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The Clash of Civilizations

Twenty Years On



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The Clash of Civilizations

Twenty Years On

EDITED BY
J. PAUL BARKER

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Perhaps no article has been as often cited or hotly debated over the past twenty years as that of Professor Samuel P. Huntington's Foreign Affairs article "The Clash of Civilizations?." Certainly considered among the preeminent political thinkers of his generation, the clash of civilizations continues to be the reference point for a host of theoretical arguments across the entire spectrum of the social sciences. Written at a time when the world was going through massive shifts, his essay looked into the future and put forward a thesis that culture would be at the center of international conflicts. A host of events in the past twenty years have given credence to this viewpoint, but also raise questions about many of its assertions. As the essays in this collection make clear, the accuracy of the thesis is hotly debated and it remains a theory with which serious engagement ought to be made.

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Introduction

J. PAUL BARKER
E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The late professor Samuel P. Huntington is among the most prolific and influential political scientists of his generation. Yet, for many he is known, not for his work on understanding civil-military relations, or on theories of political order and its implications on modernization theory, or for his work on the process of democratization.

Huntington's legacy has become inextricably linked to a Foreign Affairs article published twenty years ago this year. In his 1993 article "The Clash of Civilizations?,"¹ Huntington put forward his vision of what the post-Cold War world might look like, and the debate has not quelled since.

In the article Huntington put forward his belief that the shape of the world was shifting and that conflicts would be defined by culture rather than ideology or economic reasons. The nation state would remain a significant actor, Huntington posited, but the principle conflicts would occur between nations and groups of different cultures, and the "fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future,"² Huntington viewed this as the latest evolution in the nature of conflict, an evolution in the line of those which occurred following the Peace of Westphalia, then the French Revolution, and then the Russian Revolution. This was shorthand for a process wherein Huntington saw the primary drivers of conflicts moving from princes, to nations, to ideologies, and now finally to civilizations. Another significant observation Huntington would make was that "in the politics of civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history."³

While Huntington's thesis made some important observations, it has nevertheless attracted no shortage of serious critiques. The last twenty years have provided the necessary real world data by which to measure the arguments Huntington made as he looked forward and attempted to make sense of this new world, absent the battle between superpowers that had marked much of the previous forty years.

This collection of essays commemorating the legacy of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations article twenty years on from its original publication looks at the legacy of the theory. Some of the articles, such as that of Takashi Inoguchi, raise some objections against the thesis as it measures the theory against the evidence of the past two

decades. Inoguchi's article, by examining the evidence of Southeast Asia, highlights how Huntington's division of the world into large civilizational blocks was not accurate in making sense of these regions and the diversity existing within them. The Crescent and the Cross is a look at some of the short-comings of a "culturalist" approach in explaining the relationship between Islam and violence. While Huntington predicted that there would be conflict with the Islamic civilization, Syed Mansoob Murshed, demonstrates that he failed to foresee that the greater conflict would occur within the civilization itself.

In two of the essays, the authors consider more closely how the thesis can be applied in present-day discourse. Johan Eriksson examines the "unexpected liberalism" that emerged in the way Huntington's Clash thesis was utilized in the discourse of George W. Bush. Dieter Senghaas approaches the topic in a related way, considering how Huntington's thesis may be used to move towards intercultural dialogue in an attempt to minimize the potential for clashes when cultures come into contact.

The remaining contributions to this collection include two articles that tell the story of Huntington and where the Clash of Civilizations thesis fits within his personal body of work and within the broader climate of academia. Jeffrey Haynes' opening article is an excellent introduction to why exactly it is that this article has been so important. Its legacy is drawn not so much because of its "correctness" or "rightness" but rather, Haynes argues that its influence is due to the precise way in which it captured the zeitgeist of the post-Cold War world and because of the powerful statement it has made about globalization, capturing both the hopes and fears present in it.

David Welch in his contribution looks more closely at Huntington himself and articulates how the Clash of Civilizations thesis fit within his own development. In Welch's view Huntington was wrestling through the challenges of what "culture" was to look like in a quickly globalizing world. The challenges Huntington was confronting as he looked at the conflict that would occur in various instances between "us" and "them" was primarily about understanding better what "us" meant in this new world, and the Clash thesis was a part of how he sought to work out understanding those relationships.

The final contribution to the collection is an interview with Arshin

Adib-Moghaddam who is a scholar of the concept of the "Clash of Civilizations" which in reality was present long before the Foreign Affairs article of 1993. Adib-Moghaddam speaks from his extensive efforts to understand what was meant by the "Clash of Civilizations" thesis, not only by Huntington in his modern packaging of the ideas, but also what the thesis has meant throughout history. Adib-Moghaddam exposes what he feels are some of the methodological errors within Huntington's formulations, and also highlights the way in which this ideology perpetuates narratives of "us" versus "them." In the increasingly globalized world, it is crucial to think clearly about how to move forward so that through the increased interactions the differences that remain do not harden into the "clashes" Huntington predicted, but into something better.

Despite twenty years of commentary and critique, Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations article remains a frequent reference point for many arguments across a wide spectrum of International Relations. For this reason, its legacy ought to be commemorated, and yet, for the good of all peoples, we can hope its analysis is ultimately proven wrong, and that the globalized world is not one increasingly marked by violent conflict but by peace.

Endnotes

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993).

² *Ibid.*, 22.

³ *Ibid.*, 23.

Twenty Years after Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations'

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Today: Mali; yesterday: 9/11; the day before yesterday: Iran's 1979 revolution and its aftermath, including sustained hostilities with the USA. Since the late 1970s, the talk has been of the impossibility of different sets of values, norms and beliefs living side-by-side in an increasingly globalised world. In 1993, Samuel Huntington published what must be one of the most cited articles ever: 'The Clash of Civilizations?'¹ Why is the article so important? Why is it a touchstone for nearly all contemporary debates about the capacity of different groups to live together in relative amity not enmity?

My argument in this brief piece is not that Huntington's article was so important because his argument was 'correct' or 'right'. My claim is twofold: First, Huntington's article was and is important because it captured perfectly the end-of-the-Cold War zeitgeist, a way of seeing the world which has endured in the uncertain times which we call 'globalisation.' Second, it has proved to be an abiding statement about globalisation and the hopes and fears that it conveys.

It is almost irrelevant that his focal point: the impossibility of the West – read; the USA – and 'Islam' – read; 'Islamic fundamentalism' – living together in harmony was laughingly over-simplified, redolent of the paranoia of someone experiencing the shattering of a stable, safe and unchanging world suddenly and demonstrably confronted with the scenario of the post-World War II paradigm smashed to smithereens. What is a card-carrying Realist to do? Of course: find a new enemy and dress it up in the same preposterous 'baddy' clothes that had marked the treatment by US Realists of the USSR since the start of the Cold War and transfer the characteristics to a new 'actor': 'Islamic fundamentalism.'

It is worth recalling – especially for our younger readers – that in the early 1990s, we had just emerged from a 50-year period of secular ideological polarisation. Despite the claims of some today in the USA, the US did not 'win' the Cold War; rather, the Soviet Union 'lost' it. Unable to compete with America in a completion for global dominance, its shaky, dysfunctional and misanthropic political/social/economic system spectacularly imploded within a seemingly impossibly short period of time: apparently as strong as ever in the mid-1980s, by 1991, the Soviet Union and its system as well as its parasitic coterie of attendant nations was no more. This left a gulf, a hole, a vacuum. How, and with what, to fill it?

If globalisation was the force which defeated the USSR, it was also the trend that enabled religion to resume its long-abandoned place in global politics. Exiled to marginalisation after 1648, the sudden demise of the Cold War and the USSR and its attendant secular ideology, opened the way for a new focus on 'culture'. Now, as everyone knows who has ever played a word association game, 'religion' is almost a synonym for 'culture', because what primarily differentiates cultures from each other is religion and, especially, religious difference.

The 9/11 attacks on the United States were a key event in the debate about the role of cultural and religious difference – especially, 'Islamic fundamentalism' – in international conflict, especially in the way that they focused attention on al-Qaeda's brand of globalised cultural terrorism. For some scholars, analysts and policy makers – especially but not exclusively in the United States – 9/11 marked the practical onset of Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' between two cultural entities: the 'Christian West' and the 'Islamic world', with special concern directed at those entities which might attract the nomenclature 'Islamic fundamentalists.' This is not to claim of course that Huntington had it all his own way: Many have addressed his claims of global cultural conflict between the 'Christian West' and the 'Islamic fundamentalists' by a counter-argument: 9/11 was not the start of a clash of civilizations but rather the last gasp of transnational Islamist radicalism. (It remains to be seen if the unfolding events in Mali and Algeria are the start of a new phase.) It is hard to disagree with the claim that the events of September 11 thrust culture on to forefront of the international agenda, providing as a result Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' thesis with a new lease of life. Henceforward, many commentators were no longer inhibited in attributing essentialist characteristics to the 'Christian West' and 'Islam'. After 9/11, there was a pronounced penchant to see the world in a Huntington-inspired simplistic division, with straight lines on maps – 'Islam has bloody borders', he averred² – apparently the key to understanding what were increasingly portrayed as definitively ethically and racially defined lines across the globe.

September 11, 2001, as well as many subsequent terrorist outrages, were perpetrated by al-Qaeda or its followers; all involved extremist Muslims that wanted to cause destruction and loss of life against 'Western' targets that nevertheless often led to considerable loss of life, for example in Istanbul and Casablanca, among Muslims. The

US response – the Bush administration's 'war on terror' – targeted Muslims, some believe rather indiscriminately, in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Some have claimed that these events 'prove' the correctness of Huntington's thesis on the 'clash of civilizations'. In such views, the 9/11 attacks and the US response suggested that Huntington's prophecy about clashing civilizations was now less abstract and more plausible than when first articulated in the early 1990s. Others contend, however, that 9/11 was not the start of the clash of civilizations – but, as already noted, the last gasp of radical Islamists' attempts to foment revolutionary change in inter alia, Algeria and Egypt in the 1980s and early 1990s. We can also note, however, that 9/11 not only had major effects on both the USA and international relations but also contributed to a surge of Islamic radicalism in Saudi Arabia. This was a result not only of the presence of US troops in the kingdom, as highlighted by bin Laden, but also due to a growing realisation that the function of Saudi Arabia's ulema was and is overwhelmingly to underpin and explain away the unearned and unrepresentative dominance of the ruling king, his extended family and parasitic entourage.

A dozen years after 9/11 and 20 years since the publication of Huntington's article, what do we know now about the 'clash of civilizations'? Huntington did note in his article that he was aware of differences of opinion and outlook within 'civilizations' but he appeared to think this was much less important than an apparently clear 'clash' of values norms, and beliefs which for him characterised the division 'between' the 'West' and 'Islam'. It is clear – to me, at least – that the very idea of a world divided into 'seven, or eight major civilizations'³ is absurd. (In parenthesis, as it were, the very idea that there is 'possibly [an] African civilization'⁴ is belied by current events in Mali: just one African civilization? What, pray tell, would this comprise?) Time has shown, once again, that anyone who takes seriously the idea of a world divided into seven or eight major civilizations lacks capacity to have any possible understanding of our fascinating mosaic of a world filled with myriad ideas, norms, beliefs and conceptions of how the world is.

Endnotes

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993).

² *Ibid.*, p. 35.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁴ *Ibid.*

Enemy Wanted: Apply Without

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A friend of mine once told me a story about the seminar he attended at which Samuel Huntington first presented his nascent ideas about “the clash of civilizations.” The Cold War had recently ended, much to everyone’s surprise, and people were scrambling to figure out what world politics would look like next. Others had already staked their claims. John Mearsheimer had predicted a return to rough-and-tumble 1930s-style multipolarity.¹ Charles Krauthammer had proclaimed America’s “unipolar moment.”² Francis Fukuyama had foreseen the triumphal sweep of liberal democracy across the globe.³ And President George H. W. Bush had trumpeted a “new world order” based on the rule of law and sound global governance.⁴

“Islam,” said Huntington.

“What?” said the audience.

“Islam is the next enemy.”

“Why?”

“Well—it just is. They hate us.”

“What do you mean, ‘It just is,’ Sam? That’s not a reason. You need some kind of theory to back that up.”

“Fine. I’ll be back.”

And thus, according to my friend, was the “clash of civilizations” thesis born.

Now, I was not present in the room, so I cannot vouch for my friend’s account. And in any case, he admitted that he was paraphrasing in his typically colorful way. But that was the gist, he said; the clash of civilizations thesis began with a hunch, and the theory came later.

Anyone who understands social science knows that it isn’t supposed to work this way. We aren’t supposed to start with our predictions and engineer theories to back them up. This isn’t even supposed to be possible, epistemologically or psychologically. Our world views—which in the case of International Relations (IR) scholars includes specific kinds of theories—are supposed to shape our expectations.

Mearsheimer and Krauthammer came to the debate primed by “realism;” they disagreed on how many “poles” the post-Cold War world would have, but they agreed that international politics was always and everywhere governed by *raison d'état*. Fukuyama brought to the table training in classics, comparative literature, and political philosophy, as well as a disposition to think in terms of grand teleological narratives; liberal democracy was for him what the Weberian Prussian state had been for Hegel. The first President Bush came to the White House with a generic predilection for mission and a latent Wilsonian streak;⁵ freed of Cold War constraints, he relished the chance to indulge them.

What explained Huntington's prediction, though? He was known as a high-impact scholar of civil-military relations,⁶ comparative political development,⁷ and American politics.⁸ While he had written extensively on U.S. foreign and security policy, he had done so very much in a Cold War vein where the parameters were taken for granted. He was known to be a conservative Democrat, and people suspected him of being sympathetic to realism (though perhaps of a classical rather than “neo” kind)—but being a conservative Democrat would not generate any particular prediction about the post-Cold War world, and the fact that Huntington's prediction seemed so very different from Mearsheimer's or Krauthammer's seemed to call his realist credentials into question. What was going on?

The first iteration of the clash of civilizations thesis—Huntington's widely-read 1993 Foreign Affairs piece⁹—offered some potential answers to this question. Intriguingly, while not abandoning the realist claim that states are the most important actors in world affairs, he implied that realism had never really been enough:

For a century and a half after the emergence of the modern international system with the Peace of Westphalia, the conflicts of the Western world were largely among princes—emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs attempting to expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mercantilist economic strength and, most important, the territory they ruled. In the process they created nation states, and beginning with the French Revolution the principal lines of conflict were between nations rather than princes. In 1793, as R. R. Palmer put it, “The wars of kings were over; the wars of peoples had begun.” This

nineteenth-century pattern lasted until the end of World War I. Then, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the reaction against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism, fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal democracy. During the Cold War, this latter conflict became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, neither of which was a nation state in the classical European sense and each of which defined its identity in terms of its ideology.¹⁰

Put another way, states did not have interests *qua* states; they were merely the vehicles through which political leaders pursued other kinds of objectives. Until the end of the Cold War, Huntington insisted (following William Lind), the main fault lines of world politics were fault lines within the Western world—in effect, “Western civil wars.” Non-Westerners were either uninvolved, colonized, or bit players in Western dramas. But with the collapse of communism, there were no longer any significant cleavages within “the West.” Capitalist liberal democracy had triumphed. “With the end of the Cold War,” Huntington wrote, “international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its centerpiece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations.”¹¹

This was an intriguing idea, but a problematic one. Among the problems, as I and many others pointed out quickly enough, were the fact that it was impossible to define and deploy the concept of “civilization” rigorously, and even if one could, there was no reason to suspect that civilizational boundaries would all of a sudden become politically salient if they never had been so before.¹² There were perfectly good reasons why no one put Arnold Toynbee on his or her IR reading list.¹³

The second, longer version of Huntington's thesis—the 1996 book, which dropped the question mark from the original article's title¹⁴—only muddied the waters. Tensions and inconsistencies in his treatment of “civilizations” not only between the book and the article but within the book itself vindicated rather than rebutted his early critics. The entire effort had become self-refuting.

If the theory could not support the prediction, what could? For years,

the question of what had motivated it fascinated and mystified me.

But in 2004, I finally understood. That was the year in which Huntington published his last major book, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*¹⁵, in which he warned of the unwillingness of recent (primarily Hispanic) immigrants to embrace and assimilate into America's "Anglo-Protestant culture," unlike earlier waves of immigrants from elsewhere. I was leafing through a copy of *The New Yorker* one day, when I stumbled across a fascinating review of the book by Louis Menand—and that was when I had the eureka moment. In an almost off-the-cuff kind of way, Menand casually remarked: "Huntington's name for ideology is 'culture.'"¹⁶

That was it. Huntington was all about culture. He had defined civilization as the most general, abstract level of culture. "Western civil wars" were intracultural wars. And culture matters, more than anything else. "I think we all feel much more at home with people who have similar cultures, language and values than we do with other people," Huntington told Mark O'Keefe in a revealing interview two years before he died. Huntington had never really felt at home, and clearly he longed for it. The problem was that globalization was making it harder all the time. In 1993 he saw Islam as the great danger because "they hate us;" in 2004, he saw Hispanic immigration as the great danger because "they aren't us." It wasn't about the hate; it was about the us.

If civilizations were the main fault lines of international politics, "we" would just be "us"—at peace with ourselves in our own place, and everyone else in theirs. The clash of civilizations was not a prediction or a theory after all: it was a wish.

Endnotes

¹ John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (1990); John J. Mearsheimer. "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," *The Atlantic* 266, no. 2 (1990).

² Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, (1990/1991).

³ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

⁴ George H. W. Bush, "Address before a Joint Session of Congress

(September 11, 1990)", Miller Center of Public Affairs <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3425> (accessed 21 May 2013).

⁵ James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1992), 456-483.

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⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

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⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 22-23.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹² *The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993); Albert L. Weeks, "Do Civilizations Hold?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 4 (1993); Richard E. Rubenstein and Jarle Crocker, "Challenging Huntington," *Foreign Policy*, no. 96 (1994); Roy P. Mottahedeh, "Clash of Civilizations? An Islamicist's Critique," *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review* 2, no. 2 (1995); Pierre Hassner, "Morally Objectionable, Politically Dangerous," *The National Interest*, no. 46 (1996); Michael J. Mazarr, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *The Washington Quarterly* 19, no. 2 (1996); Stephen M. Walt, "Building up New Bogeysmen," *Foreign Policy*, no. 106 (1997); David A. Welch, "The 'Clash of Civilizations' Thesis as an Argument and as a Phenomenon," *Security Studies* 6, no. 4 (1997).

¹³ Arnold Joseph Toynbee, *A Study of History*, 12 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1935).

¹⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

¹⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).

¹⁶ Louis Menand, "Patriot Games: The New Nativism of Samuel P. Huntington," *The New Yorker*, 17 May 2004.

¹⁷ "Five Years after 9/11, the Clash of Civilizations Revisited", *The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life* <http://bit.ly/1bxytOj>.

The Crescent and the Cross

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It is now two decades since Samuel Huntington put forward his clash of civilizations hypothesis about the nature of future conflict being cultural; specifically between Confucianism, or with greater likelihood Islam, and the West.¹ This piece contends that civilizational conflict occurs mainly between distinct cultural groups within (and not between) nation states, and this conflict does not occur in a socio-economic vacuum.

Since the attacks on the United States on September 11th 2001, Western countries have become increasingly fearful of the phenomenon of “home-grown terrorism” arising out of the radicalization of youthful first, second and even third generation Muslim immigrants. Radicalized individuals, born and bred in the West were involved in terrorism, such as the Madrid train bombings of March 2004, the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in November 2004, and the London bombings of July 2005.

In addition to these acts of violence, Islamic “radicalization” also finds expression in non-violent acts of defiance and statements of difference, such as the wearing of the hijab or headscarf and other distinct cultural practices. These symbolic actions produce discomfiture, as these are seen as aggressive rejections of Western civilization. Additionally, these developments help explain the rise in popularity of theories of civilizational clashes between the West and Islam², with migration and terror allegedly two new weapons in the Muslim armoury directed against the West. Furthermore, a heated debate over the possibility of harmonious integration of Muslim communities has emerged in the West.

Although there is a vast body of work on how Islamic radicalization functions, and an even larger literature on the dangers it poses, the development of radicalization is often assumed to have emerged in a socio-economic and political vacuum. The “culturalist”³ view regards Islam as the source of a monolithic and innately violent mindset, using non-democratic means to achieve political objectives. The hatred for the West by some Muslim groups is treated as a given; hence conflict with the West necessarily follows. Some Western writers depict Muslims as wallowing in wounded pride about their historical decline. One states that: “the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilisation, whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power”.⁴

Contrary to “culturalist” predictions, global religions, such as Islam, are not monolithic. Dichotomised identity categories, pitting Western culture (“us”) against Islam (“them”) and vice-versa, do not do justice to the fact that there are many faces of Islam across both historical and time and at present. Secondly, and more importantly, individual identity is regarded as a singular phenomenon, ignoring the multiplicity of identities that individuals may possibly possess.⁵ Thus, it is conceivable for an individual to be simultaneously a Muslim, a Western citizen, a believer in democracy, as well as someone who respects difference and human rights. Furthermore, culture is not immutable; it evolves over time, and changes as material conditions alter.

The alternative explanation for disgruntled Muslim behaviour in Europe lies in wider socio-economic disadvantage, the underpinnings for which date back to Ted Gurr’s classic work on relative deprivation as the source of rebellion.⁶ Frances Stewart has documented the systematic disadvantage that Muslim groups face in Western countries. Muslim citizens in European countries are systematically poorer, suffer from greater unemployment and are less than proportionately represented in public life,⁷ in addition to the opprobrium their cultural identity attracts. Muslims, particularly in Western Europe, may be subject to systemic inequalities of opportunity in economic, political and social spheres.

The Anatomy of Muslim Radicalization

Contemporary racism in the West, especially in Europe, is driven more by disdain for cultural identities such as Islam, rather than the traditional biologically based phenomenon, complexion. This explains the rise in anti-Muslim sentiment, which is not merely an indignant reaction to violence perpetrated by Muslims, but is symptomatic of a wider disdain for Muslim culture. According to surveys,⁸ negative perceptions about Muslims among non-Muslims had grown by 2008: 52% in Spain, 50% in Germany, 38% in France, but only 23% in the UK and the USA felt negative about Muslims. The same survey indicates growth in the Muslim sense of identity amongst Muslims immigrants.

It is widely believed, even in liberal circles, that Islam is an intolerant and violent religion. There is a long ‘orientalist’ tradition in this regard;

for example Sir William Muir said in 1878: “the sword of Mahomet, and the Coran, are the most stubborn enemies of Civilization, Liberty and Truth”.⁹ Unfortunately, these notions are based on selective and limited interpretation. It can be equally argued that the Islam celebrates racial diversity,¹⁰ and requires believers to accept other religions as an article of faith.¹¹ Some of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and his cousin and son-in-law Ali, during Islam’s inception are testimony towards inclusiveness.¹² The important point is that a devout Muslim must eschew racism in all forms, should not hate Judeo-Christian civilization and reject universal values of toleration; rather the dislike of the West could emanate from injustices perpetrated thereof. Moreover, historically, Muslim countries and empires have exercised greater toleration towards other religions, compared to European practice until the 19th century (a good example would be Muslim ruled Medieval Spain).

Historical acts that may add to the sense of Muslim collective grievances include events such as the wholesale expulsion of Muslims who did not convert to Christianity from Spain (16th-17th centuries), Sicily (14th century) and the massacre and expulsion of Muslims in the Balkans (18-20th centuries). In the Middle East, the Anglo-French Sykes-Picot pact (during the First World War) resulted in an extremely unfair disposition of the former Ottoman territories.¹³ Later, the emergence of Israel, and the West’s lack of even handed behaviour towards the protagonists in the Arab-Israeli conflict spawned deep resentment. Other areas of Muslim disadvantage in the recent past include Kashmir in India, and Bosnia in the European Balkans. Their predicament is often blamed on Western double standards towards the plight of Muslims.

Terrorism is only part of the total set of actions adopted by radicalized Muslim groups in Europe, as many adopt strategies of peaceful protest, and some simply reject certain Western cultural practices. Muslim religious discourse that accompanies the retreat into confrontational behaviour towards the majority communities in their countries of adoption or birth can be linked to the spread of the Salafiyya movement (which means following those who went before, in this case early Muslims) among Muslim diasporas. Such dynamics should be analysed against the backdrop of the current three-fold manifestation of Islamic activism: political, missionary and jihadi.¹⁴ Political Islam, as embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood usually aims to seek power through political rather than violent means. Missionary

activism tends to refrain from political confrontation; rather it tends to concentrate on preaching and reviving the community of believers (Ummah). It includes the Tablighi (evangelical) and the Sufi (mystical) movements, which although theologically distinct, are both avowedly peaceful. Jihadi Islamists committed to violence with a view to defending (or expanding) Dar-al-Islam (the world of Islam).

Identity and Collective Action

Individuals may derive utility not just from consumption or identification with a cause, but also from behaviour in conformity to their sense of identity, and the like minded behaviour of other members of the group they belong to; for example the performance of prayers by the individual and his co-religionists. Here the position that the group occupies in societal hierarchy is also crucial to their collective self-esteem. The individual not only derives utility from a set of his own actions, but also similar actions of other like-minded individuals belonging to his group, and above all his own identity or self image, which in turn depends on the group's social standing.¹⁵ The last factor depends both on the group's economic disadvantage, and other factors such as the West's foreign policy towards the Muslim world. If another group member suffers disutility from inappropriate behaviour by another group member, they may lure the errant individual back to the fold. This is more likely amongst poor but culturally homogenous communities suffering from widespread unemployment, living proximate to each other in isolated ghettos with close kinship ties. Moreover, the dissident group may use this type of cooperative behaviour to resolve the collective action problem, which involves converting like-minded individuals into groups. Group grievances become individual grievances, and individuals act upon group grievances. It is useful to utilize the expression 'horizontal inequality', originating in the work of Frances Stewart. Horizontal inequality is inequality between culturally distinct groups, such as between Catholics and Protestants, Muslims and Christians and so on.

From the viewpoint of the individual perpetrator of radicalized Islamic activities, intrinsic motivation, which is often the outcome of their collective sense of humiliation, plays a major role. Perpetrators of extremist violence are not always uneducated and poor. It is not their personal poverty that will necessarily drive individual membership of a radical group, but the disadvantage faced by the group at large. From the viewpoint of individual choice, extreme acts like suicide

bombing may be rational. This is because the individual has made an all or nothing choice between solidarity and individual autonomy.

Interaction between Fear and Hatred

Just as aggrieved Muslims, indoctrinated and herded by conflict entrepreneurs into groups for collective action, may feel a profound hatred for the West, certain politicians and political parties in the West seek their own political self-advancement by preaching the dangers posed by Islam in general, and Muslim migrants in particular. In 2001, for instance, the Danish People's Party campaigned with a poster showing a young blond girl and the statement "When she retires, we will be a Muslim majority nation." The party came in third in terms of seats in Parliament, experiencing a 70% increase in its vote bank. In the 2002 French Presidential elections, Jean-Marie Le Pen of the Front National – later convicted for spreading Islamophobic messages in an interview to the Newspaper Le Monde in 2003- won a place in the runoff against Chirac and received 17% of votes. In August 2007, the Governor of Carinthia in Austria, Joerg Haider promised to ban the construction of mosques and minarets in his Province; the Austrian right won 28% of votes in the September 2008 general elections. The appeal of anti-Muslim political parties is growing, for example the Dutch PVV gained 15% of the votes in the national election of 9th June 2010, making them the second largest party. This is the notion of fear of a minority, something that can be succinctly be described as the phobia for 'Eurabia', which in part is whipped up by exaggerated statements from hate-mongering politicians and exploited within electoral politics wherever feasible.

We can think of the hate message against Muslim migrants as originating in messages sent out by a demagogic politician. Its attractiveness to the public will depend on their need for scapegoats and their own personal life experiences of these minority groups. Not all these signals will be believed: the better educated among the public may discount part of the message and others with greater knowledge of minorities based upon personal interaction may similarly disregard this signal. Some individuals (older people, less educated, those whose jobs are vulnerable) are more likely to abandon the search for truth in favour of the hate message. If enough voters believe the signal then the state will act. These take the form of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant legislation making it difficult for families to join relatives in Europe, linguistic and cultural

proficiency tests, and the banning of headscarves and veils.

Conclusions

Against the backdrop of a politicised Muslim identity, and substantial socioeconomic and political disadvantage suffered by Muslims, domestic 'integrationist' policies aimed at 'moderate Muslims' are unlikely to curb radicalization – let alone fight terrorism. Rather, they may backfire. American-style integrationist (as opposed to multicultural) policies are gaining favour in Europe, but these are doomed to failure unless the objects of the integrationist policies are also offered equality of economic, political and social opportunities. Furthermore, and quite crucially, if individuals have multiple identities, then they are more likely to act on the basis of their other (Western) identity when they are less socio-economically deprived and less frowned upon. The presence of virulent Islamophobic messages not only instils fear, but also elicits hatred, undoing the pacific-integrationist effects of material progress amongst Muslims migrants in the West.

Two decades ago, after the end of the cold war, and the triumph of liberal free market democracy, Samuel Huntington predicted that future conflict would be purely civilizational, and between nation states. The West's antagonists in these future conflicts would be the world's remaining unassimilated non-Western cultures: Confucianism, but especially Islam. In the past decade, civilizational conflict with Islam has, indeed, escalated. These struggles, however, are taking place, within and not between, nation states, including the internecine warfare (Fitnah) inside Islam. Finally, and most importantly, culture and civilization are inseparable from the economy, polity and society. Cultures are not shaped, nor do they ever evolve, in a socio-economic vacuum, making a purely civilizational conflict virtually impossible.

Endnotes

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³ Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Roots of Terror*, (New York: Doubleday, 2004).

⁴ Huntington 1996: 217.

⁵ See: Amartya Sen, "Violence, Identity and Poverty", *Journal of Peace Research*, 45(1) (2008): 5-15.

⁶ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, (Princeton: University Press, 1970).

⁷ Frances Stewart, 'Global Aspects and Implications of Horizontal Inequalities (HIs): Inequalities Experienced by Muslims Worldwide', (2008), www.microcon.eu.

⁸ <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=262>

⁹ William Muir, *The Life of Mahomet: From Original Sources*, London: Smith, Elder, (1878): 235.

¹⁰ "—We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another—the noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct". Quran: 049.013. "And of His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the difference of your languages and colours". Quran: 030.022. English translations from Marmaduke Pickthall, *The Glorious Quran*, <http://www.islam101.com/quran/QTP/index.htm>

¹¹ "Say (O Muhammad): We believe in Allah and that which is revealed unto us and that which was revealed unto Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the tribes, and that which was vouchsafed unto Moses and Jesus and the prophets from their Lord. We make no distinction between any of them, and unto Him we have surrendered". Quran: 003.084.

¹² Consider an excerpt from Muhammad's Last Sermon (circa 632 AD): "An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab nor a non-Arab has any superiority over an Arab; also a black person has no superiority over a white person, nor a white person has any superiority over a black person, except by piety and good action. Indeed the best among you is the one with the best character..." http://www.themodernreligion.com/prophet/prophet_lastsermon.htm.

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The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ and Its Unexpected Liberalism

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University professors often complain about how little political attention their ideas gain. Likewise, politicians often find the work of academics esoteric, abstract, and policy-irrelevant. If scholars find it hard enough to get their students and peers to read what they have written, they find it nearly impossible to make an impact in policy circles. Samuel Huntington's 1993 Foreign Affairs article on "the clash of civilizations" is a noteworthy exception. Not only is it one of the most cited pieces ever written by an international relations scholar — it is also one of the most widespread in policy and media circles worldwide. While there is consensus from followers and critics alike on what arguments Huntington was attempting to make — that religion rather than ideology would become the main denominator in post-Cold War conflicts, that the world's major religious communities are largely territorially delineated, and that these religious communities are given and cannot be changed — Huntington's contentions stirred and continue to stir, heated debate.

Huntington not only rejected Francis Fukuyama's then recently published piece on the end of history, and the coming victory of liberal democracy worldwide, but also reinvigorated the much-critiqued Realist worldview of the never-ending tragedy of global power politics. Huntington did so by simply replacing the clash of ideology with the clash of civilizations (read: religions).

There is proof however that the "clash" thesis has been politically utilized in a liberal and rather unexpected way, beyond, and even contradicting, the usual story about bolstering neoconservative notions of war on terrorism and Islamophobia. Surprisingly, the best example of this is how former president George W. Bush used the concept of a clash of civilizations. Bush's foreign policy has generally been described as strongly neoconservative, following rather than refuting the idea of a clash of civilizations, citing as evidence his distinction between "civilized nations" and "rogue states". Nevertheless, the manner in which Bush explicitly utilized Huntington's concept conveyed elements of liberalism. In a Presidential Address to the Nation on September 11, 2007, Bush commented on his "war on terrorism" in the following manner: "this struggle has been called the clash of civilizations. In truth, it is a struggle for civilization". This refutation of Huntington's idea was repeated many times by Bush and his administration, including Secretary of State Colin Powell and his successor Condoleezza Rice.

This rejection of Huntington's idea did not however mean that Bush found it useless. On the contrary, Bush's rhetoric redefined "civilization" to distinctively liberal values such as universal freedom and democracy rather than separate religious community. This was the effect of the simple rewording from a clash of to a clash for civilization. This liberal underpinning of Bush's foreign policy was reinforced by many other rhetorical elements of the "war on terrorism", such as how "the force of freedom" will stop the "rise of tyranny", and how the war on terrorism was defined as a war of ideology and ideas — not religion.

While Huntington's pessimistic clash of civilizations presumed religious communities as static and impermeable to change, Bush's optimistic clash for civilization presumed that communities are susceptible to fundamental value change. In his 2007 State of the Union Address, Bush argued that: "Free people are not drawn to malignant ideologies — and most will choose a better way when given the chance". On various occasions, Bush made it clear that he believed in the transformative power of spreading ideas of freedom and democracy.

It is noteworthy that Obama, while having redirected US foreign policy in many significant ways (emphasizing multilateralism, ending the war in Iraq, shifting focus to East Asia), actually has continued rather than changed Bush's liberal foreign policy rhetoric. In a speech before the Turkish Parliament in April 2009, Obama stated that the United States "is not and will never be at war with Islam", echoing Bush's words that "the enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends."

What the above examples illustrate is that even an explicit refutation of an idea can imply utility. In political debate, there is nothing as useful as a diametrically opposed view, target, or enemy. By sharply contrasting US foreign policy with the much-debated "clash of civilizations", Bush used this idea symbolically, legitimating policy, and responding to critics. The ambiguity of the word civilization allowed Bush's cunning reframing from a neoconservative to a liberal understanding. Such play on words is not always possible, and such useful "others" are not always available. Nevertheless, a broader understanding of "policy relevance" and "political utility" is called for — an understanding which includes not only direct applicability, but also conceptual and symbolic utilization.

The 'Clash of Civilizations' Faces Evidence-based Perusal

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The late Professor Samuel Huntington was a world-renowned great scholar of *rara avis*. He is greatly missed since his premature passing away. He was full of often unorthodox ideas and his writings exuded from passions about the United States and its missions. In this essay I introduce Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis in the post-Cold War context of "one hundred schools of thought" blossoming across the globe. Then I situate his clash of civilizations thesis within his own intellectual contour of alarming and alerting fellow Americans about what he believed were the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the United States as it confronted the world with its own devout missions. Thirdly, I carry out an evidence-based analysis of his thesis. This is an important exercise because Huntington was not only a great scholar but also an irresistibly seductive writer.

One Hundred Schools of Thought Blossom after the Cold War

The end of the Cold War saw the "one hundred schools of thought" literally blossom. One can recall all the prophecies like the end of history,¹ the imminent great crisis,² U.S. primacy,³ and the clash of civilizations.⁴ I have joined the one hundred schools movement by proposing the scheme of the tripartization of global politics: Westphalian, Philadelphian, and anti-Utopian.⁵ By tripartization I mean that the world would be driven largely by three distinctive principles with varying mixes: Westphalian, Philadelphian, and anti-Utopian. By Westphalian, I mean sovereign state-centered perspective. By Philadelphian, I mean functionally formed global regimes. By anti-Utopian, I mean the prevalence of anarchical spirits and emotions. Instead of arguing that one dominant principle prevails in global politics as many of the prophets in the one hundred schools movement do, I argue that three distinctive driving forces interact together depending on history, geography, and economics.

The three principles may look to some like Robert Cooper's tripartite geopolitics, in which he argues that global politics is governed by three distinctive regions: post-modern, modern and pre-modern.⁶ By post-modern he means Western Europe and other trilateral countries; by modern he means all the newly independent countries with state sovereignty kept as a flagship: by pre-modern he means all the countries that do not know Westphalian norms and institutions. Cooper's tripartite characterization of global politics is tied to geography and the colonialist legacy. Inoguchi (1999) differs from Cooper (2000), in that the former argues that the three governing principles of global politics coexist even in one society with varying

mixes. Cooper's work (2000) is also broadly similar to Ronald Inglehart's work in that rising incomes sparks a transition from materialism to post-materialism.⁷ Inoguchi (1999) juxtaposes three frameworks—Westphalian, Philadelphian, and anti-Utopian—with their economic, political, and cultural foundations and principal authors specified. Principal authors of the Westphalian framework are Henry Kissinger, Alexander Gerschenkron, and Benedict Anderson.⁸ Principal authors of the Philadelphian framework are Francis Fukuyama, Robert Reich, and Benjamin Barber.⁹ Principal authors of the anti-Utopian framework are Samuel Huntington, David Landes, and Robert Kaplan.¹⁰ Note that Huntington belongs to what I call the anti-Utopian school of thought along with another Harvard professor and a freelance writer. I argue that varying mixes of the three frameworks depend on temporal and spatial contexts.

Clash of Civilizations Thesis in Huntington's Intellectual Contour

Huntington was articulate, astute, and agile in identifying what he believes to be the key weak points or vulnerability of the United States in world politics. In 1957 when the United States faced the Soviet challenge of Sputnik, he saw the vulnerability of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in civil-military relations.¹¹ In 1967 Huntington saw that the United States misunderstood the development of emerging countries, most notably in southern Vietnam, in that progress in economic development leads to political development, that is, democratization.¹² His argument is that political institutionalization is critical in enabling many emerging countries to leap forward to political development. In 1981 he saw the often-overlooked strength of the United States amid the Iranian crisis limited by the burdens carried over from the post-Vietnam and post-oil crises.¹³ In 1996 he saw the clash of civilizations as a time-defining force, from which he saw one of the U.S. weaknesses.¹⁴ In 2004 he saw the increase in the non-English speaking population of the United States (especially among Latinos) as a key national threat because the English language is central to U.S. identity formation, including the socialization processes inculcated in family, church, and school through the use of English.¹⁵ He was immensely versatile. He was impressively eloquent in writing but not as much in lectures. Above all, Huntington was an intense patriot. He wanted to devote himself to country through these and other writings, but not through working in the government. He knew that he was at his best in writing about government, not acting in government. In sounding the alarm and alerting others about the impending clash of civilizations after the

Cold War, Huntington wanted the United States to be well prepared for what he saw as the tectonic change unfolding in global politics. Overall, he was correct in identifying some of the new driving forces such as China, Islam, and the increasing importance of religion in politics. But on three points the basis of his thesis is wrong. It is to these three points that I turn now.

Evidenced-Based Analysis of Huntington's Thesis

With the broad characterization of post-Cold War global politics and with the place of the clash of civilization thesis in Huntington's intellectual contour briefly summarized in the two previous sections, I now turn to the evidence-based scrutiny of Huntington's thesis and its foundations to see whether his thesis is of lasting value or not. With the help of the AsiaBarometer,¹⁶ I argue that the clash of civilizations thesis suffers from three key weaknesses: (1) the assumption of core states in major civilizations in Asia, (2) the underestimation of the deepening permeation of globalization, and (3) the fascination combined with fixation with the specific geographical areas adjacent to Western Europe.

Assumption of Core States in Major Civilizations

Huntington assumes that core states exist in eight major civilizations that act as a sort of regional leader. Asia (i.e., East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia) presents anomalous situations for this assumption.¹⁷ It has produced five major civilizational-defining belief and value sets: Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam, Christianity, and Hinduism. Buddhism is concentrated in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, China, Korea, and Japan. But the core state is difficult to identify. China is said to be the core state of Confucianism. But calling China Confucianism's core state is somewhat difficult. Those countries adjacent to China, sometimes called the Confucian countries, that is, Vietnam, South and North Korea, and Japan, do not necessarily have positive responses when the following question specifies China, "To what extent do you think the following country has a good or bad impact on your country?"¹⁸ Christianity does not have a core state in Asia. Neither the Philippines nor South Korea can be said to be a core state. Hinduism has a core state: India. In this analysis, the most serious deficit is that Islam does not have a core state. Demographically, Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world, followed in the Asian region by India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Maldives. Yet it is difficult to identify Indonesia as a core state. Also, Pakistan and Iran

do not qualify as a core state based on the responses of the AsiaBarometer to the question, "To what extent do you think the following country has a good or bad impact on your country?" On the whole it is very difficult to assume that each civilizational entity, if it is to exist, has a core state with followers of a similar walk of life, most notably of a similar religious creed and habit, as far as the entire Asian responses to the above noted question. This is a very critical point because in Huntington's view the threat of Islam and the rise of China pose structural dangers to the security of the United States and of the West. Neither of the two civilizational entities meets the structural components Huntington assumes, that is, a core state with its followers presumably adjacent to it.

Underestimation of Permeation of Globalization

Huntington assumes that the resurrection of religion even transcends borders and sometimes runs wild in the extreme version of Islam fundamentalism. Why I categorize him as an anti-utopianist is that he appears to believe that the transborder and transnational forces of religion make the world chaotic and anarchic. Outside of his conception of Islam and China, the basic framework of Westphalian state-centric sovereignty remains robustly retained. In assuming this, Huntington tends to underestimate the deepening and fragmenting tide of globalization that permeates each and every part of the world.¹⁹ It is as if he assumed that the strong sovereign state, further consolidated by the resurrected religious forces, asserts the civilizational entities such as a greater cultural China and a religiously united Islam. China has no followers.²⁰ Islam is fragmented between Sunni and Shia, while globally Islam has no center.²¹ This is not to say that Huntington is incorrect in foreseeing the rise of China and of Islam. But he is incorrect in saying that each forms some civilizational entity that is bound to pose a great threat to the West. Also, Huntington is incorrect in saying that China and Islam are likely to form a coalition against the West.

What we see is often the opposite: China supports Serbian President Slobodan Milošević against Islamic Kosovo Albanians; China supports Syrian President Bashar al-Asad against largely Islamic anti-government forces; China suppresses Islamic Uighurs inside China; China adopted a wait-and-see policy when Muammar Gaddafi's regime in Libya was under attack, extending emergency support to Libya without specifying any names of leaders or groups.

Fixation on Areas Adjacent to Western Europe

Huntington is, perhaps inadvertently, Western-biased. This comment is not meant to be critical of him. To non-Western observers of international relations, some American analysts of international relations appear to focus on areas adjacent to the West, whether the frontier is located in Berlin or in Jerusalem or in the South China Sea. Perhaps it is natural, as many Americans believe that the United States was founded on the principles and spirit of seeing more of like-minded peoples establishing their own republics.²² In Huntington's case, the threat to the West comes from the frontiers of two fronts, the Middle East and East Asia. Until President Barack Obama steadily withdrew U.S. forces from Iraq and Afghanistan and until he pronounced the Asia-Pacific pivot strategy that focuses the U.S. forces in East Asia and the Pacific, the U.S. capability of waging two wars simultaneously was the sacred doctrine. Huntington pronounced the doctrine to prepare for the clash of civilizations, which would help the United States to reconfigure U.S. forces most effectively and efficiently amid the post-Cold War relaxation, and to boast of the unipolar moment in U.S. strategic focus.

(A note on the AsiaBarometer: It was carried out in six waves in the 2000s to register quality of life and related matters in all 29 Asian societies, with the exception of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Timor Leste. The surveys were carried out in random samples and nation-wide schemes for each society. Roughly sixty-three thousand respondents, i.e., roughly eight million attributes are registered from them.)

Conclusion

My scrutiny of Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis has revealed some of its fundamental fragilities. Yet his combination of patriotic passions, intellectual robustness and literary flair has undoubtedly made him a great man to be remembered long after he ceased to be busy alarming fellow patriots with seductive flows of sentences.

Endnotes

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How to Promote a Perspicacious Intercultural Dialogue?

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At the end of his argument about the threatening, or actual, “clash of civilizations” Samuel Huntington pleaded for openness, collective learning, even cultural innovation (probably as a result of intercultural dialogues) – a plea which seems in discrepancy with his overall assessment of the main development trend in our world: the clash of civilizations. But left unanswered is the question “how to implement this plea in practical terms?”

Starting an intercultural dialogue with a good prospect of mutual understanding one has to omit one extremely counterproductive trap: the “essentialization” of cultures by which cultures, old and present, are assumed to be homogeneous or uniform entities. Instead, one has to enter such a dialogue with the readiness to cope with the real history of heterogeneous entities. What does such a perspective imply?

Europeans (and Westerners) should participate in an intercultural dialogue in the knowledge of their own real history. They should have previously understood that many politically motivated cultural debates at present taking place in the wide world had their analogous precursors in Europe. The cultural struggles observed today are not unfamiliar, let alone new, so long as one recalls one’s own past. Such an entry into the dialogue has been found to work discursive “wonders” in that it protects against a mostly unconscious essentialization of a late phase in European (Western) culture (this would equate European culture as such with modern value opinions and organizational principles of a modern public order). Such an approach also counteracts any temptation of essentializing other cultures (still in comparable upheaval), i.e. of perceiving them as quasi-monads. The point is that any essentialist cultural self-image and any essentializing image of another culture leads any cultural debate into a dead end, the more so if, as happens not infrequently, it takes place under politicizing conditions. A fruitful cultural dialogue therefore presupposes knowledge of the controversial paradigms that characterize the real history of every cultural sphere and especially of all global cultural regions.

As for the extra-European partners of such a dialogue, it would be important that these do not allow themselves to be elevated into representatives of their respective cultures or religions, nor to be forced into such a position. Since, in view of profound acute cultural conflicts within cultures, such “representative representatives” do not

in fact exist. What we do find are representative champions of the most varied trends, who have long been present, though quantitatively diverging, in all cultures marked by structural heterogeneity. There they are in conflict with one another: traditionalists and modernists, theocrats and secularists, modern value-promoters and reactionaries, universalists and communitarists, unbelievers and fundamentalists, status-quo followers and dissidents. Their differences are often to be found not so much in specific cultural contents that are regarded as non-exchangeable and non-negotiable. Instead these controversial and often antagonistic positions reflect modernization-conditioned analogous socio-economic and socio-political problems that as a rule transcend the individual cultural orbits. They also reflect analogous action perspectives for the management and mastering of cultural conflicts within individual cultures (civilizations) – all this today is taking place outside Europe, but no different from what it used to be in Europe itself.

To cope with this empirical evidence, the past and ongoing clash within civilizations as an inescapable fact is likely to help escape the clash of civilizations where it sporadically threatens to take place locally, regionally or even globally.

Interview with Arshin Adib-Moghaddam

CONDUCTED BY J. PAUL BARKER
E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam has emerged as one of the leading intellectuals of his generation. His writings have penetrated many fields including Middle Eastern Studies, International Relations, Post-Colonial studies, Comparative Politics and Historiography. Currently, Adib-Moghaddam is Reader in Comparative Politics and International Relations at SOAS, University of London and the Chair of the Centre for Iranian Studies. He is the author of *A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations: Us and them beyond Orientalism* which has been published by Hurst & Co. in London and Columbia University Press in New York. He has also written *The International Politics of the Persian Gulf: A cultural genealogy* (Routledge, 2006, 2009) and *Iran in World Politics: The question of the Islamic Republic* (Columbia University Press/Hurst, 2008, 2010). Educated at the Universities of Hamburg, American University (Washington DC) and Cambridge, he was the first Jarvis Doctorow Fellow in International Relations and Peace Studies at St. Edmund Hall and the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford. At Cambridge, where he completed his MPhil and PhD as a scholarship student, he was elected Honorary Fellow of the Cambridge European Trust Society.

His writings have been translated into many languages and he is a frequent contributor to leading and alternative newspapers and TV channels around the world. Adib-Moghaddam has lectured globally on topics ranging from Iranian and west-Asian politics, US foreign policy, Islamophobia, critical theory, comparative political thought and the myth of a clash of civilisations. He is also active in digital engagement through his website (www.adib-moghaddam.info), facebook, and twitter.

His newest book, *On the Arab Revolts and the Iranian Revolution: Power and Resistance Today*, will be published by Bloomsbury.

e-IR: You have authored “The Metahistory of the Clash of Civilizations,” from your perspective: What does the “Clash of Civilizations” mean? More specifically, what did Huntington mean by it? What is meant by those who continue to employ it today?

AA: With *The Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations* I was tracing how the idea that we are embroiled in a civilisational battle between “us” and “them” came about. I researched and wrote the book during

a period when the so called “wars on terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq recreated the myth that there is such a thing as a civilisational war between Islam and the west. I read the book of Huntington for the first time in German as a student at the University of Hamburg and then again in English as a PhD student at Cambridge. In both instances I found it utterly unconvincing. Huntington presented a theory of conflict without an empirical basis. As a student of political science and international relations this seemed unacceptable to me. The idea that there is such a thing as civilisational entities and that they can clash didn’t seem to appreciate the complexities of world politics.

So I took the opportunity of a generous research fellowship at Oxford University to start writing the book. I came to the conclusion that Huntington presented a theory of conflict nurtured by a good deal of unscholarly ignorance of other cultures. Huntington’s thesis is deceptively facile. It follows three methodological steps: Civilisations are cultural entities; cultures don’t change; given that “our” culture is different from “theirs” we are bound to be embroiled in a recurrent battle over supremacy in world politics. It seemed to me that the historical context was important too. Huntington wrote the article and the subsequent book after the demise of the Soviet Union. As a Cold War theorist who was always also close to decision-making circles in the United States, he wanted to alert policy makers that the end of the global competition between the Soviet Union and the west will usher into a new period characterised by civilisational conflicts, primarily between the west and Islam and what Huntington terms the “Confucian world.” From this perspective, the west is pitted against an increasingly assertive “rest”.

More research into representations of “self” and “other” both in Europe and in texts written by Muslim thinkers revealed that the theory of Huntington was not isolated; that it perpetuates an ancient myth that there is such a thing as civilisational entities and that they can clash. I started to conduct this second phase of my research upon my acceptance of my current position at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London about three years before I finished the book. This period informed the historical sections. I was increasingly convinced that the clash of civilisations is one of the most inaccurate theories ever invented. Huntington was not educated in the history of Islam. In his writings he routinely conflated being Arab with being Muslim, and vice versa. He even

went as far as to say that Operation Desert Storm, the Second Gulf War in 1990, was indicative of a clash of civilisations. Of course, the western alliance was aided and abetted by more Muslim countries than Saddam was, and the Ba’thist regime in Iraq was anything but Islamic adopting as it did a version of nationalism that was closer to the ideas of German romanticists such as Fichte and Herder than to Islamic forms of governance. The ideology of Saddam’s Iraq was based on a secular nationalist ideology and it was in constant opposition to Islamist forces. How could this be an instance of a clash of civilisations between Islam and the west?

Huntington, in typically Americo-centric fashion, did not deem it necessary to educate himself in the histories of cultures that he took the liberty to write about. As such, his book appears as a semi-educated attempt to rally together an imagined Americo-centric west in order to ward off an equally imagined other. The theory of the clash of civilisations is based on an outdated us-versus-them illogic which has lost traction, certainly for progressive intellectuals of my generation. Post-modernity has created hybrid areas that are largely liberated from the pressures of civilisational identities and which do not readily respond to political manipulation couched in civilisational language. At the same time, there has been a resurgence of the clash thesis espoused by the right-wing in Europe. Politicians such as Geert Wilders, for instance, wholeheartedly embrace the idea that we are engaged in a continuous war between the west and Islam. Osama bin-Laden spoke of a clash of civilisations as well; indeed the clash disciples in east and west are in full agreement that there is a war between the west and Islam; a truly Orwellian irony. These digressions are not attributable to Huntington of course, but as a seasoned scholar he must have known that a theory accentuating perpetual conflict and insurmountable cultural divisions can be easily hijacked for rather more destructive agendas than he had in mind. As such, he must be seen as a culprit in the perpetuation of the clash myth today and the histories of cultural conflicts that it continues to provoke.

e-IR: Some would point to Huntington or slightly earlier with Bernard Lewis, as the origin of the “Clash of Civilizations” formulation. Where would you say the origin of the idea begins?

AA: The myth of the clash of civilisations has an ancient presence. This is what I tried to show in *A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations*. I was attempting to write a history of the history of the clash, that is I was tracing the strategies, institutional sites and normative systems that have anchored the myth in our archives of history. Lewis and Huntington are merely contemporary disciples of the clash thesis. It is exactly because the myth has had an ancient presence that it was so easy for them to repackage it for contemporary consumption. Their ideas lodged into a pre-existing mentality that accentuates conflict between us and them. I hate to speak in momentous terms but really as a human species we have not managed to invent a world order yet, that would eliminate the idea that we have to be at war with the "other". To my mind, critical scholarship has to contribute to forging such an alternative world-view. To that end, the university continues to be the only laboratory of thought where we can attempt to experiment with theories of peace and reconciliation. We have that luxury and yet a whole cast of academics continue to stage-act epic dramas of conflict and mythical battles between the forces of good (the west) versus the forces of evil (the rest), seemingly unaware of recent strides in "global history", scholarship that appreciates the interconnectedness of cultures and the interdependence between east and west, north and south. I think their intransigent efforts to re-inscribe the west into a narrative of superiority a waste of intellectual talent and material resources. To make matters worse, our educational institutions are competing with an uncritical culture industry which produces cults and celebrity, rather than criticism and knowledge. So the onus is on us; democracy, after all, suffocates without the voices of critique.

e-IR: Why has this narrative had such a lasting impact and influence on cultural discourse? What are the elements that have perpetuated this idea across centuries and cultures?

AA: This is exactly the topic of *A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations* which deconstructs how and why notions of a perpetual war between us and them continue to be so popular. The book demonstrates how theories such as the clash of civilisation lodge into a pre-existing mentality, a culture of thought that has habituated us to accept war as a normal condition. I have termed this a "clash regime", a regime of truth that invents the idea of a clash on a continuous basis. The power of the clash regime explains why large sections of society have been educated and tamed into accepting the

status quo: foreign invasions, antagonism towards the other, and at the margins racism and misogyny. As such, History books as well continue to be replete with notions of us versus them, starting from antiquity with the myth of a cosmic battle between the democratic and civilised "Greeks" and the barbarian and autocratic Persians. This epic falsehood was recently re-enacted in the Hollywood blockbuster *300* which reinvigorates the myth of Thermopylae that Herodotus, the so called father of history invented. But it is not only such comic depictions of history that contributes to facile notions sustaining the us versus them logic. As indicated, academic studies are complicit too. A host of classicists and historians continue to subscribe to the notion that the west is somehow distinct from the rest and they continue to refer to the myths of antiquity in order to sustain their arguments. In his most recent book on the myth of Thermopylae, the Cambridge classicist Paul Cartledge deems my position on the clash of civilisation "wildly overoptimistic" and yet in none of his books on the topic has he presented convincing evidence for the coherence of "western" history that he and others such as Niall Ferguson continue to narrate. Western history became "western" because it was written as such and not due to a pre-ordained teleology. If Herodotus was the father of History, he was also the father of the myth of History. Of course, he was immensely talented as a narrator, but he also consulted oracles to further his understanding of historical events. Surely, we have better devices at hand to comprehend our common past. Yet in the absence of a critical understanding of our archives, we are confronted with a huge deluge of half-truths, romanticised tales and mythical narratives that entrench seemingly insurmountable cultural differences. I don't belong to the class of scholars that thinks that way. I insist on the moral right of the other to express herself in what we have misrepresented as the "western" canon.

The task has to be to reconstruct the historical debris that confronts us with an empathetic appreciation of the presence of "the other" in our archives. Emphasising "our" interdependence with "them" allows us to reassemble the interconnections of our common existence. This can't be but an intellectual battle centred on the last bastion of sanity: the university. But it can't be confined to a specialist audience. Hence, my continuous emphasis on activist scholarship, an intellectualised discourse that has transversal presence beyond the university and which penetrates as many layers of society as possible. This is one of the reasons why I do interviews like this,

conscious that the odds are stacked against all of us who attempt to disentangle the tightly woven web of lies and deceit that has nurtured the politics of aggression towards our neighbours for far too long now. After all we experience the world primarily as human beings and not as members of seemingly coherent civilisations. This is our common bond and it is about time that it is represented as such.

e-IR: As you indicate, one of the primary faults in a generalized formulation such as Huntington's is that it tends to create monolithic 'us' versus 'them' categories. In the increasingly 'inter-connected' world are these monolithic conceptions being broken down or further hardened through greater interaction?

AA: There is a dual tendency, a paradox if you want. On the one side, we are experiencing hybridisation, the break-down of grand narratives and ideational systems in an increasingly networked, post-modernised order, where ideational factors such as religious affiliation and nationality play a secondary role. The Arab revolts that spread like a wildfire throughout the region and from there to southern Europe and elsewhere is indicative of this post-ideological and trans-ideational world. The demonstrations were carried by universal themes such as democracy, social justice, empowerment, pluralism etc. At the same time they were local, steeped in the secular and Islamic symbols and imagery that permeate the societies in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere. It has been one of the great fallacies of Eurocentric theories of globalisation to assume that "the local" will evaporate in the great stream of the global. Rather, globality and locality are increasingly intermingled and inseparable. The properties of both are being changed in a grand dialectical firework. We are there and they are here. This is the brave new world that Huntington and other clash theorists don't want to accept.

It is no coincidence that Huntington was a great critic of what he called the "Hispanisation" of the United States. The right-wing wants the "other" out of here exactly in order to cleanse the self from any undue impingement. This is what the Enlightenment did to "History" as we know it here: it contributed to the great fallacy that the "west" stands alone, that Europe is unique, that our history can be detached from theirs. Today, we stand in front of a majestic abstract painting where the contours of our existence blend in with other cultures in a great display of mutual engagement. It is just a matter to bring this reality out more forcefully in the name of a common humanity that

binds us all together, so that the clash theorists here and there are contained.

e-IR: What are some possible ways forward in attempts to minimize the "clash" while recognizing there are differences among peoples in terms of history, beliefs, and practices?

AA: Differences should be celebrated; it is difference that sustains a diverse and progressive culture. Lest we forget: sameness resembles the sanitised world that racists imagine where everyone is Aryan, blonde, members of a Herrenrasse. For the European racists of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century this Herrenrasse was biologically distinct. For today's racists, for instance Anders Breivik, a great admirer of Geert Wilders and the English Defence League, or the various neo-fascist outfits that are re-appearing all over Europe it is cultural and national distinction that need to be accentuated and fortified. Racism contracts space and solidifies categories. This is the reason why it was central to fascist ideology which denied the interdependence of humanity. In the Islamic worlds there have been tendencies towards fascism as well; the ideas of Bin-Laden have more in common with those of Mussolini than with the canon of Islamic political thought. The right-wing here and there craves sameness and worships categorisation, whereas the dialectical mind opens up spaces, contact points, an interspersed territory devoid of racial and cultural hierarchies.

Let me point out that the dialectics that I am referring to are "negative" in the sense that they do not resolve themselves in a grand Hegelian synthesis, an end of history where one side defeats the other. Once it is acknowledged that winning history is futile – human beings have tried in vain to co-opt each other for millennia – peace with our neighbours remains the only rational alternative. In concrete terms this requires constant resistance to the policies of aggression, racism, wars, economic exploitation etc: Disseminating critical literature and scholarship, revealing the lies of government, countering racism in local and national politics, organising peaceful vigils and demonstrations in support of world peace, blogging in the name of equality, self-education about foreign cultures, tweeting about social injustices, a Facebook site covering human rights abuses in your country, collecting critical literature and donating them to local libraries, organising reading sessions covering radical art and books; all of these are insurrectionary guerrilla tactics that each and

every one of us here can pursue and they are all very effective in countering the clash mentality. In short: What we need is an army of empathetic peace disciples equipped with a dialectical mind-set which thinks between cultures and not exclusively within them.

e-IR: One of the observations Huntington made in the opening of his article is that the Post-Cold War world and the non-Western world are no longer the objects of history but “join the West as movers and shapers of history.” Would this observation fit with arguments you make in your newest book that we have been living in the end times of unitary categories such as “west” and “east”? What implications does this have?

AA: It seems to me that Huntington makes the argument in order to alert the “west” of a threat out there, to suggest a non-existent civilisational challenge from what he calls “the rest”. Beware of our revolting neighbours he seems to say. Let’s unite in the name of the west and fortify our polis from the barbarian hordes threatening us from the outside (Arabs, Iranians, Chinese etc.) and from within (e.g. Hispanics, Muslims). This seems the logic behind Huntington’s warning that the other has awakened to history. Yet it is not that the non-Western world never had agency; even during the colonial period they resisted. Even an astute scholar such as Edward Said was wrong in *Orientalism* to suggest that the subaltern was muted. Power and resistance go hand in hand, where there was Orientalist silence about the other, there was a cacophony of voices that resisted the colonial system on the ground. Luminaries such as Mohammad Abduh in Egypt and Jamal-ad Din Afghani in Iran, Turkey and elsewhere resisted in word and deed and were never really subsumed or “pacified” by the colonial system or a discourse such as *Orientalism*.

This never ending battle between systems of power and modes of resistance is the topic of *On the Arab Revolts and the Iranian Revolution* which proclaims the end times of monoliths such as “west” and “east” as you rightly point out. I simply don’t think that after the revolts of the past years, in the Arab world, in southern Europe and the various Occupy Movements in the UK and the USA which evolved in a distinctly global field, it is analytically prudent to think in terms of geographical entities. Threats such as terrorism, environmental deprivation and hyper-neoliberal capitalism are truly global. Opportunities such as the increasingly internationalised stop

the war movements and grassroots NGO’s in the fields of social justice, human rights and democracy are global too. *On the Arab Revolts and the Iranian Revolution* looks at this mesmerising, brave new world and tries to differentiate this global field from local expressions of protest. In the final analysis the book tries to show that we have to adjust our culture and our governing systems to the challenges of post-modernity and that we have to discard the sturdy thought patterns of yesterday. Our world is changing at a fast pace and it is about time that our mind-sets adapt to the complexity of our contemporary world disorder. My work claims a humble contribution to that end.

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