



PEMUDA RISING

**WHY INDONESIA SHOULD PAY
ATTENTION TO ITS YOUTH**

RSIS Monograph No. 29

**Leonard C. Sebastian, Jonathan Chen
and Emirza Adi Syailendra**

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S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

Note

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GLOSSARY

Aliran	“Streams”, constellation of traditional groups
BEM	Executive Body for University Students (<i>Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa</i>)
BKK	Bodies for the Coordination of Student Affairs (<i>Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan</i>)
BOE	<i>Badan Otonomi Economica</i>
Dakwah Tarbiyah	Campus Islamic Missionary Group
FLAK	Future Leaders for Anti-Corruption
GMNI	Indonesia National Student Movement (<i>Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional</i>) Indonesia
HMI	Islamic Students’ Association (<i>Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia</i>)
ICMI	Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (<i>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia</i>)
Indonesia Mengajar	Voluntary Organization of Indonesian Teachers
KAMMI	Indonesian Muslim University Students’ Action Union (<i>Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia</i>)
KKN	Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism (<i>Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme</i>)
KSM	University Students’ Study Groups (<i>Kelompok Studi Mahasiswa</i>)
LDK	University Students’ Body for Islamic Predication (<i>Lembaga Dakwah Kampus</i>)

Muhammadiyah	A Reformist socio-religious movement, was founded in 1912, advocating <i>ijtihad</i> —individual interpretation of Qur'an and Sunnah, as opposed to <i>taqlid</i> - the acceptance of the traditional interpretations propounded by the ulama
MWA	Student's Board of Trustees (<i>Majelis Wali Amanat</i>)
Nahdatul Ulama	A Traditionalist Sunni Islam group in Indonesia, was established on 1926 as a reaction to the modernist Muhammadiyah organization
NKK/BKK	Normalization of Campus Life/Bodies for the Coordination of Student Affairs (<i>Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/ Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan</i>)
OKK	Campus-Life Orientation for Freshmen (<i>Orientasi Kampus Kehidupan</i>)
Ormas	Mass Organizations (<i>Organisasi Massa</i>)
PAN	National Mandate Party (<i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i>)
PD	Democratic Party (<i>Partai Demokrat</i>)
PDIP	Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (<i>Partai Perjuangan Demokrasi Indonesia</i>)
PKB	National Awakening Party (<i>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</i>)
PKS	Prosperous Justice Party (<i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i>)

PMII	Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (<i>Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia</i>)
PNI	Indonesian National Party (<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia</i>)
PPDMS	Program for Strategic Human Resources Development (<i>Program Pembinaan Sumber Daya Manusia Strategis</i>)
PRD	People's Democratic Union (<i>Partai Rakyat Demokratik</i>)
SALAM	Student Islamic Movement University of Indonesia (<i>Nuasa Islam Mahasiswa Universitas Indonesia</i>)
SMID	Student Solidarity for Democracy in Indonesia (<i>Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi</i>)
TIDAR	The Gerindra Party or the Great Indonesia Movement Party's organizational youth wing (<i>Tunas Indonesia Raya</i>)

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PREFACE

This book presents a preliminary but timely analysis of the current youth landscape and trends in contemporary post-Reformasi Indonesia in conjunction with the upcoming 2014 general elections. Youth will inevitably feature even more prominently in the largely open culture of participatory politics as demography shifts in their favour. Many will be first-time voters in the 2014 elections with young voters comprising approximately 59 million or 34.3 per cent of the total estimated 175 million voters in Indonesia. They will shape the outcomes of future elections as demographical trends indicate that this segment of the electorate is set to grow exponentially. Thus the 2014 general elections will most likely be seen as a testing ground for political parties eager to cultivate support among the growing youth populace. They will now face the challenge of devising new strategies to adapt and court the increasingly demanding, tough and perceptive youthful electorate, or risk losing their influence on a significant voting bloc.

Historically, Indonesian youth have been a pivotal driver and major feature at crucial junctures that defined the trajectory of modern Indonesia, starting with the imminent presence of various youthful and young intellectual groups (known also as Jong Java, Jong Sumatrenon Bond, Jong Ambon, etc.) in the latter days of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. Following collective recitation of the prescient youth pledge (or sumpah pemuda) on 20 October 1928, the idea of Indonesian youth collectivism and solidarity became enmeshed alongside Indonesian nationalism. The role of youth was then vividly encapsulated in their enthusiastic participation in the independence movement, nation-building efforts and reform transitions (recall the Rengasdengklok affair 1945, anti-Sukarno movement of 1966, the Malari Incident of 1974 and Reformasi in 1998). In the process, Indonesian youth have both been romanticised and vilified in their nationalistic struggles as evidenced in their various embodiments as firebrand revolutionaries (pemudas) and earnest reformists (primarily the abode of the

mahasiswa or the archetypal university student). As much as their illustrious impact upon modern Indonesia has been documented and pedestalsed in state archives, contemporary post-Reformasi Indonesia paints a different picture of the idealised youth—one that is perhaps less ideological, more politically aware yet conspicuously reserved in their participation.

Reformasi in Indonesia has brought about significant changes since its inception even though features of Suharto's New Order (Orde Baru) remained firmly entrenched. One of them is the continuation of the New Order variety of elitism, clientalism and stagnation of the reform process in a very much decentralised and democratised landscape. Without collective student umbrage directed against the repressive NKK/BKK (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan) [Normalisation of Campus Life/ Bodies for the Coordination of Student Affairs] policies, the youth-scape remains politically fragmented. However, rapid technological advancements and new social media platforms have been making inroads into contemporary Indonesia, influencing youth in ways that are unprecedented and inconceivable. The immensely influential campus publications, student presses and study groups of the real world that catapulted the Reformasi process has now been steadily replaced by participation in blogs, Twitter and Facebook in the virtual world. This study argues that the post-Reformasi youth (of the "Generation Y" variety), though the direct beneficiaries of the reformist process, are nonetheless also the victims of half-hearted populist reforms and political complacency. As a result, they have been largely passive and even apathetic to the political process, as seen in the growing numbers of voter absenteeism (known as golongan putih or "White Group", a euphemism for casting a blank vote in ballot boxes) in district, kabupaten, gubernatorial and national elections.

This study further examines the current situation of the post-Reformasi youth landscape in Indonesia in light of the general

elections taking place in 2014 by employing both quantitative methods and qualitative studies in the field. It seeks to fill in the gaps of a largely understudied section of the Indonesian society and electorate now that the excitement of an Indonesia on the brink of Reformasi has died down. In particular, the study focuses on three aspects of contemporary youth in Indonesia: (i) youth engagement with contemporary Indonesian society in a post-Reformasi landscape, (ii) youth political participation within campuses and its cadre-system, and (iii) social media trends and its bearing upon youth. Following our research, we make the following conclusions about the current batch of Indonesian youth. First, the Indonesian youth political scene is one that is fragmented, decentralised and at times ambivalent or partially apathetic in its political preferences. They are not likely to emerge as the collective bargainers of reforms, much less inspiring large-scale organisation and spontaneous mobilisation as their predecessors during Reformasi. Second, as evident in history, major changes take place only during moments when active involvement by youth in the political process is viewed as a welcome presence. The current political impasse and stagnation of Reformasi efforts is perhaps symptomatic of the artificially high barriers of entry into politics and government of young, ambitious and idealistic entrants. Lastly, youth are raring for change in the next general elections despite the dip in party identification and loyalties seen mostly evidently in the “Jokowi effect”. The effect may be elusive and temporary but it is nevertheless representative of the combined yearnings of youth eager and desperate to see a systemic change in the political scene, among the usual and often familiar list of ex-presidents, vice-presidents, former military men, media tycoons, bureaucrats, celebrities and incumbents.

INTRODUCTION

YOUTH: THE UNBRIDLED DEMOGRAPHY?

During the wee hours of 16 August 1945, between four and five in the morning at Pengangsaan Timor 56, Sukarno was abruptly roused from his sleep by a delegation of young uniformed *pemudas* (revolutionary youth). Their intent was to kidnap Sukarno and their destination was to be the remote village of Rengasdengklok. The day before, several *pemuda* leaders met with Sukarno at his home. A heated argument ensued whereby the youth demanded a bold move by Sukarno to seize the opportunity to proclaim Indonesia's independence in what was seen as a rare window of opportunity following the surrender of Japan. It was, however, one that was dangerously bereft of the Japanese authority still in power. Their demands were countered by a furious outburst from Sukarno himself. He reasoned that such impetuosity would be unwise, as it would have led to futile bloodshed and an ominous start for the infant republic. The meeting ended rather melodramatically with threats and pleas from both sides. On hindsight, the attempt at kidnap was perhaps a last resort by the hot-headed *pemuda* leaders raring to take matters into their own hands, impressing upon Sukarno their sincerity and patriotism. This fateful encounter eventually ended with Sukarno yielding reluctantly to the *pemuda*—albeit with a few caveats and minor compromises.¹ A day later, on 18 August 1945, Sukarno proclaimed the independence of Indonesia.

Twenty years on, a second kidnapping attempt and an impending coup in disguise befell the incumbent president of Indonesia once again. At midnight on 30 September 1965, Sukarno was approached by a group of officers wearing the Cakrabirawa uniform. Without the usual fanfare, he was clandestinely summoned perforce to an

“emergency cabinet meeting” at the Merdeka Palace in Bogor.² The instigators this time were junior officers in the military. He was then subsequently placed under house arrest. The following day, on 1 October, Colonel Untung, in an official radio broadcast, appealed to “all army officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers in the whole motherland, to be resolute and to act to eradicate completely the influence of the Council of Generals and its agents in the Army”. He reiterated unequivocally that the army was “not for generals, but is the possession of all the soldiers of the Army who are loyal to the ideals of the revolution of August 1945”³ With this declaration, he sounded the death knell for the Sukarno era and the New Order (*Orde Baru*) under Suharto was abruptly ushered in. It unleashed a new political landscape that was preceded by a series of politically motivated massacres trailed along by an authoritarian regime. The role of the revolutionary patriot, as epitomised by the *pemudas* two decades ago, was quickly replaced by a new generation of young uniformed officers wary of communist treachery. While it did not resemble the Rengasdengklok affair, it had echoes of the recent past. The theme of the young rising to replace the “old” (order) precipitously resonated with its earlier precedent. This time round, however, it was not the *anak buah* or youth potentates of Sukarno that instituted “change”, but rather “strangers in deceptive uniforms”⁴ The youth were apparently nowhere to be found. Nevertheless, there is evidence of a connection with several student-based federations that had assisted in spearheading and legitimising a path for the military.⁵ Unfortunately, their roles as political mobilisers, revolutionaries and regime-changers were to be progressively downplayed and suppressed by the *dwifungsi* (dual function) role adopted by the military in the coming years.⁶ Except for brief periods of openness or *keterbukaan*, reformist and oppositional politics of the youth were summarily subdued.⁷ For the period of Suharto’s rule, the anti-Sukarno student movement of 1966 remained the flimsy foundational myth of the New Order—one that was to be toppled yet again.

Fast forward to the twilight years of the New Order regime after Suharto’s 32-year rule, youth and their role as agitators/reformers once again re-surfaced as a political afterthought in an Indonesia that was increasingly facing a parlous situation. By the late 1990s, oppo-

sition from various groups were simmering at the edges, building momentum around *aliran* groupings, *ormas* (societal organisations) and civil society.⁸ Indonesia in 1998 was on the brink of a financial and national catastrophe, which was steadily reaching a tipping point. The youth of the New Order generation, especially the underground Indonesian student movement and intelligentsia among networks of various universities, had long harboured thoughts of radical reform. Elements of increasing discontent and agitation were rising to the fore. Throes of raging, disenfranchised youth and university students, taken over by a renewed fervour of activism never seen before since the days of the revolution, were participating in waves of protests and demonstrations. They demanded an end to the rampant corruption, collusion and nepotism (or KKN, *Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme*) seen in the longstanding and corrupt regime. Some clamoured for reform but were not sure what it meant. University grounds soon became havens for student activism. Students formed study groups, set up anti-government student presses and allied themselves with NGOs to rally for political causes or participate in anti-Suharto demonstrations.⁹ Youth activists or the archetypal *mahasiswa* (university student activist) have, through their struggles and activism, taken on an almost cult-like persona of being political heroes (*pahlawan*) and national patriots by the general public, or miscreants and diletantes by the centralist state. The final blow came about following the Trisakti shootings, where enraged students took to the streets demanding for Suharto's ouster—eventually occupying the grounds, lobby and roof of the parliament building in Jakarta. Their boldness and reckless self-abandonment for reform struck a chord with the sentiments of the general public, gaining unprecedented sympathy and coverage. On 21 May 1998, Suharto announced his resignation. Indonesia would once again undergo huge political change, transiting into a new era of *Reformasi* that would be characterised by the spirit these university students purportedly fought for—greater democratisation and decentralisation. For a third time in a row, youth as political actors emerged as the unconventional heroes of the republic, rebranding themselves as fledgling reformists in a post-Suharto Indonesia.

The crucial junctures that defined the trajectory of the republic

(Independence 1945, New Order 1965, *Reformasi* 1998) had seen youth in their various embodiments as *pemuda*, junior military officers and university students rallying to the causes of patriotism, nationalism, democracy and heroic altruism.¹⁰ Morally idealistic, dauntless and impetuous, they were wont to bear the badge of righteous rebellion and struggle, oftentimes shouldering the political burden of the nation with a sense of defiance and precariousness that is perhaps characteristic of their youthful exuberance. They are the demography that stood out as unpredictable and potentially flammable. In turn, they have been widely lauded, romanticised and co-opted by the state apparatus and the Indonesian public for their legacies in uniting the disparate archipelago in times of crisis—struggling for independence and revolution, instituting political change and fighting for reform. On the other hand, they are also frequently demonised, being perceived as undisciplined, immature, reckless, wayward, wild and sometimes a dangerously frustrated and subversive bunch.

Perceptions on youth in Indonesia have been one of contradiction and angst, vacillating between an esteemed veneration for their gall and temerity and a real fear and distaste for their heedlessness and untameable grit. Being the antithesis of all gradualist and non-confrontational change, values espoused by the state have all sought to contain, diffuse and redirect such youthful unrestraint and political overdrive towards other purposes deemed worthwhile. “Family-ism” (*kekeluargaan*), “Bapak-ism”, education in schools, traditions, religious bodies, entrenched relations of power and the old *aliran* norms have all sought to rein in these impassioned young ones, making them compliant and malleable to the Indonesian state and society.¹¹ These insipid forms of social mechanisms and containment strategies have been met with partial success. In turn, the role of youth within the Indonesian state and society has erstwhile gone through a series of revivals and permutations: from mercurial revolutionaries to militant nationalists of the New Order to budding reformists of the post-Suharto era. Following the upsurge in participatory politics by all sectors of the public (a political utopia barely imagined under Suharto), how had the role and expectations of youth changed or evolved? With the approach of the general elections in 2014 (slated to be a watershed event since the post-*Reformasi* era), will youth, often

perceived as a single demographic politic, prove to be the critical mass that will redirect election trends towards a specific trajectory (just like how they unanimously pushed for revolution and reform in the past)? Will they be the alleged “wild card” or group of “swing-voters” that so many politicians made them up to be?

In our examination of the contemporary political landscape of post-*Reformasi* Indonesia and its implications on youth hailing from the “Generation Y” demography (aged 16–30) we aim to employ both quantitative and qualitative methodologies in an eclectic, mixed-method approach to assess current political trends and the political preferences of Indonesian youth.¹²

It has been established that much emphasis and anticipation have been placed on this demographic group (26.23 per cent aged 16–30 among the total population of Indonesia)—eyeing on its potential to significantly influence voting behaviour in the upcoming 2014 general elections, in particular as a political bloc.¹³ Political parties, youth wings, religious groups and civil society groups see this demographic category as possible leverages and game-changers, if only they were not as politically fragmented and diverse in their choices and preferences. In a “politics-as-usual” environment, that is to be expected. To a larger degree, the youthful demographic generally tends to vote less based on personality and more on issues they can and want to identify with (although this too varies largely with educational level, background, location, etc.). In addition, Indonesian youth have been and are much more dispersed politically than before, following the advent of neo-liberalistic ideals and free elections at the cultural and political front. Relative distances from the centre (Jakarta) have also contributed to the devolution of issues that are region-centric. There are also a significant proportion of youth who are unwilling to be involved in the electoral process. This group is known as the “*golongan putih*” or “golput” (White Group) for short.¹⁴

Considering the current political slate in Indonesia, we aim to tease out the different cleavages of youth and their participation and engagement with the political process in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia, especially with regard to the impending general elections in 2014. Most of the literature on youth engagement of politics in Indonesia focuses largely on the time period during the end of the New Order

under Suharto whereby student movements and activism became the norm (Budiman, 1978; Shiraishi, 1997; Aspinall, 2005; Juliastuti, 2006; Aspinall, 2012) but neglected developments post-Suharto.¹⁵ Emphasis was placed on the process of student mobilisation, popular activism and the role of student councils, presses and demonstrations. Things have changed since post-*Reformasi*. There is a considerable decrease in the frequency of political activities within campuses. The state and universities have been instrumental in implementing both direct and indirect measures to curb, contain and co-opt political activities among its students. Indonesia is also much more politically open than in any period of its history. Youth, compared to their predecessors under Suharto, are now much more informed and aware of political issues. The bombardment of new political ideas and alternatives not only suit the decentralised climate of *Reformasi* Indonesia but also foster an unprecedented participation in politics among various sectors of society. Apart from mainstream television, new social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and the blogosphere have all emerged as possible contenders for instantaneous information. All these have led to an overwhelming upsurge in participatory politics and an effusion of myriad political options within Indonesia. Under such an atmosphere, political aversion among youth was perhaps an unintended but inevitable consequence.

In this study, we do not seek to give a definite prediction of Indonesian youth's political inclinations or preferences in the approaching 2014 elections. Nor do we seek to isolate youth as an exceptional demographic group politically. Our study, however, aims to act as a barometer for a nuanced interpretation of the current political climate among youth in general and especially among university students in campuses—essentially the trendsetters and future political aspirants of Indonesia. The study also intends to bring to attention the contemporary Indonesian youth approach towards current politics in the new climate. The new open landscape of participatory politics and the gamut of political choices available since *Reformasi* have largely impacted upon university campuses, *mahasiswa* and youth in a variety of ways. This new generation of university students (heralding from the cohort known as “Generation Y”) are not merely the inheritors of a legacy that was birthed out of *Reformasi* politics

in the late 1990s; they represent an emerging political class untested and unproven in the new fragmentary political landscape. Although university-going students only account for about eight per cent of the total youth population, they are an influential lot, oftentimes fashioning and positioning themselves in the new politically-eclectic atmosphere as aspiring opinion-makers and budding activists. Their political clout in the short run may not be as conspicuous or potent, but nonetheless, is imperative that one looks at the long-run implications of Indonesian politics and how this demography can impact upon the political climate in the near future. Therefore, we proceed next to examine issues in the youth political scene covering three key aspects: (i) youth engagement with contemporary Indonesian society in a post-*Reformasi* landscape; (ii) youth political participation within campuses and its cadre-system; and (iii) social media trends and its bearing upon youth. These three aspects are selected on the basis of current trends in the political environment, political involvement and engagement with social platforms that are pertinent to the youth of Indonesia today.

Looking ahead, there are two important conclusions that can be gleaned from this study. One is that the Indonesian youth political scene of “Generation Y” is fragmented, decentralised and at times ambivalent and partially apathetic. This demography as a whole is not likely candidates inspiring large-scale organisation or spontaneous mobilisation the likes of *Reformasi* in a “politics-as-usual” environment, much less steer the upcoming 2014 general elections in a particular direction. They may be vital brokers for political change in the face of repression and marginalisation. However, along with the state’s inclusion and acceptance of them post-*Reformasi*, the stakes have shifted into a competition for their loyalties within a significantly fragmented core. The second conclusion is that these youth offer the potential for a sea-change in the current political stalemate, defined by institutional stagnation and clashes between old clientalist powers and the less-than-obsequious youth within the reigning climate of *Reformasi*-based politics. This new generation of youth may be what Indonesia needs to re-emerge from its political complacency of empty promises, cosmetic change and entrenched patterns of personalistic politics.

YOUTH AND POLITICAL STALEMATE AT THE CONFLUENCE OF THE OLD AND NEW

Harold Crouch, in his seminal study on the new landscape of reformist politics in post-Suharto Indonesia, described the transitional process immediately following the fall of Suharto as the sudden culmination of a “crisis-ridden” situation accompanied by a gradual resettlement into a “politics-as-usual” resolution.¹⁶ Quoting from Grindle and Thomas, he added that “crisis-ridden” reforms are conceived in an atmosphere where “policy elites believe that a crisis exists and that they must “do something” about the situation or they will face grave consequences”.¹⁷ Correspondingly, “politics-as-usual” reforms appear to be perceptibly less compelling, particularly so when “change is considered desirable but the consequences of not acting are not considered threatening to the decision-makers or regime”. He concluded that in such cases under a “politics-as-usual” environment, there is a greater propensity for the emergence of bureaucratic and narrow clientelistic relationships. The erratic amalgamation of both the initial “crisis-ridden” and “politics-as-usual” reforms in the last decade within post-Suharto Indonesia had resulted in its aftermath a contradictory landscape of apparent openness and large-scale participatory politics coexisting alongside the ghosts of empty reformist sloganeering, institutional inaptitude and backdoor compromises; all merely devolved from the centre. Unsurprisingly, in the new decentralised post-*Reformasi* landscape, regencies (or *kabupatens*) had become the new “centres”.

Indeed, the twin ideas of democratisation and decentralisation, as propagated by a *Reformasi*-dominated ideology, have impacted upon Indonesian society on all levels. “Reform” as a byword has become so thoroughly suffused within the political and social fabric of post-Suharto Indonesia that it has, quite naturally, lost most of its axiomatic thrust and impetus especially within a “politics-as-usual” environment. Rid of its inherent impetus and symbolism in a “crisis-ridden” atmosphere, the language of *Reformasi* has been steadily over-used and perpetually diluted since its advent in 1998. In more recent years, it has even been increasingly perceived by a discerning public as a tired cliché exhausted of its inherent *raison d’être*, pandering to cosmetic and sycophantic change amidst stagnation

at the political front—a phenomenon that is perhaps not privy to a “politics-as-usual” landscape. Increasingly, a significant proportion of the voting bloc had been expressing their ambivalence and apathy towards political participation, with the majority being youth and students. Forces of neo-liberalisation on the political front have also resulted in the youth scene being increasingly fragmented and de-associated from the centre, with various competing bodies of interest clamouring for the attention, participation and allegiance of Indonesia’s youth. National issues and priorities have often been overshadowed by more exclusively localised, grassroots topics—these are partly encouraged by the process of *pemekaran* (or “blossoming” from decentralisation) and partly boosted by the initiatives of free enquiry and criticism in mainstream presses and social media outlets. In a perceptibly fragmented social and political climate, it becomes much harder to see a single political exposition (be it Sukarno-ism, *Pancasila* democracy, aspirations for *Shari’a*/return to the Jakarta charter or Western-style secularism) as something that can be sacrosanct or final. The labyrinth of political choices and the efflorescence of social movements have presented post-*Reformasi* Indonesia with a new dilemma of sorts—heterogeneity overload.¹⁸

The elapse of a “crisis-driven” situation following the initial deluge of *Reformasi*-type initiatives and institutions can be described as both a continuation and a sharp demarcation of sorts vis-à-vis the confluences of old entrenched clientalist powers and an aspiring but politically untested generation of young reformists. As Indonesia slowly resettles into a “politics-as-usual” scenario and *Reformasi* gradually loses its steam, a hodgepodge of old patronage networks and clientalism eventually came to be intertwined within a neo-liberal framework. Decentralised patronage networks in which “the possibilities for multiple patrons and clients to compete for individually beneficial political relationships” mostly based on “personalistic exchange of political loyalty and material rewards” re-emerged.¹⁹ Disintegration of the centralised state rule eventually allowed for the upsurge of mini political dynasties within regencies (*kabupaten*) and sub-districts (*kecamatan*).²⁰ On the political front, there exists a similar trend of old versus new. Resurrected parties from old *aliran* cliques and the New Order, such as the likes of PDIP

(*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*), the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle for the PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*), the Indonesian National Party, PKB (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*), the National Awakening Party for NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama*), PAN (*Partai Amanat Nasional*) or the National Mandate Party for Muhammadiyah, continue to dominate the landscape. Their existence, however, has been challenged by new political vehicles and parties entering the fray, not to mention smaller party factions and outfits operating in various outer island provinces—all vying for the same political pie.²¹ These new political parties either possess a stronger network of young cadres based around a core set of ideals (i.e. PKS, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* [Prosperous Justice Party]) or are Golkar clones based on personalist dependence of a political figure (i.e. PD or the Democratic Party, Gerindra and Hanura). The PKS has been especially influential among educated youth. Its growing prominence in the political scene can be seen in its jump in the recent 2009 elections to eight per cent of the popular vote (securing 57 seats in the 560-member DPR), compared to its inception in the 1999 elections of only 1.4 per cent of the vote.²² Following the fragmentation of the political scene, youth in general have reacted to this change of political configuration in various ways, ranging from strong apathy and mild passivity to passionate participation and fervent activism. They also vary in their political ideologies, swinging from the religious right to Sukarnoist left.

CLOISTERED YOUTH IN A “POLITICS-AS-USUAL” CLIMATE

Youth have often been projected by the state acting in relative unison as part of a homogenous entity. In the imaginings of the state, they are readily transformed into veritable figures, almost hero-like, epitomising the overtures of patriotism and national struggle in their various hues. During the Old Order, they appeared as fiery revolutionaries (or *pemudas*); in the New Order, they were pictured as staunch protectors of the state; with *Reformasi*, they metamorphosed into raging student activists/reformists. Such a conjured-up projection of apparent youthful solidarity by the state should not be taken superficially, especially in a “politics-as-usual” backdrop in contemporary Indonesia. Whereas in “crisis-driven”

situation or watershed periods of history, these Young Turks tend to band together in apparent unison to battle internal and external umbrages the likes of neo-colonialism, communism and the more recent KKN, the resettlement into a “politics-as-usual” climate often dilutes and discourages this process. With the coming and going of these over-arching national issues and the splintering of the body politic into more atomised factions, the youth of today have less of an impetus to coalesce. Contemporary youth culture and *Reformasi*-infused state ideology have done well to project a cloistered ubiquity of individuation, political marketisation and commodification that has steadily deviated from the old centralised and *aliran* norms that it has now become an acknowledged state of affairs, contributing to ever greater cleavages of political identities and differentiation, even within old party lines. Concomitantly, the apparent democratisation process has also readily opened up the already multifarious political spectrum to even more competing ideologies, political affiliations and socio-cultural agendas. Youth participation in politics has thus been rather scattered and erratic ever since *Reformasi* per se was put into practice.

It has been shown quite conclusively that rampant youth involvement and intervention in politics peaked exclusively and concentrated quickly only during periods of national calamity for a short amount of time. During the interregnum periods, involvement has generally slumbered and plateaued, only to be brought to another high, depending on the political climate. This makes the calibration of political allegiances a notoriously complicated affair during times of national stability, especially among the youthful demographic.

The presidential elections of 2014 will soon come into view. Nonetheless, the potential for the current fragmentary body of youth to redirect affairs autonomously and vicariously as a single body politic remains farfetched. Even in “crisis-driven” situations throughout the historical trajectory of the republic, it has been seen that youth who mobilised themselves into activist cells and groups have been less than homogenous. Many hailed from urbanised centres and the higher echelons of society. Educational opportunities, exposure to new ideologies and a collective sense of impending urgency forged under adversity are the core reasons for youth banding together.²³

Though the stability and liberalised climate of post-*Reformasi* have made educational opportunities and exposure to new ideas widely available as an impending right for everyone, the social “glue” that inherently commits disparate youth into a social pact is lacking. Yet, this newfound set of privileges has instead polarised the youth body and broken them down into different political turfs and allegiances.

Notwithstanding, these youth are but a representation of the minority of the demographic group clustered under “Generation Y”. Relative distances from the centre are also factors that impinge upon the participation rates of nation-based protests and demonstrations. In order to sieve out the contours of differentiation, the current generation of Indonesian youth (or the eponymously sounding “Generation Y”) can and should be broken down into finer categories (of class, educational level, urban vs. rural divide, relative distance to centres of power, mobility, etc.) instead of perceiving them simplistically as a uniform collective.²⁴

YOUTH AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

REFRAMING THE ICONOGRAPHY OF YOUTH IN A FRAGMENTED LANDSCAPE

Indonesian youth today carry collectively the vestiges of past annals of revolution and reformism left behind by their predecessors. Unconsciously, the often cloistered youth of post-*Reformasi* Indonesia are a lot that have been, for most part of their lives, groomed and encouraged by the Indonesian state and society to take an active interest in the political affairs of the country—or at least in what the state paternalistically prefers. At a typical school-going age, youth are systematically inculcated into a curriculum that promotes a state-based veneration of *Reformasi* and an extension of the state's projection of youth. Without a doubt, the lingering legacy of a decade-long *Reformasi*-based initiatives and its propagandic drive still retains its nationalistic appeal among many Indonesians. Its impact upon the current generation of youth though is debatable. University students or *mahasiswa* especially, being direct bearers and inheritors of the *Reformasi* movement with the nation's expectations upon them, have traditionally been the ones that are expected to uphold and somehow sustain indefinitely the *Reformasi* legacy. *Reformasi* has long existed as an inexplicable agent and facet of community life within university campuses in essence and increasingly in form since its advent in the 1990s.

Embodied within the ethos and cultural make-up of every prominent university that had a brush with the *Reformasi* movement is the inherent idea of a kind of nationalistic activism, encapsulated within songs, anthems, hymns, chants, initiation rites and mock demonstrations. Relations between the *mahasiswa*, *rakyat* (the common people) and reform have always been symbiotic. Students in the past have often turned towards the masses to express their aversion

towards “elite politics”. A hymn illustrating such a relationship goes thus (titled “*Mars: Mahasiswa Merdeka*”):

*Kamilah mahasiswa merdeka
Senjatanya massa rakyat merdeka
Dengan diskusi dan massa aksi
Sampai rakyatpun menang
Bendera merah telah dikibarkan
Tanda mulai pembebasan
Dengan diskusi dan massa aksi
Sampai rakyatpun menang²⁵*

Even today, the language and spirit of *Reformasi* is still very much a part of the cultural fabric and moral tradition within university campuses. Nonetheless its sustaining grip and lustre upon current batches of youth have suffered significantly under the auspices of the state’s intrusion and expropriation of what was primarily a prerogative of the university students’ (*mahasiswa*) movement. Ironically, universities once fully supportive of the *Reformasi* movement in the past have been reining in on unwarranted organisations and student activities that are deemed overtly reactive or demonstrative. Non-state-based *Reformasi* initiatives are tolerated but not allowed to be fully articulated. Both students and professors have cited much tighter curriculums, exorbitant university fees, dramatic decreases in the frequencies of “bonding” time and orientation activities among freshmen and the urgency to complete their courses before time as reasons that highlight the increasing disconnect of youth-based idealism and activism with the daily vicissitudes of contemporary university life—a far cry from the student activism and the vibrancy of campus life in the 1980s and 1990s.²⁶ The state, on the other hand, has been eager to put a stamp on its growing dominance over issues of youth and reformism. It has lately taken on a renewed interest in its youthful demography.

Enshrined recently within the ordinance act of Indonesia (2009) is the Act on Youth—one that emphasised the significance of their expected role within the parameters of nationhood in accordance with Indonesia’s brand of *Reformasi*-influenced nationalism and nation building.²⁷ In one of the stated clauses, youth are supposed

to possess the inherent characteristics and demeanours that enmesh well within the nation's definition and often essentialist perception of youth: one that includes the various generalised aspects of idealism, progressivism, reformism and even a tinge of the futuristic.²⁸ These characteristics nonetheless go hand-in-hand with the nation's interpretation of patriotism and youthful professionalism.²⁹ Indonesia has always openly held its youth in high esteem, notwithstanding their long historical ties with the state's independence movement. Nevertheless, this recent reorientation towards youth warrants attention and study, especially at a time when *Reformasi* has been seen to be gradually losing its relevance and significance while electoral competition has taken on wholly new proportions. One only needs to look at the historical underpinnings of youth movements to understand the state's love-hate relationship with them.

INDONESIA'S YOUTH MOVEMENT AND ITS TRAJECTORIES

The youth movement in Indonesia was similar to several other youth movements worldwide, a relatively recent phenomenon that sprouted out of the modernisation and reformist movements during the turn of the century. Indonesia's own fateful brush with youth movements harkened back to the days of its Dutch colonial rule in the late 1900s, where privileged young intellectuals formed themselves into collective groups based primarily upon ethnicity and locality (the likes of *Jong Java*, *Jong Sumatrenon Bond*, *Jong Ambon*, etc.). They were the offshoots of a collective expressing indignation over colonial subjugation. Nevertheless, it was one that had been based narrowly on regionalism. Not all of them desired violent struggle or radical change. There appeared a proto-parliament in 1918, where a handful of these native young Indonesian leaders deliberated superficially on the idea of self-rule—the beginning phases of the imaginings of nationalism.³⁰ The conception of Indonesia as an idea, however, only officially unfolded on 20 October 1928, following the recitation of the youth pledge (or *sumpah pemuda*).³¹ For the first time, ethnicity was discarded in favour of the broader concept of nationalism. The idea of Indonesian youth solidarity gradually emerged, becoming enmeshed and eventually extended alongside with the idea of Indonesia as a nation. Both gradually become synonymous with one

another and were instrumental in uniting the concept of “Indonesia” (as yet existed at that time) against the backdrop of Dutch colonialism and other perceived foreign intrusions.³² Nevertheless, this close affinity with the Indonesian state has often taken on a path of twists and turns, at many points in history backsliding under the collective weight of an oppressive state system. The latest chapter to emerge is the *Reformasi* movement.

Looking at present Indonesia, the state’s recent re-alignment towards matters of youth in 2009 by the constitution was certainly quite poignant. Until recently after *Reformasi*, radical youthful activism petered out in favour of nation and economic-building, as the country transited from a political quagmire exacerbated by economic debt and national calamity, to a rising economic powerhouse. The recent 2009 election encouraged several political parties and governmental institutions to once again recast their focus on youth in consideration of the political investment that could possibly pay off in the near future. No longer radical political miscreants of the *Reformasi*-type era, the new “tameable” youth but whose political loyalties were suspect were now viewed with brand new lenses. In the new, variegated climate of post-*Reformasi*, the sizable demography of youth makes competition for their votes an increasingly complex yet pressing endeavour. Indeed, the numbers of youth (as defined by ages 16–30) have risen exponentially in both cities (*perkotaan*) and villages (*perdesaan*) to a combined total of 62,343,755 at 26.23 per cent of the population by 2010.³³

A prevailing sense of optimism is now evident in Indonesia since its post-*Reformasi* days. Indonesia has since held three peaceful democratic elections (in 1999, 2004 and 2009), achieved peaceful cessation of several secessionists conflicts (Aceh and the former East Timor), ensured partial separation of institutionalised military influence from politics, devolved power to the regions, developed and fostered a vibrant civil society, and accorded a greater degree of liberty to speech and the free media. These achievements are quite spectacular, considering Indonesia’s delicate state of affairs just less than two decades ago. In recent years, Indonesia’s growth rate has also been rising steadily (6.1 per cent in 2010, 6.3 per cent in 2011 and 6.5 per cent in 2012) with insulation from financial attacks propped

up by strong domestic consumption (two-thirds of its GDP). Coupled with its natural demographic bonus sustained by a relatively young population, its generous endowments of energy and commodities, stable macroeconomic situation and current political stability, it is no surprise that there has been continual reference to “Indonesia’s rise” recently. Many observers believe in the long run that prospects of continual growth from Indonesia’s own domestic consumer base and the rising affluent middle-class sector will triumph most other mature economies of Asia.³⁴ In addition, foreign direct investments (FDIs), especially of the portfolio variety, have been on the rise significantly since 2006. Indonesia’s longstanding debt with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also been paid back in full. These recent developments in an Indonesia that has witnessed steady consecutive growth rates allowed for the quick reestablishment of political and social stability in a “politics-as-usual” backdrop.

What does this all mean for the current generation of youth who grew up in such an atmosphere of relative stability, who had lived through Suharto’s New Order era and *Reformasi* or were too young to recall the massive changes that took place merely a decade and a half ago? How have governmental organisations and political parties changed in their strategies in reining in these disparate youth into their fold? For such answers, it is necessary to look in-depth at the current fragmented youth scene.

PRELIMINARY PERCEPTIONS ON CONTEMPORARY YOUTH AND POLITICS

Based on a survey conducted by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), in partnership with the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information (LP3ES), political participation among contemporary youth generally has been seen centring around three aspects: election turn-out, political party preferences and presidential candidate preferences.³⁵ These three aspects coincide with different stages of the electoral process: the pre- (or post-) election phase (election turn-out), the legislative election phase (political party preferences) and the presidential election phase (presidential candidate preferences). In order to put into perspective this emerging youthful demography, their spread within

the rural-urban sprawl should first be contemplated for comparison. **Table 2.1** shows a further breakdown of the division in the inhabitants of various age groups and in particular the numbers of youth (ages 16–30) who reside in the cities (*perkotaan*) and the villages (*perdesaan*) respectively in the year 2010.

TABLE 2.1
Division of the number and percentage of inhabitants according to
age group and area (urban and rural), 2010³⁶

Age group (in years)	Cities		Villages		Cities + villages	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
<13	28,336,777	23.95	31,272,882	26.21	59,609,659	25.08
13–15	6,397,432	5.41	7,011,218	5.88	13,408,650	5.64
16–30	33,378,741	28.21	28,965,014	24.27	62,343,755	26.23
31–45	27,609,943	23.33	25,998,031	21.79	53,607,974	22.56
>45	22,597,363	19.10	26,073,925	21.85	48,671,288	20.48
Total	118,320,256	100.00	119,321,070	100.00	237,641,326	100.00

The table indicates that for the age group 16–30 years, 33,378,741 of them reside in cities while 28,965,014 reside in villages. This amounted to approximately an equal number of youth in both cities and villages—an important factor when it comes to accessing how influential the impact of politics, social media reach and coverage and attitudes among the urbanised and rural youth are.

In the new, open climate of stabilised politics and apparent unhindered access to political information, it is imperative to first look at the main sources where youth obtain their information on politics and how frequent they follow these sources as a general gauge of their political inclinations and readiness. According to the survey, the frequency of youth being exposed to political news is high, with 53.3 per cent following local and national politics one to three days per week and 32.1 per cent at four to seven days per week.³⁷ This indicates a high level of interest among youth at least in things political. In other words, current youth are aware of political issues. In terms of sources of information on politics, television came out tops with an overwhelming 87.7 per cent of youth selecting this media as their

main source. Interestingly, the Internet ranked at a low one per cent, while traditional sources of information like newspaper/magazine stands were at 3.3 per cent. With television as the main information source, 47.5 per cent of youth who chose this form of media said that they watched the news seven days a week. Approximately 12.8 per cent of youth reported that they read the newspaper seven days a week while 32.6 per cent reported that they did not read the newspapers at all. When it came to using the Internet as a source, 36.9 per cent reported that they spent fewer than five hours on the Internet in a week and 30.1 per cent claimed that they did not use the Internet at all.³⁸

Electoral turnout by youth in past elections saw a significant drop in numbers from 85 per cent during the 2004 elections to 72 per cent in the 2009 elections. These figures reflect the growing trend of “*golput*” (*Golongan Putih* or White Group, people unwilling to be involved in the electoral process). Youth perception of politics in general can be traced by their rate of participation in various politically related activities. The RSIS/LP3ES survey had broken them down into several segments, comprising frequencies of participation in political discussions, participation in campaign activities and political participation in the public sphere.³⁹ For frequency of political discussions, 76.4 per cent indicated that they seldom or never participated in discussions on grassroots/local issues. In terms of participation in campaign activities, it was more of an even split, with 50.7 per cent indicating that they did not participate in any campaign activities. When it came to political participation in the public sphere, an overwhelming number of youth—at almost 90 per cent—indicated that they did not write articles/comments of political content for the mass media, demonstrate against government policies and/or write blogs that are related to local/national political issues. All these segments indicate a trend of non-participation in politics and political matters in general among youth. Although many are quite reasonably aware of political issues, they tend to keep politics at arm’s length. In addition, there seems to be a cautious ambivalence and reluctance towards active participation or involvement.

In terms of political party preferences, the majority of youth prefer one that is based on secular ideology rather than religious-

based political parties (63.9 per cent for the former versus 28.8 per cent for the latter). In terms of popularity, following the 2009 elections, 41.3 per cent indicated their preferences for the Democratic Party. (Note that the survey was taken in 2010). PDIP ranked second, at 15.5 per cent, followed by Golkar (12 per cent) and PKS (10.1 per cent). Actual voting in the 2009 elections did not deviate much from representations of their preferences. The Democratic Party still came out tops, at 33.1 per cent, followed by PDIP, at 11.6 per cent, Golkar Party, at 8.2 per cent, and PKS, at 6.1 per cent. Family influences were quite significant (36.7 per cent) when it came to shaping their political choices, although the categories of “Others” (22.3 per cent) and “None” (28.1 per cent) also pointed to a huge bloc.⁴⁰ It is notable that Indonesian youth view the current political party configuration as untenable. The results showed that although the youth had accepted Indonesia’s current multi-party political system, they rather prefer it trimmed to a maximum of 10 participating parties, with 49.9 per cent expressing their preferences for a participation rate of 1–5 parties while 25.9 per cent for 6–10 parties.⁴¹

Finally on the issues of presidential candidate preferences, based on youth preferences for the 2009 election, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the Boediono team stood out as most popular across the board (54.1 per cent among youth under 25 years and 51.5 per cent among youth aged 26–30 years). This was trailed along by the Megawati Sukarnoputri and Prabowo pair (17.5 per cent and 17.4 per cent, respectively), and the Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto pair (12 per cent and 13 per cent). Despite the military’s past brush with politics during the Suharto’s era that have proved unpopular among the masses, most have no qualms with nominating a potential presidential candidate with a military background (at 81.2 per cent).⁴² Military figures are usually seen as possessing strong leadership characteristics such as discipline and authority. Nevertheless, presidential candidate preferences tend to be sketchy and unexpected, with several familiar names a mainstay in the presidential slate. Youth preferences on presidential candidates can often be described as variable; nonetheless, such preferences have not run far from the archetypal “Bapak” figure that most Indonesians, including youth, often gravitate. It is also noted that the definitive traits of a “good” politician among youth tended

to be honesty and professionalism.⁴³ Although government office is seen as a respectable career, only 15.4 per cent of youth reputedly wanted to work as government officials (or what is termed as *pejabat*). A mere 4.6 per cent of youth envisaged joining the police or the military while an overwhelming 62.6 per cent see themselves becoming businessmen (45.5 per cent) and professionals (17.1 per cent)—perhaps an indication of the notoriety and poor opinion the younger generation were accustomed in seeing in such positions of authority.⁴⁴

More pertinent are the issues Indonesian youth identified with or feel strongly about, especially with respect to governmental institutions and practices. A majority of youth were dissatisfied with the performance of the current parliament, at 52.7 per cent. Many participants felt that many MPs (Members of Parliament) were unworthy of holding public office. According to surveys, many of the youth were of the opinion that the MPs were wont of corruption and moral violations. Most MPs were also seen to be more self-serving rather than working for the benefit of their constituents. The parliament was also seen as failing in being able to perform its role in terms of legislation, control and budgeting. In terms of youth views on the performance of law enforcement and judicial institutions, polls have been dismal except for the Corruption Eradication Commission (or KPK, *Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi*), which received an overwhelming 55 per cent of satisfactory votes as compared to the police, the attorney-general's office and judges. Based on a *Kompas* survey in 2011, 57.4 per cent responded that they were concerned with national affairs. In terms of the transparency of government decision-making process, it is also surprising that many youth indicated that it was not transparent, at 49.8 per cent. Ironically, in an apparently open atmosphere of participatory politics, the majority of youth felt that the government did not ensure enough participation or transparency in its operations. The level of confidence in the participatory-based process of government decision-making tends towards the negative, at 58.6 per cent who responded with a "No".⁴⁵

The overall conclusion that can be garnered from the series of surveys on contemporary youth in Indonesia is that young people in general have a disposition towards being apolitical and passive. They

were also more politically aware than their predecessors during the Suharto era. However, they rarely participated in events or organisations relating to politics or ones that were affiliated with a political party. Television still reigned as the main source of political information among youth. Newspaper readership seemed to be declining. Participation rates during elections also witnessed a significant slump in numbers from the youth demography. These indicators all point to an increasing trend of political lethargy and apathy among youth even as political information is made more readily available.

Next, secular parties were preferred over those that were affiliated with a particular religion. Accompanying such preferences are the rising social trends of “Islamisation” and the growing prominence of political Islam. Many youth, however, have expressly chosen to separate religion from politics, although it can be argued that the religious-based socio-cultural identity along the old *aliran* norms still exerts its imminent influence. Lines between religious duty and political activism have always been a source of contention. Nonetheless, it can be seen that strong identification to categories of traditionalist (associated with NU) and modernist (associated with Muhammadiyah) is weakening. The majority of youth that took part in the survey in 2010 then expressed their preference for the Democratic Party (a secular party but identified closely with SBY). Nevertheless, things could change for the upcoming 2014 elections, in the wake of numerous scandals plaguing the Democratic Party and especially after SBY completes his second term in office and steps down as president. Past patterns suggest the likelihood of a shift in favour of another secular party, either PDIP or Gerindra.

Another essential point is that the family seems to bear a relatively dominant influence in voting patterns among youth. The family’s influence, however, is not as significant, while increasingly youth have become quite independent in their voting preferences. As for issues regarding the probable image of a preferred presidential candidate, they are not conclusive. In the survey, SBY remained the most popular candidate by far. However, his role as president will run its course by 2014. Many youth nevertheless wanted change within parts of the political system that they considered inefficient. Most of them were of the opinion that many MPs holding office were unsuit-

able for the job. Youth also wanted more transparency when it came to the decision-making process within governmental institutions. Apparently, all these point to systemic or structural deficiencies within institutions that can be amended with reform and change. An interesting point that stood out in the surveys is the influence of the Internet on youth. Only about one per cent of youth reported that they depended on the Internet as their main source of political information. Granted, non-traditional sources of media derived from the Internet have not dethroned television as the prevailing source of information but things look set to change. The Internet and its associated social media platforms may be more influential than it seems, even as a complementary source of information. It was not until late 2010 that a CNN Tech report designated Indonesia as a “Twitter nation”, dubbing Indonesia the most Twitter-obsessed nation on the planet.

Elections in Indonesia are a notoriously complicated affair. In the upcoming 2014 elections, there will be a new group of young voters casting their votes for the first time. For others, it will be their second or third time. Nevertheless, it is an uphill task among political parties eager to access, figure and somehow incorporate this demography into their fold, a timely breakaway from the out-modelled conception of youth as political avengers and miscreants. At this juncture, what is perhaps most conclusive is that there is a significant shift in the youth scene from the era of *Reformasi* to post-*Reformasi*. Youth are now harder to court politically, given their reluctance and antipathy towards politics. The state often views and categorises them as a uniform homogeneous body—the perpetuation of a myth taken to its full extension. In reality, youth cannot be pinned down merely by a demographic categorisation. The contemporary youth scene in Indonesia is fragmented and inexplicably so. In order to delve deeper into the heterogeneously vibrant youth scene, it is perhaps befitting to start by mapping the youth-scape from where *Reformasi* has drawn its inspiration and most ardent appeal from—the university campuses.

YOUTH AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

MAPPING OUT THE FRAGMENTARY YOUTH-SCAPE

Being a university student or *mahasiswa* in Indonesia has its fair share of privileges and challenges. In contemporary Indonesia this can possibly mean a step closer towards gainful employment in government ministries or the private sector. Nonetheless, it also entails conforming to a particular stereotype—that of the archetypal “*mahasiswa*” deemed acceptable by the state, a pale comparison in contrast to the rebellious and critical student dissident of the *Reformasi* mould. Enrolled university students are made to recite the three “truths” of higher education (or *tri dharma perguruan tinggi*)—an acknowledgement of their assumed position in society as students of higher education as well as their perceived role and responsibilities as designated by the state (especially with regard to education, research and service to the community). Despite its seemingly lofty ideals, many merely pay lip service. Nonetheless, the state and political outfits always strive to extend its influence into the domain and autonomy of the university and its campus—the epicentre of youth politics. Hence it is not surprising that special attention is paid to its brightest and often staunchest critics.

THE EVOLUTION OF STUDENT POLITICS IN CAMPUSES FROM THE NEW ORDER TO POST-REFORMASI

The tradition of oppositional politics towards the state had its earliest roots in the New Order’s first decade in the 1970s, when students were the first to organise mass protests on issues as diverse as corruption, furore over the orchestrated 1971 elections and the extravagance of the Taman Mini entertainment park project. One of the definitive voices of dissident opposition that paved the way for

politics to be conducted within campuses was the anti-corruption student movement group “Mahasiswa Menggugat” (translated briefly as “university students unite!” [To claim and criticise]). Led by Arief Budiman, he was of the opinion that students should shoulder the responsibility as a “moral force” seeking to “correct” the government rather than one that conspired to overthrow it.⁴⁶ Following such a credo, university students then were reluctant to explicitly condemn the New Order, where they had a part in its legitimacy. Rather, they sought to criticise the regime from a distance by providing *koreksi* (correction) and *peringatan* (reminders) to the leaders. This form of moral suasion and justification was, however, eventually taken to its apotheosis following marginalisation and the subsequent systematic repression of the student-body politics by the state within campuses. Policies intended to directly nip student politics in the bud while suppressing student activism were introduced, known collectively as the NKK/BKK policies. These include a “Semester Credit System” introduced to place a more onerous curricular requirement on students in a bid to curb time spent on political activities, putting a halt to student council activities and replacing these bodies with campus administrators that have veto rights, banning and/or suspending subversive student publications and campus political activities without consultation.⁴⁷

During the late Suharto period, student protests grew both in scope and proportion. Where student demonstrations only centred on Jakarta and Bandung (during the 1966, 1973–1974 and 1977–1978 movements), it had since spread to many university towns within Java the likes of Bogor, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Solo, Salatiga, Surabaya, Malang, Jombang, Jember as well as Mataram in Lombok and Denpasar in Bali by the 1990s. Tertiary education had undoubtedly broadened its intake in conjunction with a higher market demand for university graduates. Private universities experienced a boom while state or elite universities opened up more placements to students. Protests spiked as even more students were forced to go underground following constant monitoring and intimidation by the state. Within the campuses, there were mysterious kidnappings of outspoken students who allegedly crossed the permissible boundaries of political dissidence. Fear of deportation and abductions hung like a heavy veil

over campuses throughout the country. Despite these perturbations, the demonstrative machinery of the *mahasiswa* was resilient and trudged on, fired up by the network of informal study groups, student presses and associations with NGOs. Where public demonstrations were prohibited or made too politically costly, students contributed to public debates, wrote in student publications (for example, *Politika* of Universitas Nasional Jakarta, *Ganesha* of Bandung's Institute of Technology [ITB, *Institut Teknologi Bandung*] and *Arena* of the State Institute for Islamic Studies [IAIN, *Institut Agama Islam Negeri*, Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta]) and became more involved in community and *yayasan* activities under various tasks known as *aksi informasi* (information action). When confrontation was deemed necessary, students evoked "solidarity actions" or *aksi massa* (mass action), with the intent of raising attention and enfolded the masses in a protracted fight against the government. These two-pronged strategies have served the activist *mahasiswa* population then well enough, catapulting them into the limelight of populist resistance. The more radicalised students, in particular, were influenced by the works of Franz Fanon, Paolo Freire, the Frankfurt school, liberation theology, Ali Shariati and classical Marxism. They saw themselves as the defenders and conscience of the *rakyat*, speaking up against the *elit* or *penguasa* (ruler). Several new student groups and university student unions (or BEM, *Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa*) had thus mushroomed from this turbulent phase with a renewed zeal and vision for student-based politics. Old *aliran*-based student groupings such as the Islamic Students Association (or HMI, *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*) were revitalised with a new impetus for recruitment, networking and expansion. Demonstrations, strikes and open criticisms of the government unencumbered by the burden of a prohibitively heavy student workload became an acknowledged part of a vibrant university life, at least in major state and private universities.

Student activists then could be divided into three different camps, each representing a distinct student coterie with divergent outlooks but a convergent aim at criticising and correcting the then-Suharto government. They were the liberal-populist student activists, the radicalised student activists and the Islamic (or religious-based) student activists.

Liberal populist students represented one such camp. They stood out as a loosely networked group with a distinctive populist tone peppered with a liberal political outlook, yet remaining cautious critics of the New Order. They were influenced quite significantly by the then Philippines-style “people power”. Nonetheless, most of them felt that they should position themselves more as a “moral force” rather than a kind of politicised movement. Demonstrations by this group featured elements such as “strong authoritarianism (sometimes almost with an anarchist spin), antimilitarism, and anti-elitism, a populist emphasis on the *rakyat*, and liberal themes of regularisation and accountability”.⁴⁸

The second camp of students represented a more consciously radical spectrum. They were influenced primarily by classical Marxism and leftist movements. They were of the opinion that students should break away from the traditional moral or corrective mould, pandering to the mobilisation of the popular masses against the regime. Officially, they formed organisations such as the PRD (*Persatuan Rakyat Demokratik*, People’s Democratic Union) and the *Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi* (Student Solidarity for Democracy in Indonesia, or SMID). Some of their pledges then included: a peaceful and democratic resolution of the East Timor problem, abolition of the military’s *dwifungsi* role, democratisation in the sectors of politics, economy and culture plus the full restoration of the rights of former political prisoners.

The last camp of student activists represented a new revival in the old Islamic student activism within campuses. Of course, this went hand-in-hand with other religious-based or *aliran*-based student groups critical of the government. These included the Catholic (*Persatuan Mahasiswa Katolik Indonesia*, PMKRI), Protestant (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Mahasiswa Indonesia*, GMKI) and traditionalist NU Islamic group (*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia*, PMII). Nonetheless, none was as significantly influential as the large modernist student organisation known as HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*). This camp was influenced in part by the growing wave of Islamisation in the 1980s but was also spurred on by the heavy-handed blockage and ruthless elimination of overtly political avenues for Islamic activism within campuses. The development of

the wing within HMI, also known as HMI-MPO (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam-Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi*), kept Islam as part of its foundational statutes. HMI-MPO became a dominant feature in student campuses and would continue to exert its influence among the student body even more as the subsequent rapprochement between modernist Islam and the government with the onset of ICMII (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* or The Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals) brought its semi-clandestine activities to light. The focus of Islamic student bodies, like HMI in particular, concentrated on issues dealing with morality such as state lotteries, consumption of alcohol, donning of the Islamic head scarf (or *jilbab*), prostitution and corruption. These three student activist camps have since left their indelible imprint on university campuses post-*Reformasi*, continuing to play an important role within the student body even as new student outfits and political groups joined in the foray.

These days, as the nation slowly resettles into a “politics-as-usual” climate, the *Reformasi*-style activism of the 1990s variety can be seen to have reached a plateau of inevitable sterility. Though the spirit and character of confrontational *Reformasi* have since toned down tremendously, its emphasis on form and performance (mock demonstrations, initiatory rites among student groups reminiscent of *Reformasi* era, etc.) still remains very much an incontrovertible facet of the campus cultural scene. Drained of its attendant resolve sans *Reformasi*, student activities and university-based activism have generally revolved around a re-enactment of mock *Reformasi* demonstrations and an incessant regurgitation of the apparent legacy to be upheld. This inadvertently runs into conflict with the role and duties of the post-*Reformasi* university student—how they have been nostalgically remembered and how the state intends for them to be recollected.

Students have always occupied a prominent place in the national political discourse, given their historical role in the tumultuous trajectory of Indonesia. With the advent of post-*Reformasi* initiatives and the normalisation of campus life after long-standing hostilities towards the government, veneration over the figure of the indomitable *mahasiswa* activist has somewhat diminished substantially.

Students, at least the majority of them, no longer aspire to the *Reformasi*-mould of the “never-ending student” (or *mahasiswa abadi* in Bahasa). Samuel Huntington’s suggestion of students comprising “the universal opposition” may still run true in a post-*Reformasi* landscape; nonetheless, it has since changed quite drastically in form and approach.⁴⁹ For one, demonstrations over national issues have failed to draw large crowds of sustained interest. *Mahasiswa*, on the other hand, have resorted to less confrontational and milder modes of opposition, the likes of *aksi informasi*, which includes writing in to editorials and forums, submitting petitions and participating in campus-led discussions. Others are simply too preoccupied or handicapped with their overbearing workload to be very involved in student-based activities. In an ironic twist of circumstances, echoing the previous words of the education and culture minister Daoed Joe-soef during the 1980s at the height of mass student protests, students have truly utilised their time in campus by “not wasting their time in the streets”. Rather, they choose to “fill it up with reading, writing, conducting research.”⁵⁰

Intra- and extra-campus student organisations, youth wing under-bows and NGOs have caught on to the coattails of this new liberalised post-*Reformasi* climate. The nature of student politics has also taken quite a turn. Identification with a particular political affiliation was no longer in vogue. According to the survey, the majority of Indonesian youth exhibited a propensity to dissociate themselves from politics rather than embrace them upfront like their predecessors do. Although most were politically aware, many were contented being political observers. University campuses have apparently also taken on an implicit de-politicisation process. Enter the new political vehicles post-*Reformasi* where the lines of youth activism have taken on a new meaning—commercialisation and buy-outs. With the re-settlement into a “politics-as-usual” environment, university students are less keen on active political participation but more eager to pursue social and regional (even international) agenda that captivate their imagination. Hence involvement in a particular student outfit and political youth-wing can primarily mean a few things: (i) a ticket to cadre-ship within prominent political parties, (ii) opportunities for deeper involvement with a particular agenda or issue of choice,

(iii) a sense of identification attached to a certain *aliran* grouping or religious body, and (iv) opportunities for incentives and perks in the areas of self-improvement, scholarships and outreach/funding programmes for mass student activities. While student groupings before *Reformasi* have largely latched onto anti-government stances quite homogeneously, without a basis for mass demonstrations since *Reformasi*, current groupings have splintered out from the original focused stance directed at the government.

In addition, some of these student groups based in universities further from the centre (especially non-Java ones) have taken up regional overtones that highlight the primacy of the regional over the national. Other universities, on the other hand, have in place arbitrarily created campus political parties that are notorious for their internal rivalries.⁵¹ This trend is interesting because political participation and competition within campuses among youth can now be seen to be one that is increasingly devolved and dissected into several different cleavages: private vs. state universities, Java vs. non-Java areas, Islamic vs. non-Islamic campuses, rural vs. town, etc. These new trends have all been propelled by burgeoning student bodies and new formations that appeared posthumously after *Reformasi*. Older and more traditional student groupings and quasi political youth wings have also responded to the praxis of the times by rebranding themselves, projecting towards the student community a non-partisan outlook. In addition, campuses have various tolerance levels and stances towards outside groups that are deemed acceptable depending on their culture. In the case of *Universitas Katolik Parahyangan*, a private university based in Bandung, politics within the campus is generally off-limits. On the other hand, *Universitas Indonesia* has enjoyed a relatively open and liberalised culture where campus politics is the norm and external student-based organisations are generally welcomed and tolerated. **Table 3.1** shows a cross-section of student groups and outfits before and after *Reformasi* and the division into components considered to be “intra-campus” (formally established within campus and recognised by the university), “mezzo-campus” (not formally established within campus and recognised by the university but operate within the campus and have strong links with students in the university) and

“extra-campus” (operate outside campus and involves students in its processes) within the campus of *Universitas Indonesia*. “Mezzo-campus” and “extra-campus” groups are interchangeable and fluid, depending on the culture, composition and formal regulations of each individual university campuses. The flowering of ever more student groups and political under-bows (or wings) post-*Reformasi*,

TABLE 3.1
Student groups and outfits before and after *Reformasi* within
Universitas Indonesia

	Intra-campus	Mezzo-campus (youth wing under-bows, <i>aliran</i> groups, etc.)	Extra-campus (NGOs, social movements, boarding houses, etc.)
Before <i>Reformasi</i>	University-level BEM, faculty- level BEM, MWA, KSM, Barisan Merah Saga, BOE, OKK	PMII (1972), GMNI (1954), HMI (1947)	Dakwah Tarbiyah
After <i>Reformasi</i> (Post-1998)		KAMMI (1998), SALAM (1998), PPDMS (2004), TIDAR (2008)	FLAC, Nurul Fikri Kepesantren, Indonesia Mengajar (IM)

*Note **BEM:** *Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa* (Executive Body for University Students), **MWA:** *Majelis Wali Amanat* (Student’s Board of Trustees), **KSM:** *Kelompok Studi Mahasiswa* (University Students’ Study Groups), **BOE:** *Badan Otonom Economica* (Autonomous Body for Economics, Student-based group and magazine that covers socio-political and economics issues), **OKK:** *Orientasi Kampus Kehidupan* (Campus-Life Orientation for Freshmen), **PMII:** *Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Islamic Student Movement), **KAMMI:** *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia* (Indonesian Muslim University Students’ Action Union), **SALAM:** *Nuansa Islam Mahasiswa Universitas Indonesia* (Student Islamic Movement University of Indonesia), **PPDMS:** *Program Pembinaan Sumber Daya Manusia Strategis* (Program for Strategic Human Resources Development), **TIDAR:** *Tunas Indonesia Raya* (The Gerindra Party or the Great Indonesia Movement Party’s organisational youth wing), **GMNI:** *Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesia National Student Movement), **HMI:** *Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia* (Muslim Students’ Association), **FLAK:** Future Leaders for Anti-Corruption


especially among categories designated under “mezzo-campus” and the growing influence from the “extra-campus” sectors, is indicative of a new and intriguing trend that has generally embraced the social norms of the contemporary youth-scape in its bid to attract students into its fold.

THE NEW NORMAL WITHIN CAMPUS POLITICS

While BEM (*Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa*) or the Executive Body for University Students have remained the quintessential rallying platform and focal point for *mahasiswa*-based activities at the university level, ranging from orientation activities to student welfare services, the locus of student-centric activism and its attendant role have recently shown signs of a shift towards other emerging student and political groups—especially those that appeared after 1998. These groups include the various hues of Islamic-based student and missionary organisations (mezzo-campus) as well as the new phenomenon of private-funded boarding schools or modern *pesantrens*. These primarily functioned as close-knitted ecosystems and communities providing accommodation, scholarships, tuition and empowerment programmes designed to keep its members equipped and occupied within the bounds of its influence (extra-campus). The networks from these groups extend vicariously to organisations within and outside campus, including BEM. BEM as an umbrella organisation has often relied on its faculty-level counterparts (semi-autonomous in principle), satellite groups and ancillary arms to assist in the dissemination of information on matters pertaining to activism and the nation. This structure has seen few changes in its drive to get the student population more involved in its agenda and mobilisation, often employing various trendy and innovative means to get their messages and ideas across—the likes of flash mobs, social media, online petitions and opportunistic tie-ins with related events outside campus. Disinterest and passivity among students, especially with matters pertaining to politics, remained a challenge to the rank-and-file within BEM. The constant need to re-engage the student body in political and national matters have shown that BEM is steadily losing its traditional monopoly stake over student bodies within campuses. Nonetheless, BEM still exists as the official

university-sanctioned secular student-based organisation that runs on the legitimacy of student votes and participation. While its status as an independent, autonomous body has since been challenged by the student community, it has been consistently used as the de facto platform for leverage and networking among aspiring student leaders keen to gain access into businesses and political circles. **Figure 3.1** shows a breakdown of the organisational model of BEM, its faculty-level satellite and ancillary arms.

FIGURE 3.1
Organisational model of BEM, its faculty-level satellite
and ancillary arms



*Note **KABID SOSPOL**: *Kepala Bidang Sosial Politik* (Head of Department of Social and Politics), **KADEP PUSGERAK**: *Kepala Departemen Pusat Kajian dan Studi Gerakan* (Head of Department of Policy Analysis), **KADEP AKPROP**: *Kepala Departemen untuk Aksi dan Propaganda* (Head of Department of Action and Propaganda)

KABID SOSPOL, the socio-politico arm of BEM, usually works in tandem with KADEP PUSGERAK, the Department of Studies on Popular Movements and KADEP AKPROP, the Department for Action and Propaganda, in its dissemination of political thought and action. Although official, BEM has recently come under suspicion for being agents of the university system. Clout has also started to shift from more official sources of student mobilisation to less officially recognised ones. This model of BEM is increasingly under threat from newer permutations of “opportunity structures” and “resource mobilisation” run by various mezzo-campus and extra-campus student organisations post-1998. In conjunction with current social trends prevalent among youth, these emerging *mahasiswa-*

centric groups masquerading as activity outlets tend to take up one of these four characteristics: (i) pandering to a non-partisan, secular-nationalist image/projection as a priority, (ii) appealing to a reformed religious identity and piety allegedly devoid of affixed political affiliations for the religiously-conscious among traditional *aliran* and *dakwah* (missionary) groups, (iii) incentivised “social providers” and exclusive student “groomers” gazetted by specific conditions set in a merit-based recruitment process, and (iv) the rise of new varieties of youth-based civil societies, NGOs and social movements. These characteristics correspond to the contemporary projection of post-authoritarian Indonesian youth depicted previously as being apolitical yet politically-aware, drawn to issues with a strong sense of identity as well as their general idealism and openness towards opportunities and material incentives. In a post-*Reformasi* Indonesia sans crisis situation, the impetus and rewards for participating in activism are no longer merely idealistic or spiritual. In order to preserve youth members’ allegiance to the organisation, a list of material incentives and advancement opportunities are crucial, especially with recruiting groups hungry for new members to fill its rank-and-file. Although active politicking and campaign drives have since been tacitly discouraged and even disallowed within campuses post-*Reformasi*, these newer student groups and youth wings have responded in kind by disguising or downplaying their true identities and agenda while appealing to a more universalist, secular image managed through the inconspicuous channelling of funds and energies towards non-politicised activities such as leadership training camps, youth development strategies and networking leisure events. The next part of this book will focus on the rise of these new student functionaries and groups, touching on their inherent differences in recruitment, mobilisation and their organisational processes.

INCENTIVISED “SOCIAL PROVIDERS” AND “STUDENT-GROOMERS”

A new “modern” concept of religious boarding schools or *pesantren* modelled after Islamic principles and the *dakwah* movement while enjoying close ties with the PKS—a prominent Islamic-based political party especially among well-educated and devout Muslim youth—burst into the post-1998 political scene. Unparalleled in their

networks and organisational machinery, these devout Muslim youth have been successful in garnering a groundswell of support within leading university campuses. PKS emphasis and coverage on youth and youth-based activism is perhaps the most comprehensive and institutionalised among the political parties. A youth-centric outfit of the PKS, also known as PPSDMS *Nurul Fikri* (*Program Pembinaan Sumber Daya Manusia Strategis Nurul Fikri* or Strategic Human Resource Development Programme of the Nurul Fikri Foundation), has the specific vision and cause in investing and moulding future leaders of Indonesia among the politically ambitious who will be equipped with a “comprehensive understanding of Islam, high in credibility and integrity, having a mature disposition, moderate and concerned with the life of the nation and state”.⁵² Following its vision, PPSDMS *Nurul Fikri* (or PPSDMS NF) has the explicit mission of grooming future leaders of Indonesia, having a lofty ambition of situating themselves as the foremost student leadership and development centre in the country. This organisation prides itself on recruiting the cream of the crop among university students by offering attractive stipends, leadership training and extra-curricular activities, networking opportunities and promises of political career opportunities and advancement within its much-coveted cadre membership upon graduation.

PPSDMS *Nurul Fikri*'s cosy yet ambivalent ties with its political ambit PKS and its popular appeal among well-heeled and educated Muslim youth of the post-authoritarian generation has generally been four-fold: (i) PKS, its financial backer and ideological advisor, has maintained its centrality on its inclusive and non-*aliran* stance when it comes to recruiting Muslim youth from various mixed socio-cultural backgrounds (i.e. NU or Muhammadiyah). (ii) PKS and especially PPSDMS NF positions itself as a religious movement rather than a political party, or at the very least appears to be strongly motivated by a religiously-inspired moral and ethical outlook based on modernist Islam—the interests and causes it champions reflects wider Muslim and pro-nationalist concerns that underpins political activism as a form of “religious duty”. (iii) PPSDMS NF has a strong reputation in its merit-based recruitment and promotion process among its members and cadres in which the collective is appar-

ently prized above the personal. (iv) The combination of spiritual and socio-cultural functions, services and ideologies coupled with free tuition, boarding and extra-curricular courses and activities all consolidated into a packaged, well-delineated programme with guidelines and KPIs (key performance indicators) aimed at grooming and developing aspiring youth leaders.⁵³ Activities involved include a heavy emphasis on *dakwah* activities such as *halqa*, *daura*, *pengajian*

FIGURE 3.2
Calendar of events for PPSDMS women’s hostel in the month of May 2012

SENIN		SELASA		RABU		KAMIS		JUMAT		SABTU	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
		04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00
			FM	TBI		FM	TPD	TPD			TTA
								Pembinaan keluarga Islam			
7	8	9	10	11	12						
04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00
		FM	TBI		KFP	TPD	TPD			TTA	Acara Rhusus Rumbel
					Sharing Alumni					08.00-12.00	
14	15	16	17	18	19						
04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00
		FM	SA	FM	Apel	TPD	TTA				
			09.00-22.00								
21	22	23	24	25	26						
04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00
		FM	FM	TPD	TTA						
28	29	30	31								
04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00	04.00-04.30 04.30-05.00
		FM	FM	FM							

*Note **QL:** *Qiyamulail & Sahur* (Prayers), **WBS:** *Waktu Berkah Subuh* (Morning Prayers), **TBI:** *Training Bahasa Inggris* (English Language Training for TOEFL Preparation), **SA:** *Sharing Alumni* (Alumni Sharing), **FM:** *Family Meeting*, **TPD:** *Training Pengembangan Diri* (Self-improvement Training), **KFP:** *Kajian Fikih Perempuan* (Study of Islamic Jurisprudence for Women), **TTA:** *Tahsin & Tahfidz Al Quran* [Others include **KIK:** *Kajian Islam Kontemporer* (Study of Contemporary Islam), **TJ:** *Training Jurnalistik* (Training in Journalism), **SP:** *Studi Pustaka* (Study of Documentation), **DT:** *Dialog Tokoh* (Dialogue with Leaders), **DPK:** *Diskusi Pasca Kampus* (Post-campus Discussion), **KPI:** *Kajian Politik Islam* (Study of Political Islam), **AP:** *Aktivitas Pribadi* (Individual Free-time), **OR:** *Olah Raga* (Sports), **JW:** *Jaulah Warga*, **KA:** *Kajian Akhlak* (Study of Morality), **TDS:** *Tadarus (QS. Al-Kahfi)*, **PK:** *Program Kultural* (Cultural Programme), **IK:** *Isya Berjamaa dan Kulturem*, **KT:** *Kajian Tafsir* (Study of the Exegesis of the Quran), **EDF:** *English Discussion Forum*, **KT:** *Kunjungan Tokoh* (Visitation from Leaders)]

(religious lectures), *liqa* (meeting), *rihla* (tour), *mabit* (staying overnight), seminar and workshops.⁵⁴ **Figure 3.2** shows a typical calendar of events and schedule of a member of PPSDMS *Nurul Fikri*.⁵⁵

The schedule for a prospective student under the PPSDMS *Nurul Fikri* programme revolves not only around the usual Islamic obligations and observances but also includes a litany of other extra-curricular and enrichment activities. An example would be the training of the English language for preparation for TOEFL examinations. Others would include journalistic training, sports, an English discussion forum as well as teachings on contemporary issues of Islam. In turn, the student member is evaluated based on his or her school grades and participation in these activities. Leadership skills are also particularly emphasised and groomed. Senior-junior interactions are often the foundation on which the programme is built. Scholarships funding, bursaries and subsidies are thus dependent on how well the prospective student manages his or her time in school, participation in PPSDMS-sponsored events and interactions with seniors and student leaders.⁵⁶ Members are also encouraged to be vocal or take part in student leadership roles in various capacities, including in BEM and other university networks. PPSDMS *Nurul Fikri's* appeal thus lies not in the directness of its recruitment but on its competitive, well-rounded programme and selectiveness in its candidates. According to Kemal Stamboel, PPSDMS has been strategic in its informal recruitment process, which emphasised an indirect, soft approach.⁵⁷ Its wide range of enrichment activities and opportunities for personal advancement are also a pull factor for students keen on upgrading and improving themselves.

REFORMED STUDENT ALIRANS AND DAKWAH GROUPS

Student-based *aliran* groupings or *ormas* such as the fiercely independent HMI and *Dakwah Tarbiyah* have traditionally been the forerunner not only of missionary activities within campuses but also of Islamic student activism. They had their roots in the student movements of the 1950s and 1960s but gained prominence in the late 1980s and 1990s as active protagonists against the Suharto government.⁵⁸ Following *Reformasi*, other more recent offshoots of the traditional Nahdlatul Ulama like KAMMI (established 1998

in Malang) and autonomous outfits like SALAM have sprung up in campuses throughout Indonesia. Primarily seen as *Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* (LDK) or the Campus Dakwah Board, they proliferated around state and Islamic universities by filling up the space where the prior secular-nationalist student organisations and groups previously dominated. They are representative not only of the growing trend of Islamisation and a heightened religious piety among the youth but also, more importantly, the reluctance to be associated or affiliated with organisations that have anything to do with the political process. Correspondingly, these LDKs preach a range of ideologies that often eschew matters dealing with politics and the state but appeal to Muslim sensibilities of social injustice within the *ummah*, Islamic obligations and observances. International outrages against Muslims have taken centre stage over proximate or national issues. They are also very vocal on issues pertaining to the plight of the Rohingyas, the Palestine intransigence, the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and the Syria crisis, among others. While an increasingly Arabo-centric perspective has been emphasised in some quarters, the post-*Reformasi* university landscape has seen polarisation and competition as well as mutual cooperation among local-based student outfits, rival organisations and more “modernist” Islamic variants.

For example, *Dakwah Tarbiyah*, an “extra-campus” *ormas*, is one of the troika of student-based autonomous Islamic groups that was influential in campaigning against the then Suharto government. It saw itself as an underground or “secret” Muslim student network (*hamniyah* in Arabic or *kerahasiaan* in Bahasa) and a protector of conservative Islam in an era where Islam and its observances were seen to be repressed by the New Order regime’s NKK/BKK policies. Following the rapprochement of Islam and state relations as well as the rise of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, or Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals), *Dakwah Tarbiyah* became more conspicuous in asserting its Islamic values through missionary activities and a greater involvement in campus politics. Its members are a dominant fixture in BEM elections at the university and faculty levels.⁵⁹ It draws its inspiration from Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic movements in South Asia and maintains its stance of the inseparability of state and religion. In recent years, its wide influence

and networks within student unions and BEM, however, has made *Dakwah Tarbiyah* a unique coordinating body within and outside the campus, especially among political parties (mainly PKS) and the student population.

SALAM (*Nuansa Islam Mahasiswa*), on the other hand, is an Islamic student group that emerged post-1998 and is known for its distinct adherence and active enforcement of Islamic values and piety within the campus. SALAM began with the intention of uniting various Islamic and missionary outfits at the faculty level under a single umbrella. As a student-based organisation, SALAM sees itself as a representation of the student body and society (*umat*), seeking to involve itself in issues of political or Islamic interests.⁶⁰ It is especially vocal on international issues dealing with the Palestinian Intifada and the Syrian crisis as well as more local ones such as controversies over the *halal* certification law and the anti-pornographic law.⁶¹ An aspect of SALAM is its fierce activism (in the form of *Aktivist Dakwah Kampus*) and stance especially on issues closely-related to Islam—with an emphasis on the individual to take action. SALAM has its own research unit, called SPACE (SALAM Palestine Centre) for international issues and Kastrad (*Kajian Strategis Dakwah*) for national issues. It is also well known for its capabilities in mobilising various Muslim student groups. Outside the campus, SALAM is known for its networks with all the Islamic parties in parliament (PKS, PAN, PKB and the United Development Party or PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) and aims to build dialogue among them. Within the campus, there has been cooperation among fellow Muslim organisations like KAMMI (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia*) and other LDKs.⁶² Due to SALAM's special status as an LDK, it is often seen as the main coordinating body between extra-campus outfits and intra-campus bodies.⁶³

YOUTH WINGS AND ORGANISATIONS WITH A NON-PARTISAN TWIST

Sensing the political ennui and tedium surrounding campus life, political youth wings have resorted to downplaying their identity in a bid to court more adherents into their fold. TIDAR, a junior arm and political youth wing of Gerindra, has in recent years has adopted a different strategy in its recruitment process.⁶⁴ Riding

on the bandwagon of the Jokowi-Ahok performance win at the Jakarta gubernatorial elections, TIDAR has tried to rebrand itself as a vibrant youth association while distancing from its links with Prabowo and the Djodjohadikusumo family, primarily because of his tenuous human-rights track record. Although still a secular nationalist youth wing of the Gerindra party, the political aspect has been de-emphasised to allow for a focus on more “marketable”, non-partisan qualities. TIDAR stands by its rather tacky guideline of “Five Love Philosophies” (*Filosofi Lima Cinta*) of “Self-love” (*Cinta Diri*), “Mutual-love” (*Cinta Sesama*), “Love for learning” (*Cinta Belajar*), “Love for the good-mannered” (*Cinta Kesantunan*) and “Love for Indonesia” (*Cinta Indonesia*). The politico-nationalist aspect of “*Cinta Indonesia*” has been subordinated to a vague expression of “feel good” nostalgia and courteous society within the traditional confines of Indonesian society. Even Adrianus Waranei Muntu, the head of East Jakarta TIDAR, admits to the common perception of TIDAR to Gerindra and its inevitable politico-face of Prabowo Subianto—thus the need for TIDAR to demonstrate its independence and alleged detachment from the party.⁶⁵ However, TIDAR is a unique case and, besides its inherent association with Prabowo, it prides itself in having a “clean” image with no recent scandals (compared with corruption scandals plaguing the Democratic Party and PKS—political parties that have a large youthful following). Since its establishment in 2008, TIDAR has put in substantive efforts into its public relations (PR) machinery, relying on innovative recruitment methods via social media, flash-mobs, events and mass gatherings. The programmes that TIDAR offers also deviate from its background as a political youth wing, resembling something more akin to an eclectic self-help civil society group while trying to dodge its implicit relationship with the Djodjohadikusumo family. Programmes such as “Schools for All” (*Sekolah untuk Semua*) and the “TIDAR care programme” (TIDAR *peduli bangsa*) emphasise the social aspects of community power rather than the political aspects of the Gerindra youth wing.

GMNI (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia*), or the Indonesian National Student Movement, a loosely-organised but historically prescient *ormas* (established 1954), is another example of a student-

based organisation that has chosen to focus on its Sukarnoist-socialist roots and modern-style bohemian, leftist-liberal trajectory while eschewing political affiliation. GMNI has been closely affiliated with the PNI during the Old Order and in turn its newest incarnation—the PDIP.⁶⁶ Its draw is its emphasis on the ideology of *Marhaenisme* and appeal to the intrinsic attraction youth have for rock bands and loud music. GMNI in the past had been an oppositional outfit to KAMI (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia*) and was particularly entwined in the politics of the Old Order.⁶⁷ In its more modern garb, post-*Reformasi* GMNI has evolved to be a non-conformist, free-spirited community of student representatives articulating an alternative voice against the values of consumerism, Islamism and politicking.⁶⁸ A small, tight-knitted group whose commonality is perhaps predicated more on their camaraderie based on a passion for music and grassroots interaction (of the indie variety) rather than ideology or political sloganeering, the GMNI of today (and particularly its branches in *Universitas Indonesia*) is the antithesis of its more militant and active face in the late 1960s. Nevertheless, it has a particular non-partisan, non-conformist appeal to students who are usually left-of-centre on the political spectrum, secular-minded, into indie rock, predominantly nationalist and deeply concerned about the indigenous state of affairs of the republic at the grassroots level.

NEW VARIETIES OF YOUTH-BASED NGOs AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

During the efflorescence of Indonesian NGOs in the 1960s and 1970s, they were mainly of the development sort that emerged following debates concerning how best to help the disadvantaged in Indonesia. These early NGOs helped to bridge the gap between the goals of government-based development programmes and the needs of society. Advocacy NGOs started their rounds in the late 1970s in response to the marginal impact some development programmes had on society as well as their perceived inequities.⁶⁹ In subsequent years, many small and independent NGOs have sprang up in communities around Indonesia—reaching well into the range of 4,000 to 6,000 in number—before hitting a brick wall during the New Order era as university students, one of their greatest patrons and participants, were de-politicised vis-à-vis the Campus Normalisation regulations.

Then, the press was subjected to ruthless scrutiny, journalists were forced to practise self-censorship, midnight phone calls “suggesting” changes to editorial policies were common and sometimes direct threats were made to enforce the withholding of certain articles from being published. Political parties were largely stripped of their potency while the shroud of *budaya bisu* (culture of silence) engulfed the country in what was seen as an era of a silenced and emasculated press. The death knell for further autonomous participation in civil society came following the implementation of the principle of *perwadahkan tunggal* (meaning “the only, rightful place”, originating from a Javanese term), whereby all labour unions, youth and women’s associations, farmers’ and fishermen’s associations and popular social movements were simultaneously placed under the national umbrella of coordinating bodies recognised only by the central government. Nevertheless, several of these NGOs and social bodies continued to function clandestinely with foreign aid and local backing.

NGOs and social movements poured onto the Indonesia political and social landscape again during the twilight years of Suharto’s rule. The prodigious growth and increased clout within the NGO sector then was primarily generated by the perceived inability of political parties and other students’ organisations to voice the aspirations or to represent the interests of the people. Oftentimes they acted as “pressure valve” organisations that allowed disaffected people to vent their frustrations and dissatisfactions with the government and its development programmes—although these NGOs have also fallen under the purview of the national coordinating bodies. They were instrumental in fomenting, consolidating and organising mass protests and providing vital support for the ousting of the Suharto regime.

Civil societies, grassroots organisations and NGOs in current decentralised Indonesia have unparalleled access to a newfound freedom under the *Reformasi* banner. They have in turn taken on new permutations in response to the new post-*Reformasi* climate and contemporary issues of concern among the public. No longer restricted by political or governmental red tape, they have greater leeway in their expression. They are also seen by youth and university students as a more preferred method of passive, indirect

participation in opposition to actual political participation. These NGOs/civil societies continued to function and educate the public by providing commentary and services on the social and material plight of economically and socially disadvantaged Indonesians. More importantly, current NGOs situate themselves as “self-help” entities, taking it upon themselves rather than the government in providing important sources of assistance and complementary aid in areas where government-linked initiatives were seen to flounder or stagnate. An example is the *Indonesia Mengajar* programme, founded by Anies Baswedan, the Rector of Paramadina University and inspired by a similar programme in the 1950s known as *Pengerahan Tenaga Mahasiswa*.⁷⁰ The programme works on recruiting, selecting and training Indonesia’s best and recent graduates from universities and placing them for a year in isolated and impoverished places across the archipelago. Although education levels within the archipelago have been rising, with literacy rates at 92 per cent, it has often been at the expense of the rural or non-Java outer islands. Funding for education from the central government has been unevenly spread out and there is a lack of teachers, especially in the outer islands. Under this programme, children from far-flung rural areas around the archipelago without formal education will stand to reap the benefits from the volunteer teacher participants (*pengajar muda*).

Another prominent social movement pioneered and run by recent university graduates that stands up for the contemporary social issues it champions indirectly via the younger generation is *FLAC Indonesia* (Future Leaders for Anti-Corruption, Indonesia).⁷¹ A flagship of the PPSDMS youth organisation, this movement subscribes into the current youth logic by committing to the use of storytelling, play-acting, song and games in a bid to appeal to and educate the younger generation on the potential abuses of corruption, with the idea of instilling the concept of anti-corruption from young. Frustrated with the current inability of the Indonesian authorities in tackling corruption at the official level, the founders of *FLAC Indonesia* sought their solutions in “anti-corruption” education among Indonesian children by organising events, road shows, movie screenings and telecasts at designated spots around the archipelago. Apolitical in nature, *FLAC Indonesia* is the prime example of con-

temporaneous, indirect participation in the nation's socio-political process by contemporary youth and *mahasiswa* without actual engagement with politics. Fatigue and disillusionment derived from the often inept and corrupt political outlets have pushed more youth into the relative fringes of social movements and civil societies—seen as the better arbiter of the affairs of the state.

THE GLASS CEILING OF YOUTH REGENERATION

The building of a core cadre grouping within some political parties has been more democratic and less exclusive than others. Promotion within ranks in youth wings varies in accordance to individual cadre training and advancement processes. Nevertheless, there have been debates on whether cadre advancements in party youth wings have been equitable and fair among aspiring youth. Foremost among them is the high barriers of entry into more senior levels of hierarchy due to the presence of an inner “elite circle”.⁷² Dynastic politics and family-ism is still an unacknowledged truth within party political circles. Puan Maharani of PDI-P, Yudhoyono's influence on the Democratic Party or the Djodjohadikusumo familial connection within Gerindra are prime examples of the still dominant and entrenched interest of family-style clientalist politics. Generally present within traditional or personalistic-based parties, these influences may be seen as an impediment to the ambitions of candidates yearning for a more prominent political appointment. Very few have achieved high-ranking positions within the party cadre the exceptions being Anas Urbaningrum, the ex-chairman of the Democratic Party—one without a familial tie to a political dynasty. Nonetheless, his meteoric rise had been accompanied by an equally portentous fall into the political abyss when he was implicated for graft-related corruption.⁷³ Although the imprint of youth has been integral to Indonesia's political struggles, political stability post-*Reformasi* has somewhat stifled the progression of fresh, youthful faces within politics, so much so that there has been lamentations of “*belum ada tokoh muda*” (the non-appearance of young political leaders) for the 2014 general elections.⁷⁴

Conformity to party norms via peer pressure, group think and internal checks oftentimes leave newly-minted cadres discouraged

and even disillusioned despite their initial idealism. Individual cadres tend not to stand out unnecessarily for fear of being ostracised. Even the PKS, lauded among political parties as having one of the most meritocratic and organised cadre training systems, has its inherent flaws. Among them is the overt emphasis on conformity to a certain type of group identity with the need to uphold an appearance of strong moral standing as one goes up the ranks—contributing to the cultivation of an ideal and pristine Muslim persona. The PKS, for example, adopts a “point-scoring” system used to rate or grade the level of commitment of a new member.⁷⁵ Senior PKS members are implicitly rewarded for doing additional tasks that are above the obligatory rituals and tasks of a Muslim. There is a need for PKS cadres to perform the *Sunnah* communal prayers and the non-obligatory fasting for extra points in order to be promoted to the higher level of *Naqib* (leader). No points are given, however, for the performance of obligatory duties such as the obligatory five daily prayers.

There is also the claim of alleged elitism within the cadre system and recruitment process. Student-based organisations and study circles such as the PPDMS programme (the main avenue for future appointment into cadre-training within PKS) focus its recruitment strategies and energies on the best and brightest of the *mahasiswa* population, targeting model students with exceptional grade point averages. Found only in six of the best state universities in Indonesia, the programme has often been criticised for having an elitist bent—not to mention its stringent demands in terms of the adherence to its schedule of extra-curricular activities and obligatory Islamic observances. Even more controversial is the closed system of training that creates a distinct “in-group” and “out-group” within the youth wing itself—one that is prone to inner divisions and factionalism.

YOUTH AND THE NEW SOCIAL MEDIA

REASSESSING THE AMBIVALENT IMPACT OF THE NEW SOCIAL MEDIA AMONG YOUTH

The debut of newspapers and print capitalism in nineteenth century Dutch-controlled East Indies not only reinforced notions of a quantum leap in the conception of both space and time among its inhabitants but it also facilitated the imaginings of nationhood and nationalism in Indonesia vis-à-vis the secularisation of the vernacular language Bahasa Indonesia.⁷⁶ In quite similar terms, the advent and rousing embrace of various new social media platforms on the Internet in contemporary post-*Reformasi* Indonesia seemed to mirror the previous revolution in terms of novelty, only to stop short on scale or significance. To put into perspective: If Benedict Anderson's rhetoric of museums, census and maps was a viable precursor to centralised nationalism within modern Indonesia, the enthusiastic reception and ubiquity of the Internet, Facebook and Twitter within an already nationalised Indonesia is perhaps the best reflection of a post-*Reformasi* landscape—the celebration and reification of the twin pillars of “democratisation” and “decentralisation” in the virtual world on the real.⁷⁷ Nonetheless, online and virtual democratisation and decentralisation do not always reflect realities on the ground. Due to the apparent weaker ties online as compared with the stronger bonds found in personal or occupational relations offline, social media activism have often carried a stigma commonly referred to as “slacktivism”.⁷⁸ Current discourses on “slacktivism” (lazy or armchair activism) show that online public participation (or its lack thereof) in modern democracies is often banal, facetious and are inadequate in transforming democratic institutions or re-vitalising institutional stagnancy. It may be a social revolution, but it is social revolution

at its most mundane. Alternatively, social media activism may have its strengths, especially during moments of crisis, as evident in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. While not overtly exaggerating the virtues of social media, it does play a role in the quick dissemination of information while bypassing conventional restrictions and regulations. Nonetheless, the new social media's overall political and social impact in a "politics-as-usual" Indonesia is still one that is open-ended.

Social media platforms in Indonesia have never been freer in a more open, participatory climate. To date, Indonesia has experienced phenomenal growth in social media usage, with 90 per cent of online activities dedicated to browsing social networking sites.⁷⁹ Indonesia is currently the third largest nation on Facebook and fifth on Twitter with 43 million and 29.4 million users respectively.⁸⁰ From a mere 15,000 bloggers in the blogosphere in 2007, the number of Indonesian accounts has grown to five million in 2011. Indonesia has even been dubbed the "Twitter Nation" due to it being found to be the most Twitter-addicted nation in the world by a ComScore report.⁸¹ Social media as a whole is making inroads into the social life of Indonesians everywhere. However, its itinerant venture into the political realm has been ambivalent at most. The chances of social media activism being ever translated into actual populist political activism have been few and far in between. Important and successful social media activism that stands out included the "gecko vs. crocodile case" (or the KPK case) and the Prita Mulyasari libel case (the Prita case).⁸² On the other hand, high-profile cases involving usage and coverage from social media that have failed to capture widespread support from the public include the Lapindo mudflow incident and the Ahmadiyah case.⁸³

The ability of the new social media to capture the imagination of a youthful audience is quite substantial. Indonesian youth engagement with these new social media platforms has been considerable. Yet, when it comes to online engagement and participation in politics, the youth responses have been reticent. This is somewhat in tandem with the RSIS/LP3ES survey. That survey found only a paltry one per cent of interviewed urban youth ever depended on the Internet for information on political matters as a main source. Is this

truly reflective of the impact and exposure of the new online social media despite it being a non-mainstream outlet? Is the Internet as a social networking tool, with its seemingly unparalleled coverage and wide usage in Indonesian society, an unreliable vehicle when it comes to actualising its inherent function as a form of activism and popular participation, especially among youth?

The glut of vacuous, politically biased and inaccurate propaganda or news items have certainly been the main obstacle deterring youth from taking the Internet seriously as a reliable source for political information. Its accessibility only to the urbanised and the onerous task of sieving out the wheat from the chaff in an online environment already discounts the Internet as a conventional, labour-free tool. Nonetheless, the myriad of exhaustive information accompanying a simple click of the mouse tempts the user with an unprecedented ease of access virtually at his or her fingertips. The level of sophistication and media-savviness required of a user consigns these new social media tools to the domain of the young and trendy. The Internet is also an outlet that is relatively unblemished by governmental regulations or political partisanship, making it an attractive channel for non-mainstream information. In addition, different social media platforms have been developed to serve a plethora of purposes according to their innate functions. Although connectivity is vital, the various emerging social media platforms or information and communication technologies (ICTs) expound and extenuate different aspects of its functions. For instance, Facebook has established itself primarily as a tool for social marketing and online profiling, its political implications and reach is perhaps limited only by its inherent function. Twitter, on the other hand, has capitalised on its skyrocket appeal as a text-based medium that excels in the transmission of short, condensed versions of micro-information instantaneously—almost akin to “sound-bites”. While Facebook has its fair share of loyal adherents, its inter-linked, networked function has largely located its efficacy as a tool exclusively for interactive online profiling and socialisation. Notwithstanding this, a personal page on Facebook has quotas limited at 5,000 “friends” and 500 “likes” (although fan pages can have an almost unlimited number of “likes”). Despite some impressive numbers on some of the fan pages

in Facebook among Indonesian personalities, it is largely Twitter that is making its rounds among youth as the preferred facility and tool for rapid information dissemination and circulation. It is almost non-static, fast, relatively user-friendly and hassle-free nature allows Twitter users to enjoy a larger exposure in a short span of time. It also has the upper hand in its almost continuous update of “tweets”, short messages and micro-blogs that are close to real-time and directed to an audience (whether phantom or not), termed aptly as “followers”. Nevertheless, it has a limit of 140 characters. In a fast-paced, contemporary culture of consumption where the instant is preferred over the deliberative, this might prove to be more of a boon. Most youth generally set up Twitter accounts primarily as “followers”. By doing so, they are privy to a daily dosage of “tweets” (or a short burst of inconsequential information) of their selected choice.

Realising the untapped potential of the new social media outlet, especially on Twitter, politicians have jumped onto the technological bandwagon in droves in order to court its more selective and media-savvy audience. Among notable and rising politicians armed with Twitter accounts include Budiman Sudjatmiko (PDIP, 136,644 followers), Aburizal Bakrie (Golkar, 139,800 followers), Tifatul Sembiring (PKS, 594,908 followers), Ulil Abshar Abdalla (PD, 290,423 followers) and Prabowo Subianto (Gerindra, 202,957 followers). Individual political parties have also set up their own official Twitter accounts: PDIP with 15,179 followers, DP with 8,235 followers, PKS with 49,415 followers, Golkar with 10,171 followers and Gerindra with 22,502 followers. **Figure 4.1** shows the number of Twitter followers for the five prominent politicians in graph format. **Figure 4.2** shows their corresponding political parties and the number of Twitter followers. At a glance, individual personalities and what they have to say rather than political parties stood out as wielding considerably more attention over the masses. Another good indicator of influence and impact online is the number of “re-tweets” one gets from their “followers”.

Twitter is currently seen as the more viable tool to inform and influence public opinion in Indonesia. In terms of the number of Twitter followers among political personalities, Tifatul Sembiring garners the most followers with an online visibility at a resounding 594,908. His account is also one of the most “re-tweeted” ones. This

FIGURE 4.1
 Number of Twitter followers by prominent politicians





FIGURE 4.2
 Number of Twitter followers by political parties



is perhaps not surprising, as he is a founding member of the PKS, served as party president from 2004 to 2009 before being appointed as the Minister for Communication and Information Technology. In addition, he is also a controversial figure even during his term as minister. Titaful had attempted to pass policies that support a tightening of the legal framework known as UITE (or *Undang-Undang Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronik*) in order to contain what is deemed to be “detrimental” content on the Internet.⁸⁴ In the realm of Twitter, his ministry says it has plans to target and block anonymous and offensive accounts on the popular social networking

site.⁸⁵ In a post-*Reformasi* Indonesia where press freedom is prized above all things, regulation and censorship are often empty threats. Governments have not been as adept or willing in their approach to information control on the Internet.⁸⁶ On the political front, PKS seems to be the party that is most actively engaged with Twitter, with the greatest number of followers at 49,415. Quite understandably, it is also the party that has distinguished itself by its heavy emphasis and investments on its youth. It also helps that the Minister for Communication and Information is the face of PKS. PKS is extremely active in online outreach via various media outlets for their political campaigns. Party cadres are encouraged to use social media, especially Twitter, to build close relations with their constituents.

Even so, the fluidity and vast horizontal network links of the Internet and its social media constituents bode well for the quick diffusion and circulation of information, accelerating the pace of mobilisation and demonstrative activities. However, this does not mean it will be successfully replicated in the real world. Studying the success rate of online activism and participation being translated offline, Merlyna Lim argue that the transition from virtual participation in social media to actualised offline political activism requires the former to translate into the latter the “principles of contemporary culture of consumption”, that is, light package (content that can be enjoyed without spending too much time, can be understood without deep reflection and usually having a hype-based component), headline appetite (a condition where information is condensed to accommodate a short attention span and one-liner conversations) and trailer vision (an oversimplified, hyped and sensationalised story rather than a substantial one or the oversimplified representation of actual information).⁸⁷ In university campuses pre-*Reformasi*, student newspapers and campus magazines have traditionally been the agent provocateur among students. The new phenomena of social media activism do not look set to replace the role of traditional forms of resistance and activism. Its hold over the public’s imagination has been gaining ground, nonetheless. The veil of anonymity and access to low-risk activism have made these outlets an easy avenue for superficial participation, albeit the lack of sustained engagement. In an increasingly politically lethargic and heterogeneous climate, the

new social media work best within the context of meta-narratives, icons and symbolisms that appeal to social justice and civic engagement. Nevertheless, the limits of these new virtual mediums should also be acknowledged.

Among youth and *mahasiswa* that were surveyed previously by RSIS/LP3ES, a majority of them responded overwhelming to television as being their main source of political and information input, at 87.7 per cent. This is hardly surprising as following *Reformasi*, the deregulation of the television industry has seen an outburst of TV stations that are rapidly diversifying and decentralising, catering to various segments of society with a proliferation of news, current affairs, political forums and talk-show programmes never imagined or seen before under Suharto's autocratic reign.⁸⁸ Since *Reformasi*, over 500 private television stations have sprung up in the archipelago, on top of state-owned stations.⁸⁹ Nearly every Indonesian household with access to a TV signal has at least one television set. The ubiquity and reach of the television is far more influential than the traditional sources of radio and newspaper or non-traditional sources such as the new social media platforms. In particular, *Televisi Republik Indonesia* (TVRI), a state-owned national television network, is probably

TABLE 4.1
Indonesia's leading commercial TV broadcasters 2011
by audience share⁹⁰

Station	Group	Audience share, 2011 (%)	Rank
RCTI	MNC Group	17	1
SCTV	EMTEK	16	2
TransTV	CT Group	14	3
MNCTV	MNC Group	12	4
Indosiar	EMTEK	10	5
Trans7	CT Group	10	6
GlobalTV	MNC Group	8	7
ANTV	Visi Media	7	8
TVOne	Visi Media	5	9
MetroTV	Media Group	3	10

the only free-to-air television channel that people in the countryside can receive. Several well-known TV channels come under this network, including the popular Global TV channel aimed at a younger audience. TV channels such as these still have the upper hand on their influence among youth, especially in the countryside. In addition, mainstream media like television reporting, radio networks and magazines have also ventured online. **Table 4.1** shows an overview of Indonesia's leading commercial TV broadcasters by audience share.

The fragmentary characteristics of post-*Reformasi* Indonesia thus can even be found in the apportioning of TV stations with none constituting a clear majority. In addition, these TV commercial networks are owned by wealthy politicians and business magnates who have presidential ambitions. Foremost among them is TVOne, which targets the lower and middle socio-economic bracket belonging to the Visi Media Asia group owned by Golkar Chairman Abdurizal Bakrie. Another station with political links is MetroTV, belonging to the Media Group and owned by Surya Paloh (the patron of the NasDem Party). Having these mainstream TV stations under their belt allows these politicians greater leverage and an edge over new social media platforms in shaping opinions, providing them with the requisite coverage needed for effective political campaigning.⁹¹ Both Visi Media Asia Group and Media Group have 12 per cent and three per cent of audience viewership share in 2011, respectively.

Following the barrage of social media platforms with the majority of youth being politically pensive, many of them are more than happy to be observers and political bystanders rather than active participants. The nature of these new emerging social media platforms also encourages such a process. Based on interviews with university students in various state and private universities, the new social media and ICTs have functioned more as complements rather than primary sources. They are mainly used by youth for the purposes of socialisation and networking, and are preferred for its instantaneity and polyphonic reach. Youth and students recognise the abilities of ICTs to create public awareness, buzz and "domino effects" almost instantly if the information is well received and have gained the general attention of the public. However, their accuracy and reliability, especially over the rise of sensationalised or bogus news have also

put a dent on their actual influence. Realising the potentials of a more inter-connected archipelago, Indonesia seeks to increase its connectivity in the long run.⁹² Nevertheless, at least for now, despite the phenomenal penetration of ICTs into the Indonesia heartland, reception has largely been dependent on contexts and conditions that mimic contemporary culture as well as the common sentiments of the masses. As Merlyna Lim mentions, social media activism is always prone to being spread out “too fast, too thin and too many”.

The 2009 elections saw the emergence of these new forms of social media platforms but did not feature them primarily as an electoral strategy. The general election of 2014 will see social media becoming more of a focal point and an indispensable tool in urbanised districts. Its influence, however, will still be primarily within cities. Nevertheless, it brings a fresh dimension to the competition for the hearts and minds of voters. In a move away from the traditionalism of *aliran* where people are drawn increasingly to the personality rather than the party, the new social media will inevitably be a tool not only for the legislative elections but also will be increasingly featured more in the run-up to the presidential election. It has also been evidenced that social media looks set to be more of a personal mobilisation tool rather than a party mobilisation one. Social media has in its inherent nature the resources for boosting personalistic credentials, be it via the auspices of charisma, nostalgic sentiments or personal charm. Among the youth in the cities especially engagement using social media will be critical in garnering popularity and votes. Nonetheless, it must be reminded that new social media platforms are merely tools that may or may not amplify and boost popularity or clout and is largely dependent on how it is used and contextualised. Traditional forms of media will still play the dominant role in political campaigning among rural districts (*perdesaan*), which still make up a large proportion of the voter base. Although most youth now either reside in the cities or travel to the city in search of a job, the rural vote will nonetheless be a crucial factor in the race for the general elections and presidency. The impact of the new social media remains to be seen. Nonetheless, one can safely say that until now, the effects of social media are still perceived to be one of ambivalence.

CONCLUSION

YOUTH, THE IRONIC SCARCITY OF CHOICE AND THE 2014 ELECTIONS

This book started out with the primary aim of deciphering the youth-scape of contemporary Indonesia in a bid to better understand the current political climate among youth and their approach to politics in general in a post-*Reformasi* landscape. In the preliminary analysis, contemporary youth or “Generation-Y” are noted for their passivity and sometimes apathy towards politics in general. They are more politically conscious and informed yet are less eager to participate. The current generation is more educated and cosmopolitan in outlook. They are less concerned with national problems and are correspondingly less nationalistic.⁹³ In a more decentralised climate where participatory politics takes a central position, they are also seen as being opinionated, more self-oriented and individualistic.⁹⁴ In a politically stable and increasingly affluent Indonesia with a sizable growing middle-class, many of the youth seek material comforts and advancement as a requisite.⁹⁵ Current youth are also tech-savvy and are constantly engaged with the new social media and other related technologies.⁹⁶ In addition, more than 70 per cent of youth prefer or support democracy, having grown up and been socialised into an environment where reform and democracy have been the mainstay for a decade and a half.⁹⁷ More importantly, many will be first-time voters (aged 17–21 years) in 2014, slated to be approximately 29.2 million or 17 per cent out of the 175 million voters.⁹⁸ For young voters in general, it has been estimated to amount to about 59.475 million or 34.3 per cent of the total 175 million voters.⁹⁹ These figures, of course, do not reflect the “white group” or *golongan putih*.

Contradictions, however, still abound. There is a growing religiosity among the youth populace amidst more open and liberal

attitudes. Religious conservatism has featured more prominently in their activism particularly in campuses. Although secular parties are preferred over the religious, there is an appeal to the pious even within secular outfits. The rise of opportunistic *Perdas* (*Peraturan Daerah*) or local regulations with *shari'a*-like nuances in the provincial, municipal and regency levels reflect a conflicting landscape and electorate. In terms of presidential selection, youth in general prefer alternatives and change yet are stuck with the same plethora of candidates. The “Jokowi effect” is perhaps the best illustration of not only personality politics at its earnest but also the imminent want for a change in politics. Recent surveys in 2013 also indicated the electorate’s (including youth) overwhelming preference for Jokowi as presidential candidate for 2014.¹⁰⁰ This is in spite of his thus-far short tenure as Jakarta’s governor. In terms of competition for legislative for admission into the House of Representatives or DPR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*), the preferences of youth did not deviate much

TABLE 5.1
Spread of age group voting preference and support for political parties in Indonesia, 2013¹⁰¹

	Ave.	NasD	PKB	PKS	PDI-P	Gol	Ger	DP	PAN	PPP	Han	PBB	PKPI	Not sure
≤21	6.1	2.8	6.4	1.4	17.5	14.7	16.5	17.6	5.2	5.3	3.4	0.5	0.0	8.7
21–30	17.3	4.0	4.0	5.3	19.6	16.7	11.8	11.6	5.1	4.9	1.1	0.0	0.2	15.8
31–55	58.9	2.7	5.4	5.0	19.8	20.1	9.6	6.8	3.6	6.3	2.5	0.5	0.1	17.6
<56	17.7	2.0	4.1	2.9	21.9	19.4	4.9	3.7	4.0	5.1	0.7	1.2	0.0	30.3

Note NasD: *Partai NasDem* (The NasDem Party), PKB: *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (The National Awakening Party), PKS: *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (The Prosperous Justice Party), PDI-P: *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (The Indonesian Democratic Party), Gol: *Partai Golongan Karya* (The Party of the Functional Groups), Ger: *Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya* (The Great Indonesia Movement Party), DP: *Partai Demokrat* (The Democratic Party), PAN: *Partai Amanat Nasional* (The National Mandate Party), PPP: *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (The United Development Party), Han: *Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat*, *Partai Hanura* (The People’s Conscience Party), PBB: *Partai Bulan Bintang* (The Crescent Star Party), PKPI: *Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia* (The Indonesian Justice and Unity Party)

from preferences by other age groups. **Table 5.1** shows the spread of various age group voting preferences and support for political parties.

It can be seen that the current popularity of the dominant parties of PDIP, Golkar, Gerindra and DP is spread relatively evenly among all the age groups. PDIP, Golkar, Gerindra and DP are head-to-head among the under-21 age group (at 17.5 per cent, 14.7 per cent, 16.5 per cent and 17.6 per cent, respectively) while PDIP and Golkar (at 19.6 per cent and 16.7 per cent) remain the two strongest contenders among the 21–30 age group. Their youth support base, however, remains fragmented and party identification has dipped, although the potential for them transiting as swing voters during the elections—perhaps not in all one fell swoop as a bloc—is still quite probable.¹⁰² It still remains to be seen whether the promise for change and a clean government is convincing enough for younger voters to respond in unison. Scandals have erupted so far this year in most major political parties, including PKS and DP, and these incidences will undermine their ability to attract popular support among the youth. However, in the arena of Indonesian politics, where the cult of personalism often triumphs over party institutionalisation/identification, damage control by affected parties and the apparent scarcity of choices available (a familiar list of ex-presidents, ex vice-presidents, former military-men, media tycoons, bureaucrats, celebrities, incumbents) still allows for a relatively even distribution of votes among potential presidential candidates.¹⁰³ **Table 5.2** shows presidential support (of eight names) among the youth according to age structure (in percentage).

TABLE 5.2
Spread of presidential support among eight prominent presidential candidates according to age structure (in %)¹⁰⁴

	Average	Aburizal Bakrie	Dahlan Iskan	Djoko Suyanto	Joko Widodo	Madfud MD	Megawati Soekarnoputri	Prabowo Subianto	Not sure
≤ 21	6.1	9.4	6.2	0.0	50.6	0.0	13.2	16.4	4.2
21–30	17.3	11.6	3.5	3.0	39.0	2.4	12.9	15.3	12.3
31–55	58.9	13.4	2.7	0.8	32.0	4.9	12.6	17.5	16.2
< 56	17.7	4.5	2.7	1.8	24.0	7.8	12.5	14.2	32.7

Conversely, as can be seen in Table 5.2, there is a much more skewed distribution when it comes to popular support of potential presidential candidates in the 2014 elections. At its apex, current governor of Jakarta Joko Widodo received an overwhelming wave of support from all age segments as a potential candidate for president. It is especially prescient for the under-21 age group as he takes centre-stage at 50.6 per cent. Second and third in line are ex-general Prabowo Subianto (16.4 per cent) and Megawati Soekarnoputri (13.2 per cent). Nonetheless, they are a far cry from Joko Widodo, a relatively newcomer to the political scene with not much of a track record. It is also telling that young voters, especially the under 21s, have the least incidence of uncertainty when it comes to their selection of both political parties (at 8.7 per cent) and presidential candidates (at 4.2 per cent). Voters above the age of 56 seemed to register the highest incidence of uncertainty at 30.3 per cent for political parties and 32.7 per cent for presidential support. This does not mean that youth are less uncertain about their choices but it does point to a certain sense of decisiveness among them even before the elections. Although Jokowi is seen as a favourite candidate in this survey, especially among the youth, it is still perhaps too premature to pinpoint a specific candidate of choice. Nonetheless, his popularity can be seen in light of a burgeoning yearn for change within the political landscape among the young. Jokowi the man, though popularly rooted as presidential candidate, still has several obstacles in his way. Foremost among them is his obligations to the people of Jakarta and PDIP chairwoman, Megawati Soekarnoputri.¹⁰⁵ However, popularity and the urgent cry for change among the youth may triumph other considerations, given Indonesia's current staid retinue of familiar faces at the political helm. Jokowi, in this sense, is perhaps best viewed as a phenomenon.

One thing is for sure: Courting the elusive youth vote will become a perennial problem in the current and future elections, as the youth electorate increases in size. A vibrant, burgeoning youthful demography may be good for business in Indonesia, but for political parties and the state, it may not be as straightforward as it looks, primarily because they have become more fragmented. New strategies will have to be formulated to engage apathetic youth and an increasingly

disenchanted “White Group” (*Golongan Putih*). With the stakes of reformism and change higher at each election, incumbents will have a tougher, more critical electorate to face over the greater challenge of sticking to their pre-election promises. This study also suggests that not only do youth hold the key in tackling the future political map of Indonesia but also opportunities have to be created for their active participation in the political process rather than a passive, cosmetic one. As the personification for change in Indonesia, a rejuvenation of the *pemuda* spirit would best be embodied minus the entrenched clientalist polities and dynastic ambitions of a few.

END NOTES

1. Several formal and informal interviews and discussions with senior members of parliament, professors, student leaders, student representatives of various campus organisations and members of civil society organisations were conducted by Jonathan Chen and Emirza Adi Syailendra. Special thanks go to Tito Nugraha Adiwikarta, who helped to make the interviews in Indonesia possible and all who have agreed to being interviewed. Leonard C. Sebastian would like to thank Hazelia Margaretha for so ably coordinating the survey with LP3ES. Finally, we would like to convey our thanks to the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies for funding our research.
2. Although the Declaration of Independence was an anti-climax that lacked the original panache and strong, anti-Japanese language that the *pemudas* demanded, it was nonetheless a monumental event. The proclamation stated, “We, the people of Indonesia, hereby declare Indonesia’s independence. Matters concerning the transfer of power and other matters will be executed in an orderly manner and in the shortest possible time.” It was jointly signed by Sukarno and Hatta. See John D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 1972), pp. 197–202. For a personal narration of the Rengasdengklok affair, see also Cindy Adams, *Sukarno: An Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965).
3. See Soegiarso Soerojo, *Siapa Menabur Angin Akan Menuai Badai*, pp. 232–233. See also Antonie C. A. Dake, *The Sukarno File, 1966–1967: Chronology of a Defeat* (Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2006), pp. 56–59.
4. See “Selected Documents”, *Indonesia 1*, pp. 135.
5. See Saya S. Shiraishi, *Young Heroes: The Indonesian Family in Politics* (Cornell Southeast Asia Program, Ithaca, New York, 1997), pp. 38–50. *Anak buah* is by definition subordinate to *bapak* in the *bapak-anak buah* hierarchy. However it was different this time round. These men were no *anak buah*’s of Sukarno but military henchmen acting vicariously on the *bapak-anak buah* relationship. They were taking matters into their own hands but with a twist—Sukarno’s complicity was not required.
6. The federation was known as KAMI (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia*). It was an anti-communist group that was formed on 27 October 1965. KAMI’s primary function at that time was to help strengthen General Suharto’s position. KAMI was known to provoke open conflicts with the Sukarno government. See Arief Budiman, “The Student Movement in Indonesia: A Study of the Relationship between Culture and Structure”, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 18, No. 6 (June 1978), pp. 617–619.

7. *Dwifungsi* (or doctrine of the “dual function”) served as a euphemism for the military-dominated ruling New Order regime to justify and allow for military intervention in politics.
8. The short periods of *keterbukaan* under Suharto allowed for controlled political dissension and open discussions of differences of opinion. Nonetheless, many saw it as a ruse to implicate political dissidents and arrest outspoken critics.
9. The concept of *aliran* was the initial categorisation of anthropologist Clifford Geertz in his study of the Javanese landscape in the 1950s. He observed that the Javanese populace then could be divided principally into three classes: the *abangan* (mainly the peasant class who practise a form of Javanese syncretism), *santri* (the segment that adheres to a more puritanical, orthodox Islamic worldview), and *priyayi* (primarily the aristocratic class). This conceptualisation was then extrapolated to represent vertical structures of reified identity and organisation along the lines of the dominant parties then. Correspondingly, the *priyayi* is identified with PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*), the *abangan* with the PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*) and the *santri* with the Masyumi Party (*Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia*, the modernist variant of Islam) and NU (*Nahdatul Ulama*, the traditionalist variant of Islam). See Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). In more modern times, the *aliran* concept has come increasingly under debate. See, for instance, Andreas Ufen, “From Aliran to Dealignment: Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, *South East Asia Research*, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 2008, pp. 5–41. *Ormas* is a shorthand for *organisasi massa* or mass organisations in English. It depicts organisations and congregations that are predominantly non-political in scope but have an active interest in matters of religion, education and society.
10. Students active in various movements and in student presses usually retained their student status by prolonging their university studies (sometimes for up to eight years) because they believed that it was only within the role and context of a student that the greatest political change could be instituted. To finish one’s studies on time was seen as anathema to being involved in politics and activism. See Nuraini Juliastuti (translated by Camelia Lestari and Nuraini Juliastuti), “Whatever I Want: Media and Youth in Indonesia Before and After 1998”, *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2006.
11. The journalist Brian May characteristically writes: “Indonesia was born after a kidnapping; it was to be reborn in a putsch and baptised with the blood of a massacre.” To this, it must be added

that Indonesia was to be resuscitated via the auspices of a disruptive reform. Youth's participation in all these events had been critical and significant. See Brain May, *The Indonesian Tragedy* (Singapore: Brash, 1978), pp. 92.

12. “*Bapakism*” can be seen as a euphemism for a reverence of patriarchic authority within the Indonesian society.
13. All quantitative analysis and figures on youth are derived from the survey on “Generation Y and Indonesia’s Future Outlook”, prepared by the RSIS Indonesia Programme with assistance from the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information in May 2010 (or LP3ES, *Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial*) and *Statistik Pemuda Indonesia 2010: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 2010*. Qualitative analyses were primarily derived from intensive interviews conducted within the campus grounds of the University of Indonesia as part of fieldwork from 24 February 2013 to 1 March 2013.
14. For figures on “Generation Y”, see Indonesia, Badan Pusat Statistik, *Trends of Socio-Economic Indicators of Indonesia*, February 2012.
15. According to Keith Faulks, the levels of “White Group” in any election indicated a lack of interest towards involvement in conventional politics. See Keith Faulks, *Sosiologi Politik* (Bandung: Nusamedia, 2010), pp. 237–241. According to LP3ES Quick Count, the level of participation in the 2009 election was 72 per cent, meaning that the remaining 28 per cent of eligible voters did not participate in the electoral process, a significant increase from 15 per cent in the 2004 elections.
16. In the latest instalment of studies on student activism in Indonesia, Aspinall alluded to his earlier work on addressing the issue of student mobilisation on state regimes. A state-centred approach was utilised in illustrating student activism pre-*Reformasi*. Nonetheless, little was mentioned about the more contemporary issues of student activism post-*Reformasi*, including the changing trends within university campuses or even the more contemporary forms of institutional domination such as religious student groups run by the new political parties, NGOs and civil societies. Cases on Indonesian students’ shift towards cyber-activism or transnational activism were also not reviewed. See Edward Aspinall, “Indonesia: Moral Force Politics and the Struggle against Authoritarianism”, in Merideth L. Weiss & Edward Aspinall (Eds.), *Student Activism in Asia between Protest and Powerlessness* (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2012) pp. 153–179.

17. See Harold Crouch, *Political Reform in Indonesia after Suharto* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010). “Crisis-ridden” and “Politics-as-usual” reforms are different in their scope and urgency. It can be inferred rather convincingly that concerns about bureaucratic and narrow clientalistic relationship becomes more ubiquitous in a “politics-as-usual” climate.
18. See Merilee S. Grindle & John W. Thomas, *Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press: 1991), pp. 6, 14.
19. The 1999 elections saw 48 parties competing. By the 2004 general elections, it had dipped to just 24 parties. Nevertheless the 2009 general elections saw 48 parties plus six in Aceh competing once again.
20. See Edward Aspinall, “A Nation in Fragments”, *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 1, p. 30.
21. For more information on political dynasties in Indonesia, see Julius Cesar Trajano and Yoes Kenawas, “Indonesia and the Philippines: Political Dynasties in Democratic States”, *RSIS Commentaries*, No. 018/2013.
22. The voting pie for the major parties has shrunk significantly since 1999. In 1999, the PDIP had received 33.7 per cent, PKB 12.6 per cent, PPP 10.7 per cent and PAN 7.1 per cent. By 2004, PD emerged to capture 7.5 per cent along with PKS 7.3 per cent. In the 2009 elections, PD increased its voter base to 20.8 per cent along with the emergence of other presidential party vehicles like Gerindra and Hanura.
23. See <http://www.dpr.go.id/id/tentang-dpr/fraksi>.
24. This is perhaps more so in urbanised districts, where the opportunities of quick information dissemination, forming mass organisations and swift mobilisation are vastly greater than the rural districts. It is no surprise that past revolutions often took place first in urban cities and university campuses, with rural districts bearing the brunt subsequently.
25. The tag “Generation Y” carries connotations of age (ranging from 16 to 30, based on the Act on Youth Chapter 1 Verse 1, No. 40 of 2009), socio-cultural dynamics and political class. In particular, “Generation Y” as an entity is often perceived as potential agents of change. More importantly, they lie at the cusp between the latter years of Suharto’s rule and post-*Reformasi* Indonesia, having little or no experience of centralised authoritarianism as experienced by their predecessors. For Indonesia, many from this demographic will be first-time voters in the upcoming 2014 elections. They represent a distinct body politic among political parties eager to win their vote.

26. Translated as “Hymn: The Students of Independence”: “We the students of independence, the independence of the masses our weapons, with discussions and mass actions, never resting till the common man wins. With the raising of the red flag, our symbol for liberation, with discussions and mass actions, never resting till the common man wins.” This hymn succinctly encapsulates the close relationship between youth and the common masses—youth as their voices and the plight of the common man as the motivation behind their activism.
27. A prominent example (within the campus grounds of *Universitas Indonesia*) would be the decrease in the number of days allocated for freshman orientation as well as the number of hours required by the Campus Orientation Body (OKK, *Orientasi Kehidupan Kampus*) to conduct them. Upon request by the university administration, it had to shorten its activities from one week to three days while limiting its duration to only three hours after lunch. OKK was considered one of the primary channels that socialised students into more active participation in politics and activism. Their activities span from chanting patriotic anthems to staging mock demonstrations and close interactions with seniors/alumni. See also interview with Muhammad B. Jusuf, Project Officer of OKK UI, 27 February 2013.
28. See *Undang Undang No. 40 Tahun 2009 Tentang Kepemudaan (Pasal 1 Ayat 1)*, Department of Home Affairs.
29. Article 6 of the Act on Youth reads: “*Pelayanan kepemudaan dilaksanakan sesuai dengan karakteristik pemuda, yaitu memiliki semangat kejuangan, kesukarelaan, tanggungjawab, dan ksatria, serta memiliki sifat kritis, idealis, inovatif, progresif, dinamis, reformis, dan futuristik.*” [Translated, it means, “Services carried out on matters pertaining to youth has to be in accordance with the inherent characteristics of youths, these include spirited effort, volunteerism, responsibility, having a critical disposition, idealistic, innovativeness, progressivity, dynamic, reformist and futuristic.”]
30. Article 7 of the Act on Youth reads: “*Pelayanan kepemudaan diarahkan untuk: a. menumbuhkan patriotisme, dinamika, budaya prestasi, dan semangat profesionalitas; dan b. meningkatkan partisipasi dan peran aktif pemuda dalam membangun dirinya, masyarakat, bangsa, dan negara.*” [Translated, it means, “Services carried out on matters pertaining to youth has to be directed to: a. fostering patriotism, dynamism, greater cultural achievements and a spirit of professionalism and b. increasing the participation and role of youth activism within the areas of self, society, nation and state.”]

31. See Hans Van Miert, *Dengan Semangat Berkobar, Nasionalisme dan Gerakan Pemuda di Indonesia, 1918–1930* (Jakarta: Hasta Mirta-Pustaka, 2003), pp. xxi–xxxiii.
32. The Youth Pledge or *Sumpah Pemuda* reads simply as: “Firstly, we the sons and daughters of Indonesia, acknowledge one motherland, Indonesia. Secondly, we the sons and daughters of Indonesia, acknowledge one nation, the nation of Indonesia. Thirdly, we the sons and daughters of Indonesia, uphold the language of unity, Indonesian.” [Translated from “*Pertama, kami poetera dan poeteri Indonesia, mengakoe bertoempah darah jang satoe, tanah air Indonesia. Kedoea, kami poetera dan poeteri Indonesia, mengakoe berbangsa jang satoe, bangsa Indonesia. Ketiga, kami poetera dan poeteri Indonesia, mendjoendjoeng bahasa persatoean, bahasa Indonesia.*”]
33. See Amry Vandenbosch, “Nationalism and Religion in Indonesia,” *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 21, No. 18, 1952, pp. 181–185.
34. See Statistik Pemuda Indonesia 2010: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 2010, *Jumlah dan Persentase Penduduk menurut Kelompok Umur (Tahun) dan Tipe Daerah*, p. 21.
35. Indonesia’s middle class stood at 37.7 per cent in 2003 but rose to a whopping 56.5 per cent in 2010. Chatib Basri, in his article on Indonesia’s role in the economy, argued for the combined effect of a new consumer class and the sustaining rise of a young demographic that would propel the economy in the long run. See Chatib Basri, “Indonesia’s Role in the World Economy” in Anthony Reid (Ed.), *Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant* (Indonesia Update Series, College of Asia and Pacific, The Australian National University/, ISEAS Publishing 2012), pp. 29–33.
36. See RSIS/LP3ES Survey on Generation “Y” and Indonesia’s Future Outlook (2010).
37. See *ibid.*, Statistik Pemuda Indonesia 2010: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 2010.
38. See RSIS/LP3ES Survey, *ibid.*, pp. 15.
39. See *ibid.*, pp. 16–18. (Also see in Appendix, Chart ii, iii, iv, v, vi)
40. See *ibid.*, pp. 20–22. (Also see in Appendix, Chart vii, viii)
41. See *ibid.*, pp. 33–35. (Also see in Appendix, Chart xiii, xiv, xv, xvi)
42. See *ibid.*, pp. 29. (Also see in Appendix, Chart xii)
43. See *ibid.*, pp. 11, 54. (Also see in Appendix, Chart i, xv)
44. See *ibid.*, pp. 25. (Also see in Appendix, Chart xi)

45. See *ibid.*, pp. 24. (Also see in Appendix, Chart x)
46. See *ibid.*, pp. 37. (Also see in Appendix, Chart xvii)
47. See *ibid.*, pp. 41. (Also see in Appendix, Chart xviv)
48. See Arief Budiman, *Portrait of a Young Indonesian Looking at His Surroundings* (Internationales Asienforum 4, January 1973), pp. 76–88.
49. For more on student activism of the 1970s and 1980s in Indonesia, see Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia* (California: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 118–127.
50. See Edward Aspinall, *ibid.*, pp. 127–129.
51. See Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 144.
52. See Joesoef Daoed, *Mahasiswa dan Politik, in Mahasiswa Dalam Sorotan* (Jakarta: Kelompok Studi Proklamasi: 1984), pp. 65–72.
53. In the case of Universitas Gadjah Mada, in certain faculties it is perhaps mandatory of the current political atmosphere for students to be coerced into supporting or participating in small splinter campus political parties that are often named after the place where their respective members gather or other prominent symbols of youth (e.g. “Partai Kampus Biru”, “Partai Boulevard”, “Partai Macan Kampus”, “Partai Bunderan”, etc.) There has also been collaboration with “student” parties found in other universities such as “Partai PAS UIN SuKa” (State Islamic University Sunan Kalijaga), “Partai PDKT UAD” (Ahmad Dahlan University) and “Partai Tugu UNY” (Yogyakarta National University).
54. PPKMS *Nurul Fikri* is currently based in five state universities within the region of Java, namely *Universitas Indonesia* (UI) in Depok, *Institut Teknologi Bandung* (ITB) in Bandung, *Universitas Gadjah Mada* (UGM) in Yogyakarta, *Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember* (ITS) in Surabaya and *Institut Pertanian Bogor* (IPB) in Bogor.
55. For more information on the new phenomena of PKS and its youth-directed incentives and stance, see Kikue Hamayotsu, “Beyond Faith and Identity: Mobilizing Islamic Youth in a Democratic Indonesia”, *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2011, pp. 231–247.
56. Special thanks go out to Avina Nadhila Widarsa for providing a copy of the calendar of events for PPSDMS Women’s Hostel as an illustration of the programmes under the PPSDMS flagship.

57. See also Noorhaidi Hasan, *RSIS Working Paper* No. 184, Islamist Party, “Electoral Politics and Da’wa Mobilization among Youth: The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia”.
58. Interview with Andika Bagus Permana, member of PPSDMS *Nurul Fikri*, 25 February 2013.
59. Interview with Kemal Stamboel, board supervisor of PPSDMS and Member of Parliament representing PKS, 25 February 2013.
60. See, for example, Robert Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
61. It seems like *Dakwah Tarbiyah’s* values have also invariably influenced practices in BEM UI. A recent case is the adoption of tacit separation between male and female students by a *hijab* (cloth or veil) in gatherings, meetings and elections. Interview with Adnan Mubarak, member of *Dakwah Tarbiyah*, 25 February 2013.
62. Interview with Yasir Arafat, Head of SALAM UI, 26 February 2013.
63. SALAM has also been known to sponsor some of their members to study trips in Palestine and the Middle East.
64. Interview with Fathin Rohma, member of KAMMI, 25 February 2013.
65. See TIDAR’s official website, <http://www.tidar.or.id/>.
66. Interview with Adrianus Waranei Muntu, Head of East Jakarta TIDAR, 27 February 2013.
67. The Indonesia National Party or PNI was the predecessor of the current Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (PDI-P). Primarily a nationalist and secular party, it has since incorporated Sukarnoist and *Pancasila* ideals into its fold in its later evolutions.
68. See Stephen A. Douglas, *Political Socialization and Student Activism in Indonesia* (Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, University of Illinois Press, 1970), pp. 154–156.
69. Interview with “Rio”, Head of GMNI, 28 February 2013.
70. See Tadashi Yamamoto (Ed.), *Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community: Nongovernmental Underpinnings of the Emerging Asia Pacific Regional Community*, a 25th Anniversary Project of JCIE (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Japan Center for International Exchange), pp. 122–123.
71. See Indonesia Mengajar website, <https://indonesiamengajar.org/>.
72. See *FLAC Indonesia* website, <http://flacindonesia.org/>. See also <http://flacindonesia.wordpress.com/about/>.

73. Interview with Sri Budhi Eko Wardharni, Executive Director of the Centre of Political Studies UI/PUSKAPOL UI, 28 February 2013.
74. See *Tempo Magazine*, 18–24 February 2013. Anas Urbaningrum, ex-chairman of the Democrat Party has been charged with assisted corruption in the Hambalang scandal.
75. Ibid., Sri Budi Eko Wardharni.
76. See Farish A. Noor, “The Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) in the landscape of Indonesian Islamist Politics: Cadre-Training as Mode of Preventive Radicalisation?”, *RSIS Working Paper* No. 231.
77. See Benedict R. O’G Anderson in “Language, Fantasy, Revolution: Java 1900–1950,” in Daniel S. Lev & Ruth Mcvey (Eds.), *Making Indonesia: Essays on Modern Indonesia in Honor of George McT. Kahin* (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Program, 1996), pp. 26–40.
78. For information on how the census, map and museum can have an impact on nationalism, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), pp. 163–187.
79. See Morozov, *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).
80. See Bayu Galih & Amal Nur Ngazis, “Entertainment Contents Get More Clicks”, VivaNews.com, 27 June, <http://us.en.vivanews.com/news/read/330214-entertainment-contents-get-more-clicks>.
81. See Socialbakers, Indonesia Facebook statistics, <http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/indonesia>, accessed on 21 May 2013. See also Semiocast, “Twitter Reaches Half a Billion Accounts, More Than 140 Millions in the US”, 30 July, http://semiocast.com/publications/2012_07_30_Twitter_reaches_half_a_billion_accounts_140m_in_the_US.
82. See Comscore report, June 2010, http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/2010/8/Indonesia_Brazil_and_Venezuela_Lead_Global_Surge_in_Twitter_Usage, accessed on 23 May 2013.
83. The Gecko vs. Crocodile case (or KPK case) started in April 2009 over accusations that the Corruption Eradication Commission tapped into the phone of Susno Duadji, the National Police Chief of detectives. It incited strong public support for the KPK when it was described as a *cicak*, a common house gecko, trying to pit against a much bigger institution, the *buaya*, in reference to the police. The Prita Mulyasari libel case involved a defamation suit over an e-mail complaint sent by Prita Mulyasari to relatives and friends about bad

- service in the Omni International Hospital. Although she was found guilty and detained in prison in the count of violating Indonesia's cyber law, public pressure demanded for her release because she was largely perceived as a hapless victim.
84. The Lapindo case refers to a mudflow fiasco in a sub-district of Porong in Sidoarjo, East Java, attributed to the blowout of a natural gas well drilled by the Indonesian oil and gas exploration company Lapindo Brantas Inc., resulting in the biggest mud volcano in the world. Lapindo Brantas was run by the Bakrie family. The Ahmadiyah case refers to a brutal assault in February 2011 on the Ahmadiyah community in Cikeusik in which a small group of radical Islamists slaughtered three of the Ahmadis. The video of the attack was uploaded onto YouTube with footage of the victims' bodies still being repeatedly beaten and stoned after the killings had taken place.
 85. See Kikue Hamayotsu, "The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia: Media Freedom and Religious Intolerance", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 25 March 2013.
 86. See "Indonesia tweeters fly in the face of censorship law" in *The Sydney Morning Herald* (8/2/2012), retrieved from <http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/indonesia-tweeters-fly-in-the-face-of-censorship-law-20120207-1r5f4.html#ixzz2UYG0yg1i> on 28 May 2013.
 87. See Jason Abbott, "Introduction: Assessing the Social and Political Impact of the Internet and New Social Media in Asia", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 12 April 2013, pp. 7–8.
 88. See Merlyna Lim, "Many Clicks but Little Sticks: Social Media Activism in Indonesia", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 11 February 2013.
 89. This began with the abolishment of the then Information Ministry under Abdurrahman Wahid in 1999, lifting all media restrictions. Former officials of the Information Ministry were then subsumed under a new ministry, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. This ministry governs technical and hardware aspects and has no purview over content.
 90. See Indonesia Media and Telecoms Landscape Guide 2012. Retrieved from http://www.infoasaid.org/sites/infoasaid.org/files/indonesia_guide_-_final_271112_20.12.12.pdf on 29 May 2013.
 91. Taken from *Media Partners Asia* (MPA), 2011.
 92. The triumph of mainstream media (national television) over the new social media is highlighted in the Lapindo case, where TV channels

were been successful in framing the case as a special incident as a natural disaster. In particular, TVOne has re-named the incident Lusi (abbreviated from *Lumpur Sidoarjo*) instead of Lapindo mud. This sleight of hand in information actually distances Lapindo Brantas from the disaster. See Novenanto, "The Lapindo Case by Mainstream Media", *Indonesia Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 1 No. 3, pp. 125–138, 2009.

93. The PALAPA RING (or National Optical Fiber Ring) is one such project. Started in July 2007 and part of the ambitious master plan for Indonesia's accelerated economic development and telecommunications, the PALAPA RING intends to cover as many as 33 provinces, 440 cities and districts in Indonesia with a total length of 35,280 km of underwater cables and 21,807 underground land cables. Each fibre optic ring would guarantee continuous access in case of failure (with speeds up to 10 megabytes per second) with adequate capacity to support all high-speed and broadband traffic. In particular, the PALAPA RING aims to accelerate the development of the communications sector in Eastern Indonesia. Connection to the Moluccas and Papua started in May 2013 and will take 18 months for its full installation. See "Groundbreaking Inauguration Fiber Optic Broadband Network Construction or Palapa Ring Broadband Sulawesi-Maluku-Papua in PT Telkom Ternate". Retrieved from <http://www.thepresidentpost.com/?p=28634> on 3 June 2013.
94. Only 21.2 per cent of youth place national interest on top as their main priority. See *Kompas*, 2010.
95. 63 per cent of Indonesian youth are seen to be more self-oriented. See *Kompas*, 2010.
96. 56.8 per cent Indonesian youth reported that they wanted a successful career and further education. 18 per cent reported that they wanted to be rich and famous. See Pam Nilan, Lynette Parker, Linda Bennett and Kathryn Robinson, "Indonesian Youth Looking Towards the Future", *Journal of Youth Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 6. September 2011.
97. Nielsen in 2011 reported that youth spend 14 hours per week in general engaging in technology-related activities.
98. See Mujani and Liddle, "Leadership, Party, and Religion: Explaining Voting Behavior in Indonesia", *Comparative Political Studies*, July 2007, 40, pp. 832–857, 2007.
99. See Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC), April 2013, MoHA and National General Election Commission (KPU), 2013.
100. See *ibid.*

101. According to a CSIS survey conducted in April 2013, Jokowi's popularity as presidential candidate stood at 28.6 per cent. This was followed by Prabowo Subianto at 15.6 per cent. A large majority also reported as being undecided (28 per cent).
102. Cited from RSIS Panel Discussion on "Youth Activism in Indonesian Politics and the 2014 Elections", by Dr Djayadi Hanan, Research Director of Saiful Mujani Research & Consulting titled "Young Voters and 2014 Election", held at RSIS Seminar Room 5, Block S4, Level B4 on 5 June 2013.
103. On the gradual erosion of party identification in Indonesia, see William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, "Leadership, Party and Religion: Explaining Voting Behavior in Indonesia", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 7, July 2007. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani have given strong arguments (of a bivariate, multiple regression analysis) for the growing identification of individual leadership in the legislative and presidential choices of voters in the new Indonesian democracy. See also Dirk Tomsa and Andreas Ufen, "Introduction: Party Politics and Clientelism in Southeast Asia", *Party Politics in Southeast Asia: Clientelism and Electoral Competition in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines*, Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series, pp. 1–7.
104. See Yoes C. Kenawas and Fitriani, "Indonesia's Next Parliament: Celebrities, Incumbents and Dynastic Members?", *RSIS Commentaries*, No. 089/2013.
105. See *ibid.*, Djayadi Hasan.
106. See Jonathan Chen and Emirza Adi Syailendra, "Youth and the 'Jokowi Effect': Strike while the Iron is Hot?", *RSIS Commentaries*, No. 108/2013.

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Kompas 2010.

APPENDIX

The RSIS/LP3ES survey was conducted on youth aged between 16 to 30 years in five cities (Jakarta, Surabaya, Makassar, Denpasar and Padang). The total number of samples collected was 1,000 respondents. They were selected randomly and stratified accordingly using disproportional stratified random sampling. Data was collected in person through face-to-face interviews. A questionnaire with a structured interview format was used.

CHART 1
**Preference for respective presidential candidates
 in the 2009 election based on age group**

Pairs of president/ vice president candidate election	≤ 25 years old	26 to 30 years old	31 to 40 years old	41 to 50 years old	> 50 years old
Megawati Soekarnoputri – Prabowo Subianto	17.5%	17.4%	19.2%	20.6%	21.6%
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – Boediono	54.1%	51.5%	51.9%	47.8%	49.9%
M. Jusuf Kalla – Wiranto	12.0%	13.0%	10.6%	11.9%	11.8%
Did not vote (<i>Golput</i>)	0.4%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.1%

CHART 2
Frequency of youth following political news




CHART 3
Sources of information on politics




CHART 4
Frequency of youth watching television




CHART 5
Frequency of youth reading newspapers




CHART 6
Frequency of youth Internet access




CHART 7
Frequency of youth participation in political discussions




CHART 8
Youth political participation in the public sphere




CHART 9
Youth participation in the campaign activities




CHART 10
Youth future career preferences




CHART 11
Youth views on the criteria of good politician




CHART 12
Youth's perception on the ideal number of political parties that participate in elections




CHART 13
Party preferences based on party ideology




CHART 14
Youth preferences on political party




CHART 15
Party choice in the 2009 election




CHART 16
Influences on youth political choice




CHART 17
Level of satisfaction with the performance of the legislature




CHART 18
Youth views on transparency of government decision-making process




CHART 19
Level of confidence in participatory-based process of government decision-making





CHART 20
Respondent views on presidential candidates with military backgrounds



As Indonesia's fourth general election since *Reformasi* beckons in 2014, the perception of youth in Indonesia remains culturally trapped within the outmoded image of the archetypal *mahasiswa* (university student) of the pre-*Reformasi* variety—an anachronism considering the widespread changes that have taken place well within campuses and institutions since 1998. Historically, Indonesian youth have been a pivotal driver and major feature at crucial junctures that defined the trajectory of modern Indonesia. This monograph provides insights into the changes that have taken place within the youth demography in the post-*Reformasi* state with an emphasis on current and emerging trends that would have a bearing on the 2014 General Elections.



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