System, Society & the World
Exploring the English School of International Relations

Edited by Robert W. Murray
Since its reorganization in the early 1990s, the English School of international relations (IR) has emerged as a popular theoretical lens through which to examine global events. Those that use the international society approach promote it as a middle-way of theorizing due to its ability to incorporate features from both systemic and domestic perspectives into one coherent lens. Succinctly, the English School, or society of states approach, is a three-fold method for understanding how the world operates. In its original articulations, the English School was designed to incorporate the two major theories which were trying to explain international outcomes, namely realism and liberalism. This e-volume brings together some of the most important voices on the English School to highlight the multifaceted nature of the School’s applications in international relations.

Dr. Robert W. Murray is an Adjunct Professor of Political Science in the University of Alberta’s Department of Political Science. He also serves as a blogger for e-International Relations and a regular contributor for Troy Media. He is the co-editor of *Libya, The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention* (Palgrave, 2013) and co-editor of the forthcoming *International Security and the Arctic: Understanding Policy and Governance* (Cambria, 2014).

*This project is dedicated to all of those students of international relations, past, present and future, seeking a middle-way through the thicket of self-proclaimed truths.*
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Most theories which examine the global arena focus on either one, or a small number of, issues or units of analysis to make their case about the nature or character of the global realm. While some theorists may desire alterations or a decline in the power of the state, states have not declined so far as to be removed from their place as the central actors in international relations. Even those efforts which aim at changing politics above the state level to focus more on humanity, rather than purely state concerns, often rely on states to implement new doctrines. The changes to interstate relations and the new issues facing the world at present require new ways of approaching international relations, while not abandoning rational preferences completely. One often overlooked theoretical lens which could allow for the type of theorizing required to encompass a more accurate evaluation of contemporary international relations is referred to as the English School.¹

Succinctly, the English School, or society of states approach, is a three-fold method for understanding how the world operates. In its original articulations, the English School was designed to incorporate the two major theories which were trying to explain international outcomes, namely realism and liberalism. In order to come to a better, more complete, understanding of IR, English School theorists sought to answer an essential question: “How is one to incorporate the co-operative aspect of international relations into the realist conception of the conflictual nature of the international system?” According to English School logic, there are three distinct spheres at play in international politics, and these three elements are always operating simultaneously. They are first, the international system; second, international society; and third, world society. Barry Buzan provides an explanation into each sphere:

1. International System (Hobbes/Machiavelli) is about power politics amongst states, and Realism puts the structure and process of international anarchy at the centre of IR theory. This position is broadly parallel to mainstream realism and structural realism and is thus well developed and clearly understood.

2. International Society (Grotius) is about the institutionalization of shared interest and identity amongst states, and Rationalism puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory. This position has some parallels to regime theory, but is much deeper, having constitutive rather than merely instrumental implications. International society has been the main focus of English School thinking, and the concept is quite well developed and relatively clear.

3. World society (Kant) takes individuals, non-state organizations and ultimately the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements, and Revolutionism puts transcendence of the state system at the centre of IR theory. Revolutionism is mostly about forms of Universalist cosmopolitanism. It could include communism, but as Wæver notes, these days it is usually taken to mean liberalism. This position has some parallels to transnationalism, but carries a much more foundational link to normative political theory. It is the least well-developed of the English School concepts, and has not yet been clearly or systematically articulated.²

The English School incorporates realist postulates, such as an emphasis on the primacy of states interacting in an anarchic system, but combines that realist understanding with the notion of a human element emerging from the domestic sphere. Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell claim that “international relations cannot be understood simply in terms of anarchy or a Hobbesian state of war.”³ The most important element of the English School, international society, therefore operates based on the influence of both the international system (realism) and world society (revolutionism).

Within the English School itself, there are two distinct divisions, which interpret the conduct and goals of international society very differently. The first is the pluralist account, which adheres to a more traditional conception of IR by placing its emphasis on a more Hobbesian or realist understanding of the field. Pluralists, according to Andrew Linklater and Hideemi Suganami, stress the conduct of states within anarchy, but are still sure to note that states cooperate, despite the existence of self-interest. “A pluralist framework places constraints on violence, but it does not outlaw the use of force and is, in any case, powerless to eradicate it... War is not only an instrument of realist foreign policy but is also a crucial mechanism for resisting challenges to the balance of power and violent assaults on international society.”⁴ The pluralist version of international society is founded upon minimalist rules, the protection of national sovereignty, and the quest to create and maintain international order. The constraints imposed on international society by the system of states and the condition of anarchy are thought to be the most important factors in explaining and understanding the conduct of a pluralist society of states, and such a close relationship to realist theory is what keeps the pluralist conception of the English School within a traditional IR framework.

The second interpretation of international society is referred to as the solidarist account. Solidarist conceptions of international society are interpreted in various ways, and can incorporate a variety of IR theories. Solidarists typically place their emphasis upon the relationship between the world society, or third level, and international society.

Introduction

Robert W. Murray
University of Alberta, Canada
In its earliest articulations, solidarism focused predominantly on Kantian or liberal understandings of IR, since the primary focus was on how the individual within the state affected the conduct of the society of states. This allowed for notions such as human rights, individual security, and peace to permeate the normative foundations of the international society.

Over time and since the end of the Cold War, the solidarist account of international society has also been used and interpreted by critical theorists, who want to maintain the state in their theory, but find a way to include critical, global or human concerns. Barry Buzan argues:

“This view stresses global patterns of interaction and communication, and, in sympathy with much of the literature on globalization, uses the term society mainly to distance itself from state-centric models of IR...[world society] is aimed at capturing the total interplay amongst states, non-state actors and individuals, while carrying the sense that all the actors in the system are conscious of their interconnectedness and share some important values.”

The focus on individuals, norms, values and even discourse have come to provide a forum for liberal and critical projects in IR to use the English School as a method of both explaining and understanding the world from a perspective which does stray from realism, but does not reject the primacy or necessity of the state in global affairs.

There is little doubt that the English School has grown in its popularity since the end of the Cold War, and the post-1990s period in English School theory has been termed as the School’s “reorganization” by Buzan and other prominent scholars who adopt the international society approach. One of the most interesting elements of the School is the diversity of theoretical allegiances and geographical location of those who consider themselves to be within the School and the plethora of work done under the society of states banner over the last two decades. A large advantage to a middle-approach like the English School is that on one level, it does incorporate the realist elements of IR with an emphasis on the state. On another level, however, the world society element of English School theory is able to allow for a wide array of theorists to discuss various critical elements and their effects on the society of states. Whether these come in the form of emancipation theory, globalization theory, neo or postcolonial theory and even some postmodern thinking, the critical thinkers who choose to adopt an English School method are forced to ground their work in some understanding of the state or international society. Making sure that any contemporary efforts to examine the international arena can maintain traditional elements is an essential component of modern IR. Robert Jackson highlights this point as he states:

Contemporary international relations theory tends to be a mixed bag of unrelated approaches which usually are not in dialogue. I would borrow less from unrelated disciplines and make better use of the abundant traditional resources which are available for theorizing contemporary problems of international relations seeking thereby to add to our accumulated historical stock of knowledge.

As a result of such a pluralistic model, the English School can be said to represent a coherent and advantageous method in achieving a broad and complex understanding of modern international political issues.

To demonstrate the advantages and value of the English School, this volume brings together some of the most important voices in the School to highlight the multifaceted nature of the School’s applications in international relations. In a departure from typical academic literature, this compendium was assembled with the specific goal of introducing readers to the School’s key elements, but in a way that would be accessible in terms of both comprehension and also availability.

In attempting to explain how the English School is best positioned to explain events and trends in an evolving state system, Cornelia Navari begins the volume with an emphasis on the School’s engagement with world society. Navari’s discussion of the School’s methodological focus on participant observation make the world society level of theorizing more apt in explaining the causes of change, rather than strictly the sources of change, as humanity’s impact of world events continues to grow.

In his reassessment of a pivotal piece of international relations literature, Richard Little traces the impact of Bull and Watson’s The Expansion of International Society on international relations and the English School. Little examines the criticism of Eurocentrism leveled against Bull and Watson’s vision of international society and is sure to highlight the duality of European dominance and the trend of imitation employed by non-European powers in their entrenchment into the society of states.

Andrew Linklater’s chapter presents a discussion of civilizations in the history of international society. Linklater comments on the importance of civilizations in Wight’s initial conceptions of how and why international societies work, and perhaps most importantly, Linklater interrogates the need for a re-evaluation of civilizational study as new centers of power outside of the West will influence international society in the future.

Building on the impact of shifts in international power, Roger Epp focuses his attention on the role of China in international relations theory. Epp’s primary contention is that the English School is well suited to take up discussions about China’s influence on IR theory, and how the School’s interpretive and historical elements would be ideal for analyzing emerging trends in Chinese IR theory.
Adrian Gallagher’s contribution explores one of the pivotal characteristics of English School study, being human rights. Gallagher claims that the School’s work on human rights has been an essential influence on international relations, primarily because of its ability to balance optimism and pessimism. As Gallagher suggests, the middle way promoted by the School has allowed it to critically examine rights and responsibilities issues in the broader context of IR, and has done so very well.

Cathinka Lerstad uses the English School framework to demonstrate that no simple answers exist when attempting to explain the American response to genocide in Rwanda. Lerstad’s ultimate contention is that of all theoretical approaches to the questions surrounding American inaction, the coexisting dimensions of an international order within which tensions arise that the English School embodies provides a fundamentally important lens through which to comprehend events.

In an effort to demonstrate the regional aspects of English School theory, Yannis Stivachtis provides a study of some of the most important regional or sub-global international societies in the world today. As the world continues to move away from a Europe-centric conception of international society, Stivachtis contends that regional international societies will become increasingly apparent and important. The extension of international society theory to the regional level is one of the innovative ways the School has contributed to empirical studies in recent years, and Stivachtis has been at the forefront of this work.

As the international system evolves, the rise of new great powers has become an increasingly important theme of international relations study. Jason Ralph’s chapter investigates the role of the BRICS states and how useful the English School can be in exploring their impact on international affairs. By attempting to balance the themes of “prestige in numbers” with an interpretation of legitimacy contingent upon efficacy, Ralph argues that BRICS members may be able to further increase their roles in international decision-making, and if too much prominence continues to be granted to the efficacy-based model of legitimacy without consideration of numbers, the School’s conservative image may endure.

In his chapter, Matthew Weinert delves into a crucial aspect of the English School’s framework, world society. Weinert astutely questions what precisely is meant by a world society, and who the members of world society are. His conclusion is a novel contribution to the School, in that Weinert contends that theorists must question how to “make human” and the 5 mechanisms proposed help scholars do just that: reflection on the moral worth of others, recognition of the other as an autonomous being, resistance against forms of oppression, replication (of prevailing mores), and responsibility for self and others.

In his examination of the English School’s pluralist and solidarist accounts of international society, Tom Keating presents the value of a balanced and pluralistic approach to constructing the identity of a given society of states. Keating notes that the most powerful explanation for why states continue to pursue coexistence in international society is due to the ongoing stability provided by pluralist concerns in state sovereignty without a total abandonment for solidarist values such as rights.

Alexander Astrov builds on a point introduced by Keating, noting the role and influence that great powers play in the society of states. Of all the institutions studied by English School scholars, Astrov argues, great power management is in need of elaboration. Astrov’s analysis of what exactly is meant by “management” in a system of independent states all with the power of consent, leads to a fundamental and important interrogation of exactly what role great powers play in the function of international society.

In a meta-theoretical investigation of the methodological limitations of the English School, Robert Murray presents an argument that, due to the proliferation of scholars employing the School, perhaps the time has come for a more defined set of boundaries to be drawn to distinguish exactly what an English School theory is. To do so, Murray proposes the use of Imre Lakatos’ work on Scientific Research Programs to assist in the identification of the School’s hard core assumptions and to test contributions to the School for whether they are, in fact, adding value to the School.

In all, these outstanding pieces clearly demonstrate the value and vibrancy of the English School as it exists today. Spanning a wide array of issues and themes, this project is intended to provoke thought about the School’s value and possible ways forward. There is no doubt these objectives are achieved and will hopefully contribute to the development of the English School of international relations theory.

Notes

1 For a comprehensive introduction to, and historical account of, the English School, see Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History of the English School (Houndmills: Palgrave, 1998).
5 Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International
The English School in IR theory is generally associated with the notion of international society. Indeed, it is often referred to as the international society approach. It is most commonly associated with Hedley Bull’s *Anarchical Society*, where Bull contrasted British approaches to international relations with those American and realist approaches where states are driven solely by power politics and egoistic materialism, the only laws being “the laws of the jungle”. Bull argued that although the international realm could be typified as anarchical, in the sense of lacking an overarching authority to define and enforce rules, it did not mean that international politics were anarchic or chaotic. Contrary to the billiard-ball metaphor of international politics, states are not just individual elements in a system. In practice, there is a substantial institutionalization of shared values, mutual understandings, and common interests; hence, the “anarchical society”. Indeed, he argued that even ethics were an integral part of world politics, and that prudence and morality were not mutually exclusive.

There are several distinct focuses of the English School approach. Hidemi Suganami, who first suggested the title “British Institutionalists” for the School, has pointed to its concern with institutions in the sense of operative principles, such as diplomacy, international law, the balance of power and state sovereignty. A second cut is that of Robert Jackson, who has identified the English School’s subject more broadly as codes of conduct. His focus is not directly with institutions, but with the practices of statespersons to discern their normative content. A third focus is that of Richard Little and Barry Buzan who are concerned not with actors, but with environments of action. They argue that the central concepts in English School thought – international system, international society, and world society – are different environments of action, different social realities (structures in the contemporary parlance), which exist in a dynamic relationship with one another and which require incorporation into the consideration of conduct. In short, Suganami emphasizes institutions; Jackson emphasizes agents; and Little and Buzan emphasize structures.

Navari has explored the explanatory preferences of the classical English School theorists as they appear in the classic texts. She agrees with Little that structural concepts are at the centre of the English School approach, but she observes that the classical theorists...
did not initially employ their structural concepts in an explanatory mode. Their explanations, she points out, are generally in the intentional mode; that is, they explain events and outcomes via the main actors’ aims and intentions. She observes that the classical English School thinkers distinguished between mechanistic (causal) outcomes and chosen (intentional) outcomes: for both Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, other “founding fathers”, an international society, as opposed to a system, was primarily the product of choices, and not causes. Accordingly, she identifies the classical approach as participant observation.

If the focus is institutions, then the more appropriate approach would be via international law. Peter Wilson has explained the English School understanding of international law, distinguishing between Positive Law—law that has emerged—and Aspirational Law—laws and procedures that may be emerging. Applied to developments such as sovereignty, international law, and emerging regimes—human rights, ecology, etc.—the distinction implies different questions. To determine whether a substantive institution has emerged, the researcher should ask whether institutional developments, such as human rights, contain definite obligations, whether they are sufficiently defined to allow a judge to determine derogation, and whether derogation gives rise to a sanction of some sort. To determine whether a substantive new institution is taking shape, the researcher should ask whether resolutions lead to further elaborations in later resolutions, and whether the endorsement of a new institution is hearty or sincere, on the part of a government or population of a state (Navari has recently used the model to evaluate the emerging democracy norm).

Richard Little has argued that the classical theorists in the English School tradition identified the reality of international relations with a diversity of action arenas, not merely with “international society,” and that these insights are embedded in English School theory. He relates different methods to different levels of analysis and to different forms of social structure; and he argues that both were apprehended by the classical English School scholars. In consequence, he maintains that methodological pluralism is a necessary entailment, and a necessary requisite, of the English School approach, depending on the emphasis of the individual analyst and his or her particular research question. Little’s schema draws three forms of structure, associated with international system, international society, and world society respectively. Each of these settings has different methods appropriate to its analysis—cost–benefit analysis in the context of a system of states; institutional analysis and comparative analysis in the context of a society of states; and, among other approaches, normative argument in the context of world society.

Buzan has gone further and proposed that Little’s structure may be used to identify not only the sources of change in international society, but the identification of the causes of change. Elaborating on the concept of “world society”, Buzan calls it “the idea of shared norms and values at the individual level but transcending the state.” It is constituted by the global societal identities and arrangements of individuals, non-state organizations, and the global population as a whole. He has argued that international society is not a way-station on the historical road from anarchy to a world society, but rather that an international society cannot develop further without parallel development in its corresponding world society; that is, by the development of elements of “world culture” at the mass level. But he also argues, in the manner of Hedley Bull, that a world society cannot emerge unless it is supported by a stable political framework and that the state system remains the only candidate for this. The methodological implications are that “world society” should be the focus of study, both as an object of growth and development and also as a source of change, but within the context of a (changing) state system.

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6 See Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966) for the early writings of the “founding fathers”.
The expansion of the international society as articulated by the English School is, arguably, the only effective and generally accepted grand narrative that prevails in International Relations. Nevertheless, it has come under increasing criticism in recent years for its pronounced Eurocentric bias. There is, of course, a powerful school of thought that argues that such criticisms are inevitable because grand narratives are inherently suspect. But in recent years, the importance of grand narratives has started to be reasserted. It is timely, therefore, to reassess this particular grand narrative.

The narrative is very closely associated with the English School, of course, because Bull and Watson, two of its key members edited *The Expansion of International Society* – a seminal text. But it is important to recognize that Bull himself identified the narrative as the “standard European view”, not one distinctive to English School thinking. Moreover, Bull and Watson were also quite open about its Eurocentric character, insisting that “it is not our perspective, but the historical record itself that can be called Eurocentric.”

Bull and Watson fail to identify the constituent elements of a “standard account” but it seems to be along the lines that the contemporary international society originated in Europe where over several centuries a unique society of states evolved. Only in Europe did states exchange diplomatic missions in order to symbolize and ensure a continuity in relations, build up a body of international law to regulate relations and, more specifically, thereby dictate the terms under which war could be conducted, and, moreover, only in Europe did statesmen self-consciously begin to think in terms of a balance of power, with the great powers eventually managing their collective relations in order to preserve the balance. Elements of these institutions may be found elsewhere but this repertoire of institutions has to be regarded as unique to Europe.

The “standard account” then assumes that this extensively developed international society became the prototype for the contemporary global international society and, on the face of it, what Bull and Watson wanted to do, therefore, was to map in more detail how this European society of sovereign states expanded outwards to become the
basis for the contemporary global international society of sovereign states.

In fact, Bull and Watson’s perspective is much more complex than the standard account allows and, indeed, Bull insists that the standard account manifests obvious “absurdities”, such as the idea that ancient states like China, Egypt, or Persia only became sovereign entities when they joined the European international society.4

Significantly, Bull and Watson also acknowledge that contemporary Third World states challenge the “standard account” because these states have refused to accept that they were only recently admitted into a European international society and speak instead of their “re-admission to a general international society of states and peoples whose independence had been wrongfully denied.”

A close reading of Bull and Watson indicates that their grand narrative does, in practice, substantiate this view of Third World states. Certainly their analysis fails to endorse the “standard account” – at least, in the form that I have outlined. Instead, they insist that Europe did not evolve institutions and then export them. On the contrary, the expansion of Europe and the evolution of its international society are treated as “simultaneous processes, which influenced and affected each other.”10 Although they never systematically explore the full implications of this proposition the text does illustrate this interactive process in the analysis of the later stages of European expansion.

To demonstrate this point, it is necessary to identify two distinct and important moves made in the text. The first move involves the recognition that the narrative must start long before traditional assessments of when the European international society came into existence. It opens when we start to identify the territorial growth of Latin Christendom. But this first move also acknowledges that at the same time there existed a range of discrete regional international societies as well as Latin Christendom, which included the Arab-Islamic system, the Indian subcontinent, the Mongol Tartars on the Eurasian steppes, and China. Apart from the steppes, all these regions retained their independent identity into the nineteenth century.

Watson notes that Latin Christendom expanded initially into the peripheries of what came to be known as Europe, and then this colonization process later embraced the Americas, so they too “became an extension of Christendom.”11

But even before this point, Christendom was already evolving along a very distinctive track. The other Eurasian international societies are all identified as suzerain state systems.12 But throughout Europe’s history as a distinct region, although there were recurrent attempts by various states to establish suzerain status, none was ever successful.

From the sixteenth century onwards, the Europeans acquired increasing control over the oceans and seas around the globe but they lacked the ability to penetrate the landmasses in Africa, Eurasia or the Americas (apart from Mexico and Peru). Instead they operated largely on the periphery of all these continents where they “were accepted by the indigenous communities on a basis of equality as useful trading partners.”13

Bull and Watson’s first move leads to the conclusion, therefore, that it is possible to identify the emergence of a “loose Eurasian system or quasi-system” within which the European states “sought to deal with Asian states on the basis of moral and legal equality.”14

At the start of the nineteenth century, therefore, the Europeans still acknowledged that they operated in a global arena where groups of states operated according to their own distinctive norms and institutions. Nevertheless, the Europeans were also to some extent integrated into these societies as either equals or subordinates. The ability of the Europeans to engage in trade and diplomacy around the world on the basis of signed agreements, therefore, provides evidence of a nascent global international society beginning to emerge.

Bull and Watson’s second move is made during the course of the nineteenth century when they identify a very dramatic transformation in the fundamental features of global international relations. One aspect of this transformation relates to technological advances. These permitted, first, pronounced and widespread falls in freight rates, with “(q)uantum and qualitative leaps forward in international economic relations.”15 Second, the development of steam power made it possible for the Europeans to penetrate the interior of Africa and China up their major rivers. Where there were no available rivers, the “speed of rail construction was astonishing.”16 Third, quick-firing, long-range firearms developed although Howard argues, fourthly, that improvements in “European medical techniques” were even more crucial for European penetration of Africa and Asia.17

None of these developments by themselves had to lead to a transformation in international relations. They could simply have led to an intensification of established relations within the nascent global international society. But the impact of these developments was ratcheted up because they were accompanied by some equally remarkable changes in the self-image of the Europeans and Americans. It was this factor that proved crucial in transforming the nature of an evolving global international society.

According to Brownlie, European and American international lawyers precipitated this change. By the middle of the nineteenth century it was agreed that state personality was determined by a collective recognition of statehood, but ”recognition was not dependent upon any objective legal criteria.”18 Whereas it was assumed that the European and American states – erstwhile members of Christendom – possessed state personality,
large numbers of non-European political entities that had been treated as sovereign in the past were not now considered eligible to acquire statehood.

The justification for this development is linked to the increasing reference to “modern civilized states” by nineteenth century international lawyers. But Brownlie is quite clear that the change, in practice, “interacted with an increase in European cultural chauvinism and racial theories.” Vincent argues that whereas there was a “relative lack of colour consciousness among Europeans in earlier ages of expansion,” in the nineteenth century, Europe was responsible for “racializing the world.”

The potential for a nascent global international society made up of large numbers of the existing political units around the world was essentially killed off. It was argued that to acquire statehood, and be permitted to enter the European international society, political entities had to measure up to a European standard of civilization, despite the fact that, as Bull notes, the European states themselves could not live up to every aspect of this standard.

This second move reveals that European expansion and the evolution of the international society were closely interlinked. But Bull and Watson argue that it is important not to overplay this line of argument because it has the effect of removing any sense of agency from non-European actors. As Howard notes, the Russian response in an earlier era had been to “imitate” the Europeans because they wished to be able to compete more effectively with the Europeans and they then constituted a vanguard that others could follow. States, like the Ottoman Empire, Japan and the Chinese Empire are shown to have followed the same route during the nineteenth century. Moreover, they also very quickly began to translate European and American international law textbooks and this helped them to assert their rights against the Europeans. On the other hand, there were now also many independent political units that had been acknowledged as equals in an earlier era but were soon to be absorbed into the expanding European empires and successfully prevented, at least for the time being, from participating in the evolving European based international society.

Notes


Interest in civilizations has increased in recent years, as the recent publication of Peter Katzenstein's three edited volumes reveals. As with Huntington’s discussion of the clash of civilizations, most of the literature has dealt – but not explicitly – with what Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, in one of the pioneering works of the English School, called “the expansion of international society”. The driving idea behind that book was that international society has outgrown Europe, the region in which the society of states and its core institutions such as permanent diplomacy and international law first developed. It is important to note the importance of a central theme in Wight’s reflections on different state-systems. All of them – the Hellenic, ancient Chinese, and modern European – had emerged, he argued, in a region where there was a keen awareness of a shared civilizational identity. The corollary was a powerful sense of “cultural differentiation” from the supposedly “savage” or “barbaric” world.

Wight’s position was that the members of states-systems found it easier to agree on common institutions and values because they were part of the same civilization. They inherited certain concepts and sensibilities from the distant past that enabled them to introduce elements of civility into the context of anarchy – to establish what Bull in most famous work, called “the anarchical society”. The sense of belonging to one civilization made it possible for the societies involved to place some restraints on the use of force – at least in their relations with each other. The idea of civilization had rather different consequences as far as relations with the outlying “barbaric” world were concerned. European colonial wars revealed that the “civilized” did not believe they should observe the same restraints in their conflicts with “savages”. The latter were not protected by the laws of war. They could not be expected, so it was supposed, to observe the principles of reciprocity that were valued in the “civilized” world. Parallels are evident in the recent language that was used as part of the “war on terror” to describe the members of “uncivilized” terrorist groups – the so-called “unlawful combatants”.

That example indicates that the language of civilization and barbarism is no longer merely of historical interest. But to return to an earlier theme, its continuing political salience is a function of the challenges that have resulted from the expansion of international society. Before the twentieth century, the European empires denied that
their colonies could belong to international society as equals. The establishment of the League of Nations Mandate System, followed by the United Nations Trusteeship System, held out the prospect of eventual membership of international society.¹

But at the time, most thought that the colonies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific would need many decades, if not centuries, to learn to stand on their feet as independent members of international society. They would first have to “modernize” after the fashion of the dominant European or Western states. That orientation to the non-Western world reflected the influence of the nineteenth century “standard of civilization”. The concept referred to the idea that only the civilized, as Europeans understood the term, could belong to the society of states. As for the others, they could at least be made aware of the standards by which they were judged, and they could comprehend how they would have to change before they could be admitted to international society. Similar ideas were held to apply to societies such as Japan and China that were regarded as “advanced” but as less “civilized” than the Europeans. Demonstrating their willingness and ability to conform to Western principles of international relations was essential before any claim to gain entry to international society could be considered.²

It is worth noting that references to civilization were widespread in international legal discussions of the laws of war in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.³ In a similar fashion, the idea of civilization was invoked by the prosecutors in the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals. But that language is not used so overtly today. References to the differences between one’s own “civilized” ways and others’ “savage” practices attract condemnation. That is an indication of significant changes in “post-imperial” international society. It was once perfectly legitimate – so the Europeans believed – to use a language that is now a sharp, and embarrassing, reminder of the discredited colonial age.

Not that all of the sensibilities that informed the standard of civilization have departed the scene. Recent literature has discussed the ways in which the human rights culture rests on a new standard of civilization; similar claims have been made with respect to market society and liberal democracy.⁴ Those discussions stress that international society is far from “post-European” or “post-Western” in terms of its organizing principles and core practices. They draw attention to the respects in which international society has yet to ensure cultural justice for non-European peoples, a point that was stressed in Bull’s writings on the “revolt against the West” and in Keal’s discussion of how the continuing marginalization of indigenous peoples is testimony to the “moral backwardness of international society”.⁵

Such explorations demonstrate that the principles of international relations that developed in one civilization – Europe – continue to shape contemporary world politics. They suggest that international society has outgrown Europe but it has not exactly outgrown European or Western civilization. Its dominance has meant that the most powerful societies have not come under sustained pressure to construct an international society that does justice to different cultures or civilizations.⁶

Complex questions arise about the social-scientific utility of notions of civilization, but they cannot be considered in this paper. It is perhaps best to think less in terms of civilizations and more about civilizing processes – the processes by which different peoples, and not only the Europeans, came to regard their practices as civilized and to regard others as embodying the barbarism they thought they had left behind. Major studies of how Europeans came to think of themselves as civilized can be found in the sociological literature.⁷ Their importance for students of international society has been discussed in recent work.⁸ But too little is known in the West about non-European civilizing processes, and about their impact on European civilization over the last few centuries.⁹ Related problems arise in connection with what are sometimes dismissed as “pre-modern” responses to Western “modernity”. They need to be understood not as a revolt against the West by peoples who have supposedly failed to adapt to modernity but, more sympathetically, as diverse responses to profound economic, political and cultural dislocations - and reactions to the complex interweaving of Western and non-Western influences - that are part of the legacy of Western imperialism.¹⁰

Such inquiries will become ever more important as new centers of power develop outside the West. The idea of civilization may have lost its importance as a binding force in international society, but understanding different, but interwoven civilizing processes, is critical for promoting mutual respect and trust between the diverse peoples that have been forced together over the last few centuries, and whom comprise international society today.

Notes

3 Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1979), ch. 1.
5 William Bain, Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power
In a recent article in the *Review of International Studies*, Zhang Xiaoming identifies what he calls the English School’s theoretical “inventions” of China. On one hand, he notes, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and the British Committee in which they were active participants showed a serious, historical interest in China at a time when the field of international relations typically did not. China figured in their explorations of comparative state-systems, standards of civilizations, and the so-called revolt against the West. Wight’s undergraduate lectures introduced traditions of classical Chinese thought in parallel with European traditions on the question of the barbarian. Bull, indeed, travelled to China for three weeks in 1973. But on the other hand, Zhang argues, these engagements are marked by selectivity and ethnocentrism. The story they tell is a European one, with China the outsider, sometimes the provocateur. The effect, he concludes, is to limit the English School’s appeal relative to other imported theoretical positions.

My purpose in this short essay is neither to correct Professor Zhang’s careful reading nor to defend the English School – a “brand” about which I have my own doubts – as a universal project. Rather, in response, it is to make a more modest case for an interpretive mode of theorizing, one that begins by embracing Professor Zhang’s point: “Every IR theory is provincial in cultural terms.” Interpretive theory pays attention to history, words, meanings and translations; it risks honest encounters with what it is unfamiliar; and it is willing to rethink its own certainties on the basis of those encounters. It does not assume incommensurability. It asks instead what interpretive resources – what bridges – might be present within a theoretical tradition to enable a fuller understanding. Needless to say, this orientation stands outside the mainstream. It is unfamiliar; and it is willing to rethink its own certainties on the basis of those encounters. It does not assume incommensurability. It asks instead what interpretive resources – what bridges – might be present within a theoretical tradition to enable a fuller understanding. Needless to say, this orientation stands outside the mainstream. At a time when IR has become established at universities around world, its theoretical literature nonetheless is still overwhelmingly parochial and positivist. As one sobering new study has shown, the reading lists that form the next professorial generation at leading graduate programs in the United States and Europe consist almost entirely of the conventional Western canon. Whether that canon’s endurance is proof of its scientific validity, intellectual hegemony or timidity, the result is a discipline “rooted
in a rather narrow and particular historical experience” and hard-pressed to envision a “future outside of the Westphalian box.”

In China, where IR has emerged from the practical imperatives of ideology and foreign policy, there is no shortage of theoretical activity. Some of it is done uncritically within imported templates – aided by doctoral educations overseas and a continuing airdrift of professors and texts in translation from the US. But China, as one scholar has put it, is now “between copying and constructing.” Increasingly, theory in the social sciences is assumed to have a geocultural dimension. Scholars have turned to their own civilizational sources, whether it is Confucius and other classical thinkers on humane statecraft in the Warring States period; the imperial tributary model and the corresponding world-order concepts of tianxia (“all-under-heaven”) and datong (harmony); or else the more recent experience of colonial humiliation, revolution, outsider status and “peaceful rise.” The quest for IR theory with Chinese cultural characteristics is meant typically not as a hermetic enterprise but as a step towards engagement with other scholars.

The English School is well-placed to take up this conversation, I think, so long as it is clear about its purposes. If its influence in China a decade ago was “marginal,” it has now acquired a modest following, for reasons that include its humanistic and historicist orientation, its value as a counter-weight and, not least, its implicit encouragement of a parallel “Chinese School.” Selected texts like Bull’s Anarchical Society are available in translation. But there is something at stake in China other than market share and brand-penetration. China represents a practical test of the commitment to interpretive engagement with its outer limits, spatial and temporal, how it reveals itself, how it is constituted by what happens on its frontiers. He traces the emergence of the idea of Europe against the spectre of the Turk and of modern international law through the 16th-century Spanish encounter with the indigenous inhabitants of the Americas: were they fully human, were they peoples, and, if yes, what was owed them? His lectures on the barbarian keep the memory within IR of colonial atrocities, political exclusions, dispossession by force and by law, and, a century ago, tutelary rationalizations of empire. If Wight’s inquiries are ethnocentric, they are not uncritical. Invariably, they think through an encounter from one side of it, but they do not leave that side untouched; for in any such account it is the West – many “Wests” – that must also be interrogated. What accounts for the periodic “fits of world-conquering fanaticism?”

It would be disingenuous for me to prescribe an IR theory with Chinese characteristics. At most, it is possible to say what a cross-cultural theoretical encounter might require, namely: risk, dialogue, attentiveness and introspection. In this sense, interpretive ways of thinking might be said to mirror the communicative practices of international diplomacy. They involve a double movement, towards the unfamiliar and then the familiar, describing and redescribing, rethinking that which had once seemed obvious. They show how much hinges on words, translations, gestures and protocols. The dialogue, in fact, may be “uneasy.”

But Western scholars oriented to history, language and culture ought to be fascinated by the lead taken by their Chinese counterparts, for example, in excavating the range of meanings of tianxia and its possibilities for shaping a different global or regional order. They will wonder – this is the risk of the question – whether tianxia necessarily stands in contradiction with the insistence in Chinese policy on state sovereignty and territorial integrity, whether the former, hierarchical rather than horizontal, is, in fact, more deeply rooted culturally than the latter, and whether it should be regarded as pacific or aggressive. The answer will require, inter alia, an account of how the word sovereignty itself is rendered in a language into which it once had to be translated and made intelligible. In the process, IR’s “universal” – for surely we all know what sovereignty is – will have been historicized and resituated on all sides with distinct cultural-linguistic nuances. Even sovereignty will not be the same, which is why IR theory in the West, parochial and stale, may need Chinese scholarship at least as much as the reverse is true.

Notes

1. Zhang Xiaoming, “China in the conception of international society: the English School’s engagements with China,” Review of International Studies 37:2 (2011), 763-86. I am grateful to Professor Zhang for the opportunity to present some of the ideas at a graduate seminar at the School of International Studies, Peking University, in October 2012.


5

“Look inside International Relations: she’s alright she’s alright”1 An overview of the English School’s engagement with human rights

Adrian Gallagher
University of Leeds, UK

Students are often told that to study International Relations (IR) is to investigate relations between rather than within states. This is perhaps most often heard when critics of IR construct a “straw-man” representation of the discipline which allows them to dismiss IR as too narrow. In other words, IR is said to be detached from the complexities of a 21st century globalized world that demands students understand interconnected processes at the sub-national, national, and international level. The purpose of this piece, however, is to highlight that if one “looks inside IR” one finds a much more diverse and enriching discipline. To do this, I focus on the English School’s (ES) engagement with human rights to highlight that the ES has a strong tradition of concern regarding rights and responsibilities which stems from their world view that mass human rights violations within states are a matter of international concern.2

It is easy to understand why critics hold the view that state-centric approaches such as the ES do not accurately capture human relations from the local to the global level.3 Indeed, one of the founding fathers of what came to be known as the ES, Martin Wight, acknowledged that the study of international society concealed “the real society of men and women”.4 The statement clearly demonstrates that Wight was all too aware that the complex relations between citizens and states were an overlooked and under researched issue in IR. The ES “top down” focus was then seemingly cemented in Hedley Bull’s seminal study The Anarchical Society which offered an even more state-centric interpretation of international society than Wight had originally envisaged.5 Published at the height of the Cold War, Bull’s analysis represents a well-documented trade-off between justice and order in which Bull prioritised the moral value of order over the moral pursuit of a just cause. From a contemporary perspective, this became the pluralist position in the ES with scholars such as James Mayall and Robert Jackson arguing upholding the norm of non-intervention.6

A counter-development emerged, however, in the 1980s. Bull’s pluralist position changed as he argued that the consensus against Apartheid in South Africa should be used to mobilize international action against the human rights violations taking place.8 Expanding this understanding, R.J Vincent’s seminal study Human Rights in International Relations laid the foundation for what is currently referred to as the ES solidarist position as he argued that basic human rights should be understood as floor beneath states rather than a ceiling above them.9 In other words, even without a world government, political elites should abide by a universal moral minimalism. As contemporary scholars both inside and outside the ES have acknowledged, Vincent’s work does not just stand as one of the first studies on human rights from an IR perspective but more importantly acted to rehabilitate “serious theoretical discussion on human rights in general.”10 In the post-Cold War era, Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler expanded this solidarist doctrine and in so doing, stood at the forefront of humanitarian intervention debate.11 More recently, the solidarist baton has been passed on to Alex Bellamy who works within an ES framework whilst producing cutting edge research on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).12 At the same time, Dunne now acts as Director of Research at the Asia Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.13 Accordingly, this historical trajectory helps illustrate that ES has played a pivotal role in shaping contemporary understandings of human rights and continues to do so.

With much ink spilt elsewhere on the division between the pluralist-solidarist divide outlined in the two different ES strands above, this author would like to raise a final point on the ES’s potential contribution to a new research agenda. In William Bain’s analysis of Nicholas Wheeler’s decisive, Saving Strangers, he claims “[i]t seems as though Wheeler merely invokes humanity as a self-evident moral truth – the authority of which requires no further explanation – which in the end cannot tell us the reasons why we should act to save strangers.”14 The statement draws attention to a problem that the ES has an under-theorised understanding of humanity which in turn fails to explain why “we” should act to save “them”. One response is to forge a better understanding of the relationship between the society of states and humanity which addresses the relationship between the ES and cosmopolitanism. Andrew Linklater has stood at the forefront of this research for over two decades.15 Alternatively, ES scholars could focus on the concept of order, rather than humanity, to investigate the impact that mass human rights violations have on the ordering principles of international society. It is this latter research agenda that I develop in Genocide and Its Threat to Contemporary International Order.16 This is not to say that this latter focus is mutually exclusive from the former, but that these are two timely and important research agendas which ES scholars can make a significant contribution toward in the future.17

In summary, IR is often presented as somewhat of an ill, dying discipline that will fade away as it fails to explain and understand the complexities of the 21st century. Yet when one looks at the most important issues in contemporary international politics, the crises in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Mali to name just a few, it is evident that although the ES does not explain everything it does provide a fruitful framework for analysing...
the optimism and tragedy that lies at the heart of international society. After all, the ES view remains that “there is more to international relations than the realist suggests but less than the cosmopolitan desires.”

Notes

1 I am drawing here on the song, ‘Look Inside America’ by Blur from the self-entitled album, Blur (EMI Music Publishing 1997). The song goes on to state “look inside America: she’s alright, she’s alright”.


17 Professor Jason Ralph and I are currently supervising PhDs in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds related to these research agendas.

Moral Responsibility in International Relations: 
the US Response to Rwanda

Cathinka Lerstad
Gjøvik University College, Norway

The English School offers an account of international relations that captures the interplay between morality and power; the empirical and the normative; the pluralist and the solidarist; order and justice; theory and history. It thus provides a holistic framework for analyzing the central question to any normative theory, namely the moral value to be attributed to particularistic political collectivities against humanity taken as a whole, or the claims of individual human beings. This question remains at the heart of international relations as one the most challenging moral questions of our time.

The international community has in recent decades made great strides in a solidarist direction. Corroborating the conditionality of state sovereignty, it is now widely accepted that there exists some sort of collective moral “responsibility to protect” in situations where the state fails in its obligations to protect its own people. The question of whether the expanded notion of moral responsibility animating “the responsibility to protect” is becoming solidified as a norm in international relations has consequently emerged.

What this discussion commonly fails to adequately consider, however, is the primary moral duty of the government of potential intervening countries to their own citizens and the dilemma this creates for the consistent implementation of the nascent R2P norm. While there is universal agreement that, in the face of severe human rights violations, “something must be done,” the idea that states refusing to commit troops to end such atrocities are morally bereft is not axiomatic. Charged with the primary responsibility of protecting national citizens and promoting their best interests, it is pertinent to question whether it is realistic to expect state leaders to make moral decisions independent of national interest when confronted with situations of severe human rights violations abroad.

The question, therefore, is not only one of whether individual human rights or state sovereignty should take precedence in situations where a choice between the two has to be made, as it is often presented, but also one of how the decision to intervene/

not intervene is justified to the citizens of the intervening country and whether the deployment of soldiers to protect nationals of a foreign country can be vindicated domestically. The state is thus engaged in a two-level game between domestic and international preferences, where power and morality is inextricably linked. This process is not static, but one in which discourse and action continuously shape the state as a moral actor, and our collective understanding of how and when power can be vindicated.

By focusing on relations between and among entities rather than on the alleged dispositional qualities of static entities within a social context, relational constructivism is useful in analyzing this dynamic process. From this perspective, the practical activities implemented in response to mass atrocities continually produce and reproduce actors such as “the state” and “the international community” and their notion of moral responsibility in international relations, which again give rise to the observed social actions carried out in its name. Activities devoted to legitimation are particularly interesting in this regard since these activities are among the clearest moments at which actors are produced in practice.

An English School analysis of the US response to the 1994 Rwandan genocide provides an illustrative example, suggesting that the government’s dithering response was reflective of an attempt to act according to a pluralist understanding of international relations in a context challenging its limited notion of moral responsibility among states and individuals across political and cultural boundaries.

The genocide in Rwanda created an unprecedented opportunity for the United States to provide political and moral leadership in the development of a blueprint for post-Cold War collective security responses to mass atrocities. However, concerned that the declaration of “genocide” would demand decisive action according to the UN Genocide Convention, the United States arguably led the international community in a rhetorical dance to avoid the term. Beyond the discursive efforts to undermine the situation in Rwanda in order to avoid expectations warranting undesirable action, the US lobbied for a total withdrawal of UN forces in Rwanda in April 1994. Domestic politics, dominated by democratic infighting; the legacy of Somalia; and narrowly defined national interests produced consistent delays and impediments as hundreds of thousands were massacred under the Hutu extremists’ genocidal assault.

Throughout his presidency, the Clinton administration arguably struggled to reconcile its expressed intent to support the solidarist values articulated in the UN Genocide Convention with its commitment to more pluralist principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention in other states’ domestic affairs. This tension was reflected in the inconsistency with which the Clinton administration put the principles of humanitarian intervention into practice and the accompanying erratic justifications of these responses. Drawing on the ideological reservoir of the pluralist foreign policy tradition, the Clinton
administration justified its inaction by referencing narrowly defined national interests, thus avoiding discourse that would have warranted intervention on humanitarian grounds.\textsuperscript{9}

Yet, the Rwandan case also reveals how this process of legitimation simultaneously changed public expectations of how the US should respond to similar situations in the future, thus shaping the identity of the state as a moral actor in international relations. Undermining the pluralist normative foundation of his own administration’s practices during the 1998 “Clinton apology” by delegitimizing the beliefs on which they were based, the president advanced the solidarist expanded notion of moral responsibility later articulated in R2P by attributing moral responsibility to the US to prevent or suppress similar situations of genocide and mass atrocity in the future.

The controversy surrounding the question of moral responsibility in international relations can thus be viewed as reflective of an international community striving to reconcile its pluralist and solidarist foundations. With the evolution of solidarism, new complexities associated with the concept of moral responsibility are revealed at the state level. The question we must ask ourselves is whether the complexity of considerations excuses inaction when confronted with situations of severe human rights violations. Despite the pledge of “never again,” we continue to accept excuses based on a pluralist limited understanding of moral responsibility to stand idly by while genocide unfolds. When is an excuse good enough that we consider it acceptable? How do we expect state leaders to balance different moral responsibilities in an increasingly interconnected global community? The English School account of power and morality; the empirical and the normative; the pluralist and solidarist; order and justice; theory and history, not as opposite positions, but rather as coexisting dimensions of an international order within which tensions arise,\textsuperscript{10} provides a useful starting point for further exploration of these essential questions that are likely to remain among the most central questions of international politics in years to come.

Notes

2 In the realms of social and political philosophy, cosmopolitanism is considered the idea that all human beings belong to a single moral community; one which exists regardless of social circumstances, and to which universal moral principles apply (Howard Fienberg, “Morality Comes to IR: Ethical Approaches to the Discipline.” Accessed at http://www.hfienberg.com/irtheory/brown.html (Jul. 30, 2010)). The pluralist argument, in contrast, delineates the international scene into geographic communities, which formulate the individual’s morality, in a social rather than natural context. For pluralists, the nation-state is considered a community whose members are bound by strong ties of solidarity from which moral feelings and a sense of ethical obligation naturally derive (Stanley Hoffman, \textit{Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics} (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981)). Pluralists thus appeal to particularistic foundations of morality, viewing the state as “the framework that founds and enables the ethical discourse in which social judgments are possible” (Molly Cochran, “Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism in a Post-Cold War World,” \textit{Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations} (London: Pinter, 1995), 48)). In this view, without the existence of a higher authority analogous to the state, this framework does not exist at the international level.
3 Aidan Hehir, “Political Will, Non-Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect,” Presentation at the International Studies Association meeting (February 2011).
6 Jackson, “Relational Constructivism: A War of Words.”
7 This relational constructivist approach allows for the unpacking of concepts, such as what it means for the “government” to “act.” Action, from a relational perspective, is a matter of social attribution, as certain activities are encoded or characterized as the doings of some social actor. The social attribution simultaneously produces the actor as legitimately able to perform the action in question, and legitimizes the action because this actor performs it. Legitimation processes isolate certain activities (i.e. responses to situations of severe human rights violations) and render them acceptable by characterizing them as the activities of “the state.” In doing so, they reproduce the state itself. It is in these boundary demarcations that “the state” has its most tangible existence and its most concrete presence in the daily lives of those under its authority. The state is less the determinate origin of any given social action and more a product of the processes of legitimation that produce and sustain it in particular settings. Thus, the government’s authority and responsibility has to be continually negotiated and sustained in practice. Thinking of “the international community,” “the UN Security Council,” and “the government” of the potential intervener in this way, allows us to grasp the stakes of the justifications of responses to situations of severe human rights abuses waged by politicians and other officials. The relational constructivist approach thus views statements as participants in an ongoing process of legitimation directed at humanitarian interventions. In this process, statements draw on rhetorical commonplaces already present in the social environment surrounding a particular incident (Friedrich Kratochwil, \textit{Rules, Norms, and Decisions} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 40-42). Specific articulations in the course of a public debate take these notions already in circulation and link them to particular policies, legitimating them and attributing
them as actions to some particular actor. In this context, the question of whether “situations of genocide” or “severe human rights violations” justify “humanitarian intervention” and promote “the national interest” is considered extraneous. What matters is that these are the commonplaces invoked, and that the pairing of these commonplaces affords certain kinds of action while ruling others out. What makes this line of reasoning effective is precisely that it deploys existing commonplaces, so that the audience toward which the statement is directed will recognize the argument as sensible, and that it responds unequivocally to possible counter-arguments. Both of these components of a legitimation process are important aspects of this relational constructivist account (Patrick T. Jackson, “Relational Constructivism: A War of Words”).

The “Somalia disaster” reveals how affect, empathy, and moral beliefs shape what is considered good, appropriate, and deserving of praise in situations where new norms emerge to compete with other norms and perceptions of interest. While initial support for intervention was strong, the brutal images of American soldiers being dragged through the streets in Mogadishu served to reinforce the boundaries between “Americans” and “foreigners” and the sense that the US government’s primary responsibility as a moral actor is and should be the protection of American lives and interests.

The Clinton administration’s response to Rwanda highlights the importance of separating individual and state morality. One of the dangers inherent in current approaches to addressing morality and moral responsibility in international relations is their tendency to collapse individual and state morality. Due to the moral complexity of state leadership, the moral stance of policy makers must be separated from the moral stance of individuals. Robert H. Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) refers to the ethics of statecraft as “a special ethical sphere.” Acting on the ideological reservoir of the state, policy makers are at constant risk of losing moral authority by basing their decisions on precedence considerations in situations where their individual moral compass may not be compatible with state policy. This needs to be considered when analyzing the concept of moral responsibility in international relations.


The English School and the Study of Sub-global International Societies

Yannis A. Stivachtis
Virginia Tech University, USA

The purpose of this essay is to review the English School (ES) literature associated with the study of sub-global international societies. For classical ES scholars, regional international societies were only regarded as important because the contemporary global international society was seen as a consequence of the expansion of one particular sub-global (European) international society. Nevertheless, concepts derived from the global perspective of the ES still have application at the regional level. For example, there is general agreement among ES scholars that the contemporary global international society is a “thin” one, in the sense that it is pluralistic and heterogeneous; and that within the bounds of that society, there are several “more thickly developed” “regional clusters” in which the solidarist elements of international society are developed to a greater degree. According to Barry Buzan, because the logic of anarchy works more powerfully over shorter rather than longer distances and because states living in close proximity with one another may also share elements of common culture, types of international societies may exist within the confines of a global international society. These, moreover, are places where a modern standard of “civilization” is at its most developed. Moreover, Buzan argues that the uneven development of international society means that some parts of the contemporary global system have more developed regional international societies than others.

The English School and the Study of the European International Society

In the ES literature, the Western community of states serves as the most obvious candidate for a sub-global international society. However, it has been demonstrated that the West constitutes a set of overlapping regional international societies with different degrees of thinness/thickness. Within this literature, “Europe” occupies a central place not only because the region conforms to the basic defining condition of regional inter-state society, but also because the possibility exists (although it will be unevenly realized) for a broadly integrative and solidarist movement toward cooperation and convergence.
Roger Morgan has argued that some of the concepts used by the traditional ES scholars can help to illuminate the current functioning of the European Union (EU) seen as a body of states subject to a wide range of rules, both formal and informal. Hartmut Behr also suggests that the idea and study of international society can be applied empirically to the EU as well as Europe as a whole. Thomas Diez and Richard Whitman have employed the ES concepts of “international society”, “world society” and “empire” to reconfigure the debate about the nature of EU governance and to compare the EU to other regional international systems.

Starting from Buzan's premise that regional international organizations may reflect the existence of regional international societies, Yannis Stivachtis, Mark Webber and their colleagues have sought to demonstrate that NATO, the EU, the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) point to the institutionalization of international society at the sub-global/European level. Examining the EU, Thomas Diez, Ian Manners and Richard Whitman conduct a comparison between the EU as a regional international society and the global international society as analyzed by Hedley Bull. They argue that the five core institutions of international order identified by Bull (balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and great powers) have been modified or replaced. As a result, they identify the new institutions of the European order as the pooling of sovereignty, the acquis communautaire, multilevel multilateralism, pacific democracy, member state coalitions and multiperspectivity.

Focusing on NATO, Webber contends that during the Cold War, NATO was part of the “thick” or solidarist end of European international society characterized by a convergence of values, and a sense of cooperative endeavor and common community. This core of “liberal solidarism” stood alongside a “thinner” pan-European international society, characterized by pluralist features of state co-existence, limited cooperation and the dominance of procedural mechanisms, such as the balance of power, diplomacy and international law, for managing international politics. According to Webber, NATO's post-Cold War development, and particularly its experience of enlargement, has modified this picture in some respects. Enlargement has provided the basis for an extension of the “thick” core of European international society as new members have become enmeshed in the institutional, political and social practices associated with the Alliance and NATO. In parallel, however, these very same practices have lost some of their meaning as constitutive of NATO. He concludes that in seeking to consolidate both the thicker (solidarist) and thinner (pluralist) ends of European international society spectrum NATO has managed to succeed fully in neither enterprise.

Yannis Stivachtis and Mike Habegger suggest that the CoE was and remains an essential component of European regional international society and that the evolving structures and functions of organization demonstrate an ongoing commitment to a homogeneous European regional international society.

Examining the OSCE, Georgeta Pourchot argues that the organization has developed most of the elements necessary for an international society. Pourchot notes that the OSCE displays elements of both “solidarism” and “pluralism” and contributes to a thin-thick continuum of international society in a manner that is functionally and structurally relevant. Similar conclusions have been reached by Stivachtis and Habegger in their own study of the organization. Pourchot also demonstrates that some of the institutions of international society identified by Bull, such as the balance of power, international law and diplomacy are at work within the framework of the organization concerned.

Another strand within the Europe-related ES literature focuses on the development of sub-European international societies. Laust Schouenborg analyzes the formation of a Scandinavian international society over a 200-year period and develops the concepts of “primary institution” and “binding forces” as an analytical framework. A similar approach has been undertaken by Stivachtis who focuses on the formation and evolution of a Balkan international society that can be distinguished from the broader European international society in which it is embedded.

**European Regional International Society (ERIS) and Its “Others”**

One of the main research themes developed by the classical ES was the study of relations between the historical European international society and the states located on its periphery, such as Russia and Turkey. It is interesting, therefore, to see what kind of relations exists currently between the core of ERIS, on the one hand, and Russia and Turkey, on the other.

According to Richard Sakwa, although Russia has formally adopted Western democratic norms, their implementation is impeded by both practical and political forms of resistance to the universalism proclaimed by the West. Russia does not reject the norms advanced by the main institutions of European international society, but it objects to what it sees as their instrumental application. As a neo-revisionist power, Russia insists on respect for territorial and governmental sovereignty. Consequently, Russia does not repudiate engagement with international society, but at present is ready only for a relatively “thin” version. Contrary to Sakwa’s view, Pami Aalto argues that the EU offers Russia access to regional level international society with a “thicker” set of institutions than are available in its relations with the United States and the Asian countries. The fact that Russia identifies itself with Europe has driven it to experiment with some of the solidarist institutions typifying EU-centered societies, most notable the market. Therefore, the ambivalence one may observe in the current relations between the core of ERIS and Russia is not very different from the ambivalence of the historical relations
between the core of the European society of states and Russia.

While Turkey is regarded as an integral part of ERIS, yet it is not included in its core organization, namely the European Union. Bahar Rumelili suggests that the EU relations with Turkey continue to be situated at the intersection of Europe’s particularist impulses and universalist ambitions and the construction of European and Turkish identities vis-à-vis each other is likely to remain an important arena of contestation. Stivachtis has provided a comparison between the treatment of Turkey by the EU and the treatment that the Ottoman Empire received by the members of the historical European international society and identifies many similarities between the two processes.

Finally, since the creation of the contemporary global international society has been the result of the European expansion and the superimposition of the European society of states upon other co-current regional international societies, Stivachtis and his colleagues have sought to examine the perceptions that people and states in various parts of the world hold about Europe and the European Union in order to find out whether these perceptions have anything to do with the historical expansion of Europe. Their work has revealed that some of these perceptions can be partly attributed to the historical expansion of Europe.

The Study of non-European Regional International Societies

Due to the uneven development of international society, which means that some parts of the contemporary global system have more developed regional international societies than others, another strand of ES scholarship focuses on the study of international society in other world regions to find out what factors contribute to their strength or weakness. For example, relating the study of regional international societies to the study of regional security in various world regions, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever have demonstrated how the presence or absence of mature regional international societies condition (in)security at the international, regional and state levels.

Barry Buzan, Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez and their colleagues provide a comprehensive overview of the history of the Middle East and how its own traditions have mixed, often uncomfortably, with the political structures imposed by the expansion of Western international society. They argue that the Middle East forms a sub-global international society that can be distinguished from the broader international system. However, this society has not reached a maturity degree comparable to that of the European regional international society.

Wang Qiubin focuses on the Northeastern Asia regional international society and argues that this did not come into being until the end of the Cold War, when the states recognized mutually sovereign equality. Qiubin argues that compared to the EU, regional international society is not mature in Northeast Asia and the core principles of the Westphalian system, such as territoriality and sovereignty still dominate the region.

The Expansion of Regional International Societies

The fact that gemeinschaft types of regional international societies may exist within the confines of a global gesellschaft type of international society raises the possibility that some of them may face the challenge of expanding into regions with their distinctive cultures. For example, it has been convincingly shown that the European Union (EU) constitutes a regional homogeneous international society embedded in a heterogeneous European international system. Through the process of enlargement, however, the regional homogeneous European international society (EU) expands outward, gradually transforming the heterogeneous European international system, in which it is embedded, into a more homogeneous regional European international society.

But how do expanding gemeinschaft societies incorporate members, which do not share their culture? Because the standard of “civilization” has fallen into disrepute, other standards have risen to take its place. Of particular importance is the standard of “democracy,” which encompasses several other associated concepts such as respect for human rights, the rule of law, and liberal economic development. This, along with its portrayal as a timeless universal concept, provides democracy with an advantage in the expansion of regional international societies. As such, democratization has become a stand-in for the civilizing project. Drawing on the example of the EU, Stivachtis has argued that “membership conditionality” serves a role similar to that of the historical standard of “civilization.” Stivachtis has demonstrated the similarity between the contents of the Copenhagen criteria, whose purpose is to regulate the EU enlargement (expansion) process, and the contents of the standard of “civilization,” and has argued that unless candidate states fulfill these criteria, they cannot be admitted into the EU. Democracy promotion thus became a central dynamic of enlargement not only for the EU but also for other European international organizations, such as the CoE and NATO.

European regional international society has consequently become heavily reliant on forms of conditionality and monitoring.

Notes


3 This refers to the Gemeinschaft (community) vs. Gesellschaft (society) dichotomy proposed by Ferdinand Tönnies.


12 Stivachtis and Webber (eds), *Europe after Enlargement*.


14 Mark Webber, “NATO: Within and Between European International Society,” Yannis A. Stivachtis and Mark Webber (eds), *Europe After Enlargement*, 139-58.

15 Yannis A. Stivachtis and Mike Habegger, “The Council of Europe: The Institutional Limits of Contemporary European International Society?” in Yannis A. Stivachtis and Mark Webber (eds), *Europe After Enlargement*, 159-78.


18 Pourchot, “The OSCE: A Pan-European Society in the Making?”


29 Diez and Whitman, “Analysing European Integration: Reflecting on the English School.”

In his contribution to Part III of the English School 1985 classic *The Expansion of International Society*, Hedley Bull describes what he called “the revolt against the West”.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Bull argued, European and Western powers “expressed a sense of self-assurance, both about the durability of their position in international society and its moral purpose.” That, however, did not survive the First World War. From that point on a revolt against western dominance unfolded in “five phases or themes,” which Bull identified as an anti-colonial revolution and the struggle for equal sovereignty, racial equality, economic justice and cultural liberation. This was brought about by five factors. There was, Bull argued, a “psychological awakening” in the non-Western world, “a weakening of the will on the part of the Western powers to maintain their position of dominance, or to at least accept the costs necessary to do so,” the rise of new powers such as the Soviet Union, “a more general equilibrium of power” and “a transformation of the legal and moral climate of international relations” which was influenced by the majorities of votes held by Third World states.

It is tempting to read this narrative into an analysis of contemporary international society. The coordination of positions by the BRICS – Brazil Russia, India, China and South Africa – represents some kind of psychological awakening; a post-Iraq, post-Great Recession United States suggests a weakening of the West’s willingness to maintain its position of dominance; and the rise of China promises the return of a general balance of power. These parallels need to be qualified. Christopher Layne’s argument that this time predictions of American decline are real is for instance contested, and so is the idea that “BRICS” is anything more than an acronym that conveniently frames the photo opportunities of non-western leaders. There is, however, something in Bull’s analysis that offers an interesting angle on contemporary international society. Bull noted in 1985 for instance how the grouping together of Third World states had transformed their subject status and helped to change the legal and moral climate across international society.

The equal rights of non-Western states to sovereignty, the rights of non-Western peoples to self-determination, the rights of non-white races to equal treatment, non-Western peoples to economic justice, and non-Western cultures to dignity and autonomy – these
are today clearly spelt out in conventions having the force of law.4

Central to this was the ability of these states “to call upon the prestige of numbers, not merely of states but of persons, accruing to the states claiming to represent a majority of the world’s population.”5 Implicit in this formulation is the argument that the norms and laws that characterise international society are responsive to legitimacy claims that are based on a democratic ethos of representativeness.

This is relevant today because it draws attention to the exclusionary hierarchies contained in contemporary international society and how they cannot be legitimised by “the prestige of numbers.” The exclusion of India – the world’s largest democracy - from permanent UN Security Council status is testament to that. It also sheds light on that aspect of the BRICS agenda which seeks to hold western governments to account before the international mandates of institutions like the UN Security Council and to reform those institutions so that they are more representative. Their reaction to the Libyan intervention and the Brazilian call for a “Responsibility while Protecting” can be partially understood in this context.

When English School scholarship highlights “the prestige of numbers”, and the normative power of representativeness, it does not necessarily mean it is a voice advocating reform. Its understanding of international society has always placed democratic values like representativeness and accountability in a normative framework where international order, and the power to guarantee it, is also valued. In this sense the exclusionary hierarchies of the UN Security Council, as well as less representative forms of hegemony like American empire, might be valued if they effectively provide public goods like order. This is especially so if they can encourage “followership”. Recent English School scholarship captures this debate extremely well. Andrew Hurrell, for instance, juxtaposes “effectiveness” alongside “representation”, noting that

“those who reject calls for a reform and expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council often rest their arguments on the importance of effectiveness. Yes, reform might promote representation, but at what cost? If a Council of 25 or 26 is even less able to act effectively than the current arrangement, then how has this increased the legitimacy of the organization?”

Ian Clark, too, notes how the Security Council often requires American support to be effective, which invariably requires granting the US the kind of latitude that risks delegitimizing the Council in the eyes of other states. He adds that expanding the Council on “symbolic” rather than “material” grounds runs the risk of widening the gulf between its representative legitimacy, and its efficacy-based legitimacy, all the more so if any expansion of permanent membership were in some way explicitly intended to constrain the influence of the United States.7

An “efficacy-based” conception of legitimacy may, in other words, confer “special rights and responsibilities on the state with the resources to lead” in ways that counteract “the prestige of numbers”.8 This is the kind of “middle-way” thinking that characterises much of the English School thinking. For the BRICS, they may be able to combine efficacy-based arguments with a plea to representativeness in order to promote their voice in international decision-making. But for others, any argument that prioritises efficacy over representation is bound to be seen as proof of the English School’s conservative image.

Notes
4 Bull, ”The Revolt”, 227.
8 Clark, Hegemony, 175.
World Society as Humankind

Matthew S. Weinert
University of Delaware, USA

World society never attracted as much attention as its sister concept, international society, which has served in the classical English School tradition as the *via media* between realism/international system and revolutionism/world society. Broadly construed, world society “implies something that reaches well beyond the state towards more cosmopolitan images of how humankind is, or should be, organized.” Implication, though, is not certitude, and thus Buzan could aptly characterize some views of world society as incredulous: it “doesn’t exist in any substantive form, and therefore its moral priority is unattached to any practical capability to deliver much world order.”

Martin Wight lends credence to that view, since of the three methods he outlined for constructing world society, none have come to fruition. Structural uniformity (e.g. Kant’s plan for perpetual peace as a federation of states with republican constitutions) might inflame the expectations of modern-day democrats, and one might plausibly argue that successive waves of democracy have extended a realm of peace, but the inherent state-centrism of the perspective deflects attention away from world society and towards international society. Doctrinal or ideological imperialism (e.g. messianic universalism, whether secular—Napoleonic empire, Nazism, communism—or theological—al Qaeda’s call for a resurrected caliphate) may attract followers, but such movements have been met with overwhelming force. Finally, cosmopolitanism, which prioritizes the individual above (and perhaps against the state), may have the most traction for a contemporary audience predisposed to championing human rights and associated international public policies and institutions framed around improving human welfare, and thus offers promise for deep development in ways that “assimilate international to domestic politics.” Yet on this reading world society appears as code for domestic policy homogenization, which occludes world society’s distinctiveness.

The need for (analytical and ontological) clarity may have compelled Bull to equate world society with “all parts of the human community,” which James Mayall echoes with the “view that humanity is one.” But what this means in practice is questionable. It may capture the aggregate of inter-human discourse and exchange, but contractual arrangements as exponentially increasing features of an increasingly globalized, commodified world constitute relations of exchange, yet do not lend any lasting depth to world society since contracts by definition terminate once their terms have been fulfilled. Mayall, taking a cue from Bull who defined world society in terms of commonality of interests and values, may help: “the task of diplomacy is to translate this latent or imminent solidarity of interests and values into reality.” While the conception tasks the researcher with identifying such interests and values, producing an account of how and why they arise, and assessing how they link otherwise disparate parts of the human community together in ways that constitute and shape world politics, the position replicates the assimilationist view proffered by Wight.

Buzan attempts to extricate world society from the clutches of state and international society by looking beyond human rights to consider structural regularities like the world economy and even subglobal/regional projects that shape identities, interests, and roles. Doing so disposes of normative homogeneity implied by world society (e.g. presumed solidarity) and recognizes multiple value and interest commitments held by individuals and the collectives into which they have allocated themselves (e.g. pluralism). Put differently, if we subject the broad vision of world society as human community to an organizational schematic that does not hinge on a singular, cohesive logic but that admits multiplicity, then we expose the potentialities of, and the fractures impeding, world society’s conceptual and practical development.

We might, then, tackle world society from a more primordial standpoint: membership. Gerritt Gong and Martin Wight previously demonstrated the contingency of membership in humanity, tethered as it were to notions of civility and legitimacy, and reveal that fragmented visions of world society cohabit the same analytical space as unitary notions of humankind. As ethically appealing as the thesis that all *Homo sapiens* are human may be, we must recognize that varying conceptualizations of what it means to be human have been the source of a whole lot of world (dis)order, especially if we think that imperial and apartheid systems were built upon the depravity of racially constructed notions of civilization. From various “-isms” (e.g. racism, sexism, nationalism) and sundry other psychologically and socially embedded frames of reference have precipitated a range of dehumanizing, exclusionary, and oppressive practices—all laundered through the states-system which has magnified the effects of sometimes hierarchical, nearly always discriminating notions of world society qua humanity framed from particular, exclusive collectivist vantage points. By putting cruelty first, we are theoretically compelled to destabilize the very notion of what it means to be human and with it constructs of world society. That is, forms of world society necessarily stem from varying conceptions of human being.

To capture this socially constructed phenomenon, I am working on a notion of making human. Much of the work of making human occurs, I suspect, at the micro level of the individual: e.g. encountering the other, bracketing attitudes and prejudices for the purposes of social cooperation if not harmony, learning that difference is
not something necessarily to be feared or stigmatized, or coming to appreciate our neighbor not as “insert-deragatory-term-here” but as a decent human being and one of us. Empathy and the hard work of introspection on this view deliver us from solipsistic fear and disgust of difference. Yet we do not (or cannot) always disentangle ourselves from socially and doctrinally sanctioned prejudices that become an inherent part of our psycho-social makeup. Likewise, collectives cannot always force ideologues, racists, sexists, xenophobes, and zealots to accept the other; the problem of making human thus extends beyond individual, psychological confines and presents itself as a macro phenomenon. Might there be socio-political mechanisms that perform the work of humanization—that, in other words, substitute for our resistances, failings, and prejudices?

My response to that question centers on five mechanisms that operate within and through (international) institutional sites: reflection on the moral worth of others, recognition of the other as an autonomous being, resistance against forms of oppression, replication (of prevailing mores), and responsibility for self and others. Inquiry into these mechanisms, operating at multiple levels and in multiple fora, does not take human standing in society for granted, but opens inquiry to particular kinds of questions: how do various forms of inter-human interaction inform collective social structures and generate distinctive systems of organizing the mass of human beings? In what ways does the categorization of human beings help us better explain and understand the world society concept? In what ways do institutions of international society respond to more elemental forms of inter-human interaction inform collective social structures and generate distinctive systems of organizing the mass of human beings? In what ways do the mechanics of making human constitute modes of governing and managing human diversity and hence the very notions of human being, I propose thinking of human diversity and hence the very notions of human being, by which we mean “durable modes of governing and managing human diversity and hence the very notions of human being, by which we mean “durable and recognized patterns of shared practices rooted in values commonly held” that in the end “play a constitutive role in relation to both the pieces/players and the rules of the game.”14 Though discrete, the mechanisms exhibit what Wittgenstein called “family resemblances.” Even if they may “have no one thing in common,” they “are all related to one another in many different ways,”15 much like the “resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. [that] overlap and criss-cross.”16 Framed differently, we might do for world society what has been done for international society: develop an account of primary institutions of world society to capture the complexity of ways human beings manage the very plurality of the human condition, and grapple with the paradox that while we can belong anywhere, nowhere has proven more vexing than belonging to humanity itself.

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**Notes**

2 Buzan, FIWS?, 36.
3 Wight, *International Theory*.
4 Ibid., 46.
5 R.J. Vincent quoted in Buzan, FIWS?, 51: “a fully solidarist international society would be virtually a world society because all units would be alike in their domestic laws and values on humanitarian intervention.” See also Fred Halliday, “International Society as Homogeneity: Burke, Marx, Fukuyama,” *Millennium* 21:3 (1992), 435-61.
14 Buzan FIWS?, 181.
16 Ibid., 67, 32.
Pluralism and International Society

Tom Keating
University of Alberta, Canada

Much attention among English School scholars is devoted to developing the concept of international society through an exploration of its relationship with its alternatives: international system and world society. As Buzan and others have noted, however, the relationship between pluralist and solidarist positions within international society are equally significant. The latter relationship is particularly relevant today as developments in the arenas of globalization and security raise important questions about the substantive content of the rules and institutions in existence among the state members of international society. These developments present challenges to the rights of states while seeking to extend the rights of individuals and corporations. Practices of economic globalization and human security have generated arguments about the need for and desirability of more intrusive forms of global governance – reflecting and applying values that would regulate or supersede the authority of sovereign states. Weinert recounts that “States increasingly face robust homogenizing pressures in the form of (a) transparent and accountable governance yardsticks; (b) conditionalities attached to development assistance and admission into international organizations; and (c) empowered citizens who make claims against states and international institutions that often echo (d) minimal standards of human rights.” For students of international society this represents a contemporary illustration of the tension between pluralism and solidarism.

Hedley Bull first raised these issues in The Anarchical Society when he distinguished between pluralist and solidarist accounts of international society. Bull’s distinction rested on the normative content of the rules and institutions that demarcated international society and the degree to which they gave priority to order among states and the sovereign rights of these states as opposed to more substantive values such as human rights or justice that would limit these states’ rights. Bull, in turn, urged caution in adopting more pluralist approaches less they fail to reflect a consensus among all members of the society of states. This more cautious view has been shared and reiterated by Robert Jackson in response to the interventions of the 1990s. Others, including Wheeler and Linklater, have taken up the solidarist position emphasizing themes of justice and human security and defending interventionist practices. Buchanan and Keohane, for legitimating alternative and more exclusive mechanisms for intervention. Such alternatives, however, may present a challenge to international order, especially if they are seen to serve national interests as opposed to solidarist values. For example, the interventions of individual states and collectivities such as NATO have been designed to provide a degree of protection for individuals facing harm in places such as Kosovo and Libya, but at the lowest possible risk and cost to the intervening party and in the absence of any consideration of the longer term and multidimensional security needs of the populations involved. Humanitarianism has proliferated in the last twenty years, but the real effective transformation in human security such as has occurred has been in the increased capacity and responsiveness of local national governments to serve the security needs of domestic populations. Additionally the diplomatic activity surrounding this increased activity has yet to demonstrate a deep commitment in support of solidarist principles. Instead, concerns have reflected state interests and the implicit and explicit challenges to state sovereignty. From an English School perspective, attention to the practice of states and to the intention of those who Jackson describes as the diplomatic community is critically important in examining the substantive character of international society.

The arena of economic globalization, while less widely discussed within the English School literature, is also of interest for here there is much greater evidence of a body of substantive rules and a more robust governance framework in the form of institutions and rules embodied in the European Union and the World Trade Organization. Gill has suggested that the institutions in support of globalization represent a form of constitutionalism. Yet the commitment to a common set of solidarist values in this area can also be questioned. Member governments regularly and repeatedly seek exceptions to rules or behave in ways that reflect a stronger commitment to local interests over
shared values. Additionally the significant transition in the international distribution of power with the emergence of more active and influential states, including China, India, and Brazil has added a new set of interests and values into the governance process. It would seem from the diplomacy of these states in arenas including the UN Security Council and the World Trade Organization that their interests and aspirations for international order are not incompatible with a pluralist international society, even if they differ over substantive values. To ignore differences over substantive values in an effort to construct a solidarist international society that entrenched cosmopolitan principles at the risk of alienating these emerging powers might impede an opportunity to strengthen the fabric of a vibrant pluralistic international society.

In contemplating the future balance between a more pluralist or solidarist international society, attention to the practice of individual states is of critical importance. Welsh, and Vincent before her, remind us that state practice provides the clearest reading on the acceptability and meaning of these solidarist principles that have become more commonplace in contemporary international society. State practice may reveal a profound level of skepticism towards principles that impede the sovereign authority of national governments to resist the homogenizing practices of entities such as the EU and the WTO or from a NATO vision of R2P. Often the pressures for solidarist values emanate from dominant powers with less regard for the concerns of lesser powers and with the ability to reject such values when desired. In view of such a possibility support for a more pluralist international society is understandable. This was indeed Bull’s primary concern. As Welsh notes it was also a concern for Vincent even as he tried to extrapolate a more responsive approach to human rights. “In the end, he could not accept a normative approach to international relations that would allow the strong—who were both “untrusted and untrustworthy”—to impose justice as they understood it.” Perhaps this lies at the root of concerns about the future direction of a more solidarist international society. “The key challenge,” for English School proponents of a more solidarist approach, Bellamy and McDonald maintain “is whether practices of security can emerge that are sufficiently solidarist to have real impact... whilst sufficiently pluralist to meet Hedley Bull’s concerns about the dangers of undermining international order.” The pluralist cornerstone, one that respects and protects state sovereignty even as it acknowledges the enhanced concern for rights or the shifting demands for a more integrated global economy, remains a critical foundation for international society.

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7 Buzan, From International to World Society, 139.
Great Power Management: English School Meets Governmentality?

Alexander Astrov
Central European University, Hungary

There is a puzzling and, as far as I can see, unnoticed discontinuity between the five major institutions of international society identified by Hedley Bull. Four of them - war, diplomacy, international law and the balance of power - are hardly Bull's own inventions. One can argue about the exact meaning of "war" or the "balance of power" within the English School framework, but there is hardly any doubt as to the existence of the phenomena defined by these terms. This is not the case with the fifth institution: great power management. It is not immediately clear at all what the term can possibly stand for in practice; especially so if we take "management" to be more than just a word and assign some analytical value to it. But then what exactly this value should be?

Bull himself provides little help here, and until recently, "great power management" received little attention from subsequent generations of the English School, certainly much less than the other four institutions. This, I believe, is due neither to simple theoretical negligence, nor to the demise of great powers, but results from the difficulty in reconciling the practice of great power management with one of the major tenets of the English School; namely, its insistence on avoiding "domestic analogy". Contrary to Martin Wight's argument, understanding international system by analogy with the historically specific ordering of the state.

Note, that only a century or so earlier, the distinction between the great powers and the rest is drawn differently, by the English ambassador to the Netherlands, William Temple, for example: in terms of the Aristotelian forms of government rather than modern division of powers, and the "managerial" stance of the lesser states, referred to as "tradesmen", is not only opposed to the "aristocratic" posture of the great powers but treated somewhat disparagingly. These changes parallel historic developments within European states, and it is possible to suggest that the victors in the Napoleonic wars recognized in the French undertaking not only a very old ambition to impose upon Europe a single authority, but also a genuinely new one: to establish a European government. And while resolutely rejecting the former, they stealthily embraced the latter. Hence "power by concert" and "management" in the hands of the few, now recognized as "great" in some distinctly new way; but still, as with the earlier "aristocracy"/"tradesmen" distinction, by analogy with the historically specific ordering of the state.

In Bull, unlike in American realism, great powers are such not merely because of their material capabilities, but also "by right". However, in order to avoid domestic analogy, he prefers to conceptualize this right not in terms of "ruling" - either aristocratic or executive - but by reference to specifically "international" practices and institutions. Thus, "great powers manage their relations with one another in the interest of international order," not least by preserving the general balance of power, or they "exploit their preponderance in relation to the rest of the international society," by acting either in concert or unilaterally. Yet, this results in theoretical confusion. Either, in the case of the relations between great powers, great power management becomes indistinguishable from the balance of power; or, in the case of their relations with lesser states, international society becomes indistinguishable from the realist international system shaped by the distribution of material capabilities.

Not surprisingly then, later attempts at clarifying the nature of the great powers' rights effectively re-introduced domestic analogy, but in two distinct ways. First, Ian Clark started with the acceptance of Bull's point that international society, while being shaped by great powers, is also the condition of possibility for their very existence (as with the other four institutions), so that "the absence of a great-power directorate entails...
the demise of international society altogether. Yet, since the principle of consent underpinning the existence of the great power directorate is limited to the great powers themselves, they effectively occupy the position of a (quasi)sovereign within international society.8

The second, more recent, line of argument proceeds not by establishing affinity between great power management and “classical” sovereign authority, but by questioning the juridical theory of sovereignty as such. On this view, lawyers and theorists criticized by Wight were mistaken not so much in projecting domestic sovereignty onto the international system but in their understanding of domestic sovereignty in the first place. This line of argument finds its inspiration in the writings of Michel Foucault, where the rise of Westphalian system is marked not only with further development of such “political-military” instruments as war, diplomacy and the balance of power, but also with the emergence of a new instrument – “a permanent military apparatus” which required a totally new hold on state’s own power, but also the new means of control over power-management by other states.9 This new form of power-management, both domestically and internationally, is called “police” which from the seventeenth century “begins to refer to the set of means by which the state’s forces can be increased while preserving the state in good order.” And since in the newly-created Westphalian order “there will be imbalance if within the European equilibrium there is a state, not my state, with bad police,” action must be taken in the name of the balance of power so that “there is good police, even in other states.”10

Note that in this formulation, great power management, although closely linked with the balance of power, is distinct from it. Also, as a mode of managing the balance of power and international society as a whole, it is neither limited to the concert of great powers, nor takes the form of the exploitation of their material preponderance vis-à-vis lesser states. In fact, over time, “police” develops into explicitly liberal “conduct of power” and “management” can no longer be unproblematically clustered together and those who, because of their ignorance of or aversion to liberal conception of freedom, can only be governed in some other way.11 And this distinction remains resolutely political. The problem, or rather, one of the many theoretical and practical challenges here, is that this explicitly political decision is no longer the sole prerogative of the state, even the most powerful ones. Various non-governmental agencies, especially those concerned with representing the whole of humanity, are identifying the sins of the world by offering their interpretations of life, while leaving to the states, as their “secular wing” the managerial task of actually addressing the problems.12 Consequently, it is not at all impossible to imagine a world in which something like “great power management” is clearly at work, while “greatness”, “power” and “management” can no longer be unproblematically clustered together and allocated to single entity.

The crucial aspect of this mode of power-management extensively explored by governmentality literature in IR generally and in security studies in particular, is that “governors” here represent entities whose power “is not political power at all, but purely administrative power – power of the experts and interpreters of life.” At first sight, this seems to suggest that analytical and practical distinction between “management” and other institutions identified by both Bull and Foucault as explicitly “political” comes at the expense of “greatness”. There is hardly anything “great” about the managerial pursuits of even the most powerful states, not only willingly assuming the role of global administrators but often transferring this role to private agencies. By denoting states to the position of administrators, “police” management does not merely modify

Still, as always, the situation may well be more complex and ambivalent. After all, underpinning the “police” expertise over life is a prior distinction familiar to liberalism from the very beginning: between those who, being capable of free conduct themselves, can be governed in this manner and those who, because of their ignorance of or aversion to liberal conception of freedom, can only be governed in some other way.13 And this distinction remains resolutely political. The problem, or rather, one of the many theoretical and practical challenges here, is that this explicitly political decision is no longer the sole prerogative of the state, even the most powerful ones. Various non-governmental agencies, especially those concerned with representing the whole of humanity, are identifying the sins of the world by offering their interpretations of life, while leaving to the states, as their “secular wing” the managerial task of actually addressing the problems. Consequently, it is not at all impossible to imagine a world in which something like “great power management” is clearly at work, while “greatness”, “power” and “management” can no longer be unproblematically clustered together and allocated to single entity.

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9 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France,
Traditionally, the English School (ES) approach to international relations has not been overly concerned with typically American social science interest in methods and empirical testing. As Cornelia Navari notes in this volume, early ES scholars preferred to focus their attention on participant observation as opposed to structure, system or causational variables. It is this lack of methodological rigor that has hindered the development of the ES as a sufficiently empirical theory of international relations, and one that should be addressed in order to substantially increase the School’s explanatory power in modern international relations theory.

A major problem facing the School’s ability to be tested as a theory in the social science tradition is the lack of concern with methods and a clear framework by which one could determine whether a scholar was, or was not, using a distinctly English School approach. Dale Copeland effectively summarizes a definite gap in ES thought: “Without knowing clearly what it is that is being explained, there is simply no way of gathering evidence to support or disconfirm a particular [English School] author’s position.”1

This is not to say that ES scholarship should adhere to the strict positivist standards imposed by American social science at all, but there is validity in saying there are too few commonalities between ES writers to define it as a coherent theoretical lens.2

Richard Little, building on an argument first presented by Buzan, claims that there are at least three distinct ways to view the School: “ES theory may be considered first as a set of ideas to be found in the minds of statesmen; second, as a set of ideas to be found in the minds of political theorists; and third, as a set of externally imposed concepts that define the material and social structures of the international system.”3 Further, some ES writers have attempted to cast the School as more valuable because of its methodological openness and critical possibilities. For instance, Roger Epp argues: “In other words, the English school recollects a tradition – the historicality of open-ended, intersecting, competing narratives – within which critical resources are already present. Its erudite, generous horizons contain what amount to enabling prejudices: the biases of openness to an indeterminate future.”4 Even so, the lack of any identifiable hard core assumptions or foundational principles makes theoretical evaluation of the School and its empirical validity virtually impossible.
Among the main reasons for the School’s lack of attention in mainstream international theory is the inability of scholars to test the tenets of the ES, to identify exactly when it can be a said a scholar is using the school (and not casually just referring to a society of states), and more importantly, evaluating whether the ongoing body of literature that falls under an ES schema is providing novel contributions, or if the more current conceptions of the School since its reorganization are actually falsifying what early thinkers like Butterfield, Wight, Bull and Vincent had in mind. In order to address such theoretical looseness, there may be value in attempting to impose methodological rigor to the School.

Perhaps the ideal approach to formulating a more rigorous conception of the ES can be found in the works of Imre Lakatos. In many ways, Lakatos’ work on Scientific Research Programs tries to do exactly what early School thinkers sought to accomplish from the outset – to find a middle-ground between two competing theories (in Lakatos’ case between Popper and Kuhn) that both had relevance, but fell short in any kind of truth. For Lakatos, the challenge was providing a way to balance the claims made by Karl Popper on one hand and Thomas Kuhn on the other. Lakatos’ contribution to metatheoretical evaluation is a method of determining the novelty of theory and whether contributions actually add value, or ultimately degenerate, the hard core assumptions of a hypothesis. According to Lakatos, a theory is not dismissed based on falsification alone, but is instead evaluated as a series of contributions that either provide novel facts to a research program, or may instead lead to the creation of a new one.

Evaluating theory in the Lakatosian sense requires the substantiation of empirical facts, however, which is an ongoing flaw in English School work (especially when examining world society arguments). Lakatos claims, “the time-honoured empirical criterion for a satisfactory theory was agreement with the observed facts. Our empirical criterion for a series of theories is that it should produce new facts. The idea of growth and the concept of empirical character are soldiered into one.” Within ES circles, the need to empirically verify theoretical contributions tends to be ignored. Instead, English School approaches prefer to favour rationalist methods that highlight the evolution of international societies throughout human history. Unfortunately, even this claim to historical explanation by ES writers is interpreted as weak. For a school that prides itself on offering a historical approach to international relations, there are surprisingly few diplomatic-historical analyses that extensively utilize archival sources or documentary collections. Beyond the lack of empirical content of ES theory, even the use of historical explanation is questioned in terms of what the school is trying to do through its work. William Bain asks: “But if it is clear that English School theorists take history seriously, their purpose for doing so is a great deal less so. Once we have gotten inside history and have allowed our imagination to roam freely, we are still left to ask: What is historical knowledge for.”

It would be a drastic understatement to say creating an ES research program would be challenging but it is necessary. The largest obstacle for the formulation of such a program would be the 3 levels of analysis that are simultaneously involved in the School’s tenets – system, international society and world society. Each level has its own concerns and understandings, though there is one key commonality in each – the role of the state – and this could easily serve as a starting point in building hard core assumptions.

ES literature has, since the 1970s and 80s, had a strong preoccupation with world society and how international society interacts with humanity. This has led to many arguments about humanitarian intervention, civilization, legitimacy, justice, and responsibility. Buzan claims that the reason for the world society emphasis was a shift from international to world. Other School contributors have accepted this contention as almost a given reality, yet no attention has been given to empirically testing such a significant claim. Have states become less relevant and humanity more the focus of state behaviour? Have normative ideals of morality and cosmopolitanism become the driving forces behind the actions of international society?

This is not to say that the world society fixation is flawed, but rather speaks to the need for a methodological framework that allows observers to test the School’s tenets and whether modern ES literature is adhering to the same hard core assumptions as the School’s organizers. Without being able to ask such questions, it might be that there is an English School discourse that includes references to international society, institutions and law, without there actually being a coherent and organized school of thought.

All legitimate theories must stand up to testing in order for them to be taken seriously. To date, the English School has been limited in its appeal precisely because its adherents have little or no interest in operating according to a set of defined methodological rules. Without the value provided by methodological rigor, the School faces questions about its ability to be taken seriously as a theory. History might demonstrate that various international societies have existed, but where did they come from, how are they created and who determines whether a particular society of states can be identified either as solidarist or pluralist in nature? When do international societies change or collapse? Even within the ES itself, the solidarist versus pluralist division makes it difficult to answer why the School exists at all; it seems as if both sides of the debate assume that it is still relevant and adds something to the way international politics is explained, though how this is done is ambiguous.

Without any sort of method to evaluate its contributions to the field, what function does the ES serve in the broader scope of international theory? There is where Lakatos may be of assistance, in that his work helps scholars to explore “how to assess theories, and how to decide whether, over time, theories about international relations are getting any better.” Promoting a middle way of theory-making is not exclusive to the ES, as
constructivism has more recently argued how to incorporate aspects of realism and liberalism into one approach, but constructivist scholars have dedicated themselves to answering questions about a constructivist methodology. Within those identified as ES scholars, one can classify realists, liberals, Marxists, postmodernists, Frankfurt School proponents, constructivists, and a variety of others, but other than a specific set of discursive elements and conceptual categories (i.e. international society, world society, etc), how is one to prove these thinkers are contributing to the ES or whether a totally new series of research programs have appeared since the end of the Cold War?

Until the practitioners of the English School begin to define precisely what an ES research program would look like, the School’s impact on international theory remains outside the mainstream. This is certainly not an effort to Americanize the English School but rather to hold the School to the same standards as other approaches to international relations. Martha Finnemore provides a succinct argument for why methodological concerns matter: “Americans are fond of asking what the value added is of a theoretical approach: providing a strong demonstration of this for the English School would be powerful for that audience.”

Lakatos’ work on research programs would be immensely helpful in this regard because of its ability to allow for flexibility while still identifying either a single or a series of hard core assumptions by which the School and its adherents would have to employ in order to demonstrate the School’s theoretical impact on actual world events.

Notes

2 The main commonality between English School theorists is their use of the idea of international society. See Brunello Vigezzi, The British Committee and the Theory of International Politics 1954-1985 (Milan: Edizione Unicopli Srl, 2005).
7 Imre Lakatos, The methodology of scientific research programmes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 35.
8 Mayall argues that the English School follows in the empiricist tradition of Locke and Hume, but notes this differs from the positivist method of empirically testing theory. See James Mayall, “The Limits of Progress: Normative Reasoning in the English School,” Theorising International Society: English School Methods (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2009), 148.
14 An essential contribution to constructivist methods and theory making is found in Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
Notes on the Contributors

Alexander Astrov is Associate Professor at Central European University, Budapest. He is the author of On World Politics: R.G. Collingwood, Michael Oakeshott and Neotraditionalism in International Relations (Palgrave, 2005) and the editor of Great Power (mis)Management: The Russian-Georgian war and its implications for global political order (Ashgate, 2011).

Roger Epp is Professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta. His work includes We Are All Treaty People (2008), which reflects a larger interest in place and situated knowledge.

Adrian Gallagher is a Lecturer in Security Studies and Research Methods in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds. His first monograph, Genocide and Its Threat to Contemporary International Order, used an English School approach to theorise the relationship between genocide, international legitimacy, and international order. He is currently working on a series of articles on the Responsibility to Protect and in January 2013 established the BISA Work Group on Intervention and Responsibility to Protect (IR2PWG) with Aidan Hehir (Westminster) and James Pattison (Manchester).

Tom Keating is a Professor and former Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta, where he has also served as former Vice-Dean in the Faculty of Arts. He is the author of Canada and World Order (Oxford University Press, 2013) and also of Global Politics, Emerging Networks, Trends, and Challenges co-authored with Andy Knight (Oxford University Press, 2010). His primary areas of expertise are Canadian foreign policy, international relations, and international ethics.

Cathinka Lerstad is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Heath, Technology and Society at Gjøvik University College, Norway. Her primary research interests include collective security and global health in an international relations and international political economy perspective.

Andrew Linklater is the Woodrow Wilson Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University in the UK. His most recent book is The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Richard Little is a former editor of the Review of International Studies and a former chair of the British International Studies Association. He is now an Emeritus Professor at the University of Bristol and a Fellow of the British Academy.

Cornelia Navari is Emeritus Senior Lecturer at the University of Birmingham, UK and Visiting Professor at the University of Buckingham, editor of Theorising International Society: English School Methods (2009) and author of Internationalism and the State in the 20th Century (2000) and Public Intellectuals and Foreign Policy (2012).

Jason Ralph is Professor of International Relations at the University of Leeds. He has recently completed a British Academy mid-career fellowship on British foreign policy and the use of force after Iraq.

Yannis A. Stivachtis is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Studies Program at Virginia Tech. He is also the Head of the Politics and International Affairs Research Unit of the Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER); Senior Advisor of the Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS); and Secretary of the English School Section of ISA.

Matthew S. Weinert is Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the University of Delaware's Department of Political Science and International Relations. He is the author of Democratic Sovereignty (University College London, 2007), and Making Human: World Order and the Global Governance of Human Dignity (University of Michigan, forthcoming). His research explores moral and legal dimensions of global change as evolve from tensions between international society and world society.