication during the pandemic. The surveillance of seasonal influenza is based on a nationwide sentinel surveillance network called INFLUNET.¹⁷ The system covers about 1.5-2% of the general population, with the aim of monitoring the incidence of medically attended ILI.

Phase I – Containment measures

Containment measures were implemented in April 2009, including social distancing measures and antiviral prophylaxis for close contacts of cases. A stockpile of 40 million doses of antiviral drugs stored by the Ministry of Health was distributed to the regions, together with recommendations for their correct use. This recommendation remained in force until July 2009.

Phase II – Mitigation measures

When WHO raised the influenza alert level from phase 5 to phase 6, regions were required to deliver a report illustrating the number of prob-


¹⁵ Ministry of Health, *National Plan for Preparedness and Response to an Influenza Pandemic, 2006*, http://www.salute.gov.it/imgs/c_17_publicazioni_511_allegato.pdf.

¹⁶ Caterina Rizzo et al., “Response to the 2009 Influenza A(H1N1) Pandemic in Italy”, in *Eurosurveillance*, Vol. 15, No. 49 (9 December 2010), <http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19744>.

¹⁷ For the InFluNet website see <http://www.iss.it/iflu>.

able, possible and confirmed cases and deaths. Phase 6 is characterized by community level outbreaks in at least one other country in a different WHO region in addition to the criteria defined in Phase 5. Designation of this phase will indicate that a global pandemic is under way. At the same time, the existing surveillance systems were enhanced and expanded.

Figure 3 – Pandemic influenza phases in 2009



Source: World Health Organization

In September 2009, according to the National Pandemic Plan, the Ministry identified the categories to be vaccinated with the now available pandemic vaccine. As mentioned before, about 870,000 first doses of the pandemic vaccine were put into use, representing a vaccine coverage of only 4% of the target population.

An evaluation of the Italian response to the 2009 influenza H1N1 reveals that regional authorities implemented local pandemic plans in terms of logistics, strategy of the vaccinations and general practices. As a consequence, the Italian response to H1N1 was not carried out in a uniform and homogeneous way but it enhanced the collaboration between central and local levels. Communication activities to the citizens were centralized at the national level and the Ministry of Health decided to publish daily and weekly reports on the official website. However, communication strategy was a problem as uncertainty in data about affected individuals and deaths caused a high degree of frustration that influenced the vaccination campaign. As analysed, in fact, the vaccinations covered only 4% of the target population, 15% of the healthcare personnel and 1.5% of the gen-

eral population.¹⁸

The media coverage on the early cases of H1N1 – in Italy and abroad – was extremely high and marked by over-estimated forecasts on the diffusion and lethality of the influenza. As a result, part of the Italian citizens and public opinion supported the proposal to close kindergartens and primary schools, but the government deemed it a too drastic and unnecessary measure. At the end of the day, neither the number of deaths due to H1N1 nor the number of ILI was higher than normal yearly influenza. Both the available anti-drugs stockpiles and the amount of vaccine acquired were more than sufficient to deal with the H1N1. The crisis did not have a structural impact on the functioning of Italian society, for example in terms of services disruption, neither has it drastically changed the way the civil security system deals with this kind of threat. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the low vaccination coverage at the national level, the vaccine stock at the Ministry of Health remained high and part of the doses (2.4 million) were donated to WHO for developing countries.

2.4 EXTERNAL DIMENSION

Mutual assistance and cooperation between EU Member States have been increasing over the last two decades, both in relation to trans-boundary crisis as well as in emergency situations affecting only a single Member State. This is also due to the central role played by the European Union itself, whose action has been increasing both as in terms of financial resources and areas of competence.¹⁹

It is also worth mentioning that, since its establishment in 2001, the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection has been activated about 150 times to respond to major crisis involving not only the 28 Member States but also support from Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland and the Former Yu-

¹⁸ Caterina Rizzo et al., “Response to the 2009 Influenza A(H1N1) Pandemic in Italy”, cit.

¹⁹ For an overview of the developments occurred in the 2000s in this field see, among others, Stefan Olsson, *Crisis Management in the European Union. Cooperation in the Face of Emergencies*, Berlin and Heidelberg, Springer, 2009. For an in-depth and holistic analysis of the EU crisis management see Ronald Arjen Boin, Magnus Ekengren, Mark Rhinard, *The European Union as Crisis Manager. Patterns and Prospects*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013.

goslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).²⁰ This is a tool aimed to facilitate co-operation in civil protection, to provide adequate preparedness as well as effective response to disasters inside EU as well as outside EU borders.

Furthermore, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the so-called “solidarity clause” was inserted in the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (Art. 222 TFEU). According to Art. 222 TFEU “The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster”. The solidarity clause has never been activated as of today (2014). Despite the need to consider paramount economic and funding issues the rationale of the solidarity clause is a good example of the fact that currently humanitarian assistance should be regulated by conventional law since, unless States are bound by certain specific treaty provisions, a norm of customary international law covering all disasters situation does not exist so far.²¹

As concerns more closely the external dimension of Italy’s civil security system, it is characterized by a multilateral and bilateral approach, in line with traditional Italian foreign and security policy. Italy is a member of the Council of Europe, the EU, NATO, OSCE and UN. Italy participates in the EU Community Mechanism for Civil Protection with the Civil Protection Department.

In addition, Italy takes part in numerous European and international initiatives regarding the improvement and the implementation of specific policies related to civil security, namely the organization of training activities, exchange of experts and joint exercises.²² For instance, the Civil Protection Department was involved in the project on Strengthening the National Strategy for Forest Fire Fighting in Lebanon aimed at strengthening Lebanon’s forest fire prevention and forecasting capacity.

²⁰ European Commission, *The Community mechanism for Civil Protection*, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mechanism_en.htm.

²¹ Natalino Ronzitti, “Conclusions”, in Andrea De Guttry, Marco Gestri, Gabriella Venturini (eds), *International Disaster Response Law, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012*, p. 706.

²² In some cases bilateral cooperation has led also to joint research efforts. For example, the project INTERREG IIIB has resulted in the publication in French and Italian of a Handbook addressing the issue of common methodology for the evaluation of damages caused by natural or manmade disasters. For more details see Civil Protection Department, *Progetto DAMAGE: Développement d’Actions pour le Marketing et la Gestion Post Événements*, 2006, http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/en/view_pub.wp?contentId=PUB137.

In particular, because of its position in the Mediterranean, Italy has established and promoted a different kind of programmes and partnership with neighbourhood countries, including for example:²³

- PICRIT Project: co-funded by the 2007-2013 ALCOTRA Programme, it aims at finding effective measures to cope with natural hazards affecting cross-border areas of Italy and France, by enhancing the effectiveness of established systems of civil protection and management of national emergencies, paying particular attention to the safety of the European Critical Infrastructure (ECI) of this area.
- Force d'Intervention Rapide Européenne (F.I.R.E. 4) is a cooperation project among Mediterranean countries facing similar typologies of risk, promoted in the framework of the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection. In March 2007, the European Union approved the F.I.R.E. 4 proposal – jointly presented by France, Italy, Portugal and Spain - aimed at improving the prevention of natural disasters and the cooperation in the field among teams of different European countries. The goal of the initiative is to ensure a better protection of European citizens by developing an EU rapid response facing all risks related to natural disasters. In February 2008 the steering Committee of F.I.R.E. 4 decided to include Greece as partner of the project, so the initiative is now known as F.I.R.E. 5.
- EUROMED Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters (PPRD-South EU-ROMED): it has the objective to develop and reinforce the quality of civil protection services in the Euro-Mediterranean region through institutional cooperation in the field, both between the EU and the Mediterranean Partner Countries and among the Mediterranean Partner Countries themselves, thereby promoting political and social stability.
- Adriatic-Ionian Initiative: AII organizes several roundtables to enhance the cross-border cooperation on environmental and fire protection.²⁴

²³ ACRIMAS, *D2.1 Report on Current CM Framework*, April 2012, http://www.acrimas.eu/attachments/article/111/D2.1_ACRIMAS_Report_on_CM_Framework_v2-1.pdf.

²⁴ Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII), *Environment, Protection Against Fire*, <http://www.aii-ps.org/index.php/activities/environment-protection-against-fire>.

Italy has also concluded a number of bilateral cooperation agreements and/or technical cooperation pacts on civil protection with Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, FYROM, Germany, Malta, Montenegro, Russian Federation, Serbia, Sovereign Military Order of Malta (S.M.O.M.) and Swiss Confederation. Moreover, the country has established agreements with non-European countries such as Argentina, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Indonesia, Morocco, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela.

In addition, Italian municipalities, provinces and regions have the authority to establish cross-border cooperation projects with the aim to enhance the preparedness and response activities focused on specific geographic areas. For example, the autonomous Region Valle D'Aosta participated in the 2007-2013 ALCOTRA Programme with 13 projects that encompass the monitoring of seismic events, technological risk and CBRN threats.²⁵

These agreements, which come in different forms (Treaty, Memorandum, Protocol, Exchange of Letters, etc.), promote the development of joint programmes and projects and reciprocal assistance in the event of calamities. For example, when in 2007 Italy was affected by severe and dangerous forest fires, France and Spain contributed to the crisis response by sending Canadair airplanes (See Table 3).

²⁵ Autonomous Region of the Aosta Valley, *13 nuovi progetti di cooperazione transfrontaliera*, 3 December 2012, http://appweb.regione.vda.it/dbweb/comunicati.nsf/elenconotizie_ita/9185decfddb4f883c1257ac900329439.

3.

The relations between the civil security system and citizens

3.1 EXPECTATIONS

To a certain extent, the idea of responsibility of citizens in protecting their life could be connected to the more general concept of solidarity, which is codified by Art. 2 of the Italian Constitution stating that “The Republic recognizes and guarantees the inviolable rights of man, as an individual, and in the social groups where he expresses his personality, and demands the fulfillment of the intransgressible duties of political, economic, and social solidarity.”

It could be argued that this sense of solidarity among citizens finds one of its best expressions in voluntary organizations that represent a sort of civil consciousness of social solidarity. With Law No. 225/1992, the civil protection assumes the meaning of “widespread culture” by declaring the responsibility of all citizens to effectively contribute to the protection and preservation of territory, environment and society. Moreover, the gradual decentralization of civil protection functions from State to different administrative levels has enhanced the awareness, the consensus and the participation of the population in civil protection activities through the voluntary programmes.


As concerns citizens’ expectations towards the government responsibility there are no polls related to crisis management, nor specifically to the prevention phase. However, certain episodes (especially related to recent calamities) let us say that citizens’ expectations towards the government have hardly been met, especially during the reconstruction phase. For instance, significant protests took place in the first half of February 2010 in L’Aquila against the slowness of the reconstruction process. They were carried out by the so-called “wheelbarrows people,” hundreds of citizens who gathered voluntarily to remove tons of rubble from the city.¹ Criticisms

¹ Alpaslan Özerdem and Gianni Rufini, “L’Aquila’s Reconstruction Challenges: Has Italy Learned from its Previous Earthquake Disasters?”, in *Disaster*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (January 2013), p. 119-143.

have also been made concerning the current lack of prevention plans and the state’s inaction in the improvement of safety measures for buildings, in particular schools and hospitals.²

According to the Special Eurobarometer 383 published in June 2012, about half of the Italian citizens (49%) perceive natural disasters and man-made disasters as the threats most likely to hit the country. 36% of Italians are very concerned about terrorist attacks and armed conflicts. In addition, the Special Eurobarometer 328 dated November 2009 draws a distinction between natural and man-made disasters. It further breaks down natural disasters into sections such as flooding, violent storms, forest fires, etc. and differentiates man-made disasters into industrial accidents, marine spills and nuclear accidents. As shown by the figure below, the percentage of Italians concerned about earthquakes (58%) is much higher than the EU average (22%). Landslides represent a concern for a small percentage of Italian citizens (11%) which is nevertheless higher than the EU average (7%). In contrast, Italians are less worried about industrial accidents, flooding, violent storms, forest fires, marine pollution and nuclear accidents than the EU average.

Figure 4 – Risk perceptions of natural and man-made disasters



Source: IAI elaboration based on Special Eurobarometer 328

² Umberto Mazzantini, “A un anno dal terremoto, la rinascita emiliana in un paese in crisi”, in *Greenreport*, 20 May 2013, http://www.greenreport.it/_new/index.php?page=default&id=22011.

3.2 INFORMATION

The Special Eurobarometer Report 328 (2009) reveals that 28% of Italian citizens feel informed on crisis preparedness, in line with European average (29%) while only 29% of Italian citizens feel informed on disaster response.

When it comes to the type of information channels citizens prefer to be kept informed, 47% of Italian citizens declare to rely on scientists. The next most trusted source for disaster information is national government (34%), followed by European institutions (30%), journalists (18%), and NGOs (18%).

The Civil Protection Department conducts several activities to increase public awareness about natural hazards, and to improve the resilience of society by developing a culture of civil protection through campaigns, exhibitions and publications. For instance, the pamphlet “The Civil Protection Handbook for Families” describes various types of natural hazards, emergency procedures, how to prepare for them, what actions must to be taken before, during and after the crisis and what authority to call for help.³ The Civil Protection Department website also reports information on research and studies, for example the study carried out with the Abruzzo Region involving researchers from several Italian Universities on the territory of L’Aquila.⁴ At the municipal level, the responsible for risk communication and information to citizens is the mayor, while the Civil Protection Department promotes the dissemination of information: the Contact Center is dedicated to citizens, institutions, organizations and companies that wish to receive information or give reports on activities of the Civil Protection Department’s area of competence.

As far as warning systems are concerned, Italy seems to lack a well-functioning siren system for radio/TV warnings to alert citizens in case of calamities. On the other hand, social networks have increasingly been used to spread information and raise awareness especially by citizens: for example, in the latest events of the earthquake in Emilia Romagna 14,535 tweets were sent by the people in the first two hours follow-

³ Civil Protection Department, *The Civil Protection Handbook for Families*, 2007, http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/en/view_pub.wp?contentId=PUB13445.

⁴ Civil Protection Department-Gruppo di Lavoro MS-AQ (2010), *Microzonazione sismica per la ricostruzione dell’area aquilana*, L’Aquila, Regione Abruzzo, 2010, http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/it/view_pub.wp?contentId=PUB25330.

ing the first shakes, which contained information on the evolution and the contacts of hospitals, police, civil protection, fire brigades. The Civil Protection Department, which at the time did not have either a Facebook or Twitter account, initially criticized such use of social networks since brief and quick communication in case of emergency might cause panic. This initial attitude changed during the earthquake in the Region of Tuscany (January-February 2013): the regional Civil Protection Department has kept citizens regularly informed by using both Facebook and Twitter. Such Information exchanged on social network, are also be used through open source applications such as “crowd mapping” to locate geographically the origin of a Facebook message or a sent tweet.

3.3 EDUCATION

Together with the information and communication activities mentioned above, initiatives aiming at education are carried out at various levels, from the top to local level, with particular education programs provided by the Civil Protection Department, by NGOs, by the Ministry of Interior and by its specific departments such as the National Fire Brigades, Public Rescue and Civil Defence. Voluntary organizations also realize education/training programme for volunteers involved in civil protection while evacuation drills are organized in schools, private companies and public building on the basis of emergency plans.

Safe School Project

The Safe School Project, realized by the Ministry of Interior in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and the Civil Protection Department, was launched as a pilot project in 1992 and has gradually extended to all Italian provinces. It has the objective to educate children and teachers in issues like solidarity, cooperation and self-control, so that they are able to behave correctly during emergency situations. A national committee coordinates the project at the central level and establishes guidelines for the local activities, while at the local level the Prefectures and a provincial committee define educational programs accordingly.

Training and exercises

The training activity of the Civil Protection Department aims in particular to promote the growth of a shared “culture of civil protection”, including in terms of common operational procedures and methods to be implemented throughout the country. To this end, volunteers, competent local levels – regions, provinces, mountain communities and municipalities – and young citizens are the main targets of the Department’s training. In addition, the Department organizes relief drills at national, regional, provincial and local level. Drills are an important tool for prevention and for checking emergency plans, with the objective to test the intervention model, update territorial knowledge and suitability of resources. It also aims to instruct those involved on emergency management and the population on the correct behaviour to adopt.

The National Fire Brigades provide “internal” and “external” training programs. Internal training aims at the qualification and specialization of all National Fire Brigades staff while external training addresses various categories of citizens responsible for the implementation of measures regarding fire prevention and fire fighting. Each year an average of 1,000 professional fire fighters and 30/40 technical officials are trained by National Fire Brigades. Similarly, the Italian Red Cross offers both internal and external training and education programmes.⁵

SERIT platform

In terms of Research and Development (R&D) in the fields of security, the Government and national research institutions encourage the cooperation between stakeholders that operate in security and crisis management (industry, universities, research and training organizations, end users, etc). For example, Security Research in Italy (SERIT) is the R&D platform for national security jointly promoted by the National Research Council (*Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche*, CNR) and Finmeccanica, Italy’s leading industrial group in the defence and security sector. SERIT was launched in 2011 and among its goals intends to provide input on research priorities in the homeland security domain.⁶ The SERIT regularly

⁵ More detailed information about internal and external training of Italian Red Cross are available from: Italian Red Cross, *Formazione*, <http://cri.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/647>.

⁶ SERIT Platform, <http://security.cnr.it/index.php/en/serit>.

identifies key sectors, deemed as a priority for the country investments with regards to Italian specificities,⁷ while including input for the Horizon 2020.⁸

If we take into account the overall State-funded R&D we should notice that security does not seem to be a priority.⁹ Even the Horizon 2020 ITALIA document, issued in March 2013, does not modify the previous approach in which the national research programme was linked to national technology clusters without a specific one related to security. According to some observers, this point is critical because it would be desirable to reflect the European approach in giving security its own identity (also in relation to the budget issue) in Horizon 2020.¹⁰

⁷ SERIT (Security Research in ITaly), *SEcurity Research in ITaly, Vol. 2 (2012)*, <http://www.piattaformaserit.it/?p=1753>.

⁸ SERIT (SEcurity Research in ITaly), *Food for Thought Paper on H2020, Position Paper on H2020*, February 2013, <http://www.piattaformaserit.it/?p=1816>.

⁹ Interview, Rome, April 2013.

¹⁰ Interview, Rome, January 2013.

4.

The role of the private sector in maintaining civil security

4.1 ROLE OF SOCIETAL/NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS/NGOs

The world of societal/non-profit organizations/NGOs operating in the civil security system is extremely diverse and only some of these provide a direct support to the crisis management through a formal partnership with the Government. It is the case of the Italian Association of Experts on Critical Infrastructures (*Associazione Italiana esperti in Infrastrutture Critiche*, AIIC) which intends to create and sustain an interdisciplinary culture for the developing of strategies, methodologies and technologies able to adequately govern Critical Infrastructures, especially in crisis scenarios resulting from both natural and man-made disasters.¹ AIIC aims to promote and disseminate a “security culture” by acting as a forum to exchange experiences and knowledge. The members of AIIC include also officials of the Civil Protection Department and Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

Undoubtedly, volunteers’ organizations – non-profit organization according to ANVIL terminology – play a decisive role in Italy’s civil security system by providing human resources and qualified support both in preparedness and response phases. The legal framework that regulates volunteers’ organizations within the civil security system includes Law No. 266/1991 (G.U. No. 196, 22 Aug 1991), Law No. 225/1992 (G.U. No. 64, 17 Mar 1992) and, finally, the Decree of the President of the Republic No. 194/2001 (G.U. No. 120, 25 May 2001). The first recognizes the added value of organized volunteering as an expression of solidarity, participation and pluralism and the second considers the volunteers’ organizations as a “national operational structure”, part of the National Civil Protection Service. The Decree of the President of the Republic No. 194/2001 completely

¹ For more information see Italian Association of Critical Infrastructures’ Experts, 13 April 2011, http://www.infrastrutturecritiche.it/aic/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=219&Itemid=125.

regulates voluntary organizations.

Overall, the voluntary organizations engaged in civil protection number approximately 3,000.² The total number of Italian volunteers related to civil protection is growing and currently amounts to more than one million persons; 60,000 of them are theoretically ready to intervene rapidly in case of crisis on their territory.³ In compliance with the Italian law, in order to benefit from State funding, non-profit organizations have to be entered in the register referred to in Art. 6 of Law No. 266/1991. Consequently, Law No. 266/1991 and Law No. 383/2000 (G.U. No. 300, 27 Dec 2000) point out that non-profit organizations derive economic resources for their functions and activities from contributions of the State, public authorities or public institutions aimed only at supporting specific documented activities or projects. In addition, Art. 96 of the Law No. 342/2000 (G.U. No. 276, 25 Nov 2000) acts as milestone in financing provisions of non-profit organizations related to civil security. It is declared that since 2001 a share of the national fund for social policies⁴ is determined annually by the Minister for Social Solidarity, in consultation with the Minister of the Treasury, Budget and Economic Planning for the purchase of ambulances and capital goods used directly and exclusively for socially useful activities.

A particular aspect characterizing the Italian civil security system is the solidarity role of the Catholic Church. For example, besides the financial aid for reconstruction efforts, during the Emilia earthquake the Italian Caritas – the charitable arm of the Italian Bishops Conference (*Conferenza Episcopale Italiana*, CEI) – has supported the affected population by coordinating the activities of volunteer organizations coming from different regions and by creating the so-called “Community Centers” (*Centri di Comunità*).⁵

The Italian Red Cross

The Italian Red Cross is a non-profit NGO part of the International Move-

² For the list of voluntary organizations related to civil protection see http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/en/organizzazioni_volontariato.wp.

³ Francesco Santoianni, *Protezione civile disaster management. Emergenza e soccorso: pianificazione e gestione*, Firenze, Accursio edizioni di Noccioli, 2007.

⁴ Established in 1997. See Art. 59 (44) of the Law No. 449/1997 (G.U. No. 302, 30 Dec 1997).

⁵ Caritas italiana, *Terremoto Nord Italia*, 29 May 2012, <http://www.caritasroma.it/2012/05/terremoto-nord-italia>.

ment of the Red Cross. During all its activities at the international level, the Italian Red Cross works closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross, with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. It works closely with the Ministries of Health, Economy and Finance and Defence. The Red Cross has 4 Central Committees and more than 1,000 offices throughout the country. This organization has 160,000 volunteers and 5,000 employees.⁶ The Italian Red Cross is mainly involved in the preparation and the response to national and international disasters and acts as the operational structure of the National Civil Protection Service. The “Regulations for the organization of emergency activities” is the legal basis regulating the organization of all national and territorial structures with regard to the preparation and response to disasters.⁷ The organization is part of the civil protection domain and is involved in assistance to the population and logistics in case of crisis. The Italian Red Cross can utilize its network of local units to gather information on the evolving events and share them with the Civil Protection Department, while at the same time can forward the information coming from other institutions to local units. When a crisis occurs, the two main operating structures of the Italian Red Cross are the Crisis Unit (*Unità di Crisi*) and the Coordination and Assessment Team (*Team di Coordinamento e Valutazione*). The first is the operational centre and defines how to respond according to the type of crisis. It meets only in case of a signature crisis either national or international. The second assesses the situation and supports *delegates* in coordinating the initial response to the event.

Through the role of delegates, the Italian Red Cross coordinates its civil protection activities at regional, provincial and local levels. In particular, the coordination encompasses planning, preparedness and response phases.

4.2 ROLE OF PROFIT-ORIENTED ORGANIZATIONS

An important premise is that in the past private actors were largely pas-

⁶ Italian Red Cross, *La riforma della CRI*, <http://cri.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/20126>.

⁷ Italian Red Cross, *Regolamento di organizzazione delle Attività del settore Emergenze* (Regulations for the Organization of Emergency Activities), July 2010, <http://cri.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/3994>.

sive (i.e. they expected to be protected by the State).

According to Law No. 225/1992 private organizations can participate in the implementation of the civil security system but they are not legally obliged to do so. For this purpose, the national and local structures of civil protection can stipulate conventions with public and private subjects. According to available information, it does not seem that public agencies outsource crisis management responsibilities to profit-oriented organizations. Nowadays, the private sector is becoming aware that it should be more active. For instance, there are specific tasks in Italy for private actors regarding the protection of Critical Infrastructures.⁸

Critical Infrastructure Protection

The case of Critical Infrastructures (CI) deserves particular attention since in Italy, like in other European countries, private actors are owners of CI and/or manage their security. The overall legal framework on the protection of Italian critical infrastructure is the Legislative Decree No. 61/2011 (G.U. No. 102, 4 May 2011) that transposes the EU Directive 2008/114/EC. The Decree establishes procedures for the identification and designation of critical infrastructures covering the fields of energy and transport. It also defines how to assess the safety of these facilities and their minimum standard of protection against natural and man-made disasters, industrial accidents and voluntary human threats.⁹ As specified by the EU Directive and by the Legislative Decree No. 61/2011, in order to ensure the protection and the service continuity, the CI identified is required to appoint a *liaison* security officer and to draft an Operator's Security Plan (*Piano di Sicurezza dell'Operatore*, PSO). The PSO identifies the elements that compose the CI and highlights for each of them the existing security measures.

The NISP and the Secretariat of the Interdepartmental Coordination for Critical Infrastructures (*Segreteria Infrastrutture Critiche*, SIC) play a key role for the identification and designation of CI. The NISP acts as the national contact point with other European States and European Commission while the SIC supports the NISP with technical and scientific ac-

⁸ Interview, Rome, July 2012.

⁹ Luisa Franchina, Alessia Amodio, Francesco Unali, "La protezione delle Infrastrutture Critiche tra minacce vecchie e nuove. Il decreto 61/2011", in *Information Security*, Vol. 3, No. 8 (January-February 2012), p. 12-18, http://www.infrastrutturecritiche.it/aiic/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=141&Itemid=131.

tivities. The SIC was established in December 2009 with the Ordinance of the President of the Council of Ministers No. 3836 (G.U. No. 6, 9 Jan 2010) in order to ensure the coherence and synergy between the initiatives and activities of the State administrations involved in the protection of CI.¹⁰

At the national political level, the Ministries of Interior, Defence, Economic Development, Infrastructure and Transport and the Civil Protection Department set the relevant actions and measures necessary to ensure the protection of CI located in national territory, keeping the NISP informed. In this context, cyber security is one of main area of concern and intervention. In January 2013, through a Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, Italy released its cybersecurity strategy defining the institutional framework aimed at protecting national security and critical infrastructures, with particular regard to the protection of cybersecurity system at national level. To this end, the strategy has defined the tasks assigned to each actor involved, the mechanisms and procedures in relation to vulnerability, risk prevention, response to the attacks and the timely restoration of systems' functionality in case of crisis.¹¹ At the local level, the responsibility for protection of CI is assigned to the Prefect. In case a CI covers the territorial competence of more than one Prefect, the Ministry of Interior identifies who is responsible.

¹⁰ G.Z., "Infrastrutture Critiche, Quei punti deboli di ogni stato", in *Il Giornale della Protezione civile*, 27 January 2011, <http://www.ilgiornaledellaprotezionecivile.it/index.html?idart=2656>.

¹¹ Federica Meta, "Cybersecurity, l'Italia avrà la sua task force", in *Corriere delle Comunicazioni*, 20 March 2013, http://www.corrierecomunicazioni.it/it-world/20297_cybersecurity-l-italia-avra-la-sua-task-force.htm.

5.

Quality measure: Effectiveness

5.1 ASSESSMENTS THROUGH PROFESSIONAL AND POLITICAL INQUIRIES

Political and professional inquiries have been carried out respectively by the Parliament, national courts and disciplinary boards, and tend to investigate and analyze the effectiveness of prevention and preparedness measures. The following represent the more representative and better documented (open sources) inquiries.

Train derailment in Viareggio

A first case is related to the train derailment that took place in Viareggio on June 29, 2009. Even in this case an inquiry ministerial commission was established. The Commission had to wait until March 2011, when the gathering evidence before a criminal trial was prepared by the Judge for the Preliminary Investigation of the Prosecutor of the Republic of Lucca in order to execute a series of destructive laboratory tests on materials and components for the railway wagons, materials and components involved. The freight train carrying LPG was passing the station of Viareggio. The structural failure of the axle of one of the two wheel-sets of the first carriage of the first wagon created instability in the equilibrium of the forces acting on the trolley, immediately causing the derailment. Around 345 m farther, the collision with the platform provoked the reversal of the first wagon. Consequently, the other 4 wagons overturned, their cistern cracked, resulting in leakage of LPG along the railway centre and in the surrounding areas. Three minutes after the derailment and two minutes after the convoy, a powerful explosion occurred, causing 32 deaths, dozens of injuries, serious damage to rail infrastructure and several houses near the train station.

The Plan of Railway Emergency was declared immediately and included the order of evacuation, rescue operations to isolate the area and

blocks of the movement of trains (communication was launched even before the explosion). The railway emergency plan provides for the so-called “Extended Emergency Plan”, with its main lines of activities identified by the General Plan of Emergency by the station of Viareggio. After a serious train accident, at least four levels of intervention are activated: 1. rescue and emergency relief; 2. concrete actions, technical and / or prescriptive to prevent the occurrence or continuation of any condition of danger of further damage and to restore of rail traffic; 3. investigation of the judiciary; 4. identification of the technical causes of the accident. According to Directive 49/2004, in Italy the National Agency for the safety of railways is the ‘safety authority’. In addition, the improvement of railway safety through the pursuit of operational objectives, consisting in identifying the causes of accidents or incidents of exercise, is the general objective of the activities of the Directorate General for Train Investigations. The investigations proved the preparation of the train was in accordance with the Safety Management System as well as the activities of employees were regular. It can be said that the equipment, controls, skills and procedures in the maintenance of rolling stock and accessories responded to current industry standards. Railway Enterprises are subject to the control and supervision of ANSF (*Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza delle Ferrovie* - National Agency for Railways Security), the company issuing the Security Certificate – and Infrastructure Manager. In the Viareggio case, the ANSF with a series of measures (e.g. provision No. ANSF 03502/09 of 2 July 2009) imposed carrying out special controls on the axles, aimed at identifying any defects; it imposed for wagons registered in Italy and for those registered abroad but circulating in Italy the obligation on the part of Railway Companies, the owners / charterers / users to ensure that the traceability of axles of Type “A” (ref. Fiche UIC 510.1) was guaranteed, and otherwise to conduct special audits to check for any defects (note No. ANSF 04738/09 of 26 August 2009).

The core question placed by the disaster of Viareggio concerns not only the identification of the cause of failure of a structural component of the wagon, but also the reasons why the progression of the fracture was not detected and discovered before the complete rupture. In these terms, the Commission proposed recommendations to both the normative and the technical-operational order. The survey highlighted that the safety supervision system should be reviewed, especially in terms of standards for systematic checks and security guarantees even at the European level. To increase the active and passive safety, it urg-

es to act upon the indirect causes and structural aspects of the rules that increase the likelihood of errors. In addition to this, there is the urgency of structuring an effective regulatory framework and provide it with an integrated system of adequate controls. In the regulatory field, we need to entrust the European Railway Agency (ERA) further crucial tasks. The European Railway Agency (ERA) should be in charge of the maintenance of a register on the EU rolling stock operating on the European Union network, as it happens by analogy to carriage by air; the definition of maintenance standards with related operating procedures valid throughout the territory of the Union; certification of entities authorized to carry out maintenance on rolling stock operating on European territory; procedures and/or systems to monitor and control the work of the employees authorized to carry out periodic and extraordinary maintenance operations; introduction of a penalty system to be implemented in case of proven violations of the rules and safety standards. Moreover, corrective actions should be directed to the freight sector with particular reference to the transport of dangerous goods. In the operating range, new visual and instrumental inspections should be conducted over sample surveys. Moreover, a system of full traceability of the axles is required, together with the obligation to register the results of the tests carried out on the axles and on all the important components for the railway safety. Finally, the Commission considered the importance of laws in the field of wagon leases.

L'Aquila earthquake

One of the most controversial cases concerned the role of the National Commission for the Forecast and Prevention of Major Risks of the Civil Protection Department a few days before the earthquake struck L'Aquila causing 309 victims.

In October 2012, seven Italian earthquake experts – members of the National Commission before the earthquake – were sentenced to six years in jail for failing to give adequate safety warnings to the residents of a seismically active area.¹ Six days before the earthquake, the National Commission met to assess the situation after several months of frequent small earthquakes: after the meeting, some Commission members gave encouraging statements to the media, which prosecutors said gave residents an overly

¹ The written explanations of the verdict was issued in January 2013.

reassuring picture of the risks they faced. According to prosecutors, the Commission did not uphold its mandate and consequently did not allow residents and the population to make informed decisions about whether to stay or leave their homes.² Such a judgment has been subject to numerous criticisms from the international scientific community which feared that the sentence might pave the way to legal actions against scientists who evaluate the risks of natural hazards which by their very nature cannot be forecast or ruled out with absolute certainty.³ After the sentence, the members of the National Commission resigned, creating the risk of paralysis in prevention and prediction activities carried out by the Commission.

2003 electricity black-out

The third case regarded the electricity black-out that affected the Italian network in September 2003. An inquiry commission was established in order to analyze the events causing the black-out of the national electricity system, their causes and development as well as identify any corrective measures to be undertaken.⁴

The chain of events was triggered by a 3000 MW electricity discharge along the Swiss electric circuit at 3:01 am on 28 September 2003, after a tree fell and hit the electrical system. Despite several manual arrangements aiming at closing the circuit, at 3.11 a request of modification was addressed to the Italian GRTN.⁵ According to the conventional rules, the entire manoeuvre is required to be concluded within 20 minutes. Italy observed exactly the rule, replying at 3.21. However, Rome underesti-

² La "Sentenza sulla Grandi Rischi all'Aquila, 'Fecero valutazioni approssimative'", 18 January 2013, <http://www.lastampa.it/2013/01/18/italia/cronache/sentenza-sulla-grandi-rischi-all-aquila-fecero-valutazioni-approssimative-fZRB-58Z0238YoJKCP4IDON/pagina.html>.

³ Corriere della Sera, "L'Aquila, gli scienziati Usa contro la condanna. 'Napolitano dovrebbe intervenire'", 12 October 2012, http://www.corriere.it/cronache/12_ottobre_23/aquila-scientiati-usa-contro-sentenza_e4b357a0-1ce2-11e2-99b8-aac0e-d15c6ac.shtml.

⁴ Ministry of Economic Development- General Direction of Energy and Mineral Sources (DGERM), *Black-out del sistema elettrico italiano del 28 settembre 2003*, 28 November 2003, <http://dgerm.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/dgerm/downloads/RapportoBlackout-28092003.pdf>.

⁵ GRTN stands for "Gestore della rete di trasmissione nazionale". It is a joint-stock company, deputed to promote, incentive and enhance developments of renewable resources in Italy.

mated the importance of the request due to the incomplete compliance with the agreed procedure of the Swiss counterpart, ETRANS, which requested a reduction by 300MW of the power exchanged with Italy (not enough to face the overload in the Swiss system). In the meantime, the load spread over the other Swiss electric circuits. In the next 4 minutes, at 3.25, Italy was found in a lack of 6000 MW. It is worthy to remind that Italy is an importer of electricity and, at that moment, its imports exceeded by 300 MW. Consequently, the disconnection between the Italian and the European circuit occurred inevitably, resulting in the black out.

There were three main countermeasures to prevent the case. They base on automatic and manual alarm system and automatic instruments for balancing the power capacity. Presumably Italy was able to act promptly in the request-manoeuvres time interval. However, there were several problems, such as the dysfunction of the telecommunication mechanism or ambiguous interpretations of the rules, which led to the mismanagement of the risk. The first mechanism (Rule No1; N-1) did not work due to the fact that Switzerland did not specify neither the urgency of the question nor asked for the pumps detachment, leading Italy to underestimate of the case; the second one was not successful due to the lacks of EDA (*Elaboratore Distacchi Automatici* - Automatic Detachments Calculator) mechanism to intervene in due course; the third one was the only acting “virtuously” although its 85% reliability and its deficient functioning in the South Italy. What is more, even the Commission’s work lacked of completeness due to the little time at its disposal.

As a result, the Commission proposed to complete the investigation and to implement measures in the short and medium term. These measures consist of strengthening of the “dialogue” on security issues between managers through the knowledge-facility of their networks. Moreover, neighbouring countries should agree on rapid and systematic implementation of the N-1, the capacity limits of the lines associated, the real-time representation of the most significant parts of the neighbouring networks and related measures and alarms. In addition, the Commission deemed necessary to strengthen the direct means of reliable communication between managers and neighbouring train staff in the control room; review the systems of protection and control of large thermoelectric units; enhance preventive measures and make the Automatic Detachments Calculator more flexible.

5.2 LIMITS TO NATIONAL CAPACITIES

As mentioned in section 2.4, bilateral and multilateral mechanisms are activated when national capacities are not sufficient to cope with a certain crisis. The main examples of requested external assistance are related to financial needs.

Declaration of state of emergency

The Council of Ministers, through the deliberation, declares a state of emergency in case of natural disasters, catastrophes or other events whose intensity and extent require extraordinary powers and means.⁶ As mentioned before, according to the civil protection legal framework, in Italy disasters are classified in three different types based on extension, intensity and responsiveness of civil protection: “type a” (municipal level), “type b” (provincial and regional) and “type c” (national).

According to the latest reform of the civil protection⁷ for the “type c” events the Council of Ministers declares a state of emergency upon proposal of the President of the Council or the President of the Region affected by the crisis. Following the declaration, the Head of the Civil Protection Department takes “extraordinary powers” and related measures may be taken in derogation from the provisions in force. Law No. 152/2005 (G.U. No. 176, 30 Jul 2005) establishes that even in the event of natural disasters or major events abroad, the Civil Protection Department may define the measures, approved by the President of the Council of Ministers, to declare state of emergency and to respond to disasters.

⁶ Camera dei Deputati-Servizio studi, *Disposizioni urgenti per il riordino della protezione civile*, D.L. 59/2012-A.C. 5203-A. *Schede di lettura*, 18 June 2012, <http://documenti.camera.it/leg16/dossier/Testi/D12059c.htm>.

⁷ Law No. 100/2012 (see next chapter).

6.

Quality measures: Efficiency

The presence of civil defence and civil protection domains entails two different budgets for the civil security system. The General Directive for administrative activity and management for the year 2012 issued by the Minister of Interior, allocated a total of EUR 1,747,977,737 to the Fire Brigades, Public Rescue and the Civil Defence Department. Within this sum, EUR 4,497,208 aims at improving the crisis management's planning of the national civil defence system, while EUR 1,743,480,529 are allocated for risk prevention and public rescue with the objectives to:

- Improve the rescue activities of National Fire Brigades;
- Increase the monitoring of the application of fire prevention's rules;
- Strengthen the rescue during major disasters;
- Disseminate and promote the culture of safety to the citizens;

Concerning civil protection, in 2012 the financial resources for the Civil Protection Department were EUR 1,670,392,269 distributed as follows:¹

- 71% of the total to: a) pay mortgage rates contracted by the regions to finance the reconstruction and the repair of the damages caused by major natural disasters that have occurred in recent years; b) fund the organization of the Major Events such as Mediterranean Games (2009) and World Aquatics Championships (2009);
- 22% of the total for other interventions authorized by the legislation;
- 7% of the total to: a) finance institutional activities of prevention and forecast of emergency; b) cover the costs related to the management of the air fleet; c) the general expenses of the Civil Protection Department.

¹ Presidency of the Council of Ministers, *Nota preliminare al bilancio di previsione della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri per l'anno 2012*, December 2011, http://www.governo.it/trasparenza_valutazione_merito/normativa/bilancio_PCM_2012_nota.pdf.

In addition, as a consequence to the cuts resulting from the adoption of the Stability Law (the Italian Law on national budget) the budget allocated to civil protection shows a decreasing tendency from 2011 onwards. In fact, in 2010 the amount was EUR 2,072,525,900, decreased to 1,891,846,340 in 2011. Finally the budget allocated for last year (2012) amounted to EUR 1,670,329,269.

Legislative initiatives concerning financial aspects of crisis management have been recently adopted. With Law Decree No. 59/2012 (G.U. No. 113, 16 May 2012) on Urgent Measures on the Reorganization of Civil Protection (*Disposizioni urgenti sul riordino della protezione civile*), converted by Law No. 100/2012 (G.U. No. 162, 16 July 2012) the time-span for the duration of the state of emergency has been shortened: the period, now, cannot exceed 90 days plus 60 of extension². In addition, the State no longer finances interventions in support of damages to houses and buildings of citizens who, therefore, may only rely upon private insurances. Regions may also increase the excise tax on fuel by 5 cents to finance civil protection. Moreover, Law Decree No. 195/2009 (G.U. No. 302, 30 Dec 2009) concerning the management of the response actions in L'Aquila, envisaged the establishment of the so-called "Protezione Civile Servizi Spa", a joint-stock company that was expected to be under the supervision of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers – Civil Protection Department which was also supposed to be its exclusive owner and will be responsible of appointing the company Board of Directors. The aim of this joint-stock company was to make the crisis management "more flexible and prompt." However, after being largely criticized for attempting to privatize the State's responsibility in crisis management by establishing a company that, although owned by a State's body such as the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, had its own employees whose work was based on private law contracts the relevant article was deleted and not included in the following act converting law decree into law. The most controversial aspects of the project of "Protezione Civile Servizi Spa" were linked to the issue of transparency: the fact that it was supposed to be owned and managed by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers was perceived as a threat to dialogue and confrontation among all political parties. In addition, some argued that the very founding principle of civil protection, that is voluntary solidarity, would

²In accordance with Law No. 119 /2013 (G.U. No. 242 of 15 Oct 2013) the duration has been further modified: currently it cannot exceed 180 days plus 180 of extension.

be distorted as a result.

Regarding equipment³ and technology, it seems that no major investments have been made so far: in fact, Italy's crisis management budget appears to be limited.⁴ In terms of equipment, it shall be mentioned that there is an increasing political awareness towards the future utilization of dual-use technologies and assets able to operate both in civil protection and civil defence domain.⁵ From an Research & Technology (R&T) point of view there are two main streamlines for the improvements, although constrained by the availability of national funds:

- A better management of the risk evaluation aspects;
- An improved capabilities and efficiency for the management of critical, unexpected "black swan" emergencies.⁶

The first line of improvements might provide a better assessment and quantification of the status of natural disaster in order to avoid an underestimation of the threat and possible damages, being limited by the current understanding of the underlying physical comprehension of the phenomena (earthquakes, floods and combination of natural/manmade cascading effects), nevertheless there is room to improve forecasting methods and monitoring network. Such development is, however, constrained by the availability of national funds to sustain targeted research and acquisition. The second line relates to the ability to manage unexpected aspects of low probability big crisis which overcomes the national capabilities to deal with such an occurrence. Example may be super-volcano eruption of the Campi Flegrei or the impact of Tyrrhenian underwater sliding generating high impact tsunami waves. For such context the development of new means for crisis management and dedicated infrastructure to train personnel facing complex multidimensional, multidisciplinary operation is a key capability to develop. Serious game technology and environment coupled with new Concept of Operations (CONOPS) might be the right recipe to increase preparedness on such extreme events.⁷

In addition, constrained national funds also affect the implementation

³ Interview, Rome, May 2013.

⁴ See also *SERIT Platform*.

⁵ Interview, Rome, May 2013.

⁶ Black Swan type scenarios refers to scenarios that are not fully covered by the current crisis plans and/or may present severe impact on the society due to the domino effects on population, infrastructure, transportation, among others.

⁷ Interview, Rome, April 2013.

of relevant prevention measures by administrative and political authorities: implementation is in fact not mandatory, particularly when it has significant budgetary aspects, and there are no immediate consequences if it is disregarded or only sloppily applied.

7.

Quality measure: Legitimacy

7.1 POLITICAL SUPPORT

As stated in section 2.1, the management of earthquakes in Friuli and Irpinia was characterized by slow rescue operations and lack of coordination. As a result, a debate started on how to overcome the old operative system – more centralized and based on cause and effect approach – by assuming that civil protection could embrace forecasting and preventing activities. In case of severe crisis, usually “type c” the Government and the Civil Protection Department intervenes by adopting legislative dispositions in order to support the response and recovery phases. Usually, these dispositions are aimed at declaring and/or extending the state of emergency and/or at allocating significant financial resources towards the area affected by the disaster.¹ Following the last reform of the civil protection, response measures are adopted by the Chief of the Civil Protection Department and no longer by the President of the Council of Ministers. Currently, ordinances issued within 30 days from the declaration of the state of emergency are immediately effective, without the need for a preventive control by the Ministry of Economy.² On the one hand, this allows the Civil Protection Department to act with more flexibility but, on the other hand, it reduces the Government’s role in emergency response. In addition, the latest reform has also weakened the role of coordination within the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, in favour of other actors at the national and local levels: this was evident, for example, in the case of the recent earthquakes in Emilia Romagna in 2012 if compared with that in Abruzzo in 2009.³

Finally, the complexity of the chain of command, the high number of responsible authorities and Italians’ traditional scepticism toward the Government willingness and ability to deal effectively with their problems has favoured the consolidation of a preference for emergency, exceptional

¹ Directive of the President of the Council of Ministers of 3 December 2008 (G.U. No. 36, 13 Feb 2009).

² Law No. 100/2012 (G.U. No. 162, 16 July 2012).

³ Interview, Rome, May 2013.

measures that greatly shortens the usually very long decision time. In this way, both the traditional individualistic culture and the drive to protect as rapidly and as well as possible its own interests and well-being coalesce in what we may call a “preference for emergency”. It is justified by the ineffectiveness of the normal administration, but also suggesting that it may be easier not to reform and increase the effectiveness of “normality” when the “emergency” can be better manipulated and more rewarding.

7.2 LEGAL SUPPORT

As outlined in section 5.1 about the case of L'Aquila seven Italian experts, members of the National Commission for the Forecast and Prevention of Major Risks of the Civil Protection Department, were sentenced to six years in jail for failing to give adequate safety warning to the residents of a seismically active area. Such a judgment has been subject to numerous criticisms from the international scientific community which feared that the sentence might open the way to legal actions against scientists who evaluate the risks of natural hazards. In relation with the same facts, the Head of Civil Protection Department at that time Guido Bertolaso and the council member of the Abruzzo Region with the competencies on civil protection, Daniela Stati, were also subject to investigation by the L'Aquila prosecutors for manslaughter. On January 2013, the same prosecutors closed the investigation without beginning any trial because the charges proved to be unfounded.⁴

On January, 2014, eight people encompassing local politicians, municipality civil servants, engineers and entrepreneurs, including the Deputy Major of L'Aquila, have been subject to investigation in relation to the response to the 2009 earthquake. The L'Aquila prosecutors have charged them to have committed corruption and several administrative violations between September 2009 and July 2011,⁵ mainly concerning the management of two works: the ones necessary to secure the university building Palazzo Carli damaged by the earthquake in order to prevent it to collapse – thus during the response phase; to repair and renovate a group

⁴ Abruzzo News, “Processo Grandi Rischi: chiesta l'archiviazione per Guido Bertolaso”, 30 January 2013, <http://www.notiziedabruzzo.it/primo-piano/processo-grandi-rischi-chiesta-l-archiviazione-per-guido-bertolaso.html>.

⁵ Marianna Gianforte et al., “L'Aquila, tangenti per la ricostruzione: 4 arresti”, in *Il Centro*, 8 January 2014, <http://ilcentro.gelocal.it/laquila/cronaca/2014/01/08/news/l-aquila-tangenti-per-la-ricostruzione-4-arresti-1.8429946>.

of buildings⁶ in the city centre – in the recovery phase. In February 2010, the L'Aquila prosecutors also charged politicians and entrepreneurs of administrative violations regarding the management of the works on the group of buildings "Consorzio Federico II".⁷ In October 2011, all people investigated were judged innocent because the procedures to manage the works proved to be regular.⁸ There are other ongoing trials against those charged of violations of the procedures related to the construction of some of the buildings collapsed in L'Aquila during the earthquake.⁹

In 2013, the former Mayor of Genoa (Northern Italy) was investigated by city prosecutors for suspected slander and manipulating documents in an investigation surrounding the 2011 deadly Genoa flood. According to prosecutors, documentation regarding the precise timing of when the city launched a flood alert in the fall of 2011 was tampered with by city officials.¹⁰

As far as the financial management of Major Events is concerned, the Head of the Civil Protection Department at that time Guido Bertolaso, together with the Head of the Council for Public Infrastructures and other 16 people, was subject to investigation in 2010: they were accused of corruption in the management of tenders for the preparation of the Major Event of the G8 in La Maddalena (Sardinia) in 2009. Guido Bertolaso, after rejecting all the accusations, resigned in 2010. In January 2014 the trial began.

7.3 POPULAR TRUST AND SUPPORT

According to Special Eurobarometer 371 on Internal Security dated No-

⁶ Enrico Nardecchia, "La torta da 200 milioni pagati a pie' di lista", in *Il Centro*, 14 January 2014, <http://ilcentro.gelocal.it/laquila/cronaca/2014/01/14/news/la-torta-da-200-milioni-pagati-a-pie-di-lista-1.8470164>.

⁷ La Repubblica, "Scende in campo la procura aquilana indagherà sul Consorzio Federico II", 22 February 2010, http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2010/02/22/news/l_aquila_pm_indagher_su_consortio-2395388.


⁸ Virginia Piccolillo, "Lavori post-sisma, assolti Verdini e Fusi 'Appalti regolari'", in *Corriere della Sera*, 15 October 2011, http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2011/ottobre/15/Lavori_post_sisma_assolti_Verdini_co_9_111015001.shtml.

⁹ These trials are mentioned for the sake of completeness, but they are not described in details since they are beyond the scope of this study, since they do not regard the preparedness and response phases of the civil security system's functioning.

¹⁰ Ansa, "Ex Genoa Mayor Probed for Fraud in Deadly-flood Case", 30 January 2013, http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/rubriche/english/2013/01/30/Ex-Genoa-mayor-probed-fraud-deadly-flood-case_8164336.html.

vember 2011, 60% of Italian citizens believe that Italy is doing enough to fight terrorism and more than half (about 52%) think that the country is doing enough to manage natural and man-made disasters. It shall be noticed that natural and man-made disasters in the last decade have been largely more numerous and had greater effects than terrorist attacks.

Figure 5 – National actions on fighting terrorism



Source: IAI elaboration based on Special Eurobarometer 371

The popular perceptions during a major crisis tend not to change and the public trust/support remains high in particular during the response phase of the disaster. In general, the Civil Protection Department is deemed as one the institutions closer to the citizens' needs. This in turn has caused in some regions a kind of moral hazard for which citizens tend to not be responsible by expecting in any case the public intervention.¹¹ However, the general perceptions could radically change negatively especially during the recovery and reconstruction activities as happened after the 2009 earthquake that affected L'Aquila.¹²

¹¹ Interview, Rome, May 2013.

¹² Corriere della Sera, "L'Aquila, il popolo delle carriole torna nella zona rossa per togliere le macerie", 10 March 2010, http://www.corriere.it/cronache/10_marzo_14/aquila_carriole_protesta_0a798ba4-2f78-11df-a29d-00144f02aabe.shtml.

8.

Italy's civil security in the EU context

According to the information provided by the European Community Civil Protection Mechanism, Italy has activated the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC)¹ eight times between 2007 and 2011. The MIC activations concerned specific types of disasters, in particular forest fires, landslide, floods and earthquakes and, in some cases, involved the participation of other European Member States such as France and Spain. Italy has also received significant resources from the EU Solidarity Fund for two major earthquakes, in Emilia-Romagna (2012) and L'Aquila (2009), with a total amount of EUR 1,170 million. From an overall assessment of the EU Solidarity Fund interventions since 2002, it emerges that Italy is the first beneficiary country with a total aid granted of EUR 1,246.8 million.

Table 2 - EU Solidarity Fund interventions since 2002: ITALY

Occurrence	Nature of disaster	Category	Damage (million €)	Aid Granted (million €)	Total aid granted
10/2002	Earthquake (Molise)	Regional	1,558	30,8	1,246.8
10/2002	Eruption of Volcano Etna	Regional	894	16,8	
04/2009	Earthquake (Abruzzo)	Major	10,212	493,8	
10/2010	Flooding in Veneto	Regional	676	16,9	
10/2011	Flooding in Liguria/Tuscany	Regional	722,5	18,1	
05/2012	Earthquake in Emilia-Romagna	Major	13,274	670,2	

Source: EU Solidarity Fund

¹ On 15 May 2013 the ERCC (Emergency Response Coordination Centre) was opened as the successor of MIC.

Following the 2009 earthquake in L'Aquila the European Commission, through the Solidarity Fund, granted significant assistance to Italy by allocating EUR 493,8 million divided as follows:²

- EUR 50 million for first emergency operations;
- EUR 350 million for the housing projects in L'Aquila where currently (January 2014) around 12,000 people live.
- EUR 93,8 million for over 3,100 small temporary housing units for up to 7,000 people, in the proximity of the little villages surrounding the city of L'Aquila.
- 32 high quality temporary schools have been built to ensure the education activities of over 15,000 students whose school have been affected by the earthquake.

In the case of the 2012 earthquake in the Region of Emilia-Romagna, after the financial resources of the Solidarity Fund were originally denied by five EU Member States (Finland, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden and UK) the EU finally managed to allocate EUR 670 million, the greatest aid ever allocated for natural disasters since the creation of the EU Solidarity Fund in 2002.³ A first earthquake with a magnitude of 5.9 on the Richter scale hit the area north of Bologna, towards Ferrara, causing fatalities and massive destruction to ancient buildings in surrounding towns. The second, with a force of 5.8 on the Richter scale hit the same region, this time towards the north of the city of Modena, on May 29th. The earthquakes caused 27 deaths; an estimated 350 people were injured and over 45,000 people had to be evacuated. There was serious and widespread damage to buildings, infrastructure, businesses, industrial facilities, agriculture and to the important cultural heritage sector. By far the biggest part of the damage (nearly 92%) was recorded in Emilia Romagna, particularly in the Provinces of Modena, Ferrara, Bologna and Reggio Emilia. Lombardy and Veneto were affected to a lesser extent with nearly 8% and 0.4% of total damage respectively.

It should be added that Italy itself has contributed to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, especially in terms of training, exercises and exchange of experts programmes, organized by the participant States with co-financing from the Commission. Between 2010 and 2012, the Civil

² For an overview of the EU Solidarity Fund see http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/solidarity/index_en.cfm#6.


³ European Commission, EU Solidarity Fund: A Record €670 million for Emilia Romagna, 19 September 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-959_en.htm.

Protection Department coordinated one EU-level exercise in 2010, EU TEREX in Tuscany, which simulated an earthquake scenario, and took part in four EU-level simulations. In addition, in 2013 the Civil Protection Department organized a further exercise TWIST (Tidal Wave In Southern Tyrrhenian Sea), and participated in June 2013 in the EU TARANIS operation coordinated by Austria. In addition, over the period 2007-2011 Italy assisted other countries through the Mechanism, as reported by Table 3.

Section II and Section III of the Eurobarometer 383, dated June 2012, analysed the attitude and the general awareness of European citizens with regards to the EU coordination of civil protection. More than a half of Italian citizens, about the 54%, is not aware that EU coordinates the civil protection both inside and outside the Union. This lack of awareness is confirmed by the fact that about 69% of Italian citizens declare to be not “Well informed” or “Not very well informed” about civil protection activities of the EU. The correspondent European averages on the same data are even worse (respectively 57% and 80%), nevertheless we cannot deny that EU visibility on the ground concerning civil protection is lacking.

Regarding the EU role in civil protection, 34% of Italians “totally agree” on the fact that coordinated EU action in dealing with disasters is more effective than action by individual countries, with respect to 42% of the EU average. Almost half of Italians, 48%, tends to agree with this statement, vis-à-vis 40% of the EU average. By adding the percentages related to “totally agree” and “tend to agree”, an overwhelming majority of Italian citizens (82%) believe that a coordinated EU action in dealing with disasters is more effective than actions by individual States, perfectly in line with the EU average (82%).

Figure 6 – Attitudes and awareness of EU coordination of civil protection



Source: IAI elaboration based on Special Eurobarometer 383

Table 3 – Italy's assistance to other countries between 2007-2012

Period	Crisis type and country	Contribution
28.06-30.06.2007	Forest fires in Greece	2 Canadairs CL-415
05.07-9.07.2007	Forest fires in Greece	2 Canadairs CL-415
25.07-14.08.2007	Forest fires in Albania	2 Canadairs CL-415 IT has been awarded with a Transport Grant
16.08-24.08-2007	Earthquake in Peru	Italy sent bilateral assistance
24.08-07.09.2007	Forest fires in Albania	2 Canadairs, Italy has been awarded with a Transport Grant
24.08-05.09.2007	Forest fires in Greece	1 Canadair
12.11-10.12.2007	Oil spill (marine pollution)	Italy was part of a MIC assessment team deployed in Kiev on 18.11
13.05- 27.06.2008	Earthquake in China	Italy was part of a MIC assessment team deployed on 17.05.2008
13.06-16.06-2008	Forest Fires in Norway	Italy offered aerial fire fighting capacity
24.07-28.07.2008	Forest fires in Greece	2 Canadairs CL-415
23.07-20.08.2008	Forest fires in Montenegro	1 Canadair
4.09-3.10.2008	Haiti cyclones "Fay", "Gustave", "Hanna" and "Ike"	Italy was part of a MIC assessment team deployed on 13.09.2008
13.08-14.08.2009	Forest fires in Albania	Italy offered 1 Canadair CL 415 but it was not accepted due to availability time
22.-26.08.2009	Forest fires in Greece	2 Canadairs
31.08-3.09.2009	Forest fires in Portugal	2 Canadairs
7.01-21.01.2010	Floods in Albania	2 helicopters CH47, medicines, 500 kitchens sets x 5 pers. each, 4400 blankets, 15 generators , 8 water pumps, 6 boats, 80 tents (22 m ²), 5 WP units, 30.000 sandbags
13.01-06.04.2010	Earthquake in Haiti	Italy provided water purification tablets and tents; 12 experts in assessment team, was part of an EC co-financed Preparatory Action Module;
01.03-07.06.2010	Earthquake in Chile	Mobile hospital and experts for MIC assessment and coordination teams
27.07 – 2.08.2010	Forest fires in Portugal	2 Canadairs C-415
04.08-30.11.2010	Floods in Pakistan	In-kind assistance; Italy was part of a EUCP team deployed on 19.08
03.08-20.08.2010	Forest fires in Russian Federation	Italy contributed to air-crews and water discharges

21.10.2010-14.12.2010	Haiti cholera outbreak / hurricane Tomas	Italy delivered four Inter Agency Diarrheal Disease Kits (IDDK) as well as medical equipment and material for the treatment of cholera (9.5 tons of material) on 7.12.2010
01.12.2010-05.01.2011	Floods in Albania	Food supplies (80 m3-25 tons.), hygienic material (40 m3-4 tons), suits and rainproof suits (80m3-5 tons); 1 high capacity suction pump; 2 light towers; 2 generators
02.12- 08.12.2010	Forest fires in Israel	12 tons of “Fire Troll 931” (flame retardant foam); 69 tons of “Fire Troll 931” and 20.000 lt fire foam (total value of € 300.000)
08.12-22.12.2010	Floods in Montenegro	4.000 blankets; 2 boats 10 rolls (plastic, 4x60 mt); 504 kitchen sets
		5 Generators 5 Kva
		3 Generators 10 kva
		2 Generators 18 Kva
25.02-14.03.2011	Earthquake in New Zealand	120 Tents 25 m2
01.03-01.08.2011	Repatriation of TCNs (Libya conflict)	8 experts for DVI – offer declined by NZ later on
01.03-01.08.2011	Repatriation of TCNs (Libya conflict)	Contribution to air transports capacity; to EUCPT Bravo deployed on 12/13/04; medical kits, medicines, tents, blankets, kitchen sets, hygiene kits
26.06-29.07.2011	Argentina-eruption of the Puyehue – Cordón Caulle volcano in Chile	Geology, volcanologist
11.07-13.07.2011	Explosion/power shortage in Cyprus	Contribution to EUCPT team
25.08- 08.09.2011	Forest fires in Albania	3 Canadairs
25.08-30.08.2011	Forest fires in Greece	Italy sent one plane for a cascade system
24.10-22.11.2011	Earthquake in Turkey	Tents
16.06-20.06.2012	Forest fire in Greece	2 Canadairs
06.08-12.09.2012	Forest fire in Albania	2 Airplanes
12.09.2012 - ongoing	Syrian refugees in Jordan	Italy donated a AMP to the Jordanian Royal Medical Service

Source: European Community Civil Protection Mechanism

Conclusions

As a whole, the Italian civil security system proves to be substantially tailored on the national specificities of Italy. In fact, it deals mainly with natural disasters (in particular earthquakes) because these are the most serious crisis which have affected the country in the last two decades. It is based on a complex but flexible framework, which couples the principle of *subsidiarity* with the coordination at government level and is implemented by various bodies and actors, because this reflects the Italian polycentric institutional landscape. A landscape which historically began to experience a trend towards centralization at national level only in the second half of 19th century, which was then reverted after World War Two. The Italian civil security system is primarily civilian but with a significant military contribution, in line with the country's history of use of armed forces also within the national territory. It benefits from a strong role of volunteer organizations, and only to a lesser extent from profit-oriented organizations' activism, building on the strong social ties of Italian society – particularly within certain communities. It has a strong bilateral, multilateral, Mediterranean and above all EU dimension, in line with traditional Italian foreign policy which focuses on European and Mediterranean neighbourhood. It shows citizens' perception about the system, as well as support for it, similar to the EU average, as in many other fields where Italian public opinion is traditionally in line with the European mainstream. It is marked by noticeable and active scrutiny by the Italian judiciary system – as for other domestic policy areas whereby the role of courts has increased in the last two decades. Finally, overall it passed the dramatic test of the L'Aquila earthquake by meeting very high response requirements posed by the magnitude of the crisis.

In this context, four main issues are worthy to further underline: the flexible cooperation among institutional actors, the issue of levels of governance, the role of complicated and detailed legal frameworks, the contribution of non-profit organization, the response to the 2009 earthquake in L'Aquila.

First, the complex Italian civil security system is based on a flexible interaction among its numerous institutional and operational actors, as

demonstrated by the complementary roles played by civil defence and civil protection. For example, this flexible interaction works at horizontal level with strong civil-military cooperation: Italy's dominant approach is primarily based on civilian activities but in some cases the military contributes to the crisis management with a cooperative role (*concorsoale*), particularly the Army and the Carabinieri. This is in line with the all-hazards approach to crisis management adopted by Italian civil security system, which adjusts interventions to each specific situation.

Such praxis and mindset of flexible cooperation is particularly important in countries like Italy where a number of institutional actors and levels of governance are involved in the civil security system. It is noteworthy since it may represent a good practice and a feasible alternative to more centralized civil security systems based on different administrative traditions – in other words, it is an example of the thesis that in the complex European landscape of civil security no single solution fits all.

The other side of the coin of flexible cooperation is the high number of levels of governance. Italy has developed a response system based on the principle of subsidiarity: action starts from local level and involves the relevant administrations upwards. As mentioned in the study, disasters are grouped in three different types based on extension, intensity and responsiveness of civil protection: “type a” (municipal level), “type b” (provincial and regional) and “type c” (national). Concerning the political dimension, the primary responsible of crisis preparedness and response is the mayor. In the event of a national emergency, the primary executive responsible is rather the President of Council of Ministers. This feature of the Italian civil security system is linked to the country's history marked by strong local identities and prolonged political, institutional and legal fragmentation until 1861. This situation may be also similar to other federal European countries.

A key point here is how and how much the various levels of governance cooperate with each other. It may be a problematic aspect, for example if the up-scaling mechanisms are not streamlined, or if the cooperation between national and local authorities is not based on clear division of labour, or if political cleavages take place among majors, region governors and President of the Council of Ministers belonging to different parties, and so far and so on. The debate occurred in Italy in recent years over the abolition of provinces demonstrates that there is some criticism within the public opinion on the current number of levels of governance in the country.

A third main issue of Italian civil security system is the role of complicated and detailed legal frameworks. Italy has a civil law system where, generally speaking, State and local authorities heavily regulates almost every aspect of social life thus empowering various bureaucracies. This sort of overregulation theoretically poses a huge amount of constraints to public and private activities. In this context, the legal framework is particularly important to define role, competencies and hierarchies among various actors involved in the civil security system. At the same time, in case of emergency it may be necessary to overcome some excessive constraints posed by such legal framework through extraordinary measures. This situation was epitomized by the appointment of a Special Commissioner by the President of the Council of Minister to deal with the 2009 earthquake in L'Aquila, the Head of Civil Protection Department Guido Bertolaso. Thanks to his appointment as Special Commissioner, he directed and speeded up the crisis response through his special powers. The key issue here is whether it is sustainable over the medium-long term to periodically resort to extraordinary measures and Commissioners with special powers, in order to overcome some excessive constraints posed by complicated and detailed legal frameworks.

The picture is further complicated by the fact that the system has been subject to several waves of reforms in the last two decades, sometime heading in opposite directions across the continuum between centralization and decentralization poles. This reflected the political competition between those pushing for a stronger power of local authorities and those keen to enhance the role of the President of the Council of Ministers, a fight which led to a series of constitutional, legal and regulatory changes – as well as attempted changes. This was also due to the fact that civil security, and particularly the role of civil protection which in recent years has come more frequently under the media spotlights, has been subject to a political debate in a phase of harsh clash between conservative and progressive parties. A phase which made several policy areas more contested than in previous years.

Another relevant element to underline is the decisive role played by volunteer (non-profit) organizations in Italy's civil security system, by providing human resources and qualified support both in preparedness and response phases. For example, the Italian Red Cross has around 160,000 volunteers, 5,000 employees and 1,000 offices throughout Italy. A particular aspect characterizing the Italian civil security systems is the solidarity role played by the Catholic Church.

Italy, as probably other countries in Europe, shows strong social activism based on the variety and strength of the country's social ties, for example within the family, the villages or small towns, the number of non-profit organizations as well as the associations linked to the Catholic Church. Such ties and activism become more evident during the response phase to crisis such as the earthquakes in Emilia Romagna (2012) and L'Aquila (2009) with rapid, substantial and autonomous response of citizens and non-profit organizations. Although specific social features of every EU country cannot be simply replicated elsewhere in Europe, encouraging such role of citizens and non-profit organizations may be a good practice to be kept in mind.

Finally, it is worthy to recall the major test for the Italian civil security system occurred in the last two decades, the 5.8 magnitude earthquake which hit the Province of L'Aquila in 2009. It caused the death of 309 people, injured thousands of citizens, provoked 64,391 displaced persons and severe material destruction.

The response phase included: massive and rapid search and rescue activities in the aftermath of the earthquake; the establishment within few days of tents to host around 33,000 persons for 8 months; the building of earthquake-proved houses for 24,000 displaced persons completed by the end of 2009; immediate and extraordinary measures regarding education, transport, judiciary and fiscal system in the Province of L'Aquila.

Such a response to the earthquake is a good example of both strengths and weaknesses of the Italian civil security system, including those mentioned above. On the one hand, it has successfully proved the praxis of flexible cooperation among actors such as Civil Protection Department, Minister of Interior including Fire Brigades, and the Italian Army quickly deployed in L'Aquila both for search and rescue activities and in order to contribute to local security and safety. The response phase also showed the rapid and strong reaction of citizens and non-profit organization, for example through a number of volunteer activities to alleviate the obvious difficulties of 33,000 people living in tents for 8 months. On the other hand, the response to L'Aquila earthquake highlighted the problematic relation between various levels of governance, particularly the government and municipal level. The response phase was marked by a strong lead of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers through the Head of the Civil Protection Department. This allowed to speed up the response phase and to achieve some substantial results in a reasonably short timeframe, but at the same time it raised criticism from local authorities and sectors of

public opinion about the marginal role in the decision-making enjoyed by local representatives such as the Mayor of L'Aquila.

As underlined by this study, Italian civil security system shows unique characters deeply rooted in Italy's history. This is the case of the other 21 countries studied by ANVIL too: a great diversity of national approaches to civil security marks the European landscape. However, according to the ANVIL Synthesis report on comparison of civil security systems¹, some noticeable similarities emerge.

In the 2000-2012 period, 252 crisis have been listed in the 22 countries analyzed.² The great majority of crisis, 68,25%, falls into the category of natural disasters and infectious diseases, while 23,41% were transportation and industrial accidents. Only 6,35% of crisis belonged to the category of terrorist attacks and other violent intentional threats, and 1,98% were infrastructure failures. In other words, natural disasters are by far the most frequent type of crisis experienced by the European countries considered. This does not necessarily mean that in every country the major crisis occurred in this period has been a natural disaster: the London terrorist bombing of 2005 where 52 died and 700 were injured, or the Oslo/Utoya attacks in 2011 with 77 casualties, are cases in point in this regard. Since natural disasters such as floods, storms, or forest fires in Southern Europe, are more frequent, civil security systems mostly focus on them, according to national specificities. However, as underlined by the Synthesis Report, most civil security systems adopt an all-hazards approach where a single basic structure provides an all-hazards response and adjust its operations to each specific situation. Therefore, Italy's approach is in line with the prevalent posture adopted by other European countries.

The Synthesis Report underlines another common element of considered national security systems: the transformation experienced in the post-Cold War period regarding the military role in crisis management.

¹ Raphael Bossong, Lecturer at the European University Viadrina and Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) and Hendrik Hegemann, Researcher at the IFSH were responsible for the drafting of the *ANVIL Deliverable 4.1b: Synthesis Report*, 31 October 2013, http://anvil-project.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Deliverable_4.1.pdf.

² Often there are no exact data on disasters' costs in terms of fatalities, people injured and economic costs of crisis, and the very same definition of crisis is subject to different interpretation within Europe. Therefore the figures provided by this chapter should be considered as qualitative indicators of tendencies.

Particularly – but not only – in Eastern Europe, the command and coordination role has shifted from the military to the civilian authorities at the responsible level of government. Of course, in all 22 considered countries the armed forces do contribute to civil security efforts, particularly when it comes to exceptional and prolonged crisis, often by providing considerable logistical capacities as well as manpower and resources. This military support is more frequent in countries such as Italy, Norway, Slovakia and Sweden, while some other countries are less at ease with the active deployment of the military in the homeland for historical reasons – as happens in Germany.

The Synthesis Report also stresses that civil security is an emerging policy field involving competencies from several government agencies. As a result, it has required reforms and updates of the legal framework in several European countries to clarify competencies and improve coordination. These changes have been particularly important in Central and Eastern European countries undertaking the transition from Communist regimes and adopting the EU *acquis*. In this context, the fact that Italian civil security system has been reformed in the last two decades is not unique, although the frequency of waves of reforms is arguably higher in Italy than in other European countries which enjoy more stable legal frameworks.

Concerning the administrative aspects of civil security systems, a relevant finding highlighted by the Synthesis Report regards the level of centralization/decentralization in different European countries. Each national system reflects the way public competencies and power are distributed between the local and central level, ranging from decentralized examples in federal countries (Germany, Austria, Switzerland) to central ones in many Eastern European and Balkan region. There is no clear-cut divide in this regard, but rather different degrees of centralization not easy to quantify and classify. Generally speaking, civil security is a relatively de-centralized field in comparison with other policy fields, with a significant role played by all levels of governance. In 14 studied countries out of 22, the executive responsibility for crisis preparedness and response rests primarily on the local level, i.e. mayors, with praxis to up-scale responsibilities at the upper level. In contrast, policy formulation is usually a competence of the central government – namely in 17 countries. With regard to agencies tasked with the implementation of civil security activities, the case studies reveal a variety of arrangements according to the national legal and political setup. Often

crisis management is a shared responsibility of several local agencies as well as emergency responders such as fire brigades, police and voluntary organizations. Similarly, there is a wide variety of permanent or *ad hoc* crisis coordination centers. In this context, it is difficult to find a model which may inspire the Italian debate on the appropriate number of levels of governance and their respective competencies, as each civil security system seems to be tailored on national specificities.

As outlined by the Synthesis Report, most European states have established bilateral agreements on emergency assistance with their neighbors. Moreover, all 22 considered countries are part of multilateral arrangements for civil emergency management. Regional cooperation is particularly well-established in the Baltic area, in South-Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean. Italy is relatively active in this regard, pro-actively participating to various cooperation format with neighbors and non-neighbor countries. In the 2000-2012 period, ten EU countries did ask and received assistance during major emergencies countries – including Italy, particularly for the 2009 and 2012 earthquakes. This data do not correlate with indicators like country's size, degree of regionalization or economic capacity: it rather seems to be a matter of random occurrence of major disasters.

Regarding communication by public authorities during crisis, the Synthesis Report stresses that conventional methods – i.e. television and radio warnings - are still dominant. The use of new technologies, including dedicated websites, social media and mobile phone applications, is growing but still limited. According to 2009 Eurobarometer survey, the average percentage of citizens who feel informed about crisis preparedness and response is relatively low in Europe, around 27%. As far as education is concerned, informative material is usually distributed by government agencies and/or NGOs passively, or it is made available upon request. Half of studied countries also runs television campaigns on crisis issues, while civil emergency training is part of official school curricula in eight countries – including Italy. In this context, the Italian civil security system has made a significant effort in terms of information, education and training in the last two decades, but not on a systematic basis nor by fully exploiting the potentialities offered by traditional and new ways of communication with citizens.

The Synthesis Report also underlines that a variety of voluntary organizations across Europe contribute to national civil security systems, including both large entities as the Red Cross and small ones, often with

very specific focus and expertise. In most countries this role is formally recognized by public authorities, but forms and degree of recognitions vary substantially according to national specificities. In comparison, in most considered countries profit-oriented organizations are less involved in crisis management than non-profit associations. Rather, they have to comply with requirements for safety regulations and emergency plans, plus special rules in some cases – i.e. companies operating hazardous materials. In some cases, particularly in Central and Northern Europe, states mandate companies to stockpile specific goods for the case of prolonged emergencies. In Eastern Europe there are also examples – i.e. the Baltic States – of outsourcing of civil security tasks, but this is not a dominant trend in Europe.

There is rather a growing functional need of public-private cooperation with regard to critical infrastructures protection including cyber security domain. For example, public-private partnerships or platforms for cooperation has been established in five considered countries, including Italy and Germany. Italy properly involved the manifold set of private actors which own critical infrastructures and/or manage their security, in the work to define the Italian energy and transport critical infrastructures relevant for the EC Directive on European critical infrastructures. To this end, a dedicated Secretariat of the Interdepartmental Coordination for Critical Infrastructures (*Segreteria Infrastrutture Critiche*, SIC) was established in 2009 within the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The same approach of appropriate consideration of the private actors is well included in the Italian Cyber Security Strategy issued in January 2013 and follow-up official documents. Generally speaking, the private sector is largely considered in dynamics involving investments in security R&D, for example in the initiatives regularly conducted by the Security Research in Italy (SERIT), the R&D platform for national security. SERIT brings together Italian companies and institutions engaged in security research in order to contribute to the definition of security research priorities of Italy by taking into account the European perspectives.

As a whole, these findings shed some light on the complex and differentiated landscape of national security systems in Europe. They also point out that there is not “one-size-fits-all” approach to civil security in the Old Continent. In contrast, there are national specificities to be taken into account and national good practices that may be shared among European countries. The awareness of this situation is important also for EU institutions, whose role in the civil security domain has grown in

recent years. Indeed, a more nuanced and flexible cooperation between the Union and national levels, as well as among national authorities of different EU Member States, should be explored in order to better ensure European citizens' security.

In this context, a greater understanding of Italy's civil security system – including by Italian relevant actors - may contribute to the country's efforts in such important and sensitive field. In fact, the current system presents both strengths and weaknesses, and the ongoing evolution of societies, technologies, and security risks and threats, poses both challenges and opportunities to those responsible in various ways for the security and safety of Italian citizens.

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