Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era

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Roy Kamphausen
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ASSESSING THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY
IN THE HU JINTAO ERA

Roy Kamphausen
David Lai
Travis Tanner
Editors

April 2014

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CONTENTS

Foreword .................................................................................................vii

1. Introduction ...........................................................................................1
   David Lai and Roy Kamphausen

2. The “New Historic Missions”: Reflections on Hu Jintao’s Military Legacy ........31
   Daniel M. Hartnett

   Dennis J. Blasko

4. What’s in a Name: Building Anti-Access/Area Denial Capabilities without Anti-Access/Area Denial Doctrine .............................................................129
   Christopher P. Twomey

   Wanda Ayuso and Lonnie Henley

6. The Role of Informatization in the People’s Liberation Army under Hu Jintao ..............207
   Joe McReynolds and James Mulvenon

7. China’s Evolving Naval Strategy and Capabilities in the Hu Jintao Era .........................257
   Nan Li

8. Second Artillery in the Hu Jintao Era: Doctrine and Capabilities ........................................301
   Michael S. Chase
9. “Who Cares if You’ve Been in a War?”
Veteran Activism, State Repression, and Civil-Military Relations in Hu-Era China ..........355
   Neil J. Diamant

10. Toward Strategic Leadership:
Chinese Communist Party People’s Liberation Army Relations in the Hu Era ....................399
   Timothy R. Heath

11. Trends in People’s Liberation Army International Initiatives under Hu Jintao.............441
   Kenneth Allen

About the Contributors ...........................................525
FOREWORD

It is my pleasure to introduce this 2013 publication by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College, the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), and the United States Pacific Command, focusing on *A Retrospective of the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era* (2002-12). The papers in this book provide a valuable and insightful review of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) many impressive advances over the past decade. Solid scholarship on changes taking place in the PLA helps us understand how the Chinese view the employment of military power to support broader policy aims. A historical review of patterns and developments in training, operations, acquisitions, and political military relations can greatly assist that understanding. The outstanding work in this jointly sponsored study is an important contribution toward this end.

This volume provides unique insights into the PLA’s achievements over the span of Hu Jintao’s tenure as Central Military Commission Chair from 2002 to 2012. This period saw a remarkable growth in capabilities and a critical expansion in the military’s missions. The PLA increased its adoption of information technologies and advanced sensors into its modernization efforts. It also improved its ability to carry out joint training and missions other than war. Reflecting developments in the Chinese Communist Party, the PLA also experienced important changes in its political focus and mission. Most significantly, Hu Jintao introduced the “historic missions,” which oriented the PLA toward a much greater international mission than it had previously undertaken. Supporting this new international mission, the PLA expanded
its participation in international military exercises, as well as peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions abroad, including its first ever permanent naval deployment abroad in the counterpiracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. Understanding how the PLA matured and developed in the Hu era is critical to understanding the PLA today, and for identifying opportunities to further cooperation between our two militaries.

I commend both NBR and SSI for their commitment to excellence with the release of this volume. *A Retrospective of the PLA in the Hu Jintao Era* is an essential resource for those seeking to understand how the PLA has evolved. Just as importantly, the volume helps us prepare for the opportunities before us.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

David Lai
Roy Kamphausen

The 2012 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conference took place at a time when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was making its leadership transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping. The agenda of the conference took advantage of this occasion and focused the conference discussion on the developments in China’s national security and the PLA during the Hu Jintao administration from 2002 to 2012. The participants of the conference also reflected on the future of China’s military modernization under Xi Jinping.

While a comprehensive analysis of these subject matters would be ideal, the participants had nevertheless singled out some key areas where the PLA had apparently made significant changes. The discussion papers are presented in this volume. But before presenting the key findings, a brief review of “China’s military modernization with Hu’s characteristics” is in order.

HU’S MARKS IN HISTORY?

During his reign as the General Secretary of the CCP, President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China for short), and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC),¹ Hu Jintao has put an official stamp on quite a few major changes in China’s political and national security apparatus, as well as developments in the PLA.
Three Milestones.

Among the major changes, three are of particular significance. The first one is Hu’s clean and complete handover of his political, governmental, and military titles to his successor, Xi Jinping. Back in 2002, Hu was the first party chief in the history of the CCP to assume the party’s leadership in an arguably orderly way. Even so, this first orderly Party leadership transition was overshadowed by Hu’s predecessor, Jiang Zemin, who held onto control of the gun by retaining his position as Chairman of the CMC. Hu Jintao had to wait 2 more years to become China’s “Commander-in-Chief.”

Ten years later, Hu made history again by relinquishing all of his power and positions at once. We do not know, and may never know, what took place behind closed doors before this decision—the CCP leadership was completely silent about the significance of this act, and the Chinese were apparently prohibited to talk or write about it (there was hardly any flattery written in the Chinese media). Yet this change is a milestone in the CCP’s reluctant and much-controlled process of political change. It is a positive step in the CCP’s attempt to become a more institutionalized ruling party and could go a long way to help the CCP nurture a more stable party-military relationship.

Another landmark move in China’s national security that bears Hu Jintao’s name is the propagation of a “Historic Missions for the PLA in the New Stage of the New Century” or “new historic missions” for short. The new historic missions came out of a speech Hu Jintao reportedly delivered to senior PLA officials at an expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission in December 2004 shortly after he became
Chairman of this powerful military organization. The full text of Hu’s speech was never made public; but the core components were widely disseminated. The CCP and PLA official media had characterized the new historic mission as a “Three-Provides-and-One-Role” decree. Specifically, the PLA is tasked to:

- **provide** an essential guarantee of strength for the CCP to consolidate its ruling position,
- **provide** a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of important strategic opportunity for China’s national development,
- **provide** a powerful strategic support for safeguarding China’s national interests, and
- **play** an important role in safeguarding world peace and promoting common development.

These new historic missions were later codified in China’s 2006 and subsequent *National Defense White Papers* and reaffirmed in the CCP’s 17th and 18th party platforms in 2007 and 2012, respectively.

While every element of the new historic missions is significant to the Chinese military, the most noteworthy aspect of it is undoubtedly the CCP leadership’s decision to turn on the green light for the PLA to “go global.” Indeed, the new historic missions place heavy emphasis on China’s need to protect its opportunity for development and its expanding national interests worldwide. In the words of a high-profile PLA *Daily* editorial, China’s national interests are spreading everywhere in the world, into the open seas, outer space, cyberspace, and so on. Today, China has an “interest frontier” that recognizes no territorial boundaries. The PLA must be prepared to defend these expanding national interests. To carry out these new historic missions, the PLA must act in ways commensurate with
China’s rising international status and follow China’s interests, wherever they go.⁴

By any account, the new historic missions are revolutionary for the PLA. Auspiciously, the Chinese military was ready to meet the challenges. Indeed, China’s accelerated military modernization since the mid-1990s had undoubtedly prepared the Chinese armed forces to undertake actions abroad.⁵ This is most evident in the PLA’s quick response to the CCP’s call for it to protect Chinese interests in the Gulf of Aden in December 2008.

In the late-2000s, widespread armed robbery and hijacking of merchant vessels in the Gulf of Aden had severely endangered freedom of navigation in one of the world’s busiest sea lanes of transportation. The United States and other major maritime powers had been fighting against piracy in this area for years, but China had no part of those operations, although it was one of the most affected victims—Chinese-dispatched and China-bound cargo ships made up about 40 percent of the vessels sailing through the pirate-infested waters.⁶ In December 2008, the United Nations (UN) adopted a U.S.-initiated resolution (UN Security Council Resolution 1851) calling for the international community to support the ongoing anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and authorizing the use of military force against the Somalia-based pirates. Expectation for China to take part in these international efforts was also mounting accordingly.

Compelled by the need to protect China’s interest and blessed by the UN mandate, Chinese leaders decided to put the new historic missions to a test. The PLA Navy (PLAN) promptly assembled a contingency fleet, and a first-ever PLA combat team was soon on its way to escort Chinese merchant ships in the troubled waters.
By most accounts, the PLAN escort operations have been well executed. As of April 2014, the PLAN has successfully dispatched 17 rotations of battleships to the Gulf of Aden. While protecting China’s overseas interests, the PLAN major fleets also took turns to test their capabilities in the escort operations. This undertaking has turned out to be quite a learning experience for the Chinese military in its overseas operations.\(^7\)

Moreover, and from a strategic perspective, although the PLAN escort fleet is a small contingency force with limited combat engagements (thus far), it is no exaggeration to say that its operation is a giant step for the PLA as it carries out its new historic missions and China’s march to become a full-fledged world power in international security affairs.

The third significant development is Hu Jintao’s commission of China’s first aircraft carrier in September 2012.\(^8\) China’s quest for aircraft carrier capability has been a subject of internal debate and external criticism. The most pointed question has been: Is China wasting its time, effort, and treasure to pursue a combat capability that is decreasing in utility?

Chinese leaders apparently have ready answers for this question. First, Chinese analysts and policymakers strongly hold that the absence of aircraft carrier capability in the last 60 years was a painful missing piece in China’s national security development. As China takes steps to consolidate and protect its maritime interests in the Western Pacific and expanding interests worldwide in the new historic era, Chinese leaders are convinced that a carrier-led blue water navy is essential for this mission.\(^9\)
Second, the United States is still building new *Ford*-class nuclear-powered carriers projected to operate in this century and beyond. Moreover, China’s neighbors, India and Japan are also pursuing carrier capabilities (India has just launched its first home-built carrier on August 12, 2013; Japan will have its two “helicopter destroyers,” or “light aircraft carriers” as the Chinese call them, completed in the next few years). Chinese see no reason why they should forsake their “carrier dream.”

Third, Chinese leaders are convinced that building aircraft carriers is an important part of China’s military modernization; it will also have a spillover effect on China’s overall modernization programs.

China is currently following a two-pronged approach to modernize its military. One prong continues the mechanization of its armed forces. At the same time, the Chinese military is also moving aggressively to turn itself into a formidable player in the unfolding information age. While an aircraft carrier is an important part of the former, it is also becoming an integral component of the latter. Building carriers thus serves China’s military modernization agenda on both fronts.

In addition, aircraft carrier construction is undoubtedly the crown jewel of a nation’s shipbuilding industry in particular and industrial-age technology in general. China is currently the world’s largest commercial shipbuilding nation and the second largest producer of warships, with the potential to overtake the United States and become number one by 2020. China’s time, efforts, and treasure invested in building aircraft carriers will pay great dividends for China’s shipbuilding industry. At the same time, it will benefit China’s other industries, as aircraft carrier building involves technologies from many other industries and
reflects to a good extent the level and capability of a nation’s modernization.\textsuperscript{12}

Although China’s first aircraft carrier is a refurbished ex-Soviet vessel and largely a training platform, Chinese take their efforts as painful and necessary first steps to learn and excel. They are confident that the coming of China-made and more capable aircraft carriers accompanied by battle groups will only be a matter of time.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, as its economic development continues, China will have no lack of money to support the development of aircraft carriers and their supporting battle groups.

For better or for worse, China’s breakthrough in its quest for maritime power will make its impact felt in the Asia-Pacific region and eventually, worldwide. The one that will come in a foreseeable future is the presence of Chinese aircraft carrier battle group around the unsettled and disputed areas in the Western Pacific.

Taiwan will have to prepare for the days when Chinese carrier battle groups sail along its eastern coast, making Taiwan vulnerable on both sides (the western side is facing mainland China).

The Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands are not far from Taiwan. It is undoubtedly within reach of China’s future carrier-led forces. Japan is concerned with China’s growing maritime power. It is building two “light aircraft carriers,” or the 22DDH helicopter destroyers in Japanese terms,\textsuperscript{14} with the capacity to carry the F-35 fighter jets that can make vertical takeoff and landing on board. This addition to Japan’s maritime forces is seen as Japan’s effort to match the Chinese carrier-led capabilities.

China’s South China Sea neighbors, namely the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia, share the same
concerns. They are reportedly upgrading their maritime military capabilities. It is clear that although they may not have enough to match the growing Chinese military might, they are preparing to uphold their claims on the disputed territories in the South China Sea.

The United States is also watching closely China’s efforts to build carrier capabilities. In operational terms, China’s carrier-led capability will further enhance China’s anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities that have been developing since the mid-1990s. They are posing great challenges to U.S. power projection calculations. From a strategic perspective, the development of China’s carrier capabilities is arguably turning the question of “whether” the balance of power in the Western Pacific established and maintained by the United States since the end of World War II will be altered into a question of “when” and “to what extent” the shifting of power will take place.

Much Praise.

The landmark changes highlighted above are very significant in China’s national security modernization. There have been many other major changes during Hu’s reign as well. Many of those changes have been noted in China’s biannual National Defense White Papers from 2002 to 2012. The Pentagon has also kept track of the key developments in China’s military capabilities through its annual report on the military power of the PRC.

During the CCP leadership transition, Chinese official media took the occasion to praise Hu for his “contributions” to China’s national security affairs during his 10-year reign. On the eve of the CCP’s
18th Party Convention in November 2012 (where the change of party leadership between Hu and Xi took place), the CCP’s Archival Studies Institute (中共中央文献研究室, the central authority for the CCP’s history) released its documentation of the major achievements under Hu’s leadership since the 16th Party Convention. The sections on China’s national security and military modernization summarized the developments in 11 categories.¹⁶

1. Establishment of the scientific outlook on development as the guiding principle for national security and military modernization (确立科学发展观为加强国防和军队建设的指导方针),

2. Putting forward the call for the integration of building a prosperous nation and developing a powerful military (实现富国强军的统一),

3. Propagation of the new historic mission (提出新世纪新阶段军队历史使命),

4. The transition to the guideline of using information as the driving force and the generation of new type of fighting power as the progressive point (转到以信息为主导, 以新型作战力量建设为增长点的方针),

5. Emphasis on the PLA loyalty to the CCP and strengthening party works in the military (推动军队思想政治建设, 保证党对军队的绝对领导),

6. Taking force mechanization as the basis and informationization as the driving force, push for the integration of mechanization and informationization (以机械化为基础, 以信息化为主导, 推进机械化信息化复合发展和有机融合),

7. Pushing for the rule of law in the military (推动正规化建设, 依法治军),

8. Pushing for training, establishment of the integrated operation system, logistic support system, military industries, weapon acquisition system, stan-
dardized military service system, veteran system, and military benefits (建立一体化联合作战体系, 指挥体系, 训练体系, 保障体系, 武器装备采购体系, 兵役制度, 转业退伍安置制度, 福利制度, 住房制度, 军人社会保障制度),

9. Integrate military and civilian sectors (军民融合, 寓军于民),

10. Promote People’s War principle under information-centric conditions (推广信息化条件下人民战争的原则), and

11. Enhance international security cooperation, military security dialogues (深化国际安全合作, 建立军事安全对话机制).

Along the above mentioned lines, the PLA’s Military Science journal published a series of articles (28 of them in four special issues) written by military officers praising Hu’s “contributions” to China’s national security and military modernization. Although the articles are mostly flattery, lack substance or meaningful analysis, are full of “party jargon,” and window-dressed with Hu’s call for the “scientific outlook on development” (“科学发展观”), they nevertheless show us what the Chinese want others to know about the major changes during the Hu administration. Chinese official news media and policy analysts have also joined the chorus to praise Hu Jintao for his contributions.

HU’S CREDIT?

There is no denying that China’s national security and the PLA have experienced many major changes during the Hu administration. Chinese official writings have unceasingly given credit to Hu Jintao for his
“penetrating understanding” ("洞察力") of China’s security environment, “strategic vision” ("战略眼光") on China’s military modernization mission, his “scientific outlook on development” ("科学发展观"), and “insightful theoretical instructions” ("精辟的理论指导") on practically every aspect of changes and improvements in China’s national security affairs and military organization. Of particular note is that the CCP leaders wanted badly to place Hu on a par with his predecessors, Jiang Zemin, Deng Xiaoping, and Mao Zedong. Hu’s “Thoughts” ("思想") were sought to become part of China’s guiding principles to such a degree that Hu’s “scientific outlook on development” were propagated to an almost absurd level. Indeed, almost every change and development in China nowadays must go with a “scientific outlook on development,” military or nonmilitary.

These unsolicited accreditations are preposterous for two main reasons. First, Hu Jintao is more of a follower than an innovator. Throughout his political life, Hu has carefully followed the party line. In many ways, Hu is a typical Chinese bureaucrat and survivor of China’s centuries-old repressive political culture, which demands group conformity but weeds out those who are ambitious and capable. Hu was selected by Deng Xiaoping to be a successor to Jiang Zemin not because of the intellectual attributes unduly ascribed to him, but because, quite the contrary, for his conspicuous lack of them. A humble follower like Hu Jintao posed no threat to anyone, but was trusted to follow through the CCP’s agenda.

Second, as a careful follower, Hu is only a dedicated caretaker. During his tenure as the General Secretary of the CCP, Hu carefully managed party affairs, China’s monumental domestic changes, and interna-
tional outreach. Hu must surely be grateful that the country had remained largely intact when he handed it over to his successor, Xi Jinping.

The development in China’s national security and military modernization under Hu’s watch is more of a continuation of the CCP’s modernization mission that was largely set by Deng Xiaoping and to a smaller extent, modified by Jiang Zemin, who, unlike Hu Jintao, was much more aggressive. For instance, Deng Xiaoping’s observation on “peace and development as the principal theme in the evolving world” (“和平与发展是当今时代的主题”) has been the defining view in every major Chinese official assessment of China’s security landscape, e.g., the CCP’s party platforms and China’s National Defense White Papers. China’s “3-step strategy” (“三步走战略”) for its military modernization as articulated in the National Defense White Papers is consistent with Deng Xiaoping’s prescription for China’s overall modernization. Moreover, Deng Xiaoping’s stipulations for the PLA to be “politically-correct, capability-modernized, and organization-standardized” (“革命化, 现代化, 正规化”), to turn from a “quantity-based” force into a “quality-based” one (从“数量型”转向“质量型”), and to become a well-educated and trained military are all guiding principles for Chinese leaders. Finally, the calls for a “prosperous nation with a strong military” (“富国强军”), a “world-class military industry” (“世界水平的军事工业”), and many more can all trace their origins to Deng Xiaoping’s teaching.

Deng Xiaoping, however, did not live long enough to see the information revolution that is changing the world and warfare in fundamental ways. Jiang Zemin arguably deserves some credit for bringing China’s military modernization up to speed with the trans-
formation of military affairs in the information age. His suggestions for China to “win local wars under high-tech and information conditions” (“打赢高技术和信息化条件下的局部战争”), efforts in jump-starting the “transformation of military affairs with Chinese characteristics” (“中国特色的军事变革”) following the wakeup calls from the United States with the U.S. show and use of force in the post-Cold War world, and the strategy for the PLA to pursue the “dual tasks” and develop in a “leap-forward” way (“双重任务” and “跨越式发展”) are prime examples.

Hu Jintao, though not a thoughtful or insightful innovator, and Chinese unqualified praise notwithstanding, deserves credit for his dedicated implementation of the work carved out for him.

Of particular note is that Hu had waged repeated battles against the so-called “Western conspiracy to corrupt the PLA” (“西方腐化解放军的阴谋”) during his rule. Indeed, throughout the Hu years, Chinese political and military leaders had dogmatically resisted the calls for “removing the CCP from the military” (“军队非共产党化”), “de-politicizing the military” (“军队非政治化”), and “nationalizing the military” (“军队国家化”). For this, Hu earned a high praise from PLA senior leadership for keeping the soldiers loyal to the CCP. An article by General Li Jinai in the PLA Daily about Hu's effort in this regard is the best testimony. Nevertheless, China’s national security and military modernization have experienced what the Chinese call a “golden decade of development,” thanks to Hu Jintao’s careful management and wholehearted support.
XI’S TIME FOR MORE CHANGE?

Since taking over the helm, Xi Jinping has made quite a few highly publicized calls such as the “China Dream,” the PLA being capable to fight and win wars, China standing firm on territorial disputes, a “new type of great-power relations with the United States,” so on and so forth, to further advance China’s national security goals. These calls appear to indicate that Xi is ready to promote drastic changes in China’s national security and military modernization. However, this may not be the case, for a number of reasons. First, Xi’s calls are really not new. They are natural outgrowths of China’s expanding national power. The China dream has long been an inspiration for successive Chinese leaders. It is only now that China has made much progress on its modernization and the dream appears to be within reach that Xi Jinping has taken the lead to call it out loud.

Second, Xi Jinping’s moves are a continuation of China’s longstanding development efforts. For instance, the proposed new type of great-power relations with the United States is, in essence, another round of interaction with the United States over the power transition between China and the United States.20

Ten years ago, China put forward a call for its peaceful development as an attempt to address the deadly issues stemming from the changing relations between China and the United States as a result of China’s rapid rise. At the heart of China’s peaceful development call is the Chinese leaders’ promise that China would not repeat mistakes made by past great powers undergoing similar power transition processes. In response to China’s move, the United States called for China to become a “responsible stakeholder” of the extant
U.S.-led international system, from which China had benefited tremendously since it started its economic reform in 1978.

Although this goodwill exchange between China and the United States marks a very positive step in the relationship between the two great powers, it cannot secure this complicated relationship forever. Indeed, conflict of interest has continued to trouble the two nations and brought the two to tests of will from time to time. Recognizing the need for top-level leadership, on his first visit to China in November 2009, President Barack Obama invited his Chinese counterparts to join the United States in a “strategic reassurance” construct. By many accounts, Xi Jinping’s call for a new type of great-power relationship is a long-overdue response to the U.S. initiative; after all, Xi’s call contains the following: 1) avoid confrontation; 2) promote mutual respect; and 3) seek cooperation and win-win solutions, all of which are elements of strategic reassurance.

Finally, Xi Jinping, like Hu Jintao, is also a well-behaved Chinese bureaucrat. The difference between Xi and Hu is that Xi is a princeling and has stronger ties to the Chinese military. Xi can be more confident and assertive than Hu, but not as aggressive as Bo Xilai, a disgraced high-powered princeling and putative rival to Xi. Bo Xilai is accused of corruption. But the real reason behind his fall is more likely a power struggle for leadership in the CCP. Bo was overly aggressive; he stuck his neck out and got hammered (he had just gone through a staged trial in China at the time of this writing).

According to the current CCP design, Xi Jinping will serve two 5-year terms until 2023. He is going to oversee the completion of the second step in China’s
military modernization, namely the completion of force mechanization and major advance in information-based capabilities. With Xi’s characteristics of leadership, China’s military modernization will most likely develop according to the well-specified plan under Xi’s watch in the next 10 years.

**KEY FINDINGS**

Back in 2008, Daniel Hartnett made a thorough analysis of the PLA’s new historic missions. In Chapter 2, Hartnett analyzes a few key PLA activities as direct results from the new historic mission. One marked development is the PLA’s effort to broaden its geographic and functional area of focus and acquire new skills and capabilities. The PLA has strengthened its ability to defend China’s maritime territorial interests. This includes increasing PLAN patrols of disputed maritime territories, coordination with civilian maritime enforcement agencies, and development of a nascent aircraft carrier capability. Today, Hartnett sees the following future possibilities. First, over time, the PLA may take a stronger position on perceived violations of China’s maritime territorial claims. Of particular note is that the United States should expect that the PLA will play a larger role in China’s maritime territorial disputes with other states, such as those with U.S. treaty allies, Japan and the Philippines.

Second, so long as the China’s leadership feels that the PLA is incapable of fulfilling the new historic mission, additional resources for the China’s military modernization efforts will be justified. Therefore, the United States should anticipate that the PLA will, among other things, continue to improve its maritime, space, and cyberspace capabilities—key foci of the
missions. Third, the United States should anticipate that the PLA will continue to increase its global presence as it seeks to defend China’s expanding overseas interests. Finally, the inherent tension in the new historic missions between traditional territorial defense missions and overseas missions provides the United States with an opportunity to influence the PLA’s future trajectory. The PLA should be encouraged to participate in missions around the world that benefit the common good, such as defending international freedom of navigation. Such a direction may provide China with an incentive to support current international norms and institutions, rather than transforming them to suit Beijing’s parochial interests.

In Chapter 3, Dennis Blasko discusses the People’s War doctrine, the Active Defense, and Offshore Defense strategies in the context of the new historic missions. The principles of People’s War, Active Defense, and Offshore Defense have continued to be the basis for Chinese military organization, doctrine, and operations since first articulated. All have been adapted and modified for the 21st century. These Chinese doctrines do not seek to initiate war; rather, warfighting is to be undertaken only if deterrence fails. However, this last assertion should be subject to debate. It is questionable whether the Chinese employed the principles of People’s War, Active Defense, and Offshore Defense to deal with the territorial disputes since 2009; or in other words, can those Chinese acts be called “modern maritime People’s War”? Unfortunately, neither the Chinese nor their foreign counterparts have an answer to the question.

In Chapter 4, Christopher Twomey discusses China’s internal discussion on what the United States calls anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Cen-
tral to China’s approach to facing American military capabilities in East Asia has been the development of the A2/AD forces. The PLA, however, does not use the U.S. term to describe its capabilities. In the Chinese security and defense discourse, the terms of counterintervention, assassin’s mace, trump weapons, system of systems, active strategic counterattacks on exterior lines, and the “three non’s”—nonlinear, noncontact, nonsymmetric (or asymmetric)—are frequently used.

While the Chinese have no agreement on the proper terms for the emerging A2/AD capabilities, their deployment of those capabilities has outpaced the development of doctrine to manage the application of those capabilities. This shortcoming reduces the overall combat power these capabilities might create, and suggests a lack of consideration on the part of senior PLA leaders as to how military technology is changing and how these changes might impact naval warfare today.

While this set of circumstances should not be viewed as an invitation for complacency on the part of the United States, it does suggest that continuing to monitor Chinese doctrinal deliberations will provide significant warning to foreign analysts and planners before any major improvements in this regard manifest.

On the other hand, the PLA is more deeply considering the implications of the information technologies and networks for conflict. China is able to draw heavily on outside thinking about these implications, many of which are tried and tested by the United States in wartime. Still, the integration of new A2/AD capabilities with new doctrine will remain a challenging area for the PLA given traditional bureaucratic rigidities.
In Chapter 5, Wanda Ayuso and Lonnie Henley discuss the PLA’s aspiration to jointness. They examine PLA training, exercises, and doctrine development from 2008 to 2012. They found that in 2006, Hu Jintao issued guidance on transforming PLA training by first training commanders and staff on joint operations concepts. PLA efforts toward joint operations since 2008 have centered on developing faculty expertise in military educational institutions; getting PLA commanders to think in terms of joint training; and developing information systems to facilitate joint command. These efforts are not producing rapid results, and Chinese military leaders are aware that the PLA has not reached the level of joint operations development they seek. Nevertheless, the PLA has gained knowledge in joint operations from its interaction with other countries in bilateral and multilateral exercises. PLA cadets have received theoretical training on joint operations but lack operational experience.

Despite efforts to inculcate basic concepts of joint operations in an academic setting, commanders continue to fall short in their ability to lead joint operations involving actual forces. Outside the academic setting, only a handful of military exercises address issues of joint command. Joint operations concepts have been slow to develop since the military and its leadership have had to adapt to a radically different way of thinking about military conflict. Centralized training guidance, standardized equipment, and improvements to academic training may provide the right tools to further the transformation to which military leaders aspire.

Finally, achieving a modern standard of military effectiveness will require the PLA to internalize joint operations concepts and apply them in more realistic, multi-service training exercises.
In Chapter 6, Joe McReynolds and James Mulvenon discuss trends in informationization of the PLA under Hu Jintao. During Hu’s terms, the PLA fully embraced informatization as a central guiding principle of military theory and doctrine, an underlying framework uniting PLA concepts such as the revolution in military affairs (RMA) with Chinese characteristics, integrated joint operations, civil-military integration, and system-of-systems warfare, and tying them to China’s broader civilian informatization effort. However, this theoretical sophistication masks significant operational deficits, and the PLA’s recent technological advances will not generate world-class combat abilities if they are not matched by modernized personnel and organizational structures. This will be the next major hurdle for the PLA’s informatization effort, and Hu’s primary informatization legacy is his laying the policy groundwork that, in time, may enable the PLA to overcome these structural challenges.

Mulvenon and McReynolds therefore suggest that U.S. military strategists should first focus on scenarios involving China and must understand the impact of informatization trends not only in terms of specific weapons and support platforms but also in terms of integration between military and civilian informatization and networks, both in peacetime and in defense mobilization or conflict scenarios. Accurately understanding these linkages will enable better prediction of both the outputs of China’s research, development, and acquisition (RD&A) processes and the actions of Chinese political and military actors in war or crisis scenarios.

Second, however, informatization should be understood as a source not only of increased military strength and power projection capabilities, but also of
new systemic vulnerabilities. As the PLA develops advanced command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) technologies and integration with civilian networks, they are likely to become increasingly reliant on those systems through training and doctrine, ultimately replicating the supposedly “asymmetric” vulnerabilities in these areas that PLA theoreticians have traditionally noted in their analyses of the U.S. military. Shared vulnerabilities could potentially give rise to shared interests with the United States, opening an additional path by which China may move toward becoming “a status quo power” in the space and cyber domains.

In Chapter 7, Nan Li looks at China’s evolving naval strategy and capabilities under Hu Jintao. In naval strategy, Hu has made two contributions. He required the PLA to safeguard China’s newly emerging overseas interests, which defines PLAN’s far-seas missions; and he endorsed the concept of information systems-based system of systems operations, which impacts on how PLAN conducts operations. PLAN strategists believe that near-seas missions are the priority because they are more critical to China’s physical security. Pertaining to system of systems operations, some PLA strategists argue that the premise that PLA can achieve superiority through information systems integration is flawed, and that PLA operations should still be guided by its traditional active defense strategy, which is premised on the concept of “inferior fighting superior.”

As to capabilities, the PLAN’s acquisition of an aircraft carrier, destroyers, frigates, and light frigates can be accounted for by the need to construct a “maritime system of systems” as well as PLA’s traditional active
defense strategy. Other contributing factors include availability of new shipbuilding technologies and funding, and the need to replace obsolete ships.

Li suggests that 1) because PLAN’s far-seas operations are driven mainly by economic concerns and the level of U.S.-China economic interdependence is high, such operations offer opportunities for cooperation between the U.S. Navy and the PLAN, particularly in nontraditional security operations to enhance sea lanes security; 2) China’s dependence on maritime trade and thus secure sea lanes is likely to increase, but the PLAN’s far-seas fleet responsible for securing these sea lanes still has limited capabilities. Both render the Chinese economy vulnerable. This vulnerability provides initiatives for the United States in managing U.S.-China maritime relations by adopting both coercive and cooperative measures; and 3) as more Chinese naval ships are deployed out to sea more frequently, they operate more in exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of other countries. Their experience of being “interrupted” in other’s EEZs may gradually change the perspective that underlies Chinese disagreement with the United States over military activities in EEZs. This may offer an opportunity for the United States to work out rules with China to manage naval ships’ interactions to prevent incidents at sea.

In Chapter 8, Michael Chase looks at the doctrine and capabilities of the Second Artillery in the Hu Jintao era. During the Hu Jintao era, the Second Artillery made impressive progress in doctrinal development, force modernization, and training, emerging as a cornerstone of China’s growing military power. The PLA published important volumes elaborating its doctrine for missile force deterrence operations and campaigns. After decades of vulnerability, the PLA’s Second Ar-
tillery Force (PLASAF) deployment of road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) enhanced the survivability of the nuclear missile force and strengthened the credibility of China’s strategic deterrent. The Hu era also featured the expansion of PLASAF’s conventional capabilities, giving Beijing new options to employ conventional missiles for deterrence, intimidation, and precision strike operations. In addition, Second Artillery improved its command automation, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and communications capabilities, and increased the realism and complexity of missile force training.

Chase suggests that China’s growing nuclear and conventional missile capabilities have far-reaching implications for the United States. Specifically, 1) China’s growing nuclear capabilities are likely to complicate future arms control negotiations, and aspects of PLASAF doctrine could create serious crisis stability and escalation management challenges; 2) strategic dialogue on these issues is required to mitigate escalation risks and lay the groundwork for future Chinese participation in multilateral arms control discussions; 3) PLASAF’s growing conventional missile capabilities will allow China to pose an increasingly serious threat to targets like regional bases and surface ships; and, 4) this will require the United States to rethink aspects of its traditional approach to military operations, deterrence, and assurance of allies and partners in the region.

In Chapter 9, Neil Diamant looks at China’s veteran affairs as an element of civil-military relations. Looking to move beyond propagandistic images of heroic soldiers in the official media, he finds that, overall, many PLA veterans have had difficulty adjusting to the massive changes in the reform period, with many
of them finding themselves in a precarious position in the state and society. Diamant further argues that veterans, including officers, are not a viable threat to the regime mainly on account of their old age, physical problems, lack of large scale organization, and dependence on the state. Further modernization of the PLA on the basis of force reduction is unproblematic, given the resources the CCP has invested in domestic security units.

Diamant suggests that when observing “patriotic” or “nationalistic” protests in China, the United States would do well to avoid overestimating the Chinese public’s support for the PLA, or conflict. Although there is a popular element in these activities, there is also a significant degree of state orchestration that is intended to gain leverage in negotiations.

Second, the Chinese public’s support for the PLA is not reflexive or “blind;” in fact, many oppose military benefits and refuse to consider military service themselves. If there are significant costs to a military exchange—impacting trade, employment, stability, investment and travel opportunities, the Chinese public will not support it. The United States should remind China of these potential costs in a variety of fora.

In every policy arena, Chinese policymaking must be conceptualized through the prism of fragmentation, decentralization, competition between factions, and unclear lines of authority—very much contrary to the image presented by the PRC government to the world at large. The PLA is but one institution vying for power, resources and prestige. When considering the possibility of a flare-up in the South China Sea, the interests of multiple nonmilitary agencies must be evaluated as well.
In Chapter 10, Timothy Heath looks at the emerging party-military relationship. During the era of Hu Jintao, the CCP deepened reforms that bolstered its ability to lead a professionalizing military. The reforms aimed to strengthen the CCP as an organization; render party-military relations more functional and resilient; and improve the CCP’s ability to provide strategic leadership. These changes have enabled a greater degree of dynamism and flexibility in the CCP’s leadership of the PLA. However, the reforms have also encouraged a fragmentation of party authority along national and military lines. This fragmentation of authority, exacerbated by the persistence of weak state and military institutions and the CCP’s overall political vulnerabilities, introduces new challenges to ensuring the PLA’s loyalty.

Heath suggests that reforms designed to improve the effectiveness of party leadership without surrendering control of the military are likely to continue under Xi’s CCP leadership. These reforms have resulted in a more flexible, competent CCP regime capable of leading the military’s peacetime activities. So long as the CCP continues to make necessary adjustments to its leadership style, the PLA has considerable room to grow as a professional force even as it remains a party led military.

Second, the long-term survival of the PLA as a party-led military, however, is less clear. The long-term prospects for the party’s evolving style of leadership ultimately depends on the CCP’s willingness to adopt changes that touch on fundamental principles of Leninist rule, such as measures that limit party penetration and control of all organizations.

Third, despite the reforms, the PLA continues to suffer from the CCP’s broader problems of politi-
cal weakness and fragmentation of authority. These vulnerabilities are likely to exacerbate problems of command and control in unanticipated situations. Understanding the complexity of the relationship between national CCP and PLA leadership can help U.S. policymakers navigate security-related foreign policy crises with Beijing.

In the final chapter, Kenneth Allen examines trends in PLA international initiatives under Hu Jintao. The purpose of Chapter 11 is to identify and assess international initiatives by the PLA from the time Hu Jintao became the Chairman of the CCP’s Central Committee’s Military Commission (CMC/Central Military Commission) in September 2004, after having served as one of the three Vice Chairmen since 2002, until Xi Jinping, who had served as a Vice Chairman since October 2010, replaced him during the 18th Party Congress in November 2012. Xi also replaced Hu as the Chairman of the State CMC during the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2013. While it is difficult to determine which specific international initiatives can be directly attributed to Hu, it appears that employing military diplomacy to enhance China’s soft power was clearly implemented as a concept under Hu, and that the PLA began to become actively involved in international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) and military operations other than war (MOOTW) activities as a direct result of Hu’s four historic missions. In addition, the PLA clearly improved transparency under Hu. Looking forward, the PLA will likely continue to expand the scope of its global involvement under Xi Jinping, thereby slowly becoming more confident and preparing for future conflict at or beyond its borders.
Allen thus suggests that: 1) should there be civil unrest in countries where Chinese are living and working, the PLA will most likely become more actively involved in helping to evacuate them to safety. China’s increasing focus on HA/DR will require specific technological developments, including equipment, information technology, and logistics and maintenance support. Although these capabilities would be necessary to support an immediate need, such as a natural disaster, they would also enhance the PLA’s ability to support military operations beyond its borders. Besides learning how to remain at sea for lengthy periods of time, the PLAN’s increased deployments abroad have strengthened its foreign relations. 2) The transparency of China’s military has improved in recent years under Hu. However, there remains deep international uncertainty about key areas of the PLA’s force composition and growing capabilities. 3) Looking forward to the role of military diplomacy under Xi Jinping, the PLA will most likely continue to expand its global involvement in HA/DR activities and combined exercises with foreign countries, as well as send more delegations abroad to learn from and about other countries’ militaries. At the same time, the PLA continues to provide some training for foreign militaries in China.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. The CCP has a Central Military Commission. The Chinese government also has a Central Military Commission (CMC). These are essentially the same organizations with the same people in charge. In their own words, the Chinese say that this is one organization with two names. But the CCP’s CMC is definitely more “official.” This writing follows the “Chinese custom.”
2. Jiang Zemin was handpicked by China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping during the June 4, 1989, political turmoil in China to become the CCP Secretary General and later President of China. However, Deng Xiaoping stayed as Chairman of the CMC for a few more years afterwards and stepped down reluctantly only when he was certain that Jiang would carry on the course he (Deng) had set for China. In 2002, Jiang Zemin followed Deng Xiaoping’s footsteps to withhold control of the military power.


5. Chinese leaders set China’s military modernization in motion following the so-called “wakeup calls” from the United States with its show of force against Saddam Hussein in 1991, in the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, and in the Kosovo air campaign in 1999. They apparently accelerated this monumental undertaking upon seeing the U.S. military launch another revolutionary military action against Saddam Hussein in 2003.


9. There have been numerous Chinese writings reflecting on the internal debate in China about the need, merit, and cost of pursuing aircraft carrier in the past 2 decades. The proponents have apparently prevailed in the date.


14. “Jane’s points out that the 22DDH vessels ‘could quite easily double up as the kind of light aircraft carrier that the U.S. Marine Corps uses for expeditionary operations’. . . . Although designated for helicopters, the vessel would also be capable of launching jets capable of vertical take-offs and landings.” Quoted by Julian Ryall, “Tokyo Maintains a Steady Course on Military Spending,” South China Morning Post, January 23, 2013.

15. Lu Minghui (卢明辉), “南海争端与东南亚国家的扩军（“South China Sea Disputes and Southeast Asian Nations’ Military Expansion”), 南洋问题研究 (Southeast Asian Affairs), No. 4, 2006.

16. Zhang Ning (张宁), Chief Editor, 科学发展观与十六大以来的理论创新 (The View on Scientific Development and Theoretical Advances since the 16th Party Convention), Beijing, China: 中央文献出版社 (CCP Central Archival Publication), 2012.
17. The articles are in *Military Science*, No. 6, 2010, and Nos. 4, 5, and 6, 2011.


CHAPTER 2

THE “NEW HISTORIC MISSIONS”: REFLECTIONS ON HU JINTAO’S MILITARY LEGACY

Daniel M. Hartnett

The views presented in this chapter are entirely the author’s, and do not reflect the views of any organization with which he is or was affiliated.

This chapter examines a set of missions provided to the Chinese military in 2004 and the impact these missions have had on the military’s development and activities since then. It argues that these new missions mark a significant turning point for China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Besides reinforcing traditional objectives such as maintaining Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule and defending China’s sovereign territory, the new missions for the first time require the PLA to defend China’s expanding overseas interests. As a result, the PLA has sought to adapt itself to these new requirements by broadening its geographic and functional area of focus and acquiring new skills and capabilities.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The “New Historic Missions” heavy emphasis on the need to defend China’s territorial sovereignty will likely result in the PLA taking a stronger position on perceived violations of China’s maritime territorial claims. The United States should expect that the PLA will play a larger role in China’s maritime territorial
disputes with other states, such as those with U.S. treaty allies, Japan and the Philippines.

- So long as the China’s leadership feels that the PLA is incapable of fulfilling the New Historic Missions, additional resources for China’s military modernization efforts will be justified. Therefore, the United States should anticipate that the PLA will, among other things, continue to improve its maritime, space, and cyberspace capabilities—key foci of the missions.

- The United States should anticipate that the PLA will continue to increase its global presence as it seeks to defend China’s expanding overseas interests.

- The inherent tension in the New Historic Missions between traditional territorial defense missions and overseas missions provides the United States with an opportunity to influence the PLA’s future trajectory. The PLA should be encouraged to participate in missions around the world that benefit the common good, such as defending international freedom of navigation. Such a direction may provide China with an incentive to support current international norms and institutions, rather than transforming them to suit Beijing’s parochial interests.

INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 2012, China underwent a significant change in leadership as the fifth generation of leaders assumed power. During the CCP’s 18th Party Congress (November 2012), China’s then premier leader, Hu Jintao, relinquished power to Xi Jinping. By the end of the congress, Xi took over as general secretary
of the CCP and chairman of China’s supreme military command, the Central Military Commission (CMC)—in effect becoming the head of both the CCP and the military.\(^1\) After 10 years as head of the CCP and the Chinese state and 8 years as leader of the PLA, Hu Jintao officially passed from the political stage in Beijing.\(^2\) If the past is any precedence, China’s new leader will work quickly to make his mark upon China by enacting policy guidance on issues he finds of concern. As with political transition in any country, it is likely that some of Xi’s guidance will change or possibly even counter policies and goals set during the Hu era. Already there is evidence that this is beginning to occur, as one increasingly hears what appears to be a new catchphrase for the Xi era, namely “China’s Dream.”\(^3\)

In order to better understand any new policies that Xi may implement, it is useful to look back at some of the accomplishments of the previous Chinese administration under Hu. While a full assessment of Hu’s time at the helm of China is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is possible to examine one area, namely Hu’s contributions to the PLA over the past 8 years. In particular, this chapter looks at the impact on the PLA from a set of new missions Hu provided to the military shortly after he became chairman of the CMC in 2004.\(^4\) These new missions, officially referred to as the “Historic Missions of Our Military in the New Century of the New Period” (“新世界新阶段我军历史使命”), or simply the “New Historic Missions,”\(^5\) are a set of four tasks, summarized as follows:

- **Reinforce the military’s loyalty to the CCP.** By remaining loyal to the CCP, the military can help ensure that the CCP maintains its grasp on power in China.
• **Ensure China’s continued economic development by defending China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic security.** The military should prevent internal and regional problems, such as Taiwan and ethnic separatist movements, territorial disputes, nontraditional security problems, and domestic social stability issues; from disrupting China’s economic development.

• **Defend China’s expanding national interests, especially in the maritime, space, and cyberspace domains.** The military should broaden its definition of security from simply territorial defense against traditional military threats to also defending expanding Chinese interests in key extraterritorial areas—namely the maritime, space, and cyberspace domains—as well as defending China against a growing range of nontraditional security concerns, such as terrorism.

• **Prevent the outbreak of conflict.** The PLA should do what it can to prevent the outbreak of conflict that could impact China’s national development goals by supporting international peace operations, improving its crises response capabilities, and strengthening its deterrent and warfighting capabilities.

This chapter argues that the New Historic Missions are one of the defining military policies enacted during Hu’s tenure in office. Besides reinforcing traditional PLA missions, such as ensuring the military’s loyalty to the Party and safeguarding territorial defense, the missions also expand both the definition and geographic scope of China’s security interests. On
the one hand, the Historic Missions broaden the territory in which the PLA is expected to defend China’s national interests. As a result, the PLA is no longer expected to simply protect China’s interests within its borders. Furthermore, the new missions codify the notion that the military should also include a broader definition of security, to include defending against nontraditional security threats, such as terrorism and maritime piracy.

As a result, in the years since the New Historic Missions were announced, significant changes have occurred in China’s military procurement, force modernization and reform efforts, and military activities. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to point out all developments that have been influenced by the missions. However, several areas are worth mentioning. First, the military appears to be implementing an almost campaign-like attempt to reinforce its loyalty to the Party. Second, the PLA is strengthening its ability to safeguard China’s maritime territorial interests. Third, the PLA is expanding its capabilities and operations in three key areas: the maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. All of these developments appear to reflect the influence of Hu’s New Historic Missions.

This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, the bulk of this chapter, an in-depth description of the content and significance of the New Historic Missions is provided in order for the reader to understand exactly what the missions are and what they require of the PLA. The second section, some of the more notable examples of how these missions have influence the development of the PLA are described. In the final section, some implications for the United States are provided.
For sources, this chapter draws from a variety of Chinese language writings, augmented with Western writings as necessary. In particular, it relies on two invaluable sources of information. First is the purported speech by Hu to an expanded session of the CMC on December 24, 2004. In this speech, Hu articulates—possibly for the first time—the New Historic Missions to the attending delegates. The second invaluable source is a series of lessons on the missions that the PLA’s General Political Department (GPD) published in 2006. As the PLA’s main organization representing the CCP within the military, it is worth paying attention to anything that the GPD produces. Indeed, as will be demonstrated below, the GPD’s lessons—seven in total—provide a wealth of additional information about the CCP’s thinking on the significance and specific content of these missions.

**What are the New Historic Missions?**

The New Historic Missions are a new set of four missions presented to the PLA during an expanded session of the CMC on December 24, 2004. They reinforce some traditional PLA objectives as well as provide the military with new requirements. The four missions are a significant development for China’s military for two reasons. First, they appear to be a new entry to the sacred body of Chinese “military thought” (军事思想). Second, official Chinese documents now routinely incorporate the missions into their text, further signifying their relevance. These two points are worth discussing further.
Since their announcement in 2004, the New Historic Missions have been slated for incorporation into the collection of theories that makes up the corpus of nearly sacrosanct Chinese military theories. This lexicon of Chinese military thought includes the main military-related writings and speeches of the leader of each generation of China’s leadership. As each leader makes way for the next, the military contributions of the outgoing leader are enshrined in this collection. Premier in this pantheon of Chinese military demi-gods is none other than Mao Zedong. Mao’s contribution to this collection, encapsulated in the concept of Mao Zedong Military Thought (毛泽东军事思想), spans decades of his writings and speeches, and clearly is the holist of the group. Following Mao is Deng Xiaoping’s contribution, collectively known as Deng Xiaoping Thought on Army Building in the New Period (邓小平新时期军队建设思想). Pulled primarily from Deng’s writings during the Reform and Opening Period in the 1980s, they naturally focus on issues such as reforming and modernizing the PLA in light of then-ongoing social and economic changes in China. Jiang Zemin’s input, the third component, is captured under the rubric of Jiang Zemin Thought on National Defense and Army Building (江泽民国防和军队建设思想). Of note, the transition from Jiang as China’s leader to Jiang as China’s former leader provides a bit of insight into how one’s writings are included in this sacred collection. In the late-1990s, Jiang’s military thought was referred to as “important expositions” (重要论述).6 However, since the early-2000s, Chinese sources have referred to Jiang’s military contribution as a “thought,” officially on par with Mao and Deng’s components.7

Following the pattern set by Jiang’s military thought, it appears that recently this list has expanded
to include Hu Jintao’s input, comprised in part by the New Historic Missions. Since the missions were announced, comments by high-level Chinese military officials have hinted that the missions were destined for inclusion in the list of military thought of China’s previous leadership. For example, in 2005, Politburo member and CMC vice chairman, General Guo Boxiong, stated that the missions are:

[T]he progressive innovation of the Party’s guiding military theory, the succession to and enhancement of Mao Zedong Military Thought, Deng Xiaoping Thought on Army Building in the New Period, and Jiang Zemin Thought on National Defense and Army Building.  

The GPD makes a similar argument in the first of its lessons on the missions:

In the different historical periods of the revolution, construction, and reform; our Party in succession formed the three great military theory results of Mao Zedong Military Thought, Deng Xiaoping Thought on Army Building in the New Period, and Jiang Zemin Thought on National Defense and Army Building. . . . Chairman Hu insisted on taking Marxist military theories as a guide, creatively used the successful experiences in leading national defense and army building of the Party’s three generations of core leadership to completely and profoundly reveal the Historic Missions of Our Military in the New Century of the New Period, and open up new fields of vision for us in practice to persist in and develop Marxist military theories.

Further signifying the importance of this new set of military missions, the Historic Missions have been included in a variety of official Chinese documents.
For example, since 2006, every Defense White Paper—authoritative biennial statements about China’s security situation—has mentioned the role of these missions in guiding the PLA’s modernization process. The 2010 Defense White Paper best demonstrates this when it attributes various ongoing PLA reforms as an effort to fulfill the missions:

[The PLA] intensifies theoretical studies on joint operations under conditions of informationization, advances the development of high-tech weaponry and equipment, develops new types of combat forces, strives to establish joint operation systems in conditions of informationization, accelerates the transition from military training under conditions of mechanization to military training in conditions of informationization, presses ahead with implementation of the strategic project for talented people, invests greater efforts in building a modern logistics capability, and enhances its capabilities in accomplishing diversified military tasks in order to win local wars under the conditions of informationization, so as to accomplish its historical missions at the new stage in the new century [sic; emphasis added].

Even nondefense-related official documents include a reference to the New Historic Missions. For example, the 17th Party Congress Work Report, delivered in 2007 by none other than Hu, stated that the PLA was to “fully carry out the historical missions [sic].” The CCP’s 2007 constitution also incorporates Hu’s missions, further signifying their importance.

In early-2013, the official switch of Hu’s “important expositions” to “military thought” occurred when an April 2013 PLA Daily article referred to Hu’s input as Hu Jintao Thought on National Defense and Army Building (胡锦涛国防和军队建设思想). Of note, this article
allegedly was a synopsis of an address that China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, gave to the PLA delegates of March 2013 National People’s Congress, further demonstrating the official nature of the shift in terminology.

Now that the importance of the New Historic Missions has been detailed, it is time to examine the actual missions. What exactly is the content of these four new missions? The next sections describe each of the four missions in turn.

**Mission 1: Provide a Powerful Guarantee for the Party to Consolidate Its Ruling Position.**

The first of the four missions calls upon the military to “provide an important guarantee for the Party to consolidate its ruling position” (“为党巩固执政地位提供重要的力量保证”). At its core, the intention is to ensure that the PLA remains loyal to the CCP in the event of a political crisis. During his speech to the CMC, Hu justified this mission by noting that the Party faced numerous domestic and international threats to its continued rule. According to Hu, the threats the Party faced were three-fold: the superiority of more developed nations, ideological attacks from “hostile Western forces,” and domestic social problems brought about by 3 decades of reform and development. In his speech, he asserts:

Upon entering the new century of the new period and comprehensively surveying the international and domestic situations, we face both rare opportunities for development and serious challenges. We still face pressure from developed nations with their economic, scientific and technological, and military superiorities. Hostile Western forces have not given up the wild
ambitions of trying to subjugate us, intensifying the political strategy of westernizing and dividing up China, and attempting to use their political models and value systems to change us. Our country’s reform and development is currently at a crucial period. Social interest relations are even more complicated, various hostile forces stirring up trouble by exploiting by hook or by crook a few contradictions and problems present in our realization of a socialist life, and are carrying out disturbances and destruction. International and domestic forces are collaborating and working in concert. Their final goal is to overthrow the ruling position of our Party, overthrow the national power of the People’s Democratic Dictatorship and reverse our nation’s socialist system.\textsuperscript{15}

Without the PLA’s loyalty and support, the Party fears that it will be incapable of dealing with these threats. Conversely, although not directly stated, the inability of the Party to ensure the loyalty of the military could result in the Party’s demise. According to Hu, “only if our Party closely relies upon all the people and firmly controls the People’s Army, will there be no large disturbances in China, and we will be able to ‘face danger with confidence no matter what problems arise.’\textsuperscript{16}

In order to guarantee continued CCP rule in China, the Party must not only strengthen its control over the military and ensure the military’s loyalty to the CCP, but also seek to ensure that the military is capable of dealing with these threats:

Therefore, we must tightly grasp insisting on the fundamental principle and system of the Party’s absolute leadership over the army, and strengthening the army’s revolutionization, modernization, and standardization as the important strategic tasks of Party
rule; thus ensuring that our military is able to undergo various battle tasks and various tests in complicated environments, and always is the backbone force for the Party to consolidate its ruling position.\textsuperscript{17}

The GPD’s lessons on the Historic Missions describe how to achieve this task’s objective, stating that it is essential to ensure that the military:\textsuperscript{18}

- **Remains loyal to the CCP Central Committee and CMC:** Only by ensuring the Party’s decisive leadership over the military can the Party consolidate its ruling position. Therefore, “if the Party says something, then we repeat it; if the Party orders us to do something, then we do it; if the Party points to somewhere, then we move to there.”

- **Completes all tasks entrusted to it by the Party:** In a somewhat circular argument, the GPD notes that the military’s primary task is to fulfill its obligations to the Party, which in essence means that the military is to successfully carry out its Historic Missions.

- **Fights against all threats to Party rule:** In order to confront the perceived threats confronting the Party, the GPD states that the PLA needs to strengthen its political acumen and political responsibility. In particular, the GPD notes that the military needs to resist calls to make the PLA ultimately responsible to the Chinese state, rather than the CCP as is currently the case.

The second task, “to provide a powerful security guarantee for safeguarding the important Strategic Opportunity Period of national development” (“为维护国家发展的重要战略机遇期提供坚强的安全保障”), calls upon the military to prevent domestic or international disruptions to China’s pursuit of further economic development. This mission in particular requires the PLA to defend what is referred to as China’s “Strategic Opportunity Period” (“战略机遇期”), a stock phrase for roughly the first 20 years of the 21st century. Possibly first used by Hu’s predecessor Jiang during the latter’s delivery of the 16th Party Congress Work Report in November 2002, the Strategic Opportunity Period implies that domestic and international environments favor China’s economic and social development, and therefore should be exploited. In that work report, Jiang noted that “[a]n overview of the situation shows that for our country, the first 2 decades of the 21st century are a period of important strategic opportunities which we must seize tightly and which offer bright prospects.” The GPD notes that this period benefits China’s continued development because at the international level, the overall situation is peaceful, the likelihood of great power conflict is low, and the world is moving toward multipolarization and globalization. At the domestic level, China’s economy continues to grow, benefitting the Chinese populace.

The importance of the Strategic Opportunity Period is captured in Hu’s New Historic Mission speech, where he states that:
The first 20 years of this century is the important Strategic Opportunity Period that we must tightly grasp and be able to fully accomplish. Grasping the opportunity to promote development is of the utmost importance to fully build a moderately well-off society and speed up the promotion of socialist modernization. The Strategic Opportunity Period is hard earned and defended, and exploiting the Strategic Opportunity Period requires expending even more arduous effort. In order to defend and use the Strategic Opportunity Period, we should defend national security, guard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and provide a powerful security guarantee for national development, thus creating a peaceful international environment and a harmonious social environment.

However, while China’s overall international and domestic situation during the Strategic Opportunity Period is seen in a positive light, there are also a number of perceived obstacles which could derail progress during this period. Hu’s speech notes four problem areas in particular: 1) territorial disputes with neighboring countries, 2) separatist movements on Taiwan, 3) other separatist movements, and 4) domestic social stability problems. According to Hu:

Currently, there are still a lot of factors that are influencing the Strategic Opportunity Period. Our nation’s historical land border problems have yet to be completely resolved. More than half of the three million km² of maritime surface area over which China has sovereignty and jurisdiction is involved in territorial water or maritime rights and interest disputes with neighboring states. “Taiwan Independence” separatist forces and their activities are producing serious threats for national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ethnic separatist forces are combining to harm the stability of the border areas. Terrorist activities are
negatively influencing national security and stability. Along with the deep transformation of China’s social structure, various cultures of thought are agitating each other, various social contradictions are influencing each other, and factors harming social stability are increasing. The threats facing national sovereignty, the challenges facing the unification of the motherland, and the problems facing social stability, if one aspect is not properly guarded against, fought against without effort, or mismanaged, they could all possibly influence and seriously affect the important Strategic Opportunity Period for national development.22

In its lessons on the New Historic Missions, the GPD elaborates on these threats to China:23

• **Taiwan independence movement:** Writing in 2006 when mainland-Taiwan relations were at a low point, it is understandable that the GPD would assert that Taiwan independence is the “most serious threat influencing the Strategic Opportunity Period.” Of note, this threat also includes the possibility of a U.S. intervention on behalf of Taiwan should conflict erupt.

• **Land and maritime territorial disputes:** Referring to China’s various territorial disputes as a “hidden danger,” the GPD contends that, if not settled, these issues could harm China’s chances for continued development. The GPD also states these disputes often are exacerbated by the “meddling” of international forces.

• **Terrorism and national separatist movements:** The GPD’s lessons note that terrorism is on the rise on China’s border along the arc from Central Asia, through South Asia, and into Southeast Asia. The GPD also asserts that terrorism is now a domestic problem, and mentions in
particular Xinjiang’s East Turkistan separatist movement—the only group listed by name.

• **Various domestic destabilizing factors:** The final category of factors that could derail China’s continued development is domestic social factors. Although the GPD doesn’t provide details about these factors, it does note that rising per capita income and income inequality in China are partially to blame.

In order to combat these various threats, Hu states that the military should:

[F]irmly resist foreign invasions, and ensure that China’s territorial seas, territorial airspace, and borders are not violated. They should counter and constrain “Taiwan Independence” separatist forces and their activities, earnestly defend against and attack ethnic separatist forces, never allowing the various plans of the separatist forces and western hostile powers to divide China and destroy her sovereignty and territorial integrity to prevail. They should support national relevant departments, earnestly defending against and resolutely attacking terrorist activities. They should closely pay attention to the social situation, actively support and accompany local Party committees and governments to appropriately handle various social contradictions and issues, doing a good job of safeguarding social stability.\(^{24}\)

Building upon Hu’s speech, the GPD lists three areas where the PLA needs to act:\(^{25}\)

1. **Defend China’s territorial sovereignty:** In particular, the GPD calls upon the PLA to closely monitor changes in the international and regional security situation; pay close attention to “readjustments” in
regional military deployments; strive to improve its national defense capabilities; and strive to be able to “win local wars under informatized conditions.”

2. **Counter Taiwan separatism:** The GPD notes that the PLA needs to do a good job at completing its “military combat preparations” in order to dissuade Taiwan from seeking independence. Furthermore, should peaceful means be exhausted, then the PLA needs to be ready to use military force to “thoroughly resolve the Taiwan issue.”

3. **Counter domestic terrorism and ensure domestic stability:** According to the GPD, the PLA should actively guard against terrorism and ethnic separatism, and prevent these groups from joining up with “hostile western forces.” The PLA should also assist with preventing domestic problems from destabilizing China.

**Mission 3: Provide a Powerful Strategic Support for Safeguarding National Interests.**

The third mission requires the military to protect China’s expanding national interests. Referred to as the need for the military to “provide a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests” ("为维护国家利益提供有力的战略支撑"), this mission focuses on the need to defend China’s expanding national interests in three realms: maritime, space, and cyberspace. Chinese writings state that the justification for the broadening of national security interests lies with the expansion of China’s national interests. As described in an article from China’s official news agency, *Xinhua*, when China was at an earlier stage of development, its national interests were confined within its geographic borders. Today, however, the
effects of informatization (信息化) and globalization have led China’s national interests to gradually spread out into the ocean, space, and cyberspace. According to Hu:

The progress of the period and the development of China have caused our national security interests to gradually go beyond the scope of our territorial land, seas, and airspace; and continually expand and stretch towards the ocean, space, and [cyberspace]. Maritime security, space security, and [cyberspace] security have already become an important area of national security. [Emphasis added]

The GPD lessons expand upon this argument:

People’s understanding of the oceans and development of maritime capabilities continues to rise, causing the oceans to become an important area in international struggles of the 21st Century. The discovery and use of man-made satellites, spacecraft, and space shuttles has caused space to become the new area for national interests. The widespread use of electronic computers and information networks has again caused [cyberspace] to enter into the category of national interests. The development of modern national interests manifests the trends of developing from one dimensional of the past to the multidimensional and omnidirectional space of land, ocean, air, space, and [cyberspace].

In other words, because China’s developmental interests have moved into these realms, so too should China’s security interests.

In order to carry out this task, Hu stated that the military must broaden its definition of national security to include protecting China’s newly expanded interests in the maritime, space, and cyberspace domains:
We must expand our security strategy and our military strategic field of vision; not only should we pay close attention to and defend national survival interests, but also pay attention to and defend national development interests; not only should we pay attention to and defend the security of our territorial land, waters, and air; but also pay attention to and defend maritime security, space security, and [cyberspace] security; as well as other aspects of national security.\textsuperscript{30}

As evidenced from the above quotes, this third mission focuses on three areas in particular where the PLA is required to develop the capabilities to safeguard China’s expanding interests: the maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. Each area is further detailed as follows.

\textit{Maritime Security.}

The New Historic Missions note the growing importance of the oceans to China. According to Hu, “the ocean is the great route of international contact and a strategic resource treasure-house for the sustainable development of humanity.”\textsuperscript{31} The GPD asserts that “[a]long with our nation’s economic and social development, our national interests are continually expanding and extending into the maritime space.”\textsuperscript{32} China has two types of interests in the maritime region: economic and security interests.

Maritime Economic Interests. China has primarily two types of maritime economic interests: sea lanes (and the goods that traverse them) and maritime resources.\textsuperscript{33} The maritime environment is of increasing value to Beijing due to China’s growing reliance upon international sea lanes for China’s continued develop-
In 2010, the World Bank estimated that the value of China’s total foreign trade (imports and exports) was equivalent to 55 percent of China’s gross domestic product. The majority of China’s foreign trade, as much as 90 percent according to one Chinese estimate, travels by sea. Furthermore, since 1993, China has been a net importer of oil, and in 2010 it imported over 52 percent of its consumed oil. Maritime natural resources, such as petroleum, minerals, and fisheries, are also increasingly important to China’s economy. This importance, both realized and potential, is evident in the number of maritime development plans China has released in recent years. For example, at the national level, every Five Year Plan (FYP) since the 7th (1986-90) has noted the need to develop China’s maritime resources, with the most recent, the 12th FYP (2011-15), devoting an entire chapter to this issue.

Table 2-1 below contains a small sample of China’s national maritime development plans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan Name (English)</th>
<th>Program/Plan Name (Chinese)</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th-12th Five Year Plans</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1986+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Development of China’s Maritime Enterprises</td>
<td>中国海洋事业的发展</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outline of the National Ocean Economy Development Plan, 2001-2010</td>
<td>全国海洋经济发展规划纲要</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2-1: Select Chinese National Maritime Economy Development Plans.
Because of the importance China attributes to maritime economic interest, Beijing feels the need to be able to defend them if necessary. As the most recent Chinese \textit{Defense White Paper} notes:

The seas and oceans provide immense space and abundant resources for China’s sustainable development, and thus are of vital importance to the people’s wellbeing and China’s future. It is an essential national development strategy to exploit, utilize and protect the seas and oceans, and build China into a maritime power. It is an important duty for the PLA to resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests.$^{39}$

Maritime Security Interests. China also has maritime security interests in the region. According to the GPD:

China has a large quantity of island jurisdiction and maritime rights disputes with peripheral countries. More than half of the maritime surface area over which China has sovereignty and jurisdiction is disputed by peripheral states. China has unresolved border demarcation problems in the Yellow, East China, and South China seas with some nations, and there are a lot of disputes over maritime resource development issues.$^{40}$

Safeguarding these maritime interests requires the PLA to focus more on the maritime domain; failure to do so could negatively impact China’s continued economic and social development:

Safeguarding the maritime resources for supporting China’s continued economic development, developing and safeguarding the security of China’s foreign maritime trade shipping routes and petroleum lines, attacking the problems of maritime terrorism, piracy,
smuggling, and transnational crimes, and building a peaceful and good regional maritime security order, are all China’s important maritime security interests, and concern the entire nation’s security and development.  

Space Security.

Like the maritime domain, China sees space as an increasingly important area for economic and security reasons. According to Hu:

space is the new area for contemporary international cooperation, competition, and confrontation; the development and use of space resources open up a broad prospective for the future development of human society. A few great powers are currently intensifying the pursuit of a military advantage in space, and the process of space weaponization is speeding up.

Space has also become strategic terrain for China’s development and security. Chinese writings have frequently argued that space has become the new frontier in mankind’s development. The importance of developing space to the Chinese government is demonstrated by two components of the 11th Five Year Plan (FYP), which covers 2006 to 2010. The first is an 11th FYP for space development, followed by an 11th FYP for aerospace development. Trends toward the militarization of space were also noted as justification for safeguarding space security:

The competition for space is more intense on a daily basis. Space is a very important national interest area, and it is also an endless area. The great value of space in military, economic, science and technology, and social areas is already giving daily rise to every nation’s attention.
Chinese writings about how to defend China’s interests in space provide less details than some may like. The GPD, for example, only notes that the PLA must develop space defenses and improve its space capabilities, but lists few details:

China has always advocated for the peaceful use of space and been against the weaponization of space. However, facing security threats from space, we must undertake suitable means to implement effective defenses, formulate scientific and rational long-term plans, strive to develop space technology, actively develop space, participate in international space cooperation, and strengthen the construction of space forces; thus ensuring that [our] national space interests are effectively safeguarded.47

Cyberspace Security.

The final domain specifically noted in the third task is cyberspace. As with the two previous domains, the Historic Missions also consider cyberspace important for both China’s development and security. In his speech, Hu states that:

[cyberspace] is a material space that has gradually attracted humanity’s attention along with the widespread use of information technology; in military affairs it is the ‘fifth battlefield’ after the land, sea, air, and space battlefields.48
The GPD provides a bit more detail on this domain’s growing importance to China:

Along with the development of information technology—especially computer technology—the [cyberspace] has had an increasingly larger use in economic and social development. Each nation of the world places developing and vying for the initiative in [cyberspace] in a prominent position, and crucial S&T research areas of developed nations are [cyberspace]-relevant information, communications, and superconductor technologies.\(^\text{49}\)

In order to defend China’s interests in cyberspace, the PLA needs to increase its knowledge of cyber threats and improve its cyber security capabilities. Per the GPD:

We should closely follow security threats in [cyberspace] and undertake effective countermeasures to defend against them. We should closely track advanced global electronic and information technology developments, work with relevant central departments to strengthen the construction of information security support systems, and optimize security measures from a legal, administrative, and technical angle. We should extensively carry out education on [cyberspace] security, and raise and broaden the troop’s consciousness about and disposition towards safeguarding [cyberspace]. Through feasible means, we should ensure that national economic and social activities function normally, ensure that army building is carried out smoothly, and that we are victorious in future informatized wars.\(^\text{50}\)
While firmly admitting that the absence of evidence is not the same as the evidence of absence, it is worth mentioning that at least in Hu’s speech and in the GPD’s lessons, there is no mention of offensive cyber capabilities. However, this is not to say that the PLA is not investigating how to conduct offensive cyber capabilities. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 2013 report on China’s military capabilities notes that China’s development of computer network operations capabilities are fungible for computer network attacks as well. Therefore, a more credible explanation for the lack of offensive cyber capabilities is that the topic is considered too sensitive to be discussed in open sources, and therefore discussions on this issue are likely not available for the drafting of this chapter.

Mission 4: Give Play to the Important Use of Safeguarding World Peace and Promoting Common Development.

The final task of the Historic Missions requires the PLA to respond to international crises, since China is no longer isolated from outside events by geography alone. This task, “to give play to the important use of safeguarding world peace and promoting common development” (“为维护世界和平与促进共同发展发挥重要作用”), is mainly driven by the Chinese perception that because of globalization, China is increasingly connected to the outside world, especially the global economy. As a result of this increased interconnectivity, China is no longer immune to overseas events—events only tangential to China’s interests could now adversely impact the Middle Kingdom. Furthermore, what happens in China also impacts the outside world. According to Hu:
Economic globalization trends continue to develop, causing the economies of the world’s nations to link tightly together like never before, making it difficult for any nation to develop in an isolated fashion by distancing itself from the global economy. Since the Reform and Development [Period], in order to promote the rapid development of our nation’s economy, we persisted on the basic policy of opening up to the outside, completely raising our level of openness to the outside, amply using both domestic and foreign markets, and earnestly realizing superior complementation and common development. Presently, China’s economy and the global economy form an overall situation of mutual dependence. China’s development cannot do without the world and the world’s development also cannot do without China.  

China maintains this view until today, as demonstrated in China’s recent Defense White Paper, which asserts that:

China’s security and development are closely connected with the peace and prosperity of the world as a whole. China’s armed forces have always been a staunch force upholding world peace and regional stability, and will continue to increase cooperation and mutual trust with the armed forces of other countries, participate in regional and international security affairs, and play an active role in international political and security fields.  

In order to fulfill this task, Chinese writings note that the PLA must be able to:

- **Contribute to international peacekeeping efforts**: As the GPD points out, China is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and therefore shoulders a responsibility to the international community. As
such, China requires a military that suits a nation that “directly participates in policies that affect global security and regional stability, and has a decisive role in international affairs.”

- **Respond rapidly to nonwar crises**: According to the GPD, the final mission requires a PLA that has a rapid response capability so that it can handle crises before they develop into major conflicts. In addition, it states that the PLA should improve its ability to conduct “nonwar” ("非战争") activities during peacetime, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster response. The PLA should also improve its ability to coordinate with other People’s Republic of China (PRC) government agencies to effectively respond to crises.

- **Deter and contain war**: Because of the growing destructiveness of modern warfare, the PLA should seek to prevent the outbreak of war or contain the escalation of war should it occur—particularly a war that involves China. The GPD emphasizes that the PLA should “both pay close attention to planning and carrying out firm preparations for war and stress avoiding war through crisis control.” Other writings also emphasize the need to “strengthen [the PLA’s] strategic deterrence capability.”

- **Win a war, should it be necessary**: Reflecting Trotsky’s aphorism that “you may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you,” the GPD states that “if war cannot be avoided, then we must crush the enemy’s schemes with swift and violent combat operations.” In particular, the PLA must be capable of defeating a superior opponent in a modern high-technology war,
SOME MANIFESTATIONS OF THE HISTORIC MISSIONS

So how have the Historic Missions influenced the PLA? Did Hu simply give a speech that the military promptly ignored? Or does the military simply provide lip service to the new requirements of these missions? This chapter argues that the missions have indeed been internalized by the PLA, strengthening some programs and policies that were already in place and creating new ones where nothing existed before. This section of the chapter provides an overview of some of the more likely Chinese military developments over the past 8 years that appear to strongly correlate with—if not directly flow from—the new mission set that Hu provided to the PLA. It is not a thorough discussion of everything that the PLA has done, or that could potentially be connected to the New Historic Missions. In particular, this section points out three developments: reinforcing PLA loyalty to the CCP, strengthening the PLA’s ability to defend China’s maritime territorial interests, and improving the PLA’s capabilities to safeguard China’s expanding overseas interests. Each is briefly discussed in turn.

Reinforcing PLA Loyalty to the CCP.

As demonstrated previously, the first—and likely most important—mission of the New Historic Missions calls upon the PLA to reinforce its loyalty to the Party. This idea of CCP control over the military is succinctly summarized in Mao Zedong’s statement
at the 1929 Gutian Conference that “the Party commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.” At this conference, Mao and his supporters established a system whereby the CCP was thoroughly embedded within the PLA, and the PLA made subordinate to Party rule. Although a staple of civil-military relations in China for over 8 decades, in recent years the call to ensure CCP control of the military seems to have strengthened. For example, a PLA Daily editorial claimed on the 85th anniversary (2012) of the founding of the PLA that “[w]e must more solidly and more effectively improve ideological and political building, guarantee that the forces will resolutely obey the party’s command and be absolutely loyal and reliable.” In a 2012 article in the CCP’s premier journal, Qiushi, Du Jincai, deputy director of the GPD, emphasized the need “to strengthen ideological and political education within the PLA,” and asserted that the priority tasks for the PLA are to “firmly follow the Party’s instructions and show absolute loyalty to the Party.” Not all of these calls come from military sources, either. Interestingly, China’s 12th Five Year Program notes the emphasis on strengthening the PLA’s loyalty to the Party:

We will enhance the army’s ideological and political building; persist in the basic principle and system of the Party’s absolute leadership over the army; persist in the fundamental purpose of the people’s army; greatly carry forward the excellent tradition of following the command of the party, of serving the people, and of being brave and of good at fighting; and nurture the core value concept of the contemporary revolutionary army men.
Many of these calls to strengthen CCP control over the PLA simultaneously emphasize the need to resist attempts to separate the PLA from the Party. This notion is captured under the oft-seen calls to resist the “erroneous thinking” to “remove the Party [from the military]” (非党化), “de-politicize [the military]” (非政治化), and “nationalize [the military]” (国家化)—in other words, to make the military ultimately beholden to the state and not the CCP.\(^65\)

**Strengthening the PLA’s Ability to Defend China’s Maritime Territorial Interests.**

Several high profile developments over the last year show the development of PLA capabilities to safeguard China’s disputed maritime territories in the East and South China seas. Three are noted below:

1. **Increasing PLA Navy (PLAN) patrols of disputed maritime territories:** Demonstrating the ability to safeguard China’s disputed maritime territories in the East China Sea, a PRC Ministry of National Defense spokesman stated in September 2012 that the PLAN would patrol disputed maritime areas such as the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, asserting that “it is entirely proper and lawful for Chinese naval vessels to carry out routine combat-readiness patrols and training in waters under our jurisdiction.”\(^66\) China’s 2013 *Defense White Paper* clearly asserts that the PLA has a role to play in both defending China’s maritime interests in the region, as well as backing up other Chinese government agencies tasked with the same mission—such as China’s civil maritime forces.\(^67\) Recent media reports of PLA Navy vessels patrolling the waters near the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands demonstrate that these are not simply empty statements.\(^68\)
2. **Coordination with civilian maritime enforcement agencies**: Answering a question about PLA responses to the ongoing Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands tensions with Japan, a Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesman stated that:

> the Chinese military cooperates closely with the marine surveillance, fisheries administration, and other such departments, providing security support for the state’s enforcement of laws at sea, fisheries production, oil and gas development, and other such activities.\(^{69}\)

This statement was further developed in China’s most recent *Defense White Paper*, which, for the first time ever, contained a section detailing how the PLAN is coordinating with and reinforcing efforts by civilian maritime forces to safeguard “China’s maritime rights and interests.”\(^{70}\) A notable example of this coordination occurred during the 2009 “Impeccable Incident,” when a PLAN auxiliary general intelligence vessel and a PRC Bureau of Maritime Fisheries patrol vessel, a PRC State Oceanographic Administration patrol vessel, and two Chinese-flagged fishing vessels harassed the United States Naval Ship (USNS) *Impeccable* in the South China Sea.\(^{71}\)

3. **Development of a nascent aircraft carrier capability**: Although China purchased its first aircraft carrier from the Ukraine prior to Hu’s Historic Missions speech, it is not difficult to see how the carrier could support the PLA’s requirement to defend China’s disputed maritime territorial claims and maritime economic interests. As a Xinhua article asserted shortly after the carrier was commissioned in September, “the legitimacy and necessity of developing the aircraft carrier technology to safeguard [China’s] national interests in the ocean is self-evident” [sic].\(^{72}\) Possession
of an aircraft carrier would, among other benefits, provide the PLA the ability to better reach the more far-flung of China’s maritime territorial claims.

IMPROVING THE PLA’S CAPABILITIES TO SAFEGUARD CHINA’S EXPANDING OVERSEAS INTERESTS

As noted previously, the crux of the third mission is to expand the PLA’s focus on defending China’s national interests beyond the traditional geographic scope of China’s sovereign territory. According to this mission, the PLA should now also focus on defending China’s expanding national interests, particularly in three key areas: the maritime, space, and cyber domains.

Maritime Domain.

Two developments in particular exemplify top-level calls for the PLA to expand its ability to defend China’s maritime interests—the increased area of operations of the PLA Navy, and the ongoing PLA support to international antipiracy operations off the Horn of Africa. First, by all accounts, the PLAN is expanding its area of operations. As stated in China’s 2006, 2008, and 2010 Defense White Papers, the PLAN is attempting to expand its operating range. The 2013 Defense White Paper in particular describes how the PLAN is “developing blue water capabilities of conducting mobile operations, carrying out international cooperation, and countering non-traditional security threats, and enhances its capabilities of strategic deterrence and counterattack.” This statement is corroborated by DoD’s 2013 report on China’s military power, which
notes that the PLAN continues to pursue blue water capabilities, although the report also asserts that the navy’s capabilities are “modest but growing.”

Possibly the most obvious manifestation of the New Historic Missions in PLA activities, and most applicable to this hearing’s focus, is the PLAN’s ongoing participation in anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. First dispatched in December 2008, the PLAN is now in its 14th deployment in support of this effort. Although the PLAN task forces are small in size, generally just three ships at a time, they have worked well with other international partners to escort civilian cargo ships sailing on important sea lanes in the region.

Space Domain.

One of the more infamous activities that the PLA conducted as a demonstration of its ability to fulfill the Historic Missions is its 2007 antisatellite (ASAT) test. On January 11, 2007, China launched a variant of its Dongfeng-21 medium-range ballistic missile at one of its own weather satellites, successfully destroying it upon impact. According to one report, this test was not Beijing’s first. Prior to the successful 2007 ASAT test, the PLA conducted at least two unsuccessful tests in 2005 and 2006. This trend aligns with China’s 2006 Defense White Paper, which states that improving space defense technology was a key goal for the national defense industrial complex. In addition the PLA’s nascent ASAT capability, the 2012 DoD report on China’s military power describes how “China is expanding its space-based surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, meteorological, and communications satellite constellations.” The department’s 2013 report echoes this,
and also notes that the PLA is “developing a multidimensional program to improve its capabilities to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by adversaries during times of crisis or conflict.”

Cyberspace.

There is little doubt that the PLA has internalized the requirement to improve its cyber capabilities. Reports of PLA cyber operations frequently appear in the media and foreign government reports. DoD, for example, notes that “authoritative [Chinese] writings and China’s persistent cyber intrusions indicate the likelihood that Beijing is using cyber network operations as a tool to collect strategic intelligence.” The department’s 2011 report is even harsher, asserting that the PLA is developing a full suite of cyber operations, to include computer network attack, computer network exploitation, and computer network defense. Furthermore, according to the report, “[t]he PLA has established information warfare units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks.”

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

So what does this all mean for China and the PLA? This chapter concludes with two observations. First, while it appears that the Chinese military is actively attempting to fulfill the requirements of the New Historic Missions, it is unclear how well the military can accomplish them. In order to fulfill the missions, the PLA requires much more than simply bright shiny new equipment. Much more difficult is the softer side of military modernization—the training, reorganizing,
and developing of new norms and cultures—so that the military officers and troops can effectively and efficiently carry out the tasks assigned to them. If the PLA solely focuses on acquiring new equipment, weapons, and platforms, it likely will be incapable of fully realizing the capabilities required by the New Historic Missions. Furthermore, many of these requirements, such as the ability to conduct blue water operations, will only be acquired over time, as lessons from actual operations are distilled, deconstructed, and internalized as lessons learned. Any bureaucracy is difficult to adjust to new changes, and the PLA is no exception. Its large size and various parochial interests will throw up road blocks to the smooth transition from a territorial-based military, to the global force that the CCP apparently desires the PLA to become. This is not to say that the PLA will not become global. On the contrary, this author would argue that the PLA is already an inchoate global military, as demonstrated by its naval and peacekeeping operations around the world. However, how far and how quickly it will progress to becoming a true global military remains to be seen.

One indication that things may not be going as smoothly as the CCP and PLA leadership might like is the frequent reference to the “two incompatibles” (“两个不相适应”). First mentioned in 2006, the two incompatibles refers to the notion the PLA does not have the capabilities to fight a modern war as perceived by PLA leadership, and that the PLA is unable to fulfill its historic missions. In the words of the original PLA Daily article:

the principal contradictions that the modernization level of our armed forces has yet to meet the requirements for
winning local wars under informatized conditions, and that the military capabilities of our armed forces are yet to live up to the historical mission they are shouldering at the present new stage in the new century. (Emphasis added.)

Since then, the two incompatibles have received a steady drumbeat from PLA senior leadership, most recently in a December 2012 article published in China’s premier military journal, *China Military Science*. While it remains to be seen whether the two incompatibles survives into the Xi era, it is clear that, until that time, the PLA leadership feels that the PLA has not fully reached the level that the leadership believes necessary to successfully carry out the New Historic Missions. In the meantime, PLA modernization efforts likely will continue to stress developing capabilities suited to implementing these missions.

Second, looking toward future PLA development, it is worth noting that there is a bit of tension contained within in the New Historic Missions. On the one hand, the first two missions require the PLA to focus on its traditional, historical tasks, namely, devoting overall loyalty to the CCP and defending China’s sovereign territory. These missions have been at the heart of what the PLA has done since at least China’s founding in 1949, if not earlier. One could argue that at the end of the day, this is the core focus of the PLA and its modernization efforts. Yet on the other hand, there is a new demand signal which is requiring the PLA to think as a global military confronting multiple types of missions, some of which are not even true combat operations, such as counterpiracy and peacekeeping missions. The expanded geographic requirement and new focus on nontraditional military missions require new skills, knowledge, and capabilities that the PLA is
only now beginning to develop.

Simultaneous development of the capabilities necessary to fulfill both the PLA’s traditional requirements and newly emerging ones will be difficult for the PLA (as it would for any military). While many capabilities are fungible for both sets of operations, just as many, if not more, are not, and require developing separately. Despite enjoying yearly increases in its budget, PLA resources are still finite. Funding used to develop and procure the hardware to implement an anti-access/area denial strategy means less money to purchase underway replenishment ships to support blue water operations. Emphasis on training for major combat operations, such as territorial defense, is very different than practicing for stability operations—as the U.S. military has discovered over the past decade. Developing personnel with a global understanding requires different curriculums than understanding how to conduct campaign operations. While none of this is beyond the ability of the PLA to do, it will likely either lengthen the time required to develop the skills, or result in a misbalanced approach whereby the PLA emphasizes one capability set, but only gives lip service to the other. It may even result in a PLA that actually can do neither well, since focusing on more than one core competency has been the downfall of many previous organizations.

Policy Implications for the United States.

This chapter offers several policy implications for the United States. First, given the New Historic Missions emphasis on defending China’s sovereign territory, the United States should expect China to take an increasingly stronger position on perceived violations
of China’s territorial claims. In particular, the PLA is likely to play a more active role in defending China’s disputed maritime claims in the East and South China Seas. For over 8 years, the PLA has internalized the requirement to safeguard China’s territorial interests. As a result, the PLA has been focusing on developing the capabilities to do just that. Recent incidents with Japan and the Philippines demonstrate that the PLA is likely to push the boundaries in order to demonstrate to these two U.S. treaty allies—and to the United States—that the PLA is serious about defending China’s claims. Furthermore, the development of China’s maritime, space, and cyber capabilities will likely instill the PLA with confidence in its ability to defend China’s interests in these domains, further galvanizing the PLA to take a hard line on Beijing’s behalf.

Second, so long as the CCP and PLA leadership subscribe to the belief that the PLA is currently incapable of fulfilling the New Historic Missions, the United States can expect that the PLA will continue to develop its maritime, space, and cyberspace capabilities. As past events have demonstrated, the PLA has made significant progress in these areas. The development of China’s nascent blue water capabilities, a space and counterspace capability, and near-constant reports of PLA cyber activities reflect the influence of these missions. However, the continued existence of the “two incompatibles” likely provides ammunition to those within the Chinese leadership and PLA who desire for the military to continue to develop its capabilities. Observers of the Chinese military should not be surprised in the future when the PLA demonstrates further progress in any of these areas.

Third, reflecting the influence of the final mission, the United States should anticipate that in the future,
the PLA will continue to increase its global presence. The PLA is already operating outside of China’s immediate peripheral area, albeit on a limited scale. In the coming years, this phenomenon is only likely to increase. As the PLA gains the confidence and ability to operate overseas and China’s overseas interests continue to expand, the PLA will increase its presence around the world. What form of activities the PLA undertakes remains to be seen. However, at the very least, the United States should anticipate that the PLA will continue to partake in international peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations, as well as other international presence activities, such as port calls and international exercises. The PLA may also act more parochially to defend China’s overseas interests, should Beijing feel the need. The PLA’s participation, however small, in the 2011 evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya is one example.

Fourth, given the inherent tension in the missions between the emphasis on traditional defensive operations and the need for the PLA to go global, the United States should seek to encourage the latter. To date, the PLA’s global activities have been largely in line with and supportive of international norms. The PLA has participated in international military activities to defend the global commons and maintain freedom of navigation, such as PLAN Horn of Africa operations. Of the five permanent members of the UNSC, China provides the largest number of people to peacekeeping operations. In recent years, the PLA has begun conducting humanitarian assistance operations. These trends should be supported and encouraged. The PLA, after nearly 3 decades of reform and modernization, is at a crossroads between becoming a military that actively contributes to operations benefitting...
the common good and one that aggressively defends China’s interests regardless of where those interests are located. Clearly the former is better for both the United States and the region.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Xi also became president of China, although this was not officially announced until after the annual meeting of China’s highest legislature, the National People’s Congress, in March 2013. With that position, Xi now occupies all three seats of power in Beijing.

2. Although Hu assumed leadership of the CCP and state in 2002, he did not gain final control over the military until his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, retired from the CMC in 2004.


4. It is important to recognize that these new missions were provided to all of the Chinese armed forces, to include the PLA, the paramilitary People’s Armed Police, and the militia. However, this chapter focuses solely on how these missions impacted the PLA.

5. Although often translated as the “historical missions”—to include in Chinese English-language writings—it is this author’s opinion that “historic missions” is a more accurate translation. According to The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, “historical” refers “to whatever existed in the past, whether regarded as important or not.” The term “historic,” however “refers to what is important in history: the historic first voyage to the moon.” Since it is likely that Hu did not provide a retrospect on the PLA’s past missions, the “historic missions” is therefore a better translation.


7. As far as this author can tell, this switch may have officially occurred in July 2003, when the CMC ratified a GPD-produced “outline” (纲要) to study *Jiang Zemin Thought on National Defense and Army Building*. Since then, Chinese military writings have solely referred to Jiang’s input as a “thought.” “中央军委发出通知：学习江泽民国防军队建设思想” (“CMC Issues a Notice: Study Jiang Zemin Thought on National Defense and Army Building”), China News Network (中新网), July 31, 2003, available from www.china.com.cn/chinese/PI-c/376434.htm. According to this article, the name of the notice was “江泽民国防和军队建设思想学习纲要” (“Outline on Jiang Zemin Thought on National Defense and Army Building”).


16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.


20. GPD (总政部), “第三讲：为维护国家发展的重要战略机遇期提供坚强的安全保障” (“Lesson 3: Providing a Strong Security Guarantee for Safeguarding the Important Strategic Opportuni-


22. Ibid.

23. The following is derived from GPD, “Lesson 3.”


25. The following is derived from GPD, “Lesson 3.”


27. Although the Chinese term used translates directly as “electromagnetic space” (电磁空间), a closer reading of Hu’s Historic Mission speech and other supporting materials shows that a more accurate translation of the concept implied is with the English term “cyberspace.” Therefore, this report will use “cyberspace” throughout. See Hu, “Historic Missions;” and GPD (总政部), “第四讲: 为维护国家利益提供有力的战略支撑” (“Lesson 4: Provide a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests”), August 9, 2006, available from www.ycgffy.com/Article_Print.asp?ArticleID=2283.


29. GPD (总政部), “第四讲: 为维护国家利益提供有力的战略支撑” (“Lesson 4: Provide a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests”), August 9, 2006, available from

31. Ibid.

32. GPD, “Lesson 4.”

33. Ibid.


39. The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces.

40. GPD, “Lesson 4.”

41. Ibid.

42. Hu, “Historic Missions.”

43. Sun Kejia et al., p. 73; GPD, “Lesson 4.”


46. GPD, “Lesson 4.”

47. Ibid.


49. GPD, “Lesson 4.”

50. Ibid.


54. *The Diversified Use of China’s Armed Forces*, Chap. V.

55. GPD, “Lesson 5.”

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.


59. GPD, “Lesson 5.”


64. “中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要” (Outline of the 12th Five-Year Program for National Eco-


68. See, for example, Ida Torres, “China Sends Naval Ships to Patrol Waters near Disputed Senkakus,” Japan Daily Press, April


70. The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, Beijing, China: Information Office of the State Council, April 16, 2013.


74. The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, Chap. II.


82. Ibid., p. 9.


84. The author is indebted to Dennis J. Blasko for pointing this out.

86. Tang Xiaohua and Li Jie, “进一步推进我军军事训练转变
的方法论思考” ("Reflections on Further Promoting the Transformation of Our Military’s Training Methods and Theory"), China Military Science (中国军事科学), No. 6, 2012, pp. 110-111.
CHAPTER 3

THE EVOLUTION OF CORE CONCEPTS:
PEOPLE’S WAR, ACTIVE DEFENSE, AND
OFFSHORE DEFENSE

Dennis J. Blasko

This chapter examines the continuing relevance of People’s War, Active Defense, and Offshore Defense to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) doctrine, organization, and operations. The principles of People’s War and Active Defense, along with its naval component, Offshore Defense continue to be the basis for Chinese military organization, doctrine, and operations. All have been adapted and modified for the 21st century.

People’s War principles are evident in the distribution of personnel among the services in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), its equipment inventory, the structure of the chain of command at Military District level and below, and the continuing emphasis on mobilization of the public and economy to support the military.

Active Defense is based on the premise of “striking only after the enemy has struck,” but will employ offensive operations at all levels of war and at all stages of conflict. Deterrence is the preferred method of achieving political objectives, with warfighting to be used only if deterrence fails. Even then, prudence and caution are advised before initiating the first battle and preparations must be made for protracted conflict. The PLA Navy (PLAN) currently is considered capable of executing Offshore Defense while it begins to explore and practice operations in distant waters, focusing first on “cooperation” missions.
China’s military leaders constantly evaluate the capabilities of their forces and officially see themselves as lagging behind the capabilities of advanced militaries.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

- As an element of China’s efforts to become more transparent, a robust official Chinese literature on these strategic concepts exists.
- Chinese doctrine does not seek to initiate war; rather, warfighting is to be undertaken only if deterrence fails.
- Principles of People’s War, Active Defense, and Offshore Defense can be found in China’s “assertive” behavior in sovereignty and territorial disputes underway in the South and East China Seas since 2009 in what could be called a modern, maritime People’s War.

People’s War is a form of organization of war, and its role has nothing to do with the level of military technology. The concept of People’s War is not confined to the war of low technology only.

Active defense is the essential feature of China’s military strategy and is the keystone of the theory of China’s strategic guidance.¹

INTRODUCTION

Since September 2004, even as the PLA has modernized, mechanized, informationized, and assumed new missions under Hu Jintao, its fundamental strategic foundation has continued to be the principles of People’s War (人民战争) and Active Defense (积
and, as a subset of Active Defense, its naval component, Offshore Defense (近海防御). All of these concepts have been adapted and modified for the 21st century and have proven to be compatible with Hu’s Scientific Development Concept and “Historic Missions.” They continue the basic military principles established by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin. As might be expected, Hu did not revolutionize PLA military thinking, instead, traditional core concepts have evolved as conditions changed.

This chapter examines each of these concepts and illustrates their ongoing influence on PLA doctrine and force structure. Based on analysis of these principles, they have been applied in the Chinese government’s multiagency actions in asserting its claims to sovereignty in the three China Seas during Hu’s tenure as Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). With 20-20 hindsight, we can see that the Chinese government foreshadowed in a number of official publications many of the “assertive” actions undertaken from 2009 to the present.

PEOPLE’S WAR AND ACTIVE DEFENSE—THE BASICS, CIRCA 1937

People’s War and Active Defense are two interrelated concepts based upon Mao Zedong’s writings during the wars against the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Japanese in the 1930s. Mao described numerous strategic, operational, and tactical lessons learned through the Red Army’s early battlefield experience in several essays that formed the basis for his military thought. Much of the content of these essays discusses situations particular to the campaigns against the KMT and Japanese that are of mostly historical inter-
est for the modern PLA today. Other lessons endure and form the foundation for China’s military strategy and operational concepts into the 21st century.

Perhaps the three grand principles of Mao’s military thought embedded in People’s War and Active Defense that have endured are 1) the strategically defensive posture forced upon a weak China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); 2) the need to involve the entire country through mobilization to achieve military objectives defined by the Party; and 3) the requirement for the loyalty of all the Chinese armed forces to the Party.3

Mao saw the existence of the CCP threatened first by the KMT and later by the Japanese occupation of China. The young Party and Red Army were politically, economically, and militarily weaker than their enemies and forced into rural soviets to survive. The Party and Army sought to build upon the strength of China’s large landmass and population as it assumed a strategically defensive posture before going on the offense to achieve its political objectives. After the CCP took control of the country, China was weaker economically and militarily than the United States and the Soviet Union. Beijing’s perception of relative weakness justifies the most fundamental element of current Chinese doctrine: its strategically defensive posture. This assessment of military weakness, especially relative to the United States, has begun to change as China’s economy has grown and its military has modernized, but it still remains as a fundamental reality in China’s perception of its “comprehensive national power.”

Despite the strategically defensive nature of PLA doctrine, Chinese military leaders understand fully the need for offensive actions at the tactical and opera-
tional levels of war and, when conditions demand, at the strategic level. In 1936, Mao used the term “Active Defense” to illustrate this concept:

**Active defense is also known as offensive defense,** or defense through decisive engagements. . . . the only real defense is active defense, defense for the purpose of counter-attacking and taking the offensive. . . . **Militarily speaking, our warfare consists of the alternate use of the defensive and the offensive.**

As the weaker power, the key was to shape the battlefield so that China’s strengths would allow them to take the offensive even if only in limited, specific areas. Mao expected initiative, flexibility, and good judgment from his commanders (“We do not permit any of our Red Army commanders to become a blundering hothead”) and for them to employ deception and stratagem to achieve victory. Commanders analyzed mistakes and adapted their methods of operation and were encouraged to maintain awareness of themselves, their troops, the enemy, and the “objective material foundations, i.e., the military, political, economic and natural conditions.”

This multidimensional outlook presaged the concept of “comprehensive national power” that Beijing uses to measure China’s standing in relation to other nations.

The need for mobilization was illustrated in one of the earliest references to People’s War in 1937:

Throughout the War of Resistance Chiang Kai-shek opposed all-out people’s war in which the entire people are mobilized . . . thus his actions completely violated his own Lushan statement that ‘once war breaks out, every person, young or old, in the north or in the south, must take up the responsibility of resisting Japan and defending our homeland.’
This idea continues in modern PLA doctrine in the mobilization of the people, economy, science and technology, and the emphasis on military-civil integration (军民融合) in military operations and combining military with civilian requirements in the defense industries (军民结合).

Loyalty of all the Chinese armed forces to the Party can be traced back to Mao’s words: “Every Communist must grasp the truth, ‘Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.’ Our principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party.” Party control of the military was reinforced in the first element of Hu Jintao’s “Historic Missions,” which requires the armed forces to “provide an important source of strength for consolidating the ruling position of the Communist Party of China.” In the years since Hu issued this guidance, this principle has been underscored by the repeated campaigns to oppose “removing the party from the military” (“军队非党化”), the “de-politicization of the military” (“军队非政治化”), and the “nationalization of the military” (“军队国家化”).

Mobilization and political loyalty are often linked together by the slogans that the PLA is both the “People’s Army” and the “Party’s Army.” In order for it to be successful, the PLA needs the support of people just as it must always be a servant of the CCP. But the PLA must also respect the people, and after the rupture caused by the PLA’s actions in 1989, the military has worked hard to reestablish its image as a “People’s Army” through its support to national economic construction and particularly in its contributions to disaster relief operations throughout the country.
Another way to look at the relationship of the military to the people and CCP is through the “unity between the PLA and the government and between the PLA and the people” (“军政军民团结”). As Mao wrote in 1945 in the essay, “On Coalition Government”:

The sole purpose of this army is to stand firmly with the Chinese people and to serve them whole-heartedly. . . . Internally, there is unity between officers and men, between the higher and lower ranks, and between military work, political work and rear service work, and externally, there is unity between the army and the people, between the army and government organizations, and between our army and the friendly armies. It is imperative to overcome anything that impairs this unity.\(^{12}\)

These exact themes were repeated in a staff commentator article, “Always Care About the Safety and Well-being of the Masses,” PLA Daily, in September 2012, which also mentioned the problems of a certain “small number of party members”:

The roots, the bloodline, and the strength of our party lie among the people. . . . under a condition of holding the governing status for a long time, in the environment of reform, opening up, and developing the socialist market economy, a small number of party members did not adhere to the party’s fundamental principle, did not keep in mind the party’s mass-related viewpoint and mass line, became indifferent to the difficulties and sufferings of the people. The danger of being divorced from the masses is more salient than any time before. . . . Practice shows that only when we truly care about the masses will the masses care about us; only when we treat the masses as our family members will the masses also treat us as their kinfolk.\(^{13}\)
“On Coalition Government” also acknowledged that the Army had created “a system of strategy and tactics which is essential for the people’s war” and had become skilled in both guerrilla and mobile warfare, depending on battlefield conditions. Additionally, Mao noted the Army was divided into two parts: main forces and regional forces, “the latter concentrating on defending their own localities and attacking the enemy there in co-operation with the local militia and the self-defense corps.”

Many of the concepts in Mao’s early writings on People’s War are found within the texts of White Papers on National Defense issued over the past decade and in the most recent edition of The Science of Military Strategy. Moreover, the same basic organizational structure still exists for the PLA and militia as Mao described in 1945.

PEOPLE’S WAR AND ACTIVE DEFENSE—ADAPTED FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

In order to understand the continuity and change in the concepts of People’s War and Active Defense during the period of Hu Jintao’s CMC chairmanship, a review of status of these concepts just prior to him assuming that position is useful. The continuation of many Maoist principles is apparent in the 2002 White Paper on National Defense—before Hu became Chairman of the CMC. The section on “National Defense Policy” states:

China implements a military strategy of active defense. Strategically, China pursues a principle featuring defensive operations, self-defense and attack only after being attacked. In response to the profound changes in the world’s military field and the
requirements of the national development strategy, China has formulated a military strategic guideline (军事战略方针) of active defense in the new period.\textsuperscript{16} (emphasis added)

For terminology buffs, in a single paragraph, Active Defense is called both a “military strategy” and “military strategic guideline.” This discrepancy in terminology persists in subsequent White Papers.

Furthermore, the “guideline” appears to encompass the “concept” (or “thought,” 思想) of People’s War as it explains:

This guideline is based on winning local wars under modern, especially high-tech conditions . . . stresses the deterrence of war [遏制战争, often translated as “containment of war”] . . . [and] highlights and carries forward the concept of people’s war (人民战争思想).\textsuperscript{17}

People’s War is explained as:

In the face of new changes in modern warfare, China persists in relying on the people in national defense building, enhancing the popular awareness of national defense, and instituting an armed force system of combining a small but capable standing army with a powerful reserve force; upholds the principle of combining peacetime footing with wartime footing, uniting the army with the people, and having a reserve among the people, improving the mobilization mechanism with expanded mobilization scope, and establishing a national defense mobilization system in line with the requirements of modern warfare; and adheres to flexible applications of strategies and tactics, creating new ways of fighting so as to give fuller play to the strength of a people’s war.
The 2002 *White Paper* clearly enumerates the basic fundamentals of China’s military strategy: strategically self-defensive; emphasizing deterrence of war in general, not only nuclear war; and combining military with civilian factors through mobilization. Furthermore, it stresses the flexible application of People’s War strategies and tactics and specifically identifies “creating new ways of fighting” within these parameters. In short, Active Defense and People’s War are concepts adaptable to changing conditions.

The modification of terminology for these principles is seen in the 2004 *White Paper*, issued just a few months after Hu assumed the chair at the CMC. Because Hu had been the civilian Vice Chairman since 1999, he undoubtedly was involved in the formulation and approval of these changes during the consensus-building, study-driven process of decisionmaking within the CMC. The 2004 *White Paper* repeats (in the English version) that “China adheres to the military strategy of active defense” (though the Chinese used “military strategic guideline”) and adds for the first time in a *White Paper* “and works to speed up the RMA [Revolution in Military Affairs, 中国特色军事变革] with Chinese characteristics.” This latter term is explained in its own chapter that begins with the sentence:

The PLA, aiming at building an informationalized force and winning an informationalized war, deepens its reform, dedicates itself to innovation, improves its quality and actively pushes forward the RMA with Chinese characteristics with informationalization at the core.
The section on the RMA with Chinese characteristics contains details of the PLA’s force structure; personnel policies; command and leadership structure; and developments in logistics, education, training, and equipment modernization. Thus, from the PLA’s perspective, the concept of the RMA with Chinese characteristics entails all aspects of army building in general and includes more than integrating new weapons and systems into the force and developing new methods of fighting.

People’s War is mentioned multiple times, particularly in the same paragraph that introduces the concept of winning “local wars under the conditions of informationalization” (“打赢信息化条件下的局部战争”). The 2004 White Paper speaks of developing the strategies and tactics of People’s War, along with giving priority to developing new weapons and equipment and building integrated joint operational capabilities (indicating “People’s War is not confined to the war of low technology”). Moreover, the chapter on national defense mobilization and reserve force building begins with the statement:

China adheres to the principle of having all people engaged in national defense with an aim at giving full play to the overall advantages of the present-day people’s war so as to promote the national defense mobilization and reserve force building on the basis of the overall national strength. (emphasis added)

Mobilization of the national economy is identified as a “powerful deterrence to war” (once again 遏制战争 is used). Mobilization of national economy includes mobilization of “industry, agriculture, communication and transport, post and telecommunications, science and technology, medical care and health, urban
construction, commerce and trade, and finance”—literally all aspects of society. Taking note of 2002 guidance on strengthening urban militia work, the White Paper states the urban militia should be prepared for winning “people’s wars under high-tech conditions,” not yet under the “conditions of informationalization” the active force is preparing for.

The 2006 White Paper uses Active Defense only once as a section heading “Implementing the military strategy of active defense” (once again using “军事战略方针,” “military strategic guideline”). This section mentions preparation for military struggle (军事斗争准备), winning local wars under conditions of informationization, and upgrading and developing:

the strategic concept of people’s war, and work for close coordination between military struggle and political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and legal endeavors, uses strategies and tactics in a comprehensive way, and takes the initiative to prevent and defuse crises and deter conflicts and wars (遏制冲突和战).19

The section on “The People’s Liberation Army” adds a very important modification to the concept of People’s War stating:

The Navy is enhancing research into the theory of naval operations and exploring the strategy and tactics of maritime people’s war under modern conditions (现代条件下海上人民战争).

The White Paper does not further explain this statement; however, as will be seen, a similar idea had been discussed in the 2001 Chinese edition of The Science of Military Strategy and in the English-language translation available to foreign analysts.
The 2008 *White Paper* repeats the same verbiage as in 2002: “China implements a military strategy of active defense” and ends the paragraph referring to Active Defense as a “military strategic guideline.” The paragraphs that follow are very similar to the 2002 *White Paper’s* discussion of local war (this time under “conditions of informationization”), deterrence, and People’s War, but also add for the first time a paragraph on “diversified military tasks” (“多样化军事任务”) and military operations other than war (MOOTW, 非战争军事行动). This section concludes with a longer section about the relationship of the PLA to the people and national economic development adding a new wrinkle to People’s War.

China is striving to make innovations in the content and forms of people’s war, exploring new approaches of the people in participating in warfare and support for the front, and developing new strategies and tactics for *people’s war in conditions of informationization* (信息化条件下人民战争). Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) subordinates its development to the overall national construction, supports local economic and social development, and consolidates the unity between the PLA and the government, and between the PLA and the people.\(^{20}\) (emphasis added)

This is the first appearance of the term “people’s war in conditions of informationization” in a *White Paper*. It had appeared at least once before in the *PLA Daily* in a November 2007 article about military civilian integration\(^{21}\) and has appeared only a few times afterwards, but not in later *White Papers*.

The 2010 *White Paper* repeats the formulation “China implements the military strategy of active defense of the new era” (using the Chinese for “military stra-
tegic guideline”) only once and then speaks of implementing Active Defense as one of the responsibilities of the State National Defense Mobilization Commission or Committee (国家国防动员委员会). Interestingly, People’s War under any type of conditions is not mentioned at all. The *White Paper* on “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” published in April 2013 mentions the military strategy Active Defense only once and reminds readers that the PLA constantly brings “forward new ideas for the strategies and tactics of people’s war.”

Thus, references to People’s War continue to be found in the Chinese military literature, but perhaps the most extensive explanation of its content is found in the 2001 Chinese-language edition of *The Science of Military Strategy* and its 2005 English translation.

**PEOPLE’S WAR À LA THE SCIENCE OF MILITARY STRATEGY—IMPORTANT DETAILS**

As can be seen in the excerpts from the *White Papers*, the general components of People’s War and Active Defense are consistent with the principles Mao described over 50 years ago. *The Science of Military Strategy* adds important detail to those general principles, looking at past conflicts and projecting how future wars may be fought.

Despite the association of People’s War and Active Defense with Mao, *The Science of Military Strategy* credits Friedrich Engels with their theoretical origins:

> In 1849, Engels definitely suggested the concept of people’s war...Defensive war does not exclude attacking action. After the enemy starts war, the side that is forced to make response is fully entitled to take active action to fight back until the enemy is totally defeated.\(^{23}\)
Shortly thereafter, Engels also is cited as the source of the idea that “technology determines tactics” (“技术决定战术”) in the statement, “The development of science and technology led to the change of mode and way of operations.” 24 The evolutionary process of technology shaping operational methods is implicit in the terminology surrounding People’s War and Local War as these concepts shift from a basic condition with no modifiers to “under modern conditions” to “under high technology” to “under informationized conditions” as circumstances have changed.

Mao’s military strategic theory (军事战略理论) is called “a China style Marxist strategic theory” firmly rooted in “Chinese traditional strategic culture.” Its most important parts are the “strategic guiding principles (战略指导原则) of people’s war and the strategic thinking (战略思想) of active defense.” 25 From this formulation, People’s War and Active Defense would appear to have equal status is the hierarchy of Chinese military terminology. However, the pride of first reference goes to Active Defense in Chapter 1 where “China’s national military strategy in the new era” is summarized as:

Strategy (or military strategy) in China’s new periods [sic] is taking the national comprehensive power as its foundation, the thought (思想) of active defense as its guidance (指导); and winning local war under high-tech conditions as its basic point to construct and exercise military strength; and carrying out the overall and whole-course operation and guidance of war preparations and war for the purpose of protecting national sovereignty and security. 26 (Italics in original, bold added)
People’s War is not mentioned directly but is implicit in the inclusion of the concept of comprehensive national power. The text explains this paragraph by reminding readers of the strategic defensive nature of China’s military strategy, that comprehensive national power involves more than military strength, and that strategy applies both to warfighting and to deter (威慑), prevent (防止), and constrain (制约) war. Later in the chapter, Active Defense is defined as China’s military strategy (军事战略), which is composed of service strategies (军种战略), among them the PLAN strategy of Offshore Defense. The first chapter ends by pointing out that military force can be used for both warfighting (实战使用) and “nonwar-fighting utilization” (“非实战使用”), or noncombat uses, and that the “main pattern” (“主要样式”) of war has become “high-tech local war,” but the “exploration of the guiding laws” of this new form of war “should be a major field for studying the laws of strategic guidance.” Specifically, the science of strategy must address “How a developing country like China wages people’s war under modern circumstances with fairly backward military technology to defeat superiority by inferiority and prevail over the high-technically [sic] equipped opponent.”

This appears to be the first use of People’s War in The Science of Military Strategy focusing on the PLA’s inferiority to advanced militaries. In the years after the book’s publication, many of these concepts have evolved, as seen in the previous discussion of the White Papers. For example, the “main pattern” of war has become “local wars under conditions of informationization,” and the concept of “non-warfighting utilization” has evolved into MOOTW and the range of contingencies expanded. Under Hu, MOOTW
became an important component of the PLA’s operational focus.

People’s War and Deterrence.

Throughout the remainder of *The Science of Military Strategy*, the principles of People’s War and Active Defense are major themes, both as the book discusses China’s calculus of deterrence and as it addresses warfighting doctrine. We turn first to Chapter 9 on “Strategic Deterrence” to examine the role of People’s War in China’s deterrence posture, acknowledged as a preferred method to achieve Sunzi’s objective of “subduing the enemy without fighting.”

The chapter opens with the sentence, “Warfighting and deterrence are two major functions of the armed forces.” Deterrence is based on possessing an “adequate deterrent force,” having the will to use that force, and ensuring the opponent understands China’s capabilities and will. Deterrence may be employed to *dissuade* an opponent from taking an action or it may be used to *persuade* an opponent to do something. In peacetime, “the principal role of strategic deterrence is to delay or curb outbreak of war by employing the strategic strength of national military, politics, economy, culture, and diplomacy, etc.” In war, deterrence may be used to demonstrate to the enemy the dangerous situation he is in or to display strength through a “small war” or “surgical strike” (not specified here as such, but such actions fall within the concept of Active Defense). Based on the premise that “China’s strategic deterrence is self-defense in essence,” *The Science of Military Strategy* outlines deterrence goals that go well beyond nuclear deterrence:
the role of China’s strategic deterrence is chiefly to
deter foreign invasion, defend the sovereignty, rights
and interests, and to deter the conspiracies of inter-
nal and external rivals for separating and subverting
China, so as to protect the stability of national politi-
cal situation, defend territorial integrity and national
unification.\textsuperscript{33}

People’s War has a major role in this multilevel de-
terrence strategy of nuclear, conventional, space and
information deterrence:

China currently has a limited but effective nuclear de-
terrence and a relatively powerful capability of con-
ventional deterrence and \textbf{a massive capacity of de-
terrence of people’s war}. By combining these means
of deterrence, an integrated strategic deterrence is
formed, \textit{with comprehensive national power as the
basis}, conventional force as the mainstay, nuclear
force as the backup power and reserve force as the
support.\textsuperscript{34} (emphasis added)

China’s “integrated strategic deterrence” depends
on all elements of comprehensive national power, not
just military strength. However, “deterrence may fail”
and “war or war escalation may be triggered if one
mishandles the complex situation.”\textsuperscript{35} Therefore, cau-
tion must be taken in decisionmaking and “complete
analysis and measurement of the advantages and the
disadvantages” made. Strategic deterrence is consid-
ered a means of attaining both military and political
objectives as “its risks and costs are less than strategic
operation.” \textit{The Science of Military Strategy} repeatedly
emphasizes prudence in making the decision to go to
war and recommends that warfighting be used “only
when deterrence fails and there is no alternative.”
In the end, “strategic deterrence is based on war-fighting. . . . The more powerful the warfighting capability, the more effective the deterrence.” Military forces must be capable and well prepared; “those making purely bluffing threats and intimidations hardly can afford deterrence.”36 Deterrence is not omnipotent, and war planners must “examine the worst and the toughest scenarios and be well prepared in advance, so as to steadily and effectively cope with the opponent in case of failure of deterrence.”37 Other chapters highlight the fighting principles to employ if deterrence fails.

**People’s War and Warfighting.**

Chapter 3, “Evolution and Laws of Strategic Theories,” reviews Mao’s military strategic theory based on combat in the 1930s and 1940s. It uses several pages to discuss the strategic principles of People’s War and the strategic thought of Active Defense.38 In a section on “The Military Strategy in the New Age,” it states People’s War “as a fundamental strategy, is still a way to win modern war.” After quoting Deng on its relevance, Jiang Zemin emphasizes “At no time should we drop the idea of people’s war. We should insist on the magic weapon (法宝) of peoples’ war. . . .”39

Later in Chapter 10, “Principles of Strategic Action,” Mao’s theories are stated to have “absorbed the quintessence of strategic theories at all times and in all countries” and briefly lists 10 principles of People’s War.40 This list of principles is different than that found in Chapter 3, but has many areas of overlap. The former list includes items specifically related to the revolutionary war period (for example, the reference to base areas), while the latter begins with Sunzi’s
guidance to “Know the enemy and know yourself” and adds important operational details about command and use of all Chinese capabilities. Figure 3-1 compares the two lists of principles (with commonalities highlighted in **bold**). Assuming further evolution of PLA doctrine, many of these principles are certain to be continued, as are other operational details found in the 2001 edition of the book.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Guidance Principles of People's War, Chapter 3</th>
<th>Strategic Principles for People’s War, Chapter 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To Preserve Ourselves and Annihilate the Enemy</td>
<td>1. Knowing ourselves and the enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Founding Base Areas and Creating Battlefield Are Strategic Tasks</td>
<td>2. Preserving ourselves and destroying the enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Change That's Timely to the Main Forms of Operations in Accordance with the Development and Changes of War</td>
<td>3. Striving for the initiative and avoiding the passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fight No Battle Unprepared and Not Sure to Win, and Formulate Strategy Beforehand Based on Worst Condition</td>
<td>4. Employing military forces and tactics flexibly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. You Fight in Your Way and We Fight in Ours. We Will Fight If There Is a Possibility to Win; If not, We Will Move</td>
<td>5. Combining closely the three battle forms of mobile war, positional war, and guerrilla war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Concentrate Superior Forces to Annihilate the Enemy Forces One by One</td>
<td>6. Concentrating superior forces and destroying the enemy one by one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The Main Target Is to Annihilate the Enemy’s Effective Strength Regardless of the Gain or Loss of One or Two Cities or Places</td>
<td>7. Fighting no battle unprepared, fighting no battle you are not sure of winning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Be prudent in the First Battle and Fight the Decisive Battle to Our Advantage</td>
<td>8. Being prudent in fighting the initial battle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Unifying command and being coordinated and united</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Closely coordinating military and non-military struggles, etc</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3-1. Principles of People’s War, The Science of Military Strategy.**
These principles are directly related to the “five combinations” of People’s War which mix 1) regular troops with the masses, emphasizing China’s inland and coastal border regions; 2) regular naval warfare with guerrilla warfare on the sea and develop the strategy and tactics of People’s War on the Sea (海上人民战争); 3) “trump card” ("杀手锏") weapons with flexible strategy and tactics, especially in playing “hide and seek” with the enemy; 4) high-tech weapons with common weapons, understanding that the “phenomenon that several generations of weapons and equipment” will “coexist” for a long time; and 5) military warfare with political and economic warfare to present the widest front possible to the enemy. People’s War on the Sea includes tactics of “sparrow warfare” and sabotage, ambush, and covering operations.

The guidance, “You fight in your way, and we fight in ours,” is a common theme in PLA doctrine and is linked with “striving for full initiative.” These ideas allow Chinese strategists to form a straw man from the differences between Chinese and U.S./Western strategic thinking. Under the “Laws of Strategic Thinking,” The Science of Military Strategy accurately states that, “Creativity is the soul of strategic thinking.” However, it then goes on to present a false dichotomy that “Stratagem type thinking emphasizes winning by strategy and force type thinking emphasizes winning by strength.”

The idea of winning victory by stratagem has always been the main idea of traditional Chinese strategic thinking. It means the use of limited force to achieve victory or realize the aim of the war. . . . Western strategic thinking pays more attention to the contest of strength, emphasizing direct confrontation. . . . The modern American strategy is a typical strategic
thinking model of force type, with superior military strength as its basis. . . . US strategic thinking has not shaken off its traditional model of attaching importance to strength and technology.\(^\text{45}\)

Though the author of this chapter probably exaggerated the difference between stratagem and force type thinking for effect, he fails to acknowledge that both approaches can and should be integrated. As the PLA modernizes, it becomes more tied to strength and technology, while certainly retaining its penchant for stratagem. Likewise, there are numerous recent examples of U.S. and allied forces using stratagem and deception in the wars since 1990-91. Perhaps a more sober examination of the interaction between stratagem and strength will be forthcoming in a new edition of *The Science of Military Strategy*.

**AN EVOLUTIONARY STEP FOR ACTIVE DEFENSE**

Throughout the book, the main principle of the Active Defense, “striking only after the enemy has struck,” is repeated and is the basis for China’s claim that it will always have the legal and moral high ground if forced to fight. However, while it stresses China’s strategically defensive posture, the chapter on “Strategic Guidance of High-tech Local War” provides justification for operational or tactical preemptive strikes:

Under high-tech conditions, for the defensive side, the strategy to gain mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck *does not mean waiting for enemy’s strike passively*. ‘Striking only after the enemy has struck’ in strategy is based on the ‘victory in advance’ of comprehensive national defense construction. It is
the means to win political and moral initiatives. . . . ‘the first shot’ on the plane of politics and strategy must be differentiated from ‘the first shot’ on the plane of tactics. . . . if any country or organization violates the other country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the other side will have the right to ‘fire the first shot’ on the plane of tactics. The military counterattacks may be taken by the following options: to drive the invaders out of the territory; or to launch the same attacks on the enemy’s homeland; or to attack the enemy’s foreign military bases, targets at sea or in the air.\textsuperscript{46} (emphasis added)

Clearly, the red line of what is “‘the first shot’ on the plane of politics and strategy” will vary according to the adversary and the issue under contention. However, the key is that before firing “‘the first shot’ on the plane of tactics,” there will be some period of increased political tensions, and an adversary will have taken some sort of action that China can interpret as violating its sovereignty or territorial integrity. The Chinese propaganda and legal machinery will work in concert to prove such actions were provocation for whatever steps China then takes. In other words, “striking only after the enemy has struck” does not require China to have actually suffered a physical first blow; Active Defense provides the basis for preemptive action.

\textit{The Science of Military Strategy’s} final chapter takes preemption a step further by proposing an active strategic counterattack on exterior lines.\textsuperscript{47} While reiterating that Active Defense is the essential feature of China’s military strategy, “it is necessary to adjust our way of thinking and enrich the contents of active defense on the basis of the characteristics and laws of the modern local war.” The active strategic counterattack differs from other preemptive actions because it
is taken at the strategic level of war and conducted at the beginning of a war. It is alleged not to be “a component of the expansive and extroverted offensive strategy, but a strategically defensive and active self-defense counterattack.” The book does not specify exactly how such an operation would be conducted or exactly what its main targets would be (other parts of the book detail generic target lists). Rather, this passage ends by stating the PLA should “choose the unexpected time, place, and pattern of war which the enemy finds most reluctant and difficult to deal with.”⁴⁸ An historic example of active strategic counterattack might be Doolittle’s 1942 raid on Tokyo rather than the “bolt from the blue” Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The PLA has not conducted such a joint attack at strategic depths in its history, with the closest example perhaps being the covert movement of “volunteers” into Korea in the fall of 1950. Trends in PLA modernization over the past 15 years have greatly increased China’s options for this kind of operation with the potential for cyber attacks, long-range missile (ballistic and cruise) attacks against land and sea targets, and the use of special operations forces at considerable distance from China’s shores.

Finally, future military operations (including deterrence operations) are divided into three types:

1. Preventive strategic action or operations that seek to prevent a situation from deteriorating, which may include exercises, raising alert status, establishing no-fly/no navigation zones, or low intensity operations, such as use of special operations forces or small-scale joint operations.

2. Controllable operations to restore and stabilize the situation, of medium- or of medium-low-intensity, such as regional blockade, missile assault, air attack,
island attack or defense, frontier counterattack, and medium- or large-scale joint operations.

3. Decisive operations to protect the country’s fundamental national interests and are usually medium-large scale, medium-high intensity operations that usually are decisive and “therefore must be sure to win.”

These classifications emphasize both deterrence and warfighting, perhaps unrealistically seek to overcome the uncertainty of war, and provide a standardized method for planning and training and employing troops based on a correct estimate of the situation. *The Science of Military Strategy* does not rule out the possibility that the goal of fighting a quick and decisive could evolve into a long-term confrontation or protracted war. This thought process emphasizes a professional attitude toward training and attaining operational readiness, but urges caution in making the decision to go to war.

Therefore, imprudent decision to use force is never permitted. . . . The reason for the existence of the army is to prevent and win a war. . . . We may not launch a war in a hundred years but we can never be unprepared for war for even one day. . . . Only when an army is fully prepared for war, can it be prudent to start a war and react quickly in war.

As PLA capabilities improve, should circumstances demand and the Party leadership so orders, the PLAN is likely to be involved in any long-range, strategic operation at the beginning of a war, along with the Air Force and Second Artillery. Therefore, the doctrinal foundation for the PLAN’s actions have become of greater interest to the world.
OFFSHORE DEFENSE – A RELATIVELY NEW CONCEPT

In 1985, the CMC approved Offshore Defense as the naval component of the Active Defense strategic guidelines. As such, it conforms to the basic tenets of Active Defense and People’s War described previously. The impetus for creation of the Offshore Defense concept is attributed to Liu Huaqing, commander of the Navy in 1982, when he ordered research to begin on the topic.

Liu considered Offshore Defense to be a regional defensive strategy focusing its operations first, and “for a relatively long time,” in the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas, or within the First Island Chain. He expected the PLAN’s operational areas to expand gradually to the northern Pacific and out to the Second Island Chain. No timeframe was mentioned for this gradual expansion in operational area. Liu rejected that the PLA was to become a “blue water” offensive force like those of the United States or Soviet Union.

Liu regarded Offshore Defense as more than a coastal defense strategy. Though no official minimum or maximum distances were associated with the concept, analysis published by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence in 2007 stated that for many PLAN officers, the Navy’s operational reach is a function of the PLA’s land-based aircraft and the Navy’s antisubmarine warfare capabilities.

Despite the fact that Offshore Defense has been an official component of PLA doctrine for multiple decades, the authors of the Defense White Papers have been inconsistent in its characterization. In 2000, the Navy was said to have “acquired the capability of offshore defensive operations (近海防御作战).” The
term was not used in 2002, but in 2004, the Navy was reported to have “expanded the space and extended the depth for offshore defensive operations.”

In 2006, the English version said the “Navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations,” but the Chinese characters called it a strategy (近海防御的战略).

In 2008, the most fulsome description was included, reporting the realization of “a strategic transformation” to an offshore defensive strategy, and a new concept mentioned, “distant waters” (“远海”):

Since the 1980s, the Navy has realized a strategic transformation to offshore defensive operations (近海防御的战略). Since the beginning of the new century, in view of the characteristics and laws of local maritime wars in conditions of informationization, the Navy has been striving to improve in an all-round way its capabilities of integrated offshore operations, strategic deterrence and strategic counterattacks, and to gradually develop its capabilities of conducting cooperation in distant waters and countering non-traditional security threats, so as to push forward the overall transformation of the service. . . .

In line with the requirements of offshore defense strategy, the Navy . . . enhances integrated combat capability in conducting offshore campaigns and the capability of nuclear counterattacks. (italics and bold added)

In 2010, the strategy was mentioned only once, but an important translation error was made concerning capabilities in distant waters:

In line with the requirements of offshore defense strategy, the PLA Navy (PLAN) endeavors to accelerate the modernization of its integrated combat forces, enhanc-
es its capabilities in strategic deterrence and counter-
attack, and develops its capabilities in conducting operations in distant waters and in countering non-traditional security threats. . . . By organizing naval vessels for drills in distant waters, it develops training models for MOOTW missions. (emphasis and bold added)

The original Chinese about developing capabilities in distant waters (逐步发展远海合作与应对非传统安全威胁能力) is the same in both years (except in 2010, the word “gradually” [逐步] is dropped), but the word 合作 is mistranslated in 2010 as “operations” instead of “cooperation” as found in 2008.61

The 2013 White Paper stated, “the PLAN endeavors to accelerate the modernization of its forces for comprehensive offshore operations” and is developing “blue-water capabilities of conducting mobile operations, carrying out international cooperation, and countering non-traditional security threats.”62 This is the first White Paper translation of “远海” as “blue-water,” though the old form of “distant sea waters” is also found. The White Paper also specifically states the objective of developing mobile “blue-water” operational capabilities in addition to international cooperation and MOOTW tasks.

Clearly an evolutionary transition is underway, with distant waters operations linked primarily to both warfighting and nontraditional security/MOOTW missions. The PLAN’s successful prosecution of the anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden has had a major impact and apparently is influencing doctrinal development. Nonetheless, Offshore Defense remains the doctrinal basis for PLAN operations while the shift to operations in distant waters takes place. Operations in distant waters require capabilities only now beginning to enter the PLAN inventory, such as carrier op-
erations, and the improvement of existing, but weak, capabilities such as anti-submarine warfare, area air defense, and long-distance supply and transport.⁶³

ANALYSIS

Despite personnel reductions and force structure changes over the past decade, the PLA is still organized according to People’s War concepts. The land-oriented, continental defense structure is observable in the distribution of personnel among the PLA services: army, approximately 1.6 million; navy, 235,000; air force, 398,000; Second Artillery, 100,000 (estimated).⁶⁴ Over 500,000 PLA reservists and eight million militia personnel may support the active-duty force. The PLA is further broken down into mobile and local forces, which, along with the militia, is a structure similar to that of the Red Army.

Over 60 percent of active-duty personnel are Army. Likewise, the majority of personnel in the reserves and militia support the army.⁶⁵ Border and coastal defense is the primary mission for hundreds of thousands of army, navy, and People’s Armed Police (PAP) personnel. Out of a total of over 350 naval combatants (including some 71 submarines of all types, 78 destroyers and frigates, and over 200 patrol and coastal combatants), the patrol and coastal component comprises nearly 60 percent of the force by number.⁶⁶ The largest numerical growth of all PLAN ships has been in the *Hubei* Type 022 missile patrol boat fleet, whose “limited endurance” gives it an operational range of about 300 nautical miles from China’s coast.⁶⁷ The *Hubei* force would likely be employed in conjunction with PLAN ground-based, anti-ship cruise missile coastal defense regiments and many legacy surface combat-
ant and submarine units that also have limited operational ranges. Local air defense is the main mission for about half of Air Force and Naval Aviation fighters,\textsuperscript{68} Army and Air Force anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile units, and over one-third of the reserves.

Over the past 15 years, Army helicopter and special operations forces (SOF) units have expanded, though they are still small for such a large force. More impressive has been the expansion of Second Artillery conventional missile (both short- and medium-range) units and the evolution of information/cyber warfare units capable of intelligence collection, defense, and attack in all the services and the reserves/militia.\textsuperscript{69} In total, these weapons and units have increased dramatically the distance the PLA, supported by even longer-range information/cyber operations, can strike.

Nonetheless, the majority of PLA units are optimized for continental and coastal defensive missions and the ability of the PLA to project significant military forces beyond a few hundred miles from China’s borders is limited by long-range air and sea transport. Civilian capabilities are being developed to augment air and sea transport capacities, and new civilian transportation infrastructure, such as roads, rail lines, airports, and ports, are frequently designed for dual-use national defense purposes.

PLA force structure also conforms to the “five combinations” of People’s War as its units mix older weapons and equipment with newer weapons and high technology equipment. In general, for nearly all categories of weapons in the PLA, only about 50 percent or less of the inventory is considered modern by standards defined by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).\textsuperscript{70} Over time, these percentages are changing as older weapons are retired and newer weapons intro-
duced. The 2010 *White Paper* described this situation as “The PLA is working to improve the quality and optimize the composition of its weaponry and equipment. It has formed a system with second-generation equipment as the main body and third generation as the backbone.”

People’s War focus on mobilization is reflected in the command structure existing below Military Region. Some 30 army-leader grade provincial Military District and Garrison headquarters oversee approximately 340 division-leader grade prefectural Military Subdistrict and Garrison headquarters which supervise roughly 2,800 regiment-leader grade county-level People’s Armed Forces Departments. At the bottom of this chain are grassroots (township, village, and large industrial unit) People’s Armed Forces Departments that probably number in the tens of thousands and are manned by local civilian government cadre. This hierarchy is responsible for commanding local forces (including border and coastal defense units) and the militia, as well as for conscription, demobilization, and mobilization (military-civil integration) work. Such an extensive, manpower intensive headquarters structure was necessary in previous decades before China’s transportation and communications infrastructure was modernized. However, with cell phones, computers, the Internet, and automobiles now available to cadre at all levels of government, the efficiency of the old system is open to question. This indeed is a People’s War command structure that may have outlived its utility.

People’s War mobilization principles are further implemented as all elements of the Chinese armed forces supported by civilian agencies and enterprises routinely respond to disaster relief efforts throughout
the country. Local forces of all types are first responders then, depending on the need, they are often augmented by units from distant regions.

Operationally, People’s War concepts have been demonstrated in Chinese government activities as it seeks to assert its sovereignty over disputed maritime territories and deter foreign military operations in its exclusive economic zones (EEZ). During the tenure of Hu as CMC Chairman, the civilian Maritime Surveillance Force; Maritime Safety Administration; Fisheries Bureau; Customs Anti-Smuggling Bureau; and the maritime elements of the PAP Border Security Force (known as “China Coast Guard”) have all been modernized and given lead roles in protecting and asserting Chinese sovereignty in China’s “three seas.”

In 2009, civilian fishing vessels and ships from China’s law enforcement agencies backed up by PLAN ships and aircraft harassed two U.S. Military Sealift Command ocean surveillance ships operating in international waters in China’s EEZ in what were almost certainly coordinated actions (though the precise level of government directing these activities is unclear). In these and other incidents, Chinese civilian fishing boats operated in close proximity to foreign vessels using tactics that could be categorized as a modern version of “sparrow warfare” in a maritime People’s War. Similar, but less physically dangerous, tactics have continued, exemplified by coordination between fishermen and Maritime Surveillance ships at the Scarborough Shoal and the dispatch of Maritime Surveillance ships and aircraft to patrol around the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in 2012. In the first 4 months of confrontation over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands (September through December 2012), according to Japanese reporting, Chinese maritime surveillance
vessels entered Japanese territorial waters surrounding the islands 20 times, often for multiple days. China sent a maritime surveillance aircraft to the islands for the first time on December 13. Meanwhile, according to Chinese sources, PLAN ships independently conducted three patrols in the area. This pattern demonstrates the leading role of China’s civilian law enforcement agencies in executing this strategy, while leaving no doubt that the military is ready to respond if required.

As China attempts to defend its sovereignty in disputed areas, the decision to put civilian law enforcement assets on the front line is a somewhat less provocative measure than using PLAN ships in that role, adding steps to the crisis escalation ladder, and complicating other governments’ reaction, especially for countries with primarily military options available in the region (like the United States), with weak militaries (like the Philippines), or smaller law enforcement fleets (like Japan). However, as demonstrated by the Impeccable and Victorious incidents, maritime People’s War tactics (like all People’s War tactics) decrease in effectiveness the farther from China’s mainland they are implemented. Moreover, they could (and do) fail and escalation ensues. Even when successful, People’s War tactics may prolong a conflict or standoff and may not achieve China’s political objective. If executed without adequate provocation (from the perspective of those outside China), such tactics also violate the basic precept of Active Defense, “striking only after the enemy has struck.” In many circumstances, People’s War may not be as “magic” as the Chinese claim it still to be. Moreover, some Chinese leaders (most likely civilians) may confuse political enthusiasm with military competency and misjudge the PLA’s actual operational readiness.
CONCLUSIONS

People’s War and Active Defense remain the fundamental basis for the organization and operations of the Chinese armed forces. Offshore Defense remains the current naval component of the military strategic guideline of Active Defense. As China’s economic conditions improve, domestic and international environments change, and military modernization results in increased capabilities, all three concepts are subject to adaptation. Evidence of this adaption during the CMC chairmanship of Hu Jintao can be found in the government’s series of White Papers and other authoritative military publications. Even greater doctrinal change may occur when China’s calculations of Comprehensive National Power shift in its favor, though the 2010 White Paper states, “China will never seek hegemony, nor will it adopt the approach of military expansion now or in the future, no matter how its economy develops.”

As demonstrated previously, the number of references to People’s War and Active Defense in the externally oriented White Papers have decreased even while their organizational and operational principles are still influential. Meanwhile, the terms are still used regularly by the internally directed Chinese-language PLA Daily, albeit to a lesser degree than a decade ago for People’s War. Figure 3-2 charts the appearance of these two terms in PLA Daily from 2002 to 2011.
As the PLA becomes more technologically advanced, perhaps the most important tenets of People’s War—the principles of the support of the people and the need for the mobilization of all of China’s strengths to achieve its political objectives—are unlikely to change. China’s leaders understand that the armed forces must be filled by willing and capable personnel, even if many are still conscripted. Both the PLA and the central and local governments therefore continue to expend significant effort in a national defense education program to inform the populace of the military’s missions and encourage young people to volunteer their service. Part of this program includes the annual military training given to more than 17 million students in 2,000 colleges and universities and 22,000 high schools.\textsuperscript{79}
In the event that China’s leaders perceive the need to use military force, they will seek to mobilize the people politically to support any such action. Political mobilization also applies to psyching up the troops through demanding training, emphasizing physical stamina, and political indoctrination. But there is a limit to the military effectiveness of political mobilization. Political enthusiasm does not stop bullets, guide missiles, or detect submarines and stealth aircraft.

More practically speaking, mobilization of civilian transportation is essential for military operations both within and beyond China’s borders in compensation for acknowledged PLA weaknesses. PLA and PAP forces are increasingly deploying on training missions within China using chartered civilian aircraft, and also routinely deploy in small numbers on overseas peacekeeping and training missions. Military use of civilian shipping is being enhanced by the commissioning of the 23,000-ton Qingshandao civilian passenger, roll-on/roll-off ship, the first of several of its type, which was designed with military needs in mind.

However, in a rapidly developing, high-technology situation, the mobilization of the economy and especially the science and technology sector may not be as reliable as the people’s political and civilian transportation support. Given the differences in modern advanced weapons systems compared to their industrial era predecessors, it may not be as easy to shift industrial production to weapons as it was 70 years ago. Though mobilization of the economy and of science and technology is part of the theory of People’s War, it may be less relevant in practice now than in decades past, especially in missions the PLA may undertake outside the borders of China. On the other hand, in performing MOOTW, economic
mobilization may still use civilian materials, such as food, water, living supplies, etc., but the items do not need to be produced to the same standards as military-use items.

As military professionals, PLA leaders are unlikely to disassociate themselves from Sunzi’s guidance (and the People’s War principle) to “Know the enemy and know yourself.” The PLA’s institutional drive to study and learn from other militaries’ organizations, operations, and doctrine is apparent from even a cursory reading of The Science of Military Strategy. But more important is their own assessment of where the PLA stands with respect to the capabilities of other militaries in the region and world. With foreign counterparts, PLA leaders often state, as did Defense Minister Liang Guanglie in 2011:

I also firmly believe that in terms of the level of modernization of the PLA, we can by no means call ourselves an advanced military force. The gap between us and that of advanced countries is at least 2 to 3 decades.82

For internal consumption, since 2006 a variety of official military and Party publications have repeatedly referred to the “major contradiction” (“主要矛盾”) of the “two incompatibles” (“两个不相适应”) attributed to Hu Jintao that:

Currently, our military’s level of modernization is incompatible with the requirements of winning local war under informatized conditions and that our military capability is incompatible with the requirements of carrying out its historic missions at the new stage of the new century.83
This assessment is intended to encourage the troops to continue the efforts necessary in the PLA’s multidecade process of modernization and may also be used to justify increasing defense budgets. This judgment of the senior PLA leadership from the CMC down to Military Region and operational unit leaders contrasts with the much more publicized, often aggressive, words of military pundits such as Luo Yuan (罗援), Liu Mingfu (刘明福), and Dai Xu (戴旭). It suggests that the senior military leadership may be more “prudent in fighting the initial battle” than some civilian leaders, military media analysts, and nationalistic elements in society might prefer. In the end, however, according to Mao’s principle that the “Party commands the gun,” the military leadership will obey the orders of the Party, even if some civilian CCP leaders may not be fully schooled in PLA doctrine.

As PLA capabilities improve and its technology advances, additional modifications to force structure and doctrine are expected. Some changes may appear to break with the tenets of People’s War and Active Defense, but as long as the PLA is a Party Army, the Marxist “scientific world outlook” and reverence to the leadership and wisdom of Mao, Deng, Jiang, and Hu will continue. What started as “making a virtue out of necessity” in the 1930s will endure, as China always will have a large population and large landmass to protect.

Foreign policymakers should seek to understand China’s concepts of People’s War and Active Defense as they will continue to have relevance to PLA operations, though their prominence may decline from the highs of previous decades. When speaking of People’s War and Active Defense, the Chinese may be more transparent than is the conventional wisdom.

2. According to M. Taylor Fravel, “The Evolution of China’s Military Strategy: Comparing the 1987 and 1999 Editions of Zhan-lüexue,” James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, eds., China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2005, pp. 83-84, according to the authors of the PLA National Defense University’s 1999 version of Science of Military Strategy, “two of Mao’s most important strategic ideas are Active Defense and People’s War. . . . Mao’s other strategic ideas that are less prominent today including protracted war (持久战) and guerrilla war (游击战争) among others. In Western military thought, the analog of strategic ideas are the writings of strategists such as Clausewitz or Liddell Hart, whose concepts to this day remain a part of modern strategic thinking even [though] their implications for military operations may have changed.” In that same volume, David Finkelstein (p. 17) observes:

The official military strategy of the PRC and PLA remains embedded in what is known as the ‘National Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period’ (‘新时期国家军事战略方针’), which is the closest Chinese analogue to the U.S. National Military Strategy. This highest-level national military guidance in China has two main components. The first component is operational, and it remains the ‘Active Defense’ (‘积极防御’) as adjusted for prosecuting ‘Local Wars Under Modern High-tech Conditions.’ The second of the two components concerns the myriad reform and modernization programs in both software and hardware the PLA is undergoing. It is generically referred to by the PLA as ‘army building’ (‘军队建设’) or ‘new period army building’ (‘新时期军队建设’).

3. The Chinese armed forces currently include the active and reserve forces of the PLA, the PAP, and the militia.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.


15. Links to English-language translations of all Chinese government White Papers are found at english.gov.cn/official/2005-08/17/content_24165.htm. Chinese language versions are found at www.
It is likely a new edition of *The Science of Military Strategy* has been prepared to update the 2001 Chinese edition and the 2005 English-language translation used here. The 2001 edition was written before the PLA adopted the concepts of “Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” informationization, “Three Warfares,” and MOOTW. A new edition would probably incorporate these concepts and other new terminology into the book while maintaining most fundamental doctrinal principles from decades past, adapted as necessary to account for the country’s economic and technological modernization as well as the development of new military capabilities. The 2005 English-language translation was an important step in transparency. Let us hope the Chinese government sees the benefit of that effort and provides an official translation of the new edition whenever it is published. It is useful to compare both the English and Chinese texts of this volume, however, as there sometimes are discrepancies between the two texts. For example, and perhaps of interest to the topic of Hu Jintao’s leadership, in the English version section on “The Military Strategy in the New Age” (pp. 117-118), Deng is directly quoted twice and mentioned a third time. In the Chinese version (pp. 125-127), Jiang Zemin is referenced supporting each of Deng’s three statements. However, the English text does not include Jiang’s name as found in the Chinese text. Jiang, of course, was CMC Chairman when the Chinese text was written, but had stepped down by the time the English-language edition was issued.


17. Ibid.


25. Ibid. The statement “technology determines tactics” is also found in the 2000 and 2006 editions of the National Defense University’s Science of Campaigns (战役学). For additional information on this subject, see Dennis J. Blasko, “‘Technology Determines Tactics’: The Relationship between Technology and Doctrine in Chinese Military Thinking,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 34, Issue 3, June 2011.

26. Ibid. p. 104. By now, it should be readily apparent that the Chinese are not consistent in their use of the terminology associated with the concepts of People’s War and Active Defense.


28. Ibid., p. 23.

29. Ibid., p. 35.

30. The Science of Military Strategy included “military deterrence, military diplomacy, arms control and disarmament, military conflict of low intensity, and border and coastal struggle in peacetime” as “non-warfighting utilization.” MOOTW also emphasizes anti-piracy, disaster relief operations, international peacekeeping, domestic security, and public health emergencies, along with other noncombat missions. Some of these tasks might have been considered as “low intensity” operations a decade ago.
31. Ibid., p. 213.

32. Ibid., p. 215.

33. The direct link between deterrence and Active Defense is found in Xu Guangyu, "积极防御的第一功能是防御性威慑" ("The First Function of Active Defense is Defensive Deterrence"), PLA Daily, August 23, 2012, available from chn.chinamil.com.cn/lil/2012-08/23/content_5000970.htm.

34. Ibid., p. 217.

35. Ibid., p. 222.

36. All quotes in this paragraph from Ibid., p. 224.

37. Ibid., p. 228.

38. Ibid., p. 229.

39. Ibid., pp. 103-117.

40. Ibid., p. 117. The Chinese-language text (p. 126) notes Ji-ang's emphasis; the English-language text omits his name here and two more times in the following paragraphs.

41. Ibid., pp. 230-231.

42. Ibid., pp. 456-457.

43. According to Lin Biao, "Long Live the Victory of People’s War!" available from www.marxists.org/reference/archive/lin-biao/1965/09/peoples_war/ch05.htm,

Sparrow warfare is a popular method of fighting created by the Communist-led anti-Japanese guerrilla units and militia behind the enemy lines. It was called sparrow warfare because, first, it was used diffusely, like the flight of sparrows in the sky; and because, second, it was used flexibly by guerrillas or militiamen, operating in threes or fives, appearing and disappearing unexpectedly and
wounding, killing, depleting and wearing out the enemy forces.


55. Office of Naval Intelligence, *China’s Navy 2007*, p. 26. As new capabilities are added to the PLA, such as may be provided by an aircraft carrier, this operational reach will expand.


60. *China’s National Defense in 2010.*

61. The term “distant waters operations” (“远海作战”) has appeared on several occasions in Chinese-language *PLA Daily*-associated publications since 2007.


63. For a concise review of the PLAN’s main focus on “building a navy to handle a high-intensity conflict close to home,” see Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “China’s Real Blue Water Navy,” August 30, 2012, available from thediplomat.com/2012/08/30/chinas-not-so-scary-navy/.


65. Based on the funding levels for the reserves and militia listed in the 2010 *White Paper*, the actual combat readiness of these forces is subject to question. About 1 percent (about $700 million) of the entire announced defense budget is allotted to the reserves (of 500,000+ personnel) with about 2.8 percent (about $2 billion) allocated to the militia (with eight million personnel). Additional funds from local governments would be necessary for any militarily significant training to take place. Even with local funding, the money available to these forces is probably exponentially less than is available to the active-duty PLA. Limited training results in limited capabilities to support the active forces. This situation points to a discrepancy between the theory of People’s War and its actual implementation in force structure.


68. *The Military Balance 2012* counts nearly 800 J-7 and J-8 series out of some 900 total air defense fighters, while most new fighters, over 600 airframes (J-10, J-11, JH-7, and Su-30), fall into the fighter ground-attack category. The J-7/J-8 fleet accounts for about 51 percent of all fighters/fighter ground-attack aircraft. This percentage is likely to go down as new aircraft enter the force.


70. This fact is best illustrated by the chart in “Select PLA Modernization Areas, 2000-2009,” the Office of the Secretary of Defense Annual Report to Congress, *Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China* 2010, p. 45, which reports about 25 percent of naval surface forces, 50 percent of the submarine force, 25 percent of air forces, and 42 percent of air defense forces as modern in 2009. This conclusion can be corroborated by calculating percentages of old and new equipment listed in *The Military Balance 2012*. 


77. *China’s National Defense in 2010.*

78. The author thanks M. Taylor Fravel for compiling these statistics.

79. “17 mln students join military training annually,” *Xinhua*, September 26, 2012, available from [news.xinhuanet.com/english/culture/2012-09/26/c_131875203.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/culture/2012-09/26/c_131875203.htm). However, as the *Global Times* reported the following day, a large percentage of those students attempt to avoid that training. See “Students dodge military training,” September 27, 2012, available from [www.globaltimes.cn/content/735806.shtml](http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/735806.shtml).
80. The physical toughness of PLA soldiers is often demonstrated by breaking bottles or bricks over their heads or with their hands, performing calisthenics in the mud or water, and in hand-to-hand combat techniques. Such training **may** be useful for morale, but it may also lead to a mistaken perception of their invulnerability or martial prowess.


CHAPTER 4

WHAT’S IN A NAME: BUILDING ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL CAPABILITIES WITHOUT ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL DOCTRINE

Christopher P. Twomey

While China has deployed significant anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, its development of doctrinal concepts to wield those capabilities remains underdeveloped, although doctrinal developments in other directions have continued. These, along with many high profile Chinese weapons programs, suggest China’s view of modern maritime warfare continues to evolve and often are drawing on imported ideas that will prove challenging for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to internalize in the near term.

Central to China’s approach to facing American military capabilities in East Asia has been the development of what the United States has characterized as the Chinese A2/AD forces. While China does not use that term, several other alternative terms are thought to be relevant or related: Counterintervention, Assassin’s Mace, and Trump weapons; System of Systems; Active Strategic Counterattacks on Exterior Lines; and the “three non’s” — nonlinear, noncontact, nonsymmetric (or asymmetric). Upon closer examination, several of these concepts are less important than generally thought within PLA discourse. Others speak to rather different types of doctrinal developments in different directions from A2/AD. Nevertheless, Hu Jintao’s emphasis on “scientific development” has provided
rich rhetorical soil on which some of these approaches have grown, particularly the technologically demanding “system of systems” concepts.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

- China’s deployment of A2/AD capabilities has outpaced the development of doctrine to manage the application of those capabilities. This shortcoming reduces the overall combat power these capabilities might create, and suggest a lack of consideration on the part of senior PLA leaders as to how military technology is changing and how these changes might impact naval warfare today.
  - While this set of circumstances should not be viewed as an invitation for complacency on the part of the United States, it does suggest that continuing to monitor Chinese doctrinal deliberations will provide significant warning to foreign analysts and planners before any major improvements in this regard manifest.
- On the other hand, the PLA is more deeply considering the implications of the information technologies and networks for conflict. China is able to draw heavily on outside thinking about these implications, many of which are tried and tested by the United States in wartime.
  - Still, the integration of new A2-AD capabilities with new doctrine will remain a challenging area for the PLA, given traditional bureaucratic rigidities.
• China’s continued emphasis on more traditional naval doctrines (akin to sea control and sea lane patrols) will complicate U.S. diplomacy in the region.

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the PLA has endeavored to develop the capabilities that avoid impotence in the face of American naval—and particularly carrier—deployments in China’s nearby waters. As incidents such as the 2001 EP-3C collision, the 2009 USNS Impeccable harassment, and concerns over contested claims over sovereignty in the South and East China Seas have intensified over the past decade, this aspiration toward military effectiveness serves broader Chinese interests than just the Taiwan issue.

Central to China’s approach to deterring such American deployments and preparations to defeat them in case of conflict has been the development of capabilities encapsulated under the moniker “anti-access and area denial.”¹ Much ink has been spilled describing the dangers posed by China’s A2/AD capabilities. American responses to A2/AD (Air-Sea Battle [ASB], the 2012 Joint Operational Access Concept [JOAC], and the “rebalancing” toward Asia) are also well underway.² The problem, well known to China watchers, of course, is that China does not use the term “anti-access and area denial” to describe its own military doctrine.

Indeed, complicating the matter even further, the PLA does not use the term “doctrine” in the same sense that Western militaries do. However, the military science literature (such as Science of Military Strategy (战略学) and Science of Military Operations [战役学]) and
campaign outlines (战役纲要) express roughly similar concepts on a range of topics. So what is the analogue to the “science of A2/AD” in those and related writings for PLA strategists?

This chapter attempts to assess several closely related doctrinal concepts that China does use: Counter-intervention, Assassin’s Mace, and Trump weapons; System of Systems; Active Strategic Counterattacks on Exterior Lines; and the three non’s—nonlinear, non-contact, nonsymmetric (or asymmetric). Most of the effort will be aimed to clarify these concepts and their interrelation, but significant attention will also be paid to evaluating the role that President Hu Jintao has had on their development and incorporation into China’s strategic thought.

Given the overall goals of this edited volume, the chapter will center its attention on the usage of these terms since 2004 when Hu Jintao took the leadership of the Central Military Commission (CMC) from Jiang Zemin. It should be noted that the closely related concept of “informationalization” was already in place at that point, with “local war under conditions of informationalization” having replaced “local war under high tech conditions” previously. Nevertheless, as discussed below, the use of the term accelerated under Hu, was facilitated by related ideological emphases such as the Hu’s use of the term “scientific development.”

This analysis leads to the following six key conclusions. First, while it certainly is the case that China is developing military capabilities that serve the operational goals of denying access by foreign navies to the areas surrounding China, the PLA does not have a well-developed joint operational doctrine to integrate and guide the use of those capabilities. Second, many
of the related concepts that are discussed here are, in fact, imported from outside of China, rather than exemplifying Chinese “innovation.” Although there is some “localization” or addition of “Chinese characteristics,” the significance of the Chinese efforts should not be overstated. Third, although “counterintervention” receives much attention in the West, it has only limited currency within military circles in China. Fourth, “system of systems” is playing an increasingly large role in Chinese thinking. The use of this term suggests a shift away from an emphasis on “trump” weapons that might serve as silver bullets to a more integrated approach. Fifth, while the direct role of Hu in orchestrating these changes is challenging to assess, his emphasis on “scientific development” in many ways, but especially in China’s national defense modernization, has provided rich rhetorical soil in which the technologically demanding “system of systems” approach has grown. Sixth, some of the discussion of the central “system of systems” and three non’s remain constrained by traditional PLA organizational culture. These suggest a different emphasis from A2/AD, and one that the PLA will struggle to internalize.

The Tangible Elements of A2/AD in Chinese Capabilities.

The rest of this chapter will engage Chinese military discussions—or really, the lack thereof—of A2/AD capabilities. But before turning to that assessment based on openly available Chinese publications, it is important to note that China possesses the hardware typically associated with such capabilities. One recent U.S. publication described A2/AD in general:
While A2/AD ideas are not new—the desire to deny an adversary both access and the ability to maneuver are timeless precepts of warfare—technological advances and proliferation threaten stability by empowering potentially aggressive actors with previously unattainable military capabilities. A new generation of cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles with improved range, accuracy, and lethality is being produced and proliferated. Modern submarines and fighter aircraft are entering the militaries of many nations, while sea mines are being equipped with mobility, discrimination and autonomy. . . . In certain scenarios, even low-technology capabilities, such as rudimentary sea mines, fast-attack small craft, or shorter range artillery and missile systems render transit into and through the commons vulnerable to interdiction by coercive, aggressive actors, slowing or stopping free movement.\textsuperscript{4}

According to the Department of Defense (DoD) annual report assessing China’s military capabilities, China is developing precisely such capabilities:

China’s leaders in 2011 sustained investment in advanced cruise missiles, short and medium range conventional ballistic missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, counterpace weapons, and military cyberspace capabilities which appear designed to enable anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) missions.\textsuperscript{5}

As seen in Map 4-1, these capabilities provide China with the ability to conduct missile strikes—both shore-based ballistic missiles and air- or submarine-launched cruise missiles—against naval forces that might be deployed in areas near to Chinese shores.
Beyond this potent Chinese missile force, very quiet diesel submarines (imported Kilo- and indigenous Yuan-class SSKs), and numerous small missile boats (Houbei/Type 22) add additional dimensions to such threats. The PLA Navy (PLAN) now fields a modest...
number of heavy guided missile destroyers (such as the imported Sovremenny destroyers and indigenous Lu Zhou/Type 52C/D guided missile destroyers [DDGs]). All of these are capable of launching anti-ship cruise missiles, some of which are very capable, perhaps even against American Aegis-equipped vessels. Furthermore, there is increased emphasis on Chinese naval ships and air assets training in the “distant oceans” (远海). Chinese intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities increasingly provide relevant capabilities in these regions. There is also evidence that the PLA is beginning to exercise joint air and naval attacks at least against shore targets in “joint firepower attacks,” a tactic that receives some attention in Chinese writings.

Putting all this together, it is easy to infer a set of operational strategies that aim to hold U.S. forces (or others) far offshore through deterrent threat and existential capability to attack forces at sea and in their staging areas. These would be targeted from multiple threat axes using different systems. Sequential attacks might be used early on to degrade an adversary’s defenses (i.e., missile defense ships, antisubmarine warfare [ASW] platforms). Then, the adversary’s key dependencies such as physical bases and low density/high demand logistics capabilities can be targeted. These possibilities are logical extrapolations of Chinese intent based on the capabilities China is fielding, as well as some of the exercises it is conducting. However, in order to better understand China’s approach, it would be critical to identify a relatively unified set of “military science” writings that lay out this ends-means chain (commonly known in the west as doctrinal writings). The existence of such doctrinal blueprint would help ensure that future PLA procure-
ment, training, exercises, organizational reforms, basing decisions, etc., would be made to serve the goals laid out in the doctrine. Doctrine would help us to understand how China views the nature of warfare in this era of military operations in which accurate long-range weapons are the most powerful and dominating capabilities. In particular, we want to know how Chinese military officers understand the way naval conflicts play out within the context of such a proliferation of effective missiles and how that affects traditional naval missions such as sea control, projecting power “from the sea,” and defending sea lanes of communications (SLOCs).

However, this chapter finds that there is very little coherent analysis in open source Chinese writings regarding these very real capabilities that are already being fielded by the PLA. The implications of this absence are taken up at the end of the chapter.

DEFINING TERMS

This section will discuss each of the following Chinese concepts related to A2/AD in turn: Counterintervention, System of Systems, Assassin’s Mace, and Trump weapons, Active Strategic Counterattacks on Exterior Lines, and the “three non’s” (or asymmetric). The bulk of the attention will be paid to system of systems, as befits what the author assesses to be its relative importance in terms of its breadth of use within PLA writings and what it signifies regarding directions and sources of Chinese doctrinal innovation.
Counterintervention.

In contrast to this author’s expectation, counterintervention does not seem to play a major role, at least in discussions of military operations. It also does not seem to play the role of explicitly setting the strategic context for such operational planning.

The term has two renderings in Chinese: 反干涉, and less commonly, 反介入 (both stand for anti- or counterintervention). A range of U.S. sources emphasize that these two Chinese terms encompass elements of Chinese strategy. The 2012 DoD report notes that they are broader than A2/AD, but related: “For China, “counterintervention” refers to a set of operationally defined tasks designed to prevent foreign (e.g., U.S.) military forces from intervening in a conflict and preventing China from accomplishing its military objectives.”

Other American analysts emphasize that the two Chinese terms serve as “A major tenet of China’s security strategy . . . to build anti-access capabilities to protect broader interests that it perceives threatened by a technologically dominant maritime power.”

While the terms certainly appear in some Chinese sources, what is most striking is the rarity of such references. They do not appear in Chinese Defense White Papers, although framed as a reaction to an adversary, it remains plausibly consistent with Chinese propaganda regarding their defensive orientation. The two terms rarely occur in the official newspapers. While the U.S. Government Open Source Center (OSC) does not translate a comprehensive set of Chinese sources, given the importance placed on China’s overall military modernization program by U.S. Government analysts, one would expect the topic of counterintervention to be flagged for translation and thus that database
would include more references to the term. Yet, from 2004 to October 2012, there are only a handful of translations in OSC that capture the two Chinese terms.\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, in an admittedly nonexhaustive survey of a range of recent books published by military presses such as the PLA National Defense University (NDU) and Academy of Military Science (AMS), there were few mentions of the concept.\textsuperscript{13}

To be sure, the above survey is not a comprehensive review of all such authoritative open writings. But it does suggest that viewing “counterintervention” as a Chinese expression of a broader strategy that encompasses “A2/AD” is overstating its importance in the Chinese discourse on military strategy. More broadly, the relative absence of the use of the terms raises questions about the degree to which China has engaged in doctrinal thinking to make use of its potent weapons systems.

**Active Strategic Counterattacks on Exterior Lines.**

Another term, which in Chinese conveys some aspects of the A2/AD notion, might be “active strategic counterattacks on exterior lines” (“积极的战略外线反击作战”). A well-developed argument making this case is presented by Anton Lee Wishik II.\textsuperscript{14} This certainly is an appealing “A2/AD with Chinese characteristics” phrasing, encapsulating as it does elements of “active defense,” long a mainstay of Chinese strategic writings. Wishik’s article highlights its use in a few key Chinese texts such as *The Science of Military Strategy*, which was published in 2001 by the PLA AMS press, under the leadership of Major General Peng Guangqian (彭光谦). These sources, along with an important reference from the AMS journal, *Military
*Science* (军事学术, perhaps the single most important openly published journal on Chinese military doctrinal thinking), are generally viewed as authoritative.

However, this term falls short as a useful way to understand Chinese thinking regarding its A2/AD capabilities for two reasons. First, use of the terminology has not spread widely in the Chinese literature. It appears an insignificant number of times in both *PLA Daily* web page and in the OSC archives. The material capabilities and associated training that lie at the heart of what outsiders refer to as A2/AD are widely discussed in such sources. One would expect that the military theory (or science) connecting those to operational goals would be discussed there as well.

Second, the substance laid out under that term is not particularly informative: At heart, it simply expands the geographic scope of “active defense,” long a core element of Chinese strategic policy. Indeed, that expansion goes beyond traditional A2/AD capabilities, as Wishik notes:

> In fact, the scope of these operations exceeds those formulated by an A2/AD strategy and represents an important amplification of the range of operations compared to those associated with A2/AD.15

When “active strategic counterattacks on exterior lines” calls for strikes against foreign military bases and potentially an adversary’s homeland, such an approach outranges the A2/AD systems that China fields today. Certainly, thinking about new ways to put at risk foreign militaries further from Chinese shores is an important change in the strategic thought of the PLA, and thus the article presents important findings. But those findings are not centrally about the set of capabilities listed earlier in this chapter.
System of Systems.

While the previous terms may have been overemphasized in the Western literature seeking to understand how China conceptualizes its A2/AD military capabilities, two other terms have been discussed less by Western analysts, but are nonetheless extremely important as China thinks about the evolving nature of warfare. These two terms, each of which is linked to some of the weapons technologies that could underpin an A2/AD doctrine, are still rather different in emphasis.

It is hard to overstate the importance of “systems of systems” in contemporary Chinese discourse on military affairs. The term “体系作战” might be cumbersomely rendered as “systematized warfare,” as has been done with other terms such as the equally awkward “informationalized warfare” term. Whatever the English term, at the heart, this relies on the integration through information networks of a wide range of military assets. One detailed discussion in the authoritative PLA Daily highlights these elements and is worth quoting at length.

Today’s [system of systems] operations, meanwhile, rely on information systems. They are guided by information and decision making, and connect the command systems and weapons platforms of numerous service arms and branches into a single, complete system of integrated capabilities through information networks, share a variety of battlefield information, jointly perceive the battlefield situation, accurately coordinate battlefield operations, and synchronously execute operational tasks, thereby translating an information advantage into an operational advantage. [They] release enormous power with the most attack effect on the highest-value target by the most effec-
tive operational force, and realize the maximization of operational efficiency. This is what the comprehensive combat of the past could not reach. Of course, such a decidedly important new field of knowledge as information systems should be elevated to such heights — whether or not one possesses robust information systems determines whether or not a military is able to condense different types of command systems and weapons platforms in dispersed deployment into a single system, as well as whether this system can release the maximum power. In this sense, information systems are the new engine for improving [system of systems] operation capabilities.¹⁷

Such an approach obviously requires deep integration of weapons, command and control (C2), and sensors (or more fully, ISR).¹⁸ The sum, however, of such integration is understood to be greater than the combination of the parts. This is referred to in several ways. One frequent phrasing is “1+1=2.”¹⁹ Another, perhaps more substantive, emphasizes the role of “systems of systems” in capturing network effects. Thus:

System of systems [SoS] and their aggregate system’s contribution to combat systems: They obey Metcalfe’s Law, which is based on the combat effectiveness of information combat systems and are proportional to the square of the SoS and combat capability, that is to say, SoS and combat capability no longer follow a linear relationship, but exhibit an exponential relationship.²⁰

Metcalfe’s Law is one of the classic expressions of network effects, noting that “the value of a network grows as the square of the number of its users.”²¹

Interestingly, the Chinese discussion of the value of a “system of systems” approach does not seem connected to ideas about removing the fog of war.²² In-
stead, it focuses more on enhancing the combat power or effectiveness of a combatant, albeit in a rather vague sense. For instance, it is said to facilitate transforming from “large-scale operations,” which focus on overall firepower and damage, to “information plus firepower” system attack precision strike operations.\textsuperscript{23}

Many of the discussion of system of systems describe it as the practice of leading nations or the United States, specifically. This is clearly an imported idea and not cast as a Chinese innovation. Chinese military planners increasingly talk about “confrontation of entire systems,” thus further emphasizing that their adversary will also conduct warfare in this manner.\textsuperscript{24}

All of this integration is recognized to be challenging: “the variables involved with this system are great in number and have extremely complex relationships. Various subsystems can only be integrated by relying on information systems.”\textsuperscript{25} Indeed, it is only just now beginning to be exercised by the PLA.\textsuperscript{26} Discussions of these exercises suggest that the PLA has struggled to make progress.\textsuperscript{27} One analyst, citing the PLA Daily’s treatment, concludes: “The lack of integration has, according to the PLA, caused the services to spin their wheels for many years, because of the inability to share a common operating picture and communicate laterally.”\textsuperscript{28}

Furthermore, one might question the direction taken in the incorporation of such approaches within the PLA. Although some recognition of the importance of lateral communications exists, there seems to be an emphasis on ensuring communication continuities down a lengthy chain of command.
The Army is a huge operation system, from the general headquarters on the top to companies, platoons, and squads to the bottom, the command relationships are overlapped and complex. The control nodes are interlinked. Vertical connectivity is of critical importance for the shaping of a “system of systems” in the Army.\textsuperscript{29}

It is interesting that this is the goal (ensuring that the long chain is reliable) rather than a flattening chain of command, which such networked C2 technology would facilitate. This is suggestive that traditional PLA organization culture (with its links to Chinese Communist Party [CCP] style Leninist structures) runs somewhat counter to the technologic avenues opened by recent developments.\textsuperscript{30}

\textbf{The Three Non’s—Noncontact, Nonlinear, and Nonsymmetrical.}

For PLA writers, the three non’s (三非)—noncontact (非接触), nonlinear (非线式), and nonsymmetric (非对称)—describe the nature of warfare in the current era. China views these concepts as having been displayed in recent conflicts; as such, China is trying to incorporate aspects already present in western, and in particular U.S., warfare. Thus:

Before the 1980’s, modes of war fighting were linear, contact-based, and symmetrical, and both sides of a conflict used weapons and equipment that were fundamentally at the same level. Following the new development of the revolution in military affairs, the gap between levels of military equipment in each country became quite large, exhibiting large differences, the manner of combat exhibited great changes, becoming
demonstrably more nonlinear, non-contact, and asymmetrical. Before the 1980’s, modes of war fighting were linear, contact-based, and symmetrical, and both sides of a conflict used weapons and equipment that were fundamentally at the same level.\textsuperscript{31}

The three non’s are seen by Chinese analysts to characterize North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations against Serbia as well as both Gulf Wars.\textsuperscript{32}

Several sources note the link to the C2 networks that form the core of system of systems approaches.\textsuperscript{33}

The wide use of information technology in the military will completely change the traditional styles and modes of warfare. In the evolution of mechanized and semi-mechanized warfare, the competition for information superiority will be focus of warfare, nonlinear and noncontact combat will be the main style of war fighting, and system confrontation will be the basic feature of war.\textsuperscript{34}

Each will be discussed in turn, but it is important to note that the three are quite intertwined. To some extent, nonlinear and noncontact are insignificantly differentiated. They are often referred to together, and the specifics of each blend together at times (e.g., airpower is discussed in both, although more often in the latter).

\textit{Nonlinearity.}

Central to nonlinearity is an emphasis on the fluidity of the battlefield, and Chinese writings seem to acknowledge the substantial complexity this possesses for militaries operating in such a realm:
As joint operations combat is a type of diversified large scale combat, combat style constitutes a complex and rapidly converting operational tempo. Also, because of the nonlinearity of the future high tech battlefield, battlefield mobility and firepower attack capability strength, battlefield situations change dramatically. As the struggle on the battlefield in areas such as reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, interference and counter interference, destruction and counter-destruction, deception and counter deception all raise requirements for and increase the difficulty in providing effective combat support and stable reliability.\textsuperscript{35}

To some extent, nonlinearity has a (tactically) defensive goal: McCauley, a close analyst of these debates, suggests that nonlinear warfare “seek[s] to intermingle forces rapidly on the battlefield in part to mitigate the effects of the enemy’s precision strikes.”\textsuperscript{36} Others emphasize airpower: “The purpose of nonlinear warfare lies in a strong aerial assault directed at the heart of the enemy’s ability to attack, thereby quickly disabling them in a surprising way (pulling the carpet out from under them).”\textsuperscript{37}

\textit{Noncontact.}

Noncontact warfare centers engaging an adversary from long distances.

Owing to the massive use of informatized and intellectualized weapons and equipment in the new form of war, the over-the-horizon and “non-contact” tendencies of future fighting will bring about profound changes in the way of fighting, which will replace traditional close-quarters fighting and directly aiming
at and shooting each others with “pushing-the-button operation” and long-range strikes.38

Central to this is airpower. “The purpose of non-linear warfare lies in a strong aerial assault directed at the heart of the enemy’s ability to attack, thereby quickly disabling them in a surprising way.”39

Nonsymmetrical.

Much has been written on the role of asymmetric weapons, also called trump weapons or assassin’s maces.40 Indeed, there is certainly still attention on the utility of assassin’s mace/trump card weapons that can achieve victory or compel an adversary: “Firstly, it is the possession of powerful weapons. The ‘assassin’s mace’ type weapon, which can create massive damage for an enemy when used, can ‘defeat an enemy in one blow’, and thus can achieve a deterrence effect.”41 But even for that analyst, the term seems to have shifted from the way that Lewis and Xue wrote about 6 years ago, to contain more of a systemic influence. Thus, “conventional naval deterrence uses ‘assassin’s mace’ type power as its focus, using forces on the water, below the water, in the air, and on the coasts to provide a single comprehensive deterrent.”42

Increasingly, it appears, at least when discussed in the context of the three non’s, that the term can take a broader meaning than just silver bullet weapons. In some writings, it includes an overall “weak against strong” concept, not just a weapon to overcome that balance of power.43 Others use the term to describe cross service engagements, such as air attacks on ground forces in the Kosovo campaign.44
Some discussions go so far as to emphasize the importance of avoiding over-reliance on a single “assassin’s mace” weapon that tries to integrate too many capabilities, and instead argue for the value that comes from the integration of many different components. For instance:

The integration of key elements does not seek to diversify the functions of a single key element but to organically integrate different key elements with different functions in a system, with information as the link. . . Working around the main theme and main line to push forward the scientific development of national defense and armed forces modernization is definitely not a simple matter of developing a few types of “assassin’s mace” with complete functions and tremendous might but the integration of key elements to form joint forces and raise the overall operational capability of a “system of systems.”

We often think about how these and related asymmetric weapons pose challenges, given their specific capabilities. But it is critical to recognize that these need to be deeply integrated into the “systems of systems” that was discussed previously. Doing so is a challenge. When one considers how the DF-21D (anti-ship ballistic missile) might be used in an operational context, it becomes clear that employing the DF-21D will require deep integration into Chinese ISR networks in order to be effective. Thus, what is often viewed as the epitome of a trump card weapon system today is, in fact, a weapons system which depends entirely on a broad network of systems to ensure its operational capability.

Interestingly, one source emphasizes the foreign origin of the term nonlinear but suggests a distinct Chinese interpretation:
The biggest difference between the Chinese military’s definition and that of the American military is that for the Chinese, the battle line still continues to exist, even if this battle line is not clearly demarcated.47

Again, one might note that this suggests a more limited ability of Chinese military forces to envision the more fluid battlefields that characterize such contemporary operations.

Finally, it is worth noting that many aspects of these terms, both the three non’s in the aggregate and system of systems, depend heavily on joint, deeply integrated and informationalized approaches to warfare. There is a synergy between all those concepts: excellent ISR is a prerequisite for noncontact strikes, while a system of systems approach requires the integration of battle space awareness across platforms. This interconnection between these concepts is apparent in many of the Chinese writings.48

ASSESSING HU JINTAO’S INFLUENCE

As discussed by other chapters in the volume, Hu Jintao’s influence on certain areas of the PLA’s development since 2004 has been substantial. Most prominent among these is surely the promotion of the “New Historic Missions” for the PLA. More broadly in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hu has aimed to promote “scientific development.” There has been a move to elevate that concept to the same level as Maoist or Dengist influence, by including it in the roster of the Party’s leading ideology as in “with the important theories of Deng Xiaoping Theory and the ‘Three Represents’ as the guide, thoroughly applying the Scientific Outlook on Development.”49 It is important to emphasize, however, that these two ideological concepts
are far more important to the PLA than those terms discussed earlier in this chapter. For instance, measuring influence by frequency of mention in China’s leading military daily newspaper, “scientific development” appeared in the text of *PLA Daily* newspaper articles 1,148 times in 2004, or more than three times a day.\(^5\) Similarly, discussion of the “new historic missions” appears frequently in a wide range of official speeches and White Papers. In contrast, the concept of the three non’s appears much less frequently. Figure 4-1 compares the number of times each of the three non’s appears with the number of times the New Historic Missions are mentioned in the full text of *PLA Daily* for various years.

![Graph showing the comparison of the number of times each of the three non’s appears with the number of times the New Historic Missions are mentioned in the full text of *PLA Daily* for various years.](image)

Source: Data collected from full text searches of the *Jiefangjun Bao* collection in the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) available from the Library of Congress.

**Figure 4-1. Number of Times Each of the Three Non’s Appears with the Number of Times the New Historic Missions Are Mentioned in the Full Text of PLA Daily for Various Years.**
The basic picture is one in which the three non’s appear in a dozen or so articles a year. But New Historic Missions dwarfed that number upon its announcement in 2004, and “scientific development” was several orders of magnitude more frequently mentioned.

Beyond frequency analysis, however, there is a more substantive, if indirect, degree of influence of Hu’s policies on the previously mentioned developments in Chinese military thought. Hu’s signature and pervasive advocacy for “scientific development” in all aspects of China’s policy directly enables increased attention on the foundational elements of informationalization. This relationship is clearly borne out in speeches by top military leaders and authoritative “commentaries” in the PLA Daily. As a direct part of the implementation of Hu’s initiative, there has been increased emphasis on making PLAN training more scientific in nature, and in particular, an acknowledgement that doing so facilitates jointness and deepening of informationalization.

The links between “scientific development” and “system of systems” are quite strong as well. For instance, one article discusses Hu’s advocacy as head of the CMC, noting that he:

explicitly pointed out that the scientific development concept is an important guiding principle for strengthening national defense and armed forces building, and that scientific development should be taken as the theme, quickening the transformation of the combat power generation model be taken as the main thread. ... For the development strategy, he further made clear the strategic objective of “building informatized forces, winning informatized warfare,” emphasized the enhancement of the system of systems operation capability based on information systems.
Thus, in that piece, the link from “scientific development” through “informationalization” and finally to “system of systems” is clear and direct. One quite authoritative article goes even further, noting Hu’s direct advocacy for improving “system of systems” approaches:

Chairman Hu clearly pointed out that it was necessary to promote a transformation of our military from an armed forces that was half-mechanized to an armed forces based on informatization that had composite development of mechanization and informatization and emphasized the need to improve capabilities in “system of systems” operations based on information systems as the basic focal point.\(^{54}\)

Similarly, “Comrade Hu Jintao stressed, the basic form of combat effectiveness under informationalized conditions is information system-based ‘systems of systems’ operational capability.”\(^{55}\) Other articles also make similar, if less direct, note of such linkage.\(^{56}\)

That said, the evidence presented here does not suggest a deep engagement by Hu Jintao with the concept of a “system of systems” approach in military operations. The discussion of these terms in Chinese writings is often quite superficial and consists merely of acknowledgement of Hu Jintao’s admonitions to develop such concepts. Indeed, often the concepts are absent: one article which broadly surveys Hu’s contributions in military affairs area does not refer to a “system of systems” approach at all, and neither does an article focused on Hu’s contributions to the PLA Air Force (PLAAF).\(^{57}\) Nor does there seem to be a direct link between the concept of the three non’s and Hu. But this may not be surprising, as those concepts are
so far down into the details of warfare that they would be below the attention level of top-level leaders.

Nevertheless, Hu’s advocacy for system of systems, informationalization, and “scientific development” more generally should bolster the importance of those concepts within the PLA.

ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS

This preliminary assessment has summarized selective research into a range of strategic concepts that the PLA discusses. Each might plausibly be thought to encapsulate some element of the way the PLA talks about A2/AD. However, upon further such analysis, the connection seems less strong.

First, despite this author’s own expectation, counterintervention is rarely used in Chinese military writings. Similarly, “active counterattacks on exterior lines” is also of limited, if authoritative, currency. “Joint firepower attacks” is used in a narrow and tactical perspective, and lacks the broader strategic context that A2/AD would impute. These findings—if they hold up under further research—will pose challenges for Americans who are used to discussing Chinese A2/AD capabilities, and are looking to find an equivalent in Chinese discourse. The terms would have seemed to be close analogues, if a bit broader in political and diplomatic tone for the first two, but in the absence of their widespread use in Chinese, suggest they are not useful Chinese language proxies for the A2/AD term.

The foregoing has substantial implications for the way outside observers should think about China’s potent and tangible A2/AD systems and military capabilities. In part, it serves to emphasize a point that Dennis Blasko has recently reminded us of: “most
evidence from Chinese military sources indicates that for the PLA ‘technology drives doctrine’ or, as the Chinese say, ‘technology determines tactics’ (“技术决定战术”). Indeed, one can go further and note that technology in this case appears to have out-paced the development of military theory to shape its employment.

It is certainly possible that at some high level of classification within the PLA there exist such established doctrinal writings. Perhaps such classification has been effective at preventing the public discussions of these concepts. However, this author finds that argument to be unpersuasive for three reasons. First, as shown above, sensitive military conceptual frameworks surrounding the three non’s and system of systems have been discussed in detail in the open source literature. Second, if such a doctrine exists and is shaping, training, and procuring, it would be discussed as context in PLA press reporting of such steps, if only to publicly demonstrate the basis for conducting the exercises or the rationale for acquiring the systems under consideration. Finally, China is not engaging in deterrence based signaling with these capabilities, as would have been expected if there were a clear doctrinal plan for employing the capabilities. For instance, key capabilities such as submarines, core elements of A2/AD, are not being widely used to signal Chinese advancements:

The PLAN, although now more realistic and somewhat bolder in its training and exercises, as explained above, has not—with the possible exception of the 2006 surfacing of a Song near the Kitty Hawk carrier strike group—touted or otherwise given evidence of rehearsals of encounters with simulated carrier strike groups hundreds of miles east of China, as it might do as part of a deterrence scheme.
Publicly advertising such operational doctrine would serve to enhance Chinese deterrence, a concept that would serve China’s grand strategy of avoiding U.S. interference in Chinese military operations to (in Beijing’s view) defend her sovereignty.

Second, the terms that are in more widespread use—system of systems and the three non’s—are imported from outside China. They are descriptions of the way the United States and others have fought war in the past 2 decades. They are both somewhat vague, at least on the basis of currently conducted research, but do in part accurately describe the changing nature of warfare, whether one calls that revolution in military affairs or digitization or some other American term. The rarity with which “Chinese characteristics” are added to these is also notable. It is certain that challenges for the PLA in attaining an ability to make use of these concepts are regularly discussed, but the discussion of adapting them to Chinese conditions is limited.

That said, the evaluation of how far China was along the path to obtain these capabilities seems realistic. There is a clear recognition in the PLA that China has a long way to go, and that it cannot skip or leapfrog over developmental paths. It must first continue to mechanize its force before being able to informatonize and thereafter employ the various elements discussed previously. As one Chinese major general writes:

at present, our army’s mechanized construction has not been fully accomplished, and informatization is still at the beginning phase. The objective law of military building and the practical situation of our army require us not to go all-out to emphasize informatization and totally overlook mechanization.60
Other sources emphasize the importance of integrated aviation assets to a joint, systematized force, and drone in particular, and bemoan the state of Chinese capabilities in both areas relative to the United States and Russia.61 Finally, as noted previously, some elements of the discussion of system of systems suggest that traditional biases toward hierarchical command and control continue to affect the way China thinks about system of systems. This will limit the PLA’s ability to incorporate the concept and lead to a more transformative effect on Chinese capabilities.

There also, as noted, seems to be something of an evolution in the role that “asymmetric weapons” might play. Most of the discussion of that third “non” was considerably broader than focusing on individual weapons, and indeed bled back in “system of systems” sorts of ideas emphasizing the importance of a network of weapons or the support structure for any individual weapon.62

Third, there is a degree of tension between system of systems (and to a lesser extent the three non’s) and traditional views regarding the efficacy of A2/AD. A core of A2/AD thinking is that a set of military capabilities makes denying access to the adversary militarily feasible. Both for the Soviets during the Cold War, and for Westerners interpreting China today, part of the attractiveness of an anti-access/area denial approach is its relative cost advantage: cheap missiles can threaten capital ships. However, the traditional maritime goal of “sea control” is not easily achieved through the same means that can bring about area denial (missiles and mines cannot hold space). While A2/AD explicitly has the goal to deny “sea control” to the adversary, choosing that strategy contains a tacit admission that achieving “sea control” for oneself...
is unattainable. (This is akin to Keegan’s concept of “empty oceans.”) Further, China has taken a number of costly steps that run counter to the notion that it is exclusively pursuing an anti-access/area denial strategy. Indeed, it is also pursuing some sea control capabilities. The high profile equipping of the former Soviet carrier, now christened the *Liaoning*, exemplifies this trend. The carrier, when finally equipped with a combat ready air wing, will not be a potent A2/AD asset. However, it may serve some utility in controlling seas against lower-tier threats. Discussions of a second carrier by the PLAN emphasize the continuing priority put on this capability, as does its prominent mention in the Chinese *Defense White Paper* released in 2013.

Similarly, many writings over the past 5 years have emphasized the role of PLAN in securing broader Chinese naval interests, such as SLOCs and anti-piracy patrols. Any of the writings on distant seas capabilities by Chinese military and civilian analysts tend to focus on what Chinese writers refer to as military operations other than war (MOOTW). . . . It is unclear whether, or how, the concept of “distant seas” will modify the concept of the offshore defense, which is still the official guiding concept for PLAN force development.

Additionally, some of the discussions of the nature of warfare in a three-nons and system of systems era suggest that China expects to be able to assert a degree of control over the battlefield space.

Therefore, under this premise of seizing freedom of battlefield mobility, we focus on improving the effectiveness of quickly moving through all battlefield
dimensions in the proper directions, the important places and deceive moments of combat actions, so that we can make deep strikes on enemy targets and destroy or paralyze the enemy’s combat systems.\textsuperscript{66}

Another example emphasizes the importance of Chinese naval assets operating deeply against potential attackers, but also, increasing air defense:

To respond to air strikes from the aircraft groups based on carriers, the Navy must strengthen the construction of an air defense system that integrates those based on the air, coast, and sea, and enhance the capability of naval formations in long distance interception, so as to achieve air supremacy on the sea with the alternative covers from the coast and warships. The Navy should gradually strengthen the capability of joint naval formations in charging to the rear of the enemy and striking the enemy’s capabilities in taking off and landing aircrafts, as well as warships leaving ports.\textsuperscript{67}

Again, that is akin to sea control. Other sources, as discussed previously, can be read with this degree of optimism as well. This suggests Chinese strategic thinkers have not deeply accepted that contemporary military technology advantages denial over control.\textsuperscript{68} It suggests that China, instead of honing an A2/AD doctrine (whatever the term might be), is instead developing alternate ideas that will shape broader maritime and related strategy.

These conclusions have important implications for the United States. While it is certainly true that China has developed and in many cases deployed military weapons that serve to complicate U.S. abilities to place its own forces within many hundreds of miles of China’s coastline, the lack of a widely discussed A2/AD doctrine to implement those capabilities likely re-
duces the overall threat they pose. Since doctrines do not change overnight (they shape training and coordination mechanisms, all of which require time to mature), this means Chinese capabilities are less potent than what their weapons suggest. It also suggests that a clear indicator in increasing those capabilities would be the emergence of exactly the sort of doctrine that is absent in the survey above. Given that sources such as those cited in this chapter do discuss other forms of doctrine, we can reasonably expect to see such developments there as well, if they ever occur.

Second, the main doctrinal discussions above center in imported concepts (from the Russians and the United States) on system of systems and the three non’s. This reliance on external models calls into question the capabilities for indigenous innovation in that regard within China. There are certainly important implications for the relative effectiveness of precision and long-range missiles on traditional naval warfare, and for projecting power from a limited number of bases. However, China has not developed a deep ranging strategic level discussion of those, either in terms of how it might use such capabilities or its own emerging blue water forces might be subject to attack from such.

However, the mirror image of that point should also be noted: China is drawing upon, and in some cases fairly deeply engaging in concepts regarding “net centric warfare” and the implications of information technologies for greatly enhancing the combat effectiveness of military forces. China is thus taking great advantage of the discussions in the United States and elsewhere, and continues to draw “lessons from other peoples’ wars.” Although it will need to adapt those lessons to the particular geostrategic context of
its East Asian region, it will have a substantial foundation already laid out.

Finally, the enduring discussions in Chinese security analyst circles regarding more traditional sea control, such as projecting power through naval surface ships (both carriers and surface action groups) suggests the PLAN, like many navies in the region (and the globe) will continue to compete in that sphere. This is likely to intensify Chinese operations beyond its littoral. Certainly, some of that activity will serve U.S. and global interests (such as anti-piracy and disaster relief). But in some cases, the activities will prove threatening, particularly to smaller states in the region. These developments will raise particular challenges to the diplomacy of the United States in the region, suggesting a deepening of military statecraft throughout the region, per “rebalancing” is necessary. Economic and political engagement will be insufficient for that task.

**CONCLUSION**

Thus, while the relevant terms that were considered in this chapter do not give us much insight into Chinese equivalents of A2/AD, they do, however, serve as valuable windows into how China is coming to terms with the radical changes taking place in modern warfare, as epitomized by the operations conducted by the United States, and this, may have a more enduring effect on the PLA, the region, and the United States.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4


12. This is the case regardless of a variety of search syntax (furthermore, one of spare few results is a recycling of a piece au-
thored by Abe Denmark of NBR). There are no references to “fan
ganshe” or “fan jieru,” although such phrases are occasionally in-
cluded in pinyin.

13. Books surveyed include Wang Jun, Yang Liuqing, eds. (王军，杨柳青): 信息化作战规律 (Rules of Informationalized Com-
bat), Beijing, China: National Defense University Publishing, 2006; Jiang Daohe and Liu Huimin, eds. (姜道洪，刘会民), 作战协同概论 (Operational Coordination Con-
cepts), Beijing, China: NDU Publishing, 2004; Liu Xianyao et al. (刘显尧 等著): 信息争战 (Information War), Beijing: People’s Liberation
究 (Research Questions in Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Strategy), Beijing: NDU Publishing, 2006; Dong Zifeng (董子峰), 战斗力生成模式装变 (The Chang-

PLA’s Active Strategic Counterattacks on Exterior Lines,” China

15. Ibid., p. 19.

16. In addition to the following citations, it simply pervades
Chinese discussions about facing the United States, and in par-
ticular, facing ASB and related concepts. For a lengthy discussion,
see “Big Stick Being Wielded At China—Interpreting the New
Air-Sea Battle’ Operational Concept of the US Military,” 现代兵
器 (Modern Weaponry; a journal published by an industrial military
research institute), August 2, 2011 (OSC: CPP20120418090004).
Also see the discussions in Timothy L. Thomas, The Dragon’s
Quantum Leap: Transforming From a Mechanized to An Informatized


35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.


41. Zuo Liping (左李平), 国家海上威慑论 (The Theory of National Maritime Deterrence), 北京: 时事出版社 (Beijing, China: Times Publishing), 2012, p. 63. Although the press is not particularly authoritative, the author is a naval officer and graduate of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science.

42. Ibid, p. 78.


47. Dou Chao (窦超), “强者的[大棒] 弱者的[杀手锏]—’三非’作战与我军建设” (“Noncontact, Nonsymmetric, Nonlinear Operations and Our Army Countermeasure”), 舰载武器 (Shipborne Weapons), November 2009, pp. 74-75. This is a nonmilitary affiliated publication, although the work unit is a state owned, military ship building firm.


49. See Hu Jintao speech to PLA, July 2011.

50. Selected other years are listed below; beyond that time period further research is required, but in the incomplete Open Source Center database, several hundred articles a year continue to mention the term to date. Data below taken from full text searches of the Jiefangjun Bao collection in the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI).

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55. Liu Yongming and Jin Zhenxing, (刘永明, 金振兴) “胡锦涛关于全面提高以打赢信息化条件下局部战争能力为核心的完成多样化军事任务能力重要论述研究” (“A Study of Hu Jintao’s Important Instructions on Enhancing Capabilities in Accomplishing Diversified Military Tasks with Winning Local Wars under the Informationized Conditions as the Core”), p. 5.


57. Zhang Shude, Dong Qiangqiang, and Zhao Weibo (张树德, 董嫱嫱, 赵韦博): “胡锦涛关于军事改革创新发展重要论述研究” (“A Study of Hu Jintao’s Thinking on Military Reform and Innovation”), 中国军事科学 (China Military Science), Vol. 6, No. 120, 2011, pp. 18-25. The lead author is a Vice Political Commissar at the Dalian Naval Academy holding the rank of Senior Captain in the PLAN. Shang Jinsuo, Li Zhen, Li Liguang, and Wang Ping-


62. It will be interesting to see how discussions of the carrier develop in this regard.


The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues its long transition toward truly “integrated joint operations” (“一体化联合作战”), but has made less progress to date than Chinese military leaders would wish. In the early-2000s, PLA leadership established a goal of achieving “major progress” toward “informatized armed forces” by 2020 and fully modernizing the force by the mid-21st century.¹ In 2006, Hu Jintao issued guidance on transforming PLA training by training commanders and staff on joint operations concepts. PLA efforts toward joint operations since 2008 have centered on: developing faculty expertise in military educational institutions; getting PLA commanders to think in terms of joint training; and developing information systems to facilitate joint command. These efforts are not producing rapid results, and Chinese military leaders are aware that the PLA has not reached the level of joint operations development they seek. Nevertheless, the PLA has gained knowledge in joint operations from its interaction with other countries in bilateral and multilateral exercises.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

• PLA cadets have received theoretical training on joint operations but lack operational experience. Despite efforts to inculcate basic concepts of joint operations in an academic setting, commanders continue to fall short in their ability to lead joint operations involving actual forces. Outside the academic setting, only a handful of military exercises address issues of joint command.

• Joint operations concepts have been slow to develop since the military and its leadership have had to adapt to a radically different way of thinking about military conflict. Centralized training guidance, standardized equipment, and improvements to academics may provide the right tools to further the transformation to which military leaders aspire.

Achieving a modern standard of military effectiveness will require the PLA to internalize joint operations concepts and apply them in more realistic, multiservice training exercises.

People are the most energetic and dynamic element of combat power. When all is said and done, a confrontation in modern warfare is in essence a confrontation of talented individuals. Building a corps of talented individuals suited to the characteristics of integrated joint operations is a requirement for military modernization and is essential to the ability to fight and win future local wars under informatized conditions.²

Lieutenant General Hu Yongzhu
Director, Political Department
Chengdu Military Region
INTRODUCTION

In 2004, President Hu Jintao tasked the armed forces to undertake a transformation that would enable them not only to fulfill their primary mission to safeguard national sovereignty and meet the changing needs of national security, but also to take on “the new historic missions of our forces in the new century and new era.”\(^3\) Their aspiration is to develop a joint operational force that smoothly integrates all four military services,\(^4\) employs a unified, networked information system, and acts under the unified command of a joint “command organ” (指挥机关), or headquarters in Western military parlance.\(^5\) The 2004 pronouncement accelerated a thrust launched a decade earlier when then-president Jiang Zemin added the requirement to fight “modern local wars under informatized conditions” to the “military strategic guidelines for the new period” in 1993.\(^6\) The expansion of PLA tasks inevitably requires a corresponding reform in military training, shifting from “military training under mechanized conditions” to “military training under informatized conditions.”\(^7\) Joint operations training is a clear demand and requirement for this transformation.

Chinese military leaders are well aware that the PLA has not reached the level of joint operations development and training they seek, and that achieving that goal depends on changing the education, training, culture, and mindset of the officer corps. In their own words, “the development of joint operations in the PLA is at an initial stage and requires strengthening the integration of weapons, equipment and combat system of all services and arms and strengthening
the integration of operations concepts and values of all services.” They needed to work harder, continue exploration, and come up with results that set the force on the right path.

Although the terms “joint operations” and “integrated joint operations” have been part of the PLA military terminology since at least the mid-1990s, the PLA did not issue the top-level doctrinal “outline” (gangyao) on joint operations until 1999. In the decade following 1999, military academics conducted theoretical studies of how to adapt the force for joint operations. Certain military units were identified as “whetstones” to test joint operations concepts in the field. Academic writing defined the concept and identified its characteristics and requirements. Articles like “Theory of Integrated Joint Operations Studied” and “Innovation in Joint Operations Theory,” by the commandant of Shijiazhuang Army Command Academy and the vice president of Academy of Military Science, respectively, are among the most detailed and authoritative articles on the topic of that period.

Considerable exploration on joint operations occurred between 2006 and 2008. The results were incorporated into the revised Outline on Military Training and Evaluation (军事训练与考核大纲, OMTE) issued by the General Staff Department (GSD) in 2008, and its accompanying “codified joint operations training requirement.” That same year, President Hu and the General Headquarters issued two key documents, “Strategic Training Regulations for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army” (“中国人民解放军战略训练规定”) and “Strategic Training Outline for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army” (“中国人民解放军战略训练纲目”), which established a strategic training system that systematically standardized the joint opera-
tions theoretical framework. Headquarter elements, academies, and services moved beyond researching theory and definitions to begin exploring the impact of military transformation and new OMTE requirements on the force. The PLA review of 2009 military training noted that the majority of field exercises were “test-oriented” and “research-oriented.” One of the most significant exploratory exercises started around that time was the “LIANHE” series exercises. This exercise explored theater-based informatized training with real forces and made considerable progress in upgrading joint command concepts, commander proficiency and form. The results of those experiments and writings are slowly being incorporated into new combat methods for the force.

The PLA has also gained some knowledge in joint operations from its interaction with other countries in bilateral and multilateral exercises. These have afforded the PLA lessons learned from others in the areas of command and control, military planning, and execution. The main focus of the exercises has been on counterterrorism, search and rescue, counterpiracy, and some air operations. We are less clear on how the lessons from those training events are formalized into PLA regular training or even incorporated into academic debates on concept development.

One of the biggest challenges to overcome at that time, in the words of Chen Zhaohai, director of the Military Arms and Training Department of the General Staff Department, was the creation of the right operational environment to train joint operations, specifically one that included training under a realistic complex electromagnetic environment (CEME) and informatized environment. The PLA needed to transform from conducting traditional coordinated
training to integrated informatized joint training that resembled close-to-actual-combat conditions. The PLA has modernized some of its combined arms and tactical training bases and national level training bases by fostering this type of complex environment as well as expanding the infrastructure to include simulation and online training.

PLA effort toward joint operations since 2008 has centered on three areas: developing the expertise of academic faculty in the military educational institutions; getting PLA commanders and staff to think in terms of joint training rather than combined arms training; and developing information systems and material solutions to facilitate joint command. We will present specific examples where these developments are happening across China and provide, where available, specific training events illustrating how the PLA has put these developments into effect. After our assessment of joint operations developments across China, we will discuss where the Chinese see themselves in this long-term military transformation. We will conclude with some of the challenges they still face in standardizing the information systems and establishing and standardizing the formal training organizations and structures to push beyond service-specific training into true joint operations training.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND ACADEMIC REFORMS

In 2006, Hu Jintao issued guidance on transforming PLA training. One aspect of this guidance was improving and expanding the capabilities of command academies to train commanders and staff on joint operations concepts. For the most part, the curricula of
PLA mid- and senior-level academic institutions still focused on training commanders for combined arms operations, and there were few experts on joint operations among the faculty.

In response, both service-level and national-level academies undertook modernization and upgrades. These included revising the curriculum to reflect joint operations emphasis; hiring instructors with the right experience; adding faculty who are able to translate joint operations into operational experience for a particular service; sending academics to participate in live training events, both to conduct hands-on training and to observe the challenges the force face in implementing joint operational concepts; and sending academics overseas to gain experience from other countries. Actions to implement this change include:

• The PLA Air Force Command Academy adopted new textbooks in 2008 and added courses on joint operations, air and space operations, and air force information operations. The academy also developed online courses for self-study on joint operations under informatized conditions and campaign confrontation under complex electromagnetic environments.\textsuperscript{18}

• The Shijiazhuang Army Command College established a baseline curriculum on joint operational concepts, including courses on sister services equipment knowledge, operational theory, and joint operations command skills.\textsuperscript{19}

Other potential reforms may be stuck in the proposal stage.

• The Director of the Teaching and Research Office for the Nanjing Army Command Academy offered suggestions in 2008 on how to consoli-
date resources, improve facilities, and resolve support problems for training of mid- and senior-level joint operations command personnel. He called for a teaching cadre that has mastered the joint operations concepts; assigning frontline soldiers into teaching positions, rather than career academics; and developing “blue teams” to portray opponent in simulation exercises.\(^{20}\)

- Major General Cha Jinlu, from the Department of Operations Theory and Regulations Research at the Chinese Academy of Military Science, proposed sending faculty to units conducting warfighting experiments, which he felt would benefit both sides.\(^{21}\)

- Wang Xibin, president of the National Defense University (NDU), wrote in 2009 about a number of initiatives to turn NDU into a multidiscipline joint command university. These included inviting renowned experts and famous professors to lead academic lectures; sending experts and professors to units for an extended period of time to find out the “reality and needs of the units” and promote inter-university cooperation; and extending the classroom to other institutions of learning outside of the Army.\(^{22}\)

- Major General He Lei, director of the Department of Operation Theories and Doctrines Research of the Academy of Military Science (AMS) in 2010, also proposed inviting “well-known experts” to share their knowledge of joint operations.\(^{23}\)

Clearly the efforts are not producing rapid results, judging from continued calls for more improvement. In 2010, Hu Jintao exhorted NDU to step up the culti-
vation of officers for commanding joint operations, in the spirit of the guidelines of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 17th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee. In the past 2 years, there has been less reporting on specific academy reform efforts and more on overall GSD guidance to reform military education institutions, optimize their structures, raise the quality of instruction, and intensify existing reforms. In 2012, the CMC issued the “2020 Military School and Education Reform and Development Program Outline” ("2020 年前军队院校教育改革和发展规划纲要"), laying out the development of these institutions for the next 10 years.

**TRAINING JOINT COMMANDERS AND HEADQUARTERS STAFF**

Commanders and staff are seen as the vital link in the PLA’s ability to fight under informatized conditions. The challenge is not in defining the qualities those commanders needed to possess, but rather transforming their modes of thought from concepts suitable for fighting wars under mechanized conditions to those suited to informatized conditions. Despite the efforts toward better academic instruction discussed above, Chinese leaders still do not feel confident that commanders and staff have the required level of expertise, and it remains a central point of emphasis at all levels of officer development.

GSD published a number of policy documents in 2008 to set the standards for officer development, under rubrics such as “Measures for Deeply Pushing Forward the Cultivation of Talented Commanding Personnel for Joint Operations” ("深入推进联合作战指挥人才培养的措施、联合作战指挥人才培养核心素..."
The military academic world also developed assessments of the qualities required in joint operations commanders. In 2009, articles from the President of the Nanjing Army Command Academy and from Sun Naixiang, a researcher at AMS, discussed the characteristics desired of joint operations commanding personnel, both reaching the unsurprising conclusion that commanders cannot make proper use of operational forces and advanced weaponry without extensive knowledge of joint operations. Similar assessments appear in the political work system, which has responsibility for officer personnel issues in the operational forces. Cai Yongning, a professor at the Military Personnel Management Studies Department of the Xian Political Academy, wrote in 2011 about cultivating commanding officers for joint operations. An article on the desired characteristics of joint commanders written by the vice president of AMS in 2009 suggests that having experiences in varied posts, being proficient in their service and relatively familiar with the specialties of other services, being exposed to the civilian sector and participating in international exchanges might assist commanders in embracing joint operations concepts. Looking at the PLA leadership in the last 10 years, particularly those that rose to the top levels in 2012, we see that most, if not all,
have spent some time within their service, at a military region headquarters, and in one of the general departments, essentially meeting most of the characteristics spelled out in 2009. Some of these individuals have recent practical operational experience in dealing with internal crises. Fan Changlong led the rescue operations in the Yangtze River flooding in 1998, and Xu Qiliang led the rescue operations during the 2008 Chinese blizzard in central and southern China. Li Shiming commanded the relief efforts during the 2009 Wenchuan earthquake. Additionally, about half of the current leaders are graduates of the National Defense University. It does not appear that the PLA has this assignment pattern a formal requirement for promotion to the top echelons, but it does not seem farfetched that it could do so in the future.

Mid- and upper-level academies have implemented a variety of steps to instill a joint mindset in their students.

- In 2009, PLA NDU asserted that over 95 percent of the commanders at and above group army level have been trained by NDU and are therefore capable of commanding joint operations. The university requires students to participate in exercises with actual military units during which students from all military branches formulate joint operational plans.

- In 2010, Major General He Lei, director of the AMS Department of Operational Theory and Doctrinal Research brought AMS experts to academic lessons to “impart joint operations knowledge to officers and men to help them further understand and grasp the features and patterns of joint operations.”
• The Nanjing Military Region (MR) has organized concentrated training of “joint firepower coordinators” as a form of training for joint operation commanding personnel. Nanjing MR claims that by 2012, nearly 2,000 commanders had taken part in similar exercise organized by the region and that every combat unit at the division or brigade level in the Nanjing theater has two or more “joint staff officers” with such experience.36

One recent well publicized command and staff training event was the June 2012 exercise “Joint Education 2012-QUESHAN” (“联教2012-确山”). The goal of this exploratory exercise was to “enhance the joint operational capability of the military commanding personnel.” It involved students from 19 academies and included the use of an “integrated command information system” and a “live force drill” to promote joint practice.37 Outside the academic setting, we have observed a handful of military exercises that address issues of joint command. Exercise Mission Action 2010 (使命行动2010) emphasized joint campaign command, army and air force long-range maneuvers, joint firepower attack, comprehensive defense, and precision support.38

Even with the increased training emphasis on joint operations, the force still faces criticisms of the ability of commanders at lower levels to perform even “basic tasks” of joint command, according to lessons learned in the QUESHAN exercise.39 Another recent criticism comes from the President of the Shijiazhuang Army Academy, who laments that “cadets have theoretical training but lack the operational experience gained through joint exercises.”40 We read this as saying that,
despite efforts to inculcate the basic concepts of joint operations in an academic setting, commanders and staff continue to fall short in their ability to lead joint operations involving actual forces.

INFORMATION PLATFORMS TO FACILITATE JOINT OPERATIONS

The PLA deems it necessary but not sufficient for commanding officers and staff to understand joint concepts and be able to apply them in actual operations. As important as the human dimension is, the PLA learned from observing U.S. operations that appropriate technology to support command functions is indispensable to the conduct of joint operations. In the 11th Five Year Plan (FYP), the PLA services and GSD explored material solutions to enable joint operations command. Some were intended to facilitate joint operations staff training in academies or field exercises, while others were intended to be operational command information systems for the force. Such systems, which the PLA calls “integrated command platforms” (一体化指挥平台, ICP), allow for real time mastery of the battlefield situation while simultaneously enabling commanders to command their forces. In addition to communications modes, command templates, and command decision aids, these systems integrate intelligence and reconnaissance data, weather and geospatial information, and other tools useful to the commander and his staff.\(^\text{41}\) The PLA conducted concept and equipment testing for newly fielded ICPs in a number of exercises in 2009, although initial production and deployment to the operational force does not yet appear complete.\(^\text{42}\) Many units that have received the new systems are not yet proficient in their
use, and some have complained that the systems fail to meet expectation and that further improvements are needed.  

- Sometime before 2008, Major General Cha Jinlu of AMS noted that the foundation for joint training is that information networks must be interconnected, and discussed improvements needed to support such training.  
- A 2008 article on training with ICPs warned that:

  joint training must be carried out on the basis of a reliable information network, which should be made identical to the command information system to be used in wartime if possible.

- An article on the 2009 military-wide joint training coordination conference hosted by GSD underpins the use of the integrated command platform. This platform:

  brings about evolitional changes for command methods; it is imperative that we give full play to the integrated command platform and advance the dynamic integration of all military branches, all operational units and all operational elements.

- The director of the Training Department at the Nanjing Army Command Academy, when discussing key concepts of joint operations under informatized conditions in 2010, touted the ability of network systems to support the information sharing, command decisionmaking, overall joint actions, coordination and force groupings that are essential to joint operations.
• Chen Rongdi, research fellow in the Operational Theory and Doctrine Research Department at AMS, discussed in 2010 the commander’s requirement for high technology systems that enable smooth, efficient and uninterrupted command.\(^{48}\)

• In October 2010, the CMC issued the “Comprehensive Plan for Reform of Military Training in the Period of the 12th Five Year Plan” (“十二五”时期军事训练改革总体方案), which arranges current and near future military training reform developments. In this document the CMC re-emphasizes the need for information system-based command and staff command training.\(^{49}\)

The most concrete indications of the use of the command information systems are observed during exercise and training events starting in 2010. The advanced states of these platforms suggest that exploration and development of these systems have been ongoing and the PLA was now at the technology demonstration stages.\(^{50}\) We have seen what we believe are demonstration events for senior leaders, showing off not only the capabilities of the systems themselves, but also users’ ability to employ these systems to conduct operations.

• In exercise Vanguard 2010, the Jinan Military Region conducted a 5-day theater level exercise of air defense forces during which:

  via the theater-level integrated joint operational command platform they transmitted command, air intelligence, and enemy information to various locations and in real time, received information uploaded to all commanding elements.\(^{51}\)
• The executive director of Exercise Mission Action 2010 and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Beijing MR said that the “application of the integrated command platform has removed a lot of intermediary links in issuing command documents, orders and instructions during Chinese military exercises in 2010.52

• Sun Dayong, chief of the operations and training section of a group army in Jinan MR, participated in a multi-service exercise during which “proposals formulated by the staff personnel of all the services, was sent to the commanders at the various level through the integrated platform.”53

• Joint-Education 2012-QUESHAN “reportedly used a new ‘integrated command information system’ for the first time.” 54

• A Lanzhou MR group army applied the integrated command platform to organize a drill in June 2012. The commander “opened the information command system in front of him and entered confrontational instructions.” He was also able to display “level and status of all battalion subordinate to the air defense group performance weapons and detection of air situation.” The goal of the exercise was to force commanders at all levels to make decisions based on information systems according to the group army’s chief of staff.55

• Chengdu MR forces conducted a multiservice exercise in August 2012 during which a brigade commander sent out “information through the integrated command platform.”56
These technical advances all focus on providing the strategic and operational level leadership with more information for decisionmaking but do not allow or facilitate the delegation of that decisionmaking to the lower levels. In the long run, these developments just create a force that is technologically advanced and more centralized but not agile enough to respond in crises.\textsuperscript{57} There is still some criticism, particularly at the senior-level schools, of commanders’ inability to use technology effectively in joint exercises. In 2012, the president of the Shijiazhuang Command Academy said the ongoing requirement for cadets to be “well versed in information technology and use the command information system to improve information system based command fighting skills” suggested that this is an area for further development within the force.\textsuperscript{58}

THE FUTURE OF JOINT OPERATIONS IN THE PLA

At the end of 2010, China Central Television (CCTV) interviewed China’s Minister of National Defense, Liang Guanglie, about China’s military development. In this interview, Liang discussed the future of China’s army and lays out what he calls a “three step blueprint.” In this blueprint, China’s military will achieve major progress in informatization building by 2020.\textsuperscript{59} According to this standard timeline, first articulated publicly in the 2006 \textit{Defense White Paper}:

The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century.\textsuperscript{60}
The PLA has made only modest progress toward achieving the 2020 goal, and has a number of hurdles yet to overcome to produce a force that can fight high technology wars. One major obstacle is the lack of standardized equipment that links all the service-specific information command platforms that have been developed to date. Second is the lack of a PLA-wide training structure, organization, and mechanisms to set the standards for joint operations skills. This section briefly explores these two challenges and forecasts the effect that overcoming them could have on the force.

The past 4 years have seen efforts by all services, branches, military regions, and academic institutions to develop, produce, and test equipment that meets the key requirement of interconnectivity in joint operations. As noted previously, there is still criticism among trainers and users about the equipment falling short of expectations. A Jiefangjun Bao article discussing theater joint training exhorted units to make good use of a theater information system to join together all individual combat forces, units, and elements and “break the information technology barriers that separate the armed forces in theater so that information systems are linked and interoperable.” According to a 2012 report in the Guangzhou Nanfang Zhoumo newspaper, Chinese armed forces have problems organizing and conducting training due to “restrictions of the organization structure and the command system,” and academies continue exploratory efforts to overcome that problem. During a 2012 Lanzhou MR exercise, commanders complained about inconvenience and instability in the new information systems. The chief of the GSD Training Department said in January
2012, that further development and research is needed to formalize and standardize the equipment that has been fielded and to solve problems encountered using it in training.65

Until late-2011, most developments in joint operations theory, training and exercises were led by ground forces officers. Ground-centered development of joint operations theory has constrained the development of navy, air force, and Second Artillery joint doctrine. Multiservice participation in “joint” exercises has been limited and consists more of coordinated action than true integrated operations. According to Sun Dayong, chief of the operations and training section of a group army in Jinan MR, “in previous joint operations, the Army used to play the main role, and the Navy, Air Force, the Second Artillery just dispatched liaison officers as representatives to the Army command post to receive tasks assigned to them.”66 Multiservice joint training has not been the leading form of training for the force.67

PLA academics contend that to truly transform the force to meet the challenges of informatized warfare, joint operations development needs to become a multiservice effort. In early-2012, PRC leadership reorganized and renamed the GSD Military Training and Arms Department — formerly focused solely on ground forces training — to the Military Training Department, overseeing all services in order to “strengthen the centralized and unified management of training.”68 The reorganization is intended to address the problem of joint operations concept development and training being too “army centric” and too focused on combined-arms rather than true joint training.69 The promotion of four nonground officers to the CMC in 2012—Admiral Wu Shengli, General Ma Xiaotian, General Wei...
Fenghe, and General Wu Qiliang—is another reflection of Beijing’s effort to embrace the diversity and benefits of a truly joint force. As of early-2013, there is little reporting of what effect this reorganization has had on training reform and training execution in 2012. This may be addressed in the annual GSD training wrap-ups normally published early in the year.

Along with establishing a central group to lead joint operations development and training, ostensibly operating above the interests of any single service, the PLA also needs to normalize training mechanisms to ensure the entire force trains to the same standards. Prior to creation of the Military Training Department, joint training was executed independently within the services, with few all-service, all-element joint exercises. Regional service-specific training facilities and tactical training bases adopted their own experiments to train their units in joint operations. There have been many calls for mechanisms to normalize training across the services. Over the last 2 years, all elements within the PLA intensified research and exploration of joint training under informatized conditions to come up with a multi-service, all-element training requirement.

Chen Zhaohai, then director of the Military Training and Arms Department, said in 2010 that within 5 years the PLA would “basically establish a training systems under informatized conditions and have regularized training under close to actual war conditions.” GSD Military Training Guidance for 2012 specified that joint training structures, organizational management, and operating mechanisms were to be built and perfected this year. The impact of this centralization and standardization will likely be reflected in the execution of more GSD- or MR-led multiservice training events in the next few years.
Can They Get There?

Joint operations concepts have been slow to develop in China as the military and its leadership had to adapt to a radically different way of thinking about military conflict. Centralized training guidance and standardized equipment, along with the improvements to academic training for command and staff personnel, may provide the right tools and environment to further the transformation to which military leaders aspire. Even then, catching up to world standards of military effectiveness will require the PLA to internalize joint operations concepts and apply them in more realistic, multiservice training exercises, even on a small scale. Until they do, their aspiration of more jointness and integration, major progress in informatization by 2020, and full modernization for national defense and the military by 2050, will remain a distant goal.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5


4. Technically, three services (军种) and one branch (兵种) that enjoys the status of a service.


26. Yang Xuguang 杨旭光 and Liu Feng’an 刘逢安, “绘就未来十年军队院校建设发展蓝图; 专访总参军训部部长陈宗海” (”Drawing up a Blueprint for the Next 10 Years of Military School Construction and Development—Special Interview with Chen Zhaohai, director of the General Staff Department Military Training Office”), PLA Daily online, July 6, 2012, available from chn.chinamil.com.cn/jx/2012-07/06/content_4939829.htm.


31. Liu Jixian 刘继贤, pp. 1-17; Hu Yongzhu, pp. 100-103; Chen Yong, pp. 71-73.


33. Wang Xibin.


35. Hu Junhua and Bao Guojun, “Transcending Services.”


37. Liu Feng’an 刘逢安 and Li Kunyang 李坤阳, “‘学打现代战争’; 亲历 ‘联教2012 确山’ 联合演习” (“‘Study How to Fight Modern Warfare’—an Account of Personal Experience in the ‘Joint

39. Liu Feng’an and Li Kunyang, “‘Study How to Fight Modern Warfare’.”


54. Liu Feng’an and Li Kunyang, “‘Study How to Fight Modern Warfare’.”


63. Liu Feng’an and Li Kunyang, “Study How to Fight Modern Warfare.”


65. Liu Feng’an, “Promoting the Transformation of Military Training by Building On Our Strengths.”


67. Liu Xiaohua et al; Wu Dilun and Liu Feng’an.


71. Jia Jianyi 贾建义 et al., p. 2.


CHAPTER 6

THE ROLE OF INFORMATIZATION IN THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY UNDER HU JINTAO

Joe McReynolds
James Mulvenon

MAIN ARGUMENT

This chapter examines Chinese military informatization under Hu Jintao, with an emphasis on the integration of military and civilian informatization efforts as well as the evolution of Hu’s informatization strategy from that of his predecessor, Jiang Zemin. During Hu’s term, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) fully embraced informatization as a central guiding principle of military theory and doctrine, an underlying framework uniting PLA concepts such as the revolution in military affairs (RMA) with Chinese characteristics, integrated joint operations, civil-military integration, and system-of-systems warfare, and tying them to China’s broader civilian informatization effort. However, this theoretical sophistication masks significant operational deficits, and the PLA’s recent technological advances will not generate world-class combat abilities if they are not matched by modernized personnel and organizational structures. This will be the next major hurdle for the PLA’s informatization effort, and Hu’s primary informatization legacy is his laying the policy groundwork that, in time, may enable the PLA to overcome these structural challenges.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

• U.S. military strategists focusing on scenarios involving China must understand the impact of informatization trends not only in terms of specific weapons and support platforms, but also in terms of integration between military and civilian informatization and networks, both in peacetime and in defense mobilization or conflict scenarios. Accurately understanding these linkages will enable better prediction of both the outputs of China’s research, development, and acquisition (RD&A) processes and the actions of Chinese political and military actors in war or crisis scenarios.

• However, informatization should be understood as a source not only of increased military strength and power projection capabilities, but also of new systemic vulnerabilities. As the PLA develops advanced command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) technologies and integration with civilian networks, they are likely to become increasingly reliant on those systems through training and doctrine, ultimately replicating the supposedly “asymmetric” vulnerabilities in these areas that PLA theoreticians have traditionally noted in their analyses of the U.S. military. Shared vulnerabilities could potentially give rise to shared interests with the United States, opening an additional path by which China may move toward becoming a “status quo” power in the space and cyber domains.
INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the current state and continuing evolution of the role that the concept of informatization has played in the PLA under former President Hu Jintao, in the context of both the PLA’s ongoing RMA and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) broader informatization efforts. The authors have attempted to describe the extent to which PLA informatization during the Hu era differs from that which occurred under former President Jiang Zemin, both in terms of high-level strategic directives and in terms of more concrete doctrinal and systems development.

In its various facets, informatization plays a role in nearly every modernization effort undertaken by the PLA, from networked weapons platforms and modernized C4ISR systems to personnel and structural reforms. This chapter does not seek to catalogue the development of specific technologies, platforms, and operational capabilities linked to informatization, topics which have been covered ably and extensively in Western assessments of the PLA by various experts on each of the services and branches. Instead, we examine the broader conceptual, doctrinal, and organizational framework that overlays and guides military informatization efforts. Although the lack of transparency in China’s policy formation process necessitates caution when drawing causal connections from declared policies and guiding concepts to concrete changes occurring within the PLA, official, and secondary Chinese sources provide a sufficient basis for a focused analysis of the role that informatization has played in military modernization during the Hu era, particularly as it contrasts with the approach of Jiang.
The chapter first examines how PLA theoreticians understand the structure and scope of informatization and its subordinate concepts, including the conceptualization of military tasks stemming from informatization, before delving into an examination of the institutional and doctrinal underpinnings of PLA informatization activities. The history of the PLA’s informatization concept is traced from its roots under Jiang to its use by Hu, discerning when possible the substantive differences between the two leaders’ approaches. After examining several areas in which the PLA’s informatization efforts acquired distinctive characteristics under Hu—informatization in response to the New Historic Missions (NHM), greater informatization of PLA training, and the push for integrated command platforms—the chapter offers concluding thoughts on the successes and failures of informatization during Hu’s tenure, and prospects for continued informatization under President Xi Jinping.

**HOW DOES THE PLA DEFINE INFORMATIZATION?**

Informatization (信息化) has, at times, been given a reductive or incomplete treatment in Western analysis of the PLA. When faced with the question of “What does the PLA mean by informatization?” the response offered by Western analysts is often that military informatization is a concept with vaguely delineated boundaries, which in practice is functionally equivalent to the PLA’s “RMA with Chinese characteristics,” or to the modernization of the PLA’s C4ISR capabilities, or to the American military’s concept of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW). While drawing such equivalences can provide a reasonable and
useful approximation of military informatization in certain contexts, it does not capture the full scope of what Chinese policymakers and theoreticians mean by informatization. The central flaw in this approach is the treatment of informatization as a specific monolithic concept, when, in fact, it serves as a “concept of concepts.”

The term “informatization,” at its most universal and elemental, describes the process of moving toward greater collection, systematization, distribution, and utilization of information. Within that ultimate process, however, there are numerous subordinate processes, extending down through multiple layers, from the global trend of informatization to the informatization of particular industries, societies, weapons systems, and the like. At any given level, the term “informatization” can refer to an organic, decentralized process (such as the “informatized conditions” under which the PLA are instructed to prepare to win local wars), to an intentional, directed process (the informatization of weapons and equipment), or in some cases to actions taken by an actor to adapt or prepare for informatization trends beyond its control.

A full account of the PLA’s conceptualization of informatization must start at the national level before moving to the armed forces. In addition to strictly military-oriented guidance and institution formation, the central government has enacted informatization policies that explicitly contain both civilian and military objectives, civilian-oriented informatization policies that directly and indirectly impinge upon the PLA’s ability to carry out its informatization objectives, and informatization policies for China’s other armed forces (the People’s Armed Police and Militia) that interface with corresponding PLA policies. While
this chapter is centered on the PLA’s informatization efforts, one must keep in mind both that these efforts occur within the broader context of Chinese informatization policy, and that national goals and initiatives regarding military informatization may be influenced or propelled by government actions and policies not solely aimed at or implemented by the military.

These contextual complexities, along with the many ways in which the PLA’s missions and structure differ from those of Western armies, tend to render analogies between military informatization and Western concepts such as NCW incomplete or inaccurate in practice. Although PLA scholars do reference NCW and documents such as Joint Vision 2020 as constituting American “military informatization” efforts analogous to their own, those efforts take place in fundamentally different circumstances. For example, the United States does not oversee its civilian economy with overarching “network-centric” policies, with both the civilian and military realms anchored within a common conceptual framework, as the Chinese do with informatization. Nor does the United States have an organization outside the military along the lines of China’s militia system that must be integrated into military informatization efforts for it to fulfill its duties in some of the military’s most important campaign scenarios. Just as these differences cannot be analogized away, they cannot simply be attributed to the difference in technological advancement between the two militaries. For the reasons outlined above, even if the PLA were to gain technological parity with the U.S. military overnight, the guiding concepts of its ongoing military informatization would still diverge from the American concept of NCW in numerous respects.
HOW DOES THE PLA DEVELOP INFORMATIZATION THEORY?

Just as China’s military informatization is situated within the broader context of both China’s national informatization efforts and the global trend toward informatization, the PLA conceptualizes multiple aspects of military informatization within a multilayered framework of theoretical constructs. Informatization is relevant to ongoing PLA crafting of both theory and operational practice on multiple levels, and across numerous overlapping areas of military thought. As informatization is a concept of concepts, understanding the categorical and hierarchical ways in which PLA theoreticians group the many subordinate military and national defense concerns arising from informatization can be a valuable way of contextualizing the many different strains of theory and discussion arising from it.

Since PLA doctrine is developed in research and academic organizations, theoretical discussions by these bodies are often an important guidepost for future changes in PLA strategy and doctrine. The most reputable and consistently influential of these organizations are the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) and the National Defense University (NDU), with the former having a more theoretical focus and the latter engaging more directly with doctrinal development. This section attempts to reflect the consensus of this top-echelon community within the PLA when conveying Chinese views that for the most part have not yet been explicitly codified in publicly available doctrine. The PLA has often displayed years-long “time lags” between academic consensus in the formulation
of concepts, the promulgation of those concepts as the “strategic thought” of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and military leaders, the integration of that top-level guidance into important documents such as gangyao (纲要), and the development of concrete processes and capabilities. This lag is particularly noticeable in the realm of informatization.

Although the concept of military informatization first found official expression through Jiang’s promotion of leapfrog development (跨越式发展) in 1997, it took half a decade for the concept to attain something resembling its current ubiquity. The edition of the PLA’s authoritative Military Terms (军语) put out by the Academy of Military Sciences that same year did not even contain a definition for “informatization,” much less the many specialized terms of art stemming from it, nor did subsequent PLA-issued dictionaries for a number of years afterward. By the close of the year 2000, informatization had been referenced in gangyao on topics such as command automation (指挥自动化建设纲要), noted as an important trend in the biennial Defense White Paper, and designated by Jiang as being, along with mechanization, one of the “dual historical tasks” of the PLA. Yet, military informatization was notably absent from the 10th Five Year Plan, even as civilian informatization was given prominent focus. The PLA’s top-level Military Strategic Guidelines (军事战略方针) did not formally incorporate informatization until 2002, and numerous other important documents did not yet hold military informatization as part of their central focus.

PLA academic and research institutions were nevertheless devoting significant attention to informatization during this period, and much of the core development of military informatization theory took
place during the final years of Jiang’s term as Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman. The essential underlying theoretical framework of the PLA’s current conception of informatization can be seen in the 2000 edition of the authoritative *Science of Campaigns*, albeit without the refinement and standardization of terminology found in the subsequent 2006-07 edition. Jiang’s 2002 speech before the 16th Party Congress, calling informatization both necessary for military modernization and a key enabler of what would now be termed “integrated joint operations” (IJO), touched off a flurry of theoretical construction, with numerous subdivisions of informatization theory being more fully explored.

Within the broad scope of Informatized Military Affairs Theory (信息化军事理论), PLA theoreticians divide theoretical concepts of informatization into three distinct realms: Theories of War and Military Strategy under Informatized Conditions (信息化战争与战略理论); Theories of Informatized Operations, Command, and Support (信息化作战, 指挥与保障理论); and Theories of Informatized National Defense and Troop Building (信息化国防与军队建设理论).

Within the realm of war and military strategy under informatized conditions, PLA writers see important and distinct theoretical questions of how to address national security in the information age (信息时代国防安全理论), strategy for wars under informatized conditions (信息化战争战略理论), achieving military deterrence in the information age (信息时代军事威慑理论), and the current role of the People’s War concept (信息时代人民战争理论), which is held by most PLA theorists to be of continuing relevance (though differing substance) in an age of informatization. These theoretical constructions tie directly into
broader theories in Chinese social science highlighting movement to an “information age” analogous to earlier agricultural or industrial ages, which, in turn, begets an “information society” analogous to earlier industrial or agricultural modes of society. Just as the industrial revolution transformed both the context of warfare and the means by which military capabilities were generated, Chinese theorists perceive the information society as representing a new sea-change with implications for every aspect of warfighting and military construction. PLA theoreticians view this trend as not only altering how wars are fought, but whether or not wars commence at all, with informatization sometimes lowering the barriers to entry into a conflict.9

PLA writers see the realm of informatized operations, command, and support theory as encompassing theories of information warfare (信息战理论), joint operations (联合作战理论), informatized operations and command (信息化作战指挥理论), and informatized support (信息化保障理论). The various conceptualizations of information warfare elucidated by important figures such as Wang Baocun and Dai Qingmin prior to the PLA’s systemic focus on informatization are thus integrated into the broader context of informatization theory. Information warfare theorists have continued to play a significant role in the ongoing development of informatization efforts through advisory bodies established during the Hu era, as discussed later. PLA leaders and theoreticians draw explicit links between military informatization theory and operational concepts such as joint operations and system-of-systems warfare, with Hu Jintao explicitly stating in a 2006 speech that “local wars under informatized conditions are confrontations between systems of systems, and their fundamental operational mode is integrated joint operations.”10
Finally, the PLA’s concept of informatized national defense and troop building includes the concepts of informatized troop building (信息化军队建设理论), national defense mobilization in the information age (信息时代国防动员理论), and military innovation in the information age (信息时代军事创新理论). These final sub-concepts in particular are large-scale, containing multitudes within them. PLA scholars recognize informatized mobilization as requiring systemic communication, coordination, and synchronization between the PLA, China’s other armed forces (the militia and People’s Armed Police), and civilian networks, both for the national defense and for Hu’s focus on the PLA carrying out expanded military operations other than warfare (MOOTW). PLA scholars emphatically view civil-military integration in the defense economy as a key component of both PLA informatization and military innovation, thus intertwining military and civilian informatization efforts.

The key point to recognize about this theoretical framework is the sheer breadth of its scope. Military informatization is conceived not as being confined to a single “realm” of warfare (though PLA writing does often speak of warfare that takes place in an “information realm,” or 信息领域, analogous to land, sea, and air), but rather as a major thread of technological, and thus, historical development that, in turn, necessitates new theoretical constructs, and eventually new doctrinal and operational modes, in virtually every facet of the PLA’s operations.

The scope of military informatization encompasses much of what is traditionally considered to constitute the PLA’s RMA, while also stretching beyond it. The question of how the two concepts interact is not conclusively answered by PLA writings (aside from gen-
eralities such as informatization being at the “core” of RMA), but the relationship between the concepts can be derived from the way the latter is discussed in the context of the former. The PRC and PLA leadership conceive of informatization as a broad trend of history, on par with the industrialization of the 20th century, driven by technological and theoretical innovation. In keeping with this conception, PLA writings virtually never speak of “informatization with Chinese characteristics”; the standard for a doctrine, theory, training system, or weapons platform to be considered successfully “informatized” is a judgment of against this universal historical trend, and the overall progress of “informatization” in the military context is the process of moving, by whatever means, toward achieving that standard. At the same time, actions taken toward achieving this standard will necessarily reflect the PLA’s strategic prioritization of specific missions and campaigns, and the specific operational capabilities and structures developed to achieve this standard will reflect the unique characteristics of both the Chinese armed forces and China as a whole.

The ongoing “RMA with Chinese Characteristics” can thus be described as one of the primary vehicles by which the PLA moves through the process of military informatization. The policies comprising the RMA are largely aimed at meeting a specific test, embodied in Hu’s guidance to “build an informatized military capable of winning local wars under informatized conditions,” whose parameters are shaped by the global progress of informatization rather than by a fixed reference point. Jiang Zemin similarly stated an explicit understanding that the progress of RMA would necessarily hinge on the ability to achieve the requirements of informatization, and the PLA’s con-
ceptual framework did not change on this point during Hu’s tenure. Building an informatized military is not the only aim of RMA or the sole measure of whether China’s RMA has been successful, but it is a major central facet. China must thus, in the words of former Premier Wen Jiabao discussing the RMA, “walk a road to informatization that has Chinese characteristics” by carrying out an RMA shaped according to China’s particular strategic objectives and existing military composition.

FROM THEORY DEVELOPMENT TO CONCRETE INFORMATIZATION EFFORTS

The process of building an informatized military takes the military use of information technology, particularly C4ISR technology, as its foundational base, predicated on the PLA’s technical and organizational ability to exploit military information, all with the goal of raising overall military power through multiple simultaneous avenues. In the practical sense, the PLA’s informatization efforts can be divided into three distinct yet complementary (and sometimes overlapping) spheres. Each of the three spheres relies on progress in the others in order to derive maximum benefit from informatization.

The first sphere is the development of human capital to best exploit opportunities presented by informatization. Starting from the PLA’s top leadership, this sphere involves incorporating proficiency with informatized platforms into the PLA’s training, recruitment, and promotion processes, as well as altering the RD&A process to produce military systems that are better suited to integration into system-of-systems networks, including oversight to ensure the resulting systems are fit for purpose.
The second sphere is the introduction and provision of informatized technology. This includes the retrofitting of old equipment with informatized components, the introduction of new platforms and capabilities such as C4ISR and weapons systems, and finally the integration of platforms and systems of varying sophistications and vintages to one another in order to share information from the top down (command and control), from the bottom up (sensing, measurement, and reconnaissance), and laterally (across the services and branches in informatized Integrated Joint Warfare). This sphere extends across time through the full system life-cycle, from research, development, and acquisition to implementation, proficiency training, and maintenance.

The final sphere takes place at the organizational level. It includes the modernization of operational concepts and organizational structures in ways that better enable the utilization of informatized systems and personnel, generally moving toward the formation of units which are more modular, diversified, and flexible in their range of capabilities and missions undertaken. Some military informatization experts, conceiving of these three spheres as being successively “phased in” to informatization efforts at a certain point in a military’s overall development, classify this structural sphere as arriving during a “third and final phase” of informatization. They base this classification on both the general presumption that institutional barriers and inertia in organizational culture are in some sense a greater challenge to the success of informatization than purely technical barriers, and also on the specific recognition that the Chinese military has not traditionally valued data, information, and lateral coordination on the level of its Western counterparts, an
“era gap” in organizational culture akin to the better-understood “era gap” between Chinese and Western military technology.\textsuperscript{14}

Within the broader scope of PLA informatization theory and the spheres of action outlined above, PLA academics have adopted a number of conceptual frameworks that draw a relationship between broad theories of informatization, the above conception of what military informatization efforts entail, and more specific tasks or roles they believe the military should undertake as a result of informatization (军队信息化的任务). Although there is an ongoing debate as to the finer points of specific taxonomies, the mainstream of PLA thought sorts the work necessary to build an informatized military into five major task categories.\textsuperscript{15}

The first category is combat and combat readiness informatization. In the thinking of PLA theoreticians, since the informatized mode of warfare is characterized by a rapid operations tempo, the expansion of the battlespace to ever broader domains, and a high quantity of information flow, successful combat readiness is highly dependent on the establishment of key informatized capabilities such as an integrated command architecture. Establishing the capability for real-time combat readiness and responsiveness is also crucial, and is accomplished through information network construction and the linkage of military communication networks, radar networks, computer networks, early warning capabilities, and other C4ISR architectures with information processing and command automation architectures sufficient for an integrated, resilient command and control capability that is responsive to real-time information inputs. Finally, efforts to prepare for varied forms of information warfare, ranging from electronic warfare, to computer net-
work operations to psychological warfare, fall within this domain as well.

The second category is the informatization of weapons and equipment. To meet the requirements of informatized warfare, both combat platforms and equipment require integration into both discrete connected systems and also systems of systems. This includes the transition to informatized weapon targeting and precision-guided weapons and munitions, both by grafting information technology onto existing weapons and by enshrining the ability to integrate harmoniously with existing information platforms and systems as a key requirement during the RD&A process. The informatization of existing weapons systems is particularly crucial for the PLA’s capacity building at this juncture. Despite steadily rising budgets, the PLA will continue to have technology of widely varying vintages in its force structure for many years to come, all of which must eventually be made capable of interfacing with its increasingly sophisticated C4ISR networks. This sphere also encompasses the introduction of new categories of weaponry, including directed energy weapons, kinetic energy weapons, nonlethal weapons, particle beam weapons, microwave weapons, and laser weapons, which the PLA sees as having the potential to play an important role in achieving and exploiting information superiority over future adversaries.

The third is the informatization of logistics support systems. PLA researchers see a general global trend in which the increasing complexity of informatized weapons and equipment leads to greater emphasis on logistics support as a point of failure, with the informatization of those systems being a necessity if the PLA is going to reliably conduct operations un-
der informatized conditions. This includes command automation, the development of specialized informatized logistics technology and management systems, the implementation of highly networked supply chain management, and when possible integrating civilian technology and civilian resources into military supply networks in order to improve logistics support capabilities.

The fourth is the informatization of military training and education. Training and education informatization involves both improvements in the emphasis and content of training and the introduction of new technologies (particularly various kinds of simulation technologies) and platforms into the training process, each with the aim of more effectively and efficiently preparing members of the military for combat under informatized conditions. This also includes the development of new guidelines and regulations for informatized operations, and the formation and support of institutions engaged in developing and teaching about informatized warfare at the strategic, doctrinal, and tactical levels. Informatization plays a particularly important role in the PLA’s efforts to improve its training processes, with PLA authors within the General Staff Department (GSD) and elsewhere describing it as a key enabler of joint training exercises and thus the PLA’s ability to successfully conduct joint military operations.

The fifth and final category is informatization of the PLA’s managerial work and its subordinate systems. To the extent that the efficiency and effectiveness of PLA management tasks directly impinges on the success of virtually every other mission discussed previously, informatization of management tasks is considered an indirect enabler of the PLA’s ability to
conduct and succeed at operations under informatized conditions. The establishment of information systems and the integration of information resources into existing systems fall within this task, as does the management of information itself in domains such as information security.

These tasks are prioritized within the context of PLA perceptions that near-future warfare scenarios are likely to consist of short, high intensity campaigns. In this conception of combat, victory will accrue to militaries that effectively employ informatized systems-of-systems through integrated joint operations to deny the use of information to their adversaries, establish information dominance, and maintain information control. Priority is given to specific informatization tasks with the potential to have a disproportionate impact on a limited, asymmetrical conflict versus a more powerful (and most likely more informatized) adversary.

INFORMATIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TRANSITION FROM JIANG TO HU’S LEADERSHIP

When examining theoretical discussions of military informatization by PLA scholars writing near the end of both Jiang and Hu’s terms as Chairman of the CMC, perhaps the most striking thing one notices is actually the lack of fundamental differences between them. In most respects, the PLA’s informatization under Hu Jintao represented a continuation of the long-term strategy put in place by Jiang Zemin, both in terms of broad content—the “leapfrog” informatization of an army that has, in its own estimation, not yet fully completed the previous process of mechanization—and in terms of milestone timing.
The PLA can be said to have broadly followed the “three-step” scale laid out by Jiang’s CMC in 1997 and preserved under Hu, which established three milestones in the construction of informatized armed forces that were ideally to be passed by 2010, 2020, and mid-century. The first step, the 2010 goal of building a “solid foundation” for “building an informatized army” and “winning informatized wars,” has essentially been met. In some cases, language and descriptions of particular concepts that were formerly somewhat ambiguous have had their parameters more sharply defined (as with the integrated command platform, discussed later), and in others, there has been an increased emphasis on particular concepts that highlight particular contours of how war under informatized conditions may play out. But on the whole, the theoretical underpinnings of the PLA’s understanding of what military informatization entails have not been significantly altered since Jiang’s CMC tenure. The aim remains to use the “two transformations,” mechanization and informatization, to transition the PLA from a force that is personnel-intensive to a force that is science and technology-intensive.

If the PLA’s fundamental conception of informatization remained relatively unchanged, however, the actions taken by Chinese leadership in its name have differed significantly. One key factor underlying the PLA’s rapid informatization under Hu’s term as CMC Chairman is that many of the major institutional barriers that once stood in its way were already dismantled or weakened as the result of the Jiang’s power contests with elements of the PLA leadership.

Under Jiang, emphasis on the Chinese RMA (and thus informatization) took on not only programmatic but political dimensions, with major implications for
the distribution of power, financial resources, and personnel within the PLA, including for force reductions that were resisted by elements of the PLA leadership. This gave jockeying over the scope, pace, and emphasis of informatization efforts much the same degree of political content as was seen in Jiang’s efforts to dismantle the PLA’s business empire.\(^\text{19}\) At the same time, the end of the PLA’s business activities created an important incentive for the PLA leadership to support increased budgets for informatization and RMA efforts as a means of replacing the lost revenue from their former businesses.\(^\text{20}\)

By the time Hu was installed as CMC Chairman, many of these major battles had already been fought and won. With the CMC endorsing “leapfrog development” through the “dual construction” concept (双化建设) of simultaneous mechanization and informatization, Jiang cut over 700,000 soldiers from the PLA during his tenure. Although the dual trends of calls for force reductions (primarily from the Army) and a greater share of resources going to the relatively informatization-driven PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Navy (PLAN) continued during Hu’s term, the basic contours of the PLA’s reform and informatization efforts during the Hu era were already cast without requiring Hu to expend political capital.

The PLA’s misfortune may have also worked to Hu’s advantage. As Hu was preparing to take over the Chairmanship of the CMC, the Ming-361 incident, a mechanical malfunction that claimed the lives of all hands on board a Ming-class submarine, threw PLA training deficiencies into sharp relief.\(^\text{21}\) After the incident itself, the submarine’s base remained unaware of its loss until over a week later, when it was discovered by fishing boats, causing four senior PLAN officers
to be sacked for “improper command and control.” This disastrous peacetime loss may have helped solidify support for an emphasis on improved C2 and informatized training.

With his political burdens lessened both by tragic circumstance and by the political accomplishments of his predecessor, Hu was able to focus primarily on the more technocratic challenges of policy implementation. The success of Hu’s informatization policies is best assessed not on the basis of achieving a certain lasting political and institutional consensus, as was the case with Jiang, but rather on the extent to which he brought about the successful implementation of informatization efforts in recognized areas of weakness for the PLA. Although Hu and Jiang may have differed in their various personal qualities, there was a fundamental continuity in their approaches to informatization that makes charting the unique properties of informatization in the Hu era a matter of drawing subtle distinctions rather than broad strokes.

AREAS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JIANG AND HU’S MANAGEMENT OF MILITARY INFORMATIZATION

The first several years of Hu’s tenure as CMC chairman saw the concept of informatization achieve new centrality in PLA strategic thinking, continuing the trend of Jiang’s final years in office. The Military Strategic Guidelines (军事战略方针) were formally amended in 2002, updating Jiang’s goal of the PLA being able to win “local wars under high-tech conditions” to preparing for “local wars under informatized conditions.” This change had been several years in the making. PLA doctrine under Jiang had consistently
spoken of the transformative impact of information technology, information warfare, and the information sphere of the battlefield as fundamental elements of the form of asymmetrical warfare that the PLA sees itself as preparing to fight, all of which fit within the theoretical framework of military informatization that was being constructed.

Under Hu, this recognition of informatization as the nucleus of the “high-tech conditions” shaping the future of warfare began to be reflected in an increasing range of doctrinal documents, which, in turn, integrated with China’s broader informatization strategy encompassing both the military and civilian spheres. As a result, the emphasis of preparation for informatized conflict broadened from the possession and use of advanced technology to encompass how changes in strategy, doctrine, and operations can enable a fuller leveraging of those technological advances. In 2005, a military gangyao specifically devoted to informatization (军队信息化建设规划纲要) was issued for the first time, covering the 15-year span from 2006 through 2020. The gangyao emphasized the need for major fundamental reforms in the military’s dissemination and utilization of information, based on a high-level perception that the current state of military informatization was inadequate for successfully conducting system-of-systems operations.24

In 2006, following the informatization gangyao, the PLA’s Headquarters Regulations were updated for the first time in a decade, stressing informatization to a far greater degree than their predecessors.25 Clause 7 of the General Staff Department’s (GSD) section of those regulations imbued GSD with primary responsibility for overseeing the day-to-day work of the All-PLA Informatization Leading Small Group.
GSD “informatization laboratories” have since been tasked with key informatization-related projects, such as the construction of integrated command platforms. In 2008, a new update to the Outlines on Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE, also referred to as DaGang) was issued with a greater emphasis on informatization, a development discussed in greater detail below. Finally, in 2011 the GSD’s Communications Department was reorganized into the “Informatization Department,” reflecting the central role given to GSD by Hu-era doctrine and regulations to manage the military’s informatization efforts.\(^2^6\)

The latter half of Jiang’s term as Chairman of the CMC saw a push to mirror the civilian decisionmaking and organizational apparatus for oversight of civilian informatization efforts in the military realm, a trend that continued under Hu. For most of this time period, national informatization efforts in China were overseen by the high-level State Informatization Leading Small Group (国家信息化领导小组), which, in turn, oversaw the State Council Informatization Office (国务院信息化工作办公室, SCITO) and was served by the expert Advisory Committee for State Informatization (国家信息化专家咨询委员会, ACSI). These bodies were subsumed into the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) upon its creation in 2008.\(^2^7\) ACSI and the State Informatization Leading Small Group are both known to still exist as discrete entities under this new arrangement, although the current configuration of what was previously known as SCITO is somewhat unclear.
The PLA, for its part, appears to have had an All-PLA Informatization Leading Small Group (全军信息化领导小组) since at least 2002, with an All-PLA Informatization Work Office (全军信息化工作办公室) that appears to match the functions of SCITO located under the GSD Informatization Department since at least 2004. It was not until 2005, however, that an All-PLA Informatization Expert Advisory Committee (全军信息化专家咨询委员会) was established. With respected information warfare theoretician (and former head of GSD’s electronic warfare (EW)-oriented 4th Department) Dai Qingmin, serving as the Committee’s head from its founding until his formal retirement in December 2010, the Committee has provided a relatively independent body of analysis on informatization challenges facing the PLA. Organizationally, the Committee is only a partial mirror of its civilian counterpart; it reports to both the CMC and the four General Departments, and specific Informatization Expert Advisory Committees for the Navy (海军信息化专家咨询委员会) and the Air Force (空军信息化专家咨询委员会) have also been established.28

Steps have been taken in recent years to link these parallel systems. Under Hu’s leadership, in 2006 the State Council issued its first-ever State Informatization Development Strategy (国家信息化发展战略) covering the years 2006 to 2020, issued by the State Council. The parallels between this Strategy and the military informatization gangyao covering the same span of time are not a coincidence. The Strategy explicitly establishes the military’s modernization as being one of four goals of the nation’s overall informatization efforts, and organizations operating within the realms of both military and civilian informatization, such as defense technical universities and military hospitals,
take both documents as collectively expressing a comprehensive overview of China’s overall informatization efforts to 2020. In addition to this harmonization of policy, recent years have seen continued deepening of linkages between the aforementioned civilian and military informatization organizations, with members of the National and all-PLA Informatization Expert Advisory Groups meeting and collaborating on joint assessments with increasing frequency. There has also been a broader trend toward greater explicit emphasis being given by experts on both sides to the role that informatization in the civilian economy plays in military informatization efforts.

Alongside these doctrinal and organizational changes, the process of establishing and revising underlying military concepts and theory has continued in the background, and here a degree of continuity can be observed. One useful lens for observing the evolution of the PLA’s informatization theory between Jiang and Hu’s terms as CMC Chairman is by examining the concept’s presentations in the 2000 and 2006-07 editions of the *Science of Campaigns*. Produced by the Academy of Military Sciences and National Defense University, *Science of Campaigns* is the closest thing that exists to a codified summation of PLA academic thinking on the doctrine, methodology, and theoretical constructs undergirding the missions the military may be tasked with undertaking. Changes in the *Science of Campaigns* are likely to at least somewhat correlate with changes in PLA doctrine and strategic thought, though as noted above, there may be a significant time lag between a concept cohering in this venue and its full programmatic implementation into military operations.
In the 2006 edition of the *Science of Campaigns*, informatization is not only discussed in the context of its importance for carrying out a given mission, but also noted as a “basic essential element of campaign strength.” The authors describe military operations taking place within a functional “domain of military information,” distinct from the separately introduced concept of the electromagnetic domain, in which forces can exercise “information power.” Looking forward, the authors see information as pervading every aspect of future combat, beginning with the battlefield “informatized battlefield environment” and extending to a general reliance on information power to “fully bring all the resources of war, both capabilities and materiel, into play.” Although the integration of C4ISR systems is explicitly mentioned as an important task, the authors repeatedly emphasize the need for functional integration of all informatized platforms in order to “grasp the integrated whole.”

This train of thought dovetails logically with attempts by the PLA in subsequent years to develop integrated command platform architectures, and, at various points, the authors emphasize the importance of each of the capabilities that would eventually comprise that architecture. Reconnaissance is described as a central task, with an accurate, real-time, reliable information collection capability being essential for proper exercise of command and control. Command and control (C2), EW capabilities, operational support capabilities, and logistics and equipment support capabilities are all described as essential and interlocking elements of a successful campaign.

Yet, while this mode of thinking about informatization to a large extent mirrors the centrality of informatization under Hu Jintao, these concepts are also
largely present in the edition of *Science of Campaigns* produced in 2000 during Jiang’s tenure, albeit sometimes phrased in different terms. One must be hesitant, then, to conclude that any observed increase in concrete informatization activities or greater theoretical emphasis on informatization under Hu Jintao was simply the result of Hu’s leadership and decisionmaking; the intellectual groundwork had been laid in advance during the term of his predecessor, raising the possibility that observed differences may have been partly or wholly the result of the PLA progressing through stages of increasing informatization without a substantial altering of course.

Despite a large degree of overlap between informatization under Hu and Jiang, there are also several substantive distinctions of emphasis between the guiding strategic concepts of the two eras. Three of the most important are Hu’s conception of the PLA’s NHM (the “Three Responsibilities and One Role”), Hu’s emphasis on informatized training, and most recently the PLA’s major push to achieve an integrated joint command capability through the development and deployment of informatized command platform architectures, policy objectives which have occurred alongside a policy emphasis on informatization in civilian industries and deepening civil-military integration.

INFORMATIZATION AND THE NEW HISTORIC MISSIONS

Hu’s New Historic Missions (NHM) considerably broadened the range of operations that the PLA is expected to perform, both in terms of MOOTW and in a broader conception of the military’s role in safeguard-
ing China’s national interests. After several years of planning and doctrinal development to accommodate Hu’s emphasis on MOOTW, the ability to carry out non-combat operations has become a regular consideration in all aspects of PLA force development, ranging from training and exercises to equipment RD&A. The PLAN in particular has gained a broader tasking, not only engaging in exercises but conducting operations in far seas for the first time in China’s modern history. Addressing the distinct force modernization challenges posed by the NHM necessitates an emphasis on different aspects of informatization than those most relevant to the PLA’s usual focus on regional combat operations against an asymmetric adversary, with the emphasis shifting to logistics and support informatization, as well as communication and interoperability with civilian and militia communications networks, and C2 platforms for both defense mobilization and the conduct of operations.

Another means by which the NHM has influenced the direction of informatization is in its expanding conception of China’s national interests and the PLA’s defense of those interests. The NHM has continued an important trend of PLA thought dating from the 1990s by expanding the number of realms in which it considers itself to have critical assets and interests to be safeguarded, going beyond the traditional land, sea, and air domains into the electromagnetic spectrum (including information networks) and space. Chinese anxiety about the PLA’s capacity to fulfill this mission is reflected in its being named as the second of the “two incompatibilities,” Hu’s 2008 formulation of crucial PLA missions where the military’s current capabilities are inadequate.
Although there remains debate within both the PLA and the community of Western Chinese military analysts as to whether the NHM risk displacing or jeopardizing the PLA’s preparation for traditional combat roles by diluting the focus of training and force modernization efforts, there are considerable areas of overlap between informatization directed at fulfilling the NHM, informatization directed at the PLA’s traditional aims, and civilian informatization objectives. The latter synergy is bi-directional, encompassing both military technology and platforms that are “spun off” to benefit civilian informatization, and civilian technologies, and information technologies which are “spun on” and integrated into military equipment and networks. This informatization overlap has given additional ammunition to PLA scholars arguing that the concept of military-civil fusion (军民融合, sometimes translated as “civil-military integration”) is not only an important component of China’s defense RD&A system, but also a crucial aspect of military informatization.35

INFORMATIZED TRAINING AND PERSONNEL POLICIES UNDER HU

As noted in previous writing on the modernization of PLA training, “the PLA, like all militaries seeking to integrate increasingly advanced technology, confronts a difficult set of personnel problems,” with a persistent gap between the degree of technical proficiency required to successfully operate PLA systems and equipment and the caliber of officers and enlisted personnel the PLA is able to recruit.36 The informatization of PLA training, in both the sense of greater training for the use of informatized systems and improved
use of simulation and other informatized platforms in the conduct of training, is one important means of filling that gap, and PLA authors recognize that informatized training has resulted in a “fundamental change in the mode of generating warfighting capability.”

The role of “informatized training” has grown considerably on Hu’s watch. Informatized training was mentioned for the first time in the 2005 directives on training, and was given increased prominence in 2006 and 2007 directives, including 2007’s “Decision on the Strengthening of the Military Training in the New Century and the New Stage.” PLA writers discussing efforts to reform the military’s training initiatives directly link the development of informatized training to the ability to conduct multiservice joint training exercises, a form of warfare with which the PLA has precious little experience.

Above the level of more general directives on training are the Outlines on Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE), also referred to as the DaGang (民兵军事训练与考核大纲). These training guidelines are incredibly important to the PLA’s operational evolution, as they represent the means through which doctrinal innovations are incorporated into the military’s ongoing training exercises. There is not one single unified DaGang; rather, they are a collection of over 100 documents covering varying missions and roles, with the corresponding documents being issued to military organizations in all services and branches at all levels. These instructions are the core of the PLA’s training methodologies, and when updated have resulted in a number of new training initiatives.

The DaGang underwent major revisions in 2007 and 2008, with changes such as the addition of specific documents for militia units and shifts in doctrinal em-
phasis. Perhaps the biggest shift in emphasis has been described as “moving from training for warfare under conditions of mechanization to training for warfare under conditions of informatization,” in essence a shift toward informatized modes of training. The shift amounts to a difference in emphasis rather than a binary dichotomy.

One result of this emphasis is additional attention paid to “adapting to the informatized battlefield environment” as well as offensive and defensive information warfare, including training for “achieving the aims of warfare in complex electromagnetic environments” (which, in the PLA’s expansive use of the term “electromagnetic,” includes a wide variety of information networks) and increased use of informatized command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and weapons systems. This dovetails with the push under Hu (discussed later) to develop integrated command platforms; the PLA aims to develop these platforms such that the exact same platform is suitable for use in both simulation-based training and battlefield scenarios, thus improving that training’s real-world relevance and overall quality. Many of these tasks had been outlined years prior as desired future proficiencies for PLA personnel, exemplifying the gradual transmission of concepts developed by PLA theoreticians into doctrine.

The new DaGang also places greater emphasis on MOOTW and “peacetime emergency operations,” particularly those that require active-duty forces to coordinate with and lead militia and civilian assets. Informatization plays a crucial role in the military’s ability to accomplish these tasks, which derive in part from the NHM that had been recently outlined by Hu Jintao.
In this development, several trends of informatization begin to overlap; under Hu’s leadership, significant emphasis was placed on integration of the PLA and the militia, and on the militia’s informatization. After emphasizing greater integration of militia and civilian networks with the PLA in 2004 through the NHM, 2006 saw the first ever informatization-related gangyao issued for the militia system, involving the informatization and integration of its air defense network. Following on the heels of this change, the 2007 inclusion of militias, the DaGang system, and the integration of militia networks into the PLA’s integrated command platform architectures suggests a consistent trend toward integrating the militia and China’s broader armed forces into top-level PLA informatization planning, which will be reflected in training efforts going forward.

These changes are not solely technical and organizational in nature. To the extent that one can conclusively discern shifts in the focus of the PLA’s informatization process during Hu’s term, an increased emphasis on the human element of informatization is palpable. In 2011, Hu ratified the “2020 Military Personnel Human Capital Development Plan” gangyao (2020 年前军队人才发展规划纲要), establishing the development of personnel capable of managing an informatized force as a high-level requirement for achieving the PLA’s development goals over the next decade, and placing that development at the core of the PLA’s ability to effectively seize the potential of system-of-systems operations.45 The transition from the 11th to the 12th Five Year Plan also reflects top-level guidance to deepen the informatization of training and military education.46
Noting the importance of personnel, Hu once declared that “the global revolution in military affairs is not only a revolution of military technology and organizational structures, but a revolution in military management,” a position reflected not only in informatization policy but also in many personnel-centric initiatives tied to his guiding thinking of “scientific development.” 47 There is acknowledgment within the PLA that high-level strategic thinking and doctrine on training has yet to fully permeate the training process, and that training as it currently stands remains inadequate for the successful conduct of warfare under informatized conditions. 48 It appears likely that Hu’s push for informatized training will continue to guide the PLA’s informatization process well into Xi’s tenure as CMC Chairman.

INTEGRATED COMMAND PLATFORMS AND INTEGRATED JOINT OPERATIONS

In order to properly contextualize the significance of the PLA’s recent focus on integrated command platform architectures, a brief return to discussion of Chinese military theory is necessary. PLA authors repeatedly link the move toward informatization with the development of a capability for “integrated joint operations” (一体化联合作战), which is specifically distinguished from merely “joint” operations (联合作战). This new form of combat has its theoretical basis in the PLA’s concept of “system of systems” operations (体系作战), the idea that the future of warfare involves the interaction of numerous informatized systems which, in turn, form a system-of-systems greater than the sum of their parts. In the PLA’s thinking, integrated joint operations is the practical real-world expres-
sion of special operations squadron (SoS) operations, and senior PLA theoreticians often use the terms interchangeably or explicitly equate them to one another. Integrated joint operations are “a prominent feature of future informatized warfare,” and must necessarily be a major focus of “overall informatization planning and guidance,” in that “effectively integrating all kinds of information systems into systems of systems” for the purpose of enabling integrated joint operations will translate into “increased military capabilities on the informatized battlefields of the future.”

The main difference between simple “joint operations” and integrated joint operations is that the former has traditionally been “joint in name only,” without rising to the level of what Western military would ordinarily term “jointness,” implying the simultaneous use of forces from multiple services and branches conducting coordinated operations based on orders received through a joint command post. Until recently, factors such as weighting of command post personnel toward the army, lack of interoperable communications architectures, and lack of institutional emphasis on interservice coordination have rendered PLA joint exercises a hollow shell of their notional potential, with the participating services generally either assigned to oppose one another or conducting nonintegrated operations in proximity to one another.

Integrated joint operations, by contrast, possesses all the hallmarks of jointness that the U.S. military has taken for granted for decades, such as integrated command and control, a near-real-time Common Operational Picture (COP), and reliable, regularly utilized avenues of interservice communication. Such operations are nearly impossible to conduct without the necessary C4ISR technology. In Cortez Cooper’s words,
the ability of the PLA to successfully conduct integrated joint warfare depends heavily on “develop[ing] and employ[ing] an integrated platform or network for rapid joint war zone information collection, fusion, dissemination, and command decision.” The sort of architecture necessary for enabling these tasks, a system of informatized systems, has been described conceptually by PLA theoreticians using a variety of broad terminology for over a decade. In recent years, however, the architecture has become more concrete, with development underway in GSD informatization laboratories (particularly the 61st Research Institute), the promulgation of standards for interfacing and interoperability, and deployment and testing in public military exercises.

This architecture is now explicitly described as constituting an Integrated Command Platform (一体化指挥平台, ICP), the glue connecting together unlike systems of varying origins and levels of technological sophistication and informatization. The ICP concept grew out of prior notions of “command automation systems” (指挥自动化系统), with the evolution reflected in 2006’s informatization-focused Headquarters Regulations. The ongoing development of ICPs is a core focus of current PLA informatization efforts. ICPs are not merely command and control systems; they encompass communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and even electronic warfare capabilities within a unified, integrated framework. Various ICPs with separate development teams, capabilities, and user-bases (and often incomplete or insufficient interoperability with one another) are simultaneously under development.

One noteworthy feature of ICPs is their integration not only of varied military systems, but also of Peo-
ple’s Armed Police (PAP), militia, and civilian data and communications networks. This broadening of systems integration beyond purely military-controlled systems is not only a potential boon for the PLA’s ability to coordinate resources and produce an accurate COP when conducting warfighting operations in their own backyard, but also recognized by PLA academics as a necessary condition for conducting the various nonwarfare mobilizations and operations that the military has been tasked with undertaking as part of Hu Jintao’s NHM concept. ICP development thus represents another major potential convergence point for multiple vectors of ongoing PLA and non-PLA informatization efforts.

As various ICPs are being developed within a number of military organizations, top-down coordination is necessary to ensure compatibility and interoperability. The issuing of guidance on “standardization and integration” in software design by the GSD Informatization Department appears to have had an impact in this regard, leading to the formulation of a series of “211” standards for military software and hardware which apply to interconnection and interoperability with ICPs. These standards range from “211A” which cover engineering requirements, to “211K” which cover database structure, with guidelines for information exchange protocols, packet transfer protocol specifications, and various other aspects of interoperability, all issued with the goal of creating an environment where applications and information can be shared on demand across a varied range of systems. Early ICP test deployments have at times been faulted for lacking sufficient interoperability and functionality, a problem that can only be resolved through improved adherence to uniform standards.
The push toward deployment of integrated command platforms for testing and training has gained momentum in recent years, alongside an increase in training exercises intended to simulate integrated joint operations. In July 2013, for example, the Chengdu Military Region staged the latest in a series of “command and confrontation” exercises coordinating multiple services that were connected through the use of integrated command platforms. Recently, however, there appears to have been some evolution away from this mindset. Although it is difficult to pinpoint the extent to which ICP is solely or primarily responsible for the observed evolution of PLA exercises with a joint warfare component, there does appear to be a noticeable uptick in the past 2 years in multiservice exercises that feature truly “joint” coordination and cooperation to at least some extent. Other PLA authors, however, have highlighted the incomplete deployment of ICPs as an obstacle, with different types of units across the armed forces having access to different ICPs and information sharing mechanisms.56

It is too early to tell whether these efforts will bear fruit. Integration of these platforms into military region training exercises has only been happening with any frequency since 2011, hardly enough time to judge the outcome of such an inherently disruptive, transformative process. In some military regions, the introduction of ICPs has been combined with a major push in emphasis toward integrated joint operations, further increasing the pace of change.57

Through recent PLA training exercises involving operations against a “red team” under complex simulations of real-world conditions, evidence is emerging that ICPs are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for successfully conducting integrated joint opera-
tions, as even a fully functioning integrated command platform can be utilized poorly by undertrained troops following outdated methodologies and doctrines.\textsuperscript{58} ICPs have some way to go, and there appears to be some recognition within the military leadership that this will be a fairly long-term undertaking, with only gradual displays of progress.\textsuperscript{59}

As a result, important questions remain as to what form ICP communications and coordination capabilities will take when they eventually graduate from simulations, testing, and training, and are made directly available to lower-level units on the battlefield. Although they often extol the virtues of information sharing, PLA publications discussing planned development of ICPs have also mentioned the need for higher-grade units to actively filter information before passing it downward, out of concern for both maintaining the PLA’s traditionally proactive C2 capability and for preventing information overload from stymieing low-level tactical decisionmaking.\textsuperscript{60} PLA theoreticians also see integrated command platforms as offering increased potential for “skip echelon” (跨级) C2, in which an organization more than one grade above another is able to “reach down” to directly issue commands.\textsuperscript{61}

However, there is also some evidence that the PLA explicitly views informatization as a means to better enable both ISR sharing and communications between units in the field and lower-level commanders “reaching up” several levels above them when necessary. Unlike previous ISR sharing arrangements, which had information being passed from the bottom up level by individual level, the PLA’s ICPs have been specifically designed to not only enable ISR sharing from command units to lower levels, but also from individual
soldiers at the company level up to the level of group army command headquarters, with communication bypassing intermediate levels. One recent military exercise even prominently featured individual PLA soldiers “skipping echelons” to directly call in airstrikes from PLAAF bombers on enemy positions.\textsuperscript{62}

This is, to put it mildly, not the way that the PLA has historically done business. Whether the PLA’s battlefield implementation of ICPs actually achieves this degree of operational flexibility will inevitably also depend on other factors such as reforms in training, doctrine, and organizational culture. Debates are ongoing within the PLA as to whether greater emphasis should be placed on commanders of lower-grade units taking independent initiative. Here, again, the deployment of ICPs dovetails with other informatization developments; although the PLA recognizes from the experience of the U.S. military that granting operational flexibility to low-level commanders often leads to superior results, but those gains are impossible to realize without improved training and other shifts in organizational culture. ICPs can facilitate doctrinal evolution in either direction; the same architectures that could empower lower-level officers to make rapid, autonomous decisions can also be used to increase the degree of real-time oversight and command capabilities of higher-grade organizations. Although its specific contours have yet to be determined, the essential technological underpinnings are now in place for a substantial movement toward some form of the integrated joint operations concept attaining primacy both in theory and in practice.
CONCLUSION

Even with the benefit of hindsight, it is often difficult to draw clear-cut distinctions as to which changes in informatization policy and doctrine during Hu’s time as Chairman of the CMC are best credited to his leadership and initiative, and which were simply natural outgrowths of decisions made under the leadership of his predecessor. To some extent, however, this distinction is an artificial one; examining the Chinese military as a “system of systems,” one of its most salient features is the existence of numerous mechanisms for a leader to continue to exert his influence even after he has exited the stage. Just as many of Jiang’s initiatives to expand the scope, depth, and pace of military informatization bore fruit under the Hu era, it is likely that many of Hu’s initiatives that were in their infancy or only partially developed at the close of his leadership term will continue to mature under Xi Jinping.

During Hu’s term, the PLA fully embraced informatization as a central guiding principle of military theory and doctrine, an underlying firmament uniting concepts such as the RMA with Chinese characteristics, information warfare, integrated joint warfare, and the system-of-systems approach to military operations. Under Xi, then, it is likely that this theoretical centrality will be translated into concrete organizational and systemic transformations in an increasingly broad range of spheres.

However, the PLA’s theoretical sophistication is still not matched by operational realities. Its leaders and theoreticians are not blind to the gap, and recognize that informatized technology alone will not generate effective combat abilities if they are not paired
with modernized personnel and organizational structures. In addition to his role overseeing the 12th Five Year Plan, Hu has left Xi with numerous plans and doctrines in place, guiding development out to 2020, when the PLA will ostensibly complete its second phase of “leapfrog development.” A great number of these plans relate to the human side of informatization, a modernization challenge that perhaps surpasses even the technological leaps and bounds the PLA has overcome during the past decade. Jiang’s informatization legacy centers on his bringing the PLA to embrace fully science and technology modernization, even though many of his initiatives will not fully permeate the military until after his departure. Despite the accelerated scope of technological progress under his leadership, Hu’s informatization legacy ultimately may be his laying the groundwork for the PLA to one day produce personnel and organizational structures that are up to the historic task of utilizing effectively the informatized systems and platforms they are acquiring.

Implications for the United States.

These trends, taken together, have the potential to impact significantly the calculus of U.S. policymakers and military strategists, as well as the broader Sino-American military-to-military relationship. The whole of informatization is greater than the sum of its parts, and there are policy implications stemming from China’s informatization that stretch beyond the importance of each individual informatization effort.

First and foremost, U.S. military strategists focusing on scenarios involving China must understand the impact of informatization trends not only in terms
of specific weapons and support platforms, but also in terms of integration between military and civilian informatization and networks, both in peacetime and in defense mobilization or conflict scenarios. Accurately understanding these linkages will enable better prediction of both the outputs of China’s RD&A processes and the actions of Chinese political and military actors in war or crisis scenarios.

However, informatization should be understood as a source not only of increased military strength and power projection capabilities, but also of new systemic vulnerabilities. As the PLA develops advanced C4ISR technologies and integration with civilian networks, they are likely to become increasingly reliant on those systems through training and doctrine, ultimately replicating the supposedly “asymmetric” vulnerabilities in these areas that PLA theoreticians traditionally have noted in their analyses of the U.S. military. Shared vulnerabilities could potentially give rise to shared interests with the United States, opening an additional path by which China may move toward becoming a status quo power in the space and cyber domains.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

2. The overall concept of informatization originates with Japanese intellectuals in the 1970s, and Chinese sources love to demonstrate continuity of thought by noting that it was once briefly mentioned by Deng Xiaoping as being of importance. But it was under Jiang that the military implications and implementations of informatization truly began to coalesce.

3. Due to the complexities of the Chinese language, the word xinxihua in Chinese can refer to both the state of being informatized and the process of informatization, leading some Chinese scholars to make remarks such as “informatization is both a state and a process” that can sometimes cause related concepts to appear to bleed together to non-Chinese-speaking analysts.

4. See, for example, the reference to the “informatization of society” as a factor shaping the evolving defense environment in China’s National Defense in 2010, Beijing, China: State Council Information Office, 2011.

5. The term “armed forces” is a conceptual grouping distinct from the Chinese military, and encompasses not only the People’s Liberation Army but also the People’s Armed Police and militia units.


7. One of the best comprehensive summaries of this framework can be found in Lu Dengming (吕登明), 信息化战争与信息化军队 (Informatized Warfare and Informatized Troops), Beijing: PLA Press, 2004, pp. 495-500.

8. For example, see Cheng Xiang (盛强): “针对现代建军要求, 扎实人民战争准备” (“In Accordance With Modern Army-building Requirements, Preparation for Practical People’s War”), 国防和军队建设战略问题研究 (Research on Problems of National Defense and Troop Building Strategy), November 2011. For Western analysis of the continuing relevance of People’s War, see Dennis Blasko,


14. Mei Jun (梅军) reporting comments by members of the All-PLA Informatization Expert Advisory Committee, “专家观点：军队改革与信息化” (“Expert Viewpoint: Military Reform and Informatization”), 解放军报 (*PLA Daily*), August 19, 2009. Frustration with the extent to which bureaucracy and institutional inertia delays informatization efforts is palpable throughout the commentary, with one expert on the Committee joking, “When they change something, they’ll call it ‘reform’, and when they change it back to the way it was, they’ll call it ‘deepening reform’.” See also Nan Zhansheng (南振声), “我军信息化建设最大阻力是旧观念” (“The Biggest Obstacle To Our Military Informatization is Old Ideas”), 解放军报 (*PLA Daily*), August 15, 2010.

15. Song Luyi (宋鲁毅): “军队信息化的任务及评价指标体系” (“Military Informatization Task and Evaluation Target System’),

17. For example, the *sanfei zuozhan* (三非作战) concept, which posits that future combat operations will be increasingly asymmetrical (“nonsymmetrical” in the literal Chinese, hence the *sanfei* concept translating as “the three nons”), noncontact, and nonlinear, thus increasing the role of informatization in determining the outcome of military conflicts, was integrated into a revised edition of the authoritative *Science of Campaigns* volume published during the Hu era.


24. See, for example, Han Jianxin (韩建新): “全军信息化工作办公室常务副主任侯喜贵在全国军用主题词表辅助标引系统使用骨干培训班开学式上的讲话” (“Remarks by All-PLA Informatization Work Office Deputy Director Hou Xigui at Backbone Training Class on Military-Use Auxiliary Indexing System”), 信息管理 (Information Management), No. 4, August 27, 2006.


27. It is worth noting that MIIT’s Chinese name uses the term “informatization” or xinxihua, although this is translated as “Information Technology” in the organization’s official English name.

28. It remains unclear whether these institutions are, in fact, subordinate to the All-Military Informatization Expert Advisory Group, or operating in parallel with it. The Navy Informatization Expert Advisory Group appears to have begun at roughly the same time as the all-PLA group, but the Air Force committee appears to be more recent and has some affiliation with National Defense University. See “2008 国防信息化发展论坛成功召开展示先进信息技术” (“2008 Defense Information Development Forum Successfully Held to Showcase Advanced Information Technology”), Sina Military, October 29, 2008.

29. For reasons which are still unclear, the 2006 edition of the Science of Campaigns, initially issued in 2006 by National Defense University Press, was reissued in 2007 by the Academy of Military Sciences with a number of relatively small additions, but with most of its content left untouched. Since both National Defense University and the Academy of Military Sciences are authoritative sources and the additional content does not fundamentally contradict the 2006 edition’s content, this chapter treats the content of both the 2006 and 2007 editions as authoritative.


35. See, for example, Lin Xuejun (林学俊), “国防科技工业实现军民融合发展是时代的需要” (“The Defense Science and Technology Industry Achieving Military-Civil Fusion is the Requirement of the Age”), 中国军转民 (Defence Industry Conversion in China), No. 4, 2010.


48. Yu Lei (于雷), “拓展信息化条件下军事训练 打造基于信息系统体系作战能力” (“Expand Military Training Under Conditions of Informatization, Build Warfare Capabilities Based on


55. Li and Mai, 2011.

57. This is sometimes referred to as a metaphorical “exchanging of guns” (换枪), as the organizational challenge is in many ways comparable to the incorporation of new weapons systems. See Hu, 2012.

58. See, for example, Guo Fengkuan, Lei Guangming, and Yan Liang (郭丰宽, 雷光明, 晏良), “西藏军区配备一体化指挥平台破除传统思维” (“Troops in Tibet Equipped With Integrated Command Platform, Breaking Traditional Ways of Thinking”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), December 21, 2011.

59. Qin Yinhe (秦银河), “整体推进全面建设现代后勤保障多样化军事任务的完成” (“Overall Advancement Toward the Completion of Building Modern Logistics Support for Diversified Military Tasks”), 人民日报 (People’s Daily), July 27, 2010. As part of his goals laid out at the 17th Party Congress, Hu expected the PLA to have “essentially completed” the task of developing a modernized, informatized logistics system only by 2020, suggesting an understanding that progress will be gradual.


62. Luo, 2012. The author colorfully describes the event as being “like something out of a blockbuster movie.”
CHAPTER 7

CHINA’S EVOLVING NAVAL STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES IN THE HU JINTAO ERA

Nan Li

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines China’s naval strategy and capabilities in the Hu Jintao Era. It addresses issues such as Hu’s contributions to naval strategy; the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) missions, priority, and operational concepts; and PLAN’s changing capabilities and factors that can account for changes.

For naval strategy, Hu has made two contributions. He requires the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to safeguard China’s newly emerging overseas interests, which defines PLAN’s far-seas missions; and he endorsed the concept of information systems-based system of systems operations, which impacts how PLAN conducts operations. Between far-seas and near-seas missions, however, PLAN strategists believe that near-seas missions are the priority because they are more critical to China’s physical security. For system-of-systems operations, some PLA strategists argue that its premise that PLA can achieve superiority through information systems integration is flawed, and that PLA operations should still be guided by its traditional active defense strategy, which is premised on “inferior fighting superior.”

For capabilities, PLAN’s acquisition of an aircraft carrier, destroyers, frigates, light frigates, and fast attack craft (FACs) can be accounted for by the need to construct “maritime system of systems” as well as
PLA’s traditional active defense strategy. Other contributing factors include availability of new shipbuilding technologies and funding, and the need to replace obsolete ships.

**POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

- Because PLAN’s far-seas operations are driven mainly by economic concerns and level of U.S.-China economic interdependence is high, such operations offer opportunities for cooperation between the U.S. Navy and the PLAN, particularly in nontraditional security operations to enhance sea lanes security.
- China’s dependence on sea lanes is likely to increase, but the PLAN’s far-seas fleet responsible for securing these sea lanes is likely to stay vulnerable. Both render the Chinese economy exposed. This susceptibility provides initiatives for the United States in managing U.S.-China maritime relations by adopting both coercive and cooperative measures.
- As more Chinese naval ships are deployed out to sea more frequently, they operate more in exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of other countries. Their experience of being “interrupted” in other’s EEZs may gradually change the perspective that underlies Chinese disagreement with the United States over military activities in EEZs. This may offer an opportunity for the United States to work out rules with China to mitigate naval ships’ interactions to prevent incidents at sea.
In an earlier *Asian Security* article, this author presented the following. First, China’s naval strategy has undergone two major changes: from the near-coast defense (近岸防御) strategy prior to the mid-1980s to near-seas defense (近海防御) after the mid-1980s, and integration of the new concept of far-seas operations (远海作战) into China’s naval strategy in the 2000s.

Second, related to the evolution of the naval strategy is the change in naval capabilities from limited capabilities for coastal defense to more expansive capabilities to operate more effectively in the near seas, beginning in the 2000s. The integration of far-seas operations concept may have major implications for the future development of PLAN capabilities, including developing aircraft carriers.

Third, the changes in Chinese naval strategy and capabilities can be accounted for by a combination of factors, including the role of naval leadership and personal experience, endorsement of civilian leadership, changing perception of external security environment, institutionalization of naval research, and availability of funding and technologies.

Finally, a change in naval capabilities may not always be accounted for by a change in naval strategy, but by other contingent or idiosyncratic reasons.

An attempt is made here to update China’s naval strategy and capabilities by addressing two sets of questions that have not been answered in the previously mentioned article. The first set is about China’s evolving naval strategy: What conceptual contributions has Hu Jintao made to China’s naval strategy after he became the chair of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) in September 2004? What are the specific missions for the PLAN to fulfill for both its near-seas and far-seas operations? What is the prior-
ity between near-seas and far-seas missions and why? And how may the PLAN conduct operations?

The second set of questions concerns changing naval capabilities: What new capabilities have been developed in recent years that have not been discussed in the earlier *Asian Security* article, and what can account for the new development?

This chapter has three sections. While the first section attempts to answer questions related to naval strategy, the second section addresses the issue of capabilities. The concluding section summarizes the findings and discusses the policy implications.

**Evolving Naval Strategy**

What conceptual contributions has Hu Jintao made to China’s naval strategy after he became the CMC chair in September 2004? What are the specific missions for the PLAN to fulfill for both its near-seas and far-seas operations? What is the priority between near-seas and far-seas missions and why? And how may the PLAN conduct operations? These are the key questions at the PLA conference. This section answers these questions.

**Hu’s Contributions to Naval Strategy.**

Hu has made two major conceptual contributions to China’s naval strategy, one at the strategic level, and the other at the operational level. These contributions become apparent if one compares Hu’s priorities and those of Jiang Zemin, Hu’s predecessor, who served as the CMC chair from 1989 to 2004.

At the strategic level, both Hu and Jiang have promoted naval modernization, but with very different
priorities. For Jiang, the top strategic priority, particularly after the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, was to deter Taiwan from declaring formal independence. As a result, he promoted the PLAN by acquiring Sovremenny-class destroyers and Kilo submarines from Russia, and by commissioning a handful of indigenously developed major surface and subsurface combatants. Because air superiority in any military conflict over Taiwan can be gained by land-based combat aircraft, Jiang did not endorse the aircraft carrier program for which Admiral Liu Huaqing had actively lobbied, to provide air cover for naval operations over the more distant Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Instead, Jiang pursued diplomacy with Southeast Asian countries under his “new security concept,” leading to China’s signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and of the Declaration of Code of Conduct with ASEAN with regard to the South China Sea.

Because Jiang’s priority was the Taiwan issue, he particularly emphasized that the PLAN should:

at present continue to implement the strategic thought of near-seas defense (当前要继续贯彻近海防御的战略思想), . . . to realistically appropriate the comprehensive operational capabilities of conducting maritime campaigns in the near seas (真正具备在近海遂行海上战役的综合作战能力).

Even though Jiang is the first top leader to endorse the concept of “far-seas operations,” he regards developing such capabilities largely as a secondary, long-term objective (从长远说还要注意提高远海防卫作战能力).

By the time Hu succeeded Jiang as the top leader, the naval capabilities thought necessary to deter Tai-
wan independence were largely in place. The election of anti-independence candidate Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s new president also rendered the Taiwan issue less urgent. While Hu also wants the PLA to deter flash points such as the Taiwan issue from escalating into a military conflict so that China can leverage the 20-year window of strategic opportunity (2001-20) to develop its economy, he has other strategic priorities on his agenda. Among the “new historical missions” that Hu assigned to the PLA, for instance, Hu highlighted the need for the PLA to safeguard China’s newly emerging interests in maritime, outer, and electromagnetic space.⁶

On China’s newly emerging maritime interests, Hu was particularly concerned about the issue of energy security stemming from China’s increasing dependence on oil imports. As early as at the Central Economic Work Conference held in November 2003, Hu, as the new Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary, stressed the need to develop a new energy development strategy from a “strategic overall height” (“战略全局高度”) to achieve national energy security.⁷ With the rapid expansion of Chinese economy and its integration with the global economy, Hu later stated that “issues of national development security (国家发展安全问题) such as energy security, strategic (sea) lanes (战略通道) security, overseas market security, overseas investment and personnel security have become more outstanding day by day (日渐突出).”⁸

For Hu, to project power to safeguard these newly emerging Chinese interests in the far seas or overseas, naval modernization has become indispensable. While continuing to “enhance its inner and near-seas comprehensive operations capabilities,” Hu particularly stressed that the PLAN should “make the transforma-
tion to far-seas protection (operations) step by step, and enhance far-seas mobile operations capabilities (要在提高内近海综合作战能力的同时, 逐步向远海防卫转型, 提高远海机动作战能力).”

For Jiang, developing far-seas capabilities is a long-term objective. For Hu, however, developing these capabilities has become a near-term one.

At the operational level, Hu endorsed the new concept of “information systems-based system-of-systems operations (基于信息系统的体系作战)” at an “important army conference” in December 2005. This concept offers a new conceptual framework for thinking about how the PLAN should conduct operations, which also impacts how the PLAN should develop its operational capabilities. Discussed below, this concept aims to mitigate the unintended but negative consequences of implementing a service-centered “informatization” policy, one that was earlier endorsed by Jiang Zemin. These consequences include developing overly redundant capabilities, and lacking collateral, information systems-based integration of various services and systems. In line with Hu’s “scientific development” theory, this concept clearly intends to enhance the overall cost-effectiveness for conducting operations and for developing capabilities.

**PLAN Missions in Near and Far Seas.**

While top leaders such as Jiang and Hu offer major conceptual framework or strategic guidance for naval development, it is up to the PLA and PLAN analysts to flesh out the specifics of such framework and guidance. The specific missions of the PLAN in the near and far seas, for instance, can be gleaned from writings of these analysts.
China’s 2013 *Defense White Paper*, a document written by analysts of China’s Academy of Military Science, for instance, states that:

the PLAN . . . shoulders the tasks of defending national security in the maritime direction (国家海洋方向安全) and sovereignty of territorial waters (领海主权), and safeguarding maritime rights and interests (维护海洋权益).

It goes on to state that:

according to the requirements of near-seas defense strategy, the navy attaches importance to raising the modernization level of near-seas comprehensive operations capabilities (海军注重提高近海综合作战力量现代化水平). . . . And it enhances capabilities for far-seas mobile operations and for far-seas cooperation and coping with non-traditional security threats (提高远海机动作战，远海合作与应对非传统安全威胁能力), and strengthens strategic deterrence and counterattack capabilities.\(^{11}\)

Furthermore, it has for the first time added specific sections on “safeguarding maritime rights and interests,” on “safeguarding overseas interests (维护海外利益),” and on “safeguarding international sea lanes security (维护国际海上通道安全).”\(^{12}\) Another mission that requires the participation of the PLAN, which the *Defense White Paper* devotes a section to, is “international disaster relief and humanitarian assistance (国际灾难救援和人道主义援助).”\(^{13}\) Along similar lines, PLAN commander Wu Shengli recently stressed that “the scientific development of navy construction is the unified (balanced) development to enhance both near-seas capabilities (近海能力) and far-seas protection capabilities (远海防卫能力).”\(^{14}\)
The previous account suggests that the PLAN missions fall largely into two major categories: near-seas missions and far-seas ones. For near-seas missions, besides deterring Taiwan independence and securing traditional territorial waters, a relatively new mission is “safeguarding maritime rights and interests.” This mission is clearly associated with China’s disputes with other countries about jurisdictions over continental shelves and EEZs, and about sovereignty over islands and reefs in the near seas and the territorial and jurisdictional waters they may generate.

But rather than on the frontline in these disputes, the PLAN is primarily required to protect and coordinate with the forward-deployed civilian law enforcement fleet, and to support other civilian maritime activities. According to the Defense White Paper, for instance, to safeguard maritime rights and interests:

the navy combines daily war-preparation with offering security support (提供安全保障) for state maritime law enforcement, fishery production, and oil exploration activities; establishes coordinating and concerting mechanisms (建立协调配合机制) respectively with law enforcement departments such as China Maritime Surveillance and China Fishery Law Enforcement Command; and establishes and perfects the military-police-civilian joint defense mechanisms (建立完善军警民联防机制).

Furthermore, the PLAN:

coordinates with related civilian departments to conduct maritime survey and mapping and scientific research; constructs maritime weather monitoring, satellite navigation, radio navigation and navigation-assisting signs systems; publishes timely information on weather and shipping; and establishes and perfects
navigation safety support systems within the jurisdictional seas.¹⁵

Far-seas missions, on the other hand, refer to those that safeguard the security of expanding Chinese overseas interests, including “security of overseas energy and resources, strategic sea lanes, and overseas (Chinese) citizens and legal entities (海外能源资源，海上战略通道以及海外公民，法人安全),” as well as those that provide humanitarian assistance. The PLAN, for instance, deployed a naval frigate to the Mediterranean briefly in February 2011, to support evacuation of 35,860 Chinese nationals during the Libyan crisis. But more importantly, since December 2008, PLAN has deployed naval escort groups to Gulf of Aden for continuous patrol to keep the sea lanes open against piracy. Finally, PLAN’s dedicated hospital ship *Peace Ark* traveled to five countries in Western Asia and Eastern Africa, and four countries in Latin America during 2010-11, to provide medical assistance to over 50,000 people living in these countries.¹⁶

**Near-seas Missions as Priority.**

Integrating the notion of “far-seas operations” into China’s naval strategy requires the PLAN to develop capabilities to operate in the seas beyond the near seas. This is also consistent with Hu Jintao’s call for the PLA to fulfill new historical missions, which, among many other things, highlights security of China’s newly emerging overseas interests. However, China’s naval strategists argue that more imminent security challenges to China from the maritime direction are largely concentrated in the near seas.
These challenges include the reunification with Taiwan, foreign military threats and pressures, and disputes with neighboring countries about jurisdictions over continental shelves and exclusive economic zones and about sovereignty over islands and reefs in the near seas. Nontraditional security issues in the near seas include smuggling, human trafficking, transnational crimes, and maritime environmental pollution. As a result, “at present and in a long time to come, safeguarding near-seas security should be the primary goal of China’s maritime security strategy (维护近海安全应当是中国海上安全战略的主要目标).”

Also:

better near-seas security creates favorable conditions for marching to the far seas (为走向远海创造有利条件) to meet not only the need for deepening and widening the defense space against foreign threats, but also the needs to enhance security of sea lanes and China’s newly emerging overseas economic interests, to promote international cooperation, and to raise China’s international status.

Moreover, “marching to the far seas with clear and selective objectives (有针对性地，有选择地走向远海) offers forceful support and coordination for resolving near-seas security issues.”

Furthermore, the goal of China’s naval modernization is regionally focused, rather than globally oriented. China’s naval strategists, for instance, divide the world’s navies into three categories: the far-oceans offensive type (远洋进攻型, or global blue-water type), regional defensive and offensive type (区域防御进攻型, or regional blue-water type), and coastal defensive type (沿岸防御型). The U.S. Navy belongs to the first category, while the British, French, German, Italian,
Japanese, Russian, and arguably Indian navies belong to the second category. All other navies, on the other hand, belong to the third category. The near-term goal of China’s naval modernization is for PLAN to develop into a regional-type navy (区域型海军), or to become the second type. This type of navy can operate effectively within its own region, or for the PLAN in the near seas. In the meantime, it also possesses the capabilities to project power occasionally beyond its own region and operate effectively in the seas of other oceans, as did the British navy during the Falklands War. Recent deployment of PLAN combat ships to Gulf of Aden for counterpiracy missions may be regarded as another example. Such out-of-region power projection, however, should be an exception rather than the norm. This regional navy concept is also consistent with the 1985 strategic transition, which requires the PLA to shift its focus on preparing for “early, total, and nuclear war” against a possible Soviet invasion, to preparing for local, limited war to deal with territorial and interests disputes on the margins of China.

Finally, there are major vulnerabilities and limits that may impede the PLAN’s far-seas operations. China, for instance, has neither overseas naval bases nor regularized access points in the far seas of the Indian Ocean. A limited number of at-sea replenishment ships and occasional port visits for resupply and crew rest may help in logistics support (后勤保障), but not in combat support (战斗保障), such as reloading missiles to sustain high-intensity conventional naval battles. The PLAN is also quite weak in its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, which leaves Chinese warships exposed to submarine attacks in the far seas. These may explain, in part, why China’s naval escort
groups in Gulf of Aden remain as small as two combat ships supported by one large replenishment ship, and their missions are confined to dealing with low intensity, nontraditional security issues such as piracy.

Some Chinese naval strategists argue that China should develop overseas naval bases in the Indian Ocean. But this argument has not translated into any change in Chinese policy. A major reason is that China’s nonalignment foreign policy forbids China to develop military alliance relationship with any other country. This makes it difficult to establish overseas military bases because they usually are located in territories of close allies. Also, because overseas bases are associated with the legacy of colonialism and a lack of sensitivity toward national sovereignty, China may pay an image cost if it acquires any. Acquiring overseas bases may also not serve China’s national interests well because it may entangle China in regional and domestic disputes and conflicts. All these show that near-seas missions are the priority of the PLAN in the near future.

How May the PLAN Conduct Operations?

There are two different conceptual models that may help to understand how the PLA in general and PLAN in particular may conduct operations. The first is the concept of “information systems-based system of systems operations (ISSSO),” and the other is the traditional active defense strategy (TADS).
As mentioned earlier, the concept of ISSSO was first endorsed by Hu Jintao in 2005. But it was not fully articulated and operationalized by PLA strategists until after early-2010, when a few unintended but serious consequences stemming from the policy of “informatization,” one that was endorsed earlier by Jiang Zemin, had become apparent.

One such consequence, according to PLA strategists, has to do with interservice integration. Because “informatization” is “service-centered” but not “system-centered,” what has happened is that as each service (军种) becomes more informatized, more powerful stovepipes or “isolated information islands (信息孤岛)” emerge for lack of collateral information networking across the services. Also, each service tends to be “self-serving (自我完备)” under the pretext of enhancing joint operations, concentrating on constructing “all-round service (全能军种)” (referring to ground force expanding air, shore-defense, and ship capabilities; navy expanding air and land capabilities; and air force expanding land capabilities). This causes not only unnecessary redundancy and waste of resources, but more importantly the erosion of services’ comparative advantages. Moreover, service-centered “informatization” leads to lack of common information standards and results in information monopoly by each service, which may not only contribute to inter-service tension, but lead to loss of initiatives in times of war.22

PLA strategists believe that the concept of ISSSO may help to resolve this interservice issue because ISSSO requires fostering the consciousness that war
can be fought and won by PLA system of systems, but not by individual services. As a result, the emphasis of military modernization should shift from “forging all-round services to constructing all-round system of systems (从打造全能军种转向建设全能型体系).” This means that services should transfer ownership right (所有权) and command and control of their operational elements and resources to the PLA system, while retaining the usage right of these resources. Services should also become open and transparent to one another and share the usage right (军种共享使用权) of each other’s and the PLA system’s resources, because services constitute and are the builders of PLA system of systems. “Transferring communications bandwidth and satellites to the system, for instance, can give full play to the utility of these elements.” In return, services benefit from the system by retaining the usage right of all the resources offered by the system.\textsuperscript{23}

Generally speaking, future integrated operations (集成作战) would “reinforce services’ functions for constructing and managing forces, but weaken their role to command operations. Services will supply functional units and essential elements to integrated operations command according to operational needs.” To optimize the use of these units and elements, the integrated operations command would rely on information systems such as the all-army, unified (全军统一) command and control network, early warning and reconnaissance network, communications grid network, weapons control network and comprehensive support (综合保障) network.\textsuperscript{24}

Besides the relationship between system and services or systems, according to PLA strategists, ISSSO also requires construction of collateral, integrated
system of systems operations capabilities centered on integrated networks (以集成网络为中心，建设横向一体的体系作战能力) across all services. This network-centered approach leverages information technologies and networks to permeate (渗透), fuse (融合), and connect (连通) all forces (力量), units (单元) and essential elements (要素) deployed in different distances and spatial spectrums, to achieve inter-connectedness (互联), intercommunications (互通), interoperability (互操作) and mutual complements (互补), particularly in terms of early warning and reconnaissance, command and control, communications, weapons control, and combat support. This interconnectivity enables synchronized joint action (同步联动), thus enhancing precision, coordination, efficiency and orderliness of action and strikes. 

How, then, may the concept of ISSSO enhance military operations? First, such system of systems-based synergy is not only what an individual service, unit, or weapons platform is incapable to achieve; it also helps to reduce its vulnerabilities as an individual service, unit, or platform. For instance:

employing information systems to permeate, fuse and connect weapons systems can accomplish operational effectiveness that far exceeds what a single weapons system such as an aircraft carrier can accomplish. At the same time, this integration can reduce the risks of an aircraft carrier.”

Moreover, according to PLA strategists, information systems-based integration leads to real-time and common battlefield transparency, reduces reaction time, and enables more precise strikes, thus creating conditions for dispersed (分散) and pointed (点状化) force deployment, but concentrated firepower. This
deployment also expands from traditional spatial spectrums such as land, sea and air to new spectrums such as outer, electromagnetic and cyberspace exhibiting a trend toward “comprehensive spatial spectrums (全域性).” These deployment patterns of different distances, altitudes and visibilities may enhance not only force survivability, but also battlefield versatility.\textsuperscript{27}

Traditionally, quantity superiority in manpower, weapons, and materiel may translate into battlefield effect superiority. But information systems-based integration makes it possible to achieve information superiority, which may translate into decision superiority and action superiority, and, as a result, quality superiority on the battlefield. What this means, according to PLA strategists, is that the side that can best exploit networked information systems to “coordinate the dispersed deployment of operational units, but concentration of information and firepower on the decisive targets at the decisive location and decisive time” would gain battlefield initiative.\textsuperscript{28}

PLA strategists identify two types of decisive targets on the battlefield. The first is the opponent’s information systems, particularly its capabilities for information acquisition and transmission, information processing, and information use. While electronic warfare targets electromagnetic fields to disable information acquisition and transmission, cyber warfare targets computer networks to sabotage information processing. Because soft attacks can only temporarily neutralize the opponent’s information systems, and destruction of 5 to 10 percent of key nodes may cause a systemic failure, “hard, precision strikes” on key nodes are necessary to permanently disable the opponent’s information systems.
The second type of decisive targets, according to PLA strategists, refers to those that can cause “dis-equilibrium of the opponent’s system of systems operations (打破体系作战的平衡).” To the extent orderly flow of information, energy, and materiel relies heavily on the system’s equilibrium-based stability, disrupting the flow and destroying the links (断流毁链) should cause dysfunction of the system. However, the most direct and effective method to sabotage a system’s equilibrium is to strike directly the center of gravity of the enemy’s operational system of systems (直接打击敌人作战体系的重心). But it is also recognized that this center of gravity is also the emphasis for protection and strength (保护重点和强点) of the opponent’s system of systems.²⁹

Finally, PLA strategists believe that information systems integration can optimize PLA system of systems, and enable real-time, synchronized target acquisition, decision, mobility, strikes, and control. This in turn shortens decision cycles and increases operational tempo, making it possible to conduct parallel operations and achieve all-spectrums superiority (全维优势) on the battlefield. It is noted, however, that the PLA may develop similar vulnerabilities that the more advanced militaries have developed as it becomes more integrated by information systems. Therefore, the PLA should prepare for situations where its own information systems are semi-paralyzed or completely paralyzed, and traditional fighting methods should not be abandoned (传统战法仍不能丢).³⁰

What the notion of ISSSO prescribes appears to approximate what Western analysts term the PLA’s so-called anti-access and area-denial strategy, particularly in the event of a U.S. intervention in a Taiwan conflict scenario. Based on the premise that informa-
tion systems-based integration may help to achieve some sort of battlefield parity or even superiority over the opponent, the PLA may wage a direct, frontal assault on the spearheads or comparative strength of the U.S. offensive such as its aircraft carrier strike groups and well-protected information systems. A continuous assault based on layered, multispectrum deployment of PLA forces makes it increasingly difficult for the intervening forces to advance the closer they approach China’s shores.

Some analysts suggest that this kind of PLA strategy is asymmetrical, because the PLA’s assault is largely based on its comparative advantage: the anti-ship missiles. But the term “asymmetry” may be a misnomer. This is because shore, ship, and air-based anti-ship missiles are mainly extensions of traditional anti-ship guns and bombs, and the PLA’s opponent is well armed with similar missiles and other weapons systems to counter. What may make a difference appears to be the detection range, shooting range, and precision of these missiles and weapons systems. In all these aspects, however, the PLA does not seem to have an obvious comparative advantage over the opponent. Finally, the possible time and place of such a frontal, force-on-force engagement are quite predictable. It is the possible lack of the PLA comparative advantages or superiority in such a frontal engagement that concerns some other PLA strategists. They argue that ISSSO may help the PLA to develop comparative battlefield advantages in the long run. But in the short run, the PLA, being the inferior side, should employ the traditional active defense strategy to engage a much more superior opponent.
Traditional Active Defense Strategy.

The central premise of the traditional active defense strategy (TADS) is that the PLA is the inferior side relative to its opponent. This means that the PLA would adopt a posture of interior-line strategic defense (内线战略防御). This defensive posture, however, is not static but active, because it involves many tactical-level, exterior-line, quick and offensive battles (外线的速决进攻战).

A central feature of TADS is constant force movement (运动战). Constant force movement is necessary because in many circumstances, this strategy requires maneuvers to give up frontal positions in order to avoid the spearhead (锋芒, or comparative strength) of the opponent’s offensive, and it requires constant outflanking (迂回) to shift, divide, disperse, and isolate enemy forces, to “cause the enemy to make mistakes (让敌人犯错误),” or to “lure the enemy in deep.” Force movement is necessary also because this strategy requires maneuvers to identify the vulnerabilities of the opponent’s offensive, and to amass forces for developing local and temporary superiority over the opponent’s local and temporary vulnerability, in order to annihilate enemy forces piece by piece (在运动中各个歼灭敌人). Even in a frontal engagement which is to be maximally avoided, the primary tactics employed include force movement-based deep-thrust (穿插), cut-up (分割), outflanking, and encirclement (包围).31

A major reason for avoiding a direct, frontal, force-on-force engagement against the opponent’s comparative strength is that such an engagement may end up in a war of matching attrition. Such a war clearly favors the superior side because similar casualties may mean only marginal loss for this side, but possibly to-
tal annihilation of the inferior side. On the other hand, shifting vital forces (有生力量) away from the brunt of the opponent’s major offensive, to concentrate them on tactical-level engagement against the opponent’s vulnerabilities, ensures local and temporary superiority over the opponent. This superiority makes it possible to win this tactical engagement with minimal casualties. But more importantly, the effects of winning these tactical-level battles are accumulative, because they may cause the gradual shift of balance of forces on the battlefield that may eventually allow for strategic-level offensives.

There is ample evidence that TADS has had a substantial influence on China’s naval strategy. In explaining the near-seas defense strategy in China’s National Defense University in 1986, for instance, then PLAN commander Liu Huaqing stressed that the PLAN is likely to be the inferior side relative to its potential opponent in any future naval operations. As a result, in the general context of strategic interior-line defense, it is necessary for PLAN to concentrate vital forces in the primary strategic or campaign directions (主要战役方向) through mobile operations (机动作战), to develop temporary and local force superiority (于一定时间内形成局部兵力优势). This makes it possible to resolutely attack the enemy to achieve a victory at one stroke, followed by dispersion and diversion (分散转移) and search for new fighting opportunities, while maintaining the freedom for force movement (保持兵力行动自由). As he further explained:

This is the effective fighting method for the small to win over the large at the strategic level (战略上以小胜大) and for the numerically superior to win over inferior at the tactical level (战术上以多胜少). In general, the enemy is the superior side waging the strategic
exterior-line offensive (战略外线的进攻战), and we are in a strategic interior-line defensive position. But because the enemy’s maritime offensive line is long and its forces are dispersed, it necessarily has vulnerabilities that give us the opportunities to exploit (给我以可乘之机) on the vast maritime battlefield. Although we are the inferior side, we concentrate superior forces in each campaign and battle, to conduct exterior-line quick and offensive operations, to strike one (enemy) unit (击其一部) and strive for its total annihilation (力求必歼). To this part (局部), we are the superior and can fight and win. This fighting method, however, requires forces to move quickly (兵力机动快) and concentrate suddenly (突然集中), to fight and withdraw quickly ( 快打快撤) but not to get entangled with the enemy (不与敌人纠缠) and not to engage in competitive attrition with the enemy (不与敌人拼消耗), to eat the enemy bite by bite (一口一口吃掉敌人), thus achieving the objective of accumulating small victories into big victories (以小胜积大胜).

More importantly, TADS has recently been employed by some PLA strategists to show the fallacies of ISSSO. They, for instance, identify two new PLA strategies that have been developed in order to engage the opponent in the future. One is system of systems operations, and the other is the assassin’s mace approach. For system of systems operations, these PLA strategists argue that:

it is impossible to engage in a system-on-system confrontation (体系与体系对抗) with the powerful opponent (强手). Under the condition of obvious asymmetry of comprehensive power (in favor of the opponent), such a confrontation may repeat the historical mistake of engaging the powerful opponent in a ‘state-on-state, force-on-force combat (国家和国家，大军和大军作战)’. 

32

278
For an assassin’s mace approach, they argue that “it is technically infeasible (技术上不可能) to employ assassin’s mace weapons to wage sabotage-and-strike-warfare (体系破击战) against the opponent’s highly informatized system of systems.”

For these PLA strategists, the most effective strategy to fight a powerful and superior opponent is by following the TADS. First of all, they believe that there is no absolute inferiority and superiority; as long as the PLA does not engage the opponent in a system-on-system combat, there are ways to make the opponent lose initiative and superiority. Moreover, they suggest that commanders must possess extraordinary audacity, courage and insight (过人胆识) to carry the war on, because the objective of the superior opponent is to shock and destroy the PLA’s will to fight by applying superior information and firepower. Furthermore, they argue that the PLA should turn parallel operations (平行作战) into sequential operations (顺序作战). The superior side, according to these PLA strategists, prefers parallel operations, that is, to simultaneously strike all the high-value targets in order to impose effective control of the PLA and to reduce its own casualty. The PLA, however, should turn this first engagement into its first battle (首战), followed by a sequence of other battles. Similarly, the superior opponent prefers quick, decisive operations (快速决定性作战) by employing superior informatized arms in order to realize its objectives, without protraction and rallying massive forces. The PLA, however, should strive for protracted decisive operations (持久决定性作战) to shake the opponent’s will to fight, to regain control of the style and pace of war, and to force the opponent to yield to the PLA’s wishes and demands.
Furthermore, these strategists propose that the PLA should follow the TADS principle of concentrating main forces to annihilate the enemy piece by piece (集中主要兵力，各个歼灭敌人). But rather than manpower, the PLA now can concentrate firepower to strike the opponent’s strategic and campaign-level weak links (薄弱环节) that may have a decisive impact on the will of opponent to fight. Finally, to reduce the opponent’s comparative superiority and to gain initiative, the PLA should force the opponent to fight in locations and times of the PLA’s choice, rather than the other way round.\footnote{36}

ISSSO and TADS offer two different models for understanding how the PLA in general, and PLAN in particular, may conduct operations. In the short run, TADS is likely to be the dominant model that guides PLA operations. Whether ISSSO may gain dominant influence in the long run, however, may depend on how successful information systems integration proceeds, and whether the asymmetry in favor of the “superior and powerful opponent” may be narrowed by this integration.

**Evolving Naval Capabilities**

What new capabilities have been developed in recent years that have not been discussed in the earlier Asian Security article, and what can account for the new development? This section intends to answer these questions. The new capabilities are divided into two categories: far-seas and near-seas capabilities. While far-seas capabilities refer to major ships that can operate in both far and near seas, near-seas capabilities refer to ships that cannot operate in the far seas because of their limited operational radius and sustainability.
Far-Seas Capabilities.

In the earlier Asian Security article, it was predicted that, with integration of the concept of far-seas operations into China’s naval strategy, China would acquire aircraft carrier capabilities. This prediction was confirmed by the commissioning of the Type 001 aircraft carrier, one that was purchased from Ukraine and refitted on September 25, 2012.37

This aircraft carrier is categorized as a scientific research and training ship. Scientific research is likely to refer to gaining technical and operational parameters and data for constructing new aircraft carriers. Training, on the other hand, apparently refers to training officers and crew on all the functional, technical, and operational specializations, and their coordination and integration associated with ship, ship-aircraft, and eventually battle group operations. While scientific research and training may take years to complete, the commissioning of the ship shows the PLAN’s serious commitment to big deck, fixed-wing aviation.

In the short run, China may construct an aircraft carrier more or less based on the Type 001 configuration, which may feature a ski jump ramp, third generation combat aircraft, and airborne early warning (AEW) helicopters. In the medium run, however, China may build the next generation of China’s aircraft carrier program. This type may be conventionally powered and equipped with steam catapults, and carry third or fourth-generation combat aircraft. It may install steam catapults mainly because these catapults have had substantial technological accumulation (技术储备) after more than 20 years of research and development in China.38 Steam catapult technologies also make it easier for systems integration with the steam
turbines and boilers, the likely choice for the power plant of this new type. But more importantly, PLAN needs fixed-wing AEW aircraft, which is too heavy for the ski-jump ramp of the current Type 001 platform to launch. In comparison with AEW helicopters to be deployed on Type 001, fixed-wing AEW aircraft has much more powerful information, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and therefore is crucial and indispensable for PLAN’s maritime information systems-based system of systems operations.39

In the long run, however, China may develop nuclear-powered aircraft carriers with electromagnetic catapults and fourth-generation low-observable combat aircraft. In 2012, for instance, China’s Ministry of Science and Technology introduced the 863 Project for Research on Key Technologies and Safety of Nuclear-powered Ships (核动力船舶关键技术及安全性研究863项目) at Institute 719 of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, the company that refurbished Type 001.40 This project is clearly intended for research and development of nuclear power for major surface ships such as aircraft carriers. But because nuclear power plants for aircraft carriers may require expensive investment and a long research and development cycle in order to achieve safety and reliability,41 China is likely to acquire conventionally powered aircraft carriers as stopgaps in the near future.

A primary reason for PLAN to acquire aircraft carriers is to form maritime operations system of systems (海上作战体系), a requirement of ISSSO. A fleet without aircraft carriers, for instance, is an incomplete system of systems because it cannot reach all spatial spectrums, particularly the air spectrum in the far seas. It can deploy major surface ships such as destroyers and frigates to the far seas, but these ships are exposed
and vulnerable to air, missile, and submarine attacks. Aircraft carrier capabilities, however, should reduce these vulnerabilities. This is because a carrier can provide air capabilities that can compete for air superiority and provide air cover for surface operations in the far seas. These air capabilities can also be deployed against the opponent’s air-based ASW capabilities, thus protecting one’s own submarines operating in the far seas. Finally, a carrier’s air-based ASW capabilities can be deployed against the opponent’s submarines, thus providing protection for one’s own surface ships and submarines operating in the far seas. Finally, for lack of overseas naval bases, carriers may serve as sea bases to sustain PLAN’s system of systems operations in the far seas.

Furthermore, an information systems-based system of systems may become a force multiplier, not only because it can accomplish what an individual weapons platform cannot accomplish otherwise, but also because it can reduce the vulnerabilities of that individual weapons platform. PLA analysts believe that a carrier battle group is an ideal maritime operations system of systems. With escorts such as destroyers, frigates, nuclear attack submarines, and ocean-going replenishment ships, this system of systems is capable of air operations, strikes, submarine and ASW warfare, air and missile defense, and electronic warfare, thus possessing the so-called integrated five operational capabilities (五为一体作战能力). If integrated well by the information systems, it represents the versatilely functional and optimally combined (功能完备，优化组合) system of systems, where all individual weapons platforms together not only can constitute operational synergy against the opponent, but also offer support and protection to reduce each other’s vulnerabilities, particularly the vulnerabilities of the carrier itself. On
the other hand, it is also recognized that such a battle group is too massive to conceal, making it easy to detect and attack under certain conditions.42

Besides commissioning China’s first aircraft carrier, another new development in PLAN capabilities is mass production of 6,000-ton Type 052C destroyers and 4,000-ton Type 054A frigates, and construction of 6,000-ton Type 052D destroyers. After launching of the first two 052Cs in 2003, there was a long interval of about 7 years when no new 052Cs were constructed, leading some analysts to conclude that the PLAN would not acquire major surface ships anymore. The construction, however, resumed in late-2010, accumulating to what appears to be four hulls either being commissioned or under construction by 2013. For Type 054As, 18 have been commissioned, launched, or are under construction from 2006 to 2013, with a surge of four hulls in 2011, and more are reportedly planned.

Finally, by late-2012 and early-2013, photos showing two Type-052D destroyers in construction, an upgraded variant of Type 052C, began to emerge from the Chinese military websites. This new-type destroyer exhibits a larger active phased-array radar system in comparison with the one on Type 052C. Rather than 48 surface-to-air missiles (SAM) imbedded in eight revolver-type six-cell vertical launching systems (VLS) as with 052C, the Type 052D has two canister-type 32-cell missile VLSs. It is reported that the total of 62 missiles may be a mixture of SAMs, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), anti-submarine missiles, and land attack cruise missiles. If this is true, Type 052D may be China’s first dedicated multirole destroyer.

In the earlier Asian Security article, it was suggested that Chinese naval ships acquisition is large-
ly based on an incremental approach where a small number of hulls are deployed for test and trial, followed by construction of another small number that incorporates remedies to the defects identified during test and trial. To the extent Type 052C destroyers and Type 054A frigates, being the workhorses of the counterpiracy missions in Gulf of Aden, were fully tested and trialed, their mass production indicates that the PLAN may be quite satisfied with their performance in the far seas. The maturity of Chinese shipbuilding techniques such as modular assembling of large ships, together with substantial growth of the defense budget because of rapid economic growth, may also account for this new development. The need to replace a large number of non-modernized Type 051 destroyers and Type 053H series frigates may be another reason. The 7-year pause for 052C construction, on the other hand, can be accounted for by the time-consuming relocation of the Jiangnan Shipyard to the Changxin Island outside Shanghai, but not a PLAN decision not to acquire major surface ships. Because the first two 052Cs were constructed by Jiangnan, the pause may imply that other shipyards did not have the technological capacity to build these high-end ships during this period. Finally, the consideration for organizing aircraft carrier battle groups, or the need to develop a maritime system of systems, may be a major impetus for the surge in the production of these ships, including particularly the Type 052Ds, from late-2010s on.
Near-Seas Capabilities.

One remarkable development for PLAN’s near-seas capabilities is deployment of more than 60 Type 022 FACs since 2004. Featuring a wave-piercing catamaran hull, the 220-ton craft reportedly travels at a maximum speed of 36 knots, and has an operational range of 300 nautical miles. It has also adopted stealth features that reduce radar, visual, acoustic, infrared, and electronic emissions signatures. Moreover, it is armed with eight 120-kilometer (km) range YJ83 ASCMs, and a data-link antenna that can receive off-board sensors for over-the-horizon targeting information.\textsuperscript{43}

Acquisition of a large number of Type 022s can clearly be accounted for by the PLA’s traditional active defense strategy. The craft, for instance, reflects the original institutional identity of the PLAN as an inferior, small craft navy, which is capable of effective tactical engagement against a superior opponent through mobility and stealth, particularly in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The high speed, small profile, and stealth features make it possible for the craft to approach a major target from multiple directions fast, but with low probability of being detected. The operational range combined with missile range and volume, together with data-link antenna, on the other hand, enables the Type 022s to cover most of the sea areas near China’s shores. Both enhance the chance of the craft to effectively engage and raise the cost of a superior opponent in the near seas.

Because Type 022 is designed to sortie out in times of war and because of its small size and singular role, the craft does not have the level of sustainability and versatility for conducting routine patrol to show naval presence in the near seas, particularly in times of
peace and crisis. As a result, the PLAN has endorsed the Type 056 light frigate to fill this gap. During 2011-13, for instance, 10 Type 056 light frigates were either commissioned, launched, or were under construction. The 1,400-ton ship features a “deep V” hull, sloped surface and reduced superstructure clutters, a 150-km-range air and sea search radar, and a heli-pad at the stern. It is armed with a 76-millimeter gun, two 2-cell YJ83 ASCM launchers, one 8-cell FL-3000N short-range SAM system, and two 3-cell anti-submarine torpedo tubes.44

These features clearly intend to enhance the speed, stealth, and versatility of the ship. The relatively simple and conventional weapons systems and sensors may also serve to reduce the production cost so that a large number can be acquired. It is generally believed that Type 056 is to support routine patrol of disputed areas in the near seas by China’s civilian maritime law-enforcement ships, either in managing escalation or engaging in small-scale maritime conflicts if management fails. The ship can also serve to protect Chinese ports and PLAN’s bases, and fulfill nontraditional security missions such as countering piracy and terrorism in the near seas.

Furthermore, the need to replace a large number of non-modernized Type 037 corvettes is clearly another reason for the mass production of Type 056. That 10 hulls are constructed almost simultaneously in shipyards such as Hudong Zhonghua of Shanghai, Huangpu of Guangzhou, Wuchang of Wuhan, and Liaonan of Dalian, is another example of maturity of modular construction techniques by China’s shipbuilding industry. Finally, versatility of a system of systems is not only reflected in that systems can be deployed to different distances and different spatial
spectrums, but also in that they can be deployed at different times. To the extent that Type 022 and Type 056 can be deployed to similar distance but at different times of war, crisis, and peace, they have clearly made important contributions to constructing PLAN’s “system of systems” in the near seas.

CONCLUSION

This chapter shows that for China’s evolving naval strategy, Hu Jintao has made two conceptual contributions. At the strategic level, Hu requires the PLA to enhance security of China’s newly emerging development interests, including energy security, strategic sea lanes security, overseas market security, and security of overseas Chinese investment and personnel. At the operational level, Hu endorsed the concept of ISSSO. These conceptual contributions have had a critical influence on the specific missions for the PLAN to fulfill, and on how the PLA in general, and the PLAN in particular may conduct operations. For PLAN missions, besides the near-seas ones such as deterring Taiwan independence and safeguarding territorial waters and maritime rights and interests, PLAN is now required to fulfill far-seas ones that serve to enhance the “security of overseas energy and resources, strategic sea lanes, and overseas (Chinese) citizens and legal entities,” as well as provide humanitarian assistance. On how the PLA and the PLAN may conduct operations, the concept of ISSSO requires the PLA to shift force modernization from individual services to building a PLA system of systems to optimize use of resources. Integrated by information systems, this system of systems reportedly can achieve common battlefield transparency for systems deployed in different distances
and spatial spectrums. This, in turn, would make it possible to conduct synchronized, parallel operations based on qualitative superiority stemming from information superiority.

This chapter also shows that between near-seas and far-seas missions, PLAN strategists believe that near-seas missions are the priority. This is because these missions deal with issues that are more critical to China’s physical security, and they fall within confines of regional navy and local war concepts of the PLA. These missions are the priority also because PLAN’s far-seas capabilities are still quite vulnerable for lack of overseas naval bases and robust ASW capabilities. For ISSSO, some PLA strategists argue that its implicit premise that the PLA can achieve superiority through information systems integration, which warrants a direct, frontal engagement of a powerful opponent, is flawed. Instead, they propose that PLA operations should still be guided by its traditional active defense strategy, which is premised on inferior fighting superior. This strategy highlights not only strategic defense, but tactical offense as well as protraction, which should gradually help the PLA to regain strategic initiatives.

For evolving capabilities, this chapter shows that PLAN’s acquisition of new far-seas capabilities such as an aircraft carrier, destroyers, and frigates is primarily driven by the need to construct maritime system of systems, a requirement of ISSSO. Factors such as availability of new shipbuilding infrastructure, technologies, and funding, and the need to replace obsolete ships have also contributed to the surge in such capabilities. Acquisition of new near-seas capabilities such as FACs and light frigates, on the other hand, can be explained by PLA’s traditional active defense
strategy as well as a plan for systems considerations. Other contributing factors include availability of new shipbuilding technologies and the need to replace obsolete ships.

What are the policy implications of the findings? For PLAN’s far-seas operations, they seem to be largely driven by economic concerns, and are associated with nontraditional security issues such as counterpiracy to enhance sea lanes security, and evacuation of overseas Chinese nationals in times of crisis. To the extent the level of economic interdependence of the United States and China is high, PLAN’s far-seas operations should offer opportunities for cooperation between the U.S. Navy and the PLAN, particularly in counterpiracy and other types of nontraditional security operations to enhance sea lanes security.

Because the Chinese economy is still manufacturing based, resources intensive, and export driven, and China is relatively scarce in its resources endowment, its dependence on sea lanes for shipping resources imports and manufactured products is likely to increase. The PLAN’s far-seas fleet responsible for securing these sea lanes, on the other hand, is likely to stay vulnerable for lack of overseas naval bases and robust ASW capabilities. Both factors render the Chinese economy quite vulnerable. This vulnerability should provide leverages and initiatives for the United States in managing U.S.-China maritime relations, ranging from coercive measures in times of crisis to cooperative ones in times of peace, such as allowing for more responsibilities for the PLAN to shoulder in enhancing security of these sea lanes.

The PLAN’s near-seas operations, however, offer more challenges. One major challenge is disagreement between the United States and China over interpreta-
tion of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as to what military activities are permitted within the EEZs of the coastal states. While the U.S. regards EEZs as international waters where military surveillance operations are legal and appropriate, China has a more restrictive interpretation. This disagreement has already resulted in a few dangerous incidents, including the United States Naval Ship (USNS) *Impeccable* Incident of 2009, when the ships of both sides operated in close proximity of one another in China’s EEZs. These incidents have not only put human lives in peril, but caused deterioration of relations between the two militaries, which may cause damage to overall bilateral relations if managed poorly.

As more Chinese naval ships are deployed out to sea more frequently, however, it is inevitable that they may also operate in the EEZs of other countries, and be placed under close scrutiny by other navies. PLA analysts, for instance, complain that Chinese naval ships were always followed, monitored, and interrupted (跟踪，监视和干扰) by ships of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, as they operated and transited more frequently in the straits southwest of Japanese Archipelago and near Okinawa, which fall largely within Japan’s EEZs. It now seems that even though USNS *Impeccable* and PLAN ships had different missions to fulfill in other countries’ EEZs, the frustration stemming from the interrupted access to EEZs is quite identical. Similarly, Shi Xiaoqin (师小芹), a noted naval analyst at China’s Academy of Military Science, states that:

> it is difficult for us to imagine that fortresses can be built and boundary markers buried in sea as on land. Except for the territorial waters of 12 nautical miles . . .
oceans should be freely exploited to benefit the people of all countries . . . rather than enclosed as one’s own land (圈地). . . . The goal of China’s maritime strategy is to safeguard, with other stakeholders, the openness and security of the global commons (维护全球海洋的畅通和安全).

What the above account indicates is that Chinese conception of military activities in EEZs may be evolving, largely because of an increase in China’s naval activities. If this evolution may gradually change the perspective that underlies China’s disagreement with the U.S. over military activities in EEZs, it offers an opportunity for the United States to work out a set of rules with China to mitigate naval ships’ interactions, so that incidents at sea can be avoided or minimized.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. “Near seas” refer to the three seas near China, that is, South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea. “Far seas” refer to the seas beyond the near seas, or those in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans.


3. Liu served as the PLAN commander from 1982 to 1988 and CMC vice chair from 1989 to 1997. For Liu’s advocacy of the aircraft carrier program, see Liu Huaqing (刘华清), 刘华清回忆录 (Liu Huaqing’s Memoirs), Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 2004, pp. 477-481. For Jiang’s refusal to endorse the program, author’s conversation with informed sources in Guangzhou in 2003. See also “凤凰网专访马辛春: 十年前就该造航母” (“Phoenix Net’s Special Interview with Ma Xinchun: Aircraft Carrier Should Have Been Developed 10 Years Ago”), Phoenix Net, October 14, 2009. In the interview, Ma, a former commander of the PLAN North Sea Fleet, made the point that some-
one was criticized for advocating the aircraft carrier program 10 years before. He actually refers to an incident where a North Sea Fleet senior officer was reprimanded by Jiang at a National People’s Congress annual meeting for advocating the program. Later, however, Jiang moderated his view and endorsed the carrier program in August 2004, just before he was to transfer the position of CMC chair to Hu.


12. Ibid. For a detailed discussion of sea lanes security, see Senior Captain Liang Fang (梁芳), 海上战略通道论 (On Strategic Sea Lanes), 北京: 时事出版社, 2011, Beijing, China: Current Affairs Press, 2011. Liang is a navy faculty at China’s National Defense University (NDU) in Beijing.


14. Wu Shengli (吴胜利), “深入贯彻主题主线重大战略思想，积极推动海军建设又好又快发展” (“Deeply Implement Important Strategic Thought of Primary Theme and Primary Line, Actively Push Forward Better and Faster Development of Navy Construction”), 人民海军 (People’s Navy), September 20, 2011. People’s Navy is a daily newspaper published by PLAN’s Political Department.


16. Ibid.


21. For these reasons, see Senior Colonel Huang Yingxu (黄迎旭), “未来中国需要什么样的军事力量?” (“What Kind of Military Force Does Future China Need?”), 学习时报 (Study Times), April 27, 2009. Huang is director of Mao Zedong Military Thought Studies Institute of AMS, and Study Times is a weekly publication by the Central Party School in Beijing.


27. See Ping Zhiwei (平志伟), Major Zeng Xiaoxiao (曾筱), and Major Zhang Xuehui (张学辉), “基于信息系统的体系作战机理研究” (“A Study of Mechanisms for Information Systems-based System of Systems Operations”), China Military Science, No. 4, 2010, p. 41. Ping is a professor and deputy director of Campaign and Tactics Department at Army Command College in Shijiazhuang, and Zeng and Zhang are lecturers in the Combined Arms Tactics Teaching and Research Office of that department.


30. Ibid, p. 56.


33. Senior Colonel Dan Xiufa (单秀法) and Major Ning Jun (宁军), “毛泽东以弱胜强理论再研究” (“Re-study of Mao Zedong’s Theory of Inferior Defeating Superior”), *China Military Science*, No. 3, 2010, p. 67. The citation is from a comment by Mao on his misfortune during the Jiangxi Soviet period of early-1930s. Mao’s rural, mobile strategy of building rural bases and “luring enemy in deep,” which proved to be quite effective in countering Chiang Kai-shek’s encirclement and annihilation campaigns at the time, was criticized as “rightist opportunism.” As a result, it was replaced by a Soviet-style urban strategy endorsed by Communist International representatives such as Otto Braun, to attack urban centers to trigger urban uprisings. After January 1934, however, the Red Army base areas were treated as a Soviet state to be defended by a frontal, positional warfare of attrition (阵地消耗战). The objective was to defend this state “against the enemy who would be defeated outside the gate of the state” (“御敌于国门之外”). This Soviet-style strategy of direct, frontal engagement proved to be disastrous, causing huge casualties of the Red Army, because it ended up as a war of matching attrition. By October 1934, the Red Army had to abandon its southern bases for the tumultuous northward retreat, known as the Long March. For Mao’s comment, see Mao Zedong, *Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, Beijing: Military Science Press and Central Documents Press, 1993, p. 726. Dan is an analyst at Strategy Department of AMS, and Ning is a doctoral student there.


36. *Ibid*. For a naval discussion of inferior fighting superior, see Captain Huang Peirong (黄培荣) and Lieutenant Commander Liu Changlong (刘昌龙), “持续推进立足现有装备打仗能力提升” (“Keep Enhancing the Capabilities for Fighting a War based on Existing Arms”), *China Military Science*, No. 4, 2012. Huang is an associate professor at Operations Command Teaching and Research Office of Naval Command College in Nanjing, and Liu is a doctoral student specializing in military strategy there.
37. For information on new PLAN acquisition of major combatants in this study, consult China Defense, available from www.china-defense.com/smf/.


42. PLA analysts, cited in “中国航母, 从今天驶向未来” (“China’s Aircraft Carrier, from Today to the Future”), 解放军报 (Liberation Army Daily), September 26, 2012.

43. See Nan Li, “China’s Navy Develops Fast Attack Craft,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 2009. For receiving targeting information from off-board sensors, see Huang Binbin (黄彬彬), “‘Sea Snipers’ from a Military Port of Eastern Shandong Manifest Divine Awe” (“胶东某军港海上‘狙击手’显神威”), Liberation Army Daily, August 28, 2009.

45. Xing Guangmei (邢广梅), Li Jie, and Du Wenlong (杜文龙), cited in “日本舰机频繁挑衅中国海军” (“Japanese Warships and Aircraft Frequently Provoke the Chinese Navy”), 钱江晚报 (Qianjiang Evening News), Hangzhou, April 9, 2013. Xing is director of Legal Studies Office of Naval Military Art Studies Institute in Beijing, and Du is a professor at China’s NDU.

CHAPTER 8

SECOND ARTILLERY IN THE HU JINTAO ERA: DOCTRINE AND CAPABILITIES

Michael S. Chase

The views expressed in this chapter do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Naval War College or the U.S. Navy.

This chapter assesses the doctrine and capabilities of China’s strategic missile force—the People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Force (PLASAF)—during the Hu Jintao era. During the Hu Jintao era, Second Artillery made impressive progress in doctrinal development, force modernization, and training, emerging as a cornerstone of China’s growing military power. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) published important volumes elaborating its doctrine for missile force deterrence operations and campaigns. After decades of vulnerability, PLASAF’s deployment of road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) enhanced the survivability of the nuclear missile force and strengthened the credibility of China’s strategic deterrent. The Hu era also featured the expansion of PLASAF’s conventional capabilities, giving Beijing new options to employ conventional missiles for deterrence, intimidation, and precision strike operations. In addition, Second Artillery improved its command automation, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), communications capabilities, and increased the realism and complexity of missile force training.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

- China’s growing nuclear and conventional missile capabilities have far-reaching implications for the United States. Specifically, China’s growing nuclear capabilities are likely to complicate future arms control negotiations, and aspects of PLASAF doctrine could create serious crisis stability and escalation management challenges.
- Strategic dialogue on these issues is required to mitigate escalation risks and lay the groundwork for future Chinese participation in multilateral arms control discussions.
- Furthermore, PLASAF’s growing conventional missile capabilities will allow China to pose an increasingly serious threat to targets like regional bases and surface ships.
- This will require the United States to rethink aspects of its traditional approach to military operations, deterrence, and assurance of allies and partners in the region.

INTRODUCTION

During the Hu era, Second Artillery made major strides in the development of its nuclear and conventional missile capabilities. In 2002, the year Hu Jintao became President of China and Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China was in the process of replacing its CSS-4 Mod 1 silo-based ICBMs with the longer-range CSS-4 Mod 2s, but road mobile ICBMs remained under development.¹ During the Hu era, China improved the survivability and striking power of its nuclear force by deploying the DF-31 and DF-31A road mobile ICBMs. Second Artillery’s con-
ventional capabilities also increased dramatically during the Hu era. In 2002, China had deployed about 350 conventional short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) opposite Taiwan.² By 2012, PLASAF had roughly tripled the size of its conventional SRBM force to about 1,050-1,150 missiles. Importantly, China also diversified its conventional missile force to include conventional medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM).

These force modernization developments have allowed Second Artillery to strengthen its ability to perform its key missions: strategic deterrence and conventional precision strike.³ China’s 2008 Defense White Paper elaborates on these missions as follows:

Second Artillery Force sticks to China’s policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, implements a self-defensive nuclear strategy, strictly follows the orders of the CMC [Central Military Commission], and takes it as its fundamental mission the protection of China from any nuclear attack. . . . The conventional missile force of Second Artillery Force is charged mainly of the task of conducting medium- and long-range precision strikes against key strategic and operational targets of the enemy.⁴

Similarly, Second Artillery publications indicate that PLASAF’s main mission is dual deterrence, dual operations (双重威慑, 双重作战), meaning it is responsible for nuclear deterrence and nuclear counterstrikes, as well as conventional deterrence and conventional precision strikes.⁵

Second Artillery’s central focus remains on its core military capabilities. According to the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (SSAC), with the powerful nuclear and conventional missile force capabilities that allow
Second Artillery to perform its deterrence and war-fighting missions, China’s strategic missile force has become the “trump card” for winning local wars under informatized conditions. At the same time, however, PLASAF is also responsible for improving its ability to participate in other types of operations, such as domestic disaster relief activities. For example, Second Artillery engineering and medical units participated in disaster relief operations following the rain and ice storm in South China in early-2008 and the devastating earthquake in Wenchuan, Sichuan Province, in May 2008. In a review of Second Artillery’s recent accomplishments, then Commander Jing Zhiyuan and then Political Commissar Peng Xiaofeng highlighted PLASAF’s disaster relief contributions, and military media has also prominently covered PLASAF’s involvement in such activities.

Senior PLASAF officers place all of these responsibilities in the context of the historic missions President Hu assigned to the PLA in 2004. Beyond the enunciation of the PLA’s historic missions, President Hu has apparently paid a considerable amount of attention to Second Artillery during his tenure as China’s top leader. According to Jing and Peng:

Comrade Hu Jintao has attached great importance to and placed high hope on the growth of Second Artillery, emphasizing that Second Artillery is a strategic force under the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission’s direct command, acts as our country’s core force for strategic deterrence, and plays a particularly important role in performing the PLA’s historic mission at the new stage in the new century.
The extent to which China’s top leaders view the missile force as capable of supporting their broader political and diplomatic objectives is difficult to gauge, but PLASAF’s senior leaders appear increasingly confident about its ability to perform its missions. In an authoritative review of the development of Second Artillery in the reform and opening era, Second Artillery Commander Jing Zhiyuan and then Second Artillery Political Commissar Peng Xiaofeng highlighted a variety of achievements, including improvements in combat capability, weapons and equipment, exercises and training, political work, personnel development and education, and support capabilities. In particular, Jing and Peng underscored the strengthening of the combat capability of the missile force, writing that the “integrated combat capability” of PLASAF “has been elevated significantly.” More specifically, according to Jing and Peng:

Second Artillery has taken a big stride, with the combat force evolving from a unitary nuclear force into an armed branch combining both nuclear and conventional weapons, the combat mode evolving from fixed position operation to mobile combat operation, and combat capabilities expanded from the mode of near-, intermediate-, and long-range strikes to that of intercontinental strikes.

This self-assessment appears reasonably accurate. Indeed, it reflects impressive advances in PLASAF’s nuclear and conventional missile force capabilities during the Hu era. In all, these developments resulted in a considerable increase in PLASAF’s deterrent and warfighting capabilities during the Hu era. As Jing and Peng put it, PLASAF’s advances in crucial areas such as doctrine, hardware, and training reflect “a
new upgrade of the troops’ strategic deterrence and defense operation capabilities under informatized conditions.”

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Part two evaluates PLASAF doctrine during the Hu Jintao era. Part three provides an overview of key developments in PLASAF capabilities, including nuclear and conventional missiles; command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR); and command automation systems. It also covers important developments involving training and exercises. Part four briefly looks ahead to some possible changes analysts may need to watch for during the Xi Jinping era. Part five recaps some of the key themes of the chapter and examines the implications for the United States.

SECOND ARTILLERY DOCTRINE IN THE HU JINTAO ERA

During the Hu era, Second Artillery has focused on the requirements of dual deterrence, dual operations. Along with the modernization of its forces, PLASAF has also engaged in the elaboration and refinement of its doctrine, which in turn is intended to guide the further development and future employment of its nuclear and conventional missile force capabilities. Determining what exactly is new in the Hu era in terms of doctrine is complicated by the fact that the key books published in the mid-2000s were based on documents issued in the late-1990s, specifically the 1999 Outline for Second Artillery Campaigns and Outline for Joint Campaigns. Nonetheless, PLASAF officers appear to feel as though the missile force has made important progress in this area. According to Yu Jixun:
Especially since the beginning of the new century, closely following the mission and tasks given to us by the Central Military Commission, we have emancipated our thoughts with bold innovations, actively utilized modern research methods and measures, focused on the relevance, forward looking nature, and effectiveness of combat theory research, achieved a great deal of valuable and influential results, enriched and perfected the system of strategic missile troop combat theories, and provided solid theoretical support to the accelerating preparations for military struggle and strategic missile troop transformation.\textsuperscript{18}

In particular, doctrinal publications suggest that important developments have been made in how Second Artillery thinks about deterrence operations and missile force campaigns.

**Second Artillery Deterrence Operations.**

Second Artillery published a considerable body of thinking about deterrence operations during Hu Jintao’s decade as China’s top leader. Chinese military publications released during this period of time, including *Intimidation Warfare* and SSAC (第二炮兵战役学), clearly highlighted the missile force’s deterrent role. In this context, it is important to note that the Chinese term *weishe* (威慑), which is always translated as “deterrence” by official Chinese sources, is sometimes used in a way that encompasses both deterrence and compellence or coercive diplomacy, as typically defined in Western political science literature. Accordingly, it is sometimes more appropriate to think of *weishe* as roughly equivalent to Thomas Schelling’s broader concept of coercion, which includes deter-
rence and compellence.¹⁹ Some Chinese scholars also acknowledge that the meaning of *weishe* is closer to coercion. For example, according to Li Bin, “‘weishe’ does not mean deterrence; ‘weishe’ means coercion: to force others to yield to oneself.”²⁰ Consequently, although this chapter follows the convention of translating *weishe* as deterrence, it must be noted that this is actually a broader concept that can encompass both deterrence and compellence or coercive diplomacy.

According to SSAC, Second Artillery campaign deterrence (“第二炮兵战役威慑”) is a series of military activities in which missile force units create momentum and demonstrate strength (“造势和显势”) in order to accomplish specified strategic and campaign-level objectives.²¹ The authors stress that campaign deterrence operations constitute an important component of Second Artillery’s mission of dual deterrence, dual operations. The goal of campaign deterrence operations is to “compel an enemy to accept our will or to contain an enemy’s hostile actions.” ²²

Chinese military publications indicate that PLA-SAF campaign deterrence operations take place in peacetime, crisis, and wartime. Local wars under informatized conditions, the type the PLA expects it may need to fight in the future, often begin with campaign deterrence operations aimed at compelling the adversary to accept certain conditions. Second Artillery dual deterrence operations are one of the main activities in the prologue stages of local wars under informatized conditions. One Chinese source, Zhao Xijun’s *Intimidation Warfare*, describes missile forces on high alert as “like swords drawn out of their sheath, arrows on the bent bow, and bullets loaded.”²³ Nuclear and conventional missile force units can thus be used to conduct deterrence operations designed to create an advantageous situation for China.
The objective of Second Artillery campaign deterrence activities is to compel the enemy to accept the conditions put forward by China through a process of intimidation (恫吓). This process begins with lower intensity deterrence actions such as warnings and demonstrations of strength and gradually progresses to higher intensity deterrence actions such as launch exercises or even test launches close to enemy targets. Chinese publications portray Second Artillery campaign deterrence activities as an important means for achieving campaign-level objectives, and even national strategic goals.

The guiding thoughts for Second Artillery campaign deterrence actions are “building momentum and using stratagem, and being appropriate and effective” (造势伐谋，适度有效). The purpose is to create an advantageous situation by forming a powerful force that resembles a “boulder rolling down a steep mountain.” Chinese military publications identify several campaign deterrence missions for the missile force. Among these deterrence missions are: preventing wars from breaking out; deterring escalation of a war that has already started; using nuclear deterrence as a “backstop” to support conventional operations; and compelling submission of the enemy through high-intensity deterrence actions.

Second Artillery nuclear and conventional missile force units use a variety of methods to support these objectives. One of the most important campaign deterrence methods for the missile force is “displaying strength” (实力展示). This mainly involves revealing missiles and various types of launch and support equipment, and demonstrating the high quality missile force personnel. Closely related to demonstrating strength is the concept of “using the troops to build
momentum” (“兵力造势”). According to SSAC, this refers to the use of troop deployments to create an advantageous situation for China.

At a more concrete level, Second Artillery publications discuss a variety of specific methods the missile force can employ to deter or intimidate an adversary. Some that have been carried out in recent years include sending commanders to inspect or review the troops, issuing statements about the development or deployment of new types of missiles, releasing pictures or videos of missile force exercises to the international media, and displaying nuclear and conventional missiles in National Day military parades. Chinese military publications also describe a variety of deterrence actions that could be employed under crisis or conflict conditions. These include the following:

• Moving missile launchers and support vehicles into view as the enemy’s reconnaissance satellites are about to pass overhead to show that China’s missile forces are preparing to conduct combat operations.

• Engaging in feint activities with a mix of real forces and forces equipped with fake missiles and equipment to create the impression that a larger number of forces are involved in the maneuvers, which in turn is supposed to increase the overall effects of the deterrence operations.

• Conducting simulated missile launches by deploying mobile missiles to training areas and fake launch sites just before the enemy’s reconnaissance satellites are about to pass overhead; the mobile missile units can then prepare their equipment, erect the missiles, and conduct pre-launch inspections. Similarly, China’s liquid-fueled missiles can “carry out simulated fueling.”

30
• Employing deception techniques that involve the use of electronic equipment and communications gear to simulate the electromagnetic radiation characteristics and communications patterns of missile force and command center activities.

• Creating the appearance of all-out escalation by ordering silo-based missiles and missile units at launch pads to conduct missile weaponry technical preparations at the same time.\textsuperscript{31}

• Using the domestic and international media to influence other countries.\textsuperscript{32} Some of the specific methods that can be used include issuing threats to carry out missile strikes through television news broadcasts, press conferences, and the Internet. For example, if a strong enemy sent its aircraft carriers to intervene in a crisis involving China, Second Artillery could threaten conventional missile strikes against the carriers to deter the enemy.\textsuperscript{33}

• Increasing the level of readiness of the missile force in accordance with the appropriate regulations on levels of weapons preparation to demonstrate different degrees of deterrent strength.

• Conducting launch exercises is another important method for achieving campaign deterrence objectives. This involves launching missiles at pre-determined ground or sea targets to place psychological pressure on enemy decisionmakers.

• Another option is test-launching missiles close to enemy territory or enemy ships. The objective is to convince the enemy that if it risks provoking China, it may face a devastating missile
attack. One option is conducting test launches from both flanks, which requires launching missiles at two or more important enemy targets. Another is a “cross-island offensive test launch,” which involves launching a missile across an enemy-held island.

• Still another option is launching one or more missiles close to an enemy aircraft carrier. According to SSAC:

> when conducting deterrence strikes against an enemy aircraft carrier battle group that is intruding into our territorial waters, we can launch missiles near their flanks or in front of them to demonstrate that we have the capability and determination to carry out a destructive strike against the enemy’s nuclear-powered carrier; this will frighten the enemy into leaving our territorial waters.  

• SSAC also mentions the possibility of lowering the nuclear deterrence threshold or adjusting nuclear policy, meaning China could drop or place conditions on its long-standing “no first use” policy in response to particularly threatening actions by a powerful enemy. Specifically, they state that this method could be used when a powerful nuclear-armed enemy that enjoys conventional military superiority conducts continuous medium or high intensity air raids against major strategic targets in China. Under such circumstances, the supreme command could choose to adjust China’s long-standing “no first use” nuclear deterrence policy and order the missile force to “actively carry out powerful nuclear deterrence against the enemy to
deter the enemy from continuously launching conventional air raids against [China’s] major strategic targets.”  

Chinese sources note that when conducting deterrence operations, Second Artillery must choose appropriate methods to influence the adversary. They also emphasize that PLASAF should reveal enough information about its preparations to deter the enemy, while at the same time concealing information that could expose vulnerabilities. For example, according to SSAC, because the technical preparation of missiles is usually carried out in central storage facilities under conditions of concealment, the enemy is unlikely to detect the increased readiness of Chinese missile systems. Consequently, Second Artillery must record videos of the preparations and distribute them via television and Internet, but the scenes that are revealed must be carefully selected in order to avoid divulging technical secrets.

Second Artillery Campaigns.

Second Artillery also appears to have made important progress in the development of doctrine to guide the execution of missile force campaigns and the participation of missile force units in joint campaigns. According to SSAC, the science of campaigns not only provides guidance for training and the conduct of future operations, but also establishes a foundation for making decisions about equipment development and army building. It is useful for thinking about “how to fight battles, what kinds of weapons are needed, and in what forms the training of the force and soldiers should be organized.”  

Because PLASAF lacks actual
operational experience, its campaign concepts are derived from theoretical analysis, assessments of foreign military operations, and its experiences in training and exercises.\textsuperscript{37}

The 2006 edition of \textit{Science of Campaigns}, published by the PLA’s National Defense University Press, defines a Second Artillery campaign as:

the execution of a series of nuclear or conventional missile strikes as well as associated actions by a Second Artillery campaign large formation, so as to form operational activities in order to achieve the objectives of the war, either in part or overall, in accordance with the operational intent of the higher-level authorities.\textsuperscript{38}

This definition appears to be derived from the PLA’s January 1999 “Outline for Second Artillery Campaigns” (“第二炮兵战役纲要”), which is cited in SSAC.\textsuperscript{39}

Chinese military publications indicate that Second Artillery campaigns may be categorized in a number of ways. One is according to the scale of the forces involved. According to SSAC and SOC (2006), a campaign could be a “Missile Base Group Campaign” (“导弹基地群战役”) involving multiple missile bases, a “Missile Brigade Group Campaign” (“导弹旅群战役”) involving multiple conventional missile brigades, or a “Missile Base Campaign” (“导弹基地战役”) involving a single missile base.\textsuperscript{40} Second Artillery campaigns may also be categorized on the basis of whether nuclear or conventional weapons are employed. Specifically, they can be divided into two major types of campaigns: “conventional missile strike campaigns” (“常规导弹突击战役”) and “nuclear counterstrike campaigns” (“核反击战役”).\textsuperscript{41}
Conventional Missile Strike Campaigns.

The first authoritative definition of the conventional missile attack campaign appeared in a 1996 Chinese military textbook entitled *Conventional Missile Strike Campaigns* (常规导弹突击战役), and it has since been refined and elaborated in a number of other publications. In the 2006 edition of *Science of Campaigns*, the conventional missile attack campaigns is defined as: “the series of conventional missile strikes and related operational activities by Second Artillery conventional campaign large formation, under unified command, in order to achieve the goals of the war, either partially or completely.” Furthermore, according to SOC (2006), the conventional missile strike campaign would usually be executed as an important part of a joint campaign, but it could also be carried out independently under the appropriate circumstances. SSAC also indicates that a conventional missile strike campaign would likely constitute part of a joint campaign, such as the joint blockade campaign, joint island landing campaign, joint border counterattack campaign, or joint anti-air raid campaign, but could be conducted independently under certain conditions.

Chinese military publications released during the Hu era have discussed the missions, characteristics, guiding thoughts, and principles of conventional missile strike campaigns. In all, Chinese military writings on conventional missile campaigns stress the importance of surprise and suggest a preference for preemptive strikes.

According to SSAC, basic missions of a conventional missile strike campaign include launching firepower strikes against important targets in the
enemy’s campaign and strategic deep areas, coordinating with the air force to assist in seizing campaign air dominance, coordinating with the navy to assist in seizing campaign command of the sea, coordinating with the army to assist in seizing the initiative in ground operations, and implementing conventional deterrence. More concretely, SSAC lists a number of potential targets for missile strikes in support of these objectives, including the following: enemy strategic and campaign command centers; communications hubs; radar stations; other information and communications-related targets; guided missile positions; air force bases; naval facilities; railway stations; bridges; logistical facilities, energy facilities, electrical power centers, and aircraft carrier strike groups. As for the goals of a Second Artillery conventional missile strike campaign, SSAC indicates that they include:

paralyzing the enemy’s command system; weakening the enemy’s military strength and its ability to continue operations; creating psychological shock in the enemy and shaking its operational resolve; and checking the powerful enemy’s military intervention activities (遏制强敌军事干预行动).46

According to SSAC, the key characteristics of a conventional missile campaign include the need for high-level decisionmaking and the reality of political constraints, the powerful deep strike capabilities and overall impact of conventional missiles as long-range firepower strike weapons, the complexity of coordination relationships, heavy requirements for campaign support owing to the technical nature of missile systems, and dangers of exposure and difficulties inherent in defending against enemy attacks, especially air strikes and special operations raids.47
Second Artillery’s Role in Joint Campaigns.

PLA and PLASAF volumes published during the Hu years indicate that Second Artillery would play a key role in future PLA joint campaigns. In particular, Chinese military publications underscore the centrality of missile attacks in operations aimed at achieving information dominance, air superiority, and sea control as well as countering third party intervention. In particular, Chinese military publications highlight the centrality of the conventional missile force in a variety of campaigns, including the joint amphibious landing campaign, joint blockade campaign, and joint anti-air raid campaign.

SOC (2006) defines a joint amphibious landing campaign as one that involves:

sea-crossing offensive operations, under unified command and with unified planning, carried out against the enemy’s defended coasts and islands by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery, with the assistance and cooperation of the PAP, militia, and local forces.48

Such operations depend highly on information, air, and sea supremacy, which some Chinese military publications describe collectively as the “three supremacies.” According to SOC (2006), for example, “only by seizing and maintaining the ‘three supremacies’ is it possible to truly gain the initiative in amphibious landing campaigns.”49 PLASAF’s conventional missile forces would coordinate with the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and special operations forces in conducting attacks against targets such as early warning systems; command, control, and communications systems; air defense systems; airfields, hangers, and runways; and
harbors and naval bases. The conventional missile force would thus have a crucial role to play in seizing and maintaining the three supremacies, which would be intended to result in “comprehensively paralyzing the enemy’s defensive system and creating favorable conditions for obtaining victory in the amphibious landing campaign.”

Chinese military publications indicate that the joint blockade campaign (联合封锁战役) involves air, naval, and missile force action aimed at enforcing an air and naval blockade of Taiwan. Specifically, SOC (2006) defines a joint blockade campaign as “an offensive operation that is implemented by navy, air force, Second Artillery and ground force campaign formation (军团) . . . in order to sever the enemy’s economic and military connections with the outside world.” As Wayne Ulman points out, the PLA’s joint blockade campaign “would be planned as a much more destructive operation than a simple quarantine or embargo. Enforcing the joint blockade would likely involve kinetic strikes against at least ports, airfields, and air-defense assets.” PLASAF conventional missile strikes would thus likely play a key role in such a campaign. Indeed, SOC (2006) highlights the role conventional missile strikes would play in achieving air, sea, and information superiority, as well as in blockading enemy ports and naval bases.

Second Artillery would also play a key role in the joint anti-air raid campaign, which SOC (2006) describes as “a defensive campaign with integrated offense and defense, aimed at thwarting enemy air raids.” As this definition indicates, the PLA’s anti-air raid campaign includes not only defensive actions, but also offensive operations. In particular, it involves air defense of critical targets on the Chinese main-
land to protect them from enemy precision strikes, and offensive air and missile strikes against targets such as enemy air bases, carrier strike groups (CSGs), and logistics and communications facilities.\textsuperscript{55} Chinese military publications highlight the importance of the anti-air raid campaign in terms of gaining, or losing, the operational initiative, and for China’s national security more broadly. Specifically, SOC (2006) states:

the practice of recent local wars demonstrates that air raids have already become the enemy’s main means of achieving strategic and campaign goals, and in the future it will be one of the greatest threats the PLA faces in the organization and implementation of joint operations.\textsuperscript{56}

Second Artillery’s nuclear missile force would also play an important role in a future joint campaign. According to SSAC:

In future joint operations, Second Artillery nuclear missile units are the People’s Liberation Army’s main force for carrying out nuclear deterrent, counter-nuclear deterrent and nuclear counter-strike duties; organizing and executing nuclear deterrent and counter-nuclear deterrent actions are the central duties for nuclear missile units during joint campaigns. These units aim mainly to fully demonstrate their role in nuclear deterrence and prevent the war from moving towards widening or spreading, and to deter the enemy from initiating nuclear war, and thereby controlling the war by keeping it localized, limited and bearable in scope.\textsuperscript{57}

Nuclear deterrence thus plays an important role during conventional conflicts in deterring not only nuclear attack, but also certain types of conventional escalation.
Second Artillery must therefore coordinate the actions of its nuclear and conventional missile units in order to achieve optimum deterrence effects. Because operations will take place under the shadow of nuclear threats, SSAC indicates:

nuclear missile force deterrence actions and conventional missile strike operations must be fused together and mutually interwoven (融为一体，相互交织) in order to fully bring into play Second Artillery’s deterrence and operational dual functions (慑战双重功能).

Similarly, Zhao Xijun emphasizes that nuclear deterrence and conventional missile force operations will be conducted together as part of an integrated and interwoven action.

**Nuclear Counterstrike Campaigns.**

PLASAF appears to have made some progress in its thinking about the nuclear counterstrike campaign, first defined in the mid-1980s and further developed in the 1990s. As for the current definition, in SOC (2006), the nuclear counterstrike campaign was defined as:

the series of nuclear missile strikes and related operational activities of a Second Artillery nuclear campaign large formation, which are strictly carried out under the direct command and control of the Supreme Command, and in accordance with the intent of the Supreme Command, in order to achieve specially designated strategic goals.

The definition of the nuclear counterstrike campaign in SOC (2006) is very similar to the defini-
tions offered in *Campaign Theory Study Guide* (CTSG) and SSAC. Both of these publications note that the nuclear counterstrike campaign could be carried out either independently or as a major part of a joint nuclear counterattack campaign. The latter type of campaign would involve coordination with the nuclear forces of the PLA Navy (PLAN), presumably China’s Type-094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which have entered service with the PLAN, but still await completion of the development of the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and possibly the PLAAF, if its bombers were to be armed with nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, Second Artillery would play the central role in such a campaign. In addition, according to CTSG, apart from dividing nuclear counterstrike campaigns into those that are executed independently by Second Artillery or jointly with the other services, they may also be categorized as large-scale or small-scale nuclear counterattack campaigns.

Beyond the issue of categorization, the key Chinese publications provide considerable detail on the missions, characteristics, and guiding principles of nuclear counterstrike campaigns. According to CTSG, the basic mission of a nuclear counterattack campaign is:

> carrying out nuclear counterstrikes against the enemy’s important strategic and campaign targets, in accordance with the intentions of higher levels, in order to thwart the enemy’s strategic intentions, shake the enemy’s will, paralyze the enemy’s command systems, retard the enemy’s operational activities, weaken the enemy’s war potential, and deter the escalation of nuclear warfare.
Again, this tracks very closely with the discussion of the mission of the nuclear counterstrike campaign that appears in SSAC. As for the specific targets, they would include enemy command centers, communications nodes, transportation hubs, military bases, political and economic centers, important industrial facilities, and other strategic and campaign targets.

Chinese military publications also highlight several key characteristics of nuclear counterstrike campaigns that distinguish them from other campaigns. One notable characteristic is the extremely harsh battlefield environment. This is a function of China’s no first use policy. Although the authors of SSAC discuss circumstances under which nuclear missile force deterrence operations could be used to deter conventional attacks, they nonetheless appear to assume that a nuclear counterattack campaign would be executed only after China had suffered an enemy nuclear attack. Indeed, according to SSAC:

In light of our nation’s principled stand on the issue of no first use of nuclear weapons, Second Artillery can only carry out nuclear missile strikes against the enemy’s important strategic targets . . . after the enemy has carried out a nuclear raid against our nation.

Because Second Artillery would presumably be an important target for initial enemy nuclear strikes, PLASAF command centers, missile bases, warhead storage facilities, and other important targets would suffer heavy damage from the enemy’s nuclear attack. The widespread destruction and disruption caused by enemy nuclear detonations would create extremely harsh conditions, under which surviving PLASAF forces would have to conduct nuclear counterattack campaign operations. Consequently, the requirements for protection of the force are very high.
Another characteristic that distinguishes nuclear counterattack campaigns from all other types of campaigns is the huge destructive potential of nuclear weapons, which necessitates highly centralized command and control. The long range and enormous power of nuclear weapons set them apart from conventional weapons. Any use of nuclear weapons would have a dramatic effect not only on the course and outcome of a war, but also on the overall state of the nation’s political, economic, diplomatic, and military struggle. This has obvious implications for the command and control of nuclear counterattack campaigns. According to Science of Campaigns (2006), whether the nuclear counterstrike campaign is conducted jointly or independently, because it is a strategic campaign, “it must be organized and carried out strictly according to the decisions of the supreme command.” SSAC and other Chinese military publications also underscore that highly centralized command is essential in nuclear counterattack campaigns. The Supreme Command must make all of the key decisions. This in turn necessitates command, control, and communications (C3) systems that are resistant to interference and destruction. Chinese doctrinal publications offer little information about what would happen if PLASAF units were unable to communicate with the Supreme Command (统帅部), but SSAC states that “when command is disrupted or when the situation is urgent, Second Artillery campaign commanders and their command offices should, within their limited scope of authority, act on their own judgment, in light of the strategic intentions of headquarters.”
The guiding principles for Second Artillery nuclear counterattack campaigns are close protection and key point counterattacks (严密防护，重点反击).77 “Close protection” concerns the survivability of the missile force, and is therefore a vital prerequisite for successfully carrying out a nuclear counterattack campaign. According to SSAC, close protection is “the fundamental channel through which Second Artillery increases survivability and the effective preservation of nuclear counterattack strength under nuclear conditions.” The purpose of close protection is “avoiding or to the greatest extent possible reducing the losses caused by an enemy nuclear raid or precision strike.” SSAC underscores the need to protect against nuclear attacks, conventional strikes and electronic warfare threats.78 The need for close protection against enemy attacks persists throughout a war because sudden enemy raids may occur at anytime, not only in the beginning, but also in the middle or at the end of a conflict. Key point counterattacks involve conducting “nuclear firepower key point strikes on the enemy’s crucial targets.”79 The objectives of key point counterattacks are “to cause huge losses for the enemy, and to cause the enemy to be seriously shaken psychologically, in order to achieve the goal of weakening the enemy’s will to wage war.”80

SECOND ARTILLERY CAPABILITIES IN THE HU JINTAO ERA

During the Hu era, Second Artillery made major improvements in its nuclear capabilities, diversified and enhanced its conventional missile capabilities, and upgraded its command automation and C4ISR systems. In their review of PLASAF force structure
developments, Jing and Peng state that PLASAF has made major breakthroughs in the development of weapons and equipment.\textsuperscript{81} Specifically, they write:

Implementation of the new weapon development strategy has been stepped up. Second Artillery has worked together with other departments concerned to run key research projects, succeeded in developing various models of missiles, thus building an armament series comprising both nuclear and conventional weapons that covers a full spectrum in terms of fire range and power with substantially enhanced efficacy.\textsuperscript{82}

**Nuclear Missile Force Capabilities.**

During the Hu era, China modernized its nuclear forces to enhance their survivability, increase their striking power, and counter missile defense developments. Beijing’s goal is fielding a lean and effective nuclear force that meets its evolving security needs.\textsuperscript{83} China currently maintains the DF-3 intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) and DF-21 and DF-21A medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) for theater nuclear deterrence missions. The PRC’s intercontinental nuclear ballistic missile force consists of older, limited-range DF-4 ICBMs, silo-based DF-5 ICBMs, and the recently deployed road mobile DF-31 and DF-31A ICBMs. China is also enhancing its silo-based systems.\textsuperscript{84} In addition, China may be developing a new mobile ICBM, possibly capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).\textsuperscript{85}

*Nuclear MRBMs, IRBMs, and Limited-Range ICBMs.*

China currently deploys several different missile systems for regional nuclear deterrence missions.\textsuperscript{86}
The DF-3 (CSS-2), first deployed in 1971, is a single-stage liquid propellant IRBM with a maximum range of about 3,000 kilometers (km, 1,900 miles). The National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) assesses that the DF-3 (CSS-2) is transportable but has limited mobility. China has about 14–18 liquid-fueled DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBMs with about five to 10 CSS-2 launchers. The PRC also still deploys some of its limited range, liquid-fueled DF-4 ICBMs, which have a range of about 5,400 km (3,400+ miles).

China has been transitioning to a more survivable, road-mobile theater nuclear force featuring the DF-21 and DF-21A MRBMs. According to the 2009 Department of Defense (DoD) report on Chinese military power, the PLA has about 60–80 nuclear-armed MRBMs and 70-90 associated launchers. The DF-21 and DF-21A are two-stage solid propellant road-mobile missiles with maximum ranges of more than 1,750 km (1,100+ miles).

Nuclear Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).

The silo-based DF-5 (CSS-4) ICBM, a liquid-propellant, two-stage missile, has been the mainstay of China’s intercontinental nuclear deterrence force since its initial deployment in 1981. China currently deploys about 20 DF-5s, which have a range of at least 13,000 km (8,000+ miles), enough to strike targets throughout the United States. According to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), China is “enhancing its silo-based systems.”

The most important nuclear force development during the Hu era has been the long-awaited deployment of road-mobile ICBMs, which has provided China with a much more survivable nuclear force.
Under Hu, PLASAF finally fielded two types of road-mobile ICBMs, the DF-31 and DF-31A. The DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1) is a three-stage, solid propellant, road-mobile ICBM, with a maximum range of more than 7,200 km (4,500+ miles). After a protracted development history that began in the 1980s, the DF-31 road-mobile ICBM was finally deployed in 2006. The DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) is a three-stage road-mobile ICBM, with a maximum range of more than 11,200 km (7,000+ miles). The DF-31A’s longer range allows it to reach targets throughout most of the United States. China began deploying the DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) road-mobile ICBM in 2007.

Another important development is China’s movement toward an operational sea-based deterrent to complement PLASAF’s land-based nuclear missiles. According to China’s 2010 Defense White Paper, the PLAN is enhancing its strategic deterrence and counterattack capabilities. The Jin-class SSBN has already entered service with the PLAN, but the JL-2 SLBM has faced repeated delays. Nonetheless, it may reach initial operating capability within the next 2 years, according to the 2012 DoD report on Chinese military power. When this happens, China will finally have an operational nuclear dyad. Nonetheless, PLASAF will remain the core of China’s strategic nuclear deterrent.
Conventional Missile Capabilities.

PLASAF’s conventional missile force has grown rapidly since its inception to enable China to implement its concepts for employing it for deterrence, compellence, and conventional firepower strike operations. Today, China’s conventional ballistic missile force includes DF-15 and DF-11 SRBMs and DF-21 MRBMs. China has deployed the DH-10 land-attack cruise missile (LACM) to enhance the PLA’s regional precision strike capabilities. China is also developing and deploying an ASBM based on a variant of the DF-21 MRBM. Beyond these capabilities, Taiwan officials have stated publicly that China is deploying new DF-16 ballistic missiles, with a range of about 1,000-1,500 km. In addition, PRC media reports indicate that China is developing another conventional missile system with a range of 4,000 km.

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs).

Since the early-1990s, when the conventional missile force component of Second Artillery was established, China’s SRBM forces have expanded dramatically. Indeed, estimates presented in DoD’s annual reports on Chinese military power reveal that the number of deployed SRBMs has roughly tripled since the early-2000s. By December 2010, China’s arsenal consisted of about 1,000-1,200 solid propellant road-mobile SRBMs, all deployed in areas opposite Taiwan. According to DoD, this includes about 350-400 DF-15 (CSS-6) SRBMs and about 700-750 DF-11 (CSS-7) SRBMs. China has also fielded a considerable force of mobile launchers for these missiles. NASIC estimates that China has deployed more than
200 launchers for its SRBMs.\textsuperscript{103} Similarly, DoD’s most recent report provides an estimated order of battle of 210-250 total SRBM launchers, including 90-110 DF-15 (CSS-6) launchers and 120-140 DF-11 (CSS-7) launchers.\textsuperscript{104}

Recent editions of the DoD Chinese military power report indicate that although the rate of growth appears to have slowed, there have been further improvements in quality as China has continued to upgrade the capabilities of its SRBMs. In its 2010 report, DoD noted that China was increasing its inventory at a slower rate than in past years.\textsuperscript{105} DoD expanded on this judgment in its 2011 report, indicating that the number of SRBMs appears to be holding relatively steady, but that China is replacing older missiles with newer, more accurate and capable models. According to the 2011 report:

As of December 2010, the PLA had somewhere between 1,000-1,200 SRBMs. The total number of SRBMs represents little to no change over the past year. However, the PLA continues to field advanced variants with improved ranges and more sophisticated payloads that are gradually replacing earlier generations that do not possess true precision strike capability.\textsuperscript{106}

\textit{Longer-range Conventional Ballistic Missiles.}

China has deployed conventional MRBMs and is developing and deploying an ASBM. According to NASIC: “China is also acquiring new conventionally armed MRBMs to conduct precision strikes at longer ranges. These systems are likely intended to hold at risk, or strike, logistics nodes and regional military bases including airfields and ports.”\textsuperscript{107} China’s DF-21 conventional MRBM is a two-stage solid propellant
mobile missile with a maximum range of about 1,750 km (1,100 miles).\textsuperscript{108}

Perhaps of greatest significance is China’s development of a medium-range ASBM based on the DF-21 (CSS-5). China’s interest in employing ballistic missiles to target aircraft carriers appears to date back at least to the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, when the United States deployed two aircraft carrier groups to the region in response to Chinese SRBM flight tests and military exercises. The DF-21D ASBM is a two-stage solid-propellant mobile missile with a range of 1,500+ km (932+ miles).\textsuperscript{109} According to Taiwan’s 2011 \textit{National Defense Report}, starting in 2010, China has been deploying the DF-21D in small numbers.\textsuperscript{110}

\textit{Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs).}

PLASAF has also fielded ground-launched land attack cruise missiles (LACMs), further contributing to the enhancement of its conventional long-range precision-strike capabilities. According to DoD, “The PLA is acquiring large numbers of highly accurate cruise missiles, such as the domestically produced ground-launched DH-10” LACM, which has a range of more than 1,500 km.\textsuperscript{111} The 2012 DoD report to Congress estimates that China has deployed about 200-500 DH-10 LACMs and 40-55 launchers.\textsuperscript{112}

\textit{C4ISR and Command Automation.}

Although new platforms and weapons often capture the most attention, the PLA’s development of improved C4ISR, communications systems, and command automation capabilities has probably been equally impressive over the past decade. Indeed, it is
clear that the PLA feels it made major strides in its communications infrastructure and related capabilities during the Hu era. China’s 2010 Defense White Paper highlights the PLA’s own assessment of its advances in modernizing its C4ISR architecture. According to the 2010 White Paper:

The total length of the national defense optical fiber communication network has increased by a large margin, forming a new generation information transmission network with optical fiber communication as the mainstay and satellite and short-wave communications as assistance.¹¹³

Second Artillery has clearly benefited from this expansion and modernization of the PLA’s C4ISR capabilities. In particular for PLASAF, some of the key developments during the Hu era have included advances in ISR and communications technology and the development of capabilities like the integrated command platform.

In a retrospective on key developments during this period, Lieutenant General Wei Fenghe, who was Second Artillery’s Chief of Staff from 2006-10, subsequently served as a Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and is now PLASAF Commander, highlights major improvements in ISR, communications, and precision guidance capabilities.¹¹⁴ In addition, according to former PLASAF Deputy Commander Zhang Xiang, another key development in the PLASAF’s modernization during this period was the deployment of mobile command systems.¹¹⁵

According to Chinese sources, another area of particular emphasis during the Hu years was improving Second Artillery’s command automation capabilities.¹¹⁶ Subsequently, according to Wei, PLASAF:
successfully completed the development of the fundamental automated command system and installed it in the various units one after another, marking an important milestone in the history of construction of command equipment of Second Artillery.

In March 2007, Wei reports that PLASAF:

organized a test of all the essential elements and the full-load functions of the command system, which proved that the commanding platforms at different levels all possessed advanced properties, were running reliably, and that all the norms met the requirements for use in combat operations.\(^\text{117}\)

Chinese military media reports highlight the main advantages of PLASAF’s employment of the integrated command platform, indicating that it enables commanders to coordinate and direct the operations of multiple brigades and launch units with different types of equipment,\(^\text{118}\) and to conduct structured attacks.\(^\text{119}\) According to one report, “the integrated command platform is the very kernel of material support for the development of command capability under informatized conditions,” and an essential aspect of the PLA’s efforts to improve its ability to conduct information-system based system of systems operations.\(^\text{120}\)

Training and Exercises.

The PLA has focused on improving training, and Second Artillery has been no exception. Indeed, its top leaders have frequently emphasized the importance of training. In January 2011, for example, PLASAF Commander Jing Zhiyuan and Political Commissar Zhang
Haiyang issued an order emphasizing the central role of training in further enhancing the combat capabilities of the missile force. Jing and Zhang urged the missile force to “uphold military training as a key focus in expanding and deepening preparation for military struggle, the basic way to generate, consolidate, and enhance combat power, and regular, core work in the development of [missile force] units.” Reflecting this high-level emphasis on the importance of training, Chinese military media reports suggest that PLASAF training increased in realism and complexity during the Hu era.

Overall, PLASAF emphasizes that “troops should train as they will fight,” meaning that exercises should take place under realistic conditions to temper the skills their units will need in actual combat. One important way in which many PLA exercises now attempt to enhance the level of realism is by incorporating opposing forces. The employment of blue forces in exercises is a noteworthy development because it makes training more realistic and challenging, encourages officers to take the initiative in response to changing situations, and gives troops exposure to possible adversary tactics.

Other reports indicate that training sometimes forces participating units to deviate from their prepared plans. This is done to prepare officers and soldiers to cope with actual combat situations in which they may lose the ability to communicate with higher headquarters or find that the enemy has reacted to their actions in unexpected ways. Along these lines, PLASAF units have practiced moving to alternate launch sites and erecting temporary launch pads when primary launch positions are “destroyed” during exercises. PLASAF training has also emphasized
intertheater deployments, which entail considerable operational and logistical challenges. Indeed, recent *Jiefangjun bao* reports have highlighted progress in cross-region mobility training. In addition, Chinese military media reports indicate that PLASAF units are conducting nighttime maneuver training.

PLASAF has also practiced a variety of techniques to counter enemy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), precision strike, jamming, and electronic warfare attacks. In keeping with the emphasis on training in a complex electromagnetic environment contained in recent General Staff Department training guidelines, this is intended to improve the PLA’s ability to operate in an electronic-warfare (EW) environment and to allow military units to practice various types of counter-reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and counter-EW techniques. In addition, Chinese media reports indicate that PLASAF is conducting exercises that test its ability to employ increasingly sophisticated decoys and camouflage methods to counter adversary airborne and space-based ISR capabilities, including optical, infrared, and radar imagery systems. Still another important area of emphasis in training is command automation and missile force C2. Current senior leadership training guidance highlights the importance of the informatization of the missile force and the development of information system-based system of systems operations capabilities.

Finally, a sometimes overlooked but important element of the PLA’s training reform program is standardization of training and the development and application of more stringent criteria for examination and evaluation. This emphasis on rigorous screening and evaluation is reflected in the recent promotion of
“two commanders, one operator” testing and evaluation, which focuses on assessing the capabilities of missile launcher and launch battalion commanders and specialist operators in PLASAF.\textsuperscript{129} This marks a particularly important change in that more rigorous evaluation of training can help identify problems and shortcomings and contribute to the development of a more realistic appraisal of readiness and combat capabilities. In addition, PLASAF has issued a series of regulations intended to standardize training practices and promote more robust testing and evaluation of nuclear and conventional missile-force units.\textsuperscript{130}

Although PLA and Second Artillery reporting on training and exercises continues to highlight deficiencies in certain areas and underscore the need for further improvements, PLASAF’s own self-assessments suggest that overall they made major strides in training and exercises during the Hu years. As Jing and Peng put it, “The degree of actual combat lifelikeness has been constantly enhanced for military training.”\textsuperscript{131} Moreover, they state:

. . . Second Artillery has perfectly completed a number of major exercises and combat-readiness-related tasks assigned by the Central Military Commission. In particular, in the past few years, during major live campaign exercises based on complex electromagnetic scenarios, missile brigades participating in the exercises used various types of missiles to deliver precision fire strikes on a variety of targets in several rounds, accurately hitting all the targets.\textsuperscript{132}

Similarly, Wei Fenghe highlights the importance of tempering the troops through rigorous training, and highlights achievements in training and exercises, including live missile launches, during the Hu
years. In addition, one recent *Jiefangjun bao* report highlighted summer 2012 training involving several missile brigades as reflecting a historic leap in the core military capabilities of China’s strategic missile force, especially its ability to conduct long distance mobile combat operations and its growing precision strike capability.\textsuperscript{133}

**LOOKING AHEAD: SECOND ARTILLERY IN THE XI JINPING ERA**

In a December 2012 meeting with delegates to Second Artillery’s 8th Party Congress, Xi Jinping described PLASAF as “the core strength of China’s strategic deterrence, the strategic support for the country’s status as a major power, and an important cornerstone safeguarding national security.”\textsuperscript{134} Beyond Xi’s exhortation to build a powerful and technologically advanced missile force, however, little has been revealed about the specifics of his views on the future development of PLASAF’s nuclear and conventional missile capabilities. China’s limited transparency further complicates efforts to predict future missile force developments, but trends during the Hu era and the comments of senior missile force officers probably offer a reasonable guide to understanding PLASAF’s likely direction under Xi’s leadership. According to former Second Artillery Commander Jing Zhiyuan, future developments across the missile force will include improvements in ISR, ability to penetrate missile defenses, destructiveness, survivability and protection, precision strike, and rapid reaction capabilities.\textsuperscript{135} As for future nuclear missile force developments, China is all but certain to deploy the forces it perceives as required to ensure it will have an assured
retaliation capability. Jing writes that China’s limited development of nuclear weapons will not compete in quantity with the nuclear superpowers. Instead, he writes, Beijing intends to maintain the lowest level of nuclear weapons that is sufficient for the PLASAF to guard the national security. Nonetheless, this is likely to entail considerable further growth in the size of China’s nuclear missile force. According to DIA, “China’s strategic missile force . . . currently has fewer than 50 ICBMs that can strike the continental United States, but it probably will more than double that number by 2025.”

Toward this end, according to DoD, “China may also be developing a new road mobile ICBM, possibly capable of carrying a multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV).” This statement followed many years of speculation about possible follow-on ICBM systems. Rumors about a possible DF-41 ICBM program have been in circulation for well over a decade, and photos of a large, eight-axe transporter erector launcher (TEL) that appeared on the Internet in 2007 have contributed to renewed discussion about new road mobile ICBMs.

With regard to the continued modernization of the conventional missile force, PLASAF appears poised to continue extending the power and reach of its conventional precision strike capabilities. According to Mark Stokes, after the deployment of the DF-21D, the logical next step for China would be to develop a longer-range ASBM, capable of threatening U.S. aircraft carriers out to a distance of at least 3,000 km, possibly by the end of the 12th Five Year Plan in 2015. Another possibility is that Beijing might choose to pursue new longer-range conventional strike missions and capabilities for Second Artillery. Specifically, future
developments may include further expansion of its conventional MRBM force and possibly conventional IRBMs. According to the 2011 DoD report on Chinese military developments, “China’s ballistic missile force is acquiring conventional medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles that extend the distance at which it can threaten other countries with conventional precision or near-precision strikes.”

Moreover, according to a Chinese media report, China is developing an intermediate-range conventional missile with a range of about 4,000 km. The missile, which is reportedly scheduled for deployment in 2015, would enable Second Artillery to launch conventional strikes against targets as far away as Guam.

Although it is possible to sketch the outlines of some potential developments over the next decade, a number of important questions about Second Artillery’s future remain unanswered: What new nuclear and conventional missile capabilities will Second Artillery deploy during the Xi Jinping era? Will Second Artillery acquire new missions, such as offensive counterspace operations? How will strategy and doctrine evolve as PLASAF capabilities continue to improve and the missile force potentially takes on new responsibilities?

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

In the Hu Jintao era, Second Artillery made impressive strides in the development of its nuclear deterrence and conventional strike capabilities. The deployment of substantial numbers of road mobile ICBMs is giving China the assured retaliation capability it has long sought for its growing, but still relatively small nuclear missile force. The expansion and diver-
sification of PLASAF’s conventional missile force has greatly enhanced China’s conventional deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and regional precision strike capabilities. Furthermore, Second Artillery’s institutional stature appears to have increased along with these force modernization developments, as reflected by the central role PLASAF has been assigned in PLA joint campaigns and the elevation of Second Artillery’s Commander to membership in the CMC. Over the next 10 years, China can be expected to continue to strengthen PLASAF’s nuclear missile force, which will remain the most important element of China’s nuclear deterrent posture, even after the anticipated introduction of Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and JL-2 SLBMs into the PLAN’s inventory. Perhaps the most important development in this regard could be the deployment of MIRVed road-mobile ICBMs. China can also be expected to further enhance PLASAF’s conventional precision strike capabilities with upgraded SRBMs, MRBMs, and AS-BMs. In addition, it may add some longer-range conventional missile systems to its inventory.

The development of Chinese nuclear and conventional missile capabilities has implications in a number of areas. First, even though China does not seem to be interested in seeking parity with the nuclear superpowers, China’s growing nuclear arsenal will make it a more important consideration in discussions about future nuclear arms control agreements. China’s integration into the global nuclear reduction process that President Barack Obama outlined in his 2009 Prague speech will eventually be required to move toward the long-term goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Beijing is well aware of the possibility that China will face greater pressure as a result. Teng Jianqun of the
China Institute of International Studies, for example, sees Washington’s approach as still focused mainly on Russia at present, but notes that “as bilateral disarmament progresses, the U.S. will certainly pay increasing attention to China’s arms control policies.” But China is clearly far from eager to be drawn into the process, especially given the asymmetry in the size of China’s nuclear arsenal compared to those of the United States and Russia. It should be noted, however, that China has not specified exactly what number would constitute an appropriate level, suggesting that Beijing will remain reluctant to enter into such negotiations. Nonetheless, over time, dialogue on these issues could help lay the groundwork for future Chinese participation in multilateral arms control discussions.

Second, challenges for escalation management that arise from PLASAF capabilities and doctrine will also merit consideration. Taken together, nuclear and conventional missile force developments, especially some of China’s thinking with respect to using the missile force to conduct deterrence operations to send signals aimed at influencing an adversary, also raise the possibility of miscalculation or inadvertent escalation in a crisis or conflict scenario. Miscalculation in the midst of a crisis is a particularly troubling possibility, one that could be heightened by uncertainty over the message that one side is trying to convey to the other or by overconfidence in the ability to control escalation. The most serious concern is that some of the signaling activities described in Chinese publications could easily be interpreted not as a demonstration of resolve or as a warning, but as preparation to conduct actual nuclear missile strikes, possibly decreasing crisis stability or even triggering escalation rather than strengthen-
ing deterrence. Indeed, some Chinese sources contain references that raise troubling questions about potential miscalculations that could result from attempts to increase the intensity of deterrence during a crisis or in the midst of a conventional conflict.\textsuperscript{147} Although Chinese authors appear to demonstrate at least some awareness of the danger that actions intended to deter an adversary could instead trigger escalation, the discussions of these risks in the relevant publications are quite limited.\textsuperscript{148} One possibility is that such issues are too sensitive to be addressed in greater detail in these publications. On the whole, however, the available sources suggest that Chinese thinking about the risks of specific actions may be rather underdeveloped, which in turn could make attempts at escalation management in a U.S.-China crisis or conflict extremely challenging and potentially very dangerous for both parties. Strategic dialogue on these issues could help mitigate escalation risks.

Finally, PLASAF force structure improvements, enhanced capabilities for the employment of missile force units in joint campaigns, and related doctrinal developments clearly pose serious tactical, operational, and strategic challenges for the United States and its friends and allies in the region. The trends that have taken shape during the Hu era suggest Second Artillery is likely to make further improvements in these areas under the new leadership. Along with China’s growing air, naval, space and counterspace, and information and electronic warfare capabilities, the continuing modernization of PLASAF’s nuclear and conventional missile forces will likely require substantial changes in the U.S. military’s operational concepts and capabilities. Specifically, it will probably necessitate changes in America’s traditional approach
to deterrence and assurance of U.S. allies and security partners, which has long relied heavily on regional military bases and forward deployed forces such as land-based tactical aircraft and U.S. Navy aircraft carrier strike groups.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8


2. Ibid., pp. 2-3.


4. Ibid.


8. Ibid.


11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.


17. See the postscript in SSAC for confirmation that the book is based on the Second Artillery Campaigns gangyao and Joint Campaigns gangayo, both of which were issued in 1999.


21. SSAC, p. 270.

22. Ibid.

24. SSAC, p. 271.

25. Ibid., p. 271.

26. Ibid., pp. 277-278.

27. Ibid., p. 278; Intimidation Warfare, p. 80.

28. SSAC, pp. 271-274.

29. Ibid., pp. 281-296; see also Intimidation Warfare, p. 34.

30. See SSAC, p. 289.

31. Ibid., pp. 289-290.

32. Ibid., p. 282.

33. Ibid., p. 283.

34. Ibid., pp. 292-293.

35. Ibid., p. 294.

36. Ibid., p. 18.

37. Ibid., p. 36.


39. SSAC, p. 42.

40. Ibid., pp. 46-47.

41. Ibid., pp. 45-46.

42. Ibid., p. 41.

44. SSAC, p. 317.
45. Ibid., p. 317.
46. Ibid., p. 318.
47. Ibid., pp. 318-322.
49. Ibid., p. 294.
50. Ibid., p. 296.
51. Ibid., pp. 276-292.
53. For more on the joint blockade campaign, see SOC (2006), pp. 276-292.
54. Ibid., p. 312.
55. Ibid., pp. 312-330.
56. Ibid., p. 312.
57. SSAC, p. 139.
58. Ibid., pp. 90-91.
59. Ibid., pp. 90-91.
60. Intimidation Warfare, p. 90.
61. SSAC, pp. 40-41.
62. SOC (2006), pp. 616-628

64. See CTSG, and SOC (2006).

65. SSAC, p. 297.

66. CTSG, p. 384.

67. CTSG, pp. 384-385.

68. SSAC, p. 298.

69. CTSG, pp. 385-386.

70. SSAC, p. 298.

71. Ibid., pp. 298-299.

72. Methods of protection listed in SSAC include improving early warning systems, ensuring appropriate dispersal of positions, hardening missile silos, storage facilities, and command centers, employing air defense, ground defense, and electronic warfare capabilities, and emphasizing concealment and camouflage to hide the activities of missile force units.

73. SSAC, p. 300.


75. SSAC, p. 300.

76. Ibid., p. 300.

77. CTSG, pp. 386-387.

78. SSAC, p. 303.

79. Ibid., p. 304.
80. Ibid., p. 304.


82. Ibid.


85. Burgess, “Annual Threat Assessment.”


87. Ibid., p. 17.

88. Ibid., p. 21.


90. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, p. 17.

91. Ibid., p. 21.

92. Burgess, “Annual Threat Assessment.”


95. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, p. 21.


98. Ibid.


105. Ibid., p. 31.


108. Ibid., p. 17.


111. Ibid., p. 29.


116. Wei, “Our Mission is Weightier than Tai Shan, Our Struggle Achieves Excellence.”

117. Ibid.


125. Ma Zhongbo, “全员全装全要素, 多路多向多课题” (“All-Personnel, All-Equipment, and All-Element Exercise Involving Multiple Approaches, Directions, and Subjects”), 火箭兵报 (Rocket Force News), August 1, 2006, p. 2.


129. See, for example, Yue Xiaolin, Li Fumin, and Yu Xihong, “某基地致力强化核心战位人员的核心作用：‘两长一手’ 演兵场上竞风流” ("A Certain Base Exerts Works Toward Strengthening the Core Function of Core Battle Position Personnel: Admirable Competition on “Two Commanders, One Operator” Exercise Ground”), 火箭兵报 (Rocket Force News), July 31, 2010, p. 2.


132. Ibid.

133. Liang Pengfei and Cai Ruijin, “第二炮兵已完成从‘山沟里的部队’到‘车轮上的部队’的全面转型, 精确打击能力大幅跃升” ("Second Artillery has Completed a Comprehensive Transformation from a ‘Force in Mountain Valleys’ to a ‘Force on Wheels,’ and it has Greatly Increased its Precision Strike Capability"), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), August 27, 2012.

134. See “Xi Jinping Calls for Powerful Missile Force,” Xinhua, December 5, 2012; and Wei Fenghe and Zhang Haiyang, “努力建设强大的信息化战略导弹部队” ("Diligently Build a Powerful, Informatized Strategic Missile Force"), 人民日报 (People’s Daily), December 13, 2012.


143. Zhang Han and Huang Jingjing, “New Missile ‘Ready by 2015.’” Although the report did not specify the missile’s mission, it quoted an unnamed military source as stating that the project “extends the range of China’s missiles and will therefore greatly enhance the national defense capabilities.”

144. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review reflects this challenge, stating, “over time” the United States “will also engage with other nuclear weapon states, including China, on ways to expand the nuclear reduction process in the future.” See Nuclear Posture Review Report, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2010, p. 12.

145. Teng Jianqun, “China’s Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence and Disarmament,” Malcolm Chalmers, Andrew Somerville and Andrea Berger, eds., Small Nuclear Forces: Five Perspec-

146. Ibid.


148. Ibid., p. 35.
CHAPTER 9

“WHO CARES IF YOU’VE BEEN IN A WAR?”
VETERAN ACTIVISM, STATE REPRESSION,
AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
IN HU-ERA CHINA

Neil J. Diamant

MAIN ARGUMENT

Relying mainly on blog posts and military websites, this chapter examines protesting, petitioning, and other forms of activism among People’s Liberation Army (PLA) veterans, and the frequent repression of these protests, as an important way of gauging the social, political, and cultural status of the military during the Hu Jintao era.

Looking to move beyond propagandistic images of heroic soldiers in the official media, I find that, overall, many PLA veterans have had difficulty adjusting to the massive changes in the reform period, many of them finding themselves in a precarious position in the state and society. The chapter further argues that veterans, including officers, are not a viable threat to the regime mainly on account of their old age, physical problems, lack of large scale organization, and dependence on the state. Further modernization of the PLA on the basis of force reduction is unproblematic, given the resources the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has invested in domestic security units.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

• When observing patriotic or nationalistic protests in China, the United States would do well to avoid overestimating the Chinese public’s support for the PLA, or conflict. Although there is a popular element in these activities, there also is a significant degree of state orchestration that is intended to gain leverage in negotiations.

• The Chinese public’s support for the PLA is not reflexive or blind; in fact, many oppose military benefits and refuse to consider military service themselves. If there are significant costs to a military exchange—impacting trade, employment, stability, investment, and travel opportunities—the Chinese public will not support it. The United States should remind China of these potential costs in a variety of fora.

• In every policy arena, Chinese policymaking must be conceptualized through the prism of fragmentation, decentralization, competition between factions, and unclear lines of authority—very much contrary to the image presented by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government to the world at large. The PLA, it follows, is but one institution vying for power, resources, and prestige. When considering the possibility of a flare-up in the South China Sea, the interests of multiple nonmilitary agencies must be evaluated as well.
INTRODUCTION

On March 18, 2010, Xu Lingjun (胥灵军), a disabled PLA veteran, starved to death while in a “Legal Training Center” (法制培训中心), more accurately described as a government detention center for troublesome petitioners. According to the investigations launched by reporters from several newspapers in the aftermath of Xu’s death, as well as in Internet postings on veteran websites (blog.boxun.com/hero/voiceofveteran and www.junhunw.cn), Xu was born in 1964, joined the PLA after middle school, and was injured during his service. Sent to a factory producing spirits in 1988, he lost his job in the 1990s as a result of factory reforms, despite Civil Affairs Preferential Treatment (优抚) regulations that were supposed to protect the jobs of disabled veterans. Factory officials allegedly said, “The factory’s been privatized, so nothing can be done about it.” Unwilling to keep quiet about the matter, and probably in desperate financial straits, Xu began petitioning in 2005, most likely encouraged by propaganda promoting a fairer shake for China’s rural areas. Not receiving any assistance securing his job, he continued to visit the central authorities, thus acquiring a reputation as a troublemaker (缠访者) in the county government. By 2008, in a move reflecting the more conservative tenor of the Hu era, the county established its legal training center for petitioners. Staffed by six officials assigned from the Public Security Bureau, Political-Legal Committee, Court, and the Letters and Visits Bureau, the training center’s main task was to prevent petitioning in the first place, as well as to detain petitioners for 3-8 months (without formal arrest), during which time they were to receive instruction in the State Council Regulations for Peti-
tioning, moral education, and military-style drilling. In 2009, when Xu went to Beijing yet again, the county—which surely had him under surveillance, dispatched officials to the capital to bring him back. According to his brother, Xu Lingjun, who also served in the PLA and was also arrested for petitioning, Xu was only given two meals a day, and only plain noodles for dinner and limited drinking water. When he got into a fight with another detainee, he was punished by being denied food. By late-2009 and early-2010, he had a beard, looked haggard, dirty, and thin—“not at all like a soldier,” according to his brother. In March, he died. After his death his distraught family went to the local procurator and court to file suit, but the case was never accepted. His brother tried to follow up in Xi’an and Beijing. Probably as a result of veterans’ blogs, the case came to the attention of several newspapers, all of which posted roughly similar versions of the story during July 2011. It is not clear if anything was done to the officials responsible.

To be sure, individual veterans and their families are not the only ones protesting job loss and the failure of the state to guarantee veteran benefits as firms restructure and privatize. Despite promises and regulations issued in 2004 that the CCP would place a high priority on veteran affairs, the Hu era has witnessed hundreds, if not thousands, of protests by large groups of organized veterans, including enlisted men and senior officers. In 2010, for example, a group of officers from Zhejiang claiming to represent 20,000 officers wrote an open letter to provincial authorities (party, government, military, and work units) and ordinary people demanding social justice. In early-September 2007, thousands (estimates ranged from 1,000 to 2,000) of rural veterans, mostly enlisted men,
rioted at Railroad Ministry-run job training centers in Baotou, Wuhan, and Baoji over poor conditions, the small demobilization grant (10,000-20,000 renminbi [rmb]), and the lack of assistance with meaningful job training. As a result of this rioting, the government issued an emergency decree to cease schooling in all Railway Ministry schools and to send all veterans back to their native places. This order resulted in even more protests. In mid-September, the Hong Kong newspaper Ming Pao reported that in Heilongjiang Province, approximately 1,000 veterans-turned-students at the Qiqiha’er school “began to do damage to the teaching building and dormitory with beer bottles and also attempted to break out of the school and head for the railway station.” The veterans were surrounded by several hundred public security and special police personnel “armed with loaded weapons.” 2 Then there were cases involving hundreds of army engineers in Guangdong (2008) “complaining that the local authorities have failed to implement Beijing orders to pay their pensions.” 3 Farther north, around 100 veterans, including officers and enlisted men, from Weifang in Shandong appeared at the State Council Bureau of Letters and Visits to demand that “local authorities enforce central state policy and allow them to get the benefits that they deserve.” 4 Similar demands were made by 300-400 veterans in Shaanxi who held a mass sit-in at the Provincial government to demand that the government enforce “Document #140,” give them appropriate resettlement and release petitioners representatives who had already been arrested. 5 Both of these protests were small compared to one in Guangxi involving 1,000 veterans from China’s war against Vietnam who marched through Guilin City Center holding banners calling for the government to increase their financial compensation. 6
As is clear from these sketches and in the cases described in greater detail, veterans are not entirely helpless when it comes to interacting with state authorities. By gathering in large numbers from villages and various cities, veterans clearly have organizational and networking skills; they engage in what political scientist Kevin O’Brien has called “rightful resistance” (mainly by farmers) by citing documents and regulations that support their case; their rhetoric often appeals to high-minded ideals such as the CCP’s revolutionary history, personal sacrifice, and protection of the territorial integrity of the homeland. High-ranking officers, no slouches when it comes to understating the regime from within, have been involved. Do these protests threaten the regime in any way? Are former PLA officers in a position to challenge the supremacy of the CCP because of their proven loyalty to party and country? Can the scale and frequency of veteran protests prevent further modernization of the PLA as it seeks to become more reliant on technology than large manpower resources?

In this chapter, I argue that the CCP has been quite successful managing these protests, thanks to far superior resources (especially funding for security services) and a monopoly over violence in many different forms, including beatings, arrests, and detention. Thanks to its experience in dealing with many other disgruntled populations in the reform era, the state has developed a well-honed repertoire for dealing with veterans; one rarely sees even very large-scale protests generating more than a lawsuit or containable violence. The CCP has been assisted by happenstance as well—many of the veterans it faces were drafted during the Maoist years. Quite a few are poor and in their 60s-80s; disability limits contentious action; some were involved
in militarily ambiguous battles and “projects.” Then there is the issue of veterans’ demands, which overwhelmingly focus on material improvements rather than political change. Finally, owing to state policy as described below, the majority of the veterans involved in protests and petitioning movements appear to be concentrated in relatively peripheral areas, such as rural Shandong, Yunnan, Guangxi, Shaanxi, Henan, and Guangdong, reflecting the lower-class composition of the PLA itself.

Even if veterans currently do not pose a serious threat to the regime and face problems such as poverty, health, and economic insecurity that are not entirely different from many underprivileged groups, it still behooves us to delve deeper into their distinctive situation during the last decade or so. Methodologically, this chapter argues that veterans—the policies about them, how they are treated, and how they interact with different levels of government as well as with ordinary people—speak to issues beyond their potential threat or grievances. Veterans, after all, do not appear on the political scene out of the blue—they served in the PLA during specific periods, some quite controversial, perhaps engaged in battles or domestic repression, hail from a particular locale, enjoy a state-proffered reputation, and have close association with state policies enforced by multiple administrative entities (Civil Affairs, Health, Labor and Social Security; Justice). Unlike farmers and workers who have been virtually ignored as national symbols in the reform era (class struggle, after all, is over) or as the beneficiaries of special treatment policies, the PRC, in its numerous veteran-related regulations, propaganda campaigns (Army Day and Spring Festival), popular media, and investment in wartime commemoration in the form of
martyr shrines, history museums, and patriotic education sites, officially treats military personnel as an entitlement group—that is, as a group that is said to deserve better treatment than others because of their national contributions to state security and national sovereignty. Veterans take this seriously and expect that the government will fulfill its commitments and treat them with more respect than if they were just ordinary citizens. Because of this, veterans’ expectations from the state tend to be higher than others from their socio-economic background. At the same time, however, veterans are subject to the exact same macro-economic and technological trends that have characterized the Hu era more generally; most notably, fiscal decentralization and the deepening of Internet penetration. Veterans, therefore, might be said to lie smack in the middle of many intersecting historical, military, political, economic, social, and even cultural vectors. For example, veterans speak to issues of governance—why do they frequently complain that policies are not enforced by localities (不落实政策)? Veterans can speak to issues such as martial values: Do people appreciate the PLA’s contribution? Certainly veteran issues, including veteran policy, speak to issues regarding state priorities and even legitimacy. In the United States, the rising power and status of veterans between World War I and World War II, as well as the popular views about those conflicts, can be seen in the differential treatment afforded to the latter compared to the former (more benefits, recognition, and influence). In China, is it possible that the protests involving its Vietnam War veterans reflect widespread ignorance, confusion, or profound disagreements over what that war was actually about?
Policy Legacies.

Despite official recognition by the state that veterans are worthy of preferential treatment, in actual practice, with only several exceptions, the CCP’s approach toward the overwhelming majority of its veterans since its takeover has focused on keeping them at arm’s length from significant political power, as well as authentic cultural and social representation. China, unlike most countries we now call “modern,” has never had a national army, and Leninist doctrine, embraced by the Guomindang and the Communists, always called for strict military subordination to civilian authorities. China does have regulations governing many aspects of veteran affairs, but it has never passed a single statute guaranteeing them benefits, nor have senior leaders openly and forcefully advocated for veterans as a corporate group with full integration into the state, in contrast to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the perestroika era. Unlike most all Western countries, its Asian counterparts, and Leninist sister states, China has never allowed veterans to organize on any scale beyond local communities—China does not have an equivalent to Taiwan’s Veterans Affairs Commission (國軍退除役官兵輔導委員會), the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) Ministry of Patriots and Veterans, or the American Legion or Veterans of Foreign Wars. From a cultural perspective, China probably has produced more war movies than any other country in history, but hardly reflecting an authentic veteran post-war experience (like “The Best Years of Our Lives” in 1946 or “Born on the 4th of July”), nor have its veterans published books reflecting their military experiences (Catch 22; The Naked and the Dead; All Quiet on the Western Front).
During the very first parades staged in the PRC, veterans were ignored while groups such as artists, athletes, minorities, and other “united front” personalities were represented. These legacies, which reflect a certain approach toward civil-military relations, can be seen contemporarily in current policy as well as in veteran activism. To understand veteran policy in the Hu era, it helps to take note of five key policy continuities, especially because Hu Jintao, consistent with his political record overall since being Secretary General of the CCP, did not offer much by way of new policy initiatives.

1. Native Place Resettlement (原籍安置). During the Mao years, with the exception of 1969-71 — perhaps the height of PLA influence in the Chinese political system — the overwhelming majority of demobilized soldiers were sent back to their native places, even if their villages had been ravaged by war in the 1940s or if their family members were no longer living there. There is no international precedent for this requirement, and it reflected both the overwhelmingly rural composition of the PLA at the time, the CCP leadership’s post-1949 prioritization of socialism built upon the Soviet Union’s model of heavy industry, as well as, I suspect, the disdain that educated Chinese often heap upon their rural brethren (according to the political scientist Victor Shih and his collaborators the majority of Central Committee members during most of the Mao years were May 4th [1919] intellectuals, albeit Leninists). The yuanji anzhi policy was both a violation of the 1954 Constitution, which gave citizens freedom of residence, but more importantly, veterans’ most fundamental desire throughout the history of the PRC — to acquire the benefits of urban residence. In the 1950s, veterans were understandably confused
by this policy. After having liberated the country, why could they not move freely within it? Thousands, in fact, voted with their feet. Despite the policy, veterans sold off their belongings in the countryside and “blindly” moved to cities, according to irate urban officials. Shandong, a popular recruiting area for the PLA and therefore home to many veterans (even today), witnessed a large outflow of military personnel. In 1954, nearly 3,000 veterans departed the province and headed northeast after selling their farm material and personal possessions. Resistance to the yuanji anzhi policy continued well into the late-1950s, relaxing only somewhat in the years prior to the Cultural Revolution. Yet, despite a long history of resistance to yuanji anzhi, and China’s exposure to alternative models of veteran governance, very little has changed in this fundamental approach. Of course, the rural economy has changed, and more veterans, particularly in wealthier coastal areas, have been absorbed into township and village enterprises, but the party’s view of military personnel—seeing them as a deployable state resource rather than as people with particular aspirations—has not. Many protests involving veterans today involve those who were demobilized to the interior countryside, and now find themselves in difficult financial straits.

2. Organization. Yuanji anzhi is not the only unusual feature of the PRC’s long-standing veteran policy. Another is its ban on any significant form of veteran self-organization—large fraternal associations and/or interest groups that historically have been an important force behind gains in veteran rights (for instance, in the United States, the American Legion drafted the GI Bill of 1944). Leninist principles of civil-military relations cannot explain this: after
World War II, the USSR had a national level veteran’s association—the Soviet Committee of War Veterans (SKVV)—which was an effective lobbyist for veterans’ rights in the immediate years following Stalin’s death in 1953 when China was busily learning from its Soviet “elder brother.” According to Mark Edele’s research, the SKVV was not simply “a recognition ‘from above’ of popular aspirations, but rather an appropriation ‘from below’ of an institution which was created for fundamentally different purposes.” (It was organized because the Soviets wanted to participate in the World Veterans Federation as “an arena for cold war propaganda.”) Similar to the resistance to resettlement policy, PRC veterans have a long history of attempting to form their own organizations whenever circumstances allowed. Veterans organized during the Hundred Flower Campaign (1956) and formed many units during the Cultural Revolution on both the conservative and rebel side. In the early years of the reform era, roughly 6,000 veterans in Guangdong organized a “Grieving Hearts Army” because:

thousands of young peasants cast their fortunes with the Army only to have landed back in the impoverished area and discovered that their families have lost money through their absence, village girls pursue prosperous peasants and good jobs are not to be had.

After an incident in which this “army” took over a Communist Party headquarters, provincial authorities repressed it, sending its leaders to prison. This approach continued into the later reform period—veterans still do not have recognized county, provincial, or national level fraternal associations—but, like with the other veteran policies, veterans have been able to take advantage of the Internet to find their voice and
network. Two of these forums—the “Army Spirit Network” (“军魂网”), a BBS, and the “Voice of Veteran” blog post site (hosted on U.S.-based servers)—include very useful information on veteran organization in the shadow of state surveillance, which is intensive.

3. The reliance on policies, statement, regulations and bureaucracy. Another legacy of the pre-Hu PRC veteran policy that has continued unabated is the state’s unwillingness to give statutory form to benefits provided to veterans and other military related personnel: China has nothing equivalent to a “Veteran’s Law.” From the very beginning, the center, as well as localities, has issued a wide range of documents in veteran policy. These include: “policies,” (“政策”); “decisions” (“决策”); “regulations” (“规定”); “provisional regulations” (“暂行条例”); “notices” (“通知”); “opinions” (“意见”); “measures” (“办法”); and, “circulars” (“文件”). These might be issued by the State Council, provincial governments, and ministries. Between 1949 and 1978, hundreds of these documents have been issued by authorities, and since the reform period, many “laws” relevant to veterans have been added, like the Labor Law (1994), Labor Contract Law (2008), the Revised Military Law (2011; veterans are expected to find work themselves), and the Constitution (2004 Revision, Article 35: Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession, and of demonstration). Chinese lawmaking is, probably by design, very poor in ensuring predictability, transparency, and anything resembling uniform application. Many laws are purposely vague, the result of compromises between different ministries, industries, and other interest groups, and usually leave multiple “out clauses” for local officials in the name of ensuring
maximum flexibility and adaptability, what Elizabeth J. Perry and Sebastian Heilmann have described as “guerrilla-style” policymaking.\textsuperscript{16} This policy “style” is also reflected in the very high level of fiscal decentralization: local authorities pay for most all veteran benefits out of their own pockets (what we call unfunded mandates), resulting in a built-in tension between national level policies, many of which are vague and sometimes contradictory, without clearly identifying who pays for their implementation.

While policy style shows continuities between the pre-reform and reform areas, citizens’ access to information about these policies during the Hu era represents a sharp disjuncture. Unlike veterans of previous generations who were often blind in terms of policy knowledge, veterans today can upload policy documents and locate the clauses relevant to their cause from the web. They do this with frequent gusto, brandishing a wide variety of national and local regulations, the Military Law, and Human Resources and Social Security circulars in their confrontations with authorities. This frustration leads many veterans, who feel entitled to better treatment, to the streets complaining about “lack of enforcement” and calling upon the center to come to their rescue.

4. \textbf{Propaganda}. Since the Beijing Olympics in 2008, one of the most challenging aspects of pedagogy is to convince students that the Chinese state, writ large, does not function as well as its Olympic Organizing Committee. Bolstered by a budget of roughly $65 billion and supported by the CCP as the top priority for 2008, the Olympics were a masterpiece of state stagecraft: thousands of performers dancing in lock-step, volunteers everywhere, and blue skies thanks to factory closings. China seemed to be a “can do” state.
What the Olympics actually demonstrated was that the CCP, like the dynasties it replaced, places more emphasis on controlling imagery, texts, symbolism, and making proactive use of China’s abundant cultural storehouse than ruling through coherent law and regulations. As noted by historian Chang Tai-hong, the focus on imagery reflected the CCP’s realization that “seizing power was more than a political and military campaign; perhaps even more important was the aesthetic battle over the control of colors, signs, symbols and visual vocabulary.”

Today, the CCP’s Department of Propaganda remains one of the most powerful posts in the party, controlling vast, revenue-producing resources (film, TV, publishing, radio, etc.) and is largely unaccountable.

Veterans, like the PLA, were expected to be beneficiaries of this system. There was never a time in PRC history when veterans were portrayed in a critical light. Veterans are said to have a flesh and blood relationship with the revolution, a red heart with steadfast bearing. Campaigns long emphasized the close connection, even love, between the people and the army (军爱民; 民爱军). During the Hu era, a constant stream of propaganda films about the PLA and its heroics during World War II, the Civil War, and Korean Wars flooded the airways (commemorating 60 years since the end of World War II; the 90th Anniversary of the Founding of the CCP; and the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the PLA). The CCP, unlike the Communist Party of the former Soviet Union or Vietnam, has never allowed its veterans, writers, film makers, and artists to deal with wars’ many complications, compromises, and moral ambiguities, let alone wars with outcomes that are not very flattering, such as China’s war with Vietnam in 1979. Also given short shrift are
other projects the PLA was involved in during the Mao years—building railways, tunnels and transportation projects abroad (Pakistan), or Xinjiang. Under Hu, CCP ahistorical triumphalism, so evident in the Olympics and contemporary military and Yanan-era revolutionary period propaganda, has been the dominant approach to governing the cultural sphere.

Veterans and other military personnel, as might be expected, have always been aware of these messages. In many cases, positive imagery of military prowess contradicts their own experiences in the field. Their dealings with state authorities and the people frequently depart from the image of love. Thanks to the Internet boom during the Hu years, veterans as well as soldiers can dig into the layers of lies upon which official military history rests. The notion that PLA soldiers are the most cherished people (最可爱的人) has morphed in protests in which veterans describe themselves as the most pitiable people (最可怜的人). In many respects, the CCP runs a propaganda state more than a state of laws (依法治国). By doing this, it constantly runs the risk that everyday inglorious realities will run face first into the high expectations generated by propaganda.

5. Veteran repression. Two types of veteran petitioning and protesting will be discussed: (1) former enlisted men, especially those who were involved in or disabled by the war with Vietnam, protesting for more recognition and benefits; and (2) protests involving former PLA officers and senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who became state cadres (军转干部) in industry, challenging the drastic reduction in their status during the Hu years. After these cases, I will look more closely at the internal workings of state security repression of veterans. I take this repression as
a reflection of where state priorities have been during the Hu era in civil-military relations.

**VIETNAM**

The available evidence I currently have at my disposal strongly suggests that the source of many problems in civil-military relations that faced Hu Jintao were, and continue to be, the products of policies and wars fought before his tenure; I have found fewer cases of collective action and group petitioning by veterans in their mid-20s—most of whom, I presume, are relatively healthy and require less assistance securing a basic living. In the available sources on veterans in the Hu era, the largest and most symbolically problematic protests have been mounted by veterans of China’s involvement in Vietnam, both in the 1960s and after 1979. These were veterans who had a very difficult time from the beginning, as suggested in the “Grieving Hearts Army” case mentioned earlier. Largely hailing from poor counties and provinces (Guangxi and Yunnan especially), many returned home only to find that those who had not participated in the war were enjoying greater prosperity. “Sacrifice” for the state did not pay off in a new era in which materialism, consumerism, and individualization become the dominant leitmotifs. Just like many veterans discharged after the Korean War found that the fruits of the victory in the revolution had already been distributed (land and political power), Vietnam War veterans in China have truly been a lost generation in terms of veteran policy, as well as their place in the larger political culture. Unlike China’s “victory” against the United States during the Korean War, currently celebrated by China’s so-called “nationalists,” the ambiguous outcome in
Vietnam (acknowledged by netizens in blog posts), the need to maintain good ties to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the near absence of war veterans in top leadership positions have not provided a conducive environment for these veterans to press their claims. Of course, this is never easy, even in democracies. What has made the difference in policy and culture has been the existence of large scale veteran organizations with devoted, well-connected, and feisty membership, which China lacks. In the United States, it was the Vietnam War Memorial Fund, led by veterans, that sponsored the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, and well-heeled veterans of the war like film director Oliver Stone have proved very instrumental in fostering a more welcoming environment.

Let us now discuss cases of individual and collective petitions as examples of how Vietnam veterans have fared and how they have interacted with authorities (this might be called the bottom-up perspective on civil-military relations). Xu Kaisheng, from Lingao County, Hainan, joined the PLA in 1977, and the CCP in 1979. According to his self-narrative, he was injured in the war and awarded “level-3 meritorious service” honors. He was among the fortunate to receive work after his discharge. From 1980 to 1992, he was employed at a grain bureau. In 1992, however, he was laid off and had to rely on welfare (低保金) from the county party committee, local government, and civil affairs. Unemployed for 10 years, he finally found a position, but when that company was sold to a private firm in 2007, he had “no labor relations with them.” Now, he said, he was old, infirm, wounded, disabled, and often ill but lacked medical insurance to cover his many injections. This, in his view, was a clear violation
of the benefit regulations for veterans (军人抚恤优待条例). Medical problems and lack of other resources led him to protest. Together with his fellow veteran Wang Shaoxiong, he made repeated visits to the county party committee and government. Now well into the Hu era’s obsession with internal security, Xu and Wang found themselves targets of state investigation—their “lawful and normal petitioning” became “opposing the government and party.” This became more than a local matter. Flush with funding, a state security (国安) official operating under the Provincial Public Security Department was dispatched to the county to assist with their security work. This official threw the book at Xu and Wang, charging them with crimes ranging from financial fraud, illegally occupying an official post, and disturbing public order, among others. The two were thrown in the county prison.

This list of crimes was not coincidental. The security authorities had been gathering information about their activities, which they used to tie them up in legal knots. “Illegally occupying an official post” referred to a 2009 incident in which Xu and Wang petitioned at the Central Military Commission, but as soon as they got there were arrested by Hainan officials, sent back to Lingao, and detained for 24 days; “financial fraud” was all about Xu and Wang establishing a registered Service Center for Disabled Veterans in Lingao County, which was designed to help veterans with medical insurance payments (in the letter they provided the registration number). When Xu cited state violations of its own regulations, the security officer crystalized the current view of the regime: “We [state security] don’t care about the enforcement of disabled veteran policy; you having gone to war has nothing to do with us.” In the end, the police compiled a case against
him and forwarded it to the county procurator. The procurator, however, did not authorize arrest on the grounds of insufficient evidence. Instead, the county public security bureau placed him under home surveillance (September 2009). Xu escaped, and was, at the time of his posting, a fugitive beggar in Beijing. He attached multiple documents: his rap sheet, hospital forms, bail release, and others to demonstrate his worthiness of support. Other veterans had access to his case through the Military Spirit bulletin board.

Several things stand out in this case, which is not all that unusual in the “Voice of Veteran” files. The PRC’s veterans’ policy is embedded in larger structural changes in the economy (layoffs, privatization, and development of the Internet) and is closely tied to past conflicts as well—the case flowed from his disability, age, and inability to secure stable employment. We can also see the regime’s willingness to take decisive action against repeated petitioners, no matter their past contributions to national security. Moreover, we can also see what happens when veterans organize themselves and register with the state, even on a small scale: they expose themselves to prosecution by leaving a paper trail.

There is no data about how many veterans pursued individual or small group solutions and how many gathered in larger numbers. Both were security concerns, because individual veterans, using blog sites like “Military Spirit,” could get their cases out in the open, but the public protests were different in terms of the moral and political legitimacy of the CCP. The spectacle of hundreds of veterans, most of them old, standing outside government compounds in bad weather, was embarrassing, which is why local governments made a point of quickly dispatching them
elsewhere. In Gansu Province, for instance, photos of a group of roughly 50 veterans of the Laoshan Campaign gathered, wearing their uniforms and medals with both socialist and Confucian-inspired slogans: “Long Live the Spirit of Laoshan!; Long Live the CCP!; We want work; we want to eat; we want to provide for our elders; we want to raise children.”22 In 2010 in Hunan’s Taoyuan county, some 350 representatives of the county’s Vietnam War veterans petitioned for better treatment, making a point to complain that they get less money than veterans who pacified Tibet after the riots there (wars on foreign soil deserve more compensation—even foreign countries do it that way, they argued), and that the war in Vietnam is not understood or discussed. Their protest, they noted, was just of one of thousands occurring all around the country in the last several years.23 Sometimes protesters from the war might gather in the thousands, connecting with each other via their QQ or “E两会” accounts. According to the Hong Kong Information Service for Human Rights and Democracy:

around 1,000 PRC veterans who fought in the Vietnam War staged a demonstration in Guilin in Guangxi Province on 26 December (the 118th anniversary of the birthday of Mao Zedong), demanding that the government grant them a 300 yuan monthly subsidy, which is much lower than the subsidy their counterparts in Beijing and Shanghai receive.24

This demonstration was observed by thousands of people who passed by, but it is highly unlikely that onlookers were able to pressure the government in any meaningful way.
A case involving Vietnam War veterans, as well as veterans from Korea and nuclear weapons projects, in Shatang Village in Beiliu City in Guangxi Province is an excellent example of civil-military relations in the Hu era. Like their counterparts around the country, Beiliu veterans from different villages sought to get together. In their usual *modus operandi*, local security officials at the township, fearing a petition effort, tried to stop them through preventative detention. Several incurred soft-tissue injuries as they were pushed into a police van.

After this, the Beiliu City “Comrade-in-Arms Society” (“战友会”) took action. They filed a lawsuit against the authorities under the provisions of the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL, otherwise known as “民告官”). They secured the assistance of Mou Guangyu, a Vietnam veteran himself, who was a lawyer in nearby Yuzhou District to represent them in court in Beiliu City. Unsurprisingly, given the subservience of local courts to the government in China, the Beiliu court refused to take the case, arguing that it did not “satisfy the conditions for litigation under the ALL.” Lawyer Mou appealed to the Yulin City Intermediate Court, which, surprisingly, ordered the Beiliu City court to accept and register the case. By this time, veteran websites were ablaze with blog entries about the case and mobilized to support the plaintiffs. A photograph shows veterans lined in neat rows of three, 15 deep, marching to the hearing, with one wearing the sign “Old War Veterans Representative” (“参战老兵代表”). On the “Military Spirit” site, an entry from May 11, 2011, noted that the trial did not last long, but was attended by a thousand people from many cities and the provinces. After the trial, veterans seemed optimistic that someone from the security services and local politicians would be held accountable.
On October 10, 2011, bloggers on “Military Spirit” posted an update about the verdict under the header “Devastated” (“惨败”). More than a thousand people, including Vietnam and Korean War veterans, veterans involved in nuclear power and uranium mining, as well as representatives of martyrs and military families (烈军属代表), congregated in front of the court and elected 60 people to observe the trial (10 were Korean War veterans, some were combatants from the 1974 Xisha [Paracel] Islands naval battle, but most were Vietnam War veterans). Holding banners, they sat and waited for the announcement. In its verdict, posted online, the Beiliu court ruled that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a direct causal connection between the defendants and their injuries (bruises, and a torn shirt). This, in fact, was not all that surprising because the plaintiffs did not have witnesses or other evidence. The veterans vowed to appeal to the Yulin Intermediate Court, hoping that officials from the Guangzhou Military Region would send a representative to help them. If this did not work, the veterans vowed “to carry Liao to Beijing and let the Central government decide.” As many of them surely realized, Beijing security police would be quite prepared for their arrival. Veteran protests, as this case shows, might begin with small claims for more money, but the security apparatus, by using preventative detention and extensive surveillance, can unintentionally cause them to escalate into the hundreds and thousands.
In the materials I have collected thus far, the most vocal and organized veterans who protest against the party (at all levels) have been a subset of PLA officers and senior staff members, probably senior NCOs, whose circumstances under Hu-era policies have changed the most dramatically. For the most part, these were PLA personnel who, during the Mao years and throughout the 1980s and early-1990s, were demobilized into industrial units as state cadres *junzhuan ganbu* (军转干部) or *qiye guojia ganbu* (企业国家干部) but have essentially lost their political status and the benefits as industrial units restructured. Hundreds of thousands of these veterans now claim to have status no higher than an ordinary unemployed worker. In their protests and petitions, they enjoy several assets: age (most are not infirm), health, and insider knowledge of how the state works. What pushed them into opposition, however, was simply bad luck—hundreds of thousands of their former comrades-in-arms who were demobilized to state (国家) and institutional (事业) units could be content with their lot and have no reason to protest. Industrial-unit officers, rather than officers in a more general sense, have been the deepest thorn in the side of the security-obsessed Hu regime since the gap between their expectations and their present circumstances has been the widest.

From the very first years of the Hu era, *junzhuan ganbu* have made their presence known. In 2005, an eyewitness account from Beijing reported that “about 2,000 retired members of the People’s Liberation Army, wearing their old uniforms, gathered outside the PLA’s General Political Department,” which is close to Tiananmen Square. These former PLA mem-
bers, representing some 20 provinces, were “mostly officers, including former division commanders.” Always orderly, they sat in rows in order to “express grievances about pension benefits and post-retirement jobs.” As the reporter accurately noted, “the decline of the state-enterprise system means that management jobs for former officers are scarce.”

In July 2009, several hundred veterans from Weifang in Shandong gathered to petition in Beijing. A reporter interviewed a former officer, who pointed out that:

We came to Beijing to petition to demand that central policy be enforced; junzhuan ganbu policy is not enforced locally; the central government sends down documents relevant to our situation but nothing is implemented. Those who are here petitioning now are all junzhuan cadres whose enterprises have changed their status.

Another said, “We no longer get the benefits of a state cadre and have become regular employees or retired employees so we have to petition.”

The occasion of the mass tributes to the 80th Anniversary of the PLA in 2007 was an opportune time for veterans to protest the gap between the propaganda and their circumstances. In a report entitled, “Old Soldiers Fading Away,” the reporter noted that “some decommissioned officers feel they have little to celebrate and that nobody is listening to their grievances. These former cadres believe they have fallen through the cracks caused by the mainland’s seismic economic and social changes.” One officer, formerly based in Beijing, noted that, “We were originally party cadres, but now we are left with nothing.” Local governments were blamed—their entitlements to housing, medical benefits and pensions were not being honored.
locally “despite specific government orders.” There was more than just money involved, however. They sensed, perhaps accurately, that their plight generates little to no sympathy. According to a former naval officer (47 years old):

There is no one to help us assert our rights. And once we visit government departments, we are labeled a ‘destabilizing element’...farmers, workers, even the homeless, get looked after. But we don’t have anyone to stand up for us.

In the month prior to the 80th Anniversary (veterans mostly refrained from protest during the anniversary year 2007-08 it seems), mass protests broke out in Beijing, Guangdong, and Shandong, including one in Yantai (Shandong) “involving as many as 2,000 de-commissioned officers.”

Little appears to have changed policy-wise between 2007 and 2009. On May 14, 2009, in Luoyang and its various counties, according to a report from the Hong Kong Information Center for Human Rights and Democracy, “about 2,000 retired PLA officers and servicemen . . . began demonstrating outside the municipal government at 9 AM yesterday. These retired officers and servicemen demanded that a series of issues concerning their work and livelihood be resolved.” Their main goal, according to the report, was to meet with government officials to air their grievances, convinced, like many other groups in China, that higher level authorities are unaware of on-the-ground realities because local officials file misleading and and/or patently false reporting.

In their efforts to restore their status, junzhuang veterans have not limited themselves to demonstrations. In 2007, a group of Yantai veterans wrote an open let-
ter directed to 17 PLA generals pleading for their intervention in the National People’s Congress. In another tactic, they targeted one agency whose policies drew the most ire—the Human Resources and Social Security Ministry. In a class action lawsuit filed (but not accepted) in the #2 Intermediate Court in Beijing, 162,183 veterans from all over China sued the minister, Yi Weimin, for violating Administrative Law and the rights of veterans who were assigned by the state to enterprises. Multiple laws were cited as the basis for their suit, including the ALL (Article II, Clauses 11, 5, 8), the Military Service Law (Article 2), Officer’s Law, the “General Rules of Civil Law” (“民法通则”), Article 75, Section 2, and the National Defense Law, Article 61. Their demands were quite specific: restoration of their status and benefits they deserve and financial compensation (for example, 480,000 rmb for a general). The bulk of the lawsuit, however, focused on issues over the loss of dignity. The officers, accustomed to a certain level of deference and respect, were very upset when the Party responded to lawful petitioning by labeling them as an illegal organization that incited and colluded with foreign hostile forces, and attributed their problems only to a minority with ulterior motives and an ax to grind. The Human Resources and Social Security Ministry, the veterans felt, goes its own way, ignoring national policy about veterans, all the while blaming the reforms for the problems, not bad policies. In 2010, veterans claiming to represent 20,000 former officials in Zhejiang posted an open letter claiming that one-fourth of all post-1949 officers had their rights expropriated, and traced this development to the early-1990s (when industrial reform began).
Former officers in China have been cited by officials and activists as a highly sensitive sector of the population who might swing a tide of public opinion in their favor and against the ruling Communist Party. Many veterans, I would argue, would not identify with this role at all. As noted in an open letter posted by a group of officers in Hunan protesting outside the provincial party compound:

in peacetime we are the group that is forgotten about, stuck in a nook in a remote corner and only thought about when the country and people need us; we are weaker than the most vulnerable group (弱势群体), and we discover this only after we have taken off our uniform and reenter society.

In part, this was because the media does not dare interview them and lawyers do not dare take their cases. Both of these, as we know, are key elements of the Hu-era internal security policy.

FULL-COURT PRESS: THE TOOLS OF REPRESSION

More than anything, in the long historical view the Hu era will likely be remembered for what I would call its Confucian fascist political style—its blend of propaganda about a harmonious society with virtually unlimited capacity to squash organized and sustained dissent thanks to its truly gargantuan security budget. With regard to veterans, the regime pursues a strategy of limited tolerance for petitioning, online complaining, and political gathering to allow people to “let off steam” (ala Hundred Flowers). Its scatter-shot (guerrilla) policy style toward veterans—seen in the wide range of regulations, laws, and documents
affecting them—promotes competition and jealously between them. Groups can mobilize but cannot institutionalize their demands via a national organization. The Hu regime also employs a range of tactics from the Mao years, as well as those improvised to handle petitioners around government offices. All this is done under the program of preventative security or stability maintenance (weiwen [维稳] hereafter), closely associated with former Public Security Minister Zhou Yongkang.

As seen in the very limited number of articles on veteran petitioning in the official press, the Hu regime has been very effective limiting media coverage of veteran petitioning and protest, particularly the larger ones. On the other hand, the government has not shut down veteran blogs and bulletin boards, probably, mainly, because the audience for these is limited to people already “in the know,” it provides a useful channel for population management and intelligence about veterans plans and activities—I am sure government agents have infiltrated these discussion groups, as they have patriotic websites—and much of it does not suggest imminent collective action.

The state has other softer methods of maintaining strict civilian control over its former military personnel. For example, in Xuzhou in Jiangsu Province, a policeman named Sun Quanxin, a veteran himself, was declared a candidate for model status for preventing other veterans from going to Beijing to petition and otherwise doing good weiwen work. Newspapers also heaped praise on local officials who proactively dealt with veteran problems rather than allowing them to develop into protests and petitions. As part of a similar campaign in 2008, in Daxing Anling District in Heilongjiang Province,
local officials organized a special troubleshooting meeting for resolving contradictions among veterans, which prevented all petitioning incidents. A document posted by the Civil Affairs Bureau on the website of Haikou City on February 29, 2012, noted a special *weiwen* work meeting focused on monitoring the activities of veterans who either have welfare and resettlement problems, demand recognition of having participated in battle, or former civilian workers (民工) and people’s militia personnel who were in the Xisha (Paracel) Naval battle who seek benefits. “When veterans such as these leave our jurisdiction,” the document instructed, officials had to track them down in “man-on-man coverage whenever and wherever they went.”

These reports, emphasizing Mao-era models, campaign-style mobilization around certain political calendar events (Army Day) and grass-roots cadres’ bursts of activism on behalf of veterans, largely represent the softer side of Hu Jintao’s social management program, and therefore the side more likely to be reported in the official press. Quite a different perspective can be seen in the numerous posts by veterans who were involved in various forms of individual and collective action. In these posts, convincing veterans to return home, tracking, and man-to-man coverage are euphemisms for an entire system of surveillance (real world and online), phone tapping, beatings, detentions, and forced education of the type that resulted in the death by starvation of Xu Lingjun, the veteran’s case discussed at the beginning of this chapter. For example, a veteran named Peng Guansheng from Shandong was detained recently for 17 days just for mentioning plans to join some of the 90th Anniversary celebrations [of the CCP] on July 1st online. The
police, he said, “had him under surveillance for highlighting some of the inequalities and injustices in the treatment of veterans,” and noted that “another veteran from Wuhan had his computer confiscated after he traveled to Henan province to meet with other former PLA personnel.”

In a town under the jurisdiction of Chengdu, seven veterans were having tea one summer day in 2011 when they were approached by an official with 30 plainclothes policemen who requested that the veterans go with them. The veterans asked, “Is having tea illegal?” “We are war veterans,” and “Give us a formal subpoena.” One cop said, “If we did that, you’d already be goners” (你们就完了), and then took them away. At the Wannianchang police station in Chengdu, one veteran, hoping that his military credentials would help him, said, “We are war veterans,” to which the policeman reportedly said, “You’ve fought in a war, what’s so glorious [about that]?” The veterans were indignant and retorted, “If repelling a foreign invasion isn’t glorious, what is? Corruption? Hiring prostitutes? If we went to war by mistake, ask the government to take us to the people of Vietnam and apologize.” This silenced the police on that issue, but they still wanted intelligence: “What were you guys talking about?” What are you planning on the 28th?” After this ordeal, the tea-time veterans posted their experience online and claimed to have received responses from comrades all around the country who wanted the government to demand an explanation for what happened.

As already discussed in the previous sections, there have been protests involving veterans throughout the Hu era, and even as recently as late-February 2012, when former officers from the army and navy staged a protest outside PLA headquarters in Beijing,
some calling for the military to step in to fight political corruption (which they blame for their lack of pension income) and others claiming compensations for injuries received while on duty on the PLA’s research and testing units.42 Weiwen is not skin tight. But what happens when veterans arrive in Beijing, provincial capitals, and township offices demanding better treatment? Does military service “cut them a break” when dealing with the security apparatus? Reports filed by veterans suggest that petitioning as a veteran is not very different than petitioning as an ordinary person after the crackdown in mass petitioning in 2006. In a town near Shenzhen, a Vietnam War veteran sur-named Li claimed in a written report posted on the “Military Spirit” site, that he was beaten by the party secretary, who also forced his wife to get an abortion and tubal ligation, after he began petitioning (because it made the party secretary “lose face”). He was also placed under surveillance. Li may have been particularly troublesome because, after the war he could not do agricultural labor, and was involved in a local “Veterans Friendship Association” that pushed for more assistance with medical expenses. According to the veteran’s recollection of their conversation, the party secretary noted that veterans’ problems “belong to the previous government and have nothing to do with him.”43

Similar abuses can also be seen at the county level. In May 2010, 30 unemployed and disabled veterans were waiting at a train station in Sichuan while on their way to petition in Beijing. But they were not alone. Tracked by officials in their home community, they were pushed out of the waiting room by the party secretary of the Political-Legal Committee of Zhongjiang County and others who did not have
clear identification. The veterans claimed that they were beaten at the ticket inspection area. The veterans poured out their frustrations, complaining that they have endured ridicule, cold treatment, intimidation, threats, and beatings by local officials. “Are we nobodies (蝼蚁)?” “What mistakes have we committed?” “Society! How did disabled veterans end up in this tragic state?” “Government! How have the heroes of the past become your burdensome nuisance and victims of today?”

We cannot know how many veterans started their journey to Beijing from the provinces and never made it there because of these local level security operations. Actually making it to the capital is no small achievement. But escaping the locality is no guarantee of an anonymous arrival. It appears that veterans are closely tracked by county and provincial representative offices in Beijing, and these representatives are under intense pressure (under a quota system) to make sure that “their” veterans do not remain for long. In a long letter written by a former Air Force colonel from Changsha (Liu Nanzheng, joined PLA in 1968 and CCP in 1970; a revolutionary martyr’s son) to Premier Wen Jiabao, we can see how this works. On January 12, 2010, Liu, with 100 other officers from his county, went to the State Council’s Letters and Visit’s Office to report about veteran officers problems. After their petitioning was over, the Changsha Beijing Office took him and his comrade, who had already been beaten by the Xicheng District Public Security Bureau on a previous petitioning run, to the Beijing Anyuanding Security Firm, where they remained in custody for 3 days. While in detention, they met other officers who had been swept up, including one from Shaanxi who previously had been held at the Shaanxi Beijing Office. Before they were sent back to their respective prov-
inces (courtesy of the Letters and Visits officials in the representative offices), the officers tried to figure out the detention system by asking their guards, mostly 20-year-old men. Their guards were loose-lipped, and told the officers that they were mostly enlisted soldiers with the Central Guards Bureau, but other such firms employed soldiers of the security staffs of ministries and commissions. The Anyuanding firm, which was a private enterprise that employed roughly 3,000 people and earned U.S.$3.1 million in 2008, worked very closely with the Beijing Public Security Bureau and Letters and Visits Office—the unit some petitioners think will help them out. Their specialty was guard work, “especially bringing petitioners in Beijing back to their home towns.” The former officers assessed the motives and operations: local officials want to make people disappear so that the existence of petitioners in Beijing will not damage their careers, and they pay for the service of extracting petitioners, leaving the logistics to their representative offices. Following the financial trail here is difficult—county governments pay a security firm that hires soldiers—but discerning the larger pattern is not easy.45 The paranoid concern with social stability and harmony has empowered security forces that operate without much regard for regulations, policies, or the Constitution, leaving many veterans in the same boat as other vulnerable populations in contemporary China.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Looking at veterans protests and petitioning and how they are treated by civilian officials, this chapter has argued that they occupy a fairly precarious
position in the PRC’s political system, as well as in the economy (since many are not well-off, the latter surely impacts the former). Civilian authorities hold the trump cards. Different government organs issue regulations, opinions, and guidelines that, when not confusing everyone, serve to prevent strong organizational cohesion—officers are mainly fighting for themselves, not enlisted men—making interest aggregation quite challenging. Of course, there are veterans who have found work after their demobilization, and their interests will diverge from those of the protesters. Divide-and-rule, or what the historian Chen Yung-fa called controlled polarization, is very effective in preventing a united front. To date, veteran organizations operate at the local level and are vulnerable to state penetration and repression. The government has limited the capacity of courts, lawyers, and the media from championing their cause, and ordinary civilians do not appear to be particularly enamored of their heroic contributions. The security apparatus is powerful, rich and virtually unaccountable.

The precarious political and economic status of military personnel in China is not lost among China’s youth, who might be quite proud of China’s growing strength but who also show extremely little interest in military affairs or a military career. In a study of recruitment problems in National Defense (国防) magazine, Liu Wei, Can Mou, and Ma Zengfei found that all the problems affecting veterans make it difficult to attract people to the PLA. Among reasons cited for lack of interest were financial loss, insufficient benefits, poor compensation, and meager allowances and salaries. Moreover, upon discharge, getting a job is very difficult. Wei, Mou and Ma note that in every area it is commonly reported that the number of veterans getting jobs gets lower year-to-year, and that the phe-
nomenon of getting a job then losing it is a common occurrence. Tellingly, and in contrast to the hyperbole of street protesters, the authors stressed a “weakening” defense consciousness among draft-age youth, who sought to pursue advanced studies, get a job—and perhaps after this join the PLA. In a questionnaire of 10,000 recently graduated youth in one city, less than 5 percent might even consider joining the army (“可以考虑参军”). Veterans’ observations that the poor treatment meted out to them would have serious consequences in terms of morale and support for the PLA in society appear to have been on the mark.

These findings have several policy implications for the United States. First, the United States should be careful not to overestimate the Chinese public’s support for the PLA, or conflict, based on transient, media-saturated events, like anti-American or Japanese protests, or calls for boycotts on nationalist websites. Although there is a popular element in these activities, there also is a large degree of state orchestration, intended to gain leverage in negotiations (as in “we cannot compromise because of our patriotic public opinion”). We simply do not know which factions are mobilizing which protesters, and why people are out on the street (in the recent protests against Japan, I heard that many protesters were children of downsized veterans and pensioned off workers who were more upset about their life circumstances than about the Diaoyu Islands; the sanctioned protests gave them an opening to speak out). Nor do we have a handle on how many patriotic bloggers get paid by the government per character they write. My chapter, therefore, urges a consideration of Chinese militarism or patriotism from the perspective of on-the-ground interactions and behaviors, not imagery, propaganda or formal policy.
Second, the United States should always keep in mind the extremely complex nature of Chinese feelings about the PLA and CCP. In contrast to the media accounts, both in China and the United States, which tend toward a monochromatic and frequently negative depiction of Chinese views toward us, Japan, and areas of dispute such as the Diaoyus, I would argue that Chinese frequently disagree with anti-American government propaganda, contest the official line about the legitimacy of its wars, and tend toward a high degree of pragmatism when you dig a bit under the surface. (For example, there is no evidence that applications for U.S. visas to study here has declined). If there are significant costs to a military exchange, one that will impact trade, cause unemployment and unrest, divestment, and restricted access to American institutions of higher education, I am dubious that the government or the public will support it. In this respect, concern with domestic stability is an internal bulwark against rash military adventurism.

Finally, Chinese policymaking needs to be understood through the prism of fragmentation, decentralization, competition between factions, and unclear lines of authority—very much contrary to the image presented by the Chinese government to the world at large. In the case of veterans, we can see that the PLA has very little clout in protecting their former personnel from abuse, local governments ignore national policy at little cost to them, and privatization of state functions—even public security—makes it hard to figure who is responsible for policymaking and implementation. Americans should never buy into the aura of cohesiveness that the Chinese state projects toward its domestic and foreign audiences.


5. See blog.boxun.com/hero/201108/voiceofveteran/17_1/shtml.

6. “广西千名对越战争老兵游行要求生活补助” (“In Guangxi 1,000 Vietnam war-era old soldiers marched to demand economic assistance”), Radio Free Asia, December 27, 2011.

7. To be sure, veteran protests and petitions are, like all protest movements, minority phenomena — most African-Americans, after all, did not march in Selma, AL, or Washington, DC, and most of those did not write about their experience. The majority of Americans did not join Occupy Wall Street or write about it. This, however, does not mean that the protests did not reveal something much larger occurring in politics and society: the Civil Rights protesters called attention to real and widespread racism and Occupy Wall Street to significant and real income inequality.

8. “Entitlement group” has been used by Mark Edele in his exhaustive study of Soviet veterans. See his Soviet Veterans of the


19. See Diamant, Chaps. 2 and 3.
20. See “叙开生的雪泪申诉：在京城讨饭逃亡我也要将维权继续进行下去” (“Xu Kaisheng’s appeal: A fugitive begging in Beijing, I also want to continue to protect my rights”), available from blog.boxun.com/hero/201106/voiceofveteran/26_1.shtml.


25. For the early part of the case, see “广西省北流市参战军人梁广发，刘海林参与上访遭到派出所殴打” (“Combat veterans Liang Guangfa and Liu Hailin were beaten by police while petitioning in Beiliu City, Guangxi”): “玉林市参军战友会为之鸣不平” (“The grievance of comrades-in-arms in Yulin City”), available from blog.boxun.com/hero/201107/voiceofveteran/49_1.shtml. The verdict is available from blsfy.chinacourt.org/public/paperview.php?id=703196.


31. “全国162,183名军队转业干部状告人事部起诉状” (“A lawsuit filed by 162,183 zhuanye ganbu from around the country against the Human Resources Ministry”), available from blog.boxun.com/hero/201106/voiceofveteran/14_1.shtml. For another class action lawsuit (rejected on the grounds of jurisdiction in ALL cases) in Hubei, filed in the Provincial Supreme Court by 6,823 veteran officers, see “关于湖北省最高人民法院拒收湖北省6823名企业专业干部状告人保部诉状的情况简报” (“Situation report about Hubei Supreme Court’s refusal to accept the lawsuit filed by 6,823 zhuanye ganbu in industry against the Human Resources Ministry”), available from blog.boxun.com/hero/201107/voiceofveteran/19_1.shtml.


34. “退伍军人和专业士官致湖南省委” (“Veterans and zhuanye soldiers and officers went to the Hunan Party Committee”), available from blog.boxun.com/hero/201106/voiceofveteran/19_1.shtml.

35. I have conducted a Boolean search of the CNKI database of the PRC press (the largest in the world) for 退伍军人上访/复原军人上访 (veterans petitioning) and come up almost empty handed.


39. “海口市民政局关于做好‘两会’期间复原退伍军人维稳工作的紧急通知” (“Urgent notification of the Haikou City, Bureau of Civil Affairs regarding stability maintenance work among veterans during the national congresses”) available from www.haikou.gov.cn/root9/0112/201202/t20120229_469810.htm. For a similar document issued by the Public Security Bureau of the Zhanjiang border district in Guangdong, see “广东湛江边防支队辖区352名越战退伍军人连续三年零上访” (“352 veterans from the Zhenjiang Border Control Detachment area of control have been petitioning for three consecutive years”) available from www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n80254/n1126657/2388971.html. According to this report, this area had 352 veterans, largely from the Vietnam War. Seventy-four percent of the veterans were farmers. In 2005 and 2006, they petitioned on 16 separate occasions, and in May 2006, 20 went to Beijing and quietly sat in Tiananmen Square.


41. “成都七名对越参战老兵喝茶被抓” (“Seven old Vietnam veterans from Chengdu were detained while drinking tea’), available from blog.boxun.com/hero/201106/voiceofveteran/7_1.shtml.


43. The .jpg document was copied to the Voice of Veterans site from “Military Spirit.” See “深圳参战老兵遭遇强拆有家难归” (“Old combat veterans from Shenzhen were forcibly returned home”), available from blog.boxun.com/hero/201106/voiceofveteran/5_1.shtml.

44. See “四川省德阳市中江县下岗伤残军人被当地政府镇压殴打” (“Unemployed disabled veterans beaten and repressed by local government officials in Zhongjiang county, Deyang City, Sichuan”), available from blog.boxun.com/hero/201106/voiceofveteran/13_1.shtml.
45. This security firm has since been shut down, perhaps because of these officers’ connections, after exposes in Caijing and Southern Metropolitan Daily. See Andrew Jacobs, “China Investigates Firm Linked to ‘Black Jails’,” New York Times, September 27, 2010.


47. The official view of Japan’s foreign policy is articulated in the State Council’s Information Office’s “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” April 2013. “Japan is making trouble over the issue of the Diaoyu Islands.” The United States was not mentioned by name, but was accused to increasing tensions in the region by strengthening its military alliances and expanding its presence in the region. See eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2013-04/16/content_4442750.htm.
CHAPTER 10

TOWARD STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP:
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY PEOPLE’S
LIBERATION ARMY RELATIONS
IN THE HU ERA

Timothy R. Heath

The views expressed by this author are his own and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Pacific Command, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

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MAIN ARGUMENT

The CCP’s decision to define itself as a “governing party” at the start of the Hu Jintao era represented a critical shift in the dynamics underpinning the party’s leadership of the military. During the era of Hu Jintao, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deepened reforms that bolstered its ability to lead a professionalizing military. The reforms aimed to strengthen the CCP as an organization, render party-military relations more functional and resilient, and improve the CCP’s ability to provide strategic leadership. These changes have enabled a greater degree of dynamism and flexibility in the CCP’s leadership of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). However, the reforms have also encouraged a fragmentation of party authority
along national and military lines. This fragmentation of authority, exacerbated by the persistence of weak state and military institutions and the CCP’s overall political vulnerabilities, introduces new challenges to ensuring party leadership of the military.

**POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

- Reforms designed to improve the effectiveness of party leadership without surrendering control of the military are likely to continue under Xi’s CCP leadership. These reforms have resulted in a more flexible, competent CCP regime capable of leading the military’s peacetime activities. So long as the CCP continues to make necessary adjustments to its leadership style, the PLA has considerable room to grow as a professional force even as it remains a party-led military.
- The long-term survival of the PLA as a party-led military, however, is less clear. The long-term prospects for the party’s evolving style of leadership ultimately depends on the CCP’s willingness to adopt changes that touch on fundamental principles of Leninist rule, such as measures that limit party penetration and control of all organizations.
- Despite the reforms, the PLA continues to suffer from the CCP’s broader problems of political weakness and fragmentation of authority. These vulnerabilities are likely to exacerbate problems of command and control in unanticipated situations. Understanding the complexity of the relationship between national CCP and PLA leadership can help U.S. policymakers
navigate security-related foreign policy crises with Beijing.

INTRODUCTION

The role of party leadership in the reform-era PLA has been analyzed from many perspectives. Some scholars have explored the challenge that a professionalizing PLA has posed to traditional mechanisms of party control.¹ Others have noted the growing state presence, positing a party-state-military.² Yet still others have studied party-military relations within the context of elite politics.³ Most of these studies agree that the PLA has evolved into a unique system featuring elements of both a political and professional military.⁴

However, as the CCP discards even the most basic tenets of Marxist orthodoxy in pursuit of a more flexible, pragmatic ideology, questions for the post-Mao PLA have gained a new sense of urgency. What does communist leadership of a military mean without the party’s commitment to communism? Can a political military operate apart from its original political identity? This chapter will argue that the CCP’s decision to define itself as a “governing party” at the start of the Hu Jintao era represented a critical shift in the dynamics underpinning the party’s leadership of the military. It will explore this shift by first providing an overview of party military relations and then highlighting elements of the PLA’s evolution in political identity. Turning to the Hu era, the chapter will argue that political reforms to improve the CCP’s political effectiveness have profoundly shaped the party-military relationship, creating a more flexible, dynamic form of leadership better suited to the needs of a rapidly modernizing PLA. However, the relationship
carries significant vulnerabilities, stemming primarily from difficulties linked to the CCP’s incomplete transition to a more stable form of single party rule.

OVERVIEW OF PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS

The PLA serves the CCP. As such, it swears ultimate allegiance to the CCP, not to the state, although it serves simultaneously as the military of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Authoritative writings in turn distinguish between the CCP’s political leadership and command authority. The PLA’s Regulations on Political Work explains, for example, that “ultimate leadership authority” rests with the CCP Central Committee, while “command authority” rests with the Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC).

The distinction between the functions of the party’s national and military leadership is critical to understanding the PLA’s political nature. The largely civilian party leadership at the national level provides overall political and strategic guidance, while the military’s leadership provides leadership for the armed forces in accordance with the will of the national leadership. A brief review of both levels of leadership may help illuminate how the two interact.

National CCP Leadership.

The CCP is organized along Leninist principles, one of the most important of which is the idea of party penetration of organizations. The CCP exists primarily as an extensive network of hierarchically organized political organs, or cells, that are embedded in, and control, decisionmaking for virtually all major social, economic, political, cultural, and military organiza-
tions in the Chinese polity, to include state bureaucracies, and nonofficial organizations. The party organs typically consist of the most important decisionmakers in their respective organizations and are designed to ensure that political, organizational, and operational decisions are consistent with the directives of the national leadership. Notoriously stovepiped, the Party’s various systems are functionally integrated primarily at the highest levels.\(^6\)

In theory, the highest level of national party leadership is the National Party Congress, which meets every 5 years. The CCP Constitution delegates authority between congresses to the Central Committee, which serves as the primary leadership body.\(^7\) In reality, the Central Committee delegates day-to-day authority to the Political Bureau, within which resides the supremely powerful Political Bureau Standing Committee (PBSC). Each of these bodies plays a specialized role in approving authoritative documents, issuing guidance, and providing leadership.\(^8\) For this reason, this chapter will invoke the term “CCP national leadership” to refer primarily to the PBSC, but with the awareness that the Politburo, Central Committee, and National Party Congress augment and complement the authority and power of the PBSC and are integral parts of the Party’s national level leadership as well.

**Military Leadership.**

The PLA’s political system is designed to ensure the military reliably executes the will of the CCP national leadership. While not all PLA members are CCP members, all officers and other important decisionmakers belong to the party. The most important leadership body in the military is the party’s CMC,
which also serves as the duplicate, largely redundant, state CMC. However, the primacy of party leadership is echoed throughout the military. All military units are penetrated and controlled by party organizations. Party committees (党委) supervise higher level commands, while party branches (党支部) supervise lower level ones. These organizations exercise political, organizational, and operational authority within PLA units.

Mirroring its operation throughout the Chinese polity, the military’s party organizations consist of the most important decision-makers such as commanders, technicians, and specialists in the party’s work (called “political workers”). The PLA’s political workers play an especially important role in cultivating the military’s loyalty to the Party through indoctrination, propaganda, training, and the control of promotion and other benefits. However, it is worth highlighting that these political workers are not inserted into the PLA from outside by CCP authorities—instead, they are trained professionals drawn from the ranks of the military.9

The fact that party leadership in the PLA is largely identical to the military’s leadership raises the critical question of loyalty. How does the CCP national leadership ensure that military leaders are loyal, above all, to the CCP, and only secondarily to the military as an institution? The answer traditionally has rested in the PLA’s identity as a political military focused on political goals. The system of Party leadership that suffuses the PLA was originally designed to support a communist party committed to a program of political revolution. A program of political revolution, after all, provided the most compelling justification for political leadership of the military. The premium on politi-
cal skill and expertise necessary to realize revolutionary goals also bolstered the authority of party leaders. While the form of the PLA as a political military has remained largely consistent over time, the CCP’s gradual turn away from revolutionary politics toward a more pragmatic stance has profoundly shaped the content of its authority within the PLA. A full history of China’s party-military relationship is beyond the scope of this chapter, but a brief summary may provide a sense of the evolution.

In the era of Mao Zedong, the CCP’s commitment to revolutionary ideals and Maoist ideology shaped a highly politicized military that strongly resembled the classic model for communistic militaries. The PLA intervened in domestic politics and in turn national CCP leaders tried to shape the military to conform to communist ideals. The leadership of this era was characterized by the thorough interpenetration of political and military elites, with many military leaders having extensive experience with political revolution, and many political leaders having extensive military experience.10

As Deng Xiaoping led the CCP away from the excesses of Maoism and toward reform and opening up, he set the PLA onto a path of modernization. However, reflecting the low level of institutionalization and technical competence of Party officials, the PLA’s overall institutions and standards of professional competence remained low compared to industrialized countries. The PLA occasionally intervened in domestic politics, as it did in Tiananmen in 1989. Again mirroring the CCP’s focus on rapid economic growth, the PLA immersed itself in commercial activities to contribute to that growth. The “interlocking directorate” faded with the death of so many aging revolutionaries, but
Deng remained at the nexus of the party and military leadership.\textsuperscript{11}

Following Deng’s passing, Jiang Zemin consolidated the trend in both the CCP writ large and the PLA toward greater technical competence, specialization, and commitment to modernization. Jiang led the CCP leadership to enact further market reforms and improve its professional competence as governing authorities. Concurrently, the PLA focused on external responsibilities and professional development, ended its commercial focus, and reduced further its tendency to intervene in domestic politics. Although rule of law remained weak, the CCP leadership at various levels made initial efforts to delimit and institutionalize its political authority, developments which the military replicated in its own domain. The interlocking directorate disappeared by this time, as Jiang became the first CMC chair to lack military experience and the PLA uniformed presence on the senior decisionmaking bodies declined.\textsuperscript{12}

This brief discussion illustrates two important trends. First, the CCP’s declining interest in revolutionary politics over time has corresponded with the PLA’s declining requirement to support revolutionary political activity. Second, the CCP’s growing focus on developing professional competence in governance has similarly corresponded with the PLA’s growing requirement to cultivate professional competence. The link in the trends between the CCP and PLA is not surprising, given the fact that the PLA exists as a subordinate “armed wing” of the CCP. However, these trends do raise questions about the conventional understanding of party-military relations in China, a relationship that has only grown more complex following key political developments in the Hu era.
CCP-PLA RELATIONS IN THE HU ERA: POLITICAL CONTEXT

On the eve of Hu’s accession to the post of General Secretary, the CCP leadership made a momentous decision. It adopted a new conceptual framework, or paradigm, that conclusively relegated the idea of the CCP as a revolutionary party to the dustbin of history. The 16th Party Congress Work Report, issued in 2002, became the first to state that the CCP now regarded itself as a “governing party” ("执政党") oriented toward addressing the public’s “fundamental interests” ("基本利益").

In some ways, this decision clarified and refined the idea, evident in the preceding party congress work report, that reform and opening up policies represented a turn toward a more “scientific” approach to realizing communism through incremental, pragmatic adjustments. At a deeper level, however, it represented a decisive turn away from the lingering remnants of communist idealism to which the Party leadership remains committed in name only. In defining “socialism” as the “management and realization of the interests of the people and nation,” the CCP has instead embraced a functionalist view that shares more in common with advanced (capitalist) industrial nations than communist states. In many ways, this new conceptual framework provides a firmer intellectual foundation for the Party’s ambition to evolve into a higher level of technical competence. For this reason, this decision was arguably the Party’s most important since it adopted a political and ideological stance amenable to reform and opening up at the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in 1978.
The significance of the CCP’s adoption of the governing party paradigm may be seen in the way that its adoption has coincided with political reforms designed to gradually rationalize virtually all Party functions. The purpose behind the party’s political reforms may be summarized as the **transformation of the CCP into a stable, competent, rational bureaucratic actor capable of effectively governing an increasingly powerful, technologically advanced, prosperous nation with global interests.**

The concept of “rationalization” is an important one and requires definition. This term refers to the transformation of a process, activity, or system of thought characterized by increased functionality, effectiveness, and efficiency in accordance with rationally defined objectives. The concept emphasizes qualities of standardization, predictability, systematization, and scientific control. Although the Chinese do not use the word “rationalization,” they do use terms that collectively evoke this concept, such as “scientific management” (“科学管理”), “system building” (“体系建设”), “regularization” (“正规化”), and “institutionalization” (“制度化”).15

While an evaluation of political reforms in line with this paradigm is beyond the scope of this chapter, a few highlights may illustrate the trend. During the Hu era, the CCP sought to strengthen itself as an organization through efforts to institutionalize procedures, improve recruitment and training of personnel, and other measures.16 It sought to clarify and rationalize the CCP’s relationship with the state and society, primarily through the promulgation of party and state laws and regulations, implementation of norms for terms of service, and the strengthening of state institutions. Lastly, the regime sought to enhance its ability
to deliver strategic leadership by systematizing and rationalizing its ideology to better serve the needs of policymaking.\textsuperscript{17}

Despite difficulties in implementation, the reforms have succeeded enough to enable the CCP national leadership to guide China’s growth in a complex era of globalization. The leadership has successfully guided the nation’s economy to become the second largest in the world, one thoroughly integrated with the global economy.\textsuperscript{18} This period has also coincided with considerable stability in elite politics. Although the CCP relies heavily on a massive state security apparatus to maintain stability, it has made incremental progress in increasing the flexibility with which it handles domestic problems, as evidenced by its handling of the unrest in Wukan in 2010.\textsuperscript{19} Such rapid growth has generated a variety of intense domestic pressures, but the CCP’s position nevertheless does not seem seriously threatened. Even accounting for the Bo Xilai contretemps, the regime seems secure.

However, the adoption of the governing party paradigm is not without perils. The extensive corruption pervading the regime is symptomatic of deeper problems of ideological demoralization and the inadequacy of state institutions independent of party control that are necessary for effective governance. Caught in a transition between a discredited Maoist past and the possibility of a more stable political system, the CCP remains politically vulnerable. It carries all the baggage associated with the disasters of Maoism but with little of the legitimacy that could be gained by successful transition to a more stable model of competent governance. While the CCP’s successes in realizing three decades of growth may have earned it a credit of goodwill among the public, without sus-
tained progress in reforms, shortfalls in performance could generate systemic crisis.

REFORMING THE PLA’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

These political reforms have deeply influenced the party’s leadership of the military. With the CCP’s “political” mission now defined in terms of the management of the nation’s interests, the military by definition is becoming one whose primary responsibility concerns the nation’s interests. Put another way, the PLA is evolving into the functional equivalent of a modern, national military even as it remains one organized along Leninist principles. **However, the military’s Leninist features are not unaffected by this process.** The modernization of the military, like the modernization of the governing apparatus, requires a “modernization” of the CCP’s Leninist structure in order for the party to maintain power. The key political innovation in the late Jiang and Hu eras is the CCP’s adaptation of its Leninist structure to more effectively accommodate, and guide, the modernization of the state, economy, society, and the military.

The process by which the party is carrying out this adaptation with regard to the military consists of reforms to: 1) strengthen the Party as an organization within the military; 2) rationalize the CCP’s relationship with the PLA; and 3) improve the CCP’s ability to provide strategic leadership to the military. Each of these lines of effort is explored in greater detail below.
Strengthen the Party Organization in the PLA.

As part of the broader effort to revitalize the Party, the military’s leadership, led by the CMC, has pursued measures to strengthen party authority in the PLA by deepening efforts to: 1) carry out political campaigns to enhance party cohesion; 2) improve the quality of CCP personnel in the PLA; 3) rebuild ties with the rank and file; and 4) control corruption.

Carry Out Political Campaigns.

The CMC duly carried out its responsibilities as part of the broader Advanced Nature campaign launched by the Central Committee to strengthen internal cohesion and align the CCP with the new requirements as a governing party. Within the military, the Advanced Nature campaign concluded with the issuance of an Opinion by the General Political Department (GPD) aimed at consolidating gains from the campaign. The GPD introduced specific provisions outlining the objectives, requirements, and the main content for training, as well as measures to strengthen organizational leadership. The GPD also aligned performance reviews of party cadres to accord with the frequent turnover of most military positions.

Improve Quality of Party Members in the PLA.

Party leaders within the military have revised regulations to improve the quality of its membership. In March 2004, the CMC issued the second revision to the Regulations on Party Member Recruitment by PLA Party Organizations. The purpose was to increase the professional quality of members and standardize pro-
cendures for recruitment. In February 2009, the GPD issued regulations to standardize the process by which party cadres are recruited and employed. It outlined procedures, steps, and measures for the selection and promotion and nominations of cadres, solicitation of popular feedback, and procedures for relevant decisionmaking at party committee meetings, including for ballot voting. The PLA has also established a broad variety of recruitment programs at college campuses and other venues to increase the quality of officers and technical personnel.

The military has announced new training initiatives to improve the quality of personnel in line with the PLA’s desire for leaders and technicians capable of fighting and winning hi-tech war. Military topics are increasingly common for training party leaders. As one example, in 2010 the GPD announced a 3-year study plan for senior and mid-ranking cadres to enhance both political and professional military education.

Rebuild Ties with Rank and File.

The military leadership has increased efforts to shore up the CCP’s relationship with the rank and file. In 2005, the CMC issued its first set of regulations on Party branches. Designed to enhance the connection of the Party to troops, the regulations standardized guidance on the organization, responsibilities, and tasks of the party branches. The CMC also outlined requirements for Party committees to carry out face-to-face meetings with the rank and file to better address their concerns.
Control Corruption.

Corruption throughout the period remained a festering problem, as witnessed by the downfall of PLA Navy Deputy Commander Wang Shouye in 2006. To combat corruption, the CMC in 2010 issued the first set of regulations standardizing the work of the Discipline Inspection Commission. The regulations reportedly stipulate requirements for membership, procedures, and specific responsibilities for commission members. The CMC has also issued regulations to more tightly govern the behavior of its members within the military. In 2011, it issued a military version of the Party’s regulations on the ethical integrity of its leaders. The regulations prohibit officials from accepting gifts, feasts, or other entertainment or arrangements that could impair the ability of the official to carry out his duties impartially. Pending dramatic progress in the CCP’s overall effort to control corruption, however, it remains unclear how much impact these regulations have had.

Assessment.

The PLA has enjoyed incremental progress in its efforts to strengthen the CCP as an organization within the military. Indirect evidence of improved party leadership may be seen in the anecdotal reports of progress in restoring morale and discipline following the political strife characteristic of the last Jiang years. Reports of widespread PLA indiscipline, demoralization, and declining proficiency common in Hong Kong press in the late-1990s had diminished considerably by the end of Hu’s tenure, probably reflecting better leadership, as well as improved conditions of
Western scholars have noted some progress in Chinese efforts to improve the quality of training and recruitment of party/military cadres and personnel overall, but evidence of success in meeting all of the PLA’s objectives remains less clear. However, reporting suggests limited progress in the PLA’s efforts to control corruption. Moreover, the reforms have only somewhat mitigated the CCP’s broader problems of political atrophy.

**Rationalize Party-Military Relations.**

Just as the CCP has carried out reforms to render more functional and efficient its leadership of the state and society, the PLA’s leadership has initiated reforms in the military to: 1) strengthen the role of party leadership bodies in the PLA; 2) focus party work to enhance the military’s combat effectiveness; and 3) regularize party activities.

**Strengthen the Role of Party Leadership Bodies.**

As organizations comprising the most essential decisionmakers in any military unit, party committees and branches have emerged as especially crucial tools to maintain party leadership. To enhance the leadership role of party committees, the CMC has promoted the standardization of its activities and better recruitment. Regulations revised in 2011 delineated the responsibilities of party committees, standing committees, secretaries, and members. The regulations outline procedures and principles for decisionmaking, holding meetings, and the formulation of resolutions. Mirroring the CCP’s focus on professional elites, PLA party committees now recruit heavily from military professionals and technical experts.
An article in a PLA newspaper illustrates how the party committees guide efforts to improve the military’s performance. In response to problems with carrying out joint training, a party committee in Nanjing’s air force developed a mechanism for carrying out system-wide force-on-force exercises. The party committee also organized various elements such as command and information systems to improve the effectiveness of operational units. The military also relies on party committees to oversee operational and technical commands. In the escort missions in the Gulf of Aden, the PLA appointed political commissars and set up ad hoc party committees. For technical tasks such as weapons development, the party committee drew from “leading commands at high levels, manufacturers, technical personnel, and tasked units” to exercise “concentrated and unified leadership.”

**Focus Party Work to Enhance the Military’s Combat Effectiveness.**

The CCP’s abandonment of revolutionary politics has severely weakened the traditional rationale for the PLA’s political commissars, party organs, and propaganda machinery. The PLA has responded to this development by repurposing many of these instruments to support the military’s focus on combat effectiveness. The political workers now provide services to enhance morale and welfare, personnel administration and other combat service support to military units. The PLA continues to undergo political training, but the content of that training has increasingly featured practical and military-related topics.

The CMC has directed many other aspects of its political work to support military modernization and
operations. The 2003 revision to Political Work in the PLA explicitly focused political work to build a military capable of winning hi-tech warfare. The regulations expanded sections on activities to enhance the combat function of political work, such as “public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare” as well as activities to “nurture the fighting spirit of the armed forces.”

Regularize Party Activities.

Party leaders within the military have introduced a series of regulations to standardize virtually all CCP activities in the military. Regarding personnel, the military’s Party leadership has standardized routine promotion and retirement procedures of key Party leaders, including those in the CMC since at least 1997. Norms have been introduced for military members who participate in Party congresses. Party leaders within the military have begun to standardize decisionmaking procedures. In 2004, the CMC issued regulations for party committees that outlined procedures for decisionmaking, voting, filing reports, and holding meetings. The Political Work Regulations similarly strengthened provisions for discipline and inspection organs, and standardized the frequency and timeliness of reporting requirements within lower level party units.

Assessment.

The CCP has seen incremental progress in its effort to rationalize its authority within the military. Despite prolific publication of regulations, the persistence of corruption and other abuses suggests that enforce-
ment remains inconsistent at best. The weak leadership ability of the noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps suggests the PLA continues to struggle with sustaining institutions capable of exercising decision-making power free from party interference. However, there appears to be some progress in institutionalizing norms for personnel actions, as seen in the increasingly predictable patterns for retirement and promotion. Moreover, the overall increased technical competence and capabilities of the PLA suggest that the military has succeeded in standardizing and regularizing many activities related to modernization and operations.

Enhance Ability to Provide Strategic Guidance.

A critical ingredient of the party’s effort to improve its leadership of the PLA consists of reforms to improve the CCP’s ability to provide strategic leadership. Party leaders at the national level and within the military have introduced reforms designed to enhance the ability to formulate, implement, and enforce strategic guidance to the military. Of these, the most important are: 1) the formulation of the historic missions concept, 2) the rationalization of Party theory to guide modernization and operations, and 3) measures to ensure compliance.

Historic Missions of the Armed Forces.

The significance of the concept for party-military relations is three-fold. First, it aligns the military’s fundamental missions with the party’s. Second, it explicitly aligns the military’s political posture to support the governing party paradigm. Third, it represents the overall trend toward the rationalization of ideology.
Hu Jintao issued the historic missions in 2004, roughly 7 years after the 15th Party Congress identified the CCP’s “historic tasks” in 1997 as “propelling the modernization drive, achieving reunification, and promoting world peace.”\textsuperscript{45} Political considerations likely drove the delay. Before issuing the new missions to the PLA, party leaders first had to gain consensus on the question of whether to adopt the theoretical concepts and political reforms associated with the governing party paradigm, such as the authorization of CCP membership to capitalists, entrepreneurs, and other business and technical elites. Reporting at the time described considerable resistance, from mostly leftist party leaders, to the many of the political and ideological reforms promoted by Jiang Zemin. It took years of political work, to include purges and other disciplinary measures, to overcome the leftist opposition and secure consensus within the party leadership to carry out the political and ideological reforms.\textsuperscript{46}

The CCP leadership achieved this consensus by the time of the 16th Party Congress in 2002, when it endorsed the Three Represents concept, a key theoretical idea that justified and underpinned the governing party paradigm. Political sensitivities surrounding the leadership transition probably further delayed the issuance of additional important strategic concepts, such as the historic missions, until after Hu had assumed control of the military in September 2004. By December, however, Hu had consolidated his control over the military enough to issue the historic missions. Formally known as the “historic missions of the armed forces in the new century in the new period,” these consist of four requirements: 1) “provide a security guarantee for the CCP to consolidate its governing position;” 2) “provide a security guarantee for the period
of strategic opportunity;” 3) “provide strong strategic support for the defense of national interests;” and 4) “play an important role in bringing about world peace and common development.”

These military missions support and expand on the Party’s historic tasks, reflecting the fruit of additional analysis during the intervening years. For example, the military’s second mission provides a broad expansion of the Party’s first task of “propelling modernization.” For the military, this appears to require the PLA to provide a stable internal and external security environment that can enable the CCP’s focus on national development.

The military’s third mission expands on the Party task of achieving reunification by directing the military to support the Party’s effort to secure a much broader array of interests, including contested territorial and sovereignty claims, and other security and economic interests beyond PRC borders. However, the fact that this concept is built around the CCP’s imperative to achieve reunification suggests that this remains the paramount security priority for the military as well. The fourth mission, meanwhile, directly supports the Party’s task of promoting world peace and common development, which may be understood to mean shaping a favorable international environment for China’s rise.

The only mission of the PLA that does not directly support a Party historic task is the first one; that of providing a security guarantee for the Party to consolidate its governing position. The significance of this mission is several-fold. Most obviously, this mission tasks the military with defeating efforts by all enemies, foreign and domestic, who may threaten the Party and its efforts to govern China. However, the
mission is also carefully phrased to ensure the military’s support for the CCP national leadership’s focus on improving its governing capacity. It thus carries the unstated political corollary that rules out military support for disaffected elements within the Party that reject the governing party paradigm.

Finally, the historic missions concept is another example of the Party’s increasingly scientific functional system of ideological strategic concepts that guide policymaking. The historic missions is a major element of the Party’s military guiding theory and adds a degree of consistency of language and clarity of thought not observed in functional equivalents issued by previous leaders.

**Party’s Military Guiding Theory.**

Party leadership within the military has sought to reform its ideology to facilitate its strategic leadership within the military through the formulation of a military guiding theory. The Party’s military guiding theory aims to provide authoritative theoretical guidance for the most significant aspects of military life, such as its mission, doctrine, and modernization. It consists of the study of the laws and guiding patterns of warfare and national defense as expounded by Marx, and refined by Engels, Lenin, and CCP leadership led by Mao, Deng, Jiang, and Hu. The theory also includes ideas and concepts drawn from analysis of foreign militaries, historical developments, and military science research. The PLA completed a major research project that systematized the Party’s military guiding theory in 2005.
Mechanisms for Compliance.

The CMC’s main mechanism for ensuring the compliance of military policies with the party’s strategic guidance consists of regulations and administrative measures to hold cadres accountable. A key mechanism is the requirement that all relevant laws, policies, and regulations be revised as necessary to conform to the strategic guidance following any major changes to the Party’s Marxist theory. This pattern can be seen in the revision of virtually all forms of political work regulations following the 16th Congress, which incorporated the Three Represents into its theory, and the 17th Congress, which adopted the Scientific Development Concept.49

Party leadership in the military has also enacted administrative procedures to enforce compliance. It has implemented a cadre assessment and evaluation procedures similar to their nonmilitary counterparts. Party committees play an especially important role in overseeing implementation through meetings designed to hold officials accountable. The CMC also employs traditional mechanisms such as indoctrination, study sessions, and propaganda to promote military’s compliance with party guidance.50

Assessment.

Reforms have improved the regime’s ability to provide strategic leadership, but also exacerbated political vulnerabilities. In systematizing and rationalizing its ideology, the CCP leadership reinvigorated its political theory, shored up its faltering Marxist ideology, and improved the utility of the party’s political language for analyzing problems and articulating guid-
The CCP’s delegation of more authority to bureaucratic systems such as the PLA has also enhanced its flexibility and effectiveness. Indirect evidence of successful adaptation may be seen in the CCP national leadership’s delegation of authority to military leaders who oversee operations far from Chinese soil, as seen in PLA participation in the many United Nations-led peacekeeping operations around the world.

The rationalization of party ideology is not without drawbacks, however. The focus on a scientific, functional approach to its political theory detaches the CCP from its Marxist heritage and further erodes its political credibility. The CCP’s transformation of its ideology from a tool of mobilizing the population against privileged elites into one of mobilizing policymaking elites to manage the population undercuts the party’s mass appeal and further weakens its base of popular support. Finally, the persistent weakness of state and military institutions impedes the CCP’s ability to translate its guidance into consistent policy.

TOWARD A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS

The evolution of party-military relations can perhaps be illustrated by contrasting two versions of an analogy of driving and navigating a car. The early-model version represents the party-military relationship in the Mao era. Imagine a 1950s era car, which seats two persons: the passenger represents the party’s national leadership, while the driver represents the military’s leadership. The car is a primitive one characterized by minimal automation—this is the military. Although the driver and the navigator each has slightly more experience than the other in his respective du-
ties, both are fully capable of taking turns driving and navigating. The close relationship between the driver and passenger and low level of technical complexity of the car in the analogy evokes the Mao-era CCP’s focus on revolutionary politics, the interpenetration of national and military leadership, and the national leadership’s deep familiarity with the operational and tactical details of the low-tech PLA. The word “control” is appropriate to describe the party’s relationship to the military in this model, as the PLA in this era served primarily as a tool of the CCP’s political endeavors.

A late-model version of the same analogy illustrates the advances that had appeared by the Hu era. This time, the car is high performance, highly automated, inhabited by a single occupant—the driver. However, the driver is only vaguely aware of the destination and route. He is instead guided to his destination via continuous wireless communications by a remote dispatcher. Moreover, the car is intelligent enough to feature a computer navigation aid that suggests possible routes, which the driver may negotiate with the dispatcher. Reflecting the specialization of party authority, the driver represents the military’s leadership, while the dispatcher represents the party’s national level leadership. The high performance, automated car represents the overall higher capabilities and technical sophistication of a modernizing military. Just as the dispatcher and driver in the illustration are primarily concerned with supervising and correctly steering the car, so the party’s national level and military leadership are primarily concerned with supervising and guiding the modernization and operational activities of the military. Here the word “leadership” seems a more appropriate term to de-
scribe the CCP’s role in the military. The military is a less simple tool than a semi-autonomous machine that is set in motion and guided by the watchful national and military leadership.

The analogy gives some sense of the advantage and disadvantage of the evolving style of party leadership in the military. On the one hand, the increased technical expertise and rationalization of party authority offers the possibility of superior performance at the national level in terms of improved strategic planning and policymaking. It also offers the possibility of a superior military performance, in terms of enhanced operational capabilities. Properly managed, the CCP national leadership can wield the military as an instrument of policy to versatile ends far beyond the capabilities of a Mao era PLA. But the downside is clear as well—the national party leadership, further removed from the military, is less aware of its inner workings. The largely civilian national leadership today has less experience with the military at a time when the military is developing increasingly specialized technical capabilities and its own distinct professional culture. Moreover, the military’s professionalization exacerbates questions of loyalty and identity among military leaders. The PLA’s missions, weaponry, training, doctrine, uniforms, and organization all appear increasingly similar to that of other modern, national militaries. As professionalism continues, PLA personnel are likely to be tempted to view themselves primarily as military members who happen to belong to the party, rather than as party members who happen to serve in the military.

The party’s adaptation of its Leninist structure to support and guide the military’s modernization defines the essence of the paradoxical professional polit-
ical military that is the PLA today. The process of adaptation is both proactive and reactive: the party both directs and guides the process of military modernization, and it also accommodates the PLA’s demands for standardized, consistent, competent authority generated by the process of military modernization. Three developments associated with this political transformation are worth highlighting: 1) the CCP’s changing locus of legitimacy as a driver of military professionalization; 2) the fragmentation of party authority; and 3) the growing importance of institutions and the state for party leadership.

First, the shifting locus of legitimacy drives the CCP leadership’s demand for a professional military. The CCP national leadership’s increasing focus on the management of national interests as the locus of legitimacy drives its requirement for a professional, modern military capable of securing those interests. Far from subverting control, the professionalization of the PLA directly supports Beijing’s agenda. The CCP supports professionalization because the Party requires a PLA capable of defending a growing array of security interests essential for China’s rise as a great power. Moreover, the CCP’s pursuit of institutionalized political processes suggests that it no longer desires military intervention in domestic politics. Professionalization is attractive to the CCP national leadership precisely because it keeps the PLA focused on military, not political, topics. The PLA in turn supports the idea of the CCP’s development into a governing party because such reforms promise to result in a more stable, predictable, rational bureaucratic regime that can ensure social stability and prosperity, thus freeing the military from the need to intervene in domestic politics. A competent CCP regime is also
more likely to be capable of resourcing and effectively guiding the PLA’s modernization.

Second, party authority is fragmenting along bureaucratic lines. The party-military relationship increasingly features two levels of leadership united by the commitment to uphold Communist Party authority and its strategic objectives. While at a very general level this characterization may be said to have been true of the CCP-PLA relationship in the past, the driving focus on revolutionary politics and low level of technical specialization required of the PLA in earlier eras enabled a much higher degree of unity between party and military authority.

The fragmentation of party authority along the lines of bureaucratic expertise has clarified over time. At the national level, the CCP leadership now oversees the formulation, dissemination, and implementation of strategic guidance for the nation. The CCP leadership also develops and refines the theoretical assessments and concepts that underpin its strategic guidance. The PLA leadership, meanwhile, focuses on formulating, disseminating, and implementing military related objectives and guidance to support the national leadership’s agenda. The PLA’s party leadership also develops and refines the security-related assessments and elaborates the military application of the party’s theoretical concepts. The two levels of party authority interact continually, with the CCP leadership providing top down guidance, and the PLA leadership providing expert input to refine that guidance.

This specialization of authority offers several advantages to both national party and military leadership. Empowering military leaders to provide details on how to apply party concepts and guidance gives the military more of a stake in supporting the CCP
national leadership’s agenda. It also allows the CCP national leadership to leverage expertise within the military for its ends. For the PLA, responsibility for elaborating the military application of party concepts and guidance offers an institutionalized mechanism to leverage party guidance to demand resources and influence policy.

Third, effective CCP leadership of the military increasingly hinges on the successful institutionalization of relations between party, military, and state. One of the most significant symptoms of the evolution of the party military relationship is the growing role of the state, as noted by many observers. Commentators have questioned the long-term viability of a robust state presence in the military, given the CCP’s fundamental Leninist inclination to penetrate, co-opt, and control all forms of authority and power. However, the CCP’s adoption of competent governance as the locus of its legitimacy has challenged the assumptions underpinning the traditional understanding of the Leninist features of CCP rule. Because the CCP’s evolving style of leadership is fundamentally premised on the rationalization of political processes, the most logical way for the CCP to consolidate its authority is to deepen the rationalization of its political power. Above all, this means the development and enforcement of party, state, and military laws, norms, and institutions to stabilize, standardize, and render more efficient decisionmaking and bureaucratic processes to facilitate the smooth operation of the party, state, and military.

The CCP national leadership appears to have reached similar conclusions. Since as early as 2000, the CCP national leadership has increasingly emphasized the importance of creating a consistent, predict-
able, and fair system of party and state laws and institutions to sustain economic growth, facilitate social stability, and consolidate party rule. Similarly, over the past decade, the PLA has overseen an extensive growth in party and state laws, rules, and regulations aimed at enabling the party leadership to focus on a higher level of strategic leadership. As conceived by party leaders, the growth of institutions and state power complements the CCP’s evolution as a leadership body that specializes in formulating and enforcing strategic guidance. One *Jiefangjun Bao* article explained that “systems are more fundamental, comprehensive, stable, and long term. Building a system of party rules and regulations is of tremendous significance in ensuring the party’s absolute leadership over the military.” Similarly, the PLA has sought to strengthen military institutions such as the NCO corps to improve combat effectiveness. Ironically, the PLA’s continuation as a political military may well depend on the ability of the CCP to reduce further the political character of the military.

**CHALLENGES**

The CCP appears to have made sufficient adjustments to its overall political posture, ideology, and organization to enable it to lead the PLA effectively in its peacetime modernization activities for the foreseeable future. However, the PLA faces three major challenges in its pursuit of a more modern, competent style of political leadership. Obscured in peacetime, the vulnerabilities may be exacerbated in times of crisis. While none of these challenges are inherently insurmountable, effective resolution may require reforms that touch on the most basic principles of Leninist rule.
First, the fragmentation of party leadership opens areas of potential friction. The CCP’s abandonment of its revolutionary posture has improved its effectiveness and adaptability, but also removes the most compelling justification for the PLA’s automatic obedience. On the contrary, the CCP’s claim to base its legitimacy on competent performance as a governing party invites scrutiny by others, including the PLA. Moreover, because competent governance depends so heavily on specialized expertise, the CCP national leadership’s low level of military expertise makes security-related policy a key area of potential friction with the military. The well-known phenomena of PLA officers publicly airing their differences with security-related foreign policy decisions may be read as a symptom of this dynamic. Although evidence remains elusive that the PLA has had a decisive impact on any major foreign policy decision, these voices can shape the political environment in which China’s policymakers operate.55

This phenomenon is exacerbated by the fact that the PLA’s enhanced autonomy and cohesion has increased its insularity and bureaucratic power. At the national level, this has resulted in instances of poor policy coordination with other elements of the PRC government. The Hu years saw a spate of incidents such as the cancellation of a scheduled port call by the USS Kittyhawk in 2007, the anti-satellite test in 2007 and the J-20 test in 2011. These incidents typically involved some military operation or activity that greatly impacted China’s strategic or foreign policy interests, often with what appears to be little coordination or even awareness by senior civil authorities.56 Because the military in each case did not challenge CCP authority, it would be inaccurate to characterize these
events as examples of disobedience or defiance. It is perhaps more accurate to view these incidents as symptomatic of the military’s growing insularity and professional autonomy and the consequences of weak security expertise among national level party authorities. It also demonstrates that the PLA’s operations and activities are having a greater foreign policy impact than ever, due in part to the geographic reach of its more advanced platforms and China’s rising political profile. However, problems of coordination are not insurmountable. Indeed, there are signs that the CCP national leadership is already improving its coordination between the PLA and other bureaucracies.57

Second, the combination of the CCP’s political weakness and the PLA’s increased cohesion raises the risk of eroding military loyalty to the party. Widespread corruption, popular disaffection, and a heavy increase in internal security point to fundamental political weaknesses of the CCP that have persisted through the Hu years. Furthermore, China continues to lack strong state institutions which could help administer the military and mitigate some of the CCP’s weakness. Meanwhile, the PLA’s increased autonomy, cohesion, and professional competence has raised the military’s public reputation and morale. An increasingly powerful PLA operating under a weakened CCP within the confines of an obsolete model of Party-military relations is not a recipe for long-term stability.

PLA commentators regularly hint at some level of tension between the military’s political leadership and the PLA’s modernization efforts. A typical commentary noted the gaps between the CCP’s capacities in the military and the military’s pursuit of modernization. It warned that resolving these gaps directly bears on the PLA’s ability to execute its missions. Among
concerns cited in the article are problems of CCP organizational weakness, poor grasp of military topics, and corruption. The incessant drum beat in military press regarding the party’s absolute leadership of the military is similarly significant if for no other reason than that the military leadership apparently feels compelled to repeatedly and emphatically highlight this basic fact.

The CCP’s political weakness, the lack of strong institutions, and the military’s cohesive semi-autonomy increases the risk that the military’s loyalty could erode over time. It is not inconceivable that leadership in the PLA may become co-opted by the military institution in some situations. Reports that Lieutenant General Gu Junshan resisted efforts by the national CCP leadership to impose discipline are a disturbing portent of possible troubles to come. Significantly, the reports stated that party authorities within the military failed to enforce discipline against the powerful general. The reported receptiveness of at least some in the military to Bo Xilai’s style of leadership similarly reflects the danger that a more cohesive military could pose if alienated from the national party leadership. While the number of troops involved appeared small and the threat easily contained, the danger of political disaffection within the PLA could grow should the CCP national leadership falter in its performance.

Third, the persistent weakness of institutions undercuts the PLA’s transition to a more stable form of party leadership. The fact that the CCP has made so little progress in implementing a true rule of law and crafting viable institutions despite years of effort points to the immense challenge facing Beijing in its quest for a more stable model of one party rule. For all the progress that the CCP has made in improving its
leadership style in society and the military, the transformation remains deeply incomplete. Symptomatic of the difficulties is the party’s continued heavy reliance on party committees to provide leadership and oversight of the many of even the most routine activities in the military.

Having grasped the “low hanging fruit” of rationalizing less controversial procedures, rules, and norms, the PLA faces hard work ahead as it grapples with the more intractable problems such as controlling corruption and developing the mechanisms that can mediate the exercise of political power at the highest levels. Above all, the CCP’s insistence on maintaining accountability only to itself fundamentally undercuts efforts to promote institutionalization and rule of law in China’s polity and within the military. The 18th Party Congress Work Report’s highlighting of the importance of consolidating political institutions (制度) and systems (体系) suggests that authorities recognize the urgency of the problem. However, without major reforms that touch on the very nature of the Leninist structure of the party—especially the principle of party penetration and political control of all organizations—the PLA will continue to struggle to develop the institutions upon which its success as a professional military increasingly depends.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The analysis in this chapter suggests that the PLA has made the critical adjustments necessary to enable the party to confidently lead the peacetime modernization of the military for the foreseeable future. Because the reforms are designed to improve the effectiveness of party leadership without surrendering control, the
CCP leadership led by Xi is likely to continue these reforms. However, the long-term success of this approach ultimately depends on the CCP’s willingness to adopt reforms that touch on some of the most fundamental principles of Leninist rule, especially the principle of party penetration and control of all organizations. This carries implications for dealing with the PLA in peacetime and for dealing with the Chinese leadership in crises.

The fact that Hu made little progress in establishing a true rule of law and viable institutions should not obscure the military’s important political work in this period. Incremental progress toward the strengthening of the party as an organization, the standardization and institutionalization of the party’s role in the military, and the rationalization of party ideology to better accommodate bureaucratic imperatives have resulted in a more flexible, competent CCP regime capable of carrying out its primary responsibility of guiding and leading the military’s peacetime activities. So long as the CCP continues to make necessary adjustments to its leadership style, the PLA has considerable room to grow as a professional force even as it remains a party led military.

However, the very adjustments that have improved the CCP’s ability to carry out long-term, peacetime strategic leadership of the military have opened vulnerabilities that could be exposed in moments of crisis. The party’s persistent political weakness, inadequacy of its rule of law and institutions, heavy reliance on antiquated systems such as the party committees for leadership, and the fragmentation of party authority are likely to exacerbate problems of command and control in unanticipated situations. In a security-related foreign policy crisis, U.S. policymakers may find
conflicted and confused decisionmaking in Beijing. Understanding the difficulties inherent in the connection between PRC national level policymaking and its military could help policymakers more accurately interpret Chinese policy decisions in such a crisis.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10


8. Lieberthal, p. 177.


15. These terms are often seen in key guiding party documents, such as the party congress work reports or the PRC *Defense White Papers*.


24. Kristen Gunness and Fred Vellucci, “Reforming the Officer Corps: Keeping the College Grads in; the Peasants Out; and the Incompetent Down,” Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, Travis Tanner, ed., The “People” in the PLA, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2008.


29. “促进军队党员领导干部廉洁从政的重要举措” (“An Important Measure for Promoting Ethical Governance of Leading Cadres with Party Membership,”) 解放军报 (PLA Daily), June 1, 2011.


33. Shambaugh, p. 175.


37. “总政领导就修订《政工条例》答记者问” (“PLA Political Department Head Interviewed on Amendment to Political Work Regulations”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), December 26, 2003.

38. Ibid.


40. Zhu.


42. “总政领导就修订《政工条例》答记者问” (“General Political Department Leader Answers Questions Regarding Amend-
ments to Regulations on PLA Political Work,"") 解放军报 (PLA Daily), December 26, 2003.


50. Jie Zhu.


53. Jie Zhu.


60. Garnaut.


CHAPTER 11

TRENDS IN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES UNDER HU JINTAO

Kenneth Allen

The author would like to thank Susan Lawrence for being the discussant during the conference and providing valuable support in editing the chapter. Thanks also to John Corbett, Kevin Pollpeter, Chris Pultz, and Frank Miller for their edits.

Note: Concerning exercises between militaries of two or more countries, while the PLA uses the term “joint,” which it also uses to define interaction between two or more services, foreign militaries use the term “combined.” As a result, throughout this chapter, the author uses the term “joint” when citing PLA literature and “combined” when citing foreign literature.

MAIN ARGUMENT

Military diplomacy under Hu Jintao clearly expanded in scope and achieved more international visibility, indicating that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is doing a better job of influencing how foreign countries view and interact with it. The purpose of this chapter is to identify and assess international initiatives by the PLA from the time Hu Jintao became the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) Central Committee’s Military Commission (Central Military Commission [CMC]) in September 2004, after having served as one of the three Vice Chairmen since 2002, until Xi Jinping, who had served as a Vice
Chairman since October 2010, replaced him during the 18th Party Congress in November 2012. Xi also replaced Hu as the Chairman of the State CMC during the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2013. While it is difficult to determine which specific international initiatives can be directly attributed to Hu, it appears that employing military diplomacy to enhance China’s soft power was clearly implemented as a concept under Hu, and that the PLA began to become actively involved in international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) and military operations other than war (MOOTW) activities as a direct result of Hu’s four historic missions. In addition, the PLA clearly improved transparency under Hu. Looking forward, the PLA will likely continue to expand the scope of its global involvement under Xi Jinping, thereby slowly becoming more confident and preparing for future conflict at or beyond its borders.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

• Should there be civil unrest in countries where Chinese are living and working, the PLA will most likely become more actively involved in helping to evacuate them to safety. China’s increasing focus on HA/DR will require specific technological developments, including equipment, information technology, and logistics and maintenance support. Although these capabilities would be necessary to support an immediate need, such as a natural disaster, they would also enhance the PLA’s ability to support military operations beyond its borders. For the PLA Navy (PLAN), besides learning how to remain at sea for lengthy periods of time, increased
deployments abroad have strengthened the PLAN’s foreign relations.

- The transparency of China’s military has improved in recent years under Hu. However, there remains deep international uncertainty about key areas of the PLA’s force composition and growing capabilities.

- Looking forward to the role of military diplomacy under Xi Jinping, the PLA will most likely continue to expand its global involvement in HA/DR activities and combined exercises with foreign countries, as well as send more delegations abroad to learn from and about other countries’ militaries. At the same time, the PLA continues to provide some training for foreign militaries in China.

**SOURCES**

The primary sources for this chapter include articles from the PLA Academy of Military Science’s (AMS) bimonthly periodical *China Military Science*, including a series of over 20 articles on separate topics during 2010 and 2011 under the general title “Research on Hu Jintao’s Important Instructions on National Defense and Army Building.” Other sources include articles from PLA Daily (解放军报), PLA Pictorial (解放军画报), China Armed Forces (中国军队), China Air Force (中国空军), Blue Book on *International Situation and China’s Foreign Affairs* (国际形势和中国外交蓝皮书), the Internet (Xinhua at chinamil.com, and the Ministry of National Defense [MND] website), the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database, and the biennial *China’s National Defense* (中国的国防), which is better known as the *Defense White Paper* (国
Finally, “Military Exchanges with Chinese Characteristics: The People’s Liberation Army Experience with Foreign Relations,” by Heidi Holz and Kenneth Allen, which was published in 2010 in *The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military*, and various chapters in *Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad* provide a base for examining the PLA’s foreign relations program.³

The People’s Liberation Army must actively carry out military diplomacy, which plays an important role in accelerating the modernization of our armed forces and preparation for military struggle.

CMC Chairman Hu Jintao, 2009⁴

Military diplomacy is an important part of the composition of our country’s diplomacy, and it must firmly carry out the country’s major policies, guidelines, and foreign policies. Therefore, it has a very strong strategic nature, policy nature, and sensitivity. At the same time, military diplomacy is also the peaceful application of military strength. It not only has a soft aspect, but also has rigid characteristics.

MND Foreign Affairs Office, Sep 2012⁵

**BRIEF HISTORY OF MILITARY DIPLOMACY**

Although the PLA’s military diplomacy⁶ did not begin under Hu Jintao, it clearly expanded in scope and received more international visibility under him. As a result, the PLA is apparently doing a better job of influencing how foreign countries view and interact with it.
To understand what occurred under Hu’s leadership, this first section provides a brief background of the PLA’s military diplomacy since 1949. This is followed by the second section, a summary of the growth of PLA military attaché offices abroad and foreign attaché offices assigned to China. The third section discusses the trend in senior PLA visits abroad under Hu.

Sixty Years of PLA Military Diplomacy.

To celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2009, China Military Science published an article by Professor Chen Zhiyong from the Nanjing Political Academy that provides a breakdown of the PLA’s military diplomacy since 1949 into the following five periods:

1. 1949 through the 1950s: During this period, China’s international strategy was based on a “leaning to one side” (一边倒) strategy that moved China toward the Soviet Union and away from the United States. As such, China established military attaché offices in several socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, North Korea, and Vietnam. The PLA utilized those relations to gain experience from their militaries, import weapon systems and equipment, and train Chinese military personnel overseas.

2. 1960s: In this period, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, and China shifted its “leaning to one side” strategy to an “anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist” (“反帝反修”) international united front strategy. As a
result, China’s military diplomacy shifted from a focus on relations with the Soviet Union and East European socialist countries to supporting Asian, African, and Latin American countries’ independence and liberation movements.

3. 1970s: In the 1970s, the Soviet Union became China’s primary security threat, and Mao Zedong tried to create a united front against hegemonism (反霸). The PRC also became a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and began to establish military relations, especially with Western nations. Relations with the United States also began to thaw, and diplomatic relations were established in January 1979 just before China’s border war with Vietnam.

4. 1980s: During the 1980s, China put forth the concept of peace and development. Following China’s reform and opening up, military diplomacy and exchanges expanded rapidly worldwide.

5. 1990s to 2009: During this period, the global security situation changed, and the PRC put forth the new security concept of “equality (平等), mutual trust (互信), mutual benefit (互利), and cooperation (协作).” As a result, military diplomacy was closely linked with China’s foreign policy and the Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period (issued in 1993). Military exchanges involved opening up and transparency, as well as high-level exchanges, strategic dialogue, bilateral and multilateral security forums, opening of barracks and exercises to observers, ship port visits, and combined exercises.

The Top Ten Firsts in Military Diplomacy.

In September 2012, the PLA Daily published an article entitled “Top Ten Firsts of Chinese Military Di-
plomacy from 2002 to 2012,” which are listed below and show a clear distinction of what happened under Jiang and Hu. Some of the details are discussed in separate sections in the chapter.8

1. 2002: First implementation of international humanitarian relief. In compliance with UN resolutions, China dispatched two PLA Air Force (PLAAF) transport aircraft to deliver much-needed medicine, medical equipment, and other assistance supplies to Afghanistan on March 25, 2002. It was the first time for the Chinese military to take on international humanitarian supply and relief missions.9

2. 2002: First PLAN task force around-the-world voyage. A two-ship task force consisting of the Qin-gdao guided missile destroyer and the Taicang comprehensive supply ship conducted a 132-day voyage (May 15 to September 23) around the world that traveled 33,000 nautical miles and visited 10 ports in 10 different countries across five continents.

3. 2002: First Sino-foreign joint military exercise. China and Kyrgyzstan successfully held a joint anti-terrorism military exercise from October 10-11, in the border areas between the two countries. That was the first time for the Chinese troops held a joint exercise with foreign counterparts.

4. 2005: First opening of the Headquarters of the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) to foreign militaries. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited the headquarters on October 19. He was the first foreign guest to enter the headquarters. After that, the PLASAF Headquarters was opened to three other foreign militaries.

5. 2006: First launching of Sino-foreign joint maritime patrols. The PLAN and Vietnamese Navy organized the first joint maritime patrol in April in
in accordance with the Agreement between China and Vietnam on Joint Patrol in the Beibu Gulf, signed in Beijing by the two countries in October. Thirteen joint patrols have been held since then.

6. 2008: First opening of direct telephone line to MND. MND and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation opened a direct phone line between them on March 14. This was the first direct phone communication channel between MND and its foreign counterparts.

7. 2008: First introduction of news spokesperson of the MND. On May 18, MND held a press conference to introduce PLA and People’s Armed Police (PAP) involvement in the Wenchuan earthquake disaster relief operations. That was the debut of MND’s news spokesperson at the press conference.

8. 2008: First dispatch of vessels to participate in international escort missions. The PLAN sent the first naval task force on December 26 to carry out escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast in accordance with the resolutions made by the UN Security Council.

9. 2009: First organization of multinational naval and air force events. On April 23, a total of 21 warships from 14 countries joined 25 PLAN ships and 31 aircraft during a review that celebrated the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PLA Navy. This was the first multinational maritime parade held by China. From November 6-7, the PLAAF held the first large-scale international forum, in which air force delegates from 34 countries were present to celebrate the PLAAF’s 60th anniversary.

10. 2011: First dispatch of troops to evacuate personnel overseas. The PLAAF dispatched four IL-76 military transport aircraft to Libya from February 28
to March 4 to pick up and transport Chinese personnel in Libya. At the same time, the Xuzhou frigate of the 7th Chinese naval escort task force was ordered to head for the waters off Libya to the foreign ships that were evacuating Chinese personnel in Libya. This was the first time for China to utilize military force to evacuate Chinese personnel overseas.

What is PLA Military Diplomacy?

In September 2012, the Director of the MND Foreign Affairs Office, Major General Qian Lihua, discussed the following key aspects of the PLA’s military diplomacy during an interview with PLA Daily.10

• Military diplomacy is an important part of the composition of China’s diplomacy, and it must firmly carry out the country’s major policies, guidelines, and foreign policies. Therefore, it has a very strong strategic nature, policy nature, and sensitivity. At the same time, military diplomacy is also the peaceful application of military strength. It not only has a soft aspect, but also has rigid characteristics. It plays a unique role in protecting the country’s good and safe environment. In recent years, the contact and interaction between military diplomacy and political diplomacy has become closer.

• When facing complicated and changeable international security situations, military diplomacy mainly plays the following distinct roles in creating a safe environment for the country: Strengthening mutual military trust, enhancing crisis management and control, avoiding strategic misjudgments, and deepening relations between countries.
• Military diplomacy is carried out according to the country’s diplomatic deployment, and the characteristics of our country’s military relations with other countries can be summarized in four key terms: 1) Military relations with large countries: Stable (稳); 2) Military relations with neighboring countries: Good (好); 3) Military relations with developing countries: Practical (实); and 4) Multilateral security dialogues and cooperation: Active (活).

• Joint exercises and joint training between China and foreign countries are an important way for improving the level of military training. In recent years, approximately 10 joint exercises and joint training events were held each year. Based on problems found during joint exercises and joint training, units have developed measures to improve themselves.

• In the last decade, our armed forces actively participated in international peacekeeping missions, maritime escorts, and humanitarian rescues, to include sending a hospital ship to travel around the globe to give medical treatment and to provide minesweeping support. In addition, after the earthquake occurred in Haiti in January 2010, China responded to a request from the UN for HA/DR support.

• In recent years, Chinese armed forces vigorously enhanced external propaganda. Consequently, remarkable progress was made in the armed forces’ ability to carry out soft power, especially through the use of military diplomacy. As such, military diplomacy is an important window for displaying the image of the armed forces. When Chinese military leaders visit for-
eign countries, they use multiple occasions to give speeches, accept interviews, hold meetings for communication, introduce the national defense policy and situation of army building, and also actively respond to the concerns of the outside world. As such, people and media in foreign countries have spoken highly of leaders in the armed forces.

The Growth in Military Attachés at Home and Abroad.

China’s exchange of military attachés with other countries has expanded greatly in the last 25 years and continued to grow under Hu Jintao.\(^{11}\) From 1988 to 2012, the number of Chinese military attaché offices abroad nearly doubled from 58 to 109, and the number of foreign countries with military attaché offices in Beijing has more than doubled from 44 to 103. As shown later, five of the eight national Defense White Papers published by China since 1998 have given prominent mention to the number of attaché offices that China has around the world and the number of foreign attaché offices in China. Based on information from the biennial White Papers, Table 11-1 provides the number of countries with which the PLA has established military relations, the number of countries in which the PLA has attaché offices, and the number of countries that have military attaché offices in China.\(^{12}\) Note that the PLA does not have an attaché office in every country with which it has military relations.\(^{13}\) For example, even though the PLA does not have an attaché in Uganda, and vice versa, former Defense Minister Liang Guanglie visited Kampala, Uganda, in November 2011 and pledged $2.3 million to support
the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) in its war efforts against Somalia’s Alshabab militants.\textsuperscript{14}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>White Paper</th>
<th>Countries with which China has Military Relations</th>
<th>PLA Attaché Offices Abroad</th>
<th>Foreign Military Attaché Offices in China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>100+</td>
<td>90+</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100+</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>150+</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>85</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>150+</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>No Information</td>
<td>No Information</td>
<td>103\textsuperscript{15}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>No Information</td>
<td>No Information</td>
<td>No Information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11-1: PLA and Foreign Military Attaché Offices.

According to a 2011 \textit{People’s Daily} article, the PLA’s attachés range in rank from colonel to major general (e.g., regiment leader to corps deputy leader level) and normally serve 3 to 4 years in a particular embassy.\textsuperscript{16} Besides the senior National Defense Attaché (国防武官), who is normally called the Military Attaché, some PRC embassies also have attachés who represent their individual services (e.g., Army [PLAA], PLAN, and PLAAF), as well as technical officers (技术军官) and assistant attachés (副武官). The attachés have the following responsibilities:\textsuperscript{17}

- Represent China’s armed forces abroad and maintain diplomatic contact with the host country’s military to arrange reciprocal visits;
- Support or manage military assistance, military training, military products trade, military-civil cooperation, and military technology transfer; and,
• Legal collection of military intelligence through direct or indirect contact that is reported to the relevant department in China.

The majority of China’s military attachés abroad are Army officers, most of whom are career intelligence officers. This is in large part a reflection of the PLA’s ground-force dominated culture. In early-2009, the PLAN had naval attaché billets in only three countries (United States, United Kingdom (UK), and Germany) and the PLAAF had attaché billets in only two countries (United States and UK).\textsuperscript{18} It appears, however, that the number of Air Force attachés abroad has expanded. According to discussions in Taiwan in late-2011, the PLAAF now has attachés in several additional, unidentified countries.\textsuperscript{19} In addition, according to Lieutenant Colonel Chris Pultz, who recently served in Mongolia as an Assistant Army Attaché, the PLAAF now has an attaché of Uighur descent from Inner Mongolia who is assigned in Mongolia.\textsuperscript{20} On the other hand, about 20 countries currently have air force and navy attachés in China.\textsuperscript{21}

Even though several countries have naval and air force attachés in Beijing, they do not necessarily have the opportunity to interact with PLAN and PLAAF officers on a regular basis. Normally, the only opportunity that foreign naval and air attachés have to interact with PLAN or PLAAF officials is when they escort a visiting delegation or when they arrange for a PLAN or PLAAF delegation to visit their country.
Hu Jintao’s Travel Abroad.

As General Secretary of the Communist Party, President of the PRC, and Chairman of the CCP and State CMCs, Hu Jintao traveled abroad wearing one or more hats. According to a recent book, Jiang Zemin travelled to 70 countries from 1989 to 2002, which is an average of about five countries per year. Based on information from a PRC government website and a review of the Internet, Hu traveled abroad 35 times since 2004, which was also an average of five visits per year. Both Jiang and Hu clearly exceeded any travel by their predecessors. Hu’s visits can be organized into the following four categories: 1) Economic summits, including G8; G20; Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); 2) Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summits, which began in 2001; 3) Nuclear Security Summits, which began in 2010; and, 4) Diplomatic visits to several countries.

Although Jiang and Hu occasionally met with foreign defense ministers such as the U.S. Secretary of Defense in Beijing and on trips abroad, a review of the material for each of his foreign visits found only one instance where a senior military officer accompanied them or participated in any of the meetings, including the nuclear security summits. That visit occurred in September 2001, when Jiang Zemin visited North Korea and was accompanied by General Guo Boxiong, who at that time was the Executive Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Although an occasional photo showed a military officer in the background, but they are most likely military attachés.

The reason for this is not clear, but one explanation may be that his senior military officers, including the
CMC vice chairmen, Defense Minister, and Chief of the General Staff (COGS) represent China at separate defense and security meetings, such as those held by the SCO and the security meetings discussed in the next section. Of note, however, China’s new Defense Minister, General Chang Wanquan, accompanied Xi Jinping during his visit to Russia in March 2013, which may indicate a change under Xi. For comparison purposes, senior U.S. defense officials have only occasionally accompanied the President of the United States abroad. For example, in 1998, Admiral Joseph Prueher, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), accompanied President Bill Clinton to a China Summit. In 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton accompanied President George Bush to Iraq. In addition, the Assistant Chief of the Joint Staff, a three-star general, usually travels with the Secretary of State and, if required, with the President.

Senior PLA Leader Visits Abroad.

A review of senior PLA officer visits abroad through late-2008 indicated that those senior PLA officers who travel abroad do so an average of once per year. In terms of the number of trips abroad, only the Defense Minister and the COGS have averaged more than one trip abroad per year. The Defense Minister, who averaged two to three trips annually, traveled more than any other officers. Typically, he has participated in each of the SCO’s annual defense minister’s conferences since 2001 and has taken at least two other trips annually. While the COGS also averaged two trips per year, the two CMC vice chairmen only traveled a combined total of five times to a total of 10
countries from 2001 through 2008. Most other senior officers did not travel abroad each year or traveled only once per year.

A review of information from 2009 through late-2012, however, shows that, although the pattern for the Defense Minister and COGS has remained constant, the two CMC Vice Chairmen combined nearly tripled the total number of trips abroad to double the number of countries since 2009. Specifically, in the 4 years from 2009 through 2012, Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong made seven trips to 13 different countries, while Vice Chairman Xu Caihou made six trips to 11 different countries, as shown below. Although the vice chairmen visited countries in Asia, the Americas, Europe, and the Middle East, they did not visit any African countries. One explanation for the increase in their trips is that they both retired at the 18th Party Congress, so they wanted to take advantage of the opportunity to travel. Yet another explanation is that the PLA is clearly expanding its interaction with foreign countries across the board. It will be important to see if this pattern continues under Xi Jinping.

- **CMC Vice Chairman General Guo Boxiong:**
  - May 2009: Turkey, Germany, Finland
  - November 2009: Russia
  - May 2010: Australia, New Zealand, and Indonesia
  - October 2010: North Korea
  - April 2011: Vietnam
  - September 2011: Russia
  - October-November 2011: Cuba, Colombia, and Peru
- **CMC Vice Chairman General Xu Caihou:**
  - October 2009: United States
  - November 2010: United Arab Emirates (UAE), Syria, and Jordan
May 2011: Myanmar
September 2011: Bulgaria, Serbia, and Croatia
May 2012: Mongolia
July 2012: Belorussia and Lithuania

Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie:
September 2009: Slovakia, Serbia, and Bulgaria
November 2009: Japan
May 2010: Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan
August 2010: Mexico, Columbia, and Brazil
October 2010: Vietnam (Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] Defense Ministers’ Meeting)
March 2011: Kazakhstan (SCO Defense Ministers’ Meeting), Uzbekistan
May 2011: Singapore (Shangri-La Dialogue), Indonesia, and the Philippines
November 2011: Visit to Ghana, Uganda, and the Seychelles
May 2012: United States, Poland, and Latvia
July 2012: Cambodia (ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting)
September 2012: India, Sri Lanka, and Laos

Chief of the General Staff General Chen Bingde
October 2009: Australia (12th Defense and Strategic Consultations) and Papua New Guinea
May 2010: Namibia, Tanzania, and Angola
November 2010: Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru
March 2011: Nepal
May 2011: United States, which followed Hu Jintao’s visit in January 2011
— August 2011: Russia, Ukraine, and Israel
— November 2011: Myanmar
— May-June 2012: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan (SCO Defense Meeting to discuss the Peace Mission 2012 Exercise)

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS, DIALOGUES, AND CONSULTATIONS

Although China began establishing strategic relations with various countries in the late-1990s under Jiang Zemin, the number and types of relations increased under Hu. China’s approaches are tailored to the different strategic priorities, importance, and relationships, all dealing with a high degree of attention to protocol and respect while highlighting the importance of the various relationships. This section discusses the types of relations created, as well as providing some background on them and the current situation. It also discusses other security mechanisms that China became involved in under Hu.

While Jiang and Hu attended various meetings that created some of the security dialogues, the PLA’s and Ministry of Foreign Affairs senior leaders have represented the PRC at subsequent meetings depending on the type of dialogue. Appendix 11-A provides a list of the countries with whom China has established strategic partnerships (伙伴), dialogues (对话), and consultations (磋商), as well as which senior PRC and PLA leaders attended the meetings. Although the president attended the first meeting to establish the relationship, the following meetings were attended by the premier, foreign minister, one of the vice foreign ministers, the COGS, or one of the deputy chiefs of the general staff (DCOGS), who is usually the deputy
with the foreign affairs portfolio. Of note, the defense minister has apparently not represented China in any of them.

**Building a Three-Tiered Structure.**

China has built a three-tiered structure for strategic relations—strategic partnerships, strategic dialogues, and strategic consultations—with certain countries to discuss key issues such as nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and bilateral military and security cooperation. Other topics include disaster relief, peacekeeping, maritime safety, border joint patrols, and nonproliferation. These three tiers are clearly intertwined and have different combinations as shown below:

- strategic partnership (战略伙伴)
- strategic dialogue (战略对话)
- security consultation (安全磋商)
  - Chief of the General Staff dialogue (总参谋对话)
  - defense and security consultation (防务安全磋商/ 防务与安全磋商)
  - defense and strategic consultation (防务战略磋商)
  - defense consultation (防务磋商)
  - defense strategic consultation (防务战略磋商)
  - meetings (会议)
  - military cooperation dialogue (军事合作对话)
  - security consultation (安全磋商)
  - security dialogue and cooperation (安全对话与合作)
  - strategic and security consultation (战略与安全磋商)
— strategic consultation (战略磋商)
— strategic defense consultation (战略防务磋商)

**Background.**

In the late-1990s, China began to establish what it calls strategic partnerships with several countries, including Russia, Brazil, India, Kazakhstan, and the Philippines, as well as with international organizations, including the ASEAN and the European Union (EU). These partnerships have been announced during meetings of the presidents and are the highest-level relationship between China and the other countries and serve as a framework for bilateral relations across the spectrum, including military relations.

In the mid-2000s, China began to build on its strategic partnerships and create what it calls strategic dialogues with several countries to “promote mutual trust and cooperation.”34 In 2005, China and the United States created what China called the China-U.S. Strategic Dialogue, and the United States called the U.S.-China Senior Dialogue. That dialogue was led by China’s state councilor for foreign affairs and a U.S. deputy secretary of state. In 2006, China and the United States created a Strategic Economic Dialogue, led on the Chinese side by the vice premier for foreign trade and on the U.S. side by the Secretary of the Treasury. In January 2008, the first military representatives—a PLA representative, a deputy director of the Ministry of National Defense’s Foreign Affairs Office, and a U.S. assistant secretary of defense—participated in the fifth meeting of the China-U.S. Strategic Dialogue/Senior Dialogue.35 In July 2009, the strategic/senior dialogue with the United States was merged with the
Strategic Economic Dialogue to become the strategic and economic dialogue (S&ED). In 2011, at the third round of the S&ED, the two countries created a Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) under the S&ED, as a way to bring military voices into the S&ED’s strategic discussions. China was represented by a deputy chief of the general staff.36

China’s third tier is strategic consultations, which usually involves dialogue and military cooperation between the PLA’s General Staff Department (GSD) (usually the DCOGS who are responsible for foreign relations and intelligence) and the GSD’s counterpart organization. By the end of 2010, China had established strategic consultation and security dialogue mechanisms with 22 countries.37 Some of these countries include Russia, India, Germany, and New Zealand, as well as the SCO. For example, at a meeting of SCO leaders in August 2008, Hu Jintao stated that SCO members should strengthen the strategic dialogue, solidify political mutual trust, and step up strategic consultation on important sensitive issues that affect the security, stability, and development of the members and the region, coordinate our stances in a timely way, and take effective measures.38

Current Situation.

These types of discussions began under Jiang Zemin, but continued under Hu Jintao. According to the Strategic Consultations and Dialogues (战略磋商和对话) section in the PRC’s 2010 Defense White Paper, China held extensive strategic consultations and dialogues during 2009 and 2010 with relevant countries in the field of security and defense to enhance mutual understanding and trust, and to strengthen communica-
tion and coordination. To date, China has established mechanisms for defense and security consultation and dialogue with 22 countries. The strategic and cooperative partnership between Russia and China continues to be comprehensively and vigorously reinforced. The two militaries established a strategic consultation mechanism in 1997. The 13th round of strategic consultations between the two general staff headquarters in 2010 resulted in consensus on the international strategic situation, issues in Northeast Asia, Central Asia and South Asia, and cooperation between the two militaries. The 15th round was held in August 2012 in Irkutsk, Russia. The PLA’s DCOGS, General Ma Xiaotian, and Alexander Postnikov, DCOGS of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, co-chaired the consultation. The two sides reached a consensus on such issues as bilateral cooperation between the two militaries as well as international and regional security situations of common concern. While the two sides have been discussing the same issues since the first dialogue, one of the most important aspects is that the two militaries are meeting on a regular basis at senior levels, where they are able to discuss a wide range of bilateral issues.

China and the United States maintain consultations on such issues as nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and bilateral military and security cooperation. The two countries established a mechanism of defense consultation between the two defense ministries in 1997, and held the 10th and 11th Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) on issues of common concern in June 2009 and December 2010, and the 5th and 6th Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT) in February and December 2009. According to a report written for the U.S. Congress:
By 2011, the PLA seemed to downgrade the DPCT as merely ‘working-level’ talks between the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and the Director of the PLA’s Foreign Affairs Office. The practice was at odds with the reaffirmation during Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ visit in early 2011, when Defense Minister Liang Guanglie agreed that the DCT, DPCT, and Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) were important talks. China attaches great importance to defense and security consultations with neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{41}

China has established mechanisms for defense and security consultation and policy dialogue with neighboring countries including Mongolia, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, India, and Pakistan, and has held regular consultations and dialogues at different levels with its neighbors, which focus on Asia-Pacific security, bilateral military relations, and regional flashpoint issues. The 2010 \textit{Defense White Paper} states that such consultations and dialogues play a positive role in promoting mutual understanding, consolidating good neighborliness and friendship, deepening mutual trust and cooperation, and maintaining regional peace and stability.

On behalf of China, the PLA has conducted extensive strategic consultations and dialogues with other countries. The meetings held during 2009 and 2010 are shown in Table 11-2.\textsuperscript{42}
Table 11-2: Strategic Consultations and Dialogues Held during 2009-10.

China has also established mechanisms for defense (cooperation) commission meetings with Egypt, for high-level military cooperation dialogue with Turkey, and for defense consultations with the UAE, all of which have broadened defense exchanges between China and Middle Eastern countries.43

**Multilateral Security Dialogues Mechanisms.**

Although China has historically chosen to deal with countries bilaterally, according to the 2010 *Defense White Paper*, China under Hu began to actively participate in multilateral security meetings within the framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus One (China), and ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea [ROK]). Initiated by China, the ARF Conference on Security Policies was officially staged in 2004, and has developed
into a dialogue mechanism for the highest ranking senior defense officials within the ARF framework.\textsuperscript{44} In October 2010, China attended the first ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+). In recent years, the PLA has hosted the China-ASEAN Defense and Security Dialogue (CADSD), the ASEAN Plus Three Forum on Non-traditional Security Cooperation between Armed Forces, and the ARF workshop on formulating legal rules for armed forces’ participation in international disaster relief operations. In addition, the PLA has been involved in or hosted the following multilateral security dialogues:

- The Zhongshan Forum, which was initiated in 2009. The 2012 Zhongshan Forum was held in July 2012 at the Nanjing Army Command College, where more than 300 officers and experts from 87 countries gathered to discuss foreign military operation theory study.\textsuperscript{45}
- The PLA Navy has been a member of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) that was established in 1987 to discuss maritime affairs in the region and the possibility of cooperation among WPNS members. The 2012 symposium was held in Jakarta, Indonesia, to discuss environmental issues.\textsuperscript{46}
- The PLA has attended the Shangri La Dialogue since 2007, which has been hosted by the UK’s Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS) in Singapore since 2002.\textsuperscript{47}
- In 2010, the China Military Sciences Society (CMSS) began hosting an annual Xiangshan Forum in Beijing. The theme for the October 2012 forum was the “Evolution of International Strategic Pattern and Asia-Pacific Security,” where more than 100 representatives from se-
curity and defense research institutes and ex-
erts and scholars from 19 countries including
China, Russia, the United States, UK, [French],
Germany, and Japan attended.  

**UN Peacekeeping Operations.**

While China began taking an active role in UN
peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) under the lead-
ership of Jiang Zemin, China’s, and in particular the
PLA’s, participation expanded considerably under
Hu.  

According to the UNPKO website, since UN
peacekeeping began in 1948 when the UN Security
Council authorized the deployment of UN military
observers to the Middle East, 67 peacekeeping opera-
tions have been deployed by the UN, including 54
since 1988. Over the years, hundreds of thousands of
military personnel, as well as tens of thousands of UN
police and other civilians from more than 120 coun-
tries have participated in UNPKO.  

According to the 2012 Defense White Paper, which was finally published in April 2013:

To date, the PLA has dispatched 22,000 military per-
sonnel to 23 UN peacekeeping missions, of which
three officers and six enlisted personnel have been
killed. As of December 2012, a total of 1,842 PLA offi-
cers and men were implementing peacekeeping tasks
in nine UN mission areas. Among them, 78 were mili-
tary observers and staff officers, 218 were engineering
and medical personnel for the United Nations Organi-
zation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo (MONUSCO), 558 were engineering,
transportation and medical personnel for the United
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 335 were engi-
neering and medical personnel for the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 338 were engi-
neering and medical personnel for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), and 315 were engineering personnel for the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).51

Although the 2012 Defense White Paper states that “China is the biggest troop and police contributor among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council,” other countries that are not permanent members of the UN Security Council have dispatched more personnel. For example, whereas the United States had only 150 personnel involved in PKO activities at the end of July 2012, China was 16th out of 119 countries in terms of the total number of PKO troops dispatched at that time.52

The PRC’s 2010 and 2012 Defense White Papers state that China’s involvement in peacekeeping operations (PKO/联合国维和行动) began in 1990 when it sent five military observers to the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).53 Since then, it has conducted the following activities:

- 1992: Dispatched an engineering corps of 400 officers and enlisted personnel to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was the first time China had sent an organic unit on a peacekeeping mission.
- 2001: Established the Peacekeeping Affairs Office in the MND.
- 2001: Established the Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI), which is also called the Peacekeeping Training Center, on the campus of the PAP Academy in Langfang, Hebei Province, for training policemen.54
- 2002: Joined the UN Stand-by Arrangement System.
• 2009: Established a Peacekeeping Center in Beijing under the MND for training international PKO personnel.

Based on a review the UN PKO missions that China participated in from 1990 through 2008, Chinese forces served in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe.\(^\text{55}\) No information was found to indicate that China has chosen not to participate in any particular region or country.

MND’s Peacekeeping Affairs Office (维和事务办公室) that was created to manage all PKO operations was initially identified as the GSD Peacekeeping Office (总参维和办公室) in 2003, and has apparently since been upgraded to a bureau.\(^\text{56}\) The Bureau is staffed with approximately 50 personnel, who generally have advanced degrees and extensive overseas experience, including peacekeeping deployments. The bureau’s senior officers, who speak fluent English, frequently observe peacekeeping exercises at the various regional training centers, such as the one in Mongolia.\(^\text{57}\) This is another example of MND’s use as the window for the PLA to conduct its foreign relations.

As noted earlier, China has created two peacekeeping training centers. POTI, which was created in 2001 under UN auspices, covers 70,000 square meters and is located on the campus of the PAP Academy in Langfang, Hebei Province. According to Frank Miller, who visited the facility in March 2010, POTI trains policemen from China and other countries who already have at least 5 years of experience.\(^\text{58}\) In 2010, it was training 180 personnel at a time but would be able to train 300 personnel after a second phase of construction was completed. From 2001 to 2010, POTI had con-
ducted 33 PKO Training Courses and graduated 1,700 peacekeepers.

In 2009, MND established a Peacekeeping Center (维和中心) in Beijing for training international PKO personnel. The 16,000-square-meter facility, which cost 200 million yuan (U.S.$29 million) to build, also serves as a venue for international exchanges in peacekeeping, including international conferences and training peacekeepers for other countries. With 20 classrooms, including simulation rooms for shooting and driving, the center offers professional courses on peacekeeping missions as well as English-language classes. It also offers training facilities for peacekeeping skills, including simulated UN peacekeeping camps and de-mining training grounds, as well as swimming and driving venues.

The director of the PKO Office is one of the deputy directors of the GSD’s Intelligence (Second) Department, which indicates the office is subordinate to 2PLA. The office has subordinate organizations (军区维和事务办公室) in at least the following three military regions (MRs):

- The Beijing MR, which trains medical personnel for PKO operations;
- The Lanzhou MR, which trains engineers and medical personnel for PKO operations;
- The Jinan MR, which trains engineers, transportation personnel, and medical personnel for PKO operations. The director of the Jinan MR office is also the director of the Jinan MR Handover Group (济南军区交接组).

Although most of the initial activity began under Jiang Zemin, the number of personnel per year and the countries where Chinese PKO personnel have op-
erated grew under Hu. Specifically, according to the 2004 Defense White Paper, from 1990 to 2004, China sent 3,362 military personnel to 13 UN peacekeeping missions. According to the 2010 Defense White Paper, the PLA had 1,955 officers and enlisted personnel serving in nine UN mission areas. In addition, from 1990 to December 2010, China dispatched 17,390 military personnel to 19 UN peacekeeping missions. Altogether, nine personnel had lost their lives on duty by the end of 2010. Of note, from January through July 2012, the PLA Pictorial published nine articles about how PLA peacekeeping troops (175 engineers and 43 medical personnel) trained with Uruguayan peacekeeping troops in the eastern section of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNMONUC). A July 2012 PLA Pictorial article about the 14th group of peacekeepers arriving in the Congo stated that, altogether, China has participated in a total of 23 missions and currently has personnel serving in 11 missions. According to the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) 2012 Report to Congress, the PLA has had two officers who have been appointed as the military leader of a UN Peacekeeping Force for a lengthy period of time.

Military Operations Other Than War.

Although the PLA has always helped with domestic disaster relief efforts, the concept of PLA MOOTW (非战争军事行动) outside China’s borders can clearly be attributed to Hu Jintao as a result of his four historic missions, discussed in Daniel Hartnett’s Chapter 2. Specifically, the first time this term was used in a Defense White Paper was 2008. The MND’s website also has a special section devoted to MOOTW activities. The 2008 Defense White Paper states that the PLA
is attaching more importance to MOOTW training in counterterrorism, stability maintenance, emergency response, peacekeeping, emergency rescue, and disaster relief.\textsuperscript{69}

According to the 2010 \textit{Defense White Paper}, China has increased its defense expenditures to improve its MOOTW capabilities in supporting earthquake rescue and disaster relief operations, escort operations in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia, flood control and emergency rescue operations, and international rescue operations.\textsuperscript{70}

Next, more information is provided about each of the three international components of MOOTW, including 1) escort operations in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia, 2) international rescue operations for Chinese citizens, and 3) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations.

\textit{PLA Navy Anti-Piracy Escort Operations in the Gulf of Aden.}

One of the most visible MOOTW activities, covered on an almost daily basis in China’s press and online, began in December 2008, when the PLAN deployed its first of 12 task forces to date to the Gulf of Aden, which is sometimes identified in articles about the deployments as the Arabian Sea or the Horn of Africa. As Mingjiang Li pointed out in a China Brief article in January 2009:\textsuperscript{71}

Overall, China’s handling of the Gulf of Aden mission has been quite sophisticated and skillful. China’s decision to embark on the mission signals the policymakers’ growing awareness of the necessity of using military means for the protection of Chinese commercial interests on the seas. The practical consideration
of taking advantage of the opportunity to gain naval battle experience also played a big role in the decision. Political and military confidence notwithstanding, it is also notable that China acted with considerable caution before the official decision was made public, which reflects China’s concern that such naval action might be interpreted by other powers, especially regional states, as a harbinger of Chinese assertiveness.

The caution is demonstrated in China’s probe for international responses before the official announcement of the decision and the high-profile public relations campaigns that accompanied it. The Chinese strategic community first made the proposal in the Chinese media to test how other parties would respond. Then Chinese diplomats to the United Nations followed up with a statement that China was considering the possibility of using its naval force to strike down piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Having sensed a relatively calm reaction from other states and even encouraging signals from the United States, Beijing officially made the announcement and followed up with high-profile public relations campaigns. Spokesmen at the Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry and prominent Chinese analysts strenuously attempted to justify China’s decision on the ground of international law (the UN Security Council resolutions in particular), China being victims of the Somali pirates, China’s commercial interests, international maritime security, and the operations of other countries. A notable point that China constantly emphasized was that the naval action signifies China’s intention and behavior to be a responsible power. All these aimed at forestalling any negative international opinion on China’s naval expedition to the region.

For a good summary of the first 10 deployments, see Rear Admiral Michel McDevitt’s “PLA Naval Exercises with International Partners” in Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad. As he points
out, “The anti-piracy mission embraced by the PLAN has been a dramatic ‘accelerant’ in the development of the PLAN into a genuine open ocean global naval force.” Andrew Erickson and Austin Strange also provide a good overview of the first 11 deployments in their article entitled “Selfish Superpower” No Longer?

As of December 2012, the Chinese navy has dispatched, in 13 task groups, 34 warships, 28 helicopters, and 910 Special Operations Force (SOF) soldiers, escorting 4,984 ships in 532 batches. Among them, 1,510 were Chinese mainland ships, 940 Hong Kong ships, 74 Taiwan ships, and one Macao ship. The task forces also rescued two Chinese ships from pirates who had boarded them, and 22 Chinese ships which were being chased by pirates. Each task force has averaged three vessels, including a combination of one replenishment ship along with either one destroyer (DDG) and one frigate (FFG) or two FFGs, and about 800 officers and enlisted personnel. In addition, one landing platform dock (LPD) participated in a deployment, along with a DDG. Each task force has remained on station for approximately 3 to 4 months. Depending on where the task departs from, each task force takes about 3 weeks to arrive in the gulf. For example, the 12th Task Force departed Zhoushan Support Base in Zhejiang Province (East Sea Fleet) on July 3, 2012, and met the 11th Task Force on July 26 to turn over the mission. Altogether, as of late-July 2012, the first 11 task forces had escorted 4,734 vessels and protected 41 of them from pirate attacks.

Besides learning how to remain at sea for lengthy periods of time, which is an anomaly for the PLAN, and dealing with all of the logistics, maintenance, and personnel issues this entails, the deployments have strengthened the PLAN’s foreign relations. While the
PLAN has enhanced China’s image in some countries, India continues to see the PLAN as a near- to long-term maritime threat. Most Indian writers focus on what India considers the PLAN’s strategy in the Indian Ocean to defend its sea lines of communications (SLOCs) by adopting the “string of pearls” strategy (i.e., a series of diplomatic and military measures aimed at acquiring access and strategic bases along more than 10,000 kilometers of sea lanes.) In November 2011, an Indian Navy officer and research fellow, Commander Kamlesh Kumar Agnihotri, published an article that did not discuss the “string of pearls,” but did summarize what the PLAN had done in the military diplomacy realm in addition to escorting ships through the pirates’ lair:

There have been many positive benefits for the PLAN on account of various maritime and diplomatic activities which were either associated with or complemented the presence of its ships in the Gulf of Aden. These warships have been visiting various Indian Ocean littoral countries including India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand on goodwill visits, while transiting these waters for the anti-piracy mission. The PLAN’s ships even crossed the Suez, ventured into the Mediterranean and visited ports in Egypt, Italy and Greece during August 2010. These ships, while on deployment, have regularly visited ports in Oman, UAE, Yemen, and Djibouti, either for operational turnaround, rest and recreation or to evade bad weather. The FFG Xuzhou (Type 054 Jiangkai-II class) was diverted from the anti-piracy task to the Libyan coast at the end of February 2011 to assist in the withdrawal of Chinese citizens from the crisis struck Libya and worked in tandem with the PLAAF and civil aviation evacuation effort.
Since the November 2011 article, the PLAN’s 11th Escort Task Force, which included the Qingdao DDG, Yantai FFG, and Weishanhu replenishment ship, expanded the PLAN’s military diplomacy footprint. For example, at the end of their 4-month deployment in August 2012, the Qingdao and Weishanhu visited Haifa Port in Israel.\(^7\) Meanwhile, the Yantai paid a port visit to Romania and Bulgaria.\(^8\) Each of the three visits was the first ever to those countries for a PLAN vessel.

In addition, several of the task force commanders have had the opportunity to interact with the commanders of other countries’ vessels in the gulf by either hosting them or visiting their vessels. For example, on August 8, 2012, Rear Admiral Jong An Ho (ROK), commander of the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, which is one of the international anti-piracy forces in the Gulf of Aden, and his party of five people visited the Yiyang FFG and Rear Admiral Zhou Xuming, who was the commander of the 12th Task Force.\(^9\) He arrived via helicopter from the ROK’s Wang Geon destroyer. Meanwhile, Illinois Senator Mark Kirk visited the 8th PLAN Escort Task Force in April 2011.\(^10\) According to Erickson and Strange, the PLAN task forces have operated fairly independently instead of with other nations; however, they have conducted a few joint escorts with Russian vessels, and they have conducted joint anti-piracy exercises with Pakistan and South Korea.\(^11\)

Cooperation initiatives are also unfolding within China. A symposium hosted by the PLAN in late-February 2012 brought together naval officials of 20 countries with anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden. At the symposium, the PLAN provided each participant nation with its detailed escort schedules. Additionally, the PLAN stated it will begin to cooperate with
Indian and Japan naval vessels in the region to the extent that all three navies are able to adjust each other’s schedules. However, the plan to cooperate with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) might be delayed or cancelled as a result of the ongoing dispute about the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.


Although the PLAAF always has conducted domestic disaster relief operations, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, it has conducted only a few international HA/DR efforts, all of which appear to be a result of Hu’s four historic missions. According to Xinhua:

Since the evacuation from the riots in East Timor in 2006, the Chinese government has rolled out dozens of overseas evacuation operations, extending timely rescues to tens of thousands Chinese nationals trapped in danger. That effort became especially important after thousands of Chinese nationals in the troubled North African country of Libya were robbed and a dozen were wounded as they tried to flee the violence.\(^8^4\)

The *Financial Times* stated that the Libya evacuation, which involved 32,000 people over a 1-week period, was the PRC’s largest ever.\(^8^5\) Xinhua noted that the swift evacuation also benefited from China’s growing national power and the ability to mobilize all of the necessary resources needed. Furthermore, the evacuation shows that the Chinese government has paid more and more attention to the safety and interests of the grassroots Chinese.\(^8^6\)

During the evacuation, the Chinese government chartered seven ships, sent 15 civilian flights a day,
and deployed military aircraft to bring 32,000 Chinese workers out of Libya in just 1 week. In addition to the Chinese working in oil and gas fields ran by China’s three big state-owned oil companies, tens of thousands of others were building railroads, power plants, airports, cement factories, apartment blocks, and official buildings.87

Based on specific guidance from Hu Jintao, in February to March 2011, the PLAAF sent four IL-76s to evacuate Chinese civilians from Libya. Altogether, the aircraft flew 1,655 Chinese from Libya to Khartoum, Sudan, and then brought 287 back to China.88

As noted earlier, the Xuzhou FFG was diverted from the anti-piracy task through the Suez Canal to the Libyan coast at the end of February 2011 to assist in the evacuation of Chinese citizens from the crisis-struck Libya, where it worked in tandem with the PLAAF and civil aviation evacuation effort. Although the Xuzhou did not carry any evacuees, it did escort a Greek passenger liner carrying 2,142 Chinese out of Libya to the island of Crete, where they were flown back to China on chartered Chinese civilian aircraft.89 After the Xuzhou finished its escort mission, it deployed along with the Zhoushan FFG to Durban, South Africa, for a port call.90 As Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson point out:

The Xuzhou’s mission marks an important milestone because, to the best of our knowledge, this was the first ever dispatch of a PLA military platform specifically assigned to help protect a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) to help PRC citizens trapped in an active conflict zone. Chinese policymakers now have a precedent for future military operations in areas where the lives and property of expatriate PRC citizens come under threat. We expect that the Chi-
nese people’s popular support for the mission will be high.91

Fortunately, the Xuzhou was already in the Gulf of Aden, which was only a few days away from Libya. As one Chinese scholar stated:

China’s Libya mission is a milestone for the PLAN. The action has upgraded and expanded the navy’s mission to a new level in line with President Hu’s emphasis for it to be prepared for contingencies in distant regions to protect China’s national interests. This is not simply a naval mission but more importantly is a rising power’s strategy to use military assets to respond to its citizens’ needs. It serves to demonstrate how an independent country is confident enough in its capacity to protect its nationals overseas, action which also builds a positive image. It is important to note that the PLA naval ship was on a mission to solve a humanitarian crisis and not a ploy by China to wield political and military influence in the Middle East.92

As China expands its business activities to more countries where civil unrest occurs, citizens at home and abroad will expect even more support on a timely basis, especially if foreign countries are not available or willing to help. As Collins and Erickson conclude, “We think such contingencies are very likely as China’s expatriate workers continue seeking their fortunes in potentially volatile regions such as Africa.”93

*Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations.*

Under Hu Jintao, China became actively involved in international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. In April 2001, the PRC created the China International Search and Rescue Team
(CISAR/中国国际救援队), which is composed of members of the PLA’s engineering corps and the PAP’s General Hospital. Since 2002, the PLA has undertaken 36 urgent international humanitarian aid missions, and transported relief materials worth more than 1.25 billion renminbi (RMB) to 27 disaster-stricken countries.\(^4\) Since May 2003, CISAR has joined six international rescue operations, including Indonesia twice, Iran, Algeria, Haiti, and Pakistan, and has become the UN’s 12th certified international heavy rescue team.\(^5\)

In 2010, Chinese armed forces provided a detailed article about the Haiti relief efforts following a magnitude-7 earthquake.\(^6\) For example, within 4 days of the earthquake, the PLA’s General Logistics Department had already requisitioned and dispatched to Haiti the first aircraft with relief supplies, including water, food, generators, and emergency lighting equipment.

According to the U.S. DoD’s 2010 annual report to Congress on the PLA:

> China’s increasing focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions will require a unique set of technological developments and aircraft acquisitions, including strategic airlift, to support these missions. Although these capabilities would be necessary to support an immediate need, such as an earthquake or other natural disaster, they would also enhance its ability to support military operations along and beyond its borders.\(^7\)

**PLA Air Force HA/DR Operations.**

One of the first PLAAF disaster relief efforts abroad occurred in early-May 1991, when it sent two MI-8 helicopters to Bangladesh for a month to provide support after a typhoon.\(^8\) One of the first operations by PLAAF transports occurred in March 2002, when
a single transport flew 400 tons of supplies to Kabul, Afghanistan, following an earthquake.\textsuperscript{99} The PLAAF did not conduct any further foreign HA/DR support efforts until 2011. At that point, those efforts, like the Libya evacuation, were most likely guided by Hu Jintao’s historic missions.

In September 2011, four IL-76s from the 13th Air Division in the Guangzhou MRAF took supplies to Pakistan following severe flooding, and in October 2011, three IL-76s took supplies to Thailand following flooding there.\textsuperscript{100} According to a China Air Force article, the PLAAF’s aircraft transported 30 million Renminbi worth of relief supplies from Urumqi to Pakistan, which was 3,000 kilometers away.\textsuperscript{101} Altogether, the aircraft carried 390 tons of supplies, consisting of 7,000 items. In October, three IL-76s carried about 100 tons of relief supplies to Thailand.\textsuperscript{102}

The fact that the PLAAF is now using its IL-76s for foreign evacuation and HA/DR missions is significant not only for its domestic and international implications, but also because these aircraft are being used even though the PLAAF does not have enough to support the 15th Airborne Corps or its deployment of new-generation aircraft around China or to foreign countries for exercises. Today, the PLAAF only has about 20 IL-76s, purchased from Russia starting in the early-1990s with the primary aim of supporting the PLAAF’s 15th Airborne Division.\textsuperscript{103} The 2003 DoD report stated that:

\begin{quote}
The PLA’s ability to project force beyond China’s land borders, while improving, remains limited due to a shortage of amphibious ships, heavy cargo carrying aircraft, long-range transports, and other logistical shortcomings.\textsuperscript{104}
\end{quote}
Although the PLAAF began negotiations to purchase up to 30 more IL-76s in 2005 to augment and/or replace the first group of aircraft, which are getting older and require more maintenance, they finally signed a contract in 2010 with Rosoboronexport and the Ilyushin Aviation Company to purchase 10 used Il-76MD military transport planes. The first aircraft were delivered in January 2013. The 2011 DoD report stated:

The PLA’s new missions are also driving discussions about the future of the PLAAF, where a general consensus has emerged that protecting China’s global interests requires an increase in the Air Force’s long-range transportation.

**PLA Navy HA/DR Operations.**

Following the tsunami that hit Indonesia in 2004, the PLAN was unable to provide any type of HA/DR support, especially compared to what the U.S. Navy did. As a result of that embarrassment and a response to Hu Jintao’s historic missions, the PLAN began designing the *Peace Ark* (和平方舟) hospital ship in 2005, which became operational in 2008. The *Peace Ark*, which is a converted passenger ship, has 300 beds, eight operating rooms, and multiple rooms for other medical issues. The ship is primarily staffed by personnel from the PLAN’s General Hospital, 411th Hospital, and 413th Hospital. This ship operates out of Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province (East Sea Fleet). In September 2010, the *Peace Ark* embarked on a 3-month “*Harmonious Mission* (和谐使命) 2010” voyage to the Gulf of Aden with a total of 428 officers, including 100 medical workers. While en route, the ship visited and provided medical treatment to people of Djibouti,
Tanzania, Kenya, the Seychelles, and Bangladesh. In September 2011, the ship deployed for “Harmo-
nious Mission 2011,” which lasted 105 days and in-
cluded visits to Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago,
and Costa Rica. In addition, from 2009 to 2011, PLA
medical teams held the “Peace Angel” joint operations
for humanitarian medical assistance in Gabon and
Peru, and participated in a disaster-relief exercise of
the ARF in Indonesia. The PLA health service team
staged a joint exercise on humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief code-named “Cooperation Spirit (合
作精神) 2012” with its counterparts of Australia and
New Zealand in October 2012.

**Combined Exercises.**

For all practical purposes, one can say that the is-
 sue of combined exercise (e.g., with foreign countries)
came to fruition under Hu Jintao. Although China
participated in a combined exercise with a foreign
military for the first time in October 2002 when it con-
ducted a joint anti-terrorism military exercise with
Kyrgyzstan, the number, type, and scale of exercises
clearly grew while Hu was the CMC chairman. The
2009 and 2011 PLA conferences at the U.S. Army War
College and their subsequent books — *The PLA at Home
and Abroad* and *Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at
Home and Abroad* — have covered this topic in consider-
able detail. Therefore, this section provides only the
highlights.

Over the past decade, the PLA has been involved in
four basic types of combined exercises, which include
from one to all three of the PLA’s services — Army,
Navy, and Air Force. These are 1) army combined ex-
ercises, 2) maritime combined exercises, 3) SCO exer-
cises, and 4) air force combined exercises. No exercises to date have included Second Artillery (PLASAF).

**Army (PLAA) Combined Exercises.**

According to the PRC’s 2010 *Defense White Paper*, as of December 2010, the PLA had held 44 joint military and training exercises with foreign troops. This was conducive to promoting mutual trust and cooperation, drawing on useful lessons, and accelerating the PLA’s modernization. The 2012 *Defense White Paper* states that joint army training is gradually being increased in breadth and depth. Since 2007, the PLAA has conducted a number of joint training sessions with its counterparts of other countries. The PLAA joined the “Hand-in-Hand (携手) 2007” and “Hand-in-Hand 2008” joint anti-terrorism training sessions with the Indian army, “Peacekeeping Mission (维和使命) 2009” joint peacekeeping exercise with the Mongolian army, “Cooperation (合作) 2009” and “Cooperation 2010” joint security training exercises with Singapore, “Friendship Operation (友谊行动) 2009” and “Friendship Operation 2010” joint military training of mountain troops with the Romanian army, and joint SOF unit training with the Turkish army. The PLAA special forces held the “Strike (突击) 2007,” “Strike 2008” and “Strike 2010” joint anti-terrorism training with their Thai counterparts, “Sharp Knife (利刃) 2011” and “Sharp Knife 2012” joint anti-terrorism training with their Indonesian counterparts, “Friendship (友谊) 2010” and “Friendship 2011” joint anti-terrorism training with their Pakistani counterparts, “Cooperation (合作) 2012” joint anti-terrorism training with their Colombian counterparts, and Cormorant Strike (鸬鹚打击) 2012 in Sri Lanka. In November 2012, joint
anti-terrorism training was held with the Jordanian special forces and a joint humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief tabletop exercise with the U.S. Army.

**Maritime Combined Exercises.**

The PLAN’s international exercises have primarily consisted of search and rescue exercises (SAREX), communication, formation sailing, diving, and escorting, but a few exercises have involved anti-piracy and counterterrorism training that included live firing against surface targets. Although the PLAN has gradually increased the number of its intra-service SAREXs, which began in the mid-1990s, it has gradually added several SAREX “firsts” with foreign navies:\(^{114}\)

- In December 1998, a PLAN *Houjian*-class missile patrol boat from the Hong Kong Garrison participated for the first time in a SAREX organized by Hong Kong and the United States.
- The joint SAREX conducted off the coast of Shanghai in October 2003 with a visiting Pakistani naval vessel was the first SAREX held in Chinese territorial waters with a foreign counterpart.
- During the visit by a task force to Southeast and South Asia, the PLAN conducted its first SAREX in foreign waters separately with Pakistani, Indian, and Thai naval forces in November and December 2005.

According to the 2010 and 2012 *Defense White Papers*, joint maritime exercises and training are being expanded.\(^{115}\) In recent years, the Chinese navy has taken part in the “Peace (和平) 07,” “Peace 09” and “Peace 11” multinational maritime exercises hosted
by Pakistan on the Arabian Sea. In 2007, the PLAN took part in the joint maritime exercise held in Singaporean waters within the framework of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. Chinese and Thai marine corps held the “Blue Strike (蓝色突击) 2010” and “Blue Strike 2012” joint training exercises, which were the first ever joint exercises conducted by the PLAN’s marines. The 2010 exercise lasted for 15 days and was held near Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province. Blue Strike 2012 involved 372 PLAN and 126 Thai marines. The PLA and Russian navies held the “Maritime Cooperation (海上联合) 2012” military drill in the Yellow Sea off China’s east coast, focusing on joint defense of maritime traffic arteries. During mutual port calls and other activities, the PLAN has also carried out bilateral or multilateral maritime exercises and training in such tasks as communications, formation movement, maritime replenishment, cross-deck helicopter landing, firing at surface, underwater and air targets, joint escort, boarding and inspection, joint search and rescue and diving with its counterparts of India, France, the UK, Australia, Thailand, the United States, Russia, Japan, New Zealand, and Vietnam.

**Shanghai Cooperation Organization Combined Exercises.**

The SCO was created in 2001 on the basis of the 1996 Shanghai Five organization and currently consists of six countries (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). China did not hold its first combined exercise with one of the members (Russia) until 2005. According to the 2010 and 2012 *Defense White Papers*, since 2009, the SCO has signed a succession of papers, such as the SCO
Counter-Terrorism Convention. Furthermore, joint counterterrorism exercises continue to be formalized, such as the “Peace Mission” series among the militaries, and the “Norak-Anti-Terror” and “Saratov-Anti-Terror” initiatives among law enforcement and security departments. To date, China and other SCO member states have conducted nine bilateral and multilateral military exercises.

Hu Jintao supported the overall expansion of the SCO’s military exercise component. For example, in August 2007, Hu and the other leaders of the SCO, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, attended the “Peace Mission 2007” exercise that followed their SCO summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. In 2012, Hu hosted the SCO summit and emphasized the importance of the multilateral military exercises as part of the overall relationship.

While several bilateral exercises have taken place, the “Peace Mission” exercises have been the largest exercises to date. Since 2005, they have carried out a series of “Peace Mission” joint exercises at the campaign level with strategic impact. They were the “Peace Mission 2005” China-Russia joint military exercise, “Peace Mission 2007” joint anti-terrorism military exercise by SCO members, “Peace Mission 2009” China-Russia joint anti-terrorism military exercise, “Peace Mission 2010” joint anti-terrorism military exercise by SCO members and “Peace Mission 2012” joint anti-terrorism military exercise by SCO members. These exercises served to warn and deter terrorist, secessionist, and extremist forces. The capabilities of the SCO members are constantly being enhanced to deal jointly with new challenges and new threats. So far, each country except Uzbekistan has hosted portions of
the exercise, which often takes place in phases in two countries. Furthermore, Uzbekistan has frequently chosen only to participate symbolically by sending officers to the command post exercise because Tashkent has disagreed with how the multilateral consensus in the SCO is managed.\textsuperscript{121} So far, all of the exercises have involved the Army and Air Force, but only the first exercise involved the Navy.\textsuperscript{122}

**Air Force Combined Exercises.**

Of particular note, the PLAAF’s airborne branch has been involved in Peace Mission exercises, including deploying to Russia during “Peace Mission 2007,” but has also begun to hold exercises outside the “Peace Mission” umbrella.\textsuperscript{123} For example, China’s airborne troops joined their Belarusian counterparts in the joint training code-named “Divine Eagle (雄鹰) 2011” and “Divine Eagle 2012,” held respectively in July 2011 and November 2012.\textsuperscript{124} Although its previous exercises occurred with countries on China’s border, the “Cooperation 2011” exercise in Venezuela that involved 21 airborne special forces troops was a significant change in the model. An eight-page article in the new periodical, *China’s Air Traffic Control*, provided fairly detailed information about the 21-day exercise, which it described as undertaking the tasks of special reconnaissance, supporting main force operations, implementing unconventional warfare, and participating in MOOTW.\textsuperscript{125} In addition, PLAAF Su-27s and J-11s have been involved in exercises with Turkey (“Anatolian Eagle 2010”) and Pakistan (“Shaheen 2011”), respectively.\textsuperscript{126}
EMPLOYING MILITARY DIPLOMACY TO ENHANCE CHINA’S SOFT POWER

According to Joseph S. Nye, Jr., over the past decade, China’s economic and military might has grown impressively, which has frightened its neighbors into looking for allies to balance China’s increase in hard power. But if a country can also increase its soft power of attraction, its neighbors feel less need to balance its power. Understanding this, in 2007, President Hu Jintao told the 17th Party Congress that China needed to invest more in its soft power resources. To accomplish this, China is spending billions of dollars to increase its soft power. Its aid programs to Africa and Latin America are not limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid. The Chinese style emphasizes high-profile gestures, such as building stadiums. Meanwhile, the elaborately staged 2008 Beijing Olympics enhanced China’s reputation abroad, and the 2010 Shanghai Expo attracted more than 70 million visitors. China has also created several hundred Confucius Institutes around the world to teach its language and culture. China Radio International now broadcasts in English around the clock, and, in 2009-10, Beijing invested $8.9 billion in external publicity work, including 24-hour cable news channels. But for all its efforts, China has had a limited return on its investment. A recent BBC poll shows that opinions of China’s influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but predominantly negative in the United States, and everywhere in Europe, as well as in India, Japan, and South Korea. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Middle East revolutions, China is clamping down on the Internet and jailing
human rights lawyers, once again torpedoing its soft-power campaign.\textsuperscript{127}

Based on a review of \textit{PLA Daily} and \textit{China Military Science} for China’s application of military soft power (军事软实力), it appears that, although the concept of military soft power was noted prior to 2004, it was only formally applied to the PLA under Hu Jintao.\textsuperscript{128} A search of \textit{PLA Daily} for information about soft power found a total of 561 articles; however, only nine of them were published prior to September 2004 when Hu Jintao became the CMC chairman, which indicates that at least the concept of military soft power was initiated under Hu. For example, a representative article from June 2007 stated that, in the information age, the PLA must create a strong propaganda system based on meticulous planning that covers the full range of military diplomacy to show the military’s presence and impact across a broad spectrum.\textsuperscript{129}

The first \textit{China Military Science} article to cite the term, published in 2010, states that military soft power refers to how military culture, military spirit, military image, military diplomacy, and other nonmaterial forces influence and shape the government and military in order to be able to achieve military strategic objectives.\textsuperscript{130} The second article, published in 2011, states that national defense soft power is one component of national soft power, and, from a national security perspective, researchers must focus on strategy and integrated national power.\textsuperscript{131} The first article states that one aspect of achieving military soft power requires dealing with deterrence (威慑力). Like other countries, China now engages in military parades and combined-arms, joint, and combined military exercises as a means of shaping its image of strength and deterrent capabilities among foreign countries. For example, the second article cites two joint exercises—
“Strengthening Troops (砺兵) 2008” and “Stride (跨越) 2009”—and two combined exercises—“Peace Missions (和平使命) 2005” and “2007”—as tools to help shape foreign views of the PLA. Of particular note, both Hu Jintao and Russia’s President Putin observed the “Peace Mission 2007” exercise in the Chelyabinsk Region of Russia to put their imprint on the series of exercises.

The second article to cite the term also discusses the CMC’s ability to enhance China’s soft power through the creation of the MND (国防部) Information Office (新闻事务局) in September 2007 and a new MND website, with both English and Chinese versions, that came online on August 20, 2009. Although the Information Office was created under the Foreign Affairs Office (外事办公室) in 2007, director and spokesman Senior Colonel Hu Changming (胡昌明) did not make his debut until the afternoon of May 18, 2008, at a press briefing concerning the Sichuan earthquake that had just occurred. Since April 2010, Senior Colonel Geng Yansheng (耿雁生) has been the director and concurrently the MND spokesman (国防部新闻发言人) at all press conferences. Although the director of the Information Office also serves as the primary spokesman, the deputy directors also fulfill that function. Starting in 2012, MND press conferences have been held monthly rather than on an ad hoc basis. There sometimes appears to be a lack of coordination between the MND monthly press conference and Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA) more frequent press conferences. For example, when the United States announced the rotation of Marines through Darwin, MND blasted cold war thinking, while MOFA was much milder.
One of the goals of soft power is apparently to help influence foreign media concerning the PLA through the use of the PLA’s propaganda and publicity system. For example, the 2010 *China Military Science* article provided statistics for the number of dispatches concerning the PLA carried by six foreign news agencies in 2005 that cited information from China’s official Xinhua News Agency as a primary source. The foreign news agencies were the Associated Press (AP), Reuters, Agence France-Presse (AFP), Itar-Tass, Kyodo News, and Taiwan’s Central News Agency (CNA). Altogether, about 5,100 citations from Xinhua were noted in the six news agencies’ dispatches. The foreign dispatches included either the full Xinhua article or parts of the article. The *China Military Science* article stated that, as part of globalization, the inclusion of Xinhua’s information was yet another form of military soft power. Although not stated, other media, such as military specials shown on CCTV, are also shown on foreign broadcasts and receive considerable attention. Closely linked to the issue of creating military soft power is the lack of agreement concerning military transparency.

In addition to the role of the media, the PLA has emphasized the importance of the role of its military attachés and PLA delegation visits abroad in promoting military soft power. For example, the Director of MND’s Foreign Affairs Office stated, “Military diplomacy is an important window for displaying the image of our armed forces, and every officer and soldier is an image ambassador during foreign exchanges.”  

Although no annual figures are available, including in the biennial *Defense White Papers*, Defense Minister Liang Guanglie stated in 2008 that the PLA was sending at least 150 military delegations abroad on visits,
and at least 200 foreign military delegations visited China. In the same article, Liang stated that, besides promoting military soft power, PLA delegations also promote China’s national interests. For example, when Liang visited Italy in 2008, he reported that he was able to receive a commitment from Italy’s Defense Minister that Tibet was China’s internal political matter, and that Italy did not intend to interfere.

Difficulties Establishing Hotlines.

Although China began negotiating for hotlines with various countries during the early-2000s under Jiang, hotlines were finally established under Hu with the United States (2008) and India (2010); however, the results have been minimal. In addition, Beijing has been negotiating with Tokyo for several years, but a hotline has yet to be established because of continuing maritime disputes.

Concerning the U.S.-China hotline, after staff-level preliminary discussions in 2003, the DoD formally proposed a hotline for crisis management and confidence building with the PLA at the DCT in February 2004. During Defense Secretary Gates’ visit to China in November 2007, the PLA agreed in principle to set up a defense telephone link (DTL) with the Pentagon. The two sides signed an agreement in February 2008. Then, in May 2008, PACOM Commander Admiral Keating used the hotline in its first operational use to communicate with PLA DCOGS Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian about the U.S. Air Force’s use of two C-17 transports to deliver earthquake relief supplies to Sichuan. However, during the confrontation in March 2009 when PRC ships aggressively harassed the U.S. surveillance ships, Secretary Gates told reporters that he did not use the hotline.
PLAAF Educational Exchanges.

Finally, the PLA hosts various courses for foreign military officers and sends officers abroad for short- or long-term courses. This section provides information on the PLAAF Command College’s program, which is representative of the PLA as a whole.\footnote{144}

The PLAAF Command College forms the foundation for air force educational exchanges, including sending students and faculty abroad and hosting foreign officers. These exchanges are rapidly expanding to allow PLAAF officers, including pilots, to interact on a wider range of issues with foreign air forces. Each year, a PLAAF deputy chief of staff leads students from the college’s Campaign Command Course abroad for 2 weeks to allow them to gain first-hand knowledge of foreign air forces. For example, about 30 students visited the United States in July 1998; 41 students visited Australia and New Zealand in June 1999; and 58 students, including eight major generals, visited India in November 2003. The college also has sent faculty members abroad to several countries, including Russia and Italy, to study for 1 to 3 years. Other PLAAF officers have studied in military colleges in Britain, Russia, Pakistan, Italy, and France.

In 2001, the college began providing training for foreign field-grade officers. As of early-2012, more than 600 air force officers from 75 countries had attended. The courses began with students from only one country, one language, or one specialty at a time, but that model was replaced in 2009, whereby students from multiple countries, languages, and specialties attend together. The new model also included PLAAF students, including pilots, for the first time. It was
reported that 21 foreign students, including 11 pilots, came from 12 countries such as Bangladesh, Malaysia, Uganda, Nigeria, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Singapore, and Tanzania and attended one course. Each PLAAF officer was paired with a foreign counterpart during the course, and they all spoke English.

From September 2011 to January 2012, the college held a course that included foreign and PLAAF pilots with a focus on tactics, combat methods, and simulated training. Besides six PLAAF pilots, a total of 69 officers, including several pilots, from 41 countries participated, including Venezuela, the Philippines, Pakistan, Chile, Singapore, and Saudi Arabia. During the training, the pilots simulated various tactics and techniques, including close-in engagements as well as reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance.

In addition, the college offers longer courses for foreign students. On July 15, 2005, 88 students from 25 countries graduated for a 1-year course with an unidentified curriculum.

TRANSPARENCY

Ever since the United States and China established diplomatic relations and created military attaché offices in 1979, the issue of transparency has been a sore point in the overall military relationship. The PLA began to allow more transparency under Jiang Zemin, and increased the level of transparency under Hu, much of which is a direct result of the growth in the Internet and social media. In addition, the PLA has begun to publish more books and periodicals that are available to the public about its history, organizational structure, doctrine, personnel, and education and training. As noted earlier, the MND website, its
monthly news briefings, embassy and consular websites, and a growing number of PLA-related articles on CCTV have allowed a greater understanding of the PLA.

To have a better understanding of each other, DoD and the PLA have interacted since the early-1980s at multiple levels, including senior-level visits, strategic talks, functional exchanges, education exchanges, agreements, commissions, training, and exercises. That said, however, the United States and other countries have continued to encourage the PLA to become even more transparent by allowing visits to more operational units, defense factories, and training exercises.

In essence, DoD has requested that the PLA provide information on the following topics:

- strategic intentions and capabilities;
- military budget and defense expenditures;
- personnel structure to include the number of officers, civilian cadre, and enlisted personnel in each service and branch by specialty and rank/grade; and,
- order of battle, to include the number and types of weapons in the active duty inventory and under development, as well as an open list of military organizations using their true unit designators (TUDs) rather than military unit cover designators (MUCDs).

To date, DoD has yet to receive what it considers to be sufficient answers to these questions, even though senior DoD leaders have visited previously locations that were off limits to all foreign military delegations. For example, in 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was the first foreign defense leader to visit
Second Artillery Headquarters, and, in 2011, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen saw a CSS-7 (M-11) short-range ballistic missile at a Second Artillery unit, sat in a Su-27 fighter, attended a counterterrorist command post exercise, and visited a Yuan-class submarine.\textsuperscript{146}

The 2011 DoD report to Congress summarized the current situation by stating:

> Overall, the transparency of China’s military and security affairs has improved gradually in recent years, highlighted by its publication of \textit{Defense White Papers}, establishment of an MND spokesperson, the launch of an official MND website, wider media coverage of military issues, and growing availability of books and professional journals on military and security topics. However, there remains uncertainty about how China will use its growing capabilities. The latest version highlights the PLA’s growing focus on military operations other than war, but overall, the document presents only incremental new insights into the PLA’s structure, doctrine, and capabilities. In addition, estimating actual PLA military expenditures is a difficult process due to the lack of accounting transparency and China’s still incomplete transition from a command economy. Moreover, China’s published military budget does not include major categories of expenditure, such as foreign procurement.\textsuperscript{147}

On the other hand, the PLA believes that it has become more transparent, but that there should be limits to its transparency. For example, the 2011 edition of \textit{China PLA Military Terminology} has a new entry for military transparency that states:

> Strategic intent and military capabilities are the most fundamental and important transparency issues, and they are the most important indicators of whether a
country poses a threat to the international community. Each country makes its own determination about how transparent it wants to be concerning these issues based on its national interest.148

These types of issues are also covered in the CMC’s “PLA Security Regulations” (“解放军保密条例”), which was first issued in 1963 and has been updated four times, including the latest version in 2011.149 Following the release of the 1998 version, a lengthy PLA Daily article stated:

In recent years, there have been some shocking cases of military secrets being leaked. Some people have talked thoughtlessly about the designation of military units, active equipment, the location of their stations, and other military secrets, and have even released information involving military secrets on television and radio as well as in the open press.150

According to the 2011 regulations, classified material is divided into 13 types, which can be generalized as everything that has to do with the organizational structure, strategy, operations, tactics, weapons and equipment, personnel, research and development, budgets and acquisition, training, intelligence, deployments, missions, political work, mobilization, and communications.151

The 2010 Defense White Paper addressed transparency by stating:

China attaches great importance to military transparency, and makes efforts to promote mutual trust with other countries in the military sphere. For example, since 2007, China has begun to report to the UN Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures. China gives weight to the UN Register of Con-
ventional Arms and continues to submit data to the Register on conventional arms transfer in the seven categories covered by the Register.

Of note, the 2012 Defense White Paper did not even mention the issue of transparency.

In 2012, the Director of MND’s Foreign Affairs Office stated:

Military transparency is an issue that we always talk about during external exchanges. To be frank, the United States has always asked China to have military transparency. In fact, the degree of transparency that the United States armed forces have during exchanges with us is not high. For example, when we visited a United States Air Force base, the U.S. side roped off an F-22 aircraft, and they did not allow us to get close to it. However, when the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, visited China in 2011, we not only let him visit the Su-27 but also invited him to sit in the cockpit. Even U.S. reporters were amazed by the degree of our openness. In fact, all countries have the right to independently determine the time, content, and degree of military transparency toward the outside world according to their own security interests. One important thing is that the Chinese armed forces are sincere about openness. If some people always look at the Chinese armed forces with prejudice and bias, then this is because something is wrong with their position. As for this, there is no need for us to pay too much attention to it. Instead, we should remain cool-headed and calm.152

Although the PLA has not yet satisfied DoD’s specific requests for information on strategy, funding, personnel, and order of battle, it became much more transparent in several areas under Hu Jintao. The amount of information and detail about the PLA in
the biennial Defense White Paper, which was first published in 1998, grew considerably under Hu. Specifically, one of the key components of the White Paper is the PLA’s growing interaction with foreign militaries, which, as discussed earlier, expanded under Hu. In addition, one can search the Internet and find supporting articles published by Xinhua, PLA Daily, or the MND for just about every detail in the White Paper. Besides the introduction of the MND website in 2007, the PLA increased its publication of periodicals and newspapers under Hu as follows:

- The 80-page PLA Pictorial, which has been in existence for several decades, is now published twice a month and is available online.
- In 2009, the PLA component of Xinhua began publishing a new 110-page quarterly journal in Chinese and English entitled China Armed Forces (中国军队). Since January 2012, it has been published bimonthly. Of note, although this periodical has had lead articles written by the defense minister, the director of each of the four general departments, and the commander of the PLAN, PLAAF, and PLASAF, as well as several MR commanders, there has not been a single article through late-2012 about or written by either of the two uniformed CMC vice chairmen. It is not clear why this has occurred other than their activities are covered by PLA Pictorial.
- China Air Force, which began in 1986 as a black-and-white bimonthly publication that rarely discussed current events, is now a 100-page monthly publication with color photos of weapons and training events.
• The PLA’s service and military region newspapers, which were previously for internal use only, are now openly available, and the number of issues has increased from three to four or five per week for some of them.

• In September 2012, the PLA announced a new series of 10 books that will be published in three groups. The first group comprises three books, titled *Chinese People’s Liberation Army*, *PLA’s Navy*, and *PLA’s Air Force*. Unfortunately, none of these books have much substance. The second group of books, published in 2013, will include *The PLA Aviation Corps*, *The PLA Marines*, and *The PLA Airborne Force*. The third group of books, to be published in 2014, contains four volumes: *The Chinese Naval Escorts in Aden Gulf*, *Chinese Peacekeepers Overseas*, *The Chinese Army and International Security Cooperation*, and *The Chinese Army and Humanitarian Relief*. They will be published in six languages, including English, French, Russian, Spanish, and Arabic in hard copy and as e-books, as well as audio and video versions.\(^{153}\)

• In September 2012, the PLA National Defense University’s College of Defence Studies (国防大学防务学院) created a website about the college and the PLA that has tabs for five languages (Chinese, English, Russian, French, and Spanish).\(^{154}\)

Although most foreigners understand the PLA’s current rank system, they do not understand the 15-grade system. As a result, one of the most significant issues of transparency that has occurred both
internally and externally since the PLA was formed in 1949 and ranks were reinstituted in 1988 was the addition in 2007 of ribbons on uniforms to identify the officer’s grade. The ribbons contribute to the understanding of the PLA’s officer structure, and hence the PLA’s command, control, and coordination structure. The new uniforms issued in 2007 also included name tags and patches with the person’s organization (GSD, GPD, Air Force, Navy, etc.). Taken together, information about officer grades, ranks, and positions available in the PLA’s growing open source media helps analysts determine the PLA’s organizational structure.

Finally, when taken together, these publications plus information available on the Internet from the PLA provides a much broader understanding of the PLA than prior to when Hu became the CMC chairman. One of the biggest complaints from the U.S. military, however, is that most of the information is available in Chinese only, and, therefore, it is still a transparency issue. Although the same could be said about the lack of information published by the U.S. military in Chinese, one of the biggest differences is that China has a high proportion of analysts who can read English, while the U.S. military has only a very small percentage of analysts who can read Chinese.

CONCLUSIONS

As noted in the opening paragraph, the biggest challenge is to make a distinction between what occurred under Hu’s leadership and what occurred as a result of his personal initiatives. For the most part, the differences are not evident; however, there are clear trends in what occurred under Hu. While Hu’s collected speeches and writings will offer more information,
they will not be available for at least a couple of years. For example, Jiang Zemin’s selected works were published in late-2006 in Chinese and 2011 in English.

Based on the information available, it appears that employing military diplomacy to enhance China’s soft power was clearly implemented as a concept under Hu. In addition, the PLA began to become actively involved in international HA/DR and MOOTW activities as a direct result of Hu’s four historic missions. Although the PLA’s involvement in strategic dialogues and consultations, combined exercises, and UN peacekeeping operations began under Jiang, they increased under Hu. Finally, the amount of transparency, including the creation of the MND spokesman, clearly expanded under Hu, even though there are still key areas that remain opaque.

Under Xi Jinping as the CMC Chairman, the PLA will most likely continue to expand its global involvement in HA/DR and combined exercises, as well as send more delegations abroad to learn from other militaries. Should there be civil unrest in countries where Chinese are living and working, the PLA will most likely become more actively involved in helping to evacuate them to safety. All of these events are slowly helping the PLA to become more confident and to prepare for any type of future conflict at or beyond its borders.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

1. The Chinese version of PLA Daily, which is sometimes identified as Liberation Army Daily, was accessed using East View Press’s online database that begins in the 1980s. The online version of PLA Daily is available from www.chinamil.com.cn/, and the English version is available from english.chinamil.com.cn/.


6. The PLA’s terms for military diplomacy and military exchanges are junshi waijiao (军事外交) and junshi waiwang (军事外往), respectively.


9. As noted later in the chapter, this is not accurate. One of the first PLAAF disaster relief efforts abroad occurred in early-May 1991, when it sent two MI-8 helicopters to Bangladesh for a month to provide support after a typhoon.


13. A list of all the 185 countries that currently have embassies in China is available from www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/fw/lbw/zhwjqmd_lbfw/.

15. Although the 2010 Defense White Paper did not have any statistics, based on correspondence in mid-2012 with the U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Beijing, 103 foreign countries had military attaché offices in Beijing.

16. Of note, several PLA attachés have served for up to 5-6 years in Washington, DC.


18. Information is based on correspondence with the U.S. Embassy in Beijing.

19. Interviews with Taiwan Air Force personnel and a former U.S Assistant Army Attaché to Mongolia.


21. Information is based on correspondence with the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. Some of the Navy and Air Force attachés are concurrently the Defense Attaché, so these are not necessarily considered permanent Navy and Air Force billets as the billet is rotated among the services. Only a few countries have permanent navy and air force billets in addition to the defense attaché billet.


23. See english.gov.cn/2008-04/03/content_935716.htm.

24. Information on the Group of Eight (G8), formed in 1975, is available from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G8. Although China is not an official member, it has attended the annual meetings since 2005 as part of a grouping known as the G8+5. Information on the Group of Twenty (G20), created in 2008, is available from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G-20_major_economies. Information on BRICS, formed in
2009, is available from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRICS. Information on
the APEC forum, formed in 1989 and which China joined in 1991,
is available from www.apec.org/.

25. For a Better World: Jiang Zemin’s Overseas Visits, pp. 568-573.

26. For example, a photo of Hu arriving in Italy for the 2009
G-8 Summit shows an Army colonel standing behind him with an
attaché aiguillette on his shoulder. Information is available from

27. “Russia shows Chinese defence minister possible impact
accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-323487635/russia-shows-chinese-de-
defence.html.

28. The information concerning defense personnel traveling
with the President came from discussions with former U.S. Gov-
ernment officials.

29. The information in this paragraph for travel through mid-
2009 comes from Holz and Allen, “Military Exchanges with Chi-
inese Characteristics,” June 2010, p. 441.

30. Information since mid-2009 is from individual volumes
of Qu Xing, ed., International Situation and China’s Foreign Affairs,
Beijing, China: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe. Each volume has a sepa-
rade section on PLA foreign diplomacy. Additional information
comes from Zhang Zhe, “Liang Guanglie Visits the Three Coun-
tries in America and Europe,” PLA Pictorial, Issue 2, June 2012,
pp. 4-5; Zhang Zhe, “Liang Guanglie Visits Cambodia for ASEAN
Defense Ministers’ Conference,” PLA Pictorial, Issue 2, June 2012;
Zhang Zhe, “Chen Bingde Visits Three Central Asian Countries,”
PLA Pictorial, Issue 1, July 2012, pp. 32-36; Wu Xiaoyi, Guo Heng-
tao, and Li Xiaowei, “Xu Caihou Visits Mongolia,” PLA Pictori-
al, Issue 2, June 2012, pp. 4-7; “Xu Caihou Visits Two European

31. “India and China to Hold Joint Military Exercises,” avail-
able from www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-19473365#story_
continues_1. Liang’s visit was the first to India by a defense minis-
ter in 8 years. China and India began holding combined exercises
in 2007, but the exercises were put on hold after 2008 following a series of diplomatic disagreements over visa issues.


33. The additional topics were taken from a compilation of multiple sources.

34. “State councilor tells Negroponte China ‘hopes for healthy ties with US’,” Xinhua in English, January 7, 2009. A search of Xinhua articles indicates that China has established strategic dialogues with at least the following countries and organizations: Japan, the United States, Brazil, India, South Africa, Singapore, Germany, Mexico, Pakistan, France, Australia, the UK, the ROK, Israel, and the EU. Most of these were established in 2008.


38. Chen Hegao and Qian Tong, “Hu Jintao Attends, Delivers Speech at SCO Summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan,” Xinhua in English, August 30, 2008.


42. PRC 2010 Defense White Paper.
43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.


52. See www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2012/july12_1.pdf. The other 15 countries ahead of China were (alphabetically): Bangladesh (most troops with 9,098), Brazil, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Nepal, Nigeria, Palau, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, and Uruguay.


54. The institute’s website, www.peaceopstraining.org/poti/, has tabs for Chinese, English, Spanish, French, Russian, and Arabic.


57. Information on the bureau’s personnel is based on an interview with U.S. Army Attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Chris Pultz, who served in Mongolia from 2011 to late-2012 and had the opportunity to interact with the PLA peacekeeping officers.

58. According to Colonel Frank Miller (USA Retired), the briefer during the visit noted the academy was established in 1981 and reports to the Ministry of Public Security.


60. See www1.clzg.cn/xinwen/2007-07/30/content_829610_2.htm, go.ourgo.com/Bbs/showtopic-15158.aspx and www.mod.gov.cn/djxw/2012-07/05/content_4382945.htm.

61. See news.qq.com/a/20090222/007495.htm.


64. See chn.chinamil.com.cn/wh/2011-12/12/content_4739389.htm.


66. Cheng Jingbin and Zhang Yao, “Lake Kivu: China’s Blue Helmets Complete Their 13th Rotation,” PLA Pictorial, Issue 2, July 2012, pp. 60-61. The article states that the 14th group was replacing the 13th group, and that, based on an agreement with the UN, each group remained on station for 8 months.

68. The MOOTW component of MND’s website is available from eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/MOOTW/index.htm.


71. Mingjiang Li, “China’s Gulf of Aden Expedition and Maritime Cooperation in East Asia,” Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief, Vol. 9, Issue 1, January 12, 2009. The author is a Ph.D. Assistant Professor of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.


77. A good example of this thinking is found in an article by Indian Navy officer Captain Antony George, “Deployment of PLA Navy Ships in the Gulf of Aden for Countering Piracy: Ramifica-
tions for India,” Vol. 70, Indian Navy’s Naval Despatch, September 2010, available from www.irfc-nausena.nic.in/Naval_Despatch_2010.pdf. At the time he wrote the article, Captain George was the Command Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) Officer in the Eastern Naval Command.

78. Kamlesh Kumar Agnihotri, “Military Operations Other Than War: PLA Navy’s Role in Peaceful Development of China,” Indian Military Review, November 2011, available from maritimeindia.org/article/military-operations-other-war-pla-navys-role-peaceful-development-china. At the time he wrote the article in late-2011, Commander Agnihotri was a Research Fellow with the China Cell of the National Maritime Foundation in New Delhi, India.


82. Erickson and Strange, p. 98.
83. Ibid., p. 98.


86. “China’s Libya evacuation highlights People-First nature of government.”


93. Collins and Erickson, “China dispatches warship to protect Libya evacuation mission.”


95. China’s International Rescue Operations, International Communication Bureau, Ministry of National Defense brochure handed out at the PRC Embassy on the PLA’s Anniversary in July 2012. Unfortunately, no information was found that explains what a certified international heavy rescue team is; however, one article states that CISAR was the 2nd international heavy rescue team in Asia and the 12th group in the world to have secured official approval from the United Nations. See www.cbi.gov.cn/wisework/content/111834.html.


115. PRC 2010 and 2012 Defense White Papers. For a brief history of the PLAN’s port calls, see Holz and Allen, “Military Exchanges with Chinese Characteristic.” While the number of regular port calls abroad has not increased appreciably since 2009, the PLAN has taken advantage of its counterpiracy task force deployments to visit countries in the region.

116. Ibid.


128. According to a search of East View Press’s PLA Daily electronic database, 561 articles were found using the term soft power (软实力), 46 for military soft power (军事软实力), and three for national defense soft power (国防软实力). Of these articles, fewer than 10 of the soft power articles were published before Hu Jintao became the CMC chairman in 2004, and all of the other categories were published after he took office. Of note, the 2011 edition of China’s People’s Liberation Army Military Terminology (中国人民解放军军语), published by the Academy of Military Science Press, does not have an entry for any of the three terms. The reason for this may be that the PLA has yet to codify the basis of its theory of military soft power.


132. See Dennis Blasko, “Clarity of Intentions: PLA Trans-Regional Exercises to Defend China’s Borders,” Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner, eds., *Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad*, for further information on each of these exercises.


136. See www.cninfo360.com/xwrw/20110428/190902.html. A review of *PLA Daily* indicates that, since 2010, three officers have served as the MND spokesman, including Geng Yansheng (耿雁生) and two deputies, De Like (德里克) and Yang Yujun (杨宇军). Based on the uniform Geng is wearing in his photo, his grade is that of a division leader (正师职), which means that is also the grade of the Information Office. The Foreign Affairs Office is a corps leader-grade (正军职) organization.
137. Information on the monthly conferences, which are usually held on the last Thursday of the month, is based on a review of the MND website’s press briefings tab, available from eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/index_3.htm.


140. Ibid.


144. The information concerning the PLAAF’s foreign relations comes from Allen and Kelly, “Assessing the Growing PLA Air Force Foreign Relations Program.”

145. For an excellent history of U.S.-China military relations, see Kan, U.S.-China Military Contacts.

146. Ibid.

148. China’s PLA Military Terminology (中国人民解放军军语), Beijing, China: Academy of Military Science Press, December 2011, p. 1064. The 1997 edition did not have an entry for transparency, which indicates this is a key issue for the PLA. In fact, the 2011 issue has an entirely new Military Diplomacy section with over 50 terms devoted to the subject.


155. Although the PLA reinstituted a rank system in 1988 after having abolished it in 1966, almost every grade has two assigned ranks, and each rank can have up to four grades. As a result, two major generals who meet each other for the first time still have to ask each other what their grade is so that they can figure out where they stand in the pecking order.
Appendix 11-A

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS, DIALOGUES, AND CONSULTATIONS

Table 11-A provides a list of the countries with whom China has established strategic partnerships (伙伴), dialogues (对话), and consultations (磋商), as well as which senior People’s Republic of China (PRC) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leaders attended the meetings. Some information for when the relationships were established and who attended was not found. Although the president attended the first meeting to establish the relationship, the following meetings were attended by the premier, foreign minister (FM), one of the vice foreign ministers (VFM), the chief of the general staff (COGS), one of the deputy chiefs of the general staff (DCOGS), who is usually the deputy with the foreign affairs portfolio, or a member of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS). Of note, the defense minister has apparently not represented China in any of them.

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Table 11-A. China’s Strategic Partnerships, Dialogues, and Consultations.
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

KENNETH ALLEN is a Senior China Analyst with Defense Group Inc. (DGI), where he focuses on China’s military organizational structure, personnel, education, training, and foreign relations with particular emphasis on the PLA Air Force. During 21 years in the U.S. Air Force (1971-92), he served as an enlisted Chinese and Russian linguist and intelligence officer with tours in Taiwan; Berlin, Germany; Japan; Pacific Command Air Force Headquarters, China; and Washington, DC. From 1987-89, he served as an Assistant Air Attaché in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. He was inducted into the Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) Defense Attaché Hall of Fame in 1997. Mr. Allen holds B.A.s from the University of California at Davis and the University of Maryland and an M.A. in international relations from Boston University.

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DENNIS J. BLASKO, a U.S. Army (Retired) Lieutenant Colonel, served 23 years as a Military Intelligence Officer and Foreign Area Officer specializing in China. He was an army attaché in Beijing from 1992-95 and in Hong Kong from 1995-96. He also served in infantry units in Germany, Italy, and Korea and in Washington at the DIA; Headquarters, Department of the Army (Office of Special Operations); and the National Defense University War Gaming and Simulation Center. Mr. Blasko has written numerous articles and chapters on the Chinese military and defense industries and is the author of the book, *The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century*, 2nd Ed. (Routledge, 2012). Mr. Blasko is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School.

MICHAEL S. CHASE is an Associate Professor in the Warfare Analysis and Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI. He also directs the War College’s Mahan Research Group, focusing on strategic deterrence issues. His main areas of research include Chinese nuclear policy, strategy, force modernization, U.S.-China relations, Taiwan’s defense policy, and Asia Pacific security issues. Professor Chase previously served as a faculty member in the War College’s Strategy and Policy Department, a research analyst at Defense Group Inc., and an associate international policy analyst at RAND. Professor Chase holds a B.A. in politics from Brandeis University, an M.A. in China Studies and a Ph.D. in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
NEIL J. DIAMANT has been a professor at Dickinson College, Carlisle, PA, since 2002. He has also taught at Tel Aviv University, Israel, and the University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA. Dr. Diamant has received research and teaching grants from Fulbright, the Luce Foundation, the Freeman Foundation, the Howard Foundation, and the Chiang Ching Kuo Foundation. He is currently studying veteran politics in the 21st century as well as Chinese Constitutionalism in the Mao era. Dr. Diamant is the author of Revolutionizing the Family: Politics, Love, and Divorce in Urban and Rural China, 1949-1968 (2000) and Embattled Glory: Veterans, Military Families and the Politics of Patriotism in China, 1949-2007 (2009). He has co-edited, with Kevin J. O’Brien and Stanley Lubman, Engaging the Law in China: State, Society and Possibilities for Justice (2005). His articles have appeared in The China Quarterly, The Journal of East Asian Studies, Politics and Society, Modern Asian Studies, the Law and Society Review and the Journal of Conflict Resolution, among others. Dr. Diamant holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley.

DANIEL M. HARTNETT is a Research Scientist in CNA’s China Studies Division. Prior to joining CNA, he was the Senior Policy Analyst for Military and Security Affairs at the congressionally mandated U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Mr. Hartnett began his career as a Russian and Serbo-Croatian linguist in the U.S. Army, where he employed his language skills during the civil war in Bosnia. He also worked in the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, where he assisted the department in nuclear nonproliferation negotiations with Beijing. An accomplished linguist,
he has attended several language schools including the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, CA; the Sprachen und Dolmetscher Institute in Munich, Germany; and the Beijing Language and Culture University. His research interests include China’s security and military affairs. Mr. Barnett holds an M.A. in Asian studies from the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University and a B.A. in Chinese from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in political science at George Mason University.

TIMOTHY R. HEATH is Senior Analyst for the U.S. Pacific Command China Strategic Focus Group. He has over 12 years’ experience as a China specialist in the U.S. Government. He has published several academic articles on topics related to Chinese strategy, military, and leadership. Mr. Heath earned his M.A. in Asian studies from George Washington University.

LONNIE HENLEY is the Senior Defense Intelligence Analyst for China at DIA and a member of the Defense Intelligence Senior Level executive service. He has been a China specialist since his undergraduate studies in the mid-1970s, including 22 years as a U.S. Army military intelligence and foreign area officer and the past 12 years as a civilian. His post-Army positions include Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia; Senior Defense Intelligence Expert for Strategic Warning; senior analyst at CENTRA Technology, Inc.; Deputy National Intelligence Officer for East Asia (ODNI Senior National Intelligence Service); and his current position since 2008. Mr. Henley holds a bachelor’s degree in engineering and Chinese from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and master’s degrees
in Chinese language from Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar; in modern Chinese history from Columbia University; and in strategic intelligence from the National Defense Intelligence College.

ROY KAMPHAUSEN is a retired U.S. Army China Foreign Area officer, Senior Advisor for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research, and an adjunct associate professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs.

DAVID LAI is a Research Professor of Asian Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College. Before joining SSI, Dr. Lai was on the faculty of the U.S. Air War College. Having grown up in China, Lai witnessed China’s “Cultural Revolution,” its economic reform, and changes in China’s foreign relations (the most important of which is U.S.-China relations) over the years. Dr. Lai’s most recent publication is Asia Pacific: A Strategic Assessment (2013). Dr. Lai holds a bachelor’s degree from China, and a master’s degree and Ph.D. in political science from the University of Colorado.

NAN LI is an associate professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute of the U.S. Naval War College. He has published extensively on Chinese security and military policy. Mr. Nan’s writings have appeared in Security Studies, China Quarterly, China Journal, Armed Forces & Society, Issues and Studies, and many others. He has contributed to edited volumes from RAND Corporation, Clarendon Press, National Defense University Press, and M. E. Sharpe. He has also published a monograph with the U.S. Institute of Peace. He is the
editor of *Chinese Civil-Military Relations: The Transformation of the People’s Liberation Army* (Routledge, 2006).

JOE McREYNOLDS is a researcher at Defense Group Inc.’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis. His research interests primarily center on China’s cyber warfare capabilities and defense science and technology development. He has previously worked with the Council on Foreign Relations and the Pacific Council for International Policy. Mr. McReynolds is a graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and Graduate Security Studies programs.

JAMES MULVENON is Vice-President of Defense Group, Inc.’s (DGI) Intelligence Division and Director of DGI’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis. At CIRA, Dr. Mulvenon runs teams of nearly 20 security-cleared Chinese, Russian, Arabic, Pashto, Urdu, and Dari/Farsi linguist-analysts performing open-source research for the U.S. Government. A specialist on the Chinese military and cyber warfare, Dr. Mulvenon’s research focuses on Chinese command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and reconnaissance, defense research, development, and acquisition organizations and policy, strategic weapons programs (computer network operations and nuclear warfare), cryptography, and the military and civilian implications of the information revolution in China.

TRAVIS TANNER is a Senior Project Director and Director of the Pyle Center for Northeast Asian Studies at The National Bureau of Asian Research. Prior to joining NBR, he was Deputy Director and Assistant Director of the Chinese Studies Program at The Nixon
Center. He also worked as a research assistant at the Institute for International Economics in Washington, DC. Mr. Tanner’s interests and expertise include Northeast Asian regional security, China’s economy and foreign affairs, and Taiwan politics. Mr. Tanner holds a B.A. from the University of Utah in Chinese language and literature and an M.A. in international relations from both the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center in Nanjing, China.

CHRISTOPHER P. TWOMEY is a tenured Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. In 2004, he joined the NPS faculty, later serving as Associate Chair for Research and as Director of the Center for Contemporary Conflict from 2007-09. Today, he works closely with the Departments of Defense and State on a range of diplomatic engagements across Asia and regularly advises Pacific Command, Strategic Command, and the Office of Net Assessment. He has previously taught or researched at Harvard University, Boston College, RAND, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, and has been researcher for the National Bureau of Asian Research in various capacities continually since 2010. Dr. Twomey’s book, *The Military Lens: Doctrinal Differences and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations* (Cornell University Press, 2010), explains how differing military doctrines complicate diplomatic signaling, interpretations of those signals, and assessments of the balance of power. He edited *Perspectives on Sino-American Strategic Nuclear Issues* (2008), and his work has appeared in journals such as *Security Studies, Jour-
nal of Contemporary China, Asian Survey, Nonproliferation Review, Contemporary Security Policy, Asia Policy, Current History, and Arms Control Today, in addition to a dozen edited volumes. Dr. Twomey holds a Ph.D. from MIT in political science.