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YOUTH AND HOOLIGANISM AT SPORTS EVENTS



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**“The only thing
necessary for the triumph of evil is for good
men to do nothing.”**
(Sir Edmund Burke)

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1. CONCEPT OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS

1. 1. CONCEPT OF VIOLENT CRIMINALITY

Violence is a complex social, political, cultural, psychological and ethical phenomenon. It is therefore fully understandable that an increasing number of disciplines are involved in its study: philosophy, sociology, ethics, psychology, law, criminology. Violence implies the use of force, threat or the abuse of power against another person. In contemporary conditions of life, the meaning of violence has become wider and more significant as people tend to resort to various forms of violence (physical, psychological, sexual) in order to resolve their mutual disputes and conflicts (Konstatinović – Vilić, Nikolić – Ristanović, Kostić, M. 2009: 111).

So far, numerous theoreticians have given a number of definitions of violence. For instance, the Oxford dictionary defines violence as “the unlawful exercise of physical force or intimidation by the exhibition of such force”.

The most acceptable definition from the sociological viewpoint is the following: “Violence encompasses all acts and activities which may be designated as the use of force or the threat of using force by the agent (offender) against the object (victim), regardless of the type of force, with the aim to directly or indirectly inflict pain or cause fear and suffering to the victim so as to place the victim’s behaviour under the control of the perpetrator of violence” (Mimica, Bogdanović, 2007:346).

Criminologists and other professionals dealing with crime science usually interpret the term “violence” as violent criminality as a specific form of socially dangerous acts. Delicts of violence characterise each society – what differs is only the level of vulnerability. No one is indifferent towards this phenomenon! Violence and consequences of violence do not affect only the victim, offender, police, prosecution and courts, but the entire society. Causes and conditions of violence exist in the environment of each person, to a higher or lesser extent. Fear is an important feature of violence, in addition to injury and the threat to injure life and limb. As the matter of fact, the fear of criminality is largely based on the fear of violence. Therefore, the fear of violence is an equally serious problem of modern society as the criminality of violence. In vain do many criminologists prove with empirical data that in most countries today more people lose their lives in traffic accidents than from the hands of another person. They also tend to prove that lives and health of more people are affected by white collar criminality and corruption than by the so-called street criminality. Citizens and judicial officials remain fascinated with the phenomenon of violence and the fact that the victim of a “street crime” may be anyone, at any moment (Ignjatović, 2002: 264). Therefore, they do not respond adequately to statistical data or abstract numbers showing that the risk of criminal victimisation is small in regard to such criminal offences.

The criminality of violence is defined as an extreme form of aggression. It includes those criminal activities which, by means of physical or psychological coercion, i.e. by using force or the threat to use force, damage or jeopardise the integrity of a person. There are many delicts with elements of violence and many forms of such behaviour. All of them feature the offender's aggressiveness against the victim in different variants and at a different intensity (Konstatinović – Vilić, Nikolić – Ristanović, Kostić, 2009: 112). According to Aleksić, Škulić and Žarković, the term "violence" is rather imprecise as it denotes conscious, but in criminal-legal sense intentional infliction of emotional and more frequently physical pain or injuries (Aleksić, Škulić, Žarković, 2004: 192).

Based on the above definitions, it is possible to conclude that the notion of violent criminality is used to designate criminal offences featuring brutal and aggressive action of their perpetrators, i.e. offences where the element of violence dominates, regardless of whether it is part of the very perpetration or represents another important element of a criminal offence.

In criminal-legal terms, violent criminality encompasses all criminal offences with elements of violence, i.e. criminal offences where the perpetrator, by the use of force or serious threat, damages or endangers legally protected assets (Lazarević, 2002: 11). It should be noted that the term "delict" is broader than the terms "criminal offence" and "crime". It originates from Latin and means "a prohibited action, an act contrary to law, implying either an obligation to reimburse the damages or a sanction"¹. The totality of forbidden delicts in a legal system is usually called delinquency. Besides criminal offences, delicts include misdemeanours, criminal and disciplinary offences. We shall dwell here only on criminal offences constituting the so-called violent criminality.

In its special part, the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia prescribes the majority of criminal offences which can be considered violent criminality. It is known, however, that some forms of violence envisaged as criminal offences do not always represent a sanctioned and punishable activity. Even the gravest forms of violence, such as murders, are not always criminal offences. Hence the need to limit the concept of delicts of violence: the use of force or threat aimed at damaging or endangering legally protected assets must be illegal. Therefore, the delict of violence implies the illegal use of force or threat against another person or objects (Lazarević, 2002: 13). This limitation is indispensable so as to exclude from the sphere of incrimination those acts of violence where the use of force or threats appear, under specific conditions, as permitted, legally grounded ways of behaviour. Namely, criminal offences of violent criminality most often include: certain forms of murders, criminal offences of heavy and light bodily injuries, rape, robbery, extortion, abduction, violent behaviour, jeopardising security, illegal deprivation of liberty, extortion of evidence, harassment at work, domestic violence, violence at sports events and other public gatherings etc.

Criminal offences of violent criminality may be divided into two groups: a) offences of traditional violent criminality and b) their recent forms (Ignjatović, 2011: 106). The offences of traditional violent criminality include primarily murders and the infliction of grave bodily injuries, rape. This also includes, particularly in Anglo-Saxon literature, robberies and offences

¹ "Mala enciklopedija" (*Small Encyclopaedia*), Prosveta, Belgrade, 1986, p. 173.

with elements of violent and property criminality. New forms of violent criminality include various forms of violence perpetrated in family, but also at sports events, workplaces etc. A justified question posed today is whether these are new forms of violent criminality or whether they existed before, but society no longer tolerates them (Ignjatović, 2011: 107).

Based on definitions of violent criminality and given the ways of perpetration, such offences can be considered crimes against life and limb, property, and liberties and rights of man and citizen. In a broader sense, these may be all criminal offences whose manner of perpetration involves force or serious threat, such as criminal offences from the category of offences against marriage and family, and against public peace and order.

1.2. CONCEPT OF VIOLENCE IN SPORTS

In some countries, particular violence-related delicts in sports are considered criminal offences, while other countries qualify them as misdemeanours. Sometimes the mere analysis of regulations cannot reveal the legislator's criteria to qualify such behaviour as a misdemeanour or criminal offence. Instead, attention must also be devoted to the legislative tradition of a concrete state and its commitment to intervening in sports relations by means of legal regulations.

Violence in sports implies each word or action of a sportsperson, coach, referee, parent, spectator or other participant in a sports event, which inflicts injury on those involved in the event (Kostić, M. 2008: 59). It is possible to classify several forms of violence in sports in regard to instigators of violence: violence among sportspersons, violence against referees, violence among the coach and sportspersons, violence of parents, and fan violence.

Violence in sports is committed mainly by sportspersons – e.g. by punching or tripping up when the referee is not watching. They resort to violence sometimes with the clear objective to injure an opposing team player and sometimes for the sake of intimidation, but all the time aiming to win. Coaches sometimes ask from their team to play rough in order to stop the opponent, or to intentionally hurt the best player of the other team, even at the cost of the perpetrator's exclusion from the match. In this way, players become offenders who resort to all means only to win as victory brings profit, not only to players, but chiefly to those not directly participating in the sports event (Koković, 2001: 132).

Namely, sportspersons not achieving the desired level of aggressiveness may get discouraged through criticism by their parents and the coach, or by having their playing time shortened, which represents a special form of punishment (Koković, 2001: 132). Disturbance by rivals or spectators is also a form of punishment. In contrast, by manifesting aggression, sportspersons may be awarded money, better initial positions in play, or greater respect by coaches, spectators or friends. It is therefore no wonder that one can read in "memoirs" of former sportspersons all tricks of trade they were taught, the ways in which they were stimulated, and what they were requested to do by their coaches and sometimes even by their doctors, just for the sake of winning, including the non-sporting means they used to accomplish the set objectives.

Violence among sportspersons and coaches is rare, but should not be disregarded. It is most often present in the form of verbal, i.e. psychological violence, while physical violence is rarer.² Sportswomen are often victims of abuse, of sexual or other type, though such cases are often deliberately forgotten or hidden. These women often need great courage and perseverance to prove bodily or psychological abuse. For the sake of illustration, in 1993 four members of the French athletics federation were accused of having raped their female colleague. Of course, the most frequent bodily forms of violence are injuries at competitions and overly intensive training sessions, which sometimes even ruin one's career – this was the case with the gymnast Elodie Lussac who, despite injury, was forced to compete (Bodin, Robene and Heas, 2007:15).

Violence against referees also occurs at sports events. In such situations, sportspersons and dissatisfied fans are often the agents of violence, while the referee is the victim. The cause are often incorrect referee decisions or decisions perceived as such by sportspersons. Who has not heard of cases at lower-ranked matches when fans chase the referee around the court to vent their anger? Verbal violence by fans is practically an everyday phenomenon and almost no one pays attention to it any longer.

Referees may be agents of violence when their biased refereeing results in violation of the rules of game and fairness. Such bias takes various forms – from systemic support of one team or an individual to choosing opportune moments during the event when the referee comes in and decides on the winner with one move (Šljukić, 2001: 133). Reasons for referee violence over the rules of game and fairness may be material (bribery), but also an expression of political, religious or cultural bias. The consequences of such action are sometimes very serious. Fans provoked by a referee's incorrect decision start to demonstrate violence, players start "explaining" to the referee that he was wrong; sometimes the entire chain of violent behaviour is triggered, culminating in police intervention against spectators.

We witness nowadays that brawls among players are easily sparked for rather benign reasons. Such conflict atmosphere rapidly spills over to fans and violence is then spread and brutally manifested at grandstands, around the stadium or sports halls. At the same time, there are insufficient police forces to stop this and to ensure order and normal conditions for a sports event to take place. We have thus distanced ourselves from real values of sport, and in return we have got sports competitions which increasingly feature violence and brutality. Therefore, some authors reasonably underline anomalies in sports:

- 1) Aggressive and violent behaviour against sportspersons is present in all categories – from top-level to amateur sports.
- 2) Excessive length and intensity of training increasingly burden and exhaust sportspersons' bodies.

² The latest example of physical violence among the coach and football players happened on 3 May 2012, at the match between FC Fiorentina and FC Novara, when Delio Rossi, Fiorentina's coach, physically assaulted the club's player Adem Ljajić. The physical confrontation was preceded by verbal altercation after Rossi substituted Ljajić 32 minutes into the match. As a result, Rossi was dismissed and suspended for three months and Ljajić was fined and banned to play in his home club until the end of the season. The football player Adem Ljajić is also known by his conflict with Siniša Mihajlović, coach of Serbia's national team. Namely, Mihajlović banished Ljajić who, contrary to the agreement signed by players, refused to sing Serbia's national anthem before the match, justifying his behaviour by personal convictions.

- 3) Doping undermines sportspersons' health and at the same time leads to manipulations with competitions. Doping implies latent violence against one's own body, whose consequences are manifested only much later, often even after a person stops playing sports.
- 4) Training and competitions of inhumane orientation also include children, even of pre-school age, such as, for instance, "early school specialisation".
- 5) Upgrade of sports equipment may be detrimental to sportspersons' health.
- 6) Psychological preparation of professional sportspersons as the motivation to achieve the desired results is their real "psychological doping" (Kereković, 1981: 349).

Sportspersons' parents may also be rather violent. They often enter into physical confrontation with coaches, other sportspersons and their parents, and some of them victimise and punish their children. For instance, in 2000 in Massachusetts, a parent of a ten-year boy, a hockey player, was following the team's summer training. Concerned about aggressive play, the father shouted at the coach. A fight ensued in the corridor. The father, around 45 kilograms heavier, was incessantly punching the coach in his face, while keeping him on the floor, with his feet on coach's chest. The coach died and the father was sentenced to six-year imprisonment for murder (Kostić, 2008: 62).

Local and international political "influences" on sports represent another exceptionally negative phenomenon. Finding evidence is not hard. There are extremist movements that unscrupulously flaunt their ideologies at sports events, which is why sports facilities become places of racist and xenophobic manifestations (Bodin, Robene, and Heas, 2007: 16). Sports events may also become places of ethnic, culturological or religious conflicts. Numerous boycotts of the Olympic Games are good indicators of such political tensions. Under the Olympic torch, Hitler and Goebbels propagated the domination of the Aryan race; at the times of the great economic crisis, the Spanish dictator Franco diverted the public attention from social problems to football by purchasing the then best world players – Johan Cruyff and Franz Beckenbauer; during the mandate of President Carter, the USA boycotted the Moscow Olympics for political reasons, while the Soviet Union reciprocated by not sending its team to Los Angeles; the qualifications for the World Cup triggered a war between El Salvador and Honduras (Božović, 2006: 112).

Speaking about the autonomy of sports, as a field of game and insouciance, independent of politics, is illusory given the potential of symbolic communication of sports events. As already noted, sports events, particularly collective sports, are imbued with emotions and provoke various forms of dissatisfaction. This is particularly true for international conflicts as sports appear to be an infallible indicator of national antagonism, which may always be abused by political structures. Only in this context is it possible to understand the interest in the sale of tickets and transmission of the match between the USA and Iran at the 1998 World Cup – such interest by far exceeded the football skills of the two respective teams.

1.2.1. DEFINITION OF FAN VIOLENT CRIMINALITY AND DIFFERENTIATION WITH RELATED FORMS OF CRIMINALITY

As a phenomenon, sports audience has become commonplace in modern societies where a sports event resembles a spectacle. It was observed a long time ago that sports audience is prone to

violence, which is why violence in sports is equated with fan violence, which is not true (Mille, 1997: 277). Owing to such identification, the sociology of sports has devoted most attention to fan violence.

Unlike the above forms of sport violence, fan violent criminality represents a special field of research. Though there is no specific statutory definition of fan violent criminality, the most common understanding is that it implies violence or disorders which involve football fans. This concept has in the meantime been widened to include offenders in the context of other sports events. Fan violent criminality sublimates all criminal activities, notably of extreme fan groups, but also individuals. It also implies ordinary violence in the street which does not always correspond to sports and which may be perpetrated by extreme groups and individuals who need not necessarily be fans. This is a serious social problem affecting various parts of the world and almost as a rule results in injuries and deaths (Dunning, 2001: 157). Fan violent criminality usually implies aggressive-violent activities typical for adolescents and very young adults. This form of criminality is often equated with organised crime. However, we believe that members of extreme fan groups do not necessarily need to be incorporated in organised crime as the social danger of crime largely remains within the bounds of a fan group. Although the public perceives hooligans as organised groups, unlike street gangs, hooligans sometimes function as a disorganised mob, without a clear structure and hierarchy. They do not abide by clear rules and come from highly different socio-economic and subcultural groups. Most of them act in groups as individuals, thus spontaneously creating the dynamics of groups.

There are a number of elements linking hooligans with street gangs, but there are also differences, which is why we can reasonably consider them different phenomena. The common elements of street gangs and extreme fan groups are the following: the internal structure, the leader, rules of behaviour within the group, regular meetings of members and territoriality. However, differences between extreme fan groups and street gangs do exist, though they are hardly visible at first sight. As the matter of fact, extreme fans act in public places and seek media attention. In contrast, gangs are smaller in number and do not expose themselves publicly as fan groups. Besides, hooligans lack fixed hierarchy which is much clearer in case of street gangs. Extreme fans use sports as a motive for violent behaviour, while motives in the case of street gangs may be different, whilst the objective is usually of lucrative nature (Đorić, 2012: 80). Furthermore, fan violent criminality differs from other criminal activities also in terms of motivation which is usually unclear or cannot be determined with certainty. Unlike other perpetrators of criminal offences and misdemeanours, who avoid contact with the police, fan groups express violence and misbehaviour also towards police members. Another problem concerns the violation of several regulations such as: the Law on Public Assembly, Law on Public Peace and Order, Law on Weapons and Ammunition, Criminal Code, Law on Sports, Law on the Prevention of Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events, including secondary legislation and rules on security at sports events. Given all these specificities, it is very hard to find an adequate manner of prevention and suppression. The government's response aimed at the prevention of violence and misbehaviour is fraught with difficulties reflected in changes in the method, place and form of violence, with the ultimate objective to avoid criminal and misdemeanour sanctions (Misić, 2010:5).

Criminological research into the association of under-age persons and younger adults into groups inclined to criminal and violent behaviour is important for understanding violence at sports events. Young persons in a group are more aggressive and prone to provoking disorder and violence compared to their peers who are not organised (Earle, 2011: 129). Members of such groups are exceptionally active in criminal terms because they are surrounded by “friends” with thick criminal records. Spending time in such an environment, great opportunities and chances are opened to new members to commit new criminal offences (Bouchard and Spindler, 2010: 922).

Spaaij emphasises the versatility of the phenomenon of football hooliganism, which is why it should be explored in its different social and historical contexts. Nonetheless, it is possible to discern pronounced similarities in the construction of hooligans’ identity in various national and local contexts. According to Spaaij, there are six characteristics determining the identity of extreme fans: strong emotions, the emphasis on male virility and strength, territorial identification, individual and collective emphasis on reputation, feeling of solidarity and belonging, emphasis on sovereignty and autonomy (Spaaij, 2008:375).

1.2.2. CONCEPT OF HOOLIGANISM

The word “hooligan” or “hooliganism” originates from English and its etymology has been interpreted in different ways. Two interpretations seem to be the most reliable. According to the first version, based on police reports of 1898 in England, the word “hooligan” was linked to the name of a criminal from the notorious three-member gang Hooligan – Hoodlum – Larkin (Lieberman, 2005: 120). Under the second version, the word stems from the name of an Irish immigrant family living in London and terrorising the East End (Kontos, Brotherton, 2008: 13). This street gang was called “Hooley”. Under this assumption, the word “hooligan” consists of words “hooley” and “gang”. In any case, hooliganism is the behaviour implying the use of violence, as the origin of the word explicitly shows.

The term is generally accepted and describes the destructive behaviour of individuals and groups of people who do not abide by social norms and laws, and who vandalise their environment. Free time, promotion of sports events, political ideologies and street crime led to further development of hooliganism. Such misbehaviour is ascribed today to fan groups in different types of sports, most often team ones such as: football, basketball, handball, rugby and hockey.

Hooliganism does not relate only to fan violence. Its meaning may be much broader. In colloquial speech, the term “hooligan” may be attached to a rascal or a violent person, and does not necessarily connote violence at a sports event. In this regard, hooliganism is understood both in a wider and narrow sense. The wider meaning connotes improper behaviour, usually related to a street style which implies violence. In the narrow sense, hooliganism is violent behaviour of sports fans, i.e. extreme fans, which coincides with a sports event, most often football matches (Đorić, 2012: 64).

There are several definitions of hooliganism, but what they have in common is the correlation of violence with sports, which also implies the presence of ideological-political elements. For instance, the Encyclopaedia of British Football states: “Hooliganism is linked to the feeling of

identity with a football club or national team, and is manifested as racism and xenophobia, representing the pivotal point for periodical involvement of right-wing political groups, including the National Front and the British Movement” (Cox, Vamplev and Russell, 2002:19). We believe this definition is adapted to British society and does not reflect the essence of football hooliganism in a universal way. For instance, in Serbia the notion of hooliganism implies primarily violence of extreme fans, linked to a sports event, but may also be considered ordinary violence in the street which does not always correspond to sports and which may be perpetrated by extreme groups and individuals who need not necessarily be fans.

There are definitions underscoring the hooligans’ need to belong to a group, at least in a pathological way: “A hooligan is a member of a particular fan group who accepts common values of which the hatred against other groups’ members is the deepest joint root; to whom belonging to a group means a flight from anonymity, instilling him with security; fights with other fan groups are the expression of an emotional charge; the mediocre meaning of life when being a hooligan means being free and living in the best possible way...” (Petrović, 1992: 21). Koković believes that hooliganism is a reckless, useless, aimless action accompanied with the general contempt for individuals or the entire society, as well as contemptuous behaviour which implies blatant violation of public order and a display of obvious contempt for society (Koković, 2000: 144).

The proper definition of hooliganism entails adequate understanding of its correlation with sports which are used as a cover. There is no disputing that each hooligan is also a fan to an extent. However, it is also certain that a vast majority of fans are not hooligans but people who, with a higher or lower degree of emotional charge, watch sports, while at the same time maintaining control over their individuality and behaviour. One of the main criteria distinguishing between fans and hooligans is the relation between the collective and personal (Haidt, Seder and Kesebir, 2008: 145). Numerous researches point to the difference between an individual fan and member of a hooligan group, who acquiesces to having his own identity and the system of values replaced with the perceived identity of the group that he joins. In this process, the transfer is only ostensibly directed to sports content, while it essentially depends on the collective identity of the group itself. Therefore, it is not possible to define or understand the individuality of hooligans outside of the group they belong to.

Though the phenomenon of hooliganism is comprehensible at first sight, it should be noted that it is often intertwined with related concepts such as vandalism. The nouns “hooliganism” and “vandalism” are, in most languages using these terms, treated as synonyms – their meaning may be succinctly described as “destructive and violent behaviour”.³ These phenomena may doubtless overlap, but each of them is special and defined by its specific characteristics.

We believe vandalism is related to hooliganism, though hooliganism is a type of vandalism and is a narrower concept than vandalism. The noun “vandalism” originates from the name of the northern European tribe – the Vandals, who attacked and pillaged Rome in 455 A.D. The difference between these terms is that “vandals” represent an external, and “hooligans” an

³ The meaning of “hooliganism” according to Klajn, I., Šipka, M., (2006). “Veliki rečnik stranih reči i izraza” (*Great Dictionary of Foreign Words and Expressions*), Prometej, Belgrade. In the same dictionary, the noun “vandalism” is explained in more detail as: “savage behaviour, destruction, looting and destruction of cultural values”.

internal threat. However, the Vandals are remembered in history by destruction which is not typical even for barbarian invasions, and the term “vandalism” was used for all types of destructive and reckless behaviour, regardless of perpetrators. According to some theoreticians, vandalism represents unjustifiable destructiveness (Hirsch, Kett, and Trefil, 2002: 52). However, such definition may imply the phenomenon of aggression, but also different forms of violence, which is why we cannot ascribe to it any valid scientific weight. Vandalism may also be defined as violence against material assets – this definition is incomplete as it disregards the relation towards people: “Vandalism is the purposeful destruction of and infliction of damage to private or public property without the consent of the owner of such property” (Murray, 2006: 11).

Milosavljević defines vandalism as “a form of bullying and aggression directed at destroying different material social values, while in the original sense it implies damage to and destruction of artistic, cultural and historical values (Milosavljević, 2003: 234). Through vandalism, underage persons express their attitude towards society, always conveying a message through “what” they destroy and “how” they destroy – as a rule, these are invariably values not accessible to everyone. In this way, in the majority of cases, they express resistance to their own life and social position through a primitive attitude towards something which is inaccessible” (Jugović, 2002: 355). In “Kriminološki leksikon” (*Lexicon of Criminology*), Bošković defines vandalism as “pillaging and destruction of property and collective savage passion for demolition and destruction of material, cultural and historical values”. The same author underscores that “vandalism also implies brutish and destructive behaviour of the young, manifested in different modalities of mass violence at sports events, demonstrations, rock and pop concerts” (Bošković, 1999:35).

In our opinion, one of the best definitions of violence, which has survived the test of time, is the one based on FBI reports of the 1970s: “Vandalism is wilful or intentional destruction and spoiling of property without the owner’s approval and implies: cutting, tearing, breaking, painting, drawing, soiling and other actions covered by local law” (Stanley: 1972).

By analysing the above definitions of vandalism, it can be seen that Serbia’s Criminal Code envisages some criminal offences which are considered vandalism, such as damage to other people’s property, causing general danger, destruction of public devices, violent behaviour, participation in a mob perpetrating violence, thefts. Unlike vandalism, the term “hooliganism” is almost exclusively used for violence related to sports events.

A more precise definition of hooliganism is the adoption of an antisocial system of values, substituting the traditional family or social community by a fan group.⁴ It is not hard to conclude that the main distinguishing feature of vandalism and hooliganism is that the former phenomenon implies violence most often against property (though it does not exclude violence against people), while hooliganism, apart from violence against property, always involves violence against people. Also, hooliganism in Europe is most often associated with professional football, while causes of vandalism need not be sports events.⁵ The common feature of vandalism and hooliganism is the use of usually irrational violence.

⁴ The same is valid for gangs, extremist and terrorist groups, including totalitarian and destructive cults.

⁵ An example of vandalism in our country was the behaviour of some participants after the Belgrade protest on the occasion of declaration of independence of Kosovo and Metohija, when a mass of people began to destroy buildings

1.3. MANIFESTATIONS AND CAUSES OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS

Football fan practice deserves special attention, notably due to its massive scale. Supporting a club is something expected from everyone in our society. Football as the most important of all “unimportant things in the world”, takes a lot of free time from many people, directing their interests and engaging them emotionally. Very rarely do tens of thousands of people gather in our country for occasions other than football matches. Spectator behaviour at matches is crucially determined by the sports event itself, and to a lesser extent by the social climate which is more or less related to the event. This means that spectator behaviour may be affected by the result, behaviour of players, referee decisions, behaviour of supporters of the other club, including other events taking place on the sidelines of the match. Besides, supporters’ behaviour is affected by the atmosphere created in the media, importance of the match, as well as many other social and political events. Experiences in the struggle against hooliganism in Western Europe show that in some cases violence may be triggered also by aggressive policing or an extremely unfavourable result (Spaaij, 2005: 2). Another feature of hooliganism is that violence is manifested not only in the vicinity of sports facilities, but also in other public places – e.g. on public transportation means operating in the direction of supporters’ movement, and generally at places of gathering of extreme fan groups.

Violence at sports events may be manifested in different forms of content and intensity, from relatively tolerant forms to vandalism and graver criminal cases. In criminological terms, it is one of the most interesting phenomena of contemporary society. Reasons lie in the complexity of its structure and manifestations, but also in a number of political, social, economic, cultural and other factors. A high degree of organisation and violence in manifestation, the abuse of scientific knowledge and technologies, and the appearance of new forms of incrimination make this type of crime grave and complex.

We shall point to some characteristic forms of violence most often present in practice:

- individual physical assaults at other fans or passers-by;
- group fights between opposing fan groups;
- introduction and throwing into the sports grounds or among spectators pyrotechnics and other objects which may jeopardise the lives of participants in the sports event or derail its course, including the introduction and consumption of alcohol and drugs;
- pitch invasion with the aim to impede or stop the sports event;
- damages to devices and installations in the sports facility;
- destruction or damage of vehicles, trade and other facilities on supporters’ movement routes;
- offences against property – not paying bills in cafes and restaurants;
- writing graffiti in public spaces, on transportation means, facades, elevators, monuments;

and some embassies, including public assets; the most famous example of such behaviour included breaking into shops and stealing trainers in the Belgrade downtown (Đorić, 2012: 78).

- inciting hatred or antagonism which may lead to physical confrontation on national grounds, participation in events not related to sports, and perpetration of criminal offences not related to sports events.

This is certainly not an exhaustive list of types of violent behaviour at sports events. As the matter of fact, these forms depend on a number of other circumstances and may be manifested in the perpetration of the gravest criminal offences, such as murders or the infliction of grave bodily injuries. There are also other forms of violence at football stadiums and cannot be enumerated all, notably as the existing forms alter and new forms emerge in everyday practice. Awareness of them is indispensable for several reasons. Namely, causes of violence in sports change at a fast pace, concurrently with societal development, i.e. with changing relations in society. If competent authorities are late in recognising new forms of violence, there is no timely reaction in preventing these phenomena or minimising their consequences. Forms of football hooliganism in various countries depend on the social (cultural, economic, political) context in which they appear. There are different conditions and aspects of manifestation of this phenomenon, including even highly different intensities of violence. However, sufficient common features enable us to talk about football hooliganism as about an international problem. In this regard, the research and papers of English authors are relevant as, in addition to English specificities, they elaborate on features common for Italian, German, Russian or Serbian supporters (Otašević, 2010: 13).

The link between sports and violence is so close that sports can sometimes be the source of violence, while in some moments they can be the means of controlling it. In an ideal (and probably utopian) world, sports and sportspersons, sports managers and supporters, would have less disadvantages and more limitations, while sports would be an entirely neutral sphere of society, void of tensions, discords and violence (Bodin, Robene and Heas, 2007: 237). However, sports reflect the entire situation in society, which means we must observe it as a real challenge.

The most natural and frequent question asked in relation to violence in sports is “why”. This question is posed both in case of individual offences and their totality. Answering to this question is almost impossible in either case. Causes of sports-related violence are numerous, mysterious and intertwined. To only start understanding them, an individual must collect data on the volume and trends of crime, determine the “price of the crime”, explore the conditions of life in places where it flourishes, identify criminals and their victims, determine the attitude of society towards the crime (Ignjatović, 2011:123).

Ignjatović believes that each form of criminal behaviour is triggered by the conjunction of two groups of factors: personal traits of an individual and external (primarily social) factors. Their effect does not have the same force in all offences. In some, individual factors take precedence, in some other cases external factors come to the fore, whilst in the third group both types of factors have an approximately similar intensity (Ignjatović, 2011:123). This means that criminogenic factors act in combined, synthetic and complex ways. Some of them have a more general character and relate to a larger number of various forms of criminal behaviour, whereas others affect only a particular type of criminal behaviour. The interrelatedness and complexity of effects of criminogenic factors are reflected in the fact that no individual factor suffices to spur criminal behaviour, nor only one of them may be considered the primary cause of all its forms.

As each criminal behaviour results from complex mutual influences with varying intensity, a scientific analysis of causes of criminality must take into account all factors which may be important for its emergence and development in a particular situation (Konstatinović – Vilić, Nikolić – Ristanović and Kostić, 2009: 350).

For instance, the British sociologist Dunning highlights the complexity of the conjunction of sports, violence and extremist ideologies, but also sometimes overemphasises the factor of the offenders' social position (Dunning, 1999: 43). However, the stereotype about hooligans as members of only "socially vulnerable strata" is not fully confirmed through the results of contemporary research. Some of these results indicate that hooliganism need not be observed only in the context of the offenders' social position, but through their system of values which is always partly socially determined. Most hooligans do come from lower social strata, but the hooligan way of life is also chosen by a number of persons belonging to middle or upper classes. Therefore, a more precise definition of hooliganism would be the adoption of an antisocial system of values, substituting the traditional family or social community by the fan group.⁶

The psychological cause of joining a hooligan group may be frustration caused by the social situation; however, it can also be the consequence of boredom, adventurism, curiosity and a number of other, chiefly psychological motives, which are essentially frustration-related.

Often emphasised as one of the reasons for violence at stadiums is the so-called "herd psychology", when an individual feels safer as the mass belies his anonymity (Le Bon, 1989: 42). An individual feels much more powerful in a mass. The feeling of his personal responsibility weakens owing to hidden anonymity, which is why individuals in a mass are prepared to do such things which they may never do individually (Otašević, 2010: 520).

Some authors studying police pre-emption and curbing of violence at sports events believe that individuals in a group do not lose their individuality, but share their individual identity with the group's identity. This is why the police must not observe fans as a homogenous whole, but must instead distinguish among those not ready for violence and those prepared for it. It should support those against violence and should not turn them against it with its actions. Also, the police must support the fulfilment of legitimate requests by legitimate means, and should demonstrate this to group members. It will thus pacify all those not intending to behave violently in the group.

In the Serbian media, newspaper articles and professional discussions, the war and the economic crisis are most often mentioned as social circumstances (causes) impacting most over the last years on the escalation of violence at sports events. Taking into account the situation in other European countries and the scale of violence at sports events in them, it seems that such an attitude is not correct and that it indicates superficiality in analysing the problem of violence at sports events by some authors. The examples of European countries (England, Italy, Belgium) that witnessed no wars over the last sixty years and lived in material welfare until the start of the global economic crisis in 2008, while at the same time having a serious problem with violence at sports events, implies that the causes of violence should not be sought in wars and the economic

⁶ The same is valid for gangs, extremist groups and totalitarian and destructive cults.

crisis. Certainly, the impact of the war and the economic crisis, as factors aggravating the problem of violence at sports events, should not be disregarded either (Šuput: 2012: 93). Further, it would be wrong to claim that fan violence is a sort of a “vent pipe” in totalitarian regimes as such violence exists in democratic societies as well.

It has been many times empirically proven that unemployment, chronic existential uncertainty, hopelessness, lack of perspectives and pronounced economic inequalities are elements in a significant negative correlation with the degree of social and interpersonal tolerance. Causes of violence at sports events also include antagonism towards fans of the opposing club, poor security at the event, poor performance of the home club, unsporting behaviour of players, excessive consumption of alcohol and drugs, poor stadium infrastructure.

The increase in violence at sports events in our country was certainly sparked by the lack of political will for a decisive, persistent and consistent struggle for preventive and repressive measures aimed at fighting violence at sports events, as well as by the selective treatment of “privileged” individuals participating in perpetration of violence at sports events. Of course, the limiting factors in the prevention of violence at sports events also include insufficient professional capacity and the lack of any form of specialisation of personnel in charge of taking measures aimed at fighting violence at sports events, as well as the chronic lack of material capacities of sports clubs which as a result fail to take all statutory measures to prevent violence at sports competitions that they organise (Šuput: 2012: 91).

2. HISTORY OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS

Violence at sports events was recorded in texts dating as far back as the period of Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire (Madensen, 2008:123). In the book “The King of Sports” published in 1981, in the chapter dedicated to violent fan violence, Desmond Morris gives an example of Ancient Rome and numerous incidents in chariot races divided into the factions of the Green and Blue. The gravest incident took place in 512 with a mass brawl which lasted several days and took 30,000 lives.

Later on, Rome’s urban atmosphere spread, with all its advantages and downsides, to Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire. The vivid description by Procopius, one of the greatest Byzantine historians, shows that the “urban life” has essentially changed little to date. In his work “The Secret History”, Procopius gives a detailed description of the Nika riots (“Nika” means “victory” in Greek) of January 532. The riots forced even emperor Justinian to flee and ended in a fire which engulfed the first temple of Hagia Sophia in the imperial city. The riot was instigated by the city Blue and Green factions which, at one moment, overcame their centuries-long hatred and joined in a hooligan wind which, worse than any external threat, almost destroyed the imperial city and the ruling order (Otašević, Protić, 2012:73). Procopius’ description of the hooligan terror (under temporary auspices of ruling power), which preceded the riots, seems to be more telling than today’s numerous scientific analyses of hooliganism:

“They gathered together in gangs as soon as it became dusk, and robbed respectable people in the market-place and in the narrow lanes, knocking men down and taking their cloaks, belts, gold

buckles, and anything else that they had in their hands... These acts roused the indignation of all men, even the least disaffected members of the Blue faction... But the evil spread, and as the authorities in charge of the people did nothing to punish the criminals, these men became very daring; for crime, when encouraged to manifest itself openly, always increases enormously, seeing that even when punished it cannot be entirely suppressed. Indeed, most men are naturally inclined to evil-doing... For they no longer needed to conceal their crimes, because they had no fear of punishment; but to kill an unarmed passer-by with one blow was a sort of claim to public esteem, and a means of proving one's strength and courage... The judges gave sentence on disputed points not according to what they thought to be lawful and right, but according as each of the litigants was a friend or an enemy of the ruling faction.”⁷

According to Procopius, the undeniable culprit for the riots was emperor Justinian who owed his rule largely to the support of the Blue faction and was in a certain way repaying his debt by being lenient towards their terror. When he eventually tried to re-establish the violated order, the emperor faced an invasion of “vandals” within the walls of his city which was unconquerable from the outside.

In the recent history of human civilisation, violence at football matches is particularly pronounced. Though it was not recorded exactly when the first serious incident happened, relevant information includes clashes between fans and the police on 16 July 1916 in Buenos Aires (Argentina) over the postponement of the final match at the South American Championship between Argentina and Uruguay when 40,000 people arrived at the stadium which could accommodate 20,000 (Žužak, 2010: 9).

England is considered the homeland of football hooliganism on the European continent. The roots of hooliganism date back to the late 19th century when fans of football clubs Liverpool, Manchester United, Rangers, Celtic, Middlesbrough etc. began to gather prior to each match first of all to drink, but at the same time to mount an organised presence at football stadiums and fanatically root for their clubs. The first disorders at football matches were recorded in 1880 at the match FC Preston – FC Aston Villa (5:0), when even football players got beaten. In 1950, in the brawl between fans of FC Preston and FC Blackburn, a 70-year old drunken woman participated, rooting for the guest team.⁸ Disorders began to escalate in 1985. After the horrendous March skirmish between supporters of FC Luton and notorious supporters of FC Millwall, the then UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher urgently established a “War Cabinet” with the exclusive task to fight against football hooligans.

In time, the English method began to be emulated by extreme fans in the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and other European countries. The culmination occurred with the tragic events at the Belgian stadium Heysel on 29 May 1985. This brought about more serious treatment of violence of this kind, contributing to the adoption of a larger number of international documents aimed at tackling the problem in a holistic way and setting international standards to serve as a basis for enhancing security. Important objectives in this field also include the development and adoption of international policing standards on the prevention of disorders at sports events. Violence at

⁷ See more in: Procopius, “The Secret History”; the quoted paragraph downloaded from “the Project Gutenberg EBook”.

⁸ Downloaded from: http://www.sports-venue.info/Fans/Futbol_Hooligans.html, (23/08/2013).

sports events has intensified over the past decades. The best known incidents at the global level are the following:

- In 1946 in Bolton (England), 33 supporters were killed and around 500 injured when the stadium wall collapsed.
- In 1964, 318 supporters were killed and more than 500 injured in riots at the National Stadium in Lima (Peru) at the match Peru–Argentina.
- In 1969, a one-week “football war” was waged between Honduras and El Salvador, breaking out after the match of national teams of the two countries, held on the neutral grounds in Mexico. El Salvador severed diplomatic ties with Honduras and its army entered El Salvador in tanks and bombed Tegucigalpa. More than 300 people were killed and 10,000 immigrants fled from Honduras back to El Salvador.
- In 1971 in Glasgow (Scotland), 66 supporters lost lives at the match Celtic–Rangers.
- In 1972 at the Munich Olympics, the group known as the “Black September” took several Israeli sportsmen hostage.
- In 1985 in Brussels (Belgium) at the Heysel stadium, 39 supporters were killed and 400 injured at the European Cup Final between Liverpool and Juventus, after the fence crushed under the burden of people trying to escape violence.
- In 1988, a hailstorm took the lives of 93 spectators and over 100 of them were injured during the football match at the national stadium in Nepal. Hundreds of spectators tried to leave the uncovered grandstands when the hail started, but the stadium doors were locked, causing a fatal crush at the front.
- In 1989, an earthquake struck San Francisco during the match no. 3 in the Major League Baseball (MLB) between Francisco Giants and Oakland A’s at the Candlestick Park. The stadium remained intact and no one was seriously injured.
- In 1989 in Sheffield (England), at the match Liverpool–Nottingham Forest, 96 supporters were killed and over 200 injured. An influx of thousands of supporters through a narrow tunnel to an already overcrowded grandstand caused a bottleneck at the foot. Under the pressure of crowds, people were pushed onto the fence and the security responded too late to relieve the pressure.
- In 1993, Monika Seleš was stabbed by knife during the second set of a quarterfinal match in Hamburg. A fan stabbed a 25-cm knife between her shoulder blades. Seleš was unable to return to tennis over the next 28 months due to psychological problems.
- In 1996 in Guatemala, at the match Guatemala–Costa Rica, 81 supporters were killed and 147 injured. On this occasion, the number of sold tickets exceeded the stadium capacity.
- In 1996 at the Olympic Games in Atlanta, two persons were killed and 110 injured in the bomb explosion in the Centennial Olympic Park, during a concert in the open.
- In 2000, 30 people were trampled to death in riots at the FIFA World Cup qualification match between South Africa and Zimbabwe in Zimbabwe.
- In 2001, the terrorist attack of 11 September had an immediate effect on numerous global spheres of life. In regard to sports, 15 MLB matches were cancelled on that faithful day, as well as all other matches until the end of the week. The Football League (NFL) cancelled all matches scheduled for the following weekend.
- In 2002, a father and son ran into the pitch and attacked the MLB coach Tom Gamboa from Kansas City Royals in the Comiskey Park.

- In 2004, at the match of the National Basketball League (NBA) of Indiana Pacers, a brawl erupted between players and supporters.
- In 2005, hurricane Katrina caused cancellation or relocation of numerous sports events in New Orleans in the coastal and gulf area of the USA.
- A student of Oklahoma University committed suicide, activating a bomb fastened to his body in front of a stadium receiving 84,000 spectators.
- In 2007 in Sicily, a police officer was killed in fan riots over the A-series match between Catania and Palermo, which led to the suspension of all league matches until security assessment was performed at all stadiums.
- In 2007 during the UEFA Champions League, many supporters with valid tickets remained before the closed doors of the Athens Olympics stadium which hosted the final match between Milan and Liverpool. Supporters with fake tickets, bought “under the counter”, entered the stadium and took their seats.
- In 2008 at the Summer Olympics in China, the Cuban taekwondo champion Angel Matos kicked the Swedish referee in the head, pushed the judge and spat on the floor, whereafter he got disqualified from the bronze medal match.
- In 2012 in Egypt at the Port Said stadium, 79 spectators lost their lives and more than a thousand were injured in riots at a football match.

This short overview shows that causes of risks which may escalate into violence are different and related to various sports events and at different locations across the world. Neither rich nor poor people are spared the risk, while some authors point to the greater complexity of security aspects at sports events following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the USA (Schwartz, Hall, and Shibli, 2010: 187–188). Violence at sports events is the most prevalent with football spectators, but is immanent also to sports such as basketball, rugby, ice hockey etc. It is less pronounced in North America compared to the rest of the world. Some foreign authors explain this phenomenon by the social structure of fan groups. The socio-demographic profile of a North American spectator differs from that of a European or South American one. Sports events in North America are attended by educated middle-class audience, with women constituting a large percentage of spectators. For instance, almost a half (45%) of fans of the Toronto Maple Leafs hockey team are women, with the average annual income of 70,000 dollars, which is above the national average (Russell and Ward, 2002: 458). In contrast, in Europe and South America fan violence is associated generally with young white men belonging to working classes, who represent the largest percentage of spectators. Organised football violence is dominant in Europe, while spontaneous, non-organised violence is prevalent in the USA.

The statistics of criminality show that almost a half of criminal offences relating to sports events are committed by persons below 20. Extreme groups of fans are particularly dangerous for young people as they offer them the feeling of power and belonging, which helps them develop their individual identity. The identity of fan groups is violence-based (Đorić, 2012: 194). These groups have a structure, hierarchy, territory, symbols (an anthem, coat-of-arms, flag) which differentiate them from other fan groups.

Over the past years, our country has also faced sports hooliganism. This phenomenon is developing both in qualitative and quantitative terms, and will be present in future as well. In Serbia, the problem of violence has culminated over the last two decades as some fans have lost

their lives and public peace and order have been violated at a greater scale. Besides, graver incidents have occurred during and outside of matches, involving a large number of injured persons and significant damage and demolition of property. Politically motivated public gatherings, attended by fans and some right-wing organisations, turned, as a rule, into large-scale violence and destruction.

For instance, conflicts of extreme fan groups took ten human lives in the 1999–2009 period. This indicator ranks our country the first in Europe.⁹ In 2009, in cooperation with the Association of Sports Journalists of Serbia, the Ministry of Youth and Sports of the Republic of Serbia conducted the research titled “The Media, Sports and Violence”, analysing texts published in the Serbian media in 2008 and devoted to violence at and around the sports arena. According to the research, one fan in Serbia was killed within 136 days, and all victims and offenders were aged between 17 and 25 (Đurđević, 2010: 286). For the sake of comparison, from 1996 to 1999, three murders were committed in relation to violence of extreme fans in England, five in Italy, and one in the Netherlands (Dunning, 2000: 46). The data unequivocally confirm that violence and misbehaviour of fans at sports events, notably football matches, is an international problem,

⁹ The most drastic conflicts of extreme fan groups in the observed period were the following:

- At the stadium of FC Partizan, at the match between FC Partizan and FC Crvena zvezda, a rocket was fired and killed Aleksandar Radović (30/10/1999).
- At the railway station “Pančevački most“, three Partizan fans beat to death Živorad Šišković (1936) from Belgrade who was defending a Chinese citizen (11/05/2002).
- In the brawl of fans in an Obrenovac school, lethal knife wounds were inflicted on Marko Radovanović (14/01/2005).
- On the train operating in the direction Belgrade–Bar, at the railway station in Rakovica, a fight erupted between fans of FC Voždovac and FC Rad, when Bojan Majić (1976) from Belgrade was killed with a sharp object (04/08/2005).
- On public transport in New Belgrade, a fight was picked up between fan groups of FC Čukarički and FC Bežanija, when lethal knife wounds were inflicted on Golub Balević (1987) (29/10/2005).
- Following a conflict over fan insignia, a fan of FC Crvena zvezda killed with a knife the under-age Radovan Milošević (1988) from Obrenovac (19/10/2005).
- In the Belgrade settlement of Bežanijska kosa, in a brawl between fans of FC Rad and FC Partizan, Petar Sedlak (1982), a Partizan fan, lost his life (26/04/2006).
- On the football pitch of FC Žarkovo, in the Belgrade municipality of Čukarica, a scheduled fight erupted between fans of FC Crvena zvezda and FC Partizan, when Blagojević Marko (1987), a Partizan fan, inflicted a lethal knife wound on Aleksandar Panić (1982) (27/07/2006).
- In the betting place “Rojal“ in New Belgrade, a fight erupted among three young men over fan insignia. Dejan Gajčić (1981) requested from Dušan Penić (1989) to give him the kit of Crvena zvezda to set it on fire. He then hit him several times with his gun, inflicting on him lethal bodily injuries.
- In the scheduled fight between fans of FC Vojvodina from Novi Sad and FC Partizan from Belgrade, a Partizan fan fired a shot in the direction of Dejan Dimitrijević (1981) from Novi Sad and killed him, while one person was heavily wounded. This event was preceded by violence that erupted two days before, during the match of these two clubs in Belgrade (14/04/2008).
- A few hours before the football match between FC Partizan and FC Toulouse from France, in a Belgrade café in Obilićev venac, a group of masked Partizan fans threw several activated torches at Toulouse fans and attacked them physically. The French citizen Taton Brice Sinclair Peter (1981) was inflicted injuries to which he later succumbed (17/09/2009). Quoted according to: Analytics Administration, Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia.

pervading all countries of Europe, both those considered traditionally obsessed with football and those where football and fan subculture are not deeply rooted (Göral, 2008: 502).

After several decades in which English hooligans were usually mentioned in films and documentaries, in 2005 fans of London clubs West Ham and Millwall turned the football pitch into a war arena. The two teams (sworn enemies since the 19th century) played rarely as they did not belong to the same league, but were selected in the Carling Cup second round draw. Brawls erupted before and continued during and after the match, including three invasions into the Apton Park pitch and a knife stabbed into the chests of a 44-year old fan. After this incident, football organisations requested a life-long ban on stadium entry for culprits and the minister of sports requested the exclusion of West Ham from the Cup. In relation to this event, the former West Ham fan leader said in a newspaper article that there was no reason for concern as the government controlled the situation, unlike the 1970s and 1980s when fan groups were “making a show”.

Following this incident, the English media initiated again the discussions on whether it is possible to win over hooligans, expressing concerns that such incidents could jeopardise the England’s bid to host the 2018 World Cup. This is one of rare incidents taking place in England, but it is well-known that English fans still cause serious incidents overseas. People still remember their riots at the 1998 World Cup in France and brawls with a tragic outcome in Istanbul at the match Galatasaray–Leeds when two English supporters were stabbed to death.¹⁰

2.1. RESEARCH OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS TODAY

Violence represents today one of the greatest social problems of the human community. It pervades all spheres of human society: the family, school, catering facilities, prisons, sports events, streets, the media, national and religious groups, countries. Though significantly less dangerous for the social community compared to other forms of violence, violence at sports events has been more widely present recently, which entails the implementation of systematic suppression measures. The consequences of such behaviour go beyond the very field of sports and gain wider social relevance – in competition days, football stadiums often become the epicentres of mass violent behaviour that leaves in its wake injured people, damaged property, and an atmosphere of fear and insecurity.

Over the past years, Serbia has doubtless faced the emergence of sports hooliganism. This phenomenon is developing in qualitative and quantitative terms, and will be present in future as well. However, it is not only our country that faces the problem of violent fans (hooligans) – this is a global problem present in all countries with the tradition of fan culture, as shown by the recent events in the former SFRY countries, Poland, Egypt etc.

On the one hand, the general upward trend in violence at sports events has sparked the dynamic re-examination of the existing models of social reaction and the efficiency of the judicial system, while on the other hand, it has spurred research efforts in the field of criminology. There are many researches on the phenomenon of violence of extreme fan groups conducted in the world

¹⁰ Downloaded from: http://www.sports-venue.info/Fans/Futbol_Hooligans.html (27/09/2013).

today, both in the field of phenomenology and etiology, and in regard to the efficiency of controlling violent criminality of extreme fans. Generally, the second half of the 20th century saw global changes in the nature and dimensions of violence at sports events, including the scientific understanding of causes and prevention of violence at sports events, particularly in developed European countries.

It is noteworthy that research papers on football violence and hooliganism most often do not differentiate between supporters and their leaders. As a rule, these papers focus on fans, ultrafans, extreme fans. Fan groups are presented as a homogenous whole. No differentiation is made between leaders and the very core of a fan group as a special category, from other fans who follow them, listen to them and emulate them. A neglected topic is also the criminality of football fans, particularly the criminality of fan group leaders. Some papers present only aggregate data on criminal offences committed by fans (of a team, or in a country, during a year or football season) in relation to football matches – e.g. the number of bodily injuries, damaged property, attacks at the police.¹¹ Some add to this list the statistics of criminal offences committed on transportation means on the way to the stadium or back (Pätzold and Kaempf, 2012: 218). Papers dealing with fan violence, i.e. football hooliganism, neglect the research of crimes committed outside of the sports environment. Such papers only sporadically mention that some fans are also inclined to perpetrating other criminal offences not related to sports events. Russell highlights the importance of studying the history of aggressive fan behaviour since this is important for predicting future behaviour and may help in identifying persons who are pivotal in causing violence at matches. He states that around a third of sport-related violence is caused by persons earlier convicted of violence, i.e. two thirds of football hooligans have a history of violent behaviour outside of the football-related environment (Russell, 2004: 376).

Few researches carried out in Serbia (Koković, (1990); Misić (2010); Đorić (2012)) show that violence at sports events follows global trends. These researches point to rising violence, under-age persons as the basic social base of hooliganism, frequent emphasis of national affiliation, low level of education, continuous violent behaviour, particularly at football matches.

The results of domestic research of characteristics of the formal reaction to violence at sports events reveal long-lasting court proceedings and lenient penal policy of courts (Šuput, 2010). However, though strict sanctioning of violent behaviour is inevitable, most authors believe there is a need to design special preventive programmes. Such authors thus explicitly point not only to the need and importance of designing preventive responses to violence at sports events, but also to the heterogeneity of the structure of perpetrators and offences (including the heterogeneity of factors of this phenomenon). These phenomena are, however, still insufficiently explored, notably in domestic conditions.

¹¹ For data on Belgium, see: De Vreese, 2000:203. For data on Italy, see: Roversi, Balestri., C., (2000) Italian Ultras Today: Change or Decline? *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, Vol. (8), No. 2. p. 185.

2.2. PERIODISATION OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

Violence at sports events in Serbia and its immediate surroundings is a continuous phenomenon. It cannot be adequately analysed in its entirety unless its genesis is understood. The first Yugoslav research of the “fan tribe” conducted by Željko Buzov, Ivan Magdalenić, Benjamin Perasović and Furio Radin from Zagreb highlighted the necessity to re-examine some opinions about violence at (at the time) domestic stadiums, and to explore in detail the needs for which fans came to stadiums. The most extreme groups and individuals substituted the inclination to sports and sympathies with a club with a violent expression of emotions, which is not only unrelated to sports competitions, but is entirely opposed to the basic assumptions of sports (Buzov et al. 1989:17). Violence at sports events and the subculture arising from such violence represent one of the most important, if not the most important phenomenon of young people over the last decade in Serbia. This phenomenon is present, to a larger or smaller extent and in various forms, in all states created after the collapse of the former SFRY.

Sports-related fan violence in the former Yugoslavia emerged usually in the context of ethnic conflicts, political instability and weak institutions, including the permanent socio-economic crisis and the related chronic lack of perspective. The roots of ethnic conflicts in sports in this region date back to the first football World Cup held in 1930 in Uruguay.¹²

The history fan practice in the former Yugoslavia has gone through numerous phases. Serbia’s history was extremely turbulent and dynamic and owing to constant changes in the state regulation, the history of supporters must be observed through the prism of political and territorial changes. Therefore, the creation of fan groups in the former Yugoslavia may be divided into six main periods:

- Period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia;

¹² This World Cup brought historical success – the third place to the national team, named Yugoslav at the time, but consisting of Serbian players. The story about preparations of the Yugoslav team for the World Cup vividly describes the impact of politics on sports and two forces of football – integrative and disintegrative. Moving the headquarters of the football association from Zagreb to Belgrade caused a discord along ethnic lines, which once again brought into the question the understanding of sports as a factor of integration and overcoming of class, linguistic, national and other barriers. The refusal of Croatian and Slovenian footballers to be part of the team jeopardised the participation of the Yugoslav team at the World Cup. However, when this problem was overcome, financial problems ensued. The football association lacked sufficient funds for such a distant journey. King Aleksandar, the main proponent of the ruling ideology of Yugoslavism, said he would give his support provided the national team reflected the ethnic diversity of the Kingdom, which was impossible to achieve at the moment. Another potential donor, starting from his ideological position, refused to help a national team which did not represent only Serbia. This example clearly shows that politics and ideology in relation to sports have only one aspiration – to place sports in the service of their interests. However, at the time, sports officials did not participate in such trade, bearing in mind the ethical and aesthetic principles that sports are based on. The integrative power of football then came to the fore – players of long-standing rivals, clubs BSK and Jugoslavija, were united by the love of the game and responsibility towards the nation. At the same time, supporters of our national team went beyond their passive role in sports and showed a commendable initiative. They collected money contributions for the journey of our national team. The values of sacrifice, dedication, solidarity, patriotism spilled over from the football pitch to spectator stands and enabled the greatest success of Serbian football – this was not only about the third place at the Cup, but about the picture of sport in its virtue and the preservation of its values, the picture which came close to the ideal of sports as an institutionalised game (Kragović, 2012:204).

- Period from 1945 until the late 1960s;
- Period of the 1970s and 1980s;
- Period of the 1990s;
- Period from the late 1990s to late 20th century; and
- Period from 2001 onwards.

Supporters' behaviour over more than half a century changed significantly – from mutually related individuals and smaller groups to the creation of very numerous and organised fan groups; from fan practice as an activity present only in relation to matches, to fan practice as a subculture. Orientation to the tradition of one's fan group and club is one of the main characteristics of the supporters' system of values (Otašević, Subošić, 2010:374). It should be borne in mind that tradition is a body of material, technical and spiritual knowledge, achievements, values and patterns of behaviour. It is maintained by oral dissemination which underpins the continuity and identity of a culture (Videnović, 2006: 25).

Given this, it should be emphasised that Serbia has been for a long time a part of Europe in terms of fan violence. The scope and characteristics of such violence in Serbia during the former Yugoslavia were very similar to those in England, Italy, Poland and Norway, as countries most seriously affected by fan violence. In their comparative study on fan hooliganism from the mid-1980s, Williams, Dunning and Murphy emphasise that the problem was the most pronounced in England, Italy, the Netherlands and Yugoslavia (Williams, Dunning and Murphy, 1986:31).

2.2.1. PERIOD OF THE KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA

England is the so-called cradle of football and a large number of football clubs were founded in England in the late 19th century. In Serbia, the longest tradition is cherished by FC Bačka from Subotica, founded in 1901. In the further development of football, each town or region in the state had their own football club. Before World War I, Belgrade had only three pitches of the prescribed size – those were the playing fields of clubs Soko, BSK and Velika Srbija. Pitches of Dušanovac, Kosovo and Nevesinje complied with standards, though those were unfenced fields without grandstands. The number of supporters was increasing, from 300 to 600. On the eve of the War in 1914, derby matches were attended by up to 2000 people. The atmosphere was marked by fair cheering and the absence of incidents. The first incident in the history of Belgrade supporters happened in 1924, with the conflict between fans of FC Jugoslavija and the police. The great victory of FC Jugoslavija over FC Hajduk in Split was celebrated by tens of thousands of Belgraders. At the welcoming ceremony organised for players returning from Split, a major brawl erupted between the gendarmerie and fans, including even team players (Đurđević, 1994: 66). Fans of FC Jugoslavija were the first organised fans in Serbia. There are data showing that hundreds of Jugoslavija's fans would go by train from Belgrade to Zagreb to watch football matches between FC Jugoslavija and FC Hašk Građanski.

2.2.2. PERIOD FROM 1945 TO THE LATE 1960s

The four-year war horrors still lasted when the foundations for sports societies of Crvena zvezda and Partizan were laid with the establishment of football clubs.¹³ In this way, the rivalry and conflicts between the management of the two Belgrade clubs began from the very onset. Fronts of football fans, lasting to date, were formed back then, even among communists. Partizan generals were accusing Crvena zvezda fans of being against the Army, while the latter accused the former of being against the people's government.

At the time, in the former Yugoslavia, there was great interest in sports, particularly football. Spectators behaved spontaneously and reacted to the game. At important matches, smaller groups of very loud fans would gather at particular sides of the stadium. Incidents were spontaneous and the main reason for behaviour excesses were club rivalries which reflected regional diversities (Otašević, Subošić, 2010:374). The game in the field had the decisive impact on cheering. Verbal excesses were relatively frequent, usually in the form of insults at players and fans of the opposing team, as well as referees. Chauvinistic messages were very rare, both due to the prevalent political mood of the majority of citizens and strict sanctioning by government authorities.¹⁴

2.2.3. PERIOD OF THE 1970s AND 1980s

In this period, the youth across the former Yugoslavia began to adopt the so-called *southern way of supporting*, specific by displaying a great number of club flags and banners (used at those parts of grandstands where they gathered). Besides, an increasing number of fans tried to emulate fans from northern Europe, notably the English (wearing fan shawls, chanting, gathering in smaller groups, instigating fights and other forms of violence) (Lalić, 1993:95).

¹³ In February 1945, a group of officials and youth, gathered around the United Alliance of Antifascist Youth of Serbia, launched preparations for the constitutive meeting of the youth physical education society which became Crvena zvezda on 4 March. Concurrently with the establishment of Crvena zvezda, preparations were underway to establish a football club at the Central House of Yugoslav Army, modelled on the example of the Soviet Union. The idea was to include, later on, other sports to be played by sportsmen in military uniforms. The club was established on 4 October 1945. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary, the war commander Peko Dapčević, later one of the presidents of the Yugoslav Sports Society Partizan wrote about making the decision to establish the club: "Most of us, young generals, who played and liked football, gathered together and agreed to establish a football club. There were no disputes about the name: we were partisans and it was therefore most natural to name our club Partizan".

¹⁴ An interesting example relates to 29 November 1950 when FC Hajduk, after the match with FC Crvena zvezda in Split, became the football champion in the then Yugoslavia. This date is considered the date when the fan group Torcida was founded by 113 students headed by Vjenceslav Žuvela. After the incidents provoked by the new fan group before, during and after the match, the then president of Hajduk, Ante Jurijević, was punished by the Party with a warning. The Hajduk captain Frane Matošić was excluded from the Communist Party (to be readmitted upon the intervention of Josip Broz Tito) after he punched the Crvena zvezda player Branko Stanković. Some Torcida members were detained and subjected to misdemeanour proceedings, while the fan leader Vjenceslav Žuvela was sentenced to three years in prison. His sentence was reduced to three months based on the decision of the Higher Court. Provoked by this event, Milovan Đilas gave a statement to the daily "Borba" on 1 December 1950, titled: "That is not the right way of cheering". In the same article, Đilas stated the following: "Members of this group cheered with so much recklessness that, at moments, it turned into bad-mannered and rude incidents which could, if not prevented immediately, fuel hatred between the clubs" (Lalić, 1993: 87; and dailies "Borba" and "Politika" of 01/12/1950).

This period saw the first indications of future, well-organised fan groups, notably in Split, Belgrade, Zagreb, and later in Sarajevo and other bigger towns. Fan violence has a half-symbolic character – one does not go “to the end”, i.e. there is a wish to humiliate, but not to physically injure the opposing fans. In the late 1970s, the first major conflicts emerged among the still insufficiently profiled fan groups (Otašević, Subošić, 2010: 374).

Serbian fans refute that the Torcida fan group has existed since 1950. However, it is undisputable that fans from Split were the first to introduce pyrotechnics to Yugoslav stadiums, stealing them from ships coming to the coast. Besides, there are pictures of pyrotechnic incidents at the FC Hajduk stadium in the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, according to today’s understanding of the notion of an “organised fan group”, Torcida was founded in 1981, since when they have been considered one of the best organised and most extreme fan groups in the former SFRY.

2.2.4. PERIOD OF THE 1990s

In this period, cores of fan groups evolved into profiled and rather numerous teams. Fans of Crvena zvezda and Partizan established several groups (Red Devils, Zulu Warriors, Gravediggers, Commando etc), which gradually merged into the fan groups Delije and Grobari. Other fan groups were established across the then Yugoslavia, such as: Horde zla (FC Sarajevo), Armada (FC Rijeka), Varvari (FC Budućnost) etc. The names of fan groups reflect the obvious influence of English fans. They carry a degree of militant spirit and a threat of hidden or open violence.

Great rivalry was then developed between the created fan groups and the number of fans ready to provoke drastic incidents increased. At the majority of stadiums it became unthinkable for fans of two opposing clubs to sit at the same side. Extreme fan groups consisted primarily of young people with asocial behaviour, often in no way related to the event on the pitch. These groups had an elaborate iconography, dominated by symbols typical for the English cheering style and violence which became part of the fan subculture (Otašević, Subošić, 2010:375).

In this period, the most important causes of escalating violence and hooliganism in our region were the following: formation of fan groups and their increasingly better organisation, greater aggressiveness of fans, politisation of groups and escalation of spectator conflicts into interethnic conflicts (Mihajlović, 1997). Following the 1980s and suppression of the counter-revolution, the nationalism of Kosovo Albanians was reflected in their fans’ parole: “Eho-eho” – the words used to glorify Enver Hoxha (consisting of the initial letters of his name and surname). Nationalism was flaring up. In Belgrade, fans of Belgrade football clubs who were revolted with the events in Kosovo, attacked and damaged shops owned by Albanians (Misić, 2010:87).

2.2.5. PERIOD FROM THE LATE 1990s TO LATE 20th CENTURY

Apart from great rivalry among created fan groups, incidents in the former Yugoslavia were largely influenced by interethnic and political animosities. Occasional homogenisation of fan groups on national grounds became visible. This did not involve the negation of mutual

differences among fan groups, but joint gathering of strength against the common enemy (the opposing fan group). Such situation began to evolve practically from one of the most important political events from the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century, when football clubs Dinamo and Crvena zvezda met at the Zagreb Maksimir stadium on 13 May 1990. The match never took place and remained remembered by the fierce skirmish between fans of Dinamo (Bad Blue Boys) and Crvena zvezda (Delije), which left 60 injured persons. Some circles believe that the war erupted that very day at Maksimir. Political structures began to manipulate fans for the sake of their own interests. In the early 1990s, troops for voluntary military formations were recruited from the ranks of fan groups. Leaders of some fan groups became bodyguards of various political leaders; some of them created their own paramilitary formations¹⁵, while others began to seriously deal with politics.

This period saw the start of foundation of small fan groups in all Serbian towns and blocks of flats of big towns, which appear today as initiators of local fan projects and a counterweight for the two largest fan groups of football clubs Crvena zvezda and Partizan. From World War II they were treated as “state” projects, enjoying generous support of the state at any moment. In addition, it seems that only they exist in the Serbian media, which causes jealousy of all other “small” clubs and their supporters.

2.2.6. FAN VIOLENCE IN SERBIA SINCE 2001

Fan violence continued even after the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. Quite contrary to the predictions of those who in the early 1990s claimed that once interethnic conflicts ended there would be no more fan incidents, such phenomena have become even more frequent, with even more serious consequences. In the period of disintegration of the SFRY from 1991 to 2000, the war psychosis and an incredible political pressure caused Serbian fans to turn to right-wing political structures in the long run.

In this period, fans began to professionally deal with club support as their only activity. The initiators of this exceptionally negative social phenomenon were fan leaders of FC Partizan who became the official club’s agency with a clearly defined activity – for the sake of gaining privileges in the resale of tickets, sale of supporter equipment, resale of football players and paid travels to matches held abroad. This, *inter alia*, encouraged the criminalisation of supporters, an excessive influence of hooligans on the operation of clubs, and the spreading of this phenomenon to other bigger clubs in the country. Fan groups of Crvena zvezda and Partizan receive still today direct earnings from the sale of supporter equipment at the stadium. Together with an army of millions of supporters, this guarantees to them financial security and the possibility to make spectacles that the whole world gets informed of.

Since late 2007, violence at sports events has become to suddenly spread to places unrelated to such events. Only in 2008, in addition to 138 serious forms of violence committed before, during and after sports events, another 68 cases were recorded in streets, public gatherings, catering facilities and other places unrelated to the organisation of sports events. Individuals and groups

¹⁵ Many fans were killed in battlefields of the former SFRY and monuments were erected to some of them – e.g. supporters of FC Sarajevo and FC Dinamo from Zagreb. “Football, blood and war”, Observer, Sunday, 18/01/2004. Downloaded from: <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/osm/story/0,,1123137,00.html>, last accessed on 04/04/2012.

of young men with supporter distinguishing marks display violence by throwing pyrotechnics on public transportation means, by invading and throwing teargas into catering facilities, ambushing on pupils of nearby schools etc.

Contemporary violence at sports events, particularly football matches, is still a pressing problem for all European countries. Such violence takes various forms, with a visible tendency to be relocated from the stadium itself to the surrounding area, including the wider urban environment.¹⁶

2.3. FAN GROUPS IN SERBIA

In the second half of the 1980s, at the beginning of disintegration of the SFRY, all former republics, as well as all bigger Serbian towns, saw the formation of “ultras” fan groups. Though extreme fan groups existed much earlier, the arsenal of means used in conflicts among supporters of opposing teams widened. Along with standard sticks and stones, also used were bottles, knives and other dangerous means, including firearms (Otašević, 2010: 272).

Today, according to data of the Ministry of Interior, all bigger towns in Serbia have around 40 organised fan groups and subgroups, with around 3,000 supporters, generally belonging to C (violent) or B (potentially violent) categories. Only in the territory of Belgrade, there are 11 mutually opposing fan groups, of which the most numerous and most interesting in terms of security are the fan groups of FC Crvena zvezda and FC Partizan.

When FC Crvena zvezda was established, a faction of its friends was formed with around a hundred of supporters. It consisted of young men from prestigious parts of the city – Senjak, Topčidersko brdo, Dedinje and Knez Mihailova Street. They were later joined by young men from an ordinary social environment, i.e. from working classes. The 1970s saw the first gatherings of supporters at all stadiums in the former SFRY. At the same time, supporters of FC Crvena zvezda began to gather more intensively (before matches in the catering facility “Beli grad” in Zeleni venac). After the completion of the stadium roof, the most zealous fans moved to the central part of the northern grandstand.

In the 1980s, the fan scene escalated in all parts of the world, with two big groups – Ultras and Red Devils, gathering on the northern grandstands. In the mid-1980s another group appeared – Zulu Warriors. These three groups became the main fans at FC Zvezda’s North. Later, with the help of other groups – Winners, Red White Angels, Brigade, Eagles, R. S. Clan, R. S. Army, they entered into the first conflicts with opposing fan groups. Ultras favoured the Italian style of organised support. They practiced organised arrivals at matches, mass chanting and torchlights. Supporters of the red and whites (Crvena zvezda) copied this style from Italy, by corresponding with Italian fans and obtaining from Italy fan equipment, which helped them change the picture on the grandstands.

¹⁶ This is the main finding from Section 2.6 of the White Paper on Sport, Brussels, 11.7.2007, COM (2007) 391 final, presented by the Commission: SEC (2007) 932, SEC (2007) 934, SEC (2007) 935, SEC (2007) 936; downloaded from: <http://ec.europa.eu/sport/white-paper/whitepaper8-en.htm#1>, last accessed on 24/07/2001.

As nationalism strengthened in the late 1980s, Crvena zvezda supporters, following in their tradition, declared themselves as extremist Serbian nationalists, emphasising their club as the most important thing in the world. On Christmas in 1989, all north groups united under one name and one coat-of-arms. The name chosen was “Delije sever”. After the SFRY collapsed, a generation shift occurred. Emphasis was placed on ultras as the “Delije” gradually became synonymous with every supporter of Crvena zvezda, whereas the most fervent ones wanted to differ from others and began to organise themselves into subgroups dubbed under the model of English fans.

Today, the most numerous fan group in Belgrade and the entire Serbia is that of FC Crvena zvezda – Delije sever. Police records contain 727 of these supporters, of whom 629 from the categories of violent and potentially violent. This fan group has its subgroups in Belgrade: Ultras – 124, Ultra Boys – 126, Belgrade Boys – 190, Brigade – 96, Heroes – 103, Bez straha – 30. The core of this fan group initiates violent behaviour of other group members and the majority of members have substantial criminal records.

The creation of Partizan’s fan movement may be related to 1945 when the first supporters began to gather around the newly established club. There were few supporters at the time, with poor organisation. Already in the early 1950s, the first better organised groups appeared, from Čukarica, Rakovica, Senjak, Topčider.

It is interesting that “Grobari” (“gravediggers” – name for Partizan) were thus named by their neighbours – supporters of the long-standing rival Crvena zvezda, who called them thus because of their black kit colour. They were considered the most faithful fan group in the former Yugoslavia. They got this epithet in 1976 after the match with Hajduk from Split (1:6), after remaining grand in defeat. Despite the debacle, Partizan footballers received ovations.

In the presence of around 300 Grobari, on 3 October 1999 Južni front (South Front) was established, later incorporating the subgroups: Rebels, Comando, Front, Young boys, Only You, Headhunters, Aliens, Black Toxic, Alco Front, Sexstons, Lions, Zebre, Stoka, Fontana, Mirijevo, Erotika, Vidikovac etc.

Today, the fan group of FC Partizan – Grobari, is numerous and well-organised, with 804 registered supporters, of whom 712 from the violent and potentially violent categories. The most important subgroups are: Alkatraz – 165, Stoka Pančevo – 54, Ludaci Padinska Skela – 75, South gate – 39, Antiromi – 38, Lopovi – 24, Jang Erotika – 50, Grobari Srbije – 73, Jang Boys – 20, Shadows – 28, Južni Front – 34, Čuvari časti – 31, Head Hunters – 30, Brain Damage – 22, South Family – 29.¹⁷

Branches of these fan groups from all towns in Serbia, including Montenegro and the Republic of Srpska regularly come to important matches between FC Crvena zvezda and FC Partizan in Belgrade. Branches number between 100 and 150 members. Partizan supporters also dealt with the club policy. The club suffered a great damage because of vandalist behaviour of its supporters. Under the pressure of Grobari, the long-standing officials – Žarko Zečević and

¹⁷ Data of the Analytics Administration of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia.

Nenad Bjeković, left the club. FC Partizan was punished by banishment from the UEFA Cup after a fan incident at the stadium pod Bijelim Brijegom in Mostar, on 19 July 2007 (Otašević, 2010: 274).

Supporters of Rad, the popular United Force, made a group in 1987 when several Belgrade young men, generally skinheads, decided to establish a fan group. They did not want to root for the long-standing rivals, but only for FC Rad which entered the First League of the former SFRY. Unlike the majority of the then fan groups, United Force members did not affiliate with any political party or a leader. General stagnation marked the war years and United Force was barely present in Banjica. This fan group reawakened in 2004. They began to renew the old and create new subgroups.

It is today the most extreme fan group with around 500 members, all of whom come from Belgrade and belong to violent and potentially violent categories. Their subgroups are: Gvozdeni odred Dušan silni – 67, Nuklea – 65, Teletabisi – 43, Skinsi – 16. In terms of security, this fan group deserves special attention. Though few in numbers (the extreme core has around 100–150 fans), they have participated in a larger number of incidents and mass brawls which resulted in heavy bodily injuries.¹⁸

A smaller number of these fans belong to the informal group Skinheads, with elements of Nazi ideology similar to hooligan groups in Germany – their appearance is characteristic (shaven heads), as well as their way of clothing (Dr Martens boots, combat trousers, spitfire jackets) and behaviour – brutal attacks at the Roma and homosexuals. This fan group is also showing increasing aggressiveness towards police forces¹⁹ (Misić, 2010:89).

Fans of FC Zemun are organised within the group Taurunum boys. Total 201 of them are entered in police records, of whom 181 from the violent and potentially violent categories.²⁰ A single group was founded in 1986 (Taurunum is an old name for Zemun). Before that, FC Zemun was supported by several smaller groups such as: Testas, Caldas, Lions, Godfathers, Chaos etc.

The first fan group of FC Voždovac was established in 1987, under the name of Vilenjaci. Another group, formed later, was named Dragons (later Zmajevi). After some time, these two fan groups merged.

The fan group Invalidi appeared in 1990 in Voždovac, supporting the eponymous football club to date. There are 60 registered fans, of whom 51 from the violent and potentially violent categories.²¹

The fan group supporting FC Obilić was founded in 1993, under the name of Vitezovi. Obilić then played in the First B League. They nourished excellent relations with the club management

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ The most brutal fight between fans and the police took place in Banjica when FC Rad received a goal in the last minute against the youth football club Beograd and thus moved to the Second League. To protect themselves, the attacked police forces fired and one shot hit the RTS cameraman Blagoje Topličić in his right hand finger.

²⁰ Data of the Analytics Administration of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia.

²¹ Ibid.

and used to go to all guest visits. This fan group barely exists today, they have only nine registered fans, all from the violent category.

Blue Union – fans of the youth football club Beograd, appeared in 1994, when they rooted for their club during the entire 90 minutes, most often in English and without banners. At the beginning, they would arrive at the stadium before the very start of the match and used to change the grandstands for each match, thus often getting into conflicts with guest fans. Total 198 of them are recorded today, of whom 116 from the violent and potentially violent categories. Fan groups registered in Belgrade also include: FC Balkan Bukovica – Šumari, FC Torlak – Nomadi, FC Sopot, FC Padinska Skela.²²

Fan groups are also recorded in other Serbian towns. The fan group of FC Vojvodina – Firma, is the most numerous group in Novi Sad. They have their subgroups such as: GZ, Interventna and Stara garda. The group core consists of 300 extreme and well-organised fans who demonstrate violence outside of sports courts, in streets and catering facilities, which is also typical of fan groups in the territory of Belgrade. Fan groups registered in Novi Sad include: FC Novi Sad – Korida, FC Železničar – Aveti and FC Mladost – Srpski kojoti. In terms of security at sports events over the past six years, the Novi Sad Police Directorate ranks only one step below the Belgrade Police Directorate.

In Novi Pazar, two fan groups are registered: Torcida Sandžak with around 400 members, and Ekstremiti. The latter group has a smaller number of poorly organised fans, but also includes 37 fans inclined to violent behaviour.²³ In this multiethnic environment, “rooting” is identified with national affiliation, which is why there is no larger sports event without chanting and waving banners with politically and nationally offensive content.²⁴

Nationalism in sports is demonstrated particularly in multinational communities. Pronounced nationalism follows the inevitable hate speech. The escalation of nationalism in sports is conditioned by the influence of extremist ideological political affiliations in society and their efforts to transfer at all cost the epicentre of fuelling of nationalist hatred to the area of sports (Štakić, 1996:54). Nationalism imbued with vandalism and hate speech at our stadiums and halls

²² Neither the fans of lower-ranked clubs in Belgrade are immune to brawls. While FC Voždovac and FC Balkan Bukovica were in the same competition category, matches between these two clubs were often overshadowed by brawls between Invalidi and Šumari. For instance, a brutal brawl among fans erupted at the match of the 14th round of the MOL CENTAR League, held on 9 April 2006, between FC Torlak and FC Banja in Belgrade, immediately after the match ended. In this incident, two fans of FC Banja were heavily injured and several of them were inflicted lighter injuries (Report of the City of Belgrade Police Directorate of 12/04/2006).

²³ According to data of Serbia's Ministry of Interior Analytics Department, in the 2004–2006 period, in securing matches of FC Novi Pazar, 54 police officers were injured, or 16% of the total number of injured police officers in charge of securing matches in Serbia. This figure is lower only than that for the City of Belgrade (Police Directorate data) with 144 injured police officers (or 43%) in the same period.

²⁴ On 12 November 2005, at the city stadium in Novi Pazar, during the match between FC Novi Pazar and FC Radnički from Kragujevac, public peace and order were violated by host team supporters. Only eight guest supporters came and they were brutally attacked before the match. During the match, spectators chanted nationalistic slogans and threw pyrotechnics at the referee. When the match ended, around 500 host fans, by throwing blocks of concrete, tried to break through a police cordon. As a result, 25 police officers obtained light bodily injuries. On this occasion, the police detained only 11 persons, three of whom remained in custody. Also, three discarded Molotov cocktails were found.

is an increasingly inevitable “scenery” at numerous sports events, either at sports competitions with spectators belonging to one nation, or even worse, at competitions with spectators (supporters) belonging to different ethnic groups. Hate speech in one nation largely incites the same reaction in another nation, which is why these negative phenomena should be curbed.

As in other towns of the former SFRY, during the 1970s the first fans began to gather around FC Borac in Čačak. The town stadium was full at all matches, which lasted until 1971 when spectators got disappointed with the management and players of FC Borac over the sale of the historic match for the entry into the First League, against Borac from Banja Luka. The match was attended by 20,000 spectators and most of them swore to circumvent the stadium by the Morava river. The recognisable cheering style in Čačak was displayed from 1987 when several fans formed a group named Vojvode. The group disintegrated after the collapse of the SFRY. In 1991, a group of young fans reorganised themselves and changed their name into Čete. They suffered pressure by the club management that did not approve of their name as it reminded them of the četnik movement, which was, as the matter of fact, the very aim of the fan group.

Three fan groups are registered today in the area of Čačak and its environs: Čete and Grebići – fans of FC Borac, (their core consists of 50 fans, 34 of whom belong to the violent and potentially violent categories) and Uranium boys – the fan group of FC Mladost from Lučane (numbering around 30 members, all of them from the potentially violent category).

In 1989 in Niš, the second largest town in Serbia, the fan group was formed of the largest football club in that part of the country – FC Radnički, named Meraklije. In 1999, the group numbered around 1,000 members, not only from Niš, but also from Leskovac, Aleksinac, Priština. Fraternisation with the group Blue Marines – fans of FC Spartak from Subotica took place in this period, as well as with the group Varvari – fans of FC Budućnost from Podgorica, with whom they still nourish friendly relations. Just like the club, the fan group also had its ups and downs over the last two decades. Today, the Čair stadium gathers from 300 to 400 fans, while the extreme core that goes to all guest visits numbers from 50 to 60 fans. The female fan group Niassus girls is worth mentioning; this group is perhaps the only such in the country.²⁵

Extreme fan groups are registered in other Serbian towns as well: Crveni đavoli – FC Radnički from Kragujevac, around 300 members; Ultra Semendrija – FC Smederevo, around 200 members; Marinci (Blue Marines) – FC Spartak from Subotica; Freedom Fighters – FC Sloboda from Užice; Čečenija boys – FC Sevojno; Sirmium rendžersi – FC Indija; Jakuze – FC Napredak from Kruševac; Ekstremi – FC Jagodina; Pirgosi – FC Radnički from Pirot etc.

The names of informal fan groups are associated with their readiness to demonstrate violence. The majority of members are recorded in criminal and misdemeanour records and related to persons from the criminal milieu. The antagonism among the above informal groups is demonstrated also in accidental encounters or in encounters on the same transportation lines. The majority of fans are men, while girls get involved only to a lesser extent. Members recognise themselves usually by their nicknames and most of them do not know the real names and surnames of persons that they often socialise with (Otašević, 2010: 279).

²⁵ Data of the Niš Police Directorate.

Each fan group has four structural elements with clear hierarchy – “job orderers”, leaders, the core of the fan group and supporting members. Greater reputation is enjoyed by fans who regularly attend matches of the club in the domestic terrain, often travel to guest visits, or engage in procuring fan equipment. Special reputation is enjoyed by those who demonstrate readiness to fight with other fans and the police. Each fan group traditionally gathers on a particular stand, most often behind the goalkeeper, i.e. at a particular part of the grandstand which is of special importance to it and where the access for other fan groups is strictly forbidden.

Elements of collective solidarity, exceptional territoriality and exalted masculinity take special place in the fan subculture (Vrcan, 1990: 78). These characteristics are typical of all extreme fan groups. Collective solidarity is expressed in three ways: visually, acoustically and through violence. The visual aspect is demonstrated in various fan equipment (flags, shawls, banners) which in a certain way “uniforms” a fan group, creating from it a “fan army”. Acoustic solidarity is expressed through joint singing and chanting, which instils an individual in the group with the feeling of protectiveness and power that he cannot possess on his own. Solidarity is also expressed through violence that is easily achievable in all forms of an active crowd. For the sake of solidarity, fans are prepared to do things that they usually do not practice in everyday life, meaning that violence is one of the main features of the fan subculture.

2.3.1. CATEGORISATION OF FANS IN SERBIA

According to the forms of behaviour that they demonstrate, i.e. the security risk, Serbian fans are classified into the three main categories: A – not violent (all those who do not belong to B and C categories), B – potentially violent (persons under criminal and misdemeanour investigation because of violent delicts committed at sports events), C – violent (fan group members convicted of criminal offences and misdemeanours committed in relation to sports events). However, under this categorisation, many violent and potentially violent fans could not be formally classified in a specific category. For instance, the majority of fan leaders have so far not been convicted of criminal offences and misdemeanours, nor have criminal and misdemeanour charges been filed against them, which is one of the main categorisation criteria. We believe that the European categorisation of fans is more acceptable owing to a simpler and more flexible solution. For instance, the Council Resolution of 3 June 2010 concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (2010/C165/01)²⁶, classifies supporters only as risk and non-risk supporters. A risk supporter is “a person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing a possible risk to public order or antisocial behaviour, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event”. A non-risk supporter is “a person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing no risk to the cause of or contribution to violence or disorder, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event”.

²⁶ Downloaded from: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:165:0001:0021:EN:PDF>, last accessed on: 06/2010.

2.4. CHARACTERISTICS OF EXTREME FANS

The fan subculture is a “subculture in which elements of collective solidarity, exceptional territoriality and exalted masculinity rank high” (Vrcan, 1990: 78). These characteristics are typical of all extreme fan groups. The youth is the basic social base of football hooliganism. That is why the fan subculture is studied by scientists and the entire society. For instance, the core of fan groups in Serbia is becoming increasingly intensive. Among hooligans, who are members of fan groups, the youngest one is aged ten. The presence of children and under-age persons is rising, while female members are also present. According to police data, 11 fan groups are recorded in Belgrade (2,525 fans, of whom 875 are violent and 1,389 potentially violent), while somewhat less than a half are under-age.²⁷

Today, the majority of fan groups in Serbia incorporate in their identity the elements of extreme nationalism, while some include in their iconography even national-socialistic and fascist symbols. Some media accept and even further spin these elements, in the quest for indications of a “great right-wing conspiracy” or the “Weimar syndrome”. However, all relevant facts undoubtedly show that “nationalism” and “fascism” of fan groups are usually only a décor and not the essence of their action (Otašević, Protić, 2012:83). All extreme fan and hooligan groups tend to send as many as possible provocations to the hated “system” (i.e. state apparatus). By their nature, they are crucially anarchical and opposed to any form of order. No nationalism is compatible, for instance, with the hatred of own state and the police, regardless of all irrefutable downsides that each state apparatus is bound to have. Extreme fans openly identify themselves as propagators of the so-called ACAB subculture²⁸ that most other outlaw street groups belong to (e.g. Punk, OI, RAP, Hard Core...) (Guttmann, 2003: 364).

The absence of any essential ideological content certainly does not mean that these groups cannot be instrumentalised for the achievement of ideological objectives or a criminal activity. On the contrary, the criminal environment of a typical hooligan group is an ideal soil for recruiting different types of perpetrators of criminal and extremist acts (Otašević, Protić, 2012:84).

The Serbian public are aware that supporters of the most influential clubs enjoy various privileges, turning their activity into a type of profession. They are organised in groups with strong hierarchy and directly influence the policy of their clubs. When dissatisfied with a management decision, they exert pressure and threaten with boycott. Their influence is growing and the danger for the security of property and persons is getting more pronounced. They readily distance themselves from violence, but when it happens, they never miss the opportunity to remind the wider public that they “earned” their place on the grandstands by helping the club in the most difficult circumstances. In this regard, the position and motives of leaders of Serbian fans are not essentially different from Italian ultras. Italian authors describe the link between ultras fans, football clubs (management) and politics. Italian ultras enjoy a number of economic privileges. Clubs give them free-of-charge tickets that they can sell or give to supporters and thus gain profit or influence. They also produce and sell club souvenirs etc. Italian ultras also exert a

²⁷ Data of the Analytics Administration of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia.

²⁸ All Cops Are Bastards – over the past decade, this English abbreviation has been seen on facades across Serbia.

political influence (e.g. on local elections) and enjoy political support – if needed, they organise big supporter protests and instigate street disorders to gain privileges for club owners or clubs themselves, such as tax exemptions etc. (Scalia, 2009: 46). Leaders of Serbian fans also receive free-of-charge tickets from clubs which they can give away or sell. They also organise travels to matches in the country and abroad, and thus make profit. Links between extreme fans and club management are strong in Serbia as well, both at a formal and informal level. Some fan leaders engage in the resale of football players, informally influence club politics, or act as members of club managing boards and other club bodies, for which they receive remuneration. In this way, hooligans in Serbia have successfully taken over at least one sports discipline – professional football, which is, whatsoever, the traditionally most widely followed sport.

A research²⁹ carried out in 2012 showed that the Serbian Ministry of Interior filed against 30 leaders of fan groups in Serbia 279 criminal charges, which implies that on average one fan leader committed 9.3 criminal offences within 8.52 years. Of 30 leaders making up the sample, 26 of them committed criminal offences of violence, 11 violence at a sports event, and 16 of them criminal offences against government authorities. Consistent with this are data on drug-related criminal offences – 12 leaders, and property-related criminal offences – 22 leaders. Fan leaders from our sample committed three murders, while one of the 30 analysed leaders was killed in July 2012 (the murder has still not been clarified).

In other words, managing and supporting football clubs is often a “fig leaf” for serious criminal activities. Criminal groups, disguised under supporter shawls, engage in money laundering, corruption, narco-crime, tax evasion and other forms of organised crime. Regardless of generation shifts at all levels in relation to football, including generation shifts of fan leaders, football-related fan violence and crime persist as constant phenomena, which means that the problem lies not in individuals, but in the system. Such an approach would doubtless raise significant questions for future sociological and criminological research on manifold links between football and crime.

Society should be more interested in young people attending football matches and should take adequate measures to protect them. The mass character of fan gathering is a far too serious phenomenon to be left to crime-prone persons who manipulate young people, shaping their personalities and directing their future towards crime.

Many countries hit by the global crisis are unable (or unwilling) to seriously tackle the causes of criminality and to successfully develop basic pre-emption programmes based on the implementation of social prevention measures. The desire to enhance prevention is, in the best case, visible only in “grand words” and “good wishes” incorporated in national strategic and action plans and resolutions. The problem is even more pronounced in Serbia, where there are no social and situational prevention measures, let alone the measures of efficient suppression and completion of criminal proceedings against football hooligans who have, as a rule, rather thick criminal records (Simonović, Otašević, Đurđević, 2011: 687).

²⁹ Simonović, B., Đurđević, Z., Otašević, B., (2012), data from an unpublished paper.

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Bojan Janković³⁰

3. POLICE MEASURES TO COUNTER HOOLIGANISM

Police organisations in different countries counter hooliganism at sports events in different ways. At the very beginning, police forces used to resort to repressive measures (*traditional model*), but once they concluded that these measures did not yield adequate results, but even incited violence in some situations, they began to apply proactive measures. Naturally, repressive measures have not been nor will ever be fully excluded from use, but have been complemented by proactive measures in the fields where no results were yielded or results were very poor.

3.1. TRADITIONAL MODEL OF COUNTERING HOOLIGANISM

Since hooliganism appeared, the police have been applying the traditional method of tackling this phenomenon, aiming to contain violence at sports events by repressive measures and force. This is why police forces were regularly criticised by the public. Some police organisations, particularly in South and Eastern Europe, including Latin America, had a reputation of indiscriminate use of violence against supporters (Spaaij, 2005: 4). Policing was often interpreted as a mere police reaction to a sudden problem. However, repressive measures often produced a counter-effect as violence cannot be curbed by suppression, but on the contrary, incited. Application of the traditional model by police forces showed a number of deficiencies: the lack of communication, incoherent activities, the wish to empower own capacities, repeating activities in a chain, prejudices nurtured by professionals, exclusion or non-inclusion of others in prevention, the lack of readiness to participate in projects in the long run and in a comprehensive way etc. (Tramošljanin and Latinović, 2011: 80).

As the matter of fact, police forces based their strategy of tackling violence at sports events on the so-called “bang” effect, manifested in the wish of the government and its authorities to apply such legal norms and dramatic police operations (in a sports facility and its surroundings on the event day) in order to achieve such an echo in the public which would make citizens believe that government authorities have achieved significant results in combating crime, in a concrete, visible and effective manner. Such an approach, however, contains the following deficiencies:

- short-term effect of measures;
- negligible influence on perpetrators;
- enabling the transformation of perpetrators towards criminal activities;
- instilling citizens with insecurity;
- failure to reduce the fear of crime;
- a large number of injured citizens;
- spending much more funds from the state budget;

³⁰ This section presents some results of the research “Structure and Functioning of Police Organisation – Tradition, Situation and Perspectives”, conducted at the Criminalistic-Police Academy in Belgrade.

- greater engagement of human and material resources of government authorities in detecting perpetrators;
- building trust in government institutions and citizen trust in public security only over a short time horizon (Tramošljanin and Latinović, 2011: 81).

Securing sports events and preventing violence at these events is not a simple task. The deployment of police forces will be successful if based on thorough understanding of local circumstances and the terrain, including acute awareness of supporters' intentions, the strength and composition of fan groups, and forces that will join or support them in the case of escalation of violence. The degrees of violence that may manifest at sports events are manifold and depend on numerous factors. When planning to secure a sports event, police units must take into account all relevant factors. Understanding of factors which contribute to the escalation of violence will help in the analysis of problems, in determining the effectiveness of measures, recognising the key points of intervention, and finally, in selecting adequate responses to violence. Each sports event features different factors that some police units can tackle, some of them cannot, but it is important that they be aware of them.

3.2 FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS

By analysing each sports event, members of police forces may detect and determine factors conducive to violence or contributing to its development. The analysis must be based on the “triangle of violence at sports events” (Janković, 2010: 132), which contains the main elements of a sports event. This triangle represents a modified “criminal triangle” (Simonović, 2006: 229), used in analysing crime-related problems. The relative importance of each side of the triangle will be different depending on the event concerned. Improving problematic characteristics on any side of the triangle may diminish the probability of violence at sports events. Figure 1 shows specific characteristics of the venue of the sports event, i.e. a sports facility, as well characteristics of the event and the personnel. As it is hard or impossible to impact or modify some of these factors, police units must understand the contribution of each of them to the probability of aggression.




Figure 1: Violence triangle at sports events.

Each sports facility has its specificities and characteristics which differentiate it from other facilities. For instance, if spectators are located close to the playing ground, the probability of violence is higher. It is assumed that violence is more probable with smaller physical distance between spectators and participants in the sports event. Furthermore, violence is more probable at sports events with a very high degree of noise, or in the part of the spectator area which is closer to the PA system. Namely, research has revealed that aggression among people increases at places with an extremely high degree of noise (Milojević and Janković, 2012a: 317). The same research shows that a higher degree of noise may encourage spectators to cheer more loudly and misbehave. Besides, the probability of violence diminishes in facilities with numbered seats, while increasing in facilities with only standing places. Empty space without seats may provoke the occurrence of violence first in that part of grandstands.

If violence continuously erupts in a particular facility, its negative reputation may instigate new violence, i.e. attract other aggressive fan groups seeking conflicts for the sake of obtaining media attention, or may even encourage violent and improper behaviour among average spectators. It is therefore no wonder that some sports facilities are exposed to more violence than other such facilities. If unresolved, milder forms of violence in each facility may create a negative reputation of a facility or the impression that violence is tolerated or expected in such facility. Such milder forms of violence should be approached with a “zero tolerance” strategy. Namely, “if more consistent action (response) is applied to milder violations of public peace and order, there will be fewer grave criminal offences in that particular area (environment)” (Simonović, 2006: 32).

Violence at a stadium may erupt also due to warm weather – it is well known that there is a mutual link between increased temperature and aggression, both of supporters and participants in a sports event. The higher the temperature in a sports facility, the higher the probability of violence. In cold weather, supporters may consume more alcoholic beverages to “warm up”, which also increases the probability of aggressive behaviour. In addition, the location of the facility must also be taken into account when planning a sports event. There are differences between events organised in the city or the outskirts, or generally outside of an inhabited place as different problems relate to organisation, including public transportation, protection of facilities (embassies, banks, shops, petrol stations) which may be jeopardised by hooligan violence etc. (Milojević and Janković, 2012a: 318).

All the above relates to a sports facility, while other important factors include the type of the sports event, participating clubs, the number of supporters etc. It is not the same whether a sports event will be attended by a larger number of men or women as men are more likely to engage in violent behaviour. In the part of the facility with a larger number of male spectators, particularly younger ones, the probability of violence is higher compared to mixed audience or families with children. The probability of violence also declines if there are fewer or no guest supporters.

It should be always borne in mind that the probability of violence increases if several different, opposing fan groups, or even several factions within one fan group, are present in the same sports facility.³¹ One of the most drastic examples of inadequate policing, when the said factor

³¹ In Serbia, the most famous example of high probability of violence among different factions of the same fan group concerns FC Partizan. The fan group Grobari jug contains Alkatraz as one of its largest factions. In time, the

was not seriously taken into account in security assessments, was the tragedy at the Brussels Heysel stadium in 1985. Despite several smaller fan brawls at the European Cup final between Liverpool and Juventus, conflicts were not the primary reason for the deaths of 39 spectators and injuries of 600 people. The culpability also lay with police and security officers who made omissions in handling spectators and fans of the two clubs. Such interpretation is unequivocal given that the two opposing fan groups were allowed to take the same grandstand two hours before the match. They were separated only by a fence and had ample time before the start of the match. The outcome was certain: in a charged atmosphere of sport rivalry, waiting, boredom and physical vicinity of the two fan groups caused inevitable provocative behaviour, insults and intimidation.

The first organisational mistake was made in that phase – fan groups were not sufficiently separated from one another. In the context of controlling crowds in an urban environment, it is understandable that fans were admitted to the stadium very early. However, the first mistake was accompanied with the second one: Italian fans in back rows began to panic and go down the stands, pressing a number of their comrades against the fence at the foot, who did not understand what was happening. It took several long minutes for police and security forces to open the fence gates at the bottom of grandstands. Had the decision been taken more swiftly, as a fast response to the events and the imminent danger, supporters would not have been crushed to death. Police and security forces probably hesitated, fearing pitch invasions and conflicts between the fan groups. It is pretty clear that the Heysel tragedy happened because the police did not make an adequate security assessment of a possible conflict between the two fan groups.

When ensuring security, police forces must know that an important sports event may fuel greater aggressiveness with spectators.³² For instance, an important victory may trigger disorders during celebrations at the stadium or nearby streets. The quality of a sports game may also contribute to violence. If their expectations are not fulfilled or their team plays badly, spectators may express dissatisfaction by whistling, throwing objects to the pitch, destroying inventory, while in extreme

faction called Zabranjeni broke off from the Grobari jug group. The Serbian police are well aware of the insurmountable conflict between these groups. When securing football matches, the police place Zabranjeni supporters in a special stand, always separating them with a police cordon or security agencies. An example of the lack of understanding of these circumstances, i.e. of not having adequate intelligence, was seen at the match of the UEFA Europa League between FC Thun and FC Partizan, in August 2013. Hosts were obviously poorly informed about the Partizan factions and the Swiss police and security forces failed to act, i.e. Partizan's fan factions picked up a brawl. This event is indicative of poor international police cooperation which is an important element contributing to low intensity of the occurrence of violence. Namely, the exchange of intelligence between Swiss and Serbian police forces was rather poor, resulting in security failures.

³² In terms of the degree of importance, sports events are classified into those of high and normal risk. Under Article 9 of the Rules on Security and Safety at Football Matches of Serbia's Football Association (2007), high-risk matches include: all matches between club UEFA competitions, all matches in qualification and final parts of the European and World Cups, all matches declared as such by UEFA and Serbia's Football Association based on the assessment of earlier incidents caused by one or both teams or for other similar reasons, all final matches of Serbia's Cup, all matches when it is assessed that the number of supporters of the visiting team will exceed 5% of the stadium capacity, all matches attracting attention of a large number of foreign citizens, i.e. if there are indications that they could cause disorders and jeopardise security at the match, all matches between long-standing rival teams or if supporters of these teams are antagonistic and hostile to each other, all matches conducive to the objective danger of nationalistic excesses and misbehaviour of larger numbers of spectators (the situation of aggravated interethnic relations etc), and all "barrage" matches enabling a team to go further in competition.

cases physical conflicts with players may occur. Other factors may also contribute to violence, such as alcohol, misbehaviour of players in the field, big crowds at the stadium etc.

When organising a sports event, besides the characteristics of the facility where a sports event is organised and the characteristics of the event itself, one should bear in mind the personnel organising and securing the event. The personnel organising a match includes the police, private security agencies, members of the club management and other supporting staff. Personnel must be adequately and constantly trained to take appropriate measures in organising sports events. Members of the security may be less efficient if their employees are not previously trained about ways of acting in such situations. Police personnel are experienced, but they also need special training, particularly at potential points of the sports facility where they can expect conflict situations.³³

Inexperienced personnel may reduce the effectiveness of strategies for managing the organisation of matches. Such personnel cannot identify potential dangers and react in an adequate way. When violence erupts, an inadequate response may even stimulate such violence. Inexperienced personnel, even if trained, may be tense or nervous in highly stressful situations. Police forces are often to be blamed for the eruption of violence as their negative attitudes and excessive use of coercion means may instigate violence. In addition, the presence of police and security forces may provoke violence in several ways. First, securing a sports event entails the presence of an adequate number of police and security forces. Second, in planning the event, a balance should be struck between the need to have visible and uniformed police and security forces who will have a pre-emptive impact on spectators, and the fact that excessive presence of uniformed persons may negatively affect supporters. Besides the mere presence of security forces, taking a large number of police measures may encourage fan aggressiveness. Checks of each vehicle, passing through metal detectors, searching every supporter, police dogs, may raise supporters' frustration and contribute to the eruption of violence. Last but not least, efficient command and successful communication in the chain of command must be taken into account in maintaining order in sports facilities. A clear chain of command must be established so that police officers, in performing various functions, receive clear orders relating to defined tasks and provide feedback on potential or immediate dangers.

³³ Countries facing hooliganism for a long time have established an on-going system of police education. Police officers must fulfil particular standards to be able to secure football matches. For instance, Great Britain had a great problem with hooligans, but has minimised it by applying a wide range of measures, also including quality education of police officers. After completing a police school, police officers attend on-the-job training in three levels, depending on the activities of their unit, starting from basic public order training (level 3), to specialised training, more oriented to specific, more delicate situations (level 1).

3.3 INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST HOOLIGANISM

The previous section dealt with factors contributing to the eruption of violence. Some of them can be tackled by the police, some cannot, but the police must understand them in order to determine the ways in which violence develops. However, police units securing sports events can take measures to impact factors which contribute to violence, i.e. police measures may contribute to low intensity of violation of public order, particularly at international matches (Adang and Clifford, 2011: 5).

Scientific knowledge obtained in several researches has shown that the proactive action of all entities, notably the police, together with repressive measures, produces much more efficient and acceptable results in combating hooliganism, compared to earlier exclusively repressive actions. (Adang and Brown, 2008). One research has indicated a specific group of police measures which contribute to low intensity violence or no violence at sports events. The chart below shows police measures contributing to diminished violence at sports events.




Figure 2: Police measures contributing to diminished violence at sports events.

As Figure 2 shows, there are eight factors contributing to the low intensity of violation of public order, also including a high degree of international police cooperation. All these factors cannot be classified in the same group, but it is also not possible to make full gradation from the most important to less important ones. It can be only ascertained that the degree of international police cooperation is an important factor contributing to the prevention of violence.³⁴ This section will therefore place special emphasis on international police cooperation. Other police measures, contributing to the reduction in violence, will be examined and presented in more detail in the section on methods of securing European football tournaments, at which all the described measures were implemented for the first time, at a larger scale.

³⁴ This factor was not taken into account in the incident at the Genoa Luigi Ferraris stadium, at the football match between national teams of Italy and Serbia in 2010. The incident was provoked by Serbian hooligans and resulted in the suspension of the match and disorders in the streets of Genoa. The situation would have certainly been different had this factor been taken into account in security planning. That would have diminished the probability of eruption of violence at the stadium and in the city.

The capacity of a police organisation of the host country to successfully combat hooliganism depends largely on the support to be received from other foreign police organisations, both from the country of guest players and from other countries with information or experience in organising international matches. More precisely, international police cooperation may help in ensuring full security of the event, through activities of both domestic and foreign police forces, with each of them carrying a specific degree of responsibility. Of course, the main initiator of police activities are domestic police units, but also foreign police services responsible for the provision of information, analysis of their supporters' risk, and the provision of other types of assistance to domestic forces. The volume of activities of foreign police forces at a sports event is determined in consultations between police organisations (Adang and Cuvelier, 2001:21). The size of foreign police forces being engaged will not always be the same, i.e. it will depend on the analysis of the risk posed by guest supporters.

International police cooperation usually begins with the host country's request for the provision of assistance, timely submitted through the competent ministry of interior. In the European Union, such request must be submitted at least three weeks before an international football match, but the deadline is longer depending on the degree of assessed risk. The deadline for international tournaments must be at least 16 weeks (Council Resolution, 2010: 15). Besides being timely, the request must specify the volume of support and the composition of police forces needed.

Establishment of international police cooperation in the field of combating hooliganism has two main objectives. The first objective includes the enhanced exchange of experiences between police organisations of individual countries with the aim to set common security standards and ensure public order maintenance. The second objective is to improve cooperation between countries, notably in regard to exchanging information on supporters, their movement and classification into risk and non-risk ones. To achieve these objectives, in accordance with the Council Decision of 2002, each member state must establish a National Football Information Point (NFIP) as a central point for the exchange of information on matches with an international dimension. Why was it decided to establish an office relating to football tournaments? This is because violence, though present at almost all sports events, concerns football to the greatest extent.³⁵

International police cooperation may be conducted in several ways, depending on the nature of the event being organised and the needs of the host country police. Cooperation phases include the following:

1. collection and exchange of intelligence on supporters;
2. reconnaissance, detection and obligatory escort (operational police supervision of supporters from the start of their journey, during and after the match – spotting);
3. crowd control under police supervision, and

³⁵ The fact that violence is most related to football fields was proven by the adoption of the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular at Football Matches (International Treaties, 1990). The Convention deals with the prevention of violence at all sport events, but particularly recognises the problem of violence at football matches as such violence is the most widespread (as reflected in the Convention title).

4. communication with supporters (Council Resolution, 2006).

Though it may concern a concrete sports event, international police cooperation may be an on-going practice, unrelated to any particular sports event and involving the exchange of personnel, or participation of entire police units in joint exercises aiming at the re-establishment of violated public order, organising joint seminars or conferences for police units of different countries. One such seminar, involving several police units from different European countries was the “Workshop on football hooliganism / police tactics at football games”, organised by the European Commission in March 2011 in Belgrade. The workshop was targeted primarily at members of the Serbian gendarmerie who could learn about new trends and techniques of conflict situation management relating to violence at football matches (European Commission, 2011). The aim of such international police seminars is the exchange of experiences in the application of police tactics and encouraging participants to initiate the adoption of new secondary legislation to support their countries’ efforts to curb such form of violence. In addition to seminars and exercises, cooperation may involve the attendance of foreign police forces at sports events where they would observe the organisation and activities of police units and the field, and the behaviour and reaction of domestic supporters.

Adequate preparations are necessary for full implementation of international police cooperation. Preparations must involve both the host country and other countries – for instance, the country of transit of supporters, as well as countries in possession of intelligence on supporters or other important information on the organisation of a sports event. The initiator of such preparations must be the organising country, while other countries must also be included. Obligations of other countries relate to the collection and timely submission of intelligence, controlling supporters in their territories, and preparing their teams to be sent to support the host country. However, to successfully perform these preparations, there must be a permanent dialogue between countries, through special telephone lines, holding of meetings, conferences and working visits.

The host country must make adequate preparations for international police cooperation both at central and local levels (cities and regions where sports events are held). It is therefore necessary to organise working visits of foreign police teams, from countries that police cooperation will be established with, with a view to exchanging intelligence and making direct contacts with participants. Working visits are an exceptionally important factor in learning about the working environment where foreign delegations will spend time. These visits enable making formal and informal contacts that may contribute to successful international police cooperation. The aim of these visits is to familiarise delegations with the police system of a particular country at the central level, as well as with managers of the police organisation and operation of the National Football Information Point (NFIP). By visiting towns where sports events will take place, delegations are able to meet local police managers and officers with whom they will cooperate. They are also shown the stadiums and towns where matches will be held.

The above type of preparations was applied to several larger football tournaments and the visits proved highly important in further successful police cooperation. During these visits, in addition to information receiving from the host, foreign police delegations would often bring equipment for data recording and processing (video and photo cameras, computers) and would collect necessary additional information on the spot (Adang and Cuvelier, 2001: 21).

The initiation of international police cooperation is the task of the host country organising a sports event. The minister in charge of interior affairs must send an official request for police cooperation if the police of the organising country determine the indispensability of foreign support. The request for international police cooperation must be sent in time so that foreign police organisations may make timely recommendations. The Handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one member state is involved, envisages that such request must be submitted to the other country at least 16 weeks before the football tournament, and at least three weeks before an individual international football match.³⁶ The request will also be sent to those countries that may be helpful to the host country police.

The assessment of whether foreign police organisations may offer adequate support should be considered in view of several factors: professional experience concerning sports violence, possessing information on the degree of supporter risk, possibility of ensuring adequate operational information etc. Foreign police units must act upon the request, primarily in terms of providing the risk analysis of supporters from their countries of origin. The risk analysis must be submitted at least two weeks before the match or at least eight weeks before a large sports event, such as European football cups, including all assessments in the field that international police cooperation refers to: the collection and exchange of intelligence on supporters, reconnaissance, detection and obligatory escort (operational police supervision of supporters from the start of their journey, during and after the match – spotting); crowd control under police supervision, and communication with supporters. The risk analysis may help in determining the field which is the most conducive to international police cooperation. After receiving the request, the requested country must specify in its response the degree to which it is able to meet the requests and in what of the defined fields of international assistance.

Cooperation between police forces of different countries during a football match or tournament may unfold at several levels. The highest level of cooperation takes place between National Football Information Points (NFIP) which exchange all recent information relevant for holding a safe football event. Information is also exchanged through foreign liaison officers who may sit in the headquarters of the host country police. At a lower level, the exchange of information also takes place through police officers usually called “spotters” – their role is to monitor the behaviour and movement of their supporters, from the moment of their gathering, crossing the state border and movement abroad, as well as to forward information to police headquarters. In addition to foreign spotters, the police of the host country should also have spotters for their own supporters. Foreign police teams are never independent, but are complemented by domestic police forces with whom they establish direct cooperation. The tasks of individual police officers must be determined in order to ensure successful cooperation between foreign and domestic

³⁶ The EU Council adopted the first version of the handbook in 1999, under the title: “The handbook for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence disturbances in connection with international football matches”. The next handbook was adopted in 2001, under the title: “The handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved”. The updated versions of the handbook of the same title were adopted in 2006 and 2010.

police forces. Foreign police delegations, sent to support the country organising an international football match or tournament, may have different composition, depending on the agreement reached at preparatory meetings. Delegations may consist of the head of delegation, liaison officer, spotter, operational coordinator, but may also include other persons depending on the situation.

The head of delegation of a foreign police team is a leader in all aspects – in terms of knowledge, skills, behaviour and considerable experience in international police cooperation. He must be trained in strategic, tactical and operational techniques for securing public gatherings, notably football matches. The head of delegation must have high moral and personal qualities and set an example to other members of foreign police teams. He must demonstrate flexibility in working in different circumstances, regardless of whether the situation is regular or work must be done under great pressure. He must have communication skills to be able to constructively and smoothly fit into a foreign police organisation and subculture.

As already said, the *liaison officer* from each country must ensure the flow of information between the headquarters of the host and home countries. He is in constant contact with teams of spotters who provide him with information from the field, and with the head of delegation from whom he receives strategic information. It is desirable that the liaison officer be a police officer experienced in the field of international police cooperation, with good communication skills and a status enabling him to consult all relevant sources in his country. He is expected to show creativity in finding solutions to obtain specific information and to be able to find alternative sources of information at any moment. Besides, he must collect, process and present high quality information.

One of the main methods applied by the police to gain information on supporters is the use of police officers colloquially called spotters. They can be extremely helpful to organising countries, to which they submit first-hand information, from the field and in the immediate contact with supporters. In the spotting system, each police officer engaged in spotting must be linked to a particular club. He must identify and supervise hooligans of a club, notably when they travel to guest matches. These officers create close relations with their local clubs, leaders of fan groups and registered hooligans. They could help police forces of the organising country in a very creative way, in accordance with legislation of that country.

A spotter must have a more objective and tolerant attitude compared to any other police officer. He must have skills necessary to maintain communication in all circumstances, and the skills to establish, develop and maintain contacts at different social levels. He should refrain from any activity that could jeopardise his credibility or his and other police officers' physical integrity. He must possess specialised knowledge about supporters, their habits and customs, including information on the identity of risk supporters at the first place, tactics and strategies of supporters of some clubs. His primary task is to collect and submit relevant intelligence in order to prevent violence at football matches. His secondary task is to provide assistance, in case of violence, to police and judicial authorities in identifying suspects and providing evidence against instigators of violence.

The role of an *operational coordinator* in a foreign delegation is to coordinate all operational actions in the field and ensure contacts between police officers in the field and the liaison officer in the headquarters of the host country. He also establishes links between foreign police teams in the field and local police forces of the host country. He must be in constant contact with the head of delegation and coordinate with him all actions of the foreign team.

The host country must use to the maximum extent the support received from the foreign police delegation. Before this, organisers must provide foreign police teams with adequate conditions for their stay and work. This primarily refers to personal security of foreign delegations, provision of adequate information necessary for their work, a translator if needed, domestic liaison officers, communications equipment, accommodation capacities etc.

The exchange of information on hooliganism among countries is exceptionally important in combating violence related to sports events. As already mentioned, in accordance with the Council Decision of 2002, each member state must establish a National Football Information Point (NFIP). The Decision does not recommend the organisational structure of such NFIPs as this is left to the discretion of each individual state. Establishing NFIPs in each country is indispensable for the facilitation of international police cooperation in this field. The NFIP of each country should have updated risk analyses relating to supporters of football clubs and the national team, so as to be able to efficiently respond, at any moment, to requests of other countries for relevant information on supporters and personal data on high risk supporters – hooligans.³⁷

The 2002 Decision was amended in 2007, when it was agreed that each member state should enable its NFIP access to different databases on risk persons, which are usually based in the ministry of interior. Member states should also ensure that NFIPs start to exchange analyses of critical situations at already held tournaments. Finally, each NFIP must draft its list of recommendations (generated from gained experiences) which will be made available to partners through its website or on request (Savković and Đorđević, 2010: 20).

When exchanging intelligence, a difference must be made between general and personal data. The former relate to information defining an event in all its dimensions, with special emphasis on security and security risks (strategic information), information helping police officers in making a risk analysis (operational information), and information enabling an adequate response to all security-related problems arising during the event (tactical information). Personal information relates to information about individuals assumed to pose a potential risk to security. It may contain data on individuals who previously provoked violence or disorders, or participated in them, in relation to sports events.

Information may be exchanged before, during and after the event. These three phases need not be always strictly separated. Before the event, the NFIP of the host country must formulate at a strategic level and send to one or several countries the request for information on supporters,

³⁷ „A risk supporter is a person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing a possible risk to public order or antisocial behaviour, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event. A non-risk supporter is a person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing no risk to the cause of or contribution to violence or disorder, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event”. (Council Resolution, 2006: 18).

containing the analysis of supporter risk and other information relevant for security, as well as the description of threats jeopardising the sports event. At the operational level, the NFIP of the country submitting information must provide accurate and timely information on the movement of risk and non-risk supporters, the sale of tickets and other relevant information. The country possessing relevant information on supporters must submit it to other countries even when there is no request for the collection of data. During the event, the NFIP of the organiser may request the confirmation of previously submitted information and the request for updating the risk analysis. The organising country must submit information on the return of supporters forbidden to enter the country or deported, origin or transit countries. Following the event, the organising country must submit to other countries the information on supporters' behaviour so that the countries of origin can update their analyses of risk of supporters of individual football clubs or the national team, as well as data on any incidents that guest supporters engaged in or provoked.

EU national police units dealing with hooliganism cooperate increasingly through the exchange of intelligence, particularly when big football tournaments or international matches are organised. Such concept of policing will probably be embraced by other countries as the EU enlarges, and by sports associations that are devoting increasingly more attention to the security of sports facilities.

3.4 PROACTIVE POLICE TACTICS APPLIED TO SECURING WORLD AND EUROPEAN FOOTBALL CHAMPIONSHIPS

The previous section focused on international police cooperation as an important police measure contributing to the low intensity of jeopardising public order. This section will deal with other, interrelated factors, shown through examples of good practice in organisation of large football tournaments.

In contrast to the traditional model of policing, the proactive method of policing has become largely popular over the last years. It is based chiefly on intelligence work, as well as other measures taken before a problem escalates, in combination with repressive measures. Several researches have shown that proactive policing yields better results than earlier, reactive policing (Adang and Brown, 2008).

3.4.1 EURO 2000

The proactive form of policing was applied for the first time, at a larger scale, at the 2000 European Football Championship held in Belgium and the Netherlands³⁸, based on practical experience and research. The aim was for the police to treat supporters in a friendly way, but to make it clear to them that they would tolerate no forms of hooliganism. This approach involved the use of small surveillance units in regular uniform, who were expected to maintain active contact with fans. Special intervention units, in riot gear, with special vehicles, police dogs, water cannons etc. were kept out of visibility for as long as possible. Such policing approach was

³⁸ The 2000 European Football Championship was held from 10 June to 2 July in Belgium and the Netherlands. It was the first time that two countries had jointly organised a European championship.

based on the identification of potentially violent situations and timely interventions, prior to the escalation of violence.

During the tournament, two security models were applied. The first model (applied in three cities) may be called high-profile, featuring large numbers of police officers and their visible presence in the field. The second, low-profile model (in five cities) implied public order maintenance with small, hardly visible police forces.

The low-profile approach envisaged 10 visible policemen per 100 fans, at locations where fans gathered in large numbers. The high-profile approach implied the presence of three times more police officers per 100 fans. Besides the number of policemen, the difference was reflected in the fact that low-profile police officers were more easily approachable by fans, showed more respect for different cultures and nationalities, fulfilled a more preventive role, and switched more flexibly between different approaches when necessary. However, it is noteworthy that the low-profile approach did not imply a soft reaction of the police to violence and hooliganism. Incidents were immediately tackled by applying the zero-tolerance approach to violence. The deployment of low-profile police officers was based on intelligence obtained from intelligence teams in the field and information obtained from police units of other countries. There were three times more, usually visible police officers in the high-profile approach, in riot gear and with riot vehicles. These officers were grouped in larger police units, which aggravated the establishment of contact with supporters.

Contrary to police assessments, there were only a limited number of minor incidents during the EURO 2000. It may be concluded that police deployment contributed to the event safety, i.e. the selected police tactics produced the expected effect. However, no correlation could be found between the large numbers of police officers and a smaller number of incidents. Analyses have shown that an increased presence of police officers need not necessarily lead to fewer incidents. Besides, it is possible to maintain public order effectively by applying the low profile model, without creating a siege situation or without excessively disrupting the activities of fans. This could be achieved only with police officers policing in small groups and establishing active contact with fans. This enabled easier access to information and reduced the probability that hooligan leaders remain anonymous, i.e. the probability of not being revealed later on. On the other hand, fans were made clear what they could and could not do, which reduced the probability of violence.

3.4.2 EURO 2004

Police strategies for securing the 2004 European Football Championship were based on the experience of the Dutch and Belgian police which secured the EURO 2000, but also on principles of crowd policing formulated by Reicher (Reicher, et al. 2004: 559). The starting point for these principles is the elaborated social identity model (ESIM), which states that collective disorder is made possible through manifestation of a common social identity among crowd participants. The defining dimensions of this identity serve to explain the normative limits of collective action (what people do) and the extent of participation (who does and does not join) during a crowd event.

To prevent widespread disorder, Reicher identifies four key principles for crowd policing: *education, facilitation, communication and differentiation*.

Education: As groups act on the basis of social identities, and as crowds are made up of several social groups, it is of great practical importance that police organisations educate their officers about the social identities of various groups in a crowd: their values and standards, their aims, their sense of what is right and proper, their stereotypes and expectations of other groups, their history of interaction with these groups and all other special characteristics relating to a particular group.

Intelligence should not only be focused on violent individuals and their plans, but also on understanding of the social identities of the groups which gather, to know what their aims are; the forms of police action that might antagonise them and make them more sympathetic to violent element in the crowd. The same effort that is put into identifying violent individuals should be put into obtaining an understanding of group identity. At each intelligence briefing before a sports event, it is important to equally consider information on violent members and on the social identities of groups.

Facilitation: Rather than stopping people from doing what they would, and thereby frustrating them, an emphasis on facilitation needs to be paramount in all stages of police operation. In planning to secure a sports event, police forces must identify the legitimate aims of crowd members in order to consider how best to organise policing so as to enable the aims to be met. If there is some reason why they cannot be met, it is essential not simply to give a negative response but to be creative at joint meetings in finding alternative ways in meeting the underlying aims. In achieving this principle, good communication is indispensable and at the same time represents the next principle that police forces must take into account when planning security at sports events.

Communication: One of the paradoxes of crowd policing is that it becomes increasingly important to communicate with the crowd where one seeks to avoid a potentially conflicting relationship. However in situations where relationships are potentially conflicting, spectators are least likely to trust what the police have to say, especially where there is a long history of conflict between them. However, what is very important is how communication between fans and the police takes place. The fan representative must be respected by the majority fans. However, these should not be “self-appointed” representatives, but must represent the majority of fans. For the communication to be effective, these “communicators” should be available and active at points of incipient violence (right before the event). It is a telling observation on the need to strike a balance between repressive measures and tactics where communication plays a significant role, i.e. the role of communication technologies should be increased. In securing large sports events, big screens and communication systems could sometimes be more useful than water cannons.

Differentiation: In securing sports events, police forces must be aware of different identities of groups and their different ways of acting and of reacting. One basic distinction that should be made is to distinguish between people on the basis of what they actually do, rather than on the basis of the group to which they belong. If crowd members start being violent, force should not

be applied against all crowd members, but only against those engaging in violence. This is very difficult because people tend to treat other groups as homogenous, i.e. if some amongst them act negatively, the whole group is viewed negatively. To be able to differentiate, more differentiated police tactics need to be developed and used, which will enable the separation of violent fans from other parts of the group. The differentiation principle must be considered when adopting every tactical or strategic decision, during training, planning, equipping and operating in crowds.

One of the central factors in making tactical choices is the awareness of fans about the adequate presence of police forces proportionately to the degree of risk of occurrence of violence at a sports event (Adang and Brown, 2008: 210). Fans themselves are aware of the levels of risk they pose to public order and often believe that assessments based on this argument reflect the “actual” levels of risk of a sports event. Correspondingly, there is an almost direct link between mass disorders and fans’ perception concerning the appropriateness of policing at sports events. Consequently, police tactics must reflect a balance between the perceived level of risk and the nature of policing deployment. If balance is achieved, fans within their group usually marginalise hooligan elements, i.e. there is a lack of support for antisocial activity among fans. If balance is not achieved, there are corresponding consequences: a perception of the inappropriateness of police action and presence, increased support for antisocial activity, and the emergence of uniform and generalised aggression.

All these principles were subsequently utilised by the Portuguese national police in their preparations for the 2004 European Football Championships held in Portugal (EURO 2004). A strategic approach was adopted that conformed with the low-profile approach. At the request of the Portuguese national police, an independent study (Adang and Brown, 2008: 214) was conducted into fan behaviour and public order policing during the EURO 2004. The research showed that on average 4 police officers surveilled 100 fans, both at normal and increased risk matches. This figure is somewhat lower than for the EURO 2000 when there were on average 6 police officers per 100 fans. There was no distinction between low and high profile policing during the EURO 2004 in Portugal, whereas there was a clear distinction during the EURO 2000 in this respect. Besides, in Portugal, extensive use was made of plainclothes police officers, who were deployed wherever fans gathered in large numbers. In places where the police were present, this was not in the form of full riot police. During the EURO 2000, there were much more riot police units – whenever a high profile order approach was applied, and in situations when after the conducted analysis, security assessments indicated an increased degree of risk. In Portugal, there was no difference between low and high profile order maintenance with regard to the visibility of intervention units – these units were present close to the locations where fans gathered, but were positioned in such a way that they were not directly or easily visible to fans. Furthermore, there were almost no major incidents during the EURO 2004 in Portugal.

The EURO 2000 was assessed as successfully organised because of the low frequency of violence, whereas the EURO 2004 was characterised by the absence of incidents. How is it possible that the Portuguese police managed to prevent hooliganism when other police forces did not manage to this before them? An explanation may be sought in cooperation with other European police forces, notably those of the UK and Germany which prevented registered hooligans from travelling to Portugal. However, not all hooligans were prevented from coming, but still there were no incidents. Fast and targeted police intervention to small skirmishes among

fans or to situations resembling potential conflicts, was one of the key reasons why there were no major conflicts. In this way, fans were set clear behavioural rules that they could not overstep. Police strategies and tactics, based on the low profile approach to public order maintenance, proved successful and contributed to safety of the EURO 2004, along with other factors.

Experiences gained in the 2000 and 2004 championships were later used in international tournaments that followed. Furthermore, experiences were also incorporated in EU regulations, notably through the upgraded version of the Handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one member state is involved.

3.4.3 WORLD CUP 2006

During the 2006 World Cup in Germany, a group of researchers from Sweden (Jern and Näslund, 2009: 117) explored the proactive police approach to hooligans in organisation of high risk matches. The research focused on two cities – Frankfurt and Dortmund. The strategy of the police in Frankfurt, including other cities where matches were held, was based on the classic concept of separating fans, i.e. preventing contacts among fan groups, for the purpose of preventing hooligan incidents.

Contrary to the approach applied in Frankfurt, the Dortmund strategy was different. The police tried to allow the fans to meet before the match, but under controllable conditions, i.e. under police surveillance. This strategy was later assessed as a successful example of the proactive approach to combating violence and hooliganism (Hau, 2008: 1). The approach implied the development of communication between the police and fans, and was based on the programme developed by the Dortmund police in the 1980s to deal with hooligans of the football club Borussia from Dortmund. In cooperation with the local administration that funded the programme, the police designated large open spaces, squares or parks, where fans of different football teams could meet. In these places, fans could consume food and drinks, and have good time before and after matches. Concerts were also often held on these occasions. Namely, contacts among different fan groups did exist, but under controlled conditions determined by the police. At the same time, a large number of police officers in plainclothes mingled among fans in order to collect information and control activities of individual hooligans or violent groups. In addition, there were a very small number of uniformed policemen on these locations – their task was to make it clear to fans that the police are present and willing to establish contact.

The police acted according to the low-profile model, which implied a flexible response to fans' activity and police action depending on fans' behaviour. The flexibility would cease in moments when fans demonstrated violent behaviour – in these situations, the police response was energetic. The Dortmund police did not show a large number of visible police forces. Those police officers who were visible established very close contact with fans and informed them about the reasons why they were taking particular measures and activities, so as to prevent fans from creating a wrong picture and thus getting disturbed. Operational police officers mingled with fan groups in plainclothes, collecting information on hooligan activities and informing other police units of situations when something was happening. Actions were then taken by specially

equipped units which, depending on the situation, adapted their tactics – they did not immediately use force or take persons in custody. Even in such critical situations, communication with fans was exceptionally important. However, whenever a concrete act of violence happened, the police reacted immediately, highly energetically and efficiently.

This tactic was also applied at the 2006 World Cup. The main idea was to allocate meeting places of fans under police control, which would facilitate the work of police officers, i.e. they would not have to run from one side of the city to another to “quench fire”. The idea was to ensure that police officers talked to potential hooligans so as to let them know that the police were watching them. Teams of police officers deployed in the field would act in fixed groups. This meant that during the entire World Cup, the teams consisted of the same police officers. Each team was performing a different set of tasks, but their composition was the same throughout the tournament. This helped team members build a routine and gain confidence about their work. As a result, they performed their tasks in a more successful, calmer and more professional way. Teams consisted of police officers with a lot of experience in covering football matches and knowledge to assess fans’ behaviour. Police officers in plainclothes followed the movement of fans and signalled possible violent activities. At the same time, uniformed police forces were deployed in various parts of the city.

During the 2006 World Cup, five different types of police units were securing the event (Hau, 2006: 9):

- *Information forces*: officers in plainclothes who knew the groups of fans, had contact with football clubs and could identify problematic fans. They also included Polish police forces.
- *Security forces*: in charge of specific areas – the so-called “presence forces”, wearing regular, yellow uniforms. Their primary task was to act pre-emptively with their visible presence, while other units were in charge of curbing violence which erupted.
- *Mobile squads*: police units in riot gear. They were in charge of larger geographic areas (dark green uniforms, with berets).
- *Special operation forces* (SEK, black uniforms): in charge of dangerous situations, operating forcefully, quickly and professionally when riots occur. They were engaged exceptionally, when it was necessary to isolate and arrest some ringleaders, particularly those with thick criminal records. Their operation also had a calming effect on other fans.
- *Communication forces*: in charge of assisting fans in some situations and communicating with them.

3.4.4 EURO 2008

In December 2002, Austria and Switzerland were selected as the joint host of the European Football Championship in 2008 (EURO 2008). For both countries, securing the EURO 2008 was

the largest police operation in their history. This entailed adequate preparation of police organisations, so as to preclude any greater security problems.

Almost 27,000 Austrian police officers secured the championship (Council of Europe, Standing Committee (T-RV), 2011a: 3). During preparations, the Austrian police concluded that it could not adequately secure the tournament on its own, without international police assistance. In addition to domestic police forces, around 1,100 police officers from entire Europe were deployed during the championship in Austria (850 police officers from Germany were engaged in the field) (Council of Europe, Standing Committee (T-RV), 2011a: 4). Guidelines for securing the championship included tactics applied by police units in securing the EURO 2004 in Portugal and the 2006 World Cup in Germany.

Before the start of the EURO 2008, Austrian authorities widened their police mandate in regard to combating football hooliganism. These measures included the following:

- Local police forces could decree special security zones around the stadium, in the maximum radius of 500m, in cases of increased security risk at particular matches;
- Holding the so-called “supporter interview” (*Gefährderansprachen*) with special risk supporters;
- Setting up a risk support database;
- Detaining in police stations special risk supporters during matches of their teams.

To efficiently secure the championship, intensive international cooperation was indispensable. During the EURO 2008, the Austrian police maintained contacts with foreign police organisations and exchanged intelligence through the National Football Information Point (NFIP). The NFIP was established in 2003 within the Federal Ministry of Interior, as result of merging of the Department for Sports Issues and the Department II/2 in charge of special operations (Council of Europe, Standing Committee (T-RV), 2006: 20). The NFIP enabled the exchange of strategic, operational and tactical information, and was responsible for cross-border police cooperation, in the field of securing football matches.

The Swiss police had at its disposal around 16,000 police officers, plus around 2,000 members of the Border Guard Corps (BGC) and around 200 members of the border police. Besides, the Swiss Parliament approved the engagement of the army, notably in terms of logistic assistance to police forces. It approved the engagement of maximum 15,000 troops. Their task was not to patrol the cities, suppress disorders or apprehend hooligans, but only to provide logistics and command support, coordinate medical services, ensure transport security etc.

The hosts of the EURO 2008 were recommended to incorporate in their security strategies positive experiences applied in Portugal in 2004. Before it was selected as a joint host, Switzerland had secured football matches with a large number of uniformed police officers, deployed in visible locations, which was acceptable for domestic supporters. However, the organisers were advised to change the method which was based on excessively visible police forces since supporters from other countries may not understand the behaviour of the Swiss police.

Therefore, during the championship, the Swiss police applied the 3D strategy in its contact with fans. Consistent application of the 3D strategy and a friendly but firm approach of police forces, gave a significant contribution to a safe and relaxed atmosphere. Particularly successful was the tactic of isolating problematic fans from the crowd. The 3D strategy was based on the following three principles: *dialogue, de-escalation and drastic action*.

Dialogue: The first “D” stands for dialogue. During the championship, police officers had a friendly attitude towards supporters, offering them support and being helpful representatives of law and order, all the time working towards prevention by carrying out their duties of observation, the gathering of information and the provision of assistance. This took place during patrolling, in regular uniforms, on foot or motorised.

De-escalation: The second “D” stands for de-escalation, i.e. police measures and actions aimed at the re-establishment of early or smaller-scale violation of public order. De-escalation was implemented through communication, in words and signals, with some supporters threatening to collide with the legal order, whether in a celebratory mood or out of frustration over the defeat of their team. De-escalation took place through the presence of regular police forces and/or special police units.

Drastic action/determination: If supporters disturbed the public order or intended to do so, the police took drastic action. This meant: systematic intervention against disturbers of peace and hooligans. Depending on the position of the crowd, police forces were deployed in larger groups and took, if necessary, special operating measures. The aim was to pacify the situation, arrest instigators and ringleaders, obtain evidence and ensure security in the area affected by violence.

Swiss security forces were supported by their foreign colleagues. Police officers from the participating, transit and neighbouring states were, *inter alia*, deployed as spotters or plainclothes officers to escort trains with supporters. These tasks were in principle carried out under the leadership and supervision of the Swiss police. Foreign officers who spoke the native language of their fan groups supported the Swiss police, particularly around the stadiums and at public viewing sites. Their duty was to pre-emptively demonstrate their presence, stay in touch with their fans and have a de-escalating effect. By talking to the fans from their own countries and raising their awareness, spotters pre-empted violence.

As Switzerland assessed that it lacked sufficient police forces to secure the championship, it requested support from international police organisations. In April 2008, Switzerland signed an agreement with Germany on the deployment of crowd control forces from the German states of Baden-Württemberg and Hessen, to be stationed in Basle. A similar document was signed with France. The host cities of Basle and Zurich could count on the support of between 200 and 600 police officers on each match day, while Geneva could rely on the support of between 80 and 320 French police officers. The Swiss Federal Government paid CHF 6.5 million for the engagement of French and German police officers.

During their stay in Switzerland, foreign police units were vested with particular police authorities, based on the relevant internal and international law applicable to Switzerland. The deployment of German police officers in Switzerland during the EURO 2008 was based on a

bilateral treaty with Germany of 1999. According to Article 22 of this treaty, German police officers can be placed under the command of Swiss police corps in exceptional situations. Securing a large sports event such as the EURO 2008 was one such exceptional situation. Under the said Article, German police forces could be engaged in activities of maintaining public order and combating criminal activities. In concrete terms, they could exercise all police powers, but under the Swiss command and in accordance with Swiss laws.

The deployment of French police officers was based on the police treaty of 1998. According to Article 25 of the treaty, police units of one country may be placed at the disposal of the other country for the purpose of performing specific police tasks. However, during deployment in the other country, police units are subject to the laws and regulations of their country of origin and not of the country to which they are referred. According to the treaty, the referred police units do not have any sovereign authority. However, they have the right to exercise police authority for the sake of self-defence or to arrest individuals in urgent situations. Activities of French police officers in Switzerland were limited to the surveillance of supporters and support to Swiss police units, without the use of sovereign authority. French forces could be used for crowd control as long as there was no disturbance of public order (peaceful crowd control).

During the EURO 2008, in addition to forces from France and Germany, police officers from the neighbouring, transit and participating states were also deployed in Switzerland, to a lesser extent. Those were spotters, uniformed officers and liaison officials. They did not have any sovereign authority. Their activities took place in cooperation with Swiss colleagues and never independently, and were limited to consultation and support to local police forces. The deployment of these police units was in compliance with the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular at Football Matches, and the corresponding EU guidelines.

3.4.5 EURO 2012

Poland and Ukraine were joint organisers of the 2012 European Football Championship (EURO 2012). Police organisations of both countries had to take comprehensive measures in order to adequately secure the event and accept a large number of foreign supporters.

Before the EURO 2012, Poland had great problems with domestic hooligans, particularly during the Polish football championship. This is why the Polish police took a number of measures to prepare themselves for the EURO 2012.

The 2009 Law on Mass Events Security, also relating to football matches, introduced a number of novelties in operation of the Polish police and in determining the responsibility of different entities for the security of mass events (Council of Europe, Standing Committee (T-RV), 2011b: 3). The Law concerned particularly the organisation of football matches, treating them as public gatherings of increased risk. This is why additional activities had to be taken in securing such events. The police role was to analyse possible threats and envisage all possible scenarios, including the worst-case ones. These scenarios included supporters' travels to the city where a match were held, their stay in the city before the match, and the match itself. Based on conducted risk analyses, security measures were determined, including the number of necessary security

officers, the type of equipment to be used, and the way of using such equipment. Based on completed assessment, the police also determined the degree of risk for a particular football match. The degree of risk made the organiser engage a particular number of security officers and use state-of-the-art technical devices, including video surveillance and the system for the identification of spectators. The Law on Mass Events Security stipulated the necessary number of security officers that clubs had to engage proportionately to the number of seats at the stadium. Besides, all police officers securing football matches had to complete specific training and be licensed for securing such events. The same rule applied to members of security services (Council of Europe, Standing Committee (T-RV), 2011b: 10).

In accordance with the Law, police forces were not directly engaged in securing football matches. Police units were stationed outside of the stadium and had to secure access routes to the stadium and directions of participants' movement. Only the head of police forces could be present at the stadium, in order to monitor the situation and maintain contacts and exchange information with the main security manager. The plan envisaged that security forces were the first to intervene in cases of violation of public order at the stadium. If their intervention was not successful, police forces would get involved and all security forces would be subjected to the police command. In addition to securing the surroundings of the stadium and the match itself, the police were involved in various activities which enabled safe supporters' travel, which included the surveillance over organised fan groups travelling on trains, buses or by private cars.

As the majority of European police organisations, the Polish police set up its National Football Information Point, in charge of the international exchange of intelligence on hooligans and information on violence at football matches. As Poland had a serious problem with hooligans and in the context of Poland's preparations for organisation of the EURO 2012, the concept implemented by some European police forces was adopted. The concept was based on special police officers – spotters. To make this concept viable, special courses in spotting were developed for police officers. The primary spotters' role was to act pre-emptively and in an educational way in order to approach fan groups. Their tasks were twofold. On the one hand, they had to promote desirable behaviour among fans and isolate from fan groups individuals who misbehaved, whilst on the other hand they had to protect fan groups they were cooperating with. The Polish police planned to deploy spotters in all football clubs whose supporters could make problems.

Immediately before the championship, the Polish police adopted a new strategy that it applied to the EURO 2012, envisaging the minimisation of violence. The approach was called “3×T” and was based on three activities:

Care (Polish: *Troska*) – police officers first and foremost served supporters by providing watchful care, but also information on organisation of the match, transport, routes, important facilities, possible problems; access to this information was enabled particularly to supporters from abroad.

Tolerance (Polish: *Tolerancja*) – the police had understanding for supporters who were only “having fun”, even if they expressed their emotions loudly and in an unconventional way.

Suppression (Polish: *Thumienie*) – as last resort, after the first two measures had no effect on supporters, the Polish police applied coercion means, breaking up fan groups that disrupted public order and apprehending them, in a professional, swift and correct way, making a difference between supporters who did not make incidents and hooligans. After fast intervention, the police would withdraw and try to restore the initial situation.

Apart from the application of new tactics, in preparations for the EURO 2012 the Polish police introduced novelties in education of police officers in terms of combating hooliganism. The Polish police obtained a unique simulator helping its officers acquire the skills of prevention and breaking up of hooligan disorders during football matches. The simulator could also be used for other violent demonstrations and threats of terrorist attacks. The simulator was similar to that used by pilots to exercise various critical situations during flights. The trainer for the Polish police was developed by the Higher Police School in Szczecin together with the company “Aerospace Industries” dealing with the development of simulators and trainers for air transport. In several halls equipped with computers and screens, Polish police officers practiced in virtual reality the skill of “suppressing an enraged, aggressive crowd of football hooligans”. The simulator contained detailed maps of cities where matches were held. The training enabled, *inter alia*, the detection of errors and omissions in action plans of managers of police operations, developed as a response to crisis situations, the immediate system reaction to errors, and learning to work in a team (Milojević and Janković, 2012: 622). The system could at the same time simulate the behaviour of as many as 15,000 persons and real conditions, and it enabled police officers to develop their capacity to creatively find solutions and adopt fast decisions in stressful situations. The research and development of the police “anti-hooligan” simulator was financed by the Polish Ministry of Science with EUR 1.8 million. Simulator training was conducted at the Higher Police School in Szczecin, where police units were preparing themselves for the EURO 2012 (Milojević and Janković, 2012: 622).

In addition to developing new strategies of combating hooliganism and new forms of education of its forces, the Polish police actively participated in and independently implemented preventive programmes aimed at educating younger, secondary-school age supporters (Council of Europe, Standing Committee (T-RV), 2011c: 13). For instance, the “Hooligan” programme was implemented through a number of lectures held by police officers in secondary schools, together with officials and players from different clubs whose supporters cherish mutual hostility. Another programme implemented by the Polish police was called the “Noble supporter” and was intended for lower grades of secondary schools. Its main objectives included the reduction in hooligan behaviour at stadiums by raising students’ awareness about the legal context of the problem, sanctions in case of illegal behaviour at football matches, and promotion of non-violent, positive support to their clubs. The programme, tailored for students of lower grades of secondary schools, was called “I can support EURO 2012” and was implemented before the start of the championship. It included, among other things, meetings of students, football players and police officers. Players presented to students their feelings about violence at football stadiums and sanctions for hooliganism at matches.

Ukraine, the other co-organiser of the EURO 2012, implemented special measures to ensure security. The national security concept was adopted by the decision of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers. The concept drew on experiences of hosts of previous European championships

(Belgium and the Netherlands in 2000, Portugal in 2004, Austria and Switzerland in 2008) and the 2006 World Cup in Germany. The concept envisaged cooperation with foreign police and other international organisations, and using the possibilities offered by the NFIP. Security and safety during the EURO 2012 were based on the following principle: *Safety and security are the most important.*

In 2010, the Organisation Committee “Ukraine 2012” developed the “passport of safety” of the EURO 2012 facilities. It consisted of 200 points. The observance of these points was obligatory at all facilities of the championship. These standards dealt with the quality of the technical side of facilities safety, work of personnel and coordination among security services and law enforcement authorities. Besides the above, police units had to fulfil the following requirements:

- Lowest visibility of the police at stadiums, and
- Involvement of foreign police forces.

The first requirement was present in all European strategies and aimed to significantly reduce the degree of danger, caused by the location of uniformed police officers within the eyeshot of fans. To achieve this, clear coordination of activities between police officers and security agencies was necessary. Consistent with this, police units were located outside of the stadium, in its immediate vicinity so as to be able to react to emergency situations, while at the same time being out of the area of fan attention. The numbers of police officers decreased as they got closer to the stadium, where the main role was played by security agencies and stewards.

The involvement of foreign police forces was the second security requirement set before the Ukrainian police. The entire championship in Ukraine was secured by domestic police units, though some situations entailed the assistance of foreign police forces. Therefore, the following functions and tasks were foreseen for foreign police officers from participating, transit and neighbouring countries:

- liaison officers, and
- spotters.

The Public Security Department of the Ministry of Interior was responsible for ensuring public order during the EURO 2012. For the purposes of the championship, a special body was established, called the Police Information and Coordination Centre (PICC), serving as a central body for coordination of all police activities and cooperation with other law enforcement agencies and foreign police authorities during the tournament. The Ukrainian police had sufficient resources to ensure public order during the tournament, but did not use them all in one moment. Before the start of the championship, the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior presented a list of persons who committed criminal offences relating to sports events. Police officers in the field were obliged to pay special attention to these persons.

The number of police officers in streets depended on the situation in cities, in accordance with risk assessment for a particular match. Other police forces were on standby, prepared to swiftly intervene when necessary. To ensure an appropriate level of deployment of police forces, a particular number of police officers were in plainclothes. Their task was to detect fan groups and

observe their behaviour. Accompanying groups of police officers were also formed – they wore regular uniforms and, if needed, followed fans in particular directions.

In regard to the direct security of football matches, the space around the stadium and at the stadium, the responsibility between police units and the private security sector was divided as follows:

- Security outside of the stadium – responsibility of the police;
- Ticket checks on entry – responsibility of stewards, but the police conducted general surveillance;
- Entry checks – responsibility of stewards, but with police support when needed;
- Checks on grandstands – responsibility of stewards, and
- Prevention of entries into the playing field – responsibility of stewards.

International police cooperation, in the field of fighting against football violence, was conducted through the NFIP located within the Bureau for Cooperation with INTERPOL of the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior. The NFIP was set up less than two years before the championship. As NFIP staff did not have sufficient experience in tackling hooliganism, contacts were made with representatives of police organisations whose countries organised earlier similar tournaments. Above all, cooperation was established with the Austrian and Swiss police, experiences were exchanged and a number of officers were referred to training in these two police organisations.

Based on the above analyses of police operation in securing European and world football championships from 2000 to 2012, and different variations of proactive policing, it is possible to generalise the main principles of a proactive approach to fighting hooliganism at sports events:

- **BALANCE** – The proactive approach to combating football hooliganism has highlighted the exceptional importance of maintaining a balance between the need for visible forces – uniformed police, who will have a pre-emptive effect on spectators, and the fact that excessive presence of uniformed persons may negatively affect supporters. In addition to excessive presence of security forces, the implementation of a large number of police measures may also trigger aggressiveness in supporters.
- **ASSESSMENT** – To successfully maintain public order, the police must act in accordance with the relevant risk assessment as this minimises incidents. It is of great practical importance to make an assessment, as accurate as possible, of the social identity of fan groups – values and standards, objectives, the feeling of what is right for them, stereotypes and expectations from other fan groups, earlier incidents (the time, place, facility, manner of demonstration) etc.
- **COMMUNICATION** – To avoid conflict situations, proactive communication should be established with supporters. Whenever possible, communication with supporters should be maintained by police officers who are knowledgeable about fan groups or have even gained their trust. In any case, communication should be unambiguous and in the language known to fans.

- **APPROACHABILITY BY FANS** – In each phase, where and when possible, police actions should facilitate the fulfilment of fans' intentions and objectives, provided they are reasonable and legitimate. When the police must limit fan behaviour, they must explain to fans the reasons for such limitation and provide them with other alternative means for the fulfilment of their legitimate objectives.
- **DIFFERENTIATION** – In planning and making decisions on police operation, specificities of different fan groups must be taken into account, in accordance with different parameters (nationality, number, objectives, culturological specificities etc). If these differences are not taken into consideration and police operation is planned in a routine way, the risk of incidents significantly increases.

The common feature of all the above variants of policing is their primarily proactive nature, while their repressive character is of secondary importance. When violence emerged, the police implemented targeted and swift interventions to make it clear what rules of behaviour were and what were not acceptable, with a view to preventing the escalation of violence. In all variants of policing, small surveillance units, in regular uniforms, could easily approach and make an active contact with supporters. There were also decentralised intervention units (with special equipment, riot vehicles, police dogs, water cannons), located as far away as possible from fan gathering places or places where matches were held. In these examples, the planning of police operation was based on the fast flow of information obtained from teams in the field or other foreign police organisations, by using knowledge and experience of foreign police forces with which cooperation was established. All variants of policing were based on the concept of “community policing”, as a supplement to the traditional “criminalistic intelligence/investigative approach”. Community policing focuses on managing events at public gatherings through direct and open interaction with supporters.

3.5 POLICING IN SEVERAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

We have presented above the experiences of police organisations in securing large, international sports events such as world and European football championships. However, the police struggle against hooliganism is somewhat different during national, notably football tournaments within one country, as hooligan groups are then much more dangerous and compact, and often represent criminal gangs hidden behind the colours of football fans. Police tactics are therefore specific in individual countries and are somewhat different from those applied at large international tournaments. Many abovementioned principles of combating hooliganism are applied in these cases as well, but there are some specific characteristics.

Police organisations of different countries implement various measures, activities and procedures to fight against hooliganism, which depend, *inter alia*, on political priorities, skills of police officers and other characteristics. It is therefore necessary to examine different approaches to tackling hooliganism at sports events in countries where this problem is present. We have taken Great Britain (primarily England), Italy and Serbia as relevant examples for the following reasons: Great Britain used to have considerable problems with fans, but has successfully resolved them, while Italy also had such problems, but over the past several years it has achieved the greatest progress in this field (Milojević and Janković, 2012: 613). We have also given an

overview of measures and actions taken by Serbia's Ministry of Interior with a view to reducing violence at football matches. Namely, the latest statistical indicators show that Serbia still has a great problem with extreme supporters.

3.5.1. GREAT BRITAIN

Police units across Great Britain have developed effective mechanisms to tackle violence at football matches. They do not react independently, but an entire system dealing with this problem has been established. Great Britain's Home Office is involved, at the highest level, in the struggle against hooliganism. It is also in charge of coordinating the multi-agency strategy for tackling violence at sports events in the country and overseas, and coordinating preparations for matches in the country or overseas.

In addition to Home Office representatives, the coordination group for tackling football violence also includes representatives of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, English, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland football associations, UK Football Policing Unit, the prosecution, Olympic Committee and other entities when needed (Council of Europe, 2011: 4). The UK Football Policing Unit, established by the Home Office in 2005, has the central role in tackling football hooliganism. The unit is responsible for:

- Developing national policy on policing in regard to football violence;
- National coordination of preparations for securing football matches and operations at overseas matches;
- Developing the national strategy for policing international and club matches overseas;
- Coordinating the national football intelligence network;
- Providing training and guidance to football intelligence officers;
- Exchanging police information, intelligence and risk assessments relating to football matches with an international dimension, as the Unit acts as the UK's National Football Information Point (National Policing Improvement Agency, 2010: 21).

The British Transport Police (BTP), a national police force in charge of passenger safety in railroad transport in England, Scotland and Wales, also plays an important role in tackling hooliganism. It employs 2,835 police officers and 1,455 support staff, and is engaged in seven territorial areas (Milojević and Janković, 2012: 616). Establishment of such a police organisation was necessary as Great Britain has a ramified and well-developed railways network, dating back to the 19th century and used by a large number of citizens. The BTP is also in charge of monitoring football fans who extensively use railway services to follow their clubs in visits. Police officers with experience in policing football fans are involved in this task. The BTP is always engaged in planning more extensive football operations in a larger territory. It contains a special Football Intelligence Unit, in charge of collecting data on all fans. Its officers are based around the country. Members of the BTP take a number of activities to ensure that all passengers, including football fans, travel in safety on the railways. Some of their activities include the following:

- Monitoring the number of fans, their routes and behaviour throughout their journey so that police officers, located at the final destination, know what to expect from the arriving

fans and what measures to take in order to adequately accept them, i.e. to have a prepared response to their behaviour;

- Escorting trains with fans, which operate across Great Britain, including the London tube, so that police officers can promptly react to the violation of public order, vandalism and hooliganism, or apprehend the perpetrators if feasible;³⁹
- Maintaining connection with railway operators so as to adequately respond to the need to introduce additional trains and wagons, due to a large number of fans going by rail. Sometimes, this can be of vital importance for preventing conflict situations between two opposing fan groups.
- Maintaining “dry trains” – this colloquial term relates to the role of police officers to prevent the introduction, sale and consumption of alcohol on trains carrying football fans as alcohol is known to be the main cause of fan violence. Not all trains are declared “dry”, but only those where this is assessed as necessary, as otherwise, rail operators would suffer a great financial loss if alcohol was banned on commercial lines not carrying fans (Sporting Events Act, 1985).

Police forces securing matches are responsible for the suppression and prevention of various forms of criminality within a stadium (including larger-scale disruption of public peace and order), and for assisting the club in its duties relating to security and managing of crowds at the stadium. They are also responsible for public safety and security of property and persons outside of a football stadium. Local police commanders are responsible for security at football matches held in Great Britain, in their respective territories. To manage the security of a football match, they must have experience in securing matches and monitoring fans, must be trained and licensed for the job. They are required to attend and complete the course titled “National standards for large sports events” (Drew, 2007). However, after completed training, they cannot immediately and independently engage in a management activity, but must be practically trained for some time by a more experienced colleague who successfully completed the course and is experienced in securing football matches.

What measures the police will take at a football match and at what level, depends on the earlier made risk analysis. The police conduct the risk analysis based on previously collected intelligence. In accordance with the risk analysis, the police in Great Britain classify football matches into several categories, depending on the risk of violence, as follows:

- Category CS (Club Security Only) – police free matches, managed only by club security. Around 40% of football matches in Great Britain are police free (Council of Europe, 2011: 4), of course with the previous risk analysis for each individual match;

³⁹ An example of successful operation of the BTP in tackling football was the “Midas” operation, when nine football hooligans of Charlton Athletic were arrested (England’s Third Division). On 7 January 2012, following an FA Cup match at Fulham, they demonstrated violent behaviour and chanted racist songs. Acting upon charges of concerned passengers on the train, the BTP opened an investigation into the event. The evidence was obtained as a result of successful cooperation with Charlton Athletic, and was complemented by excellent photos generated by video surveillance of the stadium, including intelligence and statements of witnesses on the train. After a two-week investigation, early in the morning, BTP officers apprehended nine hooligans proven to have demonstrated violent behaviour. For more detail see: <http://www.btp.presscentre.com/Media-Releases/Early-morning-arrests-see-nine-football-fans-detained-following-investigation-into-racist-chants-south-London-18a8.aspx>, 27/01/2012.

- Category A – low risk of violence;
- Category B – medium risk of violence;
- Category C – high risk of violence;
- Category D – category C with increased risk of violence (National Policing Improvement Agency, 2010: 21).

As already said, relevant intelligence is needed for an adequate risk analysis. Two types of police officers – intelligence officers and spotters, have the main role in collecting these data. The intelligence officer collects, evaluates, analyses and disseminates intelligence in order to reduce the risk of football violence. This intelligence also helps determine the strategy, concrete measures, activities and procedures to be applied to securing a football match, and the level of necessary resources (human resources and equipment) necessary for ensuring security. Spotters are police officers tasked with the identification and monitoring of hooligans, particularly when travelling to guest matches. These officers make close links with local clubs, leaders of fan groups and registered hooligans (Milojević and Janković, 2011: 743). Their main task is to ensure up-to-date and accurate information and intelligence on fan groups, to be further analysed and disseminated by the intelligence officer. Their another role includes establishing a link between the police and fans.

The role of a police liaison officer is equally important. He maintains communication between the police and football clubs and other stakeholders. He monitors the security measures applied by the organising club. During the organisation of matches, he advises clubs about the measures to be implemented and the manner of their implementation. During the refurbishment or reconstruction of a stadium, he gives recommendations to clubs as to the security requirements that the stadium must fulfil. During matches, he is most often positioned in special control rooms built at stadiums where the highest-ranked matches are held. The video surveillance in these rooms enables the monitoring of the situation within and around the stadium (Janković, 2010: 143). In these rooms, the liaison officer establishes contact and cooperation with representatives of the ambulance, fire brigade and other services whose presence is indispensable to ensure a safe match.

In Great Britain, a lot of attention is also devoted to the education of police forces that secure sports events, particularly football matches which are the most widely present. Following a police school, police officers are trained at three levels, depending on the activities of their respective units – from basic training in public order maintenance (Level 3) to specialised, more focused training applied in delicate situations (Level 1) (Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2009: 93). All three levels of trained officers can be deployed in public order operations, including operations of securing football matches. Officers deployed to duties outside of their home force area must be trained to at least Level 2 standard.

All uniformed police officers must complete basic level training which covers basic awareness of public order issues, and must be trained in basic tactics, such as foot cordons tactics for dealing with non-violent protests. These basic tasks are performed in everyday uniforms used, for instance, in patrolling operations. Tasks at Levels 2 and 3 are performed in special intervention uniforms with protective equipment. At Level 2, taken by officers already trained to Level 3, officers receive additional training in tactics of public order maintenance at public gatherings,

notably football matches. Level 1 implies the highest level of public order training. Officers are already trained and equipped to Level 2, and in addition receive regular refresher training. They are trained in additional specialist public order tactics, either in their territory or as assistance to other police units within their country or abroad. Level 1 officers may be members of special teams dealing with football hooligans, such as special intelligence teams for collecting information, tactical support teams or operational support units.

3.5.2. ITALY

The main concept applied by the Italian police to securing football matches is based on the strong partnership among all entities responsible for organising and managing football matches. *Questore* – head of the local police at the regional level, is the main responsible party for securing football matches. He is responsible for ensuring public order and thus for security at sports events (Council of Europe, Standing Committee (T-RV), 2008: 13). He manages *Questura*, the office in charge of harmonising the operation of all police units in a particular province, the State Police, Carabinieri, Financial Police and other police organisations. During preparations for a football match, *Questore* often requests the opinion of the Security Operational Group (GOS) regarding all problems which may arise in organisation. The GOS consists of police officers nominated by *Questore*, representatives of fire brigades, security commissioners of football clubs, representatives of healthcare institutions, communal police and other entities when needed.

As already said, the local police chief who manages the *Questura* is responsible for a concrete football match. However, to secure a football match, it is necessary to have relevant information, starting from the number of fans, whether they are violent or not, what transportation means they use, arrival routes etc. The *Questura* has only some information, usually of local nature.

To collect and exchange necessary information, the National Monitoring Centre was established within the Public Security Department of Italy's Ministry of Interior. Among other things, the Centre's role is to maintain two-way links among all stakeholders responsible for the implementation of legal provisions and organisational measures aimed at preventing violence at football matches. The Centre is a technical, administrative and advisory body of the Ministry of Interior, and can be asked to give its opinions in view of the adoption of measures on safeguarding public order and security. It assesses the degree of seriousness and importance of a sports event and the underlying risks, with special emphasis on football matches. The Centre issues its opinions on all general matters relating to the organisation of sports events, particularly football matches, and the prevention and countering of violence at these events. Moreover, the Centre may express its opinion, on request of any government authority or agency responsible for the implementation of measures at sports events. At its weekly meetings, the Centre gives its security assessment (risk assessment) for football matches to be held within two weeks following the meeting. The assessment includes the following elements:

- Possible clashes between opposing violent fan groups;
- Possible tensions between supporters and sports associations and clubs, and
- Possible clashes with police officers and other law enforcement authorities.

Based on the risk assessment developed by the National Monitoring Centre, the direct organisers of a football match take adequate security measures. Each line of work within the Centre orders to its own lines of work, involved in organising a football match, to issue guidelines to enable safe conduct of a sports event.

The “Supporters’ Unit” – a special operational unit in charge of monitoring the ultras fan groups and preventing and containing violence at football stadiums, was established within the Unit for General Investigations and Special Operations – DIGOS⁴⁰ (*Divisione Investigazioni Generali e Operazioni Speciali*). The main task of the Supporters’ Unit is to act proactively, i.e. to provide accurate and timely information before a match (on football clubs, supporters, their movement, use of transportation means, any planned mutual clashes, and other information), needed to ensure the security of a match and diminish the probability of violence. The Unit disseminates collected information to other police units securing football matches. In cases of hooligan violence, the Unit must conduct an investigation into the incidents. Following matches, its members examine the material recorded by security cameras at stadiums, in order to identify perpetrators.

On the competition day, police units take long, medium and short range measures in order to optimise the activity aimed at checking and identifying violent fans and their isolation from other fans. A special task includes the identification of hooligans who are prohibited from entering sports premises due to earlier hooligan incidents. To implement all these tasks, special measures are taken within and outside of the stadium. Measures within the stadium are taken in an extremely cautious and discrete way. They are most often taken by the regular uniformed police deployed in adequate numbers in case of an intervention, but in such a way that the security of other fans is not jeopardised. Outside of the stadium and in its direct surroundings, regular uniformed police forces and special riot units implement strict control and surveillance of supporters, in pre-defined areas:

External area: corresponding to access points in the city where a football match is held. Adequate control points are set up at access roads, railway and bus stations, airports, tollgates and other places where fans are expected to arrive. The first filtration of fans is conducted there. Different fan groups are segregated and escorted to the stadium by special routes, in order to prevent any clashes. Police forces escort organised fan groups over the entire route from the arrival point to the stadium.

Reserved area (pre-screening phase): an area reserved for the control and surveillance of fans arriving at the stadium. This area is temporarily enclosed by a fence which directs the arrival of fans, depending on their fan group. It is verified in this phase whether fans are entitled to enter the premises (whether they have a ticket for a particular part of the stadium) or whether they are prohibited from entering the stadium due to earlier hooligan incidents. The control is conducted

⁴⁰ DIGOS – the Unit for General Investigations and Special Operations is in charge of conducting investigations in particularly sensitive cases, such as terrorism, organised crime, grave criminal offences such as kidnappings and extortions. It is a special operational part of the State Police which is organised in territorial terms, and is located within provincial offices responsible for police forces (*Questura*, headed by the police head – *Questore*).

by club stewards, along with police surveillance, or the presence of special units when necessary. In this phase, fans visibly showing inebriation or violent behaviour are segregated.

Security area: pertaining to the area at the stadium itself, i.e. at access points where supporters entering the stadium are carefully checked. This involves a detailed screening of supporters, prohibition of forbidden objects and substances, and prohibition of entry to supporters possessing such objects. In this area, the control of supporters is the most thorough.




Figure 3: Control areas of the Italian police during football matches.

Security checks of spectators at football matches fall within the exclusive remit of the Italian police, with a view to reducing the possibility to jeopardise the privacy of spectators and the possibility of occurrence of possible inconveniences which may arise if such checks were implemented by private security agencies. Checks are carried out at different levels:

- Audio-visual checks: all football stadiums of Serie A and B are equipped with closed-circuit TV filming and recording systems at football matches, both inside the stadium and its immediate surroundings. The video surveillance system films spectators at the stadium, as well as external zones for the sake of filtering fans who enter the stadium;
- Metal detectors – stadium entry gates are controlled by means of metal detectors, in order to filter spectators and prevent forbidden objects from being brought into the stadium; and
- Ticketing: Tickets are checked at entry gates as they contain personal data. Tickets are coded against possible counterfeiting. Tickets are checked with special electronic equipment located at stadium entry gates. They are differently coloured according to the stadium sector where the seat is located (T-RV), 2008: 15).

3.5.3. SERBIA

The Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia has only recently begun to tackle hooliganism at sports events in a more serious way. So far, the primary method has been to implement repressive measures once violence erupts, by deploying public order units, notably the Gendarmerie, Police Intervention Units and Police Brigade within the City of Belgrade Police Directorate. In securing sports events, the Serbian police have applied a high profile method, mentioned in previous sections (Milojević and Janković, 2011: 738). This model implies the

deployment of large and visible police forces in the field. The large presence of police forces in securing football matches in Serbia may be illustrated as follows: the match between FC Partizan and FC Crvena zvezda, held on 16 October 2004 at the Partizan stadium, was attended by around 25,000 spectators, while 1,378 police officers were securing the event. This meant the presence of one police officer per 18 spectators. Five and a half years later, on 16 April 2010 at the Crvena zvezda stadium, there were around 38,000 spectators and 2,843 security officers, or one police officer per 13 spectators (Otašević and Isaković, 2011: 433).

Given the above, police officers are not only extensively engaged in securing high-risk sports events, but their numbers are also increasing each year, particularly relative to the supporters' population. While there is one police officer per 13 to 18 spectators in Serbia, this number is smaller in other European countries. For instance, during the EURO 2004 in Portugal, there was on average one police officer per 25 supporters (Adang and Brown, 2008: 214). In any case, when planning events and applying new proactive tactics in future, the Serbian police will have to strike a balance between the need for visible, uniformed police forces who will have a pre-emptive effect on spectators, and the fact that excessive presence of uniformed persons may negatively affect supporters and instigate them to violence, primarily directed at police forces.

Efforts of the Serbian police to introduce contemporary European policing standards in relation to tackling violence at sports events began on 5 May 2011, when the Serbian government adopted the conclusion (Janković and Milojević, 2011: 158) to establish within the Police Directorate of the Ministry of Interior the Department for Monitoring and Preventing Violence at Sports Events, which represents the Serbian NFIP⁴¹. The NFIP is in charge of coordinating and upgrading the exchange of information on football matches with an international dimension. It functions as a central and sole contact point for the exchange of relevant information on football matches with an international dimension, and for developing international police cooperation concerning football matches.⁴² Personal information is exchanged through the NFIP in compliance with national and international regulations. If necessary, the NFIP may broaden the exchange of information with other authorities contributing to safety and security. It is not an intelligence service, but a part of the police organisation, which is why the NFIP does not exchange secret data.

At the national level, the NFIP acts as an information centre. The Department for Monitoring and Preventing Violence at Sports Events incorporates the Division for Planning and Monitoring of Security Measures at Sports Events and the Division for Monitoring Fan Groups and Exchange of Information on Sports Events (Serbia's Ministry of Interior, 2011: 19). The City of Belgrade Police Directorate contains the same two divisions. The latter division is in charge of collecting

⁴¹ In accordance with the Council Decision of 2002, each member state is recommended to establish a National Football Information Point (NFIP) as a central point for cooperation in organising events involving more than EU country (Council Decision, 2002).

⁴² There are two groups of information exchanged through the NFIP – general and personal. The former group relates to information defining an event in all its dimensions, with special emphasis on security and security risks (strategic information), information helping police officers in making a risk analysis (operational information), and information enabling an adequate response to all security-related problems arising during the event (tactical information). Personal information relates to information about individuals assumed to pose a potential risk to security. It may contain data on individuals who previously provoked violence or disorders, or participated in them, in relation to sports events.

information on fans in the field. Other police directorates employ officers in police departments in charge of collecting and dissemination of information and coordination of activities relating to fan violence.

Furthermore, the database titled “Records of extreme fans” was set up within Serbia’s Ministry of Interior, with the aim to adequately monitor extreme fans. Currently, there are no officers in the Serbian police who would have the role of spotters and be related to particular clubs. Also, apart from the City of Belgrade Police Directorate, there are no specialised police units to collect, in the field, information on fans, particularly extreme ones. A large number of police officers are engaged in securing all football matches in Serbia (Otašević and Isaković, 2011: 433), and the police are the main, and often the only entity providing security. The law on private security has still not been adopted in Serbia and many open issues concerning the engagement of private security agencies as chief entities in securing sports events have still not been solved.

The place and role of the Serbian police in securing sports events are reflected in results of a research (Janković, 2010: 137) consisting of an anonymous survey of police officers of Intervention Units of Serbia’s Ministry of Interior (total 75 police officers) who secure sports events. The questionnaire probed into their observations in securing sports events. The results obtained presented particular features of violence at sports events in Serbia. According to surveyed police officers, verbal violence is the most frequent, followed by throwing of pyrotechnic devices and other objects to the playing ground, as well as physical violence, and finally, property destruction. When asked whether the unit reacted to verbal violence, 94% gave a negative response, which is worrying. This means that the police do not react to the mildest, initial forms of violence (though such violence is sanctioned), which may result in more serious forms of violence and graver consequences. Of the total, 51% members of intervention units said they never used coercion means in securing a sports event. It is noteworthy that firearms were not used as the hardest form of coercion. In using coercion means, there were no injured persons in 83% of cases, persons with light bodily injuries accounted for 15%, those with heavy bodily injuries made up 2%, and no one was killed.

Responding to the question about the presence of security agencies, 45% stated they are present at sports events, 34% said they are mostly present, while 21% said they are not present. It was determined that during the eruption of violence at sports events, the police are the first to react independently (75%). The police and security agencies respond together in 15% of cases, while agencies respond independently in 10% of cases. It is interesting that no answer confirmed that spectators are the first to respond to violence. Entry checks are generally performed together by the police and security agencies – 64%, the police do that independently in 19% cases, while security agencies account for 17% of cases. Total 81% of police officers stated they are briefed in advance about details of the event, which is positive as tasks cannot be performed in a quality way without proper preparations.

The most interesting observations relate to the age of persons engaging in violence. Total 94% of respondents mentioned persons aged 14–25, and 6% mentioned persons aged 25–35. This information is worrying as it shows that perpetrators of violence are very young people, most susceptible to manipulation. It may also serve in directing the work with supporters towards this population. Police officers (89%) believe that clubs support fans who engage in violence and

almost never condemn them. It is very interesting that police officers, who belong to the state apparatus and live on it, do not have a lot of trust in the state's capacity to tackle this problem. Total 55% of them said the state is partially ready to fight against violence, 28% said it is not ready, and only 17% said that it is completely ready.

Police forces of all countries examined in this paper aspire to proactive, and less to repressive policing, with the main objective to prevent violence. Great Britain and Italy have achieved positive results in tackling violence at sports events. Why the Serbian police are not on that path? The answer may lie in the fact that the said countries began to apply modern police actions, measures and procedures much earlier. Proactive policing against football hooliganism cannot yield immediate results. Unfortunately, changes in the approach to combating violence at sports events in Serbia began only in 2011 with the formation of the special Department for Monitoring and Preventing Violence at Sports Events. As a result, unlike a large number of other European countries, Serbia still does not have:

- sufficient numbers of special police units, deployed throughout the country, which will collect, in the field, intelligence and information on fans, notably hooligans. There are no police officers who would play the role of spotters and be linked to particular clubs. Further organisational changes within the Ministry of Interior are indispensable to ensure efficient implementation of measures of proactive policing against hooliganism at sports events;
- specialised training for police officers who would deal with violence at sports events. Serbia still cherishes the old practice that “everybody knows everything” and there is no specialisation and on-going professional training of personnel. It is not sufficient only for managers to visit foreign police organisations during their study visits, but all police officers dealing with this problem should complete specialised training courses and obtain necessary licenses⁴³. In all the examined countries, all police officers engaging in the security of sports events attend and complete special courses and must be licensed to engage in this activity;
- sufficiently developed proactive measures aimed at containing violence at sports events, based on collected intelligence. The police, generally, still apply repressive measures (Milojević and Janković, 2012: 625).

⁴³ As envisaged by the draft law on private security, expected to be soon adopted by the Serbian Assembly, in order to perform any activity pertaining to private security, private security officers must complete the training and obtain a license as evidence of their ability. Among other things, if a private security agency wishes to secure sports events, its officers must be licensed to perform these activities. It is preposterous that private security officers should attend special training and obtain special licenses to secure sports events, while this is not the case with police officers.

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4. PENAL FRAMEWORK REGULATING HOOLIGANISM AT SPORTS EVENTS IN FORMER YUGOSLAV AND OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

The escalation of violence at sports events over the past years has inevitably triggered legislative responses across Europe. It is believed that a sudden increase in criminal proceedings relating to violence at sports events took place in the early 1990s, though it is not known whether the increase was noted only in the number of proceedings or the number of incidents (Kerr, 2009: 41). Violence at sports events is threefold: violence at competitions, violence outside of a sports event, but it is most often considered a social problem created by spectators (Muzur and Rinčić, 2011: 146; Lalić and Biti, 2008: 253). Though violence in sports represents only one form of violence in general and does not pose a danger to society as its other forms, it should be devoted more attention both because of its upward tendency and the fact that there is an increasing number of under-age persons who commit such criminal offences (Janković, 2005: 317). Youth hooliganism at sports events has become, unfortunately, an increasingly frequent phenomenon.⁴⁴

Methods in which countries tackle this problem are different and include various measures of preventive and repressive nature.⁴⁵ Criminal law is applied, *ultima ratio*, at the moment when all other means of protecting society have not yielded satisfactory results.

As the majority of other European countries, Serbia also had to respond to mounting hooliganism at sports events with its criminal legislation. There are three main reasons for such a legislative move (Šuput, 2011a: 64). First, sports values are reflected in indisputable advantages that sports bring to society. Second, various forms of deviant behaviour arise from sports, including particularly match fixing, intentional injuring of opponents, doping etc. Finally, the third reason includes the need for safeguarding and developing the moral bases of society through sports as a socially useful activity (Šuput, 2011a: 64–67). For all these reasons, legislators in almost all European countries established mechanisms to protect sports through penal solutions, notably those relating to the prevention of hooliganism at sports events, which will be presented in this paper. As different countries envisage different legal solutions, we shall describe in detail the penal framework in Serbia and other countries of the former Yugoslavia, including England and Italy that take inglorious first places in regard to this issue in Europe.

⁴⁴ However, the inconsistency of state policy towards the young must be mentioned here – on the one hand, there is an overly protective attitude towards them, reflected even in prohibiting parents to punish children, while on the other hand, there are statements that the state intends to most severely punish supporters (Čirić, 2012: 216).

⁴⁵ Unfortunately, preventive activities are present in practice rather in declarative terms, while in reality we deal more with consequences. However, it is believed that one of possible preventive activities, particularly among the young, is organised playing of sports (Torbarina, 2011: 73).

4.1 SERBIA

As big sports events in Serbia pose a serious threat to public order and may lead to the escalation of violence, which is always accompanied by the destruction of property, light and heavy bodily injuries, and sometimes death (Otašević, 2009: 11), it was necessary to stipulate adequate penal solutions. The legislator thus prescribed relevant measures in the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia (Law, 2005/2009/2012) and adopted a number of laws regulating in more detail the field of sports as the reform of this area represents a complex and long-lasting process, particularly in transition countries (Šuput, 2008: 107).

4.1.1 CRIMINAL OFFENCE OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOUR AT A SPORTS EVENT OR PUBLIC GATHERING

As it is the case with a large number of fields protected in penal terms, sports delicts may be classified into three categories – criminal offences, misdemeanours and disciplinary violations of sports rules. While not intending to describe the differences among these categories, we wish to emphasise that the stipulation of a criminal offence represents the ultimate and most stringent aspect of the protection of sports and thus of society. Though disorders at matches are not a recent phenomenon, laws aimed at preventing violence began to be adopted only over the last two decades of the 20th century. The legislator responded to the mounting escalation of violence only in the reform effort of the early 21st century, i.e. in 2003. Up to that moment, acts perpetrated at sports events which could be qualified as criminal offences were punished through other criminal offences that they could be classified into, such as the criminal offences of violent behaviour, heavy bodily injuries etc.

The Law on the Prevention of Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events (Law, 2003/2005/2007), several times amended, stipulated the criminal offence of violent behaviour at sports events. In the midst of the criminal legislation reform, the method of regulating this criminal offence was subject to constant changes. Above all, it took courage for the legislator to launch sweeping reform, or as it was nicely said, “a legal system will do almost anything, tolerate almost anything, before it will admit the need for reform” (Langbein, 1978: 19), though the reform was an imperative. This is particularly true for more conservative legal systems, less accustomed to changes. However, the Serbian legislator has gone into an extreme as it has been exceptionally prone over the recent time to changing laws in all fields, including the field of violence in sports. This paper will present all legal solutions regulating hooliganism at sports events, starting from the first law of 2003 until the current one. As it is not necessary to describe each particular solution owing to their similarities, we shall first present all solutions and dwell briefly on their differences, and will then elaborate on the criminal offence concerned in light of valid regulations.

The Law on the Prevention of Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events prescribes the criminal offence of violent behaviour at sports events.⁴⁶ The offence is perpetrated by a person who enters sports grounds without authorisation, or by entering the sports grounds or the part of

⁴⁶ Violent behaviour is characterised by aggressive and brutal behaviour of perpetrators. The element of violence is dominant, regardless of whether the act represents the method of execution or another important element of a concrete criminal offence (Aleksić, Škulić, & Žarković, 2004: 191; Aleksić & Milovanović, 1995: 177).

the grandstands intended for opposing supporters provokes violence, physically assaults or confronts with participants in the sports event, causes violence when arriving at and leaving the sports event, takes into the sports facility or throws onto the sports grounds or among spectators objects, pyrotechnics or other explosive, flammable or damaging substances which may inflict bodily injuries or jeopardise the participants' health, damages the sports facility, its equipment, devices and installations, or provokes national, racial and religious hatred and intolerance with his behaviour or slogans, which results in violence or physical brawls at a sports event. This basic form of the criminal offence was sanctioned with the prison sentence from six months to five years (Law, 2003/2005/2007: 20(1)). As complicity is almost commonplace in this field, the legislator sanctioned the perpetration of the offence in a group more rigorously, with the prison sentence from one to eight years (Law, (2003/2005/2007: 20(2)). Group leaders were sanctioned in the most severe way, by imprisonment from one to ten years (Law, 2003/2005/2007: 20(3)). Harder forms, sanctioned from one to eight years (Law, 2003/2005/2007: 20(4)) included consequences arising from the basic form of the criminal offence and reflecting in a heavy bodily injury or larger-scale property damage. The lightest form of the offence was committed by official or responsible persons who, in organising a sports event, fail to take security measures to disable or prevent an attack, thus jeopardising the lives or bodies of a large number of persons, or property in a larger scale (Law, 2003/2005/2007: 20(5)).

Though not in an identical form, this criminal offence was transferred into the Criminal Code following its amendments of 2009. In this extremely short period, the criminal offence was perpetrated by a person who enters sports grounds or the part of the grandstands intended for opposing fans without authorisation and provokes violence, physically assaults or confronts with participants in the sports event, perpetrates violence when arriving at or leaving the sports event, takes into the sports facility or throws onto the sports grounds or among spectators objects, pyrotechnics or other explosive, flammable or damaging substances which may inflict bodily injuries or jeopardise the participants' health, damages the sports facility, its equipment, devices and installations, or provokes national, racial and religious hatred and intolerance with his behaviour or slogans, which results in violence or physical brawls with participants in the sports event. Perpetration of offences by a group was regulated in the same way, though the sanction was stricter for the group leader – from three to 12 years. Besides, offences involving heavy bodily injuries or larger-scale property damage were punished by imprisonment from two to 10 years. After imposing more rigorous sanctions for this criminal offence, the Serbian legislation remains the strictest in Europe in this field, which, however, does not guarantee that the problem of violence at sports events will be solved (Šuput, 2011b: 84).

For the time being, amendments to the Criminal Code, also of 2009, introduced the final change in the stipulation of this criminal offence. First, the name of the criminal offence changed into violent behaviour at a sports event or public gathering, and is envisaged by Article 344a of the Criminal Code. Second, the act of the criminal offence changed – the offence is now perpetrated by a person who physically assaults or physically confronts with participants in a sports event or public gathering, commits violence or damages property of higher value when arriving at and leaving the sports event or public gathering, takes into the sports facility or throws onto the sports grounds, among spectators or participants in the public gathering objects, pyrotechnics or other explosive, flammable or damaging substances which may inflict bodily injuries or jeopardise health of participants in a sports event or public gathering, enters sports grounds or the

part of the grandstands intended for opposing fans without authorisation and provokes violence, damages the sports facility, its equipment, devices and installations, or provokes national, racial, religious or other types of hatred and intolerance on any discriminatory grounds with his behaviour or slogans, which results in violence or physical brawls with participants. The prescribed prison sentence remained the same – from six months to five years. In this regard, Serbia is considered to follow the English model, though not fully (Litavski, 2010: 24). Besides, the stipulation of fines was introduced. In regard to actions of official or responsible persons, cumulative sanctions are prescribed, implying both a prison sentence and a fine. A novelty includes obligatory security measures prohibiting attendance at some sports events to persons perpetrating the offence. In regard to other aspects, this criminal offence remained unchanged.

4.1.2 ANALYSIS OF ACTS OF THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE

As we can notice, manifestations of the criminal offence of violent behaviour at a sports event or public gathering are manifold, which is why this offence may be perpetrated in different ways. What is at first sight striking is that the Criminal Code no longer envisages only the perpetration of acts at sports events, but the concept has been widened to include public gatherings. In this way, the legislator moved away from the sports field only and broadened incrimination to other, different fields of life. As proposed amendments to the Criminal Code did not envisage such solution – the solution was introduced in the parliamentary procedure, it is rightly believed that such an action was inspired by political motives, and not the real need to upgrade the criminal-legal mechanism of sports protection (Šuput, 2011a: 191). Though it is indisputable that on several occasions fans were those who disturbed public gatherings such as the “Pride Parade”, we believe that mixing protection entities in this case is unjustified and that this criminal offence should serve the exclusive purposes of sports protection. Insertion of political ideas into a serious legal text such as the Criminal Code for the purpose of collecting votes is not only detrimental, but may produce serious consequences, to be explained in the segment relating to concrete forms of this criminal offence.

First and foremost, this criminal offence belongs to the group of offences which cannot be perpetrated at any time and any place – the place and time are clearly stipulated. However, the incrimination was broadened to violent behaviour at public gatherings, whilst the Criminal Code does not envisage either the time or the place for such gatherings – therefore, to understand the meaning of these terms, one should consult the Law on the Prevention of Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and the Law on Public Assembly (Law, 2005). Namely, the criminal offence of violent behaviour at a sports event or public gathering may be committed only at the time and place when and where a sports event or public gathering are held. First, the time of holding a sports event includes the interval of two hours before the start to two hours after the end of the event. In case of increased-risk sports events, this interval covers four hours before the start to four hours after the end. Second, the sports facility must be intended for sports events and, in addition to sports grounds, it must contain grandstands, and may be accompanied with sanitary, wardrobe, storage facilities etc. To establish whether this criminal offence was perpetrated or not, it should be ascertained in time whether the event carries an increased risk or not as this determines the existence of an offence.⁴⁷ However, its non-existence does not exclude

⁴⁷ The competent sports union of the Republic of Serbia, i.e. the organiser of a sports event declares an increased-risk sports event based on the document of the competent sports union or upon the ministry's recommendation

the existence of another, related criminal offence. The same rule applies to the situation when the offence is perpetrated outside of the time envisaged for the event, in which case it will also be another criminal offence. Third, the place adequate for a public gathering must be accessible and convenient for the gathering of persons whose numbers and identity are not defined in advance, at which the gathering of citizens does not disturb public transport and does not jeopardise health, public morality or safety of people and property, and at which the transportation regime must be temporarily changed with additional measures, and the protection of health and safety of people and property ensured. Such a widely defined area for holding a public gathering also raises the issue of the justifiability of broadening the scope of the criminal offence to violent behaviour at a public gathering, which represents an exceptionally rare case in comparative legislative practice (Šuput, 2011a: 193). It is also emphasised in literature that the name of the criminal offence may be disputable as a sports event is in any case a public gathering (Šuput, 2011a: 193).⁴⁸

Therefore, the act of perpetrating the criminal offence of violent behaviour at a sports event or public gathering is alternatively defined. The first method of perpetration is a physical assault or physical confrontation with participants in a sports event or public gathering. It is not necessary to explain what represents a physical assault and physical confrontation, and the very act may be executed in different ways. We may observe that the initial form of the act was significantly changed compared to the earlier solution when unauthorised entry into sports grounds was sanctioned in the first place. The later incrimination was moved into the central place of possible alternatively envisaged forms since a physical assault and confrontation are considered much more serious forms of perpetration. Thus, the Higher Court in Kragujevac found guilty a spectator who physically assaulted a participant in a sports event on the football pitch – after the end of a second town league match, between FC Mladost from Teferič and FC Dobrača from Dobrača, he jumped over the protective fence, came to the chief referee and threw a mobile phone at him, inflicting on him a light bodily injury, i.e. a scratch on his right elbow. This is considered the criminal offence of violent behaviour at a sports event or public gathering (judgment of the Higher Court in Kragujevac 3K-185/12 of 25 January 2013, unpublished). The same criminal offence is considered an act of physical assault – after the suspension of a football match, against a referee who was caused a light bodily injury, as proven by evidence presented at the main hearing; without importance is the fact, though also proven, that a light bodily injury was inflicted, because, for an act to exist, a physical assault against the damaged person is sufficient (judgment of the District Court in Subotica Kž. 351/08 of 16 September 2008; quoted according to: Kalaba, 2011: 48–49). Therefore, what is indispensable for the existence of this form of the criminal offence is the consequence in the form of a bodily injury – in the particular case, it was a light bodily injury. In the case of heavy bodily injuries, the form of the criminal offence is considered more serious. In any way, light bodily injuries are the most frequent consequence of physical violence (Otašević, Subotić, and Vuković, 2012: 747).

However, though at first sight simple, the perpetration of this criminal offence cannot be always easily proven. For instance, the Higher Court in Kragujevac acquitted a person from charges that

provided that special circumstances indicate that violence or misbehaviour of spectators may occur (Law on the Prevention of Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events, 6).

⁴⁸ This is particularly important given that regulations on public assembly also apply to the organisation of sports events. See the Law on the Prevention of Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events, Article 5.

he physically assaulted a participant in a sports event – in the sixtieth minute of the football match between FC Šumadija and FC Popović, dissatisfied with the decision of the chief referee, the captain and player of FC Popović struck the referee in his mouth with an open palm, held his throat and head with both hands, spit at his face several times, punched him two-three times in his throat and, after other players separated him from the referee, took a water container, went again to the referee and poured water over him. Having assessed all evidence and compared it to the accused person's defence and other evidence, the court concluded that the accused person's defence, which refuted the perpetration of the criminal offence ascribed to the accused, was sincere, consistent and identical throughout the proceedings, and substantiated by witnesses' statements which were integrated into one whole, together with the accused person's defence that the court believed. Taking into account the presented evidence and the factual situation determined based on evidence, the court concluded that no evidence was presented based on which it could make its convicting judgment or evidence that could fully confirm the prosecutor's statements, particularly in regard to the infliction of bodily injuries on the damaged party, which is why the court acquitted the defendant (judgment of the Higher Court in Kragujevac 3K-85/11 of 27 February 2012, unpublished).

Acts of violence or higher-value property damage on arrival at or departure from a sports event or public gathering are rather characteristic as they can be perpetrated both outside of the time and place of a sports event or public gathering (Šuput, 2011a: 183), which creates special problems in presenting evidence in criminal proceedings. However, the legislator was right in prescribing these acts as this enables the sanctioning of types of criminal behaviour relating to hooliganism in sports, which could not be classified into behaviour at sports grandstands. Therefore, objective criteria must be used in presenting evidence. According to literature, these criteria may include the fact that an organised fan group or individuals set off for a sports event – they bought tickets and carry fan equipment etc. (Šuput, 2011a: 183). However, there was some vacillation in practice in regard to this issue and such acts were qualified as some other criminal offence (Janković, 2005: 326). This is certainly unjustified and unreasonable as the specified act of the criminal offence was introduced primarily to sanction such situations.

The next alternatively envisaged basic form of act is perpetrated by those who take into the sports facility or throw onto the sports grounds, among spectators or participants in the public gathering objects, pyrotechnics or other explosive, flammable or damaging substances which may inflict bodily injuries or jeopardise health of participants in a sports event or public gathering.⁴⁹ There is an exceptionally wide range of acts covered under this form. First, the act was committed by the very introduction of the defined means into a sports facility, while it is not necessary to throw these means onto the sports grounds or among spectators. Second, the stipulation of introducing and throwing onto the sports grounds is justified as court practice shows that objects already within the sports facility, such as chairs etc, are often thrown on the sports grounds or among spectators. The manner of introducing objects, pyrotechnics and other substances is not relevant for the existence of the act, while it is not rare that offenders are often

⁴⁹ As it is the case with several other forms, there is an overlap between the act prescribed as a misdemeanour and as a criminal offence. For instance, the act of an accused person who introduced a torch to the playing field and disturbed peaceful watching of the sports event, though he did not throw the torch to the field or among spectators, but placed it next to himself once it was extinguished, is also considered a misdemeanour (judgment of Serbia's Supreme Court 746/2005 of 26 October 2006, database Paragraflex).

assisted in this action. Offenders may introduce these objects hidden in hands, pockets, rucksacks, trainers or even snacks they buy at entry gates. The practice shows that these materials are introduced into grandstands one or two days before and are stuck under spectator seats – on the event day, supporters arrive without any objects which are already within the sports facility. Therefore, stewards have a great responsibility to carefully examine the facility before the event. In prescribing this form of act, the legislator nomothetically omitted to specify that the criminal offence also involves the throwing of these objects at spectators of a sports event and not only at spectators of a public gathering, though linguistic interpretation could be different (Đurđević, 2010: 300). However, almost any bad legal solution may be rectified by court practice, which happens in trials in regard to this criminal offence. The consequence of this form of perpetration is reflected in the occurrence of abstract danger to people's lives and health, and the criminal offence is thus committed by the very introduction or throwing of these substances onto the grounds, regardless of whether bodily injuries occurred or people's health was jeopardised. For instance, a defendant committed this criminal offence by throwing a chair onto the sports grounds (judgment of the District Court in Belgrade Kž. 2325/06 of 12 September 2006 and judgment of the Second Municipal Court in Belgrade K. 1730/05 of 7 April 2006 (Simić and Trešnjev, 2008: 234; Bulletin of the District Court in Belgrade No. 74, 2006)), or towards the protective fence and the gendarmerie on the pitch (judgement of the District Court in Belgrade Kž. 1767/06 of 28 June 2006 and judgment of the Second Municipal Court in Belgrade K. 776/05 of 21 June 2005 (Simić and Trešnjev, 2008: 233), or when he was breaking chairs and throwing the pieces on the sports grounds (judgment of the District Court in Belgrade Kž. 2802/05 of 10 November 2005 and judgment of the Second Municipal Court in Belgrade K. 240/05 of 30 June 2005; judgment of the District Court in Belgrade Kž. 2325/06 of 12 September 2006 and judgment of the Second Municipal Court in Belgrade K. 1730/05 of 7 April 2006; quoted according to: Kalaba, 2011: 50–51).

The definition of pyrotechnic devices is given in the Law on Explosive Matters, Flammable Liquids and Gases (Law, 1993/1994/2005). They represent a type of explosive matters and include the means used for fireworks, hail cannons and other rockets used for scientific, economic and other purposes, as well as objects containing explosive ingredients, spray ingredients with explosive effect or other ingredients, serving to achieve the effects of destruction, fire, light, firing or smoke. The Higher Court in Kragujevac found the defendant guilty because he introduced into the stadium Čika Dača and threw onto the sports grounds pyrotechnics which could cause bodily injuries and jeopardise the health of participants, during the match between FC Radnički and FC BASK. Namely, he introduced into the south part of the stadium a torch which he activated during the match and waved it above the heads of other spectators, and then threw it away. He thus committed the criminal offence of violent behaviour at a sports event or public gathering (judgment of the Higher Court in Kragujevac 2K-67/13 of 24 April 2013, unpublished). Or, the defendant committed this criminal offence when, intending to cause violence, he threw onto the sports grounds pyrotechnics which could cause bodily injuries and jeopardise the health of participants in the sports event – by lighting and throwing a torch onto the grounds at the final cup match (decision of the District Court in Belgrade Kž. 2450/06 of 2 October 2006 and the decision of the Second Municipal Court in Belgrade K. 1434/05 of 20 April 2006 (Simić and Trešnjev, 2008: 235–236).

The basic form of this criminal offence may also be committed by the unauthorised entry into the sports grounds or part of the grandstands intended for opposing fans, and by provoking violence. There were initial dilemmas and changes in this form of the offence, which could be committed only by the unauthorised entry on the grounds⁵⁰, without consequences reflected in instigation of violence – according to valid regulations, unauthorised entry onto the sports grounds or part of the grandstands intended for opposing fans is related to the perpetration of violence. Therefore, only the unauthorised entry, without instigation of violence, is now considered a misdemeanour. The cumulative prison sentence is prescribed at 30 to 60 days and a fine from RSD 50,000 to RSD 150,000 (Law, 2003/2005/2007: 23(2)). We believe this solution is more acceptable as the incrimination of only unauthorised entry onto the sports grounds is too rigorous as thus a criminal offence is divested of one of its basic aims – to be a last resort measure. The authorisation for entry is granted based on special regulations or oral or written approvals.

This form of offence is the most frequent in court practice, but in conjunction with another form. Thus, the Higher Court in Kragujevac found a defendant guilty because he entered into the sports grounds without authorisation and physically assaulted the referee. After the match ended, the defendant came onto the sports grounds where there was a delegate and referees, began to spit at the referee's face, held his nose, offended and threatened to him, whereafter he went again to the gates. When referees started off to the grounds, he approached the referee again, spit at him, pushed him towards the fence, and continued to threaten and offend him (judgment of the Higher Court in Kragujevac 3K-192/10 of 26 April 2012, unpublished). Or, the Higher Court in Kragujevac found two defendants guilty for the above criminal offence. The first accused entered the sports grounds without authorisation and physically assaulted participants in the sports event – in the second half of the football match between FC Vinogradi and FC Kragujevac, he entered into the sports grounds and kicked a player of FC Kragujevac in his body, whereafter the player fell to the ground. The second accused entered the sports grounds, as a player of FC Vinogradi, and physically assaulted a participant – in the second half of the same match, after the damaged party – a player of FC Kragujevac made a foul with a sharp start against a player of the other team, the accused approached the damaged party and pushed him in his chest, whereafter he fell to the ground (judgment of the Higher Court in Kragujevac 1K-189/10 of 5 August 2010, unpublished). The Higher Court in Kragujevac found two defendants guilty because they, during a volleyball match between volleyball clubs Radnički Kragujevac and Crvena zvezda Beograd, jumped over the protective fence on the western part of the hall, entered the court without authorisation, and tried to provoke violence that all participants would be exposed to, but were prevented from doing so by members of the Kragujevac Police Directorate (judgment of the Higher Court in Kragujevac 2K-449/10 of 18 January 2011, unpublished).

The act of the criminal offence concerned also includes damage to a sports facility, its equipment, devices and installations. As the legislator has not prescribed by any provision the types of actions which can cause damage to the facility, in practice this can be any action whereby the entire sports facility, its equipment, devices and installations are brought into the state of lower usage value, while the degree of damage is a circumstance which is important in deciding on the punishment. If an object is fully destroyed, this will be a more aggravating circumstance for the offender compared to mere damage. In general, spectator seats are objects

⁵⁰ The legislator was guided primarily by comparative legal practice in prescribing the unauthorised entry into sports grounds (Šuput, 2011a: 178).

that are damaged or, more frequently, destroyed, at sports events of any type. However, court practice shows that this criminal offence is often perpetrated by throwing chairs towards the grounds. Thus, if chairs are only broken, this will be considered the specified criminal offence. If chairs are thrown onto the grounds or into the grandstands, this will be considered one of the above forms of the criminal offence, subject to stricter punishment.

Finally, the basic form of the criminal offence concerned relates to provoking of national, racial, religious or other types of hatred and intolerance on any discriminatory grounds. For the act to be considered the criminal offence, such behaviour should provoke violence or physical confrontation with participants. What is striking is the pronounced similarity with the criminal offence of provoking national, racial and religious hatred and intolerance, primarily in terms of the name and content, but there are significant differences between these two types of offences. The perpetration of the criminal offence of provoking national, racial and religious hatred and intolerance consists of provoking or fuelling national, racial or religious hatred and intolerance among nations or ethnic communities living in Serbia (Law, 2005/2009/2012: 317(1)). In terms of regulation of these types of behaviour on sports grandstands, we may notice that one form is missing – the fuelling of hatred and intolerance on some of the specified grounds. Provoking means the generation of hatred and intolerance, while to be fuelled they need already exist. It is not quite clear why the legislator decided to take this step. The fuelling of already provoked hatred and intolerance will be much more frequent in practice, while there is much smaller probability that they will be provoked at a sports event (Šuput, 2011a: 187). The consequence of these two criminal offences is also different. In case of the sports-related offence, the consequence occurs once violence has erupted, while the comparable offence is committed at the very moment of provoking or fuelling national, racial or religious hatred or intolerance. Finally, it was rightly observed that national, racial or religious hatred or intolerance may be provoked only when slogans and similar activities are repeated in a particular period as it is only in this way possible to create such feelings and trigger violence, while it is practically impossible to produce this consequence only with one action and at a concrete sports event (Šuput, 2011b: 78).

As specified at the beginning of analysis of the criminal offence concerned, the latest legislative amendments introduced any kind of intolerance based on discriminatory grounds. This implies the statutory and penal protection, in an unjustified way and primarily for political reasons aimed at collecting electoral votes, of any group with affiliations deviating from the regular ones, for any reason and under any grounds, starting from sexual. Another striking feature is that the protection of these groups is envisaged in the part of the Criminal Code relating to sports, though perhaps a far better place would be to classify this offence under the provocation of national, racial and religious hatred and intolerance. As the legislator did not opt for this solution, we may conclude that the protection of these groups was introduced in a more or less hidden place.

The perpetrator of the criminal offence of violent behaviour at a sports event or public gathering may be any person. This means that the perpetrator may be not only a spectator, but also other persons present at a sports event in a particular status, including players and coaches. Thus, several accused players were pronounced guilty after participating in a mutual physical conflict at a basketball game, following the suspension over a foul (judgment of the District Court in Belgrade Kž. 2783/06 of 10/11/2006 and judgment of the First Municipal Court in Belgrade K. 2338/05 of 18/04/2006 (Simić & Trešnjev, 2008: 234)). Or, the accused were pronounced guilty

on the following grounds – following the awarded penalty, the first accused physically assaulted the chief referee and hit him in his back, offending his mother, whereafter the second accused hit him with the ball in his head (judgment of the District Court in Čačak Kž. 137/08 of 19/03/2008 and judgment of the Municipal Court in Čačak K. 264/06 of 31/12/2007 (Kalaba, 2011: 51–52)). The fact whether the accused was in the game or was excluded at the moment of perpetration has no influence on the existence of the criminal offence. Therefore, this offence is perpetrated in cases when an excluded player joins the supporters of his team, breaks through the improvised security cordon, runs into the part of the grandstands reserved for opposing fans and conflicts with them (judgment of the Higher Court in Valjevo, K. 49/2012 of 31/8/2012). Furthermore, a perpetrator was pronounced guilty of this criminal offence after attacking a participant in a sports event – being disqualified as a coach of a basketball club, he was ordered to leave the court and the sports hall, but he went back to the court, hit the referee with a chair, inflicting on him light bodily injuries (judgment of the District Court in Belgrade Kž. 32/06 of 31/01/2006 and judgment of the Fourth Municipal Court in Belgrade K. 62/05 of 08/11/2005 (Simić & Trešnjev, 2007: 203–204)). Moreover, the fact that the perpetrator of this criminal offence is the coach of one of the teams is considered an aggravating circumstance in court practice. Therefore, this fact lends particular weight to the offence and implies stricter punishment than in the case of other perpetrators of this criminal offence. In a concrete case, following a football match between FC Borac from Adran and FC Tavnik from Tavnik, the coach stood at the court centre and waited for the players to go to locker rooms, whereafter he approached the referee, swore at him, took him by his face and neck, inflicted on him light bodily injuries in the form of scratches below the eyelid and on the right jaw, and slapped him three times. The court concluded that the gravity of the offence should be valued to a sufficient extent, including the determination and impudence manifested by the accused, notably his status of a coach, which is why he was obliged to take special care of his behaviour as he was responsible for the training of players and for countering their misbehaviour. The accused neglected this obligation and attacked the damaged party (the referee) without any reason (judgment of the Higher Court in Kraljevo 2K. 186/10 of 27/09/2010 and judgment of the Appellate Court in Kragujevac Kž. 1-5836/10 of 27/01/2011 (Court Practice Bulletin of the Higher Court in Kraljevo, No. 1, 2011: 62–63)).

What is protected in this criminal offence are not the life and limb of individuals attending a sports event, but the sports event and public gathering itself (Čejović & Kulić, 2011: 555), i.e. the security and safety of all participants from violence that they might be exposed to (judgment of the District Court in Belgrade Kž. 3401/06 of 14/02/2007 and judgment of the Municipal Court in Obrenovac K. 205/05 of 13/04/2006 (Bulletin of the District Court in Belgrade No. 77, 2008; Simić & Trešnjev, 2008: 237); decision of the District Court in Belgrade Kž. 2755/06 of 28/02/2007 and judgment of the Second Municipal Court in Belgrade K. 117/06 of 07/08/2006 (Simić & Trešnjev, 2008: 236). As this offence consists of several alternatively defined execution acts and may be perpetrated only with intent (Čejović & Kulić, 2011: 555), there was equivocation in practice for some time as to whether the intention of causing violence is an important element for the existence of the criminal offence. On the one hand, there are decisions prescribing that each act enumerated in the description of the criminal offence should contain the intention of causing violence (decision of the District Court in Belgrade Kž. 2755/06 of 28/02/2007 (Kalaba, 2011: 49–50)), whilst on the other hand there are judgments according to which the very act of entering the sports grounds had to contain the intention to provoke violence (judgment of the District Court in Belgrade Kž. 2783/06 of 10/11/2006 and judgment of the First

Municipal Court in Belgrade K. 2338/05 of 18/04/2006 (Simić & Trešnjev, 2008: 234–235)). However, as it was necessary to prove the intention only for one form of the act, while this was not required for other alternatively prescribed forms (judgment of the Higher Court in Kraljevo 1K. 24/11 of 27/05/2011 and judgment of the Appellate Court in Kragujevac Kž. 1- 2938/11 of 09/08/2011 (Bulletin of the Higher Court in Kraljevo No. 3, 2011)), the legislator relinquished such solution – according to valid regulations, the criminal offence does not contain the intention to provoke violence at a sports event. Finally, a cumulative sanction of imprisonment from six months to five years and a fine are envisaged for this basic form of the criminal offence. Therefore, even the attempt at committing this criminal offence is punishable.

Complicity is not rare in this criminal offence. The legislator thus envisaged a graver form of the criminal offence in cases when it is committed in a group. Under the Criminal Code, a group consists of at least three persons related for the purpose of durable or occasional perpetration of criminal offences, where the roles of its members need not be defined, nor should the continuity of membership or a developed structure be present (Code, 2005/2009/2012: 112(22)). Therefore, to have a graver form of this criminal offence, the intentional relation among at least three persons is indispensable (Šuput, 2011: 195) due to the validity of general rules on complicity. The penalty envisaged for this form of the offence is the prison sentence from one to eight years. The gravest form implies perpetration by the ringleader, where the prison sentence ranges from three to twelve years. This circumstance must also be covered by the perpetrator's intent, i.e. the ringleader must have the awareness and willingness to act in such way.

A graver form of the offence also exists in cases when a light bodily injury is inflicted on a person or if property is damaged to a larger extent. Infliction of a light bodily injury represents, as we have stated, the basic form of this criminal offence.⁵¹ In graver forms, the damaged person is not important as a heavy bodily injury may be inflicted on opposing team supporters, players, spectators, passers-by etc. In any case, this will be a graver form of the offence. In subjective terms, intent is not necessary because negligence as a form of guilt is sufficient. This form of guilt is required also in cases when the consequence is reflected in damaged property of larger scale. Though there may be dilemmas as to property of larger scale, the legal opinion of the Criminal Department of the Supreme Court of Cassation may serve as a guidance – the value of larger-scale property exceeds RSD 1,200,000.00 in regard to the following criminal offences: abuse of the right to strike, causing general danger, inciting danger by the failure to ensure safety-at-work measures, construction works that are irregular and contrary to regulations, elimination of danger, jeopardising public transport, jeopardising transport by a dangerous act and means, negligent surveillance of public transport, and participation in a criminal offence within a group (Šuput, 2011: 197). Finally, the prison sentence envisaged for this form of the criminal offence ranges from two to ten years. In case of perpetration of any of the above forms, the security measure banning attendance at some sports events is invariably pronounced.

⁵¹ For some other victimological aspects of this criminal offence, see: Otašević, Subotić, & Vuković, 2012: 735-750. At the same time, it should not be disregarded that supporters and police officers are not the only victims of violence on sports grounds, as victims include all participants. Besides, the number of attacks against referees was on a constant increase – there were 75 attacks in 2009 and 110 in 2010 (Subošić, Otašević, & Mijalković, 2011: 305), as we have illustrated through several judgments.

A special form of the criminal offence is committed by an official or responsible person who, in organising a sports event or public gathering, fails to take security measures to disable or prevent disorders, which results in jeopardising of lives or bodies of a larger number of persons or larger-scale property. The cumulative penalty envisaged for this offence is the prison sentence from three months to three years and a fine. As it is obvious, this form represents a special criminal offence envisaged within the offence concerned. In the past, it was a separate criminal offence called the “failure to prevent disorders at a sports competition or other public gathering”. It was initially introduced into criminal legislation in 2002 and was later eliminated and criminal responsibility of an official and responsible person was incriminated again.

The criminal offence of the failure to act consists of the failure to take security measures so as to disable or avoid an attack. As rules on securing a sports facility and an event are explicitly legally prescribed, the failure to take such actions brings about the execution of this form of the offence. However, for the offence to exist, there need not be a bodily injury of a person or larger-scale property damage, because the criminal offence is committed with the very occurrence of danger. Unlike other forms which may be perpetrated by any person, the perpetrator in this case must be an official or responsible person. If lives and bodies of a larger number of persons or larger-scale property are not jeopardised because of the failure to take security measures, there will be no criminal, but misdemeanour responsibility (Đurđević, 2010: 290). What is protected in this form of the criminal offence are life and limb, including larger-scale property, whilst the offence itself may be committed both with intent and negligence.⁵²

4.1.3 SECURITY MEASURE BANNING ATTENDANCE AT SOME SPORTS EVENTS

The measure banning attendance at some sports events appears in Serbia’s criminal legislation in two forms – as a security measure under the Criminal Code and a protective measure under the Law on Misdemeanours. Though their content is largely similar, we shall dwell here only on the security measure, while the protective measure will be explained in the section relating to misdemeanours in this field.

Under the Criminal Code, a court may prohibit an offender to attend some sports events, when necessary for the purposes of ensuring public safety (Code, 2005/2009/2012: 89b(1)). The measure is pronounced with a penalty or suspended sentence, which is optional. As the Criminal Code does not envisage the criminal offences that the measure may be pronounced for, this concerns most often the criminal offence of violent behaviour at a sports event – the measure is then obligatory, which is the only case when the measure must be pronounced. However, it is believed that this may also be some other criminal offence against public order and peace, life and limb, property etc, which may take place at a sports event or in relation to the event (Đurđević, 2011: 160).

The measure is implemented as follows: immediately prior to a particular sports event, the offender must contact in person an officer at a local police department or police station in the area where the offender is present at the time, and must stay on their premises during the event (Code, 2005/2009/2012: 89b(2)). A special problem is the definition of sports events that the

⁵² However, there are beliefs that the offence may be executed only with intent. See: Đurđević, 2010: 292.

prohibition will relate to. As no legal text stipulates the sports events that the prohibition will relate to, it is believed that a court, in pronouncing the measure, should also define the range of sports events as the prohibition relating to a wide range of events would not be purposeful, i.e. it would turn into the deprivation of liberty (Đorđević, 2011: 160). Another open question is whether the person that the measure was pronounced against should only bear in mind when and where the sports event concerned is held or whether the competent authority should inform him thereof. It is unrealistic to expect from the accused to analyse each sports event and thus bear possible consequences if he fails to inform himself of the time of the event that he is prohibited to attend. In any case, the competent authority must keep records of both the persons that the measure is pronounced against and the range of prohibited events (Đorđević, 2011: 161). A special problem arises in the implementation of the measure. Namely, the accused must spend some time in a police station with exceptionally limited accommodation capacities, which at the same time hinders regular operation of persons employed (Stojanović, 2012: 317). Such security measure is pronounced over the time which many not be shorter than one year or longer than five years, starting from the date the ruling becomes final, whereas the time spent in prison is not credited to the duration of the ban (Code, 2005/2009/2012: 89b(3)). If the court pronounces a suspended sentence, such sentence will be revoked if the offender violates the ban on attending some sports events, i.e. fails to contact in person, immediately before the start of the event, the officer at a local police department or police station in the area where the offender is present at the time, for the purpose of staying on their premises during the event (Code, 2005/2009/2012: 89b(4)). If after serving the sentence of imprisonment, the offender violates the ban, i.e. fails to fulfil the specified duty, the court which imposed the ban may sentence him to the imprisonment of thirty days to three months (Code, 2005/2009/2012: 89b(5)). If the offender violates the ban, the court has the option to punish him with the imprisonment of thirty days to three months. A special criminal offence is thus prescribed in the general part of the Criminal Code, which is unacceptable (Stojanović, 2012: 317), notably as the perpetration of a criminal offence is not the issue concerned, but rather the failure to comply with the prescribed ban (Đorđević, 2011: 163). What has also remained unclear is why the legislator envisages a sanction only after the prison sentence has been served, and not in cases when it is pronounced with another type of sanction. However, as shown later, sanctions for the failure to comply with the ban exist in comparative law, primarily English. Still, as the two legal systems are different, sanctioning the violation of the ban in an identical way was not acceptable.

The Law envisages a mandatory ban on attending some sports events (Code, 2005/2009/2012: 89b(6)). As this is a relatively new security measure, assessing its effects is still early (Čejović & Kulić, 2011: 738). Experiences so far say nothing of whether and to what extent this measure contributed to curbing of criminal offences committed at and in relation to sports competitions (Stojanović, 2012: 316). As elaborated above, the obligatory pronouncement of this measure is prescribed for the time being only for one criminal offence that we have dealt with in this section.

4.1.4 MISDEMEANOURS

The Law on the Prevention of Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and Public Gatherings envisages the following ten misdemeanours that a natural person may commit:

1. throwing objects into the sports grounds or grandstands;
2. destroying property when arriving at or leaving a sports event;
3. unauthorised entry into the sports grounds, official premises and corridors, or part of the grandstands intended for opposing fans;
4. introducing or attempting to introduce, or possession or use in a sports facility of alcohol or other intoxicants;
5. introducing or attempting to introduce into a sports facility, or use of pyrotechnics and other objects and means which may hinder the course of a sports event;
6. burning fan equipment or other objects;
7. wearing fan shawls, caps or other objects with the intention to hide identity;
8. failure to act in accordance with orders of the security service;
9. resale of tickets contrary to the ban; and
10. sale of alcoholic beverages contrary to the ban (Law, 2003/2005/2007: 23(1)).

The sanction envisaged for one of the above misdemeanours includes the prison sentence from 30 to 60 days and a fine of RSD 50,000 to RSD 150,000 (Law, 2003/2005/2007: 23(1)). The gravity of these offences is also reflected in the cumulative prison sentence and a fine, including the obligatory protective measure banning attendance at some sports events (Law, 2003/2005/2007: 23(2)). Moreover, the protective measure of confiscation of an object may be pronounced for misdemeanours under items 4, 5 and 9: introducing or attempting to introduce, or possession or use in a sports facility of alcohol or other intoxicants; introducing or attempting to introduce into a sports facility, or use of pyrotechnics and other objects and means which may hinder the course of a sports event; and resale of tickets contrary to the ban (Law 2005/2008/2009/2013: 23(3)). However, the pronouncement of this measure is not obligatory, but optional, though it would be more appropriate to prescribe obligatory confiscation of the above objects.

4.1.5 PROTECTIVE MEASURE

The ban on attending some sports events is a relatively new protective measure, prescribed by the Law on Misdemeanours. It implies the offender's obligation to contact in person, immediately prior to a sports event, an officer at a local police department or police station in the area where the offender is present at the time. The offender must also stay on their premises during the event (Law, 2005/2008/2009/2013: 63(1)). The protective measure may be pronounced in the duration of one to eight years (Law, 2005/2008/2009/2013: 63(2), while the time spent in prison is not credited to the duration of the ban (Law, 2005/2008/2009/2013: 63(3)). However, if the person fails to fulfil this duty, i.e. fails to contact the person in charge, he will be punished with imprisonment from 30 to 60 days (Law, 2005/2008/2009/2013: 63(4)), i.e. with the sanction prescribed for misdemeanours committed by a natural person. In this way, the person only aggravates the situation, while the pronounced protective measure remains in force. As it is not prescribed how many times a punished person may in this way be punished again, it may be concluded that the person will always be in the same position when violating the stipulated obligations. Moreover, this is a significantly stricter provision than the one valid at the time of introducing the described protective measure in legislation, which could be pronounced in the duration from one to three years. What is particularly striking is that the protective measure for a misdemeanour may last longer than the security measure of the same name, which

already at first sight is illogical and creates dilemmas as it may bring about stricter punishment of a perpetrator of a misdemeanour than of a criminal offence. The possibility of sanctioning is prescribed here as well, which is a unique case in this legal text (remarks are the same as those given for criminal legislation). The court is obliged to inform of the pronounced protective measure the local police department in accordance with the punished person's place of residence (Law, 2005/2008/2009/2013: 63(5)). Finally, the Law on Misdemeanours envisages that the regulation determining a misdemeanour may envisage the obligatory pronouncement of the protective measure banning attendance at some sports events (Law, 2005/2008/2009/2013: 63(6)). This was done in the Law on the Prevention of Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events.

4.1.6 REMARKS ON JUVENILES AS PERPETRATORS OF MISDEMEANOURS AND CRIMINAL OFFENCES

Juveniles often appear as perpetrators of minor criminal offences, including those relating to hooliganism at sports grandstands since “the time dimension of underage status, by its very nature, most often excludes juveniles as perpetrators of grave criminal offences as a special criminological category, in terms of the gravity and nature of criminal offences“ (Soković, 2013: 489). When it comes to younger generations, particularly those who fail to meet their needs in line with their aspirations in real life, sports stadiums become “arenas for manifesting accumulated and subdued aggression which easily explodes into the most brutal forms of violence” (Božović, 2007: 103). The 1990–2010 period saw 328 juvenile perpetrators of the criminal offence of violent behaviour at sports events, of whom there was only one girl (Milašinović & Milašinović, 2011: 501). A senior juvenile appears as the typical perpetrator. The most frequent method of execution (under the influence of alcohol) implies breaking of chairs at football and basketball matches, throwing chairs towards stewards, spectators or onto the grounds, and throwing stones at opposing fans (Milašinović & Milašinović, 2011: 502). Remarks on legal rules regarding the punishment of juveniles should be presented here. Just like the old Law on Misdemeanours, the new Law contains provisions which may be disputed, whilst it cannot be unequivocally stated which of the two laws has greater flaws. According to the valid Law, a senior juvenile may be punished only if he could understand, in accordance with his mental development, the importance of his action and manage his behaviour at the time of committing the offence, as well as if it would not be reasonable to apply an educational measure owing to graver consequences of the misdemeanour or a higher degree of guilt (Law, 2005/2008/2009/2013: 81(1)). The prison sentence against a senior juvenile may be pronounced exceptionally, bearing in mind the nature of the misdemeanour, personal characteristics and behaviour of the juvenile, but may not last more than 30 days (Law, 2005/2008/2009/2013: 81(2–3)). A correct solution implies that a fine pronounced may not be replaced with the juvenile prison sentence, but will be collected in money through enforcement (Law, 2005/2008/2009/2013: 81(4)). The misdemeanour court must inform the guardian body competent for the juvenile's place of residence of the pronounced educational measure or punishment against a juvenile perpetrator of a misdemeanour (Law, 2005/2008/2009/2013: 81(5)). According to the earlier solution, the pronounced fine could be replaced with the prison sentence up to 15 days, which was at the same the longest juvenile prison sentence (Law, 2005/2008/2009: 73(3)). A major deficiency of this solution was the fact that the kind of prison

sentence was not prescribed anywhere. As a result, a fine was replaced for a juvenile by an ordinary prison sentence, which was absurd!

However, all the above would not be so disputable if there was no law regulating only the matter of juvenile criminality. In fact, the Law on Juvenile Perpetrators of Criminal Offences and Criminal-Legal Protection of Juveniles regulates in detail the sanction of juvenile imprisonment. The sanction may be pronounced only against a senior juvenile, for criminal offences subject to the prison sentence above five years. It is pronounced over full years and months, and may last for at least six months and at most five, exceptionally ten years. It is assessed that prescribing the general threshold of six months is based on the knowledge that this implies the shortest period necessary to achieve particular effects during execution (Soković & Bejatović, 2009: 100) (the so-called “condensed” treatment (Perić, 2005: 88)), or the shortest period needed for the implementation and organisation of treatment in a penal institution (Banović & Joksić, 2012: 29). In other legislations, such as the one in the Republic of Srpska, the shortest prison sentence for an underage person is one year (Mitrović & Grbić, 2008: 550), while the court is not bound by the minimum of the prescribed sentence for a concrete criminal offence (Mitrović et al, 2010: 97). Therefore, how was it possible at first place for the legislator to stipulate, by the Law on Misdemeanours, the sentence of juvenile imprisonment below six months. Such a solution in the misdemeanour legislation is damaging in many ways, despite the fact that the court practice may rectify it, i.e. may choose not to apply it. Still, it should not remain prescribed by the Law. However, it should be noted that there are beliefs that this measure will achieve its purpose in misdemeanour proceedings by exerting a positive influence on juveniles (Milić, 2013: 26–27). In line with adopted international standards, the minimum duration of juvenile imprisonment has been prescribed, which cannot and should not be changed by the Law on Misdemeanours. The general purpose of this criminal sanction cannot be achieved in such way.

4.2. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Like other European countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina also faces hooliganism at sports events. Hooliganism escalates, besides all other reasons, also due to national and religious divisions as the country consists of two entities and the Brčko District. Three, largely different constituent nations live in the country and rifts among them have become even deeper after the civil war. It is believed that the economic hardship is also reflected in violence at sports events because the country is constantly exposed to material and economic difficulties. At the same time, numerous incidents go beyond the boundaries of stadiums and spill over to political events and similar citizen gatherings (Šetka & Amidžić, 2012: 187). A special concern relates to the absence of political will to more efficiently tackle the problem, which is reflected also in legal solutions. Namely, what is characteristic is the stipulation of misdemeanours only, including relatively mild sentences. Furthermore, there is no legal text regulating this field at the state level. In the Republic of Srpska, the Law on the Prevention of Violence at Sports Events was adopted far back in 2004 (Law, 2004), while the Law Amending the Law on the Prevention of Violence at Sports Events was adopted in 2010 (Law, 2010).

Before amendments to the 2004 Law were adopted, the prison sentence could be pronounced alternatively with a fine. However, the prison sentence was abolished as it is no longer envisaged

as a sanction for misdemeanours. All misdemeanours committed by natural persons may be divided into two groups, according to the criterion of mandatory pronouncement of the measure banning attendance at sports events. Misdemeanours include the following:

1. participation in a physical conflict among spectators at a sports event;
2. participation in a physical conflict among participants – competitors at a sports event;
3. improper and derogatory behaviour of a participant – sportsperson at a sports event, in respect of spectators, referees and official persons;
4. throwing objects onto the sports grounds or hindering the sports event by special technical means or other devices;
5. damaging a sports facility where the event takes place, damaging its equipment, devices, installation and other inventory;
6. inciting hatred or antagonism by shouting rude and derogatory slogans, introducing or displaying banners and other features;
7. unauthorised entry into the sports grounds;
8. unauthorised entry into official premises and corridors in the sports facility where a sports event takes place during, immediately before or after the sports event;
9. introducing into the sports facility or consumption of alcohol or intoxicants during a sports event;
10. entering the part of the grandstands reserved for opposing fans;
11. calling for or inciting a fight or an attack against other spectators, stewards, police officers, members of the agency securing people and property, official persons of the organiser, sportspersons and other participants in a sports event;
12. failure to comply with orders of an official person (Law, 2004, 22).

The fine envisaged for the above misdemeanours ranges from KM 600.00 to KM 1,500.00, and may be accompanied (which is optional) by the protective measure banning attendance at sports events from six months to one year (Law, 2010, :3).

The legislator prescribed much fewer graver misdemeanours, in cases when a natural person:

1. physically attacks a participant in a sports event – a competitor;
2. participates in a physical conflict among spectators at a sports event, involving more than five persons;
3. physically attacks the referee, delegate and official person at a sports event;
4. physically attacks police officers or members of the agency securing the event;
5. physically attacks stewards and official persons of the organiser of the competition (Law, 2004: 23);
6. attends a sports event during the validity of the protective measure banning attendance at a sports event (Law, 2010: 4(1)).

The fine envisaged for this group of misdemeanours ranges from KM 1,000.00 to KM 3,000.00, along with the obligatory protective measure banning attendance at sports events, from six months to two years (Law, 2010: 4(1–2)).

A significant disproportion between what is prescribed and implemented in practice is believed to exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Particularly criticised is the provision under which a graver form of a misdemeanour is envisaged in cases when a perpetrator violates the protective measure banning attendance at sports events. It has never been implemented in practice and there are many persons who attend sports events despite the ban (Šetka & Amidžić, 2012: 188). A special problem is reflected in the inefficiency of the judiciary as proceedings often span around two years, which is too long and may have a motivating effect on the perpetrator (Šetka & Amidžić, 2012: 188–189).

4.3 CROATIA

Criminal offences and misdemeanours relating to violence at sports events are prescribed in Croatia by the Law on the Prevention of Disorders at Sports Competitions (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011). Like in the neighbouring countries, the Law was several times amended. The latest amendments introduced criminal offences, which were not envisaged up to then, including not such mild penalties. This was a result of severe criticism of Croatian legislation which, up to then, envisaged numerous misdemeanours and no criminal offence, and stipulated exceptionally mild sanctions (Šuput, 2010: 246). To some extent, this Law is different than laws of countries in the region, rather in terms of classification than contents (Milenković & Todorčić, 2011: 15). Following the latest amendments, the major difference concerns the number of prescribed criminal offences. The range of criminal offences includes the following:

1. participation in a fight or an assault on spectators or other persons,
2. organising violence at sports competitions,
3. destroying objects or property at a sports competition, and
4. violation of measures and bans.

4.3.1 CRIMINAL OFFENCES

The basic criminal offence in this field implies participation in a fight or an assault against spectators or other persons. The following actions are sanctioned: participation in a fight or an assault on other spectators, stewards, official persons of the competition organiser, sportspersons or other persons, during the arrival at a sports event, during the event itself or while leaving the event, which also involves heavy bodily injuries. The sentence envisaged for this basic form of the criminal offence is the prison sentence from three months to three years (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 31.a(1)). A graver form exists when the consequence of the basic form of the offence results in a death. In this case, the perpetrator will be punished, for mere participation, by the prison sentence from six months to five years (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 31.a(2)). The following two graver forms concern the organiser or the leader of the group committing some of the above offences. Thus, in case of the first form of the offence, i.e. when a heavy bodily injury is inflicted on a person, the group organiser is punished by imprisonment lasting from one to eight years (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 31.a(3)). In case of death, the person will be punished by the prison sentence from three to ten years (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 31.a(4)). Finally, no criminal offence exists in cases when a person participating in a fight got involved without his guilt or only because he was defending himself or separating other participants in the fight (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 31.a(5)).

The criminal offence of organising violence at sports competitions is committed by a person who organises or leads a group of people who, at the time of arriving at a sports competition, during the competition itself and while leaving the competition, participate in a fight or an assault on other spectators, stewards, official persons of the organiser, sportsmen or other persons, which results in bodily injuries, or damage or destruction of somebody else's objects or property of higher value. The prison sentence envisaged for this offence ranges from one to five years (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 31.b). The criminal offence of destroying objects or property at a sports competition is committed by a person who changes the appearance or makes unusable somebody else's object or property of higher value, at the time of arriving at a sports competition, during the competition itself and while leaving the competition. The prison sentence up to three years and a fine are alternatively envisaged for this offence (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 31.c). Finally, the criminal offence of the violation of measures and prohibitions is committed by a person who is found at the sports facility or his presence is determined otherwise, during the validity of the protective or security measure, or the measure banning attendance at a sports competition. The prison sentence up to one year and a fine are alternatively envisaged for this offence (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 31.d).

4.3.2 MISDEMEANOURS

All misdemeanours relating to violence at sports events in Croatia may be classified into two groups – lighter and graver misdemeanours, under the criterion of the stipulated sanction. The first group includes:

1. possession or consumption of alcohol and other beverages containing more than 6% of alcohol, drugs and pyrotechnics, weapons and other means suitable for the infliction of injuries or instigation of disorders or violence;
2. introducing or attempting to introduce into sports facilities alcoholic beverages, drugs, pyrotechnics, weapons and other means suitable for the infliction of injuries or instigation of disorders or violence;
3. arrival, attempted entry or stay in a sports facility under the influence of alcohol above 0.50 g/kg, or a particular level of milligrams in one litre of exhaled air;
4. masking persons to disguise identity;
5. attempting to introduce or introduction and displaying in the sports facilities of banners, flags or other objects demonstrating or fuelling hatred or violence on the grounds of racial, national, regional or religious affiliation; and
6. spending time and lingering at grandstands of persons without the ticket or a document issued by the organiser.

The fine envisaged for some of the above misdemeanours ranges from HRK 2,000.00 to HRK 15,000.00, or the prison sentence up to 30 days (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 39(1)). A natural or legal person who acquires or enables the purchase or acquisition of a ticket for a person under the attendance ban is punished for a misdemeanour. A natural person is punished by the fine ranging from HRK 1,000.00 to HRK 10,000.00 or the prison sentence up to 30 days, while a legal person is punished from HRK 5,000.00 to HRK 30,000.00 (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 39(2)).

The second group includes the following misdemeanours:

1. throwing objects into the sports grounds or at grandstands;
2. chanting or shouting at competitors or other spectators of messages whose content displays or incites hatred based on racial, national, regional or religious affiliation;
3. lighting or throwing pyrotechnics;
4. lighting or destroying in another way of fan equipment or other objects; and
5. attempted unauthorised entry or unauthorised entry into the sports grounds or grandstands, or the space intended for referees or other participants in the competition.

The sentence envisaged for the above graver misdemeanours is, alternatively, a fine ranging from HRK 5,000.00 to HRK 25,000.00 and the prison sentence of at least 30 and at most 60 days (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 39.a(1)). The same sentence is pronounced against a person under the protective measure, who failed to act as required (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 39.a(2)). A fine ranging from HRK 5,000.00 to HRK 50,000.00 or a prison sentence of at least 30 and at most 60 days will be pronounced against the person who was found guilty for one of the above misdemeanours, two or more times from the day of perpetration of the misdemeanour over the previous two years (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 39.a(3)).

4.3.3 PROTECTIVE, CAUTIONARY AND SECURITY MEASURES

In addition to protective and cautionary measures⁵³, a court may also pronounce the following protective measures against perpetrators of the above criminal offences and misdemeanours:

1. prohibition to attend some sports competitions in the territory of Croatia, with the obligation to report to a police station;
2. prohibition to attend some sports competitions in the territory of Croatia, with the obligation to stay at a police station; and
3. prohibition to travel to some sports competitions abroad in which the Croatian national team or sports clubs participate, with the obligation to report to a police station and deliver a travel document (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 32. (1)).

These protective measures are pronounced over a time which may not be shorter than one or longer than two years (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 32. (2)). Besides, the security measure of dispossession of an object is mandatory (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 32. (3)). A final decision on one of the above protective measures is delivered by the court not only to the submitter of the indictment proposal, but also to the national sports federation which is obliged to inform thereof the organiser of the sports competition or the contracted distributor authorised for ticket sale and the fan association (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 32. (4)). The organiser of a sports competition or the contracted distributor refuses to sell or award tickets to a person against whom a protective

⁵³ The Croatian legislator envisages six such measures: prohibition to leave residence without court permit, prohibition to visit a place or area, prohibition to approach a particular person and prohibition to establish or maintain contact with a particular person, prohibition to take a particular business activity, temporary dispossession of a travel and other document for crossing the state border, and temporary dispossession of a license to steer a vehicle or a vessel, airplane or other means of transport (Law on Misdemeanours, 130).

or cautionary measure was pronounced, over the period of validity of the measure (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 32. (5)).

The organiser is also obliged to take measures to prevent access to the sports facility to the person for whom the organiser knows or is obliged to know that he was pronounced a protective or safety measure banning attendance at some sports competitions, or a cautionary measure (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 32. (6)). Furthermore, the organiser or the distributor refuses to sell or award an admission ticket for a certain sports competition to the person for whom they know that he acted contrary to law, and will take measures to prevent the person's access to the sports facility (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 32. (7)).

If a measure is pronounced against a person, banning him to attend some sports competitions in the territory of Croatia, with the obligation to report to a police station, the person must, at least two hours before a competition, contact the police officer on duty at the police station according to the place of his residence (or if absent from that place, in the nearest police station) and inform him of the address where he shall be during the sports competition, including two hours after the end of the competition (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 32a (1)). This address may not be within the area of two kilometres from the sports facility where the sports event is held, in respect of which a protective measure was pronounced against the person, except in the case when the person has permanent or temporary residence in that area, works in the area, or has other justified reasons to reside at the particular address (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 32a (2)).

When a person is under the ban to attend some sports competitions in the territory of Croatia, with the obligation to stay in the police station, the person must, by no later than two hours before a concrete sports competition, come to the competent police station according to the place of residence. If the person is absent from the place of residence and is present in the territory of Croatia, he shall report to the nearest police station, where he must stay on official or other convenient premises until the expiry of two hours after the end of the competition (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 32a (3)). Finally, when a person is under the ban to attend some sports competitions abroad when Croatia's national team or sports clubs play, with the obligation to report to a police station and deliver the travel document, the person shall, by no later than half an hour before the start of the competition, come to the competent police station according to the place of residence. If the person is absent from the place of residence and is present in the territory of Croatia, he shall report to the nearest police station and contact the police officer on duty, informing him of the address where he will stay during the competition and two hours following the end of the competition. Seven days prior to the event, the person must deliver the travel document to the police station according to the place of residence (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 32a (4)).

If the person against whom some of the above measures were pronounced for justified reasons is not able to come to the police station due to his health status or professional duties which cannot be postponed, the person must contact the police station by telephone according to the place of residence and inform the station of the address where he is present (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 32a (6)). In any case, the police always have the authority to verify whether the person is present at the given address (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 32a (6)). If he is not present at the given address, the police may launch a search for the purpose of bringing the person (Law,

2003/2006/2009/2011: 32a (7)). However, the police will always apprehend this person if he is found in the area of the sports facility or if his presence is determined by checking the video surveillance record of the sports facility or the video surveillance record made by the police (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 32a (8)).

In addition to protective measures, the person may also be pronounced a cautionary measure stipulated by misdemeanour legislation – he may be banned to visit a particular place or area. As in this case the person against whom the measure was pronounced is not obliged to report to the police station, it may be observed that the person is placed in a more favourable position compared to the person under a protective measure (Žigante-Živković, 2010: 193–194).

The Croatian legislator envisaged an interesting solution regarding the attendance of a misdemeanour judge at a particular sports event. Thus, in the situation when a sports event is assessed to carry a high risk of disorders and violence, the president of the misdemeanour court shall, on police request, ensure the presence of the misdemeanour judge and court reporter, provided the sports facility has suitable premises for their work. Otherwise, the court president shall ensure that they be on their duty in the competent court closest to the event venue (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 33(1–3)).

As in the Republic of Serbia, the Croatian legislator stipulated a new security measure – the ban on attending some sports competitions. In addition to the sentence and other security measures, the court may pronounce against the perpetrator of a criminal offence committed during a sports event the ban on attending some sports competitions. The duration of such measure may not be shorter than one or longer than five years, while the period of prison sentence shall not be credited to the duration of the measure. In regard to the method of execution, the legislator refers to provisions regulating the execution of the above protective measures, which is why these provisions are applied analogously (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 34(1–2)).

The Croatian legislator gave an interesting solution stipulating that the misdemeanour court, on proposal of a police department competent for the place where the sports event is held or the area of the person's residence, may pronounce the ban on attending a particular sports competition or the ban on attending sports competitions against the person known to have behaved contrary to law during the arrival, in the course of the event and while leaving the sports competition, over the time not shorter than six months or longer than one year (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 34a (1)). Confirmed by the Croatian Constitutional Court (Žigante-Živković, 2010: 194), such solution was taken from comparative law as it also exists in England, as presented further in the text. By no later than two hours prior to a sports competition, the person is obliged to come to the competent police station according to the place of residence, or the closest police station if the person is absent from the place of residence but is present in the territory of Croatia, as well as to contact the police officer on duty, informing him of the address where he will be present during the sports event and two hours following its end (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 34a (2)). This address may not be within the area of two kilometres from the sports facility where the event (in regard to which the ban is pronounced) is held, except in the case when the person has permanent or temporary residence, or employment in that area, or in other justified cases (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 34a (3)). The police shall inform the parents or guardians at the social

welfare institution about juvenile persons for whom it has been assessed or established that they behaved contrary to law (Law, 2003/2006/2009/2011: 36).

4.4 MONTENEGRO

Montenegro adopted the Law on the Prevention of Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events (Law, 2007/2010/2011) in 2007 and has amended it several times in the meantime. As it is the case with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegrin legislation also does not envisage criminal offences relating to hooliganism at sports events, but only lists the types of misdemeanours. It, however, envisages the protective measure banning attendance at some sports events. The Law envisages only seven misdemeanours committed by a natural person, subject to the prison sentence up to 60 days. The misdemeanours include:

1. damaging or destroying parts of the sports facility where the event is held, its devices, equipment or installations;
2. causing disorder during the arrival, leaving or presence in the sports facility, disturbing the course of the event, or jeopardising the safety of participants in the sports event or third persons;
3. unauthorised entry into the sports grounds;
4. unauthorised entry into official premises and corridors of the sports facility where a sports event is held;
5. introducing into the sports facility and consumption of alcohol and other intoxicants;
6. introducing into the sports facility or use of pyrotechnics and other objects which may jeopardise the safety of participants in a sports event or hinder its course;
7. unauthorised entry into the part of the grandstands reserved for opposing fans. (Law, 2007/2010/2011: 23(1)).

The measure banning attendance at some sports events may be pronounced both on a mandatory and optional basis. The criterion applied is whether a person commits the misdemeanour for the first time or the person is a reoffender. Therefore, along with the sentence for some of the above misdemeanours, a ban is also optionally pronounced against the natural person, lasting from one month to one year (Law, 2007/2010/2011: 23(2)). The ban is obligatory for a repeated misdemeanour (Law, 2007/2010/2011: 23(3)).

The person against whom a protective measure was pronounced is obliged, by no later than two hours before a sports event, to contact in person the authorised official person competent according to the place of residence, and to inform him of the address where he will stay during a sports event, and during the time which elapses from his departure from the official person until the expiry of two hours after the event ends. In the case that he is unable to do this due to his health status or professional duties which cannot be postponed, the person must call by telephone and inform the officer of the address where he is present. If the person is absent from the place of permanent residence and is present in Montenegro, he must contact in person the authorised official person in the closest competent body according to the place of temporary residence, informing him of the address where he is present (Law, 2007/2010/2011: 24(1)). The authorised official person may check whether the person who reported his address is truly present at that address (Law, 2007/2010/2011: 24(2)). However, if the person did not contact the official person

or if it is determined through a check that he is not present at the reported address, the official person may launch a search to bring him at the local misdemeanour authority (Law, 2007/2010/2011: 24(3)). Finally, the official person must apprehend him if locating him in the area of the sports facility or if his presence is determined by checking the video surveillance record (Law, 2007/2010/2011: 24(4)).

4.5 SLOVENIA

Until recently the only former Yugoslav country which became an EU member, Slovenia is not spared hooliganism and violence at sports events either. Whatsoever, struggle against everyday violence has become the key political problem in the country (Plahuta & Šimuničič, 2008/2009: 11, 30). Nonetheless, the problem is not so pronounced as in other former Yugoslav and even European countries. It is reflected in the absence of a special legal text to regulate exclusively this matter. We shall therefore give only a short overview of efforts aimed at tackling hooliganism in Slovenia. Violence on sports grandstands in Slovenia began to emerge on the eve of the disintegration of Yugoslavia – in summer 1989, at the football match in Ljubljana between Olimpija and Crvena zvezda (Glas, 2005: 29).

As stated, Slovenia has no separate legal text regulating violence at sports events. Therefore, the basic law to begin from in analysing measures aimed at preventing hooliganism on sports grandstands in Slovenia is the Law on Public Assembly, forbidding the organisation of gatherings or events calling for perpetration of criminal offences, or the provocation of violence, jeopardising public order or obstructing public transport (Law, 2002: 6). Police presence is obligatory during the organisation of such events. However, police presence is not obligatory under the Law on Sports (Law, 1998) which regulates this matter in an excessively narrow and modest way, without meeting the expectations of the police that require more in-depth and explicit dedication of the organiser to the implementation of measures securing participants at a sports event. For this reason, the Law on Public Assembly must be applied. One of the provisions preventing hooliganism relates to the prohibition to carry pyrotechnics which may jeopardise the safety of sportspersons, spectators or other participants (Glas, 2005: 39). Furthermore, pursuant to the Regulation on General Measures in Sports Facilities, in case of the expected arrival of organised fan groups, who are likely to seriously violate public security, the organiser must inform the competent police station and must cooperate with the police during the sports event, in order to ensure order and safety of property and participants in the event (Regulation, 2003: 16).

The most frequent criminal offences committed at sports events include the following: a light bodily injury, threat with a dangerous tool in a fight or argument, theft, gross theft, burglary, damaging other persons' objects, violent behaviour, participation in a group committing a criminal offence, preventing an official person to perform his duty, assault on an official person on duty, and participation in a group preventing an official person from performing his duty (Košir, 1997: 28). The most common misdemeanours include participation in a fight, notably callous, impudent and derogatory behaviour; an argument or other forms of misbehaviour at a public place or misbehaviour of official persons in performing their duty (Košir, 1997: 28).

4.6 MACEDONIA

The Macedonian legislator responded to hooliganism on sports grandstands at the approximately same time as other former Yugoslav countries, by adopting the Law on the Prevention of Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events in 2004 (Law, 2004/2008/2011). The Law was amended twice. The latest amendments introduced the criminal offence of violent behaviour at sports events since only misdemeanours had been envisaged up to then.

4.6.1 CRIMINAL OFFENCE

The criminal offence of violent behaviour at a sports event is committed by a person who, with the intention to commit violence, enters in an unauthorised way into the sports grounds, or by entering into the sports grounds provokes violence, physically assaults a participant, enters into the sports facility or throws onto the sports grounds or among spectators objects, pyrotechnics or other explosive or flammable substances and causes a bodily injury or jeopardises the life or health of a participant, or participates in a fight. The prison sentence envisaged for this form of the criminal offence ranges from three months to one year (Law, 2004/2008/2011: 12-a(1)). A graver form exists if the offence is committed in a group – the perpetrator is then punished by the prison sentence from six months to three years (Law, 2004/2008/2011: 12-a(2)), while the group organiser is punished by the prison sentence from one to five years (Law MK, 12-a(3)).

4.6.2 MISDEMEANOURS

The Macedonian legislator does not explicitly define misdemeanours. The provision prescribing violence and misbehaviour also envisages misdemeanours, which represents a unique method of their stipulation in the former Yugoslav region. Namely, other countries have also stipulated the types of misbehaviour, but they separately define misdemeanours. As it is therefore not necessary to enumerate the types of misbehaviour, we shall specify here only misdemeanours, which are rather numerous.

Under the Law, misdemeanours include the following:

1. possession or consumption of alcoholic beverages or drugs, and possession of pyrotechnics convenient for inflicting injuries and provoking violence by the person arriving at a sports event, during and after the event;
2. introducing or use in a sports facility of alcoholic beverages, drugs, pyrotechnics, weapons and other devices convenient for inflicting injuries or inciting violence;
3. introducing or displaying banners, flags and other objects with a text, picture, sign, and chanting songs and slogans which incite and encourage hatred or violence on the grounds of racial, national and religious affiliation or other features⁵⁴;
4. throwing objects into the part of grandstands reserved for opposing fans, which may jeopardise lives, physical integrity of persons or property;
5. lighting or throwing firecrackers;
6. burning fan equipment, flags of another state or club, and other objects;

⁵⁴ This misdemeanour also implies hate speech that characterises several criminal offences in Macedonia. It was particularly widespread in 2011 (Kambovski & Lazarova-Trajkovska, 2012: 48).

7. incitement or participation in a fight, or an assault against sportspersons, spectators, stewards, officials, organisers and other participants in a sports event;
8. conflict among participants in a sports event;
9. unauthorised entry into the part of grandstands reserved for opposing spectators;
10. damaging or destroying sports equipment and other parts of the sports facility and transportation means, during the arrival at the competition, in the course of the competition and afterwards, over the period of two hours before and two hours after the event;
11. unauthorised entry into the part of the sports facility intended for opposing fans;
12. fans' stay or their lingering in the part of the spectator arena without a ticket or a pass issued by the organiser; and
13. unauthorised entry of supporters into the area reserved for a sports event (Law, 2004/2008/2011: 3(1)).

All the above misdemeanours turn into graver forms if committed by a masked person (Law, 2004/2008/2011: 3(2)). Different fines are envisaged for all misdemeanours. The fine for misdemeanours under items 1 and 2 equals EUR 500 in the denar equivalent. The fine for other misdemeanours ranges from EUR 550 to EUR 750 in the denar equivalent. The fine for the gravest forms of misdemeanours, committed by masked persons, equals from EUR 600 to EUR 1,000 in the denar equivalent (Law, 2004/2008/2011: 13(1–3)).

4.7 GREAT BRITAIN

In regard to hooliganism at sports events, England is ranked the first in Europe, which is why its legislator responded to this issue rather early. The Football Spectators Act (FSA, 1989) was first adopted, sanctioning several types of supporters' misbehaviour. The FSA was followed by a number of regulations aimed at governing this field in more detail, such as the Football Offences and Disorder Act (FODA, 1998), the Football Disorder Act (FDA, 2000), and the Football Disorder Amendment Act (2002). Before giving a short overview of some misdemeanours, it should be noted that violence is defined in British legislation as violence against persons or property and includes threatening violence and doing anything which endangers the life of any person (FDA: 14C(1)), whereas disorder includes stirring up hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins, or against an individual as a member of such a group, as well as using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displaying any writing which is threatening, abusive or insulting (FDA: 14C(2)). Moreover, "violence" and "disorder" are not limited only to violence or disorder in connection with football, despite the title of the Act (FDA: 14C(3)).

One of the basic and oldest misdemeanours is unauthorised attendance at designated football matches, committed by a person who is not an authorised spectator, but enters or remains on premises as a spectator during a period relevant to a designated football match (FSA: 2(1)). This period will be specified somewhat later. If the person fails to prove that he had authorisation for being at a particular place, he shall be liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or a fine; both sanctions may be cumulatively pronounced (FSA: 2(2–3)). A misdemeanour relevant for this matter is stipulated by the Public Order Act (POA, 1986), if committed at the time designated for a sports event. An individual is responsible for a

misdeemeanour if he uses menacing, malicious or derogatory words, or misbehaves, or shows in writing, signs or any other visible way the content which is menacing, derogatory or malicious, which as a result upsets a person. However, there is no misdemeanour if the accused had no grounds to believe that a person in his circle will be upset over his action, or if he was present in his apartment, and if his behaviour was reasonable. The envisaged sanction includes the prison sentence up to one month or a fine up to GBP 1,000 (POA: 5). Sanctions were later tightened to the prison sentence up to six months or a fine up to GBP 50,000.00 (FODA: 8). Therefore, this misdemeanour is analogously applied when the described behaviour is manifested at a sports event. Also, the same group includes violence or threatened violence against a person or property, including the sale of tickets by an unauthorised person. The attempt to execute these acts is also punishable, including the instigation and abetting of such acts (FODA: 2). To have a misdemeanour in relation to a sports event, the perpetration must take place during the event and in a defined period before and after the event. The first act regulating this field prescribed the period of two hours before the planned start of a sports event, and one hour after its end (FSA: 1(8)). However, the 1999 Act envisages the period of 24 hours before and after the end of a sports event (FODA: 2).

The perpetration of some of the above misdemeanours implies the possibility, though not an obligation, for the court to ban the offender to attend sports events, provided the court assesses that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the measure will have a pre-emptive effect on violence or disorder at sports events (FODA: 6; FDA: 14A(4)). If the court believes that there are no grounds to pronounce a ban, it will present at the hearing its reasons for such decision. The ban may also be pronounced in respect of sports events held outside of the territory of England and Wales, in which case the person under the ban is obliged to report to the competent police station. In the first case, the measure may last at least six and at most ten years, whilst in the second case at least three and at most five years (FDA: 14F(3)). What is particularly interesting is that the ban may be pronounced also against the person for whom it has been ascertained that he provoked or contributed to violence, regardless of whether that happened in Great Britain or another country. The police chief officer submits this application to the court, according to the place of permanent or temporary residence of the person against whom the measure is to be pronounced. The court will accept his application if it believes that violence or disorder at a sports event will thus be prevented (FDA: 14B). In such case, the measure may last at least two and at most three years (FDA: 14F(5)).

After the expiry of two thirds of ban validity, the person under the ban may file with the court an application for its termination, which the court may either adopt or refuse. In making a decision, the court is guided by different criteria, starting from the person's character, his conduct during the ban, the nature of the misdemeanour, and all other circumstances relevant for the decision. If the court refuses the application, a new one may not be submitted in the period of six months beginning with the day of the refusal (FDA: 14H). However, the failure to comply with the pronounced ban represents a misdemeanour, in respect of which the prison sentence lasts up to six months and the fine equals up to GBP 50,000.00 (FDA: 14J).

The FDA contains in its final sections the list of types of behaviour considered misdemeanours if committed at or in relation to a sports event. The list was enlarged after the adoption of the FSA. Some misdemeanours include the consumption of alcohol or use of pyrotechnics;

misdeemeanours under the POA; violence against persons or property at a sports event, while arriving at or departing from the event; the use, carrying or possession of weapons or pyrotechnics, and leaving or attempted leaving of these objects in the sports facility; apprehending a person found to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs who arrives at or leaves a sports event etc. As we can see, with a specific legislative technique, the English legislator has sanctioned a number of types of behaviour relating to sports events. These solutions have doubtless helped in creating a normative basis for the struggle against hooliganism at sports events in other European countries.

4.8 ITALY

After England, Italy is considered the second country where violence at sports events poses a serious problem (Roversi, 1991). In Italy, fan violence takes place in around 10% of football matches (Ward, 2002: 454). Hooliganism in Italy is traced back to urban particularism and the division between the northern and southern part of the country (Spaij & Anderson, 2010: 571). The Italian legislator responded to violence at sports events relatively early, adopting already in 1989 the Law No. 401 (Law, 1989/2001/2003). The Law was amended several times. It prescribes different forms of punishable behaviour and applies only in cases when a graver offence has not been committed. Italy also boasts an interesting solution relating to the deprivation of liberty and detention up to 48 hours only on the grounds of suspicion that a person participated in violence at sports events (Garraffa, 2010).

One of the basic forms relates to throwing of pyrotechnics or unauthorised entry into the sports grounds by jumping over the fence. The first form of the offence is committed by a person throwing blunt or similar objects and pyrotechnics into the sports facility, and thus endangering the safety of people. The sanction envisaged includes the prison sentence from six months to three years (Law, 1989/2001/2003: 6-bis(1)). The second form of the offence is committed by a person jumping over a fence or other ground barriers, and thus jeopardising the course of the sports event and seriously endangering the safety of people. The sanction envisaged includes the prison sentence up to six months and a fine (Law, 1989/2001/2003: 6-bis(2)). An urgent procedure is envisaged for these offences (Law, 1989/2001/2003: 8bis). The possession of pyrotechnics represents a special criminal offence in this Law. It is committed by a person who possesses pyrotechnics, such as firecrackers and fireworks, or other means for making smoke or visible gas, at places where sports events are held. The sentence envisaged for this offence includes the prison sentence from three to 18 months and a fine ranging from EUR 150 to EUR 500 (Law, 1989/2001/2003: 6-ter).

A special criminal offence relates to hindering of the regular course of a sports event. The sanction includes a fine, pronounced by the prefect (Law, 1989/2001/2003: 7). In exceptional circumstances, if there is a danger that the event will be seriously hindered, or if deemed necessary, the prefect may decide to postpone the event by no longer than a month, following consultations with the Provincial Committee for Public Order and Safety (Law, 1989/2001/2003: 7).

The Italian legislator also envisages the measure banning attendance at some sports events. Thus, the police may prevent access to venues where designated sports activities are held, to

persons suspected of participating in violence against persons or property in relation to sports events, or against whom non-final judgments were pronounced over the last five years in respect of particular criminal offences (Law, 1989/2001/2003: 6(1)). The police may order these individuals to contact in person the competent police department according to the place of residence, once or several times in designated time, in the day when sports events subject to the ban are held (Law, 1989/2001/2003: 6(2)). Regular legal remedies are possible against the decision on this measure, while the Supreme Court may decide in the last instance. The ban may not last longer than three years, and may in the meantime be abolished or amended if conditions leading to its pronouncement have changed (Law, 1989/2001/2003: 6(3-5)).

As the above legal solutions did not produce satisfactory results since violence escalated again, the Italian legislator adopted in 2007 the Law on the Struggle Against Violence at Football Matches. Total 244 MPs voted in favour of the Law, 20 of them abstained and only one was against, which speaks volumes about the awareness of politicians regarding the need to urgently solve this problem (Šuput, 2010: 244). The public particularly requested amendments and tightening of the Law, following deaths of a police officer and a spectator in a conflict between the police and fans in 2007 (Scalia, 2009: 41). The Law sets up a comprehensive framework aimed at countering sports-related violence, by vesting the police and the judiciary with much greater authority and envisaging a number of new rules (Colucci, 2010: 44).

Above all, the legislator defines violent behaviour on sports grounds, by referring to the Criminal Code. It stipulates in particular the following:

1. criminal offences against life and limb;
2. sentence in accordance with Article 144;
3. coercion in accordance with Article 181;
4. arson referred to in Article 221;
5. explosion in accordance with Article 223;
6. public incitement to violence or perpetration of the criminal offence referred to in Article 259;
7. riot referred to in Article 260; and
8. violence or threat of violence against authorities or officials, referred to in Article 285 (Law, 1989/2001/2003: 3(1)).

Furthermore, violent behaviour also implies carrying or use of firearms, explosives, gunpowder and pyrotechnics at a sports event, during the arrival at and departure from the event (Law, 1989/2001/2003: 3(2)).

The Law also stipulates a ban on attending particular sports events. Namely, a competent body may ban a person from accessing, at a particular time, the defined area surrounding the event venue (forbidden zone), provided the person already attempted to participate in violent acts against individuals or property. The ban may be in force for one year at most. It is pronounced by an authority in the country of the person's residence or the country where violent acts took place, with the latter having precedence (Law, 1989/2001/2003: 4(1-3)).

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5. PREVENTIVE MEASURES TO COUNTER HOOLIGANISM AT SPORTS EVENTS

5.1. PREVENTION OF HOOLIGANISM

Over the past few decades, Serbian society has been facing an escalation of violence, which pervades all levels of life and takes different forms (violence in transport, family, public places). Violence is expressed in many ways (as murders, physical injuries to the victim, hate speech, security threats). There is violence at the workplace (mobbing), in politics, in the media, on the streets, in sports stadiums. Violence and aggression among school youth are particularly worrying, as they often involve the use of dangerous tools and weapons (Đurđević & Kolarević 2011). Aggression amongst the young sometimes turns into group violence against innocent persons and things, and violence at sports events with elements of hooliganism, the motives for which are often difficult to explain rationally.

Hooliganism is marked by extreme asociality and (or) antisociality of the offender. The potential for (tendency towards) this type of behaviour is, as a rule, detected in the early school years when it takes the form of adolescent aggressiveness and maladjustment, tendency to harass weaker persons, mostly peers, animal mutilation, and damage or destruction of things for no apparent reason. More than in other forms of antisocial behaviour, the offender has specific personal characteristics that may be a generator of potential hazards for society. Peer group association and a tendency to undertake ever more dangerous and serious forms of violence represent some of the most common characteristics of such offenders. This raises the question of an optimal social strategy for response to, and defence from, the forms of behaviour that can be characterised as hooliganism. This is particularly important with regard to fan-related violence.

5.1.1 PROBLEMS OF A REPRESSIVE APPROACH TO HOOLIGANISM

The Serbian society has proved as highly inefficient in controlling and countering hooliganism. The most common response to hooliganism is a media furore followed by politicians' fiery speeches and promises of zero tolerance. These cases are then left to "oblivion" and referred to magistrates and criminal courts, until the next time round.

The prosecution and courts are very inefficient in processing and sentencing on hooliganism offence cases. Often, court proceedings were not even launched against hooligans (especially in football), or if they were, (exceptionally), they remained pending for many years or the sentence pronounced was too mild, i.e. grossly disproportionate to the "offence". Prison sentences, when pronounced, were either conditional or around the legal minimum. Such court practice and the applied measures of criminal suppression cannot produce an efficient impact on suppressing hooliganism.

Practice shows that sanctions against hooligan offenders do not produce a sufficiently intimidating and deterrent effect. Lenient sanctions pronounced a long time after an act of violence can only be counterproductive. Research studies on the issue of efficiency of punishment of hooliganism-prone persons were conducted abroad. As research findings indicate, it is very difficult to find ways to influence the personality of repeating offenders so as to re-educate them or deter them from committing further acts of violence. Generally speaking, preventive measures aimed at re-education have not proven effective in the case of repeating, already formed violent offenders. However, the sentencing policy also appears to be inefficient. In order for punishment against this type of offenders to be effective, it needs to meet specific conditions.

As research findings suggest, a punishment can have a powerful and lasting impact on violent offenders only if the following conditions are met: 1) immediate punishment – punishment must occur as soon as possible after an act of aggression; 2) weight of the punishment – the punishment has to be strict enough to produce a positive, deterrent effect on the violent offender; 3) high probability of punishment – punishment must almost invariably follow from undesirable behaviour (Baron, et al., 1988: 197). According to Vodinelić, hooligans, like all aggressive people, are as a rule cowardly in nature. Immediate and strict punishment of even minor violent tendencies, before more serious acts of violence, including murder, are committed, may lead to a retreat of aggression due to the fear of punishment. Fast and efficient punishment of emerging violent behaviour is the best form of prevention (Vodinelić, 1981: 196).

An international research study finds that the majority of countries do not adhere to the above principles when punishing acts of aggression. The time lapse between the commitment of an act of violence and the corresponding punishment is often too long. Punishments differ greatly across countries, from too strict in some countries to excessively lenient in others. On average, there is very low probability of detection and punishment for an act of violence (Baron, et al., 1988: 198).

The knowledge and practice embodied in the contemporary approach to controlling hooliganism, particularly in sports, reveal that repressive measures are not only unable to resolve all issues relating to this particular type of delicts but that they may also be counterproductive (Gabriel, 2012: 227). It is therefore very important to understand the psychodynamic, sociological and criminological background of hooliganism and, in line therewith, to apply first protective, i.e. preventive, measures and programmes to potential violent offenders, primarily to young people at risk. It is a generally accepted view today that repressive measures alone cannot ensure longer-term success.

5.1.2. FORENSIC, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CRIMINOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GENESIS OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOUR AND HOOLIGANISM IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

The genesis and development of violent behaviour, and of hooliganism as one of its extreme forms, must not be overlooked. Violence and hooliganism do not occur in a vacuum. There are roots, fostering conditions, direct and indirect factors, both external and internal, that give rise to their occurrence, progression and escalation. If we took manifest hooliganism, i.e. an already formed personality of an aggressive violent offender, to be our starting point (position) in

analysing and initiating hooliganism prevention projects, much would be lost in terms of strategy of social action. The possibilities of influencing an already formed chronic aggressive violent offender who can be defined as a hooligan are very limited. A correct strategic approach involves detection and intervention in early stages of formation of a personality, when it becomes apparent that a person (primarily a child) has risk factors and displays forms of behaviour, which, if left untreated, could lead to escalation and formation of a violent hooliganism-prone person.

Longitudinal studies confirm the validity of such a strategic approach to hooliganism prevention. Results of research into causes of youth violence, and models of formation of violent personalities and violent behaviour, serve as objective indicators for defining adequate prevention measures and forecasting violent behaviour. Longitudinal research was conducted to see whether a child who displayed violent behaviour at an early age would continue to display such behaviour as an adolescent, that is, whether an adolescent that perpetrated criminal offences with elements of violence would continue to do so as an adult. Such research studies represent a high-quality basis for understanding and forecasting individual violent behaviour and forecasting possible trends in criminal offences with elements of violence. They are also very important for drawing up preventive strategies.

Findings of several studies have shown that violence in childhood is a sound predictor of violence in adolescence and the initial years of adulthood. In a study conducted in Sweden, two thirds of the sample including around 1000 men who displayed aggressive (violent) behaviour by the age of 26 had been registered as violent offenders from as early as the age of 10 to 13. Another proof of continuity of aggressive behaviour comes from the results of a study conducted in Columbus, Ohio, USA. From a total number of persons imprisoned by the age of 18 because they committed a criminal offence with elements of violence, 59% were imprisoned again as adults, while 42% committed a graver act of violence, such as a murder, serious physical injuries and rape (Đurđević & Kolarević, 2011).

5.1.3. RISK FACTORS FOR VIOLENT BEHAVIOUR IN THE PERSONALITY FORMATION PROCESS

The formation of personal characteristics of a child in early school years, which may predispose such a child towards aggressive violent behaviour in the period of adolescence, is influenced by a whole range of factors that may be personal and/or conditioned by family influences and/or an unfavourable social environment, or a combination of all or some of the above in different variations and intensity.

Individual and personal risk factors

Numerous personal characteristics displayed from an earliest age are linked with violent behaviour of the young. For instance, unbridled temperament formed in childhood is associated with aggressive behaviour in adolescence. Initiation and encouragement of aggressive behaviour in early childhood implies a great risk for later violent behaviour during adolescence (Kashani, et al. 1999: 201).

Empirical evidence and studies indicate that early emotional and behavioural disorders have an impact on delinquent behaviour in later stages of life. They can be predictors of (a forecast basis for) subsequent delinquency and/or use of drugs. Predictors from this group include: maladjusted behaviour in childhood (behavioural problems), attention difficulties, hyperactivity in childhood, depression, defiance and confrontation with authorities. If these problems manifested in childhood are not treated with due attention and no prophylactic measures are taken, they will tend to escalate in the period of adolescence (Sullivan, 2006: 293–294).

Young people with violent behaviour patterns have been perceived to have cognitive and mental issues. Violent adolescents display a lower level of moral reasoning and find it more difficult to resolve everyday problems compared to non-aggressive juveniles. Researchers also noted a lower verbal IQ score among aggressive youth. Further, violent juveniles displayed more pronounced hostile attributional biases compared to non-criminal peers. Due to such biases, adolescents misinterpret other people's behaviour as aggressive (threatening), though in reality such behaviour is not at all hostile. The American Psychiatric Association has concluded that the behaviour of aggressive young people may most often be attributed to one of the following behavioural disorders: parent-child relationship disorders; attention disorders (deficit); hyperactivity (Hyperactivity Disorder – ADHD), and depression disorders (Kashani, et al., 1999: 201).

In addition to psychological risk factors contributing to the emergence of youth aggression, there are also biological risk factors, that is biological predispositions for violent behaviour (low serotonin activity, low cortisol levels, high testosterone levels, minor physical deformities, brain damage, perinatal damage, lack of certain vitamins etc.) which in adverse life circumstances become manifest especially within the psychodynamics of the parent-child relationship (Kashani, et al., 1999: 201). Biological predispositions will not be given further attention in this paper.

Family as a risk factor

A number of family factors are associated with youth violence. Particularly important variables include: family history of criminal behaviour, presence of violence, parental substance abuse, poor organisation within the family, conflicts within the family. The problem is that parents of aggressive children encourage and support such behaviour and do not guide their children towards prosocial conduct. Too strict family discipline and poor parental supervision are connected with aggressive behaviour of the young. Families of aggressive children are characterised by a lack of warmth, poor cohesion and a high degree of marital conflicts (Kashani, et al., 1999: 202).

Problematic families appear as one of the most potent risk factors for youth violence. Many authors argue that a lack of parental supervision over children is a powerful predictor of violent behaviour and juvenile delinquency. In addition, broken homes, lack of proper parenting skills, inconsistent behaviour (punishment) and excessive permissiveness also imply an increased risk of juvenile delinquency (Sullivan, 2006: 294).

Family violence is a particularly important psycho-social risk factor. Children who suffered parental violence are more prone to criminal behaviour than children who did not. Adolescents who grew up in very violent families (spousal violence, violence against children) tend to be more violent than juvenile delinquents who grew up in families where violence was less pronounced. This is due to accumulated frustrations and acquired models of conduct (Kashani, et al. 1999: 202–203; Farmer, et al., 2007: 199; Purcel & Arrigo, cited in: Đurđević, et al., 2012).

Any serious attempt at primary prevention of juvenile violence requires family cooperation and participation. There are numerous preventive programmes and family therapies which entail family participation in order to resolve problems relating to youth aggression and violence (Sullivan, 2006: 304). However, the key problem is that parents are most often not ready to participate in such prevention programmes, are reluctant to admit there is a problem or display a lack of concern.

School as a risk factor

Several factors making up the school environment are related with youth aggression, including in particular strict and inflexible rules of conduct, hostile teacher attitude and poor organisation of work within the class. The young in overcrowded schools are more aggressive towards their peers compared to the young in schools that are not overcrowded. Also, as aggressive children tend to interrupt classroom work more often than their non-aggressive peers, this can be an important indicator of pupils with problematic behaviour who should be included in preventive activities (Kashani, et al. 1999: 203).

Peers as a risk factor

Association with crime- and aggression-prone juveniles is an important predictor of future criminal behaviour of adolescents and of future abuse of alcohol and drugs (Sullivan, 2006: 295). Children and adolescents who display verbally and physically aggressive behaviour are not accepted by the prosocial young. For this reason, aggressive youths have a tendency to gravitate towards similar peers, further encouraging one another's aggressiveness. Aggressive adolescents display less aggressiveness when in a group of non-aggressive peers, but once they are back in the group of aggressive peers, they regress to aggressive models of conduct that are familiar to them (Kashani, et al., 1999: 203; Farmer, et al., 2007: 199).

Other social risk factors

Numerous research studies point to other community-related variables that are associated with juvenile violence. This refers primarily to the availability of weapons, drugs and alcohol. Juveniles in possession of weapons perpetrate more violent offences (whether involving the use of weapons or not) compared to juveniles who do not carry weapons. Juvenile delinquents who use drugs commit more acts of violence than their peers who are also crime-prone but do not use drugs. In addition, the cultural level of the community and neighbourhood characterised by poverty, disorganisation, general violence and a low sense of belonging to the local community, also contribute to an expansion of juvenile delinquency (Kashani, et al., 1999: 203).

In addition, a number of research studies have shown that the *media* may also have a negative effect, as media reporting on juvenile aggression contributes (leads) to further aggressive behaviour within this population (Kashani, et al. 1999: 203).

5.1.4. MOTIVATION FOR HOOLIGANISM

The motives for hooligan behaviour are disproportionate to its cause. For this reason, scholarly literature labels them as "inadequate" motives for a criminal offence. The term "inadequate motive for a criminal offence," first introduced by Soviet criminologists, means that the alleged or declared motive is in direct contradiction to the gravity of the committed criminal offence (Kudryavtsev, et al., 1981: 160). Here, the key dynamising factor are the subliminal processes that most often stem from a neurotic or psychopathic structure of personality, characterised by a high degree of egocentrism and aggressiveness. The motives for criminal offences perpetrated by violent offenders, i.e. hooligans, are only a subtype of inadequate motives for criminal offences. This means that not all inadequate motives for criminal offences belong to the group of hooligan motives. There are inadequate motives for criminal offences that cannot be classified as hooligan (violent) motives, but belong to other types of (primarily) aggressive criminal behaviour.⁵⁵

When it comes to hooligan (violent) motives as a subsection of inadequate motives, scholars underline the following: "As criminological, judicial and psychological literature points out, a lack of motive or the presence of inadequate motives for violent behaviour can be attributed to the fact that the assumptions underlying the elements of such motives do not, in certain cases, appear as external incentives and stimuli as much as internal states of mind and tendencies that arise from a twisted system of moral values and attitudes, while, fundamentally, they represent an attempt to use any means available (including criminal behaviour) to assert oneself in one's own eyes and in the eyes of other people. Poverty and a deformed social and psychological content of the personality, combined with failure to predict the possible consequences, leads these persons to commit violent offences as a means of demonstrating their power to others etc. Inadequate motives, as a rule (*but not exclusively so – comment BS*), occur in relation to violent behaviour and hooliganism delicts. These motives do not occur in relation to property criminal offences (Kudryavtsev, et al., 1981: 71–72)".

It is important, from both a theoretical and a practical point of view, to clarify the question of motive in the case of murder resulting from hooligan behaviour (e.g. as part of fan violence). Apart from considerations on whether it is acceptable and credible that hooligan motives (for murder and violent behaviour) are a subsection of inadequate motives, and are hence not entirely

⁵⁵ Criminal and psychological literature differentiates between two typical ways of manifesting antisocial aggression: a) uncontrolled aggression; and b) repressed aggression (Füllgrabe, 1983: 115). The former is constantly manifested in delinquent behaviour as a response to insignificant causes. It is typical of violent persons (hooligans) and implies some sort of inadequate motives. The latter kind of aggression relates to the suppression of aggressive tendencies in conflict situations. If such person is exposed to long-lasting frustration and does not vent negative emotions through socially acceptable forms of behaviour, aggressive charge will accumulate. In a situation of an insignificant cause, this type of person may manifest aggressive behaviour and commit a grave criminal offence (e.g. a murder) also against an innocent person (phenomenon: "the straw that broke the camel's back"). Such murder takes place over an insignificant cause, i.e. the offence is committed due to inadequate motives, but still this is not a hooligan murder. The types of persons committing such murders and the motivational process of criminal behaviour are entirely different than in the case of perpetrators of hooligan murders.

or at all understood by the offender, the question arises as to the content and the true nature of such motives. Answering this question has multiple significance, as it would enable legal classification of these criminal offences (in specific cases), individualisation of punishment, implementation of resocialisation treatments and prevention of emerging aggressiveness (primarily among the young).

A group of authors believe that motives for murder by callous violent behaviour (and for violent behaviour in general) are one-directional and that there is never a bundle of motives at work. There are differences with regard to the elements of such motives. Thus, Vukašin Pešić mentions *mischievousness* as a frequent murder motive that guides perpetrators of this criminal offence. He adds that alcoholism is a significant factor in the genesis of the motivational process that leads to the commitment of murder (Pešić, 1972: 114–115). Similarly to Pešić, a number of Soviet authors have pointed out that the key motive for this type of murder and hooliganism in general is recklessness, raucousness, dissolution (*ozorcmbo* in Russian). These motives are often based on a wish to “have fun”, to play a “bad joke,” “to be nitpicking about someone,” “to rebel,” “to mock” etc. (Danyshin: 1971: 87). Another group of authors believes that hooligan motives are based on hatred, revenge, jealousy (Tataruchin: 1974: 97). A third group of authors hold that motives for hooliganism are not single, but multifaceted. They have different manifestations in different situations. Hooligan motives are not based on a single element (in the case of murder and violent behaviour in general) but as a rule on a bundle of underlying motives. Hooligan motives are many-sided and, in addition to recklessness, include: display of disregard for the personal dignity of man and his work, egotism, wish to have power over others, arrogance, display of fearlessness and physical strength etc. (Tuzov: 1982: 119). In addition, hooligan motives, often met in the case of extreme football fans, also have a “systemic background”, which means that violence is a means for building up positions in an environment of offenders, or may, on the other hand, be aimed at achieving economic benefits (Đurđević & Kolarević 2011), as in the case of drugs peddling among the fan population.

Judicial practice and criminal and psychological research⁵⁶ indisputably show that there is no isolated hooligan motive and that, in practice, there is often a bundle of motives, i.e. several motives which simultaneously encourage aggressive behaviour of the offender. Hooligan motives represent a group of related motives, and not an individualised motive. In order to understand the behaviour of this type of delinquents, it is not enough to consider the issue of motives alone, because they usually differ in each specific case (though they form the same group). In determining the motivational process (motive formation process) and the motive (as a result of such process) for this type of criminal offences (murder by callous violent behaviour, and violent behaviour as the basic criminal offence), we should go a step back to consider the motivational process⁵⁷, that is, the needs⁵⁸ that underlie it. The needs are what differentiates this

⁵⁶ Based on a sample of surveyed juvenile hooligans, it was determined that their actions were motivated by the following: proving prestige – 36%; impacting on the “society” – 30%; showing disrespect to persons present – 34%. Regardless of different motives, all of them aimed to assert themselves, to a smaller or larger degree. Tuzov, A.P, op.cit, p. 117.

⁵⁷ Under the leading theories of personality, interpreting an offender personality entails looking for the *early* triggers of *current* behaviour, regardless of whether this implies a special organisation of instincts, traumas, early learning, creating the first habits, frustration etc. Despite this, the early causes of current behaviour are most often inaccessible to the respondent’s consciousness – they are *unconscious* and their detection requires the application of special methods and researcher’s great caution during interpretation (Popović, 1965: 539).

criminal offence in criminological and psychological terms from all other criminal offences. These criminal offences (murder by violent behaviour, and violent behaviour) are characterised by the offender's *need for self-assertion* before himself and/or others, or the need to "control the situation", as some contemporary authors argue.

In the case of these criminal offences, it is clear how the need for self-assertion within a specific personality structure leads to the formation of specific motives for hooligan (violent) behaviour. A specific feature of this need for self-assertion is that the offender is most often not aware of it. Due to the antisocial, and often psychopathic composition of the personality of the offender, this need is actualised and embodied in a nihilistic, destructive, aggressive, sadistic attitude of the offender towards social values, i.e. persons and things (in case of the basic form of violent behaviour). The need for self-assertion in a person with a negative social orientation is fulfilled in an antisocial aggressive way through the formation of different motives (that is, through transformation into different motives) which make up the group of so-called hooligan motives. These can include the motives of achieving sadistic pleasure in the suffering of others, of proving one's strength and courage, of showing off one's personality and authority, of protecting one's interests etc.

A distinctive feature of the motivational process (motive formation process) in the case of murder by callous violent behaviour is a lack of proportion between the cause for murder and the murder itself, that is, a lack of an adequate cause. For this reason, certain authors erroneously argue that such murders lack a motive. *This view is faulty as its advocates identify (equalise) the lack of cause for murder with the lack of motive for murder.* However, persons committing this type of murder have identifiable motives, which, as a rule, are inadequate. A characteristic of the victimological relationship in this type of murder is that the victim's behaviour did not contribute (or did not significantly contribute) to the reaching (forming) of the decision to commit murder. Therefore, there is no contribution by the victim⁵⁹, or such contribution is small and negligible relative to the consequences of the criminal offence. If this is not the case, a murder cannot be classified as a murder by callous violent behaviour. The dominant factor for this criminal offence lies, therefore, not in the external circumstances of the criminal offence, i.e. in the presence and culmination of conflict between the offender and the victim, but solely in the personality of the offender and the specificity of his, as a rule, psychopathic structure.

The characteristics of the motivational process leading to the criminal offence of murder for hooligan motives include⁶⁰: 1) The presence of the so-called *short motivations relative to the*

⁵⁸ A need represents potential or actual existence of indispensability in a person to undertake an activity (a personally dynamising factor), caused by social, psychological or biological factors, with social factors being particularly important in its formation, manifestation and manner of fulfilment.

⁵⁹ In this category of cases, a life was lost just because the offender and the victim had a physical encounter. Had they missed each other, the offence would not have happened. Before that, the victim was in no way related to the offender. The victim's personality played no role in the genesis of the criminal offence. There is no genesis of victim, but only the genesis of crime. Anyone may become a victim and it was mere coincidence that the person was found on the spot (Vodinić-Simić, 1968: 57).

⁶⁰ According to Danyshin, such offences feature the following motives: hooligan motives are characterised by sudden appearance and the speed of formation. A hooligan commits a criminal offence unexpectedly, often with no preparation. This is the essence of the first feature of hooligan motives. The second characteristic is reflected in the obvious non-existence of a cause or its disproportion with the committed act. Such hooligan motives may be dubbed

committed criminal offence (the specific murder was not planned in advance, i.e. the decision to commit murder was made instantaneously, within a conflict situation – it may happen that only the internal conflict is dominant, without any external conflict with the victim); 2) *The presence of motivational dispositions, as a lasting tendency of the personality motivational structure, towards the commitment of violent delicts in general.* Independently from the so-called short motivations relative to a specific criminal offence, these offenders frequently have a lasting disposition towards the commitment of hooligan (violent) delicts. They are both mentally and physically ready to commit such delicts, to embrace violence and not only use every opportunity for violence, but also to actively seek it (popularly termed as “brawlers”). Due to their motivational dispositions for the commitment of violent offences, the most extreme of such offenders carry with them various pieces of weaponry (boxer knives, switchblades, lock knives, hitting slings etc.); 3) *Predominance of personal motives (dispositional, habitual motivations),* i.e. motives that comprise the structure of the personality and are based on an antisocial and aggressive mindset. Such motives are not situationally conditioned in response to adverse external circumstances of the offence, or a provocation by the victim, or an earlier offender-victim relationship; 4) *The state of inebriation at the time of commitment of this criminal offence has an extremely stimulating effect on the murderer’s personality motivational structure.* The largest number of murders by callous violent behaviour (and hooligan offences in general) are committed in the state of inebriation⁶¹. 5) *The motives for these criminal offences are drivers of non-instrumental aggression.*⁶²

Given that every murder is characterised by violence and that murder, as a rule, is an act of callous violence, it is necessary to analyse the psychological drivers of the personality of the murderer in each specific case. If the offender was driven by motives that have the legal elements of another form of murder, this will not be labelled as murder by callous violent behaviour but as another type of murder (e.g. murder for revenge, jealousy, mercenary motives). If there is a proportion between the cause and the motive for a murder and if there are dynamics of prior disrupted offender-victim relations, that is, if there is a proportion and a mutual relationship between the genesis of the crime and the genesis of the victim which culminated in a

“insignificant”. Hooligan criminal offences are most often perpetrated over an insignificant cause or the non-existence of cause. A hooligan’s victim is accidental. In the majority of cases, they hooligan had nothing in common with the victim and the victim gave no serious cause for violence. In the majority of cases, the hooligan did not even know his victim. The victim just “came by” or “came into his sight”, which is sufficient for a hooligan to instigate violence. Therefore, hooligan actions may be characterised as an inadequate response. The third characteristic of hooligan motives consists of the relative superficiality of motivation of hooligan actions. As it is known, any wilful action results from weighing up the pros and cons of a particular act. A hooligan is fully aware of the damaging consequences of his actions, but this awareness does not activate volitional processes which could hinder the volitional processes for the perpetration of an act. (Danyshin I. N, op. cit, p 92).

⁶¹ Disorders of the personality structure, caused by alcohol abuse, result in criminal disposition of such person. This category of offenders is short-tempered. Under the impact of alcohol, strong uncontrolled emotions erupt with elementary force, resembling a thunderbolt or an earthquake. Affective tension is manifested under the influence of alcohol. Criminologists call such manifestation the explosive diathesis (inclination, disposition). Vodinelić Vladimir-Simić Ilija, Ubistva u Beogradu i alkohol (*Murders in Belgrade and Alcohol*), "13 maj", 4/1968, p. 57.

⁶² Heckhausen’s categorisation of aggression into reactive and spontaneous is noteworthy. Spontaneous aggression does not appear as a reaction to a concrete situation. It emerges from the desire to dominate and torture another person, which characterises this type of criminal offences. Reactive aggression emerges as a response to a concrete criminogenic situation and is manifested, for instance, in affective criminal offences (Heckhausen, 1980: 367).

murder, then the criminal law qualification of murder by callous violent behaviour cannot be applied, even if such murder has all the outward trappings of a murder by violent behaviour.

5.1.5. THE IMPACT OF ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION AND PEER GROUP ASSOCIATION OF JUVENILES ON VIOLENT BEHAVIOUR

Alcohol encourages violence, i.e. there is a firm relationship between alcohol and violence. This relationship plays out at a *psycho-pharmacological* level, as alcohol intoxication directly incites violence, and at a *psychological* level, as alcohol frees people from “restraints” imposed by socially accepted models of behaviour. Alcohol also affects the *cognitive* aspect of a personality, as it hinders reasoning and understanding of possible consequence of aggressive behaviour etc.

A number of recent research studies point to intercausality of alcohol and violent behaviour of young people. One research study sets out that alcohol consumption is associated with the gravest criminal offences committed by juveniles within the American legal system (murders, rapes, grave physical injuries to the victim). Early alcohol consumption is a predictor (signal) of later criminal and aggressive behaviour. Furthermore, alcohol use by juvenile delinquents is one of the strongest predictors of recidivism (Mouttapa, et al., 2010: 72). Another study indicates that there is intercausality between alcohol and violent crime. Young people who make abundant use of alcohol are more likely to start committing grave violent offences than the young from the control group who did not use alcohol or used it in limited quantities. Early manifestations of violence are a solid predictor of later alcohol consumption and further escalation of violence. This connection is particularly visible in the period from 15 to 19 years of age, and persists at a later age. On the other hand, research findings show that early aggression (e.g. group fights, violence against teachers, use of cold weapons and firearms) represents a solid predictor of excessive alcohol consumption at a later age, just as early alcohol consumption is a predictor of violent behaviour at a later age (Maldonado-Molina, et al., 2011: 100). It is important to note that a higher level of aggression was recorded for adolescents who started using alcohol at an earlier age. For juveniles already prone to aggression, intoxication has an *amplifying (additional) effect* on aggressive behaviour (Kashani, et al., 1999: 203).

Also important are the findings of a study detecting a connection between excessive alcohol consumption, emotion of anger (rage) expressed at the time of commitment of criminal offences and psychological identification of juvenile delinquents with the criminal violent gang they belonged to. The expression of a powerful emotion of rage in the state of inebriation is independent from the criminal offence which the juveniles committed in such state of mind. Anger and identification with members of criminal peer groups are linked with (regular) excessive alcohol consumption. The anger – alcohol – gang relation was also noticed for criminal groups of adult offenders in research studies carried out worldwide (Mouttapa, et al., 2010: 72, 77).

What violence-prone groups of juveniles and extreme fan groups have in common is a sense of belonging to a group, adherence to the same system of values, the cult of violence and strong negative emotions towards those who are different, all further spiked by excessive alcohol consumption. Peer group association of aggressive juveniles waters down the sense of responsibility, making them ready to commit criminal offences they would be reluctant to

commit outside the group. Therefore, it is very important that police should prevent any attempts to bring alcohol into the stadium before the game. They should also not allow obviously intoxicated fans to be present at the game.

Young people who tend towards excessive alcohol consumption and criminal peer group association have been found to identify with juvenile hooligan gangs in two ways: a) one type of adolescents socially participate in the juvenile delinquent gang that they identify with, and b) the other type of adolescents are not actual members of a criminal gang, but only identify with it on a psychological level, regardless of the extent to which they are actually involved with that criminal peer group. It should also be noted that adolescents who are not actual criminal gang members (not members at all or are members but not in full capacity) nevertheless identify with the “gang member” peer group and adopt some of the typical gang member characteristics, e.g. aggressive behaviour, alcohol and drug use (Mouttapa, et al., 2010: 72).

Another important finding of the above study is that psychological identification with a gang does not automatically mean actual gang membership. It is therefore important to identify the young people who idealise gangs, but have not yet become gang members, and influence them by offering other identification models and reducing alcohol consumption (Mouttapa, et al., 2010: 79).

These findings are very significant for designing programmes for the prevention of violence by extreme fans. It is important to recognise (identify) the fans who are not members of the extreme core and those who are merely supporters, and to influence such persons through prevention projects by offering non-criminal role models who can have authority for such persons and may encourage psychological identification. This should go hand in hand with a vigorous campaign against the consumption of alcohol and other addictive substances. Such fans would thus be separated (distanced) from the extreme fans, which would pre-empt their further criminalisation and escalation of aggression.

It is also important to mention that the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, 2004, noted the great preventive significance of treating drug and alcohol addictions in order to prevent serious aggressive crime within criminal groups. Results show that successful treatment of such persons dramatically reduces criminal activity in adolescence (Mouttapa, et al., 2010: 78).

Moreover, just as constant use of alcohol by juveniles is a strong predictor of violent behaviour, so is the non-use of alcohol a strong protective factor from violent behaviour. Therefore, if juvenile delinquents quit alcohol consumption, this is a strong predictor of discontinuation of violent behaviour. Efforts on preventing alcohol use can have a significant impact on reducing violent delinquency. It is therefore very important to centre preventive interventions on discontinuing alcohol use from an early age. Programmes of alcohol use prevention should start as early as elementary school and early adolescence, and should involve the participation of schools, parents and the community (Maldonado-Molina, et al., 2011: 107–109).

5.2. YOUTH-ORIENTED PREVENTION PROGRAMMES

5.2.1. ABOUT YOUTH-ORIENTED PROGRAMMES FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOUR (HOOLIGANISM) IN GENERAL

There is a view in criminology that already formed violent offenders are not easily influenced by misdemeanour and criminal sentences. In particular, lenient sentences have proven to be ineffective for this type of offenders. Therefore, emphasis is placed on methods for recognising early signs of aggression in pre-school and school children and on diagnosing the conditions and causes that lead to the formation of a violent offender personality. The next step is to implement prevention programmes in order to influence such juveniles or the entire population of juveniles and pre-empt more serious forms of violent behaviour which, in turn, could produce a whole range of negative social consequences and call for the treatment of offenders within the system of misdemeanour and criminal liability (which has already proven to be ineffective).

Prevention of violent behaviour is a very serious problem which calls for a systemic and multidimensional approach. This encompasses the drawing up and implementation of a wide range of programmes for the prevention of juvenile delinquency in general, juvenile violent criminality and alcohol consumption, as violent behaviour is often a consequence of excessive alcohol use. Prevention of violence in a society should start with the adoption of an “umbrella” strategy that would round off and set the foundations for a comprehensive system and approach to suppressing this type of crime. This comprehensive strategy should then branch out into individual prevention strategies and programmes for specific forms of violence. Let us mention here an opinion by Đurđević & Kolarević that without a national strategy for countering violence a state cannot be a legitimate rule of law state. Violence cannot be considered segmentally (family violence, school violence etc.) It is necessary to embrace a comprehensive approach to violence, with specific prevention programmes directed at specific types of violence. A person prone to violence will manifest violent behaviour in school as well as at a football game and in a family context. Also, the problem of violence cannot be solved in the school alone, without the participation of centres for social work, family and the entire community (Đurđević & Kolarević, 2011). Similarly, the problem of violence cannot be resolved only within the narrow framework of a specific area of social life in which violence occurred at a given moment or in which violence was detected (registered) in a given case by social control institutions. A person with the potential for aggressive, violent behaviour will behave in line with the adopted models of resolving everyday problems and/or conflict situations in family, transport, at work, in the sports stadium, in a cafe. The only question is at what point and in which aspect (context) of life such person’s aggressive and violent manner of conduct (living) will be registered by social control institutions. Depending on this, we will speak of a violent offender in transport, violent offender in a family, a sports hooligan. For this reason, we believe that a partial approach to violence in a community has doubtful value, as it involves the adoption of separate (mutually independent) strategies for countering family-related violence, violence at sports events etc. without so much as even mentioning many other aspects of life in which violence is present, such as violence in the media, in public appearance, violence in transport. Namely, this is one and the same type of personality which is manifested in different areas of social life depending on the specificities of a given situation and given circumstances. The conditions that have contributed to the forming of such violent personality are the same, which is of particular importance for prevention projects.

The above approach, which we embrace in this paper, is not only theoretically significant, but also points to possible practical strategies for a comprehensive response to violence in a society, offering at least three practical solutions. First, the problem of *violence in a society needs to be treated comprehensively and systematically* on the basis of an *umbrella strategy*, which should then branch into measures of prevention and adequate suppression depending on the specificities of the aspect of social life in which violence occurred, specificities of a violent offender's personality and available potentials for prevention. In this way, we do not lose sight of the whole, while, at the same time, it is easier to achieve inter-sectoral synchronisation and exchange of information and experiences (analysis of good and bad practice), saving up on resources, funds etc. The prevention of violent behaviour also involves an integrated approach of different ministries and institutions of a society: schools, centres for social work, sports associations and clubs, police, media etc. The programmes for the prevention of violence provide an opportunity for participation and cooperation of state institutions and civil society organisations on the same task, but at different levels, starting from the government and ministries down to schools, neighbourhoods, sports clubs and individuals. Also significant here is the financing and implementation of different projects, at different levels, involving the participation of different legal entities, implementation of projects covering different areas (types of problems) and different territories. In connection therewith, in addition to "umbrella prevention programmes" which it organises and implements directly, the state could also launch tenders for different prevention programmes to which stakeholders could apply (legal entities and natural persons). In this way, spare social potential could be put to use and creativity encouraged (primarily of young and unemployed professionals).

Secondly, *prevention measures should be directed at the core of the problem*, which means: a) causes of violence in a society at large; and b) causes of formation and development of aggressive personalities. If strategies and prevention programmes are directed only at forms of social relations in which violence has been manifested (family violence, violence at sports events etc.), a faulty strategic approach is in place, as the attention of institutions and the society focuses only on consequences, repercussions, forms of manifestation of violence, and not on its causes. It is the same causes that lead to manifestations of violence in different social situations (family, transport, sport etc.). Generally speaking, these include the relations within a society and the social attitude to violence. Individually speaking, these are specific types of violent offenders' personalities. Adoption of independent and unrelated strategies and programmes for the prevention of violence in specific areas obscures the deeper social roots of violence and the relations and conditions conducive to violence and the forming of violent personalities. Individual prevention programmes cannot be efficient enough as they do not address the core (whole) of the problem, and, at the same time, often involve futile spending of social resources since, because of their partial approach, they fail to deliver the desired results. In part, such a segmented approach to violence prevention stems from the division of society into different sectors, ministries, budget financing items etc. On the other hand, the problem is that the "contemporary" civilisation, most globally speaking, is based on a "class essence", a market organisation of the society which fundamentally produces, encourages and tolerates violence (market economy, unrestrained social competition, freedom of the media based on market principles which encourage sensationalism, increasing unscrupulous wealth accumulation by a

minority and increasing impoverishment of a majority, unemployment, promotion of hedonism etc.).

Third, the theoretical view that the same circumstances and causes, and the same types of personality, produce aggression and violence in different aspects of life, can encourage the setting up of databases of information useful for a strategic and integrated approach to preventive and repressive treatment of violence in a society. For instance, the forming of a single computer database of registered violent offenders that would include data on charges filed by the police for violence of any type, and misdemeanour and criminal liability of the offenders, would enable a more realistic insight into this population of delinquents (but also into the work of authorities). In this way, it could be seen that a registered family violence offender behaves in the same way (aggressively) in transport and in the sports stadium etc. It would also become apparent that several charges for violence of different types were filed against one and the same person, while no misdemeanour or criminal sentences were issued (which in Serbia is a rule when it comes to football hooligans). This would call for a deeper investigation into and oversight of work of the police and judicial authorities relating to specific cases or individuals (registered violent offenders). A single database would make it easier to monitor the genesis of escalation of aggressive personality types. It would also enable the taking of adequate prevention measures in earlier stages of manifestation of violence or allow for the choice of repressive measures to be more attuned to the displayed criminal potential.

Programmes for violence prevention should be based on previous research and analyses that help identify the problem. On this basis, the following will be done:

- problem definition (identification of the size of the problem and the different forms of its manifestation);
- identification of the nature and cause of violence in a specific area;
- definition of risk factors, from the individual to the social level (criminogenic and victimogenic), and protective factors consistent with the risk identification model;
- clear definition of goals and objects based on an interdisciplinary analysis of the problem and its scope;
- proposal of measures (specific measures, implementation based on the goals and object of interventions, target population);
- setting up of a logistical and administrative infrastructure;
- results assessment (evaluation-result, reduction in violent criminal offences). (Đurđević & Kolarević, 2011).

The awareness that motives for violent behaviour (hooliganism) have their deep roots in the satisfaction of the need for self-assertion and control can be significant in the process of drawing up strategies and programmes for the prevention of sports-related violent juvenile delinquency. It is necessary to come up with ways for redirecting and channelling the need for self-assertion in a socially acceptable direction. The formula which could form the basis for a strategy of successful prevention of this type of delicts is early recognition of aggressive behaviour in violence-prone individuals (by applying tests and indicators for early recognition of aggression in school youth), followed by pedagogical, social and psychological channelling of their need for self-assertion towards an expression of personality (and even aggression) in a socially permissible direction

through inclusion in sports clubs and heightened supervision by the community (school, social care institution, parents, police department for the prevention of juvenile delinquency, etc). There is a successful practice in some countries where these categories of persons are included in sports associations (e.g. martial arts) under the auspices or control of the police or other organised social institutions or projects.

There are numerous classifications of programmes for the prevention of violent delinquency. Prevention programmes aimed at countering violent behaviour may target: a) *Potential victims* (through informing the public via mass media about these criminal offences, criminological and socio-psychological traits of violent offenders, their distinctive features, ways to avoid conflict situations and optimal behaviour in a high risk situation, optimal behaviour in case of a conflict between sports fans and the police etc.); b) *Potential delinquents*, that is persons with a history of aggressive delinquency misdemeanours and criminal offences. Knowledge of typical socio-psychological and criminological features of this type of delinquents is significant for the implementation of prevention measures and programmes. It is particularly important to apply measures of social (criminological) prevention towards juveniles who display first symptoms of aggressive, violent and deviant behaviour; c) *Social environment* to which violent offenders most often belong (research shows that violent offenders most often come from specific and recognisable families)⁶³; d) *Increase in the efficiency of preventive and repressive activity of police and judicial authorities*, and of the measures they implement (more efficient police supervision, better police work on the sector and cooperation with citizens at the local community level during preparations for high-risk football matches etc.).

For instance, Danyshin classified all preventive measures aimed at countering hooliganism into: a) organisational measures (organisation of judicial and operational activity, coordination of activities of all authorities in contact with such delicts); b) general supervisory measures; c) operational measures (increased efficiency of the police and services dealing with these offences, e.g. records of offenders and increased supervision over them, increased supervision of places where such persons gather); d) educational and informational measures aimed at informing citizens about these offences, offenders' traits and optimal behaviour in critical situations; e) judicial measures, i.e. increased efficiency of court proceedings in these cases (Danyshin, 154).

Depending on the target group of prevention measures, preventive programmes may be:

- Universal (general), directed at the population at large without consideration of individual risks; e.g. programmes of prevention of violence through school programmes and curricula targeting all pupils or children of a certain age, but also media campaigns targeting the community.

⁶³ Perpetrators of violent criminal offences usually come from families of a very low educational and qualification background; their parents' professional status is very low; their families' economic status is very low; there are many alcohol-addicted and an above-average degree of mentally impaired members of their families; the offenders' educational and professional level is very low; many of them are unemployed; many of them come from incomplete and destroyed families, particularly those without the father; a large percentage of offenders are alcoholics or are about to become alcoholics; there are many tramps, idlers and persons with other symptoms of sociopathic and asocial behaviour; there is an above-average percentage of psychopaths and neurotics among them.

- Programmes targeting potential offenders, students who have some of the risk factors for violence. An example of such programmes is parental education (e.g. single parents).
- Programmes targeting persons already registered as having committed an act of violence or as being victims of violence.

Another type of programmes includes programmes targeting potential victims. These programmes aim to mitigate the victimogenous determinants that may result in a person becoming a victim of violence and to educate the population at large about how to behave in conflict situations in order to avert violence or in order to reduce the violent potential of the offender (Tolan, cited in: Đurđević & Kolarević, 2011).

5.2.2. PROGRAMMES FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE AMONG SCHOOL YOUTH

Programmes for the prevention of violence among school youth form a vital part of efforts to prevent violent behaviour in general and fan violence at sports events in particular. Such programmes may have a significant impact on risk factors at play during the process of formation of a juvenile's personality. Within the school system, certain weak points resulting from family upbringing can be eliminated (to a certain extent) on condition that the school places emphasis not only on educating its pupils, but also on providing them with proper upbringing. And while schools and the school system can, on the one hand, influence the risks leading to violent behaviour, on the other hand they may even generate risks contributing to a sense of resignation, frustration and rejection felt by certain categories of pupils, which may lead to further degradation of children and adolescents at risk and their turning to the streets, bad company, juvenile delinquency and violence.

As an institution, the school must be committed to violence prevention and to ensuring the safety of its pupils. The school and its pupils are potential, possible and realistic targets of many criminal aspirations and are attractive for criminals of different profiles aiming to commit a whole range of criminal offences. They are therefore exposed to different security risks (terrorist attacks, child kidnapping, drug peddling, paedophilia and other sexual deviations, computer crime, property crime, safety issues relating to transport in the vicinity of the school etc.). A school is exposed to criminal risks not only from the outside but also from the inside, as safety risks, threats and criminal offences may happen within the school as well (computer crime, sexual offences with pupils and school staff as offenders, thefts, property damage, violence of different sorts, corruption, blackmail, threats and even murders). The school system and each individual school need to tackle all of the above risks; therefore, a functional system of internal and external self-protection and control must be in place. In order for a school to be able to achieve and maintain an adequate security system, it must cooperate with the local community, police and other institutions of the state and society.

Therefore, violence prevention programmes in schools are only a narrow segment of security management within the school. Measures and programmes for violence prevention within schools can be divided into those directed at preventing violence in the school itself or in the facilities belonging to the school, and those directed at identifying pupils at risk (of becoming either victims or violent offenders) and taking measures to help them overcome an adverse

situation or a particular stage of personality development. Scholars point out that the prevention of school violence should be viewed as a holistic effort taken both at an individual level and at the level of the entire school. Individual level interventions (targeting pupils at risk) should be taken not only with regard to pupils' problematic characters, but also with regard to their developmental context (Farmer, et al., 2007: 204).

In setting up a security management system directed at averting and preventing violence within a school, it is particularly important to build up a general environment of trust and awareness that any type of violence is unacceptable. It is also important that everyone within the school is informed, ready and trained to recognise violence and to know the procedures of action when first signs of violence are detected. A contemporary concept of prevention of school violence places emphasis on the so-called micro-ecological model of security (social ecology), underlining the importance of building up an overall sense of security within the school as a micro-geographic area. This is more important than mere reliance on individual measures such as for instance metal detectors for weapons or fences around schools (Booren, et al., 2011: 174).

Prevention of violence among school youth faces many obstacles and systemic weaknesses which hinder the achievement of preventive effects. Schools attach more significance to the educational side of the process, while neglecting the upbringing aspect which should aim at achieving broader social targets. This is a great weakness of schools in Serbia and of the Serbian school system as a whole. The school can and must fulfil its other social role as well, by contributing to the forming of healthy personalities and helping high-risk pupils. By using the school system, the community has the possibility, potentials and resources to give its contribution to the forming of healthy personalities of pupils who will be trained, ready and mentally capable of dealing with the challenges, stresses and frustrations of life.

However, in practice, schools in Serbia, and not only in Serbia, treat the problem of violence in schools superficially by applying "quick fix" solutions. Schools frequently cover up violence issues in order to preserve a good reputation, or fail to take timely or adequate responses to problems which leads to further problem escalation. Sometimes, schools' poor organisation, decision-making and staffing policies or measures contribute to a sense of alienation and frustration of pupils and fuel their aggressiveness which is then manifested both in and outside the school. For certain problematic pupil categories, the school is not a safe haven but a place in which they cannot find positive identification and self-assertion, which is why they turn away from the school to the streets, juvenile delinquency and violent groups. In addition, organisational barriers, internal organisation issues, school bureaucracy and a general lack of interest often hinder attempts to implement programmes for the prevention of violent delinquency (e.g., Greene, 2005: 237).

Literature on the prevention of violent behaviour among school youth covers the following strategies: universal strategies, selective strategies and indicated strategies. Their synchronised (simultaneous) application to different risk categories is recommended.

Universal strategies are preventive strategies designed to reach all pupils and to achieve a positive effect on the general population. They comprise three general levels of action (educational, behavioural and social aspect). They are implemented within a school context in

order to address factors that can contribute (lead) to conflicts and aggression. They can also envisage standard procedures aimed at achieving positive effects. Universal strategies are, as a rule, based on student training and education aimed at promoting overall problem-resolution skills, building up of social networks as part of interventions, understanding the hierarchy of social structures and the strategies for the promotion of tolerance and acceptance within peer groups (Farmer, et al., 2007: 201). This may form the basis for programmes designed to give students a better understanding of the sports fan culture and fair play which exclude violence against the rival team or its fans. As part of such programmes, fan groups may be formed to visit football matches in an organised fashion. Their support of a given team would be based on values that are entirely different from those of extreme hooligan fan groups. Programmes of this type are implemented in a number of countries and involve cooperation of schools and sports ministries or individual clubs, and will be considered in more detail later in the paper.

Selective strategies are interventions directed at pupils with higher-than-average risks and developmental issues. Programmes of this kind aim to support high-risk pupils in order to reinforce their strengths and skills and enable them to successfully tackle and overcome the difficulties they face. Such pupils are assigned one or two mentors from the teaching staff who support them by providing advice, suggestions and company. Mentors have the task to contact other teachers in order to help high-risk pupils meet school requirements and achieve necessary results. They should also help these children integrate into peer groups with positive and prosocial attitudes, as well as maintain contact with their parents in order to help them overcome problems caused by factors outside the school system. In addition, mentors have the task to help such children find new strengths and resources, with particular emphasis on participation in sports clubs and activities or other sections depending on their abilities (Farmer, et al., 2007: 202). Successful implementation of projects of this type can be very significant as it helps children with developmental and family issues and enables their inclusion in the school system by providing positive role models and reinforcing their trust in the school. In this way, young people with a problem are saved from going over to the other side, i.e. to juvenile delinquency and resignation which, in turn, lead to addictions and violent behaviour.

Indicated strategies are directed at young people who manifest serious symptoms of behavioural difficulties. In order to design measures and programmes targeting this youth population, professionals from different fields of expertise need to work together to define developmental issues and, on the basis thereof, implement individualised programmes that would induce a change in the existing system of values, models of behaviour and social response. Programmes of assistance to this category of juveniles call for synchronised participation of different sectors and agencies (schools, special education, mental health experts, healthcare institutions, centres for social work, sport associations or recreational sections, juvenile courts). Programmes of this sort must be dynamic, sustainable and tuned to the needs of the juvenile with a problem. The strategy also entails the participation of a coordinator to monitor and coordinate the implementation of the programme relative to a specific personality (Farmer, et al., 2007: 204).

5.2.3. TARGETING RISK FACTORS THAT LEAD TO YOUTH VIOLENCE AND INTRODUCING PROTECTIVE FACTORS

Violent behaviour of the young is linked with numerous psycho-social factors that may be of different nature. In early years of a child's personality formation, adverse family, psycho-social and biological factors are the most important. As the child grows up, the spectrum of adverse factors widens.

The forming of an aggressive (violent) personality of a juvenile and/or the expression of an already formed aggressive personality (of an adolescent or adult) are also influenced by very complex broader social factors including the general social environment, tolerance of aggression in the society, presence of aggression- and violence-prone groups, the media, absence of prevention and/or unambiguous (unreserved) public condemnation of violence, inefficiency of courts and a lenient sentencing policy, economic and other crises etc.

Risk factors are factors that have an adverse effect on the development of a juvenile's personality and lead to the formation, or enable the expression, of a violent (aggressive) personality. All violence prevention projects in a society aim to make an organised (planned) impact on one or more risk factors contributing to violence. Scholars believe that the most efficient treatments and prevention programmes are those that simultaneously address several risk factors at the same time, i.e. several factors generating violence among the young. In order to achieve that, it is necessary to develop a multi-systemic approach to target the relevant risk factors (Kashani, et al., 1999: 205).

It is necessary to note that detecting risk factors in each specific case and targeting such risk factors through planned prevention programmes is not at all a simple, nor even a feasible task. For instance, some adverse factors may be at work for only a short period of time and may cease once the decision on intervention is reached, but they nevertheless produce very serious and lasting consequences for the personality of a child or a juvenile. Typical cases include sexual violence over children or isolated cases of severe trauma caused by a specific event (kidnapping, heavy violence and humiliation etc.). Some adverse risk factors cannot be addressed in all cases, e.g. if parents refuse to cooperate (parents themselves are violent or addicted to alcohol or drugs). There is only limited scope for addressing some risk factors, especially if they are compounded by some other adverse factors (e.g. psychopathy, alcoholism, poverty). It is also difficult to address some broader social factors that foster or fail to prevent aggression to a sufficient degree etc. The forming of an aggressive personality of a juvenile can be due to several adverse factors active at the same time, but in different combinations and proportions. As the spreading of aggression and violence in a society is due to a whole spectrum of risk factors (individual, personal, family, narrower and broader social, broadest socio-economic and political), prevention programmes and measures need to encompass a wide range of actions to address at least some of the major risk factors. Only a highly organised society with sufficient resources at its disposal can be successful at detecting and targeting risk factors through planned prevention programmes.

Scholars have lately singled out another strategy for the prevention of juvenile violence based on the *strengthening of protective factors* in order to build up juveniles' resilience to adverse risk

factors. This strategy does not target risks but introduces protective factors into the life of a juvenile in order to suppress or mitigate the impact of adverse risk factors if they cannot be otherwise successfully addressed in a given case.

There have been a number of research studies and projects worldwide aiming to test the efficiency of the theory on building up resilience to risk factors for youth violence. These studies are entitled *Resilience research* (Jain, et al., 2012: 109). Authors researching the effects of this strategy believe it to be the only promising option in cases where the family refuses to cooperate, and other adverse factors are present as well (e.g. poverty). Several longitudinal studies have demonstrated empirically that the introduction of protective factors has had a substantial positive effect on personality development of violent juveniles. The introduction of protective factors helped mitigate the negative impact of risk factors and had a therapeutic effect on violent youths, giving them a chance to achieve positive results, change their asocial and antisocial attitudes and accept pro-social (socially acceptable) ones (Jain, et al., 2012:108). In Sullivan's view, this strategy can also yield positive results in the case of personal risks (including difficult temperament, negative moods, early depression, aggressive behaviour, hyperactivity) which in adverse social circumstances may lead to chronic aggressive behaviour of the young (Sullivan, 2006: 292).

Protective factors include positive relationships, activities, models of conduct, personalities to which a juvenile with a history of aggressive behaviour can relate. Essentially, this is a process of pulling a juvenile out of bad company, from the street, from asocial and antisocial models of behaviour and values, and of including such a juvenile into positive activities that can attract, involve and motivate him, as well as provide positive identification models. This may take the form of participation in sports activities, a sports club, a music band, outdoor activities, groups of non-criminalised peers etc. Scholars engaged in this type of research point out that the provision of adult supervisors' support to such juveniles and their involvement in positive activities with non-aggressive peers can alter their negative models of behaviour and attitudes (Farmer, et al, 2007; Jain, et al., 2012). The validity of this strategy is confirmed by the results of research according to which juveniles who have firm relations with social institutions and who spend more time in socially acceptable activities are less likely to engage in juvenile delinquency, hooliganism and vice. The strategy described in more recent papers is based on the findings of a research study published by Hirschi as early as 1969 (cited in: Peguero, 2009: 301).

Therefore, in preventing violent behaviour of the young, it is important to empirically identify the *risks* and set up *protective factors* in each given case. Risks should be addressed if possible. With the help of protective factors (activities), a juvenile is rescued from a crisis situation, from bad company and bad models of behaviour, and attempt is made to instil positive attitudes and models of behaviour instead (Sullivan, 2006: 292).

The above considerations are very important for designing projects for the prevention of sports hooliganism as they outline clear strategies for targeting risks and for introducing protective factors in order to encourage acceptance of different models, interests and attitudes. These models and preventive strategies are clearly applicable to adolescents who are not at risk, or to cases where the risk and the expressed aggressive dominant side of personality have not yet escalated into chronic hooliganism and deep criminality. For the latter, the only chance for

success lies in the so-called indicated strategies presented in this paper and in repressive measures.

The implementation of each prevention programme, including programmes for the prevention of violent delinquency of fans at sports events, has to go through several critical stages. First of all, a team is organised to collect data, key objectives are defined, a strategic approach selected, a plan of action drawn up and work is done on its implementation. When defining projects stages, it is best to start from the SARA model. Here, the letter “S” stands for scanning of the problem. This is the first step and it comprises collection of data on the targeted problem; collection of data on prior excesses; violent groups and extreme fan groups; number, scope, cohesion and members of the core; data on the number of pupils from a specific school who are members of fan groups and have participated in violence; data on such pupils’ families and their inherent risks etc. Further, it is necessary to collect data on the specific local circumstances, resources available at the time of project planning, the financial aspect of the project etc. “A” stands for analysis, i.e. problem evaluation on the basis of collected data. The problem is analysed by applying both a qualitative and a quantitative approach. Analysis covers prior attempts to treat the problem, and the weaknesses, obstacles and issues that emerged during such attempts. Based on problem analysis, available resources, real possibilities of action and objectives are reconsidered, an action strategy defined, and prevention programme and implementation plan adopted (specifying persons in charge, individual tasks, defined schedules). The third step is response to the problem (“R”). This means plan implementation. Plan implementation is currently the most critical stage. In our country, a number of good prevention plans were drawn up (or copied from foreign sources) but many obstacles emerged in the implementation stage. Plan implementation involves a range of concrete activities, further data collection, corrections in the implementation stage, accommodation to changed circumstances, investment of a great deal of effort, work, time and sacrifice. When faced with difficulties and problems, and once the initial enthusiasm and optimism dry up, many members of the implementation team get tired, withdraw from activities or fail to meet their obligations and the programme enters into a crisis or is discontinued. This is a general practice in Serbia! The final stage of the plan is results assessment (the final “A” of the SARA formula). This stage comprises an analysis of the results achieved, measurement of efficiency of such results, detection of problems relating to plan definition or its implementation. On this basis, corrections to the plan are made, implementation team members are replaced etc. Plan assessment is also a critical stage. Plan assessment is most frequently done “pragmatically” on the basis of personal impressions, without applying scientific methods that ensure the exactness and accuracy of the results achieved. In order to avoid the above mistakes, it is useful to consult guidelines on drawing up strategic plans for the prevention of violent delinquency available on the internet⁶⁴.

It should also be underlined that the implementation of programmes for the prevention of juvenile violent behaviour and violent behaviour of fans requires, as rule, a multidisciplinary approach, i.e. joint work of several subjects and institutions on the project. For instance, implementation of school-related projects can include the police, centres for social work, football clubs, non-governmental organisations, certain fan associations etc. When a project entails the cooperation of representatives of several institutions, in practice we often see problems relating

⁶⁴ A highly useful guideline is accessible on the website: http://findyouthinfo.gov/docs/NFYVP_Toolkit_LKP.pdf, (25.10. 2013).

to coordination, failure to perform on obligations, failure to observe deadlines etc. It would, therefore, be useful that the drawing up of prevention programmes be supported by a memorandum of cooperation on the project signed by managers on behalf of their respective institutions. This protocol should envisage solutions for problem situations that may occur during project implementation.

As regards the successfulness of projects for the prevention of violent behaviour of the young, projects (and strategic approaches) have been classified into those with a positive effect (*effective projects*) and those where no positive effect was measured (*ineffective projects*). There is also an inter-group labelled as “promising” projects.

Singling out effective projects is very important, as it helps define positive practice which can then be further improved or broadened in scope. However, some programmes have proved to be ineffective and have failed to produce the desired results. The reasons for their ineffectiveness differ. For instance, the risk factors underlying a specific project were incorrectly defined, so the project “missed the target”, i.e. it did not stand a chance to produce positive results in that given case. It is also possible that not enough resources were provided for project implementation, or the project was implemented by unqualified staff, or staff that was not motivated enough to overcome obstacles encountered on the way. It is also possible that a well-designed project fails to yield positive (expected) results due to errors and weaknesses in implementation. Sometimes, a project will produce excellent results in one country or community, but prove unsuccessful in others. This may be due simply to poor project implementation, or to the fact that the project did not adequately accommodate the risk factors or the circumstances prevailing in a given environment. Some projects produce positive results that are so negligible they cannot be quantified. Sometimes, projects do not produce quantitatively positive results, but a better connection and cooperation were established among institutions, or a more favourable climate and general impression were created, in the course of their implementation. As a result, such projects can be considered fundamentally successful (although they failed in producing the expected results). In Serbia, project results are sometimes misrepresented in media, institutional meetings and forums as highly successful, whereas in reality this is far from being true. The problem is that in Serbia we lack independent, rigorous, professional and accurate project assessment.

It is very important to differentiate between effective and ineffective projects. Ineffective projects are important too as an example of bad practice. By analysing ineffective prevention projects one can detect mistakes and reasons for failure, while some projects can be reformulated or rejected as fundamentally ineffective for a given problem. In this way, we can avoid making errors in the future, while in turn saving up on resources and not wasting time on attempts that failed to produce positive results etc.

The US has gone furthest in differentiating between effective and ineffective programmes. Institutes, universities and government agencies dealing with prevention undertook comprehensive research studies over the course of several years regarding the efficiency of prevention projects. Based on project assessment processes, lists of effective and ineffective projects were compiled. It is also important to mention an over 450-page long report of the National Institute of Justice submitted to the US Congress. The report was entitled “Preventing

Crime: What Works, What doesn't, What's Promising" and was later turned into a book (Sherman, et al., 2002).

5.3. PROGRAMMES FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOUR IMPLEMENTED IN THE USA

5.3.1. ABOUT US PROGRAMMES FOR THE PREVENTION OF YOUTH VIOLENCE IN GENERAL

The problem of violence has always been highly topical in the USA. Violence among young people has been on a steady increase. On average, six or seven juveniles are murdered each day in the USA. The biggest problem in the USA is the safety of pupils in schools, as there have been cases of pupils committing mass murders of their school friends and teachers, mostly using firearms. In addition, there is a high incidence of other forms of violence (physical, mental) committed by juveniles within their schools or neighbourhoods. Another major problem in the USA is hooliganism of juvenile gangs within which all sorts of gravest criminal offences are committed, involving extreme physical violence with the use of firearms or mere physical strength. In addition, racially-inspired hooligan violence is also present. The American society is, therefore, a very violent society, characterised by easy access to firearms, which means that youth violence and aggression often have very serious consequences. For this reason, the state pays great attention to the problem of youth violence. A whole range of research studies are underway, there is ample literature on the subject, numerous prevention programmes aiming to prevent violent delicts and youth hooliganism are implemented. American projects for the prevention of violent behaviour are characterised by investment of immense financial resources, financing of a very large number of prevention projects of different kinds, participation of a large number of institutions and professionals from different fields of expertise. A science-based approach and, most importantly, very rigorous assessment of project success are other important features of these projects.

It should be emphasised that the problem of football fan violence is not as pronounced in the USA as in Europe. However, the value of US programmes for the prevention of youth violence is that they are directed (on the basis of very elaborate research) at identifying family, social and developmental risk factors leading to hooliganism (aggressive behaviour). Prevention projects aim to selectively target the defined risk factors. In addition, alcohol and drug consumption and access to firearms occupy an important position in the genesis of hooliganism in the USA. As social, psychological and family-related risk factors leading to youth hooliganism have a universal value and are present in all countries worldwide, research findings on risk factors and prevention programmes are applicable *mutatis mutandis* in other countries as well, including Serbia. Also, in addition to other standard (psycho-social, family related) risk factors, the use of alcohol and drugs has a great impact on the genesis of fan hooliganism in Serbia. Similarly to American hooligan gangs, extreme football fan groups in Serbia are associated with drug-related crime. This allows for making parallels and generalisations, as well as knowledge transfers, regarding juvenile criminal gangs and hooligan groups in the US and extreme fan groups in Serbia. For this reason, we will provide an outline of the basic strategic directions of the projects for the prevention of youth hooliganism in the US and of some basic prevention projects implemented there. We believe that American knowledge and experience in countering juvenile

hooliganism and aggression can be useful for designing projects for the prevention of extreme fan hooliganism, which is a serious problem facing the Serbian society.

In the US, the assumption underlying all prevention programmes is that juvenile violence is a complex problem which calls for complex solution. Emphasis is placed not so much on criminal sentencing of already formed delinquents, but *on projects for early detection of potential for violent behaviour and the application of prevention programmes*. Longitudinal studies have shown that children who exhibit aggression at an early age continue to behave aggressively later as adolescents. In most cases, children display aggressive behaviour in early stages of life, and unless provided with adequate support, tend to continue with such violent behaviour patterns. Violence thus progresses with the adoption of increasingly aggressive models applied with increasing frequency and in ever graver forms. On the other hand, research shows that if children from risk groups are provided assistance in school, at home and within the community, the potential for aggression diminishes markedly. A particular emphasis is placed on researching causes of aggressive behaviour and different forms of its manifestation as a basis for drawing up prevention strategies. The phenomenon of violence is interpreted in a broad sense to include problematic behaviour and expression of emotions at the time of committing acts of aggression, physical assaults, suicide, use of heavy drugs and other dangerous acts of violence against other people.⁶⁵

In designing preventive strategies, particular importance was attached to research of *juveniles organised within criminal gangs*. Criminal gangs in the US are similar to juvenile gangs in Australia or Europe and are characterised by: alienation from the school, peer pressure, problematic families, similarities among gang members, presence of adults in gangs who organise, motivate and instruct juvenile members. Factors contributing to the formation of juvenile gangs include unemployment, media, low educational and cultural level of members, similar racial (ethnic) origin of members (Lozusic, 2002). Criminal behaviour of juvenile delinquents organised in criminal groups (gangs) was compared with that of juveniles who refused to join gangs, but committed violent offences on their own. This research study corroborates earlier research findings, i.e. that gang membership leads to increased likelihood and frequency of committing grave criminal offences with elements of violence. Juvenile gang members are much more likely to commit acts of violence or to carry weapons which can produce deadly consequences. Research shows that juvenile delinquents who are gang members engage far more in drug peddling than individual violent offenders (Foreman, 2013). The strategies for suppressing and preventing juvenile gang criminality in the US are based on police methods of data compilation, databases, analyses (Simonović, 2012: 24) and suppression. When it comes to leaders of juvenile gangs, only classic repressive measures – arrest, surveillance, indictments – are realistically applicable to them. The prevention of criminality of this sort must be based on early interventions directed at high-risk juveniles, on social programmes of community intervention and mobilisation (Foreman, 2013), and programmes of education of school youth regarding dangers posed by gangs and risks of gang membership.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ <http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/child-and-adolescent-mental-health/children-and-violence.shtml> (28/10/2013).

⁶⁶ For more detail see: <http://www.findyouthinfo.gov/feature-article/gang-prevention-overview-research-and-programs>, (28/10/2013).

A number of internet websites deal with preventive measures to suppress violent behaviour, particularly among school youth. They provide valuable information for school authorities, teachers, families, pupils, technical staff and members of the community about early signals of violent behaviour, enabling them to help children before serious consequences ensue. These guidelines are primarily dedicated to the school community and point to: a) signals enabling recognition of early indicators of violence and other problematic behaviour, and b) actions to be taken by the school and the broader social community to prevent violence and other problematic behaviour. Research shows that aggressive and intolerant behaviour in childhood may be a sign of future problems. This type of behaviour may become manifest from as early as 6–11 years of age (Corbitt, 2000).

An FBI study points to indicators and early signals of predisposition to violent behaviour in general and to sexual violence in particular. The study lists early signals of violent behaviour which may stem from the context of family, school (behavioural patterns and academic performance), social dynamics of a juvenile's attitudes towards other students, drugs, weapons, playing of violent computer games, visiting websites propagating violence etc. A school teacher who recognises such signals can initiate cooperation with a psychologist or policeman specialised in prevention to help the juvenile avoid delinquency. The following early indicators of potential to commit violence are selected: a pupil has low self-esteem, a history of cruelty to animals, fire setting, interest in lighting fire, cruelty to weaker persons, fascination with weapons, especially firearms, disrespect from mothers or other family members (or is a victim of violence), failure to see beyond the path of violence, liking for music which glorifies violence, adoption of the cult of violence as a life philosophy, e.g. satanism, nihilism (Band & Harpold, 1999). Risk propensity, sensationalist behaviour, lack of control in early childhood, depression and difficult social conditions are additional factors leading to juvenile delinquency. Early signals (indicators) of potential aggression also include social withdrawal as manifested in feelings of depression, rejection, lack of self-esteem, excessive feelings of isolation and being alone (this warning sign does not point only to children prone to aggression). Children who were victims of violence and aggression (psychological, physical and sexual) display a predisposition to become aggressive towards others. Children who are often mocked, threatened, attacked and punished have a greater chance to start behaving aggressively. Poor academic performance and low school interest can also be seen as warning signs. Uncontrolled anger without much cause is a serious risk indicator. Patterns of impulsive and chronic hitting, intimidation and bullying behaviours are another significant indicator of aggression. This type of behaviour can escalate towards more serious aggression. Animal abuse and fire lighting are also considered important early signs of aggression. Early vandalism, lies and petty thefts are patterns of behaviour which precede more serious forms of violence. Ethnic, racial, sexist prejudice, coupled with other indicators, may also lead to aggression. Membership of youth gangs and violent groups is another warning signal. The same goes for alcohol and drug consumption. Fascination with and carrying of firearms is a serious warning sign of potential for aggression⁶⁷. Signs indicating a higher danger of violent behaviour include: serious physical fighting with peers and family members, severe destruction of property, severe rage for seemingly minor reasons, detailed threats of lethal violence, possession and use of firearms and other weapons, other behaviour involving threats of homicide or suicide (Band & Harpold, 1999; Corbitt, 2000; Booth, et al., 2011).

⁶⁷ <http://www.ksde.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3916>, (26/10/2013).

The social community (primarily school and police authorities) must take urgent action in the following cases: when a student reveals he has a detailed plan (time, place, method) to hurt or kill someone, especially if such student has a history of earlier aggression, if he possesses weapons (especially firearms) and threatens to use such weapons to kill a person.⁶⁸

The US Departments of Justice and Education teamed up to produce a programme of assistance to schools and the social community in order to prevent school violence. The programme involves early intervention and prevention and teamwork with educators, psychiatrists (mental health professionals), parents and students. An action guide for parents, educators and others was designed to help them recognise early signs of disturbances and potentially dangerous behaviour, as well as signs indicating a future heightening of the risk of aggressive behaviour of the young. The guide also contains instructions for the provision of assistance to such children and for taking protective measures.⁶⁹

The projects are as broad-based as possible and involve work with school children (lectures on dangers of violence, advice for potential victims, lectures on harmonious relationships and tolerance, and avoidance of violence), training of teachers and technical staff, work with parents and the child's environment. A special section is dedicated to teaching individuals how to recognise early warning signs and providing instructions on actions to be taken once these signs are recognised. Emergency plans are made for teaching staff and children. Prevention programmes also include training for teaching staff, parents, all school children, children who display early signs of aggressiveness, educational courses on controlling aggressive impulses and negative sentiments, on ways to avoid and resolve conflicts, psychological and psychotherapeutic work with children who display warning signs of aggression. Effective programmes for high-risk school children involve a wide range of preventive measures: supervision (oversight), counselling, providing instructions, participation in cultural and sports activities, community services, setting up clubs, computer sections, help with homework etc.⁷⁰

The role of the police is to design a strategy (as part of the community policing programme) which involves the forming of prevention police forces. The police cooperate closely with school authorities. In order to suppress violent delinquency among school youth, school teachers and psychologists have clearly defined tasks to recognise the potential for early delinquency in their students. To this end, the police train teaching staff to recognise such behaviour. On the other hand, police forces in the place of residence of high-risk juveniles also have the task to suppress violence. The police thus intensify oversight over high-risk juveniles in line with the "zero tolerance" policy, while at the same time involving such juveniles, through preventive strategies, into organised systems of socially acceptable activities (Corbitt, 2000; Simonović, 2006: 42; Booth, et al., 2011).

Internet websites contain instructions on prevention measures to be taken by schools and the social community to mitigate the risk factors implied by drug consumption and serious forms of violent behaviour. Eight types of social action are described (citizen mobilisation, situational

⁶⁸ <http://www.findyouthinfo.gov/youth-topics/preventing-youth-violence>, (28/10/2013).

⁶⁹ <http://www.findyouthinfo.gov/youth-topics/preventing-youth-violence>, (28/10/2013).

⁷⁰ <http://www.findyouthinfo.gov/youth-topics/preventing-youth-violence>, (28/10/2013).

prevention, citizen interventions, counselling, afterschool recreation programmes, policing strategies, policy change interventions and media inclusion programmes). Five types of school interventions are singled out (sports activities, behavioural consultations, behavioural monitoring, schoolwide reorganisation and even use of metal detectors).⁷¹

5.3.2. OVERVIEW OF SOME PROGRAMMES TO PREVENT YOUTH VIOLENCE IN THE USA

Numerous programmes for the prevention of youth violence are applied in the USA. The most frequent programmes in high schools are the development and implementation of the school security plan, introduction of school resource officers, youth counselling programmes, development of guidelines on identifying and reporting violence. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention and the US Department of Education implement a number of intervention programmes to prevent violent behaviour and they are mostly focused on improving school climate in general, education of children, school staff, and parents (Booren, et al., 2011:171). The interventions also focus on preventing crime, reducing drugs use and on destructive and violent crime, better incorporation of schools into the local community etc. (source: unpublished presentation delivered at an international congress, Edelbacher, Norden, 2008).

In order to support the preventive activities of the police, schools and other entities, the US Government passed in 1997 the Anti-Gang and Youth Violence Control Act⁷². The Government allocated USD 75 million to local governments to implement the anti-gang and youth violence strategy. The Government also started, in 1998, a Juvenile Mentoring Program – JUMP⁷³. The JUMP programme is supported by the US Justice Department and can help in preventing truancy, school violence and suppressing other kinds of youth delinquency. The programme is run by mentors in cooperation with volunteers with various backgrounds, they contact young people and write reports about their outreach to adolescents that have shown inclination to early delinquency. In the first year of the programme's implementation, more than 3000 adolescents with behavioural problems were covered in the preventive activities. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention are currently implementing 93 projects financed through the JUMP programme. Both youth and mentors view the mentoring relationship as positive. The programme particularly helps the youth stay away from alcohol and drugs, avoid fights, stay away from gang activity and not use guns and knives. The programme involves youth organisations (National Youth Network) and the media. The previous programme for the prevention of drugs use among the youth (Drug-Free Communities Support Program) also joined the JUMP programme (Corbitt, 2000).

Mediation programmes, psychoeducational and counselling programmes and other, behavioural therapy models and programmes: possibilities and limitations of their effects on risk factors.

Mental health experts in the USA apply numerous cognitive behavioural training programmes (training of parents, family therapy) in order to influence one or more psychosocial risk factors related to violent youth behaviour. Mediation programmes are very popular but studies have

⁷¹ For more detail, see: <http://www.ncjrs.org/html>.

⁷² Participation in criminal street gangs in the USA is punishable by a fine and up to six months in prison.

⁷³ http://www.mentoring.org/downloads/mentoring_418.pdf, (25/10/2013).

shown that they are not successful in reducing aggressive behaviour. Similarly, programmes based on counselling the youth inclined to violent behaviour and social skills training have shown no positive effects. Programmes based on cognitive-behavioural strategies have had a somewhat better effect than the typical therapeutic models. Most of these programmes are applied in elementary and secondary schools and cover the entire student population (Greene, 2005:243). Cognitive-behavioural techniques with highly aggressive youth delinquents such as, for instance, social skills teaching, problem-solving trainings, various cognitive techniques, role plays, and therapeutic modelling can reduce delinquent or aggressive behaviour at home and in the school. Programmes of this kind have had little or minor effect on multiple recidivists (Kashani, et al., 1999:203).

Training programmes and parent training. Training programmes and parent training programmes focusing on effective communication methods, conflict resolution, family problem solving, negotiation, soft punishment, modelling, have proved to be effective in reducing poor child adjustment and aggressive behaviour in pre-school and school children by addressing psychosocial risk factors (poor parental supervision, child disciplining methods, violence between parents). These methods have led to slight improvements in the functioning of the family, but they did not have a significant effect in case of recidivism of aggressive behaviour (Kashani, et al., 1999:203–204).

Functional family therapy (*FFT*) constitutes a far more in-depth approach to working with families on mitigating risk factors contributing to aggressive youth behaviour and uses systemic forms of therapy (behavioural and cognitive therapies combined). This method has proved to be effective in reducing less serious forms of youth aggression and in mitigating family dysfunction. This method too proved to be ineffective in reducing serious forms of aggressiveness or chronic youth aggressiveness (Kashani, et al., 1999:204).

School Climate-Oriented Strategies. This programme is complex and focuses on the change of patterns of student behaviour, thinking and attitudes. The programme pays particular attention to alcohol abuse and its risks, encouraging positive emotions and general school climate, interpersonal relations, values and norms, interpersonal conflict resolution, and codes of good conduct. Special attention is given to classroom atmosphere. The resulting strategies and programmes have been rated positively in the evaluation process. Students have manifested increased psychological connection and integration with the school and its atmosphere, they have achieved better self-identification among the school staff, and the rate of violence has fallen in schools which implemented this strategy (Greene, 2005: 243).

Student problem-solving programmes. In this programme, students are engaged in the development, implementation and evaluation of programmes and strategies based on problems identified and assessed. For instance, students develop a plan to reduce student fighting in the school restaurant and they implement it together with the school staff. Their aim is to distribute food better in order to eliminate the reasons for student dissatisfaction and fighting. From the point of view of success, this project has been rated as promising (Greene, 2005: 240–241).

School security plans. Schools in the USA have started developing their security plans under violence prevention projects. Every school needs to have its security plan. The local police,

especially the school resource officer, have an active role in the designing and drafting of school security plans. One of the key elements of each plan is the assessment of the threat that the school is exposed to. In addition, the school sets up a threat assessment team charged with developing the action plan and taking specific preventive and proactive measures to address the identified security threats. The team has the task, among other things, to identify the parents of the children that are at greater risk of violent behaviour and to work with them to reduce the risks identified, while respecting their privacy. The team conducts interviews and takes preventive measures with respect to students that have displayed inclination to school violence or who have been assessed as being potential victims. Mental health experts also take part, as appropriate. The team is trained to spot early signs of risks of school violence, educates students about security and violence etc. In particular, attention is given to the prevention of use (and distribution) of drugs in the school and its environment. The school resource officer and the team members need to contact all children and school staff in order to identify those of them who are at risk and take preventive measures. In addition, one of the important tasks is building general climate of trust. In this regard, numerous programmes are run with the aim of organising children's free time, especially the free time of children at risk. A significant part of these programmes consists of sports competitions and activities of school sports clubs. Sports leagues in which the police and schools together participate through competitions, organisation of sports camps, and improvement of positive relations also had good results. The main idea of this project is to ensure a good cooperation between the police, school and parents, maintaining ongoing contacts with the school staff and students, in order to intensify the flow of information and detect, on time, risks, threats and early warning signs indicating a possible violent behaviour and to influence it (Booth, et al., 2011).

Threat Assessment and Crisis Response Strategies. The programme consists of three threat assessment aspects: a) identification and treatment of students displaying the lack of emotional adjustment and behavioural problems; b) permanent assessment of the level of threat posed by students in which risks of aggressive (violent) behaviour have been identified; and c) crisis management and consequences. Spotting the students at risk and developing preventive programmes that would address those risks are described in detail in *Safeguarding Our Children: An Action Guide*, a document published by the American Institutes for Research. The entire document can be downloaded from the internet.⁷⁴ The essence of the programme is that the crisis team should note the early warning signs of inclination to violent behaviour in certain students, and apply preventive measures and programmes which should involve the school, parents, police, and various institutions (Greene, 2005: 242–243).

DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) Programmes. This programme deals with the prevention of drugs and violence. Under the programme, police agencies establish positive relations with school authorities and students. The police are trying to prevent violence in a number ways. First, the police must establish cooperation with the school staff and school administration. Secondly, the police are trying to keep up to date with all cases of violence and the ways students can be endangered in schools. Thirdly, the police have the duty to establish contacts with the school staff and students and encourage them to provide as much information as possible on any potential for violence or any risks, including by anonymous reports. Police

⁷⁴ http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/actguide/action_guide.pdf (27/10/2013).

and schools under this programme enter into an agreement whereby they commit to working together and collaborate in promoting the prevention of violence. Even though this programme was initially widely used and in spite of great enthusiasm, an evaluation of the programme's impact, after a number of years of implementation, found it insufficiently effective (Booth, et al., 2011), even though it is still used.⁷⁵

In the seventies, some towns in the USA introduced a restriction on the movement of youth during the night (so-called juvenile curfew) as a measure to suppress youth delinquency and youth gang activity. In many areas this resulted in a decreased youth crime rate and it had a good effect on youth development. This measure helped reduce the drugs abuse, fighting, and violent youth crimes. There are three conditions for success of this measure intended for children and youth: 1) Acceptance of the measure by the public; 2) Consistent implementation of the measure by the police; 3) Accurate record-keeping of events related to this measure. It is a generally accepted opinion that the police cannot enforce this measure on their own and without the assistance and consent of the municipal authorities, parents, schools, and the media. The media and schools should send out messages that this measure focuses on reducing youth delinquency and youth victimisation. A whole range of preparatory activities are needed to implement it, such as setting-up recreation centres, establishing social services for providing assistance to juvenile offenders and their families. This entails establishing the procedures for sanctioning, counselling and provision of services for recidivists, development of programmes for recreation, employment, designing of programmes to prevent drug addiction and youth gangs, opening of a "hot line" and establishing a crisis intervention team. The result of this strategy was collaboration between the police, misdemeanour courts, social welfare services, school management, medical services, churches and the media in their common goal of creating an advanced youth protection programme. The implementation of this measure has rapidly reduced the rate of youth delinquency during the night and early morning hours (Ward, 2000).

Families and Schools Together (FAST). This is a multi-faceted programme that has been active for a number of years now. It focuses on children that display aggressive behaviour in the pre-school environment and covers children aged six and above. The programme entails working with children and the family in the environment where the child lives. The school system and teachers also participate. The programme is implemented in a number of states. Pre-school children exposed to high risk of violent behaviour are identified in schools. The children are divided at random in intervention groups and in comparison groups whose behaviour only is only monitored. The children that were involved in the prevention programme from the start are now young adolescents. The evaluation of the programme's results showed that the children who had belonged to the intervention group showed a lower level of unadjusted and aggressive behaviour than the children who belonged to the comparison group.⁷⁶

Linking the Interests of Families and Teachers (LIFT). This programme is implemented in some states. It lasts for ten weeks and involves families and children that have shown inclination to serious forms of juvenile and violent delinquency. The programme is multidisciplinary in nature and entails training of parents, social skills training, behavioural programmes of adjustment of

⁷⁵ <http://www2.potsdam.edu/hansondj/Controversies/20070705122620.html#.P5roJFPMTrQ>, (25/10/2013).

⁷⁶ Child and Adolescent Violence Research at the NIMH, NIMH home page address: www.nimh.nih.gov, (25/10/2013).

children through communication in socialising and free-play and appropriate communication between parents and teachers. The programme results have been assessed as positive in a number of ways. The students involved in the programme have exhibited a lower level of aggression in socialising with other children, parents have shown less negative behaviour when solving family problems, and teachers indicate that such children have improved social communication and attitudes in contact with others. After a three-year intervention period, the children in the intervention group showed less persistent alcohol use, and they had less problematic behaviour in socialising with others; in this period they were detained less frequently than those outside of the intervention group, and early warning signs of violent behaviour were noted.⁷⁷

Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS) is a programme that promotes social and emotional competences. The programme covers five basic conceptual domains: self-control; understanding emotions; positive self-assessment; relationships; solving communications problems. The programme is implemented through role-plays, dialogues, story analysis and modelling of teacher and peer behaviour. The children are taught self-control and how to understand feelings and solve problems. This form of education has been applied to children and youth in regular and special classes. The intervention group has shown better understanding of emotional expression than the comparison group. The programme entails learning about necessary social competences such as the sense of friendship, development and support, anger management and control, conflict resolution and the appropriate conflict resolution methods.⁷⁸ The outcome of the evaluation has shown, statistically, significant improvement in resolution of social conflict situations and a lower percentage of aggressive behaviour and reactions within the intervention group compared to the comparison group (Greene, 2005:241).

Multisystemic therapy – MST proved to be effective in treating juvenile aggressiveness. The programme involves youth offenders displaying serious forms of violent behaviour through youth gangs. Specially trained therapists work with juveniles and their families in the minor's family environment. Particular focus is on changing negative value systems. Most therapists have identified positive forces in families which have been used in therapy as the basis for re-educating youth and for developing parenting skills. This strategy has an effect on multiple factors causing juvenile aggressiveness. The focus is on the family (on improving emotional relationships within the family and the system of parental control), school (on improving communication between the parents and teachers and improving learning skills in children), peers (participation in extra-curricular activities, sport, volunteer organisations), and social institutions with the aim of providing assistance. Special efforts are invested in individualising the needs of adolescents in the family, school, and environment. The therapy is based on the behavioural approach. This work method has proved to be more efficient than the other methods as it has had an effect on the reduction of recidivism and aggression in chronic aggressive adolescents too. It has achieved the best balance between the effects produced on chronic delinquents and aggressive youth and the price of the project. The project's advantage is that it has an effect on multiple risk factors at the same time, while the preventive therapy process is taking place in the adolescent's natural environment; it is individualised to the maximum and adjusted to specific realities (Kashani, at al., 1999:204). The programme has proved to be more cost-effective and efficient than some other programmes addressing youth delinquents which are

⁷⁷ <http://www.promisingpractices.net/program.asp?programid=204>, (26/10/2013).

⁷⁸ http://mhws.agca.com.au/mmppi_detail.php?id=64, (26/10/2013).

still applied in America and which entail separation of the adolescent delinquent from his family and his placement under the same roof with other adolescent delinquents.⁷⁹

Therapeutic Foster Care. This programme is based on scientific research. It is an intervention of the local community and it focuses on serious and chronic juvenile delinquents. Therapists specially chosen and educated to work with serious delinquents work with the juveniles in their houses. The treatment lasts on average from 6 to 7 months. This programme yielded better results than some other programmes in which the youth delinquents were gathered into groups. The programme is cheaper and it reduced delinquency considerably compared to classic forms of group work with juvenile delinquents.⁸⁰

5.4. PROGRAMMES FOCUSING ON THE PREVENTION OF FAN HOOLIGANISM

5.4.1. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF PROGRAMMES OF PREVENTION OF HOOLIGAN VIOLENCE IN SPORTS IMPLEMENTED IN AND OUTSIDE OF EUROPE

Unlike the USA and Canada, the problem of fan violence in Europe, especially football fans, is very acute. Football stadiums and the area around the stadiums often used to be (and are sometimes even now) the arenas of extremely aggressive fan behaviour which often led to forceful police response, thus at the time of “big football derbies” the streets of European cities would become theatres of real small wars. All this would be fuelled by inflammatory reports in the media. An entirely new clique of “street heroes” was thus created; hooligans whose motivation for violence was far from sports and true cheering for a team. It had taken many years and plenty of tear gas and spilled tears, plenty of crashed heads, shop-windows and cars, even a number of large-scale tragedies with life casualties, before it was realised that the problem of sport hooligan violence could not be solved with an undifferentiated approach and by applying repressive measures only. Within the framework of the new strategic approach to addressing fan violence, the emphasis was put on preventive measures, differentiating true supporters from hooligans, who were effectively no supporters, and on intensifying communication between the police, fans and fan groups. It was realised that hooligans, extremists, criminals, ultra right-wing groups, know quite well how to fill the prevention gap trying to win over and attract masses of young people and fans. Some European countries responded, which would be a somewhat belated strategy, by developing the so-called fan projects whose objective was to separate the youth and true fans from extremists, hooligans and violators. The objective of the projects was to attract the youth and keep them within the boundaries of sports and cheering and away from extreme hooligans. The government offered to the young people and fan clubs new models of organisation, support and benefits in order to distance a great number of young people from extremists. The police responded alike and started developing strategies to improve relationship with the youth, supporters and fan clubs in order to reduce conflicts and keep them away from the extremists and hooligans, whereby they applied a differentiated approach in interventions and reduced the need for applying police force. The repressive mechanism too had its strategic role which entailed quick and strict sanctioning of hooligans, barring them from matches, registering them in the police records, performing controls, analysis, intelligence work etc.

⁷⁹ <http://www.mstinstitute.org/>, (26/10/2013).

⁸⁰ <http://www.thecommunityguide.org/violence/viol-AJPM-evrev-foster-care.pdf> (26/10/2013.).

Football clubs and fans can not only be a problem but also a solution to the problem of sports-related violent behaviour and hooliganism in general as has been shown by some preventive projects in which some football clubs or clubs from other sports took part. These clubs funded sports camps, provided training and organised exhibition sports events for youth who had faced difficulties in their development, problems with drugs and violence. The Liverpool Football Club is famous for such activities and projects, but also some football and cricket clubs in Australia. These clubs organised camps in which famous football players participated in order to promote smoking cessation and drugs treatment campaigns. For instance, the Australian professional football league invested in a period of three years an amount of AUD 3 million in preventive projects. Football players from the premier football league (most of whom came from poor families) also participated in a part of this programme. These footballers visited and spent time with boys and girls who had difficult lives and involved them in sports activities. Some clubs took an active part in youth delinquency prevention projects which offered positive role models to the youth and promoted sports and physical activities. These projects have shown that sports and physical activities can play a positive role in preventing crime and violent youth behaviour. Recreational activities reduce vandalism and other forms of criminality. Using the same model, sports and recreational activities have been organised in local communities in order to address certain problems that they faced, primarily in the area of alcohol and drugs abuse by the young people. In therapeutic treatments the youth were encouraged to take up a sport and recreation, which had positive results (Cameron & MacDougall, 2000).

5.4.2. SPORTS VIOLENCE PREVENTION PROGRAMMES IN CROATIA

Similarly to Serbia, Croatia too has faced the problem of fan violence and hooliganism, primarily related to football. In terms of prevention, Croatia adopted the “Action plan for the implementation of a programme of educational measures against violence in sports, at and outside of sport events“. As provided for in the Action Plan, the curricula and teaching plans in the whole educational system were reviewed. In the curricula and teaching plans for physical and health education new educational tasks have been defined depending on the students’ age:

- For students aged 7 to 10, educational tasks focus on the respect for the opponent, complying with the rules of the game, overcoming anger and dissatisfaction and admitting the victory of the opponent;
- For students aged 11 to 13, it is important to guide them so as to respect the judge and the rules of the game, as well as to encourage team work and adopt of a non-violent approach to conflict resolution;
- For the secondary and higher education, the tasks are focused on the identification and analysis of positive examples of club support, but also the negative behaviours of players and fans in school and university sports events.

The Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, in cooperation with the Croatian Agency for Upbringing and Education implements a whole range educational measures against sports violence which are adjusted to the various students’ age. The implementation of the Action Plan is designed as an interactive relationship in which children implement and/or actively participate in most of the measures. The Action Plan states that the results of its measures will not be measurable instantly and that they will not come quickly, so therefore feedback should be sought

from children and youth at all times and the effectiveness of individual measures should be analysed. In order for the Action Plan to serve its purpose, it is pointed out that it is necessary to identify the areas to be focused on when taking action with respect to children and youth, i.e. their habits, attitudes or awareness, so it is necessary to conduct a whole range of studies.

The implementation of the Action Plan started with a consultation event in 2008 which gathered together professors. This was a basis for further successful implementation of the Action Plan and a key condition for the further implementation of measures. In cooperation with the Ministry of Interior, Croatian Football Association, sociologists and psychologists, seminars were held for professors and a book was launched on “Sports and Violence in Europe” (Bodin, Robène, & Héas, 2007).⁸¹

In addition, literature on preventing sport violence was translated. Publications, adjusted for different ages of students, were designed and distributed in educational institutions. Posters designed by artists together with the students of the Applied Arts School were also printed. The posters feature various topics such as the fight against violence, racism and discrimination. In cooperation with the Ministry of Interior, materials were drafted about the fight against violence for various age groups (from pre-school to secondary school age). A number of presentations were held on “Education against Violence at Sports and School Playground” aimed at providing children positive guidance on sports. Apart from representatives of ministries, famous sportspersons also took a part in presentations.⁸² In addition to the above activities, several international scientific conferences dedicated to sports violence prevention were also held.

The Ministry of Interior of Croatia took a series of measures to implement the Action plan for the implementation of a programme of educational measures against violence in sports, at and outside of sport events. The most important measures include the following:

- cooperation of experts in various fields: judiciary, police, education system and sports, and cooperation between sports clubs, fan clubs, local government and self-government, engagement of public figures in order to motivate, i.e. sensitise the public;
- education of elementary and secondary school students and educational professionals (teachers, psychologists and counsellors) and police officers in the fight against sports violence;
- various posters were made featuring violence prevention themes related to sports, some books on the prevention of sports violence were translated etc.;
- appropriate seminars were organised;
- “The Code of Conduct for Sports Events” is planned to be published;
- education and training of stewards for sporting events according to the Law on the Prevention of Violence at Sports Events;
- the need for efficient court proceedings and rendering of judgments and court decisions within as short time as possible from the commission of the act of violence at sporting events.⁸³

⁸¹ The Croatian translation of the book can be downloaded from: <http://public.carnet.hr/preventivni/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/KNJIGA-Sport-i-nasilje-u-Europi.pdf> (5/11/2013).

⁸² For more information visit: <http://public.mzos.hr/Default.aspx?art=9265&sec=2396>, (5/10/2013).

⁸³ For more details, visit the website of the Croatian Interior Ministry at <http://www.mup.hr/main.aspx?id=149992>.

5.4.3. SPORTS VIOLENCE PREVENTION PROGRAMMES IN GERMANY

In order to address the problem of increased fan violence and hooliganism, mainly related to football, in 1993 Germany started developing and implementing so-called “fan-projects“. A coordinating body (Koordinationsstelle Fan-Projekte bei der Deutschen Sportjugend – KOS) was set up within this programme with the task of designing social-counselling work with fans and youth. The basis for the work of this body was a document entitled “National Concept of Sports and Security” (Nationale Konzept Sport und Sicherheit (NKSS)), which covered, both in terms of content and organisation, the area of social work to reach out to the youth in regard to football. The starting point for the strategy is the premise that football fan violence cannot be suppressed successfully using repressive measures only.

The coordinating body for the development of fan projects, together with its counselling and informational function, was supported by football institutions, political figures, police, and the media. The work and activities of this body are mostly financed by the government (two thirds), i.e. the relevant ministry and football organisations (one third), though funds from donations are also used.

Through long-standing practice of preventive and social counselling work with football fans, fan projects in Germany earned very good reputation. In addition, the coordinating body works with other similar projects and initiatives in Europe. Fan projects cover basic forms of fan activities. They are implemented at stadiums, on trips, places where fans gather, and sports competitions. In order to reduce violence and extremist attitudes, fan projects try to foster a creative culture in supporters and offer alternative, recreational and educational activities to young fans. Fan projects are linked for these purposes to educational institutions and other stakeholders outside of football, which has proved to be extremely important. Besides, numerous activities conducted through these programmes are focused on anti-discrimination and prevention of violence, tournaments are organised, various gatherings and international exchanges.

There are several main areas of work of the Coordinating Body in implementing fan projects:

1. *Counselling and granting of the quality standard seal.* The following sub-activities are implemented within this range of activities:

- Advising organisations, public bodies and initiatives on the set-up and viability of fan projects;
- Intervention and mediation services for conflicts arising from football;
- Participation in national and international committees of UEFA, the EU, Europarat etc.;
- Strengthening social and educational fan work by granting the “Fanprojekt nach dem NKSS” (“NKSS-based fan project”) quality seal.

2. *Coordination and networking* includes the following sub-activities:

- Coordinating the exchange of information between fan projects and cooperating with national and international fan organisations;

- Consultancy for the German Football Association (DFB) and the German Football League (DFL);
- Collaborating with the Federal Working Group of Fan Projects (BAG).

2. *Training and further education* includes the following sub-activities:

- Conferences and workshops for fan project staff;
- Seminars for opinion leaders working in youth, fan and club projects;
- Organisation of and participation in conferences across Germany and Europe.

3. *Publishing and public relations work* includes the following sub-activities:

- Issuing of in-house publications and brochures;
- Documentation services for fan work, fan research etc.;
- Press and public relations work.

Owing to the success of their implementation, fan projects are rather widespread. A total of 47 projects in 42 locations are currently implemented. Fan projects are communicative and transparent in nature and each of them has the mission of differentiating fans from football hooligans while protecting the interests of the majority of young people who are truly devoted to sports and their clubs. The target group of these projects are youth and fans. The numerous projects implemented have their strategic basis in the National Concept of Sports and Security, but they are customised to the local realities and particularities while fostering inventiveness and creativity. The main aim of the project is to prevent violent and extremist (ultra) fans and their racist and extremist ideas and tendencies as they try to achieve their interest of manipulating fan groups and gaining their support. In this regard, projects cooperate closely with state authorities and social institutions (police, state authorities, media, and politics), youth movements and associations.

A great challenge and an important task in the implementation of fan projects is to differentiate the vast majority of the true fans (and fan groups) from ultra-right extremist fan groups and ultra-violent fan groups existing on the German fan scene and to whom the sport is not what motivates them to go to sports events. Given that the police did not use to make a difference between these groups but instead regarded them as a unique whole, mass clashes would occur between supporters and the police, which was a cause of distancing and misunderstanding between most supporters and the police. The consequence was tarnished police reputation in the eyes of the population frequenting football matches. Fan projects noted this problem and focused on improving dialogue, communication and cooperation (relationship improvement) between fans, fan groups and the police. To support these efforts, the police changed its operational strategy and started implementing communicative strategies, differentiated approach, and directed its management concept towards conflict reduction. This resulted in differentiation of the police approach, which ultimately reduced the level of violence at German stadiums. The role of the Coordination Body of the fan projects was decisive in these efforts.

Fan projects in Germany contributed to better understanding of fans and their clubs as an opportunity and unused force, rather than solely as a security and social problem (Gabriel, 2012: 227-228).⁸⁴

5.5. PROGRAMMES OF PREVENTION OF FAN HOOLIGANISM IN SERBIA

5.5.1. CURRENT SITUATION

The so-called reactive approach has been traditionally dominant in the Serbian system for the protection of the society from violence and violent behaviour in the widest sense of the notion. Social response measures are applied only after the occurrence of violent behaviour which has to be previously qualified as a misdemeanour or a crime. Except for the system of misdemeanour and criminal responsibility for violent behaviour, Serbia does not have sufficiently developed systemic measures of organised social reaction in place whereby violence would be suppressed and support provided to persons inclined to aggression so that they may fit into the social community. An example of good practice is the introduction of the school resource officer and some projects undertaken by police directorates in certain towns, or some projects designed by the Ministry of Education or some non-governmental organisations. Most of these projects have not been subject to a quality assessment test, they are applied in a narrow area and/or within a very limited timeframe. Systemic projects of primary prevention of violent behaviour in school-age juveniles are not implemented in Serbia. This constitutes a significant strategic problem.

An even graver problem is the lack of systemic projects for preventing violent fan behaviour and hooliganism in sports. The repressive approach is dominant in this area too, while prevention is systemically neglected. The key problem of the dominant repressive approach is a serious inefficiency of courts in adjudicating cases of violent behaviour by extremist fans. The entire burden of control and suppression of fan violence in Serbia is laid on the police.

Fan clubs in Serbia do not play a constructive role. They do not participate in prevention programmes nor do they engage in preventing sports violence. Football clubs in Serbia do not take responsibility for violence at sports stadiums! On the other hand, football clubs provide support to extreme fan groups and their leaders (some of the fan leaders are paid by football clubs, and some of them sit on the managing boards of football clubs). In addition, football clubs are under the influence of politics. In order to improve such security situation related to sports cheering, the National Strategy against Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events was adopted.

5.5.2. ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY AGAINST VIOLENCE AND MISBEHAVIOUR AT SPORTS EVENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

The Government of the Republic of Serbia set up an Action Team for the development and implementation of the strategy and the action plan against spectator violence and misbehaviour at sports events (hereinafter: Action Team) as a working group with the mandate to draft a proposal for a National Strategy against Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events,

⁸⁴ For more information about fan projects in Germany visit: <http://www.kos-fanprojekte.de/index.php?id=english>; <http://www.kos-fanprojekte.de/index.php?id=fanprojekte>.

to recommend a National Action Plan against spectator violence and misbehaviour at sports events, and to monitor the implementation of the National Strategy and the National Action Plan. In mid-2013, the Serbian Government adopted the National Strategy against Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events for the period 2013–2018 (hereinafter: National Strategy or Strategy), and the Action Plan for the implementation of the National Strategy.

The first step in any strategic approach to preventing sports-related hooliganism is certainly the adoption of a national strategy, action plan for its implementation and setting-up of an action team to ensure that these strategic documents are implemented in practice. It is worth noting that in Serbia this has not been an easy task at all, not least because numerous strategies and implementation plans have been adopted over the last decade in Serbia with little effect in practice. Most of these documents remained a list of nice wishes. Below is an analysis of some solutions proposed in these two documents (Strategy and Action Plan). Their strengths have been highlighted, and disadvantages too. Justified proposals and suggestions have been presented. As these strategic documents emphasise in particular that they are ‘living’ documents which will be subject to review and evaluation during the implementation stage, and upgrade, any well-meaning suggestions (and even those others) would be beneficial in preventing and suppressing sports-related hooliganism in Serbia.

The Strategy’s title itself is not convenient. The title of the Strategy is “National Strategy against Violence and Misbehaviour *at sports events*”. It is important to bear in mind that fan violence and misbehaviour does not only occur at sports events in the strict sense of the term. Fan violence also occurs on the way to sports facilities, in transport, restaurants (e.g. murder of French national Taton in Belgrade). A more precise title for the strategy would be “National Strategy against Violence and Misbehaviour Related to Sports Events (or on the occasion of sports events)“, which would in its name also have covered violence happening in town, and transport related to a particular sport event etc.

Nevertheless, not even such a title would be the most appropriate for a strategy whose aim is to establish the fundamentals for suppressing violent fan behaviour because violence and hooliganism of fan groups frequently occur even without any connection to sports competitions or events. Fan groups organise fighting and agreed brawls which are not directly related to any sport event. For instance, agreed mass brawls between certain fan groups can occur. Armed conflicts can also occur between certain fan groups. The fighting results in serious injuries even death of their participants. Fan groups, as organised violent groups in Serbia, take part, from time to time, in mass nationalist, ethnic, political and other clashes, having no relation with the sports event, e.g. organised assaults against the Roma, violence at gay prides, attacks on foreign embassies, and disruption of voting at polling stations. Fan groups in Serbia are sometimes instrumentalised by political parties and/or sports clubs (especially in football) to use violence in order to achieve some objectives which have nothing to do with sports and with being a fan of a sports club.

It goes without saying that political will and political decision are major preconditions for practical implementation of the National Strategy principles, which in turn entails responsibility of those who instrumentalise (support, tolerate, rather than prosecute) the leaders of extremist violent fan groups and their groups. If this is not achieved, the National Strategy will remain a

dead letter on paper. In addition, it is necessary to adopt one umbrella strategy which would establish a wide foundation for the prevention and suppression of all forms of violent behaviour and hooliganism in the society. This umbrella strategy would lay down the basics for the primary prevention and suppression of violence and violent behaviour of all sorts by addressing issues, such as the definition of the concept of violator and violent behaviour in various fields (family violence, sexual violence, sports-related violence, traffic violence, ethnic violence, neighbourhood violence, political instrumentalisation of violence etc.); educational programmes in schools related to the prevention of violence and work with children of various age groups; general educational anti-violence programmes against all forms of violence for individual categories; provide for education about the acceptance of differences; conflict and frustration resolution techniques and measures with respect to high-risk adolescents; recreation, relaxation, sports anti-stress programmes; control and monitoring of behaviour of registered violators as a preventive measure; obligation to identify the risk and measures to mitigate the risk contributing to violent behaviour; prevention and control; single database of violators of all sorts; prioritisation in the adjudication process; judicial and social measures against chronic violators; media and violence relationship; role of politics, schools, police, prosecutor's office, courts, non-governmental organisations etc. Separate strategies for specific areas and specific legislative provisions would derive from this umbrella strategy.

Therefore, a more appropriate title for the strategy discussed here would be “National strategy *against violence of extremist fan groups and (fan) misbehaviour in relation to sports events*”. Such a name would best differentiate extremist fan groups as organised groups generating violence in relation to and outside of sports, and also separate them conceptually from other fans or other fan groups that cannot be regarded as extremely violent. In this case the content of the Strategy itself would also need to be designed differently as one part of the Strategy would focus on the prevention of violence of extremist fan groups (their control, suppression, prohibition) as organised groups of violators, regardless of whether this violence is related to sports or not. It appears that the title proposed in this paragraph best reflects the essence of hooliganism in Serbia.

The National Strategy did not focus (enough) on extremist fan groups and their leaders. It did not make a sufficiently clear difference between extremist fan groups and their leaders on one side, and other fan groups on the other. It did not provide for measures of control, prohibition and dismantling of extremist fan groups, particularly those involved in severe forms of violence, organised crime, drug dealing etc. Illegal drugs trafficking that certain extremist fan groups are involved in is one of the major public security problems. The reasons for armed conflict between certain extremist fan groups are often to be found in fighting over the division of territories for distribution of narcotic drugs. The fan population is very important for the illegal drugs trafficking because fans are potentially a big drugs market concentrated on a small area but they are also the population from whose ranks street drug dealers can be recruited. Such extremist violent and criminalised fan groups should be unambiguously designated criminal groups. The competent authorities should make clear in their decisions, which should be supported by the media, that such groups are not sports or fan groups because what they do has nothing to do with cheering or sports but with activities of organised criminals attempting through sports to get to privileges, protection, drugs market and a disguise for their true (criminal) nature. The National Strategy does not mention the problems of extreme violence, crimes against life and limb,

bringing of fire guns to sports stadiums, drug dealing, but only points to sports competition rigging, counterfeiting and unauthorised sale of tickets for sports events that it wishes to suppress. It is clear that the National Strategy has “turned a blind eye” in front of a bigger problem by not even mentioning it even though it is actually there.

It is very important to have clear answers when it comes to the strategy of differentiating regular fans and juvenile groups as supporters from extreme fan groups who are deeply criminalised and/or oriented towards extremism. It would be important to suppress and isolate extremist, criminalised fans (who are actually no fans), and fan groups, from fan groups who are not criminalised and who see sports as the main motivation for their going to sports events. In this regard, the Strategy says: “Sincere relationship between clubs and fans are the foundation for further preventive measures. Sports organisations should adopt policies to support the true supporters, which will facilitate the process of getting the fans and clubs closer to each other. A fan outreach code and fan code of conduct should be developed together with fans. Also, sports organisations should appreciate the true supporters and refrain from putting them into the same category as hooligans. Such supporters should have their own membership cards granting them privileges when purchasing tickets and concerning club insignia, and they should also partly participate in the clubs’ decision-making processes.”

The Strategy proposes an idea that fan groups issues should be regulated in a law, i.e. “Regulating fan groups in a law would provide for a clear organisation and form of fan group activities, precise legal liability, easier analysis and understanding of behaviour, education, work transparency, possibility of supervision and control, it would prevent abuse and manipulation with juveniles etc. European experience highlights the importance of communication with fans as the means for creating favourable atmosphere in reducing security risks. A possibility should be created for fan representatives to participate in evaluations and consultations related to legislative provisions for addressing violence and misbehaviour at sports events“. We believe this idea is good and that it should be further developed in a public debate, and then proceed with regulating the matter of fan groups and fan sub-groups in a law. One of the main strategic objectives in addressing the problems of sports-related violence is the need to make a clear difference between fans and so-called “fans”. Organised crime groups and hooligan groups should be prevented from hiding behind the labels of “fans”, “fan groups”, “extreme fan groups” because this makes the power of social reaction to crime unclear and diminishes it. Legislative provisions could provide for requirements for creating “healthy” fan groups which could then be entitled, on that ground, to some privileges which would constitute an additional motivating factor for the youth to join them.

Efforts should be invested in formation of youth, i.e. new generation of fans who would have different values, attitudes and non-criminalised leaders. One may start from setting-up supporter teams in schools or sports clubs. Fans would then be educated about fair play in sports (as also mentioned in the Strategy), strictly ensuring that these fan groups make no room for registered violent and criminalised fans. Non-criminalised groups of young fans should be granted privileges such as cheaper tickets for matches and trips to sports events, purchase of sports equipment and sporting goods and provided protection from extremists. A good way to achieve this idea, in addition to what has been mentioned in the quoted segments of the Strategy, may be to put together a list of licensed fan groups (the licence could be granted or revoked) which could

provide them some benefits when going to football matches in the country and abroad, in case they satisfy certain quality standards. The German model, described above, can be a basis for the conceptual design of a solution to the situation in Serbia.

The Strategy makes no mention of decriminalisation and depoliticisation of sports clubs, which poses a considerable problem in practice. Criminal offences of financial and organised crime are committed in sports clubs in Serbia (especially football clubs). Tax evasion and fraud, money laundering, manipulation with transfers of players, and match fixing are but some of the criminal activities that occur in Serbian sports. On the other hand, there is a close relation between the leaders of extremist fan groups and football club managements. Football clubs grant benefits and pay extremist fan group leaders. If football clubs fail to decriminalise and disrupt the connections between the football club management and the leaders of extreme fan groups, who are deeply criminalised, no strategy, not even the Strategy that is being considered in this context, will have any chance to succeed. It will remain a dead letter. This is why we believe that decriminalisation of sports clubs, especially football clubs, disruption of the relations between criminalised fan group leaders and sports clubs, termination of funding of criminalised fan group leaders by football clubs and distancing of the clubs from such individuals and extremist fan groups, are among the most important conditions without which the problem of sports violence, hooliganism and crime in Serbia cannot be solved. Unless sports clubs in Serbia decriminalise and clearly distance themselves from extremist fan groups and their leaders, it will not be realistic to expect sports clubs to participate in the preventive projects and development of a new generation of supporters, establishment of licensed fan groups and differentiation of true supporters from criminalised hooligans. In any case, without this precondition, it is not realistic to expect that the mission of the Strategy can be realised.

A positive aspect of the Strategy is that it points to the need for efficient courts and application of banning measures against extreme fans. "The system of legislation must include the provisions of substantive and procedural law which will provide for efficient prosecution of those who commit crime and misdemeanours related to sports events, as well as a fair and efficient system of sanctions which will entail setting up of an appropriate system to bar the fans posing risks and the known perpetrators of criminal offences and misdemeanours from attending sports events. The sports events attendance prohibition measures must include judicial and administrative prohibitions and the judicial measure of temporary seizure of travel documents". One of the major problems in the approach to violence and hooligan behaviour at sports events to date are the inefficient courts in terms of the repressive treatment of hooligans. Courts rarely prosecute cases of violence, the proceedings last even for several years, and sentences are symbolic and disproportionate to the applied violence (Simonović, et al., 2011b). In order to speed up court proceedings, it would be beneficial to adopt the practice from other countries where high-risk matches are attended by judges, prosecutors and *ex-officio* attorneys-at-law. Namely, the police will detain hooligans who disrupt public order and take them to the prosecutor and judge who are already at the stadium. The violators are then sentenced in an expedited court procedure and immediately put in detention, which maximises the speed of the procedure and shortens the time between the commission of the crime and sanctioning, which fully satisfies the purpose of sanction. In addressing the problem of court inefficiency in the cases of violence at sports stadiums it is noteworthy to mention a suggestion from the Strategy, namely "In order to monitor the efficiency of prosecution of cases related to violence and misbehaviour at sports events, the

ministry competent for justice will conduct proactive supervision over the actions taken by justice authorities and establish a single registry, and take other measures within its remit of responsibility“.

One of the serious strategic problems related to maintenance of order at sports events is the lack of laws that govern private security agencies. This is why it happens that individuals with criminal records and persons known by their violent behaviour at sports events are engaged to work as security personnel. It happens that individuals responsible for the security of sports events bring pyrotechnics into the stadium before the beginning of a match or they tolerate when fans do that. As private security is not regulated by law, problems occur in communication between private security firms which provide security services during matches and the police because their competences, activities, responsibilities etc. are not clearly defined. This problem is indicated in the Strategy which states that it is “general knowledge that the Republic of Serbia does not have a regulated private security sector in place although there are a great number of private companies which legitimately provide steward services to sports event organisers at sports events. This systemic law is among the few laws that are missing in the national legislation governing the prevention of violence and misbehaviour at sports events. The lack of a law on private security and imprecise definition of steward services under the Law on the Prevention of Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events has resulted in a situation where the steward service providers cannot deliver efficiently its tasks as provided for in the law. In addition, private security firms providing security services at sports events recruit individuals who have not received training from the Ministry of Interior (they are not licensed) and they do not have permanent employment contracts. In implementing the society’s response to the problem of violence at sports events, the legislation has established also the institutional framework which includes not only public bodies and organisations but also sports organisations, private security service and stewardship services to whom the law entrusts certain powers with the aim of preventing and deterring violence and misbehaviour at sports events.“

Given all of the above, there is no doubt that a law on private security agencies is one of the key requirements for the implementation of the Strategy and for the prevention of violence at sports events. Before the matter of private security is regulated by law, the police should work with the Football Association and clubs in order to regulate through protocols and memoranda of understanding any issues related to stewardship service, controls, prohibition of pyrotechnics at stadiums, by sanctioning clubs if their agreement is breached. The Action Team and other bodies set up through the Strategy should engage in finding the best solutions.

The National Strategy has laid down six main strategic areas and set the objectives which provide a framework in which state authorities and sports organisations may work on preventing hooliganism at sports events.

The main strategic areas are as follows:

1. Establishing a legislative framework against violence and misbehaviour at sports events;
2. Developing multi-sectoral cooperation against violence and misbehaviour at sports events;

3. Building capacities of state authorities and sports organisation for fighting against violence and misbehaviour at sports events;
4. Improving infrastructure and management of sports facilities;
5. Prevention in fighting violence and misbehaviour at sports events;
6. Cooperation and communication with the media and media associations in preventing violence and misbehaviour at sports events.

The Strategy and Action Plan envisage in the *first strategic area*, which deals with establishing a legislative framework against violence and misbehaviour at sports events, several important groups of activities, i.e. initiating amendments to improve the current and developing new legislation to regulate security at sports events as well as to harmonise it with international legal instruments; ongoing monitoring, consideration and review of general enactments in the area of security and safety; establishing a legal framework for the work of the private security sector; development and adoption of a code of ethics and conduct for public officials and those employed in the sports business; consideration, harmonisation and review of general enactments – disciplinary regulations in order to establish an efficient system of responsibility; establishment of a system of legislation providing for operational duties of justice authorities during high-risk matches; establishment and upgrading of operational and analytical databases related to fan groups and violence and misbehaviour at sports events.

The *second strategic area* focuses on the development of multisectoral cooperation for fighting against violence and misbehaviour at sports events. The Strategy states in particular that “the multisectoral cooperation is a very important strategic area as it aims at developing and improving an integrated approach in social stakeholders to the security, safety and services components of a sports event. The primary aim of an integrated multiagency approach is to ensure, through coordination and collaboration of social stakeholders, that all social stakeholders be included and informed of all planned and implemented activities related to security, safety and services at a sport event“. Multisectoral cooperation envisaged in the Strategy first of all entails cooperation at the international level with adequate institutions and organisations of other countries and international institutions and organisations, in the field of analysing good practice, exchange of information on preventive programmes and specific sports events. Moreover, multisectoral cooperation involves cooperation at the national level and is reflected in the establishment of partnerships with all key stakeholders and institutions at the national level. In order to establish any forms of cooperation and partnership at the national level, it is understood that there is government support and activity to make formalised cooperation protocols between certain ministries (internal affairs, justice, sports etc.), representatives of relevant bodies (national sports associations and other relevant bodies) which are responsible for a number of functions (security, emergency, logistics, and services). It is envisaged that the parties of these protocols will at the same time be leading partners in preventive initiatives and projects. Finally, multisectoral cooperation entails cooperation at the level of local communities (cities and towns that host sports events) in order to establish an integrated multiagency approach in cooperation and coordination of all stakeholders in preparing sports competitions.

It is worth mentioning that establishing partnership, coordination and cooperation at the national and local levels constitutes a rather important aspect of a security strategy. We should particularly bear in mind that, as far as vertical (interagency) and horizontal (at local community

level) cooperation is concerned, Serbian society is poorly organised as a general rule. There is no tradition in Serbia of cooperation between institutions. It is exactly for this reason that many programmes and strategies have failed. Cooperation protocols are indeed a good way to overcome difficulties, but only if they become established in practice (Savković, Đorđević, 2010: 24–25).

The *third strategic area* involves the building of capacity of state authorities and sports organisations with respect to fighting violence and misbehaviour at sports events. Building capacities of institutions and authorities is a very important condition for partnerships and international cooperation in preventing and suppressing sports-related violence. In this regard, we can talk about effects of structural vulnerabilities contributing to juvenile violence and violence in society in general. These structural factors exist in all modern societies to a higher or lesser extent (e.g. Greene, 2005:38), and all areas in which the modern society manifests itself, including in relation to sports violence.

In order to increase the capacity of the relevant state authorities and sports organisations, the National Strategy provides for the following measures:

- Create within the National Council a working group as a permanent coordinating body for a number of authorities at the national level;
- Introduce an integrated training system for police officers and members of the judiciary, and representatives of organisers who are responsible for security at the sports facility;
- Introduce a human resource training and licensing system in security agencies through standardisation, i.e. setting minimum standards to be met in order to satisfy the principle of professionalism;
- Introduce education of fans as an integral part of the preventive policy based on mid-term and long-term measures, through adequate projects, and develop learning material for training;
- Develop a fan outreach code and fan code of conduct;
- Establish ethical code of conduct for public officials and those working in the area of sports and provide for an effective system of responsibility.

The Strategy particularly highlights the importance of strengthening the capacities of the police in preventing violence at sports events, and the strengthening of capacities of sports organisations. In order to build police capacities it is important to improve the resources available as they are far below those required for the implementation of objectives of the Strategy (e.g. Simonović, 2001a). In order to improve the capacities of sports organisations it is particularly important to decriminalise them and to disrupt their links to the criminal structures run by extreme fan group leaders. For instance, the Strategy says that sports organisations should adopt a policy of support to true fans, i.e. sports organisations should appreciate true fans and not classify them in the same group with hooligans. In the present state of affairs in football, for instance, this Strategy is unrealistic and not unimplementable, for the time being. The Strategy does not mention the method in which this idea would be realised in practice. This statement, as formulated in the Strategy, constitutes nothing but (insincere) wishful thinking.

The *fourth strategic area* involves the improvement of infrastructure and management of sports facilities. Having in mind unclear property-law relations and ownership of sports facilities, and the reduced income of sports clubs, there is a series of problems that need to be addressed. For some of them possible solutions are offered in the Strategy. For instance, the Strategy recommends introducing a system of licensing and certification of sports facilities, their categorisation and standardisation, introduction of modern systems of security cameras etc.

The *fifth strategic area* focuses on the issues of prevention of violence and misbehaviour at sports events. The Strategy notes that the prevention of violence and misbehaviour at sports events must be an institutionalised, joint and coordinated activity of state authorities, sports associations and civil society focused on the achievement of primary, secondary and tertiary prevention, and conflict resolution.

Primary prevention, as stated in the Strategy, entails “long-term treatment, through establishing and developing preventive programmes that have an effect on the reduction of social causes of violence at sports events, institutionalised work with young people primarily in elementary and secondary schools with parents’ mandatory participation. The aim is to provide to the youth a better understanding of changes that they go through at that stage of development, of social and family relations. In this regard, it is necessary first of all to have in place socially-organised systems of assistance and support to citizens, with the relevant institutional infrastructure, whereby a system of values that is not based on conflicts would be developed. Such a system of values would facilitate non-violent conflict resolution; develop a feeling of general solidarity, high degree of tolerance for diversity, non-discrimination etc. Target groups should be mostly young people, regardless of whether they are members of certain fan groups or not, and other individuals who are members of fan groups but who have still not displayed a form of behaviour that may be directly or indirectly considered violence at sports events. These primary prevention activities must be implemented first of all by the systems of education, social welfare, sports, culture and media, sports associations and clubs. In implementing primary prevention activities, support should be provided by the police and judiciary (prosecutor’s office and courts)“.

Primary prevention constitutes the basis for the prevention of violence in society. This involves a systematic effort towards identification of risks that may lead to the formation of violent personalities in children or youth and/or may result in violence and violent behaviour in certain conflict situations or situations posing a risk of violence. Primary prevention, identification of risks and risk-based preventive programmes is given significant attention in our considerations in this text. As already stated, primary prevention starts in elementary and secondary schools by working with children and families that are at risk (for more on this, see: Simonović, B., 2001b). In addition to mitigating risks, primary prevention is also achieved through programmes of support to individuals exposed to risk. Within this second strategic approach, i.e. in the development of support projects, young people are sent to sports and recreational activities, which is very important, as has already been discussed in this paper.

Therefore, the key leading institutions in implementing primary prevention programmes should be the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Policy. The Ministry of Health should also be involved as there is a need to address the psychological, biological and psychiatric conditions and causes of aggressive behaviour, and to address the problem of drugs and

alcoholism addiction. Some other ministries, such as the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Youth and Sports could join in, but only after the above mentioned ministries and together and in partnership with them. However, if one looks at the Action Plan, list of actions and responsible institutions for the implementation of primary prevention projects, as mentioned in the Strategy, one will see that the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Social Policy are not mentioned at all in relation to primary prevention (though the latter ministry is mentioned in relation to tertiary prevention projects). The Ministry of Education is mentioned only in the context of education related to the culture of cheering and fair play. This is only one smaller number of the programmes which belong to primary prevention, but they do not cover the remaining primary prevention fields where action is needed. This is why we believe it is necessary to pass an umbrella preventive national strategy in Serbia against violent and aggressive behaviour which would cover all areas, which would be followed by separate national strategies specifically for individual areas. This would provide the foundation for a systemic and comprehensive approach to the issues of prevention and suppression of violent behaviour in society.

The Action Plan mentions school teachers in the fields of physical education and upbringing as the leading factors in primary prevention within the school system, who will participate in activities related to the implementation of primary prevention. Physical education teachers alone cannot be the leading factors in the implementation of primary prevention projects whose target group are students, as suggested by the Action Plan. This is clearly indicated from the above descriptions of juvenile violence preventive projects implemented in the USA. All this indicates that the National Strategy and the Action Plan have not provided for the creation of necessary conditions for the implementation of primary prevention programmes. A project of primary prevention of youth violence cannot be based solely on the implementation of the Strategy which is focused on the prevention of sports-related violence. Therefore we believe that this segment, as envisaged in the Strategy, is lacking and insufficient as it makes no mention of mitigating other risks which ought to be covered by primary prevention projects.

Secondary prevention as envisaged in the Strategy entails responding to and limiting the damaging effects of violence after it has occurred, with the aim of limiting the consequences and mitigating the risks from future violence at sports events, through social inclusion of fan groups and fans and establishment of the relations of trust between supporters and other social stakeholders. Tertiary prevention involves a series of coordinated activities by social stakeholders focused on supporting known perpetrators of criminal offences and misdemeanours at sports events in their reintegration, through appropriate growth and development in case of minors, and through awareness raising about irregularities in parenting, as well as through involving them in regular social activities (employment etc.), with the ultimate aim of complete mitigation of factors having an effect on violent behaviour. As far as planning of preventive strategies is concerned in the area of tertiary prevention, it is necessary, first of all, to have in mind the outreach to juveniles who have been led astray, neglected in terms of upbringing, and who are not fully criminalised. Tertiary prevention measures can only have limited effects with respect to such individuals. Such projects demand a thorough work with the minor and his family and entail multidisciplinary work which includes joint and synchronous action by various institutions (schools, social welfare centres, health care institutions, police, and courts for juveniles, where sports associations and non-governmental organisations can also get involved).

These programmes envisage the appointment of coordinators, similar to what has been shown in the part of this document looking at the programmes implemented in the USA.

On the other hand, the main proponents and organisers of violent behaviour and hooliganism related to sports, especially football, are adult leaders or prominent members of extreme “fan groups”. These individuals are deeply criminalised and members of organised drug cartels and perpetrators of other severe crime (blackmail, murder, severe bodily injuries etc.). Preventive measures with respect to these individuals are not successful just as they are unsuccessful with respect to chronic violators and hooligans, according to the research conducted in the USA. Only law-enforcement measures can have effect when it comes to these persons, such as monitoring, control, criminal intelligence, special investigative techniques, obtaining of evidence on crimes they commit, as well as efficient and fast organisation and conduct of court proceedings. Court proceedings in Serbia against these individuals are rather inefficient even though they are notorious criminals who use sports only as a front and protection and are connected to political factors. The Strategy only touched upon these individuals even though they are a key generator of violence at sports events. Without eliminating them from sports and disrupting their connections with sports clubs, the Strategy and Action Plan will remain a dead letter, which can be clearly seen from what was happening in Serbia’s football in the first six months following the adoption of the Strategy (at the time of this analysis). Therefore, when we speak about tertiary prevention measures, the main target group should be juveniles who have been led astray and started committing crime. The key success of tertiary prevention projects can be achieved if the minors already recruited by criminals are taken away from the claws of organised criminals who pretend to be sports lovers and fans of certain football clubs.

The *sixth strategic area* focuses on cooperation and communication with the media and media associations in the prevention of violence and misbehaviour at sports events. The Strategy rightfully says that cooperation and communication with the media and media associations has the aim of avoiding sensationalist reporting about violence and misbehaviour by showing the scenes of violence, extolling and dramatising violent behaviour and encouraging violent groups by opening up media space to them, thereby popularising them and setting a bad example to the young populations.

It is correctly stated that the media must avoid showing distressing scenes in prime time during news programmes in electronic media, or publish photos and videos of violence at sports events on front pages, and must comply with recommendations of the International Sports Press Association (AIPS), FIFA and UEFA. The shots and videos should be broadcast for five seconds at most and not in prime time and front pages. This is why the Strategy correctly concludes that national and local spokespersons in all state authorities and sports organisations should closely cooperate with the media and fan groups in preparing and implementing a comprehensive communication strategy.

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6. RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

6.1. METHODS AND SAMPLE

6.1.1. METHODS

The empirical part of the research was based on research (survey), content analysis and statistical methods. The research method was applied in the anonymous surveying of respondents with a specially developed tool – the survey questionnaire, which contained 42 questions. Responses were generally closed-ended. Open-ended responses were possible only for one question. In case of 11 questions, respondents had the option to give either closed- or open-ended responses. Seven questions related to sample characteristics, while other questions aimed at proving or refuting the hypothetical framework. Survey questions were determined by the sample and the content of hypotheses, and were asked in accordance with the battery model, by categorising the basic hypothesis contents.

The content analysis enabled the collection of data on different characteristics of forms and contents of symbolic interaction relating to violent behaviour and hooliganism at sports events. All available sources of data were analysed: professional literature, local and foreign magazines, daily press, available official documents of Serbia's Ministry of Interior, radio and TV shows and the internet. Special emphasis was placed on contents concerning experiences in the prevention and suppression of hooliganism at sports events across the world. A large number of sources were processed in the content analysis. The categories of this analysis and general concepts formulated based on research issues and the content being analysed (which make a link between the theoretical framework of the research and possibilities of its practical implementation) relate to the content regarding the prevention and suppression of hooliganism at sports events. The content analysis units included attitudes towards the struggle against violence and hooliganism at sports events. Analysis units were identified and recorded, and their frequency in the pertaining categories was determined.

The statistical method, based on collected quantitative data on characteristics of violent behaviour and hooliganism among the young at sports events, served to make conclusions about the possibilities to take measures among the younger population so as to identify the age when the first hooliganism-related problems arise and to determine measures aimed at preventing escalation. This method enabled the classification and processing of data collected through research and content analysis methods – the data related to the number, frequency, intensity, type, presence and other quantitative characteristics of the research topic. The processed data served to make conclusions which enabled the verification of hypotheses. Several data processing techniques were applied within the statistical method, helping to statistically prove the set hypotheses. These techniques included the following: determining the frequency of

⁸⁵ This chapter presents some results of the research conducted within the project “Structure and Functioning of Police Organisation – Tradition, Situation and Perspectives”, implemented at the Criminal-Police Academy in Belgrade.

responses and the percentage share of each response in total responses (with and without the missing responses), and the χ^2 independence test which determined the statistically significant differences among the groups being compared or the statistically important link among individual responses.

6.1.2. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

The survey sample covered students of secondary schools in the Republic of Serbia. Sample stratification was based on the following criteria:

1. The towns of respondents' schools had first-league clubs in Serbia's Super League in the 2012/13 season. These are: Subotica, Pećinci, Kula, Novi Sad, Belgrade, Smederevo, Kragujevac, Jagodina, Niš, Užice, Ivanjica and Novi Pazar;
2. In each selected town, two secondary schools were chosen which were the closest to the football stadiums⁸⁶ where football clubs⁸⁷ from Serbia's Super League in the 2012/13 season were seated. Twenty five secondary schools⁸⁸ were selected: (1) *XII Belgrade grammar school*, 82 Vojvode Stepe St, Belgrade, (2) *IV Belgrade grammar school*, 25 Teodora Drajzera St, Belgrade, (3) *V Belgrade grammar school*, 24 Ilije Garašanina St, Belgrade, (4) *Secondary technical PTT school*, 16 Zdravka Čelara St, Belgrade, (5) *Secondary school of machine engineering*, 38 Bulevar Kralja Petra prvog, Novi Sad, (6) *secondary school "Svetozar Miletić"*, 7 Narodnih heroja St, Novi Sad, (7) *Technical school "Milenko Verkić-Neša"*, 8a Školska St, Pećinci, (8) *Secondary technical school "Mihajlo Pupin"*, 14 Laze Kostića St, Kula, (9) *Economic-trade school*, 113 Maršala Tita St, Kula, (10) *Chemical-technological school*, 53 Maksima Gorkog St, Subotica, (11) *Polytechnic school*, 38 Maksima Gorkog St, Subotica, (12) *First technical school*, 101 Kneginje Milice, Jagodina, (13) *Electrical engineering and construction school "Nikola Tesla"*, bb Kneginje Milice St, Jagodina, (14) *Grammar school "Bora Stanković"*, 27 Vožda Karađorđa St, Niš, (15) *Administrative-bureautechnical school*, 8 Trg Kralja Milana St, Niš, (16) *Technical school*, 13 Vuka Karadžića St, Smederevo, (17) *Textile-technological and agricultural school "Despot Đurađ"*, 40 Sedamnaestog oktobra St, Smederevo, (18) *Technical school*, 2 Miće Matovića St, Ivanjica, (19) *Grammar school*, 58 Trineastog septembra St, Ivanjica, (20) *Grammar school of Užice*, 6 Trg Svetog Save, Užice, (21) *School of economics*, 6 Trg Svetog Save, Užice, (22) *Grammar school*, bb Vuka Karadžića St, Novi Pazar, (23) *Technical school*, bb Vuka Karadžića St, Novi Pazar, (24) *School of economics*, 6 Radoja Domanovića St, Kragujevac and (25) *First technical school*, 8 Radoja Domanovića St, Kragujevac;
3. In each of the selected schools, students were surveyed from two classes in each grade – the class with the least and the class with the largest number of absences. Total 200 classes were surveyed.

⁸⁶ Hooliganism in Serbia is the most pronounced on football fields, but it also spills over to other sports.

⁸⁷ These are: FC Crvena zvezda, FC Partizan, FC Rad, youth FC Beograd, FC BSK, FC Vojvodina, FC Donji Srem, FC Hajduk, FC Spartak Zlatibor voda, FC Jagodina, FC Radnički, FC Smederevo, FC Javor, FC Sloboda Point, FC Novi Pazar and FC Radnički 1923.

⁸⁸ Under the stratification methodology, 32 secondary schools (16 clubs per 2 schools) were to be selected. It, however, turned out that Pećinci had only one secondary school, while XII and IV Belgrade grammar schools were the closest to the stadiums of FC Crvena zvezda, FC Partizan, FC Rad. At the same time, V Belgrade grammar school and Secondary technical PTT school were the closest to the stadiums of youth FC Beograd and FC BSK.

In accordance with the above stratification criteria, the sample contained 3662 students. Since there were 280,422 secondary school students in the academic 2012/13 year (according to the Serbian Statistical Office⁸⁹), the sample covered 1.3% of the population of secondary school students. As the sample is stratified, its size fully represents the targeted population of secondary school students aged from 14 to 19. Table 1 shows the main sample characteristics.

Distribution of respondents by town

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Subotica	319	8.7	8.7	8.7
Pećinci	172	4.7	4.7	13.4
Kula	328	9.0	9.0	22.4
Novi Sad	224	6.1	6.1	28.5
Belgrade	613	16.7	16.7	45.2
Smederevo	298	8.1	8.1	53.4
Kragujevac	290	7.9	7.9	61.3
Jagodina	260	7.1	7.1	68.4
Niš	370	10.1	10.1	78.5
Užice	331	9.0	9.0	87.5
Ivanjica	138	3.8	3.8	91.3
Novi Pazar	319	8.7	8.7	100.0
Total	3662	100.0	100.0	

Distribution of respondents by school

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Chemical-technological secondary school	155	4.2	4.2	4.2
Polytechnic secondary school	164	4.5	4.5	8.7
Secondary school of electrical engineering	172	4.7	4.7	13.4
XII Belgrade grammar school	163	4.5	4.5	17.9
V Belgrade grammar school	152	4.2	4.2	22.0
IV Belgrade grammar school	140	3.8	3.8	25.8
Secondary technical PTT school	158	4.3	4.3	30.1
Secondary school of machine engineering	115	3.1	3.1	33.3
Economic-catering secondary school	175	4.8	4.8	38.1
Secondary technical school	153	4.2	4.2	42.2
Economic-trade secondary school	280	7.6	7.6	49.9
Technical secondary school	590	16.1	16.1	66.0
Electrical engineering and construction secondary school	118	3.2	3.2	69.2

⁸⁹ Source:

<http://webbrzs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/Public/ReportResultView.aspx?rptKey=indId%3d110302IND01%2629%3d%23Last%231%26102%3dRS%2cRS1%2cRS11%2cRS12%2cRS2%2cRS21%2cRS22%2cRS23%2625%3d0%2c2%26sAreaId%3d110302%26dType%3dName%26lType%3dSerbianCyrillic>, (16/10/2013).

Grammar school	535	14.6	14.6	83.8
Textile-technological and agricultural secondary school	143	3.9	3.9	87.7
Secondary school of economics	269	7.3	7.3	95.1
Administrative-bureautechnical secondary school	180	4.9	4.9	100.0
Total	3662	100.0	100.0	

Distribution of respondents by grade

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid First	1015	27.7	27.7	27.7
Second	1062	29.0	29.0	56.7
Third	860	23.5	23.5	80.2
Fourth	725	19.8	19.8	100.0
Total	3662	100.0	100.0	

Distribution of respondents by the number of absences

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Class with the least number of absences	1912	52.2	52.2	52.2
Class with the largest number of absences	1750	47.8	47.8	100.0
Total	3662	100.0	100.0	

Distribution of respondents by gender

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Male	2024	55.3	55.4	55.4
Female	1632	44.6	44.6	100.0
Total	3656	99.8	100.0	
Missing System	6	.2		
Total	3662	100.0		

Distribution of respondents by age

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 14 years of age	10	.3	.3	.3
15 years of age	569	15.5	15.6	15.8
16 years of age	991	27.1	27.1	43.0
17 years of age	1003	27.4	27.5	70.4
18 years of age	801	21.9	21.9	92.4
19 years of age	279	7.6	7.6	100.0
Total	3653	99.8	100.0	
Missing System	9	.2		
Total	3662	100.0		

Distribution of respondents by family situation

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Lives with both parents	3023	82.6	82.7	82.7
Lives only with mother	433	11.8	11.9	94.6

	Lives only with father	139	3.8	3.8	98.4
	Does not live with parents, has a different family situation	59	1.6	1.6	100.0
	Total	3654	99.8	100.0	
Missing	System	8	.2		
Total		3662	100.0		

Distribution of respondents by financial standing

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Both parents employed	1950	53.2	53.6	53.6
	Only mother employed	471	12.9	12.9	66.5
	Only father employed	864	23.6	23.7	90.2
	Neither mother nor father permanently employed and live hard	157	4.3	4.3	94.6
	Has other revenue to live on	198	5.4	5.4	100.0
	Total	3640	99.4	100.0	
Missing	System	22	.6		
Total		3662	100.0		

What is the respondent's attitude towards the police

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very unfavourable	428	11.7	11.9	11.9
	Unfavourable	573	15.6	15.9	27.8
	Has no attitude	1595	43.6	44.3	72.0
	Favourable	708	19.3	19.6	91.7
	Very favourable	300	8.2	8.3	100.0
	Total	3604	98.4	100.0	
	Missing System	58	1.6		
Total		3662	100.0		

Has the respondent ever been apprehended by the police on the grounds of suspicion that he participated in fan conflicts or violence at sports events

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	3400	92.8	94.4	94.4
	Yes, only once	121	3.3	3.4	97.8
	Yes, several times	81	2.2	2.2	100.0
	Total	3602	98.4	100.0	
	Missing System	60	1.6		
Total		3662	100.0		

Have misdemeanour charges been filed against the respondent due to fan conflicts or violence at sports events

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	3476	94.9	96.2	96.2
	Yes, only once	71	1.9	2.0	98.2
	Yes, several times	65	1.8	1.8	100.0

Total		3612	98.6	100.0	
Missing System		50	1.4		
Total		3662	100.0		
Have criminal charges been filed against the respondent due to fan conflicts or violence at sports events					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	3478	95.0	96.8	96.8
	Yes, only once	68	1.9	1.9	98.7
	Yes, several times	47	1.3	1.3	100.0
	Total	3593	98.1	100.0	
	Missing System	69	1.9		
Total		3662	100.0		
Has the respondent been convicted of misdemeanours or criminal offences due to participation in fan conflicts or violence at sports events					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	135	3.7	3.7	3.7
	No	3466	94.6	96.3	100.0
	Total	3601	98.3	100.0	
	Missing System	61	1.7		
Total		3662	100.0		

Table 1 – Main sample characteristics

As it was expected, the majority of respondents came from Belgrade (617 or 16.7% of the sample). The fewest respondents were from Ivanjica (13 or 3.8%), which is somewhat unexpected⁹⁰. However, the reason should be sought in the fact that classes in secondary schools in Ivanjica number considerably fewer respondents than in other places, as a result of demographic trends in that municipality⁹¹. The majority of surveyed respondents attend grammar school (990 or 27.1%), and the smallest number of them attend secondary schools of mechanical engineering (115 or 3.1%). In terms of grades, classes and gender, the sample is equally distributed, without major oscillations. Most respondents (76.4%) are aged from 16 to 18, and 86.2% of them live with both parents. Somewhat above a half of respondents live in families with both employed parents (53.2%), while 157 (or 4.3%) are in a very bad financial situation, with both parents unemployed. The distribution of responses regarding the respondents' attitude towards the police is almost regular – most respondents have no attitude (neutral response),

⁹⁰ The smallest number of respondents was expected in Pećinci where only 8 classes were surveyed in one secondary school.

⁹¹ Based on official census data, population development in the Ivanjica municipality features unfavourable tendencies reflected in the deepening of total and natural depopulation, and demographic ageing. Under the 2002 census, there were 35,445 inhabitants in Ivanjica, down by 3.4% from the previous census, or 9.7% less compared to the 1971 census. In terms of the age structure, the bulk of population in Ivanjica shifts from young to middle-aged persons. According to the 2002 census, the population group under the age of 20 is on a significant decline – it fell by 47.7% compared to the 1971 census. In contrast, the number of persons above 60 has risen by 71.3%. Given these comparisons and the negative natural increase of -2.5, the Ivanjica municipality features the process of demographic ageing (Source: <http://www.ivanjica.gov.rs/ivanjica/stanovnistvo.html> – accessed on 18/10/2013).

while entirely negative and entirely positive attitudes accounted for the smallest shares (11.9% and 8.3%). However, 5.6% of respondents (cumulatively) had problems with the police – they were apprehended on the grounds of suspicion of participating in fan conflicts or violence at sports events. Misdemeanour charges were filed against 3.8% of respondents (cumulatively) due to fan conflicts or violence at sports events, while criminal charges were filed against 3.1% of respondents (cumulatively) on the same grounds. Also, 3.7% of respondents were convicted of misdemeanours or criminal offences due to participation in fan conflicts or violence at sports events.

Table 2 shows the respondents' attitude towards the police, by their residence.

What is the respondent's attitude towards the police						
			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Subotica	Valid	Very unfavourable	31	9.7	9.9	9.9
		Unfavourable	40	12.5	12.7	22.6
		Has no attitude	140	43.9	44.6	67.2
		Favourable	74	23.2	23.6	90.8
		Very favourable	29	9.1	9.2	100.0
		Total	314	98.4	100.0	
		Missing System	5	1.6		
	Total		319	100.0		
Pećinci	Valid	Very unfavourable	10	5.8	6.0	6.0
		Unfavourable	12	7.0	7.2	13.3
		Has no attitude	66	38.4	39.8	53.0
		Favourable	49	28.5	29.5	82.5
		Very favourable	29	16.9	17.5	100.0
		Total	166	96.5	100.0	
		Missing System	6	3.5		
	Total		172	100.0		
Kula	Valid	Very unfavourable	51	15.5	16.1	16.1
		Unfavourable	60	18.3	18.9	35.0
		Has no attitude	137	41.8	43.2	78.2
		Favourable	46	14.0	14.5	92.7
		Very favourable	23	7.0	7.3	100.0
		Total	317	96.6	100.0	
		Missing System	11	3.4		
	Total		328	100.0		
Novi Sad	Valid	Very unfavourable	38	17.0	17.6	17.6
		Unfavourable	33	14.7	15.3	32.9
		Has no attitude	102	45.5	47.2	80.1
		Favourable	19	8.5	8.8	88.9
		Very favourable	24	10.7	11.1	100.0
		Total	216	96.4	100.0	
		Missing System	8	3.6		

	Total		224	100.0		
Belgrade	Valid	Very unfavourable	80	13.1	13.2	13.2
		Unfavourable	123	20.1	20.2	33.4
		Has no attitude	286	46.7	47.0	80.4
		Favourable	92	15.0	15.1	95.6
		Very favourable	27	4.4	4.4	100.0
		Total	608	99.2	100.0	
		Missing System	5	.8		
	Total		613	100.0		
Smederevo	Valid	Very unfavourable	32	10.7	10.8	10.8
		Unfavourable	30	10.1	10.1	20.9
		Has no attitude	134	45.0	45.3	66.2
		Favourable	70	23.5	23.6	89.9
		Very favourable	30	10.1	10.1	100.0
		Total	296	99.3	100.0	
		Missing System	2	.7		
	Total		298	100.0		
Kragujevac	Valid	Very unfavourable	41	14.1	14.6	14.6
		Unfavourable	35	12.1	12.5	27.1
		Has no attitude	139	47.9	49.6	76.8
		Favourable	48	16.6	17.1	93.9
		Very favourable	17	5.9	6.1	100.0
		Total	280	96.6	100.0	
		Missing System	10	3.4		
	Total		290	100.0		
Jagodina	Valid	Very unfavourable	39	15.0	15.1	15.1
		Unfavourable	29	11.2	11.2	26.3
		Has no attitude	111	42.7	42.9	69.1
		Favourable	57	21.9	22.0	91.1
		Very favourable	23	8.8	8.9	100.0
		Total	259	99.6	100.0	
		Missing System	1	.4		
	Total		260	100.0		
Niš	Valid	Very unfavourable	36	9.7	9.8	9.8
		Unfavourable	81	21.9	22.1	32.0
		Has no attitude	182	49.2	49.7	81.7
		Favourable	46	12.4	12.6	94.3
		Very favourable	21	5.7	5.7	100.0
		Total	366	98.9	100.0	
		Missing System	4	1.1		
	Total		370	100.0		
Užice	Valid	Very unfavourable	26	7.9	7.9	7.9
		Unfavourable	69	20.8	20.8	28.7
		Has no attitude	127	38.4	38.4	67.1

		Favourable	76	23.0	23.0	90.0
		Very favourable	33	10.0	10.0	100.0
		Total	331	100.0	100.0	
Ivanjica	Valid	Very unfavourable	13	9.4	9.5	9.5
		Unfavourable	11	8.0	8.0	17.5
		Has no attitude	46	33.3	33.6	51.1
		Favourable	51	37.0	37.2	88.3
		Very favourable	16	11.6	11.7	100.0
		Total	137	99.3	100.0	
		Missing System	1	.7		
	Total		138	100.0		
Novi Pazar	Valid	Very unfavourable	31	9.7	9.9	9.9
		Unfavourable	50	15.7	15.9	25.8
		Has no attitude	125	39.2	39.8	65.6
		Favourable	80	25.1	25.5	91.1
		Very favourable	28	8.8	8.9	100.0
		Total	314	98.4	100.0	
		Missing System	5	1.6		
	Total		319	100.0		

Table 2 – Respondents' attitude towards the police; sample distribution by town

The χ^2 -test reveals a statistically significant difference in the frequency of responses regarding the respondents' attitude towards the police, by towns where the survey was conducted (χ^2 (44, $n=3604$) = 209.447, $p = 0.000$). Cramer's V coefficient equals 0.121, which indicates medium difference (Gravetter&Wallnau, 204, p. 605). In smaller towns (Ivanjica, Pećinci), respondents have a better opinion of the police, while the situation is opposite in bigger towns (Belgrade, Novi Sad).

6.2. ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH RESULTS

6.2.1. SUPPORTERS' AFFINITIES AND MEMBERSHIP OF FAN GROUPS

The first survey objective was to determine whether respondents support one of domestic clubs. The results are shown by Table 3.

What domestic club does the respondent support					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Spartak	48	1.3	1.6	1.6
	Partizan	1044	28.5	34.5	36.1
	Crvena zvezda	1312	35.8	43.4	79.5
	Radnički Bajmok	1	.0	.0	79.6
	Tavankut	1	.0	.0	79.6
	Donji Srem	17	.5	.6	80.2
	Vojvodina	57	1.6	1.9	82.1
	Hajduk	23	.6	.8	82.8
	Rad	32	.9	1.1	83.9

	OFK Belgrade	4	.1	.1	84.0
	BSK	3	.1	.1	84.1
	Smederevo	27	.7	.9	85.0
	Radnički (K)	82	2.2	2.7	87.7
	Radnički (N)	43	1.2	1.4	89.1
	Jagodina	20	.5	.7	89.8
	Sloboda	75	2.0	2.5	92.3
	Javor	16	.4	.5	92.8
	Novi Pazar	171	4.7	5.7	98.5
	Napredak (Kruševac)	1	.0	.0	98.5
	Polet (Sivac)	1	.0	.0	98.5
	Iskra	1	.0	.0	98.6
	Rusin (Ruski Krstur)	5	.1	.2	98.7
	Panonija (Lalić)	2	.1	.1	98.8
	Vrbas	2	.1	.1	98.9
	Sutjeska (Bačko Dobro Polje)	1	.0	.0	98.9
	Crvenka	1	.0	.0	98.9
	Zemun	3	.1	.1	99.0
	Krilas (Ćovdin)	1	.0	.0	99.1
	Mihailovac	1	.0	.0	99.1
	Sloga (Lugavčina)	1	.0	.0	99.1
	Vučak	1	.0	.0	99.2
	Bežanija (Belgrade)	1	.0	.0	99.2
	Bačka (Begeč)	1	.0	.0	99.2
	Novi Sad	3	.1	.1	99.3
	Jugović (Kač)	1	.0	.0	99.4
	Kabel (Novi Sad)	2	.1	.1	99.4
	Fruškogorac (Sremska Kamenica)	1	.0	.0	99.5
	Radnički (Sombor)	1	.0	.0	99.5
	Radnički (Ratkovo)	1	.0	.0	99.5
	Torlak (Kumodraž)	1	.0	.0	99.6
	Čukarički (Belgrade)	1	.0	.0	99.6
	Grafičar (Belgrade)	1	.0	.0	99.6
	Metalac (Gornji Milanovac)	1	.0	.0	99.7
	Lokomotiva (Lapovo)	1	.0	.0	99.7
	Jedinstvo Putevi	2	.1	.1	99.8
	Jedinstvo	1	.0	.0	99.8
	Metalac	1	.0	.0	99.8
	Miljuš	1	.0	.0	99.9
	Mladost Lučani	1	.0	.0	99.9
	Napredak	1	.0	.0	99.9
	Pukovac	1	.0	.0	100.0
	Vrtište	1	.0	.0	100.0
	Total	3022	82.5	100.0	
Missing	System	640	17.5		
Total		3662	100.0		

Table 3 – Distribution of respondents by the domestic club that they support

A large number of respondents – 3022 (or 82.5%) said they support one of the domestic clubs – 52 clubs were chosen in total. Of this, 48 respondents (or 1.6%) said they support some of the clubs that did not compete in Serbia's Super League in the 2012/13 season. Most respondents

(64.3%) support one of the two largest and most popular clubs in Serbia – Crvena zvezda and Partizan.

Is the respondent a member of a fan group		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	3123	85.3	86.1	86.1
	Yes	506	13.8	13.9	100.0
	Total	3629	99.1	100.0	
Missing	System	33	.9		
Total		3662	100.0		

Table 4 – Sample distribution based on whether respondents are members of fan groups or not

Of the total number of respondents, 506 (or 13.8%) said they are members of organised fan groups (Table 4), while 33 (0.9%) of them did not say whether they are members of fan groups. As the respondents who did not say whether they are members of fan groups gave answers to other survey questions, it may be concluded that they also belong to fan groups, but refused to admit this. Therefore, the research showed that a significant percentage of young persons (14.7%) join organised fan groups.

Total 93 fan groups were identified as follows (Table 5):

Respondent is a member of the following fan group:		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Marinci Subotica	15	.4	2.9	2.9
	AD Bajmok	1	.0	.2	3.1
	Trauma Zvezda's fans from Subotica	5	.1	1.0	4.1
	Delije Sever	110	3.0	21.6	25.7
	CZVNBGD	2	.1	.4	26.1
	Partizan	12	.3	2.4	28.4
	Užas Subotica	4	.1	.8	29.2
	Zabranjeni BG PFC	25	.7	4.9	34.1
	Grobari Aleksandrovo	2	.1	.4	34.5
	Alkatraz	28	.8	5.5	40.0
	Grobari Jug	14	.4	2.7	42.7
	Zelenaši	2	.1	.4	43.1
	South Guard	7	.2	1.4	44.5
	Delije Ruma	3	.1	.6	45.1
	Donji Srem	2	.1	.4	45.5
	Shadows	4	.1	.8	46.3
	Invalidi	1	.0	.2	46.5
	Južni Front	7	.2	1.4	47.8
	Jakuza	1	.0	.2	48.0
	Brigate 94	1	.0	.2	48.2
	Fanatici	1	.0	.2	48.4
	Anti Romi	1	.0	.2	48.6
	Grobari 1970	5	.1	1.0	49.6
	United Force	14	.4	2.7	52.4
	Banda	2	.1	.4	52.7
	Heroes	2	.1	.4	53.1
	Ultra Boys	1	.0	.2	53.3

Ultraši Mirijevo	1	.0	.2	53.5
Delije Taš	1	.0	.2	53.7
Belgrade Boys	3	.1	.6	54.3
Odred 18	1	.0	.2	54.5
Hijene	10	.3	2.0	56.5
Medvedi	11	.3	2.2	58.6
Pan Boys	2	.1	.4	59.0
Ajkule	1	.0	.2	59.2
Zulu iz Kulu	2	.1	.4	59.6
Meraklije	7	.2	1.4	61.0
Blue Tigers	1	.0	.2	61.2
Manijaci Turija	1	.0	.2	61.4
Tirani Sivic 1989	1	.0	.2	61.6
Ekstremi	26	.7	5.1	66.7
Torcida Sandžak	30	.8	5.9	72.5
Ultras	1	.0	.2	72.7
Kanabis Firm	2	.1	.4	73.1
Grobari Novi Sad	2	.1	.4	73.5
Taurunum Boys	3	.1	.6	74.1
Brigate 7	2	.1	.4	74.5
Ofanziva	1	.0	.2	74.7
Alco Boys	4	.1	.8	75.5
Armija 5	9	.2	1.8	77.3
Skizzati	2	.1	.4	77.6
Despoti	3	.1	.6	78.2
Đurađeva garda	4	.1	.8	79.0
Lugavčanski Jašari	1	.0	.2	79.2
Firma	12	.3	2.4	81.6
Grobari Kać	1	.0	.2	81.8
Korida	2	.1	.4	82.2
Pandora	1	.0	.2	82.4
Vojvode	1	.0	.2	82.5
Delije Veternik	1	.0	.2	82.7
Ivanjčani	2	.1	.4	83.1
Grobari Ivanjica	2	.1	.4	83.5
Grobari NBGD	1	.0	.2	83.7
40+	1	.0	.2	83.9
Iron Boys	2	.1	.4	84.3
Zargon Boys	1	.0	.2	84.5
Niški Kartel	8	.2	1.6	86.1
Nervno	5	.1	1.0	87.1
Freedom Fighters	11	.3	2.2	89.2
Četnici Sever	1	.0	.2	89.4
Delije Užice	4	.1	.8	90.2
Navijači Slobode sa istoka	1	.0	.2	90.4
Porno divizija	1	.0	.2	90.6
RUCZ	1	.0	.2	90.8
Crvena zvezda Veterani	1	.0	.2	91.0
Crveni đavoli	16	.4	3.1	94.1
DSRŽ	1	.0	.2	94.3
Grobari Ćuprija	1	.0	.2	94.5
Grobari Dorćol	1	.0	.2	94.7

	Grobari Paraćin	1	.0	.2	94.9
	JACZ Podmladak	11	.3	2.2	97.1
	Jagodinci	2	.1	.4	97.5
	Kormorani Lapovo	1	.0	.2	97.6
	Medveda	1	.0	.2	97.8
	Nišlije	5	.1	1.0	98.8
	Pivarska divizija	1	.0	.2	99.0
	Red Force	1	.0	.2	99.2
	Roninsi	1	.0	.2	99.4
	Štajga omladina	1	.0	.2	99.6
	Wild Boars	2	.1	.4	100.0
	Total	510	13.9	100.0	
Missing	System	3152	86.1		
Total		3662	100.0		

Table 5 – Distribution of respondents by fan group

The analysis of fan groups identified in the survey reveals several interesting facts concerning their names:

- fan groups are frequently linked to nationalistic, even chauvinistic attitudes and behaviour, and a large number of their names are in foreign languages, usually English, which is somewhat contradictory;
- fan group names may be classified into three categories: the so-called regular names – Delije, Crvena zvezda veterani, Partizan, Jagodinci etc; the so-called “silly” or humorous names – Zulu iz Kulu, Porno divizija, Nervno etc; and names associating with violence – Grobari, Marinci, Užas, Banda etc. The last group is, unfortunately, the most numerous.

Table 6 shows the number of fan groups supporting one club.

What fan group is the respondent a member of			Frequency	Percent
What domestic club does the respondent support				
Spartak	Valid	Marinci Subotica	14	29.2
	Missing	System	34	70.8
	Total		48	100.0
Partizan	Valid	Alkatraz	28	2.7
		Anti Romi	1	.1
		Grobari 1970	5	.5
		Grobari Aleksandrovo	2	.2
		Grobari Dorćol	1	.1
		Grobari Ivanjica	2	.2
		Grobari Jug	13	1.2
		Grobari Kać	1	.1
		Grobari NBGD	1	.1
		Grobari Novi Sad	2	.2
		Grobari Paraćin	1	.1
		Grobari Čuprija	1	.1
		Zabranjen BG PFC	24	2.3

		Južni Front	7	.7
		Niški Kartel	8	.8
		Ofanziva	1	.1
		Partizan	12	1.2
		South Guard	7	.7
		Shadows	4	.4
		Tirani Sivac 1989	1	.1
		Užas Subotica	4	.4
		Total	126	12.1
	Missing	System	916	87.9
	Total		1042	100.0
Crvena zvezda	Valid	Trauma, Zvezda's fans from Subotica	5	.4
		Delije Sever	109	8.3
		CZVNBGD	2	.2
		Zelenaši	2	.2
		Delije Ruma	3	.2
		Brigate 94	1	.1
		Banda	2	.2
		Heroes	2	.2
		Ultra Boys	1	.1
		Ultraši Mirjevo	1	.1
		Delije Taš	1	.1
		Belgrade Boys	3	.2
		Hijene	10	.8
		Ultras	1	.1
		Brigate 7	2	.2
		Armija 5	9	.7
		Delije Veternik	1	.1
		Ivanjčani	2	.2
		Iron Boys	2	.2
		Četnici Sever	1	.1
		Delije Užice	4	.3
		RUCZ	1	.1
		Crvena zvezda Veterani	1	.1
		DSRŽ	1	.1
		JACZ Podmladak	11	.8
		Nišlije	5	.4
		Roninsi	1	.1
		Total	184	14.0
	Missing	System	1126	86.0
	Total		1310	100.0
Radnički Bajmok	Valid	AD Bajmok	1	100.0
Tavankut	Missing	System	1	100.0
Donji Srem	Valid	Donji Srem	2	12.5

	Missing	System	14	87.5
	Total		16	100.0
Vojvodina	Valid	Firma	10	18.2
		Pandora	1	1.8
		Total	11	20.0
	Missing	System	44	80.0
	Total		55	100.0
Hajduk	Valid	Medvedi	4	28.0
		Zulu iz Kulu	2	8.0
		Total	9	36.0
	Missing	System	16	64.0
	Total		25	100.0
Rad	Valid	United Force	14	42.4
		Odred 18 (Rad)	1	3.0
		Total	15	45.5
	Missing	System	18	54.5
	Total		33	100.0
Smederevo	Valid	Alco Boys	4	14.8
		Skizzati	2	7.4
		Despoti	3	11.1
		Đurađeva garda	4	14.8
		Total	13	48.1
	Missing	System	14	51.9
	Total		27	100.0
Radnički (K)	Valid	Crveni đavoli	16	19.5
		Red Force	1	1.2
		Štajga omladina	1	1.2
		Total	18	22.0
	Missing	System	64	78.0
	Total		82	100.0
Radnički (N)	Valid	Meraklije	7	16.3
	Missing	System	36	83.7
	Total		43	100.0
Jagodina	Valid	Jagodinci	1	5.0
		Medveđa	1	5.0
		Pivarska divizija	1	5.0
		Total	3	15.0
	Missing	System	17	85.0
	Total		20	100.0
Sloboda	Valid	Nervno	5	6.6
		Freedom Fighters	11	14.5
		Navijači Slobode sa istoka	1	1.3
		porno divizija	1	1.3
		Total	18	23.7

	Missing	System	58	76.3
	Total		76	100.0
Novi Pazar	Valid	Ekstremi	26	14.9
		Torcida Sandžak	30	17.2
		Kanabis Firm	2	1.1
		Total	58	33.3
	Missing	System	116	66.7
	Total		174	100.0
Napredak (Kruševac)	Valid	Jakuza	1	100.0
Panonija (Lalić)	Valid	Pan Bojs	2	100.0
Vrbas	Valid	Ajkule	1	50.0
	Missing	System	1	50.0
	Total		2	100.0
Sutjeska (Bačko Dobro Polje)	Valid	Blue tigers	1	100.0
Zemun	Valid	Taurunum Boys	3	100.0
Sloga (Lugavčina)	Valid	Lugavčanski Jašari	1	100.0
Novi Sad	Valid	Korida	2	66.7
	Missing	System	1	33.3
	Total		3	100.0
Radnički (Sombor)	Valid	Vojvode	1	100.0
Čukarički (Belgrade)	Valid	Žargon Boys	1	100.0
Metalac	Valid	Kormorani Lapovo	1	100.0

Table 6 – Distribution of fan group members by clubs that they support

As shown in Table 6, there are many fan groups supporting the same club. This applies particularly to Crvena zvezda and Partizan, though smaller clubs also display the tendency of having several fan groups (Smederevo, Novi Pazar, Sloboda, Jagodina etc).

Earlier analyses enable the comparison of two groups of respondents that are highly significant for the research – those who belong to a fan group and other respondents. These comparisons underpin the majority of hypotheses, by identifying differences in groups after the sample is divided into fan group member and non-member respondents.

Once the sample characteristics presented in initial analyses are observed from the aspect of differences among groups of respondents belonging and those not belonging to fan groups, the following results are obtained (Table 7):

The town where the survey was conducted

Is the respondent a member of a fan group			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	Valid	Subotica	274	8.8	8.8	8.8
		Pećinci	141	4.5	4.5	13.3
		Kula	269	8.6	8.6	21.9
		Novi Sad	198	6.3	6.3	28.2
		Belgrade	515	16.5	16.5	44.7

		Smederevo	267	8.5	8.5	53.3
		Kragujevac	255	8.2	8.2	61.4
		Jagodina	204	6.5	6.5	68.0
		Niš	342	11.0	11.0	78.9
		Užice	290	9.3	9.3	88.2
		Ivanjica	119	3.8	3.8	92.0
		Novi Pazar	249	8.0	8.0	100.0
		Total	3123	100.0	100.0	
YES	Valid	Subotica	34	6.7	6.7	6.7
		Pećinci	27	5.3	5.3	12.1
		Kula	58	11.5	11.5	23.5
		Novi Sad	26	5.1	5.1	28.7
		Belgrade	94	18.6	18.6	47.2
		Smederevo	31	6.1	6.1	53.4
		Kragujevac	34	6.7	6.7	60.1
		Jagodina	56	11.1	11.1	71.1
		Niš	27	5.3	5.3	76.5
		Užice	37	7.3	7.3	83.8
		Ivanjica	15	3.0	3.0	86.8
		Novi Pazar	67	13.2	13.2	100.0
		Total	506	100.0	100.0	

The school where the survey was conducted

Is the respondent a member of a fan group			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
NO	Valid	Chemical-technological secondary school	133	4.3	4.3	4.3
		Polytechnic secondary school	141	4.5	4.5	8.8
		Secondary school of electrical engineering	141	4.5	4.5	13.3
		XII Belgrade grammar school	151	4.8	4.8	18.1
		V Belgrade grammar school	130	4.2	4.2	22.3
		IV Belgrade grammar school	111	3.6	3.6	25.8
		Secondary technical PTT school	123	3.9	3.9	29.8
		Secondary school of machine engineering	102	3.3	3.3	33.0
		Economic-catering secondary school	154	4.9	4.9	38.0
		Secondary technical school	115	3.7	3.7	41.7
		Economic-trade secondary school	221	7.1	7.1	48.7
		Technical secondary school	488	15.6	15.6	64.4
		Electrical engineering and construction secondary school	94	3.0	3.0	67.4
		Grammar school	481	15.4	15.4	82.8
		Textile-technological and agricultural secondary school	136	4.4	4.4	87.1
		Secondary school of economics	243	7.8	7.8	94.9
		Administrative-bureautechnical secondary school	159	5.1	5.1	100.0

Total			3123	100.0	100.0	
YES	Valid	Chemical-technological secondary school	16	3.2	3.2	3.2
		Polytechnic secondary school	18	3.6	3.6	6.7
		Secondary school of electrical engineering	27	5.3	5.3	12.1
		XII Belgrade grammar school	12	2.4	2.4	14.4
		V Belgrade grammar school	20	4.0	4.0	18.4
		IV Belgrade grammar school	28	5.5	5.5	23.9
		Secondary technical PTT school	34	6.7	6.7	30.6
		Secondary school of machine engineering	13	2.6	2.6	33.2
		Economic-catering secondary school	21	4.2	4.2	37.4
		Secondary technical school	37	7.3	7.3	44.7
		Economic-trade secondary school	59	11.7	11.7	56.3
		Technical secondary school	98	19.4	19.4	75.7
		Electrical engineering and construction secondary school	24	4.7	4.7	80.4
		Grammar school	46	9.1	9.1	89.5
		Textile-technological and agricultural secondary school	7	1.4	1.4	90.9
		Secondary school of economics	25	4.9	4.9	95.8
		Administrative-bureautechnical secondary school	21	4.2	4.2	100.0
		Total	506	100.0	100.0	

What grade does the respondent attend

Is the respondent a member of a fan group			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
NO	Valid	First	835	26.7	26.7	26.7
		Second	885	28.3	28.3	55.1
		Third	748	24.0	24.0	79.0
		Fourth	655	21.0	21.0	100.0
		Total	3123	100.0	100.0	
YES	Valid	First	169	33.4	33.4	33.4
		Second	167	33.0	33.0	66.4
		Third	105	20.8	20.8	87.2
		Fourth	65	12.8	12.8	100.0
		Total	506	100.0	100.0	

Respondent's gender

Is the respondent a member of a fan group			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
NO	Valid	Male	1570	50.3	50.4	50.4
		Female	1548	49.6	49.6	100.0
		Total	3118	99.8	100.0	
		Missing System	5	.2		
	Total		3123	100.0		
YES	Valid	Male	434	85.8	85.9	85.9
		Female	71	14.0	14.1	100.0

Total	505	99.8	100.0
Missing System	1	.2	
Total	506	100.0	

How old is the respondent

Is the respondent a member of a fan group			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
NO	Valid	14 years of age	9	.3	.3	.3
		15 years of age	476	15.2	15.3	15.6
		16 years of age	831	26.6	26.7	42.3
		17 years of age	840	26.9	27.0	69.2
		18 years of age	713	22.8	22.9	92.1
		19 years of age	245	7.8	7.9	100.0
		Total	3114	99.7	100.0	
		Missing System	9	.3		
Total		3123	100.0			
YES	Valid	14 years of age	1	.2	.2	.2
		15 years of age	88	17.4	17.4	17.6
		16 years of age	148	29.2	29.2	46.8
		17 years of age	156	30.8	30.8	77.7
		18 years of age	81	16.0	16.0	93.7
		19 years of age	32	6.3	6.3	100.0
		Total	506	100.0	100.0	
		Missing System				

Distribution of respondents by family situation

Is the respondent a member of a fan group			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
NO	Valid	Lives with both parents	2585	82.8	83.0	83.0
		Lives only with mother	371	11.9	11.9	94.9
		Lives only with father	116	3.7	3.7	98.6
		Does not live with parents, has a different family situation	44	1.4	1.4	100.0
		Total	3116	99.8	100.0	
	Missing System	7	.2			
Total		3123	100.0			
YES	Valid	Lives with both parents	414	81.8	82.0	82.0
		Lives only with mother	55	10.9	10.9	92.9
		Lives only with father	22	4.3	4.4	97.2
		Does not live with parents, has a different family situation	14	2.8	2.8	100.0
		Total	505	99.8	100.0	
	Missing System	1	.2			
Total		506	100.0			

Distribution of respondents by financial standing

Is the respondent a member of a fan group			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
NO	Valid	Both parents employed	1647	52.7	53.1	53.1

		Only mother employed	411	13.2	13.2	66.3
		Only father employed	746	23.9	24.0	90.3
		Neither mother nor father permanently employed and live hard	134	4.3	4.3	94.7
		Has other revenue to live on	166	5.3	5.3	100.0
		Total	3104	99.4	100.0	
		Missing System	19	.6		
	Total		3123	100.0		
YES	Valid	Both parents employed	284	56.1	56.5	56.5
		Only mother employed	56	11.1	11.1	67.6
		Only father employed	112	22.1	22.3	89.9
		Neither mother nor father permanently employed and live hard	22	4.3	4.4	94.2
		Has other revenue to live on	29	5.7	5.8	100.0
		Total	503	99.4	100.0	
		Missing System	3	.6		
	Total		506	100.0		

What is the respondent's attitude towards the police

Is the respondent a member of a fan group			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
No	Valid	Very unfavourable	292	9.3	9.5	9.5
		Unfavourable	474	15.2	15.4	24.9
		Has no attitude	1399	44.8	45.5	70.4
		Favourable	639	20.5	20.8	91.2
		Very favourable	272	8.7	8.8	100.0
		Total	3076	98.5	100.0	
		Missing System	47	1.5		
	Total		3123	100.0		
YES	Valid	Very unfavourable	128	25.3	25.7	25.7
		Unfavourable	94	18.6	18.9	44.6
		Has no attitude	185	36.6	37.1	81.7
		Favourable	65	12.8	13.1	94.8
		Very favourable	26	5.1	5.2	100.0
		Total	498	98.4	100.0	
		Missing System	8	1.6		
	Total		506	100.0		

Has the respondent ever been apprehended by the police on the grounds of suspicion that he participated in fan conflicts or violence at sports events

Is the respondent a member of a fan group			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
NO	Valid	No	2999	96.0	97.4	97.4
		Yes, only once	55	1.8	1.8	99.2
		Yes, several times	26	.8	.8	100.0
		Total	3080	98.6	100.0	

		Missing System	43	1.4		
	Total		3123	100.0		
YES	Valid	No	372	73.5	75.8	75.8
		Yes, only once	65	12.8	13.2	89.0
		Yes, several times	54	10.7	11.0	100.0
		Total	491	97.0	100.0	
		Missing System	15	3.0		
	Total		506	100.0		

Have misdemeanour charges been filed against the respondent due to fan conflicts or violence at sports events

Is the respondent a member of a fan group			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
NO	Valid	No	3029	97.0	98.2	98.2
		Yes, only once	35	1.1	1.1	99.3
		Yes, several times	22	.7	.7	100.0
		Total	3086	98.8	100.0	
		Missing System	37	1.2		
	Total		3123	100.0		
YES	Valid	No	418	82.6	84.4	84.4
		Yes, only once	35	6.9	7.1	91.5
		Yes, several times	42	8.3	8.5	100.0
		Total	495	97.8	100.0	
		Missing System	11	2.2		
	Total		506	100.0		

Have criminal charges been filed against the respondent due to fan conflicts or violence at sports events

Is the respondent a member of a fan group			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
NO	Valid	No	3030	97.0	98.6	98.6
		Yes, only once	30	1.0	1.0	99.5
		Yes, several times	14	.4	.5	100.0
		Total	3074	98.4	100.0	
		Missing System	49	1.6		
	Total		3123	100.0		
YES	Valid	No	419	82.8	85.9	85.9
		Yes, only once	37	7.3	7.6	93.4
		Yes, several times	32	6.3	6.6	100.0
		Total	488	96.4	100.0	
		Missing System	18	3.6		
	Total		506	100.0		

Has the respondent been convicted of misdemeanours or criminal offences due to participation in fan conflicts or violence at sports events

Is the respondent a member of a fan group			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
NO	Valid	Yes	71	2.3	2.3	2.3
		No	3008	96.3	97.7	100.0

Total			3079	98.6	100.0	
Missing System			44	1.4		
Total			3123	100.0		
YES	Valid	Yes	62	12.3	12.6	12.6
		No	429	84.8	87.4	100.0
		Total	491	97.0	100.0	
		Missing System	15	3.0		
	Total		506	100.0		

Table 7 – Descriptive statistics; sample distribution by the criterion of belonging to a fan group

The analysis of differences among respondent groups according to fan group membership/non-membership criteria revealed the following:

- the χ^2 -test reveals a statistically significant difference in the number (frequency) of fan group member and non-member respondents in terms of the distribution by towns (χ^2 (11, n=3629) = 55.733, p = 0.000). The Cramer's V coefficient equals 0.124, which implies a small difference (Gravetter&Wallnau, 204, p. 605). The greatest difference is noted in Belgrade relative to all other places as Belgrade has significantly more fan groups and their members than any other town in Serbia;
- The situation is the same in terms of the frequency of fan group member and non-member respondents, broken down by schools – χ^2 (16, n=3629) = 82.793, p = 0.000. The Cramer's V coefficient equals V = 0.151, which implies a small difference (Gravetter&Wallnau, 204, p. 605). Such result is expected as respondents are dispersed among a large number of schools, which is why there are differences in the number of fan group members by schools;
- Broken down by school grades, the χ^2 -test also shows a statistically significant difference between fan group member and non-member respondents: χ^2 (3, n=3629) = 26.651, p = 0.000. The Cramer's V coefficient equals 0.086, which implies a small difference, notably between junior and senior grades. Namely, most first- and second-grade students are members of fan groups, while this number declines in senior grades. This information is important as it signals the opportune time for launching violence prevention programmes at sports events;
- the χ^2 -test shows that there is no statistically significant difference in the number of fan group member and non-member respondents in terms of sample distribution by classes with the least number and classes with the largest number of absences;
- In terms of sample distribution by gender, the χ^2 -test also shows a statistically significant difference (with Yates' correction for continuity). The following values were obtained: χ^2 (1, n=3623) = 221.249, p = 0.000, with the fi coefficient equalling -0.248. Based on this coefficient, the difference may be characterised as small (Cohen, 1988). Nonetheless, it is clear that the male population is more inclined to joining fan groups, which should be taken into account in planning prevention programmes;
- the χ^2 -test reveals a statistically significant difference in terms of respondents' age (χ^2 (5, n=3620) = 15.551, p = 0.008). The Cramer's V coefficient equals 0.066, which implies a small difference (Gravetter&Wallnau, 204, p. 605);

- the χ^2 -test shows no statistically significant difference in the number of fan group member and non-member respondents in regard to their family and financial situation;
- In terms of respondents' attitude towards the police, the χ^2 -test also shows a statistically significant difference: χ^2 (4, n=3574) = 125.507, p = 0.000. The Cramer's V coefficient equals 0.187, which implies a small difference (Gravetter&Wallnau, 204, p. 605). The difference arises from a more unfavourable attitude towards the police of fan group members compared to the respondents not being members of fan groups;
- the χ^2 -test reveals a statistically significant difference in the number (frequency) between fan group member and non-member respondents in regard to whether the respondent has been apprehended by the police due to violence at sports events: χ^2 (2, n=3571) = 381.123, p = 0.000. The Cramer's V coefficient equals 0.327, which implies a medium difference (Gravetter&Wallnau, 204, p. 605) as fan group members were more frequently apprehended;
- In terms of whether misdemeanour charges were filed against fan group member and non-member respondents, the χ^2 -test also shows a statistically significant difference: χ^2 (2, n=3581) = 229.408, p = 0.000. The Cramer's V coefficient equals 0.253, which implies a small difference (Gravetter&Wallnau, 204, p. 605). The difference arises from the fact that misdemeanour charges were more frequently filed against fan group members due to fan conflicts or violence at sports events;
- the χ^2 -test reveals a statistically significant difference also in terms of whether criminal charges were filed against fan group member and non-member respondents (χ^2 (2, n=3562) = 226.156, p = 0.000). The Cramer's V coefficient equals 0.252, which implies a small difference (Gravetter&Wallnau, 204, p. 605) – criminal charges were more frequently filed against fan group members due to fan conflicts or violence at sports events;
- In terms of whether fan group member and non-member respondents were convicted of misdemeanours or criminal offences due to violence at sports events, the χ^2 -test also shows a statistically significant difference (with Yates' correction for continuity): χ^2 (1, n=3570) = 122.916, p = 0.000. The fi coefficient equals -0.188, which implies a small difference (Cohen, 1988). Regardless of this, it is clear that fan group members are more frequently convicted due to violence at sports events.

Another sample characteristic obtained through socialisation in the family and environment is the respondents' inclination to attend sports events (Table 8).

Does the respondent attend sports events				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes, regularly	546	14.9	15.1
	Yes, sometimes	1753	47.9	63.5
	Yes, but only when the team that I support plays	303	8.3	71.9
	Yes, but only when the team that I support plays as a host	134	3.7	75.6
	No, never	882	24.1	100.0
	Total	3618	98.8	100.0
	Missing System	44	1.2	

Total	3662	100.0
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Table 8 – Distribution of responses to the question “Do you attend sports events?”

According to Table 8, somewhat less than two thirds of respondents (62.8%) attend sports events regularly or sometimes. The results also show a decrease in the interest of young people in sports events as almost a fourth of respondents never visit sports events (24.1%). There are several assumptions: (1) a decline in physical activity and sports among the young weakens their interest in sports events; (2) violence and hooliganism at sports events weaken the young persons' interest in visiting sports events etc. These assumptions may be the starting point for future research.

Results of the χ^2 -test which compares whether there is a difference between responses to the above question between fan group member and non-member respondents are presented in Table 9.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	649.509 ^a	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	574.938	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	197.840	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	3587		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.54.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.426	.000
Cramer's V	.426	.000
N of Valid Cases	3587	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

DOES THE RESPONDENT ATTEND SPORTS EVENTS * IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP

Crosstabulation

			IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		Total
			NO	YES	
DOES THE RESPONDENT ATTEND SPORTS EVENTS	Yes, regularly	Count	306	236	542
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT ATTEND SPORTS EVENTS	56.5%	43.5%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	9.9%	47.2%	15.1%
		% of Total	8.5%	6.6%	15.1%
	Yes, sometimes	Count	1615	130	1745
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT ATTEND SPORTS EVENTS	92.6%	7.4%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	52.3%	26.0%	48.6%
		% of Total	45.0%	3.6%	48.6%
	Yes, but only when the team that I support plays	Count	201	98	299
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT ATTEND SPORTS EVENTS	67.2%	32.8%	100.0%

Total	Yes, but only when the team that I support plays as a host	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	6.5%	19.6%	8.3%
		% of Total	5.6%	2.7%	8.3%
		Count	114	19	133
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT ATTEND SPORTS EVENTS	85.7%	14.3%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	3.7%	3.8%	3.7%
		% of Total	3.2%	0.5%	3.7%
	No, never	Count	851	17	868
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT ATTEND SPORTS EVENTS	98.0%	2.0%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	27.6%	3.4%	24.2%
		% of Total	23.7%	0.5%	24.2%
		Count	3087	500	3587
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT ATTEND SPORTS EVENTS	86.1%	13.9%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	86.1%	13.9%	100.0%

Table 9 – χ^2 -test between respondents – members of fan groups and non-members by the number of responses to the question “Do you attend sports events?”

As shown in Table 9, the χ^2 -test reveals a statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses to the question “Do you attend sports events?” between fan group member and non-member respondents – $\chi^2 (4, n=3587) = 649.509, p = 0.000$. The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.426, which implies a medium difference (Gravetter&Wallnau, 204, p. 605). According to results, around a half of respondents who are fan group members attended or participated in some form of conflicts relating to sports. Such result is expected as it indicates that fan group members visit sports events much more frequently.

Table 10 shows the distribution of responses to the question “Why do you support a particular club?”

Why does the respondent support the club that he mentioned		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Because most members of my family support that club	837	22.9	27.4	27.4
	Because most of my friends support that club	270	7.4	8.8	36.2
	Because I like the colours of the club	268	7.3	8.8	45.0
	Because that club was very successful in the previous period	848	23.2	27.8	72.8
	Because my girlfriend/boyfriend supports that club	61	1.7	2.0	74.8
	Something else	771	21.1	25.2	100.0
	Total	3055	83.4	100.0	
Missing	System	607	16.6		
Total		3662	100.0		

Table 10 – Distribution of responses to the question “Why do you support a particular club?”

As presented in Table 10, there as an even distribution of three responses – “Because most members of my family support that club”, “Because that club was very successful in the previous period” and “Something else”. Under “Something else”, respondents usually mention local patriotic reasons – e.g. this is a club from my town (32.4%), reasons which may be classified under social interaction – e.g. in spite of my older brother/sister, girlfriend/boyfriend, or my boyfriend/girlfriend/neighbour/friend plays in that club etc. (21.7%), and thoroughly irrational reasons – e.g. one simply loves Partizan/Zvezda, Zvezda/Partizan is my life etc. (45.9%). Results of the analysis of differences between responses to this question by fan group member and non-member respondents are presented in Table 11.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	112.483 ^a	5	.000
Likelihood Ratio	107.077	5	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	65.929	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	3042		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.81.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.192	.000
Cramer's V	.192	.000
N of Valid Cases	3042	

WHY DOES THE RESPONDENT SUPPORT THE CLUB THAT HE MENTIONED * IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP

Crosstabulation

			IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		Total
			NO	YES	
WHY DOES THE RESPONDENT SUPPORT THE CLUB THAT HE MENTIONED	Because most members of my family support that club	Count	751	82	833
		% within WHY DOES THE RESPONDENT SUPPORT THE CLUB THAT HE MENTIONED	90.2%	9.8%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	29.4%	16.8%	27.4%
		% of Total	24.7%	2.7%	27.4%
	Because most of my friends support that club	Count	213	56	269
		% within WHY DOES THE RESPONDENT SUPPORT THE CLUB THAT HE MENTIONED	79.2%	20.8%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	8.3%	11.5%	8.8%

	% of Total	7.0%	1.8%	8.8%
Because I like the colours of the club	Count	239	27	266
	% within WHY DOES THE RESPONDENT SUPPORT THE CLUB THAT HE MENTIONED	89.8%	10.2%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	9.4%	5.5%	8.7%
	% of Total	7.9%	.9%	8.7%
Because that club was very successful in the previous period	Count	738	109	847
	% within WHY DOES THE RESPONDENT SUPPORT THE CLUB THAT HE MENTIONED	87.1%	12.9%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	28.9%	22.3%	27.8%
	% of Total	24.3%	3.6%	27.8%
Because my girlfriend/boyfriend supports that club	Count	54	7	61
	% within WHY DOES THE RESPONDENT SUPPORT THE CLUB THAT HE MENTIONED	88.5%	11.5%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	2.1%	1.4%	2.0%
	% of Total	1.8%	.2%	2.0%
Something else	Count	558	208	766
	% within WHY DOES THE RESPONDENT SUPPORT THE CLUB THAT HE MENTIONED	72.8%	27.2%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	21.9%	42.5%	25.2%
	% of Total	18.3%	6.8%	25.2%
Total	Count	2553	489	3042
	% within WHY DOES THE RESPONDENT SUPPORT THE CLUB THAT HE MENTIONED	83.9%	16.1%	100.0%

% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
% of Total	83.9%	16.1%	100.0%

Table 11 – χ^2 -test between respondents – members of fan groups and non-members by the number of responses to the question “Why do you support a particular club”

There is a statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses to the question “Why do you support a particular club” between fan group member and non-member respondents – χ^2 (5, n=3042) = 112.483, p = 0.000. The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.192, which implies a small difference (Gravetter&Wallnau, 204, p. 605). The greatest difference is reflected in the fact that fan group members answered this question rather with “Because most of my friends support that club” and “Something else”, which relates to the irrational group of answers. The analysis shows that fan group members, in choosing a club, are most affected by the environment outside of the family (people they socialise with), i.e. they are unable to rationally explain why they support a particular club.

Respondents were also asked the test question “What does it mean to you to support your club?”. The aim was to determine to what extent respondents, particularly fan group members, understand the essence of club support, as a social category accepted by society. The offered answers included: (1) physically conflicting with opposing fans; (2) conflicting with persons in charge of public order maintenance – members of the police, stewards and the security; (3) insulting opponents on the grounds of faith, skin colour or another trait, and physical violence; (4) use of cannon shots, “bengal” torches, firecrackers and other types of pyrotechnics; (5) encouragement of football players to achieve the best possible results, by chanting songs and slogans, and carrying fan equipment, instruments, drums, banners, shawls, flags; and (6) something else. Multiple answers were possible. Results are presented in Table 12.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulat ive Percent
Physically conflicting with opposing fans	147	4.0	4.0	4.0
Missing	3515	96.0	96.0	100.0
Total	3662	100.0	100.0	
Conflicting with persons in charge of public order maintenance – members of the police, stewards and security	71	1.9	1.9	1.9
Missing	3591	98.1	98.1	100.0
Total	3662	100.0	100.0	
Insulting opposing fans on the grounds of faith, skin colour or another trait, and physical	62	1.7	1.7	1.7

violence				
Missing	3600	98.3	98.3	100.0
Total	3662	100.0	100.0	
Use of cannon shots, "bengal" torches, firecrackers and other types of pyrotechnics	199	5.4	5.4	5.4
Missing	3463	94.6	94.6	100.0
Total	3662	100.0	100.0	
Encouragement of football players to achieve the best possible results, by chanting songs and slogans, and carrying fan equipment, instruments, drums, banners, shawls, flags...	2506	68.4	68.4	68.4
Missing	1156	31.6	31.6	100.0
Total	2506	68.4	68.4	68.4
Something else	229	6.3	6.3	6.3
Missing	3433	93.7	93.7	100.0
Total	229	6.3	6.3	6.3

Table 12 – Distribution of responses to the question "What does it mean to you to support your club?"

As shown in Table 12, more than two thirds of respondents (68.4%) correctly understand the very idea of supporting a club. However, almost a third of surveyed young persons do not know what socially acceptable behaviour of fans means. Besides, 5.4% of them believe this relates to the use of dangerous means whereby they may hurt themselves and others and thus cause significant material damage. Also, 6.3% give irrational responses – e.g. this is fun, because I am a supporter, I do not support – I live for Zvezda etc. On the other hand, 5.9% of respondents equate supporting with violence against opponents or enforcement authorities. This means that every 17th secondary school student in the Republic of Serbia believes that violence is equal to supporting at sports events, i.e. there are 1–2 such students in each class in Serbia's secondary schools (in statistical terms). If those who do not know how to answer the question and those who equate supporting with the use of pyrotechnics are added to respondents who are inclined to violence, we may conclude that each sixth secondary school student becomes a potential culprit of violent behaviour at sports events, i.e. there are around 5 such students in each class. This should be borne in mind when designing programmes for the prevention of hooliganism among the young since some sort of education about socially acceptable ways of club support is obviously indispensable. The comparison of the distribution of responses to the question "What does it mean to you to support your club?" by groups (fan group members and non-members), implemented through the χ^2 -test, produced the following results:

- there is a statistically significant difference in the number of responses "physically conflicting with opposing fans" between fan group member and non-member respondents (Table 13): χ^2 (1, n=3629) = 178.761, p = 0.000 (with Yates' correction for continuity). The fi coefficient equals -0.224 (Cohen, 1988), which implies a small difference – fan group member students gave more such responses;

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	182.025 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	178.761	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	124.798	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	181.975	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	3629				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 20.50.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	-.224	.000
Cramer's V	.224	.000
N of Valid Cases	3629	

**SUPPORTING MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT TO PHYSICALLY CONFLICT WITH OPPOSING FANS
* IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP**

Crosstabulation

			IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		Total
			NO	YES	
SUPPORTING MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT TO PHYSICALLY CONFLICT WITH OPPOSING FANS	YES	Count	71	76	147
		% within SUPPORTING MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT TO PHYSICALLY CONFLICT WITH OPPOSING FANS	48.3%	51.7%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	2.3%	15.0%	4.1%
		% of Total	2.0%	2.1%	4.1%
	NO	Count	3052	430	3482
		% within SUPPORTING MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT TO PHYSICALLY CONFLICT WITH OPPOSING FANS	87.7%	12.3%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	97.7%	85.0%	95.9%
		% of Total	84.1%	11.8%	95.9%
Total	Count		3123	506	3629
	% within SUPPORTING MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT TO PHYSICALLY CONFLICT WITH OPPOSING FANS		86.1%	13.9%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total		86.1%	13.9%	100.0%

Table 13 – χ^2 -test between respondents – members of fan groups and non-members by the number of responses
“Physically conflicting with opposing fans”

- there is a statistically significant difference also in the number of responses “conflicting with persons in charge of public order maintenance – members of the police, stewards and security” between fan group member and non-member respondents (Table 14): χ^2 (1, n=3629) = 112.105, p = 0.000 (with Yates’ correction for continuity). The fi coefficient equals -0.179, which implies a small difference (Cohen, 1988) – fan group member students gave more such responses;

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	115.799 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	112.105	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	76.155	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	115.767	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	3629				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.90.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	-.179	.000
Cramer's V	.179	.000
N of Valid Cases	3629	

SUPPORTING MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT TO CONFLICT WITH PERSONS IN CHARGE OF PUBLIC ORDER MAINTENANCE – MEMBERS OF THE POLICE, STEWARDS AND SECURITY
*** IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP**

Crosstabulation

			IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		Total
			NO	YES	
SUPPORTING MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT TO CONFLICT WITH PERSONS IN CHARGE OF PUBLIC ORDER MAINTENANCE – MEMBERS OF THE POLICE, STEWARDS AND SECURITY	YES	Count	30	41	71
		% within SUPPORTING MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT TO CONFLICT WITH PERSONS IN CHARGE OF PUBLIC ORDER MAINTENANCE – MEMBERS OF THE POLICE, STEWARDS AND SECURITY	42.3%	57.7%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	1.0%	8.1%	2.0%
		% of Total	.8%	1.1%	2.0%
	NO	Count	3093	465	3558
		% within SUPPORTING MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT TO CONFLICT WITH PERSONS IN CHARGE OF PUBLIC ORDER MAINTENANCE – MEMBERS OF THE POLICE, STEWARDS AND SECURITY	86.9%	13.1%	100.0%

	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	99.0%	91.9%	98.0%
	% of Total	85.2%	12.8%	98.0%
Total	Count	3123	506	3629
	% within SUPPORTING MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT TO CONFLICT WITH PERSONS IN CHARGE OF PUBLIC ORDER MAINTENANCE – MEMBERS OF THE POLICE, STEWARDS AND SECURITY	86.1%	13.9%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	86.1%	13.9%	100.0%

Table 14 – χ^2 -test between respondents – members of fan groups and non-members by the number of responses “Conflicting with persons in charge of public order maintenance – members of the police, stewards and security”

To ascertain whether respondents have the same interest in club and national team competitions, they were asked the question “Apart from supporting your club, do you watch matches of Serbia’s national team?”. Results are presented in Table 15.

Does the respondent watch matches of Serbia’s national team					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	I only follow my club, I am not interested in the national team	373	10.2	11.4	11.4
	I follow primarily my club, I watch the national team to a lesser extent	730	19.9	22.3	33.7
	I follow equally my own club and the national team	1546	42.2	47.2	80.8
	I follow primarily the national team, I follow clubs to a lesser extent	399	10.9	12.2	93.0
	I follow and support only the national team, I am not interested in clubs	229	6.3	7.0	100.0
	Total	3277	89.5	100.0	
Missing	System	385	10.5		
Total		3662	100.0		

Table 15 – Distribution of responses to the question “Apart from supporting your club, do you watch matches of Serbia’s national team?”

Results show that the respondents’ interest in club and team competitions is equal (almost normal distribution). However, there is a difference in responses between fan group members and non-members (Table 16).

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	156.092 ^a	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	198.319	4	.000

Linear-by-Linear Association	140.371	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	3262		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 34.96.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.219	.000
Cramer's V	.219	.000
Contingency Coefficient	.214	.000
N of Valid Cases	3262	

**DOES THE RESPONDENT FOLLLOW MATCHES OF SERBIA'S NATIONAL TEAM * IS THE
RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP**
Crosstabulation

			IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		Total
			NO	YES	
DOES THE RESPONDENT FOLLOW MATCHES OF SERBIA'S NATIONAL TEAM	I only follow my club, I am not interested in the national team	Count	280	91	371
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT FOLLLOW MATCHES OF SERBIA'S NATIONAL TEAM	75.5%	24.5%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	10.1%	18.3%	11.4%
		% of Total	8.6%	2.8%	11.4%
	I follow primarily my club, I watch the national team to a lesser extent	Count	553	172	725
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT FOLLLOW MATCHES OF SERBIA'S NATIONAL TEAM	76.3%	23.7%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	20.0%	34.5%	22.2%
		% of Total	17.0%	5.3%	22.2%
	I follow equally my own club and the national team	Count	1313	225	1538
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT FOLLLOW MATCHES OF SERBIA'S NATIONAL TEAM	85.4%	14.6%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	47.5%	45.2%	47.1%
		% of Total	40.3%	6.9%	47.1%
	I follow primarily the national team, I follow clubs to a lesser extent	Count	391	8	399
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT FOLLLOW MATCHES OF SERBIA'S NATIONAL TEAM	98.0%	2.0%	100.0%

		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	14.1%	1.6%	12.2%
		% of Total	12.0%	.2%	12.2%
	I follow and support only the national team, I am not interested in clubs	Count	227	2	229
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT FOLLOW MATCHES OF SERBIA'S NATIONAL TEAM	99.1%	.9%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	8.2%	.4%	7.0%
		% of Total	7.0%	.1%	7.0%
Total		Count	2764	498	3262
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT FOLLOW MATCHES OF SERBIA'S NATIONAL TEAM	84,7%	15.3%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	100,0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	84,7%	15.3%	100.0%

Table 16 – χ^2 -test between respondents – members of fan groups and non-members by the number of responses to the question “Apart from supporting your club, do you watch matches of Serbia’s national team?”

As shown in Table 16, the χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses to the question “Apart from supporting your club, do you watch matches of Serbia’s national team?” between fan group members and non-members – $\chi^2 (4, n=3262) = 156.092, p = 0.000$. The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.219, which implies a small difference (Gravetter&Wallnaua, 204, p. 605). The difference appears in responses “I only follow my club, I am not interested in the national team” and “I follow primarily my club, I watch the national team to a lesser extent” – these responses were more frequent with fan group members. The difference is also present in responses “I follow primarily the national team, I follow clubs to a lesser extent” and “I follow and support only the national team, I am not interested in clubs” – these responses were more frequent with non-members. Such result is more or less expected.

Whether fan group members socialise with their peers who support other sports clubs was analysed based on the distribution of responses to the question “My best friend...” – the offered responses included: (1) Fervently supports the same club as I do; (2) Fervently supports another club; (3) Supports a club, but is not a fervent supporter; (4) Does not support any club, and (5) I do not have a best friend. Table 17 shows the distribution of responses.

My best friend:

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Fervently supports the same club as I do	751	20.5	21.0	21.0
	Fervently supports another club	615	16.8	17.2	38.2
	Supports a club, but is not a fervent supporter	1264	34.5	35.4	73.6

Does not support any club	736	20.1	20.6	94.2
I do not have a best friend	207	5.7	5.8	100.0
Total	3573	97.6	100.0	
Missing System	89	2.4		
Total	3662	100.0		

Table 17 – Distribution of responses to the question “My best friend is this type of a supporter”

The results from Table 17 do not suggest conclusions important for the research topic, apart from showing that a significant number of respondents (5.7%) state they do not have the best friend, which indicates the asocial spirit and alienation among the young. There is a difference among responses given by fan group member and non-member respondents also in regard to this question (Table 18).

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	381.784 ^a	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	353.466	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	256.007	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	3553		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 28.96.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.328	.000
Cramer's V	.328	.000
Contingency Coefficient	.311	.000
N of Valid Cases	3553	

MY BEST FRIEND IS THIS TYPE OF A SUPPORTER * IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP

Crosstabulation

			IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		Total
			NO	YES	
MY BEST FRIEND IS THIS TYPE OF A SUPPORTER	Fervently supports the same club as I do	Count	490	257	747
		% within MY BEST FRIEND IS THIS TYPE OF A SUPPORTER	65.6%	34.4%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	16.1%	51.2%	21.0%
		% of Total	13.8%	7.2%	21.0%
	Fervently supports another club	Count	505	108	613
		% within MY BEST FRIEND IS THIS TYPE OF A SUPPORTER	82.4%	17.6%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	16.6%	21.5%	17.3%
		% of Total	14.2%	3.0%	17.3%

Supports a club, but is not a fervent supporter	Count	1185	69	1254
	% within MY BEST FRIEND IS THIS TYPE OF A SUPPORTER	94.5%	5.5%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	38.8%	13.7%	35.3%
	% of Total	33.4%	1.9%	35.3%
Does not support any club	Count	694	40	734
	% within MY BEST FRIEND IS THIS TYPE OF A SUPPORTER	94.6%	5.4%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	22.7%	8.0%	20.7%
	% of Total	19.5%	1.1%	20.7%
I do not have a best friend	Count	177	28	205
	% within MY BEST FRIEND IS THIS TYPE OF A SUPPORTER	86.3%	13.7%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	5.8%	5.6%	5.8%
	% of Total	5.0%	.8%	5.8%
Total	Count	3051	502	3553
	% within MY BEST FRIEND IS THIS TYPE OF A SUPPORTER	85.9%	14.1%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	85.9%	14.1%	100.0%

Table 18 – χ^2 -test between respondents – members of fan groups and non-members by the number of responses to the question “My best friend is this type of a supporter“

As shown in Table 18, the χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses to the question “My best friend is this type of a supporter“ between fan group members and non-members – χ^2 (4, n=3553) = 381.784, p = 0.000. The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.328, which implies a medium difference (Gravetter&Wallnaua, 204, p. 605). Results show that fan group members socialise much more with peers fervently supporting the same club, and socialise much less with those who do not show great interest in sports. It is interesting that fan group members socialise to a very similar degree with their peers who fervently support another club, just like the total population of respondents. Furthermore, the asocial spirit and alienation, indicated in the entire sample, are stronger among fan group members.

6.2.2. RESPONDENTS’ ATTITUDE TOWARDS SCHOOL

The first control question aiming to determine the respondents’ seriousness and maturity was: “What does school mean to you?”. The offered answers included: (1) School means boredom; (2) School is the place where I socialise well; (3) I create in school conditions for my future, and (4) School means less to me than the club that I support. Multiple answers were possible. Results are shown in Table 19.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid	Cumulative
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			Percent	Percent
School means boredom	427	11.7	100.0	100.0
Missing	3235	88.3		
Total	3662	100.0		
School means the place where students socialise well	954	26.1	100.0	100.0
Missing	2708	73.9		
Total	3662	100.0		
School means the place where conditions for a better future are created	2267	61.9	100.0	100.0
Missing	1395	38.1		
Total	3662	100.0		
School means less than the club that the respondent supports	241	6.6	100.0	100.0
Missing	3421	93.4		
Total	3662	100.0		

Table 19 – Distribution of responses to the question “What does school mean to you?”

Most respondents have a positive attitude towards school as the place where they set the foundations of their own future (61.9%) or the place where they socialise well (26.1%) (cumulatively 88%). However, more than a sixth of respondents (cumulatively 18.3%) have a negative attitude towards school, which in national terms represents a serious problem which indicates the erosion of traditional social values. The analysis of differences among responses to this question, given by fan group members and non-members, showed the following:

- the χ^2 -test proved that there is no statistically significant difference in the number of responses “school means boredom” and “school is the place where I socialise well” between fan group member and non-member respondents;
- there is a statistically significant difference in the number of responses “I create in school conditions for my future” between fan group member and non-member respondents, as follows (Table 9): χ^2 (1, n=3629) = 84.865, $p = 0.000$ (with Yates’ correction). The fi coefficient equals 0.154, which indicates a small difference (Cohen, 1988) – fan group non-members gave more such responses.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	85.777 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	84.865	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	83.246	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	85.753	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	3629				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 193.11.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.154	.000
	Cramer's V	.154	.000
N of Valid Cases		3629	

SCHOOL MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT THE PLACE WHERE CONDITIONS FOR A BETTER FUTURE ARE CREATED * IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP

Crosstabulation

			IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		Total
			NO	YES	
SCHOOL MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT THE PLACE WHERE CONDITIONS FOR A BETTER FUTURE ARE CREATED	YES	Count	2025	219	2244
		% within SCHOOL MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT THE PLACE WHERE CONDITIONS FOR A BETTER FUTURE ARE CREATED	90.2%	9.8%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	64.8%	43.3%	61.8%
		% of Total	55.8%	6.0%	61.8%
	NO	Count	1098	287	1385
		% within SCHOOL MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT THE PLACE WHERE CONDITIONS FOR A BETTER FUTURE ARE CREATED	79.3%	20.7%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	35.2%	56.7%	38.2%
		% of Total	30.3%	7.9%	38.2%
	Total	Count	3123	506	3629
		% within SCHOOL MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT THE PLACE WHERE CONDITIONS FOR A BETTER FUTURE ARE CREATED	86.1%	13.9%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	86.1%	13.9%	100.0%

Table 20 – χ^2 -test between respondents – members of fan groups and non-members by the number of responses “I create in school conditions for my future”

- there is a statistically significant difference also in the number of responses “School means less to me than the club that I support” between fan group members and non-

members, as follows (Table 21): χ^2 (1, n=3629) = 394.762, p = 0.000 (with Yates' correction). The fi coefficient equals -0.331, which implies a medium difference (Cohen, 1988) – fan group members gave more such responses.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	398.603 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	394.762	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	271.069	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	398.493	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	3629				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 33.46.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	-.331	.000
Cramer's V	.331	.000
N of Valid Cases	3629	

SCHOOL MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT LESS THAN THE CLUB THAT HE SUPPORTS * IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP

Crosstabulation

			IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		Total
			NO	YES	
SCHOOL MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT LESS THAN THE CLUB THAT HE SUPPORTS	DA	Count	103	137	240
		% within SCHOOL MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT LESS THAN THE CLUB THAT HE SUPPORTS	42.9%	57.1%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	3.3%	27.1%	6.6%
		% of Total	2.8%	3.8%	6.6%
	NE	Count	3020	369	3389
		% within SCHOOL MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT LESS THAN THE CLUB THAT HE SUPPORTS	89.1%	10.9%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	96.7%	72.9%	93.4%
		% of Total	83.2%	10.2%	93.4%
Total	Count	3123	506	3629	
	% within SCHOOL MEANS FOR THE RESPONDENT LESS THAN THE CLUB THAT HE SUPPORTS	86.1%	13.9%	100.0%	

% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
% of Total	86.1%	13.9%	100.0%

Table 21 – χ^2 -test between respondents – members of fan groups and non-members by the number of responses “School means to me less than the club that I support”

Judging by the above results, students who are not members of fan groups esteem more the traditional system of values where education and knowledge represent a significant resource. In contrast, fan group members believe that belonging to a fan group (which they very often consider a significant element with a great impact on social developments) is more valuable than traditional virtues (knowledge, education and upbringing).

An indicator of deviant behaviour of the young is a higher number of school absences. To determine whether this applies also to violence and hooliganism among the young, respondents were asked the question “Have you ever missed classes to attend sports events?”. The distribution of responses to this question is presented in Table 22.

Have you ever missed classes to attend sports events?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Never	1724	47.1	47.8	47.8
Only once	495	13.5	13.7	61.6
Only when my team plays as a guest	88	2.4	2.4	64.0
I do that regularly	278	7.6	7.7	71.7
Sometimes	1020	27.9	28.3	100.0
Total	3605	98.4	100.0	
Missing System	57	1.6		
Total	3662	100.0		

Table 22 – Distribution of responses to the question “Have you ever missed classes to attend sports events?”

Most respondents answered with “never” – 47.1%, followed with “sometimes” – 27.9%, which indicates that sports events are not a significant reason behind an increased number of absences. Table 23 shows results of the comparison between fan group member and non-member respondents.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	458.492 ^a	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	423.092	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	272.570	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	3577		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.28.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.358	.000
Cramer's V	.358	.000
N of Valid Cases	3577	

HAVE YOU EVER MISSED CLASSES TO ATTEND SPORTS EVENTS * IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP
Crosstabulation

			IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		Total
			NO	YES	
HAVE YOU EVER MISSED CLASSES TO ATTEND SPORTS EVENTS	Never	Count	1638	69	1707
		% within HAVE YOU EVER MISSED CLASSES TO ATTEND SPORTS EVENTS	96.0%	4.0%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	53.3%	13.7%	47.7%
		% of Total	45.8%	1.9%	47.7%
	Only once	Count	435	57	492
		% within HAVE YOU EVER MISSED CLASSES TO ATTEND SPORTS EVENTS	88.4%	11.6%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	14.2%	11.3%	13.8%
		% of Total	12.2%	1.6%	13.8%
	Only when my team plays as a guest	Count	57	30	87
		% within HAVE YOU EVER MISSED CLASSES TO ATTEND SPORTS EVENTS	65.5%	34.5%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	1.9%	5.9%	2.4%
		% of Total	1.6%	.8%	2.4%
	I do that regularly	Count	150	128	278
		% within HAVE YOU EVER MISSED CLASSES TO ATTEND SPORTS EVENTS	54.0%	46.0%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	4.9%	25.3%	7.8%
		% of Total	4.2%	3.6%	7.8%
	Sometimes	Count	792	221	1013
		% within HAVE YOU EVER MISSED CLASSES TO ATTEND SPORTS EVENTS	78.2%	21.8%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	25.8%	43.8%	28.3%
		% of Total	22.1%	6.2%	28.3%
Total		Count	3072	505	3577
		% within HAVE YOU EVER MISSED CLASSES TO ATTEND SPORTS EVENTS	85.9%	14.1%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	85.9%	14.1%	100.0%

Table 23 – χ^2 -test between respondents – members of fan groups and non-members by the number of responses to the question “Have you ever missed classes to attend sports events?”

As shown in Table 23, the χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses to the question “Have you ever missed classes to attend sports events?” between fan group member and non-member respondents – χ^2 (4, n=3577) = 458.492, p = 0.000. The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.358, which implies a medium difference (Gravetter&Wallnaua, 2004, p. 605). Fan group members more frequently answer with “I do that regularly” and “Only when my team plays as a guest”, which is why, at the individual level, an increase in the number of absences may indicate that the student is in contact with fan groups. This is particularly true if absences correlate with days of sports events. However, it should be underscored again that school absences may be an indicator only at the individual level. The previous comparison of groups by classes with the largest and smallest number of absences, divided into fan group members and non-members, does not show a statistically significant difference.

6.2.3. RESPONDENTS’ ATTITUDE TOWARDS EDUCATION ABOUT VIOLENT BEHAVIOUR AND HOOLIGANISM AT SPORTS EVENTS

To ascertain to what extent young people are properly familiarised with hooliganism and violence at sports events, respondents were asked the question: “Has anyone ever presented to you in school the problem of violence at sports events (legal rules, stipulated sanctions for violence at sports events, consequences: the number of injured or killed persons, punishments for teams in the country and at European competitions etc)?”. Table 24 shows the distribution of responses.

Has anyone ever presented to the respondent in school the problem of violence at sports events					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	2666	72.8	75.4	75.4
	Yes, teachers	353	9.6	10.0	85.4
	Yes, police officers	517	14.1	14.6	100.0
	Total	3536	96.6	100.0	
Missing	System	126	3.4		
Total		3662	100.0		

Table 24 – Distribution of responses to the question “Has anyone ever presented to you in school the problem of violence at sports events?”

According to results, a vast majority of respondents (72.8%) have never been educated in school about hooliganism and violence at sports events. Members of police forces have engaged themselves most in such kind of education in secondary schools (based on respondents’ answers) – in Smederevo (21.8%), Užice (20.5%) and Novi Sad (18.3%). They have engaged themselves the least in Subotica (11.0%), Pećinci (11.0%), Novi Pazar (8.2%) and Kula (7.6%) (Table 21). Teachers are most engaged in educating children about this issue in Pećinci (14.0%), Novi Pazar (12.2%) and Belgrade (11.6%), and the least in Kragujevac (7.6%), Niš (6.8%) and Jagodina (3.8%). Education takes place most often during civil education, homeroom and physical education classes. In general, it may be concluded that there are very few programmes in Serbian secondary schools aimed at the pre-emption of hooliganism and violent behaviour at sports events.

TOWN WHERE THE SURVEY WAS CONDUCTED	Yes, police officers		Yes, teachers	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Subotica	35	11.0	36	11.3
Pećinci	19	11.0	24	14.0
Kula	25	7.6	30	9.1
Novi Sad	41	18.3	18	8.0
Belgrade	108	17.6	71	11.6
Smederevo	65	21.8	31	10.4
Kragujevac	38	13.1	22	7.6
Jagodina	31	11.9	10	3.8
Niš	44	11.9	25	6.8
Užice	68	20.5	35	10.6
Ivanjica	17	12.3	12	8.7
Novi Pazar	26	8.2	39	12.2

Table 25 – Distribution of responses “Yes, police officers” and “Yes, teachers” to the question “Has anyone ever presented to you in school the problem of violence at sports events?”; by towns where the survey was conducted

The difference in the distribution of responses between fan group member and non-member respondents was ascertained by the χ^2 -test. Results are presented in Table 26.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	62.950 ^a	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	55.409	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	60.325	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	3511		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 49.23.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.134	.000
Cramer's V	.134	.000
N of Valid Cases	3511	

HAS ANYONE EVER PRESENTED TO THE RESPONDENT IN SCHOOL THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS? * IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP

Crosstabulation

	IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		Total
	NO	YES	

HAS ANYONE EVER PRESENTED TO THE RESPONDENT IN SCHOOL THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS?	No	Count	2336	310	2646
		% within HAS ANYONE EVER PRESENTED TO THE RESPONDENT IN SCHOOL THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS	88.3%	11.7%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	77.4%	63.1%	75.4%
		% of Total	66.5%	8.8%	75.4%
	Yes, teachers	Count	299	53	352
		% within HAS ANYONE EVER PRESENTED TO THE RESPONDENT IN SCHOOL THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS	84.9%	15.1%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	9.9%	10.8%	10.0%
		% of Total	8.5%	1.5%	10.0%
	Yes, police officers	Count	385	128	513
		% within HAS ANYONE EVER PRESENTED TO THE RESPONDENT IN SCHOOL THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS	75.0%	25.0%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	12.7%	26.1%	14.6%
		% of Total	11.0%	3.6%	14.6%
Total		Count	3020	491	3511
		% within HAS ANYONE EVER PRESENTED TO THE RESPONDENT IN SCHOOL THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS	86.0%	14.0%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	86.0%	14.0%	100.0%

Table 26 – χ^2 -test between respondents – members of fan groups and non-members by the number of responses to the question “Has anyone ever presented to you in school the problem of violence at sports events?”

As shown in Table 26, the χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses to the question “Has anyone ever presented to you in school the problem of violence at sports events (legal rules, stipulated sanctions for violence at sports events, consequences: the number of injured or killed persons, punishments for teams in the country and at European competitions etc)?” between fan group member and non-member respondents – χ^2 (2, n=3511) = 62.95, $p = 0.000$. The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.134, which implies a small difference (Gravetter&Wallnaua, 2004, p. 605). Judging by the results, fan group members more frequently say that they have been educated about hooliganism and violent behaviour in school. The difference is particularly pronounced in the response “Yes, police officers” – more than one fourth of respondents (26.1%) chose that response. The results may be interpreted in different ways, but are certainly illogical as the same responses are not obtained among respondents of the

same grade, class and school. The reasons may different, but fan group members are most probably especially interested in this topic and therefore better remember such education, while the remaining population is indifferent towards this issue. This is confirmed by the results of the distribution of responses to the question “Do you believe it would be useful if someone presented to you in school the problem of violence at sports events, particularly legal rules and sanctions for violence?” (Table 23).

Does the respondent believe it would be useful if someone presented to him in school the problem of violence at sports events, particularly legal rules and sanctions for violence?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes, it would be very useful	1224	33.4	34.2	34.2
	Yes, it would be particularly useful if police officers presented this to us as they most frequently deal with such violence	668	18.2	18.7	52.9
	Yes, it would be useful if our teachers presented this to us	174	4.8	4.9	57.8
	No, I am not interested	833	22.7	23.3	81.1
	No, because we are sufficiently familiar with such violence	677	18.5	18.9	100.0
	Total	3576	97.7	100.0	
Missing	System	86	2.3		
Total		3662	100.0		

Table 23 – Distribution of responses to the question “Do you believe it would be useful if someone presented to you in school the problem of violence at sports events, particularly legal rules and sanctions for violence?”

According to results obtained, 41.2% of respondents are not interested in school education about violence at sports events. The χ^2 -test shows that fan group members are particularly uninterested in such education.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	123.498 ^a	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	111.904	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	93.594	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	3545		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24.39.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.187	.000
	Cramer's V	.187	.000
N of Valid Cases		3545	

DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF SOMEONE PRESENTED TO HIM IN SCHOOL THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS, PARTICULARLY LEGAL RULES AND SANCTIONS FOR VIOLENCE * IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP

Crosstabulation

			IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		Total
			NO	YES	
DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF SOMEONE PRESENTED TO HIM IN SCHOOL THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS, PARTICULARLY LEGAL RULES AND SANCTIONS FOR VIOLENCE	Yes, it would be very useful	Count	1091	117	1208
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF SOMEONE PRESENTED TO HIM IN SCHOOL THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS, PARTICULARLY LEGAL RULES AND SANCTIONS FOR VIOLENCE	90.3%	9.7%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	35.8%	23.5%	34.1%
		% of Total	30.8%	3.3%	34.1%
	Yes, it would be particularly useful if police officers presented this to us as they most frequently deal with such violence	Count	606	59	665
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF SOMEONE PRESENTED TO HIM IN SCHOOL THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS, PARTICULARLY LEGAL RULES AND SANCTIONS FOR VIOLENCE	91.1%	8.9%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	19.9%	11.9%	18.8%
		% of Total	17.1%	1.7%	18.8%
	Yes, it would be useful if our teachers presented this to us	Count	154	20	174
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF SOMEONE PRESENTED TO HIM IN SCHOOL THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS, PARTICULARLY LEGAL RULES AND SANCTIONS FOR VIOLENCE	88.5%	11.5%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	5.1%	4.0%	4.9%
		% of Total	4.3%	.6%	4.9%
	No, I am not interested	Count	704	122	826
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF SOMEONE PRESENTED TO HIM IN SCHOOL THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS, PARTICULARLY LEGAL RULES AND SANCTIONS FOR VIOLENCE	85.2%	14.8%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	23.1%	24.5%	23.3%
		% of Total	19.9%	3.4%	23.3%

No, because we are sufficiently familiar with such violence	Count	493	179	672
	% within DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF SOMEONE PRESENTED TO HIM IN SCHOOL THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS, PARTICULARLY LEGAL RULES AND SANCTIONS FOR VIOLENCE	73.4%	26.6%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	16.2%	36.0%	19.0%
	% of Total	13.9%	5.0%	19.0%
Total	Count	3048	497	3545
	% within DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF SOMEONE PRESENTED TO HIM IN SCHOOL THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS, PARTICULARLY LEGAL RULES AND SANCTIONS FOR VIOLENCE	86.0%	14.0%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	86.0%	14.0%	100.0%

Table 24 – χ^2 -test between respondents – members of fan groups and non-members by the number of responses to the question “Do you believe it would be useful if someone presented to you in school the problem of violence at sports events, particularly legal rules and sanctions for violence?”

As shown in Table 24, the χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses to the question “Do you believe it would be useful if someone presented to you in school the problem of violence at sports events, particularly legal rules and sanctions for violence?” between fan group member and non-member respondents – $\chi^2 (4, n=3545) = 123.498$, $p = 0.000$. The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.187, which implies a small difference (Gravetter&Wallnau, 2004, p. 605). The greatest difference arises from the fact that fan group members do not want additional education about hooliganism and violence at sports events. This can be explained by the fact that fan group members believe they know enough about this social problem and its consequences (Table 26).

Does the respondent believe he is sufficiently familiar with legal rules on violence at sports events?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes, I am fully familiar	752	20.5	20.9
	I am familiar with some aspects	2482	67.8	90.0
	I am not familiar at all	361	9.9	100.0
	Total	3595	98.2	100.0
Missing	System	67	1.8	
Total		3662	100.0	

Table 26 – Distribution of responses to the question “Do you believe you are sufficiently familiar with legal rules on violence at sports events?”

Most respondents (67.8%) believe they know something about legal rules on violence at sports events. However, the χ^2 -test (Table 26) gives a somewhat different picture which explains the results obtained.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	212.150 ^a	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	192.815	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	190.244	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	3565		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 49.91.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.244	.000
Cramer's V	.244	.000
N of Valid Cases	3565	

DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE HE IS SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH LEGAL RULES ON VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS * IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP

Crosstabulation

			IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		Total
			NO	YES	
DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE HE IS SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH LEGAL RULES ON VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS	Yes, I am fully familiar	Count	520	222	742
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE HE IS SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH LEGAL RULES ON VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS	70.1%	29.9%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	16.9%	44.7%	20.8%
		% of Total	14.6%	6.2%	20.8%
	I am familiar with some aspects	Count	2203	262	2465
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE HE IS SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH LEGAL RULES ON VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS	89.4%	10.6%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	71.8%	52.7%	69.1%
		% of Total	61.8%	7.3%	69.1%
	I am not familiar at all	Count	345	13	358
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE HE IS SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH LEGAL RULES ON VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS	96.4%	3.6%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	11.2%	2.6%	10.0%
		% of Total	9.7%	.4%	10.0%

Total	Count	3068	497	3565
	% within DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE HE IS SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH LEGAL RULES ON VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS	86.1%	13.9%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	86.1%	13.9%	100.0%

Table 26 – χ^2 -test between respondents – members of fan groups and non-members by the number of responses to the question “Do you believe you are sufficiently familiar with legal rules on violence at sports events?”

As shown in Table 26, the χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses to the question “Do you believe you are sufficiently familiar with legal rules on violence at sports events?” between fan group member and non-member respondents – χ^2 (2, $n=3565$) = 212.150, $p = 0.000$. The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.244, which implies a small difference (Gravetter&Wallnau, 2004, p. 605). The test results show that fan group members believe, to a significantly higher extent, that they are fully familiar with legal rules on violence at sports events. This may also account for their rejection of additional school education about hooliganism and violence at sports events.

6.2.4. RESPONDENTS’ PARTICIPATION IN VIOLENT BEHAVIOUR AND HOOLIGANISM AT SPORTS EVENTS

To ascertain the extent of their participation in violence motivated by sports hooliganism, secondary school students were asked the question “Have there been fan fights or similar conflicts in your school (classrooms, schoolyard, near the school)?”. The distribution of responses is presented in Table 27.

Have there been fan fights or similar conflicts in the respondent’s school (classrooms, schoolyard, near the school)					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	2266	61.9	63.3	63.3
	Yes, only once	382	10.4	10.7	73.9
	Yes, several times	933	25.5	26.1	100.0
	Total	3581	97.8	100.0	
Missing	System	81	2.2		
Total		3662	100.0		

Table 27 – Distribution of responses to the question “Have there been fan fights or similar conflicts in your school (classrooms, schoolyard, near the school)?”

Almost 40% of respondents witnessed or participated in some form of violence motivated by sports hooliganism in the school or its environs. This is serious information, indicating that this type of violence is widespread among secondary school students. The χ^2 -test shows that fan group members take the lead.

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	38.659 ^a	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	36.909	2	.000

Linear-by-Linear Association	38.597	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	3550		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 53.55.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.104	.000
Cramer's V	.104	.000
N of Valid Cases	3550	

HAVE THERE BEEN FAN FIGHTS OR SIMILAR CONFLICTS IN THE RESPONDENT'S SCHOOL (CLASSROOMS, SCHOOLYARD, NEAR THE SCHOOL) * IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP

Crosstabulation

			IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		Total
			NO	YES	
HAVE THERE BEEN FAN FIGHTS OR SIMILAR CONFLICTS IN THE RESPONDENT'S SCHOOL (CLASSROOMS, SCHOOLYARD, NEAR THE SCHOOL)	No	Count	1985	257	2242
		% within HAVE THERE BEEN FAN FIGHTS OR SIMILAR CONFLICTS IN THE RESPONDENT'S SCHOOL (CLASSROOMS, SCHOOLYARD, NEAR THE SCHOOL)	88.5%	11.5%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	65.1%	51.5%	63.2%
		% of Total	55.9%	7.2%	63.2%
	Yes, only once	Count	323	58	381
		% within HAVE THERE BEEN FAN FIGHTS OR SIMILAR CONFLICTS IN THE RESPONDENT'S SCHOOL (CLASSROOMS, SCHOOLYARD, NEAR THE SCHOOL)	84.8%	15.2%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	10.6%	11.6%	10.7%
		% of Total	9.1%	1.6%	10.7%
	Yes, several times	Count	743	184	927
		% within HAVE THERE BEEN FAN FIGHTS OR SIMILAR CONFLICTS IN THE RESPONDENT'S SCHOOL (CLASSROOMS, SCHOOLYARD, NEAR THE SCHOOL)	80.2%	19.8%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	24.4%	36.9%	26.1%
		% of Total	20.9%	5.2%	26.1%
Total		Count	3051	499	3550
		% within HAVE THERE BEEN FAN FIGHTS OR SIMILAR CONFLICTS IN THE RESPONDENT'S SCHOOL (CLASSROOMS, SCHOOLYARD, NEAR THE SCHOOL)	85.9%	14.1%	100.0%

	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	85.9%	14.1%	100.0%

Table 28 – χ^2 -test between respondents – members of fan groups and non-members by the number of responses to the question “Have there been fan fights or similar conflicts in your school (classrooms, schoolyard, near the school)?”

As shown in Table 28, the χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses to the question “Have there been fan fights or similar conflicts in your school (classrooms, schoolyard, near the school)?” between fan group members and non-members – χ^2 (2, n=3550) = 38.659, p = 0.000. The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.104, which implies a small difference (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2004, p. 605). Around a half of respondents who are fan group members witnessed or participated in some kind of sports violence.

Respondents gave the following responses to the question “Have you ever participated in some form of fan conflicts?” (multiple answers were possible) (Table 29):

HAS THE RESPONDENT EVER PARTICIPATED IN ANY FORM OF FAN CONFLICTS	Frequency	Percent
No	2736	74.7
Yes, in a verbal conflict, shouting offensive chants and slogans	594	16.2
Yes, in a fan fight on the sports premises on the event day	182	5.0
Yes, in a fan fight outside of the sports premises on the event day	172	4.7
Yes, in a scheduled fan fight regardless of the event day	96	2.6

Table 29 – Distribution of responses to the question “Have you ever participated in some form of fan conflicts?”

In cumulative terms, almost a third of respondents (28.5%) participated in some form of fan conflicts. Of this, 12.3% participated in physical violence. These are alarming data about secondary school students’ acceptance and participation in violence and hooliganism at sports events. Aimed at determining differences in responses to the above question, the χ^2 -tests of the comparison of groups – fan group member and non-member respondents, showed the following:

- the χ^2 -test proved a statistically significant difference in the number of responses “No, I did not participate in fan conflicts” between fan group members and non-members, as follows: χ^2 (1, n=3629) = 638.845, p = 0.000 (with Yates’ correction). The fi coefficient equals 0.42, which implies a medium difference (Cohen, 1988) – students not being members of fan groups gave more such responses;
- there is a statistically significant difference in the number of responses “Yes, in a verbal conflict, shouting offensive chants and slogans” between fan group members and non-members, as follows: χ^2 (1, n=3629) = 402.531, p = 0.000 (with Yates’ correction). The fi coefficient equals -0.334, which implies a medium difference (Cohen, 1988) – students being members of fan groups gave more such responses;
- the χ^2 -test proved a statistically significant difference in the number of responses “Yes, in a fan fight on the sports premises on the event day” between fan group members and non-members, as follows: χ^2 (1, n=3629) = 323.969, p = 0.000 (with Yates’ correction). The fi

coefficient equals -0.229, which implies a small difference (Cohen, 1988) – students being members of fan groups gave more such responses;

- there is a statistically significant difference also in the number of responses “Yes, in a fan fight outside of the sports premises on the event day” between fan group members and non-members, as follows: $\chi^2(1, n=3629) = 293.927, p = 0.000$ (with Yates’ correction). The fi coefficient equals -0.285, which implies a small difference (Cohen, 1988) – students being members of fan groups gave more such responses;
- the χ^2 -test proved a statistically significant difference in the number of responses “Yes, in a scheduled fan fight regardless of the event day” between fan group members and non-members, as follows: $\chi^2(1, n=3629) = 173.535, p = 0.000$ (with Yates’ correction). The fi coefficient equals -0.221, which implies a small difference (Cohen, 1988) – students being members of fan groups gave more such responses.

The ways in which violence among fans erupts were analysed through responses to the question “How did the fan conflict happen – was it accidental or pre-arranged, and how was it pre-arranged”. The distribution of responses is presented in Table 30.

How did the fan conflict happen – was it accidental or pre-arranged, and how was it pre-arranged					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	The fight was accidental – it happened during an unexpected encounter of two fan groups	250	6.8	57.9	57.9
	The fight was arranged through the internet, i.e. social networks	54	1.5	12.5	70.4
	The fight was arranged through mobile phones	30	.8	6.9	77.3
	The fight was arranged through the immediate contact among individual fan group members	61	1.7	14.1	91.4
	The fight happened otherwise	37	1.0	8.6	100.0
	Total	432	11.8	100.0	
Missing	System	3230	88.2		
Total		3662	100.0		

Table 30 – Distribution of responses to the question “How did the fan conflict happen – was it accidental or pre-arranged, and how was it pre-arranged?”

Accidental encounters are the most frequent way in which violence motivated by sports hooliganism erupts (57.9%). In terms of pre-arranged fan conflicts, modern technologies take precedence over personal contacts (social networks and mobile phones (cumulatively) – 19.4% relative to direct contacts – 14.1%). Therefore, keeping abreast of the developments among fan groups on social networks may be highly important in the prevention of violence.

To ascertain to what extent secondary school students participate in forbidden activities within sports premises (such activities forming a part of fan iconography), they were asked the question “Have you ever introduced banned pyrotechnics (firecrackers, torches, cannon shots etc) at a sports event despite the entry check?”. The distribution of responses is presented in Table 31.

Has the respondent ever introduced banned pyrotechnics (firecrackers, torches, cannon shots etc) at a sports event despite the entry check

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No, never	2348	64.1	85.7	85.7
	Yes, in my underwear	126	3.4	4.6	90.3
	Yes, underneath my jacket	120	3.3	4.4	94.7
	Yes, a member of the club management helped me introduce them	33	.9	1.2	95.9
	Yes, a member of private security helped me introduce them	47	1.3	1.7	97.6
	Yes, a member of a media house (a journalist, cameraman, photojournalist) helped me introduce them	14	.4	.5	98.1
	Yes, I introduced them in another way	51	1.4	1.9	100.0
	Total	2739	74.8	100.0	
Total	Missing System	923	25.2		
		3662	100.0		

Table 31 – Distribution of responses to the question “Have you ever introduced banned pyrotechnics (firecrackers, torches, cannon shots etc) at a sports event despite the entry check”

The majority of respondents did not introduce illegal pyrotechnics into sports facilities. However, despite the ban and entry checks, around a sixth of respondents (14.3% cumulatively) introduced forbidden devices. The most frequent method was to hide pyrotechnics underneath clothes (9.0%), which signals the need for improving the operation of steward services in sports facilities. On the other hand, a solid number of respondents (145 cumulatively) were assisted in introducing banned pyrotechnics, which only confirms the above conclusion. As expected, the χ^2 -test reveals a statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses between fan group member and non-member respondents – χ^2 (6, n=2717) = 511.879, p = 0.000. The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.434, which implies a medium difference (Gravetter&Wallnaua, 2004, p. 605). Of course, banned devices were introduced to a much larger degree by fan group members.

6.2.5. RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE PLACE AND ROLE OF MEMBERS OF SECURITY AT SPORTS EVENTS

To ascertain the respondents’ perception of the persons who secure sports events and the methods they apply, and thus to make indirect conclusions about the validity of answers and ways of improving the situation regarding fan hooliganism in Serbia (Tables 57–62), secondary school students covered by the survey were asked the question “What is your perception of persons performing entry checks?”. The distribution of responses is presented in Table 32.

Respondents’ perception of persons performing entry checks

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Police	770	21.0	31.6	31.6
	Security agency	614	16.8	25.2	56.8
	Police and security agencies together	1052	28.7	43.2	100.0
	Total	2436	66.5	100.0	
	Missing System	1226	33.5		

Total	3662	100.0
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Table 32 – Distribution of responses to the question “What is your perception of persons performing entry checks?”

Only a fourth of respondents who visit sports events (25.2% or 16.8%) correctly observed that entry checks are performed by security agencies, i.e. steward services. Pursuant to the Law on the Prevention of Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events, the steward service engaged by the event organiser performs the activities of physical security and order maintenance. However, a large number of respondents perceive that the police perform or participate in performing such activities (83.2% cumulatively). This is indicative of insufficient education of the young about this issue and the wrong picture created about the police role in tackling violence and hooliganism at sports events. The χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses to this question between fan group member and non-member respondents – χ^2 (2, n=2421) = 22.346, p = 0.000, while Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.096 (indicating a small difference between groups (Gravetter&Wallnau, 2004, p. 605)). However, despite such χ^2 -test results, a large number of fan group members do not recognise the entity physically securing and maintaining order at sports events, but they identify the police as the party in charge. This is a particularly important indicator of the insufficient education of fans.

The distribution of responses to the question “Who reacted first to violence at sports events that you attended” is presented in Table 33.

Who reacted first to violence at sports events that the respondent attended				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Police	1440	39.3	55.8
	Security agency	299	8.2	11.6
	Police and security agencies together	431	11.8	16.7
	Other spectators	410	11.2	15.9
	Total	2580	70.5	100.0
	Missing System	1082	29.5	
Total	3662	100.0		

Table 33 – Distribution of responses to the question “Who reacted first to violence at sports events that you attended?”

Distribution results show again that the surveyed population has a wrong perception of who should react first to violence. Under the Law, this is the steward service, but only 11.6% of respondents have such perception. A larger number of respondents (72.5% cumulatively) perceive the police as the entity to react the first to violence at sports events. It is interesting that around a sixth of respondents perceive that other spectators and fans react the first to violence among fans. This indicates that conflicts and violence at sports events are considered integral to sports, which is entirely wrong. The difference in the distribution of responses between fan group member and non-member respondents was ascertained through the χ^2 -test. Results are presented in Table 34.

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	28.365 ^a	3	.000
Likelihood Ratio	29.043	3	.000

Linear-by-Linear Association	20.342	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	2564		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 54.56.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.105	.000
Cramer's V	.105	.000
N of Valid Cases	2564	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

WHO REACTED FIRST TO VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS THAT THE RESPONDENT ATTENDED * IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP

Crosstabulation

			IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		Total
			NO	YES	
WHO REACTED FIRST TO VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS THAT THE RESPONDENT ATTENDED	Police	Count	1119	315	1434
		% within WHO REACTED FIRST TO VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS THAT THE RESPONDENT ATTENDED	78.0%	22.0%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	53.5%	66.9%	55.9%
		% of Total	43.6%	12.3%	55.9%
	Security agencies	Count	259	38	297
		% within WHO REACTED FIRST TO VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS THAT THE RESPONDENT ATTENDED	87.2%	12.8%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	12.4%	8.1%	11.6%
		% of Total	10.1%	1.5%	11.6%
	Police and security agencies together	Count	369	60	429
		% within WHO REACTED FIRST TO VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS THAT THE RESPONDENT ATTENDED	86.0%	14.0%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	17.6%	12.7%	16.7%
		% of Total	14.4%	2.3%	16.7%
	Other spectators	Count	346	58	404
		% within WHO REACTED FIRST TO VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS THAT THE RESPONDENT ATTENDED	85.6%	14.4%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	16.5%	12.3%	15.8%
		% of Total	13.5%	2.3%	15.8%
Total	Count		2093	471	2564
	% within WHO REACTED FIRST TO VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS THAT THE RESPONDENT ATTENDED		81.6%	18.4%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
% of Total		81.6%	18.4%	100.0%	

Table 34 – χ^2 -test between respondents – members of fan groups and non-members by the number of responses to the question “Who reacted first to violence at sports events that you attended?”

As shown in Table 34, the χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses to the question “Who reacted first to violence at sports events that you attended?” between fan group member and non-member respondents – χ^2 (3, n=2564) = 28.365, p = 0.000. The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.105, which implies a small difference (Gravetter&Wallnaua, 2004, p. 605). According to results, fan group members more often correctly perceive the entity that should react first to violence at sports events, but they also more frequently answer that other spectators – supporters are the first to react to violence.

To ascertain whether respondents recognise police proactive approach to tackling violence and hooliganism at sports events, they were asked the question “In your opinion, do the police take special actions to develop and improve relations with fan groups?”. The distribution of responses is presented in Table 35.

Do the police take special actions to develop and improve relations with fan groups				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Significantly	347	9.5	9.7
	Partially	983	26.8	37.2
	Insignificantly	307	8.4	45.8
	Only in particular situations	530	14.5	60.6
	Not at all	522	14.3	75.3
	I do not know	884	24.1	100.0
	Total	3573	97.6	100.0
	Missing System	89	2.4	
Total	3662	100.0		

Table 35 – Distribution of responses to the question “In your opinion, do the police take special actions to develop and improve relations with fan groups?”

A vast majority of respondents do not recognise police proactive approach to tackling violence and hooliganism at sports events. The χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses between fan group member and non-member respondents – χ^2 (5, n=3544) = 71.412, p = 0.000, while the Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.142 (indicating a small difference between groups (Gravetter&Wallnaua, 2004, p. 605)). However, a large number of fan group members do not recognise proactive police approach to tackling hooliganism. This is a significant indicator either of supporters’ insufficient education or inadequate police proactive action.

The distribution of responses to the question “What is your attitude towards the use of police force in disorders at matches” is presented in Table 36.

What is the respondents’ attitude towards the use of police force in disorders at matches				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	The police most often apply unselective force, i.e. they beat those who did not cause violence	715	19.5	20.5
	The police most often apply force against the main perpetrators	870	23.8	45.5

When the police apply force, they do that against all those present at the place of conflict	1597	43.6	45.9	91.4
The police most often apply excessive force	300	8.2	8.6	100.0
Total	3482	95.1	100.0	
Missing System	180	4.9		
Total	3662	100.0		

Table 36 – Distribution of responses to the question “What is your attitude towards the use of police force in disorders at matches”

The majority of respondents believe that the police apply force against all those present in the disorder area (45.9%). Also, more than a fourth of respondents (29.1% cumulatively) believe the police apply excessive and unselective force (against those who did not cause disorders), which indicates relatively small respondents’ trust in the police. The difference in the distribution of responses between fan group member and non-member respondents was ascertained through the χ^2 -test. Results are presented in Table 37.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	101.025 ^a	3	.000
Likelihood Ratio	96.671	3	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	9.275	1	.002
N of Valid Cases	3454		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 42.62.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.171	.000
Cramer's V	.171	.000
N of Valid Cases	3454	

WHAT IS THE RESPONDENTS' ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE USE OF POLICE FORCE IN DISORDERS AT MATCHES * IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP

Crosstabulation

			IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		Total
			NO	YES	
WHAT IS THE RESPONDENTS' ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE USE OF POLICE FORCE IN DISORDERS AT MATCHES	The police most often apply unselective force, i.e. they beat those who did not cause violence	Count	538	168	706
		% within WHAT IS THE RESPONDENTS' ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE USE OF POLICE FORCE IN DISORDERS AT MATCHES	76.2%	23.8%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	18.2%	34.0%	20.4%
		% of Total	15.6%	4.9%	20.4%

The police most often apply force against the main perpetrators	Count	795	70	865
	% within WHAT IS THE RESPONDENTS' ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE USE OF POLICE FORCE IN DISORDERS AT MATCHES	91.9%	8.1%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	26.9%	14.2%	25.0%
	% of Total	23.0%	2.0%	25.0%
When the police apply force, they do that against all those present at the place of conflict	Count	1395	190	1585
	% within WHAT IS THE RESPONDENTS' ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE USE OF POLICE FORCE IN DISORDERS AT MATCHES	88.0%	12.0%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	47.1%	38.5%	45.9%
	% of Total	40.4%	5.5%	45.9%
The police most often apply excessive force	Count	232	66	298
	% within WHAT IS THE RESPONDENTS' ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE USE OF POLICE FORCE IN DISORDERS AT MATCHES	77.9%	22.1%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	7.8%	13.4%	8.6%
	% of Total	6.7%	1.9%	8.6%
Total	Count	2960	494	3454
	% within WHAT IS THE RESPONDENTS' ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE USE OF POLICE FORCE IN DISORDERS AT MATCHES	85.7%	14.3%	100.0%
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	85.7%	14.3%	100.0%

Table 37 – χ^2 -test between respondents – members of fan groups and non-members by the number of responses to the question “What is your attitude towards the use of police force in disorders at matches?”

As shown in Table 37, the χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses to the question “What is your attitude towards the use of police force in disorders at matches?” between fan group member and non-member respondents – $\chi^2 (3, n=3454) = 101.025$, $p = 0.000$. The Cramer's coefficient equals 0.171, which implies a small difference (Gravetter&Wallnaua, 2004, p. 605). Fan group members more frequently respond with “the police most often apply excessive force”, and much less frequently with “the police most often apply force against the main perpetrators” and “when the police apply force, they do that against all those present at the place of conflict”. Therefore, unlike the rest of the population, they do not perceive it as a problem that the police apply force against all those present in the disorder area – what they see as the greatest problem is the excessive use of force against them.

The respondents' perception of other spectators' reaction to police intervention at sports events was analysed through the question “What are your experiences with citizen reaction to police intervention in cases of violence at sports events?”. The distribution of responses is presented in Table 38.

What are respondents' experiences with citizen reaction to police intervention in cases of violence at sports events

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Citizens accept and approve of police intervention	1080	29.5	32.3	32.3
	Citizens are passive and disinterested towards police intervention	860	23.5	25.7	58.0
	Citizens are openly against police intervention	675	18.4	20.2	78.1
	Citizens are against unselective police coercion	321	8.8	9.6	87.7
	Citizens are against excessive police coercion	411	11.2	12.3	100.0
	Total	3347	91.4	100.0	
	Missing System	315	8.6		
Total		3662	100.0		

Table 38 – Distribution of responses to the question “What are your experiences with citizen reaction to police intervention in cases of violence at sports events?”

As shown in Table 38, respondents perceive that 58.0% of citizens (cumulatively) support or are indifferent towards police intervention, while 42.0% (cumulatively) are against intervention. The χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses between fan group member and non-member respondents – χ^2 (4, n=3320) = 35.245, p = 0.000. The Cramer's V coefficient equals 0.103, which indicates a small difference between groups (Gravetter&Wallnaua, 2004, p. 605) – fan group members perceive that 23.3% of citizens (cumulatively) support or are indifferent towards police intervention, while 53.1% (cumulatively) are against intervention. Fan group members again perceive that they enjoy public support for their iconography and manner of behaviour.

6.2.6. RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTION OF THE EMERGENCE OF RACISM AT SPORTS EVENTS IN SERBIA

The distribution of responses to the question “Do you believe that domestic supporters behaved in a racist way towards black English players at the football match held in Kruševac, in October 2012, between national youth teams of Serbia and England?” is presented in Table 39.

Does the respondent believe that domestic supporters behaved in a racist way towards black English players at the football match held in Kruševac, in October 2012, between national youth teams of Serbia and England

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Domestic supporters did not behave in a racist way	477	13.0	13.7	13.7
	Domestic supporters did not behave in a racist way, but they reacted to unsporting behaviour of some players of the English national team	496	13.5	14.2	27.9
	Very few domestic supporters offended black players of the English national team	380	10.4	10.9	38.8
	A larger number of domestic supporters offended, on racial grounds, black players of the English national team	313	8.5	9.0	47.8
	I am not familiar	1819	49.7	52.2	100.0
Total		3485	95.2	100.0	

Missing System	177	4.8	
Total	3662	100.0	

Table 39 – Distribution of responses to the question “Do you believe that domestic supporters behaved in a racist way towards black English players at the football match held in Kruševac, in October 2012, between national youth teams of Serbia and England?”

More than a half of respondents (52.2%) did not pay attention to whether there was a racially-motivated incident at the football match in Kruševac. The probable reason is that incidents at football matches in Serbia are rather frequent and young people no longer attach great importance to them. Total 19.9% of respondents (cumulatively) believe that supporters offended English players on racial grounds, while 27.9% (cumulatively) believe there were no racially-motivated offences. Namely, one fifth of respondents perceive racial intolerance among supporters, which is not a small percentage. The difference in the distribution of responses between fan group member and non-member respondents was ascertained through the χ^2 -test. Results are presented in Table 40.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	216.313 ^a	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	213.665	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	205.328	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	3458		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 43.99.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.250	.000
Cramer's V	.250	.000
N of Valid Cases	3458	

DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE THAT DOMESTIC SUPPORTERS BEHAVED IN A RACIST WAY TOWARDS BLACK ENGLISH PLAYERS AT THE FOOTBALL MATCH HELD IN KRUŠEVAC, IN OCTOBER 2012, BETWEEN NATIONAL YOUTH TEAMS OF SERBIA AND ENGLAND * IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP

Crosstabulation

			IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP		Total
			NO	YES	
DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE THAT DOMESTIC SUPPORTERS BEHAVED IN A RACIST WAY TOWARDS BLACK ENGLISH PLAYERS	Domestic supporters did not behave in a racist way	Count	353	122	475
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE THAT DOMESTIC SUPPORTERS BEHAVED IN A RACIST WAY TOWARDS BLACK ENGLISH PLAYERS AT THE FOOTBALL MATCH HELD IN KRUŠEVAC, IN OCTOBER 2012, BETWEEN NATIONAL YOUTH TEAMS OF SERBIA AND ENGLAND	74.3%	25.7%	100.0%

AT THE FOOTBALL MATCH HELD IN KRUŠEVAC, IN OCTOBER 2012, BETWEEN NATIONAL YOUTH TEAMS OF SERBIA AND ENGLAND		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	11.9%	25.1%	13.7%
		% of Total	10.2%	3.5%	13.7%
	Domestic supporters did not behave in a racist way, but they reacted to unsporting behaviour of some players of the English national team	Count	359	129	488
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE THAT DOMESTIC SUPPORTERS BEHAVED IN A RACIST WAY TOWARDS BLACK ENGLISH PLAYERS AT THE FOOTBALL MATCH HELD IN KRUŠEVAC, IN OCTOBER 2012, BETWEEN NATIONAL YOUTH TEAMS OF SERBIA AND ENGLAND	73.6%	26.4%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	12.1%	26.5%	14.1%
		% of Total	10.4%	3.7%	14.1%
	Very few domestic supporters offended black players of the English national team	Count	298	79	377
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE THAT DOMESTIC SUPPORTERS BEHAVED IN A RACIST WAY TOWARDS BLACK ENGLISH PLAYERS AT THE FOOTBALL MATCH HELD IN KRUŠEVAC, IN OCTOBER 2012, BETWEEN NATIONAL YOUTH TEAMS OF SERBIA AND ENGLAND	79.0%	21.0%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	10.0%	16.3%	10.9%
		% of Total	8.6%	2.3%	10.9%
	A larger number of domestic supporters offended, on racial grounds, black players of the English national team	Count	274	39	313
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE THAT DOMESTIC SUPPORTERS BEHAVED IN A RACIST WAY TOWARDS BLACK ENGLISH PLAYERS AT THE FOOTBALL MATCH HELD IN KRUŠEVAC, IN OCTOBER 2012, BETWEEN NATIONAL YOUTH TEAMS OF SERBIA AND ENGLAND	87.5%	12.5%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	9.2%	8.0%	9.1%
		% of Total	7.9%	1.1%	9.1%
	I am not familiar	Count	1688	117	1805
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE THAT DOMESTIC SUPPORTERS BEHAVED IN A RACIST WAY TOWARDS BLACK ENGLISH PLAYERS AT THE FOOTBALL MATCH HELD IN KRUŠEVAC, IN OCTOBER 2012, BETWEEN NATIONAL YOUTH TEAMS OF SERBIA AND ENGLAND	93.5%	6.5%	100.0%
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	56.8%	24.1%	52.2%
		% of Total	48.8%	3.4%	52.2%
Total	Count	2972	486	3458	

% within DOES THE RESPONDENT BELIEVE THAT DOMESTIC SUPPORTERS BEHAVED IN A RACIST WAY TOWARDS BLACK ENGLISH PLAYERS AT THE FOOTBALL MATCH HELD IN KRUŠEVAC, IN OCTOBER 2012, BETWEEN NATIONAL YOUTH TEAMS OF SERBIA AND ENGLAND	85.9%	14.1%	100.0%
% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
% of Total	85.9%	14.1%	100.0%

Table 40 – χ^2 -test between respondents – members of fan groups and non-members by the number of responses to the question “Do you believe that domestic supporters behaved in a racist way towards black English players at the football match held in Kruševac, in October 2012, between national youth teams of Serbia and England?”

As shown in Table 40, the χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses to the question “Do you believe that domestic supporters behaved in a racist way towards black English players at the football match held in Kruševac, in October 2012, between national youth teams of Serbia and England?” between fan group member and non-member respondents – χ^2 (4, n=3458) = 216.313, p = 0.000. The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.250, which implies a small difference (Gravetter&Wallnaua, 2004, p. 605). Fan group members more frequently answer that there was no racially-motivated violence at the match (52.1% cumulatively) and a much smaller percentage of them state they are not familiar with the incident (6.5%). Therefore, it may be concluded that the way of behaving and supporting, often offensive on several grounds, including nationalistic and racial grounds, are not perceived as problematic by fan group members. On the contrary, fan group members consider such behaviour regular part of the fan iconography and code of behaviour in Serbia.

Respondents gave the following responses to the question “Do you believe that the problem of racism at sports events is generally present in Serbia?” (Table 41):

Does the respondent believe that the problem of racism at sports events is generally present in Serbia					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	705	19.3	20.1	20.1
	No, this is falsehood presented by the foreign media	373	10.2	10.7	30.8
	Yes, but to a small extent	1298	35.4	37.1	67.8
	Yes, this is a great problem	977	26.7	27.9	95.7
	Something else	149	4.1	4.3	100.0
	Total	3502	95.6	100.0	
	Missing System	160	4.4		
Total		3662	100.0		

Table 41 – Distribution of responses to the question “Do you believe that the problem of racism at sports events is generally present in Serbia?”

Somewhat less than two thirds of respondents (65.0% cumulatively) recognise the problem of racism at sports events, while 30.8% (cumulatively) believe that there is no racism at matches. Therefore, young people in Serbia believe that racism at sports events does exist, and that is

should be taken into account when designing youth and fan education programmes aimed at curbing hooliganism and violence at sports events. As it was the case with the previous question, the difference in the distribution of responses between fan group members and non-members to the question “Do you believe that the problem of racism at sports events is generally present in Serbia?” was determined by the χ^2 -test which indicates a statistically significant difference – χ^2 (4, n=3473) = 112.175, p = 0.000. The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.180, which implies a small difference (Gravetter&Wallnaua, 2004, p. 605). Only 22.6% of fan group members (cumulatively) perceive the problem of racism at sports events, which represents a significant difference compared to the total population of respondents. What is obviously missing is the education of supporters about nationalism, chauvinism and racism, and their causes and consequences.

6.2.7. CONSUMPTION OF PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES AMONG THE YOUNG AND THE LINK TO VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS

Respondents gave the following responses to the question “Do you consume alcohol and in what situations?” (multiple answers were possible) (Table 42):

DOES THE RESPONDENT CONSUME ALCOHOL AND IN WHAT SITUATIONS	Frequency	Percent
No, never	1137	31.0
Yes, during celebrations and what I go out in the city	2309	63.1
Yes, I consume alcohol every day	112	3.1
Yes, when I go to football matches	117	3.2
Yes, every day when I go to school	103	2.8

Table 42 – Distribution of responses to the question “Do you consume alcohol and in what situations?”

These results are alarming as over two-thirds of respondents, who are underage, consume alcohol. The χ^2 -test (comparing fan group members and non-members) shows a statistically significant difference (with Yates’ correction for continuity) – χ^2 (1, n=3629) = 8.717, p = 0.003. The fi coefficient equals 0.050, which implies a small difference (Cohen, 1988). Regardless of this, fan group members state more frequently that they consume alcohol.

The comparison of responses to the question “Do you consume alcohol?” and the question “Have you ever been apprehended by the police on the grounds of suspicion that you participated in fan conflicts or violence at sports events?”, performed through the χ^2 -test, produced the results shown in Table 43.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	21.154 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	20.442	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	23.558	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	21.148	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	3602				

- a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 63.48.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.077	.000
	Cramer's V	.077	.000
N of Valid Cases		3602	

HAS THE RESPONDENT EVER BEEN APPREHENDED * DOES THE RESPONDENT CONSUME ALCOHOL
Crosstabulation

			DOES THE RESPONDENT CONSUME ALCOHOL		
			NO	YES	Total
HAS THE RESPONDENT EVER BEEN APPREHENDED	NO	Count	1098	2302	3400
		% within HAS THE RESPONDENT EVER BEEN APPREHENDED	32.3%	67.7%	100.0%
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT CONSUME ALCOHOL	97.0%	93.2%	94.4%
		% of Total	30.5%	63.9%	94.4%
	YES	Count	34	168	202
		% within HAS THE RESPONDENT EVER BEEN APPREHENDED	16.8%	83.2%	100.0%
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT CONSUME ALCOHOL	3.0%	6.8%	5.6%
		% of Total	.9%	4.7%	5.6%
Total		Count	1132	2470	3602
		% within HAS THE RESPONDENT EVER BEEN APPREHENDED	31.4%	68.6%	100.0%
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT CONSUME ALCOHOL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	31.4%	68.6%	100.0%

Table 43 – χ^2 -test among responses to the question “Do you consume alcohol?” and question “Have you ever been apprehended by the police on the grounds of suspicion that you participated in fan conflicts or violence at sports events?”

The χ^2 -test reveals a statistically significant difference (with Yates' correction for continuity) – $\chi^2 (1, n=3602) = 20.442, p = 0.000$. The fi coefficient equals 0.077, which implies a weak link (Cohen, 1988). Regardless of this, respondents who consume alcohol are more frequently apprehended due to violence at sports events. Therefore, it may be concluded that there is a link between the consumption of alcohol and violence at sports events.

The comparison of responses to the question “Do you consume alcohol?” and the question “Have misdemeanour charges been filed against you due to fan conflicts or violence at sports events?”, performed through the χ^2 -test, produced the results shown in Table 44.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8.704 ^a	1	.003		
Continuity Correction ^b	8.157	1	.004		
Likelihood Ratio	9.438	1	.002		
Fisher's Exact Test				.003	.002
Linear-by-Linear Association	8.701	1	.003		
N of Valid Cases	3612				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 42.66.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.049	.003
Cramer's V	.049	.003
N of Valid Cases	3612	

HAVE MISDEMEANOUR CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT * DOES THE RESPONDENT CONSUME ALCOHOL

Crosstabulation

			DOES THE RESPONDENT CONSUME ALCOHOL		Total
			NO	YES	
HAVE MISDEMEANOUR CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT	NO	Count	1106	2370	3476
		% within HAVE MISDEMEANOUR CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT	31.8%	68.2%	100.0%
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT CONSUME ALCOHOL	97.6%	95.6%	96.2%
		% of Total	30.6%	65.6%	96.2%
	YES	Count	27	109	136
		% within HAVE MISDEMEANOUR CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT	19.9%	80.1%	100.0%
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT CONSUME ALCOHOL	2.4%	4.4%	3.8%
		% of Total	.7%	3.0%	3.8%
Total	Count	1133	2479	3612	
	% within HAVE MISDEMEANOUR CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT	31.4%	68.6%	100.0%	
	% within DOES THE RESPONDENT CONSUME ALCOHOL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	31.4%	68.6%	100.0%	

Table 44 – χ^2 -test between responses to the question “Do you consume alcohol?” and question “Have misdemeanour charges been filed against you due to fan conflicts or violence at sports events?”

The χ^2 -test of independence shows a statistically significant difference (with Yates' correction for continuity) – χ^2 (1, n=3612) = 8.157, p = 0.004. The fi coefficient equals 0.049, which implies a weak link (Cohen, 1988). Regardless of this, misdemeanour charges are filed more

frequently against respondents who consume alcohol, on grounds of violence at sports events. It may be therefore concluded that there is a link between the consumption of alcohol and violence at sports events.

The comparison of responses to the question “Do you consume alcohol?” and the question “Have criminal charges been filed against you due to fan conflicts or violence at sports events?”, performed through the χ^2 -test, produced the results shown in Table 45.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8.330 ^a	1	.004		
Continuity Correction ^b	7.751	1	.005		
Likelihood Ratio	9.097	1	.003		
Fisher's Exact Test				.004	.002
Linear-by-Linear Association	8.327	1	.004		
N of Valid Cases	3593				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 36.14.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.048	.004
Cramer's V	.048	.004
N of Valid Cases	3593	

HAVE CRIMINAL CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT * DOES THE RESPONDENT CONSUME ALCOHOL
Crosstabulation

			DOES THE RESPONDENT CONSUME ALCOHOL		Total
			NO	YES	
HAVE CRIMINAL CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT	NO	Count	1107	2371	3478
		% within HAVE CRIMINAL CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT	31.8%	68.2%	100.0%
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT CONSUME ALCOHOL	98.1%	96.2%	96.8%
		% of Total	30.8%	66.0%	96.8%
	YES	Count	22	93	115
		% within HAVE CRIMINAL CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT	19.1%	80.9%	100.0%
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT CONSUME ALCOHOL	1.9%	3.8%	3.2%
		% of Total	.6%	2.6%	3.2%
Total		Count	1129	2464	3593
		% within HAVE CRIMINAL CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT	31.4%	68.6%	100.0%

% within DOES THE RESPONDENT CONSUME ALCOHOL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
% of Total	31.4%	68.6%	100.0%

Table 45 – χ^2 -test between responses to the question “Do you consume alcohol” and question “Have criminal charges been filed against you due to fan conflicts or violence at sports events?”

The χ^2 -test of independence shows a statistically significant difference (with Yates’ correction for continuity) – $\chi^2 (1, n=3593) = 7.751, p = 0.005$. The ϕ coefficient equals 0.048, which implies a weak link (Cohen, 1988). Regardless of this, criminal charges are filed more frequently against respondents who consume alcohol, on grounds of violence at sports events. It may be therefore concluded that there is a link between the consumption of alcohol and violence at sports events.

The comparison of responses to the question “Do you consume alcohol?” and the question “Have you been convicted of misdemeanours or criminal offences due to participation in fan conflicts or violence at sports events?”, performed through the χ^2 -test, produced the results which do not show a statistically significant link – the sample does not indicate a statistical link between the respondents’ habit to consume alcohol and whether they were convicted due to violence at sports events. Given the previous analyses whereby a link with the consumption of alcohol was ascertained, it may be concluded that there is a problem in operation of either of the judiciary or the police which fail to submit to the judiciary complete cases based on which it would be possible to pronounce final judgments.

Respondents gave the following responses to the question “Do you use drugs” (multiple answers were possible) (Table 46):

DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS	Frequency	Percent
No, never	3310	90.4
Yes, during celebrations and when I go out in the city at night	152	4.2
Yes, I use them every day	76	2.1
Yes, when I go to football matches	46	1.3
Yes, every day when I go to school	93	2.5

Table 46 – Distribution of responses to the question “Do you use drugs?”

These results are also exceptionally bad as almost 10% of respondents (who are underage) use drugs. The χ^2 -test (comparing fan group members and non-members) shows a statistically significant difference (with Yates’ correction for continuity) – $\chi^2 (1, n=3629) = 58.956, p = 0.000$. The ϕ coefficient equals 0.129, which implies a small difference (Cohen, 1988). Regardless of this, fan group members more frequently state they use drugs.

The comparison of responses to the question “Do you use drugs?” and the question “Have you ever been apprehended by the police on the grounds of suspicion that you participated in fan conflicts or violence at sports events?”, performed through the χ^2 -test, produced the results shown in Table 46.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	367.849 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	362.885	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	212.879	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	367.747	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	3602				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.16.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.320	.000
Cramer's V	.320	.000
N of Valid Cases	3602	

HAS THE RESPONDENT EVER BEEN APPREHENDED * DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS

Crosstabulation

			DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS		Total
			NO	YES	
HAS THE RESPONDENT EVER BEEN APPREHENDED	NO	Count	3185	215	3400
		% within HAS THE RESPONDENT EVER BEEN APPREHENDED	93.7%	6.3%	100.0%
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS	96.6%	70.3%	94.4%
		% of Total	88.4%	6.0%	94.4%
	YES	Count	111	91	202
		% within HAS THE RESPONDENT EVER BEEN APPREHENDED	55.0%	45.0%	100.0%
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS	3.4%	29.7%	5.6%
		% of Total	3.1%	2.5%	5.6%
Total	Count		3296	306	3602
	% within HAS THE RESPONDENT EVER BEEN APPREHENDED		91.5%	8.5%	100.0%
	% within DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total		91.5%	8.5%	100.0%

Table 46 – χ^2 -test between responses to the question “Do you use drugs” and question “Have you ever been apprehended by the police on the grounds of suspicion that you participated in fan conflicts or violence at sports events?”

The χ^2 -test reveals a statistically significant difference (with Yates' correction for continuity) – $\chi^2 (1, n=3602) = 362.885, p = 0.000$. The fi coefficient equals 0.320, which implies a medium link (Cohen, 1988). Respondents who use drugs are more frequently apprehended due to violence at sports events. Therefore, it may be concluded that there is a link between drug abuse and violence at sports events.

The comparison of responses to the question “Do you use drugs?” and the question “Have misdemeanour charges been filed against you due to fan conflicts or violence at sports events?”, performed through the χ^2 -test, produced the results shown in Table 47.

Chi-Square Tests					
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	307.669 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	302.227	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	169.524	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	307.584	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	3612				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.71.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table.

Symmetric Measures			Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi		.292	.000
	Cramer's V		.292	.000
N of Valid Cases			3612	

HAVE MISDEMEANOUR CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT * DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS
Crosstabulation

			DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS		Total
			NO	YES	
HAVE MISDEMEANOUR CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT	NO	Count	3233	243	3476
		% within HAVE MISDEMEANOUR CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT	93.0%	7.0%	100.0%
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS	97.9%	78.1%	96.2%
		% of Total	89.5%	6.7%	96.2%
	YES	Count	68	68	136
		% within HAVE MISDEMEANOUR CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS	2.1%	21.9%	3.8%
		% of Total	1.9%	1.9%	3.8%
Total		Count	3301	311	3612
		% within HAVE MISDEMEANOUR CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT	91.4%	8.6%	100.0%
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	91.4%	8.6%	100.0%

Table 47 – χ^2 -test between responses to the question “Do you use drugs” and question “Have misdemeanour charges been filed against you due to fan conflicts or violence at sports events?”

The χ^2 -test reveals a statistically significant difference (with Yates' correction for continuity) – χ^2 (1, n=3612) = 302.227, p = 0.000. The fi coefficient equals 0.292, which implies a weak link (Cohen, 1988). Regardless of this, misdemeanour charges due to violence at sports events are

more frequently filed against respondents who use drugs. Therefore, it may be concluded that there is a link between drug abuse and violence at sports events.

The comparison of responses to the question “Do you use drugs?” and the question “Have criminal charges been filed against you due to fan conflicts or violence at sports events?”, performed through the χ^2 -test, produced the results shown in Table 48.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	409.114 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	402.244	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	208.577	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	409.000	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	3593				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.70.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.337	.000
Cramer's V	.337	.000
N of Valid Cases	3593	

HAVE CRIMINAL CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT * DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS
Crosstabulation

			DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS		Total
			NO	YES	
HAVE CRIMINAL CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT	NO	Count	3244	234	3478
		% within HAVE CRIMINAL CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT	93.3%	6.7%	100.0%
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS	98.6%	77.2%	96.8%
		% of Total	90.3%	6.5%	96.8%
	YES	Count	46	69	115
		% within HAVE CRIMINAL CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS	1.4%	22.8%	3.2%
		% of Total	1.3%	1.9%	3.2%
Total		Count	3290	303	3593
		% within HAVE CRIMINAL CHARGES BEEN FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT	91.6%	8.4%	100.0%
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	91.6%	8.4%	100.0%

Table 48 – χ^2 -test between responses to the question “Do you use drugs” and question “Have criminal charges been filed against you due to fan conflicts or violence at sports events?”

The χ^2 -test reveals a statistically significant difference (with Yates' correction for continuity) – $\chi^2 (1, n=3593) = 402.224, p = 0.000$. The fi coefficient equals 0.337, which implies a medium link (Cohen, 1988). Regardless of this, criminal charges due to violence at sports events are more frequently filed against respondents who use drugs. Therefore, it may be concluded that there is a link between drug abuse and violence at sports events.

The comparison of responses to the question “Do you use drugs?” and the question “Have you been convicted of misdemeanours or criminal offences due to participation in fan conflicts or violence at sports events?”, performed through the χ^2 -test, produced the results shown in Table 49.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	263.962 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	258.868	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	147.719	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	263.889	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	3601				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.43.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.271	.000
	Cramer's V	.271	.000
N of Valid Cases		3601	

HAS THE RESPONDENT BEEN CONVICTED OF MISDEMEANOURS OR CRIMINAL OFFENCES DUE TO PARTICIPATION IN FAN CONFLICTS OR VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS * DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS

Crosstabulation

			DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS		Total
			NO	YES	
HAS THE RESPONDENT BEEN CONVICTED OF MISDEMEANOURS OR CRIMINAL OFFENCES DUE TO PARTICIPATION IN FAN CONFLICTS OR VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS	YES	Count	72	63	135
		% within HAS THE RESPONDENT BEEN CONVICTED OF MISDEMEANOURS OR CRIMINAL OFFENCES DUE TO PARTICIPATION IN FAN CONFLICTS OR VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS	53.3%	46.7%	100.0%
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS	2.2%	20.7%	3.7%
		% of Total	2.0%	1.7%	3.7%
	NO	Count	3224	242	3466
		% within HAS THE RESPONDENT BEEN CONVICTED OF MISDEMEANOURS OR CRIMINAL OFFENCES DUE TO PARTICIPATION IN FAN CONFLICTS OR VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS	93.0%	7.0%	100.0%
		% within DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS	97.8%	79.3%	96.3%

	% of Total	89.5%	6.7%	96.3%
Total	Count	3296	305	3601
	% within HAS THE RESPONDENT BEEN CONVICTED OF MISDEMEANOURS OR CRIMINAL OFFENCES DUE TO PARTICIPATION IN FAN CONFLICTS OR VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS	91.5%	8.5%	100.0%
	% within DOES THE RESPONDENT USE DRUGS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	91.5%	8.5%	100.0%

Table 49 – χ^2 -test between responses to the question “Do you use drugs” and question “Have you been convicted of misdemeanours or criminal offences due to participation in fan conflicts or violence at sports events?”

The χ^2 -test shows a statistically significant difference (with Yates’ correction for continuity) – $\chi^2(1, n=3593) = 7.751, p = 0.005$. The fi coefficient equals 0.048, which implies a weak link (Cohen, 1988). Regardless of this, respondents who use drugs are more frequently convicted of misdemeanours or criminal offences due to violence at sports events. Therefore, it may be concluded that there is a link between drug abuse and violence at sports events.

6.2.8. SPECIFIC FEATURES OF FAN GROUP MEMBERS

Fang group members covered by the sample (539 of them) gave the following responses to the question “How did you become a member of a fan group” (Table 50):

How did the respondent become a member of a fan group		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Friends from school persuaded him/her	31	5.8	6.4	6.4
	A girlfriend/boyfriend persuaded him/her	15	2.8	3.1	9.5
	By constantly going to matches and getting to know members of fan groups	269	49.9	55.8	65.4
	I always wanted to be a member of fan group, which is why I joined my fan group	115	21.3	23.9	89.2
	Because my older brother/sister was already a member of a fan group	27	5.0	5.6	94.8
	Something else	25	4.6	5.2	100.0
	Total	482	89.4	100.0	
Missing System		57	10.6		
Total		539	100.0		

Table 50 – Distribution of responses of fan group members to the question “How did you become a member of a fan group?”

As shown in Table 50, total 15.1% of fan group members (cumulatively) became members through the so-called indirect recruitment (“Friends from school persuaded him/her“, “A girlfriend/boyfriend persuaded him/her“, and “Because my older brother/sister was already a member of a fan group“), while the rest (71.2% cumulatively) joined through direct recruitment – by constantly going to matches and wishing to become a fan group member.

Respondents who are fan group members gave the following answers to the question “What is your status in a fan group” (Table 51):

What is the respondent's status in a fan group		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	53	9.8	10.6	10.6
	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	195	36.2	39.2	49.8
	Ordinary member – fan	250	46.4	50.2	100.0
	Total	498	92.4	100.0	
Missing System		41	7.6		
Total		539	100.0		

Table 51 – Distribution of responses of fan group members to the question “What is your status in the fan group”

The majority of respondents are ordinary members – supporters of fan groups (50.2%), which is expected. On the other hand, 39.2% of fan group members claim they are members of the narrow core, while as much as 10.6% claim to be group leaders. These are somewhat unexpected data – it does not seem probable that there are so many fan group leaders or members of the group narrow core in the stratified sample. However, results become entirely logical if the sample is broken down by fan groups and towns (Table 52).

What is the respondent's status in a fan group, by town and fan group							
What fan group is the respondent a member of	The town where the survey was conducted			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Marinci Subotica	Subotica	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	6.7	6.7	6.7
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	7	46.7	46.7	53.3
			Ordinary member – fan	7	46.7	46.7	100.0
			Total	15	100.0	100.0	
AD Bajmok	Subotica	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Trauma Zvezda's fans from Subotica	Subotica	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	40.0	40.0	40.0
			Ordinary member – fan	3	60.0	60.0	100.0
			Total	5	100.0	100.0	
Delije Sever	Subotica	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	25.0	25.0	25.0
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	50.0	50.0	75.0
			Ordinary member – fan	1	25.0	25.0	100.0
			Total	4	100.0	100.0	
	Pećinci	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	20.0	20.0	20.0
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	40.0	40.0	60.0
			Ordinary member – fan	2	40.0	40.0	100.0
			Total	5	100.0	100.0	
Kula	Valid		I am one of fan group leaders	1	8.3	8.3	8.3

			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	3	25.0	25.0	33.3
			Ordinary member – fan	8	66.7	66.7	100.0
			Total	12	100.0	100.0	
Novi Sad	Valid		I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	16.7	16.7	16.7
			Ordinary member – fan	5	83.3	83.3	100.0
			Total	6	100.0	100.0	
Belgrade	Valid		I am one of fan group leaders	1	4.2	4.3	4.3
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	10	41.7	43.5	47.8
			Ordinary member – fan	12	50.0	52.2	100.0
			Total	23	95.8	100.0	
			Missing System	1	4.2		
		Total		24	100.0		
Smederevo	Valid		Ordinary member – fan	2	100.0	100.0	100.0
Kragujevac	Valid		I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	16.7	16.7	16.7
			Ordinary member – fan	5	83.3	83.3	100.0
			Total	6	100.0	100.0	
Jagodina	Valid		I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	7	31.8	31.8	31.8
			Ordinary member – fan	15	68.2	68.2	100.0
			Total	22	100.0	100.0	
Niš	Valid		I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	33.3	33.3	33.3
			Ordinary member – fan	4	66.7	66.7	100.0
			Total	6	100.0	100.0	
Užice	Valid		I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	3	30.0	30.0	30.0
			Ordinary member – fan	7	70.0	70.0	100.0
			Total	10	100.0	100.0	
Ivanjica	Valid		Ordinary member – fan	6	100.0	100.0	100.0
Novi Pazar	Valid		I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	16.7	16.7	16.7
			Ordinary member – fan	5	83.3	83.3	100.0
			Total	6	100.0	100.0	
CZVNBGD	Subotica	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Belgrade	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Partizan	Subotica	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Pećinci	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Kula	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Belgrade	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	25.0	25.0	25.0
			Ordinary member – fan	3	75.0	75.0	100.0
			Total	4	100.0	100.0	

	Jagodina	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	25.0	33.3	33.3
			Ordinary member – fan	2	50.0	66.7	100.0
			Total	3	75.0	100.0	
			Missing System	1	25.0		
	Total			4	100.0		
	Užice	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Užas Subotica	Subotica	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	50.0	50.0	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	2	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	4	100.0	100.0	
Zabranjeni PFC	BG Subotica	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Pećinci	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	50.0	50.0	50.0
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	2	100.0	100.0	
	Kula	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Novi Sad	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	50.0	50.0	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	1	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	2	100.0	100.0	
	Belgrade	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	16.7	16.7	16.7
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	33.3	33.3	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	3	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	6	100.0	100.0	
	Smederevo	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	50.0	50.0	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	1	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	2	100.0	100.0	
	Kragujevac	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Jagodina	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	25.0	25.0	25.0
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	25.0	25.0	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	2	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	4	100.0	100.0	
	Niš	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Užice	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	2	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Ivanjica	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Novi Pazar	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	50.0	50.0	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	1	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	2	100.0	100.0	
Grobari Aleksandrovo	Subotica	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Pećinci	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0

Alkatraz	Subotica	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Pećinci	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Kula	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	3	50.0	50.0	50.0
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	16.7	16.7	66.7
			Ordinary member – fan	2	33.3	33.3	100.0
			Total	6	100.0	100.0	
	Novi Sad	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	50.0	50.0	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	1	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	2	100.0	100.0	
	Belgrade	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	4	44.4	44.4	44.4
			Ordinary member – fan	5	55.6	55.6	100.0
			Total	9	100.0	100.0	
	Smederevo	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	50.0	50.0	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	1	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	2	100.0	100.0	
	Jagodina	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	33.3	33.3	33.3
			Ordinary member – fan	2	66.7	66.7	100.0
			Total	3	100.0	100.0	
	Niš	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Ivanjica	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Novi Pazar	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Grobari Jug	Pećinci	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	50.0	50.0	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	1	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	2	100.0	100.0	
	Kula	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	6	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Belgrade	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	33.3	33.3	33.3
			Ordinary member – fan	2	66.7	66.7	100.0
			Total	3	100.0	100.0	
	Jagodina	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Novi Pazar	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	2	100.0	100.0	100.0
Zelenaši	Pećinci	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	100.0	100.0	100.0
South Guard	Pećinci	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	33.3	33.3	33.3
			Ordinary member – fan	4	66.7	66.7	100.0
			Total	6	100.0	100.0	
	Kula	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Delije Ruma	Pećinci	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	33.3	33.3	33.3
			Ordinary member – fan	2	66.7	66.7	100.0

			Total	3	100.0	100.0	
Donji Srem	Pećinci	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	2	100.0	100.0	100.0
Shadows	Belgrade	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	3	75.0	75.0	75.0
			Ordinary member – fan	1	25.0	25.0	100.0
			Total	4	100.0	100.0	
Južni Front	Belgrade	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	50.0	50.0	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	2	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	4	100.0	100.0	
	Kragujevac	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Jagodina	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Ivanjica	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Jakuza	Belgrade	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Brigate 94	Belgrade	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Anti Romi	Belgrade	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Grobari 1970	Kula	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Belgrade	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	2	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Užice	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
United Force	Belgrade	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	4	40.0	40.0	40.0
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	20.0	20.0	60.0
			Ordinary member – fan	4	40.0	40.0	100.0
			Total	10	100.0	100.0	
	Smederevo	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Kragujevac	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Užice		Missing System	1	100.0		
Banda	Kula	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Belgrade	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Heroes	Belgrade	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	50.0	50.0	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	1	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	2	100.0	100.0	
Ultra Boys	Belgrade	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Ultraši Mirijevo	Belgrade	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Delije Taš	Belgrade	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Belgrade Boys	Belgrade	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	33.3	33.3	33.3
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	66.7	66.7	100.0
			Total	3	100.0	100.0	

Odred 18	Belgrade	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Hijene	Kula	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	2	40.0	50.0	50.0
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	20.0	25.0	75.0
			Ordinary member – fan	1	20.0	25.0	100.0
			Total	4	80.0	100.0	
			Missing System	1	20.0		
			Total	5	100.0		
	Kragujevac	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Jagodina	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	50.0	50.0	50.0
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	2	100.0	100.0	
	Ivanjica	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	100.0	100.0	100.0
Medvedi	Kula	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	2	20.0	20.0	20.0
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	4	40.0	40.0	60.0
			Ordinary member – fan	4	40.0	40.0	100.0
			Total	10	100.0	100.0	
	Novi Sad	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Pan Boys	Kula	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	2	100.0	100.0	100.0
Ajkule	Kula	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Zulu iz Kulu	Kula	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	2	100.0	100.0	100.0
Meraklije	Niš	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	16.7	16.7	16.7
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	3	50.0	50.0	66.7
			Ordinary member – fan	2	33.3	33.3	100.0
			Total	6	100.0	100.0	
Blue Tigers	Kula	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Manijaci Turija	Kula	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Tirani 1989	Sivac	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Ekstremi	Novi Pazar	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	4.0	4.0	4.0
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	12	48.0	48.0	52.0
			Ordinary member – fan	12	48.0	48.0	100.0
			Total	25	100.0	100.0	
Torcida Sandžak	Kragujevac	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	50.0	50.0	50.0
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	2	100.0	100.0	
	Novi Pazar	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	3.6	3.7	3.7

			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	12	42.9	44.4	48.1
			Ordinary member – fan	14	50.0	51.9	100.0
			Total	27	96.4	100.0	
			Missing System	1	3.6		
			Total	28	100.0		
Ultras	Novi Pazar	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Kanabis Firm	Novi Pazar	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	50.0	50.0	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	1	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	2	100.0	100.0	
Grobari Sad	Novi Kula		Missing System	1	100.0		
	Novi Sad	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Taurunum Boys	Kula	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Belgrade	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	50.0	50.0	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	1	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	2	100.0	100.0	
Brigate 7	Kula	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	100.0	100.0	100.0
Ofanziva	Smederevo	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Alco Boys	Smederevo	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	2	50.0	50.0	50.0
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	4	100.0	100.0	
Armija 5	Smederevo	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	6	66.7	66.7	66.7
			Ordinary member – fan	3	33.3	33.3	100.0
			Total	9	100.0	100.0	
Skizzati	Smederevo	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	50.0	50.0	50.0
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	2	100.0	100.0	
Despoti	Smederevo	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	33.3	33.3	33.3
			Ordinary member – fan	2	66.7	66.7	100.0
			Total	3	100.0	100.0	
Đurađeva garda	Smederevo	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	25.0	25.0	25.0
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	25.0	25.0	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	2	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	4	100.0	100.0	
Lugavčanski Jašari	Smederevo	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	100.0	100.0	100.0

Firma	Novi Sad	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	25.0	28.6	28.6
			Ordinary member – fan	5	62.5	71.4	100.0
			Total	7	87.5	100.0	
			Missing System	1	12.5		
			Total	8	100.0		
	Belgrade	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	3	75.0	75.0	75.0
			Ordinary member – fan	1	25.0	25.0	100.0
			Total	4	100.0	100.0	
Grobari Kać	Novi Sad	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Korida	Novi Sad	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	50.0	50.0	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	1	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	2	100.0	100.0	
Pandora	Novi Sad	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Vojvode	Novi Sad	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Delije Veternik	Novi Sad	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Ivanjčani	Ivanjica	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	2	100.0	100.0	100.0
Grobari Ivanjica	Ivanjica	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	50.0	50.0	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	1	50.0	50.0	100.0
			Total	2	100.0	100.0	
Grobari NBGD	Belgrade	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
40+	Belgrade	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Iron Boys	Belgrade	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	100.0	100.0	100.0
Zargon Boys	Belgrade	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Niški Kartel	Belgrade	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
			I am one of fan group leaders	1	14.3	14.3	14.3
			Ordinary member – fan	6	85.7	85.7	100.0
	Niš	Valid	Total	7	100.0	100.0	
Nervno	Užice	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	20.0	20.0	20.0
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	40.0	40.0	60.0
			Ordinary member – fan	2	40.0	40.0	100.0
			Total	5	100.0	100.0	
Freedom Fighters	Užice	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	8	72.7	72.7	72.7
			Ordinary member – fan	3	27.3	27.3	100.0
			Total	11	100.0	100.0	
Četnici Sever	Pećinci	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0

Delije Užice	Užice	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	2	50.0	66.7	66.7
			Ordinary member – fan	1	25.0	33.3	100.0
			Total	3	75.0	100.0	
			Missing System	1	25.0		
		Total		4	100.0		
Navijači Slobode istoka	Užice	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Porno divizija	Užice	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
RUCZ	Pećinci	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Crvena zvezda Veterani	Jagodina	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Crveni djavoli	Kragujevac	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	9	60.0	64.3	64.3
			Ordinary member – fan	5	33.3	35.7	100.0
			Total	14	93.3	100.0	
			Missing System	1	6.7		
		Total		15	100.0		
	Jagodina	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
DSRŽ	Kragujevac	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Grobari Čuprija	Jagodina	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Grobari Dorćol	Kragujevac	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Grobari Paraćin	Jagodina	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
JACZ Podmladak	Jagodina	Valid	I am one of fan group leaders	2	18.2	18.2	18.2
			I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	5	45.5	45.5	63.6
			Ordinary member – fan	4	36.4	36.4	100.0
		Total		11	100.0	100.0	
Jagodinci	Jagodina	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	50.0	50.0	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	1	50.0	50.0	100.0
		Total		2	100.0	100.0	
Kormorani Lapovo	Niš	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Medveda	Jagodina	Valid	Ordinary member – fan	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Nišlije	Niš	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	20.0	20.0	20.0
			Ordinary member – fan	4	80.0	80.0	100.0
		Total		5	100.0	100.0	
Pivarska divizija	Jagodina	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Red Force	Kragujevac	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0

Roninsi	Kragujevac	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Štajga omladina	Kragujevac	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Wild Boars	Kragujevac	Valid	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	1	50.0	50.0	50.0
			Ordinary member – fan	1	50.0	50.0	100.0
		Total		2	100.0	100.0	

Table 52 – Distribution of responses of fan group members to the question “What is your status in the fan group”, sample distribution by fan group and town

As shown in Table 52, the initial figures from the previous table (39.2% of surveyed fan group members claim to be members of the group narrow core, while as many as 10.6% of them claim to be fan group leaders) are such due to the large sample. The comparison of responses to the question “How did you become a member of a fan group?” and the question “What is your status in the fan group?”, performed through the χ^2 -test, produced the results shown in Table 53.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	24.977 ^a	10	.005
Likelihood Ratio	25.526	10	.004
Linear-by-Linear Association	12.481	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	481		

a. 4 cells (22.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.50.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.228	.005
Cramer's V	.161	.005
N of Valid Cases	481	

HOW DID THE RESPONDENT BECOME A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP * WHAT IS THE RESPONDENT'S STATUS IN A FAN GROUP

Crosstabulation

			WHAT IS THE RESPONDENT'S STATUS IN A FAN GROUP			Total
			I am one of fan group leaders	I am a member of the narrow core of the fan group	Ordinary member – fan	
HOW DID THE RESPONDENT BECOME A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	Friends from school	Count	7	11	12	30
	persuaded him/her	% within HOW DID THE RESPONDENT BECOME A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	23.3%	36.7%	40.0%	100.0%
		% within WHAT IS THE RESPONDENT'S STATUS IN A FAN GROUP	14.6%	5.7%	5.0%	6.2%
		% of Total	1.5%	2.3%	2.5%	6.2%

A girlfriend/boyfriend persuaded him/her	Count	3	4	8	15
	% within HOW DID THE RESPONDENT BECOME A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	20.0%	26.7%	53.3%	100.0%
	% within WHAT IS THE RESPONDENT'S STATUS IN A FAN GROUP	6.3%	2.1%	3.3%	3.1%
	% of Total	.6%	.8%	1.7%	3.1%
By constantly going to matches and getting to know members of fan groups	Count	28	124	121	273
	% within HOW DID THE RESPONDENT BECOME A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	10.3%	45.4%	44.3%	100.0%
	% within WHAT IS THE RESPONDENT'S STATUS IN A FAN GROUP	58.3%	64.6%	50.2%	56.8%
	% of Total	5.8%	25.8%	25.2%	56.8%
I always wanted to be a member of fan group, which is why I joined my fan group	Count	8	34	72	114
	% within HOW DID THE RESPONDENT BECOME A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	7.0%	29.8%	63.2%	100.0%
	% within WHAT IS THE RESPONDENT'S STATUS IN A FAN GROUP	16.7%	17.7%	29.9%	23.7%
	% of Total	1.7%	7.1%	15.0%	23.7%
Because my older brother/sister was already a member of a fan group	Count	2	12	12	26
	% within HOW DID THE RESPONDENT BECOME A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	7.7%	46.2%	46.2%	100.0%
	% within WHAT IS THE RESPONDENT'S STATUS IN A FAN GROUP	4.2%	6.3%	5.0%	5.4%
	% of Total	.4%	2.5%	2.5%	5.4%
Something else	Count	0	7	16	23
	% within HOW DID THE RESPONDENT BECOME A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	.0%	30.4%	69.6%	100.0%
	% within WHAT IS THE RESPONDENT'S STATUS IN A FAN GROUP	.0%	3.6%	6.6%	4.8%
	% of Total	.0%	1.5%	3.3%	4.8%
Total	Count	48	192	241	481
	% within HOW DID THE RESPONDENT BECOME A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	10.0%	39.9%	50.1%	100.0%
	% within WHAT IS THE RESPONDENT'S STATUS IN A FAN GROUP	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	10.0%	39.9%	50.1%	100.0%

Table 53 – χ^2 -test between responses to the question “How did you become a member of a fan group?” and the question “What is your status in the fan group?”

The χ^2 -test reveals a statistically significant difference, i.e. a link between responses to the question “How did you become a member of a fan group?” and the question “What is your status in the fan group?” – χ^2 (10, n=481) = 24.977, p = 0.005. The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.161, which implies a weak link (Gravetter&Wallnaua, 2004, p. 605). Regardless of this, the test shows that indirectly recruited fan group members more frequently become leaders and members of the narrow core.

Respondents gave the following responses to the question “What does it mean to you be a member of a fan group?” (multiple answers were possible) (Table 54):

WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR THE RESPONDENT TO BE A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	Frequency	Percent
The fan group is important for me because I find in it a company to have some exciting time with	109	20.2
I substitute family for my fan group	57	10.6
My best friends are in my fan group	58	10.8
I only “kill” free time in the fan group	37	6.9
Within my fan group I give support to my club in the best possible way	283	52.5
Something else	27	5.0

Table 54 – Distribution of responses to the question “What does it mean to you to be a member of a fan group?”

The majority of surveyed fan group members (52.5%) believe they best support their team within the group. This is confirmed by the χ^2 -test of independence which shows a statistically significant difference, i.e. a link between the response “Within my fan group I give support to my club in the best possible way” to the question “What does it mean to you to be a member of a fan group?” and the response “Encouragement of football players to achieve the best possible results, by chanting songs and slogans, and carrying fan equipment, instruments, drums, banners, shawls, flags...” to the question “What does it mean to you to support your club?”. The obtained values (with Yates’ correction) are the following: χ^2 (1, n=506) = 40.720, p = 0.000. The fi coefficient equals 0.288, which implies a weak link (Cohen, 1988). Regardless of this, the test shows that a larger number of supporters (over 50%) who join fan groups know what supporting means. In other words, they are aware that supporting is part of sports (a nicer part) and that it does not serve for acting wildly, for violence and hooliganism. It is therefore inappropriate to equate fan groups with hooliganism. This thesis is confirmed by the χ^2 -test between the response “Within my fan group I give support to my club in the best possible way” to the question “What does it mean to you to be a member of a fan group?” and the response “Physically conflicting with opposing fans” to the question “What does it mean to you to support your club?” – χ^2 (1, n=506) = 10.656, p = 0.001 (with Yates’ correction). The fi coefficient equals -0.150, which implies a weak link (Cohen, 1988), but shows that this group of fans condemns physical conflicts with opposing fans. This is also confirmed by the χ^2 -test of independence between the response “Within my fan group I give support to my club in the best possible way” to the question “What does it mean to you to be a member of a fan group?” and the response “Conflicting with persons

in charge of public order maintenance – members of the police, stewards and security” to the question “What does it mean to you to support your club?” – χ^2 (1, n=506) = 5.946, $p = 0.015$) (with Yates’ correction). The fi coefficient equals -0.116, which implies a weak link (Cohen, 1988), but shows that this group of supporters condemns physical conflicts with entities securing sports events. However, the group of fans who believe that they support their club in the best possible way within the fan group and are against physical conflicts, does not give up on verbal conflicts (insults, swearing etc) either ($p = 0.300$), nor do they give up on the current fan iconography which implies torches, “bengal” torches, cannon shots and other pyrotechnics ($p = 1.000$). This leaves ample room for additional education about sportsmanlike support for the favourite club.

Respondents who do not live with both parents more frequently reply that their fan group substitutes their family – χ^2 (1, n=505) = 7.463, $p = 0.006$ (with Yates’ correction). The fi coefficient equals -0.130, which implies a weak link (Cohen, 1988), but shows that this group of respondents tend to substitute the incompleteness of their family life by membership of a fan group. This may be significant information for creating the profile of young persons who join fan groups. Another important information is that respondents who more frequently respond “My best friends are in my fan group” to the question “What does it mean to you to be a member of a fan group?” also more frequently respond “My best friend... is a member of my fan group”, which is entirely logical – χ^2 (4, n=502) = 12.258, $p = 0.016$. The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.156, which implies a weak link (Gravetter&Wallnaua, 2004, p. 605)).

Respondents gave the following responses to the question “How much older is the fan group leader than you?” (Table 55):

How much older is the fan group leader than respondents					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not older than me	32	6.3	6.7	6.7
	Older than me up to three years	51	10.1	10.6	17.3
	Older than me around five years	93	18.4	19.4	36.7
	Older than me somewhat less than ten years	139	27.5	29.0	65.6
	Older than me more than ten years	165	32.6	34.4	100.0
	Total	480	94.9	100.0	
	Missing System	26	5.1		
Total		506	100.0		

Table 55 – Distribution of responses of fan group members to the question “How much older is the leader of your fan group than you?”

The majority of respondents – 60.1% (cumulatively) say that their fan group leaders are around ten years older than them. Given the respondents’ age, we may conclude that fan group leaders are in their late 20s or early 30s.

Responses to the question “What is your attitude towards your fan group leader” are presented in Table 56.

What is the respondent's attitude towards the fan group leader				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	The fan group leader is my good friend	91	18.0	19.0
	The fan group leader is only the first among equals	95	18.8	38.8
	The fan group leader is my "leader" whom I always follow	64	12.6	52.2
	I esteem my fan group leader more than my teachers	52	10.3	63.0
	I do not think that I should always follow the ideas of my fan group leader because I do not always agree with them	132	26.1	90.6
	Something else	45	8.9	100.0
	Total	479	94.7	100.0
Total	Missing System	27	5.3	
		506	100.0	

Table 56 – Distribution of responses of fan group members to the question “What is your attitude towards your fan group leader?”

Table 56 shows that almost a fourth of surveyed fan group members (24.3% cumulatively) are in a hierarchical relation with their fan group leaders (“The fan group leader is my ‘leader’ whom I always follow” and “I esteem my fan group leader more than my teachers”). This is a significant social problem as respondents place their leaders’ authority above all other, family and state, authorities. They thus become convenient “cannon fodder” for manipulation and the achievement of very often personal objectives which are unrelated to sports and supporting, but concern classical criminality (drug dealing, racketeering etc). The rest of respondents have normal interaction with fan group leaders or are in some sort of a normal social relation (“The fan group leader is my good friend” and “The fan group leader is only the first among equals”) – 38.8% cumulatively, or they believe that the fan group leader is not an ultimate authority (27.6%).

The χ^2 -test of independence indicates a statistically significant link (χ^2 (20, n=467) = 62.310, p = 0.000) between the response to the question “How much older is the leader of your fan group than you?” and the question “What is your attitude towards your fan group leader?”. The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.183, which implies a weak link (Gravetter&Wallnaua, 2004, p. 605). Test results show that fan group members who stated that leaders are older than them by around ten years more often respond that they have a hierarchical relation with them. Therefore, we may conclude that the age of group leaders affects their members’ attitude towards them – the older the leader, the more pronounced the hierarchical relation with them and vice versa.

The χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant link (χ^2 (5, n=479) = 12.385, p = 0.030) between the response “The fan group is important for me because I find in it a company to have some exciting time with” to the question “What does it mean to you to be a member of a fan group” and the response to the question “What is your attitude towards your fan group leader?”. The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.161, which implies a weak link (Gravetter&Wallnaua, 2004, p. 605). This indicates that “exciting time” in a fan group is sought more frequently by those members who are in some sort of normal social interaction with the leader. The χ^2 -test of independence indicates a statistically significant link (χ^2 (5, n=479) = 22.194, p = 0.000) between the response “I substitute family for my fan group” to the question “What does it mean to you to be a member of a fan group?” and the response to the question “What is your attitude towards your fan group leader?”. (χ^2 (5, n=479) = 22.194, p = 0.000). The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.215, which

implies a weak link (Gravetter&Wallnaua, 2004, p. 605). Respondents who seek in a fan group the substitution for their families are much more frequently in stronger hierarchical relations with the leader. Finally, the χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant link between the response “Within my fan group I give support to my club in the best possible way” to the question “What does it mean to you to be a member of a fan group?” and the response to the question “What is your attitude towards your fan group leader?” (χ^2 (5, n=479) = 32.556, p = 0.000). The Cramer’s V coefficient equals 0.261, which implies a weak link (Gravetter&Wallnaua, 2004, p. 605) and indicates that such response is most often given by fan group members who do not believe that they should always follow the ideas of their fan group leaders as they do not always agree with them.

6.2.9. RESPONDENTS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF HOOLIGANISM AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOUR AT SPORTS EVENTS

At the end of the survey, respondents were asked the question: “In your opinion, how can the problem of hooliganism at sports events be solved?” (multiple answers were possible or respondents could formulate their own responses). Results are presented in Table 57.

RESPONDENT’S ATTITUDE CONCERNING THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF HOOLIGANISM AND VIOLENCE AT SPORTS EVENTS	Frequency	Percent
Better education of supporters	1246	34.0
Amendments to regulations	1420	38.8
Better work of the judiciary	914	25.0
Better work of the police	1446	39.5
Something else	457	12.5

Table 57 – Distribution of responses to the question “In your opinion, how can the problem of hooliganism at sports events be solved?”

Respondents (39.5%) largely identify the improvement of police work as a way of solving the problem, while the judiciary is considered the least capable of that (25.0%). However, there is no great difference among other responses – 38.8% mention amendments to regulations and 34.0% refer to better education of supporters. Responses of those deciding to propose a solution on their own (12.5%) may, in general, be classified into three categories: (1) nothing should be solved, things are good as they are; (2) the problem cannot be solved; and (3) stricter repressive measures should be applied against offenders. Identifying the improvement of police work as the key to solving the problem of hooliganism and violent behaviour at sports events arises from the perception of the place and role of entities securing sports events (Table 32–37). Bad perception of the police role in securing sports events results in the opinion that police work on tackling hooliganism is identified as insufficient.

The χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference in the opinions of fan group member and non-member respondents in regard to the answer “Better education of supporters” (Table 58).

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	14.287 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	13.917	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	14.762	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	14.283	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	3662				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 183.40.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.062	.000
Cramer's V	.062	.000
N of Valid Cases	3662	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP * THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AND HOOLIGANISM AT SPORTS EVENTS CAN BE SOLVED BY BETTER EDUCATION OF SUPPORTERS

Crosstabulation

		THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AND HOOLIGANISM AT SPORTS EVENTS CAN BE SOLVED BY BETTER EDUCATION OF SUPPORTERS		Total	
		YES	NO		
IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	NO	Count	1101	2022	3123
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	35.3%	64.7%	100.0%
		% within THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AND HOOLIGANISM AT SPORTS EVENTS CAN BE SOLVED BY BETTER EDUCATION OF SUPPORTERS	88.4%	83.7%	85.3%
		% of Total	30.1%	55.2%	85.3%
	YES	Count	145	394	539
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	26.9%	73.1%	100.0%
		% within THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AND HOOLIGANISM AT SPORTS EVENTS CAN BE SOLVED BY BETTER EDUCATION OF SUPPORTERS	11.6%	16.3%	14.7%
		% of Total	4.0%	10.8%	14.7%
Total	Count	1246	2416	3662	
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	34.0%	66.0%	100.0%	
	% within THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AND HOOLIGANISM AT SPORTS EVENTS CAN BE SOLVED BY BETTER EDUCATION OF SUPPORTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	34.0%	66.0%	100.0%	

Table 58 – χ^2 -test between the response “Better education of supporters” and the question “Are you a member of a fan group?”

The χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference (with Yates' correction for continuity) – $\chi^2 (1, n=3662) = 13.917, p = 0.000$. The ϕ coefficient equals 0.062, which implies a small difference (Cohen, 1988). Regardless of this, a smaller number of respondents who are members of fan groups believe that the solution lies in better education of supporters. Therefore, it may be expected that fan group members will resist the implementation of education programmes as a means of preventing hooliganism and violence at sports events.

There is a statistically significant difference in the opinions of fan group members and non-members in regard to the answer "Amendments to regulations" (Table 59).

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	38.724 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	38.130	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	40.421	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	38.713	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	3662				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 209.01.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.103	.000
	Cramer's V	.103	.000
N of Valid Cases		3662	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP * THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED BY AMENDING REGULATIONS

Crosstabulation

		THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED BY AMENDING REGULATIONS		Total
		YES	NO	
IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	Count	1276	1847	3123
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	40.9%	59.1%	100.0%
	% within THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED BY AMENDING REGULATIONS	89.9%	82.4%	85.3%
	% of Total	34.8%	50.4%	85.3%
	Count	144	395	539
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	26.7%	73.3%	100.0%
	% within THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED BY AMENDING REGULATIONS	10.1%	17.6%	14.7%
	% of Total	3.9%	10.8%	14.7%
	Count	1420	2242	3662
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	38.8%	61.2%	100.0%
Total	% within THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED BY AMENDING REGULATIONS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	38.8%	61.2%	100.0%

Table 59 – χ^2 -test between the response “Amendments to regulations” and the question “Are you a member of a fan group?”

The χ^2 -test reveals a statistically significant difference (with Yates’ correction for continuity) – χ^2 (1, n=3662) = 38.130, p = 0.000. The fi coefficient equals 0.103, which implies a small difference (Cohen, 1988). According to results, respondents who are not fan group members much more frequently say that the problem of hooliganism at sports events can be solved by amending regulations (by their tightening). This is also an indicator of insufficient education of young people as Serbia’s laws in this field are among the stricter ones in Europe. Bearing all this in mind, the implementation of laws represents a problem.

The χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference between fan group members and non-members also in regard to the response “Better work of the judiciary” (Table 60).

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	12.291 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	11.916	1	.001		
Likelihood Ratio	12.931	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	12.287	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	3662				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 134.53.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.058	.000
Cramer's V	.058	.000
N of Valid Cases	3662	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP * THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED THROUGH BETTER WORK OF THE JUDICIARY

Crosstabulation

		THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED THROUGH BETTER WORK OF THE JUDICIARY		Total
		YES	NO	
IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	Count	812	2311	3123
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	26.0%	74.0%	100.0%
	% within THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED THROUGH BETTER WORK OF THE JUDICIARY	88.8%	84.1%	85.3%
	% of Total	22.2%	63.1%	85.3%
	Count	102	437	539
YES	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	18.9%	81.1%	100.0%

Total	% within THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED THROUGH BETTER WORK OF THE JUDICIARY	11.2%	15.9%	14.7%
	% of Total	2.8%	11.9%	14.7%
	Count	914	2748	3662
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	25.0%	75.0%	100.0%
	% within THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED THROUGH BETTER WORK OF THE JUDICIARY	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	25.0%	75.0%	100.0%

Table 60 – χ^2 -test between the response “Better work of the judiciary” and the question “Are you a member of a fan group?”

The χ^2 -test reveals a statistically significant difference (with Yates’ correction for continuity) – χ^2 (1, n=3662) = 11.916, p = 0.001. The fi coefficient equals 0.058, which implies a small difference (Cohen, 1988). However, the difference does exist – fan group members less frequently give the response “Better work of the judiciary”. There is a statistically significant difference in the opinions of fan group members and non-members in regard to the answer “Amendments to regulations” (Table 61).

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	35.944 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	35.375	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	37.359	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	35.934	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	3662				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 212.83.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.099	.000
Cramer's V	.099	.000
N of Valid Cases	3662	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP * THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED THROUGH BETTER WORK OF THE POLICE

Crosstabulation

		THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED THROUGH BETTER WORK OF THE POLICE		Total
		YES	NO	
IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	Count	1296	1827	3123
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	41.5%	58.5%	100.0%
	% within THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED THROUGH BETTER WORK OF THE POLICE	89.6%	82.4%	85.3%
	% of Total	35.4%	49.9%	85.3%
	Count	150	389	539

Total	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	27.8%	72.2%	100.0%
	% within THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED THROUGH BETTER WORK OF THE POLICE	10.4%	17.6%	14.7%
	% of Total	4.1%	10.6%	14.7%
	Count	1446	2216	3662
	% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	39.5%	60.5%	100.0%
	% within THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED THROUGH BETTER WORK OF THE POLICE	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	39.5%	60.5%	100.0%

Table 61 – χ^2 -test between the response “Better work of the police” and the question “Are you a member of a fan group?”

The χ^2 -test shows a statistically significant difference (with Yates’ correction for continuity) – $\chi^2(1, n=3662) = 35.375, p = 0.000$. The ϕ coefficient equals 0.099, which implies a small difference (Cohen, 1988). This test also shows that respondents who are not members of fan groups more frequently say “Better work of the police”.

Finally, the χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference in the opinions of fan group members and non-members in regard to the answer “Something else” (Table 62).

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	38.099 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	37.233	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	33.713	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	38.089	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	3662				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 67.26.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	-.102	.000
Cramer's V	.102	.000
N of Valid Cases	3662	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP * THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED BY APPLYING OTHER MEASURES

Crosstabulation

	THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED BY APPLYING OTHER MEASURES		Total
	YES	NO	

IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	NO	Count	346	2777	3123
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	11.1%	88.9%	100.0%
		% within THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED BY APPLYING OTHER MEASURES	75.7%	86.6%	85.3%
	YES	% of Total	9.4%	75.8%	85.3%
		Count	111	428	539
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	20.6%	79.4%	100.0%
		% within THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED BY APPLYING OTHER MEASURES	24.3%	13.4%	14.7%
	Total	% of Total	3.0%	11.7%	14.7%
		Count	457	3205	3662
		% within IS THE RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A FAN GROUP	12.5%	87.5%	100.0%
		% within THE RESPONDENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED BY APPLYING OTHER MEASURES	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	12.5%	87.5%	100.0%

Table 62 – χ^2 -test between the response “Something else” and the question “Are you a member of a fan group?”

The χ^2 -test indicates a statistically significant difference (with Yates’ correction for continuity) – $\chi^2 (1, n=3662) = 37.233, p = 0.000$. The fi coefficient equals -0.102, which implies a small difference (Cohen, 1988). Unlike the previous tests, this test shows that respondents who are members of fan groups more frequently answer with “Something else”. When explaining the response “Something else”, respondents usually say “Nothing should be changed”, “Things are good as they are” and “This cannot be solved”. Based on test results, it may be concluded that fan group members are likely to resist any measures tackling hooliganism and violence at sports events. Namely, fan group members – those who create problems (a fifth to fourth of them) would not like the situation to change.

6.3. CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH RESULTS

The research was conducted on the stratified sample of 3662 secondary school students from 12 towns and 31 secondary schools in the Republic of Serbia. The sample covered 1.3% of the population of secondary school students. As the sample is stratified, its size fully represents the targeted population of secondary school students aged from 14 to 19.

Research results also show the diminished interest of young people in sports events as almost a fourth of respondents never attend sports events (24.1%). Two assumptions are possible: (1) reduced physical and sports activity among young persons diminishes their interest in sports events; (2) violence and hooliganism at sports events diminish the interest of young persons in attending sports events etc. These assumptions may be the starting point for some future research.

In regard to supporters’ inclinations and membership of fan groups, the research has revealed the following:

- The majority of respondents (64.3%) support one of the two largest and most popular clubs in Serbia – Crvena zvezda or Partizan;
- A significant percentage of young people (14.7%) joins organised fan groups;
- Respondents are members of 93 fan groups;
- Fan groups very often present themselves as being “patriotic”, whereas in fact they act in a nationalistic and even chauvinistic way. However, a large number of names of fan groups are in a foreign, usually English language, which is somewhat contradictory;
- Names of fan groups may be classified into three groups: the so-called regular names, the so-called “silly” or humorous names, and names associating with violence. The last group is, unfortunately, the most numerous;
- There are many fan groups that support the same team, but such groups are often in mutual conflict;
- There are many more fan groups and their members in Belgrade than in any other town in Serbia;
- A larger number of first and second grade students are members of fan groups, while this number declines in senior grades. This is an important fact which indicates when to launch violence prevention programmes at sports events;
- The male population joins fan groups to a larger extent, which should be taken into account in planning prevention programmes;
- In smaller towns (Ivanjica, Pećinci), respondents have a better opinion of the police, while the situation is different in larger places (Belgrade, Novi Sad). Fan group members have a more unfavourable attitude towards the police compared to respondents who are not members of fan groups;
- Fan group members are more frequently apprehended due to fan conflicts or violence at sports events. Misdemeanour and criminal charges are more frequently filed against them, which is why they are more frequently convicted of violence at sports events;
- Fan group members much more frequently visit sports events;
- In selecting a club, fan group members are most affected by the environment outside the family (people they socialise with), i.e. they cannot rationally explain why they support a particular club;
- Fan group members do not recognise what socially acceptable support of a sports club means. This should be borne in mind in designing hooliganism prevention programmes among young persons because some sort of education about socially acceptable club support is necessary;
- Among the total population of respondents, the interest in national team and club competitions is equal. However, members of fan groups are more interested in club competitions;
- Fan group members socialise much more with their peers who fervently support the same club and socialise much less with those young persons who do not show great interest in sports. It is interesting that fan group members socialise with their peers who fervently support another club to a very similar degree as the total population of respondents.

In regard to respondents’ attitude towards school, as an indicator of possibly deviant behaviour (if the attitude is negative), the research has revealed the following:

- More than a sixth of respondents have a negative attitude towards school, which in national terms represents a serious problem which indicates the erosion of traditional social values;
- Students who are not members of fan groups respect more the traditional system of values where education and knowledge represent a significant resource. In contrast, fan group members believe that membership of a fan group (which they often consider a significant structure with a strong impact on social developments) is more valuable than traditional virtues (knowledge, education and upbringing);
- Fan group members much more frequently skip classes to attend sports events, which is why, at the individual level, an increase in the number of absences may be considered an indicator that the student is in contact with fan groups. This is particularly true if absences correlate with days of sports events.

In regard to respondents' attitude towards education about violent behaviour and hooliganism at sports events, the research has revealed the following:

- It may be concluded that there are very few programmes in Serbia's secondary schools, aimed at student education and proactive prevention of hooliganism and violent behaviour at sports events;
- Fan group members more frequently respond that they have been educated in school about hooliganism and violent behaviour. However, it is most probable that they were especially interested in this topic, which is why they better remember such education, while the rest of the population is more or less indifferent towards this issue;
- Fan group members do not wish additional education in school about hooliganism and violence at sports events. This may be explained by the fact that fan group members believe they know enough about this social problem and its consequences.

In regard to respondents' participation in violent behaviour and hooliganism at sports events, the research has revealed the following:

- Almost 40% of respondents have attended or participated in some sort of violence motivated by sports hooliganism in the school or its environs. This is rather serious as it indicates that this type of violence is widespread among secondary school students. Fan group members take the lead;
- Around a half of respondents who are members of fan groups witnessed or participated in some form of violence motivated by sports;
- Almost a third of respondents have participated in some kinds of fan conflicts. Of this, 12.3% have participated in physical violence. These are alarming data about the situation among secondary school students in regard to accepting and participating in violence and hooliganism at sports events;
- Accidental encounters of fan groups are the most frequent way in which violence motivated by sports hooliganism erupts. In terms of pre-arranged fan conflicts, modern technologies take the lead compared to personal arrangements. Therefore, keeping abreast of the developments among fan groups on social networks may be highly important in the prevention of violence;

- Despite the ban and entry checks, around a sixth of respondents managed to introduce forbidden devices. The most frequent method was to hide these devices underneath clothes, which signals the need for improving the operation of steward services in sports facilities. On the other hand, a solid number of respondents were assisted in introducing banned pyrotechnics, which only confirms the above conclusion. The forbidden means were introduced by fan group members to a much larger degree.

In regard to respondents' perception of the place and role of entities securing sports events, the research has revealed the following:

- A large number of respondents perceive that the police perform or participate in performing such activities. This is indicative of insufficient education of the young about this issue and the wrong picture created about the police role in tackling violence and hooliganism at sports events. Also, a large number of fan group members do not recognise the entity which physically secures and maintains order at sports events, but they identify the police as the party in charge. This is a particularly important indicator of the insufficient education of fans;
- A larger number of respondents perceive the police as the entity to react the first to violence at sports events. It is interesting that around a sixth of respondents perceive that other spectators and fans react the first to violence among fans. This indicates that conflicts and violence at sports events are considered integral to sports, which is entirely wrong. On the other hand, fan group members more often correctly perceive who should first react to violence at sports events, but they also more often answer that other spectators – supporters are the first to react to violence;
- A vast majority of respondents do not recognise proactive police approach to tackling violence and hooliganism at sports events. Also, a large number of respondents who are members of fan groups do not recognise proactive police approach to tackling hooliganism. This is also a significant indicator either of supporters' insufficient education or inadequate police proactive action;
- The majority of respondents believe that the police apply force against all those present in the disorder area (45.9%). Also, more than a fourth of respondents (29.1% cumulatively) believe the police apply excessive and unselective force (against those who did not cause disorders), which indicates relatively small trust of respondents in the police. In contrast, fan group members emphasise that the police apply excessive force. Therefore, unlike the rest of the population, they do not perceive it as a problem that the police apply force against all those present in the disorder area – what they see as the greatest problem is the excessive use of force against them;
- The total sample is divided in terms of public reaction to police intervention in case of the eruption of violence at sports events – slightly above a half of respondents have a positive attitude towards intervention, while somewhat less than a half of them have a negative attitude. Fan group members perceive to a much greater degree that citizens oppose intervention. Therefore, fan group members perceive that they enjoy public support for their iconography and manner of behaviour.

In regard to respondents' perception about racism at sports events in Serbia, the research has revealed the following:

- A fifth of respondents perceive racial animosity among supporters at sports events that Serbia's national team participates in;
- The way of behaving and supporting, often offensive on several grounds, including nationalistic and racial grounds, are not perceived as problematic by fan group members. In fact, they consider such behaviour a normal part of the fan iconography and code of behaviour in Serbia;
- Somewhat less than two thirds of respondents recognise the problem of racism at sports events. Therefore, young people in Serbia believe that racism at sports events does exist and that it should be taken into account when designing prevention programmes among young persons and supporters, aimed at curbing hooliganism and violent behaviour at sports events;
- Only somewhat more than a fifth of fan group members perceive the problem of racism at sports events, which makes a large difference compared to the total population of supporters. What is obviously missing is the education of supporters about nationalism, chauvinism and racism, and their causes and consequences.

In regard to the consumption of psychoactive substances among young persons and the link with violence at sports events, the research has revealed the following:

- Over two thirds of respondents (who are underage) consume alcohol. Fan group members more frequently state that they consume alcohol;
- Respondents who consume alcohol are more frequently apprehended due to violence at sports events, and misdemeanour and criminal charges are more frequently filed against them. Therefore, it may be concluded that there is a link between the consumption of alcohol and violence at sports events;
- The sample does not indicate a statistical link between the respondents' habit to consume alcohol and whether they were convicted due to violence at sports events. As the link between violence at sports events and the consumption of alcohol has been ascertained, it may be concluded that there is a problem in operation of either of the judiciary or the police which fail to submit to the judiciary complete cases based on which it would be possible to pronounce final judgments;
- Almost 10% of (under-age) respondents use drugs. Fan group members more frequently state that they use drugs;
- Respondents who use drugs are more frequently apprehended due to violence at sports events, misdemeanour and criminal charges are more frequently filed against them, and they are more frequently convicted of misdemeanours or criminal offences. Therefore, it may be concluded that there is a link between drug abuse and violence at sports events.

In regard to specific features of fan group members, the research has revealed the following:

- The research covered 539 members of fan groups;
- A sixth of fan group members joined the group through the so-called indirect recruitment ("Friends from school persuaded him/her", "A girlfriend/boyfriend persuaded him/her" and "Because my older brother/sister was already a member of a fan group"), while the

rest joined through direct recruitment – by constantly going to matches and wishing to become a fan group member;

- The majority of respondents (around a half of the sample) are ordinary members – supporters of fan groups, which is expected. On the other hand, over a third of fan group members claim they are members of the narrow core, while as much as the tenth part claim to be group leaders. Such data were obtained due to the large sample;
- Indirectly recruited fan group members more frequently become leaders and members of the group narrow core;
- A larger number of supporters (over 50%) who join fan groups know what supporting means. In other words, they are aware that supporting is part of sports (a nicer part) and that it does not serve for acting wildly, for violence and hooliganism. **Therefore, it would not be appropriate to equate fan groups with hooliganism;**
- There is ample room for additional education about sportsmanlike support for the favourite club through the implementation of preventive programmes aimed at curbing hooliganism and violent behaviour at sports events;
- Respondents from incomplete families tend to substitute this by membership of a fan group. This may be significant information for creating the profile of young persons who join fan groups;
- Fan group leaders are in their late 20s or early 30s;
- A fourth of surveyed fan group members are in a strong hierarchical relation with their fan group leaders. This is a significant social problem as respondents place their leaders' authority above all other, family and state, authorities. They thus become convenient "cannon fodder" for manipulation and the achievement of very often personal objectives which are unrelated to sports and supporting, but concern classical criminality (drug dealing, racketeering etc);
- Fan group members who stated that leaders are older than them by around ten years more often respond that they have a hierarchical relation with them. Therefore, we may conclude that the age of group leaders affects their members' attitude towards them – the older the leader, the more pronounced the hierarchical relations and vice versa;
- "Exciting time" in a fan group is more frequently sought by those members (around a fifth) who are in some sort of normal social interaction with the leader;
- Respondents who seek to substitute their families by their fan group (around a tenth) are much more frequently in stronger hierarchical relations with the leader;
- Within a fan group, best support to the club is most often given by members who do not believe that they should always follow the ideas of their fan group leaders as they do not always agree with them. The majority of surveyed fan group members (somewhat more than half) give such response, which again indicates that not all fan group members are hooligans and violent personalities.

Finally, in regard to respondents' attitudes towards a possible solution of the problem of hooliganism and violent behaviour at sports events, the research has revealed the following:

- Respondents (39.5%) largely identify the improvement of police work as a way of solving the problem, while the judiciary is considered the least capable of that (25.0%). However, there is no great difference among other responses – 38.8% mention amendments to regulations and 34.0% refer to better education of supporters. Responses

of those deciding to propose a solution on their own (12.5%) may, in general, be classified into three categories: (1) nothing should be solved, things are good as they are; (2) the problem cannot be solved; and (3) stricter repressive measures should be applied against offenders;

- A smaller number of respondents who are members of fan groups believe that the solution lies in better education of supporters and vice versa. Therefore, it may be expected that fan group members will resist the implementation of education programmes as a means of preventing hooliganism and violence at sports events;
- Respondents who are not fan group members much more frequently say that the problem of hooliganism at sports events can be solved by amending regulations (by their tightening) and vice versa. This is also an indicator of insufficient education of young people as Serbia's laws in this field are among the stricter ones in Europe. Bearing all this in mind, the implementation of valid laws represents a problem;
- A smaller percentage of fan group members believe that violent behaviour and hooliganism can be solved by better operation of the judiciary and vice versa;
- A larger number of respondents who are not members of fan groups believe that the problem can be solved by better operation of the police and vice versa;
- Respondents who are members of fan groups more frequently answer with "Something else" and vice versa. When explaining the response "Something else", respondents usually say "Nothing should be changed", "Things are good as they are" and "This cannot be solved". Based these results, it may be concluded that fan group members are likely to resist measures tackling hooliganism and violence at sports events.

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CONCLUSION

Violence and supporters' behaviour at sports events in the region have been subject to innumerable newspaper articles, TV reports, including several sociological studies. Despite this, public hunger for information about extreme supporters and their behaviour (considered provocative by the public) and numerous explanations of the phenomenon are certainly not definitive. Each new fan incident only further amplifies the interest in this matter and replicates attempts to finally answer numerous intriguing questions raised in this regard.

Over the past years, the Republic of Serbia has doubtless faced hooliganism at sports events. This phenomenon is developing both in qualitative and quantitative terms, and will persist in future as well. In addition to poor quality of the game and the visibly lower standard of living, the fact that fan incidents have become much more frequent and serious has also affected the diminished interest in sports and dissuaded many fans from visiting sports arenas. In contrast, it seems at first sight that the crisis of the sports public has affected the least the grandstands reserved for extreme fans. Some young people, who otherwise would not be directly interested in watching matches, consider the behaviour of extreme fan groups attractive and exciting. It is exactly such behaviour that attracts them to sports premises. All this has brought about the formation of an aggressive subculture of violent fan groups and constant provocation of incidents as the arrival at a sports event is not motivated by club support, but by the desire to manifest violence and vent negative emotions.

Solving the problem of hooliganism at sports events is not an easy and simple task. Hooliganism at sports events may be reduced to a socially acceptable degree with the implementation of quality security assessments of the risk of incidents, by monitoring extreme fans and pre-empting their intentions, isolating them, performing efficient intervention, and by ensuring coordinated cooperation among government authorities, sports organisations and clubs, educational institutions and the media. In tackling violence at sports events, repressive measures should not be entirely disregarded, on the contrary. However, a proactive police approach and preventive measures should be given priority. Such an approach enables mingling of different, opposing fan groups, and need not result in conflicts and violence. Namely, fans may together support their favourite club and establish good, or at least satisfactory mutual relations.

A large number of police officers in riot gear who are deployed at visible places, are not a guarantee that violence and public order disruption will not take place. In contrast, small groups of police officers, in regular uniform and maintaining contact with supporters, may ensure a safe event. A continuous flow of correct and timely information enables police forces to maintain control over spectator behaviour. Police officers maintaining public order in a particular area should not look in a menacing way, but contrary to it. At the same time, whenever possible, they should try to behave in a friendly way and establish communication with supporters so as to ensure a relaxed atmosphere. Information on the movement of known hooligans should be submitted to all police units and each police officer must be informed, with the aim of implementing well-organised, targeted and limited interventions against designated individuals, without jeopardising other supporters. What is highly important in such interventions is to avoid

mistakes and not to apprehend or apply means of coercion against peaceful supporters, which may trigger dissatisfaction of other supporters and bring about the escalation of disorders.

Further organisational changes and a system of adequate professional training of police officers is the path that the Serbian police must follow in order to properly tackle violence at sports events. Violence has surpassed the limits of sports facilities and has become a generally social problem over the past several years. The police are therefore unable to grapple with this issue on their own, which is why it is indispensable that other segments of society get involved – families, schools, but primarily the judiciary that should, at this critical moment, efficiently process court cases initiated against hooligans.

Facing the escalation of violence, each country has set up its own legal framework to counter this phenomenon. However, though it may seem at first sight that countries would generally take a similar approach, this did not happen even among countries of the former Yugoslavia as almost all of them have adopted rather different laws. On the one hand, there are countries whose legal systems envisage criminal offences of violent behaviour at sports events, while on the other hand, there are those countries stipulating only misdemeanours in this field. Besides, there is also a lack of uniformity in prescribing the security measure of prohibition of attendance at these events. Moreover, the stipulated measures differ drastically. Of former Yugoslavian countries, legislation in Serbia is the strictest, followed by that of Croatia which prescribes exceptionally strict penalties for criminal offences relating to sports events. A special aspect concerns the relation between the prescribed and pronounced penalties as the judicial policy in Serbia is exceptionally lenient. Significant disproportion is also observed in criminal proceedings relating to this criminal offence. However, the success in countering this problem is a relative category, which is why the situation should be continuously monitored and prevention measures enhanced.

According to results obtained in empirical research, Serbia faces a serious problem of hooliganism at sports events. What is also alarming is that a significant percentage of young people (14.7%) join organised fan groups that initiate hooligan behaviour. A better situation in the field may not be expected in the coming period with the repressive approach applied towards young people in Serbia so far. Therefore, preventive programmes should be designed, offering young persons an exit from the current situation. Some of these programmes were discussed in the previous chapters, but the question is posed as to the age of persons that these programmes should be targeted at. Research has shown that the number of secondary school students in fan groups increases in the first and second grades, and declines in more senior grades. This is an important fact as it indicates the opportune time for launching programmes aimed at pre-empting violence at sports events. Another highly important fact is that the male population joins fan groups to a larger extent, which should be taken into account in planning these programmes. Of course, these are general facts, but to ensure their success, each preventive programme should account for all specificities of the environment, school, club, age and other characteristics of individuals involved.